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amas’s Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, as the name suggests, was motivated by a central focus on the Al-Aqsa Mosque and Israeli aggression against the holy sites. The aim of the operation is to put an end to the 15-year blockade of Gaza and the related status quo in the Palestinian arena. It can be said that Hamas has achieved this goal at a tactical level in a short period of time. This operation has shaken global public opinion and forced it to take a position.

Although the operation carried out by Hamas’s armed wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, has been hyperbolically described as “Israel’s 9/11,” it would be more accurate to characterize the al-Aqsa Flood as a successful deception operation in which Hamas skillfully managed to conceal its military plans by convincing Israel that it no longer wanted war.

Hamas meticulously continued its preparations for this operation while Israel, with an unexpected naiveté, thought that it was keeping Hamas under its control. It has even been claimed that during the preparation process, Hamas deliberately reduced the tempo and frequency of its actions against Israel. Military experts have claimed that the operation was the most surprising attack since the Yom Kippur War with some describing it as an unprecedented intelligence maneuver.

Why was Israel taken by surprise?

The timing of the operation, which coincided with the Sabbath, the Jewish day of worship and rest, created a shock factor that made it difficult for the Israeli forces to react immediately. Moreover, infiltration from multiple points (air, land, and sea) took the Israeli defense by surprise.

Hamas decided on the details of the operation with a very limited group of people in order to prevent leaks from within its ranks. Some analyses have also pointed out that recently Israel shifted its focus on the steps to be taken to normalize relations with Saudi Arabia and away from Hamas.

An analysis of the tactical phases of the operation reveals that as the rockets launched from Gaza caused surprise, infiltrations were carried out with motorized parachutes and hang gliders in the shadow of the rockets. The initial infiltrating elements and elite units of Hamas were seen fortifying area control and security which facilitated attacks on the concrete barriers reinforced with electronic systems. This allowed buldozers, motorcycles, and land vehicles to breach the barrier system, enabling more elements to infiltrate.

Drones carrying improvised explosive devices (IEDs) disabled the electro-optical systems of the Israeli watchtowers. At the same time, the communication line with the Israeli army headquarters was disrupted, limiting the ability to respond to the attack immediately.

The kidnapping of Israeli prisoners into Gaza will provide Hamas with political leverage to increase its bargaining power in future prisoners’ exchange.

Finally, it is argued that the Israeli army made a strategic mistake in deploying its troops mainly in the West Bank, which was one of the factors that facilitated the execution of this operation.

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ove him or loathe him, there’s no denying that Donald Trump brought a whole new level of spectacle to the world of international relations through his unique approach. In the age of social media, Trump wielded his Twitter account like a magician’s wand, conjuring up tweets that sent shockwaves through the global stage. From the moment he stepped into the political arena, he turned traditional diplomacy on its head, replacing dignified speeches with 280-character proclamations.

It was a rollercoaster ride of mixed messaging, unexpected U-turns, and moments that left even the most seasoned diplomats scratching their heads. One moment he’d be locking horns with world leaders, engaging in diplomatic smackdowns with the best of them. The next, he’d be cozying up to erstwhile adversaries like long-lost buddies.

In his book, Donald Trump’s Digital Diplomacy and Its Impact on US Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East, Ahmed Y. Zohny skillfully delves into the intricate relationship between history, political science, and the digital age. With a meticulous blend of content analysis and critical discourse analysis, Zohny examines the profound implications of Trump’s statements and tweets, that explain the often puzzling nature of his foreign policy decisions. At the same time, Zohny’s analysis unveils the intricacies of this unique form of diplomacy, shedding light on its influence on global politics.

While the American public remained primarily engrossed in the domestic implications of Trump’s presidency, people around the world were deeply curious about how his foreign policy choices would reshape the geopolitical landscape. What emerged from Zohny’s research was a deeper understanding of Trump’s communication style, marked by mixed messaging and impulsive decision-making.

One of the most significant areas of focus in the book is the United States’ withdrawal from the Iran Accord. Zohny compellingly argues that this decision not only guaranteed the collapse of the agreement but also added to the volatility in the already turbulent Middle East. Through detailed analysis, he highlights how this move significantly impacted regional dynamics and strained diplomatic relations.

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ave you ever experienced power cuts lasting more than five hours in the middle of a scorching heatwave? This is what Egyptians have been experiencing for the past two weeks and will continue to do so for the next month, according to Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly. The public, which has endured a heatwave of 40°C or more as well as power cuts, has expressed its growing discontent on various platforms in the hope that government officials will hear their voices.

Meanwhile, the Egyptian government continues to promote and invest in urban megaprojects such as the New Administrative Capital, the Cairo Monorail, and Capital Med. Madbouly recently claimed that these projects are being pursued for the necessary development of the Egyptian economy and were it not for them, the country would have collapsed some time ago.

Similarly, Saudi Arabia has been promoting its latest megacity project in the province of Tabuk known as “The Line.” If you have ever imagined living inside a mirror, The Line promises to make your fantasy come true. It is a 170-kilometer-long linear smart city stretching from west to east, and aims to be the world’s first city powered by renewable energy.

The Line

In his latest effort to promote this project, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) has teamed up with the Discovery Channel and produced a documentary titled “The Line: Saudi Arabia’s City of the Future in Neom.”

In the documentary, MBS dismissed critics of his vision, claiming that his futuristic urban megaproject, which is being constructed in an “untouched” area, will go a long way towards meeting the environmental sustainability needs of the population by 2030. He stated, “They say that a lot of the projects that are done in Saudi Arabia cannot be done, that they’re too ambitious. They can keep saying that and we can keep proving them wrong.”

Is it true that they are building The Line in an “untouched” area? According to Courtney Freer, a research fellow at the Middle East Center at the London School of Economics and Political Science, it is not. The Saudi security forces killed Abdul-Rahman Al-Howeiti of the Howeitat tribe in 2020 because he refused to leave his home, which was on the megaproject’s site.

In the same year, his tribe sent an urgent request to the UN for protection against their allegations of the government’s forced displacement. Furthermore, a report in the Wall Street Journal estimated that 20,000 people would be evicted from the area to make way for the city.

Utopian vision: Supporters of the urban megaprojects

With the current global environmental crisis, many seem to agree on the need to develop sustainable urban projects as a solution to the crisis. In addition, MENA’s largest cities are suffering from housing problems due to rapidly growing populations. So, it seems only fair that governments would come up with urban projects that can solve both problems.

Taking The Line as an example, Tarek Qaddumi, an executive director from Neom’s urban project, told the magazine Dezeen that the city will combat the negative effects of urban sprawl. Since the city is vertically layered, the structure will limit the expansion of urban areas. The city will also offer technological progress and sustainability as a way of life.

On the business side, many businesspeople believe that these urban projects will boost the economy and attract good investments. Take Mohamed Khaled, a commercial real estate consultant, as an example: he told Egypt Today that the New Capital will be the perfect place for those who want to invest their money in good locations, as it will offer great business opportunities.

The investment of the Talaat Mustafa Group, one of the biggest construction companies in Egypt, is evidence to this end. Reports have indicated that they have invested in the foundations for the “Noor City” project within the New Capital. Similarly, Rawan Ahmed, a Saudi entrepreneur, told the National that it is very exciting to have innovations such as The Line be featured in the kingdom.

In terms of smart sustainability, housing, and business, many believe that MENA’s urban megaprojects offer innovation for a better future.

Dystopian vision: Critics of the urban megaprojects

Many critics from different fields have criticized MENA urban megaprojects as dystopian because of the authoritarian nature of regional political structures, the cost of these projects, and the delusional goals set for them. Starting with the authoritarian nature, experts such as Robert Draper, a correspondent for GQ, claim that the urban megaprojects have clearly proven that governments do not involve their citizens in the decision-making process.

Returning to the Egyptian case, Michele Dunne, a nonresident scholar in Carnegie’s Middle East Program, claimed that the New Capital’s emptiness proves that President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s vision doesn’t include most Egyptian citizens: ordinary citizens are not allowed there on the grounds that it is a “military compound.”

Similarly, the Saudi government hasn’t consulted its citizens on whether they would agree to evacuate their homes for the megaproject nor has it offered them adequate compensation. While MBS claims that The Line is being constructed in an “untouched” area to provide housing for the population, the reality tells a different story.

Local population and cost

According to a New York Times report, MBS has never mentioned the tribal community that is forced to leave the project’s site or the consequences they face for not complying. On October 2, 2022, the kingdom’s special courts handed down the death sentence to three members of the Howeitat tribe who protested against the forced eviction of their homes in 2020.

Experts such as Philip Oldfield, head of school at the School of Built Environment, University of New South Wales (UNSW), have also criticized the cost of these plans. Despite governments’ claims that these projects are being implemented to save the region from the ongoing climate and overpopulation crises, Oldfield has warned that the projects are costly for all the wrong reasons. A project like The Line could destroy the biodiversity of the Saudi desert. Would the migrating birds understand what a mirror is?

Furthermore, according to Oldfield, the financial and environmental costs of building the project will overwhelm any promised environmental benefits. He told Dezeen that the project will require a huge amount of steel, glass, and concrete – all of which are not considered low-carbon materials. His findings could also be applied to the Egyptian case.

The consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war will not only revise the geography of Eastern Europe and the chessboard of international politics, but will also have an impact on the global economy.

While Europe is trying to reduce its dependency on Russian gas, the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries could experience a serious food crisis due to their high dependence on Ukrainian and Russian wheat and other grains.

Russia is the top global exporter of wheat, while Ukraine is the fifth global exporter. Both countries have a 25% share of global wheat export.

Wheat is fundamental to the diet of MENA countries as it represents 37% of caloric consumption in the region. Across the Middle East and Africa, bread represents 18% of the total diet, according to Euromonitor data, while wheat price saw a 17% increase since Russian tanks entered Ukrainian soil.

The Russia-Ukraine war may cause severe shortages or even a food security crisis in the MENA region.

MENA’s Dependency on Russian and Ukrainian Wheat

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, several MENA countries announced that the war could cause a wheat shortage as most of them import wheat and other types of grain from Russia and Ukraine.

Lebanese Minister of Economy and Trade Amin Salam said that the country—which is cash-strapped— has wheat reserves sufficient for six weeks to two months.

The Tunisian government reportedly asked officials not to address the media regarding an impending wheat crisis. However, on February 25, the ministry of agriculture had stated that it was able to secure enough wheat for three to four months.

Egypt, the largest wheat importer globally, said it has no wheat shortage. Still, it banned the export of flour, lentils, and wheat to safeguard its food, and it is exploring alternative wheat sources amid the Ukraine crisis.

Turkey has said it wouldn’t experience wheat and sunflower oil shortages. However, the war in Ukraine sparked panic buying of sunflower oil in the last week.

In Turkey, last year, 78% of wheat imports came from Russia and 9% from Ukraine. The devaluation of the Turkish lira exacerbates the country’s food insecurity. Furthermore, the rising cost of fuel and fertilizers and sanctions on Russia may disrupt the food supply chain.

Turkey’s government had reduced the import duty on sunflower oil to zero earlier in 2021. As a further precaution, Turkey has extended the customs tax exemption on sunflower oil to the end of June 2022 and on wheat, rye, barley, oats, maize, chickpeas, and lentil imports to the end of 2022.

Since September 15, 2021 the global security agenda has been occupied with a security pact designed to pave the way for a technology transfer by the U.S. to Australia, replacing France as a supplier of nuclear-powered submarines. The argument goes that this strategic initiative is only the beginning of a much larger cooperation plan regarding the future of the Indo-Pacific security complex.

Global security analysts and scholars directly focused their attention on the Indo-Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea looking into possible implications. The pivotal argument is that world security is going to shift towards the East, and the U.S.-China competition will broaden itself into another dimension with this strategic step.

This claim holds certain validity as the U.S. retreat from Afghanistan and Syria should lead to the accumulation of a certain amount of tangible sources that will need another direction to flow into.

Thus, several scholars have been supporting the literature that hypothesizes a global U.S. channeling into the Indo-Pacific security complex. An alternative approach advocates that the U.S. is not entirely eager to interfere with China due to the potential implications of such a move, yet its partners are forcing a U.S. presence in the region.

This approach is an alternative that derives its legitimacy from the middle and great powers that cooperate with the U.S. – the superpower. This argument also has its merits as international relations are not solely the enforcement of the interests of a superpower but an interaction between the latter and its partnering countries.

The global understanding of such events represented in pacts such as the AUKUS Pact is vital. However, a regionalist approach is required to better present the impact on the regional and state-level dimensions. The French involvement in the pact is the part of AUKUS that is going to cause major implications for the MENA region.

Partnerships like AUKUS that will direct interstate partnerships and even enforce them to align. Recent military procurement deals such as the Turkish S-400 acquisition, the Pakistani JF-17 fighter aircraft production contract with China, Saudi-UAE procurements of F-35 aircraft, and THAAD air defense systems from the U.S. are recent comparable cases.

These procurements created different levels of leverage and tensions for the buyer countries as they were forced to choose a side. Despite the balancing literature and the conceptual history of the practice, it becomes more apparent that a bipolar system is very antagonistic in its buildup process.

Partnerships like AUKUS that will direct interstate partnerships and even enforce them to align.

Remembering the two world wars that created the Cold War structure, it is plausible that the “playmaker” states force certain great and middle powers with strategic geopolitical significance to align with them. In this sense, AUKUS might have created a rift between the U.S. and France (and the EU in a larger context, considering the UK also left the organization) that will have certain implications for the MENA region.

For the last 30 years, the U.S. was able to embark on its Middle Eastern policy vis-à-vis its European partners, but strategic gains that directly hinder EU profitability will cause certain fractions in this practice.

The most significant impact of AUKUS on the MENA security complex is expected to be observed in the Eastern Mediterranean. Since the EU has practically perceived the Turkish pivot for energy resources towards this area and North African interests in this area as threats, the U.S. has supported European interests in securing the energy routes and protecting the integrity of South European shores. However, a political dissemination process that was potentially started with AUKUS might divide this unification in foreign policy.

The Eastern Mediterranean is a quagmire of competing interests, and a transatlantic fracture will only escalate the situation.

The Eastern Mediterranean is a quagmire of competing interests, and a transatlantic fracture will only escalate the situation. This escalation might give middle powers like Turkey broader room for maneuver. If the U.S. stops supporting these interests in the region, the EU backlash and the hawkish French position will lose a certain share of their influence and capacity. A significant shift towards the Indo-Pacific Ocean might reduce the pressure on great and middle powers competing for interests.

An alternative power-centered approach might suggest that the void left by a U.S. strategic shift towards the East would trigger a great power to take responsibility and fill the vacuum. The current power balance propounds a Russian pivot towards the Eastern Mediterranean; however, Russia’s aircraft carriers are quite worn, and its only ship, Admiral Kuznetsov, is on the maintenance deck.

This does not mean Russia cannot control this area – it holds a submarine force of 58 known units which can only be challenged by the U.S. and maybe China in the next decade. Both scenarios imply that Turkey might have more room for maneuver with less focus and escalation from rival powers.

Meanwhile the possibility that France might become even more hawkish and hyper-emphasize its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean must not be excluded. Yet, this is less likely since if France and Germany plan to keep the union together, they have to align in foreign policy following Brexit. When push comes to shove, Germany will most likely balance the French hawkish reactionary stance towards these events and prioritize economic growth in the next decade.

The T-shirt promoted by the Israeli military with an image of a pregnant Arab woman under the gaze of an Israeli sniper and with the slogan “ONE SHOT TWO KILLS” can still be found easily on the web, and remains fresh in the minds of many.

Recently, the world was shocked to see yet another photo where Panamanian policemen, in a joint exercise with Israeli trainers, pointed and fired their bullets at a target of a figure – it is not clear if it is a man or a woman –  wearing the traditional Palestinian keffiyeh.

The aberrant image was captured in what the Panamanian police called a “part of a training course with military instructors from the Israeli embassy.” A few hours later, the police institution of the Central American country issued a brief statement in which it apologized, clarifying that its values ​​are not represented in the leaked images.

The apology was issued in large part thanks to pressure from the Panamanian Committee of Solidarity with Palestine and various personalities of Arab origin.

Panama is a country that was born in 1903 when it separated from Colombia, largely thanks to U.S. imperialist ambitions. Today, the country has a population of just over 4 million, and is home to both Jewish and Arab communities which are among the most influential and powerful in the world.

Despite the fact that the country’s Arab and Jewish population numbers only 40,000 individuals, with Arabs and Jews being equal in number, their coexistence is absolutely peaceful and they have even forged social and commercial ties over time. That said, there have been cases in which Jewish families have sent their children to join the Israeli occupation army.

The Israeli influence, supervised by the United States, is very strong in Panama. One example is that Panama is one of the only two Latin American nations, along with Mexico, that still do not recognize Palestine as a state. In the UN Israel-Palestine votes, the Panamanian diplomatic representation usually votes in abstention, which in practice generally amounts to supporting Israel.

As soon as the infamous photo of the Panamanian policemen shooting the figure with the keffiyeh while being advised by Israeli instructors was made public in Panamanian media and social networks, the Arab community and several voices of local society were heard, resulting in a public apology by the police. Yet, Israel is unfazed. Israeli summer camps offering military training where even minors and tourists pay to go shoot figures in Arab dress continue their activities. Can you imagine what would happen if in a country somewhere in the world civilians or soldiers were trained to shoot at figures with the Jewish kippah?

Most of the Arabs in Panama are Muslims; many Arab women wear the hijab, the traditional headscarf that many female followers of Islam wear, and it is also possible to find men and women wearing keffiyeh. Knowing that the police of Panama, their country, and the very state body created to protect them, is being trained to kill people who look like them cannot be a pleasant feeling.

In neighboring Colombia, a few months before elections, there is a latent possibility that alternative movements will take power through democratic procedures. A large section of Colombians still remember that a few decades ago, a large part of a political party called the Patriotic Union, which opposed the traditional Colombian establishment, was eliminated through assassinations that in many cases went unpunished.

It has been proven that the paramilitary forces responsible for thousands of these deaths received advice from former Israeli military personnel. Countries like Argentina, Guatemala, or Honduras also still remember the role that Israel played in providing arms, and logistic and diplomatic support to dictatorial regimes that committed abuses against their peoples.

Many Panamanians are aware of the history of their neighboring countries. They are also clear that their country is a U.S. colonialist target. The U.S. invasion of Panama at the end of 1989 with the supposed objective of overthrowing General Manuel Noriega, a former CIA agent, and the mysterious plane crash in 1981 causing the death of General Omar Torrijos, who displeased Republicans by advocating for Panama’s rights and negotiating new terms for the administration of the Panama Canal with former U.S president Carter, are two facts that continue to serve as open wounds in the nation of the isthmus. Not all Panamanians welcome the fact that the U.S. protégé has so much influence over their military and police apparatus. It is not just the Arabs of Panama who have been upset by recent events.

The political stability of Panama is remarkable with the country being a place of peaceful coexistence for many cultures, and the Panamanian people know that what the police did was wrong. Its rectification has not really convinced Panamanian Arabs, but at the same time something important has happened: thanks to the fact that thousands of Panamanians did not remain silent, it is very likely that, at the very least, such an abomination will not be repeated on Panamanian soil and that the Israeli hasbara machine will think twice next time before provoking a community that, although far from its ancestral lands, is still part of them.

Mercenaries are back. No one knows how many billions of dollars slosh around this illicit market. All we know is that business is booming because when you need something absolutely, positively done in war, you call the private sector. Missions once conducted by special operations forces or the CIA are now outsourced — I know because I did them.

Mercenaries are deadlier than most people realize, a grave oversight. In 2018, a group of U.S. Army Rangers, Delta Force, Green Berets and Marines — America’s most elite troops — were pinned down in Syria. Attacking them were 500 mercenaries, hired by Russia. They were not the cartoonish rabble depicted by Hollywood movies. This was the Wagner Group, a high-end mercenary outfit with artillery, armored personnel carriers, and tanks.

The American commandos radioed for help. Warplanes arrived in waves, including Reaper drones, Apache helicopters, F-22 fighter jets, F-15 strike fighters, B-52 bombers, and AC-130 gunships. Scores of airstrikes pummeled the mercenaries, but they did not waver.

Four hours later, the mercenaries finally retreated. No Americans were killed, and the U.S. military touted this as a big win. But it wasn’t. It took America’s best troops and advanced aircraft four hours to push back 500 mercenaries. What happens when they have to face 1000? 5000? More? Even an undefeated military can lose.

Mercenaries are the second oldest profession, and their return is no surprise. Since 2015, mercenaries have flourished in Yemen, Libya, Nigeria, Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Mozambique, Central African Republic, and Venezuela. There are even cyber-mercenaries called “hack back” companies.

The UAE hired mercenaries to kill Houthis during the War in Yemen. Some of these were allegedly U.S. military although most came from Latin America.

There are many reasons why mercenaries are returning now. In fact, they have been gradually reappearing over the past three decades, but always in the shadows and that’s by design. Rich clients with a small or no military can swipe a check and wage war. The UAE hired mercenaries to kill Houthis during the War in Yemen. Some of these were allegedly U.S. military although most came from Latin America. After six failed years of fighting Boko Haram, Nigeria hired mercenaries to push the terrorist group out of their country, which they did in a few weeks. Libya is a mercenaries-on-mercenary war. Perhaps someday ExxonMobil will have its own army, too.

But why do states with big militaries use mercenaries? Because warfare is changing — it’s getting sneakier. We live in an information age, and weapons that provide plausible deniability, like mercenaries, are more important than raw firepower. In 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine, not by blitzkrieg but through deception. They covertly deployed Spetsnaz special forces, mercenaries like the Wagner Group, Little Green Men, and fake pro-Russia militias. Dense propaganda, troll factories, and other active measures further concealed the truth, until it was too late. While the West stood befuddled about what was going on, the Crimea was a fait d’accompli.

Moscow created the fog of war, and moved through it for victory. Mercenaries ooze plausible deniability. If they are caught, the client can disavow them. Not so for army soldiers. Plus, Russian citizens (like U.S. ones) hate seeing their dead soldiers coming home in body bags, but do not care about dead contractors. Owing to this, Putin can engage in risky military operations with minimal domestic political consequence. For the first time since the Cold War, Russia has launched expeditionary operations in the Middle East and Africa. The weapon of choice? Mercenaries, like the Wagner Group.

Private warfare is a growing trend with alarming implications, yet few in the West seem to care. Perhaps they assume international law will take care of the problem, but this is magical thinking. Who will go into Libya and arrest all those mercenaries? The UN? NATO? Nobody. Worse, mercenary can shoot law enforcement dead. The market for force literally resists regulation.

Privatizing war changes warfare in profound ways modern generals do not comprehend.

A world awash in mercenaries means more war and suffering. History teaches us that unemployed mercenaries become bandits and racketeers, preying on people and sometimes taking over whole kingdoms, as happened to Milan in the 15^th century. Soldiers of fortune can start and elongate war for profit, and avoid outbreaks of peace. This is one reason why the Thirty Years War (1618-48) in Europe took so long, as mercenaries fought for all sides in great numbers. By the time it ended, Germany lost a greater percentage of its population than in WWII.

Privatizing war changes warfare in profound ways modern generals do not comprehend. If conflict is commoditized, then military and marketplace strategies apply to war. It’s like General Patton goes to the souk. You can win wars by outbidding your enemy for mercenary services, bribing your enemy’s mercenaries to defect, or not paying your mercenaries when the war is over. However, it’s a dangerous game because your enemies and mercenaries can do the same to you, and there is no reliable way to enforce contracts.

Treachery is the watchword of private warfare. The 14^th century Florentine, Niccolò Machiavelli, was ripped off by his own mercenaries in 1500 and 1506, during a war with Pisa, causing Florence to lose to its diminutive neighbor. A few years later, he writes in his book The Prince, that mercenaries are: “disunited, ambitious, without discipline, unfaithful; gallant among friends, vile among enemies; no fear of God, no faith with men.”

Private force will also change world order. Offering the means of war to anyone who can afford it will transform warfare and the future of war. If money can buy firepower, then large corporations and the super-rich will become a new kind of superpower. This will rewrite the rules of global order. Who, how and why people fight will change, and there will be wars without states, accelerating global chaos.

This trend will grow, fueled by a free market for force that generates war but cannot regulate it. Today’s militaries have forgotten how to fight private wars, leaving us all exposed. We must increase our strategic IQs to deal with this problem before it becomes a crisis.

There is good news. Mercenaries are as old as war, yet the world did not devolve into anarchy, as is often portrayed by critics of private force. In fact, they can even do good, if hired to do so. If the industry were properly vetted and transparent, they could support UN peacekeeping operations, stop impending genocides, rescue civilian populations from human predators, hunt crime lords, and launch humanitarian operations quickly to save lives — something the international community cannot do. Mercenaries are like fire: they can burn down the house or power a steam engine. It’s a question of how we use them, so let’s use them for good.

Let it be clear to the public: there is no doubt that Tunisian democracy has been in a serious crisis for some time, although this article focuses on the events of the first weeks of 2021.

On Tuesday, February 2, 2021, Tunisian President Kais Saied visited the Interior Ministry, then toured the capital’s main street and heard people chanting for him to dissolve parliament.

Two weeks prior, the president addressed a number of citizens at a café in a popular neighborhood on the outskirts of the capital, and posted a video of his meeting with them on the official page of the Presidency. In it, people can be heard calling for him to dissolve parliament and all political parties.

Prior to this, Mohammad Abbou a former minister who met with the Tunisian president had publicly called for the army to be deployed in the cities, claiming these extraordinary measures are needed to combat what he considers the corruption of the political class.

There is now a serious constitutional crisis in Tunisia. On January 26, 2021, the Tunisian Parliament approved the inclusion of a number of ministers in the government of Hisham al-Meshichi with a large majority of nearly two-thirds.

However, President Kais Saied refused to swear them into office by allowing them to take the oath, a constitutional prerequisite for ministers to be able to carry out their duties officially.

This is an unprecedented dilemma, especially since the constitution has not anticipated that the president might refuse to confirm and deal with ministers approved by the constitutionally more powerful parliament.

Parliament Speaker and Ennahda President Rachid Ghannouchi said that in the future Tunisia should move towards a fully parliamentary system in which the president is a symbol of the state without any executive powers. His statement poured oil on the flames of the ongoing dispute between him and President Kais Saied and his supporters.

Behind this conflict lies President Kais Saied’s hostile attitude towards the political system in general and the way in which powers are divided in Tunisia’s 2014 constitution. Even before he was elected president, Kais Saied declared his aversion to partisan political representation, and refused to form any political party.

Throughout this political and constitutional crisis in Tunisia, Kais Saied has spoken with an undeniable self-confidence, and does not hide his negative and unfriendly view of the presidents of parliament and the government.

He constantly reiterates that he is ready to make “the right decision at the right time.” The majority of people understand the term “right decision” as dissolving parliament and preparing for new elections later in a new electoral system.

Public anger has turned to parliament because it is the one that gives legitimacy to Tunisian governments under the new constitution.

One might ask: why are people in Tunisia talking about dissolving parliament as if it were normal and acceptable? Isn’t the elected parliament the symbol of Tunisia’s democratic experience and the cornerstone of its political system in accordance with the country’s constitution, which was agreed upon after the revolution?

Unfortunately, the answer is that the failure of successive Tunisian governments since the December 17 revolution to achieve the social aspirations of the people, primarily employment and the fight against poverty, has made large segments of the population no longer care about the survival or demise of democracy. Public anger has turned to parliament because it is the one that gives legitimacy to Tunisian governments under the new constitution.

That second important reason is the growing anger towards the Ennahda party, the largest political force in the country and in successive governments over the past decade. Ennahda is a party with a sizeable backing, that came out on top at the 2019 legislative elections, winning 52 of the 217 seats. But for many of those who did not vote for it, their common denominator today is their desire to remove Ennahda from power.

Since Ennahda is the number one force in parliament today, and is seen as supporting the government of Hisham al-Meshishi with two other parties allied to it, the anti-Ennahda camp does not mind dissolving parliament as it means removing Ennahda from power.

For them, the democracy that put Ennahda in control of the country’s destiny and did not succeed in solving the country’s economic and social problems is not worth defending or shedding any tears over. Among them, of course, are the ideological enemies of Ennahda who cannot beat it in the polls, and believe that any other political order is better than one led by Ennahda.

Kais Saied knows all this and knows that he enjoys a broad popular support in Tunisia, more than Ennahda and any other politician in the country. He has also been able to find allies from within parliament, particularly through the Democratic Current party and the People’s Movement. He knows that if he dissolves parliament, the people will not shed any tears over it and he will not be attacked by influential media inside Tunisia.

Kais Saied also knows that although Democrats have regained power in Washington, governments such as France, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE will stand by him firmly if he makes such a move. His main problem, however, is that Tunisia’s current constitution does not allow him to dissolve parliament.

According to the constitution of Tunisia, if the prime minister in charge after the elections fails to win the confidence of parliament, the president assigns someone else to form the government. Only if this person does not have the confidence of parliament, does the president then have the right to dissolve parliament and call early elections.

This scenario is not currently available to President Kais Saied, as the government of Hisham al-Meshishi has the support of nearly two-thirds of the members of the People’s Assembly.