A

series of photographs recently circulated in the global public sphere once again laid bare a reality that is well-known but rarely spoken of. Japan Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s visit to the US provided the backdrop for scenes that have sparked much debate in Japan. The fact that the images of Takaichi dancing at a dinner party were featured prominently on the White House’s official website caused a shockwave across the country.

However, the real issue was not the dancing footage, but the psychological subservience displayed by the Japanese delegation throughout the visit. Whilst defending his decision not to inform allies in advance of the Iran operation, Trump remarked, “Who knows better about surprise than Japan?”, alluding to the surprise air raid on the US fleet at Pearl Harbor during the Second World War. Takaichi’s silence in the face of this mocking attitude drew criticism.

Her description of the leader of a country that had dropped atomic bombs on their cities as the only person “who can achieve peace across the world” was viewed by the Japanese public as a humiliating situation. What has transpired is not merely the result of a single act of diplomatic discourtesy or individual lack of judgement. Rather, these events represent the manifestation of a dependency relationship, woven thread by thread since 1945, brought into the open by a current incident.

From defeat to ‘alliance’

With the end of the Second World War, the US, acting as a hegemonic power, initiated a profound process of restructuring in both Japan and Germany. This process was framed as support for democratization and economic development. In reality, however, a structural control mechanism was established over both countries that surpassed even the most refined forms of colonialism.

The picture is striking when looking at the Japanese example. The constitution drafted under US supervision in 1947 stripped Japan of its right to maintain armed forces and declare war. Theoretically, this was presented to the Japanese people as a peace-oriented arrangement. In practice, however, it transformed Japan into a state that had to hand over its defense entirely to the US and seek Washington’s approval in every political crisis. Today, there are over 50,000 US troops and approximately fifty bases on Japanese territory. This military presence resembles not forces deployed in an allied country for the sake of shared interests, but rather a guarantee force stationed by a hegemon to secure its own sphere of influence.

Germany’s situation is, in essence, no different. Divided by the four major powers following the Second World War, Germany was reorganized as West Germany under the NATO umbrella, with every step of this reorganization subject to Washington’s approval. Even today, there are approximately 35,000 American troops in Germany. In this respect, Germany is not much different from Japan. The fact that Germany’s efforts to construct a natural gas pipeline with Russia (the Nord Stream project) were derailed by US pressure has laid this reality bare. The sabotage and explosion of the Nord Stream pipeline in 2022 have also starkly revealed just how harsh and ruthless this dynamic operates.

The illusion of sovereignty: From economic miracle to compliant growth

The post-war economic rise of both countries serves as a kind of veil for their relationship of dependency. Japan’s economic miracle and Germany’s ‘Wirtschaftswunder’ were achieved not in spite of the structural constraints these countries faced, but precisely because of the safeguards those constraints provided. The US’s open market provided a vast area for these countries’ exports; the security umbrella established against the Soviet threat, meanwhile, enabled these states to keep defense spending to a minimum, thereby allowing them to redirect resources towards industrial investment.

This was not a gift, but a transaction. In return, Japan and Germany relinquished their ability to make strategic decisions independently; they often had to subordinate their national interests to Washington’s global agenda, and at times were compelled to accept policies that entailed heavy economic costs. The Plaza Accord, which Japan signed under US pressure in the late 1980s, demonstrated just how heavy the price of this acquiescence could be. What befell the Japanese Prime Minister is also the result of this semi-colonial dependency, systematically cultivated over many years.

Window-dressing democracy: How was South Korea polished up?

Following Japan and Germany, another country we must address here is South Korea. Frankly, South Korea is in no way inferior to these nations. The 1950–53 Korean War was the first major proxy war of the Cold War. In the North, there was a communist regime backed by the Soviet Union and China; in the South, an authoritarian government supported by the US. With the end of the war, South Korea was transformed into the Western bloc’s most advanced outpost in the region. The buffer role of preventing communism from spreading south resulted in South Korea being presented on the international stage as a representative of the democratic and free world, regardless of what transpired in its domestic politics.

Yet South Korea’s recent political history stands in stark contrast to this portrayal. From 1961 to 1979, the country was ruled by Park Chung-hee’s military junta, which systematically suppressed left-wing tendencies, trade unions and the opposition. Following his assassination in 1979, another military coup took place, and Chun Doo-hwan carried out the Gwangju massacre in 1980. This massacre was largely ignored in the West, with the US administration playing a decisive role in covering up the events.

Despite this sordid past, South Korea continues to be presented by the West as a success story of Asian democracy.

Just how unfounded this privileged international perception of South Korea is has become even more apparent in recent years with a succession of scandals. In 2016, the then-President Park Geun-hye was removed from office and put on trial on charges of accepting millions of dollars in bribes from major corporations to influence state decisions. While this scandal laid bare the corruption of business world-political relations, the arrest of the Samsung Group chairman also exposed the intertwined nature of business and politics. Yet, these scandals have been presented to Western public opinion as examples proving the strength of South Korea’s democracy and commitment to the rule of law, simply because they were brought to light. The President’s trial has been cited as proof that accountability mechanisms are functioning.

In December 2024, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol declared a state of emergency, characterizing opposition parties as representatives of anti-state forces. This move was declared invalid by parliament within hours, and the President was removed from office. These developments inevitably raise the question of how a leader in a country presented as a consolidated democracy could attempt such autocratic measures. On the other hand, despite all this, it is puzzling that South Korea’s position in the upper echelons of international organizations’ democracy indices remains unchanged. For the existential contrast with North Korea renders South Korea indispensable to the West. This indispensability, in turn, brings with it a systematic display designed to mask its weaknesses.

A

s powerful nations are getting alarmingly entangled in active confrontation, the world stands dangerously close to a catastrophic war. The destructive nature of modern-day warfare means that even a single misstep could have irreversible consequences. Therefore, making the preservation of state sovereignty and independent security capabilities a critical priority for states across the international system.

Military interventions, whimsical enforcement of international law, and shifting strategic commitments contribute to the growing skepticism regarding the reliability and commitments of American leadership. An increasing number of states have begun to reassess their dependence on U.S. security umbrella.

Coinciding with the dramatic rise of China, East Asia has emerged as one of the most strategically significant regions in global politics. Nowhere is this risk of miscalculation more pronounced than in the maritime and territorial fractures of the Far East. The rapid economic and military rise of China challenges the long-standing regional dominance of the United States and intensified geopolitical competition across the Indo-Pacific.

Within this framework, the U.S.–Japan alliance is central in maintaining regional stability and deterrence. Following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, Japan was made to adopt a post-war security framework centered on constitutional pacifism and peaceful coexistence. During the American occupation, the United States oversaw the drafting of the new Japanese constitution, fundamentally reshaping the country’s political and military structure. At the core of this framework was Article 9, which renounced war as a sovereign right and prohibited Japan from maintaining traditional military forces capable of waging offensive conflict.

Japan’s global identity

For decades, this constitutional restriction defined Japan’s global identity. The country projected an image built on economic power, diplomatic engagement, and a deliberately restrained defense posture. Yet, over the decades, Japan’s strategic role evolved as one of the most critical logistical platforms for American military operations in Asia.

Geopolitically, Japan occupies a key position within the First Island Chain, a series of islands stretching from Japan through Taiwan and the Philippines that effectively forms a maritime barrier limiting Chinese and Russian naval access to the wider Pacific Ocean. Control over this chain is central to maintaining naval dominance in East Asia.

Taiwan is at the geographic center of this strategic arc; its location gives it disproportionate strategic importance. Should Beijing gain control of the island, the structural integrity of the First Island Chain would be fundamentally altered. The barrier constraining China’s naval expansion could effectively be breached.

Such a shift may dramatically reshape the regional balance of power. Control of Taiwan would provide China with direct access to deeper Pacific waters, allowing its submarine forces greater freedom of maneuver beyond the confined seas near its coastline. For nuclear-powered submarines carrying ballistic missiles, the ability to operate in deep-water environments is crucial for survivability and credible second-strike capability.

55,000 US troops stationed across Japanese territory

Presently, Japan serves as the primary logistical hub for U.S. military activity across the Indo-Pacific. The United States maintains more than 55,000 troops stationed across Japanese territory, its largest overseas deployment anywhere in the world. Japan is the world’s fourth-largest economy, providing a stable, high-tech industrial base that is deeply integrated into the U.S. supply chain, particularly in high-technology sectors such as semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, and precision engineering.

Tokyo still upholds its official non-nuclear principles, but its broader security posture is becoming more complex and strategically ambiguous than its public doctrine suggests. Domestically, a gradual rise in nationalist sentiment and increasing anxiety over territorial disputes, particularly surrounding the Senkaku Islands, further amplified calls for a more assertive security doctrine. These pressures are generating internal debates that challenge Japan’s long-standing postwar identity as deemed to be a pacifist state.

In the February 8, 2026, general election, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi led the Liberal Democratic Party to a historic landslide victory, securing a postwar record of 316 seats in parliament. For the first time in the postwar era, a strongly hawkish conservative government commands a single-party supermajority.

As of March 2026, Japan is beginning to display clear “self-ambitions”, driven by the fear that the U.S. is becoming an unpredictable and “objective-only” actor, Tokyo is aggressively pursuing the idea of strategic autonomy. While Japan is not currently a nuclear power, it is a “paranuclear” state, possessing the advanced technology and plutonium stockpiles necessary to develop a nuclear deterrent in as little as six months.

‘Managed Rivalry’

U.S.-Japan alliance has entered a phase of ‘Managed Rivalry.’ While the 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy maintains the First Island Chain as a priority, the transactional nature of the new administration’s ‘America First’ posture has introduced a ‘credibility gap.’ This has compelled Japan to accelerate its own counterstrike capabilities, most notably the March 2026 deployment of long-range standoff missiles, further antagonizing Beijing and tightening the ‘Triangular Trap’.

The logic driving these developments ultimately returns to the unique role of nuclear weapons in international geopolitics. The destructive nature of nuclear weapons provides what is often described as “ultimate deterrence.” While the possession of nuclear weapons raises profound moral and humanitarian concerns, the geopolitical reality remains that the five recognized nuclear powers under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons, along with India Pakistan, Israel and North Korea, continue to modernize their arsenals rather than dismantle them. This ongoing modernization risks leading to collapse of long-term viability of the global non-proliferation regime.

Compounding this instability is the erosion of the broader nuclear arms control architecture. With the expiration of the New START treaty, which previously limited the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems possessed by the United States and Russia, the global system of nuclear restraint has effectively entered an unregulated era. For the first time in more than five decades, there is no comprehensive, legally binding agreement constraining the nuclear arsenals of the world powers.

This development has generated deep unease among technologically advanced non-nuclear states that rely on extended deterrence guarantees. Countries such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea are now openly debating whether long-standing commitments to nuclear proliferation remain viable in an increasingly unstable security environment.

Tokyo is gradually asserting the capabilities necessary to defend its interests with greater autonomy. While it cannot abandon the alliance with Washington, Japan’s ongoing rearmament and doctrinal evolution signal that the era of complete strategic dependency may be drawing to a close. As such, Japan is preparing for a possibility that its geographic position will once again require it to act as a fully sovereign strategic power rather than merely an extension of American regional policy.

T

ensions between Japan and China escalated sharply in November 2025, plunging the two countries into one of the most serious diplomatic crises in recent years. The crisis was triggered when Japan’s new prime minister, Sanae Takaiçi, stated that a potential Chinese attack on Taiwan could threaten Japan’s survival and provoke a military response. Beijing responded with unusual severity by imposing flight and tourism restrictions, banning imports of Japanese seafood, canceling cultural exchanges, and increasing military activity around Japan.

Thus, the crisis evolved from a mere rhetorical dispute into a multidimensional competition involving historical memory, national identity, military deterrence, and geoeconomic pressure. This analysis evaluates the diplomatic, military, and ideological causes of the crisis and its effects on Asia-Pacific geopolitics, particularly regarding Taiwan and alliance balances, as well as on geoeconomics. Additionally, it examines the position of the United States in the context of its alliance diplomacy and Indo-Pacific strategy.

Causes of the crisis: Diplomatic, military and ideological dimensions

The Moment of Diplomatic Rupture: The crisis began with Prime Minister Takaichi’s November 7, 2025, parliamentary statement on a potential Chinese blockade of Taiwan. Takaichi stated that China’s use of force against Taiwan, particularly against U.S. interests in the region, could create a “life-threatening situation” for Japan. According to Japanese security law, this concept refers to a critical threshold that permits the Self-Defense Forces to intervene under the umbrella of collective self-defense. In this respect, Takaichi is notable as the first Japanese leader in office to explicitly link a Taiwan crisis to Japan’s direct security interests. Consequently, her statement was perceived as signaling a shift away from Tokyo’s traditional strategic ambiguity on Taiwan, which China viewed as “disruptive to the status quo.”

Beijing’s strong reaction and normative framework: China defined Takaichi’s words as “a serious provocation,” accusing Japan of “violating the fundamental norms of international relations.” Beijing’s fundamental claim is that Japan’s rhetoric and potential actions regarding Taiwan interfere with China’s internal affairs and contradict the “One China” principle. The diplomatic rhetoric became excessively harsh during the crisis. The threatening statement shared on social media by the Chinese Consul General in Osaka, which later was deleted, reflects a radicalization that goes beyond diplomatic norms. Furthermore, China’s rhetoric has systematically invoked historical memory. Claims that Japan is questioning the “victorious outcomes of World War II” have been raised at the UN, and emphasis has been placed on Japan’s “resurgence of militarism.”

This ideological framework is closely linked to Beijing’s framing of the Taiwan issue as both strategic and a “core interest” at the heart of its narrative of regime legitimacy and national rebirth. Indeed, Xi Jinping’s assessments that place Taiwan at the center of his “national rejuvenation” vision reinforce Beijing’s intolerance of external intervention.

Tokyo’s rationale: Meanwhile, Japan has emphasized that Takaiichi’s statement does not alter its official “One China” policy, and the approach based on the 1972 agreement remains in place. Nevertheless, Takaiichi’s remarks reflect an increase in Japanese strategic concerns. Taiwan’s geographical location is critical to the lines connecting Japan to Southeast Asia and wider maritime trade routes. If China were to establish control over Taiwan, it could pose serious risks to Japan’s energy supply and trade flows. At the same time, Japan is reevaluating its defense doctrine due to China’s increased military capacity and more aggressive air and maritime activities in the region.

Takaiichi’s “security-oriented” approach (emphasizing stronger defense, constitutional debates, and deterrence) aligns with this trend. Perceptions of China in domestic politics have also become more negative. Notably, Takaiichi’s hard line on Taiwan enjoys broad public support, reducing the likelihood of a retreat. Therefore, the crisis highlights a significant clash between the two sides’ definitions of “core interests”: China considers its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan to be indisputable, while Japan considers the Taiwan scenario to be an integral part of its national security.

Military Dimension and Escalation Risks: The crisis has quickly spilled over into the military sphere. Japan has reported high-risk incidents involving Chinese fighter jets locking fire control radars onto Japanese aircraft, though China has denied some of these claims. China’s intensification of air and sea patrols around Japan increases the risk of accidental conflict, and the weakening of communication channels heightens the possibility of miscalculation. Given these conditions, the crisis is not merely “temporary diplomatic tension” but rather a manifestation of broader security competition.

Impact on Asia-Pacific geopolitics

The crisis in the Asia-Pacific region has further hardened the Taiwan-focused security architecture and increased pressure on regional actors to take sides. Taipei has acted cautiously and kept a low profile to avoid exacerbating the situation. However, Tokyo’s explicit deterrence signal complicates Beijing’s strategic calculations. The likelihood that the use of force against Taiwan would draw the US and Japan more visibly into the conflict has increased. While this may increase deterrence in the short term, it may also fuel China’s hardening response, creating a “new normal” in which crises recur more frequently.

Alliances and regional alignment: The crisis is testing regional alliances and partnerships. South Korea has avoided taking sides and has called for dialogue between the two countries. This reflects Seoul’s attempt to balance its economic dependence on China with its security alliance with the US. However, there are signs that Washington is pressuring Seoul to take regional scenarios, particularly those involving Taiwan, more seriously. Similarly, ASEAN countries are apprehensive. Most maintain the One China policy while limiting themselves to calls for regional stability. In contrast, Japan’s more assertive stance could strengthen the deterrence of China within frameworks such as the Quad (the United States, Japan, India, and Australia).

Tensions in Multilateral Diplomacy: The conflict has spilled over into platforms such as the United Nations. China and Japan have “internationalized” the dispute by sending letters and making strong statements to the UN. China’s UN representative, Fu Cong, implied that Japan’s possible military intervention would be considered “aggression.” However, Japan found these claims “unacceptable.” This demonstrates that the crisis has the potential to erode not only bilateral relations, but also regional norms and institutions.

C

hina on Monday accused Japan of posing a military threat, with Foreign Minister Wang Yi sharply criticizing Tokyo over a recent aerial incident and its growing alignment with Taiwan. The remarks came during Wang’s meeting in Beijing with German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul.

Tensions flared after Japan said Chinese fighter jets had locked their radar onto Japanese military aircraft over the East China Sea. Tokyo condemned the action as dangerous and escalatory. Beijing rejected the accusation, saying Japanese aircraft had repeatedly approached and disrupted Chinese naval forces conducting previously announced carrier-based flight training east of the Miyako Strait.

Relations have worsened in recent weeks, particularly after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said Japan could respond if any Chinese military action against Taiwan also threatened Japan’s security. China says such remarks cross a red line.

Wang said Japan should act with “greater caution,” especially in a year marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, stressing that Japan, “as a defeated nation,” bears historical responsibility. He accused Takaichi of “exploiting the Taiwan question”—which Japan colonized from 1895 to 1945—to “provoke trouble and threaten China militarily.”

“This is completely unacceptable,” Wang said, according to China’s official Xinhua news agency.

Beijing reasserts claims over Taiwan

Beijing maintains that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. Wang said the island’s status had been “unequivocally and irreversibly affirmed” by historical and legal documents, adding that the People’s Republic of China is the successor state to the Republic of China and therefore “naturally enjoys sovereignty over Taiwan.”

Taiwan rejected the claims. Officials in Taipei emphasized that the People’s Republic of China did not exist in 1945 and has never governed Taiwan, whose formal name remains the Republic of China. Taiwan’s government regularly accuses Beijing of distorting history to justify its territorial claims.

Japan also disputed Beijing’s justification for the radar encounter. Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara said the “intermittent illumination of radar beams is a dangerous act that goes beyond what is safe and necessary.” He declined to confirm media reports that China did not respond via the bilateral defense hotline established in 2018.

Germany urges restraint amid rising tensions

The radar incident has raised concerns over the risk of miscalculation between two of Asia’s largest military powers. Both countries have expanded their military capabilities amid rising geopolitical competition across the region.

German Foreign Minister Wadephul urged both sides to avoid escalation. His trip to Beijing is part of a broader European diplomatic effort to stabilize regional tensions as China and Japan’s rivalry intensifies.

Analysts say the combination of heightened political rhetoric and increased military activity around Taiwan and the East China Sea could lead to more dangerous confrontations unless communication mechanisms between Beijing and Tokyo are strengthened.

(Source: Reuters)

J

apan is facing its most severe diplomatic crisis with China in more than a decade after an unscripted remark by newly appointed Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi triggered a furious reaction from Beijing, prompting economic retaliation and plunging bilateral ties into uncertainty.

The dispute erupted after Takaichi, responding spontaneously to a question during her first parliamentary grilling, suggested that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could lead to a Japanese military response. The comment broke with years of strategic ambiguity maintained by successive Japanese leaders and immediately infuriated China, which views Taiwan as part of its territory.

According to two Japanese government officials familiar with internal deliberations, the remark was neither planned nor designed to signal a major policy shift. “It would have been better not to say it, but it’s not incorrect,” one official said, acknowledging that Tokyo now has little room to walk the comment back. “We can’t retract it.”

China moves quickly to apply economic pressure

Beijing wasted no time demonstrating its displeasure, announcing a set of measures designed to hit Japan’s economy, the world’s fourth largest. These include a halt to Japanese seafood imports, cancellation of cultural exchanges, and a boycott on travel to Japan that could strip billions from the tourism sector. Some official meetings have also been abruptly suspended.

Economists warn the impact could be severe. China’s travel boycott alone is estimated to cost Japan more than $14 billion annually, according to Nomura Research Institute economist Takahide Kiuchi. A wider consumer backlash within China, similar to the one that followed Japan’s 2012 nationalization of disputed islands, could reduce Japanese corporate sales by the equivalent of 1% of Japan’s GDP, analysts say.

Perhaps more worrisome for Tokyo is the possibility that China could curb exports of rare earth minerals, critical to Japan’s electronics and automotive industries. Despite efforts to diversify supply chains, China still accounts for around 60% of Japan’s rare earth imports.

Diplomacy turns frosty, symbolism sharpens

Attempts by Tokyo to calm tensions have, if anything, only underscored the deepening divide. Talks in Beijing this week between senior foreign ministry officials were described by Chinese diplomat Liu Jinsong as “solemn”. Images aired by Chinese media showed Liu standing with his hands in his pockets — an intentional gesture of defiance in a formal setting.

Even Liu’s attire drew attention: he wore a five-button, collarless suit associated with the May Fourth Movement of 1919, a student-led protest against Japanese imperialism. Chinese state media highlighted the symbolism, casting it as a pointed reminder of historical grievances.

The diplomatic chill has already led Beijing to rule out a potential encounter between Takaichi and Chinese Premier Li Qiang at this weekend’s G20 summit in South Africa. Analysts say the freeze could last throughout Takaichi’s tenure. “Takaichi inadvertently boxed herself in,” said Jeremy Chan, a senior Northeast Asia analyst at Eurasia Group. “There really is no immediate off-ramp.”

Domestic backing holds, but regional risks rise

Despite the turmoil, Takaichi’s comment has not dented her popularity at home. Opinion polls show her approval ratings remain robust, with many voters viewing her stance as a firm response to regional security concerns.

Her office has insisted that Japan’s official policy on Taiwan has not changed. “Japan remains open to various forms of dialogue between the two countries,” a spokesperson said, adding that her remarks did not contradict existing government positions.

But in Beijing, the rhetoric has hardened dramatically. A Chinese diplomat appeared to allude to Takaichi’s beheading in a now-deleted post, while nationalist commentators branded her an “evil witch”. A cartoon posted by China’s military on social media depicted her burning Japan’s pacifist constitution.

With no signs of compromise on either side, officials and analysts increasingly fear the dispute could deepen further before any thaw becomes possible. “Right now, there’s not even a starting point for improvement,” a Japanese official said.

A senior U.S. diplomat in Asia added that a near-term resolution is unlikely unless Beijing seeks to mend ties with Washington and uses Japan as a diplomatic bridge. “Until then,” he said, “we’re looking at a long winter in Japan–China relations.”

(Source: Reuters)

J

apan is scrambling to contain a rapidly escalating dispute with China after comments by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi about the possible use of military force in a Taiwan conflict triggered a fierce backlash from Beijing, rattling markets and raising fears of deeper geopolitical instability in East Asia.

The diplomatic row erupted after Takaichi told lawmakers earlier this month that a Chinese attack on Taiwan that threatened Japan’s survival could, under existing security laws, pave the way for a Japanese military response. The remarks, unusually explicit for a Japanese leader, touched one of the most sensitive nerves in regional politics: Japan’s potential involvement in a cross-strait conflict.

Previous Japanese administrations have avoided publicly discussing the circumstances under which Japan might intervene, wary of provoking China, which claims Taiwan as part of its territory. But Takaichi, who became Japan’s first female prime minister in 2025 and has taken a firmer security stance than her predecessors, insisted she was simply describing a scenario already embedded in Japan’s legal framework.

“Strategic recklessness”

Beijing, however, reacted sharply. China’s foreign ministry accused Tokyo of “strategic recklessness” and warned Japan against “dangerous provocations.” Its Consul General in Osaka, Xue Jian, posted — and then deleted — a social-media message declaring that “the dirty neck that sticks itself in must be cut off,” prompting Japan to lodge an official protest and summon China’s ambassador.

The rift deepened last week when China issued an unusually blunt travel warning urging its citizens to avoid travel to Japan due to “security risks.” Japanese officials said the advisory had no factual basis and risked undermining the “mutually beneficial strategic relationship” that both countries publicly committed to restore during recent high-level exchanges.

In an effort to de-escalate tensions, Japan is dispatching Masaaki Kanai, director general of the Foreign Ministry’s Asia and Oceania bureau, to Beijing this week. According to Japanese media, Kanai will clarify that Takaichi’s remarks do not reflect a change in Japan’s security policy and will call on Chinese officials to refrain from steps that further damage the relationship.

“Various channels of communication are open,” Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi told reporters on Monday. He added that China’s travel warning was “incompatible” with the direction both governments had agreed to pursue.

The Group of 20 summit in South Africa

Takaichi may also have an opportunity to speak directly with Chinese Premier Li Qiang during the Group of 20 summit in South Africa later this week—an encounter that could determine whether the diplomatic freeze begins to thaw or hardens further.

Taiwan’s newly inaugurated president, Lai Ching-te, waded into the dispute on Monday, urging China to “exercise restraint” and accusing Beijing of launching a “multifaceted attack” on Japan. Taiwan, located just over 110 kilometers from Japan’s southwestern islands and surrounded by key shipping routes, sits at the centre of Japan’s strategic concerns.

Japan also hosts the largest concentration of U.S. military forces outside the United States, making the country a critical forward base in any potential conflict over Taiwan. Washington has so far limited itself to pointed but measured comments. U.S. Ambassador to Japan George Glass criticised Xue’s remarks on social media, calling them “unprofessional” and adding over the weekend that the episode should now be put to rest.

But the rhetoric from China has continued to intensify. On Friday, Beijing warned that Japan would face a “crushing” defeat if it intervened militarily in a Taiwan war, and criticized Tokyo’s “ambiguity” on its longstanding pledge not to possess or host nuclear weapons. A recent Reuters investigation found growing political debate in Japan over potentially revising that pledge, long considered taboo in the country that suffered the world’s only wartime atomic bombings.

The Senkaku Islands

Tensions spilled onto the seas on Sunday when a formation of Chinese coast guard vessels sailed through waters near the Senkaku Islands — known as the Diaoyu in China — a contested chain in the East China Sea. Japan said its coast guard drove the ships away, echoing a pattern of maritime confrontations that have surged since Japan nationalised the islands in 2012.

The diplomatic fight is already having economic repercussions. Analysts warn that if Chinese tourist arrivals were to fall by 25% — the scale seen during the 2012 Senkaku dispute — Japan could face a significant shock. Takahide Kiuchi of the Nomura Research Institute said such a decline would dampen growth by “more than half of Japan’s annual expansion.”

Investors braced for that possibility on Monday. Shares of tourism-sensitive companies slumped, with department store chain Isetan Mitsukoshi plunging more than 10% in early trading and Japan Airlines falling over 4%. Retail and leisure stocks also slid amid fears of a prolonged downturn in Chinese visitor numbers, a key pillar of Japan’s post-pandemic economic recovery.

While both Tokyo and Beijing say they want stable relations, their worsening dispute over Taiwan underscores how quickly East Asia’s strategic environment can deteriorate. With China increasing military pressure on Taiwan and Japan adopting a more assertive defense posture, the diplomatic turbulence may prove difficult to reverse — unless both sides seize upcoming opportunities to step back from the brink.

(Source: Reuters)

T

he world became accustomed to a unipolar order after the Cold War. However, it has been confronted with a new geopolitical reality in recent years. In this new era of intensifying competition between major powers, medium-sized powers are attempting to forge their own path instead of remaining confined within traditional alliance structures. One of the most striking examples of this trend is the defense industry partnership emerging between Türkiye and Japan, two countries located at opposite ends of Asia.

Centuries-old bonds of friendship could bring the two countries together, combining their complementary technological strengths to strengthen their strategic autonomy and become more effective global actors. As President Erdoğan pointed out in his August 29 article in Japan’s Nikkei newspaper, this partnership is evolving beyond technical and military cooperation. It also represents middle powers’ search for new types of strategic engagement in the global security architecture. At the heart of this potential cooperation are two key technologies: unmanned aerial vehicles and semiconductors.

The relationship between Türkiye and Japan is based not only on current geopolitical calculations, but also on a history of mutual sympathy and respect. One of the most well-known symbols of this friendship occurred when the Japanese people showed great assistance and sacrifice to the crew of the Ottoman frigate Ertuğrul after it sank off the coast of Japan in 1890. This historic event forged an indelible bond between the two nations. In the modern era, these ties have been further strengthened through humanitarian gestures, such as Turkish Airlines’ rescue of Japanese citizens stranded in Tehran during the Iran-Iraq War in 1985.

These historic moments have fostered a strong climate of trust between the two countries. In 2013, upgrading relations to a “strategic partnership” and frequent high-level visits between leaders demonstrate that current defense industry cooperation is a natural evolution of a deep-rooted relationship, not just a new beginning. This solid foundation makes the potential partnership more resilient and long-term.

Türkiye’s UAV revolution and Japan’s strategic quest

Türkiye’s defense industry has undergone a remarkable transformation over the past two decades. Once highly dependent on Western suppliers, Türkiye’s defense industry was forced to pursue self-sufficiency due to embargoes and tensions with allies. The most visible result of these efforts is the Baykar-produced Bayraktar TB2 UAV system. TB2s have gained global renown for changing the course of wars around the world, including in Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine, Syria, and Libya.

They have proven to be more economical and operationally effective than their high-cost Western counterparts. This success has elevated Türkiye to one of the world’s leading suppliers of armed UAVs, with exports to many countries. The recently developed Bayraktar TB3 is designed for use on aircraft carriers and has the potential to demonstrate technical compatibility with Japan’s Izumo-class ships thanks to its foldable wing design. This is an important sign of possible future cooperation.

Japan is showing great interest in Türkiye’s UAV revolution. The main reason for this interest is Japan’s search for strategic solutions for its defense industry. Compared to systems such as the MQ-9 Reaper procured from the U.S., Turkish UAVs are more economical and could alleviate pressure on Japan’s defense budget. However, cost is not the only issue. Article 9 of Japan’s 1947 constitution prohibits the declaration of war and the maintenance of military forces. This has led to the country’s heavy reliance on the U.S. for security, which is enshrined in the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

Under Article 5, both parties recognize an attack on Japanese territories as a common danger. Meanwhile, Article 6 grants the U.S. the right to maintain military bases in Japan to preserve peace in the Far East. This alliance provides Japan with a nuclear umbrella and access to advanced defense technologies. However, it also limits Japan’s independent procurement options and creates a structural dependence on the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program. Japan’s defense and security cooperation with the European Union reflects its desire to establish strategic partnerships amid growing mutual concerns about China. This signals Japan’s intention to diversify its defense ties, not only with the U.S., but also with other allies.

Japan’s domestic defense industry has long been fragile. Due to factors such as a limited domestic market and low profitability, many second- and third-tier suppliers have withdrawn from the sector. This internal hollowing-out phenomenon has driven Japan towards international partnerships, providing access to new capabilities and enabling the restructuring of the defense industry through technology transfer, joint production, and the revitalization of domestic demand.

A large portion of Japan’s defense contracts are concentrated among a few firms. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries holds the largest share at 25.5 percent, followed by Kawasaki Heavy Industries at 11.5 percent and Mitsubishi Electric at 5.4 percent. This distribution exacerbates the sector’s structural dependency, making Japan’s quest for strategic autonomy even more urgent.

The Heart of complementarity: UAVs, semiconductors and global supply chains

The Turkish-Japanese defense partnership is fundamentally based on the principle of each country complementing the other’s shortcomings. Türkiye excels in the field of UAVs with operational success and cost-effectiveness, while Japan is a global leader in semiconductor technologies, the backbone of modern warfare platforms. Modern UAVs are more than just aircraft and cameras. They require state-of-the-art semiconductors for high-resolution sensors, autonomous navigation systems, secure communication infrastructures, and artificial intelligence–supported data processing capabilities.

Although Türkiye has made significant progress in the UAV industry, it must collaborate with countries that possess expertise in advanced electronic components, a market worth trillions of dollars. This has transformed Türkiye’s need to develop domestic technological capacity within its defense industry from a strategic goal to a structural necessity. As stated in the Turkish Academy of Sciences (TÜBA) publication Global Transformations and Türkiye (2024), the international system provides a highly suitable ground for middle powers to establish strategic partnerships, particularly in the field of semiconductors.

Japan’s technological prowess is currently of great importance to Türkiye. Japan’s semiconductor industry policy has continuously evolved since the 1970s in order to adapt to global competition. Japanese companies that produce the world’s most advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, specialized chemicals, and integrated circuits are critical components of the global electronics supply chain. Alongside industry leaders such as Renesas and Tokyo Electron, new domestic manufacturers like Rapidus are competing with them in cutting-edge production processes, such as 2-nanometer production.

This situation aligns with Türkiye’s search for a secure supply chain to meet its semiconductor needs and Japan’s goal of finding new export opportunities beyond the Chinese and Western markets. Through this partnership, Türkiye can maintain its superiority in UAVs technology while transitioning to more autonomous systems. Meanwhile, Japan can seize the opportunity to establish defense industry cooperation that will deepen and solidify bilateral relations. The emphasis on semiconductors as strategic enablers underscores that this collaboration is not just a technical exchange, but also a means of fostering a strategic alliance.

Obstacles, opportunities and future scenarios

Although there is great potential for Turkish-Japanese defense cooperation, there are some potential obstacles that must be overcome. For example, Japan’s pacifist constitution and public opinion, which reject aggressive militarism, could restrict the scope of such a partnership. Notably, U.S.-origin components in Japanese semiconductors could restrict their re-export to Türkiye under the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Alliance sensitivities are also a significant factor. Over ninety percent of Japan’s defense imports come from the U.S. This indicates that Washington may be concerned that Turkish-Japanese defense ties could lower Tokyo’s supply priority. Türkiye’s NATO membership and its procurement of S-400 systems from Russia create a complex dynamic. These sensitivities must be diplomatically managed with great care.

Despite these challenges, recent high-level visits from both Tokyo and Ankara demonstrate strong political will. Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani’s visit to Ankara in August 2025 and his tour of Baykar facilities were concrete demonstrations of the importance of this cooperation. Japan’s defense and security cooperation with the European Union, initiated amid growing mutual concerns about China, signals its desire to establish strategic partnerships. This signals that Japan is diversifying its defense ties, not only with the U.S., but also with other allies.

On the other hand, it is important to note the allegations that Japan may purchase drones from Israel instead of Türkiye. If Japan, known for its respect for human rights and values, were to sign such an agreement, it would cause great disappointment in the global public opinion due to Israel’s ongoing genocide and war crimes in Palestinian territories. This is not merely a commercial preference, but also an ethical and political stance.

In terms of Turkish-Japanese cooperation, Japan’s “minilateralism” approach, developed through experience in international projects in various fields, could be instructive. The Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) with the United Kingdom and Italy aims to develop a new generation of stealth fighter jets. The Mogami-class frigate agreement with Australia is one of the most significant exports since World War II. These multilateral collaborations could create a new sphere of influence, increasing the visibility of both countries in the international arena and moving beyond the competition between major powers.

Based on these possible scenarios, the most reasonable approach to cooperation between the two countries appears to be a phased, incremental partnership. In the first stage, Japan could test a limited number of Turkish UAVs to supplement its existing capabilities, and Türkiye could incorporate Japanese semiconductors into certain platforms. More ambitious scenarios could include co-development programs for joint UAVs or electronic systems projects or “minilateralism” frameworks involving third countries, such as the United Kingdom or Australia.

Ultimately, the defense partnership between Türkiye and Japan may exemplify middle powers seeking greater autonomy within existing alliances rather than providing an alternative to alliances in the global security architecture. By combining complementary technologies, diversifying supply chains, and gaining strategic flexibility, these two countries could become more effective actors in a multipolar world. This partnership is a striking example of how technological complementarity meets political pragmatism.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

J

apan’s top trade negotiator has defended the country’s new tariff agreement with the United States, describing President Donald Trump as a “tough but gracious negotiator” and insisting that the deal — which sets tariffs on most Japanese exports at 15% — represents a fair outcome for both sides despite domestic criticism that Tokyo conceded too much.

Speaking at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan on Wednesday, Trade Envoy Ryosei Akazawa said that while the agreement was the result of months of tense talks, the final outcome avoided more punishing measures that Washington had initially demanded.

“President Trump was a tough negotiator, but I kept insisting, and he would listen graciously. I have all the respect for him,” Akazawa said. “It was a good round of negotiations.”

A hard-fought agreement

The deal, finalized in July after eight rounds of meetings in Washington, fixes tariffs on most Japanese exports to the United States at 15%, aligning with rates agreed between Washington and the European Union earlier this year.

However, Japan notably did not have to reduce its own tariffs on U.S. goods — a key victory Akazawa emphasized — while pledging to invest $550 billion in infrastructure, energy, and technology projects in the United States over the coming decade.

“Unlike the EU, Japan did not have to lower its tariffs on American imports. We found a balanced position that both sides could accept,” Akazawa said.

The final tariff level marks a significant reduction from Trump’s initial proposal to raise duties on Japanese imports to 25%, a move that Tokyo warned would have triggered a retaliatory trade dispute between two of the world’s largest economies.

Talks began under tense circumstances in late 2024, with Akazawa shuttling repeatedly between Tokyo and Washington. Critics at home derided his frequent visits as excessive, joking that he “should pitch a tent on the White House lawn.”

“Talks with Secretary [Howard] Lutnick and others were difficult at first,” Akazawa said, referring to the U.S. commerce chief. “But by the eighth round, we built a rapport, and that made all the difference.”

Political and economic pressures at home

Despite Akazawa’s assurances, the agreement has faced skepticism from Japanese lawmakers and industry groups who argue that the new tariff regime still threatens the competitiveness of Japan’s key export sectors — especially automobiles, machinery, and consumer electronics.

Japan’s economy depends heavily on exports, and the United States is its second-largest trading partner after China. Recent government data show that exports to the U.S. fell nearly 14% in August year-on-year, marking the fifth consecutive month of decline.

The drop was driven largely by the 25% tariffs the Trump administration had imposed earlier on steel, aluminum, and automobiles, part of a broader campaign to reduce U.S. trade deficits with key partners. Those duties had sent shockwaves through Japan’s manufacturing industry, particularly the auto sector.

Under the new deal, U.S. tariffs on Japanese automobiles and auto parts will remain at 15%, sharply higher than the pre-2024 level of 2.5%. However, Akazawa argued that Japanese automakers’ extensive production networks in North America will cushion the blow.

“Japanese companies already produce most of the cars they sell in the U.S. inside the U.S.,” he said. “So while tariffs are higher, the overall impact will be manageable.”

Still, the strain on exports adds another challenge for Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, whose administration has been under fire for its handling of trade frictions and a sluggish domestic economy. Ishiba is set to step down as head of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) later this week, as the party faces internal turmoil after losing its lower-house majority for the first time in decades.

The LDP will now require coalition partners to maintain control of parliament and select the next prime minister. Whoever succeeds Ishiba will inherit not only a fragile domestic economy but also the delicate task of managing relations with an unpredictable White House.

Defending Japan’s position

Akazawa dismissed speculation that the U.S. and Japan may hold differing interpretations of the agreement.

“Whoever becomes the next prime minister, Japan has an established tradition of honoring international commitments,” he said. “We have always respected agreements forged with our allies.”

The envoy added that Japan’s negotiators had to strike a balance between protecting national interests and maintaining the broader strategic partnership with the U.S., which remains Japan’s top security ally.

“It goes without saying that, with any government negotiation, there will always be someone who says Japan lost out, no matter what,” he said. “But diplomacy is about managing relationships, not just numbers.”

Reactions in Washington and Tokyo

U.S. officials have hailed the accord as proof of Trump’s determination to “level the playing field” in global trade. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick said in a statement that the deal “restores fairness” and ensures that “American workers will no longer be undercut by foreign exporters benefiting from unbalanced terms.”

Back in Japan, business leaders offered cautious approval. The Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) said the deal provides “short-term stability” but warned that sustained tariffs could undermine the competitiveness of Japanese exports in the long term.

Financial analysts noted that the agreement may help ease uncertainty in financial markets, which had been rattled by Trump’s aggressive tariff rhetoric earlier in the year. “Markets are responding positively because it removes the immediate risk of escalation,” said Miki Tanaka, a Tokyo-based economist at Nomura Securities.

Still, economists warn that Japan’s export-driven economy faces mounting headwinds amid slowing global demand, rising production costs, and a strong yen.

W

hen South Korean President Lee Jae Myung meets U.S. President Donald Trump next week in Washington for their first summit, the agenda will be dominated by security and defense costs, rising tensions with China, and the future of diplomacy with North Korea.

The White House talks come just weeks after a whirlwind of trade negotiations left Seoul largely sidelined, and they are expected to set the tone for the next phase of the alliance between the two nations.

At the heart of the talks will be the issue of “burden sharing”—the funding for 28,500 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea as part of a longstanding security arrangement dating back to the Korean War. According to U.S. officials, Trump is expected to push for a significant increase in Seoul’s contribution, despite South Korea already paying over $1 billion annually and having financed the construction of the massive Camp Humphreys base.

“President Trump clearly wants more,” said Victor Cha of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, noting previous calls for Seoul to pay as much as $5 billion to $10 billion per year. “He wants defense spending closer to 5% of GDP for all allies. South Korea is currently at 3.5%.”

There is even talk within the Pentagon of reducing the U.S. military presence if an agreement cannot be reached, though some officials are working to frame the alliance more broadly in terms of countering Chinese influence in the region.

China’s shadow over the summit

While the summit is primarily framed as a security discussion, Washington is increasingly looking to its Asian allies to play a role in its wider competition with China. Discussions are expected to include how U.S. forces in South Korea might be used in a potential crisis involving Taiwan, though Seoul remains cautious about becoming entangled in Beijing’s disputes.

President Lee has pledged full support for the U.S. alliance but has also advocated for a “balanced approach” between Washington and Beijing—an approach that may be tested as pressure grows to align more closely with U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy.

“The more explicit the depiction of U.S. Forces Korea as having an anti-China mission, the more likely China will retaliate economically or politically,” said Bruce Klingner of the Mansfield Foundation, recalling Beijing’s response to the 2017 deployment of the THAAD missile defense system in South Korea.

North Korea: Shared goals, uncertain roadmap

Trump and Lee are likely to find common ground is North Korea. Both leaders have signaled openness to renewed engagement with Kim Jong Un, although Pyongyang has rebuffed recent overtures and deepened its ties with Russia.

“I doubt much substance will be said on North Korea beyond committing to diplomacy and reiterating a goal of denuclearization,” said Jenny Town of the Washington-based 38 North program.

Lee, in an interview with Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun this week, reiterated that his administration would “lay the groundwork” for dismantling North Korea’s nuclear weapons program through talks and close coordination with Washington. However, Pyongyang has repeatedly insisted its nuclear arsenal is non-negotiable.

Nuclear latency debate in Seoul

The summit also comes amid domestic debate in South Korea about whether it should develop its own nuclear capabilities or pursue reprocessing of nuclear materials for energy and industrial purposes. Foreign Minister Cho Hyun told parliament that Seoul may seek U.S. approval to reprocess or enrich uranium—an idea met with skepticism by arms control experts.

“Too many South Korean politicians are flirting with the idea of their country acquiring the nuclear weapons option,” said Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association. “The foreign minister’s claims about the purpose of his government’s interest are hardly reassuring.”

Under the current U.S.–South Korea Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation, Seoul is prohibited from reprocessing or enriching nuclear materials, as these activities could provide the means to produce nuclear weapons.

With both leaders keen to project strength abroad while managing political challenges at home, the summit is likely to produce headline agreements on continued diplomacy with North Korea and shared commitment to the alliance. But the thorny questions—how much South Korea should pay for its security, and how far it is willing to go in supporting U.S. policy toward China—may remain unresolved.

(Source: Reuters)

F

or decades, Japan has stood as the only country ever to have suffered the horrors of nuclear attack, maintaining a pacifist constitution and a firm pledge never to produce, possess, or host nuclear weapons. But amid shifting global security dynamics and growing uncertainty over U.S. security guarantees under President Donald Trump, voices within Japan’s political establishment are beginning to question whether those long-standing principles can hold indefinitely.

At the center of this debate is Rui Matsukawa, a lawmaker from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and a former deputy defense minister. During a recent high-level conference in the United Kingdom, she was struck by how European leaders had accepted the reality that the U.S. might no longer be a reliable security partner. That realization, she says, applies equally to Japan, which currently hosts the largest overseas deployment of American troops. “You can’t really take the U.S. presence for granted,” Matsukawa observed. “Plan B is maybe go independent, and then go nukes.”

Her comments reflect a broader trend: a slow but significant shift in Japanese strategic thinking. For decades, Japan has relied on the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” as protection against nearby nuclear powers—China, North Korea, and Russia. Yet Trump’s combative stance toward allies, his tariffs on Japanese goods, and his erratic diplomacy have shaken faith in Washington’s commitment to defend Tokyo. This uncertainty has emboldened some Japanese policymakers to at least explore options such as nuclear sharing—a model in which a non-nuclear country takes part in nuclear planning and training while still depending on an ally’s weapons.

Changing public sentiment

Public sentiment, too, appears to be changing. While outright support for Japan developing its own nuclear arsenal remains relatively low, opinion polls suggest a growing willingness to reconsider the nation’s traditional “Three Non-Nuclear Principles.” Hiroshima native Tatsuaki Takahashi, whose grandfather survived the atomic bombing in 1945, noted that as the trauma of that tragedy recedes into history, more Japanese are open to rethinking the nation’s nuclear policy.

The debate is not confined to Japan. In South Korea, which also depends on U.S. deterrence, polling shows as much as 75% of the public supports developing indigenous nuclear weapons. The election of President Lee Jae Myung, who is less confrontational than his conservative predecessors, has slowed the momentum toward nuclear armament. Still, discussions of “nuclear latency”—possessing the technological capability to quickly build nuclear weapons if necessary—have gained traction even within his Democratic Party.

In both Tokyo and Seoul, the anxieties are fueled by the same source: the unpredictable U.S. president. Trump has long questioned the value of America’s defense commitments, openly chastising NATO allies, imposing trade restrictions on Japan and South Korea, and floating unorthodox ideas such as absorbing Canada into the U.S. Although his administration insists that U.S. alliances in Asia remain strong, his rhetoric has unsettled partners who see themselves on the frontline of potential conflicts with China or North Korea.

Unwavering U.S. alliance?

Officially, both Japan and South Korea maintain faith in Washington’s commitments. Japan’s foreign ministry has reiterated that it views the U.S. alliance as “unwavering,” while its defense ministry emphasizes confidence in America’s nuclear deterrent. Seoul has echoed similar assurances, calling its alliance with the U.S. the “foundation of our diplomacy.” Yet behind these public statements, private doubts are mounting. Interviews with more than a dozen lawmakers, former military officials, and diplomats reveal growing unease with leaving their nations’ survival entirely in American hands.

Still, Japan faces formidable political and cultural obstacles before it could even consider acquiring nuclear weapons. The nation’s pacifist constitution, public memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and its commitment to non-proliferation treaties all stand as major barriers. Matsukawa herself acknowledges that the U.S. remains an indispensable ally, and that persuading the Trump administration to stay engaged in Asia remains Tokyo’s priority. But by openly discussing nuclear options, she and others are breaking a decades-old taboo.

The implications of this shift extend far beyond Japan. If Tokyo were to pursue nuclear arms, it could trigger a dangerous regional arms race, potentially prompting South Korea to follow suit and destabilizing the security balance in Northeast Asia. It would also mark a dramatic departure from the global non-proliferation regime, undermining efforts to contain nuclear ambitions in Iran and other flashpoints.

For now, the nuclear debate in Japan remains largely theoretical. But as Trump’s America-First policies continue to unsettle allies, the once-unthinkable is now being quietly considered in Tokyo and Seoul. In a region surrounded by nuclear-armed powers and facing escalating tensions over Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula, the question is no longer whether Japan should think about nuclear weapons—but whether it can afford not to.

(Source: Reuters)

A

ustralia has announced a landmark $6.5 billion deal to buy 11 state-of-the-art warships from Japan, a move analysts say could elevate Canberra into a top-tier Pacific maritime power while propelling Tokyo into the ranks of major global weapons exporters.

The vessels — upgraded Mogami-class stealth frigates built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries — are described as among the most advanced surface combatants afloat, rivaling or surpassing anything fielded by China or even the United States.

Australia’s Defense Minister for Industry Pat Conroy framed the purchase as a strategic counterweight to growing Chinese naval activity, including a task force that circumnavigated Australia earlier this year and staged live-fire drills off its coast. “This is another step towards delivering a much larger and more lethal navy, with stealth frigates that will reassure our allies and deter our adversaries,” Conroy said.

Bigger, longer-range, more firepower

The Australian version of the Mogami will be larger than those in service with Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force, featuring an extended range of about 11,500 miles — roughly half the Earth’s circumference without refueling — and a lean crew of 90. That is nearly half the complement required for Australia’s current ANZAC-class frigates, a crucial advantage for countries facing military recruitment shortfalls.

Weaponry will center on 32 US-made Mk 41 vertical launch cells, allowing each ship to fire up to 128 air-defense missiles — quadrupling Australia’s current surface fleet capacity. The cells can also accommodate Tomahawk cruise missiles with 1,000-mile strike ranges, as well as long-range anti-submarine rockets, potentially giving Australia an edge in detecting and neutralizing nuclear-powered submarines.

“It’s stealth, it’s reduced manning, it’s modularity — all at a relatively affordable price,” said Alessio Patalano, professor of war and strategy in East Asia at King’s College London. Carl Schuster, a former US Navy captain, called the ship “slightly superior” to China’s Type 054B frigate, with particular strengths in air defense.

Beyond hardware, experts stress the Mogami’s software and sensor systems may be its most decisive features. “Superior sonar software could be the difference between tracking a hostile contact or missing it entirely,” noted Sidharth Kaushal of the Royal United Services Institute in London.

Japan’s shipbuilding reliability

Both Schuster and Patalano highlighted Japan’s track record for delivering complex naval platforms on time and on budget — a point of contrast with US shipbuilding delays. The US Navy has not had frigates since 2015, and its Constellation-class program, launched in 2020, is already at least three years behind schedule.

“In my opinion, [the Mogami] is superior to the Constellation class,” Schuster said. Patalano added that the US has “a lot to learn” from allies like Japan, South Korea, and the UK in innovation and efficiency.

For Japan, the deal marks its largest-ever arms export since it began loosening post–World War II restrictions on lethal weapons sales. Previously, Tokyo had sold surveillance radars to the Philippines and Patriot missile interceptors to the US, but the frigate contract — with the first three ships to be built in Japan and the remaining eight in Australian shipyards — represents a leap into high-end defense manufacturing for export.

Exporting not only the warships but also the production technology “would catapult Japan into the space of major defense industry exporters,” Patalano said.

The arrangement is also expected to create 10,000 jobs in Australia and strengthen interoperability between two members of the US-led Quad security grouping, which also includes India. Canberra anticipates the first ship will be operational by 2029.

Historic builder returns to form

The deal also spotlights Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ storied naval legacy. The firm built the Yamato and Musashi, the largest battleships ever constructed, for the Imperial Japanese Navy during World War II. Those behemoths, armed with 18-inch guns, were rendered obsolete by aircraft carriers before seeing decisive action; both were sunk by US air power in 1944–45.

Eighty years later, Mitsubishi is again producing cutting-edge warships — this time as part of a democratic alliance network seeking to maintain stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Analysts say the Australia–Japan frigate deal fits into a broader pattern of allied maritime rearmament, aimed at deterring China’s naval expansion and securing vital sea lanes. It also underscores how technological partnerships among US allies can sometimes advance more quickly than US-led programs, potentially shaping the future balance of naval power in the region.

As Patalano put it: “This is not just a ship sale. It’s a signal — that in the Pacific, America’s closest allies are investing in each other to ensure they can stand together against shared challenges.”

(Source: CNN)

I

n a recent commentary piece published on Newsweek, the ongoing debate surrounding U.S. grand strategy has been reignited, with analysts and policymakers divided over the implications of adopting an “Asia First” approach at the expense of European alliances.

The commentary, penned by Paul Cormarie, delves into the emerging concept of “selective isolationism,” where the United States would strategically isolate itself from certain regions while prioritizing others. Specifically, the “Asia First” approach advocates redirecting resources and energy towards geopolitical efforts in Asia, citing the growing threat posed by the People’s Republic of China.

Cormarie argues against this approach, highlighting the already diminished U.S. military presence in Europe compared to the Cold War era. He emphasizes the importance of maintaining strong alliances with European partners through organizations like NATO, especially in the face of potential Russian aggression. Cormarie contends that isolating European interests in favor of Asia could strain U.S. relationships with allies across both regions.

Lack of resources?

Moreover, he challenges the notion that the United States lacks the resources to maintain a robust presence in both Europe and Asia. He points out that current defense spending in the Indo-Pacific region far exceeds that in Europe, suggesting that any perceived imbalance is not due to over-investment in European security.

The commentary also touches on the recent conflict in Ukraine and its implications for U.S. foreign policy. While acknowledging the need to support allies like Taiwan, Cormarie argues against prioritizing one region over another, warning of the potential negative repercussions on U.S. credibility and global stability.

Cormarie asserts that selectively isolating regions could undermine U.S. alliances and exacerbate tensions with adversaries like China. He advocates for a more balanced approach that maintains U.S. commitments to allies in both Europe and Asia, arguing that such engagement is crucial for navigating complex geopolitical challenges and promoting stability worldwide.

The commentary has sparked debate among policymakers and analysts, with proponents and critics alike weighing in on the merits of the “Asia First” strategy and its implications for U.S. global leadership. As the discussion continues, the future direction of U.S. grand strategy remains uncertain, with important implications for international relations and security dynamics around the world.

Source: RAND

I

n a move to strengthen defense cooperation and address regional security challenges, U.S. President Joe Biden has announced plans to convene a trilateral summit with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol. The summit is scheduled to take place on the sidelines of the upcoming NATO meeting in Washington.

Diplomatic sources have revealed that President Biden intends to extend invitations to Prime Minister Kishida and President Yoon for the July gathering, with discussions expected to focus on strategic collaboration to deter threats from North Korea and China, among other pressing issues.

The proposed summit follows a precedent set during a previous meeting at Camp David last August, where the leaders reaffirmed their commitment to regular trilateral engagements. The forthcoming discussions are anticipated to build upon previous agreements and explore avenues for enhanced cooperation in defense and security matters.

Media blackout

While Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi declined to confirm Prime Minister Kishida’s participation, Japanese media outlets report a high likelihood of the summit taking place. Similarly, South Korea’s presidential office has yet to issue a response to inquiries regarding President Yoon’s attendance.

The anticipated discussions underscore the importance of strengthening ties between the United States and its East Asian allies in the face of evolving security challenges. As the U.S.-led NATO alliance seeks to expand its engagement with Indo-Pacific partners, initiatives such as this trilateral summit demonstrate a commitment to fostering regional stability and security cooperation.

Past participation of Prime Minister Kishida and President Yoon in NATO summits highlights the growing significance of Indo-Pacific partnerships within the broader framework of international security. With the looming specter of North Korea’s nuclear threat and China’s assertive behavior, the upcoming trilateral summit offers an opportunity for coordinated action and strategic alignment among key stakeholders in the Asia-Pacific region.

The trilateral summit between the United States, Japan, and South Korea is expected to yield concrete outcomes and further solidify the alliance’s commitment to upholding peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region. As preparations for the meeting gather momentum, all eyes are on Washington for the pivotal discussions that lie ahead.

Source: Reuters

I

n a historic move, Japan’s Cabinet has given the green light to a plan that signals a significant departure from the nation’s postwar pacifist principles. The decision, announced on Tuesday, paves the way for Japan to export future next-generation fighter jets developed in collaboration with Britain and Italy to other countries.

The decision to allow international arms sales represents a major shift in Japan’s defense posture and is expected to bolster the country’s role in global security efforts. Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi emphasized that while the move reflects Japan’s evolving security environment, the nation remains committed to its pacifist principles.

Under the approved plan, Japan’s arms equipment and technology transfer guidelines will be revised to permit the sale of co-produced lethal weapons to countries beyond the project’s partners. Hayashi assured that strict approval processes will be enforced to ensure compliance with Japan’s commitment to peace.

Global Combat Air Program

The joint fighter jet project, known as the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP), involves collaboration with Italy and the U.K. The initiative aims to develop an advanced fighter jet to replace Japan’s aging fleet of American-designed F-2 fighters and the Eurofighter Typhoons used by the U.K. and Italian militaries.

This decision marks a significant departure from Japan’s long-standing policy of restricting arms exports under its pacifist constitution. However, amid growing regional tensions, particularly from neighboring China, Japan has moved to deregulate its arms exports in recent years.

The move to export fighter jets and lethal weapons is seen as crucial for Japan’s participation in the project and its efforts to maintain technological superiority in the region, particularly against rivals like China and Russia.

Strengthening Japan’s military capabilities

While the decision has faced criticism from opponents, who argue that the government has not adequately explained the decision or sought public approval, the government has assured that exports will be limited to codeveloped lethal weapons for the jet and will not be used in active wars.

The Cabinet’s decision comes amid broader efforts by Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s government to strengthen Japan’s military capabilities and defense industry partnerships. Kishida is expected to emphasize Japan’s willingness to play a greater role in military cooperation during an upcoming state visit to Washington in April.

The move to export fighter jets and lethal weapons is also expected to benefit Japan’s defense industry, which has traditionally focused on supplying the country’s Self Defense Force. By expanding into international markets, Japan aims to support its defense industry while furthering its military capabilities.

Source: The Associated Press

D

espite earlier reports indicating that Japan had overtaken China as the world’s largest auto exporter in 2023, new data has emerged, suggesting that China did, in fact, maintain its position as the leading exporter. Japanese customs data initially reported that Japan exported 5.97 million vehicles in 2023, surpassing China’s reported 5.22 million vehicle exports.

However, manufacturing association data from both countries now indicates that China outpaced Japan, particularly in the passenger car segment, with 4.14 million passenger car exports compared to Japan’s 3.978 million in 2023. These figures highlight China’s dominance in the automotive sector and its ability to compete on a global scale.

A significant portion of China’s car exports, over 70% in 2023, comprised gasoline-powered vehicles, according to the Ministry of Commerce. The surge in gasoline-powered car exports to Russia followed the geopolitical events, with many international manufacturers leaving the Russian market, creating an opportunity for Chinese automakers.

Mexico as a major destination

Mexico also emerged as a major destination for Chinese gasoline-powered car exports, marking a notable shift in the traditionally protective Mexican auto industry. Chinese-made cars gained significant market share in Mexico, raising questions about the reasons behind their rapid growth in the region.

In terms of electric vehicles (EVs), China continued to make strides. The new energy vehicle penetration in China reached 40% of new passenger car sales by the end of 2023, far surpassing the approximately 7% in the United States. Chinese battery and EV company BYD surpassed Tesla in overall vehicle production in 2023, selling more battery-powered cars than the U.S. automaker in the fourth quarter.

The global automotive industry is undergoing a transformation, with China at the forefront, leading in electrification, internet connectivity, autonomous driving, and other technological innovations. China’s strategic vision, significant investments in research and development, and a supportive government have propelled the country to dominate the EV market and become a major force in the global automotive sector.

Shaping the future of the automotive industry

China’s continued success in exporting vehicles, particularly EVs, is expected to shape the future of the automotive industry, with a forecast of 5.4 million units exported in 2024, of which EVs are anticipated to constitute 40%. As China’s car makers focus on innovation and expanding their reach to new markets, the country is poised to strengthen its position as a global automotive leader.

Just a decade and a half ago, China’s presence in the automotive industry was characterized as lagging behind. In 2010, reports from a Western automotive industry journal highlighted China’s overseas vehicle sales primarily involving low-tech trucks and buses. These vehicles were predominantly shipped to less-developed markets, including Africa, Eastern Europe, and Central and South America, where buyers were perceived as more easily satisfied. The journal expressed skepticism, stating that despite the surrounding hype, homegrown Chinese cars were not deemed ready for the major export markets.

However, a significant transformation has occurred, driven by China’s extensive supply chain advantages and reduced costs in logistics, labor, and land use. Chinese electric vehicle (EV) manufacturers now boast a cost advantage of at least 20 percent compared to their American and European counterparts. Presently, China stands as the world’s largest automobile market and serves as the leading production and innovation hub for auto components and vehicles.

The momentum toward a green revolution in pursuit of sustainable global development is undeniable. The Global Carbon Project, during the ongoing global climate talks in Dubai, has reported a projected 1.1 percent increase in carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels this year compared to 2022. This announcement takes place as leaders assess progress toward the international goal of limiting global warming to 2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial temperatures.

Sources: Associated Press and Global Times

R

ussia has issued a stern warning to Japan, expressing concerns over its decision to export Patriot PAC-3 anti-aircraft missiles to the United States. Moscow argues that this move has negative implications for global security and could strain relations between Russia and Japan, especially if the munitions find their way to Ukraine.

During a regular press briefing in Moscow, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova criticized Japan’s decision, stating that it signifies a departure from the pacifist principles embedded in the country’s post-war constitution. Zakharova emphasized that Japan’s accelerated remilitarization and the transfer of weapons to the US could have tangible and adverse consequences for both global and regional security.

Zakharova highlighted the potential risk of the Japanese-made Patriot missiles being redirected to Ukraine, characterizing such actions as unequivocally hostile toward Russia. She expressed concern that Japan is losing control over its weapons, now subject to U.S. decisions on their deployment.

The first time since World War II

Japan’s recent approval to export PAC-3 missiles follows the country’s significant shift in military export policy, marking the first time since World War II that Japan has exported weapons. The decision came after Japan ended a ban on military exports imposed in 1947, allowing Tokyo to export weapons produced in Japan under foreign licenses.

While Japan maintains that the Patriot missiles are not expected to be directly sent to Ukraine, there are concerns that the move may indirectly facilitate the delivery of U.S.-made Patriots to Kiev, with the Japanese missiles replacing them in the U.S. stocks.

In response to Russia’s warning, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida asserted that there is no change to Japan’s principle as a pacifist nation. However, the move is seen as part of Japan’s broader military buildup initiated by Kishida last year, aiming to make Japan the world’s third-largest defense spender, after the U.S. and China. The Japanese government also recently approved a record 16% hike in military spending.

Kuril Islands

The deteriorating relations between Russia and Japan have been exacerbated by Russia’s military actions in Ukraine, with Japan joining Western allies in imposing economic sanctions on Russia. The two nations have yet to formally conclude a treaty ending World War II hostilities due to a longstanding territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands.

In a significant geopolitical move, the Ukrainian Parliament has formally recognized two disputed islands in the Kuril Islands chain, Habomai and Shikotan, as Japanese territory. The decision, made on Friday, came after a heated debate in the Ukrainian parliament, which is currently grappling with Russia’s aggressive attempts to annex Ukrainian territories.

The international community is closely watching the developments, recognizing the potential geopolitical ramifications of Japan’s strategic shift and its impact on the delicate balance in the region.

Sources: Anadolu Agency, Russia Today and Reuters.

I

n a pivotal moment signaling a potential thaw in relations, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida engaged in their first face-to-face dialogue in a year on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. The rare talks focused on strengthening their “strategic relationship,” despite the array of diplomatic challenges that have recently plagued relations between Asia’s two largest economies.

The meeting, which took place at a pivotal moment in San Francisco, saw both leaders agree to address economic disputes that have fueled tension, notably China’s ban on Japanese seafood imports following the Fukushima water discharge controversy and the detention of a Japanese businessman in China. Both leaders expressed a commitment to “focus on common interests” and push for a mutually beneficial relationship that navigates past their historical and territorial disputes, trade issues, and differing views on Taiwan.

The bilateral talks yielded an agreement to establish a framework for discussing export controls, a critical aspect of the broader economic partnership between the two nations. This framework aims to facilitate dialogue and prevent tit-for-tat measures that could disrupt the delicate balance of trade and economic cooperation in the region.

Framework for dialogue

The diplomatic engagement aligns with a series of high-profile meetings, including a summit between U.S. President Joe Biden and Xi Jinping, which led to the establishment of a presidential hotline and a commitment to resume military-to-military communications. Kishida’s subsequent meeting with Biden underscored shared challenges related to China, underscoring the intricate web of alliances and rivalries that define the Asia-Pacific geopolitical landscape.

According to Rumi Aoyama, an expert on Japan-China relations, China’s overture towards Japan could be an attempt to mitigate Tokyo’s close ties with Washington amid intensifying U.S.-China confrontation. As the director of Waseda Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies, Aoyama posited that Beijing might be seeking to drive a wedge between the two allies by cultivating a stronger relationship with Japan.

The APEC summit also served as a stage for regional collaboration, with Kishida meeting South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol to discuss cooperation and mutual concerns like North Korea’s missile tests. A brief trilateral encounter with President Biden emphasized a united front on security concerns.

The road ahead

As APEC leaders convened for the summit, the dialogue between China and Japan represented a glimmer of hope for regional stability. The summit, which continues until November 17, is anticipated to yield further discussions on trade, security, and environmental concerns, highlighting the multifaceted nature of economic and political dynamics in the Asia-Pacific.

The Sino-Japanese talks may set a precedent for conflict resolution and cooperation in a region fraught with complexities. However, whether this diplomatic détente will lead to lasting change remains uncertain, hinging on the practical implementation of the agreements and the ever-evolving geopolitical climate.

The China-Japan meeting in San Francisco is a significant step towards easing regional tensions, offering a potential roadmap for reconciling economic interests with diplomatic disputes. As the world watches, the outcomes of these discussions may well shape the future of Asia-Pacific relations and set the tone for international diplomacy in an increasingly multipolar world order.

Sources: Reuters, Arab News

T

he recent allegations regarding North Korea’s supply of military equipment and munitions to Russia have provoked international condemnation from countries including South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. These countries have expressed their deep concerns, claiming that such transfers exacerbate the human toll of Russia’s ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

A joint statement, released by the top diplomats from South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, offers a unified stance against what they perceive as a destabilizing factor in an already precarious global situation. South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa together asserted that these weapon deliveries, some of which have been confirmed, “will significantly increase the human toll of Russia’s war of aggression.”

The geopolitical implications of this alliance are manifold. Historically, North Korea and Russia, both engaged in separate confrontations with the U.S. and its allies, have often found common ground in their mutual interests. This bond seems to have tightened recently, as evidenced by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s visit to Russia, where he met President Vladimir Putin and toured several key military installations.

Significant shift in the balance of power

The fears of Japan, South Korea and the U.S. aren’t unfounded. Reports suggest that North Korea isn’t just making a one-sided deal; it seeks advanced weapons technologies from Russia to augment its nuclear program. If these speculations hold water, they could represent a significant shift in the balance of power in the region, posing a direct threat to many countries, especially given North Korea’s historic volatility.

The U.S., South Korea, and other concerned nations suspect this alliance to be a two-way street. While North Korea allegedly provides Russia with conventional arms to supplement its dwindling arsenal, Russia, in return, is believed to be supplying North Korea with sophisticated weapons technologies. This would not only bolster North Korea’s nuclear capabilities but could also lead to more reliable and advanced weapons systems.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, however, dismissed these allegations. During a recent trip to Pyongyang, he emphasized Russia’s appreciation for North Korea’s “unwavering” support in its Ukraine conflict. Upon his return to Moscow, and in response to these claims, he stated that “the Americans keep accusing everyone” and refused to comment further, labeling them as mere “rumors.”

1,000 containers of military equipment

However, contrary to Lavrov’s dismissive stance, the White House recently disclosed evidence suggesting North Korea had indeed delivered over 1,000 containers of military equipment and munitions to Russia. These containers, the U.S. claimed, were transferred to a Russian-flagged ship and subsequently transported via train to southwestern Russia.

The international community’s concerns aren’t limited to the ongoing Ukraine conflict. Since the previous year, North Korea has conducted over 100 missile tests, many simulating nuclear strikes against the U.S. and South Korea. With Russia potentially providing advanced weapon technologies, Kim Jong Un could develop more reliable nuclear weapons systems, threatening global stability.

To counter North Korea’s increasing nuclear prowess, the U.S. and South Korea have intensified their regular military exercises. In a show of collective defense, they have even reinstated some joint training exercises with Japan. This week witnessed the three nations’ armed forces carrying out their inaugural trilateral aerial exercise close to the Korean Peninsula.

Maritime exercise

Moreover, South Korea’s navy announced a comprehensive maritime exercise off the Korean Peninsula’s western coast. This training, encompassing live-fire drills, also saw participation from U.S. military helicopters and patrol aircraft.

While North Korea has yet to comment on this maritime drill, it has a history of perceiving such U.S.-South Korean exercises as precursors to invasion, often retaliating with missile tests.

The evolving dynamics in the region underscore the intricate balance of power and the high stakes involved. As alliances shift and nations recalibrate their strategies, the world watches closely, hoping that diplomacy and dialogue will prevail over confrontation.

Sources: The Independent, Japan Today, AP News

D

uring the past decade, international audiences have come to associate the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led Indian Government with a muscular form on Hindu nationalism that has made the country a metaphorical living hell for religious minorities. Many experts claim Muslims and Christians have been pushed to the brink of genocide by a regime and ideology – Hindutva – that makes no secret of its intent to transform India into a Hindu-only nation.

International headlines convey this reality: “In India, calls for Muslim genocide, grow louder,” observes the Washington Post. “India’s Muslims fear for their future under Narendra Modi,” says BBC. “India’s Christians attacked under anti-conversion laws” remarks the New York Times. “Dreams of a Hindu nation leave minorities worried,” declares the Japan Times.

But when it comes to the Indian Government’s relationship with non-Hindu religions, these headlines tell only a small part of a very large story, because as anyone with an intimate knowledge of India knows – this is a country of profound paradoxes and contradictions. India is what former UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill would describe as a “riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma,” a statement he used to define the Soviet Union.

Buddhism as a foreign policy tool

Because at the same time, India is persecuting religious minorities at home, it’s using Buddhism advance its foreign policy objectives abroad, particularly in Asia, despite Buddhists accounting for less than one percent of India’s total population. India has adopted the religion as a soft power tool to enhance bilateral relations in the region.

Indian headlines convey this reality: “PM Modi projects Buddhism as unique part of India’s foreign policy,” says ANI News. “Indian PM Narendra Modi promotes Buddhism worldwide,” observes Associates Times. “Modi has been working to turn India’s Buddhist heritage into strategic asset,” remarks The Week.

Buddhists may represent a tiny percentage of India’s population, but the Indian Government can plausibly sell “India’s Buddhist heritage” to a global audience, given the country is not only the birthplace of the religious faith, but also home to numerous sacred sites, including Bodh Gaya, Nalanda, and Sarnath. Some analysts contend Buddhism has been India’s most successful export, having opened the South Asian country to the world in the 6^th century, when the religion was introduced to Japan.

Modi’s ‘Act East’ and Buddhism

Moreover, Buddhism diplomacy has become an organizing principle of Modi’s ‘Act East’ policy, which aims to counter China’s growing influence in the region by cultivating bilateral economic and strategic relations with Indo Pacific nations, which is why Modi has made Buddhism a prominent feature of his international visits.

International headlines again convey this reality: “In a bid to woo Thailand, PM Narendra Modi invokes Lord Buddha,” observes the Economic Times. “PM Narendra Modi’s visit to Nepal’s Lumbini Showcases Indian Buddhist diplomacy,” writes Outlook. “PM Modi visits Buddhist temple in Japan,” remarked The Hindu. “India to spend $15 million to boost Buddhist ties in the region,” reported Associated Press.

Last year on the holiday to commemorate Buddha’s birthday – Vesak Day – Modi said, “Lord Buddha has become even more relevant…Countries are joining hands with each other and becoming each other’s strength, taking the values of Buddha.”

In his rhetoric and policies, Modi has made clear he views Buddhism to be the perfect instrument to build and enhance bilateral relations in the region because of the religion’s pan-Asian presence and reputation for promoting equality and encouraging peaceful coexistence.

Buddhist ties with Sri Lanka and Japan

By touting India’s Buddhist heritage, Modi has bolstered his government’s economic, cultural, and academic initiatives. Last year, the Indian Government announced a $15 million grant for the promotion of Buddhist ties with its neighbor Sri Lanka, where the religion is practiced by more than 70 percent of the population.

This money will be spent on the construction and renovation of Buddhist monasteries, cultural exchanges, archaeological cooperation, and reciprocal exposition of Buddha’s relics, according to India’s External Affairs Ministry.

But it’s the India-Japan relationship that best illustrates how Buddhism has operated as a binding agent between New Delhi and a fellow regional economic power, with Buddhists accounting for nearly 70 percent of the total Japanese population, a reality Modi turned into opportunity during his first visit to the North Asian country in 2014, when he chose Kyoto, instead of Tokyo, as his first destination.

He chose Kyoto because it’s home to To-ji Temple, a 9^th century Buddhist complex. There he met with then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. When India’s Minister for External Affairs tweeted a photo of the two leaders walking together through the temple grounds, he included the words, “Moving in unison. PM Modi and PM Abe at To-ji temple, symbolic of India-Japan civilizational commonalities.”

The Japanese leader echoed this sentiment, telling local reporters at the time how Buddhism spread from India to Japan, creating what he called a “sutra” [thread] between the two countries.

T

In late December 2022, the Japanese government announced a new security policy, abandoning the fiction that the country’s military (euphemistically called the “Self Defense Forces”) would not possess offensive weaponry. Perhaps more significantly, the government also announced it would increase military spending dramatically, almost doubling the budget over the next five years.

This has been reported on internationally (and domestically) as an inevitable reaction to increasing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea and elsewhere. Such reporting, however, misses the broader political context.

The two percent figure: Pleasing the Americans

The Japanese government’s stated aim is to have military spending at two percent of GDP: a startling departure from the longstanding policy commitment to keep the budget at or around one percent. This would make Japan the third-largest military spender in the world, after the United States and China—an uncomfortable fact rarely mentioned in the Japanese media.

The two percent figure is an arbitrary one, not based on any kind of serious assessment of defense needs. Indeed, some commentators have argued that the military does not have the capacity to absorb the large sums: the all-volunteer forces have consistently not been able to meet their recruiting goals. Nevertheless, successive governments of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), backed by big business, have long pushed for the increase—a push that became stronger under the overtly nationalistic cabinets of Shinzo Abe.

Rather, the reasoning is political. NATO countries, the closest allies of the United States, commit to a two percent GDP target (though not many of them fulfill this pledge, inviting American criticism). Though obviously not a NATO member, Japan increasing its military budget to two percent, would, in the minds of the political elite, endear the country to the eyes of the all-important Americans.

For Japan to be recognized as a good student and invited to the front of the classroom to sit amongst the big boys, so the political elite believe, Japan must prove its worth to the United States as a trusty military sidekick, ready to jump to action at a moment’s notice. The notion that American interests may differ from Japan’s, or that Japan may be dragged into a catastrophic war, seems simply inconceivable; for better or for worse, Japan wants to be all in.

China as Japan’s eternal boogeyman

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has, of course, provided a bandwagon for the LDP to obtain support for a larger military, and has been relentlessly exploited. However, the true adversary has always been China, labelled in the new policy as “a matter of serious concern” for Japan and the “greatest strategic challenge” the country faces.

This mantra of the Chinese threat has been repeated ad naseum in Japan for the better part of twenty years, in particular since China overtook Japan as the world’s second-largest economy in 2010. The Japanese have essentially been spoon-fed a sustained, almost hysterical barrage of how they must fear the Chinese menace.

China is a security threat, an economic threat, a political threat, a cultural threat— the list goes on and on, and is repeated over and over in official statements and in the media. Yet few can point to any plausible, concrete threat that China poses to Japan, and certainly none that would be solved by aggressive military posturing. That China poses a challenge to unipolar American hegemony in the Asia Pacific (and elsewhere) is clear, but that is a problem for Japan only because of the slavish attitude of the political elite towards the United States.

The context: Continuing Japanese decline

The background of this is, of course, ongoing Japanese decline. Since the bubble economy imploded in 1990, economic growth has been anemic at best. Wages have remained stagnant for the better part of thirty years, and the country is now in the lower third of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). A recent global survey showed that salaries for information technology (IT) engineers in Japan came in at a dismal twentieth place. With the weakening yen, more and more young people are moving abroad for higher wages—a situation that would have been inconceivable a generation ago.

The low wages are particularly galling given the brutally long hours most Japanese still work: karoshi, death from overwork, remains a major social issue in the country, with people regularly working over the officially recognized “karoshi line” of 80 hours of monthly overtime. An international survey of young people in 2018 showed that Japan was dead last in terms of hope for the future: only 12 percent of Japanese respondents said they had any hope. The second lowest, France, had twice that. Forty percent of Japanese, double the percentage of 1989, are currently in precarious, contract-based employment.

Within this general context of anxiety, people often want a scapegoat, and China has served as the all-menacing boogeyman. Of course, the Japanese do not believe that China is the direct cause of the country’s economic and social decay: rather, it is the vague sense of impending doom, of being stalked, overtaken, and left in the cold by some dark, powerful force that has, over time, gripped the popular consciousness. More and more, the “Chinese threat” is being used to simply shut down any debate—something that can be observed with the military expansion.

Amid the Russia-Ukraine war in Europe, the United States has reaffirmed its commitment to counter China in the strategically vital Indo-Pacific region, by putting $2.2 billion on the table.

But in the end, what price are the regional and world powers willing to pay—not only in financial terms—to ensure a free and open South China Sea against the backdrop of China’s rising military maneuvering?

Bone of contention

The South China Sea, which encompasses 1.4 million square miles, is of tremendous economic and geostrategic importance. More than $3 trillion in trade is transported over it each year, and roughly one-third of the world’s maritime shipping moves through its waters. It also hosts a huge number of fisheries, indispensable for the food security of China, Southeast Asia, and beyond.

Yet, apart from the economic benefits, this large swath of war is on the top agenda of many countries due to its geopolitical significance. From a narrow perspective, only a few neighboring nations have domain over parts of the South China Sea due to their respective geographic position. This includes China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. Nevertheless, many other countries such as Indonesia, Singapore, Cambodia, and Japan play a vital role in this maritime region, extending the circle of the partners involved.

Stirring opposition, China has claimed not only most of the waters of South China Sea for itself, but also competes for two groups of islands of strategic importance: the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands are contested by China and other neighboring countries.

No one wants to abandon their claims, given the richness in deposits of natural resources, and the potential to strengthen a country’s security and to open trade routes. This creates a source for a conflict which some have attempted to resolve by negotiation and legal challenges. So far, this has been in vain.

Empires’ loud talk

In the whole saga of this maritime dispute, the United States’ role cannot be ignored. The country evokes legal treaties such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to affirm the claim that the South China Sea is international waters and accuses China of militarizing the area. In recent years, artificial islets have been built by China, and some of the reefs have been converted to military facilities, paving the way for the dominance of one power.

Frothy waters amid the controversies

Due to China’s economic prowess and consequently the dependency of its neighbors on bilateral trade, many regional countries have embraced appeasing politics. However, some cracks have started to appear very recently on the surface of these seemingly friendly relations.

Last year, China deployed three ships to the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ), prompting a fast rebuke from Rodrigo Duterte, the country’s president. Also, Malaysia summoned China’s ambassador to protest against the activities of Chinese vessels in Kuala Lumpur’s EEZ.

Vietnam and Taiwan that have experienced more ups-and-downs in dealing with China than anyone else are already on a buying spree of military equipment, searching to pro-actively improve their defense capabilities (without searching for excuses for doing so).

In the eyes of many analysts, Russia’s war in Ukraine turned the rules-based order upside down. The Russian Federation resorted to a military solution to respond to the self-perceived feeling of endangerment, and in order to return its so-called ancestral lands back to the motherland after they were allegedly wrongly gifted to Ukraine.

But the erosion of the rule of law did not start in 2022.

Previously, in 1994, Ukraine was given security assurances for abandoning its nuclear weapons by the signatories of the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances. Yet, the United Kingdom and the United States, subsequently joined by France and China, allowed Russia to annex Crimea exactly twenty years after the agreement.

Therefore, many point to the perishability of certain norms of international law due to the lack of their enforcement. Washington’s selective application of rules does not help its argument when evoking the need to uphold the law. However, it is without dispute that apart from deploying its armed forces, the U.S. has supported Ukraine in countering the aggressor and it remains to be seen who will be called the winner.

With American ships frequently passing through the South China Sea, not far from the Chinese ones, it is rightly feared that one small clash could lead to a full-scale war anytime as neither China nor other parties to the dispute want to deescalate easily.

It is worthwhile to bear in mind that diplomatic solutions have not been completely exhausted despite the rounds of diplomatic salvos between China and the U.S.

Japanese policy-makers have jumped at the Ukraine crisis as an opportunity to boost the country’s credentials as a reliable member of the Western alliance—a goal stated clearly at every juncture. Japan was quick to adopt sanctions in line with the United States, and has stressed at every turn that it stands shoulder to shoulder with its international partners in the West.

Japan at first balked at the prospect of stopping the import of Russian oil, but by that time so had the Europeans, so clearly a calculation was made that Japan would not stand out on that issue. Japan also quickly changed its restrictions on weapons exports (which had prohibited exports to a country engaged in conflict) to allow it to send defensive equipment such as bulletproof vests to Ukrainian forces.

Japan even announced it would admit refugees from Ukraine, a significant move since for decades the country has been criticized for flouting international norms of refugee protection—and was criticized by G7 partners for its stated reluctance to accept Syrian refugees during the 2015 crisis.

As of March 13, 2022, the number of Ukrainian refugees brought to Japan totaled a paltry 47 persons, but the political will appears clear.

The Ukrainian crisis as an opportunity for Japan

That Japan would see the Ukrainian crisis as an opportunity is not surprising. Geographically far from the fighting, the chances of Japan being destabilized from the conflict are slim. Economic relations with Russia are meaningful in terms of oil and other energy resources, but Russia is far from being a major source for Japan, with the country relying on West Asia for nearly 90 percent of its oil.

Bilateral relations are dominated by the dispute over the Kuril Islands, which Japan insists on referring to as the “Northern Territories,” but negotiations on that issue have been going nowhere for some time. On that front, a weakened Russia can only benefit Japan.

More to the point, however, the Japanese political elite has banked heavily on the military alliance with the United States, as a bulwark against China and a means towards regaining economic hegemony in the region. Those who honestly think that China is a national security threat believe that only the Americans can and will protect Japan. Recent initiatives including countries such as the UK and Australia (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) are important, but Japan is not really hedging its bets.

The notion that the Americans are in Japan to protect the country (allowing the people to live in peace and the country to engage in economic pursuits) is dominant throughout the public discourse. Of course, that is only part of the picture: the U.S. military uses Japan as a springboard for military operations not only in the Pacific, but also in Afghanistan, Syria, and other areas of West Asia—facts which are rarely raised.

U.S. warplanes enjoy exclusive access to airspace over central Tokyo, forcing commercial aircraft to take a roundabout route towards the airport, and often hold dangerous training exercises above the city without the consent or even the knowledge of the Japanese government. For these dubious privileges, Japan pays the United States what is euphemistically called the “omoi-yari” (kindness or compassion) budget, amounting to almost $10 billion over the 2022-2026 period.

Particular excesses of U.S. forces in Japan have been subject to public criticism, and at times the government has taken action; however, fundamental questions are rarely asked. Some commentators have noted that members of the Japanese elite who dare to raise objections to the military alliance are instantly excluded from the mainstream. Like many colonized countries, the ruling class in Japan has vested interests in maintaining the status quo.

The same mistakes of WWII?

This relationship of fealty permeates throughout much of Japanese policy-making, and has become even more extreme in recent years, in particular during the reign of PM Shinzo Abe from 2012 to 2020. An overt right-wing ideologue, Abe’s premiership was characterized by numerous controversial “reforms” aimed at remilitarization and the oppression of dissent, including laws rammed through parliament that made it easier for the military to operate abroad—together with the Americans, of course.

Many Japanese were horrified that the country might be repeating the same mistakes that led to WWII. There definitely is that danger, but the fact is that any talk of remilitarization in the postwar era is aimed solely at making a larger contribution to the U.S. alliance, not independent action by Japan.

For all its faults, the Japanese right wing through WWII comprised of true nationalists: they believed that Japan needed to defend its independence, through both diplomatic and military means. The political elite now, on the other hand, is content to have Japan remain a virtual vassal state of the U.S. Indeed, it seems incapable of even contemplating a situation where that is not the case.

Will the United States protect Japan?

That may have made political sense for Japan and the region up till now, during the Pax Americana. However, one important lesson to be learned from the Ukraine crisis—as well as from the fallacy of the United States’ endless wars in West Asia, and from the four years of the Trump presidency—is that the Americans may no longer deliver on their promises.

It may be true that the U.S. has a treaty obligation to protect Japan should the country be invaded, whereas there were never any concrete assurances of protection or even NATO membership to Ukraine (publicly at least). However, it is clear that the U.S. egged the Ukrainians on, and anyway treaties are only as meaningful as the political will to implement them.

The Japanese political elite needs to reassess its strategy—and Japanese who naively believe that the Americans will always be there for us need to take a long, hard look at the situation. Banking on the Americans may no longer be a winning proposition.

A virtual summit for democracy was held on December 9-10, 2021, upon the invitation of the United States. At the summit, Joe Biden renewed his call for democracy and the fight against authoritarianism and corruption. Amongst more than 110 invited countries, 89 showed up. The question now is why the Biden administration initiated the Summit for Democracy. Let me address some important issues and their consequences in what follows.

The general assertion is that the summit was initiated in order to respond to the rhetoric that American democracy is in decay and crisis – a debate which has gone global. One of the key denominators of the democracy crisis in the U.S. has been the horrific attack on Capitol Hill on January 6, 2021 following the results of the U.S. presidential elections.

On August 30, 2021, this was followed by the withdrawal of the U.S.-led NATO forces from Afghanistan, another evident U.S. failure. These and similar events brought the image of U.S. democracy into question before a global public. In this context, the Summit for Democracy was designed to rectify the image of the U.S. both domestically and globally.

The exclusion of major U.S. partners

China and Russia were not invited to the Summit for Democracy as they are regarded as the ideological rivals of democratically ruled countries. There were also countries from the Asia-Pacific and Africa that were not on the invitation list: Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, which are considered de facto allies of the United States, were among the ASEAN members not invited.

China and Russia were not invited to the Summit for Democracy for they are regarded as the ideological rivals of democratically ruled countries.

Although Singapore and Thailand might not be fully democratic, and Vietnam has a single-party rule, they uphold – to a certain degree – democratic practices such as civil society organizations and a rule-based administration. They also have closer ties with the U.S. in fields including not only economy but also culture, academia, and the defence sector. Not only this, but they have been approached by the U.S. to adopt policies against China. Indeed, this is closely related to the well-established Asian pivot policy by former U.S. president Barack Obama.

The invitation of only Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines from the ASEAN region to the Summit for Democracy has led to speculations. Is there a rift between the rest of the member countries of ASEAN and the United States due to a widening ideological gap between democracies and non-democracies? Or is it because of these countries’ sociopolitical or socioeconomic alliances with U.S. rivals? If the former turns out to be true, there is definitely a certain degree of miscalculation by the Biden administration.

There is no doubt that the U.S. is losing credit as the leader of global democracy along with its capacity to defend democratic principles and values. Political elites in ASEAN member states, which rely on Western democracy as an ideal, can no longer satisfy or silence emergent anti-Western sentiments as now critical voices even within the ruling circles in Europe increasingly emerge and question the credibility of the U.S. “democratic” engagements abroad.

Concern over the Lack of Engagement

Japan is a highly acclaimed U.S. ally in the Asia-Pacific region and approached the U.S. decision not to invite certain ASEAN countries to the summit critically.

No doubt that the U.S. is losing credit as the leader of global democracy.

Japanese political commentators were in favor of inviting all ASEAN members, not only some, to the summit. According to them, direct U.S. engagement with ASEAN is essential to sustaining the security in the Asia-Pacific against China. The Japanese commentators seem right to criticize the imposition of a definition of democracy technically contrived by the U.S. alone.

On the subject of the exclusion of Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, Japan has implicitly reacted by expressing its concern about how to improve democratic rules in ASEAN without the U.S. facilitation and engagement through political, economic, and cultural mechanisms.

To highlight additional concerns, it should be emphasized that Singapore, a U.S. ally, and Vietnam, a potential partner of the United States, were not invited to the summit. Taking into consideration that Barack Obama was the first U.S. president to visit Hanoi after the Vietnam War, the exclusion of Vietnam from the summit is not an encouraging move for enhancing the partnership between the two capitals.

Categorizing certain Asia-Pacific countries as “non-democratic” may be true in principle. Nevertheless, the imposition of a Western-based democracy model may not be acceptable by a number of regional countries.

This miscalculated approach by the U.S. administration can potentially trigger more controversy among non-democracies in the Asia-Pacific, and may result either in an attempt to copy the model of the U.S. democracy, which could potentially end up in failure, or push them further towards strengthening their ties with China, the world’s second superpower.

Step Forward

The question remains whether the composition of the countries invited to the Summit for Democracy consisted of a wider alliance or the U.S. was simply playing the leadership role by marking its influence on democratically ruled countries. Then, the subsequent question is whether the U.S. administration intends to divide the world into democratic and undemocratic rules. If the latter is true, it is not difficult to guess the existence of a larger division and separation of countries by the United States as democratic and non-democratic ones.

The lack of U.S. engagement with Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, as member states of ASEAN, can deter the democratization processes further if the United States’ formal involvement remains ineffective. The influence of democratic principles has decreased significantly around the globe in the last decades. This includes Western countries, where democracy was born, as has become evident in the treatment of people of color and migrants.

The task of major democratic countries such as the U.S. is not to judge other democracies apathetically, but rather to galvanize democratic engagements with countries that are undergoing democratic challenges by paying a degree of respect to their existing democratic institutions.

As COVID19 was declared a global pandemic and started to impact public health systems, many countries rushed to close their borders to foreign visitors to stem the spread of the coronavirus. Japan, however, went one step further than most, banning not only foreign visitors, but even foreign residents from re-entering the country.

For example, foreign nationals who had lived twenty years in Japan who went abroad to visit family (or who happened to be abroad when the new measures went into effect) were prohibited from returning, in many cases losing their jobs and their homes. Even spouses of Japanese nationals were unable to return to Japan. At the same time, Japanese nationals who may have lived abroad for twenty years could swan into the country without any serious restrictions. The situation would have been almost comical, had it not been overtly discriminatory. However, there was barely a peep of protest within the country.

Measures targeting foreign national residents were finally rescinded in September 2020, after many diplomatic protests. However, foreigners who had not yet taken up residency were still barred, meaning, for example, highly qualified students and workers waiting to come to Japan continued to be left in limbo. Not surprisingly, many simply gave up, and went to other, more welcoming countries. Restrictions were finally eased for “exceptional cases” in November 2021, but new arrivals still had to fulfill excessive requirements that were clearly designed to make sure people could not take advantage of the new “exceptions” in practice.

For example, from November 2021, fully vaccinated foreigners could come to Japan for business purposes – only for business purposes – self-isolating “exceptionally” for three days instead of the usual fourteen. However, this was only if their business partner agreed to meet them at the airport, ensured they did not use public transport for the full fourteen days, and submitted beforehand a detailed plan of the visitor’s movements covering the entire two-week period. Approval by the government for all of this could take up to a month. People who were not partnering with a large institution that could handle these administrative demands were simply out of luck.

Even the normally diplomatic WHO was forced to make sarcastic remarks about Japan’s measures, pointing out that viruses do not read passports or choose their victims according to where they have legal residency.

In any case, as the Omicron variant emerged, after only three weeks all of these “exceptions” were frozen, and foreign visitors (though not residents this time) have once again been banned. Even the normally diplomatic WHO was forced to make sarcastic remarks about Japan’s measures, pointing out at a press conference that viruses do not read passports or choose their victims according to where they have legal residency. However, according to one poll, the measures are supported by 89 percent of the population.

Sakoku: The closing of the country

Of course, Japan is hardly unique in taking extreme measures against COVID19. However, the current situation must be viewed within the context of the xenophobia that is arguably fundamental to the Japanese psyche.

Selected foreign advisors were welcomed for their expertise, but only if their reforms did not challenge the fundamental power structures of Japanese society. The elite ran a tight ship in steering the process, and would tap the brakes whenever they felt things had gone too far.

Therefore, the general underlying attitude of both the sakoku era and the modernization period was basically constant: foreign matter (people, influences, ideas, etc.) was inherently suspect. It was to be allowed into Japan only to the extent it would be clearly advantageous for the country; otherwise, it must be shut out.

The bubble economy and ongoing “sakoku”

All of a sudden, Japan was number one, and no longer had anything to learn from the West – or from anyone.

Whether that was the right approach at the time is debatable, but at least there was willingness to learn from other countries and regions. This changed in the 1980s, with the “bubble” economy. Exporters poured profits into real estate and stock speculation, and a strong yen allowed Japanese to travel and indulge in luxuries only dreamt of before.

All of a sudden, Japan was number one, and no longer had anything to learn from the West – or from anyone. There was no need to import foreign ideas, and certainly not foreigners themselves, except for the undocumented laborers and foreign “interns” who worked (and still work) as virtual slaves.

The bubble burst in 1991, ushering in a period of economic decline that continues to this day. Japan has been overcome in economic size by China, and – a fact not widely reported in Japan, presumably because the reality is too humiliating to face – by Korea in terms of average income. The Japanese elite remain frozen, incapable of pushing forward any meaningful reform.

Extremely rigid hiring practices have resulted in a massive increase in persons in precarious employment (currently 40 percent of the workforce). Academia is ineffectual, with Japan’s internationally low-ranking universities incapable of producing free-thinking, innovative graduates. The level of English ability and of public interest in international affairs and in foreign countries, in general, is plummeting.

Academia is ineffectual, with Japan’s internationally low-ranking universities incapable of producing free-thinking, innovative graduates.

Finding fertile soil, bullish, aggressive nationalism has been on the rise. Since at least the early 2000s, Japanese popular culture (books, magazines, television, internet, etc.) has been inundated with output of the “Japan is amazing!” genre. The genre is dedicated to presenting Japan as (still) economically and socially superior to the rest of the world and arguing that pessimism is unwarranted. Many of those books and programs are downright delusional, relying on “racial superiority” type claims of the inherently moral character of the Japanese people.

In recent years, these media outputs have been taking a more sinister turn, focusing on criticisms (justified and otherwise) of China and Korea in a transparent attempt at elevating Japan in contrast. Left-leaning media and human rights organizations are also targeted for abuse, and branded as “anti-Japanese” – a situation strikingly similar to the wartime years.

During his reign as prime minister from 2012 to 2020, Shinzo Abe did his utmost to fan these nationalistic flames: refusing to accept responsibility for Japan’s wartime atrocities, promoting militarism, and attempting to have schoolchildren marked on the level of their patriotism, to name but a few. The successive two prime ministers have been less overt, but the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), from which they all come, is full of extremists with similar views. And the populace, fed a near constant diet of nationalistic propaganda, is as compliant – perhaps even willing – as can be.

In many ways, Japan seems to be reverting to a “sakoku” state: insular, inward-looking, and ever more xenophobic. Completely closing the borders like in the 17th century is of course not feasible, but the “sakoku” mental state is much more insidious. Japan may be incapable of overcoming this malaise, meaning even further decline.

Many of the old Western imperialist powers are taking part in a new scramble: this time not for Africa, but for hegemony and influence in the South China Sea. In a surprise announcement on September 15, 2021, the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom formed a new strategic partnership for the sharing of weaponry (in particular nuclear submarine and cruise missiles) and security-related cyber technology, with the main recipient of new weapons expected to be Australia. Dubbed AUKUS, this new alliance will purportedly “protect shared values and promote security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.”

Like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, commonly known as the Quad, an alliance bringing together the U.S., Australia, Japan, and India, none of the official statements of the AUKUS alliance mention China by name. And yet, like the Quad, the intentions of AUKUS are transparent: to maintain military and economic hegemony over the South China Sea, and over China in general. In other words, to keep China in its place, through brute force if necessary. Though how AUKUS and the Quad will co-ordinate remains unclear, there is little question that the provocative joint military exercises taking place under the rubric of the Quad will be expanded to include the AUKUS framework as well.

The inclusion of the UK in AUKUS has raised some eyebrows, since the country has hardly been a Pacific power since World War Two. However, the entire Brexit narrative has been based largely on imperialist fantasies of Britain returning to its “rightful” place as a global powerhouse, perhaps cajoling pesky natives into lucrative – for Britain – trade deals through gunboat diplomacy. There have been calls by influential UK politicians (backed by the former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe) for the UK to be a “major democratic counterweight” to China in the region, and a major review of foreign and defense policy in March 2021 centered on a shift to focus resources – diplomatic and military – on the Indo-Pacific.

Britain also sent an aircraft carrier to the South China Sea, essentially to join the game of intimidating China. Of course, the glory days of Queen Victoria are long over, and the notion that the current UK could accomplish much of anything on its own is somewhat fanciful, so a military alliance with the U.S. and Australia makes sense from that perspective. It should also be noted that the three AUKUS countries, together with Canada and New Zealand, are part of the Five Eyes alliance for intelligence sharing, which includes unsavory activities such as spying on each other’s citizens through monitoring of internet communications.

Even Germany has thrown its hat into the South China Sea ring, sending a frigate to the region.

France has also been flexing its muscles. In 2021, the country participated in joint military exercises in the region with Japan, the U.S., and Australia, dispatching warships to – where else? – the South China Sea. Indeed, the very birth of AUKUS was part and parcel of an imperialist game between Britain and France, with Australia abruptly cancelling a large French contract for submarines and switching to a British manufacturer. A diplomatic row ensued, with the French accusing the AUKUS countries of “betrayal” and even recalling their ambassadors to the U.S. and Australia (Britain was deemed not worth the trouble).

However, while all of that made for entertaining news, at the end of the day it was a sideshow compared to the much more important goal of beating the war drums. Even Germany has thrown its hat into the South China Sea ring, sending a frigate to the region. However, the Germans were easily snubbed by China, which refused the warship entry into a Chinese port.

Defenders of the “rules-based” order

Certainly, the most insulting idea advanced by the countries attempting to contain China is the notion they are defending the “rules-based order” in the South China Sea. In this narrative, China is the “rule breaker,” flouting the accepted laws and customs of international society. China is portrayed as a rogue state, going against international norms and the rule of law itself. The white knights of the West have arisen, not to protect their own selfish interests, but to defend those laws and rules, and champion the “fair and open” international order.

Even the openly provocative passages of Western warships in the area are euphemistically called “freedom of navigation” missions – one can imagine how the U.S. would react to Chinese warships conducting military maneuvers close to its shorelines. These blatantly biased narratives are repeated ad nauseam, not only by the governments themselves, but also by a compliant press. Unable to point to any specific violation, the media uses vague terms such as “increasing assertiveness” to describe Chinese behavior, as if that were a crime. In Japan, the right-of-center press has even resurrected the Cold War term “Free World” to juxtapose itself and the West against China.

The international system is indeed a “rules-based order,” based on laws and norms. In particular, the Charter of the United Nations proclaims the equality and sovereignty of all nations, and prohibits the use of force outside of situations of self-defense. It should be stressed that even then it is only until the Security Council decides on a course of action.

It is hardly controversial to note that the U.S. (and its allies) have openly broken these norms on a huge number of occasions, with catastrophic results for the people on the receiving end. The invasion of Iraq, the destruction of Libya, and ongoing military intervention in Syria are just some of the more egregious examples of U.S. violations of international law in recent years.

The ostensibly liberal government of President Biden thinks nothing of announcing that, even after the 20-year U.S. occupation of Afghanistan came to an unceremonious end, the country will continue the “war on terror” using “over the horizon” means, i.e., illegal bombing with drones and other air-based weapons. The so-called liberal U.S. press practically mounted a concerted campaign to stop the U.S. from pulling out its troops from Afghanistan, claiming the war on terror could not be effected without “boots on the ground.”

The U.S. thumbing its nose at international law is hardly a new phenomenon, and is not confined to the “war on terror” framework.

The U.S. thumbing its nose at international law is hardly a new phenomenon, and is not confined to the “war on terror” framework. The U.S. has intervened openly or covertly in many countries in Latin America, including Cuba, and imposes crippling sanctions on Venezuela. And continuing lavish support for countries that truly do deserve the “rogue state” label, such as the apartheid state of Israel, make a mockery of U.S. claims to be upholding international law.

Of course, the U.S. is hardly the only country that violates international law, and the notion that international law is observed more in breach than in observance is far oversold. Nevertheless, that does not detract from the main point: it is the U.S. and its allies that are being aggressive in the South China Sea, and China is completely justified in being apprehensive of the encirclement of the country by seemingly hostile navies.

A new Cold War – or even a hot one?

Though the current tensions between the West and China are often called a “new Cold War,” there are of course important differences with the past Cold War with the Soviet bloc. Probably the most important one is the extensive economic interdependence between China and the West (and the rest of the world). Even as they rattle their sabers, Western countries are mindful that they rely economically on China, as a manufacturing base and increasingly as a market.

Indeed, China is the main trading partner for the U.S., Japan, and the EU as a whole. A real shooting war would be an unmitigated disaster for the global economy: a fact well understood by business interests that wield great influence over Western governments. That may not make a real shooting war inconceivable, but it definitely does make it difficult. Much of the current rhetoric, in particular in Japan, is a result of pandering to nationalistic constituencies, and of attempts at justifying bloated military budgets and arms sales.

The problem is that, once nationalistic furor is inflamed to this extent, it can very easily get out of control. Right now, there are many opposing militaries in a small space, and merely one mistake could lead to disaster. The West will have only itself to blame if it does.

The war drums are beating loud and hard in the Asia Pacific region. The rivalry between the U.S. and China has been escalating, and is more and more referred to as a new Cold War. Of course, the U.S. and its allies say they are “responding” to Chinese “aggression” to defend freedom and justice – a narrative that is amplified by a compliant media.

Just one manifestation of the new Cold War is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, often referred to as the Quad. Created in 2007, it is an ongoing informal dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. From the outset, the Quad has been characterized by open hostility towards China and its increasing influence: that is obvious from the countries involved, their insistence on the hitherto nonexistent term “Indo-Pacific” to describe the region, and the fact that talks have been accompanied by joint military exercises on an unprecedented scale.

It is little wonder that China sees the purpose of the Quad as surrounding the country with hostile neighbors, which claim “defensive lines” practically at the Chinese shore. Essentially ignoring Chinese and other protests, provocative large-scale naval exercises continue. However, besides military and other co-operation, perhaps one of the main achievements of the Quad so far has been its success in reframing the terms of the discourse.

The 2021 statement of the leaders of the Quad trumpets their “shared vision” for an Indo-Pacific that is “free and open” and operates on a “rules-based order” – a language that has been repeated over and over by the international media, reinforcing the framing of the Quad as the purported defenders of freedom and justice. The Quad’s statement does not mention China, because it doesn’t have to – it is well understood by all what the unnamed “threats” to the above are. All of this serves to shroud the obvious intentions of the four countries (in particular the U.S. and Japan) to maintain their hegemony over the region.

To be clear, none of this is to defend the current Chinese system of governance, or the gross human rights violations perpetrated by the Chinese government. Nor is it to argue that there is no potential security threat posed by China. However, serious doubt should be cast on the narrative that the governments of the Quad are knights on white horses defending the free world from the yellow menace. For better or for worse, China is doing what any country does: demanding a global status it believes is commensurate with its might.

It may indeed be the case that, in the eyes of many in the world, the political system of Western liberal democracy is being challenged by the more authoritarian Chinese model. However, it is submitted that this is due less to Chinese successes and more to Western failings. The hypocrisy of the West in claiming that they defend democracy while they engage in military interventions throughout West Asia and Africa, slam their doors in the face of refugees, and provide the apartheid state of Israel with endless support, is plain for all to see.

While China has raised millions of its citizens out of poverty, Western economies remain geared towards exploiting the many for the greed of the few. And while respect for civil and political rights is certainly abominable in China, the perpetual “war on terror” has exposed the fragility of human rights in many countries in the West as well – not to mention the rise of near-overt fascism in the U.S. under Donald Trump. Facile concepts of “good guys versus bad guys” are not applied easily in the current Asia Pacific.

This has changed dramatically since the late 2000s, as Japan’s (and the United States’) relative power has declined. Japan’s speculation-fueled “bubble economy” burst in 1989, and since then, inept economic management, weak political leadership, and endemic corruption have meant that economic growth has been stagnant. Employment has become increasingly precarious for many, and real wages have been on a declining trend throughout what are now often referred to in Japan as the “lost thirty years.”

The overtaking of Japan by China in 2010 as the world’s second largest economy was a potent symbol to many Japanese of their country’s ongoing plummet, and of the end of the era where they dominated Asia economically. Though Japan remains the world’s third wealthiest country in terms of GDP, a shrinking population adds to a strong sense of continuous decline.

The Japanese right wing has been quick to exploit this social malaise, claiming (like in many other countries) that so-called traditional values is the answer – a return to an allegedly golden era when men were men and women knew their place. In particular, from nearly the get-go the pacifist postwar constitution has been the bête noir of the right, which has portrayed it as a national humiliation and the defanging of the Japanese military as a castration of the Japanese spirit.

Since the early 2000s, China has served as a convenient boogeyman, with the alleged “Chinese threat” being a constant feature of their campaigns. Though public support for pacifist policies generally remains strong, the right has been successful in shifting the discourse, ensuring a seemingly endless stream of references to this “threat” in political fora, the media, and popular publications.

Advances of the right under Shinzo Abe

In particular, the premiership of Shinzo Abe (who initiated the Quad in 2006) from 2012 was a watershed. A committed ideologue, Abe and his political allies have strong connections to shadowy right-wing organizations, many of which are committed to a return to the prewar order: worship of the emperor, militarism, and eradication of “Western values” and “individualistic” human rights.

True to form, Abe’s premiership was characterized by assaults on democratic institutions, the promotion of militarism, and the ramming through of oppressive legislation purportedly aimed at protecting national security (such as laws establishing vague crimes of conspiracy). Schoolchildren would be marked on the level of their patriotism, and Japan’s press freedom ranking plummeted from a high of 11 in 2010 to 72nd place in 2016 (61st place in 2021) as Abe set heavy penalties for both journalists and private citizens who publish leaked government information designated “secret.” Throughout this period, the “Chinese threat” served as an implicit (and, at times, explicit) justification for these measures.

Abe is no longer PM, but he remains an influential figure of the right, and, more importantly, the bullish nationalism he promoted seems here to stay. The anti-Chinese discourse has been amplified throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, with the right-wing press constantly referring to the “Wuhan virus” and parroting Donald Trump’s anti-Chinese fabrications.

In fact, the Japanese right is fundamentally contradictory. Domestically, they campaign against human rights and other “Western values” that were allegedly forced upon Japan after the war. However, in international relations, they are staunchly pro-American, and see Japan’s future as within the military alliance with the U.S. Hence the ease with which they make claims at the Quad and other international fora that Japan stands with its Western allies for human rights and democracy (as opposed to China of course).

This contradiction can be traced to the history of Japan’s modernization process (which has similarities with Turkey), and perhaps a postwar colonial mindset (idealizing the vanquisher). Whatever the psychology, it is clear that the right has been using China as a scapegoat to advance their repressive agenda.