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n a decisive move by the Kremlin, Russian President Vladimir Putin has announced a significant increase to the nation’s military personnel amidst the ongoing conflict with Ukraine. A decree released on Friday, which took immediate effect, mandates the expansion of Russian military forces by nearly 170,000, resulting in a total troop count of 1.32 million soldiers.

Addressing participants of the 2nd National Healthcare Congress via video at the Kremlin, President Putin’s decree was made public, signaling a substantial shift in military policy as the engagement in Ukraine extends into its 22nd month. This order marks the second major expansion since 2018 and comes after a previous augmentation last year, which saw an increase of 137,000 troops.

The Russian Defense Ministry has clarified that this increase will be primarily achieved through the recruitment of volunteers rather than a broadening of the conscription program. This strategy is seen as a response to what the ministry describes as “the special military operation” in Ukraine and to counter the perceived growth of NATO forces near Russian borders.

Justifications for military expansion

NATO’s recent activities, including the build-up of joint armed forces close to Russian territory, the deployment of additional defense systems, and an enhancement of tactical nuclear capabilities, were cited as justification for the bolstering of Russian military ranks. This move, according to the Defense Ministry, is an appropriate counteraction to “the aggressive activities of the NATO bloc.”

Last year, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated the need for a 1.5 million-strong military to ensure national security, although no timeline was provided for reaching this target. The push for a larger military comes as Russia’s initial expectations for a swift victory in Ukraine were met with robust resistance from Ukrainian forces.

The Russian government maintains secrecy over military casualties, with official figures significantly lower than Western estimates. Efforts to strengthen the armed forces have been ongoing, including the 2022 mobilization of 300,000 reservists and active recruitment campaigns across the country.

The escalating nature of the military operation in Ukraine,

Dmitry Medvedev, the deputy chair of Russia’s Security Council, announced that over 452,000 men have joined the army as contract soldiers this year, amidst reports of inducements for enlistment, including financial incentives and amnesty offers to prisoners.

These measures are in addition to the routine conscription drafts that occur biannually, aiming to enlist between 120,000 to 140,000 men for one-year terms. With the amendment of the upper age limit for mandatory service to 30 years, the Kremlin continues to reinforce its military capabilities as the conflict persists.

As global scrutiny of Russia’s military actions intensifies, this latest order by President Putin underscores the enduring and escalating nature of the military operation in Ukraine, with implications that resonate beyond the immediate region.

Source: AP News

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ussian President Vladimir Putin has signaled his intent to run in the upcoming March 2024 presidential elections, an assertion from multiple sources that could see him maintain power until at least 2030. This move comes at a time when Russia confronts its most severe geopolitical and economic challenges in recent history.

In an unprecedented political reign, Putin, who assumed the presidency on the last day of 1999 after Boris Yeltsin’s resignation, is set to outpace his predecessors in longevity, surpassing even the likes of Josef Stalin and Leonid Brezhnev.

Despite escalating tensions and complex crises both at home and abroad, Putin enjoys robust domestic support, with Kremlin-associated polls displaying an 80% approval rating. This support, coupled with the state-controlled media landscape and the lack of public dissent, makes his electoral victory a seeming foregone conclusion.

Putin at home and the world

Internationally, Putin’s decision to run occurs against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, which has drawn the most significant global confrontation with the West since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The war, along with sweeping Western sanctions, has delivered a substantial shock to Russia’s economy.

Yet, despite these challenges, Russian state forecasts remain optimistic, projecting economic growth that outpaces the European Union, bolstered by the energy sector.

At home, the war has exposed deep-seated fault lines in post-Soviet Russia. The conflict has taken a devastating human toll, with casualties on both Russian and Ukrainian sides that exceed the Soviet-Afghan War’s official numbers.

The domestic scene has also been marred by the violent suppression of opposition figures such as Alexei Navalny and by internal disputes within the elite, as evidenced by the failed mutiny and subsequent death of powerful mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin.

Putin’s leadership is leading Russia toward ruin?

Critics, such as Navalny and human rights advocates, argue that Putin’s leadership is leading Russia toward ruin, cultivating a fragile state system rife with corruption that could result in instability.

In stark contrast, the Kremlin portrays the conflict in Ukraine as a defensive stand against Western efforts to weaken and dismantle Russia, framing the situation as a struggle for survival and sovereignty.

The Kremlin has yet to officially announce Putin’s candidacy, and spokesperson Dmitry Peskov has refrained from commenting on the electoral plans. However, the unfolding narrative suggests that Putin’s campaign machine is gearing up for what many believe will be another decisive victory, reinforcing his grip on the nation at a time when Russia’s future on the world stage hangs in the balance.

Source: Reuters

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peculations regarding the health of Russian President Vladimir Putin have recently intensified, fueled by unsourced reports and rumors on various platforms, including the Telegram channel General SVR. Amidst the rampant speculations, the Kremlin has come forward to categorically dismiss these reports and clarify the president’s health status.

The recent wave of rumors gained traction when a Russian Telegram channel alluded to a serious health episode that Putin allegedly experienced on a Sunday evening. This unverified information was quickly picked up by global media outlets, leading to sensationalized headlines suggesting that the 71-year-old Russian leader suffered a cardiac arrest and had to be resuscitated. Such reports, while attracting worldwide attention, have been met with skepticism due to their lack of concrete evidence and credible sources.

Further intensifying the speculations, General SVR, the aforementioned Telegram channel, has been at the forefront of circulating stories about Putin’s health. Some of the channel’s claims have bordered on the implausible, including allegations that Putin experienced convulsions, had an assassination attempt in Moscow, and was scheduled for emergency surgery in 2022. These reports, however, have consistently been presented without substantial evidence or reliable sources to back them.

Reacting to the whirlwind of rumors, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov took a firm stance, dismissing all such speculations. In a recent press conference, Peskov emphasized the president’s robust health, stating, “President Putin is fit and well.” Addressing the body double rumor specifically, he described it as an “absurd hoax,” adding that such claims evoke nothing but amusement in official circles.

The body double narrative is not new. Back in a 2020 interview, Putin himself confronted these rumors. While he categorically denied employing body doubles, he acknowledged that there had been offers in the past to use one for security reasons. Peskov reiterated this sentiment in April 2023, dismissing talks of Putin using body doubles as “yet another lie.”

Amidst the uncertainty stirred by these speculations, Putin’s active schedule and public appearances provide a contrasting narrative. Known for his vibrant “action man” image, Putin recently celebrated his 71st birthday on October 7. Contrary to suggestions of ill health, he maintains a demanding calendar filled with public meetings, international visits, and official events. Notably, Putin made a significant visit to China recently, coupled with stops in two other Russian cities, showcasing his active participation in international and domestic affairs.

Historically, Putin’s health has always been a subject of intrigue, drawing attention from both domestic and international communities. This curiosity is in part due to the traditionally secretive nature of the Kremlin, which often leaves room for speculations to fester. Over the years, there have been various claims and conjectures about Putin’s health, some even suggesting severe ailments. In 2022, a classified U.S. report indicated that Putin underwent treatment for advanced cancer. Another investigative report by the independent Russian media outlet Proekt Media proposed that Putin might have received medical surgeries between 2016 to 2019.

However, these claims, like many others, often lack concrete evidence and verification, leading many to question their authenticity. In response to the cardiac arrest claims, Peskov stated, “Everything is fine with him, this is another canard, absolutely.”

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olitical assassination is the oldest trick in the book for getting rid of determined opponents. Assassination methods range from poisoning to shooting, and even a world war broke out following a political assassination: World War I erupted when Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian Serb, assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne. Despite the risks involved, political assassinations continue to occur across the world today.

Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner Group, died in a plane crash on August 23, 2023. Two months before his death, Prigozhin, also known as “Putin’s chef” due to his involvement in restaurants and catering services that served the Kremlin, launched a munity against the Russian government. He released a video and a series of audio recordings on Telegram claiming that the Russian military leadership was “evil” and needed to be stopped. He called for the dismissal of the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.

On June 24, Putin made a televised speech in which he claimed that Prigozhin had committed an act of treason and betrayal, and he promised to crush what he called an “armed mutiny.” Just as the situation in Russia was escalating, particularly with Wagner’s forces seizing the city of Rostov-on-Don, Prigozhin ordered his mercenaries to halt their advance on Moscow to avoid “shedding Russia’s blood.” He also agreed to live in exile in Belarus, a result of Belarusian mediation.

However, he never got that far and was found dead in a plane crash north of Moscow, leaving the future of his mercenary group unclear. Many have accused Putin of being responsible for Prigozhin’s death, given his reputation for using assassination to eliminate his opponents. Not surprisingly, the Kremlin has denied any deliberate involvement in the Wagner boss’s death.

Putin’s reputation for assassinating his rivals

The Roman emperor Domitian was famously paranoid about being assassinated. He used to joke: “It’s a terrible thing to be an emperor, because everyone thinks your paranoia about being assassinated is groundless – until you’re actually assassinated.” In fact, he was proven correct, when he was assassinated.

Putin also fears being assassinated or overthrown by his opponents. Earlier this year, there was a drone attack on the Kremlin, and unsurprisingly, Putin claimed it was an attempt on his life. In the words of Simon Sebag-Montefiore, best-selling author of Jerusalem and the Romanovs, Putin has “every reason to fear assassination.”

It is not surprising that many critics of Putin and his policies have been murdered, and many speculate that the Kremlin is behind these murders because of two common denominators among the victims: public criticism of Putin and their sudden deaths. The latest is Prigozhin, who had rebelled against Putin two months before his death. He joins a list of victims who are believed to have been murdered by Putin in order to be silenced.

Anna Politkovskaya, 2006

Anna Politkovskaya was a Russian journalist for NG who advocated for human rights in Russia. She reported on political and social events in Russia, especially the Second Chechen War. She was a critic of the Russian regime, and as a result of her writings, was arrested by the Russian military forces in Chechnya.

In 2004, she was poisoned while flying from Moscow to help resolve the 2004 Beslan school hostage crisis, which forced her to fly back to Moscow for medical treatment. She is also known for her 2004 book Putin’s Russia, which offered a description of Russia from her perspective for Western readers. She was murdered in the elevator of her apartment building on October 7, 2006. In June 2014, five men were sent to prison for her murder, but it remains unclear who ordered or paid for the hit.

Alexander Litvinenko, 2006

Alexander Litvinenko was a British-naturalized Russian defector, who was a former FSB officer in charge of tackling organized crime. He was a prominent critic of Putin and was the first to coin the term “mafia state” to describe Russia under Putin’s regime. He fled to London and became a journalist and consultant for the British intelligence services.

Litvinenko wrote two books, Blowing Up Russia: Terror from Within and Lubyanka Criminal Group, in which he accused the Russian secret services of orchestrating the 1999 Russian apartment bombings and other acts of terrorism on Putin’s orders.

He also accused Putin of ordering the assassination of Anna Politkovskaya. On November 1, 2006, a month after the death of Politkovskaya, Litvinenko was hospitalized after being poisoned by polonium-210. He died from the poisoning on November 23.

Andrey Lugovoy, a former member of the Russian Federal Protective Services (FSO), and Dmitry Kovtun, a former KGB agent, were the main suspects in the British investigation of Litvinenko’s death. The two suspects were never captured. In 2021, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the Russian regime was behind his assassination in the Carter v. Russia case and ordered Russia to pay 100,000 euros in damages.

Natalia Estemirova, 2009

 Natalia Estemirova was a human rights activist and board member of the human rights organization Memorial. She was known for her criticism of the Second Chechen War. Being a widow of a Chechen policeman, she gathered evidence on human rights violations since the beginning of the Second Chechen War.

Estemirova produced thirteen short documentaries about victims who suffered at the hands of Russian law enforcement. On July 15, 2009, she was abducted from her home in Grozny, Chechnya at approximately 8:30 a.m. Eyewitnesses reported that she was pushed into a car while screaming that she was being kidnapped. The Russian authorities later announced that they found her body, along with her belongings, in a wooded area at 4:30 p.m. Memorial claimed that “state terror” was behind her assassination.

Sergei Magnitsky, 2009

Sergei Magnitsky was a tax advisor who was responsible for exposing the Russian regime’s corruption and misconduct against Hermitage Capital Management. He claimed that the Russian government conducted large-scale theft against the company, which was sanctioned and carried out by Russian officials.

He was arrested in 2008 and died in prison before the expiration of the one-year term for which he could legally be held without trial. He became the first person in Russia to face a posthumous trial.

Stanislav Markelov & Anastasia Baburova, 2009

Stanislav Markelov was a Russian human rights lawyer. He was the attorney for Elza Kungaeva’s family, a Chechen woman who was kidnapped and murdered by Russian colonel Yuri Budanov. Budanov was released from prison on January 15, 2009.

On January 19, 2009, Markelov was assassinated while leaving a news conference in Moscow, which was less than 800 meters from the Kremlin. Anastasia Baburova, a journalist for NG who tried to rescue Markelov, was also shot and killed in the attack.

Boris Berezovsky, 2013

 Boris Berezovsky was a Russian business oligarch who made his fortune in Russia in the 1990s. It’s believed that Berezovsky was instrumental in Putin’s rise to power but that since he couldn’t exert any influence under the new leadership, he fell out with Putin. This eventually led to his self-exile to the United Kingdom, where he promised to bring Putin down.

Berezovsky accused the Kremlin of ordering the killing of Alexander Litvinenko. He was assassinated in the UK inside his bathroom, which was locked. A noose was found around his neck, leading to speculation about death by suicide; however, the cause of his death remains a mystery.

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evgeny Prigozhin, the founding head of the private military company (PMC) Wagner Group and known as “Putin’s boss,” was killed in an air strike near Moscow on August 23. In addition to Prigozhin, Dimitry Utkin, Wagner’s second in command, and six others were killed in the accident. A former special forces officer, Utkin was considered one of the strategic brains behind Wagner’s operational activities in various conflict zones. Prigozhin’s death raised questions about the future of Wagner’s activities on the African continent. Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, Libya, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, and Niger are among the countries where Wagner has left its mark.

Wagner’s activities in Africa and the mutiny

Wagner’s presence in Africa serves as a lever for Russia, which is in economic, political, and military competition with Western countries. Wagner, which has no legal basis within Russia’s borders, provides security services based on agreements and in cooperation with authoritarian governments in African countries. In return for these services, Wagner receives various economic concessions. By taking control of precious metals such as gold, diamonds, and oil, the paramilitary group acts in line with Russia’s economic, security, and political interests. The PMC also opens up new markets for Russia at a time when international sanctions are being tightened.

Moscow, which has gained significant influence through the paramilitary group under plausible deniability, does not want to lose this power in the future. In this context, the first discussion about Wagner’s future in Africa came to the fore after the mutiny that began on June 23. However, the rebellion was ended by mutual agreement and three different alternatives were offered to the Wagner staff: demobilization, exile in Belarus, and integration into the Ministry of Defense. In addition, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov acknowledged the existence of Wagner and announced that the PMC would continue its “successful” activities in Africa. These developments sent positive signals to Wagner’s partners in Africa.

Prigozhin’s death and possible scenarios regarding Wagner’s future in Africa

The timing of the visit to Benghazi by Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov is very critical. Yevkurov’s visit took place two days before the accident that killed Prigozhin and his colleagues. Based on this, Yevkurov’s visit raised the scenario that Wagner’s military operations in Libya would be taken over by another private military company working with Russia under a new plan. Shortly before and immediately after Prigozhin’s death, many Wagner personnel were found to have defected to another Russian PMC, Redut. Redut operates under the control of the GRU, Russia’s foreign military intelligence agency, and the Ministry of Defense.

Another scenario is that the Kremlin is reconsidering its military involvement in Sudan, the Central African Republic, the Sahel countries (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger), and Libya. Accordingly, Russia’s abandonment of its covert intervention approach and the shift of its military presence in Africa to a more official dimension can be interpreted as a card against authoritarian governments in Africa that depend on Wagner’s security services in the fight against violent extremism and terrorism.

In this scenario, the flexibility offered by Wagner to the countries concerned could be lost. Instead, there may be more bureaucracy and inertia. Prigozhin’s death some two months after the mutiny suggests that the Ministry of Defense and the intelligence services are trying to buy time to take over Wagner’s network and relationships in Africa during a transition period.

The third scenario is that Wagner continues its activities in new forms despite the loss of its leader. Wagner’s strong network in different parts of Africa, built in the space of ten years, highlights the pragmatic possibility of reshaping the relations that Prigozhin established with the current administrations in line with Russia’s foreign policy interests, rather than disbanding the group.

On the other hand, Wagner’s ability to operate where Moscow has no official or legal presence makes it an indispensable and highly valuable tool of the Kremlin’s foreign policy. However, as a non-state armed actor, Wagner has been associated with Prigozhin since its inception and, as a result, many analysts equate the death of Prigozhin with the end of Wagner.

Wagner after Prigozhin

Regardless of these scenarios, Prigozhin left behind a semi-independent criminal security agency in Africa. For the Kremlin, the economic and geopolitical benefits of Wagner are too critical to be completely abandoned. The coups in the Sahel over the past three years and the ousting of France from the region were part of a strategy in which Wagner plays a key role.

The relative weakening of Wagner, which is an important counterterrorism partner in unstable countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Sudan, and the Central African Republic, will create a fragile security environment for the armies of these countries and lead them to face difficulties in the fight against terrorism.

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evgeny Prigozhin, the founding head of the private military company (PMC) Wagner Group and known as “Putin’s boss,” was killed in an air strike near Moscow on August 23. In addition to Prigozhin, Dimitry Utkin, Wagner’s second in command, and six others were killed in the accident. A former special forces officer, Utkin was considered one of the strategic brains behind Wagner’s operational activities in various conflict zones. Prigozhin’s death raised questions about the future of Wagner’s activities on the African continent. Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, Libya, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, and Niger are among the countries where Wagner has left its mark.

Wagner’s activities in Africa and the mutiny

Wagner’s presence in Africa serves as a lever for Russia, which is in economic, political, and military competition with Western countries. Wagner, which has no legal basis within Russia’s borders, provides security services based on agreements and in cooperation with authoritarian governments in African countries. In return for these services, Wagner receives various economic concessions. By taking control of precious metals such as gold, diamonds, and oil, the paramilitary group acts in line with Russia’s economic, security, and political interests. The PMC also opens up new markets for Russia at a time when international sanctions are being tightened.

Moscow, which has gained significant influence through the paramilitary group under plausible deniability, does not want to lose this power in the future. In this context, the first discussion about Wagner’s future in Africa came to the fore after the mutiny that began on June 23. However, the rebellion was ended by mutual agreement and three different alternatives were offered to the Wagner staff: demobilization, exile in Belarus, and integration into the Ministry of Defense. In addition, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov acknowledged the existence of Wagner and announced that the PMC would continue its “successful” activities in Africa. These developments sent positive signals to Wagner’s partners in Africa.

Prigozhin’s death and possible scenarios regarding Wagner’s future in Africa

The timing of the visit to Benghazi by Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov is very critical. Yevkurov’s visit took place two days before the accident that killed Prigozhin and his colleagues. Based on this, Yevkurov’s visit raised the scenario that Wagner’s military operations in Libya would be taken over by another private military company working with Russia under a new plan. Shortly before and immediately after Prigozhin’s death, many Wagner personnel were found to have defected to another Russian PMC, Redut. Redut operates under the control of the GRU, Russia’s foreign military intelligence agency, and the Ministry of Defense.

Another scenario is that the Kremlin is reconsidering its military involvement in Sudan, the Central African Republic, the Sahel countries (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger), and Libya. Accordingly, Russia’s abandonment of its covert intervention approach and the shift of its military presence in Africa to a more official dimension can be interpreted as a card against authoritarian governments in Africa that depend on Wagner’s security services in the fight against violent extremism and terrorism.

In this scenario, the flexibility offered by Wagner to the countries concerned could be lost. Instead, there may be more bureaucracy and inertia. Prigozhin’s death some two months after the mutiny suggests that the Ministry of Defense and the intelligence services are trying to buy time to take over Wagner’s network and relationships in Africa during a transition period.

The third scenario is that Wagner continues its activities in new forms despite the loss of its leader. Wagner’s strong network in different parts of Africa, built in the space of ten years, highlights the pragmatic possibility of reshaping the relations that Prigozhin established with the current administrations in line with Russia’s foreign policy interests, rather than disbanding the group.

On the other hand, Wagner’s ability to operate where Moscow has no official or legal presence makes it an indispensable and highly valuable tool of the Kremlin’s foreign policy. However, as a non-state armed actor, Wagner has been associated with Prigozhin since its inception and, as a result, many analysts equate the death of Prigozhin with the end of Wagner.

Wagner after Prigozhin

Regardless of these scenarios, Prigozhin left behind a semi-independent criminal security agency in Africa. For the Kremlin, the economic and geopolitical benefits of Wagner are too critical to be completely abandoned. The coups in the Sahel over the past three years and the ousting of France from the region were part of a strategy in which Wagner plays a key role.

The relative weakening of Wagner, which is an important counterterrorism partner in unstable countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Sudan, and the Central African Republic, will create a fragile security environment for the armies of these countries and lead them to face difficulties in the fight against terrorism.

In Switzerland, people filed a petition calling for the deportation of Olympic gymnast Alina Kabaeva, Putin’s alleged mistress and mother of four of his children, drawing 70,828 signatures as of Sunday, March 26, 2022. The petition reads, “It is time to reunite Eva Braun with him,” in reference to Putin.

Kabaeva responded to the petition with dismay and anger, describing it as embarrassing and adding that “there has never been a more shameful page in the history of world sports.”

Kabaeva is the latest victim, among countless others, of rising Russophobia. Thousands of Russian art workers, businesses, and businesspeople face pressure either from Russia or from countries that oppose the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It’s not only businesses under pressure but also Russian culture.

Putinizing all Russians

Shortly after the Russian occupation of Ukraine, anti-Russian opposition began to rise in the Czech Republic. Attacks targeted Russians in the country. Some social media users went too far and made statements such as “It would be nice to somehow mark Russian citizens with a red star.”

Russians were stigmatized and attacked just because they spoke their language. Martin Dlouhý, a professor at the Prague University of Economics and Business, wrote on Facebook on February 24, 2022, that he would not conduct, test, or correct the final thesis of Russian students “due to conscience and moral principles.” Dlouhý deleted the tweet after the backlash.

Czech hotels refused to host Russians. Russian children were attacked in schools, and a woman was kicked out of a taxi just for speaking Russian. Maison de la Poutine restaurant said it received insults and threats after Russia invaded Ukraine—this was because the restaurant is exactly pronounced the same as Putin (Poutine).

Performances by Russian pianist Alexander Malofeev were canceled. His condemnation of the war in Ukraine did not help prevent the cancellation of concerts in both Montreal and Vancouver.

The University of Milano-Bicocca in Italy responded to the Russian invasion of Ukraine by canceling a lecture on Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky. In response, a street artist painted an image of Dostoevsky on a university wall in protest.

Kirill Sokolov, a filmmaker of Ukrainian roots, was excluded from the Glasgow Film Festival despite his anti-war stance because his film has received Russian state funding, according to a spokesperson of the festival.

Many Russians have been excluded from international events because of their nationality, and many Russian businesses have been attacked.

Russian-owned businesses in the U.S. have been the target of backlash because of the war in Ukraine with many businesses being vandalized. Anti-Russian slogans have been written on restaurants’ walls and windows have been smashed. The Russian House restaurant in Washington, D.C. was attacked twice in connection with the war in Ukraine. The owner of the restaurant told the Washington Post that he had received threat calls.

In Tokyo, the Russian shop “Aka no Hiroba” was the target of vandalism. Despite promoting peace since the beginning of the war, it did not escape hate attacks.

Hundreds of bars across the U.S. disposed of their Russian vodka to show solidarity with Ukraine. Russian vodka, as well as all Russian alcoholic beverages, were removed from shelves in the U.S. Meanwhile, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand joined the U.S. in sanctioning vodka and Russian alcoholic beverages, and chain stores in Europe tightened sanctions on Russian products.

Not only Russians but also animals living in Russia got their share of sanctions. The Fédération Internationale Féline, an international federation of cat registries founded in France banned Russian cats from participating in its events due to the war.

Cyberspace and technology became a part of the anti-Russia campaign as well. The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project launched the “Russian Asset Tracker,” a database to track the assets of prominent Russians with ties to Vladimir Putin.

Social media giant Meta allowed users to engage in hate speech against Putin and Russian forces. A Meta spokesperson said, “As a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine we have temporarily made allowances for forms of political expression that would normally violate our rules like violent speech such as death to the Russian invaders. We still won’t allow credible calls for violence against Russian civilians.”

Putin’s speech following the Russian military intervention in Ukraine outlines Russia’s justification on political and military grounds. Putin show determination to intervene in Ukraine but left minds doubtful about how much further Russia could go. Putin’s way of correcting the Russian Head of Intelligence Sergey Naryshkin implied that the Russian military intervention in Ukraine would be limited.

But his subsequent speech indicates a shift of intention. Putin’s recognition of the independence of the self-proclaimed People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk was an overlooked part of the speech. Putin emphasized the absence of a Ukrainian identity and stressed its Russian roots, demographic purification, Soviet investments and favoritism to Ukraine, and the so-called Nazi-type ideology of the Ukrainian leadership—all according to his reading the events.

Russia’s Political Goals and Military Objectives

Military objectives generally target achievable political goals and avoid utopic adventures that may end up in devastation. It is proper to ask, then, whether Russia’s political goals are achievable. This question is related to Russia’s grand strategy. Putin and his comrades represent a generation that enjoyed the triumph of the Russia-dominated Soviet Empire, the demise of the latter, and the emergence as the Russian Federation. It seems highly likely that a romantic yearning for the Russian imperial days of the 18^th century and the Communist Soviet system of the Cold War may be an underlying motivation.

Russian political thinking praises Russian pride, but it is also concerned with survival. Russia needs a story to keep its continent-sized territory functioning and to make its multiethnic yet Russified demography resilient. The danger for the Russian leadership is to experience a further retreat that could make Russia a loose state on the path of collapse. Such a concern makes Putin more assertive and expansionist, mainly across Russia’s perceived sphere of influence.

For instance, Russia gained leverage after the Second Karabakh War by asserting its military presence at the heart of Karabakh for an extendable five-year period. The Kazakhstan stalemate at the beginning of 2022 presented another chance where Russia intervened in the Central Asian states in order to maintain stability. Furthermore, these regions have energy reserves satisfying the appetite of energy seekers as Russia indirectly prepared itself to challenge the energy demand of the broader globe.

Putin’s statements indicate a “nationalist imperialism,” which could have destructive consequences for regional and global orders—let alone Russia itself. Putin’s inclination is nationalist since Russia is at the core of his argument. On the other hand, nationalism in Russian thinking carries the risks of provoking ultranationalism or Slavophobia once a success story is concluded by tangible gains.

Second, Russian private military companies such as the Wagner Group are sent to war zones to support pro-Russian figures such as Khalifa Haftar of Libya and attempt to encircle NATO for strategic leverage such as the Russian military presence in Africa.

Third, mediation has become a primary effort to obtain political and military initiative, as was the case in the Karabakh war and Syria.

Fourth, the Collective Security Treaty Organization has become the platform to inject Russian interests and military presence.

Last, Russia has kept third parties silent through defense sales and military cooperation such as the cases of China, India, and Egypt.

These cases show that Putin successfully employs political and military means by well-planned strategies, the ultimate goal being the survival of Russia through nationalism and expansionism over the Slavic states, and building a sphere of influence in its near abroad.

Russian Strategy in Ukraine

The Russian political goals in Ukraine are threefold. These are the fundamental tenets of the Russian quest for domination: (1) Repelling the West, unified under the NATO umbrella, from Russia’s “borders”; (2) Making the Russian identity dominant over Slavic nations, setting Ukraine as a lesson for the rest; (3) Show the “able” Russia to the former members of the Soviet Union.

Russia needs a success story to achieve its goals and, as a result, Russia’s possible failure on the ground may create undesirable consequences for the Russian identity, once Russians realize their country’s weakness.

This may cause both a disillusionment and a subsequent dissolution in the pro-Russian regimes, including Putin’s Russia. In this context and at this point, Russia’s coercive strategy over Ukraine and its current war with Ukraine have turned to a matter of life and death.

Russian Nuclear Threat

Putin’s order to activate the Strategic Nuclear Forces escalated the military and political tension with the West. Russia regularly updated its nuclear doctrine after 1993 so as to be able to use nuclear weapons if it was not the first to do so. In this sense, Russia challenged the concepts of deterrence and mutually assured destruction (MAD) for atomic warfare. The reason for such a preference would be the following.

Russia knows that its conventional military inventory is aged and cannot win a a full-scale traditional war despite its numeric superiority. Modern warfare, including proxy, hybrid, and asymmetric, defy the Russian conventional capabilities, but the West, or NATO, may hesitate to respond to a nuclear threat.

Nuclear warfare includes tactical and operational assets other than strategic assets. The slow pace of the Russian advance may need a tactical nuclear attack to create a gap in the defense lines of the weaker but stubborn Ukrainian forces. Urban warfare is costly for the Russian conventional forces.

A tactical or operational nuclear attack may clear the cities and push the Ukrainian leadership to accept Russian terms. In short, Russian aggression over Ukraine is related to its expansionism inspired by a political logic based on nationalist imperialism. The primary motivation is to revive Russia’s modern imperialism across its sphere of influence. However, despite Putin’s imperial quest, Russia lacks capacity to sustain a full-scale expansionism due to limited economic diversity, ageing weaponry, and an inconsistent strategy-making process.

The Russia-Ukraine war has revealed the thin and fragile line between the West and Russia in the guise of a new geopolitical power struggle. During and after the Cold War, the two blocs have been waging a power struggle over different countries/regions instead of directly engaging in a hot war. Cuba, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, and finally Syria have been theaters of this struggle.

The Ukraine crisis which emerged over the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and continued with the de facto situation in the Donbass region until last year, has now reached a new phase. There is a new geopolitical showdown between Russia and the U.S.-led Western bloc unfolding before our eyes. But this time, there are some differences from the Cold War era.

Although a common and harsh sanction policy against Russia has begun, one big question is whether the West, as a unified bloc, can walk the same political and strategic line as it did during the Cold War. Principally, there exists the energy issue for members of NATO that are in the European Union (especially Germany), worrying Europe due to lingering uncertainties. And there is not any serious sign that the U.S. has a concrete projection to convince its European allies to replace Russian gas at this point.

What is more, foresight of an intra-European leadership struggle that is likely to emerge between Germany and France in the near future, after Germany’s declaration that it would increase its military power with a large defense budget, suggests that it is possible to talk about multiple scenarios regarding the future architecture of the Transatlantic bloc.

Turkey and the War in Ukraine

Another important aspect of the Ukraine war is the exceptional position of Turkey, which has NATO’s second-largest military and whose role in regional issues significantly increased in recent years. President Erdoğan was able to strengthen both Turkey’s effectiveness and diplomatic power in many regional issues such as northern Syria, Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Southern Caucasus.

What does President Erdoğan calculate to gain from the diplomatic efforts in the Russia-Ukraine war?

Turkey’s ability both to follow independent policies that occasionally conflicted with Russia and to develop joint initiatives with it explains Turkey’s adaptation to the multipolar world order. Now, there is the Ukraine crisis.

So, what does President Erdoğan calculate to gain from the diplomatic efforts in the Russia-Ukraine war? As a political leader who seems to be one of the few leaders of a NATO country with relatively good access to Putin, what could be the advantages and drawbacks of his leadership in diplomacy means?

But in spite of all of this, we see that the two countries stayed away from any serious conflict. For example, while Turkey did not recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea and now the invasion of Ukraine, and has clearly stated its own position in support of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the right of sovereignty on the basis of international law and legitimacy, it has also declared since 2014 that it would not be a part of any sanction against Russia.

Turkey also avoids a confrontation with Russia along with the Western bloc and adopts a strategy of not taking a categorical position, i.e., not joining the sanctions campaign.

Turkey wants to minimize tension that may arise from conflicting interests through immediate and timely intervention and reaching a middle ground with mutual trade-offs when necessary.

Turkey approaches Russia differently than all the other members of the Western bloc, while also insisting on its principal position, i.e., the objection to the annexation of Crimea and to the invasion of Ukraine. Turkey also avoids a confrontation with Russia along with the Western bloc and adopts a strategy of not taking a categorical position, i.e., not joining the sanctions campaign.

Fruits for Turkey

This has recently served to open up a diplomatic space for Turkey as we have seen in Syria. Again, despite various conflicts like those in Libya and in the Mediterranean, Turkey and Russia could take a joint initiative in the process leading up to the Berlin Conference. So, can Erdoğan and Putin find a similar path in Ukraine?

It is primarily important to look at the approaches of the two leaders in times of crisis.

There are two basic elements present in Erdoğan and Putin’s relationship that most leaders do not have in their bilateral relations: timely intervention and playing their cards face up. The main point here is that the two leaders intervene immediately, especially in times of heated tension in the relationship, and open the option of negotiations transparently.

These two aspects helped to ease and settle serious crises in bilateral relations and regional conflicts in the last six years, and helped to find a solution without facing greater catastrophes.

This is, of course, not an alliance relationship. Both leaders could sustain their relationship through dialogue and a search for common ground as they approach each other with politically realistic, flexible, and viable options. Pragmatism lies at the heart of this flexible cooperation, which is more beneficial than conflict for both sides.

Russia is well aware of the costs of a global economic, financial, technological, and social isolation, and the mid- and long-term risks to itself of the prolongation of the war. It is quite possible at this point that Russia has an exit strategy that it plans to use in the process of dialogue with regional or global actors towards the peace negotiations.

Russia and Ukraine Understand Turkey’s Role

Ukrainian President Zelenskiy describes his relationship with Erdoğan with the words of trust. Turkey’s clear emphasis on Ukraine’s territorial integrity and its right of sovereignty for years, its fair approach to Ukraine in the international diplomacy arena, and the bilateral trade and military relations developed recently are the main reasons behind Zelensky’s positive assessment of Turkey.

Zelensky, just like Putin, approaches the issue from a realpolitik and pragmatic point of view. He is well aware that from the first moment the crisis escalated, no leader of any NATO country has had any engagement with Putin that had any potential of concrete and realistic results. As a matter of fact, for Zelensky, the Russian government’s official approval of a list of countries that commit “unfriendly actions” against it confirms the importance of Turkey’s presence at the diplomacy table as the only NATO member that is not on this “unfriendly countries” list and which still has not broken relations with Russia.

On the early morning of February 24, Russia announced a “special military operation” in Ukraine, a move that was described by U.S., European, and other world leaders as a Russian invasion which the Kremlin had no right to carry out. On the same day, thousands of Russian citizens gathered in the squares of major cities chanting anti-war slogans.

The most massive anti-war protest was held in Moscow in Pushkin Square. It was joined by more than 2,000 people, mostly aged between 18 and 30. According to local reporters, around 20-30 people were detained by police. In St. Petersburg, on February 24, there were around 1,000 protesters, and nearly 250 were detained, including a deputy of the “Malaya Okhta” movement, which was founded by the deputy delegates of the district after which it was named. On the same day, the wave of protests swept across other Russian cities and regions including Yekaterinburg, Omsk, and East Siberia.

On Saturday, February 26, people in St. Petersburg and Yekaterinburg took to the streets again. Many chanted “Stop the war” and stated they were ashamed of Putin’s decision. On the same day, in Yekaterinburg, a group of people gathered for a demonstration supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The sit-in was approved by the police.

The Russian police did not react as severely as was expected. Protesters in Yekaterinburg and Moscow said the police officers were more or less polite and did not behave violently. Yet, some brutal reactions by the police were reported by Oleg Dilimbetov, a Kommersant correspondent in St. Petersburg, who said they “grabbed everyone who took out a poster, broke into the chanting crowd, dragging people on the ground, including women.”

There were also anti-war protests in Russia on the Internet. A petition on Change.org, created on Thursday, February 24, demanding an “immediate ceasefire by the Russian armed forces and their withdrawal from the territory of the sovereign state of Ukraine,” gathered nearly 850,000 signatures with 300,000 people singing the petition in the first few hours of its launch. Among the signatories were renowned Russian actors, movie directors, cultural celebrities, politicians, and ordinary Russian citizens.

The nature of Russian anti-war protests

To understand the nature of the anti-war protests in Russia, it is enough to remember the close cultural and ethnic ties between Ukraine and Russia. At least one third of Russians have relatives in Ukraine, according to Levada-center, Russia’s major nongovernmental polling and sociological research organization. Many of those who took to the streets confirmed the same fact: they either had far or close family relationships with people in Ukraine, including the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Second, protests in Russia were spontaneous and not organized. No one expected the situation to deteriorate so quickly. According to Andrey Rusakov, the director of the Center of European and Asian Studies at the Ural State University of Economics in Russia, the nature of protests does not have a systematic character.

Behind the 2014 public demonstrations, there were mainly economic reasons and mistrust against the authorities. Many people believed that Russia was organizing protests to distract people’s attention from the financial crisis and the significant drop of the Russian currency. Now, the anti-war protesters are against military action and the loss of human life.

What does Russia want? What do Russians want?

The nature of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2014 was different than the one we have today. The annexation of the Crimea, according to the Russian authorities, “was in full accordance with the international law and was without a single drop of blood.”

Today, the scale of the conflict is much larger. It is more than just Russia-Ukraine. While at the very beginning, there were two opposite social groups in Russia – the supporters and opponents of the military operation – now the general public attitude towards the war is negative.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky ended his emotional address to the Russian people, which he made in Russian, by asking, “Do Russians want war?” He stressed that Russians and Ukrainians are different, but that’s not a reason to be enemies.

“Note that I’m talking now [about Donbass] in Russian, but no one in Russia understands what these names, these streets mean to us; these names, these events are alien and unfamiliar to you. This is our land. This is our history. What will you fight for and with whom?” Zelensky added.

Yet, the speech of the Ukrainian president did not have much effect on Russian society. And here is why: Zelensky does not have much authority as a political leader among Russians. A comedic actor in the past, his speech seemed to mimic Putin’s style, something that many Russian users commented on under the video.

Second, Zelensky addressed the Russian people asking them to stop the war, but the decision to start the military operation was made solely by the Russian president, even without informing ministers who work closely with him. Looking back at the Crimea process, many Russians understand there is no going back from the current operation, whether they like it or not. As a result, there is a high degree of uncertainty and lack of information as to what might happen next.

The conflict between the “European” West and the “Russian” East in Ukraine goes back to the early 2000s, long before 2014. The southeast regions of Ukraine are behind the largest portion of the country’s budget but have traditionally been against joining NATO.

The western regions have supported EU integration and tended to stand apart from Russia in every possible way; for example, the national status of the Russian language in the western territories of Ukraine was abolished. Nationalism movements in Ukraine started in the early 2000s, and gradually became more influential among Ukrainian people.

As a result, people in western Ukraine started considering themselves as privileged, while residents in the east essentially provided for the economy but were treated as second-class citizens. This resulted in regular clashes between Ukrainians and the demonization of the country’s eastern parts, including Donetsk and Luhansk. After the annexation of Crimea by Russia, the conflict was further aggravated.

A possible scenario of ending the war today is admitting the “neutral status” of Ukraine, the phrase that has been used by Zelensky in his appeal for negotiations. Russian President Vladimir Putin responded immediately, suggesting a meeting of the two countries’ delegations in Minsk. According to Andrey Rusakov, Russia may also be planning to change the political regime in Ukraine with the assignment of a pro-Russian political figure.

The world is witnessing a dramatic revival of the 20^th-century bipolar geopolitical order featuring the Soviet Union, today’s Russia, on the one side, and the United States on the other. This power struggle has shown one of its ugliest faces in Syria and now is showing itself in Eastern Europe with the Russia-Ukraine war. As we slowly leave the nightmare of the COVID19 pandemic behind, a new global tension is born with the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

But, there’s a region where this rivalry between the U.S. and Russia might be writing a new chapter: Latin America. Latin America is a competitive territory, abundant in natural and human resources, that could be the dream of any world superpower.

On February 3, the Colombian Minister of Defense Diego Molano stated, “We know that men and units of the FANB (Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana) have been mobilized towards the border with technical assistance from Russia … and Iran.”

This happened amidst the tensions in the eastern Colombian region of Arauca, an enclave of borderline between Colombia and Venezuela, where clashes between the Colombian army and different subversive groups occur constantly and where in January alone at least 68 people were killed.

The day after, the Russian embassy in Colombia issued a statement condemning Molano’s statement as “irresponsible” and denying any involvement in military assistance to Venezuela that could harm Colombia.

But this was not the first time Molano makes a reference to Russia. In May 2021, Colombia was under one of the most turbulent revolts in the country when millions took to the streets to protest against the government’s handling of the pandemic, the critical social situation, tax reforms, and other essential issues.

Molano accused Russia of being behind cyberattacks against the Colombian government.

This extraordinary event, in a country where civil society used to be scared to raise its voice, shook the establishment and evidently made it unusually nervous. Molano then accused Russia of being behind cyberattacks against the Colombian government, an assertion immediately denied by the Russian government.

On December 8, 2021, Minister Molano signed another treaty with NATO turning Colombia into the first and only “global partner” in Latin America. The agreement’s purpose was to “improve our defense capacity” and to “articulate cooperation with allied nations.” This is something neighboring Venezuela didn’t receive well. Nor did its ally, Russia.

Sergei Ryabkov, deputy foreign minister of Russia, said that he would “neither confirm nor deny” the possibility that Russia might send military assets to Cuba and Venezuela.

On the other hand, Venezuela has strong diplomatic, military, and economic ties with Russia. Since Hugo Chávez became president of Venezuela, both nations have entrenched their relationships. Now with President Maduro, these ties have deepened. On February 16 of last year, Maduro received Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yury Borisov in Caracas, and expressed Venezuela’s support for any Russian move on Ukraine.

The main issue discussed in the meeting was the strategic military cooperation between Russia and Venezuela. As a precedent, in January, Sergei Ryabkov, deputy foreign minister of Russia, during talks with his counterparts in the United States said that he would “neither confirm nor deny” the possibility that Russia might send military assets to Cuba and Venezuela if the U.S. and its allies do not limit their military activities in Latin America.

Venezuela is estimated to have received around $17 billion in loans from Russia since 2007, spending an unknown but presumably considerable amount on the purchase of weapons from the Kremlin. In the oil industry, the main source of income for both states, Russia has played a considerable role by taking part in the trade of this commodity, finding clients that evade the U.S.-imposed sanctions on Venezuela, thus giving some oxygen to the South American nation’s fragile economy.

There are at least 20 areas of cooperation between Russia and Venezuela, mainly, energy, military, and transportation. Other countries, in the political orbit of Venezuela, like Bolivia and Nicaragua, also have good ties with Moscow. Cuba, the oldest Russian friend in the region, is no longer alone.

Is the United States losing its “backyard” in Latin America?

In light of this reality and Russian influence in Latin America, it is easy to guess that the United States may not be very pleased with the situation. Things may get even harder for the U.S. considering that in May this year, Colombians will elect a new president and leftist candidate Gustavo Petro seems the most likely to win. Petro maintains an approach based on resuming diplomatic ties with Venezuela. The Colombian people are increasingly reluctant to any form of confrontation with Venezuela and the popular support for Duque’s right-wing government is constantly seeing new lows.

The U.S. worries about the presence of countries other than Russia in Latin America – namely, Iran and China. Iran and China have been building stronger ties with Venezuela and other Latin American nations. Considering that countries like Chile, Mexico, Argentina, and Costa Rica have turned to the political left in the last few years, and that other regional giants like Colombia and Brazil may do the same soon, the task for U.S. diplomacy may require exerting more efforts in the years to come to assure that their eastern antagonists – the Russians – fail to conquer what they consider to be theirs. The Monroe Doctrine, which states that “America is for Americans,” could become obsolete in the decades ahead.

The fear of some Colombians and Venezuelans lies in what history has taught them: when empires fight, small nations suffer. Even though it is clear that the characteristics of Latin America are substantially different than those of the peoples of the Middle East or Eastern Europe, the textbook of empires has always been the same: find a puppet in a rich place, appropriate people’s wealth, conquer another wealthy nation, and let the locals be the ones whose blood spills.

Only time will tell if Latin America will become the next playground for mighty powers such as the U.S. and Russia, or if they find a third way that shields them from becoming history’s latest tragic example.

The war in Ukraine has brought about a significant change in the politics of alliance between Russia and Belarus. Alexander Lukashenko provided the territory of Belarus for Russia’s deployment of its military equipment, which allowed for missile launches and the deployment of ground forces heading towards Ukraine. The Belarusian regime was condemned for its decision to support Russia, eventually becoming the target of further sanctions due to the “support for, and facilitation of, the invasion” of Ukraine by Russia, which were introduced by the United States on February 24, and followed by the UK and Japan shortly after.

The alignment of the Belarusian position with the Russian one has been unprecedented. Prior to 2020, both allies had concerns about the other’s reliability, producing a tension known as “intra-alliance security dilemma” that is underpinned by a combination of two internal forces: the “fear of abandonment,” which refers to being deserted or losing support (including political) based on the perception of a risk that the partner will defect in the face of significant costs emerging from prospective actions; and the “fear of entrapment,” which refers to the possibility of being dragged, via one’s alliance commitments, into a conflict over interests held by an ally, even though one might not be a party to those interests.

Considering the state of the Russia-Belarus alliance politics in 2022, the Russian fear of (political) abandonment was mitigated given the mutual solidarity of the two authoritarian countries’ leaders shifting into dictatorship. When Vladimir Putin’s extended support to Lukashenko in the aftermath of mass social protests and the political crisis in 2020, he guaranteed Lukashenko’s political survival, at a time when the West, responding to mass human rights violations, repressions, and torture in Belarus, started to adopt sanctions.

Russia and Belarus: Mutual support

Russia’s unwavering support continued in May 2021, after the forced landing of Ryanair Flight 4978 and during the 2021-2022 migration crisis at Belarus’s borders with its Western neighboring countries (provoking a ban on EU aircraft flying over Belarus in addition to further, and more extensive, sanctions packages).

Lukashenko’s alignment with the position of Russia on the war in Ukraine may not be fully surprising, but it does stand in stark contrast with the previous policy. Prior to 2020, and especially following 2014 Russia’s annexation of Ukraine, the Belarusian regime was highly conscious of the implications of Moscow’s growing control over Belarus, including via the rapid exploitation of unrest. Back then, Belarus’ active Western diplomacy and Belarusian divergence from the Russian position on a number of points earned Belarus the title of Russia’s “containing ally.”

Today, however, the Belarusian regime is endorsing Moscow’s controversial decisions, including, a de jure recognition of Crimea as a part of the Russian Federation (which took Lukashenko over seven years). And in the days that marked the beginning of Russia’s invasion, Lukashenko, while reiterating that the Belarusian soldiers were not fighting in Ukraine, stated that they could be deployed in the future.

Who will pay a high price? 

Finally, Belarus and Ukraine are two Slavic nations that share a special affinity, and this makes a label of an aggressor towards a brotherly nation especially difficult to bear. The leadership and the population of Ukraine feels betrayed by Lukashenko who has been personally reassuring Kyiv for years that Belarus would not become a platform for aggression against Ukraine.

Even though the Belarusian society has no influence over the Belarusian regime, the war in Ukraine has been casting a shadow over the Belarusian people as a whole. Sudden mistrust and even ostracization have been reported by Belarusian volunteers in their contacts with the Polish and Ukrainian border guards and the Ukrainian population as a whole.

Prominent Belarusians who paid a high price for their position of openly condemning the Belarusian regime in 2020, such as  Melitina Staniouta, have also noted a distinctive treatment “due to the passport.” Reflections of such a changing position towards Belarusians as a whole have emerged, paradoxically, as anti-war protests have been spreading in Belarus – a country where any dissenting voice is a crime by definition, and where it takes no more than a retweet for one to be imprisoned.

Belarusian protesters are certainly aware of the mass and ongoing repressions in their country that have produced 1,076 officially recognized political prisoners as of March 1, 2022; of severe human rights violations; and of torture in prisons and detainment facilities. However, they have not stopped raising their voices, even after 800 protesters have been detained as of February 27.

As the war in Ukraine continues, the world needs to be reminded: the Belarusian regime and the people of Belarus are not the same. As suggested by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borell, Belarusian protestors have to be applauded for their courage and support for Ukraine.

Vladimir Putin has crossed a line which seemed impassable for many. By launching a full-scale attack on Ukraine to revise the post-Cold War order, he has resurrected old fears in Europe and far beyond.

Are those who cannot come to terms with the past doomed to repeat its mistakes?

Many argue that Russia has always sought to satisfy its needs through conflict and by attacking others. Therefore, we should not be surprised by their full-scale military operations in a sovereign country.

Putin’s plan to restore the imperial power of Russia was evident as early as 2008 when he attacked Georgia.

This is because the irrationality here is only apparent. Putin has most likely prepared the country for such a development by hoarding huge currency reserves and making arrangements with China for the sale of its raw materials. His calculation probably includes the annexation of some of the Ukrainian territories in the east and south, and possibly leaving Ukraine bleeding without resources and unable to lift itself up from the misery.

He aims to recreate the status quo that existed before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fact that he is achieving this by seemingly irrational methods that generate gigantic costs for Russia itself is another matter.

Putin’s iron grip

In the hours up to the invasion, Putin recognized the independence of the self-proclaimed People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk – everything in an usurpatory attempt to redraw the map according to his own liking and to undermine the international order. These areas, governed by pro-Russian separatists, have been steadily moving closer to Moscow for a long time, and the world has sat back and watched.

Putin did not even refrain from questioning Ukraine’s existence, asserting that “Ukraine never had a tradition of genuine statehood,” and that the nation now known as Ukraine was carved out of Russia by Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin.

Putin is showing that he is prepared to go to great lengths to turn back the clock and re-subjugate Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact-era territories to Russia. For the time being, he is active in Belarus and Ukraine.

Putin’s motivations are serious, as he demonstrated back in 2005 when he stated that the “collapse of the USSR was not only the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century but also a real drama for Russians.”

Resetting world order

The boundaries of Putin’s fantasies can be reconstructed – albeit with some difficulty. Some experts believe that for him the pinnacle of the development of Russian statehood was Stalin’s centralized empire, where all decisions were taken by Moscow, but appearances in the form of the national flags of the republics were retained. Putin, however, seems to want to be surrounded by vassal states like Belarus.

For many years, Belarus leader Alexander Lukashenko has systematically delayed taking any binding decisions regarding a federation with Russia. The federal state therefore has remained a theory for nearly two decades.

For many years, Belarus leader Alexander Lukashenko has systematically delayed taking any binding decisions regarding a federation with Russia.

The situation changed in 2020 when mass street protests spilled across Belarus after the rigged presidential elections. Minsk became isolated by the West and suffered under sanctions, offering the perfect opportunity for Russia to become a guarantor of the stability of Lukashenko’s grip on power.

Apart from that, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and other post-Soviet states are highly likely to complete Putin’s wish list.

A new old power base

The prospect of challenging the “American world order” must be very tempting for a former KGB officer brought up in hatred and distrust of the U.S. Is Putin sensical with this? His black-and-white vision of the world explains not only his obsession with empire but also his fears over Russia’s declining population. For on almost every occasion, Putin has repeated that there should be more inhabitants in Russia. But, where to find the right number of people in a country with rising mortality and chronic poverty?

There is one way out – at least for Putin: empire building.

Russia is not very tempting economically (the exception being the corporations draining its natural resources), and its economic integration initiatives for former Soviet states are coming apart at the seams. But Putin has many tanks that can be deployed abroad, and as Lenin taught, “War is the continuation of politics only by other means.”

In sum, an empire can be built for a variety of reasons. Some believe that Russia is doomed to expand, otherwise, it will be torn apart by an explosion from within. The accumulated social discontent, which cannot be discharged due to poor governance, must be directed towards external conquests.

In the ultimatum presented to NATO in December last year, Putin demanded the withdrawal of the alliance’s troops and the related infrastructure behind the Oder River that separates Poland from Germany. This would immediately create a “grey security zone” from the borders of Russia to the western border of Poland. This means that with a forward-looking and aggressive Russia, Putin would create his own “sphere of influence.”

“Russia’s border doesn’t end anywhere,” as Putin once jokingly said. There’s only a horizon in Russia.

The current and latest waves of upheaval in international relations and the global order that have been precipitated by the Russian military operations in Ukraine in the latest iteration of the Ukrainian crisis are likely to have significant implications, even if the war is not yet over. The situation creates a lot of rumors and speculations regarding what will stem from these events in the wider world, beyond the war zone.

How will the Russia-Ukraine War affect the stance of countries that have historically followed a non-aligned or neutral status? Past political and military tensions with Russia have been used to open public discussion in Finland and Sweden, and to lobby for the idea of breaking with the past security identity policy and join NATO.

The Past and Public Opinion in Sweden and Finland on the NATO Debate

Sweden and Finland have a rhetorical tradition of neutrality or at least non-alignment in times of armed conflict. Sweden has adopted this stance after a disastrous series of wars with Russia in the 18th and 19th centuries, culminating in the loss of Finland during the Napoleonic Wars. Finland adopted the non-aligned strategy as a national survival mechanism in the wake of the struggles and challenges of being caught between the geopolitical ambitions of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany during World War II (known as the Winter War of 1939-1940 and the Continuation War of 1941-44). The Swedish stance has evolved over time and circumstances, driven by mainstream establishment politics.

Historically, Sweden has walked a very fine line that defies its claim to neutrality or non-alignment, for example sending arms to Finland during the Winter War, Swedish volunteers serving in the Nazi SS (Protection Squadron), or deporting Baltic civilians and soldiers back to the waiting Soviet NKVD, the predecessor to the KGB. In the wake of the Cold War, Sweden undertook large defence cuts to a self-sufficient military structure created to deter either side, but also drew closer to NATO cooperation.

The Swedish government’s political rhetoric in the 21st century began to move away from the word “neutral” and even downplayed non-alignment as a policy. Conflict events occurring elsewhere were used to try to gauge and manipulate public opinion to be more positive towards NATO membership. The events in Crimea in 2014 were used to shift public opinion, though unsuccessfully. What did shift public opinion was the story of a “Russian submarine” in the Stockholm Archipelago.

Although, the Swedish political elite favors NATO membership, the population is less enthusiastic.

Although, the Swedish political elite favors NATO membership, the population is less enthusiastic. Finland has also faced dilemmas, especially concerning the historical legacy of the country and its attitude towards neutrality or at least non-alignment. There have been periods of NATO lobbying Finland and Sweden to join the alliance, for example, in the wake of the alleged “Russian” submarine sightings near Stockholm and Helsinki (Helsinki – the two countries are the only non-NATO members in the Baltic Sea other than Russia).

But, for now, the issue of NATO membership is still off the table as the countries’ governments lack sufficient parliamentary and public support to push through such a “controversial” security proposal.

Rather, there is the understanding that the Russia-Ukraine War provides the basis for spurring a broader debate. Meanwhile, Finland has adopted what it calls the “NATO option provision,” whereby if it feels that NATO membership is required for ensuring Finnish security, it will begin the membership application process.

The general opinion and consensus of various non-partisan observers on the two countries’ attitude and prospects towards joining NATO is that there is currently limited likelihood of this happening in the immediate future. In spite of the external and foreign environment and pressures that create an increasingly closer relationship between these countries and NATO, there are sufficient divisions and constraints in domestic politics that hinder the pursuit of such a move.

Possible Consequences of the Different Scenarios 

Finland and Sweden’s neutrality/non-alignment status has long been used as a means of regulating and managing their geopolitical security, and to navigate the pitfalls and traps of getting actively involved in the wars of larger belligerent powers. These national foreign policy identities have been successful for both countries in preventing undue foreign interference and manipulation from the time of the Cold War onwards.

The identity of being neutral or at least non-aligned has signaled an independence from what Russia in the last two decades has seen as an increasing threat from NATO. Although there are differences and strains in the diplomatic relations between the two Nordic countries and Russia, the relations are on the basis of what can be classified as a “cold friendship.” Should Sweden or Finland actually join NATO, it would without a doubt change Russia’s security calculations concerning both countries pushing them to an enemy or adversary status.

Consequently, the notion of collective security by joining NATO is likely to have the opposite effect through increasing the collective insecurity of the two countries based on the new relationship that will result from their sovereign choice. It becomes a matter of achieving a harmony between freedom of action and a reasoned security perception that avoids the geopolitical traps experienced by both Finland and Sweden in their respective national histories.

What did France’s President think he was doing by visiting Putin in Moscow? On the anniversary of the EU adopting the Maastricht Treaty – heavily backed by France – a lot has changed in the world. But Macron hasn’t changed his own vision of France and is still living in the 90s where the Republic had more clout on the world’s stage and Russia was just rebuilding itself after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The long table stunt was pure genius by Putin, who knows a good media opportunity when it walks in the room. The ruse, to make Macron look pathetic, servile and very much a servant at the master’s table paid off as Macron was blindsided by the media arrangements, too obsessed with his moment in the global media spotlight.

Compared to other world leaders who visited Putin – Merkel, Trump and just recently Erdogan – Macron was certainly treated with a certain contempt, which reflects exactly how the  Russian leader regards the EU project and Macron himself. Lightweights.

Macron paid a heavy price consequently to agree to the long table photo shoot which served as an example of how out of touch he is and how desperate he is to promote himself as a world leader, weeks ahead of the Presidential elections in France which will probably reinstall him as the country’s premier.

He believes in a European pillar within NATO and that France should lead such a farcical vanguard, which is really what the visit to Putin was about. He undermined NATO entirely and even went as far as to support Russia’s presence in Eastern Ukraine all in exchange for the meeting itself which he really believed would make him shine at home with the voters and embolden his banal ideas of an EU army, led by France which supposedly would deter Putin.

The Russian leader’s threats are very real and Macron’s visit and the hilarious memes which followed gave Putin even more kudos.

All nonsense and wildly deluded. In reality what we saw by the move was that it merely enshrined Putin even more and affirmed him as a powerful leader of a mighty super power which, unlike the West, does not have a reputation of talking big but then retreating when someone calls its bluff. Putin is not Obama. The Russian leader’s threats are very real and Macron’s visit and the hilarious memes which followed gave Putin even more kudos and placed Russia where it has wanted to be but failed for twenty years – in a superior position where the West is actually listening to its security concerns. Macron just walked straight into a media trap and gave Putin exactly what he wanted: a snapshot of the West on its knees with cavernous, weak, ambitious leaders begging for sympathy.

Macron is part of a political elite which since Maastricht has treated Russia with contempt. In particular, the EU’s role in pushing Kiev to mull NATO membership was foolish and has led to the present crisis. The photo itself of the long table will be logged in the annals of history as the key moment where Russia no longer takes the EU and the West seriously as the tipping point now is in Russia’s favor.

Putin will be delighted by how the meeting went. Macron really got nothing accept mockery on the internet, while the EU and NATO had to just look on as puerile spectators while he made everyone look like second rate players.

Aside from the memes on the internet which just made Macron look stupid, there are some important messages there which Putin’s media people manipulated. The main message is that Russia has the advantage however the Ukraine debacle turns out. It is the lion, surrounded by mice.

The winner takes it all. And Putin is winning even more now after Macron gave him this latest media coup.

Macron’s embarrassing charade merely supported this. A French president who has delusional views about his own status in the world organizing himself a personal visit to see the Russian president doesn’t make France look like the super power that it would like to project of itself, more like a corrupt, minor EU member state which allows its president to manipulate its own media, led by a man who clearly doesn’t have any respect for the fourth estate.

France today is struggling to come to terms with its new demise and Macron’s visit just underlined this as he walked away a loser. The winner takes it all. And Putin is winning even more now after Macron gave him this latest media coup.

Another message from Putin is that he is neither scared nor bothered by the threat of sanctions from the West, which is really what the whole row is about. Sanctions alone will be difficult on Putin and in particular his close circle of tycoons who have huge investments in London. But as Biden has proved, secondary sanctions imposed on a handful of countries which buy oil from Iran, are very hard these days to implement and Putin has made it clear that, if necessary, he will trade sanctions for an invasion of some sort, if the West doesn’t engineer a way of Ukraine talking down NATO membership.

Of course, if Putin sent his own troops into those regions, Macron may well be delighted as this would give even more gravitas to his idea of an EU army. The problem of course is that the French leader doesn’t want to send French troops to a war zone with Russia, as he has proved by speeding up his own withdrawal of troops in Mali, once the presence of Russian mercenaries just recently emerged. But it will be that iconic picture of the long table which will haunt Macron as the Russian media machine will be the victor. As Churchill once said, history is written by winners. And that snapshop of the long table makes it quite clear who the winners and losers are.

The situation in Ukraine is becoming more and more dangerous each day with additional Russian troops and military equipment heading towards the border. Some reports and analyses predict that Russia may initiate a full-blown military conflict any time although a large-scale ground invasion is unlikely given the consequences Russia would face for such a move. Despite the unprecedented troop movement towards Ukraine, Russia’s strategy seems to be headed towards a grand bargaining with the U.S. at a time when the West is visibly fragmented.

The lack of sufficient European security assurances and military aid to Ukraine demonstrates that there are limits to how much help the country can receive against Russia. Russia’s smart foreign policy strategy that targets the West’s unity and the shifting focus of the U.S. from Eastern Europe to the Pacific are two of the most important parameters that limit the West’s ability to counter Russia.

Russia’s foreign policy strategy is aimed at further weakening the West’s cohesion and thus depleting impairing the position of the latter against it. To regain its lost power and status with the dissolution of the USSR, Russia strove to become a strong economic and military power while targeting the unity of the West through developing bilateral economic and energy relations with European countries.

Having become Europe’s largest energy supplier, Russia managed to carve out a form of coexistence with Europe. Despite being aware of such a threat and the existence of common platforms such as the EU and NATO, European nations have not been able to meet on common ground against Russia.

The shift of the U.S. foreign policy priority from Eastern Europe to the Pacific limited Western efforts to counterbalance Russia.

The shift of the U.S. foreign policy priority from Eastern Europe to the Pacific has also played a significant role in limiting Western efforts against Russia. Within the framework of China’s rapid economic growth that has acquired momentum since the early 2000s and in order to balance China, the U.S. diminished its security commitments in the Middle East and pulled out of Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. moved thousands of its troops overseas from NATO bases in Europe to its bases in the Pacific.

According to the budget of the United States Department of Defense, China is the country’s  number one target. With the U.S. giving more emphasis on China, its European allies are looking to manage their security with diminished U.S. involvement. Having made a habit of outsourcing their security to the U.S. throughout the Cold War and beyond due to the lack of appropriate mechanisms under the EU roof, the Europeans were caught off guard by the type of challenge Russia created in Eastern Europe.

It should be noted that Turkey is in a precarious situation since it is developing relations with Russia within the framework of Turkey’s pursuit of an independent foreign policy strategy. Turkey’s sale of Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine is being cautiously observed by Russia. Putin described the sale as “destructive behavior” in a phone conversation with Erdoğan. Turkey also proposed to act as a mediator in the crisis between Ukraine and Russia, a call both countries received favorably.

Germany and France, the EU’s strongest economies, remained hesitant when it came to providing military aid to Ukraine.

Germany and France, the EU’s strongest economies, remained hesitant when it came to providing military aid to Ukraine. In her visit to Kyiv, German Foreign Minister Baerbock refused to promise military aid to Ukraine citing the restrictive nature of Germany’s arms control policy. However, such hand-wringing may also have to do with the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, which will transport Russian natural gas directly to Europe circumventing Ukraine when it is completed.

In August 2021, during Merkel’s visit to Ukraine after the completion of Nord Stream 2, Ukraine’s President Zelensky and Merkel revealed their differences regarding the issue. Ukraine also protested Germany’s blocking of British arms in its airspace. Critics point out the double-standards of Germany’s arms sales citing its record-breaking arms exports to Egypt last year.

Following the footsteps of Germany, France, on top of not providing any concrete military assistance to Ukraine protested Ukraine’s use of Turkish-made drones in the battlefield – a  stance that angered Ukraine. At the end of the day, Ukraine was not able to receive support from leading European Union members.

The latest reports suggest that more anti-tank missiles might be coming to Ukraine as multiple Baltic nations received approval from the U.S. to send American-made anti-tank missiles to Ukraine. Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, along with Poland, are the most sensitive NATO member states vis-à-vis the Russian threat. Rising tensions in Ukraine stirred fear in the Baltic nations which fear that they might be Russia’s next target.

In the late 2000s, a plan for the placement of U.S. missiles in Poland created an outrage in Russia, which considered the move as a provocative one. Baltic nations, however, will be unable to send any German-made weapons to Ukraine as Germany blocks arms exports from third countries as well.

The supply of military weapons in the form of anti-tank missiles is intended to be used in the event of a ground invasion of Ukraine by Russia. Such an invasion may never materialize, but Russia’s threat to European security and the unity of NATO will persist. A long-term solution to the regional crisis could come only through concerted efforts to strengthen the Ukrainian armed forces.

As the crisis escalates, the limits of Germany’s and France’s readiness to protect European security emerges. The security challenge Russia created for Europe in Ukraine will continue to haunt it until Russia is either reassured or deterred. Europe’s apparent failure to deter Russia through providing sufficient military support to Ukraine may encourage future Russian provocations and endanger European security and unity.

On January 15, 2022, military personnel deployed by the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – a Russia-dominated international security organization that in addition to Russia itself includes Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan – started to leave Kazakhstan. This operation, officially dubbed a “peacekeeping mission,” involved the deployment of 2,500 paratroopers on the territory of Kazakhstan and became the first event of this type carried out by the CSTO since its creation in 1992.

The operation was launched after Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev forwarded his official request to members of the CSTO for assistance to deal with massive public protests that ultimately resulted in widespread violence and instability causing massive (in)direct economic losses and dozens of victims and that broke out in Kazakhstan in early January. Mass protests in Kazakhstan, Central Asia’s most stable country economically, started over the government’s unpopular decision to double gas prices, which affected the most vulnerable layers of the Kazakhstani society.

Having started in Zhanaozen (Mangystau Region) on January 2 – a region that has experienced public protests before – under mainly economic slogans, the protests soon spread to all major cities, despite the fact that Tokayev dismissed the government and ordered that gas prices return to their previous level. The protests reached their culmination in Almaty, where events took a particularly dramatic turn.

In his official statement, Tokayev called protesters “bandits and terrorists,” stating that “foreign states” had masterminded the protests and were organizing a de facto foreign invasion of the country. Tokayev’s opinion was immediately shared by leaders of both Belarus and Russia, where President Vladimir Putin classified events in Kazakhstan as “aggression of international terrorism.”

After several days of instability that witnessed, among others, multiple instances of vandalism, despicable violence, and full-fledged street fighting between the protestors and the Kazakh security forces, Tokayev managed to take control of the situation in all major cities and Kazakhstan started to return back to normal life gradually. While neither the circumstances of the tragic events have been fully revealed nor is it completely apparent how the Kazakhstani domestic milieu and foreign policy will evolve, three macro aspects should be highlighted.

First, the completion of the (para)military mission in Kazakhstan by the Russian-led CSTO is a vocal claim that this organization – unlike the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or similar projects – is a living entity whose operational scope and ambitions are likely to expand. It is also quite clear that when attempting to increase its influence in Central Asia, Russia, in light of the absence of other trump cards, is likely to rely increasingly on its so-called security export mechanism, i.e., Russia’s use of (para)military help and assistance to other countries facing security threats and challenges.

Third, the current mission of the CSTO in Kazakhstan might not become the last instance when the organization`s resources are used in Central Asia. It is highly likely that with Russia`s growing interest and involvement therein, the macro-region, which is rife with ethnic-religious conflicts and permeated with disagreements that have recently (once again) resulted in a (para)military conflict on the Tajik-Kyrgyz border leading to multiple casualties, might soon become a battleground between powerful players once again.

Indeed, Central Asia is a resource-endowed and strategic geographic location which is indispensable for establishing steady logistical ties between the East and West, and that once again has turned into an intersection of the strategic interests of such powerful players as Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, India, Pakistan, and the United States as well as a space for the emerging risks and uncertainties posed by the Taliban rise to power in Afghanistan.

Central Asia is a resource-endowed and strategic geographic location which is indispensable for establishing steady logistical ties between the East and West.

In light of all the above, another important aspect needs to be underscored: on January 10, 2022, Alexander Lukashenko unequivocally, and somewhat unexpectedly, warned the Uzbek authorities that they have to consider seriously the prospect of a repetition of events similar to Kazakhstan’s on their territory. Apparently, this statement, which was firmly rebutted by the Uzbek political leadership that stated that the country has enough resources to deal with a similar crisis was meant to convey the idea (arguably, circulated from Moscow) that Uzbekistan should consider (re)joining the CSTO – Uzbekistan was once a member of the CSTO but left the organization on two occasions, in 2006 and 2012.

Interestingly enough, when following events in Kazakhstan, part of Uzbek intellectual circles and the policymaking community while generally supporting Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s confidence in Uzbekistan’s ability to solve problems independently still argued that in case the challenge would exceed these capabilities “Uzbekistan might ask the Russian Federation, as its ally, for help and assistance.”

Finally, it is quite curious to note that only several months ago Russia, whose economic potential and “soft power” in Central Asia are considerably lagging behind actors such as China that exerts influence via the Belt and Road economic mega project and Turkey whose influence is premised on ethnic-cultural and religious pivots, seemed to have very few competitive advantages in the macro-region. Today, the situation appears to be getting more complex and challenging.

The fact that the Kazakhstani president requested assistance from the CSTO – aka Russia – and not any other international organization, including, for instance, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),  is very telling. In the case other countries encounter similar problems, Kazakhstan might have cast a long shadow in the greater region.

In parallel with the intensification of the global power competition, Russia is making efforts to expand its sphere of influence by taking new initiatives, especially in Africa. This is occurring in a twofold framework in which Russia is becoming more advantageous in its competition with the U.S. and at the same time, its presence is being strengthened in regions where China is increasing its weight. Thus, Russia is turning to countries in Africa with which it had close ties during the Soviet period, especially in North Africa and the Horn of Africa, and has already signed economic and military agreements with Egypt, Algeria, Mauritania, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and the Central African Republic.

Russia’s aggressive engagement with Africa has become visible in the fields of foreign policy, economy, and culture. For instance, the trade volume between Russia and Africa doubled from 2013 to 2018, exceeding $20 billion. Such data indicate that not only is Russia interested in the region, but African countries are also open to trade with Russia. The acknowledgement of the Russian presence in Africa manifests itself in a total of 92 agreements and memoranda of understanding signed at the Russia-Africa Summit and Economic Forum held in Sochi in October 2019.

There are four main motivations behind Russia’s orientation toward Africa: (1) increasing its sphere of influence diplomatically, (2) improving its economy with access to new markets, (3) expanding its militarily outreach, and (4) strengthening its position in the African continent vis-à-vis the U.S. and China.

In recent years, military cooperation has come to the fore in Russia’s Africa strategy. Given the presence of the U.S. and China, Moscow seeks to be more active militarily in Africa. Since 2015, Russia has engaged in military cooperation with more than 20 African countries through arms sales, access to ports and air bases, training military personnel, counterterrorism, and peacekeeping. Russian military advisers have been present during several conflicts and have signed a series of agreements. Today, Russia ranks first in total arms exports to Africa and Rosoboronexport, Russia’s state arms dealer, manages these sales.

Even though Russia’s Africa foreign policy covers the whole continent, Moscow’s activities in recent years have concentrated mostly on North Africa and the Horn of Africa. 

Russia is also taking steps to establish its permanent military presence in Africa and has signed agreements with Egypt and Libya, while it now has a naval base near Port Sudan. Moscow is showing effort to establish military bases in the Central African Republic, Madagascar, and Mozambique, and announced that it will establish a logistics hub in Eritrea. With the purpose of standing out in competition with global actors, new military bases are to facilitate the increase of Russian military personnel in Africa, which is currently around 7,000.

Even though Russia’s Africa foreign policy covers the whole continent, Moscow’s activities in recent years have concentrated mostly on North Africa and the Horn of Africa. As a matter of fact, three-quarters of Russia’s $20 billion trade is carried out with North African countries. Similarly, Russia has recently entered into strategic cooperation with the Horn of Africa countries and signed political, economic, and military agreements with Egypt, Libya, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Mauritania.

Libya hosts Russia’s most visible recent military presence in Africa. Russia’s private military company Wagner, which supports Khalifa Haftar’s forces, plays a critical role in the civil war in Libya. In the reports by AFRICOM and the U.S. Department of Defense, the Wagner group acts under the guidance of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Yevgeny Prigozhin, known for his close ties to Vladimir Putin, is the head of Wagner, and is alleged to be conducting covert operations on behalf of the Russian government in Libya.

Although they work with Haftar’s forces, Russian mercenaries have become a serious asset in the country at this point and they play critical roles, especially in the eastern and southern regions of Libya. Aiming to establish a permanent military base in Libya following Syria, Russia poses a serious threat to European Union countries and the U.S. in the southern flank of NATO.

Haftar’s forces have also been present in the Central African Republic, Madagascar, and Mozambique. This situation is watched with concern not only by the U.S. and European Union countries, but also by Beijing. Russia’s growing influence in the region means the inclusion of another global actor in an already populated region. For this reason, Russia’s expansion in Africa poses a security problem for both African countries and their regional allies.

Sudan is another African country with which Russia has recently increased its cooperation. Sudan is important for Russia in so far as it has a coastline on the Red Sea, one of the most important trade routes in the world and one which connects the Mediterranean to Asia. Russia anticipates strengthening its relations with Sudan and signed an agreement for a military base in the Red Sea in 2017 with the ousted President Omar al-Bashir and later during the transitional administration period.

Sudan also draws attention as one of the largest arms markets for Russia. The close relation of Sudan with the U.S., established during the transitional administration, currently prevents Russia from collaborating with the military actors. As a matter of fact, recent statements from Khartoum, announcing its intent to “review” the military base agreement with Russia, have caused worry in Moscow.

Recently, Ethiopia has become another African country that has entered into close engagement with Russia. Cooperation agreements were signed with Ethiopia on issues such as arms sales, the use of air bases, training and consultancy services to Ethiopian officers in Russian military academies, and military support services in counterterrorism and peacekeeping operations.

With the Renaissance Dam crisis, in which Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia are the main actors, the relations between Russia and Ethiopia have been moved to a different ground. Russia’s implicit support for Ethiopia vis-à-vis the dam’s construction, while disturbing Egypt on the one hand, caused Ethiopia to define Russia as a reliable ally on the other. These developments are considered the main factor that caused Addis Ababa to move closer to Moscow.

Although Russia-Mauritania relations have not displayed very positive signals, largely due to Russia’s support of the Algeria-backed Polisario Front in the Western Sahara crisis, the military cooperation agreement signed between the two countries in June 2021 has portrayed Mauritania as strategically important within the scope of Russia’s African expansion. At the ceremony held on June 23, 2021 with the participation of Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin and Minister of Defense Hanena Ould Sidi, the two countries signed and emphasized the importance of the agreement for the development of their bilateral relations.

Thus, an effective military presence of Russia has emerged in Mauritania, one of the countries in the Sahel region, which is under the influence of France. The fact that the agreement arrived shortly after France announced that it had terminated Operation Barkhane points to the direction that Russia intends to fill the gap left by France in the region.

There are also obstacles for Russia and its aggressive strategy in Africa. Issues such as the colonial actors’ fear of losing influence, the rise of new powers such as China, the instability of countries in the region, terror attacks, security problems, the increasing competition in access to natural resources, the struggle for influence by global actors, and food security and water shortages that affect the strategies of global actors, including Russia.

These factors will decide how successful Russia’s strategy in returning to Africa will be. Considering that Russia is active in many regions, the sustainability of its foreign policy in terms of economic and military capacity is also doubtful. In spite of this, Moscow is determined to pursue its aggressive foreign policy strategy and will continue its engagements in order not to fall behind in global competition.

While the United States focused on its domestic problems – primarily the sociopolitical consequences of the storming of Capitol Hill and Joe Biden’s immediate signing of executive orders and actions – Russian authorities detained the Kremlin critic Alexey Navalny upon his return to Moscow from Germany.

Western reactions to his arrest were relatively moderate, although in the future the “curious” case of Alexey Navalny could have a serious impact not only on relations between Russia and the West, but also on Russian parliamentary elections that should take place no later than September 19.

Throughout history, Russia has been ruled by tsars, monarchs, and boyars members of the highest rank of feudal aristocracies. That was even the case during the Soviet time when the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was a de facto tsar, while members of the Central Committee played the role of boyars. In modern Russia, President Vladimir Putin is often seen as a tsar.

However, Western journalists, analysts, and experts on Russia often neglect the significance of “boyars” – powerful oligarchs and members of the country’s security apparatus.

Alexey Navalny, who allegedly had been poisoned in August 2020 while on a flight from Tomsk to Moscow, hardly poses a serious threat to President Putin, especially given that his approval ratings are very low. However, his political activities may significantly jeopardize the positions of certain “boyars” who are centers of power within the Russian ruling elite.

Although the Kremlin accused Navalny of working with the CIA, Russian authorities detained the opposition figure over the alleged violations of his 2014 suspended prison sentence for embezzlement. In other words, the very fact that the Kremlin did not attempt to prove that Navalny is a “foreign agent” clearly suggests that the ultimate goal of the Russian elite may not be to completely eliminate the 44-year-old anti-corruption campaigner from political life.

This is not the first time that Navalny is behind bars. He already served several stints in jail in recent years for organizing anti-Kremlin protests. For instance, in 2015, he served 15 days for unlawfully distributing leaflets on the Moscow metro, while in February 2014 he was placed under house arrest and prohibited from communicating with anyone other than his family, lawyers, and investigators.

Unlike him, former Russian intelligence officer and the Kremlin critic Vladimir Kvachkov spent nine years in jail after he allegedly attempted to assassinate Russian politician and businessman Anatoly Chubais in 2005. However, given that Kvachkov has been very critical of the West, none of the world leaders have demanded his immediate release.

Vladimir Putin would unlikely benefit from Navalny’s murder, since in the eyes of the West and Russian opposition voters the Kremlin critic would become another “martyr,” or a “victim of the regime” such as whistleblower Sergei Magnitsky and the accomplished journalist Anna Politkovskaya. Still, for the West Putin will likely remain a political boogeyman, and Navalny’s arrest will be used as an additional instrument against Moscow.

New sanctions against Russia from the U.S. and the E.U. are inevitable.

In other words, new sanctions against Russia from the U.S. and the E.U. are inevitable. In the case of the United States, restrictions will be connected not only with Navalny but will likely be constantly expended, since sanctions are part of a permanent process generated by the ongoing new Cold War.

The Kremlin has already said that it will not take notice of calls from a number of Western leaders for the release of Alexey Navalny. Policy-makers in Russia are quite aware that Navalny’s release would mean his de facto victory over the system.

At the same time, it would mean that the Kremlin has succumbed to Western pressure. Thus, if the anti-corruption activist remains in prison, Moscow is expected to face a growing list of demands from the U.S. and the E.U., and it is not improbable that Russia will have to suspend or even cancel the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline due to U.S. sabotage.

Such actions will undoubtedly have an impact on Russian domestic affairs, although they will unlikely seriously affect Putin’s popularity. However, the ruling United Russia party is already widely unpopular, which creates possibilities and additional room for maneuver for Navalny’s Russia of the Future party and other so-called non-systemic opposition groups.

The two major systemic opposition parties – the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CP) – are expected to pass the five per cent election threshold easily and keep playing a role of the formal opposition that occasionally criticizes certain Russian officials, but never President Putin. In other words, the regime of “controlled democracy,” whose ultimate goal is elections without a change of power, will almost certainly remain intact.

On the other hand, if Navalny’s Russia of the Future party wins some seats in the Russian Duma (Parliament), Putin will have to make compromises and concessions to Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Gennady Zyuganov, the leaders of the LDPR and CP respectively, in order to neutralize Navalny’s influence in the Duma. However, there is still a long way for the Kremlin’s critic to become part of the Russian mainstream political life.

Since Russia is witnessing another Perestroika, Navalny, even imprisoned, can pose a serious threat not to Vladimir Putin whose approval ratings are still high, but to certain structures within the Russian elite – be they from the security apparatus or from powerful oligarchy – who may aim to redistribute power and wealth.