F

ollowing Viktor Orbán’s defeat, the elections held in Hungary attracted considerable attention in Turkey. Various predictions were made based on election assessments and comparative analyses. Analyses comparing the election winner, Péter Magyar, with Orbán, in particular, interpreted the election results through classic dichotomies, such as democracy versus authoritarianism, liberal democracy versus populism, and the right versus the far right.

However, regrettably, many of these analyses relied on these clichéd distinctions and interpretations. Furthermore, the post-liberal rise in Hungarian and international politics was analyzed from a liberal perspective, resulting in erroneous interpretations. Initial assessments such as the return of liberal democracy, the retreat of authoritarianism, and the defeat of the far right and populism demonstrate an inability to understand the true nature of the sociopolitical transformation occurring in Hungary and around the world.

The true significance of the Hungarian election results

The clearest conclusion to be drawn from the election results is that there is a significant crisis of legitimacy and trust within the political landscape, rather than an ideological shift. Orbán was defeated by another post-liberal figure who uses similar language, draws on the same social base, and shares a similar perception of the crisis. In other words, contrary to what is often assumed, the new prime minister, Magyar, is not so much a liberal democrat as he is another figure who largely represents the post-liberal current due to the rhetoric he employs and the ideological position he occupies. From this perspective, the Hungarian elections should not be viewed as a regime change or political transformation but rather as a renewal and cleansing of actors within post-liberalism itself.

More precisely, Orbán’s defeat and the winner’s profile do not, contrary to many interpretations, signify that the social demands he represented and championed have disappeared. On the contrary, the election results indicate that post-liberal tendencies persist, but the current government has lost its ability to represent these demands.

The most significant indicator of this is that the dynamics underpinning the post-liberal quest remain firmly in place. The inequalities brought about by neoliberalism, the uncertainties arising from technological transformation, and the perceived cultural disintegration caused by liberal democracy continue to generate a strong need for security and meaning across broad sections of society. People still expect a political stance that delivers public services and defends their own values.

For this reason, the election results should be interpreted as a rearticulation of the social demands represented by post-liberalism, despite the fact that these demands are being discredited with labels such as populism, authoritarianism, and far-right extremism. When Orbán’s political platform could no longer meet these expectations, the electorate did not abandon that platform. Instead, they chose a new leader whom they believed could represent it more effectively. Thus, the transformation witnessed in the Hungarian elections is more indicative of a crisis of representation being resolved than an ideological rupture. Society did not change its demands; it simply updated its choice of who would represent them.

Why did Orbán lose?

The real breaking point that led to Orbán losing his 16-year reign was not the depletion of his ideological framework. As the standard-bearer of the post-liberal movement, Orbán began contradicting his own claims. Over time, he formed a new power bloc to replace the “corrupt elites” he had criticized. This network, centered on the distribution of state resources, became the focal point of accusations of corruption and nepotism.

In foreign policy, however, his decision to replace the “corrupt EU,” which he claimed was victimizing the Hungarian people through liberal democratic impositions, opposing moral values, and neoliberal economic policies, with Putin’s Russia and Trump’s U.S. began to backfire. The hegemonic rhetoric of foreign policy suffered as a result of the increasing visibility and influence of Russia and the U.S. Indeed, anti-elitist rhetoric has lost credibility and is now perceived as merely anti-EU.

Furthermore, the deterioration in economic performance has accelerated this crisis of legitimacy. Financial pressures arising from high inflation, interventionist policies, and tensions with the EU have undermined the government’s claims of “stability” and a “protective state.” Consequently, the disconnect between rhetoric and material reality has become more apparent. Orbán, the champion of the post-liberal movement he defines as “illiberal democracy,” was unable to maintain the moral and political framework he had established. This has led to the collapse of his credibility, reliability, consistency, and moral superiority claims. All of this has driven centrist voters, who were already opposed to Orbán and predominantly reside in major cities, as well as peripheral voters, where Orbán traditionally enjoys a high concentration of support, to seek an alternative.

The political significance of Magyar

Péter Magyar’s rise and electoral victory are most significant at this juncture. Magyar is neither a radical alternative nor an outsider to the political discourse established by Orbán. However, it cannot be said that he has abandoned Orbán’s ideology and “found the right path,” as is often assumed. On the contrary, Magyar is a figure who speaks a similar language yet promises to anchor it within a more rational, balanced, and trustworthy framework.

What sets Magyar apart is his promise to rebuild the political ground represented by Orbán and sustain it more honestly and fairly. Consequently, Magyar is not a representative of a classical liberal restoration, and his frequent emphasis on the rule of law should not be interpreted as such. He neither abandons the idea of a strong nation-state within the post-liberal framework nor entirely abandons the space for debate and politics of self-valorization opened up by the Orbán era. Instead, Magyar promises to embed post-liberalism and politics of self-valorization within a more rational, institutionalized, and sustainable framework. In this respect, Magyar does not aim to abandon the “post-liberal” approach t rather to fulfill their requirements honestly and successfully. Thus, the political significance of Peter Magyar should not be assessed as an ideological break in Hungarian politics but rather as a recalibration of the same line.

Taking all this into account, Magyar can essentially be described as the leader of a populist initiative that takes the form of “anti-Orbánism.” His strategy is based on an anti-corruption narrative and the idea of “cleansing the state of a handful of corrupt Orbánist elites.” This is a powerful manifestation of populism. By projecting an ethical stance, Magyar positions himself as a central figure in rebuilding a legitimate and just order. This is precisely the area that was most eroded during Orbán’s tenure, and Magyar has succeeded in winning over peripheral voters with this approach.

The difference in approach toward relations with the EU is also a significant indicator of anti-Orbánist populism in foreign policy. Unlike Orbán, who sometimes relies on a confrontational rhetorical style, Magyar aligns more closely with the principle of “a strong Hungary, a strong Europe” as a European nation. This approach largely stems from the perspective that Europe’s strategic autonomy is achievable through strong nation-states, which is somewhat anti-Russian and anti-American. Consequently, while Magyar’s ideology is similar to Orbán’s, his practical policies diverge.

The picture that emerges within this framework clearly demonstrates the following: Magyar embraces post-liberalism and promises to rescue it from Orbán’s grasp, purify it, and rebuild it through discipline. While preserving the mobilization generated by populism, Magyar aims to rebuild the institutional and economic foundations eroded by Orbán. In this respect, Magyar represents a more refined, accountable, and enduring version of post-liberalism. He seeks to reinforce this by upholding the same social sensitivities through the rule of law, institutional balance, and economic rationality.

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ulgaria’s Progressive Bulgaria coalition, led by former president Rumen Radev, was on course for a commanding victory in Sunday’s early parliamentary elections, according to near-final results released by the Central Election Commission (CEC) on Monday, raising the prospect of a single-party government in a country plagued by years of political instability.

With 87.2% of ballots counted as of 9:50 a.m. local time (0650 GMT), Progressive Bulgaria had secured 44.6% of the vote, maintaining a substantial lead over its rivals. The reformist We Continue the Change–Democratic Bulgaria coalition trailed in second place with 13.5%, narrowly ahead of the center-right GERB–SDS alliance, anchored by Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria, which stood at 13.3%.

The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), traditionally representing minority communities, garnered around 6.1%, while the nationalist Revival (Vazrazhdane) hovered just above the parliamentary threshold with approximately 4.4%.

A strong lead

Earlier preliminary results, based on a smaller share of counted votes, had already indicated a strong lead for Progressive Bulgaria, with support above 43%. Parallel vote counts conducted by polling agencies and reported by the state news agency BTA projected an even higher share nearing 45%, reinforcing expectations of a decisive outcome.

Seat projections based on partial results suggest Progressive Bulgaria could win around 134 seats in the 240-member National Assembly, comfortably surpassing the 121-seat threshold required to form a majority government. GERB–SDS and We Continue the Change–Democratic Bulgaria are projected to secure roughly 38 and 37 seats respectively, while MRF and Revival are expected to hold smaller blocs.

If confirmed, the result would mark a dramatic shift in Bulgaria’s political landscape, potentially ending a prolonged period of fragmentation that has seen the Balkan country hold eight parliamentary elections since 2021. Successive votes have failed to produce stable governing coalitions, leading to a cycle of short-lived administrations and caretaker governments appointed by the presidency.

Sunday’s election once again drew a crowded field, with 14 political parties and 10 alliances competing for seats. However, voter engagement remained subdued. The CEC reported turnout at just 34.63% as of 4:00 p.m. local time (1300 GMT) on election day, reflecting persistent public disillusionment with the political process.

Growing frustration with entrenched political elites

Analysts say Progressive Bulgaria’s surge reflects growing frustration with entrenched political elites and repeated governance failures. The coalition, which campaigned on promises of institutional reform, economic stability and a break from years of political deadlock, appears to have consolidated support across a broad segment of the electorate.

“The scale of this lead suggests voters are seeking a clear mandate and an end to the cycle of inconclusive elections,” said a Sofia-based political analyst. “Whether that translates into effective governance will depend on how the coalition manages internal cohesion and opposition pressure.”

Despite the strong showing, challenges remain. Bulgaria continues to grapple with economic disparities, corruption concerns and geopolitical pressures as a member of both the European Union and NATO. A decisive parliamentary majority could provide the political stability needed to pursue reforms, but expectations are likely to be high.

The CEC is required under Bulgarian law to announce final vote totals and the official seat distribution within four days of the election. The names of elected members of parliament must be published within seven days.

Until then, attention will remain focused on whether Progressive Bulgaria’s projected majority holds as the remaining ballots are counted. If it does, the result could mark the beginning of a new political chapter for Bulgaria after years of uncertainty and repeated trips to the polls.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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rominent left-leaning leaders from across the world are convening in Barcelona this weekend in a coordinated effort to strengthen progressive alliances and push back against the growing influence of far-right movements globally.

The gatherings are spearheaded by Spain’s Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez, and Brazil’s President, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who are co-hosting a series of high-level meetings bringing together political leaders, activists, and civil society representatives.

The initiative, dubbed the “Global Progressive Mobilization,” aims to rally support for multilateralism, democratic institutions, and coordinated action on issues such as climate change and social inequality. Organizers say the meetings will culminate in a joint declaration outlining shared priorities and strategies.

The summit comes amid shifting global dynamics, including policy changes under U.S. President Donald Trump, whose administration’s cuts to humanitarian aid, military actions, and critical stance toward NATO have unsettled traditional alliances and prompted renewed debate over international cooperation.

Prominent leaders to attend

Several prominent leaders are expected to attend, including South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum. Sheinbaum’s visit marks the first trip by a Mexican president to Spain since 2018, following years of diplomatic tensions related to historical grievances over Spain’s colonial legacy.

A parallel event organized by Spain’s ruling Socialist Party is set to draw around 3,000 participants, including current and former heads of state, hundreds of mayors, trade unions, and grassroots organizations. The two-day gathering will focus on mobilizing support for progressive policies and strengthening political networks across borders.

The meetings also reflect concerns among left-wing leaders following the rise of far-right parties in recent years, particularly after gains in the 2024 European Parliament elections. Organizers describe the Barcelona summit as a response to that trend, aiming to demonstrate that alternative political pathways remain viable.

International cooperation is important

Speaking ahead of the event, Sánchez emphasized the importance of international cooperation among progressive forces. “It is important that progressive parties and governments unite to show that there is something beyond domestic politics,” he said during a recent visit to China, where he met President Xi Jinping to discuss closer ties.

The summit follows recent political developments in Europe, including the electoral defeat of Hungarian nationalist leader Viktor Orbán, which Sánchez has pointed to as evidence that far-right momentum can be challenged.

Organizers say the overarching goal is to present a unified front against what they describe as “extreme right-wing movements” and to reinforce commitments to democratic governance and international collaboration.

The Barcelona meetings are expected to conclude with a joint statement from participating leaders, outlining coordinated efforts to address global challenges and strengthen progressive political movements worldwide.

(Source: Reuters)

U

.S. Vice President JD Vance has described Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s electoral defeat as “very bad” for the United States, while pledging that Washington would maintain strong relations with Hungary’s incoming government.

Speaking in an interview with Fox News on Monday, Vance acknowledged that the loss had been anticipated but expressed disappointment at the outcome. “We certainly knew there was a very good chance that Viktor would lose that election,” he said, referring to the U.S. administration’s backing of Orbán ahead of the vote. “He’s one of the few European leaders willing to stand up to the bureaucracy in Brussels.”

Vance praised Orbán’s 16-year tenure as “transformational,” portraying him as a key ally who challenged European Union policies that Washington has also criticized in recent years. Despite his concerns, Vance struck a pragmatic tone, emphasizing continuity in bilateral ties. “I’m sad that he lost. We’ll work very well, I’m sure, with the next prime minister of Hungary,” he said.

Hungary’s opposition leader Péter Magyar and his Tisza party secured a decisive victory in Sunday’s election, according to official results. Orbán conceded defeat shortly after, stating that his party would “serve our nation from the opposition,” marking a dramatic shift in Hungarian politics after more than a decade and a half of his leadership.

A blow to Netanyahu

Orbán’s defeat is also being closely watched in Israel, where Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has long counted the Hungarian leader among his closest European allies.

The relationship between the two leaders has been both ideological and strategic. Netanyahu publicly endorsed Orbán during the campaign, describing him in a pre-recorded message as a guarantor of “safety, security, and stability.” His son, Yair Netanyahu, has also cultivated ties with Orbán’s Fidesz party and attended campaign-related events in Budapest.

Following the election, Netanyahu referred to Orbán as a “true friend of Israel” in a social media statement, while also congratulating Magyar on his victory — signaling a careful diplomatic balancing act as Israel adjusts to the new political reality in Hungary.

The partnership between Netanyahu and Orbán has extended beyond rhetoric. In 2025, Hungary announced its withdrawal from the International Criminal Court after the court issued arrest warrants against Netanyahu related to the Gaza war. The move made Hungary one of the few countries where Netanyahu could travel without legal risk.

Orbán also played a key role within the European Union by blocking joint statements critical of Israel, leveraging the bloc’s requirement for unanimity in foreign policy decisions. His departure from power could therefore alter EU dynamics regarding Israel.

Inspiration for Israeli opposition

In Israel, Orbán’s defeat is being interpreted by opposition figures as a sign that entrenched political systems can be challenged successfully.

Efrat Rayten, a member of the left-leaning Democrat party, described the result as “a message of hope.” She argued that the outcome demonstrated that even leaders with significant control over institutions and media are not immune to electoral defeat.

“The idea that a leader who controls the institutions and the media is immune to defeat has been shattered,” Rayten told CNN. “The lesson for Israel is unity, perseverance, and faith in civil society.”

Since Netanyahu returned to power in 2023, critics have frequently pointed to Hungary under Orbán as a model of democratic backsliding. Protests against judicial reforms in Israel have often included the slogan “Israel will not become Hungary,” reflecting concerns about institutional weakening.

A March 2026 report by the Zulat think tank characterized Israel as moving toward a “partially authoritarian” system, drawing parallels with Orbán’s governance. While noting differences between the two leaders, the report argued that recent policies in Israel risk undermining democratic checks and balances.

Israel’s political landscape remains deeply fragmented

Despite the optimism among Netanyahu’s opponents, analysts caution that Orbán’s defeat does not guarantee similar outcomes elsewhere. Israel’s political landscape remains deeply fragmented, and opposition unity — cited as a key factor in Hungary’s election — has historically been difficult to achieve.

Rayten emphasized that electoral change requires sustained public engagement beyond formal political institutions. “Change does not happen only in the corridors of Parliament,” she said. “It begins in the streets, with people who refuse to give up.”

As Hungary prepares for a new government under Magyar, both Washington and Jerusalem are recalibrating their strategies. For the United States, the transition represents a test of its ability to maintain alliances despite political shifts. For Israel, it marks the loss of a reliable ally within Europe — and potentially, a symbolic moment in its own ongoing political debates.

(Source: CNN and Anadolu)

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n Germany, in September 2013, a new party narrowly missed entering the federal parliament (Bundestag) in its first election, receiving only 4.7% of the vote. The Alternative for Germany Party, or AfD for short, founded in April 2013, quickly completed the necessary registration requirements at the federal level and qualified to participate in the parliamentary elections. At the time, it was not surprising that the AfD, considered by many to be a populist, anti-European party fueled by conspiracy theories and making empty promises and threats in its political rhetoric, failed to enter parliament. Indeed, experts had stated that German voters would never show interest in such political movements.

The most unpredictable turning point in the political history of Germany, which was rebuilt after World War II, was the dismissal of the AfD after the 2013 federal parliamentary elections, and its being seen as a politically insignificant movement. This policy of ignoring the AfD shaped the political attitude towards it. It paved the way for the unstoppable rise of the AfD in Germany, which began with the 2014 European Parliament elections. At the same time, it created rifts in the German social structure, opening the way for far-right and populist movements like PEGIDA and helping the AfD to build voter support.

Far-right movements in Europe, long ignored as in Germany, began to emerge as a rooted political movement from 2010 onwards. In January 2017, the “ENF (Europa der Nationen und der Freiheit)” political group in the European Parliament met in Koblenz, Germany. This meeting witnessed some very interesting encounters and statements. Nearly 40 far-right representatives from 9 countries that had far-right parties represented in the European Parliament at the time attended this meeting.

Led by Marie Le Pen of the French Front National, the meeting also featured speakers including Geert Wilders from the Netherlands, Frauke Petry from the AfD leadership in Germany, and Matteo Salvini representing the Lega Nord in Italy. The outcome of the meeting was quite alarming: Nine far-right European parties, led by Le Pen, who describe the European Union as an oppressive regime for the European people, pledged a new European future, declaring that the current EU and world system has ended and that the construction of a new future has begun.

The Bannon effect on the European far right

Another significant event at the Koblenz meeting was the celebration of Trump’s election as U.S. President in 2017 by representatives of European far-right movements, who called for a new wave of freedom in Europe, a “European Nationalism.” Even today, many consider the Koblenz meeting, although Steve Bannon did not directly attend, to be one of the first movements in Europe within the context of his “Global Populism” network, and the first example of the European far-right movement becoming jointly visible on the international stage.

Bannon’s success in Trump’s election, his subsequent impeachment, and his then-return to Europe present a rather interesting chain of events. His active involvement in European politics through “The Movement,” a Brussels-based foundation he established in 2017, his overt efforts to create a far-right, anti-EU supergroup within the European Parliament, and the similarities between these actions and the call made by far-right political parties at a meeting in Koblenz in 2017 are all highly noteworthy.

Following the Koblenz meeting, an examination of undeniable connections reveals that Steve Bannon met with numerous far-right populist politicians and political party officials in 2018-2019. One of Bannon’s biggest admirers is the leader of the Dutch PVV party, Geert Wilders. Many other far-right or right-wing populist politicians, including Alice Weidel of the AfD, Matteo Salvini of the Lega, UKIP leader Nigel Farage, Marine Le Pen of France, and Giorgia Meloni of Italy, also frequently met with Bannon.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Czech President Zeman are also among those who have met with Bannon in the past. His participation in Le Pen’s party general assembly in France in 2018, and his invitation to a conference in the Bundestag by the AfD, are examples of the unhidden connections within the Populist/Global Network that Bannon is trying to build.

Prior to the EU Parliament elections in May 2019, Bannon made various efforts to unite the European far right. Although his target of one-third of the vote was not achieved in the 2019 European Parliament elections, Bannon provided the European far right with an unprecedented opportunity, creating a political network of far-right and populist groups across Europe and even across the Atlantic.

Just as there was a tendency to ignore the rise of the far right, a large media outlet, looking at the results of the 2019 EU Parliament elections, lamented Bannon’s failure. However, what seemed like a failure to those trying to save the day, or even the moment, for European politics, actually brought together the European far right and populist political base. Bannon’s intervention gave further impetus to the European far right and populist movements. In Germany, the AfD became the main opposition party in the federal parliament after the 2017 Federal Parliament elections. In the 2025 elections, it increased its number of members in parliament to 152 as the main opposition party.

The far-right on the rise in Europe

In 2023, Wilders’ party PVV emerged as the leading party in the Dutch elections. In last year’s Czech elections, the right-wing populist party ANO, with Andre Babis, won as the leading party. Marine Le Pen reached the second round twice against Macron in the French presidential elections and lost, but increased her vote share each time. The party, formerly known as Front National, changed its name to Rassemblement National (RN) and won the local elections as the leading party. It is highly likely to be the leading party again in the elections to be held in March 2026. Furthermore, Le Pen is considered a sure winner of the 2027 presidential elections – providing she remains eligible to run.

The situation is no different across Europe. Far-right radical parties and right-wing populist parties, which have a significant presence in national elections, entered the EU Parliament in the 2024 elections with 187 members in three different groups. In the EU Parliament, far-right and right-wing radical parties formed a group under the name European Patriots (Patriots.eu), while anti-EU right-wing parties such as the European Conservatives and Innovators (ECR) and far-right radical parties like the AfD formed a group under the name ESN (Europe of Sovereign Nations). These far-right parties, constantly appearing to be seeking innovation and new directions across the EU, have increased their number of members in the parliament through name changes. The common characteristic of these groups is their anti-EU skeptical nature.

News that the Trump administration would focus on Italy, Austria, Poland, and Hungary leaving the EU, as outlined in the National Security Document (NSS) released in the U.S. in December 2025, sent shockwaves across Europe. While the White House denied these statements were included in the NSS, the fact that Bannon could, even years later, achieve his goal of creating an anti-European movement seems quite plausible after witnessing the examples of UKIP and Brexit.

Examinations of the released Epstein files indicate that Epstein and Bannon corresponded regularly between 2018 and 2019 regarding European politicians and the European far right and populist right-wing movements. In these communications, Bannon reportedly shared information about his influence on right-wing movements in Europe, specifying which politicians and parties he advised, and even naming the parties and politicians involved. While the AfD has not denied the portion of the conversations related to them, they have stated that the allegations of receiving advice from Bannon are untrue.

Anti-EU sentiment – ​​anti-immigrant sentiment – ​​Islamophobia

From the perspective of far-right and populist right-wing movements, it is possible to state that far-right political movements in Europe share three distinct common narratives. These narratives are: opposition to the European Union or the withdrawal of their countries from the European Union; xenophobia and hostility towards immigrants and foreigners, aiming to eliminate immigration to Europe; and the exclusion of Islam from the public sphere in Europe, imposing bans on Islam at the national level and restricting the rights of Muslims. According to AfD ideologue Björn Höcke, Muslims, considered foreign elements in Europe, should be expelled east of the Bosphorus. Bannon’s statements also periodically emphasize the need for a “very strict and aggressive stance against radical Islam.”

Another point worth emphasizing is the emboldening of far-right and populist movements in Europe following Trump’s re-election for a second term. It is noteworthy that these movements have brought Trump’s MAGA (Make America Great Again) or America First slogans to Europe. Babis’s campaign in the Czech Republic with the slogan “Czech Republic First,” and Hungarian Prime Minister Orban’s implementation of the MEGA (“Make Europe Great Again”) slogan during Hungary’s rotating presidency, demonstrate the spread of a different kind of Trumpism across Europe.

The stance of the Visegrad countries, members of the EU, on anti-immigrant sentiment has long been well-known. In other Western European countries, anti-immigrant sentiment and the halting of immigration are at the forefront of the main election slogans of political parties. Trump’s claims that Europe will lose its identity due to immigration by the end of 2025, and that the continent is destroying itself due to an immigrant invasion, have strengthened the rhetoric of right-wing populist and far-right parties in Europe. Even at the local level, in the German state of Bavaria, the AfD party has included in its party program the possibility of establishing a special team called AFA (Refugee Search and Deportation Police), similar to ICE in the U.S., if they come to power in that state.

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he European populist right is distancing itself from its origins as it searches for its identity. In a sense, Europe is abandoning itself. Faced with mounting migratory pressure, Europeans are attempting to create a divide between themselves and the newcomers. Yet the Enlightenment established civilized relations between individuals, not societies. The European value system claimed universality.

The phenomenon that legitimized colonialism in continental Europe was this claim of universality. In response, European thought sought ways to live in a multicultural, post-secular society. However, the popular response of European peoples manifested itself in the abandonment of this claim. They will need more time to realize that abandoning the claim to universality also means abandoning the hierarchy of civilizations.

Recognizing the decline

The European value system, based on the Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment, claimed universality and established a hierarchy among civilizations, while also creating a world system. Although not everyone believed in the system, it was important to be seen as part of it and to participate in its rituals, since the system operated in a Eurocentric manner. For around sixty years, dozens of institutions formed around the United Nations were revered as churches, determining the rituals of the new world order. These institutions collaborated with complementary elements of American capitalism, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO.

First, Europe abandoned the claims of its own value system. Then, the rest of the world lost faith in these values. Finally, the organizations that regulated the capitalist market lost their meaning. Furthermore, it has only recently become apparent that these developments signify a collapse rather than a transition. Those who argue that it is a transition claim that the world system is now dominated by five major powers, and that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council have lost their significance. They expect another country to join the US, China, the EU and Russia as the fifth member. Those who speak of the collapse of the system argue that the world is bigger than five.

Europe was not as accustomed to living with different cultures as it claimed to be. The Catholic and Protestant worlds of Europe had always demonstrated their quest for homogeneity through historical massacres. When the Enlightenment replaced religion, this quest for homogeneity became secularized within the context of nationalism. The Holocaust emerged as the catastrophe of modernity’s divisive quest for homogeneity.

After the Second World War, the economy took precedence over politics and the global market necessitated the legitimization of multicultural societies. However, the balance of the world system was disrupted by Turkey’s application for EU membership, the political crisis that began with Islamophobic attacks and the 2008 economic crisis. The influx of refugees, which peaked in 2015, and the shock of the pandemic after 2019 further intensified these crises. The Gaza massacre marked the point at which universal values were exhausted. By the beginning of the 21st century, Europe had lost its economic, political and human credibility.

Europe benefiting

The United States and Russia are the only remaining powers in a depleted Europe. The United States is anxious to protect its economic interests, while Russia is striving to preserve its political presence. Both powers seek to control the continent’s remaining countries, as if to demonstrate that they are not part of Europe. Each power engages with Europe’s populist right and supports nationalist and separatist political movements for different reasons. What they have in common is that neither wants a strong EU.

A fragmented Europe, akin to the Middle Ages, would retain its economic production and market power, but lose its political significance. Unable to produce even a common foreign policy, let alone the planned common army, Europe is doomed to remain an economic community without political will. The protectionist and passive stance of European nationalists coincides with the interests of non-European powers. This is why the populist right in Europe is simultaneously supported by both the US and Russia.

The US, keen to exert influence over the court ruling on Le Pen, is using Greenland as a pretext to crush Europe’s political power. By frightening markets with customs duties, the US is taking advantage of European peoples’ inability to protect their welfare. Meanwhile, Russia was aware that Europe could not fight back when it attacked Ukraine, which is under EU protection both politically and economically. Driven by a desire to preserve welfare without military engagement, Europe is facing significant challenges in both the economic and security spheres. With its market under threat from the US and its security architecture under threat from Russia, it seems unlikely that Europe will be able to preserve its political unity. The likelihood of Europe becoming more fragmented is quite high. Concerned about preserving their own identities, European populations are also being drawn towards federalism and ‘direct democracy’.

The main issue for those who support the European populist right is freedom of expression. However, what is actually meant by freedom of expression, as reflected in the names of Dutch and Austrian European populist right parties, is the ability to espouse views that do not align with democratic values. As provocations and rhetoric designed to attract media attention are increasingly framed in terms of freedom of expression, the fight against disinformation is becoming increasingly important in European countries. Legal regulations legitimized through disinformation originating particularly from Russia are also affecting the European populist right.

Independence

Another facet of freedom is independence. Russia views the European populist right as representing the people against the elites. Therefore, it supports the independence of European peoples in their opposition to their own elites. In European populist literature, politics against the elites is politics against the ‘established parties’. Europe’s established system also tries to prevent populists from participating in decision-making processes by drawing political boundaries.

In every European country, from Austria and the Netherlands to Italy and Hungary and the Czech Republic, politics now revolves around those in favor of and those opposed to integration with the EU. However, from the perspective of the European populist right, the sides in the political struggle are not pro-EU and anti-EU, but real people and Europeanized elites. It is hardly surprising that US populists also claim to support the ‘real people’. In this context, Musk’s speech of support at the AfD congress could be seen as an attempt to free the ‘real people’ from elite domination.

Another favorite topic of the populist right is ‘direct democracy’. The Swiss model of direct Democracy and confederalism are presented as a formula to save the EU’s political existence, but they actually conceal a Europe that has lost its political unity and declined in power. Paradoxically, therefore, the proponents of plebiscitary democracy, supported by both the US and Russia, are the European peoples themselves, who are concerned about preserving their identities. Those who advocate federal ideas based on the romantic notion that a unified political structure will emerge from a world of satisfied social interests also belong to the European populist right.

Another argument of the European populist right is that they alone can internalize the system of democratic values. This tendency makes the European populist right defensive and passive. The exclusionary tendencies of European peoples now stem not from a claim to greatness, but from a claim to authenticity. However, this claim to authenticity is increasingly diminishing amid new divisions. For example, this tendency towards division is evident among Germans, Bavarians and Munich residents. In the French populist right, the shift from Jean-Marie Le Pen’s view of French superiority to Marine Le Pen’s view of protecting ‘Frenchness’ represents an intellectual contraction. Such tendencies towards contraction and isolation are naturally supported by both the US and Russia.

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uropean leaders used the final day of the Munich Security Conference to counter sharp criticism from Washington, with the EU’s top diplomat rejecting what she called “Europe-bashing” and dismissing claims that the continent risks cultural or political collapse.

Kaja Kallas said talk of a declining, “woke” Europe was detached from reality.

“Contrary to what some may say, ‘woke, decadent Europe’ is not facing civilizational erasure,” she told delegates, arguing that the European project continues to draw interest from far beyond the continent.

Kallas welcomed remarks from Marco Rubio a day earlier stressing that the United States and Europe are historically bound together.

“The message that we heard is that America and Europe are intertwined, have been in the past and will be in the future. I think this is important,” she said.

But she cautioned that disputes will endure. “It is also clear that we don’t see eye to eye on all the issues, and this will remain the case.”

Roots of the dispute

Tensions flared after a U.S. national security strategy released in December warned that European migration trends and political choices could leave the continent “unrecognizable” within decades. European commentators reacted with alarm, with newspapers such as Le Monde saying readers were stunned by language suggesting Europe was engaged in “civilizational erasure.”

The document also accused European governments of limiting free speech and suppressing opposition, despite high press-freedom rankings across EU member states.

American officials in recent years have frequently framed their concerns using arguments critics link to the so-called “great replacement” narrative, an idea that has circulated widely in far-right movements.

In his own address, Rubio sought to soften the atmosphere, insisting the trans-Atlantic partnership remains fundamental even as Washington pushes hard on issues such as immigration, trade and climate.

He said the United States does not seek a break with Europe, a line many participants viewed as an attempt to steady relations after months of uncertainty.

Russia and Ukraine front and center

Beyond the exchange with Washington, Kallas urged Europeans to remain firm toward Russia as diplomatic efforts continue to explore ways to end the war in Ukraine.

“Let’s be clear-eyed about Russia. Russia is no superpower,” she said, describing the country as “broken” and warning that Moscow must not be allowed to secure more through negotiations than it has achieved militarily.

She argued that Europe’s security “starts in Ukraine” and said any settlement should involve limits on Russia’s military capacity, reparations for damage caused by the invasion and accountability for war crimes.

Other officials echoed the need for Europe to rely more on itself. Benjamin Haddad, France’s minister for European affairs, said Europeans should concentrate less on comforting words from U.S. speeches and more on strengthening their own defenses.

“The worst lesson we could draw,” he said, would be to relax instead of accelerating rearmament and support for Kyiv.

Despite the friction, Kallas said Rubio’s comments confirmed that the bond across the Atlantic remains real, even if increasingly complex.

Differences over migration, climate and trade are likely to persist, she said, but the task now is to manage them while preserving cooperation on shared security challenges.

If you want, I can adapt this into a punchier front-page style, a broadcast script, or a shorter news agency brief.

(Source: AFP)

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enter-left Socialist candidate António José Seguro won a commanding victory in Portugal’s presidential runoff, defeating hard-right populist André Ventura and securing a five-year term in the country’s largely ceremonial but influential top office.

With almost all ballots counted, Seguro captured roughly two-thirds of the vote, while Ventura received about one-third, according to official results.

The election was widely seen as a test of how far Portugal might follow the rightward political shifts visible elsewhere in Europe. Ventura, leader of the anti-establishment Chega (“Enough”) party, has surged in recent years and heads the second-largest force in parliament. His advance to the runoff already marked a breakthrough for the far right in a country that, since the end of dictatorship in 1974, has largely kept extremist parties at the margins.

A moderate consensus builder

Seguro, a veteran Socialist politician, campaigned as a moderate consensus builder. He pledged to work constructively with Portugal’s center-right minority government and won support from mainstream figures across the political spectrum who were eager to contain the rise of populism.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen quickly congratulated Seguro, saying Portugal’s commitment to shared European values remained strong.

Ventura, known for his theatrical speaking style and sharp criticism of immigration and traditional politics, said he would continue pushing for what he called a political “transformation” of the country. Despite losing, he significantly expanded his national profile and confirmed his party’s staying power.

Portugal’s presidency carries limited day-to-day executive authority. However, the head of state can veto legislation and, in exceptional circumstances, dissolve parliament and trigger early elections, powers that can prove decisive during times of instability.

That may be particularly relevant after Portugal held several general elections in recent years, reflecting one of the most turbulent political periods in decades.

Seguro will be sworn in next month, replacing outgoing President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, who is stepping down after serving the maximum two terms.

(Source: Aljazeera, the Assosicated Press)

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ne common feature of European populist parties has been their anti-establishment and alternative claims. They desired radical changes, such as opposition to the EU or NATO, or opposition to the common currency. However, over time, they have become more compatible with both global power and national hierarchies. They have not shied away from making concessions in order to realise their policies through power rather than by remaining in opposition. One of the most important reasons for the existence of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party was the 2015 refugee influx and Merkel’s acceptance of it with her ‘we can do it’ motto.

What popularised the AfD, however, were its ‘remigration’ policies based on opposition to refugees. When it was founded in 2013, it was a party of anti-EU conservative liberal professors and senior executives, feeding on elitist reactions rather than being a people’s party.

The 2015 refugee influx, accompanied by Islamophobic connotations and the fears it brought, helped the AfD movement gain traction within society, with nationalist radicals within the party coming to the fore. When the riots and assaults during New Year’s celebrations in Cologne at the end of 2015 were blamed on North Africans, the AfD’s rhetoric and fears had already found their social counterpart.

A party looking to the future

At the beginning of 2015, despite losing popularity after an internal power struggle, the party’s support surged from 3% to over 10% following the refugee influx and Merkel’s famous ‘We can do it’ statement. However, the party still lacked a clearly defined programme. The party, which had undergone a change in leadership, saw different factions rallying behind different names. It was filled with small groups of leaders comprising libertarians, conservatives and radical nationalists.

Populist parties such as the AfD position themselves not as nationalist parties looking to the past, but rather as parties focused on the future. Therefore, instead of reckoning with the past, they take on the task of cleansing the future. The AfD speaks not of a thousand years of history, but of a thousand years of hope. A protectionism based on the future rather than on past superiority distances populist parties from ‘crime’. Ultimately, there is no place for refugees in their clean future. In this context, they consider themselves protective rather than exclusionary.

Rather than ridding themselves of the dregs of the past, they are sanitising the future. Ultimately, this kind of pacifist attitude also protects populist parties from encountering criminal law. On the other hand, Höcke, one of the party’s radicals, makes subtextual references to the ‘thousand-year Reich’ when talking about the future, which actually shows that the message is intended to hit home. Furthermore, the AfD’s use of the term ‘old parties’ when referring to parties outside its own ranks can also be considered part of its future-oriented politics.

When it was first established, the AfD relied on conservative upper-middle-class reactions based on opposition to the single currency and the EU, while also managing to garner the reactions of the lower classes during the 2015 refugee wave. Today, however, it can easily abandon or postpone its policy of reducing the number of refugees and foreigners in order to share power. Moreover, it does not include the supremacy of the dominant culture, with its nationalist connotations, in its programme.

The understanding of dominant culture based on establishing a cultural hierarchy has been replaced by a more pacifist claim to preserve culture. In this sense, it is increasingly taking the place of conservative right-wing parties. The political stance defending German dominant culture (leitkultur) and based on opposition to refugees made the AfD the leading party in the last decade but failed to bring it into power. The AfD parliamentary group has seen that the path to sharing power lies in compromising on dominant culture and opposition to refugees and has therefore not hesitated to change its political stance.

The desire for power and east Germany

Across Europe, there is a growing tendency for populist parties to seek power through Melonization. Pragmatic populism increases its concessions on core policies as it approaches power. One of the common characteristics of European populist parties is their pragmatism regarding power. Populist parties that have managed to transform their anti-Semitism into Islamophobia, which is less harmful to them and even gains them sympathy, and their belief in the superiority of their own nation into claims that preserve their political identity, have few principles they will not abandon on the path to power. The development of the AfD is somewhat different. Other populist parties in Europe have come to power with radical rhetoric and gradually abandoned it on their path to power.

The AfD, on the other hand, presented itself with liberal and conservative rhetoric such as opposition to the euro and reached around 5 per cent, found its footing with radical rhetoric such as opposition to refugees and Islam, but finally surpassed 20 per cent with claims of preserving the dominant culture and reverse migration, softening its exclusionary rhetoric in order to share power. Its emergence as the leading party with around 25 per cent in the latest opinion polls has triggered the AfD’s desire for power, and the harshness of its rhetoric has softened. On the other hand, the Christian Democrats have directed their opposition particularly towards Chancellor Merz in order to force him into a coalition with them.

The conservative right, based on Christian Democrats, has long sought to counter populist parties by adopting their slogans, thereby further legitimising parties such as the AfD within the political spectrum. The opposition to power-sharing with populist parties, constructed like a ‘firewall’ in German politics, is losing its meaning as the AfD grows. The fact that the coalition does not allow any party to implement only its own policies also leads to populist parties accusing conservatives of not keeping their word. Parties that consider themselves large enough to share power, such as the AfD, are particularly putting pressure on conservative parties and forcing them into coalition with themselves.

Reactions rather than political concepts

They readily soften their political claims in order to overcome the political firewall that excludes them. It still seems sociologically impossible for parties like the AfD, which are based on reactions rather than political concepts, to have the majority needed to govern the country alone. Therefore, they must enter into a coalition and share power. Their quick abandonment of the political claims reflected in their slogans is actually partly due to their sociological limitations.

The AfD draws a large portion of its social support from East Germany. In a sense, East German opposition to reunification is concentrated in the AfD. East Germans perceive reunification as an unequal relationship and believe they have no influence in German politics. Although the proportion of foreigners in their cities is not high, their location on the front lines of the refugee influx fuels xenophobia. They are also not in line with the federal government’s anti-Russian policies. Russia, with whom they have collaborated for many years, is not an enemy in the eyes of East Germans.

On the other hand, while struggling with economic backwardness, they also find the environmental and green policies of the West German welfare state unnecessary. For this reason, the party they are furthest from is the Greens. However, apart from the CDU, the other traditional parties already have a significant share of the vote. Apart from the CDU, they have no serious political rival other than Sahra Wagenknecht’s Union (BSW), which has culturally right-wing and economically left-wing policies.

Their belief that East Germany’s backwardness and political problems can only be solved with strong leadership strengthens their inclination towards the AfD. On the other hand, the migration of qualified and young people from East Germany due to underdevelopment, while older and less educated people remain behind, also increases the tendency towards parties such as the AfD. Like other populist parties, the AfD also relies heavily on the theme that the people have been abandoned by the elite and those in power.

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he European Union is at a crossroads: it is struggling to deal with vital issues such as the Russian threat and the energy crisis, and trying to build a Europe that is more independent of the U.S. through greater cooperation with its neighbors. In 2024, Europe faces a busy agenda, including Russia’s war against Ukraine, Trump’s possible return as U.S. president, and EU parliamentary elections.

As we leave 2023 behind, the shattering events of the past period are challenging the European Union (EU) and all political actors. While the EU has been busy implementing its twin transformation agendas of the green consensus and digitalization, it has had to confront a changing geopolitical environment, first with the COVID-19 crisis, and then Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the growing energy crisis.

All these factors have led the EU to focus on urgent action. While Europe appeared more united at the beginning of the Ukraine crisis, the protracted war has led to the emergence of divergent voices. Finally, Israel’s response to Hamas’s attacks started badly and got worse.

The Russia-Ukraine war and the EU enlargement process

The 27 member states of the European Union have repeatedly expressed their commitment to providing Ukraine with all necessary assistance to defend its territory, fearing that a potential Russian victory could threaten the security of Europe as a whole. But as the war has dragged on, the spirit of solidarity and determination in Europe has waned. Decisions on providing financial aid to Ukraine are becoming increasingly difficult within the EU. The strategy of leaving it up to Kyiv to decide whether or not to open negotiations with Russia could be revisited in 2024.

EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has stated, “Our goal is a just and lasting peace, not a frozen conflict. The best way to bring stability and prosperity to Ukraine is EU membership. Europe can be the solution for a resurgent Ukraine.”

Von der Leyen’s comments were seen by many member states as premature and a step too far. Full membership talks with Ukraine and Moldova are due to start in 2024. Possible EU membership for war-torn Ukraine would be extremely costly for the Union. For this reason, even Poland and the Baltic states, two of Ukraine’s biggest political supporters, are hesitant and uneasy about opening negotiations with Kyiv: Ukraine’s accession to the EU would mean that member states would become Brussels’s paymasters rather than Brussels’s recipients. EU officials are trying to reassure nervous members that negotiations are just the beginning and that full membership could be years, if not decades, away.

The countries of the Western Balkans, some of which have been waiting at the EU’s doorstep for almost 20 years and all of which want to join, are watching with suspicion as Ukraine and Moldova try to become full members at record speed. Montenegro, Albania, and North Macedonia are expected to be given a concrete date for full membership, partly to reduce Russian and Chinese influence. Prospects are less rosy for Serbia and Kosovo, where ethnic conflicts are holding back progress.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other hand, is only slowly shedding its image as a dysfunctional state. Its biggest obstacle will be the potential struggle between Bosnian Serbs and other ethnic groups, provoked by Russia.

Proceedings against these two countries for breaches of the rule of law have stalled. Hungary’s anti-EU prime minister, Viktor Orbán, is likely to remain in power in 2024. There is hope for Poland, however, with former EU Council president and pro-European liberal Donald Tusk taking power in Warsaw.

When eight Central and Eastern European countries, Malta, and the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU 20 years ago, Brussels reluctantly adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, which is still in force and establishes the basis for the Union’s internal order (functioning as a form of constitution). The debate on updating this treaty will be much more relevant in 2024.

Meanwhile, EU citizens are far removed from these discussions. According to the Eurobarometer survey, 60% of EU citizens complain that they do not have enough influence on decisions taken in Brussels, yet they are generally optimistic about the future of the EU. Surprisingly, France is the least optimistic, given that it is one of the founding countries of the Union. The optimism rate there is less than 50%. The most optimistic citizens are the Danes, with 86%. In Germany, 58% are optimistic about the development of the EU in 2024.

Regional and global challenges

Europe’s response to the Gaza crisis started badly and got worse. The war in Ukraine gave the EU an opportunity to gain some geopolitical prominence. In the face of the war, the Union produced a number of policies, such as paying for arms to be sent in response to Russian aggression. But it failed to show the same unity and resolve when it tried to project a strong EU in response to the Israeli attacks on Gaza. Some European countries, notably Ursula von der Leyen’s Germany, instinctively sided with Israel and emphasized its right to defend itself. But others, such as Spain and Ireland, are more concerned with the plight of the Palestinians, warning of a humanitarian catastrophe. While Ukraine unites the continent, the Israeli conflict has the potential to divide it.

These developments undermine von der Leyen, who has been the face of a stronger and more geopolitical Europe since the Russo-Ukrainian war. The EU’s and von der Leyen’s influence extended beyond Ukraine. In a speech in March 2023, von der Leyen called for “de-risking” rather than “decoupling” economic relations with China, setting a new tone in relations with that country; she also has worked closely with the United States. New buzzwords such as “strategic autonomy” and “Team Europe” suggested that the bloc would play a full role in geopolitics as a third power in a bipolar world.

In terms of relations with the United States, the return of Donald Trump to the White House as president, despite the lawsuits against him, could mean the beginning of difficult times not only for the EU but also for NATO. Ukraine’s most important ally in terms of support, deterrence against Russia, and trade could be left out in the cold. If Trump becomes president again, Brussels would be forced to take over much of the military aid to Ukraine to avoid offending the unpredictable U.S. politician.

The German-American Chamber of Commerce predicts that Trump could punish Europe with high tariffs if he wins the presidency. In such a case, the EU would also have to raise tariffs and other fees against the U.S. This would likely trigger a new trade war, which would mean lower U.S.-European trade volumes and slower economic growth.

The worst-case scenario, say foreign policy experts in Brussels, is that if Trump worsens relations with China, the main trading partner of many European countries, the world could be set on an even more unstable path than it already is.

European elections in 2024 and possible scenarios

There will be nine parliamentary elections in Europe in 2024, most of which are expected to result in either a change of government or significant policy shifts in the countries concerned. Political fragmentation is therefore likely to become even more pronounced in Europe in 2024. Stable majorities for governments will be harder to come by, and countries governed by coalitions are likely to have to rely on multi-party agreements, further fueling political fragmentation across Europe.

Challenges such as the existence of a minority government in France, growing instability and infighting in Germany and Austria, the recent collapse of the coalition and election victory of the far-right Wilders in the Netherlands, and the reliance on small hardline parties in Spain will continue to constrain policymaking.

Growing discontent with the political establishment in general means that mainstream parties are also shifting towards more radical policies espoused by the far right and far left, especially on migration. In Austria, in particular, the far right is likely to enter government after the September 2024 elections, potentially becoming the largest party. In Portugal, early elections have been called for March 2024 after the fall of the government in November 2023. Polls suggest that the right-wing bloc, backed by the far-right Chega (Enough!) party, has a good chance of forming the next government in the country.

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lovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico expressed his support for Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s veto on a €50 billion European Union financial aid package for Ukraine. During a joint press conference in Budapest, Fico criticized Brussels for attempting to “punish” Hungary over its stance on funds for Ukraine.

Fico firmly stated that as long as he leads the Slovak government, he will not agree to a country being punished for defending its sovereignty.

Orbán, who has been in a standoff with other EU leaders, including a clash at the December European Council summit, argued against allocating funds from the EU budget for Ukraine.

He proposed a separate budget for aid to Ukraine to prevent any negative impact on the EU budget. Orbán reiterated that he does not want to jointly take up a loan and stressed the importance of aiding Ukraine in a way that does not harm the EU’s budget.

50 billion financial support plan

The €50 billion financial support plan for Ukraine, requiring unanimity, faced opposition from Hungary due to concerns about corruption in Ukraine, the effectiveness of Western support in the conflict, and the principle of EU budget support for member countries. Despite pressure from other EU leaders, Orbán remained steadfast in his position.

The EU leaders are set to discuss the issue at a summit on February 1, and Brussels is exploring ways to overcome Orbán’s veto. Last week, 120 Members of the European Parliament signed a petition urging actions to limit Hungary’s voting rights.

However, Fico supported Orbán’s proposal to find alternative sources for aid to Ukraine and criticized the EU for attempting to curtail Hungary’s voting rights. The upcoming summit will likely play a crucial role in shaping the EU’s approach to financial support for Ukraine and its long-term budget revisions.

EU budget

“If we aim to provide assistance to Ukraine, a necessity that I strongly advocate, we must ensure it doesn’t adversely impact the EU budget,” stated Orbán on Tuesday.

EU leaders are scheduled for another meeting on Feb. 1 to negotiate a deal on the financial package, with Orbán’s influential veto power remaining a significant factor.

Fico, expressing his support for Orbán’s stance, endorsed the idea of splitting the funding into four installments, subject to annual reassessment and potential blocking.

“I eagerly anticipate our gathering on Feb. 1 in Brussels, where we will observe and fully understand your rightful advocacy, as initiated during the last European Council meeting,” Fico conveyed to Orbán.

Sources: Anadolu, Politico, and Reuters

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n a significant move, far-right Dutch politician Geert Wilders, the leader of the Party for Freedom (PVV), announced on January 8, 2024, that he is withdrawing a controversial 2018 proposal that called for the ban on mosques and the Quran. This decision, seen as a crucial concession to potential coalition partners, comes just a day before the resumption of talks to form the next government following the November 2023 elections.

Wilders’ withdrawal of the legislation is considered a key step in gaining the trust and support of three mainstream parties that he aims to include in a coalition government alongside the PVV. One of the party leaders, Pieter Omtzigt of the New Social Contract, had raised concerns about the compatibility of some of Wilders’ policies with the Dutch Constitution, which upholds liberties, including freedom of religion.

The proposed legislation, dating back to 2018, was part of a series of laws presented by Wilders that aimed to restrict what he labeled as “Islamic expressions.” The bill characterized Islam as a “violent, totalitarian ideology” and called for the prohibition of mosques, the Quran, Islamic schools, as well as the wearing of burqas and niqabs. The decision to withdraw this legislation indicates a potential softening of the PVV’s strident anti-Islam stance.

Wilders’ more moderate position

During a parliamentary debate last year, following the PVV’s success in winning 37 seats in the 150-seat lower house of the Dutch parliament in the November 2023 general election, Wilders hinted at a more moderate position regarding his party’s anti-Islam policies. This move is seen as an effort to align the PVV’s proposals with the Dutch Constitution, addressing concerns raised by potential coalition partners.

In response to the withdrawal of the legislation, Wilders stated during the parliamentary debate, “Sometimes I will have to withdraw proposals, and I will do that. I will show the Netherlands, the legislature, Mr. Omtzigt’s party — anybody who wants to hear it — that we will adapt our rules to the constitution and bring our proposals in line with it.”

Wilders is scheduled to resume coalition talks on January 9, 2024, with Pieter Omtzigt and the leaders of two other parties: the center-right People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy led by outgoing Prime Minister Mark Rutte and the Farmer Citizen Movement led by Caroline van der Plas.

Laws lack majority vote

Wilders presented the three laws to the parliament in 2017, 2018, and 2019; however, they failed to secure a majority in the lower house.

Regarding the suggested ban on Islamic expressions, the Council of State, an independent legislative watchdog, recommended Wilders discard the proposal. In a 2019 advisory statement, the council stated, “The Advisory Division urges the initiators to reject the bill as it is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the democratic constitutional state, principles that the initiators aim to safeguard.”

The withdrawal of the controversial legislation marks a significant development in Dutch politics, showcasing a potential shift in the PVV’s approach and creating room for broader cooperation within the political landscape.

Source: The Associated Press

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n a surprising turn of events, Geert Wilders, an anti-Islam and Euroskeptic politician, is projected to be the unexpected winner of the Dutch election. According to an initial exit poll, his Party for Freedom (PVV) is expected to secure around 35 of the 150 seats in parliament, which is more than double the number they won in the previous election in 2021. This outcome is likely to have a significant impact on European politics.

Frans Timmermans’s Labor-Green alliance came in second place, winning 25 seats, a significant increase from their current 17 seats. Dilan Yeşilgöz, who is set to succeed outgoing Prime Minister Mark Rutte as the leader of the center-right People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) party, is projected to win 24 seats, which represents a loss of 10 seats according to the exit poll conducted by the national broadcaster NOS.

Yeşilgöz, who has made notable anti-Turkey statements throughout her political career, is recognized for her stance against immigration despite being an immigrant herself. Earlier this year, as Minister of Justice and Security she indicated that police officers and special investigating officers should be “neutral” and not wear a headscarf (hijab) at their work.

Forming a coalition government with Wilders?

However, the question remains whether other parties would be willing to form a coalition government with Wilders, as he would lack a majority in parliament despite being the largest party. In the past decade, mainstream party leaders have refused to work with Wilders in power-sharing arrangements. Nevertheless, in recent weeks, Wilders has expressed his desire to be part of a coalition after this election, downplaying his radical views on Islam and emphasizing other priorities.

The PVV still includes anti-Islam measures in its government program, such as banning mosques, the Quran, and Islamic headscarves in government buildings. Wilders is also a staunch Euroskeptic, advocating for a referendum on leaving the EU. Despite winning the most seats, it is unlikely that Wilders will become the prime minister. Yeşilgöz has already stated that she would not support Wilders as prime minister even if he had the largest share in parliament.

Pieter Omtzigt, a Dutch Christian Democrat MP has also ruled out joining forces with Wilders, citing his anti-Islam policies as contradictory to the freedoms of expression and religion protected by the Dutch constitution. Timmermans has firmly positioned himself against supporting Wilders as well.

After all the affairs and scandals in Dutch politics in recent years, such as the child benefits scandal in which thousands of families were wrongly accused of fraud on the basis of their ethnicity, it is remarkable that Dutch voters are once again choosing a right-wing party. The question of whether radical right-wing politics will last is no longer a question—it is here to stay for a while.

The PVV ultimately won due to so-called issue ownership, which in the case of the PVV was the subject of migration. In his victory speech, Wilders pledged to put an end to what he referred to as a “tsunami of asylum seekers and immigrants.”

It seems that the Dutch voted strategically to make a statement. In recent years, Wilders has appeared to move towards the center for Dutch people without migration background by putting them “first,” which was a very smart campaign strategy. Thus, he argued for more hospitals and care for Henk and Ingrid, but not for Fatima and Mohammed.

Wilders strategically appealed to Dutch voters without a migration background by prioritizing their concerns, such as healthcare, while maintaining his anti-Islam stance.

People with a migration background from different parts of the country are expressing their concerns about the increasing polarization within society.

I

n Eurowhiteness, Hans Kundnani, Associate Fellow in the Europe Programme at Chatham House, challenges a sanitized and linear history of the EU, prompting the reader to rethink Europe’s peaceful image against its imperial past. He goes on to tackle myopic assumptions about the European project throughout the book.

Kundnani argues that pro-Europeans, who cradled cosmopolitanism and renounced nationalism, have failed to perceive the reality of European regionalism. This provocative critique dissects both the civic and ethnic elements that shape European identity by highlighting Europe’s interaction with the “Other” and linking “Europeanness” and “whiteness.” 

Eurowhiteness may come off as unpalatable to many pro-Europeans, but it raises valuable questions against a backdrop of a rising far-right in Europe. Especially in the wake of the 2015 refugee crisis, the complex relationship between European identity and race demands urgent reflection.

Q. What are some of the myths that cause blind spots in understanding the European identity?

I would mention two in particular. The first is the idea that the EU is a cosmopolitan project. Cosmopolitanism usually has something to do with the whole world, and Europe is not the whole world. There’s a tendency by pro-Europeans and the EU to mistake Europe for the world. For example, when they talk about European integration, they sometimes seem to think that they’re talking about global integration, but they’re not.

Similarly, when they say “I’m a European or I’m a European citizen,” they seem to think they’re saying I’m a citizen of the world, but they’re not; They’re saying I’m a citizen of this particular region that has a very particular history and relationship with the rest of the world.

This is what I call in Eurowhiteness “the of myth of cosmopolitanism in Europe”, and related to that is the idea to think European integration is good for the whole of the world, but that may not necessarily be the case; It may be good for Europeans or may not be good for Europeans, arguably. But even if it is good for Europeans, it’s not clear if it’s good for the whole world.

The second myth would be that the EU is a peace project, and that is not entirely wrong. However, the way that pro-Europeans talk about it is sometimes simplistic; that after 1945 Europeans rejected war, and since then Europeans stand for peace. In reality, Europeans did not reject war in general in 1945. They only rejected war with each other.

In 1950 as the Schuman Declaration, which can be seen as the beginning of the idea of the EU as a peace project, is made by France’s then-foreign minister Robert Schumann, France is simultaneously fighting a brutal colonial war in Indochina.

Similarly, seven years later, when the Treaty of Rome is signed, France fought a brutal colonial war in Algeria. This demonstrates that Europeans are continuing to fight colonial wars until they’re defeated or exhausted.

Europeans like to think of themselves as being uniquely peaceful. The real story is more complicated, and in particular, as I say, to the extent that Europeans have rejected military force, it is military force within what has become the European Union, not even within Europe at large, that is being rejected.

Q. Has the EU’s focus shifted from peace to power?

I wouldn’t say it has shifted from being about peace to being about power. I think it was always about power as well as peace. In particular, it gets to what I was just saying about the idea of the EU as a peace project.

If you go back to the interwar period pan-European movement, which is the inspiration for the post-War European integration project, it is very clear that at that time already that the European integration project is about power and the perception of European decline accelerated by fighting one other.

The idea is: If we want to maintain our position in the world – and at that time this is a position of colonial domination- we have to stop fighting with each other. Not so that we can end European colonialism, but so that we can continue it. So in other words, European integration would take the competitive element out of European colonialism, allowing its practice collectively.

Part of the point of European integration in 1950s was for France and Belgium to consolidate their colonies in Central and West Africa at a time when they were no longer able to on their own. In particular, they needed an injection of West German capital.

The idea of geopolitical Europe goes back to the 1920s. It only seems new because pro-Europeans like to tell a story of Europe through the aforementioned myths. It only seems like a shift because we’ve forgotten the real history of how European integration began.

Q. Does the EU still export the European social model and the general welfare state?

Social market economy and the welfare state are no longer what the EU can to claim export anymore. It may have done once, but even in Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War we observe that this is not the case. In fact, the former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe had much more generous welfare states when they were communist countries.

What happened as they joined the EU during the enlargement process is that those welfare states were dismantled as part of their transition to democracy. There are obviously lots of things that you can criticize about the communist systems in those countries, such as the lack of political freedom and so on, but they did have welfare states.

What has happened now is a further stage in which the EU is putting pressure on member states to dismantle the welfare state. For example, during the euro crisis, the austerity Germany imposed on Greece dismantled what was left of the Greek welfare state.

Q. Your book suggests that civic ideas of Europe are being replaced by ethnic-cultural ones. What is the connection of the neoliberalization of Europe to identity politics?

What I try to show in the book is that there have always been both of the elements of civic and ethnic-cultural idea in the history of what I call European regionalism- which is similar to nationalism on a larger continental scale. I’m suggesting that we can think of the history of ideas of Europe in the way we think about the history of nations. Therefore, regionalism is like nationalism.

The earliest ideas of Europe are predominantly ethnic-cultural. For example, in the medieval period, Europeanness is synonymous with Christianity. From the modern period onwards, you begin to get civic ideas of Europe. Then, in the post war period is when the EU came closest to evolving into a purely civic regionalism. Particularly, in the period from the 60s to the 90s-2000s, there was an idea of Europe centered on the social market economy, the welfare state and depoliticized mode of governance which European integration had produced.

I think what’s happened is that the social market economy and the welfare state have been hollowed out by neoliberalism in the EU. Meanwhile, there has been a backlash against the depoliticised mode of governance where the older civic idea of Europe is no longer persuasive in the same way it was before.

The way I understand neoliberalism is not just financialization, but it’s also the depoliticization of economic policy. In other words, it’s taking economic policy out of the space of democratic contestation. Although, to some extent, this has happened in the whole world in the last 30-40 years through things like the World Trade Organisation rules, the EU has taken it further through the creation of the single market, and also the Eurozone and the fiscal rules. Therefore, it’s very difficult now to pursue a left wing economic policy in the Eurozone because the fiscal rules don’t allow you to do it.

My argument is basically that when you take economic policy out of the space of democratic contestation and no longer have big fights between left and right about economic policy, your democratic politics shifts to cultural questions.

The point of democratic politics is to reconcile different interests and to have fights about questions where people in your society have different ideas or different interests. I think a healthy democratic politics is one where you do that about economic issues because there are real differences between the interests and different ideas as well.

What has happened now is that the center left parties and the center right parties converged in the center around neoliberal economic policy, which the EU has constitutionalized. Therefore, the way parties can differentiate themselves from each other now is around cultural questions.

In terms of what Europe says to the rest of the world, there was a time it would say it stood for the social market economy and the welfare state and now it says it stands for European civilisation.

A good example of this is the phrase “the European way of life,” which used to be used by French socialists, specifically, to refer to the social market economy and the welfare state and the idea of solidarity that it was meant to embody, saying “that’s what we in Europe stand for as opposed to the United States.”

Now when you look at the way that the phrase is used, it is in more civilizational terms. In the current European Commission, the Commission of Ursula Von Der Leyen since 2019, a European Commissioner for promoting the European way of life and his job is to keep migrants out, which makes it very explicit that migrants- only migrants from the South, not migrants from the east- are a threat to the European way of life. That is a very explicit expression of civilizationalism where the European way of life is defined in terms of culture and civilisation, not in terms of the social market economy and the welfare state.

Q. In your book you imply that the center right is increasingly mimicking the far right. Is there a pro-European version of the great replacement theory, if so, what is it?

There is an idea that the EU represents a European civilisation which is being increasingly threatened. This is basically a far right idea that has now been taken on by the center right in Europe.

For example, a couple of weeks ago, Eric Zemmour was doing a rally in the South of France with the young far right leader Marion Maréchal, and the slogan on the lectern at which he was speaking was ‘Defend our civilization.’  The way the far right is thinking about Europe is there’s a European civilisation that is threatened right now. The far right tends to talk about this in the context of migration. That is, it’s the migration of non-white and non-Christian people that is threatening European civilisation.

For example, Valérie Pécresse, the Republican candidate in the French Presidential election in 2022, was talking about white replacement theory or alluding to it in terms of migration. However, in addition, what the centre right tends to do is not talk so much about migration as a racial threat, but more in foreign policy terms as a threat to European civilisation. Macron has given speeches where he’s quite explicit about this.

In other words, international politics is a clash of civilizations, like how Samuel Huntington argues, and Europe is a distinct civilization. Moreover, for someone like Macron, the West is not one civilization, which is what Huntington thought but that Europe is a distinct civilisation, separate from the United States as well.

Where I see a connection with great replacement theory is that this is almost the international political equivalent of the great replacement theory. It’s not about migration but it’s that if Europe does not unite and defend itself, it will be also replaced by other civilizations. Macron has basically said that.

Q. What are some key takeaways from history regarding Europe’s interaction with those who it sees as the “Other”?

I try to show in Eurowhiteness that there’s a long history of defining Europe against various different “Others” at various different times and it’s constantly shifting. But roughly, I would say, in the medieval period when Europe is pretty much synonymous with Christianity, Jews are defined as the primary internal other and Muslims as the primary external other, excluding the divide between Western Christendom and Eastern Christendom.

Then, in the modern period, I try to show how there is a new complex modern idea of Europe, which is partly to do with the European enlightenment and the scientific revolution. It is a rationalist, secular idea of Europe rather than a religious one. At the same time, the idea of Europe also emerges in the context of the encounter of Europeans with the populations of Africa and Asia, and especially the Americas, and that’s the context in which the idea of whiteness emerges.

So, the modern idea of Europe is not just a rationalist one as opposed to a religious one, it’s also a more racialized idea of Europe that is closely connected to the idea of whiteness. What I think happens in that context is that non-white people around the world are the “Others” against which Europeans define themselves.

In the 20th century and particularly after World War I, you have the new idea of Europe as a geopolitical bloc, which I mentioned earlier. European civilisation or the European spirit, as they talked about it at that time, is being threatened by the United States on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other hand. In that context, Russia and also the United States are respectively an “Other.” What I think we’re seeing today is a mixture of all of those “Others.”

I

n a move that took many European leaders by surprise, Slovakia’s newly sworn-in Prime Minister, Robert Fico, announced on October 26, 2023, his government’s decision to discontinue military aid to Ukraine, marking a stark shift in the country’s stance. This announcement comes amidst growing tensions in Eastern Europe and as nations across the continent grapple with the evolving geopolitical landscape.

Robert Fico, leading Slovakia for the fourth time, communicated this change in policy during a session in parliament earlier this week. In the run-up to his recent election, Fico had openly campaigned on the promise of halting military aid to Ukraine, advocating for a more independent foreign policy and stronger border protection against illegal migration.

Fico conveyed to Members of Parliament (MPs) that while Slovakia would cease supplying weapons to Ukraine, the nation would continue to provide humanitarian aid to the war-affected country. The underlying tone of the Prime Minister’s message seemed to pivot towards transforming the European Union from an arms supplier to a mediator, championing the cause of peace in the region.

Slovakia’s new approach, the EU and NATO

Fico’s ascendancy to power has not only redefined Slovakia’s approach towards Ukraine but also towards larger European matters. His administration has expressed opposition to the Western sanctions imposed on Moscow, emphasizing that any such sanctions should only be backed after a thorough analysis of their impact on Slovakia. Fico was quoted saying, “If there are to be such sanctions that will harm us, like most sanctions have, I can see no reason to support them.”

Beyond the pressing matter of military aid, the new Slovakian government’s foreign policy is being keenly observed. Many see Fico’s rise as a potential disruptor to the European Union’s and NATO’s collective strategies, especially in the context of the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

Slovakia, a nation of 5.5 million, had been a staunch supporter of Kyiv, particularly since Russia’s invasion in February of the previous year. The country had not only donated arms but had also opened its borders to refugees escaping the conflict.

This pivot in policy direction also highlights the changing political dynamics within Slovakia. The Smer party, chaired by Fico, is part of a three-party coalition government, which also comprises the Hlas party and the Slovak National Party. While Fico is often viewed as a “pro-Russian populist” – especially given his criticism of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy – many within Slovakia believe he is merely prioritizing the nation’s interests over external pressures.

Russia’s allies?

Backing this stance, the coalition partner Slovak National Party (SNS) is no stranger to making headlines. Its chairman and former parliamentary speaker, Andrej Danko, has made controversial remarks in the past, suggesting that the Russian-occupied territories were not “historically Ukrainian.” Danko’s close interactions with Russian dignitaries, including a handshake with Russian President Vladimir Putin and a selfie with Russian State Duma Chair Vyacheslav Volodin, have raised eyebrows in international circles.

While the immediate repercussions of Slovakia’s decision are yet to be fully understood, early reactions from the international community have been a mix of concern and anticipation. Many view this development as a sign of the growing divisions within the European Union, with member states prioritizing national interests over collective decisions. This change is expected to be a prominent topic of discussion at the upcoming EU summit in Brussels, where leaders from across the continent will converge.

On the ground in Ukraine, the halt in military aid from Slovakia adds another layer to the multifaceted challenges the nation faces. Despite this setback, Ukrainian officials remain hopeful that other European nations will continue their support, both in terms of military aid and diplomatic efforts to bring peace to the region.

As Slovakia navigates its new foreign policy direction, Europe and the world will be watching closely. With the balance of power and alliances constantly shifting, Slovakia’s decisions could have ripple effects far beyond its borders.

In conclusion, as the European landscape continues to evolve, nations like Slovakia play a pivotal role in shaping the narrative. The choice to halt military aid to Ukraine may be just one decision, but it underscores the complexities and intricacies of international diplomacy in these tumultuous times. Only time will tell if this decision stands as a beacon of nationalistic prioritization or as a harbinger of a more fragmented European Union.

Sources: Euronews, AFP, Le Monde

F

ar-right and racist ideology in Europe has a deep-rooted history and has shown the ability to transform itself into a political movement through political parties. Due to the basic functions of political parties in pluralist democracies, namely representation, agenda setting, public relations, awareness raising, and aspirations to power, political party status is a tremendous tool for the social organization of far-right and racist movements.

Especially in recent years, far-right parties have experienced a serious upward trend in European politics and have strengthened their presence in all regions of the European geography. Far-right parties have gradually gained popular support in several European countries, especially in Germany, France, and Italy, and have achieved significant electoral success. They have thus succeeded in becoming integrated actors in European countries’ political institutions.

Political parties are an important instrument for the functioning of democracy. They represent different segments of society, formulate policies, and seek to reflect the will of the people through elections. The inability of left-wing, liberal, and conservative political parties to offer convincing alternative solutions to the electorates’ problems, and the fact that they are too fragmented and divided to form coalitions, is seen by far-right parties as a window of opportunity to gain power in the coming years.

Ideology of European far-right parties

Although the ideologies of far-right parties in different parts of Europe differ to some extent, they are based on common points and references. These can be defined under four headings:

– Nationalism and cultural identity: Far-right and racist parties emphasize nationalism and cultural identity, placing great importance on the superiority and interests of a country or nation. Far-right parties try to attract support by focusing on national pride, national values, and cultural identity. They usually seek to unite society under the guise of a “sense of belonging” by distinguishing between “us” and “them.”

– Authoritarianism and strong leadership: Strong authoritarian leaders influence their followers by advocating discriminatory and authoritarian policies. They try to exploit society’s security concerns by emphasizing issues such as safety, order, and harsh punishment. Authoritarian leadership is used by the far right to achieve its political goals and to govern society.

– Racism and anti-immigrant sentiment: Far-right parties adopt ideological elements such as racism and anti-immigrant sentiments and show discrimination and hostility towards other groups, while defending the superiority of their own ethnic or national group. Anti-immigrant sentiment is central to the policies of these parties and often includes harsh restrictions on immigrants, racial or cultural discrimination, and policies of ethnic cleansing.

– Populism: Far-right and racist parties often use populist rhetoric. Populism aims to mobilize support by exploiting people’s emotional and economic concerns. Far-right parties present simplistic messages and answers to appeal to broad sections of the population.

The ideologies of far-right parties are based on elements such as nationalism, authoritarianism, racism, and anti-immigrant sentiments. These ideologies can spread under the influence of factors such as social discontent, economic crises, cultural conflicts, and security concerns.

Following another devastating war in Europe, destruction and humanitarian disasters were omnipresent across the continent. The suffering caused by the war led to discontent and insecurity in society, and political instability and economic difficulties paved the way for the emergence of far-right parties. Meanwhile the banning of ideologies such as Fascism and Nazism caused some far-right groups to operate underground.

Thus, Europe’s dominant countries, especially Germany, did not accommodate far-right parties into their political systems and ensured that they remained marginalized for a long time. During this period, far-right parties transformed themselves in order to win votes in elections, taking into account local social developments and the cyclical variability of world politics.

Until the 1980s, neofascist political parties generally carried on the mission of the Fascist and Nazi parties of the past. Labor migration in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s led to an increase in the immigrant population. With the periodic economic crises since the 1990s, some segments of society have become concerned about immigrants and different cultures. Economic uncertainties such as rising unemployment, ever-worsening financial difficulties, and income inequality have led to anti-immigrant sentiments among the local populations.

Since the 2000s, there has been a new wave of migration to Europe and an increase in the foreign population on the continent due to terrorist attacks, economic problems, and the Arab Spring. Although far-right parties have not completely changed their neofascist formation so as to turn this dynamic into an opportunity, they have mobilized and expanded their existing support base by resorting to populist politics that rely on social discontent and concerns, anti-immigration sentiments, and xenophobia in order to reach large masses. Now, far-right parties have changed their guise and softened their neofascist and Nazi rhetoric in order to win the support of non-radicalized conservative masses. Islamophobia and anti-immigrant policies against “non-white” immigrants have increased their popularity and begun to win votes.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, far-right parties have undergone their second evolution. True to their racist and anti-immigrant agenda, they have declared war on the globalizing world. Globalization refers to worldwide economic, political, social, and cultural interaction and integration, including elements such as advances in communication and transport technologies, free trade and investment policies, and the strengthening of international institutions. Globalization also features drawbacks such as income inequality, social and cultural conflicts, environmental degradation, and inequitable distribution of resources. The main reasons why far-right parties oppose globalization are nationalism, concerns about the loss of national sovereignty, economic effects (loss of wealth), and the preservation of cultural identity. While globalization brings about economic and cultural change, some parts of society react to this change.

Far-right parties, which have become the self-proclaimed “protectors” of the masses that find themselves on the losing end of the new globalized world, aim to convince the isolated masses that there are easy solutions to their problems through populist discourses and by mobilizing their thoughts and emotions against a specific enemy. Far-right parties, with their hatred of Islam and immigrants, and their stance against globalization, have gained serious momentum with the economic crisis triggered by the pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine War.

The rise of far-right parties in Europe

The rise of far-right parties in Europe has attracted attention and concern in recent years. Understanding the factors behind this rise will help us to understand the popularity and influence of far-right parties. Factors such as migration, economic uncertainty, cultural concerns, emphasis on national identity, and political crises are important factors influencing the rise of the far right.

Migration is an important factor in the rise of extreme right-wing parties. The large waves of migration and the so-called refugee crises in Europe have raised security concerns and fears of cultural conflict in certain milieus. Far-right parties use the issue of migration to spread fear and anxiety among the population and advocate harsh and restrictive immigration policies.

Economic insecurity and social injustice are other factors that have increased the popularity of far-right parties. Problems such as economic recession, unemployment, and income inequality drive people towards far-right parties. In particular, the loss of people’s welfare due to the global economic devastation caused by the pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine War have led to the far right’s emphasis on economic nationalism and protectionist policies finding a response in society.

Cultural concerns in Europe and the emphasis on national identity can also be linked to the rise of far-right parties. The issues of cultural diversity and the protection of cultural values are an important concern for a significant part of society. By emphasizing national identity, far-right parties exploit cultural concerns and advocate cultural protectionism.

From the War on Terror to the far-right conspiracies, Islamophobia manifests in various forms. In today’s world, systemic Islamophobia continues to cast a long and dark shadow over the lives of Muslims across continents. Rooted in historical and contemporary contexts, this pervasive form of discrimination and prejudice has significant implications for individuals, communities, and societies at large.

Systemic Islamophobia operates within power structures, institutions, and cultural biases, perpetuating inequality, marginalization, and the violation of human rights. Implicitly and explicitly, Islamophobia is reinforced by various layers of society, including governments around the world.

While its manifestations may differ from one region to another, systemic Islamophobia shares commonalities across countries and societies. It operates as a product of historical legacies, geopolitical dynamics, cultural narratives, and power imbalances. It thrives in contexts where Muslims are viewed as the “Other,” perpetuating stereotypes, prejudices, and negative portrayals that undermine their rights, dignity, and societal inclusion.

The impact of systemic Islamophobia is far-reaching. Muslim individuals and communities face challenges in various domains of life, as the titles included in this Bundle will show. They experience heightened surveillance, racial profiling, and discriminatory legislation, hindering the realization of fundamental human rights and the pursuit of justice and equality. Furthermore, the interconnetedness of discrimination makes the issue even more pressing for all.

Recognizing and understanding systemic Islamophobia is essential for dismantling its deeply entrenched structures. It requires comprehensive analysis, dialogue, and collective action which this collection hopes to envoke.

The Rise of Global Islamophobia in the War on Terror: Coloniality, Race, and Islam delves into the complex and far-reaching consequences of the ‘War on Terror’ on global perceptions of Muslims. The book examines the intersection between Islamophobia, and various social, economic, and political factors that have shaped its prevalence.

The authors convincingly argue that the ‘War on Terror’ has not only intensified anti-Muslim racism but has also provided a framework that perpetuates a global Islamophobic narrative. By framing Muslims a perpetual enemy, this conflict has fostered a climate of fear and suspicion, fueling the growth of nativist and populist movements worldwide.

One of the book’s strengths lies in its comprehensive analysis of the different forms and manifestations of Islamophobia. Through an examination of localized histories, conflicts, and contemporary geopolitical realities, the authors map out the intricate ways in which Islamophobia has taken shape across the global North and South. This approach adds depth to the understanding of the diverse factors contributing to the rise of anti-Muslim sentiment.

The book offers a nuanced and comprehensive analysis of the connections between interpersonal and institutional racism. While highlighting the deeply rooted nature of Islamophobia, the book also sheds light on the activism and resistance that have emerged to confront this issue. By featuring narratives of individuals and groups challenging Islamophobia, the authors provide hope and inspiration for those seeking to combat this pervasive form of discrimination.

Naved Bakali and Farid Hafez, The rise of global Islamophobia in the War on Terror: Coloniality, race, and Islam (Manchester University Press 2022) ISBN: 978-1-5261-6175-8, 264 pages

Islamophobia in France: The Construction of the “Muslim Problem” presents a groundbreaking examination of the multifaceted nature of Islamophobia in the country. Authored by Abdellali Hajjat and Marwan Mohammed, the book challenges the prevailing notion that Islamophobia arises solely from individual bias but rather that Islamophobia in France is deeply entrenched within existing structures of power and control.

The book sheds light on pivotal moments in French history that have contributed to the marginalization of Muslim communities. It highlights the 2004 ban on veils in schools, followed by the 2010 legislation that prohibited face-covering clothing in public spaces, primarily targeting women who wear burqas. President Emmanuel Macron’s public statements regarding the hijab’s compatibility with French ideals further illustrate the pervasive Islamophobia within the country. These cultural biases not only perpetuate discriminatory practices but also position the Muslim population as scapegoats for broader issues surrounding immigration in France.

Hajjat and Mohammed go beyond surface-level analysis to uncover the structural dimensions of Islamophobia in France. They argue that French elites strategically employ Islamophobia as a state technology to exert control and contest the presence of specific groups of postcolonial immigrants and their descendants. By exploring the data on Islamophobia and examining its functioning in contemporary French society, the authors paint a comprehensive portrait of the mechanisms through which Islamophobia operates.

Islamophobia in France is an English translation of Abdellali Hajjat and Marwan Mohammed’s Islamophobie: Comment les e´lites franc¸aises fabriquent le “proble`me musulman.” and an essential contribution to the field, providing a nuanced and insightful examination of the systemic nature of Islamophobia and its consequences on Muslim communities in France.

Abdellali Hajjat and Marwan Mohammed, Islamophobia in France: The Construction of the “Muslim Problem” (University of Georgia Press, 2023) ISBN-10 0820363251, 306 pages

In The New Crusades: Islamophobia and the Global War on Muslims Khaled A. Beydoun presents an essential examination of Islamophobia from a legal and ground-up perspective. Drawing on his intellectual prowess and moral imperative, Beydoun presents a compelling analysis of the network of anti-Muslim campaigns unfolding worldwide and offers a comprehensive analysis of how Islamophobia is utilized by both democratic and authoritarian regimes to persecute Muslim populations.

The New Crusades does not shy away from challenging the established narratives. It delves into the role of the War on Terror in fueling and intensifying anti-Muslim campaigns around the world. Beydoun skillfully illustrates how Islamophobia operates as a unifying thread, perpetuating state and social bigotry and igniting hate-mongering from both liberal and right-wing factions. Through trenchant analysis and firsthand accounts from Muslims on the ground, the author brings to light the various manifestations of Islamophobia in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and beyond.

The book’s global perspective sets it apart, as Beydoun incorporates on-site experiences, interviews, and a diverse range of contexts. This approach enhances the authority of the narrative and makes it accessible and engaging for scholars, students, and the general public.

The New Crusades unravels the distinct systems of demonization and oppression that have emerged across the post-9/11 geopolitical landscape. Whether it is the imposition of hijab bans in France, state-sponsored hate speech and violence in India, or the existence of concentration camps in China, Beydoun examines how Islamophobia operates as a global phenomenon, perpetuating discrimination on multiple fronts.

The book powerfully reveals the unsettling reality that Islamophobia remains one of the few acceptable forms of hate in the world today. By exposing this truth, Beydoun calls attention to the urgent need for collective action against Islamophobia and its far-reaching consequences. By weaving together social science, law, and captivating narratives, the author highlights the pervasive impact of Islamophobia on Muslims across the globe.

Khaled A. Beydoun, The New Crusades: Islamophobia and the Global War on Muslims (University of California Press, 2023) ISBN: 9780520356306, 390 pages

In Fear of a Muslim Planet: Global Islamophobia in the New World Order Arsalan Iftikhar, a renowned American Muslim human rights lawyer, offers a comprehensive exploration of global Islamophobia. The book refers to the chilling reminder of the Christchurch massacre, where a white supremacist perpetrated a horrific act of violence against Muslim worshippers in New Zealand. Iftikhar draws attention to the manifesto left by the attacker, titled “The Great Replacement,” which espoused the belief that Muslims posed a threat and sought to replace white people. This incident serves as a starting point for exploring the dangerous legacy of this theory and its influence on extremist acts.

Iftikhar goes on to emphasize that the victims of the “Great Replacement” theory extend beyond Muslims alone. The tragic attack on the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, which targeted Jewish congregants, exemplifies the broader impact of this ideology including the infamous actions of Norwegian terrorist Anders Breivik.. The perpetrator’s anti-Semitic and Islamophobic motivations, fueled by anti-immigration sentiments, underline the interconnected nature of discrimination.

Throughout the book, Iftikhar critiques the presidency of Donald Trump, which he argues has contributed to the exacerbation of Islamophobia in America. He dissects Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric and policies, including his claim that “Islam hates us” and his call for a complete ban on Muslims entering the US. Iftikhar contends that Trump’s leadership has fueled the growth of Islamophobia.

The book goes beyond the United States and the Western world to shed light on global Islamophobia. Iftikhar highlights the genocidal levels of Islamophobia in countries like China and Myanmar, where Muslim communities face severe oppression. Additionally, he addresses the European focus on policing Muslim women’s hijab, exposing discriminatory policies that curtail religious freedom.

Arsalan Iftikhar, Fear of a Muslim Planet: Global Islamophobia in the New World Order (Skyhorse Publishing, 2021) ISBN-13 978-1510761872, 288 pages

The Suspect: Counterterrorism, Islam, and the Security State offers a captivating and deeply personal exploration of the impact that two decades of policing and counterterrorism have had on the state of mind of Muslims in Britain. Drawing from his own experiences, author Rizwaan Sabir takes readers on a compelling journey through British counterterrorism practices and the pervasive policing of Muslims.

Sabir’s narrative describes his wrongful arrest and detention on suspicion of terrorism. He recounts the distressing process of being unjustly made a target in the “war on terror.” With candor and vivid detail, he outlines the events leading up to his arrest, including being found in possession of the Al-Qaeda Training Manual, which he had downloaded for legitimate postgraduate research purposes. Sabir sheds light on the excruciating experience of being subjected to suspicion and surveillance solely based on his Muslim identity.

Throughout the book, Sabir recounts the harrowing aftermath of his arrest. He vividly describes the relentless monitoring and scrutiny he faced upon release from custody. This included frequent stop-and-search encounters, detentions at the border, surveillance by police and government departments, and an attempt by the UK military to recruit him into their psychological warfare unit. The author’s firsthand account provides a chilling insight into the intrusive and discriminatory practices endured by Muslims in the name of national security.

Sabir argues that the profound harm inflicted on individuals like him is not merely the result of government planning errors but rather a deliberate consequence of employing a counterinsurgency warfare approach to combat terrorism and police Muslim communities. Through his writing, Sabir advocates for and building networks of solidarity and support to challenge the injustices perpetuated by these policies and practices.

The Suspect serves as a powerful call to action, urging readers to recognize and resist the profound injustice faced by Muslims. By sharing his story, Sabir empowers readers to challenge the harmful narratives and practices that perpetuate the policing of Muslims.

Rizwaan Sabir, The Suspect: Counterterrorism, Islam, and the Security State (Pluto Press, 2022) ISBN: 9780745338484, 256 pages

T

he global ascent of the far right has become an alarming phenomenon, amplified by the distressing normalization of right-wing extremism. From the U.S. to countries across Europe, far right movements have branched out by displaying variation while retaining their core foundations of violence and hatred, and have adeptly aligned themselves with contemporary political issues, exploiting the expansive reach of online platforms to propagate their ideologies.

Right-wing terrorism has swiftly emerged as the rapidest growing and, in some cases, the most prominent domestic security menace, as underscored by the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee—not to mention the far right’s harmful everyday rhetoric towards migrants and people of color.

In the United States, the number of far right extremist attacks has surpassed other acts of terrorism. The reverberations of heinous incidents like the Pittsburgh synagogue shooting and the Christchurch mosque shootings remain indelible reminders of the terror wrought by far right militants. From eco-fascists to white supremacists, this month’s book bundle encompasses various prominent and influential far-right movements.

By examining the complexities of far right ideologies, their metamorphosis over time, and the necessary measures to confront them, this collection presents an invaluable resource for comprehending and engaging with this pressing global concern.

In Spreading Hate: The Global Rise of White Supremacist Terrorism, Daniel L. Byman presents a comprehensive analysis of the global white power movement, its appeal, and the imminent threat it poses. Byman’s authoritative account spans the movement’s evolution in the United States and worldwide, shedding light on its multifaceted nature.

Drawing from a wide array of sources, Byman dispels prevalent myths surrounding white power terrorism and exposes critical deficiencies in current policies. This negligence towards growing far-right terrorism has resulted in shocking acts of violence, corroding trust in democratic institutions. Byman emphasizes that mitigating this threat necessitates swift and resolute action from governments, treating white power terrorism with the same urgency as jihadist violence.

Byman highlights how white power terrorists exploit mainstream debates, amplifying polarization and yielding significant political impact, even if the death toll remains relatively low. Contrary to popular belief, the movement is not entrenched in a rigid ideology: it is dynamic, draws inspiration from global sources and leverages cutting-edge technologies, particularly social media.

While white power terrorists exhibit vulnerabilities, such as internal divisions, lackluster leadership, and attracting not only dangerous and deluded individuals but also the inept and criminal, their potential for harm remains potent.

Mitigating the dangers of right-wing terrorism entail measures such as robust law enforcement, international intelligence cooperation, stringent regulations imposed by technology companies, and other forceful interventions. Byman not only examines policy solutions but also synthesizes extensive scholarly research, making Spreading Hate essential reading for those concerned about an increasingly interconnected movement that in the years to come harbors the potential to escalate in perilousness.

Daniel Byman, Spreading Hate: The Global Rise of White Supremacist Terrorism (Oxford University Press, 2022) ISBN: 9780197537619, 288 pages

The Rise of Ecofascism: Climate Change and the Far Right delves into the connection between the climate crisis and the rise of the far right, examining their historical roots and contemporary manifestations. By exploring the far right’s evolving stance on the environment, Sam Moore and Alex Roberts reveal a shift in strategy as they come to recognize the impending crisis as an opportunity for resurgence, moving beyond climate denial to conspiracy.

Far right ecologism is brewing within online circles and manifesting as violence on the ground. The authors argue that ecofascism’s dangerous ideology, steeped in hatred is not the answer. Instead, a genuine commitment to climate justice is crucial to combat both the far right and the environmental challenges we face. A must-read for anyone interested in learning about the trend in right-wing extremism or advocating for climate justice, this book offers a powerful critique of emerging ecofascism.

Sam Moore and Alex Roberts, The Rise of Ecofascism: Climate Change and the Far Right (Polity Press, 2022) ISBN: 978-1-509-54537-7, 160 pages

When the Hood Comes Off: Racism and Resistance in the Digital Age is a timely and comprehensive exploration that delves into the manifestations of racism in the digital realm, shedding light on the emerging antiracist strategies deployed to combat it.

Rob Eschmann skillfully weaves together meticulous research and captivating personal anecdotes to uncover how racism thrives online, challenging the notion of a colorblind society. From viral videos capturing police violence against unarmed Black individuals to the exposure of racist messages and hurtful comments on social media platforms, online communication lays bare the workings of racism in our world.

In this thought-provoking study, Eschmann not only examines the impact of online racism on communities of color and society at large, but also uncovers the unexpected ways in which digital technologies facilitate innovative tools of everyday antiracist resistance.

By drawing from a vast array of data, including insightful interviews with students of color and meticulous analyses of millions of social media posts spanning a decade, Eschmann delves into the influence of online communication on face-to-face interactions.

When the Hood Comes Off underscores the internet’s potential as a powerful organizing tool, exposing the transformative power it holds. Furthermore, the book serves as a poignant reminder that online racism can serve as a profound wake-up call, prompting us to reflect on our own responses and actions.

In a world grappling with the implications of pervasive online racism, When the Hood Comes Off: Racism and Resistance in the Digital Age invites readers to contemplate the crucial question of how we will collectively respond to this urgent challenge. Eschmann’s work is a vital contribution to the ongoing conversation surrounding racism and provides valuable insights into harnessing the potential of the digital landscape for meaningful antiracist efforts.

Rob Eschmann, When the Hood Comes Off: Racism and Resistance in the Digital Age (University of California Press, 2023) ISBN: 9780520379749, 312 pages

Ukraine’s Azov Movement has emerged as one of the most audacious and perilous far-right movements worldwide. What are its core values and goals? From the Fires of War: Ukraine’s Azov Movement and the Global Far Right is groundbreaking as the first book to be written in English about Azov. Michael Colborne unveils the origins and rapid evolution of the movement, transforming from a militia composed of marginal far right individuals and football hooligans fighting against Russian-backed forces to a multifaceted social movement that has attracted global far-right admiration.

Colborne delves into the intricate mechanisms through which the Azov Movement emerged and adeptly exploits Ukraine’s fragmented social and political landscape, including the ongoing conflict following Russia’s invasion. From the Fires of War astutely reveals the movement’s grand ambitions and the threats it poses.

Michael Colborne, From the Fires of War: Ukraine’s Azov Movement and the Global Far Right (ibidem Press, 2022) ISBN: 9783838215082, 200 pages

In his compelling book When Disasters Come Home: Making and Manipulating Emergencies in the West,  David Keen delves into the profound impact of disasters that were once perceived as distant occurrences but are now striking at the heart of the prosperous West. With crises like global warming, migration challenges, threats to democracy, the Covid-19 pandemic, and the repercussions of the war in Ukraine converging, Western societies find themselves caught in a continuous state of fear and distraction.

Keen argues that these disasters should serve as a catalyst for reform, urging us to address the systemic issues that give rise to such catastrophes. However, he reveals how frequently they are exploited for political and economic gain, sidestepping the root causes.

The interplay of various crises, whether gradual or sudden, perpetuates a toxic political landscape that exacerbates the very problems it stems from and enforces a continuous state of crisis amongst society. Politicians often take advantage of the alarm to legitimize their contribution to the disaster-producing system by creating alternate realities and “lesser evil” arguments.

A troubling aspect is the tendency to vilify those striving to alleviate the emergencies or shed light on their underlying factors. Without amplifying alternative perspectives and voices, we risk being ensnared in a self-perpetuating cycle of emergency politics, hindering true resolution and manufacturing its own justification and legitimacy.

From the economy, politics, society and war to the environment, migration, and health, When Disasters Come Home highlights nine major high profile, six abrupt and three slow-burning disasters. Lastly, it also discusses the mass contemporary flight from reality as a disaster in and of itself.

Keen’s book offers a thought-provoking exploration of the complex dynamics between disasters, politics, and the imperative need for reform. Through his incisive analysis, he challenges readers to critically assess the interconnections and potential consequences of the current crisis-ridden world.

David Keen, When Disasters Come Home: Making and Manipulating Emergencies in the West (Polity Press, 2023) ISBN: 9781509550630, 288 pages

Written by Dilara Özer.

According to a decision by the District Court of The Hague, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, which is the Dutch border police, can use ethnicity as a criterion for selecting citizens for checks at the border. As stated by the court, this does not constitute discrimination.

The case was brought against the government by several human rights organizations, NGOs such as Amnesty International, Controle Alt Delete, RADAR, and PILP-NJCM, and two citizens. These organizations were convinced that two citizens were singled out for checks by the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee officers because of the color of their skin. One of the persons, Mpanzu Bamenga was taken aside by the Marechaussee at the airport of Eindhoven in April 2018.

Mpanzu Bamenga, who is a municipal councilor of the social liberal political party D66, had just returned from Lampedusa, Italy, where he gave a lecture about institutional racism, human rights, and how to create a world in which all human rights are secured for all humans. After the councilor’s efforts to understand why he was taken aside and filing a complaint followed by a hearing, it seemed Bamenga had been arrested for being “well dressed,” “walking fast,” and having a “non-Dutch appearance.” According to the coalition that filed the lawsuit, this is a form of discrimination that violates human rights and Dutch law.

Dagmar Oudshoorn, director of Amnesty International Netherlands, stated the following about the court’s decision: “According to this ruling of the court, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee can continue with ethnic profiling. This is not only in violation of international human rights, but also of Article 1 of the Dutch Constitution.”

During border checks, the Marechaussee selects people based on their appearance, skin color, or ethnicity. These parameters determine whether someone, against whom there is no individual suspicion, is pulled aside. The Marechaussee also uses risk profiles that include ethnicity, such as in Bamenga’s case “men who walk fast, are well-dressed and who look ‘non-Dutch.’”

All in all, the ruling of the court means that ethnicity can remain part of the risk and selection profiles of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee – a decision that undoubtedly encourages discrimination.

Following the court’s decision, the anti-racism foundation Controle Alt Delete started a petition to denounce the assumption that Dutch nationality is linked to white skin color.

“In the super-diverse Netherlands in 2021, skin color is not an indication of someone’s nationality,” says Controle Alt Delete on its website. In addition to people with a refugee background and people from the former colonies, the Netherlands also has several communities that settled in the country from various parts of the Mediterranean four generations ago.

“Pull your car over” is a common phrase frequently used towards colored, Muslim, or people with a non-Western migration background.

Pull your car over

“Pull your car over” is a common phrase frequently used towards colored, Muslim, or people with a non-Western migration background. In fact, however, the Netherlands is known for its multicultural society formed as a result of colonialism and colonialism-related migration. There are people here from all over the world that makes it hard, if not nearly impossible, to define “Dutchness” and associate it simply with skin color.

The postcolonial migration flows to the Netherlands from the Dutch East Indies, the Dutch Antilles, and Suriname, the labor migration from Turkey and North African countries, the arrival of refugees from Bosnia and the MENA region make it impossible to define Dutch identity with racial features.

Immigrants nowadays growingly fall victim to acts of over-scrutiny, discrimination, or hate crimes. According to a report published in 2020 by Bureau Beke, an independent agency that specializes in research and advice in the field of security issues and crime, only in Amsterdam, more than half of the residents have experienced ethnic profiling during contact with the police.

According to the report, significant differences occur between two subgroups. On the one hand, there are the citizens with a Dutch or Western migration background, and on the other, the citizens with a non-Western migration background. The second group gives a lower rating for the general way of being addressed by the police and their trust in police officers. According to the report, citizens with a non-Western background are significantly more likely to indicate they have had contact with the Amsterdam police up to 10 times within a period of six months.

When focusing on this “police contact” it appears that mostly citizens with a Dutch background are offered an explanation as to why the police stopped or checked them while such an explanation is less likely to be offered to citizens with a non-Western migration background.

The situation in Germany is no different. According to an answer from the Ministry of Interior in response to a parliamentary question by a German representative, the German police conducted ID checks 2,953,844 times without valid reason in 2015. Critics argue that most of these controls are arbitrary and skin color and ethnic background are the two main criteria behind them.

In addition, a survey was conducted by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) on the number of people who have been stopped by the police in the last 12 months. According to responses, 25% of Turkish-origin Europeans had been stopped by the police, while only 11% of so-called native Germans responded positively.

Third-generation Turkish immigrants, born and raised in the Netherlands, also face racial profiling as it frequently occurs within their minority communities as well. It seems that Western European countries, where once multicultural society was a debated issue, are now struggling with “us” vs. “them” ideology.

By constantly keeping the criminality of “foreigners” or young citizens with an immigration background on the political agenda and in the media, and therefore in the public eye, the Other, the “non-Dutch looking” Other, is created and perceived as a threat. Institutions and authorities, with the police at the forefront of this discrimination, are motivated to believe that it is legitimate to monitor, scrutinize, and control people based on their religious difference, appearance, or skin color in order to protect “national security.” However, ironically and conversely, they are actually fabricating this imagined threat themselves.

Life is in a constant state of flux, and the world’s climate has been changing accordingly ever since the earth came into existence. Research findings in recent decades have provided evidence that man-made emissions resulting from rapid industrialization can influence the pace of this change. In the worst case, this contributes to man’s own detriment and that of ecosystems.

For this reason, countries around the world have agreed on the goal of reducing their greenhouse gas emissions through proactive measures in an attempt to limit global warming. The ways to achieve this vary around the world, depending on the structure of countries, their economies, their energy landscapes, and the importance of environmental issues in the public consciousness.

Climate change and related protection and adaptation measures are complex issues that have global significance but also require concrete local action.

For Western Europe, however, the climate debate seems to be more than a mere question of technology, efficiency and a cost/benefit ratio. The more secularized the society in a country is, and the less traditional values play a role in shaping life there, the more the issue of climate change is being stylized as a central question of human existence.

Nowhere else in the world is the public debate about climate change as much dominated by alarmism and apocalyptic thinking as it is there. It is also hardly surprising that the “school strike” movement is most strongly associated with countries characterized by a completely secularized Protestantism. “Fridays for Future” was founded in Sweden, and the movement experienced its greatest popularity in Germany.

Today, there is even talk of climate change as the “last great narrative of the West.”

The occurrence that traditional religions would give way to secular substitute religions in “enlightened” Europe is nothing new. Soon after the French Revolution, the writings of Robert Malthus, Charles Darwin, Karl Marx or Arthur de Gobineau passed the justification for intensified European colonialism and inspired ideologies such as Communism or National Socialism. Today, there is even talk of climate change as the “last great narrative of the West.”

In contrast, for millions of African children, working on toxic waste dumps or in uranium mines is part of their everyday lives, even though they would rather go to school and attend classes there.

Ideological and dogmatic climate policies in Western Europe create enormous potential for conflict.

It is not only on a global scale, where some critics accuse rich nations of denying poorer ones the opportunity for economic advancement through rigid climate protection regulations, that the climate debate reveals different perceptions.

Domestically, too, ideological and dogmatic climate policies in Western European countries create enormous potential for conflict. German government policies seek to abolish nuclear power, end coal mining, eliminate the internal combustion engine, and hope that by a certain point, high subsidies for green energy will deliver viable innovations.

To date, however, this approach has mainly resulted in Germany’s dependence on foreign energy supplies – and a world-leading position in electricity prices. It is obvious that this affects doctors’ daughters from Blankenese less than the farmer’s son from Lower Bavaria, but also the immigrant family of six from Duisburg-Marxloh.

Proponents of an even more aggressive climate policy, such as the German Green Party, promise to compensate those affected by the foreseeable explosion in electricity prices for the additional costs. An “energy allowance” is even intended to ensure that particularly efficient families end up better off than before. However, many remain skeptical about whether the money will actually reach those who need it. Moreover, politically distorted market prices cannot be enforced in the long run by subsidies against the law of supply and demand.

But an ideological approach to climate change also creates the risk of escalating social conflicts in other respects. Planned economies and redistribution, which would never have taken place in this form in Western Europe before, will one day reach their limits. At that moment, however, distributional struggles are pre-programmed that could benefit racist forces.

Already now, in some parties of the radical right in Western Europe, such as the German AfD, a tendency toward a racist charge of the climate debate can be noticed. In their circles, for example, there are increasing calls to abandon the previous position of climate skepticism and to acknowledge man-made climate change. This should have the consequence of making a rigid policy of birth control in African and Muslim countries a condition for further development aid. Some far-right politicians are already calling for a global one-child policy along the lines of China.

In the end, a social credit system modeled on the Beijing dictatorship could also be up for debate in domestic politics. In Bulgaria, the far-right IMRO party openly advocates paying benefits for women of the Roma ethnic group that undergo a sterilization. In several European countries, such as Sweden or Norway, forced sterilization of Roma women was a widely accepted practice until the 1970s.

In this way, the climate debate could also become a gateway for a return of racist practices of this kind in Western Europe. Religious upbringing, early pregnancies, or a larger amount of children could become a pretext for state authorities to harass families or remove children from immigrant home – because of their lifestyle allegedly causing “climate hazard”. For the time being, all this remains mostly a matter of speculation. However, European history teaches that it would not be the first time that a delusional and ideological policy would take on manifestations that are extremist and inhumane.

The right of religious adherents to wear religious clothing remains a divisive issue in Europe. Not only national governments have restricted this right in recent years, but private employers too are increasingly imposing bans on religious clothing. And while such bans are usually couched in neutral terms, they are often directed against Muslims, raising the fear that they will entrench Islamophobia. Nonetheless, the EU’s highest court has ruled that private employers may pursue a policy of neutrality and cite their business interests to justify discrimination against female Muslim employees.

Already in 2017, the EU Court of Justice had ruled that private employers may not discriminate directly against employees wearing the hijab, but that they may project an image of neutrality: they may not single out Muslim employees but can effectively reach the same result by cloaking their discriminatory intentions in neutral terms. Despite the torrent of criticism that followed, the Court confirmed its decision last week. Employers may adopt a policy of neutrality if there is a genuine need on their part, for example preventing social conflicts at work or meeting the wishes of customers not to see religious people.

According to the Court, member states can maintain laws that offer greater protection against religious discrimination than the EU minimum, but such laws should not unduly harm the interests of employers. In essence, the right not to be discriminated against was found to be less important than the desire of colleagues and customers not to interact with female Muslim employees.

How will the judgment affect Muslim employees?

How the judgment will affect the rights of Muslim employees in Europe is not entirely clear. Defenders of last week’s ruling point out that individual states may still adopt rules that are more protective of the right to religious freedom at work. In the 2017 judgment, the Court seemed to suggest that all EU member states must allow private employers to project an image of neutrality, including states with rules that are more favorable to the protection of religious freedom. Last week, however, the Court clarified that EU law does not impose uniform standards: member states can maintain rules that are more favorable to the right to wear religious clothing.

How the judgment will affect the rights of Muslim employees in Europe is not entirely clear.

However, the Court also ruled that more favorable national rules must not unduly harm the business interests of employers, a finding that is contrary to EU anti-discrimination legislation. The legislation aims to contribute to the full participation of all citizens in economic life.

To that end, it provides a robust framework for combating discrimination in employment, while allowing member states to adopt rules that are more favorable to the protection of equality than the EU minimum. The Court, instead, ruled that more favorable rules may need to be disapplied when the economic interests of employers are at stake. It found that the pursuit of equal opportunities for religious groups may be less important than the desire of companies to cater to the anti-religious views of their customers.

In particular, they should ask the Court to reflect on the real reasons behind so-called neutrality policies. These policies are not neutral between different beliefs, but disproportionally affect female Muslims. Moreover, private employers seem to have no reason to project an image of neutrality, were it not for their desire not to offend employees or customers with different beliefs. Should they really be allowed to cater to customers who are so prejudiced that they get upset at the sight of religious garment? Asking the question is answering it, but not, unfortunately, for the EU’s highest court.

Perhaps the Court’s approach to religious discrimination is explained by a fear of being drawn into the fractious debate over neutrality in France and Belgium.

Is religion different?

The European Union can be justly proud of its approach to discrimination. EU legislation offers comprehensive protection against discrimination on grounds such as race, gender, sexual orientation, and religion. The Court has been fairly consistent in ruling that exceptions to the right to be free from discrimination must be drawn narrowly. According to settled case law, for example, employers may not invoke their business interests to justify discrimination on the basis of their race or sexual orientation. For some reason, however, its approach to religious discrimination is different. This poses the question: Is religion so different from other protected grounds that a different approach is justified?

Some have defended the Court saying that it would be too controversial to meddle with national approaches to religious freedom. Perhaps the Court’s approach to religious discrimination is explained by a fear of being drawn into the fractious debate over neutrality in France and Belgium. However, even these countries make a distinction between public and private sector employment: the principle of laïcité does not apply to private employment. The Court could have respected the Franco-Belgian conception of neutrality without allowing private employers to pursue similar policies.

Another reason that has been put forward for treating religion differently is that it might seem unfair to distinguish between different expressions of personal belief. If an employer may wear the hijab, may a conservative person wear an “Abortion is Murder” t-shirt? May a vegetarian employee wear a hoodie that reads “Meat is Murder”? However, not all personal beliefs are equally worthy of protection. First, unlike the “Abortion is Murder” t-shirt, no one can reasonably be offended by someone wearing the hijab.

Second, while the hijab can often not be removed without remorse, our conscience is not usually burdened by a ban to manifest our commitment to vegetarianism. So yes, regulating religion clearly poses difficult questions, but that does not justify the EU court dodging such questions at the expense of religious minorities. And the right answer to such questions is certainly not to sacrifice the rights of Muslims on the altar of economic interest.

It has been ten years since popular protests in Syria against Assad’s regime started. Many European governments became involved in the armed conflicts in Syria and Iraq, while a number of their citizens became foreign fighters by joining the Syrian civil war as members of armed groups in conflict zones.

Some have joined different jihadist or militant opposition groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and Daesh (ISIS), while others in Northern Syria are fighting in the ranks of the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK terror group.

An estimated 40,000 foreign fighters are members of the terror group Daesh (ISIS), including nearly 5,000 European citizens. According to the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), around 305 of them are Dutch. Among them, there are children who unwillingly bear the responsibility for their parents’ decisions.

The children are European citizens left to face their fate without any foreseeable future. Dutch sociologists, lawyers, and human rights activists have shared their concerns over these children’s situation and future in Iraq and Syria. However, European countries do not offer any help to protect them. What is the reason?

In June 2020, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands ruled that the Dutch government is not obliged to bring Dutch Daesh women and their children back from refugee camps in Northern Syria. The state has put forward the following reasons: First, the national security in the Netherlands and other Schengen countries, which would be endangered if they return.

Second, the security risks that Dutch officials and other parties would be exposed to when bringing them back from Northern Syria. Third, the Dutch international reputation in Northern Syria may be adversely affected by contacting state and non-state actors.

The chairman of the Dutch Supreme Court indicated that human rights treaties are not directly applicable in this case, since these women are outside Dutch territory. How legitimate is this provision? Does the application of human rights treaties end as soon as one crosses the Dutch border?

Besides the Netherlands, other Schengen countries are faced with the dilemma of the repatriation of Daesh women and their children. The German and French governments last year declared that they would bring the foreign fighters back and assess the situation on an individual basis. According to the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Committee, Belgium is expected to guarantee the return of its nationals. However, the Court of Appeal in Brussels ruled in February 2019 that a group of women and their children do not have to be repatriated by the state.

Child returnees from conflict zones

The retrieval of Daesh fighters is and will remain a difficult issue as it is an unprecedented incident. However, this cannot be said about the situation of the children who are in conflict zones. There have been development programs aimed at child soldiers in the Congo and other parts of Africa, where the return to society has had a positive effect on them.

There is, therefore, a possibility with the help of de-radicalization programs for European children to return from the Syrian civil war. According to reports from the UN Security Council, children in Syria are being used as suicide bombs and to carry weapons which makes them vulnerable to indoctrination. The children of European foreign fighters in refugee camps under the YPG’s control suffer even further because of the humanitarian crisis and the constant uncertainty they live in.

The right to family reunification

Under international law, children cannot be legally separated from their parents. When children arrive in the Netherlands, they have the right to family reunion. This means that the return of mothers could also be possible. Most conservative and right-wing politicians propose bringing back only unaccompanied children whose parents have died. But should the problem be solved by fighting inhumanity with inhumanity?

Regardless of how difficult the situation might be, European politicians should keep in mind that these women and children are human beings entitled to the basic human rights that apply to everyone on Earth. Leaving European nationals to face their own fates is wrong. International human rights treaties and laws provide a solid legal framework, but when it comes to the application of these laws and to people’s sensitivity regarding foreign fighters and their families, there is still a lot of work to be done.