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n a display of solidarity in genocide, evangelical Christians from around the world are flocking to Israel to volunteer and support the ongoing war effort against Hamas. Since the conflict erupted five months ago, these volunteers have been offering their assistance in various capacities, underscoring their staunch support for Israel.

Shawn Landis, an evangelical Christian hailing from Pennsylvania, exemplifies this commitment. Upon learning about the Oct. 7 Hamas attack on southern Israel, Landis resolved to travel to Israel and lend his support as soon as conditions permitted. Now, five months later, he finds himself in a Tel Aviv kitchen, “chopping vegetables to prepare meals for Israeli soldiers.”

The influx of evangelical volunteers underscores their unwavering support for Israel, rooted in their deeply held religious beliefs. Many evangelicals view Israel as central to an end-times prophecy that heralds the return of the Christian Messiah. They draw inspiration from Old Testament writings that designate Jews as “God’s chosen people” and Israel as their “rightful homeland.”

Religious “voluntourism” to Israel

This surge in volunteerism is part of a broader trend of religious “voluntourism” to Israel. Organized trips, which include volunteering aspects connected to the war in Gaza, have seen a significant uptick in participation. Israel’s Tourism Ministry estimates that between one-third to half of the approximately 3,000 daily visitors in March are part of faith-based volunteer trips, a stark increase compared to pre-war levels.

The evangelical community’s support for Israel extends beyond individual efforts, with prominent organizations rallying behind the cause. Christians United for Israel (CUFI), led by evangelical pastor John Hagee, has raised over $3 million to aid Israeli first responders, healthcare workers, and survivors of the Oct. 7 attack.

Pouring volunteers

Additionally, the International Christian Embassy Jerusalem (ICEJ) has organized several volunteer trips, expecting to bring even more participants in the coming months.

Despite logistical challenges posed by the conflict, including suspended flights and disrupted tourism, evangelical volunteers remain undeterred. Their presence serves not only to provide tangible assistance but also to “uplift the morale of Israeli citizens amidst the ongoing strife.”

As the war in Gaza enters its sixth month, international pressure mounts for Israel to alleviate the suffering of civilians, including allowing more aid into the region. Meanwhile, evangelical volunteers continue to pour into Israel, embodying their steadfast support for Tel Aviv and its people as a genocide takes place in Gaza.

Source: The Associated Press

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n July 28, 2023, during a meeting with African leaders in St. Petersburg in Russia, a peculiar authority gave a speech: Russian Patriarch Kirill voiced his desire to expand Russian Orthodox churches in Africa.

Political expansion of the Russian Orthodox Church in Africa

Over the past two years, the Russian Orthodox Church has been expanding in Africa. It has opened more than 200 parishes in 25 African countries even though traditional Orthodox jurisdiction of Africa belongs to the Patriarchy of Alexandria, Egypt.

Patriarch Kirill claims that the Russian Orthodox Church is obliged to open new churches for the faithful in Africa as he asserts that the Patriarchate of Alexandria has lost its legitimacy through political maneuvers. Kirill’s assertion is driven by Alexandria’s decision to recognize the independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

Patriarch Theodore II of Alexandria has also issued a statement against Patriarch Kirill. He pointed out that Kirill was dividing believers through harsh political statements and that he has no right to “mislead Christ’s flock over political issues.”

Spiritual guidance amongst political divisions

The clash between Kirill and Theodore II is deeply rooted in the events of the recent past. The Kyiv Patriarchate separated from Moscow in 2019 due to political reasons—a move that was received with anger in Moscow. The Russian Church excommunicated the Ukrainian clergymen as schismatics. In the same year, Patriarch Theodore II recognized the Kyiv Patriarchate and was a leading actor in the support of Ukraine’s spiritual independence. Thus, he drew the attention of Patriarch Kirill.

The scope of Theodore II’s authority is of particular importance to Kirill as the former holds the title of the “Pope and Patriarch of the Great City of Alexandria, Libya, Pentapolis, Ethiopia, All Egypt and All Africa.” With more than one million Eastern Orthodox believers in the African continent, Theodore’s spiritual authority stretches from Niger to South Africa, while his jurisdiction attracts conflict and is vulnerable to political manipulations.

Meanwhile, Patriarch Kirill believes that increasing his influence is only possible through intervening in Theodore II’s jurisdiction. He publicly denounces the Patriarchate of Alexandria as corrupt and degenerated, and claims that the Patriarchate of Alexandria deprives Africans of spiritual guidance. In so doing, he legitimizes the Russian Orthodox Church providing them with spiritual guidance. Not confining this guidance under religious terms, Patriarch Kirill seeks to guide Russo-African relations through the Church as well.

Russian aid through religious influence

The Central African Republic can serve as an example of the Moscow Patriarchate’s approach to Africa. In the Central African Republic, a senior cleric switched allegiance from Alexandria to Moscow and the Kremlin generously rewarded this with new schools and infrastructure. Dissatisfied with the West and happy to receive Russian aid, the Central African Republic established a security cooperation with Russian private military companies, i.e., mercenary troops.

Patriarch Theodore II’s worries are political: he fears that the Russian influence in the Central African Republic could spread to other countries with Orthodox believers. The Central African Republic ended up with Russia interfering in its bureaucracy, media, economy, and politics.

Orthodoxy is serving as a tool for Russia to pursue influence in Africa, confirming the fact that religion can still serve as an instrument for soft power. Nevertheless, Russia still must beat the Alexandrian Church if it wants to expand its sphere of influence in Africa.

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n the heart of Kenya’s Shakahola Forest, a shocking discovery has unearthed a haunting story of tragedy and fanaticism. Authorities have uncovered the dark secrets of an alleged starvation cult following a tip-off from a concerned father. In the depths of the forest, more than 400 bodies were found, including innocent children. These victims fell prey to a doomsday cult led by the charismatic televangelist Pastor Paul Nthenge Mackenzie, head of the Good News International Church. The cult preached a disastrous doctrine that promised salvation through self-starvation. As the authorities delved deeper into the cult’s activities, the sinister nature of its their beliefs became evident.

This nightmarish saga dates back to the early 2000s when Pastor Mackenzie, a former taxi driver, founded the cult. Initially attracting followers with fiery sermons, Mackenzie’s messages took a dark turn over time, leading to the rapid radicalization of his followers. By 2010, his teachings focused on “doomsday” prophecies, and he began manipulating his followers for financial gain.

Mackenzie preached that his followers had to give up their earthly possessions to truly follow “the cause”. He built a spiritual camp for his loyal followers in the remote area of Shakahola Forest. He instructed them to abandon education, shun medical care, and refuse vaccinations, branding doctors as worshippers of another god. They were ordered to give up conventional food, dismissing it as “worldly food”, and told to destroy their government documents, including identity cards and birth certificates.

Eyewitness accounts reveal that the cult leader urged parents to strangle their starving children. Shockingly, Mackenzie had previously been arrested for various child deaths in 2017, 2019, and 2023, but was released on bail. When the events of the Shakahola cult came to light, President William Ruto remarked that Mackenzie’s amounted to terrorism and that he belonged in prison.

Criminal cults replicate similar patterns

However, this is not an isolated case. Throughout history, the world has witnessed similar cults with disastrous endings, such as Jonestown, the Rajneesh Movement, and the Ten Commandments of God Movement.

Experts, including Joe Navarro, a veteran of the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Program, suggest that cult leaders are often pathologically narcissistic. They have an exaggerated belief in their own importance, claim to have all the answers, and demand unwavering loyalty. These cults erode individual autonomy and critical thinking, leading members to follow the leader’s orders without question, sometimes leading to their own destruction or violent actions.

The dangers posed by such cults go beyond individual tragedies with unquestioning obedience to authority raising national and international security issues. Historical examples, such as Charles Manson’s cult and the Rajneesh Movement’s armed conflict with local authorities, illustrate the potential for violence and conflict arising from these groups.

The Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments of God (MRTCG) in Uganda is a harrowing example of how such groups can become a serious national and international security threat. In March 2000, the cult’s leaders (Joseph Kibweteere, Joseph Kasapurari, John Kamagara, Dominic Kataribabo, and Credonia Mwerinde) prophesied the end of the world, but when the predicted doomsday did not materialize, chaos broke out within the cult.

On March 17, 2000, more than 530 members, including women and children, were found dead in the cult’s Kanungu commune. The cult leaders had locked their followers in the communal church building and committed mass murder by setting fire to the building.

Cults exploit people’s vulnerabilities

Charismatic and authoritarian cult leaders, such as those involved in the cases above, possess an aura that attracts individuals to their cause. They prey on the vulnerability of their followers, promising salvation, enlightenment, or a vision of the apocalypse that resonates with their deepest fears and desires.

These cults often display hostility towards the outside world, branding it as corrupt or evil. This hostility has translated into conflict and violence, as seen in the Jonestown Massacre and the actions of the Rajneesh Movement.

Moreover, the international reach of cults such as the Rajneesh Movement and Aum Shinrikyo (a Japanese new religious movement and doomsday cult) poses a challenge to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. These cults set up operations in several countries and attract followers from different backgrounds. Their global presence allows them to manipulate vulnerable individuals from various regions, causing damage that transcends national borders. 

Social media and cults

The Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo established international centers in various countries, including Russia, the United States, Germany, and others. Similarly, around 1981, the leaders of the Rajneeshee movement (Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh and Ma Anand Sheela) were threatened with punitive action by the Indian authorities. In response, they decided to leave India. They set up a new religious settlement in the United States.

Today cult leaders can exploit communication technologies better, particularly social media and online platforms, to reach potential followers worldwide. This enables them to internationalize their movements and recruit and radicalize individuals across continents. In extreme cases where cults go haywire, they may be involved in acts of terrorism or violence that cross national borders. The breakdown of social norms and governance within these cult communities creates a hotbed for criminal activity and human rights abuses, affecting the international community as a whole.

The cautionary tale of the starvation cult in Kenya’s Shakahola Forest and its predecessors highlight the dangerous appeal of charismatic cult leaders and the tragic consequences of their manipulative doctrines. The grim impact of this cult, which claimed hundreds of lives, including innocent children, serves as a reminder of the dangers posed by such fanatical groups.

From the War on Terror to the far-right conspiracies, Islamophobia manifests in various forms. In today’s world, systemic Islamophobia continues to cast a long and dark shadow over the lives of Muslims across continents. Rooted in historical and contemporary contexts, this pervasive form of discrimination and prejudice has significant implications for individuals, communities, and societies at large.

Systemic Islamophobia operates within power structures, institutions, and cultural biases, perpetuating inequality, marginalization, and the violation of human rights. Implicitly and explicitly, Islamophobia is reinforced by various layers of society, including governments around the world.

While its manifestations may differ from one region to another, systemic Islamophobia shares commonalities across countries and societies. It operates as a product of historical legacies, geopolitical dynamics, cultural narratives, and power imbalances. It thrives in contexts where Muslims are viewed as the “Other,” perpetuating stereotypes, prejudices, and negative portrayals that undermine their rights, dignity, and societal inclusion.

The impact of systemic Islamophobia is far-reaching. Muslim individuals and communities face challenges in various domains of life, as the titles included in this Bundle will show. They experience heightened surveillance, racial profiling, and discriminatory legislation, hindering the realization of fundamental human rights and the pursuit of justice and equality. Furthermore, the interconnetedness of discrimination makes the issue even more pressing for all.

Recognizing and understanding systemic Islamophobia is essential for dismantling its deeply entrenched structures. It requires comprehensive analysis, dialogue, and collective action which this collection hopes to envoke.

The Rise of Global Islamophobia in the War on Terror: Coloniality, Race, and Islam delves into the complex and far-reaching consequences of the ‘War on Terror’ on global perceptions of Muslims. The book examines the intersection between Islamophobia, and various social, economic, and political factors that have shaped its prevalence.

The authors convincingly argue that the ‘War on Terror’ has not only intensified anti-Muslim racism but has also provided a framework that perpetuates a global Islamophobic narrative. By framing Muslims a perpetual enemy, this conflict has fostered a climate of fear and suspicion, fueling the growth of nativist and populist movements worldwide.

One of the book’s strengths lies in its comprehensive analysis of the different forms and manifestations of Islamophobia. Through an examination of localized histories, conflicts, and contemporary geopolitical realities, the authors map out the intricate ways in which Islamophobia has taken shape across the global North and South. This approach adds depth to the understanding of the diverse factors contributing to the rise of anti-Muslim sentiment.

The book offers a nuanced and comprehensive analysis of the connections between interpersonal and institutional racism. While highlighting the deeply rooted nature of Islamophobia, the book also sheds light on the activism and resistance that have emerged to confront this issue. By featuring narratives of individuals and groups challenging Islamophobia, the authors provide hope and inspiration for those seeking to combat this pervasive form of discrimination.

Naved Bakali and Farid Hafez, The rise of global Islamophobia in the War on Terror: Coloniality, race, and Islam (Manchester University Press 2022) ISBN: 978-1-5261-6175-8, 264 pages

Islamophobia in France: The Construction of the “Muslim Problem” presents a groundbreaking examination of the multifaceted nature of Islamophobia in the country. Authored by Abdellali Hajjat and Marwan Mohammed, the book challenges the prevailing notion that Islamophobia arises solely from individual bias but rather that Islamophobia in France is deeply entrenched within existing structures of power and control.

The book sheds light on pivotal moments in French history that have contributed to the marginalization of Muslim communities. It highlights the 2004 ban on veils in schools, followed by the 2010 legislation that prohibited face-covering clothing in public spaces, primarily targeting women who wear burqas. President Emmanuel Macron’s public statements regarding the hijab’s compatibility with French ideals further illustrate the pervasive Islamophobia within the country. These cultural biases not only perpetuate discriminatory practices but also position the Muslim population as scapegoats for broader issues surrounding immigration in France.

Hajjat and Mohammed go beyond surface-level analysis to uncover the structural dimensions of Islamophobia in France. They argue that French elites strategically employ Islamophobia as a state technology to exert control and contest the presence of specific groups of postcolonial immigrants and their descendants. By exploring the data on Islamophobia and examining its functioning in contemporary French society, the authors paint a comprehensive portrait of the mechanisms through which Islamophobia operates.

Islamophobia in France is an English translation of Abdellali Hajjat and Marwan Mohammed’s Islamophobie: Comment les e´lites franc¸aises fabriquent le “proble`me musulman.” and an essential contribution to the field, providing a nuanced and insightful examination of the systemic nature of Islamophobia and its consequences on Muslim communities in France.

Abdellali Hajjat and Marwan Mohammed, Islamophobia in France: The Construction of the “Muslim Problem” (University of Georgia Press, 2023) ISBN-10 0820363251, 306 pages

In The New Crusades: Islamophobia and the Global War on Muslims Khaled A. Beydoun presents an essential examination of Islamophobia from a legal and ground-up perspective. Drawing on his intellectual prowess and moral imperative, Beydoun presents a compelling analysis of the network of anti-Muslim campaigns unfolding worldwide and offers a comprehensive analysis of how Islamophobia is utilized by both democratic and authoritarian regimes to persecute Muslim populations.

The New Crusades does not shy away from challenging the established narratives. It delves into the role of the War on Terror in fueling and intensifying anti-Muslim campaigns around the world. Beydoun skillfully illustrates how Islamophobia operates as a unifying thread, perpetuating state and social bigotry and igniting hate-mongering from both liberal and right-wing factions. Through trenchant analysis and firsthand accounts from Muslims on the ground, the author brings to light the various manifestations of Islamophobia in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and beyond.

The book’s global perspective sets it apart, as Beydoun incorporates on-site experiences, interviews, and a diverse range of contexts. This approach enhances the authority of the narrative and makes it accessible and engaging for scholars, students, and the general public.

The New Crusades unravels the distinct systems of demonization and oppression that have emerged across the post-9/11 geopolitical landscape. Whether it is the imposition of hijab bans in France, state-sponsored hate speech and violence in India, or the existence of concentration camps in China, Beydoun examines how Islamophobia operates as a global phenomenon, perpetuating discrimination on multiple fronts.

The book powerfully reveals the unsettling reality that Islamophobia remains one of the few acceptable forms of hate in the world today. By exposing this truth, Beydoun calls attention to the urgent need for collective action against Islamophobia and its far-reaching consequences. By weaving together social science, law, and captivating narratives, the author highlights the pervasive impact of Islamophobia on Muslims across the globe.

Khaled A. Beydoun, The New Crusades: Islamophobia and the Global War on Muslims (University of California Press, 2023) ISBN: 9780520356306, 390 pages

In Fear of a Muslim Planet: Global Islamophobia in the New World Order Arsalan Iftikhar, a renowned American Muslim human rights lawyer, offers a comprehensive exploration of global Islamophobia. The book refers to the chilling reminder of the Christchurch massacre, where a white supremacist perpetrated a horrific act of violence against Muslim worshippers in New Zealand. Iftikhar draws attention to the manifesto left by the attacker, titled “The Great Replacement,” which espoused the belief that Muslims posed a threat and sought to replace white people. This incident serves as a starting point for exploring the dangerous legacy of this theory and its influence on extremist acts.

Iftikhar goes on to emphasize that the victims of the “Great Replacement” theory extend beyond Muslims alone. The tragic attack on the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, which targeted Jewish congregants, exemplifies the broader impact of this ideology including the infamous actions of Norwegian terrorist Anders Breivik.. The perpetrator’s anti-Semitic and Islamophobic motivations, fueled by anti-immigration sentiments, underline the interconnected nature of discrimination.

Throughout the book, Iftikhar critiques the presidency of Donald Trump, which he argues has contributed to the exacerbation of Islamophobia in America. He dissects Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric and policies, including his claim that “Islam hates us” and his call for a complete ban on Muslims entering the US. Iftikhar contends that Trump’s leadership has fueled the growth of Islamophobia.

The book goes beyond the United States and the Western world to shed light on global Islamophobia. Iftikhar highlights the genocidal levels of Islamophobia in countries like China and Myanmar, where Muslim communities face severe oppression. Additionally, he addresses the European focus on policing Muslim women’s hijab, exposing discriminatory policies that curtail religious freedom.

Arsalan Iftikhar, Fear of a Muslim Planet: Global Islamophobia in the New World Order (Skyhorse Publishing, 2021) ISBN-13 978-1510761872, 288 pages

The Suspect: Counterterrorism, Islam, and the Security State offers a captivating and deeply personal exploration of the impact that two decades of policing and counterterrorism have had on the state of mind of Muslims in Britain. Drawing from his own experiences, author Rizwaan Sabir takes readers on a compelling journey through British counterterrorism practices and the pervasive policing of Muslims.

Sabir’s narrative describes his wrongful arrest and detention on suspicion of terrorism. He recounts the distressing process of being unjustly made a target in the “war on terror.” With candor and vivid detail, he outlines the events leading up to his arrest, including being found in possession of the Al-Qaeda Training Manual, which he had downloaded for legitimate postgraduate research purposes. Sabir sheds light on the excruciating experience of being subjected to suspicion and surveillance solely based on his Muslim identity.

Throughout the book, Sabir recounts the harrowing aftermath of his arrest. He vividly describes the relentless monitoring and scrutiny he faced upon release from custody. This included frequent stop-and-search encounters, detentions at the border, surveillance by police and government departments, and an attempt by the UK military to recruit him into their psychological warfare unit. The author’s firsthand account provides a chilling insight into the intrusive and discriminatory practices endured by Muslims in the name of national security.

Sabir argues that the profound harm inflicted on individuals like him is not merely the result of government planning errors but rather a deliberate consequence of employing a counterinsurgency warfare approach to combat terrorism and police Muslim communities. Through his writing, Sabir advocates for and building networks of solidarity and support to challenge the injustices perpetuated by these policies and practices.

The Suspect serves as a powerful call to action, urging readers to recognize and resist the profound injustice faced by Muslims. By sharing his story, Sabir empowers readers to challenge the harmful narratives and practices that perpetuate the policing of Muslims.

Rizwaan Sabir, The Suspect: Counterterrorism, Islam, and the Security State (Pluto Press, 2022) ISBN: 9780745338484, 256 pages

The story of Iranian-Danish director Ali Abbasi’s latest movie, Holy Spider, which garnered a lot of attention at the 75th Cannes Film Festival, is based on the serial murders that took place in the Iranian city of Mashhad in the 2000s. Saeed Hanai, who is the subject of the film, killed 16 female sex workers in Mashhad between July 2000 and August 2001, and was executed in April 2002. The story of the man known as the “Spider Killer” has been the subject of three films: Maziar Bahari’s original 2003 film And Along Came a Spider, The Killer Spider by Ebrahim Irajzad in 2020, and finally Holy Spider, directed by Abbasi in 2022.

Over the last 20 years, there have been multiple incidents of serial murders in Iran that have been striking not only for the horrific nature of the crimes involved, but also for how they were received by the Iranian public. One such case was that of Gholamreza Khoshroo, 32, who raped and murdered nine women before being caught and hanged in 1997. Another was the 2005 case of Mohammed Bijeh, a 22-year-old who raped and killed 41 boys.

However, Holy Spider, beyond addressing Hanai’s criminal case, offers references to the Iranian social and political contexts. Hanai’s case is one of the most controversial and mysterious criminal cases in Iran’s judicial history after the Islamic Revolution, and is still surrounded by a lot of speculation and doubt.

Although Holy Spider has the tone and theme of a crime-thriller, it answers the “whodunnit” question at the very beginning. With the identity of the murderer made known, the director creates tension by exploring a much different and larger question that lies behind the case. Hanai’s murders represent a much larger problem and dilemma. We realize the array of reactions to the murders among the public and authority figures, and the social picture that can be derived from these becomes the film’s main subject.

Holy Spider is a reflection of Iranian women’s position in society as it addresses the difficulties women face in all their quests and efforts. This is also the case for the film’s heroine, a journalist who is investigating the main case and is held back at almost every moment and on every turn of her research, simply because she is a woman. The director uncovers the tensions present in Iranian society and stemming from its contradictory nature, where women can be highly trained professionals such as doctors and engineers but are also subject to strict controls over what they wear and how they look in public.

As Abbasi stated, although the film is based on Saeed Hanai’s murders, it is not a documentary, so it does not adhere to the realities of the events. The purpose of the film is not to inform us about the serial murder case with a documentary-like approach. What makes the film distinctively insightful is that it analyzes Saeed Hanai’s character on the basis of what exactly motivates him to kill by especially analyzing the religious and political beliefs that influence his decisions and actions.

Roya Karimi Majd is a veteran journalist and reporter for Radio Farda with a focus on societal issues, including women’s rights. During the making of And Along Came a Spider, she worked with Maziar Bahari in researching the details and fallout from the Hanai case from different angles. Karimi interviewed Hanai and recalls that “Saeed Hanai was a very simple and honest person but not very intelligent.” “In a lot of murder trial footage, or even when watching films about him, you sometimes feel you’re watching an actor: someone whose every movement has been planned to influence the judge’s verdict. But in the interview with Hanai, I never felt he was hiding anything or lying.”

Hanai was remarkably candid in the interview about not just how he had gone about the killings but his motivations for doing so. Karimi says he also sometimes brought up seemingly unrelated matters that gave some clue as to his psyche: most importantly, having been the victim of violent abuse from his mother as a child. The discussion was not included in the final cut of the film, but Hanai told Karimi that his mother used to try to bite off chunks of his flesh, and his body always showed the marks left by her fingernails.

It seems that some social groups want to believe that Hanai is telling the truth and that he killed the sex workers for religious reasons as this scenario is more in line with the Iran they describe. Yes, Iran has problems in terms of human rights and women’s rights, and it cannot be said to be a democratic and free country. The whole world knows this! However, the screenwriter, like the opposition to any government or regime anywhere, is solely concerned with sending a specific message to international viewers, and not with the truth about Iranian society and politics.

The rapists and traitorous men in this movie all have religious and government profiles. For example, all such men wear an agate ring, which the director repeatedly highlights with multiple zooms. In the Holy Spider, men of all levels and positions in Iran look at women in a derogatory manner or as commodities to meet their sexual needs: filmmaker, hotel worker, police, and judge – every man in every position has some sexual disorder! Some get satisfaction by humiliating women, some by raping them, and some by killing them. Iranian society on the whole is presented as disturbingly sick, and it comes as little surprise that someone like Saeed Hanai would emerge from it.

Of course, Hanai’s story could be a compelling subject for a crime, police, or horror movie, but the way this story is handled is ideological. At the same time, it should be noted that the Iranian regime is to blame for how easy it is to persuade the audience of this line of thinking. In several scenes of the movie, the judge tries to deny the connection between Saeed Hanai’s actions and his religious and revolutionary past, and to convince the audience that his decision was an arbitrary act that was not accepted by the government and the law. However, his efforts fail, and based on the viewers’ knowledge of the regime’s existing views on women, the viewers feel that Hanai’s actions were fully in line with the regime’s constant preaching of “commanding good and forbidding evil.”

When it becomes clear that a state oppresses a part of its people – in this case, women – with the excuse of protecting their “chastity” or “decency” by interfering with what they can wear, who they can have relations with and how, etc., it is easy for the audience to think that in such an atmosphere, any individual may find it in themself to “educate” or “cleanse” society of “corruption.” In this way, the audience easily establishes a connection between Hanai and the Iranian regime that enabled his abominable actions, and, in turn, it identifies Hanai’s actions with the Iranian regime.

Muslims across the globe mark the Feast of Sacrifice, or Eid aladha, a four-day feast, which takes place a day after Muslim pilgrims stand on Mount of Arafa in the holy city of Mecca, a ritual that completes the last pillar in their annual pilgrimage.

In the Muslim faith, Eid aladha sees the slaughtering of animals such as sheep, cows, etc. which represents the experience of Prophet Ibrahim sacrificing his son as commanded to him by God in one of his dreams. When Abraham was about to go through with what he saw in his dream, a sheep ascended from the skies saving the son who had completely surrendered to his father’s will.

The Feast of Sacrifice is also a season for celebration. Muslim families gather and visit each other. It is an occasion for helping the poor and needy, whereby the meat of the slaughtered animals is given to those in need, to relatives and friends. The feast is a joyous celebration of family, and a reunion where families gather and social ties are strengthened.

Children wear new clothes and are given money and sweets by their elder family members. It is one of two major Muslim feasts, and, in fact, it is the bigger of the two, and is also known as the “Big Feast (Eid).”

This supposedly joyous celebration is a reminder of a different reality under Israel’s ongoing occupation of Palestine. Family reunions translate into a bitter reminder of separation and checkpoints, where Palestinians, if they are lucky enough to be able to meet in the first place, have to cross checkpoints to meet their loved ones. In the Gaza Strip, which has been under Israeli siege for 15 years, Palestinians are not allowed to travel to the West Bank, except for 400 permits that are given to Palestinians from Gaza who have families in the West Bank.

Israel’s repeated attacks on the Gaza Strip, such as the 2014 attack, serve as reminders of the bitter memory that some 2,200 Palestinians have been killed, including during Eids. My childhood friend Ayman Shokor was killed on the roof of his family house by a random Israeli shell on July 28, 2014, during Eid, and every Eid is just another reminder of this tragic reality. In fact, the first thing that Palestinians do after the Eid prayer is to visit the graves of those killed by Israel and their families, including those in Israeli jails. For many Palestinians, Eid is a reminder of a missing child who no longer shares the same family table.

It is almost impossible for Palestinians living in the West Bank to visit their family members in Israel or Jerusalem. The same applies to the Gaza Strip, where tens of thousands of Palestinians have family members in the West Bank. Having permits to visit family members in Israel for Palestinians from the Gaza Strip is a distant dream. The wish today in Palestine is that Eid passes without a new Israeli military occupation waged against them as the past few years have seen Israel targeting Palestinians during Eid, turning their joy into dismay.

The economic hardships experienced by the Palestinians as a result of the ongoing Israeli occupation serve as another reminder of their grim reality. It makes it almost impossible for the majority of families to buy Eid clothes for their children or slaughter an animal according to tradition. In a place like Gaza, where over one out of 2.3 million Palestinians live below the poverty line, the impact of the siege on celebrating Eid is very vivid. In fact, being able to preserve the meat without it going rotten is a challenge in itself as electricity is out some 12 hours a day.

Giving Palestinians permits during Eid will not end the occupation nor will it make Israel look more tolerant and helpful to the Palestinians. It is Israel that separates the Palestinians during Eid, and the world is increasingly aware of this occupation reality.

The international community should pressure Israel to allow Palestinians, regardless of where they live, to visit their loved ones during Eid without restrictions. Israel should remove all its checkpoints that are meant to remind Palestinians celebrating Eid of their reality under occupation where they lack freedom of movement. Eid is an occasion for Palestinians to get together and they should not be forced to remember their forced separation and the control system that Israel has imposed on them.

Palestinians have the right to celebrate Eid without having to shed tears over those killed or arrested by Israel. Seventy-four years under occupation have made Palestinians become more aware of what they have lost, even more so during Eid. A few days ago, Algeria commemorated its independence from France which took place on June 5, 1962. It is now time for the Palestinians to do the same—free of occupation and fear, and able to celebrate Eid with their loved ones.

On October 5, Jean-Marc Sauvé, the head of the independent commission charged by the Catholic Church itself to investigate sex crimes in its ranks, publicly and solemnly released the massive 2,500 page report, whose conclusions he shared in a two-hour, surgically and factually devastating live presentation in front of the press, politicians, associations of victims, and Catholic officials.

The result of a three-year investigation by a panel of 22 experts in all relevant fields (law, theology, psychiatry, social sciences, anthropology, history of religions, etc.), based on Church, court, and police archives as well as interviews with victims and witnesses, the Sauvé Report is being hailed by all, without a single exception, as a model to be emulated by other nations and institutions worldwide seeking to investigate sex crimes. In its scope, conclusions, and methodological sophistication both quantitative and qualitative, it is simply unprecedented and has no equivalent anywhere in the world.

It is an understatement to say that ever since its public release, that the report, akin to a fragmentation bomb or cataclysm, has been sending shockwaves across not just the Catholic institution but the whole nation and to a much lesser extent other countries. Although everybody knew the Catholic Church had always been a hotbed of pedophilia and that was an open secret—after all, among other goals Jean Calvin’s reform movement back in the 16th century already intended to react against the massive debauchery he could observe in the Church from top to bottom—and despite widespread common awareness, the Sauvé Report stunned and shocked by the extent and gravity of what it is describing.

Main Findings

A mere few facts and numbers may give an idea:

• Between 1950 and 2020, a 70-year period, less than a lifetime, 216,000 children, 80% of whom young boys, have been raped, often repeatedly over a long period of time (several months or years) by about 3,000 predator priests or bishops (3% of the total), and a few nuns. Some of those priests raped hundreds of children.
• If one adds those who were abused by laymen working for and in the Catholic Church (catechists, monitors of youth camps, etc.), the figure rises to 330,000 victims.
• All along, the Catholic hierarchy from the peers of the criminals all the way to bishops, cardinals, and popes, including Pope Francis, knew the identity and crimes of most of the serial rapists. Yet, not only they did nothing to stop them, but they actively, systematically, and methodically denied and covered up the crimes; sheltered and protected the serial rapists from public exposure and criminal prosecution; and consistently refused to pay any attention to the victims, whose abuse they denied and whom they refused to listen to—as was still the case a mere few years ago.
• In some cases, for decades, highly organized and effective actual networks of pedophiliac priests shared among themselves and with others both the children and the pornographic material (images, etc.) produced during those sessions on church grounds.
• As Alain Cordier and other commission members declared, “I want to emphasize the fact that it is NOT a problem of the past but a problem of the present. Because the problem continues today.”

A second instant achievement of the report has been to completely pulverize all the denial, spin, hypocritical lines of defense, and attempts at minimizing the nature and extent of the crimes the Catholic Church had been able to use to oppose such accusations until October 5, 2021. At least they are no longer trying, as shown by the pope’s reaction when he lamented, “Dignity to our Lord! Shame, shame, shame on all of us!” while the other Church officials, shamed and rendered speechless, could only admit everything and hypocritically feign surprise, and then ask for “forgiveness.”

At least the French Church is no longer trying to hide or minimize any of this as it was still doing yesterday, and it has now fully accepted the conclusions of this horrifying report. Historically, this in itself is colossal progress.

To take the full measure of this, one needs to keep in mind four other facts:

1) The figures above would be terrible for a country the size of a continent like the United States with a population of 330 million. But we are here talking about a small country with a population of 67 million, the size of the state of Texas, a country where one can drive from east to west and north to south in half a day or less.

2) Those numbers include only minors, but sex crimes against legal adults above 18 years old whether nuns or practitioners are also widespread and would need to be added to the already horrible picture.

3) The comparison between the French situation and similar investigations conducted in other countries like Germany, Ireland, the United States, or Australia suggests France may actually be at the bottom of the list. One will remember that the famous 2002 Boston Globe investigation, popularized by the star-studded 2015 blockbuster Spotlight, uncovered nearly 100 pedophiliac priests and thousands of victims in a mere few dioceses of that one U.S. city and that in the years that followed, similar or worse patterns were discovered all across the country in hundreds of cities.

4)  Those numbers, whether French or American, are the “low and minimal estimates” as the Sauvé commission members have always been careful to specify in their many public interventions.

Institutionalizing Rape and Pedophilia

A few quotes by Jean-Marc Sauvé himself will illuminate the systemic nature of the crime, which can no longer be reduced to a mere few rotten apples or a matter of individuals, even thousands of them, in an otherwise healthy institution.

Until the 2000s, the Catholic Church showed a complete and cruel indifference to the victims.

Sex abuse in the Catholic Church has been a massive and systemic phenomenon, covered by a veil of silence.

Catholic authorities covered up the abuse over decades, in a systemic manner.

The cover-up has permitted mass crimes for decades.

The French findings are furthermore fully corroborated by previous findings from other countries, suggesting without a doubt that the exact same has been happening everywhere where the Catholic Church operates:

For the first time, we can all begin to understand the systematic cover-up by Church leaders that followed. The abuse scarred every diocese. The cover-up was sophisticated. The Church protected the institution at all costs […] The cover-ups by the Church served a key purpose—the longer they covered up abuses, the less chance that law enforcement could prosecute predator priests because the statute of limitations would run out. “As a consequence of the cover-up, almost every instance of abuse we found is too old to be prosecuted,” the grand jury found.

To sum up, four main lessons clearly emerge from this picture. First, the Catholic Church has been and, as Alain Cordier made clear, remains a massive breeding ground of organized mass pedophilia and a true safe haven for its thousands of sex predators. Second, pretty much everybody knew everything all along including bishops, cardinals, and popes, who were aware of the identities of the priests and children, when and where this was happening, yet not only did they do nothing but they actively covered it up, guaranteeing, in full knowledge, that this activity would go on—and one should remember here how Pope Francis himself, who now claims shock and surprise in utmost hypocrisy much to the victims’ anger, in 2018, was still defending predator priests while calling their victims liars, publicly accusing them of “slander and calumny.”

Three, besides the family (for obvious reasons such as that is where children spend most of their time, relatives have easy and permanent access, etc.), the Catholic Church has been (and most likely remains) quite simply the institution where the most pedophiliac crimes occur, well ahead of schools, sports clubs, youth camps, etc. In that domain it simply has no match. Four, and this needs to be stated without euphemism: what is described here is a gigantic collective crime—what the Catholic Church has done was to institutionalize mass pedophilia, make it part of its culture, of its DNA, and entrench then preserve and protect it like no other institution besides the family ever did, possibly in human history.

Eighteen years after the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Iraqi Shiites are divided on the relationship between political power, ethnicity, and religious legitimation. However, one thing that is clear is that the greater majority of high-ranking Shiite religious scholars in Iraq support democracy. Peyman Eshaghi of Politics Today interviewed Dr. Ali Taher Elmemmud, associate professor of sociology at the University of Baghdad, on his book titled The Embers of Governance: Iraqi Shiites and Nation-State Building Challenges in the Post-2003 Era, Beirut, Darelrafidayn, 2017 [in Arabic].

Q. What is the inspiration and motivation behind this book? What is the inspiration and motivation behind this book?

This book was my doctoral dissertation. It took two years to write, and a passionate defense that lasted six and a half hours was held for it. This was because it was the only dissertation defended in the Faculty of Humanities and the Department of Sociology of Baghdad University on Shiism and state-building in Iraq. After that, of course, it took a year to turn the dissertation into a book.

Of course, I removed some theoretical aspects from the book, and it became more suitable for non-academic readers and researchers. To write the dissertation, I conducted field research for more than a year. I succeeded in conducting interviews with twenty notable personalities. It was very challenging to meet Iraqi high-ranking Shiite clerics, known as “Sources of Emulation,” and top political figures due to Iraq’s situation and the sensitivities surrounding the issue. Among them are Al-Sayyid Ali Al-Sistani, Sayyid Muhammad Saeed Al-Hakim, Muhammad Is’haq al-Fayadh, and Bashir Al-Najafi.

Talking to intellectuals was much easier, but as I said, interviewing leading religious figures in Iraq was more difficult. For example, I spent six months trying to interview a Shiite high-ranking religious scholar known as “Marja” (literally Source of Emulation) in Najaf.

Q. How did you conduct research for this book?

While examining the state-building by Shiites in Iraq after 2003, I tried to study the fundamental theories of state-nation building. But I soon realized that many of the approaches cited about Iraq do not reflect the realities of the country. Perhaps this is because most of the researchers who have worked in this field have been non-Iraqis or have not done fieldwork. It must be borne in mind that Iraq is a country with an ancient history and deep-rooted culture. Therefore, it is challenging to bring together all the affairs of Iraq and understand the country in terms of the relationship that the government has had with its people.

For example, Francis Fukuyama has written about state-building in Iraq, and British author Liora Lukitz has written another book on state-building in Iraq. In this book, Lukitz applies Anthony Smith’s theory of national identity to the case of Iraq. However, when we scrutinize the issue, we find that neither of the two writers has been able to consider and understand Iraq’s realities. These two “Western ways” of thinking could not comprehend the local complexities.

Since 2003, Iraqi Shiite Islamists have ruled with the same secular tools and way of thinking. Thus, it must be said that this is a new phenomenon in the course of Shiite political thought. In practice, no Shiite Islamist has tried to pass Islamic law in parliament since 2003. Personal status laws were never transformed into the “Islamic” ones. The budget law, one of the clauses of which imposes a tax on alcoholic beverages, which practically guarantees their free sale in Iraq, has never been criticized by a parliament whose majority is Shiite Islamists. They never tried to establish an Islamic institution called the government. Such things show that their Islamism enjoys a civil approach.

Although this approach is not Islamist in the conventional sense, it is not necessarily secular in the anti-religious sense. Instead, it respects religion without allowing religion to rule directly. Iraqi Shiite Islamists are in favor of a civil society, and Islamism for these Islamists is a belief in Islam and a personal commitment to it. In other words, Islamism is defined by performing a series of private acts of worship, observing sincerity and trustworthiness, and the like. Islamists have no purpose other than themselves and individual issues, and do not intend to lead society towards Islam.

Most of the Iraqi Shiites are following Ayatollah Sistani. However, they are not the only ones. Some Shiites are also openly secular in three types: first, liberal seculars represented by people like Ahmad Chalabi, who passed away a few years ago. Second, the national seculars who are represented in the political arena by politicians such as Ayad Allawi. The third group is the Communist seculars, represented by the Iraqi Communist Party.

Islamist Shiites are also made up of several groups. Most of them follow Ayatollah Sistani. The second group, which is smaller than the first group, is Muqtada al-Sadr. Religiously, they were following Sayyid Muhammad-Sadiq al-Sadr, Muqtada al-Sadr’s father, who was assassinated by state forces in 1999, and now they follow Muqtada al-Sadr. Muqtada is a nationalist figure who has never called for the formation of an Islamic-Shiite state since 2003. He has promoted religious, denominational, and cultural pluralism in Iraq, especially in recent years.

The third group of Shiite Islamists is loyal to the theory of velayat-e faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist). They follow Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran, who resides outside Iraq in the Iranian capital of Tehran. These people are mainly affiliated with Iraqi militia groups. They have never dared to say that they want an Islamic or Shiite state since the fall of Saddam, but their approach is vividly focused on the Shiite identity and creating a Shiite ummah. In their view, the Shiite ummah ranges from the Hazaras of Afghanistan to Hezbollah in Lebanon. According to them, the leadership of this Shiite nation will be in Tehran.

The last group of Iraqi Shiites is supporters of Ayatollah Sayyid Sadiq al-Shirazi. They are much fewer in number than others. They are more focused on ritual issues, and they do not have a specific political program.

Religion in politics is obvious in Africa but also a sensitive topic because of the confrontations it incurs between critics and supporters of secularism. In a country like Nigeria, it might lead to tensions between Muslims and Christians, considering the fact that religious affiliation and ethnicity were excluded in the country’s national census in 1991 (and since 2006) to avoid ethnic conflicts and religious rivalries.

Regardless of the sensitivity, religion still plays an important role in leadership issues, and religious leaders still influence directly or indirectly the decisions of their followers during political practices, ethnic and social dialogues. Religion institution has also been the refuge of whenever people in the region lost confidence in their political leaders.

Contrary to the opinions of some Islamic scholars who frown at secularism, and the stands of secularists who see secularism as a value to exclude or categorize some sections of the society, the political developments in Mali between 2018 and 2020, and the events in Senegal following the 2021 protests offered a glimpse of what religious leaders can achieve in moving a nation forward and avoiding plunging it into unending chaos or “civil” war.

When the news of protests in Mali broke out in 2020, the focus quickly shifted after some days from the critical issues that led to the protests, such as the government incompetence, endemic corruption, and a declining economy, to the activism of the former president of Mali’s High Islamic Council (HCI), Imam Mahmoud Dicko, who was one of the leaders of the protest.

The Malian case showed that Islamic religious leaders in the country are diverse in their intellectual tradition, but also collaborative in political and other important issues.

On the one hand, the Malian case showed that Islamic religious leaders in the country are diverse in their intellectual tradition, but also collaborative in political and other important issues.

Iman Dicko, a “Salafi” figure who studied in Saudi Arabia and Mauritania, has been at the forefront of demanding social change and the basic needs of Malians since 2013 when he supported the presidential ambition of the ousted president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. During this period, he collaborated and worked with other religious leaders from different sects of the society, including Sufis and liberals.

Also, the current president of the High Islamic Council (HCI), Sheikh Chérif Ousmane Madani Haidara, a Sufi leader with strong followership in Mali, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, and the Malian diaspora, criticized the rebellion activities of the Mouvement National de l’Azawad and considered members of the group as “apostates”.

The 2020 events in Mali showed the role of an Imam in a troubled nation. While foreign allies of Mali, neighboring countries, and critics, including Salafi figures, accused Imam Dicko of instigating instability and stirring violence by heading the protest movement, the Imam has served as a mediator between the Malian government, terrorist groups in the northern part of the country and the oppositions.

Forcing the idea of non-participation of a religious leader in politics in a country like Mali and looking at religious activities through the limited established lens of fighting terrorism, anti-extremism, and radicalization could be more problematic than the solutions it tends to present.

Mali’s population based on a 2019 estimate was over 19.66 million of which 94.8% are Muslims, while the remaining 5.2% are Christians (2.4%), Animists (2%), and none/unspecified (0.8%). This also explains the reason behind the strong supports Imam Dicko and other Malian Imams enjoy many occasions, among which were Dicko’s campaign that forced the Malian government to weaken legislation that promotes gender equality, and his successful opposition toward the introduction of sex education in schools.

On the other hand, the participation of the Malian Imams in politics cannot be used as a yardstick for many other countries in the region due to their diverse population. There is still a lack of interest in democratic politics from Islamic leaders in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa despite the region’s history of harmony and integration between priests or religious leaders and kings, who also occupied religious positions in some of the ancient kingdoms and societies.

Another issue is the reserved positions of some Islamic leaders in the region toward secular democracy, repercussions of western invasions on their societies, and the fear of losing their dominance. The most noticeable feature in Mali and Senegal is the active interaction of religious leaders with government officials through their positions of independence from authorities which gave them the freedom of engagement in the most effective ways.

The distinctive case of Senegal aligns with the equivocal relationship between the religious institutions and the government. Senegal is considered a secular state influenced by France and about 96% of the population are Muslims, and records of peaceful transfer of power. These, according to Rachid Id Yassine, differentiate Senegal from other countries with predominantly Christian populations where the participation of religious leaders in secularism and democracy is usually linked to Christians.

Senegal’s secularism has been described as a model between the French and American models: political leaders have used religion in governing their people, anti-religion groups have also tried to tone down the influence of religion for their gains, while religious leaders have also used their power in their sector or regions of dominance without threatening the country’s peaceful coexistence. Hence, religious and democratic institutions have benefited one another rather than seeking to undermine each other.

The Senegalese marabouts have guided the country in turbulent times: many of them played a neutral role in the 2012 presidential election. Although some of them also took sides by either supporting the then President Aboulaye Wade or the opposition candidate and current president Macky Sall because of the financial interest or recuperation of their waning influence as a result of participation only in spiritual and religious matters.

Throughout the two centuries of the existence of the Russian Empire, Orthodoxy was the ideology and the main moral justification of the empire’s foreign policy expansion. This was especially the case in the “southern direction,” namely in the Black Sea and Caucasus regions, where the Ottoman Empire was traditionally the main and only military and political opponent of the Russian Empire.

Saint Petersburg and Istanbul fought each other eight times over the course of these two centuries. Both empires contained elements of theocracy in their state principles. The monarch was simultaneously the head of the official church, and in that sense, both rulers were the leaders of their respective community of believers, and shared both political and religious authority in their person. Therefore, the struggle between the Russian and Ottoman Empires traditionally not only bore military-political characteristics, but was also a religious confrontation.

Particularly indicative of this matter was the so-called Byzantine project of Catherine the Great, who in the last quarter of the 18th century intended to recapture Istanbul from the Ottomans and take the capital of the Orthodox world under the Russian protectorate. This idea was the dominant feature of Russian foreign policy for almost a century and a half. Russian troops were closest to capturing Istanbul during the Russian-Ottoman wars of 1828-1829 and 1877-1878, but these plans were not destined to materialize.

The last attempt to revive and implement the “Byzantine project” took place during World War I, when the forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet with army formations attached to them prepared to conduct a Bosphorus landing operation in 1916, following the example of the failed Dardanelles landing operation of Russia’s allies in the Entente. During World War I, the Ottomans managed to defend their capital, which automatically put an end to Russia’s “Byzantine project.” Russia’s failure to capture Istanbul exhausted the potential of the idea of uniting all the world’s Orthodox peoples under the auspices of Orthodox Russia.

Between 1920 and 1930, over 7,000 Orthodox churches in Russia were closed, and about 15,000 clergy and 200,000 ordinary people were arrested, shot, or sent to forced labor camps for following Orthodox Christianity.

After the end of the Russian Empire and the establishment of the Soviet Union in 1917, the relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and the state in Russia fundamentally changed. The Bolsheviks saw in Orthodoxy not only an ideological opponent, but also their direct competitors in influencing the minds of the majority of the Russian population, and therefore subjected the Church to harsh political repression and even terror. This process was initiated by the decree of the Soviet government of February 2, 1918, entitled “On the Separation of Church from State and School from Church.”

Between 1920 and 1930, over 7,000 Orthodox churches in Russia were closed, and about 15,000 clergy and 200,000 ordinary people were arrested, shot, or sent to forced labor camps for following Orthodox Christianity. The apogee of the persecution of the Church in Russia came in 1932 with the opening in the Kazan Cathedral in St. Petersburg of the State Museum of the History of Religion by the USSR Academy of Sciences. During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, as part of World War II, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin stopped the repressive practice against the Russian Orthodox Church, since he decided to use Orthodoxy to mobilize the Russian ethnic majority of the country’s population to fight fascism, which he succeeded in doing in full.

During Yeltsin’s presidency, the process of returning previously nationalized property and cultural artifacts to the Russian Orthodox Church began and the practice of financially supporting the Church from the state budget was initiated. The latter was perceived by the authorities and society as a certain compensation for the Church’s persecution during the years of the USSR.

The influence of Orthodoxy on Russia’s foreign policy in those years was minimal and manifested itself in a significant way only once – that is, in the first half of the 1990s, during the peacekeeping operation of the Russian military in former Yugoslavia.

However, to a greater extent, the peacekeeping mission was an allusion to the historical events of the 1870s in the Balkans, rather than a manifestation of geopolitical doctrine. Russian peacekeepers in Croatia, Kosovo, and Metohija protected not only the territory inhabited by the Orthodox Serb population during the interethnic conflict, but also physically defended the property of Orthodox monasteries and temples.

President Vladimir Putin, who was elected head of Russia in 2000, decided to turn Orthodoxy into a tool of soft power in the country’s foreign policy. During the third term of Putin’s presidency (2012-2018), an ambitious geopolitical project began to be implemented to revolutionize Russia’s influence in the Orthodox ecumene by transferring the seat of the ecumenical patriarch from Istanbul to Moscow.

These efforts were planned to be made official at the Pan-Orthodox Council in the summer of 2016, but at the insistence of the Moscow Patriarchate the location was moved to a “neutral” site – the Greek island of Crete, where the semi-independent Church of Crete operates under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in Istanbul.

In order to subordinate the entire Orthodox world to the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church’s Moscow Patriarchate and, consequently, the Kremlin, it was necessary to ensure the numerical majority of its representatives among the participants of the Pan-Orthodox Council, which is attended by patriarchs and archbishops from the fourteen autocephalous Orthodox Churches, with the exception of Rome. To this end, in 2011, an artificial increase in the number of dioceses and vicariates began in Russia by establishing 2-3 new dioceses and the mass appointment of vicars (bishops without dioceses) on the basis of the previously existing dioceses of the Russian Orthodox Church.

As a result of such actions, the number of potential participants in the Pan-Orthodox Council on the part of the Russian Orthodox Church tripled, which from a technical point of view guaranteed the Russian Church a numerical majority in representation in comparison with the other 13 generally recognized Orthodox Churches. The Moscow Patriarchate’s actions were fully supported and financed by the Russian political leadership, since the patriarchate itself, without the assistance of the state, could not independently maintain a bureaucratic structure artificially inflated for the implementation of geopolitical ambitions.

The main question to be determined at the Cretan Pan-Orthodox Council was the following: which of the two patriarchates, Constantinople or Moscow, would lead the Orthodox ecumene? If we look at this issue more broadly, in the context of global geopolitics, the question then becomes which of the two countries, Turkey or Russia, will be the legal successor and heir to the ideological, cultural, and even political heritage of Byzantium as a world center.

Thus, the issue went far beyond the framework of purely intra-Church or intra-Orthodox discussions and trends, and acquired a global geopolitical context that inevitably affected the content and nature of Russian-Turkish relations at the time. Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople resorted to ultra-radical measures within the framework of Church canons in order to repel Moscow Patriarch Kirill’s claims to Byzantine heritage.

This included the recognition of the autocephaly (full independence) of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate from the Moscow Patriarchate, which would have been completely impossible under other historical conditions. With this move, the number of firm supporters of the Moscow Patriarchate was reduced by a third, after which it was no longer necessary to talk about a Church revolution in its interests.

The end of the Cold War in the 1990s and the emergence of religiously motivated political groups on the international scene, made us aware of the role of religion in international conflicts. The Clash of Civilizations written by Samuel Huntington around this time, became central to decipher the political role of religion. Although it has been invalidated by numerous surveys that show that actually clashes occur mostly within civilizations (which are far from operating as homogenous monoliths), the thesis nevertheless remains politically influential.

In the current international context, this simplified vision of religion on the international scene has led to the exclusive focus on Islam and terrorism. This contributes to the misleading perception, that the scope and reach of terrorism in the name of God has grown out of control, that this violence is inspired by the specifics of the Islamic tradition and resilient to usual forms of compromise or negotiation. The reality is that all religious traditions can partake into political violence and challenge democracy.

Case in point: in the 1960s, the Catholic Church was seen as a major obstacle to democratization because of its support to authoritarian and military regimes from Franco in Spain to Pinochet in Chile. The ongoing radicalization of Buddhism in Myanmar or Hinduism in India are highlighting that shift to radicalism that can affect all traditions, not to mention the rise of global Orthodoxy that pursues international projects in contradiction with the international order. Regretfully, the systematic comparison of these modes of radicalization has yet to be undertaken.

I have repeatedly shown that the relevance of religion is not in the content of the religious  tradition per se but in the interactions between religious and political actors, institutions, and ideas. From this perspective, limiting Islam or any other religious tradition to beliefs or texts proves to be a dead end as the text can lead to opposite interpretations and mobilizations.

Instead, looking at the ways religious belonging and behaving intersect with political identities and behaviors solve the puzzle of apparently very secular projects leading to political battles over Islamically correct social behaviors, which are currently happening not only in Egypt, Iraq, Sudan to name a few but also India, Myanmar or Israel.

In other words, the social and political visibility of religion is not caused by an increase in personal beliefs or religiosity. People are not more fervent believers than they used to be, but their identification to religion has certainly shifted, creating a conjunction of religious and political identities that facilitate political mobilization and sometimes radical actions.

The politicization of religion in Muslim countries can be traced back to the building of the nation-state and the active role of “secular rulers” in reshaping the Islamic tradition.

Such a perspective requires a “longue durée”, historicized analysis that drastically challenges the rational choice centered theories that still dominate the field of radicalization and security studies.

To be more specific, the radicalization of religion is related to its nationalization. To be clear, most of religions within nations operate peacefully but to understand how and when religious identities or practices become radicalized, the starting point is the establishment of the modern political community a.k.a.  the nation.

Religion and National Community

For example, the politicization of religion in Muslim countries can be traced back to the building of the nation-state and the active role of “secular rulers” in reshaping the Islamic tradition. Nation-building put an end to the political  autonomy of religious institutions  that dominated the caliphal periods. It also went hand-in-hand with the homogenization of the populations inhabiting the nation’s territory.

That is why nation-building systematically omitted and sometimes eradicated particular ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups in order to create one nation defined by one religion and one language. This homogenization led to a politicized narrative of religion, that I have called political Islam.

With the rise of the nation-state, a congruence was created between Muslims of a certain religious obedience (for example, in the Sunni groups, Maleki, Shafi’i, Hanbali, and Hanafi schools) and bounded territory. Although the westernized elites were not always pious, they understood that they could not build a nation without including the belonging to Islam. To be clear, this readjustment to the national territory happened to all religious traditions but with different outcomes.

For example, Christianity in Europe at the time of the Reformation, saw its societal influence reordered by the nation-state, but also its doctrinal content redefined to make room for the state sovereignty over mundane matters. In the case of Islam, what I have called hegemonic forms of religion appeared.

Religious hegemony is not reflected in whether a state has an official religion but in a wide range of government religion policies found in many states without official religions.

It entails three main features:

– Absorption of the institutions and personnel of the religion into the state system while the other religions at best do not benefit from the same status or at worst lack legal recognition

– Inclusion of some of religious prescriptions within the legal system (family law, blasphemy)

– Shaping of the national narrative by making the belonging to the hegemonic religion the by default civic and national identity of all citizens.

In other words, religious hegemony refers to exclusive legal and political privileges granted to a specific religious group, and the association of this religion with citizenship and national belonging, while all other religious groups are marginalized. This nationalization of religion also happened in Buddhist countries like Thailand, Myanmar or Butan. Surveys show that states with hegemonic religions tend to be less democratic, independently of the specificity of the religious tradition.

Judaism, along the same line, has become a hegemonic religion in Israel, hence fueling discrimination against other religious minorities as well as uncompromising positions vis-à-vis the Palestinian claims. That is a sharp departure from the status of Jewish minorities in Europe where they had adapted to the secular national contexts by disconnecting their religious belonging from allegiance to the European political communities. We see the same trend of hegemonic Hinduism expressed in Hinduist movements that now dominate the political scene in the originally secular Indian democracy.

Additionally, global radical groups like Al Quaida or ISIS do not represent a return to pre-national forms of Islam. Quite the contrary: They are the result of dissemination of concepts that were originally framed within nations but now have spread beyond national boundaries. In other words, the existing forms of global Jihad are the transnational versions s of the interpretations of Sayyid Qutb (initially aimed at fighting against the national unjust ruler), combined with the Wahhabi doctrine which is also a modern (albeit not a modernist) religious interpretation.

Unlike the forms of national Jihad, the transnational dimension of the global Jihad appeals to young Muslims across countries because it offers and idealized and imagined Community of Believers all united in one single goal. In other words, to understand the radical forms of Islam today, it is more relevant to look into the political and cultural socialization of the activists than into their level of piety or the content of the Islamic tradition.

This nationalization and globalization of religion is also visible in Christian majority countries. Although religious diversity and pluralism in the U.S. has increased over recent decades, Christians remain the largest religious group in the country. Seemingly paradoxically, this increase in religious diversity has also been accompanied by an increase in the view of America as a Christian country. Like in Muslim countries, such a perspective remains for most Christian citizens symbolic without becoming intolerant or radical.

Evangelical communities are booming across Latin America. Where only 4% of Latin Americans identified as evangelicals in the 1970s, today that number is closer to 20%. In this context, the marriage between politics and evangelicalism is more than simply convenient.

“We do not intend to politicize Christianity, but to Christianize politics.” These are the oft-repeated words of Darío Silva, the founder of Casa Sobre la Roca, one of the largest evangelical congregations in Colombia, with over 50,000 members. It is no secret that for several Colombian politicians, receiving Silva’s public support has translated into thousands of votes in electoral districts across the country.

But Silva is not the only evangelical pastor skipping stones across Latin America’s political waters. From Catholic-majority Mexico to Argentina, the growing evangelical vote goes mostly to conservative right and the ultra-right. In Brazil where evangelicals now make up about 30% of the over 200 million population, at least 61% voted for ultra-right candidates including current president Jair Bolsonaro. Bolsonaro, a Catholic himself, has expertly surfed the evangelical wave forging strong relationships with evangelicals.

His wife and child are both evangelicals, and he himself went as far as to be baptized by evangelical rite in the Jordan River in 2016. Bolsonaro was only able to win such a considerable portion of the Brazilian electorate, including the evangelical vote, due to his conservative stances against abortion, the legalization of drugs, and the exclusion of minorities.

But how did the alliance between politics and evangelicalism come about? Are politicians approaching evangelical communities to gain votes? Or are evangelical leaders seeking out politicians to gain power? This symbiotic collusion between power and faith seems like a very convenient marriage after all.

Like most Colombians, former president of Colombia, Alvaro Uribe, is Roman Catholic. And yet, the still-politically significant Uribe, has made multiple visits to evangelical temples and participated publicly in evangelical ceremonies like an ordinary parishioner.

Could the millions of votes of the evangelical community in Colombia deliver some miracles?

Evangelicals described him as a close friend of the leading pastors of major congregations with more than 200,000 members. Uribe is accused by an important portion of the Colombian civil society of multiple corruption scandals and of massacres against civilians which he claimed was part of a plan against subversive guerrillas, with no effective legal action taken against him until now.

Given the general mistrust of evangelicals amongst Catholics, the very public pivot of powerful politicians like Uribe towards the evangelical community is significant. Could the millions of votes of the evangelical community in Colombia deliver some miracles?

The biblical account of Jesus Christ’s life tells the story of a revolutionary against the status quo of his time, someone who saw in the oppressed an opportunity to serve, and the possibility of redemption. It would only make sense that politicians and religious figures claiming to follow Jesus’ path would likewise seek to serve the poor and the downtrodden.

But many prominent Latin American evangelicals do not seem concerned with serving the people. A prime example is Jimmy Morales, Guatemala´s former president who left office in 2020 with the country overrun by corruption and scandals that included members of his own family. His most damning legacy, however, may be the impunity he granted to military commanders accused of crimes against their own people.

Despite historical antagonism between Catholics and Jews in Latin America, the Messianic belief that the Second Coming is only possible once Palestine falls under Jewish control drives evangelical political support for Israel.

Many Guatemalans are disillusioned by influential evangelicals-cum-politicians like Morales, who rather than Jesus’ gospel, seem to protect and spread corruption.

Another notable facet of evangelical politics in Latin America is unwavering political support for Zionism. Though many devout Christians would object to the occupation and ethnic cleansing of any people, the seeds of Zionism have flourished in the new Latin American religious movements as they maneuver for political power.

Despite historical antagonism and even anti-Semitism between Catholics and Jews in Latin America as in Europe, the Messianic belief that the Second Coming is only possible once Palestine falls under Jewish control that seems to drive evangelical political support for Israel.

The evangelical conviction that the return of the Messiah will lead to the death or conversion of every non-believer is, however, politically insignificant to the Zionist state, which has welcomed the establishment of Latin American diplomatic missions in recent years.

The separation between Church and State enshrined in Latin American constitutions seems to be eroding as prominently evangelical figures gain greater political power. After the coup against president-elect Evo Morales in 2019, Bolivian politician Jeanine Añez entered the Bolivian presidential palace with a Bible in her hands declaring that “The Bible comes back to Palace.” As the case of Guatemala shows, theocracy, once a foreign concept in Latin America, seems to have become less abstract.

The other defining feature of the alliance between evangelical leaders and politicians in Latin America is of course, money. Churches and religious organizations are tax-exempt in Latin America. There is no way of accurately establishing how much these Christian organizations make yet estimates suggest that in 2015 they made about one billion dollars in Colombia alone.  Popular pastors are also known to be extremely wealthy as is the industry of religion, which has been built around them.

Average churchgoers are expected to give at least one tenth of their gross income to the organization. In light of COVID-19 restrictions on congregations, pastors have successfully shifted to electronic channels for tithes and donations. In addition to votes, it seems that politicians also receive monetary support from congregations. The fiscal crisis has forced analysts to reevaluate the wealth of these organizations as a source of potential tax revenue despite the inevitable backlash such measures would cause. A rich Jesus Christ piling up untaxed huge amounts of coins is something we have not heard of, unlike what these Evangelical organizations do.

The role of evangelicals will play in Latin American politics is still unclear especially with the ongoing pandemic and recession. New challenges arise in Latin America, perhaps the most critical in the recent history of the continent. Could the joint venture of traditional politicians and evangelical leaders be able to understand these changes? Maybe it’s about time they try to find answers to the question: What would Jesus do?

Around the world, religion has come into focus as a central point of controversy and praise during the COVID-19 pandemic. Strict social distancing policies have raised thorny religious freedom issues and religious communities have faced criticism for noncompliance to the lockdown. At the same time, faith communities have also received praise for their relevance to the psychological and social needs of people in distress.

Amid this patchwork set of religious responses to the pandemic, one issue has become increasingly evident: religion has become deeply national during the course of the last several decades. But will COVID-19 lead to increased nationalist exclusionary and defensive attitudes among the religious, or might the pandemic be the cure that leads to radical social reorientation with a new emphasis on collective solidarity?

The Alliance of Religion and Nation in the Pandemic

To date, most of religious responses to the pandemic have played out at the national level, varying within the same religious tradition. For example, Muslim communities in France and Germany have accepted the shutdown of mosques with no strong resistance, but the same restrictions generated an internal controversy within Muslim groups in the UK and have been strongly opposed in Iran and Pakistan. Similarly, some  Ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel and Orthodox Christians in Greece have resisted the lockdown while others have complied with it.

The fact that religious communities are acting and reacting at the level of the nation-state is not really surprising. After all, the state has been the key political institution to address the social, economic, and health issues raised by the pandemic. For long-time observers of international politics, however, this trend far predates the current global crisis. Even in countries with historically minimal state inference like the United States, the exceptional powers to monitor and control citizens and activities in the name of security have steadily increased since 9/11 and will not go away. That is why the current situation illustrates once more the key status of state institutions to face global challenges, in this case public health.

An Alternative Path to Solidarity?

The national community functioning as the meaningful collective entity will not disappear with the coronavirus. Populist movements on the rise before COVID-19 were already expressing such a trend. It is then tempting to predict that post-coronavirus, we will witness the exacerbation of intolerance, as well as social, religious, and cultural tensions.

Religion is, however, also uniquely positioned to open up new paths of thinking about individual responsibility and community. Coronavirus has brutally made us conscious of the danger of what President Herbert Hoover called “rugged individualism” by showing that the attitude of one endangers the safety of others. Religious groups have long-standing experience in striking a meaningful balance between preservation of the community and personal fulfillment. It is therefore not surprising that some religious responses signal the growing awareness among us that “nobody is an island.”

While across traditions the debate has been raging about the limitations of religious practice caused by the lockdown, this highly publicized resistance hides the fact that most of religious voices across traditions have supported the lockdown because of its ultimate goal of saving lives, which is central to all religious teachings. At the same time, religious groups have worked to keep the community spirit alive to avoid personal isolation and despair. They have been the first to insist on the need for social solidarity to counter physical distancing. Since the beginning of the lockdown, religious communities have engaged in multiple activities online, from worship to psychological care, to financial support and assistance for the distraught members of their congregation and beyond.

Religion and the post-COVID Order

Ultimately, it is unclear how the chips will fall after the COVID crisis subsides. The positive potential of religion is certainly present.According to research in cultural psychology, groups exposed to risk show greater respect for the common good and tend to prioritize societal interests. In this respect, faith communities have moral resources to help rebuild trust in political communities, seriously weakened by the ongoing crisis.

In liberal democracies, the state responses, including the existing dilemma in the US of reopening or not reopening shed an unforgiving light on the supremacy of the market as the panacea to economic crisis and social inequalities. But religions have the resources to shape alternative responses. As emphasized by Pope Francis, value is not simply monetary, and it may be time to rethink global economy by including other human factors in our scenarios for development and growth. Additionally, political success is not exclusively grounded in material prosperity. It also entails public morality and protection of human dignity toward which religions have much to offer.

On June 1, all American religious leaders were to participate in a  national day of mourning for the victims of COVID19. The protests of the last two days against racial injustice after the death of George Floyd in Minneapolis have brought together the issues of racism and  pandemics. As expressed by rabbi Rick Jacobs of the Union for Reform Judaism, “We could treat all of these things as separate … but I do think there’s an intersection” given the pandemic’s outsized effect on communities already struggling with racism.” In the same article,  Rev.Jacqui Lewis from New York City Middle Collegiate Church  said:” Grief is not enough. Prayer is not enough,“ (…) “It’s a baby, first step for denominations to decry the violence. The next step is, what will you do to make sure your congregations are not racist?”.

Only the next months will tell us how these different trends will unfold. Early indicators show that the pandemics is affecting the privileged relation between some religious groups and their state: the state restrictions over religious practices in Russia have eroded the trust between the Russian Orthodox Church and Putin, while the support of Trump by white evangelicals has started to weaken. What is clear is that the religious global solidarity over COVID19 has not yet overcome national concerns.

…that many had the plague in their very blood, and preying upon their spirits, and were in themselves but walking putrefied carcasses whose breath was infectious and their sweat poison, and yet were as well to look on as other people, and even knew it not themselves…

From A Journal of the Plague Year (1722) by Daniel Defoe

A pandemic has hit the world and it is profoundly changing the political, economic, social and spiritual aspects of life in the 21^st century. Across the political spectrum, this is a period of the unknown; the ‘neo-liberal’ or ‘leftist’ perspective that has clamored for change away from an over-industrialized, air-polluting and ultra-capitalist world has remained largely ambivalent about the radical developments and grounding of global capitalism. On the other hand, the ‘nationalist right’ has been forced to open the money-box and pour it on the welfare state while simultaneously nationalizing railways (in the U.K.) or getting car manufacturers to produce health care equipment and beer companies to produce hand sanitizer (in the U.S.).

The solution to ‘defeating’ this pandemic is slow, methodical and inexact- everything that is the opposite of post-modern life and what it is built upon. One could argue that isolation is not the biggest obstacle (society already does much of its work and leisure online) but rather the leap into the great unknown. People have become so used to planning and preparing every detail of life that to not do so has created a crisis of the mind. Doing things fast, exact and in a precise manner has suddenly changed to an approach that is slow, inexact and without a timeline that countries, businesses, or society can control.

Politics

The immediate impulse to revert to late 19^th and early 20^th century ideas of rigidly defined borders and petty protectionist nationalism has been disastrous. Closed borders and blocked shipments of goods such as key medical supplies within the EU and over the U.S.-Canada border are just a few examples of surprising non-cooperation between allies and political trading blocks. The World Health Organization (WHO) has been largely ignored by the very countries that were instrumental in setting it up, and shockingly there is little trans-national coordination compared with previous viral situations such as Polio (the 1950s onwards), SARS (2002-2004) and Ebola (2017-2019).

In many ways, this is symptomatic of the last three decades of global politics. Tighter security and borders were a hallmark of the late 1990s and early 2000s and there has been a severe backlash against the concept of an interconnected and multi-cultural world. A revival of neo-fascist movements has become increasingly mainstream in the last decade and the conflict of the early 1990s in the Balkans has proven to be less an aberration and more a template of what can happen when extreme nationalists mix a mono-cultural mythical history with populist politics. Recent news stories of cruise ships unable to dock; slurs directed at people of Far-East Asian descent in North America; foreign nationals unable to secure any kind of accommodation in India; and people from large urban areas being met with hostility in rural areas of France are just a handful of examples of pre-existing instincts laid bare. In this context, the domino effect of locking down borders (however necessary this may have been to stop the spread of coronavirus) and being wary of foreigners seems less of a shock and more of a disjointed continuum of the last few decades that has reached pre-WWII levels of paranoia and prejudice.

Economy

One of the many things made evident in the last months has been the amount of money Western governments can pump into the citizenry – hundreds of billions of dollars, pounds, and euros have been injected into the employers, employees and anonymous workers in these nations, seemingly from nowhere. The stigma and social-Darwinist approach to a kind of hyper-capitalism has been removed overnight. Physical work is still needed (obviously, health care workers but also jobs such as delivery drivers and grocery store workers) but much of the ‘office’ work that involves a pyramid of people has quickly proven to be unnecessary. Working from home has long been accepted in certain segments of the American work culture but now other European and Asian nations are being forced to re-examine an office culture that often places showing up and ‘looking busy’ over actually doing the work needed.

Poverty is rampant with post-industrial cities and smaller regions dealing with unemployment and wages that cannot keep up with a high cost of living as well as housing that is often substandard.

All of this has not happened in a vacuum – in the U.K. the homeless population has been on the rise for the last decade. Poverty is rampant with post-industrial cities and smaller regions dealing with unemployment and wages that cannot keep up with a high cost of living as well as housing that is often substandard. In the U.S., the divide between rich and poor has been growing for the last half-century at alarming rates and an informal economy of freelance, temporary work and ‘under-the-table’ jobs is integral to a system that is now broken.

Society

Innovation often comes out of calamity and a need to resolve a problem. For instance, New York City at the turn of the century is a potentially thriving metropolis that is burdened by the hundreds of thousands of horse and buggies (and subsequent manure-waste problem that leads to disease and blocks growth). Within a few years technological and business innovations make the car an affordable option for the masses (Ford’s Model T) and the previous problems are eliminated almost instantly.

Faith

Social distancing, washing regularly and the use of a mask were all things recommended during the black plague of Europe and the ‘Spanish’ Flu or 1918 pandemic. During the medieval plagues a segment of Christian society took to beating and punishing themselves (self-flagellation) as well as others in cruel and barbaric ways. During the 1918 pandemic, there was much resistance to the disbanding of Church gatherings (in the U.S. many clandestinely got together in fields) and the Hajj went ahead as normal.

In comparison the current closure of Mosques, Churches, Synagogues and Temples has largely been followed without incident around the entire world. Religious and community leaders have been among the most rational in the balance of faith and science (keeping one’s prayers while following social distancing to avoid the virus spreading) Rather than adversely affecting the frequent, spiritual minded visitor, the closure of places of worship may strengthen the transcendental and moral resolve that already exists. In comparison, the more secular-minded may have difficulty in not being able to visit a place of worship in a time of immense socio-political and economic change. In other words, those that are looking for some spiritual meaning to make sense of this are lamenting not being able to go (such as the closure of Easter Mass throughout the world), even though they usually would not care or pay attention to a place of worship and its function in society.

A subtle yet distinct change of tone concerning words and actions of faith can be observed over the last few weeks in the U.K. and other European states. People are ‘praying’ for others (something that in my years of living in the U.K. I have never heard before) and expressing humanitarian solidarity. The doomsday, end-of-world scenario is a view on the fringes of society – in contrast to the people of every major faith around the world where the message has been fairly consistent and clear: this is a test that we have to deal with and come out stronger and more humane as a tribal group, country, religion or ummah.