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n recent years, the Eastern Mediterranean has become one of the most sensitive arenas of regional competition shaped around energy resources. The main reason for this sensitivity is that regional resources are viewed not merely as economic assets, but also as strategic instruments in terms of sovereignty, security, and power politics. Indeed, the intensifying competition in the Eastern Mediterranean has further deepened the existing political and military tensions in the region. One of the most striking examples of this tension today is Israel’s attempt to render ineffective the maritime border understanding reached between Lebanon and Israel in October 2022 under US mediation through unilateral and coercive moves.

The process leading to the agreement was the outcome of a long-standing maritime jurisdiction dispute. The area between Lebanon’s Line 29 claim and the border approach imposed by Israel in its own favour had gone far beyond a technical issue of maritime delimitation because of its high hydrocarbon potential. Under the understanding reached, the maritime boundary was drawn on the basis of Line 23. Thus, while Israel secured its sovereign rights over the Karish field, which was ready for natural gas production, Lebanon was given the opportunity to continue exploration activities in Block 9, which includes the Qana field. However, the Beirut administration, under a severe economic crisis, not only had to step back from its Line 29 claim, but was also forced to accept the concession of granting Tel Aviv a share of the possible revenues from the part of the Qana field extending into the Israeli side.

Nevertheless, Lebanon has not yet been able to obtain the short-term economic gains it expected from this understanding. The identification of commercially viable reserves in the Qana field and the transition to actual production are, by their nature, processes that will take time. Moreover, political instability, institutional weaknesses, and uncertainty in the investment environment make Beirut’s energy planning even more fragile. The current conjuncture, in turn, feeds Israel’s effort to transform Lebanon’s political and economic vulnerabilities into an asymmetric advantage in its own favor. Tel Aviv’s approach should therefore be read as part of a broader strategy aimed at eroding Lebanon’s rights over the Qana field and establishing a new hegemonic sphere in favour of Israel within the Eastern Mediterranean energy equation.

The historical continuity of geopolitical conflict

Essentially, although the tension surrounding Lebanese gas in the Eastern Mediterranean may at first appear to be a current maritime jurisdiction dispute between two states, it is part of a broader struggle for power shaped by the control of energy resources.  Throughout the twentieth century, oil in the Middle East, and following the dissolution of the Soviet Union,, energy resources in the Caspian Basin, were among the main factors fuelling sovereignty disputes, external interventions, and struggles for regional influence. From this perspective, the dispute over Lebanese gas can also be read as the contemporary reflection in the Eastern Mediterranean of the historical role of energy resources in generating geopolitical rivalry and power competition.

However, it is not sufficient to explain Israel’s position only through the general conflictual logic of energy geopolitics. The main point that deserves attention here is that Tel Aviv has brought an agreement signed through international mediation back into question in such a short period of time and has sought to create the ground for its unilateral termination. The regional conflicts that have intensified since October 2023, the silence of Western states in the face of Israel’s genocidpole in Gaza, and Tel Aviv’s strategy of leaving Beirut helpless on the ground through military pressure directly extended into the Lebanese arena have turned Israel into a maximalist and revisionist actor that recklessly violates the limits of the international legal order.

Indeed, Israeli Energy Minister Eli Cohen’s statement in March 2026 describing the 2022 Maritime Border Agreement as a “document of surrender” for Israel and bringing the option of cancellation onto the agenda shows that Tel Aviv is trying to exploit the regional chaos it has deepened in order to reopen Lebanon’s maritime jurisdiction areas to discussion. In other words, Israel’s move targeting Lebanon’s maritime jurisdiction areas and natural gas fields points directly to a development that can be described as an “energy grab”.

The west’s double standards and Europe’s energy supply security

The United States, which was the main architect and mediator of the maritime border understanding in 2022, has not shown any significant reaction to the Israeli Energy Minister’s statements aimed at cancelling the agreement. On the one hand, the Washington administration explains Tel Aviv’s military operations in the region through the discourse of “self-defense”; on the other hand, it does not raise a strong objection to the de facto reopening of maritime borders to discussion or to Israel’s moves that put pressure on Lebanon’s sovereign rights.

Europe’s stance is not very different from that of the United States. Brussels’ position is shaped not by the protection of international law, sovereign rights, or Lebanon’s legitimate claims, but rather by the potential value of Eastern Mediterranean gas for European energy supply security. For the European Union, which significantly reduced its dependence on Russian gas after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War in 2022, Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon reserves have become one of the important alternatives due to their geographical proximity and potential for supply diversification.

In this new geopolitical environment, the Tel Aviv administration seeks to realize its objective of becoming the dominant actor in the control of energy resources and transport routes in the Eastern Mediterranean by pursuing a more aggressive strategy. Despite this, the silence of Western actors in the face of Israel’s moves to narrow Lebanon’s maritime jurisdiction areas and establish de facto superiority over energy resources reveals the existence of a clear double standard. While the Western world strongly emphasizes territorial integrity and international law when Ukraine is at stake, its reluctance to defend the same principles against Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean reveals a clear double standard.

Lebanon’s economic future and investment risk

For Lebanon, which is grappling with political instability, economic challenges and infrastructure collapse, the potential revenues from the Qana field are viewed not merely as an economic gain, but as a significant opportunity for the state’s recovery and the strengthening of its institutional capacity. However, for a country such as Lebanon, marked by limited economic resources, a fragmented political system and vulnerability to external interference, any uncertainty surrounding energy projects carries serious consequences. In this regard, Israel’s attempt to revive the maritime border dispute has the potential to undermine not only the future of a specific gas field, but also the broader investment climate in Lebanon’s energy sector.

This is because offshore natural gas projects are high-cost, long-term investments that are highly sensitive to political stability. An increase in legal and political uncertainty in such projects may heighten investors’ risk perception, thereby further weakening Lebanon’s position in the regional energy equation.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the statements about unilateral cancellation and the threatening rhetoric issued by Tel Aviv clearly show that the issue in the Eastern Mediterranean is not merely a technical border dispute. The picture before us is Israel’s attempt, relying on its military superiority and the silence of Western actors, to erode Lebanon’s right to exercise control over its legitimate energy resources and to establish de facto superiority on the ground. In other words, this process should be read not as a diplomatic disagreement, but as a systematic state-led “energy grab.”

Tel Aviv’s approach once again reveals that Israel is far from being a predictable actor committed to its obligations under international law. International law, diplomatic agreements and border arrangements can easily be eroded in the face of Israel’s Zionist expansionist reflexes. For this reason, Israel’s stance once again confirms the existence of a deep and structural trust problem regarding the sustainability of long-term agreements with Tel Aviv.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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srael and Lebanon have agreed to implement a ceasefire aimed at ending months of hostilities, the Trump administration announced on Wednesday, raising hopes that a broader agreement to end the U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran could be within reach.

The agreement, reached following negotiations in Washington, requires a complete cessation of hostilities by the Iran-backed Hezbollah and the withdrawal of its fighters from southern Lebanon’s Litani region, according to a joint statement issued by the United States Department of State.

The development comes despite continued violence across the region and mounting tensions involving Iran, Gulf states, and U.S. forces.

A previous ceasefire announced last month failed to halt fighting, with clashes continuing after Israel launched operations in Lebanon in March against Hezbollah, which had opened a front against Israel in support of Tehran.

The latest agreement is viewed as a key component of wider diplomatic efforts to end the regional conflict that erupted following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran earlier this year.

Gulf attacks and Strait of Hormuz tensions continue

Even as diplomatic efforts advanced, regional tensions remained high.

Kuwaiti authorities said Iranian missile and drone attacks damaged facilities at Kuwait International Airport, killing one person and injuring more than 60 others. Airport operations were temporarily suspended before flights resumed later in the day following emergency safety measures.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps denied targeting the airport directly, claiming the damage was caused by failed U.S. interceptor missiles. The U.S. military rejected that account, saying Iranian drones deliberately targeted the airport.

At the same time, the United States Central Command reported carrying out defensive strikes against missile launch sites and naval assets in southern Iran. U.S. forces also struck targets on Qeshm Island near the strategically important Strait of Hormuz after what officials described as attempted Iranian attacks.

The Strait of Hormuz, a critical route for global oil and gas shipments, remains largely closed more than three months after the conflict began. Oil prices rose nearly 2% on concerns about continuing disruptions to energy supplies.

Negotiations with Iran remain fragile

The ceasefire announcement comes amid ongoing efforts to secure a broader agreement between Washington and Tehran.

Iran has linked progress in negotiations to an end to fighting in Lebanon and is seeking access to frozen oil revenues, sanctions relief, an end to restrictions on its ports, and guarantees regarding future access to the Strait of Hormuz.

Abbas Araqchi said negotiations with the United States had not been suspended but acknowledged that no significant progress had been made in recent days.

Meanwhile, President Donald Trump expressed optimism that developments could occur soon.

“If it happens, it could happen over the weekend,” Trump told reporters at the White House, without providing further details.

Trump also indicated that negotiators were attempting to separate discussions about reopening the Strait of Hormuz from the conflict in Lebanon.

Despite the ceasefire announcement, violence continued on Wednesday. Lebanese security sources reported Israeli drone strikes that killed at least six people in southern Lebanon and targeted areas near Beirut. Israel said it had intercepted a hostile aircraft believed to have been launched by Hezbollah.

Araqchi warned that Iran would respond decisively if Israel expanded military operations against Beirut.

The conflict has killed thousands of people, primarily in Iran and Lebanon, while disrupting global trade and energy markets. Although the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire has raised hopes for a wider diplomatic breakthrough, ongoing military incidents underscore the fragility of the situation and the challenges facing negotiators seeking a broader regional settlement.

(Source: Reuters)

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ince the start of the US/Israel-Iran War, one of the developments set to reshape the region’s political and social fabric fundamentally is unfolding in Lebanon despite a fragile and uncertain ceasefire announced by the US and Iran. At a time when the eyes of the world are focused on the Gulf, Tel Aviv is making a concerted effort to exploit opportunities and irreversibly alter the status quo on the ground, disregarding Lebanon’s sovereign rights.

Factors such as rising energy prices on the international stage, the pressure that the prolongation of the war will exert on production and supply chains, and the tendency of foreign investors in Gulf monarchies—which are beginning to lose their ‘safe haven’ status—to leave their host countries have led to all discussions and expectations regarding the war being centred around the Persian Gulf. In this process, where attention has been focused on a limited area due to potential risks whose destructive effects will be felt globally, the Zionist regime has launched a move towards the annexation of South Lebanon, in line with the aggressive expansionist strategy it has accelerated in recent years.

Following the assassination of Ali Khamenei, Hezbollah’s launch of attacks on occupied territories and its de facto intervention in the war prompted the Zionist regime to intensify its attacks on Lebanon, despite the long-standing ceasefire. Following the Al-Aqsa Flood on 7 October 2023, the occupying army implemented a strategy of diversion and securing significant gains in Lebanon through aggressive and provocative attacks on Lebanese territory, to continue the genocide in Gaza. Having gained significant psychological superiority following the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah in September 2024, Tel Aviv postponed its strategy of focusing on Lebanon, despite inflicting serious damage on Hezbollah, due to the strong resistance demonstrated by the resistance in Gaza despite limited resources.

Gaza’s realities

Given the realities on the ground in Gaza, an army severely demoralized psychologically, launching a large-scale ground operation in Lebanon could have meant facing a result far beyond the Zionist administration’s expectations. For this reason, placing Lebanon in a position where it would be constantly monitored and could be attacked if necessary was, in fact, the most reasonable option for Tel Aviv. On the other hand, Hezbollah’s reluctance to engage in an all-out war created a reality that heightened the fragility in southern Lebanon and multiplied the risks.

Despite the occupation army launching hundreds of attacks on southern Lebanon and targeting Hezbollah members following the ceasefire signed between the parties in November 2024, no retaliation was carried out against Israel. Seeking to avoid becoming the actor escalating tensions on the ground under the “Strategic Patience” approach, Hezbollah endeavored to keep its contact with Israeli forces as limited as possible, adhering as closely as possible to the rules of engagement adopted after the 2006 war.

The deep crisis unfolding in the country, driven by Lebanon’s political and economic conditions, was in fact one of the main reasons behind the strategy adopted by Hezbollah. Seeking to avoid a complete loss of its already shaken legitimacy within the country, the organization attempted to defuse the Zionist administration’s aggressive stance; however, following the commencement of attacks against Iran on 28 February, it shifted from a defense-oriented passive strategy to a military activism strategy that prioritized the offensive.

What has changed for Hezbollah in Iran since the war?

In the weeks following the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, the question of whether Hezbollah would declare war on the occupying state was the one everyone was most eager to have answered. Following the announcement on 6 November 2023 that Hassan Nasrallah would address the nation, all news agencies immediately turned their attention to Lebanon and Nasrallah’s speech. What put an end to expectations of a declaration of war was Nasrallah’s statement at the very beginning of his speech that they had gathered “to commemorate the martyrs”.

Despite the heavy blow dealt to Hezbollah by the occupying forces, the movement’s decision to limit itself to deterrence was linked not only to the sensitive conditions in Lebanon mentioned above but also to the fact that the process had been initiated by Hamas, or more specifically, the Qassam Brigades. Hizbullah, unwilling to become a part of someone else’s war, strove not to back down from the strategy it had adopted, despite losing two of its secretaries-general and founding members of its leadership cadre. The fact that the US-Israeli coalition directly targeted the Supreme Leader in its war against Iran, however, made it imperative for Hizballah to engage in the process actively.

The elimination of the highest echelons of the Iranian leadership in the opening hours of the war led the proxy forces in the region to face an existential crisis of unprecedented magnitude. Any change in Tehran would have signified, in particular, the complete collapse of Hezbollah. This new situation, arising without the movement being able to regain the ground it had lost within Lebanon’s political and social structure, compelled Hezbollah’s leadership to assess the two options and act swiftly. The movement would either adopt a stance of waiting for the process in Iran to conclude, thereby tolerating the Zionist administration’s moves, or it would choose the path of attack to weaken the occupying army, thereby enabling Iran to emerge from the process with gains and strengthen its own presence in Lebanon.

Given the risks the first scenario would pose to the organization, Hezbollah opted to enter the war directly, despite the possibility of the occupation expanding within Lebanese territory. In particular, Hezbollah’s primary expectation upon entering the war was to force the Tel Aviv administration to withdraw by inflicting the heavy losses they hoped to inflict during the occupying army’s planned ground operation. In the current situation, where Zionist leaders have escalated matters to the point of claiming sovereignty over Southern Lebanon, Hezbollah is resisting the occupiers with all the means at its disposal. Meanwhile, the Israeli army is attempting to alter Lebanon’s borders and annex them to its own territory by supporting its air strikes with ground forces.

Israel’s strategy in Lebanon

Tel Aviv, which does not hesitate to resort to any form of aggression or unlawful action to implement its political vision built on religious references, aims to apply a similar policy in Lebanon to that pursued in the Palestinian territories. Believing that a significant portion of the region has been granted to them by God, and pursuing an expansionist strategy that is difficult to contain in this context, the Zionist administration hopes to take another step towards its goal of expanding its territory by annexing South Lebanon.

Bolstered by political backing from the US and leading European states, the decision-makers of the occupying state—who deem any unlawful action permissible—are seeking to capitalize on international concern over the situation in the Gulf to engineer a major shift in the status quo in Southern Lebanon. The fact that the country does not hold a significant position within either the regional or global system, coupled with the absence of a powerful patron, is the primary reason why many parties remain indifferent to developments in Lebanon during this process. Seizing upon this environment to shape the process as it sees fit, Tel Aviv intends to establish a status quo over Lebanon that is independent of the war against Iran.

The Zionist regime, which invaded southern Lebanon in 1982 under the pretext of the country’s civil war, had not embarked on establishing settlements in southern Lebanon similar to those it had built for Jewish settlers in the West Bank, owing to regional and global dynamics. The occupying army, which remained in the region until 2000, pursued a security-focused protection strategy.

Subsequently, the withdrawal process from Lebanon was completed due to the rising political cost of maintaining a presence there. At that time, as conditions were not yet ripe, Tel Aviv did not implement its Judaization strategy in southern Lebanon; however, it is now seeking to exploit the vacuum that has emerged to extend Israel’s fluid borders as far as the Litani River. In recent days, the occupying army has continued its advance despite ground resistance, consolidating its presence in the region by seizing strategic points in the south.

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sraeli airstrikes across Lebanon intensified sharply this week, killing hundreds and wounding more than a thousand in a single day, as the country remains excluded from a fragile regional ceasefire framework, raising fears of a wider Middle East conflict.

According to the Lebanese Health Ministry, at least 303 people were killed and more than 1,150 injured in strikes carried out on Wednesday alone. The ministry said the attacks, which targeted dozens of areas across the country, included residential areas and critical infrastructure. Among the dead were at least 110 women, children, and elderly people, highlighting the heavy civilian toll.

The latest wave of bombardment brings the overall death toll in Lebanon since March 2 to 1,888, with more than 6,000 injured. Emergency teams continue to search for victims trapped beneath rubble in several locations, particularly in the capital, Beirut, where entire buildings were reduced to debris.

Attacks on southern Lebanon

In southern Lebanon, Israeli strikes hit at least 52 towns and villages over a 24-hour period, killing 24 people, according to official figures. The deadliest attacks included a strike on a residential building in Zrariyeh that killed 10 people, as well as additional strikes in Abbassiyeh and Jibsheet.

The Israeli military said it was targeting positions linked to Hezbollah. It claimed to have killed a senior figure associated with the group’s leadership in a strike on Beirut. However, the scale and spread of the bombardment have drawn international condemnation and renewed scrutiny over the proportionality of the attacks.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has defended the operations as necessary for national security, while also instructing officials to prepare for potential direct talks with Lebanon. The announcement of possible negotiations came even as strikes continued, underscoring the contradiction between military escalation and diplomatic outreach.

Efforts to contain the crisis are now intensifying on the diplomatic front. The United States has confirmed it will host talks next week aimed at reaching a ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon. A State Department official said the meeting would focus on mechanisms to halt hostilities and prevent further regional spillover.

The United Nations has welcomed the prospect of negotiations, stressing that diplomacy remains the only viable path to resolving the escalating violence. However, Lebanese officials have made clear that they will not enter talks without a prior cessation of hostilities, calling for a multi-day ceasefire as a precondition.

Hezbollah rejects direct talks with Israel

Hezbollah has also rejected the idea of direct negotiations with Israel, reiterating its position that any dialogue must follow an immediate halt to Israeli attacks. The group’s stance reflects broader domestic pressure within Lebanon, where public anger has surged amid mounting casualties and widespread destruction.

International reaction has been swift and critical. Emmanuel Macron warned that continued Israeli strikes risk undermining ongoing peace efforts and destabilizing the region further. Norway’s foreign minister said the attacks could constitute violations of international humanitarian law, while Canada issued a strong condemnation of the airstrikes and called for respect for Lebanon’s sovereignty.

In the region, Türkiye accused Israel of expanding its war beyond Gaza, warning that the conflict is entering a more dangerous phase. Pakistan also condemned the strikes, emphasizing that Lebanon must be included in any broader ceasefire arrangement tied to ongoing US-Iran negotiations.

The crisis is unfolding against the backdrop of a fragile understanding between Washington and Tehran aimed at reducing tensions elsewhere in the region. Former U.S. President Donald Trump, commenting on the situation, warned that Iran was failing to uphold commitments related to oil transit through the Strait of Hormuz, adding another layer of uncertainty to an already volatile situation.

Iran, for its part, has warned that continued Israeli attacks on Lebanon could render ongoing diplomatic efforts “meaningless,” signaling that escalation on the Lebanese front could derail broader regional negotiations.

Within Lebanon, the government has taken steps to assert greater control over the security situation, instructing the army to enforce a state monopoly on weapons in Beirut. The move appears aimed at stabilizing the internal environment as the country faces simultaneous external attacks and internal political pressure.

Despite these efforts, the situation on the ground remains highly volatile. With Lebanon still excluded from current ceasefire arrangements and military operations continuing unabated, fears are growing that the conflict could expand into a broader regional confrontation.

As diplomatic efforts gather pace ahead of next week’s talks in Washington, the coming days are likely to be critical in determining whether the violence can be contained—or whether the war will deepen further across the region.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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t the Manama Dialogue Forum held in Bahrain in November, Turkey’s Ambassador in Ankara and Special Envoy for Syria, Tom Barrack, reintroduced the concept of the “failed state”—a term historically associated with Lebanon yet largely absent from recent discourse. Since the outset of his tenure, Barrack has adopted a markedly dismissive rhetoric regarding Lebanon; in this context, he has at times labelled Lebanese political actors as “dinosaurs” and directed various accusations toward the Lebanese public, thereby further escalating diplomatic tensions.

Most recently, while underscoring Hezbollah’s military capabilities, social influence, and the Lebanese government’s inability to implement an effective disarmament strategy, Barrack offered severe criticism of Lebanon’s political landscape. In essence, however, his remarks reflect little beyond the prevailing frustrations of the United States and Israel.

Accordingly, it is essential to reconsider the application of the term “failed state”—originally employed in the post–Cold War era to describe states heavily dependent on external intervention and unable to maintain autonomous sovereignty—in relation to the Lebanese context. Thus, Lebanon’s protracted crisis must be examined not only through the lens of domestic sectarian political dynamics but also within the broader framework of regional and global policies directed toward the country.

Indeed, when viewed from the perspectives of the US–Israeli and Iranian axes, the reality becomes clearer: the sectarian and political equilibrium Lebanon has sought to construct—following a relatively stable period from its independence in 1943 until 1958, the post–1990 reconstruction driven by Rafik Hariri’s policies, and the strengthening that accompanied Israel’s withdrawal in 2000—has been destabilized as much by external forces as by internal ones.

Lebanon’s sovereign state impasse

Following the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah by Israel on September 27, 2024, Lebanon took sharp steps to eliminate Hezbollah. Additionally, the decision to place all weapons held by militia forces under state monopoly brought the concept of sovereignty back into circulation in the country. In this context, operations were launched to collect weapons in Palestinian refugee camps. Druze leader Walid Jumblatt expressed satisfaction that his followers would surrender their light weapons. Most importantly, the process of handing over Hezbollah’s weapons to the Lebanese army points to the extraordinary efforts made over the past year to ensure the state’s supremacy over society.

However, the US and Israel continue to threaten Lebanon with Hezbollah, arguing that it has not taken sufficient action. At the Manama forum, Tom Barrack compared Hezbollah to the Lebanese army, questioning which is the army and which is the militia based on Hezbollah’s superiority in terms of soldiers and missiles. This highlights the inadequacy — and, in a sense, the dysfunctionality — of the Lebanese government. These threats reveal that Barrack, who is of Lebanese origin, ignores the internal problems that have existed in the country since its independence and acts in a self-serving manner. Barrack also ignores the possibility of internal conflict in Lebanon and seems to want only one thing: a definitive solution to the Hezbollah issue as soon as possible, regardless of how the process unfolds.

Faced with pressure from Tom Barrack, Lebanon is trying to manage its internal dynamics in a more balanced way by placing society at the center of its understanding of sovereignty. This is an attempt to address its own internal problems, not only in the context of Hezbollah, but also in the context of economic and political crises. Although Lebanon is a nation state, its fragile structure, institutionalized through a “sectarian quota” system, has prevented society from recognizing the state as the sole authority.

Sect or the state?

More importantly, it has prevented society from integrating into the conventional understanding of the state.  Consequently, in terms of social life, education, employment opportunities, and most importantly, political representation, communities have established their identity and sense of belonging according to their sect rather than the state. This system legitimizes the marginalization of one sectarian group by another through political authority and domination, which led to a major civil war in Lebanon. Subsequently, it played a role in increasing social and sectarian tensions that continue to this day.

Against this backdrop, Hezbollah, seen as Lebanon’s most fundamental problem today, is essentially a consequence, not a cause, of all this internal political instability. The Shia community, Hezbollah’s biggest defender, claims to have the largest population density in the country. However, it believes that its political representation and authority are insufficient due to the lack of a census since 1932.

For this reason, Shiites view Hezbollah not only as a military force, but also as a political and social resistance movement. They declare that they will not bow to pressure. The army and government are well aware of the Shiites’ reactivity and avoid confronting Hezbollah to prevent social conflict. This prevents Shiite soldiers and officers from fighting Hezbollah soldiers in the army.

In this context, the Maronites, an influential sectarian group, seek to control other sectarian groups by claiming to be the rightful owners of Lebanon, despite the likelihood that they will never regain their pre-civil war influence. Holding key positions such as the presidency, army commandership, and central bank presidency, the Maronites want to play a leading role in the restructuring process. They intend to use the influence of the church to ensure that the political weight of these positions is more strongly felt in society. The recent harsh statements by Samir Geagea, leader of the Lebanese Forces Party, regarding Hezbollah’s weapons, for example, are indicative of his attempts to speak on behalf of the state.

The Sunnis, another leading sectarian group in the country, are seeking their place in a leaderless political process. The Druze enjoy relative stability but are affected by regional crises due to Lebanon’s economic impasse and the socio-political and sectarian situations of the Druze in Syria and Israel. The dissolution of the sovereignty paradigm that Lebanon is attempting to devise to escape state failure is inevitable in such a political impasse.

Global satisfaction with Lebanon’s failure to form a state

Shortly after the Israeli occupation of Lebanon in 1983, then-Israeli President Shimon Peres coined the term “Lebanonization,” which preceded the term “failed state” in international relations literature. The social divisions experienced during the civil war, Syrian intervention in 1976, Israeli occupation in 1982, rise of Hezbollah, and Taif Agreement—which, contrary to expectations, further solidified sectarianism—transformed Lebanon from a state into a self-destructive popular formation. The struggle for survival within this state of collapse resulted in an impasse due to external intervention.

Syria’s withdrawal of its military forces from Lebanon in 2005 was a positive development in terms of strengthening the state’s authority. However, the army’s failure to become powerful enough — or more accurately, its failure to be strengthened — and the continued concentration of economic power in the hands of a select few paved the way for political decision-makers to rely even more heavily on external support. The global system continued to pursue policies that would reinforce the country’s instability, giving Lebanon space as a regional actor only to the extent it deemed appropriate.

In this context, Tom Barrack’s July statement that “strong nation states are a threat” was viewed as criticism directed at Israel. However, it is worth noting that these words have significant resonance in Lebanon. Arab states, in particular, are seen as a threat to Israel” was viewed as criticism directed at Israel. However, it is worth noting that these words have significant resonance in Lebanon. From Tel Aviv’s security-based perspective, a legitimate government with dominant political authority and a strengthened army in Lebanon—in other words, a Lebanese state capable of stopping the occupation policy and enjoying international support in this regard—is not considered acceptable. Therefore, Israel is not content merely to resolve Hezbollah’s presence in Lebanon; it rejects any military force in southern Lebanon, including the army and UNIFIL.

During the Lebanese civil war, Israel attempted to establish an allied group compatible with its own interests through the Maronites, but this effort was unsuccessful. However, over the last two years in particular, Tel Aviv has achieved military success in Lebanon and profited from the war of attrition. It has turned the country’s political fragmentation to its advantage without needing any internal allies. Currently, with US support, Israel continues to signal that it will expand its occupation with or without Hezbollah.

Iran is another regional actor playing a role in Lebanon’s deterioration, and its historical policy is also noteworthy. The 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution was a victory for Lebanese Shiites. The establishment and strengthening of Hezbollah during the Khomeini era, along with rising cultural and sectarian interactions under Ali Khamenei, demonstrate Iran’s significant benefit from Lebanon’s sectarian system and statelessness. Although Iran’s role in exacerbating Lebanon’s instability has become less clear in the last two years, Tehran occasionally increases tensions with Lebanon through Hezbollah to maintain its position as the savior of the Lebanese Shiite community.

Of all the criticisms of Lebanon, Tom Barrack’s comments on the country’s collapsing financial system have been the most accurate. The October 2019 protests caused the Lebanese pound to rapidly depreciate against the dollar. The Central Bank’s failure to manage the crisis led to the seizure of depositors’ investments in banks and left the people facing a major economic collapse. The aid expected from the IMF to solve economic problems was tied to reform conditions, so the promised billions in aid did not materialize. Currently, Lebanon is facing obstacles in obtaining the financial support it needs due to Hezbollah. However, Israeli attacks on the south, east, and capital city of Beirut are hindering Lebanon’s reconstruction efforts. Furthermore, the failure to support the Lebanese army suggests that the country’s collapse is being deliberately maintained.

Historically characterized by sectarian diversity, Lebanon has managed to preserve this mosaic to a certain extent. However, in the modern era, it has been cited as the most vivid example of the failed state model in literature. Aside from neglecting the country’s geopolitical importance, neighboring countries have deemed strategic moves that deepen social divisions and fuel internal crises more “convenient” for their security policies. Given this situation, it seems unlikely that Lebanon’s efforts to establish state authority will succeed in the long term.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter.)

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he U.S. is pushing for Hezbollah’s disarmament. In May, Yechiel Leiter, the Israeli ambassador to the United States, said he believes Syria and Lebanon could join the Abraham Accords and normalize relations with Israel before Saudi Arabia does, as war last year changed the power balance and greatly weakened Hezbollah.

The U.S. supposedly has big plans for Lebanon once Hezbollah is gone. The alleged plan includes an economic zone in the south and a joint defense agreement. However, the details of this economic zone are still unknown, including whether it will resemble the Gaza Riviera or be something else entirely. Regardless of American ambitions for Lebanon, now is definitely not the time for normalization with Israel.

Any talk of normalization could create unrest and threaten the fragile coexistence among Lebanon’s different sects. The best possible outcome that would satisfy both Israel and Lebanon and receive the approval of regional powers is a non-aggression pact. Such a treaty would not endanger the fragile entente between Lebanon’s different factions and would provide the necessary security guarantees for both Lebanon and Israel.

Alliance with Turkey

To have a stable and prosperous country, Lebanon must ensure the following, in addition to structural and administrative reforms of state institutions: 1) Hezbollah and other groups must surrender their arms to the state to establish its authority.

2) Israel must withdraw from Lebanon, including the five points.

3) Israel must stop attacking Lebanon.

4) The reconstruction of the south must be initiated under state control. To achieve these objectives, Lebanon must negotiate with Israel.

However, Lebanon faces a problem: it has no leverage, while Israel has all of it. Lebanon needs leverage; otherwise, it will not be able to negotiate. Although Hezbollah undermined the state, it deterred Israel. Hezbollah created some leverage, though it was not controlled by the Lebanese state. Now, given the imbalance of power, Lebanon needs to acquire leverage before negotiating with Israel. This leverage can be acquired by forming the right alliances.

Similarly to Syria, Lebanon should seek a defense treaty with Turkey. The treaty will likely be accepted domestically. The pro-Iran domestic faction will accept it because they see it as a balancing factor against American influence and as potential protection from Israeli bombs. The “sovereign” factions in the Saudi camp are also likely to accept it if they receive approval from Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia could acquiesce because such a treaty would contribute to stability in Lebanon and Syria.

Turkey’s defense cooperation agreements with various countries have ranged from broad memorandums of understanding, such as those with Oman and Kuwait, which revolve around training and equipping, to more assertive engagements, such as the agreement with Qatar, where Turkey has a base and deploys soldiers. A general MOU with Turkey could give Lebanon the flexibility and leverage necessary to negotiate with Israel. Israel does not want Turkey, a NATO country, to deploy troops on its border. Therefore, Lebanon could use this leverage to negotiate with Israel, secure a withdrawal, and prevent an Israeli attack.

Political guarantees for Hezbollah

Once Lebanon has crafted a defense agreement with Turkey, it should negotiate with Hezbollah, offering the group clear political guarantees in exchange for disarmament. Hezbollah can continue operating as a political group as long as it relinquishes its arms and affirms its status as a Lebanese party, not an extension of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Lebanese government should pair Hezbollah’s commitment with a clear verification mechanism.

The Lebanese army has already presented a disarmament plan, which the Lebanese government agreed to on September 5. However, the disarmament plan was not coupled with any political settlement or guarantees for the group. Either the plan will be executed by force, leading to a clash, or it will not be executed, leading to more American pressure on the fragile state. This is why the state should seek an agreement with Hezbollah.

Once an agreement is reached with the group, the Lebanese state should lobby regional powers for their support in pressuring Israel. This pressure, coupled with the backing that Lebanon could receive from a defense agreement with Turkey, would make Lebanon eligible to negotiate with Israel.

This will give Lebanon agency when negotiating with Israel. Thus far, the Lebanese state has delegated the U.S. to negotiate with Israel on its behalf. Domestically, the state has been unable to put any real pressure on Hezbollah, nor has it been in a position to offer Hezbollah any guarantees. Any of the suggestions start with the Lebanese state having the political will to show agency and start making decisions.

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lthough discussions regarding Hezbollah’s weapons have been part of Lebanese politics since the Taif Agreement in 1989; the events of October 7, which saw Hezbollah lose its entire senior command, Israeli attacks on its weapons depots, and, particularly with the Syrian revolution, the decline of Iran’s regional influence, paved the way for negotiating Hezbollah and its weapons in such a clear and forceful manner for the first time.

From the beginning of 2025, Lebanon achieved relative stability with the election of a president and the formation of a new government, and began to chart a new course in domestic and foreign policy to determine its place in the regional equation. However, the issue of dismantling the military wing of Hezbollah, which has long been the country’s most important armed force, and disarming the group has once again brought the political deadlock in the country to the fore.

Although Hezbollah is currently weaker than ever, the failure to achieve concrete results from the negotiations, the government’s inability to manage the process well, and the continuation of Israeli attacks on Lebanon indicate that a possible weapons handover process will be more painful than expected. Accordingly, questions surrounding the issue of weapons, which involves the Lebanese state-Hezbollah-society triangle, are increasingly being raised.

Will the weapons be surrendered?

The issue of disarming Hezbollah, which was the first item on the agenda of Nawaf Salam, who became prime minister of the new government on February 8, 2025, entered a new phase when Salam accepted Tom Barrack’s proposal on August 5, and decided that there should be no armed elements in Lebanon. The transition to this new phase was significantly influenced by the expansion of the scope of the UN Security Council resolution adopted after the 2006 war within the framework of Barrack’s Hezbollah-centered disarmament project.

Indeed, as stated above, the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons began to be discussed in the 1990s and was resolved in 2006. In line with this decision, it was envisaged that there would be no armed forces other than the Lebanese army in southern Lebanon. However, after the Israel-Hezbollah war that began on October 8, 2023, Amos Hochstein, the Biden administration’s Middle East adviser, brought the UN resolution back to the agenda in the first month of the war and made statements saying that UN Resolution 1701 is not enough and that the United States is working to devise a formula to end the conflict once and for all, indicating that security strategies against Hezbollah had been determined much earlier.

At this point, it is understood that the clause in the proposal presented by Tom Barrack, which calls for the removal of Hezbollah weapons not only from southern Lebanon but also from Dahiye, Bekaa, Baalbek and all areas held by the group, had been planned by Washington and Tel Aviv for a long time.

Hezbollah’s self-restraint

Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem, who strongly opposed the draft against the Lebanese government that ratified the U.S. decision, stated that despite all of Israel’s violations after the November 26 ceasefire agreement, there had been no response from South Lebanon to Israel. He argued that Hezbollah had complied with the conditions to secure peace, but Israel had continued its occupations and attacks, stating that national security would be completely threatened by the project to disarm Hezbollah.

This situation, a clear sign that they will not comply with what Naim Qassem sees as an Israeli and U.S. plan, is bringing the tension between Hezbollah and Amal on one side and the Lebanese government and its allies on the other to a more critical point. On the other hand, Hezbollah’s continuation of its ‘Resistance: Sovereignty’ slogan indicates that the process will be stalled for some time and that no concrete progress will be made until December 2025, the deadline set for the state to take control of the weapons.

Naim Qassem’s current call for the Lebanese government to reverse its decision and for joint action against this external threat to Lebanon, developing a discourse based on national consciousness, indicates that he is seeking political support within Lebanon. Although Qassem’s statement that Lebanon’s national security is under threat has not been met with a response, his room for maneuver has been significantly reduced due to the low level of support he has received, even from Amal movement leader Nabih Berri. The Lebanese army does not have a deterrent force capable of confronting Hezbollah, besides the Lebanese government’s inability to chart a course for disarmament that would not lead to internal conflict. These are all clear signs that the group will not back down in the short term.

Another point to note at this stage is that if Israel withdraws from the occupied territories and a permanent ceasefire is achieved, it remains to be seen in what context Hezbollah will bring the issue of its weapons to the negotiating table. Indeed, the leader of Hezbollah has stated from the outset that they will not surrender their weapons by any means whatsoever. Following the permanent ceasefire expected to be signed between Israel and Lebanon, scenarios are emerging in which Hezbollah will act in cooperation with the Lebanese army and Hezbollah soldiers may be integrated into the Lebanese army. This plan, rejected by the Lebanese government and, naturally, the U.S., appears to be the only alternative offered by Hezbollah.

On the other hand, statements made by Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich that Israel will not withdraw from the five points it occupies in southern Lebanon leave Hezbollah with no alternative but to cooperate in order to maintain its military presence. Therefore, pressure exerted during the negotiation phase will mobilize Hezbollah’s social base, which refuses to accept coexistence with Israeli occupiers in the south and will widen the gap between society and the state.

What does Iran’s support for Hezbollah mean?

Shortly after Nawaf Salam accepted the U.S. proposal, the visit of Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, to Beirut and the tension that arose between him and President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Salam during the visit showed that Hezbollah had caused a stalemate between Iran and Lebanon. In this context, although Larijani proposed dialogue on the issue of weapons, he emphasized that his country would continue to support Hezbollah, stating that the resistance was a strategic asset and that ‘Tehran needs Hezbollah’s support at least as much as Hezbollah needs it,’ thus indicating that Iran would not abandon Hezbollah.

In contrast to Salam, who reacted harshly to Larijani’s remarks, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Arakchi, seeking to adopt a more moderate stance, stated that they were not interfering in Lebanon’s internal affairs but supported Hezbollah’s national security strategy, indirectly expressing their desire for Iran’s continued presence in Lebanon.

At this stage, it appears that Iran, while beginning to prioritize its internal defenses against a potential renewed conflict with Israel, is striving to maintain its influence over the Lebanese Shiites and Hezbollah, who need it more than ever. On the other hand, considering that the decline in its regional influence does not mean Iran’s withdrawal from the region, that Tehran is closely monitoring the ongoing instability in Syria, and that Saudi Arabia’s reluctance regarding Lebanon continues, it is likely that Iran will maintain its strategic support for Hezbollah.

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srael and Lebanon are moving towards an agreement on the longstanding maritime border dispute. The dispute had been a cause of tension between the two sides for over a decade and indirect negotiations have been going on since 2020.

U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein sent the latest proposal to the two sides last week, on September 30. The draft aims to settle claims over offshore gas fields. Recent discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean have shown the disputed waters to be rich in natural gas and have raised the stakes.

Hezbollah, which had been opposing the previous drafts of the deal and had threatened Israel against utilizing offshore gas fields, seems to now be giving the green light.

On October 1, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said in a speech that the draft deal was a “very important step” and that the next few days would be “crucial.”

“We support the Lebanese position so that we safeguard our right to demarcate our maritime borders and invest in our gas,” senior Hezbollah official Mohammad Raad said.

With the Lebanese economy suffering, Hezbollah has pledged to abide by the agreement which may relieve some of the strain on the economy.

“A positive atmosphere”

On October 1, Lebanese President Najib Mikati spoke of a “positive atmosphere” on the topic and that a deal would soon be reached, possibly before his term expires on October 31.

Nabih Berri, one of Lebanon’s powerful leaders and an ally of Hezbollah, said that the draft agreement “in principle meets the Lebanese demands.”

Lebanon has submitted a list of changes that it would like to see in a proposal on how to delineate a contested maritime border with Israel to the United States.

Lebanon presented its response to the deal with modifications to the U.S. ambassador on October 4. “I think that it is now in the hands of the U.S. mediator,” deputy parliament speaker Elias Bou Saab said. Bou Saab also stated that he does not think the proposed changes would derail the deal.

Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid said that they were “discussing the final details” and that it was too early to commend a done deal. While the details of the draft were not revealed to the public, Lapid stated it “safeguards Israel’s full security-diplomatic interests, as well as economic interests.”

“The security of the north will be strengthened,” he continued. “Money will flow into the state’s coffers and our energy independence will be secured.”

In a televised interview on the Iranian Al-Alam news channel on February 8, secretary general of the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, revealed that they wished the ex-Lebanese prime minister, Saad Hariri, reconsider his bombshell decision of “suspending” his political career, announced on January 24.

Nasrallah called the decision “unfortunate,” given that Hariri was their “candidate for the premiership,” highlighting that the political landscape remains extremely opaque in a post-Hariri era and that channels of cooperation and communication with the Future Movement, Hariri’s political party, shall remain open.

Ironically, Hezbollah never named Hariri for the premiership in the custom parliamentary consultations often held by the president of the republic before a PM is designated based on a majority of votes. However, Hezbollah’s position on Hariri’s departure says a lot about the role Hariri played to the militant group’s advantage especially since 2016, despite Hezbollah basking in unrivalled power during that period.

Hariri’s exit does not necessarily imply that observers, politicians, and researchers have written him off completely; however, his decision should not be taken lightly either, in terms of the seismic shift the country is undergoing by moving completely into the “Iranian influence archipelago.”

In late January, Saad Hariri arrived in Beirut following months of speculation in the wake of yet another solitary retreat – this time in the Emirati capital, Abu Dhabi – that came into effect mid-July last year. Hariri, a PM-designate at the time, stepped down after failing to form a government for over eight months. In Beirut, Hariri met with his aides, party members, MPs from his bloc, and other sectarian leaders or figures, and proceeded to announce the unthinkable: suspending his involvement in political activities and not running in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

In third-world countries (although I have reservations regarding the term), politicians and leaders do not simply step down: they either abdicate to their heirs or die while still in office. If they ever step down, it is often a form of a relegitimization process following serious blunders. Exhibit A is Egypt’s leader Gamal Abdel Nasser’s shenanigan in 1967 following his country’s catastrophic defeat by Israel in the Six-Day War of 1967.

Hariri is no Nasser

But Hariri is no Nasser and he might not even aspire to be one, and, Hariri was not met with waves of people flocking the streets asking him to rescind his decision as Nasser experienced back then. Hariri enjoyed a few flagship “selfies” with a handful of supporters near his Beiruti mansion and a couple of hours of chants in his name. The feeble reaction from Saad’s supporters, the ones he represents, is symptomatic of current times in Lebanon where sectarian leaders, previously holding gods-like statuses, are dealt major blows to their popularity, to a varying extent.

The Sunni community today stands at a three-way crossroad with different options to mitigate the current situation. As Saad fades into the horizon, until further notice, Sunnis can either succumb to further marginalization and disenfranchisement without devising a plan to attempt to fill Hariri’s shoes, or the main Sunni figures in the country can move towards creating a consortium that manages the transition into a post-Hariri era through cooperation, or lastly, compete amongst each other over the leadership of the sect causing further communal depression and the complete erosion of the sect’s leverage within the country’s power-sharing arrangement.

Unfortunately, Lebanon isn’t shifting into a secular state any time soon, nor will its sectarian system be altered at the moment, despite the hopeful dreams of the Lebanese youth that took to the streets during the October 2019 uprising.

It appears that the Lebanese Sunni leaders understand that now is not the time for petty politics amongst them, especially during an extremely sensitive phase where Iran sits and negotiates with the United States in Vienna not only regarding its nuclear program but also its influence in the region, and while the world is starting to show signs of reconsideration of policies towards the Syrian regime, despite its track record of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

As such, a common understanding seems to be brewing for the option of a concerted effort to rally the community and block the way in face of lackluster disbursement of Sunni votes. The cornerstone of such an effort will be the mufti who already adopted a proactive approach to the situation, in addition to the club of ex-prime ministers who, alongside Mikati, can throw their weight around.

However, this does not ensure that Hariri’s shoes will be filled. After all, and despite his blunders, he remains the Sunni community’s most popular leader and no other figure enjoys the potential Saad once represented – not even the sitting billionaire PM, Najib Mikati, who has yet to come out of his localized constituency in northern Lebanon towards the country as a whole.

With the Sunni community divided, Hezbollah can now rule much easier

The recent dynamics will pave the way towards a schism between the Sunni figures of the cities and those of the peripheries, who are not aligned in politics and allegiances. In fact, peripheral figures have a bigger chance for representation today, especially since they’ve maintained good relations with the Syrian regime in Damascus and with the tides shifting in their favor.

This schism will serve as a conduit for both Hezbollah and Bashar al-Assad to exercise influence over the Sunni role within the power-sharing arrangement, allowing them to break any form of unity sect leaders might work to establish. It’ll be easier for Hezbollah to rule in the wake of a divided Sunni community.

Hezbollah has lost an ally in Saad Hariri, a pro-Western PM with access to all capitals of the world who acted as a buffer between the international community and the Iran-aligned militant group and also as a whipping boy for most of the shortcomings under the pretext that “Hezbollah doesn’t rule.” Now, the group is gearing for a wider share of the pie in Lebanon as the reconfiguration of spheres of influence is underway in the region.

Hariri is obviously jumping ship, a sinking one with more holes than the current 6.5 million population can fill even if they all chipped in.

Hariri’s decision stacks up against a series of mistakes he has committed over a 17-year period, yet the decision might eventually pay off during these trying times – as in now. Saad is obviously jumping ship, a sinking one with more holes than the current 6.5 million population can fill even if they all chipped in. The economy is in shatters, the country’s relations with the outside world are collapsing, and the predominant Hezbollah-Free Patriotic Movement alliance has no competency or potential to lead the country out of the abyss.

More so, in order to secure a deal with the International Monetary Fund and other global donors, the time will come where even more difficult austerity measures will be required with harsh reforms that often come at a popularity expense. Hariri being out of the picture means he won’t be associated with those measures and will spare himself further decline in popularity.

Lebanon’s agony was compounded over the past few weeks as a result of statements made by the country’s newly appointed minister of information, George Cordahi, in a prerecorded online media interview that saw the light on September 10, 2021, but which was filmed in August 2021 and released after Cordahi was appointed in Najib Mikati’s government on September 10.

In the interview, Cordahi committed a series of blunders which highlight his very basic understanding of regional politics (or even politics, in general) and his skewed moral compass regarding what constitutes an admirable leader in his opinion (i.e., Bashar Assad and Vladimir Putin). However, all of that didn’t matter and quickly became a sideshow against the backdrop of the measures that were immediately enacted by the Saudi government following the airing of the episode by the online platform of Qatari state-owned Al Jazeera.

Riyadh seemed to have taken offense in Cordahi’s statements on Yemen, where he said that the Iran-aligned Houthi group was “defending itself … against an external aggression,” adding that “homes, villages, funerals and weddings were being bombed” by the Saudi-led coalition. He also called the 7-year war in Yemen “futile” and said it was “time for it to end.”

A diplomatic crisis spiraled out of control, with Riyadh fully halting Lebanese imports and ordering the “recall of the ambassador in Lebanon for consultations, and the departure of Lebanon’s ambassador to the kingdom within 48 hours.” Other countries within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) followed suit or took other measures, but the GCC appeared united in its stance against Lebanon – the Gulf’s unity on such a negative position towards Lebanon constitutes a precedent, with Oman and Qatar taking less escalatory measures than their counterparts.

The crisis goes well beyond Cordahi’s words regarding the war in Yemen.

Yet, while the blame for what transpired is being directed towards Cordahi, with several Lebanese politicians or sectarian leaders denouncing his statements and asking him to resign – including, in an indirect way, the incumbent prime minister – the crisis goes well beyond Cordahi’s words regarding the war in Yemen.

In fact, from an observer’s point of view, the current diplomatic crisis has been a long time coming with the perfect storm brewing over the years, especially since back in 2016 the so-called presidential deal was struck between Saad Hariri, Michel Aoun (and his U.S.-sanctioned son-in-law Gebran Bassil), and Hezbollah.

The deal birthed what was dubbed a neo-troika, which represents a power-sharing arrangement reminiscent of the one that existed during the Syrian regime’s occupation of Lebanon. However, this time, the main antagonists were the top leaders of the three main sects in Lebanon: the Maronites, the Shi`a, and the Sunnis. Yet, the neo-troika does not place all three parties on an equal footing within Lebanon’s power-sharing arrangement.

The ultimate weakening of Hariri and the disintegration of the political camp that was previously perceived to balance Hezbollah’s growing power, catapulted the Iran-funded and armed group into new echelons of influence in Lebanon. May 2018 resembled the final nail in the coffin, with Hezbollah and its allies winning a majority in the parliamentary elections allowing it to exercise control over the legislative, the executive, and the presidency. This inherently meant fully controlling the country’s foreign policy too.

Two major incidents exemplified Riyadh’s waning influence and Lebanon’s break from its traditional foreign policy positioning.

Two major incidents exemplified Riyadh’s waning influence and Lebanon’s break from its traditional foreign policy positioning. Both incidents were championed by none other than Gebran Bassil, Hezbollah’s main Christian ally in Lebanon. In February 2016, U.S.-sanctioned Gebran Bassil refused to condemn attacks on the Saudi embassy in Tehran and its consulate in Meshhad. Bassil, at the time, was a foreign minister and his decision broke with Arab unanimity within the Arab League.

Even Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, at the time, denounced the attacks, and said that his government had opened an investigation to punish the perpetrators. Moreover, Bassil refused to condemn drone attacks that targeted two major Saudi Aramco oil installations in September 2019. Bassil justified his stance by equating the Houthi attack on Riyadh to the Saudi-led Arab coalition on Sanaa while alluding to the policy of “dissociation” to avoid taking a stance. That did not bode well with Riyadh, given the gravity of the attack which obviously crossed all the red lines between Riyadh and Tehran.

Riyadh effectively realized – the hard way – that it went from hero to zero in Beirut in a span of only 15 years. This can be viewed as a record time for a country’s shift in allegiance given the size of investments Riyadh once held in Beirut, and especially since it engineered the end of the civil war in 1990 and funded Lebanon’s postwar reconstruction drive.

While Lebanon was previously seen as a satellite state were Riyadh and Damascus shared influence, the country today rotates in the Iranian orbit despite Riyadh and other powers, like the United States, retaining considerable influence there.

In today’s regional geopolitical setup, Lebanon falls within the “Iranian influence archipelago,” a reality supported by statements made by senior Iranian officials, the current Lebanese political state of affairs, and the fact that the international community includes the Lebanese dossier whenever it intends to negotiate with Tehran. After all, Najib Mikati’s government did not see the light despite the immense effort and pressure France’s Elysée exerted over 13 months up until French President Emmanuel Macron received a nod from the Iranians following the installment of their new hardline administration in Tehran.

Nevertheless, the recent Saudi escalation towards Lebanon appears to be a last hurrah despite the Saudis framing it as them cutting their losses in Lebanon and leaving. The developments in Iraq and Lebanon over the past two years – since the uprisings of October 2019 broke out in both countries – and the growing anti-Iranian sentiments in both countries, reinvigorated the Saudi drive to try and instrumentalize the new dynamics in order to attempt to roll back Iranian influence in the region.

The results of the Iraqi parliamentary elections that were held last month and the huge blow that the Iran-aligned militias were dealt, cemented the Saudi conviction, especially as Riyadh maintains good relations with the caretaker Iraqi PM – who until now remains the most favorable candidate to be reappointed to the position– and the winner of the parliamentary elections, Muqtada al-Sadr. Iraq’s influential Shi`ite cleric, al-Sadr, made a rare visit to Saudi Arabia in July 2017 and met with Mohammed bin Salman.

With today’s intertwinement of dossiers in the region, especially due to Iran’s bloated influence in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, the Saudis as much as the Iranians, view the regional chessboard as one unit where they can put pressure on each other in different places to gain concessions. Meanwhile, both had a major interest in engaging in an Iranian-Saudi dialogue that is taking place in Baghdad, an attempt to appease the administration of President Joe Biden. From one side, the Saudis want to appear like they’re breaking away from the zero-sum approach they pursued towards Iran during the days of Donald Trump’s administration, while the Iranians benefit from a semblance of regional diplomacy to try and keep “regional matters” away from the negotiation table in Vienna.

While there always seem to be efforts to rehabilitate Iran’s image at both a regional and international level, usually attempting to make Tehran appear to be the victim rather than the victimizer, few would be naïve enough to deny the fact that Iranian ambitions can actively be classified as being imperial in nature.

However, Tehran’s clergy-cum-politicians have played the game of empires in an intelligent and subtle manner, preferring to control vassal states by proxy rather than directly imposing their rule directly. In this way, Iran can claim to simply be “providing assistance” to the people of the region that it is now actively terrorizing.

Through a strategy of clever and careful outsourcing of war to ideologically loyal militants across the Middle East, Iran has managed to carve for itself a sphere of influence that threatens peace and security in the region and beyond.

War on the cheap

As previously stated, Iran does not use direct, conventional means of control and military power projection as it knows it can be a costly endeavor, both in blood and treasure.

The last time Iran was involved in a conventional conflict was against Iraq between 1980 and 1988. In almost eight full years of grinding war, Iran was left militarily and economically broken, politically isolated, and the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, famously stated that signing a ceasefire with Iraq was like drinking from a poisoned chalice.

The Iranians learnt the lesson of the war well – no amount of Shia Islamist rhetoric was able to lead the Iranian military and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to victory. After the butcher’s bill of the Iran-Iraq War, the Shia revolutionaries changed tack and began a new strategy of harboring Shia Islamist groups loyal to them, waiting for the right opportunity to install them in positions of power.

Perhaps the most famous of these groups was actually incubated during the war with Iraq and is now Iran’s leading proxy in the region. Lebanon’s Hezbollah militia, now led by Hassan Nasrallah, was created, financed, and trained by the IRGC in 1985, ostensibly to resist the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. In cooperation with their Syrian ally in the Assad regime, Iran dispatched hundreds of IRGC operatives to train Lebanese Shia irregulars in guerrilla warfare.

To this end, the PMF have executed Iran’s bidding with bloody enthusiasm. Not only are they implicated in war crimes and crimes against humanity during their campaigns against Daesh between 2014 and 2017 against innocent Sunni Arabs, but they have also recently targeted largely Shia Arab pro-democracy activists, killing at least 600 since 2019, and are actively involved in fighting in neighboring Syria where they have supported Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

But Iran’s proxies are not only active in the traditional “Shia Crescent” stretching from Iran to the Mediterranean Sea, but they also have a presence on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The Yemeni Houthi militias, while not as intricately linked to Iran as Hezbollah in Lebanon or the PMF in Iraq, are in the modern day inextricably linked to Tehran’s regional ambitions.

The Yemeni Shia group not only uses similar propaganda by calling for death to America, Israel, and publicly cursing all Jews in what can only be described as anti-Semitic hatred, but has received extensive Iranian financial and military support. This has included the provision of drone technology that the Houthis have used to harass Saudi Arabia and attack its strategically vital energy sector.

The modern Iranian empire is ruled by proxy

These groups are not simply allies, but they are direct proxies of Tehran and an extension of the Iranian leadership’s strategic ambitions.

In the Houthi case, Yemen has been used as a quagmire to bleed Saudi and its allies in an unwinnable war, while simultaneously controlling the capital city and commanding a dangerous position over vital naval shipping routes. In the Iraqi and Lebanese cases, Iranian rule by proxy is so obvious and is seen as existentially vital to Iran’s strategic ambition to dominate the Middle East, far more so than their presence in Yemen.

It is no wonder, then, that senior Iranian officials occasionally allow the mask to slip and openly gloat about their new empire and how they control four Arab capitals: Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and Sanaa. They have also made their ambitions of a wider Shia revolutionary uprising clear, and half a decade ago announced the formation of a “Shia Liberation Army”.

Without a regional and international cooperative framework to contain Iran’s ambitions and to roll back its gains in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon especially, with Yemen of secondary importance, then Tehran will only consolidate its control over these territories that are largely populated by Sunni Arabs. This will be a recipe for disaster as majorities rarely accept being ruled minorities, and therefore there is a significant risk of the outbreak of a regional sectarian war, the results of which will be devastating and must be avoided at all costs.

The Beirut clashes on Thursday, October 14, 2021, signaled a new chapter in the Beirut blast probe.

Protests to remove Beirut blast investigation judge Tarek Bitar, who is leading the investigation on the Beirut blast that killed more than 200 people on August 4, 2020, escalated in an urban guerrilla skirmish, leaving seven people dead and more than 30 wounded.

This time, tensions over the Beirut blast probe have reached a new level, and there are fears of violent escalations.

On October 14, Muslim Shiite parties, Hezbollah and Amal, organized a protest in front of Beirut’s Justice Palace to ask for the suspension of Bitar.

Meanwhile, chaos and confusion erupted in the Tayouneh area and the Ain al-Remmaneh suburb, in the southern suburb of the capital Beirut.

Tayouneh area is not new to sectarian clashes. It was a former 1975-90 civil war front line between Shia and Christian areas. Furthermore, the Ain al-Remmaneh suburb has been the theater of several clashes since the economic crisis started in 2019.

It is still unclear how the skirmish started, but unidentified snipers likely began firing at the protesters. Bursts of gunfire and explosions could be heard from the nearby Justice Palace, scattering the angry demonstrators. Black-clad protestors suddenly moved toward the Tayouneh area, where the Amal-Hezbollah armed groups were involved in gunfire clashes. The exchanges of fire involved snipers, guns, rifles, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).

While Hezbollah and Amal accused the Christian right-wing party Lebanese Forces (LF) of being behind the sniper attack, the LF denied any involvement and condemned the violence. Its leader, Samir Geagea, also blamed the Hezbollah incitement against judge Bitar.

Chaos and confusion ruled the Beirut clashes. I witnessed Amal-Hezbollah demonstrators move from Beirut’s Justice Palace and reach the Tayouneh area, near the urban park Horsh Beirut.

Lebanese Army soldiers were deployed in the surrounding area to stop demonstrators and contain the violence. Military vehicles blocked the road and joined the epicentre of the clashes, where the shootings were ongoing.

Demonstrators approached soldiers asking them to let them pass. Meanwhile, hooded armed men, most likely Hezbollah-Amal demonstrators, appeared on the road and started to shoot in the air near the Lebanese Army, which took no action.

I also witnessed a crowd surround and attack an unidentified vehicle, and heard several other shots. It was not clear what happened as crowds obstructed the view of the vehicle. I didn’t see any wounded persons during these chaotic events. Gunfire exchanges and explosions could be heard in the immediate proximity of army deployment.

The Lebanese Red Cross reported seven dead and more than 30 wounded. Civil Defence volunteers and army soldiers evacuated people trapped in the crossfire.

The Beirut clashes have caused panic and fear among Lebanese. Gunfire and explosions echoed, the wailing sirens of ambulances and evacuations revived memories of the 1975-1990 civil war.

Four bullets fell near a private French school in Furn El Chebbak neighborhood, causing panic among children, as reported by media and confirmed by several pictures published online.

Not all of the casualties were participants in the protests. Among the seven dead, a woman was shot in the head by a stray bullet in her house, and a delivery worker on duty was shot in the crossfire.

Following the Beirut clashes, the Presidency of Lebanon declared a day of mourning. Banks, schools, and public offices were closed. The Lebanese Army increased its deployment near the area of the clashes.

The Lebanese Army arrested nine people following the violence, according to a press statement. Currently, it is also probing a soldier suspected of firing towards protesters during clashes.

The burden of pressure over the Beirut clashes unexpectedly brought the Beirut Port Explosion Victims Association’s spokesperson Ibrahim Hoteit to call for the removal of Bitar. In a video circulating last Friday, he accused the judge of politicization and the U.S. of involvement in the investigation.

The politicization of the probe has polarized public opinion and exacerbated the public debate. Whoever supports Bitar’s efforts for accountability and justice over the disastrous explosion now has to face those who want his suspension from the investigation.

Furthermore, the Beirut blast probe has led to sectarian clashes, which brought the investigation to a level of tension never touched before.

For the first time since the probe started, Hezbollah and Amal have mobilized armed militias and supporters to spark fear and pressure political institutions into removing Bitar.

It is unclear if the LF has been actively involved in the clashes, but the LF-Hezbollah’s rivalry seems to have poured into the Beirut blast investigation.

The violence that erupted at a boundary between Christian and Shiite neighborhoods added new concerns over the stability of the country. Amid such sectarian drift, the Lebanese people find themselves gripped between fear and the threat of further escalations amid an unprecedented economic crisis that is eroding the country’s social fabric.

There are many reasons why nations go to war and even more why they go to civil war. The history of Lebanon in this respect is full of examples why this small Mediterranean nation is always perceived as vulnerable to civil strife.

Lebanon’s current economic and political collapse has unfortunately been a long time coming, as its archaic and medieval political system has struggled for decades to keep itself afloat. Corruption mixed with Iran’s Lebanon proxy Hezbollah have gradually detached Lebanon from the financial safety net which the Gulf Arab states and the international community has always provided.

While many have blamed the failure of the Lebanese political system and the tendency to go to war on sectarianism and international intervention, the crux of the problem lies in Lebanon’s 18 religious sects who have failed to recognize that updating the power-sharing formula, as they did in 1989 with the Taif Agreement, is insufficient if this change is not reflected in the constitution in a manner that provides stability and ultimately paves the way for a sustainable and functional state.

As it seems, there are many indicators which lead one to assume that civil war is at the gates. But, in reality, Lebanon’s current predicament requires more than a civil war to be resolved as many of the elements needed for civil war are non-existent – if not to say meager, at least in the foreseeable future.

As it stands, the only heavily armed and militarized faction in Lebanon is Hezbollah whose involvement and fighting experience in Iran’s regional expansionist project makes it lethal if civil war were to break out in Lebanon. While the rest of Lebanon’s sects and political parties maintain their own version of Praetorian Guards, some of whom were part of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), their small weapons and limited training does not qualify them to a face-off with Hezbollah.

Perhaps more importantly and for the time being, the regional and international appetite for strife is non-existent. The regional tensions between the Arab Gulf states and Iran have shifted the former’s attention to protecting their home front, especially in Yemen and Iraq, two areas which Iran and its proxies have infiltrated and used as bases to attack foreign and Arab interests.

In practical terms, recent events which transpired on the ground confirmed that civil war in Lebanon is a zero-sum game as the sectarian composition and division brought about by the 15 years of civil war has virtually created homogenous sectarian units and thus any military action on behalf of Hezbollah at the moment will not yield any clear-cut military victory. Instead, it will further flame sectarian tensions.

Recently, Hezbollah faced off with the Arab (Sunni) tribes of Khalde, south of the capital Beirut, and the Druze inhabitants of the village of Shwaya in the area adjacent to the Lebanese-Palestinian borders, which showed the limits of Hezbollah’s Iranian weapons at least internally.

In Khalde, Hezbollah could not react to the Arab tribes avenging the death of one of their own at the hands of a Hezbollah member just like in Shwaya, where the Druze intercepted a Hezbollah rocket launcher as they refused to turn their homes into potential targets for Israeli retaliation.

Be that as it may, the abovementioned factors, or lack thereof, do not really dismiss the chances of violence breaking out in Lebanon. Any sort of civil strife, though, will not remotely resemble the 15 years of civil war the Lebanese experienced or were told about by their family. The violence which will break out will be guided by fear of famine and the collapse of social order brought about by the total erosion of the Lebanese state.

If the Lebanese do not realize that this illusion of a system they live under needs to change, sooner rather than later, they will be faced with a mutated beast of violence, a beast which their sectarian safety net will not be able to contain, nor external intervention of any kind will be able to suppress.

The specter of civil war(s) is always looming over Lebanon, but, this time around, the international community and the many regional factions are not interested or willing to invest time and money in a country which has proved to be a bigger burden than ever. As Lebanon stands, it is merely an inconvenience and no longer a model of coexistence or diversity as some claim.

For four decades, the Islamic regime in Iran has sought to gain legitimacy in the Arab world by portraying itself as a defender of the Palestinians. The latest events in May in the West Bank and Gaza, however, signal that a resurgent Palestinian resistance along the lines of nationalism, is threatening the ability of external actors — including Tehran — to co-opt the cause for its own benefit as it has in the past, including via proxy actors.

Paradoxically, while the regime in Tehran has historically sought to portray itself as working against Israel, it remains dependent on Israel’s actions to accomplish its objective of gaining moral legitimacy in the Arab world. At the same time, Israel depends on Iran to jump over the ever-lingering Palestinian question and mold ties with Arab neighbors who are paranoid of Iran’s expansionism.

A Prized Highjack

Since the Tehran regime’s founding in 1979, the question of Palestine has offered it an opportunity to extend its ideological influence into both the Islamic and Arab world. Following the overthrow of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the last shah of Iran, the newly installed regime headed by Ayatollah Khomeini found in the centrality of the Palestinian cause a way to win over hearts and minds of large swaths of people in the region. It also found a springboard to grow its influence beyond borders — and indirectly fulfill its stated goal of “exporting the revolution.”

Khomeini attempted to appeal to the Umma by deliberately bypassing the leaders of the Sunni-Muslim states, but results were underwhelming. Soon after the 1979 revolution, the Iranian regime began intervening in neighboring countries, and justified this as necessary to liberate Palestine. As early as the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, the regime in Tehran raised the ingenious slogan, “The path to Jerusalem passes through Karbala.” After the war, the Quds Force, ironically, became an overreaching military and intelligence arm in neighboring countries, as it realized that it could justify maintaining a presence in Arab countries so long as it claimed to defend the Palestinians.

While the regime in Tehran raised anti-Zionist slogans as a layer of its broader anti-American doctrine, it remained – paradoxically – dependent on Israel to accomplish its objectives. Israel remained a de-facto partner of the Islamic Republic in its anti-Saddam war throughout the ’80s, bombing Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 and supplying Iran with arms throughout the war. Israel’s unjust and unlawful treatment of Palestinians, also, presented Iran with a golden ticket to keep intervening.

At the same time, the claim of fighting Israel allowed Iran to extend its reach. Tehran’s rhetoric and the sectarian nature of its newly founded regime also allowed it to establish a foothold among the Shia community in south Lebanon and to set up Hezbollah, its most prized asset overseas. The heavily armed Lebanese militant group became the most advanced point of the “Iranian influence archipelago” – sharing borders with the Islamic Republic’s ultimate foe, Israel.

Iran actively worked to vilify the PLO and went as far as labeling Palestine’s most iconic leader, Yasser Arafat, a “traitor.” In a fiery speech in Beirut’s suburbs in 1998, Hezbollah’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, went as far as calling for the assassination of Arafat by invoking the example of Khaled Islambouli, an Islamist officer who assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981. “Is there no Palestinian who can do what Khaled Islambouli did and say that Arafat’s presence on the face of this Earth is shameful to Palestinians and Muslims?” Nasrallah asked.

By overcoming Iran’s strategic isolation as a Shia revolutionary regime in a Sunni-dominated conservative region and extending its security perimeter to Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, Iran managed to brand itself as a pan-Islamic force fighting, first and foremost, for the Palestinian cause. The message was that Iran-backed Shias were fighting to liberate Palestine while Sunnis had abandoned it. Nasrallah made sure to echo this rhetoric and continuously peddle it in his speeches by raising the slogan, “We, the Shia of Ali ibn Abi Talib in the world, will never abandon Palestine, nor the people of Palestine, nor the sanctities of the Ummah in Palestine.” So, for Iran, it was the Shias that carried the torch of Palestine and Jerusalem, while Sunni states normalized.

Hamas Missiles on Jerusalem

During the latest round of violence, Iran relied on its historic formula of seeking to co-opt Palestinian resistance to increase its moral standing in the Arab world. It did this in two ways: by attempting to link itself to Hamas’s action, and by rallying Hezbollah to ramp up its rhetoric. Yet these attempts instead showcased the relative independence of Hamas as a Palestinian group, and the growing complexity of the Lebanese political scene, Hezbollah’s primary field of operation. It also highlighted the rise of a uniquely Palestinian nationalism that is leading resistance against Israel.

When Hamas started lobbing missiles on Jerusalem on May 10, 2021, following through on the May 5 warning of its armed wing to Israel over its attacks on Palestinian residents in occupied East Jerusalem, Hezbollah — with the support of Iran — found itself in a bind: on the one hand, they wanted to lay claim to what was happening, but on the other, they could not easily claim credit for Hamas’ actions. In the end, though, this seemed not to matter. The streets cared less about Hamas’s relations with Tehran and mobilized in full support of the Palestinians in general, who were also engaged in a unique moment of unity.

Part of the problem, for Iran, was Hamas’s relatively autonomous moves away from Tehran’s direct objectives, and its relative independence, underpinned by diversified sources of financial and military backing, in contrast to other sectarian-aligned ideological Iranian proxies. Meanwhile, Iran actively sought to tie both Hamas and Jerusalem (al-Quds) to its so-called axis of resistance.

Hamas’ relations had soured greatly with the axis as a result of its position on the Syrian uprising and its refusal to back the Syrian regime in its bloody crackdown on its own revolting civilians. By the time the war broke out in May this year, the process of fully reintegrating Hamas into the axis and improving ties with members of the axis had not been fully accomplished despite a visit by Hamas’s leadership to Bashar Al-Assad in Syria and the Palestinian group’s honoring of high-profile Houthi official Mohammed Ali Al-Houthi in Sanaa.

Hamas had to apologize for the photo-op between its representative in Sanaa and the Houthi leader due to the uproar it caused, specifically among Yemenis who are supportive of Hamas but opponents of the Iran-backed Houthis. The incident offered an idea of how challenging it will be for Hamas to retain wide support throughout the region if it continues to play on its dichotomies thinking it can outsmart all stakeholders.

Iran has also sought to co-opt the events in Palestine by tying the missile attacks on Israel to Qassem Soleimani, the Revolutionary Guard’s ex-Quds Force commander who was assassinated in January 2020 in an American drone strike in Baghdad. It had been Soleimani’s plan to build the missile capabilities of the Iran-funded and equipped sectarian militant groups in the region with the plan to overwhelm Israeli defenses when a conflict breaks out.

Around the time of the conflict, Iran-backed Iraqi sectarian militias and the Houthis in Yemen had all ramped up their anti-Israel rhetoric, suggesting that they may be involved in a “next conflict.” But again, this rhetoric earned little traction in the Arab world, that instead remained transfixed by the mobilization of a new generation of young Palestinians, such as the Sheikh Jarrah activist twins Muna and Muhammad El-Kurd, who deployed social media to call for unified Palestinian resistance against Israel’s evictions and its bombardment of Gaza.

Mobilizing Hezbollah

Hezbollah’s response to the latest round of violence has showcased the complexity and difficulty of the situation the party finds itself in at the moment in Lebanon. Although Hezbollah is Iran’s most prized overseas asset – and the only militant group to ever give Israel a bloody nose in the 2006 July war – it was not able to make much of an impact with regard to recent events.

Following the outbreak of violence, the group resorted mostly to ramping its rhetoric to compensate for its inability to occupy center stage during the recent escalation, – something it has always sought to do, as a strategy of cooption and domination of the conflict with Israel. The party organized marches to the Lebanese-Israeli borders and called for mosques to raise prayers in support of Palestinians. Its anti-Israel statements have increased in frequency since the war in Syria was mostly concluded in favor of Bashar Al-Assad, the head of Syria’s regime, following the involvement of Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah to prop him up. Thus, Hassan Nasrallah’s speeches started emphasizing that they “are closer than ever to liberate Jerusalem.”

Political instability has arisen around the world, driven by rising costs, food insecurity, and current effects of COVID19. Inflation was already hitting many emerging markets, but the pandemic has only exacerbated these dire circumstances. Sudan, Lebanon, and Iran are getting hit particularly hard, with current inflation rates that can only be described as hyperinflation.

Official statistics for Sudan are recording 363.14%, Lebanon 119.83%, and Iran 46.9%. These extreme rates are affecting the people of these countries on every level. The three countries mentioned are all suffering from a lack of energy sources, but these are merely underlying causes of a larger issue: their real struggle will be in overcoming rampant inflation.

As the market loses confidence in a country’s currency, a Central Bank can build up foreign reserves to “backstop” the local currency to restore faith and purchasing power for international goods like food, medicine, and fuel, most of which trade in USD. The U.S. Dollar is the reserve currency of the world, with over 80% of global trade transacting in dollars. If you don’t have access to USD, your country is at a disadvantage.

Here is a simplified example of how trade flow and foreign exchange might work in an emerging market:

• A company in Lebanon uses its dollar reserves to buy raw materials (i.e. fuel).
• They pay workers in Lebanese Pound, who use these wages to buy “goods.”
• The company sells goods locally, taking in Pounds to cover costs and make a profit.
• They can also sell some of their products abroad in USD, which would help “replenish” their reserves to buy more raw materials.
• The firm can also sell 100% in Lebanese Pound and rely on the local Banks/ Central Bank to maintain a steady exchange rate against USD or EUR to keep costs manageable to convert from local to foreign FXA fiat currency—or government-issued currency not backed by a commodity—is only as good as the confidence the market has in it.

A fiat currency—or government-issued currency not backed by a commodity—is only as good as the confidence the market has in it.

But what happens when the banks run low on FX reserves and can’t make the exchange?

A fiat currency—or government-issued currency not backed by a commodity—is only as good as the confidence the market has in it. So, if there are fears of rampant printing, expansive debt, or government instability, people will avoid using the currency, or demand more physical dollars or higher interest on debt to cover the rising risk. As confidence is lost, companies will want to transact in a “stable” currency, but these may not always be available—whether due to sanctions (U.S. sanctions on Iran) or local foreign reserve shortfalls at the Central Bank.

As costs rise, salaries must keep pace to cover bigger bills, and tax receipts fall, resulting in a government who can’t buy basic necessities. If a company can’t manage payroll or COGs (Cost of Goods Sold), how can they hire new employees or invest in facilities? Instead, they will always be reactionary. The same goes for a local consumer trying to manage a household: How can they save up for a house or car if the cost of everything around them is rising?

In Dec 2020, Lebanon experienced a devastating explosion at the Beirut port, resulting not only in the loss of innocent lives, but also crippling vital infrastructure and destroying many local businesses. Lebanon was already facing a slowdown, but now due to political instability and finger pointing, the rebuilding process has been moving at a snail’s pace, only to be hindered further by bottlenecks and shipping delays caused by COVID19.

Lebanon has struggled with power generation and transmission for years, and now with so much stress on an overtaxed system, generators are failing—or even exploding—due to overuse.

As local consumers and the broader market lose faith, they will avoid buying government debt needed to rebuild. Lebanon has struggled with power generation and transmission for years, and now with so much stress on an overtaxed system, generators are failing—or even exploding—due to overuse.

The lack of fuel oil (diesel) also pushes consumers to utilize “other” combustible material that may not be compatible on a BTU level, resulting in misfiring and failure. An economy needs cheap, reliable, and efficient power to grow, but Lebanon faces an inability to borrow and an imploding local currency. There is already anger towards the current government, and now with power outages lasting for 22 hours a day in some spots due to fuel shortfalls, tension is mounting.

The below chart breaks down how bad some currencies are faring vs the USD, and it isn’t just the Lebanese Pound. The Iranian Rial is also spiraling as U.S. sanctions remain in place, crushing the local economy.

In Iran, protests are expanding nationwide with the most recent being oil and petrochemical workers demanding higher wages to compensate for the falling Rial. Salaries have remained mostly stagnant while the currency devalues as the Iranian government expands the balance sheet.

The local infrastructure has also been failing due to terrorist attacks and ignored maintenance, resulting in rampant downtime and fires throughout the energy industry. Even though Iran produces millions of barrels of oil a day and has local refining capacity, they are struggling to maintain infrastructure and sell crude in the international market. If they can sell, it is at a steep discount due to sanctions, which limits Iran’s ability to tap American and European banks (SWIFT) as well as their currencies.

The transitional government has been facing shortages of foreign reserves, so without USD or EUR to back the Sudanese Pound, the market has lost confidence. This creates an inflationary spiral, and the inability to purchase goods such as fuel, food, and medicine (or service over 49 billion euros of foreign debt) is a huge anchor weighing down growth. It just takes one incident (on purpose or by accident) to set off a chain of events that can’t be contained, leading to more unrest, especially with the backdrop of a pandemic.

Emerging Markets are struggling under the weight of COVID19 and a sputtering global economy that is trying to awaken. The poor are getting poorer, and the middle class is being pushed closer to the poverty line as quality of life around the world is diminished. During COVID19, hundreds of millions of people fell out of the “Middle Class” and the $1.90 a day poverty line has only grown. This causes local populaces to become disenfranchised, resulting in more protests and riots against existing governments.

As COVID19 passes and people feel the sting of inflation and unemployment, pressure will mount on governments, and calls for change will rise. Each of the three governments discussed—Sudan: Transitional and Struggling, Lebanon: Fractured and Distrusted, Iran: Repressive and Suspected—will be under additional duress given the lack of local support, mounting debt, and failed policies.

The shortage of necessities (food, medicine, electricity, and fuel) will make it difficult to grow, and put more pressure on local governments. We have already seen food riots and protests . . . and we aren’t even fully out of the pandemic. Pain, despair, and anger has been bubbling beneath the surface for years, and now the match has been lit.

Lebanese Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri recently completed a two-day visit to Moscow, during which he met Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, and a number of Russian officials. Hariri’s visit coincides with talks of an upcoming initiative by Russian President Vladimir Putin which will break the deadlock and stagnation surrounding the Lebanese crisis and facilitate the formation of a new government, headed by Hariri.

This impossible task would be achieved after Russia summons Gebran Bassil, President Michel Aoun’s son-in-law and one of the main obstacles standing in the way to Lebanon’s political normalization.

The Russian initiative comes in the midst of the nuclear talks in Vienna and with the pressure on the Iranian regime from Israeli strikes and military operations – most recently the attack on Iran’s nuclear facility in Natanz and daily airstrikes that target Iran’s militias in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

The fact that Prime Minister Hariri received a royal reception at Moscow airport, with President Putin’s special representative in the Middle East and North Africa Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, Deputy Chief of Protocol in the Russian government Ambassador Kuznetsov, and the Lebanese ambassador to Moscow in attendance, is no minor detail. A scene which stood in utter contrast to the lukewarm reception the Hezbollah delegation received a month prior when they visited Moscow which many thought would be a chance to resolve the Lebanese stalemate.

The Russian side insists on forming a government of technocrats and stressing to their Lebanese visitors that obstructing the formation of the cabinet and impeding the normalization of political life is completely unacceptable. Thus, at the moment, Russia is more or less supportive of the initiative of French President Emmanuel Macron, which he announced on his visit to Lebanon after the deadly Beirut port explosion on August 4 which left the capital partially destroyed and thousands displaced.

Macron’s initiative, however, is dead in the water after the Lebanese political elite failed to honor their commitment to facilitate the formation of a so-called mission government, one which will carry out key structural reforms to allow Lebanon to receive a much-needed $10bn loan, which was supposedly heralded as a step pending the formation of the next government.

Russia’s current mindset vis-à-vis the Lebanese crisis, assumes that Gebran Bassil’s presidential chances are slim to none especially as his designation on the Global Magnitsky Act for corruption precludes him from running for president – at least in theory. Yet, Russia believes that Bassil’s political career can be salvaged if he is willing to cooperate with Russia, which will moderate the crisis and provide him and Hariri the much-needed political support and sponsorship.

Russia, formerly the supreme state in the Soviet Union, was dominant in the Lebanese political scene especially during the Civil War (1975-1990); however, with the collapse of communism it has struggled to regain its position which is partly dominated by the United States and partly by Iran via its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah.

Thus, Russia wishes to reenter Lebanon with noticeable vigor, and aspires to end the long period of its absence. Consequently, it aims to undermine and neutralize the United States’ historical role in Lebanon, a role which already seems in decline under the Biden administration. Naively, Russia seeks to move Lebanon from the traditional U.S. orbit to the Russian one, and with this, Russia’s greater role in Syria will be accompanied by curbing and later putting an end to Iranian expansion toward the Mediterranean.

Abandoned by his traditional Arab Gulf patron, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Hariri sees in Russia the only remaining lifeline, as Russia is in a better position than the U.S. in terms of the pressure it exerts on Iran and its militias in Syria. Russia simply has the ability to block the borders with Lebanon and Iraq, and corner Iran in Syria. By coordinating with the Israeli side, Russia can extract concessions from Iran and force Hezbollah to facilitate the formation of the Lebanese government.

Just like France before it, Russia is trying to deal with Hezbollah separately from Iran, and this is evident from it receiving the Hezbollah delegation in Moscow last month and projecting the idea that Hezbollah can decide on its own without Iranian consent. Yet, such an approach clearly demonstrates Russia’s lack of insight – not to say gullibility – about Hezbollah and Iran’s mindset. Iran, through Hezbollah and other similar proxies in the region, is in de facto control of Lebanon, and feels no need to concede to anyone at least of all to Russia.

Russia’s interest in Lebanon is beyond politics and is based on a desire to recuperate the cost of the Syrian war through their entry into future deals with the Lebanese political class in the energy and gas sector, as well as their desire to obtain the main investment of the port of Tripoli, which will play an important role in Syria’s postwar reconstruction.

Above all, Russia is interested in establishing a strong relationship with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and ultimately in replacing the United States as its main source of weapons and training. However, while the U.S. donates weapons to Lebanon, Russia will charge a high premium, and many of Lebanon’s politicians will profit from brokering such deals.

The issue of arming the LAF with eastern or even Iranian weapons is a recurrent topic which surfaces occasionally but never leads anywhere. This is because the Lebanese army is a Western-trained and -equipped organization with a solid relationship with its U.S. counterpart, and provides operational capacity for the U.S. in the Levant, a reality which cannot be changed simply by Russian wishful thinking.

Russia sends clear messages to Iran, Israel, and the United States that it is the only country capable of securing stability on the shores of the Mediterranean. While this might be true, Russia cannot claim to be a superpower by meddling in the trivial affairs of corrupt politicians like Bassil and his band of corrupters. If it truly wishes to replace the United States in Lebanon, it has to be willing to pay a very hefty price, starting, by confronting the regional expansionism of Iran, which has no constant allies or enemies, Russia might find itself a victim of Iranian aggression. In the end, opening up the Lebanese matryoshka doll might be less advantageous than President Putin thinks.

Salim Ayyash, a Lebanese citizen and a member of the Lebanese Hezbollah militia, was placed on the United States Department of State’s Rewards for Justice program a month ago. A bounty amounting to $10 million dollars, for any information on his whereabouts was announced on March 29. A few claims stood out from the U.S. Rewards for Justice Department statement.

First off, that Ayyash is “a senior operative in the assassination unit—Unit 121—of the terrorist organization Lebanese Hezbollah,” as per the department’s wording. Also, the statements claimed that the “[U]nit receives its orders directly from Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.” Lastly, the statement is said to be offering a reward for “information leading to preventing him from engaging in an act of international terrorism against a U.S. person or U.S. property.”

The last claim is particularly important but shall be addressed later.

In a televised interview with the American CNBC business news channel earlier this week, the 77th Maronite Catholic Patriarch of Antioch, and head of the Maronite Church, Lebanese Patriarch Mar Bechara Boutros al-Rahi pulled no punches in describing Hezbollah. Al-Rahi clearly labeled the group as an “Iranian military force in Lebanon to combat Israel.”

The Patriarch went on to say that “Hezbollah shouldn’t remain free in using arms whenever and wherever he wants and shouldn’t be capable of deciding wars in Israel, in Syria, in Iraq, in Yemen, with disregard to the government, the president and the parliament.” In recent months, al-Rahi’s rhetoric against Hezbollah has become more aggressive in congruence with the debilitated political and economic situation in the country.

While those two events are distinct, there is a vector of causality that connects what Ayyash represents and the Patriarch’s recent statements. However, a crucial caveat must be inserted in this case as the Patriarch’s statements should be taken with a grain of salt.

Avenging the Commander

While we are oblivious to the science behind the U.S.’ reward system, common sense stipulates: the heftier the reward, the more important and dangerous the operative may be. In this case Ayyash is no newcomer to the local and international political and security scene. In fact, Ayyash was unanimously sentenced in absentia, back in December 2020, by the Hague-based Special Tribunal for Lebanon to five counts of life in prison over the “intentional homicide of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri with premeditation.”

Following years of independent investigation and an international trial, Ayyash was proven guilty in intentionally assassinating Lebanon’s own ex-Prime Minister. In this context, it is important to underline that Ayyash’s reward is equal to none except that of Amir Muhammad Sa’id Abd-al-Rahman al-Mawla, the current leader of the “Islamic State.”

Even the reward of Abubakar Shekau, who is the leader of the terrorist group “Boko Haram,” responsible for scores of atrocities committed over the past year, did not amount to that of Ayyash’s—equivalent to $7 million.

In a 6-week period, Thompson accessed “dozens of files concerning human intelligence sources, including true names, personal identification data, background information,” and photographs of the sources. Meaning, Thompson’s actions took place during the escalatory trend between the administration of former U.S. president Donald Trump and the regime in Tehran, which played out on Iraq’s own soil towards the end of 2019.

Thompson was activated only a couple of days before the assassination of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps—Quds Force Commander, Qassim Soleimani on January 3, 2020.

Thompson was activated only a couple of days before the assassination of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps—Quds Force Commander, Qassim Soleimani on January 3, 2020 when a drone strike at the road leading to the Baghdad International Airport took out his convoy.

As such, the revealed information leads us to two conclusions, with the first being that Thompson’s “alleged” activation ahead of Soleimani’s killing, as per the court case, could possibly lend credence to the first justification, among the many other shifting ones, Trump’s administration gave for killing Soleimani. At the time, members of the Trump administration said that Soleimani, posed an “imminent threat” to American lives, only to be met with cynicism especially from the Democratic Party camp during the 2020 U.S. elections.

However, Thompsons’ “mission,” which spanned for 6-weeks, was meant to offer information that will allow Iran to avenge Soleimani’s killing. While the second conclusion signals Hezbollah’s clear-cut involvement in collecting the information on U.S. personnel—most probably operatives—in the Middle East, in what appears to be complicity with Iran in its attempt to avenge the killing of Soleimani.

While it isn’t clear whether Ayyash was to carry out an attack against U.S. personnel or property, as stated in the “Rewards for Justice” announcement, or whether those attacks were imminent, one cannot but pause and ponder the question of why would Hezbollah, a presumably self-styled Lebanese resistance, spy on the U.S. on behalf of Iran? How does avenging the killing of Soleimani serve the interest of Lebanon and its citizens? And why would Hezbollah get involved, while Lebanon—the group’s supposed homeland— has enough to deal with given the unprecedented economic and financial meltdown and a near full bankruptcy, which the party itself often blames on the so-called “U.S.’ siege of Lebanon.”

Of course, reasons for Lebanon’s economic demise are way more complicated than what is attributed by Hezbollah or other Lebanese sectarian parties, but what needs to be stated is that the financial collapse, is first and foremost, homemade. Meanwhile, an answer to the questions posed above lies in the organic nature of the group and its relationship with Tehran, which is often misconstrued, either due to lack of understanding or for propaganda purposes.

Intelligence Apparatus Turned Political Party

A sweeping majority of Hezbollah’s supporters often present the group to be “an ‘independent’ resistance movement that has grown into a regional power in its own right.”  The idea serves to relieve Hezbollah from the “proxy” label, which is often raised by the group’s opponents kinetically leading to questioning on the group’s allegiance and ulterior motives.

Yet, while the proxy claim holds some truth, reality is not what those supporters intend to project. The relationship between the group and Tehran is not an “interdependent symbiosis between close allies.” In fact, Hezbollah was first conceived by Ali Akbar Mohtashamipour, Iran’s ambassador to Damascus in 1982, following years he had spent in Lebanon training with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) ahead of the revolution in Iran.

According to Iranian writer Arash Azizi’s book ‘The Shadow Commander’, “based on the IRGC’s model, Hezbollah was put together by merging different Shiite armed groups as part of an Iranian transnational Shiite network aimed to represent the external influence of the newly formed Islamic republic and an export-model of its revolution.

More so, Iran assumed the role of the patron, for it would decide on everything important and would arbiter differences.” Azizi adds that “[D]ebates over the degree of Iranian sponsorship of Hezbollah sometimes fail, shockingly, to mention this fact: A majority of the party’s body of leadership consisted of Iranian officials and its composition had been decided upon in Tehran, not Beirut. There was no question about who was calling the shots.”

The group’s Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah, did not only confirm the organic nature between Dahyeh, Beirut’s southern suburb which acts as Hezbollah stronghold, and Tehran, but he doubled down on that idea back in June 2016 when he aggressively claimed in a televised speech that, “we are open about the fact that Hezbollah’s budget, its income, its expenses, everything it eats and drinks, its weapons and rockets, are from the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

According to Iranian writer Arash Azizi’s book ‘The Shadow Commander’, “[D]ebates over the degree of Iranian sponsorship of Hezbollah sometimes fail, shockingly, to mention this fact: A majority of the party’s body of leadership consisted of Iranian officials and its composition had been decided upon in Tehran, not Beirut. There was no question about who was calling the shots.”

Nevertheless, this must not be mistaken with how senior of a role Nasrallah plays in the regime’s political and theological hierarchy in Tehran. Following the assassination of Soleimani, Nasrallah is said to have been asked to play his role, especially in Iraq, and to organize the Iran-aligned Iraqi factions.

The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) has estimated that around 55% of Lebanon’s population is trapped in poverty. However, some economic experts think the country could still count on its human capital, meant as the set of knowledge, skills, and health that people invest in and accumulate throughout their lives.

Investments are central to human capital development because it delivers economic benefits in the long term. But as its outcomes are not always visible in the short period, governments may lead to underinvestment.

Lebanon is well known for its outstanding healthcare and education systems based on private initiatives. But in recent years, the country is suffering from a dangerous depletion of economic and human resources. As a consequence, Lebanese human capital is deteriorating.

The World Bank assessed that Lebanon’s human capital index placed the country with a score of 0.52, which is below the MENA average of 0.57.

Even though Lebanon is in an acceptable range in terms of healthcare, on the education front the average Lebanese student completes just 10.15 years out of the required 14, compared to a MENA average of 11.5, and a world average of 11.2.

More than one year of economic and political crises and a deteriorating purchasing power because of the devaluation of the Lebanese lira against the US dollar have left Lebanese banks and private universities struggling to survive. As a consequence, it negatively impacted access to education and healthcare.

In the last months, the American University of Beirut (AUB) dismissed around 25% of its workforce.

In the last months, the American University of Beirut (AUB) dismissed around 25% of its workforce. AUB’s students took to the street protesting against the dollarization of their tuition, which made access to higher education much more expensive.

Furthermore, the Beirut port explosion on August 4, 2020, caused serious damages to neighboring hospitals, engulfing other medical centers to struggle with the COVID19 pandemic.

Sectarian affiliation branched out into every aspect of social, political, and economic life. Since the start of the 2019 protests, two governments have already resigned. A third one is still in the process of being formed, nearly seven months after the Beirut port explosion, without any results at the time of writing.

Governments have been unable to implement effective reforms to contain the crisis. The population found itself desperate and impoverished. Moreover, the overwhelming despair that exists is prompting many people to think about leaving the country.

The overwhelming despair is prompting many to think about leaving the country.

However, the political instability of the Middle East has also played an essential role in the depletion of the economic and human resources of the country. Although Lebanon is a small country, it represents the crossroads of political influence for many countries in the region.

The Syrian war contributed to exacerbating the Lebanese crisis eroding its human capital. Lebanon and Syria have historically been entangled in times of peace and war. But both countries are also tied economically, politically, and socially.

Hezbollah, the Lebanese armed political party with allegiances to Iran, has played an active role in the Syrian conflict as an ally of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. It operated militarily all around the Syrian territory over the years, as it saw the potential loss of its Syrian ally as an existential threat for the axis of resistance against Israel, which includes Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria.

As a consequence of the involvement in the Syrian war, the U.S. has imposed sanctions on Syria and Hezbollah. Such sanctions had a high degree of impact on Lebanon’s human capital.

Sanctioning Syria means to hit part of the Lebanese economic growth, as it couldn’t benefit from the business outflows out of Syria after the outbreak of the Syrian war in 2011.

The U.S. Caesar Act, a law signed by former U.S. President Trump in 2019 that aims to sanction any government or entity that assists the Syrian regime, affects Lebanese companies trading with Syria. It will have a draining effect on Lebanese entities and individuals, due to the trade and business relations between the two countries. Sanctions hamper the economic growth and working opportunities in Lebanon, essential for the process of developing human capital.

But the Syrian war also affected Lebanese welfare. The influx of around 1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon in recent years has strained the public education system, as most Syrian refugees rely on it.

But as a symptom of the economic crisis, Lebanese children repopulated public schools, already weak before the arrival of Syrian refugees. The new enrollments in public education are countertrend compared with past years, where demand for private schools soared as public schools were overcrowded.

Lebanon is also paying the consequences of the troubled relations between the U.S. and Iran. The connection between Lebanon and Iran through its proxy network Hezbollah led Lebanon to isolate itself amid a deepening economic crisis. But at the same time, the economic dependence on the U.S. through an extensive popular and unofficial dollarization put the country in further instability. Overall, Lebanon needs financial aid from foreign countries to cope with its economic crisis. But its ambiguity with Hezbollah and Iran raises concerns among Western countries and international institutions.

Almost forty days have passed since the assassination of Lebanese political activist and staunch Hezbollah detractor Lokman Slim, with no evidence or any leads provided by the Lebanese state on the culprits of his heinous murder.

Slim, aged 58, was found dead in his rental car on the morning of February 4, with six bullets in his body, five to his back and one to his head. He was returning from his friend’s house in the southern village of Neha, deep in Hezbollah-controlled territory, 28 km from the Lebanese-Palestinian border.

Slim’s execution-style murder and the mystery that shrouds it has led to the simple conclusion that Hezbollah is responsible for silencing this furious and uncompromising voice against the Iranian militia’s hegemony over the Shiite cultural and public sphere, a hegemonic grip which Hezbollah extended to include different aspects of Lebanon’s non-existent state.

Naturally, Hezbollah denied its involvement or even knowledge of Slim’s assassination and condemned the  crime. It asked “the judicial and security authorities concerned to work quickly to expose the culprits and punish them.” Ironically, Hezbollah’s alleged trust in the judicial system was nowhere to be found when the United Nation’s Special Tribunal for Lebanon found high-ranking members of its security apparatus guilty of killing Lebanon’s former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005.

To add insult to injury, in his latest televised speech, Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s secretary general, downplayed the killing of Slim speaking for over an hour without mentioning his name, claiming that the fact that Slim was killed in an area controlled by Hezbollah does not indicate their culpability, and hinted that Slim’s killing might be the work of Israel or any Western party which benefits from politically accusing Hezbollah of the murder.

If this were the case and Israel was involved in Slim’s abduction and killing, Hezbollah needs to justify why they did not impose a full lockdown on Slim’s crime scene and why they failed to provide any sort of lead or information to the Lebanese security agencies investigating the crime.

Traditionally, in all security incidents which involve Israel, like the mysterious explosion which rocked the southern village of Ain Qana, Hezbollah was swift to impose a lockdown on the area and prevented the press as well as the Lebanese security agencies from accessing the town, something which they have done multiple times before.

If one is to accept the logic of Nasrallah, or rather the lack thereof, in other words, seeking the help of the judiciary to solve the murder of Slim, it is natural to examine the three elements of any crime – motive, means, and opportunity – and apply them to the life and death of Lokman Slim.

When it comes to motive, Lokman Slim made a career of openly challenging all forms of authority starting with his establishing of UMAM Documentation and Research, an NGO which was concerned with preserving the memories of Lebanon’s 15-year-long civil war, memories which Lebanon’s ruling establishment chose to bury alongside the bodies of its fallen victims.

Additionally, as a Shiite activist and a native of the town of Haret Hreik, in the heart of the Hezbollah-controlled southern suburbs of Beirut, Slim worked diligently to reclaim and challenge the ideological grip of Persian Shi’ism as imported by Hezbollah. This earned Slim and his family daily badgering and intimidations by Hezbollah and their band of hoodlums, some of whom were his neighbors, who went as far as branding him an Israeli collaborator which in Hezbollah’s understanding of the word is a call for murder.

Hezbollah has the required skills to abduct, interrogate, and execute a civilian like Lokman Slim, while equally terrorizing any witnesses from stepping forward and exposing the group.

If we are to explore the means of the crime it would clearly confirm that Hezbollah, with its infinite security and military means, is beyond capable of carrying out a such targeted assassination deep in its controlled areas without leaving any traces or even witnesses. Hezbollah, which is fully immersed in Iran’s regional wars, in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and beyond, has the required skills to abduct, interrogate, and execute a civilian like Lokman Slim, while equally terrorizing and preventing any witnesses from stepping forward and exposing the group.

Third, Hezbollah had the opportunity to carry out Slim’s murder simply because they knew they can get away with it – like they have done many a time before. At this particular moment, when the Biden administration and the European Union are so eagerly pursuing the reassumption of the Iranian nuclear deal talks, the killing of Lokman Slim would simply go unnoticed and would join the tens of similar political crimes that remain unsolved.

Consequently, if one is to review the aforementioned legal principles, the first suspect the Lebanese judiciary needs to summon is Nasrallah himself and hundreds of his party members who need to provide alibies and concrete evidence of their innocence. Realistically, however, this utopian judicial measure will never take place as long as Hezbollah is in possession of its Iranian arsenal of arms that grants it absolute powers and full impunity.

Lokman’s murder is simply a preemptive strike carried out by Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah, that wants to send a violent message to its own Shiite constituency: Hezbollah is are no longer hesitant to kill its own Shiite “brothers” and in their own abode if needed, and any future challenge to its authority will be met with blood and iron.

The brutal assassination of Lokman Slim will continue to perplex people in terms of its timing and its ultimate objectives. Yet, anyone who is slightly familiar with Slim’s life and career does not need to look for justification of why Iran’s Lebanese militia feared Slim’s brave rhetoric and resistance to their prevailing narrative – they feared these more than Israel’s warplanes and hit squads.

To Hezbollah, which is accused of killing Lokman Slim, this might be another chapter in their ongoing drive to dominate Lebanon and the region, but in reality, this might indeed be the epilogue for a horror story which will not end well for the Lebanese villains.

The most recent major and public act of racism Syrian refugees faced in Lebanon, dates to December 27, 2020, when hundreds of them—75 families according to local news—had to flee for their lives from a makeshift camp in the Miniyeh region near the northern coastal city of Tripoli after their tents were set alight. The incident came against the backdrop of a fight between camp residents and members of a local Lebanese family.

In November 2020, a Syrian refugee allegedly killed a Lebanese resident in Bcharre, a town in the North Governorate of Lebanon. Soon after, a group of Lebanese residents went on a witch-hunt, demanded the eviction of Syrians from the area—even the ones who lived and worked there prior to the Syrian refugee influx—and set fire to their homes in the town.

While the list goes on, two examples in two consecutive months and from two Lebanese regions with different sectarian undertones, are evidence to extrapolate about the multi-layered acts of racism Syrian refugees face in Lebanon.

Nevertheless, slapping the word racism and Lebanon on any search engine shows us that racism in the country is not a new phenomenon simply synonymous with the influx of Syrian refugees following the violent crackdown by the Syrian regime on the 2011 revolution. Racism in Lebanon is one form of discrimination that is rampant and mainstream, while other forms extend to classist discrimination, sectarian, geographic, and so on. However, racism specifically against Syrians could be traced back to the country’s “founding moment.”

While Lebanese racism is not strictly directed towards Syrian refugees, the article aims to tackle discrimination against Syrian refugees in particular. Nevertheless, Syrian and Palestinian refugees paid the brunt for the “founding narrative” and fragility of the Lebanese state that was envisioned during the process of its insurrection following the first World War.

Modern-day Lebanon was initially formed between 1918 and 1926 from the debris of “Ottoman Syria” at a time when the victors of the World War, Britain and France, were “redrawing” the map of the modern Middle East and divvying the spoils among them.

Primarily, it was the French who put the territory of Lebanon together and organized it as a state, laying the foundation for the autonomous “Mutasarrifiyya” of Mount Lebanon within the framework of “Ottoman Syria” in 1861.

In November 2020, a Syrian refugee allegedly killed a Lebanese resident in Bcharre, a town in the North Governorate of Lebanon. Soon after, a group of Lebanese residents went on a witch-hunt.

While the French wanted the country to remain a compact territory with a Christian-dominated majority in an ocean of Arab Muslims, Lebanese Christians and more specifically the Maronite-majority amongst them, saw an opportunity to set up the “national homeland” they had dreamed of with expanded territory, autonomy and independence, and pressed the French while making the best use of favorable circumstances at the time until they achieved their goal.

While the second claims that “[B]etween 1918 and 1920 the Christian demand for an independent state in Lebanon appeared to the Muslims of Syria as a more immediate and serious threat than the corresponding Zionist demand in Palestine.”

Prominent Lebanese historian, the late Kamal Salibi, wisely attributed that to the fact that, “the Muslims of Syria in 1920 identified Zionism as an external danger, but they diagnosed the call for Christian Lebanese separatism, in collusion with Western power, as treason and subversion from within. Their diagnosis of the Christian position may have been uncharitable, but so was the dominant Christian Lebanese attitude towards the aspirations of the Muslims of Syria at the time.”

As such, while Maronites had a choice between a smaller Lebanon or a confederation of autonomous Syrian cantons—sectarian ones, they opted for a “Greater Lebanon,” hoping to create and mold a larger country on the Mediterranean, in their own image.

The question of “who is Lebanese” emerged and the answer to it was: the “non-Syrian,” and the answer to “who is Syrian” question became: the “non-Lebanese.”

With that, the question of “who is Lebanese” emerged and the answer to it was: the “non-Syrian,” and the answer to “who is Syrian” question became: the “non-Lebanese,” Lebanese writer Wissam Saade concludes, sowing the seeds for Lebanese racism towards Syrians, in specific, and towards any component that challenged the Christian-dominated “concept of Lebanon,” in general.

The “othering” process, which preexisted even before Lebanon’s insurrection, was institutionalized at that moment. It drags on till today despite the different context.

Following the moment of creation, the Maronite practice in ruling the country further exacerbated tension between Muslims and Christians and eventually led to the “sectarianizing” of the social setting it on a track of collision. According to Salibi, “[W]hat the Muslims had opposed from 1920 until 1975 was not necessarily the concept of Greater Lebanon.

Rather, it was the Christian interpretation of this Greater Lebanon, as a country where the Christians were the Lebanese in a special way… By persisting in giving Lebanon a Christian interpretation, heedless of the changes that were taking place among their Muslim compatriots… contributed to reawakening the demon of tribal contradiction among the other Lebanese communities.”

Seven decades passed, between 1920 and 1975, without Lebanese Christians paying much attention to the changes that were taking place, first among their Lebanese Muslim compatriots, and then the larger region. Following the disastrous Arab-Israeli war of 1967, dubbed an-Naksah, the setback, and the incidents of Black September of 1970 in Jordan, the Muslim-dominated Palestinian refugee influx to Lebanon became a source of paranoia to the Christian leadership.

For them, the Palestinian refugeehood was perceived to be a factor of demographic change, hence, an outright contestation of the fragile “concept of Lebanon” referred to above. The paranoia and fear were ultimately and directly translated into racism leading down the slippery slope of confrontation which resulted in a 15-year civil war.

The Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) created a new set of grievances and animosities, among the different Lebanese constituencies and between Lebanese and Syrians as well. The Syrian army’s direct military intervention in the Lebanese war, which in the long run resulted in tilting the balance towards the Muslims against the Christians, dealt again a huge blow to the “concept of Lebanon” as per the Maronites. The war was concluded in 1990 with the signing of the Ta’if Agreement, which reshuffled the system, diffused power from the hands of the Maronites, made it more inclusionary, and gave Syria a “guardianship” status over Lebanon.

The Syrian regime’s guardianship lasted for 15 years (until 2005) with authoritarian practices that only sought to humiliate Lebanese in general and specifically Maronites, who saw their two main leaders either imprisoned or exiled. Lebanese racism mutated in that case and became coupled with feelings of oppression, an exercise the Syrian regime’s troops and lieutenants exercised every day to remind the Lebanese who ruled their country.

On the flip side, all this was internalized by Lebanese and projected later on even towards regular Syrian citizens that constituted an essential labor force in the country. Such blanket approach racism dismissed nuances, as in separating between the oppressor—the Syrian authoritarian regime—and the oppressed (both Syrians and Lebanese citizens).

The breakout of the Syrian revolution in 2011 and the regime’s conscious decision to violently suppress it, resulted again in a Muslim Sunni-dominated Syrian refugee influx to Lebanon. The country received around 1.5 million Syrian refugees as per the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, meaning around 36% of its population. Despite the different current-day political dynamics, the most dominant Christian-Maronite political party, at the time, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) found it befitting to capitalize on previously mentioned historical grievances and paranoia, to solidify its grip on the Christian constituency in the country and advance its own political goals.

When independent Lebanon was established in 1943, the political structure was designed to determine the proportion of representatives in the parliament according to the density of the country’s sects. At first glance, this design, based on confessionalism, the successor of the “Mutasarrifate System” formed in 1861, was seen as the only way to ensure social justice for Lebanon.

However, in line with this understanding, political road maps drawn by sectarian concerns in Lebanon led to divisions not only amongst the political elite but also the Lebanese people who were parts of the sectarian system. While the civil war between 1975 and 1990 demonstrated the violent form of this separation, most of the actors of the civil war took part in post-war Lebanese politics and played important roles in deepening the social crisis after the war.

On October 17, 2019, the Lebanese people took to the streets with the slogan “all means all” (kullun ya’ni kullun) in order to remove the perpetrators of this crisis, and to create a new political and legal system. In the early days of the demonstrations, when no sectarian slogans were chanted and party flags were not allowed, the only thing the demonstrators wanted was the complete destruction of the sectarian political system.

So, for the Lebanese, the purpose was to rid themselves of this sect-based political system and the patterns of hegemony it had created in 150 years.

However, the existing social rifts became visible during the demonstrations and manifested themselves with the main protest locations shifting to smaller ones and different social groups raising their individual demands. Calls for a “civil state” addressing leaders of the sectarian system were ironically replaced by the retired soldiers’ reaction to salary cuts or by students’ slogans to improve the education system.

In addition to these, with the failure of Hassan Diab’s government, which was established in January 2020, the sense of unity in Lebanese society eventually disappeared.

Following the protests in Lebanon, questions began to arise such as how many of the problems resulted from the sectarian political system, and whether the problem is the system itself or the politicians who cannot run it.

It now became necessary to question the sectarian codes ingrained in Lebanese society.

It was clear that the political elite sought to dissolve any formation which defied the sectarian understanding centered on their own interest.

At the same time, it became necessary to question the sectarian codes ingrained in Lebanese society in order to understand how the country’s social segments handle the current problems.

The Shiite political factor in Lebanon

Shiites were the first to break from the October protests. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s statement had a significant impact on the Shiite community who said that the demonstrations went beyond their original intent. Many Shiite groups followed Nasrallah’s call to “leave the streets” signaling the first split in Lebanon’s protests. The instance revealed the endless trust of the Shiites in the party’s leadership; the Shiites appear to interpret sectarian identity as absolute obedience to Nasrallah’s political orders.

It is true that there is a strong threat perception by members of all sects who are afraid of being taken over by another sect. However, the walls of the Lebanese sectarian system are not that sturdy. The slogans chanted by some Shiite groups against their own sectarian courts before the October protests is a good example of this fragility.

Shiite mothers took to the streets to draw attention to how they were victimized by the rights of custody accorded to them by the Jafari court in January and February 2020.

Although they did not unite with other sects, Shiites too turned to the streets to solve their internal problems during the main protests. Shiite mothers took to the streets to draw attention to how they were victimized by the rights of custody accorded to them by the Jafari court in January and February 2020. However, they did not want to remove the courts completely, but to reform them. For them, the institutions for the preservation of Shiite identity should remain in place – these were only defects that needed to be corrected.

This is, of course, not unique to Shiites in Lebanon. After the massive seaport explosion in Beirut in August 2020, the images of support by each ethnic and sectarian group given to their community make it clear why the Lebanese return to their sectarian quarters. According to Armenian Weekly, most of the medical needs and construction materials sent from Armenia to Beirut would be transported to the city’s Armenian neighborhoods most heavily affected by the explosion.

Armenia, of course, was ready to provide tailored assistance to the country’s substantial and influential Armenian community. Similarly, footage shows the Maronite Church distributing social aid to their coreligionists. People have little choice but to take refuge in their sects.

For the majority of Sunnis, Lebanese sectarianism is more of an actor-oriented problem. If the system is not going to change, the actors should not change either. Therefore, the country’s prime minister Saad Hariri should have remained in his position since he could protect the Sunnis better than Diyab thanks to the support of the Gulf States. That was what actually happened, and Hariri took over again a year later proving that he was the leader of the Sunni community.

There are also some groups who define sectarianism on the basis of socioeconomic and cultural traditions. One of them is the Druze community, who have been zuama-landlords in Mount Lebanon for many years. Centuries ago, the structure formed by the Druze, who were among Lebanon’s influential landlords and held political power in their hands, was not focused on sectarianism.

Even though their population was limited, they managed to maintain their sectarian principles thanks to the zuama system. Today, this system is weaker in Lebanon than in the past, but it continues to maintain its strength for the Druze. The Druze political leaders Velid Canbolat and Talal Arslan maintain this system in order to protect their sectarian identity. For the Druze, sectarianism finds its way via the zuama system.

No doubt, the political order in Lebanon does not satisfy any social need today. Politicians, who believe that they can open any door with the sectarian key, do not hesitate to shut these doors in people’s faces when the circumstances allow for it. Deepening cracks cause the society-state relationship to deteriorate.

One hundred fifty-three days have passed since the port of Beirut blew up destroying one third of the Lebanese capital, leaving over 200 people dead and a tally of around 3000 injured. Since the largest non-nuclear explosion in the history of mankind, only 25 middle and lower-tier Lebanese-officials in connection with the ammonium nitrate—that caused the explosion—were arrested while three others that should be, are outside the country.

Yet, the chief of Lebanon’s customs agency, Badri Daher, remains the “most senior” Lebanese official to be held in custody thus far.

This has left Lebanese citizens in addition to officials and observers from around the world perplexed and in shock. Their confusion is justified. In fact, existing government records show at least 2 presidents of the republic, 4 prime ministers, 2 commanders of the Lebanese army and dozens between ministers and senior security officials with knowledge of the 2,750 tons of explosives-grade ammonium nitrate stored at the port since late 2013.

Hence, this raises imminent questions around “why haven’t any big heads rolled” and “who are the perpetrators”?

While there could be a myriad of multi-layered answers for this question, the complexity of the situation does not strip it from a straightforwardness it inhabits. In theory, a vector connects the massive explosion of August 4 and the “Lebanese sectarian system,” rendering it responsible for what went down on that day.

More so, the intricacies of this “system,” which came alive in 1943 through an unwritten agreement called the “National Pact,” will also explain the grim chances the process of justice and accountability possess in the short to medium term.

At first, the accusation will sound odd for outsiders, especially that such an unfortunate event should reasonably capture the fingerprints of the perpetrators (individuals) instead of anonymizing them.

But the precedent is there; the April 1986 Chernobyl disaster near the city of Pripyat in the north of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic allows for a fair comparison with the case in Beirut.

The Harvard historian Serhii Plokhy’s 2018 book on Chernobyl reconstructs the sequence of events and assigns blame. In effect, Plokhy argues, it was the “Soviet system” that created Chernobyl and made the explosion inevitable. More so, glimmers of this understanding appeared in the HBO Chernobyl series, too.

In the final episode, Valery Legasov—a member of the Academy of Sciences—testifying as a witness, tells a Soviet court that the disaster happened because the tips of the control rods were made of graphite, which sped up the reaction, when the control rod was supposed to slow it down.

When asked, by the prosecutor, why the reactor was designed this way, Legasov cites the same reason that other safety precautions are ignored, and other corners are cut: “It’s cheaper.” He seems to be damning the whole “system.”

Today, the sectarian system in Lebanon has managed to dodge the most dangerous bullet aimed at it in the massive nationwide protests that rocked Lebanon starting October 17, 2019.

Since the independence in 1943, the sectarian political system has created social unrest in 1952 which ousted a sitting president, the 1958 sectarian-driven crisis (a mini-Civil war), followed by a 15 year sectarian civil war (1975-1990), a massive rift in society following the assassination of ex-Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005 which had sectarian underpinnings (and a civil war by other means), another sectarian mini-civil war in May 2008 which resulted in a revamped social contract (the Doha Agreement) also based on sectarian grounds, and military intervention in the Syrian conflict spearheaded by a sectarian militia for sectarian interest, years of political vacuum, lastly to be topped by a nuclear-like explosion in the capital and a complete economic meltdown as the country nears bankruptcy.

Today, this sectarian system in Lebanon has managed to dodge the most dangerous bullet aimed at it in the massive nationwide protests that rocked Lebanon starting October 17, 2019, unprecedented in scope and with a political narrative that denounced all sectarian leaders and the system itself.

While the protest movement posed a real threat to the sectarian ruling class, the “system” again capitalized on crises to re-enforce itself and roll back the sense of solidarity that brought Lebanese citizens together transcending sectarian fault-lines, the antidote of the sectarian system in place.

From the COVID-19 pandemic to the August 4 explosion and the economic meltdown, different sectarian stakeholders are attempting to further marginalize the state’s institutions and fan the flames of sectarianism—for instance, through quite random sectarian clashes in certain hotspots—to put the genie back in the bottle.

Additionally, despite the massive differences between the sectarian leaders at a time when the country is living its most severe crisis in contemporary history, they look after each other and work on maintaining the status quo, which preserves their interests.

Meanwhile, a class war has been launched by the sectarian leaders on the majority of Lebanese citizens (average Joes), in order to make them unilaterally bear the burdens of the economic meltdown the regime has created.

This war is manifesting itself in different ways, first by shunning any prospects of much needed reform of a system built on sectarian loyalties, nepotism and clientelism rather than meritocracy.

A complete obstruction of any investigation that could assign the blame on individuals and hold them accountable, whether for the economic Ponzi-scheme engineered to rob Lebanese of their life savings or the explosion of August 4^th.

And lastly, an undergoing “lirafication” process of all the dollar accounts in Lebanese banks at a time when the Lebanese Lira is losing its worth at a record speed and dollar bills have become as rare of a sighting as Halley’s Comet.

A clear-cut example of how the sectarian system functions is the recent efforts by sectarian leaders, including the clergy of different sects, to block a Lebanese judge in charge of the investigation from questioning senior officials, much less holding them to account.

Even though the schism between the sectarian leaders is widening, their interest-driven politics has forced them to work together to ensure no one is held accountable. This vicious cycle keeps bringing the same faces to power despite the need for reform and change.

Therefore, this system in its current dynamics is irreformable and sectarianism will continue to reign supreme blocking any attempt for much needed reform or the creation of a Lebanese citizenship that can possibly short-circuit the system and put it on a path of change.

Even when the leaders of the country miserably failed to deal with a global pandemic inflicting irreversible damage to an ailing economy because of their mismanagement, they do not have to worry about any form of accountability because “the system” protects them and rids them of any responsibility.

In her article, “Lebanon: The 3-Decade Impossible Power Sector Reforms,” Lebanese energy consultant, Jessica Obeid, discusses the electricity sector as a case in point of the ridiculousness of the system, its inability to reform and the impunity sectarianism provides you with.

While the country has defaulted on its debt for the first time in its history, because of different political, economic, and fiscal crises, the same party that has controlled the Ministry of Energy for the past decade racking up more than $39.5 billion to the public debt—equivalent to 43% of the country’s public debt, it still insists on controlling the ministry in any future government to be formed under the banner of “protecting the rights of [a] sect.” Meanwhile, the country anxiously awaits possible extended periods of darkness in 2021 due to the chronic corruption and mismanagement.