The U.S. withdrawal symbolizes a new phase for local and regional actors in Syria. Particularly for Ankara, the U.S.’ “slow and coordinated” pull out strategy, which involves 2,000 troops in North East Syria, is a game changer; it was an unexpected move that no one saw it coming two weeks ago in Ankara. However, President Erdogan had a very strong expectation that President Trump would take responsibility to reshape Turkish-American relations before it would be too late. He never gave up on maintaining his communication with President Trump.

The mobilization of Turkish troops and the declaration of high military readiness in the region following Erdogan’s Ankara speech was a direct message not for the YPG but for the U.S. government to change its policy towards the YPG. More importantly, Turkey’s unexpected yet comprehensive air strike against PKK positions in Northern Iraq was a strong sign that Turkey would extend same military campaigns against YPG positions in Syria. In this regard, it was the last chance for the Turkish-American relations to reevaluate the escalation on the YPG issue. Otherwise, Turkey would have been militarily involved in the North East Syria where the U.S. has been operating alongside YPG forces. During the phone call on December 14, as it is claimed, President Erdogan strongly stressed Turkey’s position on military action, and it was followed by Trump’s decision.

At this stage, the operational and strategic dynamics, as well as the new geopolitical calculations among the actors involved in the Syrian conflict should be reconsidered. The post-American Syria revealed the dynamics, especially for Turkey. Hence, President Erdogan should reevaluate his overall strategy on Syria. Turkey’s priority, as president Erdogan repeatedly expresses, is to eliminate the YPG threat for Turkey’s imminent national and regional security concerns.

The cooperation between the U.S. and the YPG, and the U.S. operational military presence in NE Syria were some of the important dynamics that restricted Turkey’s freedom of military action against the YPG. Trump’s withdrawal means that Turkey gained freedom of military action in eastern Syria, yet the development brings a challenging road-map for Turkey to achieve its strategic priorities. If Turkey delivers its priorities on the ground and redesigns the current balance of power, the Syrian conflict is likely to be reshaped soon.

Following the cleaning of the Manbij pocket from the YPG forces, Turkey will reach its initial goal to take full control alongside its border in the western part of the Euphrates River. This might bring Turkey freedom of military action not only to reshape the overall region including Idlib but also to accommodate refugees.

The challenges that Turkey has to reconsider are multidimensional. First and foremost, what type of military move, in an operational manner, that Turkey will adopt following the U.S. withdrawal is significant. It seems that Turkey’s first military mission is to establish a full-scale military control in the Manbij pocket where Turkey and the U.S. had already agreed, yet the YPG maintains its presence there. The intense military mobilization of Turkey and Turkey-trained National Army near the Turkish border and inside Jarablus demonstrate that Ankara will take military action in Manbij.

Even though the regime tends to mobilize its militias towards the Manbij pocket to retake the city from the YPG, Turkey certainly perceives Manbij as a military threshold to maintain its military deterrence. At this stage, deterrence for Turkey is the use of threats to dissuade the Syrian regime from initiating an undesirable act in the region. Following the cleaning of the Manbij pocket from the YPG forces, Turkey will reach its initial goal to take full control alongside its border in the western part of the Euphrates River. This might bring Turkey freedom of military action not only to reshape the overall region including Idlib but also to accommodate refugees. Up until now, 300,000 returned to their homes in the western part of the River.

Following the takeover of Manbij, Turkey’s second military move against the YPG is expected to be alongside the border. This military operation will have a different character as the YPG would probably want to defend Ayn Al Arab (also known as Kobane), Rasul Ayn, and Tel Abyad against Turkey’s military action. The YPG’s search for a new ally at this stage is one of the significant steps that can influence Turkey’s potential military action, yet it seems that no credible actor at this stage can prevent Ankara from taking military action in these regions.

The strategy that Turkey might adopt following the liberation of Manbij has two broad aims. While the first aim for Turkey is to disassemble the YPG’s territorial continuity alongside the Turkish-Syrian border, the second one is to provide a safe haven for the refugee community who were forcefully displaced by the YPG. If this will is the case, Turkey is set to accomplish its original aim to establish a secure zone alongside its Syrian border. This also means that fighting against Daesh is a secondary mission that should be carried out following the establishment of a safe zone for Turkey’s military presence.

Trump’s decision brought many opportunities to repair especially the U.S.’s wrong strategy of working with a terrorist organization to fight against another terrorist organization, but at the same time brought Syria into a new rivalry between the regional countries.

This probably brings the third dimension for Turkey’s post-American roadmap in Syria. Fighting against Daesh at this stage is a complicated issue from a military perspective in which Turkey has the capacity, yet the geographical distance where Daesh militants operate makes Turkey’s military engagement riskier. While Turkey was calculating a limited military operation against the YPG in its borderline, now Turkey has to reconsider its military strategy.

This requires a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy for Turkey to clean the area from YPG and Daesh, hold the liberated territories to sustain military presence and finally to build the post-conflict places. More importantly, Turkey’s potential far-reaching military operation towards the southern flank of Syria might also bring the Syrian regime, Russia and Iran into the geopolitical rivalry in the region, which is a situation Turkey would not want to get into. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson said that “Syrian government should assume control of areas vacated by the U.S.” This means that Russia does not tend to accommodate with Turkey’s own roadmap for the post-American withdrawal. Therefore, cooperation with Russia and the U.S. is the most significant part of Turkey’s strategy in NE Syria.

The game changer development for Turkey would be a potential and quick dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces. If the non-YPG forces (mainly the Arab forces) inside the SDF decide to detach themselves from SDF, then Turkey’s strategy has to take the Syrian regime’s move towards the eastern part of the Euphrates into account

The game changer development for Turkey would be a potential and quick dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces. If the non-YPG forces (mainly the Arab forces) inside the SDF decide to detach themselves from SDF, then Turkey’s strategy has to take the Syrian regime’s move towards the eastern part of the Euphrates into account, which poses another trouble, not just for Turkey but also for the U.S.  

The Syrian crisis is fundamentally localizing geopolitics, in which each actor has strategically different priorities regarding every single terrorist formation in Syria. Trump’s decision brought many opportunities to repair especially the U.S.’s wrong strategy of working with a terrorist organization to fight against another terrorist organization, but at the same time brought Syria into a new rivalry between the regional countries. Undoubtedly, Turkey needs a comprehensive strategy for its Syrian road-map following the American withdrawal.

Reporting for Anadolu Agency, Levent Tok and Muhammad Mislo wrote in an article, “Excluding the west of the Euphrates, YPG sits at the top of a square that deepens 45 thousand kilometer square from the line between the east of the river and Iraqi border.” According to the article, this area is one-third of the total lands of Syria.

With the intense help of U.S. airstrikes and weapon support, the YPG/PKK has been able to spread to the east of the Euphrates River.

The article adds that the biggest settlements at the east of the Euphrates are Aleppo’s Ayn al-Arab (Kobani), Rakka’s Tel Abyad and Tabka, Al-Hasakah’s Qamishli, Amude, Rasullayn towns and the north parts of Deir ez-Zor; approximately 70% of the population in this zone are still Arab. Terrorist elements intend to control the occupied lands easier in the process of state-building by forcefully re-designing the demographic structure. The YPG has forced Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmens from their lands and has prevented those that want to return as the Daesh threat has been eliminated.

According to the data provided by the High Council of Syrian Tribes and Clans, the YPG/PKK has forced approximately 1.7 million people to migrate.

The U.S.-backed YPG/PKK has seized Syria’s richest energy sources in the name of ‘fighting Daesh.’ For example, YPG/PKK terrorists seized the biggest natural gas facility in Konoko in the north-east of the petrol-rich Dier ez-Zor in September 2017. The terrorists also captured the Jafra petrol field as well as the biggest petrol field in Syria – Al-Omar.

The article in discussion claims that the terrorist elements in the region have also taken control of the three biggest dams of Syria with the air support provided by the U.S. 70% of the total electricity need of Syria is provided by these three dams.

According to Joseph Dunford – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – “(In YPG area) We are estimating 35-40 thousand local force to be trained and equipped in order to provide stability.”

Abdulkadir Selvi provides some details from the operation. According to his sources, the operation that will be launched does not carry the same pattern as previous operations, and a different strategy will be applied. Regarding the question of ‘facing Americans,’ according to Selvi’s sources, the military presence of the U.S. is within the plan and that the U.S. military will not be a target.

The main goal of the operation is to pull 1.200 Free Syrian Army soldiers from the area of OES and placing them in Akchaqala, just across Tel Abyad. In addition to this, Turkish Armed Forces have sent reinforcement troops to the Ceylanpinar area across Ras al-Ayn. The main reason for the Turkish military to enter these is the fact that, like pulling Afrin apart from Ayn al-Arab, with the operations conducted from these two points, Ayn al-Arab will be pulled apart from the Jazira at the east. This will be a huge blast to the YPG’s attempt of state-building; while enhancing Turkish dominance in Syria, it will destroy the unity of YPG.

In response to President Erdogan’s announcement of the operation, the U.S. defense ministry has stated that a one-sided military operation towards the northeast of Syria is “worrying” and “unacceptable.”

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi 

President Erdogan recently announced that Turkey’s next military operation against the YPG/PKK in northeastern Syria might be launched “within a few days,” which became the top high-level statement made in Ankara most recently. The details such as time, particular target place and duration of the military operation are not precise yet, but Turkey’s strategic objective is clear: to de-territorialize the YPG/PYD alongside its Syrian border, fix relations with the U.S. in Syria and recalibrate its military presence.

More importantly, since Turkey previously conducted military operations in Syria, policymakers realized that without any military action Turkey could not reach any of its strategic objectives in Syria. Therefore, eliminating the PKK presence alongside Turkey’s Syrian border and maintaining an army presence there might provide Ankara with an additional political maneuver to consolidate its political stance within the Syrian crisis. This, especially, will be the case when the international actors begin to shape the future of Syria.

Turkey’s strategic objective is clear: to de-territorialize the YPG/PYD alongside its Syrian border, fix relations with the U.S. in Syria and recalibrate its military presence.

Although Turkey has an obvious agenda and strategic objective in the Syrian crisis and towards the PKK/YPG presence in Syria; others, especially the U.S., hold different strategic calculations and concerns regarding Turkey’s next military move in northeastern Syria especially a comprehensive military operation against the U.S.-backed YPG group. The U.S. attempt to establish observation points in the eastern part of Euphrates was clearly a strong signal to discourage Turkey to launch a military operation against the YPG’s strongholds such as Ayn El-Arab, Tal Abyad, and Rasulayn.

Following President Erdogan’ precise statement about Turkey’s next military operation, the Pentagon said that the military operation against the “SDG is not acceptable.” However, news coming from the ground shows that the U.S. began to withdraw its military forces from Tal Abyad. This development strongly demonstrates that Turkey’s military operation is underway.  Then two questions concerning Turkey’s upcoming military operation need to be answered. While the first one is the question of how Turkey is planning the military move on an operational level, the second one is the question of how Turkey’s next military action against the YPG will potentially reshape relations between Ankara and Washington.

News coming from the ground shows that the U.S. began to withdraw its military forces from Tal Abyad. This development strongly demonstrates that Turkey’s military operation is underway.

Regarding the operational dimension of military intervention, it seems that Turkey’s military operation at this stage will not be comprehensive compared to the previous cross-border operations such as OES and OOB. Even though there are different operational scenarios in the hands of the Turkish Armed Forces, such as conducting a comprehensive and full-scale direct intervention including the infiltration of ground troops into northeastern Syria, Ankara’s first aim is to discourage the U.S. from continuing its observation points alongside Turkey’s Syrian border to protect the YPG. Ankara believes that it would be too late if the U.S. continues to establish observation points.

Ankara’s primary objective is to create a militarily protected safe zone which will be liberated from the terrorist entities and then open up a territorial zone not only to protect Turkey’s border against the terrorist infiltration but also to prevent the YPG’s territorial continuity in the eastern part of the Euphrates River. This will undoubtedly be a game changer for Turkey on the ground. The new operation, therefore, would focus on forming a region liberated from the YPG along the Syrian border and controlling critical points. The first signal coming from the ground is that Tal Abyad might be the initial target of Turkey.

Turkey will certainly use its legitimate right of self-defense or intervention. For Turkey, the YPG issue is not negotiable.

Regarding relations between Turkey and the U.S., there are many strategic domains that both sides have to rethink through. If there is an agreement over Turkey’s military operation, then one side should certainly step back. President Erdogan said that the U.S. forces would not be the target of Turkey by underlying the potential cooperation between Ankara and Washington in the fight against the remaining element of Daesh. Erdogan strongly underlined that Turkey could take full-responsibility to fight against Daesh. More importantly, Turkey will certainly use its legitimate right of self-defense or intervention, as President Erdogan stated two days ago in Ankara. For Turkey, the YPG issue is not negotiable. Under this circumstance, Turkey, one way or another, will want to keep its eyes over the YPG and northeastern Syria until a political solution is reached across Syria.

Therefore, the most likely scenario for Turkey’s upcoming military operation is a limited intervention to clean the YPG presence by holding a small piece of territory to prevent the terrorist organization from consolidating its territorial and political order. If Turkey and the U.S. can find common ground to mitigate Turkey’s security concerns over the YPG, then the two countries might be able to establish a new modality to work in cooperation for Syria.

The recent change in Ankara’s strategy towards certain terrorist organizations has been a game changer. Since 2016, Turkey has been rapidly eliminating FETO and Daesh threats. However, the policy shift and the effectiveness of the fight given against the PKK threat has been incredible so far.

The numbers regarding the counter-terrorism performance shared by Turkey’s Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu last week demonstrated how Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy has been functional in the fight against the PKK, particularly following the attempted military coup. Since the July 15 failed military coup attempt, Turkey has been revolutionizing its counter-terrorism strategy, especially in containing the PKK threat not only in Turkey but also in Syria and Iraq.

Ankara has made a drastic adjustment in its strategy towards the PKK. Before July 15, the PKK had found great opportunity to consolidate its military and political capacity to transform itself from a terrorist organization to an acceptable armed and political actor in Syria and Iraq. While the PKK has been enjoying the strategic advantages of the “reconciliation process” by reformulating its long-term strategy in Turkey, it has been repossessing its entire political and military organization and geopolitical agenda with the increasing international status notably gained following Daesh’s offense in Kobane (also known as Ayn al-Arab) in Syria and Iraq. The first attempt to achieve a territorial autonomy (known as democratic autonomy) in Turkey has failed due to Turkey’s active counter-terrorism strategy and has been territorially contained by Turkey’s military offensive in Syria and Iraq later on.

The success of Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy was shaped by three revolutionary steps; the paradigm shifts in counter-terrorism strategy, security sector reform following the failed military coup, and the changing military strategy in tactical and operational level on the ground against the PKK. Besides these steps, one of the most important driving factors behind this success is the political decisiveness in sustaining a counter-terrorism campaign against the PKK. Undoubtedly, President Erdogan’s leadership role has been playing a vital role in consolidating the political determination of Turkey.

The success of Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy was shaped by three revolutionary steps; the paradigm shifts in counter-terrorism strategy, security sector reform following the failed military coup, and the changing military strategy in tactical and operational level on the ground against the PKK.

Firstly, Turkey’s new counter-terrorism strategy integrates and synchronizes political, security, economic, and the technological components that reinforce the state as the ultimate legitimate authority over the population while reducing PKK influence over the Kurdish population, particularly. This was primarily the case following the collapse of the peace process in 2015. The counter-terrorism strategy was designed to simultaneously protect the population from PKK violence in city centers and strengthened the capacity of the state institutions to marginalize the PKK’s perception in the eyes of the local people. Especially the process of de-PKKization of the municipalities was one of the most important strategic decisions taken by the government to undermine the PKK’s mobilization activities, particularly in the economic, political and military domains.     

The changing understanding regarding the reformulation of the military operation modality is another revolutionary step in containing the PKK threat. Until recently, Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy had been based on one-dimensional strategic calculation aimed to prevent the terrorist attacks conducted by the PKK against the military and security units, especially in the South-eastern part of Turkey where the PKK’s main terrorist campaign takes place. This one-dimensional counter-terrorism strategy is based on the action-reaction operational model in which security forces usually carry a reactionary military operation following the terrorist attack against any target in a specific geographical zone.

The new counter-terrorism strategy, however, is based on non-stop anti-terrorist security and military operations not only in city centers where the PKK-affiliated persons might live but also in rural areas. More importantly, the preemptive operational model that aims to neutralize the PKK threat in its base has become the central operational mentality for Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy.

Turkey’s new counter-terrorism strategy is based on non-stop anti-terrorist security and military operations not only in city centers where PKK-affiliated persons might live but also in rural areas. 

According to figures shared by Minister Soylu, Turkish Security Forces carried out 87,838 operations against the PKK in 2018. As a result of the anti-terrorism operations in 2018, Turkish security forces have neutralized 1,289 terrorists. The percentage of the operations carried by Turkish security forces is also remarkable compared to previous years. Turkish security forces have increased counter-terrorism operations in rural areas by 173 percent over the last two years.

Turkey’s superiority in terms of surveillance technology and advanced intelligence capacity also facilitated the effectiveness of its counter-terrorism strategy and helped to prevent potential PKK attacks. Thanks to the strong intelligence network among the state security institutions and efficiency of the intelligence information shared in the operational domain, 100 senior terrorists were neutralized in 2018, including those who were listed under the red, blue, and grey categories of the most wanted terrorist list. In 2017, for instance, the PKK planned 965 armed attacks. However, this figure dropped to 677 in 2018 demonstrating the impact of Turkey’s effectiveness in military intelligence. More importantly, while the PKK conducted 250 improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in 2017, the number of IED attacks in rural areas decreased to 148 in 2018.

According to figures shared by Minister Soylu, Turkish Security Forces carried out 87,838 operations against the PKK in 2018. As a result of the anti-terrorism operations in 2018, Turkish security forces have neutralized 1,289 terrorists.

Recruitment is also vital to the PKK’s survival to sustain its terrorist campaign and propaganda. However, the numbers show that the PKK has not been effective in recruiting new fighters because of the counter-narrative program of Turkey. This is the new face of the Turkish counter-terrorism strategy in containing PKK influence over the Kurdish population. Turkey’s effective control of public space and improved population-centric counter-terrorism understanding, the PKK lost its efficiency in delivering its propaganda. The number of terrorists recruited to compensate for others killed during the counter-terrorism operations is in decline. Participation in PKK events has reached its lowest level in the last 30 years. In 2016, while the total number of terrorist recruitment was 3,881, only 95 joined to the ranks of PKK in 2018.

The security sector reform process adopted following the July 15 failed military coup attempt is another driving factor that positively shaped Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy. While the relocation of the Gendarmerie under the Ministry of the Interior was an act strengthening the effectiveness of the internal counter-terrorism operations, the Turkish Armed Forces found a great opportunity to focus on extra-territorial counter-terrorism operations against the PKK, particularly in Iraq, which operationally prevented the terrorist organization to find extra space for maneuver to infiltrate into Turkey.

More importantly, the institutional reformulation of the Village Guards (VG) in counter-terrorism operations facilitated the effectiveness of internal operations in rural areas. The numbers show the increasing effectiveness of the Village Guards in fighting against the PKK. While the number of Village Guards reached 52,395 (plus 19912 volunteers) in 2018, the average age among the village guards decreased to 32. This is not limited to the increasing number of the VG; their technological capacity and training programs were also reformulated and improved following the new requirements of the PKK’s threat.

The harmonization of the technological capacities of different state/security institutions is also a critical infrastructure investment that Turkey has been doing since 2015. The reformulation of intelligence sharing, improvement of joint operation room and joint operational information mechanism facilitated the joint counter-terrorism operations. The number of professionals in Gendarmerie is 65 %, which is incredibly high as compared to previous years. To detect and end terrorist mobilization, especially in special counter-terrorism operations, drone technology provided Turkey another great opportunity in containing the PKK threat. Except for the TAF’s drone capacity, the drone capacity of the Ministry of Interior has increased 50 percent over the last two years. This is especially vital in creating a joint security umbrella to sustain active intelligence and rapid reaction against the PKK.

Turkey is revolutionizing its counter-terrorism strategy not only against the PKK in Turkey but also against other terrorist organizations in Syria and Iraq. The new face of terrorism and changing dynamics in the Middle East are likely to push Turkey to revolutionize its military engagements in the near future.  

Turkey has been taking direct action in northwestern Syria in order to protect a variety of significant interests for several years now. Since March, Ankara has been working to build camps with a capacity to host 170,000 refugees inside Syria so to stem the refugee inflows in the event of a major operation by the regime against Idlib. The potential for a fresh round of mass exodus is increasing as the Assad regime appears to plan to capture the last remaining bastion of opposition by justifying it on the presence of al-Qaeda linked groups in the area. The Assad regime’s past practice has shown that it will not spare civilians in the event of a military operation and that it will almost certainly create hundreds of thousands of IDPs. Having warned the regime against a possible operation, Turkey has been lobbying Russia and Iran for a while now to prevent such a scenario.

There may be a real danger of escalation and risk of conflict with Turkish troops on the ground, which have been deployed to the region to create a de-confliction zone – not to mention millions of IDPs, if the Assad regime attacks Idlib. Turkey is now a major stakeholder in what happens in northwestern Syria, including much of Idlib. The region’s future has a bearing on the fate of the opposition supported by Turkey, the success of the de-confliction zones, and whether the Assad regime can make a long-lasting deal with the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK. A regime offensive in the area would produce a new era of instability, potentially disturbing the hard-earned stability thanks to Turkey’s investment on the ground and diplomatic work with Russia and Iran.

Turkey has handled the humanitarian situation admirably over the years but this does not mean it was cost-free either economically or politically. Turkey spent billions of dollars in hosting refugees and it has evolved to be a rather politically sensitive issue domestically. The Turkish administration has been advocating for the creation of stable zones in Syria so that significant numbers of refugees are given the possibility of returning to their homelands. It is not clear whether all refugees in Turkey will be able to, or are willing to, return. However, the fact that close to a quarter a million Syrians have returned is already good news for Turkey. Yet, if the regime repeats what it has done in other parts of Syria by inflicting senseless violence and damage in Idlib, Turkey will be hard-pressed to prevent millions from marching to the Turkish border and to protect its other strategic interests.

What happens in Idlib may spell the end of the Syrian Civil War at a catastrophic cost in human lives and humanitarian challenges. The regime clearly intends to declare victory by taking over Idlib even if it has to create yet another major humanitarian disaster. Russia and Iran have been the critical players on the ground with an indecisive American presence focused on Daesh. The U.S.-backed YPG is now striking a deal with the Assad regime, once again refusing to understand the realities of the region and Turkey’s determination. The Trump administration is not interested in a robust strategic presence in Syria despite arguments for it in order to contain Iran’s influence. Lacking a serious rationale for being in northern Syria other than preventing a potential comeback by Daesh, the U.S. commitment will be increasingly weakened.

Given these dynamics, Turkey will remain a major stakeholder in northern Syria and any political agreement for the future of Syria will have to ultimately accommodate Turkish interests. Russia and Iran need to make sure that the situation in Idlib does not result in a disaster that Turkey has to handle on its own. This would not only alienate Turkey as it creates real dangers against Turkish interests but will also delay a potential political deal for Syria.

Turkey’s long war against PKK terrorism is becoming increasingly decisive and effective. Just over the past week, three events took place that reflected the decisiveness and effectiveness of Turkey’s current counterterrorism strategy. The Turkish Armed Forces neutralized two senior PKK commanders in the past week and took new diplomatic steps for a decisive solution to the country’s ongoing problem. Due to the current standoff between Turkey and the U.S., these developments may not have caught much attention. Here’s what you may have missed on the PKK front:

First, Ibrahim Coban (codename Atakan Mahir, the PKK’s top commander in Turkey) was killed on 11 August in the countryside of Tunceli based on ground intelligence. The availability of ground intelligence reflects the fact that the PKK is finding it difficult to find safe corners in the rough terrain of Tunceli, which used to be a somewhat safe space for the terrorist group. Coban was responsible for a series of terror attacks in Turkey, starting from the murder of six teachers in 1994 (the PKK systematically perceive school teachers as government agents or spies and has murdered over 100 teachers so far in its terror campaign). Once Coban was located with the help of ground intelligence, he was eliminated together with four other militants in an air operation of Turkish jets.

A second big hit was the killing of Ismail Ozden (codename Mam Zeki Sengali), another senior PKK figure, who was in charge of PKK militants in Sincar, Iraq. Ozden was not only responsible for the PKK’s activities in Sincar but was also a member of the PKK’s central executive council. His truck was traced with Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on 15 August and was hit in a joint operation of Turkish UAVs and jets (you can watch the operation video here). Such an operation is not possible with enhanced military capacity alone, but also requires the inclusion of ground intelligence and diplomatic cooperation with Iraq. This brings us to the third important event that has occurred this week. Iraqi PM Haider al-Abadi visited Turkey on 14 August and met with President Erdogan. The PKK issue was on the table and the hit in Sincar on the following day shows that the Iraqi government respects Turkey’s concern for its self-defense and does not problematize sharing intelligence.

In the midst of a serious diplomatic and economic turmoil with the U.S., the series of events that have occurred this week go to reflect Turkey’s enhanced counterterrorism capacity. We can speak of two reasons for this high level of commitment and capacity to end the PKK’s separatist terrorism campaign. One is about Turkey’s motivation. Due to the fact that the PKK ended the previous ceasefire with Ankara in the summer of 2015, and further abused the ceasefire process (2013-2015) to build upon its terror wave, the Turkish government now thinks that a military solution is the only way to terminate PKK terrorism.

The second reason for this high level of commitment is not just about Turkey’s motivations, perceptions, or intentions, but about its increasing counterterrorism capacity from a military point of view. While minimizing losses, the strengthened military outposts (kalekol) and the increasing number and capabilities of Turkey’s self-produced UAVs are helping Turkey hit terrorist locations much more effectively and precisely. Hence, in a nutshell, for motivational reasons, Turkey WANTS to fight the PKK more than before and due to factors regarding capability, Turkey CAN pursue this fight much stronger than before.

Since the PKK has no safe haven in Turkey – not even a single village – Turkey’s war against separatist terrorism focuses on the PKK’s safe havens in Syria and Iraq. The group is being dismantled from areas under its control in Iraq and Syria. Afrin in Syria was a start. Turkey cleared the area from the PKK with a military incursion (for my earlier remarks on the Afrin operation, see here and here). Next in Syria is Manbij, where Turkey is currently withholding its military muscles due to the existence of U.S. troops in the area. Turkey is committed to sweep the PYD (the PKK’s Syrian branch) forces from Manbij the moment that it finds an opportunity, although this could be postponed due to the support and protection provided by the U.S. to the PKK in Syria.

If the U.S. stops supporting the PKK in Syria, Turkey will also not hesitate to end the PKK’s training camps (which not only includes military training camps but an entire schooling system based on PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan’s personality cult and teachings), arms depots, and recruitment centers in Syria. If circumstances allow, Turkey will apply the Afrin experience to Manbij and then to the east of the Euphrates, where it will eliminate the PKK’s network and enable the provision of public services, from health to education, based on its own terms and not on the PKK’s. This is the only way to stop the PKK from using local schools as terrorism factories under the disguise of PYD or SDF labels.

A parallel operation zone is Iraq, where the PKK’s headquarters are located. Turkey shows no hesitation in cleaning the country from the PKK’s safe havens. Ankara has already cleared some PKK-controlled lands across its border in Iraq, is currently digging its way towards the Qandil region, and is seeking international cooperation with Iran and Iraq in order to reach its objective (for my earlier notes on the operations in Iraq, see here and here). Hence, readers should expect further news on Turkey’s front against the PKK’s decades-long terrorism campaign.

If a student of civil-military relations in Turkey were to write a paper on the evolution of the civil-military relations before the military coup attempt on July 15, 2016, s/he would have questioned, “What happened to the military in Turkish politics?” The conclusion drawn from this paper would probably be that the military was pushed out of politics through many structural changes undertaken by the AK Party government and a judgment made within the public sphere that the military should not play a prominent political role in society. A final finding could be that the contributions of the EU had played an external role in consolidating Turkish civil-military relations in favor of civilian supremacy.

Regardless of how the central question is stated and what the answers are, civil-military relations in Turkey and the place of the military in the socio-political domains throughout the history of modern Turkey have been a controversial subject. Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the country has experienced four military coups. While the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) were able to perform a full-scale overthrow of the civilian governments and took over temporary rule during the 1960 and 1980 coup, it relied on more indirect means to bring about the forced resignation and replacement of the governments during the 1971 and 1997 coups. Due to the success of these four coups, it is not a surprise that Turkish politics has historically been dominated by the preferences of the military, and thus the nature of civil-military relations has been problematic in terms of improving democratic civilian supremacy over the military.

As a result of the ideological conflict between the military and AK Party, which has grown since the party rose to power in 2002, as well as a series of significant events since the beginning of the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials in 2008, there has been a substantial shift in the balance of civil-military relations in Turkey. Nevertheless, the question of how this rapid transformation of Turkish civil-military relations was achieved needs to be analyzed by looking at the external and internal dynamics of the AK Party era.

The AK Party government has made significant structural and political transformations in terms of civil-military relations and the military’s institutional and socio-political role, which have decreased the involvement of the military in politics since 2007. However, civil-military relations had not yet been fully civilianized before the July 15 military coup attempt. Following the suppression of the July 15 coup attempt, the unfinished democratization project of civil-military relations entered a new phase.

The June 24 presidential elections and the establishment of the new government model brought radical changes in civil-military relations as well. Initially, President Erdogan appointed his Chief of General Staff Gen. Hulisi Akar as Minister of National Defense. Following that, by presidential decree, the Chief of General Staff was positioned to operate under the Ministry of National Defense. Thirdly, by decree, the structure of the Supreme Military Council was re-designed in terms of the president’s autonomy over the final decision to determine promotions and assignments of colonels and generals and the number of ministers who can participate in Council meetings. Now, the decision regarding the promotion of the colonels and generals will be determined according to the absolute majority within the structure of the Supreme Military Council. The number of ministers who attend the Council meeting has also increased. The Vice-President and Ministry of Economy will be part of the Council meetings. But the question of whether Turkey reached a balance in civil-military relation remains due to the exceptional nature of civil-military relations in the country.

Ankara’s Four-Dimensional Strategy to Reconstruct Civil-Military Relations

To, ultimately, end the civil-military imbalance in post-July 15 Turkish politics, Ankara has attempted to restructure its entire state apparatus, in which security agents including the TAF will be positioned at the center. At the same time, the government has been trying to develop a comprehensive and long-term strategy for the newly emerging threats stemming from the regional insecurities in the Middle East. After the July 15 military coup attempt, the new period has entailed three crucial phases: lustration (de-Gulenization of the state) period, rehabilitation, democratic reconstruction of civil-military relations and modernization of the Turkish military. Ankara followed four-dimensional strategies in the post-July 15 coup attempt:

• Civilianization dimension is focused on democratic consolidation of the civil-military relations and requires that the TAF undergoes a full-fledged civilian control.
• Control-balance dimension sought to create a balance between the security forces in order to prevent a monopoly by the Chief of General Staff’s over the decision-making process within the army; and aimed to separate the security forces (Gendarmerie and Coast Guard Corps) from the chain of command to the Chief of General Staff to obtain a counter-balance.
• Ideological dimension sought to build ideational diversity within the officer core, but within the limits of their loyalty to the Constitution.
• Strategic dimension sought to redefine the national, regional, and international strategic mission of the TAF.

It is now that President Erdogan accomplished his first task by cleaning almost all the members of FETO within the TAF and other critical security institutions. The perception of TAF among the Turkish people has gained a very positive stance due to the increasing role of TAF in providing internal and regional security against threats emanating from the PKK and other terrorist organizations. TAF is more active militarily in Syria and Iraq to prevent terrorist activities against Turkey.

The second part of the post-July 15 civil-military relations is redesigned by civilian supremacy. But it does not necessarily mean that Turkey solved all its problems regarding civil-military relations. Under the presidency of Erdogan, the Ministry of National Defense will probably play a vital role in shaping Turkey’s military strategy and normalizing civil-military relations. The National Defense Ministry was in full control of the Chief of General Staff and responsible for daily military activities of TAF due to the exceptional status of Turkish military above its politics. Currently, the new minister has an important influence over the military institutions, and he has been closely working with the civilian authority in the post-July 15 Turkish atmosphere. Especially, TAF played an essential role in terms of recalibrating Turkey’s political strategy in Syria and Iraq and Turkey began to recalibrate its overall influence over the Syrian crisis.

President Erdogan’s central plan in the mid-term is to transform the Turkish military in accordance to the new regional and global geopolitical realities. TAF also wants to consolidate its adaptation capacity in order make the Turkish military more effective, deterrent, and professional. Therefore, the new minister Gen. Akar is seen as the most acceptable figure for TAF to make this transformation possible. However, since each of the aforementioned processes will take a long time to accomplish, there is a need for a comprehensive strategic roadmap for Turkey’s civil-military relations and for the strategic transformation of the military in order to increase the credibility of the TAF and minimize the security risks for Turkey in national, regional, and international security environments.

Turkey is in the midst of a ground operation in Iraq. The operation aims to clear the entire area under PKK control in Iraq and remove the PKK headquarters from the Qandil region, which is about 100 km away from the Turkish border. There were already limited operations and ongoing air bombardments of the PKK targets taking place after the PKK ended the ceasefire in the summer of 2015. Nevertheless, according to local sources, the operations took a new phase on March 11th of this year.

Accordingly, Turkish forces landed on the top of the mountains (i.e., Şapan, Dilan, Kewet, Bene, Çiyasor, Alekan ve Çiyaneya) in Sidekan/Bradost in Soran district of North Erbil. Then, eleven military bases were installed in the area. Next, the installed bases were connected to each other with the clean & sweep operations of Turkish ground forces and newly built roads between the bases. We see a close synchronization of the Turkish air and ground forces in time, space and purpose for the clean & sweep operations.

As a result of this joint operation, 155 PKK members were neutralized in the region since March 11. The 23 km long border was cleaned of the PKK threat and a total 400 km square is cleaned of the PKK. As a result of this operation, Turkey formed two pockets of PKK-free areas in Iraq across its border, one across Çukurca in the west and one across Şemdinli in the east. The eastern pocked has become a corridor heading towards Qandil and is currently as close as 24 km to the PKK headquarters.

Since March of this year 155 PKK members were neutralized in the region. The 23 km long border was cleaned of the PKK threat and a total 400 km square is cleaned of the PKK.

Turkey seems to be committed to end PKK terrorism for once and for all. After the PKK ended the ceasefire by murdering four Turkish security personnel in three different occasions from July 20 to 23, 2015, Turkey started its counter-terrorism operations. In response, the PKK increased its terror attacks including suicide bombers in bus stops, stadiums, etc. and started its so-called “rural-based urban war” in 22 centers across six cities in southeastern Turkey.

Once Turkey cleaned these residential areas from the PKK, the country seems to be committed to end the PKK in its strongholds outside Turkey. The PKK has no safe havens in Turkey, not a single “liberated” village, but is freely recruiting, training, sheltering, and even ruling vast areas in Syria and Iraq. Afrin was the first place where the PKK/PYD was cleaned off, the PKK leader Ocalan’s posters were taken down from Afrin city, and school textbooks with references to Ocalan are no longer being taught to school kids in Afrin.

Given that Qandil is 100 km away from the Turkish border, it required diplomatic negotiations with the Iraqi central government.

Following Afrin, Turkey also pressured for Sinjar in Iraq and Manbij in Syria to be cleared of the PKK. Sinjar and Manbij are still matters of diplomatic encounters between Turkey, the U.S. and Iraq. Nevertheless, unlike Manbij in Syria, the PKK is not under the security umbrella of patron states in northeast Iraq. In fact, the organization does not even allow the Kurdistan Regional Government forces to the areas under its control. Yet, given that Qandil is 100 km away from the Turkish border, it required diplomatic negotiations with the Iraqi central government.

If Iraq will be cleared of the PKK altogether, it will have to receive the support of Iraq or even Iran, which otherwise might be a retreat or even a logistical support zone. Hence, Turkey’s offensive in Iraq will require its neighbors’ cooperation. And only after such a tripartite cooperation of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, can the PKK finally be cleaned off from Qandil. As for defeating the PKK in Syria, Turkey will have to work with the U.S. and will have to find a way to persuade the U.S. to stop its support to the PKK’s consolidation in Syria.

On the 58^th day of the military campaign Operation Olive Branch, Turkey declared its victory against the PKK/YPG in Afrin. Following the collapse of the PKK’s defense strategy and its unexpected isolation within the geopolitical struggle, the city is now under full control of the Turkish Armed Forces and the TAF-backed Free Syrian Army. One way or another, it is clear that this military-political victory of Turkey will provide more opportunities for strategic manoeuvres in Ankara’s next military move, particularly towards its ongoing military campaign against the PKK in northern Syria. Upon the liberation of Afrin city, with the surprisingly little resistance by the PKK, Turkey is now reconsidering its military and political options to minimize the PKK’s role in the midterm, and de-territorialize the PKK and YPG in Syria and Iraq.

Speaking in Ankara, a day after the TAF and Free Syrian Army cleared Afrin, President Erdogan vowed to further Turkey’s fight against terrorism beyond Afrin. In his speech, Erdogan said: “We have eliminated most of the terror corridors in the region,” and “we will continue this process until we entirely eliminate this corridor that includes Manbij, Qamisli, Ayn al Arab (also known as Kobani) and Rasuylayn.” President Erdogan also underlined that Turkey’s next military move will take place in Manbij – a region that is still under the control of the U.S.-backed PKK/YPG forces. Following the visit of former U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to Turkey to negotiate about the PKK issue in Manbij, Turkey’s foreign minister Cavusoglu expressed that the YPG will hand over the governance of Manbij to the Turkey-led Free Syrian Army in the presence of the U.S. military units there. However, after Trump’s unexpected Pompeo move, as the new Secretary of State, Cavusoglu made a minor revision in his early announcement about the agreement with Tillerson over the issue of Manbij. Cavusoglu stated that Turkey and the U.S. have not reached an “agreement,” but a common “understanding” regarding the issue of the U.S.-PKK alliance in Syria. At this stage, there is still an ambiguity regarding the position of the new State Secretary in negotiations with Turkey.

While the U.S. administration’s stance towards Turkey remains unclear, President Erdogan said that Turkey would also continue its fight against the PKK in Sinjar, a region that has been controlled by the PKK since 2014. Now, the foreign and security policy circles in Ankara are speculating how Turkey will carry out its military campaign against the PKK in Iraq. Turkey sees Sinjar just as strategically important as Afrin and other PKK-controlled regions. The geographical proximity of Sinjar to Turkey, and the role of Sinjar as a hub between Qandil and northern Syria threatens Turkey’s national security, and provides the PKK with more space to freely mobilize its militants and military equipment. It is crucial to note that the PKK’s presence in Sinjar threatens Iraq’s territorial integrity as well as the political stability of northern Iraq.

The strategic rationality behind Turkey’s move against the PKK in Sinjar is very simple. Turkey believes that the PKK’s presence in Sinjar does not meet with the regional geopolitical expectations, similar to the PKK experience in Afrin. Turkey and Iraq recently reached a tacit agreement over the PKK issue in northern Iraq. Iran seems to share a similar perspective regarding the PKK presence in northern Syria and Iraq. The KRG’s independence referendum showed how an intra-regional competition turned into an ad hoc realistic alliance in the presence of a common threat. Therefore, it is possible to claim that the PKK lacks an intra-regional support in maintaining its political and military presence in Sinjar. More critically, the PKK does not benefit from the U.S. air protection in Sinjar. Thus, the security and foreign policy centers in Ankara believe that the PKK will be isolated if Turkey decides to intervene against the PKK in Sinjar.

However, this does not necessarily mean that Turkey will take unilateral action against the PKK in Iraq. There are three alternative scenarios that should be taken into consideration. First and foremost, Turkey will try to evacuate the PKK from Sinjar by encouraging the Iraqi central government to take military action. Secondly, Turkey and Iraq will take a joint military action against the PKK together, if the PKK does not peacefully hand over the city. The recent visit of Hulisi Akar, Turkish Chief of General Staff, was the first step in convincing Iraq to take military action against the PKK. After his visit, the two countries underlined the importance of commonality in the fight against terrorism. The third and yet undesired option is part of Turkey’s ongoing military activism in the region against the PKK. At domestic, regional and international levels, Turkey benefits from its trans-frontier military initiatives as the active use of military forces provide a strategic superiority for Turkey to contain security threats and strengthen its diplomatic relations. The launch of Operation Olive Branch is a good example in understanding how the use of power consolidates Turkey’s diplomatic efforts on regional and international scales.

Articulated as such, according to the third option, Turkey is likely to act unilaterally against the PKK in Sinjar. Many in the governmental circles believe that Turkey might also use its new proxy forces against the PKK in Iraq. It is fair to conclude that Turkey wants to secure its borders, and also its regional strategic priorities. The use of military power will be part of this strategy in the future until Syria and Iraq reach a level of sustainable stability and security. The regional dynamics, as well as the new trends in Turkish security and foreign policy, enables Turkey to carry out its military campaign beyond Afrin.

On March 3, 2018, Turkey’s Office of the Prime Ministry, Directorate General of Press and Information organized a visit consisting of foreign reporters and non-governmental organizations to Syria.

The aim of the visit was to inform reporters of the situation in Afrin and give information about Operation Olive Branch, which until this day has seen the neutralization of around 3,000 terrorists. In addition to the staff that organized the trip and the reporters, members of NGOs also attended. The group was reportedly composed of 20 people in total.

There was a wide range of reporters, including individuals from the BBC and Al-Jazeera. A reporter who attended the visit spoke to The New Turkey on the condition of anonymity and explained their experience.

A group of reporters are seen before the visit. Picture obtained from source. 

The trip to Syria began in Azaz, a city northwest of Syria, roughly 30 kilometres from Aleppo – n area that was included in Operation Euphrates Shield. The source emphasized that Turkey is pursuing a vital role in the re-normalization of life standards in Syria. “Turkey is trying to ensure Azaz becomes an example city for the rest of Syria. It is doing this by helping schools, re-building infrastructure and by helping the local administrations. It even has a PTT [a Turkish post-office] there.”

“Assad regime forces had bombed a mosque in Azaz. Today Turkey’s Presidency of Religious Affairs is re-building that mosque,” the source said.

Explaining that they had the chance to speak to the local populace when they were there, the source told us that the local population see Assad as the sole reason for this crisis. “The people there say that the whole reason for this crisis [in Syria] is because of Assad.”

After visiting the Azaz region, the group was taken to the village of Mersawa. The source told us that the village only consists of 15 families; half of them had left their homes due to the situation in the country. In comparison to the situation in Azaz, the standard of life in Mersawa is lower.

“We spoke to a couple of families in Mersawa. There are only around 15 families left, as most of them have migrated and left their homes. AFAD and the Turkish Red Crescent provided these families with survival necessities such as food and blankets.”

A picture depicting the help provided by AFAD in Mersawa. Picture obtained from source. 

When asked about the situation of the civilians in operation areas, the source told us that “they [the Turkish Armed Forces and the Free Syrian Army] are very sensitive against the civilians. It feels like there is a political order that warns ‘do everything to protect the civilians.'”

The source also added that some members of the Free Syrian Army said that the sensitivity in protecting civilians is “causing the operation to proceed much more slowly and that there is a clear separation between the PKK and the Kurdish population of Syria.”

Many anti-personnel landmines, which are banned by the Ottawa Treaty, have been found in areas liberated from terrorists during the Turkish Armed Forces’ ongoing operation in Syria’s Afrin region.

On January 20, 2018, Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch in order to clear the PYD/PKK and Daesh terrorists from Afrin, northwestern Syria.

Since then, many different types of arms, ammunition, tools and materials have been seized.

Several anti-personnel landmines were also found in areas cleared of terrorists between Sunday and Monday.

Since it came into force in 1999, the Ottawa Treaty, which outlaws anti-personnel mines, have been ratified or acceded by 163 countries.

The mines, which are difficult to detect, pose a threat to civilians living in the region.

During Operation Olive Branch, many shelters, hideouts and concrete sites, abandoned by the PKK/YPG and Daesh terrorists, have also been seized.

The shelters were found under trees, which were knowingly planted there in order to prevent detection of their locations by unmanned aerial vehicles. The entrance of the shelters were also covered by nylon canvas for camouflage.

Source: Anadolu Agency

On Monday 12 February, the Turkish Armed Forces announced that a total of 1,369 PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG and Daesh terrorists have been “neutralized” since the launch of Operation Olive Branch in Syria’s Afrin region.

Turkish authorities often adopt the word “neutralized” to imply the terrorists in question either surrendered or were killed or captured.

In a published statement, the Turkish General Staff said that the airstrikes conducted by the Turkish Armed Forces overnight destroyed 15 terrorist targets used for shelter as well as ammunition depots and weapon pits.

According to information gathered from the region, 103 PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG and Daesh terrorists were neutralized on Sunday.

Operation Olive Branch was launched on January 20, 2018, with the aim to secure the Turkey-Syria border and to grant Syrians the right to live free of terror.

On 20 January the Turkish Armed Forces started Operation Olive Branch, which aims to clear terrorists in the Afrin region of Syria.

While numbers vary, there are between 8,000-10,000 terrorists in the region. Approximately 700 of them have been neutralized since TAF began the operation.

Unlike the U.S., which has justified its cooperation with the PYD/YPG on the basis of “fighting against DAESH,” Turkey is fighting against all terrorist groups in Syria.

Despite the fact that Turkey called for the Trump administration to stop arming and assisting the YPG, the U.S. have remained doing so. Only recently during a phone call between the presidents of the two countries it was stated that Trump promised to stop arming the terrorist group.

Although it will take a matter of time to see whether the U.S. will keep its promise, the fact that the PYD/PKK and DAESH have agreed on a deal to fight together re-emphasizes the ignorance of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.

According to security sources as reported by the Anadolu Agency, in order to aid their fight against the Turkish Armed Forces and the Free Syrian Army, PYD/PKK released Daesh members from prisons in Afrin, Raqqa ad Deir ez-Zour on the basis that they fight against the Turkish forces.

Around 400 DAESH terrorists were taken to the town of Jinderes, south of Afrin.

The PYD/PKK convinced these Daesh terrorists by promising an end to their punishment, having their names struck off the terrorist list and ensuring that their home countries stop tracking them.

This not only re-iterates the argument made by the Turkish government that the U.S. ought to stop financing terrorism in order to fight against another form of terrorism, but also rebuts the absurd claims that Turkey was once apparently “helping ISIS [Daesh].”

The civil war in Syria has not only affected Turkey in terms of the refugee crisis it caused but has also enabled terrorist organizations to raise to the sphere, taking advantage of the chaos in the region.

Turkey’s military intervention in Afrin came due to this very reason: the PYD/YPG terrorist organization had settled to create a terror corridor on the Turkish-Syrian border, which inevitably became a matter of national security for Ankara.

The Afrin region in Syria was handed over to the PYD/YPG in Syria in 2012 by the Assad regime. Since then, the terrorist group has forced the migration of the local population, including Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens.

Thousands have been displaced due to the insecurity in Afrin.

With the operation taking place, the Turkish Red Crescent has announced that it is preparing for the accommodation of over 50,000 people near Afrin.

With the aim to re-store peace and authority in the region, the Turkish Armed Forces and the Free Syrian Army gave start to Operation Olive Branch, which began on 20 January.

Since the operation began, the forces have cleared Afrin and its surrounding areas from 649 terrorists.

In addition to this, the Turkish Armed Forces lost 7 members of its personnel serving in the area.

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared the imminent start of the Afrin operation in order to cleanse part of its southern border from PKK-affiliated YPG terrorists. The Turkish Armed Forces deployed several units to the Turkish border shared with the Afrin region, while the Turkish-backed Syrian rebels in northern Syria, who were part of the Euphrates Shield Operation, also prepared for the Afrin operation.

On 20 January, the Turkish Armed Forces began Operation Olive Branch in order to clear the Afrin region from YPG militants. The operation was set with a huge bombardment of YPG warehouses and strategic military positions. In addition to these airstrikes, the Turkish Armed Forces also targeted several YPG positions across Afrin with artillery shelling.

Operation Olive Branch came shortly after Russia withdrew its soldiers from the Afrin region in order to avoid being shelled by Turkey. The Russian withdrawal was a result of several high-negotiations between the Turkish and Russian Chiefs of Staff – who had previously met in Russia prior to the start of the military operation.

Operation Olive Branch is being conducted with a similar method like Operation Euphrates Shield, which was conducted in order to clear northern Aleppo from Daesh militants. Once again, the Turkish Armed Forces are being accompanied by Turkey-backed Syrian rebels. In contrast to the Euphrates Shield however, the main focus of Operation Olive Branch is to eliminate YPG militants in Afrin. Another difference between the two operations is also the terrain – when compared to Afrin, northern Aleppo is easier to operate as Afrin is located around mountains. More, another difference observed in the two scenarios is that the YPG have controlled Afrin for much longer than Daesh had controlled northern Aleppo.

YPG’s control of Afrin

The YPG has controlled the Afrin region since mid-2012 after the Assad regime plainly handed over the area. The terrorist organization’s control of Afrin was until Operation Olive Branch, as no other faction on the ground had attacked the region. In 2015, the YPG formed an alliance with Jaysh al Thuwwar, forming the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces. At the beginning of 2016, the YPG and Jaysh al Thuwwar captured the strategic Minnagh military airport and Tel Rifaat from Syrian rebels. Russia supported this effort with intense airstrikes. The last expansion of areas controlled by the YPG was during the Euphrates Shield Operation. The YPG took advantage of the immense fighting between Daesh and the Turkish-backed Syrian rebels and by doing so, the group tried to link up with YPG militants in Manbij. Even though the group did not succeed with this strategy, they managed to gather some new territories in northern Aleppo.

The presence of the YPG in Afrin and expanded territories around Tel Rifaat is estimated to have composed of 7,000 militants. In addition to the YPG militants, Jaysh al Thuwwar also has up to several hundred fighters under its command. Especially due to the forceful recruitment in Afrin, the YPG was able to increase its number to the 7,000 based in Afrin.

The depth of the operation

The difficulty of the operation in Afrin also depends on the aims and depth pursued by the government. In general, Turkey seems to have two different options. The first includes the entire cleansing of the Afrin region, which will take time as besieged YPG elements will fight until the very end. Additionally, the mountainous terrain in Afrin will give the terrorist group an opportunity to adopt guerilla tactics against the Turkish Armed Forces and the Syrian rebels. As the YPG is led by PKK veterans who have experienced this type of warfare, this will increase the difficulty of the operation. Within this scenario the operation should not be endangered but will take some time.

The second option includes the possibility of besieging YPG elements in Afrin and to cut any of their links with the world by capturing the Arab-majority areas around Tel Rifaat and Minnag. By doing so, Turkey would also have a route from the Euphrates Shield areas in northern Aleppo towards the rebel-held areas in Idlib. As the YPG forced the Arab population out of their homes in Tel Rifaat and surrounding areas, those areas are sparsely populated. Thus, as the YPG is likely to use civilians as a shield against the Turkish Armed Forces and the Syrian rebels, Tel Rifaat and surrounding areas will be easier to capture.

However, the Turkish strategy seems to intend to capture all of Afrin as Operation Olive Branch began with the aim to capture all strategic hills in the mountains of Afrin. With this strategy, the Turkish Armed Forces and Syrian rebels decided to attack the YPG from its strongest positions. If successful, the terrorist group will lose the possibility to retreat from the villages towards the mountains in order to conduct a guerilla warfare against the armed forces and rebels.

Media propaganda

In addition to the military difficulties, Turkey will also face propaganda warfare by the YPG and PKK media outlets as well as from western journalists and analysts who sympathize with the terrorist group. Even if Turkey tries to avoid civilian causalities as seen during the Euphrates Shield Operation in contrast to what Russia did in Aleppo or what the U.S. did in Raqqa, civilian causalities may still occur. However, as part of their media strategy against Turkey, the YPG will propagate by exaggerating any civilian casualties. This can be foreseen and it is inevitable for western media agencies to play a role in this situation. In addition to the western media, UAE-sponsored media will also join the campaign through reporting false news generated by the YPG.

Only days after the start of Operation Olive Branch, YPG-affiliated media sources claimed several fake reports about destroyed Turkish tanks, and the killing/detention of Turkish soldiers and Syrian rebels. Their propaganda was spread on social media and was also shared on the official accounts of the YPG, YPG commanders and YPG-linked websites.

An example of this includes a tweet of the YPG’s so-called political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD). The picture tweeted showed a residential building engulfed in flames stating “PYD Rojava” with the caption: “Turkish terrorist army targets civilian homes in Afrin.” Shortly after the post it was discovered that the image was from a fire incident that took place in Kuwait in 2016.

Saleh Moslem, a senior leader of the PYD tweeted: “Turkey massacres in Afrin” with a picture of injured kids. However, it was revealed that the photograph was from the Assad regime’s attacks on Eastern Ghouta.

Also, another picture shared on Twitter claimed that “kids are being targeted by Turkish army.” However, it turned out that the picture was taken from a post on January 1, 2017, during a Russian airstrike on Syria.

Examples of fake-propaganda by YPG sources could be expanded to an innumerable amount. The media strategy obducted by the YPG does not try to be reliable or valid, but seeks to de-legitimize the Turkish-led operation with all means.

The main challenges of Operation Olive Branch will be the terrain in Afrin, which gives the YPG an opportunity to seek defense in the mountains. Nevertheless, the plan of the Turkish Armed Forces is to capture the strategic hills in order to entirely eliminate all YPG militants in Afrin. In addition to the military difficulties to be embraced, Turkey has to ready itself for a propaganda war with the terrorist organization. A genuine media strategy by the YPG, in addition to journalists who openly sympathize with the group, will seek to de-legitimize the operation conducted in Afrin.

The significance of the Afrin operation for Turkey must be evaluated through two main aspects: The place of the operation in Turkey’s counter-terror efforts and Ankara’s role in the regional geopolitical equation. In this scope, the most feasible alternative to carry the counter-terrorism fight across the border and prevent the PKK from becoming a regional actor in post-Daesh Syria seems to create a strategic state in Afrin. As the operation is viewed through the current situation and risks, it presents a generic scenario. However, it can be estimated that the situation may change at any moment depending on momentary factors and influence the progress of the overall process.

The operation will take place in winter conditions and in a relatively rugged terrain that occupies approximately 2,000 km² of area. The offensive will take place based on a joint military operation concept against the hybrid terror elements comprising around 6,000-8,000 operatives deployed in fortified lines of defense in rural and residential areas. It can be said that the maneuvers of the operation unit will be provided with land forces having mobile firepower in addition to local paramilitary elements whereas fire support will be provided both from land and air.

Air offensives on the PKK/YPG positions with fire support elements from land are expected, at the initial stage, to concentrate on the Dikmetas village, Minagh Air Base and Tel Rifat town located in the east of Afrin, Sheikh al-Hadid village, Jandaris town and Burj Abdullah village in the south of Afrin, where the main defense lines of the PKK and the YPG are located. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) are expected to segregate Afrin by getting through the PKK/YPG defense lines from eastern and southern sectors, and controlling the east and south of Afrin.

The risks entailed

In the subsequent phase, PKK/YPG elements may withdraw to the center of Afrin with forward operating TSK units from the northern and western sectors of Afrin. Following this phase, the PKK/YPG may enter clashes, particularly in Afrin’s city center, and force the TSK and FSA forces to collateral damage. Meanwhile, various terror assaults against the TSK and FSA forces may be organized in Afrin, such as attacks with improvised explosives, tactical weapons or assassination attempts.

As the operation kicks off, it is highly possible that the PKK/YPG units might organize attacks in the region where Operation Euphrates Shield was launched by advancing from Manbij, and the border security units on the Turkey-Syria border by advancing from Malikiye-Kamisli-Tel Abyad-Ayn al-Arab line. Syrian regime units may cooperate with the PKK/YPG on the Tel Rifat-Zahraa line and attempt manipulative military actions in order to clog the progress of the TSK and the FSA.

The extension of the operation may lead the Russian and Syrian regime to bring forward speculations regarding the use of Syrian air space. In such a case, Turkey could be forced to enter a direct armed engagement with Hayat Tahrer al-Sham in Idlib. Apart from the ordinary Kurdish people, groups who were radicalized by the PKK in Afrin may raise difficulties in enabling stability and security in the region after the completion of the operation, and might try to problematize Turkey’s presence in Afrin in the international sphere.

The main factors that will determine the success of the operation include speed, coordination, the ability to cooperate with local units and the sensitivity in survival measures. Considering the current situation and risks, the military targets of the operation are the PKK/YPG units for the time being. However, engagement with different threats is also possible during the later stages of the operation.

The Afrin operation is a strategic move in terms of supporting Turkey’s counter-terrorism efforts, geopolitical position and eliminating national security threats. More importantly, the success that is achieved through the operation in Afrin may be employed to intervene in other areas controlled by the PKK/YPG.

Following Operation Euphrates Shield (OES), Turkey brought a new dimension to its military activity in Syria in order to minimize the PKK’s strength in northern Syria and to “de-territorialize” the terrorist group in the middle term. With the Afrin operation, the aforementioned military activity has spread in a wider geographical area in the western flank of the Euphrates.

The operation, which had been in preparation phase for a long time, started on January 20 with the offensive phase, short after President Erdogan’s “Afrin operation has actually started on the ground” statement.

While the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) declared the name of the operation as “Olive Branch,” it made reference to decisions made by the UN Security Council’s decisions with regards to the war on terror and ‘self-defence’ element in Article 51 of the UN Charter – as it did in OES.

There are a number of push factors that shape Turkey’s strategy towards the PKK’s presence in northern Syria. However, for now, Turkey will try to actualize the strategy differently in two geographical areas. Turkey’s first goal is to minimize the PKK’s presence and capacity and force it to withdraw from the areas it controls in the western flank of the Euphrates.

Afrin is one of the critical thresholds

Afrin constitutes one of the critical thresholds to realize this strategy. The PKK captured Afrin in 2011 based on an agreement with the Assad regime and it declared it as a canton in 2013. Since 2014, Afrin has been ruled by a cadre, which includes high-level PKK leaders. As stated by Talal Silo, who was a former SDF figure, individuals from the PKK’s Qandil Mountain ranks such as Khalil Tafdam, Haji Ahmad Houdro, Mahmoud Barhoudan used to administer Afrin. With the intensification of the Syrian Civil War and the Assad regime’s tacit consent, the PKK first eliminated Kurdish opposition and secured absolute authority in the region. The group then displaced non-Kurdish residents through a “subtle demographic engineering.”

In this context, residents of 42 villages and towns (Tel Rifat, Menagh, Sheikh Issa etc.) in northern Syria, whose numbers are estimated to be around 250,000, were deported by YPG militants in 2016. Following Turkey’s downing of a Russian jet, the PKK captured the Tel Rifat-Menagh axis east of Afrin from the FSA with Russian air support and consolidated its power in these regions.

On the other hand, the PKK utilized Afrin as a base for its attacks in Turkey. For this reason, the Afrin operation has a strategic importance in Turkey’s fight against terrorism. The Afrin-Amanos connection in the region had an importance with regards to the PKK’s attacks towards Turkey’s Mediterranean region. The PKK used to transfer its forces from the Hassa county to the Amanos region via its elements deployed in Afrin and its surrounding villages, also making use of the mountainous terrain.

The PKK threat towards Turkey was not limited to this. Afrin has been one of the crucial centres of the PKK’s ideological and armed training until today. Members of the PKK who used to receive training on weapons and explosives in the camps based in this region carried out attacks in Turkey. Hence, Afrin had become a harbor for the radical leftist organizations in Turkey.

The strategic goal of the Afrin operation

Although the goal of the operation was declared as bringing peace and stability to the region, taking inspiration from the olive trees there, it is safe to state that Turkey will have to face a formidable challenge in order to achieve its mission. Herein, along with difficulties on military-technical and operational levels, Ankara’s stated strategic goals for the middle and long term is likely to face geopolitical challenges.

In military terms, although Turkey drew some lessons from OES on tactical, operative and strategic levels, there are some differences in the nature of enemy identification at least with regards to Afrin. It is not difficult to expect the PKK to build its defense on its social base, where the latter is strong.

During the first stage, TAF is carrying out its land operation against shelters and weapon placements of PKK members fortified in rural areas. At this stage, although the PKK plans to stop TAF and FSA elements by making use of topographical conditions in parts of Afrin, taking the joint nature of the operation and the imbalance of power between the two parties into consideration, this plan is very unlikely to materialize. In this respect, it will not be possible for the PKK to keep rural areas under its control. Hence, the terrorist organization is expected to move its main defense to residential areas and to fight an urban warfare. Taking the PKK’s capacity into consideration, clashes in urban areas will be heavier.

These circumstances may prolong the duration of the operation and may also turn the diplomatic stage against Turkey. For this reason, Ankara would move first to minimize the strength of the PKK in Afrin, then capture strategic points and consolidate the FSA’s control there, and then fully minimize and “de-territorialize” the PKK in the western flank of the Euphrates.

A new page in the Syrian theatre

At this juncture, it appears that Turkey cannot confine itself to the Afrin operation. The importance of the Afrin operation for Ankara is to pressure, especially the United States, for the elimination of the PKK presence along the Turkish border in the eastern flank of the Euphrates, not to mention Manbij. In other words, Turkish military presence and fortification in the western flank of the Euphrates will function as an element of pressure on military and political levels against the PKK and the U.S. in the eastern flank of the river.

As long as Turkey’s military determination goes smoothly on tactical and operative stage, Washington should be prepared to take steps backwards or to lose Turkey.

The Russian position is estimated to affect Turkey’s military success in the western flank of the Euphrates. The execution of the Afrin operation indicates the presence of some sort of an agreement between Turkey and Russia. It is possible to speculate on the dynamics on which this agreement was built, but it would be wrong to think that the parties are engaging in this process based on expectations of “absolute gains.”

It is very clear that the Afrin operation has opened a new page in the Syrian theatre. This page poses some risks for Turkey as much as it does for Syria in general and for U.S. foreign policy. The perusal of this process by the U.S. is very crucial for the minimization of these risks.

Turkey has been in a long on-going preparation process for an extensive military operation against the PYD/YPG, which the country deems as a threat to both its own national security and to the territorial integrity of Syria. Ankara has been in constant dialogue with countries across the region along with prominent actors in Syria in order to establish political and military premises.

Turkey has launched an operation targeting Afrin, the western end of the terror belt. While the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) had deployed military forces to the region near Afrin, it has also established a base in Idlib, south of Afrin, effectively surrounding the city. In addition to this, thousands of Syrian opposition soldiers, who were trained through the “train-and-equip” program, were deployed against the PYD/YPG. Turkey is pursuing an initiative similar to the Operation Euphrates Shield (OES), which was launched right after the July 15 coup attempt, and which simultaneously cleansed the defined areas from both Daesh and the PYD/YPG. Operation Olive Branch (OOB) was launched a short time after President Erdogan’s announcement on 20 January, 2018, at 17:00. While the TSK announced the name of the operation as “Olive Branch,” references were made to decisions made by the United Nations Security Council and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.

What are the geopolitical and demographic features of Afrin?

Located in northwest Syria, Afrin is a district in the Aleppo Province. The district consists of seven towns: Central, Bulbul, Jandairis, Rajo, Sharran, Shayk al Hadid and M’abatli. Its border with Turkey renders the district important in terms of geopolitics. Its surface area is 1850 km², corresponding to 2% of the total surface area of Syria. Afrin is located in a mountainous region and its elevation is between 700-1269 meters. The distance between its easternmost and westernmost points is 55 kilometers, while the distance between its northernmost and southernmost points is 75 kilometers.

According to the 2004 census in Syria, 64,758 people live in the town center and the total population of the district is 172,095. The city is mostly populated by Kurds. However, Arab and Turkmen and a small population of Yazidis also reside in the region. The city experienced a population increase after the 2011 revolution, as the Syrian regime did not target the city. Yet, figures provided regarding the population of Afrin are contradictory – especially numbers released by pro-PKK/PYD sources are exaggerated. It is estimated that around 300,000 people live in the Afrin District.

Why is Afrin important for the PYD/YPG?

Following the 2011 revolution, the PYD/YPG terrorist organization made an agreement with the Assad regime handed Afrin to PYD, which declared it as its canton in 2013. Since October 29, 2014, the region has been managed by an administration appointed by the PYD. The terrorist organization has eliminated all Kurdish opposition in the region, especially the Kurdish National Council, and has established its hegemony over the region.

After the downing of the Russian aircraft, the terrorist organization captured territories between Tell Rifat and Menagh to the east of Afrin from the Free Syrian Army (FSA) with the support of Russian aircrafts. With this, the terrorist organization forced the Arab population in the region to immigrate. The group then attacked the town of Azez but failed to capture it. Since October 2016, the PYD/YPG has attempted to march on Al-Bab with the occasional air support from coalition forces. However, this march was stopped with the OES.

The YPG claims that it manages Afrin through 47 councils and 898 communes (communities) that organize the people. Even though the region is isolated from the PYD/YPG located on the eastern bank of the Euphrates, it is managed by prominent figures of the PKK such as Halil Tefdem, Ahmed Hudro, Mahmud Berhudan, Behcet Abdo and Nocin, who all receive their orders from Qandil under the chain of command of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK).

This region acts like a springboard for the organization, which will allow it to access the Mediterranean Sea. Moreover, the terrorist organization attempts to establish a line of supply through the Amanos Mountains in Turkey in order to mobilize militants with weapons. The TSK and security forces have killed over 40 terrorists trying to cross the border from Afrin. The terrorist organization sees Afrin as an important source of recruitment. They are forcibly recruiting girls and boys aged between 16-18 for their “Self-Defense Force.” There are several boot camps established by the group where these teenagers are trained.

What are some of the alternative scenarios to the Afrin offensive?

Operation Olive Branch was launched at 17:00 on 20 January with military aircraft belonging to the Turkish Air Forces, which entered Syrian air space and began targeting terrorist targets in Afrin. The TSK announced that 108 different locations used as shelter and arsenal by the PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG in Afrin and its surrounding towns were destroyed by 72 aircrafts. In addition, the TSK informed that lines of defense, command centers and border outposts of the terrorist organization were targeted by the Turkish forces from land and air.

During the pre-operation assessments, there were various scenarios about the Afrin offensive. Initially, re-capturing towns like Tell Rifat and Menagh in order to completely surround YPG militants in the region was being discussed. However, the first stage of the offensive indicates that an extensive military operation against the PKK in Afrin will take place.

The extent of the military operation will depend on negotiations made with Russia, as due to the result of an agreement made with the Syrian regime, Russia continues to control Syrian air space. It is known that Moscow is trying to persuade the Turkish regime to pursue a small-scale operation. However, it is definite that Turkey needs an extensive military operation in order to permanently remove the terrorist threat from Afrin.

The operation was launched with intense air raids and support vehicles. After the lines of defense are softened, ground war could be expected to be intensified around the Menagh Air Base-Tell Rifat to the east of Afrin and Shayk al Hadid-Jandairis-Burj Abd Allah to the south of Afrin.

It could be expected that land forces of the TSK and FSA will simultaneously penetrate the defense lines of the PKK/YPG on the southern and eastern sectors, effectively isolating Afrin. In the following stage, the TSK may force PKK/YPG militants to retreat to Afrin by pushing from northern and western sectors. These terrorist elements may attempt to use civilians in Afrin as human shields in order to draw the Turkish armed forces into urban warfare.

The PYD/YPG had been preparing for a probable military operation by Turkey. The PKK controls over 1500 km² of territory including Afrin and its surrounding cities, where Russia has also begun to establish checkpoints.

It could be assessed that PKK/PYD militants, whose numbers are around 5000-6000, along with Jaysh al-Thuwar elements consisting of approximately a couple of hundred of militants, may attempt to halt the TSK and FSA through asymmetric warfare and hybrid methods. It is known that the terrorist organization has been digging trenches, forming tunnels, placing Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and mines to certain locations. Moreover, with the courtesy of the U.S., the YPG may attempt to transport anti-tank weaponry that is currently located on the eastern bank of the Euphrates to Afrin. Considering the topography of the region, terrorist elements may attempt to use mountainous parts that are located towards the midwest and northwest of Afrin.

Nevertheless, the terrorist organization does not stand much chance against the TSK and FSA on the plains towards Afrin as well as around Tell Rifat and Menagh regions. It should not be forgotten that Turkey has learned valuable lessons from OES, especially in terms of fighting against anti-tank weaponry and asymmetric warfare methods, and has new inventory such as Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), which could counter such attempts. All in all, Turkey is much better equipped for the Afrin offensive.

What has Turkey learned from Operation Euphrates Shield?

When drawing comparisons between the OES and OOB, there are both similarities and differences. Even though Turkish forces encountered PKK/YPG elements on the bank of the Sanjur River after capturing Jarabulus, it was essentially an operation against Daesh.

OES cleared a territory of 2200 km² from terrorist elements. While the conflict was mostly on the plains, it was concluded with urban warfare in Al-Bab and surrounding towns. Regime forces along with the PKK constantly harassed the TSK and TSK-backed Syrian opposition forces. As Daesh adopted hybrid and asymmetric strategies along with using civilians as human shields, the TSK had to exact the operation meticulously and steadily. Daesh had carried out asymmetric attacks throughout the OES, attempting to halt the march of the TSK and Syrian opposition forces through bombed car and suicide bomber attacks. The fact that Daesh was effectively using anti-tank weaponry was one of the greatest challenges of the operation. As Turkey engaged in urban warfare for the first time on a cross-border operation, there were certain handicaps regarding military equipment and experienced personnel. Moreover, Syrian opposition forces were not very effective during the initial train-and-equip program.

The majority of these handicaps were addressed with the experience gained from OES. While increasing the number of UCAVs improved close air support and precision strike capacities, protection systems against anti-tank weaponry that is implemented within Turkish tanks made the TSK a force to be reckoned with. There are more personnel in the force who are experienced in asymmetric hybrid conflicts. Meanwhile, Syrian opposition forces are trained and equipped better than before. There is a significant improvement in their battle-readiness. In this respect therefore, when compared to the OES, Turkey is more advantageous in the current operation.

Speaking in Elazig on Saturday, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that Turkey’s military operation in Syria’s northern Idlib province will crush the PKK/PYD terror group in Afrin.

Referring to Afrin, the President stated: “With the Euphrates Shield Operation we cut the terror corridor right in the middle. We hit them one night suddenly. With the Idlib operation, we will collapse the western wing.”

Following an agreement with Russia and Iran, who are the two other guarantors of the Astana process, Turkish troops entered Idlib with the aim to reduce fighting between the pro-Assad regime forces and opposition fighters.

President Erdogan also criticized the U.S. for arming PKK/PYD terrorists: “The U.S. sent 4,900 trucks of weapons to Syria. We know this. This is not what allies do. We know they sent 2,000 planes full of weapons.”

Turkish army strikes PKK/PYD positions in Afrin

Reports have emerged confirming that the Turkish Armed Forces hit PKK/PYD positions in the northwest region of Afrin.

The Turkish army fired intermittent artillery shells from Reyhanli’s Ogulpinar border gate in the southwestern Turkish province of Hatay.

On Wednesday, Turkey’s National Defense Minister Nurettin Canikli told parliament’s Planning and Budget Committee that “the first delivery of the S-400 air-defense systems is planned to be accomplished in 2019.”

“The control of the S-400 will be entirely in Turkey’s hands, the friend-enemy recognition system will be changed, software changes have already started and Turkey is actively participating on that, but all discussions on where to deploy the system will be decided by Turkey. This is the biggest difference from the NATO systems,” Canikli said.

Deals have been signed between Turkey and Russia for two S-400 air-defense systems, one of them being optional.

The S-400 can carry three types of missiles capable of destroying targets, including ballistic and cruise missiles

It can also track and engage up to 300 targets at a time and has an altitude ceiling of 27 kilometers (17 miles)

The S-400 is Russia’s most advanced long-range anti-aircraft missile system so far.

Referring to the agreement signed with fellow NATO members France and Italy, Canikli said: “On the other hand, we have started developing a similar system with EUROSAM.”

Turkey’s own defense missile system

Turkey’s defense industry and the Franco-Italian Eurosam consortium will work together to determine needs and priorities for potential joint production of a SAMP-T anti-ballistic missile system.

The Minister also added that negotiations with the US on the purchase of the US-made Patriot air defense system are still continuing.

Canikli also pointed out that Turkey is currently panning its own production of defense missile system – “Turkey has also started a new platform, a new line which it will develop with its own potential.”

Turkey’s fight with the PKK

“Turkey will use its right of intervention based on international law” Canikli said referring to Turkey’s trans-boundary fight with PKK/PYD/YPG terrorist organizations.

The PYD and its military wing YPG are Syrian branches of the PKK, which has waged a war against Turkey for more than 30 years.

Tens of thousands of people have been killed, including more than 1,200 since July 2015 alone since the PKK launched its terror campaign in Turkey in 1984.

Although the US, EU and Turkey list PKK as a terrorist group the US and the coalition have largely ignored PYD/PYG links to PKK.

Revisions in the military

Canikli also announced that 8,570 personnel have been dismissed from the Turkish Armed Forces since last year’s defeated coup attempt for being linked with the terrorist organization FETO.

The dismissed military personnel include 150 generals, 4,630 army officers, 2,168 sergeants, 1,211 specialized sergeants and 411 civil servants.

The defeated coup attempt of July 15, 2016 was organized by FETO and its US-based criminal cult leader Fetullah Gulen and left 250 people martyred and nearly 2,200 injured.

Ankara also accuses FETO of being behind a long-running campaign to overthrow the government through the infiltration of Turkish institutions, particularly the military, police and judiciary.

*Written by Suna Nur Sarihan. 

Following Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield, which saw the Free Syrian Army (FSA), backed by Turkish forces, clear Daesh from the territory in north Syria between August 2016 and March 2017, the Idlib operation has been the second phase of Turkish direct involvement in Syria.

As a guarantor state within the Astana Talks, which Russia and Iran are also a party to, and as part of the mission to establish “de-escalation zones,” the main force of Turkish troops have entered Syria’s Idlib.

While the military convoys crossed from Reyhanli in southern Turkey’s Hatay province on Thursday night, the military announced that Turkish troops have crossed into Idlib in order to monitor de-escalation zones, with the aim to bring an end to the six-and-a-half-year conflict in Syria.

In a statement published by the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), the military informed the soldiers had begun establishing observation points.

“Turkish Armed Forces elements that are to serve in the Idlib de-escalation zone have started their activities by establishing observation posts from Oct 12, 2017, as part of the Astana agreement…”

“The Turkish Armed Forces continue to carry out their duties in the territory within the engagement rules agreed by the guarantor countries in the Astana negotiations.”

During the weekend, reconnaissance teams entered Idlib as part of an international agreement to establish four de-escalation zones cross Syria.

According to the statement released by the TSK, the de-escalation zones were created in order to “enhance the effectiveness of the cease-fire regime, end conflicts, bring humanitarian aid to those in need [and] establish the necessary conditions for the return of those displaced.”

After the agreements taken between Iran, Turkey and Russia during the Astana talks, the Turkish administration emphasized that it was to observe the ceasefire between the Assad-loyal militias and the Syrian rebel factions. In addition, Turkey wants to prevent Idlib from destruction by the Russians who would use the presence of Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (HTS) as an excuse for their actions. Turkish presence on the ground therefore should provide security and stability to the region.

Turkish experiences in the Syrian war, especially after the Euphrates Shield operation, convinced the Turkish government to become proactive in the region. The government is aware that if they do not act today, another party will act tomorrow at the cost of the Syrian revolution and Turkish foreign policy priorities. Another reason for Turkish intervention in Idlib is plans regarding Afrin. As Erdogan stated, the Idlib operation is planned to be used as a step for new military operations in Syria.

Rapprochement between Turkey and Russia

Turkey’s cooperation with Russia is based on reciprocity. The Russians know how costly an operation in Idlib will be and therefore prefer to control the situation on the ground with the help of Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey wants to strengthen its hand with a tactical alliance against the YPG units supported by the US. While an offensive to isolate Afrin is still on the table, the current Idlib operation would lay the foundations for this. More, Turkey wants to protect the ‘achievements’ of the Syrian rebels in Idlib and fears of a second Aleppo, Raqqa or Mosul to become a reality in Idlib. The Turkish presence in Idlib would inherently widen the Turkish sphere of influence in Syria and across the Middle East.

Nevertheless, the alliance between Russia and Turkey is a balancing act for both sides. While Russia must keep Assad-loyal militias, who consider Turkey as an enemy, under control, Turkey has to explain its alliance with Russia to the Syrian rebels. In view of the fact that Russia has been heavily bombarding the Syrian population for some time now, this becomes an herculean task. Turkey’s main argument will be the alternative to the Idlib operation: the total destruction of the region by Russia.

Will Turkey fight against HTS?

One can see from observing President Erdogan’s statements and from the current silence of HTS that both sides want to avoid a mutual confrontation. Within HTS, discussions continue on how to deal with the new situation – while one wing fears a confrontation with Turkey, the other wants to fight Turkey at all costs.

Recent developments suggest that a deal was reached between both parties. According to several videos and pictures, HTS fighters escorted Turkish observers to Darat al Izzah. The start of the Turkish observation mission was announced today by the Turkish army itself without providing detailed information. The Turkish army will be stationed at Darat al Izzah to overlook the deployments of the PKK-affiliated YPG forces in Afrin from the south. The Turkish presence in Darat al Izzah would also give Turkey the ability to pursue further military operations inside Syria, in order to fully encircle the YPG territory in Afrin.

Nevertheless, the situation in Idlib is provocative, which makes escalation more likely. Daesh and Jund al Aqsa sleeper cells are present in the region. Assad regime agents are also available. In addition, hardliners within HTS will want to take action against Turkey. Therefore, even if HTS decides not to attack Turkey, terrorist attacks on Turkish troops are likely. As a result of such attacks, the situation between Turkish security forces and HTS could quickly escalate.

The situation became even more complicated after Daesh militants in the Uqayribat region east of Hama crossed the Khanasser road towards the rebel-held areas in north-eastern Hama. The Uqayribat pocket of ISIS was besieged by the Assad regime and they crossed into the rebel-held territory without being bombed by the regime or Russia. Daesh in the rebel-held area began to fight HTS forces and captured several villages. The outcome and effects of this recent development are unpredictable, but it will surely complicate the situation in Idlib.

What would have happened if Turkey hadn’t intervened in Idlib?

After the former official branch of Al-Qaeda, the Al-Nusra front publically abandoned their link to Al-Qaeda and changed its name to Jabhat Fath al Sham. This move was interpreted by the US administration as a foolish attempt, which does not include any sustainable change of the group. Additionally, Jabhat Fath al Sham created a broader coalition called Hay’at Tahrir al Sham with other Islamist groups and the formerly US-backed Nureddin Zengi Movement. The new formation is led by Abu Jabir, the former leader of Ahrar al Sham. However, insiders claim that he is a “leader under Muhammad al-Jolani,” the former leader of Al-Nusra and the new military leader of Hay’at Tahrir al Sham. Recently, Abu Jabir was taken from his position and Muhammed al-Jolani was chosen as the temporary leader of HTS until a new leader is appointed. This decision comes after Nureddin Zengi, Abu Saleh Tahhan and his followers, Ibn Teymiyyah battalion and other several small units left the formation of Hay’at Tahrir al Sham.

During the creation and aftermath of Hay’at Tahrir al Sham, HTS abolished some Syrian rebel brigades like Jabhat al Shamiya, Suqour al Sham, Festaqem Kema Umirt, Jaysh al Mujahiddeen and the Idlib branch of Jaysh al Islam. Although thousands of Ahrar al Sham’s fighters deserted to the new formation of Hay’at Tahrir al Sham, Ahrar al Sham was able to gain more by accepting these abolished brigades as new units of Ahrar al Sham. Since then, tensions between Ahrar al Sham and HTS have not calmed down and the readiness of Ahrar to act against HTS improved. HTS on the other hand is in a constant effort to extend its areal control in the region. Therefore, the Al-Qaeda affiliated Hay‘at Tahrir al Sham captured the strategical Bab al Hawa border crossing to Turkey from its main rival Ahrar al Sham, increasing its dominance over the northwest of Syria.

With the increasing control of HTS, the region around Idlib was seen as a ‘safe-haven’ for Al-Qaeda. After the defeat of Daesh, the international community would have its new target – HTS. If Turkey had not intervened in Idlib, Russian and Iranian backed regime militias may have started a campaign to invade the region with the approval of the international community in the name of the “War against Terror.” This campaign would lead groups like Ahrar al Sham, Feylaq as Sham and other Syrian rebel factions to unite with HTS to resist against regime militias. This resistance would lack legitimacy and therefore foreign backing. The Russian-backed regime militias would have used genocidal tactics to conquer the area which would have ended in a massive refugee flow towards Turkey. Already the largest host of Syrian refugees, Turkey would have had to deal with a new refugee crisis and would have lost its leverage in Idlib to its enemy in Damascus. Additionally, Al-Qaeda would have remained in the area and would have started a guerilla tactical war, which would have resulted in a decade-long insurgency. Revolutionary factions in Idlib could evolve into terrorist groups within this given scenario.

All in all, while the Turkish intervention in Idlib carries risks, it is a necessary step that needed to be taken in order to save civilians in Syria and preserve Turkish interests. As the main advocate of the Syrian rebel factions, the largest host of Syrian refugees and as a guarantor during the Astana talks, there should be no doubt and discussion over Turkey’s involvement in solving the Syrian crisis. With Turkish absence, Idlib would face huge destruction, indiscriminate bombing, massacres, huge refugee flows and would become a new Raqqa, Mosul or Aleppo. Turkish foreign policy aims and the future of the Syrian civilians in Idlib are now hand in hand.

During the Astana talks, guarantor states Russia, Turkey and Iran signed a deal in order to establish de-escalation zones in Syria.

The three guarantors, as well as representatives of the Assad regime and some opposition factions, met in Astana in September 2017 for a sixth round of talks, aimed at ending the six-year conflict in Syria.

Following the decision made during the latest meeting, Turkey has positioned elements of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) within the borders of Idlib in order to reduce the tension in the region.

Speaking to reporters in the western province of Afyonkarahisar, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu stated that Turkey aims to prevent conflict in Syria’s northwestern Idlib.

“The matter on Idlib is we have arrived at an agreement in Astana because we want to prevent conflict in these areas through a de-conflict zone.”

Emphasizing the importance of the Astana process, the Minister said that the aim of the Turkish government is to “revive the Geneva process.”

In addition to statements made by the Foreign Minister, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also emphasized Turkey’s commitment to solving the crisis in Syria.

The President stated that if Turkey had not intervened in Idlib “bombs would fall on our cities.”

During an AK Party meeting, Erdogan told members that “Our efforts in Idlib are going on, in cooperation with the Free Syria Army, without problems at the moment.”