Almost as a historical coincidence, on the third anniversary of the 2016 failed coup attempt, the European Union has placed serious sanctions on Turkey. To some extent, the decision is coherent with the European stance towards Turkey as it underlines the double standard approach. Certainly, it is not a mystery that the relations had become very tense after 15 July, 2016, generating a profound and mutual frustration. However, the casus belli legitimizing the adoption of measures against Turkey refers to the thorny Cyprus issue and to the exploration activities started around the island. Indeed, the EU foreign ministers decided to punish Ankara over its alleged “illegal drilling activities within the territorial waters of member state Cyprus.” The outgoing President of the Council of Ministers – Donald Tusk- clearly stated “Despite our best intentions to keep good neighborly relations with Turkey, its continued escalation and challenge to the sovereignty of our Member State Cyprus will inevitably lead the EU to respond in full solidarity.” 

Essentially, the sanctions endorse that “in light of Turkey’s continued and new illegal drilling activities, the EU decides to suspend negotiations on the Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement and agrees not to hold further meetings of the high-level dialogues for the time being.” Furthermore, “the Council endorses the European Commission’s proposal to reduce the pre-accession assistance to Turkey for next year and it invites the European Investment Bank to review its lending activities in Turkey, notably with regard to sovereign-backed lending” by warning that the EU is ready to take action against individuals and companies involved in Turkey’s drilling activities on the areas, which are perceived as interference in Cyprus’s Exclusive Economic zone.

What we are witnessing today between the European Union and Turkey is the product of a long-standing deadlock.

Actually, due to the already existing tension with Brussels, Turkey had recently experienced a significant decrease on EU financial support. Indeed, for the 2014-2020 period, Ankara was supposed to receive around 4.45 billion euros for implementing political reforms and other projects aiming to facilitate Turkey-EU accession, which was downgraded of 175 million euros. As matter of fact, the sanctions aim to penalize Turkey, but they look like a cosmetic move. Indeed, what we are witnessing today it is the product of a long-standing deadlock. For example, the EU-Turkey talks on civil aviation got stuck just after the first round of negotiations started in 2016 as part of 2015 Aviation Strategy for Europe, due to the animosity of the Greek Cypriot administration. Even though Turkey is a very important global hub and valuable aviation partner for Europe, as long as there is not a reciprocal recognition and flight connections this file will be frozen.

Moreover, it is not the first time that the pre-accession assistance got reduced. In other words, anything happening on the Eastern Mediterranean does not surprise much as it is just the unfair price Turkey has been paying for the historical mistake made by Europe itself back to 2004. That year has to be recognized as a real turning point and the mother of each problems affecting Turkey-EU relations. After the Annan Plan and the related referendum on the future of Cyprus, although the Turkish Cypriots had voted for the reunification of the island and the Greek Cypriots supported the division, Brussels rewarded them by granting the status of full EU member. As it is sadly already known, internationally the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is not recognized as a sovereign state, but as invaded territory. Hence, Turkey plays a crucial role in protecting the Turkish community while it suffers the price of a distorted negotiation process as Cyprus vetoed most EU accession chapters and many EU leaders sympathized with the Greek side. This is an anathema for Turkey and its interests as EU candidate state as well as Turkish Cypriots guarantor. In other words, there is not much Ankara can do without being slammed or sanctioned. That was the case in 2004 and along the first stages of the negotiation process. Nowadays, again the story repeats itself. The EU has shown just a one-way approach by supporting unconditionally anything the Greek Cyprus claims- like the self-proclaimed economic exclusive area.

Anything happening on the Eastern Mediterranean does not surprise much as it is just the unfair price Turkey has been paying for the historical mistake made by Europe itself back to 2004.

The European management seems to not think twice in extending its jurisdiction on controversial areas and overall in targeting Turkey in a sort of provocative and nonobjective style. Overall, the EU believes that anything Turkey is doing on the Cyprus offshore is a violation of international law while on the other hand Ankara claims its own legitimacy in defending the Turkish Cypriots, who have equal rights to the natural resources of the islands. To tell the truth, the Turkish Cypriots have recently proposed a joint committee for the hydrocarbon activities off the island, which was simply ignored by the EU institutions. Actually, the upstream problem lays on the definition of legitimacy that once again goes back to the old question of the island division that Europe not only failed to solve, but has even contributed to further complicate.

Despite its international recognition and EU full membership, Turkish Cypriots consider the Republic of Cyprus illegitimate as the Greek Cypriots consider the Turkish–Cypriots self-governance illegitimate. However, the European Court of Human Rights recognizes TRNC “subservient administration” to the Government of Turkey, based on the principle that no population can remain in a governance vacuum. Thus, once again the situation is tangling up with increasing tones that are unlikely to produce further consequences.

Being understood that Turkey’s journey towards the EU got frozen due to some domestic stalemates and double standard approaches, the only card on the table recently has been the economic one. As matter of fact, Europe is one of the main trade partners of Turkey, even though some issues persist on the review of the current customs union. Likely, the measures adopted by EU institutions will not have a dramatic impact on the Turkish market, which has already proved some sustainability and resilience after the severe crisis of the last year with U.S. Moreover, for Europe Turkey is a valuable partner on the containment of immigration flows. Indeed, in a time when the far-right extremist groups in Europe are arising as protest to the current management of some critical issues such as security and migrants, Brussels cannot afford to lose Ankara’s support and collaboration hence there is room to think that any further sanctions would have limited impact.

Overall, between Turkey and Europe remains a communication gap and a mutual frustration merely undermining any dialogue for a constructive approach towards those pending issues. Thus, the impasse seems destined to continue and to become a real paradox.

“Turkey’s accession negotiations have effectively come to a standstill no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing and no further work towards the modernization of the Customs Union can be currently foreseen. The Turkish government’s repeated commitment to the objective of EU accession has not been matched by corresponding measures and reforms since then, and the EU’s serious concerns on continued negative developments in rule of law, fundamental rights and the Judiciary have not been addressed.” With those words, the Progress Report 2019 clarifies the status of the European accession process for Turkey.

This year the term ‘backsliding’ appears very often and it is related to 29 points mainly referring to the content of the rule of law, freedom of expression, effectiveness of the presidential system and to the state of the Turkish economy. Latest, it underlines serious concerns for the electoral process namely referring to Istanbul re-run elections. Beside that, when it comes to further topics they are described as “worrying” while the EU acknowledges the “outstanding efforts” to host 3.6 million Syrian refugees. Perceived as the worst report since the beginning of the accession talks, it has been rejected by Turkey for some “unfair and unbalanced criticism”. On careful observation, however, the statements do not surprise as much as they reflect the lowest point ever reached in the long and thorny negotiation journey.

For a long time, relations between Turkey and the European Union have been affected by a lack of mutual understanding and related accountability. In the recent years, the frustration characterizing both sides has given rise to a sort of deaf communicability culminated with the block of the negotiation talks by the European parliament (EP). This move was echoed by Turkish President Erdogan who stated that he might consider putting Turkey-EU accession to a referendum, as a sign of protest against the European bias and unfairness towards Turkey.

In recent years, the frustration characterizing the EU – Turkey relations has given rise to a sort of deaf communicability.

Indeed, the redundant EP declarations were both unnecessary and harmful: unnecessary because the accession got stall since its very beginning and harmful because they threw further negativity on the already complicated relationship. While Turkey’s accession to Europe is the result of a historical process that began in the 60s along the Ankara agreements and has continued until today, no one can ever doubt the benefits of joining the EU. In 2005 when the negotiation officially started, Turkey marked the greatest closeness point to Europe, but soon the enthusiasm cooled down not only because of the domestic issues Turkey had to face, but also for the hostility shown by the Franco-German bloc within the Union.

Undoubtedly, those were the years the limits of the reforming liberal policies began to arise, leaving rooms for some criticism towards and from Europe. Since then it has been clear that mainly due to the opposition of some EU Member States, the European pact was affected by a sort of lack of perspective, which contradicts that pacta sunt servanda principle as core of any fair agreement.

Then as today, the Turkish disappointment is not entirely reprehensible, if we consider that out of thirty-five negotiating chapters Turkey has opened only sixteen and closed just one while the remaining are blocked by the veto of Cyprus and other member States. In this regard, it has to be stressed that although in 2004 Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot side supported the solution offered by the Annan Plan, they had to face not only the intransigence of the Greek side, but also the annexation of Cyprus as a full EU member. Along such a political distortion, instead of full membership, some European states proposed a new “privileged partnership” formula, which undermined further the credibility of the accession process. This has created a certain distance with Brussels by nurturing the feeling that Europe is like a teacher with a red pen ready to judge without empathizing and unable of any self-criticism.

Despite the tensions and the difficulties in mutual understanding, nowadays Turkey and Europe still need each other.

Paradoxically, even if today Turkey did not have any issue related to substantial democracy and everything worked very well domestically, the pitfalls of the so called ‘Cyprus issue’ would prevent the opening of several negotiation chapters, including the most sensitive ones concerning the rule of law. These formalities are of crucial importance to catch the obstacles encountering in an already compromised path. Moreover, the 15 July failed coup attempt marked a further dividing line. Despite the dramas that a coup attempt brings with itself, some European states had some difficulty in expressing their solidarity to the Turkish government, shattering the Turkish- European talks. In the recent years, the common messages addressed to Ankara stated a more and more increasing concern about the democratic deficit of Turkey while on the other side the Turkish discontent had developed further along the fact that no Progress Report had classified FETO, the perpetrators of the coup attempt, as a terrorist group.

Nowadays, despite the tensions and the difficulties in mutual understanding, Turkey and Europe still need each other. The greatest effort in hosting the refugees, which started unilaterally much before the March 2016 migrant deal with the EU, gives a huge contribution in stemming the irregular migration flow across the Aegean Sea and in contrasting human traffickers. At a time when the migrant issue is dividing Europe, Turkey itself improved the life conditions for more than three million Syrian refugees who found shelter in its territory.

As one of the greatest worldwide donors and key players in humanitarian policies, Turkey contributes a lot to contain the immigration flows towards Europe.

In other words, as one of the greatest worldwide donors and key players in humanitarian policies, Turkey contributes a lot to contain the immigration flows towards Europe. However, one of the conditions of the 2016 deal has foreseen for Turkey an acceleration in the accession process and the visa liberalization for the Schengen area, to be provided once Ankara would have fulfilled the 72 requirements set by Brussels, including “the revision of the legislation and practices on terrorism according to European standards “. Yet, this is a crucial point for Turkey, which is engaged on several fronts in the fight against terrorism, from PKK, Daesh and FETO. Here comes another contradiction: Turkey is still the only candidate country that does not have a visa liberalization agreement with the EU with related discomfort and frustration of Turkish citizens – and among them the businesspersons who encounter constant difficulties in accessing European countries that are the first destination of their exports.

Unfortunately, the European journey turned out to be an anathema for Turkey that paradoxically is set to stand on the door for a little while longer. In the deadlock negotiation, a new element affects the relations: the rising European far-right that most probably would harm any further enlargement towards Ankara. Under the new nationalist and chauvinist wave, even the historic supporters of the Turkish membership may gradually lose interest, harnessed in their internal political and economic problems and in their anti-immigration rhetoric.

Today it is more and more common to come across comments portraying Turkey as ‘no European country and it will never be’ legitimized by some political manifestos calling for a revival of the European spirit on original identity basis. Likely, in what seems a very fragmented Europe, along its duty as the body designing the strategic agenda and priority areas for longer-term EU action, the European Council would hardly reach the unanimous decision to abandon the accession negotiations.

There is an urgent need to rethink and review the Customs Union agreement between Turkey and the EU.

As it has been stated several times by both parts as well as in the report just released, thanks to their geographical proximity, the millennial historic-cultural relations and the increasingly close intertwining of the economies, the alliance between Ankara and Brussels remains strategic. Thus, in front of the escalating violence in the MENA region and the related foreign fighters and migration emergency, cooperation is imperative. Moreover, even though they depend heavily on the political factor, mutual economic relations have great potential for further development. Since the entry into force of the Customs Union in 1996, the value of bilateral trade has more than quadrupled as well as European direct investment to Turkey.

Nowadays there is an urgent need to rethink and review the agreement, which still excludes major sectors, including services and agriculture, which are respectively 60 percent and 10 percent of Turkish gross domestic product – and public procurement. Indeed, barrier regulations, the high average rate of the most favored nation and the politics of price regulation hamper imports of agricultural products from Turkey.

An efficient update requires the elimination of asymmetric relations between Ankara, Brussels and third countries as well and the establishment of a mechanism for resolving disputes and controversies. Despite the failure to revise the customs union, the Turkish and European economies are strongly integrated at a commercial level. As assumed by the liberal logic, those interconnections are the source of indissoluble interdependence. Therefore, besides being the main interlocutor to face all the thorny issues that knock on the door of the Old Continent, it is impossible to deny that Turkey is already in Europe. Hence, in a win-win perspective the revival of the reformist spirit is the engine to re-launch a positive dialogue with the bloc and to build mutual trust.

Turkey held one of the most important local elections this past week. The election campaigns were mostly shaped by Turkish foreign and security policies concerning the Syrian crisis, the PKK, and the fight against terrorism. The AK Party won the popular vote although it lost the major strongholds to the main opposition party. Istanbul, traditionally ruled by conservative parties since 1994, and the capital Ankara were lost to the opposition bloc, which was represented by a coalition called the National Alliance (In Istanbul, the re-count of votes are still ongoing and an official declaration will be announced by the YSK). It seems that the AK Party will continue dominating the Turkish political landscape via the 45% majority vote that it scored recently, which is unchallengeable by any other single party alone at this stage – It must be noted here that the People’s Alliance, consisting of the AK Party and MHP (Nationalist Movement Party), won the majority of the votes by 52%.

Winning Istanbul in 1994 was the first step of President Erdoğan’s long-term journey in the Turkish political sphere, in which he became the first political leader in Turkish politics who has stayed in power for more than 16 years. However, whether or not he has lost his first love, Istanbul– which he frames as Islambul, remains unclear not only because of the election result but also due to the changing nature of politics in Turkey. The result depends entirely on which side of the coin you look at to make sense of the result of the local election.

President Erdoğan remains Turkey’s most powerful leader while others’ approval individually is not more than 20% and more importantly, his ruling AK Party maintains its dominant party position in Turkish politics. While his rating is somewhat high especially compared to others, the results of the local election are taken seriously by him and high-level AK Party members on whether the AK Party should rethink its political strategy and narrative regarding current Turkish politics. This was highlighted by the President in his traditional balcony speech just after the local election while the result of Istanbul was unclear. He strongly underlined that the political message that his supporters wanted to give him was understood. He stressed that Turkey has serious challenges in its foreign and security policy, including the fight against terrorism and other regional issues such as Syria, and underlined that his term would continue for more than four years, where he and his ruling party would use their abilities to reshape Turkish politics regarding what AK Party supporters and the rest of the society would like to see.

After the election results on Sunday, President Erdogan strongly underlined that the political message that his supporters wanted to give him was understood. 

President Erdoğan and his ruling party are aware of the reality that there is a mutually constitutive relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy. The subject of survival was articulated heavily during the election campaign where it held the dominant narrative. The concept has been a dominant reference point of Turkish domestic and foreign security policy for more than two centuries. However, in current Turkish foreign policy, the AK Party and President Erdoğan should focus on firstly, a comprehensive foreign and security policy strategy, rather than emphasizing the concept of survival. In international politics, survival is an integral part of understanding state behavior, and most believe that it is the ultimate behavior of state; and that states should seriously seek for the best strategy to survive. It is true that Turkey has many challenges stemming from its own geopolitical landscape and long-time allies, namely the U.S, but Ankara should rethink its foreign and security policies beyond the concept of survival.

The reason is simple; the future of the AK Party at home will be determined by its performance in its foreign and security policy, or vice versa. More to the point, the success of the AK Party came to be as a result of its ability to adjust the domestic-international balance simultaneously. It took Turkey’s EU journey into account: The EU agenda was one of the important determinants factors behind the rise of the “Turkish model” in the Middle East and beyond while domestic politics became free from military tutelage.  

The concept of survival has been a dominant reference point of Turkish domestic and foreign security policy. But now the AK Party and President Erdogan should focus on a comprehensive foreign and security policy strategy.

There are three reasons why Turkey should be serious about its foreign and security policy. The first one is economic reasons, which President Erdoğan also emphasized would be the most important priority in the government’s agenda. The economy has been a crucial component of Turkish foreign policy for sixteen years which Turkey has enjoyed being a “trading state” where the concept is based on trade-driven integration strategies rather than security-driven foreign policy, especially in its surrounding regions. Under the shadow of current economic pressure, Turkish foreign policy has to recalculate its strategy and should find a new modality regarding how to recalibrate its economic relations to overcome the current economic upheaval. Turkey is still one of the most energetic countries in the MENA region with its dynamic economy, large population, the relative weight of its diplomatic influence over the regional issues and rising defense industry. There can be no ultimate strategic gain for Turkey without maintaining its economic rise in foreign affairs, and there is no economic gain without maintaining its diplomatic engagements.       

The second reason is political stability, which President Erdoğan has been underlining its strategic importance to consolidate Turkey’s rise in international politics since he came to power. The post-local election period poses opportunities, as well as challenges, for Turkey’s gradual rise. The structural and political consolidation of the presidential system is the most challenging one. From a structural side, the institutional regulations in the post-parliamentary order are still dynamics where many institutions need to be properly relocated and redesigned. From a very political perspective, it is possible to argue that the election dynamics in Turkey have significantly changed; which indicates the possibility of an achieved bipolar balance despite the continued dominance of the People’s Alliance.

The local election emphasizes that there are many ways in constituting an alliance system between different parties irrespective of their ideological differences. From a truly pragmatic reading of politics; it reminds us of the well-known saying: “the ally of today could be your rival tomorrow.” Therefore, political stability under President Erdoğan for the next four years is strategically important, where domestic and international balance will mutually facilitate one another to keep political stability in Turkey since both the AK Party and MHP, strongly support the continuity of the People’s Alliance. The foreign and security policy of Turkey will be certainly influential not only to consolidate political stability but also to maintain the alliance between two parties.        

There has been increasing radical-extremist political ideologies across to Europe which influences Turkey’s EU perspective but, securitizing Europe is not a good strategy for Turkey’s long-term interests.

The third reason is the combined foreign and security domain, in the scope of the upcoming practical issues in Turkey’s external affairs. First and foremost, re-energizing the Turkey-EU relationship, which has been poisoned by the rise of anti-Turkish politics and increasing unwillingness to have Turkey join the EU, particularly since 2013, is crucial. The EU has been the main determining factor, if not only one, behind the consolidation of Turkish democracy, including civil-military relations and basic human rights. Turkey and the EU should learn how to compartmentalize their relations. Under the current geopolitical upheaval stemming from BREXIT to Trump’s unwillingness towards both NATO and the EU, Turkey remains a strategically important powerhouse, especially with its crucial engagement with Russia, and political and military engagement to the Syrian conflict. Turkey, on the other hand, should not homogenize or categorize Europe only with reference to Islamophobia, far-right extremism, or Turkofobia. Yes, it is true that there has been increasing radical-extremist political ideologies across to Europe which influences Turkey’s EU perspective but, securitizing Europe is not a good strategy for Turkey’s long-term interests.

In addition to the EU/Europe, the Turkey-U.S. relationship is under significant challenges. The U.S. administration since 2013 has been repeatedly undermining Turkey’s national security interests by supporting the PYD-YPG in Syria and currently is threatening in retaliation for Ankara’s decision to move ahead with the purchase of a Russian air missile system. The foreign and security issues are not limited to the U.S. Turkey should be careful with regards to the PKK issue in Syria, but at the same time should not forget that the Middle East is bigger than the PKK. It does not necessarily mean that Turkey should not prioritize the PKK, as it is a high-level national security threat. Rather, it means that Turkey should consider the Middle East and its interests from a wider geopolitical perspective.

The EU has been the main determining factor behind the consolidation of Turkish democracy, including civil-military relations and human rights. Turkey and the EU should learn how to compartmentalize their relations.

The region is significantly transforming, the nature of actors in the region are dramatically changing and the geopolitical competition among the regional actors is getting more antagonizing. The regional system sends clear signals that Turkey should respond with caution. What Turkey needs to do in the post-local election period is to redraw its foreign policy priorities from a very pragmatic and practical way, refocus its reformist agenda in foreign policy, and obtain a balanced strategy.  

On Thursday, President Erdogan spoke at the TRT World Forum, which is currently taking place in Istanbul. The Forum, which began on Wednesday, brought many speakers from all across the world, with the theme “Envisioning Peace and Security in a Fragmented World.”

During his speech, President Erdogan repeated his call for serious reforms within the United Nations Security Council – an issue that he also emphasized during his speech at the United Nations General Assembly that took place in September in New York.

Speaking at the closing session of the Forum, Erdogan said, “We need to achieve a United Nations Security Council with participation from seven continents.”

Turkey’s criticism against the United Nations and the UNSC in particular has heightened due to the organization’s failure to successfully deal with the Syrian crisis, which has led to a mass refugee problem across the world.

Erdogan repeated his “The world is bigger than five” motto, and argued that reforms need to be initiated in accordance with this acceptance.

Reminding the audience of the historical context of the UN, and that it was constructed in this manner due to the circumstances of the Second World War, the Turkish President stated, “The era of the five permanent members of the UNSC is over, we are not living under the same circumstances.”

Apart from Syria, Erdogan underlined the issue of Palestine. Arguing that the Palestine issue is one that can be solved, the President argued that the main reason why this issue has been prolonged is because the UN fails to ensure that Israel puts to practice the decisions that have been made against it.

“There are many decisions that have been taken against Israel at the UN, but none of them is implementable.”

Turkey-EU relations

During his speech, President Erdogan also touched upon Turkey’s bid to the European Union. Talking about this historical process, the President also mentioned that there could be a potential referendum in Turkey regarding this issue.

“There are many things that we can contribute to the European Union. They may have things to contribute to us but what should be done is, I suppose, to consult with 81 million people [in Turkey] and see what they will decide.”

Syrian Civil War

Turkey has been an active and key player in trying to end the Syrian Civil War. While party to the Astana process, in which Iran and Russia are also guarantor states, recently Ankara and Moscow reached an agreement on the Idlib issue.

Idlib is the only stronghold for Syrian rebels, and throughout the last month the political agenda was full with news that the Assad regime in Syria were to attack the city with Russian air support.

In regards to the issues in Syria, President Erdogan emphasized that Turkish troops are currently in Syria because the Syrian people want them to be there.

“The people of Syria invited us there. ‘Come here to save us’ they said.”

Touching upon the fragile Turkey-U.S. relations, President Erdogan also accused the U.S. of sending 19,000 truckloads of weapons and ammunition to terrorist groups in Syria.

The PKK/PYD issue and the continuous support that the U.S. has provided for the group continues to be a main obstacle in healing relations between the two countries.

Commentators argue that nationalism is on the rise in Turkey. They base this assertion on two factors. One of them is that Turkey’s two nationalist parties –the MHP and the Iyi Party – were surprisingly successful in the June 24 elections. The other factor is the claim that the AK Party has switched its discourse towards nationalism and started to follow nationalist policies in recent years. Calling off the Kurdish peace process and the military operations towards the PKK in Turkey, Syria and Iraq are claimed to verify this change. Alongside these “anti-Kurdish” policies, the rise of anti-Americanism and the loss of European Union membership trajectory in Turkish foreign policy are stated to testify the rise of nationalism in Turkey. Thus, those commentators argue that the AK Party has lost its reformist side and mounted pressure on the opposition, and under AK Party rule Turkey has closed off itself to the outside world by complying with the global trend of right-wing populism.

Indeed, nationalism is often defined in contrast with internationalism. International politics can be understood with this clash of two opposing tendencies: nationalism and internationalism. In the last decade, it’s true that the globalization process of the 1990s has been declining whereas nationalism, with its left-wing and right-wing versions, has become more salient. Nationalism is viewed with suspicion and often associated with negative connotation. This ideological bias has two unfortunate results. One of them is that analysts tend to criticize nationalism rather than understand it. This leads to the second result that nationalism is reduced to exclusionary politics. Nationalism can often be exclusionary, yet that should not blind us to the fact that it can also be an inclusive force.

This is especially valid for the Turkish context. First of all, the Iyi Party has entered into parliament and this is a success for a seven-month old party. Yet, it did not adopt a doctrinal nationalist discourse in its election campaign, not to mention its overt support for Kurdish nationalist HDP’s candidate in presidential elections. The Iyi Party recommended that Selahattin Demirtas, who is kept responsible for the death of 53 people in public demonstrations in October 2014, should be released from prison in order to pursue his election campaign freely.

Secondly, the MHP was also successful in the elections yet one should not forget that its election success was a result of MHP’s change of discourse and attitudes on certain issues in recent years. The MHP stopped denying the Kurdish existence and criticizing the presidential system of leading Turkey to federalism. The MHP has also began to support the AK Party’s productive involvement with the Middle East and backed its policies of critical involvement with Israel and the West in general.

Thirdly, the AK Party has tilted towards nationalism yet it has not begun to follow a traditional form of Turkish nationalism, which targets the ex-Ottoman millets or its neighbors such as the Greeks, Armenians, and the Arabs. AK Party’s nationalism can be labelled as neo-nationalism whose founding elements can be viewed as leaving aside idealism and embracing realpolitik in its foreign policy. In line with this policy change, the AK Party has decreased the importance of soft power and directed its gaze on increasing Turkey’s material capabilities.

Not to forget that this policy change has come after as Turkey was left alone by its Western allies in its struggle to stop the June 15 coup attempt and counter terrorist attacks on its soil. And it has by no means evolved into revisionist and aggressive foreign policy. AK Party’s critical stance towards the West and the declining importance of the EU membership goal were triggered by unwelcoming attitudes of its Western allies. Turkish foreign policy towards the West has been shaped by Turkey’s search for equal relations and respect for its autonomous sovereign will.

Fourthly, those parties that adopted traditional nationalist discourse lost the elections. One of the biggest losers of the elections was the CHP and one of the main promises of this party was to repel Syrian refugees in the event of winning the elections. This shows that Turkish society does not reward exclusionary nationalism.

And lastly, it is true that there is a growing criticism towards the West in society yet it has not turned into a chauvinist nationalism. As noted above this, was caused by the Western powers’ indifference to Turkey’s sensitivities, especially Turkey’s struggle with terrorist organizations such as FETO and the PKK. Another example that Turkish society has not given in to chauvinist nationalism is that Turkish society has successfully absorbed the four million plus refugees from Syria and other places from the Middle East. This is beyond imagination for many other countries, especially as one thinks of the current refugee crisis among the EU member states.

Turkey’s permanent delegate to the EU, Faruk Kaymakci, delivered a work plan on visa liberalization to the Frans Timmermans, the Vice-President of the EU Commission, in Strasbourg on February 7, 2018, over the seven criteria that have not yet been met.

The EU positively assessed Ankara’s proposal on visa liberty. Brussels will request three important improvements on the proposal, such as proportionality in counter-terrorism, data protection and improvements in the cooperation agreement with the European police office, Europol.

The issue is aimed to be solved by the European Parliament elections next year. The proposal made by Turkey and the criteria put forward by Brussels will be discussed at the next EU-Turkey summit in Varna, Bulgaria on March 26, 2018.

The Turkey-EU Agreement, which was signed on March 18, 2016, foresaw visa liberalization for Turkish citizens to the Schengen area. However, the EU, with the claim that there are still seven criteria that wait to be fulfilled, did not keep this promise.

Counter-terrorism: the controversial criteria for so long

The readmission agreement and visa freedom process has been built on a Roadmap, which has 72 criteria. While Turkey has fulfilled most of these, there are 7 that remain. The most controversial criteria is

“Reviewing the law and application on combat against terrorism in the way complying European standards.”

Counter-terrorism has been an outstanding topic between Turkey and the EU. Brussels has continuously been requesting Ankara to reform its law and regulations on combating terrorism. However, Turkey’s reason to reject the regulation of this law has simply been due to the fact that the country faces several terror threats, which are very different to threats that may be observed by European countries.

Ankara has argued that changing its counter-terrorism policy will politically harm Turkey’s operations.

On February 7, 2018, Presidency Spokesperson Ibrahim Kalin stated, “regulations that will not harm our combat against terrorism has been done.” Results of these regulations will be seen after the summit.

About a year ago in early March of 2017 a debate kicked off in earnest which only half a decade earlier would still have resulted in its promoters at best being sidelined, at worst removed from the public eye in their respective political parties – at least with regards to this and probably all other EU-policy making related topics. Most definitely so in central and western Europe, less so if ever in the United Kingdom!

At stake back then: asking the no-no question in the Brussels’ corridors of power; a ‘no-no’ automatically resulting in a reaction alike a father shaking his head whilst looking at his child who just did something wrong; in this context, a response of disbelief to a rather risqué question along the lines of ‘is it not better to allow for a European Union at two, perhaps even more speeds?’

Now things could not have changed more dramatically. A certain air of alarm is surrounding Brussels’ power centers – that is certain. Not only Brexit but the rise of populist movements almost everywhere paired with very vocal desires to have more say at home instead of furthering what is often perceived as an EU super state in the making may have Brussels perhaps think twice.

If a personal reflection is allowed: me and my generation are most naturally deeply grateful for the fact that what used to be the EEC, then EC, thereafter EU guaranteed a safe, peaceful upbringing in the middle of Europe which only fifteen years before my baby-boomer generation’s first wave of millions of births was at war with each other! Yet there is growing unease amongst many segments of the European population and to label each and every citizen who doubts an ever closer political Union as being extremists is nothing but standard arrogance. Which in turn will only steadily increase the share of far-right and far-left movements’ votes, only aiding those intent on destroying a modern peaceful spanning all-Europe society!

So has multispeed become trendy?

Commentators same as politicians must reflect on public mood shifts as and when required. Hence, facts first: recent comments made by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and only last week by Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, about whether it is not better for the EU to focus more on items best suited for a transnational solution, but leave some, or indeed many other policy making items to the regions and member states. Whilst this does not automatically imply a multispeed EU it is a repeat of what was said during the year 2017; together with my following quotes it at least hypothetically redefines the principle of subsidiarity.

Hence to put matters into a wider frame let us briefly travel back in time, first revisiting 7 March, 2017. As EU Observer duly reported on that day (euobserver.com; EU’s big four back ‘multi-speed’ Europe) leaders of Europe’s largest economies France, Germany, Italy and Spain whilst meeting each other, German Chancellor Angela Merkel was quoted as saying: ‘We need to have the courage for some countries to go ahead if not everyone wants to participate. A Europe of different speeds is necessary, otherwise we will probably get stuck.’

Moving on five months and arriving on 30 August, 2017, the same EU insight publication ran a story titled ‘Macron revives multi-speed Europe idea’ wherein the French President was quoted having said ‘We have to think up a Europe with several formats, go further with those who want to go forward, without being hindered by states that want – and it is their right – to go not as fast or not as far.’

But what could have triggered such a U-Turn?

The EUR-Lex website, the EU’s very own Access to European Law – portal, defines a multispeed Europe as follows: ‘Multi-speed’ Europe is the term used to describe the idea of a method of differentiated integration whereby common objectives are pursued by a group of EU countries both able and willing to advance, it being implied that the others will follow later.’

Hence we detect a certain disagreement EU internally: the leading EU engines so to speak, both France and Germany, and now other nations, too, question the functionality of a one speed EU whereas the EU legal database itself still proclaims that even if a multispeed EU is declared it only means those not following now will follow later. Think Brexit and we realize that this was, and is nothing but wishful EU jargon thinking.

Neither integrationists wish to see a new feudal type of mini fiefdoms instead of a strong EU. Nor would Brexiteers or defenders of more powers being given back to the regions wish to see that scenario either. All want prosperity, trade, peace, stability, welfare besides many other core values same as my very own baby-boomer generation as mentioned above. But as it seems a pure integrative model without allowing for dissent to be heard and without accepting people’s wishes before far right (or far left) movements figuratively speaking collect them at the ballot box is no longer the best solution.

Looking over other future EU’s model’s shoulders

Brexit will not happen before March 2019, if a further negotiation phase is agreed upon not even before March of 2021. A new EU budget will enter into force only early in the third decade of the New Millennium, too. It is negotiated from 2018 onwards and enters into force post-2020.

If we then further consider cooperation on various regional levels, the Visegrad Four Group (Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary) must be mentioned; one should further discuss the Nordic Council although it comprises non-EU member states as well; and perhaps a post-Brexit UK-Republic of Ireland (customs and border) deal is in the making – could an EU at various speeds yet modeled after existing regional forms of cooperation win the upper hand?

Phrased differently: unless there is another referendum in the United Kingdom which looks extremely unrealistic, Brexit is going to happen – so will there be a new version of a (trans-) continental Europe? A core including the Eurozone, a wider group with some political decision making agreements and trade but no complete harmonization and integration, and then a third layer or circle basically based on a free trade agreement? Or would this spell the end of modernization and peace and prosperity for Europe?

Best for EU, best for Turkey scenarios

From a candidate country’s perspective of a nation as big and influential such as Turkey one might actually suggest that whatever the outcome, Turkey belongs to the core group unless adopting the Euro will be mandatory for becoming a core group member; whether Turkey would want to switch to the Euro would need be discussed in great detail. At least with regards to Turkey-EU relations multi-speed would have turned into one speed, if everyone pulling in the same direction.

Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim and German Chancellor Angela Merkel vowed on Thursday to improve strained ties between the two countries following months-long tensions between Ankara and Berlin.

Speaking at a joint news conference with Merkel in Berlin, Yildirim called for an intensified dialogue and stronger solidarity in the fight against terrorism.

“The PKK is a terrorist organization. The PYD/YPG is a terrorist organization.

“In fact, the YPG is the PYD/PKK’s Syrian offshoot. This is also confirmed by British and American intelligence.

“Whatever their names are, their main purpose is to violate peace in the region and create new troublesome fields,” he said, adding that Turkey wants to see its allies’ support.

The premier also said the decisiveness shown by the West in its fight against Daesh should also be displayed in the battle against the PYD/PKK and YPG terrorist organizations.

The German chancellor welcomed Turkish premier’s first visit to Berlin and backed the need for dialogue to improve ties.

“I believe that this visit is a signal, showing that both sides have an interest in improving German-Turkish relations,” she said.

But she also acknowledged that difficult issues were on the agenda of bilateral relations.

“We must continue our intensive discussions,” Merkel added.

Turkey’s right to self-defence

Despite the opposition pushing the German government to exert more pressure on Ankara due to Turkey’s ongoing counterterrorism operation in northwestern Syria, Merkel underlined that Turkey reserved the right to self-defense.

“Just like every country, of course Turkey has the right to pursue its security interests,” she said.

However, she voiced concern over growing tensions between NATO allies, the U.S. and Turkey, due to Washington administration’s support for the terrorist PKK/PYD group in northwestern Syria.

The German chancellor hoped Ankara and Washington would overcome their differences and reach an agreement.

Yildirim underlined that the goal of Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch in northwestern Syria was not only to protect Turkish citizens, but also for securing NATO’s borders and preventing a huge refugee influx to Europe.

It was not Turkey that started the war in Syria but it is Turkey that continues to face the consequences of it and today it is sheltering 3.5 million refugees on its soil, the Turkish premier added.

Ties between Ankara and Berlin have been strained since the defeated coup in Turkey in 2016, as Turkish politicians heavily criticized their German counterparts for failing to show strong solidarity with Turkish government against the attempted military takeover.

Ankara slammed Berlin for granting asylum to several coup suspects, turning a blind eye to outlawed groups and terrorist organizations like the PKK and FETO, which use Germany as a platform for their fund-raising, recruitment and propaganda activities.

German politicians, on the other hand, voiced concern over press freedom and human rights issues, and criticized large-scale investigations into FETO, which orchestrated the defeated coup in Turkey.

Deniz Yucel case

The court case involving German-Turkish journalist Deniz Yucel, who was arrested last year on suspicion of doing propaganda for terrorists, was continuing in accordance with Turkey’s principles of rule of law, according to the premier.

Yildirim said the Turkish courts were under a heavy load due to cases linked to the defeated coup of July 15, 2016.

“The case of Deniz Yucel, like other cases, is continuing in accordance with the principles of the rule of law,” he said.

“Turkey faced a huge coup [attempt]. There are thousands of people in these coup-linked cases.

“The courts are overloaded. There might be delays due to the work load. I hope [Deniz Yucel] appears before the court soon and there would be a development soon.”

The arrest of Yucel and around a dozen German citizens on suspicion of aiding terrorist groups has become a source of friction between Ankara and Berlin.

Despite repeated calls by German politicians for the release of their citizens, the Turkish government ruled out any political influence on the judiciary and advised them to wait for the decision of the courts.

Source: Anadolu Agency

Relations between Turkey and Europe were already strained and policies adopted by several European countries in regards to the July 15 coup attempt led to more of a crisis between Ankara and the western bloc. Although European countries criticize Turkey on democracy, they did not openly side with democracy throughout the July 15 incidents, which gave the impression that they covertly supported the coup attempt. The bloc’s negative attitude towards the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government, which was subjected to the coup attempt, continued throughout 2016. EU member states issued diatribes to the declaration of an emergency state and steps taken by the government to purge the putschist Gulenist Terror Group (FETO) operatives from public institutions. At the end of this tense period, the European Parliament called for the accession negotiations between Turkey and the European Union to be suspended on November 24, 2016. The tension Turkey had particularly with Germany, Austria and the Netherlands reached its peak when Turkish ministers were prevented from attending meetings scheduled in these countries as part of the April 16 referendum campaign.

Trying to reason anti-Turkey policies in Germany

Another development that hindered Ankara’s relations with Brussels was the anti-Turkey propaganda utilized by far-right parties as part of their national election campaigns in the Netherlands, Germany and Austria. Alarmed by the rise of far-right and xenophobic parties in these countries, center parties embraced the arguments of the far-right, employed anti-refugee and Islamophobic rhetoric in their election campaigns and vowed to adopt a harsher stance against Turkey so as not to lose their voter base. These states protected FETO operatives who pose a serious threat to Turkey’s national security and condoned the PKK, which led Ankara to issue severe criticisms to these countries. More, smear campaigns conducted against the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the European media were regarded as disrespect to the democratic will of the Turkish people, and was interpreted as another indication of the bloc’s attempt to interfere in Turkey’s domestic affairs.

Known as Germany’s “backyard” in the EU, both Austria and the Netherlands form a bloc together with Germany, which troubles Turkey-European Union relations.

The fact that Germany, which among European countries has the closest ties with Turkey, and Austria and the Netherlands, known as Germany’s “backyard” in the EU are the leading countries of the bloc that have troubled relations between the two parties, signifies that the main source of the problem is a struggle for influence.

Having a substantial population of Turkish descent and being Turkey’s largest trade partner, Germany has always tried to interfere with Ankara’s policies through various means. This has included supporting the PKK, or using the EU accession negotiations and the issue of economic aid as threats. Over the past years, Berlin began to lose the chance to interfere with Turkey’s domestic polity due to the AK Party’s pro-independence policies. Relations between the two countries reached a new low when Germany supported the July 15 coup attempt and opposed to the April 16 referendum. While the anti-Turkey left in Germany ran propaganda against the AK Party government, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) slammed Chancellor Angela Merkel for the refugee agreement signed with Turkey. This led to the German government to adopt stricter policies against Ankara.

Turkey’s convergence with the United Kingdom, France and Italy

Alongside these problems confronted in relations between Turkey and Germany, the Ankara administration leaned towards other European actors with whom more rational relations could be established. In an attempt to diversify its foreign policy, the government took steps to liberate Turkey’s relations with Europe from the monopoly of the EU and Germany. In this scope, Turkey took a number of steps to improve relations with the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain and eastern European countries, especially in economic terms.

The main factors that played a role in helping to improve relations with the U.K. included Brexit, Donald Trump’s election as the U.S. President and the focus on economic cooperation in foreign policy. As Brexit is expected to cost a high price, London set off a quest to compensate this cost with alternative partnerships, and looked for a way to develop closer relations with Turkey within this framework. As Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim expressed during the visit he paid to London to attend the Somali Conference held in May 2017, unlike other European countries, the U.K. displayed overt support to Turkey during the July 15 coup attempt. This nevertheless has been a factor that accelerated the convergence between Theresa May’s government and Ankara.

In an attempt to diversify its foreign policy, Ankara took steps to liberate Turkey’s relations with Europe from the monopoly of the EU and Germany and tried to improve relations with the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain and eastern European countries.

With the election of Trump, who utters unfavorable comments on the European allies of NATO and has adopted the slogan “America first,” the British government is aware that it can no longer rely on the U.S. administration – especially when in the midst of the Brexit process. Departing from the EU and keeping its distance from the U.S, in its search for new partners to balance its foreign policy, the U.K. made a rational choice by cooperating with Turkey. As for Ankara, cooperation with the U.K. is of major importance especially in the field of defense, since Turkey has recently had problems in purchasing military equipment from the U.S. and other European countries such as Germany and Austria.

During Theresa May’s visit to Turkey in January 2017, the British BAE Systems and Turkish Aerospace Industries, Inc. (TAI) signed an agreement as a first step towards co-producing fighter jets, which on the Turkish side reflected an improvement of relations with London while confronting other problems in the west. Within the agreement that is worth $125 million, BAE Systems agreed to offer service in designing and developing Turkey’s national TF-X fighter jet and to transfer technologies to Turkish engineers. The production of the first prototype of TF-X jets is set to be complete by 2023. A total of 250 jets are planned to be produced for $7 billion.

In addition to the U.K., Turkey signed other significant air defense agreements with France and Italy. During President Erdogan’s visit to France on January 5, 2018, an agreement for the co-production of SAMP-T air defense systems was signed between the French-Italian consortium Eurosam and Turkey’s Aselsan and Roketsan. With this agreement, Turkey made it clear that it does not intend to remain dependent on a single country in the field of defense, and that Ankara aims to diversify its security and foreign policies by procuring similar weapon systems from its European allies in addition to the S-400 air defense systems purchased from Russia. During the abovementioned visit, Turkish Airlines also signed an agreement to purchase a total of 25 Airbus A350-900 planes.

Anti-Turkey sentiments are dissolving in Europe

Having minimized problems with the U.K. and France due to partnerships in economy and defense, the Turkish administration has also endeavored to disperse anti-Turkey sentiments created in Europe by Germany and others by taking steps towards improving its relations with Italy, Spain and eastern European EU members. The opposition to the predominance of Germany in the EU by countries such as Italy, Poland and Hungary catalyzed Turkey’s developing ties with these countries. Member states who wish to decrease their dependency on Germany within the EU have not abstained from answering Ankara’s call for cooperation since they regard developing economic relations with Turkey as part of the steps to be taken in this respect.

To restore relations, Berlin needs to give up on regarding Ankara within its own domain of influence and must not allow the anti-Turkey left diaspora in Germany to monopolize the country’s policies on Turkey.

Taking considerable steps with regard to developing relations with European countries, Turkey has repeatedly underlined that it wishes to establish rational relations with Germany on the basis of mutual respect to each other’s sovereignty and cooperation in counter-terrorism. The latest friendly meetings between the foreign ministers of the two countries indicated that the tension between Ankara and Berlin might soon come to an end. In terms of its relations with Turkey, Germany does not wish to remain isolated in Europe with only a few allies such as Austria and the Netherlands. To that end, the country does not want to keep relations strained since other European countries are gradually improving their ties with Ankara. However, in order to restore relations, Berlin needs to give up on regarding Ankara within its own domain of influence and must not allow the anti-Turkey left diaspora in Germany to monopolize the country’s policies on Turkey.

Operation Olive Branch and Europe

Operation Olive Branch kicked off by Turkey against the PKK/YPG deployed in Afrin has been an important test for the European countries wishing to establish rational relations with Ankara. It must be underlined that the European countries that have not so far acted in solidarity with Ankara in its fight against terrorism have faced a serious quandary during Operation Olive Branch. On one hand they assume that the economic relations, which they seek to restore with Turkey, will be undermined if they adopt a policy in favor of the YPG and the PKK. On the other, governments are concerned that if they side with Ankara’s intervention, they will face the pressure of PKK lobbies in the media and political circles of their countries.

Hesitant behavior displayed by European countries with regard to the terror groups that target Turkey illustrates the fact that they still side with the YPG and the PKK during the Afrin operation.

If European states had supported Turkey during the operation, they would have had a chance to restore strained relations with Ankara due to their policies in the aftermath of the July 15 coup attempt. In this way, they could have also prevented the convergence between Turkey and Russia. Some people in Europe defend this view while others regard the Afrin operation as a new opportunity to attack and slam Turkey. Although the Turkish Armed Forces have taken all measures to prevent any harm to civilians, circles claiming that Turkey is violating human rights in the operation with the weapons provided by EU countries are trying to put pressure on European governments.

Despite all these pressures, statements issued by the British and Dutch foreign ministers explicitly underlined Turkey’s right to ensure self-defense and border security, which were read as covert support to Operation Olive Branch. Contrary to this, German and French officials criticized Turkey due to the pressures of PKK proponents and anti-Turkish lobbies in their countries. However, the criticisms issued are much more tepid than expected, which can be seen as an indication of their reluctance to escalate tensions with Turkey.

Nevertheless, hesitant behavior displayed by European countries with regard to the terror groups that target Turkey illustrates the fact that they can still take sides against Ankara and side with the YPG and the PKK during the Afrin operation.

Relations between Turkey and the European Union had suffered serious damage following the July 15 coup attempt as EU Member States such as Germany had continued to support the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) and others had failed to support Turkey in its fight against terrorism.

More, with the elections in Germany, anti-Turkish sentiment had been on the rise as right-wing populist parties and movements were successful in bringing this attitude to the political agenda.

With such a decline in relations, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to France on 5th January and Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu’s visit to Germany on 6th January had suggested that both parties were willing to renew relations.

This was re-emphasized by Turkey’s permanent representative to the European Union, Faruk Kaymakci, who stated that in an attempt to gain momentum in relations, “A summit between the EU and Turkey in June ahead of the EU summit is under consideration. There are expectations in this direction.”

The EU leaders are expected to gather on June 28-29 and the Union’s enlargement policy is expected to be on the agenda. Turkey’s accession period will also be discussed.

While undoubtedly there remain ideological opposition to the entrance of Turkey into the EU, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Ekaterina Zakharieva told Bulgarian National Television that “Neither the successful protection of the EU’s external borders nor the fight against terrorism can be succeeded without a close partnership with Turkey.”

More, Bulgarian PM, emphasizing that there is a need to normalize relations between Turkey and the EU in 2018, stated that his administration “will contribute [to Turkey’s membership] as much as we can.”