Turkey’s opposition parties including the CHP, the Iyi Party and the HDP have established a holy alliance to stop the ruling AK Party-MHP bloc. The political system, especially after the introduction of the presidential system in April 2017, has started to be structured by bipolarity. The underlying motive for both of the alliances is similar, the will to power. However, they are shaped by two different and rather opposing ideological frameworks based on their positions within the political system.

The opposition seeks to detach the AK Party-MHP bloc from power, and thus adopts a discourse of liberty. This discourse strives to convince the electorate that the ruling power is oppressive and excluding the majority of society. The ruling AK Party-MHP bloc, in contrast, puts forward a discourse of power in order to maintain and strengthen its grasp on power. This discourse seeks to persuade the electorate that its rule is inclusive and should continue to sustain the security and welfare of the country.

The CHP, Iyi Party, and HDP alliance, designed to topple the AK Party-MHP bloc, is shaped by two different and rather opposing ideological frameworks based on their positions within the political system. 

Therefore, the result of the power struggle, including the upcoming local elections on 31 March, between these two political blocs will be determined by a couple of factors. The first one is the persuasive power of each discourse or policy. For the ruling bloc, the electorate will look at whether its interests are tied to the continuation of the existing order. If the electorate feel that an election loss for the ruling bloc will destabilize the political system and lead to an insecure environment, both with respect to the economy and politico-military matters, they tend to vote for the ruling AK Party-MHP bloc. More specifically, if the AK Party-MHP ruling bloc convinces the electorate that it’s loss of power will impair the fight against terrorism (PKK, FETO and DAESH) and deteriorate the country’s economy, which had recently taken a downturn, it will guarantee the election victory.

Thus, the opposition should convince the electorate that a change in power or the replacement of the ruling bloc with the opposition will not harm the fight against terrorism and improve the country’s economy. The opposition should persuade the electorate that there is an alternative to the ruling power and that alternative is itself.

For the ruling bloc in Turkey, the electorate will look at whether its interests are tied to the continuation of the existing order. The opposition need to convince the electorate that a change in power will not harm Turkey’s fight against terrorism and will improve the country’s economy. 

This leads us to the second factor. The opposition should demonstrate that the alliance between the three political parties –here we can include the Islamist Felicity Party (SP)– form a strong and dependable force for ruling the country. The opposition alliance is formed by two secular-nationalist political parties –the CHP and the Iyi Party– and the Kurdish nationalist HDP. The integrity and coordination between the CHP and the Iyi Party is not a strong one since the CHP tilts towards the Left whereas the Iyi Party has right-wing tendencies. This creates a serious divergence of opinions over some critical issues. The relations between these two parties have already created serious ideological debates among their members and caused some party members to resign and shift sides.

The opposition is not offering a clear-cut economic program to fight with the existing economic problems such as rising inflation and unemployment rates as well as not providing a comprehensive program for urban planning

As we add the Kurdish nationalist HDP, which is the political representative of the PKK armed terrorist group, the internal contradictions of the opposition bloc intensively rises. Not only the right-wing Turkish nationalist Iyi Party members and its grassroots have reacted to this rapprochement with the HDP, but left-wing CHP members and its grassroots showed displeasure with the decision to ally with the HDP. The inclusion of the HDP into the alliance has decreased the chances for the opposition to be able to weaken the ruling bloc in the upcoming local elections. This will more likely be perceived by the electorate that the opposition bloc may endanger the fight against terrorism, especially Turkey’s struggle with the PKK’s Syrian branch, the YPG.

Moreover, the opposition is not offering a clear-cut economic program to fight with the existing economic problems such as rising inflation and unemployment rates. Not to mention that the opposition bloc has not provided a comprehensive program for urban planning and government in the run-up to the local elections. In sum, despite the rising public displeasure with the existing ruling power, the opposition seems to fail to offer itself as an alternative in the elections.     

The AK Party is expected to reveal its candidate for Istanbul on Saturday. Binali Yildirim’s name has already been discussed in circles close to the party and he may be considered as the ‘common’ candidate of the People’s Alliance – composed of the AK Party and MHP. Devlet Bahceli already announced that MHP will fully support Yildirim’s candidacy in Istanbul.

The technical detail that both party’s leading figures are talking about is the fact that Binali Yildirim is currently the president of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. In the previous weeks there were rumors that Binali Yildirim will resign from his current position in order to run for the mayoral elections. However, rumors now suggest that both Erdogan and Bahceli don’t think it’s necessary for Yildirim to resign in order to become the candidate for Istanbul.

CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu is yet to comment on this issue. Whether he is remaining silent due to the friendly meeting he held with Yildirim in December or whether he will use this as a tool during the election campaign is yet to be known.

The campaigns for Turkey’s local elections in 2019 will start in full gear next week. Above economic reasons, political analysts expect the potential military operation to be launched by the Turkish Armed Forces in the east of the Euphrates to have an impact on the campaign process and the results of the election.

Since the upcoming local elections will be the first of their kind in the new presidential system, there are some technical details that are being adjusted for these elections according to the needs of the new system in Turkey.

According to the current Turkish electoral law, which has been applied until now, the official authority to depose majors are in the hands of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, in the new system, the Minister of Internal Affairs can be appointed as a technical bureaucrat and does not need to be an elected representative. In this regard, the related constitutional bylaw will change and will give this authority directly to the President.

There are also some other details, like the protocol procedures or immunity issues of the mayors – that need to be regulated. These details and others are currently being studied by technocrats and whether or not changes will occur depend on the agenda of the parliament.

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi

There are three and a half months until the local elections in Turkey and each week as the political dynamics in the country are changing, names of the candidates, details of negotiations, and the nature of alliances are also changing.

The CHP and Iyi Party have agreed upon 21 cities – 11 has been taken by the CHP and the remaining 10 that the Iyi Party has a potential. There are rumors that the two parties will also come to an agreement on 19 other districts. However, details of these districts and the names to be put forward are expected to become clear next week.

After the party assembly meeting for determining candidates for local elections yesterday, Seyit Torun – deputy head of the CHP – made a press conference and announced 67 candidates of the CHP. Torun declared that CHP’s candidate for Ankara is Mansur Yavas, for Istanbul is Ekrem Imamoglu, Adana is Zeydan Karalar, and Antalya, Muhittin Bocek. In addition to these cities, Torun declared candidates for other cities including Ahmet Meric in Agri, Tanju Ozcan in Bolu, Rasim Yilmaz in Nigde, Ali Akyildiz in Sivas, and Fatma Kaplan Hurriyet in Kocaeli.

Within the framework of its alliance with the Iyi Party, CHP withdrew its candidate – Ahmet Akin – from Balikesir. Another controversial city during the alliance negotiations between the two parties was Adana. It was later decided that the Iyi Party will support CHP’s candidate and Zeydan Karalar was announced as the candidate for Adana yesterday. The Iyi Party will also support CHP’s Antalya candidate – Muhittin Bocek – who is currently the mayor of Konyaalti (a district of Antalya).

The most discussed candidate between the CHP and Iyi Party has been Mansur Yavas. He was finally announced as CHP’s candidate and according to the alliance between the two parties, the Iyi Party will support Mansur Yavas in Ankara.

In the local elections of 2014, Mansur Yavas was CHP’s candidate in Ankara, and he received 43.82% of the votes. AK Party’s Melih Gokcek won the elections in Ankara with 44.82% of the total votes.

There are discussions that CHP is currently having some problems in deciding about its candidate for Izmir, who will run against AK Party’s Nihat Zeybekci – ex-minister of economy. The current mayor of Izmir belongs to the CHP but is not running in the upcoming elections. There are rumors that Kemal Kilicdaroglu – head of the CHP – is planning to announce a “surprise” candidate.

On the other side of the equilibrium, the AK Party and MHP have decided to go through the cities that have already been announced. It is rumored that MHP has decided to withdraw its candidates in a couple of cities and is speculated that the AK Party will withdraw its candidates in Igdir and Kars, and support the MHP’s candidates. In the People’s Alliance so far, while the MHP has not nominated candidates in Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir, the AK Party has not nominated candidates in Igdir and Kars.

According to reports from HaberTurk, the AK Party will not nominate candidates in Adana, Manisa, Mersin, and Osmaniye, where the MHP currently controls the municipalities.

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi

Although the AK Party and the MHP announced that they were not going to form an alliance for the upcoming local elections last month, the latest incidents forced them to come together under the People’s Alliance. The leaders of both parties held a meeting last week in order to discuss the possibilities and limitations of forming an alliance, and both leaders reflected positively on forming one.

The leader of MHP, Devlet Bahceli, stated that the MHP would not nominate its own candidates in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, the most critical provinces for the People’s Alliance, and that the MHP would support the AK Party candidates in these provinces. Thus, the People’s Alliance has once again emerged as a game changer in Turkish politics.

Before evaluating the reasons behind the re-emergence of the alliance, it is crucial to remember the reasons why the parties failed to form the alliance a couple of weeks ago. The AK Party and the MHP experienced a clash of interests on two issues. The first was on granting a partial amnesty for some prisoners, which the MHP fully supported and the AK Party was critical of. The second issue was the Council of State’s decision on the Student Oath. While the MHP applauded the decision, the AK Party harshly criticized it. As a result of these two crises, the parties announced that they were not going to form an alliance in the upcoming local elections.

The leaders of the AK Party and MHP have once again agreed on forming an alliance in the local elections in Turkey. Thus, the People’s Alliance has once again emerged as a game changer in Turkish politics.

Nevertheless, due to the latest mobilization within the opposition block, the parties had to change their stance in forming an alliance. The leader of the CHP started to seek for an alliance and had a meeting with high-ranking officials in the Iyi Party and HDP. Even if the reflections of the meeting with the HDP are still not clear, it is almost certain that the CHP and Iyi Party will form an alliance. As it was underlined in the press, both parties will pursue limited cooperation and collaboration in the local elections by nominating joint candidates in 9 provinces including Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Eskisehir, Antalya, Mersin, and Adana.

The mobilization of the opposition block might damage the success of the People’s Alliance in the upcoming elections and in its aftermath. If the opposition block ensures to form an alliance in critical provinces while the members of the People’s Alliance join the elections separately, the People’s alliance may lose some votes in critical provinces. Moreover, since the main aim of the members of the Nation’s Alliance is making Turkey’s presidential system a controversial issue, they will try to destabilize Turkey’s presidential system and impose their false agenda after the elections.

The fact that the AK Party and MHP joined around the same table again proves that the consolidation of the People’s Alliance has already provided and that parties in this alliance can make any sacrifice to serve the principles of the alliance. 

The AK Party and the MHP made a clever move in coming together to discuss the possible outcomes of this failure. Both parties founded their own delegation in order to maintain healthier discussions. The MHP’s support to the AK Party’s possible candidates in three major provinces increased mutual sympathy and tolerance again. President Erdogan thanked Bahceli for his commitment to the alliance. As a result of this, it is possible to broaden the boundaries of this alliance in the following days.

Consequently, after facing a serious crisis and handling it successfully, the AK Party and MHP are at the same table once again. This process proves that the consolidation of the People’s Alliance has already provided and that parties in this alliance can make any sacrifice in order to serve the principles of the alliance based on the country’s national values, unity, and solidarity.

Turkey’s local elections in 2009 will be the ‘first’ local elections in the new presidential system, both President Erdogan and his political competitors are going through a rigorous process making their final tunes in deciding the candidates of local administrators. It was recently announced by the party spokesperson that the candidates for about 40 municipalities have been decided and now waiting to be announced by the President Erdogan tomorrow.

President Erdogan and his party have still an advantage over their competitors since the last elections as the recent public opinion polls reflect. The AK Party attached importance to polls (temayül yoklaması) in deciding the candidates. In these polls two criteria are important: the first is how candidates perceive success and the second what would be the voting inclination of voters towards candidates.

Like all local elections in Turkish political history, three cities are the most important battle grounds in the competition: İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir. Experts argue that the results in these major cities will have an important impact on the next presidential elections

Change is expected in the AK Party candidate profiles that more than half the candidates will probably be new names. For Istanbul, the candidate of AK Party is finalized: Binali Yildirim – the former and last Prime Minister of the parliamentary system who has gained esteem through his former administrative responsibilities. In Ankara, polls show that Mehmet Ozhaseki – previous Minister of Environment and Urban Planning – who has a considerable experience in local administrations (as major of Kayseri between 1998-2015)- will be the final candidate. For Izmir the mentioned name was Mahmut Ozgener – 38th President of Turkish Football Association – who was an important political figure in İzmir, but sources close to the party tell that the AK Party’s candidate for İzmir will be Nihat Zeybekci, former minister of economy.

President Erdogan’s main competitor, Kemal Kilicdaroglu – head of CHP (Republican People’s Party) – has long been flirting with Meral Aksener’s Iyi Party to come up with a common candidate in major three major cities Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir in order to consolidate opposition votes against the AK Party candidate as they are aware that one victory in Ankara or Istanbul against AK Party will have a psychological effect.

On the other hand, People’s Alliance shows glimpses of survival even though both leaders, Erdogan and Bahceli, publicly announced before that there would be no alliance in the local elections. However, both leader got together in the presidential palace recently and some say that they reached to an understanding for a partial agreement on some cities. President Erdogan wants the support of MHP in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir in return for supporting MHP’s candidates in three other cities. HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party) which has been losing public support over the past five years, will apparently support CHP’s candidates in the western cities but it will depend on the candidate’s profile. CHP will be facing a grave dilemma of with whom to form an alliance: Turkish nationalist Iyi Party or Kurdish nationalist HDP?

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi. 

Almost ten days ago, the AK Party and the MHP announced that they were not going to form an alliance in the upcoming local elections. This announcement switched Turkey’s agenda from international issues to domestic concerns. Indeed, the AK Party and the MHP have been in conflict on some policy issues such as granting a partial amnesty for some prisoners and canceling the earlier arrangement on the Student Oath by the Council of State. These two issues have increasingly deepened the divide between the two parties, hence the reason why they will be participating in the elections without forming an alliance.

After the announcement of this decision, some circles claimed that the alliance between the AK Party and the MHP had completely come to an end. However, as was explained, the decision is limited only to the upcoming local elections and the People’s Alliance, which was formed last February, will continue to be active – especially in Parliament. Since there has been a latent alliance between the AK Party and MHP since the July 15 failed coup attempt, both parties have similar concerns on Turkey’s problems and the country’s position in the international arena.

In the light of this information, it is clear that the AK Party and the MHP have been acting responsibly in order to protect the country from internal and external threats, and to consolidate Turkey’s presidential system. These critical issues function as a connection between the two to act together in parliament.

How will the AK Party and the MHP manage to protect the People’s Alliance in parliament when they become rivals in the local elections?

How will the AK Party and the MHP manage to protect this alliance in parliament when they become rivals in the local elections? This is a serious question and an uphill struggle in front of them. The latest statements from both sides show that both parties will design their election campaign to provide this power balance between them. Even if they run to gain municipalities, they will not make concessions from the principles of this alliance.

Thus, it is possible to see that both parties will protect the core principles of the alliance, which was formed around the country’s national values, unity, and solidarity. These principles, of course, will also be settled at the core of the election campaigns of the two parties. Since the alliance was formed around these principles beyond of daily politics, the parties will be careful not to exceed certain boundaries.

If the AK Party and MHP are able to balance between “being rivals” in the local elections and “being partners” in the parliament, the People’s Alliance will continue to go forward.

Indeed, the serious problems brought to the fore by the AK Party and MHP have not been solved yet. Turkey still faces terrorist threats and is maintaining its fight against terrorist organizations such as FETO, the PKK, and Daesh. Even if the domestic activities of these organizations have been minimized, they are still very active abroad. Furthermore, the presidential system of Turkey still needs time and dedication to be consolidated. These issues require strong cooperation between the AK Party and MHP in order to be solved.

For all these reasons, cooperation and communication between the AK Party and the MHP will continue in the parliament, especially on critical issues for the country’s sake. The relatively long-term rapprochement between the AK Party and the MHP after the coup attempt positively reflected on the solution to Turkey’s security problems and the switch from a parliamentary to a presidential system of government. If the parties are able to balance between “being rivals” in the local elections and “being partners” in the parliament, the People’s Alliance will continue to contribute to the solution of Turkey’s serious problems in the future.

The Student Oath that was mandatorily recited in primary schools at the beginning of every school day for 76 years was abolished in 2013. Then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan reminded Turkey of the situation in Europe at the time that inspired the Oath: “During the 1930s, such practices such as Hitler’s and Stalin’s were common to shape society. You can’t see any of these practices in developed countries, which muster children to recite a text containing racist slogans.”

This oath, which reads: “I am a Turk, honest and hardworking. My principle is to protect the younger, to respect the elder, to love my homeland and my nation more than myself. My ideal is to rise, to progress. My existence shall be dedicated to the Turkish existence,” was written in 1932 by then National Education Minister Resit Galip, who was referred to as a close friend by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

Recited in schools as of 1933, the oath prescribed the model citizen of the Turkish Republic. With this prescription and other additional measures in the Republic of Turkey, which was established on the renunciation of a heritage, Turkey’s 1000 years of history and identity were downplayed by disregarding that the country is the remnant of a great empire that encompassed Kurds, Circassians, Abkhasians, Muslims and non-Muslims. Excluding all the other identities, only a constructed idea of “Turkishness” was recognized as part of the efforts to establish an ethnicity-based nation state.

Following the memorandum released in 1971 by the military, the guard of the country back then, two prayer-like phrases were added to the oath. “O Great Atatürk, who had created our life of today; on the path that you have paved, in the country that you established, I swear to walk incessantly with the purposes that you have set. How happy is the one who says “I am a Turk.”

During the term of the government that was founded after the post-modern military coup on February 28, 1997, it was ordered that the oath would be recited at the beginning of every school day instead of only the first day of the week. In fact, schoolchildren were not the only group forced to recite the oath, adults imprisoned during the military junta periods were also forced to recite it for numerous times until they screamed and cried. This was done in almost every prison, including the Diyarbakir and Mamak Prison – the latter being one where most of the prisoners supported Turkist ideology.

The recital was defended by contending that the oath strengthened the younger generations’ sense of belonging to Turkish citizenship on a constitutional ground and secured administrative stability, adding that objecting to the mandatory recital in schools is not based on any scientific ground. This is what the Council of State has said in a nutshell, who issued a verdict on the application filed by the Education and Science Workers’ Union (Eğitim-Sen) five years ago for the annulment of the provision that abolished the mandatory recital of the oath.

Following the State of Council’s verdict, Pandora’s box has been opened again. Everyone has voiced their own opinion on the Student Oath according to their political affiliations. As a requirement of his party’s historical mission, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) Deputy Chair Faik Oztrak said: “As the Council of State reminded us once again, our Student Oath, which is based on Atatürk nationalism, does neither exclude any ethnicity nor aim any polarization. The oath represents the ideals of the nation and the Republic within the country’s integrity while internalizing the notions of love and respect. It symbolizes the aim of development. If there is a legal order, then the oath will be recited in schools again.”

The Parliamentary Constitution Committee Chairman and former Justice Minister Bekir Bozdag, on the other hand, responded by hinting at the tutelage regime of the old Turkey that used to be ruled by the military and the judiciary: “With the Student Oath verdict, the Council of State overstepped its limits of governing compliance with the laws, attempted to assume the position of the executive body and disregarded the discretionary power of the executive body. In brief, it avowedly violated the Constitution and the relevant law.”

Meanwhile, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli did not only side with the Council of State’s decision, but also targeted Bozdag in a way that evokes the 76 years of collective memory: “Mr. Bozdag can say that he is Kurdish and he is free to do so. There is no one attempting to silence him. So, he is entitled to evaluate the situation according to his own temper and disposition. The Turkish nation bestowed him a senior position. So, he cannot think of denigrating the Turkish nation.”

A journalist friend of mine once said: “Nationalism is anteroom to racism.” This disease was inflicted on our territory by the West in the guise of nationalism some 200 years ago and in the form of racism during the 1930s. The Republic of Turkey paid heavy costs for the efforts to build an ethnicity-based nation that ignores multiculturalism and diversity although it was the remnant of a grand empire.

The old Turkey was a period when the nation was reduced to only one ethnicity as prescribed in the Student Oath, multiculturalism was disregarded, and the ones not conforming to this model were not even considered proper citizens. Of course, the present situation of the country is not flawless, but the old Turkey is already left behind.

In today’s Turkey, in which 4 million Syrian refugees are hosted and more than 600 thousand Syrians are to receive education, this oath does not have any relevance or validity. In this sense, President Erdogan announced in a determined demeanor that he will not condone the practices reminiscent of the single-party period’s CHP: “Does the recital of a uniformist text by our children every morning have any sense? What is the point of criticizing our Constitution Committee Chairman through his ethnicity and disposition? You claim that you are not segregationist, but you are insulting and threatening the Constitution Committee Chairman who has been a parliamentary member and a minister. We are standing behind him.”

Since 2013, Turkey has been experiencing deeply traumatic events one after the other. The country has chosen to deal with these events with a new constitution and elections, preferring something new rather than old in order to address the trauma. We are now in the final stretch of a marathon of elections that have been going on for the last two years.

After the local elections in March 2019, we will enter a 3-year period without elections, which will last until 2022. Considering the fact that we’ve continuously been under an atmosphere of elections since March 2014, which have been pretty fierce, this 3-year period will certainly feel different for the country.

Since the previous local elections held in March 2014, the nature of politics, political sociology, and voting behavior in Turkey have changed significantly.

What makes the upcoming local elections more important than a simple vote to determine local administrators is the fact that the opposition is trying to make it ‘a referendum vote’ for the Turkish government. And this effort may lead to the most critical stage of a struggle in voter sociology, which has been long ongoing.

I will attempt to explain the reasons for this.

Now that Turkey has fully transitioned to the presidential system, the government is stable and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will rule the country until June 2022. However, the situation is not the same in Parliament. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AK Party) does not hold the majority. Thus, the AK Party needs to maintain good relations with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) – its electoral ally during the 2018 elections. (The opposite also holds here, meaning that the MHP needs the AK Party as well).

The continuation of the alliance that was established prior to the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2018 had become a political necessity. Leader of the MHP, Devlet Bahceli, was the first to state this, arguing that for a presidential system to be truly established, the success of the People’s Alliance must continue in the local elections, since the opposition would rekindle discussions regarding the presidential system in case of a decrease in votes.

Bahceli was not wrong with this opinion. Similar to the efforts between the AK Party and MHP, the Nation Alliance, which was first established for the 2018 elections, between the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Iyi Party and Felicity Party also seems interested in employing a strategy of cooperation and alliance for the local elections.

While the Felicity Party does not yet appear to be a part of this equation, CHP and Iyi Party have begun flirting with the idea of an alliance. In my opinion, Bahceli’s analysis still carries its validity. However, the dynamics have significantly changed when the AK Party and MHP publicly declared following the Student Oath debate that they will not form an alliance in the local elections.

Political scene after the parliamentary elections in July 2015

To recall the last parliamentary elections, Turkish voters were roughly divided into two major blocs. The first and majority bloc represented by the People’s Alliance consists of 54% of the voter base. The Nation Alliance received 34% of the vote. The Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), which entered the elections outside of any alliance, fortified its position in the Turkish political landscape with 12% of the vote.

When examining these results, we see that the percentage of votes received by the AK Party has decreased to the levels obtained during the 2015 July elections. This is when the party failed to receive a majority in Parliament for the first time (since coming to power in 2002). The only consolation for this was that President Erdogan was selected as the first president of the presidential system in the first round, with 52.6% of the vote. The AK Party now cooperates with the MHP in order to achieve a majority in the parliament, meaning this is a de facto legislative coalition.

MHP’s key position

In comparison to the number of votes it received, this situation gives the MHP disproportionate influence. This is how, despite being the fourth largest party in Parliament, with only 50 members, the MHP could suggest for a general pardon for prisoners convicted of certain crimes.

MHP is evidently trying to use this position as a “leverage.” The last of such cases is the recent Student Oath debate, which has been the last the straw that broke the camel’s back causing the two parties to break up and follow their own ways during the local elections of 2019.

Likewise, the slowdown of the Turkish economy, along with the rising levels of inflation and unemployment, seems to have increased public discontent regarding the AK Party prior to the election. The general election held in June 2018 has shown that while the MHP lost a significant amount of votes to the newly formed nationalist Iyi Party, it has retained its significance by drawing a similar amount of votes from the AK Party. MHP now intends to recapture the nationalist vote it lost by employing its public perception.

Some recent polls reveal a remarkable trend among voters: voters continue to switch from the AK Party to the MHP. Some studies even conclude that this dynamic may have led to the MHP gaining 20% of the total votes. These studies and polls may be the reason behind the increased confidence Bahceli has shown in his relations with the AK Party and with Erdogan.

In both the constitutional referendum and the June 2018 elections we saw that with respect to opposing FETO and defending the country from future threats of terrorism, voters tend to hold the AK Party and MHP, Erdogan and Bahceli, in the same regard. The voter base of both parties constitute a “common pool” of 53% of the total vote, and the transition of voter preferences between the two parties takes place only in that pool.

The ongoing economic turbulence in Turkey gives a golden chance to the opposition parties at capturing votes from the 53% “common pool.” The CHP and Iyi Party are working hard to claim symbolically important victories against the AK Party.

Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality undoubtedly carries the utmost significance for the AK Party in the local elections. Recalling that the elected mayor of Istanbul, Kadir Topbas, was made to resign by the AK Party and President Erdogan, Istanbul emerges as a possibly problematic area for the AK Party. Formerly to negotiate with the AK Party, MHP had suggested that it would act in favor of the AK Party and not nominate a candidate in Istanbul, expecting a similar act in a different place for their benefit. However, there was not much that the AK Party could gain from the MHP in Istanbul; for the AK Party to win Istanbul, instead of MHP, the party should have focused more on the Kurdish electorate. The same is also happening between the Iyi Party and CHP, in the lines of “We should give Istanbul to them and they should give us Ankara.”

CHP’s HDP deadlock

CHP wants to gain the majority in Istanbul but whether the Iyi Party alone would achieve this is uncertain. Thus, the CHP needs to attract HDP voters as the HDP does not have a meaningful chance of winning the city. However, getting closer to the Kurds has become the biggest taboo of Turkish politics in recent years. If CHP were to name a candidate that would draw the support of Kurdish voters, they would distance themselves from Turkish nationalist Iyi Party voters. But without the support of Kurdish voters, it is highly unlikely for the CHP to win.

AK Party and MHP have both been accusing CHP of “allying with terrorists” and saying that HDP is a direct extension of the terrorist organization, the PKK. This discourse is very effective among voters. Non-Kurdish voters, regardless of which party they vote for, do not have any doubt regarding the HDP’s close relationship with the PKK. All research confirms this striking political reality. Now, seeing that the People’s Alliance is in some kind of coma, will there be a change in this discourse? Will the AK Party adopt a more soft approach to Kurdish politics? We’ll see.

While search for an alliance during the local elections has ended for the AK Party and the MHP, these efforts are likely to continue between the Iyi Party and the CHP. If the opposition parties, including the HDP, manage to form a block despite their substantial differences in micro and macro policies and gain vote from the ruling bloc of the AK Party and MHP in the elections, for example reducing the 53% total vote of the two parties to around 45-47%, Turkey might enter a discussion of legitimacy that might last until 2022. The opposition may claim that President Erdogan and the AK Party-MHP majority in the Parliament have lost their legitimacy on the following morning of the elections.

Scramble for symbolically important municipalities

The fact that the MHP and AK Party will not form an alliance in the local elections will prevent others from calculating the votes of the two parties and saying “look, this is the state of the People’s Alliance.”

On the other hand, due to the complex system of local elections in Turkey, it is hard to determine the percentage of votes a given party has received nationwide. Therefore, the real result of the election will not be determined by vote percentages but by which parties win the symbolically important municipalities and which party wins the most municipalities in total. This is why the AK Party losing metropolitan areas such as Istanbul and Ankara means a lot to the opposition.

In previous elections, the AK Party used to run a serious election campaign in Izmir, which traditionally strongly votes for CHP, but in this election it seems like the AK Party will act more defensively and prefer to focus on retaining its previous majorities. It will be interesting to watch the AK Party’s efforts to retain its popularity not only in Istanbul and Ankara but also in cities such as Antalya, Bursa, and Balıkesir.

All these constitute the reasons why this election will be decisive for AK Party’s future. If the party shows that it has retained its influence and popularity, it will prove that it has successfully emerged from the dangerous turbulence Turkey has experienced since the last months of 2013 as the “founding” party, and will continue to carry Turkey to its future. If it experiences a significant decrease in votes and fails to rejuvenate after such a loss, it will enter a period of very hard days.

The so-called People’s Alliance between the AK Party and the MHP has been in disarray. Relations between the two parties took a downturn with the disagreement on a couple of issues, such as issuing a general pardon and the Council of State’s decision to repel the earlier arrangement on the student oath. The MHP has been pressing hard for issuing a general pardon for convicts in the run-up to local elections at the end of March. The AK Party finds it inconvenient and refutes it for it might cause a loss of confidence in the public towards the law. Yet the MHP has not taken a step back and vowed to bring the issue to the Parliament.

The Council of State’s decision to repel the arrangement on the student oath and the disagreement between the AK Party and MHP on this issue has only caused further damage to the Alliance. The student oath, which was held obligatory for elementary school students to chant every morning before classes since 1933, had been removed in 2013 on account of ethnic discrimination against non-Turkish groups in the country. The decision was also taken on the basis that it carried a high dosage of ultra-secular nationalist ideology and that it may pedagogically harm students at such an early age.

The nationalist MHP has supported the Council’s decision to repel the arrangement by claiming that removing it was one of the notorious political mistakes made in the process of the democratic opening, which basically relaxed the state’s ideological control on ethnic and religious minorities in the country. The AK Party maintained its earlier reformist position on the matter and blamed the Council of meddling within the sphere of the executive. The party also warned the Council that the country could not be brought back to the times which were characterized by bureaucratic tutelage.

The uproar on the student oath case between the two political parties openly disclosed their ideological distance. This led to public debates, some claiming that the People’s Alliance might come to an end due to the noted notable ideological difference. The native-national ideological basis shared by the two parties might collapse under growing pressure and the parties may begin to move in different ideological directions defined by separate interests.

The Alliance was officially established in May this year in the run up to the critical June 24 general elections. Yet in an unofficial form the Alliance has been with us since the unsuccessful coup attempt by Gulenist army officers on 15 July, 2016. The two political parties vowed to fight against internal and external threats (including the PKK and DAESH) and to maintain the country’s survival. Besides, in the official document of the Alliance, the two parties declared that they will work together to institutionalize and consolidate the presidential system after the June 24 elections. In addition to this, the document states that they will pursue a strategy of making Turkey not only a regional, but a global power.

Some argue that despite apparent ideological differences the Alliance will maintain itself since the causes that initially led to its formation still stand true. Thus, the two parties might have taken a strategic decision to depart temporarily in the upcoming local elections in order to increase the chances of success of the Alliance in the future.

Some others contend that in both parties tension is growing among members out of fear of identity loss. Indeed, this might alarm party members since the presidential system forces the political parties into a two-party system. The temporary alliance might turn into unification in the long run. Similar tensions and concerns can also be observed in the opposition parties.

It is too early to talk about the future of the People’s Alliance. However, it is fair to state that unless the conditions that had formed the Alliance change, it will maintain its existence with periodical fluctuations.

In 2013, the Ministry of National Education abolished the administrative regulation that ordered the recital of the Student Oath, an oath that begins by stating “I am a Turk, honest, and hardworking,” which used to be recited in schools at the beginning of each day. A teacher’s union known for being close to the MHP had opened a case in the Administrative Court regarding this decision made by the ministry. During the time in which the oath had been abolished, Turkey was conducting a series of talks with the outlawed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in order to resolve the Kurdish question.

MHP was strongly opposed to this process calling it “Dissolution Process” that was indeed called by the government as “Reconciliation Process.” The Oath was considered racist by non-Turkish groups living in Turkey and MHP saw its abolition as a concession made to the PKK.

The Student Oath Case, which was opened in 2013, was concluded in October 2018 by the 8th chamber of the Council of State. The decision ruled that the Ministry of National Education cannot abolish its own administrative regulations.

This is a problematic decision for a number of reasons. First, the ministry abolishing an administrative regulation does not create a new legal situation, meaning that the Council of State has no ground for a decision concerning it. Second, the Council of State goes beyond matters of law in its decision by stating, “Sufficient scientific ground supporting the Ministry of National Education’s decision to abolish the oath does not exist,” meaning that the court is arguing whether such a decision is right on grounds of pedagogical science rather than legality. However, the Council of State does not have the authority to conduct examinations regarding the aptness of administrative decisions. Its authority is limited to examining and supervising legal matters.

In the “Old Turkey,” to use the term coined by the AK Party, courts often examined the “aptness” of government decisions and acted as if they were opposition parties, banning certain behavior. It has been a long time since this situation was named “judicial tutelage” and many efforts were made to end it.

The government has tried to change judicial cadres in order to end this practice by Kemalist and statist groups. However, these changes led to the rise of FETO in the judicial system, and this terrorist organization tried to establish its own practice of “tutelage.”

Following FETO’s bloody coup attempt on July 15, 2016, extensive crackdowns occurred in the judicial system in order to eliminate FETO members and prevent such attempts of establishing a “tutelage” from occurring again. More than half of the judges and prosecutors working at the time were dismissed. While all this was happening, the greatest supporter of President Erdogan and the AK Party was MHP and its leader Devlet Bahceli.

The Council of State’s decision discussed above thus raises questions as to whether or not those close the MHP among the judiciary came to power after the FETO crackdowns and whether they are prominent enough to show such strength against the government.

The strong open support Bahceli displayed for the Student Oath and his criticisms targeting AK Party’s former Minister of Justice Bekir Bozdag, who comes from an ethnic Kurdish background, makes the MHP’s stance on the subject very clear. MHP wants the oath back in schools.

All these together are issues that made it difficult to continue with the People’s Alliance during the local elections. Unlike MHP leader Bahceli, President Erdogan never brought these issues to the agenda until 23 October. However, the general atmosphere from Erdogan’s surroundings was that MHP’s demands in regards to the pardon of prisoners and the Student Oath was not going to be accepted.

When Devlet Bahceli was at the lectern to speak before his party’s group meeting on October 23, as always, he looked angry and stiff. In this speech, Bahceli announced that the MHP had stopped looking for ways to form an alliance with the AK Party during the local elections. He also used ambiguous language about the future of the People’s Alliance. Due to the questions launched at him after he finished his speech, Bahceli stated that the “People’s Alliance is continuing.” However, it’s not difficult to suggest that the alliance had cracked.

President Erdogan spoke after Bahceli’s speech and his decision to end the alliance possibility during local elections and bluntly stated, “Everyone can go their own ways.” While Erdogan had stated this in regards to the local elections, I think the most important part of his speech was when he defended Bekir Bozdag against Devlet Bahceli and said that “We have no other oath apart from our National Anthem.” Erdogan’s disapproval of this type of Turkish nationalism was also an illustration that the President wanted to highlight the difference between the AK Party and MHP.

Now, it’s possible to see the People’s Alliance in some kind of coma or in the fridge. Although both sides suggest that the alliance is continuing, we’ll only see the reality of this when the MHP votes either in favor or against the 2019 budget formation, which is still being discussed in Parliament. If the MHP votes against the budget then not only will the People’s Alliance die, but the newly established presidential system will also enter a serious crisis due to its failure in processing its first budget. If MHP votes in favor of the budget, this will show that the People’s Alliance will continue.

Of course, the MHP can choose to abstain from voting. In this case, the budget will pass with AK Party votes. However, the People’s Alliance will maintain to sleep in a coma.

It’s highly likely that we’ll see whether this alliance will continue and what the new rules for the two parties will be after the local elections. After observing their votes, the AK Party and MHP will do a cost-benefit analysis in order to observe how the alliance suits them best.

Nowadays, Turkey’s political agenda is full with international issues. The new term in Turkey-U.S. relations after the release of Pastor Brunson has become a matter of curiosity in the last couple of days. Moreover, the missing Saudi journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, seems to have shifted the U.S. approach against Saudi Arabia and thus will affect the current dynamics in the Middle East.

Under this ambiguous environment, Turkey’s domestic agenda and the upcoming local elections have become of secondary importance for the public. Nonetheless, political parties have already began to concentrate on their possible strategies in the local elections.

As part of their preparations for local elections, Turkey’s political parties held consultation and evaluation meetings in order to draw a road map. All parties had an idea on the possibilities and limitations in choosing the right candidate. The governing AK Party, for instance, underlined that the upcoming elections would be a turning point for Turkey’s future and it was an obligation to increase both the vote rate and the number of mayors in order to successfully implement the new presidential system. Party officials and members contributed to the ongoing discussions on possible electoral strategies in accordance with this purpose.

One of the major issues that will determine electoral strategy is whether the AK Party and the MHP will form an alliance in order to maximize their benefits. Since the unofficial meetings between the two parties have just started, it is still not possible to clarify this issue. Nevertheless, it should be underlined that both parties pay a significant attention to forming an alliance and are trying to form a consensus on possible ways of achieving this. It seems that the further details of this issue will surface in the following days.

On the other hand, preparation meetings held by the MHP and the Iyi Party revealed the increasing tension between these two parties. Even though both parties have had hot discussions since the June 24 elections, the degree of discussions altered in the last days. The Iyi Party blamed the MHP for betraying nationalist ideals by forming an alliance with the AK Party.

Since the Iyi Party faced serious existential crises after the June 24 elections and was about to collapse, it is now trying to find a new identity and purpose for existence. In accordance with this aim, the party is working to develop a nationalistic stance instead of its catch-all approach, which failed in the previous elections.

The main opposition party, the CHP, has also been discussing possible election strategies. During the meetings held, party officials criticized the party’s current discourse on being so elitist and left-wing oriented. The solution proposed for this problem was to adopt rightist and populist discourse in the upcoming local elections in order to change the image of the party.

At this point, the CHP faces a serious dilemma in deciding whether or not to form an alliance with the Iyi Party and the HDP. Due to the fact that the Nation Alliance failed in the last elections, the party is hesitant to cooperate with these parties. While an intra-party group is working hard to convince the sides to form an alliance with the HDP, some party officials are wary of this and are aware of the risks.

However, the supporting group sees this as the only way of achieving success in the local elections. The more nationalist wing of the party wants to form an alliance with the Iyi Party, especially in Ankara and some provinces in the Mediterranean and Aegean.

Even if consultation and evaluation meetings were a stage for drawing a road map for the local elections, political parties still need more time to finalize their strategies. Due to this, parties are expected to focus more on domestic policy in the upcoming days.

By February 2018 pre-electoral alliances became one of the game changers in Turkish politics. Even though all legal amendments and regulations regarding pre-electoral alliances were designed for the projected elections in 2019, the decision to hold early elections on June 24 completely changed this direction. Thus, the June 24 parliamentary elections brought new opportunities for collaboration to political parties on a legal basis.

Nowadays, Turkey has been discussing the possibility of pre-electoral alliances in local elections. Last week, chairman of the MHP – Devlet Bahceli – announced that they are open to discuss the issue of pre-electoral alliances in local elections – even though this will not be easy to formulate. While Bahceli indicated his reservations based upon a concern for the rules and nature of local elections, he brought this issue to the forefront again. President Erdogan responded positively to Bahceli’s call and stated that this could be a topic to discuss in the following days.

As has been underlined by the leaders of the AK Party and MHP, framing the rules of alliances in local elections will be different to parliamentary elections. Indeed, there are several variables that affect the formulation of alliances in local elections. Firstly, local dynamics play a fundamental role in local elections. Voters consider close-knit relations and candidate profiles more seriously in comparison to parliamentary elections. Turkey’s political culture is shaped through regionalism, which is a crucial determinant on voting behavior. People tend to vote for candidates rather than political parties and the votes of political parties show a change in local elections. For instance, since its establishment, the AK Party has always received a lower vote in local elections when compared to the vote share in parliamentary elections.

The second variable that affects the formation of alliances is related to the lack of legal infrastructure. The amendment adopted in February only regulates pre-electoral alliances in parliamentary elections. Both presidential and local elections were excluded. Thus, there is need for a new amendment that regulates official alliances on a local level. When it comes to examples from the world, we see that there are regulations on pre-electoral alliances in local elections in federal states such as Mexico and Brazil. Turkey should pay attention to frame possibilities and limitations to formulate a legal basis under a unitary structure.

For all these reasons, parties should take these factors into consideration before framing the rules of alliances in local elections. Until now, all discussions have concentrated on the positive and negative effects of alliances on the election results in metropolitan cities. Nonetheless, if there is need for a detailed framework, these questions should also be asked: how will alliances be formed in the AK Party-dominated and the MHP-dominated electoral districts? What will be ways of forming alliances in districts where voting rates between the two parties are close? Do these parties prefer to have a common candidate not running under a party banner? How will the CHP, HDP, Good Party, and the Felicity Party formulate their election strategy if forming official alliances becomes possible? What will be the strategy of these parties, especially in metropolitan cities? These questions are fundamental in designing pre-electoral alliances in local elections.

All these variables reflect that there is a need for maximizing gains and minimizing costs when determining the rules of pre-electoral alliances. All these parties should seriously calculate how alliances will reflect their voting rates. Finally, political parties should pay attention to design electoral stimulations for each district and make categorizations in order to see their total gains and losses.

If further proof regarding the orientalist framing of Turkey’s June 24 presidential and parliamentary elections were needed, the interpretations in the Western media from Washington to Berlin would provide it. Rather than understanding how the election and transition process to the new political system transforms Turkish domestic politics towards a more multipolar direction, they seek to fixate Turkey with extraordinary conceptualizations, each of them displaying their own trajectories.

Hyper-nationalism, ultra-nationalism, religious-nationalism, dictatorship, one-person rule and Islamo-fascism constitute some of the concepts that the Turkey watchers in the West chose in analyzing the result of the June 24 election. This is not new. Since 2013, Turkey has been a central phenomenon in the Western world. The new Turkish politics, however, is heading towards a different direction, which will strengthen Turkish politics and democracy. This newly emerging structure of Turkish politics will pose more significant challenges for the AK Party.

During the 1990s, Turkey had a multipolar domestic political landscape with many political parties. Each party dominated different segments of the political sociology of Turkey and competed to shape Turkish political life. Rivalry among them was inherent in the political atmosphere and was enhanced by competition and ideology spread in various segments of politics. The multipolar political system did not necessarily display a democratic approach. It was unipolar in terms of the extraordinary power status of the Turkish military over the political sphere.

As the June 24 election results showed again, there is only one power center in Turkish politics. The AK Party and President Erdogan continue to stay at the power center. Much debate goes on, however, whether Turkish politics is unipolar, multipolar, or hegemonic – all types of power regarding the regulation of politics and daily life articulated around the AK Party and President Erdogan. A hegemonic Turkish politics is one that has one dominant party without a significant major political party that can balance the AK Party or a strong leadership that can galvanize the opposition blocks against Erdogan and the AK Party. In this kind of Turkish politics, the AK Party and President Erdogan are supposed to act unilaterally with little or no cooperation from other parties to resolve major internal and external issues or to maintain the lead. More to the point, as current Turkish politics, especially during the election campaign demonstrated, no combinations of other political parties as a part of forming a balancing alliance against Erdogan have the power of mobilization.

A multipolar political system, in contrast, has several parties, which compete with each other but need engagement against each other in order to resolve internal issues and maintain the coalition to win the elections. The Turkish model of allying with politics proved these kinds of attempts in the pre-AK Party era many times.

Current Turkish politics emerged and probably will continue after the June 24 election, following the establishment of the new executive presidential system that does not fit either of these models. Instead, it is similar to what Huntington labeled in his most-cited article to understand the structure of international politics in the post-Cold War world; the emerging Turkish political landscape is a mixture of one political party, which is no longer hegemonic to consolidate power unilaterally. Turkish politics in the post-June 24 presidential election might be called, as Huntington describes in defining international politics regarding polarity, a uni-multipolar political system. A uni-multipolar political system in the Turkish context has one dominant power that is unable to dominate the entire political discourse.

This means two things for the future of Turkish politics. First, concerning the first round of the presidential election, the most powerful candidate needs at least one party’s support from the right wing of the Turkish political spectrum. If the candidate cannot win the presidential election in the first round, there is no given victory for the right wing in the second round. More importantly, there is no granted majority in the parliament for the dominant party – as the last election result demonstrated. Secondly, the single hegemonic party–as in the case of Turkey; the AK Party– can maintain its power and resolve key issues only in cooperation with some of the other minor parties.

In this uni-multipolar new Turkish political landscape, the domestic power structure has three different levels and political blocks. At the top, the AK Party, consolidating its power via conservatism, democratic nationalism and an Islamic friendly approach, has preeminence in every domain of influence. As the last election underlines, the MHP is part of the collective political values. On the second level, the CHP is positioned as the principal opposition party, that is the dominant or challenger actors in the coastal areas of Turkey’s west but with its accumulation and mobilization influence and capabilities do not expand to the entire country as compared to the AK Party. The CHP articulates its mobilization around secularism, secular-nationalism, Westernism, and populism. On the third level, there comes the nationalist Kurdish party, HDP, whose influence in the southeastern part of Turkey is no less than the AK Party. Following the emergence of the Iyi Party, as the potential representative of hybrid-nationalism and the new right in Turkey, holding around 10 percent of the votes, there is still a probability of the establishment of a fourth level.

The uni-multipolar structure of new Turkish politics with the establishment of the presidential system generates its own different patterns of competition. Under the condition of uni-multipolarity, counterbalancing the dominant party is very difficult, as the AK Party continues to strengthen its power and to maintain its alliance with the MHP – the nationalist party. There are also other minor parties that want to bandwagon with the AK Party for their own profit. The AK Party’s unique relationship with the MHP will be providing leverage against the alternative power block, but ultimately will be consolidating MHP’s power capacity, which can transform ad hoc the alliance between the two parties as their modus operandi for the next elections.

The new presidential system is extremely important in order to consolidate this type of Turkish politics, in which one party cannot win the presidential election alone. In this new system, the parliament became extremely important as contrary to the claims that the parliament would lose its veto power.

The Turkish political system is not unipolar, in which a single party acts unilaterally, but has a dominant power whose influence is possible through cooperation with other parties or power blocks. The AK Party’s primacy in the domestic distribution of power capabilities is one of the most salient features of the current Turkish politics, but the new dynamics with regards to the new system requires more cooperation to sustain its supremacy.

Sunday’s elections in Turkey have finalized the transition to the presidential system with the victory of President Erdogan and his party. Erdogan has advocated and campaigned for this system change since his years as the Prime Minister, arguing that Turkey needed a political system based on the people’s will not on the will of the civilian and military bureaucratic elites. Having handled serious domestic and foreign policy crises over the years, including party closure cases and a failed coup attempt, Erdogan’s campaign for the presidential system has been accepted by the Turkish electorate. Sunday’s elections results are a proof of this reality.

The AK Party has passed legislation in the past year to prepare and adjust to the new system but there will be more work to be done in order to restructure the executive branch. The AK Party’s seats in parliament is short of a parliamentary majority, which means that it will need to recruit the support of other parties, starting with the MHP, to implement the party program and election promises. The MHP has worked with the AK Party and entered into an alliance in the elections, which provides a ground for further cooperation. As I wrote before the elections, the parliamentary distribution will not hamper the creation of the cabinet and functioning of the executive branch.

As the presidential system requires the restructuring of the political system and fine-tuning of the relationship between the executive and the legislative branches, many details have yet to be worked out. But, President Erdogan has created the necessary groundwork to implement his agenda effectively by striking an alliance with the MHP, which has achieved better than expected results in the election. For major legislative action as well as budget negotiations, Erdogan will likely seek support from the MHP. The MHP will continue to be a key role in the legislative process as it has in the past.

One of the most serious consequences of the elections might be the leadership question in the CHP. The CHP’s presidential candidate Ince has openly challenged the current party leader Kilicdaroglu in the past for electoral failures. Sunday’s results show a large gap between Ince’s votes (%30.64) and the CHP’s electoral showing (%22.64). Ince’s relative success and the party’s perceived failure can pave the road for Ince to challenge Kilicdaroglu once again. However, if there is an understanding between the two leaders that the party voters would vote strategically to ensure that the HDP passed the electoral threshold, such a inter-party rift may not be imminent. However, the 8% discrepancy will most likely force yet another debate around the CHP’s leadership.

While the adjustments to the new system are implemented, the March 2019 local elections will be just around the corner. Political parties will enter the new year in campaign mode and the local elections results can serve as an indicator of party performances. Local elections in Turkey always have a different dynamic than general elections, as they can depend much more on local politics. The March elections will not be different but it will have less impact on the executive branch. It will serve more as an indicator of satisfaction with party performances in parliament. Political parties will focus on agenda items that will help them in local elections. This could mean that parties would have more incentive to strike a compromise with President Erdogan to show the electorate that they are in the business of delivering their election promises instead of obstructing.

The June 24 elections are historic not only for sealing the deal on the adoption of the presidential system but also providing political stability for the next five years. There will always be crises and spoilers that will test the new system. However, in this last election, the Turkish public has spoken definitively.

In two weeks, Turkish people will go to the polls to elect the members of their Parliament and President. In this process, political parties are still running their campaigns in order to increase their votes. The running AK Party is designing its campaign on the basis of the progress made by Turkey under the AK Party governments. Furthermore, the party also proposes new projects to accelerate this progress in the new era, which is called “the rise.” Nonetheless, some opposition parties cannot keep away from falling into the trap of populism and use populist discourse in accordance with their strategic needs. Because of this reason, it is important to examine prominent dimensions of election strategies of political parties.

Because the AK Party had already initiated its campaign towards the next elections and conducted meetings throughout the country before the announcement of snap elections, it is the most prepared party compared to others. After the snap election decisions, the party accelerated and broadened the scope of the campaign.

Indeed, the party’s electoral strategy has depended on a two-dimensional political space. In the first space, the party prefers traditional methods based on direct contact with masses and visiting people’s houses. It is well known that President Erdogan cares about this method very much and urges party branches to listen to the demands of people face to face. Additionally, the party also organizes mass meetings in each province of the country in order to reach to people as part of this method in the field.

On the other side, the party also prefers to use innovative methods via internet and social networks. All party representatives use social media channels actively especially to widen their voter base. The details of the AK Party’s election strategy are shared day by day on the party’s official website and social media channels. The combination of these two dimensions turns the party’s campaign into a more dynamic and active process. This is one of the reasons that makes the party’s campaign more successful compared to the strategies of other parties.

The main opposition party CHP also uses two-dimensional methods in its campaign strategy. Nonetheless, the gap between the presidential election campaign and parliamentary campaign causes some crisis within the party structure. Because Kilicdaroglu and Ince are conducting their election campaigns separately, they have a contradictory discourse. For instance, they have different opinions about each other’s success and possible vote rate in the elections.

Even if Kilicdaroglu eliminated the intra-party opposition movement cadres, most of who are close to Muharrem Ince rather than himself, the possible scenarios after the elections indicate that there can be another escalation in the intra-party opposition movement to change Kilicdaroglu’s leadership. As a result of this dispute, the party supporters do not want Kilicdaroglu to get ahead of Ince during the election campaign. For this reason, Kilicdaroglu had to cancel the joint meetings he planned to have with Ince. Additionally, Ince’s use of populist discourse in the campaign causes Kilicdaroglu to remain in the background. Thus, it is possible to say that this duality in party politics may bring another escalation in intra-party opposition after the elections.

Other political parties also use diversified political campaigns. The MHP pays attention to direct contact with people rather than organizing large-scale meetings. The Iyi Party, on the other side, tries to introduce itself to the masses and designs its campaign on this basement. All parties will maintain their campaigns until the elections. However, according to YSK rules, pre-election restrictions will be implemented by June 14 and parties will have to re-organize their campaign strategies according to these restrictions.

Turkey will hold one of the most critical elections in its history on June 24. They are critical because they are not an exchange of seats between political parties or transfer of power from one political party to another in a democratic country. On June 24, the people will rather decide whether the country should revert the old oligarchic regime in which the bureaucracy used to hold power and sovereignty or whether it should consolidate its burgeoning democratic regime in which power and sovereignty lay with the people. Besides, on June 24 the people will also decide whether the country should gain more autonomy in international politics or continue its age-old foreign policy of disengagement and dependency.

The AK Party-MHP alliance proposes to render the people’s will as the ultimate authority in the country’s political life and make Turkey great again in international politics. The CHP-Iyi Party-SP alliance, on the other hand, claims to restore the republican ideals of “Old Turkey,” which are characterized by modernist authoritarianism and bring the country back in line with the civilization, namely the West. Thus, the elections on June 24 will rather portray a moment of historical decision on the country’s regime type and national independence.

Indeed, the themes of democracy and independence will put their seal on the elections. Around these themes we have three scenarios for the post-election Turkey. In the first scenario, President Erdogan wins the presidential elections and the AK Party-MHP alliance gains the majority in parliament. This will mean that the people still hold on to their decision to switch to the presidential system on April 16, 2017. If this happens, the presidential system will be consolidated and democracy will be recognized as the only game in town.

For this will put pressure on the opposition to recognize the rule of the people’s will as the supreme will in politics and therefore the search for bringing the country back to an oligarchic regime will get shelved for good. This might also be accompanied by the democratization of the opposition’s view of international politics through its recognition of the country’s political authenticity and autonomous political will. More, terrorist organizations such as the PKK will face contraction of room for maneuver and FETO will give up hope for a comeback.

In the second scenario, President Erdogan wins the presidential election and the CHP-Iyi Party-SP alliance obtains the majority in parliament. This will display that the people still support the decision to switch to a presidential system and the consolidation of the democratic regime, yet they find the political actor –the AK Party-MHP alliance– unsuitable for this task. Encouraged with these results, the opposition will follow a politics of destabilization by blocking the presidential decrees in parliament and attempt to convince the people that the presidential system is not that good for the country. This will open up the door for changing the country’s direction back to oligarchy, emboldening the terrorist organizations such as the PKK and FETO and increasing the chances for foreign powers to influence the country’s domestic and foreign policies.

In the third scenario, President Erdogan loses the presidential election and the CHP-Iyi Party-SP alliance gains the majority in parliament. This will show that the people have changed their decision to switch to a presidential system and do not believe that President Erdogan or the AK Party-MHP alliance are suited for the task of democratizing the country’s domestic and international politics. In this situation, the opposition parties and their partners in the state apparatus will immediately attempt to take control of the country and embark on stifling the people’s demand for democratization. The people will doubtlessly show a considerable resistance to the restoration of the status quo ante at the outset, yet the lack of leadership and organization on the part of the popular front will in time give the upper hand to the oligarchic forces. In that political vacuum, the PKK will at once start a war of attrition in Northern Syria and Eastern Turkey whereas FETO will pick itself up and become a significant actor in the state apparatus once again.

Depending on the results of the election and whether the presidential election goes to the second round, one thing is certain: a new domestic makeup is waiting for Turkey.

With only one month left until election day, the political parties are about to finalize candidacy lists for Parliament. Because the parties follow different strategies in determining their candidates, each of them carried out the procedure differently. While some parties followed a more transparent method and informed the public at every stage, some contrarily held the process behind closed doors. Thus, before the announcement of the final lists, it is important to evaluate the parties’ candidate selection process in detail.

7343 people applied to the AK Party to become candidates for Parliament and the party approved the application of 7039. As part of the selection process, the AK Party established fourteen commissions in the party to conduct pre-interviews with all of these candidates. After the first round had been completed, the party conducted the second round of interviews of 2100 candidates qualified for this round. Meanwhile, as one of the strategies the AK Party introduced to Turkish political life, the party held popularity polls among rural party authorities and provincial members in 81 provinces to measure the tendency of people towards the possible candidates. It was announced that the results of these popularity polls would be evaluated seriously in the process of finalizing the lists. The party also conducted a security clearance to prevent the possibility of infiltration by illegal groups.

It is understood from the speeches of the leading figures of the party that the party will make significant changes in its parliamentary cadres. President Erdogan many times stressed that the party needs more dynamic and rejuvenated cadres. As a result of this situation, it is highly possible for the party to finalize the list combining both familiar and new names. Most probably, some of the party’s 294 out of 316 current parliament members who re-applied will find a place on the list.

The MHP released its list of parliamentary candidates last week before submitting it to the Supreme Electoral Council of Turkey (YSK). The party approved the application of 1726 out of 1815 people due to affiliations of illegal organizations and violent acts. Like the AK Party, the MHP also conducted a security clearance among these people. The party’s final candidate list includes 79 female and some prominent names currently serving as members of parliament. Nonetheless, some of the current parliamentary members were excluded from the party’s lists. This exclusion was seen as a result of the party’s efforts to rejuvenate its candidacy list compared to the previous terms.

The main opposition party CHP finalized its candidacy lists to submit to the YSK. The party’s candidate selection process was less transparent compared to the previous terms. While in the previous terms the party was conducting large-scale popularity polls in almost half of the provinces, the party just conducted small-scale surveys this term by asking about possible candidates to some of the rural party authorities. The party conducted interviews with 2139 candidates who applied and the final list will be determined by the party’s 60-seat assembly (PM) responsible for making decisions on the policy and strategy for the party.

The other parties running in the elections could not conduct a transparent candidate determination process compared to these three parties. They did not inform the public regularly about the stages of the process. Whether or not they provide transparency in the process, all of the parties running in the elections are submitting their final lists to the YSK today. Parties will organize the candidate meetings by this week and accelerate their campaign process.

After long-during discussions, Turkish opposition parties formed an alliance before the June 24 parliamentary elections. As it was called the “Nation Alliance,” this cooperation brought the CHP, Iyi Party, Felicity Party, and Democrat Party together. During the announcement of the alliance, it was also emphasized that candidates from the Democrat Party would run under the Iyi Party in elections.

These four parties have been negotiating a possible alliance for a couple of months. Indeed, the Iyi Party and Felicity Party came to an agreement on a partial alliance in the second run of the presidential elections if no candidate would win a simple majority in the first round. Nonetheless, when the decision of snap elections was taken, these parties accelerated their negotiation process. Even if all of these parties have different ideologies, principles, and system of values, they ignored such fundamental issues to form a superficial alliance against President Erdogan and the AK Party.

The CHP’s leading cadre and voters are split between nationalists/Kemalists and left-wing circles. The Iyi Party is supposed to get votes from nationalists within the CHP and MHP. The Felicity Party gets a few votes from the National Outlook Movement – most of the supporters of which vote for President Erdogan and the AK Party. Thus, there seems no realistic common ground or purpose of the opposition parties for the future of Turkey except removing President Erdogan from power that was tried in different forms in the past. This reality was seen in the declaration paper of the alliance. There wasn’t any reasonable justification or purpose of the alliance on paper. These parties also failed to explain how they were going to work in a harmony after the elections.

All of these elements show that this alliance is not an organic but an induced alliance. Does the formation of the alliance among the leading cadres of these parties reflect the will of their voters? The answer of this question is “no”.  After the announcement of the alliance, supporters of the Felicity Party criticized the cooperation of their party with the CHP on social media. Especially the CHP’s historical discourse on women that wear headscarves came to the fore again. Additionally, CHP voters heavily attacked the involvement of the Felicity Party in the alliance and denominated this party with the words such as “backward,” “reactionary,” and “followers of sharia.” These words show that radical secularists in the CHP still have the same mentality against religious people.

When it comes to the Iyi Party, the voter transferability between the CHP and Iyi Party seems to accelerate after this alliance. The angry nationalists in the CHP have already turned their face to the Iyi Party. However, some acts of the CHP’s presidential candidate Muharrem Ince may increase voter transferability between these parties on behalf of the Iyi Party. For instance, Ince’s call for the release of Selahattin Demirtas and his plan to visit Demirtas in jail have raised tensions among the nationalists in the CHP.

Overall, it is seen that the induced and superficial alliance among these parties could not mobilize their voters yet. It can be stated that these parties may take some actions towards mobilizing their voters in the last 49 days of the elections. At this point, it is important to remember that the context is highly crucial on voting behavior. As the alliance among these parties is not the result of an organic and well-thought process but simply aims to overthrow the government with no serious preparation to govern the country, they will most probably suffer to persuade their voters to vote for the Nation Alliance.

As Turkey moves towards its first presidential election, which will be held on 24 June, the political parties including the secularist People’s Republican Party (CHP), the nationalist Good Party (Iyi Party), the Islamist Felicity Party (SP), and the Kurdish nationalist Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) have struggled to team up against the alliance between the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Every alliance needs an ideological basis and the alliance among the opposition parties in Turkey is not an exception. However, the existing ideological distance between the parties poses a serious obstacle for them to form a working alliance.

This lack of shared ideological basis is sought to be evaded by resorting to negative politics, which is shaped around the principles such as democracy. And democracy is defined by a strategic goal with reference to opposing one-man rule, more particularly, Turkey’s shift to a presidential system and its main actor President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This equivalence between democracy and anti-Erdoganism might mobilize some sections of society, especially the loyal supporters of these parties. However, it falls short of persuading the majority of non-partisan, MHP constituents and the AK Party supporters. Not to mention the expected loss of votes owing to ideological contradictions among themselves.

Hence, the combined electoral support given to the alliance does not reach fifty percent of votes. This means that anti-Erdoganism is not enough to get the opposition to win the elections. There are two main reasons for why anti-Erdoganism is not sufficient for the opposition to get what they want. First of all, anti-Erdoganism is to be equivalent to democracy and Erdogan’s leadership in Turkey and the presidential system he backs are supposed to violate the fundamental principle of democracy, which is keeping the place of power empty. The AK Party rule for 15-plus years has complied with this principle of democracy. AK Party’s political life has been shaped around consolidating democracy by rolling back the military tutelage and extending the sphere of politics. And this politics of democratization has consistently attracted an ardent support from Turkish society.

Besides, the presidential system in Turkey allows for the presence of the opposition, agrees to share power and transfer it through free and fair elections, and abides by the democratic norms of separation of powers and the rule of law. The acquisition of one-man rule, therefore, does not live up to the requirements of a genuine one-man rule. Indeed, a system might be considered a man-rule, first of all, if it does not allow for a multi-party system and free elections. It needs to reject sharing power and transferring it. Secondly, a system can be described as one-man rule if it rejects checks and balances and the rule of law. That is, the rule must be arbitrary. The strong execution does not necessarily mean a one-man rule. This is what the opposition fails to grasp and tends to confuse about the presidential system in Turkey. The transition to this system received popular support and approval in the referendum on 16 April, 2017.

The second reason why anti-Erdoganism serves poorly for the opposition stems from the fact that democratic politics requires the creation of new societal demands or bringing the majority of existing societal demands together in a single political project. One can admit that despite its limited scope, the anti-Erdogan alliance brings some societal demands together. If anti-Erdoganism succeeds, the CHP believes that the “old Turkey,” which was shaped around the military tutelage, could be reinstituted and that the CHP would easily hold on to power. The HDP, too, thinks that the return of the old Turkey would create a political situation where the alienation of Kurds from the Turkish state and creation of an independent “Kurdistan” under the control of the PKK could be more likely. In the same vein, the Iyi Party feels very nostalgic about the old Turkey where the bureaucracy used to call the shots whereas the SP believes the return of the old Turkey would make it once again the main opposition party.

Sadly, the support for the old Turkey in Turkish society is not that large. Turkish society demands the further consolidation of democracy in national politics, justice in redistribution of wealth, development in the economic sphere and a powerful and autonomous Turkish state in regional and international politics. Anti-Erdoganism is far from responding to these societal demands and this makes it a poor idea in creating the largest and most inclusive power bloc in Turkish politics. If the opposition does not give up its polarization politics, it will most likely meet a decisive defeat in the upcoming election.

Turkey is a dynamic country, which often proved being able to overcome unexpected challenges. It does not seem to be a real challenge that the upcoming early elections, which were initially planned for November 2019, will now be held on 24 June of this year. President Erdogan announced this following his meeting with Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the MHP, whose offer was to hold the elections earlier than they had been planned.

To get a clear notion of what’s happening in Turkey, the following main points can be taken into consideration: First, what do the snap elections mean for the Turkish political system and the people’s attitude in general? Second, what about the main parties regarding the elections? And lastly, what do we expect during the two months until the election day?

First of all, the elections have a constitutional importance. These will be the first elections subsequent to the referendum on April 16, 2017, according to which Turkey’s old system of government has been transformed into a presidential system. Currently, Turkey is still leaded under a certain kind of semi-presidential system where a dual-executive exists. This will end with the elections on 24 June and Turkey will completely switch to the Turkish presidential system – abolishing, for instance, the office of the prime minister. On the day citizens go to the polls, both the election of the president and legislature will be held simultaneously. Consequently, the parties – or probable alliances – have to select their presidential candidate and MP candidates. Due to the fact that Turkish citizens have already experienced electing a president by popular vote, which occurred for the first time in August 2014, although the country’s political system is going to change, it can be stated that there are no complications expected during the election campaigns. Furthermore, until the Election Day, the current parliament will pass laws in order to bring harmony with the new system of government. Turkey has also been in the mood for elections for 22 months, since the AK Party and MHP started a collaboration. This created an expectation for holding elections both among the public and state apparatus.

Second, apart the marginal and Kurdish left-nationalist HDP, main parties welcomed the decision to hold elections earlier. Even the MHP-dissident Iyi Party’s leader Meral Aksener argued that her party is “the most prepared” one – even though the electoral board only confirmed that her party could participate in the elections on Sunday. CHP, the main opposition party, though, has neither announced a presidential candidate yet nor has a serious strategy regarding the elections. Officially, as a supporter of the parliamentary system, CHP’s main ambition was previously to win the elections and abolish the presidential system while bringing back the old one. However, due to the obvious lack of needed support, the CHP has to build alliances. However, as extensively explained, this will not be easy. Another interesting question is whether there will be any other potential candidates for the presidency. Most obviously, these uncertainty and speculations will continue for a short time.

On the other hand, due to an established alliance since the July 15 coup attempt in 2016 and formalizing the alliance a couple of months ago, the AK Party and MHP’s presidential candidate will be Recep Tayyip Erdogan. As it rightly stressed by Nebi Mis, it seems that during the one year subsequent to the referendum, the AK Party has made its local congresses across Turkey, which caused the party’s base and network being uninterrupted ready for elections, renewed the cadres under the leadership of Mr. Erdogan and concluded its process of building an alliance for the upcoming elections. The main opposition party, though, which has a total vote of approximately 25%, neither has found a presidential candidate yet nor could it even agree on its “alliance of principles” principles. Honestly, it’s not reasonable to think that a party and its incumbent leader, who lost 8 elections in 8 years, is going to prepare his party much better this time. No serious mind would require believing this and no political science theory would argue that this time it promises success.

Finally, domestically, the election campaigns will most probably resemble the 16 April referendum, while this time the concrete changing steps of the new system will be addressed more in depth. Opposition parties, on the other hand, have to decide what they want to achieve. Thus, either ambitions such as winning the elections in order to abolish the presidential system or pursuing to lead the country in accordance with the newly adopted system. Nevertheless, it seems that there will be an election period without many turbulences in contrast to previous ones. But it’s quite likely that externally, once again, particularly both foreign media outlets and political elites, will be biased to support a well-known anti-Erdogan and anti-AK Party discourse and discredit the elections generally. All in all, this election will be a step that will ultimately concretize Turkey’s upcoming five years.

An unexpected call from the MHP Chairman Devlet Bahceli for snap elections made a swift change in Turkey’s political agenda. The call from Bahceli was positively welcomed by President Erdogan and the AK Party circles due to the urgent need to implement presidential system, which was approved on April 16, 2017. President Erdogan emphasized that Turkey needs to hold snap elections in order to overcome uncertainties arising from the cross-border counter-terror operations in Iraq and Syria and the crisis in neighboring countries. After the parliament approved a bill on holding early elections last Friday, the date of snap elections – June 24 – was approved.

The AK Party and MHP decided to form an alliance for the next general election a couple of months ago. Thus, these parties already established their election strategies on national unity and stressed that their alliance -the People’s Alliance – would be open to each party respectful of the country’s national values, unity and solidarity. Nonetheless, the opposition parties failed to form an alliance even when they negotiated regularly with each other to reach a consensus on the issue. Although concrete steps were taken for various alliance formulas such as CHP-HDP-Iyi Party, CHP-HDP/CHP-Iyi Party, the parties could not reach an agreement. However, after the announcement of the snap elections, it became necessary for these parties to take an immediate decision on whether to join the elections either as part of an alliance or on their own.

In this context, the CHP became the most controversial party. The party has intensely been criticized for not developing an election strategy yet. Due to it being uncertain as to whether the party will form an alliance or not, the party circles started to force the Party Council to make an urgent decision towards the snap elections. As seen in the discussions, the first scenario on the CHP’s election strategy is based on the formation of an electoral alliance with the HDP. The rapprochement between these parties in the last two years strengthens this possibility. Nonetheless, there is a concern that an electoral alliance between these parties may provoke a reaction among voters of these parties, especially among the CHP’s Kemalist and nationalist voters.

However, CHP’s recent step reflected the inconsistency and ambiguity in the party’s election strategy. On April 22, the CHP allowed 15 of its MPs to join the Iyi Party. This strategy is defended with the argument of supporting the Iyi Party’s attempt to join the parliamentary elections, which would be decided after the examination of the High Election Board (YSK). This strategy was harshly criticized even by some prominent names in the CHP because of manipulating elections. Even if the Iyi Party has never joined an election before, it will get a treasury grant and form a parliamentary group in the Assembly. This strategy, which is legal but unethical, shows the possibility of upcoming next steps through the elections. Thus, it should be said that there is not going to be issues or principles in the formation of alliances among opposition parties. The only motivation behind these kinds of inconsistent steps is the anti-Erdogan agenda of these parties.

When it comes to the Iyi Party, the party seems to have two different road maps. On the one side, the party tries to broaden the limits of its alliance with the Felicity Party. It was announced that the Felicity Party would support Meral Aksener if the presidential elections proceed to the second round. It remains unclear whether this alliance would be valid in the first round of elections. On the other hand, the leading names of the party continue to negotiate with the CHP in order to form an alliance in both presidential and parliamentary elections. It is generally believed that their strategy will be revealed until the end of this week.

During his press statement on January 8, 2018, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli clarified certain ambiguities surrounding the 2019 elections that were the main items on the political agenda. In this statement, Bahceli announced that MHP would not nominate any candidate, but support President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the 2019 presidential elections. More, MHP leader highlighted that his party is open to alliance with Erdogan’s AK Party for the parliamentary elections as well. This alliance, it was suggested, should be implemented into a legal framework, allowing parties to maintain their corporate identity and to identify the percentage of votes each party receives. President Erdogan responded to MHP’s call positively, which then led to the two parties establishing their own alliance commissions.

With this, Devlet Bahceli carried out the AK Party-MHP alliance, which was formed after the July 15 coup attempt and which aimed to ensure the survival of the state, on to a next level. This was a requirement necessitated by the presidential system, as political parties have to seek alliances in order to secure the election. Therefore, after party-member presidency, the political reflections of the presidential system began to be apparent on the road to 2019.

The content and political implications of the presidential system were not discussed during the referendum campaign due to the manipulations of the opposition, refusing to allow people to understand the importance of this political transformation in terms of democratization. For instance, the “no” bloc distorted the truth about certain amendments, such as decreasing the age to be eligible for parliamentary candidacy to 18 or increasing the number of deputies to 600. Moreover, opposition leader Kilicdaroglu claimed that the 4 million Syrians who are seeking refuge in Turkey would be naturalized if the referendum succeeded. These kinds of manipulations obstructed the essence of this new system and the political implications it would bring from being understood.

Not polarization, reconciliation

Analyzing the developments in Turkish domestic politics, it becomes obvious that political parties are experiencing changes brought by the presidential system. As it is known, a simple majority is sought in the presidential elections and this condition will shape Turkey’s political landscape.

First of all, the simple majority factor renders political and social reconciliation inevitable. In the new era, political parties will be inclined to be more inclusive, agreeable and appealing to voters. In this respect, “bloc politics” foreseen by the new system enforces political reconciliation instead of polarization. Thanks to these political blocs, the public will observe which parties are working with each other and will decide accordingly. Therefore, the success of the alliance political parties will form in the presidential system is to be determined by their appeal to the public.

In terms of seeking reconciliation and alliance that is brought by the new system, the AK Party and MHP have agreed on national stance and an alliance that appeals to the majority of the public. Considering this alliance, it could be asserted that the MHP is pursuing a realistic political stance. The party sought to transform its existing cooperation with the AK Party into an alliance since the July 15 coup attempt. Bahceli’s statement about being true to the “Yenikapi spirit” and desiring to incorporate the new system is the most important indicator of this. MHP is aware of the necessity of adopting a national unity discourse amid global and regional conflicts and that this discourse appeals to the public.

What caused MHP to depart from its previous bloc was the failure of this bloc to maintain a national stance, which inevitably discomforted the public. In other words, unlike the other bloc consisting of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) along with several smaller parties, which prefer to cooperate behind closed scenes, the AK Party and MHP are conducting their alliance negotiations transparently thanks to its public consent.

No coalition but pre-election alliance

The alliance-forming process between the AK Party and the MHP also revealed another tangible outcome of the presidential system: reconciliation between political parties in a different form other than a coalition in the parliamentary system. During the discussions on transitioning to the presidential system, it was expressed that the new system would eliminate coalition governments and provide opportunities for new forms of reconciliation and cooperation. There is significant difference between presidential and parliamentary systems in terms of reconciliation. Unlike in the parliamentary system, the presidential system also seeks reconciliation among the public instead of only party leaders and political elites.

While the public only observes coalition negotiations in the parliamentary system after casting votes, the presidential system allows the public to shape alliance discussions between political parties. This is due to the fact that alliances have to be formed prior to the elections. If the agreement is only among political elites, the public may punish their political parties by not voting for them. Therefore, the AK Party and MHP are conducting their alliance negotiations transparently and prior to the election, accepting to face any repercussions in the case of public dissatisfaction.

Coalitions formed under the parliamentary system do not necessarily allow the public to know which party will have executive power. However, in the case of the AK Party-MHP alliance, the public is aware that Erdogan will maintain executive power if he is elected. In addition, even if MHP withdraws its support from the AK Party after the elections, it will not create a political crisis, as it would do in a parliamentary system.

For all these reasons, the presidential system does not have coalitions, but pre-election alliances. The process between the AK Party and MHP is a reflection of this. Therefore, criticisms about not being able to eliminate coalitions despite transitioning into the presidential system are just not true.

The process between the AK Party and MHP reveals only a part of the reconciliatory aspect of the presidential system. If the president’s party fails to secure a majority in Parliament, the President will be inclined to reconcile with other parties that possess seats. If the AK Party fails to secure a majority of seats in the 2019 elections, its alliance with MHP will most probably permeate the Parliament as well. Indeed, Bahceli clearly stated that his party will do all that is required to render the new system permanent in 2019-2024 period.

In this sense, the presidential system enforces pre-election alliances, not government coalitions. These alliances will reveal the political blocs indicating social reconciliation rather than social polarizations. Considering its voter base, it had been inevitable for MHP to become party to a different bloc. Meanwhile, the discourse on national unity, which has gathered support by the general public and which is shared by the AK Party has allowed MHP to leave the “no” bloc and join powers with the government.

Following the governing AK Party’s statements regarding the controversial referendum in northern Iraq, the two main opposition party leaders, Devlet Bahceli and Kemal Kilicdaroglu have also supported the government in its stance.

Leader of MHP, Bahceli, issued a written statement from the headquarters of the Nationalist Movement Party claiming that “it has become inevitable for Turkey to pursue an effective and comprehensive deterrence policy that includes the use of military force, and it has become inevitable for them to progressively determine coercive measures and gradually implement them.”

“This is a national security issue that cannot be underestimated by Turkey and I want to repeat that the Nationalist Movement party will stand with the government in its measures that it will take with determination in this regard.”

In the statement Bahceli said that the referendum brings a “message of a dark period” in the region, accusing Masoud Barzani of starting an “adventurous journey” that would end up with him “paying a heavy price and disappointment.”

The MHP leader added that “he [Barzani] will see how this childhood dream will turn into a nightmare.”

He called the poll a “piracy referendum” that had no legal and political legitimacy, adding that it is “void and condemned to stay on paper only.”

Earlier this week President Erdogan had only emphasized that the referendum was initiated by the KRG in order to secure the Barzani family’s political inclusion.

Moreover, CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu has urged for a common solution in regards to the aftermath of the referendum.

Talking to reporters in Ankara, the CHP leader called for Turkey, Iran and the central Iraqi government to find a common solution to the problem in northern Iraq following Monday’s controversial referendum.

“If a common solution can be produced, Turkey can make important progress on this issue.”

Kilicdaroglu also added that Turkey had demonstrated a “national stance” on the referendum and even its parliament was supporting this view.

Commercial, economic and political sanctions due

Prior to the referendum, President Erdogan had made it clear that if the Barzani administration do not listen to their calls, Turkey will not refrain from imposing political, economic and commercial sanctions on the KRG administration.

The first warning comes as the Turkish Radio and Television Supreme Council decides to remove 3 northern Iraq TV channels off air – K24, WAAR and Rudaw have been removed from Turkish satellite Turksat.

The decision was taken after the three channels called some parts of southeastern and eastern Turkey as “northern Kurdistan” in their television broadcast.

The channels did not have a license from RTUK, yet they were broadcasting the transmission using the license obtained from the KRG.

In addition to mere channel obstructions, the Turkish and Iraqi military have launched a joint military exercise on the Turkish-Iraqi border.

While Turkey had already started its military maneuvers in the southeastern Silopi region on September 18, a week ahead of the referendum, announcement of a joint exercise came after the vote took place.

A brief statement published on the Turkish General Staff’s official website announced that the third phase of the military exercise will start on Tuesday 3 October, jointly with the Iraqi military at the Habur border gate, also known as the Ibrahim Khalil border crossing, on the Turkish-Iraqi border in the Silopi district of Sirnak.

The area sits to the north of the Syrian and Iraqi borders and contains the Habur border crossing, which is the KRG’s main access point to the rest of the world.

While the July 15 coup attempt and the immediate aftermath produced a unified synergy in favor of democracy, in the year since then this has not been the case. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) in particular initially stated they were against all kinds of coups, yet lately they have made certain unjustifiable allegations that could cast a shadow on the process of uncovering the truth about the night of July 15, 2016.

The most obvious indication of a unified anti-coup synergy was the spontaneous reaction by Turkish politicians on July 15 and July 16, and the Yenikapı Demonstration on August 7. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım and the Chairman of Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Devlet Bahçeli announced that they were never-ending advocators of democracy in all circumstances. CHP Chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu also made similar strong statements against the coup attempt. The main catalyst for this active resistance against the coup attempt was in fact the message conveyed by President Erdoğan via Face Time that night, when he called for a unified national reaction.

The next day, all politicians formed a more unified nationalist stance against the coup attempt. Chief of the General Staff Hulusi Akar too attended parliament at the moment, and was an indispensable component of this anti-coup bloc. In the session, the Chief of the Parliament İsmail Kahraman said “our national anthem is our manifesto and we are all united nation.” Prime Minister Yıldırım said “all those who are involved in the coup attempt are traitors, regardless of their military ranks” after thanking all political politicians for their support. Kılıçdaroğlu said “this is definitely a coup attempt against our Republic and our traditions.” Bahçeli too said that “with the coup attempt, coup collaborators embedded into the Turkish army were identified and clarified.” HDP Chairman Selahattin Demirtaş was not able to attend the parliamentary talks as he was out of the Ankara; however, HDP spokesman İdris Baluken asserted that they were against all kinds of military coups.

The most critical aspects of a joint declaration passed then by the four political parties’ was: “the condemnation of the coup attack against the people and the parliament” and “the protection of the national will by four main political parties in spite of their political differences.” Namely, high political tension among political parties before the coup attempt transformed into a unified national stance against the coup, especially in the first days.

In this atmosphere, the Yenikapı bloc was formed not only by political parties but also by the people, who came from various ideological segments of the society. The most prominent aspect of the Yenikapı bloc was the sharp stance against all kinds of coups and a clarity about the identities and aims of the perpetrators. A national stance, one that included the cooperation of civil and military institutions, soon emerged against FETO, whose mafia-like organization and illegal actions were uncovered. Unfortunately, this unity started to crumble in a short period of time. After the national declaration at the parliament, politicians reiterated anti-coup messages for days; however, the CHP and HDP’s hesitant disposition in this matter distanced them from their initial political reflexes.

The Yenikapı Demonstration on August 7 was organized as the second platform to demonstrate national unity against the coup attempt, after the first one in parliament on July 16. Yet, the HDP was the first to stay out of this second unified platform. Demirtaş made unjustifiable accusations about the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) involvement in the coup, both while he was in Turkey and abroad. Hence, the HDP once again fell into the trap of illegal activities, just like it had with its treatment of Kurdish politics, with its disposition towards the coup attempt. Idris Baluken’s tweet: “AKP-CHP-MHP partnership isn’t new; it’s an alliance against Kurds since June 7 with the excuse of the survival of the state and fight against terrorism” was the confirmation and declaration of the HDP’s excluding itself from the anti-coup alliance. The HDP’s absence at the Yenikapı Demonstration was also a sign of their unsustainable image in the new path of Turkish politics.

On the other hand, the CHP Chairman Kılıçdaroğlu declined to attend the Yenikapı Demonstration initially, saying “Erdoğan tried to increase his political influence on the people through criticizing the opposition party.” However, after Erdoğan and Yıldırım’s insistence, the CHP chairman changed his mind saying “we will attend the Yenikapı demonstration for the same reason we were at the parliament on the night of the coup attempt.” At the same time, he underlined that he would continue to be a legal part of the Turkish politics by accepting the invitation. The MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli announced that they were against the coup attempt, and beyond taking part in the demonstration, they also supported the government in these difficult days without wavering.  Bahçeli maintained his stable political stance behind the AK Party during the Yenikapı Demonstration and during the constitutional referendum campaign. The MHP saw itself as an important proponent of the political and institutional change the AK Party wanted to see in Turkey.

As a part of his “No” campaign in the lead up to the 16 April referendum, and a part of his general “anti-Erdoğan” campaign, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu tried again to discuss unproven speculative details of the coup attempt in the public sphere and thus he took unexpected risks both socially and politically. CHP politicians abused clear evidences of the coup attempt for their inter-party politics. By reiterating claims first made by Fetullah Gülen that “the coup was planned and controlled,” the CHP’s view converged with that of FETO.

These statements by Kılıçdaroğlu became a signal of just how marginalized he had become from the national political scene. In order to counteract Erdoğan’s politics, Kılıçdaroğlu started to voice uncertain statements that downplayed the treacherous and violent aspects of the coup attempt. Abstaining from the anti-coup bloc thus was a calculated political mistake, and the balance of national unity was tipped against the HDP and CHP politicians who involved themselves in that alliance.

In the CHP’s report on the July 15 Coup Attempt, the expression “controlled coup” was reiterated. These implications and disinformation about the coup attempt have created a controversial discourse that is also harmful to the fight against these kinds of illegal bloody attacks. In any case, these allegations circulated by the CHP did not bear fruit, and were seen by the public as more attempts by the party to criticize the AK Party’s policies.

What is being done by the CHP and HDP is actually an attempt to downplay the government’s success in thwarting the coup attempt through inter-party political quarrels. Ultimately, the CHP’s allegation that the government – which was in fact the main target of the coup attempt – was responsible for July 15 was viewed by the people as simply a part of the party’s constricted politics.

On July 15, 2016, Turkey foiled a military coup attempt orchestrated by the Fetullah Gülen Terror Group (FETO), which has infiltrated every sphere of public life in guise of a simple religious congregation for decades. Motivated to seize power in the country, this insurrection was organized by brainwashed FETO operatives who can use every means possible to reach their goals and have neither discernment nor respect for any values. The FETO cult has been revealed to have a peculiar organizational structure that is unprecedented over the course of the Republican period. On July 15, the Turkish nation was confronted with the most dangerous and shadowy criminal enterprise in its history. Abusing the legitimate means of the state in order to reach their illegal goals and ideals under the protection of global power groups, this cult now poses a threat not only to Turkey, but also to Islam and to the future of the Muslim world.

Along with infiltrating every sphere of life, FETO has also designed and controlled the country’s political life with numerous masterful perception operations that shaped opinions in public and private sector for years. The terror group seized power by manipulating the business world and using intelligence organizations, security-related institutions and the judiciary in line with their own goals and interests. But how could FETO obtain such widespread influence? What kind of tactics and methods did the terror group employ to grow to such an extent? To put it otherwise, how was the groundwork of this deception laid? And most importantly, how could the group’s infiltration activities and coup and chaos plans remain covered for years? How could it be unraveled that FETO is actually a criminal enterprise in guise of a religious congregation?

So far, much has been said with regard to the plotting and deceiving skills of FETO and its leader Fetullah Gülen. FETO’s former attempts to wreak havoc on Turkey include the Roboski sabotage in 2011, the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) operation in 2012, the Gezi Park incidents in 2013, the Dec. 17-25 judicial coup attempt case in 2013, the operations on MIT trucks in Hatay and Adana provinces on Jan. 1 and 19, 2014, and the Kobani uprising on Oct. 6-8, 2014.

The retrospective inquiries conducted in the archives of the judiciary and the security directorate and the confessions of several FETO members following the Dec. 17-25 judicial coup attempts revealed that FETO had developed a chain of ploys to stage a coup as of the year 2008. Having designed and controlled almost all the political movements in the country including the main opposition party, FETO was eventually confronted with the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has constituted the greatest impediment to the terror cult so far. When the chronology of the FETO’s operations and plots are examined in retrospect, this is the first aspect catching the eye in the picture. Also, in the chain of ploys unraveled in the Tawhid-Salaam Jerusalem file that was uncovered subsequently.

In 2009, FETO also influenced the opposition parties. The terror group heavily influenced the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) administration and then intervened in the inner affairs of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) to a serious extent. The MHP establishment could recover from FETO’s harm only after the July 15 attempted coup. Nevertheless, FETO could never achieve its goals regarding the AK Party administration. When the group failed to intervene in the AK Party, it planned to topple Erdoğan during his term as prime minister by sabotaging the government’s Syria policy through wiretapping Erdoğan’s meetings at his Dolmabahçe office with former Syrian National Coalition for Opposition and Revolutionary Forces (SNCORF) President Ahmad Moaz al-Khatib and Hakan Fidan, the chief of National Intelligence Service (MIT). All their ploys were interrelated and complementary to one another. The ploys eventually upset President Erdoğan but never managed to impact his power or determination. Understanding that they would not achieve their goals with their plots in guise of legal case files, the global deception group FETO executed its ultimate plan on July 15 but failed once again.

Intelligence Repository

The most important feature of FETO that turned the group into a global power is its ability to effectively use the intelligence it obtains in accordance with its own agenda. FETO particularly stands out with its high competence in intelligence and espionage activities. The group managed to organize and form networks at every spot promising power, strategic information or money. By organizing within the civil service, MIT, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and the General Directorate of Security, FETO founded a deep intelligence network in the realm of “security bureaucracy.” All the collected data were accumulated in a major intelligence repository. To achieve their goals, FETO used and manipulated the data and documents available in the repository against the persons or groups they wanted to eliminate.

Millions of Wiretapping Cases

FETO’s wiretapping activities across the country reached several million lines. Wiretapping international and national communication traffic of the state administration, the terror cult irrevocably destroyed the data stored in a total of 2,003 computers at police departments in December 2013 and January 2014. The data and servers at the Istanbul Security Directorate were deleted with no possibility of return. Still, some vital data was obtained with regard to the FETO-linked judges and prosecutors endeavoring to justify the illegal wiretappings of FETO, which was motivated by the goal of absolute power. The FETO-linked judges and prosecutors were the key operatives of the terror cult who abused legal means for the sake of the group’s interests.

In the inquiries which began prior to the July 15 and were completed in the aftermath of the coup attempt, it was found that the FETO-linked judges and prosecutors had direct or indirect contacts with other FETO operatives based in the U.S., Spain, Germany, Austria, British Indian Ocean Territory, Sudan and France. More interestingly, it was revealed that the FETO-linked judges and public prosecutors who worked at different units had conversations with the same international telephone numbers. It was also found that some relatives of these judges and prosecutors, who were in charge of Turkey’s most significant investigations over the past 15 years, had economic ties with the business circles now being investigated for financing FETO.

The terror group has a colossal archive which includes technical surveillance and wiretapping records acquired with advanced devices, illegal recordings of public personnel, and information on the students affiliated with the group, including their families. This archive partakes of the group’s memory, encompassing data on each spot inside and outside the country where the terror group has been active. The data recorded by every operative with regard to their own unit are much more profound and detailed than the data found in most intelligence agencies. The comprehensiveness of their archive stems from the fact that each FETÖ member has operated as an intelligence agent.

Liquidation and Occupation

FETO liquidated the targeted persons or groups through a three-phased strategy that has used the personal information available in the intelligence and archive records.

In the first phase, intelligence was collected about the person to be liquidated. The data regarding the targeted person or group was conveyed to the writers holding sway over public opinion and then announced to masses that was merely an allegation.

The second phase was employed after these allegations had a broad repercussion through the journalists affiliated with FETO in the mainstream media. The allegations became controversial topics across the country by means of the reports released by certain media outlets, such as the daily newspapers Taraf, Zaman, Bugün and the TV station Kanaltürk.

In the final phase, some operations to manipulate and shape opinions were made through social media and press organs with an aim to “spur anti-government sentiments,” “mobilize the masses” and “undermine state institutions and bureaucracy.” In the summons issued for intelligence chief Hakan Fidan on Feb. 7, 2012, and in the Dec. 17-25 process, professionally executed strategies were pursued to overthrow the government with these methods.

FETO has innumerable illegal methods to use against its targets, which vary according to the targeted person’s profession, family life, personal weaknesses or social status. The group tried to economically damage its self-employed targets in a way contradicting the free competition conditions in the market or had them audited on various pretexts by its members who had infiltrated the civil service. FETÖ exerted pressure on its targets mainly through its disciples in the civil service.

Some of their methods can be listed as follows:

1- Sending anonymous letters or e-mails regarding the personal or professional life of the targeted person which contain aspersions on the person to discredit them before the public or the institution they work for. Opening civil or penal lawsuits against the persons, imprisoning them based on the aspersions, defaming them in their personal, social or professional life, impeding their appointment or promotion, disrupting their family order, etc.

2- Asserting various claims against the targeted institution or its administrators and employees via internet by using various servers that hide the claimer’s identity. Releasing footage or tapes of the targeted persons which pry into their private life and cannot be verified. Announcing such leaks to the larger masses through their legal offshoots who give credit to the relevant website.

3- Announcing doctored digital data to public that is obtained with illegal methods through the medium of FETO offshoots in security units or strategic institutions.

4- The targeted person is forced either to pay large amounts of “himmet”, the word referring to donations to Gülen charities, or fulfill another demand compelled by FETÖ with threats and blackmail such as releasing digital data on their private life or ostracizing them from their professions by filing a penal or civil lawsuit against them.

All these practices demonstrate that FETO is a terror group which has become organized in civil society for years, infiltrated key state institutions by using different guises and has operated like an intelligence organization connected to international power groups. This is the structure of the terror cult Turkey has been fighting against.

If the referendum on the presidential system in Turkey was a close call for “no,” for instance with 50.1% of the total votes, no one in this world would question its legitimacy. It would have been deemed as a tremendous victory of the anti-Erdoğan wing. It didn’t come to pass and the bill passed the referendum with 51.4%. Then, it must be Erdoğan’s triumph! President Erdoğan received the public support by acquiring 1,300,000 more votes than “no” in a referendum which was attended by 86.4% of the eligible voters. Kurdish votes showing 10-20% increase in certain cities played an important role in Erdoğan’s victory,  who has been at the helm of the government for 15 years, first as the prime minister and then as the president.

A Turkey which is surrounded by wars, hosts 2,500,000 Syrian refugees, has been targeted by both Daesh and the PKK, recently overcame a coup attempt on July 15 Gülenist infiltrators instructed by Fetullah Gülen who tried to move the country into an unprecedented chaos. Considering the reactions of especially the US universities and think-tanks, along with some Europeans ones, there is a president who is being condemned for “surviving the coup attempt.”

A president who has been more eager than his predecessors in making Turkey a full member of the EU, who has recognized the Kurdish problem and commenced the reconciliation process, who has realized education reforms for thousands of women that were forcibly thrown out by the police and forced to leave their schools just because they were wearing headscarves, and who extended his condolences to Armenians on April 24 and asked for an international commission to research what has transpired during 1915 incidents… A president who embraced the doorkeeper of the hotel he was staying in Brussels, along with the German Chancellor Schröder, who calls and talks with his childhood friends, who has earned the love and interest of the people… The most significant political leader since Atatürk.

It has become ambiguous when it did happen; however, the said president started to be compared to the cruelest man of the last century, Hitler, deemed as a dictator and alleged for massacring Kurds with an elaborate perception management that was devised by the West. In a short time the anti-Erdoğan club became quite cosmopolitan: even Daesh leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, PKK, Gülen and his henchmen became the members of it. A fabulous cosmopolitan coalition of opposition! It should be mentioned that this coalition inevitably brought quite a support to Erdoğan and affected the result of referendum in a positive way.

Talking about Turkey, there are a few members of the opposition who voted “no” and constantly criticize as they want the system to become more democratic and have a robust judicial system. Nevertheless, whatever be the discussion, the “no” movement has always been spearheaded by the main opposition party CHP which comes from a Kemalist tradition. Justice and Development Party (AK Party) which has been governing Turkey for 15 years, has proposed numerous proposals about changing the 1982 constitution that was implemented by the junta.

The main opposition party opposed all of these proposals. This wasn’t surprising, as this is the nature of the Kemalist opposition parties. However, what is surprising is that the opposition party has never proposed a change or an alternative to the 1982 constitution, the same constitution that the all people in Turkey unanimously want to change. Let alone preparing a proposal that could worry AK Party, they haven’t even scribbled a draft of a constitution. Indeed, for 15 years AK Party and its leader Tayyip Erdoğan have been always challenging their own records in elections and broke them with unprecedented figures.

Erdoğan and his party that don’t have to worry about a legitimate opposition have overcome numerous illegitimate attempts aiming to depose them. The referendum was held under the conditions of the state of emergency that was declared right after the July 15 coup attempt. The subject matter was a change in the system of government; however, this wasn’t being voted in the referendum. It was between those who are against Erdoğan, both in Turkey and the world, and those who stood with Erdoğan.

Despite the campaigning since February, almost none of the voters regardless of their point of view are aware of either the so-called parliamentary system that grants excessive authority to the president or the presidential system which is different than the existing system. Among those who are aware, the objections of the main opposition party’s voters were not taken much into consideration as they refrained from criticizing the existing odd system and, moreover, as they were the ones that made it stranger. On the other hand, even though the AK Party voters were concerned about certain things, the “yes” won because of the trust in Erdoğan.

Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) which allied with AK Party for the referendum failed to garner the expected support. However, the Kurdish votes played a decisive role in the referendum by increasing support for “yes” in 14 cities located in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. Considering the vote AK Party garnered in November 1 elections in 2015, there is a varying increase between 10% and 20% in cities in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. The concerns for security, believing Erdoğan will resolve issues of the region and the reaction against PKK’s trench and urban warfare contributed to the victory. Moreover, there were those who voted “yes” as they believed that 1982 constitution is indefensible and it is impossible to resolve the Kurdish problem with the existing parliamentary system. For this reason, Erdoğan was able to increase its votes in Diyarbakır from 22.2% to 32.43%, in Batman from 30% to 36.48%, in Mardin from 30% to 40.96%, in Siirt from 40% to 48.1%, in Şırnak from 13% to 28.41%, and in Şanlıurfa from 67.8% to 70.82%.

As a result, it could be said that Erdoğan who is the indubitably the most prominent political figure of Turkey for 15 years has received less votes than his potential. However, the precedents of Turkish political history and sociology, along with the experience, show that Erdoğan will be able to maintain his government. Even if the transition to presidential system wasn’t realized, he still would be a powerful president due to the provisions of the constitution, along with being elected president in the first round with 51.8% of the votes. He himself was powerful before; now, his seat is also powerful.

A small portion of the AK Party voters abstained from voting “yes” not because of a concern about Erdoğan, but because they weren’t sure of the answer to the following question: “what will happen after Erdoğan?” Erdoğan, who will become the leader of his party due to the constitutional change, will probably take some steps that will answers the expectations and concerns of his voters, while also taking the Kurdish voters’ support into consideration. It is also highly probable that the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) which is perceived as the only representative of Kurdish politics by the international community will face new rivaling competitors in the region, beside their only rival AK Party.

Since the adoption of the 1982 Constitution, the text has been subject to debate and several amendments. Following the elections in 2011, there was hope for a new Constitution, but it disappeared after the failure of an agreement in the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission on the revision of the text. Immediately after the failed July 15 coup attempt, Turkish political parties agreed on a brief Constitutional package. However, the subsequent political tension prevented the carrying out of the project. Surprisingly, the leader of the MHP Devlet Bahceli, initiated a new process by throwing his support behind an amendment in the Constitution that would be put forward by the AK Party. The AK Party prepared the Constitutional amendment proposal that included a “Presidential System” and proposed this amendment to the Turkish Parliament after negotiations with the MHP. The core objective of the proposal is to abandon the 1982 Constitutional model, which was drafted following a military regime. Since the 1982 Constitution does not provide a conventional parliamentary system, it facilitated the transition to the Presidential system.

Neutrality of the Judiciary

Article 1 of the proposal and Article 9 on the jurisdiction of the Constitution provide an “impartiality” clause which emphasizes the neutrality as well as the independence of the judiciary. The 1982 Constitution too called for judicial independence and emphasized the necessity of the independence and the legal jurisdiction of judges in a number of matters. However, the independence of the judiciary and its connection to the concept of impartiality does not appear explicitly in the Constitution and thus its absence is the motivation for this new proposal.

It is impossible to separate neutrality from an independent judiciary. An independent judiciary – without the influence of any individual or institution, whether inside or outside of the judiciary – upholding the law with impartiality to avoid any bias or without any prejudice whatsoever is essential. In other words, a judge must decide independently and irrespective of any personal benefit, ideology, belief and world view.

Themis, the ancient Greek symbol of the principle of justice, in her blindfold demonstrates this need for neutrality and impartiality in judging a case. The principle of impartiality is of critical importance in the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. For this reason, the impartiality provided in international human rights documents finds its place side by side with the principle of independence. Article 10 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights all emphasize the principle of neutrality.

These examples show that the incorporation of the principle of neutrality in the proposal into the 1982 Constitution is compatible with human rights conventions and will address the deficiencies in the present system.

Another reason for this addition is related to the longevity of the bureaucratic tutelage in Turkey. The army was one of the basic elements of the judicial tutelage that was established by the 1961 Constitution, with the judiciary using it as a mean to maintain its control. During this period, the judicial tutelage preferred the protection of the guardianship of the state power against the political power along with the defense of its privileges, rather than protecting basic rights or establishing the rule of law.  The activities of the judiciary have always been defended with an emphasis of the independence of institutions, however those in power have often turned a blind eye to the principle of impartiality. In other words, the emphasis on neutrality in the current proposed Constitutional change is a result of the reaction to the bureaucratic tutelage, which is trying to take the power of the democratic governance of political power under its jurisdiction.

Supreme board of judges and prosecutors of Turkey (HSYK)

The new Constitutional proposal reduces the number of members of the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) of Turkey from 22 to 13, and ends the practice of direct election of judges from other judges in the HSYK. According to the proposal, the Minister of Justice and the undersecretary of the Minister will be members of the HSYK. Four members will be appointed by the President, and the remaining seven will be elected by the Parliament. The Parliament will select three of these members from the Supreme Court of Appeals, with two of these being a teaching fellow and the third being a barrister, and one elected from among the members of the Council of State.

The first point is an important departure from the old system and it abandons the method of selection of a number of members of the HSYK by judges and prosecutors. This process was first introduced as a democratic method by the AK Party in 2010. However, the practice of this method for seven years and two electoral terms has shown that it can have negative consequences posing a danger to the Turkish democracy.  Under the previous system, the HSYK members were elected by the judges and prosecutors of this country, but this election process became politicized, with blocks of voters following various political movements. The most powerful political movement was composed of the members of the Fetullah Gülen Terrorist Organization (FETO).  This caused great damage to the judiciary. The electoral procedure essentially insulated the courts from oversight, deterred judges and prosecutors from completing their primary duties, politicized the judiciary and encouraged the emergence of political or ideological camps among the judges and prosecutors. During the course of the HSYK election, the candidates were favored for their political views, beliefs, ethnic and sectarian identities rather than on their merit or professional experience. This should not be accepted under any circumstances for an institution such as the judiciary. This politicization of the judges was seen in the press releases of the HSYK, both before and after the two most recent elections in 2010 and 2014.

Additionally, all of the camps and political parties that were parts of the judiciary were opposed to the procedure of the election of the members. The main opposition party CHP proposed that only the highest courts be allowed to elect a member of the Constitutional Court. The election procedure was totally abolished in the proposal of the MHP.

The second important point is that a simple majority was insufficient for HSYK members to be elected by the Parliament. According to the proposal, the Justice and Constitutional Commissions of the Parliament appoint three out of five candidates to the HSYK. If candidates are not supported by a majority in the Commissions, three candidates must be elected through choosing by lot. In the General Assembly of the Parliament, there shall be two votes for each of the three candidates, with three out of five candidates presented for each open seat on the HSYK. In the event of no majority being secured, a lot will be drawn for the two candidates with the most votes.

It can be seen that the election of seven members by the Parliament by way of a qualified majority, was meant to prevent a simple majority and to force parties into a compromise. In response to these positive arrangements, we can say that the lack of recognition of the authority of the HSYK members to select a part of the Supreme Court and the Council of State is a deficiency of the proposal.

Removal of Military Courts

The proposal also provides a complete abolition of military prosecution. Article 13 of the proposal reads: “Military courts outside disciplinary courts cannot be established. In the event of a war, however, military courts may be set up to take charge of the crimes committed by soldiers in relation to their duties.”

The military jurisdiction is one of the most effective elements of the tutelage system that was later reformed with the establishment of the 1961 Constitution. After the 1960 military coup, the Military High Court of Appeals was established in the Constitution, and the Supreme Military Administrative Court was also added following the 1970 military memorandum.

In the aftermath of the 1980 coup, the power of the military jurisdiction was increased by enforcing its autonomy. With the 1960 coup d’état and the subsequent intervention of the army in the government, each Constitutional change has strengthened the so-called “guardianship function” of the military judiciary.

The present Constitution broadly defined the scope of the military courts to the point that was unacceptable in a democratic state of law, and in 2010 a Constitutional amendment partially addressed these issues. In spite of the steps taken to bring military tribunals under democratic rule of law standards, military courts were preserved as a separate judicial branch in addition to the civilian judicial jurisdiction. It is rare to find an independent military judiciary and a high court for military judiciary in Western democracies.

This is the case for the Supreme Military Administrative Court. It appears that military prosecution is an important tool for the military and for the system of judicial tutelage. In this system, the army develops “a two-headed structure in the judiciary” as a result of a desire to create its own autonomous domain independent of the civilian administration.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that one of the most important institutions in which FETO is organized is the military judiciary. This presence allowed a group to gain maximum leverage in the tutelary structure. Those who closely followed FETO pointed out that they were very powerful in the military judiciary, and included high level military judges. They were even almost completely controlled by them, and they had members in many important positions, such as the General Staff’s legal adviser. Additionally, the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office made a clear statement regarding the activities of the FETO in an indictment presented prior to the July 15 coup attempt. It should be noted, however, that the question of military jurisdiction cannot be explained solely within the scope of the FETO probe, and cannot be resolved with the expulsion of judges and prosecutors tied with FETO. For this reason, a complete removal of the military judiciary was long overdue.

With the absence of a military judiciary and a removal of two high military courts, the number of members of the Constitutional Court will decrease from 17 to 15. Additionally, because of the change in the government system, the provision that excludes the judicial review of the activities of the President is removed from the Constitution. Finally, judicial review is strengthened by removing the provision that excludes judicial review of the decisions of the Supreme Military Councils concerning the members of the military.

Some of the French say “Britain has a real democracy under the cover of monarchy, while France has a real monarchy under the cover of democracy.” Thus, it’s not the system of government which determines democracy; it can either exist or not exist in both situations. On the other hand, the French president is the most powerful one on the world, beside the periods of cohabitation. This power and influence becomes more prominent with the president’s individual character. For instance, François Mitterrand was regarded as a demigod. Similarly, former French president Valery Giscard D’Estaing expressed the extent of presidential authority during an interview on his experiences. “The office of the French President holds so much power that you become the most powerful man [completely disregarding the possibility of a women president] in France, which you can understand from the looks of women in the whole of France,” he said. Even though D’Estaing’s perception of presidential power can be regarded more in line with a sexual fantasy, it’s definite that the President of the Fifth Republic has prominent authority and power due to a system that was gifted by Charles de Gaulle. This gift is called the semi-presidential system, and it’s definitely more powerful in comparison with a president in a parliamentary system, however, the odd part is that the French president has more power even than the US president.

“The same person not being both the prime minister and the president is absolutely normal; however, it is also definite that the state can’t be dicephalus,” Charles de Gaulle said at the time, making a distinction between the roles of the president and the prime minister, while signifying that the principal rule was of the president. Regardless of the person occupying it, the office of the prime ministry is nothing but an ornament in France. While saying “a president who abides by the constitution is a man of the people and he is elected to shape the destiny of his people,” de Gaulle has expressed the very essence of the president’s authority. The French President appoints the ministers, has the right to abolish the parliament, determines the country’s foreign policy, and can gather all powers unto himself/herself during the times of crisis.

In France, many amendments regarding the authority of the president were implemented since 1958; however, most of these amendments produced an increase in the presidential authority. For instance, with an amendment in 2000 the president’s term was decreased from 7 years to 5 years and it was prohibited for the president to be elected more than twice; however, as the parliamentary elections were to be held right after the presidential elections, the risk of cohabitation was also removed. In this sense, the president became more engaged in the matters, because cohabitation periods were similar to the coalition between politically incompatible parties, causing the president to be isolated.

We can understand Turkey’s both old and current systems by evaluating the power of the French president. For years, the Ministry of National Education described the president as “ceremonial” in the schoolbooks they prepared and compared with the German president. When we became adults and saw the system functioning, we understood that it was more than just ceremonial. The system of government’s name was always the parliamentary system, since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. Separation of powers wasn’t implemented at the time of Atatürk, the republic’s charismatic founder, and his successor İsmet Pasha had also followed this trend.

After the transition from a single-party system to a multiparty system in 1950 and following the military coup which resulted in the hanging of Prime Minister Menderes, the 1961 constitution consolidated the power of the state institutions against the elected officials. Similarly, the 1982 constitution which was prepared by the junta which orchestrated the September 12 1980 coup, immensely increased the power of the president. It was believed that the tutelage existing since the foundation of the republic could be perpetuated by the president who was elected by the parliament and was under the influence of the military. For many years, they were successful in achieving their aims. As was made clear with the coup that resulted in the hanging of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, no ruling political party, besides the one they supported, would be able to fully control the government.

In the first years of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), the Minister of the National Education said “I was powerless in appointing bureaucrats and colleagues in my ministry.” As it required the approval of the president, it was impossible for ministers to appoint their own personnel. President Ahmet Necdet Sezer was stonewalling all appointments. This resulted in either the deadlocking of the system or the appointment of a person favored by the president. With the right to veto, the president was the most engaged head of the executive. In other words, the president of the parliamentary system didn’t have less authority than the French president in a cohabitation period.

For many years, these “safety fuses” which were implemented with the 1961 constitution functioned. The Constitutional Court of Turkey made a decision to renew these safety fuses, a decision which would be deemed scandalous in the years to follow. Hayrünnisa Gül, the wife of the presidential candidate Abdullah Gül, wore hijab. This was unacceptable for both the military and the main opposition party. For them, a first lady wearing hijab couldn’t enter the Presidential Palace. Let alone the first lady, a woman wearing hijab wasn’t allowed into the presidential palace ever before, even as a guest! Meanwhile, the smaller parties in the parliament were pressured by the military to not support Gül, even though, according to the constitution, Gül had received enough votes to become the president. With the statements from the military, and the CHP’s, the main opposition party of the time (and still today), appeal to the Constitutional Court, the court decided that the vote Abdullah Gül received wasn’t adequate. The poll was canceled.

This illegitimate crisis, which aimed to block a politician’s way to Çankaya (the location of the old presidential palace) just because his wife wore hijab, and triggered a new development. Previously, there was a president which the military tutelage employed to “shape the upper ranks of bureaucracy and limit politics” and had consolidated power pushing the limits of the parliamentary system. This time, something new happened: to resolve the crisis, the AK Party amended the constitution in 2007. The amendment was put to a referendum and was passed by a simple majority of the public’s votes. The president was now to be elected by popular vote. This amendment in 2007 added a new layer to the president’s power with the clause of “popular vote” by changing the Article 104 of the 1982 Constitution. It could be said that the long effective system backed by the military tutelage, which tried to keep the government’s reigns out of the hands of parties like AK Party, benefitted the AK Party government at the end, despite all the suffering it has caused.

The referendum in October 2007 transformed Turkey into a country that is governed through “a de facto semi-presidential system.” As the rest of the system wasn’t designed with a presidential system in mind, it created crises which the national will had to resolve every time they emerged. This caused the presidency to become “an executive with ambiguous limitations and authorities that could expand according to the characteristics of a person.” In this form, it’s pretty similar to the French system; however, this doesn’t mean that it has no quirks. Both the president and the prime minister are powerful in this system. Beside the ones that could emerge in a time of “cohabitation,” this system is prone to crises even if both of the executives are of the same party!

Even though the international community didn’t understand what was going on, the July 15 coup attempt, which was orchestrated by a parallel and parasitic structure within the state institutions, aimed to reestablish the status quo by deposing the government. Now the government started to fight against this organization which infiltrated the state, while continuing to fight against PKK and Daesh. A state of emergency was declared in Turkey. The AK Party government is now cooperating with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which came to the fore as a result of the political conjuncture, to pass a constitutional amendment.

This amendment is aiming to change the system of government, instead of a full new social contract. It foresees replacing the existing faux semi-presidential system with a complete presidential system. “It is easy to criticize; however, believe me, what he is doing is really hard. He is driving a car and someone intentionally crashes into his car. But he doesn’t stop. While driving, he is repairing his car and he is changing the tires of the car without stopping,” a Parliament member and friend of President Erdoğan said about the man.  Erdoğan, it should be remembered, was sentenced to prison as soon as he emerged as a prominent politician, and faced party closure trials and memorandums that tried to force his policies in a certain direction.

Despite all the illegitimate attempts aiming to depose him, Erdoğan received 51.79% of the votes in the first round of presidential elections and became the president. The highest percentage of votes to be received by any candidate at the first round in Turkey, and one of the highest in the world. The people will vote on the constitutional amendment this spring while Erdoğan keeps driving the car. If it is accepted, Turkey will be governed with a new system.

Turkish politics has flared up after the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) have jointly proposed a constitutional reform bill. The reform bill seeks to move Turkey’s government system towards presidentialism. It introduces a severe system of checks and balances, or separation of powers by splitting the elections and operation of the executive and the legislative. The rationale behind this political move, as in many occasions allegedly voiced by the AK Party, is to avoid coalition governments and promote democratic politics as opposed to a bureaucracy. The AK Party asserts that coalition governments carry the danger of political instability and jeopardize democratic politics by opening up room for extra-political forces such as the bureaucracy.

Turkey’s main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), takes the lead against the reform bill. The CHP focuses on the end results of the system change and criticizes the amendment by arguing that it will turn Turkish politics into an authoritarian regime. Its main thesis is that it is likely to abolish the parliament and put an end to the republican regime. Yet, a closer look at the content of the reform bill reveals that the parliament will be intact. Nevertheless, it will lose its centrality after the center of gravity in the government system slides towards the executive. So this change does not pose a transgression on the republican order; on the contrary, it may reinforce the republican regime by boosting equality among citizens and giving a central role to the society in politics.

A closer look at the content of the reform bill reveals that the parliament will be intact.

Turkey’s Odyssey to the “Total” State

The Turkish state’s transformation from being a neutral state to a total state took place in a gradual manner. In the long nineteenth century (1808-1923), the monarchy was enervated by the bureaucracy and finally left its place to the republic in 1923. Although Turkey was established as a republic, at least in theory, it was an oligarchy in practice. So the state remained a neutral state for a long time. The bureaucratic oligarchy in Turkey might be divided into two periods. The one-party regime until 1950 and a multi-party parliamentary regime under the bureaucratic tutelage from the 1950s to the 2000s.

The general elections in 1950 were the first open and free elections of the republic. After the elections, the state opened up its doors to the society by allowing a multi-party parliament. The parliament, which used to be populated by merely the CHP, started to host the Democrat Party (DP). The DP attracted the support of the voters in the periphery and held the parliamentary majority with its successive electoral victories until the 1960 military coup.

http://thenewturkey.org/parties-politicians-and-dispositions-towards-the-july-15-coup-attempt/

The 1961 Constitution drafted after the coup redesigned the state-society relationship. It created a parliamentary system under the supervision of the bureaucratic elites. The parliamentary system under the tutelage of the bureaucracy limited the intrusions of society into the state. This was facilitated mainly by dividing the parliament into two chambers. The upper house was populated by the appointed members of the bureaucracy and served to control the lower house which hosted the representatives of the people. This was endorsed by installing more bureaucratic institutions to contain the political sphere.

The 1982 Constitution, on the other hand, redesigned the state-society relationship in a new format. It was drafted after the 1980 military coup, which came after the Kemalist state lost control of the society and that led to bloody clashes between the far-right and the far-left societal groups in the streets. The 1982 Constitution, therefore, gave emphasis to the executive branch in order to strengthen the state vis-à-vis the society. It divided executive power between the president and the cabinet of ministers. The president’s main role was to keep the cabinet and the parliament in line with the state.

After 2002, the AK Party started to dismantle the bureaucratic tutelage. The 2007 constitutional reforms introduced direct election of the president by the people. It thus transformed the presidential office from being the gate keeper of the bureaucracy to being the representative of the society. The president used to be elected by the parliament with the bureaucracy’s tacit permission. This was followed by the 2010 constitutional reforms that further curbed the bureaucratic tutelage by reforming the judiciary, especially limiting the powers of the military courts. The current reform bill seeks to continue this process of democratization by opening up the state to societal forces by moving the regime towards presidentialism.

The Crisis of the “New CHP”

The post-2002 period figures as the acceleration of Turkey’s evolution into a total state. This fundamental transformation in state-society relations has urged political parties to reconsider their political positions and discourses. The most radical change has taken place with the CHP.

Despite the fact that it has never won an open election to form a single-party government, the CHP’s secular-nationalist Kemalist ideology has always been in power. Hence, the CHP has always sided with the state in critical times against the society. It single-handedly ruled the state under a one-party regime during the period of 1923-1950. After 1950, it acted to protect the state from the intrusion of societal forces based in the periphery. Thus, it has strived to contain the parliament and placate democratic politics in order to maintain the “Kemalist” state.

The CHP’s struggle to protect the Kemalist state was carried out on the basis of its secular-nationalist ideology until around 2010.

The CHP’s struggle to protect the Kemalist state was carried out on the basis of its secular-nationalist ideology until around 2010. In 2010, the CHP not only changed its secretary general, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu replaced Deniz Baykal, but also it started to shape its politics around liberal-democratic ideology. With the liberal turn, the so-called New CHP has moved its politics from the protection of the state to the limitation of the state. More specifically, the CHP started to utilize liberal-democratic discourse in order to interrupt Turkey’s evolution to be a total state.

It has sought to form a political bloc with the anti-AK Party societal elements. The sole success of this liberal-democratic politics might be cited as the general elections held on 7 June 2015. For the first time the AK Party could not gain a parliamentary majority to form a single-party government. However, the other three political parties in the parliament also failed to carve out a coalition government. This led to a replaying of elections on 1 November 2015. The elections resulted in a landslide victory for the AK Party. This was the starting point of the crisis of the New CHP.

With the liberal turn, the so-called New CHP has moved its politics from the protection of the state to the limitation of the state.

However, this was followed by the gradual increase of terrorist attacks on Turkish soil. The PKK, the FETO, and Daesh have targeted the country. The most important breaking point was the failed coup attempt perpetrated by the Gülen terror group on 15 June 2016. After 15 June, Turkish society united against terrorism, which was dubbed as “Yenikapı Ruhu,” or the Spirit of Yenikapi, referring to a historic rally against the coup. Yet, this climate of societal unity soon ended and political parties divided into two opposing blocs. The AK Party and the MHP joined forces on the basis of a conservative-nationalist ideology, or so-called “authentic and national” politics (“yerli ve milli” siyaset). The CHP and the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP), on the other hand, formed a tacit political bloc on the basis of a secular-leftist ideology. This has deepened the crisis of the New CHP.

The CHP-HDP bloc struggles to contain the AK Party-MHP’s joint project of reforming the state through empowering the executive by moving the government system towards presidentialism. The former constitutes the “NO” bloc whereas the latter the “YES” bloc on the current constitutional reform. If the “NO” camp loses in the coming referendum (which will probably be held in early April) and the presidential system is institutionalized, Turkey’s gradual evolution to a two-party political system around the division between conservative-nationalist and secular-leftist ideologies, which is currently underway, will continue and consolidate.

The CHP-HDP bloc struggles to contain the AK Party-MHP’s joint project of reforming the state through empowering the executive.

In this picture the CHP may stop swinging between liberal-democracy and secular-left ideologies by downgrading its emphasis on a liberal-democratic discourse, which mainly serves to limit the state and locks the CHP into being merely an opposition party. Thus, it may move secular-left ideology more into the center of its party politics. If that happens, then, it marks the end of the New CHP and perhaps causes a rift in the party’s leadership. Nevertheless, the CHP will have to take a more centrist and positive political discourse by moderating its emphasis on secular-left identity to become an alternative under Turkey’s new political conditions.

Turkish politics is currently polarized by the debate over a constitutional reform bill. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) have jointly proposed a constitutional reform bill to shift Turkey’s parliamentary system towards a presidential system. These two political parties defend the bill by arguing that it will boost Turkey’s democracy. Yet the opposition, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), strongly oppose the bill by claiming that it will lead Turkey into an authoritarian one-man rule.

The opposition contends that the new constitution weakens the parliament to the extent that the presidency amasses all the powers in its hands. This will leave the government without a system of checks and balances and end the rule of law. So it sets forth a regime change, namely the end of Turkey’s republican order. The AK Party and the MHP, in response, propound that the new constitution provides better conditions for reflecting the popular will in the government. So it does not end Turkey’s republican order; on the contrary, it improves the republican order by empowering the society over extra-political forces such as the military and civil bureaucracy.

Indeed, this debate reveals the main fault line in Turkish politics. Turkish politics is primarily determined by the conflict of two historical blocs, the secular middle class and the masses in the periphery. The secular middle class, which constitutes the minority in society, figures that its interests will be best served as long as the parliament holds the central place in politics. The peripheral societal forces, which constitute the majority in society, seek to push the executive to the center in politics. The former believes that the minority will have more say in politics as long as the parliament holds a focal point. The latter thinks that the majority will get its due share in power as long as the executive occupies the central place in the political system.

So we have two competing views of democracy at hand. From a liberal perspective, democracy simply refers to the limitation of power. From a conservative perspective, democracy refers to the rule of the people, namely the concentration of power in people’s hands. While the opposition holds on to the former, namely the negative view of democracy; the AK Party and the MHP sticks to the latter, namely the positive view of democracy.

Parliamentary System under Bureaucratic Oligarchy

To put the matter in a historical perspective, the majority’s choice of positive view of democracy is tenable. The secular middle class organized around the bureaucracy ended the Ottoman monarchic regime in 1922 and established the republic in 1923. This regime change brought about another significant change, it ended the “neutral” state and replaced it with a “total” state. With this transformation of the state, the absolute separation of the state from society came to an end. The state and society, therefore, became enmeshed through political parties. The political parties became the most significant political actors.

Yet, the newly established republic was unable to deal with the disrupting effects of pluralism in society. The state found the solution in strictly separating itself from the society. It kept the parliament at the center of politics but the parliament was restricted to a political party, namely the CHP. The two attempts, one in 1925 and the other in 1930, to install multi-party systems failed.

Hence, the state under the control of the bureaucratic elite formed an oligarchic rule. It single-handedly decided on who should rule and be ruled. The nationalist-secular middle class values drove the line that divided the ruler and the ruled. The political actors with “secular” values were granted the right to rule, whereas the others with “conservative-religious” values were reduced to be ruled. Thus, the state evolved back to a neutral state. The state is off limits to society.

The period of 1950-2002 witnessed a process of controlled opening of the state to society. The bureaucratic oligarchy allowed a multi-party system. The political parties such as the Democrat Party in the 1950s and the Motherland Party (ANAP) in the 1980s dominated the parliament and challenged the hegemony of the bureaucratic elite. The former broke down after the military coup in 1960, whereas the latter collapsed within itself and lost its parliamentary majority after the leadership change.

Besides, from the mid-1960s to the 1980 military coup, the state lost control of the society. The parliament fell short of absorbing pluralism, and this unrestricted ideological polarization unleashed bloody clashes on the street, especially from the mid-1970s till the coup. In the 1990s, with the decline of ANAP, the number of parties in the parliament rose. The parliament absorbed pluralism to an extent, yet it failed to provide a working coalition government to sustain political stability. This weakness of parliament eventually pushed the state to a deep legitimacy crisis in the late 1990s.

Democratization of Parliamentary System

However, after the AK Party came to power in 2002, power has gradually shifted from the secular middle class to the masses in the periphery. This power shift led to two important constitutional reform bills in 2007 and 2010. They were designed to curb the power of the bureaucracy. The constitutional reform in 2007 brought the popular election of the president. The presidential office, which was granted broad powers by the 1982 constitution, used to be elected by the parliament and served as a gate keeper for the bureaucratic oligarchy. The 2010 constitutional reform, on the other hand, reformed the judiciary system by limiting the powers of military courts.

These institutional changes were accompanied by the process of sociological equalization within the society. This change in the distribution of power in society and the loss of power urged the opposition to launch a new political discourse which targeted the AK Party with a negative view of democracy. It constantly criticized the government for establishing an authoritarian rule. In the meantime, the power vacuum in the bureaucracy was filled up by the Gülenists. Starting from 2012, the opposition and the Gülenists began to team up against the AK Party. The Gülenists attempted a coup twice. One through the Judiciary on 17 and 25 December in 2014. The other was through the military on 15 July 2016.

Upon these onslaughts against the government, the AK Party and the MHP agreed to embark on a new constitutional reform on 1 December 2016. The 2016 reform aspires to empower the political infrastructure of the country by shifting the government system towards presidentialism. It mainly seeks to shift the center of gravity towards the executive branch within the political system and strengthen democratic politics versus extra-political forces, namely the bureaucracy.

Presidentialism and the Republic

With presidentialism, the government seeks to strike a delicate balance between two opposing forces in society, pluralism and stability. Thus, on the one hand, it seeks to sustain pluralism in society by keeping the state open to the whole society. On the other hand, it struggles to maintain political stability by steering political parties to the center.

Indeed, this has been the basic motivation of the 1982 Constitution. It installed a multi-party parliament while introducing a 10 percent election threshold. More, it split the executive between the president and the council of ministers. The president, who was planned to be elected from the cadres of bureaucracy, was granted more powers and was supposed to keep the government in line with the bureaucracy.

The current constitutional reform shares the same motivation, emphasizing stability at the face of centrifugal societal forces, but with a caveat. First of all, it unites the executive by abolishing the office of prime minister. Second, it separates the presidential election from the parliamentary elections. Third, it deprives the parliament of its power of a vote of confidence. The parliament keeps its other powers that enable it to check and balance the executive, such as calling for new elections, debating and approving the budget, etc.

Thus, the constitutional reform that seeks to shift the government system towards presidentialism abides by the basic democratic norms. Moreover, it may serve to further the democratization of the country and create a better republic. Indeed, a republican order requires two conditions. First of all, it underlines the fact that rule is supposed to be a political rule, namely there should be no categorical difference between the ruler and the ruled. It is the rule by the people for the people. Secondly, the rule is supposed to be based not on power but rational discussion. Having equality and cultural and economic homogeneity among the members of the political community is a sine qua non of a republican order. These measures constitute its genuine and actual basis.

Furthermore, the current constitutional reform may endorse the process of sociological equalization and promotes cultural and economic homogeneity among the citizens without forsaking societal differences and pluralism. This is because it puts a premium on democratic politics in the face of extra-political forces and pushes political parties to address the whole society in order to get elected. In other words, it rules out coalition governments and shifts the center of gravity in the state towards democratic politics. In short, it gives priority to society’s will.

The draft currently being debated in parliament focuses on the essence of the relationship between the legislative, executive and judicial branches and the primary features of a presidential government system. Called the Presidential System indigenous to Turkey, the draft aims to discuss the design of checks and balances between state branches. In this context, there are two points vital for ensuring majority support in the parliament for the president: the timing of constituency and presidential elections, and the formula for presidential elections. After that, other checks and balances instruments, the decree power of the president, the power to repeat elections for both parliament and president, and the procedure for budget preparation can be discussed.

Concurrent Constituency and Presidential Elections

There are two attitudes towards how the timing of elections effect the majority support of the president in parliament. The first one argues that concurrent constituency and presidential elections could create a problem in terms of checks and balances, and such an election could mean both a majority of parliament and the president could be elected from the same political party.

The other argument is that the possibility of differentiation between the president and parliament would increase if elections were held at different periods. Especially, this possibility could become evident with runoff elections. The consequence of this difference would be a parliament that reflects the political mood at one point, but not at the point when the president is elected, leaving the two bodies out of step with public will.

A considerable part of criticism against the current amendments argues that they leave the legislator with little power against the executive. The supporters of this argument state that concurrent elections for the legislator and executive would lead to a political majority in both branches from the same political side. However, while empirical research based on comparative examples supports this argument, some research also shows that there are experiences which prove this argument wrong.

Even more, as the system is presented in the current amendment, runoff elections in the presidential system could reduce the occurrence of a political or ideological divide in state organs, thanks to coalitions based on popular political figures, especially in the second round of elections. So, the argument that such a system would lead to a single party dominating both the executive and legislative branches, should not be accepted as an absolute given.

Moreover, there is a reasonable argument for justifying the amendment: getting rid of instability created by the current parliamentary system. There are some executives working with a political majority in the legislatures that are from an opposing party. This situation is called a divided government, and leads to a deadlock in the system, especially for tasks that require cooperation between the legislature and the executive. So, concurrent elections should be evaluated in terms of solving this problem.

Mutual Power to Call for New Elections

Another issue of synchronism between the legislature and executive is having the same expiration date for these state organs. If this was the case, it would be possible to prevent the occurrence of an asymmetric balance of power between them, a situation which draws attention to another issue in the proposed amendment: a mutual power to call new elections for the presidency and the legislature.

One of the weaknesses of the presidential system is the possibility of a deadlock because of a strict separation of powers and related with that, a situation where both organs cannot cease the existence of each other. Apparently the amendment aims for the avoidance of the threat of deadlock in the system by granting the power to call new elections to both the president and the parliament.

Clearly, the proposed solution is not a common mechanism in current global examples, where presidents generally have the right to unilaterally call for a new parliament, called a rescission of parliament. Presidential systems in which presidents have the right to unilateral rescission, especially in Latin America states, experience regime crisis frequently, and when presidents are elected from non-political figures, meaning presidents who are not popular, the risk of a crisis increases. In practice, different political ideologies in the branches of power could ease dissolution, and in such systems, there are no constitutional mechanisms to safeguard against this problem. There are not many examples of this power for the president or legislator in presidential systems. Today, the constitutions of some countries in Latin America, such as Peru (article 134), Ecuador (article 148) and Venezuela (article 236) give this power to presidents.

For example, article 12 of the proposed amendment envisions a mutual renewal of elections. According to the draft, the Turkish Parliament (TBMM) can decide on new elections with a 3/5 ratio of total members, and in this case, the election of both branches is done together, and this concurrency is also valid if the decision to hold new elections is made by the president.

On the other hand, if parliament decides to repeat elections in the second term of office, the president can become a candidate one more time. The parliament and the president which will be reelected will be in power until elections occur. Also both the parliament members and the president will be elected for 5 years.

With this proposed amendment, the parliament and president would have the right to call for fresh elections. Thus, presidents do not solely have the power of dissolution of government, but either the legislator or the executive could decide for new elections, and as the amendment proposes, such elections would be for both branches, preventing this decision being made in an arbitrary manner. In effect, whoever decides to call for fresh elections must themselves be confident they will win power again.

Runoff Elections for the President

Part of the amendment, which is not so different from the current system, suggests runoff elections for president. In the first polling, if any candidate cannot win an absolute majority, there will be a second poll in which the two candidates who have the highest votes in the first poll would compete. In this poll, the candidate who has the plurality of votes will be elected as president. This ensures that there will be reconciliation (no matter the vote ratio in the first poll) on the winning candidate. So this situation would strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the president.

Presidential Enactments

According to a survey of current global systems, presidents as the head of the executive have the power to publish regulatory administrative acts to carry out or develop policies. In the United States, for example, the constitution does not give power to decree law directly to the president, but they use this power based on Article 2 of the constitution. These enactments, called “executive orders,” are administrative acts and also very important instruments for building various institutions, organizing or changing bureaucratic processes and executing laws which have already been approved by the legislature.

In the Turkish amendment being currently considered, there is a proposal to give the president power to enact such orders. According to Article 9 of the amendment, which aims to change article 104 of the current constitution, the “president can publish an enactment on executive issues.” In the same article, there are restrictions and rules on this power that preclude any such enactments from effecting:

• Fundamental rights, individual rights and duties stated in the first and second parts and political rights and duties in the fourth part in the second section of constitution.
• Issues which should be regulated exclusively by laws according to constitution.
• Issues which are regulated by laws clearly.
• If the enactments conflict with laws, the provisions of the law are valid.
• If parliament passed a law about an issue which is regulated by enactments, laws replace the enactments.

These restrictions and rules circumscribe the limits of executive orders, and will not violate legislative power, a major criticism of enactments being they could act as a de facto legislative power. Certainly, the same criticisms can be made of the power to publish statutory decrees by the government in the present system, and governments could publish these statutory decrees under empowering laws which are passed by parliament. So, according to the amendment, the president could have this power without empowering law.

However, it should be considered that current presidential systems are based on a strict separation of powers. Even more, the requirement of taking permission from parliament by the presidency as an executive position cannot be compatible with the spirit of a presidential system. At this point, it could be said that the limits of presidential enactments are not clear in the amendment. For instance, in article number 9 in the draft, there is a regulation with the issue. These regulations aim to prevent any damage to fundamental rights and freedoms that could be done by enactments. In the amendment, fundamental and individual rights and duties, as already enumerated in other parts of the constitution, are preserved clearly. On the other hand, presidential enactments could be published dealing with social and economic rights as enumerated in the second part of the third section of the constitution.

Enactments are under the monitor of the Constitutional Court, and that institution is also significant for the checks and balances mechanism. For example, in the possible situation of a conflict between enactments and laws, the Constitutional Court will be the authority for a solution.

Budget Preparation

Finally, the state budget is a way of interaction between the legislative and executive branches in many governmental systems. In presidential systems, this interaction becomes more powerful and important because the strict separation of powers creates a relationship based on mutual checks and balances through the budget.

The proposed Turkish amendment gives the authority to prepare budgets to the president, and this prepared budget needs the approval of parliament, as is the case in many presidential systems in the world today. Thanks to that, the legislator has the right to reject a budget prepared by the president when it deems it necessary. In this situation, the president could prepare a new and temporary budget according to the revaluation rate.

There are major mechanisms for ensuring checks and balances in the new system which are: 1) Concurrent constituency and presidential elections, 2) Concurrent renewal of elections, 3) A time limit for terms of office, 4) Runoff elections for presidents, 5) The power to publish enactments by the president on limited issues and under the supervision of the Constitutional Court to develop and execute policies, 6) And budget preparation as a power of the president but at the same time needing the approval of parliament.

In short, the Turkish Presidential System, which is the center of the proposed amendment, creates differentiations from the current system, not only institutionally but also in terms of the construction of checks and balances. This feature puts limits on the powers of the president and parliament, especially in terms of their relation with each other, and also aims to preserve their spheres of power from intervention by the other.

Globalization followed the secularization process, yet both parties, especially Europe, did not experience any substantial shift in their views about each other. The contrary would have been expected from a world which has been encompassed by liberal capitalism, being shaped by consumer societies and becoming uniform in fields ranging from architecture to lifestyle for the last three decades. However, it didn’t happen. Maybe it’s for the better, as diversity brings with it a cultural richness.The subconscious emerged to the conscious when Paris dropped the act in the mid-2000s and spoke plainly. While this process was named and formed differently among different EU member countries, it meant the same thing: Turkey should never become a full member, yet it shouldn’t stray too far from EU. In other words, if Turkey was a vessel, it had to anchor itself at the EU port.

Turkey should never become a full member, yet it shouldn’t stray too far from EU. In other words, if Turkey was a vessel, it had to anchor itself at the EU port.

Despite these facts, it is obvious that Turkey had been passionate, strenuous, and patient about achieving full membership, until very recently. Just like the Westernization efforts and policies of the Ottomans in their last two centuries, the accession to the EU became somewhat a state policy for Turkey. Even though Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had implemented laws which were borrowed from France, Switzerland and Italy, his Kemalist followers and their party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), resisted the necessary regulations for full membership for decades. The supporters of the Kemalist ideology, who didn’t have any issue with complying with Europe’s legal system in 1930s, came up with many “Turkish exceptions” until the turn of the millennium, just to conserve some extra acquis. Seemingly contradictory, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), even though it represented conservative Muslims, was more enthusiastic about becoming a full member of the EU, as for both the party administration and their voter base, EU membership was synonymous with the hope of having a more democratic country.

40 years after applying to the European Economic Community, Turkey finally gained the status of candidate country to EU in 1999. In a country where the Necmettin Erbakan government was recently deposed by the military and there was an economic crisis, the reforms which started with the Bülent Ecevit government in order to comply with the Copenhagen criteria were accelerated during the AK Party rule. Erdoğan wanted to exact these changes; not because of pressure from the IMF, the US, EU or the international community, but out of sincerity. Erdoğan was incarcerated for 4 months due to a poem he read and, thus, couldn’t become an MP. When he was invited to the Elysee Palace by French President Jacques Chirac as the chair of the ruling party, Erdoğan had expressed his thoughts and aims clearly. Catherine Colonna, the presidential spokesperson at the time who later became the EU Minister of the socialist government, didn’t even try to hide her bewilderment: “This is the first time I see such a Turkish politician. He told Chirac that he wanted to provide all democratic and human rights to the Turkish people, just like France did; however, he added that if we wouldn’t support him in EU accession, he would create an Ankara criteria and move on, leaving the Copenhagen criteria aside.” Then, Erdoğan was elected as an MP, became the Prime Minister and accelerated all reforms to comply with the Copenhagen criteria, along with abolishing the death penalty.

The Justice and Development Party (AK Party), even though it represented conservative Muslims, was more enthusiastic about becoming a full member of the EU.

After heated discussions, the EU decided to start membership negotiations with Turkey in December 2005. However, to Turkey’s surprise, the EU’s policies and political discourse shifted simultaneously with this decision. Those who were once stating that there weren’t any obstacles for a democratic Turkey which respected human rights, adopted a contrarian position. Even France, which supported Turkey during the country’s far less democratic years, implemented legislation which allowed countries to become an EU member after a referendum. After Chirac, a group of MPs from Nicolas Sarkozy’s party pushed a constitutional reform at the National Assembly which targeted Turkey’s membership. The article was like a general knowledge quiz: “For admitting countries which have a population more than the 5% of Europe into membership a referendum is a must.” Without mentioning its name, Turkey was almost included into the French Constitution! The Senate rejected the draft. If it weren’t so, it would have been a ridiculous situation for France. However, even though the admittance of new countries to the EU is not decided by referendum according to the French constitution, during his visit to Turkey in 2014, President François Hollande reiterated that the probable membership of Turkey would be put to the people; thus, a referendum would be held.

Of course, all of these discussions had a negative effect on both Ankara and the Turkish public. The number of people believing the EU will never admit Turkey as a member increases with each new development, and they wouldn’t be wrong to think so. Then, there was an unthinkable development in 2009, especially for the ones who knew the Turkey of the 1990s. Erdoğan stepped forward with the wide support of the public to achieve social peace by resolving one of the most important issues in the history of the republic. Despite the opposition from the CHP and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), along with other efforts to thwart Erdogan both from within and outside of the country, the AK Party started to negotiate with the PKK to resolve the Kurdish Problem which had already cost the lives of 40,000 people. This initiative was expected to resonate with the EU, even though it wasn’t done for the sake of full membership. It didn’t happen. Regardless, Erdoğan continued to tear down taboos in Turkey.

Without mentioning its name, Turkey was almost included into the French Constitution!

He extended his condolences for the 1915 events, unlike previous Turkish prime ministers who claimed that Turks didn’t kill any Armenians, but that they themselves were instead slaughtered by Armenians. Moreover, Erdoğan called for the formation of an international commission which would investigate the events that took place in 1915, dubbed as a “genocide” in Turkey perpetrated by a powerful majority, and he stated that he would respect the decision of this commission. Europe chose to resist Turkey’s membership more fiercely despite the unexpected developments. France disallowed the opening of five chapters that needed to be addressed for the membership process, while eight more chapters weren’t opened due to the Additional Protocol and another six were blocked by the Greek Cypriot Administration. Even though some of these chapters were opened later, only the Science and Research chapter, out of a total of 35 chapters, was resolved, or closed temporarily. In addition, leaving the 14 chapters that were blocked by EU members aside, none of the chapters which were opened after the Science and Research chapter were ever closed, not even temporarily.

Looking at the tempo of the 53 years old relationship, it is impossible to give even an approximate date for Turkey’s membership. Moreover, maybe the EU will cease to exist in an uncertain future. Looking at Brexit and now the discussions in Italy, it is not very possible to think positively about the EU’s future. Besides the extreme right-wing Front National in France being openly against the EU, there is an increasing animosity towards globalization and the bureaucrats in Brussels by the whole political spectrum on the eve of presidential elections in EU co-founder France. The EU has truly become the “tête de turc”, the cause of all problems, in Europe!

If the issue is about money and finance, it should be stressed that Turkey is not wealthier than Europe, yet Turks are sharing their meals with Syrians. They didn’t lose their jobs because of Syrians.

Actually, this process was apparent for a time. Starting with European Coal and Steel Community and followed by the EEC and the EU, this union was a structure which united economies. When the time had come to embark on a project which would unite Europeans, it was all about “common values”. This would be possible through the preparation of a European constitution which based itself on democracy, individual freedoms and human rights. However, this constitution was rejected in EU co-founder France and then in Netherlands by referendum, making it only a dream. The Lisbon Agreement, right from the beginning is inadequate in achieving this unity.

Regarding the current situation, the European Parliament evaluated the developments in Turkey from its own perspective and decided to suspend the negotiations. However, this advisory decision was disregarded by the EU. Why? Do the bureaucrats of Brussels and European governments have a soft spot for Turkey, unlike the European Parliament? Unfortunately, the difference in positions is due to the migration agreement which was signed between Turkey and Brussels. The EU, the champion of human rights, is hesitant because Turkey might abolish the agreement and open the floodgates for 2 million Syrians, comprised of Yazidis, Alevis, Sunnis, Kurds, Arabs and Turkmens. If the issue is about money and finance, it should be stressed that Turkey is not wealthier than Europe, yet Turks are sharing their meals with Syrians. They didn’t lose their jobs because of Syrians.

At the current point, the bridge between Brussels and Ankara isn’t functioning well for both sides, as it did before; because a lot of water has really passed under the bridge. It’s not a giving that Erdoğan will do it, but if he lets the Turkish people decide on EU membership, even the famous “anchor” won’t survive, let alone the aim to become a member.

Western critiques and objections from certain domestic circles are doomed to be ineffective against the current hardening security policy and widespread domestic support for such policies. In order to trace this situation, one needs to go back to the PKK’s turn to violence in the Summer of 2015.This most recent round of the terrorism-counterterrorism cycle started as the PKK announced the end of its 16 month-long ceasefire on 11 July 2015, citing the construction of new dams and military outposts in southeast Turkey as its reason. A few days after the announcement, Bese Hozat, co-chair of the KCK (which is the umbrella term that PKK calls itself now) declared “a people’s revolutionary war” on July 15th, and was soon joined by his co-chair Cemil Bayık. On July 19th, Bayık ordered the PKK mass base in southeastern Turkey to arm themselves, erect barricades, and dig tunnels and ditches for the revolutionary war.

The battle started as the PKK murdered two policemen while they were sleeping in their homes in Ceylanpınar, Şanlıurfa on July 22nd. What followed was the Turkish state’s restarting of military and police operations against the PKK. As the PKK put its urban warfare in action in towns under the rule of HDP mayors, municipal vehicles were used by the PKK to dig trenches in roads and plant bombs. As a reaction to the PKK’s urban warfare (which was a real war by the way, as the PKK started it with mines, bombs, and RPGs, and Turkey responded first with police teams and then with military operations including the use of tanks), Turkish security forces declared curfews in combat zones and detained HDP mayors in those towns. This marked the starting point of the HDP detentions.

What followed was the replacement of those mayors with centrally appointed trustees (kayyum) and the spread of these replacements to many other HDP municipalities. As a reaction to the trustee appointments, the PKK declared that they will target trustees as well as the AK Party’s local politicians in the region. And it did. The PKK murdered Naci Adıyaman, the youth branch district chairman of the AK Party in Şırnak, and Ahmet Budak, the AK Party’s Hakkari candidate in the November 2015 parliamentary elections. The PKK continued its attacks against the AK Party politicians in October 2016 with three murders: Aydın Muştu, AK Party’s Van, Özalp district deputy vice chairman, Deryan Aktert, AK Party’s Diyarbakır, Dicle district chairman, and Mehmet Şefik Doğu, the assembly member appointed by the trustee at Erciş Municipality. Besides those murders, the PKK has also detonated bombs in AK Party headquarters and trustee appointed municipal buildings in the region.

Along with the ongoing military operations against the PKK, the HDP co-leaders Selahattin Demirtaş, Figen Yüksekdağ and nine other parliamentary deputies were arrested as another stage of Turkey’s war on terror.

Once we see this flow of events starting from last summer in one piece, then what comes next is to analyze the reasoning of the related actors: Why did the PKK murder AK Party politicians, and why were the HDP mayors and MPs arrested?

The PKK’s reasoning is simple as usual. They started a “revolutionary urban warfare” that was supposed to defeat Turkey, “liberate” those towns from Turkey and establish its de facto autonomy in the region. As the PKK failed to take HDP-ruled municipalities directly under its sole control, it even lost its indirect rule in those towns after the detentions of HDP mayors and trustee appointments. The only way for the PKK to claim that it is still controlling the region was to kill unarmed AK Party politicians, which it did. The message was, “if my politicians cannot rule, yours cannot either!” Nevertheless, what the PKK fails to see is the AK Party government has new priorities now. The PKK’s decision to return to its terror attacks after the so-called Reconciliation Process (Çözüm Süreci) closed the negotiation door for an unforeseeable time. And there is now no domestic or international factor that can change the AK Party’s decision to restart a security-first oriented approach to the problem.

The AK Party already had some internal dissent in its mass base against negotiating with the PKK during the Reconciliation Process. And now there seems to be no single trace of pressure from the party’s popular base to return to the negotiations after the PKK reinitiated violence. The MHP’s popular base almost entirely, and the CHP’s popular base in a significant degree, seem to embrace the military struggle against the PKK’s terror. With such a composition, the AK Party’s current counter-terrorism struggle has a wide range of support in society according to the leading survey companies in Turkey such as GENAR, ANDY-AR and A&G. The negotiations with the PKK ended with its turn to violence. The PKK took the HDP’s electoral success as direct support for itself and hijacked the HDP votes with its urban warfare in places where HDP rules. The overwhelming idea in society is that the PKK is using the HDP for recruitment, propaganda and logistical support purposes, and it even uses HDP-ruled municipalities as its safe havens. The government’s solution to this problem now seems to be breaking this logistical link between the HDP and PKK by arresting the HDP mayors in those municipalities as well as the HDP’s leadership with no significant domestic objection to that in the AK Party’s, MHP’s, and, to some extent even CHP’s mass bases.

While there is no strong domestic objection to the detainment of the HDP politicians, international pressure seems to be ineffective as well. Especially after Western reactions to the coup attempt on 15 July, 2016 and the American military support for the PKK’s partner organization PYD in Syria, on top of the never-ending accession process with the EU, both the EU and the United States lost their leverage on Turkey. Hence, the American and European critiques will not change the AK Party government’s decision to fight against the PKK on all fronts, including both its military and political wings. There seems to be no reason for AK Party politicians to change their mind.

The loud objections from the US and EU fall on deaf ears in Turkey, as the AK Party no longer considers them credible partners. Turkey’s current security-first orientation and the jailing of HDP politicians may not end the PKK terror for once and for all, but with the given parameters, there seems to be no factor to persuade the government to change its approach towards the PKK and the HDP.

Literally every digital social media platform from end-to-end encryption to FaceTime communication tools were put to use both by the officers in the attempted coup, by the civilians and the political forces. The latter included the President himself, who not only tweeted his anti-coup message to mobilize his eight million followers to resist the putschists but also used a popular news channel and connected through FaceTime video chat app on the iPhone, calling on all the people to stage anti-coup protests by taking to the streets and guarding critical check-points including the bridges and airports. Seeing the President alive and well through the improvised video link assured the people of the authenticity and urgency of the call. The people’s power and many Internet platforms not only stopped the participating soldiers but also deterred many other soldiers waiting their turn at the barracks. Most of the social forces posted statements on Twitter, including many MPs and political parties.Those mainstream TV channels that managed to stay on air were quick to side and sync with the digital social media platforms helping to mobilize and inform the public. Soon after the people took to the streets to stop the coup attempt, they did crush the coup. While the military tried to take control of the state-run TRT – as it had done in the previous military coups – this soon proved futile because other private mass communication channels propitiously reported about the perplexing situation, conveyed the unanimous anti-coup message of the political class and even urged the people to march in the streets to stop the coup. This has showcased the immense mobilizing role of new communication technologies such as digital mass media in crushing the attempted military coup.Make no mistake: this is not an ode to the enfolding romantic tale of social media’s liberation power. Rather it is to understand the powerful sources of massive civilian uprising against the cruel bombings and brutal attacks by the military. Digital social media disseminated the overall anti-coup attitude of the activists as well as the lay people. Indeed, such a power proved critically instrumental in mobilizing the people; showing the power of the small street activism that has eventually triggered the ongoing mass protests. For example, the feeds following hashtags such as #DarbeyeHayır (No to the Coup) and #MilletçeMeydanlardayız (The whole nation is at the maidans) were already trending for hours.

According to the data provided by Somera, the number of tweets increased by 223 percent and a total of 34.818.329 interactions was shared, reaching to a staggering of 15 million people. After 10:00 PM on July 15th, the buzz regarding the attempt started to rise, as President Erdoğan did a FaceTime on CNN Turk the first peak occurred. The next morning, the attempt failed and the second peak happened.

[The graphical analysis is produced by Somera for SETA]

As soon as the tanks blocked the roads, including the famous Bosporus bridge in Istanbul, amidst gunshots and flying F16’s, the citizens, who just happened to be there as they were returning home after work, started live-streaming through the social media platforms such as Facebook or Twitter. It is important to emphasize that the most shocking as well as mobilizing were the horrific images of tanks ruthlessly running over the civilians as well as appalling images of F-16’s bombing the Turkish Parliament building.

To be sure, the President’s video-chat and above-mentioned image sharing proved much more effective than other uses. Fearing that a possible military coup would ruin the lives and upend the country’s future prospects they tuned in to listen to the Prime Minister, Binali Yıldırım, who connected to the NTV news TV channel through a phone call confirming what was feared most, that this was indeed a coup attempt and that the public did not know the whereabouts of the PM. It was, however, the social media feeds that later carried the night with live-stream and critical information on the worsening of the situation. From the beginning of the coup attempt until 16 July midnight, there were approximately 180 tweets posted from the official Twitter account of the Prime Ministry itself. Clearly those tweets aimed to mobilize the people. The Presidency posted 35 tweets, whereas the main opposition party CHP’s official page posted 7 tweets and MHP 24 tweets.

While all the TV channels were importantly unified against the coup attempt and strongly condemned it, they were clearly out powered by the power of images and narratives presented live-stream at the social media platforms across the country. Only few minutes before the midnight, a couple of soldiers managed to enter in the offices of TRT where at gun-point they forced the anchor, Tijen Karas, to read the statement written by the junta which claimed that the government had been overthrown and that the people should return home leaving the streets to the tanks and officers for their safety.

In order to maintain the momentum of protests the day after the military coup attempt, the Internet communication platforms continued to play vital roles in convincing the people to stay at the city centers during the following nights to deter any remnants of the putschists to stage another coup. One can only hope that the anti-coup protests and the use of digital and visual media would be an opportunity for understanding the necessity of responsible use of open Internet. The latter heralds a transforming social space beyond the traditional political practice by promising to fill the destructive gap within those highly connected yet disenfranchised social forces. It may also help to stop the existential polarization in a society otherwise driven by social and political divisions.

For an in-depth analysis about the role of all counter-coup forces please see Turkey’s failed military coup Turkey’s Stillborn Junta Coup Attempt: Process, Responses And Prospects.

On the other hand, legislative immunity aims to protect a deputy from arbitrary and unfounded inquiries. Article 83 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey provides that members of the Assembly shall not be liable for any criminal action unless the Assembly decides otherwise. The execution of a criminal sentence imposed on a parliamentary member either before or after his/her election shall be suspended until s/he ceases to be a member. This is the kind of immunity which was subjected to an amendment in Turkey today.

The kind of immunity that protects a legislator from criminal proceedings, as in Turkey, does not exist in Anglo-Saxon countries, such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Canada.

There are two root causes as to why the issue has always been revisited and discussed. One reason is that immunities are broadly protected by the Constitution against criminal proceedings; and the other is that legal requests for the removal of immunities are not brought to the agenda and not processed for further action at the Assembly.

The guarantee of immunity granted to the legislators in Turkey seems to have been more extensive compared to the Western democracies. The kind of immunity that protects a legislator from criminal proceedings, as in Turkey, does not exist in Anglo-Saxon countries, such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Canada. The immunity is applicable not in criminal actions but in private/civil law in these countries.

A member of the parliament who is alleged to have committed an offence in connection with a lawsuit cannot be arrested or detained. In other words, a deputy cannot be arrested or detained if s/he fails to honor a debt in a civil lawsuit. However, the immunity in these countries is practically meaningless because being indebted is no longer a reason for an arrest.

In several countries of Continental Europe, such as Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Denmark, legislators enjoy a similar parliamentary immunity to their counterparts in Turkey; and such immunity is applicable in criminal actions. Yet, the majority of the countries above have remarkably narrowed parliamentary immunities in conjunction with the consolidation of the principle of rule of law and of public trust in Judiciary.

A wide range of exemptions on immunities have been introduced. Legislators may be detained in flagrante delicto. In Turkey, however, the exemption is applied only if a lawmaker is caught in the act of committing a crime punishable by a heavy penalty. Besides, it is also seen, in general, that parliamentarians can be judged unless immunity protects one against any kind of criminal proceedings and unless measures that necessitate deprivation of liberty, such as arrest or custody, are applied.

There were even legislatures who carried weapons or PKK militants in their vehicles. An HDP parliamentary member paid a condolence visit to the family of the suicide bomber behind the Ankara attack that claimed 37 lives.

In short, the scope of immunity in European countries is narrower than that of Turkey. In addition to such an extensive guarantee of privilege the second point, that has led to flare ups on the issue, is the scarcity of files brought on the agenda and put in process against legislators, although in each legislative term hundreds are prepared with requests to suspend immunities of lawmakers in the Assembly.

This is in contradiction with the purpose of immunity which is to protect legislators against arrests, arbitrary and unfounded inquiries – particularly to those open to provocation of the Executive power. In fact the Legislative body itself is protected here, rather than legislators, and the reason for such protection is to ensure the proper operation of the legislative body.

Notwithstanding, hundreds of files with requests to revoke immunities of some legislators are not even on Parliament’s agenda and that leads to criticisms in the public domain that immunities go beyond the protection of legislative functions, and therefore of public interest, and provide deputies the “privilege of crime”. Based upon similar criticisms, amendments to narrow immunities were made twice (in 1999 and 2001), but rejected in Parliament.

In July 2015, the PKK terrorist organization resumed terror attacks and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) representatives at the Assembly organized events to effectively support the PKK, called for violence and issued statements in favor of terror. There were even legislatures who carried weapons or PKK militants in their vehicles. An HDP parliamentary member paid a condolence visit to the family of the suicide bomber behind the Ankara attack that claimed 37 lives. The visit, in particular, ignited public reaction. Due to this incident and similar others, hundreds of files prepared by prosecutors and courts were sent to Parliament. Public reactions and relevant dossiers against legislators have fueled debates again for lifting parliamentary immunities.

The AK Party submitted a motion to Parliament for a constitutional amendment. However, the proposal seeks a temporary clause on the pending immunity dossiers, not an amendment or the removing the Article 83. A temporary clause in the Constitution would allow revoking of immunities of lawmakers whose dossiers are already in Parliament so that they can be investigated and judged.

There are two reasons behind the AK Party’s motion for a temporary clause on the existing immunity files rather than an amendment to the Constitution. The first is that when the issue of immunity is revisited, the opposition asks for the removal of all immunities. In fact, the removal of the HDP lawmakers’ immunity is open to discussion; many, including HDP deputies, ask for lifting of all privileges not of the immunities of a certain party or a legislator. In addition, a particular criticism being voiced is that the AK Party legislators have plenty of immunity dossiers and they are benefitting from the current immunity from prosecution. With the AK Party’s motion, a solution is proposed to eliminate these criticisms and public reactions against the HDP deputies in Parliament.

The second is that examination of each and every immunity dossier would take months due to the procedures stipulated in the Parliamentary Bylaws. The AK Party wishes the elimination of immunities of all the lawmakers, not only those of HDP.

The AK Party has opted for a collective regulation to remove the immunities of not just the above HDP members but of about 130 lawmakers from all parties.

Nonetheless, applying the method stated in the Constitution and the Parliament Bylaws will keep the Assembly busy for a long time and not allow it to perform any other tasks. In fact, this is emphasized in the reasoning of the proposal and it is calculated that it will take eight months for the Parliament to process all files if the existing method is applied.

In addition to their concerns about possible reactions against those who may be incriminated, the Government and the AK Party seem sensitive to judicial procedures to which the legislators whose immunities are revoked may be subjected. It is considered that the public at large, electors, and supporters of such legislators will react against custody, arrest or ill-treatment of their representatives in question.

The negativities that occurred during the elimination of the Democracy Party (DEP) lawmakers’ immunities in 1994 are still lingering in memories. On the same page, several concerns are expressed that the removal of immunities granted to HDP legislators alone will cause similar reactions and an emotional break-up, narrow the sphere of politics, and create an excuse for violence.

Due to this reason, the AK Party has proposed the regulation for all of the immunity dossiers in the queue at the Assembly not only for those of the HDP. Besides, the statements released by the AK Party signal that the ruling party wishes to avoid the repetition of the outbursts in 1994 and aims for the legislators to stand trial without arrest.

The AK Party’s proposal will be discussed in Parliamentary Constitutional Commission in the coming weeks, and will be promptly transferred to the General Assembly. Since the AK Party suffers from the absence of a majority to pass this amendment, it sought the support of the opposition parties. Although the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) announced their support for the motion, some CHP deputies have said, since day one, that they will not back the proposal.

A full support is expected by MHP in the voting, but a substantial number of CHP deputies will say “no” to the proposal. Still, it is likely that Parliament will pass the proposal of the AK Party. The statements of HDP leaders reveal that they would resist the adjudications. Thus, the trials of HDP legislators who may lose their parliamentary immunities will pre-occupy the agenda in the upcoming months.

Turkey has been the target of intensive terror attacks recently. The Reconciliation Process ended with the PKK attacks. Hundreds of security forces along with some civilians have lost their lives during this period of the conflict. In the meantime, actions and statements by the HDP legislators have caused public uproar and reactions. The AK Party has opted for a collective regulation to remove the immunities of not just the above HDP members but of about 130 lawmakers from all parties, whose dossiers are awaiting process at the Assembly. The AK Party’s motion for a temporary constitutional amendment is an attempt to find public satisfaction without narrowing the sphere of politics.