Relations between India and Pakistan—long shaped by historical rivalries and persistent conflict—are now teetering on the brink of a fresh crisis. On April 22, 2025, a deadly terrorist attack in the Baisaran Valley near Pahalgam, in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, claimed the lives of 26 civilians. The attack, the deadliest since the 2008 Mumbai attacks, has reignited debate across India over long-standing issues such as the Kashmir conflict, cross-border terrorism, and nuclear brinkmanship.

Claimed by the Resistance Front (TRF), a group that emerged in 2019 in response to India’s Kashmir policies, the attack has once again placed Pakistan-India relations at the center of global scrutiny. India swiftly blamed Pakistan, accusing it of supporting cross-border terrorism. Pakistan, in turn, denied involvement and called for an international, independent investigation.

India’s reaction was multifaceted—diplomatic, economic, and strategic. Most notably, it announced the suspension of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, signed under World Bank auspices, and revoked visas issued to Pakistani nationals. Furthermore, India imposed a complete ban on imports from Pakistan, effectively freezing what little bilateral trade remained.

Pakistan, while rejecting the terrorism allegations, emphasized the need for a transparent, international investigation and urged global institutions to intervene. In response to India’s sanctions, Islamabad implemented symbolic countermeasures and declared its intention to suspend all bilateral agreements with India, including the 1971 Simla Agreement, which has long shaped India-Pakistan diplomacy.

Historical Echoes in a Modern Crisis

This latest round of hostilities bears the unmistakable imprint of history. The Kashmir dispute remains the epicenter of tensions, echoing the unresolved legacies of partition. Pakistan continues to advocate for Kashmir’s right to self-determination and insists the conflict is international in nature. India, however, treats Kashmir as a purely internal issue and frames all discourse about it as a matter of national security.

India’s strategy of blaming Pakistan for every major incident in Kashmir reinforces its longstanding narrative: Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism. This pattern—repeating in 2001, 2008, 2019, and now 2025—illustrates the historical continuity of arguments used by both sides. However, what sets this crisis apart is the mutual suspension of two foundational agreements: the Indus Waters Treaty and the Simla Agreement.

These developments raise the specter of renewed disputes over vital issues such as water resource sharing, the status of the Line of Control (LoC), and the internationalization of the Kashmir issue—topics that had, until now, been largely settled or frozen.

The Root Cause: Kashmir

The ideological and structural tensions between India and Pakistan have persisted since the 1947 Partition. Central to this divide are identity-based narratives and the Kashmir question. Pakistan’s founding ideology—the Two-Nation Theory—underpins its position. In the wake of the April 2025 attack, Pakistan’s National Security Committee cited the incident as further validation of the Two-Nation Theory’s relevance.

For both nations, Kashmir represents more than just territory—it is an existential concern. This has led to multiple wars (1947, 1965, 1971, 1999) and numerous skirmishes. Since the 2000s, the discourse has evolved to focus on terrorism and counterterrorism, with India accusing Pakistan of supporting armed insurgents in Kashmir.

Key turning points like the 2001 Parliament attack, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and the 2019 Pulwama bombing have hardened India’s stance. Pakistan, meanwhile, maintains it merely supports Kashmiris’ right to self-determination.

India’s 2019 decision to revoke Article 370 of its Constitution—which had granted special autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir—further inflamed tensions. This move not only altered the region’s demographic dynamics but also underlined India’s insistence that the issue lies solely within its sovereign purview. However, this unilateral action has fueled demands for legal reforms and reignited grievances among the region’s Muslim-majority population.

Diplomatic Bridges in Limbo: Indus Waters and Simla Agreements

The fact that two nuclear powers are once again clashing over Kashmir raises urgent questions about regional stability. This time, the stakes are higher. India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, originally signed in 1960, could have far-reaching consequences.

The treaty allocated usage rights of eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) to India and western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan. As over 80% of Pakistan’s water supply relies on these western rivers, the treaty has been a lifeline for its agricultural economy and energy needs. As the upper riparian, India had been constrained from using water as a strategic weapon—until now.

Pakistan has warned that India’s withdrawal could be considered an act of war, underlining the treaty’s significance for its national security and food sovereignty.

In response, Pakistan has announced it will suspend the Simla Agreement 1971, which committed both countries to resolve all disputes bilaterally and peacefully. The Simla Agreement effectively prevented third-party intervention in Kashmir, favoring direct dialogue. India has historically used it to avoid internationalizing the Kashmir issue, while Pakistan has seen it as a path to maintain diplomatic engagement and avoid military escalation.

Another vital clause in the Simla Agreement defines the Line of Control (LoC), the de facto border in Kashmir. Though repeatedly violated, the LoC remains a critical buffer. Suspending the agreement may open new disputes about the legitimacy and control of this volatile frontier.

A Crisis Beyond Borders

The India-Pakistan conflict continues to be shaped by long-standing identity-based divisions and unresolved historical grievances. The April 2025 terrorist attack has not only reignited old hostilities but introduced new risks by dismantling key diplomatic safeguards.

With the Indus Waters Treaty and Simla Agreement effectively suspended, the crisis risks spilling into broader domains: water security, cross-border diplomacy, and international law. The specter of weaponized water and the disappearance of a legal framework governing the LoC make this moment particularly dangerous.

India’s emphasis on internal security and Pakistan’s push for internationalization reflect deeply rooted policy approaches. This confrontation, therefore, can be read as an updated version of a recurring pattern—but with higher stakes.

Given both nations’ nuclear capabilities, the ramifications of continued escalation are not just regional, but potentially global. As we advance, international actors and diplomatic channels must intervene and de-escalate tensions. Otherwise, the collapse of foundational agreements could open the door to unpredictable and potentially catastrophic outcomes—not just for India and Pakistan, but for all of South Asia.

The elections held in India and Indonesia this year have attracted considerable attention from scholars and practitioners, particularly in the context of security issues linking the regions to regional and international politics in the Indo-Pacific. The two countries are among the most important political actors in the region that are expected to be able to exert decisive influence, especially amid the prevailing rivalry between the United States and China.

The victories of Narendra Modi in India and Prabowo Subianto in Indonesia are not only indicative of domestic development priorities. They also reflect a new international behavior that can be interpreted as a reorientation of policy in the face of the urgency of engagement, stability and security in the Indo-Pacific region.

Questions about government conduct on this issue are not new. Historically, the geography of India and Indonesia on the Indo-Pacific map has been the most strategic, not only in terms of population and economic growth, but also in terms of relations with global powers. The parliamentary majorities formed by the newly elected president in Indonesia and prime minister in India and, lastly, the military capacity, have put these two countries in the limelight.

For all their potential power, the question remains whether Indonesia’s newly elected president and India’s newly elected prime minister will play an effective role in the global politics of the Indo-Pacific. Will the national leadership achieved by Prabowo Subianto and Narendra Modi transcend a union commitment to the projection of security and stability in the Indo-Pacific?

Mapping of the Indo-Pacific Concept

The Indo-Pacific extends from regions in the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. It precisely encompasses in the tropical land of the Indian Ocean which includes India, Sri Lanka, African nations on the western side of the Indian Ocean and Yemen up the northern side of the Indian Ocean. At the other end, lies central-western part of Pacific Ocean which includes Australia, Japan and South Korea. Between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean are all the ASEAN member states and their water zones, as well as the currently disputed South China Sea.

The Indo-Pacific concept emerged at the beginning of this century through strategists’ projections. Prioritizing economic cooperation and security between states, the growth spurt accelerated in the second decade. In the 2010s, the effects are being felt by all member countries across the region. It is now common knowledge that the introduction of the Indo-Pacific concept is directly linked to the strategic economic and security strategies of China, which is seeking a global role as a great power.

Under the leadership of the U.S. administration, especially in the face of the U.S.’s multiple disagreements with China, which have noticeably increased after Xi Jinping’s presidency in 2013, a new military alliance structure has been introduced in the Indo-Pacific in the last decade, similar to the Anglo-Saxon geopolitical entity. Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and later Japan and India are the states united in a military alliance, as seen in the case of the U.S.-led QUAD and AUKUS, and predominantly determined by the Anglo-Saxon geopolitical worldview that triggered the return of the ‘West’ to global security expansions from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific outlook.

The electoral victories in India and Indonesia have once again raised the question of whether the countries’ fate in the growing Indo-Pacific rivalry is destined to be a historical repetition, or whether both countries will intensify their economic and military engagement in the Indo-Pacific by aligning themselves with one of the power orbits.

The Strategic Reefs of India and Indonesia

So what is the position of India and Indonesia in the emerging security and economic imagination of the Indo-Pacific? To answer this question, one must recognize the existing reefs that serve the natural rationale and strategy that guide directions in both countries’ foreign relations approach within the great power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific.

India is strong but also fragile. This means that the basic social and political infrastructures of the country, which include very diverse societies divided by ethnicity, religion, caste and ideology, demand equal human rights and distribution of wealth within the political framework of the nation-state. Ideally, the hurdles to securing these demands could mean that the Indian central government could be prevented from becoming a strong actor in the international arena. This situation goes beyond the Hindu majority-Muslim minority dichotomy. It leads the country’s political elite to give priority to improving their position in domestic decision-making.

Given its inward-looking domestic politics, this does not mean that India has sidelined proactive engagement in international politics. The trigger for engagement is based solely on a realist approach, where it sees its nation’s security at stake. It was triggered by several cases. A long-standing border dispute with China in the Himalayan region is one example. Another is the maritime infrastructure projects that China is developing in connection with the Maritime Silk Road project from the west to the east of the Indian Ocean, i.e. from Myanmar to Djibouti, as well as the Pakistan-China border infrastructure at the Khunjerab Pass and the Gwadar-Kashgar crude oil pipelines, which are seen as having the potential to serve as a decisive pattern organ that would allow the weakening of India’s influence as a regional power.

Despite these signals, Narendra Modi’s response has been a barking tree. For example, in the recent open battle between China and India in the Himalayas, in which 20 Indian soldiers died, there were hardly any strong decisions taken by India, which was under the so-called strong leadership of Narendra Modi and a government dominated by Hindutva, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). On the other hand, there is another concern surrounding the recent statement made by the Indian authorities. The competition between India and China for minerals in the Indian Ocean, such as cobalt, which is now being eyed by China and Sri Lanka, has led India to claim that the Indian Ocean is the ‘Indian Sea’, which requires official confirmation of territorial sovereignty due to China’s denial. Looking at the two examples above, it is quite early to say that India has failed to portray itself as a content regional power, especially in the rising global rivalry in Indo-Pacific affairs.

The natural strategic reef that Indonesia is facing is similarly displayed through the disputes in the oceans involving the South China Sea, Natuna Island, economic ventures with China, and military strengthening partnership with the U.S. Although Prabowo Subianto will officially hold the seat of the presidency in November 2024, numerous media outlets and critics highlight his realist and constructivist approach, equipped with a strategy to gain a position in international politics, as a higher priority compared to that of his predecessor, who focused heavily on achieving domestic goals rather than international recognition. In the last two months alone, his visits to Malaysia, Singapore and the meeting with the US Secretary of State in Jordan have given the impression of his commitment to active participation in international affairs.

His realism and constructivist approach in considering international engagement comes from his military background as Defence Minister during Joko Widodo’s second term (2019-2024), his entire career in the army and war experience since the Soeharto era, his entry into national politics four times as a presidential candidate, and his role as spokesman of certain opposition circles in the country speak volumes about what Indonesia would serve to international states and communities. The dispute over China’s nine-dash line claim played a role in the victory of Prabowo, who was known as an efficient and responsive actor during China’s possible encroachment on Indonesia’s Natuna Islands. Prabowo, who was then Defence Minister, initiated an important military construction in Riau Province that provides an eagle view of the military engagement that could result from the South China Sea dispute.

However, as much as Prabowo may be a realist and constructivist, good economic relations with China and the U.S. in recent decades would prevent any lone ranger from strategizing a move. Like India, Indonesia would probably seek to balance and hedge its foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific, forcing the Prabowo administration to first strengthen and leverage cooperation with ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and the United Nations before aligning with any of the Indo-Pacific power blocs.

The atrocity of silence is worse than the atrocity itself”. This statement by the makers of the BBC documentary Murder in the Snow, which shows the shooting of Tibetan refugees as they attempted to flee across the Himalayas into Nepal, captures the feelings of Tibetans in the north Indian state of Himachal Pradesh about the plight of their country, which has been occupied by China since 1950.

The 2006 documentary, the first recorded footage of Tibetan refugees trying to cross the border, was screened at the Hope and Stories Café in Mcleodganj, home to the Dalai Lama, Tibet’s spiritual leader, and the Tibetan government-in-exile. The town of 11,000 – many of them saffron-robed monks and refugees – is a mini Tibet with the large Tsuglagkhang complex. At its heart lies Namgyal Monastery, the personal retreat of the Dalai Lama. It is a magnificent structure that houses a community of dedicated monks. The melodious chants and rhythmic sounds of ceremonial instruments that echo through its walls offer a glimpse of the deep spiritual practices that have flourished here for centuries.

Kundang Tenzin, a Tibetan photographer who founded the Hope Café in 2017, is a man with a mission: to preserve and promote Tibetan culture and to record, document and expose the oppression of the Tibetan people by the Chinese government. He calls his café Hope because he came to India with the hope of returning to Tibet.

“I still have that hope,” the soft-spoken, gentle man with an engaging smile told Politics Today. “We always talk about harmony, humility, peace, love and compassion. Our cause [freedom from Chinese oppression and respect for the human rights of the Tibetan people] is based on these ideals”.

The Dalai Lama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989 for promoting peaceful solutions based on tolerance and mutual respect to preserve the historical and cultural heritage of the Tibetan people.

“The nonviolent movement works,” said Tenzin with confidence and pride.  It is not just a fairy tale. Most of the news is about war, terrorist attacks, robbery and rape.  The younger generation may think that violence works, but the awarding of the Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama shows that non-violence works.

Following China’s communist revolution in 1948, it invaded Tibet in 1950. Overwhelmed, Tibet was forced to surrender its independence. After a failed uprising against Chinese rule in 1959, the 14th Dalai Lama – Tibet’s political and spiritual leader – fled into exile in Dharamshala, India, followed by tens of thousands of Tibetans. Since 1959, the Chinese government has exercised total political control over Tibet, using all means of repression, including forced abortion and sterilization, to deter and punish Tibetan resistance.

In this haven of peace, a tireless, dedicated team of five run a weekly program. Monday is the day for sharing stories. Niyma Samdup described his hometown of Meto Junga, near Lhasa in Tibet. “It was where the mountains touched the sky. I lived there with my two sisters and my parents. My father had a small bicycle and he went to Lhasa to look for work to feed the family. He did some cleaning, but there was no steady work, so we decided to flee with a kettle, a blanket and some clothes. I was five years old. It took us six months to walk to Nepal.

On Wednesdays, visitors to the café can spend a day living as a Tibetan.  Each morning, Nyima Samdup leads a fascinating walk through Tibetan culture, starting with donning a traditional costume and visiting the Dalai Lama’s monastery, where the 89-year-old leader gives public lectures.  Near the monastery is a chilling photo exhibition of Tibetans who have set themselves on fire in protest at the Chinese occupation. According to the Free Tibet Campaign, more than 150 people have set themselves on fire inside Tibet since March 2009. The number dropped in 2012 when the Dalai Lama said he did not condone the practice but praised the courage of those who had made the ultimate sacrifice for Tibet.

Friday is the day of documentaries and discussion. Tenzin and his colleagues are handing out leaflets about the event in Mcleodganj and have a personal message for those who come to the café in support of Tibet. Murder in the Snow tells the story of more than 70 young people who travelled for three nights in the back of a lorry as it climbed into the mountains. The refugees then walked for another 10 nights, with inadequate clothing and limited food and water, to the foot of the infamous 6000m Nangpa Pass, an ancient trade route to Nepal. As they made their way up the snow-covered pass, a group of mountaineers from a nearby camp watched in horror as Chinese border police opened fire on the refugees. The story went global when American mountain guide Luis Benitez emailed his account of the shooting to a popular climbing website. In 2006, about 100 Tibetans a month were fleeing their country. Today, only about ten a year are able to make the treacherous journey, as the Chinese have stepped up surveillance following demonstrations against their rule in Tibet in 2008.

Like the flight over the mountains, preserving Tibetan culture is an uphill struggle against seemingly insurmountable odds, but Tenzin is undeterred. “Good things are difficult to achieve,” he says philosophically, stressing that preserving the Tibetan language is essential to keeping the culture alive.

In August last year, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, citing a recent UN report on the ‘forced assimilation’ of one million Tibetan children forced into Mandarin-speaking state boarding schools far from their homes and families, called on China to stop trying to erase Tibet’s distinct identity. In December, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling on China to immediately abolish the boarding schools.

According to reports in various Tibetan-language news media monitored by ChinaAid, an international human rights organization working to promote religious freedom in China, students in Tibetan regions will be required to take full Mandarin Chinese classes from March 2023.

In his first address to the US Congress, Penpa Tsering, the head of Tibet’s government-in-exile based in India, known as the Sikyong of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), said his country was dying a ‘slow death’ under Chinese rule. “We are often asked why we don’t hear about Tibet anymore,” Tsering said.

He blamed this silence on China’s “Orwellian gridlock system, using all means of artificial intelligence to monitor people, control the flow of information and close Tibet to the outside world”.

The Chinese government continues to spread disinformation about Tibet through official statements and propaganda, paid online commentators and even fake social media accounts.

The United Nations has repeatedly challenged China over human rights abuses in Tibet, including finding that Tibet is the worst area in China for child malnutrition. In 2023, the watchdog group Freedom House again ranked Tibet as the least free country in the world, tied with South Sudan and Syria. It was the third year in a row that Tibet was at the bottom of Freedom House’s rankings, with an overall global freedom score of 1 out of 100.

The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom’s 2024 Annual Report, released on May 1, highlights the deterioration of religious freedom in Tibet due to the Chinese government’s intensified repression and “Sinicization” of Tibetan Buddhism – a policy aimed at bringing Tibetan Buddhism under the control of the Chinese Communist Party.

The Chinese government has consistently objected to the Dalai Lama’s visits to other countries, particularly his trips to Arunachal Pradesh, a north-eastern Indian state over which China claims territorial sovereignty. Countries that host the Dalai Lama often face repercussions from China. When he visited Mongolia in 2016, Beijing responded by imposing an economic blockade on the landlocked country. It also unsuccessfully pressured Sri Lanka not to invite the Dalai Lama in April this year.

Although King Charles held an informal meeting with the Dalai Lama during his European tour in June 2012, the Dalai Lama did not attend the coronation. In light of this, senior Conservative MPs have described the presence of China’s Vice President as ‘outrageous’.

From chanting ‘Tibet needs freedom’ in the streets to participating in protests and political lobbying, Tibetans around the world are resisting China’s policies despite 70 years of occupation.  The voice of the Tibetan people is carried to the outside world by a number of vocal pressure groups such as the Free Tibet Campaign.

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n a bold move to revitalize its economy, Chinese Premier Li Qiang unveiled an ambitious economic growth target of around 5% for the year 2024 during the annual meeting of the National People’s Congress, China’s parliament. The announcement comes against the backdrop of challenges posed by bankrupt property developers, indebted cities, and the need for a revamped growth model.

Premier Li emphasized the necessity to “transform the growth model,” signaling a commitment to structural changes aimed at enhancing performance and quality. The growth target, set at a similar level to the previous year, indicates a prioritization of economic growth amidst a waning post-COVID recovery. Analysts noted the increased difficulty of achieving 5% growth this year due to a higher base number.

The economic plan also focuses on defusing risks associated with the property crisis and local government debt. As China faces challenges laid bare by uneven growth in the previous year, Premier Li pledged bold new policies without providing immediate detailed plans, emphasizing stability as the foundation for transformative efforts.

Proactive fiscal stance and military measures

Acknowledging the challenges ahead, Premier Li stressed the importance of a “proactive” fiscal stance and “prudent” monetary policy. The growth target considers the imperative to boost employment, incomes, and prevent and defuse risks. In parallel, China announced a 7.2% increase in defense spending, consistent with the previous year. The report dropped previous references to “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan, showcasing a more assertive stance.

The economic plan outlines a budget deficit of 3% of economic output and the issuance of 1 trillion yuan ($139 billion) in special ultra-long-term treasury bonds. The special bond issuance, not included in the budget, is a key element of China’s economic strategy. Other policies include raising the consumer inflation target to 3%, aiming to create over 12 million urban jobs in 2024, and lifting all foreign investment restrictions in the manufacturing sector.

Addressing demographic challenges, the plan vows to improve policies supporting childbirth and raise benefits for the growing elderly population. In the property sector, financing will be directed to “justified” projects, and social housing initiatives will be expanded.

Focus on new productive forces

Highlighting a shift in the model of growth, Premier Li emphasized moving from the pursuit of speed to a focus on changing the growth model. The plan allocates resources for tech innovation, advanced manufacturing, and the removal of foreign investment restrictions in manufacturing. China aims for technological self-sufficiency, underlining its commitment to emerging technologies like quantum computing, big data, and artificial intelligence.

China’s economic policies underscore a proactive approach to address challenges, embrace technological advancements, and ensure stable economic growth. The transformative measures reflect the country’s strategic vision in navigating complex economic and geopolitical dynamics in the coming year.

Source: Reuters

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ri Lanka’s State Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tharaka Balasuriya, emphasized the need for a significant transformation in the international political and economic framework during his participation in the Antalya Diplomacy Forum (ADF) 2024 in Turkey. Speaking at the NEST Congress Center in the Belek Tourism Region, Balasuriya conveyed that the current structure, established by the victors post-World War II, requires reevaluation in response to contemporary challenges.

“Especially in times like these when tensions are high, it is absolutely imperative that world leaders come together, discuss current issues, and look for a way forward,” noted Balasuriya during an interview with Anadolu, the “Global Communication Partner” for ADF 2024. He stressed the crucial role of forums like ADF in facilitating broad discussions on political, economic, and technological issues to avoid resorting to conflict when diplomacy falters.

Encouraging collaboration between nations, Balasuriya acknowledged the intricate nature of current global challenges, expressing his intrigue with the diverse discussions at ADF. The forum, bringing together leaders from various countries, aimed to address pressing issues such as political tensions, economic challenges, and technological advancements.

Sri Lanka and Turkey

Praising the historical ties between Sri Lanka and Turkey dating back to the 11th century, Balasuriya highlighted the need to enhance economic relations between the two countries. He underlined the strategic locations of both nations and called for expanded negotiations, particularly in areas such as logistics, renewable energy, technology, manufacturing, and agriculture.

While commending Turkey’s success in the tourism sector, Balasuriya encouraged Turkish investors, especially hoteliers, to explore opportunities in Sri Lanka. He emphasized the economic progress made by Sri Lanka following reforms after the 2022 economic crisis and welcomed foreign investments to further boost growth.

Reflecting on Sri Lanka’s political and economic journey, Balasuriya acknowledged the bitter measures taken during economic crises, emphasizing the necessity for stability and international cooperation. He credited the support of countries like India in assisting Sri Lanka during challenging times.

Solidarity with the Palestinian cause

Addressing broader geopolitical issues, the Sri Lankan minister expressed solidarity with the Palestinian cause, emphasizing the need for a two-state solution for lasting peace in the region. He criticized the existing international architecture, calling for a fair representation of countries in global institutions.

“We think it is not fair to have an international architecture designed by the victors of the Second World War. We do not see this as a fair world,” Balasuriya declared, advocating for a change in both political and financial structures on the global stage.

The minister’s statements reflect the broader sentiment among some nations calling for a reevaluation of the existing global order to better address contemporary challenges and ensure fair representation for all countries.

Source: Anadolu Agency.

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n a move that underscores China’s expanding influence in the Pacific region, uniformed Chinese police officers have been quietly deployed to Kiribati, a remote atoll nation situated in the Pacific Ocean near Hawaii. The initiative, not publicly disclosed by Kiribati authorities, is part of Beijing’s broader efforts to strengthen security ties in the Pacific Islands, heightening its rivalry with the United States.

Kiribati, with a population of around 115,000, holds strategic importance due to its proximity to Hawaii and its control over one of the largest exclusive economic zones globally, spanning more than 3.5 million square kilometers. The nation hosts a Japanese satellite tracking station.

According to Eeri Aritiera, Kiribati’s acting police commissioner, the Chinese police collaboration involves community policing, martial arts (Tai Chi) Kung Fu training, and assistance in developing the country’s crime database program. However, Aritiera emphasized that there is no official Chinese police station in Kiribati.

Police assistance

“The Chinese police delegation team works with the Kiribati Police Service – to assist on Community Policing program and Martial Arts (Tai Chi) Kung Fu, and IT department assisting our crime database program,” stated Aritiera in an email response.

The Chinese embassy in Kiribati has not provided an official comment on the role of its police. In a January social media post, the embassy did acknowledge the leader of “the Chinese police station in Kiribati.”

Aritiera, who attended a meeting in Beijing between China’s public security minister Wang Xiaohong and several Pacific Islands police officials in December, revealed that Kiribati had requested China’s policing assistance in 2022. A group of up to a dozen uniformed Chinese police officers arrived last year for a six-month rotation.

A secret security pact

While China’s security and trade proposals were rejected by the Pacific Islands Forum in 2022, the Chinese government has since established a police presence in the Solomon Islands under a secret security pact. This move drew criticism from Washington and Canberra for potentially undermining regional stability.

According to Graeme Smith, a Pacific expert from the Australian National University, China’s deployment of police abroad serves to extend its reach over the Chinese diaspora and provides valuable insights into the domestic politics and diplomatic partnerships of host countries.

“Australia and the United States are concerned about that prospect, in Kiribati and around the region, and are taking measures to protect their position,” said Meg Keen, Director of the Lowy Institute’s Pacific Islands Program.

From Taiwan to Beijing

Kiribati, which switched diplomatic ties from Taiwan to Beijing in 2019, has seen increased Chinese investment in infrastructure. China’s efforts also include plans to rebuild a World War Two U.S. military airstrip on Kanton Island, raising concerns in Washington.

While Kiribati’s Kiritimati island is approximately 2,160 km south of Honolulu, the United States has responded to China’s activities by pledging to upgrade the wharf on Kanton island and expressing a desire to open an embassy in Kiribati. Australia has been providing security support, donating two patrol boats and contributing to major upgrades in Kiribati’s policing infrastructure.

Papua New Guinea, another Pacific Island nation, recently rejected a Chinese offer of police assistance and surveillance technology amid concerns from traditional security partners, the United States and Australia.

Source: Reuters

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n a surprising turn of events, Asia’s defense spending reached an unprecedented $510 billion in 2023, raising concerns about the sustainability of such ambitious budgets amidst a potential economic slowdown. The region experienced a nominal 2.8% increase in defense expenditure from the previous year, with a real increase of 4.6%.

This surge is primarily attributed to China’s continuous military modernization and North Korea’s escalating belligerence, heightening tensions across the continent.

China, marking its 29th consecutive year of increased defense expenditure, announced a budget of RMB 1.55 trillion (USD 219.5 billion) in March 2023, reflecting a substantial 7.2% nominal increase. The military giant accounted for 43% of regional defense spending in 2023, causing unease among neighboring states.

Beijing’s assertive behavior in the South China Sea, establishment of overseas military bases, and increased aggression have triggered concerns about its military intentions, particularly in the context of Taiwan.

Increasing defense budgets

In response to China’s militarization, neighboring countries have escalated their defense budgets. Taiwan proposed its largest-ever defense budget of TWD 606.8 billion (USD 19.1 billion) for 2024, focusing on enhancing its defense industrial capacity and acquiring advanced weaponry.

Other major players like Australia, Japan, and South Korea are positioning themselves for long-term security by investing in cutting-edge capabilities.

Australia, under the AUKUS partnership, is not only investing in nuclear-powered submarines but also advancing technologies such as artificial intelligence, hypersonic missiles, and quantum technologies.

Japan, facing its most severe security environment since 1945, has plans to double military expenditure by raising defense and related security spending to 2% of GDP by 2027. South Korea, countering North Korean threats, has allocated KRW 348.7 trillion (USD 266.07 billion) for its 2024-2028 mid-term spending plan, emphasizing reconnaissance satellites, submarines, advanced missile interceptors, and electromagnetic pulse weapons.

Increasing defense budgets

In response to China’s militarization, neighboring countries have escalated their defense budgets. Taiwan proposed its largest-ever defense budget of TWD 606.8 billion (USD 19.1 billion) for 2024, focusing on enhancing its defense industrial capacity and acquiring advanced weaponry.

Other major players like Australia, Japan, and South Korea are positioning themselves for long-term security by investing in cutting-edge capabilities.

Australia, under the AUKUS partnership, is not only investing in nuclear-powered submarines but also advancing technologies such as artificial intelligence, hypersonic missiles, and quantum technologies.

Japan, facing its most severe security environment since 1945, has plans to double military expenditure by raising defense and related security spending to 2% of GDP by 2027. South Korea, countering North Korean threats, has allocated KRW 348.7 trillion (USD 266.07 billion) for its 2024-2028 mid-term spending plan, emphasizing reconnaissance satellites, submarines, advanced missile interceptors, and electromagnetic pulse weapons.

India is less interesting in in increasing defense budget

However, not every country is following this trend. India, for instance, increased its defense spending by only 1.5% in 2023, a reduction in real terms considering the inflation rate. This discrepancy raises concerns about the affordability and sustainability of such ambitious defense plans.

The economic backdrop adds another layer of uncertainty, with advanced Asian economies projected to grow by a modest 1.7% in 2024. Questions arise regarding the financial feasibility of these defense budgets, particularly for nations like Japan with a large national debt and Australia facing significant costs associated with AUKUS-related expenditures. The reality of maintaining these budgets becomes even more challenging as the economic momentum in the region shows signs of slowing down.

As tensions rise and defense spending grows faster than economic growth, the Asian region faces a crucial juncture where financial realities may collide with security ambitions. The prospect of a return of former U.S. President Donald Trump, with his isolationist tendencies, adds another layer of uncertainty, potentially impacting the geopolitics of the region.

Observers are closely watching how Asian nations navigate these challenges to ensure the security and stability of the continent.

Source: IISS

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n a pivotal moment signaling a potential thaw in relations, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida engaged in their first face-to-face dialogue in a year on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. The rare talks focused on strengthening their “strategic relationship,” despite the array of diplomatic challenges that have recently plagued relations between Asia’s two largest economies.

The meeting, which took place at a pivotal moment in San Francisco, saw both leaders agree to address economic disputes that have fueled tension, notably China’s ban on Japanese seafood imports following the Fukushima water discharge controversy and the detention of a Japanese businessman in China. Both leaders expressed a commitment to “focus on common interests” and push for a mutually beneficial relationship that navigates past their historical and territorial disputes, trade issues, and differing views on Taiwan.

The bilateral talks yielded an agreement to establish a framework for discussing export controls, a critical aspect of the broader economic partnership between the two nations. This framework aims to facilitate dialogue and prevent tit-for-tat measures that could disrupt the delicate balance of trade and economic cooperation in the region.

Framework for dialogue

The diplomatic engagement aligns with a series of high-profile meetings, including a summit between U.S. President Joe Biden and Xi Jinping, which led to the establishment of a presidential hotline and a commitment to resume military-to-military communications. Kishida’s subsequent meeting with Biden underscored shared challenges related to China, underscoring the intricate web of alliances and rivalries that define the Asia-Pacific geopolitical landscape.

According to Rumi Aoyama, an expert on Japan-China relations, China’s overture towards Japan could be an attempt to mitigate Tokyo’s close ties with Washington amid intensifying U.S.-China confrontation. As the director of Waseda Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies, Aoyama posited that Beijing might be seeking to drive a wedge between the two allies by cultivating a stronger relationship with Japan.

The APEC summit also served as a stage for regional collaboration, with Kishida meeting South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol to discuss cooperation and mutual concerns like North Korea’s missile tests. A brief trilateral encounter with President Biden emphasized a united front on security concerns.

The road ahead

As APEC leaders convened for the summit, the dialogue between China and Japan represented a glimmer of hope for regional stability. The summit, which continues until November 17, is anticipated to yield further discussions on trade, security, and environmental concerns, highlighting the multifaceted nature of economic and political dynamics in the Asia-Pacific.

The Sino-Japanese talks may set a precedent for conflict resolution and cooperation in a region fraught with complexities. However, whether this diplomatic détente will lead to lasting change remains uncertain, hinging on the practical implementation of the agreements and the ever-evolving geopolitical climate.

The China-Japan meeting in San Francisco is a significant step towards easing regional tensions, offering a potential roadmap for reconciling economic interests with diplomatic disputes. As the world watches, the outcomes of these discussions may well shape the future of Asia-Pacific relations and set the tone for international diplomacy in an increasingly multipolar world order.

Sources: Reuters, Arab News

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f you’re traveling in Pakistan, you’ll have come across long stretches of road that the locals call CPEC (pronounced see-pack, short for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor). In fact, you may hardly have to leave the CPEC during intercity travel. The average travel time between Lahore and Karachi, Pakistan’s two largest cities which are about 1,200 km apart, has dropped from 20 to about 13 hours, on what represents just one part of the 3,000-kilometer-long road.

Thanks to the CPEC-related power projects, electricity outages have been reduced significantly. Tens of thousands of Pakistanis are employed in projects related to the CPEC, itself a part of China’s grandiose Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for the seamless connection of Eurasia.

Yet, if you ask a common person how the CPEC has changed life in Pakistan, they’d probably be evasive, if not dejected. They would tell you about the crushing inflation, inflated bills, the dismal status of law and order, and there being no sign of respite, exacerbated by the confusion surrounding delayed elections. There would be no mention of the CPEC or its magic.

Yet, the CPEC and the heat of the New Great Game that Pakistan faces may be behind much of what is rattling Pakistan these days.

Backdrop: The Dragon and the seas

A decade ago, the CPEC—a combination of roads, railways, special economic zones, and power and energy projects—was anticipated by many in Pakistan as a game-changer for the heavily indebted South Asian nation, comparable with the Marshall Plan, according to some analysts.

The original promise of $46 billion over 15 years came as serendipity for Pakistan at a time when the outlook was otherwise bleak—the figure has since risen to $62 billion.

The expertise and investment from a country that had the distinction of creating thriving port cities like Shenzhen out of virtually nothing garnered much fascination in Pakistan.

In turn, the deep-sea, warm-water port of Gwadar, situated in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, near the Strait of Hormuz, offered China the closest access to sea from its landlocked easternmost province of Xinjiang. It’s now the gateway of the CPEC, the BRI’s main artery, to the oceans and a commercial hub in the making.

Gwadar offers China a much faster trade route to Europe and the Middle East, reducing travel time by 10-20 days, in addition to providing an alternative route for its energy needs. It has reduced the 12,000 km sea distance to less than 3,000 km on land. Considering that Saudi Arabia is among China’s top two oil suppliers, the importance of Gwadar to China is clear.

Politics in the line of cross fire

Much that has transpired in Pakistan in the political arena over the last year may be the burden of the CPEC that Pakistan is finding hard to sustain. Imran Khan, the former prime minister, now behind bars in relation to one of the more than 150 cases against him directly accused the U.S. of overturning his government, the veiled instructions for which allegedly were conveyed by the U.S. in a diplomatic cable after his visit to Russia.

Khan had flatly declined to provide air bases to the U.S. for striking Afghanistan a few months before this and even praised the Taliban for having broken the “shackles of slavery,” shortly after the U.S. exit from Afghanistan.

However, the possibility of revival of Pakistan-Russia relations, reinvigorated by the Russian offer to export wheat and oil to Pakistan on concessional terms when the U.S. and EU were looking to isolate Russia, was the last nail in the coffin for Khan’s government, who seemed to have visited Russia without the assent of the powerful Pakistani military establishment.

Several articles in Chinese government-aligned media published after Khan’s ouster were critical of the regime change in Pakistan. The Khan administration, though initially suspicious of the CPEC agreements signed with China under the previous government, had developed a better understanding with the Asian heavyweight over time.

Still, perhaps given the scale of the country’s investment in Pakistan and the imperative to continue working with any government, China avoided an official reaction. The Russian Foreign Ministry minced no words, however, accusing the U.S. of “shameless interference” in a plot to remove the “disobedient” Khan.

As the new government assumed power in Pakistan, relations with the U.S. improved significantly. A package worth $450 million was approved for the maintenance of Pakistan Air Force’s F16 program. The much-needed IMF Standby Arrangement was signed. And most recently, Pakistan renewed a security pact with the U.S., namely the Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), after a lapse of three years.

Reports of Pakistani munition supplies to Ukraine mediated by the U.S. have emerged as well, reflecting Pakistan’s considerable warming up to the West after Khan.

Meanwhile, the U.S. showed complete aloofness to the overthrowing of Khan and the virtual dissolution of his party domestically. The Western media coverage of Khan’s ouster mostly depicted Khan as an anti-freedom enemy of the West.

Turbulence in perspective: The Dragon-slayers

It’s not just politics that is becoming a victim of the New Great Game. Pakistan is facing a resurgence in terrorism. India has often been accused of being present in Balochistan, supporting separatist insurgencies, and in the Pakistani tribal belt in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province, where it is blamed for backing the insurgent group, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Pakistani officials have repeatedly linked India to attacks on Chinese workers employed at CPEC projects, which includes the infamous case of Indian spy Kalbushan Yadav tasked with sabotaging the CPEC.

Being a counterweight to China, India is now a close U.S. ally. This has resulted in a situation where Pakistan’s stance on Indian involvement in its territory is largely ignored by the West.

For India, the Gwadar port is a competitor to its investment in Iran’s Chabahar port, just 76 nautical miles west of Gwadar, and the recently announced grand India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). That may mean even more trouble for the CPEC and its host country.

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he Pacific is heating up. The rise of China rocks the balance of power making room for an emerging new order. In this month’s book bundle, we present eight books about the hottest topic of international affairs: the U.S.-China rivalry. What awaits the world as tensions rise? This selection approaches the topic from comprehensive and diverse angles ranging from international relations theory assumptions to the most outstanding topics of the U.S.-China rivalry such as economic leadership and information war.

The competition between the two great powers has overtaken the world agenda and is shaping foreign policy decisions globally. Therefore, this book bundle was compiled with special attention to the reactions of middle and smaller powers in the face of this competition, aiming to give the reader a broader perspective to interpret what awaits the world more holistically.

Will the shift in the balance of power between the U.S. and China lead to a war? International relations theory predicts that shifts between a hegemon and a rising power may trigger actions with such consequences. Steve Chan examines how many of these theories hold true in the case of U.S.-China relations with Taiwan remaining a flash point for a possible Sino-American conflict.

Rumbles of Thunder: Power Shifts and the Danger of Sino-American War further explores the risk-oriented popular narratives on the topic with sound and well-grounded judgement, considering whether several factors that can raise or lower international tension apply to the current situation. Chan criticizes overly mechanistic frameworks and shows that power shifts do not predetermine violent outcomes—and neither does their absence ensure peace. In fact, many factors like domestic politics, international political economy, and the choices of individual leaders come into play.

Rumbles of Thunder demonstrates that claims of a “rising China” catching up and overtaking the United States are alarmist, and Chan predicts that American structural advantages will endure for some time to come. Contrary to popular belief, Chan does not maintain that China acts like a revisionist power seeking to overturn the system or that the U.S. is defending the international order. Rumbles of Thunder brings a fresh analytical outlook to the table and challenges conventional wisdom on the likelihood of war between the United States and China.

Steve Chan, Rumbles of Thunder: Power Shifts and the Danger of Sino-American War (Columbia University Press, 2022) ISBN: 9780231208451, 336 pages

In Accidental Conflict: America, China, and the Clash of False Narratives, Stephan Roach argues that the conflict between the U.S. and China wouldn’t have emerged were it not for a needless clash of false narratives, and that much of the rhetoric on both sides is dangerously misguided, amplified by information distortion, and should be seen more like a reflection of each nation’s fears and vulnerabilities than a credible assessment of the risks they face. The U.S. blames its trade and technology threats on China yet overlooks its shaky saving foundation. Meanwhile, China blames its growth challenges on the alleged U.S. containment of market-based socialism, ignoring its failed economic rebalancing.

Accidental Conflict: America, China, and the Clash of False Narratives provides an analysis of both nations’ economies, politics, and policies, and offers a new road map for restoring a mutually advantageous relationship. The book will be available in paperback on June 6, 2023.

Stephan Roach, Accidental Conflict: America, China, and the Clash of False Narratives (Yale University Press, 2022) ISBN: 9780300259643, 448 pages

Kevin Rudd, a former Australian prime minister who spent more than forty years in China, puts the turbulent relationship between the U.S. and China under the spotlight with insightful analyses based on his firsthand understanding of the mindsets of the leadership whose judgment will determine whether the future course of events will escalate to a war.

Rudd provides context as to why the U.S.-China relationship rests on a seismic fault: cultural misunderstanding, historical grievance, and ideological incompatibility are all pivotal antecedents. The antagonism between the two superpowers is starkly visible, among others, in the field of military, intelligence, technology, and trade, while either country’s capacity to draw the last straw grows daily.

Against this gloomy backdrop, Rudd constructively argues that the relationship is not doomed to escalating tension and war. If both sides can sustain a “managed strategic competition” by coexisting without betraying their core interests, conflict could be avoided. However, the opposite could be catastrophic. The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping’s China demystifies the actions of both sides, explaining and translating them for the benefit of the other.

Kevin Rudd, The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping’s China (PublicAffairs, 2022) ISBN-13 9781541701304, 432 pages

As the U.S. faces the first real challenge to its economic hegemony with the rise of China, The United States vs. China: The Quest for Global Economic Leadership sees experienced policymaker, economist, and scholar C. Fred Bergsten analyze the two great powers’ competition from the scope of global economic leadership. Is economic conflict beyond the existing trade war inevitable between China and the U.S.? Will their clash produce a new economic leadership vacuum? What can the consequences of a world economy adopting Chinese characteristics be?

According to Bergsten a confrontation between the two would be calamitous. He further argues that it would be self-defeating for the U.S. to attempt to “decouple” from its rival. Bergsten advices the U.S. to pursue “conditional competitive cooperation” to lead, rather than destroy, the world economy instead of a policy of containment. As for China, he recommends exercising constructive global leadership.

Fred Bergsten, The United States vs. China: The Quest for Global Economic Leadership (Polity Press, 2022) ISBN-13 978-1509547357, 384 pages

Is China really a threat to the U.S. or just a threat to its unilateral superpower status? According to Paolo Urio, the U.S. has historically disguised the true nature of its relations with the nations that have stood in the way of its ambitions, often projecting fear of harm from other nations even as it was expanding its dominion over them. America and the China Threat: From the End of History to the End of Empire revisits and debunks the idea of the universality of U.S. values, and the perception of the imperial, dictatorial, and state capitalist character of today’s China. It provides a historical analysis of the divergent ideologies of the U.S. and China, and reveals the source of strain the U.S. faces in adapting to the changes occurring in the international system that has moved beyond its exceptionalism and uncontested leadership, now challenged by China.

Urio challenges the U.S. proclamation that it alone can assure stability and prosperity in the international system, while demonstrating that Chinese ideology has achieved greater flexibility by integrating values imported from the West and several Confucian values. Urio argues that China is better able to adapt its public policies to changes in the national and international environments. America and the China Threat: From the End of History to the End of Empire further addresses China’s significant military and economic advances and its new investments.

Paolo Urio, America and the China Threat: From the End of History to the End of Empire (Clarity Press, 2022) ISBN-10 1949762505, 476 pages

Information War: How Artificial Intelligence Is Driving U.S.-China Military Competition addresses a crucial variable shaping the intensifying confrontation between the U.S. and China: the struggle to control information. How will modern technology be wielded in a rising conflict between the two superpowers?

Technology and national security expert Tom Stefanick argues that the two contemporary superpowers will base their security competition primarily on the fight to dominate information and perception. How will the adversaries attack the other’s information architecture while protecting their own? Stefanick highlights that the way each country chooses to employ information countermeasures will determine the amount of friction and uncertainty in the conflict.

Stefanick draws attention to artificial intelligence, which will play an important role. Information War: How Artificial Intelligence Is Driving U.S.-China Military Competition reviews the recent Chinese research and trends in AI to determine how it will approach the conflict, and provides a sober view of how artificial intelligence will be weaponized in the new information war.

Tom Stefanick, Information War: How Artificial Intelligence Is Driving U.S.-China Military Competition (Brookings Institution Press, 2022) ISBN-13: 9780815738824, 280 pages

China expert Andrew Small offers an eclectic view of a rivalry ranging far beyond “great power” politics. He provides the inside story of a revolution in the China policy of countries from around the world. The Rupture: China and the Global Race for the Future explains a diverse range of topics such as how many of the Western politicians and business leaders closest to Beijing have now become its sharpest opponents, how the COVID-19 pandemic dramatically accelerated this trend, and why 5G represents the first test case as to whether China can win the race for the future.

As competition grows between systems, the Western model itself is transforming given that China’s rise changes both the balance of ideas and the balance of power. Small traces U.S. efforts to recast relations with old allies, examining Europe’s growing role in the technological and economic contest, and Beijing’s attempts to build a coalition of its own.

Andrew Small, The Rupture: China and the Global Race for the Future (Hurst Publishers, 2022) ISBN 9781787387782, 304 pages

What path does a middle power take when engrossed in the competition between great powers? Do they get caught up between the two or forge a path of their own? In the heating U.S.-China rivalry, what are the strategic responses of middle powers in the Asia-Pacific? The Strategic Options of Middle Powers in the Asia-Pacific examines these questions through the specific case studies of South Korea, Australia, Japan, India, Taiwan, and Vietnam from their local perspectives.

With each chapter, written by experts, the book provides comprehensive studies of the regional powers in the Asia-Pacific with an in-depth examination of the contemporary geopolitics of the region, including the impact of both the Trump and Biden administrations, Beijing’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy, cross-strait relations with Taiwan, and the influences of Japan, Vietnam, Australia, and South Korea. The Strategic Options of Middle Powers in the Asia-Pacific reveals that regional middle powers actually exert influence on the direction of regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, and develops theories of foreign policy analyses, forming a systematic framework through initiating crucial concepts, including reluctant hedging, economic statecraft, and strategic position-taking.

Chien-Wen Kou, Chiung-Chiu Huang, Brian Job, The Strategic Options of Middle Powers in the Asia-Pacific (Routledge, 2022) ISBN 9781003156314, 278 pages

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he summer of 2022 hit the world rather harshly. Wildfires and unusually scorching heat often followed by flash floods in different parts of the world have become a common occurrence. The effects of climate change become more tangible and destructive for all, yet the series of disasters highlight distinctive challenges for each region.

Europe

Europe is suffering the worst drought in 500 years, most notably impacting France, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Romania, Hungary, Serbia, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Ireland, and the UK.

The effects of the drought are detrimental to trade, transport, water and food supply, and energy generation. Major rivers like the Rhine, Danube, Loire, and Po have seen a significant fall in water levels while the current dry spell is expected to last several more months.

According to the European Commission’s European Drought Observatory, 47% of the continent is experiencing a significant deficit of soil moisture, while an additional 17% is at an alert state.

As heatwaves boost energy demand and gas supplies from Russia remain limited, European energy prices have surged six months into the war. The focus is now handling the upcoming winter demand. Recently, the EU attempted to greenwash nuclear energy to calm supply shortages. While the move raises ethical concerns, nuclear energy production may further strain water supply.

All this leaves Europe in a position where it must juggle energy and water issues. In France, rivers that are used to cool nuclear reactors have reached alarming temperatures. The water used in the process is returned to the river at a higher temperature, potentially harming wildlife.

Africa

In Africa, the effects of natural disaster and climate change have led to mass migration and starvation. A World Bank report predicts that by 2050, around 86 million people in sub-Saharan Africa and 19 million in North Africa could become internal migrants due to climate shocks such as heatwaves and drought, storms, and major flooding.

Following four consecutive years of below average rainfall, the Horn of Africa is experiencing the worst drought in 40 years. The drought has devastating effects on farming. Millions of livestock have perished while failed harvests have resulted in a drop of food production. The region remains vulnerable as its economy heavily depends on agriculture.

Combined with armed conflicts, rising food and fuel prices, and the impact of COVID19, the climate crisis leaves 1.5 million persons in the region displaced according to the UNHCR. The situation in Ethiopia, Somalia, and parts of Kenya continues to worsen. Since January, over 200 children died from malnutrition in Somalia alone.

Across the Sahel region, water availability has dropped more than 40% over the past 20 years mainly due to climate change.

In April, intense rains hit South Africa causing floods and landslides across the provinces of KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape. More than 400 people died as a result of floods, making it one of South Africa’s deadliest disasters this century.

Asia

Extreme and unpredictable weather tests the resilience of Asian countries. Asia is diverse, with differing geography, population, and capabilities to respond to climate change. It also has two of the most populated countries in the world, India and China, exposing more people to potential damage.

In Pakistan, the “monsoon on steroids” caused major floods after heavy rain. Around 33 million people were affected and over 1,000 people were killed. Many have lost all their possessions and have been left homeless. In the earlier months, neighboring India and Bangladesh were hit by floods from the monsoon season that came earlier than expected.

Relatively smaller storms have also taken affect in Southeast Asia. Extreme weather events occur more frequently and intensely in the region. The storms were particularly hard-hitting on rural areas in Indonesia.

China is seeing record-breaking temperatures that sparked wildfires in its southwestern region. Cities in the south are experiencing a major drought that has dried up the rivers that cities use for hydropower, the world’s third longest river, Yangtze, among them. The river is a water source for 600 million people.

Local officials have suspended the supply of hydropower to some companies and factories, shutting down industries. China’s power crunch threatens supplies of everything from metals to food, and also is slowing down global business.

Why do flash floods follow drought?

The many cases of flooding we have seen this summer came after droughts. This is because a prolonged period of drought changes the nature of the soil.

Drought-hit land becomes vulnerable to flooding. As soil dries up and hardens, it loses its porosity and therefore, its ability to absorb the rain.

Furthermore, a warmer climate creates an atmosphere that can collect, retain, and unleash more water. This results in wet areas becoming wetter and dry areas becoming drier.

As many countries hit their highest-ever recorded temperatures this year, the picture comes as no surprise. The effects of climate change increasingly seep through our daily lives, even for the more privileged.

A virtual summit for democracy was held on December 9-10, 2021, upon the invitation of the United States. At the summit, Joe Biden renewed his call for democracy and the fight against authoritarianism and corruption. Amongst more than 110 invited countries, 89 showed up. The question now is why the Biden administration initiated the Summit for Democracy. Let me address some important issues and their consequences in what follows.

The general assertion is that the summit was initiated in order to respond to the rhetoric that American democracy is in decay and crisis – a debate which has gone global. One of the key denominators of the democracy crisis in the U.S. has been the horrific attack on Capitol Hill on January 6, 2021 following the results of the U.S. presidential elections.

On August 30, 2021, this was followed by the withdrawal of the U.S.-led NATO forces from Afghanistan, another evident U.S. failure. These and similar events brought the image of U.S. democracy into question before a global public. In this context, the Summit for Democracy was designed to rectify the image of the U.S. both domestically and globally.

The exclusion of major U.S. partners

China and Russia were not invited to the Summit for Democracy as they are regarded as the ideological rivals of democratically ruled countries. There were also countries from the Asia-Pacific and Africa that were not on the invitation list: Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, which are considered de facto allies of the United States, were among the ASEAN members not invited.

China and Russia were not invited to the Summit for Democracy for they are regarded as the ideological rivals of democratically ruled countries.

Although Singapore and Thailand might not be fully democratic, and Vietnam has a single-party rule, they uphold – to a certain degree – democratic practices such as civil society organizations and a rule-based administration. They also have closer ties with the U.S. in fields including not only economy but also culture, academia, and the defence sector. Not only this, but they have been approached by the U.S. to adopt policies against China. Indeed, this is closely related to the well-established Asian pivot policy by former U.S. president Barack Obama.

The invitation of only Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines from the ASEAN region to the Summit for Democracy has led to speculations. Is there a rift between the rest of the member countries of ASEAN and the United States due to a widening ideological gap between democracies and non-democracies? Or is it because of these countries’ sociopolitical or socioeconomic alliances with U.S. rivals? If the former turns out to be true, there is definitely a certain degree of miscalculation by the Biden administration.

There is no doubt that the U.S. is losing credit as the leader of global democracy along with its capacity to defend democratic principles and values. Political elites in ASEAN member states, which rely on Western democracy as an ideal, can no longer satisfy or silence emergent anti-Western sentiments as now critical voices even within the ruling circles in Europe increasingly emerge and question the credibility of the U.S. “democratic” engagements abroad.

Concern over the Lack of Engagement

Japan is a highly acclaimed U.S. ally in the Asia-Pacific region and approached the U.S. decision not to invite certain ASEAN countries to the summit critically.

No doubt that the U.S. is losing credit as the leader of global democracy.

Japanese political commentators were in favor of inviting all ASEAN members, not only some, to the summit. According to them, direct U.S. engagement with ASEAN is essential to sustaining the security in the Asia-Pacific against China. The Japanese commentators seem right to criticize the imposition of a definition of democracy technically contrived by the U.S. alone.

On the subject of the exclusion of Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, Japan has implicitly reacted by expressing its concern about how to improve democratic rules in ASEAN without the U.S. facilitation and engagement through political, economic, and cultural mechanisms.

To highlight additional concerns, it should be emphasized that Singapore, a U.S. ally, and Vietnam, a potential partner of the United States, were not invited to the summit. Taking into consideration that Barack Obama was the first U.S. president to visit Hanoi after the Vietnam War, the exclusion of Vietnam from the summit is not an encouraging move for enhancing the partnership between the two capitals.

Categorizing certain Asia-Pacific countries as “non-democratic” may be true in principle. Nevertheless, the imposition of a Western-based democracy model may not be acceptable by a number of regional countries.

This miscalculated approach by the U.S. administration can potentially trigger more controversy among non-democracies in the Asia-Pacific, and may result either in an attempt to copy the model of the U.S. democracy, which could potentially end up in failure, or push them further towards strengthening their ties with China, the world’s second superpower.

Step Forward

The question remains whether the composition of the countries invited to the Summit for Democracy consisted of a wider alliance or the U.S. was simply playing the leadership role by marking its influence on democratically ruled countries. Then, the subsequent question is whether the U.S. administration intends to divide the world into democratic and undemocratic rules. If the latter is true, it is not difficult to guess the existence of a larger division and separation of countries by the United States as democratic and non-democratic ones.

The lack of U.S. engagement with Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, as member states of ASEAN, can deter the democratization processes further if the United States’ formal involvement remains ineffective. The influence of democratic principles has decreased significantly around the globe in the last decades. This includes Western countries, where democracy was born, as has become evident in the treatment of people of color and migrants.

The task of major democratic countries such as the U.S. is not to judge other democracies apathetically, but rather to galvanize democratic engagements with countries that are undergoing democratic challenges by paying a degree of respect to their existing democratic institutions.

On November 12, thousands of protesters took to the streets of the Maldivian capital Male, calling for and an end to the Indian military presence and interference in domestic affairs, while chanting, “Indian Military Out,” making it one of the largest ever political protests on the archipelagic country, and igniting similar protests elsewhere, including Fuvahmulah city, where thousands gathered on Sunday, November 14, 2021.

Despite the Maldivian government’s efforts to ignore and downplay the protester’s demands, the hashtags “IndiaOut,” “IndianMilitaryOut,” and “DefendMaldives” have since become the top trending topics on social media in the country.

While the Maldives and India have long enjoyed warm ties, with Indian nationals accounting for 90,000 of the roughly 1.5 million tourists who visit the Maldivian islands each year, there’s been a noticeable shift in attitudes among the general population in recent times, as resentment grows towards New Delhi’s ever-more aggressive policies and meddling in the country and region.

These anxieties were given a jolt in June, when a series of leaked documents, showing communication between the Maldives Foreign Ministry and the Indian High Commission, revealed the Indian government denied a request by the previous Maldivian administration, under President Abdulla Yameen, to withdraw its Indian Military helicopters from the country in the months leading up to the 2018 Presidential Election.

Mr. Yameen was ultimately defeated by his Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) rival and current President – Ibrahim Mohamed Solih – in the November 2018 polls, a victory secured among allegations New Delhi had tipped its finger on the scales by meddling in the election.

The Indian government denied a request to withdraw its Indian Military helicopters from the Maldives in the months leading up to the 2018 Presidential Election

These allegations were given undeniable credibility when former President and current Speaker of Parliament – Mohamed Nasheed – gave an interview to India Today in 2019, in which he praised Indian officials and diplomats for creating a “small window” to help MDP win the election.

Worryingly, for many Maldivians, President Solih has been acting as New Delhi’s “yes-man” since the election, prompting widespread concerns he has traded the country’s sovereignty and independence to enrich his political and personal fortunes, while also dressing up Indian military expansionism as “infrastructure projects.”

More troubling still is the way some of the agreements between the two countries have been signed in secrecy, and made available to the public only because of leaked documents obtained by The Maldives Journal earlier this year.

Worryingly, for many Maldivians, President Solih has been acting as New Delhi’s “yes-man” since the election.

At the core of the protesters grievances is revelation the current Maldivian government has signed a secretive deal with New Delhi, allowing for Indian military personnel to enjoy full diplomatic immunity and tax exemption status, thus constituting a violation of the Maldivian Constitution, which states foreign soldiers may not be stationed in the country without full approval from Parliament.

Hamdham Shakeel, co-founder and editor of the independently operated Maldives News Network, explained to Politics Today how Maldivians don’t wish to be caught in the middle of a potential future shooting war between India and China in the increasingly contested Indian Ocean, a concern he described as “one of the major driving forces behind anti-Indian military sentiments.”

“Stationing and operating military assets in the Maldives would mean that it has become a point of military operation. Maldivians would have to face collateral damages for stationing Indian military personnel and hardware in the Maldives,” therefore breaking from its long-held policy of remaining neutral in regional and great power rivalries, said Shakeel.

Of particular concern is an agreement signed between the current Maldivian government and India on 21 February to develop and maintain the country’s most strategic military naval bases – Uthuru ThilhaFalhu (UTF) – which is not only located within close proximity to the capital city, but also described as its “last line of defence.”

Details of the agreement became public only after it was leaked to local newspapers, revealing Indian military personnel will be allowed to carry arms and live ammunition and conduct their own surveillance and patrols in the country.

It’s for these reasons, the “Indian Military Out” protest movement continues to gather steam, becoming better organized, with the group “Defend Maldives,” consisting of the opposition coalition, a breakaway faction of the ruling party and many other smaller groups, lending its support and infrastructure.

Expectedly, the Maldivian government launched a counter campaign against the protest movement on 17 November, when it issued a statement condemning the protesters as only a “small group of individuals with the objective of tarnishing the country’s long-standing cordial ties with India,” while accusing them of “spreading false information.”

Conspicuously, however, the Maldivian government mischievously removed the word “military” in its statement, therefore mislabelling the protest movement as “India Out,” a naked effort to malign the “Indian Military Out” protest movement as anti-India.

Shakeel scoffed at the government’s characterization of the protesters, describing the Maldivian people as great friends of the Indian people and culture, and saying they specifically oppose India’s BJP government’s “aggressive foreign policy revolving around Indian imperialism in the Indian Ocean” and encroachment on the country’s sovereignty and independence.

Just two years after the December 1971 war between Pakistan and India, on May 18, 1974, India detonated a nuclear device, confirming it possessed the A-bomb.

Pakistan had already lost a significant part of its land in that war. East Pakistan, which had already been undergoing a civil war, had emerged as the independent state of Bangladesh with help from India. With the war lost, and the country now divided, the timing of the Indian nuclear test could not have been worse.

Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was under intense pressure to counter what was perceived as a threat to the very sovereignty of Pakistan. Just a few years back, in 1965, in an interview, Bhutto had said that if India built a nuclear bomb, “we will eat grass, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own.”

Sensing what was being cooked next door, he had already directed work on Pakistan’s nuclear program to be initiated and research had already begun in 1972. But it was progressing very slowly, and the prime minister’s restlessness was growing with each passing day. Now, India’s test had come to confirm his worst fears.

Like serendipity, a letter from a hardly known young scientist working in Amsterdam, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, arrived, in which he offered his services to provide guidance for Pakistan’s nuclear program – Mossad officials would later regret having failed to assassinate him in time.

Dr. Khan, was immediately invited for a meeting by PM Bhutto. Upon his arrival in December 1974, he was surprised to learn that Pakistan’s nuclear program had already set about. What he did not like, however, was that the scientists were relying on the plutonium route. He sharply criticized this approach and explained the viability of the uranium enrichment route to Bhutto. Upon Bhutto’s request, he spelled out the action plan for highly enriched uranium to the scientists of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC).

One year after the first meeting, when Khan came to his home country for his annual vacation, and happened to visit the site, he was dismayed with the pace of progress. The scientists already working in the PAEC were no lightweights and perhaps had little reason to be receptive towards the views of someone they saw – more or less – as a holidaymaker, coming from Amsterdam for vacation and telling them what to do. The distance bomb-learning program was not working.

But Khan’s frustration over the inefficiency of the program resulted in a reaction he did not expect: Bhutto invited Khan to leave his job, settle in Pakistan, and lead the program. Khan, who was well settled in his new home abroad, which he liked very much, and who also had a wife from the Netherlands, initially expressed hesitance.

Khan had studied metallurgy in Germany, materials engineering in the Netherlands, and obtained a doctorate from the Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium. Just after his doctorate, he had joined the company Verenigde Machinefabrieken Stork-Werkspoor (VMF) in the Netherlands, which had a big portfolio of heavy machinery, including nuclear plants-related equipment.

Khan got posted by VMF as a consultant at Urenco, a uranium enrichment company, which used to provide enriched uranium to power plants in Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and the United States. According to Khan, the company was facing problems with designing gas centrifuges, and being an expert in materials, he was one of the engineers posted to this top secret facility.

Thus, Khan brought with him his experience and expertise in designing gas centrifuge technologies for uranium enrichment, which represented perhaps the most critical part in developing weapons-grade nuclear technology. He started working at a rapid pace to build the facility, and to develop and acquire materials and technologies, as fast as possible, without being detected.

Khan was a scientist, a metallurgist, and a nuclear-program architect, but at the same time, he was at the center of a secret network, having to strike deals to procure whatever was required from wherever at minimum cost and in the shortest time. Sometimes, this might have meant defense cooperation with other countries. In any case, the work progressed swiftly, and by the 1980s, Pakistan had achieved the capability for nuclear explosion.

Interestingly, the PAEC and the KRL, both complemented each other, but in many ways emerged as competitors too. Both claimed to have reached the potential to make a bomb in the 1980s using their own routes.

When India mobilized its forces in 1987 and started some of the biggest war exercises since WWII, Pakistani General Zia-ul-Haq landed in India to “watch a test match.” At the airport, he briefly met Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and warned him with a chilling equanimity, “Mr Rajiv, you want to attack Pakistan, do it. But keep in mind that this world will forget Hulagu Khan and Genghis Khan and will remember only Zia-ul-Haq and Rajiv Gandhi, because this will not be a conventional war but a nuclear war…”

With that threat, the war was averted. And Israel’s plans to strike KRL plants with India’s help, had fallen flat too.

The nuclear tests and Khan’s legacy

It was not until 1998 that Pakistan came to the fore with the bomb. When India performed its tests on May 11 and 13, 1998, Pakistan decided to go ahead with its own merely 17 days later. Pakistan conducted its nuclear explosions in an unpopulated, granite mountain range in Balochistan Province, under the name “Chaghi-I” on May 28, 1998 and “Chaghi-II” on May 30, 1998.

Before this, some had doubted Pakistan’s nuclear capability altogether. But the speed of Pakistani reaction came as a surprise even to those who believed it was in possession of an atomic bomb. Independent sources, based on seismic activity, confirmed that Pakistan had indeed conducted nuclear tests.

Today, the country is estimated to have a stockpile of nearly 165 nuclear warheads compared to India’s 156. Moreover, the KRL, in competition with the PAEC, operates a booming missiles program, in addition to other defense equipment.

Meanwhile, Khan became the target of Western media and governments quite early. In 1983, he was sentenced in absentia for trying to steal enrichment secrets from the Netherlands. He denied the charges, citing that the information he used to build the centrifuges was available in various sources which did not need any classified access. His conviction was overturned in 1986.

In 2004, Khan was accused of smuggling nuclear secrets and operating a nuclear black market. Pakistan, which is not a signatory to the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and hence not bound by its terms, assured the international community of cooperation to avoid a backlash and possible sanctions.

To the nation’s surprise, the country’s hero appeared on national television and expressed regret over his actions, extending an unconditional apology. He confessed to having supplied gas centrifuge components to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Immediately, he was put under house arrest to prevent further proliferation.

His house arrest ended in 2009, when a court found the house arrest orders to be illegal; however, his freedom to move remained severely restricted and he was kept under watch until his death on October 10, 2021, a few weeks after he had recovered from COVID19.

Joko Widodo is an Indonesian politician, businessman, and the 7th president of Indonesia. He previously served as the mayor of Surakarta from 2005 to 2012, and the governor of Jakarta from 2012 to 2014. He was elected president in July 2014 – the country’s first non-elite and non-military political leader.

Widodo is bound to the idea of change and reform in contemporary Indonesia. Although he has tried to transform the country into an Asian power, several crises, ranging from COVID-19 to some popular Islamist movements, have challenged his career. As the first English-language biography of Widodo published by Penguin Specials as a Lowy Institute Paper, Ben Bland’s Man of Contradictions shows how Widobo’s presidency mirrors a range of modern Indonesia’s paradoxes: democracy and totalitarianism, openness and protectionism, Islam and pluralism.

Although Widodo’s presidency has not yet come to an end, the author has delivered a great book. Bland, a Financial Times correspondent in Jakarta, has had unconditional access to the president, interviewed him on several occasions, and has gotten to know many of his officers and consultants. Apart from this, the author has lived in Indonesia among the ordinary people whose daily lives have been affected by Widodo’s domestic and international policies.

Bland professes that Man of Contradictions is not a “conventional biography.” His work follows what he considers the contradictions and paradoxes of Widodo, best exemplified in his manner and style. For the author, the unique manner of his leadership is an outcome of the hopes and dreams of the tens of millions of Indonesians who have voted for him.

The author has intentionally tried to prepare a book that is comprehensible to the general reader and does not become entangled with the conventional theories of policy-making and politics nor the challenging methods of biography writing. The book is an accessible source of understanding the highest-level political situation in the most populous Muslim country in the world.

Man of Contradictions familiarizes readers with Joko Widodo, the challenging leader of Southeast Asia, and at the same time, is a fresh and up-to-date political biography that opens a door to a political and social aspect of Indonesian history and society.

Ben Bland, Man of Contradictions: Joko Widodo and the Struggle to Remake Indonesia (Penguin, 2021) ISBN 978-1760897246, 164 pages.

The Azeri crushing military defeat of (pro)Armenian forces in the Second Karabakh War (September 27–November 9, 2020) resulted in Turkey’s surging popularity not only in Azerbaijan but also across the entire Turkic-speaking world.

Ankara’s decisive military-diplomatic support for its strategic ally, including military training, consultancy, and military-technical support showcasing the might of Turkey-produced unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) made leading Russian conservative thinkers grudgingly admit Turkey’s growing role and increasing popularity in different theater, including, among others, the post-Soviet space.

In Moscow, understanding seems to be growing that the idea of the “Great Turan,” built on the ideology of the unity of the Turks, is rapidly spreading not only across South Caucasus and Central Asia, but it is also gaining popularity in ethnically and religiously diverse parts of Russia as well. This is clearly visible in the rhetoric of both Russia’s conservative thinkers and representatives of the military-political leadership, which is demonstrating a growing uneasiness over Turkey’s growing influence.

In this regard, Russia’s concerns could be conditionally broken down into three interdependent macro-areas.

First, on the domestic level, the following entities, are heavily populated by Turks: Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chuvashia, Dagestan, North Ossetia, Chechnya, Crimea (unlawfully annexed from Ukraine in 2014), Yakutia, Tuva, Karachay-Cherkessia, Khakassia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Gorno-Altai Republic, and Taymyrsky Dolgano-Nenetsky District.

Russian experts admit that Turkey’s foreign policy and military successes have resulted in its increasing popularity among Russia’s Turkic-speaking peoples.

Russia’s concerns rest on two main pillars. On the one hand, Russian experts admit that Turkey’s foreign policy and military successes, ambitious domestic projects and elaborate use of “soft power,” which rest on the highly revered conservative values and traditions of the Muslim world as well as the idea of pan-Turkism, have already resulted in its increasing popularity among Russia’s Turkic-speaking peoples.

On the other hand, memories of the past, of the time of internal Russian crises, when many of the aforementioned entities openly demanded either broader autonomy or vouched for full independence and sovereignty, are still very much alive. While in some regions Russia managed to find peaceful solutions – albeit having to cede sizable economic benefits, and political and cultural autonomy– in others, confrontation took the form of open armed conflict.

Russian elites are concerned that in the case of internal crises, these sentiments (separatism/secessionism) could recur, now under the banner of pan-Turkic ideology. At this juncture, a particularly telling case is that of Tatarstan. Aside from having several pro-Turkic organizations operating on its territory, Kazan has always stood independent from Moscow.

Perhaps, the most alarming example – for Moscow, of course – was the post-2015 developments, that is the downing of the Russian fighting jet in Syria. Instead of breaking up with Ankara loud and clear, Kazan opted to remain silent causing visible confusion in Moscow.

Interestingly, amidst the crisis in the bilateral relations between Ankara and Moscow, conservative Russian commentators openly wondered whether in the case of a (para)military escalation Tatarstan would act as Turkey’s “silent ally” in Russia’s rear. Even though escalation was not meant to occur, Tatarstan’s ambivalence – undoubtedly, construed in Moscow as tacit siding with Ankara – most certainly did not go unnoticed.

The second major area is Central Asia, dubbed as Russia’s “soft underbelly,” which entered the sphere of Turkish interests after the collapse of the USSR. Specifically, starting in 1993, Turkey stood behind the creation of the first regional organizations, including, among others, the International Organization of Turkic Culture (Türksoy).

A pivotal milestone that showcased Turkey’s regional success was the emergence of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States (Turkic Council) in 2009. The latter offers its members multifaceted cooperation in the fields of economy, science, education, transportation, customs, and tourism.

Russian commentators and experts agree that a combination of Russia’s own mistakes – the foreign policy blunders of the 1990s and the derogatory treatment of foreign workers from Central Asia, which, incidentally, continues – and Ankara’s proactive position has led to the gradual erosion of Russia’s regional “soft power.” Another uninviting regional news for Russia came after an informal summit of the Turkic Council on March 31, 2021 which declared the city of Turkistan in southern Kazakhstan as “The spiritual capital of the Turkic world.”

Coupled with Kazakhstani determination to boost its ties with China through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the diminishing role of the Russian language – trendy in the whole macro-region – this news is yet another cause for worry, signaling Russia’s forfeiture of its formerly strong stance in Kazakhstan, a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, to both China and Turkey.

These developments, however, tarnish in comparison with another regional trend. Starting in 2020, Ankara has profoundly increased its activities in the fields of military-technical cooperation, offering its services and (para)military education to regional players, including Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. This has resulted in growing pro-Turkish sentiments and strengthening of the pro-Turkish lobby among the local military-political elite. In effect, Central Asia, a region where some countries are challenged with security threats, could largely benefit from the experience Turkey could offer in the area of counterterrorism and/or non-linear (para)military operations.

In this regard, it must be understood that Ankara’s increasing participation in Central Asian military-political affairs gravely upsets Russia from a moral-ideological point of view. For decades, Russia has perceived itself as an exclusive provider of military-technical assistance to Central Asian countries – perhaps, the only remaining vestige of former Soviet regional dominance. However, this seems to be withering down. Even though some influential Russian thinkers are calling on the Russian leadership to “learn the Soviet mistakes and renounce from ambitions in Central Asia,” it is dubious whether the Russian leadership is prepared to do so.

South Korea has become a soft power giant with the effective promotion of its national image and culture worldwide. The country has already proved itself by producing high-quality electronic devices and with its automobile industry. The South Korean movie Parasite was the first non-English language movie to win Best Picture at the Academy Awards in February 2020.

There is a term for this new trend: Hallyu, meaning the “Korean Wave,” describing the quick transfer of South Korean popular culture to the rest of the world. The Korean influence ranges from K-pop to television programs, drama series, and various sorts of digital content.

The Middle East region is not an exception to this wave of Korean cultural influence. Korean dramas, music, and movies are received well in the Middle East. One reason behind Korean culture’s quick penetration in the region is the overlapping cultural sensitivities related to social and moral values such as the place of family in the narratives and the lack of nudity – nudity is more common in European and North American productions. According to Spotify, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Morocco, and Algeria were the top five streamers of K-pop between 2014 and 2020.

The Korea-Arab Society (KAS) is a foundation established and funded by Korean and Arab governments to boost reciprocal cooperation in several areas such as arts, sports, culture, and economy. Korean Cultural Centers (KCC) were opened in Ankara, Cairo, and Abu Dhabi in 2011, 2014, and 2018 respectively.

On the 60th anniversary of South Korea and Turkey diplomatic relations in 2017, Turkey released the movie Ayla, based on a true story that took place during the Korean War. South Koreans call Turks “Blood Brothers.” The Department of Korean Language and Literature at Ankara University was established in 1989, and was the first department for Korean studies in Turkey.

Similarly, the UAE and South Korea have strategic partnership relations in several areas such as education, energy, and agriculture. In 2019, an MoU was signed between the UAE’s Barakah One Company and South Korea’s Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) to improve cooperation on nuclear energy. Recently, in March 2021, during the Industry and Energy Cooperation Forum, the UAE and South Korea signed another MoU for collaboration in hydrogen economy, digital innovation, and transformation.

In August 2012, Turkey and South Korea signed a free trade agreement (FTA) establishing a free trade area, followed by two other agreements on trade and investment in 2015. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan paid a visit to South Korea in 2018 and met Korean President Moon Jae-in to further the cooperation on international affairs such as the refugee crisis, fighting terrorism, world peace, and security.

South Korea has always been politically neutral in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The country has shown sensitivity towards its relationship with Israel and has kept a balance so as not to risk losing its major trade partners in the Gulf. South Korea has maintained limited military involvement in MENA with some exceptions such as the first Gulf War (1990-91). In 2003, Seoul sent troops during the invasion of Iraq but kept its forces in non-combat zones. In 2006, South Korea sent 356 soldiers to Southern Lebanon as part of the United Nations Interim Force (UNIFIL).

A win-win situation characterizes the Korean-Middle East relationship. South Korea can continue exporting high-tech products to the Middle East and benefit from bilateral agreements in other fields such as education and social reforms. Yet, the country may also face the risk of being part of the U.S. military engagements in the region, given its strong alliance and partnership with the U.S. However, South Korea is not on this track. The cultural impact of Korean arts and movies has helped the country earn a worldwide reputation especially among younger generations who are more eager to follow Korean influencers and public figures online.

Pakistan’s relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have become complicated in recent years as a result of changing regional geopolitics. To manage the difficulties in relations with Saudi Arabia, in January of this year, Pakistan appointed a retired military commander as its ambassador to Riyadh. Lieutenant General Bilal Akbar replaces Ambassador Raja Ali Ejaz, a career diplomat who was appointed to Riyadh in January 2019.

The appointment of an experienced military man is a calculated move to better handle the challenges facing the bilateral ties and their likely effect on economic relations between Pakistan, on one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on the other. It is worth noting that the Saudi ambassador to Islamabad, Nawaf bin Said Al-Malki, is also a former military man who has been in his current post since September 2017.

General Manoj Mukund Naravane, the chief of the Indian army, visited the UAE and Saudi Arabia recently for the first time. The visit was seen as a clear sign of India’s growing military ties with the two Gulf states.

Though India has close economic relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as it imports a significant portion of its oil and gas needs from the region and exports some $60 billion worth of goods to the six GCC states, New Delhi is keen to advance its military interests in the Arab region.

India’s ambition is supported by the large presence of Indian expatriates in the GCC, with their numbers in the UAE and Saudi Arabia reaching six million in total. Indian interest in expanding military ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE presents a tricky situation for Pakistan, which has been a major security partner to both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi for a long time.

A number of factors are contributing to the changing security environment in the Gulf region as key countries keep a close watch on Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) and his Saudi counterpart Mohammed bin Salman’s (MBS) uncontrolled ambitions. Countries like Pakistan, India, Iran, and Turkey as well as France, Britain, and the U.S. realize that power equations in the Middle East are changing. Israel’s embrace by Arab princes adds a new dimension to regional politics.

Military ties between Pakistan and the GCC

Pakistan can take credit for having developed a military ecosystem in the Gulf, especially in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as the GCC has a history of deep-rooted military ties with Pakistan. India already enjoys a vast trade and business engagement with Arab monarchies. Since 1967, Pakistan has routinely provided military and air force training to the Saudi Kingdom. The comprehensive defense pact between the two countries in 1982 institutionalized Pakistan’s role in Saudi Arabia’s security.

Islamabad has also supplied troops in times of regional conflicts, especially during the Iran-Iraq War and the 1991 Gulf War. Officially, some 1,600 Pakistani military personnel are now deployed in the Saudi Kingdom, but it is believed that a much larger number of Pakistani retired military personnel are serving in Saudi Arabia.

Similar engagements exist with the UAE. The fact that the first five chiefs of the UAE Air Force were Pakistan Air Force (PAF) officers speaks volumes about this military relationship. PAF officers continue to serve in the UAE as of today. The Pakistani army has also established an armor training school in the UAE  and has provided training to UAE commando battalions, as well as to all armed and artillery corps officers.

Pakistan’s economic dependency on the Gulf

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the two biggest sources of remittances to Pakistan’s economy. Around 2.7 million Pakistanis live in Saudi Arabia and 1.5 million live in the UAE. Pakistan received $14.2 billion in remittances during the first half of the financial year 2020-21 compared to $11.37 billion in the same period of the previous year. The GCC contributed 60.14% of the total cash inflow to Pakistan during the July-December 2020 period.

The rulers of Saudi Arabia and the UAE are experts in displaying their petulant money power towards Asian and Arab countries by using threats of not issuing work visas, trade boycotts, and withdrawing investments. Such a state of affairs requires high levels of diplomatic and political skills. Therefore, Pakistan’s new ambassador to Riyadh has a delicate task in managing relations on multiple fronts.

Saudi Arabia asked Pakistan to return the second tranche of $1 billion of a total of $3 billion that it had borrowed from Riyadh in 2018 shortly after Imran Khan became prime minister of Pakistan. The UAE only deposited $2 billion out of the $3 billion it had committed to Pakistan, halting a $1 billion tranche when Pakistan’s foreign minister refused to participate in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) foreign ministers’ meeting in the UAE after Abu Dhabi extended an invitation to India to be the guest of honor in the plenary session on March 1, 2019.

Bin Salman put pressure on Pakistan to stay away from the Kuala Lumpur Summit in December 2019 which was attended by Malaysia, Turkey, Qatar, Iran, and Indonesia.

In November of last year, the UAE temporarily suspended the issuance of new visit visas for 12 countries, including Pakistani passport holders.

Saudi fragility

The criticism of the Saudi-based OIC by Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi in August 2020 for not organizing a meeting of foreign ministers on the Kashmir issue did not go down well with Saudi Arabia. Qureshi’s statement that Pakistan would explore the possibility of convening a meeting of foreign ministers of Muslim countries outside the OIC angered the Saudis. Bin Salman put pressure on Pakistan to stay away from the Kuala Lumpur Summit in December 2019 which was attended by Malaysia, Turkey, Qatar, Iran, and Indonesia.

Western power brokers have exploited Saudi control and influence over the OIC, making the 57-member organization ineffective on major global issues. Saudi interventions on behalf of Western interests have been a source of frustration and anger among Muslims but not many countries have come forward to challenge Saudi Arabia’s fragile leadership in this matter. Though the Kuala Lumpur Summit was not directed at the Saudi leadership, the Saudi government was panic-stricken when it saw important Muslim leaders gathering for a summit without its approval.

Pakistan feels that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have betrayed Islamabad on the Kashmir issue by not being vocal enough to support its position against India. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have long supported Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir. Now, their growing ties with India have become strategically and economically important, and the Saudi and UAE leaderships have distanced themselves from Pakistan’s interests.

It is true that Pakistan has limited economic options. It is equally true, however, that Saudi Arabia is left with limited military options in the case a major crisis hits Riyadh. Many in Pakistan believe that the Saudis and Emiratis do not provide them the kind of economic support they have been providing to Egypt, especially after bankrolling the coup against the democratically elected government of Mohamed Morsi.

The friction in relations with Saudi Arabia is also because of Pakistan’s own change of foreign policy orientation. Prime Minister Imran Khan is keen on charting a more independent foreign policy after decades of reliance on the U.S. and the Gulf states. Islamabad’s reduced reliance on the U.S. is replicated in less reliance on the Saudi-UAE axis. It started in 2015 when Pakistan’s parliament unanimously refused to send troops to participate in the Saudi-UAE-led war in Yemen, shattering the Saudi impression of using Pakistan as a hired gun.

Whilst modern-day official diplomatic relations between Malaysia and Turkey were established in 1964, the ties between the two countries predate the modern era. Early relations can be traced back to the early sixteenth century when the Malay Sultanate of Malacca received the Ottoman help to fend off an attack by the Portuguese.

In the nineteenth century, a number of Malay states had close relations with the Ottoman Empire and notable amongst these was the personal ties between Sultan Abu Bakar of Johor and the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II.

High-level visits between Malaysia and Turkey started in 1974 and since 2000 there has been undoubtedly greater interaction between the two states. Both countries are active members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation. In 2014, relations between the two countries received yet another impetus when they were elevated to a strategic partnership.

Trade and investment between Turkey and Malaysia have been growing significantly especially since August 2015 when a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the states entered into force. For Turkey, the FTA with Malaysia was its first with a member state of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its second in the Asia-Pacific region.

There is also the Turkey-Malaysia Business Council, which was created in 1995 to facilitate trade. In 2019 alone, total trade between Malaysia and Turkey was valued at US$2.2 billion, with the balance of trade in favor of the former.

In the same vein, while Malaysia is Turkey’s largest trading partner in Southeast Asia, for Malaysia, Turkey is its third most important trading partner in West Asia. A number of Turkish companies also operate in Malaysia and these include FNSS A.S., Evyap, Haus, Yonca-Onuk, Prota Asia, Novaplast, Dorce, Tepe Kimya, Polin Waterparkbuilds, Arcelik-Beko, Dalin, LC Waikiki, Aselsan, and De Facto – to name a few.

Similarly, a few Malaysian companies too have invested in Turkey, notable amongst which is the Malaysian Airports Holding Berhad (MAHB) that not only operates but is, in fact, the largest shareholder in Istanbul’s Sabiha Gökçen International Airport, Turkey’s second busiest airport.

In terms of trade and investment, Turkey views Malaysia as its gateway to Southeast and East Asia, and likewise Malaysia sees Turkey as its doorway into the West Asian and European regions.

In the defense sector, Turkey is one of Malaysia’s main source of defense procurement, namely armored vehicles and military communications. During the visit by President Erdoğan to Malaysia in December 2019, a number of agreements between firms in the defense sector were signed.

At the global level, both Malaysia and Turkey have been described as emerging middle powers often playing a pro-active role in international affairs, and especially on issues concerning the Islamic world.

A recent example of this role was when Malaysia convened the Kuala Lumpur Summit (KL Summit or Perdana Dialogue) with the theme “The Role of Development in Achieving National Security” in December 2019. The summit was attended by 450 delegates from 56 countries.

Notable among the attendees were Turkish President Erdogan, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, and Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, the Emir of Qatar. The summit’s main agenda was to discuss problems besetting Muslim nations and undertake efforts to enhance unity in the Islamic world.

Notwithstanding the above, there were those who viewed the KL Summit as an attempt by Malaysia (and perhaps even Turkey) to create a new bloc in the Islamic world and provide an alternative to the Saudi-led OIC. The non-attendance of Saudi Arabia and even Pakistan (apparently at the insistence of the former) gave further credence to such views.

Compounded with the KL Summit were attempts by the Mahathir government to distance itself from Saudi Arabia, witnessed especially its decision to shut down the King Salman Center for International Peace (KSCIP) in Putrajaya in August 2018.

That said, the KL Summit was also very much in line with Malaysia’s new Foreign Policy Framework (FPF), launched in September 2019, which amongst others envisions a greater role for the country vis-à-vis the Islamic world.

However, barely three months after the summit, in late February 2020, the Mahathir government fell and since then little has been heard of the whole scheme. With Mahathir, the driving force behind the summit, out of power, it appears that the whole initiative to provide leadership and some form of direction in the Islamic world may have passed into oblivion.

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is the fruit of competitive international trade affairs in the Asia-Pacific that has been dominating world trade and investment environments in the past few decades. The treaty authorizes the member countries’ rational choice to stand between protectionism and free trade.

A treaty pact was signed on November 15, 2020 with virtual participation of the leaders of 15 member countries who represent almost 2.2 billion people and 30% of the world’s GDP. The anticipated greater plan and its practical gain will pump $200 billion into the global economy.

With the RCEP representing a bit less than one-third of the global economic output, this agreement is expected to have a great impact on the global economy. As observed in the last four years, more than half of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China have constantly shown annual growth of more than 6-7%.

In recent years, the ASEAN countries have not only displayed a galvanizing productivity in logistics supplies and international trade, but have also gradually improved and showed an engagement with the dominant capitalist economic principals in the form of freer commercial activities.

This development, triggered by determinant geo-political narratives in the Asia-Pacific region, effectuates creation of certain trust among members of nations and the global investors.

The spirit of the ASEAN

The terms of the agreement provide a functional vehicle to eliminate the internal differences of member countries so as to reinvigorate production and trade affairs, while obtaining gains from this regional development.

There are three major aspects which can be considered as crucial developments. The first is the ASEAN-centered expansion of trade and investment activities.

The second is related to the East Asian nations, such as China, Japan, and South Korea, that have agreed, for the first time, to comply with mutual trade rules. Without a doubt, this will have a greater influence on the region’s peace and stability. In particular, the East and South China Seas will reclaim the status of mutual waterways for all the nations adjacent to them.

The US: Inside or outside the game?

The RCEP resonates with signs of effort toward the gradual reconstruction of economic growth in the Asia-Pacific. It poses novel problems for the new U.S. administration that add to the distress of a presumed isolation. Thus, U.S. President-elect Biden may desperately search for alternatives for repositioning his country on the global stage, and, in particular, in the Asia-Pacific.

However, the grave challenge the Biden administration will face is how to convince the U.S. Senate to rebound the country’s leadership in the Asia-Pacific region. Rather, the U.S. may opt to revive the relationship with regional powers and the ASEAN.

Biden will have no other choice but to reinitiate the active presence of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific since the U.S. is already in a declining standing on the eco-political scene.

Since the United States lost an opportunity by rejecting the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) four years ago, the new administration will potentially be excluded from the RCEP, and President-elect Biden will experience a great dilemma.

When one closely revisits the first term of the Obama administration, it becomes apparent that the Eastern and Southeastern Asian countries, which serve as major drivers of global growth, intended to restructure regional trade affairs.

Liberalization is currently being experienced by the emerging regional powers. A larger regional trade agreement such as the TPPA or, as clearly proven today, the RCEP was expected since the beginning of this century, because of the changing nature of global business and trade.

When soft enforcement was used by certain regional powers such as Japan and Singapore to convince the Obama administration to sign the TPPA, it took half a decade to reach a consensus, which finally arrived in 2015. Therefore, it is not astonishing that an almost similar process began in 2012 for the regional countries in the Asia-Pacific to reach a similar pact.

Biden will have no other choice but to reinitiate the active presence of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific since the U.S. is already in a declining standing on the eco-political scene.

Thus, the new U.S. administration is likely to take a step to create a peaceful environment on the global stage in order to gain the support of its allies, some of whom feel abandoned and others politically distanced. A better-case scenario would see the U.S. invest creatively in soft power rather than refocus on the competition with China as it has done in the previous years.

India’s Lack of Self-Reliance

India preferred not to sign the RCEP in order to protect its domestic market from the “invasion” of Chinese goods.

Although growth figures show that the country has progressed in the last half decade, the Narendra Modi government preferred to lean on restricted trade borders. But the major argument is that India is yet to conceive its regional power role.

Since U.S. President-elect Joe Biden and the Indian government dubbed the RCEP a new emerging power, there is an alternative for a new geopolitical structure in the Indo-Pacific.

Biden and Vice-President-elect Kamala Harris have professed a desire to engage with India. There are strong signs that Harris has been perceived positively by Indians. Harris’s ancestral link may be instrumentalized for the U.S. in the use of soft power towards India in order to help the country regain its lost presence in the Asia Pacific region.

The RCEP is the end product of the long negotiation processes among the member countries that have dominated global trade and economic activities in recent decades. If this treaty is successfully applied, there is little doubt that it will mold trade affairs on a global scale.