Military assistance to Ukraine and its NATO membership are two separate matters. In fact, there is almost complete consensus among Alliance members to provide military assistance to Ukraine. Although some NATO members, such as Germany, were initially reluctant, they have come around to Washington’s line under pressure from their domestic public opinion, Europe, and the United States.

In the early stages of the Russia-Ukraine war, Berlin was only prepared to provide Ukraine with troops, but it has now supplied the country with Leopard 2 tanks and advanced air defence missiles. From this point of view, NATO, which has organized itself very quickly and decisively to support Ukraine militarily, will continue this support until it achieves its goals with regard to Russia.

There are already problems with the production of ammunition for certain weapons due to their intensive use on the Ukrainian front, yet, one of the most important factors determining the course of the struggle between NATO and Russia will be the production of weapons and ammunition, given that Russia is experiencing similar problems to a much greater extent.

The issue of Ukraine’s NATO membership, which is expected to be one of the main items on the agenda at the Vilnius summit, has caused serious disagreement between member states. Some, particularly the Baltic and several Eastern European countries, argue that Ukraine should become a member of NATO quickly, while others, such as the United States and Germany, where there is intense internal debate on the issue, oppose such a quick decision.

Those in favor of a more cautious approach suggest to wait until the end of the war to decide on the issue, fearing that Ukraine’s possible NATO membership during the war would draw them into direct armed conflict with Russia and would also complicate peace negotiations with Russia. They are considering postponing a decision in the hope that, at the end of the war, there will be a weakened Russia unable to oppose Ukraine’s NATO membership. Therefore, it seems unlikely that a decision on Ukraine’s NATO membership will be taken at the Vilnius summit.

However, given the establishment of a NATO-Ukraine Council and the strong likelihood that Ukraine will not be required to meet the preconditions of the Membership Action Plan for the accession of new members, such as the fight against corruption, which was previously included in the Membership Action Plan adopted at the Bucharest Summit, the door will be left open for Ukraine’s membership in the medium term. This issue will be closely linked to the development of NATO’s Russia policy and the outcome of the war. Moreover, Russia’s policy towards the West will be crucial to Ukraine’s NATO membership.

For NATO members, such as Italy and Spain, which have not yet resolved their economic problems caused by the Euro debt crisis, increasing their military spending from 1.5% to more than 2% would mean additional problems for their budget balances. In addition, the military spending of NATO members such as Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and Ireland remains well below the Alliance’s target. It should be recalled that NATO has set the 2% limit as a minimum target, and Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has persistently called for more than 2% military spending in the member states he has visited.

While Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has created a strong motivation for NATO to increase military spending, the disruptions it has caused to energy and food supplies, and prices, and the resulting economic challenges have left many members struggling to find the financial resources to increase their military spending. It is worth noting that NATO members, especially those with growing economic problems, will find it difficult to meet the Alliance’s targets for increasing military spending.

Meanwhile, the U.S. administration wants to see its NATO allies on its side in the fight against China, just as it has done with Russia. Yet, it is no secret that there are members who have reservations about this; Germany, France, and Turkey are among such countries, albeit for different reasons.

In the aftermath of the Trump era, European NATO members are struggling to trust the United States, making it difficult for them to follow Washington’s lead, especially when it comes to a policy towards China. The same reluctance was also present about a policy towards Russia; however, the Russia-Ukraine war helped to remove this reluctance and align countries behind the U.S. Now Washington wants to capitalize on this shock momentum and rally its European allies behind its line against China.

In addition to the shock effect of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the U.S. has another advantage in rallying the Europeans behind it: “American friends” in Europe. These “American friends,” commonly known as Atlanticists, are everywhere in Europe. They are in power in countries like Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland, and are partners in coalition governments in countries like Germany.

Given that China has not made a mistake similar to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, but instead is trying to create a sphere of influence for itself through economic cooperation, and given its close economic ties with some European countries, it will not be as easy for Washington to rally NATO members behind its fight against Beijing as it has been to rally them against Moscow.

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he Taiwan Strait has emerged as a geopolitical hotspot, garnering significant attention due to the escalating tensions between the United States and China. This narrow body of water, separating the island of Taiwan from mainland China, has become a focal point of power struggles and competing interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

China’s rise as a global power, both economically and militarily, has fueled concerns over its pursuit of reunification with Taiwan, which currently enjoys de facto independence from China. President Xi Jinping has made reunification a cornerstone of his administration, employing a combination of diplomatic pressure, military posturing, and economic incentives to isolate Taiwan diplomatically and erode its international standing. China’s military modernization, including the development of advanced weaponry and naval capabilities, has increased its capacity to forcefully assert its territorial claims. Meanwhile, the U.S. engages with Taiwan in a way China views as provocative. Should we be concerned?

In War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait, Scott L. Kastner delves into the increasingly tense relationship between China and Taiwan. As fears of a potential military conflict loom large, Kastner offers readers a comprehensive and nuanced analysis of the factors that could lead to hostilities while emphasizing that the situation should not be exaggerated. This book not only sheds new light on the prospects for cross-strait military conflict but also explores the pathways that could either lead to or help prevent such a crisis.

Kastner begins by examining the complex implications of deepening economic integration between China and Taiwan. While economic ties have historically been seen as a stabilizing force, the author delves into the potential risks that arise as a result of this interdependence. He further explores the shifting balance of military power in the region, considering the implications of China’s military modernization efforts and the potential impact on Taiwan’s defense capabilities. These dynamics, coupled with uncertainty surrounding the future of U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security, contribute to the complex landscape of the Taiwan Strait. A crucial question Kastner considers in his book is whether the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense.

The author also highlights the significance of domestic political changes in both China and Taiwan. By analyzing the internal dynamics within these two entities, Kastner provides readers with a deeper understanding of how domestic factors can shape cross-strait relations and potentially impact the likelihood of military conflict. Kastner delves into an in-depth examination of the intricately intertwined economies of Taiwan and China, as well as their historical background and the significance of freedom in the Taiwanese context.

While the risks of conflict are indeed real, Kastner’s analysis offers a more tempered perspective, emphasizing that war in the Taiwan Strait is far from inevitable. He argues that there are multiple distinct pathways that could lead to hostilities, and the mechanisms that may mitigate one type of conflict might not necessarily be applicable to others. However, the book underlines the presence of powerful mitigating factors, combined with plausible steps to reduce the likelihood of military conflict, providing a glimmer of hope for avoiding a catastrophic outcome.

Combining international relations theory with meticulous empirical analysis of regional trends, Kastner presents readers with valuable insights into the potential occurrence of war in the Taiwan Strait and, more importantly, how such a conflict can be averted. The book equips policymakers, scholars, and interested readers with the knowledge necessary to navigate this complex geopolitical landscape.

War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait is a timely work that provides a comprehensive examination of the risks and possibilities surrounding military conflict in the region. Kastner’s expertise and meticulous research contribute to a vital perspective that not only deepens our understanding of the Taiwan Strait issue but also provides valuable insights into maintaining peace and stability in the region.

Scott L. Kastner, War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Columbia University Press, 2022) ISBN: 9780231198653, 272 pages

Written by Dilara Özer

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ll eyes have been turned on the Chinese leader Xi Jinping ever since the 20th National Congress in October 2022, renewed his term as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, securing his position to advance his agenda for at least the next five years. His re-appointment completes a comprehensive power grab that has been gathering pace and highlights Xi’s dominance over the Chinese political system.

With its rivalry with the U.S. heating up, understanding Xi’s China is now more important than ever. Even more important is understanding the man himself considering his rigorous power and hold over the country, as well as the potential weight of his decisions in shaping international affairs.

Who is Xi Jinping? Although he came to power a decade ago, he remains an enigmatic leader who is often approached as a dictator in Western publications. His unprecedented power has been unmatched since Mao Zedong. Sinologist Kerry Brown, professor at King’s College and associate fellow at the Asia-Pacific program at Chatham House, helps dispel some of the enigma as Xi: A Study in Power comes as an easy-to-read primer on this influential leader.

Brown provides an overview of Xi’s motives and his prevalence in contemporary China. The book is part biography which covers Xi’s life from his family’s reversed fortune in his early childhood to his more recent rise to power and ambitious campaigns in China and abroad, and part analysis of his power and the impact of his rule on the West.

Xi: A Study in Power gives the reader an understanding of Xi’s vision for China’s future and what it means for the rest of the world. The book highlights that Xi has prioritized the stability of Chinese society and the astounding economic growth of China, while ensuring that nothing challenges the political status quo and the prevalence of the Chinese Communist Party.

Brown assesses the topics with China at the forefront that have had ubiquitous media coverage around the world, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and its effects on Xi’s power, protests in Hong Kong, and the reports of the cruel human rights abuses taking place in the Xinjiang region. He also analyzes how these events have been served to the Chinese public within the tightly controlled media to withhold Xi’s ambitions.

For those whose interest has been sparked by the latest global developments involving China but are overwhelmed with the inescapable number of new speculations, Xi: A Study in Power is a good place to start to understand China through its sensational leader. The book is sure to leave the reader with a heightened curiosity on the topic and sufficient information to build upon.

Kerry Brown, Xi: A Study in Power (Icon Books, 2022) ISBN: 9781785788086, 256 pages

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or centuries, national sovereignty has been the main foundation of the current Westphalian international system. Yet, the emergence of new technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and 5G brought with them a new industrial revolution. This, therefore, translates into novel challenges for the current international system and, above all, the concept of national sovereignty itself.

The third industrial revolution (3IR), known also as the digital revolution, in conjunction with the third wave of globalization, brought into existence a global digital ecosystem dominated by Western norms and values. As interconnectedness started to dominate the state of international affairs, the concept of national sovereignty began to some extent to be undermined. A new domain was brought to the concept of sovereignty: digital sovereignty.

Digital sovereignty refers mainly to a nation’s right and ability to control its own digital data and destiny. In the third industrial revolution, the system was dominated exclusively by the West, with most nations having no other choice than trusting and acting in accordance with the West’s norms and values. For this reason, there were not many discussions in terms of the rise of the importance of digital sovereignty.

Yet, the same does not stand true for the current industrial revolution as China has emerged as an alternative to the Western dominance of technology. Specifically, China, which has been deprived of the advantages of the previous industrial revolutions, is on its way to become a global leader in technologies such as AI or 5G. The emergence of another power besides the West has brought a fragmentation or decoupling to the digital ecosystem which, in turn, has led to the rise of digital sovereignty.

Caught in the rivalry between the U.S. and China, most states have started to focus more on their digital sovereignty for two main reasons: First, states are primarily afraid of losing access to essential digital components, such as the case of semiconductors. The second reason, mainly in relation to 5G, is the lack of control over the data of citizens and the international flow of this data. The rise of digital sovereignty is best understood within the framework of the 5G race between the U.S. and China, and, at the same time, the responses of other states to this race.

The 5G race

5G provides users with faster download speeds, lower latency, higher connectivity, and bandwidth. Indeed, not only will 5G be critical for faster internet access, smart city applications, and autonomous vehicles, but it will also expand mobile communications from the human-centric ecosystem to the Internet of Things (IoT), the metaverse, etc. Simply put, 5G is considered the “central nervous system of the 21^st century economy.” In this line of thought, the combination of 5G with other technologies such as AI or IoT, makes it possible for these technologies to reach their full potential with both economic and strategic benefits.

Data is crucial for 5G to work and currently we are living in a world where data is power. Having control over the 5G core network gives the responsible company/state a great advantage over others and, as a result, 5G has taken a front place in the ongoing great power competition between the U.S. and China.

While no American company has the capability to fully construct a complete 5G network, Chinese Huawei does have this ability and is currently dominating the market. Specifically, Huawei has been a global leader in 5G core solutions since 2019, and at the same time, it has been leading the 5G patents technology. Besides Huawei, only Ericsson (Sweden) and Nokia (Finland) have the capability of building complete 5G networks, but at much higher costs.

Despite not providing a clear alternative to Huawei, the U.S. has viewed the Chinese company as a threat not only to its national security, but also to its position within the international system. Following mainly a reactive approach towards Chinese policies, the U.S. has been trying to hinder the Huawei/Chinese rise in the sector.

The 5G race between the U.S. and China intensified during the Trump administration while the Biden administration has followed in the same line. The United States’ main rationale is the risk of espionage by Huawei, considering that the company is legally bound to serve the national interests of China. While such an assessment is not accepted by Huawei, several investigations have shown that it may have, or, at least has the capacity, to eavesdrop on calls.

Generally, the U.S. has founded its discourse on the dichotomy of Western liberaltarianism, freedom, and innovation vs. Chinese authoritarianism, surveillance, and control. By using this dichotomy, it has not only restricted the operations of the Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE in the U.S., but has forced its allies – especially European states – to choose between Huawei and itself.

Some U.S. allies, such as the Netherlands, the UK, Canada, and Australia, have positively responded to the American call to stop cooperation or remove the Chinese company from their 5G networks. Yet, even though U.S. policies have limited Huawei’s operations, they have not stopped Huawei from extending its sphere of influence. Currently, the number of states that are already using or are likely to use Huawei’s networks is much higher than those that have either banned, restricted, or are unlikely to use Huawei in their 5G infrastructure.

This can be explained mainly by the fact that the U.S. has not been able to provide an alternative to Huawei. Primarily as a result of the Chinese government’s supportive policies, Huawei dominates the market as the cheapest available option.

Towards a new order in the digital ecosystem

The Western dominance of the digital ecosystem has come to an end. A rising China with the ability to leapfrog the U.S. in many technological and digital areas is posing a direct threat not only to the norms and values of the digital ecosystem, but also to its structure.

The question that arises naturally is whether the current bipolar/multipolar international system will also be manifested in the digital ecosystem. The fact that the U.S. is forcing most states to choose a side makes the creation of two digital camps and powers competing for digital influence inevitable. For this reason, a bipolar digital ecosystem seems to be the most probable scenario. Furthermore, the United States’ reactive and containment policy towards China will push the latter to further its innovations and develop itself in areas where it is currently lacking or lagging.

In a bipolar digital ecosystem, other states will have to choose a side by focusing primarily on their digital sovereignty. As a matter of fact, the risks with 5G networks are always present, regardless of the provider. Specifically, the provider of the 5G network to another state will have the capability and strategic advantage to shut down the network completely at its own discretion, and to control IoT devices (i.e., autonomous cars, drones, etc.) and even to turn them into weapons.

So, the question is not whether a state will have to choose between Western or Chinese norms, as presented by the U.S., but to whom a state is willing to give up its digital sovereignty. As a state becomes reliant on another state, it must accept both the advantages and disadvantages of doing so.

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he Pacific is heating up. The rise of China rocks the balance of power making room for an emerging new order. In this month’s book bundle, we present eight books about the hottest topic of international affairs: the U.S.-China rivalry. What awaits the world as tensions rise? This selection approaches the topic from comprehensive and diverse angles ranging from international relations theory assumptions to the most outstanding topics of the U.S.-China rivalry such as economic leadership and information war.

The competition between the two great powers has overtaken the world agenda and is shaping foreign policy decisions globally. Therefore, this book bundle was compiled with special attention to the reactions of middle and smaller powers in the face of this competition, aiming to give the reader a broader perspective to interpret what awaits the world more holistically.

Will the shift in the balance of power between the U.S. and China lead to a war? International relations theory predicts that shifts between a hegemon and a rising power may trigger actions with such consequences. Steve Chan examines how many of these theories hold true in the case of U.S.-China relations with Taiwan remaining a flash point for a possible Sino-American conflict.

Rumbles of Thunder: Power Shifts and the Danger of Sino-American War further explores the risk-oriented popular narratives on the topic with sound and well-grounded judgement, considering whether several factors that can raise or lower international tension apply to the current situation. Chan criticizes overly mechanistic frameworks and shows that power shifts do not predetermine violent outcomes—and neither does their absence ensure peace. In fact, many factors like domestic politics, international political economy, and the choices of individual leaders come into play.

Rumbles of Thunder demonstrates that claims of a “rising China” catching up and overtaking the United States are alarmist, and Chan predicts that American structural advantages will endure for some time to come. Contrary to popular belief, Chan does not maintain that China acts like a revisionist power seeking to overturn the system or that the U.S. is defending the international order. Rumbles of Thunder brings a fresh analytical outlook to the table and challenges conventional wisdom on the likelihood of war between the United States and China.

Steve Chan, Rumbles of Thunder: Power Shifts and the Danger of Sino-American War (Columbia University Press, 2022) ISBN: 9780231208451, 336 pages

In Accidental Conflict: America, China, and the Clash of False Narratives, Stephan Roach argues that the conflict between the U.S. and China wouldn’t have emerged were it not for a needless clash of false narratives, and that much of the rhetoric on both sides is dangerously misguided, amplified by information distortion, and should be seen more like a reflection of each nation’s fears and vulnerabilities than a credible assessment of the risks they face. The U.S. blames its trade and technology threats on China yet overlooks its shaky saving foundation. Meanwhile, China blames its growth challenges on the alleged U.S. containment of market-based socialism, ignoring its failed economic rebalancing.

Accidental Conflict: America, China, and the Clash of False Narratives provides an analysis of both nations’ economies, politics, and policies, and offers a new road map for restoring a mutually advantageous relationship. The book will be available in paperback on June 6, 2023.

Stephan Roach, Accidental Conflict: America, China, and the Clash of False Narratives (Yale University Press, 2022) ISBN: 9780300259643, 448 pages

Kevin Rudd, a former Australian prime minister who spent more than forty years in China, puts the turbulent relationship between the U.S. and China under the spotlight with insightful analyses based on his firsthand understanding of the mindsets of the leadership whose judgment will determine whether the future course of events will escalate to a war.

Rudd provides context as to why the U.S.-China relationship rests on a seismic fault: cultural misunderstanding, historical grievance, and ideological incompatibility are all pivotal antecedents. The antagonism between the two superpowers is starkly visible, among others, in the field of military, intelligence, technology, and trade, while either country’s capacity to draw the last straw grows daily.

Against this gloomy backdrop, Rudd constructively argues that the relationship is not doomed to escalating tension and war. If both sides can sustain a “managed strategic competition” by coexisting without betraying their core interests, conflict could be avoided. However, the opposite could be catastrophic. The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping’s China demystifies the actions of both sides, explaining and translating them for the benefit of the other.

Kevin Rudd, The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping’s China (PublicAffairs, 2022) ISBN-13 9781541701304, 432 pages

As the U.S. faces the first real challenge to its economic hegemony with the rise of China, The United States vs. China: The Quest for Global Economic Leadership sees experienced policymaker, economist, and scholar C. Fred Bergsten analyze the two great powers’ competition from the scope of global economic leadership. Is economic conflict beyond the existing trade war inevitable between China and the U.S.? Will their clash produce a new economic leadership vacuum? What can the consequences of a world economy adopting Chinese characteristics be?

According to Bergsten a confrontation between the two would be calamitous. He further argues that it would be self-defeating for the U.S. to attempt to “decouple” from its rival. Bergsten advices the U.S. to pursue “conditional competitive cooperation” to lead, rather than destroy, the world economy instead of a policy of containment. As for China, he recommends exercising constructive global leadership.

Fred Bergsten, The United States vs. China: The Quest for Global Economic Leadership (Polity Press, 2022) ISBN-13 978-1509547357, 384 pages

Is China really a threat to the U.S. or just a threat to its unilateral superpower status? According to Paolo Urio, the U.S. has historically disguised the true nature of its relations with the nations that have stood in the way of its ambitions, often projecting fear of harm from other nations even as it was expanding its dominion over them. America and the China Threat: From the End of History to the End of Empire revisits and debunks the idea of the universality of U.S. values, and the perception of the imperial, dictatorial, and state capitalist character of today’s China. It provides a historical analysis of the divergent ideologies of the U.S. and China, and reveals the source of strain the U.S. faces in adapting to the changes occurring in the international system that has moved beyond its exceptionalism and uncontested leadership, now challenged by China.

Urio challenges the U.S. proclamation that it alone can assure stability and prosperity in the international system, while demonstrating that Chinese ideology has achieved greater flexibility by integrating values imported from the West and several Confucian values. Urio argues that China is better able to adapt its public policies to changes in the national and international environments. America and the China Threat: From the End of History to the End of Empire further addresses China’s significant military and economic advances and its new investments.

Paolo Urio, America and the China Threat: From the End of History to the End of Empire (Clarity Press, 2022) ISBN-10 1949762505, 476 pages

Information War: How Artificial Intelligence Is Driving U.S.-China Military Competition addresses a crucial variable shaping the intensifying confrontation between the U.S. and China: the struggle to control information. How will modern technology be wielded in a rising conflict between the two superpowers?

Technology and national security expert Tom Stefanick argues that the two contemporary superpowers will base their security competition primarily on the fight to dominate information and perception. How will the adversaries attack the other’s information architecture while protecting their own? Stefanick highlights that the way each country chooses to employ information countermeasures will determine the amount of friction and uncertainty in the conflict.

Stefanick draws attention to artificial intelligence, which will play an important role. Information War: How Artificial Intelligence Is Driving U.S.-China Military Competition reviews the recent Chinese research and trends in AI to determine how it will approach the conflict, and provides a sober view of how artificial intelligence will be weaponized in the new information war.

Tom Stefanick, Information War: How Artificial Intelligence Is Driving U.S.-China Military Competition (Brookings Institution Press, 2022) ISBN-13: 9780815738824, 280 pages

China expert Andrew Small offers an eclectic view of a rivalry ranging far beyond “great power” politics. He provides the inside story of a revolution in the China policy of countries from around the world. The Rupture: China and the Global Race for the Future explains a diverse range of topics such as how many of the Western politicians and business leaders closest to Beijing have now become its sharpest opponents, how the COVID-19 pandemic dramatically accelerated this trend, and why 5G represents the first test case as to whether China can win the race for the future.

As competition grows between systems, the Western model itself is transforming given that China’s rise changes both the balance of ideas and the balance of power. Small traces U.S. efforts to recast relations with old allies, examining Europe’s growing role in the technological and economic contest, and Beijing’s attempts to build a coalition of its own.

Andrew Small, The Rupture: China and the Global Race for the Future (Hurst Publishers, 2022) ISBN 9781787387782, 304 pages

What path does a middle power take when engrossed in the competition between great powers? Do they get caught up between the two or forge a path of their own? In the heating U.S.-China rivalry, what are the strategic responses of middle powers in the Asia-Pacific? The Strategic Options of Middle Powers in the Asia-Pacific examines these questions through the specific case studies of South Korea, Australia, Japan, India, Taiwan, and Vietnam from their local perspectives.

With each chapter, written by experts, the book provides comprehensive studies of the regional powers in the Asia-Pacific with an in-depth examination of the contemporary geopolitics of the region, including the impact of both the Trump and Biden administrations, Beijing’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy, cross-strait relations with Taiwan, and the influences of Japan, Vietnam, Australia, and South Korea. The Strategic Options of Middle Powers in the Asia-Pacific reveals that regional middle powers actually exert influence on the direction of regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, and develops theories of foreign policy analyses, forming a systematic framework through initiating crucial concepts, including reluctant hedging, economic statecraft, and strategic position-taking.

Chien-Wen Kou, Chiung-Chiu Huang, Brian Job, The Strategic Options of Middle Powers in the Asia-Pacific (Routledge, 2022) ISBN 9781003156314, 278 pages

Amid the Russia-Ukraine war in Europe, the United States has reaffirmed its commitment to counter China in the strategically vital Indo-Pacific region, by putting $2.2 billion on the table.

But in the end, what price are the regional and world powers willing to pay—not only in financial terms—to ensure a free and open South China Sea against the backdrop of China’s rising military maneuvering?

Bone of contention

The South China Sea, which encompasses 1.4 million square miles, is of tremendous economic and geostrategic importance. More than $3 trillion in trade is transported over it each year, and roughly one-third of the world’s maritime shipping moves through its waters. It also hosts a huge number of fisheries, indispensable for the food security of China, Southeast Asia, and beyond.

Yet, apart from the economic benefits, this large swath of war is on the top agenda of many countries due to its geopolitical significance. From a narrow perspective, only a few neighboring nations have domain over parts of the South China Sea due to their respective geographic position. This includes China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. Nevertheless, many other countries such as Indonesia, Singapore, Cambodia, and Japan play a vital role in this maritime region, extending the circle of the partners involved.

Stirring opposition, China has claimed not only most of the waters of South China Sea for itself, but also competes for two groups of islands of strategic importance: the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands are contested by China and other neighboring countries.

No one wants to abandon their claims, given the richness in deposits of natural resources, and the potential to strengthen a country’s security and to open trade routes. This creates a source for a conflict which some have attempted to resolve by negotiation and legal challenges. So far, this has been in vain.

Empires’ loud talk

In the whole saga of this maritime dispute, the United States’ role cannot be ignored. The country evokes legal treaties such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to affirm the claim that the South China Sea is international waters and accuses China of militarizing the area. In recent years, artificial islets have been built by China, and some of the reefs have been converted to military facilities, paving the way for the dominance of one power.

Frothy waters amid the controversies

Due to China’s economic prowess and consequently the dependency of its neighbors on bilateral trade, many regional countries have embraced appeasing politics. However, some cracks have started to appear very recently on the surface of these seemingly friendly relations.

Last year, China deployed three ships to the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ), prompting a fast rebuke from Rodrigo Duterte, the country’s president. Also, Malaysia summoned China’s ambassador to protest against the activities of Chinese vessels in Kuala Lumpur’s EEZ.

Vietnam and Taiwan that have experienced more ups-and-downs in dealing with China than anyone else are already on a buying spree of military equipment, searching to pro-actively improve their defense capabilities (without searching for excuses for doing so).

In the eyes of many analysts, Russia’s war in Ukraine turned the rules-based order upside down. The Russian Federation resorted to a military solution to respond to the self-perceived feeling of endangerment, and in order to return its so-called ancestral lands back to the motherland after they were allegedly wrongly gifted to Ukraine.

But the erosion of the rule of law did not start in 2022.

Previously, in 1994, Ukraine was given security assurances for abandoning its nuclear weapons by the signatories of the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances. Yet, the United Kingdom and the United States, subsequently joined by France and China, allowed Russia to annex Crimea exactly twenty years after the agreement.

Therefore, many point to the perishability of certain norms of international law due to the lack of their enforcement. Washington’s selective application of rules does not help its argument when evoking the need to uphold the law. However, it is without dispute that apart from deploying its armed forces, the U.S. has supported Ukraine in countering the aggressor and it remains to be seen who will be called the winner.

With American ships frequently passing through the South China Sea, not far from the Chinese ones, it is rightly feared that one small clash could lead to a full-scale war anytime as neither China nor other parties to the dispute want to deescalate easily.

It is worthwhile to bear in mind that diplomatic solutions have not been completely exhausted despite the rounds of diplomatic salvos between China and the U.S.

It should matter little to the Chinese that American diplomats and a handful of their western allies will not be attending the Beijing Winter Olympics in February. What truly matters is that the Russians are coming.

The above is not an arbitrary statement. It is supported with facts. According to a survey conducted by China’s Global Times newspaper, the majority of the Chinese people value their country’s relations with Russia more than that of the EU and certainly more than that of the United States. The newspaper reported that such a finding makes it “the first time in 15 years that China-US ties did not top the list of the important bilateral relations in the Global Times annual survey.”

In fact, some kind of an alliance is already forming between China and Russia. The fact that the Chinese people are taking note of this and are supporting their government’s drive towards greater integration – political, economic and geostrategic – between Beijing and Moscow, indicates that the informal and potentially formal alliance is a long-term strategy for both nations.

American hostilities towards China, as seen by the Chinese, have become unbearable, and the Chinese people and government seem to have lost, not only any trust, however modest, of Washington, but of its own political system as well. 66 percent of all Chinese either disapproved of the US democratic system – or whatever remains of it – or believe that US democracy has sharply declined. Ironically, the vast majority of Americans share such a bleak view of their own country, according to a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2019 and again by the Michigan Public Policy Survey in 2021.

This leads us to two possible conclusions: First, the Chinese people will not be pushing for an American-style democracy any time soon and, second, the Chinese trust in the US does not hinge on what political party controls the White House or Congress.

While the Chinese negative view of the US is unmistakably clear, Beijing remains hopeful that existing divisions with the European Union would allow it to expand economically in a region that is rife with financial and political opportunities, thus strategic growth. This fact offers China and Russia yet another area of potential cooperation, as Russia is also keen to expand into the European markets using its recently completed Nord Stream 2 gas project. Though Europe is already struggling with gas shortages, Europeans are divided on whether Russia should be allowed to claim a massive geostrategic influence by having such sway over the EU energy needs.

Germany is worried that allowing Nord Stream 2 to operate would make it too dependent on Russian gas supplies.

Germany, which already receives nearly a third of its gas supplies from Russia – through Nord Stream 1 – is worried that allowing Nord Stream 2 to operate would make it too dependent on Russian gas supplies. Under intense pressure from Washington, Germany is caught between a rock and a hard place:  it needs Russian gas to keep its economy afloat, but is worried about American retaliation. To appease Washington, the German government threatened, on December 16, to block the new pipeline if Russia invades Ukraine. But is Germany in a position that allows it to make such demands?

In the face of these vastly changing realities, the US seems to be running out of options. The Summit for Democracy, orchestrated by Washington last December, seemed like a desperate cry for attention as opposed to celebrating the supposed democratic countries. 111 countries participated in the conference.

The participants were handpicked by Washington and included such countries as Israel, Albania and Ukraine. China and Russia were, of course, excluded, not because of their lack of democratic credentials – such notions are often of no relevance to the politicized US definition of ‘democracy’ – but because they, along with others, were meant to be left isolated in the latest US hegemonic move.

The conference, expectedly, turned out to be an exercise in futility. Needless to say, the US is in no position to give democracy lessons to anyone. The attempted coup in Washington by tens of thousands of angry US militants on January 6, 2021 – coupled with various opinion polls attesting to Americans’ lack of faith in their elected institutions – places the US democracy brand at an all-time low.

As the US grows desperate in its tactics – aside from increasingly ineffectual sanctions, aggressive language and the relentless waving of the democracy card – China and Russia continue to draw closer to one another, on all fronts. In an essay entitled ‘Respecting People’s Democratic Rights’, written jointly by the ambassadors of Beijing and Moscow in Washington, Qin Gang and Anatoly Antonov wrote in the National Interest magazine that the democracy summit was “an evident product of (US’s) Cold-War mentality,” which “will stoke up ideological confrontation and a rift in the world, creating new ‘dividing lines’.”

But there is more than their mutual rejection of American hostilities that is bringing China and Russia closer. The two countries are not motivated by their fear of the American military or some NATO invasion. Russia’s and China’s militaries are moving from strength to strength and neither country is experiencing the anxiety often felt by smaller, weaker and relatively isolated countries that have faced direct or indirect US military threats.

Neither Russia nor China are afraid of direct or indirect US military threats.

To push back against possible NATO expansion, the Russian military is actively mobilizing in various regions at its western borders. For its part, the Chinese military has made it clear that any US-led attempt aimed at altering the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait would provoke an immediate military retaliation. In a virtual meeting with the US President, Chinese President Xi Jinping warned Biden on November 16 that the US was “playing with fire”. “Whoever plays with fire will get burnt,” he threatened.

The Chinese-Russian alliance aims largely at defending the two countries’ regional and international interests, which are in constant expansion. In the case of China, the country is now a member of what is considered the world’s largest economic pact. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which was officiated on January 1, covers a global market that caters to around 30 percent of the world’s population.

Russia, too, operates based on multiple regional and international alliances. One of these military alliances is the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which is currently involved in ‘peacekeeping’ operations in Kazakhstan. From Syria in the Middle East, to Venezuela in South America to Mali in West Africa and beyond, Russia’s military influence has increased to the extent that, in September 2021, Moscow signed military cooperation agreements with Africa’s two most populous nations, Nigeria and Ethiopia, challenging the traditional dominance of the US and France on the African continent.

Informally, China and Russia are already operating according to a regional and global model that can be compared to that of the now-defunct Warsaw Treaty Organization (1955-91), a political and military alliance between the Soviet Union and several Eastern European countries that aimed at counter-balancing the US-led NATO alliance. The Warsaw Pact pushed back against US-led western hegemony and labored to protect the interests of the pact’s members throughout the world. History seems to be repeating itself, though under different designations.

A virtual summit for democracy was held on December 9-10, 2021, upon the invitation of the United States. At the summit, Joe Biden renewed his call for democracy and the fight against authoritarianism and corruption. Amongst more than 110 invited countries, 89 showed up. The question now is why the Biden administration initiated the Summit for Democracy. Let me address some important issues and their consequences in what follows.

The general assertion is that the summit was initiated in order to respond to the rhetoric that American democracy is in decay and crisis – a debate which has gone global. One of the key denominators of the democracy crisis in the U.S. has been the horrific attack on Capitol Hill on January 6, 2021 following the results of the U.S. presidential elections.

On August 30, 2021, this was followed by the withdrawal of the U.S.-led NATO forces from Afghanistan, another evident U.S. failure. These and similar events brought the image of U.S. democracy into question before a global public. In this context, the Summit for Democracy was designed to rectify the image of the U.S. both domestically and globally.

The exclusion of major U.S. partners

China and Russia were not invited to the Summit for Democracy as they are regarded as the ideological rivals of democratically ruled countries. There were also countries from the Asia-Pacific and Africa that were not on the invitation list: Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, which are considered de facto allies of the United States, were among the ASEAN members not invited.

China and Russia were not invited to the Summit for Democracy for they are regarded as the ideological rivals of democratically ruled countries.

Although Singapore and Thailand might not be fully democratic, and Vietnam has a single-party rule, they uphold – to a certain degree – democratic practices such as civil society organizations and a rule-based administration. They also have closer ties with the U.S. in fields including not only economy but also culture, academia, and the defence sector. Not only this, but they have been approached by the U.S. to adopt policies against China. Indeed, this is closely related to the well-established Asian pivot policy by former U.S. president Barack Obama.

The invitation of only Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines from the ASEAN region to the Summit for Democracy has led to speculations. Is there a rift between the rest of the member countries of ASEAN and the United States due to a widening ideological gap between democracies and non-democracies? Or is it because of these countries’ sociopolitical or socioeconomic alliances with U.S. rivals? If the former turns out to be true, there is definitely a certain degree of miscalculation by the Biden administration.

There is no doubt that the U.S. is losing credit as the leader of global democracy along with its capacity to defend democratic principles and values. Political elites in ASEAN member states, which rely on Western democracy as an ideal, can no longer satisfy or silence emergent anti-Western sentiments as now critical voices even within the ruling circles in Europe increasingly emerge and question the credibility of the U.S. “democratic” engagements abroad.

Concern over the Lack of Engagement

Japan is a highly acclaimed U.S. ally in the Asia-Pacific region and approached the U.S. decision not to invite certain ASEAN countries to the summit critically.

No doubt that the U.S. is losing credit as the leader of global democracy.

Japanese political commentators were in favor of inviting all ASEAN members, not only some, to the summit. According to them, direct U.S. engagement with ASEAN is essential to sustaining the security in the Asia-Pacific against China. The Japanese commentators seem right to criticize the imposition of a definition of democracy technically contrived by the U.S. alone.

On the subject of the exclusion of Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, Japan has implicitly reacted by expressing its concern about how to improve democratic rules in ASEAN without the U.S. facilitation and engagement through political, economic, and cultural mechanisms.

To highlight additional concerns, it should be emphasized that Singapore, a U.S. ally, and Vietnam, a potential partner of the United States, were not invited to the summit. Taking into consideration that Barack Obama was the first U.S. president to visit Hanoi after the Vietnam War, the exclusion of Vietnam from the summit is not an encouraging move for enhancing the partnership between the two capitals.

Categorizing certain Asia-Pacific countries as “non-democratic” may be true in principle. Nevertheless, the imposition of a Western-based democracy model may not be acceptable by a number of regional countries.

This miscalculated approach by the U.S. administration can potentially trigger more controversy among non-democracies in the Asia-Pacific, and may result either in an attempt to copy the model of the U.S. democracy, which could potentially end up in failure, or push them further towards strengthening their ties with China, the world’s second superpower.

Step Forward

The question remains whether the composition of the countries invited to the Summit for Democracy consisted of a wider alliance or the U.S. was simply playing the leadership role by marking its influence on democratically ruled countries. Then, the subsequent question is whether the U.S. administration intends to divide the world into democratic and undemocratic rules. If the latter is true, it is not difficult to guess the existence of a larger division and separation of countries by the United States as democratic and non-democratic ones.

The lack of U.S. engagement with Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, as member states of ASEAN, can deter the democratization processes further if the United States’ formal involvement remains ineffective. The influence of democratic principles has decreased significantly around the globe in the last decades. This includes Western countries, where democracy was born, as has become evident in the treatment of people of color and migrants.

The task of major democratic countries such as the U.S. is not to judge other democracies apathetically, but rather to galvanize democratic engagements with countries that are undergoing democratic challenges by paying a degree of respect to their existing democratic institutions.

Since September 15, 2021 the global security agenda has been occupied with a security pact designed to pave the way for a technology transfer by the U.S. to Australia, replacing France as a supplier of nuclear-powered submarines. The argument goes that this strategic initiative is only the beginning of a much larger cooperation plan regarding the future of the Indo-Pacific security complex.

Global security analysts and scholars directly focused their attention on the Indo-Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea looking into possible implications. The pivotal argument is that world security is going to shift towards the East, and the U.S.-China competition will broaden itself into another dimension with this strategic step.

This claim holds certain validity as the U.S. retreat from Afghanistan and Syria should lead to the accumulation of a certain amount of tangible sources that will need another direction to flow into.

Thus, several scholars have been supporting the literature that hypothesizes a global U.S. channeling into the Indo-Pacific security complex. An alternative approach advocates that the U.S. is not entirely eager to interfere with China due to the potential implications of such a move, yet its partners are forcing a U.S. presence in the region.

This approach is an alternative that derives its legitimacy from the middle and great powers that cooperate with the U.S. – the superpower. This argument also has its merits as international relations are not solely the enforcement of the interests of a superpower but an interaction between the latter and its partnering countries.

The global understanding of such events represented in pacts such as the AUKUS Pact is vital. However, a regionalist approach is required to better present the impact on the regional and state-level dimensions. The French involvement in the pact is the part of AUKUS that is going to cause major implications for the MENA region.

Partnerships like AUKUS that will direct interstate partnerships and even enforce them to align. Recent military procurement deals such as the Turkish S-400 acquisition, the Pakistani JF-17 fighter aircraft production contract with China, Saudi-UAE procurements of F-35 aircraft, and THAAD air defense systems from the U.S. are recent comparable cases.

These procurements created different levels of leverage and tensions for the buyer countries as they were forced to choose a side. Despite the balancing literature and the conceptual history of the practice, it becomes more apparent that a bipolar system is very antagonistic in its buildup process.

Partnerships like AUKUS that will direct interstate partnerships and even enforce them to align.

Remembering the two world wars that created the Cold War structure, it is plausible that the “playmaker” states force certain great and middle powers with strategic geopolitical significance to align with them. In this sense, AUKUS might have created a rift between the U.S. and France (and the EU in a larger context, considering the UK also left the organization) that will have certain implications for the MENA region.

For the last 30 years, the U.S. was able to embark on its Middle Eastern policy vis-à-vis its European partners, but strategic gains that directly hinder EU profitability will cause certain fractions in this practice.

The most significant impact of AUKUS on the MENA security complex is expected to be observed in the Eastern Mediterranean. Since the EU has practically perceived the Turkish pivot for energy resources towards this area and North African interests in this area as threats, the U.S. has supported European interests in securing the energy routes and protecting the integrity of South European shores. However, a political dissemination process that was potentially started with AUKUS might divide this unification in foreign policy.

The Eastern Mediterranean is a quagmire of competing interests, and a transatlantic fracture will only escalate the situation.

The Eastern Mediterranean is a quagmire of competing interests, and a transatlantic fracture will only escalate the situation. This escalation might give middle powers like Turkey broader room for maneuver. If the U.S. stops supporting these interests in the region, the EU backlash and the hawkish French position will lose a certain share of their influence and capacity. A significant shift towards the Indo-Pacific Ocean might reduce the pressure on great and middle powers competing for interests.

An alternative power-centered approach might suggest that the void left by a U.S. strategic shift towards the East would trigger a great power to take responsibility and fill the vacuum. The current power balance propounds a Russian pivot towards the Eastern Mediterranean; however, Russia’s aircraft carriers are quite worn, and its only ship, Admiral Kuznetsov, is on the maintenance deck.

This does not mean Russia cannot control this area – it holds a submarine force of 58 known units which can only be challenged by the U.S. and maybe China in the next decade. Both scenarios imply that Turkey might have more room for maneuver with less focus and escalation from rival powers.

Meanwhile the possibility that France might become even more hawkish and hyper-emphasize its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean must not be excluded. Yet, this is less likely since if France and Germany plan to keep the union together, they have to align in foreign policy following Brexit. When push comes to shove, Germany will most likely balance the French hawkish reactionary stance towards these events and prioritize economic growth in the next decade.

Many of the old Western imperialist powers are taking part in a new scramble: this time not for Africa, but for hegemony and influence in the South China Sea. In a surprise announcement on September 15, 2021, the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom formed a new strategic partnership for the sharing of weaponry (in particular nuclear submarine and cruise missiles) and security-related cyber technology, with the main recipient of new weapons expected to be Australia. Dubbed AUKUS, this new alliance will purportedly “protect shared values and promote security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.”

Like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, commonly known as the Quad, an alliance bringing together the U.S., Australia, Japan, and India, none of the official statements of the AUKUS alliance mention China by name. And yet, like the Quad, the intentions of AUKUS are transparent: to maintain military and economic hegemony over the South China Sea, and over China in general. In other words, to keep China in its place, through brute force if necessary. Though how AUKUS and the Quad will co-ordinate remains unclear, there is little question that the provocative joint military exercises taking place under the rubric of the Quad will be expanded to include the AUKUS framework as well.

The inclusion of the UK in AUKUS has raised some eyebrows, since the country has hardly been a Pacific power since World War Two. However, the entire Brexit narrative has been based largely on imperialist fantasies of Britain returning to its “rightful” place as a global powerhouse, perhaps cajoling pesky natives into lucrative – for Britain – trade deals through gunboat diplomacy. There have been calls by influential UK politicians (backed by the former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe) for the UK to be a “major democratic counterweight” to China in the region, and a major review of foreign and defense policy in March 2021 centered on a shift to focus resources – diplomatic and military – on the Indo-Pacific.

Britain also sent an aircraft carrier to the South China Sea, essentially to join the game of intimidating China. Of course, the glory days of Queen Victoria are long over, and the notion that the current UK could accomplish much of anything on its own is somewhat fanciful, so a military alliance with the U.S. and Australia makes sense from that perspective. It should also be noted that the three AUKUS countries, together with Canada and New Zealand, are part of the Five Eyes alliance for intelligence sharing, which includes unsavory activities such as spying on each other’s citizens through monitoring of internet communications.

Even Germany has thrown its hat into the South China Sea ring, sending a frigate to the region.

France has also been flexing its muscles. In 2021, the country participated in joint military exercises in the region with Japan, the U.S., and Australia, dispatching warships to – where else? – the South China Sea. Indeed, the very birth of AUKUS was part and parcel of an imperialist game between Britain and France, with Australia abruptly cancelling a large French contract for submarines and switching to a British manufacturer. A diplomatic row ensued, with the French accusing the AUKUS countries of “betrayal” and even recalling their ambassadors to the U.S. and Australia (Britain was deemed not worth the trouble).

However, while all of that made for entertaining news, at the end of the day it was a sideshow compared to the much more important goal of beating the war drums. Even Germany has thrown its hat into the South China Sea ring, sending a frigate to the region. However, the Germans were easily snubbed by China, which refused the warship entry into a Chinese port.

Defenders of the “rules-based” order

Certainly, the most insulting idea advanced by the countries attempting to contain China is the notion they are defending the “rules-based order” in the South China Sea. In this narrative, China is the “rule breaker,” flouting the accepted laws and customs of international society. China is portrayed as a rogue state, going against international norms and the rule of law itself. The white knights of the West have arisen, not to protect their own selfish interests, but to defend those laws and rules, and champion the “fair and open” international order.

Even the openly provocative passages of Western warships in the area are euphemistically called “freedom of navigation” missions – one can imagine how the U.S. would react to Chinese warships conducting military maneuvers close to its shorelines. These blatantly biased narratives are repeated ad nauseam, not only by the governments themselves, but also by a compliant press. Unable to point to any specific violation, the media uses vague terms such as “increasing assertiveness” to describe Chinese behavior, as if that were a crime. In Japan, the right-of-center press has even resurrected the Cold War term “Free World” to juxtapose itself and the West against China.

The international system is indeed a “rules-based order,” based on laws and norms. In particular, the Charter of the United Nations proclaims the equality and sovereignty of all nations, and prohibits the use of force outside of situations of self-defense. It should be stressed that even then it is only until the Security Council decides on a course of action.

It is hardly controversial to note that the U.S. (and its allies) have openly broken these norms on a huge number of occasions, with catastrophic results for the people on the receiving end. The invasion of Iraq, the destruction of Libya, and ongoing military intervention in Syria are just some of the more egregious examples of U.S. violations of international law in recent years.

The ostensibly liberal government of President Biden thinks nothing of announcing that, even after the 20-year U.S. occupation of Afghanistan came to an unceremonious end, the country will continue the “war on terror” using “over the horizon” means, i.e., illegal bombing with drones and other air-based weapons. The so-called liberal U.S. press practically mounted a concerted campaign to stop the U.S. from pulling out its troops from Afghanistan, claiming the war on terror could not be effected without “boots on the ground.”

The U.S. thumbing its nose at international law is hardly a new phenomenon, and is not confined to the “war on terror” framework.

The U.S. thumbing its nose at international law is hardly a new phenomenon, and is not confined to the “war on terror” framework. The U.S. has intervened openly or covertly in many countries in Latin America, including Cuba, and imposes crippling sanctions on Venezuela. And continuing lavish support for countries that truly do deserve the “rogue state” label, such as the apartheid state of Israel, make a mockery of U.S. claims to be upholding international law.

Of course, the U.S. is hardly the only country that violates international law, and the notion that international law is observed more in breach than in observance is far oversold. Nevertheless, that does not detract from the main point: it is the U.S. and its allies that are being aggressive in the South China Sea, and China is completely justified in being apprehensive of the encirclement of the country by seemingly hostile navies.

A new Cold War – or even a hot one?

Though the current tensions between the West and China are often called a “new Cold War,” there are of course important differences with the past Cold War with the Soviet bloc. Probably the most important one is the extensive economic interdependence between China and the West (and the rest of the world). Even as they rattle their sabers, Western countries are mindful that they rely economically on China, as a manufacturing base and increasingly as a market.

Indeed, China is the main trading partner for the U.S., Japan, and the EU as a whole. A real shooting war would be an unmitigated disaster for the global economy: a fact well understood by business interests that wield great influence over Western governments. That may not make a real shooting war inconceivable, but it definitely does make it difficult. Much of the current rhetoric, in particular in Japan, is a result of pandering to nationalistic constituencies, and of attempts at justifying bloated military budgets and arms sales.

The problem is that, once nationalistic furor is inflamed to this extent, it can very easily get out of control. Right now, there are many opposing militaries in a small space, and merely one mistake could lead to disaster. The West will have only itself to blame if it does.

When you’ve been punched in the face, it’s a good idea to gather your wits before returning to the fray. Still dazed from the Afghan war, the Biden team is already speeding toward even more dangerous confrontations in multiple directions—this time, with China in their sights instead of the older jihadist foes. American strategists are focusing on bigger targets across a wide arch of distant lands and waters—South and Central Asia, the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, and the western Pacific. As Washington struggles to regain its footing, we should try to point its leaders toward a better path—one leading to global development and cooperation instead of endless brinkmanship and more pointless wars. The name of that path is the New Silk Road.

The New Silk Road is an audacious vision that might have originated in the United States. Its spirit is American to the core: a transcontinental and transoceanic venture, marshalling the energies and resources of billions of people around the world in an astonishing effort to unite societies and markets in a single human community. Breathtaking. Foolhardy. Utopian. Exactly—that’s why it’s American to the core.

So, to our shell-shocked comrades in Washington: Pause a while, open your well-trained minds to a bit of brainstorming that can advance fundamental American dreams that, today, are universal yearnings and help turn them into concrete achievements. Join the New Silk Road, share in the credit of leading the greatest humanitarian enterprise of our time, and take your turn in steering it in the best possible direction.

Follow our European and Asian allies in making the New Silk Road a broader partnership that embraces international standards of human rights, environmental protection, and transparency. Present the developing countries of the global South with a stunning array of world-class technology and finance that transcends ideology and Great Power politics.

In other words, work to improve China’s Belt and Road Initiative instead of trying to subvert it, duplicate it or ignore it. The venture has gained too much momentum to be stopped and a competing effort won’t muster adequate resources, either economic or political. Forget about trying to mount a hostile takeover. Buy into an ongoing concern that has a promising future, but is still malleable enough to serve collective interests instead of the imperial ambitions of the Beijing bureaucrats who launched it.

Work to improve China’s Belt and Road Initiative instead of trying to subvert it.

The Chinese may have originated the project, but they don’t own it. In fact, the faster it spreads the more it defies their control and spawns demands for wider participation in decision-making—not just from other governments and international bankers, but from ordinary citizens and civil society groups around the world. Many of China’s showcase projects have been stymied or revamped in the face of well-organized protests from myriad local groups—tribes in Pakistan, fishermen in Indonesia, miners in Zambia, farmers in Myanmar, urban youth in Nigeria, shopkeepers in Iran, engineers in Mexico, and many others.

Since the project’s inception, Beijing has insisted that the New Silk Road is open to every country that wants to participate. The United States should hold China to that pledge and encourage America’s friends to do the same. This would be a welcome about-face from years of futile efforts by presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden to discourage European and Asian countries from partnering with the multinational banks and consortiums that have sprung up to support New Silk Road projects. Washington’s blocking tactics have failed; it’s time to follow in the path of the many allies who took their own counsel and left America on the sidelines.

If the United States wants to display a new willingness to collaborate with neighbors and adversaries alike, there is one enterprise with a potential impact—both symbolic and practical—that supersedes all others. Chinese engineers are drawing up plans for a high-speed rail corridor connecting the entire coastal rim of the north Pacific.

The proposed route starts in northeast China, passing along the shores of Siberia into Alaska and, then, down the west coast of Canada and the U.S. all the way to California. The most spectacular feature is a possible tunnel across the Bering Strait—a fifty-mile underwater link, nearly twice the length of the Channel Tunnel between England and France.

Many Siberia-Alaska ventures have been floated since the nineteenth century, usually dismissed as fantasies worthy of Jules Verne or Ferdinand de Lesseps. Today, however, there is greater interest than ever. Trans-Arctic shipping is gradually emerging as a realistic shortcut between Pacific and Atlantic ports. Air travel is falling in favor because of rising cost and alarm over pollution. High speed trains are commonplace and an inter-hemispheric railway is just one of several megaprojects competing for attention and financing on every continent.

Many nations have concrete reasons to be cautious in joining the New Silk Road—particularly concerns over debt service, human rights, labor practices, and the environment.  However, for the United States, the chief hang-up is psychological and ideological. How can Americans feel they are still number one in the world if they have to rub shoulders with so many other chefs in the same kitchen? Wouldn’t it be admitting defeat to sign up for an enterprise they didn’t start and can never dominate?

Self-doubt should not stand in the way. Americans know perfectly well how to use their power to advance the greater good. They’ve demonstrated that many times before and they are more than equal to the task of showing it again in even more convincing ways. By combining their talents with those of others, they can multiply that force and aim it at higher goals and more inspiring ideals.

Westerners who have lived in Pacific Asian countries and absorbed their daily rhythms feel the pervasive electricity in every nerve. The sense of optimism and confidence in the future is something they internalize and learn to take for granted—until they return to the United States and Europe where they’re quickly jolted by the seemingly unnatural rust, gloom, and obesity that creeped ahead in their absence.

For Americans, participating in the New Silk Road should not be seen as a defeat or loss of standing in the international order but rather as a chance to lead in bettering the world. The task of managing the New Silk Road should not be left to a single society. By encouraging partnerships instead of hierarchies, the developed and developing countries can share both benefits and burdens more equitably and, we hope, more peacefully.

In Political Warfare: Strategies for Combating China’s Plan to “Win without Fighting,” Professor Kerry K. Gershaneck, who has studied and written on the China-U.S. relationship for the past decades, focuses on China’s political warfare which he understands a threat to the United States. The author belongs to a circle that considers China an essential enemy of American freedoms and values. The book is Gershaneck’s explanation of how “‘contemporary totalitarian Sino-fascism’ threatens democracies insensitive to the danger.”

Political Warfare: Strategies for Combating China’s Plan to “Win without Fighting” is a comprehensive analysis of the complexities of China’s challenge, including its tactics, ideologies, and organizational procedures. It entails comprehensive case studies of China’s political warfare operations against regional allies of the United States such as Thailand and Taiwan.

Gershaneck believes that China is at war with the world, and especially with the United States and its allies. He tries to explain the most important concepts and themes needed to appreciate China’s political warfare and offers a historical outline of the development of Chinese political warfare abilities and skills.

The book’s main idea is “political warfare,” a term that the author owes to the American statesman George F. Kennan (1904–2005). In April 1948, Kennan published The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare to prepare the “Free World” for the use of the political warfare needed to defeat the Soviet Union and win the Cold War. Gershaneck introduces China’s political warfare, and explains the most important terms and definitions of the concept. The book continues with China’s political warfare goals, ways, means, and wartime support, and elaborates on the country’s political warfare against Thailand and Taiwan.

Gershaneck believes there is an urgent need to establish an Asian political warfare center of excellence, to investigate, disrupt, and prosecute China’s political warfare activities.

Given that for Gershaneck China presents a substantial threat to the United States and its allies, he offers some conclusions and recommendations to empower the USA in this challenge. He discusses the need to develop a national strategy to counter China’s political warfare, and to rebuild national institutions and establish programs in this direction.

Gershaneck believes there is an urgent need to establish an Asian political warfare center of excellence, to investigate, disrupt, and prosecute China’s political warfare activities and to screen, track, and expose them. He also recommends that U.S. policymakers take legal action against China’s officials and affiliates engaged in civil rights offenses, encourage academic study that focuses on combating China’s political warfare, and finally, pass legislation to diminish the offensive power of China’s news and social media.

Kerry K. Gershaneck, Political Warfare: Strategies for Combating China’s Plan to “Win without Fighting” (Marine Corps University Press, 2020) ISBN 979-8569771318, 215 pages

Once again, turmoil in Afghanistan forces us to face the contradiction between the world we are creating and the world we want to leave our descendants. As the Great Game between the United States and China unfolds on a global scale, it seems both ironic and fitting that our attention should return to a land that has endured so many deadly dances between Great Powers and ruined empires.

The more we ponder the Afghan tragedy the more we see it as a metaphor for our global predicament and as a warning for the future. American and Chinese leaders have to make a choice—will they clash more openly in a struggle to dominate Afghanistan and its neighboring regions or will they rein in their ambitions and jealousies to accomplish goals that benefit themselves and many others? The answer will go a long way toward promoting war or peace not merely in Eurasia but in the Pacific and the world at large.

The current trend is not encouraging. Washington and Beijing are locked in a classic security dilemma—a self-sustaining cycle of mistrust and belligerence in which rivals cast one another as enemies who are pitted in a fight to the finish on nearly all issues and in every region. In this sense, Afghanistan is a microcosm of the Great Game writ large—a planetary duel of encirclement and counter-maneuver, with each side carving out spheres of influence and enclosing once open seas, aiming to control choke points that can deny access to vital routes and resources.

Such unremitting brinkmanship invites miscalculation and escalation because political and military leaders consistently underestimate risk and convince one another they can control the next sequence of moves.

Under different circumstances, the path ahead for Afghanistan and its neighbors would seem straightforward. The country abounds in untapped resources, both natural and human, that can fuel post-war recovery while spurring development in surrounding regions and far beyond. Its vast and varied mineral wealth is a prize for any multinational mining company and a potential lifeline for battered supply chains struggling to support factories and construction sites on every continent.

Along with Pakistan, Afghanistan lies at the intersection of at least two planned energy corridors that can carry oil and natural gas from Iran to China in one direction and from Turkmenistan to India in another. Transit fees from these routes alone could transform Afghanistan’s economy and society within a single generation. On top of this, there is future role for Afghanistan as a land bridge linking the commerce of the Indian Ocean with Central Asia and, from there, to growing transcontinental railroads and highways reaching all the way to the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.

As usual, impressions in Washington and Beijing are increasingly at odds concerning the likely consequences for peace and development.

All of these enterprises fit perfectly with China’s ongoing efforts to build a New Silk Road, also known as the Belt and Road Initiative. Led by Chinese finance and engineering, the New Silk Road seeks to turn most of Eurasia and Africa into a single, integrated market held together with overlapping networks of infrastructure and connectivity that will span the oceans and continents. Such a vision can be both inspiring and terrifying, depending on one’s perspective. As usual, impressions in Washington and Beijing are increasingly at odds concerning the likely consequences for peace and development.

The Biden administration’s responses to Chinese ambitions have been glib and unsubstantial. Instead of a grand vision for economic development, they are floating a public relations campaign to Build Back Better Globally (3BG for short). The core members are supposed to be the advanced industrial democracies who will also promote high standards in human rights and anti-corruption.

This network is invited to partner with a new coalition of liberal democracies—The Summit for Democracy—supporting freedom and independence against authoritarian trends backed by China and Russia. The league of democracies, in turn, will overlap with an emerging naval alliance—The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—committed to preserving free and open seas in the combined waters of the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific.

The anti-China tone of these initiatives is self-evident, but Biden’s team has sharpened the message by adding Taiwan to the mix in ways that are bound to provoke Beijing’s anger. Washington is elevating Taiwan’s diplomatic standing, increasing arms sales, and stepping up naval and air operations around the island and in nearby zones of contested territories. Biden feels the need to display American strength and resolve in a time of diminishing confidence in Washington’s protective umbrella. But he misreads the prevailing sentiments of East Asian leaders who worry that the U.S. might be inviting a fight it cannot win unless it is willing to widen the battlefield and wage all-out war in their backyards.

The Biden administration needs to abandon its chosen course of confrontation, ideological posturing, and rhetorical bluster. The last thing we need is an American version of China’s wolf warrior diplomacy. Pundits may argue that the world abhors power vacuums, but, today, what it hates even more are would-be hegemons that try to exploit them. If the U.S. insists on competing with China for the title of most benevolent hegemon, both sides will fail. No nation can provide any set of public goods—economic or military—that will earn legitimacy and acquiescence from independent states or from the newly assertive movements of global civil society.

With Afghanistan or without it, the New Silk Road offers a compelling vision for cooperation and progress on a scale that would have been unimaginable a decade ago. It is utopian in the best sense of the word. It is China’s brainchild, but it is not Beijing’s puppet or Trojan horse.

All the partners have wills of their own and their citizens are determined to recast the projects to suit local needs instead of foreign and elite interests. American leaders are wavering between trying to subvert the venture and mounting a rival effort on a smaller scale. Sadly, Washington is missing out on the best option of all—joining the emergent transnational community and taking its turn in steering the common enterprise in positive directions. If you can’t lick ‘em, join ‘em. Share in the credit, avoid being a spoiler, and don’t have sour grapes.

Jonah Goldberg and Michael Ledeen have much in common. They are both writers and also cheerleaders for military interventions and, often, for frivolous wars. Writing in the conservative rag, The National Review, months before the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Goldberg paraphrased a statement which he attributed to Ledeen with reference to the interventionist U.S. foreign policy.

“Every ten years or so, the United States needs to pick up some small crappy little country and throw it against the wall, just to show the world we mean business,” Goldberg wrote, quoting Ledeen.

Those like Ledeen, the neoconservative intellectual henchman type, often get away with this kind of provocative rhetoric for various reasons. American intelligentsias, especially those who are close to the center of power in Washington D.C., perceive war and military intervention as the foundation and baseline of their foreign policy analysis.

The utterances of such statements are usually conveyed within friendly media and intellectual platforms, where equally hawkish, belligerent audiences cheer and laugh at the war-mongering muses. In the case of Ledeen, the receptive audience was the hardline, neoconservative, pro-Israel American Enterprise Institute (AEI).

Predictably, AEI was one of the loudest voices urging for a war and invasion of Iraq prior to that calamitous decision by the George W. Bush Administration, which was enacted in March 2003.

Neoconservatism, unlike what the etymology of the name may suggest, was not necessarily confined to conservative political circles. Think tanks, newspapers and media networks that purport – or are perceived – to express liberal and even progressive thought today, like The New York Times, The Washington Post and CNN, have dedicated much time and space to promoting an American invasion of Iraq as the first step of a complete U.S. geostrategic military hegemony in the Middle East.

Like the National Review, these media networks also provided unhindered space to so-called neoconservative intellectuals who molded American foreign policy based on some strange mix between their twisted take on ethics and morality and the need for the U.S. to ensure its global dominance throughout the 21st century. Of course, the neocons’ love affair with Israel has served as the common denominator among all individuals affiliated with this intellectual cult.

The main – and inconsequential – difference between Ledeen, for example, and those like Thomas Friedman of The New York Times, is that the former is brazen and blunt, while the latter is delusional and manipulative. For his part, Friedman also supported the Iraq war, but only to bring ‘democracy’ to the Middle East and to fight ‘terrorism’.

Two important events have summoned up these thoughts: U.S. President Joe Biden’s ‘historic’ trip to Cornwall, U.K., in June, to attend the 47th G7 summit and, two weeks later, the death of Donald Rumsfeld, who is widely depicted as “the architect of the Iraq war”. The tone struck by Biden throughout his G7 meetings is that ‘America is back’, another American coinage similar to the earlier phrase, the ‘great reset’ – meaning that Washington is ready to reclaim its global role that had been betrayed by the chaotic policies of former President Donald Trump.

The newest phrase – ‘America is back’ – appears to suggest that the decision to restore the U.S.’ uncontested global leadership is an exclusively American decision.

The newest phrase – ‘America is back’ – appears to suggest that the decision to restore the U.S.’ uncontested global leadership is, more or less, an exclusively American decision. Moreover, the term is not entirely new. In his first speech to a global audience at the Munich Security Conference on February 19, Biden repeated the phrase several times with obvious emphasis.

“America is back. I speak today as President of the United States, at the very start of my administration and I am sending a clear message to the world: America is back,” Biden said, adding that “the transatlantic alliance is back and we are not looking backward, we are looking forward together.”

Platitudes and wishful thinking aside, the U.S. cannot possibly return to a previous geopolitical standing, simply because Biden has made an executive decision to ‘reset’ his country’s traditional relationships with Europe – or anywhere else, either. Biden’s actual mission is to merely whitewash and restore his country’s tarnished reputation, marred not only by Trump, but also by years of fruitless wars, a crisis of democracy at home and abroad and an impending financial crisis resulting from the U.S.’ mishandling of the COVID19 pandemic.

Unfortunately for Washington, while it hopes to ‘look forward’ to the future, other countries have already staked claims to parts of the world where the U.S. has been forced to retreat, following two decades of a rudderless strategy that is fueled by the belief that firepower alone is sufficient to keep America aloft forever.

Though Biden was received warmly by his European hosts, Europe is likely to proceed cautiously. The continent’s geostrategic interests do not fall entirely in the American camp, as was once the case. Other new factors and power players have emerged in recent years. China is now the European bloc’s largest trade partner and Biden’s scare tactics warning of Chinese global dominance have not, seemingly, impressed the Europeans as the Americans had hoped.

Following Britain’s unceremonious exit from the EU bloc, the latter urgently needs to keep its share of the global economy as large as possible. The limping U.S. economy will hardly make the substantial deficit felt in Europe. Namely, the China-EU relationship is here to stay – and grow.

There is something else that makes the Europeans wary of whatever murky political doctrine Biden is promoting: dangerous American military adventurism.

The U.S. and Europe are the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which, since its inception in 1949, was almost exclusively used by the U.S. to assert its global dominance, first in the Korean Peninsula in 1950, then everywhere else.

Following the September 11 attacks, Washington used its hegemony over NATO to invoke Article 5 of its Charter, that of collective defense. The consequences were dire, as NATO members, along with the U.S., were embroiled in their longest wars ever, military conflicts that had no consistent strategy, let alone measurable goals. Now, as the U.S. licks its wounds as it leaves Afghanistan, NATO members, too, are leaving the devastated country without a single achievement worth celebrating. Similar scenarios are transpiring in Iraq and Syria, too.

Rumsfeld’s death on June 29, at the age of 88, should serve as a wake-up call to American allies if they truly wish to avoid the pitfalls and recklessness of the past. While much of the U.S. corporate media commemorated the death of a brutish war criminal with amiable non-committal language, some blamed him almost entirely for the Iraq fiasco. It is as if a single man had bent the will of the West-dominated international community to invade, pillage, torture and destroy entire countries. If so, then Rumsfeld’s death should usher in an exciting new dawn of collective peace, prosperity and security. This is not the case.

After seven years of negotiations, The European Union (EU) paused a trade deal with China over a battle of sanctions and counter-sanctions.

The E.U. and China signed the fundamentals of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) in December 2020. The trade deal aims to guarantee a stable framework of conditions for trade and investment in each other’s markets. But to enter into force, the trade deal needs ratification from the E.U. member states and the European Parliament, where it faces vigorous opposition.

The E.U. imposed sanctions against China’s violation of human rights on the Uyghur Muslims in the Xinjiang region on March 22, 2021. It is the first time that the E.U. imposes these sanctions against China since the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. As a response, China sanctioned several E.U. citizens, including five members of the E.U. Parliament and E.U. human rights and security committee members. China’s foreign ministry specified that all relevant personnel and their family members will be prohibited from entering mainland China and its administered regions.

China’s retaliation against the E.U. members sparked concern among European representatives. “China’s sanctions on MEPs, the Human Rights Subcommittee, and E.U. bodies are unacceptable and will have consequences,” tweeted President of the European Parliament Davide Sassoli. But the remark over the violations of human rights on Uyghurs was anticipated by the President of the European Commission Ursula Von Del Leyen in the E.U.-China summit in June 2020, where she reiterated that human rights and fundamental freedoms were non-negotiable for the E.U.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that the accusations on human rights issues in Xinjiang are based “on nothing but lies and disinformation. Moreover, it highlights that the European sanctions interfere in China’s internal affairs and undermine China-EU relations.”

Amid the battle of sanctions and countersanctions, U.S. President Joe Biden can breathe a sigh of relief over the EU-China trade deal. Following the freeze of the deal, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom joined the E.U. sanctioning China. U.S. Secretary of the State Antony Blinked welcomed the European sanctions by describing the coordinated sanctions as a “united transatlantic response” to those who violate or abuse international human rights.

But for the United States, the stake of the E.U.-China trade deal is much bigger than a trade agreement. Biden aims to end unilateralism and seek a united front with the E.U., Japan, and other partners in its trade war with China. Thus, the CAI could represent a serious risk to achieve his goal.

The CAI eases the market access between the E.U. and China. China will provide a higher level of access for several sectors and guarantee fair treatment for E.U. companies. Furthermore, the CAI regulates forced technology transfer by prohibiting several investment requirements that obstacle the technology transfer.

In a nutshell, the trade deal would provide companies with a much safer environment for conducting their business, especially in general manufacturing industries, the automotive sector, and financial services. If implemented by China, those CAI could advantage E.U. businesses, but it would disadvantage U.S. competitors.

Both German and French companies are among those European firms that would benefit more from the E.U.-China investment.

In the E.U., politicians and human rights activists are concerned about whether Europe should be deepening its economic ties with China. This not only because of the issues over Uyghurs but also due to China’s policy in Hong Kong and its use of mass surveillance technologies. Furthermore, E.U. diplomats and officials have also criticized German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron’s push to finalize the deal with China.

Both German and French companies are among those European firms that would benefit more from the E.U.-China investment. Critics also came from the European Parliament. Diplomats and members of the European Parliament criticized Merkel for rushing to finalize the deal and not focusing on the forced labor rights protection in China.

However, Merkel aligned herself with the E.U. message to Beijing speaking at a press conference at the G-7 summit held in Cornwall, United Kingdom, last week. She warned that the E.U. will only ratify its investment agreement if China makes progress on labor rights.

The United States would be damaged in the framework of an E.U.-China deal. The most beneficiary of the trade deal would be European companies due to easier access to the Chinese economic infrastructure. For its part, China would attract more investments and could place itself in a favored position.

At the geopolitical level, the United States wants to restabilize ties with the E.U. and divert European attention from the appealing Chinese economic opportunities. China made some progress in expanding its influence during the Trump administration. Thus, the E.U.-China deal would impact the Biden administration’s efforts to unify the front to increase leverage on China.

But the tension raised over the violation of human rights marks a shift in the E.U.’s policy of achieving closer economic ties with China. Also, the latest G-7 summit seems to have strengthened the relations between the United States and the European countries over China. However, the E.U. is cautious. It bears in mind and acknowledges the importance of China not only as an economic party but also as a partner in climate change cooperation.

As Biden aims to freshen up the transatlantic cooperation to contain Beijing, European countries are much more cautious to unravel the economic ties with China. The E.U.-China economic relations benefit both powers. In 2019, the E.U. was China’s biggest trading partner, while China was the E.U.’s second-largest partner. The E.U.-China trade in goods is worth around €1.5 billion a day. Moreover, the E.U.-China import-export was worth almost 500 billion in 2019, according to the E.U. figures.

The war drums are beating loud and hard in the Asia Pacific region. The rivalry between the U.S. and China has been escalating, and is more and more referred to as a new Cold War. Of course, the U.S. and its allies say they are “responding” to Chinese “aggression” to defend freedom and justice – a narrative that is amplified by a compliant media.

Just one manifestation of the new Cold War is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, often referred to as the Quad. Created in 2007, it is an ongoing informal dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. From the outset, the Quad has been characterized by open hostility towards China and its increasing influence: that is obvious from the countries involved, their insistence on the hitherto nonexistent term “Indo-Pacific” to describe the region, and the fact that talks have been accompanied by joint military exercises on an unprecedented scale.

It is little wonder that China sees the purpose of the Quad as surrounding the country with hostile neighbors, which claim “defensive lines” practically at the Chinese shore. Essentially ignoring Chinese and other protests, provocative large-scale naval exercises continue. However, besides military and other co-operation, perhaps one of the main achievements of the Quad so far has been its success in reframing the terms of the discourse.

The 2021 statement of the leaders of the Quad trumpets their “shared vision” for an Indo-Pacific that is “free and open” and operates on a “rules-based order” – a language that has been repeated over and over by the international media, reinforcing the framing of the Quad as the purported defenders of freedom and justice. The Quad’s statement does not mention China, because it doesn’t have to – it is well understood by all what the unnamed “threats” to the above are. All of this serves to shroud the obvious intentions of the four countries (in particular the U.S. and Japan) to maintain their hegemony over the region.

To be clear, none of this is to defend the current Chinese system of governance, or the gross human rights violations perpetrated by the Chinese government. Nor is it to argue that there is no potential security threat posed by China. However, serious doubt should be cast on the narrative that the governments of the Quad are knights on white horses defending the free world from the yellow menace. For better or for worse, China is doing what any country does: demanding a global status it believes is commensurate with its might.

It may indeed be the case that, in the eyes of many in the world, the political system of Western liberal democracy is being challenged by the more authoritarian Chinese model. However, it is submitted that this is due less to Chinese successes and more to Western failings. The hypocrisy of the West in claiming that they defend democracy while they engage in military interventions throughout West Asia and Africa, slam their doors in the face of refugees, and provide the apartheid state of Israel with endless support, is plain for all to see.

While China has raised millions of its citizens out of poverty, Western economies remain geared towards exploiting the many for the greed of the few. And while respect for civil and political rights is certainly abominable in China, the perpetual “war on terror” has exposed the fragility of human rights in many countries in the West as well – not to mention the rise of near-overt fascism in the U.S. under Donald Trump. Facile concepts of “good guys versus bad guys” are not applied easily in the current Asia Pacific.

This has changed dramatically since the late 2000s, as Japan’s (and the United States’) relative power has declined. Japan’s speculation-fueled “bubble economy” burst in 1989, and since then, inept economic management, weak political leadership, and endemic corruption have meant that economic growth has been stagnant. Employment has become increasingly precarious for many, and real wages have been on a declining trend throughout what are now often referred to in Japan as the “lost thirty years.”

The overtaking of Japan by China in 2010 as the world’s second largest economy was a potent symbol to many Japanese of their country’s ongoing plummet, and of the end of the era where they dominated Asia economically. Though Japan remains the world’s third wealthiest country in terms of GDP, a shrinking population adds to a strong sense of continuous decline.

The Japanese right wing has been quick to exploit this social malaise, claiming (like in many other countries) that so-called traditional values is the answer – a return to an allegedly golden era when men were men and women knew their place. In particular, from nearly the get-go the pacifist postwar constitution has been the bête noir of the right, which has portrayed it as a national humiliation and the defanging of the Japanese military as a castration of the Japanese spirit.

Since the early 2000s, China has served as a convenient boogeyman, with the alleged “Chinese threat” being a constant feature of their campaigns. Though public support for pacifist policies generally remains strong, the right has been successful in shifting the discourse, ensuring a seemingly endless stream of references to this “threat” in political fora, the media, and popular publications.

Advances of the right under Shinzo Abe

In particular, the premiership of Shinzo Abe (who initiated the Quad in 2006) from 2012 was a watershed. A committed ideologue, Abe and his political allies have strong connections to shadowy right-wing organizations, many of which are committed to a return to the prewar order: worship of the emperor, militarism, and eradication of “Western values” and “individualistic” human rights.

True to form, Abe’s premiership was characterized by assaults on democratic institutions, the promotion of militarism, and the ramming through of oppressive legislation purportedly aimed at protecting national security (such as laws establishing vague crimes of conspiracy). Schoolchildren would be marked on the level of their patriotism, and Japan’s press freedom ranking plummeted from a high of 11 in 2010 to 72nd place in 2016 (61st place in 2021) as Abe set heavy penalties for both journalists and private citizens who publish leaked government information designated “secret.” Throughout this period, the “Chinese threat” served as an implicit (and, at times, explicit) justification for these measures.

Abe is no longer PM, but he remains an influential figure of the right, and, more importantly, the bullish nationalism he promoted seems here to stay. The anti-Chinese discourse has been amplified throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, with the right-wing press constantly referring to the “Wuhan virus” and parroting Donald Trump’s anti-Chinese fabrications.

In fact, the Japanese right is fundamentally contradictory. Domestically, they campaign against human rights and other “Western values” that were allegedly forced upon Japan after the war. However, in international relations, they are staunchly pro-American, and see Japan’s future as within the military alliance with the U.S. Hence the ease with which they make claims at the Quad and other international fora that Japan stands with its Western allies for human rights and democracy (as opposed to China of course).

This contradiction can be traced to the history of Japan’s modernization process (which has similarities with Turkey), and perhaps a postwar colonial mindset (idealizing the vanquisher). Whatever the psychology, it is clear that the right has been using China as a scapegoat to advance their repressive agenda.

The coronavirus pandemic has locked down almost all societies around the globe, with people even frightened of standing close to one another. If we interpret the situation we are in, it would not be an exaggeration to say that fear manages the world right now. People around the world seem to have entered an awkward period of waiting, frozen in a moment of history. Everyone is the producer and consumer of this climate of alarm for their own lives and personal safety. During these days of global hysteria, what we need to consider is whether the next step awaiting us in this global environment of trepidation is pointing to the end of an era or the beginning of a new one.

The novel coronavirus or COVID-19, which appeared in China in December 2019 and has been on the global agenda for months, is set to be the pioneer of a change that will reshape the world according to many commentators. Some are more cautious and say it is too early to come to such a conclusion. Others argue that this virus was produced in a laboratory and that new power structures will be created using such methods instead of nuclear war. On a relevant note, many are saying that the United States will no longer be a global power and China will take its place. Some experts on the other hand are contending that the United States will become stronger following the end of this pandemic. It is not feasible to claim that COVID-19 will establish a new balance by shaking the geopolitical scales. However, by looking at the data currently available, we can predict the direction this tremor may take us.

China’s Strategy

First and foremost, the emergence of this virus in Wuhan and its rapid spread perceivably makes China the source of the problem. From this point of view, China’s speed in understanding, analyzing and identifying the virus as a threat factor, and the transparency Beijing showed in sharing this information with the world, will be questioned after the outbreak is eradicated. China faces accusations from several countries, including the U.S., that it was late in alerting the world to the virus situation.

According to official statements, the absence of new cases in China as of the end of March 2020 was regarded as a success that garnered the appreciation of the whole world. Undoubtedly, bringing a population of over one billion to a standstill during the Chinese New Year celebrations, is a remarkable story for any modern state, even if this procedure was carried out in limited areas.

On the other hand, the spread of the virus worldwide, and the fact that no known remedy has been developed, has globalized the problem and pushed the whole world into a panic. After the coronavirus spread to the U.S., Latin America, EU countries, Russia, Brazil, Turkey and many others at the same rapid speed that it spread in China, countries are having an extremely difficult time in dealing with the fallout.

Overwhelmed in the face of hundreds of deaths, many countries are forcing their citizens to isolate themselves as the first line of defense and trying to prevent the epidemic from flooding hospitals by restricting travel. Total deaths in many countries have now surpassed China, and cases are rapidly increasing worldwide exceeding 6.4 million on June 3, 2020. The current situation shows that the U.S. has received the biggest blow from the pandemic so far.

While countries are developing their methods to deal with the pandemic, they are also trying to act according to their health policies, the capacity of their health systems, hospitals, and economies, and the medical resources they have. However, the virus infection rate is very high, and it is not clear when the outbreak will end. This has led to an environment full of uncertainty.

The question of global leadership

The global geopolitics, balance of powers and the hierarchy of states undoubtedly do not alter by themselves, nor do they change in peaceful ways. Looking at times of major crises in history shows us this. The U.S. independence from the British Empire, the French Revolution, World War I and II are all examples that prevent us from voicing hope about change through peaceful means. However, we should not underestimate those who advocate for peaceful change.

Although it is imperative to carry out such broad cooperation to compensate for the damage caused by the coronavirus, it is just as important to remember that it is political leadership that will carry us forward. The U.S. is traditionally expected to play an immersive and constructive role from this point on. The order that has been damaged and needs to be compensated is the West-centered liberal economic system led by the U.S. Thus, naturally, the pioneering steps to be taken to compensate for the losses this system has incurred are expected, to come from the West.

The biggest factor missing at this point is leadership. If U.S. President Donald Trump is not willing to take on such a leadership role, for which he has not shown any positive signs so far, an incredible geopolitical opportunity has been opened for the European Union – the likes of which it has not seen since its foundation. Will the EU be able to take on that role?

While German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who is preparing to bid farewell to politics very soon, is trying to keep the EU project alive, it is difficult to predict whether she will take economic geopolitical steps around the EU or even on a global scale. Even if Merkel is willing to take these steps, will rising German nationalism interfere? Or will EU member states be willing to let such a patronage role take place outside of the Union while they failed to coordinate aid among each other when it was needed the most? Looking at the latest developments, especially the plight of Italy and Spain and the battle over medical equipment, it is not possible to give positive answers to these questions.

The fact that neither the U.S. nor the EU has taken steps to find a global solution to the financial dilemma within the Western system does not mean that they are going to wait forever.

The fact that neither the U.S. nor the EU has taken steps to find a global solution to the financial dilemma within the Western system does not mean that they are going to wait forever. As most countries are currently busy dealing with their difficulties caused by the pandemic, they may have chosen to postpone this step. Failure to take such a step toward the middle of this year will certainly deepen the financial and economic problems experienced globally. This may push new actors with the potential to play the leadership role, such as China, to take on the initiative.

Those who argue that the U.S. should leave global leadership to China, claim that the coronavirus epidemic has prepared the base for such a power shift. They discuss that it is more reasonable to gradually change the global system, rather than a change through a comprehensive and destructive nuclear war. The main problem with this approach is it assumes that the U.S. is ready to leave its leadership role without a fight. Whether China’s global leadership capacity is being tested or not, it is still unclear if China and the strong economies on its side will be willing to undertake or consent to such a power shift.

The coronavirus outbreak will continue to have an impact on many governments’ human and financial resources as well as their administrative capabilities. Less damage from COVID-19 will amount to more power and quick recovery for the victim countries in the aftermath of the crisis.

Trying hard to overcome the crisis that has already disrupted their production and consumption mechanisms, many countries have announced that they will ease their markets by printing large sums of money. While such steps may temporarily produce solutions, there could be a risk of inflation in the medium term and even hyperinflation in some cases.

The U.S. injected $2.2 trillion into their market to rescue the coronavirus-battered economy. If Washington fails to manage the crisis and isolates itself by casting aside its global leadership role, this may invite China – an economy based on production and with plenty of cash reserves – to take necessary steps to be the leading global power. After China announced the supposed end of the coronavirus outbreak, it has taken some striking steps on public diplomacy, like sending aid packages and health teams to virus-stricken Italy. China may be taking these steps to prevent or preempt charges against how it handled the COVID-19 outbreak. It may also be doing these to prove its willingness to protect its partners in the One Belt and One Road project. In whichever case, the U.S. lack of self-sufficiency and disappearance in such a global crisis creates a big power vacuum and thus provides ample opportunity for China.

If China can live through the current mistrust it has incurred for being the source of the pandemic and creates an image of a credible workable partner, the shift of power towards Asia will accelerate. However, it is not going to be easy for China to overcome this crisis of trust. If it fails to turn the tide, it may lose its image of being the world’s primary production center, and most China-based production activities will be distributed to different regions in Asia and Europe.

After the pandemic ends, the EU will also face a stringent test. Having failed to provide support to its member countries such as Italy and Spain, which have been struck hard by the pandemic, the EU may face the question of survival. As for Germany, it might face national objections and some bigger economic storms in the future if it extends help to its corona-hit EU neighbors during and after the crisis.