Once again, Turkey-U.S. relations are signaling of going through another turmoil. This time it is about Turkey’s purchase of S-400 air defense systems from Russia. Charlie Summers, head of the American forces in Europe and NATO’s top military officer stated, “If Turkey takes the S-400, there would be grave consequences in terms of our military relationship, and the Patriots and the F-35s.” It is yet to be known how binding or how backed this statement is given the complexities and ambiguities in the American state apparatus in recent years. Nevertheless, it is serious in its tone. The statement is not the first of its kind but is unprecedentedly tough. The statement also brings in some retaliatory measures, such as pulling out of the Patriot missiles purchase and denying the transfer of F-35 fighter jets to Turkey.

Despite this pressure from the U.S. side, Turkey seems solid in its deal over purchasing S-400s. During a TV interview last week, President Erdogan said that it was a “done deal,” “as we conclude the S-400 issue, signed a deal with the Russians, and will start co-production.” He even stated that after this deal is finalized, Turkey and Russia may work on a possible S-500 deal. Erdogan is well-known for his firm stance against pressure, whether coming from domestic or international parties. This is more than a simple choice though. This is a strategic choice that might re-shape Turkey’s overall position in international politics. Turkey is known as a loyal ally to the U.S. since the Cold War, but it seems like some factors have pushed Turkey to question this role.

Turkey’s purchase of S-400s from Russia is more than a simple choice. It’s a strategic choice that might re-shape Turkey’s overall position in international politics. 

In fact, it is quite a simple equation. Turkey has very concrete and longstanding worries with regard to its national security. Two of them are paramount. Two organizations, the PKK and FETO, have caused many casualties for the country. Yet both organizations have found safe havens under U.S. support. The U.S. hosts FETO leader Fetullah Gulen, a Turkish citizen, and has not complied with Turkey’s extradition request. Many other FETO members and FETO institutions still remain active in the U.S. Last week, First Lady Melanie Trump even visited one of the organization’s schools in Oklahoma.

The U.S. support for the PKK is even more threatening. This is because they are operating right across Turkey’s Syrian border. The U.S. is providing weapons, training, and active surveillance for the PKK’s Syrian branch, the PYD. This is the organization that sends suicide bombers into Turkey from Syria. Amongst the 11 such attacks documented prior to Turkey’s operation against the PYD in Syria, one was quite significant. In December 2016, the PYD conducted a terrorist attack in Besiktas, Istanbul, and caused 46 deaths, including 39 police officers and 7 civilians. The attack occurred right after a football game and the suicide bomber blew herself when she was noticed by the policeman surveilling for the game. The militant who carried out the suicide bomb received training and instructions in the PYD-ruled Kobani (Ayn-al Arab) and crossed the Turkish border illegally.

As the U.S. keeps pushing Turkey away, Turkey will now have to seek for alternative partnerships and alliances.

This is one of many examples where the PYD directly targeted Turkey, which later caused the Turkish government to conduct an operation against the PYD in Afrin. The only power that keeps this organization alive today in Syria is the U.S. It would be ridiculous to expect a blind loyalty from Turkey while the U.S. backs this group, which poses a serious threat to its national security. Naturally, Turkey is seeking security partnerships with other regional and global actors – the ones that do not support terrorist organizations that target Turkey.

This is the recent story of Turkey’s shift away from the U.S. As the U.S. keeps pushing Turkey away, Turkey will now have to seek for alternative partnerships and alliances. The bad news for relations between Turkey and the U.S. is that Turkey has never felt more threatened from any other power than it feels today about the U.S. support for terrorist organizations attacking Turkey. The S-400 deal might create grave consequences, but Turkey seems to be okay with this as it feels that it has no other choice. If the U.S. genuinely wants to re-build relations with Turkey, it is as simple as stopping the support provided for the PKK and FETO.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H-9qws51mlY 

U.S. President Trump has once again rocked the world agenda with his tweets. He declared that he will withdraw the American troops in Syria. The order to withdraw U.S. forces from Syria was signed shortly after. According to American news sources, the order will start the withdrawal of 2600 American servicemen in Syria; it is “expected to begin in the next several weeks and could take several weeks to finish.”

President Trump’s decision led to severe repercussions in the American state apparatus as Secretary of Defense James Mattis quit and the top U.S. envoy leading the international coalition fighting Deash, Brett McGurk resigned. General Joseph Votel of CENTCOM has also made it clear how upset they are because of this decision. All this shows that Trump took this decision not only independent of this bureaucratic apparatus and some of his own men but also against them.

For so long, the circle around Trump tried hard to persuade him that the PYD is the only partner that they can work with on the ground. Despite Turkey’s persistent calls and warnings with regard to the PYD terrorism against Turkey, the U.S. has so far walked with the PYD. But it seems like those days are over now. Turkey’s President Erdogan has persuaded Trump to leave working with the PYD in Syria in a phone call. The unexpected part was that Trump decided not only to leave the PYD but the country altogether, which was a surprise to everybody. Nobody was ready to this new situation and it will be a whole new challenge. What might happen next then?

Despite Turkey’s persistent calls and warnings with regard to the PYD terrorism against Turkey, the U.S. has so far walked with the PYD. But it seems like those days are over now.

Assuming that the U.S. will pull out, this leaves us with a territory composing more than a quarter of Syria’s land mass. This huge mass of land will attract the interests of many global, regional, and local actors. Of course, the timing and style of the American withdrawal will limit the options but in any way, the land mass is too big not to catch some interested eyes. The first thing to know about this new vacuum is that is it too big not to catch such an attention but again, it is also too big to be controlled by a single actor alone.

As for Turkey, it would prioritize to clean its immediate neighborhood from the PYD. For this reason, Turkey might start its cleaning with Manbij in the west of the Euphrates and go on along its border toward the east. But with regard to the further south toward Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, it might be quite a bit of stretch for Turkey and its local partners to control all alone. I believe Turkey will be open to negotiate with other involved powers in the control of these southern territories and in the fight against DEASH.

Assuming that the U.S. will pull out, this leaves us with a territory composing more than a quarter of Syria’s land mass. This huge mass of land will attract the interests of many global, regional, and local actors.

European powers, Iran, and Russia all have already shown or will show interest in this landmass but it seems like it will be Russia that Turkey and its local partners will have to deal with. Iran will not make a good partner in the East of the Euphrates as its involvement will also produce the need to counterbalance from Israel and Saudi Arabia, which will bring further trouble to the already suffering Syria.

European powers, on the other hand, are too weak on the ground to have a say in the bargain. This leaves Russia as the most prominent actor in the future of the area for Turkey. This is not too bad for Turkey given the coordination level the two countries reached in Syria is impressive. The Astana process did not resolve the Syria case so far but achieved to prevent the war to escalate. The two countries share this goal of ending the war and further to keep the territorial integrity of Syria intact.

Hence, it is not too hard to imagine that Turkey and Russia can cut a deal for the east of the Euphrates as well. Further, if the U.S., one way or another, wants to dictate the terms of filling in the vacuum it will leave, Turkey again can play its hand to find a middle ground with the U.S. It seems like Turkey has learnt how not to lose the diplomacy game with great powers in the Syria theatre.

The disagreement over the control and status of the Syrian town of Manbij has been a symbol of the strategic differences between the U.S. and Turkey’s Syria policies for a while now. Turkey’s successful military operation in Afrin led to the announcement of a roadmap over Manbij, which relatively calmed down U.S.-Turkey tensions. However, the U.S. continued to support the PKK-affiliated YPG forces in a stated mission to deny a return to Daesh in northern Syria.

With Daesh no longer holding territory, this mission did not appear to provide convincing rationale for a prolonged American presence on the ground. More recently, the U.S. ended its ambiguity by announcing an open-ended presence in Syria declaring a mission to limit Iranian influence in Syria as part of a broader strategy to confront Iran in the region.

With this critical shift in strategy, the U.S. commitment to northern Syria seems to be set in motion for the long term. One of the first concrete outcomes of this change appears to be the administration’s stern warnings against a regime operation against Idlib, which would have caused yet another humanitarian catastrophe.

Turkey sent reinforcements to its observation posts in and around Idlib to prevent the regime from an easy takeover while lobbying Russia to prevent such an operation. The U.S. rhetoric against the looming operation may have helped Turkey’s case, convincing Russia to hold off at least for a period of time in return for the Turkish promise to push terror groups out of Idlib.

Another consequence of the U.S. policy change seems to be the announcement that the PYD would no longer negotiate with the Assad regime. This step seems to be aimed at softening the Turkish argument that the U.S. should not trust the PYD, which would work with the Assad regime, Iran or Russia depending on its needs. This argument still holds true despite the PYD’s obvious tactic to appease its American supporters, who are clearly concerned about the degree to which the regime is supported by Iranians.

The PYD has played a critical role in the PKK’s regional ambitions by opening the door for legitimacy in the international arena despite Turkey’s warnings. Turkey has been able to limit the PYD’s forays into the western side of the Euphrates but the area it continues to control remains a major concern for Turkey.

The U.S. policymakers in charge of the Syria policy would like to see Turkey enlisted on their side in their push back against Iran in the region and they must see an interest in alleviating at least some of the Turkish concerns. This kind of willingness to work with Turkey and the most recent announcement of joint Turkish-American patrols around Manbij can help rebuild confidence between the two NATO allies.

Nevertheless, we should be clear-eyed about the reality on the ground of the U.S. support for the PYD, which is considered by Turkey as a direct security threat. This will continue to be the Achilles’ heel in the U.S.-Turkey bilateral relationship. The PKK understands this and will seek to exploit it for its interests.

Turkey feels more confident after its Afrin operation, the Manbij agreement with the U.S., and the successful diplomatic effort to prevent the Assad regime from launching a major military assault against Idlib, supported at least rhetorically by Washington. These are strong signs for a renewed dynamic that takes into consideration Turkey’s interests and concerns. But once again, American support for the YPG continues to be the underlying fundamental strategic divergence between the two allies, with significant potential to undermine any positive momentum.

The U.S.-Turkey relationship is faced with yet another crisis, this time over the Brunson case. Crises are increasingly becoming the rule rather than the exception largely because of the underlying strategic dissonance between the two NATO allies. The U.S. and Turkey continue to fundamentally diverge over the PYD’s position in northern Syria, the Turkish purchase of the Russian S-400s, and arms transfers. The legal cases such as the Gulen extradition, the Halkbank case, and the Brunson case further deepen the existing discord. Added to this picture, the Trump administration’s domestic political troubles are pushing the relationship to the brink.

In the latest episode, Vice President Pence’s need to satisfy the demands of his evangelical constituency ahead of the November elections seems to override the need to engage Turkey rather than punish it. Pence’s harsh rhetoric was matched by President Trump’s social media message on the matter, which was clearly coordinated. As with many other foreign policy issues, President Trump used harsh rhetoric despite the welcome progress underlined by high level administration officials such as the Secretary of State Pompeo just days earlier. There is a chance diplomatic channels may produce a result acceptable to both sides on the Brunson case, but the ultimatum-like rhetoric used against Turkey would only make it harder to arrive at a political understanding, if any.

The ongoing efforts in the U.S. Congress to block the transfer of F-35s to Turkey indicates the detrimental effect of domestic political calculations on foreign policy. Congress has asked the Pentagon to provide a report evaluating the implications of Turkey’s potential purchase of Russian S-400s. Lawmakers cited the Brunson case to justify this move but the potential blockade of the transfer of the planes would hurt the very strategic partnership that the F-35 project is supposed to strengthen. President Erdogan has already pointed to international arbitration in case of such a move, which would only cause delays in the program and further damage the U.S.-Turkey security partnership.

The U.S.-Turkey relationship certainly has the capacity to overcome this latest crisis but a lot more effort is required to put it on the right track. Both sides had been avoiding public statements that would damage the ongoing working groups for a while now. But the most recent spat shows that domestic political considerations can be spoilers and it is crucially important to prevent such mishaps. The Turkish public continues to be deeply distrustful of the U.S. and the American public opinion is shaped by negative media coverage as well. Turkish politicians have made a serious effort to work with the Trump administration on all problem areas through various proposals and mechanisms to resolve problems but it is clear they will not respond well to sanction threats. The U.S. leaders need to give time and space to diplomatic channels instead of issuing counterproductive threats.

President Trump’s style of raising the stakes in order to secure a deal that benefits the U.S. seems to be at work here. However, raising the stakes based on domestic political calculations and adopting a maximalist approach cannot provide solutions in an already troubled relationship. The U.S. support for the PYD was already a move that was unilateral in its approach despite assurances provided to Turkey. Now, if the Trump administration goes down the road of unilateralism seeking to force Turkey’s hand, the relationship will only suffer damaging the national interest of both allies. The U.S.-Turkey relationship can hopefully overcome this latest crisis but we will almost certainly see more crises in the future given the instability and unpredictability in the region as well as the increasing insecurity and distrust among NATO allies.

The U.S.-Turkey relationship has always been subject to ups and downs, including the Cold War years. This was one of the themes covered in a conference on the legacy of the July 15 coup attempt organized by SETA DC. The current state of U.S.-Turkey relations is certainly less than ideal, to say the least, but the good news is that both sides are talking to each other. The laundry list of disagreements includes their diverging views on the PYD and FETO, which continue to derail the relationship. After the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and the Trump administration’s decision to impose sanctions on Iran with a November deadline, we can now add Iran to the list.

On the upside, the most recent Manbij agreement could help bridge the gap between the two sides on the PYD issue. The news of investigations launched against FETO may calm, albeit to a limited extent, the Turkish concerns that Gulenists continue to operate freely in the U.S. against Turkey. On Iran, the most recent U.S. officials’ visit to Turkey might help avoid yet another confrontation between the U.S. and Turkey, similar to the one back in 2010 when Turkey voted against imposing sanctions on Iran as one of the non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. However, the most recent Congressional proposal that threatens Turkey’s access to some global financial institutions has put extra strains on the relationship.

In the above-mentioned conference, one overarching approach was that the U.S. and Turkey will be able to work through their disagreements as they have in the past. I subscribed to this idea as well but it does not mean that it will be easy. Turkey, as many other countries, has always found it easier to deal with the Executive branch rather than Congress since certain anti-Turkey lobbying groups have a strong influence on the Hill. The absence of a sufficiently large politically active pro-Turkey Turkish constituency in the U.S. has often been a disadvantage for Turkey’s views to be heard on the Hill. In the current situation, Congressional action driven particularly by the Brunson case is creating risks for the health of the ongoing U.S.-Turkey conversations over a variety of problem areas.

President Erdogan and President Trump seem to get along well and that could be a plus for the relationship. However, we cannot overlook the longstanding disputes coupled with a continuing strategic divergence over the PYD issue, which Turkey considers a national security threat. The Manbij agreement certainly helped to come to a common understanding on the northern Syrian city but it remains uncertain if it can be extended to the areas east of the Euphrates. Furthermore, it is a concern for Turkey that the PYD is seeking to cut a deal with the Assad regime to hedge its bets if the U.S. pulls out eventually. The U.S. has not articulated a clear policy on the PYD or about what it seeks to accomplish in northern Syria in the post-Daesh period.

The Trump administration continues to deal with domestic political problems ahead of the November elections. Much of the administration’s foreign policy approach has been about disruption and policy reversals rather than comprehensive strategies. The most consequential policy change for Turkey’s regional strategy might be the Trump administration’s policy reversal toward Iran, which is currently focused on imposing sanctions and isolating the country.

The U.S.’ relationship with Turkey continues to lack a solid policy framework although it benefits from established institutional ties and more robust engagement recently. The new Iran strategy may spell trouble for the relationship if the U.S. ignores Turkey’s concerns. In the absence of a broad framework for the bilateral relationship, we may end up experiencing a rehash of the 2010 disagreement over Iran, which may undermine limited progress in other areas.

The U.S. and Turkey can and most likely will work through specific policy issues but the current uncertainties can certainly destabilize the relationship once again. Both sides have a strong interest in avoiding such a scenario and deepening the strategic conversation will be ever more important to overcome potential spoilers.

Turkey is in the midst of a ground operation in Iraq. The operation aims to clear the entire area under PKK control in Iraq and remove the PKK headquarters from the Qandil region, which is about 100 km away from the Turkish border. There were already limited operations and ongoing air bombardments of the PKK targets taking place after the PKK ended the ceasefire in the summer of 2015. Nevertheless, according to local sources, the operations took a new phase on March 11th of this year.

Accordingly, Turkish forces landed on the top of the mountains (i.e., Şapan, Dilan, Kewet, Bene, Çiyasor, Alekan ve Çiyaneya) in Sidekan/Bradost in Soran district of North Erbil. Then, eleven military bases were installed in the area. Next, the installed bases were connected to each other with the clean & sweep operations of Turkish ground forces and newly built roads between the bases. We see a close synchronization of the Turkish air and ground forces in time, space and purpose for the clean & sweep operations.

As a result of this joint operation, 155 PKK members were neutralized in the region since March 11. The 23 km long border was cleaned of the PKK threat and a total 400 km square is cleaned of the PKK. As a result of this operation, Turkey formed two pockets of PKK-free areas in Iraq across its border, one across Çukurca in the west and one across Şemdinli in the east. The eastern pocked has become a corridor heading towards Qandil and is currently as close as 24 km to the PKK headquarters.

Since March of this year 155 PKK members were neutralized in the region. The 23 km long border was cleaned of the PKK threat and a total 400 km square is cleaned of the PKK.

Turkey seems to be committed to end PKK terrorism for once and for all. After the PKK ended the ceasefire by murdering four Turkish security personnel in three different occasions from July 20 to 23, 2015, Turkey started its counter-terrorism operations. In response, the PKK increased its terror attacks including suicide bombers in bus stops, stadiums, etc. and started its so-called “rural-based urban war” in 22 centers across six cities in southeastern Turkey.

Once Turkey cleaned these residential areas from the PKK, the country seems to be committed to end the PKK in its strongholds outside Turkey. The PKK has no safe havens in Turkey, not a single “liberated” village, but is freely recruiting, training, sheltering, and even ruling vast areas in Syria and Iraq. Afrin was the first place where the PKK/PYD was cleaned off, the PKK leader Ocalan’s posters were taken down from Afrin city, and school textbooks with references to Ocalan are no longer being taught to school kids in Afrin.

Given that Qandil is 100 km away from the Turkish border, it required diplomatic negotiations with the Iraqi central government.

Following Afrin, Turkey also pressured for Sinjar in Iraq and Manbij in Syria to be cleared of the PKK. Sinjar and Manbij are still matters of diplomatic encounters between Turkey, the U.S. and Iraq. Nevertheless, unlike Manbij in Syria, the PKK is not under the security umbrella of patron states in northeast Iraq. In fact, the organization does not even allow the Kurdistan Regional Government forces to the areas under its control. Yet, given that Qandil is 100 km away from the Turkish border, it required diplomatic negotiations with the Iraqi central government.

If Iraq will be cleared of the PKK altogether, it will have to receive the support of Iraq or even Iran, which otherwise might be a retreat or even a logistical support zone. Hence, Turkey’s offensive in Iraq will require its neighbors’ cooperation. And only after such a tripartite cooperation of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, can the PKK finally be cleaned off from Qandil. As for defeating the PKK in Syria, Turkey will have to work with the U.S. and will have to find a way to persuade the U.S. to stop its support to the PKK’s consolidation in Syria.

The outlawed PKK’s Syrian offshoot Democratic Union Party (PYD) has been forcibly recruiting children similar to the PKK, which has been systematically using children in armed conflicts since 1994. It is not possible to learn the exact number of children recruited by the group. However, after the death of Latife Kaya in 2016, who was notorious for recruiting girls traveling alone around the checkpoints in Qamishli region by either convincing them or forcibly bringing them to the PYD’s training camps, it was revealed that Kaya and her friends recruited more than 500 girls through this way. Meanwhile, it has been observed that the situation caused by the group’s recruitment policy particularly in the regions they capture is even graver.

The group’s recruitment of children is known from a variety of sources including the victim testimonials covered by the media, videos of the group militants uploaded on YouTube, U.S. CENTCOM’s tweets informing that the PYD and its child soldiers were ready for war, and fashion magazine Marie Claire’s article titled “These Remarkable Women Are Fighting ISIS. It’s Time You Know Who They Are.” Some of these publications represent the children fighting in the deployments of the PYD as the subjects of a liberation war when child recruitment is in fact a serious war crime that cannot be justified with any excuse.

A number of verdicts issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC), which was established with the Rome Statute, led to the conviction of the leaders of two terror organizations on the grounds of forcibly conscripting child soldiers. An arrest warrant was issued for Bosco Ntaganda while the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) leader Thomas Lubanga Dylio was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment. Furthermore, the regulations ban the involvement of children in any act linked to terror organizations along with the deployment of children in armed conflicts, which entails the risk of death or injury.

The 2007 Paris Principles, which is the most comprehensive regulation on the subject, defines “a child associated with an armed force or armed group” as any person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual purposes.

In the framework of the ban, there is no difference between the voluntary and involuntary recruitment of children in an armed group. In both cases, the will of children cannot be regarded as consent in legal terms. The protection of the child requires annulling the child’s will to his/her own detriment. Also, the consent given to an unlawful activity is already invalid.

Aside from the legal aspect of the subject, assuming the voluntary participation of children into an armed group implies that they can also voluntarily depart the group, which is hardly the case for terror groups. In an interview published in the website of Kurd Watch, Nurman Ibrahim Khalifa, who was abducted and conscripted by the PYD in 2014 as he was 13 years old, stated that a great number of children kept at the Iraqi Kurdistan camps were severely punished due to their attempts to escape, adding that a woman who was recruited as a child was killed before the eyes of people and her body was thrown into a lake after she was caught in her eighth attempt to escape when she was 18.

A great number of children kept at the Iraqi Kurdistan camps were severely punished due to their attempts to escape, adding that a woman who was recruited as a child was killed before the eyes of people

In 2013, when the organization’s child recruitment stirred reaction from the international public, the PYD signed the “Deed of Commitment for the Protection of Children from the Effects of Armed Conflict” in Qandil with an NGO named Geneva Call, guaranteeing that they would not conscript child soldiers under the age of 18. However, it was unraveled that the organization still continued using children after signing this contract except from a small-scale demobilization following the signing, and broke into houses and abducted children by clashing with their families when they needed more militants. Although the organization ran propaganda to the international public that this situation was an exception, the statements of the victims, the propaganda and actions of the group, and the fact that the group has members in charge of recruiting and training children demonstrate that using children in armed conflicts is a systematic practice for the organization.

As the recruitment cases are examined, it is seen that the organization increases its forcible recruitment activities when they have growing need for militants and goes beyond the limits of their self-proclaimed commitments during such times. For instance, the organization ruled that they would recruit people aged between 18 and 30 in Jazira, but in their practices in Manbij during 2016, a conscription was ruled for persons aged between 16 and 35. Also, in their actions in Afrin shaped through Turkey’s operation in the region, the group increased its forcible recruitment of children out of panic.

A Syrian man who took refuge in Turkey said that after the capture of Raqqa by the PYD, the group forcibly recruited girls from houses with no men, demanded $20.000 from the families not allowing that, and they silently had to watch their daughter taken from them

At this point, the accounts of the children who escaped from the group and the people who left their hometowns are of utmost significance as they portray first-hand experiences and testimonials. In an interview he gave to the press, a Syrian man who took refuge in Turkey said that after the capture of Raqqa by the PYD, the group forcibly recruited girls from houses with no men, demanded $20.000 from the families not allowing that, and they silently had to watch their daughter taken from them since they were unable to pay the money demanded. The Syrian refugee also relayed that his 65-year-old uncle who tried to prevent the abduction of his two daughters was wounded by the group militants with a gun stroke. Upon this, the two families met in the midnight of the same day and took refuge in Turkey.

In another news report published on February 11, 2018, a boy aged around 12-14 stated that the PYD’s armed wing People’s Protection Units (YPG) forcibly gave military training to a group of children including him, and he fled after 12 days, adding that everyone he saw in the camp was forcibly recruited. Another boy around the same age also said that the YPG militants raided into their house to take him. His father fought the militants but could not stop them. According to the account of another boy, he was abducted and brought to a conflict zone by the group militants when he refused to join them.

Besides, the propaganda videos uploaded on the organization’s YouTube channels, such as YPG Press Office, feature a great deal of footage displaying child warriors. These videos try to create the impression that the children joined the PYD with motivations like fighting against Daesh, the liberation of the Kurdish people and freedom of women. In doing so, the organization strives to whitewash its policy based on systematic child rights abuse by making use of generally-accepted notions. The Western supporters of this policy also release material contributing to the group propaganda. In a video titled “Her War: Women vs. ISIS,” which was uploaded on RT America’s YouTube channel, a 16-year-old girl expresses that her participation in the group’s armed units is an honor to her family, adding that she does not go to school since women’s liberation is more important than going to school.

The organization also has members responsible for conscripting and training children. Beritan Sela, who is featured in the videos titled “Women Against Daesh” on the YouTube channel of BBC News, states that they are training the youth aged between 17 and 18. The videos shared on RT America’s YouTube channel also features a member of the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), whose code name is Tolheldan, while engaging in the training of girls in the Sehit Berivan training camp. Some militants also endeavor to gather children by going from house to house. In another incident reported by the NSO’s website, a man named Natheer Mostafa was arrested by the YPG as he tried to protect his children from the organization. NSO also reported that a YPG member called Qaraso used to visit Mostafa’s house when Natheer Mostafa and his wife were outside and tried to convince their daughters to join the YPJ, the female equivalent of the YPG.

All the sources and data on the subject indicate that the PYD, which endeavors to idealize its armed conflict in the guise of fighting a liberation war, systematically engages in child recruitment, which is mainly due to the obstacles the organization faces in mobilizing militants while proving that the PYD’s ideology does not address the masses in the region. The organization’s discourse is purportedly based on generally-accepted values, but this does not mean that they embrace these values as they claim to do and does not render the conflicts involving children ethical. Aside from the PYD, states and media outlets giving overt or covert support to child recruitment are also responsible for the risks children will undergo in conflicts and the challenges they will encounter in their education and rehabilitation processes following the conflicts.

The PKK’s Syrian branch, the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD) has been elevated to the status of a major political actor just across the Turkish border. The organization had remained a low level one since its formation in 2003 by the PKK until the Syrian Civil War, which began in 2011. Its rise and spread has paralleled the rise and spread of the war in Syria with a short lag. The PYD developed a tacit mutual understanding with the Syrian regime forces and despite sporadical small scale clashes between them, the two parties tolerated each other as they prepared for a military encounter with the rebel forces. The growth of Daesh in Syria threatened both sides but it also created an opportunity for the illicit partnership of the regime and the PYD. As Daesh grew stronger in Syria, it militarily suppressed other rebel forces and became a “useful” enemy for both the regime and the PYD, as they depicted themselves as the only alternative to a future Syria ruled by Daesh brutality. Eventually Daesh was defeated and lost its strongholds on many fronts against Russia and Iran-backed regime forces, Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army and the U.S.-backed PYD.

While the PYD first expanded its territory with the withdrawal of regime forces starting from 2012, it gained further pockets of land with the erosion of Daesh control. As Daesh was losing ground, the PYD exponentially increased the amount of territory under its control. The organization happened to rule hundreds of thousands in four self-declared cantons: Cizire (Jazira or Al-Haseke), Euphrates (formerly Kobani or Ain al-Arab), Shahba (which is only partly under the PYD control) and Afrin. As Daesh lost its self-declared capital to the U.S.-backed YPG forces with interesting twists, now major cities and districts such as Raqqa, Manbij, Haseke, Kobani, Qamisli, Afrin, Tel Abyad, Tel Rifaat, are all fully or partially under the control of the PYD. Nevertheless, such a speedy expansion in land and resources was not a smooth process – it not only relied on U.S. military and diplomatic support but also on U.S. toleration of vast human rights violations, including ethnic cleansing via forced mass displacements.

In the summer of 2015, 15 Syrian rebel groups accused the PYD of deliberately displacing thousands of Arabs and Turkmens. A year later the Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported serious human rights abuses committed by the PYD, including torture in custody, which in some cases led to the death of the detained. Considering the fact that the HRW could only visit a limited area (only Jazira canton for the aforementioned report) due to security concerns, it begs further questions for areas where the PYD’s rule was and still is more contested and more controversial.

In an earlier account, the British daily newspaper, the Times, reported that “thousands of civilians have fled their homes in northern Syria as Kurdish forces carry out what appears to be a campaign of ethnic cleansing against Sunni Arabs.” The report refers to the PYD as “Kurdish forces” and this is problematic as the organization also has a reputation for suppressing any Kurdish organization that falls apart from the PKK’s pre-determined lines. The formerly mentioned HRW report indicated that not only non-Kurds but that Kurdish opposition members have also been “convicted in apparently unfair trials” by the PYD. This is no surprise to observers who already know that the PYD left no political network other than its own by targeting Iraq’s Kurdistan Democratic Party affiliates (i.e., the Kurdish National Council, KNC) in Syria.

The cases of vast human rights abuses committed by the PYD, specifically forced displacements, are not limited with the findings of HRW. In its report ‘US ally’s razing of villages amounts to war crimes,’ Amnesty International stated that by deliberately demolishing civilian homes, in some cases razing and burning entire villages, displacing their inhabitants with no justifiable military grounds, the Autonomous Administration [the PYD] is abusing its authority and brazenly flouting international humanitarian law, in attacks that amount to war crimes.” In order to reach this conclusion, Amnesty International did not only talk to locals but also used satellite images to see the full scale of the demolition, which showed almost entirely demolished villages.

As people escape from the brutality of war in order to keep their beloved ones in a safe distance, the incoming groups that fill the vacuum usually take advantage of such situations. As Syria Direct reported based on the statements of “Kurdish activists, residents and a police officer from Qamishli in northern Al-Hasakah,” according to the conscription regulations of the PYD, “real estate and other property belonging to residents who have fled the canton will be held by self-administration authorities, with any income, such as rent, generated by the holdings going to “develop the society.”” The same report, based on witness accounts, highlights the pattern of confiscation even for those who have not fled yet. As expressed by a witness, “At first, [the PYD’s Asayish branch] offered to rent the residence, but we refused,” then “they asked to buy it” but when the owners refused again, “The third time, they confiscated our [the owners’] apartment.” It is unfortunate that UN reports under-stress such immense human rights abuses by simply describing them as “some reports alleging forced displacements” and rationalizing the implementations that “reportedly looted houses belonging to Arab villagers” with references to the war conditions.

The PYD, under U.S. military and diplomatic protection, has committed vast human rights violations ranging from arming children to training them in terror camps. As of today, the entire PYD-controlled areas are full of PKK leader Ocalan’s posters along with dead suicide bombers who are called “heroes.” It is unfortunate that the PYD is cheered within international circles for its alleged “liberal values,” while in fact its school books are full of the jailed leader of an internationally recognized terrorist organization (see link for a sample textbook and witness accounts). It is also unfortunate that the very same totalitarian structure is celebrated for holding elections, which do not allow opposition parties to compete by torturing their members or arresting its leader. Despite the given double standards to the unconditional U.S. support for the PYD, and despite the politically guided one-sided media coverage of it, some reports could come out to show what lies beneath the mask. Nevertheless, these reports and accounts are just a drop in the bucket and more effort is needed to grasp the real reign on terror in northern Syria, not only for the displaced non-Kurdish people, but also, and especially, for Kurdish residents being forcefully conscribed to the ranks of the organization in their childhood.

According to information gathered by an Anadolu Agency correspondent in the area, some movement was seen at the 10th Tanker Base Command of Incirlik Base as part of the ongoing ‘Operation Olive Branch’.

While some Turkish fighter jets took off from the base, others remained on alert. Meanwhile, military cargo planes kept arriving and leaving the base.

Turkish ground forces have started to move into Syria’s Afrin with Free Syrian Army, Turkish General Staff said earlier on Sunday.

The operation — aimed at eliminating PYD/PKK and Daesh elements from Syria’s Afrin — was launched at 5 p.m. (GMT1400) on Saturday. It was being carried out under the framework of Turkey’s rights based on international law, UN Security Council’s decisions, self-defense rights under the UN charter and respect to Syria’s territorial integrity, the military added.

Afrin has been a major hideout for the PYD/PKK since July 2012 when the Assad regime in Syria left the city to the terror group without putting up a fight.

The Turkish cities of Kilis and Hatay across the Syrian border are within the firing range of the PYD/PKK group from Afrin, which sits atop a hill. The terror group has also used Amanos Mountains to penetrate from Syria into Turkey.

The PYD/PKK depends on Afrin to connect to the Mediterranean from northwestern Syria.

The terrorist organization has also threatened the gains made from Operations Euphrates Shield and Idlib de-escalation zone over Afrin.

A quarter of Syria land and 65 percent of Turkey-Syria border are currently under occupation of the terrorist organization.

Operation Euphrates Shield began in August 2016 and ended in late March 2017 to improve security, support coalition forces and eliminate the terror threat along the Turkish border.

Source: AA

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan addresses a massive crowd in western city of Bursa before ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party’s Women Branch congress on January 21, 2018.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Sunday afternoon said the ongoing Operation Olive Branch in Syria’s Afrin will be completed “in very short time”.

Erdogan said “hopefully, we will complete this operation in a very short time.”

The operation, aimed at eliminating PYD/PKK and Daesh elements from Syria’s Afrin, was launched at 5 p.m. (GMT1400) on Saturday. It was being carried out under the framework of Turkey’s rights based on international law, UN Security Council’s decisions, self-defense rights under the UN charter and respect to Syria’s territorial integrity, according to the military.

Afrin has been a major hideout for the PYD/PKK since July 2012 when the Assad regime in Syria left the city to the terror group without putting up a fight.

The Turkish cities of Kilis and Hatay across the Syrian border are within the firing range of the PYD/PKK group from Afrin, which sits atop a hill. The terror group has also used Amanos Mountains to penetrate from Syria into Turkey.

The PYD/PKK depends on Afrin to connect to the Mediterranean from northwestern Syria. The terrorist organization has also threatened the gains made from Operations Euphrates Shield and Idlib de-escalation zone over Afrin. A quarter of Syria land and 65 percent of Turkey-Syria border are currently under occupation of the terrorist organization.

Operation Euphrates Shield began in August 2016 and ended in late March 2017 to improve security, support coalition forces and eliminate the terror threat along the Turkish border.

Source: AA

Main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) Deputy Chair Bulent Tezcan on Sunday said his party completely backs the ongoing operation in Syria’s Afrin.

Speaking at a news conference at the CHP headquarters in capital Ankara, Tezcan said: “Our glorious army has taken an important action in Afrin. We give our full support to this operation. We wish that this operation achieves success and reaches its goal as soon as possible.

We hope Turkish Armed Forces will reach its target without any injury or loss and return home safely. May God help our army and our soldiers. At the end of this process, the most important thing to remember is that territorial integrity and sovereignty of Syria is ensured.”

Turkey on Saturday launched Operation Olive Branch to remove PYD/PKK and Daesh terrorists from Syria’s Afrin.

The Turkish General Staff has said the operation was aimed at establishing security and stability along Turkish borders and the region as well as eliminating PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG and Daesh terror groups, and protecting the Syrian people from the oppression and cruelty of terrorists.

The operation was being carried out under the framework of Turkey’s rights based on international law, UN Security Council’s decisions, self-defense rights under the UN charter and respect to Syria’s territorial integrity, the military added.

It also said only terrorist targets were being destroyed and “utmost importance” was being given to not harm any civilian.

Afrin has been a major hideout for the PYD/PKK since July 2012 when the Assad regime in Syria left the city to the terror group without putting up a fight.

The Turkish cities of Kilis and Hatay across the Syrian border are within the firing range of the PYD/PKK group from Afrin, which sits atop a hill. The terror group has also used Amanos Mountains to penetrate from Syria into Turkey.

The PYD/PKK depends on Afrin to connect to the Mediterranean from northwestern Syria.

The terrorist organization has also threatened gains made from Operations Euphrates Shield and Idlib de-escalation zone over Afrin.

A quarter of Syria’s lands and 65 percent of Turkey-Syria border are currently under occupation of the terrorist organization.

Source: AA

Turkey has not stopped forcing its demands on the US. Ahead of his visit to the UK, Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirm said on Sunday that the US must “immediately” stop supporting the PKK/PYD terrorist group. Yildirim recalled the US President Donald Trump’s pledge to stop providing weapons to the terrorist group that has complicated security issues for Turkey.

“Since the very beginning, we have said that it is wrong for the US to partner with PKK’s cousin PYD/YPG in the fight against Daesh terrorist group,” he said.

Insisting that the US must return to its “real allies,” Yirdirm said, “Our friend and ally [US] told us every time that it was not an option rather an obligation. Since Daesh is now eliminated then this obligation has disappeared.”

Of late the US began to support the PYD in the Syrian war, claiming to defeat Daesh, but Turkey expressed grave concerns against the move. For Turkey, which is bearing the brunt of many aspects of the Syrian war, including hosting nearly three million refugees, fending off terrorist attacks from Daesh, PKK and FETO, the PYD as a sister wing of the PKK is just another terrorist group bent to fight against the Turkish state. Turkey is yet to come out of its decades-old fight against the PKK, and thus the creation and support for the PYD is supposed to be a great security threat for the country.

On his two-day visit to the UK, Yildirim is expected to discuss different matters regarding Syria and Iraq with his UK counterpart. He will also be meeting members of the business community and media representatives during his visit. The meeting is significant as it takes place in the aftermath of the Sochi congress held last week.

Meanwhile, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu also slammed the US for supplying arms to the PKK/PYD terrorist organization. He reminded the US president on Saturday to keep his promise regarding the issue.

“It is Turkey’s natural right to expect Trump to stick to his word not to give the PKK/PYD terror group weapons anymore,” Cavusoglu told reporters in Antalya.

On Friday, according to Cavusoglu, Trump called his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan on phone and promised that “weapons will not be given to the YPG anymore and said that essentially this nonsense should have been ended before.”

Turkey will not tolerate terrorism

In a synchronized statement Turkish National Defense Minister Nurettin Canikli said on Sunday that Turkey will never tolerate terrorist threats. During the meeting of defense ministers of the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC) in Saudi capital Riyadh, he asserted that Turkey will take all the necessary measures against the PKK/PYD/YPG terrorist group.

*Written by Waseem Ahad. 

For the Syrian Kurds, the YPG is not just an organization that fights Daesh in Syria as claimed by the US, nor it is just a threat for Turkey as security analysts and Turkish military and government agencies had been warning. As a military wing of the PKK/PYD terror group, it is potentially a threat to every community, including the one it claims to represent – the Kurds.

This was revealed by the Turkish foreign minister Mevlut Cavusoglu on Thursday. He said that the YPG was preventing Syrian Kurds from returning home, a step that could be part of its dubious objectives that the terror group is perusing through support from major external powers led by the US.

The minister said the YPG was controlling 20 percent of the Syrian territory in north. “In Turkey we have 300,000 Syrian Kurds. Not even one of them is able to go back to this area. The YPG confiscated their properties, houses, all official certificates. No archives. Everything is burned. Their land and houses are taken, they cannot go back,” he added.

Cavusoglu made the statement while speaking at a conference in Rome. Referring to the Euphrates Shield Operation launched by the Free Syrian Army – with the support of the Turkish military – he said they were able to clear 2,000 square kilometers of land along the Turkish-Syrian border of terrorist elements.

Turkey shares a large border with Syria and is the only country which has been affected by the international proxy war directly. Although the PKK waged war against the Turkish state in 1984, resulting in the death of thousands and destruction of billions of dollars, Syrian war has emboldened terror groups and its sister wings like YPG and PYD in order to destabilize Turkey. In response, the Turkish government has mobilized all its forces, including military and political to prevent Daesh, the PKK and YPG encroach into its territory.

*Written by Waseem Ahad. 

In what could amount to confirmation of Turkish apprehensions, PKK/PYD terrorists on Monday attacked Turkish armed forces’ observation point in Idlib.

Turkish security officials reported that their observation point was attacked with five howitzers and one of them landed as close as 100 meters to the point while as others landed in civilian areas.

Turkish armed forces have established the observation points in Idlib to monitor the cease-fire regime as part of their mission in Syria’s northwestern city’s de-escalation zone. The mission began on October 12 when the Turkish military began to cross into the region.

Idlib is one of the cities that faced devastating attacks from the Assad regime since the war broke out in 2011. The Assad regime lost control of the city in March 2015 to opposition groups and armed organizations.

PYD and the armed wing YPG are sister organizations of the PKK, which for over 30 years has been at war with Turkey. PKK, considered as terrorist organization by Turkey, EU and the US is responsible for a number of terrorist attacks in the country death of thousands since they began their armed campaign against Turkey in 1984.

PYD/YPG are lately thriving on the support they have been receiving from the US. Turkey has long been complaining against this support insisting that it could encourage the groups and become a security headache for the country, which is already facing threats from many sides.

*Written by Waseem Ahad. 

Ahead of the Syria conference to be held in Russia’s Sochi city Turkish, Russian and Iranian foreign ministers met on Sunday in Turkey’s Mediterranean city of Antalya.

According to the reports that emerged from the Turkish foreign ministry, the purpose of Sunday’s meeting of the three foreign ministers, Mevlut Cavusoglu (Turkey) Sergey Lavrov (Russia) and Javad Zarif (Iran) was to discuss a range of topics that may come up during the Sochi conference. The reports indicated that the purpose of the summit was to evaluate the steps that the three guarantor countries Turkey, Iran and Russia took in the past with regard to Syria and steps that needed to be taken in the future.

The meeting is significant amid the reports that Russia was also going to invite PYD to participate in the conference – which is intolerable for Turkey. The move to invite PYD seemed an unnecessary hitch that has the potential to trouble the warming relations between Turkey and Russia. Cavusoglu stated that the participation of the terrorist group in the Syrian National Dialogue Congress would be unacceptable for Turkey. “Our sensitivity about PYD/YPG is obvious,” he added.

While describing aims and benefits of ongoing cooperation among Turkey, Iran and Russia, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said, “With the Astana process, we have come a long way with Russia, especially in terms of the establishment of peace on the field and forming de-escalation zones. The situation on the field is much better compared to last year,” Cavusoglu said.

Ever since the cease-fire was brokered in December 2016 by Turkey, Iran and Russia, which led to the talks in Astana, Kazakhstan, the three contending nations have seen their objectives converge in Syria. The talks are being held in parallel to UN-backed discussions in Geneva to find a political solution to the six-year conflict.

Children with no human rights

Meanwhile, ahead of the Universal Children’s Day to be marked on November 20, an international rights organization has noted that millions of children in war-weary Syria continue to be deprived of their most basic rights, which include education, health, and protection against violence.

International Refugee Rights Organization deputy chairman Abdullah Resul Demir said, “Children are the ones mostly affected by this war. Because they are perhaps the most needy and vulnerable beings on the earth.”

He regretted that children’s rights were defined by international law, but when it comes to Syrian children “all international laws and humanity fail.”

Referring to UNICEF’s report of September 2017 Demir said a total of 8.5 million children – 6 million in Syria, 2.5 million out of the country – were affected by the conflict. The ratio of 8 to 10 Syrian children are “children of war” and 1.7 million live in the most intense areas of the conflict, while 2 million cannot go to school.

*Written by Waseem Ahad. 

On November 13, 2017 BBC journalists Quentin Sommerville and Riam Dalati published a shocking article titled “Raqqa’s Dirty Secret”.

The article explains Daesh and YPG’s corrupt partnership in Raqqa with vivid pictures that leaves very few to the imagination, including a footage of Daesh terrorists, who were incarcerated in Raqqa, being evacuated out of the city by the YPG.

This article is important in terms of revealing the dirty cooperation between the terrorist organizations and also the US’s open support to this partnership. I use the word “reveal” because this exchange between YPG and Daesh is not something new. In the past there have been similar evacuations in areas where YPG took control over Daesh. The captured Daesh terrorists were deported to different regions using newly opened roads. “It was to prevent further conflicts and deaths” was the answer they got when they asked for the reason, and when intelligence agencies confirmed these roads.

This exchange between YPG and Daesh is not something new. In the past there have been similar evacuations in areas where YPG took control over Daesh.

It should be stated that the information provided in the BBC article is only a fraction of what is out there. The parts excluded from the photographs hide even more information on the corrupt cooperation between the terrorist organizations that is based on self-interest. It is possible to gain this information by tracing the thousands of Daesh terrorists that were deported with trucks.

The information provided in the BBC article is only a fraction of what is out there.

I am including the shocking information, which I have acquired during my research, without any commentaries:

• Most of the deported terrorists have been taken to Iraqi borders. It has been evaluated that they have been taken to Iraq.
• It is stated that some of these Daesh terrorists have gone to Jordon.
• It has been evaluated that some of these terrorist have been assisted on their travel to Europe.
• Lastly, some of the terrorists have come to Turkey.

It is important to understand how these terrorists came to Turkey. This is where the second stage of the cooperation between the terrorist organizations begins. A small group of Daesh terrorists have been smuggled to Turkey by the PKK.

So, do these Daesh terrorists pose a threat for Turkey? Not technically. The reason is hidden in the detailed Daesh operations that took place last week.

According to the BBC’s article, the footage of Daesh terrorists being deported is dated on November 13. Security units have determined the movements of PKK smugglers in the Turkish border after this date. Once it was discovered that there were Daesh terrorists with the smugglers, their destinations were monitored. This resulted in the discovery of the terror network. It should be reminded that a massive Daesh operation took place on November 10 in which 82 people were arrested in Istanbul and 101 out of the 245 suspects were arrested. I have been informed that among these arrests are the Daesh terrorists that were smuggled into Turkey.

I would also like to share an evaluation on this subject: There are two reasons why the PKK is helping Daesh terrorists enter Turkey. The first reason is to harm the country. The second reason is to assist Daesh terrorists in entering Europe in order to continue the Daesh terror threat that hovers around Europe. The Qandil leadership believes that it will lose value if Daesh terror is eliminated. They try to continue their existence through the Daesh threat. In other words the PKK tries to justify itself by the Daesh threat.

Let me give you a final note to finish off: Daesh terrorists that were deported out of Raqqa were not only taken by trucks. Many “members” of Daesh, which work for various intelligence agencies, were escorted out of the country by helicopters.

On Monday the BBC reported that a deal which allowed 350 Daesh fighters and more than 4,000 of their family members to leave Raqqa was made between Daesh and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a US-backed force largely comprised of PKK/PYD terrorists.

The US media has remained largely silent on the occasions even after the BBC’s report.

“This was a local solution to a local issue, and it demonstrated the importance and power of local governance,” the Pentagon said in a statement. “The central priority here was the protection of civilian lives and the arrangement was reached by our partners and their local affiliates.”

“Part of the by/with/through approach is that we might not fully agree with our partners at all times, but we have to respect their solutions to their own issues,” it added.

Turkey has always been a critic of the relationship between the US and PYD, the Syrian branch of the PKK, which has waged a terror campaign against Turkey for 33 years causing the death of more than 40,000 people.

“With respect to all of that, we continue to encourage all parties to seek political solutions and we continue to work with the SDF because our focus is to defeat ISIS [Daesh]” Pentagon chief spokesperson Dana White said at a press briefing on Turkey’s criticism of the US stance on the deal.

BBC reported that according to many of those involved in the evacuation a huge convoy consisting of around 50 trucks, 13 buses and more than 100 Daesh vehicles left Raqqa for Daesh-controlled territory to the southeast, adding that Daesh also withdrew at least 10 vehicles loaded with arms and ammunition and the fighters included foreigners alongside Iraqis and Syrians.

Turkey did not hesitate to respond; describing the agreement as “a grave mistake,” Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdag criticized the attitude displayed by the US.

More, on Thursday, Bozdag emphasized that the terrorist groups could not have possibly made such an agreement without the knowledge of the US.

On Tuesday the Pentagon defended the deal, which allowed hundreds of Deash terrorists to escape from Raqqa describing it as a “local solution to a local issue,” namely the siege of Deash’s de facto capital in Syria.

Pentagon spokesman Eric Pahon claimed it aimed to provide civilians and families “an opportunity to leave the city and to allow the tribal leaders an opportunity to reconcile and reintegrate Syrian men who had been under ISIS [Daesh] control during its brutal three-year regime.”

Although they were “present at the discussions,” Pahon denied any role of the US-led coalition against Daesh representatives in the withdrawal negotiations.

As to the question whether Secretary of Defense James Mattis had been informed about the deal, White answered that she did not want to speak on that.

During the briefing, a question was also asked about the total number of US troops abroad. Joint Staff Director Lt. Gen. Kenneth McKenzie informed that there are 14,000 US troops in Afghanistan, 5,262 in Iraq and 500 in Syria.

Earlier this month Army Maj. Gen. James Jarrard initially put the number of US troops on the ground in Syria at 4,000 – a figure far exceeding the official count. When asked to affirm the 4,000 figure, Jarrard appeared to be caught off guard and claimed he “misspoke.”

US media silent on US support of PKK/PYD-Daesh deal

While the deal has not made headlines in the US media, according to a report by the Anadolu Agency, Pentagon spokesman Peter Cook corrected his statement that the US is delivering arms to the PKK/PYD to “the arms went only to the Syrian Arab Coalition and not to the PKK/PYD,” as it was perceived problematic to US discourse with its NATO ally, Turkey.

Last month PKK/PYD hung posters of Abdullah Ocalan dedicating the seizure of Raqqa to the convicted PKK terrorist leader who has been jailed in Turkey since 1999.

*This report was written by Suna Nur Sarıhan.

Speaking before the parliament’s plenary and budget committee on Thursday, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu slammed the US for “continuing its mistake” of backing terrorist organizations such as the PKK/PYD.

Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu stated that “the US is continuing its mistake.”

Claiming that the US backed the PKK/PYD for tactical purposes, the foreign minister said “we told them (US) that we cannot accept this.”

“We will continue expressing the danger of cooperation with terrorist organizations.”

The statement came following comments made on Tuesday by the US-led anti-Daesh coalition spokesman Colonel Ryan Dilon, who underlined that they would only support the PYD if they were fighting Daesh.

On Monday the BBC had reported a deal which had been struck between Daesh and the SDF – a force comprised largely of PKK/PYD terrorists, which are supported by the US.

While the US commented on this deal between the two terrorist groups as a “local solution to a local problem,” Foreign Minister Cavusoglu called for more cooperation with Syrians instead of terrorist organizations in Syria.

http://thenewturkey.org/pyds-new-shadow-leaders-shahoz-hasan-and-aisha-heso/

During his visit to the US, before his meeting with Vice President Mike Pence, Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim visited the Diyanet Center of America (DCA), also known as the Turkish-American Community Center and Mosque Complex in Lanham, Maryland.

During his speech at the venue, the prime minister warned attendees about the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO), which staged the coup attempt last year.

Emphasizing that there is no difference between Daesh and FETO, the prime minister added that both groups flout the sacred values of Islam, threatening peace in Muslim countries across the world.

The PM denounced FETO leader Fetullah Gulen, who is still living in the US, stating that he has corrupted and fooled many Muslims by presenting himself as a so-called “moderate Muslim.”

“The leader of the Fetullah Terrorist Organization is no cleric, he is a bloody terrorist.”

In regards to the failed coup attempt, which Fetullah Gulen took lead in orchestrating, the prime minister said that “FETO’s main goal was to infiltrate the Turkish state and put it under his [Gulen’s] control.”

He warned Muslims living in the US to “stay away from schools and cultural centers affiliated with FETO.”

While the Gulenist criminal cult will maintain its position on the prime minister’s agenda, as Turkey will renew its request for the extradition of the organization’s leader, Binali Yildirim also informed attendees of the fight Turkey is giving back home.

Since the July 15 coup attempt, the Turkish government has continued to “decipher the secret structures of this bloody terrorist organization within the bounds of law,” the prime minister said.

He stressed that the members of this organization “should pay the price for every single act of evil they did to Turkey.”

“Citizens in our country know about the misinformation games played by FETO terrorists. I also know that our citizens living abroad aren’t fooled by these games either,” he added.

US support fight against PKK

While the prime minister has terrorism on his agenda, Secretary of State Jim Mattis met with his Turkish counterpart, Nurettin Canikli at the NATO meeting of defense ministers in Brussels.

Pentagon chief spokesperson Dana W. White said in a statement that the two ministers met in order to “reaffirm the longstanding defense relationship between the United States and its NATO ally, Turkey.”

Recalling a previous meeting between the two ministers on August 23 in Ankara, White stated that “the secretary thanked the minister for Turkey’s continued, critical contributions to global security and the fight to defeat ISIS [Daesh].”

White also added that “Secretary Mattis acknowledged the threats posed to Turkey, and reiterated that the US will continue to stand with Turkey in its fight against the PKK and all terrorist therats.”

Mattis and Canikli also agreed to continue with their full range bilateral defense activities and consultations, and agreed to look for further ways to strengthen defense cooperation.

While the PKK is recognized as a terrorist organization by the US, Turkey and the European Union, the US administration denies the organic links between the YPG/PYD and PKK – which Turkey recognizes as a terrorist organization.

Immediately after the independence referendum held in northern Iraq, the PYD conveyed a congress on September 27-28, 2017. This event, known as the 7^th General Congress, was held in Rmelan. As was the case in previous PYD congresses, once again the name of the PKK/KCK leader Abdullah Öcalan was on the front line. It is known that the repressive-propagating methods of the PYD, including its establishment in northern Syria, is being directly coordinated and directed by Öcalan and the leadership in the Qandil mountains. During this two-day congress, co-chairs Salih Muslim and Asya Abdullah were replaced by Shahoz Hasan and Aisha Heso. As it can be observed from the organizational structure of the PYD and the mechanisms within this structure, the elections are determined solely by the representatives and the nominees who are appointed by the upper leadership bodies.

To briefly explain how tasks are distributed within structures of the PYD and how new task distributions occur, the following information will be useful. According to their own by-law that was published by the PYD, there are five main organs in the organization. While according to an established hierarchy the chairman is in third place of authority, above the party chairmanship, congress is declared as the supreme decision-making body. When the by-law is examined, it can be understood that the congress also dominates all levels of the organization. While according to the by-law, congress should be convened every three years, this rule has been infringed according to individual needs and interests. The most important tasks of the Congress are the determination of party chairpersons, the formation of parliament and the determination of those who will enter this parliament and the prescription of their duties. Looking at the establishment of the PYD organization, it does not hesitate to move directly in line with the directives of the KCK main leadership structures. As a matter of fact, the most recent congress has shown this in terms of its content and purpose.

As is the case with all other leading members of the PYD, the two newly appointed co-chairs appear to have been previously occupying various posts under the KCK structure. Although the 7th congress has not attracted much attention except from the people working in this area, the two selected leaders presented themselves on the international and regional level by attending the funeral ceremony of former Iraqi Kurdistan Patriotic Union (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani. The ideological approaches of the new co-chairs, who also met Masoud Barzani during Talabani’s funeral, can be evaluated by both the congress and the activities they were enduring previously when serving in the ranks of the KCK.

Former and current PYD leaders: Salih Muslim, Aisha Heso, Shahoz Hasan, and Asya Abdullah (from left to right).

The following information about the two newly appointed co-chairpersons could be identified: Shahoz Ahmad Hasan, who filled Salih Muslim’s seat, was originally born in Hasakah. Hasan, who was known to have taken part in military activities in the Qandil Mountains until 2011, was assigned to continue his activities in northern Syria the same year. One of the first public works after his Qandil years was published on the PKK’s website. Shahoz Hasan wrote an article called “The Spring of the Peoples,” in which, praising the terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan, he argued that the post-Cold War capitalist and imperialist system is going to collapse and that the imperialists are continuously going to lose in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, there is no doubt that Hasan accepts Öcalan’s thoughts and ideas as the most important source of inspiration for the region’s future. Abdullah Öcalan, who is described as “the natural leader of all the Kurdish peoples,” also appears to be identified as a “source for the victories of the people of the whole region.”

After being sent to northern Syria by the Qandil leadership, Hasan began actively working in the PYD from 2013. While firstly being appointed to the leadership board of the city of Ayn al-Arab, which was under PYD control, he was then appointed as media officer of the Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM), which was later imposed by the PYD as an administrative element to govern northern Syria in the early periods of the crisis. Later, he became a member of the Syrian Democratic Council, which is the political wing of the Syrian Democratic Forces and established at the end of 2015 to help PYD’s military wing YPG through gaining support from Western countries, especially the U.S. Meanwhile, Hasan also received membership at the “Founding Assembly of Democratic Federalism of North Syria” whose co-chairperson is Hediya Yousef. From his listed experiences, it can be assessed that Shahoz Hasan has focused particularly on media issues throughout his experience in Syria. Within these various processes, Hasan, who as stated earlier, has publications praising PKK leader Öcalan, was no doubt a prominent figure in carrying out activities in order to disseminate the PKK/KCK ideology.

This old picture shows the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and Shahoz Hasan side by side.

The other co-chair, Aisha Heso, draws a more unfamiliar portrait than Shahoz Hasan. Heso, a close associate with the Qandil cadre, was born in Afrin. It is believed that a relative with the same name as herself was killed during a clash with the Turkish Armed Forces in the Zap region of Iraq while fighting in the PKK ranks at the beginning of the 1990s. Prior to her role as co-chair of the PYD, Aisha Heso was a member of TEV-DEM’s high leading board, and head of its women’s structure. More, she had also previously served under the directives of the KCK and worked for “Yekitiya Star” (Star Women’s Union), which was established within Abdullah Öcalan’s ideological framework “gineology.” Yekitiya Star changed its name to “Star Congress” (shortly Star, Star Women Congress) with the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. Heso, who was appointed as the coordinator of this structure, is known to have protested against the lack of PYD representation in the Astana negotiations. Heso made some statements concerning the arrests of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) deputies in Turkey. When making these statements, she was interestingly interviewed as a normal citizen, with her real identity and role kept in secrecy. Lastly, in July 2017, she made multiple comments about Turkey’s possible military actions in Afrin.

Thus, the two names that have been determined by Qandil for the leadership of the PYD – Shahoz Hasan and Aisha Heso – are merely puppet leaders. As the steps taken by the PYD clearly illustrate, the terrorist organization has never stepped out of KCK directives and it will never do so. While currently there are only rumors about the new duties of the out-going chairs Salih Muslim and Asya Abdullah, who have transferred their duties to Shahoz Hasan and Aisha Heso, it is considered highly likely that both figures will be appointed to future roles on an international level.

The Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) referendum on independence is no great news for an already fractured country and a destabilized region. Independence is an openly stated goal of the Iraqi Kurds who consistently declare it is only a question of when, not if. However, the only outside support for KRG independence is confined to the Israeli promise to recognize a potential Kurdish state. Most stakeholders, including the U.S. and Turkey, oppose the referendum and support Iraq’s territorial integrity. Iraq has monumental challenges ahead including terrorism, reconstruction, refugees and internally displaced persons, and regional proxy wars being fought in its territory. A potential declaration of independence would most likely exacerbate these problems and lead to further destabilization of the country.

Some analysts have argued that Turkey might be open to or even embrace a declaration of independence given its close ties with the KRG. Turkey’s reaction so far has been anything but. A recent RAND Corporation report argues that Turkey might be open to Iraqi Kurdish independence especially if the declaration is not sudden and comes after negotiations with the Baghdad government over the long term. The reality is that the referendum is unlikely to lead to a declaration of independence and the KRG will seek an amicable divorce through talks with Baghdad. The most recent agreement between Erbil and Baghdad to fight against ISIS was supported and brokered by the U.S. In the case of independence, however, there is no such common ground and there does not seem to exist any available U.S. or Turkish patronage.

Iraq is fractured and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Unaddressed grievances in the country will likely exacerbate political instability despite the most recent military defeat of ISIS in Mosul. The most important reason for the emergence of ISIS was the failure of the Iraqi political system that left Sunnis out of the political system. Even in the very unlikely scenario where the KRG successfully negotiates Kurdistan’s exit from Iraq, the lack of Sunni say in the matter will continue to destabilize the country and the broader region. An Iraqi Kurdish exit will also be tested by the struggle over disputed territories and the lack of a political agreement.

Turkey’s economic investments and security interests along with its political relations with the KRG make it a critical actor. However, Turkey-KRG relations are now deeply unsettled by what looks like the KDP leader Barzani’s bid to prevail over his rivals with the promise of an elusive independence. If Turkey had supported the independence referendum, the KRG would have overcome a major hurdle in terms of international legitimacy. However, from Turkey’s perspective, the independence bid is a deeply destabilizing move in an environment where, only a few months ago, ISIS held large swaths of Iraqi territory. Turkey has had close relations with the KRG but multiple statements by Turkish officials against the upcoming referendum illustrate the limits of Turkish support for the KRG. Turkish opposition to the breakup of Iraq is so strong that Turkey might take punitive steps, including imposing sanctions against the KRG.

Turkey’s argument against Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence is based on a variety of considerations. First, yet another chapter in the long Iraqi civil war would bring about another layer of instability to the region and adversely impact Turkish economic and security interests. Second, potential new conflict could open up space in Iraq for the PKK which has already gained ground in Syria due to the prolonged civil war and American support for the PYD. Third, Turkey continues to value its relationship with the rest of Iraq and is particularly invested in the fate of the Turkmen community. Fourth, unintended consequences of the breakup of Iraq promise a whole new set of complications that would threaten Turkey’s border security and might weaken its current influence in northern Iraq.

Turkey has enjoyed strong ties with the KRG leadership but it does not want to be the enabler of a breakup of Iraq. Turkey spent a lot of energy during the tenure of the former Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to ensure Sunni inclusion in the Iraqi political system. In an environment where the Sunnis have virtually no say in the future of Iraq, Turkey would not want to contribute to their further alienation by midwifing an independent Iraqi Kurdistan. If the referendum leads to a new era of ethnic conflict, Turkey’s security and economic interests would be negatively, potentially empowering the PKK.

In many ways, the independence referendum has placed the horse before the cart, so to speak. There was already a referendum in 2005 with an overwhelming support for independence. Repeating a referendum with predictably similar results only indicates an effort to strengthen Barzani’s hand politically rather than a step in achieving “self-determination.” While the votes are yet to be tallied, Barzani has officially claimed victory in the referendum vote – an expected repeat of the 2005 referendum result. Yet, it is not entirely clear if this result will actually empower the KRG’s hand, as the Baghdad government has already ruled out negotiations labeling the referendum “illegal.”

The KRG President Barzani has called for negotiations with Baghdad for independence, however, the potential punitive measures and political alienation by Turkey and Iran may weaken the KRG’s hand in forcing such negotiations. In fact, Iran has already closed its border shared with northern Iraq and Turkey is mulling whether to close the border. The KRG’s referendum bid was clearly to prop up Barzani’s position against rival Kurdish parties who have been calling for a new presidential election. Having gone forward without the agreement and patronage of two neighboring powers, Iran and Turkey, the KRG has risked political isolation, not to mention potential for conflict.

Ever since the invasion of Iraq by the U.S., Iraq has gone through periods of crises and chaos with short periods of only “relative” calm. It is currently in a highly fragile state and the breakup of the country through the establishment of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan would probably lead to yet another round of conflict in Iraq’s never-ending civil war. In the absence of any international backing and legitimacy, the KRG leaders will need to think long and hard before declaring independence.

The downfall of relations between Turkey and the U.S. along with certain European countries in the last few years have weakened the country’s ties with the Western alliance. Considering that this alliance was established with NATO during the Cold War and based itself on security cooperation, the negative approach adopted by Western states towards Turkey’s security has deteriorated these relations. There are two issues that are distracting and inexplicable in terms of the solidarity expected from the NATO alliance. The first is, despite listing the PKK as a terrorist organization, Western states are allowing affiliates of this terrorist group to act freely in Europe. Second is the un-hidden military and financial support for the PYD, which is another arm of the PKK. The policies of Turkey’s Western “allies” during the July 15 coup attempt, which were perceived as a tacit support for the coup, further deteriorated relations. Similarly, countries like the U.S. and Germany opening their doors and offering protection to FETO members, who are being prosecuted as perpetrators of the coup attempt, is disconcerting Turkey.

Moreover, the insistence of these countries, in utilizing organizations like PKK/PYD and FETO as a means to “re-calibrate” Turkey’s “shifted axis” continues to obstruct healthy relations between Ankara and Western capitals. It should be highlighted that these listed terrorist organizations are not the only methods Western countries adopt in their so-called process to “re-orbit” Turkey. Attempts to press Turkey on Iraq, Syria and Qatar fronts, and enabling mechanisms of economic disruption like Germany did, and ventures aiming to spread distrust through adjudications like the US did can be considered as said tools.

Ankara not backing down from its independentist foreign policy means the continuation of the Western attacks.

In this case, what should Turkey’s foreign policy look like?

Firstly, as the country has limited economic and military capacity in comparison to global powers, Turkey will inevitably seek a balance that will relieve the pressure from Western countries and allow it a wider room for maneuver. In this respect, Turkey should improve relations with global powers like Russia and China, while emphasizing cooperation and tensions with regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Considering the fact that the listed global powers have certain hegemonic aspirations just like the U.S. and other Western countries, it is definite that achieving a balance will be challenging. However, it should be acknowledged that Turkey is not the only country facing this challenge. Germany, for instance, is also struggling to achieve a balance between its relations with the U.S. and Russia. This nature of international relations therefore forces a sovereign state to pursue foreign policy in a rational manner, ensuring the consideration of all challenges that can potentially be faced.

Today, the most prominent threats to Turkey’s security emerges from the current policies of the U.S. and German governments. So therefore, improving relations with Russia, China and other Middle Eastern countries may allow Turkey to counterbalance its Western partners. A second suggestion for a strong and capable foreign policy is that, despite the recent developments, threats and negative press that it is receiving, Turkey should refrain from disassociating herself from the West. As the bilateral relations between Turkey and Germany have come to the forefront, and while German politicians have tried threatening Turkey with suspending EU accession negotiations, the reactions they have received from member states such as Britain and Greece illustrate the fact that Western states are not in unison in terms of their approach towards Turkey. It is for this reason that Ankara must continue to seek positive dialogue with rational actors in the West. By doing so, Ankara will have the opportunity to underline the hostility of certain Western states, implying the fact that the West could completely lose Turkey if this attitude does not change. This is necessary for both pushing the policies of western states against Turkey into a more tolerable direction and preventing Russia and China from dominating Turkish foreign policy.

While Turkey’s reliance on the West in the face of threats from Soviet Russia during the Cold War era had been destructive, today, over-reliance on Russia or China in the face of threats from the western world carry equal potential harm.

With all factors listed, its geographical location and strategic importance makes Turkey an important actor in global politics, which is why carrying friendly relations with both the East and West will be beneficial for all parties. In order to ensure that Turkey does not repeat the mistakes of the past or fall into isolation, despite the difficulties that the government is facing, maintaining a balanced foreign policy is what Ankara is trying to achieve.

After the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia was preoccupied with domestic reforms and works of reconstruction for almost ten years. Under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin since 2000, the country first entered a period of recovery followed by a steady growth. During this period, Russia gave priority to the issue of Chechnya, which was regarded as a significant security problem. Following its victory in the Second Chechen War, Russia was able to form an authority in the region, giving momentum to internal economic and political stability. More, the new regime began focusing upon developing its military force, ensuring it became capable in defeating external threats.

Hence, Russia’s military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria are reflections of this strategy. At this point, in order to understand Russia’s strategy and what it requests from the international arena, Putin’s historical speech delivered at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 and Russia’s state doctrine must be addressed.

Putin’s Munich Speech and Doctrines

The speech Putin delivered at the Security Conference in Munich in 2007 had drawn great reactions. In fact, the speech was called the Putin Doctrine. In his harsh criticism against the unipolar world system, Putin’s words that drew the most attention were the following:

“However, what is a unipolar world? One might embellish this term, at the end of the day it refers to one type of situation, namely one center of authority, one center of force, one center of decision-making. It is world in which there is one master, one sovereign. And at the end of the day this is pernicious not only for all those within this system, but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within.”

The points emphasized by Putin in Munich can also be regarded as the priorities of the Russian state doctrine. The Russian Federation shapes its domestic and foreign policy based on three main principles:  first, the National security doctrine, which assesses internal and external threats and specifies functions of the governmental bodies in this domain.  Second, the Foreign policy doctrine, which outlines general political purposes and priorities in the international arena and finally, the military doctrine, which defines external threats to the country and ways and means of national defense.

Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia adopted four national security doctrines (1997, 2000, 2009, 2016), four military security doctrines (1993, 2000, 2010, 2014) and four foreign policy doctrines (1993, 2000, 2008, 2013). When we examine these doctrines, two main emphases come up which never change: A unipolar world cannot be accepted, a multi-polar world order is required for international stability and NATO’s expansionist policy is a national security threat for Russia.

These two main points are the backbone of the doctrines. For a multi-polar world order Russia wants to form a new power center with countries like China, India and Iran under the umbrella of International Organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)Moreover, the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization formed by the former Soviet bloc countries are a part of Russia’s initiative towards establishing new blocks.

While attempting to form these kinds of new power centers, Russia is also trying to prevent NATO’s expansionist policy towards its borders. Hence, the 2008 Georgia and 2014 Ukraine military interventions are significant signs of Russia’s determination on this issue. On the other hand, with the military intervention in Syria in 2015, Russia moved its power struggle with the West far away from its borders.

Military Interventions and New Cooperation

Russia has defined NATO and the EU’s expansionist strategy towards Caucasian/Eastern European countries as a national security threat. Especially the “color revolutions” taking place in Georgia and Ukraine in the 2000’s have greatly disturbed Russia. NATO’s expansion strategy towards the Russian borders created the necessity for a counter move in terms of Russia’s interests. In fact, the Russia-Georgia war had been the first indication in this regard.

The Russia-Georgia War did not bring an end to the struggle for influence in the former Soviet geography among the US-EU-Russia triangle, on the contrary, it caused the struggle to deepen further. Six years after the war, as a result of Ukraine forming closer relations with the EU, Russia first occupied Crimea and then annexed it in contradiction to international law.

The economic and political sanctions towards Russia applied by the Western countries following the occupation of Ukraine were not enough to deter Putin. With the military intervention in Syria in 2015, Russia took revenge of the Libya operation conducted during the Arab Spring, gaining the upper hand against the West. By getting involved in Syria, Russia has shifted the international attention away from Ukraine and saved itself from further pressure. Just like a player being trapped in a corner of the “go” board moving to another corner of the board in order to rescue itself from this trap, Russia which was trapped in Ukraine moved the “stone” to Syria.

http://thenewturkey.org/ex-soviet-state-fighters-in-daesh/

Russia has obtained significant power in international politics as a result of these three military interventions. Apart from the military interventions, it also established a security circle in the region by signing new military agreements with Central Asian countries, Armenia and Belarus. In addition to its involvement in Syria, Russia also seeks to enhance its military relations with Libya and Egypt by signing new military agreements.

Another country with which Russia deepened its relations during this period is Turkey. After the aircraft crisis, relations between the two countries returned to its former level.  There are still numerous areas of conflict between the parties, particularly the Syria crisis. First of all, Russia’s cooperation with the terrorist organization PYD in Afrin disturbs Turkey. In addition, the Russian occupation of Crimea is a security threat for Turkey in the Black sea region. More, Russian sanctions are still in effect on certain Turkish products despite the agreement between the two governments. These are only the apparent problems that the two countries have to deal with at first. Nevertheless, the two countries continue working together in the Turkish Stream Project and the Akkuyu nuclear power plant project, which are strategically important. The talks held between the two countries on Turkey’s purchasing of S-400 air defense system from Russia is also quite significant. Russia by acting mutually with NATO-member Turkey in some certain strategic projects in energy and military areas is sending a message to the West.

The Obstacles to the Goals

The prospect of Russia being able to prevent NATO and the EU’s expansionist policies depends on several factors. At this point, Russia should first of all overcome domestic structural problems. Firstly, it needs to speed up economic modernization and address the issue of corruption in governmental organizations. In the report entitled Theses on Russian Foreign Policy, prepared by the Center for Strategic Research (CSR) and the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) in 2017, the following inference is highly important as quoted: “The underdevelopment of the Russian economy and its governance institutions poses a much more significant threat to the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity than realistic military threats that Russia is already well protected from.”

Russia’s extreme economic dependence on energy revenues is another important problem. The share of petroleum and natural gas in Russia’s budget revenue is approximately 45 percent. Despite the high energy revenues gained between 2003 and 2013, the Russian industrial structure has not been revived yet. Furthermore, the economic and political sanctions of the West following the Crimea occupation have placed the Russian economy in a difficult situation. Alongside these domestic issues, Russia’s dependence on China is also an important factor in its quest to become one of the important power centers of the multi-polar world system.

Although Russia is an important military and political power, its economic deficiency prevents it from fulfilling its long term global policies. This is where China comes into play. Russia is the largest crude oil and natural gas supplier of China. In the past where Russia has experienced problems with its western counterparts on energy security, it automatically turned to China and secured new energy agreements. Russia also exploits SCO against the West in the international politics. Not only Russia but also China has influence on SCO countries. Indeed, China has greater influence on SCO than Russia. While China and Russia may be perceived as strong allies, their political interests do not always coincide and this can be displayed by the economic rivalry over Central Asia. Ultimately, Russia’s place within the global power structure. Although the two countries seem like strong political allies, political interests of China and Russia do not always coincide. The economic rivalry over Central Asia is a good example of this. One way or another, Russia’s place in international power politics will depend on the course of Sino-Russian relations.

http://thenewturkey.org/can-turkey-benefit-from-a-strategic-alliance-with-russia/

Turkey is another key country for Russia, whose success is related to aligning its political interests with Turkey’s interests in the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Black Sea and Middle East. A similar situation is also true for Turkey. If Russia wants to solve disputed problems with Crimea, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, it has to consider Turkey’s interests as Turkey has historical, cultural, and political links with the region. Another topic is energy. Instead of Russia, Western consumers support Turkey as an alternative energy route from the Caspian to Europe, as Turkey has been considered a reliable partner for Caspian producers and their exports. All of these factors force Russia to take into consideration the geopolitical importance of Turkey. The two countries may coordinate their policies to ensure security and stability in the Black Sea and continue their efforts to stabilize Syria and the Middle East. The “aircraft crisis” has shown both sides that an enmity between Turkey and Russia would only lead to a lose-lose situation.

A unipolar world order is not an option for Russia, which considers Western powers at its borders a potential national security threat. The real challenge for Russia is tied to her ability in dealing with internal structural problems and its relationship with China and Turkey, which will be decisive in determining Russia’s position in world politics.

Chemical weapons have been used 45 times in Syria since last year, according to the Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which monitors the elimination of the toxic arms in order to ensure international security. The most recent chemical attack to draw world attention took place on April 4, 2017 in Khan Sheikhoun district, which is located in southern Idlib. The Khan Sheikhoun attack also prompted the fledgling Trump administration to carry out a cruise missile strike on a Syrian airbase allegedly used for the chemical attack, which targeted innocent civilians and children.

The Red Line in US Syria Policy

In response to the use of chemical weapons against innocent civilians, the root causes of the Trump authorization of a missile attack in Syria have been widely discussed at the international level. Trump’s missile strike could be interpreted as taking a stand against the use chemical weapons, which had been clearly marked as a ‘red line’ in Washington’s Syria policy by the previous administration. Back in 2013, President Obama had said any violation of the red line could lead to a possible change of US policy towards the Syrian civil war.

Apparently, Trump and his predecessor Obama are on the same page about what a red line in the Syrian civil war is. According to US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, the top leadership of the Assad regime ordered the Khan Sheikhoun attack and decided to employ deadly chemicals including sarin gas to hit innocent people. Nevertheless, Syria and Russia are adamant that the recent sarin gas attack is a ‘false flag’ operation that Al-Qaeda or one of the Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist groups that controls the Idlib province set off in order to elicit an American intervention which put 20% of Assad’s air force out of action. However, if we take a look at the recent history of the use of chemical weapons in Syria, despite international condemnation, significant non-overlapping arguments were laid out by the Syrian government and even by the OPCW.

Even though Syria signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in October 2013 and OPCW reported Syria had removed all of its chemical arsenal in June 2014, the Syrian government went on to carry out chlorine gas attacks several times in Idlib. It is possible that Syria has used the Chemical Weapons Convention as a screen, so it can attribute future deadly chemical attacks on opposition groups fighting in Idlib.

Most probably, the Syrian government did not expect a sudden US attack that  would destroy one of their significant airfields. From now on, there is a possibility that Trump’s retaliatory attacks might stop Assad from using chemical weapons. Apparently Russia can quickly replace the lost aircraft at the destroyed airbase, so it is difficult to anticipate the future of Syria and how the recent US attacks might change the balance of power on the battlefield, specifically in Idlib province where the next “mother of all battles” is yet to come.

Trump’s Policy in the Middle East Will Not Be a Huge Departure from That of Obama’s

Following the chemical attack, the international community has renewed calls for supporting regime change and removing Assad from Syria, arguing that if this does not happen, Syria will stay vulnerable to further gross human rights violations. Even though the US has followed a pro-active policy in the region over the last 15 years, this time it seems that Trump’s policy in the Middle East would be “reactive.” So far, Trump’s policy has not offered any concrete solution to stop the humanitarian crisis except offering condemnation and carrying out some warning attacks. Most probably, Trump’s policy in the Middle East will not be a huge departure from that of Obama’s.

Trump’s reaction to the deadly chemical attack is rather symbolic and discursive, and does not change his stated aim that his top priority in Syria is to defeat DAESH. Syria urgently needs two rational solutions for two rising concerns which threaten the collective security of the region. One of them is to curtail the presence of terror organizations such as DAESH and PYD in the region. The other is to stop chemical attacks targeting civilian-inhabited areas and causing mass casualties. In this regard, Turkey could possibly get a leading role and step up for a pro-active policy in the region, especially after its Euphrates Shield Operation in Syria has been shown to be so successful.

Turkey Was Right to Consistently Call for Assad’s Ouster

After wide-spread chemical attacks in Syrian territory, the international community has been able to find the lowest common denominator and chanted “Assad must go” with one voice, however Turkey has known of the urgency of Assad’s ouster since the beginning of the war. After the chemical attack Turkey has renewed this call one more time.

The state apparatus in Syria has completely been destroyed and the legitimacy of the regime is highly questionable. More than 11 million people have been displaced (almost half of Syria’s population) and the economy has shrunk 65% since the start of the war. This is in addition to the situation even before the conflict began, when many Syrians were complaining about high unemployment rates, widespread and normalized corruption, and a lack of political freedoms.

Who Will Take the Lead in the Syrian Battleground?

The current situation in Syria is pathetic, as another deadly chemical attack was launched against innocent civilians, but no single institution or government seems sure of what the next step will be, and who is going to take the leading role. Moreover, there are communication problems between Moscow and the US, whose priorities are clashing against each other, with one side working for the “survival of the regime” and another for “fighting DAESH.” No one knows how Russia will take the facts of the recent chemical attack in discussions with their US counterparts, so the level of dialogue is very critical between the two powers and will determine the future of Syria under the Trump administration.

After a meeting with Putin on May 3, Erdoğan will meet with Trump on May 16. That meeting will turn out to be critical, as it will be the first “face to face” encounter between the two leaders. Additionally, two key NATO allies will have the chance to mend a relationship that was wounded by persistent US cooperation with PYD, the Syrian branch of the PKK.

Turkey should be neither too pessimist nor too optimist especially after Rex Tillerson’s statements on Syria, which were recently laid out after a joint press conference with Russian counter-part Lavrov. Tillerson underlined the urgency of Assad’s departure, however he added that the US is not going to lead it. His statement is a good summary of the American position, in that it is standing up for Syria.  The next step should be to realize that Turkey has a clear strategic advantage and can become that leading figure on the Syrian battleground needed to remove Assad.

When the Syrian civil war erupted, no one could easily predict the battlefield would evolve to a multi-dimensional and multi-territorial conflict where thousands of foreign proxies and fighters from different countries have been dragged into expeditiously. Based on the fact that the general overview of the battlefield has expanded and even most ominously crossed the borders of Syria and spilled over Iraq, it is unrealistic to talk about presence of just one battlefield but there are numerous battlefields where proxies have buckled down to debilitating each other.

DAESH is causing a radical sociological transformation in the region

Even though there are various actors actively playing on the ground, DAESH and its earlier incarnations are the main precipitating factors welcoming a radical sociological transformation in the region. DAESH has a bid of “becoming a state” leaning on a rather apocalyptic vision with a rhetoric of self-proclaimed caliphate. This rhetoric rips up the main notion of the Westphalian state system called ‘soil integration’ and destabilizes traditional state envisagement. When DAESH hit the road to implement a deconstruction model in the region, its golden shot was the seizure of Mosul in June 2014 which symbolized the tearing up of the Sykes-Picot Border of 1916, which demarcates Iraq from Syria. Only then did it grab the attention of international community and especially that of the US.

DAESH is slaughtering tens of thousands of people ferociously under its rule with a desire to expunge each force on its way, which puts in danger its autocratic rule. From the very beginning of the war; the reason of Russia and the US’s entry into the war respectively is primarily about saving Assad and destabilizing the region in the favor of PYD, Syrian branch of the PKK, where they are dominating a vast majority of Syria’s northern border; currently advancing towards Deir-Ez Zor Euphrates Axis and pushing towards DAESH de facto capital Raqqa with the full support of the US-led coalition.

Fighting against the threat posed by DAESH is one of Assad’s rationalization for staying in power and to be protected by Russia; however; it is crystal clear that neither Assad with a constant military, diplomatic and financial support from Russia and Iran nor the US is fighting DAESH to root out its cruel militias from the Middle East. One incident which is worth remembering: Syrian troops were driven out of Palmyra in December, 2016 following leaving of Russian soldiers and abandoning the historical city to fate of guardianship of the Syrian army in April. Syrian troops retook Palmyra from DAESH for the second time in March, 2017; nevertheless; it is blatant that there is a sham fight among Syrian troops and DAESH militants to leave and recapture the strategic territories in the Syrian civil war.

A success story in the Syria battlefield: Operation Euphrates Shield

Owing largely to the quest for a new pro-active foreign policy direction; Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield on August 24 to purge the region from terrorist groups such as the PYD, YPG and DEASH along with the Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army force and Turkish officials confirmed that the 2,200-square-kilometer area has been completely cleared of the DAESH militants. While the operation has turned out an unequivocal success; a number of foreign policy commentators both in the national and international level are running a campaign to discredit significant gains by Turkey in the Al-Bab operation after the US deploys heavily armed marines to Syria to launch the Raqqa offensive with the YPG dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) amid Turkey’s objections to the US authorities.

However, as Turkey Presidential Spokesperson İbrahim Kalın stated yesterday; it is not yet certain which groups and policies will shape the future of Raqqa. Taking into consideration the above-mentioned facts; the speculation of Al-Bab operation is rather baseless; where Turkey’s gains on the ground are so obvious. In addition, one thing should be emphasized that Turkey is the only country in the world coordinating its fight against the PKK, its affiliate in Syria the PYD, and DEASH at the same time.

Manbij Operation: Outcome of military success in Al-Bab

Relying on its recent military success in Al-Bab, Turkey has launched an operation of encircling of the Western Manbij even though Russian General Staff declared that an agreement was reached between the Assad regime and the YPG for the peaceful transfer of Manbij’s control to Assad regime forces. Free Syrian Army continues its operations against Syrian Democratic Forces despite arrival of government fighters due to the fact that Manbij Military Council which is under the domination of the US allied Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) denied handing over areas to the Assad regime in a menacing manner.

In addition, as the US state department explained earlier this week; the US is insistent on not seeing the YPG as a terrorist group despite raising Turkish concerns which is a clear sign of the US authorities would carry on protecting YPG forces at all costs.  It seems that the US is going ahead with several measures with an intention to refute Turkey’s leading argument on the Syrian battleground, especially following Turkey’s announcement in the previous week that should the YPG forces does not withdraw from Manbij which was promised several times by the US authorities over the past few months, Turkey will storm the YPG forces.

The US recent moves are leveraging the crisis in the region

Apparently, the US’s recent moves are clear indicators of its willingness to escalate the crisis with Turkey. After Trump took office on January 20, 2017; it is still unclear what kind of a US is Turkey going to ally with? The latest moves of the US invite Turkey to reshape the basic parameters of Ankara’s relation with the US. Despite the fact that Turkey has been successful in blending its wider objectives with a clear intention to fight DAESH and YPG, the ambiguity that the US breeds in Syria is still eliciting many risks that Turkey should withstand. Based on a precarious sort of balance prevalent in the region, the final move of the US might be interpreted as way of blunting Turkey’s recent gains throughout the Al-Bab Operation.

Recent military maneuver of the US might raise up tensions between various actors in the battlefield

The US’s recent policy has produced a direct confrontation with Turkey such as once was experienced heavily with Russia. This would be the biggest foreign policy test for Ankara, on how much is it able to adjust to its new pro-active foreign policy instruments to the new phase of the US foreign policy. It seems that the US foreign policy priorities happen to line up with PYD which causes ramping up of divergence between the US and Turkey in terms of Syria policy and the Middle East as a whole. Nonetheless, recent military and political maneuvers of the US might lead to inter group and intra group struggles in the region taking into consideration sectarian and demographic vulnerabilities embedded in the region, especially while it is obvious that all the actors and borders have intertwined each other like never before. Having been confronted with multidimensional threats, Turkey appears determined not to leave off its advantageous position in Syria across swathes of strategic attacks coming from both national and international level.

A sustainable resolution to the instability in the Middle East that emerged with the Arab Spring has yet to be proposed. The countries in the region are already being affected negatively by the instability. Terrorist and sub-state actors have gained such vast areas of influence that a long time is needed to eradicate their harmful effects. International actors have stayed passive while they should actively and staunchly work for the elimination of instability, instead their inaction has led to the perpetuation of the instability.

Of course, the countries of the region share the blame, having prioritized historical rivalries and striving for power and increasing their influence in the new regional order. All of these caused terror to gain momentum, for proxy wars to flourish, and shook the nation-states to their very core. It should not be forgotten that political actors like al-Assad, who laid waste to his own country, have also contributed to the chaos in the region.

The aforementioned factors made the instability a stable feature of the Middle East. It is obvious that Turkey and the Gulf countries are not content with the regional developments. They had been the US’ strategic partners during the Cold War, but disillusioned with the US after the Second Iraq War (2003) and the Arab Spring, respectively. Especially President Obama’s Middle East policies, which exacerbated the instability, raised concerns in Turkey and the Gulf countries over their own national security. Obama’s presidency and heritage will remain as bitter memories in both nations’ minds.

President Erdoğan recently went on a Gulf tour consisting of three countries: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. He was welcomed by high-ranking leaders in all three counties and returned to Turkey after striking deals in the trade, finance, culture, and defense sectors. It should be noted that Iranian leader Rouhani was visiting the other two Gulf countries, Oman and Kuwait, while Erdoğan was in the Gulf. These visits revealed which actors Turkey and Iran had better relations with. We can say that Turkey and the Gulf countries are of the same mind in certain regional issues, while keeping in mind that Gulf countries have certain differences amongst themselves. When it comes to US relations, regional stability, and terror, Turkey and the Gulf countries have common concerns.

Common Concerns

Firstly, there are issues concerning foreign policy: the security of the Gulf becoming a secondary concern for the US, the US paving the way for Iran’s influence with the nuclear deal, and the US’ stance towards countries of the region like Iraq and Syria. The US’ retreat from the Gulf in the military sense caused a serious trauma to the Gulf countries, as the US had been the de facto guarantor of the Gulf since World War II. The content of this trauma reminds one of the serious crises caused by President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 1964 letter to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü. With this letter, Turkey experienced the disadvantages of relying on a single actor in its security policies.

Still, Turkey experienced even worse relations with the US in the last couple of years. The July 15 coup attempt being almost disregarded by the US,  the US arming PYD and YPG in Syria and providing to political support to the said organizations, along with not adequately supporting Turkey in its fight against terror, are some of the indicators of this troubled period. Moreover, while Turkey is having judicial problems with the US over the extradition of FETO leader Fetullah Gülen, the Gulf countries also have judicial issues with the US over recent legislation allowing Americans to sue foreign governments for alleged support for terrorism (JASTA).

Secondly, limiting Iran’s influence in the region and regional stability are common concerns. While the Gulf countries centered their national security policies around the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring began, these policies shifted after the nuclear deal was signed between the P5+1 countries and Iran. Iran was once again the main threat to Gulf countries, especially to Saudi Arabia. Following the nuclear deal, Gulf countries began to have closer relations with Turkey in order to counterbalance and limit Iran. Turkey and the Gulf countries, with the exception of Qatar, were in different positions during the Arab Spring. The shift in policies is also closely linked with Saudi King Salman’s ascension to the throne. Iran’s aggressive and interventional stance in Syria, Yemen and Iraq raised concerns in Turkey and the Gulf countries. They all now agree on preventing Iran from gaining further influence.

Thirdly, there are mutual concerns over the elimination of terror, which is the most significant source of the region’s instability. DAESH, the PKK, YPG-PYD, and other terrorist organizations in the region are a threat to countries’ national security, as their regular series of bombings and attacks clearly demonstrate. DAESH’s terrorist actions in both Turkey and Saudi Arabia revealed how much a threat it is to these countries. Since the beginning, Turkey and the Gulf countries have been supporting the international coalition fighting against DAESH, which has employed its field and weapons potential.

But this determination to fight DAESH became more focused after the group carried out suicide bombings in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. DAESH has also threatened Bahrain, through one of its high-ranking leaders Turki al-Binali who is of Bahraini descent, revealed the extent of the danger posed by the group. Similarly, Turkey is fighting against DAESH, the PKK-PYD-YPG, and FETO with little support. Therefore, Turkey and Gulf countries understand each other better in regards of the fight against terrorism. FETO’s recent recognition as a terrorist organization by the Gulf countries is a crucial indicator of this support.

Similar Methods

The aforementioned three factors indicate the necessity for closer relations between Turkey and the Gulf countries. Moreover, these countries have all interposed the threats with almost similar methods. While Turkey is trying to establish its national security outside its borders with Operation Euphrates Shield, Gulf countries have responded to Iran trying to surround them with the Yemen operation. The Gulf countries tried to step up their military drills (e.g. North Thunder) and redesign their military alliances (e.g. Islamic Military Alliance). On the other hand, Turkey improved its military relations with Russia in order to overcome the issues it’s facing in Syria. Therefore, Turkey and the Gulf countries are trying to prepare themselves for an expected future in which the US’s Middle East policies are expected to change with the Trump administration. In this sense, Trump’s statements about Iran and DAESH can be perceived as the harbinger of what’s to come.

In parallel with this, it is possible to make some observations about Erdoğan’s Gulf tour. Firstly, it can be said that Turkey and Gulf countries are thinking of influencing the US’ new Middle East policy. Secondly, they are looking for cooperation in curbing Iran’s excessive influence and pushing it back to its borders. Considering all of these, Erdoğan’s statement about “Persian nationalism” in Bahrain is significant. Lastly, the upcoming Raqqa operation against DAESH will be seemingly vital for regional politics. Turkey expressed that it wants to be alongside the US in the Raqqa operation.

Moreover, Turkey asserted that it wanted to remove PYD-YPG form the operations and replace them with an army which is comprised mainly of Arabs. Therefore, it is possible that Erdoğan requested support from the Gulf countries to have more Arabs in the army which will besiege Raqqa, and to persuade the US to follow this approach. Considering all of these factors, the close cooperation between Turkey and the Gulf countries on issues like Syria, DAESH, Iran and regional stability will yield a win-win situation for both parties in the short and midterms.

Founded by the PKK terrorist organization in 2003, PYD developed into a critical actor in Syria after 2011. Currently led by Salih Muslim and Asya Abdullah, the organisation has adopted an official ideology chiefly driven by radical leftist discourse; moreover, it advocates the political vision of Abdullah Öcalan, a leading figure of the PKK and an arrestee in Turkey since 1999. The PYD’s headquarters is located in the Syrian town of Qamishli and, according to its constitution, the organisation pursues the objective of securing and spreading the “Apoist” ideology (referring to Öcalan) in northern Syria, called Rojava by many Kurds.

Today, the relationship between PYD and PKK is debated and, in fact, deliberately concealed by rhetorical manoeuvres. However, the question of how to engage legally with the PYD remains controversial as it is clearly the Syrian branch of the PKK, an officially recognized terrorist organization by many authorities like the EU and the USA, Turkey’s allies. However, recent developments on the Syrian ground show that the US government does not hesitate to collaborate with such a PKK-affiliated organization as a leverage tool, even as it considers cooperating with al-Qaeda-affiliates as a support for terrorism. However, if one looks at the PYD’s constitution, the PYD openly accepts the Kongra-Gel (People’s Congress of Kurdistan) as the ‘highest legislative body’, indicating that both PKK and PYD are operating under the same umbrella. In addition, the organisational structures, symbols, discourses and, more importantly, Abdullah Öcalan’s identity as the natural-born leader of all Kurds leaves no room to discuss the PYD’s affiliation with PKK. Can it now be classified as a terrorist organisation, or is it just a harmless political party?

YPG’s Role in the Syrian Crisis

Most of Northern Syria is now de facto ruled by an administration built on a ‘social contract’, which orders how each canton should be organised and governed. This contract, signed by several parties on January 6, 2014 in Amuda, shows similarities with the KCK system[1]. Despite the PYD’s claim of democratic pluralism, it constantly uses YPG, PYD’s armed group, to designate positions to their own men in the councils generated by the contract. Relying on military might rather than the people’s will reflects the undemocratic character of the PYD’s political ideology. Oppositional Kurds are mostly represented by the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria (PDK-S) and the umbrella organization of Kurdish National Council (KNC). Since the beginning of the civil war, they have always sided with the Syrian opposition against the Assad regime. However, observations make it clear that the oppositional Kurds are strongly oppressed by Assad-backed PYD sympathizers and their militias. Eventually, the majority of PDK-S and KNC members have been pacified and forced to flee to Turkey or the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Northern Iraq. Under these circumstances, it is nearly impossible for the PDK-S and other KNC-affiliated groups to aspire for new policies and declare real, non-pragmatic demands.

It is striking to observe how a militia group could gain so much territory during the turmoil in Syria. Just to remember, the YPG took control of Ain al-Arab, Amuda and Afrin just in a few days and without a serious fight. If one looks at Qamishli now, it is no secret that the Assad regime troops and the YPG militias are acting together and cooperating to ensure their goals. This partnership brings mutual benefits to both. YPG, which was built on the model of PKK’s armed wing HPG, specifically cooperated with Assad’s troops, got direct help from the PKK and was successful in muzzling oppositional Kurds in the region. The declaration of autonomous cantons in Northern Syria is actually an experiment done within the geographical laboratory of Rojava, a manifestation of the hitherto theoretical paradigm which the PKK wants to benefit from and has tried to implement for many months in Turkey.

In addition, benefiting from DAESH’s presence in Syria, PYD has presented itself as a multi-tool for the USA and Russia. Nowadays, PYD has representative offices in some states and the YPG has also begun to set up bureaus as well.

Complexity in Theoretical Classification

PYD appears to be an actor with different faces. Imagine a political party in Europe which ensures regional security via its own militias. What would the European reaction be, for instance, if the Bavarian CSU used militias to protect its federal borders and its people? Obviously this sounds abnormal, but exactly this is happening in Syria. Benefitting from the turmoil and the absence of a state authority in Syria, PYD uses the YPG to enforce its ideology. Step by step, it is causing the disintegration of Syria to achieve an independent state through firstly declaring autonomous cantons and then declaring a federation. It is the same approach exercised by the KRG in Iraq and their way to autonomy. Some classify the KRG as a quasi-state, but today it is easily possible to observe that the PYD is exactly striving for the same.

The PYD is using illegal and unconventional methods to justify its legitimacy, forcing mostly Arabs and Turkmen to migrate, evacuating villages and using child militias. Just as the PKK threatens the people of Turkey, the PYD is doing the same with its armed militias in Syria.

PYD’s Own Conflict of Legitimacy: A Strategy?

According to some human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, PYD repeatedly violates basic human rights in the regions it controls. Attempts to stop these violations constantly fail. For example, Geneva Call announced that, after the signing of an agreement, the YPG demobilized nearby 150 child soldiers from battlefields. However, Kurdwatch, a project based in Berlin, revealed that, after the agreement, countless children have died on battlefields.

Nowadays, the PYD is following a strategy to justify itself through opening foreign offices in Western cities. This is accompanied with the PYD’s attempt to detach itself from its military wing, the YPG. After US armour and ammunition helped the YPG through the Syrian Democratic Forces, some disputes arose between the military and the political wings of the PYD. Redur Khalil, the YPG spokesperson, admonished Salih Muslim indirectly as the latter openly stated that the US government is directly supporting the YPG with weaponry. The most important point in Khalil’s message was that Muslim should not interfere with issues that he does not know about. Some may argue that there are serious disputes between PYD and YPG, and this differentiation is to lead one to think that there is a more moderate wing that could be included to the peace talks for example. Others claim that this differentiation between PYD and YPG is just a strategy to provide legitimacy to a terrorist organization and make it at least tolerable for the Turkish government. The second perspective is more likely, and, today, it is not easy to foresee if this strategy will work out.

Many investigations and public records prove that the PYD is a terrorist organisation, a violent non-state actor. Benefiting from the absence of a functioning state, YPG is fulfilling all requirements to be classified as such. Additionally, its clear connection to the PKK, a terrorist organisation identified by the EU and the US, must lead to the conclusion, that the PYD and its affiliates are also terrorist groups. Therefore, the allies of Turkey should give up making rhetorical differentiations between the PKK and PYD, if they really want to re-establish the order and security in Syria.

[1] Group of Communities in Kurdistan, an umbrella organization founded by PKK to implement Abdullah Öcalan’s ideology in Kurdish regions.

The Geneva Talks held in order to find a diplomatic solution to the Syria problem failed as expected and attention is now turned again towards the front where the violence had never stopped during the talks. The principle reason behind this failure was the unwillingness of the Russian-Iranian-Damascene axis to stop its offensive against the opposition and the disinclination these governments showed to diplomatic efforts to find a lasting solution to the crisis.

The military advancements that they lately achieved by their irresponsible aggression apparently convinced them of the possibility of a military victory on the front. Thus the Moscow-Tehran-Damascus axis chose to buy time in Geneva by coming with unacceptable conditions from the opposition’s viewpoint. The ambivalent attitudes shown by the international community and the resultant lack of a solid and homogeneous block to check their moves is the fundamental factor which encouraged them.

As the Syrian branch of PKK, PYD is openly conducting an armed struggle against Turkey and uses every means to create a civil war in the country.

While Moscow and Tehran are determined to keep the Assad regime intact and to restore Syria’s territorial integrity around the Baath regime at every humanitarian cost there is no similar determination in the opposition. Those parties which are assumably discontent with the policies pursued by Moscow and Tehran make anything but a uniform entity for they have different and conflicting visions regarding Syria’s future and ending the humanitarian crisis in the country. The fact that Turkey and its Western allies failed to agree on PYD’s position and on whether or not it would be invited to Geneva created a serious, if for a short while, and exemplified the complicated the situation on the “opposing front”.

As the Syrian branch of PKK, PYD is openly conducting an armed struggle against Turkey and uses every means to create a civil war in the country. Thus, the insistence of the US and other Western powers to see this terrorist organization as a viable “ally” is a major source of discontent in Ankara, the Turkish capital. Having been a long-standing ally of the West for 60 under the NATO framework Turkey finds it hard to understand why these countries, which explicitly recognized PKK as a terrorist organization, regard the PYD as their ally in Syria. Then, how should we understand the current situation?

First of all, we must answer why, at the cost of angering Turkey, these states particularly the US supports the PYD? Two explanations can be suggested for this. Firstly, lacking a holistic strategy about what to do in Syria, the US and others chose to fight against Daesh as the prime enemy and regarded the “secular” PYD as a reliable partner in this fight. This capacity of PYD was supposedly proven by its victories against Daesh. Finding the opposition fighting against the Assad regime too “Islamic”, the US is engaged in efforts to create an artificial armed group that is in line with its own interests as done previously in Afghanistan and Iraq. The problem is that by definition such a group lacks the societal basis necessary to direct the future of Syria and it is not in fact against the Assad regime. Yet Washington and others do not really seem to pay much attention to this. In the first instance PYD is expected to fulfil its responsibility in the fight against Daesh; and at a later stage, the intention is to use the presence of this armed group as a trump card to shape the future of Syria. For this reason, the US intends to keep control over PYD against the Damascene administration supported the Russia-Iran axis. However, having been aware of Washington’s plan, Moscow and Tehran have already started moves to grasp this force out of the US hands. This situation points to a soon-to-come US-Russia struggle over PYD. Time will show how the PYD gets affected by this struggle.

http://thenewturkey.org/the-threat-of-daesh-sleeper-cells-and-how-to-contain-it/

The second explanation regarding the US backing for the PYD could be its effort to check Turkey’s Middle East policy over PYD. Being uncomfortable by the policies followed by AK Party administration on Middle East without taking into account the interests of Washington and Brussels, these countries want to minimize Ankara’s role in the region by supporting PYD. As PYD gets stronger so does PKK and the control they establish over a large territory in Syria encouraged the latter to end the Peace Process with the Turkish state and to resume its terrorist activities. Trapped in such a complicated situation at home Turkey would have little incentive to properly pursue its Middle Eastern policies. Such a strategy of limiting the Turkish regional power and turning Ankara into an actor obedient to the Western policies carry the severe risks. President Erdogan’s reproval to the US by asking the Washing administration whether it is with Turkey or the terror organizations PYD and YPG shows the negative consequences of this policy on Turkey. The US needs to urgently decide whether it has chosen Turkey or the PKK/PYD as its ally and to stop its policy of trying to discipline Ankara by use of the PYD.

Considering PYD’s position within the framework of the Geneva talks and the latest developments in Syria, we see that the organization has placed itself against Daesh by reading the civil war conjecture within the country correctly, and that it has also set up its position on the Assad regime in a way that won’t be bothersome for either the US or Russia.

Whether Washington develops a holistic strategy for Syria will be a fundamental factor determining the path of the conflicts in the country. Finding a definitive solution to the Daesh terror is, for the Obama administration, a clear priority compared to preventing the Russian advancements in the region. Yet such a definitive solution can only be found once a holistic solution to the Syrian crisis is realized. Just as the airstrikes conducted against Daesh will not altogether bring an end to such terrorist organizations like it, the concentrated attacks by Russia, Iran, and the Assad regime which completely disregard civilian lives as well as the abandonment of remaining cities will lead to increased radicalism in Syria. This in turn will continue to supply convenient grounds for these types of organizations.

Having turned a blind eye on the Russian military and political advancement in the region and limited its Syrian strategy to the struggle against Daesh, the US structured a due diplomacy throughout the Geneva talks. In this frame, while attempting to include PYD in the talks, it has not demonstrated the necessary attitude against Russia and Iran in order to stop their attacks against the opposition and civilians while the talks were still continuing. While cities were being bombed on one hand, the talks produced no concrete achievements and ended in failure.

Considering PYD’s position within the framework of the Geneva talks and the latest developments in Syria, we see that the organization has placed itself against Daesh by reading the civil war conjecture within the country correctly, and that it has also set up its position on the Assad regime in a way that won’t be bothersome for either the US or Russia. It did not act against the Assad regime not to make Russia and Iran edgy, it does not openly support the Damascus administration in a way that would make the US uncomfortable. The US and other Western powers ignored the partnership of PYD with the Assad regime in certain cities. PYD is certainly following an extremely risky strategy. How long can it keep the autonomous regions it created by angering the Sunni Arabs and Turkey? When it kept between the American and Russian bid for power, which side will it choose?

Maybe these questions are still needs answers, but the historical experience shows that global actors easily switch the tools they use for their Middle Eastern policies. Thus the US or Russia, or any other state, can stop supporting PYD and take a hostile position. In this case, the PYD will have to face alone the regional actors it has disturbed. For this reason, the PYD needs to act with the awareness that non-regional actors such as the US and Russia will not be permanent in the Middle East, and that on the contrary, countries such as Turkey will continually have a role in shaping the region.

The Geneva talks showed that the Syrian civil war will continue for an uncertain period of time. After all, the ongoing attacks of the Russia-Iran-Assad block demonstrate the fact that these actors still insist on an offensively military method. Whether or not they will achieve their goal will be determined by the resistance of the opposition, the attitudes of the states which support them, and whether the passive policies of Western countries such as the US will continue or not. In the meantime there is, unfortunately, to reason to hope that the number of casualties and refugees will drop. Let’s hope the international community takes, in the nearest future, firm and determined attitude to stop the humanitarian crisis in Syria.