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enezuela’s devastating twin earthquakes have rapidly evolved from a humanitarian catastrophe into the most serious political challenge facing interim President Delcy Rodriguez, as criticism mounts over the government’s handling of rescue efforts and long-standing weaknesses in the country’s emergency response system.

The twin earthquakes, which struck on June 24, have killed nearly 1,500 people, left tens of thousands missing and caused widespread destruction across parts of the country, particularly in the coastal state of La Guaira and the capital Caracas. Thousands remain displaced as emergency workers and volunteers continue searching through collapsed buildings for survivors.

While the initial public reaction focused on grief and shock, frustration has increasingly been directed at the government’s response, with residents, aid workers and analysts accusing authorities of reacting too slowly to one of the country’s worst natural disasters in decades.

For Rodriguez, who assumed the presidency following the removal of former President Nicolas Maduro earlier this year, the crisis represents the first major test of her administration.

In the immediate aftermath of the earthquakes, Rodriguez declared a national state of emergency, expressed condolences to victims’ families and appealed for international assistance.

However, critics argue that official rescue operations have failed to keep pace with the scale of destruction.

Residents from some of the worst-affected communities say they have relied largely on neighbors and volunteers rather than government emergency teams to search for trapped victims.

Mairet Perez, travelling from the Colombian border carrying relief supplies for relatives in La Guaira, described communities digging through rubble with little official assistance.

“Everyone in La Guaira is searching and digging out people with their bare hands,” she said. “And the government? What have they done? Nothing.”

She said some neighborhoods had still not been reached by government rescue teams days after the disaster.

The criticism has been echoed by political analysts who argue that years of economic decline, institutional weakness and underinvestment have left Venezuela poorly equipped to respond to a major emergency.

Phil Gunson, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, said the country’s emergency response capacity had deteriorated significantly over the past decade.

“The government response is anything from totally non-existent to, at best, completely inadequate,” Gunson said.

According to analysts, years of economic crisis, corruption, sanctions and declining public investment have weakened hospitals, emergency services, water systems and electricity networks, limiting the state’s ability to mount an effective disaster response.

International aid fills critical gaps

As domestic rescue efforts struggled, international assistance quickly became essential.

More than 20 foreign search-and-rescue teams have arrived in Venezuela, including personnel from the United States, Spain, Qatar and several Latin American countries.

The United States has deployed military aircraft carrying humanitarian supplies, medical equipment and specialist rescue personnel, while foreign governments have pledged additional financial and technical assistance.

Nevertheless, observers argue that the influx of international aid has also highlighted shortcomings within Venezuela’s own institutions.

Reports have emerged of delays affecting foreign rescue teams entering the country. Colombian firefighters were reportedly held for several hours at Caracas airport before receiving permission to proceed to affected areas.

Authorities have also restricted access to several disaster zones, requiring journalists and humanitarian organizations to receive official authorization before entering.

In some communities, frustrated residents reportedly broke through security cordons in an effort to begin rescue operations themselves.

Social media has also amplified criticism, with videos showing volunteers using basic tools to search collapsed buildings while appealing for additional equipment such as helmets, excavators and medical supplies.

The relative absence of Venezuela’s military from front-line rescue operations has drawn particular attention.

Civil society organizations noted that while soldiers have largely been deployed to regulate access into affected areas, many citizens expected a larger military role in search-and-rescue operations.

Some Venezuelans contrasted the limited deployment with the heavy military presence witnessed during political protests following the disputed 2024 presidential election.

Aid organizations also warn that previous legal restrictions imposed on nongovernmental organizations continue to complicate relief operations, as many community groups were weakened or forced to suspend activities in recent years.

Political consequences may extend beyond the disaster

Beyond the immediate humanitarian crisis, analysts believe the earthquakes could reshape Venezuela’s political landscape.

Rodriguez inherited power only six months ago after Maduro’s removal during a US-backed operation that dramatically altered the country’s political trajectory.

Although her administration has sought closer cooperation with Washington and international partners, Rodriguez remains a divisive figure because of her long association with the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) and her previous role as Maduro’s deputy.

Political scientist Javier Corrales of Amherst College said many Venezuelans continue to associate Rodriguez with the country’s prolonged economic collapse and institutional decline.

“She is seen as part of the problem,” Corrales said, noting that even some within the ruling party question her political direction following closer cooperation with the United States.

The earthquakes have also renewed scrutiny of Venezuela’s infrastructure.

Civil engineers note that although seismic building regulations were strengthened following the devastating 1967 Caracas earthquake, enforcement has often been inconsistent.

Experts argue that weak inspections, poor urban planning and substandard construction practices contributed to the collapse of numerous residential buildings during last week’s disaster.

Gunson also suggested that large-scale public housing programs developed under the governments of Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro may have left thousands living in buildings constructed below acceptable engineering standards.

For many survivors, the disaster has reopened wounds from previous natural disasters, with some families once again losing homes rebuilt after earlier floods and landslides.

Despite growing criticism, Rodriguez has continued touring affected communities while promising that reconstruction will begin as quickly as possible.

Her administration insists emergency operations remain ongoing and has pledged to coordinate reconstruction efforts alongside international partners.

Analysts caution that the political consequences of the disaster remain uncertain.

Natural disasters have historically transformed political fortunes, either strengthening governments that respond effectively or accelerating public dissatisfaction where responses are viewed as inadequate.

Some experts believe the influx of international aid could provide Rodriguez with an opportunity to demonstrate competent leadership if reconstruction proceeds transparently and efficiently.

Others warn that any perception of corruption, political favoritism or poor management could deepen existing public distrust.

For now, rescue workers continue searching through damaged neighborhoods as families await news of missing relatives.

While the immediate priority remains saving lives and assisting survivors, the earthquakes have also exposed the structural weaknesses that have accumulated over years of political and economic turmoil—weaknesses that now present Rodriguez with the defining challenge of her presidency.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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t least 32 people have been confirmed dead and around 700 injured after two powerful earthquakes struck Venezuela, causing widespread destruction in the capital Caracas and other parts of the country, according to authorities.

The twin quakes, measuring 7.2 and 7.5 in magnitude, hit less than a minute apart about 160 kilometers west of Caracas, triggering building collapses, damaging infrastructure and prompting fears that the final death toll could rise significantly as rescue efforts continue.

Emergency crews raced through the night to search for survivors trapped beneath the rubble of collapsed buildings. Images from Caracas showed rescue workers combing through debris while families gathered anxiously near disaster sites awaiting news of missing relatives.

Interim President Delcy Rodríguez said at least 32 people had been killed and hundreds injured, though officials cautioned that casualty figures remained preliminary.

Rescue efforts intensify

Search-and-rescue teams have been deployed across affected areas, with authorities focusing on collapsed residential buildings and heavily damaged neighborhoods.

Eyewitnesses described scenes of panic and devastation. One survivor in Caracas said residents struggled to escape amid dust clouds and falling debris.

“The scene was like a horror movie,” the survivor told Reuters, describing how people climbed over rubble to reach safety.

Several aftershocks have been recorded since the initial earthquakes, complicating rescue operations and raising concerns about further structural collapses.

Thousands of deaths feared

While official casualty figures remain relatively low so far, the U.S. Geological Survey’s Prompt Assessment of Global Earthquakes for Response (PAGER) system has warned that the eventual toll could be much higher.

According to updated USGS modeling, there is a 39% probability that fatalities could range between 1,000 and 10,000 people, and a 37% chance the death toll could reach between 10,000 and 100,000 if the most severely affected areas suffered extensive structural failures.

The agency also estimates economic losses equivalent to between 1% and 4% of Venezuela’s gross domestic product.

The United States announced it has activated a disaster assistance team and emergency task force to coordinate humanitarian support.

According to the U.S. State Department, Washington plans to send search-and-rescue specialists, medical supplies and humanitarian aid in cooperation with Venezuela’s interim government.

U.S. President Donald Trump said the earthquakes may have caused a “devastating number of deaths” and pledged American support for relief efforts.

Oil sector appears largely unaffected

Despite concerns about Venezuela’s energy infrastructure, authorities reported no immediate damage to major oil facilities.

Officials in Maracaibo, near the country’s main oil-producing region around Lake Maracaibo, said there were no reports of injuries or significant damage affecting petroleum operations.

Energy companies operating in Venezuela have begun assessing facilities, although industry sources warned that prolonged power outages could disrupt crude production in the coming days.

The disaster comes at a sensitive moment for Venezuela, which is undergoing a political transition following the removal of former President Nicolás Maduro earlier this year.

The country continues to face severe economic difficulties, with widespread poverty, fragile infrastructure and ongoing efforts to rebuild institutions after years of political turmoil.

As rescue operations continue and damage assessments expand, authorities fear the human and economic cost of the disaster could become one of the most severe natural catastrophes to strike Venezuela in decades.

(Source: Reuters)

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onservative candidate Abelardo De La Espriella has secured a narrow victory in Colombia’s presidential runoff election, defeating leftist Senator Ivan Cepeda in a closely contested race that signals a significant political shift in one of Latin America’s largest economies.

According to preliminary results released by Colombia’s national registrar on Sunday, De La Espriella won 49.66 percent of the vote, while Cepeda received 48.70 percent, leaving a margin of approximately 250,000 votes with nearly all ballots counted.

The result marks a major setback for the political movement of outgoing President Gustavo Petro, Colombia’s first left-wing president, whose reform agenda and security policies became central issues during the election campaign.

De La Espriella, a lawyer and political newcomer, campaigned on promises to crack down on crime, revive economic growth, reduce government spending and strengthen Colombia’s oil and gas sector.

Speaking to supporters in the coastal city of Barranquilla after the results were announced, he pledged to govern for all Colombians regardless of political affiliation.

“I will govern for all Colombians, for those who voted for me and for those who chose the other candidate,” De La Espriella told cheering supporters.

His campaign centered on criticism of Petro’s administration, which he accused of failing to contain armed groups, drug trafficking and insecurity in several regions of the country. He vowed to end negotiations with rebel and criminal organizations while expanding investment in the energy sector and reducing the size of the state by as much as 40 percent.

Despite advocating major economic reforms, De La Espriella has also promised to maintain some of Petro’s most popular social measures, including a 23 percent increase in the minimum wage and assistance programs for vulnerable communities.

The president-elect also received a congratulatory call from Donald Trump, who had publicly endorsed his candidacy during the campaign. The endorsement attracted attention both inside Colombia and internationally, highlighting growing ties between conservative political movements across the Americas.

Cepeda refuses to concede immediately

Although the preliminary count favored De La Espriella, Cepeda stopped short of immediately conceding defeat.

Addressing supporters in Bogotá, the veteran leftist politician said his campaign would await the completion of Colombia’s official verification process, which involves a ballot-by-ballot review supervised by judges and notaries.

Cepeda said his campaign was contesting results from roughly 33,000 ballot boxes out of more than 122,000 nationwide.

“We are open to dialogue; we are willing to reach agreements as long as they are respectful, genuine, and reflected in political actions that benefit the nation,” he told supporters.

While acknowledging the narrow margin, Cepeda emphasized that his supporters remain a powerful political force that must be represented in future national decisions.

The close result reflects a deeply polarized electorate divided between demands for stronger security measures and support for the social and environmental reforms introduced under Petro’s government.

De La Espriella will take office facing significant political and economic challenges.

Despite winning the presidency, he is expected to encounter resistance in Congress, where Cepeda’s coalition, the Historic Pact, remains one of the largest political blocs. No party controls a majority, meaning the incoming president will likely need to negotiate extensively to pass legislation.

Analysts say this reality may force De La Espriella to moderate some of his more ambitious proposals, particularly plans to dramatically reduce government spending and reshape state institutions.

The new administration must also address mounting public debt and sluggish economic growth while balancing demands for increased security spending.

Questions have additionally been raised about De La Espriella’s business record. During the campaign, Colombian media reported that several of his companies had been dissolved or faced financial difficulties, though his legal practice remained profitable. The president-elect rejected suggestions that these issues undermine his economic credentials.

Security concerns dominated the election

Security emerged as one of the defining issues of the campaign.

Many Colombians remain concerned about growing violence linked to drug trafficking organizations, dissident guerrilla factions and criminal networks operating in remote regions.

Supporters of De La Espriella argued that a tougher approach is necessary to restore public order and combat extortion, kidnappings and narcotics trafficking.

However, critics fear his confrontational rhetoric could undermine ongoing peace initiatives and potentially reignite broader conflict in a country that has endured more than six decades of violence involving left-wing insurgents, right-wing paramilitary groups and criminal organizations.

At Cepeda’s election-night gathering, several supporters voiced concerns that Colombia could move away from reconciliation efforts pursued in recent years.

Colombia’s election adds to a broader trend across Latin America, where several countries have recently elected conservative leaders.

Voters in countries including Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Bolivia and Ecuador have shifted toward right-leaning governments amid concerns about inflation, crime and economic performance.

More than 26.3 million Colombians participated in the runoff vote, representing a strong turnout among the country’s 41.4 million eligible voters. More than 427,000 voters submitted blank ballots, often viewed as a form of protest against both candidates.

While the final certified results are still pending, De La Espriella’s victory appears set to usher in a new political era for Colombia, one focused on security, economic liberalization and closer relations with conservative governments across the region.

(Source: Reuters)

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.S. President Donald Trump has endorsed Colombian presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriellaahead of this month’s runoff election, injecting an international dimension into a closely contested race that could shape future relations between Colombia and the United States.

In a social media post on Tuesday, Trump said the outcome of the election would be critical for Colombia’s future and its ties with Washington.

“The results of this election are very important to the future of Colombia and its relationship to the United States,” Trump wrote.

De la Espriella, a right-wing lawyer who has never held elected office, will face leftist senator Ivan Cepeda in a runoff after neither candidate secured an outright majority in the first round of voting.

According to official results, de la Espriella won nearly 44% of the vote, while Cepeda received just under 41%, setting up a highly competitive second-round contest later this month.

Security and crime dominate campaign

De la Espriella has built his campaign around promises to crack down on criminal organizations and armed groups that continue to operate across parts of Colombia.

His proposals include the construction of 10 large prisons and a tougher security strategy aimed at combating drug trafficking and organized crime.

The candidate’s rhetoric and law-and-order agenda have drawn comparisons to Nayib Bukele, whose aggressive anti-gang policies have earned both praise and criticism across Latin America.

In a video shared on social media following Trump’s endorsement, de la Espriella emphasized the importance of cooperation with Washington in addressing Colombia’s long-standing security challenges.

“The United States plays a crucial role in combating crime and narco-terrorism and in finally freeing Colombia from so much pain and violence,” he said.

The candidate also highlighted what he described as shared values with Trump, including support for democracy, freedom, and the rule of law.

Petro criticizes US intervention

Trump’s endorsement quickly drew criticism from Colombian President Gustavo Petro, whose relationship with the U.S. leader has often been strained.

Petro, Colombia’s first left-wing president, responded on social media Tuesday night, criticizing Trump’s public support for de la Espriella. While details of Petro’s comments were not immediately available, the intervention is likely to intensify debate over foreign influence in the election campaign.

The runoff will be closely watched across the region as voters choose between two sharply contrasting political visions.

De la Espriella has campaigned on a platform centered on security, stronger ties with the United States, and conservative policies. Cepeda, a veteran human rights advocate and longtime senator, has emphasized social reforms and continuity with parts of Petro’s political agenda.

The election outcome could have significant implications for Colombia’s domestic policies, its approach to security and drug trafficking, and its relationship with Washington, one of Bogotá’s most important international partners.

With polls indicating a tight race, both candidates are expected to intensify campaigning in the coming weeks as they seek to win over undecided voters before the decisive runoff vote.

(Source: Reuters)

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he US embargo constitutes a multi-layered pressure mechanism that is deepening Cuba’s energy crisis. Whilst companies transporting oil and insurance firms are reluctant to take risks due to sanctions on fuel supplies, the decline in subsidized oil flows from Venezuela is also exacerbating the crisis. At the same time, thermal power stations frequently go offline due to restricted access to US-origin technology and spare parts. Financial sanctions and Cuba’s inclusion on the list of ‘state sponsors of terrorism’ prevent international banks from facilitating payment transactions and hinder energy investments.

This situation is disrupting both fuel supply and infrastructure renewal, leading to widespread power cuts and economic disruptions across the country. The electricity crisis in Cuba is not merely a technical failure; it is a multi-layered “national security” issue that directly affects the country’s economic, diplomatic and social fabric.

Cuba’s electricity grid (SEN – Sistema Eléctrico Nacional) relies heavily on thermal power stations dating from the Soviet era, with ages ranging from 35 to 45 years. Due to a shortage of foreign currency, regular maintenance cannot be carried out on these stations, and spare parts cannot be procured. This situation leads to the power stations frequently being taken offline due to breakdowns. I would like to emphasize a crucial point here: the Antonio Guiteras power station in Matanzas and the Lidio Ramon Perez power station in Felton are the backbone of the system. Even the slightest technical fault at these sites plunges the entire island into darkness.

US intervention in Venezuela has ‘deeply’ shaken Cuba

Cuba relies heavily on heavy crude oil and diesel for its electricity generation. Whilst Venezuela under Nicolás Maduro met 40 per cent of the island’s oil needs, this support has come to a virtual standstill in recent times due to the pressure of US sanctions. As Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel has emphasized, with the exception of limited shipments from Mexico, virtually no fuel has been imported into the country since the start of the year. The US’s threat of sanctions against shipping companies transporting fuel to Cuba and the countries involved is causing deep social and economic fractures on the island.

Power cuts, known among the public as ‘Apagones’ and a major source of stress in daily life, virtually paralyzed the country in the second half of March. Between 16 and 23 March, as Cuba was plunged into total darkness, transport ground to a halt, life at petrol stations came to a standstill, and food supplies began to spoil rapidly due to the failure of refrigeration systems.

During this period, when the internet and communications were down, healthcare services were also severely disrupted. People are forced to cook their meals over wood fires because their stoves are not working. A tourist in Cuba describes the fuel shortage as follows: “If you want to order a pizza from outside, the delivery cost is twice the price of the pizza itself.” Consequently, bicycles are currently serving as the primary means of transport. The Cuban government, which has taken drastic measures such as changing working hours in public institutions and banning the use of air conditioning to tackle the energy crisis, is attempting to reduce consumption to a minimum.

However, the effects of the crisis have also spilled over into tourism; the suspension of flights by international airlines and the closure of hotels have plunged the tourism sector—the lifeblood of the economy—into a major crisis. Consequently, a population of 10 million faces collective punishment; this ‘energy embargo’ imposed by the US is forcing the island into scarcity and the regime into change.

Although Cuba’s population is officially reported to be approximately 11 million, it is estimated that the actual population has fallen to around 10 million due to the wave of emigration that has gained momentum in recent years. In particular, it is reported that in 2022 and 2023, hundreds of thousands of Cubans—equivalent to around 4–5 per cent of the population—left the country due to economic hardships and chronic power cuts. Whilst the migration of predominantly young and educated segments of the population is notable, the aging of the remaining population creates a more vulnerable situation, particularly for those requiring care during periods when the effects of the energy crisis are most acutely felt.

It is quite difficult to quantify the scale of the energy crisis in Cuba with a single ‘percentage’, as the situation changes by the hour. However, current technical data clearly reveals the critical level the crisis has reached. According to daily reports from the Cuban Electricity Union (UNE), approximately 30 to 45 per cent of the country’s total electricity demand cannot be met; this means that, particularly in the evenings, nearly half the country is left in the dark. As power cuts are implemented on a rotating basis, the entire population is left without electricity at certain times of the day.

The current situation is described as a ‘chronic shortage’ rather than the nationwide blackouts seen in the past. Whilst the capital, Havana, experiences relatively fewer outages due to its status as a tourism and administrative hub, people in regions such as Matanzas, Holguín and Santiago de Cuba can spend between 12 and 18 hours a day without electricity.

The lobby led by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s family background paints a different picture from what is widely known in the public eye. Rubio’s parents, Mario and Oriales Rubio, left Cuba not after the 1959 revolution, but in 1956—that is, before Fidel Castro came to power—and emigrated to the US for economic reasons. However, Rubio’s description of himself as a “child of exile” during the early stages of his political career led to the perception that his family had fled the country to escape the Castro regime.

This situation sparked controversy in 2011 when the Washington Post revealed that the family had emigrated before the revolution. Rubio responded to the criticism by stating that his family had returned to Cuba briefly after the revolution and had severed all ties with the country after witnessing the Castro regime. Rubio’s hardline stance towards Cuba is shaped not only by his family history but also by his ideological stance and domestic political dynamics.

In Florida politics, the Cuban immigrant voter base—particularly centered in Miami and possessing a strong anti-communist base—has effectively made a hardline stance against the Cuban regime a political necessity. It was reported in the press that this lobby donated 200 million dollars to help Donald Trump win the election. Rubio, however, defines the Cuban regime not merely as a political rival, but as an authoritarian structure posing a threat to democracy in the Western Hemisphere and to US security, and views the alliance forged with Venezuela and Nicaragua as a regional risk.

In line with this approach, Rubio—one of the most vocal opponents of the normalization process during the Obama era—played a key role in tightening sanctions against Cuba in the subsequent period. He also argues that, under the Helms-Burton Act—which forms the cornerstone of US policy—sanctions can only be lifted if there is political change in Cuba. Rubio maintains that lasting improvement is impossible without ‘new leadership’ and political reform in Cuba.

However, this strategy is sparking serious debate on the ground: the worsening fuel crisis, power cuts and difficulties accessing basic necessities are increasing the pressure on the population, whilst experts note that this could deepen the humanitarian crisis rather than the political one, and trigger new waves of migration.

The “deepest crisis” since the 1959 Revolution

Cuba is experiencing its most fragile period since the revolution due to the structural collapse of its food, medicine and energy systems. The current situation, historically compared to the 1990s “Special Period” (Periodo Especial), is being exacerbated by limited support from traditional allies such as Russia and China, and aid from left-wing governments in Latin America that has fallen short of expectations.

In the international community, the question of whether the solution lies in the lifting of US sanctions or in Havana undertaking radical political and economic reforms constitutes the greatest uncertainty regarding the island’s future. The Havana administration is preparing a “negotiation package” aimed at ending the chronic tension with the US that has persisted since the 1959 Revolution; this package involves radical changes whilst refusing to compromise on sovereignty.

Cuba’s strategic approach is built on four pillars: the lifting of the US embargo in exchange for opening the way for political reforms based on internal dynamics; the rejection of Washington’s “backyard” policy and the establishment of the principle of “diplomacy between equals”; and the cessation of support for left-wing groups to address regional security concerns.

Presented under the “win-win” principle, this diplomatic move is positioned not as a “surrender” but as a search for a solution based on mutual respect; meanwhile, the Cuban government is clearly drawing its red lines by sending a message that the spirit of historical resistance against attempts to force submission through economic or military pressure remains alive.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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cross Latin America, a profound demographic transformation is underway. From bustling avenues in Santiago to upscale neighborhoods in Mexico City, everyday life is reflecting a generational shift: fewer children are being born, and traditional ideas about family are rapidly evolving.

According to the latest data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), fertility rates across the region have fallen to an average of 1.8 children per woman—well below the replacement level of 2.1 needed to maintain stable population levels. The drop marks a dramatic decline from the 1950s, when women in the region had an average of nearly six children.

Experts say the pace of change has been striking. “It even exceeded what the United Nations projected two decades ago,” said Simone Cecchini, a senior official at ECLAC, noting that Latin America’s demographic transition has outpaced that of many European countries.

A cultural shift away from traditional family roles

One of the most visible signs of this transformation is cultural. In major cities like Buenos Aires and Quito, there are now more dogs than children. Pet-friendly housing developments, once a niche offering, are becoming mainstream, reflecting changing priorities among younger generations.

Sociologist Martina Yopo Díaz, based in Chile, describes a growing tendency for younger people to place less emphasis on parenthood as a life goal. “Children, and reproduction in a broader sense, are occupying an increasingly marginal place in the life projects of younger generations,” she explains.

This cultural evolution is closely tied to broader changes in gender roles. Women today have greater access to education and employment opportunities, and motherhood is no longer seen as an inevitable or defining milestone.

Declining teenage pregnancies drive change

A key factor behind the falling birth rate is the sharp decline in teenage pregnancies. Across Latin America, governments have expanded access to contraception and promoted reproductive rights, leading to significant public health gains.

In Chile, for example, teenage pregnancy rates have dropped by nearly 80% over the past decade. Regionally, births among girls aged 15 to 19 fell from around 70 per 1,000 in 2014 to approximately 50 in 2024, according to ECLAC data.

While still higher than in most parts of the world, the downward trend reflects increased awareness, education, and autonomy among young women. Experts say this shift has played a major role in accelerating the region’s demographic transition.

Inequality shapes reproductive choices

Despite the overall decline, fertility trends vary significantly across social groups. In a region long marked by inequality, access to resources continues to shape reproductive decisions.

Lower-income women often have more children than they intend, partly due to limited access to education and family planning services. In contrast, higher-income women frequently have fewer children than they would like, constrained by career demands and the high cost of raising a family.

Education is a critical factor. In countries like Mexico and Brazil, rising levels of schooling among women have been closely linked to declining fertility rates. As women spend more years in education and enter the workforce in greater numbers, they tend to delay childbirth and have fewer children overall.

“Women’s participation in the labor force, gender inequality, and fertility form a very complex knot,” Cecchini said, highlighting the interplay between economic opportunity and family life.

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hile’s newly inaugurated president, José Antonio Kast, has reignited debate about the country’s authoritarian past after expressing admiration for former military ruler Augusto Pinochet.

Kast was sworn in on March 11 in Valparaíso after winning December’s presidential runoff with more than 58 percent of the vote — the largest vote total in Chilean electoral history.

The symbolism of his inauguration drew attention even before the ceremony. In an official portrait released weeks earlier, Kast wore a presidential sash bearing a coat of arms not used by Chilean presidents since Pinochet’s rule.

Pinochet governed Chile from 1973 to 1990 after leading the 1973 Chilean coup d’état that overthrew democratically elected president Salvador Allende. His regime was responsible for widespread repression, with more than 3,000 people killed or disappeared and thousands more imprisoned, tortured, or forced into exile.

Kast has long been associated with a sympathetic view of the former dictator. In past campaigns he suggested that Pinochet, if alive, would likely have supported his candidacy. Critics say that admiration is also reflected in his political alliances and cabinet appointments.

Among those named to his government are lawyers who previously defended Pinochet, including Fernando Barros as defense minister and Fernando Rabat as minister of justice and human rights.

Felipe González Mac-Conell, author of Kast: The Chilean Far-Right, says the new president’s political agenda echoes elements of the Pinochet era, including neoliberal economic policies and a strong emphasis on law-and-order measures.

“What has permeated his political project is a vindication of the cultural values and economic model associated with the dictatorship,” he said.

Frustration with politics fuels support

Despite the controversy surrounding Kast’s views, analysts say his electoral success cannot be explained simply by nostalgia for authoritarian rule.

Instead, many voters appear to have supported him out of frustration with Chile’s political system and economic conditions in recent years. The country has experienced rising crime concerns, social unrest and political polarization.

Discontent grew during the presidency of Kast’s predecessor, Gabriel Boric, whose ambitious reform agenda faced political resistance and economic challenges.

Kast capitalized on those frustrations by campaigning on promises of stronger security policies, tighter immigration controls and economic stability. His Republican Party positioned itself as a harder-line alternative to both the left and the traditional conservative establishment.

Jose Alejandro Godoy, a Peruvian political scientist studying democratic backsliding in Latin America, says Kast’s rise reflects a broader regional trend in which voters turn toward strong leadership when they lose faith in traditional politics.

“People feel politics is not improving their lives,” Godoy said. “In that environment, leaders who promise order and decisive action become attractive.”

Similar dynamics have appeared elsewhere in Latin America. In Brazil, former president Jair Bolsonaro openly praised the country’s past military dictatorship, while in Argentina, President Javier Milei has minimized some of the abuses committed during that country’s military rule.

Security versus democratic freedoms

Chile remains deeply divided over the legacy of Pinochet. A 2023 survey by the polling firm Mori Chile found that more than one-third of Chileans believe the 1973 coup that brought the general to power was justified.

Supporters of Kast argue that references to Pinochet reflect admiration for the economic reforms introduced during his rule, which helped transform Chile into one of Latin America’s most market-oriented economies.

Critics, however, warn that glorifying authoritarian figures risks weakening democratic norms and respect for human rights.

“The concern,” Godoy said, “is that societies may begin to trade civil liberties for promises of security and order.”

As Kast begins his presidency, Chile now faces the challenge of addressing public demands for stability while safeguarding the democratic principles that have guided the country since the end of Pinochet’s rule in 1990.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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exican security forces have killed Nemesio “El Mencho” Oseguera Cervantes, the elusive leader of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, in a dramatic operation that officials say was made possible by a tip from a figure close to his inner circle and intelligence shared by the United States.

The high-stakes raid, carried out Sunday in the hills outside Tapalpa, has triggered a wave of retaliatory violence across western Mexico, underscoring both the symbolic and operational weight of taking down one of the country’s most powerful cartel bosses.

For years, Oseguera evaded capture despite being one of Mexico’s most-wanted fugitives and a central figure in the trafficking of methamphetamine and fentanyl into the United States. His organization grew into a dominant criminal force with a decentralized structure that allowed regional bosses wide autonomy.

The breakthrough came on February 20, when Mexican authorities received what Defense Secretary Ricardo Trevilla Trejo described as a “concrete tip” about Oseguera’s location. Investigators had traced a link through the network of one of the drug lord’s romantic partners. Crucially, a “trusted man” within her orbit provided access that helped authorities narrow in on the hideout.

The following day, the woman reportedly left the secluded cabin complex where Oseguera had been staying. He remained behind with members of his security detail — a window Mexican forces moved quickly to exploit.

The raid on Cabañas La Loma

The target was a wooded compound near Tapalpa known as Cabañas La Loma, a vacation rental site previously sanctioned by the US Treasury for allegedly providing material support to cartel activities.

To avoid tipping off lookouts, Mexican authorities relied primarily on ground forces, supported by limited helicopter air cover. Units from the army and the National Guard’s Special Immediate Reaction Force established a perimeter before advancing up a long, remote driveway toward the compound.

Eyewitness videos later verified by media outlets showed armored vehicles climbing a slope toward the cabins, followed by bursts of automatic gunfire and plumes of thick black smoke.

As troops closed in, they came under fire from Oseguera’s lieutenants. According to officials, eight cartel members were killed in the initial exchange, and two soldiers were wounded.

Oseguera and several deputies fled into nearby forested terrain. A detachment of Special Forces pursued them through dense undergrowth. After a further firefight, they captured the cartel leader and two bodyguards, all seriously wounded.

A death in transit

Authorities placed Oseguera, his two bodyguards, and a wounded soldier aboard a helicopter bound for a hospital in Guadalajara. However, officials said the three cartel members died during the flight.

Fearing immediate unrest in Guadalajara — a stronghold for the cartel and a host city for the upcoming 2026 FIFA World Cup — authorities diverted the aircraft to Morelia International Airport. From there, an Air Force plane transported the bodies to Mexico City.

News of Oseguera’s death sparked rapid retaliation. Cartel gunmen set up flaming roadblocks, torched vehicles, and clashed with security forces in multiple municipalities across Jalisco and neighboring states. Airlines suspended flights to affected areas, and the US government urged its citizens to shelter in place.

Amid the violence, 25 members of the National Guard military police were reported killed.

President Claudia Sheinbaum confirmed that the United States shared intelligence that aided the operation but emphasized that no US ground forces were involved.

The timing of the operation is politically significant. Sheinbaum has faced mounting pressure from Donald Trump to curb the flow of fentanyl and other narcotics into the United States, amid threats of unilateral cross-border action.

Oseguera had been designated by Washington as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, with a $15 million reward for information leading to his capture.

Security analysts say the Mexican government likely calculated that the intelligence window — combined with the vulnerability created by the absence of key associates — presented the best opportunity in years to neutralize him.

A symbolic blow — but not the end

Experts caution that while the killing of Oseguera is symbolically significant, it may not immediately dismantle the cartel he co-founded.

Armando Vargas of the think tank México Evalúa described the move as a calculated risk, arguing that authorities believed they could contain the expected backlash. Meanwhile, political scientist Gustavo López Montiel noted that Oseguera had already ceded some operational control while in hiding.

The cartel’s franchise-like structure, in which regional leaders retain considerable autonomy, could limit short-term fragmentation. Still, analysts warn of possible internal jockeying for power and opportunistic moves by rival organizations.

The operation unfolds at a delicate moment for Mexico. Guadalajara is scheduled to host four group-stage matches of the 2026 FIFA World Cup — an event expected to bring economic benefits but also heightened international scrutiny.

In a public address Monday, Sheinbaum sought to reassure the nation.

“The most important thing right now is to guarantee peace and security for the entire population of all of Mexico,” she said. “People can be assured that peace, security, and normalcy are being maintained in the country.”

Whether the death of “El Mencho” ultimately stabilizes or destabilizes the security landscape remains to be seen. For now, Mexico has struck a decisive blow against one of the hemisphere’s most notorious cartel leaders — with help from an insider in his personal life and critical intelligence from abroad.

(Source: CNN)

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even members of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) were killed during a major military operation in western Mexico, including the group’s leader Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, widely known as “El Mencho,” authorities said Sunday.

Mexico’s Defense Ministry said Army Special Forces, working alongside the National Intelligence Center and the Attorney General’s Office, carried out the operation in Tapalpa, in the state of Jalisco — a known CJNG stronghold.

The mission involved multiple Mexican Air Force aircraft and National Guard units and aimed to capture Oseguera. According to officials, troops came under fire during the raid and responded in self-defense.

Four cartel members were killed at the scene, while three others — including a man identified as “Ruben ‘N,’ alias Mencho” — were critically wounded and later died during air transfer to Mexico City. Authorities said forensic investigations are underway to formally confirm Oseguera’s identity.

Two additional suspects were arrested. Security forces also seized heavy weaponry and armored vehicles, including rocket launchers capable of targeting aircraft. Three Special Forces personnel were wounded and transported to medical facilities in Mexico City.

The Defense Ministry added that intelligence supporting the operation was provided by U.S. authorities under bilateral security cooperation frameworks. Both Mexico and the United States had offered substantial rewards for Oseguera’s capture — $15 million from the U.S. government and 300 million Mexican pesos from Mexican authorities.

Rise of a Cartel leader

Oseguera led the CJNG from its origins as an armed faction of the now-defunct Milenio Cartel, transforming it into one of Mexico’s most powerful and violent criminal organizations. A former police officer, he rose to prominence in the early 1990s and became known internationally for the cartel’s extreme brutality and expansion into global drug trafficking networks.

The reported killing triggered an immediate and widespread violent response across several states where the CJNG operates.

Authorities reported road blockades, burning vehicles, and armed clashes in Tamaulipas, Michoacán, and Nayarit.

In Jalisco, Governor Pablo Lemus Navarro issued a red alert, suspended public transportation, and ordered the cancellation of large public events. In-person classes across the state were also cancelled for Monday.

Mexico’s Security Cabinet announced that federal forces from central Mexico and neighboring states were being deployed to reinforce security in Jalisco. While airports remain operational, most departures from Puerto Vallarta Airport were reportedly cancelled, with some arrivals also disrupted.

International warnings

The unrest prompted travel warnings from foreign governments.

The United States urged its citizens in affected states — including Jalisco, Tamaulipas, parts of Michoacán, Guerrero, and Nuevo León — to shelter in place. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau praised the operation, calling it “a great development for Mexico, the US, Latin America, and the world,” while acknowledging the violent backlash.

Canada’s Foreign Ministry also warned of violence and roadblocks in Jalisco and advised citizens to follow local authorities’ guidance. Air Canada suspended flights to Puerto Vallarta, citing ongoing security concerns.

Amid the unrest, Mexico’s embassy in Washington sought to counter online rumors alleging that CJNG members planned retaliatory attacks against civilians. Officials described the claims as unfounded and identified a social media account on X as a source of disinformation.

Authorities continue to monitor the situation as security operations intensify across western Mexico.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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ince the beginning of the 20th century, the United States has intervened numerous times in Latin American countries, which it considers its “backyard,” to protect its own interests, often using arguments of “democracy” and “the fight against communism” to legitimize these interventions. Within this historical context, the US operation on the night of January 3, 2026, in Venezuela, capturing and abducting President Nicolas Maduro, has once again brought to the forefront criticisms that Washington can disregard international norms for the sake of its hegemonic interests.

Indeed, Trump’s rhetoric about governing Venezuela until a safe transition is ensured, and the clear messages from US oil companies regarding the resumption of production in Venezuela, demonstrate that geo-economic objectives were decisive in this intervention. Therefore, the Maduro operation can be read not as a new behavior in the long practice of US intervention in Latin America, but rather as a more visible manifestation of the same intervention logic.

Disregard for International Legitimacy

U.S. interventions in Latin America have often targeted democratically elected governments. In Guatemala, the 1954 elected president Arbenz was targeted for land reform, and a CIA-backed coup led to a long civil war. One of the most striking examples of U.S. interventions in Latin America is the debate surrounding Washington’s role in the 1973 coup that overthrew Chilean President Salvador Allende by General Augusto Pinochet. Three years later, following the 1976 coup in Argentina, it has been argued that the U.S. adopted a stance of accepting and supporting regime change. The U.S.’s direct military intervention in Panama in 1989 to overthrow Manuel Noriega demonstrated Washington’s ability to employ hard power when necessary.

These examples in Latin America indicate that the U.S. has long held an approach to intervention that prioritizes its security and geo-economic interests. Washington, citing various reasons, primarily the fight against communism, has instigated government changes in many countries while channeling military and economic resources to authoritarian regimes aligned with US interests.

The kidnapping of Maduro has made it even more apparent that the “Rules-Based International Order” rhetoric, which the Washington administration has consistently promoted, especially since the end of the Cold War, is in practice selectively applied. Indeed, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s statement in Davos—” We knew that international law was applied with different rigor depending on the identity of the accused and the victim. This construct was useful because it offered certain benefits of American hegemony. So we put the sign on display “—clearly confirms this. Within this framework, the US move regarding Venezuela also emerges as one of the factors weakening the legitimacy of liberal hegemony.

U.S. Energy Management Plan

Looking at the historical role of energy, while the United Kingdom built its industrial power on coal in the 19th century, the US consolidated its global power through oil in the 20th century. Therefore, in US interventions concerning energy, the main issue has often been who controls the oil, where it is sold, who controls the revenue, and how prices are determined. The US organization and support of the 1953 coup in Iran after Mossadegh nationalized oil is a classic example demonstrating Washington’s ability to directly intervene in the internal politics of countries when energy interests are at stake.

In 1980, the Carter Doctrine considered the flow of oil in the Persian Gulf a vital US interest and declared that any means, including military force, could be used against any attempt to threaten this flow. Indeed, the Gulf Crisis of 1990 demonstrated how this logic worked in practice; the possibility of oil supply disruption and price shocks became one of the main justifications legitimizing US-led military intervention. This historical context demonstrates that the US has been able to resort to a variety of tools, including hard power, when it comes to oil flow.

In this context, while the capture and extradition of Maduro to the US is being justified by the rhetoric of “fighting drugs-narcoterrorism,” it also demonstrates the continuation of the US’s energy-geopolitical reflexes in the background. Indeed, Trump stated that they had taken the oil found on the Venezuelan tankers seized by the US, that it would be processed in US refineries, and that 30-50 million barrels of oil would be shared. Furthermore, Trump’s statement that the US would decide which major oil companies would enter Venezuela clearly shows that the intervention was not solely for security reasons, but also aimed at establishing de facto control over oil flow and revenue.

Furthermore, the US’s oil-centric energy system is facing significant competitive pressure today due to the rapid spread of renewable energy technologies. In particular, China’s production share exceeding 80% in the solar energy supply chain and its role in accounting for more than three-quarters of global battery sales provides it not only with technological superiority but also the opportunity to establish an alternative energy-economy network to the US-centric system by exporting panels, batteries, and electric vehicles to many parts of the world. Indeed, one of the most critical fronts of the global competition with China is the critical minerals and supply chains dependent on these minerals, which are essential for renewable energy technologies and digitalization.

Venezuela possesses rich resources of critical minerals vital to the technology industry, including coltan, known as blue gold. For the US, which seeks to break China’s monopoly in battery and high-tech production, controlling Venezuelan resources also means cutting off Beijing’s access to these strategic raw materials. Therefore, the January 3rd operation should also be considered a concrete manifestation in Latin America of the US strategy to contain China through its supply chains.

Controlling the oil industry

Finally, the pursuit of control over the oil industry in Venezuela, the country with the world’s largest proven oil reserves, can be interpreted not only as a response to today’s supply needs but also as a goal to “buy time.” Assessments indicating that the pace of transition to renewable energy and investment appetite can weaken during periods of low fossil fuel prices suggest that the strategy of increasing oil supply and suppressing prices could have a “slowing down the transition” effect. Indeed, Trump’s mention of aiming to lower prices by releasing more Venezuelan oil onto the market shows that this approach can also be interpreted as an intention to “make the transition more controlled.”

Furthermore, the goal of lowering oil prices coincides with the aim of reducing inflationary pressure in the US by lowering energy costs and mitigating economic discontent in domestic politics. Washington’s past calls for OPEC to increase energy production and Trump’s pressure on OPEC to increase energy supply at different times support this idea. In this respect, the Venezuela move can also be read as a complementary part of the strategy of increasing oil supply to lower prices.

From an environmental and climate perspective, moves to lower oil prices have the potential to counteract the goals of accelerating the renewable energy transition and reducing emissions. Given the Trump administration’s approach of prioritizing fossil fuel production over the climate agenda, the oil strategy implemented through Venezuela can be seen as a step that supports and strengthens this trend.

In conclusion, the events in Venezuela exemplify the hegemonic politics of the United States, which complements its energy and precious metal resources with military force in order to maintain its global leadership. Washington’s move sends a clear message, primarily to rising powers such as China, that Latin America is within the US sphere of influence and that the regional geo-economic order will be shaped in accordance with Washington’s priorities.

The crisis of the international order is no longer an abstract concept. It is evident in headlines that would have seemed inconceivable a decade ago: US operations in Venezuela, threats to take Greenland by force, and the deepening strategic divide between Washington and its European allies. While the liberal order championed by Washington is not collapsing overnight, it is clearly hardening into a more transactional, unilateral and openly strategic approach.

The Trump administration justifies these moves in terms of national security. This framing is not entirely incorrect, but it is incomplete. The deeper question is not whether these actions are about security. Rather, it is about why they are happening now and how they are converging across seemingly unrelated theatres, from the Arctic to Latin America to Eastern Europe.
The answer lies in the accelerating AI race.

Analysed in isolation, issues such as Greenland, Venezuela, rare earth diplomacy and energy realignment appear as traditional realpolitik: resource grabs, power projection and coercive diplomacy. However, when considered collectively, they reveal a coherent long-term strategy centred on one objective: securing the material and energy resources necessary to win the AI competition against China.

This is not about territory. It is about infrastructure.

AI as a grand strategy

Since returning to office, Trump has treated AI not as a sectoral priority, but as a systemic one. AI is now at the core of US national strategy, shaping defence modernisation, industrial policy, export controls, energy planning and strategic finance. Critical mineral supply chains have been formally recognised as national security imperatives in Trump’s National Security Strategy. Executive orders have sought to expand domestic extraction and rebuild rare earth processing capacity in the United States. Public–private partnerships with American mining and materials firms reflect a broader attempt to restore industrial capabilities that had long migrated abroad.

However, what makes this moment distinct is the unprecedented alignment between the federal government and major technology firms. Silicon Valley is no longer operating at arm’s length from Washington. AI developers, semiconductor manufacturers, hyperscale cloud providers and energy-intensive data centre operators are becoming increasingly involved in strategic planning discussions. Contracts, export controls, infrastructure financing and industrial policy are being designed in consultation with the firms that are driving AI development. The boundary between national and corporate strategy has become unusually thin.

Taken together, these measures signal something larger than economic policy. They reveal an acknowledgement of a structural constraint: the US cannot fully decouple from China under current technological conditions. The conversation about decoupling began during Trump’s first term, but time has exposed its limitations. Semiconductor fabrication, rare earth refining, advanced battery production and energy systems remain deeply interwoven across borders.

This creates a strategic paradox. Although decoupling is presented as a security necessity, the extent of interdependence means that abrupt separation would be destabilizing. Both Washington and Beijing understand this. Each is now engaged in a quiet race to reduce vulnerability before a systemic rupture occurs. The objective is not immediate disengagement, but preparation.

Strategic autonomy in semiconductors, rare earth processing and energy generation will determine who can withstand a future rupture. The state that secures control over these foundational inputs first will possess disproportionate leverage in the AI competition.

Export bans on advanced chip designs, restrictions on critical mineral flows and the rapid expansion of industrial alliances are not isolated measures when viewed through this lens. They are components of a larger repositioning exercise. Resource diplomacy has become more assertive because the AI race has shifted from software to infrastructure.

Greenland: REE and the Arctic chessboard

Trump openly threatened to annex Greenland, claiming it was a matter of national security rather than minerals. The rhetoric was blunt. Yet, after months of diplomatic friction, discussions evolved to include frameworks that explicitly incorporated rare earth elements alongside defence cooperation. This shift reveals a deeper truth: Today, Greenland’s geostrategic value lies less in its immediate military positioning and more in its long-term role in critical supply chains.

The island hosts some of the world’s largest undeveloped rare earth deposits, including the Kvanefjeld and Tanbreez sites, which are both rich in heavy rare earth elements that are essential for advanced magnets, precision weapons, semiconductors and AI hardware. As early as 2019, Washington signed a memorandum of understanding with Greenland focused on cooperation in critical minerals, long before the latest escalation. This suggests that access to resources has long been part of the calculation.

China has also recognised Greenland’s importance. Through its Polar Silk Road strategy, Beijing has pursued infrastructure projects and secured stakes in rare earth ventures linked to Greenland. Even where projects have stalled, China’s dominance in rare earth processing gives it leverage over any future extraction.

Meanwhile, the Arctic itself is undergoing transformation. Melting ice is opening up new shipping routes and altering the military landscape across the North Atlantic. Greenland is located at the intersection of emerging trade routes and missile trajectories, making it a strategically important location in a warming world.

In the evolving geopolitical landscape of AI and advanced manufacturing, rare earths are not peripheral; they are fundamental. The modern infrastructure of AI — semiconductors, permanent magnets, high-end sensors and quantum materials — depends on minerals that are currently dominated by China’s processing capacity. Greenland offers an alternative source of supply in this high-stakes contest.

Therefore, Trump’s interest in Greenland is not a quixotic land grab. It reflects a broader shift: security policy is now infrastructure policy. The question is not whether Greenland matters, but why it matters now, and how access to minerals and supply-chain leverage are reshaping the meaning of national security in the 21(st) century.

Venezuela: Energy, minerals, and strategic leverage

At first glance, Venezuela appears to be a classic oil story. It has the world’s largest proven oil reserves. However, this is not just about fossil fuels in the traditional sense of energy security. AI is changing the energy equation dramatically.

Electricity demand in the United States is rising rapidly, partly due to explosive growth in data centers built to power AI and cloud computing. In 2023, U.S. data centers consumed around 4.4% of total electricity, and this figure is expected to increase significantly as AI workloads grow. In states where data centers are concentrated, electricity prices are rising faster than the national average, with power bills increasing by 13% in Virginia, 16% in Illinois and 12% in Ohio in the past year alone. Utilities are extending generation capacity and upgrading transmission networks to meet this concentrated demand, highlighting that electricity is now a strategic fuel rather than a commodity.

Venezuelan oil and gas could help to offset U.S. energy demand by supplementing crude oil supplies, thereby alleviating stress on the grid and refineries. However, Venezuela’s strategic significance extends well beyond hydrocarbons. Much of the country sits on the ancient Guayana Shield, which is home to substantial deposits of nickel, copper, bauxite, coltan, gold, and other critical minerals that are essential for advanced electronics, defense technologies, renewable energy sources, and AI hardware. In 2016, Caracas established the extensive Orinoco Mining Arc as a state-controlled area for mineral extraction, formally placing these resources under centralized management.

In practice, however, mining there has become a mix of state oversight, informal operations, and widespread illegal extraction. A significant proportion of minerals, particularly coltan and other strategic materials, are smuggled into Colombia and then on to global markets, with much ultimately ending up in China’s processing networks. Even though official rare earth output remains underdeveloped, Venezuela’s broader mineral ecosystem reinforces Beijing’s leverage in global supply chains. At the same time, it should be noted that China has been Venezuela’s largest buyer of crude oil for years.

From this perspective, it could be argued that control or influence over Venezuelan resources and minerals would offer the U.S. several strategic advantages. Firstly, it would allow Washington to act strategically on its own energy needs rather than leaving them vulnerable to global disruptions. Secondly, it would reduce China’s access to discounted Venezuelan crude, thus limiting Beijing’s ability to diversify. Thirdly, it would strengthen U.S. leverage through sanctions and market positioning.

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enezuela has accused the United States of deploying previously unused military technology during the January 3 abduction of President Nicolás Maduro, claims that gained renewed attention after US President Donald Trump referred to a mysterious weapon he called a “discombobulator”.

Venezuelan Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López said the operation amounted to turning Venezuela into a “weapons laboratory”, alleging that advanced technologies powered by artificial intelligence were tested during the raid in Caracas. The US has not officially detailed the operation, which resulted in Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, being taken into US custody.

Speaking earlier this month, Padrino López said 47 Venezuelan soldiers and 32 Cuban personnel providing security to Maduro were killed during the operation. He later claimed Washington had used weapons “never before seen on the battlefield”.

“The president of the United States admitted they used weapons no one else in the world possesses,” he was quoted as saying by the Venezuelan newspaper El Universal.

Trump’s remarks fuel speculation

Trump appeared to confirm the use of unconventional technology in interviews with US media outlets. Speaking to NewsNation, he said a “sonic weapon” had been used during the raid on what he described as a heavily fortified military compound guarded by Cuban forces.

“Nobody else has it,” Trump said. “We have weapons no one knows about.”

Days later, Trump told the New York Post that US forces had used a device designed to disable defensive systems. “The discombobulator,” he said, declining to provide further details.

Speculation intensified after social media posts attributed to a Venezuelan security guard described intense sound waves, severe physical distress and bleeding during the operation. Al Jazeera and other international media outlets have been unable to independently verify these claims.

The White House has not commented on the alleged injuries.

Experts cast doubt on ‘sonic weapon’ claims

Military analysts say known US “sonic” systems, such as long-range acoustic devices (LRAD), are primarily designed for communication, crowd control and deterrence, not for disabling military hardware.

“These systems can cause discomfort or disorientation but cannot shut down air defenses or communications networks,” said Brussels-based military analyst Elijah Magnier.

Other non-lethal systems, such as the Active Denial System, affect people through directed energy but similarly do not interfere with electronics.

Experts suggest the reported failure of Venezuelan defense systems is more consistent with electronic warfare, cyber operations or high-powered microwave technology, all of which the US has used in past conflicts.

Such tools can jam radar, disrupt communications, disable electronics or cut power without visible damage.

“There is no evidence of a new weapon,” Magnier said. “The term ‘discombobulator’ appears to be political language referring to a combination of existing non-kinetic capabilities.”

No evidence of new weapon technology

While major powers routinely deploy new systems in real-world conflicts, analysts stress that there is currently no public evidence that the US used a previously unknown weapon during the Caracas operation.

“The effects described can be explained by conventional electronic warfare and standard disorientation tools,” Magnier said. “There is no need for a science-fiction explanation.”

The US government has yet to formally respond to Venezuela’s accusations.

(Source: Aljazeera)

On December 14, in the second round of Chile’s presidential elections, Jose Antonio Kast, the far-right candidate from the Republican Party, won 58 percent of the vote. He defeated his left-wing rival and ruling party candidate, Jeannette Jara, by a margin of 16 points. This result made history by bringing the far right to power through democratic means for the first time since Augusto Pinochet’s military dictatorship ended in 1990.

This development does not mean that Chile has returned to dictatorship, however. Rather, it represents a serious political defeat and warning for the left. Kast’s success stemmed from his ability to form a broad coalition that garnered support from his own party and other significant right-wing groups. The election results reflect not an entirely right-wing society, but rather the left’s failure to deliver fundamental changes after coming to power following the widespread social uprising in 2019.

The Pinochet dictatorship in Chile lasted from 1973 to 1990, when democracy was restored. Although right-wing governments came to power during this period, they avoided openly defending Pinochet. The reason it is now referred to as the “far right” is because a politician who openly declared himself Pinochet’s heir was elected and advocated harsh, authoritarian “public order” policies. Kast’s failure to criticize human rights violations during the Pinochet era, as well as his attempts to legitimize this legacy, distinguish him from the traditional right and have led to his being labeled as “far right.”

Kast’s victory on December 14, 2025, won by a large margin, is seen as a concrete sign of a strengthening right-wing trend in Chile and Latin American politics. Kast campaigned on issues that have become increasingly prominent on the national agenda, such as security, immigration, and economic uncertainty. These issues resonated with millions of voters. Consequently, for the first time in the post-Pinochet democratic era, a leader who openly advocates for right-wing and hardline policies will take office on January 15.

Mandatory voting benefits the right

In this election, the first in the country to feature mandatory voting, millions of previously apolitical voters turned out at the polls and largely shifted towards the right, drawn by rhetoric about “order,” “security,” and “authority.” This shift was a decisive factor in the election outcome. While Kast’s overwhelming victory does not automatically signal a wave of right-wing support across Latin America, it warns that left-wing governments failing to genuinely transform the system can strengthen the extreme right.

This result is not a coincidence or a momentary outburst of anger but rather the product of a long-standing political process. The failure of the institutional and reformist line — defined as the “Atlanticist left” — to offer society a real, fundamental transformation project paved the way for this outcome on December 14. Public opinion research companies, which had failed in many of their pre-election predictions in Latin America, correctly predicted Kast’s clear victory this time.

What does Kast’s Victory mean for Palestinian policy?

The left’s campaign failed to offer a positive, transformative program. It was largely based on fear of stopping Kast, which was not enough to convince the masses. This defeat is not unique to Chile. It is part of a broader trend linked to the global rise of the far right, supported by the United States and conservative circles. Therefore, Kast’s victory is seen as a result of the left’s political stagnation and lack of direction. Kast’s win also signifies a weakening of Chile’s critical stance on the Palestinian issue and an improvement in relations with Israel. Chile is home to approximately 500,000 Palestinians outside the Arab world.

Left-leaning President Gabriel Boric had described Israel’s attacks on Gaza as “genocide” and recalled the ambassador to Tel Aviv. While the human rights–centered approach of the Boric era will be replaced by a policy that prioritizes security and geopolitical interests, Chile’s strong and organized Palestinian diaspora will continue to be an important factor that partially balances this shift.

Analysts do not view this outcome as unique to Chile. They point to a broader trend of right-wing shifts across Latin America and the rise of the right in countries such as Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, and Honduras. The defeat of left-wing parties in many countries is explained by growing insecurity and dissatisfaction with existing political options and demands for tough solutions to security and migration issues. Whether this shift to the right will be permanent, however, depends on whether the new right-wing governments can produce concrete results.

If the right returns to the established order, violent street protests could spell the end for them once again, as has happened before. Therefore, the Colombian elections in five months and the Brazilian presidential election next year have taken on critical importance, as these two countries are important pillars of the left in the region. Colombian President Gustavo Petro described Kast’s victory as “the Nazi remnant has won,” while Brazil and Mexico made more cautious and optimistic statements. Meanwhile, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro described Kast as a fascist and a continuation of the military dictatorship. This result, of course, delighted Argentina’s far-right leader Javier Milei and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a champion of the right wing.

Why Did the left fail to win in Chile?

From the perspective of left-wing voters, Kast’s victory is seen as a significant defeat that exposed the limitations of a moderate, reformist strategy. Therefore, Kast’s victory is perceived as dangerous for the left because the rhetoric of “order,” “security,” and “toughness” is gaining strength. This increases the risk of pressure on workers’ rights, trade unions, and the student movement, as well as the criminalization of social demands. While this result does not necessarily signify an automatic right-wing wave across Latin America, it serves as a warning that left-wing governments which came to power promising change but failed to transform the system may strengthen the far right.

This outcome is linked to economic uncertainty, rising crime and insecurity, migration issues, and left-wing governments’ failure to meet populist expectations rather than to societies suddenly becoming right-wing. In Chile, for example, the left came to power after the major social upheaval in 2019 but merely managed the system rather than transforming it fundamentally. This has reinforced the perception among large sections of the population that “nothing has changed.” Read alongside similar developments in Argentina, Ecuador, and other countries, this situation reveals that Latin American politics is shifting toward identity, security, and authority. However, this shift is viewed as a temporary but serious disruption caused by the strategic and programmatic crisis of the left rather than a permanent, unidirectional right-wing wave.

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n the night of January 3, Caracas was jolted awake by a sequence of explosions so sudden and precise that, for hours, the world believed Venezuela had entered a new war. Reports indicated that more than 150 U.S. Armed Forces aircraft operated over the region, while a dozen cruise missiles struck critical sites across the capital and beyond: Oil facilities, military headquarters, air bases, Fort Tiuna, the Presidential Palace, the mausoleum of Hugo Chávez, and installations on the strategically vital island of Margarita.

Yet what followed did not resemble war. There was no cascade of air-defense fire, no counterstrike, no troop mobilization, and no descent into chaos. Within hours, the White House announced that President Nicolás Maduro and his wife had been captured and transferred to the United States. What at first appeared to be an act of American military domination, upon closer examination, look entirely different.

Extraction, not invasion

The most puzzling aspect was not the missiles but the silence that greeted them. Venezuela’s air-defense network, regarded as the most advanced in Latin America, failed to respond. Independent monitoring systems and eyewitnesses were reported to have confirmed that not a single defensive missile was fired. Even more telling were accounts suggesting that Venezuelan special forces had taken control of air-defense sites hours before the strike, effectively disabling them. This pointed not to a failure of technology, but to a decision from within. The implication was stark: The gates of the country’s airspace appeared to have been opened deliberately. That American missiles did not target air defenses is a key clue indicating an inside operation.

The implications deepened when reports emerged that Maduro had not been seized in a Hollywood-style raid by American commandos, but rather arrested by his own senior officers. High-ranking figures within the Venezuelan military were said to have detained Maduro and his wife and handed them over to U.S. Delta Force operatives at Caracas International Airport. The missiles, in this account, were not the spear of conquest but a curtain behind which an internal transfer of custody occurred. The spectacle of military power provided cover for a political act already decided.

This interpretation gained further weight when U.S. Senator Mike Lee was quoted in accounts as saying that the missile strikes were intended to facilitate Maduro’s extraction, not to trigger a ground invasion. Once Maduro was in custody, American military operations quickly halted. There was no attempt to dismantle the Venezuelan state, seize ministries, or install a new government; the machinery of power remained intact, merely missing its former occupant. In this context, Trump remarked, “The first attack was so successful, we probably don’t have to do a second, but we’re prepared to do a second wave…” Viewed through the lens of traditional regime change, this was an anomaly. In the emerging logic of multipolar geopolitics, it was a masterclass in containment.

A Coup that wasn’t

Perhaps the clearest indication that this was not a traditional U.S.-driven coup lies in who emerged afterward. Instead of the pro-American opposition figure María Corina Machado, a right-wing politician who had cultivated close ties with Trump, especially after her October Nobel Prize, which she publicly dedicated to him, the U.S. president dismissed her as lacking both the backing and the “respect” required to lead Venezuela.

Power instead passed to Diosdado Cabello, widely regarded as aligned with Russia, China, and Cuba. Even American analysts acknowledge that Cabello represents continuity in Venezuela’s strategic posture against Washington. Had the United States intended to remake Venezuela in its own image, such an outcome would have been inexplicable. But if Washington’s objective was simply to remove a volatile, sanctioned, and diplomatically paralyzing leader without triggering open war, the result becomes far more intelligible.

The great power understanding

The shadow of Beijing and Moscow quietly loomed over the unfolding drama. In the days leading up to Maduro’s arrest, Venezuelan authorities were reported to have held confidential meetings with Chinese diplomats. Just hours before his capture, Nicolás Maduro received Qiu Xiaoqi, China’s special envoy for Latin American affairs, at the Miraflores Presidential Palace. Around the same time, former President Trump met with U.S. Ambassador to China David Perdue. A week earlier, Chinese officials convened with their Russian counterparts in Moscow to discuss Venezuela. These parallel diplomatic tracks suggest that Maduro’s removal was not a unilateral American operation, but a calculated maneuver tacitly acknowledged by the major powers invested in the country.

On January 4, 2026, Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, commented on Trump’s actions, describing them as unlawful but consistent with the defense of U.S. interests. “It must be acknowledged that, despite the obvious unlawfulness of Trump’s behavior, one cannot deny a certain consistency in his actions. He and his team defend their country’s national interests quite harshly,” Russia’s TASS news agency quoted Medvedev as saying. Medvedev added that Latin America is traditionally considered the “backyard” of the United States and suggested that Trump appeared determined to exert control over Venezuela’s oil supplies.

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wenty-six European Union member states on Sunday urged calm and restraint following recent US military action in Venezuela, stressing the need to uphold international law and the principles of the United Nations Charter.

In a joint statement issued by EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, the bloc said escalation must be avoided and emphasized that all actors are bound by international legal norms, regardless of circumstances. Hungary did not support the statement, standing apart from the rest of the EU.

“The European Union calls for calm and restraint by all actors, to avoid escalation and to ensure a peaceful solution to the crisis,” the statement said. It added that respect for international law and the UN Charter remains a cornerstone of global security.

UN security council

The statement recalled the “particular responsibility” of UN Security Council members to uphold international law, describing it as a pillar of the international security architecture. It underscored the EU’s longstanding position that the erosion of legal norms risks destabilizing the global order.

The EU reiterated its stance that Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro lacks democratic legitimacy and reaffirmed support for a peaceful, Venezuelan-led transition to democracy that respects the country’s sovereignty.

“The right of the Venezuelan people to determine their future must be respected,” the statement said, while stressing that any resolution to the crisis must be inclusive, democratic and negotiated by Venezuelans themselves.

While condemning transnational organized crime and drug trafficking, the EU emphasized that such challenges must be addressed through sustained international cooperation conducted in full respect of territorial integrity and national sovereignty.

The bloc said it remains in close contact with the United States, as well as regional and international partners, to support dialogue among all parties involved. The objective, it said, is to facilitate a negotiated and peaceful solution to the crisis.

The statement also called for the unconditional release of all political prisoners in Venezuela and confirmed that EU member states’ consular authorities are coordinating closely to ensure the safety of EU citizens, including those allegedly detained unlawfully.

US capture of Maduro sparks global reaction

The EU statement followed remarks by US President Donald Trump, who said that US military action in Venezuela resulted in the capture of Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. Trump also said Washington would assert control over Venezuela “for the time being,” including through the deployment of US troops if necessary.

Maduro and Flores were transferred to New York late Saturday and are being held at a federal detention facility in Brooklyn. They face US charges related to drug trafficking and alleged cooperation with criminal groups designated as terrorist organizations.

Maduro has denied all accusations, describing the operation as a kidnapping and insisting he remains Venezuela’s legitimate president. Officials in Caracas have called for his release.

Maduro pleads not guilty in US court

On Monday, Maduro pleaded not guilty to multiple narcotics-related charges during a court appearance in Manhattan, where he appeared shackled and wearing prison attire. His wife also entered a not-guilty plea. The next court date was set for March 17.

Maduro told the court he was innocent and said the charges were politically motivated. His defense lawyer said the case would involve extensive legal challenges, particularly concerning what he described as an unlawful military abduction.

Hours later, Venezuela’s Vice President Delcy Rodriguez was sworn in as interim president in Caracas. While expressing support for Maduro, she gave no indication that her administration would directly confront the US operation.

The US has long considered Maduro an illegitimate leader following the 2018 election. However, legal experts and several governments have questioned the legality of capturing a sitting head of state, warning that the move could undermine the rules-based international order.

Russia, China and several Latin American allies of Venezuela condemned the US action, while the UN Security Council convened to debate its broader implications.

Despite international concern, the Trump administration has defended the operation as lawful and necessary, framing it as part of a broader campaign against international drug trafficking.

As uncertainty surrounds Venezuela’s political future, the EU reiterated that restoring democracy, respecting sovereignty and upholding international law must remain central to any resolution of the crisis.

(Source: Anadolu Agency and Reuters)

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asry Asfura, the conservative candidate backed by U.S. President Donald Trump, has been declared the winner of Honduras’ presidential election, following weeks of delays, technical failures and allegations of fraud surrounding the November 30 vote.

The National Electoral Council (CNE) announced Wednesday that Asfura secured 40.3% of the vote, narrowly defeating center-right Liberal Party candidate Salvador Nasralla, who received 39.5%. The ruling LIBRE party’s candidate, Rixi Moncada, finished a distant third.

Asfura is set to assume office on January 27, serving a 2026–2030 term.

Delays, manual count and protests

The vote count was marred by widespread technical problems that forced authorities to manually count around 15% of tally sheets, representing hundreds of thousands of ballots. The prolonged process sparked political unrest, with the ruling LIBRE party calling for protests it described as opposition to an “electoral coup.”

Demonstrations at times blocked election officials from accessing vote storage facilities, further delaying the count. The final results were approved by two electoral council members and one deputy, while a third council member, Marlon Ochoa, was absent during the announcement.

Nasralla rejected the declaration of results, claiming valid ballots were excluded from the final tally. While urging supporters to remain peaceful, he described the outcome as illegitimate.

“I will not accept a result based on omissions,” Nasralla said, calling the outcome “the saddest Christmas for the Honduran people.” This marks his third unsuccessful bid for the presidency.

Congress President Luis Redondo, a member of the ruling LIBRE party, also rejected the results, calling them “outside the law” and “without value.”

Trump’s role

Trump openly endorsed Asfura before the election, calling him the “only real friend of freedom in Honduras” and warning of consequences if preliminary results were altered. He also threatened to cut U.S. financial support to Honduras if Asfura lost and pardoned former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández, a member of Asfura’s party who had been imprisoned in the U.S. on drug trafficking charges.

Opposition figures accused Trump of election interference, arguing his last-minute involvement influenced the outcome.

Following the announcement, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio congratulated Asfura and urged all parties to accept the results to ensure a peaceful transition. The Organization of American States (OAS) said it would issue a report on the election, noting unresolved issues in the vote count.

Asfura, 67, is a former mayor of Tegucigalpa and a businessman of Palestinian descent. Known by the nickname “Papi, at your service,” he built his reputation on infrastructure projects and a low-profile governing style.

He campaigned on a pro-business platform, emphasizing job creation, education and security, and has signaled he may reconsider Honduras’ diplomatic recognition of Taiwan.

Asfura is currently under investigation for alleged corruption linked to his tenure as mayor, charges he denies, calling them politically motivated.

“People don’t care about ideology,” Asfura said during the campaign. “They want solutions.”

(Source: Reuters)

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he US decision to add the Cartel de los Soles (Sun Cartel) to its list of Foreign Terrorist Organisations signals a new phase in Washington’s pressure strategy against Venezuela. The US claims that this organisation, which it alleges has long-standing links to high-ranking Venezuelan military personnel and officials, is an institutionalised smuggling network that transports a significant portion of Colombian cocaine through Venezuela to the US and Europe. Therefore, the decision is interpreted not merely as a measure to combat drug trafficking, but as a political step aimed at squeezing President Nicolas Maduro’s administration on the international stage and tightening diplomatic and economic sanctions.

Moreover, this classification grants Washington access to broader legal tools, such as financial sanctions, asset freezes, and pressure on third countries. Most importantly, it is argued that this step creates a legal basis for a potential military intervention in Venezuela. With this designation, Washington can more easily justify its actions internationally by stating that it is ‘conducting operations against drug cartel leaders.’ According to US claims, Maduro and his inner circle are at the top of the Cartel de los Soles. Therefore, the decision provides Washington with a strong justification that can withstand international reactions in the face of possible harsh measures.

Caracas, however, ‘categorically’ denies the cartel’s existence, arguing that this decision is an attempt to justify intervention in Venezuela. According to experts, the US military presence in the Caribbean region does not necessarily mean direct conflict; it can often serve the purpose of exerting pressure, increasing negotiating power and sending a message to the region. Therefore, although tensions are high in the region, international circles consider it more likely that developments will continue along the lines of diplomatic, economic and psychological pressure.

Can Venezuela withstand a possible war?

According to international security experts, Venezuela’s ability to withstand a possible conventional war against the US depends on the logistical support it will receive from China and Russia. Given its current military capacity, it is stated that the country would be unable to resist a coordinated and sudden attack by the US for long. Venezuela, which has been under heavy sanctions for years, has seen its maintenance, repair and logistical infrastructure weakened, while its army has become largely dependent on weapons supplied by Russia, Iran and China.

Venezuela ranks 50th among 144 countries in terms of military strength. The country has approximately 123,000 active military personnel, 220,000 militiamen and 8,000 reservists. Although senior military officials state that the number of militiamen is close to 8 million, regional experts do not consider this figure realistic.

Its inventory includes 23 Su-30MKV fighter jets acquired from Russia and 15 F-16A fighter jets procured during a period of good bilateral relations with the United States in the 1980s. It also possesses 8 Mi-17 helicopters, 12 radar systems, S-300VM air defence missiles, 44 S-125 Pechora systems and around 5,000 Russian-made Igla-S portable air defence missiles. It is known that Venezuela has recently received Pantsir-S1 and Buk-M2E air defence systems from Russia, as well as additional S-300VM and S-125 Pechora batteries.

Due to the economic crisis and sanctions that Venezuela has been experiencing for many years, maintenance activities for aircraft, radars, armoured vehicles and naval assets are lagging behind, and many platforms cannot operate at full capacity. It is stated that Caracas has no chance of sustaining a conventional war due to the superior military capacity of the United States. Let us not overlook an important detail: The US is conducting military exercises in the Caribbean country of Trinidad and Tobago, which is only 11 kilometres from the shores of Venezuela’s La Guaira city. If the US were to take this location, reaching the capital Caracas would be a matter of moments, as Caracas is only 27 minutes away from La Guaira by road.

Despite some modern systems at Caracas’ disposal, the weakness of its air defence in terms of integration and scope reinforces the view that the US could render these elements ineffective in a short time. However, it is important to bear in mind that, due to the country’s geography, militia structure and regional dynamics, a possible invasion could turn into a long and costly process for the US.

Caracas unlikely to resist open front conflict

The majority of the Venezuelan army’s tanks and armoured units are outdated models, while a lack of spare parts and maintenance poses a significant vulnerability. The country’s navy is also small and fragile compared to that of the US. Due to the economic crisis, the sustainability of fuel, ammunition, and logistical capacity is also severely limited. This picture supports assessments that Caracas cannot resist Washington in an open confrontation.

Nevertheless, experts emphasise that it will not be possible for the US to gain complete control over Venezuela in the short term. The country’s mountainous regions, forests, the Amazon basin and the Venezuela–Colombia border are extremely conducive to guerrilla warfare. The militia structure that the Maduro administration has been promoting for a long time, although official figures are disputed, suggests that hundreds of thousands of armed volunteers could be involved in the conflict. The fact that large segments of the population oppose US intervention could also turn a possible occupation into a nationalist resistance. The cartels, armed groups and smuggling networks along the Colombian border will also create a multi-layered environment that is difficult for the US to control.

Experts therefore point out that the real problem for the US is not ‘winning the war’ but ‘managing the aftermath.’ Washington’s superior military power could quickly neutralise the Venezuelan army, but stabilising and controlling the country could take years. As in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, prolonged insurgencies, loss of control in border regions, and costs running into billions of dollars pose serious risks for the US. It is therefore stated that Washington’s priority is not direct occupation, but rather increasing economic pressure, deepening diplomatic isolation, and bringing about change in the internal political balance in Caracas.

Venezuela’s air defence systems are not resilient against modern US technology, the majority of its tank fleet consists of older models, and the weakness of its maintenance and logistics infrastructure due to the economic crisis seriously limits its operational capabilities. Venezuela’s dependence on Russia and Iran for most of its heavy weapons and ammunition also makes sustainability in a protracted conflict even more questionable.

Although the Maduro administration has claimed for years that it has expanded its militia force, the government’s frequently cited figure of ‘8 million militiamen’ is considered unrealistic by many analysts. Regional experts note that Maduro uses the emphasis on militias as a control mechanism in domestic politics. This approach sends a message of strength against both the opposition and potential divisions within the army. However, the convergence of heavy weapons, long-range systems, and irregular militia structures under one roof increases the risk of ‘miscalculation’ in the region. At a time when the US maintains a massive military presence in the Caribbean, even a minor provocation has the potential to trigger regional tensions.

Over 80 people killed on allegations of drug trafficking

Drug trafficking plays a significant role in the backdrop of this political-military tension. The US Coast Guard’s ‘Operation Pacific Viper’ targets the Pacific Ocean as one of the main routes for cocaine smuggling. According to reports in the Latin American press, over 34 tonnes of cocaine were seized in the Pacific as part of the operation. The Pacific route has become a corridor that has grown in volume in recent years and has become increasingly difficult to detect. Shipments originating from Colombia’s Pacific coast reach the coasts of Panama, Guatemala and Mexico; from there, they either jump to the US by sea or are transported north by land.

Tracking and interception operations at sea are becoming increasingly difficult due to the use of semi-submersible boats, fishing boats and high-speed motorised vehicles on the water. In raids conducted by the US, mostly in the Caribbean Sea, on the grounds that they were transporting drugs, more than 80 people have lost their lives so far. While it remains to be confirmed whether these deceased individuals were drug traffickers, Colombian President Gustavo Petro has claimed that they were innocent.

Venezuela’s location is particularly noteworthy. According to data from independent international organizations, the country is a critical transit area for both land and air traffic due to its border with Colombia, the world’s largest cocaine producer. Although Venezuela’s transit role is increasing on routes heading to the east and south coasts of the United States via Colombia, the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico, the Pacific route, which the United States ignores, still accounts for more than 80 per cent of drug trafficking.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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he United States is preparing to launch a new phase of Venezuela-related operations in the coming days, escalating efforts to weaken President Nicolas Maduro’s grip on power amid a widening military buildup in the Caribbean, four U.S. officials told Reuters.

The officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the plans, said covert operations are expected to form the initial wave of action. They emphasized that the timing and contours of the operation remained fluid and that it was unclear whether President Donald Trump had issued a final order.

Still, the discussions mark the sharpest turn yet in Washington’s pressure campaign against Maduro, who has ruled the crisis-stricken country since 2013 and accuses the U.S. of seeking to overthrow him.

A senior administration official declined to detail the plan but did not rule out any option. “President Trump is prepared to use every element of American power to stop drugs from flooding into our country and to bring those responsible to justice,” the official said.

Covert action expected as first step

Two officials said covert CIA-led operations—already authorized in Venezuela—would likely form the first phase of the new effort. The CIA declined to comment.

The potential scope of U.S. options reflects the administration’s growing assertion that Maduro and key Venezuelan military figures oversee the Cartel de los Soles, which Washington accuses of trafficking cocaine into the United States. Maduro denies any involvement, calling the allegations fabricated.

The Trump administration plans on Monday to designate the cartel as a foreign terrorist organization, a move Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said “brings a whole bunch of new options to the United States.” Trump has said the designation could justify targeting Venezuelan infrastructure and financial assets.

Military buildup raises regional concerns

The posture comes against the backdrop of a substantial U.S. military buildup near Venezuela. The Navy’s largest aircraft carrier, the Gerald R. Ford, arrived in the Caribbean on November 16 with its strike group, joining at least seven warships, a nuclear submarine and F-35 aircraft.

Officially, U.S. forces have been conducting counter-narcotics missions. Yet the scale of the deployment has alarmed regional governments and human rights monitors, who argue the assembled firepower goes far beyond what such operations require.

Since September, U.S. forces have carried out at least 21 strikes on alleged drug-smuggling vessels in the Caribbean and Pacific, killing at least 83 people. Human rights groups have condemned the attacks as extrajudicial killings, and some U.S. allies have privately expressed concern about possible violations of international law.

The FAA on Friday warned airlines of a “potentially hazardous situation” in Venezuelan airspace, prompting three international carriers to cancel flights from the country on Saturday.

Maduro digs in as Washington weighs options

Maduro has dismissed U.S. claims of drug trafficking and insists Venezuela will resist any attempt to remove him. Government-aligned media have recently broadcast segments discussing “prolonged resistance,” a guerrilla-style military strategy that would rely on dispersed units carrying out sabotage operations.

Venezuela’s armed forces, once one of Latin America’s better-equipped militaries, have deteriorated after years of economic collapse. Reports suggest some unit commanders have had to negotiate directly with farmers for food supplies due to shortages.

Still, analysts warn that any attempt by Washington to forcibly oust Maduro risks setting off a prolonged conflict. Despite low approval ratings and economic devastation, Maduro retains the loyalty of the upper military ranks and key armed civilian groups.

Peru has severed diplomatic relations with Mexico after former Prime Minister Betssy Chávez, a close ally of ousted President Pedro Castillo, fled to the Mexican embassy in Lima to request political asylum, officials said on Monday.

Foreign Minister Hugo de Zela announced the decision at a press conference in Lima, calling the move a response to “an unfriendly act” by Mexico. The rupture marks the lowest point yet in already fraught relations between the two Latin American nations, which have clashed repeatedly since Castillo’s dramatic removal from office in late 2022.

“In response to this unfriendly act and taking into account the repeated occasions in which the current and former presidents of that country have interfered in the internal affairs of Peru, the Peruvian government has decided today to break diplomatic relations with Mexico,” de Zela said.

De Zela confirmed that Peruvian authorities learned earlier in the day that Chávez, who had been facing criminal charges related to Castillo’s failed attempt to dissolve Congress, entered the Mexican embassy to seek asylum.

Diplomatic fallout

The announcement came hours after local media reported a heavy police presence outside the embassy compound in Lima’s San Isidro district. Officers were seen guarding the perimeter while government vehicles arrived and left throughout the afternoon.

Mexico’s Foreign Ministry did not immediately respond to requests for comment. The Mexican government, under President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, has previously granted asylum to several members of Castillo’s administration, deepening tensions with Lima.

López Obrador has repeatedly criticized Castillo’s ouster, describing it as a coup and refusing to recognize the legitimacy of President Dina Boluarte’s government. Peru’s leaders have accused the Mexican president of “persistent interference” and “ideological bias” in domestic affairs.

Monday’s decision to break diplomatic relations effectively halts official communication between the two nations and will likely result in the closure of embassies in both capitals.

A political ally on the run

Betssy Chávez, 34, served as prime minister for just over four months in 2022 before Castillo’s attempt to dissolve Congress sparked a constitutional crisis that ended with his arrest and impeachment.

Chávez, a lawmaker and labor minister before rising to the premiership, was among several high-ranking officials accused of conspiring with Castillo to illegally dissolve the legislature and rule by decree.

Prosecutors have charged her with rebellion and conspiracy, seeking a 25-year prison sentence. She was detained in June 2023 but released three months later while her trial was ongoing.

Her lawyer, Raúl Noblecilla, told local radio station RPP that he had not been in contact with his client for several days and could not confirm whether she had officially requested asylum. “I have no knowledge of her current situation,” he said.

According to court documents, Chávez’s driver testified that during Castillo’s failed power grab in December 2022, she asked him to drive her to the Mexican embassy before returning to her office. Chávez has denied that account and maintains she had no prior knowledge of Castillo’s plan to dissolve Congress.

Strained relations since castillo’s fall

Diplomatic ties between Mexico and Peru have been deteriorating since Castillo’s ouster in December 2022, when he was arrested after attempting to dissolve the opposition-controlled Congress and rule by decree.

Castillo, a rural schoolteacher and leftist union leader, won the presidency in 2021 amid widespread frustration with the political elite. His government was plagued by corruption scandals, political instability, and clashes with Congress throughout his 17 months in office.

After his arrest, Castillo sought refuge in the Mexican embassy but was intercepted by security forces before he could enter. Mexico later offered asylum to members of his family, who fled to Mexico City in December 2022.

President Boluarte’s government has accused Mexico of meddling in Peru’s internal affairs by sheltering Castillo’s relatives and publicly questioning the legitimacy of her presidency. In December 2022, Peru expelled the Mexican ambassador, and relations have remained strained ever since.

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he U.S.’s increased military activity in the Caribbean, the harsh statements from the government of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, and regional balances point to a new wave of crisis rising in Latin America. To understand the U.S.’s stance towards Venezuela, it is useful to briefly look back at the past.

With Hugo Chavez coming to power in Venezuela in 1999, relations with the United States rapidly deteriorated. Chavez nationalized the state oil company PDVSA, channelling the revenues into social programs; he developed relations with China, Russia, Cuba and the Middle East. Under the banner of ‘21st-Century Socialism’, he sought to establish an anti-U.S. bloc in Latin America. Washington, however, labelled Chávez an ‘instability factor’ and attempted to oust him from power in 2002 by mobilizing his opponents.

Following the event, which went down in history as the 48-hour coup, U.S.-Venezuela relations reached a breaking point. Although Chávez later met with Obama, no progress was made in the relationship. After Chávez’s death, the Maduro administration, which came to power in accordance with his will, also faced similar pressures. In 2018, an assassination attempt against Maduro using a drone failed.

Subsequently, Juan Guaidó, the former Speaker of the National Assembly supported by the U.S., called for an uprising in Caracas with some soldiers, but the coup attempt was unsuccessful. Later, mercenaries backed by the U.S. and Colombia attempted an invasion from Venezuela’s northern coast. However, the attack was thwarted thanks to prior intelligence, and many individuals, including two Americans, were arrested and sentenced to 20 years in prison.

The U.S. pressure policy towards Maduro

The U.S., which does not recognize Maduro as the legitimate head of state, accused the Venezuelan President of ‘international drug trafficking’ in March 2020 and offered a $15 million reward for his capture. This reward was later increased in stages to $25 million and finally to $50 million. The Washington administration deployed military pressure elements in addition to diplomatic and economic sanctions. It deployed warships, nuclear submarines and advanced fighter jets to the Caribbean region on the grounds of combating Latin American drug cartels.

Although official statements indicated that these elements would be used for ‘intelligence gathering, surveillance and intervention with small boats in the fight against drug trafficking,’ experts point out that military activity on this scale has not been seen in the region since the 1989 invasion of Panama.

Latin American experts I spoke to warned that Washington’s possible military intervention in Venezuela would destabilize not only the Caracas government but the entire region.

According to recent reports, the U.S. Navy has carried out operations against speedboats in the Caribbean allegedly ‘carrying drugs’. However, it remains unclear whether these boats were actually loaded with drugs and whether those killed were cartel members. Venezuela and Colombia have repeatedly stated that the boats that were hit had no connection to drug traffickers.

The U.S. allegation of the Cartel de los Soles (Sun Cartel)

The U.S. accuses Maduro of being the leader of the Sun Cartel, but there is a peculiar situation: neither Venezuela, Mexico nor Colombia officially recognizes the existence of this organization. Cartel de los Soles is the name given to a drug network allegedly made up of high-ranking soldiers and government officials within Venezuela. The name comes from the sun symbol worn on the shoulders of generals in the Venezuelan army; therefore, ‘cartel of the suns’ actually means ‘cartel of the generals’. It first came to prominence in the 1990s with allegations that some Venezuelan officers were involved in drug trafficking.

According to the U.S., this cartel collaborates with organizations such as the Marxist FARC in Colombia to ship cocaine to the U.S. and European markets and operates as an institutionalized structure within the upper echelons of the Venezuelan state. The Maduro government has repeatedly stated that these accusations are being used by the U.S. as a ‘pretext for regime change’ in Venezuela. Maduro stated in a recent television appearance that his country is free of drugs and that security forces have dealt significant blows to the cartels in recent years.

The Venezuelan government denies the existence of such an organization (the Sun Cartel), rejects the allegations, and labels them as ‘imperialist propaganda.’ Venezuela consistently informs the international community that the United States’ true intention is not to combat drugs, but to covet oil and natural resources.

The Maduro administration sent a letter to President Trump on September 6 via his special representative Richard Grenell in an attempt to normalize relations with the U.S. The letter clearly stated that the allegations against Venezuela of ‘links to mafia and drug trafficking gangs’ were completely unfounded. Maduro conveyed the message, ‘If your goal is to fight gangs, I am not the one to target; however, if you wish to engage in trade, I am open to discussion.’

Nevertheless, this olive branch extended by Maduro to Trump did not satisfy the U.S. administration. Washington has, for now, ignored this offer, but it would not be surprising to see new initiatives on the agenda in the coming period.

Despite U.S. military activity in the Caribbean, ‘the streets are calm’

According to assessments received from colleagues in Venezuela, daily life in the country continues largely as normal. There is no noticeable abnormality in shopping centres, restaurants, cafes and commercial centres. Although the public is closely following developments, no significant change in daily habits has been observed. However, the opposition makes no secret of the fact that they would welcome a possible U.S. military intervention. We know that opposition leader Maria Corina Machado and other politicians living in exile abroad are conducting intensive lobbying activities in the U.S. Congress. Right-wing leaders in Latin America are also not holding back from calling on Washington to ‘come’ through black propaganda in the media.

As in every country, there are factions in Venezuela that want intervention from another power. The sole objective of Maduro’s ideological enemies in Latin America is to bring about regime change under the banner of ‘democracy.’ In the Turkish media, Venezuela is still being assessed based on conditions during the COVID-19 era. However, comments suggesting that the country is on the brink of a famine crisis do not reflect reality. The country has experienced steady growth over the past five years; the rapid rise of the dollar has stopped, and inflation is partially under control. If economic sanctions were lifted and the billions of dollars frozen were returned, conditions would undoubtedly improve significantly.

The most fundamental difference between the government and the opposition is clearly visible on the streets and squares of the country. While the opposition argues that there is rampant corruption and that this is the root cause of the crisis, the government accuses the opposition of encouraging economic sanctions. The government’s message in the squares can be summarised as follows: ‘Remember, the opposition encouraged economic sanctions, and billions of dollars were stolen from the country.’

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eru’s political turmoil deepened early Friday as Congress voted to remove President Dina Boluarte from office, citing her failure to curb an escalating wave of violent crime that has gripped the nation. Lawmakers swiftly installed José Jerí, the 38-year-old president of Congress, as interim leader — the country’s sixth president in less than a decade.

The dramatic vote unfolded shortly after midnight, marking the culmination of weeks of mounting frustration over the government’s inability to stem rampant violence and organized crime.

In a 130-member unicameral Congress, 124 lawmakers backed Boluarte’s removal. None opposed the motion — a rare display of unity among Peru’s often-fractured political factions.

Lawmakers had convened an emergency debate late Thursday after approving four impeachment motions against the embattled leader. They invited Boluarte to appear before them to defend her record, but when she failed to attend, the vote to oust her proceeded immediately.

The move came just hours after a shooting at a concert in Lima injured five people, further inflaming public outrage over unchecked crime across the country.

A presidency brought down by violence and distrust

Boluarte, Peru’s first female president, had taken office in December 2022 following the ouster of leftist President Pedro Castillo, who attempted to dissolve Congress and rule by decree. As Castillo’s former vice president, Boluarte was elevated to complete his term, promising stability and reform.

But her nearly three years in office were marked by deep political division, corruption scandals, and a surge in criminal violence that has left tens of thousands of Peruvians feeling unsafe.

Within the first three months of her presidency, Peru saw more than 500 protests demanding her resignation. Analysts say her government’s credibility steadily eroded as crime worsened and economic inequality persisted.

Official figures released in August revealed the scale of the crisis: between January and mid-August 2025, at least 6,041 people were killed — the highest death toll for that period since 2017. Meanwhile, reports of extortion and organized crime have soared, with nearly 16,000 extortion complaints filed between January and July, a 28% increase compared to the previous year.

In a televised address on Wednesday, Boluarte partly blamed the deteriorating security situation on illegal immigration, claiming foreign criminal networks had taken root in Peru.

“This crime has been brewing for decades and has been strengthened by illegal immigration,” Boluarte said during a military ceremony. “Past administrations opened our borders and allowed criminals to enter without restriction.”

Her remarks drew sharp criticism from human rights groups, who accused her of scapegoating migrants while failing to present an effective national security plan.

Midnight vote, immediate transition

The impeachment session — Peru’s ninth attempt to unseat Boluarte since she took office — was the only one to succeed. The overwhelming vote reflected rare bipartisan agreement that her administration had lost control of the streets.

Moments after the result was announced, lawmakers erupted in cheers and began singing the national anthem. By dawn, José Jerí, who had presided over Congress, was sworn in as interim president in a televised ceremony.

Jerí pledged to uphold Peru’s constitution and oversee a peaceful transition of power ahead of elections scheduled for April 2026.

“I will defend the sovereignty of our nation and ensure that power is handed over to the democratically elected president next year,” Jerí said, moments after receiving the presidential sash.

During a brief speech broadcast just before Jerí’s swearing-in, Boluarte defended her record, highlighting social and economic initiatives launched under her leadership.

“I have not thought of myself, but rather of Peruvians,” she said, before the live feed abruptly cut to the inauguration of her successor.

A cycle of political instability

Boluarte’s ouster adds another chapter to Peru’s long-running cycle of political instability, where nearly every elected president in the past two decades has faced impeachment, resignation, or imprisonment.

Since 2016, the country has seen a rapid succession of leaders — Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, Martín Vizcarra, Manuel Merino, Francisco Sagasti, Pedro Castillo, and Dina Boluarte — none able to complete a full five-year term.

Boluarte’s downfall, however, underscores a particularly acute crisis: the convergence of political dysfunction and surging violent crime. Analysts say Peru’s Congress — which enjoys little more public trust than the presidency — is seeking to channel public anger at rising insecurity toward restoring its own legitimacy.

“This is less about reform and more about survival,” said Lima-based political analyst María del Carmen Rivas. “Peru’s political class has lost the confidence of the people. Removing Boluarte may calm the streets for a moment, but it won’t fix the deeper problems.”

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n a bid to quell escalating tensions, Argentina and Colombia have reached an agreement to defuse a diplomatic row sparked by inflammatory remarks exchanged between their respective presidents.

The dispute erupted following a vitriolic attack by right-wing Argentine President Javier Milei on his leftist Colombian counterpart, Gustavo Petro, prompting Colombia to order the expulsion of Argentine diplomats.

In a joint statement issued late Sunday, the foreign ministries of both countries affirmed their commitment to resolving differences and fortifying bilateral relations.

Colombia announced the return of its ambassador to Buenos Aires, while Argentina pledged a visit by its foreign minister to Bogota. Additionally, Colombia retracted its threat to expel Argentine diplomats, indicating approval of Argentina’s newly appointed ambassador.

President Milei and Petro friction

The friction between President Milei and President Petro has been characterized by heated exchanges, with past confrontations revolving around ideological differences and personal attacks.

Milei, known for his outspoken libertarian views, labeled Petro a “terrorist murderer,” citing his involvement with a leftist guerrilla group. In response, Petro accused Milei of exacerbating poverty in Argentina through his libertarian policies.

The recent escalation underscores the deep-seated ideological divisions between Milei and Petro, who represent starkly contrasting political ideologies.

Petro, championing leftist policies aimed at addressing poverty and inequality, stands in stark contrast to Milei’s libertarian agenda, which advocates for reduced government intervention and fiscal austerity.

Ideological divergence?

Despite their ideological divergence, both leaders ascended to power on promises of transformative change, tapping into widespread discontent with traditional political establishments perceived as ineffectual in addressing societal challenges.

As Argentina and Colombia move to mend diplomatic fences, the resolution of this spat underscores the importance of constructive dialogue and diplomatic engagement in navigating ideological differences and fostering regional cooperation.

With both nations facing pressing socio-economic challenges, the imperative for collaboration and mutual understanding remains paramount in ensuring stability and prosperity in the region.

Source: The Associated Press

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n a striking gesture of détente, the United States and Venezuela have successfully conducted a prisoner exchange, signaling a subtle yet notable shift in the strained relations between the two countries. Ten American detainees, considered by the U.S. to be wrongfully imprisoned, have been released by Venezuelan authorities and have safely landed back on American soil.

The group arrived at a military base in San Antonio, Texas, on December 20 at night, and among them were six Americans whom the U.S. government had long advocated for their release. U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan celebrated their return, heralding the end of an arduous diplomatic effort.

In exchange, President Joe Biden granted clemency to Alex Saab, a Colombian businessman with close ties to Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, who was detained in Miami on charges of money laundering. Saab’s release and return to Venezuela were confirmed by the Venezuelan government, which has vigorously defended him against accusations of siphoning off $350m from Venezuela in a corrupt scheme.

Recent sanctions relief

The return of Saab to Venezuelan soil was a momentous occasion for Caracas, with President Maduro personally welcoming him back. This exchange comes as the White House commits to a deeper engagement with Caracas, evidenced by recent sanctions relief in response to Venezuela’s commitment to fair elections in 2024.

Qatar played a crucial intermediary role in facilitating the talks, with the White House acknowledging their significant contribution. The Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs lauded the successful mediation, which aligns with its track record of resolving key international issues.

The deal also includes the release of at least 20 Venezuelan prisoners, including political detainees, a move that reflects a softening stance from Maduro’s government. Among the freed is the infamous Malaysian businessman, Leonard Glenn Francis, known for his central role in a vast U.S. military bribery scandal.

Broader implications for U.S.-Venezuelan relations

On Thursday, the Qatari Foreign Ministry expressed gratitude towards both the United States and Venezuela for their positive engagement with its diplomatic efforts. The ministry described the recent mediation as a segment of wider endeavors to resolve the lingering disputes between the two nations. The successful outcome of the mediation underscores Qatar’s reputation as a dependable partner on both regional and international stages, emphasizing its commitment to fostering peace, security, and stability globally.

The exchange has broader implications for U.S.-Venezuelan relations, which have seen incremental improvements despite a history of discord. With the U.S. indicating that further sanctions relief could be contingent on the continuation of positive steps towards democracy in Venezuela, this prisoner swap could be the harbinger of a new chapter in diplomatic ties.

While the precise details of the negotiations remain classified, the success of this exchange offers a glimpse into potential future cooperation. As the international community observes these developments, the focus remains on how this thaw in relations could impact both nations’ political landscapes and contribute to regional stability.

Source: Aljazeera English

B

ritish musician Roger Waters has encountered a concerted effort by Israeli lobbies to disrupt his Latin American tour, reportedly due to his outspoken support for the Palestinian people amid recent hostilities with Israel.

In an exclusive interview with TRT World, the Pink Floyd co-founder detailed the opposition he’s faced, including attempts to cancel his shows and boycotts based on accusations of anti-Semitism, which he vehemently denies.

Waters, known for his high-grossing tours and political activism, has described the actions of these lobbies as a smear campaign against him for condemning what he perceives as Israel’s “collective punishment” of Gaza residents.

He expressed his empathy for the people of Gaza, referring to the Israeli assault as being supported by “the most powerful empire in the world,” a statement indicative of his critical view of U.S. foreign policy.

A boycott campaign

The 80-year-old artist revealed that during his ‘This Is Not a Drill’ tour in Argentina and Uruguay, he faced a boycott campaign that he alleges was orchestrated by Israeli lobbies. They managed to co-opt hotels in Buenos Aires and Montevideo, leading to extraordinary measures taken against his stay and performance.

Waters’ troubles extended to Santiago, Chile, where he claims there were also attempts to cancel his show despite its popularity and sold-out status. This backlash followed him to Brazil, where he reportedly had to lodge in Sao Paulo after being told there was no room available in Argentina.

During a performance in Buenos Aires, Waters spoke to his audience about being silenced for his belief in human rights. This statement came amid legal and political challenges, with an Argentine lawyer filing a complaint against him and a Uruguayan lawmaker calling for the revocation of his title as a Distinguished Visitor, first awarded in 2018.

Solidarity with Waters

The Israeli lobbies, according to Waters, have accused him of spreading hatred against Jewish people, an accusation he rejects, comparing the tactics used against him to those in “Goebbels’ playbook.”

Despite these challenges, the Latin American Confederation of Workers showed solidarity with Waters, offering their hotels to him and his band amid the controversy. His tour also included a meeting with former Uruguayan President Jose Mujica, known for his leftist stance.

Waters has been a vocal critic of Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians and has supported the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement against Israel. He has consistently criticized the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, which began in 1967 and is considered illegal under international law.

The artist’s visit to Chile also included engagement with Club Deportivo Palestino, a football club founded by the Palestinian diaspora, where he received thanks for his solidarity with the Palestinian cause.

The ongoing genocide in Gaza has drawn the attention of various international artists and activists like Waters, who use their platforms to voice their concerns and support for affected populations. Waters’ actions and the ensuing backlash underscore the polarizing nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its far-reaching impact on global discourse.

Source: TRT World

A

rgentine labor leaders have expressed staunch opposition to the newly elected President Javier Milei’s proposed economic reforms, which include significant privatizations and a reduction in public spending. Milei’s victory, with a larger than expected margin, has sparked concerns among unions and social organizations that fear the impact on the country’s workforce and public services.

Milei, known for his dramatic campaign demonstrations, including wielding a chainsaw, has called for radical actions to revive Argentina’s stagnant economy, which is currently battling an annual inflation rate of 140%. His post-election comments indicate a strong shift towards privatization, suggesting that “everything that can be in the hands of the private sector will be,” including state-owned media, oil and gas companies, water distribution, and train services.

Union leaders, led by Héctor Dear, the secretary general of the General Confederation of Labor, are closely monitoring Milei’s statements. Dear emphasized the labor movement’s focus on job creation and production, countering Milei’s plans which they believe could lead to economic cuts and job losses.

Privatization of the state-owned Aerolineas Argentinas

Pablo Biró, head of the Airline Pilots Association, made a fiery proclamation against Milei’s intention to privatize the state-owned Aerolineas Argentinas, signaling a potential for intense labor conflict.

While some union leaders advocate a cautious approach, awaiting Milei’s implementation of policies, others, like Daniel Catalano from the State Workers’ Association, have declared immediate resistance, aligning with human rights groups like the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo in symbolic opposition.

Concerns also extend to human rights organizations that foresee potential setbacks in policies that have enabled the prosecution of crimes against humanity during Argentina’s military dictatorship. Leftist social organizations are planning to mobilize against austerity measures, indicating a turbulent road ahead for the incoming government.

Significant social protest?

Analyst Nicolás Saldías predicts that Milei’s quick action on privatizations could trigger significant social protest, as labor unions are well-prepared to mobilize against policies they view as detrimental. Argentina’s robust tradition of labor union activism, known for its impactful strikes and roadblocks, suggests that the country may be on the verge of a period of heightened civil unrest.

President-elect Milei has acknowledged the likelihood of protests and has vowed to enforce the law without succumbing to pressure. With a history of volatile responses to protests, including fatalities, Argentine law enforcement may face challenges in maintaining order without exacerbating tensions.

As Argentina prepares for Milei’s tenure beginning in December, the nation watches with apprehension, anticipating the potential consequences of his administration’s controversial policies on the fabric of Argentine society.

Sources: ABC News and AP

C

hina’s foreign ministry issued a stern warning to Argentina on Tuesday, November 21, labeling any potential severance of bilateral ties as a “serious mistake.” The statement follows the electoral victory of Argentina’s right-wing libertarian Javier Milei, who has publicly denounced dealings with communist regimes, including China.

Mao Ning, a spokesperson for China’s foreign ministry, stated during a news briefing that the flourishing relationship between China and Argentina should not be jeopardized. Mao’s comments underscore China’s concerns over Milei’s prior criticisms of China and his likening of the Chinese government to an “assassin.”

The president-elect’s stance marks a significant departure from outgoing President Alberto Fernandez’s policy, which embraced China as a key ally and “true friend” to Argentina. Fernandez’s recent visit to Beijing reaffirmed commitments to collaborate within international frameworks like the G20 and BRICS.

Argentina would not be joining BRICS

Diana Mondino, poised to become the foreign minister in Milei’s administration, asserted that Argentina would not be joining the BRICS bloc and indicated a halt to interactions with the governments of China and Brazil, according to Russia’s RIA Novosti.

Mao Ning responded to inquiries about Mondino’s remarks by emphasizing the economic synergies and cooperation potential between China and Argentina. He expressed China’s intention to foster stable and long-term bilateral relations, despite the political changes in Argentina.

Earlier, Mondino clarified that while Argentina would continue trade with Brazil, the Milei administration aimed to terminate non-transparent state-to-state deals with China. This move aims to address what she termed “multiple secret negotiations” that have occurred in the past two decades.

The potential loss to Argentina

Chinese state media have downplayed Milei’s comments, focusing on the potential loss to Argentina should it decide to exclude China from its market. The media’s response reflects a broader narrative that suggests Argentina may face economic repercussions if it pivots away from its current relationship with China.

The unfolding diplomatic drama signals potential shifts in South American politics, which could have wider implications for international trade and geopolitical alignments in the region.

A significant policy shift could introduce economic uncertainty, both for Argentina’s market and for Chinese businesses operating there. The prospect of renegotiating or canceling trade deals and projects may lead to short-term economic disruptions.

Milei’s foreign policy decisions will likely have domestic repercussions. Depending on how his policies impact Argentina’s economy and international standing, there could be varying levels of public support or opposition.

Source: Reuters and MSNBC News

L

atin America’s recent “left turn” was triggered by a growing discontent with entrenched inequalities, social injustices, and perceived disregard for the marginalized segments of society. This resurgence of left-wing politics is by no means uniform, as the diverse nations of Latin America each have their own unique narratives and experiences. The region has emerged as one that bears witness to the ebb and flow of democratic ideals, often under the shadow of powerful elites.

Often times, right-wing forces have repeatedly dethroned elected governments that challenged the rich and accepted democracy only after removing the Left and widespread market reform. In this context, a question worth considering is: how would the Right react if democracy threatened elite interests?

Gabriel Hetland’s thought-provoking book, Democracy on the Ground: Local Politics in Latin America’s Left Turn, delves into the confluence of the Left and the Right shedding light on the dynamics of political power through the prism of local politics in Venezuela and Bolivia.

Hetland’s work is the culmination of two years of immersive fieldwork, during which he meticulously observed and analyzed the attempts at participatory reform in cities governed by both the Left and the Right in each of these South American nations. He sets out to unravel a compelling puzzle: what drives political elites to embrace participatory democracy within select Latin American cities while neglecting it in others? The fundamental inquiry at the heart of this book is whether democracy can truly flourish when elite interests are at stake.

Democracy on the Ground presents an essential grassroots examination of two ‘populist’ experiments conducted in Venezuela and Bolivia. One of the central findings of Hetland’s research is that participatory reform measures were more successful in Venezuela compared to Bolivia, regardless of the party in office. Hetland posits that Venezuela’s ruling party achieved a unique form of hegemony, wherein it presented its ideology as a shared vision for all citizens. This political maneuvering forced the Venezuelan Right to operate within the Left’s political framework, ultimately compelling it to implement participatory reforms with surprising vigor.

O

n May 17, 2023, Ecuador’s President Guillermo Lasso dissolved the opposition-led legislature, setting the stage for immediate elections. The snap elections, held on August 20, 2023, resulted in the election of a new congress and a presidential candidate. However, as none of the presidential candidates received a majority of votes, the country is now gearing up for a presidential runoff scheduled for October 15.

In the runoff, Ecuadorians will witness a competition between Luisa Gonzalez of the left-wing populist party associated with former president Rafael Correa and 35-year-old businessman Daniel Noboa, hailing from a prominent and affluent political family lineage. Following the assassination of outspoken organized crime critic Fernando Villavicencio on August 9, addressing crime-related issues has been notably absent in the presidential race.

In recent months, a disturbing trend of targeted killing has swept through the political landscape, claiming the lives of numerous politicians and elected representatives. In the eastern coastal city of Manabí, mayor Luz Marina Delgado and a colleague lost their lives in a fatal attack, as assailants fired upon their vehicle, causing a tragic collision.

A known investigative journalist, Villavicencio, 59 years old, had focused extensively on anticorruption and the violence caused by drug trafficking in Ecuador. Last May, during an interview with CNN en Español, he asserted that Ecuador had been transformed into a “narcotic state” and outlined his intention to spread a campaign against what he labeled the “political mafia.” Villavicencio, who was one of the only citizens who dared to confront such criminals, previously mentioned that he had been the target of life threats by criminal organizations.

Ecuador: The transit nation

Once regarded as a bastion of stability in Latin America, Ecuador now faces a pervasive battle against organized crime that transcends borders. The nation has become embroiled in a complex fight involving Colombian and Mexican drug cartels, both vying for profitable opportunities within a weakened state plagued by corruption and political turmoil, with the criminal groups notably gaining the upper hand.

The tragic surge in violence has not been seen before in the nation’s history, as decapitated bodies, car bombings, and public space confrontations have become distressingly commonplace. Homicide rates have spiked by a staggering 245% in the past two years, driven by escalating brutality, and an unprecedented number of Ecuadorians are now seeking refuge at the southern border of the United States. Within this grim landscape, gang members hang the remains of victims to assert dominance and establish connections with Mexican cartels, indicating their infiltration and collaboration with local criminal groups.

Notably, UN projections suggest that Colombia, by 2021, had achieved a record high cocaine production of around 1,400 metric tons, with nearly 45% of this volume traversing Ecuador en route to North America, Europe, and Australia. This underscores Ecuador’s role as a pivotal transit point in the cocaine trade.

Latin America’s drug exportation

Once drugs enter Ecuador, a majority pass through its biggest port, Guayaquil, on their way to Europe. Common hiding places are next to seafood or inside bananas. Despite the government jailing thousands of gang members, the drug trade continues.

Last March, a prominent Ecuadorian congressman unveiled the extent to which the Albanian mafia has permeated his country. Through a combination of violent activities, bribery, and the creation of front companies, the Albanian mafia has established an illicit operation worth millions. The operation centers around procuring cocaine at a discounted rate in Latin America and subsequently selling it in the European market.

Spanish customs agents and the national police have disclosed the seizure of the largest-ever cocaine haul in the country, weighing 9.5 tons. They found the drugs hidden within a banana shipment from Ecuador, located in a refrigerated container at the port of Algeciras. The find, which occurred on August 23, 2023, surpasses the previous record of 8.4 tons seized in 2018, also concealed in a banana cargo at the same port.

Authorities initiated the operation after receiving information in July 2023 regarding an incoming shipment of Colombian cocaine via Ecuador. The smugglers carried out their activities through an Ecuadorian banana exporting company, with intentions to distribute the illicit cargo across Europe, starting in Portugal.

The U.S. is currently grappling with drug use, particularly the use of xylazine, also known as “tranq” or “zombie drug.” This substance is particularly hazardous when combined with illicit drugs such as cocaine and heroin, as it intensifies their effects and raises their street value. The U.S. has launched a National Response Plan to deal with the overdose pandemic caused by the drug crisis.

The plan includes educating health professionals on how to treat xylazine withdrawal and addiction, as well as the skin injuries it causes. Additionally, the plan aims to counter illegal imports from Mexico and explore alternatives to eradicate its usage.

How does Ecuador deal with gangs?

The Lasso government initiated the imprisonment of gang leaders. Yet, the government’s efforts to manage the prisons, which are taken over by gangs, has been unsuccessful. Struggles for control within the prisons have resulted in a minimum of 14 mass killings since 2021. In the previous month, disturbances erupted in seven correctional facilities, resulting in the loss of 31 lives.

The Lasso administration declared several states of emergency in the past years, including night curfews in coastal provinces to reduce the violence. However, local gangs continue to appear to have the upper hand. Following a security cabinet meeting, Lasso stated, “We cannot deny that organized crime has permeated the state, political organizations, and society itself; it is a problem that has been brewing for more than a decade.”

Ecuadorian media has alleged that Lasso was inclined towards a potential arrangement that will give gang leaders indirect authority within the prisons. Lasso refuted any claims of ongoing negotiations with the gangs.

Politicians in Ecuador continue to be targets for criminal gangs alongside growing concerns among citizens, leading to migration towards North America. Ecuadorians are hopeful that the elections scheduled for this October will lead to a reduction in the influence of gang leaders and drug cartels that have gained significant control within the nation.

R

elations between the republics of Argentina and Turkey date back to the early 20th century when thousands of Ottoman subjects started migrating to Argentine territory. The family migratory chains, popularly (and wrongly) called Turcos (Turkish), were mainly Christian or Jewish (from what today would be the territory of Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine) and were composed of migrants who left the Ottoman Empire mostly in “irregular” ways.

The Ottoman Empire’s interest in keeping in touch with its nationals helped to establish the first bilateral relations. The economic aspect was secondary, to which the Argentine government paid more attention, and the focus was on people’s immigration and religion.

From the 1990s onwards, political and economic cooperation accelerated through the signing of a series of agreements: the Agreement on Economic and Trade Cooperation (1992), the Agreement on Visa Exemption (1992), the Agreement on Scientific-Technical Cooperation, the Air Services Agreement (2011) and the Agreement on Customs Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (2018), among others.

The increased political cooperation translated into growth in trade: Trade exchange between Argentina and Turkey grew 411% between 1992 and 2018. The maximum peak of the trade exchange was achieved in 2022, reaching $1.18 billion, with more than $711 million of Argentine exports. Although the trade exchange has grown in recent decades, it is still a very insignificant part of the total exports for both countries (Turkey represented 0.8% of Argentine exports in 2022, and Argentina represented less than 0.2% of Turkish exports in 2022).

In turn, the trend in trade with Turkey – as with the Middle East – mirrors the pattern of Argentina’s trade with developed countries: a preponderance of commodities or primary products with limited added value in exchange for industrial or manufactured goods.

Turkish Foreign Policy and the Global South

Turkey foreign policy has been linked to regional and global dynamics in recent decades, such as the various conflicts bordering its territory (Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, and now Ukraine) or the Russo-Western tensions in the broader Black Sea region that have turned Turkish foreign policy into a more assertive one, anchored in regional power and national security.

Additionally, the Turkish presence has become increasingly global, especially in the Global South. In the last decade, Turkey’s neighborhood has been embroiled in cumulative turbulence, including active armed conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh, and Moscow’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, and the competition for advantage in terms of maritime delimitation and energy resources in the eastern Mediterranean.

As a central example, Turkey’s relationship and interest in Latin America hit its peak in the 2010s through the growth of trade and the use of Turkish soft power. As part of the Global South, Latin America still holds a place in Turkish foreign policy since this relationship is aligned with Turkey’s rhetoric of independence in international relations, national self-sufficiency, exploration of economic opportunities, and national security.

Within this juncture, Argentina (for economic opportunities) and Turkey (for autonomy and national interests) launched the satellite cooperation project in 2019 between Investigaciones Aplicadas Sociedad del Estado (INVAP, the Applied Research State Company), a company owned by the Province of Río Negro of Argentina, and Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI, a Turkish state-owned company) through the creation of a joint venture called GSATCOM.

The Turkey-Argentina venture’s main objective or goal is the construction of a Geosynchronous Equatorial Orbit (GEO), “à la carte, with a modular and scalable design”: a high-throughput satellite (HTS), with all-electric propulsion and reconfigurable, onboard equipment to adjust to market demands, and the capacity to be adapted to the whole range of existing launchers.

The antennas of these satellites with ion engines can be redirected with a very low loss of efficiency and their onboard signals can be digitized for retransmission. Flexible loading allows the satellite to have a useful life of 15 years at a significantly lower cost; therefore, it can adapt to market changes.

In this regard, tasks were allocated according to the strengths of each company: INVAP is in charge of leading the development of the communications system, while TAI is in charge of the structure and thermal subsystem. This first jointly produced GEO satellite is scheduled to be ready by 2024, according to official information. The project suffered some delays (completion was originally estimated for 2021) due to the COVID-19 global pandemic and Argentina’s budgetary restrictions.

What does the GEO joint satellite cooperation between Turkey and Argentina project demonstrate? Granted, the relationship between the two countries in political terms was –and still is – not optimal, with ups and downs mainly due to an Armenian diaspora lobbying against Turkey and blocking Argentina from developing relations further, and the bilateral relationship lacking an important commercial exchange. Yet, it was possible to develop this joint project because the two companies, with similar origins of being created by their national states and with similar objectives, have shown sound development and are constantly searching for technological innovation and commercial opportunities, which played instrumental roles in achieving this collaboration.

An industrial infrastructure

Yet, it was possible to develop this joint project because the two companies, with similar origins of being created by their national states and with similar objectives, have shown sound development and are constantly searching for technological innovation and commercial opportunities, which played instrumental roles in achieving this collaboration.

In addition, after the end of the Cold War, both Turkey and Argentina developed an industrial infrastructure and a sizable scientific-technological complex despite struggling with constant economic crises. However, unlike in the past, Argentina, through the INVAP, was the one that took the initiative and studied the whole satellite chain for market niches.

In Latin America, Argentina has one of the biggest developed industrial-scientific complexes. For example, Argentina has three Nobel Prizes in Science (for instance, Brazil, which is five times bigger in terms of population, has none). It’s quite surprising that a country like Argentina’s has nuclear, satellite, and aerospace capabilities when most of Latin America mainly depends on natural resources for their economies. 

Once it found an opportunity, Argentina searched for several years for a partner and found TAI. Once the talks between the two companies began in 2017, they successfully established the joint venture in 2019, including the public-private collaboration to achieve the objective. As Gonzalez Levaggi and Blinder point out, “Having differing motivations (referring to Argentina and Turkey) does not mean that cooperation is unachievable.”

This case of South-North cooperation, in which Argentina and Turkey develop their potential to climb the ladder of technological innovation, is a good example of a foreign policy emphasizing developing autonomous capabilities. In other words, it is a policy that widens the margins for developing countries to navigate an increasingly uncertain international sphere.

B

razil has been at the center of speculations between Western expectations towards a renewed regional leadership and the increasing ties with BRICS. In April 2023, Lula da Silva, or simply Lula, Brazil’s president, visited China, welcomed Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s minister of foreign affairs, in Brasilia, and sent Celso Amorim, his closest foreign policy advisor, to meet Volodímir Zelenski. While Lula is showing democratic credentials and holds hard feelings towards Washington, Brazil’s  new international strategy looks to take advantage of the great power competition with an active nonaligned perspective. Latin America seems to be going in the same direction but not necessarily due of Brazil’s new active diplomacy.

Brazil is back

After overcoming a judicial process that included serving a period in prison and returning to the political arena, Lula’s 2023 electoral victory allowed him to resume an active foreign policy with an autonomist orientation that seeks a balance between developed Western powers and revisionist visions of the global order. As Ryan Berg, director of the Americas Program at the at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), argues, Brazil is hedging among great powers and pursuing an agenda of nonalignment, as exemplified in Lula’s visit to Beijing.

Lula has made clear that his priority is to focus on Brazil’s international reinsertion, strongly criticizing the Bolsonaro era both for its authoritarian attitudes domestically and for its erratic foreign policy. Among the main priorities of his new international agenda are the search for peace in the Ukrainian conflict, the establishment of a new regional leadership, and an active and determined projection in the Global South. Special attention has been given to regions where Brazil had regressed in the Bolsonaro era, such as the Middle East and Africa.

However, the new administration faces significant challenges due to the current international landscape, which differs considerably from when it left power. Back then, Brazil was considered a rising star and major powers had a generally positive perception of its role in the global governance agenda—at least until the signing of the tripartite agreement with Iran and Turkey. Today, however, strategic competition among major powers imposes constraints on pursuing a more autonomous foreign policy, especially vis-à-vis traditional partners such as Washington or new strategic partners such as Moscow.

Autonomous decisions have a higher cost. Moreover, the regional context has changed. During the Bolsonaro era, Brazil became a major non-NATO ally (MNNA), which increased its degree of strategic interdependence with the U.S., while the growing presence of China forces Brazil to have a more balanced position given the existing tensions between China and the U.S.

Finally, Lula intends to rebuild the Union of South American Nations (USAN, or UNASUR in Spanish), but South America is less ideologically and politically homogenous than it used to be, which in some ways hinders plans to relaunch this regional body that was deactivated during the previous administration.

Latin America and the Russo-Ukrainian War

The Russian presence has not gone unnoticed in discussions in Latin America. The war in Ukraine is the focus of foreign policy debate in most of Latin America; the discussions are framed in a context of how the region should navigate the rise of China and the emergence of new global actors such as Russia. Among academics, experts, and decision-makers, there are broadly two perspectives on Latin America’s place in an increasingly multipolar world: on the one side, to side with the U.S., or China and/or Russia in the new great power competition, or, on the other, to remain outside of the competition.

The alignment calls for a choice between the United States and China. This option is generally marginal in Latin American foreign policy discussions, and often has a strong liberal ideological component. The strong pro-democratic and liberal affinities generally favor a special closeness with the United States and the Western world, but there are also growing pro-China sympathies, for example, in Venezuela and among some of Latin America’s left-wing movements.

Across the region there is a near consensus not to engage in the new great power competition, while seeking opportunities for economic development and strategic alliances with other countries. The second option has different expressions but can be summarized as a form of nonalignment. The recent book “Latin American Foreign Policies in the New World Order: The Active Non-Alignment Option” edited by Fortin, Heine and Ominami reunites different voices which call for an equidistant position between the White House and Beijing while seeking to deepen regional integration and more active diplomacy both with rising players and in the Global South.

For example, facing the Russo-Ukrainian War, the major Latin American regional players—Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico—have shown a more pragmatic and less forceful stance with respect to condemnation, with a mixture of balanced positions and a search for compensation. Thus, no country in Latin America adopted sanctions against Russia. The case of Brazil is particularly interesting since it shows an important degree of continuity between Bolsonaro and Lula except for the new “peace coalition” project which has been at the core of the current presidential diplomatic maneuvers. Although Bolsonaro’s and Lula’s diplomatic responses offered different nuances within and across different regional players, they signaled an autonomous perspective facing global pressures.

What does active nonalignment mean for Latin America?

Are Brazil and Latin America nonaligned? The answer is yes. Neutrality and nonalignment have been at the center of Latin America’s external choices both in relation to the Russo-Ukrainian War and the U.S.-China strategic competition. However, only to stand aside in a changing global environment is not enough to strengthen agency in world politics. Latin America suffers from a structural relevance deficit in the global scenario, so a more active and prompt approach towards global affairs is needed. Diversification, open regionalism, multilateralism, and soft power are optimal routes to increase regional presence and relative weight in international affairs.

While nonalignment is a fact in current times, the active side of the equation seems to be far behind regional needs. Regional fragmentation and stagnation have been increasing in recent years and the multilateral position does not mean that the regional players coordinate their policies—even those related to the Russo-Ukrainian War— while diversification and soft power policies fluctuate in relation to the importance that governments give to international issues. The relations between Turkey and Latin America are a vivid example of the lack of continuity, with the initiative usually coming from Ankara. In the end, Lula’s new Brazil offers an opportunity to put the region back on the international stage, although it will most likely be following Brasilia’s and not a collective agenda.

S

ince the dawn of 21^st century, the world has been witnessing a shift in the global power balance, with the rise of new economic and political powers. One of the most notable examples of this shift is the emergence of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) as a major powerful inter-regional bloc on the world stage. This group of countries, which represents some of the fastest-growing economies in the world, has been working together to promote a multipolar world order and to challenge the dominance of traditional Western powers.

Argentina and Saudi Arabia may soon join the BRICS group, which would strengthen the multipolar world order bloc, according to recent media rumours. Saudi Arabia has expressed interest in joining the BRICS nations, according to South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, who was in the Kingdom at the time. If this were to occur, the inclusion of these two nations would benefit the group and the entire world, politically and economically.

Saudi Arabia is an important regional and global player in world politics, and henceforth, its addition to BRICS will provide a significant economic and political influence to the group. For instance, Saudi Arabia’s membership will provide a valuable partner in the region to this group and would help promote stability in the Middle East. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is also a major player in the global petrochemical industry, with a production capacity of more than 70 million tons/year. Saudi Arabia’s admission to BRICS would provide its members with a reliable partner in the energy sector and would help promote stability in the global oil market.

On the contrary, Argentina’s membership would bring valuable economic benefits to the group and would help promote trade and investment between BRICS and Latin America. According to IMF and World Bank records, the Argentina’s GDP is $406.2 billion, which makes it the 23rd largest economy in the world.

In addition, Argentina has a strong manufacturing sector, predominantly in the aerospace and automotive industries. Argentina’s membership in BRICS would grant the other members entry into these industries and help stimulate cooperation in the field of manufacturing.

Despite both Argentina and Saudi Arabia facing economic challenges in the past few years,  joining BRICS could provide them with new opportunities to access new markets, and to boost development and economic growth.

For instance, in the case of Saudi Arabia, joining the BRICS group would provide it with new opportunities for investment and trade, which would help to diversify its economy and reduce its dependence on oil exports. Saudi Arabia’s addition to BRICS is particularly quintessential from the standpoint of the ongoing shift towards renewable energy sources, which is likely to lead to a decline in demand for oil in the coming years. As a matter of fact, Saudi Arabia’s inclusion in BRICS would give it access to new technologies and expertise, which would be crucial for its efforts to diversify its economy and create new jobs.

Similarly, in the wake of the ongoing economic crisis in Argentina, joining BRICS would provide it with new opportunities for trade and investment, which would help to stimulate its economy and create new jobs. The ongoing economic crisis in Argentina, which has been characterized by high inflation, a large fiscal deficit, and a large trade deficit, makes the BRICS group a new opportunity for the country. Joining BRICS would provide Argentina with access to new technologies and expertise, which would be crucial for its efforts to modernize its economy and create new jobs.

From the geopolitical and geo-economic standpoint, the BRICS countries have been working to establish a more unbiassed and impartial world order for years, and the inclusion of Saudi Arabia and Argentina in the group would further strengthen these efforts. The BRICS group as an economic bloc have been working on diverse proposals to promote this multipolar world order. For instance, the creation of the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, which is designed to provide alternative sources of finance for developing countries, is a key BRICS initiative. The inclusion of Saudi Arabia and Argentina in the group would further strengthen these initiatives and provide more resources and support to these efforts.

Likewise, from the strategic standpoint, the inclusion of Saudi Arabia and Argentina in BRICS would promote regional stability and cooperation at the global stage. Saudi Arabia and Argentina are key regional players and their membership would bring valuable regional expertise and provide a valuable partner to the BRICS countries in these regions.

To conclude, the possible inclusion of Saudi Arabia and Argentina to the BRICS would bring significant economic, political, and social benefits. The addition of two regional powers to BRICS would further advance the influence of this bloc in particular regions. Their inclusion would strengthen the multipolar world order, provide new opportunities for growth and development, disseminate regional stability and cooperation, and strengthen cultural and educational exchanges.

Last Sunday, May 29, the first round of the Colombian presidential elections took place. In a country of slightly more than 50 million people, out of 39 million who are eligible to vote, more than 21 million exercised their right in a relatively calm environment, despite the high polarization and the permanent paranoia. All sides accuse their opponents of fraud and foul games, and are all together responsible for the tense atmosphere. None of the candidates reached the 50% +1 percentage required for victory.

Yet, leftist Gustavo Petro won 40.32% of the votes and Rodolfo Hernández, an engineer turned businessman and former mayor of Bucaramanga, Colombia’s sixth largest city, won 28.15% of the votes. The two will move on to a runoff on June 19.

The main surprise was the defeat of Federico Gutiérrez, the establishment’s man to maintain the status quo. Current president Iván Duque has a disapproval rate of 70%, leaving the country now highly economically vulnerable, with an inflation rate near a two-digit high, an unemployment of 12%, a high crime rate in cities, and an increase in violence in the rural areas.

Meanwhile, hundreds of community leaders and former guerrilla combatants who signed a peace deal with the government in 2016 were murdered by paramilitary factions as deep unrest hit several social sectors due to the Colombian government’s mismanagement of last year’s general strike.

Against this background, the message of the Colombian people was clear: we want change. Gutiérrez got 23.91% of the votes and immediately announced that he will support Hernández for president, confirming what many Colombians think, namely that Hernández is the establishment’s Plan B for clinging to power.

Petro, whose campaign has elapsed mainly in massive public appearances in Colombian cities and towns, proposes a government program focused on social issues. An increase in taxes for the 4,000 richest citizens, a cut in certain tax reliefs for big companies, financial support for the education and health sectors, a social approach to the war on drugs, strengthening the peace process which the current government shows contempt for, and a climate agenda that contains the exploration and production of oil—Colombia’s main source of income—in the midterm.

Petro, a militant of the leftist nationalistic guerrilla organization M-19 back in the ’70s and ’80s, is seen by almost half of the country as the “Colombian Hugo Chávez,” the late Venezuelan Marxist leader. Even though Petro showed support for Chávez in the past, he has distanced himself from his successor, Nicolás Maduro in recent years. Also, in a clear attempt to soften his image, Petro has met with entrepreneurs while he has been consistent in calling for the unity of alternative social and political forces in the country.

Hernández’s approach targets the bureaucracy. He promises cutting public spending (even announcing that he will donate his salary for social causes), and introducing a tax cut that could increase consumption and strengthen people’s purchasing power. Although his daughter, Laura, was kidnapped and murdered in 2004 by the leftist guerrilla ELN, he assures voters that he will seek peace negotiations with them, and give support to the Colombian agricultural sector.

Similar to Petro, he announced his plan to reestablish diplomatic ties with Venezuela, opposes the use of chemicals in coca and marijuana crops and the use of fracking during oil exploration, and endorses same sex marriage and adoption.

His critics view him as a demagogue or a populist, but this seems not to impact the view of the people he governed in Bucaramanga, where he overwhelmingly won on May 29. His claim that he is independent from the traditional political class does not appear to have completely convinced certain voters. He has also been involved in several controversial statements; on a radio show, years ago, he said, “I’m an admirer of a great German thinker named Adolf Hitler.”

Later he said he meant Albert Einstein. He also was filmed slapping a councilman who denounced him and his son for corruption while he was Bucaramanga’s mayor. His vice-presidential pick is the Afro-Colombian academic Marelen Castillo from the same Western region as Márquez.

Both candidates say their policy towards the United States will be based on friendly ties and mutual respect. Colombia was named “a strategic ally for NATO” during Ivan Duque’s presidency. Being its best “friend” in Latin America, the United States will be closely watching what happens in the June elections. Yet, whatever the outcome is, the U.S. will make sure it does not essentially harm Colombia’s traditionally submissive attitude.

One thing that unites Colombians is the general belief that the next four years will have to be revolutionary in terms of how the next president manages the country’s resources and politics. The Colombian people are very unhappy with the current administration. Life, beyond the pandemic, has become considerably harder for most Colombians: food prices soar, security deteriorates, and opportunities for a better future seem scarce.

The fact that Gustavo Petro and Rodolfo Hernández are in the home stretch in this crucial political moment is solid proof that Colombians are fed up with the political establishment. How this very same establishment will manage to maneuver in order to survive and perhaps even come out stronger from this juncture is yet to be seen.

The second pink tide in Latin America is ongoing as Mexico’s president Andrés Manuel López Obrador won the referendum on April 10, 2022.

López Obrador, who has been serving as president since his election victory in 2018, won the referendum conducted to decide whether he should step down or finish his six-year term in September 2024. In Mexico, presidents are limited to a single term of six years in office.

Although turnout rates were meager, López Obrador won almost 90% of the votes with only 18% of the eligible voters showing up on the day.

Before the referendum, his approval rating was 60%.

Opposition parties claimed that the president could use this landslide referendum to extend his six-year term. In a video message, López Obrador said, “I’m going to continue serving until the last day of my term. I’m not going to go past that because I’m a democrat, and I’m not in favor of re-election.”

Colombia turning to the left?

Colombia offered further proof of the rising left in Latin America with Gustavo Petro winning the primary presidential election with a landslide. Petro was defeated by Ivan Duque in 2018. Since then, the country has entered a complex phase, especially with economic inequality rising due to the COVID19 pandemic.

Colombia was shaken by mass protests in 2021. Polls show that many voters are dissatisfied with the current elected leader and Petro’s chances to be elected in the upcoming elections are increasing.

On May 29, 2022, the first round of Colombia’s presidential election will be held.

Will a former guerrilla member become a president?

Gustavo Francisco Petro Urrego was born in a small town in northern Colombia in 1960. His family migrated to a bigger town, where he later studied at the La Salle public school. Petro studied economics at the Universidad Externado de Colombia and after his graduation, he continued his education at Escuela Superior de Administración Pública (ESAP). Later, he earned his master’s degree in economics.

While at school, he got involved in politics and became a member of M-19, a Colombian guerrilla organization. During the 1980s, he was tortured and imprisoned for being part of the organization.

Later, the organization evolved into a political party in which Petro participated as a member in the 1990s.

In 1994, he was appointed to the Colombian embassy in Belgium as a diplomatic attaché for human rights, a position he held until 1996.

In 2002, Petro was elected to the Chamber of Representatives of Colombia, representing Bogotá, the county’s capital. Later, in 2006, he was re-elected as a senator in an election that saw the second highest voter turnout in the country.

His aspiration to become president started with the 2010 presidential election, where he ranked fourth in the election race, receiving 9.1% of the total votes.

Between 2012 and 2015, he served as mayor of Bogotá. During his tenure, there was a significant reduction in homicide rates, reaching a number that had never been seen in the previous two decades.

In the 2018 presidential election, Petro came second and lost the election to Iván Duque Márquez, the current president. However, he received eight million votes—the highest number ever to be won by a leftist candidate.

Petro is currently serving as a senator (2018-2022). In the presidential primaries on March 13, 2022, he received almost four million votes, double the number of votes won by his opponents. The 61-year-old politician became the presidential candidate for the coalition Historic Pact for Colombia by public vote.

In 2021, a poll published by Invamer showed that at least 75% of Colombians disapproved of Duque’s leadership style, making him the most unpopular leader in the country’s history.

Duque’s popularity crashed when social unrest across the country evolved into anti-government protests, killing 43 civilians in 2021.

The end of right-wing politics in Latin America?

Experts argue that the left is re-emerging in Latin America, especially after the COVID19 pandemic, which saw living conditions worsen.

After years of right-wing neoliberal dominance, many Latin American countries are moving towards left-wing politics. The movement is often referred to as the “pink tide,” which speaks of the regional change towards the left in Latin America after Hugo Chavez came to power in Venezuela in 2000.

For Latin America’s political map, the weekend of March 11-13 was historical. On Friday, March 11, 2022, in Chile’s capital, Santiago, newly elected president Gabriel Boric and his cabinet assumed power in the Andean country, with a recent past of intense social turmoil. On Sunday, March 13, the Colombian people too elected their legislative body and a number of parties decided by popular vote their final candidates for the presidential election on May 29.

With COVID 19 gradually receding, the challenge of the incoming presidents in Latin America will be addressing the aftermath of the pandemic’s catastrophic implications of over the last two years.

In the last decades, both Colombia and Chile have been ruled by what could be described as right-wing neoliberal governments. Boric, a former student leader whose role in the social struggle throughout the past years in Chile has been recognized, rose to power with a promise of bringing about structural social changes in the economic spectrum, pensions, abortion, gender issues, migration, and other sensitive issues for the Chilean people.

Feared by the traditional Chilean power centers, Boric is now facing critics from his own leftist base who voted him in mainly due to his moderate stance regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which he recently condemned, the same as he had condemned autocratic leftist Latin American governments such as Nicaragua.

Boric’s positions in the early days of his duties in office seem less radical than what voters from, for example, the Chilean Communist Party would have expected them to be. It is clear that for Boric to have a grip on power in Chile, he must distance himself from radical postures and somehow calm the traditional elites without submitting to them. The fact that he is 36, one of the youngest presidents in the world, puts some extra pressure on him.

The continent’s youths seem to have awoken from a long lethargy and the fact that the young man, known as a student who took to the streets in Chile, a country shattered by the violence of a prowling dictatorship became president is significant. Boric has to prove that the future is better in the hands of those who stand a higher chance to be part of it.

The March 13 primary elections in Colombia helped cast a denser shadow over the results of the 2018 election. A few days after the primary elections’ results were released in 2018, Petro’s party, Pacto Histórico, had gained at least 390,000 votes as “found” by his party’s election witnesses body, after electoral observers reported irregularities.

So even though the leftist parties may still not have a majority in Congress, they will definitely have a larger representation than they did in the past four years. This scenario could lead to Petro’s presidency, giving him a strong legislative support, but, as Boric did in Chile, he will necessarily have to bargain with the traditional parties to develop his social agenda, through flirting with the Colombian electorate.

Still, there’s nothing sure for Petro in a country where the political and social establishment is not used to losing and the right-wing candidate, Federico Gutiérrez, has all the political machinery on his side.

During the pandemic, Chile and Colombia experienced drastic social unrest, rarely seen before, despite their violent histories. The ruling regimes in both countries failed to deliver welfare to their peoples in the midst of the pandemic. Latin America is a region plagued by social inequalities where natural resources have been exploited for the benefit of foreign multinational companies with the complicity of local elites. Poverty levels and crime rates skyrocketed in most Latin American countries.

Politically, the subcontinent has oscillated between populist governments simplistically labeled “leftist” or “right-wing.”

Countries like Argentina have been oscillating between both extremes without achieving sustainable prosperity. Mexico’s leftist President Andrés López Obrador, who after three attempts, snatched power from the conservative ruling parties, still keeps a relatively healthy level of popularity among Mexicans, but violence is rampant and social inequalities are more than evident.

Likewise, other Latin American countries also fail to find continuity in state policies that would translate in social conquests redounding to better conditions for their citizens. The roots of inequality and social injustice in Latin America are profoundly and intimately related to its colonial history and the process to transcend it is tortuous and slow-moving compared to the people’s needs.

Brazil, the region’s giant, will have presidential elections in early October, expecting a probable comeback of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the socialist former president (2003-2010). Da Silva represents a radical contrast to Bolsonaro’s ultra-right, pro-U.S. government.

The recent developments this year in Chile and Colombia as well as the possibility of Brazil following their footsteps in their elections in October may give birth to a new hope in the region. An essential issue that the new governments must approach is the resumption of diplomatic ties between South American countries, shattered by the influence of the United States.

For instance, Venezuela has no ties today with Colombia and Brazil, two of its most important and increasingly relevant neighbors. The three countries share key challenges like migration and economic development.

The world is witnessing a dramatic revival of the 20^th-century bipolar geopolitical order featuring the Soviet Union, today’s Russia, on the one side, and the United States on the other. This power struggle has shown one of its ugliest faces in Syria and now is showing itself in Eastern Europe with the Russia-Ukraine war. As we slowly leave the nightmare of the COVID19 pandemic behind, a new global tension is born with the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

But, there’s a region where this rivalry between the U.S. and Russia might be writing a new chapter: Latin America. Latin America is a competitive territory, abundant in natural and human resources, that could be the dream of any world superpower.

On February 3, the Colombian Minister of Defense Diego Molano stated, “We know that men and units of the FANB (Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana) have been mobilized towards the border with technical assistance from Russia … and Iran.”

This happened amidst the tensions in the eastern Colombian region of Arauca, an enclave of borderline between Colombia and Venezuela, where clashes between the Colombian army and different subversive groups occur constantly and where in January alone at least 68 people were killed.

The day after, the Russian embassy in Colombia issued a statement condemning Molano’s statement as “irresponsible” and denying any involvement in military assistance to Venezuela that could harm Colombia.

But this was not the first time Molano makes a reference to Russia. In May 2021, Colombia was under one of the most turbulent revolts in the country when millions took to the streets to protest against the government’s handling of the pandemic, the critical social situation, tax reforms, and other essential issues.

Molano accused Russia of being behind cyberattacks against the Colombian government.

This extraordinary event, in a country where civil society used to be scared to raise its voice, shook the establishment and evidently made it unusually nervous. Molano then accused Russia of being behind cyberattacks against the Colombian government, an assertion immediately denied by the Russian government.

On December 8, 2021, Minister Molano signed another treaty with NATO turning Colombia into the first and only “global partner” in Latin America. The agreement’s purpose was to “improve our defense capacity” and to “articulate cooperation with allied nations.” This is something neighboring Venezuela didn’t receive well. Nor did its ally, Russia.

Sergei Ryabkov, deputy foreign minister of Russia, said that he would “neither confirm nor deny” the possibility that Russia might send military assets to Cuba and Venezuela.

On the other hand, Venezuela has strong diplomatic, military, and economic ties with Russia. Since Hugo Chávez became president of Venezuela, both nations have entrenched their relationships. Now with President Maduro, these ties have deepened. On February 16 of last year, Maduro received Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yury Borisov in Caracas, and expressed Venezuela’s support for any Russian move on Ukraine.

The main issue discussed in the meeting was the strategic military cooperation between Russia and Venezuela. As a precedent, in January, Sergei Ryabkov, deputy foreign minister of Russia, during talks with his counterparts in the United States said that he would “neither confirm nor deny” the possibility that Russia might send military assets to Cuba and Venezuela if the U.S. and its allies do not limit their military activities in Latin America.

Venezuela is estimated to have received around $17 billion in loans from Russia since 2007, spending an unknown but presumably considerable amount on the purchase of weapons from the Kremlin. In the oil industry, the main source of income for both states, Russia has played a considerable role by taking part in the trade of this commodity, finding clients that evade the U.S.-imposed sanctions on Venezuela, thus giving some oxygen to the South American nation’s fragile economy.

There are at least 20 areas of cooperation between Russia and Venezuela, mainly, energy, military, and transportation. Other countries, in the political orbit of Venezuela, like Bolivia and Nicaragua, also have good ties with Moscow. Cuba, the oldest Russian friend in the region, is no longer alone.

Is the United States losing its “backyard” in Latin America?

In light of this reality and Russian influence in Latin America, it is easy to guess that the United States may not be very pleased with the situation. Things may get even harder for the U.S. considering that in May this year, Colombians will elect a new president and leftist candidate Gustavo Petro seems the most likely to win. Petro maintains an approach based on resuming diplomatic ties with Venezuela. The Colombian people are increasingly reluctant to any form of confrontation with Venezuela and the popular support for Duque’s right-wing government is constantly seeing new lows.

The U.S. worries about the presence of countries other than Russia in Latin America – namely, Iran and China. Iran and China have been building stronger ties with Venezuela and other Latin American nations. Considering that countries like Chile, Mexico, Argentina, and Costa Rica have turned to the political left in the last few years, and that other regional giants like Colombia and Brazil may do the same soon, the task for U.S. diplomacy may require exerting more efforts in the years to come to assure that their eastern antagonists – the Russians – fail to conquer what they consider to be theirs. The Monroe Doctrine, which states that “America is for Americans,” could become obsolete in the decades ahead.

The fear of some Colombians and Venezuelans lies in what history has taught them: when empires fight, small nations suffer. Even though it is clear that the characteristics of Latin America are substantially different than those of the peoples of the Middle East or Eastern Europe, the textbook of empires has always been the same: find a puppet in a rich place, appropriate people’s wealth, conquer another wealthy nation, and let the locals be the ones whose blood spills.

Only time will tell if Latin America will become the next playground for mighty powers such as the U.S. and Russia, or if they find a third way that shields them from becoming history’s latest tragic example.

Nayib Bukele, the president of El Salvador of Arab/Palestinian origin, made his first visit to Turkey in January 2022, where he signed a series of agreements covering economy, defense industry, and technology among others with his counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In a strained relationship with the Biden administration, Bukele finds in Ankara a potential partner to develop a broad cooperation agenda, while later visiting the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in his regional tour.

If geopolitics rules the dynamics of the Middle East and the Black Sea region, ideology is what matters most in Latin America’s regional and global affairs. Currently, Latin America has a complex mix of conservative populist leaders such as Brazil’s Bolsonaro and El Salvador’s Bukele and the return of a “pink” tide after the elections of Alberto Fernandez in Argentina, Pedro Castillo in Perú, and Gabriel Boric in Chile, in addition to the left-wing governments in Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua.

Despite regional polarization, conservatives and leftists in Latin America have a common point: both are experiencing complicated relations with the Biden administration, so there is a need to diversify relations globally. How do they diversify? They are increasingly looking to engage with Eurasian regional and global powers from China to Turkey, despite pressures from the West. Among other reasons, this is why Jair Bolsonaro is soon visiting Moscow, Alberto Fernandez decided to join the Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Bukele visited Turkey.

Bukele’s visit to Turkey seems to be a turning point in Turkish-Latin American relations. It is not only the first Latin American presidential visit to Turkey in the COVID19 era, but it signals a series of elements that are shaping a new agenda in line with Turkish foreign policy. First, technology is becoming the forefront of a new wave of Turkish activism. Second, Turkish private investing in Latin America and the Caribbean is growing almost from scratch, thus showing a new face for companies’ internationalization, and third, Turkish soft power is capturing increasing attention.

Bukele’s visit to Turkey seems to be a turning point in Turkish-Latin American relations

Ankara’s opening to Latin America has reached unprecedented levels. From almost non-existent regular diplomatic ties and scarce trade flows in the early 2000s, Turkey took the lead with a multidimensional foreign policy which identified various opportunities in Latin America. Twenty years later, the outcome is more than positive. Turkey has 17 embassies in Latin America, Turkish imports jumped from less than US$3.5 billion in 2010 to 8.5 billion in 2018, while exports doubled in the same period, reaching US$3.2 billion.

Turkish Airlines has flights to several regional destinations in Latin America and Turkish television series are famous and appreciated in the region, while hundreds of Latin American students have completed their studies in Turkey. Finally, Turkey is an observer member of different regional organizations such as the Central American Integration System (SICA), the Pacific Alliance, and, lately, Parlatino, the Latin American Parliament.

Finally, renewables – especially solar, hydroelectric, wind, and geothermal energy – are central to Turkey’s energy strategy due to the energy bill cost and the aim to collaborate on sustainable development. The country’s renewable capacity will be expanded over 50% in the next five years according to the International Energy Agency, while Latin America is moving to a more sustainable approach over using traditional sources of energy. The potential investment of a geothermal plant in El Salvador can be an example of the current technological capabilities and visualize opportunities for investments in other countries where the development of green energy is yet to move forward.

At the same time, Turkish investments are growing in Latin America. Up to the mid-2000s, Kordsa, a Sabanci Holding subsidiary in Argentina, was the only company investing in the region, but nowadays more than 20 Turkish companies operate in the region, mostly in the automotive, mining, and transportation sectors.

For example, Turkish Airlines is present in several countries from Argentina to Cuba, Yildirim Holding is close to exploiting the mega mine project Cañaverales in Colombia, and the hazelnut producer Banu is developing a long-term investment in Chile. Until recently, Turkish businesspeople were reluctant to invest in such a distant region, but the growing presence of Turkish Airlines, a series of high-level visits (usually with the presence of businesspeople), and the sustained government support for trade missions is beginning to pay off.

Soft power is also offering returns along the cultural connection. Multiple players such as Anadolu Agency, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), the Turkish Maarif Foundation, and, more recently, the Yunus Emre Institute, which opened offices in Mexico DF and Buenos Aires, are making important contributions, while television series have exposed the Latin America public to the Turkish way of life. Finally, the ongoing “Armenia-Turkey Normalization Process” can help ease the bilateral relations with countries with significant Armenian communities such as Argentina and Uruguay.

Despite the global gap during the peak of the COVID19 pandemic crisis, relations between Turkey and Latin America are reassembling on a new, tech-oriented agenda. Nowadays, Latin America sees Turkey as an extra-regional partner – such as Indonesia, South Korea, or Australia – with which it can cooperate on different bilateral and multilateral interests, and where it can look for opportunities to improve its economic development, the major goal of Latin American countries. Now is the time to mature and expand these relationships.

Since 2017, Judge Mario Carroza has been investigating the illegal adoptions from Chile which are estimated to number over 20,000 from the 1950s to the late 1990s. The judicial investigation so far has revealed that several professionals in trusted positions, such as doctors, social workers, religious persons and judges, were complicit in the trafficking network. So sophisticated was the network, that 19 juvenile court, 28 health centres, 24 religious or private homes, as well as 72 buildings in Chile were used as nurseries to host children pending their adoption. Mothers, meanwhile, were fed lies by professionals, including that their children were deceased, in order to sever any possibility of searches and reunification.

The US-backed Chilean dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet is well known for the neoliberal experiment unleashed upon the country. Against a backdrop of torture and disappearances which alerted the world to human rights violations in the country, the Pinochet dictatorship sought to embellish its image. Promoting a veneer of welfare was an integral part of its propaganda, and children became the unknown victims of an intricate trafficking network which facilitated the illegal adoption of minors to foreign countries.

Between 1971 and 1992, it is estimated that over 2,100 Chilean children were illegally adopted to Sweden. In October 2021, Swedish Social Affairs Minister Lena Hallengren announced an investigation into the adoptions. This comes after several years of the Swedish media reporting about irregularities in adoption documents.

Initial research in Chile pointed towards the Swedish Adoption Centre as facilitating the adoptions between both countries. Diplomatic relations between Sweden and Chile during the Pinochet dictatorship was marked by a right-wing campaign to combat the image portrayed by Chilean exiles which was vocal about the human rights violations in the country. The Sweden-Chile Society, which espoused fascist ideology and collaborated with Chile over the surveillance of exiles, was instrumental in facilitating ties between the dictatorship and the Swedish Adoption Centre.

Adoption became a policy for the Chilean state – a means through which Pinochet could establish diplomatic ties in countries where large communities of Chileans had sought exile.

Adoption became a policy for the Chilean state – a means through which Pinochet could establish diplomatic ties in countries where large communities of Chileans had sought exile. Between 1978 and 1988, the dictatorship institutionalized forced adoption through the National Plan for Minors

Charlotta Haggren was adopted to Sweden on January 1, 1974. She was the pilot case for adoptions from Chile to Sweden, according to Anna Maria Elmgren – a Swedish woman who worked for the Swedish Adoption Centre and whose name has been linked to several illegal adoptions.

CAW serves as a platform for adoptees globally. Many adoptees do not speak Spanish, having been brought up away from their home country and distant to news from Chile. The organization’s first concern was to bring news related to the illegal adoptions to the adoptees by means of their website, in English.

One of CAW’s main objectives nowadays is family searches and reunions. Alejandro Quezada, CAW’s founder, explains that a connection with the past, to establish what happened is important, notable the separation of children from the mothers and the ensuing abductions.

Currently, Quezada adds, the connection between adoptees is crucial. He explains that many adoptee groups may focus on different issues. “But one can see that one of the subjects is the “getting out of the fog”, understanding that the history they were always told about their adoption, might perhaps not be true. Or they know isn’t true because they found their biological family who tell the other side of the story which doesn’t coincide with what the adoptee was always told. Today, when adoptees get connected to our network and are looking for the truth, it is their believe there could be more to it and they look for like-minded adoptees from the same birth country to reflect with and understand their history more in depth.”

Quezada reflected upon how the investigations in Sweden are an important link in order to establish what went on Chile. “CAW as a platform is and will remain to be connected with the deputy who helped to have this investigation to start up. In case that we can offer anything in any form that can help the investigation move forward, then we will provide that, taking into consideration the privacy of the persons in case it would be personal information.”

“Because it is important that Sweden tries to get the truth to the surface like they did in the Netherlands, it is of the utmost importance that information is shared in order for the investigation team to have a clear picture of history in intercountry adoptions. We will be awaiting the outcome of the Swedish investigation while remaining actively involved in initiating similar investigations with other European countries and governments. Once the results of the Swedish investigation are being published, we will most likely have in depth conversations with the people who initiated the investigation to look into further steps towards the Chilean part of it. Taking into consideration that today, Chile is the only country who send their children away to be adopted abroad and is investigating their history towards this crime against humanity,” Quezada explained.

On the Sweden investigation, Quezada notes, “Any result of the investigation will have an impact. Not only on the adoptee but on the whole adoption environment currently in place in Sweden. Also, any investigation and their results of a government into intercountry adoptions is not only being followed by adoptees who live in that country, but by adoptees worldwide. Question remains, what will be the following steps of the government after the results have been published. Which action will be taken to future generations if any.”

When Arabs arrived in Central and South America, they had nothing but the clothes they wore. They were called “Turcos” as they carried Ottoman passports. Today, they are wealthy and occupy important positions. Are they “sons who lost their mothers,” as a poet once put it? Do they maintain their ties to Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan, the lands of their ancestors? Yousef M. Aljamal of Politics Today spoke with Simán Khoury, a Palestinian-Salvadorian, who serves as the president of the Palestinian Federations in Latin America, about the ethnically Arab populations in Latin America today.

Q. When people of the Levant arrived in Latin America in the late nineteenth century, they were called “Turcos.” Can you tell us about this? What does it mean and how do South Americans perceived the term?

The Arab immigration, especially from the Levant or Greater Syria, to Latin America was mostly in the late nineteenth century during the period of the Ottoman Empire. All those immigrants held Ottoman passports. So basically, people there did not distinguish between Arabs and Turks, and they called us all “Turcos” (Turks).

Q. What is the reason for this contempt of “Turcos”?

The majority of those who immigrated at that time were poor and ordinary people, mostly peasants. Ordinary Latin Americans, who lived and thought in feudal structures, considered them as inferior, lower-class people.

When our grandparents and our great-grandparents arrived there, four, five, or six generations back, they did it barefoot, which means that they were in a dire economic situation.

Q. What was the stereotype in the minds of immigrants about Latin America? I mean economically.

They were men of modest substance. Everyone wanted to go to America, meaning North America, and had no idea about possible differences between North, Central, and South America. They thought that they were going to North America. However, they arrived at Puerto Colombia, in Colombia, or in Cuba, where they split up. Some went to Chile, some went to El Salvador, and from there to other places, especially the places where they had relatives, if any.

Q. Why are Levant immigrants mainly concentrated in Chile, El Salvador, and Honduras?

There are about a million Palestinian immigrants in Latin America. The majority almost are from Palestine, especially from Bethlehem. In addition, the majority of those immigrants were Palestinian Christians from the city of Bethlehem. Chile has about half a million Palestinians, and there are maybe some 200,000 in Honduras, and 120,000 in El Salvador. Although there are people who say that these numbers are exaggerated, I am sure that they exist and we have statistics supporting that.

Chile has about half a million Palestinians, and there are maybe some 200,000 in Honduras, and 120,000 in El Salvador.

Q. There is a saying, which goes “In every town in Chile, there is a priest, a policeman, and a Palestinian.” Can you tell us more about Palestinians’ impact in Latin America today? What are their positions, their economic status, their cultural, political, and societal status?

When immigrants arrived, they were in a miserable economic situation and suffered from extreme poverty, but they managed to integrate. First, they worked as street vendors and this contributed to their marginalization by the feudal and wealthy classes. But they managed to set up shops and work in textile factories. Gradually, their financial situation improved, which led to an improvement in their social situation. These immigrants struggled for their children to live a better life. They sent their children to schools and universities, and were able to obtain a better social status.

Q. You have spoken about the relations that still link the Latin American Levantines with the Middle East. How do you see the new generation, especially with the Internet and easy access to information? Do they try to restore this relationship and the link between them and their countries of origin? If yes, how do they express this?

Although these migrations took place a long time ago, 80, 100, or 120 years ago – for example, I immigrated 41 years ago – the link between Palestinians and their homeland, despite the fact that they belong in the countries they are currently in, is excellent. They visit their homelands, whether Palestine, Syria or Lebanon – especially the Lebanese, who live in large numbers in Brazil, reaching 7 million.

They still send money and other kinds of aid, whether from Chile, Brazil, or El Salvador to their families there and continue to visit them. As an expression of our cultural identity, we participate in pro-Palestine political and cultural events on every possible occasion and follow the latest news. We have activities, including political ones, to support the Palestinian cause. We have many people in El Salvador who are politically active and support the cause.

Q. Historically, the relationship between South and Central America and the Middle East is strong, but recently, there has been a rise of the right wing in South and Central America. This, of course, also applies to the whole world. Do you observe any impact of this trend on South American interest in Middle Eastern affairs?

This has a great impact on our relationship. In 2017, with the presence of a left-wing government and the activism of the Palestinian community, we were able to close the Israeli embassy in El Salvador. However, the current situation is different due to the economic power of the Jewish lobby in South America.

In 2017, with the presence of a left-wing government and the activism of the Palestinian community, we were able to close the Israeli embassy in El Salvador.

At present, Palestinian embassies are not showing enough effort to influence these countries diplomatically and win their support. This is surprising because this cause is fundamental, it is about displaced people who are being expelled from their lands by brutal force. I personally blame Palestinian diplomacy because there are many countries, even when Chile was ruled by the right, which are still supportive of Palestine. For example, the President of the Republic of El Salvador Elías Antonio Saca González visited Palestine and he was a right-wing politician. He visited his family, the city of Bethlehem and Palestine, while currently, there are leftist countries that try to destroy these relations.

Two months ago, we published an article on the controversial issue of using models with the Palestinian keffiyeh in the training of the Panamanian police by the Israeli police. What are the reflections on this in local society?

Even though we have a large group of Palestinians in Panama, who have the upper hand in the country economically, the incident shows that the Israeli lobby is strong. I have personally been to the city of Cologne, where the greatest merchants in the Colon Free Zone are Palestinians. The community is doing what it can and we cannot blame them. What’s sad is that the Palestinian community has not had enough support from the Palestinian government or the PLO during the last three or four decades.

Is it possible to form a lobby that supports the rights and demands of the Arab Middle Eastern communities in Central and South America, similar to, for example, the Jewish lobby in the U.S. so that it presses, for example, for the recognition of the Palestinian state? In entire South America, Mexico and Panama are the two states, which haven’t yet recognized Palestine.

There is a lobby in Chile. For example, we have around 12 parliamentarians of Palestinian origin, and there is a league of these parliamentarians to support the Palestinian cause.

There is a lobby in Chile. For example, we have around 12 parliamentarians of Palestinian origin, and there is a league of these parliamentarians to support the Palestinian cause. Similarly, although this lobby is currently less effective in El Salvador, they nurture considerable support in Latin America in general.

The T-shirt promoted by the Israeli military with an image of a pregnant Arab woman under the gaze of an Israeli sniper and with the slogan “ONE SHOT TWO KILLS” can still be found easily on the web, and remains fresh in the minds of many.

Recently, the world was shocked to see yet another photo where Panamanian policemen, in a joint exercise with Israeli trainers, pointed and fired their bullets at a target of a figure – it is not clear if it is a man or a woman –  wearing the traditional Palestinian keffiyeh.

The aberrant image was captured in what the Panamanian police called a “part of a training course with military instructors from the Israeli embassy.” A few hours later, the police institution of the Central American country issued a brief statement in which it apologized, clarifying that its values ​​are not represented in the leaked images.

The apology was issued in large part thanks to pressure from the Panamanian Committee of Solidarity with Palestine and various personalities of Arab origin.

Panama is a country that was born in 1903 when it separated from Colombia, largely thanks to U.S. imperialist ambitions. Today, the country has a population of just over 4 million, and is home to both Jewish and Arab communities which are among the most influential and powerful in the world.

Despite the fact that the country’s Arab and Jewish population numbers only 40,000 individuals, with Arabs and Jews being equal in number, their coexistence is absolutely peaceful and they have even forged social and commercial ties over time. That said, there have been cases in which Jewish families have sent their children to join the Israeli occupation army.

The Israeli influence, supervised by the United States, is very strong in Panama. One example is that Panama is one of the only two Latin American nations, along with Mexico, that still do not recognize Palestine as a state. In the UN Israel-Palestine votes, the Panamanian diplomatic representation usually votes in abstention, which in practice generally amounts to supporting Israel.

As soon as the infamous photo of the Panamanian policemen shooting the figure with the keffiyeh while being advised by Israeli instructors was made public in Panamanian media and social networks, the Arab community and several voices of local society were heard, resulting in a public apology by the police. Yet, Israel is unfazed. Israeli summer camps offering military training where even minors and tourists pay to go shoot figures in Arab dress continue their activities. Can you imagine what would happen if in a country somewhere in the world civilians or soldiers were trained to shoot at figures with the Jewish kippah?

Most of the Arabs in Panama are Muslims; many Arab women wear the hijab, the traditional headscarf that many female followers of Islam wear, and it is also possible to find men and women wearing keffiyeh. Knowing that the police of Panama, their country, and the very state body created to protect them, is being trained to kill people who look like them cannot be a pleasant feeling.

In neighboring Colombia, a few months before elections, there is a latent possibility that alternative movements will take power through democratic procedures. A large section of Colombians still remember that a few decades ago, a large part of a political party called the Patriotic Union, which opposed the traditional Colombian establishment, was eliminated through assassinations that in many cases went unpunished.

It has been proven that the paramilitary forces responsible for thousands of these deaths received advice from former Israeli military personnel. Countries like Argentina, Guatemala, or Honduras also still remember the role that Israel played in providing arms, and logistic and diplomatic support to dictatorial regimes that committed abuses against their peoples.

Many Panamanians are aware of the history of their neighboring countries. They are also clear that their country is a U.S. colonialist target. The U.S. invasion of Panama at the end of 1989 with the supposed objective of overthrowing General Manuel Noriega, a former CIA agent, and the mysterious plane crash in 1981 causing the death of General Omar Torrijos, who displeased Republicans by advocating for Panama’s rights and negotiating new terms for the administration of the Panama Canal with former U.S president Carter, are two facts that continue to serve as open wounds in the nation of the isthmus. Not all Panamanians welcome the fact that the U.S. protégé has so much influence over their military and police apparatus. It is not just the Arabs of Panama who have been upset by recent events.

The political stability of Panama is remarkable with the country being a place of peaceful coexistence for many cultures, and the Panamanian people know that what the police did was wrong. Its rectification has not really convinced Panamanian Arabs, but at the same time something important has happened: thanks to the fact that thousands of Panamanians did not remain silent, it is very likely that, at the very least, such an abomination will not be repeated on Panamanian soil and that the Israeli hasbara machine will think twice next time before provoking a community that, although far from its ancestral lands, is still part of them.

Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro is facing mass demonstrations across the country calling for him to step down, in the context of the government’s mishandling of the coronavirus pandemic and growing allegations of corruption. “Bolsonaro has a knack for creating enemies out of his supporters,” Prof Anthony Pereira was quoted as saying recently, in the context of demonstrations in Brazil against the government’s mishandling of the coronavirus pandemic.

But will the protests be enough to bring Bolsonaro down, especially when the rift between the left wing and the right wing in Brazil remains so pronounced? COVID19 mismanagement might create a common ground, but only within the pandemic context as, behind the scenes, Bolsonaro and his supporters have benefited from his right-wing, neoliberal agenda.

Brazil has the highest COVID19 death toll in Latin America and the second highest globally, exacerbated by an absence of planning and complete disregard for the country’s collapsed healthcare system. It is not merely the inequalities inherent in Brazilian society which have influenced the collapse, but the government’s refusal to consider any measures other than a strategy to achieve herd immunity through infection, under the pretext of curbing people’s freedoms. While Europe is waking up to the complexities of curbed freedom of movement despite available vaccines due to countries pursuing different policies, in Brazil the people are facing a totally different scenario.

Brazil’s former health minister Luis Henrique Mandetta was fired by Bolsonaro after challenging his unscientific approach to the pandemic. With Bolsonaro disregarding health professionals’ advice, and playing a dangerous game regarding the availability of vaccines, which have reduced the death toll especially in the case of the elderly and the vulnerable, Brazilians are concerned about their wellbeing and the government’s refusal to provide for their health.

In March, Brazil sent a delegation to Israel to view the process of an experimental medication being developed for COVID19, with an adviser to Bolsonaro stating the visit would “yield partnerships that will make a difference in combating the health crisis and in the resumption of the Brazilian economy.” By May, Brazil was seeking deals to acquire surplus doses of the Astra Zeneca vaccine from the U.S. and U.K.

Brazilians are concerned about their wellbeing and the government’s refusal to provide for their health.

Since August 2020, Brazil engaged diplomatically with Russia to obtain the Sputnik V vaccine, which was later suspended by the country’s national health service, Anvisa, on account of alleged “lack of consistent and reliable data,” despite favorable reviews in the leading health journal, The Lancet. Reuters has recently reported the definite cancellation of a contract with Russia for 10 million doses of the Sputnik V vaccine.

However, the coronavirus pandemic has forced a different sort of reckoning among Brazilians, although the process may be temporary until an outcome is achieved. Bolsonaro’s mishandling of the pandemic happened amid growing accusations of corruption. A poll in July revealed that 54 percent of Brazilians would support the impeachment of Bolsonaro, while 51 percent disapproved of him, indicating growing resentment since his tenure started in 2019.

The statistics reflect a possible turning to the left, which is not impossible especially with the return of former president Lula da Silva to the political scene. Polls indicate a probable win for Lula in the forthcoming presidential elections. and Bolsonaro has already accused the Supreme Court of favoring his opponent.

Given the rise of the left in Latin America – Chile is the most prevalent example at the moment of the right wing’s spectacular fall – Bolsonaro is guaranteed U.S. support for the time being. In July, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director William Burns met with Bolsonaro to discuss the political situation in Latin America, and the Brazilian leader specifically mentioned Venezuela, Bolivia, Chile and Argentina in comments discussing the visit.

COVID19 might trigger more widespread displeasure among Brazilians, but the military, as well as Bolsonaro’s neoliberal policies favoring privatization are also a force to be reckoned with. For a definite shift to occur, the left will have to continue leading the mobilization struggle in Brazil, which would then encourage the already occurring decrease in support for Bolsonaro, who has exploited the masses for the interests of the privileged.

But there are indications that, across Brazil, a more profound reckoning might be happening. Just as in Chile, the rise in transport fares triggered a vast outcry against right-wing President Sebastian Pinera, resulting in drastic losses for the right-wing and the rewriting of a new constitution to replace that of former dictator Augusto Pinochet, Brazilians may want to reconnect politically with their past.

The burning down of the statue of Borba Gato by a group of demonstrators recently; a memorial which represents the colonial violence which ravaged Brazil’s indigenous people, is a case in point. The action was intended to ignite debate about Brazil’s past and the glorification of the colonizers, but the action itself was powerful enough to steer political thought towards opposing Bolsonaro’s dictatorship nostalgia.

Brazil lags behind in terms of dictatorship memory and justice, and despite not having the highest death toll when it comes to dictatorship victims, 50,000 people were imprisoned and 10,000 forced into exile. Bolsonaro’s government abused the democratic mandate to recreate dictatorship oppression. COVID19 may well be the moment for political change in Brazil, yet the pandemic must not obscure the reasons behind the Brazilian people’s dissent.

Almost 48 years have passed since the U.S.-backed military coup in Chile ousted the democratically elected socialist presidency of Salvador Allende. The outcome was 17 years of military dictatorship under Augusto Pinochet’s rule, resulting in thousands of Chilean opponents tortured, murdered and in over 3,000 cases, disappeared. The U.S. role has gradually been uncovered under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act.

Less known, and still under wraps for alleged security reasons, is the role Australia played in Chile, in the years leading up to the coup.

Recently, former Australian military intelligence officer Cristian Fernandes presented a legal request to declassify documents pertaining to Australia’s role in Chile working as proxies of the U.S.’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The country’s role in the years leading up to the coup was exposed in 1977, but details have remained classified. The Australian government’s legal and security  representatives have deemed any declassification as harmful to Australia’s security interests and international relations.

Fernandes’s request was rejected by the Australian government, despite the fact that the request did not call for revealing the identities of the officers involved, or any surveillance techniques used by Australia’s Secret Intelligence Services (ASIS).

Australia’s role in Chile commenced with a request from the CIA in 1970 to have two ASIS officers stationed in Chile’s capital, Santiago, reporting directly to Washington.

Australia’s role in Chile commenced with a request from the CIA in 1970 to have two ASIS officers stationed in Chile’s capital, Santiago, reporting directly to Washington. Australia’s Foreign Minister William McMahon approved of the collaboration, starting the clandestine operation in 1971. With the CIA closely monitored by the Allende government, the U.S. turned to its allies for help, particularly where it risked exposure in Chile.

Conflicting reports have emerged over ASIS’s links to the CIA, with some stating that Australian’s security services were working independently. However, the Labour Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, who took office in 1972, was informed by ASIS director Bill Robertson of its officers’ role in Chile and that their presence was tied to the destabilization of Allende’s government. Whitlam’s order to revoke ASIS’s presence in Chile was either initially ignored or else, other sources say, Whitlam hesitated in signing the revocation of the ASIS officers in Chile, out of caution regarding the U.S.’s possible reaction.

The first CIA-ASIS links in Chile were reported by the Australian newspaper, the Sydney Morning Herald, who were contacted by ASIS to call off the investigation and to withhold publishing the names of the officers involved. In 1977, Whitlam stated to the Australian parliament, “It has been written – and I cannot deny it – that when my Government took office, Australian intelligence personnel were working as proxies of the CIA in destabilizing the government of Chile.”

Indeed, a search for the terms “Australia-Chile” turns up nothing in the U.S. National Security Archive’s database of declassified documents.

The Hope Report, commissioned by Whitlam, was published in 1977, confirming the presence of ASIS agents in Chile yet making light of the political situation and negating the links between ASIS and the CIA.

According to Nicky Hager, a journalist specializing in intelligence gathering, Australia would have asked the U.S. to refrain from declassifying documents that would highlight its role in the destabilization of Allende’s presidency. Indeed, a search for the terms “Australia-Chile” turns up nothing in the U.S. National Security Archive’s database of declassified documents.

Transparency as regards Australia’s involvement with the CIA in Chile has not been forthcoming. The Freedom of Information Act exempts documents dating back to 40 years from being published, ostensible for security reasons and the country’s national interest. While the identity of the ASIS officers in Chile has been established, Australia’s Intelligence Services Act of 2001 prohibits the publishing of names unless permission is granted by the security agencies’ directors.

Australia became a safe haven for Chileans escaping the horrors of Pinochet’s military dictatorship, even as its secret services collaborated against Allende and remained in Chile in the aftermath of the coup. In Australia, Chilean refugees were another target for ASIO and its espionage – the humanitarian welcome was juxtaposed against the politics of spying for Chile and the CIA.

Additionally, Australia was also a destination for Chilean torturers and agents, some settling in Australia to extend the espionage network on Chilean refugees. One notable case which received considerable national and international media attention is that of Adriana Rivas, a former torturer and secretary to Chile’s National Intelligence Directorate (DINA) Chief Manuel Contreras, who worked at the detention and extermination centre known as Cuartel Simon Bolivar.

Rivas absconded from Chile in 2010 through Argentina to escape facing justice and settled in Australia, working as a nanny.  Relatives of the disappeared have since 2013 worked with lawyers to have Rivas extradited from Australia to Chile, where she is wanted for her involvement in the torture and disappearance of seven detainees, among them the leader of Chile’s Communist Party, Victor Diaz. Rivas was detained in Sydney in 2019 and this week, the Federal Court of Australia rejected the former DINA agent’s appeal, declaring her extraditable to Chile.

Colombian people took to the streets on April 28.  For Colombia, a country with a population of slightly more than 50 million, what happened that day was fairly rare: people got fed up with the establishment. A few weeks earlier, the Finance Minister Alberto Carrasquilla had announced the imperious need for a tax reform in which, among other measures, basic goods like salt, coffee, and chocolate would be taxed at a 19% rate. The country has been struggling under the COVID-19 pandemic, which has taken the lives of 88,700 Colombians so far, with lockdowns aggravating an already deteriorating economic situation.

According to DANE, the national statistics department, 22 million Colombians survive on less than $90 a month including 7.4 million who survive on less than $39. In 2020, 42.5% of the Colombian population were considered poor, a 6.8% surge from 2019. Colombia is a country where a member of congress earns 40 times the minimum wage, with an official unemployment rate of 15%, and an informal economy accounting for 50% of the country’s economic activity.

So, when the head of the economic team of Iván Duque’s government announced that even coffee, the symbol of Colombia’s economy, was a target for taxation, the common citizen decided they had had enough. In the past, most of the protestors had been organized by unions such as FECODE, the teachers’ union, or by CUT (Central Union of Workers), by calling on thousands to take to the streets, but the outcome was not even close to the level of protests this time.

However, this was not the only reason for the Colombian people’s reaction. Duque’s leadership regarding the enforcement of the peace treaty that his predecessor Juan Manuel Santos had signed with FARC, the country’s main guerrilla group, in September 2016, has been deficient: more than 900 social activists and 276 former combatants have been murdered since the treaty was signed.

Native communities, which make up around 4.5% of the Colombian population, have denounced that their ancestral territories have been affected by this lack of diligence.

Native communities, which make up around 4.5% of the Colombian population, have denounced that their ancestral territories have been affected by this lack of diligence. The drug trafficking business keeps violently disturbing these indigenous communities with no robust reaction from the national authorities. As a result, they too took to the streets massively.

In general, the people of Colombia demand the government adopt reforms in the police institution that include the dismantling of the special anti-riot force, accused of numerous abuses against Colombians; reform the health system which is basically privatized in Colombia; better economic conditions for both employees and entrepreneurs; more effective taxation for the extremely rich and an aid relief for those earning less; a guaranteed basic income for the poorer since the pandemic has been catastrophic especially for the most vulnerable; and also more resources for public education.

One of the main effluents during the strikes has been the students. Colombian youngsters face a future where the lack of job opportunities contrasts with the huge difficulties to access high-quality education. Relying on the official numbers of the Colombian Ministry of Education, only 52% of Colombian students acquire a technical or professional education after high school. Most of them seek refuge in jobs in call centers, delivery services, or other low paid jobs characterized by lack of social protection and social security.

It is the students, in fact, who feature heavily in the deadly toll of the violent repression that the Colombian police has practiced against its civilians. According to the Colombian human rights NGO TEMBLORES ONG, a month after the general strike started, there have been at least 43 homicides and 1,133 injuries due to the intervention of the police force, and 1,445 people have been reported arrested.

Not only this, 22 sexual assaults were reported and 47 eye injuries, with many losing an eye as a result of the actions of the regime’s security forces. In many cases, human rights lawyers have denounced arbitrary arrests where basic rights have been denied to those arrested. The number of missing people is in the hundreds. In other words, a national tragedy has occurred in just over a month in Colombia.

Armed civilians in Cali have been filmed shooting with automatic firearms at people marching in the streets.

Amidst this chaos, the one thing that has shined above everything is the absence of real leadership by the head of the state Iván Duque. A week ago, an international commission of human rights flying in from Argentina was prevented from entering the country and sent back from Bogota’s airport. The Colombia president has been asked by the public to meet with the protesters, but he has refused to do so.

Santiago de Cali or simply Cali, the country’s third most populous city, is a 30-minute flight from the capital. It is considered the epicenter of the strike and even though its population is around 5% of the country’s total, it accounts for 60% of the casualties. Armed civilians in Cali have been filmed shooting with automatic firearms at people marching in the streets.

All of this is happening in front of the police personnel with the evident complicity of the official forces. The police has focused exclusively on repressing the protests while these armed civilians remind Colombians of the nightmare of paramilitary squads, which sadly are far from being the ghosts the times past. Duque went to Cali twice. On both occasions, he met with the police forces and the civilians living in rich neighborhoods, where the armed citizens shooting at the protestors had been spotted.

The government’s attitude has been limited to basically accusing the popular movement of being subversive and terrorist, and blaming the former left-wing presidential candidate Gustavo Petro of inflaming the situation. The Colombian society is polarized between those supporting the right-wing ruler and those opposing him. Meanwhile, most Colombians think the country’s real boss is Álvaro Uribe, the former two-time president who is accused of standing behind thousands of extrajudicial killings during his 8-year term in office.

Now more than two weeks into the protests, the government decided to call off the proposed tax reforms from Congress. Finance Minister Carrasquilla, a stubborn squire of the regime, resigned. A few days later, a health reform which was on the path to becoming a law and which according to critics would transform the Colombian system into a copy of that of the U.S. in terms of privatization, was also dismissed. Three important achievements for the people indeed.

Liberation theology can provide a critical and deep understanding of how politics and religion, and in particular the Catholic Church in Latin America, are interrelated. Liberation theology reveals how religion can be used as a vehicle to justify and translate the religious understanding of politics into concrete action. The message that advocates of liberation theology want to convey is that religion is heavily involved in society, and that the core and essence of its teaching is to advocate on behalf of the oppressed – even if it comes at a cost.

During the 1960s and 1970s, a debate emerged in Latin America that aimed to provide a critique of liberation. In the Latin American context, liberation theology was viewed as a means to strengthen the Church’s presence in public life. It rejected lecturing people from an ivory tower and losing touch with reality under the banner that the church should be separate from politics and that religion should remain pacifist even in cases where oppressed groups are subjected to violence. Concepts such as wisdom and rational knowledge became secondary and complementary to the notion of liberation.

In this context, liberation had three meanings: (1) political liberation, meaning the liberation of oppressed nations; (2) religious liberation, meaning people’s liberation from “sins”; and (3) historical liberation, meaning the liberation of humans as part of the course of history.

The introduction of political liberation to the overall meaning of liberation shifted the discourse and the involvement of the Catholic Church in politics and public life in Latin America. This revolutionary definition of liberation made actors, who had control and influence over the Church for a long time, such as the Vatican and the U.S. administration, feel uncomfortable. Put simply, this new discourse threatened their influence over the Church and its followers.

In 1984, the Vatican issued a document directed at its churches and followers warning them against the theology of liberation, which was advocated by a group associated with the Catholic Church.

In 1984, the Vatican issued a document directed at its churches and followers warning them against the theology of liberation, which was advocated by a group associated with the Catholic Church. These attempts didn’t prove successful and they indirectly contributed to strengthening the liberation discourse of the Church and its clergy.

The first meeting of the Catholic liberation clergy was held in Colombia in 1968. In 1972, a year before the military coup in the country, another theology of liberation conference was held in Chile, organized by a group called “Christians for Socialism.” The declared goal of the conference was to encourage human rights against authoritarian regimes and to give meaning to theology by connecting it to society and politics.

Ernesto Cardenal, a scholar, painter, artist, poet, and political figure, is considered one of the leading names of the theology of liberation in Latin America. He was among a number of priests in Nicaragua who led a revolution against the Somoza family, which governed the country for more than 43 years.

He eventually became the minister of culture after the revolution and engaged in a campaign to spread literacy and culture in the country. Eventually, he resigned following differences over managing the country’s affairs with his comrade and president of Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega.

When Pope St. John Paul II visited Nicaragua in 1983, he openly asked that Cardenal and four other priests who advocated the theology of liberation be removed from governmental posts over their involvement in the revolution and public life.

When Pope St. John Paul II visited Nicaragua in 1983, he openly asked that Cardenal and four other priests who advocated the theology of liberation be removed from governmental posts over their involvement in the revolution and public life.

A famous photo of Pope John Paul and Cardenal shows the former telling the latter that he “must fix [his] affairs with the Church.” A year later, the pope suspended Cardenal because of his role in politics – the order lasted until 2019, when Pope Francis lifted it.

Liberation Theology in the Middle East

In the Middle East, the theology of liberation has gained prominence in countries which suffer from oppression with attempts made to create a movement of Arab theology in Egypt. In Palestine, Hilarion Capucci, a Syrian Roman Catholic priest who was located in Jerusalem, was involved in smuggling weapons to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) through Jordan and Lebanon. As a result, he was imprisoned in Israel for 3.5 years, during which period he went on hunger strike a number of times. He was eventually released as part of a deal between Israel and the Vatican whereupon he was relocated to Latin America.

Capucci spent the rest of his life in exile in Rome. Ironically, he has supported the Assad government despite the immense suffering, destruction, and displacement it has caused the Syrian people. In 2019, a drama series was produced about Capucci which served as propaganda to whitewash Assad and his regime.

Theodosios (Hanna) of Sebastia is the archbishop of Sebastia, a position he holds under the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem, and is known for his opposition to Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian Territories. He is seen at nearly every Palestinian national conference or protest.

In late 2019, his political stance almost cost him his life. Theodosios accused Israel of attempting to poison him over his stance against its occupation of Jerusalem after Israeli forces fired a gas canister into his Jerusalem church. He was rushed to hospital and later received treatment in Jordan.

The theology of liberation is an attempt to show that devout Christians around the world see the role of the Church in public life and politics as going beyond feeding the poor and offering them prayers. Its advocates assert that Christianity is about defending the poor and vulnerable, and sacrificing one’s life for this purpose. Christianity, for them, is not simply offering prayers and shying away from public engagement.

The Chilean protests which started in October 2019, triggered by a rise in metro fares and expanding to demand an overhaul of the dictatorship constitution, eroded the veneer of a so-called prosperous country, if the World Bank were to be taken seriously. One of the fastest growing economies that thrives upon social inequalities, Chile’s restricted affluence can be traced back to the neoliberal experiment unleashed upon the country on September 11, 1973.

The US-backed coup which ousted socialist President Salvador Allende and backed dictator Augusto Pinochet, embarked upon a terrifying operation to rid the country of any left-wing mobilization. Torture, murder and disappearances of dictatorship opponents in over 1,200 detention and torture centers ushered in the neoliberal phase for Chile.

An essay penned by Orlando Letelier who was assassinated in the US by the Chilean’s National Intelligence Directorate (DINA),  illustrates how the “Chicago Boys” – a group of Chilean economists trained by Milton Friedman, were involved in the dictatorship coup and supplemented the repression with neoliberal policies. An economic plan for Chile that was funded by the CIA.

Closer to home, the US-backed Brazilian dictatorship also played a role in Chile’s destabilization. The US perceived Brazil under dictatorship rule as a strategic partner for the US in Latin America, to “try and prevent new Allendes and Castros and try where possible to reverse these trends.” Brazil also made a first bid to lead the US-funded Operation Condor in Latin America which resulted in the killing of at least 60,000 people – a plan that sought to purge the region of left-wing influence, failing to take the helm only due to opposition from other countries, including Chile and Argentina.