In France, although the rise of the far right, Islamophobia, anti-refugee rhetoric and populism do not seem to directly contradict the notions of people’s right to vote and national sovereignty at first glance, it definitely challenges the liberal democratic system that came into prominence in the aftermath of World War II. Therefore, in the context of the crisis of democracy confronted in France, we can mention a dual situation that encompasses the problems in the operation of the democratic regime and the collapse of the liberal order. In this context, the operation of the democratic regime refers to the social governance mechanisms such as public-representation relations, system of parties, voter turnout and people’s belief in the political system whereas the liberal order refers to the central political balances such as French national identity, multiculturalism, liberty, social state and liberal-capitalist values. In consideration of these aspects, this article aims to scrutinize the movements that fight against the French democratic regime and liberal order and discuss the underlying reasons for the rise of populism in France.

Problems in the operation of the democratic regime    

In today’s France, not only liberal values but the entire democratic regime and representation system are suffering a profound crisis. Viewing the surveys reflecting people’s lack of trust in politicians, the conventional political system and the substantial decline in voter turnout over the past 20 years, we can observe that the French democratic structure has been subjected to severe criticisms. People’s distrust in the representation system is disembodying the notion of national sovereignty, one of the milestones of democracy, in the long term. Based on the will of the people, just as other democracies, the French democracy is destructing itself when it cannot enable people’s determining role in governance through the representation mechanism. The distrust of French people in the system is not an ineffective phenomenon, but rather causes a set of radical changes in the French political order.

The best example portraying this situation is the political strife and polarization in France. Some developments, such as the convergence of long-established center right Republicans and far-right National Rally, the complete dissolution of the center left Socialist Party, and the rise of the vote share of the far left La France Insoumise (Unsubmissive France) to around 20 percent are all symptoms of this strife. The only conventional liberal party currently active in the French political arena is Emmanuel Macron’s La République En Marche! (The Republic on the move!), whose members mostly comprise former members of the Socialist Party and the Republicans. In a nutshell, since the French democratic system could not incorporate people’s will in its governance, it has been facing a radical transformation with the disturbance of the old former liberal balances.

Although the rise of the far-right in France began around 35 years ago with the Front National, it has influenced the discourses of other parties and dominated the present popular discourses with regard to identity, immigration, security, and Islam.

Protecting the liberal order

Liberalism is one of the most crucial characteristics of the new democratic balance that emerged in the aftermath of World War II in French history. Aiming to merge capitalism and the social state by protecting individual rights and social identity, the first traces of the liberal order were seen in the program of the National Council of Resistance (CNR) that was jointly designed by Charles de Gaulle supporters and Communist partisans in 1944. As of the post-war period, through economic growth and social movements, the French decision makers from both the right and left endeavored to defend individual freedoms alongside strengthening the independence and welfare system in France. Referred as the French liberal balance, this period prevailed between 1945 and 1975 immediately after the decline of fascism.

Nevertheless, when the French economy encountered its first stagnation, the racist and nationalist political movements repressed until then managed to resurface. The racist Front National, which gained 11% of the French vote in the 1984 European Parliament Elections, started to steer the agenda in French politics with its anti-immigrant and anti-Islam discourse. Although the rise of the far-right in France began around 35 years ago with the Front National, it has influenced the discourses of other parties and dominated the present popular discourses with regard to identity, immigration, security and Islam. As a result, the mainstream liberal parties started implementing hardline policies at least in matters relating to security. Just as many anti-Islam and anti-immigrant decisions (headscarf ban laws, establishment of Immigration and National Identity Ministry, harsh measures in security policies etc.) were issued during the Chirac and Sarkozy governments between 2002 and 2012, a series of decisions that restrict individual freedoms have been issued in recent years on the pretext of fighting against Islamization and terrorism (state of emergency and security law, uncompromising refugee policies etc.).

In view of this framework, it can be better understood why the total vote share of the racist and Islamophobic candidates in the first round of the latest presidential elections was around 46 percent (total vote for Front National, the Republicans and Debout la France). Although Macron saved the old liberal balance, the growth of the far-right and far-left parties cannot be stopped. So, it is not hard to foresee that a new illiberal balance might appear if the public anger against the liberal party continues to grow.

The poor, immigrants, and white middle class in France, which has similar sociological dynamics with the Trump electorate in the U.S., feels alienated from both the state and the state elite.

Causes of crisis in French liberal democracy

Economic approach: It can be contended that the long-standing austerity policies and worsening economic conditions of the “white middle class” are among the primary causes of the growth of populist and racist movements and people’s distrust and anger for the French political system. In this scope, the most vulnerable class affected by the restriction of French social state assistance is neither the upper class that enjoys a large economic income nor the lower classes that have the opportunity to apply for subsistence aids granted by the state. The white middle class in France, which has similar sociological dynamics with the Trump electorate in the U.S., feels alienated from both the immigrants and the state elite. The vast majority of “Yellow Vest” protesters in Paris, who have been protesting against the high cost of living and fuel prices, belong to the white middle class.

In this respect, it would be useful to remember economist Branko Milanovic’s “elephant chart” that shows the evolution of different income classes across the world. In the chart, the elephant’s torso stands for the sharp increase in the incomes of the poorest segments, who constitute half of humanity and mostly live in developing countries, while the trunk represents the upper classes of developed countries, which corresponds to 1% of the world population. The face of the elephant indicates that the income levels of middle classes in industrialized countries have been making no progress. Although it cannot be said that middle classes live under poor conditions, their quality of life is gradually declining.

All in all, as a result of the economic stagnation in France, the French middle class supporting the old liberal balance has stoked an authoritarian, populist and racist “white man’s revenge” just like the case in the U.S.

Institutional approach: Another reason for the current crisis in French liberal democracy is the delegation of a part of the French state’s sovereignty to EU institutions. When European nation states vested the EU with considerable authorities such as monetary policies, the situation began to challenge national democratic structures built on the basis of the nation’s sovereignty principle. Due to the delegation of authorities, European nations lost their controlling power on the state level and could not retrieve those rights from the political institutions of the EU. The growth of Euroscepticism in European societies stems from the impression that the EU institutions are controlled by lobbies and a privileged group who did not come to power through democratic means. Regardless of the accuracy of this view, most French people today define the Brussels-originated rules and neoliberal policies as pressure. Meanwhile, a part of the French electorate, including those with both right and left allegiances, are in search of a “savior” that can revive the national political will. In this sense, the present French liberal elite might face a decline and even be labelled as traitors.

As a result of the economic stagnation in France, the French middle class supporting the old liberal balance has stoked an authoritarian, populist and racist “white man’s revenge” just like the case in the U.S.

Social approach: Last but not least, the tension in the French liberal democratic order also stems from a long-term recession ongoing for centuries in the collectivity perception of the French society. According to French philosopher Marcel Gauchet, when the French liberal order improved, a crisis emerged in the democratic operation in a contradictory way. To put otherwise, the efforts to extend human rights and liberties by solely focusing on individuality have been detrimental to the collectivity potential of the French. For this reason, it can be argued that the French move away from religion, traditions and any kind of social ideology (such as communism and nationalism)  and focus on individual independence and freedom weakened their collective political influence and force. This dichotomy between the individual (liberal) and the collective (democratic) provides an insight into the increasing popularity of authoritarian identity politics among the French. On the other hand, such identity politics debates cause polarizations in the French public, leading people to nationalism, racism, religious extremism, communitarianism or nihilism.

Macron represents himself the voice of the liberals against authoritarian nationalists for the 2019 European Parliament elections. However, the liberal and central balances of France might confront a complete dissolution unless the economic, institutional, and social causes of the rise of populism are seriously addressed.

Departing from the Japanese-American political scientist Francis Fukuyama’s contention in his “The End of History” thesis that liberal democracy is the final form of political regime that humanity has achieved so far, it can be inferred that the latest turbulences confronted in recent years in the West, especially in Austria, signalize a crisis in democracy. If we assume that right and left-wing populists and far-right groups are within the realm of democracy, it would not be correct to mention a democracy crisis in Austria and the Western world. Presently, far-right groups, who are on the rise and enjoying quite an influence, are trying to underline that they are acting within the limits of democracy by arguing that they are against the establishment. The latest developments have indicated that the discussions will center upon the question of who stays within the limits of democracy. At this point, it is crucial to note that the force who will determine the prominent discourses will have the upper hand in politics. 

Democracy crisis in Austria

In this manner, it is required to note that the most important political assault affecting the outbreak of a democracy crisis in the West and Austria has both external and internal sources. The internal political effects comprise radical political movements seen in Western democracies. It can be observed in the case of Austria that the conventional center-right and center-left parties have declined in political influence whereas the forces with far-right or far-left engagement have become more mainstream and appealed to larger masses.

Although the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) has been present in the Austrian political scene as the most prominent far-right actor, a notable organization representing the far-left is not on the horizon yet. This is probably due to the fact that the Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ), the leading political group likely to fill this gap, has not yet recovered from the trauma of the Soviet Union’s dissolution. Nevertheless, since this situation is incidental, it is not a remote possibility that a change might happen in the political composition of the opposite side, as FPÖ develops xenophobic and Islamophobic policies that were promised and expected to be practiced by the party.

As already known, alongside Putin’s Russia that has been aspiring to interfere with European politics, the source of the greatest external threat posed to the system in Europe has been U.S. President Donald Trump for the past two years. In this context, it is important to remember that Trump’s former chief strategist Steve Bannon strived to form an “international right” by trying to gather the far-right groups in Europe under a single roof.

Trump’s former chief strategist Steve Bannon strived to form an “international right” by trying to gather all far-right groups in Europe under a single roof. 

Accordingly, we must note that the United States, who “exports” human rights and democracy to other countries across the world according to experts, is now endeavoring to instill right-wing populism in Europe. Through this “movement” led by Bannon, the U.S. is seeking to strengthen the nation-state notion in the EU and stir an internal chaos within the continent as the country sees the Union as a considerable rival. So, the U.S. is trying to maximize its own interests with its pure power policy it practices by liberating itself from one of the “soft” impediments of the liberal democratic order.

Apparently, the FPÖ representatives were afraid that this direction of the U.S. might show themselves as traitors before the eyes of the Austrian public, so they announced that they would avoid a comprehensive cooperation with Bannon for the European Parliament elections to be held on May 23-26, 2019. Along with that, they displayed pragmatic behavior and welcomed Bannon’s works in virtual platform that are in favor of them.

Austrian Muslims

Unfortunately, the following days do not seem very promising for Austrian Muslims. Re-founded among the ruins of World War II, Austria’s governments have always been based on a political conciliation named “Grand Coalition,” formed by the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) and the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), other than a few exceptions. This situation persisted until the late 1990s. Over the course of that period, Muslims and Turks were not subjected to serious pressure by the political arena, media or public whereas people of color were mostly considered the “others” of Austria.

Through an “international right” movement sought to be established by Steve Bannon, the U.S. endeavors to install right-wing populism in Europe in order to stir internal chaos within the EU – which it sees as a considerable rival. 

A new orientation that began with the discharge of the liberals within the FPÖ during Jörg Haider’s chairmanship of the party in the mid-1980s allowed for more visibility for foreigners and people of color. Both SPÖ and ÖVP tepidly responded to this situation, and even though these parties enjoyed short-term election victories, the FPÖ had the upper hand in terms of discourse since the others inclined towards reflecting far-right ideas. In time, in accordance with the strategy of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP), FPÖ started to assert that it represents the interests of the conventional voter base of the center parties including SPÖ.

And as the aftereffects of the 9/11 incidents started to hit Austria, Muslims were designated as the new “other” among Austrian people, which worsened the course of events. The center parties SPÖ and ÖVP did not draw any lessons from their past mistakes and chose to impose pressures on Muslims and practice socio-political restrictions on foreigners in order to break the effect of FPÖ’s discourse. The epitome of these policies is undoubtedly the “Islam Law” that entered into force on March 31, 2015, which restricted the legal rights of the Muslims compared to other official religions of Austria.

The formation of a coalition government by ÖVP’s Sebastian Kurz and FPÖ’s Heinz-Christian Strache is in itself a phenomenon that characterizes the democracy crisis in Austria. Along with the Islam Law, there are many other practices that gradually deprive Muslims of their rights. Haunted by the specter of the February 28 postmodern coup in Turkey, the current practices in Austria such as the efforts to ban headscarf for Muslim women and restrict Muslim people’s education and working rights show parallelism with Turkey during the 1990s. These practices are also reminiscent of the atrocities against foreigners, especially the Jewish people, prior to World War II. 

The United States, which apparently “exports” human rights and democracy to other countries across the world, is now aiming to install right-wing populism in Europe.

Turkey provides a mental relief for Muslims in Austria

Paradoxically, Turkey benefits from the turbulent situation prevailing in the West. The Western countries, who used to try to control Turkey by acting as a bloc, are now obliged to negotiate with Turkey without any sign of the past collectivism. The old peremptory nature of the West has also changed. Now, the West can no longer impose pressure on Turkey, but rather Turkey points at Western countries for their Islamophobic, xenophobic tendencies and contradictory behaviors. Although this approach of Turkey does not seem to favor the repressed Austrian Muslims at first sight, it must be underlined that the presence of a harbor to shelter in the long term does at least provide a mental relief for Muslims.

On Monday, the 57th anniversary of the execution of Turkey’s first democratically elected Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, was commemorated by the Turkish people. At the commemoration on Sunday, Turkey’s current Interior Minister, Suleyman Soylu, who has an important closeness and relation to Menderes, actually summarized Menderes’ political perception of the majority of contemporary Turks by stressing“I want to ask you, what did Adnan Menderes want except democracy? What else did he want except this country’s development, its progress, and the fact not to be humiliated due to people’s beliefs? What other aspirations did he have except constructing dams, building roads for this country, develop the country’s agriculture, and, to develop the country’s industry?”

Menderes has still a fundamental meaning for Turkish democracy and a special place in the minds of Turks with regard to the country’s past and future. It wouldn’t be even that wrong to mention that both left and right-wing oriented Turks remembered his era and his destiny while having for the first time actively resisted against putschists on Turkey’s streets during the recent coup attempt on 15 July 2016.

Menderes was hung by the military junta on September 17, 1961 subsequent to the coup d’état against his ruling DP government on May 27, 1960. Besides Menderes, Fatin Rustu Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan, who were the Foreign Minister and Finance Minister at that time, were also executed by the junta as well. During that time, the Prime Minister had been arrested together with various DP members by the putschists while the judiciary of the junta accused him among other things of violating the constitution and contradicting “Ataturk reforms.”

Menderes symbolized an important figure for Turkish citizens who wanted to end the single-party-regime of the CHP, which ruled the country from 1923 to 1950. Apart from his political experience as a member of the short-lived Free Republican Party (FRP), which was closed down by the government after four months in 1930, Menderes entered into politics as a member of the only party in the country, the CHP on the eve of President and CHP Chairman Mustafa Kemal’s visit to Aydin. Even though it was not Menderes’ purpose to be elected as a CHP MP, he was mentioned on the CHP candidate list, which was based on Mustafa Kemal’s personal decision and which Menderes later noticed. Thus, Menderes became a CHP MP until his expulsion in 1945, at which time the DP was initiated by some similar minded politicians. After the multi-party system was introduced in Turkey also due to external factors in 1946, Turkish citizens became more and more aware of Menderes and his popularity increased during the opposition years (1946-50).

In the first “controversial” democratic election in 1946, for which the DP did not have the necessary time to mobilize and organize itself, the DP had won only 62 seats in parliament. Therefore, it remained in the opposition until May 14, 1950 when it ultimately won the election, receiving 53 percent of all votes. The 1950 elections constituted a watershed in the history of modern Turkey due to the fact that until that time parliamentary politics was perceived merely as an extension of the Kemalist state bureaucracy and administration led, by the single-party-regime. Thus, for the first time, a so-called popular electorate received the opportunity to express its political choice against an ultra-secularist statist approach, represented by the CHP elites.

The DP’s main objective under the Menderes administrations (1950-60) was to change things as soon as possible by addressing the main motto, “Enough! It is the nation’s turn to speak” (Yeter! Söz Milletin) Actually, the DP internalized some of the liberal ideas of the Progressive Republican Party, which had been closed down in 1925, even prior to the establishment of the Free Republican Party – a reaction by the single-party-regime, which early noticed that Turkish people do not accept CHP’s policies.

It can be said that in contrast to the CHP, the DP represented a relatively tolerant and respectful position regarding religion, religious lifestyles and free-market capitalism – despite its similar Kemalism-based stance. However, the DP cadres did not have the necessary power to ensure a comprehensive liberalization of the entire economy for a long period. In other words, the nature of Turkey’s economy did not lend itself to wide-ranging liberalization with additional unexpected declines particularly in the agricultural sector. Nevertheless, these facts do not have a decisive importance regarding Menderes himself as a symbol of Turkish democracy and the people’s will.

Subsequent to the deposing of his last government (1957-1960) by the Turkish Armed Forces on May 27,1960, Menderes was arrested along with various leading party members and put on trial until September 17, 1961. When the junta hung two of his ministers and Menderes himself, several policies which had been implemented by the DP governments in the 1950s that allegedly contradicted with “Atatürk reforms” were cancelled by the junta.

Moreover, the Kemalist version of secularism, after an alleviation period of 10 years between 1950 and 1960 again gained importance as was the case from 1923 until 1950. More interestingly, various projects in the field of economy, which were initiated by the Menderes administration, were also canceled by the junta as well.

Today, for many Turks, although analyzing or reading political developments from a right – or left-wing perspective, it has to be admitted that for most people today Prime Minister Menderes is accepted as a personality who represented the people’s voice – despite political and human weaknesses, which are common in every era. Thus, to understand Turkey’s current political dynamics and the people’s negative stance against potential contemporary tutelage biases, one has to understand those developments in Turkey’s history. Most people still are in the opinion that Turkey owes much to Adnan Menderes due to his struggle for democracy, because otherwise it’s still believed that a quasi-single-party-regime would have continued.

Many analysts take the rise of a particular person to political primacy as a sign of one-man rule or authoritarianism. The basic reason behind this crooked perception is that political life is taken as it happens to be merely in one single mode. This mode can be defined in terms of the situation within which the basis of socio-political order or the established laws and institutions are to an extent consented by all the participants.

Yet there is another moment of politics beside this moment of political normalcy. This is the moment of pre-political within which the political structures are dislocated and there is a sheer disagreement over the laws and socio-political institutions. In the former situation, we observe the rule of law and the rule through institutionalized mechanisms. In the latter, there is the primacy of a person or a group of people due to the collapse of institutions and the presence of a political vacuum.

The conditions that determine Turkish political life resembles the latter case. There are three characteristics of this special condition of Turkish politics. The first is the presence of formlessness. The post-1980 period testified the dissolution of Kemalist hegemony under the pressure of domestic opposition groups such as the conservatives, liberals and the Kurds. Combined with the globalization process, the statist Kemalist order in Turkey was deeply shaken. These internal and international challenges intensified the existing discrepancy between the societal demands and established political order and paved the way for a political vacuum and formlessness in the country that begged to be filled.

The second characteristic is the presence of a large consensus within society that the country needs a new political order. The support for democratization in almost all sections of society has demonstrated those political expectations. The demand for democratization has simply been signifying the desire for an alternative political order. This has been accompanied later by a high demand for political being in the face of formlessness and dual domination of bureaucratic oligarchy and foreign forces. This was manifested by the victory of the “yes” campaign in the referendum on constitutional change for the presidential system on April 16, 2017, and the failure of the June 15, 2016 military coup attempt, resisted by the people.

The last condition is the longtime absence of political leadership for realizing those political objectives. Turkish society has been in search for popular leadership with military and political virtù since the 1950s. Adnan Menderes (and his DP) and Turgut Ozal (and his ANAP) were candidates for that role of a liberator. However, both political figures or movements were successfully contained and ended by the then hegemonic state bureaucracy. They failed to get the oligarchic structures to roll back and replace them with a new form of political order.

The rise of President Erdogan to political primacy and the gradual establishment of a new political form have been a response to this pre-political situation in Turkey. Erdogan has risen to a leadership position in that political vacuum and has become the leader that has laid the foundations of a new political order in the country. He has led the process of political revolution, which is characterized with the replacement of an oligarchic political regime with popular democracy. The switch to a presidential system in a period of time from 2007 to today represents this process of democratization.

The next step in front of Erdogan is to transfer political power to the people by producing conditions that the country is ruled though laws. This may happen in two steps. The first step is the completion of the transition to a presidential system with the 24 June elections, which promises to put the popular will at the center of politics. The second step is the construction of a new constitution, which should be based on society values and play a role of balancer against the political forces such as the bureaucracy and big business. With all these done, Turkey will reach the moment of political normalcy and Erdogan will then retreat to a less prominent position. Under current conditions those criticisms of one-man rule towards Erdogan represent nothing but an utter ignorance of politics.

On Sunday (May 6) at a public meeting Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will declare a manifesto in run-up to the June 24 election, which is the first presidential election of the country. Erdogan’s decision to declare a manifesto is noteworthy because it will mark not only Turkey’s transition to the presidential system but also a new era in the country’s political life. For this reason, it is expected that Erdogan will stress on the achievements that Turkey has scored so far in its attempt to transform the old (Kemalist) regime and the direction that the country will take in the future.

Indeed, despite fiery disagreements on its character, everybody concedes that Turkey has undergone an epochal change under Erdogan’s leadership and that has brought the country into a new political reality. This political reality has two dimensions: freedom and power.

The emergence of a new political actor. Looking at the freedom dimension, at the center of this political reality lies the emergence of a new political actor. Before 2002 the periphery, which was mainly composed of conservatives and lower-classes, was scattered and thereby subject to the Kemalist hegemony. Kemalists, who successfully equated themselves within the political community, strived to include the periphery into this secular-nationalist whole or excluded them in the event of resistance.

Since the disorganized state of the periphery was the main cause of its subjection to the Kemalist hegemony, the AK Party under Erdogan’s leadership, first of all, aimed at bringing the periphery into unity through the discourse of conservative-democracy. This was the first step to produce a new political actor and facilitated the containment of the Kemalist hegemony. Secondly, as this new political actor came to fruition, the state was decoupled from Kemalism. This resulted in the dislocation of the Kemalist hegemony. And lastly, it has begun to expand and deepen its hegemony in society by incorporating various societal demands into its conservative-democratic whole. As a result, the periphery has evolved from being subject to Kemalist hegemony to a counter-hegemonic force and finally to a hegemonic force.

From oligarchy to democracy. The periphery’s rise to a hegemonic position transformed the political system from an oligarchy to democracy. Turkey shifted from a monarchy to republican regime in the 1920s, yet it failed to establish a democratic system. It rather portrayed an oligarchic political system in disguise of democracy up until the 2000s.

Kemalist oligarchy depended on the rule by a privileged secular-nationalist minority that included mainly the state bureaucracy, civil servants and the upper-classes. The line between whom to rule and be ruled was drawn by membership to the official ideology, that is secular-nationalism. Despite the presence of a multi-party parliamentary system, those political groups that did not bear the official ideology were not granted the right to rule. For the state was claimed to be possessed by the secular-nationalists. If the others had the chance to rule, they were limited by the bureaucratic tutelage or excluded from power by force.

After 2002, the rule of the game significantly changed with the advent of a new political actor. The political system began to be democratized. For this purpose, the place of power was emptied and freed from the Kemalist content. No particular political actor or ideology has given the right to own it forever and without entering into political struggle. Hence, the sphere of democratic politics enlarged and accordingly, the importance of elections mounted. Political actors started to compete for power by producing the most inclusive identity through incorporating as much societal demands as possible. Thus, the right to rule began to be determined by the ability to produce the largest power bloc, the majority.

All in all, the shift to a presidential system may be the most critical step in institutionalizing democratic politics in Turkey. It promises to further the empowerment of the elected representatives of people vis-à-vis the bureaucracy, enlargement of the sphere of politics and increase the influence of elections. In a nutshell, it places the popular will above any other will and at the center of politics. This is the core of the silent revolution that Erdogan has achieved in the last 15-plus years.

Every government needs a main opposition party to which it has to pay regard while taking any action or decision. The incompetence of the main opposition is surely an unfortunate situation for Turkey.

Egypt has left behind one of the most anti-democratic electoral processes seen on a global level in recent years. Abdalfettah Al-Sisi, who led the military coup in 2013, won the elections held by the junta regime in 2014 and established a far repressive regime in the country than the Mubarak period. By employing all kinds of anti-democratic practices, Sisi’s regime has been at war with democracy. During Sisi’s presidency, the civil opposition came under heavy pressure by the regime, media was taken under government control and civil society has been restricted extensively.

During the past five years, thousands of civilians who were opposing the regime were arrested and tried in military courts. The regime did not (and continues not to) tolerate any opposition against those who are perceived as a threat to the security of the regime. This situation was particularly observed in the period before the 2018 presidential elections. Numerous individuals who announced their intention to run in the elections were either forced to withdraw their candidacy or imprisoned. While the 2018 presidential elections were held in such an environment, the leader of Ghad Party Moussa Mostafa Moussa, who defined himself as a “strong supporter of Sisi,” was the only candidate who could participate in the elections “against” Sisi.

For many, this election has not gone beyond a democratic ritual. This is reflected in the low level of participation. The official figures suggest that voter turnout was 41%. However, many observers claim that turnout was much lower than figures published. On the first day of the voting process, only %7 of Egyptians participated in the elections, displaying a strong message of discomfort against the Sisi regime. In an effort to encourage voters, the Egyptian regime announced that voting is obligatory and individuals that fail to vote, would face a fine.

With this concern in place, many Egyptians went to the polls and cast their votes. The government also arranged free transportation for public and private workers in large cities. There were even reports that the police checked IDs of people at cafes and forced them to go and vote. It was also claimed that in some regions, people who went to vote were paid money or given food aid. Following the vote, it was announced that Sisi, unsurprisingly, won the elections with % 97 of the votes.

These undemocratic course of events in Egypt were not surprising for many in the region. Neither were the reactions of Western states. While Egypt witnessed a guideline example of an undemocratic election process, the Western “democracies” such as the U.S. and the U.K. rushed to celebrate Sisi’s victory. Immediately after the election results were announced, U.S. President Donald Trump and British Prime Minister Theresa May called Sisi to express their support for the “democratization” process in the country. The Portuguese President Marcelo Rebelo de Souza even visited the country to congratulate Sisi in person.

The British Prime Minister’s words for the Sisi regime were of particular interest. During her phone call, Theresa May told that the election was an important step for Egypt’s transformation into a functioning democracy. She further suggested that the result of the election was proof of the Egyptian public’s confidence in their president, Abdalfattah Al-Sisi. May’s comments, which do not have any touch on reality were harshly criticized by many international observers. Critics argued that given the scale of human rights abuses, unlawful practices and oppressive policies conducted by the Sisi regime, Theresa May’s attitude would be considered as disregard to the Egyptians who suffer from this autocratic regime the most.

There are four basic motivations behind the support of U.S. and U.K. governments for the Sisi regime. The first is the fact that Egypt is a crucial partner for the regional interests of these countries. Secondly, Egypt constitutes a major ally with regards to the security of Israel. Third is the fact that Egypt is an irreplaceable actor in the emerging regional alliance between Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Israel and the U.S. Finally, another important motivation for the Western support of Egypt is to prevent the increasing interaction between Cairo and Moscow. It has recently been observed that Russia has increasingly been exerting its influence in the region by deepening relations with Egypt.

The support of Western countries for such an autocratic regime in Egypt would bring costs for them. By neglecting Egypt’s serious problems and not urging the Sisi regime to pursue democratic reforms, these countries contribute to the continuation of political and economic problems in the country. They have been losing the confidence of millions of Arabs in the Islamic world by supporting a regime that ignores democratic values. This attitude will deepen the distrust between the people of the region and the Western governments in the long-run, as opposed to the repressive regimes of these countries.

The representation of ethnic minorities is an important indicator that reduces inequalities in society. In our case, the representation of Muslims living in Europe, which is not so high, is crucial for the sake of democracy in Europe.

Professor Sener Akturk’s report “Political Engineering and the Exclusion of Religious Conservative Muslims in Europe” which was published by SETA, presents us the underrepresentation problem of Muslim minorities in twelve Western European countries. Akturk separates them into 6 pairs and 3 clusters; Austria, France, Spain and Italy the first, Germany, Norway, Denmark and Switzerland the second, Norway, the Netherlands, the U.K. and Belgium the third clusters. These pairs differ from each other on the underrepresentation of Muslim minorities, the historical background of Muslim presence on their lands and the political tendencies and gender equality rate of MPs.

Even though they have larger Muslim populations and deeper historical roots with Islamic culture, the first quadruplet has extremely low or almost no Muslim representation. The second quadruplet has encountered Muslim minorities more recently, but still have a moderate level of Muslim underrepresentation – except for the case in Switzerland. In this group, Germany draws attention with 19 Muslim MPs out of 709 in the Bundestag.

Switzerland is very distinct in this group with only 1% Muslim representation in Parliament although the country has a 4.5% Muslim population. Nevertheless, Switzerland is a country that has very restrictive citizenship laws. Currently only 12% of Muslim residents in Switzerland are Swiss citizens.

The last four states have higher levels of representation. Among them, while the U.K. has a moderate level of underrepresentation and Belgium a proportionate level of representation, Sweden and the Netherlands are described to have an “overrepresentation.” It is also important to mention that Belgium was the first European country that saw a female Muslim wearing a headscarf become an MP.

In his report, Akturk also reveals another important factor, which is the disproportionate representation of genders. While many European countries, especially France and Germany, suffer from a fatigue in the underrepresentation of women, Akturk’s report finds that there is an overrepresentation of Muslim women in European parliaments. This proportion is more balanced in Sweden.

Interestingly however, the report emphasizes that descriptive representation (the number of Muslim MPs) does not directly equate to substantive representation (the political eagerness to present and defend the rights of the group that the politician represents). This highlights the fact that the social rights and problems faced by Muslim minorities may not always be defended by Muslim political elites in Europe. For instance, Muslim MPs did not loudly oppose Islamophobic developments, especially in Switzerland, such as the ban of constructing mosques with minarets.

One can infer from the report that Muslims across Europe are not well represented in parliaments. While the report solely focuses on “conservative Muslims,” the term here can be accepted to refer to Muslims that want to be able to live what Islamic culture requires publicly and freely, raising the question as to whether we ought to call them “conservatives.” However, it is clear that the disconnection between heavily leftist and liberal Muslim MPs and the so-called “conservative” sect of Muslim society has resulted in a weakening political entity in Europe.

This report leads us to ask questions such as, who are the conservative and secular Muslims in Europe, why do leftist parties have the weight on Muslim representative in European parliaments, what would European politics look like if there was an increase of the number of Muslim MPs in conservative parties and how would this reflect on substantive representation?

There is widespread criticism that Turkey’s ruling AK Party has a poor democratic performance. Disrespect for basic rights and liberties of political and social opposition is counted as the main reason for that. This is claimed to testify the fact that the AK Party performs an authoritarian governance and undercuts democracy. Indeed, the AK Party fails to provide an equal treatment of all demands in society. In other words, it is unable to embrace society as a whole. The question is whether failing to represent all of society, or not being able to respond to all demands in society makes a political party authoritarian. More to the point, can we label a political party authoritarian in every instance of failure to carry out the impossible task of democracy?

What is to be democratic?

In order to give a satisfying answer to this question we should carefully differentiate two things: democracy and authoritarianism. Authoritarianism means to violate the basic principle of democratic politics, which is accepting the emptiness of the place of power. Respecting the principle of democracy involves first of all having a multi-party political system, periodically conducting open and fair elections, and allowing the political opposition to be present in the parliament. Secondly, we can also add that the right to oppose and criticize policies of the ruling force through various channels is to be respected. And finally, the ruling power is to admit that its rule is bound by law. Therefore, if the ruling group do not allow for political opposition and assumes its power above the law, then we can declare that there is an authoritarian regime in the country.

If the ruling political party respects the presence of political opposition and allows to be limited by law, then we can say that there is a democratic regime. This posits the different dimensions of democracy. However, democratic regimes also require providing an identity to the social whole. This identity dimension constitutes the second moment of democracy. Indeed, democracy is an ambiguous political regime which encapsulates both moments, that is identity and difference, and requires to hit a handsome balance between these conflicting forces. Harboring these two conflicting forces, democracy is an impossible task and cannot fully be achievable. Even if the ruling political power respects the difference dimension, it usually fails to provide an incontestable identity to society. Generally, it fails in the identity dimension and falls short of embracing all demands in society. This failure can be viewed as a lack of democracy, yet cannot be labelled as authoritarianism.

Is the AK Party authoritarian?

Looking from this perspective, the AK Party is not representative of authoritarian politics. However, it might fail to provide a full-fledged democratic rule. To put differently, its lack of democracy does not amount to authoritarianism. Its failure in democracy stems from not being able to provide an incontestable identity to the social whole. In its early years of rule, the AK Party sought to provide an overarching identity by responding to all social demands. It aimed at trivializing the existing societal differences between Turks and Kurds, Sunnis and Alawites, conservatives and secularists, and Muslims and non-Muslims around the so-called politics of “civilization.” The party believed that society as a whole had to come together around this identity, which was supposed to remedy all societal fault lines.

Yet this politics of civilization faced a strong resistance in society. With the Gezi Park protests (2013) and the PKK stimulated HDP riots (2014-15), it came to a halt. Following this failure, the AK Party began to provide a new identity through the so-called politics of “native and national.” Currently, the AK Party seeks to bring society into unity through this discourse, as it calls society to come around this identity of being “native and national.” Yet the party has faced and continues to face robust resistance by the opposition. The political opposition follows the politics of difference by raising the criticism that the AK Party does not respect rights and liberties in society. This undoubtedly seeks to block the AK Party’s hegemonic moves. However, the opposition does not perform the second moment of democracy – it does not even consider providing a workable unity in society. Therefore, the opposition in Turkey also fails in its democratic performance.

Briefly, the AK Party cannot be blamed of reducing democracy to elections. The governing party embraces both moments of democracy. However, so far, it has yet been unable to bring society around a workable unity.

Over the past few years, the political arena in Egypt has witnessed an unprecedented period of oppression. The leading indicators of this situation can be listed as Abdel Fattah al-Sisi administration’s harsh stance towards the peaceful opposition after seizing control of the state with a military coup in 2013, the exclusion of the civilian agents in the country from political processes and growing human rights violations. One of the main reasons for the Sisi regime’s ease in practicing such oppressive policies is the silence of the leading Western democracies to the Cairo administration, as has been clearly observed throughout the period running up to the presidential election, that is to be held on 26-28 March, 2018.

Egyptians will vote for one of the two candidates, President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi and Moussa Mostafa Moussa, the leader of liberal Al-Ghad Party, who has been a strong supporter of Sisi regime. It is observed that Moussa does not pose any threat to Sisi in the presidential race. All possible rivals of Sisi have been eliminated in varieties of ways by the state authorities in the pre-election period. What is shocking with this process is that no Western democracy issued a condemnation of Sisi regime’s ruling out all its possible rivals in the election by arresting or intimidating them. In order to illustrate the situation in a more explicit way, it would be useful to take a look at the events leading to the election period.

Several candidates stood out as potential candidates for the presidential election in Egypt, including Ahmed Shefik, who is among the prominent actors of the old regime and was a resident of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for the past five years, the former Chief of General Staff Sami Anan, the lawyer and activist Khaled Ali who is known for his remarks opposing the Sisi regime, and Egypt’s former top auditor Hisham Geneina, who was discharged from duty in March 2016, following his statement that he would unravel the corruption in the country. After the National Elections Commission announced the election schedule, these names kicked off their efforts to officially run for the election, during which people had a glimmer of hope that different names might compete for the presidential seat. But what happened during the candidacy application period displayed the Sisi regime’s determination to hold on to the ruling power.

Sisi purges the dissidents

Ahmed Shefik, a candidate for the election, returned to Egypt from the UAE, where he has lived for the past five years, after he published a video announcing his candidacy on social media. Brought under the surveillance of security apparatus as soon as he entered the country, Shefik had to waive his candidacy following the contacts he made with intelligence officials. It was alleged that the pressure of the Sisi regime’s intelligence service has been instrumental in Shefik’s decision.

Sami Anan’s candidacy application was also rescinded as he was taken into custody because of his intention to run for the presidency. The ground for the cancellation is shown as “political engagement during his military service.” Although Egyptian authorities issued statements in line with this justification, it can be said that the cancellation of Anan’s candidacy has impeded one of Sisi’s strongest rivals.

Meanwhile, Khaled Ali and Hisham Geneina, who also attempted to run for the election, decided to withdraw after considering the judicial and physical assaults against them, the experiences of the other candidates and the political oppression prevalent in the country. Ali announced in a press statement that he would not become a candidate whereas Geneina announced his withdrawal after he was subjected to a knife attack.

On the other hand, another development that occurred in February showed that the political oppression in the country targets not only those running for the presidential election, but all the dissidents. Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, who adopted a conservative-liberal political stance after leaving the Muslim Brotherhood following the Egyptian Revolution in 2011 and achieved a considerable popular support with the Strong Egypt Party he initiated, was detained after his house was raided following his criticisms of the Sisi administration in a TV broadcast. It is argued that Aboul Fotouh was detained only because of his criticisms to the regime. This incident is noteworthy as it clearly illustrates the extent the political oppression in Egypt has reached. Arrest of Aboul Fotouh drew reactions from various dissident groups in the country and human rights organizations.

The West is silent to the violation of rights

Another noteworthy aspect with regard to this oppressive environment throughout the Egyptian presidential election is the silence of the Western countries in the face of the incidents. As a matter of fact, this situation is parallel to the Western political attitudes towards Egypt in the aftermath of the coup d’état in 2013. It has been observed that many Western countries displayed a positive approach towards the Sisi regime despite the antidemocratic practices, violations of rights and economic instability in Egypt. Western countries and the Sisi regime organized many official contacts, signed partnership agreements and engaged in coordinating activities in many fields after the coup, all of which are concrete indicators of their support to Cairo.

Sisi paid an array of official visits to Italy, the Vatican and France in November 2014 as part of his European tour. Having paid visits to Germany and Hungary in June 2015, Britain in November 2015, and Greece in December 2015, Sisi also made official contacts in Portugal and France in 2016 and 2017 respectively. Similarly, many European leaders visited Egypt and contributed to the recognition of the Sisi administration as a legitimate government despite all the human rights violations it engages in. A number of politicians including the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson, Austrian Chancellor Christian Kern, Vatican Leader Pope Francis, former French President Francois Hollande and the U.S. Vice President Mike Pence paid visits to Egypt in the post-coup period.

Among these countries, France has provided a considerable degree of support to the Sisi administration in many respects. During Sisi’s France visit in 2014, Paris approved the selling of high-tech defense products, including fighter jets and battleships, to Cairo, which stirred a reaction among human rights groups. Having gained profits corresponding to multi-billion dollars from the agreements, France has maintained this approach up until today. The incumbent French President Emmanuel Macron also hosted Sisi in Paris in October 2017 and expressed his pleasure in the continuation of the cooperation between the two countries.

In response to the criticisms made on the violation of human rights in Egypt, Macron said the following words at the joint news conference with Sisi: “I believe in the sovereignty of states, and therefore, just as I don’t accept being lectured on how to govern my country, I don’t lecture others […] My deeply held conviction is that it’s in President Sisi’s interest to accompany the defense and consolidation of human rights by the Egyptian state, in the context that only he can be the judge of.” His remarks stirred controversy both in France and abroad.

Although thousands of dissident civilians have been jailed, democratic values have been breached and a strict policy that disregards the freedom of expression and press has been pursued since 2013, Macron avoided issuing any criticism on these matters, which is significant in terms of displaying the Western countries’ general approach on Egypt and the Islamic world.

Western countries have also provided economic support to the Sisi administration. Several giant financial institutions such as IMF and World Bank, credit rating agencies, global capital owners and international corporations displayed a positive approach to Egypt in the aftermath of the coup in order to consolidate the power of the Sisi regime. Long-term loans were granted to the country whereas efforts have been exerted to create a positive image for the Egypt’s economy, and attempts have been made to create an impression that global capital is eager to enter the Egyptian market. Therefore, various engagements corresponding to multi-billion dollars were contracted in the economy and investment forums organized to that end.

Along with the actors in Egypt and the Middle East, the Western democracies have a major role in the oppressive regime’s increasing anti-democratic practices that do not allow any dissident voice. Considering the stance of these countries after the Egyptian coup, it can be contended that they do not have any concerns regarding democracy or human rights and are shaping their policies in line with certain economic and political interests. It is more accurate to regard the Egyptian presidential elections as a new step toward consolidating the oppressive regime, which was established with a global political support rather than a step towards democratization, indeed the country is far from it.

FETO, a religious criminal cult and led by the US based cleric Fetullah Gülen, is a bizarre political phenomenon. It is ostensibly a religious community located in civil society, yet in reality it is a shady and aggressive organization whose activities and political ambitions can easily be branded as terroristic. It has a definitely Janus-faced structure, which can only be grasped by understanding the context of secular authoritarianism in Turkey. Indeed, FETO has found fertile ground to blossom within a social order where democratic politics had been precluded.

The collapse of an ancient Ottoman regime and traditional socio-political structures in the 1920s precipitated a feeling of identity loss in Turkish society. This trauma was exacerbated with the establishment of an oppressive secular authoritarian regime in the following decades. More specifically, the erection of republican regime in 1923 was to bring a radical change in the symbolic order of the society. The break with the old order created a political situation within which both a democratic and an authoritarian order could take hold.

A democratic regime refers to a political order within which the place of power is kept indefinite and open, which means that power is open to all political actors and none of them can occupy it forever. An authoritarian regime, on the other hand, comprises the closure of the place of power to societal opposition and identifying it with a quasi-transcendental ideological content. This cancels out the contingent nature of power, thus renders democracy obsolete.

The young Turkish Republic took the latter path. The secular bureaucratic elite monopolized power in their hands by pushing aside the political opposition and identify the place of power with secular-nationalist ideology. This authoritarian political order formed around single-party rule with no popular elections. Besides, the bureaucratic elite by deploying the state’s enormous power embarked on a systematic policy of “purifying” the society in line with its secular-nationalist ideology.

The Democratic and Authoritarian Options

In the face of this authoritarian turn, society has reacted in two alternative yet competing forms of political struggle. One of these has taken the path of forcing the authoritarian regime to democratize by dislocating the bureaucratic elite from the state apparatus. This has served to empty the place of power by consolidating and enlarging the sphere of democratic politics, where agonistic political actors can compete freely, vis-à-vis the bureaucracy.

The Democratic Party in the 1950s, the Motherland Party in the 1980s, the Welfare Party in the 1990s and lastly the AK Party in the 2000s have walked thorough this path and struggled to restore the democratic republican ideals of 1923. This democratic option has evolved in three steps. First of all, it has sought to establish and sustain a multi-party political system with free elections. This was achieved in 1950 and despite intermittent suspensions it has been maintained since. Secondly, it has strived to roll back the civil and military bureaucracy’s influence in the political system through democratic reforms. This took place in the 2000s. Lastly, it has struggled to institutionalize a governmental system that assured to materialize the democratic republican ideals. This was carried out in April 2017.

The other strand of political struggle has parted significantly from the democratic option in terms of its ways and political objectives. It has mainly sought to conquer the state from within by infiltrating it thorough various channels. Its course of action has followed the objective of controlling critical state institutions, expanding aggressively in the sphere of civil society and infiltrating into political parties by using whatever means necessary. Thus, its main objective is to replace the secular authoritarianism with a seemingly more society-friendly and conservative one. Instead of keeping the place of power empty, this obscurantist form of politics tends to fill it with other content and block the opposition.

FETO represents this authoritarian option. It has taken advantage of alienation and the widening gap between a relatively conservative society and the oppressive secular regime. It has considerably succeeded in channeling society’s energy and frustration against the authoritarian state. Moreover, society’s resentment has escalated after each incident of military and civil bureaucratic intervention in democratic politics in the second half of the twentieth century. These interventions have weakened some segments of society’s backing for the democratic option in its struggle to bring the oppressive regime down and geared them to shift their loyalty to FETO’s authoritarian option.

Exploiting the Democratization Process

The 2000s witnessed an extensive democratization process. It extended political and cultural rights and freedoms to the ostracized sections of society. It achieved democratization in civil-military relations. It enhanced economic and cultural equality to a degree and thereby boosted the standards of political participation. All these boiled down to the dislocation of secular bureaucratic actors and secular-nationalist ideology from the state.

This was a critical development for Turkish democracy. At last, the essential criterion of a democratic regime was in place: the place of power has grown empty. Yet the occurring vacuum in this transition posed a great danger for it would be abused by political forces that had no respect for democracy. This was what happened in Turkey in the 2000s. FETO took advantage of the displacement of secular-nationalist actors from the state apparatus. Thus, the 2000s testified to two synchronized and opposing developments. The AK Party-led democratic bloc struggled to democratize the political system in the face of the secular-nationalist status quo whereas FETO accelerated its policy of infiltration and invasion of the state institutions and capturing control of civil society.

http://thenewturkey.org/why-should-not-the-west-love-the-gulenists/

Since the struggle between the democratic bloc and the secularist status quo lay at the center of political struggle and FETO’s capability of manipulation through its vast sources of media outlets and control of the intelligence, FETO’s invasion of the state went unnoticed by both the AK Party and the larger public, or not taken seriously enough till the threat it posed to Turkish democracy reached a critical stage. Indeed, FETO, a religious criminal cult, cloaked its real intention and activities behind a discourse of democracy, peace and dialogue and skillfully presented itself as a benevolent force.

FETO’s Path to the Coup

2010 marked a turning point in Turkish politics. From the 1950s onwards Turkish politics had been determined by a polarization between the secular bureaucratic elite and the conservative and liberal social forces. The secularist elite had struggled to sustain the control of the state whereas the conservative social forces had strived to democratize the political system. Nevertheless, after 2010, the conflict between two conservative social forces, the AK Party and FETO, became the defining feature of Turkish politics.

FETO, which had struggled for almost four decades to get hold of the state, now found itself in a situation where the AK Party blocked its long-term political objectives. Controlling the majority of the state apparatus, FETO has endeavored to push the AK Party aside by deploying various discourses and strategies in the period of 2010-2016.

One method was that FETO was at pains to show Turkey has become an authoritarian or “one-man rule” country under the AK Party rule. For example, the discourse of polarization and authoritarianism peaked during the Gezi protests in June 2013. FETO motivated and manipulated this incident to de-legitimize and marginalize the AK Party in both the society’s and the international community’s eyes.

FETO also sought to portray that the AK Party had been involved in terroristic activities by especially alleging that it harbored and supported terrorist groups such as DAESH. It attempted to create an image that Turkey had become a rogue state under AK Party rule. This was meant to bring then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan before the International Criminal Court. For this aim, FETO-affiliated officers stopped a truck which was owned by the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) in Adana in January 2014. FETO’s media outlets leaked news that it was loaded with weapons that were sent to so-called terrorist groups in Syria.

Moreover, FETO tried to portray the AK Party as a deficient power that failed to rule the country. In order to fuel a psychology of insecurity in society and to alienate the electors from the AK Party before the upcoming local elections in March 2014, FETO-affiliated prosecutors filed lawsuits against the AK Party, accusing some high-ranking party members of organized corruption, in December 2013.

Failing in all these attempts, FETO resorted to military intervention. FETO-affiliated officers attempted to take hold of the government, attacked key security buildings and the Turkish Parliament, and killed 250 people during the attempted coup on July 15, 2016. Yet the coup attempt was foiled by a heroic civilian resistance.

Quo Vadis?

On 20 June 2016, Parliament declared a state of emergency, which has started an extensive purge of FETO members from the state apparatus. It has also dealt a deadly blow to its financial and human resources base. Many FETO members have been jailed or fled the country. This crackdown on FETO has devastated its organizational structure and its morale.

This figures as much a crucial development as the discard of the bureaucratic elite from the place of power for Turkish democracy. The disqualification of two authoritarian options consecutively in the last two decades has prepared a suitable ground for the country’s flourishing democratic regime. Today Turkey opens up a new page in its political history. It needs to restructure the state apparatus and bring its political system in line with democratic norms. The main challenge in front of the AK Party is to lead and complete this historic process.

Turkish Interuniversity Board (ÜAK) strongly condemns the recent coup attempt to overthrow the democratically elected and legitimate Government of Turkey. Serving as an active voice of freedom and democracy, all our universities stand against this unacceptable and shameful attempt against our national will and our parliamentary democracy, the rule of law and freedom. Remembering the devastation in our recent history caused by the previous coups, we also invite all academics and students in the world to stand against this attempt.

Please note that the authorities are now in full control of the unwelcome attempt to depose The Grand National Assembly and overthrow the legal government in Turkey, and that all educational institutions, including universities, academies, community and vocational colleges and related educational establishments thereof are open and freely functioning.

We urge our international colleagues not to allow Islamophobia to cloud their judgments and acknowledge that we all members of Interuniversity Board of Turkey involving all rectors, fully support Turkish Grand National Assembly, its elected representatives of all political parties and endorse peoples’ resistance to the anti-democratic coup d’état attempt.

Interuniversity Board of Turkey

We Are the Good Ones is a book written by Schreyer and Broeckers on how mainstream media in Europe and in the West in general tried to demoralise Russia during the crisis in Ukraine. Any steps by Russians or pro-Russian groups in Ukraine were seen as unjust, illegal, inhuman and anti-Western per-se. Although there was a previous rapprochement between Russia and Europe in the fields of counterterrorism, natural gas trade cooperation and others, just one conflict on interests turned Russia into an “other” for Europe.

There are two steps involved in making a bogyman out of someone. Firstly, in our case, it starts with referring to Europe’s unquestionable and essentialist attitudes of being good per nature. Europeans and Westerners in general are always the good guys, those who do not do anything bad. Since they have the self-vision of being cultivated, founders of liberal democracy and forerunners of all modern achievements in the world, their awareness of the self is simply being the good, independent of which kind of stance they have or what their actions are, while the rest does not really matter at all.

The Case of Turkey

The referendum on the 16h April of this year is a plebiscite on reforms to Turkey’s constitution. Shortly, citizens of the Republic of Turkey will decide on whether they want to change Turkey’s executive to a presidential democratic order or to remain in the present form of governance. Since 1.5 million Turkish citizens residing in Germany, along with hundreds of thousands living in mainly Western European states, will participate in the referendum and politicians from different factions are extending their campaigns into these countries. Whereas in every European country politicians and private persons can campaign for a ‘No’, this has not been the same for anyone campaigning for a ‘Yes’. A trend starting with the cancellation of the conference, which was to be given by the Minister of Justice, Bekir Bozdag, has continued, with further meetings legally registered but cancelled due to arbitrary procedures.

After the cancelation of meetings of the Minister of Justice, a few days later meetings of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, have been cancelled as well. Although the argument was made by German public servants that political campaigning by foreign politicians is not a fundamental right; this was not the case for others. For instance, the Leftist Party (die Linke) and the Greens (die Grüne), the third and fourth largest parties represented in the German parliament, are officially campaigning for a ‘No’’ which illustrates the political stances of political parties actively involving in foreign campaigns. The irony is between the prohibitions of politicians campaigning for their political agenda related to their own country to their own citizens living abroad and free activity of political parties campaigning for a foreign concern, in their own countries but to people who they consider foreigners.

The same case can be observed in the Netherlands, where Prime Minister Rutte declared he would not allow any meetings of ministers of Turkey in the Netherlands, yet the previous deputy minister of Turkey, Abdullatif Şener, actively campaigns for a ‘No’ and meets Turkish citizens living there.

Indeed, it is another aspect of the psychology of the Good Ones to characterize anyone who is an ally as also being good, regardless of their actions. Therefore, their agenda and raison d’être is legitimized and should not be questioned. It is, in other words, the illustration of how and why European politicians, public servants and journalists are applying double standards without even recognizing and comprehending it. It is sometimes an act springing from unconscious attitudes towards certain ideas, persons and topics. Indeed, a pro-PKK demonstration in Frankfurt on 20 March is therefore possible, although the PKK is officially recognized as a terror organization by Germany.

The events over the night of 11 March 2017 have their roots in this essentialist, prejudicial and arbitrary actions as well. However, it is not just rooted in an unconscious act but there is a certain agenda behind it. Speaking for the Dutch case, there have been General Elections on 15 March and the right-wing Populist Party leader Wilders was leading in the polls. Rutte, the current Prime Minister, has evidently misused his office as a prime minister to catch up with Wilders’ votes and to have a chance for a further re-election, which he in the end won as the primary party.

In other words, his means were values like liberal democracy, ideas like freedom of expression and assembly, and further characteristics on their proclaimed liberal democracy for not losing his office, and his power. Therefore, a bad person named Erdogan is always useful for being a good person named Rutte, Wilders, Schulz or good girls like Le Pen or Merkel. It is becoming more and more obvious, what would happen if an EU national politician would be detained in Turkey. However, this is the destiny; they do not even deserve fundamental rights, since they are basically, the Bad Ones.

There is a new trend in the West. It has been a couple of years, I believe. Renowned intellectuals, strategists and media outlets are publishing comments, headlines and academic articles about Turkey and its president without remorse and conscience. They are openly advocating for a military junta over democracy, assassination or execution of a leader over the legitimate change in power.

Last summer, with instructions from Fetullah Gülen, a self-proclaimed scholar who continues to reside in Pennsylvania, US, his infiltrators within the army declared that they were seizing power in order to depose President Erdoğan and the government. While the people of Turkey were bewilderedly watching a presenter trying to read the junta’s coup declaration with hands shaking on TV, all hell was breaking loose on the streets. Bridges in Istanbul were closed and surrounded by military vehicles, meanwhile several police officers had gone up the towers of the bridge and were shooting with sniper rifles.

The sound of tanks moving on main roads, sonic booms of F16s and, gunfire on the streets were all mixed up. Everyone was in terror. Many deputies of both the government and the opposition were trying to survive within the parliament as F16s were dropping bombs on the compound. There also was an assassination attempt on President Erdoğan, who was at a hotel where he spent time with his grandchildren. There was an ongoing clash between the assassination team and presidential bodyguards at the hotel, while the headquarters of the National Intelligence Organization was under attack and the Chief of General Staff was being held as a hostage.

People across Turkey took to the streets and thousands in Ankara and Diyarbakır surrounded garrisons to prevent tanks from going out on the main roads. People tried to stop military vehicles and tanks using unimaginable methods.

Whatever was transpiring definitely was a strange situation. Turkey has experienced several coups; however, this time it felt different. It felt like an invasion, an attempt to colonize Turkey; this was what the majority of the people felt, at least. By dawn, the coup attempt was thwarted. There were lifeless bodies and severed limbs on the streets: the tragic stories of the deaths of hundreds of fathers and sons, siblings who stood side by side. Thousands of men, women, young and elderly were being hurried to hospitals.

Intellectuals infactuated with military juntas and assassinations

While bombs were being dropped and the screams of people reached the heavens, renowned academics in the US were tweeting about the coup attempt as if watching a sports match. For instance, Daniel Pipes wrote “He [Erdoğan] deserves to be ousted by a military coup. I hope it succeeds.”, while David Miller wrote “Erdogan was a megalomaniac ruining a great country. Who’s going to miss him?” These academics aren’t some minor figures and they weren’t the only ones writing in such a way. Hundreds of tweets just like the aforementioned ones later transformed into newspaper headlines, analyses in academic journals, and articles. Unbelievable! In the periodical Foreign Policy, Edward Luttwak criticized not the junta itself, but their failure to pull off the coup. According to Luttwak, they failed to realize the “first rule for a successful coup.” What was it? “Capturing or killing the head of the government, first and foremost”! The putschists, who wounded more than 2,000 and killed 246, have “violated the golden rule,” said Luttwak. It was crucial, as “they [the putschists] left the opportunity for Erdoğan to call the people to resist the coup”!

The world-renowned journal The Economist had the same connotation: “The sultan survives”! Similarly, an analyst of Fox News, Ralph Peters, made two obnoxious comments within a week: “Friday night’s failed coup was Turkey’s last hope to stop the Islamization of its government and the degradation of its society.” One week later, he wrote: “[…] now he [Erdoğan] has real support among half of the population, those for whom the fever of faith is the ultimate intoxicant. He polls better than Hitler did. “Mein Kampf” is no match for the Holy Koran.” For Peters, the people of Turkey sacrificing their lives to thwart the coup was not an issue. The one who should die, or deposed at least, according to Peters, was the president, and unfortunately he still alive and was standing tall. Furthermore, the situation was direr as Erdoğan’s supporters consolidated their belief in the president.

On the other hand, the Holy Quran of Muslims was being compared to Mein Kampf, which was written by the perpetrator of the largest genocide on earth. And the Quran was portrayed as a book that could surpass Mein Kampf in terms of atrociousness. This means that in the US and many parts of Europe, the direst of Islamophobic statements, and giving advice on how to violently depose a government and execute its leader is not a crime, but a component of freedom of speech!

The day after, those who believed that Erdoğan deserved the coup and should be executed advocated that Erdoğan designed the coup or at least knew of the coup with the same impunity as before. There were similar headlines published on reputable newspapers which acted in support of these allegations. The Guardian published Gülen’s statement on its website: “Turkey coup may have been ‘staged’ by Erdoğan regime”! 8 days after the coup, while people were still at hospitals or at the funerals of their loved ones, The Independent published a news piece titled “President Erdoğan’s Turkey is modelled on the Third Reich.” Later, the news outlet removed this piece from its website, probably out of shame! Michael Rubin, on the other hand, wrote an opinion on Foreign Affairs website the day of the coup which was titled “Erdogan Has Nobody to Blame for the Coup but Himself.”

Erik Jan Zürcher also wrote that even if the government hadn’t planned the coup, they were in the know and planned what to do after the coup. All of the Western media underscored that only Erdoğan was accusing Gülen and his henchmen for attempting a coup, while disregarding the statements of the main opposition party, other opposition parties, high-ranking generals and academics which were on the same page with Erdoğan. Including the most fervent enemies of Erdoğan, nobody had a doubt that the coup was ordered by Gülen; however, the Western media ignored all of these, as if there was an accord among them. Lastly, seven months after the coup attempt, the President of the German Federal Intelligence Service Bruno Kahl said “We don’t believe the coup attempt was made by Gülen” in his interview with the journal Der Spiegel. As the German intelligence is still intact, Kahl’s statement has only one meaning: “We are supporting Gülen.”

After thwarting the attempt, the government had to dismiss all members of this organization from the state, while closing down media outlets and private enterprises which supported the said organization. A state of emergency was announced for this reason and all of these were done. Then, these were deemed similar to the applications of Stalin and Hitler. However, no one drew a comparison with the time when East and West Germany were united and thousands of civil servants (who weren’t infiltrators like Gülenists) in East Germany were dismissed, even though it was a much more controversial process than the one in Turkey.

It’s not a crime to demand the head of a leader in the West!

The propaganda by the Western media which emerged with the July 15 coup attempt are continuing and getting worse by the day. Regardless of the issue, who and what kind of violent action is put against Erdoğan, the result doesn’t change. Turkey experienced this once again last week. Due to the referendum for a change in the system of government which is to take place on April 16, both the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the opposition are concerned with rallies in Turkey and abroad. There are more than 5 million Turkish citizens living in various countries of Europe. This population which has dual citizenship is able to cast their votes in Turkish elections.

Germany and the Netherlands didn’t show any kind of opposition against the Turkish parties which are advocating the no vote in the referendum during their rallies in their countries; however, this wasn’t true for AK Party. Last week, the Turkish FM’s travel permission was revoked by the Dutch government, while the minister of family and social policies was barred from entering the Turkish consulate (which is considered a territory of Turkey) in Rotterdam, later to be deported with a police escort. Moreover, they released attack dogs on people who took the streets to protest these actions and these people were also beaten by the police.

This treatment was not acceptable at any level; however, a single visual became embedded in the minds of Turks: a police dog biting the leg of a young male, while a police officer is keeping two protesters who are trying to help that person at bay with a baton. This visual was just like the ones showing torture at Abu Ghraib prison during the invasion of Iraq. After this, the main opposition party CHP demanded relations with the Netherlands to be suspended. Opposition parties and all people regardless of their opinion of Erdoğan condemned the treatment that was shown to the Turkish citizens and ministers. Meanwhile, the Blick daily in Switzerland published a Turkish headline: “Vote no against Erdoğan’s dictatorship.” Again, in Switzerland, a far-right crowd made a demonstration, probably with a permit as no police officers interfered, with ugly masks, calling the Turkish citizens to vote no in the referendum. These visuals were so abhorrent that Aykut Erdoğdu, a deputy of the main opposition party CHP, couldn’t hold himself and tweeted the following: “To whom the actions of these racist bastards in Europe are serving in the referendum?”

The target of those who carry out this abhorrent, anti-democratic and illegitimate campaign is the only politician who could garner 51.8% of the total votes in the first ballot. Anti-West sentiments increase among millions of supporters of Erdoğan and even those who oppose him. This rising hate is not because of Marinne Le Pen in France, Wilders in the Netherlands, or the neo-nazis in Germany; it is because of those who support the junta, see assassination as a legitimate method to depose an elected leader, and feign ignorance about a malicious organization which has infiltrated state institutions for 40 years!

Turkish politics is currently polarized by the debate over a constitutional reform bill. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) have jointly proposed a constitutional reform bill to shift Turkey’s parliamentary system towards a presidential system. These two political parties defend the bill by arguing that it will boost Turkey’s democracy. Yet the opposition, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), strongly oppose the bill by claiming that it will lead Turkey into an authoritarian one-man rule.

The opposition contends that the new constitution weakens the parliament to the extent that the presidency amasses all the powers in its hands. This will leave the government without a system of checks and balances and end the rule of law. So it sets forth a regime change, namely the end of Turkey’s republican order. The AK Party and the MHP, in response, propound that the new constitution provides better conditions for reflecting the popular will in the government. So it does not end Turkey’s republican order; on the contrary, it improves the republican order by empowering the society over extra-political forces such as the military and civil bureaucracy.

Indeed, this debate reveals the main fault line in Turkish politics. Turkish politics is primarily determined by the conflict of two historical blocs, the secular middle class and the masses in the periphery. The secular middle class, which constitutes the minority in society, figures that its interests will be best served as long as the parliament holds the central place in politics. The peripheral societal forces, which constitute the majority in society, seek to push the executive to the center in politics. The former believes that the minority will have more say in politics as long as the parliament holds a focal point. The latter thinks that the majority will get its due share in power as long as the executive occupies the central place in the political system.

So we have two competing views of democracy at hand. From a liberal perspective, democracy simply refers to the limitation of power. From a conservative perspective, democracy refers to the rule of the people, namely the concentration of power in people’s hands. While the opposition holds on to the former, namely the negative view of democracy; the AK Party and the MHP sticks to the latter, namely the positive view of democracy.

Parliamentary System under Bureaucratic Oligarchy

To put the matter in a historical perspective, the majority’s choice of positive view of democracy is tenable. The secular middle class organized around the bureaucracy ended the Ottoman monarchic regime in 1922 and established the republic in 1923. This regime change brought about another significant change, it ended the “neutral” state and replaced it with a “total” state. With this transformation of the state, the absolute separation of the state from society came to an end. The state and society, therefore, became enmeshed through political parties. The political parties became the most significant political actors.

Yet, the newly established republic was unable to deal with the disrupting effects of pluralism in society. The state found the solution in strictly separating itself from the society. It kept the parliament at the center of politics but the parliament was restricted to a political party, namely the CHP. The two attempts, one in 1925 and the other in 1930, to install multi-party systems failed.

Hence, the state under the control of the bureaucratic elite formed an oligarchic rule. It single-handedly decided on who should rule and be ruled. The nationalist-secular middle class values drove the line that divided the ruler and the ruled. The political actors with “secular” values were granted the right to rule, whereas the others with “conservative-religious” values were reduced to be ruled. Thus, the state evolved back to a neutral state. The state is off limits to society.

The period of 1950-2002 witnessed a process of controlled opening of the state to society. The bureaucratic oligarchy allowed a multi-party system. The political parties such as the Democrat Party in the 1950s and the Motherland Party (ANAP) in the 1980s dominated the parliament and challenged the hegemony of the bureaucratic elite. The former broke down after the military coup in 1960, whereas the latter collapsed within itself and lost its parliamentary majority after the leadership change.

Besides, from the mid-1960s to the 1980 military coup, the state lost control of the society. The parliament fell short of absorbing pluralism, and this unrestricted ideological polarization unleashed bloody clashes on the street, especially from the mid-1970s till the coup. In the 1990s, with the decline of ANAP, the number of parties in the parliament rose. The parliament absorbed pluralism to an extent, yet it failed to provide a working coalition government to sustain political stability. This weakness of parliament eventually pushed the state to a deep legitimacy crisis in the late 1990s.

Democratization of Parliamentary System

However, after the AK Party came to power in 2002, power has gradually shifted from the secular middle class to the masses in the periphery. This power shift led to two important constitutional reform bills in 2007 and 2010. They were designed to curb the power of the bureaucracy. The constitutional reform in 2007 brought the popular election of the president. The presidential office, which was granted broad powers by the 1982 constitution, used to be elected by the parliament and served as a gate keeper for the bureaucratic oligarchy. The 2010 constitutional reform, on the other hand, reformed the judiciary system by limiting the powers of military courts.

These institutional changes were accompanied by the process of sociological equalization within the society. This change in the distribution of power in society and the loss of power urged the opposition to launch a new political discourse which targeted the AK Party with a negative view of democracy. It constantly criticized the government for establishing an authoritarian rule. In the meantime, the power vacuum in the bureaucracy was filled up by the Gülenists. Starting from 2012, the opposition and the Gülenists began to team up against the AK Party. The Gülenists attempted a coup twice. One through the Judiciary on 17 and 25 December in 2014. The other was through the military on 15 July 2016.

Upon these onslaughts against the government, the AK Party and the MHP agreed to embark on a new constitutional reform on 1 December 2016. The 2016 reform aspires to empower the political infrastructure of the country by shifting the government system towards presidentialism. It mainly seeks to shift the center of gravity towards the executive branch within the political system and strengthen democratic politics versus extra-political forces, namely the bureaucracy.

Presidentialism and the Republic

With presidentialism, the government seeks to strike a delicate balance between two opposing forces in society, pluralism and stability. Thus, on the one hand, it seeks to sustain pluralism in society by keeping the state open to the whole society. On the other hand, it struggles to maintain political stability by steering political parties to the center.

Indeed, this has been the basic motivation of the 1982 Constitution. It installed a multi-party parliament while introducing a 10 percent election threshold. More, it split the executive between the president and the council of ministers. The president, who was planned to be elected from the cadres of bureaucracy, was granted more powers and was supposed to keep the government in line with the bureaucracy.

The current constitutional reform shares the same motivation, emphasizing stability at the face of centrifugal societal forces, but with a caveat. First of all, it unites the executive by abolishing the office of prime minister. Second, it separates the presidential election from the parliamentary elections. Third, it deprives the parliament of its power of a vote of confidence. The parliament keeps its other powers that enable it to check and balance the executive, such as calling for new elections, debating and approving the budget, etc.

Thus, the constitutional reform that seeks to shift the government system towards presidentialism abides by the basic democratic norms. Moreover, it may serve to further the democratization of the country and create a better republic. Indeed, a republican order requires two conditions. First of all, it underlines the fact that rule is supposed to be a political rule, namely there should be no categorical difference between the ruler and the ruled. It is the rule by the people for the people. Secondly, the rule is supposed to be based not on power but rational discussion. Having equality and cultural and economic homogeneity among the members of the political community is a sine qua non of a republican order. These measures constitute its genuine and actual basis.

Furthermore, the current constitutional reform may endorse the process of sociological equalization and promotes cultural and economic homogeneity among the citizens without forsaking societal differences and pluralism. This is because it puts a premium on democratic politics in the face of extra-political forces and pushes political parties to address the whole society in order to get elected. In other words, it rules out coalition governments and shifts the center of gravity in the state towards democratic politics. In short, it gives priority to society’s will.

Democracy and democratic values have long been at the epicenter of international affairs. Universally applied democracy has come to determine not only internal but also international affairs. Despite this, democracy has remained a controversial issue and, not in a few cases, has been used as a tool in the hands of those who claim to be standard bearers of democratic values: the West.

On July 15, the Turkish state structure was threatened by a coup attempt, which aimed to overthrow the Turkish government and democracy. Governmental institutions that represent democracy in Turkey such as the Grand National Assembly (TBMM) or media outlets were bombed and innocent civilians who strove to defend their nation were killed. More than 250 men, women and children were killed during the coup attempt organized by the Fetullah Gülen Terror Organization (FETO), which eventually failed to achieve its goal.

For the first time in Turkey, politics, the media and people united against the common enemy: the coup plotters. Nevertheless, during and after the coup attempt, another opponent actor emerged. Surprisingly, some international actors, both leading politicians and media outlets, were disappointed by the failure of the coup attempt and still fail to recognize the democratic values to which the Turkish citizens firmly adhered. Moreover, some of these actors strove to exacerbate the situation. At this point, it is fair to ask whether these international actors want a democratic or a non-democratic Turkey. It seems that their choice is a non-democratic Turkey, which will follow their recommendations and submit to their will.

The stance of these international actors can be analyzed under three subtitles: politics, the media and Turkish expats. With the exception of the latter, the behavior of the other actors was not fair –not only towards the Turkish state but also, most importantly, towards the Turkish citizens.

During the first hours of the coup attempt, state leaders and government representatives made vague statements. It was clear that their stance towards the coup attempt was to be shaped according to its outcome. As it became evident that the putschists were losing ground, only then did the state leaders begin to declare their support for the democratically elected government. This pattern was followed primarily by the US and other Western countries. A striking example is the message directed to the US citizens from the US embassy in Turkey in which the coup attempt was called an “uprising”.

While politicians were reluctant to make politically incorrect moves, the media acted as it habitually has done during the last years: it vilified Erdoğan. From the beginning of the coup attempt, Western media did not hesitate to announce that the Turkish government had fallen and that the military was in control. News about Erdoğan requesting asylum in Germany was widely broadcast. In addition, even when the president, the prime minister and other leaders declared that the state was in control of the situation and that this was just a coup attempt, Western media did not transmit this critical information to their audiences.

Fabricated news about Turkey occupied the headlines of the Western media and these were unfortunately not mere exceptions. In fact, Turkey has become immune to such kinds of hoax, though the Western public has not. The Western media almost unanimously began to accuse the Turkish government and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan directly or indirectly and are still trying to portray him as culpable in these events. First, the mainstream Western media did not mention the names of those who attempted the coup. They have been portraying FETO as a peaceful face of Islam and Western countries continue to harbor the organization’s leader and leading personalities in their respective countries. Moreover, the Western media and politicians forget that the organizers of the coup attempt–FETO–pose an imminent threat to the security of Turkey, and the measures taken in the aftermath of the coup are the same as any state would take to protect its own national security.

Second, the Western media focused solely on President Erdoğan, and did not mention at all how the putschists bombed the capital city, how the army helicopters killed more than 250 innocent women, men and children without mercy or even how the united people marched on the streets to protect their state. Most of the headlines raised concerns about the “authoritative tendencies of Erdoğan and the purge against the opposition groups.” By this, they concealed the reality and the message that the Turkish citizens gave on the streets. They refused to see that all political parties represented in parliament declared their opposition to the coup attempt. Similarly, the Western media refused to expose the support against the coup attempt in the streets and the squares of Kurdish-populated cities.

Third, the Western media and many journalists warned and even threatened the Turkish authorities against punishing the putschists. It can be said that they do not want the Turkish government to take proper measures against the putschists. Moreover, the Western media stated their defiance against the state of emergency declared by the Turkish government, a legal right in the constitution, and also accepted by the European Human Rights Convention. Their Orientalist approach towards Turkey shows that they still consider Turkey to be a typical Middle Eastern or a third-world country.

An important example that needs to be mentioned is WikiLeaks. Soon after the coup attempt, WikiLeaks posted on its official Twitter account that the Turkish citizens must get ready to fight as it was to publish approximately 300,000 emails from the AK Party that would shed light on the coup attempt and those behind it. It was a shame for WikiLeaks and the media outlets that made news of this statement as it resulted in a huge sham. The emails that were made public were mainly spam email followed by some inconsequential emails. Afterwards, many Turkish citizens mocked WikiLeaks, while the international media remained silent, pointedly not updating their previous news in this regard.

The media outlets in the Middle East were/are more neutral towards the coup attempt. They were divided into two opposing categories. The first category welcomed the coup attempt in Turkey, which has been considered as the last Ikhwan-like regime in the region. This view was shared by the Egyptian media, which is under the control of the Sisi government, an administration established after a military coup in 2013. Similarly, the media outlets controlled by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were also strongly pro-coup and anti-democracy. Those who are in favor of one-man rule and strictly authoritarian regimes consider Turkey to be one of the last remnants of the popular and democratic movements of the Middle East. The second view welcomed the crackdown of the coup attempt and declared its support of the Turkish people and their legitimate administration.

Lastly, the Turkish expats in different countries went out onto the streets to support the democratically elected Turkish government in its battle against the Gülenist Terror Organization that plotted the coup attempt. Many Turks gathered in front of Gülen’s mansion in Pennsylvania, requesting his extradition to Turkey. At a time when the Turkish people are intimidated by the West, the support of their expats was essential. However, some influential Turks living in the West and working for the Western think-tanks followed the policies of their host institutions, criticizing the Turkish government and President Erdoğan, but omitting the death toll and the outstanding resistance of the Turkish people.

To conclude, the domestic and international actors, in most cases, had opposite impacts on the events of July 15. While the domestic actors served as a catalyst for defending the unity of the state and the democratic values, the international actors mostly tended to obliterate the reality, especially through their biased media. For what it is worth, the Western antagonism did nothing but further unite the Turkish people. Today, the people are aware of their power and this has made them stronger than ever; a notion that the West has long taught but little supported.

From a societal perspective, a constitution is a multidimensional phenomenon. According to Kenneth Wheare, a distinguished authority on constitutions, there are two main attitudes about constitutions. According to the first a constitution is primarily and almost exclusively a legal document in which there is only place for legal rules and practically for nothing else. Yet, for those who favour the second attitude a constitution is a sort of manifesto, a confession of faith, a statement of ideals, a “charter of the land”. Essentially, a constitution is the basis for the organization of a state. And in turn state institutions provide for the society the necessary mechanism to exercise political, administrative, and judicial powers in order to ensure law and order. Also, it is through this mechanism that individual rights and duties are established and the economic activities are regulated and promoted.

Although currently the Turkish case is, quite understandably, at the centre of the debates in Turkey, this country is not alone in its quest for a new constitution. Writing a constitution is an important part of many peace-making and democratic transition processes. Newly founded independent states new regimes and countries in transition to democracy that seek democratic credentials put constitution-making at the top of their list of priorities. With its long-standing democracy Turkey is still ruled by the 1982 Constitution which has been designed by military forces instead of democratic processes. The constitution was a by-product of 1980 coup d’etat and lacks the civilian and democratic spirit. The 1982 Constitution aimed to deepen the military tutelage system that has been originally established by the 1960 Constitution which was put into effect after the 1960 military coup det’at. Several amendments has been made by on the 1982 Constitution by civilian governments since it came in effect to eliminate  not only the undemocratic but also anti-democratic features of the constitution. Yet, the undemocratic spirit is so deeply ingrained in this constitution that amendments fall short of finding a definitive solution. Shortly after the time it came into force, there have always been hot debates around this constitution and demands have been voiced by diverse social groups to produce a new and civilian one carrying the spirit.

Beyond the Text: the Question of Agency 

Notwithstanding the significance of debates around the content and the wording of a constitution the question of who has the right to make a constitution is usually insufficiently addressed. Thomas Jefferson, the principle author of the American declaration of Independence, wrote in a sent letter to James Madison and dated 6 September 1789 that “no society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law. The earth belongs always to the living generation. They may manage it then, and what proceeds from it, as they please, during their usufruct.” Jefferson basically refers to the fact that not only each generation should be able to choose the laws under which it is governed, but also the power of repeal is in no way equal to the power to choose a new one. The principle of popular sovereignty and the unalienable right of the people to participate in public affairs require the promotion of popular participation in constitution-making. That is to say in democratic systems the ultimate right to participate in the making of a constitution rests with popular classes of the society.

http://thenewturkey.org/the-rise-and-fall-of-feto-in-turkish-politics/

Political elites inevitably play a major role in making decisions about how to structure a new constitution. However, there is now an established trend to build into the process broad participatory mechanisms in order to avoid a constitution that simply divides the spoils among competing factions, and to improve the chances of the new constitution enjoying a high degree of popular legitimacy. In the ever-changing world, therefore, the forms of public participation now go beyond just voting for constitutional representatives or in a referendum. Instead, they include civic education and media campaigns, public consultation (on how to manage the process as well as on the substance of the constitution), national dialogue, and other creative means. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of Turkey, expressed in a speech in last January that the constitution making process should include public participation via workshops and search conferences.

Notwithstanding the significance of debates around the content and the wording of a constitution the question of who has the right to make a constitution is usually insufficiently addressed.

Public participation is often taken to mean voting—for example, electing a constitutional convention or ratifying a constitutional text by referendum. Especially in developing nations in Africa and elsewhere, however, there are experimental attempts to place the initiative in the hands of citizens and to create an open constitutional conversation in which the public partakes in agenda-setting, content writing and ratification processes.

The methods of constitution-making have changed over time. In absolute monarchies the monarch alone enjoys the monopoly to decide for a constitution. or else, many constitutions were imposed on a vanquished or colonized people (for example, in Western imperial systems—the MacArthur constitution in Japan after World War II, and to a lesser extent in Post-War Germany and in colonies once they gained their independence). From mid- twentieth century onwards democratic processes of constitution-making became the norm in which the principal responsibility has been assigned to a parliament or to a constituent assembly. Since the last quarter of that century, the emphasis has shifted to the active and qualified popular participation—whether as individuals, social organizations, or communities.

In order to successfully repeal the 1982 Constitution and to make a new civilian and democratic one in Turkey, all democratic actors must, as a prerequisite, acknowledge  popular right to make a constitution and to partake in the entire process. Especially the political parties represented in the parliament should spend the greatest effort to ensure the popular participation in the constitution-making process and to produce a constitution that reflects the popular will and meet popular demands.

On June 29, 2014, an armed group declared that they had established the Islamic State and that they were to restore the caliphate. Subsequently, the group changed its name to the Islamic State of Iraq and to Levant/Syria-ISIL/ISIS.  In a short span of time, the group has taken hold of a number of cities, ammunition stores and has established substantial financial resources.

ISIL is a modern phenomenon and it is in many ways not different from fascism or communism which for a great part defined the bloody history of the twentieth century. For ISIL, the caliphate is a mere declaration of intention – it has never offered any theological explanation of it. Its leadership’s main group of advisors is composed of the remainders of Saddam’s army, especially the Republican Guards; in this manner ISIL features in the dictatorship of the Saddam era. ISIL is a reflection of the situation created by the United States and, later, by Iran in the region. Currently, Western countries are targeting ISIL, which in return, puts up strong resistance and has gained new sites in Iraq and Syria. At this stage, ISIL has gained the sympathy and support of radical organizations such as Al Nusra and the Islamic Front. ISIL’s power is, in a sense, a result of the lure of power. It must be born in mind, however, that neither other jihadi movements –including many warring factions under the banner of ISIL- nor major denominations –including Salafis- have accepted ISIL’s call for the establishment of the caliphate.

ISIL’s ontological base is a reaction against the regional policies of Western countries and Israel alongside the failure of the state institutions in Iraq and Syria. The emergence of fascist organizations everywhere in the world in such overwhelming and long-term instability is frequently encountered. ISIL is an outcome of the latter and to present it as one of the main reasons of the state of affairs in the Middle East is complete demagoguery.

Salafi movements can be seen as products of the reaction against the globalization of modernity in an effort to influence the Islamic world. However, ISIL represents a more radical break than Salafi movements; it is impossible to consider ISIL as part of heretical Islam. It is true that ISIL has derived its human resources from “Muslim” societies but its mode of appearance, ignorance, hastiness and greenness has reduced it to a tool for preparing the ground for regional operations of various outsiders and to legitimize and facilitate their operations.

ISIL is a modern phenomenon and it is in many ways not different from fascism or communism which for a great part defined the bloody history of the twentieth century.

ISIL suggests that all areas of life –and politics, of course- must be carried out as they were in the initial stages of Islam. That stage, at least as far as ISIL defines it, is almost an imagined one. As to the call for the caliphate of Al Baghdadi, certain questions must be answered from the outset: Is the caliphate an issue that can be owned by a group formed in a few years and trying to make a name by terror activities? Can we explain the situation while ignoring its historical-sociological background? As is known, the caliphate has a connotation of higher authority inviting all Muslims to obey. Today, the nation-state, which is formed on the concept of “absolute” positive and negative sovereignty, is the norm in global politics. It will not recognize any higher authority including the caliphate in the traditional meaning of the term. Therefore, a call for the caliphate is nothing but an instrument to carry out immediate objectives.

http://thenewturkey.org/why-daesh-is-so-pleasant-to-israel/

Radical groups or ideologies can be seen in every society and in all periods. What is important is how these groups or ideologies get hold of the community or the international system. At this point, we should ask: would we still be referring to the so-called Al-Qaida organization, had there never occurred a power struggle between the USSR and the U.S. in Afghanistan? Can we understand the emergence of ISIL without Al-Qaida and the U.S. occupation of Iraq? Going back further, without the postcolonial practices of Western countries in the Middle East – i.e. the extraordinary political capacity of the U.S. to remain on friendly terms with Saudi Arabia so as to hold sway over oil flux – would Salafi/Wahhabi ideologies terrorize marginal groups in the Islamic world?

What about the concept of jihad and mujahidin? Were not the mujahidin the “good guys” for the U.S. before 1989? What was the content of the concept prior to the mujahidin of Afghanistan? What about democracy? Do Western countries want to see real democracies in the Islamic world? What is the nature of the rage of the Muslims living in Western countries? Is it only because they are Muslims or because of the frustration caused by racist and exclusionary circumstances in the West? What is the target of this rage? Why do they kill Muslims in Syria and Iraq?

With these questions, we do not want to empty the historical content of the concept of jihad and to suggest that the concept is wholly produced by Orientalist approaches. On the contrary, the term jihad occupies an exceptional place in Islamic history. It has been a main motivation behind the social, economic and political power of Muslim states. From this perspective, we need to ask again: Can people who use the “jihad” rhetoric offer a clear definition of the concept, which is acceptable to everyone, especially to Muslims? Do the “jihadists” emulate historical Muslim figures or modern warriors like Hitler and Saddam Hussein? Current representation of the concept empties its historical content and makes it unattractive in the eyes of the whole world, including Muslims. This sort of empty concept eliminates one of the vital ontological roots of the Islamic world and exterminates its most important vantage point against the West.

It does not seem realistic to say that ISIL will soon be wiped out of the Middle Eastern scene in an environment where state institutions are paralyzed, the state image has collapsed, and political commitments are defined along sectarian lines.

At this point, it is of little significance to detect the presence of Western actors or intelligence agencies in the emergence of ISIL. What is significant is how ISIL is utilized by global actors for the sake of their pragmatic purposes. In order to understand this, we should look at the kinds of results brought about by policies designed and implemented through ISIL. To give a few examples:

• The intervention of countries such as the U.S., the U.K., Russia and Iran in Iraq and Syria is legitimized in the eyes of both their public and the global community.
• These countries have exported radicals from their homelands and in this manner postponed upcoming internal problems, thanks to the ground offered through ISIL.
• The concept of Muslim-Western tension proposed in the “Clash of Civilizations” thesis has been reinforced through ISIL.
• The center-periphery relations between the West and Middle Eastern countries have been reinforced with no visible anticipation of change in the near future.
• This environment has increased the importance of Israel as the sole representative of the West in the region and any possibility of objection to Israeli policies by the international community has been seriously impaired.
• Although Syrian opposition was and still is the most important group struggling against ISIL, its legitimacy has severely been eroded; the Assad regime has been legitimized and its life has been prolonged through ISIL.
• Iran has stiffened its hegemony in Iraq and increased its presence in Syria under the pretext of combating ISIL.
• Kurdish nationalism, PKK and its affiliates in Syria and Iraq have grown stronger.

It does not seem realistic to say that ISIL will soon be wiped out of the Middle Eastern scene in an environment where state institutions are paralyzed, the state image has collapsed, and political commitments are defined along sectarian lines. Unless power-sharing struggles between global and regional actors cease, to build successful states in Iraq and Syria will never be possible. The most aggrieved parties from this situation have been the Syrian and Iraqi peoples, of course. Regional countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, and Turkey have been hit the hardest both in their domestic and foreign policies. It cannot be said that Western countries and Russia have clearly benefited from the turmoil in the region. The country that has benefitted the most, however, is Israel, which is now the most relaxed it has ever been in its history as the highest threats to its existence, namely Syria, Iraq and Egypt, have been paralyzed.