Three months ago when the Assad regime surrounded the Turkish observation post in Idlib’s Morek, I argued that Turkey needed a new approach to Idlib in order to prevent a bigger disaster. Since then, the situation in Idlib has relatively calmed down and the joint Syrian-Turkish military operation against the YPG has redirected the focus of the world to northeast Syria. The dynamic situation in this region, including the development of bilateral agreements between Turkey and Russia and between Turkey and the US in addition to the repositioning of the US to the oilfields of Syria has resulted in a general ignorance of the current situation in Idlib. Every side is using its energy to gain a bigger piece of the cake in northeast Syria, except for Iran. The latest attack on the IDP camp in Qah, in its inhuman brutality has no military purpose but was intended to shift the focus from northeast Syria to Idlib.

The dynamics between Russia and Turkey in Idlib and northeast Syria are opposite but similar to each other. The Russians demand the withdrawal of radical elements from the agreed demilitarized zone; the Turks demand the withdrawal of the Marxist YPG from the agreed safe-zone. Both sides criticize the other for not implementing the agreement and threatening the other with a military operation. However, there are also significant differences. The situation in northeast Syria is a direct threat to Turkey’s national security, but the situation in Idlib is not for Russia.

Another Turkish-backed operation against the YPG would not have costs for Russia except for the loss of additional gains and leverage. A Russian-backed operation on Idlib would be catastrophic for Turkey as Turkey can’t bear the burden of a further two million more refugees. On military terms, Russia has air superiority in Idlib, but Turkey has air superiority in northeast Syria. In all of this, the US has given massive de-facto support to Russia’s position against Turkey but does give diplomatic and rhetorical support for Turkey in Idlib.

A Russian-backed operation on Idlib would be catastrophic for Turkey as Turkey can’t bear the burden of a further two million more refugees.

In recent times, Idlib has witnessed several important developments. The 4th Division of the Syrian Arab Army of Maher al-Assad known for its ties to Iran has repeatedly failed to advance against the Syrian opposition forces and HTS or HTS-aligned groups in the Kurdish mountains of Latakia. While the resistance of the armed opposition and HTS-aligned groups in Latakia’s Kabbanah is being portrayed as a heroic one, in the end when the regime side is persistent enough and gets sufficient Russian air support, the defense line will collapse sooner or later. Such a gain would have significant effects on the military balance of power in Idlib. If the regime succeeds in gaining the upper hand in this area, it can fight downhill towards the operationally significant town of Jisr al Sughour.

In the meantime, a popular uprising against HTS in the city of Kafr Takhharim is an important proof of the social movement in Idlib which rejects the regime as well as radical groups. This will be an important asset for any policy and strategy for Idlib.

Therefore, I argue that the focus on northeast Syria should continue as much as possible and attempts by the regime, Iran, or Russia to change the focus to Idlib should be prevented by increasing the escalation in northeast Syria to force the regime to allocate reinforcements to this region and to call out the manpower limits of the regime which may prevent the regime from starting another major military campaign. In the meantime, Turkey needs to change the balance of power in Idlib in its favor in order to have a stronger position in the tit-for-tat dynamic that Russia may try to create. In this manner, it is important to note that opposition groups have sent no reinforcements from Idlib to northeast Syria, but the Assad regime had to send its Russian-trained and Russian-equipped 5th Corps due to lack of manpower.

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) released a new report about humanitarian developments in Idlib, stating that 576,000 people were displaced between 1 May and August 18 in 2019. The OCHA report gives a strong warning to the world and to Turkey in particular. Since Turkey stands alone in Idlib, European states have avoided taking strategic responsibility, the US has sidelined itself and Gulf States like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates view Idlib as a zero-sum game to undermine Turkey. Turkey also failed to use any of its four options to prevent its observation posts in Morek being besieged by the Assad regime. I argued that Turkey needs a new approach for Idlib, but what if the worst case scenario happens? One where a humanitarian disaster in Idlib cannot be prevented and the UN warning that 2 million refugees may flee to Turkey occurs?

According to UNHCR, the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey has reached 3,650,000 making Turkey the biggest host country for refugees in the world. However, the situation has its burdens for Turkey. Ignoring the economical, humanitarian and political costs, social tensions within Turkish society and hate speech against Syrian refugees are increasing. As a step to manager the refugee population, authorities in Istanbul announced new regulations that required unregistered Syrian refugees to return to cities in which they were registered by 20 August. However, after demands by the Syrian community, the deadline was extended for two months. While tensions against Syrian refugees are on rise in Turkey, the prospect of a further two million refugees from Idlib would be a catastrophe.

Turkey may be forced to establish transfer routes to the Greek and Bulgarian borders, opening the way for Syrian refugees to pass into Europe.

One of the main reasons behind such a worst case scenario would indeed be that Turkey stands alone in Idlib. While Turkey has taken on the burden of preventing a humanitarian disaster in Idlib alone, the country should not also carry the burden of the costs and risks of hosting two more million refugees. Turkey needs to force the world to take responsibility. Closing the borders to Syrians who face death in Idlib is not an option for Turkey, and if the worst case scenario happens, Turkey must open its borders to Syrians. However, while Turkey has no other option but to let Syrians in, it also has no other option but to let Syrians out. In order to prevent unregistered movement of refugees inside the country, Turkey may be forced to establish transfer routes to the Greek and Bulgarian borders. In such a case, the refugee deal between the EU and Turkey would end, opening the way for refugees in Turkey to pass into Europe. The countries that rejected taking responsibility for Syrian refugees and let Turkey do so on its own would then be forced to carry some of the burden. Turkey cannot take full responsibility if such a worst case scenario were to occur even if they provided with financial support to do so.

However, a second option also remains. With the support of the EU states and the US, Turkey could convince Russia to establish a security belt in Idlib. Such a move would require Turkey to take control over a certain area in Idlib following the Euphrates Shield model. Until now, Russia and the Assad regime want a military solution for Idlib, but the pressure of European States and the US, and Turkey’s decisiveness may help to facilitate a security belt free from bombs, terrorists and Assad’s forces. A security belt would also require commitments from the EU and the US. While details like depth and timeline of such a safe zone have to be decided, the new Turkish base north of Khan Sheikhoun, where the Turkish convoy remained after raids, could be a good guide for a new line. In this context, the upcoming Erdogan-Putin meeting in Russia will determine the fate of Idlib, the fate of millions of civilians and whether this worst-case scenario will happen.

In my previous column on the fate of the Turkish observation point in Morek I argued  that Turkey had four options to prevent its soldiers from a siege by the Assad regime: Withdrawing, preventing, escalating or postponing. On August 19, Turkey did not utilize any of these options, and the supply route to the observation point in Morek was cut off. A last-minute attempt by the Turkish Armed Forces to send in a convoy failed as regime attacks prevented the convoy from reaching Khan Sheikhoun.

Assuming that no miracle will happen soon, the Turkish authorities need a new approach for Idlib. This should start with reaching an evacuation deal and securing the safety of trapped soldiers in Morek. Otherwise, if the Turkish soldiers aren’t evacuated, a terrible fate might come true. It is not known what the regime and its militias will do, nor is it guaranteed that Russia can prevent the regime or its militias from unilateral actions against Turkish soldiers. At this stage, there are still options for Turkey in Idlib to form a new approach.

In the morning of August 19, the Turkish Armed Forces sent in a huge convoy of tanks and armored vehicles towards Khan Sheikhoun. The aim was to establish a base in the strategic town located on the M5 highway in order to secure the supply route towards the observation point in Morek. When the convoy came close to Khan Sheikhoun, a strike landed in front of the convoy and stopped it from moving further. Minutes afterwards, a second strike hit the rear of the convoy hitting Syrian opposition fighters escorting the Turkish convoy. Five hours later the Turkish Defence Ministry condemned the incident. However, when the convoy attempted to move forward again, the road was hit by another strike and the convoy stopped again. After failing to prevent this besiegement from occurring, the Turkish side have not risked escalation as well. No retaliation or any other kind of escalation towards the Assad regime has happened. Furthermore, a deal with Russia to postpone any actions towards the Turkish forces seemingly did not happen.

In order to not risk the lives of the Turkish soldiers, Turkey needs to evacuate or withdraw its soldiers starting with the one in Morek.

Since then, the Turkish convoy remains in the open area and waits. In the meantime, the Assad regime managed to capture the Al Nimr checkpoint and cut the M5 highway to Khan Sheikhoun and Morek. During the night, the regime started an operation into Khan Sheikhoun with their new night vision equipment supplied by Russia and managed to capture parts of the city by dawn. With the inevitable loss of Khan Sheikhoun, the Syrian opposition mostly evacuated from the pocket in northern Hama, but the Turkish soldiers in Morek stayed. This made the last option of withdrawing obsolete and the worst-case scenario of a siege against Turkish soldiers in the observation point in Morek happened.

After this development, the Turkish observation points in Idlib became pointless and the Assad regime and Russia may do the same with the other eleven observation points as well. In order to not risk the lives of the Turkish soldiers, Turkey needs to evacuate or withdraw its soldiers starting with the one in Morek. Such a move would also open the way for a humanitarian disaster in Idlib in which 3.5 million civilians would be targeted by the Assad regime. According to different estimates, one to two million Syrians may attempt to cross into Turkey as refugees. As such a scenario is unacceptable, Turkey needs to find a way to prevent this from happening. Safeguarding the rebels in Idlib by granting a special protection or a different mechanism like a security belt along the border might help in this regard. Nevertheless, the option of escalating always remains but risking a war against the Assad regime and Russia seems very unlikely under current circumstances.

Since the ceasefire announcement was made during the 13th round of the Astana process, there has been an escalation of fighting in Idlib. The regime axis supported by heavy Russian airpower has made gains with significant implications for the political process and Turkey’s position and role in Idlib. I argued before that Turkey and Russia have a way out of the escalation in Idlib, but that Russia may use the escalation in Idlib to seek favorable terms in the constitutional committee formation process which could not have been finalized in the last Astana summit held in the Kazakh capital Nur Sultan. The advance of the regime axis in Idlib has captured Habit and Sukayk. If the regime succeeds in capturing Khan Sheikhun from the Syrian opposition, it will threaten to besiege the Turkish observation point in Morek. Even if Turkey and Russia want to avoid a direct escalation, the Assad regime is progressing towards a military solution which it believes can only happen if Turkey withdraws from Idlib. Turkey must therefore decide the fate of its observation point and with it the fate of Idlib.

There seem to be four pathways for Turkey: Withdrawing, escalating, postponing or preventing. Each of which will have its own implications and risks. Starting with the first, withdrawing from one observation point to prevent its besiegement will open the way for the Assad regime to do the same with the other 11 observation points. This will make the observation point meaningless and undermine the Turkish role in Idlib, the Astana process and in the overall geostrategic situation in the region. The withdrawal from a Turkish observation point would mark a precedent affecting the entire Turkish deterrence strategy, which is important to Turkish foreign policy from the Eastern Mediterranean to northern Iraq. While the withdrawal of Turkish troops may be the main goal of the Assad regime, the implications for Idlib and the region would be too high for Turkey. Therefore, this option seems to be the less likely.

Current frontline around the Turkish observation point in Morek as of 14 August 2019

The second option for Turkey is direct escalation by confronting the Assad regime ground forces with a harsh response to prevent the regime from attempting to besiege the Turkish observation point. Turkey would need to declare a red line over Khan Sheikhoun and directly strike the regime to advance further. Previous experiences have shown that the regime understands the language of violence. The regime attacks on the Turkish observation point in Sher Maghar, which also aimed to force Turkey to withdraw, stopped after Turkey retaliated against the regime. To prevent the regime from cutting the supply line to the Turkish observation point in Morek, the Turkish Armed Forces may consider punishing the regime hard. However, too much escalation may also play into the hands of the Assad regime as it may trigger an escalation between Turkey and Russia as well.

Another option for Turkey would be to negotiate a new line of de-escalation with Russia and to withdraw the observation points further north. However, such a move would not only mean the handover of essential territory to the regime axis, but would postpone addressing the dilemma of the observation points weakening the Turkish hand for another time. Lastly, Turkey can work to prevent besiegement of its observation point by extensively supplying the Syrian opposition. In this case, the Turkish position in Idlib would continue as it stands. But what if the Syrian opposition fails? Without a plan B or extensive support to ensure that a regime advance would be stopped, Turkish soldiers may be placed at risk of being trapped in a siege. In this case, a new crisis over Turkey’s role in Syria will become inevitable.

The province of Idlib currently stands center stage in the Syrian Civil War. In the past three years, the Assad regime has gained ground throughout the country, making Idlib the last rebel-held stronghold. Russia and Turkey, key players in the Syrian conflict, brokered a significant ceasefire in Idlib last September. The agreement created a nine-mile demilitarized zone which called for the withdrawal of “radically minded” opposition forces. Patrol groups, consisting of Russian and Turkish units, were tasked with ensuring the agreement’s integrity. However, with almost a year passed, the tenuous ceasefire has nearly collapsed. Since April, intense fighting has erupted in the region. With humanitarian costs soaring and no solution currently in sight, Idlib’s future grows more uncertain by the day.

Since the ceasefire was instituted last October, both sides have been accused of violating terms. The “radically minded” forces, which referred to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), have not only refrained from evacuating the buffer zone but have since expanded their power. By January 2019, HTS had gained control over the majority of the Idlib, portions of Aleppo and Hama, and parts of major roadways and border-crossings. Due to the group’s former ties with al-Qaeda, pro-regime forces have labelled HTS a terrorist threat, and used the group’s past association as a rationale for military engagement. With heavy artillery, pro-government forces have bombarded communities along the demilitarized zone. Over the past three months, they have also conducted a joint air campaign with Russian forces. Airstrikes have rained down cluster munitions and incendiary weapons on Idlib from above, while snipers on the ground fire on the city. Despite the great odds they face, the opposition has prevented the regime from gaining large swaths of territory. Senior rebel commanders, however, recently reported that Russian forces fought directly on the battlefield for the first time in northern Hama. If this instance was not an anomaly, and Russian troops regularly join ground forces, the opposition will face even more challenging odds.

Meanwhile, as a consequence of the current stalemate, more than three million civilians living in Idlib are suffering the costs of war. The regime’s campaign has attacked civilian centers indiscriminately: strikes have targeted residential neighborhoods, medical facilities, schools, markets, and sites housing the displaced. According to the UN, at least 450 civilians have been killed in Idlib since Spring, with over one hundred of these causalities having occurred during a ten-day period this July. Michelle Bachelet, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, declared that those who have intentionally attacked civilians will be held responsible for war crimes. She also stressed that civilian suffering has been largely ignored by the international community. Bachelet spoke of a “paralyzed” UN Security Council, and its failure to pressure Assad to stop the fighting. While speaking to the Security Council this week, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs stated, “You know what is happening and you have done nothing for 90 days as the carnage continues in front of your eyes.” He continued, “Are you going to…do something about it?” If the international community does not work together to deter the regime, many fear the government will further intensify its use of force in Idlib. If pro-government troops launch a full-scale attack on the city, the UN predicts a humanitarian disaster. Such a crisis will leave countless more civilians to a fate of suffering, death, and displacement.

The most recent offensives launched by the Assad regime have forced hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee to camps at the sealed Turkish-Syrian border. The UN has predicted that two million more could flood to Turkey’s border if Idlib is infiltrated.

As the potential for extreme escalation looms, humanitarian officials have looked to Russia and Turkey to renegotiate a political solution. With over three million Syrian refugees living in its territory, Turkey has accepted more Syrians fleeing violence than any other country. The most recent offensives launched by the regime have already forced hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee to camps at the sealed Turkish-Syrian border. The UN has predicted that two million more could flood to Turkey’s border if Idlib is infiltrated—a predicament Turkey greatly hopes to avoid. To prevent this potential influx, President Erdogan has broached the topic in communications with President Putin. They have discussed plans to hold another summit, along with Iran, to continue dialogue on the Astana peace process. The two leaders, however, may diverge in what they hope to actually accomplish. While President Erdogan aims to prevent carnage in Idlib from threatening the Turkish border, President Putin’s objectives are less discernable, and perhaps more nefarious. After supporting the regime for four years, Russia may seek to help Assad stamp out the country’s rebels once and for all. Alternatively, Russia may strive for Idlib to remain deadlocked in a conflict-ridden ceasefire. In eastern Ukraine, Russia has denied military involvement in the Donbass while maintaining a significant foothold in the region. The country may aim to secure a similar type of influence in northwestern Syria. Overall, whatever their motivations may be, Turkey and Russia are once again the two powers that hold the most sway in Idlib. Although Russia’s long-term intentions remain unknown, negotiations are likely the best chance for altering the status quo.

Though Idlib’s future has yet to be decided, the city’s crumbling ceasefire has made some realties clear. Firstly, Russia has achieved some of its goals. Through its intervention into the civil conflict, the country has gained influence in the Middle East and shifted the war in Assad’s favor. In doing so, Russia has continued to assert its relevancy as a regional power. Secondly, Turkey is still waiting for back-up. The international community has yet to exert pressure on the Assad regime for blatant violations of international law. Countries have also refrained from verbally sounding the alarm on Idlib in any significant way. Thirdly, Idlib’s people are the latest to pay the price in an eight-year civil war that has proved enduring and gruesome. It should not be lost on the world, however, that Idlib’s current state could easily worsen. If the regime attacks the city without restraint, a new state of chaos will erupt in northwestern Syria. Grave consequences will undoubtedly result.

For over two months, shelling, air strikes and clashes at the front in Idlib have become a way of life. In this period, over 300 civilians have been killed, thousands more have been injured and over 330,000 fled their homes. On the battle front, the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition mourn heavy causalities, and no side has come out winning. Even if the Assad regime, supported by heavy Russian air support, has managed to reverse all gains by the counter-offensives of the Syrian opposition, the main question remains: Where is the escalation in Idlib heading and what is its purpose?

When de-escalation in Idlib ended, Russia’s purpose may have been to force Turkey to implement the Sochi memorandum, or to open the way for the regime axis; but as Turkey stood its ground firm and responded, both sides entered a stalemate. Since then, the spiral of violence continues. Since the initial progress by the regime axis at the beginning of the ground assault, the Syrian opposition managed to capture other areas in counter-offensives, but over the weekend the regime managed to gain control over lost terrain. This development opens the question: Will the regime push further, or after restoring lost terrain will de-escalation somehow achieved?

I argued before that recent developments in northwest Syria could in fact give Turkey and Russia the opportunity to re-enforce the Sochi arrangement. However since then, there isn’t any real change on the ground or a diplomatic sign towards a new rapprochement between Turkey and Russia in regards to Idlib. Those arguing that the escalation in Idlib was designed to push Turkey to fulfill its purchase of the S-400 were proven wrong by the continued bombardment despite Turkey’s purchase of the air-defense systems. The purpose of the current escalation hasn’t yet become clear.

If the regime axis wants to capture all of Idlib, or at least all the region to the M4 and M5 highways, the current strategy won’t achieve this goal. The Assad regime would need to open several different fronts; and the Russians would need to expand their air campaign towards the Turkish-Syrian border, the Russians would need to call Iran in as the Iranian militias could turn the table in favor of a military ‘solution’ in Idlib. Regardless of the implications of such steps, until today they remain untaken.

The escalation’s current nature is more suitable as a strategy to force the other side to make concessions at the negotiation table rather than to enforce a military solution. In this regard, the purpose of the current escalation in Idlib may have changed during the course of the spiral of violence due to Turkey’s response, but the Russians may attempt to channel the escalation into a deal in the next Astana meeting on August 1 on 2. It’s known that Turkey and the Syrian opposition insist on a genuine political transition process, and that the details of the formation of a constitutional committee and its working procedure have to be set yet. Therefore, Russia may try to use the escalation in Idlib as a bargaining chip to enforce its terms on Turkey and the Syrian opposition, which will favor Assad and aim to prevent real power-sharing.

If this is the case, and Turkey once again doesn’t knock over under Russian pressure of escalation, what will happen to the Astana process and what will happen to the escalation in Idlib? The answer to this question underlines the importance of Idlib; and the importance of Turkey’s role. If Turkey and the Syrian opposition fail to stand firm, the political transition process towards peace in Syria might fail. The international community has to understand that only their stance with the Syrian opposition can really pressure the regime axis to implement and accept changes towards a brighter future for Syria. Neither the threat of sanctions and the promise of reconstruction funds, nor reliance on a local actor following a separate agenda outside the regime-opposition dispute will result in the acceptance of demands by the regime axis.

More than three weeks of airstrikes and ground attacks have left Syrians in the Idlib province stranded and scared.

The United Nations’ director of humanitarian affairs, Mark Lowcock, warned that a full-blown ground offensive by regime coalition forces, which would seek to seize the province entirely from opposition control, would result in the worst humanitarian crisis of the 21st century.

This rhetoric isn’t new. In fact, it sounds a lot like the rhetoric pushed in September of 2018 – when the United States and its EU partners collectively cut funding to civil society groups in Idlib, at the same time as the international community pushed Turkey and Russia to reach a deal in Sochi that would create “demilitarized zones” on the provincial borders of Idlib, Hama, and Aleppo, which would ostensibly prevent a possible humanitarian crisis. However, as part of a sustained wartime strategy which seeks to expose opposition-controlled areas to pure attrition, Russia and the Assad regime have violated those deals more than 600 times since April, according to the UN’s latest assessment.

Eight months later, the Assad regime, backed by Russian air power, has conducted a ruthless aerial campaign which has forced over 200,000 people to flee their homes in less than a month. Meanwhile, 200 people have been killed, nearly all by indiscriminate shelling and aerial bombing.

 Russia and the Assad regime have violated the political deals more than 600 times since April, according to the UN’s latest assessment.

Russia insists that it is targeting so-called terrorists, while rights groups like Amnesty International say Russian-backed regime coalition attacks are deliberately and systematically targeting health facilities, in an effort which amounts to war crimes.

Despite the overwhelmingly clear evidence towards those responsible for this destruction, the international community has failed to hold any party to account for the demolishment of medical facilities or any other attacks over the past several weeks.

Recently, a debate at the UN concluded that a party in the conflict with access to advanced weaponry was carrying out the attacks. But despite this, the debate failed to name any particular party as accountable for the attacks. This is obviously a moot point, and eliminates the need for an international response at any level.

The current wave of relentless aerial bombardment is reminiscent of the Russian-backed regime coalition offensives – in 2016 in Aleppo, and in 2017 in the rural Damascus countryside. The results of both of those military operations were the forced displacement of tens of thousands of civilians and opposition fighters to northern Syria, many of them to Idlib.

Just like Russia and the Assad regime have done in the past, the ongoing aerial campaign has targeted critical infrastructure including hospitals and emergency services like the Syrian Civil Defense, more commonly referred to as the White Helmets, in order to cut civilians off from critical lifelines that enable them to continue living in their homes and going about their daily lives.

The current wave of relentless aerial bombardment of Idlib is reminiscent of the Russian-backed regime coalition offensives – in 2016 in Aleppo, and in 2017 in the rural Damascus countryside.

But what, exactly, does this campaign look like?

During a recent trip to Idlib, my cameraman and producer drove 100km south of the Turkish border into Idlib province. We passed through at least a dozen armed opposition checkpoints, past a number of armed opposition headquarters, and on significant stretches of both the north-south M5 and east-west M4 highways. Despite Russian and regime claims that they were targeting so-called terror groups, all of the checkpoints and headquarters we passed by – many of which were on those main transit routes such as the M5 – were unscathed, and armed opposition fighters simply waved us through. In contrast, the towns we drove through were more like ghost towns, with few people remaining in the streets. Those who were outside dragged their feet as they walked through the broken streets, with piles of rubble and broken concrete serving as the canvas behind them.

Our ultimate destination was Kafrnabel, the home of the late Syrian philosopher and activist Raed al-Fares and a longtime hub of resistance in Idlib province. But as we passed through, from highway to town to hospital center, the scene became increasingly more grim.

When we arrived at the Kafrnabel Surgical Hospital, we found a scene that indicated brute force and ill intent. The entire hospital, from floor to ceiling, was caved in – and all the equipment and supplies in the hospital were unfit for service. I began speaking to the doctor who served as the head administrator of the hospital, but midway through, warplanes started patrolling above our heads. The doctor, obviously disturbed by his past encounters with Russian air power, was not willing to stick around any longer. He cut the interview short, and went off to seek shelter. At this moment, the first bomb fell.

Driving towards the place of the attack on the White Helmets facility in Kafranbel, Syria on May 13. Photo source, Obaida Hitto

As we left the hospital ourselves to go somewhere safe, a large plume of smoke rose up over the town’s humble skyline. Exhausted but determined, we considered our role in the area as journalists, and decided to go towards the scene of the attack.

Suddenly, I heard a sound, looked up into the sky, and there it was: as though a little paper airplane we played with when we were children, a Russian Sukhoi-series jet.

Upon our arrival at the scene of the attack, we piled out of the car and debated amongst ourselves whether it was safe to park there – whether our car would be struck by a falling bomb. This fear was legitimate, as the regime coalition has kept a well-documented history of double-tap strikes on areas it has targeted. While we discussed, warplanes continued to circle above us. Suddenly, I heard a sound, looked up into the sky, and there it was: as though a little paper airplane we played with when we were children, a Russian Sukhoi-series jet glided across the sky unabated, free to do as it pleases.

Moments later, a loud bang, followed by the screams of women and children pouring out of their homes. They ran, panicked, away from the scene of the attack.

Families living under olive trees in northern Idlib near Atmeh on the Turkish border. Photo source, Obaida Hitto

In the distance, close to the first blast site, a plume of smoke rose up over the buildings surrounding us. We moved closer to the scene of the attack to get a better look.

As we arrived, we saw the result of the strike: a White Helmets civil defense center was flattened. A chaotic scene unfolded before us as civilians, including young children, stood in the streets, in shock from the bombings, debating whether they should stay or leave.

This is the reality on the ground in Idlib today. For the outside world, this may come as a surprise: there is, of course, an internationally recognized de-escalation zone and de-militarized zone, negotiated by the international community, which ostensibly exists to protect civilians from such attacks. But for the millions of people living in northern Syria, many of whom have been displaced multiple times during the war, this is just another reason for them to continue what they started 8 years ago: a popular revolution against the monster which threatens their families, homes, and lives, which they call the regime of Bashar al-Assad.

Moment of the attack on White Helmets facility in Kafranbel, Syria May 13. Photo source, Obaida Hitto

The military escalation in the northern Hama countryside is part of the pressure on Turkey to resolve its options and make concessions. The escalation also reflects the stalemate of the Astana process and the growing differences between its three sides. However, it is not expected that the current escalation will produce or lead to any political results in the light of the inability to end the military campaign and while indicators show there could be a new situation in the area.

The 12th round of the Astana negotiations, which took place on April 25-26, 2019, failed to achieve a breakthrough in the presented files especially the Constitutional Committee and the detainees, which was followed by several Russian statements of escalation, especially the statement of Russian President Vladimir Putin from Beijing in which he said “the possibility of the battle on Idlib still exists but the timing is not.”

Several days following Putin’s statement, the Syrian regime backed by its Russian ally began a military campaign in Hama northern countryside on 5 May, 2019, and captured several towns and villages, most notably Kafr Nabudahand and Qalat al-Madiq. Before this campaign started, the Syrian regime and Russian warplanes launched intense airstrikes on the northern and western Hama countryside and later extended to Idlib southern countryside.

The continuation of battles in Hama, the regime force’s difficulty in advance, the high number of casualties and the increasing tone of official statements from Turkey prompted analysts to provide multiple readings of the recent field escalation.

The Turkish stance towards this process was initially overshadowed by silence while European countries and the U.S. only issued timid statements. This came while opposition forces were able to temporary advance in the Tal Rifat area before it withdrew, which was interpreted as a “swap deal” between the Turkish and Russian sides. But the continuation of battles and the difficulty of the progress of the regime forces in addition to the high number of casualties and the escalation of the Turkish statements later, prompted analysts to provide multiple readings of the field escalation outside the framework of the “swap deal,” and this piece is trying to analyze the military escalation, the Russian and Syrian regime motives and exploring the limits of the current field escalation and the consequences on the political and field situation.

Military escalation: the indications

The failure of round 12 of the Astana negotiations to achieve a breakthrough in the file of the detainees and the Constitutional Committee, was followed by Russian statements on a possible operation in Idlib which it didn’t set a date for. These statements were accompanied by a marked escalation in the field since the beginning of May.

14 areas were hit by regime artillery, 40 were hit by Russian airstrikes, and 14 by regime airstrikes in Idlib and southern countryside of Idlib, Hama northern countryside and Aleppo western countryside were targeted between 1 and 5 May, 2019. Then regime forces with its militias backed by Russian forces launched a ground attack in northern Hama countryside while the shelling and airstrikes that targeted other areas continued.

From 6 to 14 May, 2019, (ground attack period): Southern Idlib, northern Hama, and western Aleppo witnessed 429 Regime artillery, 104 RuAF raids, and 95 SyAF raids, bringing the total number of Regime ‘violations’ of the DMZ agreement to 3598 artillery attacks, 131 SyAF and 281 RuAF airstrikes since 17 Sep 2018 until 14 May 2019.

Syrian regime forces and its backed militias, due to the firefight and the intensive shelling, have made progress on the ground and captured several towns and villages such as Kfarabouda, Qalqat al-Madiq and others. The size of the area that the regime’s forces captured recently from the armed opposition forces is 60 square kilometers.

Map (1): Northern Front Situation Map – 18 May 2019

The progress of the regime’s forces in Hama northern countryside, accompanied by the temporary progress of the Turkish-backed opposition groups in Tal Rifat area and the lack of clarity of the Turkish position on the current military situation, indicated that there was a “swap deal” between the Turkish and Russian sides. However, this analysis is hasty and inaccurate due to the following reasons:

• The withdrawal of the Euphrates Shield forces from the three locations controlled which they captured from PYD less than 3 hours.
• The strength of opposition defenses against regime attacks and ground militias in the northern Hama countryside.
• The Russian raids are random and include many sites in Idlib and not just the axes of the ground attack.
• The Turkish observation point in Sheer Mughar in south Idlib was targeted by regime artillery, forcing civilians in their vicinity to move into Idlib governorate.
• Recent Turkish statements that criticized Idlib military operation by the Russian and the Regime

The current military escalation in the field can be traced back to the stalemate in Astana and the growing differences between its parties, as demonstrated by the failure of the Round 12 negotiations to make any progress. Moscow’s desire to change the field’s equations so that it can move the negotiations and push its political vision for resolution and to pressure Turkey to ease its opposition to the Russian efforts within the course of Astana, and push it to respond to Russian demands in the de-escalation zone.

Moscow is trying to intensify pressure on Ankara to resolve its position on the S-400 deal, and to sabotage the understandings emerging between Turkey and the U.S. in multiple files.

Moscow is also trying to intensify pressure on Ankara to resolve its position on the S-400 deal, and try to sabotage the understandings emerging between Turkey and the United States in multiple files such as the situation in the east of the Euphrates. On the other hand, Iran and the regime want to invest military escalation to sabotage the Turkish-Russian understandings. This is what Turkish president Erdogan pointed out in the telephone conversation with his Russian counterpart saying that the regime is trying to inflame the situation on the ground to serve its political agendas and stalling the formation of the Constitutional Committee. While Iran wants to impose itself as a partner in the Sochi Agreement through its co-operative militias on the ground, as well as sabotage of emerging understandings aimed at its interests and influence in Syria.

10 May 2019, in the first six days of the battles, the Iranian-backed militia’s participation was confirmed on the following axes:

• The Lebanese Hezbollah – Tall Othman axis
• Qwat al-Ghaith (Part of the 4th division) – Kafr Nabudahand axis
• Qwat al-Ghadab (LDF) – Qalaat al-Madiq axis

The limits of military escalation and its political and field implications

Moscow bet on the completion of rapid field progress similar to what happened in the southern Syrian region last year (a military collapse followed by reconciliations), also bet on the growing Turkish-U.S. conflict and Ankara’s preoccupation with internal files but failed in part to achieve what it sought despite the intense airstrikes and the size of the forces participating in the ground attack, where the opposition factions and jihadi groups were able to absorb the shock and began to launch counter-attacks against the regime forces, the field operations showed the weakness of the ground forces backed by Russia (such as 5th Corps, Tiger Forces and Liwa al-Quds) and the significant casualties among its ranks.

As well as the field, operations did not affect the positions of Ankara and didn’t push Turkey to compromise as Moscow believed. In light of the current situation, it is likely a weak cease-fire will be reached but will be open to the possibility of resumption of escalation in the field and each party will seek to invest in the situation on the field and use it in political negotiations in Astana or the Sochi agreement. In conclusion, the Sochi deal cannot be bet on, as the deal faced several problems in the long run and it is unlikely to collapse in the future.

In the first year of President Trump’s tenure, Turkish-American relations went through what we can call a period of “sizing up,” as hopes for a new beginning were somewhat moderated by strategic challenges. The Trump administration had inherited the Obama policy of supporting “local forces” (read YPG) against Daesh with no U.S. boots on the ground save for the “military advisors.” Turkey was patient in Trump’s first year to allow the administration some time to re-evaluate the mission and start working with Turkey instead of the PKK’s Syrian branch. When it became clear that the Trump administration would settle on the same policy, Turkey launched a military operation in Afrin to ensure the YPG forces would not go west of the Euphrates river.

The serious divergence on the ground in northern Syria has continued, but efforts to put the U.S.-Turkey relationship back on track also continued, as outstanding legal cases (Brunson and Zarrab cases) were compartmentalized away from broader policy questions. However, the pressure from the Evangelical base of the Trump administration led to an ill-timed ultimatum by President Trump and Vice President Pence, resulting in yet another bilateral crisis.

As a result of the pressure, the U.S. imposed sanctions against Turkish ministers and additional steel and aluminum tariffs, a first against a NATO ally. These measures appeared to be largely symbolic, but they had a serious impact on the Turkish Lira’s devaluation against the U.S. dollar. As Turkey refused to bow down to such economic pressures, the relationship came to the brink of total breakdown. Clearly, the Brunson case was a major catalyzer in this process, but the underlying strategic disagreements and the already existing mutual distrust has created a fertile ground for a major crisis.

With the Turkish courts deciding to release Pastor Brunson last week, however, an important new phase might just be starting in the bilateral relationship. Brunson’s return to the U.S. and President Trump’s hosting of the pastor in the oval office with high level administration officials sends a strong message to the Evangelical base ahead of the midterm elections in November.

Not that Trump risked losing the support of the Evangelicals, but Brunson’s return gives his standing with Evangelical supporters a big boost. Turkish leadership has maintained the legal process played itself out and both sides insisted there was no specific deal. We should note that there does not need to be a deal for this development to have a positive impact on the U.S.-Turkey relationship.

The fact that a legal case derailed the relationship between two NATO allies should give everyone a pause. It underscores the complexity of the strategic environment in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood and heightened security concerns Turkey feels as a result of U.S. policies in the region. President Trump’s positive remarks about Turkey reflect his concern over his standing with the Evangelical voters, but this will not be enough for a broader strategic conversation between the U.S. and Turkey.

The recent changes in the U.S. Syria policy have given at least a limited amount of reassurances to Turkey that its interests would be taken into consideration more carefully. The U.S. rhetorical support for Turkey against an imminent military operation against Idlib was a welcome development in this sense. Yet, without a more comprehensive policy coordination between two sides, the mutual skepticism will continue, especially as the U.S. continues to support the YPG.

The upside for the relationship is that the “sizing up” period may be over and both sides are much clearer about their positions. The ambiguities regarding northern Syria as well as the uncertain fate of the Brunson case are no longer excuses for the lack of an honest dialogue. The regional crises will almost certainly create new challenges and the U.S.-Turkey ties will be tried. The lesson from the Brunson case is that Turkey will not bow to threats and pressures, and that the U.S. will need to pursue diplomatic options instead. Going forward, a talk-first-shoot-later approach will have to win for a healthier U.S.-Turkey relationship.

Yesterday the Turkish Ministry of National Defence announced that the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the demilitarized zone of Idlib was completed. The announcement noted that the Syrian opposition and other anti-regime groups had withdrawn heavy weapons from the demilitarized zone and underscored that “operations were ceaselessly underway to establish sustainable and enduring peace in Idlib within the framework of the consensus reached in Sochi.”

The announcement from Turkish Defence Ministry came after Lavrov discussed the progress in demilitarization of Idlib at a news conference in Moscow. Underlining that Turkey plays a pivotal role in the creation of a demilitarized zone, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov voiced confidence of the Idlib demilitarization process, noting that it was progressing well.

These reciprocal remarks come as the October 15 deadline for the completion of the demilitarized zones is drawing closer.

Sergey Lavrov told reporters in a news conference that: “The deadline for demilitarized zones to be fully functional expires on October 15. A day or two do not play any role, in any case, the quality of these works is more important”.

Turkey and Russia had agreed to jointly establish a demilitarized zone in Idlib which is seen as the last remaining stronghold of Syria’s opposition. The leaders of the two countries, President Erdoğan and President Putin met at Sochi in September and reached a consensus on the demilitarization process of the Idlib region.

The memorandum of understanding signed between the two countries called for the stabilization of Idlib and aimed to eliminate the threat of terrorism by forbidding acts of violation. The agreement stipulated the establishment of a  disarmament zone spanning 15-20 km in Idlib.

The pact had maintained that the opposition groups in Idlib would remain where they were currently located, while Russia and Turkey would jointly conduct patrols in the area to prevent potential new conflicts.

Mutual voicing of this renewed confidence by the two countries provides a positive outlook for the region ahead of the 15 October demilitarization deadline. With Syria only just starting to emerge from the atrocious conflict that was launched in 2011, with increased concerns over the refugee crisis haunting European leaders, some of whom are discussing the potential of shutting down airports after having shut down sea ports and turned away many boats carrying refugees midway in the Mediterranean sea and with Turkey taking the real lead in responsibility of the refugee crisis with over 4 million refugees, maintaining stabilization in Syria is of utmost importance for all the parties concerned.

The disagreement over the control and status of the Syrian town of Manbij has been a symbol of the strategic differences between the U.S. and Turkey’s Syria policies for a while now. Turkey’s successful military operation in Afrin led to the announcement of a roadmap over Manbij, which relatively calmed down U.S.-Turkey tensions. However, the U.S. continued to support the PKK-affiliated YPG forces in a stated mission to deny a return to Daesh in northern Syria.

With Daesh no longer holding territory, this mission did not appear to provide convincing rationale for a prolonged American presence on the ground. More recently, the U.S. ended its ambiguity by announcing an open-ended presence in Syria declaring a mission to limit Iranian influence in Syria as part of a broader strategy to confront Iran in the region.

With this critical shift in strategy, the U.S. commitment to northern Syria seems to be set in motion for the long term. One of the first concrete outcomes of this change appears to be the administration’s stern warnings against a regime operation against Idlib, which would have caused yet another humanitarian catastrophe.

Turkey sent reinforcements to its observation posts in and around Idlib to prevent the regime from an easy takeover while lobbying Russia to prevent such an operation. The U.S. rhetoric against the looming operation may have helped Turkey’s case, convincing Russia to hold off at least for a period of time in return for the Turkish promise to push terror groups out of Idlib.

Another consequence of the U.S. policy change seems to be the announcement that the PYD would no longer negotiate with the Assad regime. This step seems to be aimed at softening the Turkish argument that the U.S. should not trust the PYD, which would work with the Assad regime, Iran or Russia depending on its needs. This argument still holds true despite the PYD’s obvious tactic to appease its American supporters, who are clearly concerned about the degree to which the regime is supported by Iranians.

The PYD has played a critical role in the PKK’s regional ambitions by opening the door for legitimacy in the international arena despite Turkey’s warnings. Turkey has been able to limit the PYD’s forays into the western side of the Euphrates but the area it continues to control remains a major concern for Turkey.

The U.S. policymakers in charge of the Syria policy would like to see Turkey enlisted on their side in their push back against Iran in the region and they must see an interest in alleviating at least some of the Turkish concerns. This kind of willingness to work with Turkey and the most recent announcement of joint Turkish-American patrols around Manbij can help rebuild confidence between the two NATO allies.

Nevertheless, we should be clear-eyed about the reality on the ground of the U.S. support for the PYD, which is considered by Turkey as a direct security threat. This will continue to be the Achilles’ heel in the U.S.-Turkey bilateral relationship. The PKK understands this and will seek to exploit it for its interests.

Turkey feels more confident after its Afrin operation, the Manbij agreement with the U.S., and the successful diplomatic effort to prevent the Assad regime from launching a major military assault against Idlib, supported at least rhetorically by Washington. These are strong signs for a renewed dynamic that takes into consideration Turkey’s interests and concerns. But once again, American support for the YPG continues to be the underlying fundamental strategic divergence between the two allies, with significant potential to undermine any positive momentum.

Turkish President Erdogan met his counterpart Putin in Russia’s Sochi on Monday. In a joint news conference with Erdogan, Putin stated that “We agreed that by October 15 (we will) create along the contact line between the armed opposition and government troops a demilitarized zone of a depth of 15-20 km, with the withdrawal from there of radically-minded rebels, including al-Nusra.” Further, he also expressed that the Turkish and Russian mobile patrol units will monitor the demilitarized zone. The agreed points were released days after the meeting but the list just adds a few more details to the statement on Monday without changing the substance.

The buffer zone to separate the hostile forces with a demilitarized corridor surrounding Idlib sounds all good. This is exactly what Turkey wanted to achieve as the Idlib deal is going towards a sharp edge. Nevertheless, there is a significant caveat in this deal: the expiration date. There is a reason why Putin specifically referred to October 15. What happens if the projected demilitarized zone cannot be established by then? What happens if the groups in Idlib refuse to return their heavy arms to show no threat to Russia? What if an actor from inside or outside of Idlib spoils the process by an attack of provocation? These are all significant questions worth to think about.

But no matter what, Turkey’s Idlib deal gave the rebels one more month to consider their options. It gave Turkey another month to make its preparations for the worst case scenario. It also presented another successful test for the Turkish-Russian cooperation in Syria. Especially Iran seemed to be less proactive towards the final decision of Monday. With the diminishing pressure felt from the Assad and Iranian regimes, Turkey and Russia will find a lot more to agree on.

As for Iran, they must have no hard feelings. As Turkey did not spoil their plans to maintain security around Damascus and further down the south, Iran should and seems like did respect Turkey’s concerns just across its border in Idlib. Perhaps it was not Iran but Russia who came to this conclusion and kept Iran out in the most recent phase of the deal, but regardless of that, Turkey and Russia should be and for now are the actors to negotiate over the fate of Idlib. This intermediary solution over Idlib is still just a plan whose implementation will be challenging. Further, it is more like a temporary resolution until the involved actors decide and negotiate what to do next.

And finally, this deal is just about Idlib and does not cover the neighboring Tel Rifaat let alone the rest of Syria. But all these concerns do not make the Idlib deal a bad one. This plan was needed for its implementation and for a long-lasting resolution in Idlib. Simply, you cannot continue without a start even though there is still a long path to walk through from Idlib to Tel Rifaat and to the rest of Syria. But you have to start from somewhere and, at this stage, it is Idlib.

What Turkey needed in Idlib was a stable situation in the city that will not destabilize Turkish territory across the border and will not harm the Turkish-Russian deal. Turkey so far has been onto this goal but the question as to what will happen to the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is still a question to decide about. In their recent statements, some pro-HTS accounts showed no sign of change in their hostile attitudes toward Turkey and Russia.

It almost seems like some rebel factions think that Idlib will not be like Northern Aleppo, Deraa, or Eastern Ghouta. It almost seems like they are confident that they will not lose a possible battle in Idlib. Yes, they can perhaps go underground and plan for a long-lasting insurgency in Idlib. But the simple fact about a possible Idlib offensive will guarantee a large-scale demolition of the city and loss of lives in great numbers. We will see whether we can see some sense of responsibility and rationality from the involved actors and we do not have much time to see the result as the expiration date of October 15 will come fast.

The Idlib uncertainty is temporarily over. However, following the Sochi Summit held on Monday, September 17, debates about the real winner in the Idlib case remains unclear. From a humanitarian standpoint, protecting more than 3 million civilians from a full-scale military assault carried out by the Syrian regime is a real achievement. However, from a geopolitical perspective, Idlib — as the last territorial stronghold of the opposition armed groups — turns into a chess-board between Russia and Turkey. At first sight, it seems that Turkey played a vital role in preventing a potential unilateral Russian-Syrian military offensive and found a new opportunity to maintain the existing border of the Idlib region; to consolidate its military presence through the extension of its military outposts, and to protect moderate opposition groups’ territorial control. However, the question of how Turkey will be able to deliver its gains on the ground is an open question and depends on how Russia thinks about the future of Idlib at the end of the expiration date of the deal signed between Moscow and Ankara in Sochi. But the strategic importance of the Russian-Turkish dialogue is valuable to maintain the deal. More importantly, Turkey’s Idlib projection might bring many new dynamics not only for Ankara’s own calculations regarding its position alongside its Syrian border but also for the future of the Syrian crisis.

From a very rationalist perspective, Turkey has many challenges as well as opportunities in the post-Sochi agreement period regarding its entire Syrian strategy. Turkey has to deal with challenging tasks in Syria. Among them, preventing the PYD-PKK’s consolidation of military and political leverage across Syria is the most crucial one, while the U.S. continues to reshuffle its original strategy about the Kurds in the eastern part of the Euphrates river. Maintaining the territorial control of the Afrin-Azaz-Jarablus triangle and protecting the Free Syrian Army’s status in this region are the secondary objectives that Turkey wishes to achieve. Consolidating the Free Syrian Army’s position militarily and empowering the Syrian political opposition within the wider geopolitical struggle regarding the solution of the Syrian crisis is another challenge that Turkey faces. Idlib is located at the center of these geopolitical concerns of Turkey. Fighting against the PKK means fighting against the U.S. at the same time, and struggling for a secure place for the Syrian opposition on the table means a deal has to be made with Russia.

From the Turkish perspective, winning Idlib at this stage has many strategic values. First and foremost, preventing a possible humanitarian catastrophe provides Turkey a real advantage not only for its already-deepening refugee issue but also for its economy. Before the Turkish-Russian deal in Sochi, in case of a unilateral offensive, the UN announced that more than half a million people from the Idlib region would be displaced and move towards Turkey’s border. Under the current circumstances and changing public perception towards the refuges, this would bring real trouble into Turkish politics, particularly before the upcoming local election. More importantly, during the time of economic uncertainty of the country, the refugee flow would bring the extra cost for the Turkish economy.

The second one is significant regarding the protection of human life from a full-scale military operation. In the post-Astana process of the Syrian crisis, Turkey has been consolidating the Syrian opposition under the umbrella of the Free Syrian Army. The FSA played a vital role during Operation Olive Branch and Turkey could maintain its military presence in the Afrin region with the assistance of the FSA and restructured the very nature of the local politics there throughout the mobilization period of the FSA. In the post-Astana process in Idlib, Turkey did the same thing without clashing with any radical armed groups and regrouped the moderate armed group under the umbrella of the National Liberation Army. The deal which has been agreed upon between Turkey and Russia means that Turkey can maintain the existing territorial management of the moderate armed group and that it also gets to keep its military posts in Idlib. If Turkey can manage to disband and dissolve the radical groups on the ground, such as the HTS, then it can keep maintaining its control over the Idlib region to consolidate its political leverage in the Syrian crisis for the foreseeable future.

The third strategic value for Turkey is to protect Turkish-Russian dialogue on the ground. Turkey and Russia have been closely working since the Astana initiative started. Even though the two countries do not fully agree over the Syrian crisis since they have been supporting different parties, both sides can compartmentalize their tactical and operational priorities on the ground. The Idlib deal represents that both countries agree on a full-scale military solution would prolong the war itself. More importantly, losing Turkey at this stage would bring a new wave of uncertainty for Russia in the Syrian crisis. Even though the roughly one-month time frame for Turkey to dissolve the radical group is not enough, the strategic dialogue between Russia and Turkey can provide an extension to do this objective.

When taking the dimensions above into consideration for the new Idlib deal, Turkey also gets to keep its role in the Syrian crisis. Controlling remarkable territories alongside its borders with its armed forces in the opposition armed groups’ presence, Turkey is still playing a vital role for the future of the Syrian crisis in the international arena. At this stage, the most important objective for Turkey is to solve the potential radicalization of the armed groups. If Turkey can deliver its objective, then it can keep its overall position in the Syrian civil war.

The Turkish-Russian agreement arrived in Sochi in a meeting between President Erdogan and President Putin comes just in time to avert a major humanitarian crisis. The agreement is to create a demilitarized buffer zone between the opposition and the Assad regime from where heavy weapons would be pulled out. The 10 to 12-mile corridor would be free of al-Qaeda related terror groups under the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the zone would be patrolled by Turkish and Russian forces. It is clear that the implementation will be key in determining the ultimate success of the deal but preventing hundreds of thousands from rushing to the north is already a huge relief for Turkey.

The agreement, which will come into effect by October 10, is a diplomatic win for Turkey as well. Turkey has been lobbying Russia and Iran to prevent the Assad regime from committing more war crimes and creating yet another humanitarian disaster. Through the Astana process, Turkey has worked to deescalate the conflict and to create safe zones. The Assad regime has been using the presence of terror groups like the HTS to justify a major military operation against Idlib, which houses around three million civilians. The Turkish-Russian agreement sends a signal to the regime that it cannot ignore Turkey’s interests and export insecurity to its northern neighbor.

Turkey has adopted a forward leaning military posture since the summer of 2016 to ensure that security threats emanating from Syria no longer threaten the Turkish border towns. Both the Euphrates Shield and Afrin operations accomplished this goal to a large extent by pushing the YPG, Daesh, and regime control away from the border. A large-scale military operation by the regime against Idlib would upset the hard-achieved stability in the areas controlled by Turkey and Turkish-supported opposition groups. It would not only weaken Turkey’s ability to manage the humanitarian challenges on the ground but also threaten Turkish border security.

The most difficult part for Turkey will probably be ensuring that the HTS are removed from the buffer zone areas. The continued HTS presence has given the Assad regime an excuse to make a case for attacking Idlib. While it is extremely difficult and unrealistic for Turkey to eliminate HTS completely, the agreement gives Turkey time to force the group’s hardcore elements, which are in fact in the minority, to separate from the more local Syrian fighters and leave the area. This will be critical in removing the Assad regime’s excuse to attack Idlib.

In strategic terms, Idlib is the last bastion of the moderate opposition supported by Turkey. The agreement would require the opposition to pull its heavy weapons out of the buffer zone, which would remove the chance of an imminent clash with the regime forces supported by Russia and Iran. It is not yet clear whether Iran would abide by this agreement but it was already clear that Iranians did not necessarily alienate Turkey at this point. It would be extremely difficult for the regime to launch an offensive on its own without Iran’s help. If the opposition can feel somewhat secure as a result of this agreement, given that Turkish troops will be patrolling the buffer zone, they may be able to focus on other priorities such as providing security and confronting al-Qaeda related groups.

Turkey’s diplomatic success may have just saved thousands of innocent lives as well as yet another unnecessary humanitarian crisis. However, the Assad regime will certainly seek to take over Idlib eventually. If the Turkish-Russian deal succeeds, the opposition can survive and the contours of a future political deal can be based more on realities on the ground rather than the political goals of the Assad regime.

After last Friday’s tripartite summit of Iran, Russia, and Turkey in Tehran, there was another meeting this Friday, bringing Turkey, Russia, France, and Germany together in Istanbul. The meeting enabled France and Germany to be more involved in the resolution of the crisis. France and Germany’s positions on Idlib are very similar to that of Turkey for different reasons. Hence, we can talk about a European perspective on Idlib and it also includes Turkey’s. Going back to Friday’s meeting, all parties agreed on the necessity of a political solution for Idlib according to the statement of Turkey’s Presidential Spokesman Ibrahim Kalin. As these diplomatic exchanges continue, Turkey feels to have more time to facilitate a peaceful solution on Idlib.

Turkey is trying real hard to prevent a devastating battle from occurring in Idlib. The diplomatic talks that occurred in Tehran and this Friday in Istanbul are just one side of these efforts. The other side is pure realpolitik. Turkey increased its tone against a fait accompli regime offensive in Idlib and it further made its deterrence discourse more credible with new deployments on the ground. While the open sources did not give the specifics, what we know is that Turkey’s reinforcement included new troops and armored vehicles around its observation posts in Idlib and along its border with Idlib.

The reinforcement, on the one hand, serves the purpose of deterring a possible regime offensive, but on the other hand, it is also vital for Turkey if its deterrence strategy fails to deter the regime from starting the offensive. In such a scenario, these reinforcements will play a significant role for Turkey to defend its already-settled troops in Idlib. These troops had been deployed to serve in Turkey’s observation posts that were established in the Astana process of Turkey, Russia, and Iran. They were not designed for defensive purposes but merely for the reconnaissance mission. Now Turkey is making these posts defendable with new reinforcements and, hence, also deterring the regime and other hostile forces from attacking them.

What is crucial at this moment for Turkey is meeting on a middle ground with Russia. As long as Turkey and Russia can keep a common position based on mutual respect for their security perceptions, the situation in Idlib and elsewhere in Syria should be solved peacefully and satisfactorily for both countries.

Excluding the American sphere of control in Syria, Turkey’s primary concern is the PYD’s role in Tel Rıfaat and Russia’s primary concern is the armed groups in Idlib. Turkey has already designated the the Hey’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) as a terror organization and it seems like Turkey will increase its pressure on the HTS to dissolve itself or leave Idlib. As long as Russia plays a supportive role in Idlib, the city can be cleaned from groups like the HTS without burning down the entire city and causing another humanitarian catastrophe.

Turkey’s primary strategy in this game is to deter the Syrian regime from a brutal offensive while trying to find a middle ground with Russia and bringing the similar minded European powers closer to the game. This strategy seems to not be a maximalist one but quite a reasonable and applicable strategy that can convince both Russia and European powers. What Turkey and the rest of the reasonable actors need now is to prevent spoilers from undermining this well-crafted strategy.

The Tehran summit that was held last week did not produce any clear-cut solution to overcome the ongoing uncertainty in the Idlib region. The uncertainty remains as to whether Russia and the regime forces will carry out a full-scale military offensive against the opposition via Iran-backed Shia forces. While Turkey’s position and solution package regarding the issue is welcomed by the international community, especially by the United Nations, the other stakeholders of the Astana process, Russia and Iran, reject the Turkish proposal. Two basic factors trigger the uncertainty and disagreement over Idlib between Russia and Turkey. The first is the security concerns of Russia regarding the terrorist threat emanating from HTS, which targeted Russian military bases in Syria with drones at the beginning of this year. On the other hand, the occasional confrontation between the opposition armed groups and Syrian regime forces constitute a rationale for a military offensive in Idlib. Therefore, the security concerns of Russia and the regime form the main reason for Russia to disagree with Turkey’s proposal.

The second reason is more complicated, and it might deepen the uncertainties in the region. This is the question of how the HTS is going to disarm itself and disband its organizational structure in preventing Russia to agree on Turkey’s proposal. The primary dynamic that drives these uncertainties is the ambiguity of the overall Russian strategy towards the position of the opposition groups located in the Idlib region. It is clear that Russia’s ultimate desire is to undermine the presence of all opposition groups in Idlib and to declare its military victory. The Syrian regime also shares this objective. This therefore makes the Turkish solution package more fragile and difficult to achieve – unless the Turkish government receive stronger international support. To put the matter bluntly, three questions should be asked at this stage: Does Russia think that the Turkish proposal is credible and achievable? Is the Turkish offer achievable on the ground? Does Turkey have the deterrence capacity to transform the HTS and other minor armed groups with military force? These questions cannot be answered at this stage.

It is not yet possible to state that there is full consensus between Putin and President Erdogan on the management of the Idlib crisis. However, at this stage, it is possible to say that the proposal Ankara has offered provoked Russia to re-think its position. The first pillar of the Turkish solution package consists of a “security warrant” that will be provided by Turkey to Russia in the south and to the Syrian regime forces in the northeast. According to this option, Turkey will consolidate its military presence along with the presence of the member of National Liberation Army, established by Turkey in the post-Astana process under the framework of creating a moderate opposition group and dissolving the radical elements in Idlib. Turkey will apply the same procedure towards the de facto border between the regime forces and the opposition armed groups.

After the first phase Turkey will start to implement a mechanism to enable the HTS to lay down its weapons and dissolve its military structure. This act, for sure, will take time for Turkey. With the support of Russia and Western countries, this objective is achievable. If the HTS does not accept this option, then Turkey is proposing a military solution to disband the group. Only then will the Turkish-backed moderate armed groups carry military operations against the HTS and other minor armed groups. It is possible to say that Turkey and the moderate armed groups can achieve this objective at the end of the day. According to signals coming from the ground, the HTS seems to accept the first option and tends to desire to disband its military structure. This option also depends on Russia’s intention of air bombardment. If Russia continues to carry out air strikes against the HTS, then it is difficult to say that the HTS will come close to Turkey’s offer.

The third part of the solution package is establishing a joint struggle with the terrorism issue in the Idlib region as expressed by President Erdogan, following the Tehran summit. This proposal involves creating an international dialogue mechanism to overcome extremism-related matters in the Idlib region, including foreign fighters, stabilizing refugee mobilization, and forming a stable non-conflictual region. This does not necessarily mean that an international military coalition is necessary to overcome the issue. Instead, political support for Turkey’s decisiveness and good intentions is much more important than providing military means on the ground.

This is the right time for the international society to take real responsibility in order to overcome the already deepening Syrian crisis. The violent fall of Idlib will not bring an end to the Syrian Civil War, but Idlib can provide a tremendous opportunity for Russia and the international community to find a common ground for the future of Syria. Therefore, Turkey’s struggle to find a peaceful solution to the Idlib issue should be supported.

Turkey has been the most vocal critic of the seemingly impending military assault against Idlib by the Assad regime. Turkey has serious concerns about the strategic and humanitarian consequences of a potential operation. An Assad-Iran ground operation supported by Russian airpower (though limited it may be) can unleash yet another humanitarian catastrophe, producing hundreds of thousands of IDPs and refugees. A regime takeover would signal the end of the opposition as we know it. However, Turkey’s adamant stance combined with its recent military reinforcements to the 12 observation posts might bear fruit and deter the regime, at least for the time being. Given the strong rhetoric used by the U.S. against the Assad regime especially with regard to its potential chemical weapons use, Russia might not be so eager to deploy its air support to the regime any time soon.

The most recent Tehran summit that brought the main sponsors of the Astana process, Turkey, Russia and Iran, demonstrated the level of deep disagreements between these powers. While Ankara has pushed for better relations with Moscow recently, the summit showed that Turkey would stand its ground when it comes to defending its interests in Syria, including the support for the moderate opposition. Turkey has not contended itself with warnings about a possible disaster in Idlib but has taken measures to deter the Assad regime from engineering a fait accompli. Clearly, a regime assault on Idlib goes against the basic logic of the Astana process and it can seriously derail any attempt at a political solution.

The Assad regime and its supporters have shown time and again that they have little interest in a truly political process to end the conflict in Syria. The regime has been trying to “win” through a systematic effort to take over most of the country by implementing strategic ceasefires and military operations both sequentially and simultaneously depending on the region. While there has been the talk of a political process, there has been little tangible progress on that front. Turkey’s military presence on the ground and its continued support to the opposition appear to be the only true obstacles before the regime to accomplish its goals. Turkey, on the other, is trying hard to ensure that when and if the Geneva process happens, it comes to the table with a strong hand and a viable opposition to speak of.

The most recent reports indicate that there has been a quiet policy shift in U.S. policy. Having justified its military operations in the north of Syria on the Daesh threat, the U.S. political and military leaders have not been making a strong case for continued operations in Syria, albeit until recently. The recent shift seems to entail a more open-ended commitment despite President Trump’s earlier comments about leaving Syria soon. Now, the Syria policy appears to be insistent on the departure of Iranian forces from the country as well as a stronger, albeit rhetorical, posture against the Assad regime’s potential Idlib operation. It is difficult to say the U.S. and Turkey see eye-to-eye on Idlib but there are clearly strong overlaps.

A realignment could re-emerge between the U.S. and Turkey’s policies on Idlib, which could give the Assad regime and especially Russia a pause. Despite the diplomatic benefits the U.S. position may provide, Turkey has skin in the game in a way its NATO ally does not. With the recent U.S. appointment of James Jeffrey, the new representative for engagement on Syria, there are signs that Washington might listen to and understand Ankara better, especially on its Syria policy. However, there is every indication that the U.S.’s continued support for the YPG, the Syrian extension of the PKK, will continue. In fact, much of the new Syria policy might depend on this relationship. If that continues to be the case, the U.S.-Turkey agreement on Idlib may not grow into broader cooperation on Syria.

A key component of the new U.S. policy on Syria will be the focus on reducing Iranian influence in the region, hoping to enlist Turkey’s support. However, with the impending sanctions on Iranian energy sectors, it is safe to bet that the U.S. and Turkey will have serious disagreements on Iran. Turkey vehemently disagrees with Iran on Syria but it is reliant on Iran for its oil and natural gas needs. If the U.S. is interested in enlisting Turkish support against Iran’s regional influence, it will need to engage Turkey in a meaningful way beyond the somewhat limited agreement on Idlib.

On September 7, the leaders of Turkey, Russia, and Iran met in Tehran to discuss the Syrian issue with Idlib being the most important topic on the agenda. The organizers broadcasted the whole summit, which allowed us to witness a kind of a televised argument in which Erdogan ceased the moment to ask Putin and Rouhani for a ceasefire in Idlib. Basically, what the Turkish side was trying to achieve is to spare lives of more than 3.5 million civilians in the province from the Assad regime’s aggression, and buy some time to solve the problem.

During the summit, Turkey’s President highlighted his country’s grave concerns and sensitivities towards the issue. If a major assault is to be launched against the Syrian province, the humanitarian catastrophe will be big and Turkey, with its maximum capacity being utilized to support refugees, will not have more room to deal with it. Stressing the importance of Idlib, the Turkish side clearly said that it is a matter of national security and will not leave the city.

President Erdogan may not have fully succeeded in convincing both leaders to halt the military operation; however, the political showdown uncovered in the summit shed light on the different agendas, interests, and priorities of Turkey, Russia and Iran. If we add the U.S. to the mix, then it would be safe to assume that the way the Idlib dilemma is going to be handled will have a profound impact on the power game evolving in Syria and on its future.

Despite the unlimited support the Syrian regime is getting from Moscow and Tehran, Assad is still less than a decision maker in his country’s affairs. By defeating the opposition and taking over their last stronghold Idlib, Assad’s allies want to guarantee his regime a better position in the political process, boost the efforts to extend its control over Syria, and expedite the ongoing proceeding to re-legitimatize it as a de-facto ruler for the whole country.

Although in a very unfavorable position vis-à-vis the Russia-Iran-Assad axis from one side, the U.S.- SDF/ PYD /YPG axis from another, Turkey –as clearly reflected by the Tehran summit– is the only country which is still actively defying Assad in public and behind closed doors. In this sense, Ankara is seen as an obstacle that needs to be neutralized if not completely removed from Idlib.

Unlike other times where Russia conceded for Turkey, things seem to be a little bit different now. Aware of Ankara’s critical position, Putin insisted on his stance, refused to include “ceasefire” in the text and showed support for the assault against the province with the pretext of the presence of terrorist organizations. After the summit, Assad and Russia intensified their aerial bombardment giving a clear sign that a land assault is near.

The situation will harshly test Ankara–Moscow relations in Syria and how both of them will cope with the coming developments and challenges there. A major assault on Idlib is expected to create a humanitarian catastrophe and trigger flows of refugees towards the Turkish borders. This will increase the political, economic, and security pressure on Ankara, but most importantly will hinder its credibility as a guarantor in the eyes of the Syrian opposition. The direct result will likely be the end of the Astana process and the breakdown of the trilateral mechanism with further implications to come.

Thus, by ignoring Turkey’s critical points and concerns, Moscow not only risks undermining its understandings with Ankara, but also endangers the fate of the political process in a way that will likely make a sustainable solution in Syria impossible. Taking into consideration that, without Turkey, there can be no serious progress on the coming non-military challenges (constitutional law, preparing for elections, construction….etc), Russia would be shooting itself in the foot if it insists on a full scale military assault on Idlib.

Moscow needs to understand very well the risks arising from such a scenario and that without taking Ankara’s concerns into account, it might win the war but it will never win peace. If decision makers in Russia are fully aware of this point, then there will be still a slim chance to halt the military operation or at least downsize it to a limited operation.

To be sure, everyone except Turkey, seems to be agreeing on the military operation in a way or another including the U.S. While Russia and Iran are in a rush to achieve the above-stated goals and consolidate Assad’s power, Washington made it clear that its only concern is the use of chemical weapons. Last week, U.S. ambassador to the UN said at a UN press conference, “If they – Assad and his allies- want to continue to go the route of taking over Syria, they can do that, but they cannot do it with chemical weapons.”

Just five months ago, U.S. President Trump stressed that he wanted to withdraw from Syria and bring his troops back home. Now Trump has agreed to a new strategy that indefinitely extends the military effort to ensure the departure of Iran and its proxy forces, the “enduring defeat” of Daesh (IS), the establishment of a stable, nonthreatening government acceptable to all Syrians and the international community.

Yet, allowing Assad to kill civilians, take over Idlib, and extend his control over more territories with the help of Iran and Russia will run against the freshly stated goals of Washington’s new policy in Syria. It will be hard to imagine that the U.S. will be able stay in Syria indefinitely, prevent the emergence of terrorists, and drive Iran out of the country if Assad is going to consolidate his powers. In this context, the U.S. has an interest in stopping the imminent military assault on Idlib and can work with Turkey on this issue for their mutual benefit.

Americans have always complained lately about the Turkish-Russian cooperation. It should be kept in mind that Ankara is working with Moscow in Syria after it was on the verge of war with it at the end of 2015 because the U.S. decided to downsize itself and make alliance with a franchise branch of the PKK in Syria, thus constantly working against Turkey’s national security.

Currently, disagreements with Russia and Iran on Idlib are visible. Turkey, a NATO ally, is saying it will stand its ground amid the imminent military assault of Assad and his allies on the city. However, since the balance of power is not in Turkey’s favor versus Assad, Iran and Russia, the U.S. can step in to defend Ankara, not only politically but militarily if needed. When they have the will, Americans proved that they can act. They defended the PYD against Assad, they defended themselves against Russian mercenaries without the pretext that such a lethal engagement will lead to a total war.

Another option on U.S.-Turkey cooperation in this matter can be explored too. U.S. officials can offer valuable intelligence information that might help Ankara convince Moscow that there is a more effective way to work on counterterrorism operation in Idlib rather than letting Assad and his allies take over the city with the pretext of fighting terrorism. This will not only raise Turkey’s chance to halt the operation but will serve Washington’s interest too.

If it were considered as a country, Idlib would have been the second country in hosting refugees. The Tehran summit proved that Ankara’s position to defend the civilians in Idlib against the Assad regime is not another PR strategy rather than an ethical position, which is constantly undermined by the imbalance of power. Defending civilians against the brutality of the Assad regime and his allies should not only be Turkey’s responsibility. The international community, including the U.S., has great responsibilities to carry in this particular matter as well.

The Tehran summit on the future of the Idlib region is over, but the Idlib conundrum continues. The final meeting of the summit was interestingly broadcasted live so that the participating nations could raise their position publicly regarding the Idlib issue. It was a textbook example demonstrating competing discourses and strategies that frame the participating nations’ policy justification regarding the situation, not only in the Idlib region but also in Syria. President Erdogan encouraged Russia and Iran to accept a ceasefire in Idlib by saying that the people of the region hold many anxieties about the catastrophic consequences of the aerial bombing by Russia and Syria. He also mentioned that such an accord would be a victory of the summit.

However, Turkey’s cease-fire call was rejected by Russia and Iran. President Putin responded that “a cease-fire would be good.” Putin also mentioned that representatives of terrorist organizations have enough common sense to stop resistance and lay down their weapons. It was evident that President Erdogan underlined the importance of the cease-fire for the civilian people who might be targeted by Russian air bombardment.

Turkey’s priorities regarding Syria are still shaped by the same parameters as the final declaration of the summit shows. Territorial integrity has always been a central component of Ankara’s concerns regarding the Syrian crisis. President Erdogan underlined the terrorist threat by referring to the growing relationship between the U.S. and the PYD, which is the PKK’s Syrian branch. As it can also be understood through the Russian and Iranian leaders’ statements during the meeting, the U.S presence in the northern part of Syria is not welcomed as it undermines Syrian territorial integrity and Turkey’s national security. This concern was directly mentioned in the final statement of the meeting.

However, as compared to the previous Astana summits, in the final communique of the Tehran summit, Turkey, Russia, and Iran framed Syria concerning its official name: the Syrian Arab Republic (three times). This is an important signal to see Turkey’s “new” position regarding the Syrian regime, as Turkey always tends to prefer the Assad regime instead of using SAR.

In addition to the strong emphasis on the territorial integrity of Syria Turkey, Russia and Iran also revealed the “sovereignty” of the Syrian state in the final declaration of the meeting. From a personal point of view, it is unclear to me how Turkey locates the sovereignty of the Syrian state over the entire country which has been divided into many parts, in which Turkey also holds some part of it. More importantly, how Turkey understands the domestic dimension of the SAR’s sovereignty is not clear. This shows also how the PKK threat shapes Turkey’s understanding of the Syrian crisis. Therefore, the Tehran summit is interesting to understand whether Turkey’s perception of the solution of the Syrian crisis has shifted.

As the final statement of the meeting underlines, the UN is the most important component of Turkey’s perspective regarding the Syrian crisis. In the joint statement, Turkey, Russia, and Iran reiterated the importance of the UN and underlined that the Syria crisis could only reach a final resolution through a negotiated political process, not military means.

How the Idlib issue will be solved is still unclear as there was no mentioning of any mechanism to prevent the Russian and Syrian regime’s full-scale military assault on Idlib, but it seems that Turkey’s proposal was partly accepted by Russia and Iran. Before the summit, there were three scenarios: limited intervention against the radical groups such as HTS in particular places, full-scale military intervention and, finally, allowing Turkey to dissolve and disband the radical groups. At this stage, it is claimed that Turkey has given HTS a week deadline to respond to Turkey’s proposal of dissolving and disbanding the group. From news on the ground, the group will only accept the proposal if Russia and Syria give an end to their attacks.

The Tehran summit underlined the importance of the Astana summit and Turkey’s role in the resolution process of the Syrian crisis, but it also showed the difficulties for Turkey, particularly during the emergency time on the ground. 

The Syrian Civil War, which has been raging for more than seven years, is entering a new phase, as the Assad regime is threatening to take over Idlib with Russian air support. This may very well be the end of the opposition as we know it since Idlib remains the last opposition stronghold. The Assad regime and Russia are making a case about the insertion of extremist elements to the city, conveniently ignoring the millions of IDPs that came to the region following the fall of Aleppo and other areas to the regime. In this phase of the conflict, the regime will seek to take the city at any cost, hoping to declare victory in the ravaged country. Once that happens, Russia will be able to argue that now is the time for the political process to move forward and reconstruction efforts to start. All this will happen at a huge civilian costs.

In many ways, Idlib has become a refuge not only for civilians but for opposition forces that have lacked serious support from outside, except for Turkey. The insertion of al-Qaeda affiliates, such as the HTS, into the region has helped the Assad regime to justify a military operation just like it has done in the rest of Syria. It’s a familiar pattern after all when the regime turns a blind eye to the movement of such groups at the beginning only to use them as justification for further military operations down the road. The international community has largely watched this pattern unfold over and over again, except for when the refugee outflows threatened Europe’s stability. It has not only failed to help the opposition but also delivered a message to the Assad regime that it can create humanitarian catastrophes with little, if any, cost.

With the latest news of Russian air bombardment and the potential operation of regime forces to the city, Turkey is ever more nervous about the humanitarian costs and the possible breakdown of the deconfliction zone it has helped to create. Turkey’s first preference was to work with its NATO ally, the U.S. to empower the opposition for a lasting political deal in Syria. Disillusioned with U.S. policy, however, Turkey has increased its diplomatic efforts toward the two major players on the ground, Russia and Iran, through the Astana and Sochi processes. An important result of significant value for Turkish strategic interests has been the creation of deconfliction zones. Turkey’s intervention to contain the PYD/PKK’s march toward the west was also not opposed by Russia and Iran.

The Assad regime’s impending Idlib operation carries the risk of alienation of Turkey from this diplomatic process, not to mention the potential confrontation between Turkish forces and the regime forces. If the Assad regime conducts an all-out assault on Idlib, Turkey will be hard pressed to protect its interests: maintaining the deconfliction zone, stemming the refugee outflows, containing the PYD/PKK, and continuing to engage with Russia and Iran diplomatically. If the opposition loses its control in Idlib to the regime, there may not be much of a need for a diplomatic process anyway. If and when the regime declares victory, Russia will try to pivot quickly to a debate on reconstruction rather than a political solution. Given the complexities of security and political interests of all political actors, it is difficult to imagine either a meaningful reconstruction effort or a sustainable political agreement will emerge any time soon. Under these conditions, Syria will not be stable for a long time to come regardless of what happens in Idlib.

Idlib, the last stronghold of the military and political opposition, is becoming a new episode for the seven-year-old Syrian Civil War. While the Syrian regime and Iran-backed Shia militias are planning a military offensive against the opposition in Idlib, where approximately 2,9 million people including internally displaced people live, Russia has puzzling hesitations whether the military option would bring a solution or produce more chaos for the Russian strategy in Syria.

“A military solution here would be a disaster, not just for the Idlib region, but a disaster regarding Syria’s future,” Mevlut Cavusoglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, told a news conference in Moscow with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov. However, Turkey’s priorities in reaching a peaceful solution for Idlib are becoming more difficult and complicated to achieve due to the nature of the conflict in the region.

The dynamics of geopolitical competition among the regional countries and Turkey’s self-capabilities are in test vis-a-vis overcoming Ankara’s strategic anxieties on the ground, mainly to achieve what Russia and other international actors are expecting from Turkey’s military presence there and political engagement with the opposition groups in the region.

The deterioration of Turkish-American relations, in which both countries have divergent policies towards Syria – particularly in the eastern part of the country – is also creating more complexities for the future of the Idlib region, as well as Turkey’s difficult role in it. At this stage, the actors involved in the new Idlib turmoil have competing strategies and divergence policy options.

Turkey’s priorities in Idlib

Turkey has twelve military observation points in the Idlib region to observe the de-escalation agreement in which Russia, Turkey, and Iran had agreed upon within the framework of the Astana summits. From the very beginning, Turkey started to establish military observation points in Idlib. Ankara safely delivered its security priorities in terms of increasing the number of military outposts across the Idlib region, preventing the radical groups, particularly Al-Qaeda affiliated ones, such as HTS, from getting more ground among the military opposition and remobilizing moderate armed groups under the framework of the National Army.

However, it is difficult to say that Turkey successfully de-integrated radical groups and eliminated their military capacity due to internal dynamics among the armed groups, the rigid ideological perception of the radical groups toward the peaceful solution in Syria and the military moves of the Syrian regime towards the opposition groups in the Idlib region. The HTS’s political and military mobilization in the area and its militant ideology was an extremely important obstacle in achieving Turkey’s original strategy.

At this stage, Turkey’s security priorities are shaped by many puzzling variables. As Ankara’s intensive diplomatic talks with Russia have demonstrated during the last two weeks, Turkey firstly aims to prevent the Syrian regime’s unilateral military intervention against the opposition groups. For Ankara, a large-scale military operation without distinguishing civilians from radical armed groups can create a new wave of instability in the region that would cause another conflict spill-over effect from Syria to Turkey.

The new mass refugee flow towards Turkey, together with the potential of an influx of radical fighters, can create another security threat for Turkey and can complicate the already existing massive refugee issue in the country. More importantly, there is a most-likely scenario that Turkish troops in the Idlib region intentionally or unintentionally can be targeted by any other third party and this might trigger the conflict between Turkey and other actors that are operationally involved in the Idlib war.

In addition to these security concerns for Turkey, strategically, the Idlib offensive apparently with the victory of the Syrian regime at the end of the day, can create real strategic pressure on Turkey’s military presence in the Afrin region where the Turkish forces defeated the PKK and ensured the Free Syrian Army’s military and political presence there.

The most important thing for Turkey’s strategic priorities is the continuation of its military presence in the region, especially within the western part of the Euphrates river. At this stage, it seems that Ankara and Moscow are continuing with their negotiations over the issue and that the Russian side is expecting for Turkey, before it’s too late, to achieve what they agreed upon in Astana.

The puzzle of the Turkish-Russian dialogue

While Turkey sees the potential Idlib conflict from the very center of its national and regional security priorities, Russia has a completely different agenda. The Russians see the military fall of Idlib by the Syrian regime as a tactical and operational issue, yet Moscow cannot be sure about the broader implications of the Idlib war across Syria -including the remobilization of militant groups, the continuation of the war, and destruction of the Astana agreement.

Ankara understands the Idlib war from the angel of a massive flow of refugees into Turkey, remobilization risk of radicals along its border, and the potential threat against its strategy of containing the PKK/YPG in the region. While Turkey can influence military oppositions, Russia is the only country that can contain the Syrian regime’s military operations against opposition groups in Idlib. From a realistic perspective, both countries are locked with a dilemma; the dilemma between choosing a strategy that relies on a war against the radical groups and maintaining peaceful negotiations with radical armed groups to dissolve their military structure.

At this stage, Ankara’s expectation is for Russia not to easily open the gate for a full-scale military campaign for the Syrian regime forces.  As Lavrov stated in the press meeting in Moscow, Turkey and Russia will continue to bring a diplomatic solution as they had agreed to apply for opposition armed groups in Aleppo last year. What Turkey and Russia agreed in their meeting in Moscow remains unclear, yet Russia proposed to Turkey some options both to eliminate the HTS, which is the most influential armed group (approximately 13. 000 fighters) inside the Idlib region and to bring a peaceful diplomatic solution. However, the realities on the ground are more complex than Turkey’s and Russia’s desire to eliminate HTS presence in a minimal time.

As the leader of the HTS Abu Mohammad al-Golani declared many times in his statements that they would not allow the Syrian regime military assault and demobilize their fighters. Rather than dissolving the group, the HTS member declared that they are “working hard to arrive to a useful solution in the liberated north.” More importantly, the very nature of the groups is complex; they are not composed of indigenous fighters and their ideological commitment to “revolution” is hierarchical and radical.

If Russia and Turkey can agree over a haven option in which the members (it is not possible to know how many fighters would leave the HTS in this process) can survive, then the Syrian regime military campaign may be out of option. This narrative is not limited to the HTS. There are also other armed groups that have an entirely different view toward the ongoing uncertainties.

Therefore, it is not clear whether the diplomatic dialogue will necessarily bring about a peaceful solution to the Idlib region and whether it will determine the status of the opposition. However, Russia and Turkey are still key actors who will determine the future of Idlib.

The U.S. factor in Idlib

While Turkey and Russia are the main determinant powers for the future of Idlib, the U.S. administration has indirect concerns regarding the situation in Idlib. However, three interrelated dynamics shape the U.S. perception towards Idlib.

The first is the probability of a chemical attack by the Syrian regime against the civilian population in Idlib. The U.S, France, and Britain released a joint statement regarding the military offensive of the Syrian regime against civilian and civilians infrastructure in Idlib by using chemical weapons. U.S. officials are particularly worried that the regime would turn to chlorine-filled helicopter-launched barrel bombs as it has in the past.

The second one is the potential strategic re-consolidation of Iranian influence through the Idlib offensive. The Syrian regime’s military power is heavily dependent on Iranian proxies to fight against opposition groups in the region. It is a critical topic since the Russians are unwilling to support the regime’s military assault. The U.S. administration sees an Idlib offensive as an opportunity for Iran to reconsolidate its military influence in Syria. This is especially important following the announcement of Iranian officials that Tehran agreed to a deal deepen military cooperation with Syria despite moves by the U.S. to contain Iranian military reach in Syria. This move also undermines the U.S.’s attempt to convince Russia to get rid of Iranian capabilities and to get Iranian fighters out of the country.

The third factor that shapes the U.S. understanding of Idlib is the possibility of a dissemination of radical armed groups across Syria – which would escalate another violent moment in the Syrian crisis. At this stage, it is difficult to say that the U.S. administration has an obvious policy option towards the situation in Idlib except that the U.S. wants to remain in contact with Russia and Turkey.

Options and implications

The future of Idlib remains unknown, but which actors will be determinant in shaping the already fragmented issue on the ground depends on their capability either to convince the self-disbanding radical anti-regime forces or to fight against them. It seems that Turkey has limited influence over the Al-Qaida affiliated armed groups to transform them peacefully. Ankara also does not want to fight against the radical groups at this stage unless Turkey is targeted by any of them.

The only way for the solution and to prevent a new political and security turmoil in the region is the evacuation of the radical armed groups from Idlib. It is hard to guess at this stage who can determine who is who regarding their level of extremism, yet Turkey’s and Russia’s intensive diplomatic attempts can bring a new way out from the Idlib elusiveness.

If this option does not work on the ground, then a limited military campaign against particular armed groups and especially HTS-led places in the Idlib region will be conducted by Russia and Syrian regimes forces. If this becomes the case, a limited refugee flow towards Turkey should be expected.

If the regime and Russian military campaign goes beyond a limited military intervention and turns into a full-scale military assault, then two major developments should be expected. The first one is the radicalization of the moderate armed groups against Russia and the Syrian regime, and the second is the alienation of Turkey from the Astana process, which might bring more cost for Russia. At this point, the upcoming summit between Russia, Turkey, and Iran in Tehran on September 7 will be of critical importance as it will determine the decisiveness of the three actors to maintain their consensus on a ceasefire and de-escalation zone, or to shape the future of the Syrian crisis.

Turkey has been taking direct action in northwestern Syria in order to protect a variety of significant interests for several years now. Since March, Ankara has been working to build camps with a capacity to host 170,000 refugees inside Syria so to stem the refugee inflows in the event of a major operation by the regime against Idlib. The potential for a fresh round of mass exodus is increasing as the Assad regime appears to plan to capture the last remaining bastion of opposition by justifying it on the presence of al-Qaeda linked groups in the area. The Assad regime’s past practice has shown that it will not spare civilians in the event of a military operation and that it will almost certainly create hundreds of thousands of IDPs. Having warned the regime against a possible operation, Turkey has been lobbying Russia and Iran for a while now to prevent such a scenario.

There may be a real danger of escalation and risk of conflict with Turkish troops on the ground, which have been deployed to the region to create a de-confliction zone – not to mention millions of IDPs, if the Assad regime attacks Idlib. Turkey is now a major stakeholder in what happens in northwestern Syria, including much of Idlib. The region’s future has a bearing on the fate of the opposition supported by Turkey, the success of the de-confliction zones, and whether the Assad regime can make a long-lasting deal with the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK. A regime offensive in the area would produce a new era of instability, potentially disturbing the hard-earned stability thanks to Turkey’s investment on the ground and diplomatic work with Russia and Iran.

Turkey has handled the humanitarian situation admirably over the years but this does not mean it was cost-free either economically or politically. Turkey spent billions of dollars in hosting refugees and it has evolved to be a rather politically sensitive issue domestically. The Turkish administration has been advocating for the creation of stable zones in Syria so that significant numbers of refugees are given the possibility of returning to their homelands. It is not clear whether all refugees in Turkey will be able to, or are willing to, return. However, the fact that close to a quarter a million Syrians have returned is already good news for Turkey. Yet, if the regime repeats what it has done in other parts of Syria by inflicting senseless violence and damage in Idlib, Turkey will be hard-pressed to prevent millions from marching to the Turkish border and to protect its other strategic interests.

What happens in Idlib may spell the end of the Syrian Civil War at a catastrophic cost in human lives and humanitarian challenges. The regime clearly intends to declare victory by taking over Idlib even if it has to create yet another major humanitarian disaster. Russia and Iran have been the critical players on the ground with an indecisive American presence focused on Daesh. The U.S.-backed YPG is now striking a deal with the Assad regime, once again refusing to understand the realities of the region and Turkey’s determination. The Trump administration is not interested in a robust strategic presence in Syria despite arguments for it in order to contain Iran’s influence. Lacking a serious rationale for being in northern Syria other than preventing a potential comeback by Daesh, the U.S. commitment will be increasingly weakened.

Given these dynamics, Turkey will remain a major stakeholder in northern Syria and any political agreement for the future of Syria will have to ultimately accommodate Turkish interests. Russia and Iran need to make sure that the situation in Idlib does not result in a disaster that Turkey has to handle on its own. This would not only alienate Turkey as it creates real dangers against Turkish interests but will also delay a potential political deal for Syria.

Following Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield, which saw the Free Syrian Army (FSA), backed by Turkish forces, clear Daesh from the territory in north Syria between August 2016 and March 2017, the Idlib operation has been the second phase of Turkish direct involvement in Syria.

As a guarantor state within the Astana Talks, which Russia and Iran are also a party to, and as part of the mission to establish “de-escalation zones,” the main force of Turkish troops have entered Syria’s Idlib.

While the military convoys crossed from Reyhanli in southern Turkey’s Hatay province on Thursday night, the military announced that Turkish troops have crossed into Idlib in order to monitor de-escalation zones, with the aim to bring an end to the six-and-a-half-year conflict in Syria.

In a statement published by the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), the military informed the soldiers had begun establishing observation points.

“Turkish Armed Forces elements that are to serve in the Idlib de-escalation zone have started their activities by establishing observation posts from Oct 12, 2017, as part of the Astana agreement…”

“The Turkish Armed Forces continue to carry out their duties in the territory within the engagement rules agreed by the guarantor countries in the Astana negotiations.”

During the weekend, reconnaissance teams entered Idlib as part of an international agreement to establish four de-escalation zones cross Syria.

According to the statement released by the TSK, the de-escalation zones were created in order to “enhance the effectiveness of the cease-fire regime, end conflicts, bring humanitarian aid to those in need [and] establish the necessary conditions for the return of those displaced.”

After the agreements taken between Iran, Turkey and Russia during the Astana talks, the Turkish administration emphasized that it was to observe the ceasefire between the Assad-loyal militias and the Syrian rebel factions. In addition, Turkey wants to prevent Idlib from destruction by the Russians who would use the presence of Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (HTS) as an excuse for their actions. Turkish presence on the ground therefore should provide security and stability to the region.

Turkish experiences in the Syrian war, especially after the Euphrates Shield operation, convinced the Turkish government to become proactive in the region. The government is aware that if they do not act today, another party will act tomorrow at the cost of the Syrian revolution and Turkish foreign policy priorities. Another reason for Turkish intervention in Idlib is plans regarding Afrin. As Erdogan stated, the Idlib operation is planned to be used as a step for new military operations in Syria.

Rapprochement between Turkey and Russia

Turkey’s cooperation with Russia is based on reciprocity. The Russians know how costly an operation in Idlib will be and therefore prefer to control the situation on the ground with the help of Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey wants to strengthen its hand with a tactical alliance against the YPG units supported by the US. While an offensive to isolate Afrin is still on the table, the current Idlib operation would lay the foundations for this. More, Turkey wants to protect the ‘achievements’ of the Syrian rebels in Idlib and fears of a second Aleppo, Raqqa or Mosul to become a reality in Idlib. The Turkish presence in Idlib would inherently widen the Turkish sphere of influence in Syria and across the Middle East.

Nevertheless, the alliance between Russia and Turkey is a balancing act for both sides. While Russia must keep Assad-loyal militias, who consider Turkey as an enemy, under control, Turkey has to explain its alliance with Russia to the Syrian rebels. In view of the fact that Russia has been heavily bombarding the Syrian population for some time now, this becomes an herculean task. Turkey’s main argument will be the alternative to the Idlib operation: the total destruction of the region by Russia.

Will Turkey fight against HTS?

One can see from observing President Erdogan’s statements and from the current silence of HTS that both sides want to avoid a mutual confrontation. Within HTS, discussions continue on how to deal with the new situation – while one wing fears a confrontation with Turkey, the other wants to fight Turkey at all costs.

Recent developments suggest that a deal was reached between both parties. According to several videos and pictures, HTS fighters escorted Turkish observers to Darat al Izzah. The start of the Turkish observation mission was announced today by the Turkish army itself without providing detailed information. The Turkish army will be stationed at Darat al Izzah to overlook the deployments of the PKK-affiliated YPG forces in Afrin from the south. The Turkish presence in Darat al Izzah would also give Turkey the ability to pursue further military operations inside Syria, in order to fully encircle the YPG territory in Afrin.

Nevertheless, the situation in Idlib is provocative, which makes escalation more likely. Daesh and Jund al Aqsa sleeper cells are present in the region. Assad regime agents are also available. In addition, hardliners within HTS will want to take action against Turkey. Therefore, even if HTS decides not to attack Turkey, terrorist attacks on Turkish troops are likely. As a result of such attacks, the situation between Turkish security forces and HTS could quickly escalate.

The situation became even more complicated after Daesh militants in the Uqayribat region east of Hama crossed the Khanasser road towards the rebel-held areas in north-eastern Hama. The Uqayribat pocket of ISIS was besieged by the Assad regime and they crossed into the rebel-held territory without being bombed by the regime or Russia. Daesh in the rebel-held area began to fight HTS forces and captured several villages. The outcome and effects of this recent development are unpredictable, but it will surely complicate the situation in Idlib.

What would have happened if Turkey hadn’t intervened in Idlib?

After the former official branch of Al-Qaeda, the Al-Nusra front publically abandoned their link to Al-Qaeda and changed its name to Jabhat Fath al Sham. This move was interpreted by the US administration as a foolish attempt, which does not include any sustainable change of the group. Additionally, Jabhat Fath al Sham created a broader coalition called Hay’at Tahrir al Sham with other Islamist groups and the formerly US-backed Nureddin Zengi Movement. The new formation is led by Abu Jabir, the former leader of Ahrar al Sham. However, insiders claim that he is a “leader under Muhammad al-Jolani,” the former leader of Al-Nusra and the new military leader of Hay’at Tahrir al Sham. Recently, Abu Jabir was taken from his position and Muhammed al-Jolani was chosen as the temporary leader of HTS until a new leader is appointed. This decision comes after Nureddin Zengi, Abu Saleh Tahhan and his followers, Ibn Teymiyyah battalion and other several small units left the formation of Hay’at Tahrir al Sham.

During the creation and aftermath of Hay’at Tahrir al Sham, HTS abolished some Syrian rebel brigades like Jabhat al Shamiya, Suqour al Sham, Festaqem Kema Umirt, Jaysh al Mujahiddeen and the Idlib branch of Jaysh al Islam. Although thousands of Ahrar al Sham’s fighters deserted to the new formation of Hay’at Tahrir al Sham, Ahrar al Sham was able to gain more by accepting these abolished brigades as new units of Ahrar al Sham. Since then, tensions between Ahrar al Sham and HTS have not calmed down and the readiness of Ahrar to act against HTS improved. HTS on the other hand is in a constant effort to extend its areal control in the region. Therefore, the Al-Qaeda affiliated Hay‘at Tahrir al Sham captured the strategical Bab al Hawa border crossing to Turkey from its main rival Ahrar al Sham, increasing its dominance over the northwest of Syria.

With the increasing control of HTS, the region around Idlib was seen as a ‘safe-haven’ for Al-Qaeda. After the defeat of Daesh, the international community would have its new target – HTS. If Turkey had not intervened in Idlib, Russian and Iranian backed regime militias may have started a campaign to invade the region with the approval of the international community in the name of the “War against Terror.” This campaign would lead groups like Ahrar al Sham, Feylaq as Sham and other Syrian rebel factions to unite with HTS to resist against regime militias. This resistance would lack legitimacy and therefore foreign backing. The Russian-backed regime militias would have used genocidal tactics to conquer the area which would have ended in a massive refugee flow towards Turkey. Already the largest host of Syrian refugees, Turkey would have had to deal with a new refugee crisis and would have lost its leverage in Idlib to its enemy in Damascus. Additionally, Al-Qaeda would have remained in the area and would have started a guerilla tactical war, which would have resulted in a decade-long insurgency. Revolutionary factions in Idlib could evolve into terrorist groups within this given scenario.

All in all, while the Turkish intervention in Idlib carries risks, it is a necessary step that needed to be taken in order to save civilians in Syria and preserve Turkish interests. As the main advocate of the Syrian rebel factions, the largest host of Syrian refugees and as a guarantor during the Astana talks, there should be no doubt and discussion over Turkey’s involvement in solving the Syrian crisis. With Turkish absence, Idlib would face huge destruction, indiscriminate bombing, massacres, huge refugee flows and would become a new Raqqa, Mosul or Aleppo. Turkish foreign policy aims and the future of the Syrian civilians in Idlib are now hand in hand.

During the Astana talks, guarantor states Russia, Turkey and Iran signed a deal in order to establish de-escalation zones in Syria.

The three guarantors, as well as representatives of the Assad regime and some opposition factions, met in Astana in September 2017 for a sixth round of talks, aimed at ending the six-year conflict in Syria.

Following the decision made during the latest meeting, Turkey has positioned elements of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) within the borders of Idlib in order to reduce the tension in the region.

Speaking to reporters in the western province of Afyonkarahisar, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu stated that Turkey aims to prevent conflict in Syria’s northwestern Idlib.

“The matter on Idlib is we have arrived at an agreement in Astana because we want to prevent conflict in these areas through a de-conflict zone.”

Emphasizing the importance of the Astana process, the Minister said that the aim of the Turkish government is to “revive the Geneva process.”

In addition to statements made by the Foreign Minister, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also emphasized Turkey’s commitment to solving the crisis in Syria.

The President stated that if Turkey had not intervened in Idlib “bombs would fall on our cities.”

During an AK Party meeting, Erdogan told members that “Our efforts in Idlib are going on, in cooperation with the Free Syria Army, without problems at the moment.”

Ahrar al-Sham’s presence and power in Northern Syria will be tested. The rivalry among high level Ahrar al-Sham commanders, between those who opposed a merger with Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS) and those who are pro-merger, led to the announcement of a splinter group called Jaish al-Ahrar. If this process leads Ahrar al-Sham to further disintegration, JFS will be the winner of this split and probably become the strongest power in Idlib. A JFS dominated Idlib will be problematic for Turkey’s moderate Syrian opposition discourse and might weaken Turkey’s influence in Idlib and its surroundings. Ankara would prefer a well-supplied united Syrian armed opposition over today’s chaos. But if some merger will lead the Syrian opposition to a political position close to JFS, then Turkey will face a situation that could end with a loss of its influence on the main actor in Idlib.

A direct confrontation between the Turkish Army or Turkey’s Syrian allies with JFS should not be expected. Despite their extremist discourse and al-Qaeda-linked background, JFS enjoys support in the Syrian opposition and society because of their policies and their fight against Assad, DAESH and the YPG. Thus a fierce conflict between rebel factions won’t be tolerated nor find support among the Syrian pro-revolution public. But a fight against a common enemy would be a better cover for Turkey’s efforts among the Syrian opposition.There is reason to believe Turkey may get more directly involved in Idlib. Turkish President Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu have repeatedly stated that the target after al-Bab city will be Manbij, which is under YPG control. If the Euphrates Shield operation is extended not only to Manbij but also to Afrin, Turkey will prefer to surround the YPG from the south of Afrin too. In this case it would not be surprising if Euphrates Shield expands to include the Idlib northern countryside. This strategy may create the possibility of a direct Turkish confrontation with Assad and Russia, because a Turkish military presence in Idlib, on top of their presence in the Azaz-Jarablus-al-Bab corridor, may be a potential threat for Assad’s forces in Aleppo.But this strategy has the potential to increase Turkey’s influence over the Syrian opposition. Turkey has ties with mainstream opposition groups, in particular Ahrar al-Sham, Faylaq al-Sham, Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki and various FSA brigades. With the possible intervention of Turkey in Idlib, relations between Turkey and the mainstream opposition can move to a new phase with a high level of cooperation.

In brief, the civil war will not end in Syria after the fall of Aleppo, but the relationship between local actors (the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition) and external actors (backers of Assad and the Syrian opposition) will determine the fate of the war at least in North Western Syria. While the Syrian opposition lacks unity and a supply of heavy weapons, the Assad regime also lacks manpower to launch a successful offensive without effective support from its allies.

There are two questions that will apparently be decisive in the near future: how far will Russia continue to back the Assad regime, and when and where will Turkey further its intervention in Syria against the YPG?

In the biggest battle of the ongoing Syrian war for Aleppo since July 2012, the Assad regime and its Russian and Iranian allies benefited from the international community’s discord to corner the rebels into a small area of the city. By knowing the military and political importance of Aleppo, the regime and its allies targeted civilians to force the city’s surrender. Only in the last week, nearly a thousand civilians lost their lives, and thousands more were wounded.

The type of operations by the regime resemble the Russian strategy of “scorched earth” already used in Chechnya. Among the prominent tactics being used are the use of barrel bombs, which goes back to the notorious General Suheil Hassan from the pro-regime “Tiger Forces”. Hassan argued that a normal life in Aleppo must become impossible. Only that circumstance could lead to loyalists regaining a foothold in eastern Aleppo. Specifically infrastructure like markets, schools, electric stations, and hospitals were targeted by the regime. This shows the long-term strategy for Aleppo.

It is a broadly used strategy by the regime to force civilians out of cities that the regime could not take back by conventional force. Therefore it decided to seize by bombs emptied cities. This has been witnessed also in Homs, Ghouta and now in Aleppo. With the Russian intervention, the “scorched earth” strategy became more violent. Besides barrel bombs, phosphorous, napalm, and cluster munitions have also been dropped. As a result barely any humanitarian infrastructure has been left standing. There are no longer any hospitals in the besieged rebel-held districts of Aleppo. One of the fatal results of this strategy is the huge amount of civilian causalities. Since the beginning of the battle in Aleppo, civilians lost their lives or had to migrate out of the city.

The two steps of besieging Aleppo

The capture of rebel-held Aleppo would not have been possible without Russian air support, and simultaneous offensives by the PKK-affiliated YPG and DAESH that forced rebels to fight on multiple fronts.

In February 2016, the regime and its allies started an offensive from Bashkoy and were able to reach Nubbol and Zahra. The three year old partial siege of Nubbol and Zahra could only be broken with massive Russian close air support for Syrian Arab Army (SAA) troops on the ground. Nubbol and Zahra was besieged from three sides by rebel forces and the other side bordered the YPG-held territory of Efrin. With this move the partial siege was broken and the main supply road of the rebels from Azaz to Aleppo was cut. After this the Kurdish YPG invaded Tal Rifaat, fighting the FSA-rebels there with massive Russian air-support too. The YPG created a buffer zone between rebels in the north and regime forces and its allies. During the YPG assault on Tal Rifaat, DAESH also attacked Marea, which seriously put pressure on the rebel forces. It should be noted that the capture of the infantry school in Aleppo by DAESH from rebel forces helped the regime advance towards Bashkoy.

After this, the regime started its second step of the offensive in June 2016. It imposed its own siege on rebel-held territories in Aleppo. The Russian and regime air forces systematically bombed the last supply-road – the Castello Road – to the eastern parts of Aleppo, which runs through northwest Aleppo. The Castello Road became unpassable after regime forces and their allies advanced from Handarat towards the Mallah farms and constantly bombed the road from the north, while YPG forces attacked the last supply-road from the south. This situation led to the de-facto siege of Aleppo. The rebels started an offensive against the YPG forces in Sheykh Maqsoud but they failed. The regime and its allies, who captured the Mallah farms, started a joint operation with the YPG and seized the Castello Road. The siege of Aleppo started in July 2016.

The counteroffensives of the rebels

To break the siege the two major rebel umbrella organizations, Aleppo Jaysh al-Fath and the Fatah Aleppo Operation Room, started a joint operation from the south of Aleppo. After a week the rebels took the 1070 settlement complex, the Artillery School, Ramousah and Musherfah, which again led to the break of the siege. The operation from inside and outside the siege was both successful. But in the following days the rebels weren’t able to widen the area by capturing the 3000 complex and the cement factory from the SAA. The rebels weren’t able to open the new supply route through Ramousah to be wide enough. The regime artillery and the Russian and regime airstrikes imposed a de-facto siege on Aleppo once again. On the ground the regime started a counteroffensive with a huge amount of foreign Shiite fighters. In this offensive the Iranian strategy of “human waves”, which proved itself in the Iraq-Iran war, were used by the foreign Shiite forces fighting for the regime. It also demonstrated how heavily the regime relies on foreign fighters. Rebels lost Ramousah, Musherfah, the Artillery School and half of the 1070 complex. Aleppo was besieged again.

At the end of October, Jaysh al-Fath and the Fatah Aleppo Operations Room tried another joint operation to break the siege. By taking into account the weaker effectiveness of airstrikes in urban areas, the rebels didn’t attack from the area around the Artillery School. They attacked the Dhahiyat al-Assad region further to the southwest of Aleppo’s center. Dhahiyat al-Assad and Minyan was captured in the operation by rebels. They made some gains in the 1070 complex, but the SAA and its allies repelled attacks on the 3.000 complex and the New Aleppo district. An offensive launched on the Zahra district produced some gains, but again all of them were reversed the same day. During this operation it was seen that Jaysh al-Fath began relying heavily on VBIEDs, also known as car bombs.

A total of 17 VBIEDs were used. Six of them were used at the 3000 complex, three VBIEDs in New Aleppo and the same amount in the 1070 complex, two in Dhahiyat al-Assad, two in Minyan and one at the Zahra district. Three of the VBIEDs were remote controlled VBIEDs. They belonged to Ahrar al-Sham. Eight VBIEDs were from Turkistan Islamic Party and six VBIEDs from Jabhat Fath Sham. Rebels tried to compensate for their lack of air superiority by using VBIEDs. This tactic was not significant enough to change the fate of rebels in eastern Aleppo.

After the failed rebel attempt, the regime began its own large scale attack from the air and ground. The eastern parts of Aleppo were attacked with intensive firepower, which led to a step by step withdrawal of rebels. Besides the regime forces, Russian Special Forces, Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Shia militias and the Lebanese Hezbollah participated in the offensive. The PKK-affiliated YPG forces joined the al-Assad side from Sheykh Maqsoud. The Kurdish organization attacked the rebels and cooperated with the regime. Rebels and civilians started to withdraw to the southern parts of besieged eastern Aleppo and were squeezed into an area less than 30 km². As a result they gradually lost other parts of the last remaining rebel-held areas as well.

There are reports that the regime and its allies have begun arrests of opposition figures, while some rebels have started to negotiate with Russia for an evacuation route from Aleppo under Turkish mediation.

Behind the bombardment by the regime and its allies, which has not distinguished between fighters and civilians, is the idea that a full capture of Aleppo could break the willpower of rebels to win this war.

After the fall of Aleppo the regime will try to eliminate the rebels in south Syria and Idlib militarily or they will try to force them to surrender. Or at least they will try to impose a political solution on the negotiation table against rebels who have lost the war.

It no longer seems possible to change the military fate of Aleppo. After this it seems more logical to try to find a solution on the negotiation table and try to avoid more civilian causalities, which is the current strategy of Turkey.

It is not possible to say positive things about the fate of the Syrian Revolution if there isn’t a major change in the field soon. If the rebels don’t unite under a unified leadership they will go on to lose step by step.