The results of the Istanbul elections is still being discussed in Turkey. The clear-cut victory of Ekrem Imamoglu over Binali Yildirim has raised questions on the transformation of voting behavior. Why did a significant number of the Istanbul electorate change their voting preference in just 84 days? Is this change in voting behavior related to a long-lasting social and political transformation in Turkish society? Even though it is not an easy task answering these questions, there are some eye-catching issues that are crucial to find a satisfying answer.

The first critical point is related to the transformation of the profile of the electorate in the last decade. Contrary to a common myth implying that the number of young voters is increasing in Turkey, their number showed a decrease in the last decade. While the ratio of young people between the ages 15-29 consisted of 26.79 percent of the whole population in 2007, this ratio decreased to 24,34 percent in 2015. In parallel to this information, the ratio of young voters is also showing a slight decrease. Thus, it is obvious that the argument on rejuvenation does not explain the reason behind the change of voting behavior.

Contrary to a common myth, the number of young voters in Turkey showed a decrease in the last decade.

Nonetheless, a second more prominent point explains more about the change of voting behavior, especially in regards to the Istanbul elections. This point is the reaction that the electorate gave against the renewal of elections in Istanbul. The Turkish electorate has always been critical against the renewal of elections and the idea of snap elections. However, the ongoing dynamics in political, economic, and social affairs determine the way of reactions. For instance, in 2002, the electorate showed a noticeable reaction against existing political actors because of the ongoing economic crisis. During November 2015, the electorate favored the ruling party in the renewed elections in order to avoid uncertainty arising from political and economic instability, the future of the Kurdish question, and the war in Syria.

When it comes to the Istanbul elections, it is possible to say that the electorate was not convinced about the reason why the elections were canceled in the first place. Therefore, they reacted against the AK Party candidate, Binali Yildirim. Thus, rather than a long-lasting dissatisfaction with the government, the results of the election is substantially related to the post-March 31 period, along with pre-electoral alliances.

The electorate was not convinced of the reason why the elections were canceled, and they reacted against the AK Party.

The reaction given by the 220,000 AK Party supporters who voted for Binali Yildirim on March 31 and who did not vote for him on June 24 should therefore be evaluated within this framework. A certain number of the electorate did not accept the rationality behind the renewal of the Istanbul elections – although it was legally explained.

All political parties will most probably take all issues into consideration when discussing the change of voting behavior in Turkey. It is obvious that there is a need for further studies based on empirical data in order to understand the in-depth reasons behind this issue. It is crucial to understand whether there had been a long-lasting shift in voting behavior of whether the specific conditions of the Istanbul elections created a short-term change in the electorate. Even if the second option is more valid under these circumstances, all political parties need to take necessary measures in order to prepare for the first option.

Turkey’s long-awaited live debate between the two mayoral candidates of Istanbul, Binali Yildirim and Ekrem Imamoglu, took place on Sunday night. Despite high expectations and controversies, the live debate did not end up with any shocking events or scandals. Thus, both candidates showed a decent performance and there was no unfair balance in their appearance at the debate.

After the live debates in the U.S., survey companies conduct an instant survey to show the true winner of the debate. Nevertheless, the format of the program in Turkey was not designed in a way that enabled being able to choose the winner of the debate. Throughout the program, two candidates never engaged in a face-to-face dialogue. Rather than being in direct interactions, the two candidates separately answered the questions of the moderator.

Imamoglu underlined that he had never allowed the sale of alcohol at social facilities during his mayorship in Beylikduzu province. These statements created anger and frustration among his supporters.

Although the public complained that the program was dull and that the moderator ought to have allowed the two sides to interact with each other, there were small incidents that raised tensions throughout the program. The most prominent incident was Ekrem Imamoglu’s statements on the ban of alcohol and gender-segregated pools. Imamoglu underlined that he had never allowed the sale of alcohol at social facilities during his mayorship in Beylikduzu province. He also stated that he built gender-segregated pools in Beylikduzu while he was trying to show his “respect to conservative values.” Nonetheless, Imamoglu’s statements created anger and frustration among his supporters and this issue became one of the most controversial outcomes of the live debate.

Even though a true winner of the debate cannot be declared, there is a public consensus that Binali Yildirim was more successful in answering the questions of the moderator. Indeed, Yildirim showed great success in explaining the reason of the cancellation of the Istanbul elections by emphasizing his demand on a re-count of votes rather than a cancellation. When it comes to Imamoglu, he could not clearly answer most of the questions asked by the moderator. Imamoglu could not make a satisfactory explanation on his humiliation of the Governor of Ordu and his intention to copy data from the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality.

Even though a true winner of the debate cannot be declared, there is a public consensus that Binali Yildirim was more successful in answering the questions of the moderator.

Nevertheless, both candidates have well-prepared projects on resolving the structural problems of Istanbul, such as transportation, traffic, and youth unemployment. Yildirim clearly identified how he was going to find resources to implement his projects on these structural problems. Imamoglu also provided information on his long-term projects on the resolution of green area problems and youth unemployment in Istanbul.

Both candidates had a consensus on the importance of the problem of Syrian refugees in Turkey. However, they had a different road map in the resolution of this issue in the long-term. While Yildirim underlined that refugees would return to their countries after creating conflict-free zones in Syria, Imamoglu spoke about a project on creating a distinct zone for Syrian refugees before sending them back to their countries. It is fair to state that both candidates failed to mention the rise of hate speech against Syrian refugees in Turkey.

It seems that the live debate between the two candidates did not create a huge impact on the electorate. Nevertheless, Yildirim’s performance on the live debate may create an effect on the previous AK Party voters who did not go to the polls on March 31. Beyond all these issues, the live debate was a triumph for Turkish democracy, which indeed, was the true winner of the live debate on Sunday night.

After long-lasting discussions and controversies, the Istanbul mayoral candidates – Binali Yildirim (AK Party) and Ekrem Imamoglu (CHP) – agreed on holding a live debate with the moderation of anchorman Ismail Kucukkaya. There is no doubt that this live debate will shape the results of the upcoming Istanbul elections and will be one of the unforgettable moments in Turkey’s political history.

When discussions on this issue started for the first time, people kept asking why the two candidates intended on holding a live debate, as this was not so common. It’s true that live debate among politicians during election campaigns has not been an issue for the last decade in Turkey. The last prominent live debate was held between Recep Tayyip Erdogan, leader of the AK Party and former CHP chair, Deniz Baykal, just before the 2002 parliamentary elections.

Even though the Turkish public is not familiar with live debates between politicians, recent examples have attracted a lot of attention from the public. After the two mayoral candidates announced that they were open to discussing their projects on Istanbul in a live debate, various circles discussed the effects that this incident will have on the election results.

The live debate between Binali Yildirim and Ekrem Imamoglu may shape the results of the upcoming Istanbul elections.

Live debates are events that shape voting preferences. A survey result on the effects of live debates on voting preferences shows that 38% of voters are influenced by debates. When it comes to the U.S. example, live debates have become a traditional part of election campaigns since the 1960s. Nonetheless, even though live debates are still very crucial, statistics show that the U.S. audience does not pay much attention to live debates in comparison to how it did before.

Although there is no consensus on the effects that live debates have on elections, it is widely accepted that they are the most powerful determinant on voter preferences – especially on swing votes. Surveys also show that a significant number of voters who tend not to participate in elections change their decisions after live debates.

Due to this, the live debate between Binali Yildirim and Ekrem Imamoglu may be the main determinant of the Istanbul elections. Since approximately 1.7 million voters did not go to the polls and with the almost 300 thousand invalid votes on March 31, the live debate has huge potential to change the direction of the Istanbul elections. At first, it may increase voter turnout by effecting the decision of nearly 2 million people who either abstained from voting, or whose votes were invalid.

On March 31, 1.7 million voters did not go to the polls , the live debate has huge potential to change the direction of the Istanbul elections.

Another effect of the live debate will be on the transformation of Turkey’s political culture in the long-term. Live debates are very popular in presidential systems where pre-electoral alliances are a crucial determinant on election results. Live debates allow voters to become familiar with the candidates of alliances. Furthermore, candidates chosen by the alliance of different political parties have a chance to get the support of voters of these parties in live debates. Thus, it is not an exaggeration to state that presidential candidates may also hold live debates in future elections in Turkey.

Regardless of all these issues, the live debate between Yildirim and Imamoglu this Sunday will be an interesting experience for the Turkish public.

Since there is only a month left until the June 23 elections, survey companies have begun to publish their results of recently-conducted surveys. The first examples show that surveys do not propose a valid and consistent set of results for the upcoming elections. One of the reasons for this inconsistency is due to the rapid change in voting behavior. Because the election campaign period is relatively short, voters are exposed to various issues that have a potential to swing their vote day-to-day. Thus, it is crucial to merge statistical information with the specific conditions of the Istanbul elections in order to better understand ongoing dynamics in the field.

Firstly, a re-run of elections in Istanbul cannot be a flash in the pan to voters as survey companies have claimed. Since the voting behavior of the electorate is still under the influence of ideological baggage, a significant number of people will vote for the same parties and candidates that they did on March 31. So, it is obvious that the vote difference between the two candidates, the average leading margin, will not be so high.

The fact that AK Party, CHP and Iyi Party voters did not go to the polls on March 31 decreased voter turnout in Istanbul by approximately 6 per cent.

Secondly, understanding the possible voting behavior of voters who did not go to the polls on March 31 is crucial in order to show possible reactions. At this point, decision tree methodology provides a successful method for clarification and protection of data. When this method is implemented on the March 31 election results, almost 60% of voters who did not go to the polls previously had voted for the AK Party at least once. More, around 250.000-280.000 voters who had voted for President Erdogan on the June 24 presidential elections did not go to the polls on March 31 either.

What do these numbers tell us about the upcoming elections? First, it is obvious that a significant number of AK Party voters did not go to the polls on March 31. When examined closely, most of these voters are those in areas such as Gaziosmanpaşa, Pendik, Esenler, Beykoz, Kağıthane and Bayrampaşa districts. Thus, the AK Party must focus on these districts to understand the reasons why these voters did not go the polls.

On March 31, almost 60% of voters who did not go to the polls had previously voted for the AK Party at least once.  

Statistics show that the number of voters who did not go the polls on March 31 from other political parties is also relatively high. A significant number of CHP and Iyi Party supporters also chose not to go to the polls. The increase in the number of these voters decreased the voter turnout in Istanbul by almost 6 percent. Thus, all political parties need to understand why their “loyal supporters” did not go to the polls on March 31.

Some recently conducted surveys are trying to answer some of these questions. For instance, they explain the decrease of voter turnout via reactions of voters against over-politicization. Indeed, it is obvious that Turkish people are more polarized and have become over-politicized in recent years compared to the previous generation, due to extraordinary events that took place. Nevertheless, the same surveys still fail to show the causation between the decrease in voter turnout and over-politicization.

Political parties themselves must conduct field works in order to see the social dynamics beyond these statistics.

Thus, survey results do not properly explain why the vote difference between the two candidates – Binali Yildirim and Ekrem Imamoglu – are low and why parties, especially the AK Party, lost a significant number of their loyal voters on March 31. It is necessary for parties to conduct field works in order to see the social dynamics beyond these statistics.

As is known, Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Board (YSK) announced that the mayor elections in Istanbul will re-run on June 23, 2019. There have been and still are discussions on various reasons behind the decision, which has been addressed in detail by various analysts.

The AK Party and the CHP will have to re-organize themselves and establish a new strategy in order to broaden their electorate. Two of the previous 8 mayor candidates who competed in the March 31 elections (TKP and DSP’s candidates) have resigned in favor of the CHP’s candidate, Ekrem Imamoglu. The left-nationalist Kurdish HDP had already resigned its candidate during the previous election on March 31 in favor of Imamoglu. The HDP announced once again that it will continue its previous decision of supporting Imamoglu.

Under these conditions, it seems clear that Turkey’s entire political landscape will be shaped by an election atmosphere, when the election re-run is just limited to the election of the mayor of Istanbul. This is because Istanbul is Turkey’s most important city and therefore the results are of great significance for all parties, their future strategies and national projections. The creation of a political leader is not that easy in Turkey and there are certain illusions underpinned on social media. By this, I’m trying to stress the interesting increase of Ekrem Imamoglu’s popularity and his actual lack of strategy. With no doubt, Imamoglu is getting pushed into the foreground by both the Turkish public and certain media outlets, along with, interestingly, foreign media and political circles.

Although it’s only Istanbul re-electing its mayor, Turkey’s entire political landscape is shaped by an election atmosphere as the result will shape the future of all political party strategies. 

However, if one actually analyzes Imamoglu’s mostly preferred discourses, statements and his political orientations, one will notice that he is acting like a populist politician with an objective of maximizing his electorate. By this, Imamoglu does not care about his party’s traditional line, party base or political orientation, which actually conflicts with his current actions and discourses.

Subsequent to the initial election on March 31, even though it was not clear whether Imamoglu had actually won the elections and while the YSK had not yet announced any official statement, Imamoglu took a journey to Ankara in order to visit the Mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. This is a very popular gesture in particular secularist Kemalist voters and political circles. This was a deliberate move and so was his signing of the official memorial book as “the Mayor of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality.” This act was a violation of the law due to the lack of official mandate, which he had not yet received from the YSK at that time.

Imamoglu acted in a similar way when he recently visited the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, subsequent to the YSK’s announcement that elections will be re-run on June 23. Imamoglu once again signed an official book in Northern Cyprus as “the Mayor of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality,” although he had already given back his official mandate due to the cancellation of elections.

While walking on the corridors of the municipality accompanied by cameras, Imamoglu showed that he will eat the same lunch as all employees do. This was interpreted as dishonest and unconvincing populism.

During his approximately three weeks in office as mayor of Istanbul, Imamoglu continued to behave and act in a populist manner. For instance, while walking the corridors of the municipality accompanied by cameras, Imamoglu had the goal to send the message that he will eat the same lunch as all employees do. This act was also interpreted as an act of dishonest and unconvincing populism.

It is well-known and a global preference that new politicians in particular are biased to populist moves, which is not problematic above all regarding parties such as the CHP or HDP. However, it is worth to analyze and focus on the issue of how Imamoglu and the CHP cadres in Istanbul, who are led by the controversial figure, Canan Kaftancioglu, will shape the party’s future. This question becomes a fundamental one due to several changes in the party’s general orientation, especially in the last couple of months, which also continued subsequent to March 31.

For instance, it was no secret that the HDP, which is the political branch of the PKK, openly supported the CHP’s candidate – although the CHP did not address questions concerning an obvious CHP-HDP cooperation. Not a single CHP politician both on the national or local level dared to criticize this cooperation or to take an open position. Furthermore, Ekrem Imamoglu did not seem to have any problem in admiring the former HDP chairman, Selahattin Demirtas’s political line.

Additional questions, in particular from conservative and nationalist circles who do not see Demirtas as a legitimate politician but rather as a political mouthpiece for the PKK, did not receive any concrete answers from CHP cadres. However, it is actually known that both traditional CHP voters and members challenge this friendly strategy while enduring the situation to the motivation of becoming the winning side in Istanbul. The same counts for the party’s Istanbul provincial chief, Canan Kaftancioglu, and her political views, which are definitely incompatible with traditional CHP notions. Kaftancioglu’s problematic stance regarding several leftist violent groups are disturbing many civilian politicians, also among CHP circles. Despite this, and her previous statements – even supporting a terrorist organization’s leader – Kaftancioglu recently made clear that her views have not changed.

While heading to the elections on June 23, some may argue that the CHP is transforming itself into a more “open” political party. In addition, it might also be suggested that in the long-run, the party will diminish its radical Kemalist-secular stance, which can be counted as one of the obstacles to universal democracy. However, it’s likely that by transforming itself from a Kemalist party into a populist, aggressive and radical-leftist welcoming party, the CHP’s credibility will still continue to decrease in the long-run.

By not addressing issues of national security, such as the PKK and FETO, the CHP does not seem fit to face potential challenges in a particular areas of concern. At the end of the day, the electorate will make its decision whether a rather populist figure such as Imamoglu and his quasi-co-candidate for Istanbul, Kaftancioglu, will be preferred. Or whether there will be a long-term request for the CHP to transform into a stable, social-democratic political party. The realization of the latter seems to be very difficult to deal with both in terms of content and method. It’s up to the CHP electorate.

After the Electoral Supreme Court (YSK) made the decision to re-run mayoral elections in Istanbul, political parties and their candidates re-started their preparations for the upcoming elections. Since the campaign period is quite short – there are only 40 days until the elections – political parties have accelerated their ordinary election campaign process. Thus, they made a snap decision to finalize the details of their electoral strategy.

At this point, it is crucial to ask the following question: What are the basics of the electoral strategies political parties are pursuing for the upcoming Istanbul elections? The answer to this question is that it’s too early to tell, since we are still in the early phase of the process. Nevertheless, there are some significant issues that political parties pay attention to in the early phase. Firstly, it is obvious that political parties are trying to mobilize their electoral base. Both candidates who previously ran in the election, Binali Yildirim for the People’s Alliance and Ekrem Imamoglu for the Nation’s Alliance, had a close number of votes. Thus, it is seriously important for the candidates to preserve their electoral base in order to obtain the majority of votes on June 23.

The AK Party’s emphasis on “Turkey’s Alliance” is an outcome of the attempt to broaden its electoral sphere.

Secondly, candidates have to broaden their electoral sphere in the following days in order to get to an advantageous position. It seems that both candidates have realized this and are focusing on it nowadays. There are some options for both candidates to achieve this target. For instance, they are trying to attract the attention of voters from other political parties. As a result of this, both candidates tend to have a more inclusive perspective on the aftermath of the June 23 elections. Rather than focusing on issues that divide society, they underline issues that can connect them to broader society. The AK Party’s emphasis on “Turkey’s Alliance” is also an outcome of this broader perspective.

Another eye-catching issue in the electoral strategy of political parties is the fact that they are giving special attention to voters who did not go to the polls in the previous elections. As I emphasized last week, the voter turnout in Istanbul was 83,88% and approximately 1.8 million people did not go to vote on March 31. As a result, political parties are trying to analyze the socio-economic background of these voters. Members of both alliances are trying to reach to these voters in order to gain their support in the upcoming elections. It is not an exaggeration to state that the support of people who did not vote in the March 31 election will be the main determinant of the election on June 23.

Rather than focusing on all voters, political parties seem to pay attention to the voters who did not previously go to the polls.

Hometown organizations in Istanbul also seem to be another target for both candidates. Since most of the electorate in Istanbul migrated from other provinces, political parties may conduct back-channel diplomacy with the representatives of these organizations. For example, the MHP chairman, Devlet Bahceli, seems to focus on interacting with these organizations in order to receive support from members. This strategy may be one of the basics of the MHP and People’s Alliance’s electoral campaign.

To sum up, political parties will compete to broaden their electoral sphere effectively in the upcoming days. Rather than focusing on all voters, they seem to pay attention to the voters who did not previously go to the polls. Since the process is full with ambiguities, it needs a little more time for parties to clarify their strategies.

As Ekrem Imamoglu was awarded the election certificate of Istanbul mayoral election 17 days after the election and preparing to take the mayor’s office, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) filed an extraordinary objection to the Supreme Election Council (YSK) to interrogate the question posed by the AK Party’s mayoral candidate Binali Yildirim: “Why did the number of votes I received increase by 16 thousand after 10 percent of the ballots were recounted and the vote difference between the two of us fell to 13.729?” In the petition presented to the YSK, the cancellation and renewal of the Istanbul metropolitan mayoral election was requested on the grounds of “the unlawfulness and the closing gap in the vote difference between the two parties as a result of the incidents and circumstances effective in the results and impartialness of the election.”

According to the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) deputy chair and spokesperson Faik Oztrak: “AK Party’s objection comprised the re-submission of the subjects already resolved by the YSK rather than the incidents and circumstances effective in the election results and impartialness.” President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said: “Whether we like it or not, the YSK is authorized to rule the final decision.” Then, both sides have issued various statements, harsh or reasonable, on what the YSK ruling must be.

Eventually, the YSK ruled its final decision with 7 out of 11 votes. The Council found the AK Party’s objection right and decided for the rerun of the Istanbul mayoral election on June 23. In light of the AK Party’s objections, it was ruled that “225 balloting committee leads and 3.500 balloting committee members were found to be not employed by the government despite the explicit provision in the election law and the ballots cast in these ballot boxes were effective in the vote difference.” The YSK also ruled for “filing criminal complaint against the district electoral board chairs and members and ballot board leads who made unlawful assignments.”

A storm was raised after that point. The CHP Chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu declared the list of the judges who opted for “yes” in the YSK ruling, saying: “The YSK has become the address of injustice, unlawfulness, inequality and remorselessness. They cannot usurp democracy, justice and rights by hiding behind their juridical titles.” These words that target the YSK caused reaction from the institution. This time, the YSK issued a statement on behalf of all its members, not referring to the decision given with 7 out of 11 votes. The statement condemned all the remarks that contained threats and insults and pointed out that “it is unacceptable to personally target or defame the judges due to their decisions.

The YSK, which was founded in Turkey in 1950 and has been responsible for the general conduct and supervision of elections, has always performed this duty honorably.

Nevertheless, the YSK, which was founded in Turkey in 1950 and has been responsible for the general conduct and supervision of elections since then, has always performed this duty honorably. Even during the period of military tutelage that started in the early Republican period and continued until quite recently, the parties not favored by the system could manifest themselves in elections and managed to come to power. These parties were tried to be rendered ineffective with innumerable methods with the support or direct appeal of the CHP or through the judiciary, the most important leg of the tutelage regime. There are at least 50 different examples of this for the past 50 years.

The parties upholding Muslim conservative traditions, such as late Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party, Virtue Party, and pro-Kurdish parties such as the Democracy Party (DEP), the People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) were closed. Their governments were dissolved with coups while their political leaders were imprisoned. Despite all, the one with popular support has always been obvious. Late Adnan Menderes’ Democrat Party (Menderes was executed during the 27 May, 1960, coup with the support of the CHP), Erbakan’s Welfare Party (On 28 February, 1997, the party’s government was overthrown with a coup supported by the CHP, the party was closed, and its leader and members were banned from politics), and Erdogan’s AK Party have confronted various closure cases, memorandums, and cancelled elections ever since their establishment. But still, they won the elections thanks to the healthy functioning of the election mechanism.

So, in such an order, the CHP is the only unrivaled party in Turkey in objecting to the election results. The party filed its first objection in 1946, when the multi-party system had just been introduced, in an election environment based on “open vote, secret counting.” Since then, it has become almost traditional for the party to blame each winning party for gerrymandering and the electorate for being ignorant and stupid in every election. The CHP has also lately claimed that President Erdogan’s presidency is illegitimate irrespective of the fact that he was elected president in the first round of elections with a 52 percent vote share.

In the 2014 local election, the mayoral elections in 14 places, including Yalova and Agri, were renewed with a YSK decision. In the renewed Yalova election, the municipality changed from the AK Party to the CHP.

Of course, throughout history, a number of parties objected to election results in Turkey with claims of “errors and irregularities,” which can be been observed in every corner of the world, including the U.S. and Europe. The objections were answered in accordance with the popular will within a system that thoroughly examines each determinant within the laws. In the 2014 local election, the mayoral elections in 14 places, including Yalova and Agri provinces, were renewed with a YSK decision. In the renewed Yalova election, in which 75.813 voters cast ballots, the municipality changed from the AK Party to the CHP. The same year, BDP (former name of today’s Peoples’ Democratic Party-HDP) candidate Sirri Sakik won the Agrı mayoral election by receiving only 10 more votes, to which AK Party objected with the claim of irregularities. Agri provincial electoral board ruled for the recount of some ballot boxes. The provincial electoral board also accepted the BDP’s objection and the election was rerun. Sakik was elected as Agri mayor in the renewed election by increasing the vote difference from 10 to 2851. In a nutshell, the system always functioned in favor of the people’s will.

Despite this history, the CHP has been voicing claims that democracy suffered a blow since the announcement of the YSK’s decision to cancel and renew the Istanbul mayoral election. This is not a surprise, neither the reactions from the West. But the most curious reaction came from former President and AK Party co-founder Abdullah Gul, who tweeted: “What I felt in 2007 when the Constitutional Court made its unfair 367 ruling, that is what I felt yesterday when another high court, the Supreme Election Council, made its decision.” What was the 367 ruling? Are these two incidents really similar? Although Gul’s motivation was different while saying these words, he activated Turkish society’s collective memory on the subject of coups against democracy amid the CHP’s claims of “unfair elections, blow on democracy.”

The 367 ruling: what happened in 2007?

According to Article No 102 of the Turkish Constitution at the time, the president could be elected with a maximum of four parliamentary rounds of voting. The decisional quorum was a qualified majority of two-thirds (367 votes) of full membership for the first two rounds, and an absolute majority (267 votes) for the third and fourth rounds. In an interview he gave to Cumhuriyet newspaper on 26 December, 2006, former Supreme Court of Appeal prosecutor Sabih Kanadoglu argued that the qualified majority of 367 votes was not only the decisional quorum but was also the necessary quorum for the opening of the session, claiming that the decision would be invalid unless at least 367 parliament members attend the voting. Following him, then Chief of General Staff Yasar Buyukanit said that he hoped the next president would be faithful to the republic not only in words but in deeds.

While Kemalism rallies were organized all over the country and the media covered a slew of threat messages that instilled fear, then Prime Minister Erdogan decided not to run for president. In other words, the leader of the party that enjoys the largest popular support in Turkey could not run for president in this atmosphere of pressure and nominated Abdullah Gul instead. The first round of the elections was held on 27 April, 2007. There were two parties in the parliament at the time. The CHP did not attend the session, 357 votes were cast, and Gul received 352. Following the voting, in spite of the explicit constitutional article that is comprehensible for any literate person, the CHP appealed to the Constitutional Court for the objection of the election with the 367-ruling argument. In the evening of the same day, a press release that would later be referred as “e-memorandum” was published on the official website of the General Staff, which stated that Gul’s candidacy was not wished. With its decision issued on May 1, the Constitutional Court ruled the presence of at least 367 parliament members in the Plenary Session, and cancelled the first round of the parliamentary voting. So, the relevant constitutional article, despite its explicitness, was violated by the Constitutional Court due to the pressure of the military and the appeal of the CHP.

Upon that, the AK Party decided for an early election and 27 June, 2007, was determined as the election date. The ruling party won the election by receiving 47 percent of the vote. But although it was de-facto against the constitution, there was a scandalous condition that ruled: “367 parliament members must attend the session.” The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) entered the Parliament by exceeding the election threshold in the early election. The crisis was eventually solved when MHP leader Devlet Bahceli said: “The AK Party can nominate whomever it wishes. As we have entered the Parliament, the 367 obstacle will be overcome.” Receiving 341 votes in the first round and 337 votes in the second round, Abdullah Gul was elected as the 11th president of Turkey by receiving 339 votes in the third round of the parliamentary voting, which was attended by 448 parliamentarians.

Of course, there is no similarity between the “367 ruling” and “the decision of rerunning the elections upon the objection appeals of a political party on the grounds of irregularities.” What really matters is the motivation of the CHP leader Kilicdaroglu, who once signed that scandalous appeal. Enjoying the support of the military and the judiciary at the time, the CHP organized secularism rallies, threatened people and made the election cancelled by appealing to the Constitutional Court despite its 19.2 percent vote share. The discrepancy between the two cases is evident but Kilicdaroglu insists on ignoring this. There is one more sentence in Gul’s tweet: “We haven’t made any progress since then.” Of course, Gul uttered this remark by targeting the AK Party, with which he parted ways a long time ago, but his words allowed the CHP an opportunity to give an account of a past deed. While even the former president from the AK Party, whose presidency was once hampered through illegitimate ways, is siding with the CHP now (the party even offered him presidential candidacy for the 2018 elections), the CHP must issue an explanation at least for the 367 ruling even if they cannot explain or justify what they have done against democracy throughout the Republican history. Then we may make progress.

Since its foundation, the AK Party has rightfully been designated as a ‘political party of public service’ as the AK Party’s leadership has always focused its political energy on Turkey’s public administration deficit. During the first decade of its political power, a steady economic growth had been accompanied with various ameliorations primarily in the fields of transportation and health. From the problem of overcrowded classrooms in education to the revolutionary changes for the benefit of disabled citizens, the AK Party’s politics of public service has achieved significant success in various fields of social life.

Thanks to its organizational and communicational capabilities, which were directly inherited from the Welfare Party, the AK Party has been in political power for 17 years. As Recep Tayyip Erdogan has successfully been taking the leading role, the rest of the AK Party’s cadres seems to be successful as well. However, the AK Party’s reliance on Erdogan’s leadership for winning general and local elections has concluded with the weakening of the AK Party’s organizational structure and the linkage between the electors and the political party.

The AK Party’s reliance on Erdogan’s leadership for winning elections has concluded with the weakening of the AK Party’s organizational structure.

Learning the need to remain close to the people from the AK Party’s political success, Ekrem Imamoglu draws himself away from the hate discourse of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and instead adopts a much more moderate political discourse that mainly relies on projects and services. Nonetheless, people will not find Imamoglu’s political discourse credible and convincing until the CHP itself abandons its discriminatory and exclusionist political discourse.

Although Imamoglu’s political promises influences Turkey’s young voters, mature voters hesitate about the CHP’s sincerity due to its negative political record. Being highly discontented about its political history, Turkish electors cannot easily be convinced to vote for the CHP even though they personally feel sympathy for its municipal candidate. Highly valuing the AK Party’s policies and public services, Turkish electors are inclined to vote for the ruling AK Party if only the linkage between the candidate and the electors could have been restored.

Populism or public service?

In the recent years, populism has become one of the most controversial and frequently-used concepts of politics. Amongst the leftist political parties, Bulent Ecevit was the most populist political leader. Holding up Ecevit as an example, Muharrem Ince appealed to populist political discourses both in his struggle for the CHP’s chairmanship and Turkey’s presidency. As soon as his candidacy for Turkey’s presidency was announced, Ince had adopted a populist language to convey his political message to large masses of people. Yet, his politics backfired due to the insincerity of his attitudes and expressions.

People still hesitate to vote for Imamoglu as the CHP never adopts a service-based political vision and neglects political sensitivities of the people in forming its alliances.

With reference to his inclusive and reconciliatory discourses, Imamoglu adopts a populist political attitude as well. As opposed to the CHP’s exclusionist political discourse, Imamoglu’s electoral campaign aimed at appealing to large masses of people, including the AK Party’s voters. In the printed bulletins, Ekrem Imamoglu has even adopted a cunning electoral strategy by emphasizing his surname ‘Imamoglu.’ In other words, he appears to imitate the AK Party’s political discourses which has always been criticized by the CHP for abusing the religious feelings of Turkey’s electorate. Nonetheless, people still hesitate to vote for Imamoglu, as the CHP never adopts a service-based political vision and always neglects political sensitivities of the people in forming its alliances with other political parties.

In contrast, the AK Party has succeeded to strengthen its political discourses by changing the sociology of Turkey’s electorate and creating a new class of electors, and taking the resolution of Istanbul’s urban problems (such as urban poverty, lack of infrastructure, population density) into the center of its political agenda. Yet, as the AK Party won both general and local elections thanks mainly to Erdogan’s strong leadership. The linkage between the people and the AK Party has weakened. As Turkey’s economic problems exacerbate, Turkish electors have begun to adopt a new electoral attitude that is separated from political ideologies and allegiances.

As Turkey’s economic problems exacerbate, Turkish electors have begun to adopt a new electoral attitude that is partly different from political commitments.

In such a political and economic milieu, Imamoglu strives to gain the support of Turkey’s public opinion by adopting a moderate and inclusive political discourse. Imitating Binali Yildirim’s moderate political stance and the AK Party’s public service-based political vision, the CHP aims at gaining the votes of those electors who are less political and who could have voted for different political parties. Nonetheless, the CHP’s political sincerity is still open to dispute.

Consequently, winning Istanbul’s municipal elections is almost equal to winning Turkey’s elections. Therefore, political discourses pertaining to Istanbul’s governance that are developed by the competing candidates for the local elections of June 23 will certainly shape Turkey’s political future.

Why did Turkey’s local election result in an unexpected outcome? Currently politicians, scholars and the rest of the Turkish public are dealing with this question in order to understand the dynamics that affected the election. As I analyzed last week, one of the leading dynamics of change were the rules and regulations of newly-emerging pre-electoral alliances in Turkey. There is another eye-catching debate on how the socio-economic transformation of the Turkish youth reflected on voting behavior. Some scholars argue that a new voter profile will change the balance of Turkish politics in the near future and the first traces of it were seen on March 31.

13.970.568 young voters between 18-29 years old voted in the June 24 parliamentary and presidential elections in Turkey. They composed a majority of voters with 24,8% compared to other age categories. Even though the official statistics on voter profile during the March 31 local elections have not yet been shared, it is obvious that the number of young voters showed a slight increase again.

Some scholars argue that a new voter profile will change the balance of Turkish politics in the near future and the first traces of it were seen on March 31.

What do these statistics tell us? Indeed, even if the number of young people between 18-29 years old is significant, it does not mean that voter profile showed an apparent change in the last years. The truth is that Turkey’s voter profile has always consisted of young people. For instance, while 14.367.567 young voters between 18-29 years old had voted in the 2011 parliamentary elections. This number only showed a slight increase to 14.423.643 young voters in the 2015 parliamentary elections. The ratio of young voters between 18-29 years old decreased from 34,9 percent in 2011 to 24,8 percent in 2018. In other words, it will not be right to say that Turkey’s voting profile is getting younger year by year.

So, if the number of young voters did not skyrocket, why has the impact of the young vote on the 31 March local elections become a hot topic of discussion? This is also related to the socio-economic transformation of Turkish society in the last years and the reflections that it has had on the voting behavior of the youth. Especially with the proliferation of social media channels, the political affiliation process of young people has fundamentally changed. While the main source of political affiliation was close-knit relations for the past generations, there have been multiple sources for young people to form their political attitude and behavior.

Recent surveys show that young people tend to have different political behavior from their families.

Recent surveys also show that young people tend to have different political behavior from their families. Their inner circle friends and social media contacts – even YouTubers – have a crucial role in determining their political behavior. These young people also care about different issues when voting for a political party. For instance, issues such as youth unemployment and education matter more for young people than political ideology or security.

All of these factors show that even if the rate of young voters between 18-29 years old decrease in recent years, the changing political affiliation of young people is one of the determinants of the 31 March local elections. Because of this reason, it is crucial for parties to design their programs and election campaigns according to the socio-economic transformation of young people, who may be the new game changers in Turkish politics.

Before the objection process regarding the local election was completed, Ekrem İmamoğlu signed the book in Anıtkabir as Mayor of Istanbul only one day after the election and repeated almost every day that he is the new mayor of Istanbul. After 25 years, by a hair’s breadth, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) finally gained success with the support of the Iyi Party and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). So, the party marked a relative success for the first time after losing 8 elections in a row since Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was elected as the party chairman in 2010. The CHP achieved this success with nationalist and former Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) member Mansur Yavaş in Ankara and with Ekrem İmamoğlu in Istanbul, whose profile is closer to the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) than the CHP. In Ankara, Yavaş and his friends celebrated their success by shouting Allah-u Akbar, whereas İmamoğlu performed a grace prayer in Eyüp Sultan Mosque.

Ekrem Imamoglu’s election in Istanbul affirms once again that a politician with a typical CHP, Kemalist, or secular identity cannot win an election in Turkey. 

So, it was once again affirmed that a politician with a typical CHP, Kemalist, or secular identity cannot win an election in Turkey’s sociology. The leading name aware of this fact within the CHP has been İmamoğlu. With the adoption of the new presidential system, alliances also competed for the local election. In the previous election, the AK Party’s vote share was 42 percent and the CHP’s was 26 percent. The CHP built its strategy on this sociological aspect and won the election only with a difference of 13 thousand votes against Binali Yıldırım, who marked significant achievements in Turkey’s transportation system, took office as prime minister and parliamentary spokesperson.

Istanbul before and after Erdogan 

Up until 1994, Istanbul was a city where garbage was hardly collected and piled up on streets, and in several instances the garbage piles exploded (in 1993, the garbage stored in Ümraniye exploded, leaving 37 people dead), tap water did not run most of the time and residents stored water in buckets. Also, public transportation means were very poor at the time. Only someone who owned a private car or could afford to pay for a taxi had the privilege of going to the other end of the city.

The Golden Horn was contaminated to such a degree that people could not breathe around it, whereas Topkapı, Suriçi and their neighborhoods almost turned into a dump. When Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected as Istanbul mayor 25 years ago, he took over from the CHP a city that was devastated in terms of urban development, which was a shame considering the glorious past of the city that once served as the capital of the East Roman Empire and Ottoman Empire.

Erdoğan’s team healed the city and marked a great period of recovery and progress in Istanbul for 25 years. They solved the water problem, restored historic buildings, afforested the city, and tulips eventually found their historic home again. The Golden Horn was cleaned and became home to 47 fish species and many parks, sports facilities and walking tracks were built around its surroundings. Istanbul has finally become a city with a giant underground web that makes reaching one end to the other end of the city very easy. The third transcontinental Bosphorus Bridge, namely Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge, was built, and the rail system and road transport were connected with a sub-sea tunnel. Plus, two new airports were introduced to the city.  

İmamoğlu endeavored to create an impression among the Kurdish and Muslim-conservative electorate that he is not a typical CHP politician.

Imamoglu’s discourse and election strategy 

Although it is hard to admit for Erdoğan dissidents, the municipal works in Istanbul that kicked off in 1994 and continued up until today have set a milestone for the city. With their service, the AK Party erased the bad memories of Istanbul under CHP’s rule, and İmamoğlu did his best throughout his campaign to avoid triggering this collective memory. Appearing as the joint candidate of the CHP, the Iyi Party and the HDP, İmamoğlu endeavored to create an impression among the Kurdish and Muslim-conservative electorate that he is not a typical CHP politician although the Kemalist mindset subjected these groups to oppression and suffering throughout the Republican history. As opposed to CHP Chairman Kılıçdaroğlu, who in regards to the New Zealand terrorist attack said, “terror coming from the Islam world caused different reactions across the world,” İmamoğlu recited Surah al-Yasin in Eyüp Mosque, which is located next to the Tomb of Eyüp Sultan, a companion of the Prophet Mohammad.

With their service in Istanbul, the AK Party erased the bad memories of Istanbul under CHP’s rule and Imamoglu did his best throughout his campaign to avoid triggering this memory. 

İmamoğlu, who evidently received education in Koran courses as a child – although the CHP is proud to have shut down these courses – appeared with his hijab-wearing mother in the first photo he presented to the public. While some groups from the CHP base wrote “the tyranny started in 1453” on walls in Istanbul during violent Gezi Park Protests, and Kılıçdaroğlu ignorantly said that “the Ottomans tortured and annihilated the Turks,” İmamoğlu started his election campaign by paying a visit to the Tomb of Fatih Sultan Mehmet.

While addressing the HDP base in Istanbul, who said “we feel like traitors for voting for the CHP, but we’ll still opt for CHP although it breaks our hearts,” he adopted a careful tone by saying: “Istanbul is the city that has the highest population of Kurdish citizens. We will not discriminate against anyone.” But this does not represent the whole situation. As I heard from a Kurdish businessman years ago: “We could not even enter some doors until the Welfare Party won Istanbul municipality in 1994. As from that time, we have joined and won many bids.”

Although the CHP displays a sharp antagonism against Erdoğan, the CHP leader does not even attend national holiday receptions hosted by Erdoğan and called him an “illegitimate President” despite the fact that Erdoğan was elected as President by 52.6 percent in the first round, İmamoğlu visited the President in the early periods of his campaign, and said the following about the visit: “It’s been a good meeting, in which we listened to some experiences and suggestions about Istanbul. He has relayed valuable anecdotes. I also asked for the President’s vote.” So, the new mayor of Istanbul was all along aware of the fact that Erdoğan has been a determining and transforming figure in Turkish politics for 25 years.

And maybe this is why he seems to be a figure who is under transformation to such an extent that he took an oath to “protect the spirit of Istanbul” in a letter he wrote in address to Kemal Atatürk in the Anıtkabir notebook. So, for the first time again, a CHP politician mentioned the spirit of Istanbul. Even more, while entering the municipality office on his first day as mayor, he said: “This city is a sacred city that has a peculiar spirituality, prayers and experiences. Embracing all these requires an extraordinary depth.”

Unless the Supreme Election Council (YSK) accepts the objections of the AK Party and the elections are renewed, İmamoğlu is likely to become a new high-profile politician in Turkish politics. It is not yet known whether he has the extraordinary depth to govern Istanbul that he himself referred to. Will he continue his political path as a Republican son embracing the Seljuk and Ottoman heritage as opposed to his party’s constant fight against the country’s values ongoing since the early Republican period, or will he keep this fight like his party by ignoring a thousand year old past as if addressing an amnesic society?

Will Imamoglu continue his political path as a Republican who fight against the country’s own values, or will he draw a new profile leaving the CHP’s classical stance aside?

Will it set an impediment to his career within the CHP if he follows the first path? Even though it seems quite early to speculate on that, the first signs of it have already surfaced. Although İmamoğlu performed a grace prayer in Eyüp Sultan Mosque after the election, it was represented by the CHP mouthpiece Halk TV and other Kemalist media outlets as “İmamoğlu said prayers of peace.” This is the formula they came up with to avoid saying “salaat!”

The possible source of inspiration for this tone is also curious. During the visit paid by the Catholic Church spiritual leader Pope Benedict XVI to Sultanahmet Mosque in Istanbul, Istanbul Mufti Prof. Mustafa Çağrıcı had invented a formula. The Pope’s visit to the mosque was referred as a “stance of peace” in media. But this expression caused a disturbance in the Catholic world and spurred a series of heated polemics. Evidently, the formula invented for the Pope entered the Kemalist media’s literature since they said “prayers of peace” instead of “performing salaat.” As they say, the devil is in the details.

Will İmamoğlu, a high-profile CHP politician now, perform Friday prayer with congregation on Fridays? If so, will Kemalist intellectuals and Kemalist media, who regard the statesmen’s performing Friday prayer beginning from the term of the late Turgut Özal as a “reactionary act,” be able to digest this? Coincidentally, it was reported while penning these words that President Erdoğan and Istanbul Mayor İmamoğlu met in the funeral of a businessman. After performing Friday prayer, the two names appeared on the same row for funeral prayers.

Plus, İmamoğlu tweeted “May your Lailet Al Berat be blessed,” and liked two tweets shared by the President Erdoğan, which are as follows: “A 4.5 year-long continuous period of action now lies ahead of our country. As the 82 million citizens, we should make the most of this period. We should leave behind election debates and focus on our true agenda, first and foremost the economy and security,” and “It is now time to once again cool the hot iron, shake hands, hug each other and reinforce our unity and solidarity. Our target in the upcoming 4.5-year period is to enhance our people’s prosperity as well as to achieve Turkey’s goals for 2023 by preserving the security-freedom balance and eliminating threats against our country.”

Although it has been three weeks since the March 31 local elections, Turkey’s domestic policy agenda is still dominated by the results. The primary reason for this is the ongoing ambiguity in Istanbul. Even though the Provincial Election Board gave the official certificate of election to Ekrem Imamoglu, the candidate of the CHP and Nation Alliance, the legal evaluation of the Supreme Electoral Board (YSK) will terminate all grey areas about the results of the Istanbul elections in the following days.

Another prominent issue of discussion in the past few days is the determinants of the March 31 elections. All parties conduct their own evaluations and analyze the dynamics affected by the results. This is also a hot topic of discussion among masses and on national and international media platforms. At this point, the critical question is whether electoral alliances are determinants of the March 31 local elections.

Answering this question requires a close examination of the election results. In general, the results show that electoral volatility among alliances was very low. In other words, two alliance blocs majorly kept their votes and consolidated their voters. For instance, while the People’s Alliance, consisting of the AK Party and MHP got 53.7% of the vote in the June 24 elections, they received 51.6% in the recent local elections. Thus, keeping the majority of its votes. Moreover, the Nation Alliance increased its votes almost by 4 percent in the local elections. This increase was due to the HDP’s involvement in the alliance in 11 provinces. Thus, neither the People’s Alliance nor the Nation Alliance increased their voting rates in the elections.

Electoral alliances determined the election results in metropolitan cities. Imamoglu won the mayoral race in Istanbul as a result of a broad alliance between the CHP, Iyi Party, and HDP.

The results of the March 31 elections in metropolitan cities show that electoral alliances are the determinant of the results in these provinces. Although there was not a major increase or decrease in the votes of political parties, Imamoglu won the mayoral race in Istanbul as a result of a broad alliance between the CHP, Iyi Party, and HDP. The candidate of Ankara, Mansur Yavas, also won the elections with the support of these parties. If they had failed to make an alliance, neither Imamoglu nor Yavas would have been able to win the elections. Thus, changes in the borders of alliances were one of the main determinants in the March 31 local elections.

HDP’s support for the Nation Alliance in 11 provinces played a crucial role in affecting the results. This can be understood by analyzing the difference between the votes of mayoral elections and city councils.

To sum up, the answer to the abovementioned question is clear: yes, electoral alliances are the main but not the only determinant of the 31 March local elections. There is a need of further detailed analysis on the causation between the results of the local elections and electoral alliances.

Almost all of Turkey’s elected mayors have begun their service after receiving their official certificates of election. Due to the recount of votes in some provinces by the Supreme Electoral Council (YSK), some candidates are still waiting for the completion of the legal process in order to get their certificates that will authorize their selection. It seems that the ongoing process in Istanbul may take more time due to the new applications for recounts of votes in some districts. Furthermore, the legal process may continue in Istanbul even after the authorization of one of the candidates as mayor.

In addition to the long-lasting legal process in Istanbul, Turkey is also busy with the first actions of some newly-elected and excited mayors. Since a significant number of mayors in cities changed with the 31 March local elections, newly-elected mayors are trying to gain support by opting in for populism. This is a worrying issue for the electorate and for future local governance in Turkey.

Since newly-elected mayors intend to broaden their impact, the people of Turkey have been subject to an enormous number of populist actions in the last week. The most problematic populist action belongs to the newly-elected mayor of Bolu, Tanju Ozcan, from the CHP. As a former member of parliament, Ozcan took a shocking decision to cut public grants for Syrian refugees in his province. Indeed, the most shocking side of this incident was his discourse towards refugees; he dehumanized them and blamed them for being a burden on the shoulder of Turkish people.

Newly elected mayors in Turkey are trying to gain support by opting in for populism. This is a worrying issue for both the electorate and for future local governance in Turkey. 

Although Ozcan was elected as a candidate by a social democratic party, his actions and discourse are similar to politicians of extreme right parties in Europe. Due to increasing criticism towards him, the Foundation of Social Democracy (SODEV) made an official announcement and condemned Ozcan for being inconsistent with the rules of social democratic municipalism. Nevertheless, Ozcan continued to defend his actions and underlined that he would not let any refugee receive aid from the municipality.

Another eye-catching example of populism in local governance is the superficial actions of new mayors in some issues. Even though most of them promised to solve long-lasting structural problems in the cities they ran their election campaigns, it seems that they have chosen to ease the way to increase their popularity among the masses. For instance, some mayors from the CHP, including the mayor of Ankara, started to clean the statues of Ataturk, even though there was simply no dirt. These mayors also added “TC,” an abbreviation of Turkish Republic, on the boards of municipalities.

Some mayors from the CHP, including the mayor of Ankara, started to clean the statues of Ataturk, even though there was simply no dirt.

Indeed, these kinds of superficial and populist actions show the true characteristic of the CHP’s political approach. Mostly new-elected mayors from the CHP showed great sensitivity and respect towards conservative values during their election campaigns. They underlined the importance of unity and solidarity in that period. However, after being election, they turned back to their true colors.

Will this process bring nationalist-secularist reflexes of the CHP into Turkey’s political life again? Are the populist actions of newly-elected mayors the first signs of this? It is a well-known fact that symbolic acts have always been important in Turkish politics. If the revival of the CHP in local governance brings back old habits, it will not be a surprise for Turkish people to face dominant nationalist-secularist reflexes in public life.

Turkey had one of its most significant local elections yesterday. The agenda of the elections was more about national or even international issues rather than local matters. According to the unofficial election results, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has once again come first in the elections, as it has done in every single election since 2002. Nevertheless, the party, while preserving its votes in the national scale, seems to have lost the capital Ankara while Istanbul results are so close that I am sure there will be some recounting. As this column mostly focuses on the Kurdish question, my take on the elections will be about the cities where Turkey’s Kurds live densely.

With respect to the Kurdish question, and hence, AK Party – HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party) competition in the eastern and southeastern cities, the results are quite promising – if not an overwhelming glory, for the AK Party. For one thing, AK Party has retained all cities under its rule except for Erzincan, where it lost to the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), not the HDP. Elazığ, Erzurum, Malatya, Muş, Bingöl, Gaziantep, Kilis, Şanlıurfa, Adıyaman, all were retained by AK Party, most of them with quite big margins.

AK Party has not lost a single city to the HDP while gaining Ağrı, Bitlis, and Şırnak back from the HDP. This is a straightforward win.

AK Party has not lost a single city to the HDP while gaining Ağrı, Bitlis, and Şırnak back from the HDP. This is a straightforward win for AK Party vis-a-vis the HDP given that the HDP has so far never lost a city municipality where it was in power. What makes it more impressive is that it is not a small shift of votes that enabled the AK Party to win in those cities. It was quite a big shift. The AK Party, according to unofficial results, received 56% of the votes in Ağrı where it only got 38% in 2014. It increased its votes from 40 to 44, and, most dramatically in Şırnak from 17 to 62 percent. The HDP, on the other hand, lost its vote share in most of places even where it usually came first. The HDP also lost Tunceli to the Turkey Communist Party (TKP) while coming first in Kars where the MHP was holding the municipality.

The AK Party won multiple towns that were under HDP control since 2014. Most striking examples are from Hakkari and Şırnak where the HDP used to come first with big margins.

Apart from these cities, the AK Party also won multiple towns that were under HDP control (under the BDP banner) since 2014. Most striking examples are from Hakkari and Şırnak where the HDP used to come first with big margins. While the AK Party seems to have won Derecik, Şemdinli and Çukurca in Hakkari, it also obtained Uludere and Beytüşşebap in Şırnak, all from the HDP. Overall, the AK Party has won four districts out of seven in Şırnak and three out of five in Hakkari. Diyarbakır, on the other hand, did not let the AK Party to win a victory in the city other than Çermik and Hani districts. Nevertheless, in pretty much all the cities of the region, even in places where the HDP came first, the AK Party has increased the number of municipal districts it won.

These results, overall, suggest that AK Party is the winner in Turkey’s eastern cities. The HDP, on the other hand, lost many municipalities it had won in 2014. While the party had gained 10 cities and 67 districts in 2014, the numbers respectively fell to 8 lost its vote share in most of the places and 50 districts in 2019. Hence, it lost 2 cities and 17 towns in the region, almost entirely to the AK Party. These results show that neither the AK Party’s electoral alliance with the nationalist MHP nor the trustee appointments resulted in a decrease in the party’s votes in the region. Quite the opposite, the AK Party increased its votes in the region and this tells us that the AK Party’s stiff counterterrorism measures against the PKK have also damaged the PKK’s political wing, the HDP.

Turkey has had a tight schedule in terms of elections and referendums within the past couple of years. With the upcoming local election on March 31, the Turkish electorate will have gone to polls for the seventh time over the course of the past five years. Aside from the main agenda of the elections and referendum, one of the leading aspects that has been insistently brought into question by certain groups is the safety and reliability of elections. In fact, Turkey’s election experience in a multi-party system and the constitutional and legal guarantees in terms of the administration and supervision of elections invalidate such claims.

Particularly opposition parties and some groups supporting them have started claiming in the run-up to the election that gerrymandering would be set up to interfere with and manipulate the results. It is even claimed that there will be cast ballots made for Syrian refugees, as the issue of Syrian refugees is the most frequently raised. Election safety was one of the priorities of the government for the last elections held on 24 June, 2018. To that end, Parliament passed Law No 7102 last year, which introduced the relocation of ballot boxes in order to merge ballot boxes for the prevention of possible pressures of the PKK terrorist organization on the electorate and to enable easier access to ballot boxes for the electorate who are unable to go to polling stations. Although the opposition criticizes this law, the practice during the last elections proved that the criticisms are unfounded.

In order to ensure the safety of elections in Turkey, parliament passed Law No 7102 last year, which introduced the relocation of ballot boxes in order to merge ballot boxes for the prevention of possible pressures of the PKK on the electorate. 

Turkey’s Supreme Election Council, indeed, has addressed this issue in its decision that refers to Law No 7102. This Law is intended to end the problem of “unsealed ballot paper,” which became an issue after the previous election. However, the purpose of this law is to minimize invalid votes appeared in the unsealed ballot papers due to the negligence of the balloting committee. In other words, this law has prevented the disallowance of ballots in cases when the electorate fulfills the voting procedure without a fault. The Constitutional Court recognized this law as a requirement of election safety, refusing to annul the election results. The relocation provided by this law has been found acceptable and proportionate for a democratic society.

Opposition makes gerrymandering claims according to election results

Although they do not seem to have convinced the public, the opposition is still voicing baseless claims of gerrymandering ahead of the March 31 local elections. This attitude rather looks like a preparation of the pretexts to be embraced in case of a defeat. As can be remembered, we experienced one of the most striking examples of this during the general election on 7 June, 2015. Claiming that the government engaged in gerrymandering before and during election day, the opposition dismissed those claims and began celebrating the results when it turned out that the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) did not reach a majority to come to power alone. In view of the opposition’s behavior in elections, it is evident that they cling to such claims only if the AK Party wins. As for the March 31 elections, they have already started circulating such claims again.

Turkey has a long-established experience in terms of the administration and supervision of elections. Ever since the 1950s, when the multi-party system was introduced in the country, the fair and orderly conduct of elections is guaranteed despite some rough patches in democracy. It must be noted that the institutional guarantees are also effective in that alongside the election experience of political parties and society. With the Election Law that entered into force in 1950, the principle of conducting elections under the administration and supervision of the judiciary was adopted for the first time in the history of the Republic of Turkey. The YSK and provincial and district election boards were founded on the basis of this Law. Subsequently, the constitutions of 1961 and 1982 vested independent judicial bodies, namely the YSK and election boards, with the authority to conduct the administration and supervision of elections as a constitutional principle. In most practices observed in Western democracies, judicial supervision is essential for democratic and fair elections. Besides, judicial bodies are not obliged to conduct the administration of elections. In Turkey; however, judicial bodies are vested with both the supervision and administration of elections. In this sense, it is safe to say that the system in Turkey is more guaranteed and impartial. According to Article 79 of the Constitution:

“Elections shall be held under the general administration and supervision of the judicial organs.

The Supreme Council of Election shall execute all the functions to ensure the fair and orderly conduct of elections from the beginning to the end, carry out investigations and take final decisions, during and after the elections, on all irregularities, complaints and objections concerning the electoral matters, and receive the electoral records of the members of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and presidential election…”

Also, according to the Law on the Organization and Powers of the Supreme Council of Election, “The Council is independent and impartial in exercising its powers and performing its duties. No office, agency, authority or person shall order or instruct the Council.” (Article 3)

Although Turkey’s opposition parties do not seem to have convinced the public, they are still voicing baseless claims of gerrymandering ahead of the March 31 local elections. This attitude rather looks like a preparation of the pretexts to be embraced in case of a defeat

It must be noted that YSK members are not appointed by a political body but are elected among and by the General Boards of the Supreme Court and the Council of State. Besides, the Provincial Election Board consists of two principles and two alternate members elected among the highest-ranking judges other than the central county election board chairs and is chaired by the judge of the highest rank commissioned within the provincial center town. As can be seen, judges who are the watchdogs of constitutional guarantees are assigned on the boards that will conduct the administration and supervision of elections. Therefore, there is no reason to be concerned about the institutional mechanisms employed in the administration and supervision of elections.

Political parties participate in all election boards and electoral processes

Another important principle that will guarantee the reliability and safety of elections is the participation of political parties in the organization of election boards. According to the Law No 298 on Elections, among the political parties taking part in elections, the four parties who receive the highest vote share in the last parliamentary election and the parties that have a parliamentary group in the Turkish Grand National Assembly can have one principle and one alternate representative in the YSK. These representatives can attend all the activities and meetings of the Council. Considering the procedures on the participation of political parties in election boards, distrusting the boards does not have a reasonable explanation.

Along with the judicial mechanisms that secure the safety and reliability of elections, political parties also participate and observe all the electoral procedures during election day. Political party representatives are assigned on ballot-box committees and directly participate in the counting and listing of votes. Aside from the ballot-box committee chair chosen among public officers, there are representatives from five political parties in the committee. The party representatives in the committees take samples from ballot result reports and register the results. After the counting of votes, the reports are compounded in a district and provincial election board and the results are determined and announced under the supervision of political parties. As a requirement of the open counting and listing principle, the counting of votes is made public under the supervision of parties. We also know that aside from political parties, several platforms and NGOs, such as “Vote and Beyond” closely monitor ballot counts.

Aside from political parties monitoring the ballot counts and election results, other platforms and NGOs, such as “Vote and Beyond” also closely monitor ballot counts, which ensures election safety and reliability in Turkey. 

Above all, the YSK transparently administers all the phases of elections. After elections, the Council scans the originally signed reports of all ballot boxes across the country and publishes them on its official website. Thus, the electorate and political parties have a chance to compare the ballot box results with the data they obtained.

Gerrymandering allegations, which were rarely seen in the past, have apparently turned into a manipulation tool for the opposition to justify its repeated defeats over the past years. The administration and supervision of elections have successfully been conducted in our country for a long time. For this reason, it would be more reasonable for political parties to develop new methods that will appeal to larger masses instead of casting unfounded doubts on the reliability and safety of elections.

Turkey’s local elections will be held tomorrow. After long-lasting heated debates among political parties, voters will go the polls to select local governors in 30 metropolitan districts, 51 provinces, 922 countries, 32.105 neighborhoods and 18.306 villages. Beyond that, the March 31 local elections will be one of the main determinants of Turkey’s political, social, and economic order for the next 5 years.

Since there is less than 24 hours left to the elections, it is crucial to discuss possible future scenarios that may occur after the results are displayed. Which dynamics will be effective in the post-election period in Turkey and will these dynamics be determinant on national and international political issues? Answering these questions requires analyzing possible scenarios on post-election Turkey.

Turkish voters go the polls to select local governors in 30 metropolitan districts, 51 provinces, 922 countries, 32.105 neighborhoods and 18.306 villages.

The first scenario depends on the shift of power dynamics in two prominent cities – Istanbul and Ankara. These cities have been at the core of the election campaigns of all political parties. Members of the Nation Alliance aim to gain Istanbul and Ankara from the AK Party in order to weaken the AK Party and the People’s Alliance in the long term in order to increase their own sphere of influence in politics. Since the quality of local administration in these provinces also reflect the success or failure of political parties in parliamentary and presidential elections, the motivation of the Nation Alliance is quite understandable.

Because of this, winning the mayoral races in Ankara and Istanbul will provide an enormous advantage for political parties. More, members of the Nation Alliance are also trying to prevent the re-emergence of intra-party opposition in the post-election period. The leaders of the CHP and Iyi Party faced serious opposition after their failure in the June 24 elections. Opposition groups within both parties postponed their activities until the local elections. Thus, winning the mayoral race – even in one of these cities – will enable Aksener and Kilicdaroglu to re-consolidate their power.

The second scenario depends on the future of Turkey’s presidential system. One of the hot topics of the local election campaigns was the future of the government system in Turkey. Even a former politician, Husamettin Cindoruk, claimed that this election would be the revenge of the presidential system from Turkey’s previous parliamentary system of government. The main aim of the CHP and Iyi Party is switching back to the parliamentary system by weakening the AK Party-MHP bloc in politics. If the AK Party and MHP lose any power or authority, the Nation Alliance may try to question the legitimacy of the presidential system after the elections.

The results of the March 31 local elections will be a determinant on the future of speculative economic attacks on the Turkish economy.

The third scenario is on the main dynamics of Turkey’s foreign policy in the aftermath of the local elections. As President Erdogan underlined, Turkey will continue to conduct cross-border military operations after the elections in order to provide domestic and border security. Nonetheless, the Nation Allies has been trying to delegitimize Turkey’s cross-border operations and the leader of CHP re-iterated his stance against these operations during the election campaign. If the Nation Alliance broadens its electoral sphere, they will be more determined to present a critical stance against cross-border military operations.

Last but not least, the results of the March 31 local elections will be a determinant on the future of speculative economic attacks on the Turkish economy. Especially in recent days, there has been some rumors on the devaluation of the Turkish Lira after the local elections. Opposition parties also claim that Turkey’s economic indicators will get worse after the elections. Thus, if the AK Party and MHP consolidate their power in local elections, they will manage to tackle these speculations after the elections.

Turkey’s local elections will take place this Sunday. With this piece right before the elections, I would like to stress once again the most controversial component of the Nation Alliance, namely the HDP. It is well-known that Western media outlets deliberately disregard the Kurdish-nationalist HDP’s obvious ties to the PKK terrorist organization. The most salient feature of HDP’s strategy for the local elections is the tacit character of the alliance they have joined. Neither the HDP representatives nor their allied parties have the courage to openly and publicly state this alliance, ironically due to possible criticisms to be received from their voter bases.

Turkey held its previous local elections in 2014 when the HDP seemed to be in favor of solving the “Kurdish issue” by allegedly persuading the PKK terrorist organization to give up its arms, stop terrorist attacks, and leave Turkish territory. However, this did not happen and in contrary, the PKK started its bloody attacks in various Turkish cities subsequent to the June 2015 elections. The HDP did not criticize these attacks and made efforts to discredit the government by spreading false information.

The upcoming local elections in Turkey will be the first after it became obvious that the HDP is just acting in line with and on behalf of the PKK. It’s worthwhile to be on the watch for the election results in the eastern part of the country on the evening of 31 March.

It is difficult for any rational mind to believe the PKK’s narrative that the Turkish government started the fight  as a reaction to the HDP’s “success” subsequent to the June 2015 elections. This argument clearly disregards the unwillingness of the PKK to dissolve itself or to leave Turkey. Discussing this point further and further is a waste of time because of the continuing pre-designated stance by the HDP and PKK supporters against the Turkish government. Moreover, it’s almost impossible to conduct a reasonable debate with obvious supporters and admirers of a terrorist leader such as Abdullah Ocalan/Kurdish left-nationalists and also with Turkish Marxists who are sympathetic to the HDP – just due to one dominant reason, namely, of having a personal or ideological “problem” with President Erdogan. One must also not forget that between 2014-2016, many HDP-led municipalities openly supported the PKK’s ambitions in certain cities and even provided financial and logistic support. Although Western media outlets do not address these issues, it is also a known stance that HDP politicians do not accept the PKK as a terrorist organization.

Foreign observers should keep in mind that these will be the first local elections right after it became obvious that the HDP is just acting in line with and on behalf of, the PKK. In this context, the electorate’s decision, particularly in the Eastern part of Turkey, should be watched on the evening of 31 March by considering the previous period of 2015-2019.

There is also an obvious and general weirdness regarding the HDP as a political party per se. Although the party is based on an electorate partly consisting of Kurdish nationalists, along with culturally conservative reflexes, the party is mistakenly perceived as a leftist-secular democratic party. This perception is above all boosted by Turkish leftist journalists, intellectuals, and academics, who were previously oriented in radical Marxist and socialist circles. However, presenting the HDP as a main supporter of universal human rights is mere ultimate wishful thinking.

HDP is perceived as a leftist-secular democratic party chiefly by Turkish leftist journalists, intellectuals, and academics, who were previously oriented in radical Marxist and socialist circles. 

In such cases, it is perhaps usual for Western observes that are “left-biased” and secular journalists, who are also absurdly uncritical of the authoritarian-exclusive Kemalist ideology, to applaud and praise the former chairman of the HDP without any criticism regarding his separatist ambitions, his playing down of PKK terrorism, his sympathy to jailed PKK leader Ocalan, and his general ambivalent stances, such as even considering to form a coalition with nationalist MHP (in 2015). As mentioned above, besides foreign media representatives lacking analyses, there are also some Turkish voices who disregard all these facts by regularly creating a false image.

Another point that must be mentioned is HDP’s ambivalent stance and bias in order to collaborate with Turkish political parties, which have very different ideological perceptions. It seems that a certain kind of hatred with regard to current government cadres reached a new peak. Actually, the Kurdish-nationalist HDP was eager to establish a coalition government right after the June 2015 election, when Kemalist-secular CHP invited HDP and the nationalist MHP to form a coalition. MHP chairman rejected these ambitions while CHP chairman Kilicdaroglu did not have any problem with collaborating with the HDP.

Similarly, the CHP has established a de facto alliance with the HDP for the upcoming 31 March local elections. Former HDP chairman recently declared that the HDP will support CHP and Iyi Party candidates in the West. But the question should follow: What did these two parties promise the HDP in order to receive such support? No representative from either party is ready or has any courage to answer this question. But this does not exclude the actual feelings of CHP, Iyi Party and even Felicity Party voters. How will they react against such weird efforts to collaborate with a de facto separatist party?

The evening of 31 March will show.

Political parties are on the home stretch of the upcoming local elections. They have been trying to broaden their electoral base in the last weeks by bringing their floating voters back in line. Parties are also dedicated to attracting the votes of new voters in order to make a difference not only for these elections, but also for the future ones. Even if all parties conduct their own election campaign, as well as organizing some joint meetings with their allies, the priority issues of all parties are quite distinct from each other.

The members of the People’s Alliance – the AK Party and the MHP – see the elections as a matter of national survival. Understanding the motivation of the AK Party and the MHP requires examining the positions of these two parties in politics closely.

After the July 15 coup attempt, the AK Party and the MHP left their disagreements aside and collaborated on critical issues. The first issue agreed on was the need for a comprehensive fight against domestic and international terrorism. Turkey had to set up a detailed plan for discharging civil and military servants affiliated with the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) – the perpetrator of the military coup. The support provided by the MHP to the AK Party government during this process enabled the government to take the necessary action in this fight.  

Turkey has been facing a serious threat from PKK terrorism since the end of the resolution process. The PKK adopted urban warfare tactics and targeted city centers to broaden its impact. More, the PKK’s branch in Northern Syria, the YPG, became a serious threat for Turkey’s national security. The MHP supported the government in its cross-border operations in order to provide security for the country.

Nonetheless, contrary to the support provided by the MHP, other opposition parties came out against the issue. During the process, they made contradictory statements about the government’s actions. While they claimed that they were supporting Turkey’s fight against terrorism, they criticized the government severely because of the operations it held.

Indeed, this contradictory approach of the opposition parties is also effective in their election campaigns. For instance, Kilicdaroglu, the chairman of the CHP, announced that they were determined to fight against terrorism and that having a latent alliance with the HDP would not harm their position in this issue. Nevertheless, Kilicdaroglu and the rest of the CHP does not see the presence of the YPG in Northern Syria as a threat to Turkey, even despite the attacks that occurred in the last couple of years that were conducted by YPG-affiliated terrorists.

Contrary to the approach of the Nation’s Alliance, the AK Party and the MHP emphasize that Turkey should maintain its determined position in fighting against terrorism. For these parties, local elections are crucial in order to provide an effective battle on the ground. As President Erdogan claims, Turkey should focus more on fighting against domestic and international terrorism without losing any power in the local sphere.

The AK Party and the MHP also emphasize the threat posed by the HDP gaining power due to the CHP and Iyi Party. Almost two years ago, when the PKK broke the ceasefire, HDP municipalities in eastern Turkey declared their autonomy, which was against the Constitution. These municipalities were providing logistic support to the PKK against the state during the urban warfare. Due to these reasons, the AK Party and MHP are strongly in favor of preventing the PKK’s predominance over the HDP administrations.

Overall, the AK Party and the MHP see the upcoming elections as a matter of national survival. The results of the elections will show whether this approach has been welcomed by the electorate.

Turkey is heading towards the final phase of its local elections, which will be held on 31 March. With no doubt, Turkey’s policymakers called for a new system of government due to various difficult experiences in the past, as building adequate and strong governments was not that easy. It was quite understandable that parties, which heavily criticized each other and even defamed one another, came together in order to find a common base for the country. As a consequence, citizens supporting each party casted doubt on the sincerity of politicians.

Nevertheless, the new presidential system entailed not a totally new, but a rather structural and stability oriented phenomenon, namely pre-election alliances. These alliances have been firm enough to be continued even in the local elections.

Turkish politics nowadays has established the roots of a two-block political landscape, although not both blocks have concrete political ambitions and systematic preferences. As is known, the “People’s Alliance,” consisting of the AK Party and MHP was established right before the 16 April, 2017, referendum and continued during the parliamentary and presidential elections last year. On the other hand, parties around the main opposition party, the Kemalist-secular CHP, made efforts to bring together entirely different, and indeed ideologically conflicting groups, such as the Kurdish-ethnic HDP, the conservative SP and the Turkish-nationalist-oriented Iyi Party.

The second bloc has less of a chance and more difficulty to persuade and broaden its electorate. This is due to their lack of a coherent election program and the lack of a shared future projection. While the People’s Alliance refers itself to a set of compatible ambitions and narratives, the Nation Alliance is based on incompatible narratives and only has one common objective – to get rid of President Erdogan.

Despite the actual alliance-seeking efforts by the CHP and other parties, they have oddly come to refuse the existence of such an alliance, even in provinces where it is obvious that the candidate is an umbrella one. If a CHP-led alliance does not have the courage to openly conduct a campaign, then political engineering will be an option, and this option will fail on election day. As a stark comparison to the Nation Alliance, President Erdogan and Devlet Bahceli have openly stressed the main framework of the People’s Alliance with regard to the local elections.

The People’s Alliance was established on the night of the July 15, 2016, coup attempt, when the AK Party and MHP leaders took a strong position against the Gulenist putschists. In addition to this, these two parties had previously come together to get work done in Turkish politics. For instance, the MHP did not boycott Abdullah Gul’s bid for presidency in the parliament in 2007 (despite strong opposition from both the pro-tutelage Kemalist officers within the CHP and the Turkish Armed Forces). More, in 2007, both parties came together to lift the headscarf ban, which resulted in a closure trial against the AK Party in 2008. Both party leaders also resisted the violent Gezi Protests in 2013.

Today, the People’s Alliance describes its main character as standing for the “people’s will,” with the only aim to “serve the nation.” However, the Nation Alliance does not seem to have any concrete political position or self-description. This ambivalence and blurriness leads to a lack of transparency. And because of this situation, the People’s Alliance has described the CHP-led alliance as the “product of secret bargaining and political engineering.”

Kemalist-secular authorities and traditional Kemalist voters are unsatisfied with a quasi-alliance between the CHP and HDP due to the fact that the latter is the political arm of the PKK terrorist organization. Senior CHP figures have announced their candidacy from the Democratic Left Party (DSP) as a protest against CHP’s alienation. This has therefore caused dispute between the CHP and DSP, and the CHP has accused the DSP for dividing votes. However, DSP Chairman Onder Aksakal has rejected such accusations and stressed that the CHP is the only actor responsible for the success of the AK Party. Aksakal also underlined the CHP’s previous efforts that failed and that were not compatible with its traditional values. These were, namely, nominating a non-CHP politician as CHP’s presidential candidate in 2014, supporting the ultra-nationalist Iyi Party with 15 CHP MPs in 2018, and of course, not accepting any electoral defeats since 2010 after Kilicdaroglu became chairman.

The 31 March local elections will most likely contribute to the transformation of Turkey’s political landscape. By this, it can be inferred that a two-bloc system will be entrenched in the future. The continuing efforts of the People’s Alliance are reinforcing this trend, while the CHP-led alliance lacks a sincere and concrete narrative. While it lacks a concrete narrative, this does not exclude the actual existence of the Nation Alliance. Time will show whether this alliance will transform in the long-run due to the political pressure felt from the electorate.

Since there’s less than a month left for the local elections in Turkey, the current public tendency is being questioned by political parties. All political parties conduct their own polls in order to understand the reflections of the public towards their election campaigns. Nevertheless, each survey campaign presents different results about the current tendency of the public. Because of this reason, the reliability of survey campaigns has become one of the hot topics. Recently, President Erdogan stated that he did not trust the results of election polls. The President’s statement encouraged an in-depth discussion on the failure of Turkish survey campaigns and the reasons behind it.

It is a well-known fact that Turkey’s survey campaigns have never showed quite a success in estimating election results consistent with the actual results. Indeed, survey campaigns in the U.S. and Europe have faced the same problem in the last years. During the presidential election in the U.S., survey campaigns did not give any single chance to Trump’s victory against Clinton. Furthermore, Macron’s selection as the President of France was a shock for survey campaigns. These countries also questioned the reasons behind the failure of elections polls, just like the current situation in Turkey.

This problem is highly related to the lack of well-prepared research design. Most of the companies do not pay attention to a research design that reflects the whole population. This creates an enormous reliability problem for the results of the companies. For instance, some campaigns conduct research with just a bunch of people and present results as if they represent all of society. The problem in research design results is biased results that come out at the end of the research.

It is also obvious that methodological fallacy is a very common problem among survey campaigns. One of the reasons behind this problem is the lack of sample strategy in research. Campaigns fail in selecting their samples consistent with socio-economic and political aspects of Turkish society. Even if they follow cluster sampling strategy in the first phase, it becomes expensive and problematic for companies to follow this sample strategy. Moreover, survey campaigns do not have their own researchers on the field and they cannot control the implementation phase of research. As a result, their sample fails in representing the whole of society.

Another crucial problem of election polls arise in political affiliation of survey companies. Almost all survey companies have an affiliation with political parties. Even political parties establish their own companies to conduct election polls on their own. It is common to see the establishment of new companies just before the elections. Nevertheless, the political affiliation of these companies creates a serious problem in the reliability of results. Especially after the June 24 elections, owners of some survey companies admitted that they made fraudulent in the results of their research to prevent hash criticisms from political parties and their voters. Thus, it is a common practice for these companies to not present the actual results.

The reliability problem of survey companies should be discussed in a comprehensive way. Since it is not an easy task for these companies to handle all problems in a short term, they should focus on resolving these problems in a long term.

In Turkey, one of the favorite songs of those defining themselves as “leftist” is Mills (Değirmenler in Turkish) by Bulent Ortacgil, of which the lyrics go: “You, me, against the windmills. Consciously, each of us as a vanished warrior. We flow into seas as rivers. Maybe the finest way ever is this way…”

The song is about an impossible love, which is relevant to the left wing in Turkey in the sense they consider their fight to be an impossible love, and although they know they will lose in the end, the fight is still noble to them.

This is a specific mentality, an ode to defeat that is internalized and which has almost become part of genetic codes for a certain political segment. To put otherwise, it is a victim mentality based on finding excuses for failure and defeat. There is a famous Winston Churchill quote, which was also often repeated by the late Turkish President Suleyman Demirel: “No excuse can replace success.”

When I look at the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) nowadays, I recall Ortacgil’s Mills and this particular Churchill quote Demirel was fond of because there are roughly three blocs within the party. The first one is the core crowd gathering around CHP Chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu. The second is the crowd around Muharrem Ince, who are looking forward to seeing a CHP defeat in the 31 March local elections, and the third is the group who either passed to the Democratic Left Party (DSP) or resigned from the CHP since they could not become candidates. If the CHP enjoys an election victory under the leadership of Kilicdaroglu on March 31, the second and third groups will resolve. However, if the opposite holds true and the party faces a defeat, the last two groups will revolt and even draw a part of the first group to their side in an attempt to call for an extraordinary meeting.

One does not need to be a clairvoyant or an analyst to know the CHP and the corridor whispers to be able to predict all these things. Everything is pretty obvious.

Developments within the CHP reflect Kilicdaroglu’s purge attempts within the party. Rather than having ideological concerns, his motivation is to consolidate power and undermine rivals. 

Although the CHP is currently focused on the local election, all the leading names in the party, including Kilicdaroglu, are currently eyeing what will happen on the morning of April 1. While determining the candidates almost by himself, his main concern has been to gain strength by April 1. This is why Kilicdaroglu did not nominate anyone who acted with Ince before and has been siding with candidates who have stayed loyal to him, even though some of these individuals are accused of corruption.

Lately, CHP member Gursel Tekin issued a quite nuanced and strict written statement and a group of CHP mayors resigned while some names passed to the DSP. Also, former chairmen known as “the lords of the CHP” convened and Bodrum Mayor Mehmet Kocadon resigned from the CHP and became a candidate for Mugla Metropolitan Municipality.

All these developments reflect Kilicdaroglu’s purge attempts within the party, but rather than having ideological concerns, Kilicdaroglu’s motivation here is to consolidate his power and undermine his rivals.

But of course, such developments will negatively affect the CHP’s vote share. In that case, Kilicdaroglu will probably argue that the CHP could not win since the groups divided the party and accentuated their own identities rather than the party identity. So, his excuse for defeat is already at hand. 

Why does the CHP fail to address larger masses?

Looking at from a more general perspective, it is evident in Turkish politics that the ruling party has won all elections since 2002, with vote shares varying between 35 and 49 percent, whereas the main opposition party has always remained between 20 and 25 percent.

The AK Party has occasionally suffered declines in its vote share. However, although such fluctuations have been experienced, the CHP’s vote share hardly changed, indicating the fact that the party failed to address groups other than its own base.

Kilicdaroglu’s excuse for a possible defeat is already at hand. He will argue that the CHP failed due to the group divisions in the party, which accentuated their own identities rather than the party identity.

Since he was assigned as chairman of the party, Kilicdaroglu has been scrutinizing underlying reasons of this situation. But while doing so, he has been acting like a surgeon, searching for a cure by applying trial-and-error method on a patient lying on the operation table.

We might quickly forget about such things, but still can try taking a step back and look at the general picture: We have seen a different CHP in each election period.

Do you remember the nationalist group transferred by Kilicdaroglu in 2011 to come to the forefront in the party’s image and discourse that included names like Emine Ulker Tarhan and Suheyl Batum?

Or, do you remember the leftist, socialist, and Alevi groups that came to the forefront by emphasizing Gezi Park protests during the electoral period in 2015?

And currently, in the run up to the local elections, Kilicdaroglu has once again changed the image of the party and addressed the electorate with a different message. This time, he is directly engaging in populist behavior, accentuating the rhetoric he adopted in the June 24 elections last year. While creating ambiguities and gaps in his party’s ideology, he is prioritizing winning and leaning towards a political opportunism that can be summed up with the motto, “No matter who you are, vote for me to undermine the AK Party.”

It’s not fair for me to give advice to the CHP, but in my opinion, the party’s biggest problem since the 1950s has been that they do not have a genuine or original opinion to present to Turkey.

During the periods when the center of politics was divided and the nation was led by coalitions, the lack of ideas was not evident on the surface. But in the last 16 years, whether we like it or not, this political center has shifted towards the AK Party and Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Kilicdaroglu is acting like a surgeon, searching for a cure by applying trial-and-error method on a patient lying on the operation table.

The problem is not just that the CHP does not have any ideas worth expressing to the Turkish people. More crucially, the CHP is under the illusion that its criticisms of the current government, at least some of which are quite accurate, are ideas, and has for a long time been under the spell of laziness that has restricted their ideas and discourse to these limits.

Today we know very well what the CHP is against and what it thinks should not happen in the country. But we do not know what it is for and what it can actually promise Turkey.

Criticism is obviously something that is in the very nature of being in opposition and is an extremely important element from society’s point of view. It is ridiculous to criticize the CHP for their criticisms towards the government and their works. The problem is not that the CHP criticizes, but that it does not say anything else. Due to this reason, the CHP is restricted to a discourse, the main limits of which are determined by the government.

As long as this basic parameter does not change, no matter how many times the CHP changes its strategy, it will not be able to achieve any meaningful change in its number of votes. The CHP does not need political engineering or clever strategies, but needs to come up with new ideas. In other words, the CHP needs to focus on politics rather than engineering, develop a political discourse and use strategies that bring this to the forefront.

But of course, such a new political idea that has failed to emerge in the last 16 years will not miraculously emerge right before the elections. Meaning that the CHP will experience an election just like the ones in the past. We will see whether the path that was chosen, namely “what if it works”, will work or not.

Then let us return to the beginning of this article. Everyone in the CHP, from its leader to its doorman, is not only aware of the criticisms I have expressed here, but feels them in their bones. Due to this, they compete with each other more than competing with their electoral opponents, and again, everyone in the CHP is more curious about the morning of April 1 rather than the eve of March 31.

With almost a month left until the local elections, political parties have put all their efforts to cross the finish line in lead. All parties have made and continue to make efforts to maximize their gains in local administration. While on the one hand local elections dominate the agenda of domestic politics, there is a rising discussion on the possibility of the formation of a new political party on the other. Some political circles imply that former AK Party ministers are about to establish a new political party as an alternative against the government. Even if there have been no official statements made about these allegations, Turkey is nowadays discussing the possibility of the establishment of a new splinter party.

Indeed, Turkey’s political history is full with splinter parties founded as a result of disagreements and intra-party rivalries. The prominent examples of splinter parties in Turkey are the Great Union Party founded by Muhsin Yazicioglu, the New Turkey Party founded by former MPs of the Democratic Left Party, and Turkey Party established by Abdullatif Sener, a former minister of the AK Party currently serving as an MP for the CHP. All of these political parties were divided into various functions due to increasing conflicts and clashes of ideas at the time.

Why has the AK Party never faced any massive intra-party opposition in comparison to other political parties?

Since the AK Party has been in power for 17 years, there have always been some rumors about new splits within the party. However, even if some politicians leave the party because of the clash of interests, there has never been a massive intra-party opposition movement within the party.

Why has the AK Party never faced any massive intra-party opposition in comparison to other political parties? The answer of this question lies behind the powerful and consolidated leadership of President Erdogan, which has been acknowledged by the masses for years. Nonetheless, other political parties experienced some problems in providing consensus and the acknowledgement of the party leadership by society. For instance, both the CHP and Iyi Party have experienced a leadership crisis in the last year, which has resulted in the resignation of some prominent party officials from both parties.

Abdullah Gul, Ahmet Davutoglu, and Ali Babacan have been proposed as challengers of Erdogan’s leadership. Do these names really have the capacity to challenge Erdogan or get mass support?

When it comes to the AK Party, Erdogan’s leadership cannot be challenged by other opposition groups. In the current process, the names of Abdullah Gul, Ahmet Davutoglu, and Ali Babacan have been proposed as challengers of Erdogan’s leadership. Nevertheless, it is a well-known fact that none of these names have the capacity to challenge Erdogan’s leadership or get mass support.

These three names have served in various positions under the AK Party administration. Abdullah Gul served as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister, and President. Likewise, Ahmet Davutoglu and Ali Babacan have also served in critical positions in the AK Party governments. After their terms ended, they did not have a serious impact on the dynamics of the party. This means that they could not create their own followers neither under the roof of the AK Party, nor among the voters.

Due to the fact that these names have not provided a statement either supporting or denying the allegations, it is possible to see some mobilization among former AK Party officials. Nevertheless, because of the lack of leadership and support, it is difficult for these mobilized groups to turn into a new political movement against the AK Party. Turkey’s opposition parties, on the other side, will never quit their quest for an alternative conservative party against Erdogan since they cannot perform an effective opposition in Turkish politics.

In the run up to the local elections to be held on March 31, anti-refugee rhetoric targeting Syrian refugees have started to appear in campaign speeches – a pattern that has been repeating itself since 2015. Some political leaders and party representatives have once again brought up the “Syrian” rhetoric in a negative way. An aggressive atmosphere for election campaigns can be regarded as a political convention. In democratic countries, it is only natural to observe a certain degree of tension. This goes for all democratic countries. But insisting on similar arguments in every electoral period shows that some limits may have been overstepped.

The exclusionist discourse adopted by the representatives of the main opposition, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Iyi Party, does not only overstep the limits of political ethics, but also demonstrates that these parties violate fundamental principles and humanitarian aspects such as charity, justice, human rights, and the right to live. Despite that, the effort to consolidate the electorate by making use of the issue of Syrian refugees has turned into a manipulative tool for the members of these two parties.

Social provocation and Syrian refugees

The Iyi Party and CHP have bad records with regard to spreading anti-refugee sentiment that has lately come into prominence ahead of the local elections. Politicians from both parties have been engaging in activities that contribute to the production and circulation of discourses that aim to manipulate society. There are numerous examples of this. But it would be more than enough to just remind a few of the most provocative incidents, which were generally fomented by those who are antagonistic to the Turkish President Erdogan. For instance, in January 2017, Ozturk Yilmaz, CHP deputy chair responsible for foreign policy, issued a statement to spur anti-refugee sentiments in public by stating that Syrian men were hanging out with Turkish girls while Turkish troops were fighting and dying in al-Bab. This mindset was subsequently spread in the political spectrum spearheaded by the CHP and Iyi Party. Similarly, Muharrem Ince, CHP’s presidential candidate for the elections that took place on 24 June, 2018, said that the Syrian refugees who went to their hometown to celebrate religious holidays should not be allowed to Turkey on their return.

The anti-refugee discourse adopted by the CHP and Iyi Party does not only overstep the limits of political ethics, but also demonstrates that these parties violate fundamental principles and humanitarian aspects such as charity, justice, human rights, and the right to live.

There are a series of baseless biases on Syrian refugees, which are incessantly repeated by certain groups as if they are true. Some of the most common biases are often phrased as: “Everything is free of charge for Syrians, since our citizens pay for everything,” “Syrian students are accepted into universities without taking any exams,” “TOKI (Turkey’s public housing body) gives Syrians houses free of charge,” “Their phone bills are paid by the state,” “The state puts Syrians on a payroll,” and “Syrians do not work or produce anything. They are only a burden for our economy.” Although relevant state institutions have issued many statements expressing the inaccuracy of these claims, such rumors are still widespread in public.

The approaches of the opposition party chairs also reflect the same rigidity, which indicates that the opposition has lost its common sense on the political ground. For instance, CHP Chair Kemal Kilicdaroglu issued many statements promising that he would send Syrians “back home.” In a speech he made in Gaziantep in April 2017, Kilicdaroglu argued that the state shows greater care to Syrians than its own citizens, he constructed a polarizing political language by using the refugee issue and claimed that refugees are loitering in Turkey while Turkish troops are being killed in al-Bab.

The same goes for Iyi Party Chair Meral Aksener. Prior to the June 24 elections, Aksener promised to send Syrians back to their country during her presidential campaign. This was most probably employed as a strategic tactic. Aksener touched on the subject in many of her speeches and repeatedly promised to send all Syrians back to their country before the month of Ramadan in 2019. Consequently, considering the present conditions of the Syrian Civil War, it is not hard to imagine how such a scenario would trigger a lurid carnage.

As Turkey is approaching the March 31 elections, the same discourse is re-appearing and being re-employed. Within this context, the statement made by Hatay Metropolitan Municipality Mayor and CHP member Lutfu Savas on January 17 that, “If a Syrian refugee was to come forward as a candidate in the local elections in the districts of Reyhanli, Yayladagi, Altinozu, they’d certainly win,” shows that this constitutes the continuation of previous approaches. These can be interpreted as obvious attempts by political actors to consolidate their public bases by fueling anti-refugee sentiment.

Upon examination of the mentioned examples, there are strong indications that the anti-refugee sentiment is turning into xenophobia and in some dimensions carries similarities with far-right movements of Europe. The ostracizing attitudes of racists in Europe towards Turks and other Muslims are trying to be implemented in Turkey. Another point that should be stressed here is that the attitudes of the two parties regarding the subject of refugees is not focused on developing solutions. Aside from the suggestions that “Syrians should leave” and that there should be a reconciliation with the Assad regime “immediately,” the CHP and Iyi Party do not have any healthy suggestions in such a wide field.

There are strong indications that the CHP and Iyi Party’s anti-refugee sentiment is turning into xenophobia and in some dimensions carries similarities with far-right movements of Europe.

The opposition’s contradiction regarding Syrian refugees 

When examining the discourse employed by Turkish political parties that are trying to use the matter of Syrian refugees living in Turkey as a propaganda tool for the upcoming elections, a great contradiction can be observed. In order to deal with this problem, which has its roots in Syria, the Turkish administration under the leadership of President Erdogan, is engaging in intense diplomatic efforts both with global powers such as the U.S. and Russia and with regional powers such as Iran. Within this context, the Astana peace process, initiated with Russia and Iran, has come to a significant point. They are also negotiating with the U.S. in regards to the territory held by the YPG-PYD in the west of the Euphrates, as well as the presence of the terrorist organization in the regions east of the Euphrates.

President Trump’s announcement of the withdrawal of the U.S. from Syria, as well as following announcements regarding the establishment of a “safe zone,” which is in accordance with Turkey’s intentions in the region, show that these negotiations have yielded, and are likely to continue to yield, positive results. Undoubtedly, there are many unknown variables in the process. Due to this reason, delicate diplomatic efforts are being made as part of a long and arduous process.

In addition to these political processes, Turkey has also displayed its hard power capabilities with its military operations. Firstly, in 2016, Operation Euphrates Shield was conducted against Daesh. Following, in 2018, Operation Olive Branch was conducted in Afrin against the terrorist organizations YPG/PYD and Daesh. These two military operations yielded important results in terms of ensuring the territorial integrity of Syria with the removal of terrorist organizations, the destruction of groups threatening Turkey’s national security, and the safe return of refugees to Syria. President Erdogan frequently expresses to the global public that in the following period, Turkey will continue to shape its Syria policy with similar intentions. The fact that over 300 thousand Syrian refugees have been able to return to their homes as a result of these operations is important in understanding the political codes awaiting us.

In this context, the contradiction revealed is as follows: Even though authorities from the CHP and Iyi Party have established their campaigns around Syrian refugees, they have always opposed such measures and processes that allow for the safe return of Syria refugees. While the AK Party is making efforts to both protect Turkey’s interests in the region and to ensure the safe return of refugees to their countries, the fact that political movements expressing discontent towards the heavy presence of Syrian refugees in Turkey oppose such efforts shows an important paradox in their attitudes. As a result, it can be concluded that the perspective of these two parties regarding the refugee matter is not focused on finding solutions, but rather focused on using the issue for their own interests in domestic politics.

Even though the CHP and Iyi Party argue for the return of Syrian refugees in their campaigns, they always oppose measures and processes that allow for the safe return of refugees to Syria.

Two main reasons lie behind this discourse. The first is the effort to corner the AK Party and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as they were in power during the period in which Syrians fled the war and sought refuge in Turkey. The second has to do with the electoral base of the political parties that are trying to keep this propaganda tool alive. The political spheres that produce, attempt to spread and employ this discourse are seeking to motivate their public bases. It should be emphasized that this discourse, which has been built on natural problems that exist in the societal foundation within the context of Syrian refugees, is brought in certain communities.

Shifting to the far right?

So, how many Syrian refugees are currently residing in Turkey and how many of them have the right to vote? These numbers are shared with the public. According to Turkey’s Interior Minister, Suleyman Soylu, the number of Syrian refugees currently living in Turkey is around 3 million 630 thousand. The total number of those that have been naturalized is 73,820. Subtracting this number from those that are below the voting age, 53,990 people remain. Meaning that only 53,990 Syrian refugees will be able to vote in the upcoming local elections. Considering that Syrians that are eligible to vote live in different cities across Turkey, they do not have the capability to heavily influence any region and do not have the ability to change the results of the vote. Due to this reason, campaign strategies that start by putting emphasis on “Syrians” lack any real basis.

Looking at the elections held in Turkey since 2015, all four of them resulted with the victory of the AK Party. While the AK Party failed to receive the majority in the general elections of June 7, 2015, it received 49% of the total votes in the elections held on November 1, 2015, and formed the government. Again, in the constitutional referendum held on April 16, 2017, the proposal brought forward by the AK Party and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) was accepted and in the following presidential elections held on June 24, 2018, Erdogan was elected as the President of Turkey. The People’s Alliance founded by the AK Party and the MHP also achieved an overwhelming victory against the Nation Alliance, which employed a similar discourse in the campaign trail.

Insistence on igniting anti-refugee sentiment for simply gaining more votes pushes society towards the political right. And this will not benefit anyone in the long-term.

The language of propaganda that aims to incite anti-refugee sentiment does not have the capability to change the voting habits of the public in Turkey. It can be foreseen that the decision of political actors to employ this discourse, despite having experienced the above stated fact in the previous four elections already, will not do them much good. The only result that will be produced by their insistence on this point is within the context of an ideological shift in their public bases, pushing them more towards the right. And it is obvious that this will not benefit anyone in the long-term.

Turkey’s opposition parties including the CHP, the Iyi Party and the HDP have established a holy alliance to stop the ruling AK Party-MHP bloc. The political system, especially after the introduction of the presidential system in April 2017, has started to be structured by bipolarity. The underlying motive for both of the alliances is similar, the will to power. However, they are shaped by two different and rather opposing ideological frameworks based on their positions within the political system.

The opposition seeks to detach the AK Party-MHP bloc from power, and thus adopts a discourse of liberty. This discourse strives to convince the electorate that the ruling power is oppressive and excluding the majority of society. The ruling AK Party-MHP bloc, in contrast, puts forward a discourse of power in order to maintain and strengthen its grasp on power. This discourse seeks to persuade the electorate that its rule is inclusive and should continue to sustain the security and welfare of the country.

The CHP, Iyi Party, and HDP alliance, designed to topple the AK Party-MHP bloc, is shaped by two different and rather opposing ideological frameworks based on their positions within the political system. 

Therefore, the result of the power struggle, including the upcoming local elections on 31 March, between these two political blocs will be determined by a couple of factors. The first one is the persuasive power of each discourse or policy. For the ruling bloc, the electorate will look at whether its interests are tied to the continuation of the existing order. If the electorate feel that an election loss for the ruling bloc will destabilize the political system and lead to an insecure environment, both with respect to the economy and politico-military matters, they tend to vote for the ruling AK Party-MHP bloc. More specifically, if the AK Party-MHP ruling bloc convinces the electorate that it’s loss of power will impair the fight against terrorism (PKK, FETO and DAESH) and deteriorate the country’s economy, which had recently taken a downturn, it will guarantee the election victory.

Thus, the opposition should convince the electorate that a change in power or the replacement of the ruling bloc with the opposition will not harm the fight against terrorism and improve the country’s economy. The opposition should persuade the electorate that there is an alternative to the ruling power and that alternative is itself.

For the ruling bloc in Turkey, the electorate will look at whether its interests are tied to the continuation of the existing order. The opposition need to convince the electorate that a change in power will not harm Turkey’s fight against terrorism and will improve the country’s economy. 

This leads us to the second factor. The opposition should demonstrate that the alliance between the three political parties –here we can include the Islamist Felicity Party (SP)– form a strong and dependable force for ruling the country. The opposition alliance is formed by two secular-nationalist political parties –the CHP and the Iyi Party– and the Kurdish nationalist HDP. The integrity and coordination between the CHP and the Iyi Party is not a strong one since the CHP tilts towards the Left whereas the Iyi Party has right-wing tendencies. This creates a serious divergence of opinions over some critical issues. The relations between these two parties have already created serious ideological debates among their members and caused some party members to resign and shift sides.

The opposition is not offering a clear-cut economic program to fight with the existing economic problems such as rising inflation and unemployment rates as well as not providing a comprehensive program for urban planning

As we add the Kurdish nationalist HDP, which is the political representative of the PKK armed terrorist group, the internal contradictions of the opposition bloc intensively rises. Not only the right-wing Turkish nationalist Iyi Party members and its grassroots have reacted to this rapprochement with the HDP, but left-wing CHP members and its grassroots showed displeasure with the decision to ally with the HDP. The inclusion of the HDP into the alliance has decreased the chances for the opposition to be able to weaken the ruling bloc in the upcoming local elections. This will more likely be perceived by the electorate that the opposition bloc may endanger the fight against terrorism, especially Turkey’s struggle with the PKK’s Syrian branch, the YPG.

Moreover, the opposition is not offering a clear-cut economic program to fight with the existing economic problems such as rising inflation and unemployment rates. Not to mention that the opposition bloc has not provided a comprehensive program for urban planning and government in the run-up to the local elections. In sum, despite the rising public displeasure with the existing ruling power, the opposition seems to fail to offer itself as an alternative in the elections.     

The AK Party’s heatedly anticipated election manifesto was shared with the public last week by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Since there is less than two months for the upcoming local elections, revealing the manifesto was an important step towards setting the rules and regulations to be followed during the election campaign. The focus on the election manifesto was establishing smart and eco-friendly cities and other details of newly-emerging projects and ideas were shared with the public.

The AK Party’s election manifesto consists of 11 basic articles focusing on the mentioned themes. The articles basically cover issues such as city planning, urban renewal projects, infrastructure and transportation, smart cities, green cities, social municipality, and urbanization. In the manifesto, it’s emphasized that there is a need of a new understanding in governing the urban rather than solely using traditional methods. Due to this, it was quite interesting to see that the AK Party is renewing its approach to local administration and urban governance after its long-lasting success story.

The AK Party’s recently revealed local election manifesto emphasizes that there is need for a new understanding in governing the urban rather than solely using traditional methods.

Since the beginning of the AK Party’s local administration tradition in 1994, the party adopted a unique and intrinsic approach, integrating binary concepts such as traditional vs. modern and old vs. new. This approach created a new understanding of governance in Turkey’s local administration. Indeed, all parties had renewed their way of governance in accordance with the AK Party’s hybrid approach. Social municipality and cultural municipality had become key concepts of local administration.

The latest election manifesto goes even beyond this understanding. As an innovation in governing the urban, the party foresaw a more environment-friendly approach in all areas related to the urban. For instance, the promise of building horizontal cities instead of vertical ones was one of the reflections of this new approach. Furthermore, the emphasis of the protection of nature and history in the urban to protect the values of cities is another example of this understanding.

Another aspect of this newly-emerging approach is to provide more effective tools to implement technological innovation in local administration. At this point, the concept of smart cities facilitating services for people appears at the forefront. Smart cities integrate local administration and technological development in order to accelerate the process of providing services to the locals. As has also been emphasized in the manifesto, it has now become an obligation to make cities smarter under the current circumstances.

AK Party’s latest manifesto is the reflection of the party’s intrinsic and newly-emerging approach in governing the urban.

It was also promised that people would be more involved in the decision-making processes in local administration. The active participation of people in local politics has recently become a hot topic. There have been some institutional renewals in local levels in order to provide the active participation of people. Nonetheless the manifesto underlines that there should be new tools to provide better participation in accordance with the understanding of “governing with the people.”  

The AK Party’s latest manifesto is the reflection of the party’s intrinsic and newly-emerging approach in governing the urban. If this approach becomes dominant in local politics, Turkey will probably face a new way in governing the urban in accordance with technology, innovation, and ecological considerations.

The AK Party is expected to reveal its candidate for Istanbul on Saturday. Binali Yildirim’s name has already been discussed in circles close to the party and he may be considered as the ‘common’ candidate of the People’s Alliance – composed of the AK Party and MHP. Devlet Bahceli already announced that MHP will fully support Yildirim’s candidacy in Istanbul.

The technical detail that both party’s leading figures are talking about is the fact that Binali Yildirim is currently the president of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. In the previous weeks there were rumors that Binali Yildirim will resign from his current position in order to run for the mayoral elections. However, rumors now suggest that both Erdogan and Bahceli don’t think it’s necessary for Yildirim to resign in order to become the candidate for Istanbul.

CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu is yet to comment on this issue. Whether he is remaining silent due to the friendly meeting he held with Yildirim in December or whether he will use this as a tool during the election campaign is yet to be known.

The campaigns for Turkey’s local elections in 2019 will start in full gear next week. Above economic reasons, political analysts expect the potential military operation to be launched by the Turkish Armed Forces in the east of the Euphrates to have an impact on the campaign process and the results of the election.

Since the upcoming local elections will be the first of their kind in the new presidential system, there are some technical details that are being adjusted for these elections according to the needs of the new system in Turkey.

According to the current Turkish electoral law, which has been applied until now, the official authority to depose majors are in the hands of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, in the new system, the Minister of Internal Affairs can be appointed as a technical bureaucrat and does not need to be an elected representative. In this regard, the related constitutional bylaw will change and will give this authority directly to the President.

There are also some other details, like the protocol procedures or immunity issues of the mayors – that need to be regulated. These details and others are currently being studied by technocrats and whether or not changes will occur depend on the agenda of the parliament.

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi

There are three and a half months until the local elections in Turkey and each week as the political dynamics in the country are changing, names of the candidates, details of negotiations, and the nature of alliances are also changing.

The CHP and Iyi Party have agreed upon 21 cities – 11 has been taken by the CHP and the remaining 10 that the Iyi Party has a potential. There are rumors that the two parties will also come to an agreement on 19 other districts. However, details of these districts and the names to be put forward are expected to become clear next week.

After the party assembly meeting for determining candidates for local elections yesterday, Seyit Torun – deputy head of the CHP – made a press conference and announced 67 candidates of the CHP. Torun declared that CHP’s candidate for Ankara is Mansur Yavas, for Istanbul is Ekrem Imamoglu, Adana is Zeydan Karalar, and Antalya, Muhittin Bocek. In addition to these cities, Torun declared candidates for other cities including Ahmet Meric in Agri, Tanju Ozcan in Bolu, Rasim Yilmaz in Nigde, Ali Akyildiz in Sivas, and Fatma Kaplan Hurriyet in Kocaeli.

Within the framework of its alliance with the Iyi Party, CHP withdrew its candidate – Ahmet Akin – from Balikesir. Another controversial city during the alliance negotiations between the two parties was Adana. It was later decided that the Iyi Party will support CHP’s candidate and Zeydan Karalar was announced as the candidate for Adana yesterday. The Iyi Party will also support CHP’s Antalya candidate – Muhittin Bocek – who is currently the mayor of Konyaalti (a district of Antalya).

The most discussed candidate between the CHP and Iyi Party has been Mansur Yavas. He was finally announced as CHP’s candidate and according to the alliance between the two parties, the Iyi Party will support Mansur Yavas in Ankara.

In the local elections of 2014, Mansur Yavas was CHP’s candidate in Ankara, and he received 43.82% of the votes. AK Party’s Melih Gokcek won the elections in Ankara with 44.82% of the total votes.

There are discussions that CHP is currently having some problems in deciding about its candidate for Izmir, who will run against AK Party’s Nihat Zeybekci – ex-minister of economy. The current mayor of Izmir belongs to the CHP but is not running in the upcoming elections. There are rumors that Kemal Kilicdaroglu – head of the CHP – is planning to announce a “surprise” candidate.

On the other side of the equilibrium, the AK Party and MHP have decided to go through the cities that have already been announced. It is rumored that MHP has decided to withdraw its candidates in a couple of cities and is speculated that the AK Party will withdraw its candidates in Igdir and Kars, and support the MHP’s candidates. In the People’s Alliance so far, while the MHP has not nominated candidates in Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir, the AK Party has not nominated candidates in Igdir and Kars.

According to reports from HaberTurk, the AK Party will not nominate candidates in Adana, Manisa, Mersin, and Osmaniye, where the MHP currently controls the municipalities.

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi

Local elections in Turkey have always been exposed to various dimensions of politics. Compared to parliamentary elections, the agenda during local elections include different issues such as urbanization, infrastructure facilities, local administration, and ecological subjects. As well as these issues, local dynamics such as close-knit relations and the personal reputation of candidates play a significant role on the results. The dominance of these facts causes different electoral results that deviate from parliamentary elections.

It is a well-known fact that the success or failure of parties in parliamentary elections do not give any clue about the results of local elections. There has always been a gap between the results of these two for all political parties. A political party that is not a significant player in parliamentary elections can become quite successful and win municipalities. As a result of this phenomenon, all parties have different strategies for local elections.

What does micro campaign mean?

Nowadays, while Turkey’s political parties are focusing on their election campaigns, there is an ongoing discussion in the media about the possibilities and limitations of conducting micro-campaigns. Micro campaigns mean conducting election campaigns for a narrower target group, such as women, unemployed people, and youth, rather than focusing on the whole population. This method enables politicians to diversify the content of their campaigns and develop a multi-discourse for them.

Indeed, micro campaigns have been quite popular in the U.S. in the last decade. Especially in the election campaign of Trump, which was micro-targeted and which successfully utilized social media channels. When it comes to Turkey’s local elections, it is crucial to develop best practices for each electoral district.

The AK Party is the pioneer of micro-campaigns in Turkey’s elections. It is seen that the party always focuses on inviting new options for election campaigns in accordance with the country’s current dynamics. For instance, President Erdogan announced that traditional election campaign methods causing visual and noise pollution will be eliminated in the local elections process. Thus, the party will develop new options in order to attract new voter profiles and to implement more environmentally-friendly methods.

Indeed, since the party has always paid attention to these issues, it has become more successful in drawing support from new voters. According to the results of some surveys, the AK Party is still in first place among other political parties in terms of gaining new votes. Nevertheless, it is also a fact that the party should pay more attention to these voters and invent new options in order to get support from these groups.

It is possible to see that the AK Party will adapt a much well-developed micro-campaign strategy this time. The first dimension of this campaign will be to use a problem-solving approach for each electoral district by focusing on the most crucial problems faced. Rather than implementing a traditional discourse, the party may focus directly on concrete problems and their solutions. Furthermore, the party may focus on adapting specific discourse for each electoral district in order to reflect the expectations of voters.

The second dimension of this campaign may be to use social media channels more effectively rather than focusing on TV and newspapers. This can be one of the most important parts of a micro-campaign strategy, which is popular all around the world. Using this method requires adapting a dynamic rather than static election strategy that can be renewed according to changing expectations.

It is not an easy task for all parties to adopt micro-campaigns for each electoral district. Using this strategy requires renewing the basis of the campaign in each step. Nevertheless, it will be a good change for Turkish voters to see various practices of micro-campaigns on the local level.

The heat of the upcoming critical local elections of 31 March, 2019, is getting warmer. The local elections are the most important item on the political agenda of Turkey nowadays after the international turmoil.

President Erdogan is expected to meet with Devlet Bahceli, head of the MHP, in order to continue the ‘People’s Alliance,’ which was formed in the last parliamentary and presidential elections held on June 24.

The former part of the deal between the AK Party and MHP is clear: in every province where the opposition parties form an alliance, there will be a common candidate under the People’s Alliance.

Both Erdogan and Bahceli will decide about the details of the union between the AK Party and MHP as well as finalizing ‘common candidates’ in certain cities. The former part of the deal is clear: in every province where the opposition parties form an alliance, there will be a common candidate under the People’s Alliance. For the latter part, according to Abdulkadir Selvi, a political journalist from Hurriyet daily newspaper, the deal between the two parties is “sealed” in Isparta and Kars and there is some “discomfort” in Adana and Mersin.

Speaking at his party’s meeting on Monday, Devlet Bahceli declared that if Binali Yildirim becomes candidate for Istanbul, the MHP will give him full support.

Last week some Turkish newspapers wrote about the details of the alliance and called it a “gesture model,” which is being described as both parties being “considerable” to their “sensitivities” in certain cities and districts. There are some rumors that there will be a change of candidates in Adana and Aydin. MHP has declared to support the AK Party’s candidates in Denizli and Erzurum, after recalling its candidates in these cities. This support is said to spread to other cities that are expected to be won by the AK Party. On the other hand, in 60 centers where the MHP won the local elections in 2014 and where they are still leading the polls, the AK Party is expected to support the MHP candidates. In three major cities – Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir – the MHP will not declare a candidate and will support the candidates of the AK Party.

Meanwhile, the leader of the main opposition, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, met with Iyi Party leader Meral Aksener a couple of times last week and are expected to meet again this week in order to finalize the negotiations on an alliance.

Kilicdaroglu is said to have decided the name for Istanbul: Ekrem Imamoglu – the current lead of Beylikduzu. Therefore, Aksener has not much to do with the candidate of Istanbul. According to Selvi, the race for Istanbul will be between Binali Yildirim and Ekrem Imamoglu.

The major issues between these two parties are the common candidates to be shown in Ankara and Istanbul. This is because there are certain obstacles as both parties are competing for the leading role in the opposition camp. Kilicdaroglu is said to have decided the name for Istanbul: Ekrem Imamoglu – the current lead of Beylikduzu. Therefore, Aksener has not much to do with the candidate of Istanbul. According to Selvi, the race for Istanbul will be between Binali Yildirim and Ekrem Imamoglu.

While the meetings between the opposition leaders have been ongoing, they have not yet reached the clarity that the AK Party and MHP have. The major differences on who will be common candidates in the important provinces will remain a problem. Aksener has already stated that “if we are leaving Istanbul, Izmir, Adana, and Mersin, then the two major cities – Ankara and Antalya – shall remain with us.”

Since there is less than four months until the 2019 local elections, all political parties are busy nowadays trying to finalize their candidate selection process and election manifesto. Nevertheless, as a new phenomenon in Turkish politics, the issue of pre-electoral alliances are at the top of the agenda of all political parties. Even though the People’s Alliance, which consists of the AK Party and the MHP are about to finalize their negotiation process, the opposition block of the CHP, Iyi Party, and HDP are still discussing the boundaries and limitations of forming an alliance.

It is crucial to make process-tracing in order to understand the roots of problematic issues within this block. It was announced that the Nation Alliance that was formed between the CHP, Iyi Party, and Felicity Party had been terminated after the June 24 elections. These parties made harsh criticisms against each other and about the failure of this alliance in the parliamentary elections. It was a well-known fact that the opposition parties formed an alliance solely to stand against the People’s Alliance.

The parties that formed the Nation Alliance have different ideological orientations and political agendas about the future of Turkey. Nowadays, there is an ongoing discussion on whether differences in their ideological orientations prevent the formation of pre-electoral alliances in local elections within this opposition bloc. Even prominent political figures of this block pay attention to the danger, which may bring more destruction to their own parties. How will these parties manage to form a balance between their ideological orientation and the interests of the opposition block? The answer of this question reflects the main crisis within this bloc.

How will the opposition bloc in Turkey manage to form a balance between their ideological orientation and their interests? The answer to this question reflects the main crisis within this bloc. 

It is obvious that the main aim of the opposition parties is preventing the success of the People’s Alliance in local elections. In accordance with this purpose, the parties are trying to form an alliance, especially in critical provinces such as Istanbul, Ankara, Adana, and Mersin. The parties in the opposition block face a conflict of interests for these provinces and therefore negotiations fail to be carried forward.

The Iyi Party, which was established almost a year ago, sees these local elections as a springboard for its future. Since the party experienced a serious existential crisis after the June 24 elections, the local elections are perceived as a way of overcoming the crisis. Due to this, the Iyi Party wants to win the local elections especially in Ankara, Adana, and Mersin. The party claims that there is a significant number of voters in these provinces and that CHP should not nominate any candidate in these provinces. Nevertheless, as Turkey’s main opposition party, the CHP is not open to withdrawing from these provinces in favor of the Iyi party. This issue is the main reason of the conflict of interest within the block.

The Iyi Party, which was established almost a year ago, sees the 2019 local elections as a springboard for its future. Since the party experienced a serious existential crisis after the June 24 elections, the local elections are perceived as a way of overcoming the crisis.

Moreover, these parties have different opinions on the boundaries of the alliance. While the CHP is willing to include the HDP in this alliance, the Iyi Party is against this. At the end of the day, the HDP’s position within the opposition block becomes a serious problem for the future of this opposition block. Even though the leaders of the CHP and Iyi Party will have a meeting this week, it seems difficult to overcome all these problems in the short term.

Within the past two weeks, Turkey’s governing AK Party revealed a significant number of mayor candidates for the upcoming local elections. After negotiations between the AK Party and the MHP on forming an alliance again, both parties have accelerated their preparations for the elections. As these elections are a crucial turning point for the AK Party and the consolidation of the new political system, the candidate selection process was important to establish a successful election strategy.

President Erdogan’s three-term rule, which limits running for office for a maximum of three terms, with the purpose of providing dynamism and rejuvenation in party cadres has been implemented for the first time in local elections. Due to this reason, 91 mayors of provinces and counties currently serving could not be re-nominated. The first round of candidates were announced by President Erdogan on 24 November. These included the candidates of 40 provinces, consisting of politicians, NGO leaders, governors, and former ministers. President Erdogan underlined again that competency and the merit of the candidate compose the criteria that the AK Party has used in the candidate selection process.

As the upcoming local elections are a crucial turning point for the AK Party and the consolidation of the new political system, the candidate selection process was important to establish a successful election strategy.

The second round of candidates were announced soon after, on 27 November. The most striking names in this second group were the candidates of Ankara and Izmir. The deputy chair of the AK Party, Mehmet Ozhaseki, was nominated for Ankara, while the former Minister of Economy Nihat Zeybekci became the mayoral candidate for Izmir. Ozhaseki and Zeybekci are well-known politicians throughout the country and their nomination was a sign that the AK Party is paying more attention to these metropolitan cities. Nevertheless, even if the candidacy of Binali Yildirim for Istanbul is almost certain, it is yet to be announced to the public.

The candidates for Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir form the cornerstones of the AK Party’s election strategy. As Bahceli announced, the MHP will not nominate candidates in provinces that the AK Party has, and will support the AK Party’s candidate in order to maintain the solidarity of the coalition formed during the June 24 elections. As a result of this, the People’s Alliance has already significantly gone ahead of the game. The AK Party nominated three high-profile politicians to attract the voters in these electoral districts, and these candidates have been welcomed by the MHP. Thus, the candidate selection strategy of the AK Party in these provinces received successful reflections by both parties.

President Erdogan’s three-term rule, which limits running for office for a maximum of three terms, with the purpose of providing dynamism and rejuvenation in party cadres has been implemented for the first time in local elections.

Nonetheless, the AK Party is aware of the rejuvenation demands among the masses. In accordance with this purpose, the party has made significant changes in its candidate profiles. For instance, only 10 out of 40 among the first group of candidates are currently serving mayors of their electoral districts. This shows that the AK Party is paying attention to the mobilization in local administration.

The rest of the AK Party’s candidates will be announced throughout December along with the party’s election manifesto. It is possible to see some joint candidates as part of a cooperation between the AK Party and the MHP. Negotiations on the possibilities and limitations of the alliance are being conducted precisely. The concrete results of these negotiations will be seen in the following days as the rest of the candidates are announced.

In the past couple of days, Turkey’s political agenda has mainly been shaped by the upcoming local elections scheduled for March 2019. Understanding the importance of the local elections from a foreign point of view might be difficult if one disregards some crucial points. Although there is still over four months until election day, it won’t be wrong to focus on the main dynamics of the upcoming elections in Turkey.

The local elections planned to be held on 31 March, 2019, will be the first elections subsequent to the final establishment of the Turkish presidential system on 24 June, 2018. The previous local elections in all 81 provinces of Turkey were held in March 2014 when besides the mayors of the Turkish provinces, all other leading local offices had been elected as well. Furthermore, the 2014 local elections symbolized a key importance due to the prior judicial coup attempts by FETO members, who infiltrated the Turkish judiciary for over years.

Despite several moves and FETO-related – or manipulated – media supported campaigns, Turkish citizens did not accept a tutelage-like scenario by FETO and thus the ruling AK Party, led by then Prime Minister Erdogan, won the local elections without any heavy losses. Actually, this day could be thought of the acceleration day of the end of FETO, which even in this subsequent process tried to execute a bloody coup on 15 July, 2016, which also failed due to the people’s will that prevented the putschists.

After re-joining the party, President Erdogan, who was once the Mayor of Istanbul, pushed for reform within the local cadres of the AK Party. 

In regards to the 31 March, 2019, local elections, there are some important points that have been taken into account by both the AK Party and the MHP. As one remembers, both parties had created an alliance during the 24 June presidential and parliamentary elections, which symbolized Turkey’s ultimate switch to a new system of government. Interestingly, despite some disagreements in the afterward concerning some certain policy issues, it became clear last week that both parties will once again cooperate during the local elections – this time in a limited range but still covering Turkey’s three provinces with the highest population. Thus, this time the alliance will focus on certain cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. It has to be stressed that approximately 25 million of Turkey’s total – 81 million – population, live in these three cities.

Following this path, during his speech on Saturday, MHP leader Devlet Bahceli stated, “No matter who the Justice and Development Party nominates in the three biggest provinces, we will provide full support. There has been no bargain, collusion or give-and-take in making our decision.” Bahceli also added by addressing the continuing importance of the presidential system while stating “Whoever aims to destroy the presidential system will find us standing against them. This is about the People’s Alliance, the presidential system and the composition of local administrations in line with that.”

Highlighting his support for an alliance during the local elections in Turkey next year, MHP chair Devlet Bahceli stated, “Whoever aims to destroy the presidential system will find us standing against them. This is about the People’s Alliance, the presidential system and the composition of local administrations in line with that.”

On the other hand, the AK Party, actually began the renewal of its local cadres in 2017 when President Erdogan was able to re-join the party after the constitutional ban. On the day he was able to join the party, President Erdogan stated, “We will update all of our provincial, district and town organizations by the end of the year (2017) because there is a fatigue. We have to overcome this. With more dynamic teams, we have to prepare for 2019 [elections].”

It was no surprise that once again Erdogan himself, who was the mayor of Istanbul between 1994-1998, had realized the urgent need for certain reforms within the AK Party with regard to the upcoming local elections.

By elaborating on the motivation of the opposition parties regarding the local elections, one should particularly keep in mind that the main opposition party, the CHP, is once again seeking some rationality absent alliances, as it had tried during the 24 June elections by bringing together all opposition parties under the same umbrella. By this, the CHP, aims to come together with the conservative Saadet Party, secular-nationalist Iyi Party and is trying to find other ways to cooperate with the Kurdish nationalist HDP. But whether these ambivalent moves will find a reflection and positive reaction among the CHP constituent is another question. The main point all opposition parties share is the rejection of the newly established presidential system. If the opposition parties gain any success in major cities such as Istanbul or Ankara, they will most probably trigger a questioning of the legitimacy of the presidential system.

The CHP is trying to come together with the conservative Saadet Party, secular-nationalist Iyi Party and is trying to find other ways to cooperate with the Kurdish nationalist HDP.

In addition, and interestingly, Kemal Kilicdaroglu – the CHP chair – who has lost 9 elections since he became the party’s leader in 2010, still insists on keeping his position and has ignored harsh calls made by close party circles for him to step down by actively preventing party conventions. Moreover, the party’s presidential candidate during the June 24 elections and potential new chairperson of the CHP, Muharrem Ince, is testing for new opportunities in order to achieve his main purpose to become the successor of Kilicdaroglu. For this, he currently seems to have a new short-term strategy, namely, becoming the CHP’s candidate in Istanbul. Whether this will happen and what Kilicdaroglu is planning will become clearer in the upcoming weeks.

Kemal Kilicdaroglu – the CHP chair – who has lost 9 elections since he became the party’s leader in 2010, still insists on keeping his position and has ignored harsh calls made by close party circles for him to step down by actively preventing party conventions.

All in all, it can be guessed that the campaigns regarding the local elections will be held in a rather general elections atmosphere as has been the case in previous local elections in Turkey.

Although the AK Party and the MHP announced that they were not going to form an alliance for the upcoming local elections last month, the latest incidents forced them to come together under the People’s Alliance. The leaders of both parties held a meeting last week in order to discuss the possibilities and limitations of forming an alliance, and both leaders reflected positively on forming one.

The leader of MHP, Devlet Bahceli, stated that the MHP would not nominate its own candidates in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, the most critical provinces for the People’s Alliance, and that the MHP would support the AK Party candidates in these provinces. Thus, the People’s Alliance has once again emerged as a game changer in Turkish politics.

Before evaluating the reasons behind the re-emergence of the alliance, it is crucial to remember the reasons why the parties failed to form the alliance a couple of weeks ago. The AK Party and the MHP experienced a clash of interests on two issues. The first was on granting a partial amnesty for some prisoners, which the MHP fully supported and the AK Party was critical of. The second issue was the Council of State’s decision on the Student Oath. While the MHP applauded the decision, the AK Party harshly criticized it. As a result of these two crises, the parties announced that they were not going to form an alliance in the upcoming local elections.

The leaders of the AK Party and MHP have once again agreed on forming an alliance in the local elections in Turkey. Thus, the People’s Alliance has once again emerged as a game changer in Turkish politics.

Nevertheless, due to the latest mobilization within the opposition block, the parties had to change their stance in forming an alliance. The leader of the CHP started to seek for an alliance and had a meeting with high-ranking officials in the Iyi Party and HDP. Even if the reflections of the meeting with the HDP are still not clear, it is almost certain that the CHP and Iyi Party will form an alliance. As it was underlined in the press, both parties will pursue limited cooperation and collaboration in the local elections by nominating joint candidates in 9 provinces including Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Eskisehir, Antalya, Mersin, and Adana.

The mobilization of the opposition block might damage the success of the People’s Alliance in the upcoming elections and in its aftermath. If the opposition block ensures to form an alliance in critical provinces while the members of the People’s Alliance join the elections separately, the People’s alliance may lose some votes in critical provinces. Moreover, since the main aim of the members of the Nation’s Alliance is making Turkey’s presidential system a controversial issue, they will try to destabilize Turkey’s presidential system and impose their false agenda after the elections.

The fact that the AK Party and MHP joined around the same table again proves that the consolidation of the People’s Alliance has already provided and that parties in this alliance can make any sacrifice to serve the principles of the alliance. 

The AK Party and the MHP made a clever move in coming together to discuss the possible outcomes of this failure. Both parties founded their own delegation in order to maintain healthier discussions. The MHP’s support to the AK Party’s possible candidates in three major provinces increased mutual sympathy and tolerance again. President Erdogan thanked Bahceli for his commitment to the alliance. As a result of this, it is possible to broaden the boundaries of this alliance in the following days.

Consequently, after facing a serious crisis and handling it successfully, the AK Party and MHP are at the same table once again. This process proves that the consolidation of the People’s Alliance has already provided and that parties in this alliance can make any sacrifice in order to serve the principles of the alliance based on the country’s national values, unity, and solidarity.

Turkey’s local elections in 2009 will be the ‘first’ local elections in the new presidential system, both President Erdogan and his political competitors are going through a rigorous process making their final tunes in deciding the candidates of local administrators. It was recently announced by the party spokesperson that the candidates for about 40 municipalities have been decided and now waiting to be announced by the President Erdogan tomorrow.

President Erdogan and his party have still an advantage over their competitors since the last elections as the recent public opinion polls reflect. The AK Party attached importance to polls (temayül yoklaması) in deciding the candidates. In these polls two criteria are important: the first is how candidates perceive success and the second what would be the voting inclination of voters towards candidates.

Like all local elections in Turkish political history, three cities are the most important battle grounds in the competition: İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir. Experts argue that the results in these major cities will have an important impact on the next presidential elections

Change is expected in the AK Party candidate profiles that more than half the candidates will probably be new names. For Istanbul, the candidate of AK Party is finalized: Binali Yildirim – the former and last Prime Minister of the parliamentary system who has gained esteem through his former administrative responsibilities. In Ankara, polls show that Mehmet Ozhaseki – previous Minister of Environment and Urban Planning – who has a considerable experience in local administrations (as major of Kayseri between 1998-2015)- will be the final candidate. For Izmir the mentioned name was Mahmut Ozgener – 38th President of Turkish Football Association – who was an important political figure in İzmir, but sources close to the party tell that the AK Party’s candidate for İzmir will be Nihat Zeybekci, former minister of economy.

President Erdogan’s main competitor, Kemal Kilicdaroglu – head of CHP (Republican People’s Party) – has long been flirting with Meral Aksener’s Iyi Party to come up with a common candidate in major three major cities Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir in order to consolidate opposition votes against the AK Party candidate as they are aware that one victory in Ankara or Istanbul against AK Party will have a psychological effect.

On the other hand, People’s Alliance shows glimpses of survival even though both leaders, Erdogan and Bahceli, publicly announced before that there would be no alliance in the local elections. However, both leader got together in the presidential palace recently and some say that they reached to an understanding for a partial agreement on some cities. President Erdogan wants the support of MHP in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir in return for supporting MHP’s candidates in three other cities. HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party) which has been losing public support over the past five years, will apparently support CHP’s candidates in the western cities but it will depend on the candidate’s profile. CHP will be facing a grave dilemma of with whom to form an alliance: Turkish nationalist Iyi Party or Kurdish nationalist HDP?

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi. 

On Sunday 22 April, Turkey’s main opposition party CHP announced that 15 MPs had resigned and joined the Iyi Party. This action was taken under the conditions when it was not yet clear whether the Iyi Party could take part in the June 24 early elections. After this move by the CHP, it was announced that the Iyi Party could take part in the elections. This incident created a rapprochement between the two parties and turned into an official alliance in time. Nowadays, Turkey has been witnessing another rapprochement between the CHP and the Iyi Party and wonders whether it will turn into another pre-electoral alliance again.

Indeed, there have been some rumors of unofficial meetings taking place between the party officials for some weeks now. Some of these meetings have been verified by party officials, but it was emphasized that the agenda of those meetings were not related to local elections and possible alliances. Nevertheless, the leaders of the CHP and the Iyi Party had their first official meeting last week.

The CHP and the Iyi Party are trying to find a way to make not a broad but a limited cooperation and are seeking to find a proper and well-designed method to provide it.

The agenda of this meeting, of course, was the upcoming local elections and the possible advantages and limitations of forming an alliance. As reflected in the press, the parties are negotiating on several scenarios in order to form an alliance in 9 provinces. In other words, the CHP and the Iyi Party this time are trying to find a way to make not a broad but a limited cooperation and are seeking to find a proper and well-designed method to provide it.

Nonetheless, the picture is not yet clear even though the sides are asserting the opposite. For instance, Istanbul, Ankara, Antalya, Mersin, and Adana, are expected to be an issue of negotiation between the two parties. However, previous election results reflect the fact that these parties fail to win the elections by forming an alliance, even if ceteris paribus. Additionally, surveys conducted to see possible outcomes of the alliance prove the probability its limited success.

Under current conditions, the CHP forming an alliance with HDP in Istanbul and Iyi Party in Ankara seems to be more reasonable. However, when taking into consideration previous election results, even this will not bring about the intended outcome.

Of course, both the CHP and Iyi Party are aware of this fact as they conduct surveys and prepare simulations. Due to this reason, the CHP has been trying to broaden the boundaries of a possible alliance by involving the HDP. Kilicdaroglu had a meeting with a former HDP MP, Ahmet Turk, last week solely for this purpose. The Iyi Party on the other hand, has announced that they will not accept any scenarios that suggest bringing the Iyi Party and HDP together. This means that the CHP will have to make a choice between these two parties by calculating the gains and losses of the two options.

Under current conditions, forming an alliance with the HDP in Istanbul and with the Iyi Party in Ankara seems to be more reasonable. However, when taking into consideration previous election results, even this will not bring about the intended outcome. More, it is not an easy job to find candidates running for election under any possible alliance. For instance, Mansur Yavas, one of the possible joint candidates for Ankara, underlined that he would not run under a party and demanded a broad consensus on his name. Finding a proper way and good candidates for alliances is a complex issue.

The lack of trust between the CHP and the Iyi Party might be the biggest deficiency for a possible alliance.

Last but not least, the lack of trust between the CHP and the Iyi Party might be the biggest deficiency for a possible alliance. The sharp break of the Nation Alliance after the June 24 elections caused mutual accusations and severe criticisms between the two parties. None of the parties took the responsibility of the failure of alliance and blamed each other instead. Since only 5 months has passed since this process, both parties will primarily have to pay attention to building trust between themselves.

Less than five months are left to the local elections in Turkey. Political parties have already started the process of selecting their candidates. Even though it is not yet officially confirmed, Iyi Party is going to nominate Ümit Özdağ for İstanbul, Şengül Hablemitoğlu for İzmir, and İsmail Koncuk for Adana according to party sources. Before selecting the right candidate, all political parties are setting a roadmap to follow in the upcoming elections. Analyzing these roadmaps is crucial to understand main dynamics of the upcoming process.

As the governing party, the AK Party has begun to make some preparations for possible candidates. The party will organize a meeting for the party delegates in the following days in order to settle the criteria for candidate selection. Even though this criteria has not yet been clarified, President Erdogan underlined that the party would determine candidates with the participation of all party branches. Furthermore, the AK Party is focusing on choosing candidates who have a good reputation in their electoral districts. In accordance with this aim, party officials are paying close attention to the results of surveys conducted in various electoral districts to see the reflections of possible candidates.

While there have been some names debated in the press as possible candidates, the head of the local administration branch of the party announced that the process would be finalized at the end of the month. According to official statements coming from other party sources, some provincial and district heads will resign in order to run for the position of mayor.

AK Party officials are paying close attention to the results of surveys conducted in various electoral districts in order to assess the reflections of possible candidates.

When it comes to the main opposition party, the CHP is still facing serious issues, which is preventing the party from focusing on local elections. While on the one hand Muharrem Ince’s role within the party is still being questioned, the latest controversial speech of CHP deputy Ozturk Yilmaz on the Adhan (Islamic call to prayer) raised tensions within the party again. Because of this reason, the CHP spokesman warned all party officials to obey the rules of the party and to stay away from provocative speeches.

Despite these issues, the party is still discussing the possibilities and limitations of forming an alliance with other opposition parties. The CHP had a meeting with representatives from the Iyi Party and the HDP in previous weeks. Nevertheless, it is still a question as to whether the party will form an alliance or not, and how opposition parties will approach the idea of forming an alliance in the local elections. Thus, it seems that these parties will wait until last minute to announce whether they will be forming an alliance or not.

The HDP, on the contrary, is openly seeking to form an alliance, especially with the CHP. The party officials frequently call for uniting against the AK Party to gain more municipalities and weaken the party on a local level. Although the HDP officials see the formation of the “democracy block” as an obligation, the other parties have not yet replied to this call yet. Some CHP officials have welcomed this idea and are trying to convince party leadership to respond positively.

The main opposition party, the CHP, has not been able to focus on local elections due to the party being pre-occupied with the unclear role of Muharrem Ince within the party and the recent controversy regarding the Adhan.

Consequently, while parties have accelerated their preparations for the upcoming local elections, their candidates and strategies are still unclear. After the candidates are announced, all parties will start their local election campaigns on local and national levels.

Almost ten days ago, the AK Party and the MHP announced that they were not going to form an alliance in the upcoming local elections. This announcement switched Turkey’s agenda from international issues to domestic concerns. Indeed, the AK Party and the MHP have been in conflict on some policy issues such as granting a partial amnesty for some prisoners and canceling the earlier arrangement on the Student Oath by the Council of State. These two issues have increasingly deepened the divide between the two parties, hence the reason why they will be participating in the elections without forming an alliance.

After the announcement of this decision, some circles claimed that the alliance between the AK Party and the MHP had completely come to an end. However, as was explained, the decision is limited only to the upcoming local elections and the People’s Alliance, which was formed last February, will continue to be active – especially in Parliament. Since there has been a latent alliance between the AK Party and MHP since the July 15 failed coup attempt, both parties have similar concerns on Turkey’s problems and the country’s position in the international arena.

In the light of this information, it is clear that the AK Party and the MHP have been acting responsibly in order to protect the country from internal and external threats, and to consolidate Turkey’s presidential system. These critical issues function as a connection between the two to act together in parliament.

How will the AK Party and the MHP manage to protect the People’s Alliance in parliament when they become rivals in the local elections?

How will the AK Party and the MHP manage to protect this alliance in parliament when they become rivals in the local elections? This is a serious question and an uphill struggle in front of them. The latest statements from both sides show that both parties will design their election campaign to provide this power balance between them. Even if they run to gain municipalities, they will not make concessions from the principles of this alliance.

Thus, it is possible to see that both parties will protect the core principles of the alliance, which was formed around the country’s national values, unity, and solidarity. These principles, of course, will also be settled at the core of the election campaigns of the two parties. Since the alliance was formed around these principles beyond of daily politics, the parties will be careful not to exceed certain boundaries.

If the AK Party and MHP are able to balance between “being rivals” in the local elections and “being partners” in the parliament, the People’s Alliance will continue to go forward.

Indeed, the serious problems brought to the fore by the AK Party and MHP have not been solved yet. Turkey still faces terrorist threats and is maintaining its fight against terrorist organizations such as FETO, the PKK, and Daesh. Even if the domestic activities of these organizations have been minimized, they are still very active abroad. Furthermore, the presidential system of Turkey still needs time and dedication to be consolidated. These issues require strong cooperation between the AK Party and MHP in order to be solved.

For all these reasons, cooperation and communication between the AK Party and the MHP will continue in the parliament, especially on critical issues for the country’s sake. The relatively long-term rapprochement between the AK Party and the MHP after the coup attempt positively reflected on the solution to Turkey’s security problems and the switch from a parliamentary to a presidential system of government. If the parties are able to balance between “being rivals” in the local elections and “being partners” in the parliament, the People’s Alliance will continue to contribute to the solution of Turkey’s serious problems in the future.

Since 2013, Turkey has been experiencing deeply traumatic events one after the other. The country has chosen to deal with these events with a new constitution and elections, preferring something new rather than old in order to address the trauma. We are now in the final stretch of a marathon of elections that have been going on for the last two years.

After the local elections in March 2019, we will enter a 3-year period without elections, which will last until 2022. Considering the fact that we’ve continuously been under an atmosphere of elections since March 2014, which have been pretty fierce, this 3-year period will certainly feel different for the country.

Since the previous local elections held in March 2014, the nature of politics, political sociology, and voting behavior in Turkey have changed significantly.

What makes the upcoming local elections more important than a simple vote to determine local administrators is the fact that the opposition is trying to make it ‘a referendum vote’ for the Turkish government. And this effort may lead to the most critical stage of a struggle in voter sociology, which has been long ongoing.

I will attempt to explain the reasons for this.

Now that Turkey has fully transitioned to the presidential system, the government is stable and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will rule the country until June 2022. However, the situation is not the same in Parliament. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AK Party) does not hold the majority. Thus, the AK Party needs to maintain good relations with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) – its electoral ally during the 2018 elections. (The opposite also holds here, meaning that the MHP needs the AK Party as well).

The continuation of the alliance that was established prior to the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2018 had become a political necessity. Leader of the MHP, Devlet Bahceli, was the first to state this, arguing that for a presidential system to be truly established, the success of the People’s Alliance must continue in the local elections, since the opposition would rekindle discussions regarding the presidential system in case of a decrease in votes.

Bahceli was not wrong with this opinion. Similar to the efforts between the AK Party and MHP, the Nation Alliance, which was first established for the 2018 elections, between the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Iyi Party and Felicity Party also seems interested in employing a strategy of cooperation and alliance for the local elections.

While the Felicity Party does not yet appear to be a part of this equation, CHP and Iyi Party have begun flirting with the idea of an alliance. In my opinion, Bahceli’s analysis still carries its validity. However, the dynamics have significantly changed when the AK Party and MHP publicly declared following the Student Oath debate that they will not form an alliance in the local elections.

Political scene after the parliamentary elections in July 2015

To recall the last parliamentary elections, Turkish voters were roughly divided into two major blocs. The first and majority bloc represented by the People’s Alliance consists of 54% of the voter base. The Nation Alliance received 34% of the vote. The Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), which entered the elections outside of any alliance, fortified its position in the Turkish political landscape with 12% of the vote.

When examining these results, we see that the percentage of votes received by the AK Party has decreased to the levels obtained during the 2015 July elections. This is when the party failed to receive a majority in Parliament for the first time (since coming to power in 2002). The only consolation for this was that President Erdogan was selected as the first president of the presidential system in the first round, with 52.6% of the vote. The AK Party now cooperates with the MHP in order to achieve a majority in the parliament, meaning this is a de facto legislative coalition.

MHP’s key position

In comparison to the number of votes it received, this situation gives the MHP disproportionate influence. This is how, despite being the fourth largest party in Parliament, with only 50 members, the MHP could suggest for a general pardon for prisoners convicted of certain crimes.

MHP is evidently trying to use this position as a “leverage.” The last of such cases is the recent Student Oath debate, which has been the last the straw that broke the camel’s back causing the two parties to break up and follow their own ways during the local elections of 2019.

Likewise, the slowdown of the Turkish economy, along with the rising levels of inflation and unemployment, seems to have increased public discontent regarding the AK Party prior to the election. The general election held in June 2018 has shown that while the MHP lost a significant amount of votes to the newly formed nationalist Iyi Party, it has retained its significance by drawing a similar amount of votes from the AK Party. MHP now intends to recapture the nationalist vote it lost by employing its public perception.

Some recent polls reveal a remarkable trend among voters: voters continue to switch from the AK Party to the MHP. Some studies even conclude that this dynamic may have led to the MHP gaining 20% of the total votes. These studies and polls may be the reason behind the increased confidence Bahceli has shown in his relations with the AK Party and with Erdogan.

In both the constitutional referendum and the June 2018 elections we saw that with respect to opposing FETO and defending the country from future threats of terrorism, voters tend to hold the AK Party and MHP, Erdogan and Bahceli, in the same regard. The voter base of both parties constitute a “common pool” of 53% of the total vote, and the transition of voter preferences between the two parties takes place only in that pool.

The ongoing economic turbulence in Turkey gives a golden chance to the opposition parties at capturing votes from the 53% “common pool.” The CHP and Iyi Party are working hard to claim symbolically important victories against the AK Party.

Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality undoubtedly carries the utmost significance for the AK Party in the local elections. Recalling that the elected mayor of Istanbul, Kadir Topbas, was made to resign by the AK Party and President Erdogan, Istanbul emerges as a possibly problematic area for the AK Party. Formerly to negotiate with the AK Party, MHP had suggested that it would act in favor of the AK Party and not nominate a candidate in Istanbul, expecting a similar act in a different place for their benefit. However, there was not much that the AK Party could gain from the MHP in Istanbul; for the AK Party to win Istanbul, instead of MHP, the party should have focused more on the Kurdish electorate. The same is also happening between the Iyi Party and CHP, in the lines of “We should give Istanbul to them and they should give us Ankara.”

CHP’s HDP deadlock

CHP wants to gain the majority in Istanbul but whether the Iyi Party alone would achieve this is uncertain. Thus, the CHP needs to attract HDP voters as the HDP does not have a meaningful chance of winning the city. However, getting closer to the Kurds has become the biggest taboo of Turkish politics in recent years. If CHP were to name a candidate that would draw the support of Kurdish voters, they would distance themselves from Turkish nationalist Iyi Party voters. But without the support of Kurdish voters, it is highly unlikely for the CHP to win.

AK Party and MHP have both been accusing CHP of “allying with terrorists” and saying that HDP is a direct extension of the terrorist organization, the PKK. This discourse is very effective among voters. Non-Kurdish voters, regardless of which party they vote for, do not have any doubt regarding the HDP’s close relationship with the PKK. All research confirms this striking political reality. Now, seeing that the People’s Alliance is in some kind of coma, will there be a change in this discourse? Will the AK Party adopt a more soft approach to Kurdish politics? We’ll see.

While search for an alliance during the local elections has ended for the AK Party and the MHP, these efforts are likely to continue between the Iyi Party and the CHP. If the opposition parties, including the HDP, manage to form a block despite their substantial differences in micro and macro policies and gain vote from the ruling bloc of the AK Party and MHP in the elections, for example reducing the 53% total vote of the two parties to around 45-47%, Turkey might enter a discussion of legitimacy that might last until 2022. The opposition may claim that President Erdogan and the AK Party-MHP majority in the Parliament have lost their legitimacy on the following morning of the elections.

Scramble for symbolically important municipalities

The fact that the MHP and AK Party will not form an alliance in the local elections will prevent others from calculating the votes of the two parties and saying “look, this is the state of the People’s Alliance.”

On the other hand, due to the complex system of local elections in Turkey, it is hard to determine the percentage of votes a given party has received nationwide. Therefore, the real result of the election will not be determined by vote percentages but by which parties win the symbolically important municipalities and which party wins the most municipalities in total. This is why the AK Party losing metropolitan areas such as Istanbul and Ankara means a lot to the opposition.

In previous elections, the AK Party used to run a serious election campaign in Izmir, which traditionally strongly votes for CHP, but in this election it seems like the AK Party will act more defensively and prefer to focus on retaining its previous majorities. It will be interesting to watch the AK Party’s efforts to retain its popularity not only in Istanbul and Ankara but also in cities such as Antalya, Bursa, and Balıkesir.

All these constitute the reasons why this election will be decisive for AK Party’s future. If the party shows that it has retained its influence and popularity, it will prove that it has successfully emerged from the dangerous turbulence Turkey has experienced since the last months of 2013 as the “founding” party, and will continue to carry Turkey to its future. If it experiences a significant decrease in votes and fails to rejuvenate after such a loss, it will enter a period of very hard days.

Nowadays, Turkey’s political agenda is full with international issues. The new term in Turkey-U.S. relations after the release of Pastor Brunson has become a matter of curiosity in the last couple of days. Moreover, the missing Saudi journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, seems to have shifted the U.S. approach against Saudi Arabia and thus will affect the current dynamics in the Middle East.

Under this ambiguous environment, Turkey’s domestic agenda and the upcoming local elections have become of secondary importance for the public. Nonetheless, political parties have already began to concentrate on their possible strategies in the local elections.

As part of their preparations for local elections, Turkey’s political parties held consultation and evaluation meetings in order to draw a road map. All parties had an idea on the possibilities and limitations in choosing the right candidate. The governing AK Party, for instance, underlined that the upcoming elections would be a turning point for Turkey’s future and it was an obligation to increase both the vote rate and the number of mayors in order to successfully implement the new presidential system. Party officials and members contributed to the ongoing discussions on possible electoral strategies in accordance with this purpose.

One of the major issues that will determine electoral strategy is whether the AK Party and the MHP will form an alliance in order to maximize their benefits. Since the unofficial meetings between the two parties have just started, it is still not possible to clarify this issue. Nevertheless, it should be underlined that both parties pay a significant attention to forming an alliance and are trying to form a consensus on possible ways of achieving this. It seems that the further details of this issue will surface in the following days.

On the other hand, preparation meetings held by the MHP and the Iyi Party revealed the increasing tension between these two parties. Even though both parties have had hot discussions since the June 24 elections, the degree of discussions altered in the last days. The Iyi Party blamed the MHP for betraying nationalist ideals by forming an alliance with the AK Party.

Since the Iyi Party faced serious existential crises after the June 24 elections and was about to collapse, it is now trying to find a new identity and purpose for existence. In accordance with this aim, the party is working to develop a nationalistic stance instead of its catch-all approach, which failed in the previous elections.

The main opposition party, the CHP, has also been discussing possible election strategies. During the meetings held, party officials criticized the party’s current discourse on being so elitist and left-wing oriented. The solution proposed for this problem was to adopt rightist and populist discourse in the upcoming local elections in order to change the image of the party.

At this point, the CHP faces a serious dilemma in deciding whether or not to form an alliance with the Iyi Party and the HDP. Due to the fact that the Nation Alliance failed in the last elections, the party is hesitant to cooperate with these parties. While an intra-party group is working hard to convince the sides to form an alliance with the HDP, some party officials are wary of this and are aware of the risks.

However, the supporting group sees this as the only way of achieving success in the local elections. The more nationalist wing of the party wants to form an alliance with the Iyi Party, especially in Ankara and some provinces in the Mediterranean and Aegean.

Even if consultation and evaluation meetings were a stage for drawing a road map for the local elections, political parties still need more time to finalize their strategies. Due to this, parties are expected to focus more on domestic policy in the upcoming days.

With the rise of discussions around local elections, the electoral strategy of opposition parties in Turkey have come to the forefront again. Especially the main opposition party, the CHP, became the focus of these discussions last week. The party’s possible strategy was not only an issue of concern among other parties; it was also a puzzle for intra-party circles. Even though the CHP’s strategy in local elections is not clear yet, taking into consideration discussions made, it is possible to see a latent alliance among the CHP and other opposition parties.

As occurred just before the June 24 elections, the party once again conducted a research on possible outcomes of forming alliances in local elections. Even if the results of this research were not shared with the public, it becomes an obligation for the party to keep its current position in the local administration as reflected on the press. Due to this reason, there are several scenarios on the table for the CHP’s local election strategy.

Nowadays, the main scenario focuses on the outcomes of a possible alliance between the CHP and the HDP during local elections. A similar scenario was also present during the June 24 election period. Due to the fact that the CHP found this alliance ineffective in comparison to the alliance with the Iyi Party (IP) and the Saadet Party (SP), party circles convinced the leaders to choose the second option. Although there was not an official alliance between the CHP and HDP during the June 24 elections, the CHP maintained its latent support for the HDP’s electoral campaign. This was to such an extent that some CHP circles voted for the HDP in the parliamentary elections. Post-election surveys indicate that the HDP passed the threshold with the votes it obtained from CHP supporters.

Due to these reasons, another latent alliance between the CHP and HDP is the most powerful scenario on the agenda. As reflected in the media, the party sees this alliance as beneficial – especially in metropolitan cities. Istanbul, of course, becomes the main target of the CHP in local elections and the party designs its electoral campaign by focusing on this city. The results of the 2014 local elections reflect the fact that it is not possible for the CHP to “win” Istanbul by only forming an alliance with the HDP. Thus, the party is trying to broaden the boundaries of this alliance by involving other parties and political circles.

At this point, the possibility of forming an alliance with IP (Iyi Party) is also on the agenda. However, because the official alliance between the CHP and IP was broken soon after the June 24 elections, it is difficult for these two parties to re-form an alliance. More, rising nationalistic tendencies within the IP makes it impossible for the party to get together with the HDP. Finally, IP officials blamed the CHP for failure in the parliamentary elections, and therefore, it will not be easy to convince these individuals to forming another alliance with the HDP.

Even though the official alliance between CHP and IP was broken soon after the elections, the close relation between CHP and HDP continues. The similarity in discourse among these two parties increases the possibility of an alliance to occur during local elections. It is almost certain to see a latent alliance in Istanbul and Ankara, and it will not be a surprise to see an alliance in other electoral districts. However, seeing as the votes of this alliance will not be enough for the CHP to gain Istanbul, the party will try to find a new way to convince Meral Aksener’s IP.