Since the start of the war in Syria, many debates erupted around the future of Bashar al-Assad and that he will not play any role in the future of Syria. However, the Syrian opposition demands the change of the regime, not just an individual. Until today, the Iranians and Russians succeeded in securing Assad his position, long enough that the U.S. does not speak about regime-change anymore. Saudi Arabia is trying to push the Syrian opposition to accept a political transition process with Assad. But Assad remains as a symbolic obstacle for peace in Syria. Thus, the question is: If Russia decides to oust Assad from power to accelerate the political process in Syria and tries to impose a trustful and reliable ally in the country, will it succeed?

To date, two different names come up in this regard: Ali Mamlouk, the former head of the National Security Bureau, and the Syrian Commander Gen. Suhail al-Hassan, nicknamed the “Tiger,” who leads the Russian-backed famous Tiger Forces. Suhail al-Hassan as a predecessor to Assad came into discussion when he was rewarded by Russian generals at the Humeimin base and his congratulations letter to the Russian President, Vladimir Putin. Ali Mamlouk on the other hand, remains as one of the only people who allegedly is in contact with other states such as the U.S., Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and others, solely due to this position as being the head of intelligence.

The recent re-shuffle in the Syrian regime has seemingly strengthened the Russian position and Russia-allied figures have been appointed to critical positions.

Going on with the case of Suhail al-Hassan, in his report, Can Kasapoglu argues: “[…] evidence suggest that Syria could witness a serious intra-regime power struggle between General Suheil al-Hassan, the commander of the battle-hardened Tiger Forces (Qawat al Nimr), and the incumbent Baathist military elite” and that “to materialize its political goals in Syria, Russia should rein in profiteer paramilitary formations, restrict Iran-orchestrated Shiite militancy’s presence in the Syrian security sector, and ensure a unified chain of command to lay the foundations of the post-civil war doctrinal order of battle of the Syrian Arab Armed Forces.”

Ali Mamlouk on the other hand might help Russia have a less problematic ousting of Assad as his stance within the Baathist military and political elite is strong. In this regard, during the beginning of July 2019, Russia placed Ali Mamlouk as the deputy of Bashar al-Assad and appointed Mohamed Deeb Zeitoun as the head of the National Security Bureau. Zeitoun is also a close ally of Russia.  

The general re-shuffle in the regime apparatus has seemingly strengthened the Russian position and Russia-allied figures have been appointed to critical positions. However, a main obstacle remains in front of Russia – its ally, Iran.

If Russia ousts Assad, then it would risk confrontation with Iran in Syria as the regime apparatus is divided between Iranian and Russian allies.

Currently, the alliance between both parties is being symbolized by Assad himself. If Russia ousts Assad, then it would risk confrontation with Iran in Syria as the regime apparatus is divided between Iranian and Russian allies, who are in competition over power. While the Russian side has more political power, the Iranian side is overwhelmingly stronger in terms of allied militias. In short, if Russia ousts Assad, Syria might enter a new dynamic in which the current regime axis would split and fight within themselves. Also, the current escalation in Idlib has proven the Russian limits without the active support of Iran. As long as the war continues or even further escalates, Russia is dependent on Iranian support.

All in all, Russia can find its Syrian Kadyrov. However, in contrast to Chechnya, Russia needs to balance and share power with another actor or risk an entire new conflict dynamic to evolve in Syria. Therefore, as long as Bashar al-Assad succeeds in managing the balance between Iran and Russia, he may remain as the formal head of Syria. However, if the political transition process finally occurs, even this balancing act may not help him stay in his position for which Assad burned Syria down and handed over his Powers to his protectors in Tehran and Moscow.

When the demonstrations in Syria started, the U.S. was fast on the very forefront, declaring its support to the demands for a democratic and free Syria. However, after 8 years of war, the U.S. has sidelined itself in the dispute between the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition, abandoning the later entirely. Nevertheless, the formulated U.S. ambitions in Syria bring up the need for the U.S. to re-engage with the Syrian opposition, namely the Syrian National Army. Otherwise, the U.S. goals for Syria will remain as meaningless words, likely to be redrafted by military measures of the regime axis.

According to U.S. Special Envoy James Jeffrey, the main goals of the U.S. in Syria are to ensure the defeat of Daesh, force Iran out of Syria and change the behavior of the Assad regime. While many in Washington think that they can enforce these terms by economic means – like sanctions as a stick and funds for reconstruction as a carrot – and staying inside Syria until U.S. terms are accepted, the regime axis does not seem impressed. The current carrot and stick strategy is based upon the assumption that the regime and Russia has a huge interest in re-building the formerly opposition-held areas it destroyed itself, and the miscalculation of the regime’s behavior. If economic sanctions would be enough to enforce terms on the regime, the regime would have accepted them when it was on the verge of collapse before the Russian intervention in 2015 and in 2013, when the regime almost lost control over all of Syria.

Many in Washington think that the U.S. can enforce its terms in Syria only by economic means – like sanctions as a stick and funds for reconstruction as a carrot.

In regards to Iran, I argued last week that the U.S. has limited options in Syria and has no real effective way of dealing with Iran in Syria. The last U.S. ambition in Syria is the enduring defeat of Daesh in which the U.S. has reportedly invested about $14.3 billion until June 30, 2017, but now the organization is re-grouping underground and conducting several attacks in Syria and Iraq. Some analysts like the ISW report suggests that Daesh has the capacity to capture an urban center. Focusing on Syria; there is a huge correlation between YPG-held areas and Daesh attacks.

Source: Tomasz Rolbieck

In order to be capable of achieving any goals in Syria, the U.S. needs to re-engage with the Syrian opposition. I am not suggesting that the U.S. change its horses, but that it should come back to its first horse again. The U.S. has mainly abandoned the opposition for two reasons: First, the fight against Daesh, in which the U.S. has regarded the Syrian branch of the PKK the most effective, and second, the ties between the Syrian opposition and extremists.

Regardless of the truth in these arguments, currently none of them apply. The first fight against Daesh is now in a new era in which popular support and acceptable governance will be the main effective tools to grab the extremists from their pool of recruitment and target their survivability. In regards to Iran, the Syrian opposition is a natural enemy of Iran and empowering them will ultimately help to force Iranians out of Syria. By supporting the Syrian opposition, the U.S. will have more room to ‘change the behavior’ of the regime in line with the UN-coordinated process.

The U.S. needs to re-engage with the Syrian opposition. I am not suggesting that the U.S. change its horses, but that it should come back to its first horse again.

In this matter, the Syrian National Army (SNA) provides the U.S. with a good opportunity. Composed of Arabs, Turkmens and Kurds, the SNA is the official armed structure of the Syrian Interim Government, which was formed by the Syrian opposition. The areas held by the SNA are totally separated from any extremist faction. Of the 28 factions in the SNA, 13 were previously supported by the U.S., 11 were established after U.S. support came to an end, and 22 fought against Daesh.

More than three weeks of airstrikes and ground attacks have left Syrians in the Idlib province stranded and scared.

The United Nations’ director of humanitarian affairs, Mark Lowcock, warned that a full-blown ground offensive by regime coalition forces, which would seek to seize the province entirely from opposition control, would result in the worst humanitarian crisis of the 21st century.

This rhetoric isn’t new. In fact, it sounds a lot like the rhetoric pushed in September of 2018 – when the United States and its EU partners collectively cut funding to civil society groups in Idlib, at the same time as the international community pushed Turkey and Russia to reach a deal in Sochi that would create “demilitarized zones” on the provincial borders of Idlib, Hama, and Aleppo, which would ostensibly prevent a possible humanitarian crisis. However, as part of a sustained wartime strategy which seeks to expose opposition-controlled areas to pure attrition, Russia and the Assad regime have violated those deals more than 600 times since April, according to the UN’s latest assessment.

Eight months later, the Assad regime, backed by Russian air power, has conducted a ruthless aerial campaign which has forced over 200,000 people to flee their homes in less than a month. Meanwhile, 200 people have been killed, nearly all by indiscriminate shelling and aerial bombing.

 Russia and the Assad regime have violated the political deals more than 600 times since April, according to the UN’s latest assessment.

Russia insists that it is targeting so-called terrorists, while rights groups like Amnesty International say Russian-backed regime coalition attacks are deliberately and systematically targeting health facilities, in an effort which amounts to war crimes.

Despite the overwhelmingly clear evidence towards those responsible for this destruction, the international community has failed to hold any party to account for the demolishment of medical facilities or any other attacks over the past several weeks.

Recently, a debate at the UN concluded that a party in the conflict with access to advanced weaponry was carrying out the attacks. But despite this, the debate failed to name any particular party as accountable for the attacks. This is obviously a moot point, and eliminates the need for an international response at any level.

The current wave of relentless aerial bombardment is reminiscent of the Russian-backed regime coalition offensives – in 2016 in Aleppo, and in 2017 in the rural Damascus countryside. The results of both of those military operations were the forced displacement of tens of thousands of civilians and opposition fighters to northern Syria, many of them to Idlib.

Just like Russia and the Assad regime have done in the past, the ongoing aerial campaign has targeted critical infrastructure including hospitals and emergency services like the Syrian Civil Defense, more commonly referred to as the White Helmets, in order to cut civilians off from critical lifelines that enable them to continue living in their homes and going about their daily lives.

The current wave of relentless aerial bombardment of Idlib is reminiscent of the Russian-backed regime coalition offensives – in 2016 in Aleppo, and in 2017 in the rural Damascus countryside.

But what, exactly, does this campaign look like?

During a recent trip to Idlib, my cameraman and producer drove 100km south of the Turkish border into Idlib province. We passed through at least a dozen armed opposition checkpoints, past a number of armed opposition headquarters, and on significant stretches of both the north-south M5 and east-west M4 highways. Despite Russian and regime claims that they were targeting so-called terror groups, all of the checkpoints and headquarters we passed by – many of which were on those main transit routes such as the M5 – were unscathed, and armed opposition fighters simply waved us through. In contrast, the towns we drove through were more like ghost towns, with few people remaining in the streets. Those who were outside dragged their feet as they walked through the broken streets, with piles of rubble and broken concrete serving as the canvas behind them.

Our ultimate destination was Kafrnabel, the home of the late Syrian philosopher and activist Raed al-Fares and a longtime hub of resistance in Idlib province. But as we passed through, from highway to town to hospital center, the scene became increasingly more grim.

When we arrived at the Kafrnabel Surgical Hospital, we found a scene that indicated brute force and ill intent. The entire hospital, from floor to ceiling, was caved in – and all the equipment and supplies in the hospital were unfit for service. I began speaking to the doctor who served as the head administrator of the hospital, but midway through, warplanes started patrolling above our heads. The doctor, obviously disturbed by his past encounters with Russian air power, was not willing to stick around any longer. He cut the interview short, and went off to seek shelter. At this moment, the first bomb fell.

Driving towards the place of the attack on the White Helmets facility in Kafranbel, Syria on May 13. Photo source, Obaida Hitto

As we left the hospital ourselves to go somewhere safe, a large plume of smoke rose up over the town’s humble skyline. Exhausted but determined, we considered our role in the area as journalists, and decided to go towards the scene of the attack.

Suddenly, I heard a sound, looked up into the sky, and there it was: as though a little paper airplane we played with when we were children, a Russian Sukhoi-series jet.

Upon our arrival at the scene of the attack, we piled out of the car and debated amongst ourselves whether it was safe to park there – whether our car would be struck by a falling bomb. This fear was legitimate, as the regime coalition has kept a well-documented history of double-tap strikes on areas it has targeted. While we discussed, warplanes continued to circle above us. Suddenly, I heard a sound, looked up into the sky, and there it was: as though a little paper airplane we played with when we were children, a Russian Sukhoi-series jet glided across the sky unabated, free to do as it pleases.

Moments later, a loud bang, followed by the screams of women and children pouring out of their homes. They ran, panicked, away from the scene of the attack.

Families living under olive trees in northern Idlib near Atmeh on the Turkish border. Photo source, Obaida Hitto

In the distance, close to the first blast site, a plume of smoke rose up over the buildings surrounding us. We moved closer to the scene of the attack to get a better look.

As we arrived, we saw the result of the strike: a White Helmets civil defense center was flattened. A chaotic scene unfolded before us as civilians, including young children, stood in the streets, in shock from the bombings, debating whether they should stay or leave.

This is the reality on the ground in Idlib today. For the outside world, this may come as a surprise: there is, of course, an internationally recognized de-escalation zone and de-militarized zone, negotiated by the international community, which ostensibly exists to protect civilians from such attacks. But for the millions of people living in northern Syria, many of whom have been displaced multiple times during the war, this is just another reason for them to continue what they started 8 years ago: a popular revolution against the monster which threatens their families, homes, and lives, which they call the regime of Bashar al-Assad.

Moment of the attack on White Helmets facility in Kafranbel, Syria May 13. Photo source, Obaida Hitto

Following the eruption of the Syrian uprising, the Assad regime has not hesitated to use any tactics to crack down on the uprising and reinstall its iron fist over Syrian territory. Using chemical weapons and barrel bombs are just among the many inhumane measures that the Assad regime has used.

However, despite all of its brutal methods, the Syrian regime was unable to maintain its control over Syrian territory. Since the first year of the crisis, the opposition forces have started to control different areas of Syria where it established its modus operandi of governing, and challenging the regime’s claims of sovereignty.

The Syrian control map has been changing dramatically. The expansion of the Syrian opposition territorial control reached its peak in mid-2013. However, the rise of Daesh at the expense of the opposition, and its loss of territorial control to the U.S.-backed PYD/SDF has marginalized the opposition, forced and limited its territorial control to non-connected separated pockets.

Yet, the Russian intervention at the end of September 2015, which radically changed the balance of power, and led to the Assad regime being able to re-stand on its feet. Backed by Russian Air Forces and associated by Iran’s paramilitary groups on the ground, the Assad regime started to choke the opposition’s controlled pockets, and apply its policy of forced migration. 

Encircle, starve and migrate

The Syrian regime has used forced displacement as a method to crack down on rebelled areas and to ensure the maintenance of its control since the first year of the uprising, as in the case of the Bab Amr district of Homs in February 2012. This method was accelerated and applied in several areas after the regime gained an upper hand with Russian intervention.

‘Encircle–starve–migrate’ was the tactic that Assad regime and its allies started to apply against the opposition-controlled pockets. Benefiting from Russian and Iranian support, and misusing the announced ceasefire and de-escalation agreements, the Syrian regime has accelerated its offensive campaigns.  

Dealing with each opposition pocket separately, the regime forces started to apply its tactics by encircling the pocket, starving its inhabitants, and displace the people who reject the regime’s rule – via what the regime and its allies preferred to call ‘reconciliation agreements.’ However, the ‘reconciliation agreements’ were nothing more than forced evacuation agreements, which came after long sieges and bombardment.   

‘Encircle-starve-migrate’ is the tactic being deployed by the Assad regime in order to crack down on rebel areas and to ensure the maintenance of its control. 

The evacuation agreements have enabled the Assad government to reclaim its sovereignty, but also to interfere in the demographic composition of the evacuated regions. The evacuation agreements of the towns of Madaya and al Zabadani in April, Darayya in August, Muaddamiye in September (in Western Ghouta), and East Aleppo in December 2016, evacuation agreement of Duma in Eastern Ghouta in April 2018, evacuation of northern Homs opposition pocket in May 2018, and Daraa pocket in July 2018, have all concluded with the forced evacuation of hundreds of thousands of Syrian people. Idlib was the final destination for the evacuated people, while Afrin and Euphrates Shield Operations have received a proportion of the displaced people, mainly in the latest waves.      

What is more important, is that the Assad regime seems to have taken measures to render permanent these coerced demographic changes instituted in various districts and even entire cities, and is set to accelerate these changes in the reconstruction phase of these areas. Among the most significant of these measures is the expropriation of former residents’ rights to their property, which would be transferred to Iran-backed pro-regime militants and their families.

Law No. 10 of 2018: Legalization of demographic engineering

The signing of law no. 10 of 2018 on April 2, 2018, represented a serious step by the Assad regime to ‘legalize’ the unlawful ‘de facto’ displacement. It is expected that this legislation will facilitate the legalization of demographic changes instigated by forced migration and deportation. The law, which has been voted on and signed into the Syrian legal code by the Parliament and al Assad respectively, authorizes the formation of new administrative units, in accordance to general administrative regulations. The measure in question will codify de facto demographic shifts by allowing for the reestablishment of administrative institutions in areas where residents had been compelled to abandon their homes due to armed clashes or forced migration, as it made it more difficult for former residents to retain their rights on their property, and enables those who have seized such property to register these properties under their own ownership. As such, this formerly unlawful action currently underway is now in the process of becoming legal.

As mentioned above, the latest legislation, which builds on the prior law no:66 of 2012, allows for the confiscation of property rights of lawful residents of areas having underwent forced expulsion and migration, by authorizing the establishment of new institutions in existing administrative units. The new law dictates that former residents must apply to these nascent institutions in order to acquire documents proving their ownership of their property within the first 30 days after the institutions’ establishment. While the law’s second clause of its second article, allows for the use of deputation of family members or other representatives by property owners in their application to the related institutions, it is foreseeable that evacuees will not easily be able to utilize this right. This is due to the fact that state institutions tend to be inactive in these areas of concern, as well as that it is usually entire families at a time that are expelled from their homes and towns, making options for potential representatives quite limited, if at all existent. In any case, it is not likely that those who have taken refuge abroad or in opposition-held territory to return to their former homes for fear of arrest, torture, and revenge, until these risks are eliminated.

Law No 10 of 2018, passed by the Parliament and al Assad respectively, attempts to legalize the unlawful de facto displacement of Syrian people.

The new law can also be interpreted to allow for incoming occupants of evacuees’ homes to claim ownership of these properties, based on the sixth clause of the second article, which permits the application for ownership based purely on a claimant’s word in the absence of documentation. The legislation is worded as such: ‘In the absence of documentation authenticating the claimant’s property ownership, the applicant must […] specify the location, perimeter, shareholders, and type of property for which they are applying.’ As can be seen here, the law’s phrasing is quite ambiguous and can be utilized by regime allies to claim ownership over property which is not claimed within the specified timeframe, or over property created by new administrative structures.

Following this new legislation, the Ministry of Local Government announced that it would be working on the necessary arrangements for the revision of administrative structures both in Homs and East of the capital. It has also been announced that these arrangements would apply to the Bab Amr district which had been evacuated in 2012 after its siege by regime allies, as well as the eastern entrance of Damascus and especially the Harasta District near Eastern Ghouta, which had been evacuated of most of its residents during the past weeks.

Another issue raising concern of evacuated real estate being distributed among regime allies is the statement that either official identification cards or passports must be presented during the process of claiming properties in newly formed administrative units, as is stipulated in clause 19 of the second article. The basis for this concern is the fact that the Damascus Directorate of Migration and Passports has recently distributed 200.000 Syrian passports to foreign militants transferred to the country by Iran. It is believed that these passports will be assigned to Iranian, Afghan, and even Iraqi Shiite militants and their families, thus giving them permanent residency in the country.

Long-term impact

The Syrian regime seems to continue its strategy of forced migration to win the battle on the ground and he would apply it in Idlib as well. Hence, while the Idlib region, which has remained as the latest pocket in the hand of the opposition, may represent a puzzle for international actors, it is not for the Syrian regime. Being the last destination for hundred thousands of displaced people, and the refuge of almost four millions Syrian would not prevent the Syrian regime from applying its strategy of scorched earth that generated new waves of displaced people. The ongoing offensive by the regime forces in southern Idlib has forced almost 150 thousand people to flee their hometowns towards the Turkish borders in its early days, generating the possibilities of new refugee waves.      

It is impossible for the Syrian state in the long-term to re-stand on its feet without the efforts of the young generations of well-educated and professional Syrian refugees.

The Syrian regime strategy of legalizing its unlawful measures will impact the future of Syria. Those forced to leave their homes in Syria either to the Idlib region, which would end as a temporary shelter, or to other countries, represent a remarkable proportion of the Syria Arab Sunni population. Taking into consideration that there will be limited proportion of returnees under current conditions, the exclusion of the displaced people from the Syrian population will recreate the Syrian social fabric, and thus have strategic impact.  

On the other hand, those who fled Syria to other countries represent the vast majority of the young generation, educated and professional class, as well as the main businessmen community of the Syrian society. Hence, it will be impossible for the Syrian state in the long-term to re-stand on its feet without their efforts.     

The outside danger of a regime assault has forced the armed Syrian opposition to cooperate with extremists, after they faced a huge setback following an Al-Qaeda-Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) linked major assault. While the Syrian opposition could have pushed back extremists, their inability to act as a united front made them an easy bite for extremists. As HTS expanded its control in Idlib, opposition fighters and groups in the area are now facing a dilemma. One the one hand, the Syrian opposition does not want to cooperate with extremists, but on the other, they want to protect their hometowns from the Assad regime, manning the front lines and providing HTS with the needed manpower, which the later cannot gather on its own. Long rivals of HTS, such as Ahrar al-Sham and Suqour al-Sham had to sign a deal with extremists, allowing its fighters to man the front lines in areas recently lost to HTS. Pinched between the danger of losing their hometowns to the Assad regime and their instability to act united against HTS, the armed Syrian opposition are preparing their own graveyards.

On January 1, 2019, HTS started its assault on areas held by the Nureddin Zengi Movement under the pretext of the killing of five of its elements by the later. As it became clear the next day that HTS aims to eradicate the entire presence of the Nureddin Zengi Movement, the general leadership of the National Front for liberation declared a general mobilization against extremists. The National Front for Liberation is a Turkish-backed umbrella of the armed opposition factions, which was gathered under one banner in order to counterbalance radical groups in Idlib. The National Front for Liberation included 11 Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army factions, including Faylaq al-Sham, Jaysh al-Nasr, the Free Idlib Army, the First and Second Coastal Divisions, the First and Twenty-Third Divisions, the Second Army, Jaysh al-Nukhba, Shuhada al-Islam Darayya, and Al-Hurriyat Brigade. Later, they have been joined by the Nureddin Zengi Movement, Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Ahrar, and Suqour al-Sham.

As HTS expanded its control in Idlib, opposition fighters and groups are facing a dilemma. One the one hand, the Syrian opposition does not want to cooperate with extremists, but on the other, they want to protect their hometowns from the Assad regime. 

Despite the call by the National Front for Liberation, factions in Idlib have shown little readiness to confront HTS and aid the Nureddin Zengi Movement. HTS was able to capture all areas held by the Nureddin Zengi Movement and force their leadership to flee to Afrin, as Ahrar al-Sham and Suqour al-Sham accompanied by small subunits of Jaysh al-Nasr, the Free Idlib Army and Jaysh al-Nukhba in the Ghab Plains put up some fights against extremists. During the second round of its operations, HTS attacked the Ghab Plains and captured the entire area. On January 10, a ceasefire signed between sides ended the clashes in Idlib. The ceasefire also formalized HTS superiority within Idlib.

However, HTS faced a huge burden, which it couldn’t solve alone. As areas held by the Nureddin Zengi Movement and the Ghab Plains were located along the front lines with the Assad regime-held areas, these front lines had to be manned. First, HTS tried to persuade opposition fighters with salaries and promises to supply them, but these attempts failed. Knowing that its own manpower wasn’t enough, HTS needed the Syrian opposition to man the front lines in Idlib. Additionally, HTS had seen itself under pressure as opposition fighters living in the Ghab Plains wanted to leave the area towards Afrin. In the broader context, HTS strengthened its own position, but were on the verge to weaken the general balance of power in Idlib against the Assad regime.

Despite the call by the National Front for Liberation, factions in Idlib have shown little readiness to confront HTS and aid the Nureddin Zengi Movement.

Therefore, the extremists signed another deal with Ahrar al-Sham and Suqour al-Sham, which allows for the return of these to the front lines in the Ghab Plains. The deal was signed by the two factions in order to protect their hometowns from the Assad regime. It does not put the factions under the control of HTS, but it does imply that the factions have to coordinate their work with HTS within an operation room. Also, many former subunits of the Nureddin Zengi Movement joined Faylaq al-Sham, meaning that the front lines in western Aleppo will be strengthened by opposition fighters.

The armed Syrian opposition in Idlib has become pinched between the danger of losing their hometowns of the Assad regime and their inability to confront HTS as a united bloc. As long as the armed Syrian opposition in Idlib do not confront HTS as a united whole, the groups alone will be an easy bite for HTS, as it is the biggest faction in Idlib. However, the number of the Syrian opposition in Idlib as a whole is higher than that of HTS. On the other side, the Syrian opposition will be forced to cooperate with HTS inside Idlib in order to protect their hometowns. A withdrawal to areas under Turkish protection in Afrin and northern Aleppo might be an option, but the personal links to hometowns is a preventative factor.

If the Syrian opposition in Idlib cannot get out of this pinch, it is doomed to fail. A growing presence of HTS will make a Russian-supported regime assault on Idlib more likely as Turkey will have a weaker position to prevent such an operation. The 12 Turkish observation points in Idlib are the main obstacles for the regime to start a wide-scale operation towards Idlib. Therefore, the negotiations between Turkey and Russia on the Syrian issue will decide over the fate of Idlib and the armed Syrian opposition.

As long as the armed Syrian opposition in Idlib do not confront HTS as a united whole, the groups alone will be an easy bite for HTS, as it is the biggest faction in Idlib.

However, HTS is now discussing providing the armed Syrian opposition with a new perspective in which the HTS-initiated civil ‘Salvation Government’ will form a Defense Ministry to which a new military council will belong, uniting all the armed groups inside Idlib. According to critics by Al-Qaeda figures who defected from the former Al-Nusra Front, the military council will be led by a commander of Faylaq al-Sham, who is a defected Syrian military officer. Additionally, rumors suggest that a former minister of the pre-2011 Syrian government will head the Salvation Government in order to boost the legitimization of the HTS-initiated body. The aim of HTS is to unite the entire armed factions in Idlib under its own government, and aims to prevent the legitimization of a military assault by Russia due to its own hegemony in Idlib and to strengthen its own military manpower.

Within HTS, this idea is a new attempt of the pragmatist wing. In the past, the pragmatist wing succeeded in accelerating the cut of ties to Al-Qaeda and the formation of HTS. With these developments, many hardliners of the former Al-Nusra Front deserted and others were assassinated by unknown gunmen in Idlib. Despite the strengthening of the pragmatist wing inside HTS, the dogmatic wing has still power to put an end to it, as the later controls the most efficient military units of HTS. The balance of power within HTS is thus shaping the future of Idlib.

In the long run, a solution has to be found on the issue of HTS in Idlib, which will be a military one. The armed Syrian opposition has the opportunity to protect their hometowns from extremism and the Assad regime.

While this idea is relatively new and is still being discussed inside HTS, it might be seen as a way out of the dilemma for the armed Syrian opposition in Idlib. However, this would mean that the armed opposition would be used in an attempt as a tool to legitimize the HTS project. It also seems unlikely that HTS would hand over its power. Instead, it might seek to use the military council under the Salvation Government as a front group. Furthermore, it has to be seen how this idea will evolve. Currently, neither HTS seem to be ready for such a move, nor is the international community ready to accept such a structure in Idlib.

From the Turkish perspective, the situation in Idlib is directly related to its own national security, as Turkey is already the country hosting the largest refugee population and wants to avoid a new refugee crisis. On the other hand, Russia wants to keep its good relations with Turkey and is aware of the difficulties and risks of a military operation towards Idlib. Therefore, both sides may agree on a roadmap, which will at least delay a military operation towards Idlib. In the long run, a solution has to be found on the issue of HTS in Idlib, which will be a military one. In this regard, the armed Syrian opposition has the opportunity to protect their hometowns from extremism and the Assad regime.

Under current circumstances, the Syrian opposition remains weak in their disunity and seem incapable of getting rid of HTS. In this case, the Assad regime would start an operation towards Idlib under the pretext of the presence of HTS supported by Russia, who will try to persuade Turkey to withdraw from Idlib. The Syrian opposition however seems reluctant to protecting their hometowns and are instead retreating, which could force them to cooperate with extremists in case of a regime assault. Such a scenario would surely end in the armed defeat of the Syrian opposition in their last stronghold.

After nine months of political deadlock, the Lebanese were finally able to come together and form a unity government on January 31 amid the worsening economic situation in the country. Lebanon has been falling back in every single aspect in politics, economic, tourism, infra-structure…etc. since the assassination of its former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri in 2005.

Such long delays in the formation of the government are becoming familiar in Lebanon especially in the last decade or so. It took the Lebanese more than two years to agree on electing Michel Aoun as a president in 2016. The Parliament extended his term by itself a couple of times since 2009, and there have been chronic problems and difficulties in the formation of the successive governments. Yet, some officials bragged lately about their ability to run the country without a budget!

The Lebanese always have their own version(s) of the events in the region. They tend to interpret the regional developments via the local lens. Last December, I paid a visit to Lebanon where I had the chance to talk to some of my colleagues and friends (think-tankers, journalists, activists, and academicians) about their perspective regarding the latest developments in Syria, and how these developments would affect Lebanon as well as their evaluation of different roles played by several foreign players inside Syria including the U.S., Russia, Iran and Turkey.

Many of them fear the return of the Assad regime to the regional and international arena, and thus its old influence on the Lebanese politics, economy, security and society. It is true that this influence has never left Lebanon in the first place, but it significantly decreased during the Syrian revolution. The expected come back of the Syrian regime might be overloaded this time with overwhelming lust for revenge.

Lebanon fears the return of the Assad regime to the regional and international arena, and thus its old influence on Lebanese politics, economy, security, and society. 

In June 2018, Lebanese President Michel Aoun, a Christian allay of the pro-Iran Shiite Hezbollah, signed a naturalization decree granting citizenship to many prominent Syrians of the inner circle of Assad. The decree disturbed many Lebanese and was seen as an indicator for the resurrection of the Syrian regime’s influence inside the Lebanese politics. Almost six months later, in December 2018, Assad regime designated more than 600 local and foreign individuals on its terror list, including Turkey’s President Erdogan, former Turkish PM Ahmet Davutoglu and many Lebanese politicians such as the Lebanon’s Prime Minister Saad al –Hariri, Walid Joumblatt, Samir Geagea and others.

The U.S.’ decision to withdraw from Syria already left implications inside Lebanon. Many Lebanese noticed that their new government was on the verge of being formed at then. However, Trump’s decision to withdraw the U.S. troops from Northern Syria empowered the pro-Iran and Assad camp in Lebanon, lead by Hezbollah, who interpreted this step as a victory for this camp. Therefore, adding more conditions to allow the formation of the government.

Trump’s decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Northern Syria empowered the pro-Iran and Assad camp in Lebanon, lead by Hezbollah, who interpreted this step as a victory for this camp. Therefore, adding more conditions to allow the formation of the government. 

There are those who interpret Hezbollah’s bigger involvement and role in the government as a possible preparation for a war with Israel. Such assumption doesn’t come out of the blue. Before the Syrian revolution, Lebanon was always used as a mailbox for exchanging messages between Iran and Assad regime from one side, and Israel from the other. In 2006, Lebanon paid heavy price for forcibly playing such role through Hezbollah.

As a result, Israel destroyed hundreds of homes and wiped out entire villages in Southern Lebanon. Around 1000 Lebanese died, 4500 got injured, and almost a quarter of Lebanon’s population got displaced. Lebanon, the state, lost billions of dollars, besides UNSCR 1701 and the heavy losses the Lebanese side suffered at then eventually prevented Hezbollah from launching new attacks on behalf of Iran across the borders.

While Iran and Hezbollah have been deepening their presence and influence in Syria in the last few years, Damascus assumed the role of the mailbox from Lebanon. However, as the war is winding down there, many Lebanese fear that Lebanon might return as a playground for Iran and Assad. One indication is the increasing rhetoric engagement of Hezbollah with Israel and tunnels build up on the borders.

While Iran and Hezbollah have been deepening their presence and influence in Syria in the last few years, Damascus assumed the role of the mailbox from Lebanon. However, as the war is winding down there, many Lebanese fear that Lebanon might return as a playground for Iran and Assad.

During the Syrian revolution, Hezbollah’s rhetoric focused solely on attacking “Sunnis” -with the pretext of fighting what the party calls them (Takfiris)- to rally Shiite behind him in his involvement in Syria. Nowadays, Hezbollah is shifting back the focus to Israel as a tool to regain its lost legitimacy in the Arab and Islamic world. Such behavior may involve miscalculations and might quickly escalate into war.

One interesting point though is that some Lebanese tend to think that Russia’s role in Lebanon is growing lately and that if stayed on the same course, it may enable Moscow -in the future- to assume Syria’s old role inside Lebanon. This idea has supporters and opponents. Sunnis – anti-Assad- might live with it if this would spare them the need to directly address Assad in Syria, however pro-Iran Shiite such as Hezbollah are not comfortable with it especially if it comes on the expense of the Iran-Assad influence in Lebanon.

There are those in Lebanon who think that Iran’s influence in Syria is retreating thanks to Russia’s new ascending role in the region. According to this point of view, Iran and its proxies are no longer in a position to challenge Russia in Syria mainly because Moscow is working to restore a pro-Russian regime. In fact, those who agree with this narrative think that Moscow managed to re-structure some branches of the intelligence, security, and military apparatus in Syria in a way that serves its interests and secure a pro-Russia regime rather than a pro-Iran one. 

There are those in Lebanon who think that Iran’s influence in Syria is retreating thanks to Russia’s new ascending role in the region. According to this point of view, Iran and its proxies are no longer in a position to challenge Russia in Syria mainly because Moscow is working to restore a pro-Russian regime.

Yet, not everyone in anti-Assad’s camp in Lebanon agrees on this narrative. There are those who see things from a difference perspective, and according to them, Iran is still very influential inside Syria. The pro-Iran militias which have mushroomed in the last few years in Syria always have the option to join the regime’s institutions or stay outside, in both cases, Iran will retain its influence on them.  Unlike the Russian influence, the Iranian one is ideological and sectarian. This kind of influence is hard to break and last much longer than the one based on merely material interests.

When it comes to Turkey’s role in Syria, many Lebanese hope that Turkey can continue its opposition for Assad, but not so many of them are optimistic about this issue. Most of them believe that the Turkish military presence in Syria is there to stay. The ultimate goal of Ankara however is not very clear to them. Some of them think that Turkey will eventually sub-ordinate some areas inside Syria like Idlib to the Turkish territories; others think that Ankara’s effort in Northern Syria will go in vain as it will eventually have to give these areas back to Assad regime.

Regarding the latest rapprochement steps of several Arab countries with the Assad regime, some of them expressed their belief that this step is well coordinated with Russia. However, others think that foreign policies of Arab Gulf countries are chaotic and not necessarily coordinated with Moscow and ultimately will benefit Russia, Iran and Assad.

Although the Turkish administration is still very cautious, Trump’s decision to withdraw troops from Syria has been echoed for the government in Ankara and for Turkish foreign policy on an international level.

There is more than one perspective on the U.S. decision to withdraw troops from Syria – a decision that was taken by President Trump on Wednesday. The reaction from the region and the U.S. reflects the two sides of the equilibrium. While Russia, Iran, and Turkey are happy about the decision, European countries such as the UK, France, Greece, and Israel are having a hard time digesting the decision. As stated by Ibrahim Kalin, spokesman for the Turkish President, Turkey is still cautious about the decision.

On Wednesday, Trump tweeted, “We have defeated ISIS in Syria, my only reason for being there during the Trump Presidency.” According to Trump himself, the decision was not a surprising one. Commenting in Twitter again on Thursday, he tweeted, “Getting out of Syria was no surprise. I’ve been campaigning on it for years, and six months ago, when I very publicly wanted to do it, I agreed to stay longer. Russia, Iran, Syria & others are the local enemy of ISIS. We were doing there work. Time to come home & rebuild. #MAGA.”

Not everyone in the U.S. administration supports Trump’s decision either. Some republicans strongly oppose the decision and criticized Trump for strengthening the hands of Russia and Iran, who are defending the Assad regime. According to some U.S. officials that spoke to Reuters on confidentiality, U.S. commanders in Syria are worried about a ‘quick’ withdrawal.

Just a day after Trump announced his decision, Turkish President Erdogan and Iranian President Rouhani came together in Istanbul with the invitation of Erdogan and emphasized that both countries will work closer together in order to end the war in Syria and to start building a political process.

Although the meeting between the two leaders had been arranged earlier, the ‘move’ was considered meaningful and was supported by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Both leaders decided not to make any comments on Trump’s decision.

During their press conference in Ankara, Erdogan found it sufficient to comment “There are many steps that Turkey and Iran can take together to stop the fighting in the region and to establish peace,” while Rouhani said “Syria’s territorial integrity must be respected by all sides. Both countries are in the same opinion regarding this.”

Both the approval of possible patriot sales to Turkey and the U.S. withdrawal from Syria will have a direct effect on the foreign policy of Ankara in the short and long term. Hence, these two events have been observed as a triumph for Erdogan.

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi

The final declaration of the Istanbul summit, which included Turkey, Russia, Germany, and France was interpreted by some authorities as Turkey having changed its Syria policy. The reason for those comments was the insistence of Russia and France to include the Assad regime in the process of democratic transition in Syria and Turkey’s silence on the Russian and French demand on that matter.

In effect, during the summit Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan clearly expressed that for Syria to transit to a democracy, Assad had to leave his seat and the future of Syria had to be decided by the Syrian people, including the opposition groups and civilians which now reside outside of the country. Almost 3,5 million of them have taken refuge in Turkey from the start of the civil war.

Indeed, Turkey has followed the policy of regime change or democratic transition from the very beginning of the Arab Revolt in Syria. The inclusion of Assad to the process of democratic transition does not necessarily mean that Turkey’s policy on Syria has changed. To remind the reader, once the toppling of the Assad regime by the opposition through a military struggle proved impossible, especially with the Russian intervention in September 2015 and the U.S.’s policy shift of seeking regime change in Syria to providing support to the YPG against Daesh, the political solution to the Syrian crisis has become more salient. Turkey, to an extent, has conceded to a shift from a military to political solution to the Syrian crisis.

Turkey still maintains its position at the outset to remove the Assad regime in Syria. What has changed is merely the path towards that end, the political solution replaced the military solution to the crisis.

However, it can’t be argued that shifting from military to political means constitutes a policy change. The policy change does include not a change in means but a change in ends. Turkey still maintains its position at the outset to remove the Assad regime in Syria. What has changed is merely the path towards that end, the political solution replaced the military solution to the crisis.

Turkey’s current policy towards Syria is shaped around preparing the ground for political change, shift from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one. The final step for ending the crisis in Syria harbors holding free elections in the country, which is expected to be resulted with the loss of Assad and its supporters since they constitute the minority. For that goal, Turkey has been struggling to sustain and enlarge its military presence in the country.

Turkey’s military operations in Syria – Operation Euphrates Shield and Operation Olive Branch – to purge terrorist groups from Jarabulus and Afrin respectively and the Idlib concord with Russia to protect civilians in the region and the Manbij concord with the U.S. to cleanse the region from the terrorist elements can be mentioned in this context.

Turkey’s policy of keeping and enlarging its military presence in Syria has two aims: Sustaining Turkey’s national security against YPG and Daesh terror and achieving democratic change in Syria.

More, President Erdogan declared that after Manbij, Turkey will hold another large-scale military operation towards the east of the Euphrates in order to dismantle terrorist elements from the region. This will also serve the same purpose of sustaining and enlarging Turkey’s military presence in Syria to make possible the political solution to the crisis. Having military presence on the ground and transferring it to political force at the table constitutes Turkey’s current policy towards the Syrian crisis.

Thus, Turkey’s military operation in northern Syria cannot be reduced to its struggle with the YPG. This policy of keeping and enlarging Turkey’s military presence serves for a double purpose: Sustaining Turkey’s national security against YPG and Daesh terror and achieving democratic change in Syria. It includes both defensive and revisionist goals. However, Turkey’s revisionism in Syria should not be interpreted as territorial expansion. One of the clauses of the declaration of the Istanbul summit clearly expresses that Syrian territorial integrity is to be respected and maintained. All countries signing the declaration agree on that Syria should continue its sovereign independence.

Turkey’s position in Syria should not be interpreted as territorial expansion. One of the clauses of the declaration of the Istanbul summit clearly expresses that Syrian territorial integrity is to be respected and maintained.

Nevertheless, it is still not clear that whether the two great powers, the U.S. and Russia, and Iran as well, will adjust to that policy of democratization in Syria. Turkey and European countries, especially Germany, will seek to end the crisis in Syria by finally democratizing the country. Both countries have borne the brunt of the undemocratic political conditions in Syria. Germany suffers from the refuge flood whereas Turkey suffers from both refuge flood and terrorist threats.

Today in Istanbul, four governments — Turkey, Russia, Germany, and France — are meeting for a summit over Syria, attempting to consolidate the Sochi Agreement signed by Russia and Turkey over Idlib, and re-invigorate the international political process. There is little reason to think that these talks can succeed on either front.

Turkey was drawn into the “Astana process” with Russia and Iran at the end of 2016. One of the key aspects of this political track was the creation of four “de-escalation” zones, three of which were then systematically liquidated by the Bashar al-Assad regime and its backers in Iran and Russia. By July of this year, only the Idlib de-escalation zone, the last province in insurgent hands, remained. The pro-Assad forces gave clear indications that Idlib was next and this assumption took hold. Having destroyed or humbled nationalist rebels across the country, and deported jihadist insurgents to Idlib, packing them in among a desperate, displaced population, the regime coalition was able to frame the apparently imminent offensive in “war on terror” terms.

On 17 September, a deal between Turkey and Russia was reached in Sochi as part of the Astana process that called off the pro-Assad offensive, for now, and created a demilitarized zone (DMZ) in Idlib. The zone cut ten miles into the insurgent zone, where Turkey has “observation posts”, and leaves the Assad-Iran forces surrounding Idlib. The responsibility was put on Turkey to clear the DMZ of heavy weapons by 10 October and by 15 October to remove the “radical terrorist groups”—namely Tandheem Hurras al-Deen, al-Qaeda’s new faction in Syria; Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), al-Qaeda’s former branch in Syria and the predominant insurgent force in the province; and the smaller jihadist groups that are dependent on HTS like the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP).

It was unclear that HTS would comply with this arrangement, though they did through an ambiguously-worded eleventh-hour  statement. HTS announced that it was taking a “balanced” approach that prevented a sanguinary offensive by the regime coalition, yet at the same time they were not going to be dragged into a political process dominated by the regime’s allies.

The Turkish government has been engaged in a campaign to split apart HTS, drawing its reconcilable elements into the mainstream opposition, grouped with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) factions under the banner of National Liberation Front (NLF), while isolating and eliminating the extremist hard core. HTS understands this danger, and the danger of de-escalation, which has allowed the re-emergence of the protest movement—against Assad and the jihadists. To counter this, over the last two months, HTS has arrested scores of activists to try to dismantle civil society and bring the province under its sole control. The Turkish struggle with these al-Qaeda-linked and al-Qaeda-style jihadists poses a serious threat for the country  since their networks cross into Turkey itself. There is a risk of domestic terrorism from a Turkish crackdown on extremists in Idlib.

There is also a major trap-door in the September agreement for Turkey: assuming the jihadists are neutralized, the pro-Assad coalition remains poised to attack Idlib and might well take advantage of the reduced resistance either to launch a full-scale offensive or to impose a “reconciliation” (surrender) agreement in the province. While Turkey might, in theory, be open to a reconciliation agreement, it has to be known that such an accord would not prevent the wave of refugees and the scattering of terrorists inside Turkey that Ankara so badly fears. It would also invite in an Assad-Iran system that has close relations with Ankara’s sworn enemies, the YPG/PKK, perhaps bringing the Kurdish terrorists into another border area.

The primary factor determining whether a pro-Assad offensive is viable is whether Russia provides air support. The regime itself, as Russia knows better than most, is in tatters. But politically, the ongoing presence of HTS, a fact for the foreseeable future, could provide a pretext more or less at the time of Assad’s choosing. The dilemma for Moscow, finally made to choose sides, is that its feeble position leaves it trying to bluff its way into influence. Moscow has been able to temporarily delay an attack by Assad and Iran to preserve its relations with Turkey, since such relations are the easiest way to undermine and potentially fracture the NATO alliance. If and when the Assad-Iran ground force moves against Idlib, however, it is very unlikely the Russians will withhold airstrikes—they have already begun them, after all, if only to keep the pressure on Turkey, even as negotiations continue.

One way to prevent a regime coalition offensive in Idlib would be if the U.S. stepped in. If the U.S. could come to a more balanced position between Turkey and the PKK it could allow for a so-called “NATO zone” that would put nearly half the country out of reach of the pro-Assad coalition, and place Turkey’s territorial holdings in Syria under the political protection, if not the military protection, of the United States. This scenario remains unlikely since the U.S. has committed itself to the PKK. Over the summer, Russia was able to correctly read U.S. statements of support for rebels in the Deraa area of the south as hollow and managed to convince Israel to hold fire as Assad and Iranian militants seized the border zone. Similarly, while the U.S. and Turkey remain divided, it allows Russia to play one off against the other and advance its cause and that of its client regime.

This situation renders the efforts by Germany and France to energize the peace process moot. The Geneva process has in any case been significantly reshaped along Astana lines by the Russians so that it now favours “peace” on Assad’s terms, and, whether Russia lends an assist or not, the Assad regime—supported by Iran—retains a maximalist position that intends to reconquer every inch of Syria’s territory. The Europeans have no ability to stop this militarily and the belief that “reconstruction” funds do or can offer leverage over the regime is pure fantasy. Firstly, any funds fed into the Assad-held zone will be syphoned off to reinforce a patronage system of organised criminality and sectarianism. Secondly, a regime that has endured the last seven years of warfare will not be swayed from its course — let alone pushed from office  by money. At most, the Europeans could offer political support to Turkey, potentially making it more awkward for Russia to back an attack, though over time attention will fade and Idlib’s fate will likely be settled by force.

The Turkish-Russian agreement arrived in Sochi in a meeting between President Erdogan and President Putin comes just in time to avert a major humanitarian crisis. The agreement is to create a demilitarized buffer zone between the opposition and the Assad regime from where heavy weapons would be pulled out. The 10 to 12-mile corridor would be free of al-Qaeda related terror groups under the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the zone would be patrolled by Turkish and Russian forces. It is clear that the implementation will be key in determining the ultimate success of the deal but preventing hundreds of thousands from rushing to the north is already a huge relief for Turkey.

The agreement, which will come into effect by October 10, is a diplomatic win for Turkey as well. Turkey has been lobbying Russia and Iran to prevent the Assad regime from committing more war crimes and creating yet another humanitarian disaster. Through the Astana process, Turkey has worked to deescalate the conflict and to create safe zones. The Assad regime has been using the presence of terror groups like the HTS to justify a major military operation against Idlib, which houses around three million civilians. The Turkish-Russian agreement sends a signal to the regime that it cannot ignore Turkey’s interests and export insecurity to its northern neighbor.

Turkey has adopted a forward leaning military posture since the summer of 2016 to ensure that security threats emanating from Syria no longer threaten the Turkish border towns. Both the Euphrates Shield and Afrin operations accomplished this goal to a large extent by pushing the YPG, Daesh, and regime control away from the border. A large-scale military operation by the regime against Idlib would upset the hard-achieved stability in the areas controlled by Turkey and Turkish-supported opposition groups. It would not only weaken Turkey’s ability to manage the humanitarian challenges on the ground but also threaten Turkish border security.

The most difficult part for Turkey will probably be ensuring that the HTS are removed from the buffer zone areas. The continued HTS presence has given the Assad regime an excuse to make a case for attacking Idlib. While it is extremely difficult and unrealistic for Turkey to eliminate HTS completely, the agreement gives Turkey time to force the group’s hardcore elements, which are in fact in the minority, to separate from the more local Syrian fighters and leave the area. This will be critical in removing the Assad regime’s excuse to attack Idlib.

In strategic terms, Idlib is the last bastion of the moderate opposition supported by Turkey. The agreement would require the opposition to pull its heavy weapons out of the buffer zone, which would remove the chance of an imminent clash with the regime forces supported by Russia and Iran. It is not yet clear whether Iran would abide by this agreement but it was already clear that Iranians did not necessarily alienate Turkey at this point. It would be extremely difficult for the regime to launch an offensive on its own without Iran’s help. If the opposition can feel somewhat secure as a result of this agreement, given that Turkish troops will be patrolling the buffer zone, they may be able to focus on other priorities such as providing security and confronting al-Qaeda related groups.

Turkey’s diplomatic success may have just saved thousands of innocent lives as well as yet another unnecessary humanitarian crisis. However, the Assad regime will certainly seek to take over Idlib eventually. If the Turkish-Russian deal succeeds, the opposition can survive and the contours of a future political deal can be based more on realities on the ground rather than the political goals of the Assad regime.

After last Friday’s tripartite summit of Iran, Russia, and Turkey in Tehran, there was another meeting this Friday, bringing Turkey, Russia, France, and Germany together in Istanbul. The meeting enabled France and Germany to be more involved in the resolution of the crisis. France and Germany’s positions on Idlib are very similar to that of Turkey for different reasons. Hence, we can talk about a European perspective on Idlib and it also includes Turkey’s. Going back to Friday’s meeting, all parties agreed on the necessity of a political solution for Idlib according to the statement of Turkey’s Presidential Spokesman Ibrahim Kalin. As these diplomatic exchanges continue, Turkey feels to have more time to facilitate a peaceful solution on Idlib.

Turkey is trying real hard to prevent a devastating battle from occurring in Idlib. The diplomatic talks that occurred in Tehran and this Friday in Istanbul are just one side of these efforts. The other side is pure realpolitik. Turkey increased its tone against a fait accompli regime offensive in Idlib and it further made its deterrence discourse more credible with new deployments on the ground. While the open sources did not give the specifics, what we know is that Turkey’s reinforcement included new troops and armored vehicles around its observation posts in Idlib and along its border with Idlib.

The reinforcement, on the one hand, serves the purpose of deterring a possible regime offensive, but on the other hand, it is also vital for Turkey if its deterrence strategy fails to deter the regime from starting the offensive. In such a scenario, these reinforcements will play a significant role for Turkey to defend its already-settled troops in Idlib. These troops had been deployed to serve in Turkey’s observation posts that were established in the Astana process of Turkey, Russia, and Iran. They were not designed for defensive purposes but merely for the reconnaissance mission. Now Turkey is making these posts defendable with new reinforcements and, hence, also deterring the regime and other hostile forces from attacking them.

What is crucial at this moment for Turkey is meeting on a middle ground with Russia. As long as Turkey and Russia can keep a common position based on mutual respect for their security perceptions, the situation in Idlib and elsewhere in Syria should be solved peacefully and satisfactorily for both countries.

Excluding the American sphere of control in Syria, Turkey’s primary concern is the PYD’s role in Tel Rıfaat and Russia’s primary concern is the armed groups in Idlib. Turkey has already designated the the Hey’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) as a terror organization and it seems like Turkey will increase its pressure on the HTS to dissolve itself or leave Idlib. As long as Russia plays a supportive role in Idlib, the city can be cleaned from groups like the HTS without burning down the entire city and causing another humanitarian catastrophe.

Turkey’s primary strategy in this game is to deter the Syrian regime from a brutal offensive while trying to find a middle ground with Russia and bringing the similar minded European powers closer to the game. This strategy seems to not be a maximalist one but quite a reasonable and applicable strategy that can convince both Russia and European powers. What Turkey and the rest of the reasonable actors need now is to prevent spoilers from undermining this well-crafted strategy.

The Tehran summit that was held last week did not produce any clear-cut solution to overcome the ongoing uncertainty in the Idlib region. The uncertainty remains as to whether Russia and the regime forces will carry out a full-scale military offensive against the opposition via Iran-backed Shia forces. While Turkey’s position and solution package regarding the issue is welcomed by the international community, especially by the United Nations, the other stakeholders of the Astana process, Russia and Iran, reject the Turkish proposal. Two basic factors trigger the uncertainty and disagreement over Idlib between Russia and Turkey. The first is the security concerns of Russia regarding the terrorist threat emanating from HTS, which targeted Russian military bases in Syria with drones at the beginning of this year. On the other hand, the occasional confrontation between the opposition armed groups and Syrian regime forces constitute a rationale for a military offensive in Idlib. Therefore, the security concerns of Russia and the regime form the main reason for Russia to disagree with Turkey’s proposal.

The second reason is more complicated, and it might deepen the uncertainties in the region. This is the question of how the HTS is going to disarm itself and disband its organizational structure in preventing Russia to agree on Turkey’s proposal. The primary dynamic that drives these uncertainties is the ambiguity of the overall Russian strategy towards the position of the opposition groups located in the Idlib region. It is clear that Russia’s ultimate desire is to undermine the presence of all opposition groups in Idlib and to declare its military victory. The Syrian regime also shares this objective. This therefore makes the Turkish solution package more fragile and difficult to achieve – unless the Turkish government receive stronger international support. To put the matter bluntly, three questions should be asked at this stage: Does Russia think that the Turkish proposal is credible and achievable? Is the Turkish offer achievable on the ground? Does Turkey have the deterrence capacity to transform the HTS and other minor armed groups with military force? These questions cannot be answered at this stage.

It is not yet possible to state that there is full consensus between Putin and President Erdogan on the management of the Idlib crisis. However, at this stage, it is possible to say that the proposal Ankara has offered provoked Russia to re-think its position. The first pillar of the Turkish solution package consists of a “security warrant” that will be provided by Turkey to Russia in the south and to the Syrian regime forces in the northeast. According to this option, Turkey will consolidate its military presence along with the presence of the member of National Liberation Army, established by Turkey in the post-Astana process under the framework of creating a moderate opposition group and dissolving the radical elements in Idlib. Turkey will apply the same procedure towards the de facto border between the regime forces and the opposition armed groups.

After the first phase Turkey will start to implement a mechanism to enable the HTS to lay down its weapons and dissolve its military structure. This act, for sure, will take time for Turkey. With the support of Russia and Western countries, this objective is achievable. If the HTS does not accept this option, then Turkey is proposing a military solution to disband the group. Only then will the Turkish-backed moderate armed groups carry military operations against the HTS and other minor armed groups. It is possible to say that Turkey and the moderate armed groups can achieve this objective at the end of the day. According to signals coming from the ground, the HTS seems to accept the first option and tends to desire to disband its military structure. This option also depends on Russia’s intention of air bombardment. If Russia continues to carry out air strikes against the HTS, then it is difficult to say that the HTS will come close to Turkey’s offer.

The third part of the solution package is establishing a joint struggle with the terrorism issue in the Idlib region as expressed by President Erdogan, following the Tehran summit. This proposal involves creating an international dialogue mechanism to overcome extremism-related matters in the Idlib region, including foreign fighters, stabilizing refugee mobilization, and forming a stable non-conflictual region. This does not necessarily mean that an international military coalition is necessary to overcome the issue. Instead, political support for Turkey’s decisiveness and good intentions is much more important than providing military means on the ground.

This is the right time for the international society to take real responsibility in order to overcome the already deepening Syrian crisis. The violent fall of Idlib will not bring an end to the Syrian Civil War, but Idlib can provide a tremendous opportunity for Russia and the international community to find a common ground for the future of Syria. Therefore, Turkey’s struggle to find a peaceful solution to the Idlib issue should be supported.

Turkey has been the most vocal critic of the seemingly impending military assault against Idlib by the Assad regime. Turkey has serious concerns about the strategic and humanitarian consequences of a potential operation. An Assad-Iran ground operation supported by Russian airpower (though limited it may be) can unleash yet another humanitarian catastrophe, producing hundreds of thousands of IDPs and refugees. A regime takeover would signal the end of the opposition as we know it. However, Turkey’s adamant stance combined with its recent military reinforcements to the 12 observation posts might bear fruit and deter the regime, at least for the time being. Given the strong rhetoric used by the U.S. against the Assad regime especially with regard to its potential chemical weapons use, Russia might not be so eager to deploy its air support to the regime any time soon.

The most recent Tehran summit that brought the main sponsors of the Astana process, Turkey, Russia and Iran, demonstrated the level of deep disagreements between these powers. While Ankara has pushed for better relations with Moscow recently, the summit showed that Turkey would stand its ground when it comes to defending its interests in Syria, including the support for the moderate opposition. Turkey has not contended itself with warnings about a possible disaster in Idlib but has taken measures to deter the Assad regime from engineering a fait accompli. Clearly, a regime assault on Idlib goes against the basic logic of the Astana process and it can seriously derail any attempt at a political solution.

The Assad regime and its supporters have shown time and again that they have little interest in a truly political process to end the conflict in Syria. The regime has been trying to “win” through a systematic effort to take over most of the country by implementing strategic ceasefires and military operations both sequentially and simultaneously depending on the region. While there has been the talk of a political process, there has been little tangible progress on that front. Turkey’s military presence on the ground and its continued support to the opposition appear to be the only true obstacles before the regime to accomplish its goals. Turkey, on the other, is trying hard to ensure that when and if the Geneva process happens, it comes to the table with a strong hand and a viable opposition to speak of.

The most recent reports indicate that there has been a quiet policy shift in U.S. policy. Having justified its military operations in the north of Syria on the Daesh threat, the U.S. political and military leaders have not been making a strong case for continued operations in Syria, albeit until recently. The recent shift seems to entail a more open-ended commitment despite President Trump’s earlier comments about leaving Syria soon. Now, the Syria policy appears to be insistent on the departure of Iranian forces from the country as well as a stronger, albeit rhetorical, posture against the Assad regime’s potential Idlib operation. It is difficult to say the U.S. and Turkey see eye-to-eye on Idlib but there are clearly strong overlaps.

A realignment could re-emerge between the U.S. and Turkey’s policies on Idlib, which could give the Assad regime and especially Russia a pause. Despite the diplomatic benefits the U.S. position may provide, Turkey has skin in the game in a way its NATO ally does not. With the recent U.S. appointment of James Jeffrey, the new representative for engagement on Syria, there are signs that Washington might listen to and understand Ankara better, especially on its Syria policy. However, there is every indication that the U.S.’s continued support for the YPG, the Syrian extension of the PKK, will continue. In fact, much of the new Syria policy might depend on this relationship. If that continues to be the case, the U.S.-Turkey agreement on Idlib may not grow into broader cooperation on Syria.

A key component of the new U.S. policy on Syria will be the focus on reducing Iranian influence in the region, hoping to enlist Turkey’s support. However, with the impending sanctions on Iranian energy sectors, it is safe to bet that the U.S. and Turkey will have serious disagreements on Iran. Turkey vehemently disagrees with Iran on Syria but it is reliant on Iran for its oil and natural gas needs. If the U.S. is interested in enlisting Turkish support against Iran’s regional influence, it will need to engage Turkey in a meaningful way beyond the somewhat limited agreement on Idlib.

On September 7, the leaders of Turkey, Russia, and Iran met in Tehran to discuss the Syrian issue with Idlib being the most important topic on the agenda. The organizers broadcasted the whole summit, which allowed us to witness a kind of a televised argument in which Erdogan ceased the moment to ask Putin and Rouhani for a ceasefire in Idlib. Basically, what the Turkish side was trying to achieve is to spare lives of more than 3.5 million civilians in the province from the Assad regime’s aggression, and buy some time to solve the problem.

During the summit, Turkey’s President highlighted his country’s grave concerns and sensitivities towards the issue. If a major assault is to be launched against the Syrian province, the humanitarian catastrophe will be big and Turkey, with its maximum capacity being utilized to support refugees, will not have more room to deal with it. Stressing the importance of Idlib, the Turkish side clearly said that it is a matter of national security and will not leave the city.

President Erdogan may not have fully succeeded in convincing both leaders to halt the military operation; however, the political showdown uncovered in the summit shed light on the different agendas, interests, and priorities of Turkey, Russia and Iran. If we add the U.S. to the mix, then it would be safe to assume that the way the Idlib dilemma is going to be handled will have a profound impact on the power game evolving in Syria and on its future.

Despite the unlimited support the Syrian regime is getting from Moscow and Tehran, Assad is still less than a decision maker in his country’s affairs. By defeating the opposition and taking over their last stronghold Idlib, Assad’s allies want to guarantee his regime a better position in the political process, boost the efforts to extend its control over Syria, and expedite the ongoing proceeding to re-legitimatize it as a de-facto ruler for the whole country.

Although in a very unfavorable position vis-à-vis the Russia-Iran-Assad axis from one side, the U.S.- SDF/ PYD /YPG axis from another, Turkey –as clearly reflected by the Tehran summit– is the only country which is still actively defying Assad in public and behind closed doors. In this sense, Ankara is seen as an obstacle that needs to be neutralized if not completely removed from Idlib.

Unlike other times where Russia conceded for Turkey, things seem to be a little bit different now. Aware of Ankara’s critical position, Putin insisted on his stance, refused to include “ceasefire” in the text and showed support for the assault against the province with the pretext of the presence of terrorist organizations. After the summit, Assad and Russia intensified their aerial bombardment giving a clear sign that a land assault is near.

The situation will harshly test Ankara–Moscow relations in Syria and how both of them will cope with the coming developments and challenges there. A major assault on Idlib is expected to create a humanitarian catastrophe and trigger flows of refugees towards the Turkish borders. This will increase the political, economic, and security pressure on Ankara, but most importantly will hinder its credibility as a guarantor in the eyes of the Syrian opposition. The direct result will likely be the end of the Astana process and the breakdown of the trilateral mechanism with further implications to come.

Thus, by ignoring Turkey’s critical points and concerns, Moscow not only risks undermining its understandings with Ankara, but also endangers the fate of the political process in a way that will likely make a sustainable solution in Syria impossible. Taking into consideration that, without Turkey, there can be no serious progress on the coming non-military challenges (constitutional law, preparing for elections, construction….etc), Russia would be shooting itself in the foot if it insists on a full scale military assault on Idlib.

Moscow needs to understand very well the risks arising from such a scenario and that without taking Ankara’s concerns into account, it might win the war but it will never win peace. If decision makers in Russia are fully aware of this point, then there will be still a slim chance to halt the military operation or at least downsize it to a limited operation.

To be sure, everyone except Turkey, seems to be agreeing on the military operation in a way or another including the U.S. While Russia and Iran are in a rush to achieve the above-stated goals and consolidate Assad’s power, Washington made it clear that its only concern is the use of chemical weapons. Last week, U.S. ambassador to the UN said at a UN press conference, “If they – Assad and his allies- want to continue to go the route of taking over Syria, they can do that, but they cannot do it with chemical weapons.”

Just five months ago, U.S. President Trump stressed that he wanted to withdraw from Syria and bring his troops back home. Now Trump has agreed to a new strategy that indefinitely extends the military effort to ensure the departure of Iran and its proxy forces, the “enduring defeat” of Daesh (IS), the establishment of a stable, nonthreatening government acceptable to all Syrians and the international community.

Yet, allowing Assad to kill civilians, take over Idlib, and extend his control over more territories with the help of Iran and Russia will run against the freshly stated goals of Washington’s new policy in Syria. It will be hard to imagine that the U.S. will be able stay in Syria indefinitely, prevent the emergence of terrorists, and drive Iran out of the country if Assad is going to consolidate his powers. In this context, the U.S. has an interest in stopping the imminent military assault on Idlib and can work with Turkey on this issue for their mutual benefit.

Americans have always complained lately about the Turkish-Russian cooperation. It should be kept in mind that Ankara is working with Moscow in Syria after it was on the verge of war with it at the end of 2015 because the U.S. decided to downsize itself and make alliance with a franchise branch of the PKK in Syria, thus constantly working against Turkey’s national security.

Currently, disagreements with Russia and Iran on Idlib are visible. Turkey, a NATO ally, is saying it will stand its ground amid the imminent military assault of Assad and his allies on the city. However, since the balance of power is not in Turkey’s favor versus Assad, Iran and Russia, the U.S. can step in to defend Ankara, not only politically but militarily if needed. When they have the will, Americans proved that they can act. They defended the PYD against Assad, they defended themselves against Russian mercenaries without the pretext that such a lethal engagement will lead to a total war.

Another option on U.S.-Turkey cooperation in this matter can be explored too. U.S. officials can offer valuable intelligence information that might help Ankara convince Moscow that there is a more effective way to work on counterterrorism operation in Idlib rather than letting Assad and his allies take over the city with the pretext of fighting terrorism. This will not only raise Turkey’s chance to halt the operation but will serve Washington’s interest too.

If it were considered as a country, Idlib would have been the second country in hosting refugees. The Tehran summit proved that Ankara’s position to defend the civilians in Idlib against the Assad regime is not another PR strategy rather than an ethical position, which is constantly undermined by the imbalance of power. Defending civilians against the brutality of the Assad regime and his allies should not only be Turkey’s responsibility. The international community, including the U.S., has great responsibilities to carry in this particular matter as well.

The long-expected Tehran summit, which was aimed to bring a resolution to the heating Idlib problem on Syria took place on Friday, September 7. The tripartite summit of Turkey, Russia and the hosting country, Iran, also included bilateral talks between the leaders. As it appeared on the live speeches of Erdogan, Putin, and Rohani, the talks were hot and the positions were stiff, hence it was not an easy job for the leaders to meet around a common position. While the difficulties were obvious, the problem is heating for Idlib’s civilian population and the need for a resolution is imminent.

The joint statement of the summit included twelve points. According to the first point in the statement, the Astana process is regarded as successful for diminishing violence in Syria over the last one and half years. While this was the reason why Turkey backed the Astana process from the very beginning up until now, its effectiveness is questioned even by Turkey. The designated de-escalation zones (Idlib, parts of northern Homs, Eastern Ghouta, and parts of Deraa and Quneitra) worked for some time but the regime forces attacked them one by one with Iranian and Russian backing with one or another excuse. And now the last pocket of those, Idlib, has been sporadically targeted by air strikes for the last few days. In the summit, President Erdogan also stated his discontent with the destiny of the other three de-escalation zones and his concern about Idlib following the pattern.

The second point in the joint statement was more obviously agreeable with its emphasis on the territorial integrity of Syria. This has been Turkey’s position since day one of the Syrian crisis. All the three actors genuinely share this position and this decisiveness can be interpreted as a handicap for the possible long-term goals of the U.S. in the east of the Euphrates River in Syria.

The rest of the points in the statement reaffirmed the three countries’ determination to continue their joint efforts for coordination. Turkey has proved to be a very collaborative actor for Iran and Russia but again, an fait accompli in Idlib will also shake Turkey’s trust in this trilateral cooperation and will put the future of this cooperation in danger.

From the perspective of Turkey, the joint statement is not the best possible text, but it is also not the worst. Of course Turkey would be happier if there was a clear warning to the PYD/PKK in the joint statement, but let us not forget that the summit was primarily about Idlib and hence, the absence of PYD-PKK linkages in the text is not a deal breaker for Turkey for now. This issue will be more and more important for Turkey when the attention will shift from Idlib to the northeast territories of Syria. Moreover, neither the PYD nor the Assad regime were represented in the Astana process or in the summits like the one in Tehran on Friday.

Another great thing about the summit would be if Russia and Iran fully agreed with Turkey’s concerns about the humanitarian crisis in Idlib in case it is attacked by the regime forces. Yes, the joint statement did not guarantee a fully peaceful solution over Idlib but this diplomatic traffic is still better than no diplomacy for Turkey, which is trying to eliminate the possibility of a bloodbath in Idlib. For Turkey, this diplomatic traffic is also a way to buy time as Ankara is enlarging the camps and increasing its capacity for relief around Idlib for a possible humanitarian crisis. After all, the odds for a larger scale attack in Idlib are very high but Turkey will try its best to postpone the battle until its relief mission is ready and also to minimize the battleground to narrower circles by keeping the heaviest populated areas of Idlib out. After all, Idlib’s future cannot be left to the radical groups such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham but it can also not be left to the regime, which is likely to carry out mass killings. Until a final resolution is adopted on the future of Syria, Turkey will play its fair role in Idlib to keep itself safe from possible threats to be originated from Idlib and to keep the city’s civilian population safe from Assad’s rockets and dungeons.

The Tehran summit on the future of the Idlib region is over, but the Idlib conundrum continues. The final meeting of the summit was interestingly broadcasted live so that the participating nations could raise their position publicly regarding the Idlib issue. It was a textbook example demonstrating competing discourses and strategies that frame the participating nations’ policy justification regarding the situation, not only in the Idlib region but also in Syria. President Erdogan encouraged Russia and Iran to accept a ceasefire in Idlib by saying that the people of the region hold many anxieties about the catastrophic consequences of the aerial bombing by Russia and Syria. He also mentioned that such an accord would be a victory of the summit.

However, Turkey’s cease-fire call was rejected by Russia and Iran. President Putin responded that “a cease-fire would be good.” Putin also mentioned that representatives of terrorist organizations have enough common sense to stop resistance and lay down their weapons. It was evident that President Erdogan underlined the importance of the cease-fire for the civilian people who might be targeted by Russian air bombardment.

Turkey’s priorities regarding Syria are still shaped by the same parameters as the final declaration of the summit shows. Territorial integrity has always been a central component of Ankara’s concerns regarding the Syrian crisis. President Erdogan underlined the terrorist threat by referring to the growing relationship between the U.S. and the PYD, which is the PKK’s Syrian branch. As it can also be understood through the Russian and Iranian leaders’ statements during the meeting, the U.S presence in the northern part of Syria is not welcomed as it undermines Syrian territorial integrity and Turkey’s national security. This concern was directly mentioned in the final statement of the meeting.

However, as compared to the previous Astana summits, in the final communique of the Tehran summit, Turkey, Russia, and Iran framed Syria concerning its official name: the Syrian Arab Republic (three times). This is an important signal to see Turkey’s “new” position regarding the Syrian regime, as Turkey always tends to prefer the Assad regime instead of using SAR.

In addition to the strong emphasis on the territorial integrity of Syria Turkey, Russia and Iran also revealed the “sovereignty” of the Syrian state in the final declaration of the meeting. From a personal point of view, it is unclear to me how Turkey locates the sovereignty of the Syrian state over the entire country which has been divided into many parts, in which Turkey also holds some part of it. More importantly, how Turkey understands the domestic dimension of the SAR’s sovereignty is not clear. This shows also how the PKK threat shapes Turkey’s understanding of the Syrian crisis. Therefore, the Tehran summit is interesting to understand whether Turkey’s perception of the solution of the Syrian crisis has shifted.

As the final statement of the meeting underlines, the UN is the most important component of Turkey’s perspective regarding the Syrian crisis. In the joint statement, Turkey, Russia, and Iran reiterated the importance of the UN and underlined that the Syria crisis could only reach a final resolution through a negotiated political process, not military means.

How the Idlib issue will be solved is still unclear as there was no mentioning of any mechanism to prevent the Russian and Syrian regime’s full-scale military assault on Idlib, but it seems that Turkey’s proposal was partly accepted by Russia and Iran. Before the summit, there were three scenarios: limited intervention against the radical groups such as HTS in particular places, full-scale military intervention and, finally, allowing Turkey to dissolve and disband the radical groups. At this stage, it is claimed that Turkey has given HTS a week deadline to respond to Turkey’s proposal of dissolving and disbanding the group. From news on the ground, the group will only accept the proposal if Russia and Syria give an end to their attacks.

The Tehran summit underlined the importance of the Astana summit and Turkey’s role in the resolution process of the Syrian crisis, but it also showed the difficulties for Turkey, particularly during the emergency time on the ground. 

The Syrian Civil War, which has been raging for more than seven years, is entering a new phase, as the Assad regime is threatening to take over Idlib with Russian air support. This may very well be the end of the opposition as we know it since Idlib remains the last opposition stronghold. The Assad regime and Russia are making a case about the insertion of extremist elements to the city, conveniently ignoring the millions of IDPs that came to the region following the fall of Aleppo and other areas to the regime. In this phase of the conflict, the regime will seek to take the city at any cost, hoping to declare victory in the ravaged country. Once that happens, Russia will be able to argue that now is the time for the political process to move forward and reconstruction efforts to start. All this will happen at a huge civilian costs.

In many ways, Idlib has become a refuge not only for civilians but for opposition forces that have lacked serious support from outside, except for Turkey. The insertion of al-Qaeda affiliates, such as the HTS, into the region has helped the Assad regime to justify a military operation just like it has done in the rest of Syria. It’s a familiar pattern after all when the regime turns a blind eye to the movement of such groups at the beginning only to use them as justification for further military operations down the road. The international community has largely watched this pattern unfold over and over again, except for when the refugee outflows threatened Europe’s stability. It has not only failed to help the opposition but also delivered a message to the Assad regime that it can create humanitarian catastrophes with little, if any, cost.

With the latest news of Russian air bombardment and the potential operation of regime forces to the city, Turkey is ever more nervous about the humanitarian costs and the possible breakdown of the deconfliction zone it has helped to create. Turkey’s first preference was to work with its NATO ally, the U.S. to empower the opposition for a lasting political deal in Syria. Disillusioned with U.S. policy, however, Turkey has increased its diplomatic efforts toward the two major players on the ground, Russia and Iran, through the Astana and Sochi processes. An important result of significant value for Turkish strategic interests has been the creation of deconfliction zones. Turkey’s intervention to contain the PYD/PKK’s march toward the west was also not opposed by Russia and Iran.

The Assad regime’s impending Idlib operation carries the risk of alienation of Turkey from this diplomatic process, not to mention the potential confrontation between Turkish forces and the regime forces. If the Assad regime conducts an all-out assault on Idlib, Turkey will be hard pressed to protect its interests: maintaining the deconfliction zone, stemming the refugee outflows, containing the PYD/PKK, and continuing to engage with Russia and Iran diplomatically. If the opposition loses its control in Idlib to the regime, there may not be much of a need for a diplomatic process anyway. If and when the regime declares victory, Russia will try to pivot quickly to a debate on reconstruction rather than a political solution. Given the complexities of security and political interests of all political actors, it is difficult to imagine either a meaningful reconstruction effort or a sustainable political agreement will emerge any time soon. Under these conditions, Syria will not be stable for a long time to come regardless of what happens in Idlib.

Idlib, the last stronghold of the military and political opposition, is becoming a new episode for the seven-year-old Syrian Civil War. While the Syrian regime and Iran-backed Shia militias are planning a military offensive against the opposition in Idlib, where approximately 2,9 million people including internally displaced people live, Russia has puzzling hesitations whether the military option would bring a solution or produce more chaos for the Russian strategy in Syria.

“A military solution here would be a disaster, not just for the Idlib region, but a disaster regarding Syria’s future,” Mevlut Cavusoglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, told a news conference in Moscow with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov. However, Turkey’s priorities in reaching a peaceful solution for Idlib are becoming more difficult and complicated to achieve due to the nature of the conflict in the region.

The dynamics of geopolitical competition among the regional countries and Turkey’s self-capabilities are in test vis-a-vis overcoming Ankara’s strategic anxieties on the ground, mainly to achieve what Russia and other international actors are expecting from Turkey’s military presence there and political engagement with the opposition groups in the region.

The deterioration of Turkish-American relations, in which both countries have divergent policies towards Syria – particularly in the eastern part of the country – is also creating more complexities for the future of the Idlib region, as well as Turkey’s difficult role in it. At this stage, the actors involved in the new Idlib turmoil have competing strategies and divergence policy options.

Turkey’s priorities in Idlib

Turkey has twelve military observation points in the Idlib region to observe the de-escalation agreement in which Russia, Turkey, and Iran had agreed upon within the framework of the Astana summits. From the very beginning, Turkey started to establish military observation points in Idlib. Ankara safely delivered its security priorities in terms of increasing the number of military outposts across the Idlib region, preventing the radical groups, particularly Al-Qaeda affiliated ones, such as HTS, from getting more ground among the military opposition and remobilizing moderate armed groups under the framework of the National Army.

However, it is difficult to say that Turkey successfully de-integrated radical groups and eliminated their military capacity due to internal dynamics among the armed groups, the rigid ideological perception of the radical groups toward the peaceful solution in Syria and the military moves of the Syrian regime towards the opposition groups in the Idlib region. The HTS’s political and military mobilization in the area and its militant ideology was an extremely important obstacle in achieving Turkey’s original strategy.

At this stage, Turkey’s security priorities are shaped by many puzzling variables. As Ankara’s intensive diplomatic talks with Russia have demonstrated during the last two weeks, Turkey firstly aims to prevent the Syrian regime’s unilateral military intervention against the opposition groups. For Ankara, a large-scale military operation without distinguishing civilians from radical armed groups can create a new wave of instability in the region that would cause another conflict spill-over effect from Syria to Turkey.

The new mass refugee flow towards Turkey, together with the potential of an influx of radical fighters, can create another security threat for Turkey and can complicate the already existing massive refugee issue in the country. More importantly, there is a most-likely scenario that Turkish troops in the Idlib region intentionally or unintentionally can be targeted by any other third party and this might trigger the conflict between Turkey and other actors that are operationally involved in the Idlib war.

In addition to these security concerns for Turkey, strategically, the Idlib offensive apparently with the victory of the Syrian regime at the end of the day, can create real strategic pressure on Turkey’s military presence in the Afrin region where the Turkish forces defeated the PKK and ensured the Free Syrian Army’s military and political presence there.

The most important thing for Turkey’s strategic priorities is the continuation of its military presence in the region, especially within the western part of the Euphrates river. At this stage, it seems that Ankara and Moscow are continuing with their negotiations over the issue and that the Russian side is expecting for Turkey, before it’s too late, to achieve what they agreed upon in Astana.

The puzzle of the Turkish-Russian dialogue

While Turkey sees the potential Idlib conflict from the very center of its national and regional security priorities, Russia has a completely different agenda. The Russians see the military fall of Idlib by the Syrian regime as a tactical and operational issue, yet Moscow cannot be sure about the broader implications of the Idlib war across Syria -including the remobilization of militant groups, the continuation of the war, and destruction of the Astana agreement.

Ankara understands the Idlib war from the angel of a massive flow of refugees into Turkey, remobilization risk of radicals along its border, and the potential threat against its strategy of containing the PKK/YPG in the region. While Turkey can influence military oppositions, Russia is the only country that can contain the Syrian regime’s military operations against opposition groups in Idlib. From a realistic perspective, both countries are locked with a dilemma; the dilemma between choosing a strategy that relies on a war against the radical groups and maintaining peaceful negotiations with radical armed groups to dissolve their military structure.

At this stage, Ankara’s expectation is for Russia not to easily open the gate for a full-scale military campaign for the Syrian regime forces.  As Lavrov stated in the press meeting in Moscow, Turkey and Russia will continue to bring a diplomatic solution as they had agreed to apply for opposition armed groups in Aleppo last year. What Turkey and Russia agreed in their meeting in Moscow remains unclear, yet Russia proposed to Turkey some options both to eliminate the HTS, which is the most influential armed group (approximately 13. 000 fighters) inside the Idlib region and to bring a peaceful diplomatic solution. However, the realities on the ground are more complex than Turkey’s and Russia’s desire to eliminate HTS presence in a minimal time.

As the leader of the HTS Abu Mohammad al-Golani declared many times in his statements that they would not allow the Syrian regime military assault and demobilize their fighters. Rather than dissolving the group, the HTS member declared that they are “working hard to arrive to a useful solution in the liberated north.” More importantly, the very nature of the groups is complex; they are not composed of indigenous fighters and their ideological commitment to “revolution” is hierarchical and radical.

If Russia and Turkey can agree over a haven option in which the members (it is not possible to know how many fighters would leave the HTS in this process) can survive, then the Syrian regime military campaign may be out of option. This narrative is not limited to the HTS. There are also other armed groups that have an entirely different view toward the ongoing uncertainties.

Therefore, it is not clear whether the diplomatic dialogue will necessarily bring about a peaceful solution to the Idlib region and whether it will determine the status of the opposition. However, Russia and Turkey are still key actors who will determine the future of Idlib.

The U.S. factor in Idlib

While Turkey and Russia are the main determinant powers for the future of Idlib, the U.S. administration has indirect concerns regarding the situation in Idlib. However, three interrelated dynamics shape the U.S. perception towards Idlib.

The first is the probability of a chemical attack by the Syrian regime against the civilian population in Idlib. The U.S, France, and Britain released a joint statement regarding the military offensive of the Syrian regime against civilian and civilians infrastructure in Idlib by using chemical weapons. U.S. officials are particularly worried that the regime would turn to chlorine-filled helicopter-launched barrel bombs as it has in the past.

The second one is the potential strategic re-consolidation of Iranian influence through the Idlib offensive. The Syrian regime’s military power is heavily dependent on Iranian proxies to fight against opposition groups in the region. It is a critical topic since the Russians are unwilling to support the regime’s military assault. The U.S. administration sees an Idlib offensive as an opportunity for Iran to reconsolidate its military influence in Syria. This is especially important following the announcement of Iranian officials that Tehran agreed to a deal deepen military cooperation with Syria despite moves by the U.S. to contain Iranian military reach in Syria. This move also undermines the U.S.’s attempt to convince Russia to get rid of Iranian capabilities and to get Iranian fighters out of the country.

The third factor that shapes the U.S. understanding of Idlib is the possibility of a dissemination of radical armed groups across Syria – which would escalate another violent moment in the Syrian crisis. At this stage, it is difficult to say that the U.S. administration has an obvious policy option towards the situation in Idlib except that the U.S. wants to remain in contact with Russia and Turkey.

Options and implications

The future of Idlib remains unknown, but which actors will be determinant in shaping the already fragmented issue on the ground depends on their capability either to convince the self-disbanding radical anti-regime forces or to fight against them. It seems that Turkey has limited influence over the Al-Qaida affiliated armed groups to transform them peacefully. Ankara also does not want to fight against the radical groups at this stage unless Turkey is targeted by any of them.

The only way for the solution and to prevent a new political and security turmoil in the region is the evacuation of the radical armed groups from Idlib. It is hard to guess at this stage who can determine who is who regarding their level of extremism, yet Turkey’s and Russia’s intensive diplomatic attempts can bring a new way out from the Idlib elusiveness.

If this option does not work on the ground, then a limited military campaign against particular armed groups and especially HTS-led places in the Idlib region will be conducted by Russia and Syrian regimes forces. If this becomes the case, a limited refugee flow towards Turkey should be expected.

If the regime and Russian military campaign goes beyond a limited military intervention and turns into a full-scale military assault, then two major developments should be expected. The first one is the radicalization of the moderate armed groups against Russia and the Syrian regime, and the second is the alienation of Turkey from the Astana process, which might bring more cost for Russia. At this point, the upcoming summit between Russia, Turkey, and Iran in Tehran on September 7 will be of critical importance as it will determine the decisiveness of the three actors to maintain their consensus on a ceasefire and de-escalation zone, or to shape the future of the Syrian crisis.

Turkey has been taking direct action in northwestern Syria in order to protect a variety of significant interests for several years now. Since March, Ankara has been working to build camps with a capacity to host 170,000 refugees inside Syria so to stem the refugee inflows in the event of a major operation by the regime against Idlib. The potential for a fresh round of mass exodus is increasing as the Assad regime appears to plan to capture the last remaining bastion of opposition by justifying it on the presence of al-Qaeda linked groups in the area. The Assad regime’s past practice has shown that it will not spare civilians in the event of a military operation and that it will almost certainly create hundreds of thousands of IDPs. Having warned the regime against a possible operation, Turkey has been lobbying Russia and Iran for a while now to prevent such a scenario.

There may be a real danger of escalation and risk of conflict with Turkish troops on the ground, which have been deployed to the region to create a de-confliction zone – not to mention millions of IDPs, if the Assad regime attacks Idlib. Turkey is now a major stakeholder in what happens in northwestern Syria, including much of Idlib. The region’s future has a bearing on the fate of the opposition supported by Turkey, the success of the de-confliction zones, and whether the Assad regime can make a long-lasting deal with the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK. A regime offensive in the area would produce a new era of instability, potentially disturbing the hard-earned stability thanks to Turkey’s investment on the ground and diplomatic work with Russia and Iran.

Turkey has handled the humanitarian situation admirably over the years but this does not mean it was cost-free either economically or politically. Turkey spent billions of dollars in hosting refugees and it has evolved to be a rather politically sensitive issue domestically. The Turkish administration has been advocating for the creation of stable zones in Syria so that significant numbers of refugees are given the possibility of returning to their homelands. It is not clear whether all refugees in Turkey will be able to, or are willing to, return. However, the fact that close to a quarter a million Syrians have returned is already good news for Turkey. Yet, if the regime repeats what it has done in other parts of Syria by inflicting senseless violence and damage in Idlib, Turkey will be hard-pressed to prevent millions from marching to the Turkish border and to protect its other strategic interests.

What happens in Idlib may spell the end of the Syrian Civil War at a catastrophic cost in human lives and humanitarian challenges. The regime clearly intends to declare victory by taking over Idlib even if it has to create yet another major humanitarian disaster. Russia and Iran have been the critical players on the ground with an indecisive American presence focused on Daesh. The U.S.-backed YPG is now striking a deal with the Assad regime, once again refusing to understand the realities of the region and Turkey’s determination. The Trump administration is not interested in a robust strategic presence in Syria despite arguments for it in order to contain Iran’s influence. Lacking a serious rationale for being in northern Syria other than preventing a potential comeback by Daesh, the U.S. commitment will be increasingly weakened.

Given these dynamics, Turkey will remain a major stakeholder in northern Syria and any political agreement for the future of Syria will have to ultimately accommodate Turkish interests. Russia and Iran need to make sure that the situation in Idlib does not result in a disaster that Turkey has to handle on its own. This would not only alienate Turkey as it creates real dangers against Turkish interests but will also delay a potential political deal for Syria.

The suburb of Douma near Damascus witnessed a brutal chemical attack on April 7^th.  Seventy-eight people lost their lives due to the attack and the number of the wounded exceeds 100. The blood samples suggest that chlorine gas and an unnamed nerve agent were used in the attack. The signs also indicate the Assad regime for the perpetrated attack, as his regime has a long record of using chemical weapons indiscriminately against the rebels and civilians in rebel-held towns. Further, for actors other than Assad, using chemical weapons in the outskirts of Damascus is not an easy thing to do and using it against Assad’s enemies is not a smart thing to do.

Syria has long been a bloodbath in the midst of chemical attacks, heavy bombardments of civilians in Aleppo, Eastern Ghouta, Raqqa, and so on. As the death toll in the Syrian Civil War has passed half a million, the world seems to have gotten used to the pain and despair in Syria. Thousands of civilians dying under heavy shelling has become the new routine of Syria. Deaths under bombs do not even make headlines anymore, just like in its sidekick Yemen. Life in Syria, as in Yemen, in normal conditions is nasty, brutish, and short.

When you ask school kids to name some organic chemicals, you hear fructose or glucose, which tend to be the first world problems in the “normal” world. Yet, the answer to the same question might well be nerve agents or chlorine in Syria. While the world got used to seeing blood and tears in Syria, nerve agents that kill Syrians still make the world nervous. There is one thing that might still poke the world’s attention to the despair of Syrians and Assad seems to have been doing that one thing: using chemical weapons. U.S. President Trump does not have a good record of respecting civilian lives either as we saw in the U.S.-backed PYD offensives in Syria. But I guess what counts as crossing the red line is not how many civilians are killed but how. More, chemical weapons are the answer that the U.S. does not like to hear. Trump, in response to the Douma attack, tweeted full rage calling Assad an animal and promised to make him pay a big price.

 

Nevertheless, as days passed after the Douma attack, mixed signals came from the US. Would the US hit Assad? Analysts found it highly likely. When would the attack take place? According to the signals coming from the DC, Paris and London, it would be sooner than later. Would it be enough to topple down the Assad from power? That was the big question. And now we know the answer is no. The strikes did not aim to end the Assad’s brutal regime but just to deter another instance of chemical attack.

In an earlier occasion of the chemical attack in Khan Shaykhun, the U.S. had launched 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles from the Mediterranean Sea and hit the Shayrat Airbase around this time last year. Yet, hitting regime-held military bases in such a limited way has proven to be ineffective. It cost Assad some soldiers and some weaponry and equipment, but Assad did not have shortage of replacements with the ongoing Iranian and Russian support. Hence, the earlier strikes last year this time did not prevent Assad from committing brutality again and the most recent one on Friday night will not. As a response to the U.S.-led alliance strikes, we might see one change in the way Assad commits brutal acts. April 2018 strikes were stronger than the U.S. strikes in April 2017. The message for Assad is that the volume will increase even more if he uses chemical attacks once again. However, the very same message tells Assad that he is quite secure if he is satisfied with killing his own citizens with weapons other than chemical weapons.

Assad is at it again. His regime used chemical weapons against civilians in Eastern Ghouta, which has been under attack for weeks. It was about a year ago that Assad used chemical weapons to which President Trump responded with a limited military strike. It was more of a show of force than a shift in policy. Since then, the Trump administration largely continued the Obama administration’s policy in Syria. The administration has continued to focus exclusively on Daesh at the expense of changing the equation in the broader civil war.

The most recent Trump announcement to withdraw from Syria “very soon” appears to have more to do with the domestic public opinion than with creating a new Syria policy. The latest attack in Eastern Ghouta may trigger a military response but it will likely remain limited again and keep the Assad regime in place without creating a new Syria policy. As both Obama and Trump said it in their own way, Syria is ultimately “someone else’s problem” for the U.S. Nor is the American public interested in getting involved in Syria any more than they have already. Ahead of the November midterm elections, President Trump might be interested in another show of strength by punishing Assad without deeper involvement in Syria. And Assad knows this.

The Syrian Civil War is entering its eighth year and the Assad regime has used chemical weapons on multiple occasions without serious consequences. It has gotten away with murder with the backing of Russia and Iran. Yet, the U.S. preferred to play the blame game during the Obama administration. Despite the limited military strikes of last year, the Trump administration is displaying a familiar pattern of blaming Russia and Iran but refusing to provide international leadership to bring an end to the conflict. Taking a lead in Syria would require a lot of political and diplomatic investment in a war which the administration considers someone else’s problem. Russia and Iran are too deeply involved to give up now while the U.S., alongside Europe are unwilling to play a big role. Assad is acutely aware of the failures of the international community.

Both President Trump’s harsh rhetoric (his first direct criticism of the Russian President Putin for supporting Assad) and the French President Macron’s red line statement make it likely that there will be a military response. In fact, the readout of a phone call on Sunday between Trump and Macron mentioned an agreement to “coordinate a strong joint response.” Both leaders can show the Assad regime that they will not tolerate the use of chemical weapons but it has become largely irrelevant for Assad as long as the military response remains limited, narrowly designed not to upset the balance of power on the ground. There is no serious indication that it will be different this time around.

One of the central dilemmas since the beginning of the Syrian civil war has been that the Assad regime has been able to use international indecision and disagreements to its advantage. In its weakest moments, the regime benefited from Russian and Iranian support even at the expense of Syria sovereignty. Facilitating the growth of terror groups at the expense of legitimate opposition, the Assad regime has also helped to turn the attention away from itself. All of this was not out of the regime’s genius but due to its repeated attempts at testing the limits of the Western responses towards the atrocities. The international community has reassured Assad that he may be punished for it but using chemical weapons will not spell the end of his regime. There are no signs it will be different this time around.

The Assad regime late Wednesday attacked residential areas in Syria’s Eastern Ghouta district with chlorine gas, Syrian Civil Defense said.

The attack came late at night in Eastern Ghouta’s village of Hammuriyah, the civil defense group, known as the White Helmets, said on its social media account.

The posting said that many women and children were affected by the gas but that their number and condition are not yet clear, since intense attacks by the regime and its supporters are ongoing and the roads are closed.

On March 12, the Assad regime cut Eastern Ghouta into three distinct parts, to capture southern Hammuriyah, where it also conducted attacks, including poison gas attacks, on civilian areas.

Despite a UN Security Council cease-fire resolution, on March 3 the regime and its allies began a major ground operation — backed by Russian air power — aimed at decisively capturing Eastern Ghouta, an opposition-held suburb of Damascus.

On Feb. 24, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2401, which calls for a month-long cease-fire in Syria — especially Eastern Ghouta — to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid.

Three days later, Russia announced its own cease-fire initiative, calling for daily, five-hour “humanitarian pauses” in the opposition-held district.

Home to some 400,000 people, Eastern Ghouta has remained the target of a crippling regime siege for the last five years.

The regime has stepped up its siege in recent months, preventing the delivery of badly needed humanitarian aid and leaving thousands of residents in need of medical treatment.

Last week, a UN inquiry commission released a report accusing the Assad regime of committing war crimes in Eastern Ghouta, including the use of chemical weapons on civilians, causing mass starvation, and forcibly preventing medical evacuations.

Source: AA

As the U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson explained the shift in U.S. policy priorities in Syria towards an attempt to limit Iranian influence by close cooperation with the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), questions have emerged regarding how realistic such policies would be. This is especially relevant in regards to the long YPG-Iran cooperation in Syria, of which signs are still visible in Afrin. Therefore, it is questionable as to how the very same YPG will “limit” Iranian influence in Syria.

Iran’s cooperation with the YPG before Kobane

While the U.S. officially listed the YPG as the Syrian branch of the PKK, with the battles in Ayn al Arab – better known as Kobane – the U.S. suddenly deleted the YPG from their list of terrorists. The U.S. decision to work with the YPG in Syria led to serious concerns in Turkey as the government in Ankara began questioning why a NATO ally was supporting a terrorist organization that threatens the national security of another NATO member.

Before the U.S. began to cooperate with the YPG in Syria, Iran, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Assad regime were among the main allies of the terrorist group. This was to such an extent that the Assad regime handed over certain areas at the southern border of Turkey to the YPG in order to neutralize the Syrian Kurds who were an active part of the Syrian opposition at the time. With such control in Syria, YPG militants eliminated important Kurdish figures and organizations in their areas of control, weakening opposition against the Assad regime.

Before the U.S. began to cooperate with the YPG in Syria, Iran, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Assad regime were among the main allies of the terrorist group.

More, YPG presence in Afrin and Aleppo city made them de-facto allies with Iran and Iran-backed militias. The YPG in the Sheikh Maqsoud district neutralized an important frontline for the besieged regime forces in Aleppo and lately besieged the city. The YPG in Afrin played an important role in supplying the Iran-backed militias in the besieged pockets of Nubbl and Zahra and for the siege of Aleppo, which resulted in the capture of the city by the Assad regime and Iran-backed militias. YPG militants in Afrin, Aleppo city, Ayn al-Arab and rural Hasakah had mainly been supplied by Iran and the Assad regime.

Iran’s cooperation with the YPG-dominated SDF

Tillerson states that the U.S. wants to maintain an open-ended military presence in Syria, not only to fight Daesh, but also to provide a bulwark against Iranian influence, to ensure the departure of the Assad regime, and to create conditions for the safe return of refugees. But these claims, namely supporting the SDF in northeast Syria as a tool against Iran, are problematic.

The SDF alliance was formed to fight Daesh and not Iran or the Assad regime. While some Arab units in the SDF had previous links to Syrian rebels who fought against the Assad regime, others have maintained important relations with the Assad regime and Iran. For example, one of the largest Arab components of the SDF, the al-Sanadid Forces, which are a tribal army of the Shammar tribe, has strong relations with Iran.

YPG militants in Afrin, Aleppo city, Ayn al-Arab and rural Hasakah had mainly been supplied by Iran and the Assad regime.

It is said that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps were cooperating with the Sanadid Forces. Another example is Liwa Suqour al-Raqqa, a brigade that had links to the Assad regime. The largest local Syrian rebel faction in Raqqa – Liwa Thuwwar al-Raqqa – fought against Liwa Suqour al-Raqqa due to its links with the Assad regime and dismantled the group. However, the U.S.-backed and YPG-dominated SDF arrested the leaders of Liwa Thuwwar al-Raqqa.

Until today, the SDF has not fought one single battle against Iran-backed militias. Skirmishes with the Assad regime didn’t last for too long either. The most fragile tension between the SDF and the Assad regime erupted recently in Deir al-Zor over the fight for oil stations as the U.S.-led coalition stroke Assad regime militias, killing at least 100 Assad militias and Russian mercenaries as well. Even if the U.S. manages to break the YPG’s cooperation with Iran, the alliance formed in the SDF was not formed in order to combat Iran.

Does Iran support the YPG in Afrin?

With the launch of Operation Olive Branch, led by the Turkish Armed Forces and the National Army – a unit of all Free Syrian Army factions operating in the Euphrates Shield areas in northern Aleppo – Iran’s tacit support for the YPG became one of the most interesting topics. Senior Iranian diplomats and the Iranian president called for the end of the operation and emphasized their resentments against the Turkey-led operation.

While Iran’s president Rouhani called on Turkey to stop its military operation in the northern Syrian enclave of Afrin, claiming that it will only result in more deaths on both sides, he also stated: “We wish that Turkey’s operation in Syria will end at the earliest time.”

Statements made in the Iranian parliament were harsher. Member of Parliament, Muhammed Kasim Osmani, labeled President Erdogan a dictator and accused Turkey of committing war crimes worse than Saddam Hussein or Daesh in Syria. More, foreign ministry spokesman Behram Kasimi said: “Iran is following the developments in Afrin closely and concerned. We hope this operation at the Syrian-Turkish border will end soon, finishing the crisis in the area. Chaos in Afrin will enable takfiris to regroup and re-strengthen in Syria’s north.”

While many Turkish analysts and experts claimed that the statements made from Iranian officials were only “rhetoric,” developments in Afrin are confusing. If the claims made by pro-Iranian and pro-regime Al-Masdar News and some others on the ground are true, Iran and the Assad regime might then be providing the YPG in Afrin with supplies through Nubble and Zahra.

As Kino Gabriel, spokesman for the SDF said: “There are different ways to get reinforcements to Afrin, but the fundamental route is via the regime forces. There are understandings between the two…” On February 18, a senior member of the YPG told Reuters in a propagative tone that the terror group and the government of Bashar al-Assad have agreed for the regime army to enter Syria’s Afrin. On the following day, Syrian state TV announced that the regime forces would enter Afrin “within hours.” However, militias allied to the Syrian regime, the so-called National Defense Forces, did not enter Afrin and no official statement in this direction has yet been made.

Interestingly, it would not be the Assad regime, but the Popular Mobilization Forces who would enter Afrin. Popular Mobilization Forces was founded, supplied, backed and controlled by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. As known, the Russians tried to integrate the Popular Mobilization Forces into the 5th Corp of the Syrian Army in order to weaken Iran-backed militias. However, the project was only partially successful.

Who is Supplying the YPG with Iranian Weapons?

During Operation Olive Branch, the YPG has used, visually confirmed, Iranian weapons. Among them are Iran-produced 107mm rockets, which were also found earlier in Turkey during anti-terror operations against the PKK. More remarkable was however the Iranian-produced Toophan guided anti-tank missile, which was used to target Turkish Armed Forces in Afrin. The Toophan missiles are an Iranian copy of the American TOW missiles. In addition to the Toophan system, the YPG in Afrin also used an Iranian Safir 4×4 vehicle with a mounted 106mm M40 A2 gun. These Safir vehicles were previously used in Syria only by Iran-backed Shia militias. The Assad regime is known to have no access to these vehicles. Along these, there is also ambiguity about the number of U.S.-supplied weapons transferred to Afrin.

There now remains intriguing questions as to how, where and when the YPG obtained Iranian military equipment. Does Iran’s military support for the YPG continue after Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch? Does the intense use of ATGMs by YPG militants in Afrin suggest an ongoing supply for the terrorist group? It is claimed that prior to Operation Olive Branch, the YPG in Afrin reportedly never used Konkurs. It was only after the launch of the operation that the YPG began to intensively use Konkurs systems.

It is extremely difficult to trace the chief actors of this arms delivery and it therefore remains an open question as to who supplied the YPG with Iranian weapons: Is it the Iranians themselves, the Assad regime, or the Americans providing Iranian weapons?

The military operation Turkey launched in Afrin, Operation Olive Branch, officially kicked off on 20 January with air raids conducted by Turkish jets against the terror group, the PKK, and its Syrian offshoot, the People’s Protection Units (YPG). Prior to this, Turkish authorities had already expressed on various platforms that the Afrin operation would be launched. Two weeks before the operation began Syrian regime forces initiated a large-scale assault in Idlib soon after the Khmeimim Air Base, which is currently operated by Russia, came under mortar fire and was attacked by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Idlib is among the de-escalation zones agreed on during the Astana process. However, the influence of several groups in the region, including Tahrir al-Sham, which is reportedly linked to Al-Nusra Front, has created ambiguity concerning the policies to be implemented regarding these groups. Tahrir al-Sham’s presence in Idlib is occasionally underlined by the U.S. and is employed to legitimize various policies concerning the most significant area Turkey has influence in Syria.

The multifaceted attack involved simultaneous use of a large number of UAVS and targeted Russia’s military presence in a region, which according to the Astana talks, is under the watch of Turkey. A crisis between Turkey and Russia was avoided as Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that he knew who was behind the incidents and that Turkey was not involved. Consequently, as well as disrupting Russia’s military presence, the motive of the attack may have been to hamper the cooperation between Turkey and the countries involved in the Astana process. Certain steps, such as Russia opening the air base it controls in Syria to Turkish jets during Operation Olive Branch, indicates that mutual trust between the two countries is gradually improving. It can also be observed that Russia seems to comprehend Turkey’s concerns within the context of the operation and regards the U.S. accountable for the incidents, as the U.S. provided the YPG weaponry.

Turkey kicked off the operation in order to purge terrorists deployed in Afrin, which is geopolitically crucial for Ankara. More importantly, the fact that Turkey has specified Manbij as the second target, where U.S. troops are currently deployed on the ground of repelling the Daesh threat, may lead to a serious crisis between Turkey and the U.S. In addition, the U.S. recently announced that it plans to form a new “North Army” at the southern border. While U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and the Pentagon subsequently modified the initial announcement, it was also stated that a 30,000-strong new border security force, answerable to the “North Army” would be established in order to protect Syria’s borders with Turkey, Iraq and Jordan. The force was planned to control passes at the northern, eastern and southern borders of Syria and to cut Syria’s ground liaison with its neighbors other than Lebanon (and Israel).

Grounds of the Afrin operation

Turkey has a number of concrete reasons to launch the Afrin operation. Firstly, and most importantly, the region poses an immediate threat to Turkey’s national security. It is well known that a large number of PKK militants passing the border through this location have been trying to turn the Nur Mountains in south-central Turkey into a terror base. As seen over the past couple of months, the terror group went as far as to infiltrate the interior zones of Turkey such as Fethiye and Mugla. Consequently, Turkey’s fight against the PKK can be extended to different regions and different ways of fighting can be employed as the group ends prioritizing Syria or receives orders from the power groups it is affiliated with.

Another ground for the operation is related to Afrin’s geographical location. If the terror group attempts to form a corridor that reaches the Mediterranean by making use of the chaos in Idlib, Afrin is the only area that will allow for such a corridor. The PKK previously adopted a similar opportunism and seized control in Manbij by taking advantage of the chaos that emerged during Operation Euphrates Shield. When U.S. diplomats in Washington also began to support the YPG along with military officials in the field, Ankara reached the end of its tether and decided to start the operation.

Currently, Turkey believes that it is meaningless to waste more time to convince the Trump administration. More, Ankara intends to demonstrate that it has increased its power in the field and has left behind its domestic crises that peaked in July 2016, and which shackled the country in many aspects including the Syrian issue. The Syrian Civil War has illustrated that forces who cannot actively launch operations in the field do not have any influence on the negotiation table, whilst their most fundamental security concerns are not taken seriously even by their allies. Turkey eventually kicked off the Afrin operation, which had already been delayed for a long time, in order to eliminate the threats posed to the country’s internal security and in order to display a stronger presence on the negotiation table in the subsequent phases of the Syrian crisis.

Effects of the operation on Iran-Turkey rapprochement

Iran is undoubtedly another country that has close interest in the latest developments in the region. Although the country has recently been on the agenda due to the street demonstrations in its various cities and towns, Iran is still closely following the developments regarding Syria and the Shia militia commanded by the administration is still maintaining its activities. Tehran was pleased to see that Turkey updated its Syria policies with the Astana process in early 2016. Since then, Turkey and Iran displayed similar attitudes on various regional issues including the referendum in Iraq and the blockade on Qatar. Turkey’s recent rapprochement with Iran has played a role in Ankara’s clear stance with regard to the latest incidents in Iran. Otherwise, it was discerned with whom the conflicts and chaos in the region favor.

Turkey’s military intervention against the YPG, which had turned into a U.S.-paid army and which had seized control in a substantial part of Syria, especially towards the Iraqi border by going beyond the traditional Kurdish geography, may be interpreted from different perspectives by Iran. First, Tehran criticized Turkey’s intervention since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis and emphasized the “sovereign rights” of Syria. Defending its own and Russian presence in Syria on the grounds that it was agreed with the Damascus regime, the Tehran administration asserted that all kinds of interventions by Turkey and other countries lacked legal ground.

In this context, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Behram Kasimi’s statement that Iran is concerned about Turkey’s Afrin operation and Iranian Chief of Staff Mohammad Bagheri’s emphasis on Syria’s territorial integrity are not surprising. However, aside from the official statements and diplomatic expressions, it is obvious that the operation will drive a wedge between Turkey and the U.S. and lead Ankara to align itself with Russia and Iran. Therefore, it would be unreasonable to expect a practical reaction from Tehran towards Turkey’s military operations in limited locations such as Afrin and Manbij. As a matter of fact, the Iranian administration knows that it is not the only determinant in Syria and that it is not realistic to expect the regime to control the entire country at this phase. By any means, Tehran is aware that it needs to cooperate with a country or a power group. Given Iran’s sensitivity to the presence of the regime and the “resistance line,” the country is unlikely to give a harsh reaction to Turkey’s presence in Syria.

Although Turkey mostly underlines the threat posed by the YPG due to the group’s affiliation with the PKK, it can be contended that the group is likely to be assigned to hinder the “Shia belt” in the south. This is of vital importance for Israel and Saudi Arabia considering the relations the group built with Saudi Arabia by means of Raqqa and several Arab tribes largely due to the heavy weaponry provided to the YPG. Given that the “Border Protection Unit” is expected to protect Syria’s borders with Iraq and Jordan, the YPG and its variations can soon head south as they are blocked by regime forces in the Deir ez-Zor and Abu Kamal line. Likewise, it will not be a surprise if the U.S.-backed opponents on the Syria-Jordan border head north in order to completely block the Syria-Iraq border.

Whether Tehran and the groups that it allies with will accept this situation is out of the question as Tehran explains its presence and struggle in Syria through this “line.” In this case, the YPG will become the mutual target of both Ankara and Tehran with different motives and in different regions. Furthermore, the U.S. will expect this new “army” to hinder logistic support sent from land and some groups within the Popular Mobilization Forces (Al-Hashd Al-Sha’abi) commanded by Iran within a possible Israel-Hezbollah conflict, which seems unavoidable yet dubious when it will take place. The situation becomes clearer when considering the fact that the YPG is Washington’s most effective fighting force. Tillerson only recently stated that the key target of U.S. policy in Syria is to decrease Iran’s influence.

It is highly unlikely that Iran will respond harshly to the Afrin operation. As underlined above, Iran’s red lines concerning intervention in Syria are the presence of the regime and the securing of the resistance line. As Turkey does not directly threaten these concerns, it is possible for Tehran to be more empathetic to Ankara’s priorities in Syria. At this point, Turkey’s articulate expression of its intentions and objectives within the context of the operation has been useful. Informing the Syrian regime through a written note before the operation begun also played a major role in toning down the reactions of Iran and Russia.

On Tuesday 6 February, CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu called on the government to form contact with the Assad regime in Syria in order to resolve the country’s on-going civil war.

Kilicdaroglu’s comments came as Turkey deepens its operation in Afrin, which has cleared approximately 1,100 terrorists from the Turkey-Syria border.

Operation Olive Branch was launched in Afrin on 20 January in order to clear the Turkey-Syria border from terrorists and to set the conditions enabling Syrian refugees in Turkey the opportunity to return to their home lands.

The PYD/YPG has forced thousands of Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens from their villages, leading to a mass migration flow into Turkey.

In response to Kilicdaroglu, on Thursday President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said “What will we talk about to a murderer who has killed 1 million of his citizens?”

The Syrian regime, despite the ceasefire, continues to shell Eastern Ghouta. On Wednesday regime attacks in the region left 33 dead – of which 13 were children.

“You can go arm in arm with terrorists when necessary… But, we haven’t so far walked with those taking that path with the permission of terror organizations, and we will not do so in the future.”

The Assad regime and allied militias started an operation from northern Hama towards Abu Dhuhur military airport, capturing dozens of villages each day. Backed by Russian airpower, forces loyal to the Assad regime are trying to capture areas east of the trainway linking Damascus to Aleppo. Following the decrease of DAESH presence in Syria, loyalist forces have been able to find more fighters ready to fight against Syrian rebels. Syrian rebels on the other hand are facing several difficulties. The dominance of Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) and its weakness against loyalist forces, supply shortages, internal disputes between Syrian rebels and HTS generates trouble among the rebel forces.

DAESH factor

In contrast to the rebels in Idlib and surrounding areas, the Assad regime had frontlines against DAESH. The terrorist organization and loyalist forces fought on several levels which affected the manpower of the regime. While the Assad regime tried to compensate its lack of manpower with foreign Shia fighters backed by Iran, the military attitude of DAESH was focused on causing as much damage as possible. As DAESH shrunk into small pockets in Syria, the threat posed by the group against the Assad regime effectively decreased. This allowed for loyalist forces to send a new batch of fighters to fight against the Syrian rebel factions.

In addition to this general effect of DAESH, the Assad regime allowed the pocket of DAESH in Hama to cross its areas in order to fight against Syrian rebels in northeast Hama. Firstly, Hayat Tahrir al Sham, which controls the area, was surprised by the attack of DAESH and lost several villages in hours. After this setback, HTS began a counter-assault, re-taking parts of the villages it lost. During the time the DAESH pocket attacking HTS shrunk into some villages, loyalist forces began their operation against territories controlled by Syrian rebels. This gave DAESH a momentum to re-group and attack HTS again, capturing several villages. DAESH was also prepared against the Assad regime, but no clashes between them in the area were reported. By allowing DAESH to pass its area towards northeast Hama, the Assad regime killed two birds with one stone.

Supply shortage

Since the United States decreased its support for the Syrian rebels, in contrast to Russia and Iran who massively increased their support for the loyalist forces, Syrian rebels have constantly been losing ground. While a Russia-backed regime operation from north Hama to south Idlib in October 2015 ended in a disaster for the loyalists, this time they cannot be stopped. During the Hama operation in 2015, Syrian rebels did not lose one village and destroyed dozens of tanks. Syrian rebels backed by the MOM and MOC operation room used 115 TOW guided anti-tank missiles and 25 other ATGMs in one month. The effect of the TOW missiles provided by Saudi Arabia and the U.S. were highly sufficient. Some speculated that the TOW will have the same impact on the Syrian Civil War as did the Stinger MANPADs used in the war in Afghanistan. In contrast to the 115 TOW missiles used in October 2015, Syrian rebels used 8 TOWs in December 2017 across Syria.

In addition to the strategic TOW missiles, Syrian rebels also lost foreign support in terms of provision of weaponry, logistics, humanitarian and structural aid. Especially since the increasing Russian intervention in Syria, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia began to decrease their supplies to Syrian rebels. More, due to the increasing dominance of HTS, European countries also began to cut the structural and humanitarian aid provided to rebel-held areas in northwest Syria.

HTS dominance

Hayat Tahrir al Sham, as an alliance of the former Al-Nusra Front and other brigades like the Nureddin Zengi Movement and Jaysh al Ahrar, formed the strongest militia in Idlib and its surroundings. Even if the Nureddin Zengi Movement and Jaysh al Ahrar broke their alliance with HTS over disputes that followed a HTS attack on other Syrian rebel factions like Ahrar al Sham, HTS still remains the strongest faction on the ground. After HTS attacked Ahrar al Sham and captured the strategic Bab al Hawa border crossing, the dominance of the group in the area became clear. Even though HTS dominates Idlib and its surroundings, its popularity was massively affected due to the group’s aggressions against other Syrian rebel brigades including Jaysh al Mujahiddeen, Jaysh al Islam, Thuwwar al Sham, Suqour al Sham, Sham Front, Nureddin Zengi Movement and Ahrar al Sham.

During these attacks, HTS captured several weapon depots of Syrian rebels and imprisoned influential personalities of their factions. The attacks led to the crush down of all of these factions in Idlib besides Ahrar al Sham and the Nureddin Zengi Movement. Ahrar al Sham was heavily weakened after the HTS attacks, and the Nureddin Zengi Movement managed to repel HTS attacks on its positions. While the HTS managed to steal many weapons, this came at the cost of the cut of foreign supplies to the Syrian rebels. The group gathered more weapons after its aggressions, however, the overall amount of weapons in the area decreased due to this stop in foreign supplies.

HTS also formed the so-called Salvation Government as a pseudo civilian administration of all rebel-held areas in Idlib and its surroundings. Prior to the formation of the Salvation Government, rebel-controlled areas were managed by local councils who were linked to the Syrian Interim Government, which was formed by the exile-opposition in 2013 and which enjoys recognition of several countries who backed the Syrian uprising against Bashar al-Assad.

The Salvation Government tried to establish its own control over the areas in concern by force, demanding the disbanding of local councils linked to the Syrian Interim Government – whether voluntarily, or with the force of the HTS. This behavior displayed by the HTS-backed Salvation Government not only led to the cut in humanitarian aid to the area, but also to the alienation of the local population. In reality, the authoritarianism displayed by governors was a main reason for the Syrian uprising in 2011. Therefore, by forcing its control over rebel areas, the Salvation Government inevitably contributes to a decrease in arguments in favor of the Syrian rebels.

Another important weakness is grounded in the low popular support of HTS in Syria. While the Syrian opposition enjoyed important support within Syrian society, HTS is logically viewed as Al-Qaeda – a group that does not enjoy popular support among Syrians. Many Syrians rejected to fight against the Syrian rebels, yet the same cannot be said for HTS. Many want to fight against the Assad regime, but just not in the name of Al-Qaeda.

Treason

After a huge loss of territory, many accusations of treason was formulated by several actors on the ground. One can sum them in two points of views: Firstly, HTS is accusing rebels who attended the Astana negotiations with betrayal and is refusing to send reinforcements in order to stop regime operations. Second, Syrian rebels are accusing the HTS of withdrawing from the frontlines after a brokered deal with Russia. Syrian rebels argue that HTS was the dominant force and claim that the group rejected to give Syrian rebels their weapons back despite them sending fighters for support. It must be noted that accusations of betrayal are normal when losing ground rapidly.

There are many reasons why Syrian rebels are losing ground in Idlib. However, the situation can be summed up in three points. Firstly, due to losing foreign, popular and logistic support, secondly due to the infighting and mistrust between themselves, and finally, due to the DAESH factor. It is not clear how the territorial gains by the Assad regime are in agreement with the Astana negotiations, which officially tried to de-escalate tensions on the ground. The Turkish Foreign Minister accused the Assad regime in targeting the moderate Syrian opposition with the pretext of fighting Al-Nusra, stating that this behavior endangers the negotiations in Sotchi and Astana. By supplying Syrian rebels with assistance, Turkey may want to remind Russia how costly military operations in Syria could get and thus put pressure on Moscow to stop the Assad regime violating the ceasefire.

It is rumored that the Syrian Civil War is almost at its end. Both sides no longer have as many moves on the battle field and the country’s future is said to be determined by diplomacy. Only time will show whether or not this is correct. However, the fact that any serious disagreement at the discussion table will result in the sides taking military steps on the field in order to secure their positions is an undeniable truth.

With the aim of being as cooperative as possible during the Geneva Talks, Turkey, Russia and Iran first came together in Astana and then in Sochi, bringing their positions closer together. Parallel to this and in preparation for the Geneva meetings, Saudi Arabia brought together groups of the Syrian opposition, which are politically aligned with the Kingdom, in Riyadh. Likewise it is known that the US and Israel are in close contact with the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD)/Syrian Democratic Forces (SDG) with plans to include them on the negotiations table.

So, who are the winners and losers of the civil war, which is in its seventh year, and which parties are preparing to end through the Geneva process? Of course, the answer to this question varies according to an individual’s political perspective. When observed from a humanitarian point of view, however, there has been no real winner of the Syrian civil war.

Who could have won in a war which left over 500 thousand people dead, over 5 million Syrians forced to leave their home country and to live in misery in other countries and which left 7 million Syrians displaced at home? More, baby Aylan, who lost his life in the waters of the Aegean, representing the loss of thousands of refugees on the way to Europe, who could have won a war in which children died under barrel bombs, and finally, who could be described as the victor of a war which has ingrained itself in the memories of children.

Who can possibly explain to the children that were victims of chemical weapon attacks in East Ghouta and Han Sheikh, children that couldn’t anticipate why all of a sudden they stopped breathing, that there could be some sort of victory in this war? Is there need to discuss the defeated of this war with parents that saw their children die in this way?

The real convicts of the Syrian Civil War are those who did nothing, although they could, to end this war, those that looked down on refugees that sought refuge in their countries, and those that did not make an effort to prevent the chemical attacks by the Assad regime. These are individuals and states that allowed for Syrian cities to be taken under blockade, who allowed for the demolition of cities and who not only supported terrorist organizations such as Daesh but did nothing to prevent their terror.

To add to this list, in order to maximize their profits, those that sold desperate refugees fake life jackets, causing them to drown, those that utilized anti-refugee political sentiment in their countries, leading to the closure of borders, and those that tried to revert the crisis into an opportunity by making refugees work for very little pay are the real losers of the Syrian Civil War.

In contrast, those that felt sorrow for the death of babies like Aylan, and for the deaths of the children, women and men, who in turn tried all they could to end the crisis, are the real victors of this war. Those who opened their doors to refugees instead of turning their helplessness into an opportunity, and those that perceived them through the eyes of Ali as “brothers in Islam or equals in humanity,” are those that passed this “Syrian test.”

Those who protested against the massacre of people by chemical weapons, the demolition of cities with barrel bombs and the slaughter of people by burning them in cages are the victors of this war as they displayed the right attitude.

There may be some who consider this perspective a benign humanitarian one and would be willing to look at the issue from a realistic point of view. The only reality of the Syrian Civil War, however, is the massive cost of human lives and tragedies. The losses of countries such as the US, Russia, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, the Assad regime, Jordan, Qatar and others, when assessed within their own frameworks of profit maximization, is another issue.

On Monday Russia proposed imposing a ceasefire in Eastern Ghouta on the outskirts of Damascus – one of the de-escalation zones- for Tuesday and Wednesday.

The Bashar al-Assad regime agreed to the cease-fire, a senior UN envoy said on Tuesday.

UN special envoy Staffan de Mistura speaking at the eighth round of Syria peace talks in Geneva, said: “l was just informed by the Russians today at a P5 [UN Security Council permanent members] meeting.”

“The Russians have proposed and the government has accepted a cease-fire in Eastern Ghouta,” he said.

“Now we need to see whether this takes place but it is not coincidental that this was actually proposed and agreed upon just the day of the beginning of this [talks] session,” the diplomat added.

At least 147 have been killed by air strikes and shelling since the Syrian army, with Russian air power, began the offensive to take the besieged rebel-held Eastern Ghouta nearly two weeks ago, Syrian Observatory for Human Rights – a war monitoring body – said.

These latest Syria peace talks involve a united opposition delegation; an Assad regime team is expected to join the discussions on Wednesday.

Syria’s opposition also called for direct negotiations in Geneva with representatives of the Assad regime.

The Geneva negotiations were first held on 30 June 2012. Geneva 2 started on January 22, 2014, but failed. The negotiations, which began on January 29, 2016 for the third time, ended when the Assad regime besieged Aleppo.

According to UN sources, the first stage of the 8th round of negotiations is expected to end Friday, December 1^st and reunite in the middle of December.

The enclave is under siege by Assad forces since 2012, but it has become far worse in recent months since routes used to smuggle in food were shut.

The UN World Food Programme said in a report last week that residents are so short of food that they are eating trash, fainting from hunger and forcing their children to eat on alternate days.

The Syrian Islamic Council and the Syrian Interim Government called for an initiative to unite all Syrian rebellion factions under one command – the National Army. The initiative had many positive reactions from the opposition factions, but to make it reality will be a hard task due to the overwhelming power of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham or due to ideological differences. On the other hand, time is running out amid a possible big regime-assault on Idlib and its surrounding areas.

The idea to form a national army was proposed by the opposition’s interim government in exile and by the Syrian Islamic Council, a body of Syrian Muslim clerics established in 2014 in Turkey. More than 44 factions put their weight behind the project in officially published statements: prominent factions like Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, Feylaq-ur-Rahman and Feylaq as-Sham; brigades located in northern Aleppo like the Hamza Division, Sultan Murad Division, Muaatasim Brigade or Levantine Front, factions in the Idlib region, which are backed by the MOM operation center like the Free Idlib Army; former member of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham alliance Nureddin Zengi movement, which was supported by the US in the past and many other smaller factions. It is also claimed by Usama Abu Zeid that the Southern Front alliance of the Free Syrian Army factions in south Syria will also join the National Army.

After initial support by Syrian rebellion factions, the interim government provided its President Jawad Abu Hatab temporarily with the duties of the Minister of Defense to form a joint commission in order to appoint the Chief-of-Staff of the army. On September 4, the formation of the National Army was officially declared, but to bring it to reality on the ground will remain a hard task. The first step towards making it reality on the ground was the appointment of Fadlallah al-Haj from Feylaq-us-Sham as the Minister of Defence. Haytham al-Afisi from the 51. Brigade was appointed as his deputy.

First of all the experience of Jabhat al Islamiyyah, which was a unity of rebel brigades with similar ideologies located all over rebel-held territories in Syria, have not been forgotten  it was  unity on paper. Members of the group only had similar logos, but there was neither a real unified military structure nor a unified political body. The National Army project on the other hand, desires to unite several brigades with many different political views, different kinds of organizational structures and diverse size of members. Main support for the project is rooted in the current political and military situation on the ground. Syrian rebels are losing foreign support, ground and strategic positions and supplies. Awareness for unity heavily increased after Hayat Tahrir al-Sham^[1] (HTS) started to take more power in northern Syria, after it defeated Ahrar al-Sham and captured the strategic border crossing Bab al-Hawa. The initiative of the National Army is also a reaction to the initiative by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to create a unified body and civil administration, which was seen as a plot by the HTS to force its rule over all rebel factions.

Also within the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham body are many internal disputes. The second biggest faction of HTS, Nureddin Zengi, defected from the organization. . In addition, prominent scholars like Muheysini and Ulyani defected from HTS due to its unjust politics and ignorance towards its own judicial body. Recently, the former Ahrar al-Sham units of the prominent military commander Saleh Tahhan also left HTS. Resistance within Syrian society against the rule of HTS is increasing. Many elected civil administrators rejected the offer of HTS and was therefore forced out of power by HTS militias. Many Syrian rebel brigades perceive this trend as highly dangerous. They assume that their areas will soon be declared as Al-Qaeda-land, which will result in a massacre conducted by the regime and its allies.

The National Army project may be the last hope of Syrian rebels to protect themselves from the projection above, but it will be inevitably hard to achieve. Officially declared unities may not reflect themselves on the ground. Therefore, in hope for the National Army initiative to become a reality in practice, many brigades are seeking international foreign support. One member of the political office of Ahrar al Sham stated that “it depends on the Turkish support to the National Army project against Jolani^[2] to be successful and command all units.”

On the other side in northern Aleppo, Syrian rebel brigades operating in the Euphrates Shield area are still not organized under a single command. Three different bodies were formed by the Syrian rebel brigades in the region, which is a result of different funding and foreign support for the factions. The National Army project by the Syrian Islamic Council and the Interim Government was officially supported by all factions in the Euphrates Shield region. To unite the factions in this region may be easier due to the Turkish presence on the ground. Turkey already managed to command all factions in one operation center, but to unite all under a National Army is a difficult task, yet it is not impossible.

This initiative launched by the Syrian opposition themselves aims to obtain foreign support. Under current circumstances in which the MOM operation center supports some chosen brigades, while others were supported by foreign nations or individuals, the National Army project could not become reality. As long as the support is not united under one structure, which will benefit the interim government, the Syrian opposition factions will also be unable to unite. In this case, it is only a question of whether the HTS or the Syrian regime will be first in eliminating Syrian opposition on the ground.

^[1]Hayat Tahrir al Sham was a unity between the famous Nusra Front, Ahrar al Sham defectors, Nureddin Zengi and others small units, but after internal tensions Nureddin Zengi and half of the former Ahrar al Sham members left the group

^[2]Jolani was the chief of the Nusra Front and is now the military overall commander of Hayat Tahrir al Sham, but new leaks show that he is the unofficial leader of the organization. 

In the biggest battle of the ongoing Syrian war for Aleppo since July 2012, the Assad regime and its Russian and Iranian allies benefited from the international community’s discord to corner the rebels into a small area of the city. By knowing the military and political importance of Aleppo, the regime and its allies targeted civilians to force the city’s surrender. Only in the last week, nearly a thousand civilians lost their lives, and thousands more were wounded.

The type of operations by the regime resemble the Russian strategy of “scorched earth” already used in Chechnya. Among the prominent tactics being used are the use of barrel bombs, which goes back to the notorious General Suheil Hassan from the pro-regime “Tiger Forces”. Hassan argued that a normal life in Aleppo must become impossible. Only that circumstance could lead to loyalists regaining a foothold in eastern Aleppo. Specifically infrastructure like markets, schools, electric stations, and hospitals were targeted by the regime. This shows the long-term strategy for Aleppo.

It is a broadly used strategy by the regime to force civilians out of cities that the regime could not take back by conventional force. Therefore it decided to seize by bombs emptied cities. This has been witnessed also in Homs, Ghouta and now in Aleppo. With the Russian intervention, the “scorched earth” strategy became more violent. Besides barrel bombs, phosphorous, napalm, and cluster munitions have also been dropped. As a result barely any humanitarian infrastructure has been left standing. There are no longer any hospitals in the besieged rebel-held districts of Aleppo. One of the fatal results of this strategy is the huge amount of civilian causalities. Since the beginning of the battle in Aleppo, civilians lost their lives or had to migrate out of the city.

The two steps of besieging Aleppo

The capture of rebel-held Aleppo would not have been possible without Russian air support, and simultaneous offensives by the PKK-affiliated YPG and DAESH that forced rebels to fight on multiple fronts.

In February 2016, the regime and its allies started an offensive from Bashkoy and were able to reach Nubbol and Zahra. The three year old partial siege of Nubbol and Zahra could only be broken with massive Russian close air support for Syrian Arab Army (SAA) troops on the ground. Nubbol and Zahra was besieged from three sides by rebel forces and the other side bordered the YPG-held territory of Efrin. With this move the partial siege was broken and the main supply road of the rebels from Azaz to Aleppo was cut. After this the Kurdish YPG invaded Tal Rifaat, fighting the FSA-rebels there with massive Russian air-support too. The YPG created a buffer zone between rebels in the north and regime forces and its allies. During the YPG assault on Tal Rifaat, DAESH also attacked Marea, which seriously put pressure on the rebel forces. It should be noted that the capture of the infantry school in Aleppo by DAESH from rebel forces helped the regime advance towards Bashkoy.

After this, the regime started its second step of the offensive in June 2016. It imposed its own siege on rebel-held territories in Aleppo. The Russian and regime air forces systematically bombed the last supply-road – the Castello Road – to the eastern parts of Aleppo, which runs through northwest Aleppo. The Castello Road became unpassable after regime forces and their allies advanced from Handarat towards the Mallah farms and constantly bombed the road from the north, while YPG forces attacked the last supply-road from the south. This situation led to the de-facto siege of Aleppo. The rebels started an offensive against the YPG forces in Sheykh Maqsoud but they failed. The regime and its allies, who captured the Mallah farms, started a joint operation with the YPG and seized the Castello Road. The siege of Aleppo started in July 2016.

The counteroffensives of the rebels

To break the siege the two major rebel umbrella organizations, Aleppo Jaysh al-Fath and the Fatah Aleppo Operation Room, started a joint operation from the south of Aleppo. After a week the rebels took the 1070 settlement complex, the Artillery School, Ramousah and Musherfah, which again led to the break of the siege. The operation from inside and outside the siege was both successful. But in the following days the rebels weren’t able to widen the area by capturing the 3000 complex and the cement factory from the SAA. The rebels weren’t able to open the new supply route through Ramousah to be wide enough. The regime artillery and the Russian and regime airstrikes imposed a de-facto siege on Aleppo once again. On the ground the regime started a counteroffensive with a huge amount of foreign Shiite fighters. In this offensive the Iranian strategy of “human waves”, which proved itself in the Iraq-Iran war, were used by the foreign Shiite forces fighting for the regime. It also demonstrated how heavily the regime relies on foreign fighters. Rebels lost Ramousah, Musherfah, the Artillery School and half of the 1070 complex. Aleppo was besieged again.

At the end of October, Jaysh al-Fath and the Fatah Aleppo Operations Room tried another joint operation to break the siege. By taking into account the weaker effectiveness of airstrikes in urban areas, the rebels didn’t attack from the area around the Artillery School. They attacked the Dhahiyat al-Assad region further to the southwest of Aleppo’s center. Dhahiyat al-Assad and Minyan was captured in the operation by rebels. They made some gains in the 1070 complex, but the SAA and its allies repelled attacks on the 3.000 complex and the New Aleppo district. An offensive launched on the Zahra district produced some gains, but again all of them were reversed the same day. During this operation it was seen that Jaysh al-Fath began relying heavily on VBIEDs, also known as car bombs.

A total of 17 VBIEDs were used. Six of them were used at the 3000 complex, three VBIEDs in New Aleppo and the same amount in the 1070 complex, two in Dhahiyat al-Assad, two in Minyan and one at the Zahra district. Three of the VBIEDs were remote controlled VBIEDs. They belonged to Ahrar al-Sham. Eight VBIEDs were from Turkistan Islamic Party and six VBIEDs from Jabhat Fath Sham. Rebels tried to compensate for their lack of air superiority by using VBIEDs. This tactic was not significant enough to change the fate of rebels in eastern Aleppo.

After the failed rebel attempt, the regime began its own large scale attack from the air and ground. The eastern parts of Aleppo were attacked with intensive firepower, which led to a step by step withdrawal of rebels. Besides the regime forces, Russian Special Forces, Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Shia militias and the Lebanese Hezbollah participated in the offensive. The PKK-affiliated YPG forces joined the al-Assad side from Sheykh Maqsoud. The Kurdish organization attacked the rebels and cooperated with the regime. Rebels and civilians started to withdraw to the southern parts of besieged eastern Aleppo and were squeezed into an area less than 30 km². As a result they gradually lost other parts of the last remaining rebel-held areas as well.

There are reports that the regime and its allies have begun arrests of opposition figures, while some rebels have started to negotiate with Russia for an evacuation route from Aleppo under Turkish mediation.

Behind the bombardment by the regime and its allies, which has not distinguished between fighters and civilians, is the idea that a full capture of Aleppo could break the willpower of rebels to win this war.

After the fall of Aleppo the regime will try to eliminate the rebels in south Syria and Idlib militarily or they will try to force them to surrender. Or at least they will try to impose a political solution on the negotiation table against rebels who have lost the war.

It no longer seems possible to change the military fate of Aleppo. After this it seems more logical to try to find a solution on the negotiation table and try to avoid more civilian causalities, which is the current strategy of Turkey.

It is not possible to say positive things about the fate of the Syrian Revolution if there isn’t a major change in the field soon. If the rebels don’t unite under a unified leadership they will go on to lose step by step.