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he Ankara Summit clearly demonstrated which issues lie at the heart of NATO’s security agenda. The strong emphasis in the summit communiqué on collective defense, the transatlantic bond and Article 5 of the Washington Treaty once again underscored that the Alliance’s fundamental priority is deterrence and defense. Russia’s long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security, continued support for Ukraine, increased defense spending, the expansion of industrial production capacity and the development of new military capabilities formed the main framework of the Ankara Summit.

This picture is perfectly clear. Whilst the Russia-Ukraine War continues, it was to be expected that NATO would prioritize deterrence on its eastern flank. Indeed, the summit communiqué provides for the provision of 70 billion euros’ worth of military equipment, aid and training support to Ukraine by 2026, and for at least equivalent levels to be maintained in 2027. Similarly, the increase in defense investment by European allies and Canada, the announcement of new procurement worth over 50 billion dollars, and the emphasis on expanding defense industry production capacity demonstrate that NATO prioritizes the conversion of expenditure into tangible military capability, alongside its spending ratios.

360-degree security and the southern dimension of NATO in Africa

Another statement in the Ankara Summit Declaration indicates that this discussion must be addressed within a broader context. NATO states that it is continuing its 360-degree approach to deterrence and defense. This approach acknowledges that the Alliance’s security is not limited solely to its eastern flank, the Russian threat, or conventional military capabilities. Strategic competition, widespread instability, hybrid threats, terrorism, energy security, sea lanes, cyberspace, space, unmanned systems, artificial intelligence and critical infrastructure are all different components of the same security landscape.

It is precisely for this reason that NATO’s southern flank is one of the areas that requires more careful consideration following the Ankara Summit. However, Africa is not at the centre of this debate. NATO’s main agenda is, of course, not centered on Africa. Nor should it be expected to be. Nevertheless, Africa is a dimension that cannot be overlooked when seeking to understand the security architecture of the southern flank. The vast geography stretching from the southern Mediterranean to the Sahel, and from the Red Sea to the Horn of Africa, is one of the areas that tests what NATO’s 360-degree security approach means in practice.

At this point, it is necessary to make a conceptual distinction. NATO’s approach to Africa is not the same as the Africa policies of individual NATO member states. NATO is an organization comprising allies with different historical experiences, geopolitical priorities and bilateral relations. France, Italy, Turkey, the US, the UK and Spain do not all view Africa in the same way. Some allies focus more on North Africa, some on the Sahel, some on the Horn of Africa, whilst others prioritize maritime security and trade routes. Furthermore, the fact that many countries are members of both NATO and the European Union can, at times, lead to a blurring of priorities and instruments.

This diversity need not be a weakness. If managed correctly, it could foster a richer debate within NATO regarding its southern flank. After all, each ally possesses field experience, diplomatic networks, defense capabilities and development tools in different geographical regions. The real challenge lies in transforming this diversity into a shared understanding of security. Following the Ankara Summit, what NATO needs is not to produce a centralized, one-size-fits-all policy towards Africa, but rather to develop more realistic channels of cooperation with security institutions, regional organizations and relevant countries in Africa.

A security line stretching from migration to the Red Sea

The issue of migration is one of the most visible aspects of this. In European public discourse, Africa is often brought to the fore through debates on irregular migration. Locations such as Lampedusa, Ceuta and the Canary Islands highlight the link between stability in North Africa and Europe’s border management. However, viewing migration solely as a security threat is an incomplete approach. War, poverty, climate pressures, food insecurity and weaknesses in state capacity are among the root causes of human mobility. NATO’s recognition of climate change as a threat multiplier is also significant in this regard. Climate change may not, in and of itself, directly cause conflict. However, it can exacerbate resource scarcity, economic vulnerability, displacement and local tensions.

That said, the scale of migration originating from Africa should not be exaggerated. African migrants do not constitute the largest group of migrants accepted by NATO countries. A significant proportion of migration movements in Africa take place within the continent itself. Consequently, viewing Africa solely as the source of migration towards Europe is both analytically flawed and fails to establish a sound basis for partnership. A more appropriate approach is to develop sustainable mechanisms that strike a balance between shared responsibility, humanitarian protection, border management, development and the building of local capacity with countries along migration routes.

The second key issue that makes the African dimension of the Southern Flank significant is maritime security and trade routes. The call in the Ankara Summit Declaration for Iran to fully respect freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates that NATO views maritime security not merely as a traditional military issue, but as a strategic matter linked to global trade and energy security. The same logic applies to the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb–Suez corridor. The Houthis’ attacks on commercial vessels have highlighted just how vulnerable this corridor is. The diversion of ships around the Cape of Good Hope has increased transit times, fuel costs, insurance expenses and the strain on global logistics.

For this reason, Red Sea security is not merely a matter for the countries in the region. Europe’s energy supply, production chains and commercial competitiveness also depend on this route remaining open and secure. The war in Sudan, the fight against terrorism in Somalia, inter-state tensions in the Horn of Africa and security vacuums in the Sahel are developments that indirectly but significantly affect NATO’s southern flank. The conclusion to be drawn from this is not that NATO should expand militarily into Africa. A more realistic need is to establish more regular cooperation with African countries and regional institutions in the areas of maritime security, early warning, intelligence sharing, border security, counter-terrorism capabilities and crisis prevention.

Partnership amidst competition and Turkey’s contribution

Great power competition is also a significant part of this picture. Russia’s efforts to deepen its security ties in areas such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Sudan, and to develop a more institutionalized presence through mechanisms such as the post-Wagner African Corps, are trends being closely monitored by NATO. China’s influence in Africa, meanwhile, is advancing through ports, transport corridors, digital infrastructure, mining and investments in critical minerals. Resources such as cobalt, manganese, platinum group metals, lithium and graphite have become critical for the defense industry, the energy transition and advanced technology production.

Nevertheless, it would be an oversimplification to view Africa merely as a stage for competition between Russia, China, the US or Europe. African states are the actors who determine their own security preferences and development priorities. For NATO and its allies, the path to achieving a lasting impact lies in establishing partnerships with Africa based on respect for sovereignty, local ownership, technology sharing and mutual benefit. Relations with Africa’s security architecture must also be built upon this understanding. The African Union, regional economic communities, IGAD, ECOWAS and other regional structures are the pillars of joint security production.

Turkey’s experience offers a notable example in this debate. As a NATO ally, Turkey is one of the countries that has transformed its defense industry capacity into tangible military capability. The developing capabilities in areas such as unmanned aerial vehicles, electronic warfare, munitions, and land and sea platforms are directly linked to the discussions on industrial base and production depth emphasized at NATO’s Ankara Summit. However, Turkey’s role in Africa should not be interpreted solely through the prism of defense industry exports.

The training activities carried out in Somalia through TURKSOM represent an approach focused on capacity-building for local security institutions. Turkey’s integration of humanitarian aid, education, health, infrastructure and diplomacy with security support demonstrates that a more holistic approach to security is possible for the southern flank. The Ankara Declaration, signed between Ethiopia and Somalia, has also highlighted the importance of preventive diplomacy. Whilst mediation is not an alternative to military deterrence, it is a complementary element of the security architecture in terms of managing crises before they escalate into armed conflict.

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he 2024 projection for Africa contains a variety of risks and opportunities. The issues that are expected to be most prominent in Africa during this year are the elections scheduled for 2024 in Africa, the security of the Sahel region, the geopolitics of the Red Sea, the risks posed by terrorist organizations across the continent, and economic growth and food security. As an important crossroads in the transformation of the global system, Africa’s role is likely to increase in 2024.

The year 2024 is projected to be a test for democracy for almost half of the world. Forty countries, 3.2 billion people, and economies with a combined GDP of $44.2 trillion will go to the polls. Africa will play a major role in this test as elections will be held in countries covering a third of Africa and affecting more than 335 million people. South Africa, Mozambique, Botswana, Namibia, Mauritius, Comoros, Rwanda, Ghana, Burkina Faso, South Sudan, Chad, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Mauritania, Tunisia, and Algeria will hold elections in 2024. Somalia’s Somaliland will also hold elections in 2024.

South Africa, Algeria, and Ghana stand out. These countries, especially South Africa and Algeria, have stronger economies than others in Africa, and the political risk is likely to be high. On the other hand, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad are due to hold presidential elections in 2024, creating an alternative corridor of military rule in the Sahel. The current conflicts in Sudan are likely to spill over into Chad. There is also a serious risk that the ongoing conflict in Sudan will continue to affect the region and increase instability.

The social tensions, refugee movements, and possible armed conflicts that will result from the elections have the potential to increase tensions in the region. Meanwhile, the process is unlikely to bring democratic change, given the control of state institutions by candidates backed by military juntas. South Sudan is a relatively new state and a census has yet to be conducted; the country is scheduled to have the last election of 2024, but it is very likely that it will be postponed for 2025.

Security, Terrorism, and Geopolitics in Africa

The Sahel region was on the agenda in 2023 with frequent military interventions. Elections scheduled for 2024 in Sahelian countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad, which have seen military interventions in recent years, are raising regional security concerns. Developments in recent years have led to the emergence of an alternative corridor of military rule in the Sahel. At the same time, the presence of terrorist organizations in the Sahel is another risk factor that increases security concerns.

Furthermore, the departure of France, which ended its military presence in Niger at the end of 2023, is likely to increase the activities of terrorist organizations in the region. The situation also has the potential to complicate security issues further. While France’s presence has so far not reduced terrorism in the region, its absence in Niger could increase instability in the region, depending on the capabilities and capacities of local security elements.

If security gaps emerge in 2024, terrorist organizations may increase their attacks to fill these gaps, deepening regional instability. It is likely that such gaps will be seen as a window of opportunity by terrorist organizations and there is a high risk that terrorist organizations, able to expand their sphere of influence, will exploit ethnic and religious tensions to threaten civilians in the countries of the region. Conflict thus risks worsening the security situation and triggering waves of migration and displacement.

Economic Prospects and Risks

According to the African Union Development Bank, Africa is expected to grow by 3.8%. East Africa stands out as the region with the highest expected growth: it is expected to grow at an average rate of 6.3%, almost twice as fast as the continent as a whole. However, economic growth in Africa is also expected to be relatively slow in 2024 because of food insecurity, high food inflation, and hence high food prices, as well as high energy prices and the disruption of the global supply chain, or developments in the global system and the instability they create, leading to inflationary pressures. Double-digit inflation is expected in 2024 in countries such as Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt, and Ghana.

The aftermath of the Russia-Ukraine war and the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic in previous years have had a significant impact on food and energy prices. However, when the effects of global climate change are taken into account, food insecurity caused by droughts and floods, particularly in East Africa, is causing significant disruption. In addition, ongoing conflicts between states or between states and non-state (armed) actors on the continent are exacerbating the already bad situation and further destabilizing the continent. There is also a risk that the current escalation of geopolitical tensions in the Middle East will lead to further volatility in energy markets. This is likely to trigger new inflationary pressures and have a negative impact on global growth. This process may therefore have a direct impact on Africa’s growth in the medium and long term, if not in the short term.

What is more, many African countries are likely to feel the financial distress caused by excessive debt and heavy fiscal burdens. While Zambia is close to completing its debt restructuring, the process is likely to be protracted. This creates considerable economic uncertainty.

Risks and Opportunities for Food Security

Food security is one of the most important issues for African countries in 2024. African countries, which have large amounts of arable land, water resources, and labor, are food importers. In the simplest sense, if the countries in Africa that import food are unable to do so, their people will face famine and death. Due to the Russia-Ukraine war, countries in Africa had problems importing grain from the warring countries; while the Black Sea Grain Initiative was in place, this was possible, but imports ended when Russia withdrew from the agreement. In fact, 25 African countries now depend on Russia and Ukraine for more than a third of their wheat imports.

Following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative, it announced that it would unilaterally resume grain aid to six African countries. However, the fact that the remaining countries do not have secure access to grain is a major concern. It is expected that the Black Sea Grain Initiative will be put back on the agenda in 2024, but the repercussions of the war have been an important lesson for African countries.

African countries should take advantage of their fertile, arable land and seize opportunities to become at least self-sufficient, implement agricultural reforms, and increase their cereal production. Yet, seizing these opportunities requires more than focusing on agricultural infrastructure and reforms: it also requires comprehensive planning for various factors such as technology transfer, education, and infrastructure. Prioritizing efforts to ensure the sustainability of these factors should be a priority for African countries in 2024.

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he Israeli-Palestinian conflict has polarized Africa. The earlier reflection of this was seen in Israel’s attempt to join the African Union. It has become clear that African countries that have cordial relations with Western countries side with Israel on Gaza. The Middle East and Gaza in particular has divided African nations one more time.

The Palestinian cause, whose origin dates back to 1917, remains important in the global system today. Israel’s occupation of Palestine, which began in 1948, is important not only for the Middle East, but also for countries struggling against colonialism, such as numerous countries in Africa. Israel’s inhumane practices in Palestine, i.e., apartheid, displacement, injustice, and disregard for human rights, are practices that African countries have also been subjected to and have similar intersections with many of the practices of colonial forces in Africa in the past, such as capitalism and dispossession.

Israel’s occupation of Palestine based on strategies similar to those that underpinned colonialism and apartheid in Africa has survived despite 75 years of criticism and reactions. In fact, Israel’s unfair land acquisition/usurpation of Palestinian lands, the blockade in Gaza, the apartheid wall in the West Bank, the failure to treat the real owners of the land as human beings, its discriminatory policies, and practices in place stopping the Palestinian people from practicing their culture and beliefs as they wish are all part of Africa’s dark legacy. It all feels like a familiar memory. These difficulties are an important factor in the Palestinian people empathizing with the injuries and inequalities experienced during the colonial period, on the one side, and in the peoples of Africa supporting the Palestinians’ struggle for freedom, on the other.

This intersectionality is emphasized in the statement by Nelson Mandela, the former president of South Africa, who said, “Our freedom will be incomplete without the freedom of the Palestinian people.” The fact that South Africa’s support for Palestine has attracted the most attention in Africa is a reflection of a sensitivity towards the apartheid system. While this is an example of solidarity extending from one continent to another, it is also a strong message that emphasizes support for societies that share similar difficulties, evils, and injustices.

The African Union’s position

Africa’s solidarity with Palestine is based on Palestine’s solidarity with Africa. Historically, the Palestinians see their struggle for liberation in the context of the struggles of most African countries against Western colonialism. Resolution 77 (XII) adopted by the African Union in 1975 states, “The racist regime in occupied Palestine and the racist regimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa have common imperialist origins, form a whole and have the same racist structure and policies aimed at the suppression of human dignity and integrity.”

The African Union has taken decisions on Palestine that are fundamentally supportive of its independence and sovereignty, and aim at ensuring a just and lasting peace between the two countries. The African Union supports the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian question, and takes the position that the capital of the Palestinian state will be East Jerusalem. However, not all members of the African Union, which has 55 members in total, have the same opinion, and each country takes a position within the framework of different national interests. For example, countries such as Ghana, Kenya, and Rwanda support Israel and condemn Hamas.

Competition and new opportunities for cooperation on the African continent are leading some countries to move away from the united stance of the past and towards pragmatic relations. In this context, Israel’s initiative to become an observer member of the African Union in 2021 was viewed by the African Union Commission as controversial. However, following this decision, several countries such as South Africa, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Namibia, Botswana, Comoros, Tunisia, Djibouti, and Mauritania announced their opposition to the decision.

The African Union responded to the ongoing conflict between Hamas and Israel with a statement issued through the African Union Commission calling for an end to the attacks and encouraging the parties to negotiate a two-state agreement as the only solution to the conflict.

Forty-six of the 55 African Union member states have established diplomatic, economic, and development cooperation with Israel. This cooperation has not, however

Division in Africa after October 7

The conflict between Hamas and Israel which began on October 7, 2023 has revealed divisions in public opinion in Africa and world. While some states claim that Israel has the right to defend itself against Hamas’s attacks, others stress that Israel continues to occupy Palestine and separate the Palestinian people living in Gaza and the West Bank, viewing Hamas’s attacks on Israel as justified.

In the face of Israel’s massacres in Gaza, some African countries abstained from voting for a ceasefire at the UN General Assembly, namely Tunisia, Gabon, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Zambia. Countries such as Kenya and Rwanda are among those supporting Israel. While Rwanda issued a statement “expressing its deepest condolences and sympathy to the government and people of Israel following the attacks on Israeli territory,” Kenya’s foreign minister also condemned the attack in Israel and said he was “saddened by the tragedy.”

Meanwhile, Israel’s interest in African countries has increased in recent years. As diplomatic relations have grown, so has cooperation in areas such as defense and security, counterterrorism, intelligence, and border control. In addition, arms transfers between African countries and Israel have reached a remarkable level. In fact, over the past decade, various arms transfers have taken place between Israel and countries such as Senegal, Morocco, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles, Uganda, and Zambia. In fact, the silence of some African countries on Israel’s genocide and massacres in Gaza is due to their dependence on the West and Israel in political, economic, and security terms.

Determined support for Palestine in Africa

According to research by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), Israel’s military operations against Gaza have sparked a wave of protests and rallies around the world. Protests over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which account for 38% of global demonstrations, are estimated at 4,200 in total. More than 3,700 of these demonstrations were pro-Palestinian and more than 520 pro-Israeli. Morocco is the country with the most pro-Palestinian protests (267 protests in total) despite its government remaining close to Israel.

There are also countries on the continent that are reacting against Israel’s bloody policy, massacres, and genocide in Gaza. Countries such as South Africa, Nigeria, Chad, and Algeria have taken actions that go beyond expressing support for Palestine. For example, while the Nigerian Senate called for a ceasefire and the start of negotiations for a two-state solution, South Africa called for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza. South Africa went a step further and issued statements accusing Israel of genocide and war crimes. Chad also supported South Africa, which recalled its diplomats from Israel and withdrew its ambassador from Tel Aviv.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has polarized Africa. An earlier reflection of this polarization was seen in Israel’s attempt to join the African Union. African countries that have friendly relations with Western countries side with Israel on the Palestinian issue. However, the people of these countries, who have experienced pain similar to that of Palestine in the past, do not always agree with their governments. The structure of the international system is reflected in today’s relations between states and the countries with which they are heavily interdependent. Areas of economic cooperation are undoubtedly reflected in global politics, and Africa’s positions and reactions on the Palestinian issue should be read in this context.

However, the African people, who have brutally experienced firsthand mankind’s disregard for human life, stand by the Palestinian people, regardless of their rulers and policies that support Israel against Palestine. Africans’ principled stances and the positions of the governments that govern them are not aligned. All in all, Africa’s position on the Palestinian issue is weakening the continent’s standing with divisions between governments and societies, and between countries supporting Palestine and those supporting Israel.

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n a significant shift in defense partnerships, Niger has terminated its security and defense collaborations with the European Union, opting instead to fortify its military cooperation with Russia.

The move, announced by Niger’s Foreign Ministry on November 4, entails the discontinuation of the European Union Military Partnership Mission (EUMPM) in Niger, which had been initiated in February with the objective of bolstering the Niger Armed Forces’ capabilities to combat terrorist threats. The termination of this mission was accompanied by the revocation of privileges and immunities previously granted under the partnership.

Concurrently, the junta in Niger has also put an end to the 2012 EU civilian mission aimed at enhancing the country’s internal security forces. This cancellation of EU defense agreements coincides with a significant meeting in Niamey between Niger’s military leadership and a Russian delegation, culminating in a defense cooperation agreement signed by Russian Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel-General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and Nigerien Defense Minister Gen. Salifou Mody.

The pivot towards Russia

This pivot towards Russia follows a suspension of financial aid and security assistance by the EU in response to the military intervention in July that ousted Niger’s elected President Mohamed Bazoum. In a related development, on August 3rd, Niger’s military rulers had already declared the annulment of military pacts with France, a move that was met with skepticism from Paris due to concerns about legitimacy.

Despite these tensions, French President Emmanuel Macron announced in September the planned end-of-year withdrawal of approximately 1,500 French troops stationed in Niger as part of a broader regional counterinsurgency operation.

Niger’s realignment towards Russian military support marks a notable change in the geopolitical landscape of West Africa and reflects the increasing Russian influence in the region’s military affairs. The consequences of this shift, both for Niger’s internal stability and regional security dynamics, are yet to unfold as international observers watch closely.

Implications for the West African region

This pursuit has recently led to a notable pivot away from Western alliances towards Russia. The junta’s actions suggest a strategic realignment and a search for partners more aligned with its current political stance.

The broader implications of this shift are significant for the West African region, where France and the EU have traditionally held considerable influence. The departure of French troops and the cessation of EU security missions represent a withdrawal of Western military presence and, potentially, a vacuum that could be filled by other powers like Russia, as indicated by the newly signed defense cooperation agreement.

As Niger navigates these sanctions and repositions itself on the global stage, the dynamics of power and influence in the region are poised for change, with the junta’s maneuvers likely to invite further scrutiny from both regional bodies and the broader international community.

Sources: Anadolu Agency and AP

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frican leaders have intensified their longstanding campaign for permanent representation on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), a push that has recently gained the backing of France and Germany.

President Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea, while addressing the African Union Committee of Ten (C-10) summit in La Paz, Equatorial Guinea, emphasized the historical injustice faced by the continent due to its lack of permanent representation on the UNSC.

Since 2005, African nations have been unified in their demand for equitable representation, calling for two permanent seats with veto power and two additional non-permanent seats.

The call for renewed and united action was echoed by Nguema, who urged that African states remain vigilant and speak with one voice to avoid being sidelined by other countries’ alliances. He stressed the urgency of accelerating reforms to ensure “equitable representation of Africa through expanded membership.”

UNSC reforms

The meeting, which saw the convergence of African heads of state and representatives from UN and African Union agencies, sought to solidify a common position on UNSC reforms.

In a significant development, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna, during a visit to the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, expressed support for the African position. Baerbock acknowledged the changing global dynamics since World War II, advocating for two permanent African seats on the Security Council.

The UNSC currently has five permanent members – the U.S., UK, France, China, and Russia – and non-permanent members who serve on a rotational basis. At present, Mozambique, Gabon, and Ghana represent Africa.

The push for African seats on the Security Council comes amid growing calls for reforming the body to better reflect contemporary global realities. African Union Chairperson Moussa Faki, alongside outgoing AU Chairman and Senegalese President Macky Sall, have voiced this demand at various international platforms, including the U.N. General Assembly.

Biden for Africa

U.S. President Joe Biden has also shown support for Africa’s representation in global economic and security forums, including the G-20 and the Security Council.

As the European Union and the African Union strengthen their relations, particularly in light of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, Baerbock highlighted the necessity of African support in “defending the European peace order.” She also condemned Russia’s blockade of Ukrainian grain exports, which has exacerbated the food crisis in the Horn of Africa.

The support from Germany and France marks a crucial step for Africa’s aspirations at the UNSC. The summit in Equatorial Guinea is expected to finalize the African common position in the quest for increased representation on the global stage.

Sources: Anadolu Agency and VOA

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n a significant move, U.S. President Joe Biden announced plans to remove Uganda, Gabon, Niger, and the Central African Republic from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) trade program, effective from January 1, 2024.

The decision came in light of what President Biden described as “gross violations” of internationally recognized human rights standards by some of the nations, specifically pointing to the controversial anti-homosexuality law enacted in Uganda.

The decision does not mark a permanent exit for these countries. President Biden clarified that there will be ongoing evaluations to determine if they can re-qualify for the program based on the established eligibility criteria.

Gabon and Niger have been cited for their failure to establish or continually progress towards the protection of political pluralism and the rule of law. Despite intensive dialogues and engagements, the U.S. feels that these countries have not addressed key concerns regarding their non-compliance with the AGOA eligibility criteria.

AGOA, established in 2000, offers qualifying African countries duty-free access to the U.S. market for over 1,800 products. Its goal has been to foster economic relations, promote exports, and facilitate job creation among the participating nations. With AGOA set to expire in September 2025, there have been ongoing discussions regarding its extension and future framework.

Economic implications

The decision to remove these nations from the AGOA framework is expected to have economic implications, as the program has been a significant driver for exports and economic growth in the beneficiary countries. The four nations have not yet officially responded to the U.S. government’s announcement.

Many African governments and industrial organizations are advocating for an early extension of the program for an additional decade. They believe that confirming the continuation of AGOA without alterations will provide much-needed assurance to businesses and potential investors, ensuring sustained economic collaboration and growth.

The push for a 10-year extension underscores the significance of AGOA in Africa’s trade ecosystem. It remains to be seen how the U.S. will respond to this appeal, but the ongoing discussions indicate a strong desire to maintain and possibly expand the trade relationship between the U.S. and Africa.

Not all countries benefited the same from AGOA

Variability in the utilization of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) among nations can be attributed to multiple factors, ranging from business climates to policy implementation challenges. AGOA’s export criteria or if the program’s objectives are unclear. Policy conflicts arise when internal stakeholders, from the government to workers, have differing views on AGOA’s vision or strategy.

By 2022, of the 39 beneficiary countries of AGOA, 18 had established a strategy to maximize the program’s benefits. Countries with a structured AGOA plan, such as Mali, Mozambique, and Zambia, saw significant growth in exports to the U.S. However, the positive correlation between having an AGOA strategy and witnessing beneficial outcomes is intricate.

While having supportive elements like political will and resources plays a role, a clear AGOA strategy can also enhance these factors and provide a straightforward path to increase exports.

For instance, Ethiopia, prior to U.S. sanctions, bolstered its AGOA-aligned exports by identifying sector-specific challenges and creating targeted solutions, leading to a significant increase in exports. Similarly, Botswana’s evolving AGOA strategy, which is continuously refined based on stakeholder feedback, may offer a valuable template for other African nations.

Sources: Reuters, TRT World and Brookings

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he coup against Niger’s President Mohamed Bazoum, one of the most important allies of the West in the Sahel, paves the way for the consolidation of the influence of other global actors seen as alternatives by regional states, Russia in particular. The fact that people organized rallies in support of the junta intervention in Niger and unfurled the flags of other foreign actors, especially Russia, in the squares is a result of the growing reaction against the West and the search for trusted alternative partners.

The coups taking place in the Sahel since 2020 stem from the fact that the African society, nourished by pan-Africanist ideas, has consolidated its military forces to intervene against the governments in the face of antagonism towards the French.

Following the military intervention in Niger, the governments of the Sahel countries are divided into two factions: those which support the junta and those who support ousted president Bazoum. In the Sahel region, Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso are supported by Russia, while the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries, which have pursued their democratization processes more steadily than others, have deepened their relations with Western actors, particularly France.

The polarization in the region and ECOWAS’ plan to intervene militarily against the junta government in Niger is one of the main items on the international community’s agenda. From this point of view, the planned military intervention in Niger by ECOWAS, which is supported by Western countries, in particular France, may prevent regional development and weaken West African states in general, rather than weakening the junta regimes.

Background of the events unfolding in Niger: The “coup ecosystem” born of Anti-Westernism

Niger, which gained independence from French colonial rule in 1960, has experienced four coups to date. On July 26, 2023, soldiers led by General Omar Tchiani, commander of the Presidential Guard Regiment, intervened against the Bazoum administration which had been elected in February 2021. The coup attempt was successful and currently, there is a junta government led by Tchiani, resulting in the polarization of the region with the support of global actors. The reasons for the military intervention can be explained in the context of both domestic and foreign policy.

Although Bazoum’s administration failed to solve the country’s security and economy problems in the context of the fight against terrorism, the main problem was Tchiani’s demand for power and his close relationship with Bazoum’s predecessor, Mahmoud Isafu. It is claimed that Bazoum wanted to remove Tchiani from office before the intervention, and that, therefore, the main reason for the military intervention in terms of domestic politics was the power dispute between the two actors.

Regional and global interactions are another factor underpinning the disagreements between the political and military leaders in domestic politics. During the last decade, the Sahel crisis, which involves the three border lines of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger of the Sahel geography, encompassing the arid topography extending from the Green Cape of Senegal to the Cape of Somalia, has witnessed the spread of al-Qaeda- and DAESH-linked terrorist organizations.

In this context, the peacemaking and peacekeeping operations carried out by Western actors in the region, France in particular, have not yielded any significant results, leading to a backlash among the local societies. Riding the wave created by this reaction, military leaders have created a “coup ecosystem” in the Sahel that interacts with the anti-French sentiments of the societies and has resulted since 2020 in coups in Mali, then in Guinea, and Burkina Faso. The intervention against the Bazoum regime in Niger is also part of this coup ecosystem.

Western actors’ influence in the Sahel and possible ECOWAS intervention in Niger

In the fight against terrorism in the Sahel, Western actors provide equipment and training support to countries in the field of security. As of 2022, however, France announced that it will withdraw its 5,100 troops, which have been in the region since 2013, first under the banner of Operation Serval and then Operation Barkhane. Instead though France shifted its personnel from Mali and Burkina Faso to Niger.

The United States, on the other hand, supports counterterrorism operations in Niger with 1,000 security personnel and an unmanned aerial vehicle base in the Agadez region. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which was established by a UN Security Council resolution in 2014, is supported by 53 countries with approximately 11,000 personnel.

Western actors might appear to be acting within the framework of common interests regarding the junta regime in Niger, but we know from international politics that actors may act under the same umbrella organization.

It should not be forgotten that the U.S. would have to impose sanctions on Niger if it used the word “coup” and chose instead to emphasize diplomatic efforts and differentiate itself from France’s rigid stance.

The diplomatic pressure exerted on the junta by ECOWAS, led by Nigeria, to hand over power to Bazoum, as well as the announcement by Burkina Faso and Mali that they would declare war against a possible Western-backed military intervention by ECOWAS against Niger, indicate that geopolitical ruptures in the Sahel may deepen. In this sense, Algeria has also stated that an ECOWAS intervention against Niger would escalate regional instability and that it will not use force against neighboring countries.

Algeria’s decision has a significant impact on the decision of ECOWAS countries to intervene militarily in Niger. Indeed, Algeria is a key country both for its strong economy among the countries in the region and for Nigeria’s Trans-Sahara gas pipeline project, which will join the existing natural gas pipeline connecting to Europe in Algeria via Niger. Therefore, it is clear that if ECOWAS intervenes militarily in Niger, it will not find full regional support.

On the other hand, an ECOWAS intervention scenario could accelerate the East-West confrontation in the Sahel, with proxy forces in the form of terrorist movements. This would have a significant negative impact on the demographic gains and the exploitation of natural resources by the regional countries.

Military intervention in Niger risks expanding the coup ecosystem

The military intervention against the Bazoum regime in Niger is a regional security concern due to the growing terrorist threat in the Sahel over the last decade and the success of coups since 2020. It is likely that the military intervention in Niger will bring Chad into the coup ecosystem after Libya, Sudan, Mali, and Burkina Faso. As a matter of fact, there is a growing and suppressed opposition to the current government in Chadian society,  as in the cases of Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

The planned military intervention by ECOWAS against the junta in Niger led by Western actors will deepen regional instability rather than weaken the junta regimes. Indeed, in the event of such a scenario, proxy wars will emerge from an environment where terrorist movements spread and Eastern actors, especially Russia, fill the vacuum created by anti-Western sentiment.

Even if junta governments in the Sahel lose power, instability in the region will deepen and economic development will be negatively affected. A reasonable solution could be to accelerate diplomatic processes to ensure the transition of junta governments to democratic governance and development based on the equitable distribution of resources with the support of Western actors.

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n Wednesday, August 23, a private jet that took off from Moscow and was headed towards St. Petersburg, lost radio communication at around 17:30 Moscow time, once again putting Russia at the top of the news headlines. The world was quick to hear the news of the probable death of Yevgeni Prigozhin, the chief of the Wagner army, as videos of the moment of the crash and the wreckage site were posted on social media.

The fact that even the Russian news agency TASS was quick—by Russian standards—to announce that Prigozhin and the Wagner management team were on board the crashed plane signaled that the finale many had been waiting for had arrived.

After his death, commentary focused on Prigozhin’s personality and eccentric biography. However, for the purpose of providing a useful perspective on what the future holds for Russia, it is useful to focus less on who Prigozhin was and more on what he stood for. This approach is also more useful for answering questions about the future of the Wagner structure and Russia’s goals.

Post-USSR needs: Oligarchs and Wagner

Russia’s urgent search for a free-market economy organization to replace the Soviet system that collapsed in 1991 produced a class of elite capital labeled “oligarchs,” the likes of which are not found anywhere else in the world. This capitalist class, which at first, in cooperation with Western countries, siphoned off the resources of the Russian state, inevitably underwent a structural transformation after 1999, with Putin’s rise to power.

The oligarchs of the first era were replaced by the business circles that Putin cultivated while running the city of St. Petersburg, and both resources and wealth changed hands rapidly. When the first oligarchs of the post-Soviet era insisted on doing things their own way, they were purged, either by being forced to flee abroad or imprisoned. Prigozhin, thanks to his St. Petersburg roots, was able to carve out a niche for himself in the food industry as a chef within the oligarch structure of this second period.

What differentiated Prigozhin from his peers was that he recognized the Kremlin’s needs in time and invested in these areas at the right time and place. Caught unprepared for the rules of the free market economy in 1991, the Russian state found itself at the mercy of the oligarchs. From 1999 onwards, with NATO’s eastward expansion, it was discovered that a similar mistake had been made in foreign policy. In fact, the consequences of this mistake were the factor that brought Putin to power. What was the mistake?

By 1999, it was clear that the verbal assurances given to Gorbachev, then first secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, by his Western counterparts and even NATO officials that NATO would not expand eastwards were in vain. However, by this time, Russia had abandoned its spheres of influence not only in Europe but also in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Asia-Pacific region. This vulnerability allowed the U.S. to intervene in Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, Serbia, and Venezuela without deterrence. The Kremlin urgently needed to find a solution to this imbalance created by the unipolar world.

Prigozhin: The man of opportunity

It was at this point that Prigozhin realized the advantages that the conflicts in Ukraine’s Donbas region and in Syria and Libya could bring Russia in terms of geopolitical competition. It was clear that a dynamic military force, in line with Russian Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov’s concept of “hybrid warfare,” would have a role to play in helping Russia reclaim its spheres of influence. This was the “opportunity” that set Prigozhin apart from other similar oligarchs and earned him worldwide recognition, even leading to his tragic end.

Russia needed a shadow army, whose powers were deliberately left ambiguous and whose legal position was not clearly defined, to protect its presence in overseas territories. Prigozhin provided this need with the Wagner Group. Representing the entrepreneurial personality, organizational skills, and patriotism he brought from his business life, the Wagner Group soon turned the tide of events in Russia’s favor on the Syrian, Libyan, Belarusian, and Ukrainian fronts. The geopolitical balance, which had turned against the Kremlin with the disintegration of the USSR, had reoriented itself and Moscow’s fate had begun to change.

Wagner’s operational success soon became a way out for African countries seeking to free themselves from the influence of France and the United States. Not only that, similar demands began to come from Latin American countries. The U.S. and France were now facing Wagner’s phantom in the countries they had plundered recklessly in the aftermath of the First Cold War.

Things were going well, even better than expected, for both the Kremlin and Prigozhin, until February 24, 2022. As much as the leadership in Moscow did not want to acknowledge it, when their plan to seize the capital Kyiv and fully occupy Ukraine, or at the very least change the government, failed, news of the cracks between Prigozhin and the ruling class around the Kremlin reached the media.

Russia-Ukraine war rocks the Wagner-Kremlin balance

The situation in which the Russian army found itself when facing the Ukrainian defenses forced it to adopt a defensive posture and led Prigozhin to make statements directly targeting Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov before the international community. Moreover, ultranationalist figures such as Dmitry Utkin had rallied around Prigozhin.

Although the Wagner army appeared to remain loyal to Putin, it was now clear that they wanted to change the balance of power around the Kremlin. After Prigozhin’s death, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov stated, “Prigozhin was a nationally significant person. But he either did not see or did not want to see the whole picture of what has been happening in the country lately. I wanted him to give up his personal ambitions for bigger national issues, but that’s the kind of person Prigozhin was. He had a character of steel and a desire to achieve what he wanted immediately.”

The Battle of Bakhmut, which began in August 2022, marked the beginning of the final turning point in the future of the relations between Wagner and the Kremlin. Prigozhin’s criticism of Shoigu and Gerasimov became increasingly harsh and reckless, arguing that both the capture and retention of Bakhmut were the work of Wagner. Prigozhin’s statements targeting Defense Minister Shoigu on May 5, 2023 were a sign that the tipping point had been reached.

Prigozhin was burning bridges with words like “Wagner is suffering tens of thousands of casualties so that you can sit like a fat cat in your luxurious office.” The Kremlin’s response to this was ordering an agreement to integrate Wagner into the Defense Ministry. Prigozhin refused to sign this and on June 23, repeating the words of the Roman general and statesman Julius Caesar, he said “Alea iacta est,” the die is cast, in other words. Prigozhin had now crossed all red lines,  but his future was not to be as bright as Caesar’s.

Prigozhin published a video message claiming that Russia’s attempt to invade Ukraine was based on lies and that defense minister Shoigu had deceived both President Putin and the Russian people about the war. The next day, the Wagner army launched a mutiny unlike any other in modern history. Within 24 hours, Wagner reached within 95 kilometers of Moscow according to some sources and 310 kilometers according to others, shooting down Russian army attack helicopters and even an intelligence plane on its way at an unexpected speed.

However, the Wagner mutiny did not find the support it had hoped for from within the Russian army. In fact, Prigozhin’s mutiny hit the rocks when Ramzan Kadyrov, who shared Prigozhin’s criticisms against the Minister of Defense and the Chief of General Staff but had redefined his side in this power struggle as of March, also turned against the mutiny.

The failure of General Sergey Surovikin, nicknamed “General Armageddon” for his activities in Syria and the commander of the Russian forces that began the invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, to make a move in favor of Wagner was instrumental in ending the mutiny. According to Western sources, General Surovikin, who was the commander of the Russian Aerospace and Air Forces at the time of the mutiny, was intercepted by forces loyal to Putin, who had received advance notice of the attempt.

After his Telegram message on June 24 to stop the mutiny, Surovikin never appeared in public again and was relieved of all his duties the day before the plane crash that killed Prigozhin. It is now common knowledge that Surovikin is under house arrest and will never appear in public again, as happened to disgraced generals during the USSR. House arrest is, in fact, the best-case scenario for him.

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ince 2020, the Sahel region has witnessed a significant number of military coups with various political implications at the regional and global levels. Tunç Demirtaş, a researcher at the Ankara-based think tank SETA, attributed the regular occurrence of military coups in the Sahel to regional dynamics. Demirtaş argues that regional dynamics such as terrorism, insurgency, inequitable income distribution, poor governance, security issues, and anti-French sentiment stemming from the colonial past were the main factors behind the recent military coups in Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Chad. Building on this, he claims that security gaps in particular disrupt processes of democratic institutionalization and lead to military coups.

As a landlocked country in the Sahel with a population of about 26 million, Niger was also subject to the aforementioned dynamics that paved the way for military coups. Niger is a former French colony: it became a French overseas territory in 1946 and gained independence in 1960. Since then, the country has experienced a total of four coups.

Before the most recent military coup in 2023, Niger’s government was aligned with the U.S.- and French-backed counter-insurgency efforts in the Sahel. Recent military coups in Mali and Burkina Faso ended the longstanding French military presence in the Sahel, with the exception of Niger. This was largely due to the anti-French rhetoric used by military regimes to legitimize their rule and consolidate popular support.

The 2023 coup in Niger

 On July 26, 2023, the military in Niger led by General Abdourahmane Tchiani staged a successful coup d’état in Niger, overthrowing President Mohamed Bazoum, who is under house arrest. The military cited poor governance and lack of security in the country as the reasons for the coup.

Niger’s army spokesman, Amadou Abdramane, announced on national television that the country’s borders had been closed, a nationwide curfew had been imposed, and political institutions had been suspended until further notice.

On July 27, the Nigerien army declared that it would support the coup to avoid a “murderous confrontation” that could potentially turn into a “bloodbath.”

On July 28, General Tchiani proclaimed himself head of state.

Ousted President Bazoum wrote on X, formerly known as Twitter, that “hard-won gains will be safeguarded” and that “all Nigeriens who love democracy and freedom would want this.” This was Bazoum’s first communication since the military coup. Bazoum’s foreign minister, Hassoumi Massoudou, also wrote on X, calling on “democrats and patriots” to make this “dangerous adventure” fail.

How did Africa respond to the coup d’état?

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), backed by the U.S. and France, held a summit three days after the military coup in Niger. ECOWAS condemned the coup and called for the restoration of constitutional order and the unconditional release and reinstatement of President Bazoum. It used the rhetoric of military intervention if the ruling military regime didn’t meet the conditions for a return to constitutional order and the reinstatement of President Bazoum, setting a deadline for August 6, 2023.

Following the expiry of the ECOWAS ultimatum, ECOWAS did not launch a military intervention. However, it ordered the activation of its standby force on August 10. In its statement, ECOWAS pointed out that all options, including the “use of force,” were on the table to restore constitutional order in Niger. On August 18, ECOWAS announced that it set an undisclosed D-day for the military intervention to restore constitutional order in Niger. Whether or not ECOWAS will intervene militarily still remains an unanswered question at this point.

ECOWAS immediately closed Niger’s borders and banned commercial flights to the country. As part of the economic sanctions, it halted financial transactions with Niger and froze its national assets and aid.

The African Union (AU) also condemned the military coup, calling for the “immediate and unconditional return of the offending soldiers to their barracks” in a press release. On August 22, the AU suspended Niger over the military coup.

With ECOWAS threatening military intervention, the military junta in Niger called for mass mobilization. On June 5, the Volunteers for the Defence of Niger, a pro-coup NGO, launched a recruitment drive across the country. Amsarou Bako, one of the founders, told the Associated Press: “It’s a contingency; we have to be ready whenever it happens. Anyone over the age of 18 can register and the list will be given to the Nigerien military so they can call on people if necessary.” “The junta was not involved in the recruitment drive, but was aware of the initiative,” he added.

At the same time, African countries such as Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Algeria have sided with the military in Niger. They issued a joint statement saying they were opposed to the threat of military intervention by ECOWAS. They also mentioned that they would intervene militarily in support of the military in Niger if necessary.

French and U.S. reaction to Niger coup d’état

 France strongly supported the ECOWAS rhetoric of military intervention to restore constitutional order and ousted President Bazoum to power. It announced the immediate suspension of all development and aid to Niger. On August 3, it also suspended military cooperation with Niger until further notice.

Interestingly, France refused the military regime’s request to withdraw its troops. An opinion piece in the Atlantic Council attributed France’s proactive role in countering the military coup to its declining influence in the Sahel. It argued that because France’s interests were at stake following the military takeovers in the region, and before the military coup Niger was the last stronghold of French military presence, France resorted to a military solution under the umbrella of ECOWAS.

In contrast to France, the United States has been hesitant about responding to the coup. Unlike France, the U.S. has not called it a “coup” and has opted for a diplomatic solution by sending an envoy to meet with the ruling military. Nevertheless, the U.S. suspended security cooperation with Niger and, like France, cut off development aid.

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ince 2020, a trend has emerged in African politics which has seen nearly a dozen military coups or attempts take place. While some have failed, most have succeeded. Those who staged the coups claim they are freeing their countries from Western influence, namely France and the United States. Other coup leaders have referred to domestic politics and the worsening economic situation in their countries as the factors behind their coups. Most notably, there is an increasing sign of solidarity among the military regimes being formed after these coups.

For instance, the Burkina Faso and Chad military regimes threated to send armies to Niger in case of foreign intervention. Below is a list of coups and coup attempts that have taken place since 2020 in Africa in chronological order.

Mali (August 2020)

This takeover involved a group of mutinous soldiers who took control of the government. The epicenter of the coup was the the Sundiata Keita military base in Kati, a town 15 km from the capital Bamako. During the coup, key government officials, including President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, were arrested, ultimately leading to Keïta’s resignation and the dissolution of the government.

The coup was triggered by widespread protests against Keïta’s government, which had been plagued by allegations of corruption, poor governance, and an inability to tackle the country’s security problems. The protests were ongoing since June 2020 and had gradually increased in size and fervor, paving the way for the eventual coup.

The consequences of the coup were far-reaching, unsettling Mali’s stability and exacerbating its ongoing security challenges. The Malian armed forces were severely weakened by the coup.

Chad (April 2021)

A cohort of military officers, led by Mahamat Idriss Déby, the scion of the late president Idriss Déby Itno, launched a military coup. This was triggered by the death of President Déby on  April 19, 2021 who was killed while fighting rebels in the northern region of the country. The rebel group, known as the “Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT),” had launched an offensive against the government in the weeks leading up to Déby’s death.

Following Déby’s death, the military formally announced the dissolution of the government and the suspension of the constitution. Subsequently, Mahamat Déby was appointed interim president and took over the leadership of a 15-member military council.

The reverberations of this coup have caused a state of upheaval in Chad, As Chad navigates an uncertain path forward, it faces several challenges that must be resolved to pave the way for the restoration of democratic governance.

Guinea (September 2021)

Guinea’s government takeover was orchestrated by a contingent of specialized forces led by Mamady Doumbouya who seized the presidential palace in the capital, Conakry. President Alpha Condé was arrested, released, and placed under house arrest. The coup was sparked by widespread dissatisfaction with Condé’s government, due to allegations of corruption, mismanagement, and human rights abuses. The coup was also fueled by Condé’s controversial decision to amend the constitution to allow him to seek a third term in office.

A transitional government was set up in October 2021, with Doumbouya assuming the role of interim president. This government promised to organize elections within 36 months, a timetable that was met with skepticism due to the prevailing uncertainties.

The aftermath of the coup has had a destabilizing effect on Guinea.

Sudan (October 2021)

General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), seized the country’s government during a period of transitional government. The coup was triggered by internal conflicts within this government, pitting military and civilian leaders against each other. The military faction expressed dissatisfaction with the pace of the transition to democracy and argued for a greater retention of power. The civilian leaders, on the other hand, wanted a rapid transition to civilian rule.

The coup was met with widespread protests in the capital, Khartoum, which were quickly put down. The coup leaders arrested several civilian leaders, including Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, and dissolved the existing transitional government. Looking ahead,

The Gambia (December 2021)

An attempted coup d’état was led by a contingent of soldiers who stormed the State House in the capital Banjul. Although President Adama Barrow escaped unharmed, he was subsequently placed under house arrest; however, the coup failed as Barrow effectively regained power with the support of the Gambian armed forces. The leaders responsible for the coup were arrested and charged with treason.

The motivations behind the coup were complex and stemmed from factors such as the country’s ongoing political instability and the vulnerability of its military structure. The Gambia has experienced several coups and attempted coups in recent years, exposing divisions and lack of discipline within the military ranks. The coup highlighted the country’s vulnerability to political instability. The Gambia, characterized by its compact size, has a history of political turbulence, and the coup attempt served as a stark reminder of the fragility of the country’s democratic systems.

These challenges include the need to address political instability, strengthen the military, and tackle corruption.

Burkina Faso (January 2022)

A group of insurgent soldiers, on January 23, 2022, stormed the capital, Ouagadougou. In February 2022, a transitional government was formed, with Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba assuming the role of interim president.

The aftermath of the coup has had a destabilizing effect on Burkina Faso, exacerbating the country’s existing security problems. As Burkina Faso moves forward, it faces a range of challenges that must be resolved to pave the way for democracy.

Guinea-Bissau (February 2022)

The coup attempt was staged by a contingent of rebel soldiers who stormed the government palace in the capital, Bissau. Although President Umaro Sissoco Embaló escaped unharmed, several government officials were arrested. Ultimately, the coup failed and Embaló managed to regain control of the government. The leaders behind the coup were subsequently arrested and charged with treason.

The coup attempt was fueled by several factors, including the country’s ongoing political instability and the fragility of the military apparatus. Guinea-Bissau has experienced several coups and attempted coups in recent times, revealing divisions and lack of discipline within the military ranks. The coup also highlighted the country’s vulnerability to drug trafficking. Guinea-Bissau is a key transit point for cocaine from South America to Europe, and drug trafficking is believed to have played a role in instigating the coup attempt.

Many of the nation’s difficulties need to be resolved in order to promote stability and democratic government. These challenges include the need to address the country’s political volatility, strengthen its armed forces, and combat the scourge of drug trafficking.

São Tomé and Príncipe (February 2022)

On February 24 and 25, 2022, an unsuccessful coup took place on the island nation of São Tomé and Príncipe. The coup was orchestrated by four individuals, including Delfim Neves, the incumbent president of the National Assembly, and a military officer previously linked to an earlier coup attempt. The coup leaders attempted to seize control of both the military barracks and the government headquarters in the capital, São Tomé. However, their efforts were met with fierce resistance from loyal troops and they were eventually defeated.

The coup leaders were subsequently arrested and charged with treason. The São Tomé and Príncipe government condemned the coup attempt and vowed to ensure that the perpetrators would face legal consequences. The coup attempt marked a setback for democracy in São Tomé and Príncipe, a country known for its long-standing political stability. The country has never experienced a successful coup, with the events of February 2022 marking the first coup attempt since 1995.

The episode also highlighted the complexities facing São Tomé and Príncipe, an African island nation with a fledgling democracy which faces challenges of poverty, unemployment, vulnerability to corruption, and the specter of political instability. São Tomé and Príncipe’s path remains uncertain, but the nation’s commitment to democracy and the rule of law remains firm. The government has expressed its determination to strengthen the security apparatus and root out corruption. The country is also actively seeking international support to address its economic difficulties.

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gainst the backdrop of the Nile’s flowing currents, a complex struggle unfurls between Egypt and Ethiopia, each driven by their distinct needs and aspirations. As the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) nears completion, tensions rise, underscoring the challenge of balancing development and preservation in a region with scarce water supplies. The Nile River, one of the longest rivers in the world, passes through eleven different countries from south to north, and its appears that Ethiopia and Egypt are unwilling to share it. Egyptians cannot live without the Nile, and they depend on it completely for water. Ethiopia also needs GRED for development.

Throughout history, Egypt has had a profound connection to the Nile. The country consists of more than 90% desert and the Nile is called the “Gift of the gods.” At the same time, Ethiopia needs the Nile water to fill GERD and help the country supercharge its economy. More than 60% of Ethiopia is not connected to the power grid, which is something the government wants to change.

This is where the tension begins between the two countries. Mohammed Mahmoud, director of the Climate and Water Program at the Middle East Institute, warns, “Folks have never actually gone to war just because of water.” “Now, we could be at the point in history where that changes.”

What will Ethiopia gain from GERD?

With a budget of $4.2 billion, GERD is in the western Benishangul-Gumuz region and has been a source of contention between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt since the beginning of its construction in 2011.

Sudan and Egypt fear the Ethiopian project could reduce their share of the Nile waters. Ethiopia insists the dam is the key to its economic development: the dam is Africa’s biggest hydroelectric project to date and is expected to generate over 5,000 megawatts of electricity, doubling the nation’s electricity output when it has been fully completed.

More than 60% of Ethiopians cannot access electricity. Prime Minister of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed stated that “Ethiopia doesn’t have any intention to cause harm to Sudan and Egypt.” “But we also don’t want to live in darkness,” he added. Currently, 90% of construction has been completed.

What has caused the Nile waters crisis?

Egypt is in the grip of a water crisis caused by an increasing population and a limited water supply. The country has less water per person each year and is already below the United Nation’s water poverty threshold. By 2025 the UN predicts that Egypt will be approaching an “absolute water crisis.” Climate change, poor water management, recurring droughts, and the new Ethiopian hydropower dam on the Nile River are worsening the water crisis in the country.

In a report by Fast Company Middle East, Mohamed El-Kamel, the managing director of Alashanek ya Balady Association for Sustainable Development (AYB-SD), mentions a combination of factors that make Egypt susceptible to drought such as diminished rainfall, exacerbated by the increase in greenhouse gas emissions which leads to elevated temperatures. These changes also contribute to a shift in the distribution path of water. The escalating temperatures and impacts of climate change further cause water evaporation and decrease the water levels in Egypt’s lakes and rivers.

Depending solely on the Nile presents a heightened challenge in mitigating water scarcity for the country. The shrinking of the Nile is a result of increasing temperatures and prolonged drought periods. During the Cairo Water Week, Egypt’s Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Dr. Hani Sewilam underscored the country’s significant reliance on the Nile for nearly 97% of its irrigation and drinking water, outlining the interconnected transboundary risks.

Egypt is deeply concerned by the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in terms of its water security. According to Dr. Sherine Ahmed El Baradei, associate professor at the Civil Engineering Program at the German University in Cairo, “Filling the reservoir over a more extended period would be a beneficial approach, as Ethiopia’s reservoir filling every five to seven years could lead to a reduction of Egypt’s water share by approximately 12 to 25% during the filling period.”

How to solve the water crisis

With a population that exceeds 109 million now, Egypt’s population is predicted to more than double within 50 years. The population problem is exacerbated by a lack of natural resources and habitable space, although Egypt extends over one million square kilometers. Most Egyptians live in just 7% of the country, mainly along the Nile and the Nile Delta. Due to overpopulation, the government began a family planning campaign to reduce birth rates and control overpopulation, dubbed “Two children are enough.” The government believes that this campaign will be a solution to Egypt’s pending water crisis.

Rice plays an important role in Egyptian cuisine with annual rice consumption standing at 67.5 kg per capita. Egypt switched from a rice exporter to a rice importer following governmental measures reducing rice-cultivated areas due to the water shortage crisis. According to the Global Agricultural Information Network (GAIN), the country approved a law to circumvent illegal rice cultivation.

If a farmer is found to be planting rice outside of the allotted rice growing area set by the government, they could face a fine ranging from EGY 3,000 to EGY 10,000, or face a maximum six-month prison sentence. This was another government measure to combat water scarcity. 

Due to climate change, increasing human population pressure, and Ethiopia constructing a giant hydropower dam on the Nile, Africa is facing a water crisis. However, this crisis poses particular challenges for Egypt as the river provides nearly all Egyptians with drinking water. Without water, there can be no Egypt. As part of Egypt’s national strategy to improve accessibility to drinking water, a seawater desalination plant in New Mansoura recently began operations. The project is a part of the first phase of Egypt’s strategy which aims to build 21 seawater desalination plants that will reduce water extraction from the Nile.

The proposed desalination plants will be able to provide the water-stressed nation with an additional 3.3million m³/d of water that can be used to irrigate crops or for public water supply. Once the second phase is completed, the plants are expected to increase the country’s desalination capacity by 8.8 million m³/d at a total cost of $8 billion.

Is a water crisis imminent?

The citizens of Ethiopia are suffering from lack of electricity and hope to remedy this with the Rennaisance Dam. Furthermore, the completion of the Renaissance Dam will boost Addis Ababa’s economy by exporting electricity. However, countries like Egypt, at the end of the trail that receives the water, are worried about not having enough water to survive.

Egyptians have always depended on the Nile for their survival. Meanwhile, the construction of Ethiopia’s dam is currently 90% complete, and many meetings, agreements, and discussions between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan have been held with no mutual agreements.

Egypt and Ethiopia are unlikely to budge as both countries want what is best for their future. At the same time, Egyptians and Ethiopians want a suitable alternative to the impasse – and the sooner the better.

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est Africa is a region that has been plagued by coups since 2020. The most recent coup was in Niger on July 26, 2023. In 1900, Niger was a military zone administered by France. In 1946, it became a French overseas territory and since 1960, it has existed as a “fully independent” state in the international system. Since independence, Niger has suffered four coups d’état and three attempted coups d’état. This has led Niger to be described as one of the most unstable countries in the international system—a development highly related to its colonial legacy.

After the coup d’état in Niger, France, the United States, the West, in general, and, in particular, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union, condemned the coup and issued statements calling for the restoration of constitutional order and democratic conditions as soon as possible. Today, it is clear from the coups that the expectations of West African societies for democracy have not been met.

The serious problems in the security architecture of West African countries cause the security gaps that unfortunately lead to coups. It is difficult for a healthy democracy to function in countries where mutual trust and security cannot be fully guaranteed; in societies where people have lost their loved ones as a result of the practices of the governments and terrorist groups that rule the country, democracy is not a priority.

Niger is one of the ten poorest countries in the world and suffers from the persistence of insecurity due to a series of security problems such as economic problems, corruption, unequal distribution of income, terrorism, insurgency, conflicts and political instability, bad governance, and internal power struggles. All these stand out as the main factors behind the coup. Struggling with terrorism for many years, Niger is unable to guarantee security and France’s lack of success in providing security and stability had led to public outcry. On the other hand, the presence of Russia’s Wagner Group, which provides relative security, leads to the appearance of Russian flags in Niger and increased Russian influence in the region.

The coup in Niger

Unfortunately, coups in the Sahel now seem to be a regular occurrence. The Niger coup was preceded by coups in Mali in August 2020, Guinea in September 2021, Chad in April 2021, and Burkina Faso on January 24, 2022. Following the coups in Mali and Burkina Faso, French soldiers from these countries moved to Niger as part of Operations Barkhane and Sabre.

Together with the soldiers who entered Niger as part of these operations, it is estimated that there are 1,500 French soldiers in the country that have been deployed for counterterrorism training, intelligence, and air support.

Led by General Abdourahamane (Omar) Tchiani and the Nigerien presidential guard, a coup d’état took place on July 26, against Niger’s President Mohammed Bazoum, who had been democratically elected in 2021 with 55.6 percent of the vote. It remains unclear at this stage how the coup will end and what direction the process will take. The coup’s chances of success may also be linked to the intervention of external actors.

Looking at the reasons for the coup in Niger, which occupies a critical position in African politics and in West Africa, the aforementioned internal reasons come to the fore. In this context, while the number of putschist generals in the Sahel is increasing, the coup plotters are using anti-French discourses to legitimize their presence. This discourse is also being used by Russia, which is seeking to expand its presence in the region through Wagner and other means.

By using anti-French rhetoric, the coup generals in the Sahel are also trying to benefit from the global competition in international relations, legitimize their presence, and consolidate their position. At the same time, they are trying to create a balanced situation by forming alliances with other countries in the region that have also been taken over by coups.

Regional implications of the coup 

The Niger coup has implications and consequences both for the country and for actors with imperialist ambitions such as France, China, and Russia. In the process, the confidence in France’s influence in the region has weakened, while regional security risks have increased.

In the aftermath of the coup, the use of the rhetoric of military intervention by ECOWAS to restore the old order can be said to reflect its efforts to prevent instability in the region and ensure regional peace. At the same time, regional actors such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Algeria, have supported the new government in Niger. They issued a joint statement opposing the possible use of force by ECOWAS and stating that they would intervene militarily if necessary. This situation could lead to divisions among the countries in the region and ECOWAS’s ability to provide a coordinated response to such events may be reduced.

Nevertheless, if ECOWAS decides to intervene militarily, conflict in the region is inevitable. In addition, the presence of Nigeria, one of the most important countries in West Africa, Algeria, another important country in North Africa, and Chad, which is not a member of ECOWAS, as key actors in the regional equation will play a crucial role in determining the direction of regional tensions.

There are two alternative approaches that hold the potential to avoid conflict in Niger: the anti-coup military and civilian groups within Niger, and the efforts of Benin and Chad through mediating roles. It is believed that the anti-coup group within the Niger military will not use force against the coup plotters so as to avoid conflict; however, it is possible that a counter-coup could emerge, perhaps if the coup group is weakened. Nevertheless, the threatening messages by coup leaders in neighboring countries are setting in motion a process that is having a significant impact on tensions in Niger and the region.

Global implications of the coup

After the coup in Niger, global competition is intense among actors such as France, the U.S., Russia, and China. France, in particular, has strong relations with West Africa; however, after the coups in Mali and Burkina Faso, it has paid more attention to Niger. The U.S., France, Germany, and Italy also have military bases in Niger. The most important of these military bases is Niger Air Base 201, a U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) base, which stands out as an intelligence and surveillance center for the United States.

Niger shares a long border with Nigeria, which has significant energy reserves in the region, and instability in Niger can affect Nigeria’s security. Regional instability is undesirable given the U.S. relationship with Nigeria in the context of energy cooperation and U.S. interests in West Africa. Furthermore, the regional terrorist organization Islamic State – West Africa Province (ISWAP) has the potential to strengthen its presence in the region by taking advantage of the possible conflict situation.

On the other hand, the energy resources in West Africa, where French companies such as Areva are active, are essential for France’s energy security. France depends on nuclear energy with nearly 70% of France’s energy needs being met by nuclear power stations. Niger, which has the seventh-largest uranium reserves in the world and the second-largest in Africa, is France’s third-largest uranium supplier. Niger supplies 19% of France’s uranium needs and exports the largest amount of uranium to France and Canada. At the same time, Niger supplies 25% of the European Union’s uranium needs.

Meanwhile, the China National Petroleum Corporation is building an oil pipeline project between Niger and Benin, most of which will pass through Niger, with a capacity of 90,000 barrels of oil per day. The coup in Niger and the stabilization of the country are therefore crucial to China’s economic interests in the region. In this context, it is also possible that China will take financial initiatives in relation to the coup. Given China’s cooperation with Russia on specific agendas, the global competition may continue in West Africa and these actors might evaluate the situation in the region as an opportunity for Russia to continue the war in Ukraine and squeeze the West in the energy sector.

F

rench President Emmanuel Macron recently completed a five-day trip to Africa, visiting Gabon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of the Congo, and Angola on March 1-5. Macron’s trip to Africa excluded several countries in the Sahel region, including Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, where there is significant tension with France.

Macron faced by criticism and protests

French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent trip to Africa aimed to deepen cultural connections and the exchange of ideas between France and African countries. He promised to end the “Françafrique” policy, which has long been criticized for enabling French political and economic influence in Africa.

His recent visit to Africa was met with criticism from numerous regional political analysts, who argued that his promises lacked new substance and were simply a repackaging of previous pledges. Many have expressed disappointment that Macron did not offer concrete plans or policy changes to address the complex issues facing the continent.

African political analyst Amir Nourdine Elbachir pointed out that Western nations are still discussing plans for Africa without involving Africans, suggesting that Macron’s new policy for Africa was prompted by threats to French interests in the continent.

Meanwhile, President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Félix Tshisekedi urged Macron to treat African nations as equal partners. Tshisekedi’s statement was made during a press conference with Macron held in Kinshasa on Saturday, March 4, 2023.

Tshisekedi called for France to change its “protectionist” attitude towards African countries, adding that France needs to see African countries as partners rather than in a paternal relationship.

The critiques suggest that while Macron’s new policies may be a step in the right direction, they may not go far enough in addressing the root issues of French interference and neocolonialism in Africa.

Despite Macron’s promises to end “Françafrique,” the French practice of maintaining economic and political influence over its former African colonies, Macron faced criticism and protests throughout his trip.

Lingering colonial legacy

France’s history of colonialism in Africa has left a legacy of resentment and distrust towards the West. Many African nations feel that their resources have been exploited and they have been left to deal with the aftermath of the colonial era leading to a deep and ongoing mistrust toward Western countries, and primarily Europe.

As competition for influence in Africa grows more intense, African nations are increasingly seeking partners who prioritize African interests and treat them as equal rather than viewing them as pawns in a neocolonial game.

Protests erupted during Macron’s visit to Gabon, where some demonstrators held placards stating “France get out.” The country’s opposition leader Jean Ping accused France of having a “neocolonial attitude” towards Gabon.

China and Russia on the rise

In recent years, China and Russia have expanded their presence in Africa, raising the concerns of European countries and the United States.

An interesting video circulated on social media showing some of the protestors who were chanting slogans against Emmanuel Macron’s planned visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo carrying Russian flags in their hands. The protest highlights the growing influence of Russia and China in Africa.

China’s economic policies in Africa focus on extracting natural resources, expanding the Chinese consumer market, and ensuring economic and political stability. Through President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative, China has expanded its economic cooperation with various African countries.

On the other hand, Russia’s approach to Africa involves business opportunities, arms sales in exchange for diplomatic support for Russia’s foreign policy preferences, political support for authoritarian leaders, and security cooperations. Russia’s relative popularity in the Global South has disappointed Western observers, and its attraction strategy has been fueled by the “memory diplomacy” approach whereby it highlights positive historical narratives such as its lack of involvement in the slave trade in Africa or colonialism in the region, and its role in supporting African countries during their struggle for independence.

In contrast, the European Union is trying to establish a broad political and economic relationship with African countries based on trade, investment, aid, and technical support, aiming to achieve better control over irregular migration.

The changing dynamics of Africa

African countries increasingly seek to assert their independence and pursue their own economic and political agenda.

The rise of China and Russia in Africa poses a challenge for the United States and EU countries by adding another layer to international African politics. They now have to re-adjust their approaches  to engage with African countries, taking into consideration their expectations and diplomatic needs.

The ongoing resentment towards the West in Africa highlights the need for a more equal and respectful relationship, one that both acknowledges the ongoing impact of Western colonialism and aims to help Africa address the root causes of poverty and instability.

Tribal conflicts have long been a major topic among scholars of violence and conflict. In Africa, the high number of tribes poses both opportunities and challenges to some African governments, which follow a policy of branding new national identities. While efforts for nation-building and identity formation move forward in certain African countries, in others, where loyalty and belonging to tribes grow steadily, such efforts meet obstacles .

In 1986, David Crary opined that Africans adhere to their tribes for factors such as the sense of belonging to a clan or extended family, shared customs and language, and displeasure with groups perceived as economic or political rivals.

Historically, tribes served as petty nationalities throughout Africa. Although these tribes fought each other before colonization, they were rarely involved in the daily clashes and wars that we witness today. It would be a mistake to disregard the historical origins of today’s tribal violence in Africa, which can be traced back to when Europeans created the borders of what they considered their own domains and grouped together tribes regardless of the languages, cultures, and peoples who owned and lived on these lands.

Academics such as late Kenyan professor Katama Mkangi, and Richard Morrock believe that colonial powers created several practices that identified and institutionalized communal differences among colonized communities in Africa and promoted tribal jealousies as part of a divide-and-rule strategy. They set one ethnic group against another, such as the Kikuyus and Luo of Kenya, whom they viewed as dangers because of their vast populations.

After independence, however, Africans with financial and political interests in maintaining the status quo and profiting from the divides and frictions have perpetuated these tribal splits and communal divisions. Some ethnic communities regard investigating one of their own as a political witch hunt and an attack on their tribes and interests, even when the investigation is carried out by a legal and national authority for the sole purpose of national interest. The Jacob Zuma corruption case in South Africa, and his appeals and support from the KwaZulu-Natal province, bolster this point.

In East Africa, tribal warfare in Rwanda and Burundi has been widely explored, with a special emphasis on the Rwandan Genocide of 1994. There is also a clear ethnic division in Kenyan politics since the country’s independence in 1963. The 2007 post-election violence in Kenya serves as an illustration of how tribalism and politics intertwine, and how they impact each other.

Violent conflicts between Fulani and Dogon erupted as the Malian army failed to fight what was considered a “jihadist” insurrection dominated by the Fulani ethnic group and backed by armed “Islamist” organizations. According to research from 2021, the Malian army implemented a plan of funding and training a Dogon militia for self-defense, which assaulted Fulani communities, resulting in Fulani counterattacks. As a result, the 2019-2020 killings and internal conflicts between the Fulani and Dogon populations have occurred.

Ethnicity has also had a significant influence on Guinean politics in the previous decade. Former President Alpha Condé, a Malinke, vowed in 2010 to unite all Guineans, regardless of tribe, after winning the presidential election held under Guinea’s transition to democratic rule following a coup d’état two years earlier.

Condé’s governance and political strategies, however, demonstrated that he used the ethnic card until he was deposed in a coup in September 2021. During his presidency, there were also riots between youths and supporters of his then-ruling party, and the main opposition parties from Guinea’s two largest ethnic groups, the Malinke and the Peul (or Fulani).

In Nigeria, it is difficult to examine political changes outside of an ethnoreligious setting. The ongoing campaigning for the next 2023 general election has focused on the Hausa-Fulani versus the Yoruba-Igbo, or south versus north. Taking up arms and intercommunal tensions have been politicized, as is largely the case with the Niger-Delta crisis in the country’s south-south zone, conflicts between Fulani herders and local farmers in the Middle Belt and other parts of Nigeria, Muslim-Christian clashes in Kaduna, and the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast. Meanwhile, the ruling elites and main political parties from the country’s largest ethnic groups have all perfected the art of feeding off and exploiting grievances of marginalized communities.

Looking at different incidents of tribal violence in Africa and their impact on regional politics, communities, and the economy, one could conclude that, while the causes of conflicts are broad and varied, ethnicity is a tool exploited in various regions of the continent. The introduction of one-party political systems aimed at blunting the influence of ethnic factions is one of the solutions adopted by several post-independence African leaders who denounce tribalism as an obstacle to political and economic developments and consider communal crisis to be a major impediment to national development.

However, some of these leaders’ actions contradict their statements, since their styles of leadership, tampering with the constitutions, and hegemonic presidencies—as witnessed in numerous nations today—have all led to various types of social and political violence between the political dominant tribes and marginalized ethnic groups.

It is worth mentioning that some Africans recommend redrawing boundaries and reverting to pre-colonial domains to prevent the communal crises, and sociopolitical and economic damage caused by colonial borders. However, several Pan-Africanist theorists and figures, including Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, have criticized this solution, arguing that redrawing borders along ethnic lines, or as they were before colonialism, would result in a continent composed of hundreds of small tribal states, which would only exacerbate crisis and instability.

Hence the viable and practical solutions to tribalism in Africa lie in good governance, regional cooperation, and enhancing the role of the African Union and borderless Africa initiatives.

Turkey is seeking to counter the Western and neo-colonial influence in the African continent by its increasing economic as well as political presence in the continent. The latest visit by President Erdoğan to strategic countries in Central and West Africa has cemented this vision set by Ankara. Erdogan’s commitment in strengthening the ties between Turkey and Africa is demonstrated since 2004 in the 50 plus trips to the continent and the 30 visits he made to African states.

In his four-day visit to Central and West Africa, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan aimed to boost economic as well as political relations with strategic African countries, following the roadmap designed in the Turkish relations with Africa for 2022 to 2026. Last October, Erdoğan’s four-day diplomatic tour included Angola, Nigeria, and Togo. Also, in October 2021, Istanbul hosted ministers from African countries and business leaders in a summit which aimed particularly at boosting trade between Turkey and African nations.

In his African tour, Erdoğan has visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal. Erdoğan’s visit to Guinea-Bissau was the first-ever presidential visit from Turkey to Guinea-Bissau. In Congo, a cooperation deal on the defense industry, a military framework agreement and a protocol on financial aid were signed between both sides.

In Senegal, Erdoğan and his Senegalese counterpart President Macky Sall attended Turkiye-Senegal Business Forum in Dakar, where Erdoğan said that his target to increase the bilateral trade volume between the two countries from $400 till $1 billion. Erdoğan highlighted that despite the coronavirus pandemic, the trade volume in 2021 jumped 42% year-on-year to $540 million.

Erdoğan said his target is to increase the bilateral trade volume between Turkey and Senegal from $400 till $1 billion.

Since 2007, The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), has completed around 190 projects in Senegal. In terms to the cultural relations between the two countries, the Turkish Maarif Foundation has provided education to almost 800 students in Senegal.

Because of its geographical location, Senegal is an export gateway to West African countries.

In his visit to Kinshasa, the capital of the DRC, the two countries have signed agreements to enhance cooperation in various fields, including a military framework agreement, a protocol on financial aid and a cooperation deal on the defense industry. Erdoğan who was accompanied by a delegation of Turkish businessmen and government officials.

President of Democratic Republic of Congo Felix Tshisekedi described the cooperation agreements with Turkey as “win-win” deals, adding that Congo has sought Turkish support in the fight against militia groups active in the east of the DRC.

In the last 20 years, the number of Turkish embassies in Africa has risen from 12 to 43, with the aim is to increase it to 50, according to the Turkish vision and the country’s policy of “Strategic Africa,” launched by Erdoğan in 2003. As the European Union is the first trading partner and the first investor in Africa according to Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, the trade between Turkey and the African continent has increased to $25.3 billion in the past decade, after it commissioned the Africa Opening in 2005, and compared to only $5.4 billion in 2003.

Ankara has a commitment to increase this bilateral trade to more than $50bn in next coming years. Additionally, Turkish Airlines has become a key player in African countries, providing services to more than 60 destinations, while putting Istanbul a central destination for intercontinental travel.

Turkey has highlighted that Western countries have exploited the Africa continent for decades for their own imperialist interests. In that respect, in contrast to the American and European approaches, and the former as well as new Western imperialism in Africa, Turkey’s business and political approaches to the African countries have focused on development and cultural projects.

Elif Comoğlu Ulgen, the Turkish Ambassador to South Africa said that Turkey is in the continent with a win-win strategy and Africans see Turkey as a country not coming to the continent with any colonial baggage. On the other hand, since the fifties, the terms of engagement of the EU with African states was determined without consultation with Africans.

Addressing Angola’s parliament last October, Erdoğan stated that “As Turkey, we reject western-centred orientalist approaches to the African continent”. In his criticism to the UN Security Council framework and hierarchy, Erdoğan highlighted that 1.3 billion people live on the African continent however they are not represented at the Security Council.

As Turkey, which is described by Erdoğan as an “Afro-Eurasian state,” positions itself as a fairer and strategic alternative ally for African nations, its policy in the continent has become under the spotlight especially by the former imperialist states which could view its new position as a threat to their economic and political influence in the continent.

In his definition of monarchical tendencies in African political culture, Professor Ali Mazrui put forward four factors. The first factor is the quest for aristocratic effect, as leaders desire large consumptions and expensive lifestyles. The second factor is the personalization of authority which in some instances goes to the extent of creating a distinct or royal title for the leader. The third factor is the sacralization of authority, which relates to personalizing authority and glorifying a leader and his office or institution. The fourth and last factor is the search for a royal historical identity motivated by a vague sense that national dignity would be lacking without a glorious past of ancient and kingly success. These factors could be seen in some African countries that practice family dynasties today.

Political dynasty exists when close family members or relatives succeed a retiring leader or president in office. It is more associated with monarchies, and political dynasty is not peculiar to Africa even though kings still reign majestically in most African countries due to their position as custodians of tradition and history of their people.

Multi-party elections and peaceful transfers of power have become more common in the continent since the 1990s, and today, among the fifty-four countries in Africa only three monarchies still maintain their monarchical status as head of state or government (Morocco, Lesotho, and Swaziland).

However, family dynasties could also be seen in some African countries. The common examples of ruling families and family dynasties in the continent are the handing over of power from fathers to sons, or from one brother to another. The current examples of sons succeeding their fathers are that of Gabon, Togo, Kenya, and Chad. In other countries with the longest-serving presidents, such as Uganda, Equatorial Guinea, and Cameroon, leaders are planning to hand power to their sons.

Family politics and ruling dynasties in Africa could be seen more in local government’s politics and state positions where candidates campaign based on their kinship or dynasty lineage.

There have been several failed plans by some presidents to make their wives the next presidents. In Zimbabwe, former leader, Robert Mugabe failed in his plan of handing power to his wife, which led to a crisis within his party ZANU-PF and the 2017 coup d’état. In South Africa, former president Jacob Zuma couldn’t influence his party, the African National Congress (ANC) during his ex-wife, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s leadership battle.

Family politics and ruling dynasties in Africa could be seen more in local government’s politics and state positions where candidates campaign based on their kinship or dynasty lineage. Yet, at the continental and national levels, the examples of Kenya, Ghana, and Chad offer a clear glimpse of ruling families and their impacts on democratic systems and politics.

Also, supporters and campaigns tend to focus on the personalities and family records of both men; Kenyatta’s political influence as the son of the first president and his family fortune all provide him with a distinct edge in elections, while on the other hand, Odinga’s supports cut across those who saw him as representing the economically and politically marginalized communities. For many Kenyans, the competition and rivalry between the two families mean choosing between Kenyatta who is the “good son” of the palace that will spend anything to protect the status quo, or between Odinga who is an underdog that will revolutionize the polity.

The implications of the family dynasty in Chad could be seen in the personification of state and national politics, constitutional amendments, and the cult of personality that revolves around the Débys.

In Chad, the ruling family has the fingerprints of military elements and foreign power support. In 1990, former president Idriss Déby, a Zaghawa of the Bideyat clan seized power and ruled the country until his sudden death in 2021 due to the injuries he sustained during clashes with northern rebels. The solution in this situation, as called for in Chad’s constitution is to hand power over to the National Assembly. However, the military and presidency disregarded the constitution and swiftly named General Mahamat, Déby’s 37-year-old son as the country leader. The unconstitutional move was also supported by many African and foreign leaders, including France who all pointed to the increase in terrorism and violent activities in Lake Chad and Sahel regions.

The implications of the family dynasty in Chad could be seen in the personification of state and national politics, constitutional amendments, and the cult of personality that revolves around the Débys. The 30-year rule of Idriss Déby is characterized by assigning family members and allies from his Zaghawa ethnic group to senior government positions.

Chad is highly diverse ethnically, hence tearing up the constitution after the death of Idriss Déby and putting another Déby at the helm of power complicate the relationships between Zaghawa which dominates the national politics, and others. This also led to divisions within the military, and intensified the internal crisis between the ruling family, especially between General Mahamat and his brother Zakaria, who was rumored to have been one of the first in line for succession.

In Ghana, the current president, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, was born into a prominent family and a residence that headquartered the first political party in Ghana. Akufo-Addo’s father, Edward, grand uncle, J.B. Danquah, and uncle, William Ofori Atta were all among the “Big Six” leaders (or founding fathers) that helped Ghana gain independence in 1957. Akufo-Addo’s supporters are also quick to point to his father’s contribution to Ghana whenever the opportunity arises.

However, the case of Ghana is different from what is seen in other African nations that practice family dynasties in politics, such as Togo or Chad, because the long-established families in Ghana play by the rules. Family ties in the Ghanaian case don’t necessarily weaken the democratic institutions, as Ghana is regarded as one of the most stable democracies in Africa, and everyone still has the same chance and opportunity to run for political seats.

Through the above examples and Mazrui’s definition, one could conclude that family dynasties have their roots in African cultures which promote the continuation of legacies and expansion of kingdoms from fathers to sons. The impacts in modern democratic politics, however, are that political power is concentrated in one or few families and authority is restricted amid a few, hence political rule in a country turns into a monarchical system.

Although some might argue that family dynasties bring development and stability in some countries, the conclusion that could be derived from the realities in many African countries is that the culture of family dynasties in democratic systems will result in prioritizing family lineage and alliance over competence, weak accountability, lack of competitiveness, transparency, representation in politics and more divisions among different ethnic groups. And the end products are corruption, bad governance, and economic mismanagement.

Appearing for the first time in 2014 at the border with Ukraine and controlled by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner Group is engaged in a number of conflicts. Syria and Libya were two countries where Russia’s involvement in civil wars and alleged employment of Wagner Group proxies were most visible.

In April 2012, when then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was asked in the Russian Duma about whether he supported the idea of creating a network of Russian private military companies, he replied positively and emphasized that PMCs could be tools of influence abroad, allowing the realization of national interests without the direct involvement of the state.

Mali

As reported by the Associated Press, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken cautioned Russia’s Wagner Group on Saturday against meddling with attempts to foster democracy in the West African country of Mali.

Mali “remains a linchpin for future stability in the Sahel and we have deep concerns about that stability and deep concerns about the extremism and terrorism that is spreading tentacles in the region,” Blinken stated during a joint press conference with Senegal’s foreign minister, Aissata Tall Sall. The Sahel region of West Africa encompasses a wide territory south of the Sahara Desert, where extremist organizations are battling for control of the region.

The French government on December 23, 2021 criticized the decision by the Malian transitional authorities to authorize the deployment of the Wagner Group, and accused Russia of sponsoring the private military company’s employment of mercenaries in the West African nation.

In a statement, the Western nations warned that the deployment of Wagner mercenaries could “lead to an aggravation of the human rights situation in Mali [and] threaten the agreement for peace and reconciliation” in the conflict-torn country.

Central African Republic (CAR)

The United Nations issued a report  on June 25, 2021, in which it accused Russian instructors in the Central African Republic’s armed forces of being engaged in massive indiscriminate killings, looting, and enforced disappearances. The report was authored by a panel of specialists. Despite the fact that the report to the United Nations Security Council makes no reference of those instructors being Wagner associates, news reports and the United Nations’ working committee on mercenaries establish the connection.

In order to train Central African Republic troops, President Touadéra has sought the assistance of the Russian government, and a Russian official serves as the president’s security advisor. Some analysts believe that this is part of a trend of Russian military involvement spreading throughout Africa.

As reported by the United Nations specialists group on March 31, 2021, the Russian contractors collaborate closely on a UN peacekeeping deployment that has been stationed in the Central African Republic since 2014. It is the purpose of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) to protect civilians while also creating an atmosphere that would enable the nation to establish long-lasting institutional structures.

The 13,500 UN forces are tasked with protecting civilians and preventing armed groups from inflicting harm on the populace. They helped secure the election, but they are helpless to disarm the rebels and are often attacked by the rebels themselves. Some have also been accused of sexually abusing children.

The commander of the EU training missions, General Jacques Langlade, stated that “Due to the control exerted by the mercenaries of the Wagner group over the CAR armed forces, the European Union, keen to respect international humanitarian law, has decided to temporarily suspend training”.

“This blurring of the lines between civil, military and peacekeeping operations during the hostilities creates confusion about the legitimate targets and increases the risks for widespread human rights and humanitarian law abuses,” said Jelena Aparac, Chair-Rapporteur of the United Nations working group on private military contractors.

Following months of political strife, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed marched to the front in the first week of December 2021, deployed defensive forces, and declared victory, stating that the government had recaptured the key Amhara and Afar Regions previously seized by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). However, the proclaimed triumph was nothing more than a political gambit and a premeditated pullback to facilitate future steps, according to the TPLF.

Although the violent conflict began in November 2020, it took a dramatic turn about a month ago when the TPLF, which is strategically allied to the Oromo Liberation Army, claimed to have seized control of the critical towns of Kombolcha and Dessie, both located on a strategic highway leading to Addis Ababa. Despite Abiy’s claims that he had recaptured these areas, the TPLF’s subsequent replies pose troubling doubts about the country’s social, political, and economic future.

The aftermath of the Tigray war appears not to be limited to a humanitarian crisis that has resulted in millions massacred, starved, and forced to flee their homes, as other consequences such as increased political polarization, economic crisis, and diplomatic challenges are slowly unfolding in the country.

Among the far-reaching consequences are the absence of aid, the war spreading to other towns in the country, war-induced economic disintegration, and an exponential drop in the country’s GDP. Additionally, the decision to close at least 30 embassies due to alleged financial losses, as well as the destruction of the Amhara and Tigray Regions, which would take at least 30 years to recover, highlight the country’s gradual collapse as a result of the conflict.

War of visions

Now more than ever, Ethiopia appears to be at a significant ideological and political crossroads. When we hold up to view the root causes of many internal Ethiopian disputes before and after the country became a federalist state in 1995, we see diversity, ethnic nationalism, and divergent political visions. Tigray is no exception. The TPLF ruled the country for three decades before Abiy’s election in 2018.

Their rule maintained a quasi-federalist leadership style that partially succeeded in bringing people together under the banner of ethnic federalism yet failed to implement the actual tenets of ethnic federalism, resulting in grievances and high tensions between the government and the people, and ultimately leading to the party’s demise. 

However, tensions did not dissipate when Abiy Ahmed came to power, owing to the conflicting visions of the preceding actors who once held political leverage. The TPLF favored a more absolutist approach to diversity, with Amhara being more assimilationist and Oromo more secessionist. On the other hand, Abiy attempted to put the country through a significant transition to centralization by introducing the idea of the Prosperity Party, a new pan-Ethiopian party established to supersede the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition.

Following the outbreak of the war, the habit of resolving issues through talks in parliament or systematic governmental procedures has now shifted to using arms and weapons to achieve goals or attain desired outcomes, thus defying the sanctity of state authority and federal legitimacy. One example that explicitly demonstrates that anyone with access to firearms can act without regard for the law lies in the Amhara nationalists’ forceful annexation of Welkayit and Tegede/Tsegede, allegedly seized from them by Tigray in 1991.

Unfortunately, with Abiy Ahmed’s declared victory against the TPLF, the route to dialogue and negotiation is deteriorating.

Furthermore, the TPLF’s decision to disregard regional sovereignty and send soldiers into the neighboring Amhara and Afar Regions indicates that guns- and armament-generated legitimacy is the current trend. Even the government has taken the unprecedented step of requiring regular citizens to take up arms to combat the TPLF, going so far as to allow them to seize firearms from them. Arms proliferation has also been seen among minority ethnic groups. These groups have shown a lack of faith in the political regime, leading them to view taking up arms as the ultimate silver bullet to their concerns.

What awaits Ethiopia: reconciliation or utter annihilation? 

The chance of averting the months-long conflict and maintaining peace in the nation mainly depends on the ability of the parties involved in the atrocities to negotiate and find common ground. However, this seems highly improbable due to the unforeseen moves and gambits by the parties involved in the conflict. Unfortunately, with Abiy’s declared victory against the TPLF, viewed by the TPLF as yet another tactical step towards a better strategy, the route to dialogue and negotiation appears to be quickly deteriorating.

If the conflict continues in this direction, the resulting humanitarian crisis and human toll will leave the country in a terrible state, with little hope of medium- or long-term progress or recovery. Moreover, with more ethnic-based organizations joining the Ethiopian army or the TPLF, the probability of severe consequences resulting from the war appears imminent.

These consequences can only be avoided if these groups strive to integrate diverse ideological positions and establish a vision for cooperative administration or negotiate on the provided terms.  

Even if the TPLF and Abiy decide to terminate the war, ethnic nationalism and other competing ethnic interests will continue to give rise to tensions. However, if the conflict is brought to an end, aid may reach the Tigray Region, partially helping alleviate the critical conditions of those suffering the consequences of the war. Nonetheless, the damage done is indelible and is predicted to have a long-term impact on the country’s economic and sociopolitical fabric.

A new and strategic actor in Africa, Turkey has intensified its military cooperation as well as political, economic and cultural ties with most of the African countries. Since labelling 2005 the “Year of Africa”, Turkey has built strong relations across Africa, this vision even goes back to 1998, when Turkey’s African Initiative Policy process started, and when Turkey became an observing member of the African Union in 2005 and 2008. Turkey’s African Initiative Policy has then developed in 2013 to become Africa Partnership Policy.

Political relations has developed between Turkey and Africa in the last two decades, as during Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Erdoğan era 31 new embassies have opened and the total number of Turkish embassies in Africa has increased from 12 in 2002 to 43 in 2021, which will soon reach 44 embassies, with the opening of the Turkish embassy in Guinea-Bissau.

In addressing the Angolan parliament this year, Erdogan described Turkey as an “Afro-Eurasian state”. Additionally, Turkey has established joint Business Councils with 45 African countries and 40 Sub-Saharan African countries.

Ankara is now preparing for the third Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit, which will take place in Istanbul on 17^th and 18^th December 2021, a summit discussed by Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu and Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, during his visit to Ankara in September, 2021.

When it comes to trade and investment, the Turkey-Africa Economic and Business Forum has facilitated to increase the economic ties between both parties. Turkey’s trade with African countries have reached $25.3 billion by 2020 from $5.4 billion in 2003 when Erdogan came to power.

In addition to trade, investment and cultural projects in Africa, security and military cooperation have cemented the relations between Turkey and many African influential countries.

According to the Turkish president, Ankara is determined to raise the bilateral trade figure with Africa to $50 billion. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that the volume of projects undertook by Turkish contracting companies in the African Continent has reached $71.1 billion and reached $19.5 billion in the Sub-Saharan African countries.

The military cooperation also has extended to Chad – during the visit of the transitional President Mahamat Idriss Deby to Ankara, last month, Erdogan stated that Turkey will develop cooperation with Chad in the military and security fields, beside the bilateral trade which has reached $112 million and expected to double in the near future. Chad is currently undertaking the periodical presidency of the G5 Sahel and the Community of Sahel–Saharan States.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed signed a military and financial cooperation deal with Ankara, during his visit in August this year to Turkey. Ambassador Dina Mufti, the Ethiopia ministry of foreign affairs spokesman, told Anadolu Agency that Ethiopia, Africa’s second-most populous country, would accept if Turkey played a role in mediating in the border dispute between Sudan and Ethiopia. Turkey is also a commercial player in Ethiopia, as $2.5bn has been invested in Ethiopia out of a total of $6bn already invested by Turkish companies in sub-Saharan Africa.

In Sudan, before the current political crisis, the bilateral trade volume between Turkey and Sudan was expected to reach $2 billion, as Sudan has become the sixth largest export Turkish partner in Africa

From Sudan to Niger, a cooperation agreement has been signed between Ankara and Niamey which allowed Ankara a military presence in the country in July 2020. Turkey has signed agreements on military cooperation, sports, and youth during Cavusoglu’s visit to Niger, and during his visit to Togo, agreements were signed concerning cooperation in defense.

In North Africa, Turkey has been involved in trade and defense in the region, providing support for the UN-backed administration in Libya. In its neighbor, Algeria has become Turkey’s second largest trading partner in Africa after Egypt, with exchanges that reached $4.2 billion in 2020, and with expectations that the two countries will expand trade to $5 billion in 2021, exceeding Egypt, thanks to the agreement Turkey has signed with Algeria, the “Friendship and Cooperation Agreement with Algeria”.

In a military deal between Morocco and the Turkish manufacturer Baykar, Ribat has received the first units of Turkey’s Bayraktar TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). Additionally, the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces (FAR) attended a training program in Turkey in July according to media reports. The Turkish military technology and products will now compete with the French market in the North African, as Morocco has been long been using the French Heron drones.

Among the many afflictions that Africans must endure today, the most dangerous might be their leaders’ growing enthusiasm for geopolitics. Across the continent, politicians are convinced the time is ripe for African nations to become more influential and autonomous actors in world affairs. In this context, the metaphor of Island Africa acquires a double meaning—the continent is both distinct and central at the same time, able to assert a unique identity while claiming a greater share of power in global networks that need its resources and consent more than ever.

In the past, great powers exploited Africans as colonies and pawns, but now the tables have turned—China and Russia are undermining American and European dominance—and African leaders look forward to playing a new version of the great game, this time in a starring role.

This self-confidence may surprise observers accustomed to seeing Africa as a sphere of influence constantly vulnerable to outsiders competing to carve out special zones and dependent client states. Indeed, America’s diplomats and generals still imagine Africa as remaining in exactly this sort of passive posture. Inside the Beltway, the prevailing view is that Chinese companies and Russian mercenaries are creating mischief, exploiting Africa’s weaknesses for their own gains while sabotaging Western efforts to strengthen local militaries against growing threats of cross-border terrorism and insurgency.

With increasing alarm, Washington warns African leaders to beware of debt traps and arms races that threaten peace and democracy. Reject Chinese telecom investment, limit Russian military training, don’t turn your backs on Western friends who’ve provided the arms and finance that kept you afloat for so many years.

African leaders have grown accustomed to these admonitions and they’ve learned to use them to good advantage in playing off outside powers against one another. Having multiple options strengthens the leverage of African negotiators in many fields—trade, resource extraction, arms deals, human rights disputes, technology transfer, diplomatic standing, aid packages, loans, investments, and more.

At the same time that African rulers are juggling foreign relations, they are also trying to sort out power relations among themselves. If Africans are going to rule Africa, then which countries will lead and which will follow? If the dream of pan-African unity is as elusive as ever, then what practical steps can encourage greater integration? If the continent is too vast to be governed as a whole, then how many Africas should there be?

For the largest and strongest African countries, the slogan of regionalization has become the favored response to these questions about inter-African power.

For the largest and strongest African countries, the slogan of regionalization has become the favored response to these questions about inter-African power. The basic approach assumes a broad consensus over the historic existence of distinct regions shaped by topography, ecology, climate, migration, culture, language, state formation, trade networks, and links to other continents. The number of regions is open to debate, but usually limited to five or six. Supposedly, each region has a particular political dynamic—an implicit hierarchy of power with one or two preeminent states standing above their neighbors.

This approach to centralizing power—as opposed to legitimate authority—invites resistance and bloodshed from many directions at once. If Africans have been so determined to expel foreign oppressors, why should they now rally behind home-grown princes with similar predatory instincts? In an era of global civil society and transnational rebellion, why would African citizens resign themselves to watching local elites command a global playing field while they remain on the sidelines? In fact, the more popular sentiment in Africa favors greater devolution of power and local autonomy—precisely the opposite of regionalization’s path toward hegemonic consolidation.

Outside powers might endorse these developments for several reasons. They could concentrate on their higher priority struggles with one another while leaving Africa to its own devices. The greatest costs of government and security would be borne by African elites without constant and direct engagement from foreign patrons. Foreigners could maintain their distance while competing more vigorously—though not more safely—for commercial and diplomatic advantage.

Great powers—despite their divergent interests—are buying into the African discourse on regionalization without appreciating its inherent flaws and self-defeating tendencies.

And, with so many rivalries between states and opposition movements, opportunistic foreigners would have wide room for troublemaking if they chose to weigh in, openly or covertly. Prime examples include the competition between Nigeria and South Africa for unofficial leadership of pan-Africanism, the confrontation of Egypt and Ethiopia over control of the Nile River Valley, and long-simmering tensions pitting Algeria against Morocco in North Africa and Kenya against Tanzania in East Africa. Following this logic, great powers—despite their divergent interests—are buying into the African discourse on regionalization without appreciating its inherent flaws and self-defeating tendencies.

Many debates over African politics mirror questions about the changing character of the international system in general. In a post-American world, what is the optimal number of rivals for a multipolar balance of power? Can stable alliances or concerts of powers substitute for absent hegemons? Can new hierarchies form under rising powers willing to provide public goods to an international society that is both more interconnected and more fragile?

Sadly, the African and global discussions often underestimate the importance of legitimacy and its unavoidable reliance on popular consent and wider participation. At both levels, governing elites are so preoccupied with clinging to power that they neglect mounting worldwide demands for greater power sharing—among nations, classes, and generations.

In Africa and beyond, power sharing is fleeting, and power grabs are endless. Entrenched elites pour more energy into refurnishing their penthouses even as the lower floors and foundations are crumbling beneath them. But no system of hierarchies and hegemons is salvageable. Circulating elites and fine tuning their pecking orders are certain recipes for failure—unless we become so discouraged as to conclude that war and revolution are the only remedies left for unjust institutions incapable of reform and self-correction.

In parallel with the intensification of the global power competition, Russia is making efforts to expand its sphere of influence by taking new initiatives, especially in Africa. This is occurring in a twofold framework in which Russia is becoming more advantageous in its competition with the U.S. and at the same time, its presence is being strengthened in regions where China is increasing its weight. Thus, Russia is turning to countries in Africa with which it had close ties during the Soviet period, especially in North Africa and the Horn of Africa, and has already signed economic and military agreements with Egypt, Algeria, Mauritania, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and the Central African Republic.

Russia’s aggressive engagement with Africa has become visible in the fields of foreign policy, economy, and culture. For instance, the trade volume between Russia and Africa doubled from 2013 to 2018, exceeding $20 billion. Such data indicate that not only is Russia interested in the region, but African countries are also open to trade with Russia. The acknowledgement of the Russian presence in Africa manifests itself in a total of 92 agreements and memoranda of understanding signed at the Russia-Africa Summit and Economic Forum held in Sochi in October 2019.

There are four main motivations behind Russia’s orientation toward Africa: (1) increasing its sphere of influence diplomatically, (2) improving its economy with access to new markets, (3) expanding its militarily outreach, and (4) strengthening its position in the African continent vis-à-vis the U.S. and China.

In recent years, military cooperation has come to the fore in Russia’s Africa strategy. Given the presence of the U.S. and China, Moscow seeks to be more active militarily in Africa. Since 2015, Russia has engaged in military cooperation with more than 20 African countries through arms sales, access to ports and air bases, training military personnel, counterterrorism, and peacekeeping. Russian military advisers have been present during several conflicts and have signed a series of agreements. Today, Russia ranks first in total arms exports to Africa and Rosoboronexport, Russia’s state arms dealer, manages these sales.

Even though Russia’s Africa foreign policy covers the whole continent, Moscow’s activities in recent years have concentrated mostly on North Africa and the Horn of Africa. 

Russia is also taking steps to establish its permanent military presence in Africa and has signed agreements with Egypt and Libya, while it now has a naval base near Port Sudan. Moscow is showing effort to establish military bases in the Central African Republic, Madagascar, and Mozambique, and announced that it will establish a logistics hub in Eritrea. With the purpose of standing out in competition with global actors, new military bases are to facilitate the increase of Russian military personnel in Africa, which is currently around 7,000.

Even though Russia’s Africa foreign policy covers the whole continent, Moscow’s activities in recent years have concentrated mostly on North Africa and the Horn of Africa. As a matter of fact, three-quarters of Russia’s $20 billion trade is carried out with North African countries. Similarly, Russia has recently entered into strategic cooperation with the Horn of Africa countries and signed political, economic, and military agreements with Egypt, Libya, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Mauritania.

Libya hosts Russia’s most visible recent military presence in Africa. Russia’s private military company Wagner, which supports Khalifa Haftar’s forces, plays a critical role in the civil war in Libya. In the reports by AFRICOM and the U.S. Department of Defense, the Wagner group acts under the guidance of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Yevgeny Prigozhin, known for his close ties to Vladimir Putin, is the head of Wagner, and is alleged to be conducting covert operations on behalf of the Russian government in Libya.

Although they work with Haftar’s forces, Russian mercenaries have become a serious asset in the country at this point and they play critical roles, especially in the eastern and southern regions of Libya. Aiming to establish a permanent military base in Libya following Syria, Russia poses a serious threat to European Union countries and the U.S. in the southern flank of NATO.

Haftar’s forces have also been present in the Central African Republic, Madagascar, and Mozambique. This situation is watched with concern not only by the U.S. and European Union countries, but also by Beijing. Russia’s growing influence in the region means the inclusion of another global actor in an already populated region. For this reason, Russia’s expansion in Africa poses a security problem for both African countries and their regional allies.

Sudan is another African country with which Russia has recently increased its cooperation. Sudan is important for Russia in so far as it has a coastline on the Red Sea, one of the most important trade routes in the world and one which connects the Mediterranean to Asia. Russia anticipates strengthening its relations with Sudan and signed an agreement for a military base in the Red Sea in 2017 with the ousted President Omar al-Bashir and later during the transitional administration period.

Sudan also draws attention as one of the largest arms markets for Russia. The close relation of Sudan with the U.S., established during the transitional administration, currently prevents Russia from collaborating with the military actors. As a matter of fact, recent statements from Khartoum, announcing its intent to “review” the military base agreement with Russia, have caused worry in Moscow.

Recently, Ethiopia has become another African country that has entered into close engagement with Russia. Cooperation agreements were signed with Ethiopia on issues such as arms sales, the use of air bases, training and consultancy services to Ethiopian officers in Russian military academies, and military support services in counterterrorism and peacekeeping operations.

With the Renaissance Dam crisis, in which Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia are the main actors, the relations between Russia and Ethiopia have been moved to a different ground. Russia’s implicit support for Ethiopia vis-à-vis the dam’s construction, while disturbing Egypt on the one hand, caused Ethiopia to define Russia as a reliable ally on the other. These developments are considered the main factor that caused Addis Ababa to move closer to Moscow.

Although Russia-Mauritania relations have not displayed very positive signals, largely due to Russia’s support of the Algeria-backed Polisario Front in the Western Sahara crisis, the military cooperation agreement signed between the two countries in June 2021 has portrayed Mauritania as strategically important within the scope of Russia’s African expansion. At the ceremony held on June 23, 2021 with the participation of Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin and Minister of Defense Hanena Ould Sidi, the two countries signed and emphasized the importance of the agreement for the development of their bilateral relations.

Thus, an effective military presence of Russia has emerged in Mauritania, one of the countries in the Sahel region, which is under the influence of France. The fact that the agreement arrived shortly after France announced that it had terminated Operation Barkhane points to the direction that Russia intends to fill the gap left by France in the region.

There are also obstacles for Russia and its aggressive strategy in Africa. Issues such as the colonial actors’ fear of losing influence, the rise of new powers such as China, the instability of countries in the region, terror attacks, security problems, the increasing competition in access to natural resources, the struggle for influence by global actors, and food security and water shortages that affect the strategies of global actors, including Russia.

These factors will decide how successful Russia’s strategy in returning to Africa will be. Considering that Russia is active in many regions, the sustainability of its foreign policy in terms of economic and military capacity is also doubtful. In spite of this, Moscow is determined to pursue its aggressive foreign policy strategy and will continue its engagements in order not to fall behind in global competition.

The decision by the African Union Commission, on July 22, to grant Israel observer status membership in the AU was the culmination of years of relentless Israeli efforts aimed at co-opting Africa’s largest political institution. Why is Israel so keen on penetrating Africa? What made African countries finally succumb to Israeli pressure and lobbying?

To answer the above questions, one has to appreciate the new Great Game under way in many parts of the world, especially in Africa, which has always been significant to Israel’s geopolitical designs. Starting in the early 1950s to the mid-70s, Israel’s Africa network was in constant expansion. The 1973 war, however, brought that affinity to an abrupt end.

What Changed Africa

Ghana, in West Africa, officially recognized Israel in 1956, just eight years after Israel was established atop the ruins of historic Palestine. What seemed like an odd decision at the time – considering Africa’s history of western colonialism and anti-colonial struggles – ushered in a new era of African-Israeli relations. By the early 1970s, Israel had established a strong position for itself on the continent. On the eve of the 1973 Israeli-Arab war, Israel had full diplomatic ties with 33 African countries.

“The October War”, however, presented many African countries with a stark choice: siding with Israel – a country born out of Western colonial intrigues – or the Arabs, who are connected to Africa through historical, political, economic, cultural and religious bonds. Most African countries opted for the latter choice. One after the other, African countries began severing their ties with Israel. Soon enough, no African state, other than Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland, had official diplomatic relations with Israel.

Then, the continent’s solidarity with Palestine went even further. The Organization of African Unity – the precursor to the African Union – in its 12th ordinary session held in Kampala in 1975, became the first international body to recognize, on a large scale, the inherent racism in Israel’s Zionist ideology by adopting Resolution 77 (XII). This very Resolution was cited in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379, adopted in November of that same year, which determined that “Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination”. Resolution 3379 remained in effect until it was revoked by the Assembly under intense American pressure in 1991.

Since Israel remained committed to that same Zionist, racist ideology of yesteryears, the only rational conclusion is that it was Africa, not Israel, that changed. But why?

Since Israel remained committed to that same Zionist, racist ideology of yesteryears, the only rational conclusion is that it was Africa, not Israel, that changed. But why?

First, the collapse of the Soviet Union. That seismic event resulted in the subsequent isolation of pro-Soviet African countries which, for years, stood as the vanguard against American, Western and, by extension, Israeli expansionism and interests on the continent.

Tellingly, Washington does not only serve as Israel’s benefactor in Palestine and the Middle East, but worldwide as well, and Israel is willing to go to any length to exploit the massive leverage it holds over the US government. This stifling paradigm, which has been at work in the Middle East region for decades, is also at work throughout Africa. For example, last year the US administration agreed to remove Sudan from the state-sponsored terror list in exchange for Khartoum’s normalization with Israel.

In truth, Sudan is not the only country that understands – and is willing to engage in – this kind of ‘pragmatic’ – read under-handed – political barter. Others also have learned to play the game well. Indeed, by voting to admit Israel to the AU, some African governments expect a return on their political investment, a return that will be exacted from Washington, not from Tel Aviv.

Unfortunately, albeit expectedly, as Africa’s normalization with Israel grew, Palestine became increasingly a marginal issue on the agendas of many African governments, who are far more invested in realpolitik – or simply remaining on Washington’s good side – than honoring the anti-colonial legacies of their nations.

Netanyahu the Conqueror

However, there was another driving force behind Israel’s decision to ‘return’ to Africa than just political opportunism and economic exploitation. Successive events have made it clear that Washington is retreating from the Middle East and that the region was no longer a top priority for the dwindling American empire. For the US, China’s decisive moves to assert its power and influence in Asia are largely responsible for the American rethink.

The 2012 US withdrawal from Iraq, its ‘leadership from behind’ in Libya, its non-committal policy in Syria, among others, were all indicators pointing to the inescapable fact that Israel could no longer count on the blind and unconditional American support alone. Thus, the constant search for new allies began.

For the first time in decades, Israel began confronting its prolonged isolation at the UNGA. America’s vetoes at the UN Security Council may have shielded Israel from accountability to its military occupation and war crimes; but US vetoes were hardly enough to give Israel the legitimacy that it has long coveted. In a recent conversation with former UN human rights envoy, Richard Falk, the Princeton Professor Emeritus explained to me that, despite Israel’s ability to escape punishment, it is rapidly losing what he refers to as the ‘legitimacy war’.

Palestine, according to Falk, continues to win that war, one that can only be achieved through real, grassroots global solidarity. It is precisely this factor that explains Israel’s keen interest in transferring the battlefield to Africa and other parts of the Global South.

On July 5, 2016, then Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, kick-started Israel’s own ‘scramble for Africa’ with a visit to Kenya, which was described as historic by the Israeli media. Indeed, it was the first visit by an Israeli prime minister in the last 50 years. After spending some time in Nairobi, where he attended the Israel-Kenya Economic Forum alongside hundreds of Israeli and Kenyan business leaders, he moved on to Uganda, where he met leaders from other African countries including South Sudan, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Tanzania. Within the same month, Israel announced the renewal of diplomatic ties between Israel and Guinea.

The new Israeli strategy flowed from there. More high-level visits to Africa and triumphant announcements about new joint economic ventures and investments followed. In June 2017, Netanyahu took part in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), held in the Liberian capital, Monrovia. There, he went as far as rewriting history.

“Africa and Israel share a natural affinity,” Netanyahu claimed in his speech. “We have, in many ways, similar histories. Your nations toiled under foreign rule. You experienced horrific wars and slaughters. This is very much our history.” With these words, Netanyahu attempted, not only to hide Israel’s colonial intentions, but also rob Palestinians of their own history.

Moreover, the Israeli leader had hoped to crown his political and economic achievements with the Israel-Africa Summit, an event that was meant to officially welcome Israel, not to a specific African regional alliance, but to the whole of Africa. However, in September 2017, the organizers of the event decided to indefinitely postpone it, after it was confirmed to be taking place in Lome, capital of Togo, on October 23-27 of that same year. What was seen by Israeli leaders as a temporary setback was the result of intense, behind-the-scenes lobbying of several African and Arab countries, including South Africa and Algeria.

The reactions since the commencement of trading under the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) on January 1, 2021 are similar to previous regional and continental projects in Africa: AfCFTA for many young Africans, entrepreneurs, and startup owners was a welcomed development. It was, for foreign economists, Africa’s most “ambitious” project to date.

For critics of “pan-Africanism” or government officials in some African countries, AfCFTA raises more problems and questions than answers: what is the role of China and the U.S. in the agreement? Isn’t the project a form of neocolonialism and neoliberalism aiming to benefit the capitalist world? The questions go on.

The points being raised by those skeptical of AfCFTA cannot be overlooked. Although confining the initiative, just like other African projects, into the Chinese influence, American or other foreign powers’ domination undermines the aspirations of Africans themselves.

The plan to create an economically integrated Africa could be traced back to decades ago under the Organization of African Unity, now African Union (AU). AfCFTA, which was established in 2018, stemmed from various summits, frameworks, and treaties.

The Monrovia Declaration of 1979 aimed at maximizing the benefits of Africa’s natural resources for the wellbeing of Africans, while the Lagos Plan of Action, 1980 sought to clarify the important economic sectors and policies, and to increase the continent’s self-sufficiency. The Abuja Treaty of 1991 which established the African Economic Community and other subsequent agreements adopted by regional blocs and countries also bolster the integration agenda.

The first of its kind in Africa, AfCFTA is facing a lot of challenges but it also brings a lot of positive prospects to 1.3 billion Africans worth $3.4 billion dollars.

However, the direct path to AfCFTA started in January 2012 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia when the 18^th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU resorted to establishing a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) and endorsed an action plan on Boosting Intra-Africa Trade (BIAT) with focus on areas such as trade policy, intra-trade facilitation, productive capacity, trade-related infrastructure and information, trade finance and market integration among others.

The 2017 deadline to establish AfCFTA wasn’t met until March 21, 2018, when 44 out of 55 member states in AU signed the African Continental Free Trade Agreement in Kigali, Rwanda. The agreement, as of March 4, 2021, has been signed by all member states of the AU except Eritrea, thus makes it the largest free trade area in the world in terms of member countries with a total population of 1.3 billion.

AfCFTA initiative is also considered a backbone for other ongoing and future continental projects, including the Single African Passport (AU Passport), the Single African Currency among others to promote inclusive social development and achieve economic sustainability across the continent.

The initiative, if executed well. is expected to lead to an increase in trade flows and intra-trade within the continent by 53.2% after the reduction of import duties and the removal of non-tariff barriers. It will help African businesses to meet the needs of growing markets within the continent, and also help member states to diversify their exports, accelerate their growth and attract foreign direct investment.

The benefits of AfCFTA can also go beyond providing solutions to the problem of exports and imports, to limiting the neocolonialist policies, most especially with the increase in calls for an end to French “intervention” in the Sahel and foreign exploitations in other parts of the continent.

The rapid population growth and the number of young Africans, who are expected by 2030 to make up 75 percent of those under the age of 35, also mean that there is an urgent need to create new job opportunities by providing supports and infrastructures for the establishment of new local industries and startups. It can present numerous opportunities for youth and serves as an effective tool for enhancing peace and security within the continent.

Implementation and challenges

Africa in coming months and years will witness rounds of negotiations at the headquarters of the AU in Addis Ababa and the Secretariat of AfCFTA in Accra, Ghana, for dialogues and agreements between the member states on the movement of capital and people, investment facilitation, and finalizing the establishment of a continental customs union.

The main challenges facing AfCFTA are related to the political will of African governments and policy implementations, such as their total readiness to open borders, trade with each other, and comply with customs regulations and unified border policies. There are concerns about the possibility of ceding national sovereignty for the sake of the Pan-Africa agenda, the difficulty of ensuring an equal or balance level of benefit for all member states, and weak infrastructures that are crucial to achieving the free movement of goods and services.

Also, Adjusting national laws and policies to suit AfCFTA’s agreement might incur huge costs in member states and heighten the sense of “loss of identity” in some countries, especially with the rise of “Xenophobia-Afrophobia” in South Africa.

Opening borders could complicate national economic and local market crises due to competition between different economies and companies. This has been the argument of the Labor Union and small manufacturers in Nigeria, a country with a population of 200 million and a nominal GDP of $376 billion which accounts for about 17% of Africa’s GDP. The country also refused to ratify the free trade agreement until it bowed to pressure in November 2020.

The limited understanding of African migration continues to hinder effective policies, far from addressing the current lived realities and migration drivers. Often, Africa is negatively represented as a continent of mass migration to Europe, lacking nuance and depth to the existing drivers and patterns.

According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division (2020), Africans migrate more within the continent than overseas. According to the Africa Migration Report, African migrants comprise no more than 14 percent of all global migrants. An African perspective is needed to demystify all myths, fears, and misconceptions, especially during this pandemic.

Prior to COVID-19 pandemic, socio-economic conditions, climate change, and internal conflicts served as significant push factors for most African migrants. However, the sanitary crisis has resulted in unprecedented socioeconomic impact across the African continent and brought a new driver for a wave of migratory flows. The restriction on human mobility and other measures imposed to tackle the pandemic have impacted the overall economic activities and livelihoods. The situation became alarming for the vulnerable persons in the African countries.

In parallel, as internal conflicts intensify in the Sahel, the region’s socio-economic conditions worsened, and hundreds of thousands of people are awaiting the opportunity to migrate for a better future inside the continent or through Morocco on to the European continent.

Despite the regularization of 50,000 migrants during the two campaigns of 2014 and 2016 launched by the Moroccan government, estimated numbers of irregular migrants in Morocco demonstrate a significant increase of migrants without legal status.

However, it is important to note that the exact percentage of migrants who have been smuggled and trafficked could not be calculated at the national level, whether for those crossing the perilous Mediterranean and the Atlantic, the desert, or those crossing borders in Ceuta and Melilla.

The general trend of migrants opting to reach Europe through Morocco are men and women under the age of 35 and more recently young couples. Migrants mainly from Congo Brazaville, Guinea Conakry, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Cameroon, Mali, Liberia, Nigeria, Gambia, Eritrea, Sudan, Tchad seek to reach Europe by landing on the Moroccan coasts or through the borders of Ceuta and Melilla.  Sometimes, migrants could be minors, especially from Guinea Conakry and Senegal.

“I was working as a maid before the pandemic, I tried to save money to pay my journey to Spain, but I couldn’t work during the confinement, it was challenging and hard to cover basic needs ( food and rent ), I was forced to do prostitution to get some money for a living.”

African countries are most affected by poverty, famine, desertification, and various deadly pandemics, resulting in a high percentage of Africans deciding to migrate and are forced displaced.  Due to the failure of effective policies to address the root causes of irregular migration, migrants are victims of traffickers and smugglers along the routes. According to the Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2020, migrants are at more risk for human trafficking, disappearance, and loss of life.

As an example, a migrant recounts his dangerous and hell-like journey from Cameroon to Morocco stating to Politics Today that:

“From the beginning of the journey, you are the target of organized criminal groups, you can come across smugglers who take all your money, torture you, and ask you to call the family to send them money so they can free you. I faced the same treatment along the route, it’s Bis-Repitita, in front of me. Two migrants lost their lives as a result of multiple tortures.”

The African countries cannot curb these problems without good coordination between different institutions and adequate support for local development efforts. Without shared responsibility, African countries will not be able to put in place a model that ensures the prevention of irregular migration and the assistance and protection of migrants. In addition, African countries also have to cooperate in developing initiatives to realize the vision of Agenda 2063 of an integrated Africa. The African Union revised Migration Policy Framework (MPFA 2018-2030), and the African agenda on migration was adopted in 2018. In his capacity as an African leader on migration, King Mohammed VI, through the African Agenda on Migration, proposed the creation of The African Migration Observatory in 2018. The official inauguration was under the African Union’s aegis on 18 December 2020 in Rabat, Morocco.

The African Migration Observatory is envisaged to develop a mechanism of collecting, analyzing, and sharing information between members to promote controlled management of migration flows. The Observatory will generate geographically balanced information on migration that responds to the continent’s needs in terms of factual management of the phenomenon. 

It is a real challenge for African Union to develop autonomous institutions, such as the African migration observatory. As such, the implementation of these policies needs to be funded by African funds. Efforts should be made to ensure the complementarity of financial and technical resources between African countries.

They also need to improve the coordination control systems to improve data collection and information exchange. But, in the scarcity of national migration observatories, the African Union members have to create national institutions as focal points of the African Migration Observatory.