On November 13, 2019, upon the invitation of U.S. President Donald Trump, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan paid a working visit to the United States. Watching from the sidelines, Russia observed the visit attentively and waited for the outcomes.

The Russian State News Agency, TASS, reported on the visit with the following title: “With or Without the West? Erdogan Makes a Choice in Washington.” The primary question that TASS focused on in regards to the meeting between the two leaders, was whether Turkey’s position in the NATO alliance would change.

In fact, it is necessary to separate Russian coverage of the meeting made by Russian mainstream media, such as television channels and newspapers, on the one hand, with high circulation and broader impact, and think tanks on the other, such as the Russian Council and the Institute of the Middle East, whose publications address a smaller audience who are professionally interested in specific countries. There was a noticeable difference in how both groups covered President Erdogan’s visit to Washington.

Publications from Russian mainstream media targeted at a wider audience, which include the aforementioned TASS Agency, focused on the problematic relations between the West and Turkey, especially in the framework of the NATO Alliance. This is despite the fact that some politicians in Russia consider President Trump to be a leader who is trying to be a businessman in politics, is always ready for dialogue and compromise, and that is just enveloped in a “bad environment,” which refers almost entirely to outside the perimeter of the White House, including Congress, the Pentagon, and the Department of State. Just remember how the State Duma applauded the election of Donald Trump, hoping that he will change the course of relations between the U.S. and Russia. Today the widely accepted opinion of President Trump in Russia is that “he is a good guy, but without power and in a bad environment”.

On the eve of President Erdogan’s visit to Washington, this “bad environment” presented itself in two unpleasant surprises for U.S.-Turkish relations. This came in the form of two bills. One seeking the adoption of sanctions against Turkey due to its operations in Syria, the other which aimed to recognize the events of 1915 as a “genocide of the Armenian people”. The meeting between the two presidents was closely observed by Russia to see, first, how the meeting would enable both parties to resolve old issues, and, how they would be able to deal with new challenges.

The other problems in the relations between U.S and Turkey includes Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring in Syria, American support for the YPG in Syria, Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense systems, the U.S.’s proposal to supply the Patriots to Turkey, extradition of Fetullah Gulen (FETO criminal cult leader) to Turkey, the “Halkbank” case and so on.

The final press conference between Presidents Erdogan and Trump did not provide much news to the Russian media. They noticed Trump’s favorable tone and compliments to the Turkish president, as well as Erdogan’s return of the famous unpleasant letter to Trump.

The Turkish and U.S presidents again spoke about their goal to increase the trade turnover between two countries by five times, from the average value of USD 20 billion up to 100 billion. Interestingly, Trump’s wording about this target was misunderstood by the Russian media, even the central TV-channels. The Russian media incorrectly understood that Trump proposed a “trade deal” to Erdogan worth up to $100 billion if Turkey refused to use the Russian S-400 air defense systems. As a result, when Erdogan, once again, announced that the Russian-Turkish deal was in motion, it was interpreted in Russia as a rejection of $100 billion ‘in cash’.

During this same time, there were many observers in Russia who were surprised by the fact that Turkey is still trying its best to normalize bilateral relations, with the U.S in despite the problematic relations. What is equally as surprising to them is what Turkey is doing with the NATO Alliance. According to them NATO has lost its sense and meaning after the end of the Cold War, and is facing an identity crisis.

Russian Turkologists and think-tankers on Turkey

Russian think tanks, like the Russian Council and the Institute of Middle East, both located in Moscow, draw a picture that differs significantly from the one that is being shown to everyday Russians through the mass media.

Firstly, Russian analysts are completely devoid of any illusions regarding the possibility of Turkey leaving the NATO alliance whether it be short, medium or long term. Secondly, the fact that Turkey acts more independently in the present day and is building its own security architecture using the S-400, or the fact that it is more profitable for Turkey to leave NATO, does not necessarily entail that this is what Turkey wants. This is an axiom.

In addition to this, the existence of the very serious problems in Turkish-American relations is not a reason for the Turkish leadership to break its ties with the United States, as this would allow distortions towards alternative world centers of power, including Russia. The skill of maintaining a permanent balance in the international arena while simultaneously maintaining its position as an important country for many foreign players is a key advantage for Turkey. Of course,  it will not give this up.

As for the opinion of Russian think tanks, which is also supported by the author of this article, at this stage, there are currently a number of unresolvable problems when it comes to the bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States. These problems include the U.S. support to the YPG, the extradition of Fetullah Gulen to Turkey, and the purchase of S-400 systems in Turkey, which, in one way or another, has negatively affected Turkey’s ability to remain in the F-35 fighter jet program.

Briefly, what could be solved by the Washington visit of President Erdogan was solved. The resolution on the events of 1915 was blocked. However, the problems that cannot be solved today are being confined by Turkey. In other words, Turkish diplomacy seeks a way to separate zones of cooperation from problem areas.

Having carried out Operation Peace Spring in Syria and creating a security corridor along the Turkish-Syrian border, the Turkish leadership has finally set in motion the removal of YPG militants and is proceeding with arrangements to send Syrian refugees living in Turkey to these territories. Obviously, Turkey does not want to be the sole sponsor of this process and will seek financial support from the West. The search for this financial assistance will take place in the European Union as well as in the United States.

A further point, which I suppose may exist between Turkey and Russia is connected to the extradition foreign Daesh fighters. It is clear that Turkey, as the Turkish leadership often says, does not want to become a “hotel for terrorists”. But in order to deport criminals who are in Turkey, the Turkish leadership needs to mold a political response with a proper understanding of the situation both in the West and in the U.S. Turkey must try to avoid any matters or steps that may be interpreted abroad as “blackmailing”. Especially with this sensitive issue, when this is a classic cliché regarding President Erdogan that appears again and again in the West.

Given the fact that the Turkish economy needs a constant influx of foreign investment, it is no coincidence that before the negotiations with Trump, Erdogan met with major American business people. The goal of attracting a large capital into Turkey is not of any less importance for the Turkish leadership than the current situation in Syria. In parallel, the country’s credit and investment ratings should be sorted, which, to a large extent, relies heavily on the United States. If Erdogan’s trip to the U.S. were to be looked at from this perspective, it would be seen as follows:

1. Erdogan’s visit to the United States and meeting with Trump balanced the intensity of the dialogue between him and Vladimir Putin.
2. Although Trump spoke at the final press conference in general terms, his statements about Turkish-American relations and his relations with Erdogan were extremely positive. Thus, he sent a signal of “stability” to the stock exchange and to investors.
3. The most odious anti-Turkish initiatives in the United States were removed from the agenda.

By obtaining the U.S’s approval for Operation Peace Spring and negotiating in Washington, Erdogan clarified Turkish-American dialogue and sent a message to his partners in the Astana Process (both Russia and Iran) that Turkey was not building exclusive relations with them, and was not going to break away from the West. According to the Russian point of view, Turkey today concludes its most important agreements with Russia and will continue to do so in the near and continuing future. Since these breakthroughs have been achieved between Turkey and Russia, Turkey will continue to try to balance the ongoing dialogue in the West, even if it does not bring significant results for Turkey today.

Naturally, the situation may somehow change after the presidential elections in the U.S in year 2020, if a new administration comes into power in the White House. But there is hardly a voice among Russian analysts who expect rapid changes in the current triangle between Russia, Turkey and the U.S. For Turkey, Russia will be a country to develop the projects and dialogue, which it may not do with the West. While in the U.S., Turkey’s hard battle to address its concerns, and the existence of anti-Turkish voices will continue without any breakthroughs.

Three months ago when the Assad regime surrounded the Turkish observation post in Idlib’s Morek, I argued that Turkey needed a new approach to Idlib in order to prevent a bigger disaster. Since then, the situation in Idlib has relatively calmed down and the joint Syrian-Turkish military operation against the YPG has redirected the focus of the world to northeast Syria. The dynamic situation in this region, including the development of bilateral agreements between Turkey and Russia and between Turkey and the US in addition to the repositioning of the US to the oilfields of Syria has resulted in a general ignorance of the current situation in Idlib. Every side is using its energy to gain a bigger piece of the cake in northeast Syria, except for Iran. The latest attack on the IDP camp in Qah, in its inhuman brutality has no military purpose but was intended to shift the focus from northeast Syria to Idlib.

The dynamics between Russia and Turkey in Idlib and northeast Syria are opposite but similar to each other. The Russians demand the withdrawal of radical elements from the agreed demilitarized zone; the Turks demand the withdrawal of the Marxist YPG from the agreed safe-zone. Both sides criticize the other for not implementing the agreement and threatening the other with a military operation. However, there are also significant differences. The situation in northeast Syria is a direct threat to Turkey’s national security, but the situation in Idlib is not for Russia.

Another Turkish-backed operation against the YPG would not have costs for Russia except for the loss of additional gains and leverage. A Russian-backed operation on Idlib would be catastrophic for Turkey as Turkey can’t bear the burden of a further two million more refugees. On military terms, Russia has air superiority in Idlib, but Turkey has air superiority in northeast Syria. In all of this, the US has given massive de-facto support to Russia’s position against Turkey but does give diplomatic and rhetorical support for Turkey in Idlib.

A Russian-backed operation on Idlib would be catastrophic for Turkey as Turkey can’t bear the burden of a further two million more refugees.

In recent times, Idlib has witnessed several important developments. The 4th Division of the Syrian Arab Army of Maher al-Assad known for its ties to Iran has repeatedly failed to advance against the Syrian opposition forces and HTS or HTS-aligned groups in the Kurdish mountains of Latakia. While the resistance of the armed opposition and HTS-aligned groups in Latakia’s Kabbanah is being portrayed as a heroic one, in the end when the regime side is persistent enough and gets sufficient Russian air support, the defense line will collapse sooner or later. Such a gain would have significant effects on the military balance of power in Idlib. If the regime succeeds in gaining the upper hand in this area, it can fight downhill towards the operationally significant town of Jisr al Sughour.

In the meantime, a popular uprising against HTS in the city of Kafr Takhharim is an important proof of the social movement in Idlib which rejects the regime as well as radical groups. This will be an important asset for any policy and strategy for Idlib.

Therefore, I argue that the focus on northeast Syria should continue as much as possible and attempts by the regime, Iran, or Russia to change the focus to Idlib should be prevented by increasing the escalation in northeast Syria to force the regime to allocate reinforcements to this region and to call out the manpower limits of the regime which may prevent the regime from starting another major military campaign. In the meantime, Turkey needs to change the balance of power in Idlib in its favor in order to have a stronger position in the tit-for-tat dynamic that Russia may try to create. In this manner, it is important to note that opposition groups have sent no reinforcements from Idlib to northeast Syria, but the Assad regime had to send its Russian-trained and Russian-equipped 5th Corps due to lack of manpower.

One of the main outcomes of the Sochi Summit between Turkey and Russia was the joint patrols along the Syrian-Turkish border with a depth of 10km. Since then, northeast Syria has witnessed many important developments, and joint patrols between Russia and Turkey commenced at the moment of writing. The future of Turkish-Russian joint patrols faces an important challenge due to the gap between the agreed mechanism and the capacities of Russia in Syria. Even if the Russians increase their military presence, they might still be incapable of maintaining joint patrols with the Turkish Armed Forces. The only possibility of such patrols for Russia would be to accept Turkish superiority in the region and to use Turkish strength against the YPG.

Going with the premise that Russia and Turkey are fully interested in conducting the ongoing joint patrols and fulfilling the deal, the main reason why joint patrols in northeastern Syria is a difficult task is quite similar to the reason why both nations could not conduct joint patrols in Idlib. Armed groups on both sides are of essential threat to one another. If the Russians enter Idlib, Turkey would have a hard time ensuring their safety and vice-versa. If Moscow wants to conduct joint patrols with Turkey and ensure the safety of such patrols, Russian forces accompanied by the Assad regime would need to convince the YPG terror group first. However, the latter is not so interested in this, especially after the Turkish-Syrian joint military operation against them. Even the Americans who were trusted by much of the YPG had a very hard time convincing the YPG for the temporary entry of the Turkish army in a much smaller area in depth and length. It is impossible that the YPG will accept Turkish patrols willingly along the entire Turkish-Syrian border strip.

The only option for Russia to facilitate the joint patrols would be to implement the Sochi agreement fully. Only if Moscow enforces the withdrawal of the YPG to 30km south of the Turkish border will joint patrols with Turkey be safe and durable. Some patrols might happen without the full withdrawal, but the risks are too high and it won’t be sustainable, especially when both sides enter non-rural areas. Therefore, the Turkish demand of joint patrols which was agreed upon in Sochi can be seen as a guarantor mechanism for the real withdrawal of the YPG from the safe-zone. There seems to be no way of having joint patrols with Turkey and providing camouflage for the YPG to remain in the zone simultaneously.

And it is exactly at this point that Russia may reach its limits in Syria. As the situation in Idlib is still fragile, the Assad regime is incapable of sending its battle hardened forces to northeast Syria. The Russian military assets are located at the west side of Syria. To build up a strong military presence in northeast Syria would be a huge task for the Assad regime and Russia’s logistics. For instance, the S-400’s air protection system does not cover the Russian forces in east Syria and the financial resources of the regime are limited.

Even if the regime and Russia could manage to build up a strong presence in northeast Syria, it seems that the enforcement of the YPG’s withdrawal from the safe-zone would almost be mission impossible for Russia. Vladimir Putin may have made promises he is incapable of keeping. The only way out for Russia would seem to be letting Turkey weaken the YPG to an extent which is manageable for the Russian military presence in Syria, or to clearly threaten the YPG with the strength of the Turkish Armed Forces.

Deliveries of the Russian air defense systems S-400 to Turkey, which began on July 12, 2019, claim to be a historic event that marks the beginning of a new stage in the development of the Republic of Turkey. But not many people immediately realized the significance of this Turkish-Russian arms contract in modern Turkish history.

Full awareness of the significance of the deal began to occur in the last few days. In both Russia and Turkey, the public witnessed televised images of Ruslan aircrafts—the largest Russian transport aircrafts— ­­­landing at Mürted air base near Ankara.

The importance of the purchase of S-400 system by Turkey goes far beyond that of a single purchase of military equipment. It can result in large scale deals in the defense industry with impacts across all its segments: space, rocket production, aviation industry, shipbuilding, machine building, small arms, and so on. Moreover, we can talk not only about the purchase of these weapons by one party from another, but about a full-fledged partnership in the development, production and marketing of the manufactured equipment.

Moreover, such a long-term strategic deal may create further channels of dialogue between Turkey and Russia which have not previously existed or extensively used until now. By the S-400 deal, we may speak about the dialogue between the military structures and defense companies of the two countries. The significance of these new channels for Turkish-Russian relations is difficult to overestimate.

But, in all our discussions these days in Russia, questioning where relations between Russia and Turkey can move towards, there was always a question— if the S-400 deal will be brought to its logical conclusion.

The importance of the purchase of S-400 system by Turkey goes far beyond that of a single purchase of military equipment.

Let’s be honest: until July 12, 2019 a significant share of Russian observers and experts were skeptical and expressed serious doubts that something would not happen at the last moment to prevent the deal. This “something” however, did not happen, which broke all the patterns at the end of 2017. So, for the Russian experts footage on Turkish TV screens of the Russian Ruslan aircrafts landing at Mürted Airbase became both a refutation of their fears and a pleasant surprise, showing Turkey’s determination to cooperate with Russia in the defense industry.

Russian President Putin has a habit, regardless of relations with certain foreign countries or leaders, to call everyone “our partners”. As a result, his usage of “Western partners” or “American partners” in recent years when relations between Russia and the West have been particularly difficult, have acquired a completely definite meaning for everyone. When the Russian president is broadcasting, listeners understand what kind of partnership he is talking about.

So, for Russian observers, the practical implementation of the Russian-Turkish agreement on S-400 became a pleasant surprise. But, in the terms of President Putin, the “Western partners of Turkey” responded in a manner akin to the stages of grief recognized in modern psychology: denial, anger, bargaining, depression; and now the “Western partners” are about to move on to the fifth and final stage— the stage of acceptance. One does not even have to be a very attentive observer to identify the drift through all these five stages in the West, first of all, in the leaderships of both the USA and NATO.

In the first stage of “denial”, which lasts for a long time, the “Western partners” did not want to believe that the purchase of S-400 by Turkey might have taken place. In the foreign press and media, it was often possible to read and hear about “Turkish blackmail” as a strategy aiming to get something from the West. In the West, they got used to thinking that trade and bargaining is a kind of national sport for Turkish diplomacy. Accordingly, in the eyes of the West, Russia appeared to be a kind of “scarecrow”, which is used by Turks to scare Western politicians so that they “behave better towards Turkey”.

In the second stage of “anger”, Turkey started to hear reminders about the importance of bloc solidarity under NATO, which, after some time, turned to threats to apply measures and even sanctions against Turkey. In particular, through the framework of the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) adopted in 2017.

It is not known who was more surprised with the word “sanctions”: the Turks, who were loyal allies of the North Atlantic Alliance for many years, or the Russians, who were watching what was happening like some kind of a fantastic movie. Moreover, the United States quickly stepped out of bounds when it declared the exclusion of Turkey from the joint development and production of F-35 fifth-generation fighter aircrafts, given that Turkey is a full-fledged participant in this project and fulfilling its obligations.

At the beginning of this year, we began to observe the third stage— “bargaining”. After many years of negotiations with the Turkish side, the Americans, finally proposed Turkey purchase their own “The Patriot” systems instead. However, “The Patriot” is outclassed by the S-400 System. When comparing the range of destruction of aerodynamic targets and ballistic missiles, target height, radar coverage range, deployment time, target speed, the reaction time of the complex, rocket launch angle and other measurements, the S-400 case is superior, and much more less expensive than the American system. It would be right to say that S-400 is a step forward and newer generation system than “The Patriot”. The S-400 was first introduced in the Russian army in year 2007, while “The Partiot” has been used by American military forces since 1982. At the same time, despite this proposal, technology transfer to Turkey by the Americans was not envisaged, and a positive decision of the American Congress was not guaranteed in advance.

The short-sightedness of the US in the past led to their loss of arms markets of India and Egypt to Russia. One which the Americans have been trying to get back for many years.

Ankara quite quickly figured out the issue for itself and the whole world during the G-20 Summit in Osaka. Where it observed the fourth stage –“depression” of the United States. Just remember how the American President Trump said to President Erdogan that he “understands Turkey” and that the Obama Administration, while being in power, “behaved badly” when it refused to sell “The Patriot” to Turkey. What the whole world saw cannot be called by other word then “depression”. Because America had nothing to offer to Turkey today to persuade it or force it to abandon the S-400 deal.

And depression is followed by the final fifth stage, “acceptance”. Throughout this time, America tried to talk to Turkey not as a regional leader but as a third world country. As a result, the Americans had to change the tone of their communication with Turkey and even delay the imposition of sanctions. However, it is not clear for how long this will last. Maybe the Americans remembered how their short-sighted moves in the past led to their loss of arms markets of India and Egypt, and how Russia took the place of the United States in these countries. One which the Americans have been trying to get back for many years.

Today, a very similar situation occurs for the United States with Turkey. Turkey has shown itself to be a truly independent state, making a decision and bringing it to its logical conclusion. This is despite the unprecedented pressure that was exerted on Turkey to force it to abandon the S-400 deal, and speaking more broadly, to abandon Turkey’s possible cooperation with Russia in the defense industry.

After S-400 case, we saw the new Turkey. One which the West and perhaps even the whole world will now have to accept. This is quite painful for the West. But if, for example, the United States exclude Turkey from the F-35 program, doubtless, Russia will be happy to begin negotiations on the sale of its fighters Su-35 or even Su-57 instead of the F-35.

By coincidence, it was on these days that Turkey celebrated the third anniversary of the failed coup attempt, organized by Fetullah Gulen and its criminal cult with their headquarters in the United States. Today’s Turkey has enough power to make its own decisions and defend them regardless of external pressure. And, it seems, that the S-400 deal became “two in one”: a solution for Turkey, which is strengthening its defense capacity, and an important test for true independence in the international arena. Nowadays, we are witnessing how the fifth stage begins —the stage of acceptance of such a Turkey by the West and by the whole world.

Russia’s primary global strategy is to become a great power and to establish a multipolar global order. Thus, Russia sees rivalry with the U.S. as inevitable to accomplish these.

The fact that Turkey is both a NATO member and a U.S. ally is one of the most important factors that determines the relationship between Ankara and Moscow. For Moscow, NATO is a vehicle for the U.S. to establish its global dominance and is a threat to Russia’s national security. Russia engages in a variety of strategies to balance or reduce the threat it perceives from the U.S. and NATO. One of these is establishing close relationships with countries that are members of NATO.

The fact that Turkey has the second largest military in this alliance introduces a new and distinct direction to Moscow’s policies towards Ankara. Turkey’s relative importance compared to other NATO members in the dimensions of geopolitical position, economy, human capital and military capabilities prompts Moscow to search for more methods of establishing closer relationships with Ankara. However, the aforementioned strategic capabilities of Turkey mean the emergence of a strong geopolitical rival for Russia at the same time. Russia that regards itself a “great power”, establishes relationships with other countries according to their status. It works to establish closer relationships with strong countries and perceives Turkey within this framework.

Turkey is both a NATO member and a U.S. ally and this is what mostly determines the relationship between Ankara and Moscow.

The fact that Turkey does not limit itself to an alliance with the West and the fact that Ankara maintains close relations with Russia and other Eastern countries by occasionally maintain a foreign policy that is independent of its alliance with the West is perceived positively in Russia. The fact that the Ankara administration places importance on its relationship with Moscow and does not display a radical attitude towards Russia like other U.S. allies is also perceived positively by the Russian administration.

By occasionally maintaining a foreign policy that is independent of its alliance with the West is perceived as proof that the Western alliance is not a monolith and that the divisions between the members of this alliance can serve Russian interests. Since the Western alliance fails to act as a single body, it becomes less of a threat to Russia, which is in a comparatively isolated position today.

Turkey, Russia and the West

According to Russia, a reason behind Turkey distancing itself from the West and becoming closer with Russia is the problematic relationship that it has with the U.S. and other European countries. Meaning that in some way, the worsening relationship between Turkey and its western allies opens room for development in the Ankara-Moscow relationship. This in turn makes Turkey and Russia “partners by fate.”

Turkey, which has been waiting to become an EU member for decades, does not trust the West anymore. Russia has also experienced a similar situation. Wanting to become part of the West following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was continuously marginalized by Western countries and the promises given to Moscow were not kept. At the same time, this process resulted in the West approaching Russia’s borders close enough to become a threat to Russia’s national interests. Thus, the distrust that both Turkey and Russia hold against Western countries is based on justified reasons. According to Moscow, the one-sided policies the West maintains under Washington’s leadership are against Turkey’s interests as much as they are against Russia’s interests.

The worsening relationship between Turkey and its western allies opens room for development in the Ankara-Moscow relationship. This in turn makes Turkey and Russia “partners by fate.”

One of the main reasons for the deterioration in relations between Ankara and Washington is that the U.S. does not seek Turkey’s interests. The common opinion that the U.S. was behind the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, the U.S. refusing to extradite the Gulenist Terror Group (FETO) leader Fetullah Gulen, its alliance with the PYD in Syria, the disagreement on the subject of the purchase of air-defense systems, and the U.S. introducing tariffs on Turkish iron and steel are the main subjects that have caused the relationship between Ankara and Washington to worsen. Thus, the deterioration of this relationship has led to expectations that Turkey will distance itself from the U.S. and draw closer to Russia. This situation is perceived by Russia as a crisis in the Western alliance and is considered a geopolitical loss for the U.S. In short, all developments against the interests of the U.S. are seen as in favor of Russian interests.

The Syrian crisis

The intensification of the crisis in Syria, the U.S. stopping its support for the Syrian opposition and strengthening its cooperation with the PYD, and the separation of Ankara’s and Washington’s priorities in Syria forced Turkey to seek strategies alternative to the U.S. The balance of power in Syria shifted with Russia becoming directly involved in the conflict in September 2015 and the emergence of a refugee crisis following the military operations conducted on the border with Turkey, which left Ankara face-to-face with serious security problems. The main reason why relations between Turkey and Russia improved following the rapid deterioration during the “jet crisis” is that both actors need each other for the development of a solution regarding the Syrian crisis, which has become an international security problem.

The fact that Turkey and Russia, along with Iran, have come together to seek their common interests has been an important development for Moscow. The beginning of the Astana Talks following the failure of the Geneva peace talks and the fact that the parties managed to reach a consensus on the subject of security has led to Russia perceiving Turkey as an effective and constructive power as well as an irreplaceable actor. Russia has understood that the solution of the Syrian crisis and the presence and security of Russian forces in Syria is dependent on cooperation with Turkey to a significant degree. Turkey’s potential to greatly contribute to the re-building and development of Syria due to its significant influence over the Syrian opposition and its long border with Syria is an important matter from the Russian perspective. The successful diplomatic and military operations Turkey held during the Syrian crisis has also led to Ankara becoming a more important actor in the eyes of Moscow.

S-400 Deal

Another subject that has had a negative effect on relations between Turkey and the U.S. and which is also closely followed by Russia due to its involvement is the subject of the S-400 air defense systems. According to Russia, there are several reasons why Turkey wants to purchase the S-400 air defense system from Russia: The first is that the U.S. does not want to provide Turkey with the patriot systems. Secondly, not wanting to hand over its air space to the West, Turkey seeks to possess its own national defense system in the long-run. Finally, Turkey prefers the S-400 system over the Patriot systems due to its more advanced technology.

Stating that it can provide the weapons and technologies that the U.S. avoids giving to Turkey, Russia seeks to strengthen its relationship with Turkey in the field of military as well. Russia sees this relationship from two points of view: First is keeping Turkey, a NATO member, close to itself by distancing it from the U.S. The second is to create a market for its own military industrial complex. Russia knows that Turkey intends to establish a “relationship equilibrium” with Washington and Moscow and wants to be part of that equation. On the other hand, these intentions do not mean that they will comply with all weapons technology transfers requested by Turkey.

Another reason why Moscow wants to sell an advanced technology such as the S-400 to Ankara is that Russia has started selling these systems not only to Turkey but to other countries that wish to possess this kind of technology and have or intend to establish close relations with Russia. Furthermore, the existence of the S-500 defense systems that possess more advanced technologies compared to the S-400 systems and the continued work on the development of the S-600 systems opens the door for the delivery of the S-400s to Turkey.

While Moscow wants to establish close relations in the military-technical field with Ankara due to geopolitical reasons, it has certain hesitations. One of these is that Russia does not like the idea of Turkey increasing its power. This is because it considers the possibility of Turkey becoming a rival to itself. The second of these is the common opinion in Russia that due to Turkey’s NATO membership, its preferences will be more in line with this alliance rather than Russia.

Russia is aware that Turkey maintains an independent foreign policy and establishing close ties with Moscow is beneficial to its own interests and sees this as a geopolitical gain. However, the Russian administration also approaches Turkey’s policies with suspicion and due to this, intends to establish a strategy of balance.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the early years of the new Russian Federation were marked by the country leaving regions it was traditionally present. The leadership of the new “independent” Russia wrongly treated its rejection of the communist ideology and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact to be a necessary and sufficient condition to consider the Cold War to be over.

The logical consequence of this erroneous point of view, as well as the economic difficulties of the first year after the collapse of the USSR, was a destructive foreign policy that narrowed the sphere of Russia’s strategic interests in regards to its closest neighbors. As a result, the Russian military-political presence in the world decreased noticeably: in particular, the most important Russian military bases (as successors to the USSR) in Cuba and Vietnam were closed.

Under these conditions where Russia had temporarily lost its geopolitical view, the so-called “logistics point” in Syria’s Tartus (existing since 1971), remained, literally by miracle, as a Russian asset. The unrestrained expansion of NATO to the East towards the Russian borders, as well as the numerous conflicts unleashed by the U.S. and its allies across the world, led Russia to the need to return to a more active foreign policy position. As a result, the Russian administration initiated negotiations on the re-establishment of military bases in Cuba and Vietnam.

Russia’s participation in the civil war in Syria led to an increase of the role and strengthening of the Russian Mediterranean bases, including the Russian Navy base in Tartus and the aviation group at Hmeymim airport. It ought to be stated that the Russian presence in the E. Mediterranean will grow in the near future outside the conflict in Syria due to the energy wealth in the region, as well as the growth of terror. It is obvious that in addition to the terror threat, the new U.S. policy in the Middle East will have an influence on Russian plans.

An integral aspect of Russian foreign policy is energy diplomacy. At the heart of this is the need for Russia to ensure safe and reliable corridors for the delivery of its energy resources – oil and natural gas – to world markets. First of all, we are talking about the largest European market.

For the first time in the history, Turkey is becoming a transit country for the supply of Russian natural gas to Europe.

This is the reason for the new format of relations between Russia and Turkey in the framework of the Turkish Stream gas pipeline construction project, instead of gas transit through Ukraine. For the first time in the history of bilateral relations, Turkey is becoming a transit country for the supply of Russian natural gas to Europe.

The Mediterranean factor also arose in relations between Turkey and Russia. This is related to the construction and operation of the first Turkish nuclear power plant, Akkuyu, by Russia in the area of the Mediterranean city, Mersin. The strategic facility obviously requires special security measures. This not only means protection on the ground, air and sea of the perimeter of the nuclear power plant itself, but also the protection of routes for the delivery of nuclear fuel to Akkuyu and for the removal of waste.

Thus, the Akkuyu NPP creates another issue in the broad agenda of cooperation between Turkey and Russian in the military-political sphere. The basis of this cooperation – the Astana format – is also directly connected with the Mediterranean region.

The situation that is unfolding today around the gas fields of the Mediterranean cannot escape Russian attention, as the country is one of the leaders in gas production and gas trade. Up to now, in the confrontation between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the one hand, and Southern Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and Egypt (which are backed by the U.S., EU and global corporations), on the other, Russia has not yet said its word.

Russia has only two options for responding to the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The first option is a policy of non-intervention, since Russia’s greatest strategic interest in the energy sector is directed towards the Arctic basin. And the possibility of obtaining access to the fields of the Eastern Mediterranean and its profitability for Russian mining companies is not obvious.

Thus, the active involvement of Russia in the confrontation around the disputed gas fields of Cyprus, without creating obvious economic benefits can cause unnecessary tension for Russia either in relations with Turkey, or in relations with a broad front of regional and Western countries. This includes the UK, which is expanding its air force on the island, as well as France, which recently signed an agreement with Southern Cyprus on the establishment of its naval base in the area of the village of Marie.

At the same time, the option of Russia’s support of Southern Cyprus, directly or indirectly, in a dispute with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is practically excluded. Not promising big benefits, the issue could cause a logistically unjustified crisis in relations between Moscow and Ankara. Needless to say, these days Moscow has high hopes for expanding its arms trade, as well as for further building up cooperation with Turkey on a whole.

So, as the second option for Russia, the administration could consider supporting Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the gas dispute in the E. Mediterranean.

Russia has only two options for responding to the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. The first is by taking no sides and the second is considering to support Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. 

It should be noted that the format of the Astana process in Syria, no matter how hard it is implemented, is a Russian-Turkish success story. Another issue is that Astana is a “wartime” process and, of course, will cease to exist after the end of the active phase of the civil war in Syria. Such a stage, as of 2019, is just around the corner. And Russia is interested in creating long-term institutions of “peacetime” military-political cooperation with Ankara.

These institutions could link Russia and Turkey in exactly the same way that, in the economic sphere, the two countries are linked to each other by the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, the Turkish Stream gas pipeline, the S-400 deal, tourism, mutual investments, and much more.

Let us repeat this point: Russia and Turkey have strategic projects that serve as the foundation stone of bilateral relations in the economic sphere.

And in the military-political sphere, the Astana process is a good starting point in the absence of established institutions of Russian-Turkish cooperation in this field. The Russian leadership is fully aware of the fact that both the Astana process and the S-400 deal creates an opportunity for Russia to develop relations, for example, in terms of creating a framework of relations with Turkey in the military-political sphere in the long-run. The point of entry for this cooperation has already become the Mediterranean (Syria) and, in principle, it could be increased if certain conditions arose.

In Russia, there are often voices defending the point of view about special relations between Russia and Greece, which are implicated in the historical and religious community. However, fortunately for Russia, in Russian foreign policy there are hardly any so-called “brotherhood” factors (the most vivid example is the modern relations of Russia and Ukraine) but more sober political calculations based on real benefits and real interests.

Unlike Turkey, Russia’s relations with Greece have neither anchor projects, nor large common strategic interests, nor prospects for a cardinal increase in trade, economic & political ties.

Unlike Turkey, Russia’s relations with Greece have neither anchor projects, nor large common strategic interests, nor prospects for a cardinal increase in trade, economic and political ties. In figures, Russian exports to Turkey are approximately 7 times higher than Greece. Willing or unwillingly, Greece is a part of the anti-Russian EU economic sanctions. Therefore, it is unlikely that the factors of “fraternal” Greece and “fraternal” Cyprus will be considered as a deterrent for Russia to come forward on the Turkish side in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Another issue is that the only possibility of an Eastern Mediterranean deal between Turkey and Russia is an agreement that goes beyond energy cooperation itself. Only this will justify drawing Russia into the regional confrontation. Let us immediately make a reservation that, compared with the policy of neutrality in the gas dispute, the possibility set out below should be considered as markedly less likely.

Russia could side with Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus based on the strategic goal of building up its military and political presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. And also, based on the understanding of the historical chance to form a long-term military-political alliance with Turkey, which has risen possibly for the first time since the days of the founder and first president of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

If you go into theoretical reasoning, then such a long-term Russia-Turkey alliance would promise both sides immediate and numerous benefits far beyond the scope of the Mediterranean basin itself. For example, the joint contribution of the parties to ensuring security in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the security of the Black Sea basin, can be noted on the basis of the regime envisaged by the Montreux Convention, etc.

Russia and Turkey demonstrate a readiness, in spite of all differences, to hear and respect each other’s interests. This can be seen in Syria within the framework of the Astana process. However, whether the “21st Century Deal” in the military-political sphere will arise in relations between Turkey and Russia is a big question, considering Turkey’s NATO membership – which nobody doubts. But only such a Russian-Turkish deal, far beyond the scope of energy, can justify drawing Russia into an international confrontation developing around the gas fields of the Mediterranean Sea.

Soviet Russia was the first country that recognized the new Republic of Turkey, even before its official proclamation in year 1923. In the forthcoming year, 2020, the two countries will celebrate the 100th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between them. Besides the fact that this is a significant anniversary in itself, it is also a good occasion to analyze what has been achieved over the century and to think about the prospects of development in bilateral relations.

The leader of the Bolshevik revolution and the founder of the Soviet Republic Vladimir Lenin and the leader of the War of Independence, the founder and the first president of the Republic of Turkey Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, by joint efforts, set a new vector of relations between the two countries, as the successors of the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire.

Despite the fact that the century of relations between the two new states was marked by many ups and downs, often accompanied by acute political crises, the main task set by the leaders at the very beginning was solved: peoples’ perception of each other ceased to be only hostile, as it was during several centuries. And, moreover, mutually beneficial cooperation resulted in concrete results and visible projects that laid the foundation for the future. The parties started to establish a new positive historical memory and laid its foundation, in particular, by cooperation at the most difficult stage after the proclamation of two young states. The memory about this still lives both in Russia and in Turkey.

Numerous Russian-Turkish wars of the past gradually faded into the background and remembered in the context of making predictions for the future less often. Rather, the societies of the two countries perceive the clashes of the past as two neighboring empires at a time when war was the main instrument for settling interstate disputes and disagreements. Moreover, and this is also essential, the Russian-Turkish wars have never been wars of annihilation, unlike the Second World War, which is still a non-healing wound for Russian society.

Fortunately, times have changed in the direction of resolution, even the most controversial issues through dialogue. Moreover, modern Russian-Turkish relations demonstrate a success story: the disputed political issues are localized by the parties and considered separately, mostly without affecting trade and economic relations.

Modern Russian-Turkish relations demonstrate a success story: disputed political issues are localized by the parties and considered separately, mostly without affecting trade and economic relations. 

It is extremely important not to forget about the projects implemented by the parties in the 20th century and, in particular, about the Soviet industrial heritage that is preserved and continues to operate in Turkey, including textile, metallurgical, chemical, glass, energy facilities and enterprises. That is why the project on the inventory and documentation of this heritage, with making the results public, is one of the priorities for the Russian-Turkish Project Development Association (TUR RUS), headed by undersigned.

At the center of modern trade and economic relations between the parties are several foundation stones, including energy trade, mutual investments, tourism and humanitarian ties.

Separately, it is worth noting the projects that have become a symbol of bilateral relations, such as the first Turkish nuclear power plant “Akkuyu,” the “Turkish Stream” gas pipeline and cooperation in the defense industry, which will start after the delivery of the Russian air defense systems S-400 to Turkey at the end of this year. The strategic importance of each of these projects lies in the fact that these are not just purchase and sale agreements, but triggers new opportunities and areas of long-term cooperation in technology areas with high added value.

Regarding humanitarian ties, it may be noted that the year 2019 was declared the Cross Year of Culture and Tourism by the presidents of the two countries. Those 6 million Russian tourists who visited Turkey in 2018 by themselves contribute to an intensive dialogue between the Russian and Turkish people.

The years 2015 – 2016 were marked by one of the most acute crises in the new history of Russian-Turkish relations – by the so-called “airplane crisis.” However, it is worth noting the main thing – despite the political crisis, the economic basis of bilateral relations, in particular, the supply of energy resources to Turkey by Russia continued to function properly.

Projects between Russia and Turkey are not just purchase and sale agreements, but trigger new opportunities and areas of long-term cooperation. 

Restricting bilateral cooperation in other areas turned out to be so unprofitable for both parties, that it forced them to sit down at the negotiating table and promptly resolve the conflict, which many observers considered to be insoluble, at least in the short and medium terms. Let’s just realize that the crisis lasted only seven months.

First of all, this crisis became a vivid evidence that the economic and humanitarian ties between the two countries reached such a level of depth, that they were able to balance even the most acute political crises in the new history. Secondly, the parties received a sad, but, apparently, necessary experience of what the rash actions can lead to and what damage to their interests can be caused.

It would be wrong to assume that the economy balanced policy, but did not suffer losses. On the contrary, the seven crisis months, as well as the transit period for the full restoration of Russian-Turkish relations, were unacceptably expensive. One can count on the fact that this experience will be taken into account by the parties in the future, in order to prevent its repetition.

But this should be recognized, in the present conditions, already insufficient.

It should be recognized that modern trade and economic relations between Russia and Turkey need to open new pages of cooperation and to implement new projects. The goal that was declared by the presidents of the two countries on a fourfold increase of trade turnover – from 25 to 100 billion dollars – itself shows that the leadership of the two countries is aware that the existing potential is not just not fully utilized, but is also very far from its real capacity.

The contract on the construction of the first Turkish nuclear power plant “Akkuyu,” involving the transfer of peaceful nuclear technologies from Russia to Turkey, creates a wide range of opportunities for the establishment of joint ventures, whose products may be in demand in Russia and Turkey, and may be also supplied to third countries. It is worth recalling that the Russian-Turkish Intergovernmental Agreement does not define any borders on the transfer of Russian technologies to Turkey. It means, if to express this idea with a one sentence, Russia expressed its readiness to transfer to Turkey as much technology as Turkey is ready to get and utilize. This is a big importance of the “Akkuyu” project and the greatest opportunity for the parties to cooperate, which takes the deal far beyond the construction and operation of another power plant.

The gas pipeline, got the name “Turkish Stream,” which implements what the undersigned proposed ten years ago, when said, that Russia, as a producing country, and Turkey, as a transit country, are not competitors in the energy market. Turkey is interested in uninterrupted, in sufficient quantities and in direct supplies of Russian energy resources, without another transit countries. Russia, in its turn, is interested in Turkey, as in the second largest client (after Germany) – consumer of its natural gas, as well as in a reliable corridor for the delivery of its energy resources to Europe. Let’s repeat, Russia and Turkey are not competitors in this sense, they complement each other. The establishment of an important energy hub in Turkey does not contradict the interests of Russia. Moreover, the two countries should analyze the possibilities of cooperation in such an important energy region as the Eastern Mediterranean.

Among the promising areas of Russian-Turkish cooperation in the defense industry are rocket production, aircraft construction, shipbuilding (including submarines), unmanned aerial vehicles, etc.

And finally, it is worth to mention the contract for the supply of the Russian air defense systems S-400. Obviously, it is perceived in Russia as a pilot project, which is supposed to launch new supplies of the Russian defense industry’s products to Turkey. Moreover, the fact that there is a transfer of Russian technologies foreseen in the deal indicates that Russia is ready to establish joint ventures with Turkey in the defense industry, and, moreover, perform supplies to third countries. The Russian government has overcome an important psychological barrier that previously existed in relation to Turkey, as the country is a member of NATO. Among the promising areas of Russian-Turkish cooperation in the defense industry are rocket production, aircraft construction, shipbuilding (including submarines), unmanned aerial vehicles, etc. Separately, it is worth noting the opportunities for cooperation between Russia and Turkey in the space industry and researches.

It should be noted that these are the areas that were launched by just three projects of Russian-Turkish cooperation, where the Russian and Turkish sides abandoned clichés and showed their readiness for flexible thinking. What other areas may be equally breakthrough?

In this sense, let’s name just one specific area and one project where Russian-Turkish cooperation can make a breakthrough.

Firstly, such results may be brought by Russian-Turkish cooperation in the field of software development, in the field of Big Data and in cyber security. Naturally labelled “Russian hacker” is another black propaganda. However, at the same time, it is recognition of the indisputable fact that Russia is one of the world leaders, which owns its own search engine, its own anti-virus systems, its own social network, and its own developments in the field of ensuring cybersecurity of the country, both in terms of external, and internal threats. All these are globally competitive. Some of these products are widely known in Turkey, including Yandex search engine and Kaspersky antivirus.

The main risks for the future of relations between Turkey and Russia are related to the exerting external pressure and provocations in order to prevent their further development.

Secondly, it is worth to mention the Istanbul Channel. In Russia there is the opinion that there is no financial model for the project, which provides a return of investments. And, therefore, the probability of its construction is not too high in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the problem of the growing traffic through Bosporus may negatively affect Russia. Russia is also interested in a preservation of the security regime in the Black Sea basin, within the framework of the Montreux Convention. And, in this sense, the parties, at least, have a reason to start a conversation about the Turkish initiative related to the Istanbul Channel.

The main risks for the future of relations between Turkey and Russia are related to the exerting external pressure and provocations in order to prevent their further development. Especially when it comes to sensitive issues for bilateral relations, in particular, Syria and the post-war settlement in the country, the Crimea and the Crimean Tatars, relations in the Turkey-Ukraine-Russia triangle, and Russian-Turkish competition in the Central Asia and Caucasus region.

There are contradictions in each of these issues between Russia and Turkey. However, there is also a field for cooperation. In this sense, along with successful and mutually beneficial trade and economic relations, which, as we said, balance political risks, it is worth noting the lack of institutional ties between Russia and Turkey. As Russia has its own initiatives such as the Eurasian Economic Union and The Collective Security Treaty Organization, Turkey is a member of the Customs Union with the EU and NATO. Objectively, the parties are lacking a strategic cooperation platform, both in economic and military/defense fields, which would bind them strategically to each other even more. This is most arguably the biggest gap between Russia and Turkey nowadays, which the parties should think about firstly.

Turkish President Erdogan met his counterpart Putin in Russia’s Sochi on Monday. In a joint news conference with Erdogan, Putin stated that “We agreed that by October 15 (we will) create along the contact line between the armed opposition and government troops a demilitarized zone of a depth of 15-20 km, with the withdrawal from there of radically-minded rebels, including al-Nusra.” Further, he also expressed that the Turkish and Russian mobile patrol units will monitor the demilitarized zone. The agreed points were released days after the meeting but the list just adds a few more details to the statement on Monday without changing the substance.

The buffer zone to separate the hostile forces with a demilitarized corridor surrounding Idlib sounds all good. This is exactly what Turkey wanted to achieve as the Idlib deal is going towards a sharp edge. Nevertheless, there is a significant caveat in this deal: the expiration date. There is a reason why Putin specifically referred to October 15. What happens if the projected demilitarized zone cannot be established by then? What happens if the groups in Idlib refuse to return their heavy arms to show no threat to Russia? What if an actor from inside or outside of Idlib spoils the process by an attack of provocation? These are all significant questions worth to think about.

But no matter what, Turkey’s Idlib deal gave the rebels one more month to consider their options. It gave Turkey another month to make its preparations for the worst case scenario. It also presented another successful test for the Turkish-Russian cooperation in Syria. Especially Iran seemed to be less proactive towards the final decision of Monday. With the diminishing pressure felt from the Assad and Iranian regimes, Turkey and Russia will find a lot more to agree on.

As for Iran, they must have no hard feelings. As Turkey did not spoil their plans to maintain security around Damascus and further down the south, Iran should and seems like did respect Turkey’s concerns just across its border in Idlib. Perhaps it was not Iran but Russia who came to this conclusion and kept Iran out in the most recent phase of the deal, but regardless of that, Turkey and Russia should be and for now are the actors to negotiate over the fate of Idlib. This intermediary solution over Idlib is still just a plan whose implementation will be challenging. Further, it is more like a temporary resolution until the involved actors decide and negotiate what to do next.

And finally, this deal is just about Idlib and does not cover the neighboring Tel Rifaat let alone the rest of Syria. But all these concerns do not make the Idlib deal a bad one. This plan was needed for its implementation and for a long-lasting resolution in Idlib. Simply, you cannot continue without a start even though there is still a long path to walk through from Idlib to Tel Rifaat and to the rest of Syria. But you have to start from somewhere and, at this stage, it is Idlib.

What Turkey needed in Idlib was a stable situation in the city that will not destabilize Turkish territory across the border and will not harm the Turkish-Russian deal. Turkey so far has been onto this goal but the question as to what will happen to the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is still a question to decide about. In their recent statements, some pro-HTS accounts showed no sign of change in their hostile attitudes toward Turkey and Russia.

It almost seems like some rebel factions think that Idlib will not be like Northern Aleppo, Deraa, or Eastern Ghouta. It almost seems like they are confident that they will not lose a possible battle in Idlib. Yes, they can perhaps go underground and plan for a long-lasting insurgency in Idlib. But the simple fact about a possible Idlib offensive will guarantee a large-scale demolition of the city and loss of lives in great numbers. We will see whether we can see some sense of responsibility and rationality from the involved actors and we do not have much time to see the result as the expiration date of October 15 will come fast.

The Idlib uncertainty is temporarily over. However, following the Sochi Summit held on Monday, September 17, debates about the real winner in the Idlib case remains unclear. From a humanitarian standpoint, protecting more than 3 million civilians from a full-scale military assault carried out by the Syrian regime is a real achievement. However, from a geopolitical perspective, Idlib — as the last territorial stronghold of the opposition armed groups — turns into a chess-board between Russia and Turkey. At first sight, it seems that Turkey played a vital role in preventing a potential unilateral Russian-Syrian military offensive and found a new opportunity to maintain the existing border of the Idlib region; to consolidate its military presence through the extension of its military outposts, and to protect moderate opposition groups’ territorial control. However, the question of how Turkey will be able to deliver its gains on the ground is an open question and depends on how Russia thinks about the future of Idlib at the end of the expiration date of the deal signed between Moscow and Ankara in Sochi. But the strategic importance of the Russian-Turkish dialogue is valuable to maintain the deal. More importantly, Turkey’s Idlib projection might bring many new dynamics not only for Ankara’s own calculations regarding its position alongside its Syrian border but also for the future of the Syrian crisis.

From a very rationalist perspective, Turkey has many challenges as well as opportunities in the post-Sochi agreement period regarding its entire Syrian strategy. Turkey has to deal with challenging tasks in Syria. Among them, preventing the PYD-PKK’s consolidation of military and political leverage across Syria is the most crucial one, while the U.S. continues to reshuffle its original strategy about the Kurds in the eastern part of the Euphrates river. Maintaining the territorial control of the Afrin-Azaz-Jarablus triangle and protecting the Free Syrian Army’s status in this region are the secondary objectives that Turkey wishes to achieve. Consolidating the Free Syrian Army’s position militarily and empowering the Syrian political opposition within the wider geopolitical struggle regarding the solution of the Syrian crisis is another challenge that Turkey faces. Idlib is located at the center of these geopolitical concerns of Turkey. Fighting against the PKK means fighting against the U.S. at the same time, and struggling for a secure place for the Syrian opposition on the table means a deal has to be made with Russia.

From the Turkish perspective, winning Idlib at this stage has many strategic values. First and foremost, preventing a possible humanitarian catastrophe provides Turkey a real advantage not only for its already-deepening refugee issue but also for its economy. Before the Turkish-Russian deal in Sochi, in case of a unilateral offensive, the UN announced that more than half a million people from the Idlib region would be displaced and move towards Turkey’s border. Under the current circumstances and changing public perception towards the refuges, this would bring real trouble into Turkish politics, particularly before the upcoming local election. More importantly, during the time of economic uncertainty of the country, the refugee flow would bring the extra cost for the Turkish economy.

The second one is significant regarding the protection of human life from a full-scale military operation. In the post-Astana process of the Syrian crisis, Turkey has been consolidating the Syrian opposition under the umbrella of the Free Syrian Army. The FSA played a vital role during Operation Olive Branch and Turkey could maintain its military presence in the Afrin region with the assistance of the FSA and restructured the very nature of the local politics there throughout the mobilization period of the FSA. In the post-Astana process in Idlib, Turkey did the same thing without clashing with any radical armed groups and regrouped the moderate armed group under the umbrella of the National Liberation Army. The deal which has been agreed upon between Turkey and Russia means that Turkey can maintain the existing territorial management of the moderate armed group and that it also gets to keep its military posts in Idlib. If Turkey can manage to disband and dissolve the radical groups on the ground, such as the HTS, then it can keep maintaining its control over the Idlib region to consolidate its political leverage in the Syrian crisis for the foreseeable future.

The third strategic value for Turkey is to protect Turkish-Russian dialogue on the ground. Turkey and Russia have been closely working since the Astana initiative started. Even though the two countries do not fully agree over the Syrian crisis since they have been supporting different parties, both sides can compartmentalize their tactical and operational priorities on the ground. The Idlib deal represents that both countries agree on a full-scale military solution would prolong the war itself. More importantly, losing Turkey at this stage would bring a new wave of uncertainty for Russia in the Syrian crisis. Even though the roughly one-month time frame for Turkey to dissolve the radical group is not enough, the strategic dialogue between Russia and Turkey can provide an extension to do this objective.

When taking the dimensions above into consideration for the new Idlib deal, Turkey also gets to keep its role in the Syrian crisis. Controlling remarkable territories alongside its borders with its armed forces in the opposition armed groups’ presence, Turkey is still playing a vital role for the future of the Syrian crisis in the international arena. At this stage, the most important objective for Turkey is to solve the potential radicalization of the armed groups. If Turkey can deliver its objective, then it can keep its overall position in the Syrian civil war.

Turkey is set to buy the S-400 missile defense system from Russia as President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, while meeting his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in Ankara on Monday, announced that the deal would be finalized “this week.”

The S-400 deal between Russia and Turkey has reached close to its success after a more than year of negotiations.

“Our colleagues will come together this week to conclude the work,” Erdogan said.

The news of negotiation between Russia and Turkey had raised speculation in the West as Turkey is a core partner of the Western military alliance NATO. However, the Turkish government seemed determined to buy the missile system from NATO’s main rival due to Turkey’s fear of the West’s duel role in the Syrian war, indifference to last year’s failed coup attempt and its antagonist approach to the country.

The S-400 is a modern-day long range missile system that is capable of carrying three types of missiles which can destroy targets including ballistic and cruise missiles. The system can track and engage up to 300 targets at a time and has an altitude ceiling of 27 kilometers (17 miles).

The two presidents also discussed bilateral trade relations and both expressed the hope and desire to keep the relations going.

Erdogan said, “Our bilateral trade volume with Russia increased 30 percent as of the first 10 months of 2017. We have a harmonious working environment at the political level.”

Russian president Vladimir Putin told that obstacles to trade and economic ties had been removed. “Within the first eight months of this year Turkish agricultural exports to Russia increased by 1.8 percent,” he said.

Relations between the two countries had entered a crisis after Turkey shot down a Russian jet over the Turkish-Syrian border in late 2015. Russia immediately imposed sanctions on Turkey, which mainly targeted the tourism sector, as Russian tourists form a major number of tourists in Turkey — about three million per year.

Russian withdrawal from Syria

Putin on Monday made a surprising visit to war-torn Syria, ordering his troops to prepare withdrawing from the country as Syria, according to the president, had been cleared of the terrorists. The commander of the Russian forces in Syria, Colonel General Sergei Surovikin, said that Russia will withdraw its 23 combat aircrafts, two helicopters, special force units, military police, and area security personnel from Syria.

Russia intervened in the Syrian war militarily in September 2015 after receiving an official request from the Assad regime. Putin met with Bashar al-Assad at Khmeimim Air Base, southeast of Latakia, on Monday.

However, the questions still remain unanswered as to whether Russian advisors will remain in Syria, what kind of weaponry they are going to leave behind and how they are going to support the Assad regime from now on.

Media reports since 2015 have suggested that Russia was sending all its high-tech and advanced weaponry including T-90 tanks (first post-Soviet tank) and Sukhoi jets to usher the Syrian government – that along with its rivals have killed more than 350,000 Syrians. The battle tank, which the US media had reported reached Syria’s Latakia air base in 2015, is equipped with a 125mm tank gun and an anti-aircraft machine gun. The weaponry that remains in Syria is going to be a concern for neighboring countries, most importantly Turkey.

Amid the warming relations between Turkey and Russia that have high stakes connected to the stabilization in Syria, Turkey has high hopes to acquire Russian assent for the operation in the Afrin province of Syria. Afrin is the hub of YPG/PKK terror groups and Turkey is bent on preventing them just like Daesh.

Criticizing US move on Jerusalem

Amid the rising fury throughout the Muslim world, Erdogan and Putin also spoke against US president Donald Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The Russian president stated that the status of Jerusalem should be settled through direct talks between Palestinians and Israel.

While speaking at the press conference he said, “Both Russia and Turkey think the decision of the US to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel is not helping the situation in the Middle East. It is destabilizing the region and wiping out the prospect of peace.”

US reacts to Russian announcement

Meanwhile, the US has dismissed the Russian claim and at the same time feigned indifference at the Russian announcement of troop withdrawal from Syria. A Pentagon statement on Monday claimed that Russian statements on the withdrawal of its forces from Syria “do not typically correspond” with the situation on the ground.

In a press statement Pentagon spokesperson Military Col. Rob Manning said, “Russia’s comments do not impact US priorities in Syria.”

*Written by Waseem Ahad