In a bid to pressure a close ally over rising oil prices, US President Donald Trump cautioned Saudi Arabia hinting that it would be improbable for Saudi Arabia to endure two weeks without military support from the Trump Administration.

President Trump was quoted: “We protect Saudi Arabia. Would you say they’re rich? And I love the king, King Salman. But I said, ‘King, we’re protecting you. You might not be there for two weeks without us. You have to pay for your military. You have to pay.”

While the president didn’t indicate the timing of his remarks and the White House indicated that the call focused on “issues of regional concern”, it is highly possible that they were made during his call with King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud over the weekend.

SPA, Saudi Press Agency, run by the state indicated that the two leaders discussed “efforts to maintain supplies to ensure the stability of the oil market and ensure the growth of the global economy.”

Trump has been making remarks akin to these about other close allies such as Germany, Japan and South Korea to shoulder more of the responsibility by taking “more of the financial burden of their defense.” These statements have alerted many international observers and concerned other US allies like the pro-Israel lobby over the reliability of the commitment and support of US towards its allies.

Trump’s confrontational statements about a country US deems a close ally were made during a campaign rally on Tuesday in Mississippi which drew a standing ovation from his supporters.

Crude oil prices have rocketed to a four-year high and in retaliation Trump is pressuring OPEC to lower the costs which has peaked to over $80 per barrel for Brent in the last month. Saudi Arabia, the world’s top oil exporter and the de facto leader of OPEC, plays a critical role in the oil cartel.

“OPEC nations are, as usual, ripping off the rest of the world and I don’t like it,” President Trump said, angered. “Nobody should like it. We defend many of these nations for nothing, and then they take advantage of us by giving us high oil prices. Not good. We want them to stop raising prices. We want them to start lowering prices and they must contribute substantially to military protection from now on.”

While it is too early to tell whether this spat will snowball into a major crisis, King Salman’s silence on the matter is keeping the fog in the air.

On Saturday morning, the U.S., U.K. and France launched a retaliation strike on the Syrian military due to the use of chemical weapons on civilians. Regardless of the fact as to whether the strikes fulfill military and political necessities and is in accordance with international law, it’s interesting how the German government tried to position itself by evaluating and commenting on the recent events. Prior to the airstrikes led by the Western trio, which consists of three countries possessing legalnuclear weapons and being permanent members of the UN Security Council, Chancellor Merkel excluded Germany’s active participation in the possible military action in Syria while stressing that her government supports the need “to send a clear signal that the use of chemical weapons is unacceptable.”

Following the airstrikes on Saturday morning, the Christian Democrat Chancellor said that the joint strike was “necessary and appropriate” while the country’s Social Democrat foreign minister supported the government’s stance as well. On the other hand, recent polls suggest that a majority of Germans (60 percent) don’t support the military strike.

Opposition parties also criticized the military campaign and even the government’s political support. Only the FDP rebuked Merkel’s early position by stating that it was not right to remove the possible military involvement of German military forces as an option at this point in time – maybe the allies could have asked for Germany’s military “help.”

Some left-wing German media outlets condemned the Assad regime’s chemical attacks but called for a non-military engagement against Syria in the form of strengthening sanctions against Syria’s patron, Russia. Conservative commentators on the other hand rightly stressed the fact that if there is no military retaliation against Assad, then, “the nuclear weapon of the little man” will be a common preferred weapon of mass destruction. Whether the recent strike was a serious retaliation step is a different question.

While the German public discusses these current developments it’s striking that some renowned think-tanks or foreign policy platforms also address Germany’s military potential and the alleged need for its “military revival.” Given the official views of German politicians in the last couple of years, and the increasing belief that Germany will to be a global actor, one could actually expect that Germany would have taken an active and joint role in striking the Assad regime. However, this did not happen.

Thus, why, on the one hand, do German politicians and renowned voices tend to discuss a militarily active Germany while not being involved in the case of actual opportunities such as joining the coalition against the Assad regime? The answer is based on domestic and external factors.

Due to its historical burden and post-WWII perception of a peaceful oriented foreign policy, German military engagement – in comparison to France or the U.K. – has generally been less on the country’s ambitious political agenda, despite rather external pressures. However, because of recent developments in transatlantic relations and other global developments, there is a steadily growing number of voices calling for a strengthening of European security – indeed, meaning the strengthening of the German military. In this sense, politicians underscore their country’s security interests by stressing the importance of the EU and its insufficiency in security matters. However, reality does not fit with the perceptions of German policy makers.

First of all, it’s very unlikely that a collective European idea of joint security will be established in the near future. The U.K. is leaving the EU and France, as a permanent member of the UNSC and a nuclear power, is also capable on its own. Secondly, despite the fact that the German army faces some scandals, the military’s capabilities are also extremely lacking despite all the rhetoric ambitions on strengthening the German military and the country’s alleged will to take its own fate into its hands. Thirdly, while on one hand the German public supports a more active role of Germany in global politics, there is not a majority who support any military engagement – despite louder calls from leading policymakers and international voices. As above mentioned, the public did not support a recent joint military strike against Syria.

Hence, it’s a bit strange that Germany has positioned itself within the circle of military powerful Western circles in the form of permanently commenting on global political and military related issues when it is not able to show any effective military capabilities. Furthermore, there are no serious signs that this will or can really change in the near future. The government neither tries to persuade the German public for a more militarily characteristic active role, nor does it plan to increase the country’s military spending – again, despite several calls from global voices. Thus, it would be more convincing if political elites take serious and realistic steps by leaving out ambivalent stances.

The claim that the process started by the 1997 Turkish military memorandum will “last a thousand years” was founded on a wrong answer to the question as to why military coups occur. According to this view, coups are the result of a clash between a state with immense powers or a “progressive” bureaucratic elite and public elements with “reactionary” beliefs. Historically, the coups in Turkey happened due to political and public actors that were unable to internalize the republican regime and Ataturk’s reforms crossed the red lines of the state. Thus, military coups would only end after the entire public internalized reforms through a radical political and cultural shift. The sociological extinction of “reactionary” views and the decreasing number of people subscribing to those views led to the end of coups.

Those who sought alternative answers to this question were also similarly mistaken. For example, people evaluating the issue from the point of political culture reasoned that coups happen due to a statist mindset with authoritarian and patriarchal inclinations. Such mental constructs, present since the Ottoman era, were the real reason for coups. The prevention of new coups required a radical shift in public mentality, which would subsequently lead to a dominance of democratic beliefs in politics. In order to accomplish this, it was necessary for the perpetrators of the coups, namely the state, the military or the bureaucratic elite, to gradually lose its importance and control in politics to a civil society with liberal beliefs.

Another opinion was that coups in Turkey occur as a result of the interference of international powers. This was especially for the cause of the U.S. due to its global influence and self-interest in Turkish politics. According to this belief, any government that adopted internal or foreign policies against the interests of the U.S. would inevitably face a military coup. Therefore, in order to prevent coups, it was necessary to stop toeing the line of the west and end their influence in Turkey.

These three views all disregard the sociological structural factors of the Turkish public. The changes in the balance of power between political and public actors in the country were not being accounted for. Coups could possibly be triggered by an authoritarian and patriarchal mindset endemic in the state, resistance of the public to internalize Kemalist reforms and bureaucracy or international forces seeking to shape Turkish politics according to their own interests. However, none of these factors explain why coups are actively being used as a tool in political power relations. The reason for this is because only the perpetrators of the coup, whether the military, bureaucratic elite or the west were being focused on. The political and sociological forces subject to the coup were being objectified and not being viewed as political agents. The reason why coups were being actively used as a tool in political power relations and succeeding in their intentions was due to the fact that the public subject to such military interventions were weak.

Changing balances of power

To give a substantial answer to the question regarding why coups occur, one must examine and account for the historical developments in political and social balances of power in Turkey. The main power struggles in Turkish politics between the 1840s and the 1920s happened between the Ottoman Sultan and the westernized bureaucratic elite, combined with inner conflicts of the bureaucratic elite itself. During this period, popular democratic forces were not even perceived as actors in politics. Since the 1950s, political power struggles have occurred between the military and the bureaucratic elite, around which gathered the capital-owning class, organic intellectuals, artists, politicians and small portions of the public in line with these elements either due to ideological or financial benefits, versus popular domestic forces of the public. We can identify two main structural breaking points within this period that deeply affected public power balances.

The first is the partial dismantling of state power and its division among democratic forces according to the principles of democratic politics. This turned the long-standing hierarchical structure of political power in the country into an anarchical one (as in power did not belong to anyone). State power that was solely wielded by the Sultan for a long time prior to the 19^th century was being shared among bureaucratic oligarchic powers and the Sultan until 1919. Following the abolition of the Sultanate in 1922, political power transferred entirely to the bureaucratic oligarchy. In both cases, government power was not open to the public and had absolute owners.

The opening of political power to the public with a multi-party parliamentary system was introduced and its subsequent adoption by certain political actors in the 1950s caused a radical change in the situation; it opened the political stage for large masses in search of a democratic regime. Likewise, democracy is a system of government where segments of the population that hold a majority are the principal actors in the government of the state. From this point onwards, political power was being shared between the bureaucracy and large public masses – in other words, between the appointed and the elected. After the 1950s, the struggle for power was the main driver of Turkish politics. The 1960, 1980 and 1997 coups are critical moments in Turkish history where oligarchic powers, along with their bureaucratic and civil counterparts, acted together to keep their hold on political power and to banish the representatives of the people from the power domain via accusations of being “reactionary” and “separatist.” These sudden coups were always followed by periods where via the introduction of new regulatory agencies, power was restored to the bureaucratic oligarchy and further denied to the general public.

The second structural breaking point was the continuous strengthening of democratic public actors against the oligarchy. This is a situation that must happen in practice if a democratic regime’s ideal of transitioning political power to the public is to be realized. The conservative strata of the public, composed chiefly of people with low socio-economic status from the Turkish countryside, became urbanized and improved their economic and cultural class over the course of a half a century period. The result of this sociological shift is the gradual change of material and moral power balances between the minority oligarchic powers and majority democratic powers in the country. If a small analogy is to be made between this situation and international relations, we can say that the unipolar structure that enabled the hegemony of oligarchy powers and backed coups slowly evolved into a bipolar structure via the strengthening of democratic forces. This bipolar structure enabled the AK Party to assume power in 2002 and allowed it to become even more established and stable in the following periods between 2002 and 2010.

The period from 2010 onwards was defined by the gradual shift of power towards the pole represented by the AK Party and a transition back to a unipolar power structure. Two indicators representative of this are first, the Nationalist Movement Party’s (MHP) – a party that traditionally associated itself with a different segment of society – decision to closely follow the AK Party’s line after the November 1, 2015, elections. The second indicator is the fact that the opposition led by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) had to plan its policies defensively, with the focus of preventing AK Party’s influence and power from increasing rather than offensively, with the focus of reclaiming the government and political power.

Are new coups possible?

Changing power balances explain why the coups of 1960, 1971, 1980 and February 28, 1997, were successful while the memorandum of 27 April 2007, the attempted judiciary coup of December 2013 and the failed military coup of July 15, 2016, were unsuccessful. As pro-democratic political and public actors change power balances in their favor, coup attempts become unable to achieve desired results. Furthermore, as democratic forces accumulate their share of power in the political system, coups will ultimately stop being an effective tool in power struggles. Thus, as coups fail to succeed, the heavy costs of participating in a failed coup attempt, namely the legal punishments of participating in anti-democratic acts, deter future coup attempts.

The court decision of June 2014 that sentenced the participants of the 1980 coup to life imprisonment, the current point arrived in the trial process concerning the 1997 coup and the fast-moving trial process of the 2016 coup attempt signify that Turkey has reached an important milestone with respect to domestic democratization. Coup trials can neither be reduced to, as some say, attempts of revenge, nor can they be reduced to purely apolitical processes where injustices are addressed and justice is served. Attempts to define this process through apolitical points of views disregard the historical structural breaking point that Turkey has gone through. Since the 1950s, large public masses have become political actors and the power balances in Turkey continue to shift in favor of pro-democratic forces. This historical and on-going structural process renders future coups impossible.

February 28 was a coup. There was nothing post-modern about it. In a clear and direct way, it was a military coup d’état. The government was deposed through threats, blackmails and various other methods. Illegitimate means were used. It was anti-democratic.

While the army led the way, academics supported them, the business world preferred this overthrow and the media announced the whole thing. A legitimately elected government was deposed due to its number of deputies in Parliament. Politicians were threatened at the National Security Council. They were forced to sign various decisions. Tanks paraded on the streets. People were arrested. Discrimination occurred in all spheres, on all levels. Methods of political engineering were applied. Psychological warfare became part of everyday life. If this is not a coup, then what was it?

Those who claim that February 28 was not a coup are only trying to cover up their own crimes. I’m not sure who coined the term “post-modern coup,” but it is being used frequently. What does this mean? Nothing essentially. Are coups modern? Did they not exist before modernity? What does post-modernism, a phenomenon of the social sciences, have to do with February 28? The whole thing is farcical.

Turkey’s conservatives barred from accessing education

The coup’s most prominent aspect was education. With discriminatory policies and double standards, the religious segment of society was barred from accessing education. The headscarf ban was implemented and wasted away a generation. The 28 February coup was not only framed against politicians, but against society.

Looking back, we may assume that this mentality has been defeated. However, the estimates of the damage made are yet to be calculated: How many girls were barred from education due to wearing a headscarf? How many people were barred from education through the implemented quotient to imam-hatip and vocational high schools? How many dreams were shattered?

In the upcoming years, all these estimates may become clear. For instance, it might be easier to calculate how many people were denied the right to an education due to their headscarves. Yet, we may not know how many girls had to remove their headscarves in order to access education. Moreover, we may never know the cost of the trauma the coup had on the psychology of these girls.

Think about it. How many girls had to give up on registering to university because of the headscarf ban? You may have seen such examples around you. It is possible to understand what a prominent tragedy this was by listening to personal experiences. We may assume that it has a higher cost when we think about society as a whole. Despite these events, if some are still claiming that February 28 was not a coup, this means that the arrays of events have not been explained well enough.

Another aspect of this hostility and design was the quotient issue of imam-hatip high school graduates. Through the implementation of a quotient, the coup plotters wanted to bar a generation from accessing education. Those who remember will note that in the summer of that year, regulations involving university entrance had changed. High school seniors learned that entering a university was almost impossible in the autumn. More, they were told that they could not transfer to other high schools as it was also banned. Some transferred to open high schools, where they would complete their education from outside the system. There were a few who entered foundation universities. Some had to go abroad, as if they were exile. They suffered a lot. Yet, these people were the only ones that could have saved themselves as a minority. Most of them were doomed and were forced to apply to open education. While their scores were enough to enter prestigious universities in Istanbul or Ankara, they were forced to register to associate degree programs.

We didn’t forget, we won’t forget

Who could possibly calculate the estimates of this cost? Who is to be held accountable for the people deprived of an education? There is a vile figure left from those times. He was only recently defending all these discriminatory practices on TV. In the eyes of God, everything is forgivable, with the exception of injustice towards a fellow human being. Thousands of people were barred from establishing a good career and helping their children and grandchildren establish a good career. Is this a forgivable crime?

I came across a friend of mine who could have entered the most prestigious universities in Turkey had these unjust practices not been implemented. He told me that he had worked in various villages and towns of Anatolia for many years as a high school graduate. After many years he re-entered the university exam. He said he would be graduating soon. “After 18 years, I barely got everything back on track,” he said. Who is going to answer for all these years wasted? Who can claim that February 28 was not a coup? It was a vile coup that stole the future of people.

There is never a “good” coup, as all of them in all forms are detrimental. However, February 28 was different than previous coups as it tried to achieve more. The government deposed with the May 27, 1960, coup and which was replaced with state bureaucracy had an impact on the state, but not directly on society itself. The right to education was not barred. The March 12, 1971, coup was realized among various fractions of the state and was mostly dis-regarded by the people. The September 12, 1980, coup hurt a lot of people. However, it had a limited design towards the people as it aimed to perpetuate the tutelage system. It did not care about left or right wing politics – its focus was the state. Meanwhile however, the February 28, 1997, coup did not only push the largest ideological group in Turkey away from politics, but also attempted to destroy them. In this respect, the February 28 coup is on par with the July 15, 2016, coup attempt. The July 15 coup attempted to have a larger impact than February 28. It tried to control all of society, not just a particular segment. If the July 15 coup attempt had been successful, the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) would have had control of both the state and society. As they failed with this aim, they attempted to push the country into a civil war. Considering these factors, only July 15 could be compared with February 28 in terms of vileness.

There is never a “good” coup. Military overthrows are vile. However, some are trying to whitewash February 28 today. Excuse me, but we have not forgotten, and will never forget the tragedies lived.

Europe is set to form a new army whose membership would encompass, minus Britain, Denmark and a few others, all the European Union states. In what has been considered as a “historic” moment on Monday, 23 members of the EU, led by France and Germany, signed a pledge to form a united army. The move has triggered major debate, with proponents calling it as complementary and opponents as competitive to NATO.

EU Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini stated that “23 member states engaging both on capabilities and on operational steps is something big.” Keeping the door open for those who did not join the army, Mogherini said Pesco, backed by the EU defense fund, “will enable member states to use the economy of scale of Europe and in this manner to fulfil the gap of output that we have.”

The member states’ signatures signify the political will but only legal endorsement, which is expected in December, can confirm the program’s force. Sources within the EU said that the agreement is not just going to be a bureaucratic co-operation, but real investment that will help develop Europe’s defense industry and spur research and development in military capabilities that the bloc needs most.

Though the campaign for joining forces had started in the 1950s, the timing of the agreement is ever more significant. It comes in the backdrop of Brexit, rising right wing forces in Europe, member countries’ dwindling support for NATO and more importantly Turkey’s lack of trust over its NATO partners and warming up of relations between Turkey and NATO’s arch rival Russia. Turkey is the largest man-power contributor to NATO.

The proponent officials such as Mogherini hail the European army arguing that it will be complementary to NATO: “The EU has tools to fight hybrid warfare – the use of conventional weapons mixed with things such as propaganda and cyber-attacks – that NATO does not have at its disposal.”

German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel said that the agreement was “a great step towards self-sufficiency and strengthening the European Union’s security and defense policy – really a milestone in European development.”

Britain, which is set to leave the EU, did not veto the formation of a “permanent structured co-operation (Pesco),” as it has been named, though, as was expected, refused to sign the pledge. Denmark, Ireland, Portugal and Malta also abstained. The fact that Britain did not block the initiative to form a EU army – rather tacitly supporting its formation – is expected to attract furious response from the country’s Brexit supporters.

David Banks of Veterans for Britain had only a few days ago stated that British involvement in the European defense union would sharply undermine Brexit. He emphasized that any form of EU defense unity should not involve Britain as the force would allow the EU to oversee increasingly blurred lines between the armed forces of different states. As a supporter of Brexit, according to Banks, opposition to an EU Army was one of the few things which united “Yes” and “No” voters during the Brexit referendum.

Unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV), which are produced by and are in the inventory of limited number of countries, could be deemed as a military superiority. There are 150 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems used by 48 countries. The global market of UAVs is around US$2.8 billion, which is expected to skyrocket to US$9.4 billion by 2025. Turkey is one of the very few countries who are successful in producing UCAVs, and it seems the country intends to maintain this success.

As domestic production increases and national resources are pooled, the dependency rate in the defense industry declines swiftly. The most vital aspect of military technology is the nationalization of military capacity. If a country is unable to produce its own weaponry and develop new technological systems, it will be forced to acquire its needs from other countries. This situation would surely complicate independence in terms of military capacity and may cause further issues through time.

As discussed recently, the focus here should be how UCAVs add a strategic value to Turkey’s military capacity. Moreover, the current status of UCAVs in the world should also be addressed. Firstly, UCAVs have yielded positive results especially in terms of counter-terrorism since their inclusion to the inventories of the Turkish Armed Forces and the police. In respect of tracking terrorist activities and destruction of terrorist elements in rural areas, detecting terrorist elements on mountains and preventing terrorist incursions, UCAVs are filling a prominent gap.

In addition to its operational successes during counter-terrorism operations, it is also possible to assert that UCAVs constitute a successful and strategic military capacity as they provide security to personnel, allow a stronger grip over the field and are cost-efficient. Pressure asserted upon the PKK and the preventative nature of UCAVs and UAVs could be understood through the complaints of terrorist elements.

Besides intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance, these vehicles also ensure dominance over the field. UAVs have a positive impact in preventing terrorist activities not only in mountainous and rural regions, but in urban areas as well. Therefore, the contributions of UAVs and UCAVs could be considered as an unparalleled development, especially as terrorist organizations are having a hard time in moving without any interference.

UAVs and UCAVs provide military advantage

On the other hand, strategic contributions of UCAVs are not limited to counter-terrorism operations; they constitute a glaring advantage in border security, cross-border operations and in combat zones. UAVs and UCAVs had a positive impact in the success of the Operation Euphrates Shield. These vehicles facilitated the process of tracking elements of terrorist organizations on the field such as Daesh and PYD. Similarly, they were also crucial in preventing border transgressions along with weapon and ammunition smuggling attempts. The previously costly activities realized by numerous military personnel have therefore been streamlined.

One glimpse at the Syrian civil war is adequate to assess the crucial role of UAVs and UCAVs. The fact that Russian UAVs have completed over 14,000 sorties since the beginning of Russia’s operation in Syria is illustrative of the prominence of these vehicles. Therefore, actors possessing these systems undoubtedly gain a military advantage in the combat zone. Utilization of such military systems is not limited to national states, as terrorist organizations are also trying to benefit from the advantages of the vehicles in concern. Daesh’s assassination drones and the PKK/PYD/YPG’s mini drones are only some examples.

Aware of its benefits, many countries are trying to add UCAVs to their military inventory. For instance, France announced that it would arm UAVs procured from the US until 2019, with the purpose of using them in West Africa. Moreover, France’s attempts to produce UCAVs jointly with Germany, Spain and Italy has been covered by the media. It should be expressed that the US, China and Israel are well invested in the development of these vehicles.

Genuine and domestic software is a must

Meanwhile, China’s aggressive policies in terms of UAV and UCAV sales must be underlined, as it concerns the region. It is possible to see that China is selling these vehicles to many countries in the Middle East and Africa. Besides sales to Egypt, a UAV factory has been agreed to be constructed in Saudi Arabia.

While China acting freely in a matter which the US is reserved will be crucial for the balance in the region, unless the software is genuine and domestic, these systems are vulnerable to being tampered by the producing country. In this respect, it could be asserted that Iran, Turkey and Israel are in a better position in the region, as they have their own national systems.

While criticizing Republican People’s Party (CHP) deputy Sezgin Tanrıkulu over the allegations of targeting civilians, President Erdoğan said “You are employing Qandil’s [the mountain where PKK’s headquarter is located] discourse. We have worked for years to produce our own unmanned aerial vehicles.” Indeed, it was not easy for Turkey to reach this capacity. As Turkey’s experience with Israeli-made Herons suggest, these systems are vulnerable to tampering as long as the software is not genuine and domestic.

Moreover, Turkey is attempting to further its capacity. Enabling more efficient military operations, these systems are expected to progress onto the next level – it was announced that unmanned fighter jets will be produced in the short-term. Unmanned fighter jets will definitely add a prominent strategic value to Turkey’s military capacity. Currently, there are 30 Bayraktar Tactical-Class UAVs in the inventory of security forces, 8 of which are UCAVs. Meanwhile, an additional 16 of these vehicles will be delivered to the security forces in the short-term. Considering the security risks emerging from Syria and Iraq, it would not be wrong to suggest that the number of UCAVs should be increased.

In the meantime, 6 Anka-S UCAVs produced by Tusaş are expected to be added to the inventory before 2018. It should also be noted that a Turkish company, Vestel, is also working on a UAV named Karayel [Northwest Wind].

All in all, Turkey has a strong base in this field; further progressing this base with the development of unmanned fighter jets will grant Turkey a strategic military advantage in the region in terms of counter-terrorism operations and deterrence.

Turkey stepped up efforts to acquire its own missile-defense system after the US, Germany and the Netherlands – all NATO members – decided at the end of 2015 not to renew their Patriot-missile deployments in southern Turkey.

Under the $2.5 billion agreement Ankara is due to receive two batteries of the antiaircraft missile from Moscow within the coming year and then produce two more batteries in Turkey.

While this has been a major step in modernizing Turkey’s defense system, worries have elapsed over Turkey’s affiliation with NATO. Although members of the security pact have expressed their concerns with Turkey shifting away from NATO, the Turkish administration have made it clear that the deal with Russia will not affect its duties under the organization.

It is true that relations between Turkey and NATO have been strained due to the recent negative press during the German federal elections, the on-going war in Syria and the unsupportive comments made by western allies during the July 15 Coup attempt, where FETO attempted to hijack the Turkish government.

Turkey marks significant developments in the defense industry. Undoubtedly, the project of developing indigenously-developed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is among the country’s leading innovations. Manufacturing and using indigenously produced drones contributed to Turkey’s counter-terror fight to a great extent in recent months. Therefore, the developments in UAV technologies and their place in the defense industry constitute a considerable object of interest. SETA Foundation’s Strategy Program Director Hasan Basri Yalçın and researcher Abdullah Erboğa conducted an interview with Haluk Bayraktar, the General Manager of Baykar Makina, which presents important information regarding Turkey’s position in the field.

---

The requirement of building a national and domestic defense industry has been highlighted in Turkey for a long time and we have lately observed that Turkey has achieved rapid progress in terms of developing UAVs. What kind of a transformation has Turkey experienced in the defense industry? Was there any critical turning point?

In Turkey, major steps were taken in the defense industry during the early Republican period. A number of national entrepreneurs and businessmen such as Nuri Demirağ, Vecihi Hürkuş, Şakir Zümre and Nuri Kılligil formed a convention in this respect. These names used to embrace their jobs as a mission. During the late 1940s, their initiatives were interrupted with the Marshall Plan aid that was introduced after Turkey’s strategic decision was shaped by the U.S. during World War II. Instead of the national entrepreneur/businessman model, the businessman model based on distributing important foreign brands was preferred. The question as to why Turkey does not yet have a domestic automobile partially stems from such choices made at the time. With the Marshall Plan aid, our military was equipped with donated foreign armored vehicles, tanks and weapons instead of domestic weapons.

The interrupted phase resumed with the Cyprus incidents in 1974, as during this period Turkey was subject to an arms embargo. It was during this era that the “make your own plane” campaign was re-initiated. Turkish Aerospace Industries Inc. (TAI) and Turkey’s leading defense systems producer ASELSAN were among the facilities established during this period. The period from the 1970s to early 2000s can be defined as the period of direct procurement and utilization from abroad. Meanwhile, joint production and montage activities were seen in certain projects.

In addition to manufacturing plants being found, a joint montage line of F-16 jets were also established with TAI in 1984. ASELSAN was established in 1974 as a consequence of the embargo imposed following the Cyprus Operation. Following ASELSAN’s establishment, while the U.S. continued to donate radios to Turkey, these were not used solely in order to encourage the operations of ASELSAN. There was another turning point as of 2004. It is argued that the hood event was the main factor triggering this since the turning point did not occur solely with the effect of a civilian initiative. Some military factors were also in play and we were direct witnesses of this period.  From the 1990s onward, the “network centric warfare” strategy gained prominence across the world and software and electronic components came into prominence in platforms. This reflected the possibility that those weapons might be used against us unless an investment was made within our own means. With advancing technologies, this situation became even more clear. Everything was mechanic a century ago, and electronic software dramatically changed the modes in the industry.

The turning point occurred in 2004 due to the fact that major bids corresponding to several billion dollars were on the agenda during the previous five years, such as bids on UAVs, tanks and helicopters. All of these were canceled and a domestic and original development model began to be implemented in 2004. The model was implemented in the field of UAVs in the most outstanding way. So, Turkey’s current position in the field of UAV technologies is the result of gradual process. Although it was really interrupted – for instance we confronted numerous obstacles as Baykar – a will was certainly displayed in this respect and we are now living the outcomes of this will.

UAVs in Counter-Terrorism

UAV technologies have developed at a rapid pace – is this because they are more producible or did the field emerge as a strategic necessity in the context of counter-terrorism?

Both factors have been effective. UAV technologies do really create the effect of force multiplier in operations as combatant force cannot properly be employed unless the targets are pinpointed. In addition, the conditions stemming from asymmetrical warfare environments increase the need for UAVs. It also presents a couple of advantages in terms of production and technological improvement. Each move made in this scope can take you to the cutting edge since UAV technologies experience a paradigm shift in aviation industry. While the previous century was based on a platform-focused aviation, the current focal points of the sector include themes like electronics, software and artificial intelligence.

Military systems are the top platforms. Below them are main subsystems, material technologies and their components. This field is required to encompass both military qualifications and military standards. For instance, if you are developing tanks, an enterprise cannot randomly step up to develop tanks. It is not easy to compete in a field that has remained steady since the Second World War. But an enterprise can develop domestic and independent UAVs, as we did, and can yield successful results. Thanks to the initiatives we made around a decade ago, we can develop and manufacture our local UAVs in our country and put them into the service of our military.

Is this because tanks are more complicated?

Rather than being complicated, it is a system that was developed a long time ago and so therefore it is not very easy to make groundbreaking moves in this field. As UAV technologies are newly developing, no specific standards or qualifications are requested for it. No one puts emphasis on certain qualifications in this field across the world as technology is always ahead of legal regulations. Besides being a newly-developing technology, UAVs do not have established main sub-industries when their subsystems and components are viewed. For example, in the automotive sector, all components can be found in the market from alternators to the most basic ones. It is a stable sector unlike the newly-developing UAV industry and for this very reason, it enables a great deal of flexibility. So many components from civilian sectors can be incorporated into the UAV industry. We call this “off-the-shelf material.” For example, suppose that you are developing the flight control system of an UAV.  It is a computer system that stabilizes the aircraft and enables it to automatically follow the routes identified and uploaded by you. You develop a software to create this system. Also, you need to work on the computer’s electronic equipment design and architecture. You create this design and architecture, and gather the components forming the computer such as its processor, diode and transistor. While you devise an authentic board design, you can purchase the components off-the-shelf since you have access to them for civilian and commercial purposes. This thus allows for the rapid improvement of the UAV industry.

Do you think there has been a critical point in the international arena where the need for UAVs has increased? Such as the Gulf War and the Second Iraq War to give examples from the past. Do you think the progress of UAV technologies accelerated at a certain point?

When you consider the literature, an example of this are the target drones used by the U.S. in Bosnia. There are also reconnaissance drones. Prior to that, drones were used in the Beqaa Valley by Israel. Israel is intensively employing such technologies in wars. We know that they were used in the most intensive way in the aftermath of 9/11. In a sense, this is due to the fact that the opportunities offered by technology make it possible to utilize UAVs in such operations.

While not that common in the Gulf War, AWACS (the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System) was used in Kosovo.

During the Gulf War, the U.S. did not have an established UAV technology yet. Especially following the results obtained through GNAT UAV in Kosovo, its upgraded version Predator was predominantly used in that area. Meanwhile, Turkey was among the first countries importing GNAT UAVs. We purchased ten of them in 1994 but did not use GNAT or I-GNAT systems in the following years. Their average duration of flight is around 100 hours, which is incredibly low. They were not used then possibly due to the fact that our military structure and outlook on this technology was different.

New Generation Wars and UAVs

There was the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) issue during the 1990s. From now on, military conflicts will arise not because of the problems caused by the industrial revolution but of the problems arising from information revolution. The network centric warfare will be out in the open and all systems will operate interdependently, which is called “system of systems.” Such a state was commonly seen during the 1990s and early 2000s, but there is a claim suggesting that firepower is still effective especially with the start of proxy wars. Which period do you think UAVs belong to?

Considering the phenomenon of network centric warfare, UAV systems encompass many different technologies including communication, sensor, processor, command and control technologies. As a matter of fact, the progress made in these technologies make us effective. For example, sorting out some communication systems allows one to develop satellite communication and a broadband communication system that is higher than the line of sight. This makes you acquire the ability to transmit images with very high resolutions. Or, the sensor you develop becomes portable in drones. In other words, UAVs will have the same function with AWACS. Consequently, technology and practice are parallel to each other. This is the point where network centric warfare comes into play. It enables regarding each component in the battlefield as a communication instrument or a sensor while enabling the reciprocal transmission of data at certain hierarchic layers.

UAV technologies are the direct outcome of network centric warfare as UAVs do not mean anything alone. For example, the aircrafts developed by Bayraktar are flying day and night, both inside and outside the country borders. From the moment, they take off, all the data is gradually transmitted to all centers and monitored by the top level. When an engagement decision is issued, it is conveyed to the base that flies the relevant jet. So, the system operates within a hierarchy of network centric warfare. Imagine a ground control station that flies a drone by itself. It has a pilot and a payload operator. It flies the drone, and while monitoring it, the image is simultaneously conveyed to various centers including brigade command and general staff, and each of them issue a decision on their own level. Then these decisions are transmitted to the system from a certain base.

The practices in the concept of network centric warfare depend on how far the developed technologies comply with this structure. Currently, our UAVs use a home-grown virtual globe, namely the Geographical Analysis System (CAS) developed by Piri Reis company. This is a software-based mapping technology. About a decade ago, the country did not have such a chance: Let’s say you are launching operations in a certain region. As teams change, you did not have a chance to analyze and filter the data of the previous team, which impedes the formation of strong ties. Now we have a software system operating above servers. All data is live. Everyone involved in the process enters their data and each one has the opportunity to see everything live. This is actually a component of the network centric warfare.

Turkey’s UAV capacity

How would you assess Turkey’s position in UAV technologies from a global perspective?

From 2004 onwards, Turkey displayed a will in this field that was reflected to the specifications of the Undersecretary of Defense Industries (SSM), which is the procurement authority. The necessity of being home-grown and authentic is asked in all the critical components as part of the specifications. Some criteria were adopted and implemented in this respect. For example, purchasing a component from a local supplier who buys it from abroad is not considered national. We started with micro UAVs and thought that starting from such a point was the most crucial factor.

As a matter of fact, this is another dimension represented by UAVs. In the previous century, aviation was completely based on aircrafts, air vehicles and platforms, but this has changed with the advent of UAVs. It has evolved into a technology solely focusing on electronic software and guidance and control systems. To give an example, we are currently developing all the components of UAVs including their flight control systems, frames, server systems that operate ailerons, batteries, power systems and ground command and control. Aeronautics and aircraft engineering constitute only 10 percent of this. In other words, designing the airframe is 10 percent of the overall job.

To explain our position, I can say that Turkey is among the countries that use UAVs intensively. Also, aircrafts keep developing as long as they fly. You can develop them. But an aircraft waiting in hangar cannot take you anywhere. It causes you trouble. In this sense, Turkey has significant experiences.

I think Turkey is among the top five or six countries that can use UAVs effectively in operational terms. Thanks to the contribution of the companies that have developed this technology in an authentic way like we have done, this experience has come to the fore. We started from the bottom of the ladder, and have come to our current position by gradually growing. Of course, we will keep our progress. Technology is a race. But one of the most important factors that will contribute to this progress is the experience of using them in the field. This factor will take us even further. Experience, identification of necessities, and additions on the system based on the feedback we have: These are the factors that improve us. No improvement can be achieved without practice.

What is the exact process? Does the military request a specific technology from you or do you develop and serve the technology to the army? Can the political and bureaucratic bodies rapidly respond to the technological improvements?

Bayraktar Mini UAV is the first system we developed. The SSM was the first one demanding Bayraktar Mini UAV. They invited us and other companies according to an invitation method based on competition and everyone developed and presented an aircraft model through their own means without any research and development support. We ranked first and the grounds of Bayraktar Mini was thus laid. For example, Malazgirt rotating-wing UAV is a project we kicked off with our own initiative. We also took initiative in many other things such as Bayraktar Tactical Bloc 2 without any demand from the procurement authority. We call it embracing duty as a mission. It happens very often. The structure in Turkey needs to change, and it is gradually changing. Currently, the military is the consuming body while the the SSM is the procurement authority. And the industry is the producer. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) has ten years procurement plans. Strategic plans and project necessities are determined based on these plans. The military reveals project needs by working within the structure and conveys the Project Definition Documents to the SSM. The documents state the needs and the SSM endeavors to meet the needs by means of the defense industry.

But to what extent is this technologically effective? How far are the country’s industrial infrastructure activities and competence concerned while determining the needs? This has many restrictions in terms of technology. Which feature is on which level? Which one needs more focus? To which one is our industry more inclined? As a matter of fact, various spheres across the country including industry and academia are required to take part in the process. In the U.S., there are test centers called battle space. Students, academics and entrepreneurs are invited to take part in exercises with the military. While we were testing Bayraktar Mini ten years ago in southeastern Turkey, military officers told us: “No one interacted with us like you did.” However, engineers must cooperate with the military as they need to see and feel the military’s necessities. If the military and engineers remain detached from each other, the process would not work out. We actually need a transformation in this structure. Currently, there is an array of procedures implemented in Turkey that begin with the manufacturing of the product after the needs are identified. They are currently more flexible and dynamic than a decade ago. As far as I see, the SSM can take on much more initiative. Such factors are also important in advancing the projects.

UAVs and the Regional Balance of Power

Among the regional rivals of Turkey such as Iran, Israel, Egypt and Russia, who are the actors we can compete with in the region?

Iran and Israel started their UAV works before us. They have been making a great deal of investment in the field. In some technological aspects such as guide control algorithms and navigation systems, we are more advanced than these countries. The triple-redundant flight control system we developed and the results we obtained clearly demonstrate that.

For instance, a triple-redundant flight control system has been used in a tactical UAV for the first time in the world. This is such a flight control system that the drone can manage its own taxiing, departure and navigation from the moment it departs hangar. It also has various automatic modes. The landing process is completely automatic and takes place with a triple-mode redundancy. The system automatically determines which landing mode is to be used according to the degree of the wind-force. It applies the brakes after it lands and then returns to hangar. This kind of automation is not available even in airliners yet. Bayraktar is the one who firstly employed this system in the UAVs of such size.

What about Israel’s Heron drones?

Turkey ordered 10 Herons from Israel in 2005. Some delays occurred in their delivery and the first delivery was made in 2010. But many malfunctions were subsequently encountered in the logistic process. Bayraktar TB2 UCAVs, on the other hand, have been in inventory since 2014 and they are currently much more advanced than Heron drones, which are procured for operational activities. This is due to the fact that it is an authentic system developed in line with latest technological advancements.

The U.S. provides a great deal of technological support to Israel. But we have observed that we are far more advanced especially in flight control algorithms and systems. To express more tangibly, Bayraktar TB2 has been in the air for 15.000 hours and it has been operating only for two years. Despite that, many results have been obtained. It is a fully automated system that manages all the phases of the flight on its own. Even the first prototype we developed in 2009 had automatic taxiing, departure and landing modes, while none of them was available in Heron. Heron drones were hired during these years, which were remotely controlled by Israeli pilots. The problems grew after those pilots left the country following the Gaza flotilla raid. In this sense, I can safely express that Turkey is far more advanced than these countries particularly in flight control systems.

Is there a distinction between the vehicles designed to be combatants and the ones that were subsequently used as combatants? For instance, do Bayraktar and other Turkish companies directly plan the vehicles as combatants?

As a matter of fact, Bayraktar TB2 was designed as a reconnaissance aircraft. What they demanded from us was an aircraft that reaches an altitude of 18.000 feet, carries 35 kg weight and flies for 10 hours. We developed an aircraft with further technical features and came up with a system that can reach an altitude of 27.000 feet, carry 100 kg, and fly for 24 hours so that it can carry ammunitions. But of course, it was not developed within the concept of offensive combat. Its airframe can make long-time flights. It also collects and transmits real time data and makes engagements in certain cases. When the types developed for offensive combat are considered, we need air vehicles that are much quicker, a little more maneuverable and with far more carrying capacity.

Does this transition require a qualitative or a quantitative distinction? Or is the distinction much sharper than this?

It is a very smooth and natural transition. There is no difference in terms of technology. It is actually a normal progress. So, what I said is aerodynamically true. There is no radical difference when you look at the subject through the lens of electronics or software.

Does this new platform require a new structuring?

It required a new hull. Also, we need to take certain steps regarding the turbine engine technology as a country. Our target is to become independent especially in critical components.

Domestic Engine Production

How can we solve the engine issue?

We do not have any problem with that since Bayraktar TB2 has a piston engine that can be procured from everywhere. But this is not the case for turbine engines, which have some constraints. Turkey is already investing in turbine technology with the support of the SSM. Also, it must be noted that the aim of developing home-grown and authentic drones is motivated by the will of improvement without depending on external sources. The whole system of Bayraktar TB2 was developed by Turkish engineers. As for the airframes, electronic systems, guidance and ground control systems, we can produce them as many as we desire whenever we wish. This is why they are national – 93 percent of it is home-grown. The average rate of this in the defense industry is currently around 50 percent. It is noteworthy that such an important technology is around 90 percent domestic while the average domesticity rate in the defense industry is around 50 percent. This is due to the fact that a considerably high added value can be provided when its electronics and software are developed.

Being domestic is crucial for the defense industry. This aspect is not so important for other civilian sectors such as the automotive sector. But in the defense industry, being domestic is really of critical importance since foreign producers can deny anything to you when defense is in question. There are many instances to that. Therefore, Turkey has taken certain platform-based steps with regard to critical components and now we are advancing in the field of main subcomponents and subsystems as well as the field of material technologies. We will keep our progress and hopefully reach the point we aim.

But still Turkey cannot procure combatant UAVs.

Piston engine, or internal combustion engine, is not a critical component for Bayraktar TB2. This product is manufactured in many places of the world since the technology for it has been in the market for a hundred years. Although being domestic is significant, there are some priorities for that. For instance, as Baykar, electronic software was a pivotal priority for us. Consequently, we endeavored to develop all the critical electronic and software components as completely home-grown in the first phase and now we are yielding the outcomes of this endeavor. In terms of engine, there is a serious need for tribune engines in the country. The SSM has been initiating and supporting programs in this respect. We are trying to come up with solutions that would consolidate our independence.

Suppose that you decide to make a combatant UAV, but it is not certain how long it will take for the tribune developing company, which was awarded the contract by the SSM to develop this. Do such situations affect your projects?

Sure, they do. But they have certain road maps. The SSM released the roadmap for UAVs for the first time. Maybe you have read about this. There is a road map encompassing the period until 2035 which also touches upon the engine issue. They are also engaging in activities of coordination regarding this. So, the SSM is trying to make a coordination, exerting efforts to prevent programs from conflicting each other.

What kind of advantages do the combatant UAVs offer in the concept of asymmetrical war?

They offer very important advantages. Above all, they can stay in the air for a long time. They can exercise assignments in dangerous spots for long durations without being located. In this sense, they bring a great advantage.

What if satellite technology would be more advanced? Do you have any plans regarding the use of satellite technology?

We are not using satellite in our current communications system as we are communicating in the line of sight by installing antenna systems in certain centers. You can think of it as a base station. Satellite communication is not so necessary for the vehicle we developed.

What kind of experiences have you gained from the Operation Euphrates Shield? Is there any point you find important in this context?

Over the course of the Operation Euphrates Shield, Bayraktar TB2 vehicles offered support to our troops from the air as far as the weather conditions allowed. Of course, we have gained some important experiences. For example, the project of central command and control system emerged as a result of this.

Turkey’s fight against the Gülenist Terrorist Organization (FETÖ) continues. Courts are accepting indictments against suspects which participated in the July 15 coup attempt that left 249 martyred and 2,186 wounded.

After the coup attempt 41,326 people were detained. Among the detainees, there were 2 Constitutional Court, 131 Supreme Court, 43 Council of State and 5 Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors members, along with 2 four-star generals, 6 major generals, 10 lieutenant generals and 184 brigadier generals.

Detainees not giving concrete information about FETÖ indicates that the terrorist organization is still influential. Despite facing life sentences, detainees are not talking or being forced to not talk about FETÖ.

Accused of planning and enforcing the attempted assassination of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Marmaris, and the killing of Erdoğan’s bodyguard Mehmet Çetin, Colonel Şükrü Seymen defended himself in court by saying “I have attempted a coup; even if the punishment is death, I do not regret it.” This defense is important in terms of how FETÖ is organized as Seymen refrained from uncovering who was behind the heinous act of the coup.

Radio Talks Reveal the Bloodthirsty Face of the Organization

The joint indictment on the events took place in the General Staff compound and the addendum of the indictment on Army Aviation Command revealed the bloodthirsty face of the terrorist organization through visuals and radio commands about the detainment of ranking officers by the putschists and slaughter of civilians.

The indictment regarding Army Aviation Command, where putschists lifted off with military helicopters that fired on civilians, clearly states that Gülenist soldiers were informed about the coup attempt prior to its execution. There are striking expressions.

http://thenewturkey.org/the-rise-and-fall-of-feto-in-turkish-politics/

Lieutenant Emre Erkan, a training officer at Army Aviation Command, said “today is the bloody Friday” to his company during muster on the morning of July 15. Ramazan Turgut, who expressed that he was serving as an artilleryman in Cyprus and started to serve at Army Aviation Command as a trainee from April 14, 2016 onwards, said “During the muster at 08:00 on the morning of July 15, Lieutenant Emre Erkan told the whole company that that day was the bloody Friday. We had training at 13:00. I attended the said class.”

Levent Çağrı Çakır also expressed that he attended the muster on the same morning and affirmed that Emre Erkan said “it is going to be the bloody Friday.”

In the indictment, it is expressed that Emre Erkan took the keys of the armory without any record keeping by Quartermaster Özgür Oprukçun. On the very same day, Battalion Commander Lt. Col. Yasin Candemir ordered Emre Erkan to distribute the weapons to the soldiers, Emre Erkan told the soldiers that “the terrorists might attack in the guise of police and soldiers,” and that soldiers collected ammunition and magazines from the room of the lieutenant colonel.

Second Lieutenant Tolgahan Akbuğa said “When we entered the armory, Lieutenant Emre Erkan gave each of us a G3 without looking at their serial numbers.”

Private Mustafa Turan said that Lt. Col. Özcan Karacan, who was tasked with dispatching and managing the helicopters on the night of the coup attempt, was giving orders to higher ranking officers. Turan added that it was obvious Karacan was giving orders to the personnel near the main entrance. “Lt. Col. Karacan came to me and said ‘if any police comes here, they are terrorists in guise. I order you to shoot them; we won’t let them capture here.’ I told him I would rather shoot myself than shooting at the police. He yelled at me and said ‘you don’t know the punishment of insubordination,'” said Turan.

Five Civilian Gülenists at Akıncı Military Base, the Heart of the Coup

The center of July 15 coup attempt was the Akıncılar Military Base. Images of Adil Öksüz, a Sakarya University staff member who led the coup attempt and was revealed to have visited the FETÖ leader Fethullah Gülen in Pennsylvania, with the putschists at the base were included in the indictment.

FETÖ members Kemal Batmaz, Harun Biniş, Nurettin Oruç and Hakan Çiçek were also confirmed to be at the military base. The aforementioned were found out to be in connection with Adil Öksüz and ordering ranking officers at the base despite being civilians, all of which were recorded via security cameras.

Kaygusuz: Hit the police department, destroy the compound

In the indictment on the events that transpired at Akıncı Military Base, there are visuals of putschists bombing Ankara Police Headquarters with military aircraft and radio communication between putschist pilots.

Dispatching and managing F-16 aircraft from Akıncı Base and relaying all attack orders to pilots, Staff Captain Mustafa Mete Kaygusuz ordered Pilot İlhami Aygül to hit the police department and destroy the compound.

An excerpt from the radio conversation between the base and the pilots:

Pilot İlhami Aygül: We are observing the clash in front of the police department.

Mustafa Mete Kaygusuz: Hit the police department, destroy the compound.

Aygül: Roger, we are firing on the area of conflict. Please confirm.

Kaygusuz: Confirmed.

Aygül: Roger. Is the police department compound the first or the second building near ANKAmall? We can also fire on the zone of conflict.

Kaygusuz: Fire on where the conflict is, where concentrated fire is taking place.

Aygül: Roger that. They are firing towards the road from the police department. We are firing on the compound.

Kaygusuz: You’re free to bomb the compound.

Kaygusuz: Have you hit the police department.

Aygül: We will be attacking it in two minutes.

Kaygusuz: Let’s hurry up. One more bomb, two bombs.

Aygül: Come again?

Kaygusuz: One more bomb there.

Aygül: Two bombs for the conflict zone.

Mustafa Mete Kaygusuz later confessed; he admitted that he became connected with FETÖ during his high school years and that he ordered pilots to bomb targets on the night of the coup attempt.

Prevent the Aircraft with the Presidential Seal from Flying

Talking with Oğuz Alper Emrah, one of the indictees of the Akıncı indictment, Ahmet Tosun described the presidential aircraft: “The aircraft you’re to prevent [from flying] is probably the presidential aircraft, it will have a seal on it. It’s a huge aircraft with the presidential seal on it.”

Ahmet Tosun said that the suspect Ahmet Özçetin, the staff colonel who served as the 4th Main Jet Operations Commander, was responsible for the F-16 bombing orders that martyred civilians.

“Ahmet Özçetin told me that the aircraft the president is in took off from either Antalya or Dalaman and asked me to investigate it, tracking the radar,” said Tosun.

Tosun added that the bombing of the interchange, Police Special Forces and Police Aviation Headquarters near the presidential compound, along with the supersonic fly-past over Kızılay and the General Staff compound were ordered by Özçetin.

President Erdoğan was the real target of the putschists

The real target of July 15 coup attempt was President Erdoğan. They were aiming to detain or assassinate him, as it would render their coup successful.

Two F-16s took off from Diyarbakır Airbase on July 12 and photographed the hotel President Erdoğan was staying at. On July 13, again two F-16s under the control of Air Forces Command Intelligence Department scanned the hotel and its vicinity.

Colonel Ali Yazıcı, who was Erdoğan’s Head Military Aide at the time, learned where Erdoğan was staying and relayed the information to Brigadier General Gökhan Şahin Sönmezateş, while departing from Antalya to reach the hotel in Marmaris on the night of July 15.

Statements of the bloodthirsty putschist Zekeriya Kuzu are included in the indictment on the assassination attempt of President Erdoğan, which resulted in two police officers being martyred.

In the indictment, it is stated that former master sergeant Zekeriya Kuzu, who is nicknamed “Pasha” and is the “base imam” for the Çiğli 2nd Main Jet Command Base, said the following to the police officers: “You will go through hell, it’s all starting now. (…) you said you were going to eradicate us, now we will eradicate you; if you even dare to raise your heads, we will kill you. Where is he [Erdoğan], which helicopter picked him up, to which airport he will land, when did the helicopter take off?”

Moreover, it is highlighted in the indictment that the putschists which were the part of the assassination team stepped on the heads of police officers with boots, fired around the officers and brutalized them.

Sergeant Aydın Özsıcak and Lt. Col. Davut Uçum, who were among the assassination team, also became the suspects of a reopened investigation on August 9, 2016 as FETÖ was connected to the death/assassination of Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu and his five companions.

Özsıcak and Uçum were charged with stealing Argus5000 CE and SKYMAP (which has the ability to record) from the helicopter wreck that became the grave of Yazıcıoğlu and his five friends on March 25, 2009; however, the investigation had resulted in dismissal of charges.

Giving his statement to Kahramanmaraş Deputy Public Prosecutor Kemal Yalçın, Özsıcak alleged that him being in the team attempting to assassinate Erdoğan and stealing equipment from the helicopter are “nothing but a coincidence.”

Putschists Coordinated the Dink Murder

Meanwhile, in the indictment of the Hrant Dink murder case, it was revealed that FETÖ planned the murder.

Participating in the coup attempt and captured wounded after the clash at Ankara Gendarmerie Command, Lieutenant Muharrem Demirkale, who is the Commander of Separatist Activities Intelligence Team at Istanbul Gendarmerie Intelligence, was revealed to be coordinating gendarmerie that had a part in Hrant Dink’s murder. Moreover, it was found out that Demirkale spoke with Specially Authorized Prosecutor Zekeriya Öz seven times on the phone the day before and after the murder.

Sergeant Yavuz Karakaya, who was detained on the charge of cooperating with the putschists at the Ankara Gendarmerie Command on the night of the coup attempt, was found out to be observing Ogün Samast and Hrant Dink before, during and after the murder.

FETÖ Dictated Three Books to Obscure the Dink Murder

In order to prove that police officers that are affiliated with them had nothing to do with the Dink murder, FETÖ made three writers write book on this murder. Adem Yavuz Arslan wrote Bi Ermeni Var, while Nazlı Ilıcak wrote Her Taşın Altında The Cemaat mi Var? and Bayram Kaya wrote Kördüğüm: 21 Numaralı Suikast Yolcusu. The FETÖ link with the murder was obscured through the said books.

FETÖ’s Media Organization Deciphered

Investigations into FETÖ’s media organization underscored how the Zaman daily influenced national newspapers and TV channels.

The indictments clearly show that Zaman acted at the behest of FETÖ in the media.

Publishing Deniz Baykal’s sextape, snatching of Adil Öksüz who is the black box of the coup attempt and serving manipulated images of the Hrant Dink murder were some of the operations that FETÖ executed in the media.

The official documents show that 1,000 of the Zaman 2,500 employees were journalists, while most of these journalists worked in various national newspapers and TV channels. Majority of these journalists were placed in various media outlets.

Trained at the Zaman daily, Cihan News Agency and Samanyolu TV, these journalists were put into crucial positions within TRT and many other national dailies and TV channels during the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials.

Between the years 2008 and 2014, almost all of the security and judicial correspondents of various newspapers and TV channels were originating from the Zaman daily. FETÖ realized the perception management through these journalists who were placed in national media outlets. Many other correspondents were polished by FETÖ. Even during the December 17-25, 2015 coup attempt, FETÖ correspondents were actively working in national media outlets.

For instance, let’s take a look at the indictment regarding the Hrant Dink murder case: it is stated that FETÖ placed Ercan Gün, who worked 14 years for Zaman, to FOX TV 11 days before the Dink murder and that the montaged photo of Ogün Samast holding a Turkish flag was published on FOX TV through his efforts.

Working for Zaman since 1993 and staying for 14 years, Ercan Gün’s transfer to FOX TV on January 8 2007, just days before the Hrant Dink murder, is evaluated as a deliberate effort to obscure the evidence. FOX TV News Director Ercan Gün was detained as a part of the investigation on the murder; however, FOX TV administration did not sever its ties with Gün. He is still shown as the news director in the staff page of the TV channel.

Ankara Representative Erdal Şen of Habertürk Daily Helped Adil Öksüz Escape

Originating from Zaman daily, Erdal Şen was revealed to be an active participant of the coup attempt.

Şen helped Adil Öksüz, FETÖ’s “Turkish Armed Forces imam” who was detained at Akıncı Airbase in Ankara only to be released with a suspicious decision, escape. It was found out that Şen helped Adil Öksüz hide in an apartment in the Üsküdar district of Istanbul.

Erdal Şen’s wife Emine Şennur Şen is also Adil Öksüz’s sister-in-law. Emine Şennur Şen was apprehended for using FETÖ’s ciphered communications application, ByLock.

At the Habertürk Headquarters on the Morning of the December 17 Coup Attempt

Administrators of the Habertürk daily and TV channel also attract the attention in the indictment about FETÖ’s media organization. It is stated that administrators who have transferred from Zaman to Habertürk knew of the 17-25 December coup attempt in 2013 beforehand.

Witness testimonies reveal that Habertürk TV News Coordinator Oğuz Usluer, Chief Editor Abdullah Kılıç and News Director Cuma Ulus came to the building at 07:00 on December 17, which was unusual for them, and worked on police summaries throughout the day.

It was also recorded that Usluer, while he was the broadcast coordinator of Habertürk TV, warned Editor Mehmet Yeşilkaya, as Yeşilkaya tried to cut off the reporter who was reading Hakan Şükür’s resignation letter; thus, Usluer allowed the whole letter to be read. Moreover, Usluer referred to the resignation letter as “a manifesto.”

Ankara Representative who published Deniz Baykal’s sextape is apprehended because of a FETÖ link

Yener Dönmez, who founded the Vahdet daily and closed it down after the July 15 coup attempt, published Deniz Baykal’s sextape on the website called Habervaktim while he was the Ankara representative of the Akit daily.

Deniz Baykal was forced to resign from his post of chairman in Republican People’s Party after the publishing of the said images. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu replaced him. FETÖ published images and documents of setup trials on the website Habervaktim.

Dönmez was detained as a part of the investigation into the images that allegedly showed Deniz Baykal. Dönmez was found out to be using ByLock. Moreover, Dönmez confessed that Deniz Baykal’s tape was sent to him by FETÖ-affiliated journalist Cevheri Güven. “Cevheri Güven called late at night. He said ‘something was sent to you, have you seen it.’ I learned that images of Deniz Baykal were relayed to the newspaper’s report line and then we decided to publish them,” said Dönmez. These quotes are directly taken from Dönmez’s statements.

As a part of the investigation into Deniz Baykal’s tape, 37 Gülenist police officers, including Ömer Altıparmak who is the former Head of the Intelligence Department at Security General Directorate, were apprehended.

Images, information and documents of Ergenekon and Balyoz trials are deleted

FETÖ completely deleted the recorded videos, information and documents of the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials.

The indictments regarding Hasan Hüseyin Özese, the Head Judge of Istanbul 13th Heavy Penal Court, and Hüsnü Çalmuk, a fellow judge, both of whom were tasked with the Ergenekon trial and were apprehended after the July 15 coup attempt, clearly state that FETÖ obscured the evidence.

Supervisory Board of Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors found out that the Istanbul 13th Heavy Penal Court irreversibly deleted all information and documents on computers by using the Wipe application before delivering them for inspection.

The court had video recorded all Ergenekon hearings that started on October 20 2008 and ended on August 5 2013. Even during the breaks between hearings, witnesses and secret witnesses were recorded. Through the deletion of the information and documents, along with video records, uncovering of any irregularities and mistrials is made impossible.

After the failure of the 17-25 December coup attempt, FETÖ formatted computers at Istanbul Security Directorate with the Wipe application and deleted the records of illegal wiretappings and technical surveillance.

The second declaration of the coup was to be announced on CNN Türk and FOX TV

The information that Gülenists regrouped after the coup declaration announced on TRT failed and that they wanted to announce a second one on CNN Türk and FOX TV was also included in the indictments.

In the joint indictment on the events which took place in the General Staff compound, it is underscored that the former Commander of Northern Sea Area Command Rear Admiral Ömer Faruk Harmancık, who commanded the coup at the Akıncı Airbase, called CNN Türk, FOX TV and the Honorary President of Doğan Holding Aydın Doğan’s bodyguard on the night of the coup attempt.

The statement of Major General Mehmet Dişli, who is the head of Strategic Transformation Department at the General Staff, is included in the indictment. He testifies that Harmancık said “we have prepared a second declaration and a broadcast vehicle will come soon; we want you to read this” to Chief of Staff Hulusi Akar.

After this exchange, it was found out that Harmancık called the CNN Türk building, which was raided by the putschists at 03:23, at 03:28 and 03:29 on July 16. Moreover, he called the line belonging to Doğan Holding which was being used by the security team in Bodrum at 06:34.

Aydın Doğan was on vacation in Bodrum during the coup attempt. Doğan stated that the line Harmancık called twice was being used by his security detail in Bodrum.

On the other hand, Harmancık called FOX TV’s Ankara office at 06:24. As it is known, the coup attempt in Ankara ended after Hulusi Akar was retrieved from Akıncı Airbase with a helicopter at 09:30.

It was revealed that Harmancık talked with Lt. Col. Ümit Gençer, who dictated the coup declaration at 23:30, eleven times. Ankara Public Prosecutor’s Office is continuing to investigate the communication traffic of Doğan Holding and FOX TV on July 15.

All of the information gathered in the text only covers a part of the statements given to the security forces and the prosecutor’s office. As more indictments are submitted to the courts and more Gülenist putschists confess to their crimes, the background of this bloody coup attempt will be revealed.

Pakistan and Turkey have stepped up efforts to explore all avenues to bolster bilateral relations in multidimensional areas with a special focus on expanding defense and military ties, keeping in view emerging geo-political challenges.

According to the Ministry of Defense Production (MoDP), Islamabad and Ankara have signed three documents recently aimed at bolstering cooperation in the defense industry.

As part of the efforts to transform the existing collaboration into a strategic partnership, both the countries signed agreements in the presence of Rana Tanveer Hussain, Pakistan’s minister for defense production, and Fikri Işık, minister for National Defense of Turkey, on the sidelines of the 13th International Defense Industry Fair (IDEF) 2017.

Firstly, the two sides signed the contract for the sale of Pakistan’s 52 Super Mushshak trainer aircraft, which the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) will supply to the Turkish Air Force. The contract was signed by Chairman PAC Air Marshal Arshad Malik and Turkish Undersecretary SSM Prof. Dr. Ismail Demir. Details reveal the Letter of Intent (LoI) with Turkey for the sale of aircraft was signed in November last year.

Secondly, Ankara and Islamabad signed a Letter of Intent on the four MİLGEM Ada class corvettes project. On behalf of Pakistan, the letter was signed by Secretary of Defense Production Lt. Gen. Muhammad Owais while Undersecretary SSM Prof. Dr. Ismail Demir signed on behalf of Turkey.

The third document was signed between the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) and Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) for collaboration in the aviation field. The signatories were Chairman PAC Air Marshal Arshad Malik and CEO of TAI Dr. Temel Kotil.

Lt. Gen. (Retd) Talat Masood, a noted defense analyst, said Turkey and Pakistan have accelerated their efforts to strengthen their ties with a focus on defense relations. “In view of the new challenges that the region faces, both the countries are coming much closer together,” Masood observed.

In the ongoing sort of conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran, he said countries like Pakistan and Turkey think these divisions only help countries who are the enemy of Islam.

http://thenewturkey.org/why-europe-is-increasingly-irrelevant-to-the-middle-east/

Pakistan’s minister Hussain said: “With the signing of landmark three documents, the level of Pakistan-Turkey defense industry collaboration will further be intensified.” Among future plans, he specifically mentioned the possibilities of joint ventures and co-production between the two countries.

Congratulating Pakistan and Turkey on achieving this milestone after signing the documents, a statement by the Pakistan’s MoDP quoted Turkish Defense Minister Fikri Işık as saying: “Pakistan is a brother, true friend and strategic partner of Turkey.” He said these agreements would bolster bilateral defense industry collaboration, which would be expanded through concerted efforts.

Recalling the support extended by the Muslims of South Asia during the Turkish War of Independence, he said: “Turkey would always be the development partner of Pakistan.”

Ali Mahar, a noted Islamabad based analyst on Middle East and Muslim Affairs, said: “Look, apart from government to government ties, the Pakistanis and Turkish nations enjoy deeper historic relations.”

Pakistan’s minister for defense production have recently held a meeting with Turkish Defense Minister Fikri Isik in Islamabad to discuss cooperation in the defense industry.

The growing level of cooperation was consistent with the vision of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif who had directed developing a comprehensive, long-term and forward-looking strategic framework for defense collaboration.

Amid stepped up diplomatic contacts, the two countries concluded their two-day crucial round of talks in January, focusing on defense cooperation.

During the meeting, the Pakistani side was led by Defense Secretary Lt. Gen. (Retd) Zamirul Hassan Shah while the Turkish delegation was headed by Deputy Chief of General Staff Gen. Umit Dundar.

According to documents reviewed by thenewturkey.org, the talks were held under the Bilateral Dialogue Group (BDG), which was established in 2003 and is known as the highest institutional mechanism for steering defense cooperation.

Pakistan and Turkey have over the years made significant strides in their defense cooperation as Ankara had gifted 34 T-37 aircraft and spares to Islamabad.

When asked about the bilateral trade volume in the defense sector, an official at the Ministry of Commerce said exact figures on the defense trade between the two countries are not known “because most of the things are in the pipeline.”

Ankara is buying MFI-17 Super Mushshak aircraft from Islamabad and also upgrading three Pakistani submarines and jointly building a fleet tanker with which troops from both countries have held joint drills in the recent past.

Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif said: “Islamabad has a strong desire to strengthen its partnership with Turkey in all fields, including the defense sector.”

According to details, Aselsan, one of Turkey’s main defense vendors, and Pakistan Aerospace Industries have signed an agreement for Turkish company ASELPOD to supply a Pakistani complex for installation on Pakistani F-17 Thunder fighters.

The ASELPOD system will enable JF-17s of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) to deploy laser-guided bombs by having ASELPOD illuminate targets. In addition, ASELPOD can identify geo-location coordinates and, empower JF-17 to successfully use laser-guided missiles. The deal is currently in the first phase, and includes 16 systems of this type worth $25 million.

Hussain had held a series of meetings with Tamil Kittel, Chief Executive and Chief of the Turkish Aviation Industry, here in Islamabad, where the two sides pledged to cement defense ties in the backdrop of a changing security environment.

Hassan Askari Rizvi, a defense and political analyst, said Pakistan and Turkey have signed many defense agreements over the last five years in defense production and defense cooperation.

Defense cooperation between Ankara and Islamabad is of paramount importance because of terrorism related issues that plague the region.

Earlier last year, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said Islamabad has invited Ankara and Doha to jointly manufacture defense equipment.

Sharif made the call for the trilateral cooperation during his meeting with Qatari Defense Minister Dr. Khalid Bin Mohammad Al-Attiyah in Islamabad.

Khalid said his country wants enhanced military cooperation and production of equipment in Qatar with the assistance of Pakistan and Turkey. Both Ankara and Islamabad have to focus on benefiting from each other’s experience in defense issues to curtail reliance on other countries, he added.

The west and US half-heartedly cooperate with Pakistan and Turkey in defense matters, forcing both the countries to join hands to tackle challenges head-on Mahar added.

According to the MoDP, Islamabad agreed to sell eight locally-manufactured Mushshak training aircraft to Doha. Turkey also recently signed an agreement to get 100 such aircrafts from Pakistan.

A statement by Hussain, said Turkey has decided to buy 52 Super Mushshak basic trainer aircraft, costing more than $50 million, over the next three years.

The aircraft are scheduled to be delivered in three batches –  the first one in 2017, the second in 2018 while the last batch would be delivered in 2019.

A successful accomplishment of Mid-Life Upgrade and Falcon STAR configuration for PAF F-16s culminated with a graceful closing ceremony that took place at Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) in Ankara.

Air Chief Marshal Tahir Rafique Butt, Chief of the Air Staff Pakistan Air Force said the successful completion of the Mid-life Upgrade and Falcon STAR Configuration of the PAF F-16s in Turkey is yet another milestone achieved. “Indeed, Turkey has always been a trusted friend of Pakistan, and our Air Force-to-Air Force relations have proved its worth as an ally and partner in various joint ventures,” he noted.

Last month, Hussain attended Turkey’s 13th International Defense Industry Fair (IDEF) 2017 in Istanbul amid participation by leading defense-manufacturing companies from Pakistan.

Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF), Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC), Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT), Defense Export Promotion Organization (DEPO and National Radio & Telecommunication (NRTC) were among others who participated in the IDEF.

Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim along with Pakistan’s Minister for Defense Production visited Pakistani stalls.

On the side-lines, Hussain met with a delegation of Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) including Chairman Mr. Oğuz Borat and President and CEO Dr. Temel Kotil.

Last month, Dr. Temel Ketil, CEO/President of Turkish Aeronautical Industry (TAI) and Hussain, during a meeting here in Islamabad pledged defense industrial/technical cooperation is an integral part of the Pak-Turkey strategic relationship.

Bilateral contact has intensified over ongoing cooperation in the defense technical field, over projects such as the PN Fleet Tanker, MILGEM Corvettes, 5th Generation Fighter (National Fighter Programme), T-129 attack helicopter and Super Mushshak Aircraft project.

In view of the current crisis, Gen. (Retd) Masood said Ankara- Islamabad defense cooperation gained more importance because both the countries are facing internal and external dangers. There is a lot of commonality in terms of thinking and strategies of Turkey and Pakistan, he observed. “Even in matters of strategy, matters of weapon systems, matters of defense policies, coordination, exchange of experience and training opportunities for each other are areas in which bilateral ties could be further expanded,” he concluded.

Although the latest NATO Summit held in Brussels on May 25, 2017 was a symbolic meeting meant to open the organization’s new headquarters and unveil some new memorials, it was significant since the new U.S. President Donald Trump, who has described the military alliance as “obsolete,” met the other leaders for the first time. As the leaders of all the member countries were present, several important subjects were also discussed in the summit alongside the openings.

Increasing military expenditures to favor US-based weapon companies

Still shocked by Trump’s election victory, European leaders were concerned about the possibility of the U.S. President’s pressing upon them with new demands during the summit. During a period in which Russia particularly came into prominence with its aggressive policies, they did not wish the impairment of their security partnership with the U.S. although they abstained from shouldering the burden necessitated by this partnership. While the U.S. military expenditure reached 3.3% of the country’s GDP, Trump urged the European members of NATO to increase their military expenditures up to 2% of their GDP, asserting that the countries falling behind this would owe a debt to the alliance. For countries whose military expenditures are around 1.2% of their GDP, such as Germany, this demand is quite a challenge. To meet this demand by the U.S., Germany will have to increase its military expenditure up to $70 billion and allocate far more funds to compensate for insufficient spending in the past. Several European NATO members including Spain, Italy and the Netherlands do also have the same concern in the face of the U.S. pressure due to their low military spending.

Planning to boost U.S. military expenditure to more than 4% of GDP, the Trump administration’s push for European NATO members to increase their military expenditures signals Washington’s reluctance to provide for the safety of Europe and the expectation that European countries will allocate more funds for their own security. Trump’s insistence on this matter is understandable given that U.S.-based weapons manufacturers will earn considerable profits from the increased defense budgets. Not wishing to return from Europe empty-handed following his Middle East tour, during which he made multi-billion dollar arms deals with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, Trump is highly aware of the fact that the European continental countries offer a market on par with the oil-rich Gulf Arab region.

It is not surprising that the first country Trump targets in this respect is Germany, which had a $295 billion foreign trade surplus last year. Being a businessman, it is unsettling for Trump to see Germany as the trade surplus champion of the world in a period when the U.S. had a $734 billion trade deficit. Having previously accused Berlin of pursuing an aggressive trade policy, Trump regards Germany’s excessive trade surplus as one of the causes of the excessive trade deficit in the U.S. A more balanced picture can be expected provided that Germany increases its military expenditure and the quantity of the weapons it buys from American companies.

The European countries are even more in need of the U.S. security umbrella given the aggressive policies Russia has adopted in the past years, which increased its military expenditure to 4.9% of its GDP. Therefore, although they are disturbed by Trump’s negative views on NATO and the speculations regarding Trump-Putin relations, it can be argued that the European allies will acquiesce to the pressure of the U.S. and increase their military expenditures.

http://thenewturkey.org/us-failed-to-stick-up-for-democracy-in-the-night-of-july-15-coup-attempt/

One of other most prominent subjects at the NATO Summit was cooperation in the campaign against terrorism. During his Middle East tour, Trump called the leaders of the Islamic countries to joint action against terrorism in his address in Riyadh. He also addressed the NATO allies in Brussels to take joint action with regard to preventing terrorism. Despite that, the U.S. has been providing indirect support to the outlawed PKK, one of the most dangerous terrorist groups in the region, through the medium of the PKK’s Syrian offshoot, the People’s Protection Units (YPG).

The summit took place only a few days after the terrorist attack in Manchester, England; consequently, cooperation against terrorism under the umbrella of NATO was particularly highlighted during the summit. The joint fight against terror has been one of the main reasons for NATO’s existence since the end of the Cold War. However, it is not possible to say that the alliance’s members are in full solidarity with each other regarding terrorism, which has been posing a severe threat to most NATO countries.

Turkey does not rely on NATO

It is obvious that Turkey is the leading country in NATO effected by terror. Being subjected to simultaneous assaults by a number of terrorist groups, including the PKK, the Gülenist Terror Group (FETÖ) and Daesh, Turkey has not received the support it expected from NATO allies. It turned out that some allied countries adopted certain policies that sided with the terrorist groups in question. Having invoked Article 5 of its founding treaty after 9/11, NATO has not exerted any efforts to aid Turkey, which has been rocked by devastating terror attacks. Ankara’s outlook towards NATO has changed negatively as the U.S. and some European NATO allies protected or condoned the activities of the PKK and FETÖ militants who have been the perpetrators of the attacks against Turkey.

Various factors have brought NATO into discredit in the eyes of Turkey. Although listed as a terrorist organization, the PKK has easily found militants and financial resources in Europe. Washington openly provided weapons to the PKK’s Syrian offshoots, namely the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing the YPG. Germany and several other NATO members are reluctant to recognize FETÖ as a terrorist group by dismissing FETÖ’s link to the July 15 coup attempt and giving asylum to FETÖ leaders, including military officers directly involved in the attempted overthrow. Besides, Turkey did not receive any support from NATO when it was targeted economically and politically by Russia at the end of 2015 because of the situation in Syria. This also played an important role in Turkey’s declining trust in the alliance.

In addition, Turkey was confronted with several problems while buying the weapons it needed from NATO allies to fight against terror and other threats in the Middle East, which constituted another component of the security-related crises between Ankara and Brussels. Following the July 15 coup attempt, the Western allies turned their backs on Ankara while Ankara was expecting their support. To add insult to injury, the allies issued some statements suggesting that Turkey’s NATO membership might be canceled due to Turkey’s measures against coup plotters during the critical period following the failed coup attempt. These developments fomented a profound unrest among the Turkish public and led masses to believe that some of the NATO allies might have been behind the coup attempt.

After having trust issues with its Western allies, Turkey sought rapprochement with Russia and leaned towards military cooperation with the country, which was sealed with the deal to purchase S-400 air defense missiles. Russia also gave overt support to Turkey after the coup attempt, which posed a major problem for NATO. While NATO has been unremittingly making mistakes that might result in losing their 65-years-long ally to Russia, some European members of the alliance intervened in the domestic affairs of Turkey by endorsing the “no” campaign ahead of the April 16 constitutional referendum in Turkey. Such factors tested Ankara’s limits.

After it was decided NATO’s would join the fight against Daesh at the summit, Germany reportedly considering withdrawing its troops stationed in İncirlik Air Base as part of the anti-Daesh fight, upon which Turkey remained indifferent. This also manifests the severity of the problems within the alliance. It will be a good start to resolve at least some of those problems if the European members of NATO and the U.S. realize that they have adopted certain policies against Turkey that are incompatible with the alliance, especially over the past few years, and start supporting Ankara in its fight against terrorist groups including the PKK and FETÖ.

 

 

There is a new trend in the West. It has been a couple of years, I believe. Renowned intellectuals, strategists and media outlets are publishing comments, headlines and academic articles about Turkey and its president without remorse and conscience. They are openly advocating for a military junta over democracy, assassination or execution of a leader over the legitimate change in power.

Last summer, with instructions from Fetullah Gülen, a self-proclaimed scholar who continues to reside in Pennsylvania, US, his infiltrators within the army declared that they were seizing power in order to depose President Erdoğan and the government. While the people of Turkey were bewilderedly watching a presenter trying to read the junta’s coup declaration with hands shaking on TV, all hell was breaking loose on the streets. Bridges in Istanbul were closed and surrounded by military vehicles, meanwhile several police officers had gone up the towers of the bridge and were shooting with sniper rifles.

The sound of tanks moving on main roads, sonic booms of F16s and, gunfire on the streets were all mixed up. Everyone was in terror. Many deputies of both the government and the opposition were trying to survive within the parliament as F16s were dropping bombs on the compound. There also was an assassination attempt on President Erdoğan, who was at a hotel where he spent time with his grandchildren. There was an ongoing clash between the assassination team and presidential bodyguards at the hotel, while the headquarters of the National Intelligence Organization was under attack and the Chief of General Staff was being held as a hostage.

People across Turkey took to the streets and thousands in Ankara and Diyarbakır surrounded garrisons to prevent tanks from going out on the main roads. People tried to stop military vehicles and tanks using unimaginable methods.

Whatever was transpiring definitely was a strange situation. Turkey has experienced several coups; however, this time it felt different. It felt like an invasion, an attempt to colonize Turkey; this was what the majority of the people felt, at least. By dawn, the coup attempt was thwarted. There were lifeless bodies and severed limbs on the streets: the tragic stories of the deaths of hundreds of fathers and sons, siblings who stood side by side. Thousands of men, women, young and elderly were being hurried to hospitals.

Intellectuals infactuated with military juntas and assassinations

While bombs were being dropped and the screams of people reached the heavens, renowned academics in the US were tweeting about the coup attempt as if watching a sports match. For instance, Daniel Pipes wrote “He [Erdoğan] deserves to be ousted by a military coup. I hope it succeeds.”, while David Miller wrote “Erdogan was a megalomaniac ruining a great country. Who’s going to miss him?” These academics aren’t some minor figures and they weren’t the only ones writing in such a way. Hundreds of tweets just like the aforementioned ones later transformed into newspaper headlines, analyses in academic journals, and articles. Unbelievable! In the periodical Foreign Policy, Edward Luttwak criticized not the junta itself, but their failure to pull off the coup. According to Luttwak, they failed to realize the “first rule for a successful coup.” What was it? “Capturing or killing the head of the government, first and foremost”! The putschists, who wounded more than 2,000 and killed 246, have “violated the golden rule,” said Luttwak. It was crucial, as “they [the putschists] left the opportunity for Erdoğan to call the people to resist the coup”!

The world-renowned journal The Economist had the same connotation: “The sultan survives”! Similarly, an analyst of Fox News, Ralph Peters, made two obnoxious comments within a week: “Friday night’s failed coup was Turkey’s last hope to stop the Islamization of its government and the degradation of its society.” One week later, he wrote: “[…] now he [Erdoğan] has real support among half of the population, those for whom the fever of faith is the ultimate intoxicant. He polls better than Hitler did. “Mein Kampf” is no match for the Holy Koran.” For Peters, the people of Turkey sacrificing their lives to thwart the coup was not an issue. The one who should die, or deposed at least, according to Peters, was the president, and unfortunately he still alive and was standing tall. Furthermore, the situation was direr as Erdoğan’s supporters consolidated their belief in the president.

On the other hand, the Holy Quran of Muslims was being compared to Mein Kampf, which was written by the perpetrator of the largest genocide on earth. And the Quran was portrayed as a book that could surpass Mein Kampf in terms of atrociousness. This means that in the US and many parts of Europe, the direst of Islamophobic statements, and giving advice on how to violently depose a government and execute its leader is not a crime, but a component of freedom of speech!

The day after, those who believed that Erdoğan deserved the coup and should be executed advocated that Erdoğan designed the coup or at least knew of the coup with the same impunity as before. There were similar headlines published on reputable newspapers which acted in support of these allegations. The Guardian published Gülen’s statement on its website: “Turkey coup may have been ‘staged’ by Erdoğan regime”! 8 days after the coup, while people were still at hospitals or at the funerals of their loved ones, The Independent published a news piece titled “President Erdoğan’s Turkey is modelled on the Third Reich.” Later, the news outlet removed this piece from its website, probably out of shame! Michael Rubin, on the other hand, wrote an opinion on Foreign Affairs website the day of the coup which was titled “Erdogan Has Nobody to Blame for the Coup but Himself.”

Erik Jan Zürcher also wrote that even if the government hadn’t planned the coup, they were in the know and planned what to do after the coup. All of the Western media underscored that only Erdoğan was accusing Gülen and his henchmen for attempting a coup, while disregarding the statements of the main opposition party, other opposition parties, high-ranking generals and academics which were on the same page with Erdoğan. Including the most fervent enemies of Erdoğan, nobody had a doubt that the coup was ordered by Gülen; however, the Western media ignored all of these, as if there was an accord among them. Lastly, seven months after the coup attempt, the President of the German Federal Intelligence Service Bruno Kahl said “We don’t believe the coup attempt was made by Gülen” in his interview with the journal Der Spiegel. As the German intelligence is still intact, Kahl’s statement has only one meaning: “We are supporting Gülen.”

After thwarting the attempt, the government had to dismiss all members of this organization from the state, while closing down media outlets and private enterprises which supported the said organization. A state of emergency was announced for this reason and all of these were done. Then, these were deemed similar to the applications of Stalin and Hitler. However, no one drew a comparison with the time when East and West Germany were united and thousands of civil servants (who weren’t infiltrators like Gülenists) in East Germany were dismissed, even though it was a much more controversial process than the one in Turkey.

It’s not a crime to demand the head of a leader in the West!

The propaganda by the Western media which emerged with the July 15 coup attempt are continuing and getting worse by the day. Regardless of the issue, who and what kind of violent action is put against Erdoğan, the result doesn’t change. Turkey experienced this once again last week. Due to the referendum for a change in the system of government which is to take place on April 16, both the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the opposition are concerned with rallies in Turkey and abroad. There are more than 5 million Turkish citizens living in various countries of Europe. This population which has dual citizenship is able to cast their votes in Turkish elections.

Germany and the Netherlands didn’t show any kind of opposition against the Turkish parties which are advocating the no vote in the referendum during their rallies in their countries; however, this wasn’t true for AK Party. Last week, the Turkish FM’s travel permission was revoked by the Dutch government, while the minister of family and social policies was barred from entering the Turkish consulate (which is considered a territory of Turkey) in Rotterdam, later to be deported with a police escort. Moreover, they released attack dogs on people who took the streets to protest these actions and these people were also beaten by the police.

This treatment was not acceptable at any level; however, a single visual became embedded in the minds of Turks: a police dog biting the leg of a young male, while a police officer is keeping two protesters who are trying to help that person at bay with a baton. This visual was just like the ones showing torture at Abu Ghraib prison during the invasion of Iraq. After this, the main opposition party CHP demanded relations with the Netherlands to be suspended. Opposition parties and all people regardless of their opinion of Erdoğan condemned the treatment that was shown to the Turkish citizens and ministers. Meanwhile, the Blick daily in Switzerland published a Turkish headline: “Vote no against Erdoğan’s dictatorship.” Again, in Switzerland, a far-right crowd made a demonstration, probably with a permit as no police officers interfered, with ugly masks, calling the Turkish citizens to vote no in the referendum. These visuals were so abhorrent that Aykut Erdoğdu, a deputy of the main opposition party CHP, couldn’t hold himself and tweeted the following: “To whom the actions of these racist bastards in Europe are serving in the referendum?”

The target of those who carry out this abhorrent, anti-democratic and illegitimate campaign is the only politician who could garner 51.8% of the total votes in the first ballot. Anti-West sentiments increase among millions of supporters of Erdoğan and even those who oppose him. This rising hate is not because of Marinne Le Pen in France, Wilders in the Netherlands, or the neo-nazis in Germany; it is because of those who support the junta, see assassination as a legitimate method to depose an elected leader, and feign ignorance about a malicious organization which has infiltrated state institutions for 40 years!

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s two-day visit to Pakistan on November 16 is largely viewed as a fresh move to give impetus to Islamabad-Ankara bilateral ties in trade, defence, education, and other sectors. Next year will mark the 70th year of Pakistan-Turkey diplomatic ties, which Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has pledged to celebrate with “zeal and enthusiasm.”

The current trade volume between Islamabad and Ankara is recorded at around $500 million in 2014-15, with exports to Turkey recorded at $309.19 million and imports at $191.05 million, according to Pakistan’s Ministry of Commerce. In August, Pakistan and Turkey agreed to eliminate 85% of tariffs in an attempt to enhance trade, part of a larger Free Trade Agreement (FTA) under negotiation.

Ahead of Erdogan’s visit, Pakistan declined to extend the visas of 108 Turkish nationals and their families, all teachers at a network of private schools with ties to Fethullah Gulen. Turkish officials, including President Erdogan, have been calling for Islamabad to close the Gulen-linked schools for months, saying they were part of a terror organization behind the coup attempt and years of attempts at destabilization in the country, and were a threat to Pakistan as well.

“We have to be very careful with such organizations and their causing risk and threat for the security and stability of every country where they have presence,” Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said in Islamabad this August.

In his address to a joint session of Pakistan’s parliament, the third such occasion, Erdogan expressed his gratitude by saying that “I am thankful for the solidarity demonstrated by the Pakistan on this matter… And for their decisive stance against this organization.”

“It is imperative to dismantle this evil network,” Erdogan said. “The terrorist organization is a threat to the security and public order of Pakistan.”

Islamabad had already set a November 20 deadline for Pak-Turk staff to leave the country. However, Erdogan assured the students who were studying in the Pak-Turk schools would be taken care of with the highest standards, and Islamabad has said arrangements will be made to ensure the schools continue to function, but under a new administration.

http://thenewturkey.org/sino-turkish-relations-in-the-age-of-global-transformation/

Many Pakistanis have witnessed three military administrations themselves; and have praised Erdogan and the public’s success at foiling the July 15 coup. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif himself was jailed and exiled after a military coup in 1999, after a coup by the head of the military, Gen. Pervez Musharraf. Musharraf, who spent his childhood in Turkey, has repeatedly praised the Turkish military for its role in leading Turkey. Sharif returned from exile in 2007, and months of street protests by his followers and other civilian leaders forced Musharraf’s resignation within a year.

During Erdogan’s visit, Sharif told Parliament the way Turkey “defeated this illegal assault on democracy was remarkable.” In May, Sharif acted as a witness at the marriage of President Erdogan’s daughter in Istanbul, a reflection of the closeness of the two leaders, who head countries trying to emerge from a long history of military interventions.

While political leaders in Pakistan have agreed with Islamabad’s decision to deport the Pak-Turk teachers, some, like Hamid Mir, a political commentator and a senior journalist based in Islamabad, have speculated the actions may have been a product of the Sharif-Erdogan relationship, and that Islamabad and Ankara failed to make a public case for why the steps should be taken.

Support for Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

Erdogan offered support for Islamabad at a time of heightened cross border tensions in the disputed region of Kashmir, where scores of civilians have been killed since September in firing between Pakistani and Indian soldiers.

Referring to the Kashmir issue, Erdogan said the dispute of Kashmir should be resolved by Islamabad and New Delhi in line with UN resolutions and the wishes of Kashmiri people.

He stressed the need for stepped up cooperation against terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and its affiliate Daesh who he said are the agents of the war carried out against Islam.

He pledged Pakistan-Turkey ties would be deepened further through the Strategic Cooperation Council, which was established in 2009 between Ankara and Islamabad.

Since then, both the countries have signed 51 agreements and documents within the council.

Under the new arrangements between Pakistan and Turkey, 500 Pakistani students would be able to go to Turkey for PhD scholarships every year in light of a document signed between Pakistan’s Higher Education Commission and the Turkish higher education body.

Sharif lauded Turkey’s bid for Pakistan to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). “Our close relationship serves as a stability factor in the region,” Sharif said of Pakistan-Turkey cooperation.

Pakistan has already applied for the membership of the 48-member organization. Turkey has been supporting Pakistan’s membership in the NSG—the 48-member group, which regulates international nuclear commerce.

Turkey is supporting a call for a criteria-based approach for admitting non-NPT countries.

Earlier, Pakistan Army Chief General Raheel Sharif while welcoming Erdogan, said Islamabad and Ankara have brotherly relations and both countries are time-tested friends.

A statement from the Presidency stated that Erdogan agreed to the idea floated by President Mamnoon Hussain regarding a long-term bilateral defence cooperation agreement.

Islamabad and Turkey are already pursuing a number of defence collaboration projects with Anakara is helping Islamabad with the midlife upgrade of Khalid-Class Submarines and the two sides also collaborated in building a Naval Fleet Tanker.

In addition, Turkey is interested in purchasing MFI-17 Super Mushshak aircraft from Pakistan.

Expanding Economic Cooperation

Pakistan and Turkey have agreed on the elimination of 85% of tariffs, a deal that will include regulatory duties and additional duties in case of Pakistan and additional duties and mass housing fund duties in case of Turkey.

Pakistan’s exports to Turkey are likely to increase by $500million to $600 million in a short span of time. Major trade items between Pakistan and Turkey include fabrics, beverages, spirits and vinegar, plastics, chemicals and machinery.

Pakistan’s exports are concentrated in construction, transportation, other business services and government services while imports are concentrated in transportation, other business services, travel, construction, and government services.

“In the next few years, with the passage of time trade and commerce relations between the two countries will reach new heights,” said Hassan Askari Rizvi, a noted political analyst. Both the leaderships have pledged to expand trade at a time when a number of Turkish companies have been working in Pakistan, he added. ”The relationship is mutually beneficial for both Islamabad and Ankara,” Rizvi concluded.

Military recruitment was the most applicable means of infiltration. The Turkish military has different statuses for its personnel, and the status system has gone through minor changes since it was established. Statuses vary from Generals to Officers, NCOs (non-commissioned officers), specialists and mandatory service personnel. Strategic and operational positions are run by generals and officers, and these were the statuses that became the chief targets of Gülenist Terror Organization (FETO). An Officer candidate is required to attend one of the military high schools, Kuleli, Işıklar or Maltepe, at the age of 13-14.The infiltration process began before the entrance examination for military high school. Gülenists invited talented middle-school students from religiously conservative and relatively poor family backgrounds to join the Quran recitation courses, small tutoring facilities or to the houses of the Gülen order, generally run by elderly FETO cadres (known as abi in Turkish). Here, students were given basic Islamic education and met with Gülen’s interpretation of Risale-i Nur (The Message of Light), authored by Said Nursi. During the 1980s, students recruited by Gülenists were encouraged, guided and even conditioned as officers before entering military high school. The prestigious image of the military uniform was a convincing incentive for a brilliant student to become an officer, and even the parents of the students perceived the uniform to be a sign of high social status.

Early infiltration of the military was based on the self-capacity of the candidate students motivated by the FETO cadres, but FETO members under cover as secular officers in the military were able to steal the exam questions to provide the answers to future cadets during late 1980s and early 1990s.  Lt. Col. Levent Türkkan, the aide de camp to Gen. Hulusi Akar for years and involved in the coup attempt on July 15 2016, confirmed that he was supplied in advance with the military high school entrance examination questions in 1989.

Each military student and their families were subjected to an intelligence inquiry by the national intelligence service, police and the gendarmerie intelligence units. Since the FETO candidate cadets were selected from among religiously conservative families, they had no chance of surviving in the military high schools. Thus, students were advised to adapt themselves to the Kemalist discourse during school days; however, their actual devotion and loyalty was to the FETO and they continued to pay visits to the houses of Gülenists in İzmir, Bursa and Istanbul, where the military high schools are located. During these visits, students were warned not to reveal their FETO identity, ordered not to take the Risale-i Nur booklets with them to the school campus, and even asked not to pray during their time at school.

Once they had passed the first two years at the school, they rarely encountered problems in being identified as Gülen-linked students and easily graduated from military high school and became qualified to enroll in the military academies, which is the next major step to becoming an Officer. The majority of the military academy students (army, navy and air force) came from the military high schools, and some students from the civilian high schools also enrolled at the academies. A similar path was followed by FETO students from the civilian high schools, taking the university entrance exam to enroll at the military academies. However, in this case, FETO members at private tutoring centers and the OSYM (Student Selection and Placement Center) played a vital role in enabling the students to enter the military academies by educating them and even providing the exam questions.

Senior FETO officers attending the interviews gave preference to crypto-FETO students who applied to become cadets at the academies. After being accepted into the academies, the students survived in the schools by pretending to share or sometimes by advocating secularist and Kemalist ideology, and they were successful in that regard. But, at the same time, they expressed their devotion and loyalty to FETO and paid regular visits to Gülenist houses. They were told in these houses that their duty was to graduate with honors degrees, which would enable them to be potential candidates for the status of General in the future. They were motivated, educated and helped with school assignments. Even if they were unlikely to be potential candidates for General status, FETO expected to benefit from their operational positions.

Who organized the coup attempt?

The July 15 coup plotters were mainly of the rank of Brigadier General, becoming generals in 2012, 2013 and 2014, entering the military high schools in the early 1980s and the military academies during the mid-1980s. The operational-level coup officers ranged from Lt. Colonels to Captains, who entered the military high schools in the early 1990s and 2000s. The pre-military school period and the entrance process into both the military high schools and the academies were vital for FETO to infiltrate the military, and it was mainly the Officers that FETO exploited. A former military personnel, on the condition of anonymity, states, “… after-school infiltration into officer status is not a desired procedure for FETO members, since it jeopardizes the compartmentalization” (this is an unconventional warfare definition for the division of the cellular structure of a secret organization).

The second status that FETO desired to infiltrate was NCO circles. NCOs play a significant role in technical and tactical military missions. Since the strategic aspect of NCO positions is rare, FETO made no long-running efforts to infiltrate NCOs. However, FETO aimed to infiltrate the NCO schools of the gendarmerie and the air forces, where the NCOs are mostly employed. The gendarmerie is the law enforcement agency and has the closest ties with local people in Turkey. It also has a widespread operational and intelligence network, at work in every corner of Turkey, and gendarmerie operations and intelligence are dependent on NCOs. On the other hand, the air force ground service also is dependent on NCOs, and no flights can be made without ground services. These two NCO circles were targeted for infiltration by FETO. However, the biggest infiltration effort against NCO status was made with the young Sergeants in their early 20s. Their youthful energy was usurped by the Gülenists.

FETO members in the military targeted NCOs who regularly prayed as true believers of Islam and victimized them for discharge from the military to divert attentions from FETO members in the military. During the 1990s, military personnel who were discharged from the Turkish armed forces were either ordinary Muslims or belonged to other branches of the Nur Order, of which the Gülenists allegedly claimed to be a part, but not the Gülenists themselves. This was a tactic utilized by FETO to survive in the military.

A discharged NCO states that, “… in 1997, my unit and I visited a commando unit for a military training. I asked a place to pray at noon and a senior NCO of the hosting unit who was a FETO member came by and warned me that I should not pray openly, instead I should hide my way of practicing Islam. I was shocked. I was not the member of an order and I told him that I am a Muslim and I have no intention of hiding my identity. He got very pissed …”

FETO had tried not only to infiltrate the military from outside but also to “desterilized” the strategic and operational units of true soldiers. The Special Forces (SF) became a primary target of FETO, and between 2004 and 2008 hundreds of elite SF warriors were transferred from their teams into regular army units.

When the figures involved in the military are analyzed above, the infiltration target is clearly seen. FETO had an agenda to capture and hold the strategic chain of command in the Turkish armed forces. The lately promoted Generals were perceived as the main group behind the coup attempt, but the real soldiers of the state were not involved in this treason.

From a societal perspective, a constitution is a multidimensional phenomenon. According to Kenneth Wheare, a distinguished authority on constitutions, there are two main attitudes about constitutions. According to the first a constitution is primarily and almost exclusively a legal document in which there is only place for legal rules and practically for nothing else. Yet, for those who favour the second attitude a constitution is a sort of manifesto, a confession of faith, a statement of ideals, a “charter of the land”. Essentially, a constitution is the basis for the organization of a state. And in turn state institutions provide for the society the necessary mechanism to exercise political, administrative, and judicial powers in order to ensure law and order. Also, it is through this mechanism that individual rights and duties are established and the economic activities are regulated and promoted.

Although currently the Turkish case is, quite understandably, at the centre of the debates in Turkey, this country is not alone in its quest for a new constitution. Writing a constitution is an important part of many peace-making and democratic transition processes. Newly founded independent states new regimes and countries in transition to democracy that seek democratic credentials put constitution-making at the top of their list of priorities. With its long-standing democracy Turkey is still ruled by the 1982 Constitution which has been designed by military forces instead of democratic processes. The constitution was a by-product of 1980 coup d’etat and lacks the civilian and democratic spirit. The 1982 Constitution aimed to deepen the military tutelage system that has been originally established by the 1960 Constitution which was put into effect after the 1960 military coup det’at. Several amendments has been made by on the 1982 Constitution by civilian governments since it came in effect to eliminate  not only the undemocratic but also anti-democratic features of the constitution. Yet, the undemocratic spirit is so deeply ingrained in this constitution that amendments fall short of finding a definitive solution. Shortly after the time it came into force, there have always been hot debates around this constitution and demands have been voiced by diverse social groups to produce a new and civilian one carrying the spirit.

Beyond the Text: the Question of Agency 

Notwithstanding the significance of debates around the content and the wording of a constitution the question of who has the right to make a constitution is usually insufficiently addressed. Thomas Jefferson, the principle author of the American declaration of Independence, wrote in a sent letter to James Madison and dated 6 September 1789 that “no society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law. The earth belongs always to the living generation. They may manage it then, and what proceeds from it, as they please, during their usufruct.” Jefferson basically refers to the fact that not only each generation should be able to choose the laws under which it is governed, but also the power of repeal is in no way equal to the power to choose a new one. The principle of popular sovereignty and the unalienable right of the people to participate in public affairs require the promotion of popular participation in constitution-making. That is to say in democratic systems the ultimate right to participate in the making of a constitution rests with popular classes of the society.

http://thenewturkey.org/the-rise-and-fall-of-feto-in-turkish-politics/

Political elites inevitably play a major role in making decisions about how to structure a new constitution. However, there is now an established trend to build into the process broad participatory mechanisms in order to avoid a constitution that simply divides the spoils among competing factions, and to improve the chances of the new constitution enjoying a high degree of popular legitimacy. In the ever-changing world, therefore, the forms of public participation now go beyond just voting for constitutional representatives or in a referendum. Instead, they include civic education and media campaigns, public consultation (on how to manage the process as well as on the substance of the constitution), national dialogue, and other creative means. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of Turkey, expressed in a speech in last January that the constitution making process should include public participation via workshops and search conferences.

Notwithstanding the significance of debates around the content and the wording of a constitution the question of who has the right to make a constitution is usually insufficiently addressed.

Public participation is often taken to mean voting—for example, electing a constitutional convention or ratifying a constitutional text by referendum. Especially in developing nations in Africa and elsewhere, however, there are experimental attempts to place the initiative in the hands of citizens and to create an open constitutional conversation in which the public partakes in agenda-setting, content writing and ratification processes.

The methods of constitution-making have changed over time. In absolute monarchies the monarch alone enjoys the monopoly to decide for a constitution. or else, many constitutions were imposed on a vanquished or colonized people (for example, in Western imperial systems—the MacArthur constitution in Japan after World War II, and to a lesser extent in Post-War Germany and in colonies once they gained their independence). From mid- twentieth century onwards democratic processes of constitution-making became the norm in which the principal responsibility has been assigned to a parliament or to a constituent assembly. Since the last quarter of that century, the emphasis has shifted to the active and qualified popular participation—whether as individuals, social organizations, or communities.

In order to successfully repeal the 1982 Constitution and to make a new civilian and democratic one in Turkey, all democratic actors must, as a prerequisite, acknowledge  popular right to make a constitution and to partake in the entire process. Especially the political parties represented in the parliament should spend the greatest effort to ensure the popular participation in the constitution-making process and to produce a constitution that reflects the popular will and meet popular demands.