The Afrin region in Syria was liberated by the Turkish Armed Forces and the Syrian National Army during Operation Olive Branch. Since then, the security of the region has been a main topic. Based on a dataset of two months of YPG attacks, I wrote earlier how the YPG is trying to sabotage security and how the YPG propaganda machine defends these terrorist attacks. Bellingcat published a report about the insurgency of the YPG in Afrin. The YPG has explicitly tried to undermine efforts to increase security as a strategy, but security is also undermined by crimes of Syrian National Army fighters and as a result of mass migration towards Afrin due to the forced displacement by the Assad regime of residents living in Ghouta, Homs, Hama and Deraa. While security in Afrin is better than in Deir Ezzor, Raqqa, Idlib, or Deraa, especially after the ‘Peace Operation’ targeting criminal gangs, it is very important to improve the security of the region for the sake of the people. This column will discuss some possible ways of improving security in Afrin.

1. Cleansing of Tel Rifaat

One of the main sources of the relative insecurity in Afrin is Tel Rifaat. The YPG is using the area protected by the Russians and the Assad regime in order to infiltrate Afrin, conduct terrorist attacks and intimidate locals cooperating with the Turkish authorities. As long as Tel Rifaat remains a safe-haven for the YPG, the security in Afrin will always be threatened. Turkey needs to find a way to clean the area, but until now, the Russian and Assad regime are rejecting any attempts, while not doing anything against the YPG themselves. The source of insecurity in Afrin will likely remain over the foreseeable future. Therefore, the only way of dealing with Tel Rifaat remains in trying to prevent infiltration from Tel Rifaat to Afrin as much as possible. In this regard, the wall in construction between Afrin and Tel Rifaat might ease the threat.

As long as Tel Rifaat remains a safe-haven for the YPG, the security in Afrin will always be threatened.

2. Strong Turkish footprint model

The Turkish Armed Forces currently have a light footprint in Afrin. Turkish soldiers are mainly located inside their bases and go on patrols with massive precautions and protective measures. The Turkish role is limited to advice, training and logistic support to the Syrian National Army and the Free Syrian Police in Afrin. If this changes and Turkey implements its New Southeast Strategy in Afrin, the security of the region might improve significantly. On the other side, a strong Turkish footprint model would directly risk Turkish soldiers and result in the impression of a Turkish annexation of Afrin, which may have other diplomatic and political consequences. Turkey’s engagement in Syria is based on the aim to preserve Syria’s territorial integrity and such a move might harm Turkey’s reliability.

If Turkey implements its New Southeast Strategy in Afrin, the security of the region might improve significantly. 

3. Forming a hierarchic governance

The security apparatus in Afrin is divided into four autonomous sections: The Free Syrian Police, the Syrian National Army, the free courts and local councils. All are officially related to the Syrian interim government. This could be changed entirely towards hierarchic governance in which a government oversees the work of all three sections and has full control over them, basically to establish an alternative government to the Assad regime in the northwest of the country. This move could also be empowered by popular elections in the region. However, this move is a double edged sword. While on the one hand it may boost the role of the Syrian opposition and challenge the Assad regime in its entirety, on the other, it will re-draw the dynamics of the Syrian conflict with its risks as well as its opportunities.

The disagreement over the control and status of the Syrian town of Manbij has been a symbol of the strategic differences between the U.S. and Turkey’s Syria policies for a while now. Turkey’s successful military operation in Afrin led to the announcement of a roadmap over Manbij, which relatively calmed down U.S.-Turkey tensions. However, the U.S. continued to support the PKK-affiliated YPG forces in a stated mission to deny a return to Daesh in northern Syria.

With Daesh no longer holding territory, this mission did not appear to provide convincing rationale for a prolonged American presence on the ground. More recently, the U.S. ended its ambiguity by announcing an open-ended presence in Syria declaring a mission to limit Iranian influence in Syria as part of a broader strategy to confront Iran in the region.

With this critical shift in strategy, the U.S. commitment to northern Syria seems to be set in motion for the long term. One of the first concrete outcomes of this change appears to be the administration’s stern warnings against a regime operation against Idlib, which would have caused yet another humanitarian catastrophe.

Turkey sent reinforcements to its observation posts in and around Idlib to prevent the regime from an easy takeover while lobbying Russia to prevent such an operation. The U.S. rhetoric against the looming operation may have helped Turkey’s case, convincing Russia to hold off at least for a period of time in return for the Turkish promise to push terror groups out of Idlib.

Another consequence of the U.S. policy change seems to be the announcement that the PYD would no longer negotiate with the Assad regime. This step seems to be aimed at softening the Turkish argument that the U.S. should not trust the PYD, which would work with the Assad regime, Iran or Russia depending on its needs. This argument still holds true despite the PYD’s obvious tactic to appease its American supporters, who are clearly concerned about the degree to which the regime is supported by Iranians.

The PYD has played a critical role in the PKK’s regional ambitions by opening the door for legitimacy in the international arena despite Turkey’s warnings. Turkey has been able to limit the PYD’s forays into the western side of the Euphrates but the area it continues to control remains a major concern for Turkey.

The U.S. policymakers in charge of the Syria policy would like to see Turkey enlisted on their side in their push back against Iran in the region and they must see an interest in alleviating at least some of the Turkish concerns. This kind of willingness to work with Turkey and the most recent announcement of joint Turkish-American patrols around Manbij can help rebuild confidence between the two NATO allies.

Nevertheless, we should be clear-eyed about the reality on the ground of the U.S. support for the PYD, which is considered by Turkey as a direct security threat. This will continue to be the Achilles’ heel in the U.S.-Turkey bilateral relationship. The PKK understands this and will seek to exploit it for its interests.

Turkey feels more confident after its Afrin operation, the Manbij agreement with the U.S., and the successful diplomatic effort to prevent the Assad regime from launching a major military assault against Idlib, supported at least rhetorically by Washington. These are strong signs for a renewed dynamic that takes into consideration Turkey’s interests and concerns. But once again, American support for the YPG continues to be the underlying fundamental strategic divergence between the two allies, with significant potential to undermine any positive momentum.

Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy has undergone a massive transformation, particularly in the fight against the PKK, while the extra-territorial military operations have expanded towards Syria and Iraq where the PKK has been consolidating its political and military influence since the dissolution of the Syrian and Iraqi sovereignties.

Turkey began to operationalize its new counter-terrorism strategy with Operation Euphrates Shield (2016) in Syria and carried out its military operation against the PKK in Afrin with Operation Olive Branch (2018). Even though, these two military operations have different geopolitical aspects and execution methodologies, both military operations had the same strategic objectives: to de-territorialize the PKK in Syria, to eliminate its military capacity including manpower, and to weaken its international cooperation especially with the countries that provide militarily and political support to the PKK since the rise of DAESH.

Turkish authorities believe that the reactionary struggle against the PKK is not the best strategy to degrade and defeat the PKK’s terrorist campaign against Turkey. The best approach, according to Turkish authorities, should be designed by considering three interrelated variables: political decisiveness, Turkey’s military advantages and sustainability of military operations not only within Turkey but also in extraterritorial spaces such as Syria and Iraq.

Political decisiveness became a central element of the new counter-terrorism strategy following the collapse of the peace process in 2015. Turkish security forces have been able to defeat the PKK’s violent activities through domestic counter-terrorism operations; even though the PKK aimed to establish “liberated zones” by implementing violent urban tactics to widen the conflict zones towards significant city centers in southern Turkey.

The central rationality behind the PKK’s strategic consideration was the Syrian Civil War, in which Turkey has had to deal with many security and political challenges. In such a conflictual environment, the PKK could enjoy its territorial expansion. However, Turkey’s early military reactions against the PKK in the city centers of southeastern Turkey during the urban conflict between 2015 and 2016 have made substantial progress, and the PKK lost its entire terrorist mobilization and public support across the region.

Following domestic-counter terrorism operations, Turkey started to expand its actions towards the PKK in Syria. During this period, Turkey’s priority was to roll back the PKK’s geopolitical expansion along Turkey’s Syria border. Afrin, in this context, was a strategic threshold for Turkey to see how Ankara would be able to maintain its political decisiveness under the regional security vacuum that was somehow antagonistic and the U.S.’s apparent strategy over the presence of the PKK in Syria in the fight against DAESH.

Turkey’s military advantages along with its increasing capacity in defense technologies became central to sustain its military operations and ultimately defeated the PKK in Afrin. Operation Olive Branch resulted in a military and political victory for Turkey. Following the 58 days of the clash, the PKK was defeated and had to leave from the city centers. Following the triumph of Afrin, the Manbij agreement with the U.S. over the issue of the PKK presence showed how Turkey used its political decisiveness and military capacity to change the facts on the ground. From a domestic counter-terrorism struggle to Afrin and Manbij, Turkey has also shown its willingness regarding the continuation of the military offensive against the PKK, even though the regional and international conjuncture is against this policy.

Now, Turkey aims to maintain its counter-terrorism strategy against the PKK in Qandil where the PKK has settled as a safe haven thanks to the lack of Iraq’s sovereignty, the geographical sophistication of the region and the military capacity that the PKK has been building for almost 40 years. At his stage, Turkey has similar strategic goals: securing its border security against terrorist infiltration, eliminating the PKK’s presence in northern Iraq by holding terrorist camps in the region to isolate the PKK from its stronghold in Qandil and preventing the logistical mobilization of the PKK.

Turkey’s military operation now targets the PKK’s two strategically important locations in the region: Khakurk and Qandil. Turkish forces have already secured almost 500 sq. km in Khakurk and opened a safe corridor that reaches the Qandil Mountain since the beginning of the operation in March 2018. This time, the military strategy is not only targeting to eliminate PKK terrorists but also aiming to clean and hold the territory where the PKK has any presence.

The execution of military tactics in operational level on the ground is different compared to the OOB and OES in Syria due to the topographical feature of the region. But, the political decisiveness, Turkey’s military advantages, notably its technological superiority over the PKK, and willingness to maintain military operations toward the center of the Qandil Mountains seem to change the nature of the conflict between Turkey and the PKK.

This will be the first comprehensive counter-terror operation against the PKK. The regional dynamics are also behind Turkey’s military offensive. If Turkey can manage the dynamics emanating from the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and the central Iraqi government in favor of its new strategy, the PKK cannot sustain its presence in the region. But this does not necessarily mean that the PKK threat for Turkey will disappear in the near future.

Source: Suriye Gündemi

At this stage, there are two critical strategic challenges for Turkey in its fight against the PKK. The first challenge is about the question of how the PKK will transform its overall strategy in Syria and Iraq after the fall of Qandil. More importantly, the real challenge for Turkey is whether the PKK can find another safe haven in Syria or Iraq. The second challenge for Turkey is about the question of how Turkish military can maintain its military presence in northern Iraq particularly in the Qandil area. The Defense Minister of Turkey announced that Turkey would not withdraw its military force until the PKK is ultimately defeated in Iraq.

Turkey now has 14 different military bases in northern Iraq. Compared to the previous military operations against the PKK in this region, the presence of Turkish military troops in different places provide more space to maneuver. However, the continuation of Turkey’s military presence might undermine the relations between Ankara and Baghdad. Therefore, the success of the new counter-terrorism strategy is also part of a regional agreement between Iraq, Turkey, and Iraq against the PKK. Iran is currently neutral toward Turkey’s ongoing operation. If Turkey’s military strategy can succeed in the short term to defeat the PKK in Iraq, then reaching a midterm consensus between Turkey, Iraq, and Iran will be easier.

Turkey is in the midst of a ground operation in Iraq. The operation aims to clear the entire area under PKK control in Iraq and remove the PKK headquarters from the Qandil region, which is about 100 km away from the Turkish border. There were already limited operations and ongoing air bombardments of the PKK targets taking place after the PKK ended the ceasefire in the summer of 2015. Nevertheless, according to local sources, the operations took a new phase on March 11th of this year.

Accordingly, Turkish forces landed on the top of the mountains (i.e., Şapan, Dilan, Kewet, Bene, Çiyasor, Alekan ve Çiyaneya) in Sidekan/Bradost in Soran district of North Erbil. Then, eleven military bases were installed in the area. Next, the installed bases were connected to each other with the clean & sweep operations of Turkish ground forces and newly built roads between the bases. We see a close synchronization of the Turkish air and ground forces in time, space and purpose for the clean & sweep operations.

As a result of this joint operation, 155 PKK members were neutralized in the region since March 11. The 23 km long border was cleaned of the PKK threat and a total 400 km square is cleaned of the PKK. As a result of this operation, Turkey formed two pockets of PKK-free areas in Iraq across its border, one across Çukurca in the west and one across Şemdinli in the east. The eastern pocked has become a corridor heading towards Qandil and is currently as close as 24 km to the PKK headquarters.

Since March of this year 155 PKK members were neutralized in the region. The 23 km long border was cleaned of the PKK threat and a total 400 km square is cleaned of the PKK.

Turkey seems to be committed to end PKK terrorism for once and for all. After the PKK ended the ceasefire by murdering four Turkish security personnel in three different occasions from July 20 to 23, 2015, Turkey started its counter-terrorism operations. In response, the PKK increased its terror attacks including suicide bombers in bus stops, stadiums, etc. and started its so-called “rural-based urban war” in 22 centers across six cities in southeastern Turkey.

Once Turkey cleaned these residential areas from the PKK, the country seems to be committed to end the PKK in its strongholds outside Turkey. The PKK has no safe havens in Turkey, not a single “liberated” village, but is freely recruiting, training, sheltering, and even ruling vast areas in Syria and Iraq. Afrin was the first place where the PKK/PYD was cleaned off, the PKK leader Ocalan’s posters were taken down from Afrin city, and school textbooks with references to Ocalan are no longer being taught to school kids in Afrin.

Given that Qandil is 100 km away from the Turkish border, it required diplomatic negotiations with the Iraqi central government.

Following Afrin, Turkey also pressured for Sinjar in Iraq and Manbij in Syria to be cleared of the PKK. Sinjar and Manbij are still matters of diplomatic encounters between Turkey, the U.S. and Iraq. Nevertheless, unlike Manbij in Syria, the PKK is not under the security umbrella of patron states in northeast Iraq. In fact, the organization does not even allow the Kurdistan Regional Government forces to the areas under its control. Yet, given that Qandil is 100 km away from the Turkish border, it required diplomatic negotiations with the Iraqi central government.

If Iraq will be cleared of the PKK altogether, it will have to receive the support of Iraq or even Iran, which otherwise might be a retreat or even a logistical support zone. Hence, Turkey’s offensive in Iraq will require its neighbors’ cooperation. And only after such a tripartite cooperation of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, can the PKK finally be cleaned off from Qandil. As for defeating the PKK in Syria, Turkey will have to work with the U.S. and will have to find a way to persuade the U.S. to stop its support to the PKK’s consolidation in Syria.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made a surprise visit to Turkey’s southern Hatay province last Thursday. As Operation Olive Branch continues to take ground, the visit was welcomed by a sizable audience, with the participation of some celebrities ranging from singers to national athletes.

Prior to the speech given in the late hours of the evening in the southern region of the Hatay Province, President Erdogan, accompanied by the Chief of General Staff Hulusi Akar, Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdag, Defence Minister Nurettin Canikli and Land Forces Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces Gen. Yasar Guler, visited the Turkish military units to inspect the progress and congratulate the military men for their celebrated efforts.

The operation in Afrin, beginning in January of this year and ending last month, has been hailed by people in Turkey and those in the northwestern regions of Syria as not only a success against the PKK/PYD tyranny, but also on the fact that it has become one of the numbered peaceful places within the calamitous ongoing Syrian Civil War.

During his speech at the central police station, Erdogan adulated the wholeness of the people as being the foundation to protecting collective sovereignty, praised the solidarity of the public figures and celebrities for their presence, and thanked all the civilian care networks such as AFAD (The Disaster and Emergency Management, Republic of Turkey) to the Health Ministry for their support and determined efforts to help those in need. Lastly, while displaying his gratitude and respect towards the indispensable efforts of the Turkish Military, he quoted Gazi Mustafa Kemal in saying “There is no such thing as protecting the line, there is only protecting the ground, and a unified ground is what makes a nation.”

In recent years the YPG, the Syrian branch of the internationally recognized terror organization PKK, has increased its activity emanating from Syria since they took advantage of the Civil War and occupied the northern regions in 2012. The PKK/YPG has mostly focused on carrying out cross-border missile attacks on the Provinces of Hatay and Kilis, having fired more than 90 rockets in 2018 alone.

So far, two Syrian and three Turkish citizens have been killed, with over 100 casualties, of which numerous are still in critical condition. Together with human deaths, some of those who have survived are effected by a slow bombardment that their homes, vehicles and neighborhoods were destroyed.

With the Afrin operation coming to an end, direction has now turned to the Manbij. Separated by the Euphrates river from the rest of the YPG/PKK controlled areas of northern Syria, Manbij is another important territory in which Turkey seeks to relieve the areas inhabitants from unwanted occupation while protecting Turkish lands from further terrorist threats.

While recently there has been speculation of French intervention in the region as a mediator between Turkey and the YPG, Ibrahim Kalin, the spokesperson for the Turkish Presidency has firmly indicated that Turkey “rejects any efforts to promote ‘dialogue,’ ‘contact’ or ‘mediation’ between Turkey and terrorist organizations.”

When compared to Turkish endeavors, both Euphrates Shield and Operation Olive Branch have not only conformed with International Law, U.N. Security Council resolutions and her right to self-defense under the U.N Charter, but has been an effective and efficient method in maintaining the unity of Syria’s territorial integrity.

The successful completion of Afrin operation seems to have ruffled some international feathers however, bringing previously absent players into the spot light. Considering much of the brutality is over when compared to the bulk of the civil war, Macron’s attempt to enter Syria through the back door not only remind us of the ignominious policies during the French Mandate for Syria, but suggest he still has some road to travel before becoming a man in international politics.

On March 29, French President Emmanuel Macron met with leaders of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Élysée Palace. Following the meeting, Le Figaro first reported that France is sending troops to northern Syria, and then re-wrote the caption that France might send troops – referring to members of the SDF as source for the news. A day before this happened, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that U.S. troops will retreat from Syria. This was followed by a telephone conversion between Trump and his French counterpart, and increasing cooperation with Turkey. Combined with statements made by the YPG, recent developments have made it seem that France will take the place of the U.S. if the latter retreats from the region.

Élysée Palace refuted the claims with the statement that France will send reinforcement units to Manbij. However, the statement also touched upon the target of reaching “stability,” particularly in the secure zone located in northeastern Syria within the framework of an inclusive and balanced order. This might implicate France’s possibility of coming up with an administration model for the Syrian Kurds living in the region nearby the Syria-Turkey border in case Manbij is included in Turkey’s field of control. Élysée Palace also announced that they hope to see the establishment of dialogue between the SDF and Turkey with the support of the international community.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reminded that his French counterpart remarked similar opinions during their one-on-one meeting and added: “We are deeply sorry about the latest statements coming from France, which we find wrong and hope to have stemmed from a misunderstanding. Those hosting the terror group members in a top-level office must know that this only means an antagonistic move against Turkey.”

The latest statements are far from being peculiar when considering the record of France in Syria, as the country has engaged in many atrocities in the Middle East. When France and the U.K. divided Arab territories into mandate governments according to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, France had Syria. Although the reports made after the Macron-SDF meeting were refuted, they still evoked memories of the French military’s invasion of Damascus 97 years ago. During France’s 20-year mandate government in Syria, the foundations of Syria’s future were laid. The mandate government divided the country into six regions and founded the “Special Forces of the Levant.” Comprising mostly of Nusayri and Druze soldiers, the Special Forces then formed the grounds of the Syrian Army. It is argued that the Nusayris gained dominance in the state despite being a minority group due to this ground laid by the French.

In 1970, Hafez al-Assad came to power by staging a military coup. In Syria, where more than 70 percent of the population is Sunni, the minority Nusayris ruled the country with the Baath regime, which is a peculiar combination of Arab nationalism and Soviet socialism. The French government and the Assad family always acted in favor of each other. Regardless of whoever came to power in France, this situation never changed. For instance, when Hafez committed the 1982 Hama massacre, socialist president François Mitterrand was serving his first term in Élysée, but he did not even issue a single condemnation to Assad. More, Hafez’s brother Rifaat al-Assad, the commanding officer allegedly responsible for the Hama massacre, moved to Paris after having tension with his older brother, and allegedly engaged in embezzlement and money laundering. He spent a serious amount on financing Channel Tunnel and received his residence permit thanks to that.

Republican President Jacques Chirac also displayed red-carpet treatment to Assad, who made his first visit abroad to Paris in 1998 after 30 years. In 1999, Chirac hosted Bashar al-Assad in Élysée before he had any official status. He was also the only western leader that attended the father Assad’s funeral one year later. Throughout all these decades, France has never shown any concern about the situation of Syrian Kurds, whom Assad deprived of citizenship. Plus, the country always supported Saddam Hussein, the perpetrator of the 1988 Halabja massacre. While Turkey opened its border gates after the Halabja massacre, France only accepted 500 Kurdish refugees. A French diplomat friend of mine was surprised at the fact that Turkey opened its borders without pursuing any form of screening. When I asked him how the French authorities selected people, he pointed to his teeth and said, “they look at their teeth.”

Although relations between Paris and Damascus hit a low after the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, who was Chirac’s close friend, Chirac’s successor Nicolas Sarkozy restored relations between the two countries. He hosted Bashar Assad three times while Assad paid return visits. However, the Arab Spring changed the course of events, as France could not foresee the phenomenon that started in Tunisia, where the Ben Ali dictatorship favored by France was overthrown. It can be contended that France showed such a hasty demeanor in Syria for this reason. The country favors dictatorial regimes, but as soon as their decline becomes obvious, it starts to criticize the same regimes. The statements issued by Élysée Palace regarding the Macron-SDF meeting stressed the male and female parity within the delegation. But they did not touch on the fact that many international NGOs issued various reports indicating that the YPG and PKK terror groups, which adopt an ideology with Stalinist and fascist elements, armed 10-year-old children and made 15-16 year-old children organize kamikaze attacks.

Middle Eastern politics is boiling once again. The rumor is that France will replace U.S. troops in Syria. While there are some signs of this, these are ambiguous at best. U.S. President Trump said in a speech in Ohio that the U.S. will be getting out of Syria “very soon.” On the other side of the Atlantic, French President Macron met with a delegation of the Syrian Democratic Forces (the late brand of the PYD) and declared his support for the organization. Pro-PKK sources even claimed that in the meeting Macron promised to send troops to prevent a further Turkish “aggression” against the SDF. Of course, many questions regarding this replacement scenario remain unanswered. Did Trump really mean what he said? Can he really pull troops out of Syria given CENTCOM’s years-long investment in the PYD/SDF? Can Macron really send troops to Syria? Even if he does, would they be just symbolic forces or can France really take the risk of a military encounter with other forces on the ground, particularly with Russia, given the recently heated relations between Russia and NATO? Hence, such a replacement in the near future is not probable, but possible. Anything is possible in the contingent world of politics anyway. Nevertheless, from Turkey’s point of view, such scenarios are worth attention but no more. Even if it happens, which is still not and may never be on the horizon, it is not a game changer for Turkey.

Regardless of which country arms and protects the PKK’s offshoot in Syria, Turkey seems to be decisive in its struggle to counter the PKK threat beyond its borders. Turkey’s Afrin offensive has resulted in the quick demise of the PKK’s Afrin project. Nevertheless, Afrin is just the first step of a more comprehensive offensive against the terrorist organization. For Turkey, the PKK has to be cleaned off from the areas it currently holds in Iraq and Syria. Turkey’s western allies might have difficulty to understand the country’s rationale, but to put it simply, Ankara does not want the PKK to send suicide bombers across the border from Iraq or Syria. The organization has cost thousands of lives in Turkey and it is time to terminate the group once and for all. If the PKK is terminated, that’s not going to happen in Turkey. The terrorist organization does not have any arms depots, school or training camps in Turkey. The PKK’s 40 year-long bloodshed did not suffice it to take a single village in Turkey. Conversely, the organization entirely resides on territories in Iraq and Syria.

The PKK’s headquarters, training camps and arms depots all are in Iraq and Syria. All the territories that the organization controls are beyond Turkish borders, whether it be Qandil, Sinjar, Manbij, or Haseke. The organization trains its recruits in camps in Iraq and Syria and sends them to Turkey through the territories that it controls. The PKK even runs schools in these places where it teaches children the “heroic” act of killing Turks. With the fall of Afrin, the organization will no longer be able to teach children in the city to be “heroes” by joining the PKK. Elementary schools in Afrin will no longer have the pictures of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan on its walls or in school textbooks. The city will no longer hold ceremonies for the PKK’s suicide bombers who both killed and died in Turkey. Afrin was just one of the PKK’s recruitment and training centers. Turkey is persistent to handling the rest of these arms depots, recruitment and training centers, and its entire organizational network and military capacity one way or another. Turkey is more dedicated than ever to counter the PKK wherever it seeks shelter, whatever name it makes up to call its offshoots, and whichever country it receives support from. The question is not whether it will, but when and where. Turkey’s “allies” that arm, train, and protect the PKK may keep the group safe in some zones for some time, but this was not enough to stop Turkey in Afrin and may not be enough in the next battleground.

With Olive Branch Operation (20 January-18 March), Turkish Armed Forces and the Turkish-backed National Army (Free Syrian Army) captured Afrin in less than two months. Some analysts insist that the PKK/PYD did not lose the city but it was just a case of strategic exit only to strike back harder. Well, if true, it is very kind of the PKK to leave the city to the Olive Branch forces with a perfect timing right on March 18^th, to salute the anniversary of the iconic Canakkale War (Gallipoli Campaign) of 1915. Nevertheless, leaving aside the irony, there is still some truth to this absurd claim. The easy takeover of Afrin was a result of strategic planning, but not of the PKK. Turkey planned and executed how the city would be captured with full control from day one. There occurred some unexpected developments such as the temporary closure of the airspace by Russia in the early days of the operation but with no damage to the overall flow.

Hence, the YPG forces fled the city not as a result of their strategic planning, but out of despair. What was the YPG’s strategy then? Looking at the statements of PKK/PYD spokespeople, from the PKK leaders in Qandil to the commanders on the ground in Afrin, it was to wage a defense battle. On top of such statements, the full stack of ammunition depots around the city center, food storages in the PYD offices, and attempts to infiltrate into the city with new forces, it seems obvious that the goal was to wage a defense battle.

What about the Turkish strategy then? It was more of an encirclement as a form of siege warfare than rapid domination. While the operation was criticized in some circles for being slow for reasons still mysterious to me, it was proceeding smoothly at a steady pace. Almost too smoothly especially when compared to Turkey’s Euphrates Shield Operation (24 August 2016-29 March 2017), which witnessed stronger resistance by DEASH especially in the Battle of Al Bab. Now, let’s come to how this strategy flowed smoothly.

First, significant actors in Syria – Russia and the U.S – were informed about Turkey’s decisiveness to fulfill its self-defense. Russia agreed as a result of persistent diplomatic exchanges and the U.S. had to agree. Hence, the operation could avoid the cases of friendly fire and prepared the international community for what to come.

With the start of the operation, Turkish artillery and air force crushed the PYD fortifications and forces (and later the regime militia who were invited to help the PYD) in the outskirts of Afrin and neighboring towns. As Turkey captured the heights surrounding Afrin one by one, PYD forces went blind against Turkey’s surveillance and detection superiority. Turkey could use its reconnaissance points from the south in northern Idlib, from the east in Azaz, and from the west and north in neighboring Turkish towns. As the pre-constructed reconnaissance points and constant air surveillance met even closer ground surveillance with the captured heights, the blindfolded PYD doomed to fail. While the Olive Branch Forces were moving forward on multiple fronts, the PYD was left with no chance to concentrate its forces. As the villages were taken one by one, more significant towns such as Rajo and Cinderes were being encircled.

Nevertheless, Turkey’s encirclement strategy, which is known for not letting easy retreat, left an exit door – or a golden bridge, as it is called in the military literature – open for the YPG militants. The bridge was not big enough for a collective retreat but it allowed individual militants to flee their positions. Like in Cinderes and Raco, Afrin center had this exit door open until the day before the final takeover. As the militants tried to flee through the only exit left for them to vacate the civilian populated areas, what welcomed the Turkish forces in the city were full stacked ammunition depots. Hence, the PYD’s strategy(!) of giving Afrin to Turkey was not chosen by the PYD but forced by Turkey.

On the 58^th day of the military campaign Operation Olive Branch, Turkey declared its victory against the PKK/YPG in Afrin. Following the collapse of the PKK’s defense strategy and its unexpected isolation within the geopolitical struggle, the city is now under full control of the Turkish Armed Forces and the TAF-backed Free Syrian Army. One way or another, it is clear that this military-political victory of Turkey will provide more opportunities for strategic manoeuvres in Ankara’s next military move, particularly towards its ongoing military campaign against the PKK in northern Syria. Upon the liberation of Afrin city, with the surprisingly little resistance by the PKK, Turkey is now reconsidering its military and political options to minimize the PKK’s role in the midterm, and de-territorialize the PKK and YPG in Syria and Iraq.

Speaking in Ankara, a day after the TAF and Free Syrian Army cleared Afrin, President Erdogan vowed to further Turkey’s fight against terrorism beyond Afrin. In his speech, Erdogan said: “We have eliminated most of the terror corridors in the region,” and “we will continue this process until we entirely eliminate this corridor that includes Manbij, Qamisli, Ayn al Arab (also known as Kobani) and Rasuylayn.” President Erdogan also underlined that Turkey’s next military move will take place in Manbij – a region that is still under the control of the U.S.-backed PKK/YPG forces. Following the visit of former U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to Turkey to negotiate about the PKK issue in Manbij, Turkey’s foreign minister Cavusoglu expressed that the YPG will hand over the governance of Manbij to the Turkey-led Free Syrian Army in the presence of the U.S. military units there. However, after Trump’s unexpected Pompeo move, as the new Secretary of State, Cavusoglu made a minor revision in his early announcement about the agreement with Tillerson over the issue of Manbij. Cavusoglu stated that Turkey and the U.S. have not reached an “agreement,” but a common “understanding” regarding the issue of the U.S.-PKK alliance in Syria. At this stage, there is still an ambiguity regarding the position of the new State Secretary in negotiations with Turkey.

While the U.S. administration’s stance towards Turkey remains unclear, President Erdogan said that Turkey would also continue its fight against the PKK in Sinjar, a region that has been controlled by the PKK since 2014. Now, the foreign and security policy circles in Ankara are speculating how Turkey will carry out its military campaign against the PKK in Iraq. Turkey sees Sinjar just as strategically important as Afrin and other PKK-controlled regions. The geographical proximity of Sinjar to Turkey, and the role of Sinjar as a hub between Qandil and northern Syria threatens Turkey’s national security, and provides the PKK with more space to freely mobilize its militants and military equipment. It is crucial to note that the PKK’s presence in Sinjar threatens Iraq’s territorial integrity as well as the political stability of northern Iraq.

The strategic rationality behind Turkey’s move against the PKK in Sinjar is very simple. Turkey believes that the PKK’s presence in Sinjar does not meet with the regional geopolitical expectations, similar to the PKK experience in Afrin. Turkey and Iraq recently reached a tacit agreement over the PKK issue in northern Iraq. Iran seems to share a similar perspective regarding the PKK presence in northern Syria and Iraq. The KRG’s independence referendum showed how an intra-regional competition turned into an ad hoc realistic alliance in the presence of a common threat. Therefore, it is possible to claim that the PKK lacks an intra-regional support in maintaining its political and military presence in Sinjar. More critically, the PKK does not benefit from the U.S. air protection in Sinjar. Thus, the security and foreign policy centers in Ankara believe that the PKK will be isolated if Turkey decides to intervene against the PKK in Sinjar.

However, this does not necessarily mean that Turkey will take unilateral action against the PKK in Iraq. There are three alternative scenarios that should be taken into consideration. First and foremost, Turkey will try to evacuate the PKK from Sinjar by encouraging the Iraqi central government to take military action. Secondly, Turkey and Iraq will take a joint military action against the PKK together, if the PKK does not peacefully hand over the city. The recent visit of Hulisi Akar, Turkish Chief of General Staff, was the first step in convincing Iraq to take military action against the PKK. After his visit, the two countries underlined the importance of commonality in the fight against terrorism. The third and yet undesired option is part of Turkey’s ongoing military activism in the region against the PKK. At domestic, regional and international levels, Turkey benefits from its trans-frontier military initiatives as the active use of military forces provide a strategic superiority for Turkey to contain security threats and strengthen its diplomatic relations. The launch of Operation Olive Branch is a good example in understanding how the use of power consolidates Turkey’s diplomatic efforts on regional and international scales.

Articulated as such, according to the third option, Turkey is likely to act unilaterally against the PKK in Sinjar. Many in the governmental circles believe that Turkey might also use its new proxy forces against the PKK in Iraq. It is fair to conclude that Turkey wants to secure its borders, and also its regional strategic priorities. The use of military power will be part of this strategy in the future until Syria and Iraq reach a level of sustainable stability and security. The regional dynamics, as well as the new trends in Turkish security and foreign policy, enables Turkey to carry out its military campaign beyond Afrin.

In June, 2015, I came across two Syrians in Şanlıurfa’s Akçakale district who were contemplating the Syrian border facing Tell Abyad with hopeless eyes. A black smoke remaining from the U.S. bombardment wreathed the town, which was covered with yellow dust as far as the eye could reach. Having received a substantial amount of military aid from the U.S., the terror group PKK and its Syrian offshoot Democratic Union Party (PYD) were advancing towards Daesh deployments in Tell Abyad thanks to the generous help of the American jets. However; that war, which was almost visible to the naked eye, was not similar to the wars on the other fronts of Syria. Daesh was leaving the areas it occupied without hardly any resistance and heading towards Raqqa, the city the terror group used as its Syrian headquarters at the time. Daesh militants looked as if they were willfully handing over Tell Abyad to the PYD.

The PYD’s attempt to carry out a demographic massacre in north Syria came to light with this war. In Tell Abyad, the PKK blatantly displaced the locals from the land they had been living on for centuries, which eventually started to be vocally expressed and recorded in various international reports. However, nothing was done to stop this crime against humanity. Of course, the PKK and the PYD’s displacement policy did not begin in Tell Abyad. The organization, which started organizing and collecting a base under the name of “Apocular” in eastern and southeastern Turkey during the 1970s, initially kicked off a sweeping process of destruction against religious functionaries along with the members of various Kurdish organizations such as the Revolutionary Democratic Culture Association (DDKD), the Revolutionary Eastern Culture Clubs (DDKO), Kawa and Rizgari. Becoming the only dominant organization in the region through this method, the PKK implemented the exact same method 40 years later in Syria.

The Baath regime, which got into trouble with its armed opponents in Syria in 2011, made an agreement with the PKK leadership in Mount Qandil and assigned the security to the PKK militants in many regions, including Qamishli, Al-Hasakah, Afrin and Ayn al-Arab (Kobani). In return for this generosity of the Assad regime, the PKK took over the role of silencing the opponents of the regime in these areas. On June 27, 2013, the PKK militants launched a fusillade attack on a group of Kurdish civilians who were protesting against the regime in Amuda district. Five civilians, including a 5-year-old girl, were killed in the incident. The terror group’s attacks on dissident Kurds continued. Several leaders including Mashaal Tammo, Abdullah Bedro and Sherzad Rashid were assassinated by the PYD militants. With these methods, the PYD built an empire of fear in north Syria and consolidated its power. No one was able to raise their voice against the organization. The terror group’s next step was displacing the Kurds who were not supporting the PKK. With compulsory military service, detentions, arrests, arbitrary fines and heavy taxes, the Kurds not adhering to the PYD and the PKK were displaced. Tens of thousands of Syrians were forced to leave Afrin, Qamishli, Amuda, Ayn al-Arab and Al-Hasakah.

The legitimacy guise tailored for the PYD

After eliminating the potential problems, the PYD focused on its efforts to form a state in these areas. During the first weeks of 2014, the PKK declared three cantons in north Syria named Afrin, Kobani and Jazira. Nine months later, Daesh took action to capture Kobani. A legitimacy guise was tailored for the PYD during the Daesh-PYD war with the contributions of the international press. Daesh’s attack on Kobani became the top topic on the international agenda whereas foreign correspondents paid visits to Kobani to market the terror group. So, the PYD militants were declared “heroes who defended their people against barbaric Daesh militants.” During this period, many countries offered considerable military support to the PYD. From then on, Washington became the PYD’s boss instead of Damascus. The U.S. authorities firstly helped the establishment of an operational group named Euphrates Volcano by uniting the PYD’s armed wing People’s Protection Units (YPG) with several minor armed groups. Soon after, the group was renamed as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

After Kobani was “liberated”, many trucks carrying weapons and ammunition were sent to the SDF, in which the YPG operatives formed the backbone whilst the PKK commanded all the decision mechanisms. The aids were coordinated from a U.S. base established in Rimelan district. The YPG militants, who were endeavoring to secure a few checkpoints with ineffective weapons until that point, were being transformed into a regular army.

The next target after Kobani was Tell Abyad, which was occupied by Daesh at the time. Following a low-intensity conflict that lasted a few days, Daesh abandoned Tell Abyad. But the nightmare was not over for the locals. Having lived under the oppression of Daesh for more than two years, the locals of Tell Abyad were forced to leave their villages after the district was captured from Daesh.

On June 23, 2015, a source of mine whose family lives in Tell Abyad sent this text message to me:

“The PKK members gathered families in a school in Hammam Turkmen and threatened them saying ‘This place has become a military zone, so leave the village. If you don’t leave, we will make American jets bomb your houses by giving your coordinates as Daesh targets.’ Some families are now leaving the village out of fear.”

To research this incident, I made a few more contacts and after verifying it published the story in a national newspaper. The neighborhoods of the locals who refused to leave their homes were shelled the next day, upon which they had to be abandoned and most of the victims are currently living in refugee camps. Following this event many people brought this issue to the agenda. As someone bearing witness to this atrocity, I can safely say that the PKK/PYD and the U.S. connived on this crime against humanity in Tell Abyad. In Hammam Turkmen neighborhood, where the closest Daesh positions were 30 kilometers away at the time, 20.000 Syrian Turkmens were displaced in this manner.

The PYD has changed the demographics of Syria

Afterwards, hundreds of thousands of Syrians were forcibly displaced from the towns of Manbij, Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, which were occupied by the PKK/PYD with the support of U.S. air forces. All of this happened before the eyes of the U.S. The terror group, seeking to consolidate its territorial power in Syria, used many methods to change the demographic structure of the country. Hundreds of Arabs were imprisoned and tortured after being accused of Daesh membership. Those who raised livestock had their cattle seized. Those who owned farmlands had their farms burned. People who did not want to leave had their children forcibly conscripted and sent to the front lines. Most of the people who lived in these areas had to leave to escape such treatment.

The city of Tell Rifaat, belonging to the district of Azaz just south of the Turkish border, is one of the places where PYD/PKK’s strategy of forced displacement has been employed to its greatest extent. PYD/PKK surrounded Tell Rifaat, which lies along the Azaz-Aleppo road, in 2016 and subsequently started shelling civilian settlements in the region. The rebels in Tell Rifaat, seeing no other way out of this situation, had to hand over the region to the PYD to save the lives of the civilians living there. However, despite being spared death, they were not spared exile. The PYD forced 250.000 civilians to leave this region by employing the methods described. Tell Rifaat, once one of the largest settlements in the area, is now a ghost town.

The PKK turned the Daesh attack on Iraq/Sinjar, just like the one on Kobani, into propaganda, and used it to dominate the Yazidi population. The PYD began conscripting Yazidis once the attack was repelled even though during the Daesh attack on Sinjar it did not take a position that would change the course of the battle. The PKK, which had previously created a division called YPJ (Yekineyen Parastina Jin/Women’s Defense Units), created a division consisting solely of Yazidis called YPŞ (Yekineyen Parastina Şengal/Sinjar Resistance Units). Many young Yazidis were transported to Syria over the Rabia border crossing and given mandatory military training by the PKK in the organization’s military camp in Qamishli. Syrian Yazidis were also brought to this camp. After receiving a short military training, some Iraqi Yazidis were sent back to Sinjar while others were sent to Syrian front-lines.

Undoubtedly, the crimes and the demographic massacre of the PKK and the PYD are not limited by these actions. Some local councils founded by Syrian rebels are keeping records of some of the exiled Syrians. But these records are very limited. No credible number exists on how many people have been forcibly displaced from their homes so far. According to current records, the number of Syrians exiled from towns such as Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, Qamishli, Al-Darbasiyah, Al-Shaddadah, Rmelan, Al-Qahtaniyah, Al-Hasakah, Tell Brak and Tabqa exceeds two million. Not only Arabs but also Turkmens, Kurds and Assyrians have suffered from these policies. The displaced people, now living in very hard conditions, are dreaming of the day they will return to their homes.

Aiming to eliminate terrorist elements of PKK/YPG, The Operation Olive Branch (OOB) launched by Turkey on January 20 revealed how local, regional and international actors in the Syrian crisis are intertwined. Both Syrian “revisionist actors” and regional actors, trying to maintain or maximize their gains along with minimizing damage, openly voiced their discomfort regarding Turkey’s novel “boots on the ground” strategy, which priorities Turkey’s military power as a foreign policy tool. More than just voicing, they have also taken certain steps seeking to obstruct Turkey’s military depth in Afrin. Iranian-led Shiite militia in support of Assad moving to Afrin to fight against Turkey, together with PKK/YPG last month, was one of the most significant indicators of the aforementioned situation. Meanwhile, despite having different motives, we have seen both Russia and the U.S. become agitated because of the Afrin operation.

Even though it is wary about Turkey’s “boots on the ground” strategy, Moscow calculates that this strategy will escalate the tensions between Ankara and Washington and force Turkey to become closer with Russia; therefore, their approach towards Turkey remains the same. Meanwhile, Washington doesn’t want to strengthen Russia’s hand and is aware that disregarding threats to Ankara’s very existence may deteriorate Turkish-American relations further, evolving into something more than a conjunctural crisis. In this respect, the recent diplomatic traffic between Turkey and the U.S. indicates that the U.S. policymakers have become “more concerned” about Turkey’s assertiveness in Syria and that the U.S. desires to reconcile with Turkey rather than exacerbate the schism between the two NATO partners.

The “boots on the ground” strategy which could be defined as eliminating threats before they reach the country’s borders is clearly yielding positive results for Turkey’s national security. The picture is actually clear; taking the Operation Euphrates Shield and outposts being established in Idlib into consideration, Ankara will achieve a military and political depth in Syria that includes territories northwest of the Euphrates with OOB; a depth that Turkey won’t relinquish in the near future. With the possible addition of Manbij to the aforementioned territories as a result of negotiations with the U.S., Turkey might secure targets in its “game plan” more easily in the short-term.

Turkey’s Game Plan in Afrin

Turkey’s Afrin operation is the continuation of the new national security strategy that was shaped more clearly after the July 15 coup attempt. According to this strategy, Turkey could only contain threats emerging in Syria and Iraq, as a result of the power vacuum, with efficient deployment of military assets. In this respect, the strategy foresees the utilization of military power in the field and in cross-border operations instead of reserving it.

Considering the larger region which includes Syria and Iraq along with protruding military power and the said region’s political and geopolitical realities, the following are Ankara’s aims for the future:

• Minimizing the PKK existence on both Syrian and Iraqi borders
• Consolidating diplomacy in order to assure Syria’s territorial integrity
• Consolidating diplomatic compromise with Russia and Iran achieved in Astana and Sochi
• Weakening the U.S.’ political and military ties with PKK/YPG

In order to simultaneously achieve the aforementioned targets, Turkey has to overcome certain trials. Ankara’s security strategy mostly focuses on the minimization of the PKK threat. However, the efficient deployment of military power won’t suffice on its own; the complex network of regional and international relations has to be managed simultaneously.

First of all, eliminating the cross-border threat of the PKK with military force requires a meticulous balance between the seemingly conflicting interests of Russia and the U.S. Every improvement in Turkish-Russian relations in regards to PKK/YPG and Syria has an impact on Turkish-American relations; therefore, the relations between Turkey and Russia is at the center of it all. On the other hand, consolidation of diplomacy and the maintenance of the reconciliation between Turkey, Russia and Iran are necessity for preserving Syria’s territorial integrity. Inclusion of Washington to this process might bring balance between Moscow-Regime-Tehran, consolidate the diplomatic initiative and work in favor of Turkey. It shouldn’t be forgotten that certain regional actors like Israel and Iran might attempt to undermine this diplomatic process. Tehran’s approach to Turkey could be clearly understood from Iran’s deployment of militia and armed forces of the Syrian regime which forced Russia to become the intermediary between PKK/YPG and the Syrian regime in Afrin. Iran could be asserted as the leading “most unreliable” actor that could prevent Turkey from achieving its aforementioned goals.

Syria’s territorial integrity isn’t all about the dynamics between Turkey and PKK/YPG. In other words, Turkey may have thwarted PKK/YPG from controlling a united swath of land with Operation Euphrates Shield and OOB; however, it isn’t possible to foresee how the diplomatic process along with the preparation of a new constitution will shape Syria, especially east of the Euphrates. This is important as it is a reminder that the Syrian conflict isn’t only about the power struggle between the regime and the opposition.

A part of Turkey’s game plan, consolidation of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Ankara is relatively easy. Russia desires the schism between Turkey and the U.S. to widen and deepen. Meanwhile, we know that Russia needs Turkey in resolving the Syrian crisis and this is the main reason for Russia giving the green light to Turkey’s Afrin operation. Moscow knows that Turkey’s presence on the field tests the relations between the U.S. and PKK/YPG, forcing the U.S. to act more carefully. On the other hand, Moscow also believes that counterbalancing Iran’s field advantage and prominent influence over the regime with Turkey is useful. Besides the Syrian crisis the tensions between Turkey and NATO, along with the EU, makes Russia’s investment in Turkey even more worthwhile. Therefore, the consolidation of relations between Ankara and Moscow has become one of the pillars of security policies. Yet, symmetricity of this consolidation is crucial.

Turkey-U.S. Relations

The aim to weaken the U.S.’ relations with PKK/YPG and reinforcing cooperation rather than conflicts have become a crystallized subject in terms of the ever-complicating network of regional and international relations. In order to dismiss the PKK as an issue between Turkey and the U.S., territories under the control of the terrorist organization on both banks of Euphrates has to diminish, its armed capacity has to be minimized and its partnership with the U.S. should end. Even though the PKK won’t be able to hold on to the west side of the Euphrates because of OOB, Iran’s and the Syrian regime’s certain initiatives on the field might make it harder for Turkey to completely control Afrin.

Yet, Turkey needs to “reconcile” and “find a midway” with the U.S. to realize the remaining two aims. Minimizing PKK/YPG activities to the east of the Euphrates through military intervention is among the options. However, realization of this intervention without any kind of reconciliation with the U.S. might escalate the crisis in Turkish-American relations. There is hope for a settlement between Turkey and the U.S. after the former U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson’s visit to Ankara. If the U.S. leaves Manbij to the Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army, Ankara might revise the options regarding the east of the Euphrates. This obviously doesn’t mean Turkey will consent to the PKK existence in the said region.

The other options include reinforcing the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which consists mostly of PKK/YPG militants with Arabs and Kurds that aren’t affiliated with the terrorist organization, thus diluting the existence of terrorist elements, and recalling all the heavy weaponry provided to the YPG after the military phase against Daesh is over. A concrete step has to be yet taken to realize these options. Meanwhile, if Washington seeks a “local power” to limit Iranian influence over Syria in a post-Daesh setting, it has to be aware of the issues that might emerge as a result of building this strategy on the YPG. Therefore, Turkey is still one of the leading actors that could prevent revitalization of Daesh and aide the dismantling of Iran’s influence in Syria.

It’s definite that Turkey won’t back down and will force the U.S. to sever its ties with PKK/YPG. At this point, Turkey has to be militarily active on the field; Turkey’s military activities might persuade the U.S. to agree with Turkey’s demands.

Secondly, the necessity to implement a strategy that would thwart both Russia and Iran’s attempts to undermine Turkey’s fight against PKK in Syria. Iran is the most “anti-Turkey” country involved in the Syrian crisis. While Moscow handles issues in a more pragmatic way, Tehran always sees events through an ideological lens; the Shiite militia’s latest performance in Afrin proves this. It should be remembered that “military activism” and deterrence will be key in counterbalancing Iran.

Since Turkey implemented “boots on the ground” strategy in northern Syria, the Syrian crisis has become more complicated. Only those who are determined will land on both feet at the end of this crisis.

Some local security sources spoke to Anadolu Agency on condition of anonymity that the YPG/PKK terrorists force civilians to dig two-meter deep, two-meter wide and kilometers-long ditches in order to block the entrance of Turkish military forces into Afrin.

Turkey has been watching the YPG by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which show how the terrorist organization prevent residents to leave the city. Another video footage captured by Turkish UAVs show how a mine planted by the YPG killed civilians as they tried to leave the city.

As part of their defense strategy, the YPG/PKK had started digging ditches, building tunnels, making barricades, and planting bombs much earlier. It is commented that the ditches and tunnels in Afrin seem professional and this evokes the question if the YPG received a foreign support or training to build them.

Since the first day of the operation, both Turkish military and political authorities have repeatedly pointed out that the operation is targeting only YPG/PKK terrorists in order to establish security and maintain stability along Turkey’s borders as much as to protect civilians from the YPG cruelty, already known to thousands of locals who were forced to leave their houses by force of arms.

The political invalidation of the Arab world has been one of the most important consequences of the recent developments in the Middle East. It seems that Gulf countries seem to have no strategy for dealing with Iran, and they are short-sighted in not supporting Turkey, even though Turkey is the only country capable of pushing back against Iran in the region.

The Gulf has always been a sub-region that characterized the scattered nature of the Arab world. The Arab Spring caused a political rift among Gulf countries, which took varying approaches to the crises and actors shortly after they emerged. This rift deepened after the 2013 military coup in Egypt and evolved into a full-blown crisis in 2014. The conflict between Gulf countries reached its peak in mid-2017 as the trio of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain enforced a diplomatic, political and economic embargo on Qatar.

Oman continues to maintain its non-conflictual foreign policy, and Kuwait too has a relatively neutral stance. Qatar, on the other hand, represents the opposition against the UAE-Saudi Arabia coalition. While Qatar and Turkey usually act in unison, backed by the US and Israel, UAE and Saudi Arabia along with Egypt pursue policies against Turkey and Qatar. These two parties step on each other’s toes when it comes to nearly every issue existing in the Middle East.

Their approaches to Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch (OOB), launched on January 20 with the aim of eradicating terrorist elements from the border, are also similar. In this respect, Turkey’s military operation has caused the schisms between the Gulf countries to resurface once again. Right after the initiation of the operation, Turkey invited the ambassadors of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar, along with other respective countries’ diplomats residing in Ankara, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and briefed them about the operation, in an effort to win their support.

Same old story in the Gulf

Despite the briefing, especially Saudi Arabia and UAE stood against Turkey’s OOB. Allegedly enforcing the regional policies of the US and Israel, the leadership of these two countries continued to be in close relations with Washington and Tel Aviv. As it was also the case with the previous operation, Brett McGurk, the most prominent US official responsible in Syria and a fervent supporter of the PKK/YPG, met with representatives from the UAE and Saudi Arabia during his visit to Abu Dhabi. Egyptian and Israeli representatives were also present at this meeting. These four countries are known for their anti-Turkey policies in the region. In one of his previous statements, McGurk had alleged that the operation would rejuvenate Daesh in Syria.

Being the most fervent anti-Turkey Gulf country, the UAE described the operation as an infringement on Syria’s sovereignty. UAE Foreign Minister Anwar Gargash went further by saying through social media that the operation was a threat to the security and unity of Arabs.

Gargash tweeted “the developments regarding Afrin created the need to redefine and restore Arab national unity.” Thus, he claimed that inaction would lead to the marginalization of Arabs in the region, and tried to rally the Arab public against Turkey.

With the influence of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, Egypt under the Sisi administration described the operation as an assault on Syria’s security. In its statement, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs alleged that OOB was undermining the political resolution efforts in Syria along with infringing on political agreements.

Moreover, officials of both the UAE and Egypt responded positively to the PYD/YPG’s call for support. Their reactions could be seen as the continuation of the US and Israeli sustenance to the terrorist organization. Meanwhile, this should be regarded as an attempt to consolidate the new divide in the region. Considering these statements, the YPG is hopeful of receiving military and financial support from the UAE and Egypt.

It’s known that Saudi Arabia has a similar perspective. After Raqqa was recaptured from Daesh and the city was razed to the ground by the US in late 2017, reports about Saudi Arabia sending a representative to the annihilated city and promising $1 billion to the US’ new ally the YPG for reconstruction were leaked. Despite all this, Turkish President Erdoğan called Prince Salman of Saudi Arabia, the ruler of the largest and most important Gulf country, and exchanged opinions about the aim of the operation and expectations. According to Anadolu Agency, Erdoğan announced that Turkey would allow the gradual return of Syrian refugees in Turkey to the liberated towns. During the call, both leaders underscored the importance of preserving Syria’s territorial integrity and developing a political resolution to the conflict.

Qatar continues to support Turkey

Ostracized by other Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Qatar continued to side with Turkey, which has been the case since the beginning of the Syrian crisis. Declaring its support for Turkey’s OOB, Qatar described the operation as a necessity in terms of assuring national security. In his statement, Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani asserted that developments in Syria were a direct threat to Turkey’s national security and announced his country’s support for all countries like Turkey who seek to preserve their own national security.

The Qatari Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lulwah al-Khater announced “Qatar’s support to Turkey initiative which aims to preserve national security and prevent terrorist attacks.” Al-Khater also expressed that OOB was legitimately launched by Turkey to preserve Syria’s territorial integrity along with national security concerns.

Qatari media followed a similar approach and showed support for the operation. For instance, Al-Watan daily reported on the operation with the following title: “Erdoğan: Operation Olive Branch is to eliminate terrorists.” The photo used for this news article had Syrians holding posters that said “We support the Turkish military operation which aims to liberate our people in Afrin from YPG.” The same article also relayed President Erdoğan’s statements which expressed Syria and Turkey’s fates are intertwined, that Turkey wouldn’t be secure unless Syria is secure. Similarly, al-Raya and al-Arab dailies reported that Russia and the US’ reckless policies have forced Turkey to launch the operation and secure its own national security.

Regional crises and the chaos in the Middle East has always forced powers to constantly shift their positions. This creates challenges in maintaining interstate cooperation.

Given that, the OOB has caused some confusion in the Gulf. Anti-Turkey Gulf countries are facing a dilemma in terms of the Syrian crisis. On one hand, they don’t want Turkey to be more active in the region. On the other, they are aware that Turkey is the only country in the region that can counterbalance Iran. They especially know well that Turkey and Iran are waging a proxy war in Syria. Considering both Turkey and Iran, the Gulf countries believe Iran is a larger threat to them; therefore, one would expect them wanting Turkey to be more powerful. However, despite all these factors, the UAE and Saudi Arabia followed a similar policy with Iran, creating one of the most significant paradoxes in recent history, while Kuwait chose neutrality.

A total of 3,444 terrorists have been “neutralized” since the start of Operation Olive Branch in Syria’s northwestern Afrin region, the Turkish General Staff said in a statement on Wednesday morning.

Turkish authorities often use the word “neutralized” in their statements to imply the terrorists in question either surrendered or were killed or captured.

On Jan. 20, Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch to clear YPG/PKK-Daesh terrorists from Afrin, northwestern Syria.

According to the Turkish General Staff, the operation aims to establish security and stability along Turkey’s borders and the region as well as to protect Syrians from the oppression and cruelty of terrorists.

The operation is being carried out under the framework of Turkey’s rights based on international law, UN Security Council resolutions, its self-defense rights under the UN charter, and respect for Syria’s territorial integrity, it said.

The military also said only terror targets are being destroyed and that “utmost care” is being taken to avoid harming civilians.

Source: AA

Turkey’s president said on Wednesday he hopes the northwestern Syrian city of Afrin would be liberated from terrorists “by this evening.”

The route in eastern Afrin terrorists use to enter and exit will be closed soon, Recep Tayyip Erdogan told a gathering of village and neighborhood heads at the presidential complex in the capital Ankara.

On Jan. 20, Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch to clear YPG/PKK and Daesh terrorists from the region of Afrin, near Turkey’s southern border.

According to the Turkish General Staff, the operation aims to establish security and stability along Turkey’s borders and the region as well as to protect Syrians from the oppression and cruelty of terrorists.

The operation is being carried out under the framework of Turkey’s rights based on international law, UN Security Council resolutions, its self-defense rights under the UN charter, and respect for Syria’s territorial integrity, it said.

The military also said only terror targets are being destroyed and that “utmost care” is being taken to avoid harming civilians.

Source: AA

Evidence of the terrorist YPG/PKK using young children uncovered in the Turkish-led operation in Syria’s Afrin region confirms what many international rights watchdogs already reported: the terrorist recruitment of minors.

The memory cards of cameras seized during the ongoing Operation Olive Branch in Syria’s Afrin region, launched on Jan. 20 against YPG/PKK-Daesh terrorists, show children — age 13-17 — bearing arms, training with weapons, and living in poor conditions in the mountains.

In a December 2016 report Iraq: Armed Groups Using Child Soldiers, Human Rights Watch documented 29 cases in northern Iraq of children recruited by armed groups affiliated to the terrorist PKK.

According to the report, children under age 15 took part in fighting, staffed checkpoints, and cleaned and prepared weapons.

The same PKK activity was also documented in a November 2013 United Nations report called Children and Armed Conflict.

The report said Kurdish armed groups recruited boys and girls age 14-17 in Syria’s Hasakah region.

The 2014 U.S. State Department Human Rights Report also said the terrorist PKK — the YPG/PKK’s parent group — regularly recruited children in the past, though the number of child soldiers recruited by the PKK that year was unknown.

The report also said PKK had kept up abducting and conscribing young people, adding that it was not generally clear whether they joined by force or volunteered.

Families of allegedly abducted children staged several protests during the year demanding the terror group free their children, it added.

Kidnapping children

In 2015, the U.S. Trafficking in Persons Report said Kurdish children were sometimes kidnapped and forced to participate in PKK forces, according to uncorroborated reports.

In the 2016 report, the U.S. said the YPG/PKK continued to recruit and use boys and girls, including children younger than 15.

According to the report, the YPG/PKK reportedly took the children to indoctrination and training camps.

In April 2015, a 16-year-old girl in Aleppo was allegedly recruited by YPJ/PKK female terrorists against the wishes of her family, said the report.

The forced recruitment of children by the YPG/PKK was also documented in reports of German-based Kurdwatch.

In a May 2015 report, Kurdwatch said the PYD/YPG/PKK kidnapped 12-year-old Fatimah S.A.

Quoting a family member, the report said: “The girl simply disappeared. Her parents are PYD supporters. However they weren’t asked if they wanted to send the girl to the military.

“The YPG claims that the girl decided by her own free will. Her parents were not even allowed to accompany their daughter. They were promised that after two weeks training, Fatimah would be allowed to return if she wants.”

According to the International Criminal Court, the enlistment and conscription of child soldiers under age 15, as well as using them to participate actively in hostilities, is a war crime.

According to the Turkish General Staff, Operation Olive Branch aims to establish security and stability along Turkey’s borders and the region as well as to protect Syrians from terrorist oppression and cruelty.

The operation is being carried out under the framework of Turkey’s rights based on international law, UN Security Council resolutions, its self-defense rights under the UN charter, and respect for Syria’s territorial integrity, it said.

The military also said only terror targets are being destroyed and that “utmost care” is being taken to avoid harming civilians.

Source: AA

Ever since Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch in northwestern Syria, its goals have been mischaracterized and quite a few myths continue to thrive. One of these is that Turkey is conducting the operation because it cannot tolerate any “Kurdish” gains in northern Syria. It has become commonplace to describe the PKK-linked YPG as “American-backed Kurdish militias” or simply “Kurds” as if they represent the majority or all of Syrian Kurds. In fact, the YPG has sought to dominate the region at the expense of Kurdish groups not aligned with the PKK.

Back in the fall of 2014 during the battle for Kobani, the YPG refused to allow a large contingent of Peshmerga forces to help with the fight against Daesh. At the time, Turkey had even allowed the Kurdish Peshmerga forces from Iraq to travel through its territory – a first in Turkish history – to arrive in Kobani. From the beginning, the YPG has only been interested in creating a PKK stronghold in northern Syria. This is clearly unacceptable for Turkey but it is a far cry from an “obsession” with any Kurdish political gain in Syria. If anything, Turkey has encouraged unity among Syrian Kurds and sought to convince the PYD to join the opposition forces against Assad. Turkey also supported non-PYD Kurdish representation in a national dialogue congress.

Another major myth has been the YPG’s “effectiveness” as ground forces against Daesh. It should be remembered that the PYD had made a deal with the Assad regime at the beginning of the Syrian uprising. It was only after the sudden rise of Daesh that the YPG started to promote itself as “staunchly secular” and fearless fighters against Daesh. The Obama administration decided to utilize them as “local partners” against Daesh in an environment where the American public was opposed to any “boots on the ground.” Ever since then, the YPG has dominated the military battlefield largely thanks to US military support including critical air cover and protection.

The devil’s bargain continued under the Trump administration but the YPG’s utility is now proving limited at best. The political commitment of the YPG to the PKK’s goals in Syria is so strong that they announced that they would redeploy their forces from the Daesh fight to Afrin against Turkey. The irony should not be escaping anyone that the YPG is willing to abandon the fight against Daesh – the very rationale for the US support – in order to fight a US NATO ally. Some analysts have suggested that the US can broker a deal with Turkey and somehow convince the YPG to sever ties with the PKK. However, Turkey’s Afrin operation has exposed that the congruity between the two is so deep and organic that the PKK’s strategic and political goals take priority over the fight against Daesh.

The myths about the YPG can be maintained so far as the US policymakers choose to ignore realities on the ground for political expediency or the lack of a coherent Syria policy. Turkey’s Afrin operation has already exposed many of the ill-conceived notions about the YPG. It is time for the US to coordinate with Turkey strategically and rely on its NATO ally for its policy goals. Establishing stability in northern Syria is a common goal but it cannot come at the expense of Turkey’s national security. Ensuring that Daesh does not come back is also a common goal but the YPG cannot be relied upon to achieve it. Abandoning the myths about the YPG would serve the US well. Then comes the hard task of crafting a realistic Syria policy that is coordinated with Turkey and one that can achieve lasting stability.

On March 3, 2018, Turkey’s Office of the Prime Ministry, Directorate General of Press and Information organized a visit consisting of foreign reporters and non-governmental organizations to Syria.

The aim of the visit was to inform reporters of the situation in Afrin and give information about Operation Olive Branch, which until this day has seen the neutralization of around 3,000 terrorists. In addition to the staff that organized the trip and the reporters, members of NGOs also attended. The group was reportedly composed of 20 people in total.

There was a wide range of reporters, including individuals from the BBC and Al-Jazeera. A reporter who attended the visit spoke to The New Turkey on the condition of anonymity and explained their experience.

A group of reporters are seen before the visit. Picture obtained from source. 

The trip to Syria began in Azaz, a city northwest of Syria, roughly 30 kilometres from Aleppo – n area that was included in Operation Euphrates Shield. The source emphasized that Turkey is pursuing a vital role in the re-normalization of life standards in Syria. “Turkey is trying to ensure Azaz becomes an example city for the rest of Syria. It is doing this by helping schools, re-building infrastructure and by helping the local administrations. It even has a PTT [a Turkish post-office] there.”

“Assad regime forces had bombed a mosque in Azaz. Today Turkey’s Presidency of Religious Affairs is re-building that mosque,” the source said.

Explaining that they had the chance to speak to the local populace when they were there, the source told us that the local population see Assad as the sole reason for this crisis. “The people there say that the whole reason for this crisis [in Syria] is because of Assad.”

After visiting the Azaz region, the group was taken to the village of Mersawa. The source told us that the village only consists of 15 families; half of them had left their homes due to the situation in the country. In comparison to the situation in Azaz, the standard of life in Mersawa is lower.

“We spoke to a couple of families in Mersawa. There are only around 15 families left, as most of them have migrated and left their homes. AFAD and the Turkish Red Crescent provided these families with survival necessities such as food and blankets.”

A picture depicting the help provided by AFAD in Mersawa. Picture obtained from source. 

When asked about the situation of the civilians in operation areas, the source told us that “they [the Turkish Armed Forces and the Free Syrian Army] are very sensitive against the civilians. It feels like there is a political order that warns ‘do everything to protect the civilians.'”

The source also added that some members of the Free Syrian Army said that the sensitivity in protecting civilians is “causing the operation to proceed much more slowly and that there is a clear separation between the PKK and the Kurdish population of Syria.”

Turkey’s deputy prime minister said Thursday that during Turkey’s current counter-terrorist Operation Olive Branch in Syria, there have been no civilian casualties or injuries.

Speaking at Anadolu Agency Editors’ Desk, Bekir Bozdag said: “To date, no civilians have died or even been hurt in Turkish Armed Forces operations.”

Bozdag also said Turkey’s fight against the terrorist PYD/PKK in Afrin, northwestern Syria, near Turkey’s border, is providing tremendous support for Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Anyone who backs or patronizes the terror group PYD/PKK, including the U.S., will face a response by Turkey, Bozdag said.

The U.S. has called the PYD/PKK a “reliable ally” in its fight against Daesh, against strong objections by Turkey, which has documented that the group is an offshoot of the terrorist PKK.

In its 30-year terrorist campaign against Turkey, the PKK — recognized as a terrorist group by the U.S., EU, and Turkey — has taken some 40,000 lives.

Addressing reports of Syrian regime forces or regime-backed forces seeking to intervene, Bozdag added that if the Bashar Al-Assad regime enters Afrin posing as the YPG/PYD/PKK they will be targeted, and if militias enter, they will be targeted too.

On Jan. 20, Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch to clear PYD/PKK and Daesh terrorists from Afrin, northwestern Syria.

According to the Turkish General Staff, the operation aims to establish security and stability along Turkey’s borders and the region as well as to protect Syrians from terrorist oppression and cruelty.

The operation is being carried out under the framework of Turkey’s rights based on international law, UN Security Council resolutions, its self-defense rights under the UN charter, and respect for Syria’s territorial integrity, it said.

The military also said only terror targets are being destroyed and the “utmost care” is being taken to avoid harming civilians.

Source: AA

The civil war in Syria has not only affected Turkey in terms of the refugee crisis it caused but has also enabled terrorist organizations to raise to the sphere, taking advantage of the chaos in the region.

Turkey’s military intervention in Afrin came due to this very reason: the PYD/YPG terrorist organization had settled to create a terror corridor on the Turkish-Syrian border, which inevitably became a matter of national security for Ankara.

The Afrin region in Syria was handed over to the PYD/YPG in Syria in 2012 by the Assad regime. Since then, the terrorist group has forced the migration of the local population, including Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens.

Thousands have been displaced due to the insecurity in Afrin.

With the operation taking place, the Turkish Red Crescent has announced that it is preparing for the accommodation of over 50,000 people near Afrin.

With the aim to re-store peace and authority in the region, the Turkish Armed Forces and the Free Syrian Army gave start to Operation Olive Branch, which began on 20 January.

Since the operation began, the forces have cleared Afrin and its surrounding areas from 649 terrorists.

In addition to this, the Turkish Armed Forces lost 7 members of its personnel serving in the area.

Regardless of the fact that the European Union recognizes the PKK as a terrorist organization, the bloc has continuously remained silent to Turkey’s concerns.

The latest event reflecting this was when Member of the European Parliament Kati Piri downplayed the threat posed by the group.

Piri is associated with the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament, and has been a member of the EP since 2014.

During an interview published on Saturday 27 January, Piri stated that “For us [the EU], the PKK and its variations are not a threat. There are no attacks of PKK in the Netherlands, Belgium or France.”

While this not only goes against the understanding of the term “alliance,” it also reflects the problematic approach towards terrorism, which is threat to the entire world regardless of its source and target.

Acting as a Rapporteur during a meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, Piri ignored comments made by the FM in regards to discussions made about the PKK.

Criticizing this stance, the FM stated “They have appointed one PKK sympathizer lady for a country of 80 million. I only say ‘lady’ out of courtesy. I told her about the situation for two hours.”

“She didn’t note anything I said, but put everything the PKK said in her report. We should not take a rapporteur like this into account.”

Linking the situation to the current Operation Olive Branch in the Afrin region of Syria, the FM said: “In Operation Olive Branch, we have been very strong both in the field and at the table. We have both breathed down on the terrorists in the field, and done what had to be done in terms of diplomacy.”

Underlining the fact that the operation is being held in line with internal law, Cavusoglu added: “Everyone has seen how serious Turkey is with this operation. The friends, countries we call allies, the so-called allies, the [terrorist] YPG supporters, and the neighbors have seen it. We have no doubts about the steps we can take in the days to come.”

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared the imminent start of the Afrin operation in order to cleanse part of its southern border from PKK-affiliated YPG terrorists. The Turkish Armed Forces deployed several units to the Turkish border shared with the Afrin region, while the Turkish-backed Syrian rebels in northern Syria, who were part of the Euphrates Shield Operation, also prepared for the Afrin operation.

On 20 January, the Turkish Armed Forces began Operation Olive Branch in order to clear the Afrin region from YPG militants. The operation was set with a huge bombardment of YPG warehouses and strategic military positions. In addition to these airstrikes, the Turkish Armed Forces also targeted several YPG positions across Afrin with artillery shelling.

Operation Olive Branch came shortly after Russia withdrew its soldiers from the Afrin region in order to avoid being shelled by Turkey. The Russian withdrawal was a result of several high-negotiations between the Turkish and Russian Chiefs of Staff – who had previously met in Russia prior to the start of the military operation.

Operation Olive Branch is being conducted with a similar method like Operation Euphrates Shield, which was conducted in order to clear northern Aleppo from Daesh militants. Once again, the Turkish Armed Forces are being accompanied by Turkey-backed Syrian rebels. In contrast to the Euphrates Shield however, the main focus of Operation Olive Branch is to eliminate YPG militants in Afrin. Another difference between the two operations is also the terrain – when compared to Afrin, northern Aleppo is easier to operate as Afrin is located around mountains. More, another difference observed in the two scenarios is that the YPG have controlled Afrin for much longer than Daesh had controlled northern Aleppo.

YPG’s control of Afrin

The YPG has controlled the Afrin region since mid-2012 after the Assad regime plainly handed over the area. The terrorist organization’s control of Afrin was until Operation Olive Branch, as no other faction on the ground had attacked the region. In 2015, the YPG formed an alliance with Jaysh al Thuwwar, forming the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces. At the beginning of 2016, the YPG and Jaysh al Thuwwar captured the strategic Minnagh military airport and Tel Rifaat from Syrian rebels. Russia supported this effort with intense airstrikes. The last expansion of areas controlled by the YPG was during the Euphrates Shield Operation. The YPG took advantage of the immense fighting between Daesh and the Turkish-backed Syrian rebels and by doing so, the group tried to link up with YPG militants in Manbij. Even though the group did not succeed with this strategy, they managed to gather some new territories in northern Aleppo.

The presence of the YPG in Afrin and expanded territories around Tel Rifaat is estimated to have composed of 7,000 militants. In addition to the YPG militants, Jaysh al Thuwwar also has up to several hundred fighters under its command. Especially due to the forceful recruitment in Afrin, the YPG was able to increase its number to the 7,000 based in Afrin.

The depth of the operation

The difficulty of the operation in Afrin also depends on the aims and depth pursued by the government. In general, Turkey seems to have two different options. The first includes the entire cleansing of the Afrin region, which will take time as besieged YPG elements will fight until the very end. Additionally, the mountainous terrain in Afrin will give the terrorist group an opportunity to adopt guerilla tactics against the Turkish Armed Forces and the Syrian rebels. As the YPG is led by PKK veterans who have experienced this type of warfare, this will increase the difficulty of the operation. Within this scenario the operation should not be endangered but will take some time.

The second option includes the possibility of besieging YPG elements in Afrin and to cut any of their links with the world by capturing the Arab-majority areas around Tel Rifaat and Minnag. By doing so, Turkey would also have a route from the Euphrates Shield areas in northern Aleppo towards the rebel-held areas in Idlib. As the YPG forced the Arab population out of their homes in Tel Rifaat and surrounding areas, those areas are sparsely populated. Thus, as the YPG is likely to use civilians as a shield against the Turkish Armed Forces and the Syrian rebels, Tel Rifaat and surrounding areas will be easier to capture.

However, the Turkish strategy seems to intend to capture all of Afrin as Operation Olive Branch began with the aim to capture all strategic hills in the mountains of Afrin. With this strategy, the Turkish Armed Forces and Syrian rebels decided to attack the YPG from its strongest positions. If successful, the terrorist group will lose the possibility to retreat from the villages towards the mountains in order to conduct a guerilla warfare against the armed forces and rebels.

Media propaganda

In addition to the military difficulties, Turkey will also face propaganda warfare by the YPG and PKK media outlets as well as from western journalists and analysts who sympathize with the terrorist group. Even if Turkey tries to avoid civilian causalities as seen during the Euphrates Shield Operation in contrast to what Russia did in Aleppo or what the U.S. did in Raqqa, civilian causalities may still occur. However, as part of their media strategy against Turkey, the YPG will propagate by exaggerating any civilian casualties. This can be foreseen and it is inevitable for western media agencies to play a role in this situation. In addition to the western media, UAE-sponsored media will also join the campaign through reporting false news generated by the YPG.

Only days after the start of Operation Olive Branch, YPG-affiliated media sources claimed several fake reports about destroyed Turkish tanks, and the killing/detention of Turkish soldiers and Syrian rebels. Their propaganda was spread on social media and was also shared on the official accounts of the YPG, YPG commanders and YPG-linked websites.

An example of this includes a tweet of the YPG’s so-called political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD). The picture tweeted showed a residential building engulfed in flames stating “PYD Rojava” with the caption: “Turkish terrorist army targets civilian homes in Afrin.” Shortly after the post it was discovered that the image was from a fire incident that took place in Kuwait in 2016.

Saleh Moslem, a senior leader of the PYD tweeted: “Turkey massacres in Afrin” with a picture of injured kids. However, it was revealed that the photograph was from the Assad regime’s attacks on Eastern Ghouta.

Also, another picture shared on Twitter claimed that “kids are being targeted by Turkish army.” However, it turned out that the picture was taken from a post on January 1, 2017, during a Russian airstrike on Syria.

Examples of fake-propaganda by YPG sources could be expanded to an innumerable amount. The media strategy obducted by the YPG does not try to be reliable or valid, but seeks to de-legitimize the Turkish-led operation with all means.

The main challenges of Operation Olive Branch will be the terrain in Afrin, which gives the YPG an opportunity to seek defense in the mountains. Nevertheless, the plan of the Turkish Armed Forces is to capture the strategic hills in order to entirely eliminate all YPG militants in Afrin. In addition to the military difficulties to be embraced, Turkey has to ready itself for a propaganda war with the terrorist organization. A genuine media strategy by the YPG, in addition to journalists who openly sympathize with the group, will seek to de-legitimize the operation conducted in Afrin.

The significance of the Afrin operation for Turkey must be evaluated through two main aspects: The place of the operation in Turkey’s counter-terror efforts and Ankara’s role in the regional geopolitical equation. In this scope, the most feasible alternative to carry the counter-terrorism fight across the border and prevent the PKK from becoming a regional actor in post-Daesh Syria seems to create a strategic state in Afrin. As the operation is viewed through the current situation and risks, it presents a generic scenario. However, it can be estimated that the situation may change at any moment depending on momentary factors and influence the progress of the overall process.

The operation will take place in winter conditions and in a relatively rugged terrain that occupies approximately 2,000 km² of area. The offensive will take place based on a joint military operation concept against the hybrid terror elements comprising around 6,000-8,000 operatives deployed in fortified lines of defense in rural and residential areas. It can be said that the maneuvers of the operation unit will be provided with land forces having mobile firepower in addition to local paramilitary elements whereas fire support will be provided both from land and air.

Air offensives on the PKK/YPG positions with fire support elements from land are expected, at the initial stage, to concentrate on the Dikmetas village, Minagh Air Base and Tel Rifat town located in the east of Afrin, Sheikh al-Hadid village, Jandaris town and Burj Abdullah village in the south of Afrin, where the main defense lines of the PKK and the YPG are located. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) are expected to segregate Afrin by getting through the PKK/YPG defense lines from eastern and southern sectors, and controlling the east and south of Afrin.

The risks entailed

In the subsequent phase, PKK/YPG elements may withdraw to the center of Afrin with forward operating TSK units from the northern and western sectors of Afrin. Following this phase, the PKK/YPG may enter clashes, particularly in Afrin’s city center, and force the TSK and FSA forces to collateral damage. Meanwhile, various terror assaults against the TSK and FSA forces may be organized in Afrin, such as attacks with improvised explosives, tactical weapons or assassination attempts.

As the operation kicks off, it is highly possible that the PKK/YPG units might organize attacks in the region where Operation Euphrates Shield was launched by advancing from Manbij, and the border security units on the Turkey-Syria border by advancing from Malikiye-Kamisli-Tel Abyad-Ayn al-Arab line. Syrian regime units may cooperate with the PKK/YPG on the Tel Rifat-Zahraa line and attempt manipulative military actions in order to clog the progress of the TSK and the FSA.

The extension of the operation may lead the Russian and Syrian regime to bring forward speculations regarding the use of Syrian air space. In such a case, Turkey could be forced to enter a direct armed engagement with Hayat Tahrer al-Sham in Idlib. Apart from the ordinary Kurdish people, groups who were radicalized by the PKK in Afrin may raise difficulties in enabling stability and security in the region after the completion of the operation, and might try to problematize Turkey’s presence in Afrin in the international sphere.

The main factors that will determine the success of the operation include speed, coordination, the ability to cooperate with local units and the sensitivity in survival measures. Considering the current situation and risks, the military targets of the operation are the PKK/YPG units for the time being. However, engagement with different threats is also possible during the later stages of the operation.

The Afrin operation is a strategic move in terms of supporting Turkey’s counter-terrorism efforts, geopolitical position and eliminating national security threats. More importantly, the success that is achieved through the operation in Afrin may be employed to intervene in other areas controlled by the PKK/YPG.

Following Operation Euphrates Shield (OES), Turkey brought a new dimension to its military activity in Syria in order to minimize the PKK’s strength in northern Syria and to “de-territorialize” the terrorist group in the middle term. With the Afrin operation, the aforementioned military activity has spread in a wider geographical area in the western flank of the Euphrates.

The operation, which had been in preparation phase for a long time, started on January 20 with the offensive phase, short after President Erdogan’s “Afrin operation has actually started on the ground” statement.

While the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) declared the name of the operation as “Olive Branch,” it made reference to decisions made by the UN Security Council’s decisions with regards to the war on terror and ‘self-defence’ element in Article 51 of the UN Charter – as it did in OES.

There are a number of push factors that shape Turkey’s strategy towards the PKK’s presence in northern Syria. However, for now, Turkey will try to actualize the strategy differently in two geographical areas. Turkey’s first goal is to minimize the PKK’s presence and capacity and force it to withdraw from the areas it controls in the western flank of the Euphrates.

Afrin is one of the critical thresholds

Afrin constitutes one of the critical thresholds to realize this strategy. The PKK captured Afrin in 2011 based on an agreement with the Assad regime and it declared it as a canton in 2013. Since 2014, Afrin has been ruled by a cadre, which includes high-level PKK leaders. As stated by Talal Silo, who was a former SDF figure, individuals from the PKK’s Qandil Mountain ranks such as Khalil Tafdam, Haji Ahmad Houdro, Mahmoud Barhoudan used to administer Afrin. With the intensification of the Syrian Civil War and the Assad regime’s tacit consent, the PKK first eliminated Kurdish opposition and secured absolute authority in the region. The group then displaced non-Kurdish residents through a “subtle demographic engineering.”

In this context, residents of 42 villages and towns (Tel Rifat, Menagh, Sheikh Issa etc.) in northern Syria, whose numbers are estimated to be around 250,000, were deported by YPG militants in 2016. Following Turkey’s downing of a Russian jet, the PKK captured the Tel Rifat-Menagh axis east of Afrin from the FSA with Russian air support and consolidated its power in these regions.

On the other hand, the PKK utilized Afrin as a base for its attacks in Turkey. For this reason, the Afrin operation has a strategic importance in Turkey’s fight against terrorism. The Afrin-Amanos connection in the region had an importance with regards to the PKK’s attacks towards Turkey’s Mediterranean region. The PKK used to transfer its forces from the Hassa county to the Amanos region via its elements deployed in Afrin and its surrounding villages, also making use of the mountainous terrain.

The PKK threat towards Turkey was not limited to this. Afrin has been one of the crucial centres of the PKK’s ideological and armed training until today. Members of the PKK who used to receive training on weapons and explosives in the camps based in this region carried out attacks in Turkey. Hence, Afrin had become a harbor for the radical leftist organizations in Turkey.

The strategic goal of the Afrin operation

Although the goal of the operation was declared as bringing peace and stability to the region, taking inspiration from the olive trees there, it is safe to state that Turkey will have to face a formidable challenge in order to achieve its mission. Herein, along with difficulties on military-technical and operational levels, Ankara’s stated strategic goals for the middle and long term is likely to face geopolitical challenges.

In military terms, although Turkey drew some lessons from OES on tactical, operative and strategic levels, there are some differences in the nature of enemy identification at least with regards to Afrin. It is not difficult to expect the PKK to build its defense on its social base, where the latter is strong.

During the first stage, TAF is carrying out its land operation against shelters and weapon placements of PKK members fortified in rural areas. At this stage, although the PKK plans to stop TAF and FSA elements by making use of topographical conditions in parts of Afrin, taking the joint nature of the operation and the imbalance of power between the two parties into consideration, this plan is very unlikely to materialize. In this respect, it will not be possible for the PKK to keep rural areas under its control. Hence, the terrorist organization is expected to move its main defense to residential areas and to fight an urban warfare. Taking the PKK’s capacity into consideration, clashes in urban areas will be heavier.

These circumstances may prolong the duration of the operation and may also turn the diplomatic stage against Turkey. For this reason, Ankara would move first to minimize the strength of the PKK in Afrin, then capture strategic points and consolidate the FSA’s control there, and then fully minimize and “de-territorialize” the PKK in the western flank of the Euphrates.

A new page in the Syrian theatre

At this juncture, it appears that Turkey cannot confine itself to the Afrin operation. The importance of the Afrin operation for Ankara is to pressure, especially the United States, for the elimination of the PKK presence along the Turkish border in the eastern flank of the Euphrates, not to mention Manbij. In other words, Turkish military presence and fortification in the western flank of the Euphrates will function as an element of pressure on military and political levels against the PKK and the U.S. in the eastern flank of the river.

As long as Turkey’s military determination goes smoothly on tactical and operative stage, Washington should be prepared to take steps backwards or to lose Turkey.

The Russian position is estimated to affect Turkey’s military success in the western flank of the Euphrates. The execution of the Afrin operation indicates the presence of some sort of an agreement between Turkey and Russia. It is possible to speculate on the dynamics on which this agreement was built, but it would be wrong to think that the parties are engaging in this process based on expectations of “absolute gains.”

It is very clear that the Afrin operation has opened a new page in the Syrian theatre. This page poses some risks for Turkey as much as it does for Syria in general and for U.S. foreign policy. The perusal of this process by the U.S. is very crucial for the minimization of these risks.

Turkey has been in a long on-going preparation process for an extensive military operation against the PYD/YPG, which the country deems as a threat to both its own national security and to the territorial integrity of Syria. Ankara has been in constant dialogue with countries across the region along with prominent actors in Syria in order to establish political and military premises.

Turkey has launched an operation targeting Afrin, the western end of the terror belt. While the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) had deployed military forces to the region near Afrin, it has also established a base in Idlib, south of Afrin, effectively surrounding the city. In addition to this, thousands of Syrian opposition soldiers, who were trained through the “train-and-equip” program, were deployed against the PYD/YPG. Turkey is pursuing an initiative similar to the Operation Euphrates Shield (OES), which was launched right after the July 15 coup attempt, and which simultaneously cleansed the defined areas from both Daesh and the PYD/YPG. Operation Olive Branch (OOB) was launched a short time after President Erdogan’s announcement on 20 January, 2018, at 17:00. While the TSK announced the name of the operation as “Olive Branch,” references were made to decisions made by the United Nations Security Council and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.

What are the geopolitical and demographic features of Afrin?

Located in northwest Syria, Afrin is a district in the Aleppo Province. The district consists of seven towns: Central, Bulbul, Jandairis, Rajo, Sharran, Shayk al Hadid and M’abatli. Its border with Turkey renders the district important in terms of geopolitics. Its surface area is 1850 km², corresponding to 2% of the total surface area of Syria. Afrin is located in a mountainous region and its elevation is between 700-1269 meters. The distance between its easternmost and westernmost points is 55 kilometers, while the distance between its northernmost and southernmost points is 75 kilometers.

According to the 2004 census in Syria, 64,758 people live in the town center and the total population of the district is 172,095. The city is mostly populated by Kurds. However, Arab and Turkmen and a small population of Yazidis also reside in the region. The city experienced a population increase after the 2011 revolution, as the Syrian regime did not target the city. Yet, figures provided regarding the population of Afrin are contradictory – especially numbers released by pro-PKK/PYD sources are exaggerated. It is estimated that around 300,000 people live in the Afrin District.

Why is Afrin important for the PYD/YPG?

Following the 2011 revolution, the PYD/YPG terrorist organization made an agreement with the Assad regime handed Afrin to PYD, which declared it as its canton in 2013. Since October 29, 2014, the region has been managed by an administration appointed by the PYD. The terrorist organization has eliminated all Kurdish opposition in the region, especially the Kurdish National Council, and has established its hegemony over the region.

After the downing of the Russian aircraft, the terrorist organization captured territories between Tell Rifat and Menagh to the east of Afrin from the Free Syrian Army (FSA) with the support of Russian aircrafts. With this, the terrorist organization forced the Arab population in the region to immigrate. The group then attacked the town of Azez but failed to capture it. Since October 2016, the PYD/YPG has attempted to march on Al-Bab with the occasional air support from coalition forces. However, this march was stopped with the OES.

The YPG claims that it manages Afrin through 47 councils and 898 communes (communities) that organize the people. Even though the region is isolated from the PYD/YPG located on the eastern bank of the Euphrates, it is managed by prominent figures of the PKK such as Halil Tefdem, Ahmed Hudro, Mahmud Berhudan, Behcet Abdo and Nocin, who all receive their orders from Qandil under the chain of command of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK).

This region acts like a springboard for the organization, which will allow it to access the Mediterranean Sea. Moreover, the terrorist organization attempts to establish a line of supply through the Amanos Mountains in Turkey in order to mobilize militants with weapons. The TSK and security forces have killed over 40 terrorists trying to cross the border from Afrin. The terrorist organization sees Afrin as an important source of recruitment. They are forcibly recruiting girls and boys aged between 16-18 for their “Self-Defense Force.” There are several boot camps established by the group where these teenagers are trained.

What are some of the alternative scenarios to the Afrin offensive?

Operation Olive Branch was launched at 17:00 on 20 January with military aircraft belonging to the Turkish Air Forces, which entered Syrian air space and began targeting terrorist targets in Afrin. The TSK announced that 108 different locations used as shelter and arsenal by the PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG in Afrin and its surrounding towns were destroyed by 72 aircrafts. In addition, the TSK informed that lines of defense, command centers and border outposts of the terrorist organization were targeted by the Turkish forces from land and air.

During the pre-operation assessments, there were various scenarios about the Afrin offensive. Initially, re-capturing towns like Tell Rifat and Menagh in order to completely surround YPG militants in the region was being discussed. However, the first stage of the offensive indicates that an extensive military operation against the PKK in Afrin will take place.

The extent of the military operation will depend on negotiations made with Russia, as due to the result of an agreement made with the Syrian regime, Russia continues to control Syrian air space. It is known that Moscow is trying to persuade the Turkish regime to pursue a small-scale operation. However, it is definite that Turkey needs an extensive military operation in order to permanently remove the terrorist threat from Afrin.

The operation was launched with intense air raids and support vehicles. After the lines of defense are softened, ground war could be expected to be intensified around the Menagh Air Base-Tell Rifat to the east of Afrin and Shayk al Hadid-Jandairis-Burj Abd Allah to the south of Afrin.

It could be expected that land forces of the TSK and FSA will simultaneously penetrate the defense lines of the PKK/YPG on the southern and eastern sectors, effectively isolating Afrin. In the following stage, the TSK may force PKK/YPG militants to retreat to Afrin by pushing from northern and western sectors. These terrorist elements may attempt to use civilians in Afrin as human shields in order to draw the Turkish armed forces into urban warfare.

The PYD/YPG had been preparing for a probable military operation by Turkey. The PKK controls over 1500 km² of territory including Afrin and its surrounding cities, where Russia has also begun to establish checkpoints.

It could be assessed that PKK/PYD militants, whose numbers are around 5000-6000, along with Jaysh al-Thuwar elements consisting of approximately a couple of hundred of militants, may attempt to halt the TSK and FSA through asymmetric warfare and hybrid methods. It is known that the terrorist organization has been digging trenches, forming tunnels, placing Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and mines to certain locations. Moreover, with the courtesy of the U.S., the YPG may attempt to transport anti-tank weaponry that is currently located on the eastern bank of the Euphrates to Afrin. Considering the topography of the region, terrorist elements may attempt to use mountainous parts that are located towards the midwest and northwest of Afrin.

Nevertheless, the terrorist organization does not stand much chance against the TSK and FSA on the plains towards Afrin as well as around Tell Rifat and Menagh regions. It should not be forgotten that Turkey has learned valuable lessons from OES, especially in terms of fighting against anti-tank weaponry and asymmetric warfare methods, and has new inventory such as Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), which could counter such attempts. All in all, Turkey is much better equipped for the Afrin offensive.

What has Turkey learned from Operation Euphrates Shield?

When drawing comparisons between the OES and OOB, there are both similarities and differences. Even though Turkish forces encountered PKK/YPG elements on the bank of the Sanjur River after capturing Jarabulus, it was essentially an operation against Daesh.

OES cleared a territory of 2200 km² from terrorist elements. While the conflict was mostly on the plains, it was concluded with urban warfare in Al-Bab and surrounding towns. Regime forces along with the PKK constantly harassed the TSK and TSK-backed Syrian opposition forces. As Daesh adopted hybrid and asymmetric strategies along with using civilians as human shields, the TSK had to exact the operation meticulously and steadily. Daesh had carried out asymmetric attacks throughout the OES, attempting to halt the march of the TSK and Syrian opposition forces through bombed car and suicide bomber attacks. The fact that Daesh was effectively using anti-tank weaponry was one of the greatest challenges of the operation. As Turkey engaged in urban warfare for the first time on a cross-border operation, there were certain handicaps regarding military equipment and experienced personnel. Moreover, Syrian opposition forces were not very effective during the initial train-and-equip program.

The majority of these handicaps were addressed with the experience gained from OES. While increasing the number of UCAVs improved close air support and precision strike capacities, protection systems against anti-tank weaponry that is implemented within Turkish tanks made the TSK a force to be reckoned with. There are more personnel in the force who are experienced in asymmetric hybrid conflicts. Meanwhile, Syrian opposition forces are trained and equipped better than before. There is a significant improvement in their battle-readiness. In this respect therefore, when compared to the OES, Turkey is more advantageous in the current operation.

Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim speaks at a meeting with media representatives at Vahdettin Mansion in Istanbul, Turkey on January 21, 2018.

Operation Olive Branch aims to create 30-kilometer-deep (approx. 19 miles) safe zone in northwestern Afrin region of Syria, Turkish prime minister said Sunday.

“First goal [of the operation] is to create a safe area there and then we can take concrete steps to eliminate terrorist elements,” Binali Yildirim told media representatives in Istanbul.

He said there are 8,000-10,000 terrorists in Afrin and Turkey would clear all the terrorists on its borders.

Yildirim said Russia, the U.S. and Iran were informed about Turkish plan ahead of the operation.

“There is confusion in U.S. [regarding the operation]. Everyone speaks different things,” he said, adding that they also did not voice a firm opposition to the operation.

Source: AA

A retired U.S. army officer has said the United States made a “terrible mistake” by supporting Syrian Kurds (PYD/PKK).

In an exclusive interview with Anadolu Agency, Edward J. Erickson, who is currently a professor at the Marine Corps University, talked about the recent developments in Syria’s Afrin and the relations between the U.S. and Turkey.

“The Afrin operation is a continuation of Operation Euphrates Shield,” Erickson said.

Turkish military units are already deployed in Afrin, a district of Aleppo province near the Turkish-Syria border, which is under siege by the PYD/PKK terrorist organization. The PYD/PKK is the Syrian offshoot of the PKK terrorist group, which has been designated a terrorist organization by Turkey, the U.S. and the EU.

“What is happening to Turkey right now is in the same way my country (U.S.) was sucked in to Iraq and Afghanistan, Turkey is being sucked in to Syria,” Erickson said. “It is very difficult to draw the line and say ‘we are going to stop right here’, that is Turkey’s problem.”

United States’ problem is to be a player in Iraq and in Syria, Erickson said. “We tried to support the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and failed, they collapsed. Our next client, the next choice was the YPG, the Kurds.”

“The problem now is in Afrin, as you know there are not just the rebel forces, there are also YPG, Kurdish forces. This has brought Turkey and United States into direct competition.”

U.S. arming of PYD/PKK

When asked about the U.S. arming of PYD/PKK, Erickson said the U.S. needed a group on the ground to fight against Daesh.

“We then sent weapons to Kurds. We promised Turkey – our president, our secretary of state, defense Trump, Tillerson and Mattis – that we will get the weapons back. I don’t think Turkey believes that, personally I don’t believe that. I don’t think Syrian Kurds will return weapons. This is going to lead to big problems between Turkey and the U.S,” he said.

“I think we made a mistake, personally. I don’t speak for the U.S. government. I think the United States made a terrible mistake supporting Syrian Kurds.”

When asked about his opinion on what is United States’ policy in Syria, Erickson said initial Obama policy was that “Assad must go.”

“And when the situation in Syria became so complicated, the Obama administration changed that to ‘maybe Assad can stay but we got to work with it, somehow’,” he said.

“The Trump administration has not revealed (its policy) on what Assad will be,” he added.

Erickson said currently there are 2,000 U.S. soldiers fighting against Daesh in Syria, but their future is unknown after Daesh is crushed.

“ISIS is almost crushed. The question is after ISIS is crushed, what will the Americans do? Will they stay there, will they leave? Will they encourage the PYD to attack Assad? We really don’t know,” he said.

“We are waiting for America’s national military policy,” he added. “Right now, the only government that can function and govern in Syria is the Assad regime. Nobody likes that, but it is the reality.”

Source: AA

Turkey has legitimate security concerns over insurgency inside its borders, U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis said Sunday, according to U.S. media reports.

“Turkey is a NATO ally. It’s the only NATO country with an active insurgency inside its borders. And Turkey has legitimate security concerns,” Mattis told reporters in a plane headed for Asia.

His remarks came amid Turkey’s ongoing military operation against terror groups in the Afrin region.

Noting that the overall success against Daesh “does not remove many of Turkey’s concerns,” Mattis said it is “easy to understand” why Ankara is worried that the conflict will extend beyond the Syrian border.

”Turkey was candid,“ Mattis told reporters. “They warned us before they launched the aircraft that they were going to do it. We are very alert to it. Our top levels are engaged and we’re working through it.”

Turkey’s operation was carried out against the PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG and Daesh terrorist groups under the framework of Turkey’s rights based on international law, the UN Security Council’s decisions and self-defense rights under the UN charter.

Arab media have shed the spotlight on Turkey’s ongoing Operation Olive Branch to dislodge the PYD/PKK terrorist group from northern Syria’s Afrin city.

Most newspapers cited President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s statements that the operation targets PYD/PKK terrorists in the city.

“Erdogan: Olive Branch to defeat terrorists”, headlined Qatar’s Al Watan newspaper.

The daily published a picture of Syrians waving a banner reading “We back Turkish military operation to shield our people from PYD terror”.

The Qatari Raya newspaper cited Erdogan’s criticism during a recent party conference of U.S. plans to create a PYD/PKK force in northern Syria.

“Turkey launches Olive Branch Operation in Afrin”, read the main headline of the Saudi-funded Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper.

The daily said Ankara has informed Damascus of its military operation in Afrin and cited Erdogan’s statements that the operation will include Manbij.

The Saudi newspaper pointed out to the Turkish military’s statement that the operation aims to achieve “security and stability” along the Turkish border and in the region and end the presence of PYD/PKK and Daesh in Afrin.

Bahraini newspaper Al-Ayam cited Turkish Foreign Minister Mavlut Cavusoglu’s statements that the operation “only targets terrorists” and that Turkey “has informed all sides of what we are doing”.

The Kuwaiti daily Al-Rai headlined “Turkey launches Olive Branch against the Kurds of Afrin and ‘angry’ Russia … withdraws its soldiers”.

“Erdogan: Manbij will be next … and gradually we will clear the borders of this terrorist filth,” reads another headline by the daily.

Source: AA

According to information gathered by an Anadolu Agency correspondent in the area, some movement was seen at the 10th Tanker Base Command of Incirlik Base as part of the ongoing ‘Operation Olive Branch’.

While some Turkish fighter jets took off from the base, others remained on alert. Meanwhile, military cargo planes kept arriving and leaving the base.

Turkish ground forces have started to move into Syria’s Afrin with Free Syrian Army, Turkish General Staff said earlier on Sunday.

The operation — aimed at eliminating PYD/PKK and Daesh elements from Syria’s Afrin — was launched at 5 p.m. (GMT1400) on Saturday. It was being carried out under the framework of Turkey’s rights based on international law, UN Security Council’s decisions, self-defense rights under the UN charter and respect to Syria’s territorial integrity, the military added.

Afrin has been a major hideout for the PYD/PKK since July 2012 when the Assad regime in Syria left the city to the terror group without putting up a fight.

The Turkish cities of Kilis and Hatay across the Syrian border are within the firing range of the PYD/PKK group from Afrin, which sits atop a hill. The terror group has also used Amanos Mountains to penetrate from Syria into Turkey.

The PYD/PKK depends on Afrin to connect to the Mediterranean from northwestern Syria.

The terrorist organization has also threatened the gains made from Operations Euphrates Shield and Idlib de-escalation zone over Afrin.

A quarter of Syria land and 65 percent of Turkey-Syria border are currently under occupation of the terrorist organization.

Operation Euphrates Shield began in August 2016 and ended in late March 2017 to improve security, support coalition forces and eliminate the terror threat along the Turkish border.

Source: AA

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan addresses a massive crowd in western city of Bursa before ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party’s Women Branch congress on January 21, 2018.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Sunday afternoon said the ongoing Operation Olive Branch in Syria’s Afrin will be completed “in very short time”.

Erdogan said “hopefully, we will complete this operation in a very short time.”

The operation, aimed at eliminating PYD/PKK and Daesh elements from Syria’s Afrin, was launched at 5 p.m. (GMT1400) on Saturday. It was being carried out under the framework of Turkey’s rights based on international law, UN Security Council’s decisions, self-defense rights under the UN charter and respect to Syria’s territorial integrity, according to the military.

Afrin has been a major hideout for the PYD/PKK since July 2012 when the Assad regime in Syria left the city to the terror group without putting up a fight.

The Turkish cities of Kilis and Hatay across the Syrian border are within the firing range of the PYD/PKK group from Afrin, which sits atop a hill. The terror group has also used Amanos Mountains to penetrate from Syria into Turkey.

The PYD/PKK depends on Afrin to connect to the Mediterranean from northwestern Syria. The terrorist organization has also threatened the gains made from Operations Euphrates Shield and Idlib de-escalation zone over Afrin. A quarter of Syria land and 65 percent of Turkey-Syria border are currently under occupation of the terrorist organization.

Operation Euphrates Shield began in August 2016 and ended in late March 2017 to improve security, support coalition forces and eliminate the terror threat along the Turkish border.

Source: AA

Main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) Deputy Chair Bulent Tezcan on Sunday said his party completely backs the ongoing operation in Syria’s Afrin.

Speaking at a news conference at the CHP headquarters in capital Ankara, Tezcan said: “Our glorious army has taken an important action in Afrin. We give our full support to this operation. We wish that this operation achieves success and reaches its goal as soon as possible.

We hope Turkish Armed Forces will reach its target without any injury or loss and return home safely. May God help our army and our soldiers. At the end of this process, the most important thing to remember is that territorial integrity and sovereignty of Syria is ensured.”

Turkey on Saturday launched Operation Olive Branch to remove PYD/PKK and Daesh terrorists from Syria’s Afrin.

The Turkish General Staff has said the operation was aimed at establishing security and stability along Turkish borders and the region as well as eliminating PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG and Daesh terror groups, and protecting the Syrian people from the oppression and cruelty of terrorists.

The operation was being carried out under the framework of Turkey’s rights based on international law, UN Security Council’s decisions, self-defense rights under the UN charter and respect to Syria’s territorial integrity, the military added.

It also said only terrorist targets were being destroyed and “utmost importance” was being given to not harm any civilian.

Afrin has been a major hideout for the PYD/PKK since July 2012 when the Assad regime in Syria left the city to the terror group without putting up a fight.

The Turkish cities of Kilis and Hatay across the Syrian border are within the firing range of the PYD/PKK group from Afrin, which sits atop a hill. The terror group has also used Amanos Mountains to penetrate from Syria into Turkey.

The PYD/PKK depends on Afrin to connect to the Mediterranean from northwestern Syria.

The terrorist organization has also threatened gains made from Operations Euphrates Shield and Idlib de-escalation zone over Afrin.

A quarter of Syria’s lands and 65 percent of Turkey-Syria border are currently under occupation of the terrorist organization.

Source: AA

Speaking to reporters on Thursday 18 January, Turkey’s presidential spokesman stated that the steps taken by the Turkish administration in order to protect its national security are “definitely” not a move against Syrian Kurds.

Kalin stated: “I want to underline once more that the steps Turkey takes towards protecting its own national security in Afrin, Manbij, Jarabulus or in other places [in Syria] are definitely not a move against Syrian Kurds.”

The emphasis comes as an operation in Afrin – a region bordering Turkey’s Hatay and Kilis provinces – is widely expected in the upcoming days.

Turkey intends to clean Afrin from the PKK/PYD – which has remained a major national security threat to the country.

Kalin also commented on the mis-understanding surrounding the “Border Security Force” announced by spokesman for the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) Col. Ryan Dillon.

The presidential spokesman stated that U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said: “There will not be a force like that, it was expressed incorrectly. A false statement was made and wrong people spoke.”

“Now, in plain words, we will be following this closely,” Kalin said.

Before finishing his words, Ibrahim Kalin also re-emphasized that Turkey will oppose the legitimization of U.S. support to the PKK/PYD, YPG or SDF.

On Thursday 18 January, the U.S. State dept. urged Turkey to refrain from taking any action in Afrin, Syria, calling on the Ankara administration to remain focused on the fight against Daesh.

Following a news briefing, State dept. spokeswoman Heather Nauert stated that the U.S. wanted Turkey to abstain from violence in the northwestern city of Afrin.

“We would call […] on the Turks to not take any actions of that sort.”

“We don’t want them to engage in violence but we want them to keep focused on ISIS [Daesh].”

The Assad regime handed over Afrin to the PKK/PYD terrorist group and according to estimates there are around 8,000-10,000 terrorists in the area.

The PKK/PYD and the PKK’s Syrian offshoot the YPG have remained a national security threat for Turkey and thus the Turkish administration has justified its intention to intervene in Afrin on this basis.

Due to the differences in opinion regarding the threat posed by the PKK/PYD, relations between Turkey and the U.S. have remained at an all-time low.

While the Trump administration continues to provide military and financial assistance to this terrorist organization in the name of fighting Daesh, Ankara has continuously emphasized that a terrorist group cannot be defeated by supporting another one.

Speaking to reporters after his meeting with U.S. counterpart Rex Tillerson in Vancouver, Canada, Mevlut Cavusoglu stated that Turkey may expand its operations in northern Syria to Manbij city and east of the Euphrates River after Afrin has been cleared.

Cavusoglu spoke in Canada where he was attending the Vancouver Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on Security and Stability on the Korean Peninsula.

The FM stated that “Turkey’s precautions against the YPG/PKK cannot be limited to Afrin alone. There is also Manbij and east of the Euphrates River.”

Commenting on the U.S. plan to establish a so-called “border guard” in northwest Syria, the FM underlined that this will “irreversibly harm U.S.-Turkey ties.”

While the decision has been condemned on all fronts in Turkey, and has been questioned by the Russian and Iranian administrations, Turkish FM stated that different opinions among the Pentagon and Centcom as well as different institutions and ministries in the U.S. regarding support for the SDF and the PYD/PKK have been causing the problem.

Reminding reporters of past U.S. behavior regarding Manbij and Raqqa, and the U.S. support for the PYD/PKK, Cavusoglu urged the Trump administration to fulfill its promises.

The U.S. had promised that local councils would run the cities (Manbij and Raqqa) after they were liberated. However, they currently remain under the control of the PYD/PKK.

More, urging the U.S. to stop supporting the group and to retrieve its weapons, Cavusoglu stated: “The U.S. has previously stated that the PYD/PKK was not their strategic partner, [that] in fact, they were only working together to defeat Daesh.”

“As we can see, we have so many reasons to be skeptical, and we have enough reasons to take our own precautions.”

Following the brief given by the Foreign Minister, the Pentagon stated that the U.S. acknowledges Turkey’s concern over its plans for a border security force in Syria and that “close communications” with Turkey will continue.

Speaking in Elazig on Saturday, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that Turkey’s military operation in Syria’s northern Idlib province will crush the PKK/PYD terror group in Afrin.

Referring to Afrin, the President stated: “With the Euphrates Shield Operation we cut the terror corridor right in the middle. We hit them one night suddenly. With the Idlib operation, we will collapse the western wing.”

Following an agreement with Russia and Iran, who are the two other guarantors of the Astana process, Turkish troops entered Idlib with the aim to reduce fighting between the pro-Assad regime forces and opposition fighters.

President Erdogan also criticized the U.S. for arming PKK/PYD terrorists: “The U.S. sent 4,900 trucks of weapons to Syria. We know this. This is not what allies do. We know they sent 2,000 planes full of weapons.”

Turkish army strikes PKK/PYD positions in Afrin

Reports have emerged confirming that the Turkish Armed Forces hit PKK/PYD positions in the northwest region of Afrin.

The Turkish army fired intermittent artillery shells from Reyhanli’s Ogulpinar border gate in the southwestern Turkish province of Hatay.

Turkey is set to buy the S-400 missile defense system from Russia as President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, while meeting his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in Ankara on Monday, announced that the deal would be finalized “this week.”

The S-400 deal between Russia and Turkey has reached close to its success after a more than year of negotiations.

“Our colleagues will come together this week to conclude the work,” Erdogan said.

The news of negotiation between Russia and Turkey had raised speculation in the West as Turkey is a core partner of the Western military alliance NATO. However, the Turkish government seemed determined to buy the missile system from NATO’s main rival due to Turkey’s fear of the West’s duel role in the Syrian war, indifference to last year’s failed coup attempt and its antagonist approach to the country.

The S-400 is a modern-day long range missile system that is capable of carrying three types of missiles which can destroy targets including ballistic and cruise missiles. The system can track and engage up to 300 targets at a time and has an altitude ceiling of 27 kilometers (17 miles).

The two presidents also discussed bilateral trade relations and both expressed the hope and desire to keep the relations going.

Erdogan said, “Our bilateral trade volume with Russia increased 30 percent as of the first 10 months of 2017. We have a harmonious working environment at the political level.”

Russian president Vladimir Putin told that obstacles to trade and economic ties had been removed. “Within the first eight months of this year Turkish agricultural exports to Russia increased by 1.8 percent,” he said.

Relations between the two countries had entered a crisis after Turkey shot down a Russian jet over the Turkish-Syrian border in late 2015. Russia immediately imposed sanctions on Turkey, which mainly targeted the tourism sector, as Russian tourists form a major number of tourists in Turkey — about three million per year.

Russian withdrawal from Syria

Putin on Monday made a surprising visit to war-torn Syria, ordering his troops to prepare withdrawing from the country as Syria, according to the president, had been cleared of the terrorists. The commander of the Russian forces in Syria, Colonel General Sergei Surovikin, said that Russia will withdraw its 23 combat aircrafts, two helicopters, special force units, military police, and area security personnel from Syria.

Russia intervened in the Syrian war militarily in September 2015 after receiving an official request from the Assad regime. Putin met with Bashar al-Assad at Khmeimim Air Base, southeast of Latakia, on Monday.

However, the questions still remain unanswered as to whether Russian advisors will remain in Syria, what kind of weaponry they are going to leave behind and how they are going to support the Assad regime from now on.

Media reports since 2015 have suggested that Russia was sending all its high-tech and advanced weaponry including T-90 tanks (first post-Soviet tank) and Sukhoi jets to usher the Syrian government – that along with its rivals have killed more than 350,000 Syrians. The battle tank, which the US media had reported reached Syria’s Latakia air base in 2015, is equipped with a 125mm tank gun and an anti-aircraft machine gun. The weaponry that remains in Syria is going to be a concern for neighboring countries, most importantly Turkey.

Amid the warming relations between Turkey and Russia that have high stakes connected to the stabilization in Syria, Turkey has high hopes to acquire Russian assent for the operation in the Afrin province of Syria. Afrin is the hub of YPG/PKK terror groups and Turkey is bent on preventing them just like Daesh.

Criticizing US move on Jerusalem

Amid the rising fury throughout the Muslim world, Erdogan and Putin also spoke against US president Donald Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The Russian president stated that the status of Jerusalem should be settled through direct talks between Palestinians and Israel.

While speaking at the press conference he said, “Both Russia and Turkey think the decision of the US to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel is not helping the situation in the Middle East. It is destabilizing the region and wiping out the prospect of peace.”

US reacts to Russian announcement

Meanwhile, the US has dismissed the Russian claim and at the same time feigned indifference at the Russian announcement of troop withdrawal from Syria. A Pentagon statement on Monday claimed that Russian statements on the withdrawal of its forces from Syria “do not typically correspond” with the situation on the ground.

In a press statement Pentagon spokesperson Military Col. Rob Manning said, “Russia’s comments do not impact US priorities in Syria.”

*Written by Waseem Ahad