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urkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit, covering Tripoli and Benghazi between August 11 and 12, has been one of the most visible indicators of the shift in Türkiye’s Libya policy that has become apparent in recent years. Immediately prior to the visit, a 4.5-million-litre petrol tank at the Zawiya Refinery, 50 kilometres west of Tripoli, was set alight by a drone attack, prompting the National Oil Corporation to declare a state of emergency at the highest level. Foreign Minister Fidan’s reference to an approach that “makes no distinction between western, eastern and southern Libya” is the clearest expression of Ankara’s new approach, which, whilst defending Libya’s territorial integrity, does not limit its engagement on the ground to a single political and geographical center.

Exercises unite the army but not politics

One of the notable changes in the Libya dossier in 2026 was Washington’s return as a more visible actor. Indeed, the initiative led by Massad Boulos, US President Donald Trump’s adviser on Arab and African affairs, materialized in Sirte on July 14. Khalid Haftar, son of Khalifa Haftar and Chief of Staff of the Libyan National Army (LNA), and Selahaddin Nemrush, Chief of Staff of the Government of National Unity (GNU), met under the supervision of the United Nations (UN) Support Mission and issued a declaration on a ‘single national army’. They also agreed to organize joint exercises to tackle smuggling and migration along the Chad-Niger border.

Details that have emerged suggest that a power-sharing formula is being discussed, under which Abdulhamid Dbeibeh would remain as Prime Minister and a senior executive position would be opened up for the Hafter faction. Furthermore, plans to encourage the return of American energy companies to Libya and to carry out joint military activities under the leadership of AFRICOM indicate that Washington is seeking to advance the political, economic and security dimensions of its Libya policy simultaneously. The adoption in April 2026 of the first unified budget since 2013 has been one of the most tangible outcomes of this process to date.

Washington approaches Libya’s political crisis partly with a cost-benefit analysis. The Central Bank cannot finance two parallel governments indefinitely; therefore, scarcity forces the parties to unite. This is an approach that treats the economy as the driving force, whilst regarding legitimacy as a technical detail to be resolved later. The unification of military institutions under a single structure, the conduct of joint exercises and even reaching agreement on a joint budget are genuine achievements. However, none of this address the question of which political authority the armed groups will be subject to. Indeed, the outright rejection of the plan by the armed groups in Misrata, the militia clashes in Tripoli and the objections rising from the south demonstrate that the architecture on paper has yet to find its counterpart on the ground.

Ankara’s own terms

Another weakness of the Boulos initiative lies in the tension between timing and legitimacy. The 36-month transition timetable and the stated election date of February 17 position the ballot box as a promise rather than a concrete objective. The fact that the unified budget signed in April has still not been implemented shows that the agreement on paper has had only limited impact on the ground. Political steps taken without establishing an implementation mechanism do not, on their own, alter the balance of power on the ground. Furthermore, power-sharing carries the risk of fueling corruption and further reinforcing existing power networks by easing current constraints on public spending. In short, the formula of political compromise in exchange for oil revenue is sufficient to keep the two capitals at the negotiating table in the short term. However, as the size of the rent to be shared increases, so does the disruptive capacity of armed actors left out of the process. The events in Zawiya can also be interpreted within this framework.

Türkiye is positioning itself within this plan on its own terms. Ankara’s advantage lies in maintaining its strong military and political presence in western Libya whilst progressively deepening its relations with actors in the east. Foreign Minister Fidan’s meetings in Tripoli with Dibeybe, Menfi and Takala, as well as Acting Defence Minister Zubi, Interior Minister Trabelsi, Chief of the General Staff Nemrush and Head of Military Intelligence Mahmud Hamza; and in Benghazi with Marshal Hafter, Saddam Hafter and Agile Salih, demonstrates that Türkiye is analyzing the situation in Libya at the level of its security apparatus.

Moreover, some of the figures on this list, including Agile Salih, are known to be actors who maintain a distance from the American initiative. Consequently, Ankara’s network of contacts encompasses actors who approach the American initiative to varying degrees. Ankara’s military and political access emerges as a key factor in making the US plan feasible on the ground. This position allows it to continue its engagement with Ankara through American initiative, whilst enabling it to defend its own priorities more forcefully at the negotiating table.

Sons and nephews: The consolidation of loyalty and a fragile arena

The most critical dynamic observed in Libya today is the advancement of succession engineering rather than institutionalization. In the east, Saddam Hafter’s military and political clout, Khalid Hafter’s position within the General Staff, and Bilkasım Hafter’s management of the reconstruction budget through the Development and Reconstruction Fund; whilst in the west, Ibrahim Dibeybe’s central role in the dossier as the Prime Minister’s national security adviser, represent the two ends of the same spectrum. In both camps, power is consolidated through families and networks of loyalty rather than through institutions. In this context, Ankara has established relations with actors likely to influence the future of Libyan politics.

The fact that political and military balances in Libya are never static makes this approach rational from a foreign policy perspective. Washington’s return to the negotiating table is also reshaping the calculations. The key capability stemming from Ankara’s decade-long experience lies not in alliances formed with specific actors, but in the flexibility to recalibrate its position as actors change. Conversely, when Türkiye’s core interests are at stake, the same flexibility cannot apply. The inclusion of the Turkish Armed Forces’ Libya Task Force Command in Tripoli in the visit program serves as a deliberate reminder of the deterrent power underpinning diplomacy.

Vulnerability, however, is concentrated in the west. The Zawiya refinery has for years been a nexus of fuel subsidies, smuggling and rivalry between armed groups. The increasing isolation of Mohammed Bahrun—a key regional actor who once aligned closely with the Dbeibeh faction—is turning Zawiya into one of the new flashpoints of tension between the government and local armed groups. Regardless of who carried out the attack, the current situation indicates that one of the key dimensions of the struggle in western Libya centers on the distribution of rents and resources. Foreign Minister Fidan’s inclusion of Omar Mukhtar’s memorial tomb in his Benghazi itinerary can be interpreted as a symbolic message showing that Türkiye’s engagement in the east is not limited solely to existing political and military actors. Ankara is establishing a foundation in the east that is grounded not only in military and political relations but also in Libya’s historical memory.

The Cairo circle: The Mecca Pact, maritime jurisdiction zones and the equation extending to the Red Sea

The framework that gives Fidan’s visit to Libya its true significance, however, is regional. The joint defense agreement signed in Mecca on August 7 by President Erdoğan, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif established a collective security architecture that treats an attack on one party as an attack on all parties, whilst remaining open to the participation of other regional countries. This move, which brings together Türkiye’s military weight within NATO, Saudi Arabia’s financial capacity and Pakistan’s security capabilities within the same framework, has made the divisions between the various partnership networks already taking shape in the region more apparent.

The addition of India’s growing interest to the cooperation between Greece, the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus and Israel indicate the emergence of overlapping partnerships that balance Türkiye’s regional influence, rather than a single opposing bloc. The competitive arena for this axis could extend from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Red Sea and East Africa.

At this juncture, the Türkiye–Libya agreement on maritime zones, signed in 2019, is becoming one of the key elements in the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean, in addition to its legal status. The political sustainability of the agreement depends not only on the continuity of the government in Tripoli but also on Benghazi’s stance towards this text. For this reason, the relationship maintained with the Haftar family is also significant in terms of safeguarding Türkiye’s legal rights and gains regarding maritime zones in the Eastern Mediterranean. The relations Ankara has developed with Benghazi present an important opportunity for the maritime zones agreement to gain acceptance in eastern Libya as well.

Egypt might join the Mecca Agreement

Cairo was the missing link in this equation. Foreign Minister Fidan’s visit to Egypt following his trip to Libya completes this missing link. The topics to be discussed outline the strategy for the region. Alongside Gaza, Syria, Libya, Sudan and the Eastern Mediterranean, the details of this strategy include hydrocarbon and electricity grid integration, the defense industry, and the trade volume, which is targeted to increase from 8 billion dollars to 15 billion dollars. Foreign Minister Fidan’s indication that Egypt might join the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, however, elevates this visit beyond a mere technical consultation. The fact that Türkiye and Egypt are now able to speak with one voice on Libya could weaken one of the key elements of the rival patronage equation that has long fueled the east-west divide in Libya.

It is no coincidence that the Sudan dossier is also being discussed at the same table. Egypt is the key country in the corridor linking the Eastern Mediterranean to the Red Sea and East Africa. The quest for stability in Libya and the containment of the conflict in Sudan are two ends of the same geopolitical axis. The defense framework signed in Mecca on August 7, the meetings in Tripoli and Benghazi held between August 11 and 12, the reception of Mahmoud Abbas in Ankara on August 12, and the visit to Cairo on August 13 all constitute an intense diplomatic flurry crammed into a single week. It would be an oversimplification to view this sequence of events as entirely unrelated developments.

Turkish foreign policy today views the Eastern Mediterranean, North Africa and the Red Sea basin as an increasingly interconnected security zone. Ankara’s emphasis on a ‘single Libya’ is, in fact, the diplomatic expression of its view that the Eastern Mediterranean constitutes a holistic, rather than fragmented, strategic equation. Within this equation, Libya serves as a strategic terrain where it is critical not only to secure gains but also to safeguard them over the long term.

(Originally published in Turkish by SETA Foundation)

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urkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said Wednesday that a comprehensive investigation has been launched into the plane crash in Türkiye that killed Libya’s army chief and several members of his delegation.

Speaking at the Justice and Development (AK) Party’s extended provincial heads meeting in Ankara, Erdoğan said the incident “deeply saddened us” and extended condolences on behalf of Türkiye to the “brotherly Libyan people,” the Libyan armed forces and the government.

The Libyan Chief of the General Staff, General Mohamed Ali Al-Haddad, and four members of his delegation, as well as three crew members, died when a Falcon 50 business jet crashed shortly after taking off from Ankara.

Erdoğan said relevant Turkish ministries would provide further information as the investigation progresses.

Black boxes recovered as search and inspection continue

The aircraft was located about 2 kilometers south of Kesikkavak village in Ankara’s Haymana district. Search and rescue operations continued overnight despite heavy rain and dense fog, with efforts coordinated from a mobile command center established by Türkiye’s Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD).

Turkish Interior Minister Ali Yerlikaya said the plane’s flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder were recovered early Wednesday, and the examination process has begun to determine the cause of the crash. He added that debris from the aircraft is spread across an area of approximately 3 square kilometers.

More than 400 personnel, supported by 103 ground vehicles and seven aircraft, are working at the site.

A Libyan military delegation arrived in Ankara on Wednesday to inspect the crash scene, while a separate 22-member delegation — including relatives of the victims and officials from Libya’s Defense and Interior ministries — also traveled to the Turkish capital.

Authorities said findings from the investigation will be shared with the public once the analysis is complete.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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hen assessed as a whole across four contexts, the Turkey-Italy-Libya Summit has signaled the first signs of a search for a new balance in the Mediterranean. In the geostrategic sphere, a framework linking the Eastern Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan Africa. In the economic sphere, a development vision supported by energy, integration and logistics routes. In the regional cooperation sphere, technical committees, multilateral formats and a process institutionalized with UN support, and finally, in the context of EU security, common solutions to irregular migration and human trafficking stand out.

The trilateral summit between Turkey, Italy and Libya, held in Istanbul in early August, was a critical meeting where long-term strategic lines for the Mediterranean basin and Africa were discussed. This summit also presents a framework that is coherent in terms of geostrategic, economic, regional cooperation and European security contexts. Each of these contexts exists and functions as interlinked rings. Therefore, it is a fact that this trilateral summit cannot be reduced to a single dimensional parameter.

From the Eastern Mediterranean to Sub-Saharan Africa

One of the most critical aspects of the tripartite summit is the new equation it presents in a geostrategic context. The Eastern Mediterranean has long been at the center of attention due to energy discoveries, disputes over maritime jurisdiction and regional competition. The maritime jurisdiction agreement signed by Turkey with Libya in 2019 invalidated the plans of Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) and suspended projects such as the EastMed pipeline. Today, the fact that Italy, a member of the EU and NATO, is sitting at the same table with Turkey and Libya confirms this agreement. Thus, a geopolitical reality has emerged in which Greece and the GCA are isolated, and the Ankara-Tripoli-Rome axis has been strengthened.

However, in this geostrategic picture, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and Turkey are dimensions that should not be overlooked. Israel’s rhetoric has recently increased, tending to portray Turkey as a “threat center”. As in the cases of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Iran, the reasons cited are the expansion of defense industry capacity, the construction of a nuclear energy reactor for peaceful purposes, and support for Palestine. In particular, allegations are being made that the nuclear power plant in Akkuyu is intended for a nuclear weapons program. Furthermore, Turkey’s UAV base in the TRNC, its signal intelligence facilities and its reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities are being presented by Israel as potential threats. These statements actually reveal that Israel has pursued a strategy of dividing the area into small pieces rather than engaging in a major conflict directly, thereby restricting the opponent’s room for maneuver through rhetoric and alliances.

To this end, Israel is increasing its efforts to build closer ties with the Republic of Cyprus and Greece. It is noteworthy that, despite Turkey not pursuing a policy of hostility towards any actor in its own region or within the global system, various actors share common ground with Israel through their opposition to Turkey. In this context, the Turkey-Italy-Libya cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean has the potential to act as a balancing factor against new alliance initiatives targeting Turkey, in addition to energy and migration issues and the Cyprus case.

Energy, Integration and Logistics Routes

The economic agenda became a natural complement to the geostrategic picture. At the summit, joint projects in the energy, oil and gas sectors, port investments, infrastructure projects and Libya’s connection to regional projects in the Mediterranean in terms of connectivity were at the forefront. Indeed, these issues serve as tools for economic cooperation and strategic integration. Turkey’s infrastructure and construction experience, combined with Italy’s energy investments through ENI, present a critical opportunity for cooperation in Libya’s reconstruction process.

In terms of logistics routes, the transformation of Libya’s ports into a new bridge to Europe and the interior of Africa is in line with the common interests of the three countries. Thus, it creates an effect that strengthens economic integration, security and geopolitical interests. At this point, the potential of economic development to mitigate the driving factors of migration will also enable energy and infrastructure projects to have a mitigating effect on irregular migration in the future. Therefore, it is considered that the economic agenda is directly linked to the migration and security agendas.

From technical level to multilateralism

On the other hand, the institutionalization of regional cooperation is the third link that completes the economic context. The establishment of technical level committees in a tripartite structure at the Summit enables the committees to begin working on concrete steps. The mechanisms formed by the committees aim to transform cooperation from abstract declarations of intent into action. In addition, the quadripartite format proposed by Libyan Prime Minister Dibeybe, which would include Qatar and involve ministers, demonstrates the intention to broaden the scope of cooperation. Qatar’s financial, humanitarian and logistical contributions are a factor that will increase the feasibility of the projects.

This situation signals that regional coordination will evolve beyond the Mediterranean coastal countries to include the Gulf countries. Furthermore, the political process to be conducted with UN facilitation and the support given to the elections reflect Turkey’s approach to enhancing the role of the UN in the international system. Indeed, in the face of increasing criticism of the UN and the questioning of its role in the international system, Turkey appears to be making a positive effort. Therefore, it can be said that Turkey aims to strengthen the legitimacy of the multilateral system, beyond bilateral and trilateral relations.

Common solutions to common challenges

As the fourth and final link, the migration issue has emerged as one of the most prominent topics of the Summit. Migration is a matter directly related to European Union (EU) security. Italy, as one of the most vulnerable countries on the EU’s southern border, considers limiting migration flows a vital priority.

Meanwhile, Turkey has long been implementing joint projects with Europe to combat irregular migration and human trafficking. Libya, as the main departure point for migration routes, is at the center of this triangle. The Summit was expected to discuss action plans to combat human trafficking networks, prevent irregular movements, and support Libya in managing migration pressures. The important point here is that migration is being addressed both as a security issue and as an economic and humanitarian matter. Italian Prime Minister Meloni’s desire to transfer the cooperation experience with Turkey, which she described as ‘excellent results,’ to Libya can be seen as a sign that the EU will also be indirectly involved in this process.

This context also serves as a reminder that Turkey is an integral part of EU security. Ankara’s role has the potential to counteract the influence of policies within the EU that prioritize the narrow interests of Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. Thus, migration can be seen not only as a crisis issue but also as a basis for establishing a new security architecture between Turkey and Europe.

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n conflict zones around the world, water has become a weapon, leading to dire consequences for civilian populations. From Yemen to Ukraine to Libya, the deliberate targeting or indirect impact on water infrastructure has exacerbated humanitarian crises, highlighting the urgent need for innovative solutions to minimize civilian harm.

In Yemen, a country plagued by civil war since 2014, both state and non-state actors have targeted water infrastructure as part of their military strategy. The Houthis, backed by government forces, have engaged in a tug-of-war over control of water resources, leading to blockades and attacks on water supplies.

The resulting water shortages have contributed to food insecurity and disease outbreaks, disproportionately affecting women and children. Humanitarian organizations struggle to provide assistance amid ongoing conflict and logistical challenges, leaving millions in desperate need of aid.

Destruction of water infrastructure in Ukraine

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has brought devastation to the country’s water infrastructure. The deliberate destruction of civilian infrastructure, including the Nova Kakhovka Dam, has led to displacement and water shortages for millions of people.

The interconnected nature of water and energy systems means that attacks on one system can have ripple effects on the other, further exacerbating the crisis. Despite international condemnation, Russia continues to target critical infrastructure, leaving civilians without access to clean water and sanitation.

Libya, torn apart by a decade of conflict, has also seen its water infrastructure targeted and destroyed. The collapse of dams and water systems in cities like Derna has led to catastrophic flooding and displacement. Different factions vie for control over water resources, leading to looting, sabotage, and threats that impact water availability for civilians. The Great Man-Made River Project, a vital water supply network, has become a battleground, further exacerbating the humanitarian crisis.

Devastating consequences for civilian populations

The weaponization of water has had devastating consequences for civilian populations in conflict zones. In addition to water shortages, communities face food insecurity, disease outbreaks, and displacement. Women and children are particularly vulnerable, with girls facing increased risks of violence and barriers to education. Humanitarian organizations struggle to provide assistance amid ongoing conflict and logistical challenges, leaving millions in desperate need of aid.

Addressing the weaponization of water requires innovative solutions and international cooperation. Investing in resilient water infrastructure, addressing climate change’s impact on water resources, and promoting conflict-sensitive development are essential steps. Additionally, enforcing existing international law and holding perpetrators accountable for their actions can help deter future attacks on water infrastructure. However, these efforts must be supported by sustained political will and financial resources to make a meaningful impact.

The weaponization of water in conflict zones represents a global crisis that demands urgent attention and action. From Yemen to Ukraine to Libya, civilians are bearing the brunt of this devastating tactic, facing water shortages, food insecurity, and disease outbreaks. Addressing the root causes of the crisis and investing in resilient water infrastructure are critical steps towards mitigating its impact and ensuring the well-being of affected populations.

Source: Wilson Center

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he overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi’s 42-year-long regime in 2011, following public uprisings, plunged Libya into a political, social, and military crisis. Even after 13 years, the country has yet to achieve unity and integrity. The uprising, ignited on February 17, 2011, is considered by some as the root cause of today’s conflict environment, while others view it as a justified and legitimate quest for a new order.

Revolution dilemma

Although the February 17 revolution emerged as a popular movement, the post-revolution phase, particularly two years later with the enactment of the “political isolation law’” that marginalized former Gaddafi-era soldiers and bureaucrats from the political scene, followed by the military polarization of 2014, indicated that the revolution had been co-opted by certain political and military cliques into a struggle for power.

This scenario and the historical flow extending to the present day reveal that the masses, aspiring for better living conditions and a fairer governance model, have relinquished control of the revolution to the country’s political elites. The fragile and fragmented security atmosphere, perceived as a window of opportunity by tribal and militia groups active in the east and west, led to deep divisions and polarizations across various sectors, constructed through narratives and policies securitized within the narrow agendas and interests of the relevant actors.

Over time, this division evolved into armed conflict, leading to the deaths of tens of thousands of Libyans in the civil wars of 2014 and 2019, and further laying the groundwork for the emergence of regional animosity and seeking of revenge. Despite being ethnically more homogeneous compared to many countries in the Middle East and Africa, the North African nation witnessed its initial revolutionary vs. anti-revolutionary divide deepen into Islamist vs. secular, east vs. west, and even city vs. town polarizations, all of which have hindered the processes of reconciliation and state reconstruction.

For instance, the city of Misrata stood out as both a stronghold of the revolution and in favor of the influential Islamist Muslim Brotherhood movement, while the city of Benghazi transformed into a hub for revolution opponents and former Gaddafi-era soldiers and bureaucrats, especially following the rise of militia leader Khalifa Haftar in the east. Additionally, the capital, Tripoli, along with influential western cities like Misrata, Zawiya, and Zintan, became strategic points where armed groups are engaged in a power struggle, specifically aiming to expand their spheres of influence and augment their control over official institutions in the post-revolutionary era.

Disruptive interventions by external actors

Parallel to these internal balances, Western countries within NATO, which planned and executed air strikes against Gaddafi in 2011, have continued to intervene in the process. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), established under the auspices of the UN, has remained inadequate in terms of providing a foundation for permanent and sustainable solutions, instead supporting interim governments and similar power-sharing agreements formed in 2015 and 2021.

More importantly, NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya, the first peacekeeping operation implemented under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, neglected the responsibility to rebuild, a crucial component of the R2P approach. The post-Gaddafi reconstruction process was left to Libya’s incomplete institutions and a society lacking a developed sense of citizenship. Subsequent international conferences, such as those in Palermo and Berlin, witnessed meetings that veered into a dominance struggle, far from solving issues, and were marked by disagreements stemming from conflicting interests among Western nations.

On the other hand, the authority vacuum and weak borders have transformed Libya into a hub for mercenaries, on the brink of regional crises, where fighters are gathered and dispatched. The period during which Gulf countries and the Russian private military company (PMC) Wagner Group financed numerous Syrian, Chadian, and Sudanese foreign fighters within Haftar’s ranks was documented in several open sources. From this perspective, it can be stated that external interventions have been as detrimental to Libya’s unity and integrity as internal factors.

The Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), convened under the auspices of the UN in Switzerland on February 5, 2021, designated the Government of National Unity (GNU), led by the businessman from Misrata Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, as the new transitional administration to guide the country towards the elections planned for December 2021. Gaining relative support from rival figures in a short period, the GNU prioritized economic and political reforms. However, the postponement of the planned elections due to controversies over candidate criteria and constitutional debates led to a broader division, culminating in the establishment of a new parallel government in February 2022. The developments following this date can be identified as primary causes for the conflicts erupting in and around Tripoli, closures of oil facilities, and the resultant economic and political crises.

Militias and Libyan politics

The current situation has enabled militia groups in the country to evolve into political entities over time, leveraging the privileges and powers they have accumulated. This transformation is elucidated by the concept of “militia diplomacy,” which denotes the distribution of shares in military and political institutions. According to this approach, militias affiliated with tribes or community-based in the east, west, and south aim to position actors sympathetic to them in government during transitional processes.

The deviation from this scenario not only questions the legitimacy of the new structure in the eyes of these groups but also leads to potentially destabilizing endeavors. Many analysts focusing on Libya argue that militia groups, which have been integrated into the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, and Presidential Council since 2011, have become “statized,” positing this as a significant impediment to democratic processes.

Currently, it is possible to discuss some initiatives regarding the reorganization of the December 2021 elections that were canceled. Alongside mechanisms involving local and international actors led by the UNSMIL, priority should be given to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs. A united Libya requires unified institutions and, more importantly, a unified military. At this point, both the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA), comprised of Haftar’s forces in the east, and the fragmented security bureaucracy in the west of the country indicate chronic problems for the future.

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ibya has not been on the international political agenda since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war as much as it was in the prewar period, yet recent major developments in the country have the capacity to influence both local Libyan and international actors involved in Libya. In fact, the protracted military and political developments in Libya have been triggered by the vacuum created by this relative decline in “international interest.”

With the end of the post of Stephanie Williams, the dominant leader of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) and, more generally, the political transition process has been left “unattended.” In this vacuum, the power struggle among Libyan actors escalated, military conflicts erupted occasionally, and the atmosphere of relative stability brought about by the political transition became extremely fragile.

With the disengagement of the UNSMIL, regional actors, especially Egypt, gained a lot of room for maneuver, and through their influence over certain Libyan actors, they were able to shape the political developments in the country and even attempted to redesign the political arena. These attempts naturally deepened the existing fault lines between Libyan actors and made conflicts inevitable.

When Aguila Saleh, the speaker of the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, announced that he withdrew his vote of confidence from the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU)—effectively acting on behalf of parliament—and when the Government of National Accord (GNA) appointed Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha as prime minister to form the the Government of National Stability; when Khaled al-Mishri, the head of the Tripoli-based Supreme State Council (SCC), initiated a series of negotiations to establish a legal basis for the elections—effectively taking over the political transition process—and when Mishri and Abdul Hamid al-Dbeibeh dismantled the GNA and attempted to form a new “unity government,” they all found Cairo as a strong supporter and benefactor.

Cairo’s activism in the western (Tripoli) region, taking advantage of the vacuum, was met with reactions and counter-mobilizations from Western regional actors, and periodic waves of instability in Libya. For a long time, Libya has been unable to achieve internal instability due to the influence of external actors. Important political and military developments in its periphery and on its borders seem destined to add fuel to the fire in a country struggling to gain internal unity, reach a political solution, and overcome its fragmented structure.

The Fezzan equation in the region

Although Fezzan, one of Libya’s three main geographical regions, has a much more modest role in influencing Libya’s destiny compared to the eastern (Barka) and western (Tripoli) regions, it constitutes a small African component of the country. Arab identity, as an extension of the Gaddafi regime, is, of course, a phenomenon that encompasses the whole of Libya, but this identity is somewhat more “diluted” in Fezzan compared to other regions. This is certainly due to Fezzan’s geographical, demographic, social, and cultural proximity and strong links with Libya’s African neighbors.

In the period after Gaddafi’s ouster, the borders, due to the disappearance of the state mechanism and the fragmented military and political structure, have become even more uncontrolled and porous. While completely controlling all of Libya’s borders is impossible both in terms of length and the difficulties inherent in desert regions, the southern border of Libya is the least controlled of all. The situation of Fezzan’s border with Chad and Niger has natural, humanitarian, man-made and criminal dimensions.

The social contact between the northern regions of Chad and Niger and Fezzan through tribal and kinship ties constitutes the natural and human aspect of uncontrolled borders. On the other hand, smuggling is the main economic activity in these border regions due to their largely desert nature and the sparseness of population density and settlements. In other words, in addition to natural social ties and interactions, economic and illicit activities and interactions are also very strong.

Libya’s African connection and its potential to be affected by Africa’s “problems” are not limited to the fact that it neighbors Chad and Niger via the Fezzan region. The positioning of Libya in the envisioning and geopolitical projections of the country by the external actors which have been involved in Libya also connects Libya to Africa. France, the most prominent of the European countries involved in Libya and so far the most decisive actor in the dynamics of the crisis, has strongly supported Haftar in many respects, and not only because it shares Haftar’s revolutionary and anti-“Islamist” ideological stance.

France’s goal of maintaining its presence and influence in the Sahel region, in general, and Operation Barkhane, in particular, has led to its interest and active intervention in Libya, which by virtue of its geographical and demographic elements is a natural part of this region, In fact, France’s perception of Turkey’s presence in Libya as having a potential impact beyond Libya, for example in North Africa in general or in the Sahel region, is behind France’s sharp anti-Turkey moves in its Libya policy.

Likewise, for Russia, another of the most influential external actors involved in Libya, Libya functions as an important part of its more macro-level African designs. The Wagner mercenary army, which is the mediator of Russian influence and presence in many African countries, has also been Russia’s choice in Libya. The regions where the Wagner mercenary army, which is estimated to number around 2,000 today, is engaged, deployed, and operating on Libyan soil show that Russia attaches particular importance to the “Africa-facing” side of Libya and makes its operational investments there.

In short, Libya is inevitably becoming part of Africa, not only because of the strong land connection of its southern Fezzan region with Sahel countries like Chad and Niger, but also because of the policies pursued by influential external actors. The juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali, and now Niger are notable for their anti-French and pro-Russian rhetoric. If the series of coups in the Sahel turns into an active struggle for influence between France and Russia, the countries of the Sahel region will be destabilized.

With the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner mercenary army’s head, Russia’s African network is entering a transition period. The importance of Libya within this African network was demonstrated when Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov made his first visit to Libya on the day of Prigozhin’s death. Both the possible instability of the Sahel countries and Wagner’s active physical presence in the Fezzan region increase the risk of Libya being affected by the power struggle and instability of this region in the coming period.

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early 8% of the population of the Libyan city of Derna was killed or went missing after devastating floods hit the city on September 10, 2023, in the biggest natural disaster in the country’s modern history. A third of the city’s buildings were wiped out and swept away by the Mediterranean Sea, while hundreds of bodies are believed to be trapped in structures and buildings under water.

The disaster followed a warning issued last year by professor of civil engineering Abdelwanees Ashoor. “In the event of a major flood, the consequences will be catastrophic for the inhabitants of the valley and the city,” the Libyan academic wrote. Ashoor was not taken seriously by the authorities, resulting in one of the greatest flood tragedies in modern history in a country torn by conflict and war.

The floods have affected 200,000 Libyans, and the entire area of the old city of Derna was swallowed by water after the two dams surrounding the city exploded at 3:00 a.m. local time, giving people little time to flee. In fact, the local authorities had sent out a text message the day before warning people not to leave their homes because of the heavy rains caused by Storm Daniel, which hit the region from Greece.

Thousands dead and missing

Bad weather conditions made it impossible to use helicopters due to the strong winds at the time of the storm, in addition to the extremely difficult natural terrain of the area, which prevented the arrival of rescue equipment, teams, and vehicles.

Storm Daniel, which hit eastern Libya on September 10, killed at least 7,300 people and left around 11,000 homeless in a city with an estimated population of around 200,000. According to preliminary official figures, more than 36,000 people have been displaced.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said the death toll from the floods in Derna had risen to 11,300, while 10,100 people were still missing. The UN warned that an epidemic could break out in the city due to decomposing bodies and water pollution. Some 150 people have arrived to hospitals due to poison after drinking from the polluted water of Derna.

The UN confirmed that 170 people had died in floods elsewhere in eastern Libya, and that the number of displaced people in northeastern Libya had reached approximately 40,000.

Warning against drinking unclear water

At the same time, the UN envoy to Libya, Abdullah Batili, said he had seen the destruction and devastation in Derna and left with a heavy heart. He noted that the disaster was beyond Libya’s capacity and went beyond politics and border issues.

Georgette Gagnon, assistant secretary-general, resident coordinator and humanitarian coordinator for Libya, confirmed that the UN is working with partners and local authorities to continue to deliver and coordinate much-needed humanitarian assistance to those in need.

The neglect of the city, which was previously a stronghold of armed groups opposed to Gaddafi and then Haftar’s forces, and the failure to maintain its dams and facilities and renovate its old buildings, in addition to the battles and wars it witnessed between 2015 and 2018, are among the factors that caused the death toll of Storm Daniel to rise dramatically.

Meanwhile, Libyans are still waiting for international aid to help them overcome one of the most tragic events in the country’s modern history. The city of Derna has experienced unprecedented destruction with residents being killed by both flooding and collapsed buildings. As time passes, the chances of finding survivors in Derna fades away.

T

he elections in Turkey, the most important elections of 2023 worldwide, rolled on after the May 28 runoff, with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan getting 52.18 percent of the votes against his rival, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, and being re-elected.

On June 3, Erdoğan attended the swearing-in ceremony at the parliament and named the cabinet members right after the ceremony, the same evening. New faces have appeared in fifteen ministerial positions except for two ministries: the ministries of health and culture. The foreign, interior, defense, and finance ministries were among the most crucial cabinet posts with new incumbents. These four vital positions have been filled by well-known, experienced, and respected politicians and bureaucrats who have played critical roles in the country’s past two decades.

The replacement of the foreign minister, Mevlut Çavuşoğlu, with Dr. Hakan Fidan, who served as the head of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), and the assignment of Prof. Ibrahim Kalin, who served as a presidential spokesperson and advisor to Erdoğan, as the new head of Turkish intelligence have attracted the attention of not only regional powers but also international players due to the duo’s importance for the country and President Erdoğan.

Despite some analysts considering the new assignments as indicators of change, this is not the case. In the past three years, Turkey has adopted a normalization policy merged with its financial aims of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI).

The past three years’ diplomatic and economic attempts have aimed at the deliberate preparation of Turkey’s transforming foreign policy and economy. This transformation has brought about a series of hardships for the country resulting from the fall of the Turkish currency as Turkey seeks to be a regional financial hub. However, the Turkish government plans to make Turkey a “center country” as suggested by Wallerstein’s world systems theory which argues that the world economic system serves to benefit some countries and exploit others.

Turkey’s recent achievements in the defense industry (fighter jets, drones, missiles, etc.), technology, and its indigenous car (TOGG) are among the vital indicators of this intention. Rather than being exploited, Turkey wants to decrease the value of the Turkish lira, and stabilize and improve its relations with regional powers as part of its normalization efforts.

What is more, the country’s proactive role in several conflicts has brought it to the fore as a regional and international spot for resolving conflicts. Since this strategy requires a stabilized region and good diplomatic ties, Ankara, witnessing the decreasing hegemonic power of the U.S., started mending its ties with its neighbors, particularly the Gulf countries, which could impact a wide range of areas and regions, including the Maghreb.

Turkey and the Maghreb

What can be expected next in Turkey’s relations with the Maghreb countries in light of Turkey’s new cabinet?

First, it is vital to remember the fact that the newly assigned foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, has been behind the scene of Ankara’s normalization efforts with regional powers. Egypt is among the countries with which Turkey has sought normalization, and Ankara and Cairo have already announced the assignment of their ambassadors after several years of cold diplomatic ties. The normalization between Ankara and Cairo is important since it can help resolve Libya’s more than decade-long conflict, along with the disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey’s strengthening ties with Egypt would provide Ankara with an advantage against Greece, which signed an MoU with Cairo a year after Ankara signed one with Libya’s UN-backed government.

This can also provide an opportunity to find a solution for the Eastern Mediterranean gas and border rift. Regarding Libya, Turkey has been backing the UN-recognized government headed by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah while being in touch with several parties to the conflict. On the contrary, Egypt has been one of the closest allies of warlord Khalifa Haftar, the Tobruk-based parliament’s speaker and its PM-designate Fathi Bashagha. During Bashagha’s failed attempts to enter Tripoli, Turkey played a balancing role by stopping the clashes and mediating between the warring parties.

Following the visit of CIA Director William Burns to Libya in the middle of January in which he met with Dbeibah and Haftar, Fidan was quick to take action and meet Dbeibah, Menfi, Khalid al-Mishri, the Chairman of the High Council of State, and even Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

Hakan Fidan

Turkey’s foreign policy during Hakan Fidan’s tenure at the MIT was a conversion of his background activities into diplomatic steps, with Ankara’s grand strategy remaining the same: making Turkey a more independent, balanced, and proactive foreign approach, considering the decreasing hegemonic power of the U.S. in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have been seen to be happy with Erdoğan’s re-election as they were among the first countries to congratulate him on his election victory. Considering the upcoming visits and meetings between Turkey, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, Fidan could lead Ankara towards a solution of its long-standing issues.

With an operational intelligence service, proactive foreign policy efforts, and a qualified staff comprising among others the aforementioned ministers, Turkey only needs to eliminate its economic hardships. An improving Turkish economy would also help heal the wounds of the region and the world at large. As the U.S. is losing its hegemony across the region, Turkey, after recovering from an economic and diplomatic crisis, will seek to become a regional and global hub for trade, diplomacy, and politics as per its grand strategy.

M

ohamed Auajjar, the chair of the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya (FFM), led a three-year investigation by the UN Human Rights Council to investigate human rights abuses committed by all parties to the conflict in Libya since 2016.

The mission urged the Libyan authorities to cooperate more closely to uncover the truth behind the widespread crimes committed against both Libyans and migrants in the country.

According to the FFM, there are reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity have been committed. These crimes include arbitrary detention, murder, torture, rape, enslavement, sexual slavery, extrajudicial killings, and enforced disappearances.

The EU’s indirect support for human rights abuses in Libya

During the course of its investigation, the UN fact-finding mission visited Libya and urged local authorities to cooperate more extensively to establish the truth about these heinous and massive crimes.

The mission focused on identifying human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law in various Libyan cities.

FFM investigator Chaloka Beyani has stated that the European Union’s support for Libyan authorities has “aided and abetted rights breaches against migrants.”

Beyani clarified, “We’re not saying that the EU and its member states have committed these crimes. The point is that the support given has aided and abetted the commission of the crimes.”

The EU’s response to allegations

In response to these allegations, European Union Spokesman for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Peter Stano denied that the EU intends to “push and keep migrants in Libya.”

Stano emphasized that the EU “does not finance any Libyan entity and does not give material funds to partners in Libya.”

Despite the EU’s denial of involvement, the report highlights its indirect support in facilitating these human rights abuses. This raises concerns about the EU’s role in the ongoing crisis in Libya and the subsequent impact on human rights and international law.

Survivors speak out

The report found that the violations were carried out under the nominal or actual control of Libya’s Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration, the Libyan Coast Guard, and the Stability Support Apparatus.

According to the report, the FFM asserts that the “European Union and its Member States, directly or indirectly, provided monetary and technical support and equipment,” including boats to the Libyan Coast Guard and the Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration for the interception and detention of migrants.

The report revealed alarming crimes against humanity in Libyan detention centers, where migrants faced torture, rape, enslavement, and starvation.

One victim who was held in Maya, Ayn Zarah, and Gharyan detention centers said, “Our concern is not dying in the water, but our concern is to go back to the prison where we will be oppressed and tortured by guards.”

The report disclosed numerous survivors and witnesses of rape cases, indicating that such crimes were widespread and routinely experienced in detention centers.

Pregnancies resulting from rapes in detention centers were frequently observed according to the report, and women often gave birth without access to professional medical assistance.

In this regard, victims often became aware of being sold or bought only when confronted with new circumstances and abuse. Enslavement, including sexual slavery, occurred in detention centers, and the mission found evidence of such crimes in Sabratha and Bani Walid.

The report documented cases of migrants forced to work in factories, construction,   and agriculture.

“In a case of enslavement and forced labor, a child from Mali was taken to a farm and forced to work with animals, only to be told he had been bought when he asked to leave.”

A

nti-migrant racism in North Africa was thought to be a taboo, but in reality it never was. Racism against African migrants, coupled with unabashed anti-Black xenophobia, is alive and kicking in North Africa. Tunisian President Kais Saied’s recent comments on February 21 about sub-Saharan migrants surely shocked many people. Saied labelled migrants as “hordes” and a “demographic threat” to his country. Even more, Saied called for “the need to put a rapid end to this immigration,” which, to his view, has become a source of “violence, crime and unacceptable acts.”

For a country like Tunisia, a generator of migrants fleeing to find a better life in Europe, Saied’s speech may seem out of place and contradictory. Doesn’t the European far right, which applauded Saied’s speech, say the same about Muslim migrants?

President Saied’s invective is neither unprecedented nor isolated in the larger geographical area, the Maghreb. From Morocco to Libya, passing through Mauritania, Algeria and, of course, Tunisia, hateful allegations are not only the prerogative of what some people there call the “little people” to whom we could add the “uncultured” or the “intolerant.” In the upper echelons, at the highest level of the Maghreb states, the same ideas circulate.

For this discourse is not new. Since the Maghreb became the exit door for migrants from Africa to reach the fabled El Dorado, Europe, this immense territory has been transformed into a huge waiting room for tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of sub-Saharan migrants unable to reach the European coast. A waiting room that has turned into an open-air prison over time. Especially since, to curb this migration flow, the European Union outsourced its borders and entrusted their guarding to the Maghreb states by rewarding them financially, diplomatically, or both.

A migrant mass

The direct consequence of this strong policy of containment has been the creation of a migrant mass that has settled permanently in the Maghreb and lives on the fringes of society, waiting for a passage to Europe. It has also caused inevitable impoverishment and generated the phenomenon of criminalization that no one questions, especially not the local population in contact with migrants.

It is important to understand that as long as migrants were only crossing the territory, they were tolerated. It was only when they were prevented from doing so that their presence began to pose a problem and the old demon of racism resurfaced.

Over the past twenty years, many serious and sometimes bloody incidents have taken place against migrants in North Africa, without being properly reported by the press. Police raids followed by robberies and humiliations, assaults, lynching organized by neighborhood lords or angry citizens, and even rapes have targeted this vulnerable population.

Racism is as old as the world and knows no borders. The Maghrebi expressions for Black people, “âzzi” (black), “kahlouche” (negro), “âbid” (slave), or “oussif” (slave, servant), which have been heard with force recently, are not new and are not a relic of colonialism. As far back as the 14th century, Ibn Khaldun, a historian of Arab descent born in Tunis, wrote that “the only peoples who accept slavery are the negroes, because of their lower degree of humanity, their place being closer to that of the animal.”

Legacy of French colonization

These expressions are therefore the fruit of a mentality that predates the French colonization of Algeria and Mauritania, the French protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco, and the Italian occupation of Libya. What has changed is the violence of words and actions.

In 2012, the Moroccan weekly Maroc Hebdo devoted an entire dossier to the “Black Peril,” attacking without embellishment those who “live by begging, engage in drug trafficking and prostitution” and “pose a human and security problem for the country.” On Moroccan social media, there are regular calls for the expulsion of African migrants, the closure of borders, and the banning of mixed marriages in order to preserve an improbable “purity of the Moroccan race.”

On the other side of the border, in Algeria, a hashtag on Twitter resurfaces from time to time (in Arabic), #NotoAfricansinAlgeria, which immediately sets the world on fire by calling for the hunting down and deportation of migrants. Sometimes, the creators of these hateful messages deliberately confuse Black migrants with Black North African citizens. From the Atlantic Ocean to the Egyptian border, there is a Black Maghrebi population whose ancestors were slaves or settled in North Africa several centuries ago. They are certainly citizens, but they are still considered second-class ones.

A few years ago, in 2016, a Black model of Algerian nationality, Amina Hamouine, had to face an extraordinary campaign of hatred because she had the idea, or the “bad idea” as her detractors would say, of being photographed wearing a Kabyle dress—the Kabyle people are Berbers from the region of Kabylia. This was an unforgivable mistake for those who identify the Kabyle woman from the whiteness of her skin.

Too Black?

Recently, Khadidja Benhamou, an Algerian citizen from Adrar in the south of the country, was deemed “too Black” to wear the crown of Miss Algeria 2019—her skin color did not represent all Algerians, it seems.

But it is not only the “little people” who indulge in these feelings that sociologists and anthropologists call “systemic negrophobia.” Some Algerian leaders do as well. In 2017, five years before the Tunisian president’s remarks, senior officials of Algiers, which has a virulent anti-colonial past, were not kind to migrants either.

Ahmed Ouyahia, an Algerian politician who has been appointed prime minister ten times—an absolute record— and who at the time was head of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s cabinet as a minister of state, described African migrants on the private television station Ennahar TV as “[t]hese illegal foreigners bring[ing] crime, drugs and several other scourges.” At the time, Ouyahia was the secretary general of the National Democratic Rally (RND), one of the two crutches, along with the National Liberation Front (FLN), that support the government in Algeria.

His words were echoed and amplified a few days later by Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelkader Messahel, who identified the arrival of sub-Saharans in the country as a “threat to national security.”

But the ultimate horror was reached again in 2017 in Libya, when footage filmed by CNN journalists revealed to the world the unimaginable in the 21st century: an auction of migrants from Nigeria at a market near Tripoli.

Anti-racism laws

To counter this unfortunate litany of racist acts, Tunisia passed a law in 2018 penalizing racism and established January 23 as the “National Day for the Abolition of Slavery.” However, the 2018 law, historical, innovative, and the first of its kind in the Arab world, was annihilated by the verbal outrage of President Saied on February 21, 2023, when he evoked a “criminal plan prepared at the beginning of this century to change the demographic composition of Tunisia” and whose objective was to transform the country into an “African-only country” and to remove its “Arab Muslim” identity.

Of course, one can try to nuance this reality by recalling, for example, the decision of the Moroccan authorities to launch campaigns to issue resident permits, such as in 2014, which initially resulted in the regularization of 25,000 undocumented migrants. It can also be argued that, like Tunisia, Algeria adopted a law criminalizing racial discrimination in 2020. But these gestures of goodwill have little impact if they are not followed by campaigns to educate the local population on the need to accept the “other.” Campaigns that television stations refused to broadcast, as was the case in Morocco.

All crises, whether economic or security-based, produce exasperation that ends up finding a scapegoat, and African migrants have become the ideal candidates. They pay for the economic crisis and the criminal behavior of a minority in their own community.

As a scapegoat, they also pay the price for some of the services rendered by the Maghreb states to Europeans: to showcase its status as a paid gendarme of the European Commission, Morocco got carried away by its destructive zeal on June 24, 2022, when it violently curtailed an attempt by several hundred migrants, mostly Sudanese, citizens of a “brotherly Arab” country, to force their way into Ceuta, a Spanish enclave on Moroccan territory.

EU responsibility

The result—24 dead according to the Moroccan authorities, 37 according to a local association, not counting the missing—has not only tarnished Morocco’s image in Africa but also revealed another problem that is worth studying. In which state in the world, except for the former East Germany and the now defunct Berlin Wall and migrants escaping war to Greece and Italy, are dozens of people killed to prevent them from leaving a country that is not theirs to seek refuge elsewhere?

A tragedy that ended with a congratulatory gesture worthy of the former East Germany, as the president of the Spanish government, Pedro Sánchez, praised the brutal intervention of the Moroccan police force.

Finally, the European Union’s migration policy, which consists of preventing human beings from moving freely, by force if necessary, has helped this local outbreak of racism and intolerance, and dynamited several principles, some of them religious, that were thought to be immutable.

Pan-Africanism, the egalitarian and anti-slavery utopia propagated in most of the post-independence Maghreb countries, especially Algeria, has come to an end. The myth introduced by these countries of an integrating Islam that makes no distinction between a white and a Black person has been shattered. Despite many migrants adhering to Islam, they are treated as strangers to the Ummah.

The Libyan capital Tripoli was shaken by a wave of clashes between rival armed groups during the early hours of May 17. The clashes were instigated by the sneaking into Tripoli of Fathi Bashagha, who was designated as the prime minister by the Tobruk-based parliament, the House of Representatives (HoR), in February this year on the grounds that the incumbent Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli had expired its mandate since elections did not occur on December 24, 2021.

The fact that a “designated prime minister” had to sneak into the capital of the country is itself telling enough. Bashagha had to keep his entry into Tripoli, in the middle of the night, highly secret. He revealed his arrival on social media, bragging about his ultimate “successful entry,” as this was his third attempt to enter Tripoli. The previous two unsuccessful attempts were both foiled by the tenacity of the armed groups who either remained loyal to the incumbent prime minister Abdel Hamid Dbeibah or were unconvinced by Bashagha’s claim to be prime minister.

In his first attempted entry into Tripoli, Bashagha was expelled after a heated “negotiation” between armed groups barely avoiding an armed conflict. His eventual entry on May 17 resulted in anti-Bashagha forces attacking the Nawasi Brigade, which had escorted Bashagha into Tripoli and hosted him in its headquarters. Eventually, it had to give in to the heavy pressure from the anti-Bashagha forces and handed him over to a neutral military force to escort him out of the city on the same day.

Bashagha’s attempts to enter Tripoli and the subsequent clashes among armed groups are symptoms of a wider political and regional power struggle. Formalities aside, Bashagha’s claim to premiership became possible only after his coalition with the HoR and more importantly, its speaker Aguila Saleh. The Saleh-Bashagha coalition aims at dismantling the Dbeibah-led GNU and replacing it with the Bashagha-led Government of National Stability (GNS), which would be heavily under the influence of the “kingmaker” of the coalition—Khalifa Haftar.

The Regional and International Aspect of the Saleh-Bashagha Coalition

Although the initiative started as Saleh and Bashagha’s pursuing their personal interests, the coalition was not built in a vacuum. The Saleh-Bashagha coalition lobbied in certain capitals for their alliance, and made their move once they received the green lights and blessing of those same capitals. Although the coalition promised to be useful to many, each capital committed to it to varying degrees.

While some capitals endorsed the coalition openly, others demonstrated their support more indirectly. Paris and other European capitals as well as Riyadh were among the lower-profile supporters of the Saleh-Bashagha coalition. However, Cairo and Moscow were much more straightforward in their endorsement.

While Dbeibah did not hide Turkey’s special place among Tripoli’s friends, he did not leave Egypt out, either. On the contrary, Dbeibah granted more contracts to Cairo than he did to Ankara to placate the former and ensure its neutrality vis-à-vis Tripoli. As a matter of fact, Ankara was not bothered by losing some Tripoli stakes to Cairo as it thought that they would work as the proverbial carrot for the latter. Nevertheless, Cairo chose to proceed with a zero-sum mentality: winning was not good enough for Cairo, it wanted to make sure that Ankara was not winning as well.

An agreement over Dbeibah would mean a rapprochement slightly more favorable to Ankara than Cairo. Cairo, on the other hand, wanted to keep the rapprochement with Ankara on its own terms. Thus, Cairo came up with a rival premiership proposal with purportedly “pro-Turkey” Bashagha, which would also supposedly appease Ankara. However, this was the greatest smokescreen in the whole parallel government scheme: Cairo consented to the Saleh-Bashagha coalition only after making sure that Bashagha was transformed into something else—the junior partner of the greater coalition of Haftar and Saleh.

Bashagha’s role was envisioned as nothing more than being a subordinate to the Haftar-Saleh duo. His function was supposed to be to extend the influence over Tripoli of both Haftar and Saleh, and their external backers, none more so than Cairo. Therefore, Cairo saw in the Saleh-Bashagha coalition the prospect of undermining Ankara’s prevalence in Tripoli and duly supported it.

The idea of negotiating with Ankara after diluting its position of strength in Tripoli through a change of government appeared much more attractive than engaging in a win-win setting with Ankara. Unless Cairo comes to terms with Ankara’s presence and influence in Tripoli, Libya will not be a theatre of convergence between the two countries.

The Spanish-American philosopher George Santayana once said, “Only the dead have seen the end of war.”

Considering the current situation in Libya, this would be among the best ways to describe the country’s current circumstances vis-à-vis the hope-filled attempts to have free and fair elections which were planned more than a year ago.

Libyans hoped to end their more than a decade-long war when the UN-sponsored Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) elected Abdul Hamid Dbeibah to lead a new transition government in the country and lead Libyans to the polls on December 24.

Following candidacies of controversial figures like Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and warlord Khalifa Haftar, and the lack of a constitutional basis to hold free and fair elections in the country within the agreed timeline, the process literally became a born-dead one.

Although the UN-sponsored LPDF made it clear that the mandate of Dbeibah’s government was valid until June 2022, the pro-Haftar, eastern-based parliament House of Representatives (HoR) argued that the UN-backed Government of National Unity’s (GNU) mandate had expired.

The HoR and pro-Haftar figures’ opposition was followed by an attempt by the HoR to install a new rival government to challenge that of Dbeibah. Former UN-backed government, Government of National Unity’s Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha, after a series of negotiations with the HoR, was designated as the new PM of the transitional government, which was rejected by the GNU and the country’s west regions.

During this process, Bashagha tried to enter the capital, Tripoli, to assume power. His military convoy failed to do so, with Dbeibah saying he would hand over his power only to an elected government.

Dbeibah, on the other hand, announced his country’s plans to have elections while the UN was trying to bring different sides to the table to negotiate the constitutional basis for having elections amid the growing specter of military confrontation between the two sides.

Although the HoR initially refused to choose members for the joint committee, the rivals met on Tuesday, April 19, in the Egyptian capital Cairo, to discuss constitutional arrangements for new elections.

Aguila Saleh, the HoR’s speaker, Khalifa Haftar, and Fathi Bashagha are fully aware that the priority of the international community is not “legitimacy” but self-interest, a fact that can even be observed in their pragmatic statements.

The international community doesn’t want to abandon the pro-Haftar side to Russia; however, they also don’t want their so-called “pro-democracy” stance to be damaged in the eyes of the world by yielding up Dbeibah.

At this point, two strategies step forth. First, international actors will try their best to bring Dbeibah and Bashagha to the table to find a new and peaceful diplomatic final exit to have elections under their sponsorship. Second, they will recognize Bashagha’s legitimacy and offer a new political dialogue forum with a reshuffled Libyan team while not abandoning their rhetorical and democratic discourse.

The second option seems more feasible after considering what happened in 2019, as the U.S. played ostrich when Khalifa Haftar launched an offensive against the UN-backed government. Washington suspended the U.S.-citizen warlord’s trials about war crimes in Libya ahead of the December 24 elections.

As it is known, accessing the Mediterranean has been a consistent and significant goal of Russian foreign policy, which seeks to challenge NATO’s naval supremacy and the U.S. presence throughout the Eastern Mediterranean.

With its military existence in Syria, Moscow found a door to knock on: it sent infamous Wagner mercenaries in support of Haftar and built another passage for itself between Sirte and Jufra, critical spots in Libya neighboring the Eastern Mediterranean. Despite this, we have not seen Washington taking a solid stance against the warlord.

When Haftar’s military operation against the UN-backed government failed, thanks to Turkish forces’ support to the internationally recognized government, the U.S. was quick to broker a new political dialogue while hoping to force through elections.

As a new war and an oil embargo are at the international community’s elbow, the UN, the U.S., the UK, and others seek absolute legitimacy by any means. In their eyes, any sacrifice is worth protecting their interests, including sacrificing the democracy that Libya has been dreaming of after decades-long turmoil.

Time flies when it comes to the rapidly developing sequence of events in Libya. As of early 2021, there was an atmosphere that was regarded as promising for the first stage of elections in the country.

Fast-forward to December 24, and Libyan politics is debating how to have legitimate elections in order not to allow yet another tyranny in the war-torn country.

Representatives of around 30 countries arrived in Paris in November to discuss the recent political situation in Libya. Political actors such as the UK, Germany, Turkey, and Italy emphasized the need for a consensus on election law while France and Egypt are obsessed with having an election as soon as possible.

Due to the election laws unilaterally issued by the Aguila Saleh-led House of Representatives, Khalifa Haftar could now run for Libya’s presidency. The laws issued by Saleh have not been voted and passed in the parliament. Moreover, dual citizens, war criminals, and people who hold military posts are not permitted to run for the Libyan presidency, and Haftar faces several impediments to running for the elections.

Everybody, including France and Egypt, knows the warlord cannot even get 10 percent of the votes if elections are held freely in Libya.

Furthermore, it seems, Haftar’s ambitions are such that he is even ready to destroy his long-term supporters, showing no mercy. According to rumors, Saleh’s wish to run for Libya’s presidency was refused by Haftar and Egypt recently.

Haftar threatened people in east Libya against supporting Saleh as a candidate to run for the presidency.

When Saleh insisted, Haftar threatened people in east Libya against supporting him as candidates are obliged to collect 5,000 signatures to run for the presidency. Sending a message to Saleh’s potential supporters, Haftar stated that anyone who signs Saleh’s candidacy will be jailed. Despite all this, in a surprising move, Saleh announced his candidacy.

The overwhelming majority of Libyan people and politicians first want to have a solid foundation for an electoral system – a constitutional law that will be reached through consensus. That’s why the laws announced by the House of Representatives are considered flawed.

Yes, Libya needs elections to erase the traces of the civil war and chaos, and to heal its wounds, but not by unilaterally imposing “laws” which favor a warlord rather than a civil authority.

It is not only the High Council of State that demands a delay in order to reach a mutually accepted consensus on electoral laws, but also the Government of National Unity officials and political figures in the west along with the members of Tobruk-based House of Representatives.

France is among the countries which have been supporting Haftar at all costs, and the conferences organized in Paris, in general, have been a tool in its attempt to remain a key actor.

Nonetheless, even some of the Western participants of the most recent Paris Conference on Libya in November emphasized the need for change in election law.

Elections per se cannot enable Libya to rebuild its war-torn soul, but free, fair, and legitimate elections based on equitable laws can. And delaying elections to have a free and fair election is much better than having a flawed one.

Libya has been waiting for stability for more than a decade – the missed time can be tolerated, but the destruction of the efforts that have been made in this time cannot.

Recently, there have been a number of high-profile meetings between the leadership of Libya’s Government of National Unity [GNU] and that of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Besides hosting discussions and affirming their support for the political transition and further cooperation on security, several economic deals have been announced.

Libya and Algeria agreed to resume flights, reopen land borders and launch maritime lines and on the measures to boost trade and investment. Following a visit at the end of May by Tunisia’s Prime Minister, Libya and Tunisia concurred on facilitating border crossings. Morocco just hosted another round of intra-Libyan talks.

While to some, this may seem like a new tangent for Libya’s complicated foreign policy, it is actually a logical and healthy continuation of previous initiatives. Proximity, shared culture, interdependence and shared threats give the countries of the Maghreb common interests. Despite some different circumstances and the intense rivalry between Algeria and Morocco, all three countries have tried to appear neutral and offer constructive diplomatic assistance while attempting to limit any contagion to their own fragile situations.

Historical Context

Besides geography, the countries of the Maghreb share a lot of culture and history. In more recent times, the late Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi attempted coups against the leaders of both Morocco and Tunisia as part of his numerous, failed attempts at a larger union. There has also been discord between other members, notably Algeria and Morocco, who have longstanding differences, especially over the fate of the Western Sahara.

Despite all this, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia established the Arab Maghreb Union in 1989 to promote cooperation and economic integration. However, the issues that divided them proved too difficult to overcome and the organization quickly became dormant. Initially the poorest country in the region, the discovery of oil in the 1950s made Libya the richest nation and therefore an important economic motor for the whole Maghreb. Despite this new wealth, Qaddafi’s quixotic governance meant that Libyans often depended on their neighbors for goods and services.

Plenty to Deal with at Home

Besides good intentions, these three western neighbors may also have had domestic considerations for not getting involved militarily in the Libyan conflict. Without a source of considerable outside financing, it would have been very costly to start an unnecessary foreign adventure and these countries had plenty of drama to deal with. Having overthrown the authoritarian rule of President Zine el-Abidine Ben, Tunisia was going through many growing pains with its more open politics.

There was intense competition between Islamist and more secular parties. A truth commission appointed to investigate human rights violations of previous regimes accused President Beji Caid Essebsi of committing crimes while serving in the government of Ben Ali’s predecessor, Habib Bourguiba. Essebsi died while in office in 2019. The process to replace him was somewhat ambiguous and a formal constitutional court had yet to be established.

Algeria had gone through its own civil war from 1991-2002 and had remained under emergency law until 2011. During the period of the Libyan crisis, long-time President Bouteflika had serious health problems and there were numerous protests demanding more freedom and political change. Following massive street protests, Bouteflika resigned in 2019.

Morocco has continued to deal with its conflict in Western Sahara with the Polisario Front, which rejects its 1975 annexation of the territory.  Following the Arab Spring, Morocco engaged in its own reform program. While avoiding the intense disturbances of many of its neighbors, some tensions have remained.

Common Security Worries

Besides the issues that they have sometimes foisted on each other, the Maghreb countries share many other concerns like radical cross-border groups and pressure by the European Union to stem the flow of migrants. People also flow within the region. After the fall of Qaddafi, an estimated 200-400,000 Libyans decamped to Tunisia [out of a population of around 11 million].

Several thousand Tunisians fought for jihadist groups in the Middle East or Libya between 2011 and 2016. Besides being the closest major theatre of operations, Libya also served as a launching pad for attacks like that of Daesh attack on the border town of Ben Guerdane, allegedly motivated by an air attack on its training base.

Tunisia reinforced its patrols and built a sand barrier covering 168 of the 468 kilometres of its porous border with Libya. An estimated 600 Tunisian extremist jihadis are reckoned to remain in Libya, primarily in the south. Others continue to fight in other countries, including the nearby Sahel region. Though reduced, the threat has not disappeared but the security restrictions are a heavy burden on the economy, particularly for pastoralists and other border communities.

Like Tunisia, Algeria shares a border with Libya and has been worried about infiltration by  Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb [AQIM] like the attack on gas facilities at Ain Amenas and a possible return of radicalized Tuaregs who had served in Qaddafi’s paramilitary “Islamic Legion” such as happened in Mali. The Government reinforced its border with Libya by deploying an additional 30-40,000 troops but like Tunisia, it also has to worry about security restrictions disturbing border livelihoods.

Morocco does not share a border with Libya, but some recruitment of fighters to go to Libya is alleged to have taken place there.

Also… The Sahel

While Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco are concerned by issues in Libya, it is worth remembering that the southern part of Algeria is in the Sahel region and Morocco is close by, if not formally part of it. Several countries of the Sahel are experiencing serious problems of violent Jihadi attacks, inter-ethnic conflict and coups besides chronic issues of extreme poverty and climate change.

Even though they not among the most affected, the Maghreb nations must be watchful of threats and spillover coming from the Sahel as well. Morocco has started to take a keen interest in developments and has started to play a role in the G5 Sahel force.

Mercenaries are back. No one knows how many billions of dollars slosh around this illicit market. All we know is that business is booming because when you need something absolutely, positively done in war, you call the private sector. Missions once conducted by special operations forces or the CIA are now outsourced — I know because I did them.

Mercenaries are deadlier than most people realize, a grave oversight. In 2018, a group of U.S. Army Rangers, Delta Force, Green Berets and Marines — America’s most elite troops — were pinned down in Syria. Attacking them were 500 mercenaries, hired by Russia. They were not the cartoonish rabble depicted by Hollywood movies. This was the Wagner Group, a high-end mercenary outfit with artillery, armored personnel carriers, and tanks.

The American commandos radioed for help. Warplanes arrived in waves, including Reaper drones, Apache helicopters, F-22 fighter jets, F-15 strike fighters, B-52 bombers, and AC-130 gunships. Scores of airstrikes pummeled the mercenaries, but they did not waver.

Four hours later, the mercenaries finally retreated. No Americans were killed, and the U.S. military touted this as a big win. But it wasn’t. It took America’s best troops and advanced aircraft four hours to push back 500 mercenaries. What happens when they have to face 1000? 5000? More? Even an undefeated military can lose.

Mercenaries are the second oldest profession, and their return is no surprise. Since 2015, mercenaries have flourished in Yemen, Libya, Nigeria, Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Mozambique, Central African Republic, and Venezuela. There are even cyber-mercenaries called “hack back” companies.

The UAE hired mercenaries to kill Houthis during the War in Yemen. Some of these were allegedly U.S. military although most came from Latin America.

There are many reasons why mercenaries are returning now. In fact, they have been gradually reappearing over the past three decades, but always in the shadows and that’s by design. Rich clients with a small or no military can swipe a check and wage war. The UAE hired mercenaries to kill Houthis during the War in Yemen. Some of these were allegedly U.S. military although most came from Latin America. After six failed years of fighting Boko Haram, Nigeria hired mercenaries to push the terrorist group out of their country, which they did in a few weeks. Libya is a mercenaries-on-mercenary war. Perhaps someday ExxonMobil will have its own army, too.

But why do states with big militaries use mercenaries? Because warfare is changing — it’s getting sneakier. We live in an information age, and weapons that provide plausible deniability, like mercenaries, are more important than raw firepower. In 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine, not by blitzkrieg but through deception. They covertly deployed Spetsnaz special forces, mercenaries like the Wagner Group, Little Green Men, and fake pro-Russia militias. Dense propaganda, troll factories, and other active measures further concealed the truth, until it was too late. While the West stood befuddled about what was going on, the Crimea was a fait d’accompli.

Moscow created the fog of war, and moved through it for victory. Mercenaries ooze plausible deniability. If they are caught, the client can disavow them. Not so for army soldiers. Plus, Russian citizens (like U.S. ones) hate seeing their dead soldiers coming home in body bags, but do not care about dead contractors. Owing to this, Putin can engage in risky military operations with minimal domestic political consequence. For the first time since the Cold War, Russia has launched expeditionary operations in the Middle East and Africa. The weapon of choice? Mercenaries, like the Wagner Group.

Private warfare is a growing trend with alarming implications, yet few in the West seem to care. Perhaps they assume international law will take care of the problem, but this is magical thinking. Who will go into Libya and arrest all those mercenaries? The UN? NATO? Nobody. Worse, mercenary can shoot law enforcement dead. The market for force literally resists regulation.

Privatizing war changes warfare in profound ways modern generals do not comprehend.

A world awash in mercenaries means more war and suffering. History teaches us that unemployed mercenaries become bandits and racketeers, preying on people and sometimes taking over whole kingdoms, as happened to Milan in the 15^th century. Soldiers of fortune can start and elongate war for profit, and avoid outbreaks of peace. This is one reason why the Thirty Years War (1618-48) in Europe took so long, as mercenaries fought for all sides in great numbers. By the time it ended, Germany lost a greater percentage of its population than in WWII.

Privatizing war changes warfare in profound ways modern generals do not comprehend. If conflict is commoditized, then military and marketplace strategies apply to war. It’s like General Patton goes to the souk. You can win wars by outbidding your enemy for mercenary services, bribing your enemy’s mercenaries to defect, or not paying your mercenaries when the war is over. However, it’s a dangerous game because your enemies and mercenaries can do the same to you, and there is no reliable way to enforce contracts.

Treachery is the watchword of private warfare. The 14^th century Florentine, Niccolò Machiavelli, was ripped off by his own mercenaries in 1500 and 1506, during a war with Pisa, causing Florence to lose to its diminutive neighbor. A few years later, he writes in his book The Prince, that mercenaries are: “disunited, ambitious, without discipline, unfaithful; gallant among friends, vile among enemies; no fear of God, no faith with men.”

Private force will also change world order. Offering the means of war to anyone who can afford it will transform warfare and the future of war. If money can buy firepower, then large corporations and the super-rich will become a new kind of superpower. This will rewrite the rules of global order. Who, how and why people fight will change, and there will be wars without states, accelerating global chaos.

This trend will grow, fueled by a free market for force that generates war but cannot regulate it. Today’s militaries have forgotten how to fight private wars, leaving us all exposed. We must increase our strategic IQs to deal with this problem before it becomes a crisis.

There is good news. Mercenaries are as old as war, yet the world did not devolve into anarchy, as is often portrayed by critics of private force. In fact, they can even do good, if hired to do so. If the industry were properly vetted and transparent, they could support UN peacekeeping operations, stop impending genocides, rescue civilian populations from human predators, hunt crime lords, and launch humanitarian operations quickly to save lives — something the international community cannot do. Mercenaries are like fire: they can burn down the house or power a steam engine. It’s a question of how we use them, so let’s use them for good.

In recent weeks, Tripoli has seen a steady stream of visits by European officials after the Government of National Unity (GNU) won the confidence of the Libyan parliament to lead the country to elections in late December of this year.

At a time when the new Libyan government is rejoicing in a diplomatic watershed – illustrated by the intense schedule of visits to Tripoli by foreign dignitaries – the need for EU members to boost relations with Libya is already emerging as one of the most acute foreign policy challenges. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ visit to the Libyan capital on April 6, demonstrated the difficulty of this task.

“Let those who tried to question our relations in the past stay back,” said Mitsotakis during his meeting with his Libyan counterpart, Abdel Hamid Dbeibah, who was appointed in February to head the new Government of National Unity bringing together representatives from the west and east of the country for the first time since 2014.

In 2019, Faiz al-Sarraj’s Government of National Accord (GNA), backed by Turkey, had driven General Haftar’s forces out of western Libya. To further the cooperation and in exchange for vital support for the GNA, al-Sarraj signed two memoranda of understanding, “The Security and Military Cooperation” and “Restriction of Marine Jurisdictions,”  with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Istanbul on November 28, 2019.

Mitsotakis asked Tripoli “to cancel the illegal documents presented as agreements between states when they have no legal value.” But days after his short visit, Erdoğan and Dbeibah reaffirmed their commitment to the “Restriction of Marine Jurisdictions” agreement.

This angered some of their neighbors in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as some EU members who were willing “to circumvent the agreement if it cannot be cancelled” as a European diplomat told Le Monde. Erdoğan and Dbeibah also signed numerous agreements following one-on-one and inter-delegation talks.

Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio said that Italy and the United States have “a common concern about the presence of foreign forces, both Russian and Turkish, in Libya,” meaning that there is a perception of “stronger” cooperation between the two countries on this matter.

Europe has recently shown interest in the upcoming elections in Libya.

During a meeting in Washington on Monday with his U.S. counterpart Antony Blinken, the two officials discussed the importance of the “full implementation of the ceasefire in Libya and the holding of elections [scheduled for December 24] on time.”

Europe has recently shown interest in the upcoming elections in Libya. Last month, the Libyan High National Electoral Commission held a meeting attended by foreign ministers from Italy, Germany, and France. The commission said the ministers “continued to support the commission in carrying out the elections scheduled for December 24 of this year.”

On Tuesday, French Ambassador to Libya, Béatrice Le Fraper du Hellen, signed an agreement with Gerardo Noto, the resident representative of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in Libya, by which

France pledged to contribute one million euros to support the UNDP project “Promoting Elections for the Libyan People,” bringing the total funds contributed by France to the said project to 1,850,000 euros. This is particularly interesting after France backed General Haftar with military support during his 2019 attempt to take over Tripoli.

In many ways, Libya presents unparalleled benefits to EU members and the ongoing EU diplomatic efforts are proof of Europe’s interest in the political upturn in this neighboring country after a decade of chaos.

President Biden’s agenda will have to focus overwhelmingly on U.S. domestic politics given the pressing challenges surrounding COVID-19 and the economic fallout from this unprecedented public health crisis. His administration has underlined their commitment to a foreign policy that better reflects the concerns and priorities of America’s middle class.

There is much debate about what this “foreign policy for the middle class” will look like, but you can be sure that the administration will be focusing on ending the “forever wars” and attempting to more substantively pivot away from the Middle East toward Asia and competition with China, a goal that proved elusive during previous administrations.

The Biden administration is not seeking to end U.S. engagement in the Middle East, but rather to limit the U.S. military presence in the region and to engage in greater multilateral diplomacy. The U.S.-led regional security architecture that has been in place for decades is no longer sustainable, and the new administration is eager to cultivate partnerships to increase burden sharing and encourage regional stability, while also assuring that its own strategic interests are still protected.

Biden’s Foreign Policy Priorities

The Biden administration is working on reinvigorating America’s State Department, which suffered from an unprecedented level of resignations and long-term vacancies during the Trump administration, and on cultivating greater multilateral cooperation with allies that were often disregarded over the last four years.

Biden officials speak much more of human rights and democratic norms, in stark contrast to Trump, but it’s unclear how much of this will lead to a substantive realignment of policy priorities in the Middle East. Sanctions over human rights violations are already being implemented, but they rarely target the major violators in conflicts and human rights violations, especially not heads of state.

The conflict in Libya will constitute a significant policy priority in the Transatlantic relationship between the United States and Europe.

Regarding Middle East priorities, Biden officials have laid out very clear priorities, namely returning to the Iran Nuclear Deal and supporting conflict resolution efforts in Yemen, both of which Biden’s teams are working vigorously to advance. This translates to a significant strategic focus on regional security in the Gulf and on Iranian influence in conflict theaters like Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.

North Africa will not feature high on the list of priorities. However, the conflict in Libya will constitute a significant policy priority in the Transatlantic relationship between the United States and Europe.

The United States maintains important bilateral relations with foreign patrons on both sides of the Libyan divide, namely Turkey, UAE, Egypt, France, and Russia, and is working to apply pressure on these actors to withdraw from Libya’s conflict by pushing all parties to respect the UN arms embargo, which the UN Panel of Experts recently argued was “totally ineffective.”

Libya offers a crucial milieu where the Biden administration can put its commitment toward multilateralism and diplomacy into action.

Former acting UN envoy on Libya and veteran American diplomat Stephanie Williams stated that an estimated 20,000 foreign fighters were present in Libya. Some reports indicate that some countries which have mercenaries in Libya are now planning to withdraw them in line with the current reconciliation process.

Libya offers a crucial milieu where the Biden administration can put its commitment toward multilateralism and diplomacy into action. This conflict also represents an opportunity to reinvigorate the Transatlantic partnership, which was damaged during the Trump administration.

Biden has emphasized time and time again that the United States needs to repair its ties with key European allies, and supporting conflict resolution efforts in Libya is a key modality through which to pursue this policy goal. Libya is at the top of the agenda in talks between the United States and European allies like Germany and France.

The Libyan conflict is in many ways more pressing for America’s European allies, who are preoccupied by concerns of regional instability, counterterrorism, migration, and Russian presence at NATO’s backdoor. The internationalized nature of the Libyan war is also linked with other regional tensions along Europe’s southern border, namely the tensions between Turkey, Greece, and other European and Middle East powers over maritime rights and resources in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Beyond supporting the tenuous ceasefire and political transition in Libya, the Biden administration can offer more humanitarian support and coordination for the estimated 574,000 foreign migrants, 316,000 internally displaced persons, and 44,000 refugees in Libya. The outbreak of COVID19, on top of the political instability and violence, hurts these vulnerable communities especially hard. It will take a long-term commitment from the international community to help rebuild Libya’s fragmented and under-resourced institutions, not to mention to ensure that the ceasefire holds.

Libyan experts have laid out a host of economic, political, and security challenges facing the Government of National Unity. Already the optimism surrounding the parliament’s approval of this interim government has been tamed by several high-profile political assassinations in both Benghazi and Tripoli, yet another indication of the urgent need for security sector reform.

Conflict Resolution Across the Region

Moving forward the Biden administration needs to maintain its active diplomatic efforts in Libya and work as closely as possible with its European allies on supporting the ceasefire and the political transition, as well as on pressuring foreign actors to withdraw from the conflict. This will be a difficult feat. The U.S. administration should take this a step further by helping to push the Libya Stabilization Act through Congress.

Experts discussed the possibility of a peaceful transition in Libya at an online panel organized by SETA Brussels entitled “Libya’s Political Transition Process,” on February 23, 2021. Libya’s political transition process, the role of external powers, and possible future scenarios for the country were among the topics discussed.

Claudia Gazzini, an analyst at the International Crisis Group in Libya, outlined the efforts by the United Nations to create an interim government by uniting the two governments in Tripoli and Tobruk, boost dialogue, and end the ongoing civil war. Based on the current political events taking place in Libya, Gazzini was optimistic about progress in the country. She noted that “running transparent elections where candidates freely competed and accepted election results was an unprecedented step” and something new on the Libyan political scene.

During the panel, Gazzini emphasized the need to have trust in the cabinet and the House of Representatives. Rich in resources such as oil, all Libyans would benefit from a single unified authority in control of the state in the form of an elected government. Gazzini emphasized how revenues from hydrocarbon production and oil exports can be used productively by the government, once formed.

Francois Burgat, emeritus director of research at the French Center for Scientific Research and a senior research fellow, political scientist, and expert on Arab affairs, shed light on the role of external actors in Libya, especially the United Arab Emirates, and the geopolitical importance of Libya after the Arab Spring.

Sharing the optimistic view by Gazzini, Burgat focused on the UAE’s role in creating militias to fight “political Islam” as part of its years-long strategy. “The Emirates buy support and create militias to fight an enemy, whom they call ‘political Islam,’” said Burgat.

Tarek Megerisi touched on the internal dynamics of the political transition process in Libya. A heavily divided country, torn between warring governments and competing groups, does not give a positive impression for the future. Internal conflicts need to be settled for a country to progress, he stressed and continued, in Libya, reality makes it clear that having a dynamic field with several external actors leads to a relative pessimism regarding the transition.

There is a need for Libyans to organize themselves, select a representative party, and have free elections.

Murat Aslan noted that the scene in Libya is rapidly changing and evolving. The problem does not lie in forming a government, but rather in maintaining stability. This means that there is a need for Libyans to organize themselves, select a representative party, and have free elections. “Some challenges are posed by internal and external groups that might be expelled from the dialogue, which requires cautious steps while addressing the various interests of the different parties,” Aslan concluded.

When asked about the political dialogue in Libya, Gazzini reflected on the lack of common understanding among Libyans of the political process. The fact that there are representatives appointed by an external body, namely the UN, alongside the State Council and other 13 representatives, leaves Libyans without a clear road map for the coming elections. This suggests a better reconciliation of efforts to guide the country through its transition period. Certain external parties, such as Turkey and Europe, could be a great support to Libya in ensuring the proper launch of its economy.

In Burgat’s opinion, the UAE seems to be fighting its opponents rather than acting as a regional leader in the place of Egypt. “Political Islam” is a term coined  to signify “the enemy of democracy” by leaders such as Egypt’s president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi or the UAE’s Mohammed bin Zayed. They both use the term repeatedly in their speeches and come together to fight a single opponent – the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood by and large is seen as the representative of “political Islam.”

The Libyan situation has seen the involvement of different actors such as the EU, Turkey, France, Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. France might need to revise its strategy in the Middle East, especially under Emmanuel Macron, considering the tolerating of caricatures that mock Prophet Mohammed and cause offense to Muslims, and Macron decorating Sisi with the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor in 2020, despite all the allegations made against the Sisi regime and its violations of human rights.

Maybe it is time for Libyans to handle their issues internally with the help of friendly countries and bodies. In fact, it is in the country’s best interest to handle its problems on its own, without external interventions. The existence of various actors and military groups in the country might adversely affect the transition process. Do Libyans lack trust in officials appointed by external institutions such as the United Nations? The truth is that they do not trust the intentions of countries such as France which supports Haftar and Sisi – the latter being the former U.S. President Donald Trump’s “favorite dictator.” Only time will tell.

Libya recently saw the conclusion of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), a peace process under the United Nations’s (UN) auspices. Its primary outcomes were an election date, set for December 24, 2021, and a new executive authority. The composition of the latter was a widely unexpected climax. In a process outwardly reverse-engineered to facilitate one result, the winning list of four candidates did not include the projected heavyweights.

Indeed, the combination of the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) Speaker Aguila Saleh proved to be too toxic in list-form. The former had alienated some Tripoli armed groups and built rapports with adverse factions, while the latter damaged his political brand by legitimizing eastern ex-General Khalifa Haftar’s military adventures.

The winning list was not actively endorsed by LPDF delegates; it was more a case of voting against the other option, or, alternatively, “voting as veto.” Correspondingly, it was less ideology than opportunism that united the new executive authority. This can be both a boon and a bane – the former as it offers novel openings for pragmatism because this quadruplet has less baggage, and the latter as the lack of concinnity and the reliance on kickback-giving may prove to be unsustainable.

The designated Prime Minister (PM) and head of the Government of National Unity (GNU), Abdelhamid Dabaiba, is a wealthy and transactional businessman with handy experience in the construction sector. He has been angling for this position for some time, and was also part of the 2017 Misratan delegation to Moscow. His unscrupulous nature comes with drawbacks, however, as corruption allegations – he has links to his cousin Ali Dabaiba, a moneyed Gaddafi-era procurement official – and vote-buying accusations have bogged him down.

The new Presidential Council (PC) consists of three members, one for Libya’s historical three provinces. The member for Cyrenaica, and President-designate of the PC, Mohammed al-Mnefi, is from Tobruk. He markedly neither supported nor denounced Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli, and therefore how far his influence reaches in eastern Libya is still unclear.

A member of late Libyan hero Omar al-Mukhtar’s tribe, he was previously Tripoli’s ambassador to Greece, though he was expelled after the GNA’s maritime agreement with Turkey (Athens has ironically announced it intends to reopen its Libyan embassy).

Al-Mnefi recently met with Haftar in Benghazi; with accountability calls disregarded in modern-day Libya, this is a critical time for al-Mnefi to establish whether he will be the politician to demonstrate the east is not monolithic or if he will fall victim to recurrent missteps. His ambitious priorities in this 10-month preparatory period are military and institution unification, as well as national reconciliation.

The member for Tripolitania, Abdullah al-Lafi, is from Zawiya and a moderate HoR parliamentarian, while the member for Fezzan, Mossa al-Koni, is a Tuareg born in Ghadames; he was part of the HoR then the GNA’s PC before resigning in January 2017.

Considering the Saleh-Bashagha duo’s possible qualms with the executive authority’s on-paper transience had they won – candidates pledged not to run for December’s elections if selected – this result may be more propitious in the long-run. This is the silver lining; as they are permitted to run, this may make them more vested in seeing them happen.

Dabaiba’s likely balanced cabinet, which he has stated will include carrots for key constituencies and placate individuals like Bashagha, also needs the HoR’s approval. Yet, in an astute move by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (USMIL) that suggests some past lessons are being learned, if the HoR fails to grant confidence (as Saleh recently threatened and given his post-Libyan Political Agreement actions), the responsibility will be transferred to LPDF delegates.

This crystalizes the rubber stamp nature of the HoR, which has planned a preliminary session— though its circumvention might provide a pretext for prospective spoilers such as Saleh and Abdullah Thinni, PM of the east-based Interim Government. While it would also be a polarizing issue at the LPDF (given February 5’s disapproval voting dynamics and the winning ticket still only earning 53 per cent), the prospects for pragmatism increase.

Having its eggs firmly in the Haftar basket, the UAE remains to be seen whether this new status quo will prove to be satisfactory.

As ever, the response of international sponsors will be vital. Although the expected carousel of lip-service did transpire, there can be a sharp dichotomy between what is said and done vis-à-vis Libya, as the last decade has exhibited. Indeed, how Egypt responds to seeing its preferred candidate Saleh lose will be consequential.

Whereas it would have liked to retain the HoR as an excuse to safeguard its perceived interests, UNSMIL’s foresight means that option is no longer directly on the table – though the precarious constitutional process it is hosting remains available. Conversely, backing December elections in good faith could be seen as risky in Cairo as it may stand to lose considerably if they are held fairly.

Another relevant actor is the UAE and how it chooses to respond. Having its eggs firmly in the Haftar basket, it remains to be seen whether this new status quo will prove to be satisfactory. Haftar has incidentally been elevated again at the expense of Saleh, who may lose his HoR speakership to a parliamentarian with Fezzan origins. Nevertheless, strong doubts persist as to whether Haftar’s powerbroker status is merited or merely imposed by his foreign backers.

For Turkey, it will be mostly content by this outcome; it has good relations with PM-designate Dabaiba, a Misratan who gave his first interview to a Turkish outlet and called it an “ally, friend, and a brotherly state.”

For Russia, its primary interests are preserving its influence in Libya, ideally with a military installation in Sirte, Jufra, or both. Given it implausibly insists on Private Military Company Wagner’s independence from Moscow, it is expected to keep working both sides. If regular Libyans are on board is another matter – protests recently resumed in Houn, a town beside Jufra Airbase, demanding the departure of mercenaries. 

Moving forward, Libya now has a new executive authority. If the GNU is endorsed, it replaces the GNA, a government that likely could have been sufficient had it received more material support from the international community. In any case, facilitating elections in December remains the priority.

On June 22, 2020, participating in Operation Irini, the German frigate Hamburg searched the Turkish merchant ship MV Roseline A.  It was subsequently stated that the soldiers who boarded the ship questioned the crew and conducted detailed examinations of the ship by opening the freight containers.

The Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately condemned the EU move in an official statement by declaring that no advance permission had been acquired either from the captain or from Turkey.

The ministry pointed out that information concerning the EU move was conveyed to Turkey exclusively through the ship’s staff. This rare incident that led to a formal objection from Turkey and caused serious tension deserves to be examined as it raises significant political and legal issues.

The Legal Framework of Intervention on the High Seas

The rules regulating the operation of merchant ships on the high seas are established by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter, Law of the Sea Convention). Although Turkey is not a party to the convention, the relevant rules reflect customary principles of international law and are abided by Turkey and all other states.

The doctrine of the high seas is based on the principle of the freedom of the seas. Therein, all states can enjoy the freedom of navigation of the high seas and the right of their aircraft to fly in the airspace over the high seas, to place submarine cables and oil pipelines, to fish, conduct scientific research, and construct artificial islands and other facilities permitted by international law.

The Legal and Political Reflections

Considering the legal framework summarized above, the first issue that needs to be addressed is whether there were “reasonable grounds for suspecting” the Turkish merchant ship was involved in any activities banned in the Law of the Sea Convention.

The intervention is described in the official statement of the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs as “ambiguous” and “suspicious.” This implies that Turkey was not presented with satisfactory evidence that there were reasonable grounds to intervene.

Moreover, the fact that no weapon was found as a result of the search shows that the ship was searched based on a general suspicion rather than concrete one.

No weapon was found as a result of the search shows that the ship was searched based on a general suspicion rather than concrete one.

It was pointed out in the statement made by the ministry that the purpose and benefit of Operation Irini “are open to debate” and that the operation itself was not “impartial” as it did not control “the arms support to the outlawed Haftar” but instead it “punished the legitimate Libyan Government.”

The statement points out that neither NATO nor the governments of Turkey and Libya were consulted, and that the consent of the flag state, i.e. Turkey, was not obtained.

It is without doubt that there are controversial matters surrounding Operation Irini. First, the operation was not directly established by a UN Security Council resolution nor was there any UN supervision. In fact, the EU launched the operation with objectives that do not comply with the task of inspecting the arms embargo.

Considering that the task of Operation Irini is not limited to searching for weapons but also covers the prevention of oil smuggling and human trafficking, it becomes clear that it is, in fact, actually associated with the protection of the security and defense interests of the EU in the Mediterranean Sea.

The command council of the operation is dominated by France and Greece which are recently in serious conflict with Turkey in the Mediterranean Sea and Libya. The deputy operation commander is a French national and Italy and Greece will alternate the Force Commander every six months.

Therefore, the activities carried out under Operation Irini are inevitably partial against Turkey and lacking goodwill, which makes any activity illegitimate according to the fundamental principle of international law.

As can be understood from the UN Security Council resolutions mentioned above, it is not clear whether the arms embargo also targets the legitimate government of Libya. In some decisions, the legitimate government is held exempt from restrictions in order to ensure stability in the country.

The Libyan Government of National Accord has established defense agreements with certain countries, including Turkey. The arms embargo should therefore not prevent the arrival of armed elements from countries like Turkey given the signed bilateral defense cooperation agreements between the two countries.

Turkey’s Response

Following the search of the Turkish ship, Turkey’s priority is to prevent similar interventions on Turkish merchant vessels in the Mediterranean Sea. This said, there are legal measures against such unlawful interventions.

As the ships on high seas are under the jurisdiction of the flag state and are considered a part of that country, the flag state has the right to take all necessary legitimate measures to prevent such illegitimate acts on the basis of the right of self-defense.

These measures may include military measures as long as they are necessary and proportionate.

On the other hand, the flag state has the right to initiate the necessary legal procedures in the courts of the intervening state in order to get compensation for all damages that resulted from an illegal intervention.

The Law of the Sea Convention provides that all the damages should be compensated “if the suspicions prove to be unfounded.”

A criminal procedure against the personnel who intervened can also be initiated, if there is enough evidence that the intervention and the related acts constituted criminal violations.

The acts during the intervention were conducted on a Turkish-flagged merchant ship that is regarded as Turkish territory. The personnel who carried out the acts could therefore be subject to a criminal investigation in the Turkish courts in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Turkish Criminal Code.

On October 23, a ceasefire was signed following the successful campaign by Libya’s internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) to roll back General Khalifa Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli with Turkish military help. All units are supposed to return to their camps and all foreign forces [including training crews] to leave within three months.

Registration was to begin immediately with a view to integration or demobilization. Land and air crossings are supposed to be opened and media escalation and hate speech to halt. A joint security room will form a monitoring force. The 5+5 Joint Military Committee (JMC) will develop a mechanism with the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to monitor the implementation.

Signs of hope in Libya

Some real progress has been made. Despite an attack by Haftar forces on Ubari November 28, the ceasefire has generally held and exchanges of detainees have continued. Flights between Benghazi, Tripoli, Sebha, Ghat and Ubari have resumed. Oil production, almost stopped after Haftar closed most sites in January, is now back to pre-blockade levels of 1.2 million barrels per day.

While the 5+5 JMC continues to meet, political and economic negotiations are also happening. On December 7, the Central Bank of Libya held its first unified board meeting since 2014 to discuss exchange rates. UNSMIL has facilitated virtual and in-person sessions of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum [LPDF] on reforming the executive authority. Defying pro-Haftar Speaker Aguila Saleh, 127 out of 200 members of the House of Representatives met in Ghadames and agreed to choose a new speaker at their next session scheduled for December 21.

Saleh held a rival “official” session in Benghazi but less than 20 members showed up. His removal would be a blow to Haftar and his foreign backers: the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Egypt and France. Saleh has been the effective civilian face of the eastern government despite Haftar’s attempted dismissal of all civilian authorities on April 27.

All of this is largely positive. So, has the civil war come to an end? Though we hope progress will continue, we are only at the beginning of the beginning. Recent history shows how difficult the road ahead will be.

Elections in Libya can be a step forward

According to the LPDF plan, presidential and parliamentary elections should be held December 24, 2021. This would be an important step, if they take place and are reasonably free and fair. However, as we saw before, elections are not a panacea. The results must be broadly accepted. Then comes the infinitely harder and more important challenges of making laws and governing. Between now and then other major obstacles remain.

The two sides have not begun to withdraw their combatants. Addressing the LPDF on December 2, UNSMIL acting chief Stephanie Williams noted that 20,000 foreign forces still on Libyan soil besides continued hate speech and human rights abuses.

While Turkish troops remain, Haftar’s foreign allies will not want to leave if the UAE and Saudi Arabia continue to pay the bills.

Haftar began his April 2019 offensive just days before a UN supported peace conference was to start, so the GNA is unlikely to want to give up its protector. Turkey has already indicated its forces will stay as long as the internationally recognized government wants them to.

While Turkish troops remain, Haftar’s foreign allies will not want to leave if the UAE and Saudi Arabia continue to pay the bills. One option would be a reasonably robust international peacekeeping mission to monitor the ceasefire and help separate the parties.

In 2012, most combatant troops were revolutionary fighters with little formal training. With barely any regular junior officers and troops, revolutionaries did most of the work on the ground with minimal supervision.

Qaddafi left hollowed-out security institutions. Most of the officers were colonels and most of the enlisted personnel were sergeant majors – generally near retirement age. Authorities constantly squabbled among themselves. In 2012, most combatant troops were revolutionary fighters with little formal training. The old guard and the revolutionaries did not trust each other much. With barely any regular junior officers and troops, revolutionaries did most of the work on the ground with minimal supervision.

Inevitably, many became used to their entitlements and reluctant to reform. While able to come together to combat existential threats like the so-called “Islamic State” [IS or Daesh] or Haftar’s advance on Tripoli, they tend to fight amongst themselves and against the Government when not under imminent danger.

There needs to be a comprehensive plan, accepted by most, if not all, with effective coordination. Transitional mechanisms will be needed for the different formations to come under an overarching structure with a generous, unified benefits structure for pay and retirement to avoid jealousy. This is essentially what South Africa did at the end of Apartheid.

Though that country still has issues, it has avoided falling back into civil war. A professional training mission should support this transition, focusing not just on basic training but also on effective democratic governance of the security sector. Ideally, this would be an international mission with a NATO backbone since it has the infrastructure. If it is composed of only a few countries, Libyans may not trust it. Fortunately, there are some plans created in 2012-2013 that lay out a vision of what Libyan security forces could look like, so the work does not need to start from scratch.

New player or new attitude in Libya?

A major factor will be the incoming American administration. Under President Obama, the U.S. did not get engaged much until IS arrived. President Trump was even more nonchalant, particularly given his indulgence to Middle Eastern autocracies, until Russia’s Wagner Group mercenaries started showing up.

President-elect Biden has declared that he will be less permissive. A recent report by the Defense Department’s Inspector General invoking UAE funding of these fighters is a factor in bipartisan Congressional opposition to arms sales to the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. As they fight back with their impressive public relations arsenals, we will have to wait a few more months to see whether real change will come.

Disclaimer: The opinions above are those of Mr. Reid alone and do not purport to represent the United Nations.

In the past few months Luigi Di Maio, the youngest Italian Foreign Minister since Galeazzo Ciano, who served from 1936 until 1943 in the nefarious government of his father-in-law, Benito Mussolini, has been involved in rebuilding the international supply chain and reopening borders to free circulation after the country was hit hard by COVID-19. However, Di Maio’s second priority has been to protect Italy’s interests in Libya in the new scenario that emerged after Turkish intervention in favor of the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA).

Italian Foreign Policy on Libya

Irregular migration, energy and security are the three main Italian interests in Libya. Despite the diversification policies since the early 1970s, Libya still plays a relevant role in Italy’s energy policy because of the amount of oil imported, the exceptional quality of Libyan crude oil, and the Greenstream subsea gas pipeline laid by the Italian energy giant, ENI (State Hydrocarbons Authority), and opened in 2004. Moreover, for Rome, Libyan gas is probably the only reliable alternative to Russian natural gas.

As in all European countries, the issue of immigration is at the top of the political debate in Italy too. Most of the irregular migrants entering the country come from the shores of Libya. The issue has created enormous tensions domestically – just remember that the Catholic Church has pressed for a policy of open borders, but the Italian right is basing much of their populist discourse on stopping migration by all means. Irregular migration has also created significant tension at the EU level, which is refusing the modification of the Dublin Regulation.

Future perspectives

Thus, Di Maio’s priority is to provide stability in the country, to provide security, the flow of oil and natural gas, and the containment of irregular immigration. For Rome, the ideal option is to reach a political compromise between the different parts and maintain the unity of the country. However, in the present situation, where different regional and global actors have sided with opposing groups, it appears a remote option.

Turkish intervention in favor of the GNA has even reduced the chances for an Italian role and has created a situation that (from Rome’s viewpoint) resembles the first phases of the unending Syrian crisis. Consequently, Italy is now faced with a difficult choice of taking a leading role opposing Ankara or cooperating with it.

Di Maio initially attempted to reduce the GNA’s dependency on Ankara with a more active and independent role. Nevertheless, this would mean a radical shift in Italian foreign policy and unprecedented deployment of its military as well as economic resources. This is unlikely because of three constraining elements. Firstly, foreign policy choices must enjoy domestic support. The Italian media, however, continue to follow the Libyan crisis sporadically and without interest. Italian public opinion also deplores the use of military force as an instrument of foreign policy, as an “enemy” is not regarded as an implacable foe that needs to be confronted with military power and, instead, can be more effectively engaged using diplomacy.

Secondly, Italian defense policy, as stated by the White Book of the Italian Ministry of Defense, is concentrated on the Euro-Atlantic geopolitical area and on the Euro-Mediterranean geopolitical area. The Euro-Atlantic security is guaranteed by NATO, EU, “common values” and strong economic and cultural ties. The Euro-Mediterranean area, however, is characterized by anarchy and suffers political and economic instability and intra-state competition. Yet, despite its relevance, it is very unlikely that the Italian Armed Forces can intervene in the Euro-Mediterranean area outside the U.S.-led mission scenario –  something that the Trump administration is not considering.

Consequently, Italy has pointed to a UN-sponsored solution to the crisis and to the reinforcement of Mission Irini, the EU military operation to enforce the arms embargo to Libya. Both efforts appear difficult in materializing when key members of the EU and permanent members of the Security Council either backed Haftar (Russia and France), who aims to destroy the GNA militarily or are uninterested in the crisis (U.S., U.K., and China).

Italy has relatively small economic resources to invest in Libya or to apply pressure. Because of the huge public debt and the poor performance of its economy, the country cannot afford big investments abroad. Private investments are also unlikely. Major companies like FIAT or UniCredit, which have been important actors of Italian foreign policy in Libya and the East Mediterranean, are now focused on the American or internal market. The only relevant economic player is ENI, which has been active in Libya since 1959 and has lobbied the Italian government extensively.

Exactly because of these three restrictions, to not lose a role in North Africa, Italy should look into a compromise with Turkey, which deployed enormous resources in Libya. However, this compromise may need brave decisions: Turkey’s image with the Italian public is particularly poor, and the Rome-Ankara alliance may damage relations with France, Greece, and Egypt. With the first two countries, there is a high level of interconnection that will not be damaged by an eventual competition in Libya. Moreover, Paris has been frequently in conflict with Rome on the issue of migration and proved highly destabilizing in Libya. Italian policymakers define Egypt as an “inescapable partner” in the Middle East. This view has been maintained even after Giulio Regeni’s brutal killing in February 2016, presumably by members of the Egyptian security apparatus, and the fact that none have been brought to justice.

At the moment Italy appears to be in a cul de sac in Libya with a young Foreign Minister who will not be able to change Italian foreign policy because he lacks strong political support; his party is in turmoil and he recently lost its leadership. Everybody hopes, though, that he will not share the young Foreign Minister Ciano’s fate, who watched powerless the decline of Italy’s power in the Mediterranean.

The use of armed drones, or Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), continues to evolve nineteen years after a CIA MQ-1 Predator drone saw its unsuccessful combat debut over Kandahar, Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, in the first days of the so-called “War on Terror.”

Though the United States until recently restricted exports of its long-endurance Predator and MQ-9 Reaper UCAVs, China, Iran, Israel, and Turkey have since developed and widely exported their own combat drones. These cost one-third or less than the price of a $15 million Reaper system, though they do have significant deficits in remote-control range, endurance, and weapons payload in comparison.  Nonetheless, these new Predator-style drones, as well as smaller and cheaper unmanned systems are now impacting conflicts across the globe.

Notably, in 2019-2020 the long-running Libyan civil war became dominated by drone warfare, which largely superseded sporadic and costly strikes from manned aircraft. First, the United Arab Emirates deployed Chinese-built Wing Loong drones armed with laser-guided Blue Arrow missiles in support of the Libyan National Army (LNA). When a 2019 offensive on Tripoli stalled, the LNA largely ceased ground operations and turned to drone strikes to maintain pressure.

However, Turkey then deployed Bayraktar TB2 UCAVs to support the opposing Government of National Accord (GNA). In the new phase, drone targeted drone on the ground, finally realizing the science-fiction trope of war between robots. Concerted drone strikes eventually destroyed numerous Pantsir-S1 short-range air defense systems defending the LNA’s key western airbase, leading the LNA to withdraw in May.

Earlier in March, Turkish Bayraktar and Anka-S drones impacted the Syrian Civil War, where Ankara opposes the efforts by Damascus to crush the last rebel stronghold in Idlib province. After several deadly attacks on Turkish troops, Turkey retaliated with waves of drone strikes supported by Korral jamming systems that overwhelmed Syrian air defenses, destroyed dozens of Assad-allied armored vehicles and artillery systems, and killed hundreds of personnel, bringing the offensive in Idlib to a halt.

These are decisive operational outcomes, even though UCAV losses were also non-negligible. Air defense shot down at least eight Bayraktars over Libya. Bayraktars and more valuable Anka-S drones were also lost over Syria. But these losses were materially and politically acceptable in ways that the loss of a dozen manned warplanes would not have been.

Unmanned Systems and the Threshold for Violence

Militaries worldwide are eager to procure drones because they lower the stakes for inflicting violence, and can kill more cost-efficiently than other methods.

A combat aircraft like an F-16 has been able to launch precision-guided weapons for decades, and such aircraft can carry more weapons and travel at a higher speed than any drone in service. But every time that an F-16 is deployed, there exists a risk, however small, that it will be lost over hostile territory, which could have dramatic political repercussions.

Thus, every F-16 sortie requires support assets, which may include electronic warfare aircraft to suppress air defenses, airborne warning, and command aircraft (AWACS) to maintain situational awareness, and search and rescue units on standby to rescue a downed pilot. All of the aircraft involved cost tens of thousands of dollars per flight hour to operate, and exhaust their fuel quickly unless a (large, expensive) tanker airplane is deployed to keep them aloft.

UCAVs, by contrast, cost less per flight hour, do not require rescue or escort assets, and can loiter over combat zones for over 20 hours searching for targets – and lost drones usually incur few political consequences. That said, the threshold for violence against drones, even unarmed types, has also proven much lower—in part because it can be observed that countries do not consider shooting down a drone to be as serious as an attack on a manned aircraft.

However, the tendency to see drones as acceptable targets could also backfire by inadvertently triggering escalation to deadly conflict. After Iran downed an unarmed U.S. RQ-4N drone in 2019, the U.S. reportedly came close to launching a deadly counter strike.

The Small UAS Threat

Predator-style drones and their missiles so far remain too large, expensive, and sophisticated to be operated by non-state actors. However, the same is not true for affordable and widely available civilian micro- and mini-drones.

In the Battle of Mosul, ISIS (Daesh) used numerous small drones to drop hand grenades or kamikaze themselves with explosive payloads into government forces. In Syria, insurgents launched a “swarm” of thirteen drones at a Russian airbase, though without much success. In Venezuela, a jury-rigged drone was employed in a failed assassination attempt on President Maduro.

Such Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (SUAS) afford non-state actors the ability to inflict greater costs in casualties and terror on government-aligned forces without exposing themselves to retaliation. However, they have yet to decisively impact a conflict.

However, states are also developing and fielding weaponized micro- and mini-drones (or “loitering munitions” or “kamikaze drones”) like the U.S. Switchblade, Israeli Harops and the Turkish Kargu-2. These relatively lightweight systems can serve as precision-guided missiles on the fly. The first kamikaze drone attack was delivered by an Israeli-built Harops drone in 2016 during conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Future Drone Combat Systems

Current UCAVs are slow and lack the speed to evade air defense fire; furthermore, those capable of long-range/endurance remain too expensive to be truly expendable. Thus their usefulness in a “Great Power conflict” is limited.

Accordingly, the United States, China, and Russia are pursuing new, sophisticated UAVs thought to be survivable in a shooting war against a hi-tech adversary. One approach is to arm stealth drones like the RQ-170 and the (prototype) Russian Okhotnik-B, although supersonic drones are also under development.

Inexpensive “loyal wingman” drones designed to assist fighter pilots in aerial warfare are also approaching entry into service in the 2020s, as are aerial decoy drones for diverting air defense fire.

Russia has also combat-tested an unmanned ground combat vehicle (UGCV) in Syria, though with disappointing results due to inherent difficulties in maintaining a long-distance communication link through intervening terrain, while the U.S. plans to field a trio of UGCVs in Light, Medium and Heavy-weight categories.

At sea, the U.S. Navy hopes that cheap robotic warships (USVs) will help fill out its shrinking fleet at an affordable cost. China, Russia, and the U.S. are also developing several types of submarine drones. These will be useable in surveillance roles fairly soon, but autonomous, combat-capable submarines will surely follow.

The drones killing humans today are directly controlled by other human beings. Autonomous functions are usually limited to behaviors to avoiding crash and collision and returning towards the controller if the signal is lost.

However, that will change. Advanced combat drones may be designed to perform their missions in situations where their control signal may be disrupted or inaccessible, such as a stealth UCAV penetrating enemy territory or a submarine deep beneath the surface of the ocean. Automated missile defense systems may demand reaction speeds exceeding human capability.  Swarms of small drones would be impossible to individually control, meaning their decision-making would be tied to networked AI.

Particularly chilling is work to adapt UCAVs to use facial recognition technology, which is notoriously prone to error, to identify persons for lethal attacks. There would then exist the risk that an autonomous combat system may attack when, or whom, it should not attack.

Defenders of autonomous systems argue AI might be less error-prone than humans, who have accidentally shot down airliners and bombed wedding parties. Critics counter that an autonomous combat system will lack the human ability to judge from context whether the use of violence is appropriate.

Regardless, the genie is out of the bottle as the technology to manufacture affordable UCAVs spreads globally, affording even resource-poor armed forces like that of Nigeria new ways to wield airpower more affordably and effectively than before.

But in turn, security forces must now develop and field affordable short-range air defense capabilities to defend against drones, including low-cost radars, jammers, laser weapons, and even anti-drone drones as traditional missile-based air defense solutions may prove too expensive per shot to contain the threat posed by smaller swarming drones.

Drones undoubtedly offer a relatively low-cost and low-risk means to surveil and project violence. However, the capacity to kill higher numbers and more efficiently does not mean that killing is necessarily justified, effective, or free of collateral damage.

Though touted as being more precise weapons compared to the traditional method of plastering a “kill zone” with large unguided aerial bombs or artillery shells, drones strikes have nonetheless resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths in part because they can be used so much more liberally than manned warplanes. Even the normalization of targeted assassination has worrying implications.

While drone proliferation in 21st-century warfare is inevitable, it is desirable to develop mutually-agreed-upon norms regulating their use in multi-national forums. Unfortunately, it seems unlikely such effort will be undertaken by countries eager to field UCAV systems and export them abroad.

The Trump administration has dismantled a large part of the arms control regime painstakingly erected in prior decades, so it seems doubtful that drone warfare will take priority over arms control measures of strategic, space-based and cyber weapons in the coming years. The U.S. and its rivals have also collectively weakened alliances and international institutions which could be used to negotiate such regulations in favor of transactional two-party negotiations.

China and other countries’ success in drone exports have led the U.S. to ease its own restrictions, a move very much in the commercial interests of domestic defense manufacturers. Meanwhile, neither Beijing nor Moscow believe that human rights concerns should limit arms sales abroad. Ultimately, Predator-style drones remain most effective when used by a state against weak states or non-state actors. In an international order based on states, those most impacted by drone warfare usually do not have a seat at the table.