Exceptional for being a “post-modern coup” in Turkey’s history of coups and triggering one of the largest devastations of the political system in contemporary history, February 28 differs from other coups for being a process rather than a one-off intiative. Unlike conventional military coups that occurred during the multiparty system era, the coup was realized in coordination with actors from the judiciary, mass-media, academia, finance and the business worlds while the material and psychological damage it caused is still observable in various institutions and segments of society. The said damage is a result of the immense socio-psychological traumas triggered by the implementation of the headscarf ban, discriminatory quotients and national security pressure over pious segments of society with the pretense of a so-called “Sharia threat.” While there are ongoing February 28 trials today, the disappointments, tragedies and wasted years of thousands of people who were barred from employment and education are still fresh. On the other hand, it is obvious that the coup caused political and economic devastation due to banned politicians, parties that were closed down, siphoned banks and ransacked public finances. Having multidimensional societal and institutional devastations similar to all other military coups, analyzing the economic and financial damage caused by the February 28, 1997 coup is crucial.

Turkey’s first liberalization experience

Remembering the issues and systemic malfunctions of Turkey’s post-1980 liberalization experience is important in terms of better understanding the economic dimensions of the February 28 process. Turgut Özal led Turkey’s first wave of liberalization and implemented it according to the “Washington Consensus,” which limits state interference and enforces deregulation. During this era, the overlapping visions of the Motherland Party and foreign institutions led by the IMF and World Bank accelerated the process towards an open economy. However, even though a free market economy was advocated, failing to amend regulations and establish control mechanisms necessary for the institutional infrastructure rendered the country’s economy prone to crisis. Meanwhile, the era of fragile coalitions which began in 1991, triggered a ten-year long period of instability as political uncertainties and financial crises aggravated each other. High inflation, burden of uncontrolled public debt and the need for international loans condemned the economy to a vicious cycle in which debts were paid off with new loans. With the 1994 financial crisis, Turkey suffered its first systemic shock after the decision of financial liberalization in 1989.

The divided political structure and vulnerabilities in the management of the economy in the mid-1990s consolidated the spoils system. Public finance deteriorated due to paying high interest to the financial sector over aggravating internal debt. Systemically making losses under the pretense of “duty losses,” state economic enterprises (KITs) were being covered by high interest loans taken from private banks, making it a lucrative business for individuals with immense capital. By loaning the credits taken abroad to public institutions with high interest rates and exploiting the internal debt spiral, a superficial bourgeoisie that had the political power to form and destroy political coalitions was shaped. Along with banks, large-scale industrial enterprises in and around the Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen (TÜSIAD) amassed a huge capital through internal debt incomes, which were shown as non-operating income. The terms such as industry, investment and production became obsolete in the country.

The Welfare Party’s ‘pool system’ in the Treasury

Winning the elections in 1994 through the discourse of clean politics and crowning this victory by coming first in the 1995 parliamentary elections, the Welfare Party led by Necmettin Erbakan formed a coalition with the True Path Party and was determined to implement a “pool system” that would overhaul the management of macroeconomics. Implemented in 1996, this system created a resource pool among state enterprises and allowed those showing relatively better financial performance to loan with low interest rates. Rather innovative for its time, the pool system limited the vulnerabilities of public finance that was caused by state enterprises and the total public debt started to decline. However, as has been the case throughout Turkey’s political history, the large-scale bourgeoisie objected to this innovation in order to protect their interests, resorting to anti-democratic tactics. The new public finance order caused a great loss to those who were loaning funds to the state institutions with high interest rates. Rejecting to lose their source of easy income, this financial bourgeoisie initiated its plan to either persuade the coalition to give up the pool system or to depose the coalition. A consensus was formed between the military-civilian bureaucracy and large business groups along with their media affiliates who were all ideologically opposed to the Welfare Party’s Islamic discourses. A psychological war was launched during which the economic concerns and calculations were kept hidden as a part of the strategy and some careless statements made by certain members of the Welfare Party were provocatively used to indicate a so-called “Sharia threat.”

Financial operations hidden behind the regression discourse

What happened next is history. Using the expression “readjusting democracy”, February 28 process created a new type of post-modern coup aiming to change the government through the discourse “secularism is being abolished” rather than just seizing the control of the state through armed forces. Assumed to “last for a thousand years,” this process was expected to shift the economic and social balance along with the political, to obstruct political movements that emphasize Islamic identity and to constrain the conservative representatives of the business world like Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (MUSIAD) and Anatolian Tigers Business Association (ASKON).

While injecting the paranoia of regression into the subconsciousness of society with marginalized figures and images, the coup perpetrators were attempting to cover up the substantial economic and financial operation. Indeed, during the 4-year time period between February 28, 1997, and the 2001 financial crisis, Turkey lost its public finance discipline and experienced the most intense subsequent crises of the country’s political economy. Coming to power in June 1997, the coalition formed between the Motherland Party, Democratic Left Party and True Path Party, also known as the AnaSol-D coalition, removed the pool system and opened the way to the internal debt exploitation cycle. This caused the interest expenditure to national dividend ratio to increase from 5% to 17% within four years. Allowing the financial bourgeoisie to exploit internal debt, this system crashed with the twin crises of 2000 and 2001 – all tax revenue of the state was being used for paying interest and it was not enough.

The financial cost of February 28 process: over $50 billion

Along with having a detrimental effect on public finance, the February 28, 1997 coup also damaged financial supervision and regulation systems. Undermining the financial supervision system, weak coalition governments issued multiple banking licenses together with their allies including the military-civilian bureaucracy and financial bourgeoisie. Transferring public banks to private enterprises without any supervision, issuing banking permits easily, siphoning banks the high volume of international loans taken to be given to public institutions with high interest rates and the fragility of supervisory institutions triggered a banking crisis. During the process, 20 private banks announced bankruptcy and were transferred to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund of Turkey (TMSF). Considering the burden of seized banks, their interests and the burden of public banks, which were at a duty loss, the February 28 process cost over $50 billion to Turkey.

One of the most tragic features of the era in terms of the relationship between politics and economics was that retired generals were being made members of many private companies and the executive boards of various holdings. Under military tutelage, these large-scale enterprises did not shy away from protecting themselves with senior military officers and using their influences for commercial purposes. As the Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök objected to this practice on ethical grounds, this tradition, which only exists in third world countries, came to an end. However, the mysterious relationship between military actors and the financial bourgeoisie is among the main dimensions of February 28, which we are yet to shed light upon. Meanwhile, it should be remembered that the TUSIAD administration – which tries to boast on being pro-democracy and pro-modernization – while reaping the economic benefits of this hefty crime period, was silent to injustices committed against conservative political movements, conservative segments of society and entrepreneurs.

Despite all institutional and democratic gains, as the July 15 coup attempt reminds us that the threat of military coups in Turkey is still alive. For this reason, democratic consolidation, social solidarity and economic institutionalization which render such coup attempts unsuccessful, shall be achieved swiftly and the anti-coup spirit should be kept alive at all times.

February 28 was a coup. There was nothing post-modern about it. In a clear and direct way, it was a military coup d’état. The government was deposed through threats, blackmails and various other methods. Illegitimate means were used. It was anti-democratic.

While the army led the way, academics supported them, the business world preferred this overthrow and the media announced the whole thing. A legitimately elected government was deposed due to its number of deputies in Parliament. Politicians were threatened at the National Security Council. They were forced to sign various decisions. Tanks paraded on the streets. People were arrested. Discrimination occurred in all spheres, on all levels. Methods of political engineering were applied. Psychological warfare became part of everyday life. If this is not a coup, then what was it?

Those who claim that February 28 was not a coup are only trying to cover up their own crimes. I’m not sure who coined the term “post-modern coup,” but it is being used frequently. What does this mean? Nothing essentially. Are coups modern? Did they not exist before modernity? What does post-modernism, a phenomenon of the social sciences, have to do with February 28? The whole thing is farcical.

Turkey’s conservatives barred from accessing education

The coup’s most prominent aspect was education. With discriminatory policies and double standards, the religious segment of society was barred from accessing education. The headscarf ban was implemented and wasted away a generation. The 28 February coup was not only framed against politicians, but against society.

Looking back, we may assume that this mentality has been defeated. However, the estimates of the damage made are yet to be calculated: How many girls were barred from education due to wearing a headscarf? How many people were barred from education through the implemented quotient to imam-hatip and vocational high schools? How many dreams were shattered?

In the upcoming years, all these estimates may become clear. For instance, it might be easier to calculate how many people were denied the right to an education due to their headscarves. Yet, we may not know how many girls had to remove their headscarves in order to access education. Moreover, we may never know the cost of the trauma the coup had on the psychology of these girls.

Think about it. How many girls had to give up on registering to university because of the headscarf ban? You may have seen such examples around you. It is possible to understand what a prominent tragedy this was by listening to personal experiences. We may assume that it has a higher cost when we think about society as a whole. Despite these events, if some are still claiming that February 28 was not a coup, this means that the arrays of events have not been explained well enough.

Another aspect of this hostility and design was the quotient issue of imam-hatip high school graduates. Through the implementation of a quotient, the coup plotters wanted to bar a generation from accessing education. Those who remember will note that in the summer of that year, regulations involving university entrance had changed. High school seniors learned that entering a university was almost impossible in the autumn. More, they were told that they could not transfer to other high schools as it was also banned. Some transferred to open high schools, where they would complete their education from outside the system. There were a few who entered foundation universities. Some had to go abroad, as if they were exile. They suffered a lot. Yet, these people were the only ones that could have saved themselves as a minority. Most of them were doomed and were forced to apply to open education. While their scores were enough to enter prestigious universities in Istanbul or Ankara, they were forced to register to associate degree programs.

We didn’t forget, we won’t forget

Who could possibly calculate the estimates of this cost? Who is to be held accountable for the people deprived of an education? There is a vile figure left from those times. He was only recently defending all these discriminatory practices on TV. In the eyes of God, everything is forgivable, with the exception of injustice towards a fellow human being. Thousands of people were barred from establishing a good career and helping their children and grandchildren establish a good career. Is this a forgivable crime?

I came across a friend of mine who could have entered the most prestigious universities in Turkey had these unjust practices not been implemented. He told me that he had worked in various villages and towns of Anatolia for many years as a high school graduate. After many years he re-entered the university exam. He said he would be graduating soon. “After 18 years, I barely got everything back on track,” he said. Who is going to answer for all these years wasted? Who can claim that February 28 was not a coup? It was a vile coup that stole the future of people.

There is never a “good” coup, as all of them in all forms are detrimental. However, February 28 was different than previous coups as it tried to achieve more. The government deposed with the May 27, 1960, coup and which was replaced with state bureaucracy had an impact on the state, but not directly on society itself. The right to education was not barred. The March 12, 1971, coup was realized among various fractions of the state and was mostly dis-regarded by the people. The September 12, 1980, coup hurt a lot of people. However, it had a limited design towards the people as it aimed to perpetuate the tutelage system. It did not care about left or right wing politics – its focus was the state. Meanwhile however, the February 28, 1997, coup did not only push the largest ideological group in Turkey away from politics, but also attempted to destroy them. In this respect, the February 28 coup is on par with the July 15, 2016, coup attempt. The July 15 coup attempted to have a larger impact than February 28. It tried to control all of society, not just a particular segment. If the July 15 coup attempt had been successful, the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) would have had control of both the state and society. As they failed with this aim, they attempted to push the country into a civil war. Considering these factors, only July 15 could be compared with February 28 in terms of vileness.

There is never a “good” coup. Military overthrows are vile. However, some are trying to whitewash February 28 today. Excuse me, but we have not forgotten, and will never forget the tragedies lived.

As the series of trials continue in Turkish courts, a court in Izmir sentenced the lawyer of Fetullah Gulen, the criminal cult leader of Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO), to 12 years in prison. The lawyer Feti Ün was slapped a sentence of eight years in jail initially, but it has now been increased to 12 years in accordance to the Counterterror Act.

Following last year’s failed coup attempt by FETO, the Turkish government and security agencies have taken a range of steps to weed the terrorist elements out of different social, education and security institutions.

Although Gulen himself is based in the United States, his vast network is spread across the world, but its form had been strongest in Turkey. By tacking a wide range of steps, the Turkish government is working to prevent future attacks on the Turkish state.

The lawyer’s sentencing coincided with many other trials in which a number of policemen and soldiers were sentenced for coup related criminal charges and their links with FETO.

A Konya court sentenced six former police officers and the former assistant police director of Konya’s Aksehir district and a former security chief, separately. The sentences range from six years and 10 months to seven years and six months over FETO links.

A Samsun court also jailed a former doctor to six years and three months in prison for being members of an armed terrorist organization.

Meanwhile, eight of 36 suspects on trial concerning Turkey’s Central Bank staff in Ankara were released under judicial control.

Although the country paid a heavy price for resisting the July 15, 2016- coup attempt, that left 250 people martyred and some 2,200 injured, Turkey is expected to emerge stronger as the government takes on all the associated elements strongly.

*Written by Waseem Ahad. 

According to information from a Turkish judicial official, the European Court of Human Rights has rejected around 25,000 applications from Turkish nationals, all related to last year’s coup attempt.

The court declined to hear the cases on the grounds that the applicants had failed to exhaust judicial procedures in Turkey.

Thousands of people across Turkey have been arrested or dismissed from their jobs over links to the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO), which staged last year’s bloody coup attempt, which left 250 people martyred and nearly 2,200 injured.

It was also added that the curt referred to this procedure in its rejection of cases.

On Tuesday Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirm urged the United States judiciary to immediately extradite Fetullah Gulen, the U.S.-based criminal cult leader, whose clandestine organization (FETO) attempted a military coup in Turkey last year.

Speaking to the reporters at Ankara’s Esenboga Airport before embarking on the US visit, Yildirim said there were piles of files, enough to prepare for FETO leader’s extradition. “The judiciary in the U.S. should take immediate legal action and do what’s necessary,” he said.

250 people were killed and nearly 2,200 others injured while resisting the July 15 coup attempt in Turkey in 2016.

The visit of Turkish Prime Minister to the U.S. comes against the backdrop of the visa crisis between the two countries that was set off after Turkish staff at the U.S. mission were arrested two months ago for their ties with FETO. While the visa services were though partially restored on Monday, the PM’s visit is expected to further improve the relationship between the two NATO allies.

However, Yildirim promptly dismissed the statement made by the U.S. Embassy about “high-level assurances” from Turkey and that the country will give advance notice of any detentions or arrests of local staff members in the future.

Yildirim called for the respect for Turkey’s principles of law on the part of U.S., citing the example of the arrest of two bodyguards of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on his visit to the U.S.. “The legal process is underway in line with the principles of the state of law in both countries. Therefore, negotiations demanding mutual assurances are not needed,” said Yildirim.

The agenda of the visit where Yildirim is expected to meet U.S. Vice President Mike Pence to discuss a range of issues which include Syria, Iraq, FETO, PYD, YPG, and refugees.

1,837 FETO suspects appear in court

Meanwhile, at home in Turkey the trials of 1,837 FETO coup suspects began on Monday in the Sincan Criminal Courthouse complex, which hosted six separate trials. The trials include FETO’s involvement in the Turkish General Staff, Akinci Airbase, Gendarmerie Schools Command, and Turkish Military Academy as well as the Polatli 58th Artillery Brigade, Artillery, and Missile School Command.

Appearing in court were 221 suspects in the General Staff case, 486 suspects in the Akinci Airbase case, and 239 suspects in the Military Academy case. Also, the trial of 330 suspects from the 58th Artillery Brigade along with the Artillery and Missile School Command in the capital Ankara’s Polatli district is also continuing.

In two separate criminal courts in Sincan, 317 suspects and another 244 suspects in the Gendarmerie Schools Command Case appeared before a judge.

In the Akinci Airbase case, former Brig. Gen. Gokhan Sahin Sonmezates, accused of attempting to assassinate Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during the defeated coup, made his plea.

During his hearing, Sonmezates refused to answer any questions from the judge or prosecutors.

Tensions in the court room later rose as some of the complainants and suspects were evicted from the courtroom.

The court decided to reconvene for the Turkish General Staff main coup-plotters case on Tuesday morning. The hearing of the Gendarmerie Schools Command case ended after the identification of 244 suspects, and the chief judge decided to reconvene on Tuesday.

On July 15, 2016 FETO criminal cult leader Fetullah Gulen, who is currently based in the U.S., orchestrated a military coup which martyred 250 people and left 2,200 injured.

While the coup failed, it is known that the terrorist organization has infiltrated Turkish state institutions, including the military, ministries, schools and universities.

Since July 15 many operations have been conducted across Turkey with the desire to free the country from the members of this criminal cult that have hidden themselves under a civil organization blanket.

Within latest efforts, an operation was launched on Thursday across 11 provinces including capital Ankara in order to arrest over 130 officials suspected of being linked to FETO.

The suspects include 101 personnel from the Finance Ministry and 32 from the Labor and Social Security Ministry.

Among the suspects, 129 had already been dismissed from duty for suspected links to the group.

In addition to the operations, on Thursday the Council of Judges and Prosecutors dismissed 39 judges and prosecutors after they were accused of being linked to FETO.

According to a source of the council, the decision was taken after a probe into digital material, including records of encrypted programs that FETO members use and information gleaned from statements and confessions of judges and prosecutors.

The encrypted program used by FETO members, ByLock, is a smartphone app which is believed to have been cracked by Turkish security agencies, allowing them to identify tens of thousands of suspected FETO supporters.

http://thenewturkey.org/feto-and-its-role-in-stoking-the-kurdish-issue/

No obstacle left for Gulen’s extradition

While domestic developments in Turkey have been focused on capturing terrorists that remain in state institutions and domestic domains, has also confirmed that there is ‘no obstacle left’ in extraditing FETO leader from the U.S.

Speaking to reporters in south-eastern Gaziantep province, on Friday Abdulhamit Gul stated: “Recently all commitments have been fulfilled according to the agreements. That is to say there is no obstacle left formally for his (Gulen’s) extradition.”

Gul confirmed that all evidence against Gulen had been sent to the U.S. authorities and that now a state under the rule of law should do what is necessary.

The minister added: “We want the U.S. to extradite the leader of the terrorist organization which has killed 250 people in Turkey, of which there is evidence and has been documented in court decisions.”

Source: AA and other agencies

While a year has passed since the July 15 coup attempt, trials, especially those in Istanbul and Ankara, are proceeding swiftly. While there are newly opened cases, there are also those that have been concluded and upheld by the Supreme Court. The leading trials in Ankara and Istanbul along with the Akıncı Airbase trial continue with the defenses of the suspects. Despite factors including the hardships faced by the judiciary due to the increased workload following the dismissal of judges, FETO’s secretive and insidious nature, negative publicity abroad and multiple threats within the country, the coup attempt is being successfully fought against in courtrooms. Cem Duran Uzun, Dr. at the Faculty of Law at Çankaya University, spoke with Dr. Hüseyin Aydın, the attorney of President Erdoğan who is observing the trials, about the status of the coup attempt trials, uncovered truths, issues that are being faced, the performance of the judiciary and the future of the trials.

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The fight against FETO will take time

Mr. Aydın, at which stage are we in coup attempt trials and the fight against FETO? Could you outline the process?

First of all, we have to distinguish the fight against FETO and the coup attempt trials chronologically. In terms of administrative and legal proceedings, the fight against FETO goes back farther than the latter. We can mention December 17-25 as the date the fight against FETO took a new dimension. In this respect, we should evaluate the period between December 17-25 and July 15 and the period following July 15 separately. The successfulness of the fight and their conception is completely different than each other. In the former, even though President Erdoğan underscored the threat posed by FETO towards the state and public and emphasized the prominence of fighting this organization within the boundaries of law, we have seen that institutions weren’t able to keep up with the political will until July 15, unfortunately.

When the fight against FETO during the period between December 17-25 and July 15 is compared with the current, it could be argued that it was less successful in producing results. The presence of FETO-member judges and prosecutors, FETO members in said institutions and their overt and covert efforts to halt these investigations caused such a result.

After the July 15 coup attempt, the intelligence organization, security forces and Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) have increased their cooperation with the judiciary and significant progress was made in FETO investigations. Today, we are seeing that legal procedures are being taken against tens of thousands of FETO suspects, thousands of investigations are being conducted and we’re even seeing some cases being upheld by the judiciary. However, looking at the bigger picture, we are currently at the beginning of this fight and there is a long legal process awaiting us; especially when we consider the secretive structuring of the organization. More cases and trials may emerge after new evidence is found. It will definitely take time.

FETO-member prosecutors fled after obfuscating evidence

Could we claim that the judiciary largely uncovered FETO and perpetrators of the coup attempt? Is the judiciary successful in this matter?

We have to give credit where it’s due. No legal procedure took place after the 1960 coup, 1971 memorandum, nor the 1980 coup. Similarly, the February 28 postmodern coup took place in the near past; at the time, instead of investigating the coup, the judiciary preferred to be the accomplice of those who realized this postmodern coup. The judiciary in Turkey has such an unfortunate tradition. In this respect, we could say that the judiciary was on its tracks; while the July 15 coup attempt was going on and its success or failure was uncertain, we saw that the judiciary started investigations on putschists in Ankara, Istanbul, İzmir and many other cities around 23:00, even issuing warrants. This was a welcome development and we have to be thankful as a nation to those members of the judiciary who took the initiative.

Coup attempt investigations are mostly complete. Now criminal cases are being conducted. Some with fewer suspects are already concluded. Moreover, a criminal case was concluded in Erzurum and was upheld by the Supreme Court. Therefore, it became definite that this was a Gülenist coup attempt with the court decision. However, there are cases with numerous suspects; these are the crucial ones. The Akıncı Airbase trial along with the Ankara and Istanbul class action suits are still going on.

Is it possible to say that we know every nook and cranny of the coup attempt, so to speak?

We cannot say that all aspects of the coup attempt have been revealed by the judiciary. There are a couple of reasons. First of all, only a very limited portion of the TSK members involved in the coup attempt became confessors. This proves to be an issue when you try to uncover certain aspects of the coup attempt.

Secondly, during the coup attempt state institutions were caught off guard and weren’t prepared for it. As the putschists were aware of this situation, we believe they may have obfuscated evidence and documents that could be used against them during the coup attempt and even on the day after. We were unable to reach a part of the sought evidence because of this mass obfuscation. For instance, we have learned that those prosecutors who investigated the Akıncı Airbase were actually FETO members and that they have fled Turkey.

As a portion of the evidence is obfuscated and confessors are limited among the putschists, it could be said that certain aspects of the coup attempt are still in the dark. However, I can clearly say that there is a clear picture about who planned the coup, who lead it, who were involved in it and how it was done. If we consider that the leader of this terrorist organization resides abroad, we can easily assume that plans for the post-coup Turkey along with the coup preparation plans are abroad. Moreover, there is most probably information that was unbeknownst even to those who were in command. In this respect, it wasn’t possible to access to the said evidence, legally speaking.

Class action suits may be finalized in 2018

As you have said, certain cases are being concluded and new ones are being opened. In your opinion, how will these class action suits in Ankara and Istanbul proceed? When will these trials reach a conclusion?

We have previously experienced trials with hundreds of suspects and we have seen that they took 15 to 20 years to reach a conclusion, while many cases were dropped because of statute of limitations. In order to not have to go through the same experience in these trials, the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK) took some precautions and judges started to practice new methods. For instance, all of the courthouses are conducting these trials without any adjournment. This isn’t a practice that you would usually see in our judiciary system. These hearings take one or two months, so that a decision could be reached in a shorter time.

HSK has taken a precaution recently. The courts which are trying the coup attempt suspects aren’t only working on a single case; they work on multiple coup attempt cases. As these courts look at all cases regarding terror and terrorism, they are working on cases about FETO, PKK, Daesh and DHKP-C. Therefore, there are numerous cases they should work on. For this reason, HSK has appointed additional staff to these courts; the additional staff will probably work on other files than the coup attempt case. This will allow the presiding judge board to focus on the coup attempt cases and conduct uninterrupted hearings. Considering all of these precautions, I believe the class action suits, including Akıncı Airbase and General Staff cases, will be resolved in 2018.

What do suspects’ statements, their defenses and behaviors such as wearing t-shirts with the word “HERO” on it account for? Is there a common FETO strategy behind these? How could the judiciary counteract these strategies?

Even though it has taken a large hit with the investigations, FETO still maintains its organizational mobility in Turkey. We can say that these suspects are following a common defense strategy. This strategy is based on several pillars.

Firstly, they deny all and just lie. As I have said before, there are a limited number of confessors; the rest of them are denying their actions even though there is clear material evidence against them. Moreover, they’re claiming that they aren’t Gülenists, attempting to acquit FETO. Most of them are saying that FETO members might be among the putschists; however, none of the suspects admit that they are members. If all suspects are acquitted for not being FETO members, it won’t be possible to legally prove that FETO convened the coup. As suspects know this, they are saying what they are saying. They are trying not to accuse each other or make statements that might be used against one of their own.

Then, in order to create the image that the organization is still standing tall, they are trying to have high spirits and morale. As our imprisonment system has prison wings, they are able to consolidate. On the other hand, keeping morale high prevents them from unraveling and discourages confessors from confessing. Indeed, we have seen certain confessors renouncing confessions. It’s not hard to foresee that some of the current confessors are doing the same. This is their strategy.

Meanwhile, the organization is taking care of families of the incarcerated. As most of the relatives of the incarcerated, especially those of the TSK, had intra-organizational marriages, there is a significant solidarity. They are helping each other. It’s not a secret that the organization is providing material and moral aid to their families. Therefore, we can say that the organization has taken every necessary precaution in order to prevent them from falling apart and panicking.

While it can be argued that parents tended to disown their own children for their actions one day after the coup, this tendency is no longer relevant; we are observing that the organization is trying to have a hold on these families. We are currently focusing on the legal procedure; yet we don’t have a policy about other aspects of this organization, such as familial relations, their social circles and cutting their ties with FETO. Therefore, we have some shortcomings in these issues. I believe institutions should work on these issues.

Suspects are denying all as they are relying on the ECHR

Will their denials and attempts to acquit FETO save them? What are their goals?

Firstly, they believe denying actions despite clear material evidence doesn’t have serious legal consequences. It’s a gleam of hope; not all of them will be saved. Yet, even if one of them is saved by just denial, it’s a gain for the organization.

Secondly, the organization isn’t only limited to Turkey; FETO is present in over 160 countries. Therefore, admitting the organization’s involvement in the coup will have significant repercussions abroad. For this reason, their denial is about saving face.

Thirdly, there is a European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) process. Even if denying won’t produce results for them in Turkish courts, they might be hoping that their denials might lead to their acquittal at the ECHR.

Fourthly, I believe that they might be denying their actions just in case, as they are calculating that a political change might take place in Turkey and hope that their acquittal will be easier in such a political climate if they don’t admit anything.

Could it also be about projecting a strong and united image to their members abroad, encouraging them to stay together?

Indeed, let me provide an example. The organization’s civil administrator Kemal Batmaz didn’t say with whom he was staying on the night of the coup on purpose. However, he said the following: “Even if my statement or his testimony can save me, I won’t give his name. Even if I were to be executed or imprisoned for a lifetime, I won’t give his name.” He is a civil administrator of the organization; what he is saying is a message to all FETO members. I deliberately asked him whether he was encouraging other suspects to stay silent and not give names. He replied “Don’t evoke a thought that I wasn’t thinking of.” Nevertheless, the message was clear. Keeping a high morale and keeping the organization intact is what FETO members prioritize.

It’s not possible to block FETO’s concealed messages

There is an anger towards the putschists from all segments of society, regardless of their relation with those who were martyred or wounded on the night of the coup. They demand these putschists to be tried and punished swiftly. What are the duties of society, politicians and the media during these trials?

We have to agree that these are challenging trials for the judges, as well. Investigating a coup and putting the putschists on trial is unprecedented for our country. The judiciary never had the courage before. Considering all these challenges, we as the people have to be respectful to the legal procedure and contribute to the trials for a swift conclusion. Meanwhile, the principle of fair trial, a prominent component of international agreements and our legal procedure, is as important as the swiftness of the result. If we disregard this principle and allow misconduct, this might cause us to lose our righteous position because of a technicality. In order to avoid this possibility, we have to be patient and allow the trials to be conducted in the way they should be.

You have mentioned that these suspects act with a strategy and we have spoken about how they continue to communicate with each other. Is it possible to block their communications in prisons, preventing them from encouraging each other and showing resistance in trials? Can we talk about negligence, in this regard?

First of all, we should clarify that any person who is trained in the ways of such an organization would know how to act without any communication. Therefore, cutting their communications wouldn’t and won’t produce a completely different outcome. Such expectations are not realistic, as we’re talking about an organizational training that has transformed into a lifestyle.

What could’ve been done that wasn’t? We have a certain imprisonment system. This isn’t the first time that somebody is being tried according to Article 309 of Turkish Penal Code. Imprisonment doesn’t mean conviction. In this respect, the imprisoned have certain rights and you can’t just infringe your own laws. Visits from relatives, open and private conversations and legal advice are some of the said rights. Moreover, they can still relay concealed messages during these conversations. As you know, the organization has a system of concealed messages. For this reason, they don’t need to relay messages in an open way. This mustn’t be disregarded.

On the other hand, it’s not possible to keep all suspects apart from each other, both legally and technically. Prominent figures are being held in single rooms; however, this isn’t possible for all. We have a wing system in our prisons; there are 6-person, 8-person, 10-person and 16-person rooms. This system, therefore, becomes an advantage for them in terms of communications and solidarity. In addition, there are 485 suspects and they’re all in a mass trial, sitting next to each other and listening to what others are saying. Moreover, in our trials, the most prominent suspect’s name is the first in an indictment and our courts hear their defenses first. This prominent suspect’s statement and his/her defense style are a message to the rest. Therefore, it’s not possible to block open or conceal messages neither legally nor technically.

Civil and military administrators captured at Akıncı Airbase

Civil administrators of FETO have given their statements first at the Akıncı Airbase trial; a trial that you have been observing closely. Now, military suspects are defending themselves. What are some of the most striking details or information that you have heard during the trial?

There are striking details about civil administrators of the organization. First of all, all of them have worked at Kaynak Holding and its subsidiaries. They have FETO in their past. Moreover, most of them have relatives that are members of FETO. On the other hand, all of them were captured near the village of Akıncılar. Some claimed they were looking for land to buy; however, it’s not a suitable place to look for land. Others have said they were there, at 08:00 in the morning, to shoot a documentary about animal husbandry, while some claim they were there for a social event.

In terms of profiles, civil administrators are completely different from each other. All of their skills are complementary. For instance, we can say Kemal Batmaz has a great command of FETO’s ideology and terminology; thus, he has internalized the core principles of the organization. He is possibly FETO’s imam of Air Force. Nurettin Oruç seems more of an average person; however, uncovered evidence suggest that he is the imam of Gendarmerie. Moreover, Oruç’s connections in Germany are intriguing. Hakan Çiçek, on the other hand, looks like a people’s person. He’s seemingly a Kemalist and he’s not breaking his character even during trials. His U.S. connections and visitations are also intriguing. Aside from going to Pennsylvania, where FETO’s leader Fetullah Gülen resides, he seems to have visited other places for other reasons.

We believe Harun Biniş prepared the technical infrastructure of the putschist command, established their communications with others abroad and procured necessary equipment. Thus, we believe him to be the one who set up communications with Fetullah Gülen and prepared the technical infrastructure for the coordination of the coup. He is an electrical and electronic engineer that graduated from Bilkent University and he is an arrested suspect in the “Wiretapping Encrypted Telephones” case.

So, they have complemented each other and managed the coup attempt in coordination?

We can definitely say that. For instance, Hakan Çiçek isn’t your average person; he was managing the canteen at Fetullah Gülen’s FEM Preparatory School in Altunizade, Istanbul. He has been in the organization for a long time. Moreover, it was later found out that that very same preparatory school was where the young TSK personnel paid homage to FETO, especially those who have recently became lieutenants. There is such a connection. We can assume that Hakan Çiçek has continued to be in touch with these military personnel who have became members to the organization.

Witness testimonies suggest that there were more civil administrators at Akıncı Airbase. Is this possible?

It’s very probable. Some have mentioned numbers around 20-30 or even 40-50. However, some of these civil administrators may have been military personnel with civilian clothing; there are witness testimonies suggesting this. Nevertheless, we can say that there were more than just 5 civil administrators at the Akıncı Airbase on the night of the coup attempt; it is possible to assume that there were lower ranking civil administrators at the military base. Some of them have fled and we’re seeing that they all didn’t go in the same direction. Those who went to Akıncılar village were captured, while those went to separate directions may have fled.

Who are the more prominent military administrators of the coup attempt? Who were involved in its planning and application?

If we’re to speak about Akıncı Airbase, Chief of General Staff Hulusi Akar was greeted by four figures when he arrived at the airbase: Kubilay Selçuk, Ömer Faruk Harmancık, Hakan Evrim and Mehmet Dişli. Mehmet Dişli arrived there together with Akar. Then, Akın Öztürk came to the airbase. These were the people who surrounded Akar. Moreover, Akın Öztürk clearly says that Mehmet Dişli, Ömer Faruk Harmancık, Kubilay Selçuk and Hakan Evrim were putschists and claims that he has been trying to persuade them not to carry out the coup attempt. Therefore, these five figures are important. On the other hand, there were others on that night who were at the military base, coordinating the coup in other cities. Osman Kılıç is one of them; he’s being tried in the “Assassination Attempt of  President” case.

A figure we have scarcely heard of.

Kılıç is a prominent figure and an influential colonel. Similarly, Muzaffer Düzenli was at the Akıncı Airbase, coordinating the putschists in Istanbul. Gökhan Sönmezateş, who coordinated the operation in Muğla, is also a crucial figure. Mehmet Partigöç, who has signed the martial law decisions, is a very important figure. We believe that Partigöç was one of the brains behind this coup attempt, assessing his behavior at the court and his files. We can say that these are the higher-ranking figures.

No data to support “controlled coup” allegations

We know from the indictment that serious preparations were made for the coup attempt. How was the coup attempt thwarted despite these preparations? According to what data does the opposition allege this was a “controlled coup”?

First, we have to clarify that this coup wasn’t foreseen by the government. There was a lack of intelligence.

So, there are administrative and informative mistakes.

We may argue whether there were such mistakes. The second thing I want to emphasize is that intelligence was received on the day the coup took place. Once again, we may ask whether precautions taken after this intelligence were adequate or not. However, the allegation of a controlled coup implies that there is a force that commands and there is another force that is being commanded. Those who make this allegation aren’t overt about what they are saying. Yet, it is clear that they are claiming the coup was commanded by President Erdoğan and that the commanded forces were Gülenists. This is an irrational suggestion, as the coup targeted President Erdoğan. It’s not a secret that FETO is hostile to Erdoğan; the organization’s leader and members have been very clear about this. Would an organization hostile to Erdoğan submit their forces to him and allow him to mastermind a coup for his own benefit? Secondly, in order to support this allegation, you have to establish concrete relations between President Erdoğan and those who administered the coup attempt. As this is impossible and there is no evidence, this theory isn’t even mentioned in the files.

No concrete data, document, information or even suspect statements.

Exactly. Just by considering these two facts, it’s not possible to make such an allegation. They’re just interpreting, so to speak, the outcomes of the coup attempt and this is a faulty approach. Because the coup attempt failed, it has repercussions for the organization. Yet, those who planned this coup didn’t believe it would fail; they believed they would succeed. In this respect, we have to seek an answer for the following question: “If it was successful, who would benefit from it?” On the other hand, some are alleging that it was planned to fail right from the start. This isn’t true, not in any way. Looking at the evidence, we can say that it was a near perfect plan.

There are several factors which made the coup attempt a failure. Firstly, there was intelligence on an operation to the National Intelligence Organization (MİT). This was regarded as part of a larger plan and certain precautions, including flight restrictions, were taken by the General Staff. These precautions caused the putschists to think that the coup was uncovered and they decided to act earlier. The coup that was planned to start at 03:00 was rescheduled to 20:00-21:00. This rescheduling caused issues with the planning and its application.

After these, they failed to capture or kill President Erdoğan along with Prime Minister Yıldırım. In this respect, their failure is due to rescheduling. If the coup started at 03:00, they might’ve been successful. On the other hand, President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Yıldırım calling people to take the streets and resist the putschists was also an important factor. This wouldn’t be possible at 03:00. However, rescheduling the coup caused all plans to go awry for them and they were forced to make new plans. These plans were faulty and caused the failure of the coup. Therefore, claiming that the coup was rigged for failure right from the beginning is nothing but a farce.

Lastly, I want to ask: what should we do to explain the coup attempt trials better both in Turkey and abroad? Also, would you want to add anything?

First of all, as a nation, we have thwarted a serious attack on July 15. Only a few nations could have achieved this. Therefore, we have to be aware of the gravity of what we have achieved. This will allow us to see that we can overpower this organization. The fight against FETO is going well; the possibility of this organization reestablishing itself in Turkey and becoming a threat to our nation and state is largely removed.

Our people shouldn’t despair in this fight. We have achieved great things and I believe these achievements will lead to new achievements for our state and our people. This fight concerns all; it’s not only President Erdoğan’s or the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) cause. Regardless of political outlooks, it’s the fight of all citizens in Turkey. We have to put our differences, ideologies and political outlooks aside. No one should forget that this organization wouldn’t have been allowing any dissidents to exist, if they had been successful.

Since the July 15 coup attempt by FETO, the government of Turkey has cracked down on fighting against this terrorism and ensuring that the state bureaucracy is free from such ideologies.

The defeated coup attempt, orchestrated by the Fetullah Gulen cult, left 250 people martyred and nearly 2,200 injured.

In its attempt to demolish such terrorism, Turkey has received support from the United Kingdom, as the British government stated that Turkish authorities have a right to act against suspected perpetrators of last years defeated coup attempt.

While the German government has provided asylum to those escaping facing judicial trial in Turkey, the UK Foreign Affairs Committee underlined that “the Turkish government has a right and responsibility to act against the suspected perpetrators of the coup attempt and also against those who have committed or are planning terrorist acts.”

More, the Committee stated that “we recognize the difficulty of tackling the networks of secretive organizations, and of tackling terrorism,” highlighting the “importance to safeguards which help uphold international human rights standards and the rule of law.”

The report published by the Committee also supported Turkey’s fight against different terrorist groups, including the PKK and Daesh.

“PKK terrorist attacks, and the PKK’s decision to take fighting to the towns and cities of the south-east of Turkey in 2016 show callous disregard for human life and wellbeing,” the report said.

Upholding Turkey’s sovereignty, the report added that “Turkey has a legitimate right to defend itself against this appalling violence.”

The elimination of FETO in Africa

While the fight against FETO has received support from the UK, the Turkish government has increased its will to destroy the terrorist organization overseas.

In an attempt to ensure that the FETO-linked schools in countries all over the world do not continue to contribute to the acts of terrorism, the Maarif Foundation was established.

The Foundation has been tasked to take over schools abroad operated by FETO following last year’s coup attempt.

Member of the Board of Directors of the Maarif Foundation, Dr. Hasan Yavuz, stated that there are FETO-linked schools in 36 of 54 countries across Africa, noting that the foundation has completely taken over schools in five countries.

Yavuz also mentioned that further agreements have been made with 14 countries in order to transfer the schools, and that negotiations are in progress with 7 other countries in the continent.

9 FETO-linked schools in Guinea with 1,000 students were the first to be transferred to the foundation.

Talks are also to be held with officials in Equatorial Guinea, Comoros Islands, the Seychelles and Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi in this regard.

On 15^th of July 2016, a coup attempt was foiled in Turkey that was allegedly carried out by the Fetullah Gülen Terrror Group (FETO), led by Fetullah Gülen, the cult leader living in the US. Indeed, the group’s bad record on democracy is not new. Previously Gülen had openly supported the September 12, 1980 military coup with his article “Son Karakol” (“The Last Outpost”) published in the Sızıntı Magazine on October 1, 1980 – the first FETO publication that began in 1979. During the post-modern military coup of February 28, 1997, which targeted Necmettin Erbakan, the Prime Minister of Turkey and the leader of the Welfare Party, Gülen presented the pro-military Hürriyet daily with the headline: “You botched, just submit”. However, this attitude was interpreted by many as an effort by the group to establish a good relationship with the “real” authority in the country, rather than interpreting it as a sign of the group’s tendency to overtake the whole military institution to rule over the country. The group was going to try a military coup nearly two decades after, but this time by themselves.

During the coup attempt, FETO employed its civil administrators, called imams, who functioned under a strict organizational hierarchy that enabled them to exercise effective control over its affiliated state personnel. These imams were appointed as supervisors to various judges, prosecutors, military and police officers, who submitted to their commands. Hierarchical statuses of imams over these personnel were determined according to their closeness to Fetullah Gülen, to whom supernatural powers were attributed.

The Role of Civil Administrators in the Planning of the Coup

The most extensive indictment on the July 15 coup attempt, the Akıncı Indictment classifies the civilians at the Akıncı Airbase, the headquarters of the coup attempt, into two categories: “Civilian Suspects” and “Civilian Administrator Suspects”. Fetullah Gülen, Adil Öksüz, Kemal Batmaz, Hakan Çiçek, Nurettin Oruç and Harun Biniş are named as civil administrator suspects. Civil administrator suspects were caught together with the military personnel at the Akıncı Airbase on the morning of July 16, 2016.

These figures were caught on security footage and there are testimonies about their presence at the airbase. They are purported to have dictated who was going where, which actions were to be taken and which targets were to be attacked with helicopters and warplanes carrying high-ranking officers at the mess of the 143^rd Fleet at Akıncı Airbase. Hakan Çiçek, a suspect, has accepted that he was present at Akıncı Airbase, claiming that he was invited there for a social event by Commander Ahmet Özçetin, who is another suspect of this case. According to the indictment, they were actively involved in the preparation of the coup.

Testimonies recorded in the indictments state that the coup was planned at secret meetings led by Adil Öksüz, who was to inform Gülen about these meetings. Öksüz is claimed to have organized meetings abroad as well. Along with confessions and testimonies, the embankment analysis and flight records of Öksüz support these claims. Adil Öksüz is among the most prominent names in FETO and among the closest persons to Gülen. Demonstrating their relationship, investigations have revealed that there is footage in which Öksüz was sitting in Gülen’s chair, with a group of children as an audience.

http://thenewturkey.org/evidences-in-feto-indictments/

Deeming the November 1 election results as a threat to their existence, FETO rented a three-story villa in Konutkent, Ankara through the Empati Consultancy Company on November 9, 2015. According to witness statements in the indictments, coup preparation meetings were held at this house with the participation of FETO-affiliated Turkish Armed Forces officers on the following dates: December 27, 2015; January 9, 2016; January 16, 2016; January 30, 2016; February 20, 2016; February 29, 2016; March 14, 2016; March 30, 2016; May 5, 2016; May 27, 2016; June 4, 2016; June 15, 2016.

Attending the last meeting on July 9, 2016, Lieutenant Colonel Turgay Sökmen asserted that “a coup preparation with the participation of all forces was underway, that he would continue his work where he was going and that there weren’t any issues”. Öksüz led the prayer before the meeting and spoke on religious subjects. In one of his speeches, he said that “one of the first things to do on July 15 was to free [FETO] members out of the prisons they are incarcerated with the forces that was tasked with this duty”. In another speech, he said “my friends, I have just spoken with our elder [Fetullah Gülen], he sends his regards to all of you. I will be leaving for Istanbul on Saturday or Sunday and then will go abroad. If everything is fine, I will be seeing our elder on Tuesday and will return here on Wednesday or Thursday”.

Rear Admiral Halil İbrahim Yıldız, talking about the same meetings, said that there were some preparation meetings in Ankara and that Northern Sea Area Commander Read Admiral Ömer Faruk Harmancık told him that there was an almost-finished coup plan. Moreover, Harmancık told Yıldız that the plan was to be carried out on either July 15 or 22. According to Yıldız’s statements, during the meeting that Öksüz was present, it was asserted that the coup would take place after 03:00 o’clock. After this, Harmancık told Öksüz that everything was ready and Öksüz suggested he go to the US in order to show the coup plan to Fetullah Gülen in person. There are many testimonies and statements from both suspects and witnesses validating the roles of FETO member civil administrators during the coup preparation process.

Three Important Trips Abroad

There are three important trips abroad by civilian suspects at the same date during the process of preparation for the coup. Suspect Harun Biniş was unable to make these trips as he was being tried at the Ankara 2^nd Heavy Penal Court under the charge of illegal wiretapping for FETO/Paralel Devlet Yapılanması (PDY).

The first trip was undertaken when Öksüz, after the first coup preparation meeting on December 27, 2015, travelled to the United Kingdom on December 31. It seems that Batmaz was also in the UK, meanwhile, Hakan Çiçek and Nurettin Oruç were in Germany at that time. It is possible to surmise that they were feeling the pulse of FETO members in other countries right after the coup preparation meeting.

Secondly, after the meeting on March 14, 2016, there was a trip abroad between March 17-21, 2016. Besides FETO administrators Öksüz, Oruç, Çiçek and Batmaz, the highest-ranking suspect General Akın Öztürk’s son-in-law Lieutenant Colonel Hakan Karakuş also joined this travel. Following this travel to the US, it was observed that on the very same day, March 21, 2016, Gülen wore a khaki robe reminiscent of military uniforms and relayed the information on the coup with a secret message embedded in his statement published on the website www.herkul.org

http://thenewturkey.org/the-gulen-cult-between-modernism-and-narcissism/

Lastly, two days before the coup attempt, between July 11 and 13, Batmaz and Öksüz travelled to the US on the same plane. This travel is confirmed by entrance-exit analysis and flight records, and it was right before the coup took place. Witness statements assert that the date and hour of the coup approved by Gülen was at 03:00 on July 16. Plane tickets and the security footage also confirm this.

Beside these three important trips, Batmaz has 9 trips coinciding with other coup suspects and 7 of them with Adil Öksüz. Moreover, all civil administrator suspects, including Batmaz, claim that they do not know each other and that this is nothing but a coincidence. This is believed to have been a common tactic utilized by the accused suspects to hide their links to the organization.

Indeed, the footage of Batmaz and Öksüz at the airport two days before the coup shows the following: Batmaz leaving the plane and waiting for Öksüz to leave the plane, then both come together and Batmaz coming towards Öksüz while Öksüz is checking his baggage, talking with each other while walking, Batmaz looking at his back (probably to check whether they are being followed), exiting the airport and walking across the road together. Yet, even though Batmaz accepts that it is him on the footage, he claims he does not know Öksüz; moreover, he states that he does not remember some 925 phone calls he had with Adil Öksüz.

The trips, relationships, meetings and other evidence are strong enough to prove FETO members’ finger in the coup attempt, whereas the false denials of this evidence just functions as another form of evidence, which shows how the group members still continue to utilize a common tactic to escape punishment.

While the July 15 coup attempt and the immediate aftermath produced a unified synergy in favor of democracy, in the year since then this has not been the case. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) in particular initially stated they were against all kinds of coups, yet lately they have made certain unjustifiable allegations that could cast a shadow on the process of uncovering the truth about the night of July 15, 2016.

The most obvious indication of a unified anti-coup synergy was the spontaneous reaction by Turkish politicians on July 15 and July 16, and the Yenikapı Demonstration on August 7. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım and the Chairman of Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Devlet Bahçeli announced that they were never-ending advocators of democracy in all circumstances. CHP Chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu also made similar strong statements against the coup attempt. The main catalyst for this active resistance against the coup attempt was in fact the message conveyed by President Erdoğan via Face Time that night, when he called for a unified national reaction.

The next day, all politicians formed a more unified nationalist stance against the coup attempt. Chief of the General Staff Hulusi Akar too attended parliament at the moment, and was an indispensable component of this anti-coup bloc. In the session, the Chief of the Parliament İsmail Kahraman said “our national anthem is our manifesto and we are all united nation.” Prime Minister Yıldırım said “all those who are involved in the coup attempt are traitors, regardless of their military ranks” after thanking all political politicians for their support. Kılıçdaroğlu said “this is definitely a coup attempt against our Republic and our traditions.” Bahçeli too said that “with the coup attempt, coup collaborators embedded into the Turkish army were identified and clarified.” HDP Chairman Selahattin Demirtaş was not able to attend the parliamentary talks as he was out of the Ankara; however, HDP spokesman İdris Baluken asserted that they were against all kinds of military coups.

The most critical aspects of a joint declaration passed then by the four political parties’ was: “the condemnation of the coup attack against the people and the parliament” and “the protection of the national will by four main political parties in spite of their political differences.” Namely, high political tension among political parties before the coup attempt transformed into a unified national stance against the coup, especially in the first days.

In this atmosphere, the Yenikapı bloc was formed not only by political parties but also by the people, who came from various ideological segments of the society. The most prominent aspect of the Yenikapı bloc was the sharp stance against all kinds of coups and a clarity about the identities and aims of the perpetrators. A national stance, one that included the cooperation of civil and military institutions, soon emerged against FETO, whose mafia-like organization and illegal actions were uncovered. Unfortunately, this unity started to crumble in a short period of time. After the national declaration at the parliament, politicians reiterated anti-coup messages for days; however, the CHP and HDP’s hesitant disposition in this matter distanced them from their initial political reflexes.

The Yenikapı Demonstration on August 7 was organized as the second platform to demonstrate national unity against the coup attempt, after the first one in parliament on July 16. Yet, the HDP was the first to stay out of this second unified platform. Demirtaş made unjustifiable accusations about the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) involvement in the coup, both while he was in Turkey and abroad. Hence, the HDP once again fell into the trap of illegal activities, just like it had with its treatment of Kurdish politics, with its disposition towards the coup attempt. Idris Baluken’s tweet: “AKP-CHP-MHP partnership isn’t new; it’s an alliance against Kurds since June 7 with the excuse of the survival of the state and fight against terrorism” was the confirmation and declaration of the HDP’s excluding itself from the anti-coup alliance. The HDP’s absence at the Yenikapı Demonstration was also a sign of their unsustainable image in the new path of Turkish politics.

On the other hand, the CHP Chairman Kılıçdaroğlu declined to attend the Yenikapı Demonstration initially, saying “Erdoğan tried to increase his political influence on the people through criticizing the opposition party.” However, after Erdoğan and Yıldırım’s insistence, the CHP chairman changed his mind saying “we will attend the Yenikapı demonstration for the same reason we were at the parliament on the night of the coup attempt.” At the same time, he underlined that he would continue to be a legal part of the Turkish politics by accepting the invitation. The MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli announced that they were against the coup attempt, and beyond taking part in the demonstration, they also supported the government in these difficult days without wavering.  Bahçeli maintained his stable political stance behind the AK Party during the Yenikapı Demonstration and during the constitutional referendum campaign. The MHP saw itself as an important proponent of the political and institutional change the AK Party wanted to see in Turkey.

As a part of his “No” campaign in the lead up to the 16 April referendum, and a part of his general “anti-Erdoğan” campaign, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu tried again to discuss unproven speculative details of the coup attempt in the public sphere and thus he took unexpected risks both socially and politically. CHP politicians abused clear evidences of the coup attempt for their inter-party politics. By reiterating claims first made by Fetullah Gülen that “the coup was planned and controlled,” the CHP’s view converged with that of FETO.

These statements by Kılıçdaroğlu became a signal of just how marginalized he had become from the national political scene. In order to counteract Erdoğan’s politics, Kılıçdaroğlu started to voice uncertain statements that downplayed the treacherous and violent aspects of the coup attempt. Abstaining from the anti-coup bloc thus was a calculated political mistake, and the balance of national unity was tipped against the HDP and CHP politicians who involved themselves in that alliance.

In the CHP’s report on the July 15 Coup Attempt, the expression “controlled coup” was reiterated. These implications and disinformation about the coup attempt have created a controversial discourse that is also harmful to the fight against these kinds of illegal bloody attacks. In any case, these allegations circulated by the CHP did not bear fruit, and were seen by the public as more attempts by the party to criticize the AK Party’s policies.

What is being done by the CHP and HDP is actually an attempt to downplay the government’s success in thwarting the coup attempt through inter-party political quarrels. Ultimately, the CHP’s allegation that the government – which was in fact the main target of the coup attempt – was responsible for July 15 was viewed by the people as simply a part of the party’s constricted politics.

On the anniversary of the July 15 coup attempt, I have talked with a couple of young people of different socio-cultural and economic backgrounds, about their perception of the coup attempt and the post July 15th process. Before I present their perception and opinions, I have to confess the social scientists’, including me, misinterpretation about the sociology of youth in Turkey.

The crisis of belonging and selfishness are the common problems among young people in almost all countries in the world. This crisis brings the isolated and individualist or self-absorbed personalities obsessed with consumption, self-exposure, etc. Until last year, almost all social scientists in Turkey had the same opinion about the youth of Turkey that they are very apolitical, detached from all kinds of political world views, selfish, overconfident and conformist. However, on the night of the 15th July, the youth of Turkey shifted these perceptions and evaluations; thousands of young people were in the streets to stand against the coup attempt even though they had never experienced a coup before.

What was the coup about? Why did parts of the army occupy streets and what was their final purpose? Although they had so many questions in their minds, they were in the streets with their parents; they learned the answers to all of these questions through what they had seen in the streets. They saw real weapons, real tanks and real F-16 warplanes up close. They were eyewitnesses to hundreds of casualties and murders. Some of them were also wounded and even murdered by some soldiers firing bullets and dropping bombs from the F-16s. Mahir, Abdullah Tayyip, Mehmet Ali, Batuhan and many other young martyrs who were shot dead that night showed us how to re-read the sociology properly.

Today one year has passed since the coup attempt, and the perception and opinions of young people are very valuable to analyze the past year. Firstly, they witnessed one of the most important turning points in Turkey’s history and they consider themselves a bit lucky for experiencing this extraordinary event.

The reason for that is they think that we haven’t completely analyzed the background of this treacherous night yet. Within this context they naturally have some concerns about their future. “We feel the shadow of the future,” a young man puts it blankly. An 18-year-old university student says: “We know the murderer very well but not the contributors.” A 16-year-old high school student says that he saw the tip of the iceberg on that day and other ways of carrying out a coup might not be unlikely. The young interviewees add that the putschists’ mentality might still be alive in Turkey and FETÖ may use alternative sophisticated techniques to perpetrate a new attempt to overthrow the government.

For several decades FETÖ leaders tried to transform young people into the profile they wish. This profile is very submissive and not supposed to have any kind of critical thinking. According to the young people I talked with, this logic of FETÖ is not accidental; they used to train or create their own so-called “soldiers without any identity or belonging. No room for family or real identities was left to these young minds.

This young generation is very open to different societal experiences but very soon feel skeptical. “We do not want any kind of dystopia created by the events of July 15th” a 23-year-old teacher explains. The question that we have to ask ourselves is how we, as a society in general, prepare the youth in this uncertain phase? The issue is straightforward: it can be explained in simple terms. They do not want to be the object of any kind of ideology or belief and they have the self-imagination of being free subjects.

The Need for A Positive Agenda

Finally, I asked them about their views on the post July 15th period, the state of emergency and generally the current situation of Turkey. Most of them think that just a year is too short to understand and analyze the complexities of the July 15th events. Because of the fact that the coup attempt has been very complicated and multi-factored, the analyses have to be made in a cautious way.

However, the young men and women underline the significance that the whole investigative processes should be kept up fairly in the spirit of justice and the rule of law. The trials of the perpetrators and the suspects should not harm the legitimacy of civil resistance and should not hijack the July 15th resistance. “We have a great potential to tackle all the grave problems created by previous generations. But from now on we need a positive agenda,” a 19-year-old Kurdish university student says. “We do not want to be the part of a hurried culture or hurried politics,” a 15-year-old female Imam Hatip High School student expresses.

They are seeking alternatives. It signifies entirely different sets of youth policies in Turkey. The most important determinant of this demand is by far the aspect of education. But what kind of education are we talking about? A 21-year-old law school student summarizes it for us: “we don’t want any academic junk food; we demand real education!” Besides education, they demand a moral community in which they could find role models to follow.

Some young people think that there is a dearth of real role models in this period when they especially need it much more than ever before. In their opinions, if we cannot take a positive agenda serious, on the contrary a lot of individualism, atomization and fragmentation of societal ties will be the result instead of a desired sensitivity and compassion to function as main motives for the next generations. And if individualization and fragmentation of societal ties would be the outcome, a civil resistance against another July 15th like attempt could be difficult to imagine.

Turkish Interuniversity Board (ÜAK) strongly condemns the recent coup attempt to overthrow the democratically elected and legitimate Government of Turkey. Serving as an active voice of freedom and democracy, all our universities stand against this unacceptable and shameful attempt against our national will and our parliamentary democracy, the rule of law and freedom. Remembering the devastation in our recent history caused by the previous coups, we also invite all academics and students in the world to stand against this attempt.

Please note that the authorities are now in full control of the unwelcome attempt to depose The Grand National Assembly and overthrow the legal government in Turkey, and that all educational institutions, including universities, academies, community and vocational colleges and related educational establishments thereof are open and freely functioning.

We urge our international colleagues not to allow Islamophobia to cloud their judgments and acknowledge that we all members of Interuniversity Board of Turkey involving all rectors, fully support Turkish Grand National Assembly, its elected representatives of all political parties and endorse peoples’ resistance to the anti-democratic coup d’état attempt.

Interuniversity Board of Turkey

 

When the international responses to the democracy-suspending coups staged throughout Turkey’s political history are considered, the initial silence of the Western democracies in the face of the July 15 attempted coup makes more sense. Particularly in the context of the coups staged in May 27, 1960, March 12, 1971 and September 12, 1980, the policies adopted by the Western democracies stand out as evidence proving that they were defeated by the pragmatism of liberal democracy’s rhetoric of values.

In the aftermath of the 1960 coup, a number of prominent Western media outlets including New York Times, Le Monde, Wall Street Journal, Time, Die Welt, and BBC endeavored to convince their audience to the notion that the coup could be justified for some reasons while encouraging their governments to get in contact with the putschists.

Undeniably, the Turkish intelligentsia who were alienated from their own values and disturbed by then Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and ruling Democrat Party (DP) also contributed to such reflections of the coup in the Western media. Having received a negative response only from the French government among the European countries, the putschists achieved to make themselves accepted in the international arena with the support of the U.S. While Turkey’s dialogue with the European Community (EC) went on following the coup, the pro-Western statements of the putschists regarding NATO and the EC sufficed to convince the Western public opinion.

The West’s efforts to develop ties with the junta by condoning and almost affirming the 1960 coup also fomented the following coups. From 1960 to the end of the Cold War, the coup plotters did not confront any problem of legitimacy in the international arena due to the U.S.’s containment policy towards Russia and strategy of keeping Turkey by its side. Except for some weak protests, tepid condemnations and exceptional and insubstantial sanctions, the juntas in Turkey have always been affirmed by the Western liberal democracies.

Right after the first post-coup contact between then U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Fletcher Warren and the 1960 coup leader Cemal Gürsel, Washington provided financial aid to the junta, which pointed to the hasty demeanor of the U.S. Besides, barely two months passed since the 1960 coup when the U.S. deployed Jupiter ballistic missiles in Turkey against Russia, which was another sign of the volition of cooperation between the junta and the U.S. government.

The U.S. government’s approach to the 1960 coup in Turkey shows a great parallelism with the Obama administration’s approach to the 2013 Egyptian coup staged by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. As can be seen in the coup cases of 1960 Turkey and 2013 Egypt, the first coups staged against the governments formed as a result of free and transparent elections in developing democracies have been accepted as restoration, institutionalization and incorporation of democracy by the U.S. All kinds of support have been provided to military junta regimes including international recognition and financial aid.

The coup on March 12, 1971 was staged shortly after the White House exerted pressures on Süleyman Demirel’s government with regard to opium production, which showed that the approach of the U.S. to the 1960 coup was carried one step further. The junta administration chaired by Nihat Erim, who was assigned by the putschists, won the approval of Washington by banning opium production as requested by the U.S. In so doing, the junta gained legitimacy in the West.

As for the coup staged on September 12, 1980, no change was observed in the approaches of the U.S. and other Western democracies to the junta. It is a widely known anecdote that then CIA station chief in Turkey Paul B. Henze was rumored to have said: “Our boys have done it,” to then U.S. President Jimmy Carter while mentioning the 1980 coup. Although Henze denied saying so after 27 years from the incident in an attempt to recover his public image as a coup advocate, it is a general acceptance among political observers that the White House played a role in the 1980 coup. In view of the increasing influence of Russia in the region after the coup, a strategy was adopted to consolidate Turkey’s position as a U.S. ally.

The U.S.’s supportive attitude to the coups in Turkey has been a determinant in the international arena. Being aware of this factor, the coup plotters endeavored to receive the U.S. support before or during their coup attempts.

Therefore, the U.S. approach to the July 15 coup attempt is required to be examined in detail.

US Response to July 15 Coup Attempt

In the night of July 15, 2016, when it was understood that the military troops’ presence on the streets signalized a coup attempt, the first statement from the U.S. was issued by then Secretary of State John Kerry, who was in Russia in the meantime. After Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım spoke to a live TV broadcast at 11.05 p.m. and stated that there was a military insurrection that would not be allowed by the government, Kerry said at 11.57 p.m.: “I hope there will be stability and peace and continuity within Turkey.”

Stating that he was not informed on what exactly was happening in Turkey, Kerry chose not to articulate any expression showing support to the democratically elected government. While Kerry was issuing this statement, international TV stations had already begun to announce that a coup was being staged in Turkey. During the moments when the coup attempters shot and killed civilians, the U.S. administration continued to watch the incidents in a complete silence.

Retreating into silence and searching for a new position following Kerry’s “peace, stability and continuity” message, the U.S. gave the impression that they were disappointed since the “peace, stability and continuity” message that was issued at 11.57 p.m. would have meant something had the coup attempt succeeded. The timing of this message, which was issued while the elected government was not yet suppressed by the putschists and the government authorities kept resisting, passed into the history of U.S. diplomacy and democracy as a disgrace.

While Kerry’s statement encouraged the coup attempters even more, a number of senior diplomats representing Turkey called their counterparts at the U.S. Embassy and the White House to point out that such a statement was unacceptable. Highlighting that this statement of Washington, which did not give any support to the government, could be read as a support to the coup plotters, they asked the U.S. government to issue a statement siding with democracy.

In the statements, he issued to the international media outlets, Presidential Spokesperson İbrahim Kalın called the allies of Turkey to stand up against the coup attempt. Yet, those calls were not adequately answered by the U.S. administration.

At 12.13 a.m. in that night, a declaration by pro-coup soldiers was read at the TRT, claiming they had taken control of the country. The declaration stressed on the relations with NATO and reassured about the duties and commitments as part of the NATO alliance. The U.S. gave its next response when the TRT was taken over by the putschists.

The statement made on the White House’s official Twitter account only expressed that the incidents in Turkey were closely followed and President Obama was informed on the subject. It was 12.17 a.m. when the White House issued this statement. Only six minutes after this statement, a substantial move that turned the tables came from President Erdoğan. At 12.26 a.m., Erdoğan called people to take to the streets and resist the coup attempt. Upon that, people started pouring into streets to defy the insurrection, which was not foreseen by the coup plotters.

Within minutes, the putschists began to retreat in the face of the determined resistance of citizens. As from 02.00 a.m., the pro-coup troops were started to be detained. The first supportive statement from the U.S. was issued when it became obvious that the coup attempt would be foiled. At 02.05 a.m., the White House called authorities to support the elected government. But the word “coup” was abstained in the statement.

The U.S. only took a clear stance upon the failure of the coup attempt. Kerry stated on July 16 that he had a phone conversation with Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, adding that the U.S. provided full support to the democratically elected government and its democratic establishments. The U.S. officials preferred to issue statements that were supportive of the elected government by abstaining from using the word “coup”.

Given that the U.S. had also refused to call the Egyptian coup a coup, Washington gave the initial signals that they would adopt a strategy similar to their stance on the Egyptian coup with regard to the July 15. On July 24, 2016, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden paid a visit to Turkey to restore the damage of the policy Washington adopted in the coup night. Expressing that he stands for democracy and admires the resistance of Turkish people, Biden remarked that he was moved by the leadership and courage displayed by President Erdoğan during the night of the coup attempt.

During his visit, Biden underscored several times that the U.S. did not side with the coup, which might mean that the White House felt an embarrassment over its reticence in the night of July 15. The U.S. Vice President’s remarks that condemned the coup attempt and praised the resistance for democracy will pass into the history of Turkey-U.S. relations as trivia. On the other hand, Washington’s first statement during the night of the coup attempt will always be remembered: “We hope stability and peace and continuity.”

While theoreticians, who analyze world politics through media continue to guess what will happen throughout the year by looking at the New Year’s cover of The Economist, another magazine has been clearly conveying the developments to its readers without any encoded messages by events and people put on the cover. Considering the closest ones to home, this magazine covered many topics ranging from the headscarf discussions to Naim Süleymanoğlu’s success at the Olympic Games after filtering them through an American and Western perspective.

The New York-based magazine registered as TIME started to be published weekly in 1923, later spreading to Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia, South Pacific and South America over the years. The only constants of the magazine were its publication language being English and foretelling the future through local and international events or figures that were put on to the cover.

While Charlie Chaplin who made it to the cover in 1925 became a leading force in cinema, Mahatma Gandhi who was on a 1931 cover of the magazine became a world-renowned figure in the following years. Similarly, TIME had put Nazi Germany’s Commander of the Naval Forces Erich Raeder on its cover in 1942 and touched on his passive nature and military blunders. Raeder resigned from his post the following year; “he had no idea about submarine warfare. He never cared about it. He was obsessed with ships; yet, he failed to equip them with a substantial air force. He probably was the weakest link of the Nazi Army” were some of the comments that continued to haunt Raeder for many more years. Talking about the future of computers in 1983 and covering the internet in 1990s, the magazine was the most prominent conveyor of political developments.

Leaders deemed authoritarian by TIME were deposed via coups

Putting coups carried out in many countries to its cover, the magazine came to be known as a “coup-loving” publication because of its disposition towards the events. The 1953 Iran, 1954 Panama and 1973 Chile coups were all narrated as the fall of a dictator and the victory of the public.

TIME never skipped the coups in Turkey, as well. While the magazine is mostly known for its cover with Kenan Evren and the caption “Holding Turkey Together,” this wasn’t the first such incident at TIME.

In 1958, Adnan Menderes was put on the cover with the caption “Turkey’s Premier Menderes.” The magazine wrote the following about Menderes: “With his every year in office, Menderes has become more autocratic, more sensitive to criticism. Striking out in fury at anyone questioning his policies, he has half smothered both the press and opposition political parties under a blanket of repressive legislation.” Analogous to Menderes, Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh prior to the 1953 coup, Guatemala’s President Jacobo Arbenz prior to the 1954 coup and Chile’s President Salvador Allende prior to the 1973 coup were all put on the cover of TIME, while being mentioned in news pieces as “once democrats who resorted to authoritarianism.”

The Army is responsible for upholding the constitution

While it was not on the covers, the coup of May 27 1960 found itself a place in the magazine. Using a photograph which had a group of people celebrating the coup, TIME was justifying the coup with the following passage: “The Turkish army has long scrupulously observed the admonition of the late great Kemal Ataturk that the army should stay out of partisan politics. But it also remembered that Ataturk charged it with guarding the constitution.”

Kenan Evren: Holding Turkey Together

The coup of September 12 1980 was welcomed in the US with the exclamatory expression “our boys did it.” On the covers of TIME‘s Europe, Asia and South Pacific editions of September 29 1980 issue, there was the photograph of Kenan Evren. On the eight page, in a long feature article titled “Holding Turkey Together”, the events leading to the coup and Kenan Evren himself were extracted. The coup was mentioned in the following way:

“After months of rising terrorism by both the extreme left and extreme right, the country allowed itself to settle into a state of unaccustomed relaxation. Civilians waved at tanks rumbling through the streets of Istanbul. Automobile drivers shook hands with soldiers who manned the roadblocks. Storekeepers raised their bombproof shutters for the first time in months, and restaurants began to fill up again in the evenings. Some city dwellers looked far trimmer than usual, simply because they no longer packed pistols inside their coats or waistbands.”

February 28: “Military Sacked Erbakan”

TIME had signaled the postmodern coup of February 28 1997 from the very first days of the Welfare Party. Publishing an article titled “Secular State Suspended?” when the party came into power, the magazine was almost conveying the message “how could you allow such a government” as Necmettin Erbakan’s to the Turkish army. “He [Erbakan] is a populist, pro-Islamic politician whose party did not field a single female candidate in the last elections […] Last week Erbakan became the head of the first Islamist-majority coalition government in Turkey since Kemal Ataturk declared it a secular state in 1923,” wrote TIME.

Not pondering on the decisions of February 28, TIME had praised Mesut Yılmaz who became the prime minister after Welfare Party’s coalition was deposed by the military with an article titled “Mr. Secular”: “Turkish military believes that it is better to be sad than sorry in terms of Turkey’s secular future. President Süleyman Demirel becoming the chair of NATO member countries and Mesut Yılmaz, the leader of the lesser opposition party with 129 seats in a parliament of 550, becoming the prime minister verifies the military’s approach. While some argue that Yılmaz lacks the political mediation skills to form a sustainable government, his decision to withdraw from Libya and his stance against the rise of Islamic fundamentalism dissipate the suspicions. After all, the military sacked Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan for doing the opposite of the said decisions. Moreover, NATO will also love Yılmaz for taking these decisions.”

Perspective on April 27 E-Memorandum: “AK Party is a threat to the public”

TIME‘s comment on the e-memorandum of April 27 2007 was the following: “Military has always been a strong political actor in Turkey and it has carried out four coups against those threatening the country’s secular system since 1950. In 2007, the military published a concealed threat which led to snap elections. Practices like singing hymns in schools instead of mosques and organizing Holy Quran recitation competitions on April 23 which were introduced by the AK Party government were always seen as a threat to the very existence of the republic by the military.

Expediting the crisis by writing a condemning declaration against the ruling party electing the president, the military expected the Turkish voters agree with the generals’ view that pro-Islamic AK Party is a threat to the nation. With the coup attempt that will go down in history as e-memorandum, they hoped to sway the minds of the people as they did before. They aimed to force the AK Party to form a coalition, causing them to share the power.”

On July 15: Cemal Gürsel brought democracy

The coup attempt of July 15 was also covered by TIME and articles praising the previous coups in Turkey were being published on the magazine’s website while the coup was still going on. The article written by Lily Rothman was adding insult to injury even before the people were able to thwart the coup: “In that 1960 coup, General Cemal Gursel was named President, Premier and Defense Minister, leaving the world with hopes that the nation was on its way back to true democracy. It would only be eleven years, however, before a group of military leaders handed a radio newscaster a memorandum to read out loud, telling the people of Turkey that the government had once again ‘pushed our country into anarchy, fratricide and social and economic unrest’ and thus ‘the Turkish armed forces, fulfilling their legal duty to protect the republic, will take power.'”

“The country resists an attempted coup, but the worst could be yet to come”

Even before the coup was over, the magazine was praising the perpetrators and the coup itself. When the coup was thwarted, the first issue of TIME published after the coup included a photograph of Turkish people resisting the coup accompanied by the title “Turkey’s Longest Night”. In the subtitle, however, it was noted that “The country resists an attempted coup, but the worst could be yet to come.” The magazine referred to the coup as an “amateurish attempt.”

While President Erdoğan was described as oppressive, the magazine also argued that there were people in Turkey who wanted the army, the protector of the republic, to take action. The subtitle “the worst could be yet to come” was interpreted as Turkey entering a political deadlock and hinting that increasing polarization might create an armed conflict among the people.

Yet once again, TIME had sided itself with a coup. After all, Erdoğan had made it to the cover of the magazine even two years before the December 17-25 incidents, which acted as a precursor to the coup, and was criticized for allegedly becoming an autocrat.

TIME, praising all the military coups that happened since May 14 1950, Turkey’s transition into multiparty system, seized the opportunity to celebrate the July 15 coup perpetrated by FETÖ, not breaking with its tradition. Even after the coup attempt was thwarted by the people, the magazine continued to publish many articles that implied if the coup was successful, it would be better for Turkey, consolidating its putschist position.

Conducted by the Ankara 17th Heavy Penal Court and known to the public as “the July 15 coup attempt lawsuit” or “General Staff main lawsuit”, the first hearing of the case commenced on May 22. Defendants’ defenses are being heard in subsequent sessions. Similarly, “the main coup trials” were commenced in Istanbul on May 29. As the defense was covered by the media, Chief of Staff Hulusi Akar submitted a statement to the Parliament’s Coup Inquiry Commission, and the National Intelligence Organization’s (MİT) revealed the July 15 Coup Report to the public, making it the hottest topic of June.

Meanwhile, Parliament’s Coup Inquiry Commission also revealed its report and the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) prepared a 300 page long comment on the said report. While the CHP doesn’t clearly contest the idea that the coup was perpetrated by FETÖ, the main opposition party continued to allege that “the July 15 coup attempt was a foreseen, but an unavoidable coup that was controlled for an outcome.” Considering that the trials are at full throttle and the anniversary of the coup is drawing closer, it could easily be said that these discussions will become increasingly heated.

The Fight against FETÖ/PDY after July 15

Before talking about the course of cases and the prominent parts of indictments and defenses, it would be more beneficial to provide some information about the judiciary’s fight against FETÖ/PDY and the July 15 coup attempt. Firstly, it should be noted that the judicial process and trials against FETÖ/PDY had commenced prior to July 15. A day before the coup attempt, the joint indictment was completed and was accepted by the Ankara Heavy Penal Court. Moreover, new cases against FETÖ/PDY were opened in almost all cities and districts of Turkey.

Although the figures change by the day, according to the statement of Minister of Justice Bekir Bozdağ, today more than 160,000 people are part of these trials; 50,402 of them have been arrested, while 47,136 people were released under judicial control. 7,963 people were first detained and later were released. Civil servants like judges, prosecutors, military personnel and police officers constitute the majority of those who are arrested.

Besides these court cases against FETÖ, there are numerous cases and inquiries directly concerning the July 15 coup attempt. Among these cases, the most prominent one is the class action lawsuit against 221 suspects, including some members of the Peace at Home Council, on the events that took place at the General Staff Compound in Ankara. On the other hand, the case on the events which transpired at the Akıncı Airbase, the case on the attempted assassination of President Erdoğan in Muğla, and the case on the coup in Istanbul are other prominent class action lawsuits related to the coup attempt. There are also separate cases opened for each individual incident in cities like Ankara, Istanbul, Malatya, Diyarbakır, Sakarya, Kars, Ardahan, Edirne, Kocaeli, Manisa, Isparta and Şırnak. Therefore, the cases on the coup and FETÖ/PDY are being conducted simultaneously from two channels.

The indictments and evidence of prominent court cases in Ankara and Istanbul came to be known by the public and defendants’ defenses are being covered by the media. Considering the investigations and the court cases, it can be said that the judiciary is conducting challenging lawsuits with a superhuman effort. The challenge is twofold; while FETÖ/PDY’s emphasis on secrecy is one side of the problem, the other is the loss of personnel in the judiciary following the July 15 coup attempt. Almost one third of judges and prosecutors, amounting to around 4,000, were discharged from duty. Despite the gap and the lack in the numbers of senior judges and an ever-increasing work load, the judiciary’s handling of the process is above the standard.

Indictments and FETÖ/PDY’s Defense Strategy

It should be said that the general structure of FETÖ/PDY, their organization within the Turkish Armed Forces and all phases of the coup attempt, along with the perpetrators and their crimes, are mostly identified and clarified. Moreover, some cases are being concluded by now. The first lawsuit to be concluded in Ankara was of the Secretary-General of President Fahri Kasırga’s abduction and the suspect of this case were punished with an aggravated life imprisonment on June 15. On May 27, the first acquittal decision was given in Adıyaman; however, it should be expressed that the Court of Cassation is yet to approve both of these lawsuits.

Regarding the defense strategy, the suspects are acting in unison with a common narrative. Unlike any normal defendants, they are not only trying to save themselves; they are also trying to convey some sort of messages to other FETÖ members and both to the domestic and international public. They are conveying the message that FETÖ members are yet to be deciphered and they are still alive and kicking. They are trying to erase the traces of FETÖ and consolidate the opinion that it was a controlled coup. To achieve their goals, they are rejecting every accusation, with the exception of a few defendants, despite the findings and evidence. Secondly, they are refraining from accusing others. Lastly, they are refraining from mentioning FETÖ as the perpetrator of the coup.

All of the defendants are talking about their past services to the Turkish Armed Forces and their successes, drawing analogies to Ergenekon and Sledgehammer defendants who were victimized by FETÖ and trying to tap into the sympathy that is felt towards the victimized military personnel. Moreover, they are claiming that they aren’t FETÖ members; they are even alleging that they have fought against FETÖ for many years and were victimized by the organization in the past.

Despite being in the middle of the coup, they are refraining from accusing other suspects, and claiming that they have no information about who conducted the coup attempt or implying that the high-ranking officers of the Turkish Armed Forces were behind the coup attempt. Even though rejecting all claims may be considered as a natural reflex, their efforts to save other suspects and whitewash FETÖ are definitely unnatural. Furthermore, there is an impression that the suspects are forming groups and are trying to play certain roles. The common narrative itself indicates the existence of a prepared and orderly organization. Similarly, their leniency to deception and deceit through the distorted understanding of taqiyya also points out the involvement of FETÖ.

Those who are members of the Peace at Home Council and were active in the conducting of the coup are seen to be rejecting physical evidence such as clear recordings, witness testimonies and their confessions at the prosecutors’ office, ridiculing the court itself. Commander of the Akıncı Airbase Hakan Evrim, who was at the base where aircraft lifted off and landed for hours and who saluted FETÖ’s civilian imam Kemal Batmaz, alleges that there wasn’t a coup attempt and that he is not a FETÖ member. Similarly, Sinan Sürer, who fired on civilians entering the General Staff Compound, used ByLock and participated in the coup preparation meetings led by Adil Öksüz, rejects all claims despite recordings and hard evidence, even alleging that the gun he was holding was actually a phone. Former Staff Colonel Doğan Öztürk, on the other hand, asserts that he never saw Deputy Chief of Staff Yaşar Güler on the night of coup, even though he was recorded by security cameras while escorting Güler to the headquarters. There are many other defenses that are in the same vein as these.

It could be said that the main aims of these defenses are to whitewash FETÖ and to consolidate the notion that the coup was actually a ploy or it was a controlled coup attempt. It is clear that they are trying to create a perception in accordance with Fetullah Gülen’s previous claims about the coup. For this reason, they are making statements which accuse high-ranking military officers and the MİT.

With the condition of protecting the rights of defense and fair trial, FETÖ suspects should be barred from managing the judicial process and the public perception. Taking the sensitivities of the public, families of martyrs and veterans into consideration, the suspects must be prevented from showing off; however, legal errors that might cast a shadow on the trials and bring about Turkey’s condemnation at the European Court of Human Rights must be averted. Prejudiced circles and existent negative public opinion should be granted no quarter in this matter.

There is a new trend in the West. It has been a couple of years, I believe. Renowned intellectuals, strategists and media outlets are publishing comments, headlines and academic articles about Turkey and its president without remorse and conscience. They are openly advocating for a military junta over democracy, assassination or execution of a leader over the legitimate change in power.

Last summer, with instructions from Fetullah Gülen, a self-proclaimed scholar who continues to reside in Pennsylvania, US, his infiltrators within the army declared that they were seizing power in order to depose President Erdoğan and the government. While the people of Turkey were bewilderedly watching a presenter trying to read the junta’s coup declaration with hands shaking on TV, all hell was breaking loose on the streets. Bridges in Istanbul were closed and surrounded by military vehicles, meanwhile several police officers had gone up the towers of the bridge and were shooting with sniper rifles.

The sound of tanks moving on main roads, sonic booms of F16s and, gunfire on the streets were all mixed up. Everyone was in terror. Many deputies of both the government and the opposition were trying to survive within the parliament as F16s were dropping bombs on the compound. There also was an assassination attempt on President Erdoğan, who was at a hotel where he spent time with his grandchildren. There was an ongoing clash between the assassination team and presidential bodyguards at the hotel, while the headquarters of the National Intelligence Organization was under attack and the Chief of General Staff was being held as a hostage.

People across Turkey took to the streets and thousands in Ankara and Diyarbakır surrounded garrisons to prevent tanks from going out on the main roads. People tried to stop military vehicles and tanks using unimaginable methods.

Whatever was transpiring definitely was a strange situation. Turkey has experienced several coups; however, this time it felt different. It felt like an invasion, an attempt to colonize Turkey; this was what the majority of the people felt, at least. By dawn, the coup attempt was thwarted. There were lifeless bodies and severed limbs on the streets: the tragic stories of the deaths of hundreds of fathers and sons, siblings who stood side by side. Thousands of men, women, young and elderly were being hurried to hospitals.

Intellectuals infactuated with military juntas and assassinations

While bombs were being dropped and the screams of people reached the heavens, renowned academics in the US were tweeting about the coup attempt as if watching a sports match. For instance, Daniel Pipes wrote “He [Erdoğan] deserves to be ousted by a military coup. I hope it succeeds.”, while David Miller wrote “Erdogan was a megalomaniac ruining a great country. Who’s going to miss him?” These academics aren’t some minor figures and they weren’t the only ones writing in such a way. Hundreds of tweets just like the aforementioned ones later transformed into newspaper headlines, analyses in academic journals, and articles. Unbelievable! In the periodical Foreign Policy, Edward Luttwak criticized not the junta itself, but their failure to pull off the coup. According to Luttwak, they failed to realize the “first rule for a successful coup.” What was it? “Capturing or killing the head of the government, first and foremost”! The putschists, who wounded more than 2,000 and killed 246, have “violated the golden rule,” said Luttwak. It was crucial, as “they [the putschists] left the opportunity for Erdoğan to call the people to resist the coup”!

The world-renowned journal The Economist had the same connotation: “The sultan survives”! Similarly, an analyst of Fox News, Ralph Peters, made two obnoxious comments within a week: “Friday night’s failed coup was Turkey’s last hope to stop the Islamization of its government and the degradation of its society.” One week later, he wrote: “[…] now he [Erdoğan] has real support among half of the population, those for whom the fever of faith is the ultimate intoxicant. He polls better than Hitler did. “Mein Kampf” is no match for the Holy Koran.” For Peters, the people of Turkey sacrificing their lives to thwart the coup was not an issue. The one who should die, or deposed at least, according to Peters, was the president, and unfortunately he still alive and was standing tall. Furthermore, the situation was direr as Erdoğan’s supporters consolidated their belief in the president.

On the other hand, the Holy Quran of Muslims was being compared to Mein Kampf, which was written by the perpetrator of the largest genocide on earth. And the Quran was portrayed as a book that could surpass Mein Kampf in terms of atrociousness. This means that in the US and many parts of Europe, the direst of Islamophobic statements, and giving advice on how to violently depose a government and execute its leader is not a crime, but a component of freedom of speech!

The day after, those who believed that Erdoğan deserved the coup and should be executed advocated that Erdoğan designed the coup or at least knew of the coup with the same impunity as before. There were similar headlines published on reputable newspapers which acted in support of these allegations. The Guardian published Gülen’s statement on its website: “Turkey coup may have been ‘staged’ by Erdoğan regime”! 8 days after the coup, while people were still at hospitals or at the funerals of their loved ones, The Independent published a news piece titled “President Erdoğan’s Turkey is modelled on the Third Reich.” Later, the news outlet removed this piece from its website, probably out of shame! Michael Rubin, on the other hand, wrote an opinion on Foreign Affairs website the day of the coup which was titled “Erdogan Has Nobody to Blame for the Coup but Himself.”

Erik Jan Zürcher also wrote that even if the government hadn’t planned the coup, they were in the know and planned what to do after the coup. All of the Western media underscored that only Erdoğan was accusing Gülen and his henchmen for attempting a coup, while disregarding the statements of the main opposition party, other opposition parties, high-ranking generals and academics which were on the same page with Erdoğan. Including the most fervent enemies of Erdoğan, nobody had a doubt that the coup was ordered by Gülen; however, the Western media ignored all of these, as if there was an accord among them. Lastly, seven months after the coup attempt, the President of the German Federal Intelligence Service Bruno Kahl said “We don’t believe the coup attempt was made by Gülen” in his interview with the journal Der Spiegel. As the German intelligence is still intact, Kahl’s statement has only one meaning: “We are supporting Gülen.”

After thwarting the attempt, the government had to dismiss all members of this organization from the state, while closing down media outlets and private enterprises which supported the said organization. A state of emergency was announced for this reason and all of these were done. Then, these were deemed similar to the applications of Stalin and Hitler. However, no one drew a comparison with the time when East and West Germany were united and thousands of civil servants (who weren’t infiltrators like Gülenists) in East Germany were dismissed, even though it was a much more controversial process than the one in Turkey.

It’s not a crime to demand the head of a leader in the West!

The propaganda by the Western media which emerged with the July 15 coup attempt are continuing and getting worse by the day. Regardless of the issue, who and what kind of violent action is put against Erdoğan, the result doesn’t change. Turkey experienced this once again last week. Due to the referendum for a change in the system of government which is to take place on April 16, both the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the opposition are concerned with rallies in Turkey and abroad. There are more than 5 million Turkish citizens living in various countries of Europe. This population which has dual citizenship is able to cast their votes in Turkish elections.

Germany and the Netherlands didn’t show any kind of opposition against the Turkish parties which are advocating the no vote in the referendum during their rallies in their countries; however, this wasn’t true for AK Party. Last week, the Turkish FM’s travel permission was revoked by the Dutch government, while the minister of family and social policies was barred from entering the Turkish consulate (which is considered a territory of Turkey) in Rotterdam, later to be deported with a police escort. Moreover, they released attack dogs on people who took the streets to protest these actions and these people were also beaten by the police.

This treatment was not acceptable at any level; however, a single visual became embedded in the minds of Turks: a police dog biting the leg of a young male, while a police officer is keeping two protesters who are trying to help that person at bay with a baton. This visual was just like the ones showing torture at Abu Ghraib prison during the invasion of Iraq. After this, the main opposition party CHP demanded relations with the Netherlands to be suspended. Opposition parties and all people regardless of their opinion of Erdoğan condemned the treatment that was shown to the Turkish citizens and ministers. Meanwhile, the Blick daily in Switzerland published a Turkish headline: “Vote no against Erdoğan’s dictatorship.” Again, in Switzerland, a far-right crowd made a demonstration, probably with a permit as no police officers interfered, with ugly masks, calling the Turkish citizens to vote no in the referendum. These visuals were so abhorrent that Aykut Erdoğdu, a deputy of the main opposition party CHP, couldn’t hold himself and tweeted the following: “To whom the actions of these racist bastards in Europe are serving in the referendum?”

The target of those who carry out this abhorrent, anti-democratic and illegitimate campaign is the only politician who could garner 51.8% of the total votes in the first ballot. Anti-West sentiments increase among millions of supporters of Erdoğan and even those who oppose him. This rising hate is not because of Marinne Le Pen in France, Wilders in the Netherlands, or the neo-nazis in Germany; it is because of those who support the junta, see assassination as a legitimate method to depose an elected leader, and feign ignorance about a malicious organization which has infiltrated state institutions for 40 years!

Fethullah Gülen’s seemingly Islamic modern cult emerged in such an environment and spread over the years. He claimed to be a follower of Said-i Nursi, who Gülen never visited because he was a Kurd, as Gülen states in his own memoirs of youth, and was seemingly fighting against communism during the Cold War. Using the prestigious name of the persecuted Said-i Nursi, Gülen persuaded both Turks and Kurds that he was working for the benefit of Islam. Even though Gülen’s movement was criticized by other religious congregations for its depreciatory approach towards them and isolation from even the other disciples of Said-i Nursi, it was received rather well by both the society and the state.

Gülen supported and praised all military coups aiming to restore Turkey to its “factory settings” and preserve the status quo.

Gülen supported and praised all military coups aiming to restore Turkey to its “factory settings” and preserve the status quo. When the strictly secular Army deposed Erbakan and his government in 1997, Gülen praised what came to be known as the post-modern coup. Despite the harsh criticism of certain Islamic groups, some of the Muslims who weren’t followers of Gülen also believed that he was forced to make such statements against his own belief due to Turkey’s political environment.

Relocating to the US in 1999 and becoming famous for his schools all around the world, Gülen didn’t face any hardships after 9/11, which was suspicious for some, but not for the whole. Alongside conferences on interfaith dialogue and religious tolerance, Gülen started to pose as an admirer of Rumi and write about him, a strategy for the consumption of a Western audience; just like using Said-i Nursi had been for a Turkish audience. Even though the Rumi Center in the US was obviously named after Rumi, it was always Gülen’s name that was being propagated.

While certain individuals of the Kemalist Left in Turkey claimed that the Gülen Movement was a project of the US against the USSR in the Cold War, their allegations weren’t taken into consideration as these individuals opposed all religious groups.

So, the question is how the members of the Gülen Movement were able to infiltrate the most secular institution, the Army, to an extent to even attempt a military coup in a country that was ultra-secular until the near past? Against the practices of military school administrators, who examined the knees of young applicants to find and eliminate the ones that prayed regularly, Gülen advised his followers to do whatever is necessary, not to pray, and to drink alcohol, the end goal being to enter these military schools. Gülen and his followers used the same methods to infiltrate the judiciary, academia and the media.

Gülen advised his followers to do whatever is necessary, not to pray, and to drink alcohol, the end goal being to enter these military schools.

From the 1970s onward, they infiltrated every ideological movement in Turkey’s sociological structure, while concealing their true beliefs. None was aware of this function of the Gülen Movement; moreover, not every member was aware of each other. The truth is that they had become a widespread organization which was able to reach the elites of countries through their schools, media outlets, holdings and relief organizations. When the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came to power after weathering multiple storms (Erdoğan’s sentence, two trials to close the party down, the opposition of the whole media), the party was forced to open the door to this organization by assuming that at least they wouldn’t have any issue with their Muslim identity, unlike the Kemalist-secular ideology dominating the state. “Give them an inch and they will take a mile,” as the saying goes, but this wasn’t known at the time.

This seemingly Islamic modern and armed cult first revealed its true face, even if a little, while Turkey and the PKK were engaged in the reconciliation process. Targeting the process, Gülen started an operation through his members within the judiciary to make the head of the National Intelligence Organization stand trial for his role in the negotiations. However, first with the events of December 17-25, 2013 they tried to depose the government by claiming that it was corrupt, and then with the July 15 coup attempt, the organization was completely deciphered. Since then, Turkey has been working on cleansing the institutions of Gülenists and analyzing this cult.

Social scientists, political scientists and psychiatrists’ association are all trying to analyze and explain the leader and the members of this cult according to their own specializations. These analyses are one of the hottest topics in the media and everyone is trying to understand the organization. “Why did my arrogant but helpful neighbor change immensely after the coup attempt?” “They were our relatives and we knew their son was a Gülenist. However, we were shocked when we saw him on TV, among the putschists.” “Two sons stopped seeing their own mother as she is against Gülen, I really don’t understand it”. “The man [a Gülenist] fired his weapon and killed two people right before our eyes. Then recited bismillah before drinking water and then said that the ones he killed just moments ago went to heaven. What kind of a person does this and says that?” These are the questions that have emerged, which puzzle people when they are trying to understand the organization.

“The man [a Gülenist] fired his weapon and killed two people right before our eyes. Then recited bismillah before drinking water.”

I spoke to one of my friends, who was sentenced and was a member of a far left organization in the 1970s. “I know almost all kinds of leftist organizations around the world. We grew and lived within these organizations. Yet, I have never seen an organization giving its member an order, saying ‘you will stand here for 20 years and when the time comes, you will emerge’, let alone hearing of this order being carried out,” he said in utter bewilderment.

The members of this organization, with the instructions of their leader, stole the examination questions to infiltrate state institutions and became prosecutors, judges and teachers by usurping the rights of many thousands. Any threats to their organization were eliminated by slandering them, covering these slanders on their news channels, sentencing them via prosecutors and judges who are their members, and upholding their sentences in the higher courts once again with their own members. When they couldn’t achieve this, they sought vulnerabilities of these people to exploit and blackmail. Moreover, the members were ordered by their leader to “criticize or slander Gülen,” otherwise they may be exposed. Each and every one of them had experienced being untouchable.

They went from ultranationalism to being an international extra, ultimately to treason. How did they commit all these acts and how did they justify it to themselves?

Psychiatrists are explaining this situation as a “frenzy as a result of excessive narcissism.”

With outside observations and confessors from within, the Pandora’s Box has finally opened. Just like all other cults based on modern messianic apocalyptic scenarios and saviors, the Gülen Movement is also a cult. The members’ interactions with those who aren’t with the cult are limited, even if it’s their families. A narcissistic leader and a cult of narcissism. Most of them entered as they were mere children; however, these people, even the adults, have forsaken their own “selves” just to become a huge and singular “Self”. With harsh punishments (to be beaten by the leader himself, dismissals, threats) and rewards (being praised by the leader, receiving gifts, being exemplified), the bond between the leader and the members was strengthened. This narcissistic structure and its members seemingly didn’t have much problem with justifying all the amorality they were a part of. They claimed all of their amoral actions, which even an average person would abstain from committing, were to save the world. There wasn’t any illegal and amoral act left for them to commit. Moreover, they never believed they would lose; for them their leader is “the holy savior” and they are “the chosen.” What differentiates them from Daesh?

On the other hand, our experiences show that resorting to violence or committing massacres does not have anything to do with being a member of a terrorist organization which emerged from a Baath-ridden, post-American occupation Iraq; white and blue collared members of such a cult are also capable of committing these atrocities. We have seen this on the night of July 15, 2016. Psychiatrists are explaining this situation as a “frenzy as a result of excessive narcissism.” The questions regarding Gülen’s national and international connections and targets are yet to be answered.

After the purge of such a bloody military insurgency, Turkey, as a respectable member of the international community, which had held national elections since the 19th century, expected a positive reaction from its Western partners and Western media. This was an understandable expectation since Western countries represent themselves as markers of democracy, advocates of the supremacy of the will of the people, and guardians of legitimately elected governments, which may be discharged only again by elections.However, Turkey’s Western partners failed to raise a powerful voice against the July 15 coup attempt. They failed to raise even a feeble voice. After thirty-nine days, US Vice-President Joe Biden visited Ankara; no high-level politicians from Germany, France, or the UK visited Turkey. Most of the statements after the coup attempt were of the nature of expressing regret that the coup had failed.

Specifically, during the last days of July, James Clapper, the Director of US National Intelligence, complained by saying, “Many of our interlocutors in the Turkish Army have been either purged or arrested”; in the same vein, Joseph Votel, the Commander of US Central Command, was “concerned” about, not the coup attempt, but how US operations in the region will be affected by the attempt. Such statements raise the suspicion of whether the US might have been behind the coup attempt. A few days after the coup attempt, John Kerry, US Secretary of State, made a statement to the effect that operations against FETO members should not go too far, which was sufficient to establish a background for the criticisms directed at the US. Tens of articles of the kind supporting the failed coup were published in the mainstream Western media such as the New York Times, the Guardian, Time, CNN, the Washington Post, BBC, the Times, and Der Spiegel. It is no wonder that such publications led to deep disappointment in Turkey.

Anti-Turkey Stand of the Western Media in History

As one considers the background of perception management in the Western media against Turkey, it is seen that this disappointment goes far back into the past and has been practiced for decades by contemporary media outlets. Western media, to a large extent, has positioned itself against Turkey on many issues. For instance, Kemal Karpat, in his book entitled Politicization of Islam, in a section on press, talks about how European countries used the Western press against the Ottomans, helping us understand better the current state of affairs with the following example: “The foreign powers used their ‘free’ press to excoriate and condemn Abdulhamid without causing diplomatic incidents except on rare occasions. The French used Le Figaro, while the Russians enlisted Le Nord, a Brussels newspaper, into their service and financed the famous salon of Madame Olga Novikov in London, in which Turks were described as unfit for Western civilization and as promoters of ‘Muslim fanaticism’.” The excerpt underlines the fact that, since the 19th century, Western countries have sought to keep the Ottomans under control by using the press and financing certain lobbies to demonize the Turks.

A similar assessment is made by Orhan Koloğlu, in his book entitled The History of Press. Koloğlu recounts that, during the period 1828-1829, the beginning of the Greek uprising, thousands of Muslim children, women, and elderly were massacred by the Greeks; yet, the Western press pointed at the Ottoman State as the side that committed the massacres; such a blatant and overt disinformation campaign by the Western press was astonishing to the Ottomans. In the 19th century, the same attitude was exhibited by the Western press in the cases of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Armenia.

The Western media’s anti-Turkey publications after the July 15 coup attempt, and the two examples I presented from the 19th century, demonstrate that Western media outlets target the victimized rather than the guilty. As one traces back over the vital issues Turkey has faced, it is clear that the Western media has continued incessantly with the same publication strategy, unless the West had a direct self-interest at stake.

Edward Said’s Diagnosis

The anti-Turkey campaign conducted by the European and the American mainstream media is in perfect agreement with the emphasis made by Edward Said in his book Culture and Imperialism. In his work, Said tells about “the existence of an international media that invades insidiously an incomprehensively vast land.” Because, the matter of transforming many different events in many different places around the globe into news, after filtering them through Western interests, has begun to establish another method of hegemony.

To illustrate this, for example, the operations conducted by Turkey against the terror organizations DAESH and PKK have been distorted by both the New York Times and Der Spiegel to claim that “Turkey is killing civilians, invading the region, and killing the Kurds.” As visual misinformation, pictures of people killed by the Russian bombardments in the region were used non-factually. The increasing dosage of such publications after the July 15 coup attempt is proof that the anti-Turkey campaign is being escalated deliberately. On the night of July 15, NBC announced that “Erdogan, refused landing in Istanbul, is reported to be seeking asylum in Germany,” which was certainly a lie; yet, the channel has not apologized for this misinformation. The cover of a special Der Spiegel issue on Turkey on September 11, 2016, carries both visually and content-wise stamps of orientalism. On the cover, the magazine uses such expressions as, “Ein Land verliert die Freiheit” (a country loses its freedom) and “the dictator in fight with his own cities,” and pictures the minarets of the Blue Mosque (Sultanahmet Mosque) as fired rockets. In tone with Said’s emphasis, a typical distortion and otherization has been committed by the magazine. That is, the news is veiled as it is propagated.

Journalism as Fictionalism instead of Objectivity

The above excerpts from historians Karpat and Koloğlu show that the Western media has a long and prejudiced history against Turkey, which still continues today. In this historical stretch, it appears that there have been many politically charged, manipulated, and constructed news stories published and disseminated by the Western media against Turkey. Thus, disregarding the principle of objectivity, and other principles and regulations that define the realm of professional ethics are ignored when it comes to Turkey.

No doubt, Turkey has to respond to such campaigns and these efforts must include both public diplomacy and lobbying activities. However, deep prejudice and the absence of objectivity exhibited by the Western media against Turkey are major problems mostly related to the administrators of the biased newspapers and to their cultural capitals. It is difficult to find a direct remedy for this, because the manipulation of the media is a result of conscious and deliberate choice. In spite of this, Turkey should never give up in the attempt to remind prejudiced media managers of the fundamental principles of journalism and the simple facts and rules of democracy.

Turkey aborted the July 15 coup attempt and this was, to a certain extent, due to the fact that the government has gradually proven its legitimacy in the eyes of different ideological groups. Political institutions, however, have lagged behind society and this became apparent thanks to the suppression of the coup attempt and the way in which it was thwarted. Societal and political expectations instantly became closer and a sudden and strong overlap occurred on the night of July 15. National feelings and discourses in this instantaneous compromise seem to have been effective in creating today’s political atmosphere. However, the nationalist feeling will, undoubtedly, lose its current effect in the long run and more sophisticated concepts to elucidate the new consensus will come into play.Due to the structural problems of Turkish politics, the gap between political authority and peripheral values has always caused democracy-related problems. It is not only religion-state relations but also ethnic-sectarian differences that increase the complexity of this picture. The conservative-democrat characteristic of the political power in the last fifteen years has profoundly changed the never-ending dichotomy of center-periphery relations in Turkish society. The simple secular-religious dichotomy in politics was transformed into something new; relations altered; and Turkey has entered a new phase.

The number one reason for this change is that the suppression and exclusion of religious values from the political sphere have come to an end and this has happened at the expense of radical secularism in Turkey. The ideological polarization between central and peripheral values inflicted by political institutions has considerably weakened. Hence, both sides – namely, the secularist and conservative – have developed a capacity to unite against a new kind of enemy or for a different aspiration. By the same token, the two sides have met each other in practical life and their lifestyles have integrated with the elimination of the ideological differences. Daily issues instigated by ideological controversies have lost their old meanings. A new and shared public space and new relations have emerged. Fear of potential social problems stemming from living together, which was frequently voiced in the early years of the AK Party by the secularist camp, has lost its popularity. Since neither the secular nor the conservative camps have been discriminated, or given privilege, old political arguments cannot be revived.

Shortly before the July 15 coup attempt, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had said, “We will re-establish the State.” That was the outcome of the unveiled consensus that was already under way in the social sphere among different ideological groups, but which was to be reflected in political institutions as well. Obviously, Erdoğan’s position as the supreme commander – namely President of the Republic – has become one of the most critical turns in this road. Social policies to meet the needs of religious people who have been outmaneuvered for long and to bring new dynamics into society could only have been designed through such institutional means. Timing and the paths that Erdoğan has followed until now have been influential in his multi-faceted achievements as much as his use of rhetoric and the corresponding social realism in his political behavior.

Nationalism has undeniably enabled a stunning mass mobilization in this new consensus, especially with the developments in the international political conjuncture. However, the difference here is that the current nationalism, while mobilizing different ideological segments of Turkish society, has gained a wider social base and sophisticated as to integrate into other ideologies. In this political conjuncture, it is undeniable that nationalism has served as a glue to bind all segments of Turkish society, and that the glue has a dilute nature that will allow unbinding in due time. Because the feeling that has mobilized society is anti-militarism as much as it is nationalism. In Turkish society, today, there are strong uniting motivations, such as anti-militarism, participation in the public sphere, and democratic expectations. All of these motivations tend to transform policies, but they cannot be easily understood through either headcount or dichotomist structural analysis of the past. As different segments of Turkish society are fully participated in the process of production and division and sustain their contributions to the legitimacy mechanisms of political power, the needs of the social and political spheres will continue to follow each other.

The American Revolution was, to a large extent, identical to an independence war. The Americans objected to the authority of King George III and the British Parliament, but on no account were they slaves in shackles. In March 1770, British soldiers panicked when Americans threw snowballs at them and opened fire. Five Americans died, but in a short period of time the event became known as the Boston Massacre throughout the colonies, one of the smallest massacres in world history!American merchants decided to stop selling British tea and refused to unload the tea from the three ships anchored in Boston Harbor. On the night of December 16, 1773, a group of 60 Americans went to the harbor and threw the tea into the sea. The British Parliament was angered by this act and imposed a ban on the usage of Boston Harbor until the owners of the tea were fully compensated. Parliament also declared that Boston would be governed by British soldiers commanded by the British general, Thomas Gage.

The American Congress gathered in 1774. Congress sent a petition to George III and Parliament, asking for the harbor to be opened, the soldiers removed, and the taxes abolished. The petition did not solve the problem or bring peace. Skirmishes between Americans and British soldiers broke out, evolving into full-scale war. In the beginning, it seemed impossible that the Americans would win against Britain, a huge military world power that had recently won the Seven Years War. However, in 1778, things started to change. The old foe of Britain, France, decided to side with the American colonies. Then, Spain and the Netherlands also entered the war. In 1781, George Washington captured the biggest British army unit at Yorktown, in Virginia. The colonies gained independence and started construction of the new political system.

The Americans did fight for their independence against an imperial power with which they shared many social and cultural values. According to one interpretation, they preferred to set up a republic instead of a kingdom because they had conducted their independence war against the British kingdom. The colonies desired to achieve two important aims at the same time: to create a new common political entity and to keep their autonomy. The American founding fathers were also sensitive to achieving or, to put it better, protecting individual freedom. Thus, they created a federal system to please the colonies, and implemented checks and balances in the sense of constitutional governance traditions to serve individual freedom.

France was late with respect to Britain, both in having a constitutional order and achieving industrial revolution. It was poor and militarily weak. In hostility against Britain, France helped the American colonies to defeat the British Empire. The French people followed the fight of the Americans with great admiration. Ironically, they had to obey an emperor in their own country.

France was a country of three classes. The first class consisted of the Roman Catholic priests (the Church) who did not have to pay taxes as Catholicism was the official religion of France. This class had other privileges too. The second class, which included almost 30,000 people, lived in large manors, farms inherited by their ancestors. They had high social and official status, serving as generals, ambassadors, and ministers, and very few of them paid taxes. The third class was the largest, numbering almost 26 million. It included lawyers, merchants, doctors, farmers, etc. They were the people who paid taxes, even for basic needs. They also paid taxes to the church.

The French people were poor and in the seasons of bad harvest they went hungry. The state was also broke. King Louis XVI wanted to impose taxes on the aristocracy, but was not able to succeed in this. Social unrest seemed inevitable. As the American Declaration of Independence was translated into French and published, millions of French people read it and learned about freedom and equality.

Louis XVI pressed for taxes. The aristocracy declared that they would agree to be taxed, provided that the representatives of the three classes came together and united on the necessity of the taxes. The king accepted and the representatives of the three classes assembled. However, the representatives of the third class (named as the public, or the people) were discriminated against and made to understand that they were not as important as the other classes. The voting method in the Assembly also caused discontent among the representatives of the third class. As the third class included a huge majority of the French people, its representatives changed the name of the Assembly to the National Assembly and convinced some of the priests and aristocrats to act with them. Other aristocrats rushed to ask the king to stop the new Assembly from functioning, fearing that it would take decisions that would harm their interests. The king accepted and locked the meeting hall.

The new Assembly insisted on gathering and decided to write a new constitution. The king ordered the National Assembly to dissolve but his order was rejected. He then decided to use force and called upon his special guard unit of soldiers from Switzerland. The people in Paris, hearing that the king’s guardians were coming to suppress them, declared that they would resist. They attacked the Bastille on the July 4, 1789, to find an arsenal that had only a dozen prisoners being protected by almost ten soldiers. However, later on, in writing the history of the French Revolution, a story about the Bastille was produced that is comparable to the American Boston Massacre. The French Revolution grew to extensive violence that cost the lives of thousands, among which were not only aristocrats but also ordinary people.

After the French Revolution, France adopted a republican political structure. The newly emerged republic was based on the idea of equality for all citizens. It produced the French Declaration of Human and Citizen Rights. The French revolutionaries also took a position not only against the dynasty but also the religious establishment (the Church) and even religion itself, and created the French laïcité. More than two centuries after the French Revolution, the French people are still divided into two large groups: those who are for the Revolution and those who are against it.

Thus, the French revolution marked a break in French political history. Although it is debatable how successful it was in reaching its declared aims, the French Revolution proceeded to create a completely new political structure instead of restoring what the French people called the ancient regime.

Setbacks of Revolution

Now it is time to make a general observation about the results of revolutions. The term ‘revolution’ connotes, especially when used in romantic senses and contexts, radical changes that sweep completely away previous institutions, rules, and social and political entities. This approach is misleading. Revolution might mean significant change, but on no account does it lead to the change of everything. The idea that it can be possible to change everything at once and for forever is an unrealistic, false approach, denied by the nature of human life. In the case of the three classical revolutions, including the French, it is possible to detect continuity in social and political life. There is nothing surprising in this, as life depends upon repetition and continuity.

Turkish Political System up to July 15, 2016

Turkey lived through and witnessed an unprecedented event, not only in Turkish history but probably in the history of the world on July 15, 2016. The Turkish people defeated an attempted coup by the military without the use of weapons. In order to fully grasp what happened and why it is unique and so important, we need to point out the main characteristics of the Turkish political system before July 15, 2016.

The Turkish Republic was founded on October 29, 1923, after an independence war as a relatively plural and democratic political entity. Then, in 1925, it was turned into a single-party dictatorship that lasted until 1945. After the end of WWII, Turkey faced the truth that it had to make a choice between the democratic West and the totalitarian Soviet bloc. Due to several domestic and international factors, the political leadership of the time decided to unite with the West and started the process to transfer the closed political system into a democratic one. On May 14, 1950, Turkey had its first democratic elections, in which the opposition party – the Democrat Party (DP) – won and replaced the People Republic Party (PRP).

However, the PRP and its allies in the bureaucracy and society were discontent with the new regime. As early as 1952, only two years after the DP took office, army officers began to make plans to overthrow the democratic government. They started a military coup on May 27, 1960, the first coup in the history of the Turkish Republic. After a show trial, the army executed PM Adnan Menderes, and had a new constitution prepared that allocated the army a special and undemocratic position and, overall, established what we call a bureaucratic tutelage system. In the new political structure, the democratically elected government was given limited scope and the rest of state authority was reserved for the bureaucracy, with the army at the center.

All democratically elected governments showed discontent with the bureaucratic tutelage system and made small attempts to change its denominators. The biggest effort in this respect occurred after the AK Party came to power in November 2002. During the AK Party era, the bureaucratic tutelage system has been pushed back step by step. In his fight against bureaucratic state power, PM Erdoğan has needed allies in the bureaucracy as he, despite having political power, lacks bureaucratic cadres. Within the state structure, the main bureaucratic groups were the Kemalists and the Gülenists. As they were coming from similar religious and cultural backgrounds, Erdoğan allied with the Gülenists against the Kemalist cadres. However, the Gülenists were a deep-rooted, clandestine group with their own ambitions and plans. The aim of the Gülenists was to seize power within the bureaucracy so that, no matter which political party was in office, they would have the real power.

Erdoğan sensed the Gülenist make-up in the bureaucracy in 2010 and started preparations to take steps to curb the Gülenist bureaucracy. This was the beginning of a still ongoing fight between the two powers: democratically elected, legitimate, and transparent government on one side, and a hidden, bureaucratic, totalitarian power on the other.

The Gülenist movement made several attempts to take Erdoğan’s governments down. It tried to arrest the head of the National Intelligence Agency and, through him, reach Erdoğan in February 2012. The attempt failed. Then, the Gülenist gang tried to benefit from the Gezi Revolts in June 2013. An important effort to oust Erdoğan came from Gülen’s men in the police and judiciary on December 17-25, 2013. This attempt also failed.

The Coup Attempt of the Gülenist Army

Everyone in the country knew that the Gülenists had infiltrated the army, but no one was sure how large the infiltration was. It became clear on the night of July 15, 2016. The army officers who were FETO (Gülenist Terror Organization) members attempted a violent military coup. It was the bloodiest coup attempt in the history of the Republic. More than 200 people were killed and thousands were wounded. The people resisted the Gülenist officers and defeated the coup.

Many domestic and foreign observers of Turkish politics had expected such an attempt by the Gülenists. But why did it come on July 15, 2016? One might consider two reasons: 1) the judiciary was about to arrest many Gülenist officers who had participated in plot trials committed against army officers who were not Gülenists; 2) the government was about to have almost 2,000 Gülenist officers retired at the High Military Commission meeting in early August 2016. The Gülenists understood that they would lose an important part of their manpower in the army. This forced them to begin the coup as soon as possible. As the National Intelligence Agency learned of the attempted coup, the coup plotters changed their timing and began to implement their plan at 21:00 pm July 15, instead of 03:00 am on the night of July 16, 2016.

One point needs to be specifically mentioned here. The Gülenists had been able to present themselves to the outside world – though, of course, not to the Turkish people – as a peaceful movement of moderate Islam that defended secularism and fought radical Islam. They also managed to portray Erdoğan as a radical Islamist and Turkey as a country run by Islamists. To do this, they used totalitarian disinformation tactics. In fact, it is Gülen and his men who are radical. Gülen wishes to create a political system that resembles that of Iran. His ultimate aim is world domination.

The coup attempt failed. Several factors contributed to its failure. President Erdoğan and PM Binali Yıldırım declared that they would resist, even at the cost of their own lives. Erdoğan called on the people to defend democracy in the streets. Millions of people from every walk of life and political bent poured into the streets unarmed and challenged the soldiers. Public prosecutors issued a warrant to the police forces to arrest soldiers who were trying to overthrow the government. Turkish media, for the first time in the history of the Turkish republic, stood united against the coup attempt. The police bravely fought against the soldiers taking part in the coup, and army officers who opposed the coup attempt and were loyal to the constitutional order resisted in active or passive ways against the Gülenist officers.

The Gülenists tried to renew and accelerate the Kemalist bureaucratic tutelage system. That the coup attempt failed, or to put it better, that Turkish politics and the people defeated it, will have consequences for Turkish politics and the political system. Turkish politics will push the bureaucratic tutelage system back even further. It is certain that Turkey will be more democratic afterwards. After the failed coup attempt, Turkey began to reconstruct the state structure. Of special importance in this respect are the reforms in the army. For decades, the army in general and army generals in particular enjoyed a fairly autonomous position with regard to the democratic government. Generals saw themselves on a par with high-level politicians, and even thought of themselves as superior to the prime ministers.

Now, all of this is changing. Military schools at the level of high schools have been, rightly, closed down as they had been completely infiltrated by the Gülenists. Commanders of the army, navy, and air forces will be under the command of the Minister of National Defense, something that has been talked about for decades but has never come to pass. The National Intelligence Agency will be restructured.

More importantly, there is a spirit of reconciliation in the country. Turkish politics is excessively divided, but all main political parties united to oppose the coup. Political leaders now use softened language towards each other. People from all political parties participated in demonstrations against the coup. All of these developments give us hope for the future of Turkish democracy.

July Revolution of Turks      

It is not an exaggeration to call the Turkish people’s defeat of the coup attempt a revolution. It has the main characteristics of the classical revolutions. It caused or paved the way for sweeping political change. The Gülenists competed illegitimately for political power and lost the fight. Millions of people joined the resistance against the coup attempt. Now we can say that Turkey is among the countries that have a saga to support the democratic system. Turkey’s July 15 resistance against the coup attempt is no less than the British, American or French revolutions.

Consolidation of Democracy after an Attempted Coup D’état in Spain 

Spain suffered more than 50 military coups or attempted coups between 1814 and 1981. Most of these coups were held with the aim of increasing the authority of the state or “rescuing Spain” from external influences. The last failed coup attempt was named “23-F” and was over after a one-day domination by the putschists on February 23, 1981. It was held by the Civil Guard, a military force positioned between the army and the police. On the day of the attempt, 200 members of the Civil Guard broke into parliament and took almost 350 MPs hostage. According to the later revealed coup plot, Franco-era sympathizers of the Civil Guard aimed to arrest the leaders of all political parties and eliminate the political hierarchy to create a power vacuum that would be filled by them. This attempt, interestingly, has much in common with the failed coup of July 15, 2016, in Turkey, both in forms of practice and methods of struggle. It was defeated by strong statements against the coup from King Juan Carlos I of Spain and the uncompromising attitude of the Spanish media against the coup plotters. Moreover, lack of support from the vast majority of the armed forces prevented the spread of the coup throughout the country.

Immediately after the occupation of parliament, Juan Carlos gave the first public statement on television and called for the continuation of the democratic government. As the Commander in Chief of the Spanish army, his call for troops not to join the coup attempt was effective in preventing further incidents. Additionally, a state of emergency was declared in a short period of time and the troops loyal to the King were sent to parliament. One of the smart decisions of the king overtook the plans of the putschists: he formed a temporary cabinet consisting of undersecretaries to avoid the creation of a power vacuum in the country. After all measures, the putschists ended the occupation of parliament and surrendered.

This failed coup attempt pointed out the truth that, even if leaders were trying to empower democratic institutions, there was a requirement for the comprehensive restructuring of the Spanish armed forces. In fact, the leaders of this coup had made a similar attempt in 1978 and were sentenced to just seven months in prison. The lesson taken from this event was that, if putschists are not appropriately punished, members of the army will continue to consider the coup as an option. The Supreme Council of Military Justice conducted the trial and, according to the final judgment, the putschists largely responsible for the coup were sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment. After this attempt, drastic measures were taken to prevent further coups. In 1982, all military officers with any connection to previous coup attempts were dismissed from the army. Instead, pro-democracy bureaucrats and officers were designated to critical missions and appeared more in the press. The officers thought possibly to be involved in the coup were appointed to passive missions. Also, military governors in the Ministry of Defense were replaced by civilians and the prime minister did not place any officer in the government anymore.

Without doubt, the most important factor enabling the consolidation of democracy in Spain was the acceleration of the accession process to the EU (known as the European Economic Community (EEC) at that time). The European parliament gave instructions to accelerate the accession negotiations with Spain after the failed coup. The main objective of this decision was to establish Spanish democracy on a firm ground through full membership to the Union. As a result, Spain became a member of the EU in 1986 and Spanish democracy was taken under the wing of the EU.

Greece’s Transition to Democracy after a Failed Coup

Dominated by the junta between 1967 and 1974, Greece reopened its democratization process and began to struggle with political leaders of the junta period after overthrowing the juntaists. However, an elected civil government was exposed to a new coup attempt in February 1975 by Greek army officers sympathetic to the recently deposed junta regime. The democratically elected civil government of Greece was alerted to the coup attempt by the director of the Central Intelligence Service before the juntaists put their plan into action, and the juntaists were arrested in the early hours of February 24, 1975. This failed coup became known as “The Pyjamas Coup” because most of the juntaists were arrested in their nightwear.

After this attempt, the Greek government decided to move against all anti-democratic elements of the military: 500 officers were retired, 800 officers were assigned to passive missions and almost 100 suspended anti-juntaist officers were brought back to their posts to strengthen the government’s hand in fight against the juntaists. The juntaists were charged with the crimes of high treason and insurrection in the trial dubbed “Greece’s Nuremberg.” The leaders of the attempt were sentenced to death, which was later commuted to life imprisonment. The rest also were sentenced to prison terms ranging from a minimum of five years to life imprisonment.

As in the case of Spain, the largest contribution to the politics of the normalization and demilitarization efforts was provided by the country’s route to becoming a member of the EU. To restore a stable democracy, Greece became a member of the EU in 1981 without fulfilling all conditions and criteria. Although EU membership contributed to reducing the risk of a coup, Greece had to grapple with the problem of terrorism for many years until the 2000s, as did Spain.

Spain and Greece followed the same path in the transition to democracy after a failed coup. As can be seen, the EU played a critical role in the democratization of both countries and made some concessions to promote their memberships. However, when it comes to Turkey’s July 15 coup attempt case, the EU seems not to take any responsible steps to help Turkey expurgate the ruins of the coup attempt. In other words, Turkey is in a position that requires the country to take matters into its own hands. Also, both cases show that it is crucial to avoid any weakness in discharging junta elements from the security services, bureaucracy, civil society organizations, and the media, as long as remaining within the law. All of these measures are required to avoid manipulating the post-coup process and the threat of internal conflict. It should be recalled that the most important step is struggling with society’s perceptions that cause coups. Turkish society’s reaction to the July 15 coup attempt is one of the most concrete examples of increasing awareness about the damage that coups can cause to democratic institutions.

Picture: “After he burst into the Cortes, the Spanish parliament, the mustachioed Lieutenant-Colonel Antonio Tejero de Molina (C) brandishes his pistol 23 February 1981 on the tribunal of the Cortes, as he takes the cabinet and some 350 MPs hostage, during an attempted coup by a right-wing group of the paramilitary Guardia Civil. King Juan Carlos later the same day told the Spanish people in a television broadcast that he had ordered the armed forces to “take all necessary measures” to put down the coup. The King’s broadcast ended the coup.” AFP

At first glance, this may appear to hold some truth, given the Gülenists’ overt allegiance to liberal-democratic politics and in general to Western ways of doing things. Yet, below the iceberg, Gülenism has a real face, a dark obscurantist zeal for world domination, in terms of its goals, and the path chosen to achieve them contradicts almost everything that is Western. Gülenism is rather a radical nihilist subject, which is antagonistic to liberal modernity.Indeed, in the process of transition from a traditional to modern society, there emerge three generic types of subject. All of these types of subject are alternative responses to the question of how to handle the relationship between man and the outside world. In traditional society, the subject was conceptualized as an organic part of society and in which society was understood to be a transcendental and unchanging moral totality. The shift to the modern era has resulted in the loosening of society’s grip on the subject. The subject has become morally autonomous and free of society, but only at the cost of alienation. In other words, collective societal values have become optional, not a necessity for the subject. The subject has become “homeless” and is required to find meaning in order to continue its moral integrity on its own.Thus, in the modern era we have three generic types of subjectivity. The first is the Nietzschean “Last Man.” The Last Man is the subject that approaches alienation with open arms. Its motto is “world without values.” It rejects the values or collective responsibilities that overcome the individual for the sake of the bodily pleasures of the material world. The politics of the Last Man, the subject of negative nihilism, consists of apathy towards politics, therefore succumbing to individualism and limitless hedonism.The subject of radical nihilism, on the other hand, goes in the opposite direction. Its motto is “values without world.” It lives for higher values and is always ready to sacrifice its life for transcendental values that cannot find space in the world. It has a tense relationship with the outside world. Hence, its politics is shaped by either becoming introverted, like post-Ancient Greek stoics or the Dostoyevskian “Man of the Underworld,” in order to ease the pressure of worldly existence, or by becoming extroverted to destroy the world, like the fundamental terrorist groups such as Daesh in the modern era, for the sake of values.

The last form of subjectivity rests on positive nihilism. The motto of a positive nihilist is “world with values.” It embraces both values and the world by redefining the relationship between them. It follows not transcendental values, which are rather given and ahistoric, but immanent values, which are socially constructed and historical. So, it embarks on creating new values from scratch. It approaches the world as neither a valueless place nor a place antagonistic to its values. It strives to create itself and a world by constantly creating novel values. Its politics, therefore, hovers over the search for human emancipation, seeking more humane life here and now.

Who is a Gülenist?

Today, one can come across both negative nihilists and positive nihilists in the West. The ideal is to make positive nihilism the norm while the default comes to be negative nihilism. Despite their sheer differences, both positive and negative nihilistic types act open-heartedly in society. They strive for power and participate in political life, but only through legal and democratic political channels.

What about Gülenism? With what type of nihilism is the Gülenist affiliated? What are the basic tenets of Gülenist politics? In fact, a typical Gülenist is a radical nihilist, blending its offensive and defensive forms. It attaches itself to a set of transcendental values, which it thinks of as alien to this materialistic and ungodly world. With its fellow Gülenist members, it withdraws from the world and builds up a parallel universe, at the center of which the Messiah figure of Fethullah Gülen resides. Like a typical stoic, it rejects the world for the sake of its own values and for an unfettered moral life within its community. It rejects the outside world to enjoy inner freedom in its cosmic world. Up to this point, Gülenism is similar to any other collectivity of hermits, or a typical religious group that is disenchanted with modern life. Indeed, this is the image the Gülenists strive to present to the general public.

Unfortunately, there is more to Gülenism. It might sound odd, but the Gülenists act with a motivation to conquer the whole world. Hizmet (to be in the service of the whole of humanity) is a key word that defines the movement. It should be noted that the Gülenists operate in more than 100 countries across the globe. Gülen establishes his sermons on the theme of entering the hearts of the local people by offering various kinds of service, such as education and health, and talks highly of those “soldiers of Hizmet.” The mission of the soldiers of Hizmet is not only made up of helping people where they operate but also to marry the daughters or relatives of local notables to garner political influence for the cause. In each country, by enlarging its clout in civil society and infiltrating state apparatus, the Gülenists strive to control the strategic posts of power. This amounts to amplifying the Gülenists’ parallel world step by step and society by society towards the outside and, in the end, uniting the whole world under its own parallel world.

To achieve this, Gülenists pose a Janus-faced personality. This hypocritical personality speaks two separate and somewhat contradictory “languages.” With the “outside people” (a generic label given to non-members by the movement), the Gülenist talks like a typical individualist liberal-democrat; within the boundaries of its closed community, it communicates through an esoteric language that incessantly reminds the members of their collective responsibilities and the importance of self-sacrifice for the cause. It praises the society of free and equal individuals in its media outlets as it interacts with the general public, yet within the boundaries of its community it is allowed nothing but a very strict hierarchical structure that has formed around an infallible and omniscient Messiah figure.

Moreover, it talks around the importance of dialogue and tolerance among individuals and societies in the public sphere but does not hold back from resorting to build up exclusive and closed areas of control for itself in society behind closed doors and to use all kinds of violence against those whom it thinks of as an obstacle to its sacred mission when the opportunity presents itself. Hence, it abides by two completely different registers of morality. It does not hesitate to act completely in contrast to its value-system or pretend in order to hide its real self in the outside world. In Gülenism’s lexicon, this act of dissimulation and infiltration is of central importance, and is known as takiyye or tedbir.

Thus, eventually, Gülenism has grown from being a collective of introverted stoic-type radical nihilists to a collective of extroverted Daesh-type radical nihilists. It has slowly evolved from a figure that turns its back to the world to enjoy inner freedom and repose, to a figure that embarks on destroying the world of others for the sake of its own parallel world. This evolution from defensive to offensive radical nihilism has gradually progressed and reached its prime on the bloody night of July 15. Indeed, Gülenism is a clandestine terrorist organization acting outside the legitimate boundaries of democratic politics, attacking the very values of freedom and equality upon which the West was built. In short, it is remote and detrimental to the ideals of the West.

Why should not the West support the Gülenists?

As this Janus-faced structure of the Gülenists unfolds, the interests and ideals of the West will fall apart. The growing discrepancy between the faces, therefore, will put pressure on the West to make a hard choice between its interests and ideals. Until now, the West has seemed to side with interests, putting ideals on the back burner. Indeed, to recover the emergent contradiction between interests and ideals after July 15, the media outlets have been inundated by coverage that struggles to carve out a convenient narrative of the event. This has encapsulated various forms of coverage, such as denying the reality of the coup attempt, turning a blind eye to the Gülenists’ involvement in the coup and putting the spotlight on the purges of the Gülenists by state apparatus after July 15.

Nevertheless, in the long run, protecting the Gülenists will inextricably harm Western interests. Political actors are supposed to perform their identities through their actions as long as they want to maintain the existing definition of who they are. Therefore, sacrificing ideals to interests to such an extent may unleash an identity crisis and disrupt the actors’ ethical integrity. This may deepen the thriving problem of democratic deficit, which has been instigated by the ever-growing distance between the elite and the common people in the West. The rise of right-wing populism that is underway across the West may find more room to flourish and finally lead to a wave of political instability.

Moreover, not living up to its own ethical-political standards will also significantly erode the West’s moral standing in the international arena. True, hard power calls the final shot; however, soft power is a necessary ingredient for an efficient foreign policy and determines success in international politics. The loss of moral superiority and prestige will enervate the West’s leadership in world politics. In a nutshell, Gülenism is the fatal dagger to the very heart of the Western worlds’ ethical-political ideals and to its strategic interests as well.

In particular, many of the Iranians in Europe and the US suffer from a traumatic reading of their history as they are also misled by their limited familiarity with the social and political developments that take place in Turkey. From the morning of July 16 onwards, they chose to concentrate on those who were purged, detained or arrested for their connection with FETO, Fetullah Gülen Terror Organization, rather than on the 250 citizens who died or the thousands of others who risked their lives and were injured when resisting the putschists. Take, for example, the inflammatory comments Hamid Dabashi shared on social media recently, in which he irresponsibly compared President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan with, all at once, Kim Jong-un of North Korea, Adolf Hitler, Mussolini, Franco of Spain, Ioannis Metaxas of Greece and Juan Peron of Argentina. Ironically, what infuriated Mr. Dabashi so much was the historic huge gathering in Yenikapı/Istanbul on August 7 where millions of people, including the president, the prime minister and the leaders of the two main opposition parties, came together to peacefully denounce the putschists again.

The Incubus of the Past or the Burden of History

Such an attitude not only displays an academic frivolity not uncommonly found among some Iranian experts who know little about Turkey but also testifies an uncanny tendency among them, as among some of their Turkish counterparts, to exceed the limits of a scholarly comparison between Turkey and Iran. True, Iran and Turkey have, roughly from the early 19th century onwards, followed fascinatingly similar historical trajectories. But the underlying spirit in these trajectories has been noticeably different. Throughout their modernization processes from 19th century onwards although they converged in their struggle against the ever-increasing imperial pressures coming from the West, the struggle consolidated the extra-governmental elements in Iran while it was mainly organized around the state machine in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey.

Further, despite the major ups and downs, throughout the decades, popular elections played the determining role in Turkey, while Iran almost invariably appeased repression at home to remove foreign domination. It is quite problematic that, while some pro-regime figures in Iran tend to interpret every popular movement in the Middle East as inspired by the uprisings that brought about the Iranian Revolution of 1979, some of the anti-regime Iranians hasten to analyze almost every such movement, especially if it harbors an Islamic tone, as a prelude to an Islamic state.

Interestingly enough, however, these two opposite positions seem to agree on an unfavorable reading of the failed coup attempt in Turkey. Basically, the now well-known obsession against President Erdoğan and his policies constitute a common ground between the two opposite camps. It is no secret that the conservative circles inside Iran have long since turned against Erdoğan. They see him and the current regional policies of the Turkish government as an obstacle to taking full advantage of the ‘historical opportunity’ that has emerged for them from the widespread destabilization in the Middle East to realize their regional power aspirations. Many conservative figures in Iran condemned, inasmuch they did, the crushed coup attempt not on democratic grounds but for notably different motivations. The anti-regime Iranians, on the other hand, have mysteriously accused President Erdoğan of leaning towards authoritarianism and even totalitarianism, the two terms whimsically and irresponsibly used by Erdoğan’s opponents.

Diverse Political Readings

Also, reactions to the failed coup inside Iran have not only reflected the perceptions of Turkey by Iran’s political elite but have also reemphasized the political divides at home. Javad Zarif, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, was among the first to condemn the coup attempt. Hours after the attempt, he emphasized the significance of popular will and sided with the Turkish people. For the Moderate-Reformist figures, the failed coup attempt attested to the significance of the unalienable popular will and the futility of any move to run against it. Unsurprisingly, with the presidential elections less than a year away in Iran and the risk of Rouhani’s disqualification from running for president by the Guardian Council becoming more pronounced, the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and his close circle have used the failed coup attempt to send a democratic message to the conservative establishment in Iran to respect the popular will.

For the Principalists, the failed coup has provided the best opportunity to disfavor the Rouhani government on one obvious point, to wit, its rapprochement with the US, especially following the nuclear deal reached in 2015. In a statement at a gathering in Tehran, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei referred to the failed coup attempt in Turkey as a sign of the untrustworthiness of the US for its alleged involvement. Another conditional condemnation of the failed coup attempt came from Ali Akbar Valayeti, Khamenei’s aide in international affairs, who used it to criticize Turkey for its insistence on the removal of Asad in Syria. In an interview on 16 July 2016, only one day after the coup attempt, he expressed his hope that “a day would come when the Turkish administration would also respect the opinion and vote of the Syrian people” and claimed “Bashar al-Assad has also been elected through the ballot box.”

The crushing of the coup attempt marks a watershed, not only in Turkey but also in the entire region. As Javad Zarif put it, “Turkish people’s brave defense of democracy and their elected government proves that coups have no place in our region and are doomed to failure.” In order to secure a lasting solution to the regional crises, most significantly to the Syrian issue, both Turkey and Iran must cooperate as two governments with high popular support, as destabilization or unpopular rule in one inevitably affects the other. Based on the recent foreign policy moves, there is every reason to suggest that Turkey is determined to restore peace in the Middle East by maximizing regional cooperation.

The comments made by some Iranian scholars teaching at western universities not only demonstrate their misreading of the developments which recently took place in Turkey but also give insightful ideas about the limits of their objective thinking. Fortunately, many Iranians inside the country see any coup attempt as categorically damnable, as they welcome the popular resistance in Turkey that heroically crushed the putschists on July 15. They, as every people in the Middle East, appreciate the costs of ineffectual, unpopular and foreign-controlled governments for the region.

Turkey has lived through the biggest trauma in its recent history, as the members of the Fetullah Gülen Terror Organization (FETO) attempted a coup d’état on July 15, 2016. However, the heroic people of Turkey managed to quell this sordid attempt by literally standing unarmed against flying bullets and tank shells. Together with the people were the police, loyal soldiers and politicians, first and foremost being the president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. As a country which has just survived a coup attempt, Turkey has astonished many with its political resilience. While systematically neutralizing coup plotters in multiple governmental organizations, such as the military, judiciary, bureaucracy, health and education sectors, which had been infiltrated by the FETO, the government preserved its functionality and managed to perform as normal.

In the same vein, to the astonishment of many, the Turkish economy showed great resilience in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt. Even in the first working day after the coup attempt, there was no panic in the financial markets. The Turkish lira only marginally lost its value against the US dollar and there was no rush on banks or bonds. In fact, the effect of the coup attempt on the financial markets was barely discernable. The Turkish democracy and economy have survived major setbacks in recent years and proved their resilience, the true extent of which has been understood more clearly in the light of the failed coup attempt.

It was absolutely vital to take necessary steps and give relevant messages to soothe the financial markets at such a critical time. The policymakers managed this process well in a calm and professional manner. The statements were to the point and the policy actions met the needs of the financial markets. In this vein, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Şimşek underlined that the policymakers were implementing best practices and Turkey was committed to the market economy. Şimşek also assured that capital controls were out of the question. Moreover, The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey took immediate actions to ensure the efficient functioning of the banking sector and to relieve financial investors.

In addition to these statements and policy actions, a well-functioning financial system, strong public finances, a dynamic real sector and a moderate current account deficit helped the Turkish economy to stay afloat against the failed coup attempt.

After having endured financial troubles and two major financial crisis in 1994 and 2001, Turkey finally set out to establish financial infrastructure via several regulations and supervisory institutions such as Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency and Savings Deposit Insurance Fund. Having learnt the lesson from the financial troubles suffered, the Turkish financial system has become much more resilient than that of most countries in the world. That is why the Turkish financial industry stayed totally intact in the aftermath of the 2008-09 global financial crisis as financial industries around the world experienced hard times and even faced numerous bankruptcies, such as Lehman Brothers, as well as bail-outs, such as massive insurance company AIG. When we take a look at the important indicators of banking sector, such as credit growth, capital adequacy ratio, the non-performing loans ratio, return on assets and return on equity, it is clearly seen that the Turkish banking sector is not only financially robust, but also highly profitable compared to that of many countries and as far as historical records are concerned.

Public finance is also strong in Turkey. As of 2015, public debt as a share of GDP stood at only 33 percent in Turkey, while it is 249 percent for Japan, 178 percent for Greece, 104 percent for the US and 90 percent for the EU. While the interest burden was very high in the 1990s, as real interest rate of total domestic debt stock was more than 30 percent, it diminished tremendously as real interest rate plummeted to single digit levels in the 2000s. Moreover, Turkey has wiped off all debt owed to the IMF by paying the last installment of 421 million US dollars in 2013, which marked the end of the 52 year debt history with the IMF.

Real sector indicators such as the capacity utilization rate of manufacturing, real sector confidence index and firm entry & exit rates show that the current situation of the Turkish real sector provides a robust image. Current account deficit has been regarded as the Achilles heel of the Turkish economy, as Turkey relies on foreign capital inflows to finance the current account deficit, making it vulnerable to global economic fluctuations. However, although current account deficit and economic growth rates moved in the same direction until two years ago, with higher economic growth rates resulting in a widening current account deficit and lower economic growth rates reducing current account deficit, the economy has been growing in tandem with narrowing current account deficit for the last two years. To put this into numbers, current account balance as a share of GDP decreased from -7.7 percent in 2013 to -5.4 percent in 2014, before shrinking to -4.5 percent in 2015.

The Turkish economy showed the glimpses of its resilience in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt, such that the economy and financial system have worked very well without any instability; as if nothing major took place just a matter of days earlier. The Turkish economy survived serious challenges and actually fared markedly better than that of numerous countries, especially in Europe, in the last few years. It now faces a bigger challenge. However, Turkey, with its strong and healthy economy and financial system, has the required strength and resolution to overcome this challenge too, as the immediate aftermath of the failed coup attempt has attested.

Note: A longer version of this article was recently published by SETA Foundation with the title, “The Resilience of the Turkish Economy after the Failed Coup Attempt”

Was it a spontaneous call and a spontaneous mass response? I believe and will argue that while the timing and brutality of the coup attempt was unexpected, the possibility of a coup itself was not. It is an unfortunate tradition, or rather a curse that Turkey could never fully break, for Turkey’s right and center-right incumbent parties to be forced out of power by the military.The military in Turkey has a tradition of toppling down the democratically elected governments. The reasons vary but in general, the military elites tend to think that the public keep making the mistake of voting for the wrong guys. According to this ill opinion, politicians are nothing more than populist rhetoricians and do not care about the long-term interests of the country. Further, politicians do anything for reelection such as responding to the demands of the ordinary man on the street (a.k.a. democracy) rather than asking wisdom from the military which “only cares about the true interests of the nation”.

Accordingly, the military knows the true interests of the country but the elected politicians and voters just don’t get it. For such a viewpoint, the republic comes before democracy. The military is the defender of the republic and, when necessary, feels obliged to defend it against the people who elect the politicians. Until recently, such an understanding had a solid popular base in the society as well, not big enough to win the elections though. The supporters of the military tutelage especially in the bureaucracy, judiciary, and academia saw nothing wrong with the military hijacking democracy. Even today, some people shy away from calling the 1960 military intervention as a coup (darbe), but prefer to call it a revolution (ihtilal or devrim) instead.After all, the commonly heard phrase, “We are the soldiers of Mustafa Kemal [Mustafa Kemal’in askerleriyiz]” indicated that the military is under the command of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk rather than the current president or prime minister of the time. A coup plotter major and a judge associated with the coup arrested for being involved in the Gülenist coup attempt of July 15 both repeated the slogan “We are the soldiers of Mustafa Kemal.” Regardless of whether it was a genuine call or just a lip service to cover their Gülenist side, this slogan has always been in the back of coup plotters’ mind in the past and present. The military simply did not care about the higher civilian authorities who are alive and currently in office but chose to follow a ghost they created in their imagination.A former chief of the general staff had delicately summarized the military’s autonomy from the elected politicians, government, and any other higher authority in his secretly recorded tape in 2011. (Gulenists are argued to be behind the release and share of this voice recording, which is another proof that the coup is not a temporary problem, nor is it the problem of one single faction in the military. Rather it is a systematic problem of the Turkish military, which needs to be handled for once and for all.) The general, referring to the Article 35 of the Armed Forces Regulation which had been codified in order to justify the coups, stated “They talk about removing the article 35 or something of this sort. Remove it or not, we, as armed forces, exist for this. This is our natural historical mission. Nobody can give us advice on this. Nobody can tell us the opposite of it.”

I have made this long intro just to make one point clear. The Turkish armed forces have traditionally thought that, when it deems it necessary, it has the right to punish the politicians by crashing the democracy with a coup. But in fact, the military enforced all the previous coups (in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997) not because it had the right, but it had the might to do so. They had the tanks and civilians did not, this simple. As of 2016, the military still has the tanks and the civilians still don’t. Everybody knew this, so did President Erdoğan. And Erdoğan also knew that the military continues to be the same old military. Despite all the changes it went through, there was one untouched characteristic: they saw plotting a coup as a natural right of theirs.

Since his party came to power in 2002, Erdoğan has long been worried about a coup against his party, Justice and Development Party (AK Party). The AK Party has won five consecutive elections (a record in Turkish history) and received over 49 percent of the overall votes in the most recent one. However, the curse was still out there. Erdoğan and AK Party politicians kept their eyes open for the tanks in the streets of Ankara. For many, a coup was an inevitable end for the AK Party, which did not give up winning the democratic elections one after another. Erdoğan himself had lost his seat as the mayor of Istanbul in the aftermath of the 1997 coup and spent 4 months 10 days in prison. He was seriously warned a decade later in 2007 with a military memorandum and his party narrowly escaped from being closed by just one vote in the constitutional court in 2008.

Hence, Erdoğan and his followers long expected a coup and probably gave some thought to what to do if/when the day comes. Nobody did anything for the PM Menderes when he was arrested by a colonel in 1960 and was sent to death row in a year. Nobody came to the help of Demirel, Erbakan and all the other politicians in times of coups. But this time the story would be different. Erdoğan has long stressed that he did and will stand firm against any undemocratic intervention. He asked his followers to do the same and his followers had long promised to be ready. It was a matter of humor for the Turkish public opinion to see Erdoğan being greeted by his fans in shrouds (the cloth in which Muslims are buried upon death) in 2013. But the message was serious and clear: we are behind you ‘to death.’

In short, people did not flood into the streets to defend their PM Menderes in 1960 partly because they had no clue about how Menderes’ life would be brutally concluded by the junta and partly because they had no clue about what they could do to prevent or reverse the coup. The same went for the following coups of Turkey up until the one in 2016. This time, people were ready. They had been reminded of the bitter end of earlier politicians and were motivated to defend their votes and elected politicians against a coup. In other words, both Erdoğan and millions of his followers (plus, even greater millions of the entire Turkish electorate) were ready for a coup to occur.

The only error was, they long waited for a Kemalist coup to attempt to crash the Turkish democracy. However, the address was different this time as Gülenists were behind the coup. Nor was the brutality of the coup expected, as it was the most brutal attempt in Turkey ever, with 240 lost lives to defend the democratic regime. Nevertheless, Erdoğan and AK Party were clear on what to do against a coup and with this expectation, they transformed the Turkish electorate on what to do in case a junta tries to crash the democratic process in Turkey. Hence, Turkish voters had learnt their lesson, were ready and waiting for the coup even if they did not know when or from where exactly it would show up. I hope the Turkish military can also learn its lesson and eventually understand that it is not their job to teach people how not to vote. If there is one lesson the failed Gulenist coup attempt of July 15 can teach to the rest of the military, it is the unquestionable stupidity and extreme danger of plotting a coup in 21st century Turkey.

Note: The article picture at the top is a famous AK Party banner from 2013. Photos (from left): Former PM Menderes (text: you hanged him!), former PM and President Özal (text: you poisoned him!), and Erdoğan (text: we won’t feed him to you)

The psychological impact of the coup attempt has created a strong sense of betrayal in Turkish society, leading to the formation of a new sociological base. There were already disgruntlements among an extensive number of people over the Gülenists’ chronic double-dealings, their messianic culture, and their ambivalent discourse inconsistently and awkwardly juxtapose religious and secular values insincerely for pragmatic reasons. After the coup attempt, a sense of betrayal emerged against Gülenists, who, in fact, were never expected to resort to military power and to use it against civilians. Until the bloody coup attempt, Gülenists occupying governmental posts were accused of disobeying state authority by forming a parallel structure within the state and solely looking after the group’s own interests. With the coup attempt, however, they went one step further and targeted the state itself with the purpose of becoming rulers of the country. They aimed to reconstruct the state in accordance with their own vision by using every, including deadly, means possible, which is unpardonable to any Turkish citizen.President Erdoğan, making an analogy between chameleons and FETO members one week after July 15, came to the conclusion that chameleons would feel insulted by this comparison. Erdoğan declared that FETO members pathetically change their ideology, discourse, and ideas according to every political conjuncture. Today, many people in Turkey agree that Gülenists have no fair religious, national or universal agenda, except their own ends that justify all means in any given context. The unreliable and unrespectable characters of Gülenists constitute the main motive behind their exclusion from society.Another reason behind the sense of betrayal in Turkish society is the well-known charitable activities of Gülenists, who had been identified generally with their non-profitable organizations. Their primary agenda was presented as public education, for which they applied a variety of methods to reach different socio-economic classes of society. They organized several educational programs targeting not specifically one social group, but differing groups according to economic income, occupation, and family background etc. However, people realized that their sole purpose was indoctrination. They organized social aid gatherings for housewives and political discussions for academics and journalists. For different social groups, they utilized different discourses. Additionally, Gülenists were generally known for their dedication to the group’s ideals such as devoting their lives to hard work for little money. Teachers working at FETO schools, in addition to earning little, further denoted a fixed portion of their salary to the organization. Religious and universal values stood at the core, appealing to all social groups in Turkey.

Many had supposed that Gülenists were good people and that their activities would help society for the better. A good example is Bülent Ecevit, a former prime minister of Turkey and known to be a strong advocate of the Kemalist leftist political ideology. Ecevit supported the Gülen Movement by saying that Fetullah Gülen was the representative of moderate Islam vis-à-vis political Islam. However, with the uncovering of the secret agenda of the Gülenists and its messianic discourse, both concealed by the avowal of universal moral values, many people realized the terrible mistake they had made, which caused a strong sense of betrayal. Since the coup attempt, people in Turkey have fully grasped the fact that the Gülenists’ real intention was to take control of the state. Fetullah Gülen, the FETO leader, taught his disciples to obey all rules without question and to wait for the right time to seize power. It seems that the Gülenists sacrificed their lives to reach the promised day, to which they had dedicated their entire lives.

Although Turkish politics is passing through turbulent times, one can safely argue that the decades-old discourses and highly problematic hypocritical approaches of Gülenists have lost all plausibility. Moreover, the Gülenists have lost their legitimacy and credibility within society. A recent study shows that eighty-one per cent of Turkish citizens support Gülen’s extradition to Turkey and a subsequent trial. Many believe that the Gülenists’ will to seize power will not stop here and that they may seek to regroup in other countries in order to redesign their domestic politics. The foreign minister of Turkey, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, has already pointed out such a threat for some of the Turkic countries in which FETO has been established for decades, as in Turkey. As Gülenists attempt to turn Turkey from democratic to military rule, it is probable that they will try to apply similar methods to other countries in the near future. On the bloody night of July 15, Turkish people acknowledged that Fetullah Gülen and his followers pose a global threat since they did not hesitate to use heavy weapons against civilians when they tried to seize power.

FETO has lost all legitimacy in the eyes of Turkish society and, as a side effect, has united Turkish citizens from all ideological backgrounds and worldviews. Turkish citizens survived by defending their democracy against this religio-military attack. For Gülen, it seems that Turkey was only a step toward a broader goal; the organization will certainly continue to disseminate and realize its messianic purpose from East to West. The FETO leader should be considered not only a religious fanatic and fundamentalist in his own country but also a danger to the democratic world order.

Immediately after the coup attempt, the efforts of the Central Bank officers and economic management team helped to ward off the initial shock waves. In particular, Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Simsek’s statements for foreign investors played an important role in reassuring investors during this difficult process. Simsek stated that structural economic reforms will be on the agenda, investors’ confidence will be secured, daily life will not be affected and political decisions will be market friendly.There are five important points that stand out in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt.

The Central Bank’s Measures after the Coup Attempt

The measures taken by the Central Bank (CB) on July 17 have played a crucial role in easing the first shock waves created by the coup attempt. Official statements on supplying unlimited liquidity to banks and the assurance of financial stability have stabilized the banking system and the markets, so that possible financial repercussions on the morning of July 18, 2016, could be avoided.

The CB’s decision on July 19, of lowering the interest rates by 25 basis points of the upper band of the interest rate corridor, showed its strong belief in Turkey’s economic prospects. On July 22, the CB announced that meetings will be held with domestic and foreign investors, analysts and members of finance sector. The CB gave a strong message that the Turkish economy cannot be redesigned by a coup attempt.

The Economic Management Team’s Message to Domestic and Foreign Investors

Statements by President Erdogan, Prime Minister Yıldırım and especially Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Simsek supported the normalization process and economic stability, leading to a climate of trust for domestic and foreign investors and the financial markets.

Simsek’s meeting with 500 international investors via tele-conference was so effective in giving first-hand information about the latest developments, that the promise of unlimited liquidity in the markets and of sticking to the fiscal discipline convinced the markets and investors of the swift recovery.

The Declaration of a State of Emergency

The government declared a State of Emergency for a three-month period to root out the hidden FETO members. It should be underlined that the government’s main intention is only to fight against this terror organization, whose members disguise themselves within various bureaucratic, judiciary and military posts. Therefore, in the period of the State of Emergency, the Turkish government will pay the utmost attention to ensure investors’ confidence in the markets through market-friendly political decisions and ensuring that daily life is as unaffected as possible. It appears that a quick normalization will be realized thanks to the strong democracy, operative markets and continuously enriched investment atmosphere.

The Stable Position of the Stock Market and the Foreign Exchange Market

Although the stock market index (BIST100) declined and exchange rates rose after the coup attempt, such small fluctuations were halted by timely economic measures and comforting statements from politicians. Economic indicators will apparently be optimized soon.

International Rating Agencies’ Statements and Decisions

Immediately after the failed coup attempt, the international rating agencies unfortunately made controversial statements regarding Turkey. In fact, Turkey has a very strong fiscal position and very low levels of public debt and budget deficits. In addition, policymakers have already taken economic measures to prevent fluctuations. Despite all of the positive indicators, Moody’s has threatened to lower Turkey’s credit rating, possibly to the garbage level. Some believe that, with this decision, Moody’s has aimed to drive the markets into panic. Despite the admirable economic performance of Turkey, in the past, Moody’s has acted unrealistically slowly to increase rating levels.

Likewise, Standard & Poor’s has decreased Turkey’s credit rating from BB+ to BB, thus making a negative contribution and causing malicious damage to the reputation of the Turkish economy. Fitch’s decisions will be more important in the near future. Overall, the negative attitudes of the rating agencies seem unfair and prejudiced. These institutions should take into account the potential of Turkey’s economic performance and contributions to the world markets.

Turkey has experienced robust economic growth since 2002, thanks to political stability and reforms. The Turkish economy has grown uninterruptedly for the last 26 quarters. This performance has occurred despite the global financial crisis and the geopolitical risks in the Middle East. This performance will continue with new structural reforms.

Despite the failed coup attempt, economic experts estimate that strong domestic demand will trigger production and investment in the following months. It is not the first time that Turkey has been given such a low rating. Despite the prejudiced attitudes of some international rating agencies, the wheels of the economy should continue to accelerate. In addition to the concerted efforts of the public and private sectors, communication with foreign investors should be set to continue. While Turkey contends with FETO (FEtullah Gulen Terror Organization), economic reforms are on the agenda and the market economy continues to function in its own way.

Democracy and democratic values have long been at the epicenter of international affairs. Universally applied democracy has come to determine not only internal but also international affairs. Despite this, democracy has remained a controversial issue and, not in a few cases, has been used as a tool in the hands of those who claim to be standard bearers of democratic values: the West.

On July 15, the Turkish state structure was threatened by a coup attempt, which aimed to overthrow the Turkish government and democracy. Governmental institutions that represent democracy in Turkey such as the Grand National Assembly (TBMM) or media outlets were bombed and innocent civilians who strove to defend their nation were killed. More than 250 men, women and children were killed during the coup attempt organized by the Fetullah Gülen Terror Organization (FETO), which eventually failed to achieve its goal.

For the first time in Turkey, politics, the media and people united against the common enemy: the coup plotters. Nevertheless, during and after the coup attempt, another opponent actor emerged. Surprisingly, some international actors, both leading politicians and media outlets, were disappointed by the failure of the coup attempt and still fail to recognize the democratic values to which the Turkish citizens firmly adhered. Moreover, some of these actors strove to exacerbate the situation. At this point, it is fair to ask whether these international actors want a democratic or a non-democratic Turkey. It seems that their choice is a non-democratic Turkey, which will follow their recommendations and submit to their will.

The stance of these international actors can be analyzed under three subtitles: politics, the media and Turkish expats. With the exception of the latter, the behavior of the other actors was not fair –not only towards the Turkish state but also, most importantly, towards the Turkish citizens.

During the first hours of the coup attempt, state leaders and government representatives made vague statements. It was clear that their stance towards the coup attempt was to be shaped according to its outcome. As it became evident that the putschists were losing ground, only then did the state leaders begin to declare their support for the democratically elected government. This pattern was followed primarily by the US and other Western countries. A striking example is the message directed to the US citizens from the US embassy in Turkey in which the coup attempt was called an “uprising”.

While politicians were reluctant to make politically incorrect moves, the media acted as it habitually has done during the last years: it vilified Erdoğan. From the beginning of the coup attempt, Western media did not hesitate to announce that the Turkish government had fallen and that the military was in control. News about Erdoğan requesting asylum in Germany was widely broadcast. In addition, even when the president, the prime minister and other leaders declared that the state was in control of the situation and that this was just a coup attempt, Western media did not transmit this critical information to their audiences.

Fabricated news about Turkey occupied the headlines of the Western media and these were unfortunately not mere exceptions. In fact, Turkey has become immune to such kinds of hoax, though the Western public has not. The Western media almost unanimously began to accuse the Turkish government and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan directly or indirectly and are still trying to portray him as culpable in these events. First, the mainstream Western media did not mention the names of those who attempted the coup. They have been portraying FETO as a peaceful face of Islam and Western countries continue to harbor the organization’s leader and leading personalities in their respective countries. Moreover, the Western media and politicians forget that the organizers of the coup attempt–FETO–pose an imminent threat to the security of Turkey, and the measures taken in the aftermath of the coup are the same as any state would take to protect its own national security.

Second, the Western media focused solely on President Erdoğan, and did not mention at all how the putschists bombed the capital city, how the army helicopters killed more than 250 innocent women, men and children without mercy or even how the united people marched on the streets to protect their state. Most of the headlines raised concerns about the “authoritative tendencies of Erdoğan and the purge against the opposition groups.” By this, they concealed the reality and the message that the Turkish citizens gave on the streets. They refused to see that all political parties represented in parliament declared their opposition to the coup attempt. Similarly, the Western media refused to expose the support against the coup attempt in the streets and the squares of Kurdish-populated cities.

Third, the Western media and many journalists warned and even threatened the Turkish authorities against punishing the putschists. It can be said that they do not want the Turkish government to take proper measures against the putschists. Moreover, the Western media stated their defiance against the state of emergency declared by the Turkish government, a legal right in the constitution, and also accepted by the European Human Rights Convention. Their Orientalist approach towards Turkey shows that they still consider Turkey to be a typical Middle Eastern or a third-world country.

An important example that needs to be mentioned is WikiLeaks. Soon after the coup attempt, WikiLeaks posted on its official Twitter account that the Turkish citizens must get ready to fight as it was to publish approximately 300,000 emails from the AK Party that would shed light on the coup attempt and those behind it. It was a shame for WikiLeaks and the media outlets that made news of this statement as it resulted in a huge sham. The emails that were made public were mainly spam email followed by some inconsequential emails. Afterwards, many Turkish citizens mocked WikiLeaks, while the international media remained silent, pointedly not updating their previous news in this regard.

The media outlets in the Middle East were/are more neutral towards the coup attempt. They were divided into two opposing categories. The first category welcomed the coup attempt in Turkey, which has been considered as the last Ikhwan-like regime in the region. This view was shared by the Egyptian media, which is under the control of the Sisi government, an administration established after a military coup in 2013. Similarly, the media outlets controlled by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were also strongly pro-coup and anti-democracy. Those who are in favor of one-man rule and strictly authoritarian regimes consider Turkey to be one of the last remnants of the popular and democratic movements of the Middle East. The second view welcomed the crackdown of the coup attempt and declared its support of the Turkish people and their legitimate administration.

Lastly, the Turkish expats in different countries went out onto the streets to support the democratically elected Turkish government in its battle against the Gülenist Terror Organization that plotted the coup attempt. Many Turks gathered in front of Gülen’s mansion in Pennsylvania, requesting his extradition to Turkey. At a time when the Turkish people are intimidated by the West, the support of their expats was essential. However, some influential Turks living in the West and working for the Western think-tanks followed the policies of their host institutions, criticizing the Turkish government and President Erdoğan, but omitting the death toll and the outstanding resistance of the Turkish people.

To conclude, the domestic and international actors, in most cases, had opposite impacts on the events of July 15. While the domestic actors served as a catalyst for defending the unity of the state and the democratic values, the international actors mostly tended to obliterate the reality, especially through their biased media. For what it is worth, the Western antagonism did nothing but further unite the Turkish people. Today, the people are aware of their power and this has made them stronger than ever; a notion that the West has long taught but little supported.

While publicly adopting a rhetoric of intercultural dialogue and peaceful existence, the mystical movement has avoided close contact with any traditional Islamic groups or NGOs, and adopted a purely pragmatic mode of interaction with many political parties, aiming to penetrate critical state institutions. Adherents of the movement constituted a powerful web of institutions that extracted capital and human resources across a wide geography that spans from Latin America to Sub-Saharan Africa and from the United States to Central Asia. The main strategy was to recruit highly qualified youth from a variety of backgrounds and to indoctrinate them along the lines of Gülen’s messianic teachings based upon hiding real identities, forming secret networks and collaborating with main intelligence agencies, starting from the Cold War period.In Turkey, Gülenist groups managed to form a massive web of human cells, over the years, placed in the higher echelons of the security establishment, intelligence institutions, the judiciary, bureaucracy, academia and the business circles in the country. Their first attempt to topple President Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party, which were perceived to engage in open conflict with the secretive group, came with the 17-25 December conspiracies in 2013. Yet, the plot to discredit the president and his party through fabricated sleaze allegations did not work as planned and the Gülenists in the security establishment and judiciary were disclosed. While investigations were underway to unveil and exclude a substantial portion of Gülenist elements from the military in August 2013, they launched a preemptive strike and initiated the most unorthodox coup in Turkey’s political history, triggered by a distorted religious order.Although Turkey’s political establishment and society in general are not unfamiliar with military interventions, this coup was utterly unorthodox and unique because it was not executed by the central command of the Chief of Staff, but rather by a military junta controlled by Gülenist coup plotters from different army ranks. In this junta, lower-ranking officials who enjoyed a higher position in the distorted religious establishment as Big Brothers (“abi”) were giving orders to generals, along with some academics, bankers and business people associated with the group.

It emerged that the Gülenist soldiers and civilians involved in the coup attempt were carrying 1 dollar banknotes, allegedly blessed by Gülen himself, as a coded means of communication. The coup was also unorthodox from the perspective of organized violence against the close entourage of the president, the Chief of Staff and major commanders of the army, crucial state institutions and the civilian population. Unprecedented events, including the bombing of the Turkish National Assembly, the headquarters of the Intelligence Agency and Special Police Forces by F16s dropping laser-guided bombs, the assassination attempt targeting the president, and the use of high-tech attack helicopters, heavy artillery and tanks against civilians differentiated this coup from its predecessors.

The wide scope and inclusiveness of the democratic reaction to the coup was also unique in Turkish political history, as civilians in both urban and rural centers, municipal workers and NGOs resisted the initiative that planned to pull Turkey into the status of a third-world country. Frankly speaking, Turkey’s experimentation with democratic rule was interrupted on numerous occasions in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997, and the idea of “military-led modernization from above” has deep ideological roots that go back at least a century, reaching the Young Turks and early Kemalists.

Despite intensive dialogue and integration attempts with NATO, the European Union and Western institutions for over half a century, the shadow of a potential military takeover has never disappeared from the horizons of the world’s 18th largest economy. But, in previous military interventions, particularly those in 1960 and 1980, the country was struggling with acute socio-economic crises and there was a need for strategic change in development policy, which were used as precepts by the generals to justify the coups. Looking at the 15 July Gülenist coup attempt, it is very clear that there was no socio-economic basis for the coup as the Turkish economy was displaying a respectable growth performance in a global environment that has been demonstrating sluggish growth. There was also no strong social support for the attempted coup.

The Gülenist coup attempt was thwarted thanks to the strong leadership of President Erdoğan, the powerful reaction of the Police Special Forces and the noble sacrifices of civilians at a cost of around 250 martyrs and 2,000 wounded. Despite the huge humanitarian and psychological impact of the attempted coup, the potential impact on the economic structure constituted one of the most important crunch points. Turkey was caught by this heinous coup attempt while the economy was gaining steam, normalization attempts with Russia, Israel and Egypt in foreign policy were advancing with potentially significant economic contributions and strong growth prospects were expected for 2017.

Despite initial hesitation in the international markets, strong macroeconomic fundamentals and effective crisis management by the Central Bank and economic bureaucracy helped to keep the reflections on banking and financial sectors at a minimum. Despite a temporary hike in exchange rates, the stock exchange did not experience a collapse in the value of traded stocks, and there was no speculative attack or exodus of international investors. Perceived investment risks associated with Turkey in the eyes of international investors did not jump either. The rise in the CDS figures during the coup attempt that reflect the risk perceptions of the country for investors was roughly equal to the rise observed when previous Prime Minister Davutoğlu declared his resignation.

Every coup attempt creates multifaceted social, political and economic costs and, objectively speaking, the 15 July Gülenist coup attempt will not be seen as an exception. Since a state of emergency has been declared to normalize the security situation, short-term international investors might be a little jittery in the short term. But in the medium and long term, structural reforms and incentive packages that were announced to boost domestic and international investments before the coup will continue unabated. Notwithstanding the premature and politically motivated decisions by some international credit rating agencies, those investors who place their faith in Turkey with a long-term vision are bound to win as the economy has ample potential for growth.

The post-coup environment will witness a process of purification whereby Gülenist elements embedded in the state bureaucracy, academia, business circles and the media will face legal investigations and prosecutions. This purification process is bound to exclude harmful elements from the state establishment and the private sector, thereby contributing to Turkey’s socio-economic dynamism in the coming years.

How did Fitch and Moody’s react?

Whereas the S&P downgrade is regarded as having trivial direct effects, the verdicts to be rendered by Fitch and Moody’s, which have been holding Turkey in the investment zone since November 2012 and May 2013, respectively, will be critical.

Upon the shock, Moody’s put Turkey on negative watch, declaring that it would watch the country closely in the months to come. While the previously set official date for Moody’s decision on Turkey is August 5, it seems possible that the institution will extend the timeline for a thorough review. Fitch, on the other hand, primarily highlighted the risks that the Turkish banks could be exposed to in the near future. It is expected to complete its rating review by August 19.

Taken as a whole, statements from both agencies similarly focus on the political risks of the junta attempt that could possibly discourage investors and damage the economic reform agenda of the country. Therefore, their decisions are likely to be shaped to a great extent by the signals received on the medium-term political outlook and the government’s dedication to the reforms. Furthermore, macroeconomic indicators will also be closely watched, along with prospective policy moves.

What are the economic prospects for Turkey?

Having noted the concerns and arguments raised, it now makes sense to clarify some of the relevant issues from an objective perspective. The need for such a perspective arises from the misleading nature of some of the news stories globally disseminated through the international media.

Regarding the relevant misperceptions and worries, one basic fact to be aware of is the character of the foiled coup attempt. Turkey, with its upper-middle income economy and long years of approved political stability, is a modern country that has left military coups far behind in the 20th century. In this respect, the coup attempt that erupted on July 15 cannot be considered a classical military upheaval as it was plotted by FETO, the clandestine terrorist network that infiltrated the Turkish Army. Therefore, the courageous citizens and leaders of the Turkish Republic had every right to defend their democracy on the night of July 15 against the FETO threat that would undoubtedly destabilize the country in an irreparable way. Having thwarted the peril, Turkish people of all political wings are now proud and more interlocked than ever, cherishing hopes for a much stronger democracy.

In this sense, the critical point leading to the answer with regard to political stability lies at the heart of the purge of the network from the Army and bureaucracy. Hence, the three-month state of emergency declared in the country aims to complete this task in an efficient and expeditious way in order to eliminate any relevant future risks. The process will have no implications on economic activity, as guaranteed and soundly emphasized by the government.

Consequently, operations conducted against the terrorist organization of interest are vital for a stronger-than-ever stability in Turkey, supporting the fundamentals of the economy in the medium and long term. This is why credit rating agencies and all investors with an eye on the Turkish economy should assess the recent developments in the country primarily from that significant perspective.

On the other hand, there is no doubt that the macro outlook is an equally important pillar of the decisions of economic actors. In this respect, the Turkish economy’s dynamic growth potential is still undeniably promising and awaits the implementation of the structural reforms promised by the government. The reforms, also targeting a more investment-friendly environment, are expected to boost overall confidence and accelerate the economic performance in the medium term.

Aside from its growth prospects, Turkey is well recognized in terms of its exemplary fiscal discipline and resilient banking sector with steady capital adequacy ratios. While the current account deficit has always been a structural problem in the economy, it has gradually decreased and hit rock bottom recently. Although the decline has been supported considerably by import prices, the risk imposed by the deficit has eventually become weaker. Yet, the ongoing finance needs cannot be denied and, hence, the confidence of foreign investors in the Turkish economy is still of great worth.

In consequence, reminding of its credible history in terms of ability to repay, and underlining the ongoing efforts for strengthened political and economic prospects, Turkey invites all interested global associates to closely witness its sincere dedication to a bright future. In Turkey, business is as usual and will hopefully be even better than usual. All the country needs is fair and objective treatment built upon truthful information.

Algeria 1954-62

The influential film The Battle of Algiers (1966) by Italian director Gillo Pontecorvo re-creates epic battle scenes between the Arab population of Algiers and the ethnically French soldiers who control the movement, actions and outward behaviour of the society.  Anger rages on the streets and in the ‘casbah’ and the audience identifies with the guerrilla tactics of the FLN. The formal approach of the film is steeped in neo-realism with location shooting and some FLN members such as Saadi Yasef and the local population playing themselves. It also uses a grainy newsreel style of cinematography with high-contrast low-key lighting.

This is a key work in the history of cinema which converges the styles of Documentary and Fiction; it is also significant for its anti-colonial stance and empowering depiction of Algerian Muslims resisting the French cultural and political occupation of their land.

The spirit of this classic film converged with the real noise and resistance on the streets of Istanbul. I listened to the Mosques across the city frequently give the Azaan in-between prayer times and then recite empowering supplications in Arabic and brief instructions to resist in Turkish.

My friends described the atmosphere on the Boğaziçi bridge; a lot of young women chanting ‘Turks don’t back off…’ as they walked directly into the military coup’s fire before jumping to the ground.

‘Your ammunition will finish soon…’ was verbally thrown at the coup soldiers followed by ‘We’re going to win or we’re going to die…’

Cheers erupted from the unarmed civilians when a tank-like ‘toma’ vehicle was blown up.

Iran 1979

The book titled Staging a Revolution: The Art of Persuasion in the Islamic Republic of Iran (2002) edited by Peter Chelkowski and Hamid Dabashi sits comfortably in my personal book collection back in Canada but the content of the book showcases, summarizes and reflects the revolutionary zeal of the time.

The confidence in the destiny of the Iranian nation as it rose up and overpowered the Shah’s autocratic state while also calling upon their collective Islamic cultural history is shown through design that reflects a remarkable synthesis of classical, sacred subject matter and form with new materials, resources, formats and styles. Posters, banners, stamps, bank-notes, wrappers, murals and graffiti were all used just before, during and after this key period. Another notable comparison from this book are the early Soviet posters from the 1920’s and their powerful embrace and creation of a constructivist approach to Modernism to push their new message.

The revolutionary spirit of these posters and messages came to me upon hearing the calls of ‘Allahu Akbar!’ on the streets of Istanbul. Beyond ethnic, sectarian and political chasms the following days witnessed a mass celebration of flags and cheers across streets sometimes still scattered with tanks, overturned cars and the remnants of the failed coup. This was a resistance and reclamation of Istanbul, Ankara and Turkey which will have benefits for the culture of the Ummah around the world.

A New Turkey

Much has been written about the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the 1923 rise of the secular nation state of Turkey; loss of a wounded Empire, reclamation and sovereignty of borders from the Allied powers, Turkification of the people and the legacy of an ongoing divide between secular institutions and mentalities and religious rights. However it is also useful to look at the resistance of July 15-16, 2016 as historically important in a global and cultural context. Deccani Souls, The Battle of Algiers and Staging a Revolution remind us that contemporary Turkey also has a Muslim soul that is able to resist attempted militarized coups and the global hegemony.

Literally every digital social media platform from end-to-end encryption to FaceTime communication tools were put to use both by the officers in the attempted coup, by the civilians and the political forces. The latter included the President himself, who not only tweeted his anti-coup message to mobilize his eight million followers to resist the putschists but also used a popular news channel and connected through FaceTime video chat app on the iPhone, calling on all the people to stage anti-coup protests by taking to the streets and guarding critical check-points including the bridges and airports. Seeing the President alive and well through the improvised video link assured the people of the authenticity and urgency of the call. The people’s power and many Internet platforms not only stopped the participating soldiers but also deterred many other soldiers waiting their turn at the barracks. Most of the social forces posted statements on Twitter, including many MPs and political parties.Those mainstream TV channels that managed to stay on air were quick to side and sync with the digital social media platforms helping to mobilize and inform the public. Soon after the people took to the streets to stop the coup attempt, they did crush the coup. While the military tried to take control of the state-run TRT – as it had done in the previous military coups – this soon proved futile because other private mass communication channels propitiously reported about the perplexing situation, conveyed the unanimous anti-coup message of the political class and even urged the people to march in the streets to stop the coup. This has showcased the immense mobilizing role of new communication technologies such as digital mass media in crushing the attempted military coup.Make no mistake: this is not an ode to the enfolding romantic tale of social media’s liberation power. Rather it is to understand the powerful sources of massive civilian uprising against the cruel bombings and brutal attacks by the military. Digital social media disseminated the overall anti-coup attitude of the activists as well as the lay people. Indeed, such a power proved critically instrumental in mobilizing the people; showing the power of the small street activism that has eventually triggered the ongoing mass protests. For example, the feeds following hashtags such as #DarbeyeHayır (No to the Coup) and #MilletçeMeydanlardayız (The whole nation is at the maidans) were already trending for hours.

According to the data provided by Somera, the number of tweets increased by 223 percent and a total of 34.818.329 interactions was shared, reaching to a staggering of 15 million people. After 10:00 PM on July 15th, the buzz regarding the attempt started to rise, as President Erdoğan did a FaceTime on CNN Turk the first peak occurred. The next morning, the attempt failed and the second peak happened.

[The graphical analysis is produced by Somera for SETA]

As soon as the tanks blocked the roads, including the famous Bosporus bridge in Istanbul, amidst gunshots and flying F16’s, the citizens, who just happened to be there as they were returning home after work, started live-streaming through the social media platforms such as Facebook or Twitter. It is important to emphasize that the most shocking as well as mobilizing were the horrific images of tanks ruthlessly running over the civilians as well as appalling images of F-16’s bombing the Turkish Parliament building.

To be sure, the President’s video-chat and above-mentioned image sharing proved much more effective than other uses. Fearing that a possible military coup would ruin the lives and upend the country’s future prospects they tuned in to listen to the Prime Minister, Binali Yıldırım, who connected to the NTV news TV channel through a phone call confirming what was feared most, that this was indeed a coup attempt and that the public did not know the whereabouts of the PM. It was, however, the social media feeds that later carried the night with live-stream and critical information on the worsening of the situation. From the beginning of the coup attempt until 16 July midnight, there were approximately 180 tweets posted from the official Twitter account of the Prime Ministry itself. Clearly those tweets aimed to mobilize the people. The Presidency posted 35 tweets, whereas the main opposition party CHP’s official page posted 7 tweets and MHP 24 tweets.

While all the TV channels were importantly unified against the coup attempt and strongly condemned it, they were clearly out powered by the power of images and narratives presented live-stream at the social media platforms across the country. Only few minutes before the midnight, a couple of soldiers managed to enter in the offices of TRT where at gun-point they forced the anchor, Tijen Karas, to read the statement written by the junta which claimed that the government had been overthrown and that the people should return home leaving the streets to the tanks and officers for their safety.

In order to maintain the momentum of protests the day after the military coup attempt, the Internet communication platforms continued to play vital roles in convincing the people to stay at the city centers during the following nights to deter any remnants of the putschists to stage another coup. One can only hope that the anti-coup protests and the use of digital and visual media would be an opportunity for understanding the necessity of responsible use of open Internet. The latter heralds a transforming social space beyond the traditional political practice by promising to fill the destructive gap within those highly connected yet disenfranchised social forces. It may also help to stop the existential polarization in a society otherwise driven by social and political divisions.

For an in-depth analysis about the role of all counter-coup forces please see Turkey’s failed military coup Turkey’s Stillborn Junta Coup Attempt: Process, Responses And Prospects.