While Turkey is focusing on the local elections that will take place on March 31, certain foreign policy developments are continuing to dominate Turkey’s agenda. Syria is still at the center of Turkey’s foreign policy agenda. However, it is best to lower the expectations for Syria particularly in the context of the U.S. withdrawal. Every player in Syria has its account, priorities and game plan. Turkey, Russia, Iran, and the U.S. are the main actors that can make an impact on the ground, but their agendas and priorities certainly differ from one another, not only towards some specific issues in Syria but also against each other. Turkey’s position is exceptional in this regard as Ankara has to deal with two major interrelated problems, simultaneously.

First and foremost, the PKK issue is still the primary concern of Turkey. Ankara was able to eliminate the PKK threat through Operation Olive Branch and Euphrates Shield in the western part of the river. However, the threat emanating from the PKK is remaining in the eastern part of the river. There is a clear strategic objective of Turkey to eliminate the PKK’s military, political, economic and even territorial power. However, the problem for Turkey is that the PKK is not only an issue between Turkey and the PKK, rather it has been gradually becoming a geopolitical antagonism between Ankara and Washington. Therefore, each time Turkey has to consider its strategy of engagement against the PKK in Syria by taking into consideration the U.S.

The problem for Turkey is that the PKK is not only an issue between Turkey and the PKK, but rather a geopolitical antagonism between Ankara and Washington.    

More than two months after the withdrawal decision, it is still unclear what kind of order will be established in the east of Euphrates after the U.S. withdrawal. There are three ways for the United States. The first one is to make a deal between Turkey and the U.S. on establishing a safe zone alongside Turkey’s Syrian border under the control of the Turkish Military Force and Turkey-backed military groups. For sure, the U.S. wants to establish a mechanism to ensure that the PYD-YPG is protected by a small international protection force by creating other safe areas where the PYD can survive. With this plan, the U.S. wants to satisfy both Turkey and the PYD at the same time. One of the primary strategic goals of the U.S. in this context is to promote a “dialogue” between Turkey and the PKK if Turkey accepts a safe zone in which the PYD will be protected, as well. However, it is well known that this offer is not accepted by Turkey. 

The second way for the U.S. is to establish an order based on SDG areas outside the safe zone. It doesn’t have to be under the name of SDG. This order consists of three pillars: political, economic and military (security). In other words, in the long term, the U.S. wants to establish a governmental structure consisting of Kurdish, Arab and other ethnic elements with a strong autonomy. The only thing that the U.S. cannot trust in the long term is the Arab community. For the U.S. it is not clear whether the Arab communities, especially the major tribal ones, will accept to share the power with PYD-YPG, as it would make them lose their geopolitical superiority over the Turkish-initiated safe zone.

The U.S.’s core objective in the negotiation process is not to withdraw from Syria. In fact, the U.S. wants to appease Turkey via the negotiation process to gain time.

The third way can be more complicated and costly for the U.S. A group from the Pentagon and State Department think that the YPG should completely eliminate Turkey’s safe zone proposal by coming to terms with the Syrian regime in one way or another. For this purpose, the U.S. is carrying out negotiations with both Russia and the Syrian regime. So, the essence of the work is that on the one hand, the United States is carrying out an intense negotiation process with Ankara while keeping in touch with all the other actors involved in the case. The fact that CENTCOM’s top official, Votel, has been communicating with Mazlum Kobani, one of Turkey’s red-listed PKK’s ground leaders, proves this point.

Of course, in such a scenario, it is quite clear that Russia constitutes the main target actor to be negotiated. However, it is hardly possible for Russia to trust a process carried out by the U.S. On the other hand, Turkey is reluctant when it comes to U.S. premises. The fact that the negotiations on the safe zone has been taking more time than wanted is putting pressure on Turkey instead of enabling the country to save time.

Conditions in Northern Syria may force Turkey to follow “first act then deal” option.

The U.S.’s core objective in the negotiation process is not to withdraw from Syria after forming a safe zone as Turkey wishes. In fact, the U.S. wants to appease Turkey via the negotiation process to gain time. In this case, Turkey needs to create its own options. Turkey may be forced to create a ground plan for itself eventually, which makes the “first act then deal” mindset one of Turkey’s policy options. Besides that, the idea of ​​including Russia in the process towards the east of the Euphrates should not be underestimated. This also seems to be related to the process in Idlib soon.

For Idlib, the formula is simple: strengthen moderate opposition, oppress and persuade HTS for a solution. At the end of the day, no other state but Turkey has serious plans for the east of the Euphrates.

These two issues are directly impacting Turkey’s policy options. How the Idlib issue is going to be resolved remains unclear despite that Turkey has gained time via the Sochi Summit. Idlib offers significant opportunities for Turkey, but also contains the risk of turning into a problem. First of all, Russia is creating pressure on Turkey through Idlib. Moscow’s “either resolve it or consent to an operation” policy has impacted Turkey’s negotiation process with the U.S. unavoidably.

In sum, Turkey can provide rapid progress in both if it can create a de facto situation both in Idlib and in the east of the Euphrates by taking more initiative and producing authentic solutions. For Idlib, the formula is actually to strengthen moderate opposition, oppress and persuade HTS for a solution process! At the end of the day, it is clear that no other state but Turkey has serious plans for the east of the Euphrates.

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced on Wednesday (December 12) that Turkey will carry out a military operation in the east of the Euphrates River in Syria in a few days. The operation will target the PYD – the PKK’s offshoot in Syria. There have been some news from the ground signaling that there is ongoing mobilization in Turkey right across the Syrian border. This is a sign showing that the operation can start anytime. Yet, some doubt about the likelihood of its occurrence given the possible American reactions.

The president’s announcement came shortly after the U.S. announced building observation posts near the Turkish border. This was felt like a slap on the face by some Turks. Yet for many, this is just a follow up to a consistent set of American policies that aim to strengthen the PYD, not only against Deash but with a broader agenda for a longer term.

The PYD under the American security umbrella has gained territory, American weaponry, American military training, and quasi-recognition by the West. In other words, the U.S. is building a state for its proxy force on the ground. The problem is, this proxy force is Turkey’s number one security threat. This is the organization that trains its armed personnel under the posters of PKK leader Ocalan. This is the organization that teaches school kids Ocalan’s ideas, which are merely about carving out territory from Turkey by the use of terror tactics.

All this time, American officials told Turkey that their support for the PYD is tactical and temporary while carving out a quasi-statehood for the PYD right across the Turkish border. This is not acceptable. No country will allow a terror organization to gain such capabilities and recognition.

The U.S. is building a state for its proxy force on the ground. The problem is, this proxy force is Turkey’s number one security threat.

American officials are still trying to convince Turkey that the PYD and the PKK are not the same, as Turkey is consistently fighting with PYD militias within its own borders, yes in Turkey. This is not just about the PYD authorities cheering up when the PKK carries out suicide attacks in Turkey. This is not just about the PYD teaching school kids the glory of killing Turks. This is literally about the PYD fighting Turkey. The PYD’s marketing face Zozan Cudi is one of many examples who were marketed to the Western media as pretty PYD girls fighting against Deash, but who happened to be killed within Turkish borders fighting against the Turkish army.

The U.S., sooner or later, has to find a way to do business in Eastern Syria without the PKK. This is hard given that the PYD/PKK left no other actor in the region to work with. But there is no alternative as Turkey will not watch the PKK build up its army in Syria only to hit Turkey harder.

After all, Turkey has no more patience as the PYD’s armed militias receive weapons and training from the U.S. and then infiltrate into Turkey to utilize such assets. There is no doubt that the American officials know what the PYD is, what it was formed for back in 2003 by the PKK, and what its priority is. Turkey will not allow a terror organization to get rooted right across its borders, even under U.S. protection.

What is next then? What is going to happen when Turkey carries out a well-deserved operation to its principal enemy? It seems like the American scenario is built on the impossibility of this option. Yet this can happen and will happen sooner or later. And when it happens, will U.S. forces fight against Turkey to back Turkey’s number one enemy? I doubt.

Right now, the best case scenario is the occurrence of Turkey’s military operation in a narrow circle such as Tel Abyad. After such a limited operation, Turkey can take a pause for the U.S. to finally see that a military conflict between the PYD and Turkey in Eastern Syria is not only possible, but also inevitable. As Turkey keeps its initial operation limited in scope, the U.S. can shift its policy to one that will not pose an existential threat to Turkey. The U.S., sooner or later, has to find a way to do business in Eastern Syria without the PKK. This is hard given that the PYD/PKK left no other actor in the region to work with. But there is no alternative as Turkey will not watch the PKK build up its army in Syria only to hit Turkey harder.

Since the beginning of this month, the U.S. has taken many positive steps toward Turkey. The first was the joint patrols with Turkey in Manbij. The U.S. also declared that Turkey would be exempt from the sanctions on Iran. The U.S., on the very same day, also lifted the sanctions against Justice Minister Abdulhamit Gul and Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu with regard to the ban on their entry to the U.S. and their possible financial affairs in the U.S. Turkey quickly responded in the same way by removing its own sanctions against the counterparts in the U.S.

A new one was added to these steps last Tuesday. On November 6, the State Department listed the PKK’s three top executives in its ‘reward for justice ’program. ‘Reward for Justice’ is a reward program developed by the U.S. Department of State for counter-terrorism. The program lists the names and information of the most wanted terrorists and promises a reward if information provided is useful for the capture of these persons. The list includes 11 categories covering rewards ranging from 250 thousand dollars up to 25 million dollars. The names of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and Daesh leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi are on the top of the list. The PKK leaders included in the list are Murat Karayilan ($5 million), Cemil Bayik ($4 million) and Duran Kalkan ($3 million). Three other familiar names are also in the list but none of them are new in the list. Musa Asoglu, Seher Demir Sen, Zerrin Sari, all from the revolutionary socialist DHKP-C organization, had already been in the category of 3 million dollars before last Tuesday.

Along with Murat Karayilan, Cemil Bayik, and Duran Kalkan, there are three other familiar names in the list of ‘Reward for Justice’ who are Musa Asoglu, Seher Demir Sen and Zerrin Sari, all from the revolutionary socialist DHKP-C organization.

One major aspect of this matter is about the significance of these positive steps, if they really are. Frankly speaking, there is not much going on here no matter how many steps the U.S. took toward Turkey. To start with, Turkey’s exemption from the Iran sanctions is not only for Turkey but also for seven other Asian countries, and is only temporary. And the main motive in this exemption is not about giving Turkey a relief but about controlling global oil prices. The removal of sanctions against two Turkish ministers is also no big deal. There was no real harm anyway, it was a sanction only on paper. The joint patrols in Manbij is good news but it came too late, much later than expected. Further, Turkey is still expecting the promises to be kept in its entirety, such as the removal of the PYD units from the city of Manbij.

The US bounty on the PKK’s top leadership is one thing. But Turkey-U.S. relations have much deeper issues to resolve ranging from the Halkbank Case to the ongoing American hospitality to coup plotter Fetullah Gulen and to the American support for the PYD.

If we go back to the bounty issue for the PKK’s top leadership, that’s another good sign, but just a sign, nothing more. It’s not as if the U.S. captured these three people and handed them to Turkey. It is still a mystery to many in Turkey whether the U.S. will use the expected information in favor of Turkey or not. Relations between Turkey and the U.S. have much deeper issues to resolve ranging from the famous Halkbank Case to the ongoing American hospitality to coup plotter Fetullah Gulen.

And perhaps at the deepest level, there lies the American support and shield for the PYD. Unless the U.S. shows a sign, a genuine sign, that it understands and respects Turkey’s concerns on these matters, other steps taken will be nothing more than noise. This should not be understood in the way that all these steps mean nothing for Turkey. They mean a lot if this is the first stage of a new path. But it does not really mean much, if at all, if this is the entire package.

Turkey’s long war against PKK terrorism is becoming increasingly decisive and effective. Just over the past week, three events took place that reflected the decisiveness and effectiveness of Turkey’s current counterterrorism strategy. The Turkish Armed Forces neutralized two senior PKK commanders in the past week and took new diplomatic steps for a decisive solution to the country’s ongoing problem. Due to the current standoff between Turkey and the U.S., these developments may not have caught much attention. Here’s what you may have missed on the PKK front:

First, Ibrahim Coban (codename Atakan Mahir, the PKK’s top commander in Turkey) was killed on 11 August in the countryside of Tunceli based on ground intelligence. The availability of ground intelligence reflects the fact that the PKK is finding it difficult to find safe corners in the rough terrain of Tunceli, which used to be a somewhat safe space for the terrorist group. Coban was responsible for a series of terror attacks in Turkey, starting from the murder of six teachers in 1994 (the PKK systematically perceive school teachers as government agents or spies and has murdered over 100 teachers so far in its terror campaign). Once Coban was located with the help of ground intelligence, he was eliminated together with four other militants in an air operation of Turkish jets.

A second big hit was the killing of Ismail Ozden (codename Mam Zeki Sengali), another senior PKK figure, who was in charge of PKK militants in Sincar, Iraq. Ozden was not only responsible for the PKK’s activities in Sincar but was also a member of the PKK’s central executive council. His truck was traced with Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on 15 August and was hit in a joint operation of Turkish UAVs and jets (you can watch the operation video here). Such an operation is not possible with enhanced military capacity alone, but also requires the inclusion of ground intelligence and diplomatic cooperation with Iraq. This brings us to the third important event that has occurred this week. Iraqi PM Haider al-Abadi visited Turkey on 14 August and met with President Erdogan. The PKK issue was on the table and the hit in Sincar on the following day shows that the Iraqi government respects Turkey’s concern for its self-defense and does not problematize sharing intelligence.

In the midst of a serious diplomatic and economic turmoil with the U.S., the series of events that have occurred this week go to reflect Turkey’s enhanced counterterrorism capacity. We can speak of two reasons for this high level of commitment and capacity to end the PKK’s separatist terrorism campaign. One is about Turkey’s motivation. Due to the fact that the PKK ended the previous ceasefire with Ankara in the summer of 2015, and further abused the ceasefire process (2013-2015) to build upon its terror wave, the Turkish government now thinks that a military solution is the only way to terminate PKK terrorism.

The second reason for this high level of commitment is not just about Turkey’s motivations, perceptions, or intentions, but about its increasing counterterrorism capacity from a military point of view. While minimizing losses, the strengthened military outposts (kalekol) and the increasing number and capabilities of Turkey’s self-produced UAVs are helping Turkey hit terrorist locations much more effectively and precisely. Hence, in a nutshell, for motivational reasons, Turkey WANTS to fight the PKK more than before and due to factors regarding capability, Turkey CAN pursue this fight much stronger than before.

Since the PKK has no safe haven in Turkey – not even a single village – Turkey’s war against separatist terrorism focuses on the PKK’s safe havens in Syria and Iraq. The group is being dismantled from areas under its control in Iraq and Syria. Afrin in Syria was a start. Turkey cleared the area from the PKK with a military incursion (for my earlier remarks on the Afrin operation, see here and here). Next in Syria is Manbij, where Turkey is currently withholding its military muscles due to the existence of U.S. troops in the area. Turkey is committed to sweep the PYD (the PKK’s Syrian branch) forces from Manbij the moment that it finds an opportunity, although this could be postponed due to the support and protection provided by the U.S. to the PKK in Syria.

If the U.S. stops supporting the PKK in Syria, Turkey will also not hesitate to end the PKK’s training camps (which not only includes military training camps but an entire schooling system based on PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan’s personality cult and teachings), arms depots, and recruitment centers in Syria. If circumstances allow, Turkey will apply the Afrin experience to Manbij and then to the east of the Euphrates, where it will eliminate the PKK’s network and enable the provision of public services, from health to education, based on its own terms and not on the PKK’s. This is the only way to stop the PKK from using local schools as terrorism factories under the disguise of PYD or SDF labels.

A parallel operation zone is Iraq, where the PKK’s headquarters are located. Turkey shows no hesitation in cleaning the country from the PKK’s safe havens. Ankara has already cleared some PKK-controlled lands across its border in Iraq, is currently digging its way towards the Qandil region, and is seeking international cooperation with Iran and Iraq in order to reach its objective (for my earlier notes on the operations in Iraq, see here and here). Hence, readers should expect further news on Turkey’s front against the PKK’s decades-long terrorism campaign.

In June, 2015, I came across two Syrians in Şanlıurfa’s Akçakale district who were contemplating the Syrian border facing Tell Abyad with hopeless eyes. A black smoke remaining from the U.S. bombardment wreathed the town, which was covered with yellow dust as far as the eye could reach. Having received a substantial amount of military aid from the U.S., the terror group PKK and its Syrian offshoot Democratic Union Party (PYD) were advancing towards Daesh deployments in Tell Abyad thanks to the generous help of the American jets. However; that war, which was almost visible to the naked eye, was not similar to the wars on the other fronts of Syria. Daesh was leaving the areas it occupied without hardly any resistance and heading towards Raqqa, the city the terror group used as its Syrian headquarters at the time. Daesh militants looked as if they were willfully handing over Tell Abyad to the PYD.

The PYD’s attempt to carry out a demographic massacre in north Syria came to light with this war. In Tell Abyad, the PKK blatantly displaced the locals from the land they had been living on for centuries, which eventually started to be vocally expressed and recorded in various international reports. However, nothing was done to stop this crime against humanity. Of course, the PKK and the PYD’s displacement policy did not begin in Tell Abyad. The organization, which started organizing and collecting a base under the name of “Apocular” in eastern and southeastern Turkey during the 1970s, initially kicked off a sweeping process of destruction against religious functionaries along with the members of various Kurdish organizations such as the Revolutionary Democratic Culture Association (DDKD), the Revolutionary Eastern Culture Clubs (DDKO), Kawa and Rizgari. Becoming the only dominant organization in the region through this method, the PKK implemented the exact same method 40 years later in Syria.

The Baath regime, which got into trouble with its armed opponents in Syria in 2011, made an agreement with the PKK leadership in Mount Qandil and assigned the security to the PKK militants in many regions, including Qamishli, Al-Hasakah, Afrin and Ayn al-Arab (Kobani). In return for this generosity of the Assad regime, the PKK took over the role of silencing the opponents of the regime in these areas. On June 27, 2013, the PKK militants launched a fusillade attack on a group of Kurdish civilians who were protesting against the regime in Amuda district. Five civilians, including a 5-year-old girl, were killed in the incident. The terror group’s attacks on dissident Kurds continued. Several leaders including Mashaal Tammo, Abdullah Bedro and Sherzad Rashid were assassinated by the PYD militants. With these methods, the PYD built an empire of fear in north Syria and consolidated its power. No one was able to raise their voice against the organization. The terror group’s next step was displacing the Kurds who were not supporting the PKK. With compulsory military service, detentions, arrests, arbitrary fines and heavy taxes, the Kurds not adhering to the PYD and the PKK were displaced. Tens of thousands of Syrians were forced to leave Afrin, Qamishli, Amuda, Ayn al-Arab and Al-Hasakah.

The legitimacy guise tailored for the PYD

After eliminating the potential problems, the PYD focused on its efforts to form a state in these areas. During the first weeks of 2014, the PKK declared three cantons in north Syria named Afrin, Kobani and Jazira. Nine months later, Daesh took action to capture Kobani. A legitimacy guise was tailored for the PYD during the Daesh-PYD war with the contributions of the international press. Daesh’s attack on Kobani became the top topic on the international agenda whereas foreign correspondents paid visits to Kobani to market the terror group. So, the PYD militants were declared “heroes who defended their people against barbaric Daesh militants.” During this period, many countries offered considerable military support to the PYD. From then on, Washington became the PYD’s boss instead of Damascus. The U.S. authorities firstly helped the establishment of an operational group named Euphrates Volcano by uniting the PYD’s armed wing People’s Protection Units (YPG) with several minor armed groups. Soon after, the group was renamed as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

After Kobani was “liberated”, many trucks carrying weapons and ammunition were sent to the SDF, in which the YPG operatives formed the backbone whilst the PKK commanded all the decision mechanisms. The aids were coordinated from a U.S. base established in Rimelan district. The YPG militants, who were endeavoring to secure a few checkpoints with ineffective weapons until that point, were being transformed into a regular army.

The next target after Kobani was Tell Abyad, which was occupied by Daesh at the time. Following a low-intensity conflict that lasted a few days, Daesh abandoned Tell Abyad. But the nightmare was not over for the locals. Having lived under the oppression of Daesh for more than two years, the locals of Tell Abyad were forced to leave their villages after the district was captured from Daesh.

On June 23, 2015, a source of mine whose family lives in Tell Abyad sent this text message to me:

“The PKK members gathered families in a school in Hammam Turkmen and threatened them saying ‘This place has become a military zone, so leave the village. If you don’t leave, we will make American jets bomb your houses by giving your coordinates as Daesh targets.’ Some families are now leaving the village out of fear.”

To research this incident, I made a few more contacts and after verifying it published the story in a national newspaper. The neighborhoods of the locals who refused to leave their homes were shelled the next day, upon which they had to be abandoned and most of the victims are currently living in refugee camps. Following this event many people brought this issue to the agenda. As someone bearing witness to this atrocity, I can safely say that the PKK/PYD and the U.S. connived on this crime against humanity in Tell Abyad. In Hammam Turkmen neighborhood, where the closest Daesh positions were 30 kilometers away at the time, 20.000 Syrian Turkmens were displaced in this manner.

The PYD has changed the demographics of Syria

Afterwards, hundreds of thousands of Syrians were forcibly displaced from the towns of Manbij, Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, which were occupied by the PKK/PYD with the support of U.S. air forces. All of this happened before the eyes of the U.S. The terror group, seeking to consolidate its territorial power in Syria, used many methods to change the demographic structure of the country. Hundreds of Arabs were imprisoned and tortured after being accused of Daesh membership. Those who raised livestock had their cattle seized. Those who owned farmlands had their farms burned. People who did not want to leave had their children forcibly conscripted and sent to the front lines. Most of the people who lived in these areas had to leave to escape such treatment.

The city of Tell Rifaat, belonging to the district of Azaz just south of the Turkish border, is one of the places where PYD/PKK’s strategy of forced displacement has been employed to its greatest extent. PYD/PKK surrounded Tell Rifaat, which lies along the Azaz-Aleppo road, in 2016 and subsequently started shelling civilian settlements in the region. The rebels in Tell Rifaat, seeing no other way out of this situation, had to hand over the region to the PYD to save the lives of the civilians living there. However, despite being spared death, they were not spared exile. The PYD forced 250.000 civilians to leave this region by employing the methods described. Tell Rifaat, once one of the largest settlements in the area, is now a ghost town.

The PKK turned the Daesh attack on Iraq/Sinjar, just like the one on Kobani, into propaganda, and used it to dominate the Yazidi population. The PYD began conscripting Yazidis once the attack was repelled even though during the Daesh attack on Sinjar it did not take a position that would change the course of the battle. The PKK, which had previously created a division called YPJ (Yekineyen Parastina Jin/Women’s Defense Units), created a division consisting solely of Yazidis called YPŞ (Yekineyen Parastina Şengal/Sinjar Resistance Units). Many young Yazidis were transported to Syria over the Rabia border crossing and given mandatory military training by the PKK in the organization’s military camp in Qamishli. Syrian Yazidis were also brought to this camp. After receiving a short military training, some Iraqi Yazidis were sent back to Sinjar while others were sent to Syrian front-lines.

Undoubtedly, the crimes and the demographic massacre of the PKK and the PYD are not limited by these actions. Some local councils founded by Syrian rebels are keeping records of some of the exiled Syrians. But these records are very limited. No credible number exists on how many people have been forcibly displaced from their homes so far. According to current records, the number of Syrians exiled from towns such as Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, Qamishli, Al-Darbasiyah, Al-Shaddadah, Rmelan, Al-Qahtaniyah, Al-Hasakah, Tell Brak and Tabqa exceeds two million. Not only Arabs but also Turkmens, Kurds and Assyrians have suffered from these policies. The displaced people, now living in very hard conditions, are dreaming of the day they will return to their homes.

Aiming to eliminate terrorist elements of PKK/YPG, The Operation Olive Branch (OOB) launched by Turkey on January 20 revealed how local, regional and international actors in the Syrian crisis are intertwined. Both Syrian “revisionist actors” and regional actors, trying to maintain or maximize their gains along with minimizing damage, openly voiced their discomfort regarding Turkey’s novel “boots on the ground” strategy, which priorities Turkey’s military power as a foreign policy tool. More than just voicing, they have also taken certain steps seeking to obstruct Turkey’s military depth in Afrin. Iranian-led Shiite militia in support of Assad moving to Afrin to fight against Turkey, together with PKK/YPG last month, was one of the most significant indicators of the aforementioned situation. Meanwhile, despite having different motives, we have seen both Russia and the U.S. become agitated because of the Afrin operation.

Even though it is wary about Turkey’s “boots on the ground” strategy, Moscow calculates that this strategy will escalate the tensions between Ankara and Washington and force Turkey to become closer with Russia; therefore, their approach towards Turkey remains the same. Meanwhile, Washington doesn’t want to strengthen Russia’s hand and is aware that disregarding threats to Ankara’s very existence may deteriorate Turkish-American relations further, evolving into something more than a conjunctural crisis. In this respect, the recent diplomatic traffic between Turkey and the U.S. indicates that the U.S. policymakers have become “more concerned” about Turkey’s assertiveness in Syria and that the U.S. desires to reconcile with Turkey rather than exacerbate the schism between the two NATO partners.

The “boots on the ground” strategy which could be defined as eliminating threats before they reach the country’s borders is clearly yielding positive results for Turkey’s national security. The picture is actually clear; taking the Operation Euphrates Shield and outposts being established in Idlib into consideration, Ankara will achieve a military and political depth in Syria that includes territories northwest of the Euphrates with OOB; a depth that Turkey won’t relinquish in the near future. With the possible addition of Manbij to the aforementioned territories as a result of negotiations with the U.S., Turkey might secure targets in its “game plan” more easily in the short-term.

Turkey’s Game Plan in Afrin

Turkey’s Afrin operation is the continuation of the new national security strategy that was shaped more clearly after the July 15 coup attempt. According to this strategy, Turkey could only contain threats emerging in Syria and Iraq, as a result of the power vacuum, with efficient deployment of military assets. In this respect, the strategy foresees the utilization of military power in the field and in cross-border operations instead of reserving it.

Considering the larger region which includes Syria and Iraq along with protruding military power and the said region’s political and geopolitical realities, the following are Ankara’s aims for the future:

• Minimizing the PKK existence on both Syrian and Iraqi borders
• Consolidating diplomacy in order to assure Syria’s territorial integrity
• Consolidating diplomatic compromise with Russia and Iran achieved in Astana and Sochi
• Weakening the U.S.’ political and military ties with PKK/YPG

In order to simultaneously achieve the aforementioned targets, Turkey has to overcome certain trials. Ankara’s security strategy mostly focuses on the minimization of the PKK threat. However, the efficient deployment of military power won’t suffice on its own; the complex network of regional and international relations has to be managed simultaneously.

First of all, eliminating the cross-border threat of the PKK with military force requires a meticulous balance between the seemingly conflicting interests of Russia and the U.S. Every improvement in Turkish-Russian relations in regards to PKK/YPG and Syria has an impact on Turkish-American relations; therefore, the relations between Turkey and Russia is at the center of it all. On the other hand, consolidation of diplomacy and the maintenance of the reconciliation between Turkey, Russia and Iran are necessity for preserving Syria’s territorial integrity. Inclusion of Washington to this process might bring balance between Moscow-Regime-Tehran, consolidate the diplomatic initiative and work in favor of Turkey. It shouldn’t be forgotten that certain regional actors like Israel and Iran might attempt to undermine this diplomatic process. Tehran’s approach to Turkey could be clearly understood from Iran’s deployment of militia and armed forces of the Syrian regime which forced Russia to become the intermediary between PKK/YPG and the Syrian regime in Afrin. Iran could be asserted as the leading “most unreliable” actor that could prevent Turkey from achieving its aforementioned goals.

Syria’s territorial integrity isn’t all about the dynamics between Turkey and PKK/YPG. In other words, Turkey may have thwarted PKK/YPG from controlling a united swath of land with Operation Euphrates Shield and OOB; however, it isn’t possible to foresee how the diplomatic process along with the preparation of a new constitution will shape Syria, especially east of the Euphrates. This is important as it is a reminder that the Syrian conflict isn’t only about the power struggle between the regime and the opposition.

A part of Turkey’s game plan, consolidation of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Ankara is relatively easy. Russia desires the schism between Turkey and the U.S. to widen and deepen. Meanwhile, we know that Russia needs Turkey in resolving the Syrian crisis and this is the main reason for Russia giving the green light to Turkey’s Afrin operation. Moscow knows that Turkey’s presence on the field tests the relations between the U.S. and PKK/YPG, forcing the U.S. to act more carefully. On the other hand, Moscow also believes that counterbalancing Iran’s field advantage and prominent influence over the regime with Turkey is useful. Besides the Syrian crisis the tensions between Turkey and NATO, along with the EU, makes Russia’s investment in Turkey even more worthwhile. Therefore, the consolidation of relations between Ankara and Moscow has become one of the pillars of security policies. Yet, symmetricity of this consolidation is crucial.

Turkey-U.S. Relations

The aim to weaken the U.S.’ relations with PKK/YPG and reinforcing cooperation rather than conflicts have become a crystallized subject in terms of the ever-complicating network of regional and international relations. In order to dismiss the PKK as an issue between Turkey and the U.S., territories under the control of the terrorist organization on both banks of Euphrates has to diminish, its armed capacity has to be minimized and its partnership with the U.S. should end. Even though the PKK won’t be able to hold on to the west side of the Euphrates because of OOB, Iran’s and the Syrian regime’s certain initiatives on the field might make it harder for Turkey to completely control Afrin.

Yet, Turkey needs to “reconcile” and “find a midway” with the U.S. to realize the remaining two aims. Minimizing PKK/YPG activities to the east of the Euphrates through military intervention is among the options. However, realization of this intervention without any kind of reconciliation with the U.S. might escalate the crisis in Turkish-American relations. There is hope for a settlement between Turkey and the U.S. after the former U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson’s visit to Ankara. If the U.S. leaves Manbij to the Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army, Ankara might revise the options regarding the east of the Euphrates. This obviously doesn’t mean Turkey will consent to the PKK existence in the said region.

The other options include reinforcing the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which consists mostly of PKK/YPG militants with Arabs and Kurds that aren’t affiliated with the terrorist organization, thus diluting the existence of terrorist elements, and recalling all the heavy weaponry provided to the YPG after the military phase against Daesh is over. A concrete step has to be yet taken to realize these options. Meanwhile, if Washington seeks a “local power” to limit Iranian influence over Syria in a post-Daesh setting, it has to be aware of the issues that might emerge as a result of building this strategy on the YPG. Therefore, Turkey is still one of the leading actors that could prevent revitalization of Daesh and aide the dismantling of Iran’s influence in Syria.

It’s definite that Turkey won’t back down and will force the U.S. to sever its ties with PKK/YPG. At this point, Turkey has to be militarily active on the field; Turkey’s military activities might persuade the U.S. to agree with Turkey’s demands.

Secondly, the necessity to implement a strategy that would thwart both Russia and Iran’s attempts to undermine Turkey’s fight against PKK in Syria. Iran is the most “anti-Turkey” country involved in the Syrian crisis. While Moscow handles issues in a more pragmatic way, Tehran always sees events through an ideological lens; the Shiite militia’s latest performance in Afrin proves this. It should be remembered that “military activism” and deterrence will be key in counterbalancing Iran.

Since Turkey implemented “boots on the ground” strategy in northern Syria, the Syrian crisis has become more complicated. Only those who are determined will land on both feet at the end of this crisis.

Evidence of the terrorist YPG/PKK using young children uncovered in the Turkish-led operation in Syria’s Afrin region confirms what many international rights watchdogs already reported: the terrorist recruitment of minors.

The memory cards of cameras seized during the ongoing Operation Olive Branch in Syria’s Afrin region, launched on Jan. 20 against YPG/PKK-Daesh terrorists, show children — age 13-17 — bearing arms, training with weapons, and living in poor conditions in the mountains.

In a December 2016 report Iraq: Armed Groups Using Child Soldiers, Human Rights Watch documented 29 cases in northern Iraq of children recruited by armed groups affiliated to the terrorist PKK.

According to the report, children under age 15 took part in fighting, staffed checkpoints, and cleaned and prepared weapons.

The same PKK activity was also documented in a November 2013 United Nations report called Children and Armed Conflict.

The report said Kurdish armed groups recruited boys and girls age 14-17 in Syria’s Hasakah region.

The 2014 U.S. State Department Human Rights Report also said the terrorist PKK — the YPG/PKK’s parent group — regularly recruited children in the past, though the number of child soldiers recruited by the PKK that year was unknown.

The report also said PKK had kept up abducting and conscribing young people, adding that it was not generally clear whether they joined by force or volunteered.

Families of allegedly abducted children staged several protests during the year demanding the terror group free their children, it added.

Kidnapping children

In 2015, the U.S. Trafficking in Persons Report said Kurdish children were sometimes kidnapped and forced to participate in PKK forces, according to uncorroborated reports.

In the 2016 report, the U.S. said the YPG/PKK continued to recruit and use boys and girls, including children younger than 15.

According to the report, the YPG/PKK reportedly took the children to indoctrination and training camps.

In April 2015, a 16-year-old girl in Aleppo was allegedly recruited by YPJ/PKK female terrorists against the wishes of her family, said the report.

The forced recruitment of children by the YPG/PKK was also documented in reports of German-based Kurdwatch.

In a May 2015 report, Kurdwatch said the PYD/YPG/PKK kidnapped 12-year-old Fatimah S.A.

Quoting a family member, the report said: “The girl simply disappeared. Her parents are PYD supporters. However they weren’t asked if they wanted to send the girl to the military.

“The YPG claims that the girl decided by her own free will. Her parents were not even allowed to accompany their daughter. They were promised that after two weeks training, Fatimah would be allowed to return if she wants.”

According to the International Criminal Court, the enlistment and conscription of child soldiers under age 15, as well as using them to participate actively in hostilities, is a war crime.

According to the Turkish General Staff, Operation Olive Branch aims to establish security and stability along Turkey’s borders and the region as well as to protect Syrians from terrorist oppression and cruelty.

The operation is being carried out under the framework of Turkey’s rights based on international law, UN Security Council resolutions, its self-defense rights under the UN charter, and respect for Syria’s territorial integrity, it said.

The military also said only terror targets are being destroyed and that “utmost care” is being taken to avoid harming civilians.

Source: AA

Germany on Wednesday banned several rallies planned by a PKK-affiliated organization in northwestern cities.

According to Cologne police, rallies by PKK-affiliated organization NAV-DEM scheduled for today (Thursday) in Cologne and Leverkusen were forbidden due to repeated violations of the law and crimes committed by members of the group in recent weeks.

PKK/PYD supporters in Germany launched a campaign last month against Turkey’s ongoing counterterrorism operation in northern Syria and held demonstrations across the country in which they carried banned flags and posters of the PKK terrorist group.

In a press release Wednesday, Cologne police recalled that the PKK has been listed as a terrorist organization in Germany and said it would not allow NAV-DEM’s demonstrations planned for Thursday as members of the group were likely to again carry outlawed symbols of the terrorist group.

Turkey has long criticized German authorities for tolerating PKK activities and pressured Berlin to take stricter measures.

The PKK has been banned in Germany since 1993 but is still active with nearly 14,000 followers among the country’s Kurdish immigrant population, according to the country’s domestic intelligence agency BfV.

PKK’s continued propaganda, recruitment and fundraising activities remain the main source of political tensions between Turkey and its NATO partner Germany.

Supporters of the PKK and its Syrian branch PYD have organized radical and violent protests across Germany since Jan. 20, when Turkey began a military operation against terrorist targets of the PKK/PYD in northwestern Syria.

Turkey has stressed that Operation Olive Branch is being conducted within the framework of Turkey’s sovereign rights based on international law, UN Security Council resolutions and self-defense rights under the UN Charter.

The PKK, which is listed as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the U.S. and the EU, waged a terror campaign against Turkey for more than 30 years, killing nearly 40,000 people.

Source: AA

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared the imminent start of the Afrin operation in order to cleanse part of its southern border from PKK-affiliated YPG terrorists. The Turkish Armed Forces deployed several units to the Turkish border shared with the Afrin region, while the Turkish-backed Syrian rebels in northern Syria, who were part of the Euphrates Shield Operation, also prepared for the Afrin operation.

On 20 January, the Turkish Armed Forces began Operation Olive Branch in order to clear the Afrin region from YPG militants. The operation was set with a huge bombardment of YPG warehouses and strategic military positions. In addition to these airstrikes, the Turkish Armed Forces also targeted several YPG positions across Afrin with artillery shelling.

Operation Olive Branch came shortly after Russia withdrew its soldiers from the Afrin region in order to avoid being shelled by Turkey. The Russian withdrawal was a result of several high-negotiations between the Turkish and Russian Chiefs of Staff – who had previously met in Russia prior to the start of the military operation.

Operation Olive Branch is being conducted with a similar method like Operation Euphrates Shield, which was conducted in order to clear northern Aleppo from Daesh militants. Once again, the Turkish Armed Forces are being accompanied by Turkey-backed Syrian rebels. In contrast to the Euphrates Shield however, the main focus of Operation Olive Branch is to eliminate YPG militants in Afrin. Another difference between the two operations is also the terrain – when compared to Afrin, northern Aleppo is easier to operate as Afrin is located around mountains. More, another difference observed in the two scenarios is that the YPG have controlled Afrin for much longer than Daesh had controlled northern Aleppo.

YPG’s control of Afrin

The YPG has controlled the Afrin region since mid-2012 after the Assad regime plainly handed over the area. The terrorist organization’s control of Afrin was until Operation Olive Branch, as no other faction on the ground had attacked the region. In 2015, the YPG formed an alliance with Jaysh al Thuwwar, forming the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces. At the beginning of 2016, the YPG and Jaysh al Thuwwar captured the strategic Minnagh military airport and Tel Rifaat from Syrian rebels. Russia supported this effort with intense airstrikes. The last expansion of areas controlled by the YPG was during the Euphrates Shield Operation. The YPG took advantage of the immense fighting between Daesh and the Turkish-backed Syrian rebels and by doing so, the group tried to link up with YPG militants in Manbij. Even though the group did not succeed with this strategy, they managed to gather some new territories in northern Aleppo.

The presence of the YPG in Afrin and expanded territories around Tel Rifaat is estimated to have composed of 7,000 militants. In addition to the YPG militants, Jaysh al Thuwwar also has up to several hundred fighters under its command. Especially due to the forceful recruitment in Afrin, the YPG was able to increase its number to the 7,000 based in Afrin.

The depth of the operation

The difficulty of the operation in Afrin also depends on the aims and depth pursued by the government. In general, Turkey seems to have two different options. The first includes the entire cleansing of the Afrin region, which will take time as besieged YPG elements will fight until the very end. Additionally, the mountainous terrain in Afrin will give the terrorist group an opportunity to adopt guerilla tactics against the Turkish Armed Forces and the Syrian rebels. As the YPG is led by PKK veterans who have experienced this type of warfare, this will increase the difficulty of the operation. Within this scenario the operation should not be endangered but will take some time.

The second option includes the possibility of besieging YPG elements in Afrin and to cut any of their links with the world by capturing the Arab-majority areas around Tel Rifaat and Minnag. By doing so, Turkey would also have a route from the Euphrates Shield areas in northern Aleppo towards the rebel-held areas in Idlib. As the YPG forced the Arab population out of their homes in Tel Rifaat and surrounding areas, those areas are sparsely populated. Thus, as the YPG is likely to use civilians as a shield against the Turkish Armed Forces and the Syrian rebels, Tel Rifaat and surrounding areas will be easier to capture.

However, the Turkish strategy seems to intend to capture all of Afrin as Operation Olive Branch began with the aim to capture all strategic hills in the mountains of Afrin. With this strategy, the Turkish Armed Forces and Syrian rebels decided to attack the YPG from its strongest positions. If successful, the terrorist group will lose the possibility to retreat from the villages towards the mountains in order to conduct a guerilla warfare against the armed forces and rebels.

Media propaganda

In addition to the military difficulties, Turkey will also face propaganda warfare by the YPG and PKK media outlets as well as from western journalists and analysts who sympathize with the terrorist group. Even if Turkey tries to avoid civilian causalities as seen during the Euphrates Shield Operation in contrast to what Russia did in Aleppo or what the U.S. did in Raqqa, civilian causalities may still occur. However, as part of their media strategy against Turkey, the YPG will propagate by exaggerating any civilian casualties. This can be foreseen and it is inevitable for western media agencies to play a role in this situation. In addition to the western media, UAE-sponsored media will also join the campaign through reporting false news generated by the YPG.

Only days after the start of Operation Olive Branch, YPG-affiliated media sources claimed several fake reports about destroyed Turkish tanks, and the killing/detention of Turkish soldiers and Syrian rebels. Their propaganda was spread on social media and was also shared on the official accounts of the YPG, YPG commanders and YPG-linked websites.

An example of this includes a tweet of the YPG’s so-called political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD). The picture tweeted showed a residential building engulfed in flames stating “PYD Rojava” with the caption: “Turkish terrorist army targets civilian homes in Afrin.” Shortly after the post it was discovered that the image was from a fire incident that took place in Kuwait in 2016.

Saleh Moslem, a senior leader of the PYD tweeted: “Turkey massacres in Afrin” with a picture of injured kids. However, it was revealed that the photograph was from the Assad regime’s attacks on Eastern Ghouta.

Also, another picture shared on Twitter claimed that “kids are being targeted by Turkish army.” However, it turned out that the picture was taken from a post on January 1, 2017, during a Russian airstrike on Syria.

Examples of fake-propaganda by YPG sources could be expanded to an innumerable amount. The media strategy obducted by the YPG does not try to be reliable or valid, but seeks to de-legitimize the Turkish-led operation with all means.

The main challenges of Operation Olive Branch will be the terrain in Afrin, which gives the YPG an opportunity to seek defense in the mountains. Nevertheless, the plan of the Turkish Armed Forces is to capture the strategic hills in order to entirely eliminate all YPG militants in Afrin. In addition to the military difficulties to be embraced, Turkey has to ready itself for a propaganda war with the terrorist organization. A genuine media strategy by the YPG, in addition to journalists who openly sympathize with the group, will seek to de-legitimize the operation conducted in Afrin.

Turkey has been in a long on-going preparation process for an extensive military operation against the PYD/YPG, which the country deems as a threat to both its own national security and to the territorial integrity of Syria. Ankara has been in constant dialogue with countries across the region along with prominent actors in Syria in order to establish political and military premises.

Turkey has launched an operation targeting Afrin, the western end of the terror belt. While the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) had deployed military forces to the region near Afrin, it has also established a base in Idlib, south of Afrin, effectively surrounding the city. In addition to this, thousands of Syrian opposition soldiers, who were trained through the “train-and-equip” program, were deployed against the PYD/YPG. Turkey is pursuing an initiative similar to the Operation Euphrates Shield (OES), which was launched right after the July 15 coup attempt, and which simultaneously cleansed the defined areas from both Daesh and the PYD/YPG. Operation Olive Branch (OOB) was launched a short time after President Erdogan’s announcement on 20 January, 2018, at 17:00. While the TSK announced the name of the operation as “Olive Branch,” references were made to decisions made by the United Nations Security Council and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.

What are the geopolitical and demographic features of Afrin?

Located in northwest Syria, Afrin is a district in the Aleppo Province. The district consists of seven towns: Central, Bulbul, Jandairis, Rajo, Sharran, Shayk al Hadid and M’abatli. Its border with Turkey renders the district important in terms of geopolitics. Its surface area is 1850 km², corresponding to 2% of the total surface area of Syria. Afrin is located in a mountainous region and its elevation is between 700-1269 meters. The distance between its easternmost and westernmost points is 55 kilometers, while the distance between its northernmost and southernmost points is 75 kilometers.

According to the 2004 census in Syria, 64,758 people live in the town center and the total population of the district is 172,095. The city is mostly populated by Kurds. However, Arab and Turkmen and a small population of Yazidis also reside in the region. The city experienced a population increase after the 2011 revolution, as the Syrian regime did not target the city. Yet, figures provided regarding the population of Afrin are contradictory – especially numbers released by pro-PKK/PYD sources are exaggerated. It is estimated that around 300,000 people live in the Afrin District.

Why is Afrin important for the PYD/YPG?

Following the 2011 revolution, the PYD/YPG terrorist organization made an agreement with the Assad regime handed Afrin to PYD, which declared it as its canton in 2013. Since October 29, 2014, the region has been managed by an administration appointed by the PYD. The terrorist organization has eliminated all Kurdish opposition in the region, especially the Kurdish National Council, and has established its hegemony over the region.

After the downing of the Russian aircraft, the terrorist organization captured territories between Tell Rifat and Menagh to the east of Afrin from the Free Syrian Army (FSA) with the support of Russian aircrafts. With this, the terrorist organization forced the Arab population in the region to immigrate. The group then attacked the town of Azez but failed to capture it. Since October 2016, the PYD/YPG has attempted to march on Al-Bab with the occasional air support from coalition forces. However, this march was stopped with the OES.

The YPG claims that it manages Afrin through 47 councils and 898 communes (communities) that organize the people. Even though the region is isolated from the PYD/YPG located on the eastern bank of the Euphrates, it is managed by prominent figures of the PKK such as Halil Tefdem, Ahmed Hudro, Mahmud Berhudan, Behcet Abdo and Nocin, who all receive their orders from Qandil under the chain of command of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK).

This region acts like a springboard for the organization, which will allow it to access the Mediterranean Sea. Moreover, the terrorist organization attempts to establish a line of supply through the Amanos Mountains in Turkey in order to mobilize militants with weapons. The TSK and security forces have killed over 40 terrorists trying to cross the border from Afrin. The terrorist organization sees Afrin as an important source of recruitment. They are forcibly recruiting girls and boys aged between 16-18 for their “Self-Defense Force.” There are several boot camps established by the group where these teenagers are trained.

What are some of the alternative scenarios to the Afrin offensive?

Operation Olive Branch was launched at 17:00 on 20 January with military aircraft belonging to the Turkish Air Forces, which entered Syrian air space and began targeting terrorist targets in Afrin. The TSK announced that 108 different locations used as shelter and arsenal by the PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG in Afrin and its surrounding towns were destroyed by 72 aircrafts. In addition, the TSK informed that lines of defense, command centers and border outposts of the terrorist organization were targeted by the Turkish forces from land and air.

During the pre-operation assessments, there were various scenarios about the Afrin offensive. Initially, re-capturing towns like Tell Rifat and Menagh in order to completely surround YPG militants in the region was being discussed. However, the first stage of the offensive indicates that an extensive military operation against the PKK in Afrin will take place.

The extent of the military operation will depend on negotiations made with Russia, as due to the result of an agreement made with the Syrian regime, Russia continues to control Syrian air space. It is known that Moscow is trying to persuade the Turkish regime to pursue a small-scale operation. However, it is definite that Turkey needs an extensive military operation in order to permanently remove the terrorist threat from Afrin.

The operation was launched with intense air raids and support vehicles. After the lines of defense are softened, ground war could be expected to be intensified around the Menagh Air Base-Tell Rifat to the east of Afrin and Shayk al Hadid-Jandairis-Burj Abd Allah to the south of Afrin.

It could be expected that land forces of the TSK and FSA will simultaneously penetrate the defense lines of the PKK/YPG on the southern and eastern sectors, effectively isolating Afrin. In the following stage, the TSK may force PKK/YPG militants to retreat to Afrin by pushing from northern and western sectors. These terrorist elements may attempt to use civilians in Afrin as human shields in order to draw the Turkish armed forces into urban warfare.

The PYD/YPG had been preparing for a probable military operation by Turkey. The PKK controls over 1500 km² of territory including Afrin and its surrounding cities, where Russia has also begun to establish checkpoints.

It could be assessed that PKK/PYD militants, whose numbers are around 5000-6000, along with Jaysh al-Thuwar elements consisting of approximately a couple of hundred of militants, may attempt to halt the TSK and FSA through asymmetric warfare and hybrid methods. It is known that the terrorist organization has been digging trenches, forming tunnels, placing Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and mines to certain locations. Moreover, with the courtesy of the U.S., the YPG may attempt to transport anti-tank weaponry that is currently located on the eastern bank of the Euphrates to Afrin. Considering the topography of the region, terrorist elements may attempt to use mountainous parts that are located towards the midwest and northwest of Afrin.

Nevertheless, the terrorist organization does not stand much chance against the TSK and FSA on the plains towards Afrin as well as around Tell Rifat and Menagh regions. It should not be forgotten that Turkey has learned valuable lessons from OES, especially in terms of fighting against anti-tank weaponry and asymmetric warfare methods, and has new inventory such as Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), which could counter such attempts. All in all, Turkey is much better equipped for the Afrin offensive.

What has Turkey learned from Operation Euphrates Shield?

When drawing comparisons between the OES and OOB, there are both similarities and differences. Even though Turkish forces encountered PKK/YPG elements on the bank of the Sanjur River after capturing Jarabulus, it was essentially an operation against Daesh.

OES cleared a territory of 2200 km² from terrorist elements. While the conflict was mostly on the plains, it was concluded with urban warfare in Al-Bab and surrounding towns. Regime forces along with the PKK constantly harassed the TSK and TSK-backed Syrian opposition forces. As Daesh adopted hybrid and asymmetric strategies along with using civilians as human shields, the TSK had to exact the operation meticulously and steadily. Daesh had carried out asymmetric attacks throughout the OES, attempting to halt the march of the TSK and Syrian opposition forces through bombed car and suicide bomber attacks. The fact that Daesh was effectively using anti-tank weaponry was one of the greatest challenges of the operation. As Turkey engaged in urban warfare for the first time on a cross-border operation, there were certain handicaps regarding military equipment and experienced personnel. Moreover, Syrian opposition forces were not very effective during the initial train-and-equip program.

The majority of these handicaps were addressed with the experience gained from OES. While increasing the number of UCAVs improved close air support and precision strike capacities, protection systems against anti-tank weaponry that is implemented within Turkish tanks made the TSK a force to be reckoned with. There are more personnel in the force who are experienced in asymmetric hybrid conflicts. Meanwhile, Syrian opposition forces are trained and equipped better than before. There is a significant improvement in their battle-readiness. In this respect therefore, when compared to the OES, Turkey is more advantageous in the current operation.

Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim speaks at a meeting with media representatives at Vahdettin Mansion in Istanbul, Turkey on January 21, 2018.

Operation Olive Branch aims to create 30-kilometer-deep (approx. 19 miles) safe zone in northwestern Afrin region of Syria, Turkish prime minister said Sunday.

“First goal [of the operation] is to create a safe area there and then we can take concrete steps to eliminate terrorist elements,” Binali Yildirim told media representatives in Istanbul.

He said there are 8,000-10,000 terrorists in Afrin and Turkey would clear all the terrorists on its borders.

Yildirim said Russia, the U.S. and Iran were informed about Turkish plan ahead of the operation.

“There is confusion in U.S. [regarding the operation]. Everyone speaks different things,” he said, adding that they also did not voice a firm opposition to the operation.

Source: AA

A retired U.S. army officer has said the United States made a “terrible mistake” by supporting Syrian Kurds (PYD/PKK).

In an exclusive interview with Anadolu Agency, Edward J. Erickson, who is currently a professor at the Marine Corps University, talked about the recent developments in Syria’s Afrin and the relations between the U.S. and Turkey.

“The Afrin operation is a continuation of Operation Euphrates Shield,” Erickson said.

Turkish military units are already deployed in Afrin, a district of Aleppo province near the Turkish-Syria border, which is under siege by the PYD/PKK terrorist organization. The PYD/PKK is the Syrian offshoot of the PKK terrorist group, which has been designated a terrorist organization by Turkey, the U.S. and the EU.

“What is happening to Turkey right now is in the same way my country (U.S.) was sucked in to Iraq and Afghanistan, Turkey is being sucked in to Syria,” Erickson said. “It is very difficult to draw the line and say ‘we are going to stop right here’, that is Turkey’s problem.”

United States’ problem is to be a player in Iraq and in Syria, Erickson said. “We tried to support the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and failed, they collapsed. Our next client, the next choice was the YPG, the Kurds.”

“The problem now is in Afrin, as you know there are not just the rebel forces, there are also YPG, Kurdish forces. This has brought Turkey and United States into direct competition.”

U.S. arming of PYD/PKK

When asked about the U.S. arming of PYD/PKK, Erickson said the U.S. needed a group on the ground to fight against Daesh.

“We then sent weapons to Kurds. We promised Turkey – our president, our secretary of state, defense Trump, Tillerson and Mattis – that we will get the weapons back. I don’t think Turkey believes that, personally I don’t believe that. I don’t think Syrian Kurds will return weapons. This is going to lead to big problems between Turkey and the U.S,” he said.

“I think we made a mistake, personally. I don’t speak for the U.S. government. I think the United States made a terrible mistake supporting Syrian Kurds.”

When asked about his opinion on what is United States’ policy in Syria, Erickson said initial Obama policy was that “Assad must go.”

“And when the situation in Syria became so complicated, the Obama administration changed that to ‘maybe Assad can stay but we got to work with it, somehow’,” he said.

“The Trump administration has not revealed (its policy) on what Assad will be,” he added.

Erickson said currently there are 2,000 U.S. soldiers fighting against Daesh in Syria, but their future is unknown after Daesh is crushed.

“ISIS is almost crushed. The question is after ISIS is crushed, what will the Americans do? Will they stay there, will they leave? Will they encourage the PYD to attack Assad? We really don’t know,” he said.

“We are waiting for America’s national military policy,” he added. “Right now, the only government that can function and govern in Syria is the Assad regime. Nobody likes that, but it is the reality.”

Source: AA

Turkey has legitimate security concerns over insurgency inside its borders, U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis said Sunday, according to U.S. media reports.

“Turkey is a NATO ally. It’s the only NATO country with an active insurgency inside its borders. And Turkey has legitimate security concerns,” Mattis told reporters in a plane headed for Asia.

His remarks came amid Turkey’s ongoing military operation against terror groups in the Afrin region.

Noting that the overall success against Daesh “does not remove many of Turkey’s concerns,” Mattis said it is “easy to understand” why Ankara is worried that the conflict will extend beyond the Syrian border.

”Turkey was candid,“ Mattis told reporters. “They warned us before they launched the aircraft that they were going to do it. We are very alert to it. Our top levels are engaged and we’re working through it.”

Turkey’s operation was carried out against the PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG and Daesh terrorist groups under the framework of Turkey’s rights based on international law, the UN Security Council’s decisions and self-defense rights under the UN charter.

Recently this week spokesman for the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) Col. Ryan Dillon announced that the U.S.-led coalition was creating a 30,000-strong “Border Security Force” in northern Syria.

It was announced that the majority of these 30,000 fighters would be SDF veterans – otherwise known as YPG militants.

In stark comparison, on Thursday 18th January, the Pentagon dismissed the recently announced “Border Security Force” and announced that the U.S.-led coalition is training the PKK/PYD-led SDF as a “stabilization” and “hold force.”

Pentagon spokesman Eric Pahon stated: “There was a mis-characterization of the training that we are providing to local security forces in Syria.”

“What we are doing is designed to enable our partner forces to maintain local security, as our statement said, for people who are returning to their homes.”

Pahon claimed that the training is “aimed also at preventing an outflow of fleeing Daesh terrorists as their presence comes to an end and they start trying to scatter.”

Asked whether this new force would be a policing force, Pahon said he would not describe it in that way, but rather call it a “kind of security or stabilization force,” or some sort of “hold force.”

Describing what a “hold force” meant, Pahon stated that it is designed to secure small areas where Daesh has been removed and to prevent the terror group’s resurgence.

Following the statements made earlier this week by Ryan Dillon, Turkey had criticized this decision on all fronts.

In regards to Turkey’s sensitivity over the issue, Pahon said: “We are aware of the security concerns that our NATO ally Turkey has presented. We have been in regular discussions with Turkey particularly since this issue cropped up. Our senior leaders have been talking. I am not going to get into the content of those discussions. Turkey is also a valuable member of the coalition.”

On Thursday 18 January, the U.S. State dept. urged Turkey to refrain from taking any action in Afrin, Syria, calling on the Ankara administration to remain focused on the fight against Daesh.

Following a news briefing, State dept. spokeswoman Heather Nauert stated that the U.S. wanted Turkey to abstain from violence in the northwestern city of Afrin.

“We would call […] on the Turks to not take any actions of that sort.”

“We don’t want them to engage in violence but we want them to keep focused on ISIS [Daesh].”

The Assad regime handed over Afrin to the PKK/PYD terrorist group and according to estimates there are around 8,000-10,000 terrorists in the area.

The PKK/PYD and the PKK’s Syrian offshoot the YPG have remained a national security threat for Turkey and thus the Turkish administration has justified its intention to intervene in Afrin on this basis.

Due to the differences in opinion regarding the threat posed by the PKK/PYD, relations between Turkey and the U.S. have remained at an all-time low.

While the Trump administration continues to provide military and financial assistance to this terrorist organization in the name of fighting Daesh, Ankara has continuously emphasized that a terrorist group cannot be defeated by supporting another one.

Following the announcement that the U.S. will form a border force in Syria led by the SDF, head of Turkey’s delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly has called for the U.S. to reverse this decision.

In a written statement, Ahmet Berat Conkar criticized the decision made by the U.S. and claimed that unless reversed, the decision to create a border force in Syria will jeopardize U.S. relations with Turkey.

Conkar, who is also the deputy of the AK Party, stated that forming a border security force with the SDF contradicted “commitments and statements of the U.S.”

“[It] will constitute a threat to the national security of our country and consequently to NATO.”

Echoing comments made by Turkish Foreign Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and Turkish Presidential spokesman, Conkar called on the U.S. to “reverse their decision before relations between the U.S. and Turkey are harmed irreparably.”

He underlined Turkey’s “determination to eliminate any threat to its national security and its commitment to Syria’s territorial integrity.”

Syria’s territorial integrity was also raised by Russian authorities, who emphasized that they were waiting for the U.S. to explain this decision made.

Syrian opposition

In addition to Conkar, the Chief Negotiator of the Syrian Negotiations Commission (SNC) also expressed strong reservations about the U.S. plan to establish a border guard in northwest Syria.

The aim of the SNC – Syria’s umbrella opposition group – is to build a single, unified national army at the point of political transition.

In this respect, Nasr al-Hariri stated that “any force based on ethnicity or religion will be harmful to a political solution.”

“A large, separate Kurdish force might open the door for a new political struggle in the region.”

The Turkish authorities have further interpreted this move by the U.S. as an attempt to legitimize the terrorist organization PKK/PYD in the region.

Speaking to reporters after his meeting with U.S. counterpart Rex Tillerson in Vancouver, Canada, Mevlut Cavusoglu stated that Turkey may expand its operations in northern Syria to Manbij city and east of the Euphrates River after Afrin has been cleared.

Cavusoglu spoke in Canada where he was attending the Vancouver Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on Security and Stability on the Korean Peninsula.

The FM stated that “Turkey’s precautions against the YPG/PKK cannot be limited to Afrin alone. There is also Manbij and east of the Euphrates River.”

Commenting on the U.S. plan to establish a so-called “border guard” in northwest Syria, the FM underlined that this will “irreversibly harm U.S.-Turkey ties.”

While the decision has been condemned on all fronts in Turkey, and has been questioned by the Russian and Iranian administrations, Turkish FM stated that different opinions among the Pentagon and Centcom as well as different institutions and ministries in the U.S. regarding support for the SDF and the PYD/PKK have been causing the problem.

Reminding reporters of past U.S. behavior regarding Manbij and Raqqa, and the U.S. support for the PYD/PKK, Cavusoglu urged the Trump administration to fulfill its promises.

The U.S. had promised that local councils would run the cities (Manbij and Raqqa) after they were liberated. However, they currently remain under the control of the PYD/PKK.

More, urging the U.S. to stop supporting the group and to retrieve its weapons, Cavusoglu stated: “The U.S. has previously stated that the PYD/PKK was not their strategic partner, [that] in fact, they were only working together to defeat Daesh.”

“As we can see, we have so many reasons to be skeptical, and we have enough reasons to take our own precautions.”

Following the brief given by the Foreign Minister, the Pentagon stated that the U.S. acknowledges Turkey’s concern over its plans for a border security force in Syria and that “close communications” with Turkey will continue.

On Sunday 14 January, Ryan Dillon, spokesman for the U.S.-led coalition, officially known as the Combined Joint Task Force –Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), announced that the coalition will establish a new 30,000 strong border security force with the SDF.

The SDF is a U.S.-backed group that is largely controlled and funded by the PKK/PYD terrorist organization in Syria.

In a written statement, Dillon stated that “The coalition is working jointly with the SDF to establish and train the new Syrian Border Security Force (BSF).”

He added that “Currently, there are approximately 230 individuals training in the BSF’s inaugural class, with the goal of a final force size of approximately 30,000.”

Earlier this week it was revealed that the PKK/PYD was forming a so-called army with U.S. support.

Some 400 “border guards” trained by the U.S. through the Pentagon and the CIA formed “The North Army.”

These trained terrorists were also provided with both theoretical, technical and military training and assistance and high-technology equipment.

Attempting to justify the situation, Dilal stated that efforts were taken in order to ensure that individuals served in areas close to their homes. “Therefore, the ethnic composition of the force will be relative to the areas in which they serve.”

“More Kurds will serve in the areas in northern Syria. More Arabs will serve in the areas along the Euphrates River Valley and along the border with Iraq to the South.”

Informing that the recruitment process had begun, Dilon also highlighted that half of the recruits of the new force will be SDF veterans.

Turkish response

The SDF – a group pioneered by the PKK/PYD – is inevitably one of the biggest national security threats to Turkey.

Regardless of the fact that the U.S. recognizes the PKK as a terrorist organization, and amid the attacks that the group has conducted in Turkey, the Trump administration continues to support the Syrian offshoot of the group, the PYD and the SDF.

Thus, following Dillon’s statement, Turkey’s presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin emphasized that the U.S. is taking “worrisome steps towards legitimizing the PKK terrorist group’s Syrian offshoot, PYD-YPG under the pretense of the ‘fight against Daesh.’”

In a written statement, Kalin also added that the steps taken by the U.S. aimed to provide a permanent place for the terrorist group in the region.

Highlighting that the situation is “totally unacceptable,” Kalin re-iterated the fact that Turkey has the right to fight all terror groups in any manner, time and place it deemed fit, and would continue to take necessary measures to ensure its security in line with national interests.

Following the first response from Kalin, the Foreign Ministry also issued a statement reminding that Turkey had re-iterated on numerous occasions that it was “wrong and objectionable” to operate with the PKK/PYD terrorist organization on the ground in Syria in order to fight against Daesh.

The statement also added that the establishment of the so-called Syria Border Protection Force was not consulted with Turkey – which is also a member of the coalition.

Highlighting the mystery behind the decision, as it is unknown which coalition members approved the decision, the Foreign Ministry also stated that “To attribute such a unilateral step to the whole coalition is an extremely wrong move that could harm the fight against Daesh.”

“Such initiatives, through cooperation with the PYD/YPG in contradiction with the U.S. commitments and statements, endanger Turkey’s national security and the territorial integrity of Syria, and are totally unacceptable.”

In addition, Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdag tweeted: “Letting the PYD/YPG – PKK’s branch in Syria – by the U.S. to establish a so-called terror army for creating a terror corridor in the region on the pretext of combating Daesh, is not a fight against Daesh and terrorist organizations, but rather a support to terrorism and terrorist organizations.”

Ankara has on numerous occasions reminded the U.S. administration that they cannot win the battle against terrorism by condemning one form and supporting the other. However, despite these efforts, the U.S. administration is continuing to make drastic mistakes in the Middle East.

Russia warns

Turkey is not the only country to have condemned and spoken out against the decision of the U.S. Party to the Astana talks, the Russian administration also slammed the U.S. plan to form an army led by the PKK/PKK, warning that it could jeopardize Syria’s territorial integrity.

Speaking at his annual news conference in Moscow, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov pointed to the possible problems that could occur between Turkey and the Kurdish population as a result of the U.S. plan.

“The U.S.’ unilateral, ultimatum-like project, aimed at establishing an army in Syria, may create problems in relations between Turkey and the Kurds.”

Lavrov also stated that this move by the U.S. would lead to the formation of a large isolated area on Syria’s border with Turkey and Iraq.

“This serious issue is leading to worrisome results regarding the steps to be taken for these areas in Syria.”

Similar to Turkey, Russia’s Foreign Minister underlined that Moscow expects an explanation from the U.S. administration as this move will not “serve to calm the situation” in Syria’s Afrin district, which borders Turkey.

“Like our Turkish and Iranian colleagues, we also expect an explanation from the U.S. on this issue. We think this decision will jeopardize Syria’s territorial integrity.”

On Sunday 14 January, the PYD/PKK terrorist organization located in Syria targeted the residential area in Azaz with multiple rocket attacks from the Afrin district bordering Turkey.

According to reports, a large number of rockets were fired by the terrorist organization on the civilian settlements in the area controlled by the Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army forces.

While no casualties were reported, the attacks inevitably caused material damage.

Turkish Armed Forces stationed in the Euphrates Shield Operation area in Syria and in the de-escalation zones in Idlib retaliated with artillery fire targeting the terrorist group in Afrin.

The PYD/PKK terrorists have been attacking civilians in Azaz from time to time since the city was liberated by the Turkey-backed Euphrates Shield forces last year.

The Euphrates Shield Operation ended in March 2017, clearing 2,200 square kilometres area off Daesh in northern Syria.

While the PKK is acknowledged and accepted as a terrorist organization by not only Turkey, the EU and the United States, the Trump administration (and previous U.S. administrations) continue to provide military and financial assistance to its Syrian offshoot – the PYD.

Reports emerged on Friday, 12 January, which confirmed that two citizens of Syria’s northern Manbij city were tortured and killed by the PKK/PYD terrorist organization.

Hannan Al-Jarivah, 25, and Abbud Al-Minkhan, 23, were tortured to death by PKK/PYD terrorists.

The bodies of the two young men, with one’s head cut off, were found in a village 20 kilometers west of Manbij.

Tensions escalated between civilians in Manbij and the PKK/PYD terrorist organization after families of the two victims recognized the bodies of their children, whose photos were shared on social media.

Footage that was shared on social media shows hundreds of people who took to the streets of the city as a response to the killings, following the weekly Friday prayer.

Located on the west bank of the Euphrates River, an Arab-populated city, Manbij remains under the control of the Syrian offshoot of the PKK, the PYD.

 

The US is a Joke was the title of the travel book Enis Batur wrote many years ago. In a chapter of his book, he signified that even those who have never been to the US knew the country very well. It was a well-known place. A country that everyone has something to say about. It’s a dream for some, it’s the power behind everything for others. The social, cultural and economic impact it created affects everyone in certain ways. This is why the US is well known by almost everyone. For this reason, there have been different expectations from the US.

Recently however, this imagined US began to confuse us. While failing to live up to the expectations, the country became increasingly ambiguous. Those trying to understand the US were shocked at every milestone. We began to face a mechanism which we knew little about. There were peculiar developments in its foreign and security policies. Regression of the US was always analyzed over education, infrastructure and the growth of its rivals. However, unexpected developments surpassing all of these started to occur. The November elections revealed another face of the US, never-ending gossips about Russia showed the system’s inability, and the disparity between cabinet members and the president witnessed by the public demonstrated the dysfunctional nature of basic mechanisms.

Improvidence of the super power

For some, all of these were explainable as they were able to rationalize these situations and issues. Yet, the matter was the fact that this wasn’t expected from a country that is deemed a super power. Many expressed that they never knew this side of the US. In reality, the US has been facing such events for the most of its existence. It’s a mechanism that is full with pitfalls created by its own defense policies, that has power struggles between different institutions that eclipse state policies and which love to ask questions like “who lost Iran?” or “why don’t they like us?” after foreign policy crises. Despite all of its natural resources, world-renowned universities, innovative engine and attractiveness, it’s a power suffering from improvidence in terms of foreign policy and security.

We’re talking about a country that has launched Facebook and Firefox, found rocks that indicated Mars had water in the past through NASA and tortured prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison, all in the same year.

While Steve Jobs was revolutionizing the technology industry in 2001 with the first iPod, the US was betraying its own norms establishing the Guantanamo Camp with the proposal of several security experts. While 8 out of 9 Nobel prizes were given to scientists employed by its universities in 2003, following the ideas of a group of ideologues the US invaded Iraq, leading to one of the greatest fiascos of its history. We’re talking about a country that has launched Facebook and Firefox, found rocks that indicated Mars had water in the past through NASA and tortured prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison, all in the same year. This asymmetry and contradiction in different fields sometimes seems like a bad joke. Just like what Enis Batur asserted. Sometimes it’s really confusing.

The US turns all into conspiracy theorists

The meaning we ascribe to the policies of the US turns us all into so-called conspiracy theorists. In fact, all of us are right to a certain extent. We’re facing a situation in which a former vice president has won a Nobel Peace Prize for his movie on global warming, while the current president has withdrawn from the Paris Climate Agreement; a situation in which Obama was awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize without any accomplishment, while he was indifferent to the greatest tragedy since World War II. It seems normal to have certain challenges in understanding and ascribing meanings.

The issue is that no one expects such clumsy security and foreign policy strategies from a very qualified group of people. We’re peculiarly hopeful that all strategies are implemented taking long-term goals and various factors into consideration. We try to explain false methods of relations more than it deserves.

Turkey has been doing this for the last three or four years. It’s trying to make sense out of the US policies in bilateral relations and attempting to correct certain mistakes. Since the US began to provide military support to the YPG three years ago, Turkey has been trying to explain that the YPG and the PKK are of the same essence. Moreover, Turkey has been trying to explain why military support to the YPG is a security risk for the country and why eradicating a terrorist organization with another is problematic. In reality, most US officials are aware of the situation. This plan of not having an exit strategy, upsetting the ethnic balance in the region and deteriorating relations with Turkey are all troublesome. However, this policy is still on the go with a despair that is assumed not fitting of the US officials.

Most US officials are aware of the situation. This plan of not having an exit strategy, upsetting the ethnic balance in the region and deteriorating relations with Turkey are all troublesome.

The US pawns its YPG strategy asserting that it doesn’t have any other partners other than the terrorist organization. A country that has been shaping diplomacy and international relations along with determining paradigms and discourses is breaking its half-century-long alliances over the battle plans of several careerist officials against Daesh. Similarly, the US doesn’t want to empathize with Turkey regarding the trauma caused by the July 15 coup attempt or the threat that FETO is posing to the country. Moreover, the US seems unaware that its indifference towards Turkey’s demands is harming the trust relations between the two countries. Despite all, the US expects Turkey to act normal, as if nothing has happened. Seemingly, the US doesn’t care about the erosion of trust caused by not maintaining the alliance and security relations expected from an ally.

A country that has been shaping diplomacy and international relations along with determining paradigms and discourses is breaking its half-century-long alliances over the battle plans of several careerist officials against Daesh.

Nowadays, Turkey approaches any positive development with cautious optimism. Turkey expected the US to say yes to a safe zone in Syria in order to save civilian lives, considering that the US previously carried out the operation in Kosovo – just like Turkey expected the US to adhere to the international norms it advocates and its own “red line” after the chemical attacks in Syria. Or just like the US was expected to condemn the coup in Egypt, as the US had stated that it wants to be on “the right side of history” a couple of years prior.

Turkey – from confusion to resentment

The initial confusion of Turkey was replaced with resentment. However, it seemed like it was out of control for the US administration. As if to prove the long present conspiracy theories, US officials began to post photos together with PKK militants. US soldiers with the YPG blazon is an image that won’t be forgotten for many years in Turkey. While we were thinking that it couldn’t get any worse, the visa process to Turkish citizens were announced to be halted by the US embassy. At this point, the reason is irrelevant. The US has implemented a policy to Turkey and Turkish citizens that hasn’t been implemented to Russia – despite investigations about Russian interference in the US elections and ongoing intelligence wars – or any other NATO ally. This spiced up the present resentment and distrust towards the US over the issues of PKK and the Gulenist criminal cult (FETO).

The US has implemented a policy to Turkey and Turkish citizens that hasn’t been implemented to Russia – despite investigations about Russian interference in the US elections and ongoing intelligence wars – or any other NATO ally.

We’re not sure what those who proposed and implemented this visa suspension want to achieve, as we were unable to understand what the US wants in previous instances. I believe it’s not hard to assert that the US has emotionally fractured its bilateral relations with Turkey. The US merely added another to its list of public catastrophes. The political dimension of this decision could be managed through bilateral meetings and communications. However, it should be admitted that it has created a negative attitude towards the US in various circles of Turkish society. This will pressure foreign policy makers in the long-term.

If this continues to be the case and the US’s reactions continue to be confusing, queries about the US alliance reliability will be replaced with queries about the reliability of the US. The unpredictable and coarse approach of the US towards its allies will affect its future alliances. The confusion and resentment towards the US policies won’t be understood just as a bad joke anymore. People will begin to ask the question The US is a Joke, Dear Frank, But How Much Can We Laugh at It – as the full title of Batur’s book. The regression of the US will speed up when this happens and when the US constrains itself with the means to punish its allies and when it begins to be deemed as a distrusted super power.

The Pentagon responded today to the questions asked at the press conference yesterday to spokesman Colonel Rob Manning.

To the question whether the weapons once distributed to the PKK/PYD will be taken back again, Col. Rob Manning responded in a written statement.

“It is our intent to regain large vehicles and heavy or crew-served weapons once specific threats have been defeated,” he said.

“Make no mistake: a lot of fighting is still necessary to defeat the remaining pockets of ISIS [Daesh], and substantial work remains to ensure ISIS’s lasting defeat in the region, particularly as the group reshapes itself into more of an insurgency,” he added.

According to Anadoly Agency’s report, Manning also claimed that US advisors would monitor the weapons and supplies and their use, ensuring they are only used against Daesh.

In the statement it has been argued that the US-backed forces have agreed to comply with the Geneva Convention and the Law of Armed Conflict, as a precondition of US support.

To the question as to whether the SDG (PKK/PYD) were given arms to support the Geneva talks, defense minister Jim Mattis responded that Pentagon officials said the fight with Deash continues and the Coalition would continue to support its PKK/PYD partners as they provide security that enables stabilization assistance to liberated areas.

In the Geneva II Conference on Syria, a UN-backed international peace conference on the future of Syria, the declared aim is to end the Syrian Civil War by bringing together the Syrian government and the opposition to discuss clear steps towards a transitional government.

Thirty-six members of the Syrian opposition’s High Negotiations Committee are expected to attend peace talks in Geneva this week.

It was stated that while the details of the support were not shared, the support given to the PKK/PYD was taken into consideration.

Despite its well-documented ties to the PKK, which was recognized as a terrorist group by the US, EU, and Turkey, the US has treated the PKK/PYD/YPG as allies in its anti-Daesh efforts.

In the PKK’s over three-decade terror campaign against Turkey, more than 40,000 people including security force personnel and civilians, have lost their lives.

PKK/PYD’s ethnic cleansing ‘unacceptable’

Meanwhile Turkey’s National Security Council met under President Erdogan’s leadership in Ankara. A written statement was released just after the meeting.

“PKK/PYD/YPG terrorist organization’s efforts to carry out a covert ethnic cleansing by changing the demographic structure of Syria is against international law and human rights, and, therefore, it is unacceptable,” the statement said.

The council emphasized that Turkey will continue to take all necessary measures at the Turkey-Syria border area in order to ensure its own security.

According to the statement the Turkish Armed Forces are successfully continuing its “observer mission” in Syria’s Idlib de-escalation zone.

“It is observed that peace and security will literally be achieved when this mission is carried out near western Aleppo and Afrin,” it added.

NATO drill incident

The recent incident during a NATO drill in Norway involving a civilian Norwegian official who depicted the Turkish president Erdogan and Turkey’s founding leader Ataturk as an “enemy collaborator” was also mentioned in the statement, adding that such hostile attitudes and expressions were “unacceptable.”

It was stated that such events harm the solidarity principle of NATO, which is the basis of this alliance and that developments linked to the incident would be followed closely.

*Written by Suna Nur Sarihan. 

According to information gathered by a source from Syria’s Haseke province, close to the Anadolu Agency, the US army has apparently delivered combat and mine resistant vehicles via the Semalka border crossing at the Iraq-Syria border.

It is reported that the source added that the terrorist organization plans to dispatch the vehicles and hundreds of militants to the Afrin district in Aleppo province, near the Turkish border.

The PKK/PYD needs to use the Aleppo corridor controlled by the Bashar al-Assad regime and Iran-backed groups for delivering the vehicles.

The PYD and its military wing YPG, are Syrian branches of the PKK, which has waged a war against Turkey for more than 30 years.

Since the PKK launched its terror campaign in Turkey in 1984, tens of thousands of people – including security personnel, women and children – have been killed, including more than 1,200 since July 2015 alone.

The US and the coalition has since ignored the link between the PYD and PKK – which the US, EU and Turkey list as a terrorist group.

Turkey cites the PYD’s deep ties with the PKK in opposing the US cooperation with the PKK/PYD.

While the US accepts the PKK as a terrorist organization, it claims that the PKK’s Syrian offshoot, the PYD, us a “reliable partner” against Daesh.

Speaking to France 24 on Monday, Presidential Spokesman Ibrahim Kalin made important statements about recent developments concerning Turkey, including NATO’s military exercise, the Reza Zarrab case and relations between Turkey and the US.

Presidential Spokesman Kalın emphasized that the use of pictures of the Turkish Republic’s founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and current President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during a NATO exercise in Norway in the “enemy chart” should be investigated carefully.

“This is one incident, but of course we are a strong ally in NATO and we participated in many exercises.” Kalın said after underlining that Turkey’s relations with the NATO dates back to the 1950s.

A civilian Norwegian official depicted President Erdogan as an “enemy collaborator.” During the computer-assisted exercise of the drill Turkey’s founding father Atatürk was shown in the list of “hostile leaders.” Turkey had immediately withdrawn its troops after the incident on Friday.

“Of course, this incident has to be studied, investigated very, very carefully — who did it, who put those pictures in there, etc.,” Kalin said and also stated that it is impossible to expect Turkey not to react to this event.

While Turkey had received an official apology, questions still remain as to how and why such an incident could occur in an organization such as NATO.

“Well I don’t know the details. We will see. We’ve relied on NATO’s explanations so far, and I think there will be an investigation, and we heard a couple of people have been fired. But we seek to know how such a thing can happen within NATO so such thing won’t happen again,” Kalin said responding to a question on whether it was an accident or not.

To the question whether Turkey is considering severing ties with NATO Kalın responded that Turkey is not thinking of making such a step.

Turkey-US relations

Kalın underscored that the 2 main points that are crucial for Turkey are still waiting to be solved since the times when former US President Obama was in office. The first is in regards to the US support for the PKK/PYD in Syria and second, the extradition of Fetullah Gülen, the criminal cult leader of the terrorist organization FETO, who is behind the coup attempt on the July 15 in 2016 which lead to the death of more than 250 people.

He claimed that FETO is “using the US system to launch an attack against Turkey through the Zarrab case or Halkbank case, which is one of the public banks in Turkey.”

Zarrab, who was arrested last year on alleged fraud and Iran sanctions-related charges, has been in jail in the U.S. pending trial.

Kalın called the case a political one, which is intentionally damaging the reputation of President Erdogan although there were no ties between president Erdogan and Zarrab.

“Now, we have never asked for something that is outside the legal framework. We asked for his [FETO leader Fetullah Gulen’s] extradition to Turkey based on a treaty of extradition of criminals that the U.S. signed in the 1960s,” he said.

He added that the US did not provide any convincing explanations as well and that Turkey is “asking for their extradition so they can be tried in Turkey”

When asked if Turkey still has hope on this issue, Kalin emphasized that the US attitude is “having a negative impact on our bilateral relationship too. Because if you allow such a group of people in your country functioning against a key ally, how are we supposed to respond to that?”

“This whole thing is a very politically motivated case. We are depending on energy from outside. We had to do trade with Iran during the sanctions. We said we will have to try some other means to do it. Our banks were involved, our economy ministry was involved… Americans know all of this,” Kalın claimed.

PKK/PYD relations with the US

Kalin also repeated the concerns of Turkey on the US relationship with PYD and the recent PKK/PYD’s deal with Daesh, which allowed Daesh terrorists and their families to flee the city of Raqqa, Syria.

Calling it a “terrible deal,” Kalin stated that it is a fallacy and contradicting move to support one terrorist group against another.

He said Turkey now is “expecting the US to disengage from the PKK/PYD because the mission has been accomplished. And we will see how they [the US] devises their plans now”.

“Now the question is this: they have said all along that the [PKK/PYD] is the most effective force against Daesh. Well, it is actually the other way around,” he added.

He said that if the US provided that kind of support to any other group such as the Free Syrian Army or Turkmen or another Arab group, they would have been the most effective group against Daesh.

The PYD and its military wing YPG are Syrian branches of the PKK, which waged war against Turkey for more than 30 years.

Since the PKK launched its terror campaign in Turkey in 1984, tens of thousands of people have been killed, including more than 1,200 since July 2015 alone.

The US and the coalition have largely ignored the PYD/YPG links to the PKK, which the US, EU, and Turkey list as a terrorist organization.

*Written by Suna Nur Sarihan. 

Turkish government officials expressed their shock as the US openly defends PKK/PYD’s deal that allowed hundreds of Daesh fighters to flee the besieged city of Raqqa.

Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim slammed the statement issued by the Pentagon as “shocking.”

“Siding with a terrorist organization for demolishing another terrorist organization is not the kind of work which should be done by states.”

“Local solution to a local issue,” is how Pentagon spokesman Eric Pahon defended the agreement to allow around 250 fighters and 3,500 of their family members to flee their de facto capital of Raqqa on November 12.

Pahon said that the “central priority here was the protection of civilian lives and the arrangement was reached by our partners and their local affiliates.”

The US did not elaborate on how the deal was going to save civilians, but Turkish Prime Minister responded to the unprecedented revelation by pointing to its dangers.

“Those Daesh members, who were freed with their weapons, will be able to cause the killing of innocent people, notably in Turkey, Europe and America,” he said.

The deal not only saved one terrorist organization, Daesh, but it opened the gate for another terrorist organization, PKK/YPG, to move in. The prime minister highlighted the multifaceted risks this deal has raised.

According to reports, the deal was struck between Daesh and the SDF, a US-backed force that consists largely of PKK/PYD terrorists. 50 trucks, 13 buses and more than 100 of the group’s own vehicles enabled Daesh’s flight from Raqqa.

The revelation raised serious questions across the world over the role of the US in countries where it has been involved militarily, including Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. In a recent interview with Mehdi Hasan, former Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai accused the US for collaborating with Daesh in order to maintain its presence in the war-torn country for a long term.

According to the Anadolu Agency, Syria’s Bashar al-Assad regime held talks with the PKK/PYD on Sunday in the regime-controlled Qamishli district of Hasakah province in northeastern Syria.

The Assad regime reportedly offered autonomy to the PKK/PYD terrorist group in return for withdrawal from areas under its control, but the organization has demanded a federation status instead.

Ali Mamlouk, the head of the country’s National Security Bureau, represented the Assad regime in the talks.

According to the sources, Mamlouk assured the PKK/PYD that the Syrian regime would recognize the terrorist organization’s authority in the region on condition that it withdraws from the lands it captured during the Syrian civil war.

However, it has been reported that the PKK/PYD rejected the offer and demanded the country’s constitutional system to be re-structured.

Though the two sides failed to reach an agreement, they agreed to hold further meetings in the future.

There has been no comment from either the Syrian regime of the PKK/PYD on this claim.

According to Anadolu Agency map measurements, the terrorist organization occupies about a quarter of Syrian territory, most of which is populated by Arabs and Turkmens.

In recent years, non-state armed actors have increasingly used unmanned vehicles as an attack method. DAESH, Hezbollah, Hashid Shaabi, Syrian oppositions, PYD/PKK are continuing to use drones. The IEPs placed on the remote controlled mini land vehicles are used by DAESH for attack purposes. The Houthis in Yemen are using drones to conduct kamikaze attacks on Saudi SAM batteries, and using bomb-laden unmanned marine vehicles for attacking Saudi frigates. From this perspective, it can be said that the nature of future wars will be shaped by unmanned robotic vehicles. Therefore, the countries that fail to develop relevant technologies both for defensive and offensive purposes will be the ones most harmed during times of conflict and combat. This analysis has focused exclusively on drone technology, which is an imminent threat and used regularly by non-state armed actors for the purpose of attack.

DAESH’s new attack tool: Drones

The tactics that non-state armed actors use in the Middle East by the means provided by technology have made it difficult to combat against these actors with conventional methods. In particular, DAESH’s character and the way it uses technology has made it the most dangerous terrorist organization that threatens regional and international security and has made it difficult to combat. In this context, the drones that people can freely obtain for hobby and leisure purposes are being used by DAESH for lethal purposes.

When used in conjunction with an explosive device, drones, having just a few hundred dollars of cost, can make the million-dollar vehicles become unusable, cause personnel casualties and, most importantly, drop the personnel motivation in the field through the psychological pressure it imposes. From this perspective, drones that were first used for reconnaissance and surveillance activities on a tactical level in Iraq and Syria are now being adopted on a strategical level and have gained greater impact.

Two main Goals: maximizing casualty and producing organizational propaganda

When examining the usage methods of drones by DAESH, we can observe that they have been endorsed for two purposes. The first is to cause the other party maximum casualties and the second is to spread capabilities of the terrorist organization in the media for propaganda purposes. To achieve these goals, drones are used in three different ways:

1. Reconnaissance/surveillance activities for gathering intelligence,
2. Coordinating SVBIED attacks for the purpose of maximum casualty,
3. Conducting a direct attack by dropping IED or kamikaze attack with an IED loaded drone.

According to the documents captured from DAESH, the terrorist organization, contrary to what is thought, has a systematic drone program that makes preparations to use drones as a weapon and conducts R&D activities in order to increase capabilities. The above image demonstrates its drone strategy. DAESH aims to maximize the causalities and to fabricate propaganda by using all these tools and methods together.

DAESH’s effective use of drones slowed down the Mosul Operation

Since the beginning of the operation in Mosul conducted by the Iraqi security forces against DAESH, drones have been popular in coordination of SVBIED attacks. Through these attacks the extent of casualties in Iraq reached a point that the Eastern Mosul Operation (the third phase of Operation Conquest) had to be halted for two weeks and the Western Mosul Operation (the fourth phase of Operation Conquest) stalled. Moreover, the percentage of casualties reached 40 percent among Iraqi Special Forces (Golden Division). This reflects the fact that a mere simple technology has the potential of being very effective when, and if, it is used with a good strategy and a correct method.

The drone program, which was successfully implemented by DAESH in Mosul, was put into action against the PYD/PKK in Raqqa. Despite all the US material support, DEASH’s use of drones as an attack vehicle could not be prevented. While the PYD/PKK elements were moving towards Raqqa, as the terrain remains open, drones have been used for reconnaissance/surveillance and the dropping of IEDs. However, as the PYD/PKK elements entered the city center of Raqqa, SVBIED attacks coordinated with drones have increased. Due to the natural camouflage provided by the city center, the SVBIEDs failed to be recognized until the last moment, which caused the Raqqa operation to slow down as a result of the increase in casualties. In an attempt to close the personnel gap that emerged due to the casualties, the PYD/PKK have increasingly turned to recruiting child soldiers who are under the age of 18 years.

A new rising threat in the world

The use of drones for attacks, which was introduced to the literature of irregular warfare by DAESH, has gained an international dimension as other non-state armed actors have begun to adopt similar methods.  The Hezbollah and Opponents in Syria, the Hashid Shaabi in Iraq and Houthi in Yemen have started to use drone technology. The use of drones in the battlefield in a cost-effective manner for offensive, defensive and reconnaissance purposes, is likely to cause regular state armies to include drones in combat concepts in the near future.

Turkey is one of the very first countries, which is challenged by the threat of drones as it is neighbor to Iraq and Syria and is combating DAESH and PYD/PKK at the same time. As a matter of fact, DAESH used drones for attacks against Turkish military units who carried out Operation Euphrates Shield in Syria. In addition, when the member of the DAESH terrorist organization who attacked Reina was captured, two drones were seized in his home. Moreover, a DAESH terrorist was caught in Adana while he was planning to carry out a bombed attack using a drone on a US plane located in the İncirlik Air Field, and to attack a field where US troops were located.

Besides, the PYD/PKK has learned to use this technology as an attack tool while fighting against DAESH in northern Syria.  Within this scope, in August 2017, the first attack was realized by dropping an IEP with a drone on one of the Turkish outposts on the Syrian border. Very likely the PYD/PKK is now preparing to use drones against Turkey regularly, just like DAESH. As it can be seen, both terrorist organizations are in preparation to use drones against Turkey as a means of attack. For this reason, it is necessary for Turkey to rapidly develop combat methods against this new weapon.

What should the combat method be?

The threat posed by drones can be decreased by technological developments. However, an anti-drone system that can thoroughly and successfully defeat drones is yet to be developed. Still, drone technology rapidly continues to advance. In particular, the number of drones commanded by a single operator increases every passing day. The progress in night vision will increase the magnitude of the danger in the near future. Firms sought alternative methods in the fight against drones, among which are mesh arms, electronic jamming systems, protection by eagles and hunting down drones with nets. However, none of them have been sufficient on their own.

ASELSAN is one of the leading companies in the world that produces technology against drone threats. The “IHTAR” developed by ASELSAN against this new threat was presented to units of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the Presidential Complex. This system is based on the soft-kill principle, which is to disable the drone by electronic jamming. However, in order to combat this threat, both soft-kill and hard-kill methods must be developed together. Thus, when a detected and tracked drone cannot be deactivated by electronic jamming, the hard-kill system would be activated and the IEP or kamikaze attack by the drone would be prevented. This kind of hard-kill system can easily be integrated into ASELSAN’s IHTAR system.

In addition to fighting with drones by developing new technologies, the following preventive measures should also be taken:

• The close monitoring of the commercial drone market to prevent bulk purchases of such devices.
• Those who purchase drones of 0.5-4 kg, which is called DRONE0 category, should be subject to registration procedures as is the case for the other drone categories such as DRONE1 and DRONE2.
• The prevention of unauthorized flights over institutions and organizations critical for the national security of Turkey and military security zones; the prevention of the procurement/supply of such aerial vehicles by terrorists for potential use in bomb attacks and reconnaissance activities against Turkish security forces and institutions and organizations with high vulnerability; and the prevention of shooting films and taking photos of the aforementioned venues.

In recent years, Turkey’s defense industry has been developing rapidly. At the very beginning of the 2000s, the country’s rate of dependency on foreign industrial suppliers was around 80%. It now is able to create weaponry and systems with its local resources. In this regard, The 13th International Defense Industry Fair (IDEF 2017) was important in demonstrating the development of Turkey’s defense industry.

Turkish firms showcased their weapons and weapon systems. The National Corvette MilGem, National Attack Helicopter T129 ATAK, National Main Battle Tank ALTAY, National Assault Rifle MPT-76, National Combat Aircraft TF-X, Turkish Light Utility Helicopter T625, Armed Hürkuş, Missiles (Cirit, Kaplan, Mızrak, Hisar, Som, Bora), National Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Bayraktar TB2, Anka and Karayel, Göktürk-1 Satellite and Armored Combat Vehicle are some examples.

There are many other ongoing weapon and weapon systems projects like these that have been completed and are being used by the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and the police force. The era of direct procurement from abroad is soon to be over. From joint production and partial design, Turkey evolves towards creating genuine and unique designs.

Strategic Value

The defense industry is actually an integral component of a country’s grand strategy, national security strategy, defense strategy and hierarchy of military doctrines. The success of these strategies mostly relies on military capacity, consisting of national weapons and weapon systems. Therefore, we can talk about the development of military technology in accordance with the aims determined by the hierarchy of strategies.

While the security threats that emerged with the Arab Spring in the Middle East indicated the scope of possible threats posed by states and non-state actors, it also underscored the importance of having and utilizing domestic military technology. Turkey has repeatedly experienced the said strategic value of the defense industry. From the hardships faced before and after the Cyprus Peace Operation to the ones that are faced in fighting terrorism, from direct and indirect embargoes from Western countries to internal and external actors trying to halt the development of the Turkish defense industry, the country has experienced many difficulties. However, despite these past experiences, the Turkish defense industry has started to attract increasing international attention and become a rather hot topic over the last fifteen years. Two Turkish defense firms are now among the world’s top hundred defense firms. According to a 2016 evaluation by Defense News, ASELSAN has risen from 62nd rank to 58th, while TUSAŞ from 78th to 72nd. It should be pointed out that no other member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation is on this list.

Despite being in a better condition than in previous decades, the Turkish defense industry has to employ multiple methods to meet its strategic aims in shorter periods. The defense industry has critical projects for the future; the national combat aircraft TF-X is one of them. There are alternative solutions for Turkey to eliminate the deficiencies in terms of qualified personnel capacity and technical infrastructure in a short time. According to TUSAŞ General Director Temel Kotil, “The TF-X will be a fifth generation combat aircraft. When we develop this aircraft, we will become the fourth ranking country in this field. TUSAŞ will collaborate with BAE Systems for the initial stage of the project. We are planning to have the first flight in 2023 and employ the aircraft by 2029.”

Political Value

In fact, President Erdoğan’s will for the development of national defense industry allowed the sector to become what it is today. He enforced an approach that relied on local solutions and national power to ensure security and stability. In this respect, it was decided to minimize external dependencies with all kinds of incentives and support for the domestic the defense industry. While the rate of domestic resources being used to meet security needs was 24% in 2002, it rose to 41.6% in 2007 and 54% in 2011. Today, it is around 68%. Having 80% locality in terms of the defense industry, which is seen in developed countries, is what Turkey aims to achieve in the shortest time possible.

Fighting against terrorist organizations like the PKK/PYD and Daesh in recent years, Turkey once again observed the necessity of a local defense industry in its struggle for power with regional and global actors. The US’ strategic armament support to the YPG, and Western countries enforcing a direct or indirect arms embargo on Turkey as a tool during times of strained relations are now frequent occurrences. European countries are either not delivering the promised products or doing whatever they can to delay the delivery. Meanwhile, the systems that are being developed entering the inventory to ease Turkey’s anti-terror strategies and extraterritorial operations are necessary for building up a military power capacity. Looking at the transformation in anti-terror operations due to the use of UAVs is a telling enough sign.

http://thenewturkey.org/securing-turkeys-borders-a-proactive-strategy-with-high-tech-approach/

Müjdat Uludağ of the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM) stated the following: “The tensions between countries are undoubtedly affecting defense industry cooperation negatively. Especially countries with powerful defense industries are enforcing an industrial policy which aims to prevent new actors from emerging, just to protect their own positions. Turkey’s priority is to establish a completely independent defense industry. Yet, Turkey is also open to cooperation in the defense industry with allied countries; because the real threat is common issues faced by countries, like global terrorism. Common threats require common resolutions.

Keeping this in mind, our institution continues to have bilateral and multilateral cooperation with many countries around the world. We have ongoing cooperation projects with the countries of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Asia-Pacific countries with developed technological infrastructure, South American countries and allies in the Middle East. Turkey will maintain its win-win policy in these defense industry cooperation strategies. In this respect, we expect more active support from our NATO allies against all terrorist activities that pose a threat to Turkey.”

Nevertheless, it is important to make this a goal not only championed by the political establishment, but also by the bureaucracy. Universities and research centers must be engaged in this process and collaborate with the defense industry. This will ease the development of the defense industry and allow its value to be understood by the public. It is obvious that there are certain deficiencies in the cooperation between the defense industry, universities and research centers in our country, especially when compared to other countries. However, according to Kotil, there are hopeful developments in this field:

“The interest in developing technologies in the universities, innovation, intellectual and industrial property, and entrepreneurship has increased in the recent years, showing a parallel with the diversification of support and incentive programs. In this respect, we can say that industrial cooperation both in our firm and country is rapidly developing. With a proactive approach, various policies are being developed and mechanisms created to strengthen the ties with universities. With the implemented applications, strategic cooperation with universities is expected. In this context, TUSAŞ has R&D cooperation protocols with 25 universities, KOOP (long-term internship) with two universities, integrated education program with three universities and Program for Training Defense Industry Researchers (SAYP) protocol with sixteen universities. As a part of these protocols, we are sharing certain information with university staff in engineering departments and research centers about our technological road map and how to conduct projects together. On the other hand, we are working on cooperation protocols regarding research and education with many other universities. A holistic view of Turkey suggests that the country has more potential in developing cooperation between the universities and the industry. For this reason, we try to understand the expectations of universities. We want to improve our cooperation with mutual trust, long-term common goals and win-win principles.”

Therefore, these kinds of cooperation will have positive outcomes in the future. Providing figures will clarify the importance of the subject: today, only at Teknopark Istanbul, there are 170 R&D firms and their 2,750 R&D personnel started around 600 national projects up to today. Moreover, the numbers of firms, personnel and projects are increasing by the day.

Economic Value

Beside its political and strategic yields, the defense industry also has important economic outcomes. Especially with the incentives for exporting and the development of products that can compete on the international market, the defense industry contributed to the economy of the country. Around $196 million in defense and aviation exports in 2004 skyrocketed to $1.673 billion in 2016. The total defense and aviation turnover of $1.855 billion in 2006 is now around the $6 billion mark. As the figures suggest, the capacity and the income of the sector were at lower levels thirteen years ago. Yet, it still lags behind powers that focus on this sector.

Uludağ evaluated the situation in his following statement:

“Our defense and aviation exports are sevenfold when compared to the 2002 data. While the said rise shows that our defense industry is improving in terms of competence, it also indicates to a huge potential waiting to be tapped. As platforms, we have achieved important exports in land vehicles in the past. We are aiming to reach high figures in exports in the global markets in parallel with our business development plans for ship and helicopter platforms along with UAV systems. To reach this target, we are working in coordination with certain public institutions in providing long-term loans for products by the defense and aviation industry that have high strategic value. Meanwhile, the platforms and systems we produce are being used by TSK and our security forces; this will prove to be an advantage for the firms. Yet, our firms focusing on the international markets and strategically prioritizing their efforts with a holistic outlook is also crucial for reaching higher figures in exports.”

Therefore, it could be said that the defense industry may build up a momentum with steady steps and cling onto the international markets. A $25 billion export target has been set for 2025. While this target may be deemed as impossible in the short-term, it is quite possible with the value-added that will be provided by nationalized production of software and hardware. According to the 2016 report of SSM, SSM has approved 269 projects which amounted to TL123 billion. Looking at the distribution of the projects, it could be seen that 47.58% is for domestic development, 8.18% for domestic direct procurement, 20.07% for R&D, 8.5% for joint production projects, and 10.78% is for foreign direct procurement. Therefore, support for projects that are more local than others will bring the desired economic value with it.

Turkey is the world’s sixth largest armament importer and fifteenth largest armament exporter. According to SIPRI data, Turkey spent $15 billion on its defense budget in 2016. Transitioning from a procurer of weapons to producer of weapons contributed to our exports. Turkey’s leading export partners in terms of the defense industry are the US, Germany, Malaysia, the Gulf countries and Azerbaijan. 34.3% of the exports were done with NAFTA members, 23.7% with the EU, 18.5% with Middle Eastern countries, 8.6% with Far Eastern countries, and 7.5% with CIS countries.

There are many steps to be taken for Turkey to have a defense industry that can compete globally; however, looking at the efforts, we easily can say that Turkey is on the right track. The more independent its military technology, the more powerful Turkey will be. In this respect, the private sector has to contribute more and take the initiative.

Turkey is fighting against multiple security threats in a region mired in conflict. To not have any vulnerabilities in its fight, Turkey has to increase and consolidate its military capacity. In this sense, the defense industry has to adopt the network-centric warfare doctrine and shape its efforts accordingly. On the other hand, there are certain risks that obstruct the national defense industry. The Gülenist Terrorist Organization’s (FETÖ) activities serve as a break for certain crucial projects. Similarly, embargoes enforced by Western countries bring the risk of slowing down these projects. However, the most important risk is that immense efforts to improve the defense industry may be halted by bureaucratic procedures. Despite all the hardships and challenges, Turkey must continue developing its national defense industry and seek ways to accelerate even further.

President Erdoğan’s meeting with US President Trump was overshadowed by the Pentagon’s decision to provide heavy weaponry to the YPG. Meanwhile, Trump’s mind was preoccupied with rumors of impeachment over allegations his administration shared state secrets with Russian officials. Some circles in Washington, on the other hand, tried to prevent the one-on-one meeting of Erdoğan and Trump.

The Pentagon’s hasty decision to equip the PKK/PYD with heavy weaponry was due to a possible revision in the planning of the Raqqa offensive after the two leaders’ meeting. There were no substantial changes in the planned Raqqa offensive, which is being coordinated by the Pentagon, but Turkey was able to relay its concerns about the PYD/YPG and the demographic engineering in the region at the highest official level. Turkey was also able to secure certain guarantees about the fight against the PKK, and made clear the fact it would actively continue its fight against the terrorist organization. Moreover, Turkey emphasized that it wouldn’t stand idle as the PKK/PYD, Daesh, and Iran-backed Shiite militias carried out ethnic and sectarian cleansing in the region.

Trump’s statement underscoring the strategic and military partnership between Turkey and the US was crucial. Even though the Turkish delegation returned to the country with a cautious optimism, this statement was perceived as the herald of a new era in Turkey-US relations, which had been on the decline since May, 2013. No one was expecting all the issues between the two countries to be resolved in an instant, but the image of the two leaders standing side by side was interpreted as the beginning of a more promising period for bilateral relations.

This was not the only indication that the level of understanding and cooperation between the US and Turkey could be on the mend.

Factors prompting the normalization of Turkey-US relations

The normalization in relations between Turkey and Israel, which had been in a crisis since the Mavi Marmara incident, will cause a gradual change in how Turkey is perceived both by the Trump administration, which has been especially sensitive on the issue, and circles that are associated with the Israeli lobby in Washington, which have advocated anti-Turkey sentiments for some time now. While Turkey will continue to advocate for the basic rights of the people of Jerusalem and Palestine, it will be more careful to avoid tensions with Israel. There are concrete efforts to increase the common interests of the two countries, especially in energy, tourism and trade.

Another issue that both Turkey and the US converge on in this new era is Iran’s expansionist policies in the Middle East. In particular, Iran-backed militia forces which are trying to gain ground using a sectarian discourse and ideology are posing a threat to the interests of many countries and local elements in the region. Checking these militias, whose presence is rationalized as a necessary counter to Daesh, brings Turkey, the US and many other countries in the region on common ground.

http://thenewturkey.org/will-the-trump-administration%E2%80%99s-syria-policy-change-after-the-chemical-attack/

Enclosing Sunni countries with a “Shiite crescent” – a policy that was covertly endorsed by the Obama administration to limit the Sunni governments in the region much to the chagrin of traditional allies like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf countries and Israel – is no longer sustainable. The Trump administration, which is yet to take over the control of security and foreign policy from the Obama administration’s military and civil bureaucrats, will realize that cooperation with Turkey could yield more effective results than surrounding the country with terrorist organizations like the PKK/PYD and Shiite militia forces.

Turkey’s success in Operation Euphrates Shield already debunked the myth that the PKK/PYD is the most effective force in the fight against Daesh. If Brett McGurk, the US envoy to the coalition against Daesh, and an Obama administration appointee who has built his own career on the an alliance with the PKK/PYD, and certain CENTCOM officials take a step back, the permanent and constructive possibilities of coordination with Turkey will become more apparent.  Turkey can provide a solution that is sustainable given the region’s sectarian and ethnic patterns, unlike the PKK/PYD, which has only sought to exploit these dangerous fault-lines.

The US’s persistent support to the PKK/PYD is antagonizing moderate Syrian Kurds who are being dominated by the terrorist organization, along with Arabs in Northern Syria who have been forced from their own lands, not to mention Washington’s own ally, Turkey. If the Trump administration is to adopt a controlled chaos strategy in the Middle East, just like the Obama administration, instead of an orderly one, they can continue their alliance with PKK/PYD; however, if the US wants to stabilize the region and win over the allies it has offended, they have to widen their narrow perspective. In this respect, Erdoğan and his team went to Washington with a comprehensive plan.

Another development which may cause the Trump administration to revise its relations with Turkey is the level of popular support President Erdoğan has demonstrated through the constitutional amendment referendum. Certain circles in Washington have been trying to prove that Erdoğan has little support and will not remain in office long, a campaign that began with the Gezi Park Protests in May, 2013. Having emerged with the clear support of the people both in the July 15 coup attempt and the April 16 constitutional referendum, Erdoğan has shown that he is has the backing of Turkey, and he is not going anywhere. Decision makers in Washington, along with leaders of other countries will have to acknowledge this sooner or later.

Erdoğan, at his meeting with Trump, expressed a sincere hope for more cooperation between the two countries, while also highlighting Turkey’s concerns on the road to normalization. Ankara is eagerly waiting to see how Trump will respond to its call. It is still not clear whether the relationship between the two countries is to become strategic in terms of regional politics. Another question that the whole world anxiously awaits the answer to is whether Trump will be left standing after his ongoing power struggle with the Washington establishment.

Former US President Barack Obama had designated Turkey as a model partner in his first term. However, regional priorities of the Obama administration shifted drastically after 2012. The attack on the US diplomatic mission in Benghazi in September 2012, which resulted in the death of the US ambassador, is thought to be one of the main reasons behind this shift. After 2014, a new US foreign policy approach led to the containment of Turkey from all sides. The Obama Administration’s decision to form an alliance with the terrorist PYD/YPG against DAESH in Syria was a turning point for Turkey.

The US political and military support for PYD encouraged the PKK and other terrorist organizations to target Turkey. The PKK ended the reconciliation process in the summer of 2015 and commenced its terror attacks against the country. Simultaneously, DAESH started to increase the frequency of its attacks against Turkey. The US’s clear stance against Turkey might have been a factor behind the failed coup attempt by FETO (the Fetullah Gülenist Terror Organization) in the Summer of 2016. The leaders of FETO had probably calculated that given the Erdoğan administration’s unpopularity in Washington policy circles, not many actors in the US would resist such a coup attempt. They were right in the sense that not so many people among the Obama administration clearly and vociferously condemned the putschists that tried to topple the democratically elected government of Turkey. However, FETO leaders miscalculated the Turkish people’s own resistance and strong reaction to the coup attempt.

Obama’s foreign policy approach was not just directed against Turkey. Although the second term of the Obama administration was a nightmare for traditional US allies including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Ukraine, Obama’s policies produced a favorable environment for the US’s rivals like Iran, Cuba, and Russia. The containment of Sunni countries with a “Shiite crescent” was truly ensured during the Obama administration. Nuclear talks with Iran, political developments in Iraq and the US’s military retreat from Iraq paved the way for Iran and its sectarian geopolitics. Iran was the primary beneficiary of the Obama Administration’s Middle East policy. “The strategy to balance old allies with old rivals” was costly for the US’s traditional allies. However, all actors started to seek new means to compensate for their losses. Turkey’s balancing strategy and recalibration efforts were the result of such a quest.

Turkey was in search of a new partner to overcome the internal and trans-border security challenges that the country was facing. Turkey’s attempts to improve relations with Russia and contacts with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization were a direct result of this search. Indeed, Operation Euphrates Shield that aimed to cleanse the Turkish-Syrian border from terrorist elements commenced only after mutual agreement with Russia. The search for new cooperation opportunities in Turkish foreign policy does not entail becoming a part of a new alliance system in the short term; however, it caused Turkey to distance itself from the alliance system that it is a member of. The new orientation of Turkish foreign policy may cause it to form issue or region-based strategic partnerships or limited alliances. The adoption of a dynamically balanced policy instead of relying on a particular alliance for increasing security in the short and midterm seems a more probable option.

In the short-term, Turkey will try to have a much more balanced relationship with the US, Russia and EU. To have a reasonable balanced policy, Turkey should do its best to avoid any situation that could bring these three actors in line against itself. At the regional level, on the other hand balancing Iranian expansionism, and sectarian rhetoric as well as the containment of the PKK/PYD and DAESH will be Turkey’s top priorities.

Being surrounded by the PKK/PYD, DAESH and Iranian-backed sectarian militias is the worst-case scenario for Turkey. However, Turkey is not the only actor unhappy with the activism of the aforementioned violent non-state actors and militia groups. Turkey may be in a position to take risks against these actors because unlike for the US, EU and Russia; PKK/PYD, DAESH and the sectarian militias constitute an existential threat against Turkey’s security. Turkey’s more assertive struggle against these actors in the field may encourage three major actors (US, EU and Russia) to cooperate or at least to stop resisting against Turkey. These diverse objectives may eventually contradict each other, which is the main challenge for Turkey.

Transition from Axis to Balance Policy

Turkey abstained from direct military intervention in the Syrian civil war and this was something unexpected by Washington, which, previously too, had not received logistical support from Turkey during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The US administration seems to have been frustrated by Turkey’s military refraining from intervening in Syria in the framework of the alliance with the US, and started to question the necessity of an ally that didn’t act in the interest of Washington. On the other hand, relations with President Erdoğan and the AK Party government became tense.

The period following the downing of a Russian fighter jet near the Syrian border by the Turkish Air Force in November 2015 had been painful for Turkey. The country’s relations with both the US and Russia became tense since early 2015. Meanwhile the EU was also indifferent towards Turkey’s sensitivities in its struggle against terrorism. All factors combined, each and every one of these actors tried to benefit from the fragility of the country and expected Turkey to go along with their interests. The Gülenist coup attempt of July 15, 2016, took place in such a fragile environment.

Today, Turkey’s top priority is to have more balanced relationships with the US, Russia, and EU. Improving the relations or being on friendly terms with at least two of these actors is a key to Turkey’s economic and political stability. Keeping a delicate balance between the US, Russia and EU is quite significant for maintaining Turkey’s relative autonomy in its foreign relations as much as in its domestic security. On the other hand, however, balancing interests in the economy and security is another challenge for Turkey. There is no magic formula to reach these objectives at the same time but the balancing policy should henceforth be the pivotal term for Turkish foreign policy. Having tense relationships with more than one global actor accompanied by other regional security challenges makes Turkey less immune to domestic and international shocks.

The turbulent era of Turkish foreign policy, especially during Barack Obama’s second term, is the reflection of the struggle to adapt to the new foreign policy approach. It is probable to have a more rational policy, based on the mutual interests of the two countries during the Donald Trump presidency. At some point, the Trump administration will have to make a strategic choice between Turkey and the PKK/PYD in Syria and it will shape the future of Turkish-American relations. The competition between US CENTCOM and the US EUCOM will also influence the end result. While US CENTCOM has chosen PKK/PYD as its strategic partner, EUCOM may choose to improve cooperation and collaboration with Turkey in critical security issues regarding Europe.

On the other hand, Turkey’s efforts to coordinate its Syria policy with Russia, despite certain difficulties, may have positive outcomes for Turkey’s security. If the Astana Process for the resolution of the Syrian conflict produces some productive outcomes, this might help the resolution of other issues as well. We have to keep in mind that Turkey and Russia are still far from reaching a strategic agreement in any significant security related issue including the future of Syria.

The EU is a more complicated counterpart for Turkey. Although there are more areas of potential cooperation and mutual interests between Turkey and the EU, especially in the fields of economy and security, the possibility of strengthening ties in the near future is quite grim due to internal political complications and challenges of both actors. The results of parliamentary elections in Germany in September 2017 and French presidential elections will have a significant influence on the leadership of the EU. Until then, EU-Turkey relations may be unstable at best.

The legacy of openings to other regions such as Africa, Latin America and East Asia is positive but these regions do not have strategic value for Turkey’s foreign policy agenda. If the EU institutions decide to continue more hostile relations with Turkey and try to isolate Turkey, alternative options including the Shangai Cooperation Organization may be considered more seriously. Fluctuations and instabilities in US-Russian relations will have a direct impact on Turkey’s strategic decisions and choices. That is why the decision makers in Turkey will be following this relationship closely. Turkey is entering a new era where diplomacy has to be conducted meticulously to meet the new challenges.

Turkey is having difficulty communicating its current foreign policy objectives and practices, which are closely linked to the country’s recent domestic challenges. Both Turkey’s traditional NATO allies and Russia are unwilling to cooperate with it in its efforts to meet security challenges related to the spillover effects of the Syrian war and the problems related to the FETO (Fetullah Gülenist Terror Organization). Indeed this reluctance is beyond the scope of a simple communication problem.

Turkish decision makers feel that the country’s traditional allies are now implicitly containing Turkey with their tacit encouragement of the terror organizations that are targeting Turkey. Both the US as well as EU members seem to have strong ties with terrorist elements such as the PKK and the FETO which constitute an existential threat to Turkish national security. The CENTCOM commanders do not hide their strategic cooperation and collaboration with the PYD and the PKK in Syria. Those terror organizations constantly target Turkey with the weapons provided by the US and other coalition partners.

The anti-DAESH coalition provided limited support to Turkey in its fight against the terror group, however the coalition partners also set some limits for Turkey in its fight against the terror group in the course of Operation Euphrates Shield. EU institutions and European politicians are pursuing biased policies to tarnish Turkey’s international image rather than cooperating in the areas where both sides have common interests. These are the main reasons why Turkey has to make a structural transformation in its foreign policy approach as well as in its priorities in its relations with the US, EU, and Russia.

This transformation is directly linked to Turkey’s rising security concerns in which change in the policies of Ankara’s historical allies is the main reason behind it. The new yet complex security environment and challenges made Turkey more introverted within the last two years. Turkish foreign policy did not choose an isolationist path, however unlike the more idealist era Turkey’s imminent security concerns necessitated a more balanced approach. Defensive and coercive foreign policy tools started to assume a more significant place in Turkish foreign policy decision-making. Turkey seemed less prepared in coercive foreign policy, besides the use of military might, and faced more international resistance despite the fact that it was used against DAESH.

The priority of the AK Party era Turkish foreign policy was to diversify its relations in terms of regions/countries and to expand the autonomy of Turkey’s foreign policy. This diversification also tried to strike a balance between economic, political, and security related interests. Turkey tried to resolve its problems with neighboring countries and institutionalize strong political, economic and cultural ties during the AK Party administration until 2013. This diversification effort was not shaped at the expense of any specific third party. This approach also aimed to decrease Turkey’s dependency on its traditional allies in terms of defense and security.

The inclusion of the EU integration process into Turkey’s policy agenda played constructive roles within the political and economic fields. However, with the EU decision to block Turkey’s membership process under the pretext of the Cyprus issue, Turkey turned to improve its ties with other regions, and thus the policy was labeled as an “opening period.”  Turkish foreign policy tried to improve ties with the Middle East, Russia, and African and Latin American countries during this time. Rather than shifting its axis towards other forces, Turkey prioritized the country’s national interests. This policy was frequently criticized by Turkey’s traditional allies as well as by the local affiliates of these allies. Turkey’s allies put pressure on Turkey through rhetoric like “shift of axis,” “Neo-Ottomanism,” “Middle-Easternization,” “Eurasianism,” and “Islamization of Turkey’s foreign policy.”

On the other hand, Turkey adopted an idealist foreign policy vision between 2004 and 2013 with the claim to be an actor that can help to facilitate more collaborative relations around its neighboring region. This policy emphasized an “order instituting” actor role for Turkey. In accordance with this idealist vision, Turkey decided to become a proactive mediator or facilitator for the resolution of numerous regional crises. Regional cooperation and trade opportunities were improved with comprehensive international platforms. These policies were quite effective until the early stages of the Arab Spring. The regional atmosphere was conducive to the implementation of such a constructive agenda. Turkey also paid attention to coordinate its efforts with its Western allies.

The outbreak of the Syrian Civil War and the destabilization of Iraq due to the rise of terror organizations and ethnic and sectarian militia groups radically changed the security environment of Turkey. The country felt the risk of destabilization due to immediate challenges. Terrorist organizations found a suitable environment to spread along Turkey’s southern border. NATO mostly stood still against these changing security trends; only precautions against DAESH were taken. NATO involvement was quite weak and insufficient to provide safeguards for Turkey. Threats posed to Turkey’s security by terror organizations such as the PKK, DHKP-C and FETO, were mostly disregarded.

The lukewarm stance of Turkey’s NATO allies with regard to Turkey’s security challenges resulted in the isolation of Turkey in terms of security and foreign policy. Turkey was left alone in its fight against terror and this strategic choice of Turkey’s “Western allies” was at the same time a strategy to constrain and balance Turkey’s pro-active role in regional politics. Turkey was expected to renounce its proactive role and return back to a traditional defensive role that was designated for it during the Cold War era. Turkey resisted in adapting its regional foreign policy to the traditional defensive model.

Turkey, being surrounded by a mix of violent non-state actors/ terror groups, felt it necessity to deploy its military on the field with Operation Euphrates Shield. Turkey’s active presence intensified its relations with the US, Russia and Iran since mid-2014. However, the attempts to recalibrate the Turkish foreign policy to this new security oriented paradigm started in mid-2016. Turkish foreign policy is switching into a more pragmatic approach. Border security and the struggle against terrorism will be prioritized, yet non-coercive approaches such as humanitarian and development aid, conflict resolution and mediation approaches, trade diplomacy and soft power will continue to be on the agenda.

Reducing dependence on defense industry and expanding and strengthening its network of non-state partners in the regional context are other medium term goals. Having been disappointed by the hostile policies of its traditional allies, Turkey will now emphasize an issue-based balancing strategy. Turkey is experiencing a seesaw pattern and disappointments in its foreign policy are the byproduct of this recalibration effort. Turkey does not refrain from using its hard power against terror elements on both sides of its borders, despite criticism by the US, Russia and other regional actors.

The adoption of pre-emptive security operations on both sides of Turkey’s border was a major shift for Turkey’s security doctrine. Turkey shifted its foreign policy approach along its southern and eastern borders. This shift can be portrayed as a change from pro-active constructive diplomacy to pre-emptive security. This change also has effects on domestic politics and bureaucratic configuration. More nationalist discourses started to dominate multilateralist voices and security diplomacy started to become more central actors to Turkey’s foreign policy making since both the Turkish public and Turkish decision makers are getting increasingly disappointed by the US and EU’s indifference to its security concerns.