T

he struggle for influence between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis in Yemen, which was once marked by intense fighting but had continued at a lower intensity particularly over the past four years, resurfaced following developments in September.

The wave of attacks launched by the Houthis against targets in Saudi Arabia on September 8 caused extensive damage to oil facilities and left dozens of people injured. These attacks demonstrated that the Yemen conflict, which Riyadh believed it had contained through the 2022 ceasefire, had once again intensified, bringing the fighting back onto Saudi territory.

Viewed within the broader regional and global geopolitical context, these developments can be regarded not only as a new phase of Yemen’s civil war but also as a new front in the war being waged by the United States and Israel against Iran.

The primary reason behind the Houthis’ adoption of a new strategy in Yemen and their increasingly confrontational stance towards Saudi Arabia can be identified as the collapse of the ceasefire between the United States and Iran. Indeed, following the breakdown of the ceasefire in July, the Houthis began intensifying their attacks against Yemen’s Saudi-backed central government, seeking, in a sense, to punish Riyadh, which they accused of acting in coordination with Washington.

Security vulnerabilities

In line with this strategy, the Houthis also sought to establish control over Yemen’s coastal regions. Bringing maritime traffic in the Red Sea under Houthi control was intended to exert pressure not only on Saudi Arabia but also on global actors.

Houthi forces rapidly captured stretches of the Red Sea coastline, including the port of Mocha and the strategically located island of Perim at the entrance to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. They subsequently began targeting cities under central government control further inland, including Taiz and Marib.

The principal factor behind the Houthis’ remarkably rapid advance was the withdrawal of Saudi-backed forces from their positions within a very short period, in some cases without putting up any resistance. Alongside the Houthis’ military superiority, poor coordination among opposing forces also played an important role.

Beyond the realities on the battlefield, this development can be regarded as a major loss of prestige for Saudi Arabia, while also exposing significant strategic vulnerabilities.

An even more critical dimension of these developments emerged in the subsequent phase. Emboldened by the psychological advantage gained through their advances in Yemen, the Houthis began directly targeting Saudi territory.

These attacks frequently followed strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen, which the Houthis claimed had been carried out with Saudi Arabia’s involvement.

Furthermore, the Houthis regard Riyadh as the principal backer of Yemen’s central government and, for this reason, consider Saudi Arabia a legitimate target. Consequently, Houthi forces have been conducting attacks designed to inflict maximum damage on both Saudi Arabia’s military and economic capabilities.

The targeting of oil facilities in the Saudi city of Yanbu was a particularly significant development in this regard.

By seeking to undermine the oil-export capacity of Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil exporter, the Houthis aimed to exert pressure on Riyadh, setting the stage for a further escalation of tensions.

Indeed, in the period that followed, Saudi Arabia intensified its attacks against Houthi targets, both directly and through Yemen’s central government.

Through these attacks, the Houthis also sought to obstruct the Red Sea route that Saudi Arabia had activated as an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz.

This strategy aligns with Iran’s post-war policies and is being pursued with the objectives of threatening Riyadh’s stability while ensuring that Iran’s influence over the Strait of Hormuz becomes permanent.

Indeed, weakening the Red Sea corridor that Riyadh has sought to establish as a backup route also demonstrates the Houthis’ efforts to maximise both their deterrence capabilities and their bargaining power at the negotiating table.

The support that failed to materialize from the United States

Another noteworthy aspect of the intensifying conflict is Saudi Arabia’s difficulty in responding effectively to Houthi attacks.

One of the principal reasons for this can be attributed not so much to a shortage of resources but rather to the inability to use existing resources properly and efficiently.

Indeed, the failure of Saudi Arabia, which has made the largest investments in armaments in the Middle East for years, and its local allies in Yemen to mount an effective defense against the Houthis has raised questions about Riyadh’s military capabilities.

Media reports even suggested that, during the period of intensified Houthi attacks, the Saudi crown prince called US President Donald Trump to request assistance, but Trump remained reluctant to intervene.

Trump’s proposal to offer diplomatic support and accelerate the sale of F-35 fighter jets, rather than conduct airstrikes in support of Riyadh, reportedly provoked a strong reaction from the Saudi leadership.

This process can therefore be seen as a renewed confirmation of the considerable risks Saudi Arabia faces as a result of relying on the United States as its sole security umbrella.

These developments have also paved the way for Saudi Arabia to turn towards alternative security mechanisms that it has been developing for some time.

One of the strategies prioritized by the Saudi leadership is to accelerate the implementation of the Mecca Agreement, signed jointly with Türkiye and Pakistan, and transform it into a protective security framework for Riyadh against potentially greater threats.

Although this alliance is not yet operational, it is expected to become one of the three countries’ most important security instruments in the near future.

Looking ahead, three scenarios stand out regarding Saudi Arabia-Houthi tensions, which have been among the major justifications for the US-Israeli war against Iran.

The first scenario involves the parties refraining from further escalation and instead pursuing negotiations. This could lead to a cessation of hostilities and the launch of a diplomatic process in which actors such as Oman, Pakistan or Qatar could play a role.

The second, and more dangerous, scenario would involve Saudi-backed forces launching a counteroffensive in an attempt to secure a decisive victory over the Houthis.

Such a development could prolong the conflict, pave the way for further humanitarian crises in Yemen, a country that has suffered from instability for years, and worsen the situation considerably.

The most pessimistic scenario would involve the crisis expanding into a regional confrontation, creating an environment in which a greater number of countries become directly involved in the fighting.

In fact, such an outcome could produce a geopolitical rupture far greater than that caused by the war against Iran and further entrench regional instability.

It could also make polarization among regional actors more pronounced and lead to the emergence of more clearly defined alliances.

Ultimately, Saudi Arabia’s reassessment of its security strategy concerning Yemen, along with a reconsideration of its relationship with the United States in this context, can be regarded as a necessity.

As one of the Gulf region’s most powerful countries, Saudi Arabia must first strengthen its national defense capabilities and, at the same time, invest in security frameworks developed with regional actors with whom it can establish relationships based on clear mutual trust. Such measures are essential if Riyadh is to preserve domestic stability, counter external threats and sustain its economic achievements.

Riyadh’s success in this process will have implications not only for Yemen but also for the wider geographical area stretching from the Red Sea to the Strait of Hormuz.

(Orignally published in Turkish by Kriter)

O

man has proposed a preferential bilateral trade and investment agreement with China as the two countries seek to deepen economic ties and expand cooperation across strategic industries.

Sultan Haitham bin Tariq al-Said made the proposal during a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Monday, describing the agreement as a way to create new opportunities for trade and investment.

“We are confident that such an agreement would open new avenues for trade and investment, facilitate and enhance commercial and investment exchanges between our two nations,” Haitham told Xi, according to remarks reported by Oman’s state-run news agency.

The proposal comes as Oman seeks to increase trade with its largest commercial partner and attract investment into sectors that form part of its efforts to diversify its economy beyond oil exports.

Haitham said Muscat was interested in establishing joint investment funds covering renewable energy, artificial intelligence, digital technologies, space and defense.

The discussions also emphasized closer cooperation between financial and investment institutions, suggesting that the proposed partnership could extend beyond conventional trade in goods and energy.

Xi described closer relations with Oman as a “shared strategic choice” for both countries, saying he was ready to work with Haitham to elevate their strategic partnership and contribute to regional stability and prosperity.

Energy and technology at the center of economic cooperation

China is Oman’s largest trading partner, with bilateral economic relations supported by Omani exports of crude oil and other energy products to the Chinese market.

The two countries have also been developing commercial and tourism links. Direct flights between Beijing and Muscat began in November 2025, providing additional connectivity for business and travel.

Oman is seeking to expand its renewable energy supply chains and digital commerce as it pursues broader economic diversification. Cooperation with China could provide access to investment, technology and industrial expertise in areas including clean energy and advanced digital infrastructure.

The proposed joint investment funds would offer a framework for financing projects in several emerging sectors. However, the announcement did not specify the size of the funds, their investment timelines or the projects that would receive priority.

Haitham also highlighted the importance of cooperation between financial institutions, indicating that strengthening investment channels would be an important part of the proposed economic relationship.

The talks reflect China’s continuing efforts to strengthen its economic and diplomatic partnerships across the Middle East, where energy trade, infrastructure investment and technology cooperation have become increasingly important areas of engagement.

Historic visit underscores growing strategic ties

Haitham arrived in Beijing on Sunday for a two-day state visit, the first by an Omani head of state since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1978.

His arrival was followed by an official welcoming ceremony on Monday, where he and Xi reviewed an honor guard at the Great Hall of the People.

Although the regional conflict was not directly addressed in Haitham’s opening remarks, the Omani leader praised China’s efforts to promote international security, stability and cooperation.

“We further express our deep appreciation for China’s positions on key issues concerning our region,” he said.

The visit comes as Beijing seeks to maintain diplomatic engagement across the Middle East amid continuing regional tensions. China’s Foreign Ministry said last week that Beijing would soon send special envoys to countries in the region to encourage dialogue and de-escalation.

Oman’s proposal therefore carries both economic and diplomatic significance, although the discussions announced on Monday focused primarily on bilateral trade, investment and strategic cooperation.

The two governments have described the visit as an opportunity to establish a new phase in their relationship. Whether that ambition produces a formal preferential trade agreement and concrete investment commitments will depend on subsequent negotiations.

(Source: Reuters)

I

was thirteen when I first read George Orwell’s 1984. Growing up in a politically unstable region, the novel felt like a commentary on the world outside my window.

Throughout human history, every iteration of state power deployed mechanisms of control to consolidate authority and resources for the ruling elite. Orwell’s genius lay in capturing this universal mechanics of state power.

Orwell imagined a state that demanded obedience through surveillance and controlling flow of information. Generative AI, state-controlled algorithms, digital identity systems, and automated public infrastructure now determine what citizens should believe, what resources they survive on, and whether authentic public opinion exists at all.

Unlike Orwell’s oppressive telescreens, contemporary technologies are carried voluntarily. Citizens willingly purchase, update, and carry the devices of their own oversight, surrendering their autonomy for digital convenience. In fact, digital architecture continuously fosters dependency of present life on these tools.

Consider the control of information. Orwell’s Ministry of Truth rewrote the past by destroying records and manufacturing official narratives. Today, mass reliance on generative artificial intelligence is quietly conditioning populations to trade cognitive friction for friction-free answers, outsourcing basic tasks, writing, and critical reasoning to algorithms. As individuals become dependent on quick machine outputs, they are systematically conditioned to think, articulate, and structure arguments in uniform mannerisms dictated by the statistical averages of large language models.

Modern digital control

This homogenization of thought acts as an organic counterpart to Newspeak. By funneling human expression through standardized stylistic templates and algorithmic consensus, generative AI flattens individual idiosyncrasy, critical divergence, and creative rebellion, conditioning society to accept machine-curated outputs as neutral truths rather than biased reflections of corporate training data.

Modern digital control decides which information gains visibility, which narratives are deprioritized, and which voices are quietly shadow banned. Information simply gets buried under automated streams of synthetic noise or throttled at the network level. In 2025 alone, human rights monitors documented over 300 internet shutdowns across more than 50 countries during periods of civil unrest and armed conflict.

When access to the internet is restored, the medium itself acts like a double-edged sword. For populations living under military occupation or authoritarian rule, the smartphones required to seek aid or document atrocities simultaneously expose their locations, networks, and identities to state intelligence apparatuses.

The danger of algorithmic governance is hardwired into the administrative machinery of Western democracies as well. Across the globe, governments are outsourcing public administration to automated risk-scoring models that lack basic transparency and due process.

In the Netherlands, the court system was forced to strike down the government’s SyRI (System Risk Indication) algorithmic risk model, which was deployed to detect welfare fraud by aggregating personal data across public agencies. The system disproportionately targeted low-income and racial minority neighborhoods with opaque scoring metrics, offering citizens no clear avenue for legal appeal.

Fraud-detection platforms

In the United States, automated fraud-detection platforms, such as Michigan’s MiDAS system, wrongly flagged tens of thousands of unemployed citizens for fraud, stripping them of benefits and imposing financial penalties without human oversight.

Algorithms inherit the assumptions, limitations and biases of the systems in which they are built. When an opaque risk score determines access to public benefits, or when a person cannot discover why a decision was made, technological efficiency can become a substitute for due process.

Unlike the centralized state apparatus of 1984, contemporary surveillance relies on a complex, transnational architecture connecting tech monopolies, data brokers, and defense contractors.

Silicon Valley tech giants control the cloud infrastructure and generative artificial intelligence models that feed public consciousness, while states purchase surveillance capabilities off the shelfs. This creates an asymmetric alignment of commercial profit and state security. Even as corporate frontier labs race to deploy increasingly autonomous models, acknowledging catastrophic safety risks and deceptive alignment failures in their technical disclosures, policymakers around the world actively resist binding international regulations in favor of technological dominance.

Former Anthropic safety researcher Jacob Coxon publicly warned of a 10 percent chance of AI causing human extinction within the decade, echoing warnings from pioneers like Geoffrey Hinton and institutions like the Centre for International Governance Innovation. Yet at the United Nations General Assembly, U.S. President Donald Trump explicitly dismissed existential concerns, declaring that official U.S. documentation would rebrand “artificial intelligence” as “Super Intelligence” (SI) and vowing not to rein in growth.

When public institutions become dependent on privately controlled infrastructure, who sets the limits on its use? Who can audit the systems making consequential decisions? And what happens when a technology becomes so deeply integrated into public administration, financial networks or national security that abandoning it carries prohibitive costs?

Is AI weightless?

Crucially, the popular illusion that AI is a weightless, virtual cloud conceals an intensely material reality, massive industrial facilities guzzling water, coal, and gas to train and run frontier models. This computational thirst is reviving fossil fuels, keeping aging coal plants online and burning gas to guarantee 24/7 baseline electricity. In regions across South Asia, including India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, where groundwater tables are already severely depleted and over 1.3 billion people face water stress, hyperscale data centers receive guaranteed municipal water concessions for evaporative cooling, prioritizing corporate server heat management over agricultural irrigation and drinking water. In developing nations across Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, data centers operate thousands of diesel generators as power backups, emitting nitrogen oxides and fine particulate matter directly into adjacent residential areas and driving up local rates of respiratory illness.

While compute power, proprietary software, and market capitalization are overwhelmingly concentrated in wealthy Northern nations, the physical, environmental, and human burdens are offloaded onto the Global South. The hardware supply chain depends on rare earth minerals like cobalt, lithium, and nickel extracted from open-pit mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo and across Southern Africa, destroying rainforest ecosystems and contaminating watersheds.

The lifecycle ends where it begins: millions of tons of high-performance server hardware, discarded after short 2 to 4-year operational lifespans, are shipped as electronic waste to toxic dumping grounds like Agbogbloshie in Ghana, where local workers burn components in open fires and face severe dioxin, lead, and mercury poisoning. Furthermore, the human labor required to train these models relies on low-wage workers in Kenya, Uganda, India, and the Philippines, paid fractions of Western minimum wages to review and filter toxic content without healthcare support.

The ultimate power of modern surveillance lies in its psychological efficiency and structural asymmetry. The modern Big Brother does not need a telescreen in every living room, it is enough to control the interconnected digital infrastructure through which society communicates, accesses knowledge, and survives.

B

inance, the world’s largest cryptocurrency exchange, has suspended deposits and withdrawals following a massive security breach involving an estimated $6.3 billion in digital assets, an incident that could become the largest cryptocurrency theft ever recorded.

The exchange said Thursday that it had worked with industry partners and law enforcement agencies to identify and freeze affected assets, locating approximately $3 billion so far. The status of the remaining $3.3 billion remains unclear.

Binance co-founder Yi He pledged that the company would cover all losses resulting from the attack, while the exchange sought to reassure its global customer base that user funds remained safe.

According to Binance, preliminary findings suggest the breach may have originated from a compromised laptop belonging to one of its engineers. The attacker allegedly used the device to access an internal system and execute unauthorized withdrawals.

The company has temporarily halted all deposits and withdrawals while security teams investigate the incident, secure wallet infrastructure and trace the affected funds.

With approximately 335 million registered users worldwide and $162.8 billion in assets under custody, according to its 2025 annual report, Binance occupies a central position in the global cryptocurrency industry.

Bitcoin and ether tumble as investors reassess crypto risks

News of the breach triggered an immediate selloff across cryptocurrency markets during early Asian trading Friday.

Bitcoin fell more than 3% to $76,368, its lowest level in six weeks, while ether declined more than 3% to a two-month low of $2,178.

BNB, the cryptocurrency originally launched as Binance Coin, dropped 5% over the preceding 24 hours to approximately $709.70, according to CoinGecko.

The impact extended to publicly traded cryptocurrency companies. Shares of US-based exchange Coinbase Global declined 4.8% in extended trading, while bitcoin-focused company Strategy fell nearly 6%.

Industry analysts warned that the incident could undermine investor confidence in centralized cryptocurrency exchanges, particularly as digital assets were already facing pressure from elevated US interest rates and weakening demand from exchange-traded fund investors.

Tim Sun, a senior researcher at Hong Kong-based HashKey Group, said the breach could further weaken investors’ appetite for risk and encourage greater scrutiny of exchange security, financial stability and liquidity.

Aravind Srinivasan, head of systematic over-the-counter trading at cryptocurrency market maker GSR, described the incident as the largest hack in history.

Blockchain analytics firm Chainalysis and other industry specialists also indicated that the reported losses could make the attack the biggest cryptocurrency heist on record.

Crypto companies coordinate efforts to freeze stolen assets

Several major cryptocurrency companies have joined efforts to identify and freeze assets linked to the breach.

Stablecoin issuer Tether said it had frozen nearly $1.57 billion in affected funds, while Circle reported freezing more than $800 million.

Ripple also froze approximately $200 million, according to Binance’s Yi He.

World Liberty Financial, a cryptocurrency company linked to US President Donald Trump and his family, said it had coordinated with digital asset custodian BitGo to freeze funds associated with the incident.

Yi said approximately $27 million in stablecoins and another $2 million worth of World Liberty tokens had been frozen.

Binance maintains a Secure Asset Fund for Users, a reserve held entirely in bitcoin and designed to protect customer assets in the event of security breaches.

The company has not specified how much of that reserve would be needed to compensate users.

The attack adds to growing concerns over cryptocurrency security. According to blockchain research firm TRM Labs, hackers stole approximately $2.9 billion across nearly 150 cryptocurrency attacks last year.

In September, rival exchange Bitget reported the theft of roughly $350 million in digital assets.

Bernardo Brites, CEO of payments and stablecoin infrastructure company Trace Finance, warned that increasingly sophisticated hacking techniques, including the use of artificial intelligence to identify vulnerabilities, were making digital asset platforms harder to protect.

He suggested that the latest incident could accelerate a shift away from smaller exchanges that lack sufficient financial reserves to absorb major losses.

Binance.US, a separate cryptocurrency exchange, said it was unaffected by the breach. Coinbase also confirmed that its systems were not affected.

As investigators work to trace the remaining assets, the incident presents another major test of the cryptocurrency industry’s ability to safeguard customer funds and maintain confidence in centralized trading platforms.

(Source: Reuters)

A

growing shift toward military spending among the world’s wealthiest countries is widening the gap between international development assistance and escalating humanitarian needs, potentially threatening human security and political stability, according to new research released Tuesday by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

The report warns that major donor governments are increasing defense budgets while reducing development assistance, creating additional financial pressures for countries already struggling with armed conflicts, natural disasters and economic instability.

Global military expenditure reached a record $2.9 trillion last year, equivalent to 2.5% of global gross domestic product, according to SIPRI data.

Meanwhile, official development assistance (ODA) has been declining since 2024, based on figures from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Researchers found that core development assistance began stagnating as early as 2021, although the underlying trend was temporarily obscured by increased support for Ukraine following Russia’s full-scale invasion and higher spending by donor countries on hosting refugees.

The largest reductions in core assistance have affected economic infrastructure and health programs, two areas considered essential to long-term development and human security.

Humanitarian funding gap could reach $179 billion by 2028

SIPRI researchers estimate that global development assistance requirements could climb to $326 billion by 2028, depending on the evolution of armed conflicts, natural disasters and other factors affecting humanitarian needs.

Under that scenario, the gap between required funding and expected assistance would reach $179 billion, exceeding the total amount of ODA commitments projected for that year.

The findings highlight a growing imbalance between governments’ military priorities and their commitments to international development.

Xiao Liang, a researcher with SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme, said wealthy countries in Europe and elsewhere had substantially increased defense spending in response to growing security threats.

However, those increases have coincided with significant reductions in other government expenditures, including humanitarian and development assistance.

Liang warned that declining aid could generate widespread insecurity for countries and populations dependent on international support.

He also cautioned that military expenditure was likely to continue increasing over the coming years, creating additional pressure on development assistance and competing budget priorities.

Nan Tian, director of SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme, described the findings as evidence of a sustained retreat from essential humanitarian and development commitments at a time when global needs are expanding.

However, the researchers stressed that the projected funding shortfall remains relatively small compared with the additional resources governments are committing to defense.

According to SIPRI, closing the anticipated aid gap would require redirecting only a fraction of planned increases in military spending, suggesting that meeting future development needs remains financially achievable.

Germany and Britain illustrate competing budget priorities

The report examines recent military and development spending policies in Germany and the United Kingdom, highlighting how governments have justified reductions in foreign assistance as necessary to finance higher defense expenditures.

Researchers found that the savings generated by these aid reductions would make only a marginal contribution to the military spending increases being planned.

The findings raise questions about the extent to which development assistance must be reduced to accommodate national security commitments.

SIPRI argues that treating military expenditure and development assistance as competing priorities overlooks the broader role of humanitarian and economic support in preventing instability.

Development programs can help address underlying sources of insecurity, including poverty, weak infrastructure and limited access to essential services.

The report comes amid increasing geopolitical tensions and militarization, with governments placing greater emphasis on strengthening their military capabilities.

Researchers acknowledge that countries face legitimate reasons to invest in defense as international cooperation weakens and security threats intensify.

However, they caution that military capabilities alone cannot guarantee lasting security, particularly when reductions in international assistance risk worsening the conditions that contribute to instability.

Liang emphasized that development aid should be regarded as complementary to defense expenditure rather than an alternative to it.

The findings underscore a central challenge facing major donor countries: balancing immediate military requirements with the long-term humanitarian and development investments needed to sustain international stability.

Without a change in current spending priorities, SIPRI warns, the widening aid gap could leave vulnerable populations facing greater insecurity even as global military expenditure continues to reach unprecedented levels.

(Source: SIPRI)

T

he leaders of Norway and Finland have held rare direct talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in an effort to influence negotiations aimed at ending the war in Ukraine, marking a significant diplomatic departure from Europe’s longstanding policy of limiting high-level engagement with Moscow.

Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre spoke with Putin for approximately 90 minutes Tuesday, ahead of another round of US-brokered peace negotiations scheduled to take place in Abu Dhabi next month.

The conversation comes amid growing European unease over US President Donald Trump’s increasingly conciliatory approach toward Russia and deteriorating relations between Washington and Kyiv.

Western European leaders have largely avoided direct communication with Putin since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, concerns about being sidelined from negotiations have prompted renewed debate over whether Europe should establish its own diplomatic channels with Moscow.

Stubb described Tuesday’s conversation as frank and substantive, emphasizing that Finland and Norway, as Russia’s neighbors, have a direct security interest in the outcome of the conflict.

He said the initiative had been prepared in consultation with Ukraine and the United States and followed an October 20 meeting in Oslo involving US special envoy Steve Witkoff and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

The Nordic leaders subsequently contacted Zelenskyy to brief him on their discussion with Putin.

European concerns grow over Trump’s approach to Russia

The diplomatic initiative comes as Trump’s administration faces criticism from European allies over recent decisions concerning Russia and Ukraine.

Washington’s relationship with Kyiv has deteriorated following Trump’s criticism of Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy facilities, which he blamed for contributing to rising diesel prices in the United States.

Trump subsequently reached an agreement with Putin to release Russian diesel supplies to American and international markets despite existing sanctions on Russian oil.

His administration also suspended newly approved sanctions against Moscow, prompting criticism from European governments and members of his own Republican Party.

Ukraine has separately accused the United States of restricting access to Starshield, a military-grade satellite communications system used by Ukrainian forces.

Against this backdrop, Stubb and Støre are seeking to ensure that European security interests remain part of any negotiated settlement.

The Finnish president emphasized that the call did not signal weakening support for Ukraine or constitute negotiations on behalf of Europe.

Støre similarly argued that maintaining pressure on Russia and engaging diplomatically were not mutually exclusive.

However, the Kremlin’s account suggested that Putin had offered little indication of flexibility.

Moscow reiterated that any lasting peace agreement must fully account for what it describes as Russia’s legitimate interests, while accusing NATO and European Union countries of prolonging the conflict through confrontational policies.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov characterized the discussion as constructive but maintained that Putin’s position remained unchanged.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was more dismissive, suggesting that the Nordic initiative offered no new proposals and reflected European governments’ desire to secure a place in negotiations.

Moscow also continued to question Zelenskyy’s legitimacy. Russian presidential aide Yury Ushakov said the Ukrainian leader should travel to Moscow if he wanted direct negotiations with Putin.

Nordic initiative exposes divisions among European allies

The unexpected diplomatic outreach has received a mixed response across Europe, exposing disagreements over how governments should approach negotiations with Russia.

Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson expressed skepticism about the initiative, questioning whether Putin genuinely wanted peace and indicating that some European leaders had not been informed beforehand.

Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen warned against individual diplomatic initiatives that could undermine Europe’s collective position.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk also urged caution, emphasizing the need for vigilance in contacts with Moscow.

Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys argued that Europe must participate in negotiations over Ukraine’s future but should do so through a coordinated approach backed by concrete demands and diplomatic leverage.

The differing reactions reflect a broader challenge facing European governments as Washington takes the leading role in efforts to broker an agreement between Moscow and Kyiv.

While some leaders believe direct engagement is necessary to influence the diplomatic process, others fear that fragmented European initiatives could weaken their collective negotiating position.

The latest developments come as Ukraine continues to endure Russian attacks, with residential areas and civilian infrastructure suffering extensive damage.

For Norway and Finland, the immediate objective appears to be reopening communication with Moscow without abandoning their commitments to Kyiv.

Whether that approach can translate into meaningful influence over the forthcoming Abu Dhabi negotiations remains uncertain, particularly as Russia continues to insist on its existing conditions for ending the war.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

L

ula won Brazil’s presidential election, but Congress shifted to the right. Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party will hold 121 of the 513 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 28 of the 81 Senate seats, while the left will hold 124 seats in the lower house and 16 in the Senate. Lula secured the presidency, but he will have to govern alongside a more right-leaning Congress. Although the Workers’ Party has never secured a majority, the strengthening of its opponents will make building the support necessary to implement its agenda more difficult and politically costly.

Lula da Silva has made history in Brazilian democracy, both by securing a fourth presidential term and by becoming the first president to win a runoff election after finishing second in the first round.

In the October 4 first round, he trailed his rival, Flávio Bolsonaro, by 2.2 million votes. On October 25, however, he received 64.25 million votes, defeating Bolsonaro by approximately 4.4 million votes. The message from the ballot box is clear, but it has its limits: Winning the presidency does not mean gaining control over every center of power in the country. Although voters have given Lula a mandate to govern, doing so without negotiation and compromise will not be easy.

How did Lula achieve victory?

First, voter turnout played a decisive role. The abstention rate fell from 21.1 percent to approximately 19 percent, meaning that nearly three million fewer voters stayed home. Between the two rounds, Lula gained 10.3 million additional votes, while Flávio Bolsonaro gained only 3.6 million.

Second, Lula made important geographical gains. Following his October 4 defeat, he established two priorities: expanding his electoral base in the northeast and reducing voter abstention. He increased his vote total in the northeast from 21.4 million to 24.4 million and reclaimed Minas Gerais, the only state to switch sides, with 50.4 percent of the vote.

Third, his campaign successfully combined street-level mobilization with digital organizing. Large rallies were complemented by a digital army coordinated by lawmaker André Janones through the WhatsApp group “Exército do Lula” (Lula’s Army), which brought together approximately 11 million people.

Lula also introduced voter-friendly economic promises, including exempting gasoline from federal taxes, debt forgiveness for microbusiness owners, and an expansion of the Pé-de-Meia program. At the same time, he warned that Flávio would cut social spending and surrender Brazil’s sovereignty to Trump.

The more difficult question is how much of Lula’s victory reflected genuine support for his political agenda and how much resulted from opposition to the return of Bolsonarism. Initial analyses emphasize voter mobilization and grassroots organization. Concern about a possible Flávio victory was probably just as influential as enthusiasm for Lula himself.

Lula holds the Presidency, but the right gains strength in Congress

Lula won the presidency, but Congress shifted to the right. Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party (PL) will hold 121 of the 513 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 28 of the 81 Senate seats, while the left will hold 124 seats in the lower house and 16 in the Senate.

Lula will therefore have to govern alongside a more right-leaning Congress. Although the Workers’ Party (PT) has never secured a parliamentary majority, the strengthening of its opponents will make assembling the support required to implement its agenda more difficult and politically costly.

In the Chamber of Deputies, Centrão will play a crucial role in forming a majority. An informal political grouping composed predominantly of centrist and center-right parties, Centrão is known for its pragmatism and its practice of negotiating political support in exchange for influence over ministries, government appointments, and budgetary resources.

Hugo Motta, the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies and one of Centrão’s central figures, has already secured the support of 273 lawmakers, exceeding the 257 votes required for his reelection. However, this support does not automatically translate into votes for the government.

Passing budgets and reforms through Congress will force Lula into political negotiations, potentially requiring concessions on his policy agenda. Nevertheless, the outlook is not entirely pessimistic: Motta’s rapprochement with Lula during the election campaign could create room for compromise.

Lula will also face a more conservative Senate, where he must negotiate support for his reforms and government appointments. The election of the Senate president will be particularly important because it will determine who controls the legislative agenda and the pace of voting.

Moreover, upcoming vacancies on the Supreme Federal Court resulting from judicial retirements will make the Senate a key arena in the struggle over Brazil’s institutional balance.

Has Bolsonarism been defeated?

Flávio lost the presidency, but Bolsonarism retains considerable political strength. He received more than 59 million votes, while the Liberal Party (PL), despite lacking an outright majority, will become the largest individual party in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. According to a count conducted by local media, 16 of the elected governors supported his candidacy.

Following his defeat, Flávio announced that he would not recognize the result and would seek to annul the election.

His main argument centered on Supreme Federal Court Justice Cristiano Zanin’s decision to extend voting by two hours because of reported transportation difficulties, particularly in Salvador and São Paulo. Zanin had previously served as Lula’s lawyer.

The extension applied only to polling stations that remained open; those that had already closed were not reopened. It should also be noted that both campaigns had requested extensions, although their requests concerned different geographical areas.

The decision, described by the media as unprecedented, sparked legal debate, and the Electoral Public Prosecutor’s Office opposed extending voting hours.

However, the controversy does not, in itself, demonstrate that irregularities affected the election result. The president of the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) confirmed that the process was secure, while the presidents of both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies recognized Lula’s victory.

I

sraelis began voting Tuesday in a closely contested national election that could determine Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political future, three years after the October 7 attacks and amid growing public divisions over his leadership, successive wars and Israel’s increasing international isolation.

Polling stations opened at 7 a.m. local time and will close at 10 p.m., with approximately 7.3 million Israelis eligible to cast ballots, including 330,000 first-time voters.

The election is widely viewed as a referendum on Netanyahu, Israel’s longest-serving prime minister, who has spent 19 years in office and faces one of the most consequential political challenges of his career.

Opinion polls indicate a tight contest between Netanyahu’s Likud party and its right-wing allies and an opposition alliance led by Gadi Eisenkot, a former military chief who has positioned himself as an alternative to the incumbent’s leadership.

Neither bloc currently appears assured of securing the 61 seats required to form a majority in Israel’s 120-member parliament, raising the possibility of prolonged coalition negotiations or another election next year.

Netanyahu campaigns on wartime leadership as opposition demands accountability

Netanyahu has centered his campaign on his wartime record and close relationship with US President Donald Trump, who has publicly endorsed his reelection bid.

The prime minister has portrayed his leadership as essential to confronting Iran, suggesting Sunday that Trump would be prepared to take further military action against Tehran if Netanyahu remained in power.

Eisenkot rejected that argument, accusing Netanyahu of relying on fear and political threats to retain office.

The former military chief said he was confident Washington would cooperate with any Israeli leader chosen through democratic elections.

For many opposition supporters, the vote represents an opportunity to demand accountability for the security failures surrounding the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attacks, which killed approximately 1,200 people and resulted in 251 hostages being taken, according to Israeli figures.

Israel’s subsequent military offensive devastated much of Gaza and killed approximately 74,000 Palestinians, according to Gaza health authorities.

Eisenkot, who joined Netanyahu’s wartime cabinet following the attacks, resigned eight months later after criticizing the prime minister’s leadership.

Opposition groups have pledged to establish a national inquiry into the failures surrounding October 7.

Nilli Mor, a volunteer campaigning for the Democrats party led by former general Yair Golan, said she hoped the election would bring a new beginning for Israel.

Meanwhile, Netanyahu’s political future could once again depend on far-right coalition partners Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich.

Ben-Gvir, whose Jewish Power party has gained support in recent polls, expressed confidence Tuesday that Netanyahu would return to office.

Undecided voters and coalition arithmetic could determine outcome

With neither major bloc holding a decisive advantage, voter turnout and last-minute decisions could prove critical.

Approximately 13% of Israeli voters remained undecided, according to research by the Israel Democracy Institute.

Participation among Israel’s Arab minority could also influence the election’s outcome, potentially improving Eisenkot’s chances of forming an alternative government.

Although Eisenkot has ruled out formally joining forces with Arab parties, analysts suggest they could support a minority government to prevent Netanyahu from returning to power.

The election also comes amid growing dissatisfaction among some traditional Likud supporters, including voters concerned about Netanyahu’s ongoing corruption trial, in which he denies wrongdoing.

Political analyst Amotz Asa-El of the Shalom Hartman Institute predicted a narrow result rather than a decisive victory for either side.

Beyond domestic politics, the election carries significant implications for Israel’s regional strategy following military confrontations with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iran.

Eisenkot has pledged to prevent Iran from acquiring military nuclear capabilities, either through force or a diplomatic arrangement backed by Washington.

While he opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state, he has criticized rising settler violence against Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and rejected Netanyahu’s far-right coalition partners.

If neither Netanyahu nor Eisenkot succeeds in assembling a governing majority, Netanyahu could remain caretaker prime minister until another election is held.

For Israeli voters, Tuesday’s ballot represents a choice not only between competing political leaders but also over the country’s direction after three years of devastating conflict, deepening polarization and mounting diplomatic challenges.

(Source: Reuters)

B

razilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has secured a historic fourth term in office after narrowly defeating right-wing Senator Flavio Bolsonaro in a dramatic presidential runoff, overcoming a first-round defeat.

The 80-year-old leftist leader won more than 51% of Sunday’s vote, compared with approximately 48% for Bolsonaro, the son of jailed former President Jair Bolsonaro. Electoral authorities declared Lula the winner after 98.76% of ballots had been counted.

The victory marks an unprecedented political comeback in modern Brazilian history, making Lula the first presidential candidate in nearly four decades to overturn a first-round defeat and win the subsequent runoff.

Bolsonaro had initially emerged ahead in the October 4 election, securing 47.03% of votes against Lula’s 45.16%, a difference of approximately 2.2 million ballots.

However, an intensive three-week campaign focused on economic concerns, social welfare programs and mobilizing absent voters helped Lula reverse the result.

His victory also represents a significant setback for Brazil’s right wing, which had hoped to return the Bolsonaro family to power.

Voting extension triggers controversy and legal threats

Sunday’s election was marked by confusion after a last-minute judicial decision extended voting hours by two hours following complaints from both presidential campaigns.

Lula’s campaign accused local authorities of deliberately reducing public transportation services in several cities, potentially preventing lower-income voters from reaching polling stations.

Bolsonaro’s campaign separately requested additional voting time in areas affected by heavy rainfall and flooding.

In Minas Gerais, authorities reported electricity outages at 349 polling locations, although electronic voting machines continued operating using backup batteries.

Supreme Court Justice Cristiano Zanin subsequently ordered polling stations that remained open to continue accepting voters until 7 p.m., two hours beyond the original closing time.

However, some polling stations had already closed and shut down their voting equipment before the decision was announced.

The resulting confusion prompted Bolsonaro to question the election’s legitimacy and pledge to seek annulment of the results.

Bolsonaro accused Zanin, who previously served as Lula’s personal lawyer before being appointed to the Supreme Court in 2023, of improperly changing election procedures.

Brazil’s Federal Police are also investigating allegations of election-related transportation disruptions across five states.

In Salvador, a court ordered the arrest of the city’s transportation secretary over allegations that he directed reductions in bus services.

The developments have raised concerns about potential legal disputes following an already deeply polarized presidential contest.

Higher turnout delivers Lula victory and challenges Trump

Increased voter participation appears to have played an important role in Lula’s comeback, particularly in northeastern Brazil, a longstanding stronghold of his Workers’ Party.

According to Andrei Roman, head of polling firm AtlasIntel, lower abstention may have contributed to the president’s victory.

Approximately 33.4 million Brazilians stayed home during the first round, representing nearly 21% of eligible voters and marking the highest general-election abstention rate since 1998.

Lula spent the final weeks of campaigning seeking to mobilize those voters, emphasizing household economic pressures and promising measures including free public transportation on weekends.

His victory also carries significant international implications, particularly for relations with the United States.

President Donald Trump has maintained close ties with the Bolsonaro family, while Lula has repeatedly criticized Washington’s tariff policies and what he describes as interference in Brazil’s domestic affairs.

Reuters reported that US State Department officials had pushed for sanctions against Brazil as part of efforts to weaken Lula’s administration and facilitate the Bolsonaro family’s political return.

Asked Sunday which candidate he preferred, Trump declined to publicly endorse either contender.

Lula, meanwhile, portrayed his victory as a defense of Brazilian sovereignty and democratic institutions against domestic and international pressure.

In his election-night address, the president said Brazilians had overcome external interference and rejected political misinformation.

“The election was a defeat for denialism,” Lula declared. “It was a defeat for lies.”

Despite the celebrations among his supporters, Lula begins his historic fourth term facing a divided electorate, threatened legal challenges and the difficult task of rebuilding political consensus in Latin America’s largest country.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

I

sraeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has declared that overthrowing Iran’s government remains Israel’s primary objective, raising the prospect of another military confrontation with Tehran despite growing doubts over whether Israel possesses the capabilities or international backing needed to achieve regime change.

Netanyahu’s remarks come ahead of Israel’s national elections next week, as his government faces declining public support and mounting questions about its regional security strategy.

The Israeli leader reiterated his position following discussions with US President Donald Trump on Sunday and a visit to Israel by US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth.

However, there has been no indication that Washington has agreed to participate in another offensive against Iran, particularly one explicitly intended to remove its political leadership.

Military analysts say Israel retains considerable offensive capabilities and could inflict substantial damage on Iranian military infrastructure. But they question whether air strikes, covert operations and cyberattacks could translate into the collapse of Tehran’s government.

Military superiority does not guarantee regime change

Israel has demonstrated its ability to strike targets deep inside Iranian territory, supported by advanced weapons systems, intelligence capabilities and aerial refueling assets.

Urban Coningham, a research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), said Israel could potentially reestablish air superiority and launch another campaign against Iranian targets.

Nevertheless, analysts distinguish between weakening a country’s military capabilities and removing its political leadership.

Netanyahu has portrayed Iran as a major security threat since his first term as prime minister in 1996, repeatedly advocating international action against Tehran.

The United States eventually joined Israeli military operations against Iran in June 2025 and participated again in the campaign launched on February 28, 2026.

Despite those interventions, Iran’s government remained in power.

Netanyahu himself acknowledged the limitations of aerial bombardment in March, suggesting that overthrowing the Iranian leadership would require a ground component.

Caglar Kurc, an assistant professor at Abdullah Gul University in Türkiye, said air strikes could weaken Iran’s military infrastructure without completely eliminating its capacity to retaliate.

He argued that achieving regime change would require deploying troops and maintaining a military presence inside Iran for years, a commitment Israel would struggle to sustain.

Experts also questioned whether intelligence operations or support for armed opposition groups could provide a viable alternative.

Although Israel retains intelligence networks inside Iran, deploying covert assets risks exposing them to Iranian counterintelligence operations.

Similarly, Kurdish and Baloch armed groups are not considered capable of independently defeating Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Iran retains retaliatory capabilities as US support remains uncertain

A renewed Israeli offensive would also carry substantial military and economic risks.

Sidharth Kaushal, a senior RUSI research fellow, said Iran likely retains significant missile stockpiles despite damage sustained during previous confrontations.

Its antiship missile capabilities remain particularly important, supported by domestic production and mountainous terrain that provides natural protection against aerial attacks.

Iran could also exploit the financial imbalance between inexpensive offensive drones and the considerably more expensive interceptor systems used by Israel.

Previous exchanges have already depleted portions of Israel’s interceptor inventories, potentially complicating its ability to sustain defensive operations during another prolonged confrontation.

Washington’s willingness to participate represents another major uncertainty.

According to a Financial Times report this week, an Israeli proposal for renewed strikes failed to secure Trump’s approval, although the disagreement did not necessarily rule out future American involvement.

With US midterm elections approaching, Trump faces domestic political pressure to avoid another escalation.

Without American participation, Israel would also lack access to certain specialized military capabilities, including the massive GBU-57 bunker-busting bombs deployed by US B-2 bombers against Iran’s Fordow and Natanz nuclear facilities in June 2025.

Analysts suggest Tehran could respond to an independent Israeli offensive by concentrating retaliatory strikes on Israel while avoiding American military installations and disruption to the Strait of Hormuz.

Such an approach could allow Iran to impose significant costs on Israel while reducing the likelihood of direct US intervention.

Ultimately, experts argue that Netanyahu faces a fundamental strategic obstacle: Israel may possess the military power to severely damage Iran, but destroying infrastructure and military installations does not necessarily create the conditions required to overthrow an established government.

Without a credible ground strategy, sustained international backing and a viable political alternative inside Iran, Netanyahu’s declared objective of regime change remains far more difficult to achieve than another round of devastating military strikes.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

G

lobal debt has surged beyond $365 trillion, placing governments under mounting financial pressure as rising interest payments consume public budgets and intensify economic frustration across Europe, where hundreds of thousands of protesters have taken to the streets demanding relief from soaring living costs.

According to the Institute of International Finance (IIF), worldwide debt held by governments, businesses and households increased by approximately $10 trillion during the first half of 2026, reaching a level equivalent to roughly $44,000 for every person on the planet.

The unprecedented debt burden comes as major economies face increasingly expensive borrowing conditions, forcing governments to allocate greater portions of their budgets to interest payments rather than public services.

The consequences have become particularly visible in France, where nationwide demonstrations over living costs, stagnant wages, unaffordable housing and underfunded education have highlighted growing dissatisfaction with the country’s economic direction.

More than 550,000 people participated in demonstrations across France on Saturday, according to the Interior Ministry, following weeks of student-led protests.

Similar demonstrations have erupted in Belgium, Italy and Portugal. While many gatherings remained peaceful, some descended into clashes, looting and fires.

France faces mounting debt crisis as borrowing costs surge

France has emerged as a major source of concern in European financial markets, with its government borrowing costs reaching their highest level since 2002.

The country currently pays approximately 5% to borrow money through 10-year government bonds, considerably higher than Germany’s 3.41%.

More strikingly, French borrowing costs have surpassed those of Italy and Greece, two countries that experienced severe financial difficulties during the eurozone sovereign debt crisis.

Only the United Kingdom, which operates outside the eurozone, currently faces higher borrowing costs among the major European economies examined.

The widening gap between French and German bond yields reflects investors demanding greater compensation for lending to Paris amid concerns about its fiscal outlook.

France’s public debt has reached approximately $4.2 trillion, equivalent to 118.5% of its gross domestic product, placing it fifth globally in absolute government debt.

The International Monetary Fund projects that France’s debt could climb to 121.8% of GDP by 2030, further complicating efforts to stabilize public finances.

Rising bond yields carry significant consequences for government spending.

When countries issue debt at higher interest rates, they must devote more resources to servicing their financial obligations, potentially leaving less funding available for hospitals, education, infrastructure and pensions.

Governments facing such pressures may eventually be forced to increase taxation, reduce public expenditure or borrow even more money.

The situation has revived memories of Europe’s sovereign debt crisis between 2010 and 2012, when soaring borrowing costs pushed countries including Ireland and Portugal into international financial assistance programs.

Global interest payments exceed annual defense spending

The debt challenge extends far beyond Europe.

The United States remains the world’s largest government debtor, with outstanding public debt reaching approximately $41.4 trillion, equivalent to 127% of its economy.

China follows with $22.5 trillion, or 104% of GDP, while Japan holds $8.7 trillion in government debt and has the highest debt-to-GDP ratio among major economies, at approximately 199%.

The United Kingdom’s government debt stands at $4.4 trillion, representing 102% of GDP, while Italy owes approximately $3.7 trillion, equivalent to 138% of its economy.

Germany, by comparison, carries $3.5 trillion in public debt, representing a significantly lower 65% of GDP.

The mounting financial obligations are accompanied by an increasingly expensive global interest bill.

Advanced economies paid more than $3.3 trillion in interest on government bonds over the past year, exceeding estimated annual worldwide spending on defense, artificial intelligence and clean energy individually.

Global defense expenditure stood at approximately $3.1 trillion, compared with $2.6 trillion for artificial intelligence and $2.3 trillion for clean energy.

The growing cost of servicing debt is also likely to affect households, as higher government borrowing costs can contribute to increased interest rates on mortgages, vehicle financing and consumer credit.

For policymakers, the challenge is balancing fiscal sustainability against growing public demands for economic relief.

With governments facing pressure to reduce deficits while citizens demand greater investment in essential services, the global debt surge is becoming not only a financial concern but an increasingly significant political challenge.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

T

housands of students and teachers marched through central Athens on Wednesday, demanding affordable housing, increased education funding and government action to address soaring living costs, as a widening wave of economic protests continued to spread across Europe.

The demonstrations, which also took place in several other Greek cities, including Thessaloniki and the western port city of Patras, reflect growing frustration over rising household expenses, deteriorating school conditions and the financial pressures facing university students.

Protesters carrying banners and placards marched through the Greek capital, accusing the country’s conservative government of failing to adequately support students and educators amid mounting economic difficulties.

One banner reading “From Greece to France, give money to education” highlighted the growing connection between demonstrations taking place across the continent.

Other protesters carried signs written in French declaring, “To study or to survive,” underscoring concerns that rising living expenses are forcing young people to choose between pursuing their education and meeting basic financial needs.

The protests come amid widespread demonstrations across several European countries, where rising fuel prices, stagnant incomes and increasingly unaffordable housing have intensified public dissatisfaction.

France has witnessed particularly significant unrest, with some demonstrations descending into violent clashes, while similar protests have also taken place in Italy and Albania.

Students demand affordable housing and greater government support

Housing affordability emerged as one of the central grievances among Greek students, many of whom say existing government assistance falls far short of covering their accommodation expenses.

Panagiotis Moschonas, a 20-year-old engineering student participating in the Athens demonstration, criticized the government for failing to introduce meaningful measures to address the financial difficulties facing university students.

He pointed specifically to the government’s student housing subsidy, arguing that the assistance was insufficient and poorly structured.

According to Moschonas, students receive a monthly rent subsidy of 120 euros, approximately $135, which does not even cover half the cost of accommodation.

He also criticized the fact that the subsidy is distributed at the end of the year rather than when students face their monthly rental obligations.

The complaints reflect broader concerns among young Europeans who are increasingly struggling to secure affordable accommodation while pursuing higher education.

Beyond housing, demonstrators called for greater public investment in schools and universities, arguing that education budgets have failed to keep pace with rising costs and growing institutional needs.

Wednesday’s demonstrations were accompanied by a teachers’ strike, although some schools remained open despite the industrial action.

Educators said worsening working conditions and financial pressures on their families had made further collective action necessary.

Teacher Ioannis Rompas said the strike reflected growing frustration among education workers who were struggling to cope with everyday expenses while witnessing the continuing deterioration of public schools.

“Today we are striking because this situation can’t continue for our families,” Rompas said, citing high living costs and the increasing difficulty of making ends meet.

He warned that conditions in schools were deteriorating significantly year after year, adding to the pressure facing teachers and students alike.

Police deployed as European protest movement widens

Greek authorities maintained a significant security presence throughout Wednesday’s demonstrations, with riot police closely monitoring protesters as they moved through central Athens.

Officers conducted spot checks and searched bags belonging to people approaching the demonstration areas.

Businesses along the protest route also took precautionary measures, with several shops and cafes lowering steel shutters to protect their premises against potential damage.

The security arrangements reflected concerns over possible violence, given that demonstrations in Greece have previously escalated into confrontations between protesters and police.

The latest mobilization comes as governments across Europe face mounting pressure to address the consequences of rising living expenses and public dissatisfaction with spending priorities.

Students and teachers have become increasingly prominent in the demonstrations, arguing that education and affordable housing should receive greater government attention.

The coordinated grievances emerging across national borders suggest that economic frustration is developing into a broader political challenge for European governments.

For Greek demonstrators, Wednesday’s march delivered a clear message: existing financial assistance and education policies are no longer sufficient to address the growing pressures facing students, teachers and their families.

With similar protests continuing elsewhere in Europe, the demonstrations in Athens highlight how rising living costs are increasingly translating into public demands for changes in government spending and social policy.

(Source: ABC News)

N

ATO is sending additional maritime patrol aircraft, surveillance equipment and intelligence personnel to the Black Sea following a series of deadly drone attacks on commercial vessels, as fears grow over the expanding consequences of Russia’s war in Ukraine for regional security and international shipping.

The announcement Tuesday follows at least six attacks on vessels over 10 days, several of which occurred near the coastlines of NATO members Romania and Bulgaria, leaving dozens of sailors dead or missing.

NATO spokesperson Colonel Martin O’Donnell confirmed that member states were strengthening their military presence in the region, with additional resources intended to improve monitoring and help identify potential threats.

“Allies have or will send additional maritime patrol aircraft, radar systems, explosive exploitation teams, intelligence personnel, drones and more to the Black Sea,” O’Donnell said.

He emphasized that improving the alliance’s ability to monitor developments and exchange information would be central to its response.

“The most important thing we can do, however, is to increase our situational awareness in the region through increased sensors and data sharing,” he added.

The decision came after NATO’s principal political decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council, discussed the deteriorating security situation during a meeting at the alliance’s headquarters in Brussels.

Although military analysts have suggested that Russia was almost certainly responsible for the attacks, NATO, Romania and Bulgaria have stopped short of formally attributing them to Moscow. The Kremlin has denied responsibility.

Deadly attacks raise alarm among NATO members

The latest escalation follows a succession of strikes against civilian shipping in one of Europe’s most strategically important maritime corridors.

On October 5, Romanian authorities reported that two people had been killed after a vessel caught fire and sank in Black Sea waters. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy subsequently accused Russia of carrying out the attack.

Further incidents followed, including drone strikes against two chemical tankers near Romania’s coastline last week that set the vessels ablaze and left seven sailors missing.

Other attacks near Romania and neighboring Bulgaria have heightened concerns about the safety of commercial shipping, with at least five additional cargo vessels reportedly targeted over the preceding 10 days.

Across the incidents, at least 23 sailors have been reported dead or missing.

NATO spokesperson Allison Hart said the alliance had already taken steps to reinforce its eastern defenses, including strengthening its ability to counter unmanned aerial threats.

“NATO has already strengthened our posture along the eastern flank, including with counter-drone capabilities,” Hart wrote on X.

The latest deployment represents an additional effort to protect regional security as the conflict increasingly affects maritime activity beyond Ukraine’s immediate coastline.

The Black Sea remains a critical route for international trade, particularly Ukrainian agricultural exports, making disruptions to commercial shipping a concern extending well beyond the countries directly involved in the conflict.

EU warns attacks threaten global food security

The European Union has condemned the latest incidents, warning that continued attacks on commercial vessels could have serious consequences for global food supplies.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas described the recent escalation as dangerous and unacceptable, pointing to six attacks in just 10 days involving drones suspected of originating from Russia.

Kallas suggested Moscow could be attempting to undermine Ukraine’s economy by disrupting maritime exports, particularly grain shipments that provide Kyiv with an important source of revenue.

The attacks come as global food markets face mounting pressure from droughts affecting several regions and the continuing war in the Middle East.

According to Kallas, further disruption to Black Sea shipping risks worsening an already fragile international food supply situation.

The growing security concerns have also placed renewed attention on NATO’s ability to respond to threats affecting its member states without becoming directly involved in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

For Romania and Bulgaria, both NATO members bordering the Black Sea, the attacks have brought the consequences of the war increasingly close to their territorial waters and commercial maritime infrastructure.

While the alliance has not announced direct military action against those responsible, its decision to deploy additional aircraft, radar systems and intelligence resources signals a heightened determination to monitor threats and reinforce its presence in the region.

With commercial vessels continuing to face potential attacks, the Black Sea is emerging as another increasingly volatile front in the wider security crisis surrounding the war in Ukraine.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

T

he war that erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on April 15, 2023, has evolved, after more than three years of fighting, into a conflict that can no longer be explained simply as a power struggle between two military organisations.

As of September 2026, the situation in Sudan points to a prolonged war of attrition in which military operations of varying intensity across different parts of the country, deepening economic fragmentation, a worsening humanitarian crisis and cross-border support networks involving external actors are increasingly reinforcing one another.

During the early stages of the war, the Khartoum and Darfur fronts formed the centre of the fighting. Today, however, the military centre of gravity has shifted significantly towards Kordofan, Darfur and the Blue Nile region.

The advances made by the SAF in and around Khartoum during 2025 enabled the Sudanese government to consolidate its control over the northern and eastern parts of the country. Although efforts to restore a degree of normality in the capital have begun, this does not mean that the war is approaching its end.

On the contrary, the RSF’s continued dominance in Darfur and the expansion of fighting into Kordofan and the Blue Nile region demonstrate that the geographical character of the conflict is changing.

North Kordofan, in particular, has become one of the war’s most critical strategic junctions since the summer of 2026. The SAF’s gains along routes around Bara in July and September are important for access to logistical corridors connecting El-Obeid with Darfur.

In response, the RSF has carried out drone attacks against SAF-controlled centres, particularly El-Obeid, attempting to offset pressure on the ground through long-range strikes.

Mutual attacks and new population movements continued in North Kordofan during the final week of September.

One of the most striking transformations in the conflict has been the way unmanned aerial vehicles have altered the war’s strategic character.

According to the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, more than 1,000 people were killed in drone attacks during the first five months of 2026.

Both sides have acquired the capability to strike targets far behind the front lines. Electricity infrastructure, fuel facilities, hospitals, markets and areas sheltering displaced civilians have all been affected by attacks.

Sudan’s war has thus evolved into a conflict in which conventional ground warfare is intertwined with cross-border technology and weapons supply networks, turning the country into a de facto testing ground for weapons manufacturers.

A New axis of conflict stretching from Darfur to Kordofan

Darfur continues to provide the RSF with military and economic depth in the war. The group’s capture of El Fasher in October 2025 consolidated its dominance across western Sudan.

As a result, an increasingly pronounced east-west division has emerged on Sudan’s de facto map of territorial control. The SAF largely controls the north, east and areas around Khartoum, while the RSF’s sphere of influence is concentrated in Darfur and parts of Kordofan connected to the region.

This does not, however, mean that a stable boundary has emerged between the two sides. On the contrary, Kordofan is becoming a transitional zone between their respective areas of control.

Control of El-Obeid is strategically important not only from a military perspective but also because of its position along the overland route linking Khartoum with Darfur.

Consequently, the possibility that the future of Sudan’s war will be determined less by Khartoum than by the Kordofan corridors, where control has repeatedly shifted between the parties in recent months, is becoming increasingly likely.

Meanwhile, renewed escalation in the Blue Nile region has added another dimension to the conflict.

The activities of the RSF and elements of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N) have transformed areas close to the Ethiopian and South Sudanese borders into a new security flashpoint.

Clashes around Geissan and Kurmuk in recent weeks, along with allegations concerning cross-border logistical routes, indicate that Sudan’s war is beginning to intersect more directly with instability in the Horn of Africa.

From military fragmentation to economic fragmentation

Perhaps one of the most significant dimensions of Sudan’s de facto fragmentation is emerging in the economic sphere.

In areas controlled by the SAF, the Sudanese pound’s black-market exchange rate against the US dollar has fallen by almost half since the summer of 2026. By contrast, the currency has followed a relatively more stable trajectory in some RSF-controlled areas.

According to figures for September 2026, the dollar was trading at approximately 7,500 Sudanese pounds on the black market in SAF-controlled areas, compared with around 4,200 pounds in RSF-controlled territories.

A significant share of Sudan’s gold, livestock, oilseed and gum arabic production is located in areas controlled by the RSF or in contested territories, further deepening the country’s economic fragmentation.

Consequently, control over the resources and trade routes that finance the war economy has become as decisive as territorial control itself.

Gold-producing areas, overland routes extending into Libya and Chad, Red Sea ports and oil infrastructure are now as important to the sustainability of the war as military bases.

P

resident Emmanuel Macron appealed for calm on Sunday, a day after France suffered one of its worst days of unrest in ‌years, with thousands arrested and shops looted or damaged after protests over high prices and declining public services.

Fresh clashes broke out in Paris and Marseille, where riot police intervened to prevent attempts to ransack businesses.

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Nationwide demonstrations had erupted into riots on Saturday, with a town hall torched, shops pillaged and buildings covered in graffiti as violent groups clashed with police in cities across the country.

“Looking at these images, we have all asked ourselves: What was going ​through their minds? How can French people do this to France?” Macron said in a televised address to the nation.

“Nothing justifies it, nothing explains it, nothing excuses it. Tonight, ​we all feel anger and shame.”

Saturday’s unrest laid bare the deep anger at Macron, who leaves office in 2027 after a decade in power ⁠that has increasingly become defined by social discontent, a weak economy and ballooning debt.

Macron said those protesting peacefully had legitimate grievances and their actions should not be confused with those seeking to wreak ​havoc.

He stopped short of declaring a state of emergency, as demanded by some right-wing politicians, but said the government would act to allow prefects to ban protests if necessary to protect public buildings ​and local businesses.

Paris protests like a war zone

The government has blamed the violence on what it said were ultra-left groups, as well as criminals it said had instigated the looting.

One protester died on Saturday after suffering a cardiac arrest during demonstrations in Paris. Police made 2,400 arrests across France, while nearly 1,000 officers were injured, French Interior Minister Laurent Nunez said.

Police again clashed with protesters and fired tear gas at Place de la Republique on Sunday afternoon, ​and protesters had set fire to piles of bicycles. A Reuters witness said there appeared to be several hundred protesters in the area.

A massive clean-up operation took place in cities from Lille ​in the north to Marseille in the south and from Strasbourg in the east to Bordeaux in the southwest, where a masked mob invaded the residence of the local prefect.

“It’s like a war zone here!” exclaimed ‌Dutch entrepreneur Tije ⁠De Boer, who was visiting Paris with his children and said the unrest forced him to evacuate his hotel at Place de la Republique.

More than half a million people joined marches in scores of cities on Saturday, marking the convergence of a month-long student movement with broader social discontent against rising living costs and declining public services.

Several hundred shops damaged

While hundreds of thousands protested peacefully across France on Saturday, violent fringe groups targeted public buildings, looted luxury boutiques and supermarkets, and attacked police vehicles and officers.

Far-right National Rally leader Marine Le Pen, frontrunner going into next year’s presidential campaign, also ​called for calm, saying France must not become ​accustomed to images of the country being ⁠battered, abused and ransacked.

“Violence is not an opinion. Destruction is not a form of expression. And chaos cannot serve as a project for France,” she said in a video address.

Hard-left France Unbowed presidential candidate Jean-Luc Melenchon said Macron needed to answer the demands of protesting high-school students.

In Limoges, famed for ​its porcelain, the collapse of the town hall’s clock tower in a fiery blaze revived memories of the 2019 fire that devastated Paris’ ​Notre Dame cathedral. Mayor Guillaume ⁠Guerin said not enough officers from the national police had been deployed to his city.

“There was a clear, premeditated intention to burn down the town hall, and the people inside feared for their lives,” Guerin told Reuters on Sunday. He threatened to resign if the city did not receive the funds needed to repair the town hall.

Economy Minister Roland Lescure pledged support on Sunday for business owners who suffered losses. “Those ⁠who break ​things will pay, repair the damage and be held accountable for their intention to sow chaos,” Lescure said in ​a statement.

French retailer Carrefour’s (CARR.PA), opens new tab CEO Alexandre Bompard told French broadcaster BFMTV that 50 of the company’s shops had been damaged, including 20 that were looted, with losses from the damage running into the tens of millions of euros.

(Source: Reuters)

U

kraine launched one of its largest drone assaults on Russia overnight Sunday, targeting oil facilities and industrial sites in St. Petersburg and leaving at least one person dead, Russian officials said, as a growing dispute between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and US President Donald Trump threatens to complicate efforts to end the war.

Russia’s Defense Ministry said its forces intercepted or neutralized 1,015 Ukrainian drones across 15 Russian regions, Russian-annexed Crimea and the Black Sea.

St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov described the attack as massive, saying fires broke out at the city’s oil terminal, the Ruchi oil depot and industrial warehouses in the southern Kolpinsky district.

At least five people were injured, while several apartment buildings and two houses sustained damage, according to Beglov.

The strikes also disrupted operations at St. Petersburg’s main airport, where authorities imposed temporary flight restrictions over safety concerns.

Elsewhere in the region, Russian e-commerce giant Ozon reported a fire at its logistics facility, while technology company VK said drones had struck its data center. The company said its services remained available.

Leningrad regional Governor Alexander Drozdenko said 145 drones were intercepted over the region, with approximately 20,000 residents left without electricity.

The scale of the attack marks a significant escalation in Ukraine’s campaign against Russian energy infrastructure, which Kyiv has increasingly targeted as part of its efforts to undermine Moscow’s ability to finance its military operations.

Trump and Zelenskyy clash over stalled ceasefire

The strikes come at a particularly sensitive moment in relations between Kyiv and Washington, with Trump publicly criticizing Ukraine’s continued attacks on Russian energy facilities while defending his decision to delay additional sanctions against Moscow.

On Sunday, Trump said imposing new sanctions risked pushing Russian President Vladimir Putin away from negotiations aimed at ending the conflict.

The US president also accused Zelenskyy of undermining diplomatic efforts through continued strikes on Russian oil infrastructure, claiming the Ukrainian leader did not want the war to end.

Their disagreement follows Trump’s October 11 announcement of an energy ceasefire between Moscow and Kyiv, an arrangement that quickly descended into uncertainty amid continued Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure.

Zelenskyy said Ukraine had temporarily refrained from targeting Russian energy facilities following the announcement, but Moscow had failed to reciprocate.

In a social media statement Sunday, the Ukrainian president said Russia had attacked Ukraine’s energy, oil and gas infrastructure 76 times over the preceding week.

Russian strikes overnight also hit energy facilities in four Ukrainian regions, leaving tens of thousands of families without electricity, he said.

“America should see that Russia is not taking any reciprocal steps in response to sanctions relief or agreements,” Zelenskyy wrote.

Speaking on NBC’s Meet the Press, Zelenskyy warned that easing economic pressure on Moscow would only strengthen Putin’s ability to continue the war.

He also revealed that intelligence sharing between Washington and Kyiv had resumed after being temporarily suspended.

While maintaining that he trusted Trump, Zelenskyy warned that any American decision to side with Russia would amount to a historic mistake.

Later Sunday, Zelenskyy said he had spoken with US presidential envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner about the outcome of negotiations between American and Ukrainian officials in Miami on October 9, as well as potential next steps in diplomacy.

Russia continues deadly attacks on Ukrainian cities

As Ukraine intensified its long-range drone campaign, Russian forces continued launching deadly strikes across Ukrainian territory.

An overnight attack on Kyiv killed a woman and injured three others, Mayor Vitali Klitschko said Monday. The strikes damaged a 25-story residential building, hit a subway station and affected a medical facility.

In the southern city of Zaporizhzhia, two Russian attacks Sunday killed a woman and wounded at least two other people, including a six-year-old girl, according to local officials.

Zelenskyy also reported that Russian strikes on residential buildings in the western Volyn region killed two people and injured 12, including two children.

He said Moscow had launched nearly 2,700 attack drones, 1,700 aerial bombs and 66 missiles against Ukraine over the past week.

The intensifying attacks on both sides underscore the challenges facing Washington’s diplomatic initiative, with Kyiv demanding concrete Russian commitments before agreeing to halt strikes on energy infrastructure.

For now, the competing military campaigns and increasingly public disagreements between Trump and Zelenskyy suggest that efforts to secure even a limited ceasefire remain deeply uncertain.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

T

he order to limit a satellite system used by Ukraine for battlefield communications and drone operations came from inside the White House, according to two U.S. officials and a Western official briefed on the matter.

The officials said leaders at the Defense Department received a message that the SpaceX Starshield service for the Ukrainian military needed to be slowed.

The officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity, did not specify who in the White House made the decision or who was responsible for implementing the order. The Pentagon is the biggest customer of Starshield, which is the military-grade version of the Starlink service.

Ukrainian officials said this week that military-grade Starlink receptors stopped working in Ukraine when mounted on fast-moving objects, interfering with the performance of Ukrainian drones that rely on them for onboard guidance systems over Ukrainian territory.

A person in Ukraine’s Defence Ministry said on Thursday that the receptors were now working when in motion, but only at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour (160 kph).

US Pressures Ukraine Over Refinery Attacks

The move to temporarily restrict the vital communications system came as President Donald Trump has pressured Kyiv to stop its attacks on Russian refineries, which he has blamed for soaring energy prices that are denting his Republican Party’s prospects in the November midterm elections.

Experts say that surge in energy costs is mainly the result of the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran, which brought Iranian attacks on energy facilities and has largely shut the vital Strait of Hormuz.

In response to a request for comment about the order to limit Starshield, a senior U.S. official said: “No such request was ever made by the president.”

The White House did not respond to questions about whether other administration officials might have made the request.

Starshield was developed by SpaceX specifically for government and national-security customers, particularly the U.S. Department of Defense. Starshield uses the Starlink constellation as its backbone.

Ukrainian officials said the restrictions complicated strike missions against Russian forces and logistics in occupied territory and slowed interceptor drones used to shoot down incoming Russian Shahed drones.

Elon Musk, the CEO of SpaceX, said on X on Wednesday that because Starshield systems are owned and controlled by the U.S. government, any limits on speed or usage are decided by the U.S. military or the president.

SpaceX did not respond to a request for comment.

The Department of Defense and the Ukrainian embassy in Washington also did not respond to requests for comment.

Decline in Relations

Relations between Kyiv and Washington have deteriorated in recent days following a meeting in Miami on Oct. 9 that convened representatives from both countries as well as Europe and the World Bank.

Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, the Trump administration’s Middle East envoy, struck a tough tone with Ukraine in the meeting, according to a separate person familiar with the matter. They told Ukrainian officials that the U.S. was frustrated with Kyiv’s continued strikes on Russian refineries despite repeated requests from Washington to stop.

The U.S. delegation also explained Washington’s decision to strike a diesel deal with Russia, saying the White House hoped it would soften Moscow’s stance on peace talks.

That deal, under which Russia will supply more than 2.25 million barrels of diesel to U.S. and global markets, has triggered a backlash from some U.S. lawmakers, who say it will give Moscow cash to pursue its war without forcing Russian President Vladimir Putin to make concessions to end the conflict.

In the days that followed, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and Trump criticized each other, with Zelenskiy calling the U.S. decision on the Russian diesel deal “weak.” Trump called for elections in Ukraine and Zelenskiy’s ouster.

Behind the scenes, American officials threatened to stop providing intelligence to Kyiv about Russian missile launches that Ukraine uses to thwart attacks, as Reuters previously reported. Trump said on Tuesday Washington was still sharing intelligence with Ukraine.

Following the move to restrict Ukraine’s access to Starshield, the Ukrainians made calls on Tuesday and Wednesday to find answers from senior officials at the White House, State Department and Pentagon, a senior Ukrainian official said, adding that Kyiv was told it was a White House decision.

The Pentagon has spent billions of dollars on the Starlink and Starshield services. It has also bought dedicated Starshield satellites, including communications spacecraft for missile-warning missions and a spy constellation for the National Reconnaissance Office, Reuters reported in 2024.

(Source: Reuters)

G

ulf security has reached a historic turning point in recent years amid shifting global power balances and deepening regional crises. Qatari Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani’s call to bring the Gulf states and Iran together within a shared regional security framework stands out as one of the most tangible diplomatic manifestations of this search.

Al Thani’s description of the region’s recent conflicts as a “wake-up call” for all actors exposes the fundamental shortcomings of the existing security equation. Qatar’s proposal should therefore be understood not merely as an isolated diplomatic initiative by Doha, but as an expression of regional actors’ desire to assume greater responsibility and initiative over their own security.

Qatar’s proposed model

Underlying this ambition are the limitations of security policies pursued for decades. For a long time, Gulf states built their security strategies largely around military alliances and defence agreements with actors outside the region, particularly the United States.

However, recent conflicts have clearly demonstrated that external security guarantees alone are insufficient to establish regional stability. The direct targeting of energy facilities, critical infrastructure and maritime navigation routes has shown that security cannot be ensured solely through conventional military capabilities or alliance commitments.

Qatar’s vision does not seek to dismantle existing external alliances or military cooperation with the United States. On the contrary, it aims to add a homegrown, regional layer of security to the existing architecture.

Doha’s model envisages preserving the deterrent power of external security partnerships while establishing direct communication channels and confidence-building mechanisms between the Gulf states and Iran to prevent crises from escalating.

The greatest challenge facing this vision, however, lies in the structural difficulties of integrating Iran into such an architecture.

The crisis between the Gulf states and Tehran is not simply a temporary disagreement. Rather, it represents a deeply entrenched structure of mistrust shaped by ideological divisions, competition for regional influence, missile programmes, maritime security risks and the activities of non-state armed actors.

From Iran’s perspective, meanwhile, the US military presence in the region and new security partnerships with Israel are regarded as threats in their own right.

Given this profound asymmetry, the establishment of a NATO-style Gulf-Iran security alliance based on collective defence is unrealistic in the short or medium term.

The success of Qatar’s proposal should not, in any case, be measured against such maximalist expectations. A more feasible alternative would be a gradual approach to establishing regional security mechanisms.

In the initial phase, it would be possible to open military communication channels, establish common navigation rules to ensure maritime safety, limit attacks on energy infrastructure and activate direct diplomatic channels during crises.

Such concrete, small-scale measures could, over time, provide the foundation for a more institutionalised framework for regional dialogue.

Establishing the security equation

Another critical factor that will determine the extent to which Qatar’s call gains traction is the absence of a uniform perception of the Iranian threat among members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

While Qatar and Oman have traditionally pursued policies that keep channels of dialogue with Tehran open, the security calculations of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have been shaped by a more uncompromising approach.

Nevertheless, the restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in recent years through Chinese mediation has demonstrated that greater space has emerged for diplomacy across the Gulf.

Although this development has not ended the rivalry, it has revealed a willingness to make tensions more manageable.

Qatar’s proposal seeks to transform this current environment of dialogue into a permanent and institutionalised structure.

However, Doha cannot pursue this initiative alone. A more realistic path would involve GCC members first reaching a minimum level of consensus among themselves on security matters, before moving towards an expanded framework that includes Iran.

On the other hand, the inclusive structure proposed by Qatar does not contradict deterrence-oriented military cooperation initiatives such as the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement being developed between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan.

At first glance, robust defence alliances and dialogue-oriented security initiatives may appear contradictory. In reality, however, they represent two complementary dimensions of the same security equation.

While defence agreements and joint military structures strengthen deterrence capabilities, the regional dialogue mechanisms proposed by Qatar seek to reduce the risk of military confrontation arising from miscalculations.

The future of Gulf security will therefore rest not on a single alliance model, but on a multilayered architecture in which deterrence and diplomacy are pursued simultaneously.

This multilayered structure also offers strategic opportunities for Türkiye.

Ankara’s growing defence industry and security cooperation with Gulf countries strengthens regional deterrence, while the diplomatic channels it maintains with Tehran position Türkiye as a facilitating and balancing actor during periods of crisis.

Beyond all these regional and global dynamics, Qatar’s insistence on this proposal is directly rooted in its own economic and national security interests.

With its enormous LNG exports, major investments around the world and ambitious economic transformation objectives, Doha can sustain its position only within a stable and predictable regional environment.

Moreover, the extensive economic transformation visions being pursued by neighbouring countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE also require an uninterrupted environment of regional peace.

A large-scale war breaking out in the Gulf has the potential to directly paralyse the economic infrastructure and trade routes of the entire region, including Qatar.

Regional stability is therefore not an abstract aspiration for Qatar, but a prerequisite for its national development.

Doha’s mediation diplomacy on the global stage is also an extension of this logic. Its ability to communicate simultaneously with different, and even adversarial, actors gives Qatar a critical role as a “safety valve” during regional crises.

Mistrust between the parties

Ultimately, Prime Minister Al Thani’s call for a new security architecture encompassing the Gulf states and Iran is not a straightforward project that can be implemented in all its dimensions in the short term.

Deep-rooted mistrust between the parties, asymmetric threat perceptions, the prominent role occupied by external actors within the existing framework, and Iran’s reluctance to make concrete security commitments constitute the most significant obstacles to the process.

Nevertheless, it would also be a mistake to dismiss the proposal as a utopian diplomatic aspiration.

Recent crises have demonstrated the fragility of the existing externally dependent security structure. This reality is compelling regional actors to establish gradual and flexible dialogue mechanisms.

Qatar’s initiative clearly demonstrates that Gulf security can no longer be maintained solely under a security umbrella provided by external powers. Instead, the region needs a homegrown and inclusive approach in which regional countries assume direct responsibility.

Although time will tell to what extent this initiative can be institutionalised, the reality that a Gulf security architecture excluding Iran is unsustainable is becoming increasingly apparent.

The new security concept proposed by Qatar offers an indispensable vision for the Gulf’s future stability.

Although deep-rooted mistrust and asymmetric threat perceptions among the parties may slow the process, the limitations of the traditional externally dependent architecture are pushing regional actors towards flexible and gradual dialogue mechanisms.

The diplomatic initiative launched by Doha not only seeks to safeguard economic interests but also paves the way for regional countries to have a greater say in determining their own future.

In the long term, this multilayered structure, combining deterrence with diplomacy, represents the most rational roadmap for building lasting peace and collective security in the Gulf.

(Orignally published in Turkish by Kriter)

I

srael’s expanding military-controlled zones in Gaza and southern Lebanon are reshaping both territories despite US-brokered ceasefire agreements, as shifting boundaries, widespread demolitions and restrictions on civilian movement leave hundreds of thousands of displaced families uncertain about whether they will ever return home.

The so-called “Yellow Line”, used by Israel to demarcate areas under its military control, has emerged as a defining feature of the post-ceasefire landscape in both territories, according to separate Al Jazeera reports published on October 12 and 14.

In Gaza, Israeli control and access restrictions now cover approximately 65 percent of the territory, confining 2.1 million Palestinians to the remaining 35 percent. In southern Lebanon, Israeli troops continue to occupy a zone extending up to 10 kilometers into Lebanese territory, where entire villages have been demolished and residents remain unable to return.

Although the circumstances and agreements governing the two territories differ, analysts cited by Al Jazeera say the expanding military boundaries reflect a similar pattern of territorial control, population displacement and destruction of civilian infrastructure.

Gaza’s shrinking territory

A year after the US-brokered Gaza ceasefire, Israel has expanded its military-controlled territory beyond the original Yellow Line established under US President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan to end the war.

The agreement initially required Israeli forces to withdraw to the demarcation within 24 hours, with further withdrawals expected in subsequent phases.

Instead, Israeli troops have repeatedly moved the yellow concrete blocks marking the boundary farther west, bringing additional Palestinian neighbourhoods and agricultural areas under military control.

On Sunday, Israeli forces reportedly relocated the blocks dozens of metres west in Shujayea, southeastern Gaza City, forcing more Palestinian families to flee.

“It’s not simply about where the ‘Yellow Line’ is today but where it can move next,” Al Jazeera correspondent Ibrahim al-Khalili reported from Gaza City.

The original ceasefire arrangement left Israel controlling approximately 53 percent of Gaza, restricting Palestinians to 172 square kilometres of the 365-square-kilometre territory.

Research organisation Forensic Architecture estimated that Israeli control had expanded to 58 percent by December. In March, the Israeli military introduced an additional restricted area, described as the “orange line”, requiring humanitarian organisations to coordinate movements with the army.

According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), military control and access restrictions now cover 65 percent of Gaza.

The remaining population is concentrated within approximately 128 square kilometres, increasing population density to nearly 16,000 people per square kilometre, almost three times its prewar level.

Each resident has an average of just 61 square metres of land, compared with approximately 160 square metres before the war.

The humanitarian consequences are compounded by extensive destruction. The UN Satellite Centre estimates that 82 percent of Gaza’s structures have been damaged or destroyed, while the Food and Agriculture Organization says only 3 percent of its cropland remains both undamaged and accessible.

More than 950,000 Palestinians are living in displacement sites vulnerable to flooding, predominantly in tents and makeshift shelters.

Approaching the Yellow Line also poses significant dangers. Nearly 1,500 Palestinians have been killed across Gaza since the ceasefire was announced, according to figures cited by Al Jazeera.

Southern Lebanon faces a similar pattern

A comparable military demarcation has emerged in southern Lebanon, where Israeli forces continue occupying substantial territory despite a framework agreement signed with Lebanon in June.

The agreement, reached through US-brokered negotiations, was intended to facilitate a phased Israeli withdrawal and establish pilot zones where Lebanese Armed Forces personnel would replace Israeli troops and disarm Hezbollah forces.

However, Israel continues to occupy territory extending up to 10 kilometres north of the border, while demolitions of homes and infrastructure have continued behind the Yellow Line.

Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz has previously indicated that Israeli forces would not withdraw from Lebanon, raising concerns about an extended occupation.

The latest Israeli military campaign followed Hezbollah rocket fire on March 2, which the group described as retaliation for repeated Israeli violations of the November 2024 ceasefire and the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Israel subsequently intensified its military operations and reinvaded southern Lebanon, displacing more than 1.2 million people.

According to Al Jazeera, approximately 50 frontline villages, including Khiam and Bint Jbeil, have suffered extensive destruction.

Mohamad Bazzi, a New York-based political analyst originally from southern Lebanon, said the destruction reflected an effort to make entire communities uninhabitable.

“Israel’s primary goals were to empty, depopulate, and make those dozens of frontline villages and towns uninhabitable,” he told Al Jazeera, describing the approach as an application of the Gaza model to Lebanon.

Ahmad Baydoun, a Lebanese architect and open-source researcher based in the Netherlands, said the Yellow Line had effectively become a fixed military boundary despite the ceasefire.

He argued that continued demolitions suggested the ceasefire was being applied differently to Israeli-occupied territory than to the rest of Lebanon.

Displacement risks becoming permanent

Beyond the Yellow Line, discussions in Israel about establishing an additional “Grey Line” have intensified concerns about the future of southern Lebanon.

According to reports cited by Al Jazeera, the proposed boundary could extend approximately four kilometres into Lebanese territory, creating an uninhabited buffer zone where civilians would be prohibited from rebuilding their homes.

Restrictions also affect residents who remain in villages under Israeli control.

Baydoun said access to agricultural land increasingly depends on checkpoints and military coordination, describing the emerging system as the “West Bankification of those who remained”.

The consequences extend beyond immediate military operations.

Even if Israeli forces eventually withdraw, widespread destruction of housing, roads, agricultural land and essential infrastructure could prevent displaced communities from returning for years.

Ali, a displaced resident of Khiam currently renting accommodation in Hasbaiyya, said his hometown had become uninhabitable.

“Khiam is destroyed, there’s nothing, it’s uninhabitable for the next 10, 15, 20 years,” he told Al Jazeera.

Across Gaza and southern Lebanon, the expanding Yellow Lines have therefore become more than military demarcations. They increasingly determine where civilians can live, whether they can access their land and how much territory remains available for reconstruction.

With withdrawals stalled and destruction continuing, both territories face growing uncertainty over whether temporary ceasefire arrangements are evolving into prolonged systems of territorial control and displacement.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

O

ver the years, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s addresses to the United Nations General Assembly  have reflected the strategic deepening of Türkiye’s foreign policy vision and the global projection of the “Century of Türkiye” perspective. Taken together, these speeches constitute a manifesto for an emerging order-building actor at a time when the Western-centered established order has reached an impasse.

Over the past five years, the rhetorical trajectory of Türkiye , and consequently that of President Erdoğan , has undergone a marked acceleration in parallel with shifts in the global system. Türkiye’s evolution -from an actor seeking to heal the wounds of the pandemic and test its mediation capacity at the 77th General Assembly in 2022 to a power shaping the debate on a broad range of global issues, from cyberterrorism and artificial intelligence ethics to regional conflicts and global injustice, at the recently convened 81st General Assembly- confirms its positioning as an indispensable actor in the reconstruction of the global architecture.

The first stage of this strategic continuity was the period in which Türkiye demonstrated its active mediation and humanitarian diplomacy capabilities to the international community.

Mediation and the search for systemic reform

The 77th and 78th General Assemblies, held as the Russia-Ukraine war activated major geopolitical fault lines, marked a period in which Türkiye institutionalized its identity as a facilitator and mediator. The diplomatic rhetoric of the period was shaped by the confidence that came with being an actor capable of maintaining a balance between the parties to a conflict.

Türkiye’s most tangible achievements during this period were undoubtedly the Istanbul Agreement and the Black Sea Grain Initiative. This initiative, which enabled 33 million tonnes of grain to reach global markets, helped stabilize food prices and served as a global bridge against the threat of hunger. The initiativewas presented as one of the United Nations’ most significant diplomatic achievements of recent years and as one of the most successful applications of the principle of “functionalism” in international relations, demonstrating Türkiye’s capacity to resolve concrete crises.

The principle that “there are no winners in war and no losers in a just peace” became the central tenet underpinning the speeches at the 77th and 78th General Assembly.

During this period, Türkiye’s criticism of the UN Security Council largely remained constructive, focusing on improving the system through greater transparency, efficiency and democratization. Türkiye had not yet reached the conclusion that the system had completely collapsed. Instead, it continued to leave room for optimism that the existing structure could be reformed and made more effective in the pursuit of peace and justice.

However, during the 79th and 80th General Assemblies, this constructive language rooted in mediation would later give way to a much sharper and more systemic confrontation as Türkiye’s discourse evolved into an expression of the global conscience.

Exposing a moral collapse

The 79th and 80th General Assembly sessions coincided with a period in which Israel’s attacks on Gaza exposed what the article describes as the moral and humanitarian failure of the modern international system. President Erdoğan’s speeches during this period moved beyond the limits of pragmatic diplomacy toward a language of “conscience diplomacy” in opposition to global injustice.

The statement, “Not only children are dying in Gaza; the UN system is dying too,” was among the most striking expressions of Erdoğan’s 80th General Assembly address. The figures cited in the speech were presented as evidence of systematic and deliberate destruction, including nearly 100,000 civilian casualties, more than 20,000 children killed, and 146 children who reportedly died as a result of starvation being used as a weapon.

References in the 80th General Assembly speech to amputations carried out “without anesthesia” and to millions of people forced to search for food in garbage were presented as evidence that the demand for justice could no longer be addressed merely by reforming the existing system, but had become an urgent necessity.

The comparisons made in the 79th and 80th speeches between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Hitler, and the reference to what was described as a “murder network,” were presented not simply as rhetoric but as historical evidence of the post-1945 order violating the very values it had pledged to protect.

The inability of the UN Security Council to prevent the killing of 326 UN personnel by Israel, as cited in the article, and the tearing of the UN Charter at the UN podium by Israel’s permanent representative were described as evidence of the system’s failure.

At this stage, Türkiye sought to move its criticism onto the terrain of international law by calling for legal mechanisms, including the 1950 “Uniting for Peace” resolution, to be activated. This period, when systemic criticism reached its peak, was followed at the 81st General Assembly by a shift toward proposing a new regional and global architecture.

Türkiye as an “order-building” power and the evolution of the “The World Is Bigger Than Five” Doctrine

President Erdoğan’s address to the 81st General Assembly is presented as evidence of Türkiye’s transition from a crisis-managing actor to an order-building power seeking to shape a new global and regional system beyond individual crises.

The speech reflected a stage in which Türkiye sought to demonstrate its capabilities through concrete solutions and norm-setting, rather than merely criticism.

The vision outlined for Syria following the December 8 Revolution is presented as one of the clearest examples of this new period. Türkiye advocates a regional stability model centered on Syria’s territorial integrity and the legitimate expectations of its people, as well as a region free from terrorism, under the principle of “regional ownership.”

At the strategic level, the Development Road Project and the Organization of Turkic States were presented as potential “global centers of attraction,” reflecting Türkiye’s economic and political integration capacity.

The most notable aspect of the 81st General Assembly, however, was Türkiye’s emphasis on its role as a norm-setter. Warnings about cyberterrorism and technological hegemony demonstrated what the article describes as an advanced perspective on the security risks of the digital age.

The emphasis on artificial intelligence ethics, the Zero Waste movement , which has gained the support of 105 countries , and “climate justice” through Türkiye’s hosting of COP31 were presented as manifestations of Türkiye’s ambition to help establish global standards.

The phrase “The world is bigger than five,” first articulated by President Erdoğan from the UN podium in 2013 and subsequently becoming a defining theme of Türkiye’s approach to global politics, is described as having evolved into a sophisticated international law project.

During the 77th and 78th General Assemblies, the slogan emphasized reform within the existing system, including greater transparency, accountability and democratic representation at the Security Council.

During the 79th and 80th sessions, amid the Gaza war, it evolved into a criticism of the veto power as a shield protecting those accused of genocide. The 81st General Assembly then took the argument further, calling for alternative mechanisms and what the article characterizes as a legal transformation.

According to approach, the will of more than 190 countries should not be subordinated to that of five. When the Security Council becomes deadlocked, mechanisms such as the “Uniting for Peace” resolution and regional defense and development alliances could be used to bypass institutional paralysis.

Alongside strengthening diplomatic relations with Latin American countries, the Israeli government is seeking to expand cooperation in the fields of the economy, technology, security and innovation. However, Israel’s outreach to Latin America also faces certain limitations. While the foreign-policy priorities of governments in the region can change, the Israel-Palestine issue remains an important factor in relations with Latin American countries. Israel’s actions in Gaza have provoked the strongest reaction among Latin American populations in recent history. Israel is aware of this and is therefore pursuing new policies in the region.

The decision by Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar to declare 2026 the “year of focusing on Latin America” from the ministry’s perspective is being presented as part of Tel Aviv’s strategy to break its isolation in the region. Alongside strengthening diplomatic relations with Latin American countries, the Israeli government is seeking to expand cooperation in the fields of the economy, technology, security and innovation.

One of the important steps in this policy was the Isaac Accords launched between Israel and Argentina in April 2026. The agreement aims to promote security, counterterrorism, trade, technology and economic cooperation between the two countries and other Western Hemisphere countries that share similar policies.

Bolivia restored diplomatic relations with Israel in December 2025, with the two countries agreeing to reappoint ambassadors and increase bilateral contacts. Relations with Colombia were also restored in August 2026. Under the new President Abelardo de la Espriella, steps were taken to reestablish diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv, appoint ambassadors and strengthen economic relations.

These developments indicate that Israel is seeking to reverse the diplomatic ruptures experienced in Latin America in the previous period and rebuild its diplomatic network across the region.

Argentine leader Milei’s “extraordinary” affinity for Israel

Relations between Israel and Argentina have become closer politically and diplomatically than ever before following Javier Milei’s election as president in 2023. The Milei administration has described Israel as one of Argentina’s principal strategic partners, designated Hamas as a terrorist organization and continued to express strong support for Israel on international platforms.

Milei’s visit to Israel in 2024 and his visit to the Western Wall were among the symbolic steps reflecting the political rapprochement between the two countries. One of the key elements of this rapprochement was Argentina’s decision to move its embassy to Jerusalem. Milei announced the decision in 2024 and stated that the embassy would be moved to Jerusalem in 2026.

While the ideological and strategic alliance established by the Milei administration with Israel in foreign policy has reached a peak, Argentina is experiencing a deep socioeconomic crisis at home. The “shock therapy” economic policies implemented by Milei after taking office—including cuts in public spending, the removal of subsidies and the devaluation of the peso—were intended to bring inflation under control but severely affected the population’s purchasing power.

As a result of these measures, the country’s official poverty rate surpassed 50 percent, reaching its highest levels in two decades. Pensioners, public-sector workers and low-income groups in particular were pushed into a severe cost-of-living crisis as food, transportation and energy costs increased.

Colombia’s new leader is a strong supporter of Israel

Relations between Colombia and Israel began to take a new shape following the diplomatic rupture that occurred under former President Gustavo Petro over Israel’s actions in Gaza. The new period began with Abelardo de la Espriella, who took office on August 7 and had refused to recognize the victory of the left-wing administration, describing it as fraudulent.

The Petro administration had severed diplomatic relations with Israel in May 2024 over Israel’s actions in Gaza. Following de la Espriella’s assumption of office, a rapid normalization process began between the two countries.

One of the most notable steps in the new administration’s shift in Israel policy was Colombia’s recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. In a statement issued on August 10, 2026, Colombia announced that it recognized Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights and considered Israeli control of the area important for Israel’s security.

The decision was one of the clearest indications that Bogotá had departed significantly from the previous administration’s policy toward Israel.

Another important component of the change in relations is the relocation of the Colombian Embassy to Jerusalem. The de la Espriella administration had already included the relocation of the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem among its campaign promises.

While the two sides have discussed strengthening security and economic ties alongside diplomatic relations, the possibility of Colombia resuming coal exports to Israel and changing its position in certain international legal proceedings against Israel has also emerged.

Most recently, Colombia withdrew its request to intervene in the genocide case filed against Israel at the International Court of Justice.

Critical elections in Brazil enter Israel’s radar

Brazil’s general elections, scheduled for October 4, 2026, represent an important turning point for the future of relations between Israel and Latin America’s largest country.

During the Lula administration, relations between the two countries experienced serious diplomatic tensions over the Gaza war. Brazil’s position on the Palestinian issue became a particularly clear source of divergence.

In February 2024, Israel declared Lula “persona non grata,” while Brazil recalled its ambassador from Tel Aviv. Diplomatic tensions between the two countries continued into 2025.

Against this backdrop, Flavio Bolsonaro, the presidential candidate of Brazil’s right-wing opposition, has been sending clear messages about strengthening relations with Israel. In a statement in June, Bolsonaro said that if elected, Brazil would once again move closer to Israel, relocate its embassy in Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and join the Isaac Accords.

Bolsonaro’s Israel policy has not been limited to foreign policy during the election campaign. Bolsonaro also presented to the public at an election event a video message sent to his campaign by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

This development indicates that political contacts between Brazil’s right-wing camp and the Israeli government have become increasingly visible during the electoral process.

Depending on the election result, two different approaches are expected to emerge regarding Brazil’s Israel policy: the continuation of the Lula administration’s existing position on the Palestinian issue or a Bolsonaro administration seeking to restore and strengthen diplomatic and strategic relations with Israel.

Flavio Bolsonaro’s statements on Jerusalem, Israel and the Isaac Accords have already outlined the main areas in which foreign policy could change in the event of a change of government.

U

krainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy accused the United States of failing to provide sufficient support to Ukraine as Russian strikes killed at least 78 people and wounded 215 across the country over two days, intensifying pressure on Kyiv’s Western partners to strengthen military assistance and sanctions against Moscow.

The latest attacks included a Russian bomb strike on the eastern city of Kramatorsk that killed at least 35 people, according to Ukrainian authorities. The assault came a day after a wave of Russian drones and missiles struck locations across Ukraine, killing dozens, including 22 people in a residential building in the town of Pryluky, approximately 130 kilometres east of Kyiv.

Speaking to reporters in Pryluky on Thursday, Zelenskiy criticized Washington for pursuing potential economic cooperation with Russia while simultaneously attempting to broker an end to the war, which has continued for more than four years.

He also urged the United States to expand Ukraine’s access to Starlink satellite communications, arguing that the technology could help Ukrainian forces detect and target Russian ballistic-missile launchers.

“Open Starlink for Ukraine,” Zelenskiy said, recalling that access had been made available in response to developments involving Iran. He argued that additional access would strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend its airspace and put pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin to negotiate.

Zelenskiy questions Washington’s approach

Zelenskiy’s remarks followed comments by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who described the war as a dangerous stalemate and said Washington would continue working toward a settlement.

The Ukrainian president challenged that assessment, arguing that diplomatic efforts could not be reconciled with discussions about future economic projects involving Russia while Russian attacks continued.

“Where’s the truth here, where’s the honesty?” Zelenskiy asked, describing the situation as a lack of willingness rather than a genuine stalemate.

His criticism comes as Ukraine attempts to regain the battlefield initiative after Russian territorial gains slowed this year. Despite those efforts, Moscow has continued an increasingly intense air campaign targeting Ukrainian cities, infrastructure and other facilities.

Reuters reported on Thursday that senior Russian and US officials, including US Special Envoy Jared Kushner, had discussed the possibility of bringing a US investor into the Nord Stream pipelines, which supplied Russian natural gas to Germany before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The discussions have added to Kyiv’s concerns about the direction of Washington’s policy toward Moscow. Zelenskiy urged US President Donald Trump to increase sanctions pressure on Russia and said Ukrainian negotiators would travel to the United States on Friday and Saturday for talks.

He also said he expected Ukraine’s European partners to participate in discussions with Washington. Air defence would be a central issue, given the frequency and scale of Russian attacks.

Civilian casualties mount as attacks intensify

The strike on Kramatorsk was among Russia’s largest single attacks of the year, Ukrainian officials said. Twenty people were wounded in the assault, which tore through two buses in the embattled eastern city.

Regional Governor Vadym Filashkin accused Russian forces of deliberately targeting civilians, saying the presence of passengers on a bus made it a particularly devastating target.

Images released by officials showed bodies lying along a debris-strewn street beside the charred remains of a bus. Zelenskiy said some victims had yet to be identified and warned that the attack would not go unanswered.

Russian authorities have denied deliberately targeting civilians, although Russian forces regularly launch missile and drone attacks against Ukrainian cities.

Elsewhere, local authorities reported that a Russian guided aerial bomb killed two people in a village in southeastern Dnipropetrovsk region, while another person died in the western city of Ivano-Frankivsk. A further drone attack in Kramatorsk killed two people, bringing the city’s reported death toll to 35.

In Kyiv, Mayor Vitali Klitschko said four people were killed and 19 wounded in morning attacks on the capital. The strikes also disrupted water and electricity supplies, with officials warning that restoring services would take time.

Infrastructure under growing pressure

Russia has intensified its drone attacks on Kyiv in recent weeks, targeting warehouses and data centres while renewing its campaign against Ukraine’s electricity network ahead of winter.

The attacks have raised concerns about the country’s ability to protect essential infrastructure as temperatures fall and demand for heating and electricity increases.

Russian technology company Yandex said it was still unable to determine whether equipment at a data centre struck by a Ukrainian drone could be restored. Zelenskiy did not specifically address the incident involving Yandex but said Ukraine was responding to Russian attacks by “mirroring” strikes against data centres.

The latest wave of violence underscores the challenges facing Ukraine as it seeks to strengthen its air defences, maintain Western support and secure a diplomatic settlement on terms acceptable to Kyiv.

With civilian casualties mounting and critical infrastructure under pressure, Zelenskiy’s criticism highlights a growing tension between Ukraine’s demand for stronger military backing and Washington’s efforts to pursue negotiations with Moscow.

For Kyiv, the immediate priorities remain protecting civilians, expanding defensive capabilities and persuading its allies to maintain pressure on Russia while diplomatic efforts continue.

(Source: Reuters)

A

Tuareg fighter calling himself Azzghim has become a familiar face in Mali’s online war. He turns up in military dress in videos shared by accounts sympathetic to, or run by members of, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), and he spends most of his screen time attacking Russia’s Africa Corps.

He also appears not to exist. Researchers who studied the clips found the usual marks of synthetic video, in the way his body moves and in glitches in the color and the sound, and concluded that he had been generated rather than filmed. His following has not suffered for it. One account given over largely to reposting and remixing Azzghim material had 207,000 followers when the researchers looked at it. Another account in the same orbit used a synthetic teenage boy.

A face helps. An anonymous account can post the same message, but a man in fatigues talking into the camera gives it a body and a voice, and unlike the FLA’s real fighters, he can’t be captured or made to talk.

Azzghim is the most striking product of a wider experiment in Mali, and every side is taking part. In June, the media arm of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, the al Qaeda affiliate better known as JNIM, put out AI-generated posters to promote videos of its April attacks. Pro-government accounts have published synthetic clips celebrating the Malian army and its Russian partners. Russia-linked networks aimed at African audiences have used the same tools to write articles, translate them and put synthetic presenters in front of a camera.

It would be easy to read all this as the familiar story in which cheap AI hands powerful propaganda tools to anyone who wants them. What stands out in Mali is how differently the same software performs depending on who is holding it. A jihadist media office making posters, a few separatist sympathizers building a character on TikTok and a Russian operation running websites in several languages are doing very different jobs, and in each of them the software is the least expensive part.

The same tools, unequal results

A September report by the Dakar-based Timbuktu Institute compares how JNIM, FLA-linked accounts, networks supporting Mali’s military authorities and Russian-linked operations use generative AI. Of the four, JNIM’s documented use is the thinnest; the researchers describe it as “still at a limited but potentially evolving experimental stage.” The June posters remain the clearest example. The battlefield footage promoted by Az-Zallaqa, the group’s media arm, was real. The advertising wrapped around it was not, and it carried the usual giveaways, with blurred backgrounds and buildings melting into the vegetation behind them.

That modesty should not be mistaken for incapacity. JNIM already has what most influence campaigns spend years building: a media office, a back catalog of battlefield footage and channels that reliably put it in front of people. Generative tools could speed all of that up, turning a statement into Fulfulde or Tamasheq within the hour, dubbing a video for a different audience, or recutting the same claim several ways before anyone on the other side has drafted a reply. Nobody has yet shown that JNIM does any of this, and having the tools is a long way from knowing how to use them to any effect.

The pro-government side, meanwhile, has found an audience. One Bamako-based TikTok account identified by the Timbuktu Institute built up more than 436,000 followers with AI-generated material praising the army and the Africa Corps. After the April fighting it posted a video presenting Kidal as a city the government had recaptured. It drew 4.7 million views, far more than anything publicly documented from JNIM’s experiments.

That video came out of the fighting that began on April 25, when JNIM and the FLA launched coordinated attacks across Mali. Defense Minister Sadio Camara was fatally wounded in Kati after a suicide attacker drove an explosives-laden vehicle into his residence and a firefight followed. In Kidal, rival versions were circulating within hours.

The FLA said it had taken the city; the army called its departure a tactical repositioning, and Russian accounts dwelt on the Africa Corps’ resistance. Armies have always rebranded retreats and rebels have always inflated their gains, and an old photograph with a fresh caption can still travel a remarkable distance. What has changed is the volume and the speed. A single clip can now be recut, given a new voiceover and translated for a second audience before anyone has checked where it was filmed, and a small team can sustain an output that once needed a newsroom.

Russia’s information machine

Russia’s operation sits in a different category. Moscow was feeding anti-French and anti-Western narratives into Malian politics long before generative AI arrived, and the outlets it built for that purpose have since absorbed the new tools. In 2025, France’s VIGINUM agency mapped the network around African Initiative and traced a related operation, AI-Freak, probably linked to it, which mixed AI-generated text, images and video with fake news sites, inauthentic accounts and search manipulation. A model can turn out a script or a translation in minutes. Deciding who should see it, which accounts should carry it and where it will look credible is still work done by people.

The output dwarfs the audience. Between September 2023 and April 2025, African Initiative’s website published 18,127 articles in several languages. VIGINUM, citing SimilarWeb, counted 104,818 unique visits between December 2024 and February 2025, around 35,000 a month. Its six official Telegram channels had 69,720 subscribers between them.

OpenAI’s encounter with Stop News, another Russian operation, is starker still. OpenAI disrupted it in 2024, after its operators used AI to produce articles, comments and images in English, French and Russian for sites posing as news outlets in Africa and Britain. Few operations have leaned so heavily on synthetic imagery, and most of its accounts attracted almost no engagement. It came back the following year with more ambition, including YouTube and TikTok channels fronted by a synthetic newsreader who praised Russia and the Africa Corps and attacked France, the United States and Ukraine.

By August 2025, Newstop Africa’s main account on X had 172 followers, and its TikTok and YouTube channels about 1,900 each. One TikTok video reached 63,300 views; another reached 87. OpenAI found little sign that the network had spread beyond its own accounts and placed it in Category 2 on its six-point Breakout Scale.

Why trust still beats technology

Mali’s audiences are not blank screens. They come to these videos with years of war behind them and settled views about France, Russia and the junta, and they judge a message partly by who sends it. Some players entered this contest with large followings and voices people already recognized, able to push a clip across several platforms in an afternoon. Others started with almost nothing. A shaky battlefield video from an account people trust will usually travel further than a polished synthetic image from a source nobody knows.

Checking is slow in Mali and getting slower. Access to conflict zones has narrowed. RFI and France 24 have been off the air since 2022, when the authorities made their suspension “definitive.” In June, the authorities detained the journalists Chahana Takiou and Abdrahamane Keïta under the cybercrime law, Takiou after criticizing its use against the press and Keïta after saying on television that JNIM controlled Kidal.

Between an event and an independent account of it there is now a gap of days, sometimes longer, and the army, the armed groups, Russian-linked outlets and their partisans all rush to fill it. Generative AI shortens the time it takes them to get there. The state, for its part, has been working on other ways of finding out what Malians say to one another.

T

he growing strength of far-right parties across Europe is raising concerns within NATO that political opposition to military spending and aid for Ukraine could slow the continent’s efforts to strengthen its defenses amid rising tensions with Russia.

Far-right parties in countries including France, Italy, Belgium, Germany, Poland and Romania are increasingly using voters’ concerns over the cost of living to challenge higher defense budgets, military support for Ukraine and a greater role for the European Union in defense policy.

The positions of the parties differ significantly, but their growing influence is creating a challenge for mainstream governments seeking to maintain public support for increased military spending.

In France, National Rally leader Marine Le Pen has called for limits on aid to Ukraine, arguing that the country can no longer afford the financial burden. In Italy, Roberto Vannacci, a former general and European Parliament member who leads the National Future party, has questioned increased defense spending while commodity prices remain high.

“The challenge for Europe’s mainstream parties is how to sustain support for higher defense budgets even if that means competing with welfare and other priorities,” the article said.

Janne Kuusela, permanent secretary at Finland’s defense ministry, said rising living costs were creating space for populist arguments over military spending and financial support for Ukraine.

The issue is particularly significant as several major NATO countries, including France, Italy and Poland, prepare for elections in 2027. Far-right parties in those countries could have greater influence over national budgets and defense policies.

NATO is seeking to persuade its members to meet an ambitious target of spending 5% of gross domestic product on defense and security by 2035. Four NATO diplomats told POLITICO that the possibility of a slowdown in spending was becoming a growing concern, although some said the consequences might not become clear until countries begin their next budget cycles.

A NATO military official warned that European countries were already trying to close the gap with Russia in military capabilities.

“So far, we’re on a positive trajectory — if someone closes the faucet, there’s a risk of losing capabilities,” the official said.

Cost of living fuels resistance to higher defense spending

European countries and Canada are expected to spend about $634 billion on core defense requirements this year, an increase of 11% from 2025. But public support for further increases is limited.

An August poll assessed by the European Council on Foreign Relations and shared with POLITICO found that an average of 46.2% of respondents in eight European countries would oppose higher defense spending if it required higher taxes. About 35.5% supported such an increase.

Opposition to tax increases for military spending was particularly strong in Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Poland. Respondents in the Netherlands, Sweden and Britain were more likely to support higher taxes for defense.

Protests against increased military spending have also taken place in Rome, Brussels and Madrid, with demonstrators arguing that additional defense funds could come at the expense of hospitals, universities and social services.

Support for Ukraine has also declined. NATO’s internal polling showed support falling from 59% in 2025 to 55% this year, with lethal military aid identified as the least popular form of assistance.

The political challenge varies across Europe. Far-right parties have taken different positions, ranging from opposition to military assistance for Ukraine to resistance to EU-level defense initiatives and broader criticism of increased defense budgets.

France’s National Rally and Romania’s Alliance for the Union of Romanians oppose aid to Kyiv, while Poland’s Law and Justice and the Netherlands’ Party for Freedom have resisted EU-level defense projects. Germany’s Alternative for Germany and Italy’s National Future have criticized increased defense spending more broadly.

Political opponents of these parties have accused them of weakening Europe’s response to Russia. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said pressure against European defense policies was largely coming from Moscow, while parties including National Rally and AfD have faced scrutiny over their historical ties to Russia.

Pressure on NATO and European defense plans

The political debate is becoming more complicated as governments attempt to reconcile security priorities with domestic economic pressures.

In France, Le Pen’s National Rally has indicated that it would maintain the country’s existing trajectory of higher military spending. In Italy, however, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni proposed reducing defense spending by €8 billion from the government’s initial proposal amid pressure from her coalition partner, the League.

League senator Claudio Borghi argued that public money should prioritize pensions, tax relief and household utility bills over weapons.

In Poland, President Karol Nawrocki, backed by the right-wing Law and Justice party, attempted unsuccessfully to block access to nearly €44 billion in EU SAFE defense loans. He argued that the scheme could make Poland dependent on Brussels and impose additional debt on future generations.

NATO officials are concerned that a slowdown by major European powers could affect the alliance’s ability to develop the military capabilities it considers necessary to deter Russia.

The consequences could extend beyond national defense budgets. France and Italy are among the countries responsible for significant portions of European defense investment and aid to Ukraine, meaning any reduction in their spending could have broader implications for NATO.

“If bigger countries stop making progress, then NATO will stop making progress,” one NATO diplomat said, warning that weaker European defense capabilities could leave Ukraine more vulnerable.

The debate could also affect negotiations over the European Union’s next long-term budget if discussions continue into next year.

As European governments prepare budgets and elections approach, mainstream parties face pressure to justify increased defense spending while addressing concerns over living costs and public services. For NATO, the challenge is maintaining momentum on rearmament while political support for higher military expenditure becomes increasingly contested across Europe.

(Source: Politico)

D

emonstrations swept across France on Tuesday as students, teachers and parents protested against overcrowded classrooms, staff shortages and deteriorating school buildings, with clashes between protesters and police leaving hundreds injured and prompting the government to promise a response.

The nationwide protests marked the biggest day of demonstrations in a movement that began in September in deprived suburbs of Paris before spreading across the country. Prime Minister Sebastien Lecornu described the violence as the most serious student unrest in decades.

More than 250,000 people took part in demonstrations in dozens of cities, according to the Interior Ministry, while organisers put the figure at about 450,000. Marches were held in Paris, Strasbourg, Rennes, Toulouse, Lyon, Marseille and Nantes, among other cities.

Police used tear gas and water cannons to disperse groups involved in clashes on the edges of demonstrations. The Interior Ministry said 488 people were arrested on Tuesday and 48 security personnel were injured.

Lecornu told lawmakers that at least 215 teenagers and 85 school employees had been injured in clashes, describing the casualties as the “heaviest toll in decades” for France’s school system. His office said more than 700 police officers had also been injured during the protests.

President Emmanuel Macron convened Lecornu and senior ministers for an emergency meeting as the government faced mounting pressure to contain the unrest.

Students protest over underfunded schools

Despite the scale of the demonstrations, the demands of the protesters have focused primarily on conditions inside France’s schools rather than immigration or religion.

Students and teachers have complained about understaffing, overcrowded classrooms, insufficient funding and poorly maintained buildings. Some schools have faced basic problems including water leaks and rat infestations.

The High School Students Union said more than half of France’s high schools had either been blockaded or closed for the day. In some areas, education authorities attempted to move classes online.

Protesters carried handmade signs criticising years of what they described as government neglect. In Marseille and Nantes, demonstrators held signs reading “The state has killed national education,” while parents in Toulouse joined students and teachers at the front of a march.

Hugo Vetzel, a recent high-school graduate in Strasbourg, said protesters felt increasingly disconnected from political decision-makers.

“There is such a gap between the elites and us,” he said.

Rights groups, student organisations and parents have accused authorities of using disproportionate force against young protesters. The government, meanwhile, has argued that the movement has been hijacked by outsiders and that some demonstrations have descended into urban violence.

In Paris, police said around 300 people, many of them masked or hooded, confronted security forces. Several storefronts were damaged, although authorities said the broader demonstration in the capital was largely peaceful.

More than 1,800 people were being prosecuted for unspecified offences connected to the unrest, including 1,483 minors, according to the Justice Ministry.

Teachers and protesters have disputed the government’s distinction between peaceful demonstrators and violent groups. Omar Slaouti, a high-school teacher in the Paris suburb of Argenteuil, said authorities were trying to divide young people into “good” and “bad” protesters.

Government promises action amid financial pressure

Lecornu has ordered ministers to respond to the main demands raised by students and school staff. The government plans to examine measures to ensure absent teachers are replaced, review the length of the school day and consider extending lunch breaks.

Ministers will also examine repairs required at ageing school buildings. Lecornu has instructed them to present their initial proposals by the end of October.

But parents and protesters have expressed scepticism about whether government promises will translate into meaningful improvements.

Emilie Lhomme, a parent protesting outside the Helene Boucher school in Paris, said official statements would not be enough to change students’ daily lives.

The government faces a difficult financial environment as it considers additional education spending. France is under pressure to reduce a widening budget deficit while economic growth remains weak and concerns over public debt have pushed borrowing costs higher.

The yield on France’s 10-year bonds briefly exceeded 5% last week, reaching its highest level in 24 years. Rising borrowing costs have also raised concerns across the wider euro area.

Finance Minister Roland Lescure said Tuesday there was no need for the European Central Bank to intervene.

The protests come as France approaches a presidential election next spring, with support for populist parties on both the far right and far left increasing. Far-right National Rally leader Marine Le Pen has used the country’s fiscal difficulties to promote plans for reducing public spending.

At the same time, France’s education system faces longer-term challenges. Education spending has lagged inflation, while French students have fallen behind their OECD peers in overall performance, according to data cited from the PISA 2025 assessment.

The government must now balance demands for greater investment in schools with pressure to control public finances. For students, teachers and parents, however, the protests have brought immediate concerns about classrooms, staffing and school buildings to the center of the national debate.

(Source: Reuters)

A

merican President Donald Trump said a threat linked to Iran prompted the United States to withdraw B-1 bombers from a British airbase, as questions remained over an alleged plot targeting the facility and tensions between Washington and Tehran continued to rise.

The bombers had been deployed at RAF Fairford, a key US base in Britain that has been used to support American military operations in the Middle East. They were recently involved in US strikes on Iran.

Trump said on Monday that the aircraft were moved after US officials received information indicating a potential threat.

“We had an idea that there might be a threat, and why would I leave them there?” Trump told reporters. He said moving the aircraft cost relatively little and that the decision was intended to reduce the risk to US personnel and military assets.

Asked whether the people behind the threat were connected to Iran, Trump said they were.

Vice President JD Vance said the move was made as a precaution, citing concerns about Iran’s record of attacks against US interests and other targets. “We are being extremely cautious,” Vance said, while declining to provide further details.

However, Secretary of State Marco Rubio sought to distinguish the bomber withdrawal from the suspected plot. He said there was no direct link between the removal of the aircraft and the arrests and that the Pentagon was regularly reallocating military resources according to operational requirements.

A NATO military source said Iran was still considered an acute threat to US assets in Britain.

Iran has rejected allegations that it was involved in any plot against the airbase. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi dismissed the accusations as baseless, saying claims about alleged terrorists working for foreign states did not establish Iranian responsibility.

Fairford’s role in US Middle East operations

RAF Fairford, about 145 km west of London, is one of the most important European bases available to the United States for heavy bombers such as the B-1. Although the aircraft are not permanently stationed there, the base has supported previous US military campaigns in the Middle East.

A Pentagon official confirmed that all US bombers deployed at Fairford had returned to their home bases in the United States. The Pentagon said the bomber force remained ready to provide precision global strike capabilities “anywhere, anytime.”

The withdrawal could nevertheless reduce Washington’s ability to quickly launch additional missions against Iran from Europe.

Christoph Bergs, a research analyst at the Royal United Services Institute, said the redeployment would temporarily reduce the US capacity to “quickly surge sorties against Iran,” potentially lowering the immediate threat level.

He also noted that Fairford’s operational role had already been constrained by restrictions imposed by Britain.

During the current conflict, Washington had permission to use Fairford only for defensive strikes against Iranian missile sites that were attacking ships in the Strait of Hormuz. Britain had refused to allow US forces to use its bases for offensive operations against Iran.

The restrictions have contributed to strains in the traditionally close US-British relationship.

The aircraft could potentially be moved to other US facilities, including Diego Garcia or bases in the Gulf, although such a move would depend on available capacity, agreements with allies and security considerations, according to Bergs.

The security concerns at Fairford emerged after a series of arrests near the base.

“A plot”

In the early hours of September 27, five British men in their 20s were arrested after police saw them running into fields from three white vans parked near the facility. Police said no explosives were discovered, although petrol was found.

The five men were later released on bail. A sixth man, a dual British-Iranian national arrested four days later on suspicion of preparing terrorist acts, was also released on bail.

Trump had previously said the alleged plot was intended to cause “big damage” and suggested it might have been connected to Iran. He later criticized the decision to release the suspects on bail.

The British government has declined to comment on the alleged Iranian connection, although a spokesman for Prime Minister Andy Burnham said the base remained safe.

A senior NATO military official said the removal of the bombers would not affect the alliance’s overall ability to respond to threats, emphasizing the combined capabilities of its 32 members.

The incident has nevertheless highlighted the security risks surrounding US military facilities in Europe as Washington remains engaged in the conflict with Iran. The decision to move the B-1 bombers also illustrates the balance between maintaining forward military capabilities and protecting American personnel and equipment from potential attacks.

(Source: Reuters)

E

thiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has renewed his call for access to the Red Sea, intensifying a dispute with neighbouring countries as renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia raises concerns about wider regional instability.

Abiy made the demand on Monday as he was sworn in for another five-year term, insisting that Ethiopia, despite being landlocked, must secure an outlet to the sea.

Speaking to parliament, Abiy said his government would work to obtain a port on the Red Sea, describing maritime access as critical to Ethiopia’s future and “civilisation.”

“Based on the principle of give and take, we will work diligently to ensure that Ethiopia has an outlet to the sea,” Abiy said.

Ethiopia lost direct access to the Red Sea in 1993 when Eritrea, previously part of Ethiopia, became independent. Since then, Addis Ababa has depended on neighbouring countries and regional ports for much of its maritime trade.

The renewed demand comes at a particularly sensitive moment for the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia’s relations with several neighbouring countries have deteriorated in recent months, while fighting has again intensified in the northern Tigray region.

Addis Ababa has accused Eritrea, Egypt and Sudan of supporting opposition forces in Tigray. The renewed conflict has raised concerns that Ethiopia’s internal fighting could become entangled with longstanding regional rivalries.

Eritrea, meanwhile, has accused Ethiopia of seeking access to the Red Sea through Eritrean territory, highlighting the sensitivity surrounding Abiy’s maritime ambitions.

Neighbours reject exclusive Ethiopian claim to Red Sea

The dispute over maritime access has unfolded alongside a broader disagreement over who should determine the future of the Red Sea and how regional states should protect their interests.

Four of the five African countries bordering the Red Sea — Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia — met on Sunday in New Alamein, Egypt, where their leaders called for greater cooperation on regional issues.

In a joint position, they said governance of the Red Sea was the exclusive responsibility of its coastal states. They also rejected actions that could affect Egypt and Sudan’s use of Nile waters.

The statement came against the backdrop of another long-running dispute involving Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile. Egypt and Sudan have repeatedly raised concerns about the project and its potential effects on their water supplies.

Ethiopia’s Foreign Ministry responded on Monday by saying that discussions over the Red Sea should take into account what it described as the country’s “legitimate interests and enduring connection” to the body of water.

The statement underscored the gap between Addis Ababa’s position and that of its coastal neighbours. While Ethiopia argues that its economic and strategic interests require reliable access to the Red Sea, the coastal states maintain that they retain primary authority over the waters and their shores.

Somalia has taken a somewhat different position. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who attended the Egyptian summit, congratulated Abiy on his renewed mandate and expressed a desire to strengthen relations between the two countries.

Mohamud had previously told Al Jazeera that Somalia did not object to Ethiopia obtaining access to the Red Sea through Somali territory. However, he stressed that any such arrangement would have to be formally negotiated between the two countries.

A possible area for bilateral negotiations

His comments suggest that maritime access remains a possible area for bilateral negotiations, even as the broader regional dispute becomes increasingly sensitive.

The issue is unfolding as Ethiopia faces renewed conflict in Tigray. Ethiopian federal and allied forces have entered the regional capital, Mekelle, as fighting between government forces and opposition groups has escalated.

The conflict has added another layer of uncertainty to Ethiopia’s relations with its neighbours, particularly Eritrea, which shares a border with Tigray.

Abiy’s renewed push for Red Sea access therefore comes at a time when Ethiopia is seeking to address both its economic dependence on foreign ports and growing security challenges across the Horn of Africa.

Regional leaders have continued to call for dialogue and cooperation, while Addis Ababa insists that Ethiopia’s interests must be taken into account in discussions over the Red Sea.

The coming months could determine whether Ethiopia’s demand develops into negotiated port arrangements with neighboring coastal states or contributes to further tensions in an already volatile region.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

B

razil’s presidential election is heading to a second round after President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and right-wing Senator Flavio Bolsonaro emerged as the leading candidates in a closely watched and deeply polarized first-round vote.

Brazil’s electoral court confirmed that the two candidates will advance to the October 25 runoff after neither secured the majority required to win the presidency outright. With nearly 99 percent of votes counted, Bolsonaro had about 47 percent of valid votes, compared with 44.9 percent for Lula. The result sets up another major confrontation between the political forces associated with Lula and the Bolsonaro family.

Lula, 80, is seeking a fourth, non-consecutive presidential term after a political career spanning almost five decades. Flavio Bolsonaro, 45, is the eldest son of former President Jair Bolsonaro and is seeking to return his father’s right-wing political movement to power. Jair Bolsonaro is serving a 27-year prison sentence for plotting a coup after losing the 2022 election.

The election takes place as Brazilians confront concerns over crime and the cost of living, while relations between Brazil and the United States have become increasingly tense. The outcome is also being closely watched across Latin America, where a series of recent elections has strengthened right-wing political forces.

Bolsonaro outperforms polls as runoff battle begins

The first-round result was notable because it differed from expectations in several opinion polls. While most surveys had predicted a runoff, they generally placed Lula ahead of Bolsonaro in the first round.

Instead, Bolsonaro finished about two percentage points ahead of the incumbent president. The unexpected result has raised questions about why polling organizations underestimated his support and highlighted the strength of the left-wing electorate.

Bolsonaro said after the vote that the result demonstrated that Brazilians wanted change. Analysts cited by Reuters suggested that he may have benefited from protest votes from voters who preferred other candidates but regarded defeating Lula as their immediate priority.

Political analyst Rafael Favetti said the protest vote could help Bolsonaro in the runoff but might also limit his ability to expand his support because some voters who might otherwise have shifted to him later had already supported him in the first round.

Lula acknowledged that the first-round result had been unexpected. He said he had believed he could win outright but vowed to strengthen his campaign before the runoff, describing the next stage of the contest as “extra time.”

The runoff is expected to be closely contested. Voters who supported the other 10 candidates in the first round will now become crucial to both campaigns. Ronaldo Caiado and Renan Santos, who together won about 5.3 million votes, have previously said they would not endorse either candidate.

Right-wing gains extend beyond presidential race

Bolsonaro’s strong performance was part of a broader electoral advance for Brazil’s right. Right-wing parties, led by Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party, were performing strongly in both chambers of Congress, with the PL on track to become the largest force in the Chamber of Deputies while also gaining ground in the Senate.

Members of the Bolsonaro family also secured important victories. Michelle Bolsonaro, a former first lady and Flavio’s stepmother, won a Senate seat in the Federal District, while Carlos Bolsonaro, Flavio’s brother, was elected to the Senate in Santa Catarina.

The results indicate that the political movement built around Jair Bolsonaro remains a powerful electoral force despite his exclusion from the presidential race. Andre Pagliarini, a historian and international studies professor, said the performance of far-right legislative candidates suggested deeper popular support for the Bolsonaro political project than many observers had expected.

The congressional results could have significant consequences after the presidential vote. Conservative lawmakers already dominate both houses, and a stronger right-wing presence could make it more difficult for Lula to advance his legislative agenda if he wins another term.

For Bolsonaro, meanwhile, a presidential victory could provide greater political space to pursue his priorities, including his pledge to seek an amnesty for his father.

With three weeks remaining before the October 25 runoff, Brazil now faces another closely fought contest between Lula and the Bolsonaro political camp, with the balance of power in Congress adding another layer to an election that could shape the country’s political direction for years to come.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

Y

emen’s Saudi-backed, internationally recognized government has announced a major military offensive aimed at recapturing territory controlled by the Iran-backed Houthi movement, escalating a conflict with growing implications for regional security and international shipping.

Yemeni President Rashad al-Alimi said on Sunday that government forces would continue their campaign until the country was liberated from what he described as the grip of the “terrorist militia.” A military spokesman subsequently called on the Houthis to surrender their weapons.

The announcement by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), which governs from the southern city of Aden, followed weeks of Houthi advances that have weakened government forces and brought the strategically important Bab el-Mandeb Strait under the group’s control.

The strait, at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, is a crucial passage for international shipping between the Mediterranean and Asia. Its capture has given the Houthis additional leverage over global maritime trade and opened a new front in the wider war involving the United States, Israel and Iran.

The latest escalation comes as regional tensions remain high following the US-Israeli war against Iran, which began in February. Iran’s responses have included disrupting oil shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, on the opposite side of the Arabian Peninsula.

Houthis claim attacks on Saudi oil facilities

As the Yemeni government announced its counteroffensive, the Houthis said they had launched ballistic missiles and drones against Saudi Aramco sites in Riyadh and the Khurais area of Saudi Arabia.

The group claimed the attacks caused major fires and were retaliation for approximately 50 Saudi-led air and missile strikes in Yemen during the preceding 12 hours. Saudi Arabia had not immediately confirmed the reported attacks or the extent of any damage.

Al-Alimi said the government had decided to launch the offensive after exhausting opportunities to de-escalate the conflict. He thanked Saudi Arabia for its support and urged Yemen’s regional allies and international partners to assist the PLC’s forces and institutions.

Regional and Western officials had previously told Reuters that Saudi Arabia and its Yemeni allies were preparing an assault against the Houthis. Under the reported plans, Saudi forces would lead aerial operations while Yemeni government troops conducted fighting on the ground.

The United States is already providing intelligence support for Saudi operations in Yemen, according to people familiar with the preparations. Several regional and European countries are also providing mainly defensive military assistance to the kingdom.

Washington’s involvement comes as the US war against Iran has weakened parts of Iran’s military and political leadership while drawing the United States into another major regional engagement and depleting important military equipment.

The Houthis, formally known as Ansar Allah, have controlled Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, and large areas of the northwest since 2014. The region contains most of the country’s population. Despite years of military operations by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and their Western allies, the movement has retained control of extensive territory and strengthened its weapons capabilities with Iranian assistance.

Saudi Arabia intervened in Yemen’s civil war in 2015 at the head of an Arab coalition supporting the internationally recognized government, but the campaign failed to defeat the Houthis. A truce agreed in 2022 largely held until this year, when the conflict intensified amid the wider confrontation involving Iran.

Houthi advances threaten Taiz and Red Sea shipping

The government’s announcement follows a rapid Houthi offensive last month that captured the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and approximately 150 kilometers of Red Sea coastline within weeks. The advance caused government forces to retreat and shifted the balance of power on the ground.

Military sources said the Houthis had also gained control of strategic hilltops near Taiz over the previous 48 hours, advancing towards the last road connecting the city with Aden on Yemen’s southern coast.

Control of that route could effectively place Taiz under siege. Yemen’s third-largest city is home to hundreds of thousands of civilians and hosts thousands of government troops. Its strategic importance is compounded by its political significance: Al-Alimi comes from the region.

A siege would further worsen an already severe humanitarian crisis. The World Food Program said last week that three in four families in parts of Yemen were going hungry as fighting intensified, displacing tens of thousands of people and disrupting supplies to millions.

The struggle for Bab el-Mandeb has also raised concerns beyond Yemen. The waterway is a vital route for commercial shipping, and its importance has increased as disruption in the Strait of Hormuz has made alternative routes more strategically significant.

The Houthis’ recent territorial gains therefore pose challenges for Yemen’s government, Saudi Arabia and international efforts to protect maritime trade. Their ability to threaten shipping and Saudi oil infrastructure gives the group influence extending well beyond the territory it controls.

Yemen has been fragmented by years of conflict involving local armed groups and regional powers. The latest government offensive could reshape the military balance, but the Houthis’ recent advances, their control of strategic territory and the continuing humanitarian emergency suggest that any campaign to retake the country will face substantial challenges.

(Source: Reuters)

T

he Trump administration has urged France and Germany to release emergency diesel reserves to help ease soaring global fuel prices, warning that Washington could impose a ban on US diesel exports if European countries fail to act, according to three people familiar with the discussions.

The pressure marks an escalation in Washington’s efforts to bring down record US diesel prices as President Donald Trump considers measures to increase domestic fuel supplies ahead of November’s midterm elections.

For European governments, however, releasing additional emergency stocks presents a difficult choice. The European Union must weigh the immediate need to reduce fuel prices against the possibility of a worsening supply crisis if the conflict involving Iran continues and global energy markets remain disrupted.

The European Commission’s energy taskforce, which includes the Commission and representatives of all 27 EU member states, is due to discuss the situation on Friday morning, a Commission spokesperson said.

EU officials said the Commission, Germany, France, Italy, Britain and Ireland had already held discussions on Thursday about the possible release of diesel reserves.

The International Energy Agency has not yet asked Germany to release its emergency stocks, Germany’s economy ministry said. It was not immediately clear when the IEA would next consider the issue.

The US administration has expressed particular frustration with France and Germany, which Washington believes have not fully implemented earlier commitments to release emergency oil and petroleum-product reserves.

“It is in Europe’s best interest to work with the United States as we pursue multiple pathways to boost the supply of refined products and lower costs for consumers,” a US official told Reuters.

Washington seeks more fuel as global supply tightens

One source familiar with the discussions said the United States had asked the European Union to release 120 million barrels of diesel over the next six months.

Europe has become increasingly dependent on US fuel supplies after banning Russian imports following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. The disruption caused by the US-Israeli war against Iran has further complicated supplies from the Middle East, increasing pressure on global refined-product markets.

US Energy Secretary Chris Wright said he was “highly confident” that Europe could help reduce fuel prices by drawing down its emergency diesel inventories.

“This is a time for a coordinated release of diesel stores as we go into harvest season and we go into winter heating oil season,” Wright told Fox News. He said additional diesel was available and suggested that coordinated action could produce positive results for consumers.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent also called on US allies to fulfill commitments made under an agreement among International Energy Agency members in March. He said the United States had already released 172 million barrels of oil under the agreement.

“America is doing its part,” Bessent said on X, adding that Washington expected its allies to match their commitments with action.

The pressure on European reserves comes as several major fuel suppliers have taken measures that are tightening international markets.

Russia has extended its ban on diesel exports until the end of October, according to Reuters. The measure comes after Ukrainian attacks damaged several Russian refineries.

Chinese refiners have also suspended October fuel exports to strengthen domestic supplies, while PetroChina has cancelled cargoes, according to sources cited by Reuters.

The disruptions have added to concerns about the availability of diesel at a time when demand is expected to rise during the agricultural harvest and winter heating season.

Europe faces a difficult reserve decision

The European Union must balance the immediate economic pressure from high fuel prices against the strategic value of maintaining emergency stocks.

Releasing large volumes could increase supplies and potentially reduce prices, but governments may be reluctant to deplete reserves while uncertainty remains over the conflict involving Iran and the possibility of further disruptions to international energy markets.

Relations between Washington and European capitals have already been strained by disagreements over tariffs and defense spending, adding another layer of complexity to the discussions over fuel reserves.

France’s energy ministry declined to comment on the US request. An official at the Élysée Palace said Trump and French President Emmanuel Macron did not discuss the issue when they met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York the previous week.

The official said Macron would convene a video conference of G7 leaders to discuss rising fuel prices and the global availability of refined petroleum products. The meeting would also consider coordination on releasing strategic reserves in cooperation with the International Energy Agency.

The proposed G7 discussions reflect the broader international effort to manage a tightening fuel market as governments confront disruptions from several major producers.

For Washington, securing additional supplies could help ease pressure on US consumers before the November elections. For Europe, however, releasing substantial diesel reserves could reduce prices in the short term while leaving countries with smaller buffers against a further deterioration in global energy supplies.

The debate therefore places the United States and its European allies under pressure to coordinate their response to an increasingly strained global fuel market, even as they face different domestic priorities and concerns about future supply disruptions.

(Source: Reuters)

R

ussia has warned NATO that it would be prepared to use nuclear weapons if the Western alliance attempted to isolate Kaliningrad, escalating tensions between Moscow and the alliance over the strategically important Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea.

In a diplomatic note sent to NATO and seen by Reuters, Russia accused the alliance of pursuing a “dangerous and reckless course” that carried a high risk of direct armed conflict. Moscow also warned that any confrontation could involve Russian strikes against decision-making centers in NATO member states from the outset.

“Russia will be ready to use the entire arsenal of forces and capabilities at its disposal, including nuclear weapons,” the diplomatic note said, referring to any NATO attempt to isolate Kaliningrad from the rest of Russia.

Kaliningrad is a heavily militarized Russian territory located between NATO members Poland and Lithuania. Moscow has increasingly highlighted what it describes as threats to the exclave as NATO countries expand military activity in the Baltic region.

The Russian warning comes amid already strained relations between Moscow and Western governments following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova separately accused officials from NATO countries of demonstrating what she called “Russophobia” and a willingness to wage war against Russia. She said Moscow hoped its warnings would be taken seriously.

The Kremlin said the message was directed at what spokesman Dmitry Peskov called “hotheads in Europe.”

NATO rejects Russian nuclear threat

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte rejected Moscow’s warning and said the alliance had responded by emphasizing that it was defensive in nature.

“We are a defensive alliance,” Rutte said. “And stop the nuclear threats. This is absolutely not called for and not helpful.”

In its response to Russia, NATO said none of its exercises or activities posed a threat to Russian territory. The alliance also called on Moscow to end its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and refrain from what it described as increasingly reckless behavior toward NATO members.

Asked whether the risk of Russia using nuclear weapons against the Baltic states was now real, Rutte said it was not. He argued that Russian President Vladimir Putin understood that Russia could not defeat NATO.

The exchange nevertheless comes as European governments and Moscow accuse each other of escalating military and political tensions around the Baltic Sea.

Russian embassies in at least three European countries have issued statements in recent days accusing NATO of increasing tensions through military exercises and scenarios involving Kaliningrad.

European governments, meanwhile, have accused Moscow of conducting a broader “hybrid war” through activities including sabotage and arson. Russia denies those accusations and rejects repeated claims from Western politicians that it is preparing for a military attack against a NATO country.

The latest Russian warning has also raised concerns among analysts about the possibility of miscalculation.

Nikolai Sokov, a Vienna-based nuclear analyst and former Russian diplomat, said it was becoming increasingly difficult for Western countries to expand their support for Ukraine without increasing the risk of direct confrontation with Moscow.

Sokov said Russia could interpret some Western actions differently from European governments. He cited arms supplies to Ukraine, sanctions against Moscow, interceptions of Russian ships, military exercises and intelligence flights near Kaliningrad as developments contributing to the tension.

He said Russia could view a potential blockade of the Baltic Sea as an act of war even if European governments considered it to be below the threshold of direct conflict.

“I see a risk of mutual miscalculation,” Sokov said.

Attempt to intimidate European governments

A NATO diplomat described the Russian message as another attempt to intimidate European governments, while saying the alliance would not be deterred from supporting Ukraine.

A senior European defense official said the warning was serious, describing it as the first time since the Cold War that Russia had threatened Europe in such terms.

The competing statements underscore the increasingly tense security environment around the Baltic Sea, where Russian and NATO forces operate in close proximity. While NATO says its activities do not threaten Russia, Moscow has repeatedly warned that developments involving Kaliningrad could have wider consequences.

The latest dispute highlights the risks created by escalating military activity and increasingly forceful rhetoric between Russia and the Western alliance. With both sides maintaining sharply different interpretations of the security situation, analysts warn that miscalculation could further increase the danger of confrontation.

(Source: Reuters)

P

ete Hegseth, U.S. Defense Secretary, has announced plans to cut by 20 percent the number of military positions reserved for generals and admirals, a move that could significantly reshape the Pentagon’s senior leadership and has raised questions about political influence over the US armed forces.

Hegseth announced the planned reduction on Wednesday at the US Marine Corps base in Quantico, Virginia, describing it as a long-overdue effort to change the culture of the military. He said reducing senior positions was necessary to remove what he described as “woke” elements from the armed forces.

“You can’t change a culture with the same people who enabled it,” Hegseth said, arguing that personnel decisions were central to changing military culture. He also said the armed forces should focus on training, readiness, accountability, discipline and lethality.

The Pentagon has previously presented reductions in senior positions as part of efforts to streamline bureaucracy and reduce layers of command. However, analysts cited by Al Jazeera said the latest plans could also have implications for how senior military officers are selected and how willing they are to challenge political leaders.

According to the Associated Press, citing Pentagon officials, Hegseth intends to double a 10 percent reduction in top-ranking personnel ordered last year, bringing the overall reduction to 20 percent by January 1, 2027. The plan would affect roughly 800 general and admiral positions across the one- to four-star ranks.

Congress sets statutory limits on the number of generals and admirals. A Congressional Research Service report recorded 848 active-duty generals and admirals in September 2025, compared with an authorized maximum of 857.

The planned cuts do not necessarily mean that every officer currently occupying an affected position will immediately leave the military. Reuters reported that some positions would be eliminated, while others would be reassigned to lower-ranking offices.

Debate over military leadership and political influence

The argument for reducing the number of senior military positions predates Hegseth’s tenure. Supporters of reform have argued that the US military has too many layers of command and headquarters, and that reducing senior ranks could give officers closer to military operations greater authority.

Walter Ladwig, a political scientist specializing in US foreign policy at King’s College London, said there was a credible case for reducing the number of senior officers. He noted that the overall size of the US military had declined significantly since the end of the Cold War, while the number of flag officers had not fallen correspondingly.

At the same time, however, Hegseth’s proposed cuts come after a series of high-profile dismissals and leadership changes at the Pentagon.

President Donald Trump and Hegseth have fired or pushed into retirement more than two dozen military leaders since Trump took office in January 2025, according to the article. Those removed include Army Chief of Staff General Randy George and Navy Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Lisa Franchetti. Trump also dismissed Air Force General CQ Brown as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in February 2025.

The administration has also dismissed the only two women serving as four-star officers, along with other senior female officers. Army Secretary Dan Driscoll resigned in August following reported disagreements over Hegseth’s handling of senior military personnel.

The dismissals and blocked promotions have prompted questions about how commanders are selected and whether professional disagreements with the administration could affect military careers.

Political considerations

Robert Ralston, a lecturer in political science and international studies at the University of Birmingham, said the proposed reductions should be viewed alongside the earlier personnel changes. He argued that the measures appeared to form part of a broader effort to select military leaders according to political considerations.

Hegseth’s tenure has also been marked by controversy over his relationship with senior Pentagon officials. In March 2025, he shared details of planned strikes on Yemen in a Signal chat that inadvertently included the editor-in-chief of The Atlantic magazine. Later reports about weapons supplies in the Middle East prompted a Pentagon investigation into leaks and tighter restrictions on journalists.

The administration has also introduced changes aimed at ending what Hegseth calls “woke” culture, including new physical fitness requirements and the abolition of diversity policies.
Critics say the combination of dismissals, blocked promotions and personnel reductions could affect morale and the development of future military leadership. Ralston said the changes could have long-term consequences for leadership pipelines within the Department of Defense.

Ladwig, while describing Hegseth’s relationship with senior Pentagon leaders as unusually confrontational, cautioned against interpreting every reduction as a political power struggle. He noted that civilian control of the military gives an elected government authority to determine defense priorities and reorganize the armed forces.

At the same time, he warned that officers could become less willing to offer candid professional advice if they believe political alignment is important for career advancement.

The proposed 20 percent reduction therefore comes at a sensitive point for the US military, with Hegseth facing scrutiny over his management of senior commanders and the broader direction of the Pentagon. The changes could reduce layers of command and bureaucracy, while also prompting continuing debate over military professionalism, leadership selection and the relationship between civilian political authority and senior military advice.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

A

passenger aircraft traveling from Dubai to Tel Aviv transmitted an emergency signal and was reportedly diverted toward Saudi Arabia, according to Israeli media reports.

Ynet reported that the aircraft, carrying more than 150 passengers, issued an emergency alert during the flight. Initial reports described the incident as a possible hijacking, although the circumstances surrounding the alert and the aircraft’s subsequent change of course have not been independently established.

According to the reports, the aircraft changed direction and headed toward Saudi Arabia after the emergency signal was transmitted. The reason for the diversion remained unclear, and there was no immediate official confirmation explaining what had occurred aboard the plane.

The reported incident prompted an emergency response at the highest levels of the Israeli government. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz were reported to have convened an emergency meeting following the alert.

However, authorities had not immediately confirmed whether the aircraft had actually been subjected to an attempted hijacking or whether the emergency signal was linked to another technical, security or operational issue.

Preliminary information

There was also no immediate official information regarding the condition of the passengers and crew, the aircraft’s exact location, or whether it had landed or was continuing toward Saudi Arabia.

The reports come amid heightened sensitivity surrounding aviation routes and security in the region. Any confirmed security incident involving a passenger aircraft traveling between the Gulf and Israel could have wider implications for regional aviation.

At this stage, however, the available information remains preliminary. The initial reference to a possible hijacking has not been independently verified, and the reasons for the reported diversion remain unknown.

Authorities are expected to provide further information as they investigate the emergency signal and establish what prompted the aircraft to alter its flight path.

(Source: Ynews)

F

or many years, Lebanon did not occupy a central position in Türkiye’s regional policy. The fragility of the country’s political, social, and economic structure, its relative weakness compared to other actors in the Middle East, and its subjection to the influence of various powers were the primary obstacles preventing Ankara from developing a comprehensive strategy for Lebanon.

It would not have been a meaningful or reasonable choice for Türkiye to become involved before conditions conducive to the intense competition among various actors on Lebanese soil had emerged. Consequently, a situation prevailed in which a more basic-level approach, such as stable diplomatic relations between Ankara and Beirut, along with humanitarian aid, cultural events, and limited economic ties, was accepted as a given by both sides. However, the new status quo that emerged in the Middle East following Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, which began on October 7, 2023, paved the way for reshaping established relationship patterns and adopting a new understanding among regional countries.

The genocide in Gaza, the attacks carried out by the occupying state in line with its aggressive expansionist strategy, the state-building process led by Ahmed al-Sharaa that began with the end of the Bashar al-Assad era in Syria, the triggering of regional fault lines, and the emergence of a new reality due to the U.S./Israel-Iran War, all of these have paved the way for the restructuring of bilateral relations between Türkiye and Lebanon in a new tone. Before October 7, spheres of influence in Lebanon were largely defined.

The Assad regime’s influence, which, though weakened after 2006, persisted, and Iran’s decisive role in the country’s politics through Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia’s balancing role on the ground through Sunni political and economic elites, France’s efforts to preserve its traditional presence under the pretext of being the protector of the Maronite population, and the Zionist administration’s ambition, particularly to seize southern Lebanon, prevented the formulation of long-term strategies for the country. In Lebanon, a country with extreme fragility and an equally weak capacity to generate solutions, it was not easy for a new actor to enter the scene as a game-changer. The fundamental shift in the regional political equation and the transformation of the security landscape resulting from the events mentioned above presented an opportunity for a new beginning in Turkish-Lebanese relations.

The new reality in Lebanon after October 7

The shifting geopolitical environment around Lebanon after Al-Aqsa Flood not only disrupted the country’s traditional balances but also heightened society’s need for a new, trustworthy actor. In addition to the traumas of the 1975–90 civil war, the spillover of the Iran-Israel conflict into Lebanese territory had pushed societal fatigue to its peak. One main reason was weak state authority in Lebanon and Hezbollah’s transformation into a key determining actor because of the power it wielded. Furthermore, the profound disruption of Lebanon’s economic and social fabric following the civil war in Syria, along with the fact that pro-Assad and anti-Assad groups were waging a struggle through Lebanese territory, were among the factors preventing the Lebanese government from functioning effectively. However, the escalation of clashes between Hezbollah and the Zionist regime, followed by the occupying army’s series of operations that killed the majority of Hezbollah’s leading figures, signaled the emergence of a new reality on the ground.

The fact that the occupying army, which had withdrawn from Lebanese territory in 2000, began to regain control of certain areas within the country and asserted sovereignty over the region extending as far as the Litani River meant that Beirut would face numerous challenges in the new era. Perhaps the most significant development offering hope for Lebanese politics and the people during this period was the change taking place in Damascus. While the end of the Assad regime and Shara’s assumption of control with a new vision posed new security risks for Tel Aviv, for Beirut it highlighted the potential for a new strategic alliance to emerge in the region.

The spread of the aggressive strategy, carried out by the Zionist regime for political motives, into Syrian territory, and the occupying army’s intensification of its attacks and invasive actions aimed at disrupting Damascus’s stability, undermining its self-confidence, and increasing its vulnerability, were developments that also posed a threat to Türkiye’s national security. It was unthinkable for Ankara, which had paid a heavy price throughout the Syrian civil war, to accept that the Syrian people would be thrown into turmoil by the actions of the occupying state just as they were about to catch their breath. The strategic alliance between Türkiye and Syria also gave the Lebanese people hope.

Walid Canbolat’s visit to Türkiye in December 2024, as a prominent political figure and leader of the Druze community, was a significant indicator of Lebanese expectations. This visit, which took place immediately following the revolution in Syria, was nothing less than a message to Ankara to develop a new strategy regarding Lebanon. In a context where Hezbollah had lost a significant portion of its leadership, the Gulf states and the Western world were unable to assert themselves against Zionist aggression. Tel Aviv’s claim to sovereignty over Lebanon was expanding day by day; mentioning Türkiye in the context of its historical legacy aligned with the prevailing mood in the country. Following October 7, the overwhelming majority of every group in the country had come to expect Ankara to take a more visible role in Lebanon.

A Strategic relationship as a necessity

The profound changes in Syria and Türkiye’s ever-increasing influence in the Middle East are forcing the occupying state to intensify its pressure on Lebanon and to make the government dependent on it by compelling it to enter into various agreements. Caught between Hezbollah and Israel, Lebanese leaders are seeking a way out while simultaneously pursuing a balanced policy toward Tel Aviv in line with U.S. recommendations. Because the country’s political system has created deep ideological divisions among the ruling elites, conflicting political statements and strategies are a constant feature of Lebanese politics. In such an environment, the Zionist administration seeks to consolidate its influence in the region by developing a new relationship with Beirut through the Eastern Mediterranean, while also trying to minimize the likelihood of Beirut joining the Ankara-Damascus alliance in the new post-revolutionary situation in Syria. For this reason, Türkiye’s policy toward Lebanon must be conducted under the new conditions, with a strategic vision far more distinct and profound than in the past.

The separate visits to Türkiye in July by Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and President Joseph Aoun not only have the potential to open a new chapter in bilateral relations but also reveal the unique balances of Lebanese politics. During Salam’s meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, statements regarding Türkiye’s role in developing Lebanon’s infrastructure and the need to strengthen strategic relations in light of the new regional situation were particularly prominent. President Aoun, for his part, emphasized during his visit that the cooperation and coordination to be established with Türkiye constitute a strategic necessity rather than a temporary preference. In particular, conveying Ankara’s clear stance in the face of Israel’s dangerous initiatives in the Eastern Mediterranean and its efforts to involve Lebanon in this process via Southern Cyprus was highly significant for the course of the process.

Both visits and the topics discussed are highly significant in that they demonstrate the need to develop relations between the two sides after many years. Given the current fragilities, Türkiye is the only actor with which Lebanon can establish a strategic partnership in the region, and whose role Lebanese society can clearly accept. From Ankara’s perspective, shifting balances in the Palestinian arena, the transformation in Damascus, and the need to curb Tel Aviv’s aggression and expansionism require moving relations with Lebanon into a new phase. Although Ankara adopted a more limited policy toward Beirut to avoid becoming entangled in Lebanon’s power struggle in the past, the dynamics following October 7 have made it imperative to shift this approach and significantly strengthen ties with Lebanon within a strategic framework. In particular, sustaining the momentum gained after the revolution in Syria on December 8, 2024, and building relationships at various levels on the ground are crucial to a more stable region.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

B

eef prices are rising sharply in China, cattle farmers in the United States are struggling with higher costs, and poultry producers in India are cutting production as pressures across the global meat industry intensify.

More than 90 percent of the world’s population consumes meat in some form, making developments in livestock and poultry production important for food prices and household diets worldwide. Rising input costs, drought, biological production cycles and trade restrictions are combining to put pressure on meat supplies.

At the center of the problem is a supply chain that depends on resources and time. Cattle require years to reach slaughter weight, while poultry depends heavily on feed made from globally traded grains and soybeans. Farmers also need adequate land, water and favorable weather conditions to maintain their animals.

When one part of the system is disrupted, the effects can spread throughout the wider food market.

Brazil, US and China see Cattle herds decline

Brazil, the United States and China are the world’s three largest beef producers, together accounting for more than half of global beef production. All three, however, are experiencing declines in their cattle populations.

According to a March estimate from the US Department of Agriculture, Brazil’s cattle herd is expected to total about 177.4 million animals in 2026, down nearly 8 percent from 192.5 million in 2024.

The United States is also dealing with historically low cattle numbers. The USDA counted 86.2 million cattle and calves on farms on January 1, 2026. The number of beef cows, which are essential for producing future calves, fell 1 percent from the previous year to 27.6 million. The 2025 calf crop also declined by 2 percent.

China’s cattle herd was estimated at 94 million in January 2026, down from 105 million two years earlier, a decline of about 14 percent.

The shrinking herds are contributing to lower beef production. The USDA forecasts that Brazil’s beef production will fall 2 percent this year, while exports are expected to decline 5 percent. US beef production is projected to fall 4 percent, while China’s total beef supply is expected to be 12 percent lower than in 2024.

China, the world’s largest beef consumer and importer, has already seen prices climb as domestic production declines and imported supplies remain constrained.

Drought, costs and biological limits

The factors behind shrinking herds differ between countries.

In Brazil, restrictions imposed by China and the European Union, two important export markets, have reduced incentives for producers, according to analysis by Augusto Neto of S&P Global.

Brazil is also experiencing what the USDA calls a cattle reversion cycle. Producers reduce slaughter rates and retain female cattle for breeding in an effort to rebuild their herds.

In the United States, drought has affected about 60 percent of cattle-rearing areas, according to S&P Global. Reduced grazing opportunities have contributed to higher feed costs, putting additional pressure on farmers.

The US meat industry is also heavily dependent on immigrant labor. Organizations representing cattle breeders in Texas, Oklahoma and Kansas recently said immigration enforcement raids were disrupting already strained operations.

High beef prices might normally encourage farmers to increase production, but cattle cannot be produced quickly in response to market signals. Kenneth Foster, a professor of agricultural economics at Purdue University, told Al Jazeera that it can take years for producers to expand their herds and for additional cattle to reach the market.

The fastest way to rebuild a herd is often to retain female cattle that could otherwise be sold and use them for breeding. But that requires producers to absorb the costs of keeping the animals while waiting for the next generation.

As a result, high prices can coexist with limited supply for an extended period.

A

ccording to Tim Marshall, geography is the most fundamental and immutable parameter determining the fate of nations. Mountains, rivers, deserts, and oceans are natural prisons that limit leaders’ options. The approach formulated by Robert D. Kaplan as “geography’s revenge” points to the same conclusion: No matter how advanced military technology becomes, physical barriers and natural resource constraints continue to define the limits of strategic planning.

The most striking geographical feature of East Asia is that, despite being home to a very large portion of the world’s population, it is extremely deficient in arable land, freshwater resources, and fossil fuel reserves. This scarcity of resources makes all major powers in the region critically dependent on maritime trade routes. As Tim Marshall emphasizes in his analyses, just as Western Europe’s disconnected rivers and rugged mountainous terrain historically led to the emergence of numerous fragmented states, East Asia’s geography is a combination of vast landmasses, which are extremely difficult to unify, and deep oceanic rifts. This situation not only hinders regional integration but also forces states to operate within security dilemmas and maintain consistently high levels of military spending. One of the actors most deeply affected by this general geographic constraint in East Asia is the People’s Republic of China.

Geopolitical constraints for China

Despite its continental-scale land area and status as the world’s second-largest economy, China faces significant challenges in overcoming the geographical constraints imposed upon it. China’s eastern borders are encircled by a chain of islands, referred to in geopolitical literature as the “First Island Chain”, largely controlled by U.S. allies such as Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. This geographical barrier prevents the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) from freely accessing the open oceans. Taiwan, situated at the center of this island chain, acts as a fortress blocking China’s access to the depths of the Pacific. Although the Chinese navy is striving to become a modern naval power with three aircraft carriers, its warships must pass through narrow straits such as Miyako, Luzon, or Tsushima during both peacetime and times of crisis. These straits can easily be blocked by enemy submarines and coastal defense systems.

The most concrete and dangerous manifestation of this geographical constraint is the “Malacca Dilemma,” which directly threatens China’s energy security. China imports approximately 70 percent of the crude oil it consumes, and more than 80 percent of these imports reach the country directly through the Strait of Malacca. Located between Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula, the Strait of Malacca is one of the most critical chokepoints in global trade due to its shallow waters (average depth of 25–27 meters, dropping to as low as 23 meters in some areas) and its narrowest point, where the strait narrows to 2.7 kilometers in the Phillip Channel region. In the event of a conflict, a blockade of this strait by the U.S. Navy would effectively sever the lifelines of the Chinese economy. To overcome this vulnerability, the Beijing administration has embarked on infrastructure projects worth billions of dollars, despite their limited efficiency and impact. Some of these projects include:

• China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: The road and rail lines aimed at connecting the Port of Gwadar to Xinjiang must pass through the Baluchistan area with high security risks, and cross the Karakoram Mountains, one of the world’s most rugged mountain ranges. This situation keeps the project’s transport capacity at a level that is incomparably lower than that of maritime routes.
• Myanmar Pipelines: While the oil and natural gas pipelines extending from the port of Kyaukpyu to Yunnan Province are operational, the oil pipeline’s capacity of 440,000 barrels per day can meet only a very small fraction of China’s massive daily energy needs.
• Alternative Maritime Routes: Although deeper passages such as the Lombok and Sunda Straits could be used, these routes significantly increase shipping costs by extending the voyage distance. The “Northern Sea Route” in the Arctic, meanwhile, is covered in ice for most of the year and is under Russian control. The fact that it is under Russian control creates yet another form of dependency or constraint.

However, rather than accepting these geographical constraints as inevitable, the Beijing administration is pursuing a multi-layered and innovative strategy to overcome them. The most critical pillar of this strategy is based on the logic of transforming geographical dependency itself into a source of strength. The massive Belt and Road Initiative should be viewed not merely as an infrastructure push, but as a strategy to ensure energy and trade security by making countries along land and sea routes economically dependent on China. In parallel, China has risen to become the world’s largest producer of electric vehicles, batteries, and renewable energy technologies to mitigate the strategic vulnerability created by its dependence on fossil fuels. Perhaps most importantly, another way to overcome geographic limitations is to shift competition beyond existing geographical boundaries. With this vision, China is making major investments in new arenas of competition, such as cyberspace and outer space; by developing the capacity to compete with the U.S. in these domains, it aims to render the constraints of traditional geopolitics obsolete.

Tim Marshall argues that leaders come and go, but geography is permanent. Unlike the U.S., which is surrounded by weak neighbors, China shares land borders with 14 countries. No comparable rival to the U.S. possesses such geographical proximity to it. In East Asia, three nuclear powers (China, Russia, North Korea) and two technological powers (Japan, South Korea) live within each other’s artillery range. This proximity creates a security dilemma in which the strengthening of one state’s power, such as China building up its navy, directly threatens the survival of its neighbors (Japan, South Korea) and triggers counterbalancing alliances (AUKUS, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and the U.S.-South Korea-Japan trilateral cooperation).

China’s land borders also present another geopolitical dilemma. Maintaining control over border regions historically inhabited by non-Han ethnic groups, such as Xinjiang and Tibet, is a vital national security priority for China. However, maintaining control over these regions forces China to spend more annually on internal security mechanisms and social control technologies than its official defense budget (which was $215 billion in 2016). The border with India is bisected by the Himalayas, the world’s highest mountain range. While this prevents the two nuclear powers from projecting large military forces against one another, it keeps the possibility of a potential security dilemma alive.

In terms of internal vulnerabilities, food and water insecurity represent China’s greatest Achilles’ heel. Although China must feed approximately 20 percent of the world’s population, it possesses less than 10 percent of the world’s arable farmland and only 6 percent of its freshwater resources. The famine that occurred between 1958 and 1961, which claimed the lives of 30 to 40 million people, has made food security a red line in the minds of China’s leadership. As a result of urbanization and industrialization, China lost more than 12 million hectares of prime agricultural land between 2009 and 2021. To boost production, the government has relied heavily on pesticides and chemical fertilizers (accounting for 30 percent of the world’s fertilizer supply), which has led to soil degradation and the contamination of irrigation water with heavy metals such as cadmium.

The geographic distribution of water resources is also severely unbalanced. The northern regions, which account for 56 percent of grain production, have access to only 16.5 percent of the nation’s water resources. This situation has led to desertification, land subsidence, and a decline in agricultural productivity in the North China Plain due to excessive groundwater extraction. To meet its growing protein needs, China has become dependent on imports of feed grains and edible oils; indeed, in 2021, the country’s reliance on imports for liquid oils reached 70 percent.

China’s demographic crisis

China’s demographic profile, however, reveals another pressing constraint. Driven by the strict “one-child policy” enforced for decades and the effects of rapid urbanization, China’s population officially began to decline in 2022. According to the United Nations, China’s population will decline from its peak of 1.42 billion in 2025 to 1.31 billion by 2050 and will fall below 800 million by the end of the century.

The main issue here is not so much the decline in population as the radical shift in the age structure. China faces the risk of becoming the first major economy to “age before it gets rich.” While Japan’s per capita GDP was at developed-country levels when it faced its demographic crisis, China has been caught in this process before even surpassing the middle-income level. China’s working-age population (ages 15–64) peaked between 2013 and 2015 and has been steadily declining ever since. The old-age dependency ratio, which stood at 11.9 percent in 2010, rose to 21.9 percent in 2022 and is projected to reach 51 percent by 2050.

This means that in the future, there may not even be two working-age people to support each elderly citizen. This shift will lead to a structural collapse in demand in the real estate sector, a decline in savings rates, and the bankruptcy of pension funds. The fact that China’s population aged 80 and older is projected to reach 126 million by 2050 has the potential to trigger major humanitarian and economic crises in rural areas where the social safety net is inadequate.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

S

outh Korea has demanded an official explanation and apology from Ukraine after accusing Kyiv of disclosing the transfer of two North Korean prisoners of war (POWs) to Seoul despite an agreement to keep the matter confidential.

Seong Ghi-hong, a senior presidential secretary for public relations, said Sunday that Seoul strongly regretted Ukraine’s decision to publicly announce the transfer and its subsequent denial that a nondisclosure agreement had existed.

“The presidential office expresses strong regret over Ukraine’s unilateral disclosure and its subsequent false announcement that there had not been a non-disclosure agreement,” Seong said in a statement.

He added that the South Korean government was reviewing whether additional measures were necessary in response to the dispute.

The controversy followed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s announcement last week during the United Nations General Assembly that Kyiv had transferred two North Korean POWs to South Korea. Zelenskyy said the soldiers had been captured while fighting alongside Russian forces in the war against Ukraine.

According to the South Korean presidential office, Ukraine had repeatedly discussed the prisoners’ transfer with Seoul through various channels and had asked South Korea to keep the arrangement secret. Kyiv had reportedly been concerned that publicly transferring the soldiers could trigger domestic criticism that Ukraine had surrendered an opportunity to exchange them for Ukrainian prisoners held by Russia.

Seoul agreed to maintain confidentiality, citing security, diplomatic and humanitarian considerations. South Korean officials said secrecy was particularly important for protecting the prisoners and their families.

The presidential office said Zelenskyy subsequently disclosed the transfer at the UN without sufficient consultation with Seoul and later denied that a confidentiality agreement had been reached.

Seong said the denial had seriously undermined trust between the two governments and could have consequences for bilateral relations.

Zelenskyy adviser rejects Seoul’s account

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung had already addressed the dispute publicly on Thursday, saying Ukraine had disclosed the transfer in violation of a nondisclosure agreement.

Lee said keeping the transfer confidential had been appropriate because of the potential consequences for the prisoners and other parties involved.

“I do not know what circumstances led the Ukrainian side to disclose the matter despite the confidentiality agreement, but it is deeply regrettable,” Lee wrote in a post on X.

Ukraine, however, disputed Seoul’s characterization of the arrangement.

Dmytro Lytvyn, an adviser to Zelenskyy, told journalists that Ukraine was an “open country” and suggested that keeping the transfer secret would have been unusual.

“From the entire story – which is long and detailed – we reported only the fact itself, that they were sent to the Republic of Korea,” Lytvyn said.

The conflicting accounts have created a diplomatic dispute between Seoul and Kyiv over how the transfer was handled and whether an agreement restricting public disclosure was formally reached.

The issue is particularly sensitive because of the unusual circumstances surrounding the two prisoners, who were captured while serving with Russian forces.

North Korean soldiers captured in Russia

Ukraine captured the two North Korean soldiers in Russia’s Kursk region in January 2025. According to the report, they were the first North Korean soldiers captured alive since Pyongyang began supporting Russia in its war against Ukraine in 2024.

Their transfer to South Korea followed discussions between Seoul and Kyiv over the legal and humanitarian status of North Korean prisoners.

The issue was also discussed during a NATO summit in Ankara in July, where Lee met Zelenskyy. South Korea’s senior presidential spokesperson, Kang Yu-jung, said afterward that the two leaders had agreed to address the status of North Korean POWs in accordance with international law.

The agreement built on an earlier understanding reached during a South Korea-Ukraine foreign ministers’ meeting in March, when the two countries pledged to cooperate on the POW issue.

The dispute comes as South Korea seeks to revive dialogue with North Korea and as US President Donald Trump has again expressed willingness to engage with Pyongyang.

The presence of North Korean troops in Russia has become a significant issue in the wider Ukraine war. According to South Korean intelligence cited in the report, North Korea is estimated to have deployed between 14,000 and 15,000 soldiers to support Moscow since 2024, primarily in Russia’s Kursk border region.

South Korean, Ukrainian and Western officials have said the North Korean forces suffered heavy casualties, with more than 6,000 soldiers killed in fighting.

The fate of North Korean POWs has consequently become an issue involving not only Ukraine and South Korea but also the broader diplomatic and security relationship between Seoul, Pyongyang, Moscow and Kyiv.

For South Korea, the latest dispute has raised concerns about the handling of sensitive information involving the prisoners and their families. For Ukraine, the issue has highlighted its position that the transfer itself was significant enough to be publicly disclosed.

The two governments now face the task of addressing their conflicting accounts over the alleged confidentiality agreement while continuing cooperation on the status of North Korean prisoners captured during the war.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

C

hinese President Xi Jinping visited Egypt on September 1, marking the first such visit in a decade. Taking place on the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1956, Xi’s visit carried symbolic significance and served as a key indicator of the growing momentum in relations between Beijing and Cairo in recent years. The statements made by the leaders of both countries regarding the visit, in which they emphasized the importance they attach to bilateral relations, further underscore this trend.

Another notable aspect was that both leaders highlighted the broader regional implications of these bilateral ties. In this context, Chinese President Xi, highlighting Egypt’s dual Arab and African identity, emphasized the need to strengthen cooperation by noting that Cairo plays “an important role in promoting the collective cooperation between China and Arab states as well as between China and African countries.” Meanwhile, Egyptian President Abdulfettah el-Sisi similarly highlighted that his country was the first Arab and African state to recognize China, emphasizing that Cairo is a key actor in Beijing’s efforts to develop relations with both Arab and African states.

It can be said that China-Egypt relations, which had limited opportunities for development in the 20th century, began to develop rapidly from the beginning of the 21st century, as Beijing’s relations with Africa gained momentum. The elevation of the relationship to the level of a comprehensive strategic partnership during President Sisi’s official visit to China in 2014 marked a significant step.

Economy is the key word

As is the case with China’s relations with many other countries, economic ties constitute the most concrete and significant aspect of the relations that have developed during this period. China’s annual trade volume with Egypt, which stood at approximately $0.9 billion in 2000, reached approximately $20.8 billion by 2025. Another key indicator of these economic ties is China’s investments in Egypt. Beijing’s investments in Egypt have exceeded $10 billion, with investments in the industrial sector being particularly noteworthy.

The Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone project, launched in 2008 to encourage China’s industrial investments in Egypt, is one of the most significant steps taken in this direction. As of 2025, with over $3.8 billion in investments made in the zone, nearly 200 companies are operating there, providing employment for approximately 10,000 people. China has also provided $7.7 billion in loans to Egypt between 2000 and 2024.

In contrast to economic relations, the security dimension of relations between the two countries has been an area with limited scope for development until recently. However, it is possible to say that significant activity has taken place in this area, particularly in 2025. In this context, claims that emerged during the year, that Egypt procured the HQ-9B air defense system from China and signed a deal worth approximately $400 million for the procurement of 10 WJ-700 UAVs, represent significant developments in arms trade between the two countries. The signing of a memorandum of understanding between Egypt and China’s North Industries Corporation for joint UAV production during this period was a step demonstrating the two countries’ intention to develop defense industry cooperation.

Eagles of Civilization exercises

One of the most important steps taken to strengthen military relations between Beijing and Cairo was the “Eagles of Civilization 2025” exercise. Held in Egypt, this large-scale exercise, the first joint air exercise between the two countries, also holds symbolic significance as it represents one of China’s most important military activities on the African continent. The second iteration of the exercise, “Eagles of Civilization 2026,” was conducted immediately prior to Xi’s visit.

China-Egypt cooperation, which is generally built on a foundation of strong economic ties, is evolving into a strategic partnership that increasingly encompasses the security dimension, as intended by both sides. However, it is fair to say that sustaining the momentum achieved in these relations will become increasingly difficult. The primary reason for this is the concerns that the deepening of Beijing-Cairo relations, particularly in the security sphere, will raise on the U.S. side. A key reason for Washington’s concerns is that, as part of its global competition with China, Beijing’s development of security ties with Egypt could allow it to gain military influence in a strategically important region.

Another major source of concern for the U.S. relates to Israeli interests. Egypt’s efforts to reduce its dependence on the U.S. in this area by developing military ties with China, and to enhance its military capabilities independently of the U.S., will be viewed as a threat by Israel. Driven by similar concerns, Washington intervened in the military relations Egypt developed with Russia in the second half of the 2010s, as well as in significant arms procurements, by applying pressure through the threat of sanctions against Cairo. The trajectory of China-Egypt security relations also holds the potential to trigger similar interventions.

(Originally published in Turkish by the Middle East Africa website)

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erman Chancellor Friedrich Merz (CDU) faces difficult days ahead this fall, both within the coalition government he leads and within his own party, the CDU. The federal government, which has occasionally made headlines due to debates and disagreements ahead of the Bundestag’s summer recess in July, is highly likely to face new challenges starting in September.

Chancellor Merz, who promised to implement significant reforms upon taking office in May 2025, has not fully delivered on these promises during his more than one year in office and has faced criticism as a result. Merz has also been criticized for making numerous concessions, despite his campaign promises, in order to form a coalition with the SPD at the federal level. Recent polls showing a significant decline in both his party’s and his own personal popularity are placing the Chancellor and the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition in a more precarious position in the coming months.

Over the past summer, Merz has remained in the spotlight due to new internal party issues, and he continues to be a target of criticism, particularly for his ongoing shortcomings in communication. For example, in July, the Chancellor raised the issue of replacing certain CDU ministers in the federal government; however, the failure to find a replacement for Federal Minister of Transportation Patrick Schnieder (CDU), whose dismissal had been widely reported, caused considerable astonishment among the public. During this process, criticism of Merz from the minister in question, and even from his inner circle in his electoral district, drew attention.

Furthermore, Merz’s selection of a candidate for Federal Minister of Health, coupled with his own statements that the nominee would not be successful in such a role because he lacked experience in the field just a year prior, further undermined the credibility of both Chancellor Merz and the CDU/CSU circles. A similar impression of inconsistency and a credibility issue also arose during the process leading to the resignation of Jens Spahn, the CDU/CSU’s Federal Parliamentary Group Leader, a development that essentially triggered the ministerial reshuffles, after he stepped down due to a specific incident that contradicted his party’s principles and his own position. Essentially, Spahn’s resignation could be viewed as partially advantageous for Chancellor Merz and the party’s internal balance, and looking ahead, because Spahn could have posed a potential rival within the party. However, Merz’s failure to fully manage this process has not translated into a consolidation of power for him at this stage.

Criticism of Merz’s communication strategy

Ongoing criticism of Chancellor Merz’s communication strategy has intensified, particularly following his departure for summer vacation at the end of July. Although the political agenda in Germany is generally calmer during July and August, it can be said that this summer has seen some quite critical developments. Nevertheless, Merz’s continued silence has drawn serious criticism from the public and the media. While media outlets published articles questioning the Chancellor’s whereabouts, including reports of extreme heat in Germany causing difficulties in daily life and low river levels posing economic risks to major transportation routes, none of these issues prompted the Chancellor to issue a statement while on vacation. Furthermore, despite ongoing debates over the government’s proposed reforms during the summer months, forest fires reaching serious proportions in Germany, and, most recently, the discovery of a drone containing an explosive device at Leipzig Airport, Chancellor Merz did not break his silence or cut short his vacation, which lasted approximately three weeks.

During this period, criticism of the Chancellor came not only from the media but also from opposition parties. Finally, after Merz ended his vacation on August 22, he responded with particularly harsh rhetoric to protests directed at him while visiting the region affected by the wildfires. This stance led to further criticism of his communication strategy. Here, too, the Chancellor was observed to have resorted to an impulsive, reactive tone. Consequently, the fact that the agenda, which had been strained by discussions of a cabinet reshuffle before the vacation, began with similar tension after the vacation has reinforced the impression that a harmonious and smooth political process is highly unlikely in the fall months.

In addition to the fragile situation within the CDU, where Merz continues to serve as chairman, it can be said that there have also been disagreements with the coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). In particular, it has become clear to the public that various disagreements persist even after difficult compromises were reached on certain major reform initiatives, such as pension reform. Consequently, it has become apparent that rather than adopting a collective approach as a government, the coalition partners have once again prioritized their own parties and voter bases.

This situation has reinforced the perception that the coalition will not be able to fully carry out its remaining term of approximately two and a half years in line with shared future goals. A draft agreement on pension reform was prepared before the summer recess, but both criticism of this draft from some SPD politicians and opposition from CDU state premiers in the three eastern German states have drawn significant attention. Whether such goals can be enacted into law and implemented in the Bundestag this coming fall is viewed as a serious test. The ability to implement these legislative goals is also linked to several other factors.

Critical state parliamentary elections

This fall, several state parliamentary elections of great importance will take place in Germany, elections that have the potential to influence political developments at the federal level. First, on September 6, elections will be held in Saxony-Anhalt, followed by elections in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania on September 20. In particular, a potential election defeat is expected for the incumbent CDU state premier and the coalition government in Saxony-Anhalt. Meanwhile, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), classified by Saxony-Anhalt’s Office for the Protection of the Constitution as a “confirmed far-right organization”, is expected to finish first in the Saxony-Anhalt election by a significant margin.

Despite all these factors, it is reported that the AfD has reached a vote share of approximately 42 percent in recent polls in Saxony-Anhalt and has also emerged as the leading party at the federal level. Meanwhile, the Chancellor’s party, the CDU/CSU, is said to have slipped to 23 percent and second place at the federal level. In contrast, the AfD has risen to approximately 28 percent, moving into first place in federal-level polls as well. While this situation may come as a surprise in German politics, it can be said that this trend at both the state and federal levels has become entrenched.

Although the AfD is expected to finish first in the state parliament election on September 6, it is not anticipated to form a government due to the other political parties’ principle of refusing to form a coalition or cooperate with it. However, criticism that the “firewall” (“Brandmauer”) principle, which rejects any form of cooperation with the AfD, has actually strengthened the party has intensified in recent months. Calls from some local CDU politicians to soften the party’s rigid stance have even made their way into the public discourse. On the other hand, the possibility that parties such as the Greens and the SPD may fall below the 5 percent electoral threshold in the eastern states could pave the way for the AfD to secure an absolute majority in Saxony-Anhalt, enabling it to form a state government on its own. Although this possibility currently seems remote, it is prompting other political actors to explore new political avenues, including at the federal level.

While some politicians are adopting a more tolerant rhetoric toward cooperation with the AfD, others are more vocally and in a coordinated manner calling for action to ban the AfD. For example, even Saxony’s CDU State Premier Michael Kretschmer, breaking with the CDU leadership at the federal level, has adopted a stance suggesting that “we need to talk to anyone who wants to talk,” including the AfD, making these efforts more evident. On the other hand, political science circles point out that, rather than this type of cooperation, the option of a minority government, particularly in the eastern states of Germany, should be given more serious consideration.

However, it is also known that Chancellor Merz and the CDU leadership generally do not look favorably upon the option of a minority government, either at the federal level or in the states. Furthermore, the CDU’s continued adherence to its principle of not cooperating with the Left Party significantly complicates the prospects for a CDU-led government in situations where the AfD fails to secure an absolute majority.

Efforts toward a partial economic recovery and ongoing challenges

In addition to these critical developments, it can be said that the German economy has failed to achieve the expected positive momentum and, with the exception of a partial, temporary recovery in the second quarter of the year, has not fully met expectations. This economic stagnation continues to put pressure on the federal government and is also considered a significant factor, particularly in the state legislative election processes. For example, the inflation rate in Germany rose notably to 2.8 percent in July and 2.9 percent in August, and this figure is expected to rise further. This situation is linked to rising energy costs and, in particular, the ongoing increase in gasoline prices.

Here, too, the fact that the U.S.-Iran conflict has not yet reached a resolution that would ease global markets, along with the limited predictability in Germany, can be cited as the underlying causes. In addition to the inflation figures, the fact that the number of unemployed exceeded three million again in August (6.5 percent) following July is fueling continued criticism of the federal government. Furthermore, it is claimed that the downturn in the automotive sector and the negative impact of this year’s extreme heat and drought on the German economy have reached 36 billion euros. Consequently, the additional challenges posed by these cost increases are expected to become even more pronounced in the coming months.

Finally, Germany’s budget deficit-to-GDP ratio rose to 3.1 percent in the first half of 2026, exceeding the European Union’s 3 percent Maastricht criterion. Although infrastructure investments and increased defense spending, in line with the federal government’s objectives, have had positive effects on economic growth, the 11.6 percent increase in interest payments to 27.3 billion euros, particularly in the first half of the year, is viewed as a cause for concern and has led to criticism that the budget balance is under pressure.

T

igrayan leaders said Wednesday that a new war with Ethiopia’s federal government had begun after fighting erupted in the northern Tigray region and neighboring Afar and Amhara, threatening to unravel a four-year-old peace agreement that ended one of the country’s deadliest conflicts.

The renewed fighting comes nearly four years after the end of Ethiopia’s 2020-2022 civil war between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and federal forces. The conflict resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths and a major humanitarian crisis before the two sides signed the Pretoria Agreement in November 2022.

The latest escalation follows months of deteriorating relations between the TPLF and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government. Tensions intensified further on Sunday when the TPLF announced that it had formed an alliance with six other armed groups from across Ethiopia with the stated goal of overthrowing Abiy’s government.

The Tigray National Regional Government, which is led by the TPLF, said its forces had been instructed to respond to what it described as an attack by the federal government.

“Following the intensification of the invasion conducted through various methods by Abiy Ahmed’s autocratic and genocidal Prosperity regime against the people of Tigray,” the regional administration said in a statement, adding that Tigrayan forces had entered what it called a defensive war.

The statement represented a significant escalation in rhetoric between the two sides and raised fears that the fragile peace established after the previous conflict could collapse.

Fighting spreads beyond Tigray

Getachew Reda, an adviser to Abiy and a former TPLF official, said on X that Tigrayan forces had seized control of federally controlled airports in Tigray and launched an “all out offensive” against government positions in neighboring Afar and Amhara.

Ethiopian Airlines suspended flights to the region as reports of fighting emerged.

Four sources familiar with the developments, including a senior Ethiopian government official, a diplomatic source, a humanitarian source and another source with links to the TPLF and an allied militia, confirmed fighting in Tigray, Afar and Amhara.

According to the sources, Tigrayan forces in Afar were fighting alongside a local armed group. In Amhara, they were fighting alongside Fano, an armed militia that has become a major opponent of the federal government.

Fano had sided with federal forces during the 2020-2022 war but later turned against Abiy’s government, launching an insurgency in 2023. The group is now part of the alliance announced by the TPLF.

The involvement of armed groups from outside Tigray could broaden the conflict and increase the pressure on the federal government. The alliance announced by the TPLF includes six other groups, although the Reuters report did not provide further details on the members or their military capabilities.

Spokespeople for Abiy, the federal government and the TPLF did not immediately respond to requests for comment on Wednesday.

The federal government has accused the TPLF of violating the Pretoria Agreement and seeking to create chaos. The latest developments therefore represent a direct challenge to the peace arrangement that brought an end to the previous war.

Eritrea role raises regional concerns

The renewed fighting has also drawn attention to Eritrea, Ethiopia’s northern neighbor and longtime rival.

Abiy’s spokesperson, Billene Seyoum, told Reuters on Monday that members of the newly announced alliance had been cooperating for some time with financial backing from Eritrea.

Eritrea has repeatedly denied accusations that it supports Ethiopian armed groups. Its information minister declined to comment on Wednesday about the latest developments.

The allegations underscore the broader regional dimension of Ethiopia’s internal conflicts. Eritrea was directly involved in the previous Tigray war, during which its forces fought alongside Ethiopian federal troops against the TPLF. The Pretoria Agreement subsequently brought the large-scale fighting to an end.

The renewed clashes could therefore have consequences beyond the immediate battlefields in northern Ethiopia if regional actors become more deeply involved.

The 2020-2022 conflict in Tigray caused widespread destruction and displacement, while hundreds of thousands of people died, according to the Reuters report. The peace agreement halted the main fighting, but political disputes and tensions between the federal government and Tigrayan authorities remained unresolved.

The emergence of a new alliance linking the TPLF with Fano and other armed groups adds another layer of uncertainty. Fighting in three regions could also complicate humanitarian operations and efforts to maintain the peace established in 2022.

For now, reports of renewed hostilities mark the most serious threat to the Pretoria peace agreement since it was signed. With the TPLF describing its military action as defensive and the federal government accusing it of violating the agreement, the competing claims highlight the depth of the political divide.

The latest clashes leave the future of Ethiopia’s fragile peace uncertain, with the possibility of a wider confrontation depending on whether the fighting spreads and whether the opposing sides can prevent the breakdown from developing into another prolonged civil war.

(Source: CNN)

F

ifteen years after Libyans rose against personalized rule, the country risks replacing one family-centred dictatorship not with democracy, but with competing dynasties, armed patronage networks and a political class that has discovered that “transition” can last forever.

Libyans have not necessarily abandoned their aspiration for democracy. Something more insidious is happening: They are being taught that democracy does not matter.

Fifteen years after the overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi, Libya remains trapped in what is still politely called a “transition.” Governments described as temporary become permanent, elections are promised and postponed, and institutions whose democratic mandates have long expired continue to exercise power. Armed groups become state actors, family members become commanders and power brokers, and public money sustains a system whose principal achievement is its own survival.

The absurdity is illustrated by the Government of National Unity headed by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah. Created as an interim authority to take Libya to presidential and parliamentary elections in December 2021, it remains in power in Tripoli in 2026 although those elections never happened. In the east, meanwhile, another political-security establishment has consolidated itself around Khalifa Haftar, his family and the forces under their control. Governments change names, roadmaps are rewritten, and election dates recede into the future, but those exercising power remain. Libya has turned the provisional government into a permanent political system: everybody is temporary, but nobody leaves.

Perhaps that is no accident. Genuine elections contain something profoundly threatening to Libya’s political class: the possibility of losing. Elections mean that those controlling ministries, budgets, armed formations, contracts and patronage networks today might wake up tomorrow without them. Why should beneficiaries of the existing order enthusiastically construct the mechanism capable of removing them?

A convergence of interests

Dbeibah and Haftar are not allies, and eastern and western power centres continue to compete. Yet beneath their rivalry lies a convergence of interests. The western establishment needs money, armed protection and control of Tripoli; the eastern establishment needs access to national revenues and international legitimacy. Militias need salaries and influence, business networks need contracts, politicians need offices, and families surrounding powerful men need access to wealth. Foreign governments want oil, migration control, counterterrorism cooperation and sufficient stability to protect their interests. No formal coalition is necessary. Everyone merely has to conclude that continuation of the existing system is preferable to allowing Libyan voters to overturn it.

The bitterest irony concerns nepotism. Libyans rose in 2011 against a political order in which the state had become inseparable from Qaddafi, his sons and the networks surrounding them. Yet power in eastern Libya has become increasingly concentrated not merely around Khalifa Haftar but around the Haftar family. His son Saddam Haftar has risen to become deputy commander of the eastern forces and increasingly represents that establishment internationally. Instead of building institutions capable of surviving Khalifa Haftar, eastern Libya risks building a succession mechanism capable of perpetuating his family. Western Libya has developed a different but similarly troubling phenomenon through the growing political and commercial influence of networks associated with the Dbeibah family.

Libya thus risks completing a grotesque historical circle. It overthrew one family-centred authoritarian state only to produce multiple family-centred political, commercial and military fiefdoms. This is not a restoration of Qaddafi’s Jamahiriya. In one respect it could prove worse: Qaddafi presided over one personalised state; Libya now risks acquiring several personalized centres of power competing over the resources of the same country.

None of this can be understood without oil. Libya possesses immense petroleum wealth shared among a population of only several million people. That should provide the foundations for one of Africa’s most prosperous states. Instead, it helps finance political dysfunction. A government dependent upon taxation must, however imperfectly, worry about the citizens from whom it collects revenue. Libya receives enormous income from selling hydrocarbons abroad. Control the institutions through which that money flows and you gain influence over budgets, salaries, subsidies, contracts, appointments and patronage.

How do we build a prosperous Libyan state?

The central political question therefore risks ceasing to be “How do we build a prosperous Libyan state?” and becoming “Who gets access to the money generated by the Libyan state?” Oil makes capturing the government extraordinarily profitable. When political survival can be financed through distributing oil rents, accountability to citizens becomes less urgent. Libya’s greatest economic blessing becomes its political curse.

The international community also deserves uncomfortable scrutiny. Western governments proclaim their commitment to elections, while the United Nations continues producing roadmaps towards elected and unified institutions. The language remains impeccable. But governments reveal their priorities through behaviour rather than communiqués.

Europe wants Libya to restrain migration across the Mediterranean. Washington wants counterterrorism cooperation, regional stability and limits on Russian influence. Italy wants energy and migration cooperation. Turkey, Egypt, France, Russia and the Gulf states pursue their own strategic and commercial interests. Oil must continue flowing, migration must be contained, jihadists controlled, and geopolitical competitors kept in check.

And if the men capable of delivering these things happen to be authoritarian, dynastic or embedded in systems of patronage? Increasingly, the practical answer appears to be: We can work with them.

Haftar has understood this particularly well. The more he presents himself not merely as a Libyan military strongman but as a regional security broker—cooperating against terrorism, becoming useful in the Sahel, controlling territory and offering stability—the more the question in foreign capitals changes. Instead of asking, “By what democratic authority does this man exercise power?”, policymakers begin asking, “Can this man deliver what we need?”

Democracy in question

That is often how democratic principles die in international diplomacy: not through one dramatic betrayal, but through a thousand pragmatic accommodations. Democracy moves quietly from objective, to aspiration, to talking point.

Yet it would be wrong to conclude that Libyans themselves have rejected democracy. When municipal elections have been permitted, Libyans have demonstrated a willingness to participate, while consultations have repeatedly produced demands for elections, unified institutions and accountable government. The tragedy may therefore not be that Libyans no longer want democracy, but that they increasingly believe nobody will allow democracy to change anything.

That is more dangerous, because frustration eventually becomes exhaustion. After enough failed roadmaps, postponed elections, rival governments, parliaments, militias, foreign interventions and political conferences, ordinary citizens stop asking constitutional questions. They ask whether the electricity will stay on, whether salaries will be paid, whether their children can find work and whether they can return home safely at night. When politics reaches that point, authoritarianism no longer requires enthusiasm. It requires fatigue.

Then comes one of the oldest bargains in politics: give us obedience and we will give you stability. After fifteen years of turmoil, such a proposition inevitably becomes more attractive. Some Libyans remember a country that, whatever the brutality and absurdities of Qaddafi’s rule, possessed a single government, a recognizable state and a degree of everyday predictability. That does not mean they want Qaddafi back. It means that when democracy becomes associated with disorder, corruption and political impotence, authoritarianism can acquire the appearance of competence simply by comparison.

That may ultimately prove the greatest failure of post-2011 Libya: not merely that democracy failed to arrive, but that those who captured the transition could succeed in discrediting democracy without ever seriously trying it.

Libyans demanded dignity, accountability, political participation and an end to arbitrary, personalized government in 2011. What risks emerging instead is a system of family networks, armed patronage, oil rents, corruption, foreign sponsorship, unelected institutions and indefinitely postponed elections.

C

hinese President Xi Jinping arrived in the United States for talks with President Donald Trump on Wednesday, as the war involving Iran has reshaped global energy markets and strengthened Beijing’s position as an increasingly influential player in the international energy system.

Trump is expected to press Xi over China’s energy relationship with Iran during the meeting in Washington. However, analysts and energy executives cited in the report see limited incentives for Beijing to change course, arguing that the conflict has in several ways strengthened China’s economic and strategic leverage.

The war has pushed global energy and commodity prices higher, with oil trading at around $100 a barrel on Tuesday. At the same time, China has expanded exports of clean-energy technologies to countries facing energy insecurity and has relied on its substantial crude oil reserves to cushion the effects of market disruptions.

Erica Downs, a former CIA energy analyst and current senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, described China as a major beneficiary of the crisis. She said Beijing had managed the disruption relatively well and was unlikely to feel significant pressure to respond to US requests.

The developments come as Trump’s administration seeks to persuade China to reduce its energy ties with Iran and Russia while increasing purchases of American oil and natural gas.

Trump seeks to pressure Beijing over Iran and energy

A senior White House official said the administration would tell Xi that continuing to do business with Iran was unacceptable and that there would be consequences.

The issue is particularly significant because China has been a major buyer of Iranian and Venezuelan crude. Trump has taken measures that have made it more difficult and expensive for Beijing to obtain oil from those sources, while also suggesting that the United States could take control of Venezuelan oil.

Trump told world leaders at the United Nations on Tuesday that the United States now had a primary claim to Venezuela’s oil, adding: “To the victor belong the spoils.”

At the same time, Washington hopes to encourage Beijing to rely less heavily on Russia for oil and gas and return to the US energy market.

China has sharply reduced direct purchases of US natural gas since Trump imposed tariffs on Chinese imports last year. It also stopped buying US crude oil, although Chinese purchases of fuel from US refiners have increased in recent months.

The Trump administration had previously argued that tariffs on Chinese goods could encourage Beijing to loosen its control over critical minerals and persuade Chinese companies to purchase more American energy.

So far, however, those efforts have produced limited results. An LNG industry executive cited in the report said there was little expectation that the Xi-Trump talks would generate a major breakthrough.

The meeting is also taking place against the backdrop of a war that has absorbed much of the White House’s attention. Philip Luck, an international business analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a former State Department official, said the administration appeared to have had limited time to prepare for the summit because of the ongoing crisis.

Despite the geopolitical importance of the meeting, energy executives and analysts interviewed for the report did not expect major substantive developments.

China expands its role as an energy superpower

The conflict has nevertheless highlighted the scale of China’s influence over global energy markets.

China is the world’s largest oil importer and has used its purchasing power to build substantial crude reserves. It has also become a major regional supplier of petroleum products, meaning changes in Chinese exports or domestic demand can influence energy markets well beyond its borders.

The war has also accelerated China’s role in clean-energy markets. Chinese companies are exporting solar panels and electric vehicles to countries seeking alternatives to vulnerable supplies of Middle Eastern oil and gas.

Experts cited in the report said this combination of conventional energy reserves, petroleum exports and clean-energy manufacturing is giving Beijing new forms of leverage in the global energy economy.

Downs said the perception in China is that energy security is increasingly shifting away from control over physical resources such as oil and coal toward control over energy technologies. China’s dominant position in the manufacturing of many clean-energy products puts it in a strong position to meet its own needs while supplying other countries.

Ethan Zindler, head of country and policy research at BloombergNEF and a former US Treasury Department official, said the war was boosting Chinese clean-energy exports into developing markets.

In regions such as sub-Saharan Africa, where many countries are still working to expand electricity access, Chinese solar technology can provide an immediate alternative to dependence on imported fossil fuels.

The developments could therefore have consequences extending well beyond the immediate US-China dispute. As countries seek greater energy security following disruptions in global oil and gas supplies, China is increasingly positioned to provide both energy products and the technologies needed for electrification.

For Washington, that presents a difficult backdrop to the Xi-Trump meeting. The United States is seeking to use trade and energy policy to influence Beijing’s relationship with Iran, Russia and global commodity markets. Yet the Iran war has simultaneously strengthened China’s position in areas ranging from oil reserves and petroleum products to solar panels and electric vehicles.

The result is a US-China meeting taking place at a moment when the global energy landscape is changing rapidly, with China gaining influence through both traditional energy markets and the expanding clean-energy economy.

(Source: Politico)

T

he United States plans to establish two new military bases in Greenland under an agreement expected to be signed with Denmark and Greenland at the United Nations General Assembly in New York on Tuesday, according to people familiar with the matter.

The planned sites are Narsarsuaq in southern Greenland and Mestersvig on the island’s east coast, where a military outpost is currently used by Denmark’s Sirius Dog Sled Patrol, a special forces unit. The plans would expand the US military presence in Greenland at a time of heightened strategic interest in the Arctic and months after President Donald Trump repeatedly called for greater US control over the semi-autonomous Danish territory.

Three people familiar with the matter told Reuters that the agreement would allow Washington to re-establish a military presence at Narsarsuaq, the location of the former Bluie West One base that the United States closed in the 1950s. Narsarsuaq, once an important US military installation, now has only a few dozen residents.

Two of the sources said Mestersvig would also be included in the agreement. The remote site is currently associated with the Sirius Dog Sled Patrol, which operates in Greenland’s vast northeastern territory.

The three governments are expected to sign the agreement at 10:30 a.m. Eastern Time on Tuesday. The full text has not been made public, and the people familiar with the negotiations said some details could remain unresolved until the signing.

Neither the Danish nor Greenlandic governments immediately responded to Reuters requests for comment. A White House spokesperson also declined to provide details, referring instead to an earlier statement saying the agreement would “secure and defend the security of Greenland and the United States.”

Agreement follows months of tension over Greenland

The proposed bases come after months of political and diplomatic pressure from Trump, who has repeatedly argued that the United States should control Greenland. At various points, Trump declined to rule out using economic or military pressure to acquire the territory.

Greenland remains part of the Kingdom of Denmark but has extensive self-government. Trump’s demands have been overwhelmingly rejected by Greenlanders, according to polling cited by Reuters.

The US president’s comments, particularly during a period of heightened pressure in January, generated a diplomatic crisis within NATO and prompted Denmark and Greenland to seek negotiations with Washington. The talks were aimed at reducing tensions while addressing US concerns about Arctic security.

Denmark has presented the new agreement as part of a broader NATO-based approach to security in the region. According to the Danish government, the arrangement would place Arctic security within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization rather than leaving responsibility solely to Washington and Copenhagen.

The agreement could therefore represent a shift in how Denmark and its allies approach the military security of Greenland, while also allowing the United States to strengthen its presence in an area that has become increasingly important for strategic and defence planning.

Greenland’s geographic position between North America and Europe has long given it military significance. Its location also makes the territory important for monitoring activity across the North Atlantic and Arctic regions.

During the Cold War, the United States maintained a much larger military footprint in Greenland. According to Reuters, Washington operated 17 military installations there and had more than 10,000 personnel stationed on the island.

That presence declined substantially after the Cold War. Today, the United States operates Pituffik Space Base, formerly known as Thule Air Base, which has around 150 US military personnel.

New bases could expand US arctic presence

The return to Narsarsuaq would mark a significant development because the site previously served as an important US military facility. Bluie West One was established during World War Two and later became part of the American military network across Greenland before closing in the 1950s.

Mestersvig, meanwhile, is located in a remote part of eastern Greenland and has traditionally supported Denmark’s military and surveillance activities through the Sirius Dog Sled Patrol.

The planned US facilities would therefore add to the existing American military infrastructure while working alongside Danish and NATO capabilities in the Arctic.

The agreement also comes as Arctic security has gained greater importance among NATO members. The region has become increasingly significant for military surveillance, transportation routes and competition among major powers.

For Denmark and Greenland, the agreement could provide a framework for strengthening security cooperation with the United States while keeping Greenland within the Danish realm and the wider NATO defence structure.

For Washington, expanding its military footprint would increase its ability to operate in Greenland and monitor developments in the Arctic without requiring a transfer of sovereignty.

The plans nevertheless remain politically sensitive because they follow Trump’s campaign to increase US influence over Greenland. His earlier statements about acquiring the territory strained relations with Denmark and raised concerns among Greenlandic political leaders.

The new agreement instead appears to focus on military cooperation and security arrangements rather than any change in sovereignty. Its final terms, however, were not yet publicly available at the time of the Reuters report.

If signed as expected, the agreement would represent a notable expansion of US military access in Greenland and a return to locations that once formed part of Washington’s Cold War defence network. It would also underline the growing strategic importance of the Arctic to the United States, Denmark and NATO.

(Source: Reuters)

I

srael’s practices of forced displacement and even extermination in Gaza have created a rift in the architecture of security and memory that post-World War II Europe constructed. This rupture clearly signifies a crisis. Rather than framing this crisis as a mere foreign policy divergence, it is important to characterize it as the collapse of the moral exceptionalism generated through the absolutization of the suffering of the Holocaust. The diplomatic protest process currently led by Spain and Ireland takes the form of a rebellion by the periphery and postcolonial memory against the hegemony of memory represented by the center—Germany and the United Kingdom. Consequently, with this protest, the capital of victimhood has been exhausted, and the colonial codes within Western rationality have begun to be deciphered.

The most significant case illustrating this is the images of destruction emerging from Gaza. These images not only triggered a diplomatic fault line in Western capitals but also led to the fracturing of the most fundamental pillar of memory upon which modern European identity was built. The scene unfolding is less about ceasefire negotiations or humanitarian crisis management and more about the collapse of the perception of “moral exceptionalism”—the transformation of the trauma of the Holocaust into a political shield. This collapse lays bare just how fragile and internally fragmented Western rationality—which was assumed to be a homogeneous whole—truly is.

Moral exceptionalism and the capital of victimhood

With the end of World War II, the Israeli state apparatus converted its unique “capital of victimhood” into a pragmatic geopolitical strategy within the international community. At the root of this capital of victimhood lies the Holocaust perpetrated by Nazi Germany. Undoubtedly, the Holocaust was an organized and bureaucratic machine of extermination in human history. However, rather than interpreting this historical tragedy as a universal warning against fascism, Israel’s official political discourse has transformed it into a functional diplomatic shield that legitimizes every military move by the state and disregards international law.

The danger articulated by sociologist Michael Rothberg lies precisely here. As he puts it, when memory is constructed as a zero-sum game, the recognition of one suffering necessitates the invisibilization of all other sufferings. This zero-sum regime of memory, which Israel has imposed not only on the West but on nearly the entire world, has placed the Jewish Holocaust in an absolute and incomparable position. In this process, the dispossession of Palestinians and the violence they have endured have been reduced to an ontologically secondary and insignificant detail. Another manifestation of the effort to render this genocide absolute and incomparable was Europe’s granting of the privilege to Israel to operate beyond the bounds of the law in order to suppress its own sense of guilt. The entire spectrum of practices currently taking place in Gaza—based on dispossession, violence, displacement, and annihilation—is being carried out in connection with this privilege.

The illusion of Western state rationality: Germany and the United Kingdom

The case of Germany serves as the most jarring laboratory for this privilege-based normative blindness. Without distinguishing Israel’s security from its own state rationality, Germany is attempting to atone for its past experience of the Holocaust through its silence today. To such an extent that German bureaucratic rationality, in an effort to free itself from the burden of its negative historical legacy, has become incapable of naming the violence Israel is perpetrating in Gaza. Its reflexive criminalization of pro-Palestinian protests in the streets as anti-Semitism should not be interpreted as an authoritarian securitization practice. This situation amounts to the center’s preservation of its own hegemony of memory. For Germany, criticizing Israel would mean the collapse of its moral foundation. Thus, preserving the uniqueness of the Holocaust paradoxically necessitates turning a blind eye to the crimes being committed today.

Germany serves as the normative shield of the regime of moral exceptionalism. Britain, on the other hand, is the imperial architect of this regime. The British state mind approaches the issue not so much through the lens of Holocaust guilt but rather through a colonial continuity inherited from the 1917 Balfour Declaration and the Mandate for Palestine. The British government’s current stance—suspending the rule of law in the face of the destruction in Gaza—is a reflex to protect the center’s own imperial legacy. For this reason, the United Kingdom occupies the center of moral exceptionalism in terms of imperial architecture.

Spain and Ireland: The postcolonial uprising of the periphery

Germany’s normative position and Britain’s imperial architectural position are what tie the issue together precisely at this point. The rift taking shape in Europe regarding this issue originates not from the center but from the historical and geographical “periphery.” The fact that Spain, Ireland, Norway, and Slovenia have recognized the State of Palestine and adopted the harshest diplomatic language in modern European history against Israel does not signify a sudden awakening of human rights consciousness.

Ireland, in particular, carries within its national memory the trauma of British colonialism and forced displacement from its lands. The fundamental factor that makes Ireland’s rebellion within Europe so jarring is directly linked to Britain’s imperial background. Indeed, when the Dublin government looks at Gaza, it sees the colonial geopolitical order that its former master, Britain, established in the Middle East and continues to support to this day. Consequently, an Irish diplomat’s assessment of Gaza is built not on the victims of World War II, but on the recognition of a 21st-century prototype of 19th-century colonial logic—a displaced people and an occupying power.

Although in a different way than Ireland, Spain has a political fabric shaped by confronting the aftershocks of the Franco dictatorship, the civil war, and ultimately its own imperial past, bearing the traces of the leftist political tradition and the post-ETA disarmament processes. With such a political fabric, Spain resonates on the international stage as the most significant voice from the periphery. Consequently, from the perspective of the Madrid administration, events at the Al-Aqsa Mosque or in Gaza enable it to take a leading role in taking significant steps to expose the hypocrisy of the exceptional protection Europe grants to Israel.

These countries, in Rothberg’s words, are operating the mechanism of “Multidirectional Memory.” These countries do not deny the Holocaust, but they openly rebel against its use as a cloak to cover up today’s colonial violence, the apartheid regime, demographic engineering, and the massacre in Gaza.

G

ermany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) emerged as the strongest party in a state election in northeastern Germany on Sunday, according to voting projections, dealing a major setback to Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s conservative party and increasing pressure on his coalition government.

The AfD was projected to win 38.3% of the vote in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, narrowly ahead of the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), which was projected at 35.4%, according to ARD public television. Merz’s conservative bloc, meanwhile, stood at 4.9%, below the 5% threshold required to enter the state parliament.

The result represented the worst performance by Merz’s mainstream conservative party in a German state election since the end of World War Two, according to Reuters. Merz described the outcome as “a disaster” but said he intended to remain in office and continue pursuing his reform program.

The result came after the AfD had already achieved a major breakthrough earlier this month by finishing first in Saxony-Anhalt. The party also leads national opinion polls, although Germany’s other major parties have so far refused to enter governing coalitions with it.

The latest vote has therefore renewed debate over the long-standing political “firewall” designed to keep the AfD out of government.

AfD gains momentum as Merz defends reform agenda

The election results added to challenges facing Merz, who entered office last year promising reforms aimed at reviving Germany’s sluggish economy. His government has struggled to win broad public support amid criticism of pension, tax and healthcare reforms, as well as rising household costs.

Marcel Fratzscher, president of the Berlin-based DIW economic research institute, told Reuters that the results could make it more difficult for the federal government to build political support for fundamental reforms.

He warned that if governing parties maintain their existing political red lines, Germany could face greater political paralysis and continued economic weakness, while the AfD could benefit further ahead of the 2029 federal election.

Merz, however, rejected suggestions that the election result should lead to a retreat from his reform programme. He argued that Germany needed determination and patience to address its economic problems.

He described the reforms as a response to what he called the growing appeal of authoritarianism in German society.

In Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, SPD state premier Manuela Schwesig also campaigned by criticising both the AfD and the federal government’s policies. Schwesig said opposition to Germany’s financial and military support for Ukraine was an important factor behind the AfD’s support in the state.

She also pointed to continued interest among some voters in restoring energy links through the Nord Stream pipelines, which transported Russian gas to Germany before being damaged in explosions in 2022.

German Vice-Chancellor Lars Klingbeil, who leads the SPD, meanwhile signalled that the government should pay greater attention to voters’ concerns, including issues surrounding pension reforms.

The election campaign was also shaped by economic pressures. Voters in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania highlighted rising living costs, energy prices and household financial difficulties as major concerns.

Berlin vote highlights wider political fragmentation

The elections also brought significant changes in Berlin, where the far-left Die Linke emerged as the leading party in projections.

Die Linke was polling at 25.3%, while Merz’s conservatives had fallen to 19%. The AfD also increased its support to 16.3% in the traditionally liberal capital.

The result marked the first time Die Linke had topped the vote in Berlin. The party has campaigned on policies including nationalizing housing held by corporate landlords and imposing rent controls.

The simultaneous gains by both the far right and far left highlighted the increasingly fragmented political landscape facing Germany’s established parties.

The AfD’s latest state-level success follows its strong performance in Saxony-Anhalt on September 6, where it came close to securing an outright majority. The party has sought to capitalise on concerns over migration, energy policy and the economic situation while advocating tougher measures to deport foreigners who have no legal right to remain in Germany.

It also supports restoring energy ties with Russia and leaving the euro, positions that have helped transform the party from a fringe eurosceptic movement into one of Germany’s most prominent political forces.

The party’s rise has intensified debate over whether the established parties can continue to exclude it from governing coalitions while maintaining support among voters who increasingly back the AfD.

For Merz, Sunday’s results add to the political difficulties confronting his government. Despite calling the outcome a “disaster,” he has made clear that he intends to remain chancellor and press ahead with his reform agenda.

The elections therefore leave Germany facing a combination of economic pressure, growing political fragmentation and an increasingly prominent far-right opposition as the country moves toward the 2029 federal election.

(Source: Reuters)

A

n observation that the world is undergoing a profound transformation across the political, economic, technological, and security spectrum has become a cliché. Yet the scale and nature of the transformation underway today extend well beyond a conventional geopolitical realignment where merely existing power balances are redistributed. What is changing simultaneously is far more fundamental: the rules governing the international system, the centers of gravity, the meaning of security, patterns of economic interdependence, and even the nature of war and conflict itself.

States continue to compete through conventional military capabilities. However, technology, energy, trade, finance, intelligence, information, and strategic communication have increasingly become integral instruments of national power. At the same time, the contours of the emerging order will not be determined by great powers alone. Regional actors will also play a determinant role to shape this order through their political will, economic capacity, asymmetric capabilities, military strength, diplomatic networks, and ability to build partnerships.

For countries with a potential to be a regional power, therefore, the fundamental question is no longer simply how to withstand the consequences of global transformation. It is how to acquire sufficient capacity and strategic agency to influence its direction and help shape its outcomes. This is not merely a matter of strategic preference. It is an imperative.

Creating strategic space

Türkiye’s strategic orientation in recent years should be understood precisely against this backdrop. Rather than positioning itself as a state that merely adapts to changes determined elsewhere, Türkiye has increasingly sought to develop the capacity to influence the environment in which those changes unfold.

This orientation is visible across a broad spectrum of national policy—from foreign and security policy to defense-industrial development, energy security, diplomatic activism, and domestic political stability. Two developments are particularly illustrative of this strategic direction: the National Solidarity and Social Integration process pursued under the objective of a “Terror Free Türkiye,” and the Türkiye-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Joint Defense Agreement, referred to as the Mecca Agreement.

At home, Türkiye is seeking to eliminate the structural security challenges that have constrained its political, economic, and social potential. Abroad, it is simultaneously developing bilateral and multilateral partnerships designed to strengthen its position in a rapidly changing regional environment and to contribute to the formation of a more capable and resilient regional security architecture.

Developments across Türkiye’s immediate neighborhood have demonstrated that terrorism, irregular migration, energy security, border security, economic stability, and regional order can no longer be treated as separate policy issues. They constitute an interconnected security environment. Türkiye has therefore sought to create greater strategic space by employing the full spectrum of its national capabilities—from diplomacy and intelligence to military power and defense-industrial capacity. Its regional approach has gradually evolved from a conception of security centered primarily on protecting its borders toward one focused increasingly on shaping the security environment beyond them.

The critical point here is that strategic power is not driven from military capability alone. What matters is the ability to translate capabilities into political outcomes through the combination of power, political will, and diplomatic capacity. In Türkiye’s recent strategic approach, the interaction among these three elements has become increasingly visible.

A Türkiye free of terrorism

The objective of a “Terror Free Türkiye” can be understood as a natural extension of this broader strategic approach. The National Solidarity and Social Integration process should therefore not be viewed solely as a security policy designed to dismantle the PKK terrorist organization or eliminate an armed threat. Its strategic ambition is considerably broader. It seeks to strengthen social cohesion, reinforce the bonds of citizenship, and unleash Türkiye’s political, economic, and social potential from the long-term constraints imposed by terrorism and security-related instability.

The significance of the “Terror Free Türkiye” vision lies precisely in its ability to bring security and social integration within a single strategic framework. The Law on National Solidarity and the Strengthening of Social Cohesion, adopted by the General Assembly of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye, should likewise be understood within this broader political and strategic context. It is not simply a legal instrument; it forms part of a wider effort to strengthen the foundations of national resilience.

In the contemporary understanding of national security, state power can no longer be measured solely by weapons systems, economic output, military personnel, or territorial capacity. Social resilience, political stability, institutional strength, and the existence of a shared sense of national purpose are equally important components of national power.

This is particularly significant in an era characterized by hybrid threats, disinformation, social polarization, proxy conflicts, and attempts to exploit societal divisions. Under such conditions, social cohesion is not merely a domestic policy objective. It is itself a component of national security. This creates a direct strategic link between domestic security and foreign policy.

The traditional distinction between internal and external security is increasingly blurred. Domestic stability and foreign policy are no longer separate spheres governed by entirely different dynamics. They form an interconnected strategic matrix in which developments in one domain directly affect the capacity available in the other.

For Türkiye, eliminating the terrorist threat and strengthening social cohesion at home, while simultaneously contributing to the shaping of regional security architectures abroad, are therefore interconnected components of a single strategic vision.

The resources, political attention, and strategic energy consumed by terrorism can instead be redirected toward economic development, technological advancement, social resilience, and foreign policy. In this sense, a “Türkiye Free of Terrorism” is not simply a domestic security objective; it is a foundation for greater strategic autonomy.

A state can exercise greater maneuverability in foreign policy only when it possesses a sustainable foundation of security, stability, and social cohesion at home.

From security consumer to security producer

This brings us to the second dimension of Türkiye’s emerging strategic posture: the transition from unilaterally producing security to building shared security capabilities.

The defense and security cooperation Türkiye has developed with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, alongside the domestic National Solidarity and Social Integration process, should be viewed within this broader framework. The three countries possess capabilities that are, in many respects, complementary. Türkiye contributes a sophisticated defense industry, extensive military experience, operational capabilities, technological know-how, and decades of NATO experience. Pakistan brings significant military capabilities, strategic geographic positioning, and established expertise in defense production and security affairs. Saudi Arabia contributes substantial economic and financial capacity, energy resources, and considerable strategic influence in the Gulf and wider Arab world. Taken together, these capabilities can form the foundations of a broader and more resilient regional security ecosystem.

The emerging model also has the potential to transcend the traditional concept of an alliance. The security challenges of the twenty-first century are increasingly multidimensional and interconnected. Terrorism, proxy warfare, missile and UAV threats, maritime security, energy security, cyberattacks, the protection of critical infrastructure, economic vulnerabilities, and emerging technological threats cannot be effectively addressed through military capabilities alone—or by any single state acting in isolation.

The regional security architecture of the future will therefore depend increasingly on multi-layered and complementary partnerships encompassing defense, intelligence, technology, energy, cybersecurity, critical infrastructure, and economic resilience. Türkiye’s strategic opportunity in this environment is to position itself not merely as a country that consumes security, but as a country capable of producing and exporting security capabilities.

Türkiye’s growing defense-industrial capacity is central to this transformation. The defense industry is no longer simply a sector designed to meet the military requirements of the state. It has become an increasingly important instrument of foreign policy, technological development, diplomatic influence, economic power, and strategic autonomy.

A country’s ability to meet a substantial proportion of its defense requirements domestically reduces its vulnerability to external constraints during periods of crisis. At the same time, defense-industrial capacity changes the nature of its relationships with other countries. A state that can provide advanced defense technologies, establish joint production arrangements, transfer know-how, and develop long-term industrial partnerships possesses instruments of influence that extend well beyond conventional diplomacy.

Türkiye’s defense-industrial rise should therefore not be interpreted merely as a technological or economic achievement. From the perspective of regional security, it represents a strategic lever through which Türkiye can share capabilities with partners, develop joint production ecosystems, deepen institutional ties, and transform short-term security cooperation into durable strategic partnerships. This perspective also highlights the broader geopolitical significance of the Türkiye-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan axis.

Türkiye occupies a pivotal position connecting Europe, the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Pakistan is strategically positioned at the intersection of South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Saudi Arabia lies at the center of the Gulf and occupies a pivotal position within the Arab world.

The convergence of these three countries in the security domain therefore has implications extending well beyond their bilateral or trilateral relations. It has the potential to establish strategic connectivity between different geographic theaters.

The fact that the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement is open to the participation of other regional countries further strengthens this potential. Such an approach can enhance collective resilience while creating a framework through which regional actors themselves assume greater responsibility for their security environment. For this reason, the emerging cooperation should not be interpreted simply as a conventional defense arrangement among three states.

Viewed from a broader strategic perspective, it can potentially contribute to the emergence of a new belt of security and strategic cooperation linking Eurasia and the Middle East, as well as South Asia and the Gulf. When this external dimension is considered together with the objective of a “Terror Free Türkiye,” a striking strategic symmetry emerges between Türkiye’s domestic and foreign policy.