The Council of the European Union had decided to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova in December 2023. On June 25, 2024, the EU held the first meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference at ministerial level to officially open accession negotiations with both Ukraine and Moldova. In many ways, this accession negotiation process was different from others. A brief look at the EU’s previous enlargements is needed to understand this difference.

A Brief History of EU Enlargement

Enlargement policy is the EU’s most important foreign policy instrument. The reason for this is the transformative power of the EU, the power to transform the countries that will become members of the EU by means of conditionality. By spreading its values through enlargement, the EU is able to ensure its stability, security and prosperity. Moreover, by enlarging with new member states, the EU becomes a much stronger Union economically, politically and geopolitically, and increases its effectiveness in the international system.

Since its first enlargement in 1973, the EU has gone through several rounds of enlargement, bringing the number of member states up to 28. Following Brexit and the UK’s withdrawal from the Union, the EU now has 27 Member States. Each enlargement has been assessed in the context of the needs of the time and has taken place when the conditions have been met. For example, the UK, Ireland and Denmark applied to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1961, but were rejected twice, first in 1963 and again in 1967, because of French President Charles De Gaulle’s concerns over Britain’s close ties with the United States that would be detrimental to the Union. The first wave of enlargement, which included the UK, did not take place until after De Gaulle’s resignation.

The second wave of enlargement was also dealt with assessing in the context of the needs of the time. The EEC had suspended the Association Agreement with Greece after the Greek junta seized power in 1967 and installed the regime of the colonels. After the military junta had handed over power to civilians and a democratic government had been restored, Greece applied for membership again. After six years of negotiations, the Member States, instead of excluding Greece, arguing that its democratization could be achieved more effectively within the EEC, acted with the idea that we would admit Greece as a member in 1981 and democratize it.

Under the regime of General Francisco Franco, Spain’s application to join the EEC in 1962 was rejected. Following political reforms and democratic elections, Spain submitted its formal application in 1977, which led to the EEC’s decision to open accession negotiations in 1978. Similarly, after the resignation of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar in 1968 and the replacement of the regime established by the military coup of 1974 with a democratic regime following the 1975 elections, Portugal formally applied to the EEC in 1977 and began negotiations in 1978. The 1981 enlargement to include Greece and the 1986 southern enlargement to include Spain and Portugal changed the EU from a “club of democracies” into a “school of democracy”.

In addition to political issues, obstacles to Iberian enlargement included the fact that these two countries produced similar agricultural products to France. In addition, the fact that Spain and Portugal, which had been ruled by dictatorships for many years, were economically lagging the other members caused concern among other EEC member states because of the possible influx of workers from these two countries.

Although Bulgaria and Romania failed to meet the EU’s criteria on corruption and an impartial judiciary, they were granted membership in 2007, albeit belatedly. Rather than leaving Bulgaria and Romania outside the EU, as was the case with Greece, they were helped to continue their transformation and development within the EU.

The most recent enlargement of the EU was the accession of Croatia. Croatia, which gained independence after the break-up of Yugoslavia, was able to join the EU after resolving its border issue with Slovenia. The growing strategic importance of the Balkans for the EU paved the way for Croatia’s accession process and the prospect of future Balkan enlargement.

For Turkey, which started accession negotiations to the EU at the same year with Croatia in 2005, the EU negotiation process was de facto frozen. When Balkan enlargement on the agenda and accession negotiations officially opened with Ukraine and Moldova, the question arises as to what will happen to the accession negotiations with Turkey. Although Turkey has recently expressed its willingness to take steps to revive its EU membership process it has not been included in these new enlargement perspectives of the EU.

Ukraine and Moldova’s EU Accession Process

We are witnessing that the EU, long suffering from enlargement fatigue, has begun taking important steps in the enlargement process. In a changing world and in the new European security environment, the EU has put aside its longstanding anti-enlargement approach. The war in Ukraine and its aftermath, as well as the changing conjuncture, have given a new impetus to EU enlargement, with both Ukraine and Moldova and the Western Balkans on the EU agenda.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen signaled this change in her State of the Union speech on 13 September. In her speech, von der Leyen said that a new group of states, including the Western Balkans, would be admitted as new member states of the EU. The date for this enlargement scheduled to 2030. On 7 May 2024, the EU member states took a decision to support the Western Balkan countries with 6 billion euros, 4 billion euros in loans and 2 billion euros in grants to make them economically ready to join the Union. The fulfillment of this support based on two conditions: achieving political reforms and foreign and security policy alignment with the EU against Russia.

Ukraine and Moldova, previously part of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP), began to be considered in new enlargement policy. The relationship between Ukraine and the EU evolved into a different process with the Association Agreement, negotiated between 2007 and 2011 and signed in 2014, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).

The pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych’s reluctance to sign the DCFTA led to pro-EU protests in November 2013, the so-called Euromaidan uprisings, and Yanukovych’s removal from power, and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, which is called as “special military operation” by Russian government, became the factor that accelerated Ukraine’s accession process. On 28 February 2024, 4 days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine applied for EU membership and on 23 June Ukraine was granted candidate status by the EU.

Although relations between Moldova and the EU began in 1994, when Moldova signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, the main obstacle to Moldova’s membership in the EaP under the ENP was the fact that the country’s economy did not meet EU standards and, most importantly, the situation in the Russian-backed Transnistria region.

Moldova, like Ukraine, applied for EU membership on 3 March following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Together with Ukraine, it was granted candidate status on 23 June 2022. Ukraine is currently at war with Russia, while Moldova is concerned about a possible war situation due to Russia’s support for the Transnistria region.

The start of negotiations with Ukraine on 25 June was only possible after convincing Hungary, which was opposed both because of the war in Ukraine and because of the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine. Negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova were officially launched before Hungary took over the rotating EU presidency on 1 July, thus avoiding a potential stumbling block. But there are many other features of this wave of enlargement that make it different from the others.

I

n Eurowhiteness, Hans Kundnani, Associate Fellow in the Europe Programme at Chatham House, challenges a sanitized and linear history of the EU, prompting the reader to rethink Europe’s peaceful image against its imperial past. He goes on to tackle myopic assumptions about the European project throughout the book.

Kundnani argues that pro-Europeans, who cradled cosmopolitanism and renounced nationalism, have failed to perceive the reality of European regionalism. This provocative critique dissects both the civic and ethnic elements that shape European identity by highlighting Europe’s interaction with the “Other” and linking “Europeanness” and “whiteness.” 

Eurowhiteness may come off as unpalatable to many pro-Europeans, but it raises valuable questions against a backdrop of a rising far-right in Europe. Especially in the wake of the 2015 refugee crisis, the complex relationship between European identity and race demands urgent reflection.

Q. What are some of the myths that cause blind spots in understanding the European identity?

I would mention two in particular. The first is the idea that the EU is a cosmopolitan project. Cosmopolitanism usually has something to do with the whole world, and Europe is not the whole world. There’s a tendency by pro-Europeans and the EU to mistake Europe for the world. For example, when they talk about European integration, they sometimes seem to think that they’re talking about global integration, but they’re not.

Similarly, when they say “I’m a European or I’m a European citizen,” they seem to think they’re saying I’m a citizen of the world, but they’re not; They’re saying I’m a citizen of this particular region that has a very particular history and relationship with the rest of the world.

This is what I call in Eurowhiteness “the of myth of cosmopolitanism in Europe”, and related to that is the idea to think European integration is good for the whole of the world, but that may not necessarily be the case; It may be good for Europeans or may not be good for Europeans, arguably. But even if it is good for Europeans, it’s not clear if it’s good for the whole world.

The second myth would be that the EU is a peace project, and that is not entirely wrong. However, the way that pro-Europeans talk about it is sometimes simplistic; that after 1945 Europeans rejected war, and since then Europeans stand for peace. In reality, Europeans did not reject war in general in 1945. They only rejected war with each other.

In 1950 as the Schuman Declaration, which can be seen as the beginning of the idea of the EU as a peace project, is made by France’s then-foreign minister Robert Schumann, France is simultaneously fighting a brutal colonial war in Indochina.

Similarly, seven years later, when the Treaty of Rome is signed, France fought a brutal colonial war in Algeria. This demonstrates that Europeans are continuing to fight colonial wars until they’re defeated or exhausted.

Europeans like to think of themselves as being uniquely peaceful. The real story is more complicated, and in particular, as I say, to the extent that Europeans have rejected military force, it is military force within what has become the European Union, not even within Europe at large, that is being rejected.

Q. Has the EU’s focus shifted from peace to power?

I wouldn’t say it has shifted from being about peace to being about power. I think it was always about power as well as peace. In particular, it gets to what I was just saying about the idea of the EU as a peace project.

If you go back to the interwar period pan-European movement, which is the inspiration for the post-War European integration project, it is very clear that at that time already that the European integration project is about power and the perception of European decline accelerated by fighting one other.

The idea is: If we want to maintain our position in the world – and at that time this is a position of colonial domination- we have to stop fighting with each other. Not so that we can end European colonialism, but so that we can continue it. So in other words, European integration would take the competitive element out of European colonialism, allowing its practice collectively.

Part of the point of European integration in 1950s was for France and Belgium to consolidate their colonies in Central and West Africa at a time when they were no longer able to on their own. In particular, they needed an injection of West German capital.

The idea of geopolitical Europe goes back to the 1920s. It only seems new because pro-Europeans like to tell a story of Europe through the aforementioned myths. It only seems like a shift because we’ve forgotten the real history of how European integration began.

Q. Does the EU still export the European social model and the general welfare state?

Social market economy and the welfare state are no longer what the EU can to claim export anymore. It may have done once, but even in Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War we observe that this is not the case. In fact, the former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe had much more generous welfare states when they were communist countries.

What happened as they joined the EU during the enlargement process is that those welfare states were dismantled as part of their transition to democracy. There are obviously lots of things that you can criticize about the communist systems in those countries, such as the lack of political freedom and so on, but they did have welfare states.

What has happened now is a further stage in which the EU is putting pressure on member states to dismantle the welfare state. For example, during the euro crisis, the austerity Germany imposed on Greece dismantled what was left of the Greek welfare state.

Q. Your book suggests that civic ideas of Europe are being replaced by ethnic-cultural ones. What is the connection of the neoliberalization of Europe to identity politics?

What I try to show in the book is that there have always been both of the elements of civic and ethnic-cultural idea in the history of what I call European regionalism- which is similar to nationalism on a larger continental scale. I’m suggesting that we can think of the history of ideas of Europe in the way we think about the history of nations. Therefore, regionalism is like nationalism.

The earliest ideas of Europe are predominantly ethnic-cultural. For example, in the medieval period, Europeanness is synonymous with Christianity. From the modern period onwards, you begin to get civic ideas of Europe. Then, in the post war period is when the EU came closest to evolving into a purely civic regionalism. Particularly, in the period from the 60s to the 90s-2000s, there was an idea of Europe centered on the social market economy, the welfare state and depoliticized mode of governance which European integration had produced.

I think what’s happened is that the social market economy and the welfare state have been hollowed out by neoliberalism in the EU. Meanwhile, there has been a backlash against the depoliticised mode of governance where the older civic idea of Europe is no longer persuasive in the same way it was before.

The way I understand neoliberalism is not just financialization, but it’s also the depoliticization of economic policy. In other words, it’s taking economic policy out of the space of democratic contestation. Although, to some extent, this has happened in the whole world in the last 30-40 years through things like the World Trade Organisation rules, the EU has taken it further through the creation of the single market, and also the Eurozone and the fiscal rules. Therefore, it’s very difficult now to pursue a left wing economic policy in the Eurozone because the fiscal rules don’t allow you to do it.

My argument is basically that when you take economic policy out of the space of democratic contestation and no longer have big fights between left and right about economic policy, your democratic politics shifts to cultural questions.

The point of democratic politics is to reconcile different interests and to have fights about questions where people in your society have different ideas or different interests. I think a healthy democratic politics is one where you do that about economic issues because there are real differences between the interests and different ideas as well.

What has happened now is that the center left parties and the center right parties converged in the center around neoliberal economic policy, which the EU has constitutionalized. Therefore, the way parties can differentiate themselves from each other now is around cultural questions.

In terms of what Europe says to the rest of the world, there was a time it would say it stood for the social market economy and the welfare state and now it says it stands for European civilisation.

A good example of this is the phrase “the European way of life,” which used to be used by French socialists, specifically, to refer to the social market economy and the welfare state and the idea of solidarity that it was meant to embody, saying “that’s what we in Europe stand for as opposed to the United States.”

Now when you look at the way that the phrase is used, it is in more civilizational terms. In the current European Commission, the Commission of Ursula Von Der Leyen since 2019, a European Commissioner for promoting the European way of life and his job is to keep migrants out, which makes it very explicit that migrants- only migrants from the South, not migrants from the east- are a threat to the European way of life. That is a very explicit expression of civilizationalism where the European way of life is defined in terms of culture and civilisation, not in terms of the social market economy and the welfare state.

Q. In your book you imply that the center right is increasingly mimicking the far right. Is there a pro-European version of the great replacement theory, if so, what is it?

There is an idea that the EU represents a European civilisation which is being increasingly threatened. This is basically a far right idea that has now been taken on by the center right in Europe.

For example, a couple of weeks ago, Eric Zemmour was doing a rally in the South of France with the young far right leader Marion Maréchal, and the slogan on the lectern at which he was speaking was ‘Defend our civilization.’  The way the far right is thinking about Europe is there’s a European civilisation that is threatened right now. The far right tends to talk about this in the context of migration. That is, it’s the migration of non-white and non-Christian people that is threatening European civilisation.

For example, Valérie Pécresse, the Republican candidate in the French Presidential election in 2022, was talking about white replacement theory or alluding to it in terms of migration. However, in addition, what the centre right tends to do is not talk so much about migration as a racial threat, but more in foreign policy terms as a threat to European civilisation. Macron has given speeches where he’s quite explicit about this.

In other words, international politics is a clash of civilizations, like how Samuel Huntington argues, and Europe is a distinct civilization. Moreover, for someone like Macron, the West is not one civilization, which is what Huntington thought but that Europe is a distinct civilisation, separate from the United States as well.

Where I see a connection with great replacement theory is that this is almost the international political equivalent of the great replacement theory. It’s not about migration but it’s that if Europe does not unite and defend itself, it will be also replaced by other civilizations. Macron has basically said that.

Q. What are some key takeaways from history regarding Europe’s interaction with those who it sees as the “Other”?

I try to show in Eurowhiteness that there’s a long history of defining Europe against various different “Others” at various different times and it’s constantly shifting. But roughly, I would say, in the medieval period when Europe is pretty much synonymous with Christianity, Jews are defined as the primary internal other and Muslims as the primary external other, excluding the divide between Western Christendom and Eastern Christendom.

Then, in the modern period, I try to show how there is a new complex modern idea of Europe, which is partly to do with the European enlightenment and the scientific revolution. It is a rationalist, secular idea of Europe rather than a religious one. At the same time, the idea of Europe also emerges in the context of the encounter of Europeans with the populations of Africa and Asia, and especially the Americas, and that’s the context in which the idea of whiteness emerges.

So, the modern idea of Europe is not just a rationalist one as opposed to a religious one, it’s also a more racialized idea of Europe that is closely connected to the idea of whiteness. What I think happens in that context is that non-white people around the world are the “Others” against which Europeans define themselves.

In the 20th century and particularly after World War I, you have the new idea of Europe as a geopolitical bloc, which I mentioned earlier. European civilisation or the European spirit, as they talked about it at that time, is being threatened by the United States on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other hand. In that context, Russia and also the United States are respectively an “Other.” What I think we’re seeing today is a mixture of all of those “Others.”

T

he year 2022 witnessed several tensions in EU–China relations, mostly due to COVID-19-related supply chain disruptions, the Russia-Ukraine War, and Taiwan. The question here is to what extent these crises could affect relations between the EU and China in the long run.

Diplomatic relations between the European Union and China go back to 1975. Following the signing of a trade agreement in 1978, bilateral trade increased significantly. The door to a new cooperation opened after the Trade and Cooperation Agreement was signed in 1985 thanks to China’s opening up and the regular visits between European and Chinese diplomats and businesspeople.

The EU-China relationship keeps evolving in the 21st century with intensifying commercial ties, especially as a result of the worldwide economic crisis. Today, the EU-China relations have become more complex.

Growing economic partnership

Trade is the main factor motivating EU-China relations with commercial partnerships and mutual investments creating mutual dependency over time.

The EU has been China’s largest trade partner since 2004, and China was the EU’s second-largest trade partner. Today, China surpassed the United States to become the EU’s largest trade partner mostly thanks to the high demand during the pandemic.

In 2021, bilateral EU-China trade in goods reached €1.9 billion a day.

According to statistics, between January and August 2022, trade between China and the EU increased by 8.8%, and the EU investment in China increased by 123.7%.

Three EU member states had a trade surplus with China, according to the goods trade balance with Germany accounting for the biggest surplus.

“China and the EU are indispensable trade partners. The EU was China’s biggest trade partner for 16 years (until 2019), and China has been the biggest trade partner for the EU since 2020. Even as the pandemic rages around the world, trade between China and the EU has continued to grow.

This reciprocal trade relationship plays a fundamental role in the respective economic development and social prosperity, especially in this era with an increasing risk of geopolitical conflict,” Dr. Zang Shumei, a research fellow at the School of Politics and International Relations at East China Normal University, told Politics Today.

Who needs whom more – China or the EU?

Commercial activities and economic interests generally foster diplomatic ties. However, the fact that the EU member states do not act as a single block makes relations more complicated. For example, Greece blocked an EU statement at the UNHRC in June 2017 criticizing China’s human rights records. Another significant host of Chinese investment, Hungary, has repeatedly blocked EU statements criticizing China’s record on human rights under President Xi Jinping.

Despite efforts by EU policymakers to diversify the bloc’s trade and investments, commercial ties with China are strongly established and resist alternations, and Europe is still one of Chinese investors’ most preferred destinations.

Nevertheless, after decades of China feeling it is just a financial gamble for European firms, market conditions have become far more challenging due to restrictive COVID-19 policies, slowing economic growth and rising geopolitical tensions.

Additionally, the insufficiency of investment reciprocity is detrimental to European interests. In terms of labor and manufacturing costs, logistics systems, and industrial parks, China continues to be a competitive manufacturing hub. Twenty-four EU member states had a trade deficit with China. The Netherlands had the largest deficit, followed by Poland and Italy. “We find that the trade deficit has been growing between the two partners. But we should not simply conclude that one needs the other one more. China and the EU will continue to need each other, not only in trade but also in various global issues,” stated Dr. Zang.

The United States as third actor in the EU-China relations

There is a third factor affecting EU-China relations: the United States. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China and the European Union are two major forces of multilateralism. Upholding multilateralism has been one of their most important common understandings and shared responsibilities.

There are diverging opinions in the European Union about the limits of acting in accord on foreign and domestic policies. Countries from the former Eastern European bloc tend to seek U.S. protection through NATO and favor the U.S. presence and policies.

Moreover, these countries still need to make urgent infrastructural investments as their economies develop slowly. This is the same reason why, conversely, some countries of the former Eastern European bloc have approached China’s Belt and Road Initiative positively.

Cultivating its relations further with the 16+1 states in Eastern Europe, China is aware of this internal difference. Meanwhile, China’s presence in Eastern Europe makes an anti-China stance at the EU level less likely.

Relations between Lithuania, an EU member state, and China stopped in July 2021 after Lithuania decided to allow the Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania to be opened in Vilnius under the name “Taiwan.”

Overall, it is clear that member states’ political stances on China will not be the same, but some EU members have a bigger impact on the decision-making process. Dr. Zang argues that “Macron’s insistence on Europe’s strategic autonomy shows traces of Gaullism, even though this autonomy is severely threatened by the current crisis in Ukraine. Such an insistence on French and European autonomy has been an important positive element for constructing good Sino-French and Sino-Europe relations.”

On April 3, Viktor Orbán, the candidate of Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance and the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), claimed victory for his fourth consecutive term as prime minister against the six-party United for Hungary coalition’s candidate Péter Márki-Zay.

In the final days leading to the elections, the war in Ukraine reflected heavily on campaign narratives, increasing voter turnout to 69.54% and advantaging Orbán who largely dominates Hungarian media. The opposition maintains that the elections were not on fair grounds with checks and balances issues and gerrymandering.

Following his 53% win, Orbán mocked Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky as an opponent to overpower through his campaign, and sent a message to the EU saying that conservative civic and patriotic politics was the future. He was able to maintain a two-thirds majority in the parliament, which the opposition claims

Orbán used to his advantage in his prior terms. However, a referendum in which Orbán advocated in favor of banning educational material for minors claiming that it promotes homosexuality and sex reassignment was deemed invalid.

The war in Ukraine and the election in Hungary

On March 15, during rallies commemorating the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, an important event shaping the formation of the Hungarian national identity, the war in Ukraine shaped the electoral campaigns’ narratives. Orbán presented his followers with a choice of a “pro-peace right” or “pro-war left.” Similarly, Márki-Zay remarked a “single historic choice: to choose Europe over the East, freedom over tyranny.”

While Orbán’s idea of taking a pro-peace approach is keeping Hungary neutral and out of the war, his party accused his opponent of wanting to send Hungarian soldiers to fight in Ukraine. Márki-Zay stated that these were “slanderous claims.”

Márki-Zay criticized Orbán for serving Putin’s interests, and argued that Hungarians thought it was Putin and not Brussels that needed to be stopped for peace to prevail. The opposition ran with a promise for a new constitution to restore the rule of law that it claims Orbán has marred, alongside accusing Orbán of promoting a hate campaign towards minorities and certain persons, namely George Soros. The opposition mainly stood for a pluralistic political system and the repairing of alliances with the EU and NATO.

Opening to the East

During Orbán’s 12 years in power, Hungary has cultivated an amicable relationship with Russia alongside dissent from the EU. Their relations started flourishing in 2011, when Hungary introduced an “Eastern Opening” policy to trade with countries like Russia, China, and Turkey to counterbalance economic ties with the West.

Three years later, Hungary gave a construction project to Russia for expanding Hungary’s only nuclear plant with Russian financing, which has caused much speculation within the EU. Hungary has confirmed it will move forward with the project after calls from the opposition to scrap it in the wake of the Ukraine war.

Furthermore, during the Russian annexation of Crimea, Hungary was hesitant to sanction Russia. In November 2021, the Hungarian foreign minister was awarded the highest state honor for non-Russians, the “Friend of Russia” award.

Orbán’s reasoning can be summarized in an interview on March 3, where he stated Hungary was caught up between major geopolitical powers and that it was NATO expansions that triggered the war by not appealing to Russian security demands.

He described Russia-Hungary relations as balanced and fair, hailed China’s strong economic endurance post-2008, and articulated his interests in developing a beneficial relationship with China, which he acknowledged as an emerging world power in the shifting world order.

Orbán evaluated the current Anglo-Saxon order in a manner reminiscent of his issues with the EU, saying, “Anglo-Saxons want the world to recognize their position as morally right. For them, it’s not enough to accept the reality of power; they also need you to accept the things that they think are right. The Chinese have no such need.”

Hungarian voters and the Ukraine crisis

A recent Pulzus Research survey shows the differences in how voters of different parties perceive the war. It found that 25% of Fidesz-KDNP supporters said that Russia had launched a “justified war” to protect the Russian minority in Ukraine.

Fewer than half of Fidesz-KDNP voters agreed that the attack on Ukraine was a show of great power aggression, and 26% percent said they did not know why the war broke out. Meanwhile, 89% of opposition supporters view the conflict as a war of great power aggression.

The major difference in perception may be due to the government’s pro-Russia stance over the years in addition to some pro-government media rhetoric. Although most major pro-government outlets have displayed neutral reporting on the war, pro-Russia narratives were put forward by some experts.

Many policy-makers had warned of the potential Russian aggression against Ukraine, but with few exceptions nobody had expected Putin’s war jets to bomb the capital of Ukraine or the Russian army to invade Ukrainian territory. Vladimir Putin shocked the world and expectedly, this created turbulence in international politics as countries are economically interdependent. Meanwhile, Europe was faced with the tough reality of its dependency on Russian energy, slowing down its reaction time with sanctions.

For days now Russia has been bombing and trying to invade Ukrainian cities. Not only soldiers but also hundreds of civilians have been killed or injured, while hundreds of thousands have been displaced. The initial American and European reaction to the Russian invasion was weak and limited, and Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainians felt abandoned by their allies. European allies had hoped to deter Putin with sanctions.

Even though Biden and European leaders bragged about severe economic sanctions, this didn’t stop Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Energy export is the backbone of the Russian economy and sanctions against this sector would perhaps be the most devastating tool. However, it is unrealistic to expect the West to sanction the Russian energy trade, meaning oil and gas. Here is why.

Russian dominance over Western energy markets

In the 1960s, when Western Europe had begun to import gas from the Soviet Union, it was Western Germany that imported Soviet gas first. Over the years, as European demand for gas increased, European gas imports from the USSR increased as well. Things changed in the 1990s as states in Europe started diversifying their gas supplies and the Russian share in gas imports declined.

During that time, domestic gas production also increased in countries producing gas in Europe, notably the Netherlands, Norway, and the UK. But the amount they produced did not entirely replace Russian gas supplies; European countries’ dependence just decreased from about 90 percent to 75 percent in the late 1990s.

In the 2000s, liquified natural gas (LNG) became an alternative way to import gas. Europe started to construct regasification terminals. Today, led by Spain, more than 10 European countries have a total of about 210 billion cubic meters of LNG import capacity. This, however, does not mean that the EU does not import Russian gas anymore. In the first half of 2021, Russia was the main natural gas supplier of the EU with a share of 47 percent, followed by Norway with 20.5 percent.

The degree of the EU’s dependency on Russian gas differs from country to country. Eastern Europe is the most dependent on Russian gas, whereas Germany imports the most Russian gas by far. Overall, more than one third of the total of imported gas in Europe comes from Russia.

Most people confuse energy security with the security of natural gas supplies. This is a common mistake by the EU policy-makers, who focus exclusively on the gas supplies. Energy security means more: it is also about oil and coal imports. Both crude oil and petroleum products as well as coal imports by the EU are also dominated by Russia – 25 percent and 46 percent respectively.

Moreover, Europe is not the sole market that imports Russian energy products. China, along with other major Asian economies, and even the U.S., import oil and gas from Russia. Asian countries’ limited indigenous hydrocarbon resources have pushed them to turn to their energy-rich neighbor, Russia.

But due to infrastructure constraints caused by the rough geography of the U.S. that does not facilitate the construction of pipelines, the United States, the world’s number one oil and gas producer, is forced to buy both oil and gas from its ultimate rival, Russia.

Can sanctions deter Russia?

Russia is now facing critical sanctions over the invasion of Ukraine. The EU, the UK, the U.S., and Canada with many of their allies limited the Central Bank of Russia’s access to its $630 billion reserve. They also froze Putin’s and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s assets in their respective countries. But putting sanctions has its limits.

The circumstances were different when the U.S. led the international community-imposed sanctions on Iran, Venezuela, or Libya – all three are members of OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries), and Iran is the second-largest producer of crude oil in the organization. But Russia is not Iran. Russia is the second-biggest producer of global oil and gas, and its supply is desperately needed to heat homes, run factories, and generate electricity in Europe.

Since the last quarter of 2021, the world has been facing severe energy shortages which pushed the gas and electricity prices to levels that have never been seen before. As part of the sanctions against Russia, the EU just targeted the oil refineries of the Russian energy sector aiming to prevent their modernization. On February 27, the EU, the UK, Canada, and the U.S. decided to remove a number of Russian banks from the SWIFT system in order to restrict their ability to do business across borders.

This is expected to bring tremendous damage to the Russian economy. But then, European capitals began to import more Russian gas via Ukraine since the sanctions still do not target energy payments.

Time to rethink energy security in Europe

The Russian aggression in Ukraine once again has shown that the European Union deeply needs alternative energy suppliers. The fact that LNG is not a substitute for pipeline gas ties the hands of European states.

Neither Qatar, the second-biggest LNG exporter, nor the U.S., the number one natural gas producer, can replace Russian gas. It is not just about the capacity that they can supply, it is also about the European gas market structure. Many energy analysts seem unaware that the EU does not have a continent-wide natural gas transmission system. This means that we cannot talk about a single European gas market.

For instance, Spain, Europe’s largest gas liquefaction capacity holder, cannot transmit its gas to Germany or to Poland since it is disconnected from the rest of European gas infrastructure. Therefore, at the moment, LNG cannot offset the Russian pipelines’ gas. Most states with LNG facilities also import Russian LNG because it is cost-efficient.

As the Russian invasion of Ukraine enters its fourth day, there has been an outpouring of compassion for Ukrainians, which has garnered widespread coverage in international news outlets. With cities around the country under siege, civilians fleeing the conflict, and hundreds of Ukrainians fleeing to neighboring Poland and Belarus, reporters from across the world have not missed the beat in covering the war.

However, as the conflict progressed, several Western news reporters could not hide away from their racist thoughts, as pointed out by various social media handlers.

“This isn’t a place, with all due respect, like Iraq or Afghanistan that has seen conflict raging for decades”, Charles D’Agata CBS news senior reporter noted on Friday, for which he subsequently apologized.

His comments received with harsh criticisms and outrage via social media, with many readers pointing out how his views led to the increasing dehumanization of non-white Christian and non-Europeans suffering from a conflict in mainstream media.

On Saturday, former Ukraine Deputy General Prosecutor David Sakvarelidze spoke to the BBC and further echoed the same virtue signaling and appealing to the average British citizen through relatability, saying, ”It’s very emotional for me because I see European people with blue eyes and blonde hair being killed”.

Biased Media Coverage of Refugees

In the meantime, an ITV News correspondent in Poland had similar comments, stating “This is not a developing third world nation. This is Europe.”

Media commentators, journalists, and political personalities have been accused of hypocrisy for using their platforms to applaud Ukraine’s armed resistance to Russian forces while simultaneously expressing their horror at the prospect of such a battle occurring in a “civilized” society.

The human rights violations committed against millions of people in the Middle East, pushed by authoritarian leaders, masquerading as concerned liberal reformists in the West, further highlights the racial and anti-Muslim subtext of the lives of non- European nations as unimportant because they are judged inferior and therefore “uncivilized.”

The lack of awareness of earlier European wars, from the Russian takeover of Crimea to the Serb-committed Bosnian Genocide, demonstrates the willful misrepresentation of recent European history by purposely portraying the Middle East and Muslim nations as synonymous with war.

Old wounds, new scars: African students fleeing Ukraine

The growing refugee crisis in Ukraine has reopened old scars for international students fleeing the country’s strife. Local hatred and hierarchies, and differing perspectives on what it means to be European are all being solidified.

Tens of thousands of African students are studying medicine, engineering, and military affairs in cities under siege throughout Ukraine. According to the education ministry, Morocco, Nigeria, and Egypt are among the top ten nations having foreign students in Ukraine, accounting for over 16,000 students. Thousands of Indian students are also attempting to exit the country.

The growing refugee crisis in Ukraine has reopened old scars for international students fleeing the country’s strife.

A popular trending hashtag on Twitter has been sharing the worries of Africans leaving Ukraine under the hashtag #AfricansInUkraine, where a young woman told NCA News, “We have to get ourselves to Poland, which is the other way across Ukraine…we’re not given any forms of transportation. All the forms of transportation available are prioritizing Ukrainian citizens”.

“It is sickening to know that this was even necessary. In the midst of war, devastation, and people fleeing Ukraine, some working the border have time (and the moral deficit while facing people in despair) for racism” remarked Martin Luther King Jr.’s daughter, civil rights campaigner Bernice King.

Racism is still alive and kicking in Europe

Indeed, xenophobic views against foreigners have remained continuously high across Central Europe over the last decade. The potential for political mobilization of these sentiments is significant and obvious to all political factions, whether they are pro-government forces, secular liberals or extreme nationalists.

According to a 2015 study issued for the UN High Commission for Refugees on ‘Press Coverage of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the EU: A Content Analysis of Five European Countries,’ “It is impossible to ignore the role of the mass media in influencing public and elite political attitudes towards asylum and migration. The mass media can set agendas and frame debates. They provide the information which citizens use to make sense of the world and their place within it…”

“Research in many countries has found that refugees and migrants have tended to be framed negatively as a problem, rather than a benefit to host societies…there were very few articles which focused on the need to address the push factors driving population flows”.

The apparent double standards in coverage of the Ukraine war does not lessen the anguish and pain of Ukrainians fleeing to safety and protecting their sovereign territory. It only spotlights those who have been subjected to war and turmoil for a far longer length of time and do not fit the “blue-eyed” mainstream accessibility standard.

Until media analysts, commentators, and journalists report on conflict in Europe in the same way they do in the Middle East, without compromising the facts of each individual conflict but appeal to the viewer’s humanitarian nature, as they did with the Ukraine crisis, will increase confidence in mainstream channels.

Sweden prides and projects itself as being a very modern and liberal society, and an integral and active member of the international community. It is a country that seeks “to punch above its weight.” In practical terms this refers to its desire to have an effect on shaping global developments that is above and beyond its tangible resource availability.

Branding and reputation management play a key role in Swedish foreign policy as an attempted perception force multiplier and with special attention given to curating the impression of Sweden as a value entrepreneur in 21^st-century international relations. This begs the logical and critical question: does the communication hype match the substance of the practical implementation of Sweden’s foreign policy?

Ideological Basis of Swedish Foreign Policy

One of the central components of Swedish foreign policy is its international brand, used as a means to legitimize its actions and ideologically informed by politically central-based norms and values. There are four key profile areas in the “Brand Sweden” strategy that has been active since 2013: society, creativity, innovation, and sustainability. This is about how Sweden has officially defined Swedes, and how they desire to project Sweden and Swedishness to the world in its foreign policy as a template for others to follow. For example, “Brand Sweden” defines Swedish society in the following idealistic picture:

The Swedish social model inspires interest from around the world. The “Swedish model” is built on a core of economic growth, social responsibility and trust expressed through a universal welfare system and strong institutions. This profile area also includes values such as gender equality, respect for human rights, sustainable development, low corruption, and use of new technologies, and it can therefore be used in different ways to create trust in international contexts.

There is a palpable level of idealism and arrogance in the manner “official” Sweden views itself in relation to other countries and other peoples, which it pursues with a messianic zeal in spite of the obvious flaws and physical realm realities that paint a very different picture. The “unofficial” accounts of a system, such as the work of Masoud Kamali on the effects of neo-liberalism in and on Sweden, do not follow what it is preaching to the rest of the world.

The four profile areas noted above from the Brand Sweden campaign are in turn used to inform key Swedish foreign policy programs and approaches. This is where Sweden tries to project itself on the world stage as a progressive and forward-looking norm and value entrepreneur, and a “responsible” member of the international community.

Swedish Foreign Policy in Practice in the 21st Century

There are concrete practical and pragmatic reasons for Sweden’s efforts to cultivate a strong international brand image, which is used as the basis for realizing political objectives; encouraging scientific and cultural exchanges; attracting tourism, investment, and human talent; and promoting trade. It also serves the basis for what are considered as being negative rumors and disinformation.

Recently, institutional mechanisms have been created that are intended to uphold the official narrative in Sweden and abroad, such as the Department for Psychological Defense. These act as gatekeepers and defenders of the country’s idealized and curated image. The cracks are becoming more numerous and obvious in the utopian promises of Swedish foreign policy, and the dysfunctional reality is coming through.

Sweden intends to be an international actor serving for the good in the world. However, the country exports weapons to states involved in armed conflicts.

The notions and practices of Sweden’s humanitarian superpower brand and feminist foreign policy are coming under increasing critical scrutiny owing to obvious discrepancies and contradictions between word and practice. For example, the promise of Swedish feminist foreign policy is for Sweden to be an international actor and a force for good in the world. However, Sweden exports weapons to belligerent states involved in armed conflicts, such as the Gulf states and their war of attrition against Yemen.

The fact that Sweden is willing to arm non-democracies involved in a protracted bloody conflict such as that in Yemen and other conflicts, defies the rhetorical promises and gives a very hollow ring to the idea of Sweden as a responsible international actor bringing enlightenment, innovation, and sustainability to marginalized and dispossessed global peoples.

In contradiction to the idea of Sweden’s positive and peaceful contribution to international relations, encapsulated in such norms as neutrality or non-alignment with international brands, discrepancies are obvious. Thus, the Swedish political establishment elite is increasingly integrating into Euro-Atlantic structures and hosting NATO military exercises on Swedish soil. This suggests a general idea to build up hard power, not as an independent actor, but within the context of an existing military alliance.

Perhaps one of the major reasons for the failure of Sweden’s ideologically informed foreign policy is that this is better suited to a Western-centric global order, where the United States is the unipolar hegemonic power. In the global information and cognitive realm where liberalism was the ideological lens, the Swedish approach made sense. This is no longer the case as a non-Western-centric and multipolar order is gradually gaining power and influence, where pragmatic and non-ideological approaches and styles of communication are more effective.

Sweden is not detached from the mainstream, but rather is integrated into the global mainstream and the liberal politics establishment. It rarely ventures too far from the strategic priorities of mainstream liberal politics, and, on occasion, can engage with some leeway in foreign politics of lesser importance. In spite of all of the talk and rhetoric, Sweden does not follow an independent and innovative path of foreign policy – it follows the lead of such institutions as the European Union and the United Nations. At this point in time, the distinction between the promises of the ideological façade and the resulting dysfunctional reality cannot be more obvious.

With hundreds of thousands of refugees trying to enter Europe since 2015, a common European Union policy on refugees has become an undeniable necessity. However, the EU has failed in dealing with the refugee crisis particularly in terms of carrying the burden equally among all member states. The crisis continues to this day and is dividing Europe above all other issues.

As no solution has been found by the EU countries, the crisis leaves thousands of refugees trapped at borders. The most recent example is the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe at the border between Belarus and Poland, where thousands of refugees are waiting to cross into Europe.

In recent years, it has become more and more difficult to enter Europe through Italy and Greece, and refugees have been searching for alternative routes into Europe. Poland, a member of the European Union, has become the new doorway to the EU, a route to build a better future.

Refugees are using this comparatively new migration route by way of Belarus. Refugees sell all their property in their home countries in order to afford the journey expenses to the Belarus border, while others are allegedly encouraged by the government of Belarus and given tourist visas and plane tickets to Minsk. As a result, in the last few months, nearly 2,000 refugees, mostly from Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan, have been trapped between Belarus and Poland.

Desperate refugees have tried to breach the Polish border with Belarus, and Polish troops have used water cannons and tear gas to stop them. Meanwhile, Poland has significantly increased its border security. Even though some managed to make it into Europe, most refugees tried to survive in these dire conditions until November 17, 2021, when they were moved into a refugee camp provided by the Belarusian government at the Kuznica-Bruzgi border crossing, only a kilometer from Poland.

The conditions in the shelters are very harsh with limited access to water, food, and medicine. The weather is freezing: below -10 degrees Celsius. There is no social distancing in light of the COVID19 pandemic and people claim to get one meal a day. Toilets and showers are housed separately from the shelters, and around 1,200 refugees live and sleep on blankets. Some have even lost their lives in these freezing conditions. At the same time, since Poland has strengthened its border fence, it seems nearly impossible to enter Europe.

Yet another political game is being played between Russia and the EU via Belarus. While Russia supports Belarus in the migrant crisis, it denies the involvement of Belarus in the migration cirsis and blames European countries for imposing sanctions on Belarus.

Even though by inviting migrants to enter the EU, Belarus is using them as a political tool, these desperate people flee their countries not because of Lukashenko’s invitation but because they have no other option. If they did not flee to Belarus, they would flee somewhere else. Rather than focusing on the humanitarian crises and on possible solutions, countries are blaming one another for political gains while the EU continues not to accept migrants.

At this very moment, there is a humanitarian catastrophe unfolding at the EU border and a critical question remains unanswered: what is going to happen to the migrants on the Belarus and Poland border? What will happen to them if they refuse to return to their home countries?

The fabric of Italian politics has changed since February 2021. With the electoral triumph of Lega and Fratelli d’Italia, two far-right parties are taking the lead. Lega sits at the table of Mario Draghi’s government while Fratelli d’Italia takes a front-row seat in the opposition. At the same time, they use increased immigration to fuel the political debate in Italy.

Immigration in Italy over the years

Traditionally, migration in Italy consisted of Italians moving from the south to the north in search of better jobs and living conditions. However, this flow started to wind down in the 1970s. In its place, immigration from outside Italy started to increase in the 1980s and became noticeable in the 1990s with the enactment of the Martelli law (Law No. 39 of February 28, 1990). This law acknowledges Italy’s new “country of immigration” status. Since then, immigration increased further, and anti-immigration sentiments continued to proliferate.

“Needed but not welcome”

According to Maurizio Ambrosini, professor of sociology of migration at the University of Milan, the integration of immigrants in Italy is determined by the gap between the economic and the political-cultural paradigms. In Italian society, immigrants are “wanted but not welcome.” Economically, many regions welcome immigrants as a labor supply from which to draw.

Yet, Ambrosini adds, paradoxically, local and regional governmental institutions take measures, referred to as “local exclusion policies,” that intend to suppress migrants. These policies include cultural exclusion, such as banning the opportunity of mosques for Muslims; security exclusion, referring to local measures against irregular immigration; and economic exclusion, limiting the opening of economic activities run by immigrants (for example, running a kebab shop).

Although some of these policies have been defied by the National Office against Racial Discrimination, the situation remains essentially unchanged. Today, the far right in Italy keeps targeting immigrants and their rights while aiming to obscure them, and launching threats against them.

The 2015 “refugee crisis” and the rise of Lega and Fratelli d’Italia

Lega has been an outspoken anti-immigrant party since 1991. Initially, it held a strong stance against southern Italians. However, with immigration ramping up since the “refugee crisis”, the party drastically radicalized its political views on asylum seekers from the Middle East and North Africa. The far-right parties have used the increased migratory flows to shape their political agendas, blaming immigrants for all problems the country has had to cope with.

Since the 2019 European parliamentary elections, the support for Fratelli d’Italia has been growing at a regular pace. It gained popularity and support by pressing the European Union to leave the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, and favoring a naval blockade on North Africa to stop “illegal” immigration. Furthermore, Meloni does not want to grant Italian citizenship to children born in Italy to refugees and is an extreme advocate of Italy’s Christianity against “Islamization.” In her eyes, an ideal immigration system favors immigrants with a Christian background because they “integrate better.”

Salvini’s and Meloni’s discourse is effective. In 2019, the Pew Research Center noted that 55% of Italians had negative views towards Muslims.

And Meloni’s discourse expands internationally.

The relationship with like-minded parties across Europe is not only changing the fabric of Italian politics, but also of European politics.

In September 2020, Giorgia Meloni received a letter of endorsement from Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. The letter stated that “Italy needs a solid center-right that protects our Italian friends from the wave of immigration, that preserves the values of the traditional family and Christian culture and that helps to avoid economic collapse.” Then, in July 2021, Fratelli d’Italia and other Eurosceptic political parties united in the European Conservatives and Reformists Party (ECR Party), and signed a declaration to protest against the EU’s political position on migration. Poland’s governing Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS), France’s Rassemblement National, Austria’s Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPO), Spain’s VOX, and Italy’s Lega were among some of the other parties to sign.

In this declaration, parties from different EU countries say that their alliance is “a tool of radical forces” trying to develop a European superstate based on traditional family values against mass immigration,” adding:

“We reaffirm our belief that the family is the bedrock of our nations. When Europe faces a serious demographic crisis with low birth rates and an aging population, developing family-friendly policies should be the response, not mass immigration. We are convinced that the sovereigns in Europe are and will remain the nations and the peoples of Europe.”

The message of this declaration, namely that immigrants are to blame for all that is wrong in Italy, speaks to a growing number of voters and puts the wind in the sails of the far right in the country. The relationship with like-minded parties across Europe is not only changing the fabric of Italian politics, but also of European politics. Let us hope that their moderate counterparts can change their course to safeguard European values around solidarity, human rights, and human dignity.

Life is in a constant state of flux, and the world’s climate has been changing accordingly ever since the earth came into existence. Research findings in recent decades have provided evidence that man-made emissions resulting from rapid industrialization can influence the pace of this change. In the worst case, this contributes to man’s own detriment and that of ecosystems.

For this reason, countries around the world have agreed on the goal of reducing their greenhouse gas emissions through proactive measures in an attempt to limit global warming. The ways to achieve this vary around the world, depending on the structure of countries, their economies, their energy landscapes, and the importance of environmental issues in the public consciousness.

Climate change and related protection and adaptation measures are complex issues that have global significance but also require concrete local action.

For Western Europe, however, the climate debate seems to be more than a mere question of technology, efficiency and a cost/benefit ratio. The more secularized the society in a country is, and the less traditional values play a role in shaping life there, the more the issue of climate change is being stylized as a central question of human existence.

Nowhere else in the world is the public debate about climate change as much dominated by alarmism and apocalyptic thinking as it is there. It is also hardly surprising that the “school strike” movement is most strongly associated with countries characterized by a completely secularized Protestantism. “Fridays for Future” was founded in Sweden, and the movement experienced its greatest popularity in Germany.

Today, there is even talk of climate change as the “last great narrative of the West.”

The occurrence that traditional religions would give way to secular substitute religions in “enlightened” Europe is nothing new. Soon after the French Revolution, the writings of Robert Malthus, Charles Darwin, Karl Marx or Arthur de Gobineau passed the justification for intensified European colonialism and inspired ideologies such as Communism or National Socialism. Today, there is even talk of climate change as the “last great narrative of the West.”

In contrast, for millions of African children, working on toxic waste dumps or in uranium mines is part of their everyday lives, even though they would rather go to school and attend classes there.

Ideological and dogmatic climate policies in Western Europe create enormous potential for conflict.

It is not only on a global scale, where some critics accuse rich nations of denying poorer ones the opportunity for economic advancement through rigid climate protection regulations, that the climate debate reveals different perceptions.

Domestically, too, ideological and dogmatic climate policies in Western European countries create enormous potential for conflict. German government policies seek to abolish nuclear power, end coal mining, eliminate the internal combustion engine, and hope that by a certain point, high subsidies for green energy will deliver viable innovations.

To date, however, this approach has mainly resulted in Germany’s dependence on foreign energy supplies – and a world-leading position in electricity prices. It is obvious that this affects doctors’ daughters from Blankenese less than the farmer’s son from Lower Bavaria, but also the immigrant family of six from Duisburg-Marxloh.

Proponents of an even more aggressive climate policy, such as the German Green Party, promise to compensate those affected by the foreseeable explosion in electricity prices for the additional costs. An “energy allowance” is even intended to ensure that particularly efficient families end up better off than before. However, many remain skeptical about whether the money will actually reach those who need it. Moreover, politically distorted market prices cannot be enforced in the long run by subsidies against the law of supply and demand.

But an ideological approach to climate change also creates the risk of escalating social conflicts in other respects. Planned economies and redistribution, which would never have taken place in this form in Western Europe before, will one day reach their limits. At that moment, however, distributional struggles are pre-programmed that could benefit racist forces.

Already now, in some parties of the radical right in Western Europe, such as the German AfD, a tendency toward a racist charge of the climate debate can be noticed. In their circles, for example, there are increasing calls to abandon the previous position of climate skepticism and to acknowledge man-made climate change. This should have the consequence of making a rigid policy of birth control in African and Muslim countries a condition for further development aid. Some far-right politicians are already calling for a global one-child policy along the lines of China.

In the end, a social credit system modeled on the Beijing dictatorship could also be up for debate in domestic politics. In Bulgaria, the far-right IMRO party openly advocates paying benefits for women of the Roma ethnic group that undergo a sterilization. In several European countries, such as Sweden or Norway, forced sterilization of Roma women was a widely accepted practice until the 1970s.

In this way, the climate debate could also become a gateway for a return of racist practices of this kind in Western Europe. Religious upbringing, early pregnancies, or a larger amount of children could become a pretext for state authorities to harass families or remove children from immigrant home – because of their lifestyle allegedly causing “climate hazard”. For the time being, all this remains mostly a matter of speculation. However, European history teaches that it would not be the first time that a delusional and ideological policy would take on manifestations that are extremist and inhumane.

In an annual UN-sponsored report, Denmark is named the “Happiest Country in the World” for a fourth year in a row. Since the country does not have any mountains, it is known around the world for its bike culture. Moreover, this beautiful country has 444 islands and since only 76 of them are inhabited, the Danes have lots of opportunities to go on island-hopping.

Another fun fact about Denmark is the so-called Janteloven, also known as the “Law of Jante,” which the Danish-Norwegian writer Aksel Sandemose described as the Scandinavian mentality whereby “no one is better than the other, everyone is accepted and equal.”

Yet, nothing could be further from the truth. As it turns out this unofficial Danish law is forgotten or no longer implemented in 2021 given that Denmark is not welcoming or accepting any refugees or asylum seekers. While no other European country has made a similar decision, the Danish authorities have withdrawn the asylum status of dozens of refugees from Syria.

In the same annual UN report, authors claimed that the unhappiest country in the world is Afghanistan, followed by Rwanda. Ironically, Rwanda is the country to which Denmark is aiming to send its Syrian refugees.

Recently, two Danish ministers, Minister for Development, Cooperation  and Minister for Nordic Cooperation. Flemming Møller Mortensen and Minister for Immigration and Integration Mattias Tesfaye visited Rwanda without informing the Danish media, and both refused to comment on the purpose and details of the visit or the agreement signed with the Rwandan authorities. The agreement was signed during the 4-day visit by the Danish delegation.

Although, at first, the ministers’ visit was not publicized in Danish media, the Foreign Ministry of Rwanda published the developments concerning the meeting between the two countries. According to DR (Denmark’s Radio – Danish Broadcasting Corporation), the Danish foreign minister confirmed the parties agreed on working more closely on asylum and migration.

In addition, DR’s Africa correspondent Søren Bendixen, stated, “The two Danish ministers refuse to speak to the Danish press. We can, therefore, not get confirmation that the two sides have discussed – or agreed – that Rwanda will in the future accept some of Denmark’s asylum seekers.”

Since the ministers refused to speak, it was first uncertain what the countries agreed upon. However, more than a week later, on May 5, 2021, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark launched the two agreements, which took the form of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).

Although this MoU is a non-binding agreement, and thus gives no rise to legal obligation on the part of any party, it aims to create a mechanism of bilateral cooperation on asylum and migration issues between the two states and under current international standards. According to the articles of the agreements, Denmark’s intentions remain unclear; however, if Rwanda accepts Denmark’s asylum seekers in the future, this is worrisome.

Rwanda is already hosting more than 170,000 refugees according to a UNHCR report and a number of refugees and asylum seekers have already been evacuated from Libya to Rawanda. Only two years ago, the Rwandan police killed 11 refugees because of protests against the reduction in food aid in refugee camps. This renders the country unsafe for refugees.

This is not the first time that Denmark makes such decisions regarding its refugee policy. As the first European nation to do so, the country earlier came under criticism for telling refugees to return to Syria. The Danish government even offered money to the refugees to return to their war-torn homeland.

In an article, Michala Clante Bendixen, chair of the Danish organization Refugees Welcome and country coordinator for the European Commission’s European Web Site on Integration, wrote, “Denmark which was once renowned as a liberal, tolerant, open-minded society with respect for human rights and a strong and humane welfare state, now became the first country in Europe to revoke residence permits for Syrian refugees.”

According to statistics by Amnesty International, approximately 900 people from Damascus were granted a temporary status in Denmark while the Danish authorities revoked the permits of 380 Syrians.

However, fortunately, there is still a silver lining: according to Bendixen, it is not possible to send the refugees to Syria anytime soon since Denmark won’t negotiate with Syria’s president Bashar al-Assad as the countries broke their diplomatic ties. This suggests that the refugees will remain in Danish refugee camps or other European countries while awaiting their deportation.

According to death toll rates, the Syrian civil war has caused the death of almost 400,000 people while 5.5 million people have been displaced – a very small number of them end up in Western Europe, and eventually an even smaller number in Denmark.

According to statistics by Amnesty International, approximately 900 people from Damascus were granted a temporary status in Denmark while the Danish authorities revoked the permits of 380 Syrians. Those sent back to refugee camps or so-called return centers are not able to work, study, or apply for any benefits accessible to Danes. Since the departure of refugees is only possible on a voluntary basis, Denmark is aiming to pressurize the refugees to self-deport.

Denmark today is a country where there is a burqa ban for Muslim women in public; whose politicians commit to a “zero asylum seeker goal”; where Muslims are believed to be disrupting social cohesion; and where an anti-ghetto policy, set under the motto “No Ghettos in 2030,” aims to combat and gentrify Muslim neighborhoods. Moreover, Denmark’s controversial plan to get rid of immigrant neighborhoods affects many citizens with non-Western backgrounds who live or own a house in these neighborhoods.

Some of the residents of these neighborhoods were only allowed two-year contracts since the government is planning to abolish nearly 40 percent of the “ghetto” area. The never-ending political and social debates surrounding Muslims makes many of these citizens feel that they don’t belong to Danish society.

Another remarkable event in the realm of Danish politics is the incident of the former Danish immigration minister Inger Støjberg who misled the parliament and is now facing impeachment for illegally ordering the separation of underage couples seeking asylum. The ex-minister said at the time that the measure was necessary to save child brides, but the rigid way she decided this left dozens of young couples who applied for asylum together separated from each other without being able to do anything to prevent it.

Even if they were expecting a child, had children, or screamed from the rooftops that their love and intentions were real and genuine, no underage asylum seeker could be placed in the same asylum seekers center as their spouse or partner. Not only were new asylum seekers separated, but also people who had already been in an asylum seeker center for a long time were treated in the same way.

It is hard to guess from its current course of action, but Denmark at the moment is governed by a left-wing coalition. The Social Democrats are adopting a far-right immigration agenda and raising questions that seem hard to understand. This makes one worry about the future of refugees and Muslims in Denmark, or more precisely, if they even will have a future at all in the country since all of Denmark’s official policies target minimizing the presence of Muslims, immigrants, and refugees in the country.

When the video of a Minneapolis policeman pressing his knee on the neck of George Floyd who was lying on the ground without any resistance went viral on social media, “Black Lives Matter” protests erupted and spread across the world. Tens of thousands of protesters, in and outside the United States, from Amsterdam to Palestine and Tokyo took to the streets to show solidarity with the movement and called for justice for all victims of discrimination. Out of love for their fellow human beings, people spoke out.

During the past weeks, Palestinians have been protesting against the forced displacement of residents in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in Jerusalem, followed by an Israeli court order to the residents, enforcing them to reach an agreement with the settlers who claim that these houses belong to them. In the meantime, and very recently, Said Odeh, a 16-year-old boy from a village south of the occupied West Bank was shot twice in the back and killed by Israeli forces. Other photos on social media of an incident with an Israeli soldier pressing his knee on the neck of Omar Alkhatib emerged earlier this week.

The international community, however, seems uninterested in the human rights violations happening just before our eyes. What, then, made the international community stand up for George Floyd, but couldn’t move people to stand up for Said Odeh or Omar Alkharab? How is it possible that the life of a white man could be more precious than the life of a black man, and the life of a black man could be more precious than that of a Palestinian?

Why can’t human rights activists, heads of states, and others raise their voice against the evident human rights violations? Why could Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, for example, take the knee during a Black Lives Matter demonstration in Ottawa but not stand up for a single Palestinian life? Don’t their lives matter?

It seems, again, for the umpteenth time, most Arab countries prioritize close ties with the United States and Israel over speaking up against the apartheid state of Israel.

Earlier this year, the Palestinian Foreign Ministry argued that the continuing violations of the Israeli occupation are a blow to human rights and warned that the silence can be interpreted as “compliance with or fear of the occupying power.”

People from different corners of the world don’t know where to start. Should they be surprised by the deafening silence in the West, the lack of solidarity and guilty conscience of the leaders of the Arab Gulf, or the disturbing silence of the Asian and North African countries? It seems, again, for the umpteenth time, most Arab countries prioritize close ties with the United States and Israel over speaking up against the apartheid state of Israel and its ongoing violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.

Moreover, what about the deafening silence of feminists? Where is their solidarity with Palestinian women? Terry Reintke, a German politician and member of the European Parliament, lashed out as a “brave” and “powerful” woman against Turkey’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention and spoke about the hundreds of women who are killed every year in the country. Where is Reintke when Palestinian women and children are being killed by Israeli soldiers? Don’t their lives matter?

Old media, old bias 

It is also striking that Western media outlets do not reflect the reality of what is happening in East Jerusalem. Recent developments in the region were referred to as “clashes between Israel and Palestine”, “chaos”, “scuffles”, “both sides”, and “war”. The terminology of these headlines manipulate the actual situation and give a wrong perspective on what is really happening.

Thanks to technology, and especially social media, people all over the world are able to follow the violence of the Israeli occupation troops against the Palestinians. However, Western media outlets still attempt to present the Palestinians as perpetrators. When Israeli troops stormed Al-Aqsa Mosque during prayer, the BBC stated that the protestors “hurled stones at the police” and referred to the attacks as “clashes” between the two sides.

Just when one might think it can’t get any worse, the Belgian public television VRT NWS: nieuws reported that “Israeli police was attacked with projectiles.”

The media in other European countries was not much different. The Dutch public television NOS claimed that there have been “fierce clashes between Palestinians and the Israeli police which resulted in more than 200 injuries, mostly on the Palestinian side.” Meanwhile at least 395 Palestinians have been injured and killed, as of Monday night, according to the Palestine Red Crescent.

According to a statement by UNICEF, 37 Palestinian children were injured and eight of them were arrested. Meanwhile, 13 Palestinians suffered injuries resulting in the loss of their vision. In the Gaza Strip, 21 Palestinians were killed by Israeli strikes in one day, nine of whom were children.

Western media outlets, which constantly self-advertise their objective reporting, are neither unbiased nor objective. People across the world have been  sharing their frustrations on social media, asking politicians, prime ministers, journalists, and human rights defenders to speak up and to tell the truth about what is happening in Jerusalem. And this time their voices are being heard.

On 15th April 2021, the United States expelled 10 Russian diplomats over accusations of Russia meddling into the U.S. 2020 Presidential elections and the Solarwinds hack. Russia responded by declaring 10 U.S. diplomat’s persona non-grata on the same day. This interaction came just days after Biden’s proposal for a bilateral summit, signaling that beyond bilateral tensions, domestic political contexts play a role in the latest confrontational stance from Washington.

Public disclosure of expulsions is not required, implying that highly publicized announcements of such expulsions might have domestic value. While some uses of this tool are purely reactionary, more strategic examples of diplomatic expulsion can be traced to broader policy frameworks.

To maintain domestic support in Russia, Putin seems to utilize diplomatic expulsions to contest with enemies or spread anti-West rhetoric to Russians. Russia’s expulsion of diplomats from three EU countries as well as Ukraine comes amid an ongoing regional conflict. Domestic economic challenges and political tensions related to the inhumane treatment of Alexei Nalvany currently plague the Russian federation yet, Vladimir Putin doubled down in his latest state of the Union address on April 21, 2021.

He accused the U.S. and the West of bullying Russia, insisting that Russia has shown ‘restraint.’ Facing several domestic challenges, including economic and social challenges caused by COVID19, ‘sagging political ratings’ and parliamentary elections five months away, tit-for-tat expulsions vis-a-vis the U.S. and the West have domestic value to Putin.

Putin’s U.S. counterpart, Joseph Biden, will hope to reap political gains, both domestically and internationally, for adopting strong anti-Russia foreign policies. The Biden administration is committed to fulfilling campaign promises made to the American public, which includes punishing Russia for election interference and the SolarWinds Cyber-attack. His predecessor Trump avoided criticizing Russia’s action against the United States and praised Putin repeatedly, an action which contributed to his failed reelection bid alongside inability to handle the pandemic and civil rights protests.

A recent Gallup poll showed that 41% of Americans surveyed had unfavorable opinions toward Russia and 23% consider Russia one of the U.S.’s greatest enemies, second only to China.

The Majority of Americans believe Russia’s malignant actions contribute to domestic instability. A recent Gallup poll showed that 41% of Americans surveyed had unfavorable opinions toward Russia and 23% consider Russia one of the U.S.’s greatest enemies, second only to China. Given the crucial role public opinion plays in domestic politics in the United States, it is no surprise that President Biden has taken a strong stance against Russia, using economic sanctions and diplomatic expulsions to do so.

The Biden administration’s foreign policy approach to Russia is similar to Ronald Reagan’s Cold War approach to the Soviet Union. Both used diplomatic expulsions as part of a broader strategic framework to engage Russia. As Daniel Fried notes, the Reagan administration adopted a two-way approach in its foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. On one hand, he adopted aggressive policies including diplomatic expulsions, economic sanctions, support of Poland’s solidarity movements and arming of anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan.

Yet the Reagan administration also aimed to cooperate with the Soviet Union on issues of arms control and areas of cooperation in the Middle East. The Biden administration seems to be adopting the same two-fold strategy. Reported by New York Times, Washington’s recent economic sanctions and diplomatic expulsions to Moscow were followed by “a proposal for a summit at which the United States and Russia could shift to a more productive partnership on issues of common concern.”

What this Means for Global Politics

While diplomatic expulsions are not necessarily a new norm, expelling diplomats for solidarity’s sake is fast growing. Poland recently expelled three Russian diplomats in solidarity with the U.S. after it announced broad sanctions on Russia in retaliation for election interference. According to the reports from Reuters, Russia has responded by expelling five Polish diplomats.

In the same vein, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have joined in solidarity with the Czech Republic to expel Russian diplomats in protest over allegations that Russian intelligence was involved in the ammunition depot explosion in 2014, Reuters reported. Most prominently was the joint expulsion of Russian Diplomats by 27 countries in a show of solidarity to the United Kingdom in 2018 following the poisoning of an ex-Russian spy and his daughter in Salisbury, England.

Diplomatic expulsions are low-cost alternatives to more aggressive actions like economic sanctions and military actions. While leaders may make calculated decisions about the use of expulsions as a foreign policy tool, the logic of these decisions is not necessarily separate from domestic political contexts.

Escalations will further split countries along ideological lines similar to that of the Cold War and this has extensive consequences. Abhinav Pandya discusses some of the consequences of Diplomatic Expulsions in his piece, Demystifying Diplomatic Expulsions. He suggests that NGOs, private companies, and journalists face uphill tasks working in countries involved in Diplomatic expulsions and counter-expulsions because they are likely to be subjected to stricter surveillance.

He further highlights Scott Stewarts opinion that “Governments tend to deploy Non-Cover intelligence” or illegals after episodes of diplomatic expulsions.” According to Stewart, this is dangerous as it could further degenerate into an intelligence war or ‘spy swaps.’

In recent weeks, Tripoli has seen a steady stream of visits by European officials after the Government of National Unity (GNU) won the confidence of the Libyan parliament to lead the country to elections in late December of this year.

At a time when the new Libyan government is rejoicing in a diplomatic watershed – illustrated by the intense schedule of visits to Tripoli by foreign dignitaries – the need for EU members to boost relations with Libya is already emerging as one of the most acute foreign policy challenges. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ visit to the Libyan capital on April 6, demonstrated the difficulty of this task.

“Let those who tried to question our relations in the past stay back,” said Mitsotakis during his meeting with his Libyan counterpart, Abdel Hamid Dbeibah, who was appointed in February to head the new Government of National Unity bringing together representatives from the west and east of the country for the first time since 2014.

In 2019, Faiz al-Sarraj’s Government of National Accord (GNA), backed by Turkey, had driven General Haftar’s forces out of western Libya. To further the cooperation and in exchange for vital support for the GNA, al-Sarraj signed two memoranda of understanding, “The Security and Military Cooperation” and “Restriction of Marine Jurisdictions,”  with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Istanbul on November 28, 2019.

Mitsotakis asked Tripoli “to cancel the illegal documents presented as agreements between states when they have no legal value.” But days after his short visit, Erdoğan and Dbeibah reaffirmed their commitment to the “Restriction of Marine Jurisdictions” agreement.

This angered some of their neighbors in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as some EU members who were willing “to circumvent the agreement if it cannot be cancelled” as a European diplomat told Le Monde. Erdoğan and Dbeibah also signed numerous agreements following one-on-one and inter-delegation talks.

Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio said that Italy and the United States have “a common concern about the presence of foreign forces, both Russian and Turkish, in Libya,” meaning that there is a perception of “stronger” cooperation between the two countries on this matter.

Europe has recently shown interest in the upcoming elections in Libya.

During a meeting in Washington on Monday with his U.S. counterpart Antony Blinken, the two officials discussed the importance of the “full implementation of the ceasefire in Libya and the holding of elections [scheduled for December 24] on time.”

Europe has recently shown interest in the upcoming elections in Libya. Last month, the Libyan High National Electoral Commission held a meeting attended by foreign ministers from Italy, Germany, and France. The commission said the ministers “continued to support the commission in carrying out the elections scheduled for December 24 of this year.”

On Tuesday, French Ambassador to Libya, Béatrice Le Fraper du Hellen, signed an agreement with Gerardo Noto, the resident representative of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in Libya, by which

France pledged to contribute one million euros to support the UNDP project “Promoting Elections for the Libyan People,” bringing the total funds contributed by France to the said project to 1,850,000 euros. This is particularly interesting after France backed General Haftar with military support during his 2019 attempt to take over Tripoli.

In many ways, Libya presents unparalleled benefits to EU members and the ongoing EU diplomatic efforts are proof of Europe’s interest in the political upturn in this neighboring country after a decade of chaos.