The trial against Bajan Rafakan and Ekim Alptekin is set to begin in the U.S. on 11 February, 2019, which is directly related to the extradition of Fetullah Gulen – the leader of the Fetullah Terrorist Organization, which staged the failed coup attempt in Turkey on July 15, 2016.

Bajan Rafakan, the ex-business partner of Michael Flynn – former U.S. national security advisor – pleaded not guilty on Tuesday to charges against him that he secretly lobbied for Turkey to extradite Gulen, who is currently residing in the U.S.

Rafakan, who was the former director of U.S. Export-Import Bank and Ekim Alptekin – a Turkish businessman – were accused of ‘secret’ lobbying and ‘lying’ about their work. Rafakan pleaded not guilty in a federal court in Virginia and is set to defend the charges against him at a trial starting on February 11, 2019. Alptekin, who denied the charges made against him on Monday via a spokesman, is not expected to attend the trial as he is not currently in the U.S.

The accusations made against Rafakan and Alptekin are working with Turkish government officials on a so-called secret plan to return Gulen, who is currently living in exile in Pennsylvania, to Turkey.

Fetullah Gulen was the mastermind of the failed coup attempt in Turkey, and while the Turkish government has made called for his extradition, the U.S. administration has rejected this plea on the claim of ‘lack of evidence.’

Rafakan, who is a co-founder of the consultancy firm, Flynn Intel Group, is accused of a rarely enforced law, which requires lobbyists to disclose their work when working with foreign actors. Prosecutors accuse both Rafakan and Alptekin for providing false statements to the Justice Department about their work.

The case against Rafakan and Alptekin was built mostly on information provided by Flynn, who admitted that he lied about his role in lobbying activities and has been cooperating with the Justice Department in the case.

On Tuesday, the White House stated that U.S. President Trump told Turkish President Erdogan that his administration will ‘take a look’ at the possibility of extraditing Gulen, but added that Trump made no commitment in this regard.

The extradition of Gulen has remained one of the most troubled issues between Turkey and the U.S. among others, such as the U.S. support for the YPG in northeast Syria that has now taken a different direction as to please the Turkish government.

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi

Speaking at the 18^th Doha Forum in Qatar yesterday, Cavusoglu responded to a question on whether or not Turkey will accept a Syria with Assad in the future. The FM said, “What we are trying to do at the moment is work for a creation of a constitution for Syria by the Syrians.”

Cavusoglu emphasized the importance of preparing for democratic elections in Syria and stated, “This process needs to be conducted under the umbrella of the UN. Everybody should have their rights. It should embrace both those Syrians inside and outside Syria, who are currently living in my country and other countries as refugees. Credible, transparent and democratic elections should be done. After this kind of an election Syrians should decide who will govern their country.”

Answering a question posed by the moderator, CNBC correspondent Hadley Gamble, as to whether or not Turkey will work with Assad if he is elected in those elections, Cavusoglu said, “If there will be democratic and credible elections, in that case everybody needs to consider this (possibility).”

Gamble also asked whether or not any new step of the U.S. President in Syria will change Turkey’s position, to which Cavusoglu responded, “I believe President Trump is thinking to leave Syria once again.”

Regarding the meeting of guarantor states at the minister level in Geneva next week, Cavusoglu announced, “We are working to announce that we have agreed on the constitution committee next week in Geneva. There are some issues regarding the list of NGOs. The (Syrian) regime demands a two-third majority, Turkey and the United Nations are against this. Therefore, we are working (on it).”

Cavusoglu remarked that they are striving for an authentic agreement to be executed and said, “We intend to go to Geneva to announce that the constitution committee has been completed and meet again probably at the end of this year or the beginning of next year.”

Apart from the issues in Syria, Cavusoglu was also directed a question about the extradition of Fetullah Gulen, the FETO leader. “In Argentina, Trump told Erdogan they were working on extraditing Gulen and other people… I have recently seen a credible probe by the FBI on how the Gulen organization avoids taxes.”

Reuters reported yesterday that the FBI declined to comment on “whether the law enforcement agency was investigating individuals or entities with ties to Gulen for tax evasion.”

Last week, Turkish President Erdogan said that Turkey would start new initiatives abroad to target the finance of Gulen supporters.

Finally, commenting on the possible military operation to be launched by Turkey on the YPG/PKK in north Syria, Cavusoglu said, “We will not risk the lives of American soldiers. Our goal, like the operation in Afrin and Operation Euphrates Shield, is the YPG/PKK… Are Americans guardians of the PKK? They should not be. This is the problem. Why did they provide so much weaponry (to the YPG/PKK)?”

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi

The U.S.-Turkey relationship is going through interesting times, as both allies are willing to work through their differences despite serious disagreements over a host of issues. Turkey has been pressing the U.S. as well as the international community to take a firmer stand against those responsible for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.

When asked about the extradition of Gulen to Turkey, Trump denied getting involved in the legal process but stated that the U.S. is looking for “whatever we can do for Turkey.”

The Turkish position puts President Trump in an awkward position, as he appears inclined to accept that the Crown Prince Mohammad bin Selman was not responsible. Trump also pledged that the relationship with Saudi Arabia would not be affected by the Khashoggi affair. Despite this disagreement, President Trump made some positive statements about President Erdogan and Turkey, citing the release of Pastor Andrew Brunson last month. Most recently, when asked about the extradition of Gulen to Turkey, Trump denied getting involved in the legal process but stated that the U.S. is looking for “whatever we can do for Turkey.”

There is also the U.S. support for the YPG that continues to be a sticking point. However, both the American and Turkish leaderships express willingness to work through these differences largely because the two NATO allies have a lot more to gain by working together than at cross purposes. 

For some analysts, the Khashoggi case has been a useful tool for Turkey to play politics in a geostrategic power struggle.

For some analysts, the Khashoggi case has been a useful tool for Turkey to play politics in a geostrategic power struggle. It is important to note that the Saudi failure to provide an explanation for what happened to Khashoggi lasted weeks. Every explanation the Saudis provided was quickly falsified by facts and Turkey insisted on accountability as well as national sovereignty. For all intents and purposes, the Saudi behavior forced Turkey to leak facts and made it all too easy to pursue a “drip drip strategy,” if there was ever such a conscious strategy in the first place.

The U.S. media’s pressure on the Trump administration to take a clear stance was indirectly owed to Turkey’s unwillingness to let this murder be covered up. Turkey made a careful distinction between King Salman and the rest of the Saudi leadership, creating at least some wiggle room without abandoning full accountability for Khashoggi’s murder. President Trump may have preferred that the issue goes away somehow but his administration continued to engage Turkey on the matter. This dynamic of persistent engagement despite deep differences is interesting and might provide a blueprint at least for the next two years.

Both on the issue of Gulen’s extradition and the U.S. support for the YPG, there seems to be a similar dynamic at play. Turkey has requested Gulen’s extradition and pushed hard for it politically but understands the political constraints on the Trump administration. This does not mean Turkey will contend itself with the status quo and give up on the extradition request. Turkey will continue to bring up the issue and pressure the U.S. side to act against the Gulen network all the while engaging instead of confronting the administration. With regard to the YPG issue, Turkey again insists that the U.S. should stop supporting the organization because of its links to the PKK. Yet, it continues to engage the new U.S. team on the Syria policy without accepting any kind of normalization of the YPG.

Time will tell if this is all we can hope for but continuous engagement through crises may be the solution for the time being.

All the minefields in the U.S.-Turkey relationship need careful analysis and comprehensive policy coordination and there is a long way to go before that happens. Nevertheless, it is important to underline that the two sides are both willing to listen to each other’s positions and engage in a meaningful way. It is not clear if this dynamic will be sustainable in the medium and long terms but it should be considered a start in any case.

Time will tell if this is all we can hope for but continuous engagement through crises may be the solution for the time being. However, we should not lose sight that a comprehensive strategic dialogue would produce more concrete and sustainable results in the long run.   

According to a recent NBC News report, the White House is looking for ways to extradite Fetullah Gulen, the leader of FETO, which plotted the failed coup attempt on 15 July 2016 in Turkey, which left 250 victims dead and more than 2,000 injured. According to the report, the “Trump administration officials asked federal law enforcement agencies to examine legal ways of removing” Gulen. The Justice Department, FBI, Homeland Security Department and naturally the White House, are all reported to be involved in the process. Now you might be thinking that this was denied by the U.S. administration, as on Friday, the Justice Dept denied any potential extradition. This in itself was unusual, as it’s not typical for the Justice Department to comment on matters pertaining to potential cases of extradition. However, the fact that something like this has been on the agenda this week was quite serious.

The initial report by NBC News suggests that the extradition of Gulen could take place in order to ease Turkey’s pressure on Saudi Arabia in regards to the Jamal Khashoggi murder, which brought Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman to the forefront as a brutal murderer. As expressed in the report, this is an option, but could also be false. Hence, the focus here isn’t on the language of the report, which describes Gulen as an “Erdogan foe,” and an “exiled cleric,” nor is it the link with the Khashoggi case. Rather, Gulen’s extradition is far more important than any of these. With various sources claiming different stories, if the Trump administration has actually considered the extradition of Fetullah Gulen, this would be a game changing move.

With various sources claiming different stories, if the Trump administration has actually considered the extradition of Fetullah Gulen, this would be a game changing move.

For over two years, the U.S. has underestimated the significance of Gulen for Turkey. It’s as if the U.S. administration doesn’t care about hosting the individual responsible for Turkey’s bloodiest coup ever. What annoyed the Turkish public and the politicians as well is the perception that the U.S. was behind the coup attempt. There seemed to be no other explanation for why a capable state like the U.S. would host such a most-wanted terrorist despite its ally’s persistent requests. If the extradition process was to take place, the Turkish perception of the U.S. would take a new turn.

As for my own part, with all these different stories in the media, I’m still having trouble in understanding why the U.S. would want to extradite Gulen after all the damage done to its relations with Turkey. Once he returns to Turkey, Gulen will eventually inform the Turkish authorities on his foreign connections. After all, the reasons for the inquiries over him before the coup attempt were more about the spying activities of his organization in Turkey. It is impossible for an organization like FETO to maintain its network in such an effective manner without support from outside. If the U.S. were really to extradite him, this would show that the administration is not afraid of what Gulen would spill during his questioning by Turkish authorities. This will give back the U.S. the credibility it lost within the Turkish public opinion and decision makers.

The U.S. administration has underestimated the significance of Gulen for Turkey. It’s as if the administration doesn’t care about hosting the individual responsible for Turkey’s bloodiest coup ever.

Nevertheless, there must be a reason why the potential extradition of Gulen was high on the agenda this week – 2 years after the failed coup attempt. It’s hard to figure out why the U.S. has insisted to protect Gulen for so long, and then suddenly various rumors emerge about the administration wanting to extradite him. When taking this development into consideration with the recent bounties on the PKK’s top three leaders, one does ask whether the U.S. is reformulating its policy with Turkey.

While the debate on Gulen’s extradition and the U.S. listing three PKK terrorists on the Rewards for Justice Program will remain live, we’ll have to wait and see if any concrete results come out of these steps.

As the U.S. pushed Turkey away with the hope that coercion will make Turkey realign its foreign policies in harmony with U.S. interests, Turkey has searched and found new channels of cooperation in the international arena. Such cooperation channels with the European countries, Russia, Iran, and Qatar showed that the coercion is not pulling Turkey to the U.S. orbit but pushing it further away. Hence, if the U.S. does take any positive move in helping Turkey fight FETO, this could be interpreted as a way of compensating the damage caused to bilateral relations between Ankara and Washington.

While the debate on Gulen’s extradition and the U.S. listing three PKK terrorists on the Rewards for Justice Program will remain live, we’ll have to wait and see if any concrete results come out of these steps. If they do produce sincere results, this will reflect itself as an unrepresented boost in relations between Turkey and the U.S.

Minister of Justice, Abdulhamit Gül announced on Friday that Turkey had requested the extradition of 419 FETO (Fetullah Terrorist Organization) affiliated fugitives, members of the pseudo-religious cult which plotted the coup attempt of July 15, from various countries.

In an interview with Anadolu Agency, the minister noted that: “The extradition of 419 FETO leaders and members have been requested from foreign countries to date”. Adding that “red notice requests” had been issued for affiliates of the group who couldn’t be tracked down, Gul noted that there were FETO affiliates whose whereabouts were still unclear. Underscoring that the requests for extradition were issued after thorough investigation into the terroristic cult by the Turkish courts, Gul noted that these requests were conveyed via the Ministry of Justice to the respective countries that the fugitives escaped to or sought political protection in.

The threat that FETO poses is still underestimated by many countries. With a global network operating in over 160 countries, a net worth of 50 billion USD as of 2008, selflessly obedient followers who can give up anything and commit the most horrendous crimes on the command of their leader Fetullah Gulen, and a gruesome track record of devising a deadly coup across Turkey, martyring over 250 civilians and injuring over 2200 individuals in July 15, 2016. Turkey charges the organization with plotting to overthrow the state through an insidious decades-long infiltration into many state apparatuses spanning the military, judiciary as well as many strategic governmental organizations.

Minister Gul underlined that Turkey had reiterated its request for the extradition of the head of the cult, Fetullah Gulen, 7 times to the United States. Highlighting that the extradition requests were in line with the law of extradition and ample evidence and relevant documentation was submitted to the authorities, the Minister added that fresh evidence was shared with renewed requests.

The discrepancy between the judicial systems of the two countries is called to question as Turkey recently released Pastor Brunson after he went through a fair trial, whereas a leader that asks its followers to execute civilians -let alone being put to trial- is living merrily under state protection of the United States. Hopeful of the availing of justice, Justice Minister Abdulhamit concluded: “Our extradition requests are still held in the U.S. Department of Justice. At this point, our expectation is the initiation of a judicial process for extradition as soon as possible”

Since the failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016, the AK Party government has been trying to emphasize the fact that the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) is not only a threat to the national security of Turkey, but is also a threat to other countries that it operates in.

Although the group, led by U.S.-based criminal cult leader Fetullah Gulen, tries to present itself as a “civil society” in countries that it operates, by ensuring its activities are conducted through businesses and -mainly- through the education system of countries in concern, after its attempt to topple the democratically elected government in Turkey on July 15, the group has been accepted by an official terrorist organization not only by the state but also by the Turkish public – regardless of ideological or religious affiliation.

In it’s attempt to ensure that justice is served, Turkey’s most recent calls to extradite FETO members has been in Germany and in Cambodia. With President Erdogan’s official visit to Germany last week, the President called for the German government to realize that this group, which is very active in Germany, will eventually become a threat that the German authorities will have to deal with nationally.

However, more recently, during a joint press conference with Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Prak Sokhonn, Turkish FM Mevlut Cavusoglu stated, “We have repeated our extradition request on the issue of high profile FETO members in Cambodia.”

“This terror group is a threat not only for Turkey, but every country it operates in.”

Sokhonn mentioned that Cambodia is “in close cooperation with Turkey” in regards to the fight against FETO.

“As a friend of Turkey, Cambodia will continue to support Turkey in its operations against FETO,” the FM said.

In his address to the United Nations on Tuesday, September 25, President Erdogan called on world leaders to take measures against the Gulenist criminal cult network. Two days later, this time during his trip to Germany, the Turkish President repeated his call and asked Germany to designate the Gulenist organization as a terrorist organization. Despite Turkey’s call for over two years now, the Gulenist cult members are still active in Western countries, from the United States to Germany and many others.

The organization operates in the disguise of charter schools in the U.S., think-tanks all over the Western world, and some online media networks such as news portals, and so on. While the Turkish public opinion is united against FETO, not everybody is well informed on the organization, and this is why they have difficulty in understanding Turkey’s insistence on this matter.

The very first question towards Turkish demands on the Gulenist network is on the terrorism charges. Many academics and journalists with some interest on this matter in the West question the terrorism charges. These questions are now being repeated after Erdogan’s recent remarks in the U.S. and Germany. They simply ask how an organization led by a “cleric” and which runs charter schools can engage in terrorism. Despite the amount of evidence delivered by the Turkish authorities, this evidence does not reach the ears that need to hear them.

Here is a brief story of the Gulenist network’s gradual and complex journey into terrorism:

It was quite uncommon to call the Gulenist organization – also known as FETO – a terrorist organization a few years ago. After all, terrorism is a form of political violence, and the group was not violent – until they became violent. With its school system to recruit and train young minds, the organization’s structure worked quite effectively in Turkey and abroad.

Gradually, the picture became clear as the recruits began to infiltrate state institutions – first in small numbers, then in masses. It became increasingly clear to the Turkish decision makers that the organization was stealing classified information, sometimes distorting it, and servicing it to foreign services or the media depending on the purpose.

By the end of 2013, there was no doubt about the fact that the members of the Gulenist criminal cult in various state institutions were well connected to each other and were well guided by a central authority in a clear command chain. This is essentially why they were called the “parallel state” by Erdogan – who was the organization’s primary target.

While it took the AK Party government some time to clarify the real purpose and structure of the Gulenists, once they did, there was no way back other than stopping them. As the government began to clean the Gulenists from state institutions, and as it became clear that the elected government will win this battle, Turkey witnessed the July 15 coup attempt in 2016.

The Gulenists in the military carried out a coup attempt, sent a squad to assassinate Erdogan, and killed 248 civilians and state security personnel in multiple spots. And this was the day that the Gulenists were no longer just a secret society infiltrating the state apparatus and being used by foreign services. The July 15 coup attempt also showed that the organization was capable of using violence on a massive scale.

We do not tend to call coup plotters as terrorists, neither in Turkey’s earlier coups nor on the global scale. However, this time, it is different. It was not the military that orchestrated the coup attempt but an organization whose leader is not a soldier and whose members were mostly civilians. This is how we saw a Gulenist ex-cop in military camouflage in a tank in Istanbul on that night. This is how we saw civilian engineers taking part in the coup attempt. This is how we saw civilian professors in the Akinci military base, the headquarters of the coup attempt on that night.

Gulenist academics and journalists also spent quite an effort to spread fake news that night about a manufactured story claiming that Erdogan was fleeing the country and so on. July 15 showed the entire Gulenist criminal network in its entirety on the mission. It was not a conventional coup attempt of soldiers unlike the coups that we know, but it was a joint coup attempt of Gulenist professors, police officers, engineers, and also soldiers. If terror is the use of violence by non-state actors targeting civilians in order to achieve their political objectives, Gulenists did this on the night of July 15 and, hence, they are a textbook example of terrorist organizations – a very innovative one.

A report has been published by SETA on the confessions of FETO (Fetullah Gulen Terrorist Organization) members and affiliates regarding their infiltration strategies into the Turkish government. The report notes that the interval between 1962 and 1980 was the incubation period of FETO where it recruited new members, started institutionalizing and took its first steps towards permeating into government apparatuses. Between 1980 and 1999 FETO continued spreading via a façade of “moderate Islam” which it dedicatedly kept up. During the late 1990s, FETO started using educational institutions to increase its global outreach. Between 1999 and 2012, FETO is known to have persevered FETO’s unbeknownst tutelage hold on the government. Seeing themselves above and beyond all moral codes of ethics and religious values, FETO has justified all means of threats, blackmail, extortion, and plots to meet their ends.

Strategic priorities of FETO in permeating state institutions

The first and foremost goal of FETO “was to accumulate as many affiliates as possible into strategic institutions and use their network to promote these individuals as higher up as possible in the organizational ranks” the report highlights. Confessions reveal that FETO especially prioritized staunchly permeating strategic departments such as HR, IT, private secretary office, intelligence, accounting and training.  FETO is known to have seized hold of training centers that train future candidates to these strategic institutions such as the TSK (Turkish Armed Forces – TAF) and the Police force.

In a television program aired in 1999, Fetullah Gulen manifests his underlying motive: “We must ceaselessly get prepared. When we find the opportune vacancy, we will start the marathon. We must be cautious. If we act rash, they will eradicate us. By taking this into account, we must be taking our steps cautiously.” The report recounts that FETO’s ceaseless efforts paid off significantly in the 1990s when the terror group had finally managed to permeate into all levels of all the government institutions. Since 2012 its primary aim has been the overthrowing of the government.

FETO has always prioritized strategic institutions in its infiltration strategy, and has stolen various entrance examination questions via these institutions, tapped into the phones of key individuals, and manipulated trials by forging documents and generating fake evidence.

Lifelong indoctrination

By exploiting economically poor and clever children at a young age, distancing from their families for long intervals and effectively adopting them “as his children” FETO literally subjected the children to emotional manipulation through various means such as melodramatic shows of poignant lectures distributed via video cassettes to “light houses”, the place of residence where these children continued being indoctrinated the report highlights. After discovering the power of media, FETO started publishing Sızıntı magazine, a double entendre that literally and ironically means “infiltration.”

Giving FETO members a head start in recruitments

The report notes how FETO polished affiliate candidates and gave them a head start in the competition for specific positions via exclusive opportunities such as scholarships, masters programs and paid international experience. The report further highlights how FETO tried to enervate and drive out non-affiliate members from the institutions by mobbing, running slander campaigns, collective pressurizing and by forcing them to resign to gain an overall control of the institution. The report notes that whilst only 400 FETO affiliates were ousted from TSK over decades, over 1500 individuals were thrown out on “irtica charges” (in reference to individuals who were found to be prominently religious in a setting which tends to be overtly secular).

Structure of the Provincial FETO-PDY Armed Terror Organization

Stealing entrance examination questions

There is a striking similarity in the way the entrance examination questions were serviced in advance to FETO-affiliate candidates in all the institutions according to the accounts of FETO affiliates highlighted in the report. Several examples showcased in the report cited candidate confessions during interrogations who said that they “were given the questions via an abi (elder brother in reference to their immediate mentor”) with a code name and given 15 minutes to memorize all the questions and answers and were cautioned not to exhibit surprised facial expressions when seeing the same questions in the actual exams, to wait until the end of the allotted exam time, never to say that the “exam went well” following the examination, and not to talk about their encounter with anyone and never to re-contact them again.”

Fraudulent recruitment processes

In the confessions of some FETO affiliates who had a strong hand in the police force they described how the drawing of lots for the determination of the district of operation of fellow policemen were fraudulent with two divisions inconspicuously placed in the bags from which the draws were being made to ensure that the locations for FETO affiliate policemen were always drawn from the section that had the strategic locations. Similarly, in the selection process of candidates for the General Directorate of Kars Police Force, one FETO affiliate confesses how a FETO affiliate vice chancellor of the Police Academy present during candidate interviews raised a red pen if the candidate was to be subjected to psychological pressure and difficult questions by the jury and a green pen for easy questions directed to FETO affiliates to smooth the interview process and eliminate non-FETO affiliates from the pool of contenders.

License to sin and transfer of bad deeds to Fetullah Gulen

Tabip Albay confesses the following: “Şemsettin took me to the dormitories where Fetullah Gulen was residing. Gulen said: “You have undertaken a noble mission, do not make yourself evident and implement your tasks diligently. To hide yourself, you can drink alcohol, it won’t be haram. If your wife is covered you can uncover her hair, it won’t be haram. Even if it is, I will take the responsibility of the deed. Since this cause is great, it won’t be haram. Earn new members and stand out in your work. If you reach the necessary positions, our cause will be achieved.”

The report also notes an imam in military high schools who confessed that Gulen advised that after a rigorous religious education, to keep their identity confidential that they should act like “Italian artists in the morning.” A similar account in the report notes members of the judicial system who were advised “to refrain from fasting or to walk around with a water bottle in Ramadan, to refrain from going to Friday prayers, drink in public if necessary to hide their identities.”

Technological permeation, hacking, stealing examination questions and forging documents

At OSYM it was realized that from the tea servers to the technicians of the institutions, FETO had seized all ranks of the hierarchy. The report notes that “their university entrance examination prep centers always had similar questions to the official exam since they were funneling questions right from the source.” To facilitate mass staffing they ensured that questions from their prep centers were also included in the official exam.

When there was an extraordinary success rate at the proficiency exam for academicians, ALES, it was realized that FETO had been stealing the questions for this exam as well. “It was realized that the computers storing the questions were exploited and the security surrounding these computers were breached both physically and through cyber-attacks and that FETO affiliates had established virtual servers in computers.” Via these virtual servers, it was deduced that FETO was able to access many questions.

The report also notes that FETO infiltrated the information technology infrastructure of Turkey, utilizing many means to forge evidence, wiretap key officials and access confidential government archives. In TUBITAK many meritless FETO affiliates gained a stronghold and wiretapped non-affiliates to push them out of the cadre. It was realized that the code of the encrypted phones used by government officials were obtained by FETO affiliates and used to slight the phones and wiretap them. The report also notes that FETO affiliates manipulated the interrogation of the kozmik oda (cosmic chamber), military espionage cases, Balyoz and Ergenekon cases since they were in charge of assessing evidence for these cases.

This report aims to be of use to individuals responsible for combating FETO infiltration to provide insight into the strategies they employed throughout their decades long insidious permeation into key government institutions. It is of essence that their true colors be manifested continuously to gain public support in the fight against this sinister organization, enlighten and raise overall awareness on an organization that has cost significantly to the Turkish people and continues to pose a threat to the international community in its various strongholds and areas of influence which are still in the process of being divulged due to their systematic, deeply ingrained and covert natures.

*Written by Rukiye Kaya. 

SETA has recently published a second, extended report on “The organization of FETO (Fethullah Gulen Terror Organization) in Germany and Germany’s Policy on FETO”. The comprehensive report expounds the structure and activities of the organization in Germany, considered a safe haven for FETO fugitives and offers a holistic account of FETO in Germany spanning the profile and historical institutionalization of the organization, structure of their network, recruitment methods, affiliated NGOs, schools, financial resources, lobby activities, media outlets, close relations with the German government and provides solutions and strategies for the combat against FETO. The report also conducts an elaborate comparative analysis of FETO prior and following the 15 July coup attempt, which marks a turning point in their operations, the result of four decades of covert operations, dedicated planning, foreign alliances and gradual infiltration into many state apparatuses and strategic organizations.

FETO’s structure, network and educational institutions

FETO’s second largest presence after Turkey amongst 170 countries worldwide is Germany. The report notes that FETO capitalizes on the fact that Germany is home to the largest Turkish diaspora and has largely gained ground by “exploiting the void created by unsuccessful integration strategies employed on Turkish expatriates”. FETO begins indoctrinating future followers at their schools governed by a separate and cunningly devised curriculum “that synthesize Gulenist teachings with modern science”. FETO opens numerous “light houses/Lichthauser” for students across Germany where the extracurricular indoctrination continues in a communal environment. As delineated in the report, there are around 25-30 private schools and 150 prep centers in Germany and it notes the resignation of a principal of German origin from one of these schools citing his farewell statement: “The teachers are admirers of Gulen and take decisions in my absence. I can no longer take responsibility for this school.”

The report depicts the concentric and hierarchical structure of FETO where the external circle consists of sympathizers and attendees of the weekly sohbet (“discussion”) gatherings, and those that receive financial aid from FETO, the middle circle comprises the financial donors, businessmen who cover the wages of the inner circle and provide resources for the activities of the external circle. The inner circle contains teachers, journalists, lobbyists, academicians, think tanks and company employees of FETO. The report notes that their allegiance and loyalty is appraised by how much they “give back” to their community as percentage of wages “reaching up to 70% of their income”.

FETO’s income sources

With an estimated net worth of 50 billion dollars worldwide as of 2008, the report suggests that the organization operates akin to a holding rather than a religious organization and divulges affiliate organizations that generate revenues as companies, schools, media outlets, NGOs and charity organizations which funnel money to be used for alternate purposes. Their business platform BUV (Federal Union of Entrepreneurs Foundation) comprises many important companies. The report also reveals that FETO is noted for “generating illegal income via money laundering, tax evasion and spurious bills through members holding dual citizenship to facilitate undetected international transfer of money.”

“We will be useful for Germany”

Following the coup attempt which largely revealed their ulterior intentions in the eyes of public opinion (unanimously in Turkey and increasingly abroad), FETO was compelled to put on a facade to maintain their presence in Germany, by distancing and differentiating themselves from the rest of the Turkish diaspora, the report attests that FETO adopted a multifaceted rhetoric such as “moderate Islam”, “interfaith dialogue”, “educational organization”, “well-integrated/assimilated Turk” and “useful instrument to pressurize the Turkish government”. The report highlight that for Die Welt newspaper, FETO openly confesses that they will be useful for Germany (Wir Werden Deutschland von Nutzen Sein).

FETO’s infiltration into German politics

The report showcases the political infiltration of FETO in Germany via their Intercultural Dialogue Forum (Forum für Interkulturellen Dialog e.V. –FID) where former president of German Federal Parliament and member of CDU Christian Democratic Union, Rita Süssmuth and Omid Nouripour of the Alliance ’90/The Greens who currently serves as a member of the Bundestag, spokesperson on party’s foreign affairs, both served as members of the advisory board. Both members were “compelled to part ways with FID after public questioning of their affiliation with FETO following recent developments”.

Germany’s reaction to FETO and suggestions for joint bilateral action

Capitalizing on the ease with Germany provides recluse to Turkish political refugees, FETO has sought the assistance of Germany and as the report indicates “among 288 diplomatic passport holders and 771 special passport holders who have applied for asylum, 42% have been accepted by February 2018.”

Germany’s reluctance to extradite coup plotters, failure to acknowledge the criminal status of FETO and open condoning of FETO atrocities despite ample evidence provided by Turkey and the criticisms directed by German opposition parties on the antidemocratic nature of FETO, is regarded to be “in stark contradiction with their supposed stance on democratic values and hurts bilateral relations.” The report notes the remarks of Bruno Kahl, president of German Federal Intelligence Service who rejected in an interview to Der Spiegel that FETO was behind the coup attempt. When asked whether Berlin was informed of the powers behind the 15 July coup attempt, Kahl replied that answering this question would not be possible since it would be against the German government’s “vital interests”.

The report suggests that the German public is still largely uninformed of FETO’s true colors and receives a one sided view of the organization and calls the German government to take concrete steps to cooperate with Turkey to thwart this dangerous organization and raise awareness on their covert criminal operations. The report also suggests that bilateral cooperation can be triggered into motion between the two countries by providing concrete suggestions for joint action to thwart FETO which poses a mutual threat to both countries as it uses similar methodologies to permeate state institutions worldwide and has publicly announced that it will completely move its base from Turkey to Germany following the coup attempt.

*Written by Rukiye Kaya 

U.S. President Trump had another one of his Twitter moments on Thursday. This time, the target was Turkey. He tweeted as follows: “The United States will impose large sanctions on Turkey for their long time detainment of Pastor Andrew Brunson, a great Christian, family man and wonderful human being. He is suffering greatly. This innocent man of faith should be released immediately!” The tone and means of the message is far from diplomatic conventions but this is not something unusual for Trump. There are stranger things in this matter.

First, who is Andrew Brunson and why was he jailed (currently under house arrest)? Brunson is an American pastor who has lived in Turkey over two decades. He was arrested on December 9, 2016, about 4 months after the failed coup attempt in Turkey. He was arrested for terrorism and spying charges. It is no secret that countries send spies to other countries, even to the ones they ally with. Hence, whether or not Brunson is one of them, it would not surprise anybody if some people spy in Turkey for the U.S. When people are found spying, they might be exchanged, which is not uncommon between countries. But there is more to this story.

To open it up further, Brunson was claimed to be linked to FETO (Fethullahist Terror Organization) which plotted the June 15, 2016 coup attempt and is responsible for killing 250 Turkish nationals and injuring thousands on the night of the coup attempt. Speaking of FETO, the leader of the organization and the mastermind of the coup attempt, Fethullah Gulen lives in his mansion in the U.S. Gulen is not a U.S. citizen but Turkey’s calls for his extradition does not find ears in the States. U.S. politicians keep referring to the issue as a matter of judiciary and avoid taking initiative. Yet, when it comes to the Brunson case in Turkey, Trump can easily threaten Turkey with “large sanctions.”

Something is not right in this picture. Why would the U.S. not extradite a non-U.S. (Turkish) citizen to Turkey despite the bloodshed he spilt in Turkey? Why would the U.S. allow the remnants of Gulen’s network to organize in the country, while some other partners of Turkey extradite the members of the organization? What would any sensible person think about such a situation? Gulen is a Turkish citizen who plotted a coup attempt in Turkey but seeks and finds support from the U.S. As a result, many, if not all, Turkish nationals see the July 15 coup attempt as an American project.

In fact, it is easy for the U.S. to end these suspicions by simply extraditing Gulen. But for some reason it is not. Why not? When this is the case, naturally, many Turkish nationals think the U.S. will not extradite Gulen because he knows too much! And because his extradition would hurt the American credibility in the eyes of its future partners in crime. Yes, this is the overwhelming public opinion in Turkey on the U.S.-Gulen affair. And who can claim this line of thinking does not make sense?

At the end of the day, the U.S. has not extradited Gulen so far despite Turkey’s insistence on the matter. Yet, the very same U.S. asks Turkey to release Brunson, who is suspected of spying in Turkey and being linked to Gulen’s coup attempt. This is not fair. This is the stronger side imposing its will on the side that it sees weaker. This is like a quote from the famous Melian dialogue: “While the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Well, the story might have a different end this time if the U.S. keeps alienating Turkey and pushing it to seek alternatives to its long-lasting alliance with the U.S. Hence, the question is, will the U.S. try to keep a significant ally on its side or push it closer to its global rivals?

Once, the Prussian King Frederic II chose a place in the southwest of Berlin for the construction of a palace for himself. But there was a massive mill in the land. So, if he were to have a palace in this place, the mill would both spoil the panorama and make noise. Upon that, the King went to the owner of the mill named sans-souci (carefree) and told him that he decided to buy the mill at that very moment, asking him to estimate a price for it. Sans souci refused to sell his mill and answered the King’s threats and objections as follows: “Of course, your majesty, your majesty could easily do that, if – begging your pardon – it were not for the Supreme Court in Berlin.” The King gave permission for the construction of the palace, whereas the mill remained within the complex. Eventually, the palace was named after the miller. Since then, those words of the miller are employed in such contexts related to justice in Germany and various other countries including Turkey.

As looked through the present-day perspective of Turkey, we see military coup plotters alongside the PKK militants in Berlin. Of course, there is a Supreme Court in Berlin, but the present justice system does not interdict their presence. One can contend that it is customary for the states regarded as democratic to protect several terror groups, which is true. However, the definitions, regulations and penalties with regard to terrorism, terrorists and terror crimes vary from country to country across the world. The approaches similar to Germany’s have also been displayed in the policies adopted by other European countries in the case of the PKK. Consequently, although it is unacceptable for Turkey, this approach of Germany can be evaluated within the norms of the European Union. But no matter what justification is employed, there is a fact that Germany can never explain today. How could Germany, one of the two founding states of the EU, harbor and protect the people who attempted to stage a coup in Turkey, who is an EU candidate? Being the leading state of the EU, Germany has to make it clear that on which EU criteria they protect the Gulenist Terror Group (FETO) militants.

The FETO operatives who attempted to stage a military coup in Turkey on July 15, 2016, which killed 248 people and wounded more than 2.000, fled to Germany shortly after the attempted coup. According to the data released by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, BAMF), a total of 1.059 people, including 288 with diplomatic passports and 771 with green (bureaucratic) passports, requested asylum between the time of the attempted coup and March 2018; and almost half of them were granted with asylum.

Also, Germany was not informed about the organizational structure of FETO solely through the channel of Turkey. On July 25, 2014, the intelligence service of Baden-Württemberg state released a comprehensive report about FETO on its website. But it turned out that the report was removed from the website following the coup attempt. As of August 2016, it became apparent thanks to the statements of the suspects and the witnesses and intelligence data that FETO members chose Germany as a harbor. Among the Turkish public, no one has doubts regarding FETO’s role in the failed coup. Hundreds of statements and analysis on the subject issued by many politicians of all political parties, including the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), can be found with a simple Google search. Despite that, the German Federal Intelligence Chief Bruno Kahl gave an interview to Der Spiegel on March 18, 2017, in which he claimed that FETO is a non-governmental organization engaging in religious and secular education activities and they were not convinced that FETO leader Fetullah Gulen was behind the coup attempt. These remarks stirred a great deal of reaction not only from Turkey, but from the German media and the Left Party of Germany.

In an article entitled “Wo Erdoğan Recht Hat?” (The Points Where Erdogan is Right About), which was published by TAZ on September 11, 2017, Jürgen Gottschlich covered the allegations on the criminal records of prominent FETO members and touched upon the possibility that Kahl either is not familiar with the issue at all or does deliberately protect the organization. Another article published by FAZ a few days later warned that in case it is found that the FETO operatives whose part in the coup attempt were proven were hiding in Germany, Berlin would not overcome the burden of harboring a criminal organization in its territory without taking legal proceedings.

The Left Party also issued a number of parliamentary questions on the subject. The replies given to these questions by the German government clarified Germany’s stance on FETO. One of the questions demanded to know that on which intelligence data Kahl’s remarks are based and whether Berlin was informed about the identity of the forces involved in the failed coup. The answer given to this question underscored that the organization was not monitored by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz or BfV). Of course, Germany could not have announced the contacts it had with FETO members it protects. But with the answer given to the second parliamentary question, the German government avowedly displayed its position. The government suggested that answering such a question is not possible for the vital interests of the German state.

Surely there is a Supreme Court in Berlin today. But it is alarming that a state of law who is the founding member of the EU is currently guarding coup plotters, which is not even kept as a secret. The German public will hopefully bring them to account one day.

The Turkish Republic has faced several coups and coup attempts since its establishment in 1923 and even throughout the late 19^th and early 20^th centuries. This trend, unfortunately, did not change in subsequent times as it –once again– came into appearance in 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997 and even on 27 April 2007, when a so-called “e-memorandum” was issued by the ultra-secularist then-General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces in order to prevent the AK Party’s presidential candidate from being elected.

It’s ill-advised to acknowledge some un-informed Turkish academics who insisted on the thesis that the Turkish military had always respected Turkish democracy and that the only intent of the putschists was to restore the allegedly repeatedly failing Turkish democracy. Similar narratives do not merit consideration as they overlook or intentionally disregard significant factors. Proposing that the Turkish military thus far was able to intervene in politics without the support of foreign allies is imprudent. Thus, it’s quite logical to expect that subsequent to an alleged “restoration” process following coup regimes, even those supporting the tutelage military regimes may put pressure to put an end to this period. That’s it. Furthermore, without the pressure of external factors, neither Turkey would have given up its one-party CHP-regime in 1946, nor would it lend the power to civilians after each coup attempt. But these issues go beyond the borders of this column.

Turks are generally aware of the historical anti-democratic mechanisms and tutelage intending institutions in Turkey, which have been largely attenuated in the recent 15 years. Despite these democratic changes, which prioritized the civil actors in the Turkish political system, today, the question arises about how a military coup on July 15, 2016, could been attempted? Moreover and more importantly, how was the coup attempt prevented on this instance?

The main and striking factor in the prevention of the recent coup attempt was the people’s active will, who were able to directly thwart the execution of the coup. For the first time in Turkish history, people stood against the country’s own military and blocked an infiltrated faction of the military geared to take over the country’s leadership–as a result of this heroic resistance of unarmed civilians, 250 Turks were martyred by the armed forces.

On this instance in contrast with previous coups, the driving force behind the coup was not a Kemalist or ultra-secularist group, but rather the supporters of Fetullah Gulen, whose disciples infiltrated key state institutions over the last 40 years. The Gulenist cult members are widely acknowledged and designated today by all Turkish political parties and societal groups as a terrorist organization, called FETO. All left-wing, right-wing and conservative circles have no doubt regarding the perpetrators of the 15 July coup attempt.

This consensus is also a reason why during the night of the coup attempt, not only conservatives and nationalists took to the streets to prevent the coup –subsequent to President Erdogan’s call– but also some leftists and even some Kemalists deemed the coup attempt illegitimate and illegal. To understand the people’s actual motivations and their standpoints in a broader perspective, our book-publication, ‘Democracy Watch: Social Perception of 15 July Coup Attempt’ from 2016 may be a good reference to contextualize Turkish people and their perception of the 15th July coup attempt.

In the 1990s, when the armed forces still controlled Turkish politics by indirect mechanisms –such as the media etc. – this kind of collective civil mobilization against an anti-democratic armed actor would be unimaginable. Thus, both the partly successful de-militarization process of Turkey’s politics in the recent years via rise of civil-democratic politics and the fact that the coup was attempted by a prevalently hated group, the FETO, were important in thwarting the coup. This is also a fundamental reason why the state of emergency, which will end in the coming days, was not opposed by the majority of Turks since its main target was the FETO.

Furthermore, it should be stressed that the presidential leadership was a crucial factor in the failure of the attempt. By calling the citizens to go on streets and protect democratic rights, Turkish President Erdogan differentiated himself from previous Turkish political leaders and thus mobilized the country against an anti-democratic attempt. The result was ultimately a success, reaching yet another successful milestone paving the way to Turkey’s progressive democracy path.

Nowadays, questions also arise as to the plausibility of potential future coup attempts. Undoubtedly, steps such as the strengthening of people’s democratic sensitivities, sustaining the democratic transformation of Turkey’s political institutions, continuing the fight against illegal groups within the army such as FETO, and the establishment of a further professional-democratic understanding of the armed forces by stressing civilian control will be the main factors in minimizing the likelihood of future coup attempts – regardless of their affiliations. Of course, the importance and meaning of the Turkish armed forces for Turks is not to be disregarded or diminished and it’s true that this perception is based on a rather emotional, religious and historical backdrop. Nevertheless, this fact does not hinder the need to further develop a sincere democratic understanding of civil-military relations in Turkish politics.

In this sense, it’s important to stress the recent institutional step, according to which the chief of General Staff and force commanders will henceforth fall under the new Defense Minister – a civil person. As already known, the previous Chief of General Staff, General Hulusi Akar, quit his job as military official right after he was appointed as the new Defense Minister in Turkey’s first presidential cabinet last week. Thus, it seems that an interesting transition model was formulated in order to establish an effective increase in civil politics. Moreover, similar progressive steps to develop the civilian control of the military –by taking into account the needs of a strong and democratic military– will most likely provide beneficial in reducing the notion of coups in the minds of anti-democrats, let alone the likelihood of potential future coup attempts by factions of the army.

Within two years since the July 15 coup attempt, Turkey has overcome several monumental challenges. The first and foremost challenge was the coup attempt which was thwarted in its tracks by civilian initiative thus setting the path for future challenges. The coup attempt was undertaken by an illegal organization, FETO, which tried to usurp power from within the state bureaucracy. Members of this organization had systematically infiltrated state institutions for decades while keeping up a façade of merely being a civil society organization.

Turkish people took to streets upon President Erdogan’s call to confront the putschists and protect their democracy. Countless stories from that night have been recounted all illustrating that Turkish people will no longer tolerate anti-democratic forces to dictate their will. It was clear from the onset of the night of the July 15 coup attempt that the era of coups in Turkey was drawing to an end. Unlike previous military interventions, Turkish people’s resistance that night signaled a major turning point in the history of Turkish democracy.

The second challenge was to tackle an unequaled terror organization which had taken over many strategic institutions, subsequently permeating its grip on power through anti-democratic means. Turkey was already dealing with domestic and regional terror organizations like the PKK and DAESH. Confronting FETO, however, demanded a unique approach as this organization existed within the state itself. Turkey had to comb through the state bureaucracy to find out members of a highly secretive organization who received orders from outside rather than from their legitimate superiors in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Especially in the weeks and months immediately following the coup attempt, there was imminent fear of the potential of another coup attempt transpiring any moment. The recent trauma of the night of July 15 was compounded with the urgent need to find out the perpetrators and prevent yet another attempt.

The third challenge was to establish a multi-pronged approach to combat domestic and regional terrorism. Both DAESH and the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK, were posing immediate security threats especially along the Syrian border. Towns bordering Turkey were often subjected to rocket attacks and occasional destabilizing activities such as smuggling. Lack of stability on the Syrian side of the border created opportunities for the YPG, which was increasingly legitimized and encouraged by western support. Only a month after the coup attempt, Turkey decided to take the fight across the border into Syria both to demonstrate its resolve and to ensure that it would not simply sit by and watch the PKK gain ground. To this end, Turkey conducted the Euphrates Shield and Afrin operations in addition to maintaining a military presence in Idlib. Through its military intervention in northern Syria, Turkey’s fight against terrorism evolved from a defensive state to a new proactive approach after the coup attempt by fighting terror organizations across the border when necessary.

The fourth challenge was a political one: to rebuild the political system that suffered from decades of military and civilian tutelage system. The traditional tutelary system prevented the popular will from being fully reflected in the political arena and various state institutions had the ultimate say in state affairs. The AK Party years have challenged this system in a significant way and yet a comprehensive change to the system, which was demanded by people of all segments of the society, had still to be realized. The 2017 referendum on the transition to a presidential system represented the most significant overhaul of the governance system in Turkey. With the June 24 elections, Turkey has now transitioned to a full presidential system whereby the state institutions originally set up to oversee the civilian governments are now going to serve under the elected leaders. It will take time for the new system to be fully functional and there may even be hurdles along the way. Nevertheless, an elected president and an elected parliament are now at the center of the political system with the unelected and appointed civil and military bureaucratic institutions serving under them.

We will certainly continue to debate the reverberations of the July 15 coup attempt and its legacy for the country. But one overarching message is clear: Turkish people will no longer tolerate their democratic rights and popular will to be undermined and hijacked by cliques and terror groups from within and outside the state. This will most likely constitute the cornerstone of the country’s democratic maturity in the years ahead.

Two years ago, Turkey witnessed the coup attempt by the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO), which had been infiltrating critical state institutions for a long time. The putschists killed 241 people and 2195 others were injured. During the two-year period after the coup attempt, there have been serious investigations towards FETO-linked people in public institutions and the judiciary. These investigations aimed to purify state institutions from FETO domination.

After two years, understanding the attitudes and perceptions of people towards FETO is important. There have been some studies analyzing the psychological aspects of the coup attempt and its perpetrator. All these studies show that FETO is still perceived as the most dangerous terrorist organization by people and it differs from other organizations by choosing extraordinary methods. For instance, while it pretends to be “a peaceful religious community working for the sake of humanity” in the international arena, the members of this terrorist organization still manipulate investigations to commit more crimes. The complication of their methods in communication and giving orders still make them one of the most abnormal terrorist organizations in history.

All of these factors keep the hatred towards FETO among Turkish people alive. The second commemoration of the coup attempt took place with the participation of millions of people throughout the country. In cities, people prayed for the souls of the martyrs and the sake of Turkey. They also showed their anger and hatred towards FETO. This shows that there is a consensus among people, no matter their ideology or political view, that FETO is a dangerous terrorist organization, which does not hesitate to act against human dignity.

The hatred towards FETO makes July 15 one of the most critical junctures in Turkey’s history. After the coup attempt, millions of people gathered for democracy watches in order to show their respect to Turkish democracy. These events created a new atmosphere uniting people all around the country. The participation to commemoration ceremonies in masses shows that this spirit is still alive after two years. Thus, it is obvious that July 15 created a founding spirit for the future of the country.

Even if there is a consensus on July 15 and its meaning in Turkey’s history among Turkish people, there is a concern among people that foreign countries failed to understand FETO danger. The two-year lasting process after the coup attempt shows that foreign countries are not aware of the dangers of this terrorist organization. Obviously, one of the reasons of this misperception arises from the widespread belief among these countries indicating that this organization is not as dangerous as Turkey claims.

Since FETO is a multi-faced terrorist organization showing its “soft” and “peaceful” face to foreign countries, most of these countries are blind to see connections between this group and the July 15 coup attempt. This makes it difficult to fight against FETO in the international arena. Additionally, some groups in Turkey also try to soften perceptions against this group under the influence of the discourse of FETO. Nonetheless, it should be reminded that some Western countries – in comparison to their attitudes two years ago – have begun to take into account the role of FETO in the coup attempt. This reflects some success in Turkey’s fight against the terrorist organization.

Consequently, Turkey proceeds to convince other countries about its two-year lasting fight. The unquestionable consensus among Turkish people on FETO’s role as the perpetrator of the coup attempt also started to re-shape the approaches of foreign countries. It is obvious that, with the support of the people, Turkey will continue to progress in its fight against FETO in the domestic and international arena.

One of the most important actors on the night of July 15, 2016, was the personnel of the Directorate of Religious Affairs. Calling mosque staff in all cities to duty, the directorate consolidated the people’s resistance against the coup taking place in Istanbul and Ankara. In this respect, in an unprecedented way, mosques broadcasted messages calling people to go out on the streets and thwart the coup attempt. This process, during which the Directorate of Religious Affairs personnel faced dangers such as going through a conflict zone or being attacked by some Turkish citizens verbally and physically, was initiated with former President of Religious Affairs Mehmet Gormez’s verbal instruction on Ulke TV when he reached the TV channel through phone around 11:40 PM:

“I ask all of my devoted brothers out there, please each and every one of you run to the minarets. First recite salawats to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), then invite all people of Turkey to protect their rights and will.”

In addition to this verbal instruction on TV, the directorate personnel received a text written by Mehmet Gormez around 01:00 AM:

“My fellow devoted brother, doing whatever we can to protect the rights of our people is our duty. We can never allow this country and its people to be divided, deprived of peace and prosperity along with the will of people being infringed through coercion and violence. As the spiritual guides of our nation, we will stand with the people against all illegal initiatives. I call all of you to resist this heinous treachery [the coup attempt] in a nonviolent way by going up the minarets, the symbol of our freedom. Tonight, lights of minaret should remain on and the people of Turkey should be invited to protect their rights via reciting salawats.

Mehmet Gormez”

After this instruction of Mehmet Gormez, sounds of salawats, call to prayers, prayers and announcements rose from the minarets. Gormez had given the general framework to muezzins and let them do whatever they can within this framework. This situation revealed a rich potential of materials; while some muezzins recited salawats unceasingly, others were inviting people to resistance after salawats, praying in Turkish/Arabic, reciting “salat-ı ümmiye,” Turkey’s national anthem and poems.

Shaped through improvisation in terms of content, this rich material gave insight to the relations between the July 15-religion in particular and religion-state/politics/democracy/military in general along with how these relations were perceived by Turkish society. In addition, it also revealed how the directorate personnel viewed this sinister event and how they conveyed their views to the public along with uncovering how one of the most effective motivators functioned. In this respect, this material is crucial and for this reason it would be beneficial to look at what happened on the night of July 15 from this perspective through the common points that could be found among limited sources:

Looking at the mood of these calls and prayers, it is clear that there is an apparent and dominant “war of independence” or invasion psychology. This wasn’t a coup aiming to overthrow the government, but the state, call to prayer, the flag and independence – all of which are seen as synonymous. “Europe,” “the U.S.” “Zionists,” “Christians,” “heretics,” “hypocrites” and co-conspiring traitors are behind this coup attempt. This psychology had an impact on the frequent recitation of the Turkish national anthem written along with Arif Nihat Asya’s poem “Biz Kısık Sesleriz” [“We are the husky voices”]. Meanwhile, referred historical figures also reflect this psychology: Ulubatli Hasan, Mehmed the Conquerer, Abdulhamid II, Sütçü İmam…

National unity and solidarity are among the most underscored arguments during the calls made from minarets. Undoubtedly, this was the case because it wasn’t a solely military coup; it was perpetrated by a religious order which had a social correspondence. In this respect, with the addition of indiscriminate usage of heavy weaponry against the people, the coup was seen more of a threat than just a struggle for power between two parties or an attempt to shift power. This perception was due to the damage caused by violent political and social conflicts in Syria and Egypt in the near past being still fresh in the memory of people.

Protecting democracy and the national will were two points that were frequently expressed by religious officials when calling people to resist. People were invited to take the streets not only for the love of God or country, but also for the love of democracy, while it was highlighted that the national will, elected government, president or the Parliament could be altered with arms and coups, that was a clear threat.

Exactly two years has passed since the July 15, 2016, coup attempt in Turkey, but the fight against the terrorist organization led by the U.S.-based former imam Fetullah Gulen, officially known as FETO, remains at the top of the country’s agenda. The sustained importance of this issue stems from the discovery of new evidence about the organization as well as the opposition’s approach to Turkey’s crackdown on the FETO network.

In the wake of the July 15 coup attempt, Turkey launched a proactive campaign against FETO terrorism. It is necessary to note, however, that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s commitment to this struggle predated the failed coup. As a matter of fact, he described the group as a ‘parallel state’ in the immediate aftermath of the judicial coup attempt on December 17-25, 2013. A designated terrorist organization that the National Security Council (MGK) officially identified as a threat against Turkey’s national security, FETO suffered major setbacks since the July 15 coup attempt, as its operational capabilities within the country were completely eliminated – at least for the time being. The declaration of a state of emergency, coupled with a number of decreed issues within that legal framework, facilitated the dismissal of FETO members, affiliates and contacts from the public service. Others, who actively participated in the organization’s illegal activities, were brought to justice. Over the following months, Turkish courts handed down various sentences to defendants over their links to FETO and their complicity in the July 15 coup attempt.

The question today is whether Turkey’s struggle against this 50-year-old organization, which is half as old as the Republic itself, has reached its conclusion. In order to answer this question, we must provide the following analysis and support the claims mentioned in it.

First of all, FETO has never been a religious organization. Since its formation, the group operated as a terrorist organization. Provided that it successfully disguised itself as a faith community, however, resulted in an overall failure to understand the movement’s true nature until the July 15 coup attempt.

Fundamental qualities of the organization

In order to fully appreciate the challenges that Turkish authorities face in their fight against FETO, it is necessary to understand what kind of organization it really is. At the same time, it is crucial to raise awareness about the threat posed by FETO members, whom certain foreign governments continue to harbor, to host FETO members around the world.

According to many counterterrorism experts who describe FETO as a terrorist organization, the group does not share the organization structure and operational processes with others. Developing a deeper understanding of the organization, whose members are radicalized by Fetullah Gulen’s cult of personality, is also key to the success of ongoing efforts to defeat it. To be clear, it is not possible to argue that FETO is known or has been explained sufficiently.

The first defining feature of cult movements is that their authoritarian leaders are considered sacred by their followers. Since the organization’s establishment, Gulen’s most significant accomplishment was to identify himself as a holy person. As a self-proclaimed chosen person, Gulen repeatedly compared himself to the Prophet Muhammad over the years. At other times, he presented himself as the executioner of His wishes. In doing so, Gulen took necessary precautions to ensure his total control over the organization. As a paranoid individual, he single-handedly decided which of his followers would marry and how they would name their children. Gülen also monitored the communications of his closest associates in an effort to concentrate all powers in his own hands.

FETO is also quite capable of indoctrination, which is the second most important quality of cult movements. As a matter of fact, the entire organization is a reflection of Gülen himself. A closer look at the group would reveal that it shares the personality traits of its leader. As such, the organization shares Gülen’s sinister nature, desire for becoming a legend, fear of death, tendency to alienate others, eagerness to hide his true motives and lack of confidence. Gulen was able to accomplish this goal with the help of a powerful network of indoctrination. Over the years, recordings, preparation schools and educational institutions have been the most significant carriers of Gulen’s messages. It was thereby that the organization’s leader came to control the minds of recruits from their childhood onwards. Those individuals, whose minds came to be controlled, became main players within the ‘parallel state’ in later years. With a sense of absolute devotion, they swallowed all discourse and actions of Gulen and his organization without reservation. Despite the overwhelming evidence against Gulen, for example, many members of the organization continue to turn a blind eye to the criminal nature of its activities out of absolute devotion and the hope of a better future.

To be clear, the nature of FETO was unmistakably shaped by the objectives of its sponsors. For example, many people view the organization’s current state as a deviation from religious principles over time. Quite the contrary, FETO has never been a religious movement. Instead, it has always been a terrorist organization. Instead of undermining state authority through armed struggle like traditional terrorist organizations, it aimed to infiltrate various public institutions to create a ‘parallel state’ which would take over the country’s government when the time came. Almost all sources on FETO, however, lack a coherent analysis of its emergence – – even though Gulen has always been open about his ultimate goal. A careful analysis would reveal that only a handful studies delve into the organization’s relationship with the Peace Volunteers Movement, a product of Washington’s anti-communist campaign that started its activities in Turkey in the early 1960s (just as Gulen was starting out), or how much time Gulen used to spend at the American locale in Edirne and his links to intelligence officers during his military service.

At all stages of its evolution, FETO remained capable of easily adapting to changing political circumstances in Turkey and around the world.  In other words, it assumed the shape of its container. It used religion to conceal its true identity and seized the opportunities it entailed.

At which level is Turkey in its fight against FETO?

The first step taken in order to fight with FETO was to initiate investigations against kumpas davaları (trials that FETO promoted with manipulations and fake evidences) which were used by FETO for the purpose of providing a “legal” dimension to its illegal activities. By these illegal activities, FETO aimed to speed up its organizational structuration in public institutions such as the Turkish Armed Forces.

OHAL (state of emergency) was put into action following the July 15 failed coup attempt. Then, with the help of decree laws issued in this state of emergency, the elimination of FETO members in public officials and breaking their power in various fields mainly including the spheres of education, media and economy, were at the top of the agenda. Dismissal of persons, who take orders from their “brothers” and “sisters” in the organization instead of their chiefs in the public offices, can be understood in this context. In this way, public personnel who have connections with FETO were dismissed and legal proceedings against them were initiated for the reason of abusing the possibilities offered by the state.

In order to block activities of FETO in the field of education, nearly 2.000 schools, student dormitories and various courses in connection with the organization have been closed by the Ministry of National Education.

Also, precautions were taken against the economic power of FETO by dealing with companies such as Bank Asya and Group of Koza Ipek, who act as intermediaries for money laundering. Trustees were appointed to these companies and suspicious past activities of them were examined by ministries, institutions and organizations.

The process of removing the effects of FETO from the state, as the most important part of the fight against FETO, is not an individual-centered approach but rather it aims to remove groups whose activities were infected with terrorism/crime. Up to now, 287 lawsuits were filed against the coup attempt and 171 cases reached at decisions. In these cases, 2.140 people were sentenced.

Turkey continues to struggle with FETO even in the international arena. Various information and documents have been forwarded to interlocuters in order to struggle with the manipulations initiated by the terrorist organization. In this context, authority in FETO schools in many places, especially in the Balkans and African countries, were delivered to the Republic of Turkey.

FETO isn’t just a threat against Turkey

Starting with the judiciary and law enforcement, the officials conducting Turkey’s fight against FETO, along with the political leadership behind the agenda, cracked down on the organization’s network at unprecedented levels. Keeping in mind Gulen’s character traits, it is important to highlight that the organization cannot be completely incapacitated in a short period of time. After all, FETO isn’t limited to its public profile. Since April 2017, the Turkish National Police has identified the organization’s undercover cells within the state apparatus and security operations concentrated on those specific targets. In light of newly available evidence, the Turkish authorities concluded that FETO was an extremely potent covert organization. It is possible to argue that each visible component of the organization has a ‘parallel’ or hidden counterpart. For example, it became clear that all FETO members within the Turkish Armed Forces reported to other, ghost-like members (known as hidden imams within the group). Regardless of their ranks, those operatives received orders and instructions from individuals other than their superiors within the military hierarchy. This specific arrangement meant that FETO became a ‘parallel state’ par excellence and was indeed a terrorist organization seeking to seize control of the state apparatus.

In addition to generating revenue for the group, FETO schools across the world served as a source of new recruits who would be trained to become part of the ‘parallel state.’ For the sake of presenting itself as a peaceful movement, FETO used its educational institutions as a front. Although Turkey ended the group’s activities in the area of education, it is important to note that Gulen’s school network became the organization’s backbone in recent years. Gulen-affiliated schools in the United States, Europe, Central Asia and Africa carry on supporting the survival of the organization. According to information obtained from individuals, who were captured in Ukrain, Sudan, Kosovo, Azerbaijan and Gabon in recent months by the Turkish intelligence servcices, they served as principals or teachers at FETO schools.

FETO schools outside Turkey must be considered serious national security threats in host countries. After all, those institutions formed the backbone of the group’s presence in other countries. First and foremost, countries harboring identified FETO members are now the new centers of the organization. These countries violate international law and diplomatic norms by supporting a terrorist organization, which attempted to overthrow Turkey’s democratically elected government in 2016, to seem unreliable. At the same time, they render themselves defenseless against potential attacks by FETO members. It is no secret that the children of local elites in many countries, where the group operates, are enrolled in schools affiliated with Gulen. As a matter of fact, it is possible to argue that political elites in countries, where FETO launched educational institutions relatively early, are graduates of those schools. In this regard, the group forms ‘parallel states’ in those countries as well.

On July 15, 2016, Turkey encountered the single greatest act of rebellion in the history of the Republic – which it overcame thanks to the sacrifice of the ordinary people. In the wake of the coup attempt, the country launched an all-out offensive against FETO. Although significant progress has been made within the country, members of the organization, who fled Turkey ahead of the failed coup, continue a smear campaign against the country. In this regard, many countries, including Turkey’s self-proclaimed allies in the West, do not pay the due attention to the steps taken by Turks in the international arena. Although there is irrefutable evidence linking Gulen to the coup attempt in Turkey, those countries are unwilling to extradite senior leaders of the organization to Turkey. We must not forget that FETO is the product of an ‘intelligence thinking’ and the group’s structure and activities were shaped by the same line of thinking. As such, the organization poses a security threat not just to Turkey but also other countries where it remains operational. Let us hope that those who ignore the FETO threat today can see the group for what it really is before it is too late.

Two years ago, on July 15, Turkey experienced a vicious coup attempt in its rather substantial history of coups. This coup attempt was more similar to the May 27, 1960 coup when compared to September 12, 1980, as the latter was realized within the chain of command. The July 15 coup attempt was perpetrated by a seemingly religious group, a criminal cult with civilian affiliates that had infiltrated not only the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) but all state institutions makes it unique. During that night, unarmed public and the Parliament were attacked for the first time in Turkish history of coups. This coup, however, was thwarted with the courage of the Turkish people and the determination of the political will. Nevertheless, a challenging process of cleansing state institutions from FETO members and mending the wounds left by the coup attempt had followed.

Re-establishing the public order and incapacitating the putschists were prioritized; without delay, the government began to remove FETO members from state institutions. Following the TAF’s cleansing, FETO-affiliated civil servants in all institutions, especially in the judiciary and the security forces, were removed according to the law, and administrative and legal processes were initiated. However, this was only the beginning. To be able to eliminate this threat efficiently, the Council of Ministers gathered under President Erdogan’s lead announced a three-month state of emergency in all cities of Turkey on July 20.

The state of emergency’s proclamation was preferred because of the extent of the threat and the counter-measures needed to be implemented against it. This coup attempt wasn’t realized only by a limited military junta organized under the TAF – it was perpetrated by a secretive and insidious organization that infiltrated public institutions. Infiltrating the TAF over numerous decades and operating in a clandestine way, the extent and capability of this organization was unclear. Investigations on and operations against this organization show that FETO is yet to be deciphered completely.

During the coup attempt, along with previous events, we have seen the existence of judges, prosecutors, security force members and high-ranking state officials, which unquestioningly obey every whim of FETO leader, Fetullah Gulen. Captured at the “command center” of the coup attempt and later identified as FETO’s TAF imam, Adil Oksuz, was released by judges despite the legal consequences. Similarly, two military prosecutors went to the Akinci Airbase on the day after the coup, destroyed the evidence there and escaped from Turkey.

Along with these, a police officer assassinating Russia’s Ambassador to Turkey, Karlov, indicated the threat FETO posed. It was clear that this organization, which could hurt Turkey’s security and peace with sabotages, assassinations or suicide bombings should be eliminated with a long-term plan. Moreover, the PKK and Daesh were increasing their pressure on the region, terrorist threats were emerging from Syria and Iraq and cross-border operations were taking place during this period. All of these made the state of emergency a necessity.

Turkey’s state of emergency and terror groups

The state of emergency is a mechanism employed when a state faces an adversary or a threat that cannot be eliminated through common and conventional legal measures. The main characteristic of this mechanism is that it increases state authority which, in turn, allows the state to eliminate the threat more easily. State of emergency is implemented and maintained by constitutional institutions in accordance with the respective laws in the constitution. Therefore, it doesn’t mean undemocratic, unlawful and arbitrary usage of power. Constitutional rights, the rule of law and legal supervision of all state institutions are maintained. In addition, state of emergency is a procedure that is included in the constitutions of all democratic states with the rule of law and no state hesitates to implement it when necessary.

According to the 1982 Constitution, Turkey had two emergency administrative procedures: state of emergency and martial law. Martial law was abolished with the constitutional amendment approved in the April 16 referendum. Therefore, the state of emergency is the only emergency administrative procedure. The constitution foresees that the Council of Ministers gathered under the lead of the president may proclaim a state of emergency with the condition of being limited to 6 months at a time. This decision is published in the official gazette and immediately submitted to the Parliament for ratification. The Parliament can alter the length of the state of emergency – upon request of the Council of Ministers, the Parliament could prolong the state of emergency up until four months at a time or could remove it. In this respect, the Parliament has the final say over the state of emergency. In fact, the Parliament prolonged the state of emergency by three months seven times upon requests of the Council of Ministers in the past two years.

Regarding matters of the state of emergency, the Council of Ministers under the leadership of the president may proclaim executive orders without requiring an empowering law ratified by Parliament. Even though it’s claimed that the executive orders proclaimed during the state of emergency bypass the Parliament, executive orders are submitted to the Parliament and it has the authority to alter, decline or approve them. Indeed, the Parliament has approved all state of emergency executive orders after discussions, rendering them eligible for the supervision of the Constitutional Court. Therefore, both the legislative and the judiciary is able to audit these executive orders. Meanwhile, there are three or four decades old executive orders, which are yet to be audited by the Parliament.

The state of emergency targeting  state or society?

It has been expressed that the most prominent characteristic of the state of emergency is the increasing authority on the part of the state. The extent of this authority and how it should be exercised is regulated by the State of Emergency Law No.2935. Despite the authority endowed to the state by the law, it was exercised in a way to not interfere with the everyday life of the people and to facilitate the fight against FETO. After the events during which police officers and the military clashed, the necessary and efficient precautions to have healthy investigations on thousands of suspected military and police officers, civil servants and civilians, to reestablish public order and to reinvigorate the economic life were implemented with the state of emergency.

It should be underscored that the exercise of authority during the state of emergency is supervised by the judiciary. Only the state of emergency executive orders were exempted from legal supervision of the Constitutional Court. However, as this caused apparent issues, the State of Emergency Commission was established and this commission paved the way for legal supervision.

In a region that is mired with civil wars and various terrorist threats, Turkey faced a military coup attempt and thwarted the short-term threat with sacrifices made by the state and its people. However, the past two years have shown that this is actually a long-term threat that needs to be fought with determination. Despite being occasionally criticized, the state of emergency was received rather well by the public. Nevertheless, prior to the June 24 elections, President Erdogan expressed that they would discuss the annulment of the state of emergency after the elections. Following the elections, former Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdag stated that there was a will to remove the state of emergency and that its schedule would be discussed. If the state of emergency which is to end on July 18 isn’t extended again or the Parliament votes against its extension, it will be annulled. Thus, the state of emergency will be possibly annulled on July 18, if there isn’t any drastic change. It could be expressed that the state will continue to fight against terrorism with determination regardless of the statement of emergency.

“Once innocence is lost, it’s not possible to find it again,” says Bauman. When people start to taint their God-given nature with or without intent, being aware of it or not, nothing will be like it used to before. In this respect, infer the following inspired by the verses “Are those who know equal to those who do not know?” (Az-Zumar 9) and “The darkness and the light are not equal” (Fatir 20): Are those who protect their candor, innocence and humanity equal to those who do not? Holy texts are full of examples who betray themselves, their society, nature and ultimately God himself by failing to protect their innocence. I believe it’s enough to remind Lucifer’s disobedience and Cain’s murder of his brother Able.

To comprehend the loss of innocence is the issue. Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) defines feeling guilty as “remorse” (Ibn Majah, Zuhd, 30). To feel remorse, one should be aware of its crime; moreover, one should reprimand himself/herself. We see that Prophet Jonah submits to the God Almighty by saying “Indeed, I have been of the wrongdoers” (Al-Anbya 87) despite being a prophet himself, while Lucifer constantly avoids facing his crime and loss of innocence through arrogance (Al-Baqarah 34) and trying to justify itself (Al-A’raf 12). This is where the soul and mind become devilish.

FETO’s dogmatism

2 years has passed since the heinous July 15 coup attempt perpetrated by FETO. Turkey was in intensive care for a year, trying to come back to life. Our state, its government (Justice and Development Party, or AK Party for short) and those who backed them both (Nationalist Movement Party, or MHP for short) have implemented meticulous policies throughout this process. We have experienced the individual and societal trauma caused by the attempted attack on the state organization and democratic system. It’s without doubt that some were victimized by false accusations and denouncements motivated by the purple brain or personal ambitions. We see that these wrongs are being corrected incrementally.

The discrepancy between FETO’s apparent facet and hidden agenda, thus it’s extreme form of dissimulation (taqiyya), have inflicted wounds to the minds of all Muslims, especially Islamists, the pious and nationalist-conservatives. Firstly, the treatment of this wound isn’t as easy as it seems. An indomitable will by a resolute political administration is required.

Let’s go back to where it all started. FETO, which was deemed innocent by the public prior to 2012, lost its innocence through the December 17-25 events and the July 15 coup attempt. We are facing a structure characterized by Hoffer’s “true believers” and Rokeach’s “closed [dogmatic] mind.” A mental and emotional rigidity with the potential of fanaticism… Caused by unshakeable belief and utmost devotion, this condition was defined as “being a hashhashin,” referring to Hasan as-Sabbah’s original assassins.

Why? Because with the mind-numbing opium, people transform into mindless drones. It’s possible to talk about Marx’s remark that “religion is the opium of the people.” In FETO’s hand, religion turns into an opiate. For this reason, its members don’t feel remorse about attempting to suspend democracy and infringe the constitution along with killing hundreds of people. According to their belief, remorse is only possible if they disobey FETO leader Gulen, their acclaimed “messiah.”

Considering Fromm described such structures as “authoritarian,” it’s easy to understand how the leaders of fascist organizations are idolized. In this respect, loyalty and trust is only reserved for the leader in FETO. The belief that only the leader represents the truth has invaded every cell of their being. They evaluate every knowledge and information only according to their narrow ideology and purpose. If the provided knowledge and information is compatible with the organization’s teachings, it is accepted easily; otherwise, they will deny. “They have hearts with which they do not understand, they have eyes with which they do not see, and they have ears with which they do not hear” (Al-A’raf 179) describes the type of dogmatic and fanatical people in such authoritarian organizations perfectly.

Fanaticism takes only one step from dogmatism. Fanatics possess all the traits of dogmatic thought process and personality. However, they’re more prone to employing violence. Regardless of religious exploitation, rigid authoritarian structures all possess psychosocial issues like seeing the world in black and white, failing to see the grey zones, monopolizing the truth, perceiving the future with a pessimistic outlook, feeling insecure and accepting only other members as their brothers and sisters. All of these could be observed in FETO; yet, there is more: fanaticism. Individual or organizational, fanaticism is characterized by violence and aggression caused by contracting consciousness. In this regard, FETO isn’t only a dogmatic organization, but also a fanatical one.

The December 17-25 events and the heinous July 15 coup attempt has shown that Gulenism believes the ends justify the means and that it is a terrorist organization using violence unfetteredly. Similar to FETO, the PKK with its Marxist and leftist discourse is also a dogmatic and fanatical organization. So, it’s not hard to understand how these two terrorist organizations have found common ground in inflicting harm to the Turkish people and the state. We see that once innocence is lost everything is permitted.

In psychology, such personalities are deemed as morbose and it’s contagious. Brainwashing, inculcation and persuasion  strategies uniform the members, rendering them into one dimensional personalities. Members of FETO and similar organizations always have strong reaction mechanisms; what I mean by this mechanism is that there is a discrepancy between how they appear and what they actually are. Then, lets ask the question again: did the FETO leader and his followers lose their innocence after December 17-25 and July 15? It’s apparent that this organization that employs and encourages dissimulation has used a different language while they speak with pious people, Kemalists, and with a fellow member. This means innocence never existed.

The July 15 resistance is a milestone

There is another question to ask: why does Turkey suffer a coup or a coup attempt, which is backed by external powers, every 10-15 years? The answer should be sought in terms such as trauma, instability and discontinuity. The 1960 military coup traumatized our grandfathers, 1980 coup traumatized our fathers, February 28, 1997, coup traumatized ourselves and the July 15 coup attempt traumatized our children. Could these traumatized generations attempt to develop the country, build a civilization or challenge imperialism and capitalism? They can hardly do it anymore. Due to political instability, development is interrupted. In turn, his interruption creates transitional periods, wasting generations in a decade or so. What needs to be done is clear; we need to be politically stable and achieve continuity in development.

In his book “The Foundations of Civilization,” Will Durant insistently underscores the importance of a resolute state structure, political stability and economic order. Durant also expresses that religion and morality along with advanced scientific researches, literature and arts are indispensable elements of a civilization. It’s high time that we leave our traumas behind, achieve development and stability, and rebuild our civilization. The heinous July 15 coup attempt taught us that coups are history in this country. Nevertheless, the state should be equally distanced from either secular or religious organizations and should try to pull them towards legitimate grounds. Why? “Too much trust is too much indeed,” says Shakespeare.

When the Russian Ambassador to Turkey Andrey Karlov was assassinated during an exhibition he attended in Ankara, many groups particularly in the Western media likened the incident to the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, the potential heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, which triggered World War I. They certainly have a point in drawing such an analogy since many similar assassinations throughout history brought about wars. Also, many claimed that the assassination would cause a serious tension in the volatile and incipient Moscow-Ankara alliance, which did not come out right.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed that the assassination of Karlov was motivated to diminish Turkey-Russia relations. On the night of the incident, both presidents stated that the assassination was a provocation aiming to hamper the normalization process in bilateral relations, adding that they agreed to form a joint committee on the subject. Upon that, a delegation consisting of 18 Russian officials visited Turkey to join the committee that investigated the murder. Putin said that the assassination is surely a provocation and they want to identify who instigated it. Russia bestowed a Hero of Russia honor on Karlov, who was appointed to Ankara three years before his death and endeavored to restore ties between the two countries during his term in office.

The perpetrator, who was obviously aware that he could not stay alive after shooting the ambassador in the art gallery, screamed: “Don’t forget Aleppo, don’t forget Syria” just after shooting Karlov. Police later killed him. The perpetrator, Mert Altıntas, was a 22-year-old policeman who had served in Ankara’s riot police unit. Although his profile did not give any clue about his affiliation to a terror group like Al-Nusra or Daesh, his possible links to these terror groups were investigated. Eventually, the data collected on his background and networks indicated that the hitman was a member of the Gulenist Terror Group (FETO). Although it is not easy for a foreigner to understand, another hint was unraveled which made it clear for Turkish people that it was another typical act of FETO. An episode of a TV series titled Nizama Adanmis Ruhlar (The Souls Devoted to the Order), which was aired in December 2014, on FETO-owned and now defunct STV channel, showed that a Russian Ambassador was assassinated in an art gallery, which is curiously identical to Karlov’s murder.

There were more findings, but they remained insufficient for the prosecutor. The investigation continued. The perpetrator’s PC hard disc was examined but it turned out that all his files were deleted. As part of the investigation Turkey and Russia conducted jointly, Russia asked to examine his PC with a different method, and eventually the deleted data were found. Among the data, the Russian delegation found that two files with the words “Fetullah Gulen,” the leader of FETO, 690 files with the word “Hizmet,” a term that literally means “service” which FETO calls itself, four files with “FETO”, and one file with “Nur Community” were deleted from his computer.

The delegation also searched for the words “Al Qaeda,” “Al Nusra,” and “Daesh” among the deleted files but found no results. Following the meetings held between the Russian delegation and the Ankara Chief Prosecutor’s Office, Ankara Public Prosecutor Adem Akinci, who ran the Turkish leg of the investigation, started the works to identify the FETO unit Altintas was affiliated with. It was found that the person Altintas was answerable to is a teacher who is currently jailed pending trial in Ankara as part of another FETO case. The prosecutor’s office issued an arrest warrant for the person considering his possibility of acquittal.

In a statement released on the subject, the prosecutor’s office expounded that Altintas was a FETO operative and that according to the findings the assassination was organized by FETO. According to the prosecutor’s office, FETO members planned the assassination in a way to show the hitman as an Al Qaeda member for several months before the incident.

The case file has been completed. Upon the demand of the Ankara Public Chief Prosecutor’s Office that has run the investigation on the assassination of Karlov on December 19, 2016, Ankara 2^ndCriminal Court of Peace issued arrest warrants for Fetullah Gulen, Serif Ali Tekalan, Cemal Karata, Cengiz Ozkan, Emrullah Uslu, Hamza Sevinc, Murat Tokay and Temel Alsancak for “pre-meditated murder” and “attempt to overthrow the constitutional order.”

Thus, another file has been conveyed to the U.S. as regard to the extradition of Gulen, who currently resides in Pennsylvania, U.S. As the U.S. intelligence service has not collapsed, they must certainly know about this international terror group leader who has been living in the U.S. for 18 years. For Russia, on the other hand, FETO has been labelled as a group “made in the U.S.,”  even when FETO was perceived as a “legitimate” group in Turkey. We will see what happens next.

Following the failed coup attempt in Turkey last year, which left 250 people died, the Turkish government’s crackdown on members of the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) has continued.

While the domestic fight against this terrorist organization has included the closure of FETO schools and withdrawing affiliated members from state institutions, the fight against FETO’s international branch has faced barriers from the US, which is home to the leader of the organization.

Speaking to Anadolu Agency, Turkish Justice Minister Abdulhamit Gül stated that the U.S. is obliged to extradite Fetullah Gülen to Turkey in line with a 1979 agreement between Washington and Ankara.

Gül mentioned that the treaty made a “probable cause” a sufficient reason to extradite a suspect.

While the U.S. has so far declined to hand over Gülen on the basis that Turkey has not provided sufficient evidence, Minister Gül said that there have been “five separate requisitions from the court and we have sent almost 100 folders of evidence, testimonies and confessions to the U.S.”

The extradition treaty between Turkey and the US, which was signed in 1978 and came into force two years later, covers offenses in both countries that are punishable by more than a year in prison. This includes “any offense committed or attempted against a head of state or head of a government.”

The treaty also adds that the countries “undertake to surrender to each other… all persons who are found within the territory or the requested party and who are being prosecuted for or have been charged with an offense.”

FETO in Africa

In addition to activities in Turkey, the terrorist organization is also well-known to be active in Africa.

During the Turkey-Africa Education Ministries Conference, held at Istanbul’s Ciragan Palace, Ismet Yilmaz called for the closure of FETO schools in Africa.

While highlighting the deep roots between Turkey and the African continent, Minister Yilmaz said: “We expect our brother African countries to cooperate more with Turkey to wage a better fight” against FETO schools.

These schools he continued, “are schools linked to this terrorist organization [FETO] in Africa. These schools are providing financial support to the organization.”

In contribution to its fight against the international wing of FETO, the Turkish administration established the Maarif Foundation, which was designed in order to take over the administration of overseas schools linked to FETO.

Nineteen African countries have already handed over FETO schools to Maarif or have closed them at Ankara’s request.

More, during a joint press conference with visiting Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari, at the presidential complex in Ankara, President Erdogan stated: “I would like to express that there is no difference between FETO, Daesh and Boko Haram. No matter what they serve or claim or their name – all of them are gangs of murderers who feed on the blood of innocents.”

Commenting on the terror faced in Nigeria by Boko Haram, the President emphasized that “We stand by our Nigerian friends on their fight against terrorism.”

Erdogan also urged Nigeria to take steps on shutting FETO-run schools in the country and to coordinate with Turkey to combat the terrorist group.

On July 15, 2016 FETO criminal cult leader Fetullah Gulen, who is currently based in the U.S., orchestrated a military coup which martyred 250 people and left 2,200 injured.

While the coup failed, it is known that the terrorist organization has infiltrated Turkish state institutions, including the military, ministries, schools and universities.

Since July 15 many operations have been conducted across Turkey with the desire to free the country from the members of this criminal cult that have hidden themselves under a civil organization blanket.

Within latest efforts, an operation was launched on Thursday across 11 provinces including capital Ankara in order to arrest over 130 officials suspected of being linked to FETO.

The suspects include 101 personnel from the Finance Ministry and 32 from the Labor and Social Security Ministry.

Among the suspects, 129 had already been dismissed from duty for suspected links to the group.

In addition to the operations, on Thursday the Council of Judges and Prosecutors dismissed 39 judges and prosecutors after they were accused of being linked to FETO.

According to a source of the council, the decision was taken after a probe into digital material, including records of encrypted programs that FETO members use and information gleaned from statements and confessions of judges and prosecutors.

The encrypted program used by FETO members, ByLock, is a smartphone app which is believed to have been cracked by Turkish security agencies, allowing them to identify tens of thousands of suspected FETO supporters.

http://thenewturkey.org/feto-and-its-role-in-stoking-the-kurdish-issue/

No obstacle left for Gulen’s extradition

While domestic developments in Turkey have been focused on capturing terrorists that remain in state institutions and domestic domains, has also confirmed that there is ‘no obstacle left’ in extraditing FETO leader from the U.S.

Speaking to reporters in south-eastern Gaziantep province, on Friday Abdulhamit Gul stated: “Recently all commitments have been fulfilled according to the agreements. That is to say there is no obstacle left formally for his (Gulen’s) extradition.”

Gul confirmed that all evidence against Gulen had been sent to the U.S. authorities and that now a state under the rule of law should do what is necessary.

The minister added: “We want the U.S. to extradite the leader of the terrorist organization which has killed 250 people in Turkey, of which there is evidence and has been documented in court decisions.”

Source: AA and other agencies

On 15^th of July 2016, a coup attempt was foiled in Turkey that was allegedly carried out by the Fetullah Gülen Terrror Group (FETO), led by Fetullah Gülen, the cult leader living in the US. Indeed, the group’s bad record on democracy is not new. Previously Gülen had openly supported the September 12, 1980 military coup with his article “Son Karakol” (“The Last Outpost”) published in the Sızıntı Magazine on October 1, 1980 – the first FETO publication that began in 1979. During the post-modern military coup of February 28, 1997, which targeted Necmettin Erbakan, the Prime Minister of Turkey and the leader of the Welfare Party, Gülen presented the pro-military Hürriyet daily with the headline: “You botched, just submit”. However, this attitude was interpreted by many as an effort by the group to establish a good relationship with the “real” authority in the country, rather than interpreting it as a sign of the group’s tendency to overtake the whole military institution to rule over the country. The group was going to try a military coup nearly two decades after, but this time by themselves.

During the coup attempt, FETO employed its civil administrators, called imams, who functioned under a strict organizational hierarchy that enabled them to exercise effective control over its affiliated state personnel. These imams were appointed as supervisors to various judges, prosecutors, military and police officers, who submitted to their commands. Hierarchical statuses of imams over these personnel were determined according to their closeness to Fetullah Gülen, to whom supernatural powers were attributed.

The Role of Civil Administrators in the Planning of the Coup

The most extensive indictment on the July 15 coup attempt, the Akıncı Indictment classifies the civilians at the Akıncı Airbase, the headquarters of the coup attempt, into two categories: “Civilian Suspects” and “Civilian Administrator Suspects”. Fetullah Gülen, Adil Öksüz, Kemal Batmaz, Hakan Çiçek, Nurettin Oruç and Harun Biniş are named as civil administrator suspects. Civil administrator suspects were caught together with the military personnel at the Akıncı Airbase on the morning of July 16, 2016.

These figures were caught on security footage and there are testimonies about their presence at the airbase. They are purported to have dictated who was going where, which actions were to be taken and which targets were to be attacked with helicopters and warplanes carrying high-ranking officers at the mess of the 143^rd Fleet at Akıncı Airbase. Hakan Çiçek, a suspect, has accepted that he was present at Akıncı Airbase, claiming that he was invited there for a social event by Commander Ahmet Özçetin, who is another suspect of this case. According to the indictment, they were actively involved in the preparation of the coup.

Testimonies recorded in the indictments state that the coup was planned at secret meetings led by Adil Öksüz, who was to inform Gülen about these meetings. Öksüz is claimed to have organized meetings abroad as well. Along with confessions and testimonies, the embankment analysis and flight records of Öksüz support these claims. Adil Öksüz is among the most prominent names in FETO and among the closest persons to Gülen. Demonstrating their relationship, investigations have revealed that there is footage in which Öksüz was sitting in Gülen’s chair, with a group of children as an audience.

http://thenewturkey.org/evidences-in-feto-indictments/

Deeming the November 1 election results as a threat to their existence, FETO rented a three-story villa in Konutkent, Ankara through the Empati Consultancy Company on November 9, 2015. According to witness statements in the indictments, coup preparation meetings were held at this house with the participation of FETO-affiliated Turkish Armed Forces officers on the following dates: December 27, 2015; January 9, 2016; January 16, 2016; January 30, 2016; February 20, 2016; February 29, 2016; March 14, 2016; March 30, 2016; May 5, 2016; May 27, 2016; June 4, 2016; June 15, 2016.

Attending the last meeting on July 9, 2016, Lieutenant Colonel Turgay Sökmen asserted that “a coup preparation with the participation of all forces was underway, that he would continue his work where he was going and that there weren’t any issues”. Öksüz led the prayer before the meeting and spoke on religious subjects. In one of his speeches, he said that “one of the first things to do on July 15 was to free [FETO] members out of the prisons they are incarcerated with the forces that was tasked with this duty”. In another speech, he said “my friends, I have just spoken with our elder [Fetullah Gülen], he sends his regards to all of you. I will be leaving for Istanbul on Saturday or Sunday and then will go abroad. If everything is fine, I will be seeing our elder on Tuesday and will return here on Wednesday or Thursday”.

Rear Admiral Halil İbrahim Yıldız, talking about the same meetings, said that there were some preparation meetings in Ankara and that Northern Sea Area Commander Read Admiral Ömer Faruk Harmancık told him that there was an almost-finished coup plan. Moreover, Harmancık told Yıldız that the plan was to be carried out on either July 15 or 22. According to Yıldız’s statements, during the meeting that Öksüz was present, it was asserted that the coup would take place after 03:00 o’clock. After this, Harmancık told Öksüz that everything was ready and Öksüz suggested he go to the US in order to show the coup plan to Fetullah Gülen in person. There are many testimonies and statements from both suspects and witnesses validating the roles of FETO member civil administrators during the coup preparation process.

Three Important Trips Abroad

There are three important trips abroad by civilian suspects at the same date during the process of preparation for the coup. Suspect Harun Biniş was unable to make these trips as he was being tried at the Ankara 2^nd Heavy Penal Court under the charge of illegal wiretapping for FETO/Paralel Devlet Yapılanması (PDY).

The first trip was undertaken when Öksüz, after the first coup preparation meeting on December 27, 2015, travelled to the United Kingdom on December 31. It seems that Batmaz was also in the UK, meanwhile, Hakan Çiçek and Nurettin Oruç were in Germany at that time. It is possible to surmise that they were feeling the pulse of FETO members in other countries right after the coup preparation meeting.

Secondly, after the meeting on March 14, 2016, there was a trip abroad between March 17-21, 2016. Besides FETO administrators Öksüz, Oruç, Çiçek and Batmaz, the highest-ranking suspect General Akın Öztürk’s son-in-law Lieutenant Colonel Hakan Karakuş also joined this travel. Following this travel to the US, it was observed that on the very same day, March 21, 2016, Gülen wore a khaki robe reminiscent of military uniforms and relayed the information on the coup with a secret message embedded in his statement published on the website www.herkul.org

http://thenewturkey.org/the-gulen-cult-between-modernism-and-narcissism/

Lastly, two days before the coup attempt, between July 11 and 13, Batmaz and Öksüz travelled to the US on the same plane. This travel is confirmed by entrance-exit analysis and flight records, and it was right before the coup took place. Witness statements assert that the date and hour of the coup approved by Gülen was at 03:00 on July 16. Plane tickets and the security footage also confirm this.

Beside these three important trips, Batmaz has 9 trips coinciding with other coup suspects and 7 of them with Adil Öksüz. Moreover, all civil administrator suspects, including Batmaz, claim that they do not know each other and that this is nothing but a coincidence. This is believed to have been a common tactic utilized by the accused suspects to hide their links to the organization.

Indeed, the footage of Batmaz and Öksüz at the airport two days before the coup shows the following: Batmaz leaving the plane and waiting for Öksüz to leave the plane, then both come together and Batmaz coming towards Öksüz while Öksüz is checking his baggage, talking with each other while walking, Batmaz looking at his back (probably to check whether they are being followed), exiting the airport and walking across the road together. Yet, even though Batmaz accepts that it is him on the footage, he claims he does not know Öksüz; moreover, he states that he does not remember some 925 phone calls he had with Adil Öksüz.

The trips, relationships, meetings and other evidence are strong enough to prove FETO members’ finger in the coup attempt, whereas the false denials of this evidence just functions as another form of evidence, which shows how the group members still continue to utilize a common tactic to escape punishment.

FETO, a religious criminal cult and led by the US based cleric Fetullah Gülen, is a bizarre political phenomenon. It is ostensibly a religious community located in civil society, yet in reality it is a shady and aggressive organization whose activities and political ambitions can easily be branded as terroristic. It has a definitely Janus-faced structure, which can only be grasped by understanding the context of secular authoritarianism in Turkey. Indeed, FETO has found fertile ground to blossom within a social order where democratic politics had been precluded.

The collapse of an ancient Ottoman regime and traditional socio-political structures in the 1920s precipitated a feeling of identity loss in Turkish society. This trauma was exacerbated with the establishment of an oppressive secular authoritarian regime in the following decades. More specifically, the erection of republican regime in 1923 was to bring a radical change in the symbolic order of the society. The break with the old order created a political situation within which both a democratic and an authoritarian order could take hold.

A democratic regime refers to a political order within which the place of power is kept indefinite and open, which means that power is open to all political actors and none of them can occupy it forever. An authoritarian regime, on the other hand, comprises the closure of the place of power to societal opposition and identifying it with a quasi-transcendental ideological content. This cancels out the contingent nature of power, thus renders democracy obsolete.

The young Turkish Republic took the latter path. The secular bureaucratic elite monopolized power in their hands by pushing aside the political opposition and identify the place of power with secular-nationalist ideology. This authoritarian political order formed around single-party rule with no popular elections. Besides, the bureaucratic elite by deploying the state’s enormous power embarked on a systematic policy of “purifying” the society in line with its secular-nationalist ideology.

The Democratic and Authoritarian Options

In the face of this authoritarian turn, society has reacted in two alternative yet competing forms of political struggle. One of these has taken the path of forcing the authoritarian regime to democratize by dislocating the bureaucratic elite from the state apparatus. This has served to empty the place of power by consolidating and enlarging the sphere of democratic politics, where agonistic political actors can compete freely, vis-à-vis the bureaucracy.

The Democratic Party in the 1950s, the Motherland Party in the 1980s, the Welfare Party in the 1990s and lastly the AK Party in the 2000s have walked thorough this path and struggled to restore the democratic republican ideals of 1923. This democratic option has evolved in three steps. First of all, it has sought to establish and sustain a multi-party political system with free elections. This was achieved in 1950 and despite intermittent suspensions it has been maintained since. Secondly, it has strived to roll back the civil and military bureaucracy’s influence in the political system through democratic reforms. This took place in the 2000s. Lastly, it has struggled to institutionalize a governmental system that assured to materialize the democratic republican ideals. This was carried out in April 2017.

The other strand of political struggle has parted significantly from the democratic option in terms of its ways and political objectives. It has mainly sought to conquer the state from within by infiltrating it thorough various channels. Its course of action has followed the objective of controlling critical state institutions, expanding aggressively in the sphere of civil society and infiltrating into political parties by using whatever means necessary. Thus, its main objective is to replace the secular authoritarianism with a seemingly more society-friendly and conservative one. Instead of keeping the place of power empty, this obscurantist form of politics tends to fill it with other content and block the opposition.

FETO represents this authoritarian option. It has taken advantage of alienation and the widening gap between a relatively conservative society and the oppressive secular regime. It has considerably succeeded in channeling society’s energy and frustration against the authoritarian state. Moreover, society’s resentment has escalated after each incident of military and civil bureaucratic intervention in democratic politics in the second half of the twentieth century. These interventions have weakened some segments of society’s backing for the democratic option in its struggle to bring the oppressive regime down and geared them to shift their loyalty to FETO’s authoritarian option.

Exploiting the Democratization Process

The 2000s witnessed an extensive democratization process. It extended political and cultural rights and freedoms to the ostracized sections of society. It achieved democratization in civil-military relations. It enhanced economic and cultural equality to a degree and thereby boosted the standards of political participation. All these boiled down to the dislocation of secular bureaucratic actors and secular-nationalist ideology from the state.

This was a critical development for Turkish democracy. At last, the essential criterion of a democratic regime was in place: the place of power has grown empty. Yet the occurring vacuum in this transition posed a great danger for it would be abused by political forces that had no respect for democracy. This was what happened in Turkey in the 2000s. FETO took advantage of the displacement of secular-nationalist actors from the state apparatus. Thus, the 2000s testified to two synchronized and opposing developments. The AK Party-led democratic bloc struggled to democratize the political system in the face of the secular-nationalist status quo whereas FETO accelerated its policy of infiltration and invasion of the state institutions and capturing control of civil society.

http://thenewturkey.org/why-should-not-the-west-love-the-gulenists/

Since the struggle between the democratic bloc and the secularist status quo lay at the center of political struggle and FETO’s capability of manipulation through its vast sources of media outlets and control of the intelligence, FETO’s invasion of the state went unnoticed by both the AK Party and the larger public, or not taken seriously enough till the threat it posed to Turkish democracy reached a critical stage. Indeed, FETO, a religious criminal cult, cloaked its real intention and activities behind a discourse of democracy, peace and dialogue and skillfully presented itself as a benevolent force.

FETO’s Path to the Coup

2010 marked a turning point in Turkish politics. From the 1950s onwards Turkish politics had been determined by a polarization between the secular bureaucratic elite and the conservative and liberal social forces. The secularist elite had struggled to sustain the control of the state whereas the conservative social forces had strived to democratize the political system. Nevertheless, after 2010, the conflict between two conservative social forces, the AK Party and FETO, became the defining feature of Turkish politics.

FETO, which had struggled for almost four decades to get hold of the state, now found itself in a situation where the AK Party blocked its long-term political objectives. Controlling the majority of the state apparatus, FETO has endeavored to push the AK Party aside by deploying various discourses and strategies in the period of 2010-2016.

One method was that FETO was at pains to show Turkey has become an authoritarian or “one-man rule” country under the AK Party rule. For example, the discourse of polarization and authoritarianism peaked during the Gezi protests in June 2013. FETO motivated and manipulated this incident to de-legitimize and marginalize the AK Party in both the society’s and the international community’s eyes.

FETO also sought to portray that the AK Party had been involved in terroristic activities by especially alleging that it harbored and supported terrorist groups such as DAESH. It attempted to create an image that Turkey had become a rogue state under AK Party rule. This was meant to bring then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan before the International Criminal Court. For this aim, FETO-affiliated officers stopped a truck which was owned by the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) in Adana in January 2014. FETO’s media outlets leaked news that it was loaded with weapons that were sent to so-called terrorist groups in Syria.

Moreover, FETO tried to portray the AK Party as a deficient power that failed to rule the country. In order to fuel a psychology of insecurity in society and to alienate the electors from the AK Party before the upcoming local elections in March 2014, FETO-affiliated prosecutors filed lawsuits against the AK Party, accusing some high-ranking party members of organized corruption, in December 2013.

Failing in all these attempts, FETO resorted to military intervention. FETO-affiliated officers attempted to take hold of the government, attacked key security buildings and the Turkish Parliament, and killed 250 people during the attempted coup on July 15, 2016. Yet the coup attempt was foiled by a heroic civilian resistance.

Quo Vadis?

On 20 June 2016, Parliament declared a state of emergency, which has started an extensive purge of FETO members from the state apparatus. It has also dealt a deadly blow to its financial and human resources base. Many FETO members have been jailed or fled the country. This crackdown on FETO has devastated its organizational structure and its morale.

This figures as much a crucial development as the discard of the bureaucratic elite from the place of power for Turkish democracy. The disqualification of two authoritarian options consecutively in the last two decades has prepared a suitable ground for the country’s flourishing democratic regime. Today Turkey opens up a new page in its political history. It needs to restructure the state apparatus and bring its political system in line with democratic norms. The main challenge in front of the AK Party is to lead and complete this historic process.

Being a dervish is a crown of dignity, a mark of untarnished morality. Sufism offers nothing but modesty. Modesty is centered around the humbleness of astaghfirullah (may the Almighty forgive me). Despite Yunus Emre’s saying, whilst having so many possessions troubles of the heart won’t go away, the former congregation and the current Gülenists (FETO members) buried its secretive facet into the cold waters of politics, while shedding its mystical facet by becoming a social phenomenon.

They overlook the fact that everyone has the ability to think, but only a fraction has the ability to reason. Those who have a mind that learns the moral of the story will have a falling out with the people. They don’t feel the need to ask where the vessel they’re on is bound to; they don’t pay any attention to the fact that those who’ve asked never boarded the vessel. They don’t care about whom the true reigns belong to. They never think that some stations don’t and won’t accept dominance. The Gülenists aspire to everything, yet they never take responsibility for what they aspire to.

They make a mountain out of a molehill and an ocean out of a drop. They act in accordance with the expression keep your friends close and your enemies closer. They seek for a road in a road-forsaken land. They laugh at the renowned couplet Our own water and bread crumb is better than worldly possession / Our own corner in a ruin is better than a stranger’s mansion. They turn a deaf ear to the saying to know another, one should know oneself.

Being others, they never find a chance to be themselves. They submit their yokes to another’s hand. When malevolence becomes concentrated, it leaves no room for benevolence. Consequently, Gülenists turn into storeowners that drop the price towards the sunset. Whichever order addresses your malice, that is your order; whichever disposition humors you, that is your disposition is the expression they embody. Order is replaced by disposition. They never put their cards on the table. They wear a different face while talking to each individual or to each group. They try to manage all facets simultaneously. Hypocrisy is their keyword.

They are the incarnation of Voltaire’s saying “duplicity is the virtue of the cowardly”. While building the metaphysics of imposture, they establish friendly relations on toxication and intoxication. Their revenues never meet their expenditure. They sow wheat, but reap the straw. They transform everything to anything. As they don’t abstain from acting both like believers and deniers, what they spell out is neither a word, nor carries any meaning. They don’t believe that lifestyle determines the thought and that the thought determines the lifestyle. They trade the truth for a figment and the figment for the truth. They ravage the virtue of wisdom. They fulfill the saying nothing makes a fish bigger than almost being caught.

Thoughts and actions don’t guide their words. Gülenists know politics by heart. They use Islam for negotiation. Moreover, they sow the seeds of infidelity in the soil of Islam. They spread a word and then try to gather them from others. They never think that all they hold dear will crumble when they distribute the concept of justice to their own members. They embrace the saying may eyes that cry for others be blinded. They turn a blind eye to the fact that there is no greater recommendation than merit. They never want to remember that the world turns because of justice and that those who don’t comply with justice will pay the price when the righteous wrath of the Almighty is incurred.

They don’t want to be reminded that the unjust will be brought to justice by being given a punishment on par with the injustice they have caused, thus everyone will get their just dues. Gülenists act in a way that enables the downfall of the state just to depose those who they perceive as opposition. While they should be the last in a line of succession, they try to be the first. They create such an image of the country that allows foreign inspection and supervision. They render the sphere of congregations and religious orders unreliable and incredible. It is the story of a crumbling ideal. Words and promises lose their value. Every confession becomes a deceit. The sayings of Walter Benjamin and Dostoyevsky, “there is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism” and “have you noticed that it is the most civilized gentlemen who have been the subtlest slaughterers” respectively, are once again confirmed.

Even though the tail always wants to wag the dog in every era, the fire of sedition will have to be extinguished with the water that has tempered the sword of politics. The state demonstrates that its power is something to be reckoned with; “a ferocious murderer could be sentenced by a cowardly judge and hanged by a Romani.” Hence, it’s revealed that what is assumed as a power is the very weakness itself; once again, it is once again realized that those who overreach their position will be doomed to annihilation. It is reiterated that the traditions of an adolescent congregation can never destroy the millennia-old tradition of the state and the ties to the state can never be encompassed by ties to a faction.

It will be seen that the state isn’t a sword that could be wielded by any singular faction. It will be inscribed into history that the future of those movements which don’t use Turkey as a yardstick is non-existent. It will be reminded to all around which center the system revolves. It will be once again demonstrated that peace will be maintained by preparing for war and distinguishing those who are wolves in sheep’s clothing. Let’s end it all with a couplet by Müstakimzâde: “A stranger wouldn’t know the savor of a conversation with the beloved/Would one converse with another if their beloved was truly loved”.

Even if Fetullah Gülen did not examine and take after Hassan-i Sabbah and his Hashashin – which is very possible – it’s definite that he uses the same strategy and methods in his campaign for power veiled by religion. Some may argue that they don’t share any similarities as Sabbah and the Hashashin are known for their zealotry and for coining the term “assassin” for the Western civilization; however, the Hashashin weren’t only an association for assassins that killed just for profit. Indeed, as it has been underscored by many articles written on Gülen’s organization, the Hashashin were attributed with many terms such as state, cult, faction, sect, order, organization, movement or a school in the historical literature. As multifaceted organizations, they are inevitably seen in different – contradictory, even – lights.

While Sabbah vied for power with its da’is (who invites people to a cause) who appeared like dervishes that were sent from Alamut Castle to the Seljuk Empire, Gülen sought to possess power through his “Hizmet volunteers” that first originated from Erzurum and then from Pennsylvania. Gülen is more successful than Sabbah in terms of conveying synchronized messages to his followers and using various overt and covert systems simultaneously. On one hand, he tries to overthrow the state by establishing another state within it, on the other hand, his organization appears like a civil society movement that peacefully spreads their belief. They seem the same!

Hassan Sabbah’s base of operations, Alamut Castle, which was used against the Seljuk Empire, was built at a fortified location, on a mountain with an altitude over 2,000 meters. According to some reports, Sabbah didn’t leave his room much, let alone the castle, until his death in 1124. Historians extract that Sabbah would devote much of his time to reading and writing and that he maintained his appearance as an ascetic throughout his life. Even now, when you google Fetullah Gülen’s name, you may find hundreds of articles in numerous languages about his tolerance, intellectual capacity and piety.

While the Hashashin captured the Alamut Castle and its surroundings through various trickeries, Gülen and his so-called Hizmet Movement captured the metaphorical castles in Turkey (and also many other countries) following the same methods with success. The Hashashin benefited from the lack of an intelligence organization in the Seljuk Empire; Gülenists, on the other hand, infiltrated the most confidential state institutions of Turkey, especially the Turkish army, and festered over the years.

The Hashashin were divided into five segments; similarly, Gülen’s organization also has a strict hierarchy. As it was the case with the Hashashin, Gülenists conducted their operations through an organization based on “imams”; there were imams for each city, district, neighborhood and even occupation. While the Hashashin served at houses to propagate their belief and recruit new members, Gülenists served at the so-called “light/radiant houses” for 40 years. “Hizmet volunteers”, just like da’is, befriended young people, engaged with them at evening talks and lastly invited them to the cause. Analogous to the Hashashin, the Gülenists also forced the member who vowed secrecy to pay a regular fee correlated with their income. Unlike the case of the Hashashin, becoming a member of an organization in Turkey was a great advantage. Gülenists were unrestricted and unbound, so to speak; regardless of occupation, it meant you had a free pass.

Even though Gülenists were affiliated with certain assassinations in Turkey, the most important being the assassination of journalist Hrant Dink who was of Armenian descent, many weren’t convinced. Yet, as Turkey experienced on the night of July 15, the Gülenists’ target was President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, similar to the Hashashin’s assassination of their greatest enemy, Seljuk Vizier Nizam al-Mulk. Just like the zealots of Sabbah, Gülenists lived an inconspicuous life and waited for decades to receive an order.

The Hashashin were known for their ability to blend in and do whatever the situation necessitates. According to the occasion, they dressed like sufis, beggars, the rich or scholars. Indeed, Nizam al-Mulk was killed by an assassin that dressed like a sufi. On the other hand, the Hashashin didn’t assassinate only prominent figures and state officials; they also killed anyone who were a perceived threat or opposed them. Unlike Sabbah and his zealots, Gülen and his followers also resorted to character assassination. They have carried out these character assassinations through various means: by employing their own media outlets to commit slander, by blackmailing, plotting against individuals or plainly threatening their targets.

Austrian orientalist Joseph von Hammer’s description of the Hashashin (1818) also accurately describes the contemporary Gülenist Terrorist Organization (FETÖ): “… that union of impostors and dupes which, under the mask of a more austere creed and severer morals, undermined all religion and morality; that order of murderers, beneath whose daggers the lords of nations fell; all powerful, because, for the space of three centuries, they were universally dreaded, until the den of ruffians fell with the caliphate, to whom, as the centre of spiritual and temporal power it had at the outset sworn destruction, and by whose ruins it was itself overwhelmed.”

As it can be traced from Gülen’s books and his followers’ discourses, they were defending a conservative, orthodox Islam and were nationalist to the degree of being racist against Kurds during the first 20 years. Gülen, at the time, was a religious leader who criticized Turkey’s ultra-secular policies and had rigid rules about the interactions and relations between men and women. Moreover, he was abasing the West, defining it as the source of all evil and the devil himself.

Regarding this discourse, conservative circles believed Gülen headed a run-of-the-mill religious congregation in the Middle East. Gülenists’ practice of taqiyya (deception) – that they hid their beliefs and acted like Kemalists, leftists or Alevis – wasn’t unknown to conservative circles, if they didn’t hide it, it would be impossible for them to exist within the judiciary, police force and bureaucracy. They were living a double life perforce.

Their deception wasn’t a secret to Kemalists as well. The Kemalists’ approach was a bit different. They believed the Gülen Movement was a part of the US’ moderate Islam project; however, they thought that Gülenists were only acting like moderates. In reality, Kemalists thought, that they would one day execute a revolution like Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran and overthrow the regime in Turkey. Hence, after the investigation by the Chief Public Prosecutor of Ankara State Security Court in 1999, a trial against Gülen was commenced on August 22, 2000 with the charge of attempting to overthrow the secular regime and to instate theocracy. Yet, Gülen was long gone; he left for the US in March, 1999.

Gülen’s anti-Western discourse faded when he stepped foot in the US. The evil West turned into the holy West. He had to appeal to the Western public opinion; otherwise, financial resources and the schools he commanded to be opened in all around the world, including the US and Europe, would be at peril. For the West, this international organization was reminiscent of sects like Moon and Scientology; however, at the same time, it had an Islamic appearance. Especially after 9/11, it wasn’t easy to exist in the West. Gülen would adopt a new discourse after going to the US, insomuch as including the following section in his book titled “Fasıldan Fasıla 5 (Chapter by Chapter V)”:

If they told me at the gates of Heaven that the East and the West merged without losing their own particularities and are in complete harmony, I would consider it as one of the greatest tidings I was given in this life.

In another of his statements, he became more than a religious figure who thought about hell and heaven. Even though Gülen became a subject of investigations by security forces, prosecutors and secret services of the US and Germany, he was able to influence public opinion successfully.

With his positive discourse about the West and the permission for university students with headscarves to “remove their headscarves,” he also won the hearts of secular circles in Turkey. Those who were previously suspicious about Gülen started to follow the way of the former Prime Minister and the Democratic Left Party Chairman Bülent Ecevit (Gülen and Ecevit always held each other in high esteem) and trusted Gülen. After all, Gülen and his followers “weren’t threatening; moreover, they were acting in the interest of the nation and the state, as they were teaching children abroad the Turkish language in their schools.”

Even though it’s a bit late, today everybody is aware that Gülen is targeting Turkey, just like the Hashashin targeted the Seljuk Empire. Yet, could they have other aims? Prof. Dr. Hilmi Demir, who has been conducting research on Gülen for 20 years, has investigated Gülen’s statements in his books. What does the reincarnated Hassan-i Sabbah say? Those who are suspicious about it should read Gülen’s books, listen to his recordings and see what he says. For instance, in a book he says the following:

“Time is definitely ticking away in our interest. We may be lacking certain dimensions, aspects at the moment; however, one can predict how a fetus will grow in its mother’s womb. Our situation is similar to that. Labor is drawing near seemingly. Reconciliation of hearts is important in this matter. If not today, tomorrow a congregation has to seize the power of this world from those who are irresponsible.”*

“… one of the most important issues is to know the enemy very well. This is only possible through a functional intelligence organization. (…) While getting to know the enemy through a perfectly functional intelligence organization, we should not allow the enemy do the same to us!”*

“Then, those who embrace the future should become a footman for it, instead of waiting the time to come. So, when the future comes, it could take the lead of the army.”*

There’re many other instances of these kind of statements directly quoted from Gülen’s own book called Fasıldan Fasıla I (“Chapter by Chapter I” in English); so, you should read them and reach a conclusion. What affair does a religious congregation have with intelligence, who holds the power of this world and why would a congregation aim to possess this power? Maybe Turkey isn’t their only target!

* M. Fethullah Gülen, Fasıldan Fasıla 1 (İzmir: Nil Yayınları, 1996).

On July 15, 2016, Turkey foiled a military coup attempt orchestrated by the Fetullah Gülen Terror Group (FETO), which has infiltrated every sphere of public life in guise of a simple religious congregation for decades. Motivated to seize power in the country, this insurrection was organized by brainwashed FETO operatives who can use every means possible to reach their goals and have neither discernment nor respect for any values. The FETO cult has been revealed to have a peculiar organizational structure that is unprecedented over the course of the Republican period. On July 15, the Turkish nation was confronted with the most dangerous and shadowy criminal enterprise in its history. Abusing the legitimate means of the state in order to reach their illegal goals and ideals under the protection of global power groups, this cult now poses a threat not only to Turkey, but also to Islam and to the future of the Muslim world.

Along with infiltrating every sphere of life, FETO has also designed and controlled the country’s political life with numerous masterful perception operations that shaped opinions in public and private sector for years. The terror group seized power by manipulating the business world and using intelligence organizations, security-related institutions and the judiciary in line with their own goals and interests. But how could FETO obtain such widespread influence? What kind of tactics and methods did the terror group employ to grow to such an extent? To put it otherwise, how was the groundwork of this deception laid? And most importantly, how could the group’s infiltration activities and coup and chaos plans remain covered for years? How could it be unraveled that FETO is actually a criminal enterprise in guise of a religious congregation?

So far, much has been said with regard to the plotting and deceiving skills of FETO and its leader Fetullah Gülen. FETO’s former attempts to wreak havoc on Turkey include the Roboski sabotage in 2011, the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) operation in 2012, the Gezi Park incidents in 2013, the Dec. 17-25 judicial coup attempt case in 2013, the operations on MIT trucks in Hatay and Adana provinces on Jan. 1 and 19, 2014, and the Kobani uprising on Oct. 6-8, 2014.

The retrospective inquiries conducted in the archives of the judiciary and the security directorate and the confessions of several FETO members following the Dec. 17-25 judicial coup attempts revealed that FETO had developed a chain of ploys to stage a coup as of the year 2008. Having designed and controlled almost all the political movements in the country including the main opposition party, FETO was eventually confronted with the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has constituted the greatest impediment to the terror cult so far. When the chronology of the FETO’s operations and plots are examined in retrospect, this is the first aspect catching the eye in the picture. Also, in the chain of ploys unraveled in the Tawhid-Salaam Jerusalem file that was uncovered subsequently.

In 2009, FETO also influenced the opposition parties. The terror group heavily influenced the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) administration and then intervened in the inner affairs of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) to a serious extent. The MHP establishment could recover from FETO’s harm only after the July 15 attempted coup. Nevertheless, FETO could never achieve its goals regarding the AK Party administration. When the group failed to intervene in the AK Party, it planned to topple Erdoğan during his term as prime minister by sabotaging the government’s Syria policy through wiretapping Erdoğan’s meetings at his Dolmabahçe office with former Syrian National Coalition for Opposition and Revolutionary Forces (SNCORF) President Ahmad Moaz al-Khatib and Hakan Fidan, the chief of National Intelligence Service (MIT). All their ploys were interrelated and complementary to one another. The ploys eventually upset President Erdoğan but never managed to impact his power or determination. Understanding that they would not achieve their goals with their plots in guise of legal case files, the global deception group FETO executed its ultimate plan on July 15 but failed once again.

Intelligence Repository

The most important feature of FETO that turned the group into a global power is its ability to effectively use the intelligence it obtains in accordance with its own agenda. FETO particularly stands out with its high competence in intelligence and espionage activities. The group managed to organize and form networks at every spot promising power, strategic information or money. By organizing within the civil service, MIT, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and the General Directorate of Security, FETO founded a deep intelligence network in the realm of “security bureaucracy.” All the collected data were accumulated in a major intelligence repository. To achieve their goals, FETO used and manipulated the data and documents available in the repository against the persons or groups they wanted to eliminate.

Millions of Wiretapping Cases

FETO’s wiretapping activities across the country reached several million lines. Wiretapping international and national communication traffic of the state administration, the terror cult irrevocably destroyed the data stored in a total of 2,003 computers at police departments in December 2013 and January 2014. The data and servers at the Istanbul Security Directorate were deleted with no possibility of return. Still, some vital data was obtained with regard to the FETO-linked judges and prosecutors endeavoring to justify the illegal wiretappings of FETO, which was motivated by the goal of absolute power. The FETO-linked judges and prosecutors were the key operatives of the terror cult who abused legal means for the sake of the group’s interests.

In the inquiries which began prior to the July 15 and were completed in the aftermath of the coup attempt, it was found that the FETO-linked judges and prosecutors had direct or indirect contacts with other FETO operatives based in the U.S., Spain, Germany, Austria, British Indian Ocean Territory, Sudan and France. More interestingly, it was revealed that the FETO-linked judges and public prosecutors who worked at different units had conversations with the same international telephone numbers. It was also found that some relatives of these judges and prosecutors, who were in charge of Turkey’s most significant investigations over the past 15 years, had economic ties with the business circles now being investigated for financing FETO.

The terror group has a colossal archive which includes technical surveillance and wiretapping records acquired with advanced devices, illegal recordings of public personnel, and information on the students affiliated with the group, including their families. This archive partakes of the group’s memory, encompassing data on each spot inside and outside the country where the terror group has been active. The data recorded by every operative with regard to their own unit are much more profound and detailed than the data found in most intelligence agencies. The comprehensiveness of their archive stems from the fact that each FETÖ member has operated as an intelligence agent.

Liquidation and Occupation

FETO liquidated the targeted persons or groups through a three-phased strategy that has used the personal information available in the intelligence and archive records.

In the first phase, intelligence was collected about the person to be liquidated. The data regarding the targeted person or group was conveyed to the writers holding sway over public opinion and then announced to masses that was merely an allegation.

The second phase was employed after these allegations had a broad repercussion through the journalists affiliated with FETO in the mainstream media. The allegations became controversial topics across the country by means of the reports released by certain media outlets, such as the daily newspapers Taraf, Zaman, Bugün and the TV station Kanaltürk.

In the final phase, some operations to manipulate and shape opinions were made through social media and press organs with an aim to “spur anti-government sentiments,” “mobilize the masses” and “undermine state institutions and bureaucracy.” In the summons issued for intelligence chief Hakan Fidan on Feb. 7, 2012, and in the Dec. 17-25 process, professionally executed strategies were pursued to overthrow the government with these methods.

FETO has innumerable illegal methods to use against its targets, which vary according to the targeted person’s profession, family life, personal weaknesses or social status. The group tried to economically damage its self-employed targets in a way contradicting the free competition conditions in the market or had them audited on various pretexts by its members who had infiltrated the civil service. FETÖ exerted pressure on its targets mainly through its disciples in the civil service.

Some of their methods can be listed as follows:

1- Sending anonymous letters or e-mails regarding the personal or professional life of the targeted person which contain aspersions on the person to discredit them before the public or the institution they work for. Opening civil or penal lawsuits against the persons, imprisoning them based on the aspersions, defaming them in their personal, social or professional life, impeding their appointment or promotion, disrupting their family order, etc.

2- Asserting various claims against the targeted institution or its administrators and employees via internet by using various servers that hide the claimer’s identity. Releasing footage or tapes of the targeted persons which pry into their private life and cannot be verified. Announcing such leaks to the larger masses through their legal offshoots who give credit to the relevant website.

3- Announcing doctored digital data to public that is obtained with illegal methods through the medium of FETO offshoots in security units or strategic institutions.

4- The targeted person is forced either to pay large amounts of “himmet”, the word referring to donations to Gülen charities, or fulfill another demand compelled by FETÖ with threats and blackmail such as releasing digital data on their private life or ostracizing them from their professions by filing a penal or civil lawsuit against them.

All these practices demonstrate that FETO is a terror group which has become organized in civil society for years, infiltrated key state institutions by using different guises and has operated like an intelligence organization connected to international power groups. This is the structure of the terror cult Turkey has been fighting against.

Conducted by the Ankara 17th Heavy Penal Court and known to the public as “the July 15 coup attempt lawsuit” or “General Staff main lawsuit”, the first hearing of the case commenced on May 22. Defendants’ defenses are being heard in subsequent sessions. Similarly, “the main coup trials” were commenced in Istanbul on May 29. As the defense was covered by the media, Chief of Staff Hulusi Akar submitted a statement to the Parliament’s Coup Inquiry Commission, and the National Intelligence Organization’s (MİT) revealed the July 15 Coup Report to the public, making it the hottest topic of June.

Meanwhile, Parliament’s Coup Inquiry Commission also revealed its report and the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) prepared a 300 page long comment on the said report. While the CHP doesn’t clearly contest the idea that the coup was perpetrated by FETÖ, the main opposition party continued to allege that “the July 15 coup attempt was a foreseen, but an unavoidable coup that was controlled for an outcome.” Considering that the trials are at full throttle and the anniversary of the coup is drawing closer, it could easily be said that these discussions will become increasingly heated.

The Fight against FETÖ/PDY after July 15

Before talking about the course of cases and the prominent parts of indictments and defenses, it would be more beneficial to provide some information about the judiciary’s fight against FETÖ/PDY and the July 15 coup attempt. Firstly, it should be noted that the judicial process and trials against FETÖ/PDY had commenced prior to July 15. A day before the coup attempt, the joint indictment was completed and was accepted by the Ankara Heavy Penal Court. Moreover, new cases against FETÖ/PDY were opened in almost all cities and districts of Turkey.

Although the figures change by the day, according to the statement of Minister of Justice Bekir Bozdağ, today more than 160,000 people are part of these trials; 50,402 of them have been arrested, while 47,136 people were released under judicial control. 7,963 people were first detained and later were released. Civil servants like judges, prosecutors, military personnel and police officers constitute the majority of those who are arrested.

Besides these court cases against FETÖ, there are numerous cases and inquiries directly concerning the July 15 coup attempt. Among these cases, the most prominent one is the class action lawsuit against 221 suspects, including some members of the Peace at Home Council, on the events that took place at the General Staff Compound in Ankara. On the other hand, the case on the events which transpired at the Akıncı Airbase, the case on the attempted assassination of President Erdoğan in Muğla, and the case on the coup in Istanbul are other prominent class action lawsuits related to the coup attempt. There are also separate cases opened for each individual incident in cities like Ankara, Istanbul, Malatya, Diyarbakır, Sakarya, Kars, Ardahan, Edirne, Kocaeli, Manisa, Isparta and Şırnak. Therefore, the cases on the coup and FETÖ/PDY are being conducted simultaneously from two channels.

The indictments and evidence of prominent court cases in Ankara and Istanbul came to be known by the public and defendants’ defenses are being covered by the media. Considering the investigations and the court cases, it can be said that the judiciary is conducting challenging lawsuits with a superhuman effort. The challenge is twofold; while FETÖ/PDY’s emphasis on secrecy is one side of the problem, the other is the loss of personnel in the judiciary following the July 15 coup attempt. Almost one third of judges and prosecutors, amounting to around 4,000, were discharged from duty. Despite the gap and the lack in the numbers of senior judges and an ever-increasing work load, the judiciary’s handling of the process is above the standard.

Indictments and FETÖ/PDY’s Defense Strategy

It should be said that the general structure of FETÖ/PDY, their organization within the Turkish Armed Forces and all phases of the coup attempt, along with the perpetrators and their crimes, are mostly identified and clarified. Moreover, some cases are being concluded by now. The first lawsuit to be concluded in Ankara was of the Secretary-General of President Fahri Kasırga’s abduction and the suspect of this case were punished with an aggravated life imprisonment on June 15. On May 27, the first acquittal decision was given in Adıyaman; however, it should be expressed that the Court of Cassation is yet to approve both of these lawsuits.

Regarding the defense strategy, the suspects are acting in unison with a common narrative. Unlike any normal defendants, they are not only trying to save themselves; they are also trying to convey some sort of messages to other FETÖ members and both to the domestic and international public. They are conveying the message that FETÖ members are yet to be deciphered and they are still alive and kicking. They are trying to erase the traces of FETÖ and consolidate the opinion that it was a controlled coup. To achieve their goals, they are rejecting every accusation, with the exception of a few defendants, despite the findings and evidence. Secondly, they are refraining from accusing others. Lastly, they are refraining from mentioning FETÖ as the perpetrator of the coup.

All of the defendants are talking about their past services to the Turkish Armed Forces and their successes, drawing analogies to Ergenekon and Sledgehammer defendants who were victimized by FETÖ and trying to tap into the sympathy that is felt towards the victimized military personnel. Moreover, they are claiming that they aren’t FETÖ members; they are even alleging that they have fought against FETÖ for many years and were victimized by the organization in the past.

Despite being in the middle of the coup, they are refraining from accusing other suspects, and claiming that they have no information about who conducted the coup attempt or implying that the high-ranking officers of the Turkish Armed Forces were behind the coup attempt. Even though rejecting all claims may be considered as a natural reflex, their efforts to save other suspects and whitewash FETÖ are definitely unnatural. Furthermore, there is an impression that the suspects are forming groups and are trying to play certain roles. The common narrative itself indicates the existence of a prepared and orderly organization. Similarly, their leniency to deception and deceit through the distorted understanding of taqiyya also points out the involvement of FETÖ.

Those who are members of the Peace at Home Council and were active in the conducting of the coup are seen to be rejecting physical evidence such as clear recordings, witness testimonies and their confessions at the prosecutors’ office, ridiculing the court itself. Commander of the Akıncı Airbase Hakan Evrim, who was at the base where aircraft lifted off and landed for hours and who saluted FETÖ’s civilian imam Kemal Batmaz, alleges that there wasn’t a coup attempt and that he is not a FETÖ member. Similarly, Sinan Sürer, who fired on civilians entering the General Staff Compound, used ByLock and participated in the coup preparation meetings led by Adil Öksüz, rejects all claims despite recordings and hard evidence, even alleging that the gun he was holding was actually a phone. Former Staff Colonel Doğan Öztürk, on the other hand, asserts that he never saw Deputy Chief of Staff Yaşar Güler on the night of coup, even though he was recorded by security cameras while escorting Güler to the headquarters. There are many other defenses that are in the same vein as these.

It could be said that the main aims of these defenses are to whitewash FETÖ and to consolidate the notion that the coup was actually a ploy or it was a controlled coup attempt. It is clear that they are trying to create a perception in accordance with Fetullah Gülen’s previous claims about the coup. For this reason, they are making statements which accuse high-ranking military officers and the MİT.

With the condition of protecting the rights of defense and fair trial, FETÖ suspects should be barred from managing the judicial process and the public perception. Taking the sensitivities of the public, families of martyrs and veterans into consideration, the suspects must be prevented from showing off; however, legal errors that might cast a shadow on the trials and bring about Turkey’s condemnation at the European Court of Human Rights must be averted. Prejudiced circles and existent negative public opinion should be granted no quarter in this matter.

If the referendum on the presidential system in Turkey was a close call for “no,” for instance with 50.1% of the total votes, no one in this world would question its legitimacy. It would have been deemed as a tremendous victory of the anti-Erdoğan wing. It didn’t come to pass and the bill passed the referendum with 51.4%. Then, it must be Erdoğan’s triumph! President Erdoğan received the public support by acquiring 1,300,000 more votes than “no” in a referendum which was attended by 86.4% of the eligible voters. Kurdish votes showing 10-20% increase in certain cities played an important role in Erdoğan’s victory,  who has been at the helm of the government for 15 years, first as the prime minister and then as the president.

A Turkey which is surrounded by wars, hosts 2,500,000 Syrian refugees, has been targeted by both Daesh and the PKK, recently overcame a coup attempt on July 15 Gülenist infiltrators instructed by Fetullah Gülen who tried to move the country into an unprecedented chaos. Considering the reactions of especially the US universities and think-tanks, along with some Europeans ones, there is a president who is being condemned for “surviving the coup attempt.”

A president who has been more eager than his predecessors in making Turkey a full member of the EU, who has recognized the Kurdish problem and commenced the reconciliation process, who has realized education reforms for thousands of women that were forcibly thrown out by the police and forced to leave their schools just because they were wearing headscarves, and who extended his condolences to Armenians on April 24 and asked for an international commission to research what has transpired during 1915 incidents… A president who embraced the doorkeeper of the hotel he was staying in Brussels, along with the German Chancellor Schröder, who calls and talks with his childhood friends, who has earned the love and interest of the people… The most significant political leader since Atatürk.

It has become ambiguous when it did happen; however, the said president started to be compared to the cruelest man of the last century, Hitler, deemed as a dictator and alleged for massacring Kurds with an elaborate perception management that was devised by the West. In a short time the anti-Erdoğan club became quite cosmopolitan: even Daesh leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, PKK, Gülen and his henchmen became the members of it. A fabulous cosmopolitan coalition of opposition! It should be mentioned that this coalition inevitably brought quite a support to Erdoğan and affected the result of referendum in a positive way.

Talking about Turkey, there are a few members of the opposition who voted “no” and constantly criticize as they want the system to become more democratic and have a robust judicial system. Nevertheless, whatever be the discussion, the “no” movement has always been spearheaded by the main opposition party CHP which comes from a Kemalist tradition. Justice and Development Party (AK Party) which has been governing Turkey for 15 years, has proposed numerous proposals about changing the 1982 constitution that was implemented by the junta.

The main opposition party opposed all of these proposals. This wasn’t surprising, as this is the nature of the Kemalist opposition parties. However, what is surprising is that the opposition party has never proposed a change or an alternative to the 1982 constitution, the same constitution that the all people in Turkey unanimously want to change. Let alone preparing a proposal that could worry AK Party, they haven’t even scribbled a draft of a constitution. Indeed, for 15 years AK Party and its leader Tayyip Erdoğan have been always challenging their own records in elections and broke them with unprecedented figures.

Erdoğan and his party that don’t have to worry about a legitimate opposition have overcome numerous illegitimate attempts aiming to depose them. The referendum was held under the conditions of the state of emergency that was declared right after the July 15 coup attempt. The subject matter was a change in the system of government; however, this wasn’t being voted in the referendum. It was between those who are against Erdoğan, both in Turkey and the world, and those who stood with Erdoğan.

Despite the campaigning since February, almost none of the voters regardless of their point of view are aware of either the so-called parliamentary system that grants excessive authority to the president or the presidential system which is different than the existing system. Among those who are aware, the objections of the main opposition party’s voters were not taken much into consideration as they refrained from criticizing the existing odd system and, moreover, as they were the ones that made it stranger. On the other hand, even though the AK Party voters were concerned about certain things, the “yes” won because of the trust in Erdoğan.

Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) which allied with AK Party for the referendum failed to garner the expected support. However, the Kurdish votes played a decisive role in the referendum by increasing support for “yes” in 14 cities located in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. Considering the vote AK Party garnered in November 1 elections in 2015, there is a varying increase between 10% and 20% in cities in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. The concerns for security, believing Erdoğan will resolve issues of the region and the reaction against PKK’s trench and urban warfare contributed to the victory. Moreover, there were those who voted “yes” as they believed that 1982 constitution is indefensible and it is impossible to resolve the Kurdish problem with the existing parliamentary system. For this reason, Erdoğan was able to increase its votes in Diyarbakır from 22.2% to 32.43%, in Batman from 30% to 36.48%, in Mardin from 30% to 40.96%, in Siirt from 40% to 48.1%, in Şırnak from 13% to 28.41%, and in Şanlıurfa from 67.8% to 70.82%.

As a result, it could be said that Erdoğan who is the indubitably the most prominent political figure of Turkey for 15 years has received less votes than his potential. However, the precedents of Turkish political history and sociology, along with the experience, show that Erdoğan will be able to maintain his government. Even if the transition to presidential system wasn’t realized, he still would be a powerful president due to the provisions of the constitution, along with being elected president in the first round with 51.8% of the votes. He himself was powerful before; now, his seat is also powerful.

A small portion of the AK Party voters abstained from voting “yes” not because of a concern about Erdoğan, but because they weren’t sure of the answer to the following question: “what will happen after Erdoğan?” Erdoğan, who will become the leader of his party due to the constitutional change, will probably take some steps that will answers the expectations and concerns of his voters, while also taking the Kurdish voters’ support into consideration. It is also highly probable that the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) which is perceived as the only representative of Kurdish politics by the international community will face new rivaling competitors in the region, beside their only rival AK Party.

There is a new trend in the West. It has been a couple of years, I believe. Renowned intellectuals, strategists and media outlets are publishing comments, headlines and academic articles about Turkey and its president without remorse and conscience. They are openly advocating for a military junta over democracy, assassination or execution of a leader over the legitimate change in power.

Last summer, with instructions from Fetullah Gülen, a self-proclaimed scholar who continues to reside in Pennsylvania, US, his infiltrators within the army declared that they were seizing power in order to depose President Erdoğan and the government. While the people of Turkey were bewilderedly watching a presenter trying to read the junta’s coup declaration with hands shaking on TV, all hell was breaking loose on the streets. Bridges in Istanbul were closed and surrounded by military vehicles, meanwhile several police officers had gone up the towers of the bridge and were shooting with sniper rifles.

The sound of tanks moving on main roads, sonic booms of F16s and, gunfire on the streets were all mixed up. Everyone was in terror. Many deputies of both the government and the opposition were trying to survive within the parliament as F16s were dropping bombs on the compound. There also was an assassination attempt on President Erdoğan, who was at a hotel where he spent time with his grandchildren. There was an ongoing clash between the assassination team and presidential bodyguards at the hotel, while the headquarters of the National Intelligence Organization was under attack and the Chief of General Staff was being held as a hostage.

People across Turkey took to the streets and thousands in Ankara and Diyarbakır surrounded garrisons to prevent tanks from going out on the main roads. People tried to stop military vehicles and tanks using unimaginable methods.

Whatever was transpiring definitely was a strange situation. Turkey has experienced several coups; however, this time it felt different. It felt like an invasion, an attempt to colonize Turkey; this was what the majority of the people felt, at least. By dawn, the coup attempt was thwarted. There were lifeless bodies and severed limbs on the streets: the tragic stories of the deaths of hundreds of fathers and sons, siblings who stood side by side. Thousands of men, women, young and elderly were being hurried to hospitals.

Intellectuals infactuated with military juntas and assassinations

While bombs were being dropped and the screams of people reached the heavens, renowned academics in the US were tweeting about the coup attempt as if watching a sports match. For instance, Daniel Pipes wrote “He [Erdoğan] deserves to be ousted by a military coup. I hope it succeeds.”, while David Miller wrote “Erdogan was a megalomaniac ruining a great country. Who’s going to miss him?” These academics aren’t some minor figures and they weren’t the only ones writing in such a way. Hundreds of tweets just like the aforementioned ones later transformed into newspaper headlines, analyses in academic journals, and articles. Unbelievable! In the periodical Foreign Policy, Edward Luttwak criticized not the junta itself, but their failure to pull off the coup. According to Luttwak, they failed to realize the “first rule for a successful coup.” What was it? “Capturing or killing the head of the government, first and foremost”! The putschists, who wounded more than 2,000 and killed 246, have “violated the golden rule,” said Luttwak. It was crucial, as “they [the putschists] left the opportunity for Erdoğan to call the people to resist the coup”!

The world-renowned journal The Economist had the same connotation: “The sultan survives”! Similarly, an analyst of Fox News, Ralph Peters, made two obnoxious comments within a week: “Friday night’s failed coup was Turkey’s last hope to stop the Islamization of its government and the degradation of its society.” One week later, he wrote: “[…] now he [Erdoğan] has real support among half of the population, those for whom the fever of faith is the ultimate intoxicant. He polls better than Hitler did. “Mein Kampf” is no match for the Holy Koran.” For Peters, the people of Turkey sacrificing their lives to thwart the coup was not an issue. The one who should die, or deposed at least, according to Peters, was the president, and unfortunately he still alive and was standing tall. Furthermore, the situation was direr as Erdoğan’s supporters consolidated their belief in the president.

On the other hand, the Holy Quran of Muslims was being compared to Mein Kampf, which was written by the perpetrator of the largest genocide on earth. And the Quran was portrayed as a book that could surpass Mein Kampf in terms of atrociousness. This means that in the US and many parts of Europe, the direst of Islamophobic statements, and giving advice on how to violently depose a government and execute its leader is not a crime, but a component of freedom of speech!

The day after, those who believed that Erdoğan deserved the coup and should be executed advocated that Erdoğan designed the coup or at least knew of the coup with the same impunity as before. There were similar headlines published on reputable newspapers which acted in support of these allegations. The Guardian published Gülen’s statement on its website: “Turkey coup may have been ‘staged’ by Erdoğan regime”! 8 days after the coup, while people were still at hospitals or at the funerals of their loved ones, The Independent published a news piece titled “President Erdoğan’s Turkey is modelled on the Third Reich.” Later, the news outlet removed this piece from its website, probably out of shame! Michael Rubin, on the other hand, wrote an opinion on Foreign Affairs website the day of the coup which was titled “Erdogan Has Nobody to Blame for the Coup but Himself.”

Erik Jan Zürcher also wrote that even if the government hadn’t planned the coup, they were in the know and planned what to do after the coup. All of the Western media underscored that only Erdoğan was accusing Gülen and his henchmen for attempting a coup, while disregarding the statements of the main opposition party, other opposition parties, high-ranking generals and academics which were on the same page with Erdoğan. Including the most fervent enemies of Erdoğan, nobody had a doubt that the coup was ordered by Gülen; however, the Western media ignored all of these, as if there was an accord among them. Lastly, seven months after the coup attempt, the President of the German Federal Intelligence Service Bruno Kahl said “We don’t believe the coup attempt was made by Gülen” in his interview with the journal Der Spiegel. As the German intelligence is still intact, Kahl’s statement has only one meaning: “We are supporting Gülen.”

After thwarting the attempt, the government had to dismiss all members of this organization from the state, while closing down media outlets and private enterprises which supported the said organization. A state of emergency was announced for this reason and all of these were done. Then, these were deemed similar to the applications of Stalin and Hitler. However, no one drew a comparison with the time when East and West Germany were united and thousands of civil servants (who weren’t infiltrators like Gülenists) in East Germany were dismissed, even though it was a much more controversial process than the one in Turkey.

It’s not a crime to demand the head of a leader in the West!

The propaganda by the Western media which emerged with the July 15 coup attempt are continuing and getting worse by the day. Regardless of the issue, who and what kind of violent action is put against Erdoğan, the result doesn’t change. Turkey experienced this once again last week. Due to the referendum for a change in the system of government which is to take place on April 16, both the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the opposition are concerned with rallies in Turkey and abroad. There are more than 5 million Turkish citizens living in various countries of Europe. This population which has dual citizenship is able to cast their votes in Turkish elections.

Germany and the Netherlands didn’t show any kind of opposition against the Turkish parties which are advocating the no vote in the referendum during their rallies in their countries; however, this wasn’t true for AK Party. Last week, the Turkish FM’s travel permission was revoked by the Dutch government, while the minister of family and social policies was barred from entering the Turkish consulate (which is considered a territory of Turkey) in Rotterdam, later to be deported with a police escort. Moreover, they released attack dogs on people who took the streets to protest these actions and these people were also beaten by the police.

This treatment was not acceptable at any level; however, a single visual became embedded in the minds of Turks: a police dog biting the leg of a young male, while a police officer is keeping two protesters who are trying to help that person at bay with a baton. This visual was just like the ones showing torture at Abu Ghraib prison during the invasion of Iraq. After this, the main opposition party CHP demanded relations with the Netherlands to be suspended. Opposition parties and all people regardless of their opinion of Erdoğan condemned the treatment that was shown to the Turkish citizens and ministers. Meanwhile, the Blick daily in Switzerland published a Turkish headline: “Vote no against Erdoğan’s dictatorship.” Again, in Switzerland, a far-right crowd made a demonstration, probably with a permit as no police officers interfered, with ugly masks, calling the Turkish citizens to vote no in the referendum. These visuals were so abhorrent that Aykut Erdoğdu, a deputy of the main opposition party CHP, couldn’t hold himself and tweeted the following: “To whom the actions of these racist bastards in Europe are serving in the referendum?”

The target of those who carry out this abhorrent, anti-democratic and illegitimate campaign is the only politician who could garner 51.8% of the total votes in the first ballot. Anti-West sentiments increase among millions of supporters of Erdoğan and even those who oppose him. This rising hate is not because of Marinne Le Pen in France, Wilders in the Netherlands, or the neo-nazis in Germany; it is because of those who support the junta, see assassination as a legitimate method to depose an elected leader, and feign ignorance about a malicious organization which has infiltrated state institutions for 40 years!

The various discussions that have commenced with the election of US President Donald Trump have continued on a global scale as well as within the United States. Two main reasons exist for these debates. The first is xenophobia and Islamophobic rhetoric that is prevalent in his discourse. The second is the current order who cannot accept Trump as President and the attitude of the media establishments regarding this stance. Generally speaking, it is possible to narrow this down to two focal points, with one side being in favor of Trump and the other firmly opposing his election. Media conglomerates had also been at the center of this debate during the election campaign, taking their positions with either party.

As per tradition for Presidential elections, a number of the pioneering media establishments in US media made statements supporting either the Democratic or the Republican Party. But many of the endorsements came from outlets that traditionally remain silent, and this time there was an unprecedented across the board sentiment against one candidate, Trump. For example, USA Today had announced that for the first time in its 34 year history it would weight in on an election, saying that it would stand against Trump. Foreign Policy magazine, breaking tradition for the first time in almost 50 years, said it would endorse Hillary Clinton. Another magazine, The Atlantic, published an editorial piece throwing their unwavering support behind Clinton and opposed Trump’s presidency. In its 159-year history, the only other time this had taken place was when the magazine endorsed Abraham Lincoln in 1860 and Lyndon B. Johnson in 1964. In addition, leading broadcasting services CNN and NBC were also firmly against Donald Trump. The Washington Post, one of the most widely circulated newspapers in the United States instead preferred to use the phrase “Trump is not suitable for the US Presidency” whilst The New York Times made known their position for Hillary Clinton by stating that their support for her was a result of her intellect, experience, toughness and courage spanning over a career of almost 40 years of continuous public service.

As the November 8 2016 Presidential election drew near, such statements that indicated the position of many media establishments increased substantially with virtually the entire US media showing support for Hillary Clinton against Donald Trump. The mainstream media firmly believed that the Democratic Party would win. Similarly, many of the public polls and surveys conducted throughout the election campaign predicted and in fact, confirmed, that Clinton would be victorious. The result was contrary to all expectations. Despite the propaganda campaign, Trump won the election and like the first signals that he had given during the beginning of the election campaign, his tirade of vilification and condemnation against the media multiplied substantially.

Trumps’ fury at US media

Launching a barrage of attacks on the American media, Trump’s expressions have surpassed the line of criticism with his stinging, voracious attacks that have bordered on dragging names through the mud as well as going so far as threatening to litigate legal cases aimed at shutting down some outlets. Trump has repeatedly said that the “media are the biggest liars on earth” and his repetitive use of this statement clearly is a reflection of his attitude. In his first official White House press conference, the dialogue between himself and reporters from CNN and the BBC in front of the world was a striking example of this attitude. During the press conference, Donald Trump refused to answer a question from a CNN reporter and turned to the CNN camera saying that “Not you. Your organization is terrible.”

During a press conference held at Trump Tower, Donald Trump turned to CNN executive Jeff Zucker and derided the network saying, “CNN news network is completely false. I hate your network, everyone at CNN is a liar and you should be ashamed….” Referring to the NBC News network and Time magazine, Trump also condemned the establishments saying “the media is trying to marginalize me by lying.”

During the Obama presidency, tradition called for the Associated Press to ask the first question at White House briefings. Trump did not allow for this to happen.

Without a doubt, photographs clearly showed the Trump inauguration had a far lower turnout than the 2009 inauguration of Barack Obama. A Time magazine correspondent incorrectly reported that Trump had removed a bust of Martin Luther King Jr. from the Oval office, adding more fuel to Trump’s media fury. Regardless, despite the passing of these events, Trump’s battle with the media over Twitter has not diminished. During the most intensive Twitter rants, he continued to name names and on more than one occasion, has made many generalisations concerning the “false” reporting of the American media. On February 6^th 2017, Trump made outright attacks on the American media. Launching a Twitter tongue-lashing against the New York Times who had revealed embarrassing White House revelations, he said in one message that “The failing NY Times writes total fiction concerning me. They have gotten it wrong for two years, and now are making up stories & sources!” His vendetta against the media continued with attacks on CNN, ABC, and NBC, claiming these news organisations were making a deliberate attempt to bring people into the streets and that they wanted to replace him with a President of their choice.

Undoubtedly, media establishments outside of the US are also receiving their fair share of criticism.

When looking at Trump’s vitriol towards the media and the media’s approach to Trump, it goes without saying that it is a battle that has only just begun.

Media remembers “ethics” after Trump experience

The constant humiliation of news establishments by Trump and his treatment of reporters during the press conference have opened a new front line regarding freedom of the press, freedom of expression and the position of media within a democratic society. Gary Gutting wrote an op-ed for the New York Times, where, after painting a picture of the current climate, he concluded, “recent events, here and elsewhere, revive the worry, expressed by Plato, that populist democracy can readily pave the way to dictatorship. Resisting this threat (and this temptation) is the first duty of today’s patriots.” In his piece, Gutting essentially built a wall against the Trump administration, tying it up with the founding principles of the US and the principles of democracy.

A more direct response to Trump’s media attack came from Reuters in the form of an editorial from its editor-in-chief Steve Adler, entitled “Covering Trump the Reuters Way.” In his piece, Adler noted that the worldwide news agency operated in more than 100 countries around the world and stressed principles of neutrality and independence in the face of challenges such as censorship, legal prosecution, visa denials, and even physical threats to journalists. Adler stressed Reuters would continue to pursue critical reporting on the Trump administration because it’s part of their own journalistic principles.

In a news commentary headline, the BBC asked whether Trump’s accusation of media “not reporting terrorist attacks” was true, by running a long assessment of the terrorist attacks around the world one by one and whether they were covered by the BBC. One can ascertain that the BBC had in fact relayed news regarding terrorists attacks to its readership and that it had related this information on the basis of its professionalism of its journalistic integrity, and that Trump, whether deliberately or ignorantly, was trying to blame the media.

Evidently, media organisations around the world took issue with Trump’s accusations and found themselves defending their journalistic integrity. It is clear that these accusations against the media will increase in the future. At this point, it is necessary to examine the journalistic ethics and the universal principles of journalism. Quite frankly, leaving Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric to the side, the moral position of the language used by the US and UK media can also be debated. Have those same media organisations who have taken a stance against Trump’s humiliating and insulting discourse been able to uphold their “journalism ethic” of fairness and impartiality when it comes to different countries and peoples? What kind of general publication policy did these outlets have when Turkey, Iraq and Palestine were the subject concerned? Did they apologise for inaccuracies and false news reports then?

Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction; the BBC’s reporting of Turkey

When looking into American history, it can be claimed that it has a relatively free and neutral media. The basis of this is the principle of liberty that was relayed to the press by the first amendment of the US constitution in 1791. However an observation of this picture shows us that this understanding of freedom is limited largely to the benefit of the US. During the US occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan and in addition to this, the illegal occupation of Palestine and the massacre of thousands of people resulting from continuous attacks by Israel, the media has either played the role of the three monkeys or have been the congratulatory fifth arm of imperialism, or has either supported or provoked attempts through propaganda like journalistic practices. When it came to covering Israeli assaults on Gaza, for instance, outlets went out of their way to give coverage to rockets being fired into nearby Israeli settlements, with almost no casualties being caused, while thousands were being killed in Gaza.

In 2003, the global public opinion on the existence of nuclear weapons and the subsequent invasion of Iraq was largely swayed by US/UK media outlets, including NYT, CNN, the BBC, and Reuters. Prior to the 1990 war on Iraq, images of badly oiled birds from the Gulf were regularly shown by CNN, convincing the world of the evilness of Saddam Hussein. The same media establishments continued this ethic throughout the occupation. In this regard, the US media could be considered an echo chamber for the White House or the Pentagon.

In this context, we can also give the example of the double standard of the Western media who used patronising language towards Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and their support for illegal attempts to topple the Turkish President, a President voted in by the Turkish people.

The publications produced by the BBC and CNN against the Turkish government are not that particularly difficult to pinpoint either. In June 2013, during the Gezi Park protests, CNN broadcast live from Gezi Park for hours, and used language that incited protests and street violence. In fact, they presented the news as if there was a civil war. If that wasn’t enough, CNN then used a public meeting attended by more than a million people at the Kazlicesme suburb of Istanbul in support of Erdogan and portrayed it as if it was something that was held in opposition to him.

In addition to this, Christiane Amanpour, CNN’s foreign news presenter cut shortthen Prime Minister Erdogan’s adviser on live television, which was seen by many as extremely offensive. Many of BBC’s broadcasts on Turkey were shaped in a similar fashion.

The personal views of many of these journalists, despite pledges to follow ethical practices of objectivity, have often come out in their writing as well as other communication.

A tweet by a BBC journalist on January 28 2017 during Theresa May’s visit to Turkey saying that there was “a lot of gold” at the Turkish presidential palace has turned into a source of mockery by many Twitter users.

In 2013, a Turkish news journalist with the BBC was similarly ridiculed for choosing to provide a platform to a small group of government opponents. The protesters, the reporter tweeted, were saying “Let’s not be the standing man, but the man that stops. Let’s stop the economy.”

When it came time to choose headlines, these media outlets have usually given space to opposition voices whose rhetoric is far from objective, again a break with what should be journalistic ethics. A December 2014 meeting between Turkish President Erdogan and Russian President Putin, for instance, was headlined with a quote from a critic who described it as the “summit of the honourable lonely ones”.

On July 15 2016, virtually the entire Western media targeted Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in a language that clearly indicated that it had chosen to ignore public sentiment in the country, instead taking sides with Fetullah Gulen’s army faction during the coup attempt. On July 16, Reuters described Fetullah Gulen as a Muslim preacher, and gave Gulen space in the headline, to describe the coup attempt as having been “staged.”

By way of reporting the failed coup attempt in this malicious manner, the Reuters news agency lost its impartiality and signed off the broadcast from the FETO perspective. The Reuters news agency shared these clear statements and content throughout the night of the coup attempt in its broadcast despite the clear national will of the Turkish people, and its legitimate government represented by the elected President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

It is possible to expand these examples, not just in the context of Turkey but in the context of other countries as well. Therefore, the media in the US and the global media oligarchs that have put up a front in their battle against Donald Trump claiming journalistic ethics and integrity by no means absolves them of their own sins.

On the contrary, their malicious reporting and behaviour has confirmed the existence of a structure that is used unashamedly in the pursuit of their own agenda. This attitude will not surpass a double-faced standard. A coin has two faces. Trump has shown that he is on one side of this coin, taking a hard stance against the global media empires, in particular the ones in the US. This stance, in fact has been scorned and belittled by elitist circles for quite some time. On the other side of the coin are the media organisations.

Since the very beginning of the election campaign, the US media channels, by taking a position against Donald Trump, in their pursuit of their agenda have been defeated in two ways. Firstly, if to take into consideration French sociologist Jean Beaudrillard’s words, “the silence of the masses do not speak to the screens, but have turned their backs,” then without a doubt, it is clear that much of the American public has little connection with the American media, and that the media is playing its own tune with its audience being only itself.

Secondly, the widespread assumption of the American media, inspired by classical media theories, have thrown out the window the idea that they can inspire and distort the thinking of the masses. Many people in America did not vote as the media thought they would, handing Trump enough votes to win office. In the presidential election, the party supported by the US media establishment lost the election and the cold reality that emerged was that there was little relationship between the media and the people of America, and that very few cared for what was being said on television or at the very least, ignored what was being said. Without a doubt, the fury of the American media establishment is caused by this cold reality. The American media establishment should take an equitable and broadminded approach for all and that it should raise the flag of tolerance for those who are devoid of a powerful voice. Otherwise, once Trump raises his own anger and fury, it can be seen that the curtain of the American media conglomerates will fall furthermore with terrifying consequences.

Men claiming to be the Messiah or the Mahdi – including Fetullah Gülen – are not a new phenomenon.  Since the earliest decades of Islam, many have built a following around them, using charisma and exploiting societal and political upheaval to convince followers they are the promised saviors, and their community is destined to herald the final utopia before the current world ends. Faruk Yaslıçimen talked with Dr. Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, professor of History at TOBB University of Economics and Technology, about the striking commonalities between modern day “Messiahs” and the phenomenon seen throughout centuries. Prof. Ocak is a prominent historian with his numerous pioneering books and articles on Islamic heterodoxy and heterodox communities in the Ottoman Empire.

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Prof. Ocak, you believe that there are common characteristics of Messianic movements in history. How far can we take this? Can you give us a few examples?

Messianic movements usually emerge under similar conditions and with similar characteristics. Historical trajectories both in the West and East attest to this. One should keep in mind that any attempt to understand such Messianic movements by focusing merely on ideology and theology would be incomplete. These movements are, indeed, the products of their time and political, social, economic, cultural, ideological as well as geographical factors play their roles. Messianism is actually a mentality that was largely created by these conditions.

I should emphasize that one should search for theological and political explanations only after studying the sociological and psychological dimensions of these movements and their leaders in detail.

Do you think Messianic movement can be categorized?

Well, actually it is possible to categorize these movements into two groups: in the first group, there are Messianic movements that result from political and economic strains. In the second group, we see such movements emerging out of political ambitions. Messianic movements are found not only in the Islamic world or in the pre-modern societies, but also today, in any part of the world. These movements are closely linked to several political, sociological, economic, and ideological factors and have many characteristics in common. To give but a few examples, almost all the leaders of the Messianic movements in history argued that the existing order was corrupt and the political leader was unjust and cruel. These Messianic figures claimed themselves as the creators of the fair and ideal socio-political order.

Well, how does this process work in practice?

There are several ways. A self-claimed Mahdi might see himself as the chosen one, entrusted with the mission to cure prevalent socio-political crises, and imposes this idea on those around him. He sometimes sincerely puts forward some suggestions to construct his ideal society. Messianic figures may also engineer a systematic propaganda mechanism to satisfy their political ambitions. Some of them perpetuated this propaganda very successfully, with incredible methods. That’s exactly where the problem begins. Why does a person claim to be a “Mahdi” and how does he become a candidate for solving the problems he believes exist and formulate his propaganda accordingly?

You have mentioned earlier a socio-psychological factor.

Yes, I think it is possible to explain this factor in two stages. In the first stage, the person who puts forward the claim of being a Mahdi questions the troubles that he had experienced in his inner world, thinks about their reasons, and finally finds the political authority responsible for all the troubles. In the second stage, he starts believing that he is the one chosen by a divine power to end injustice. It is this two-stage process that we call the “socio-psychological factor.” What one needs to be aware of here is that this process leads the individual with the mindset of the “Mahdi” to an inevitable psychological position.

I wonder, which individuals come to your mind first in this regard?

Several such figures emerged in almost the same manner in the Islamic world and in Europe.

The case of Baba İlyas is one of them. To put it briefly, one begins to believe that he is responsible for removing injustices. Or, as in the second group of Mahdi movements I mentioned earlier, the politically-motivated Mahdi acts as if he is the one chosen by the divine power to offer a remedy to the prevailing problems. He believes in his mission and begins to convince the others.

There are several Mahdis in history that achieved their aims. The oldest messianic claim in the Islamic world, for instance, was put forward by Muhtar es-Sakafi, who rivaled the Umayyad power in 684. He aimed to satisfy his political ambition and became a headache for the Umayyad government.

As you can see, there are similar psychological factors in the first and second group of the Messianic movements. To be able to understand these factors correctly, we must have recourse to psychological analysis, which is largely lacking in Turkish historical studies. As far as I know psychological biographies of historical figures and political leaders – except for a work on Atatürk – have not received the attention they deserve in Turkey.

Do we have any example of messianic movements, which emerged in Anatolia?

Of course, the Babai revolt, which took place in 13th Century Seljuk Anatolia under the leadership of Baba İlyas, is a typical example of these movements. I studied this revolt for my doctoral dissertation and looked into what were the main motivations for people who took part in the revolt. I asked the question of why Baba İlyas and his followers felt the need for opposing the political authority in such a self-sacrificing manner. Historical accounts in our hands indicate that Baba İlyas sincerely believed that God guided him. There were several reasons behind his revolt: the Anatolian Seljuk Sultan Gıyasettin Keyhüsrev II’s unfair and incompetent administration, oppression of the Turkmens, and heavy taxation. The revolt started when a tax collector insulted Baba İlyas in Adıyaman. Another typical and tragic example, which the leftist circles in Turkey are more concerned with, is the revolt of Shaykh Bedreddin in 1416 during the early Ottoman period.

So, what were the fates of Baba İlyas and Sheikh Bedreddin?

When we look at the historical accounts, it seems that Baba İlyas really believed that God appointed him. He sincerely believed Gıyasettin Keyhüsrev II was a cruel ruler, that his government must be overthrown, and that it was himself who would do it. When Amasya was besieged by the Seljuk forces, Baba İlyas received a fatal wound between his shoulders. He felt he was dying. When people around him asked, “Why are you injured and about to die although you told us that you are immortal,” he said, “I will consult with God and ask why this misfortune has come to us.” Baba İlyas died in seclusion. His followers did not find his body immediately. They chose to believe that he did not die but went into the presence of Allah to bring help to them. They continued to fight until their last strength. The same process also took place in the revolt of Sheikh Bedreddin.

Then what happened?

The Seljuk forces found the body of Baba İlyas, they desecrated it, dangling it over the walls of the city. Their goal was to convince the Turkmens to believe that Baba İlyas died and thus to put an end to the revolt. In the case of Sheikh Bedreddin, his opponents hanged him at Serez in front of his disciples.

Let me remind you here once again that the figures who initiated and directed these movements were those who sincerely believed in their missions. It is necessary to distinguish these figures from the ones who revolted against the authorities out of their political ambitions.

You mentioned that the Mahdis are usually charismatic people. How does charisma work? In what stage does the charismatic person proclaim himself as a Mahdi? When do his followers begin to believe in this claim?

Max Weber had several interesting observations on how charisma works. Suffice it to say here that charisma is partly related to the nature of the person in question. Some people have inborn reactive qualities to certain physical, behavioral, and external factors. Most importantly, they are persuasive figures. Their words and deeds have an influence on those around them. A person who believes that he is the “Mahdi” and who is regarded as such in his circles uses his charisma to increase his followers and controls them psychologically to achieve his goals. The “Mahdi” becomes ready for his mission when he feels it fully. Those people around him are already mentally ready to accept it. Of course, this is a simplified version of the events. This process is not as easy and simple as I narrate it here.

You are saying that these movements reconstructed exclusive worldviews and historical perceptions. How does this process take place? How do they build legitimization processes, rationality, and a different way of thinking, believing, and perceiving than the rest of the society?

It was the political, social, and economic turmoil and crises, which helped these movements to build their legitimacy and discourse. A disrupted socio-political order leads people to search for an idealized world. This search inevitably asks for a new worldview and a different perception of reality. It also requires a virtual sense of history based on an ideal “age of happiness” (asr-ı saadet) and a “golden age.” The so-called Mahdi and his followers focus on how to bring about this “age of happiness” in their lifetimes. This is a very strong psycho-social motivation behind the Messianic movements. Without such a strong motivation, it would be hard for the leaders of these movements to set their followers into motion.

Do these movements have primarily a political or a religious motive?

Since the aim of these movements is to remove and replace the existing political authority, which they accept as the cause of the prevailing political and socioeconomic crises, their motive primarily is a political one. To explain his cause to his followers and to ensure legitimacy for the movement, the Mahdis use religion, which is the most valid argument. Historical accounts show us that the leaders of messianic movements and their followers believed that a divine authority appointed them for a special mission. They were convinced that they would succeed in their actions with divine support. Without this belief and hope, it was impossible for these movements to emerge and pursue their claims.

Politics is starting to get into the business after a while.

Of course, their goal is to remove the political authority that they oppose, to exercise power in person, and to establish their idealized “worldly paradise.”

Do these movements have certain characteristics that are specific to the Shi’ite or the Sunni world?

Shi’ite influences and efforts of the Sufis played a great role in the spread of these movements in the Sunni world. There are many hadiths attributed to the Prophet Muhammad in this regard, but neither their chains of narration (sanad) nor their texts (matn) are authentic. These hadiths are revealed in books written after 950 AD, when the Abbasids took power. It was the same time period when the Shi’ite ideology emerged with a claim that the imamate, or the leadership, belongs to the Shi’ites. The term “imam” means here the person appointed by God to rule the society. He is an infallible figure who takes his knowledge directly from God via inspiration. According to this ideology, the imams are the deputies of the Prophet Muhammad. The Mahdi concept of the Shi’a, with all these characteristics, has a reflection in the Sunni world, especially in the mystical circles. So, there is not much difference.

You are talking about the Mahdi belief in Shi’ite…

Yes, this is the position of the Mahdi in the Shi’ite ideology. The 12th Imam Muhammad al-Mahdi, the son of the 11th Imam Hasan al-Askari, is believed to have disappeared in Samarra. It is held that he will emerge at a date close to Doomsday. Today, historical studies show us that Hasan al-Askari had never had a son. But the Shi’ite theology created a fictional 12th Imam to have an everlasting idea of the imamate in its ideology and to keep the Mahdi belief alive among the believers. Although Muhammad al-Mahdi was a person who never really existed nor ever lived, the Shi’ite doctrine chose to maintain the Mahdi belief in the form of a virtual imam.

At first, there was not any place for the idea of the Mahdi in the Sunni doctrine. With the intensification of Sufi influences in the beginning of the 10th century, however, we see the emergence of this motive in the Sunni world. Many leading Sufis such as Hâkim Tirmizi and Muhyiddin Ibn Arabi played a role in the spread of this idea. In the 14th century, Ibn Khaldun felt the necessity to point out that the idea of Mahdi was not a part of Islam and had nothing to do with it.

In fact, the origin of the term the “imam of the universe,” which was attributed to Fetullah Gülen by his disciples, has its roots in these centuries. This Shi’ite expression has become widespread among the Sunni people through mysticism.  Although there is no such thing in the Sunni doctrine, people chose to believe that a Mahdi would emerge in times of troubles. This idea was widespread both at the time of the Seljuks and the Ottomans, and to some extent, even today. From the 10th century on, people fabricated some hadiths on the emergence of the Mahdi at a date close to the end of the times. These hadiths, some which were included into collections of reliable hadiths, narrate the characteristics of the Mahdi in detail. There were and still are several Sunni scholars who have rejected these hadiths. Although this is the case, refuting the idea of Mahdi in Islam might cause trouble even today. The fanatics of this belief will immediately prepare a place for you in hell.

Do we have any example of counter-propaganda by political authorities against the Messianic movements in history? If so, what is the nature of it?

Yes, there is counter-propaganda against the messianic movements. We can give the example of Firdevsi-i Rumi in making propaganda for the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid II (r. 1481-1512) in his Kutbnâme against the Şahkulu Baba Tekeli rebellion in 1511.

Şahkulu Baba Tekeli proclaimed himself as the Mahdi and rebelled against the Ottoman government. He gathered around 30-40 thousand men – there are different numbers in the chronicles – and defeated the Ottoman forces more than seven times. There was intense Shi’ite propaganda in Anatolia at that time, initiated by the newly emerged Safavid state. The belief in the Mahdi was also widespread among the Sunnis because of this propaganda. Firdevsi-i Rumi, one of the leading authors of the period, claimed that the true Mahdi was Bayezid II. He wrote his Kutbnâme to support this claim. This was a counter-movement aimed at reducing the pro-Iranian messianic movements in Anatolia to an illegitimate position in the eyes of people, thus ensuring the security of the Ottoman state. Similar movements and rebellions continued during the reign of Süleyman the Lawgiver (r. 1520-66), when the Ottoman army was enjoying great victories on the Western front. Melami circles, for instance, took an opposition stand. They engineered a different type of propaganda and implied that the Ottoman sultans were cruel, they were not able to govern the people, and their sheiks, whom they called “Qutb,” had to take over the administration. The Melami movement was, in fact, a messianic movement. Although it is hard to find it in their sources unequivocally, one needs to read between the lines to find this.

Well, does this really have anything to do with the lack of political foresight, or with the military and economic losses the state experienced at that time?

Of course, these factors played a significant role. These movements emerged after severe political, economic, and military crises. Think about the battles that the Ottomans fought on numerous fronts, in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. The Ottomans were also fighting with the Safavids in the east and with the Mamluks in the south. Military activities mean a loss of money, property, and human resources. It also means that society cannot be sure of its future. The state levies extraordinarily high taxes, called avârız, on people to finance the military expeditions. It is even said that Yavuz Sultan Selim (r. 1512-20) received loans from Jewish bankers to meet the expenses of the Egypt campaign. These initiatives created a disturbance among the people.

The tax issue is very important. The heavy taxes that the Seljukids demanded from the Turkmens also created an important reason for the Babai to revolt. It is known that the Turkmens were not willing to pay taxes throughout history. If you impose extra taxes during a war to meet military expenses, it will spark a further reaction. The propaganda of the Shi’ite Safavids and the heavy taxes caused a series of messianic rebellions during the reign of Suleiman the Lawgiver. As historian Cornell Fleischer said, some Ottoman intellectuals engaged in propaganda on behalf of the Ottoman Sultan, saying he was the true Mahdi, to suppress these revolts.

How did the society react to this claim?

It is possible to argue that people accepted this claim. The historical sources, however, do not provide us many details of their reaction.

The sultans are considered “blessed” people. Does it have anything to do with it?

Yes, these two are related. Since the Middle Ages, Turkish rulers were seen as divinely blessed. It is written in the Orkhon inscriptions that “Bilge Kagan, who found kut [favor] in the blue sky.” According to the pre-Islamic Turkish tradition, God blesses the ruler. The one blessed by God has the right to rule. Other members of the dynasty have no such right. That is the reason people had not interfered with the power struggle among princes in Turkish history. Turkish princes had their support base among bureaucrats and soldiers, not laypeople, since laypeople believe that whoever God wills, it is he who will rule. Tursun Bey also refers to this belief in his Tarih-i Ebu’l-Feth. Whoever wins, that is the will of God. Obeying him is, therefore, considered obedience to God.

If we talk about the present, do you think that Fetullah Gülen’s case is the most recent messianic movement in the Islamic world?

We know that Gülen has received his early education and training in the Nur movement (also called Nurculuk). As an academic working on religious movements, I was following the publications of various religious circles in the 1980’s. It was at that time when I read Said-i Nursi’s Sikke-i Tasdik-i Gaybi and understood that Said-i Nursi, the founder of the Nur movement, had a belief in the Mahdi. I also listened to and watched some the sermons of Gülen – I even owned around 10 cassettes belonging to him – I wanted to know and to get an idea of this movement. Although his sermons gained popularity in the 80’s, I never believed in the sincerity of Gülen. Some television stations used to broadcast his sermons. I carefully watched these sermons and examined his gestures. It seems to me that he was doing theater. He was crying and acting hectically and in a tumultuous way.

On the other hand, Gülen has his own charisma. What does this mean for his alleged Mahdism?

Gülen is a charismatic figure and I think we should mention him in the first group of Mahdis. In other words, Gülen is a sincere believer in his mission. He claims that he communicates with the Prophet and even with God. Remember the case of the Babais I mentioned earlier. Baba İlyas too claimed that he was having a conversation with God. Gülen was able to gather around hundreds of thousands people due to the rigid Kemalist government, which pushed religious people to look for ways to survive or, better, to find ways of ending the cruelty. These were the main political and sociological factors that prepared the ground for Gülen’s messianic movement. Then come the other factors, like the personal one, I mean the one related with the leadership of the movement.

Recently, Gülen was claimed to be a Sabataist, actually a crypto-Muslim disguising his Jewish faith and that his Messianic mission was linked to this culture. You know, such claims are occasionally made and it’s not possible to prove them. Yet, it is well-known that when Sabbatai Zevi, founder of the Sabbatean movement and claimed to be the long–awaited Jewish Messiah, appeared in the 17th century during the time of Sultan Mehmed IV, he was able to find many followers from Ottoman Jews. Zevi disguised his Jewish faith by pretending to be a Muslim and there is an abundant literature and information, both speculative and scholarly, on Sabataists in the Ottoman Empire.

Do you see it as a kind of schizophrenia that the leaders of such movements have?

I do not know that. But when we look at the other examples in history, it is possible to argue that these types of Mahdis are usually schizophrenic.

How?

For example, they say that “the Prophet came to me tonight, I chatted with him, and he said to me this and that,” or “Khidr came to visit me after the Isha prayer,” “Khidr performed the Isha prayer behind me,” etc. We can give many other examples: “After performing the Fajr prayer Khidr took me with him. I traveled with him through the seven skies. On the first level, I chatted with the Prophet Moses. On the second level, I chatted with the Prophet Idris.”

Many Sufi sources, particularly the hagiographies, are full of these and other similar stories. In some modern publications, the Prophet Idris was portrayed as a Qutb rose to the second heaven to command all the celestial / empyrean affairs. Some studies refer to the God Thoth in ancient Egypt as the figure who has the power and privilege of commanding the celestial affairs. These studies establish similarities between him and the Prophet Idris.

In short, there is a need for creating a “Mahdi” typology based on examples in history. While doing it, we should do historical, theological, sociological, and especially psychological analysis and put them into good use. I think this is an important job not only to understand what happened in history, but also to understand similar cases today.

Thank you very much Prof. Ocak for this very illuminating interview.

Since the adoption of the 1982 Constitution, the text has been subject to debate and several amendments. Following the elections in 2011, there was hope for a new Constitution, but it disappeared after the failure of an agreement in the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission on the revision of the text. Immediately after the failed July 15 coup attempt, Turkish political parties agreed on a brief Constitutional package. However, the subsequent political tension prevented the carrying out of the project. Surprisingly, the leader of the MHP Devlet Bahceli, initiated a new process by throwing his support behind an amendment in the Constitution that would be put forward by the AK Party. The AK Party prepared the Constitutional amendment proposal that included a “Presidential System” and proposed this amendment to the Turkish Parliament after negotiations with the MHP. The core objective of the proposal is to abandon the 1982 Constitutional model, which was drafted following a military regime. Since the 1982 Constitution does not provide a conventional parliamentary system, it facilitated the transition to the Presidential system.

Neutrality of the Judiciary

Article 1 of the proposal and Article 9 on the jurisdiction of the Constitution provide an “impartiality” clause which emphasizes the neutrality as well as the independence of the judiciary. The 1982 Constitution too called for judicial independence and emphasized the necessity of the independence and the legal jurisdiction of judges in a number of matters. However, the independence of the judiciary and its connection to the concept of impartiality does not appear explicitly in the Constitution and thus its absence is the motivation for this new proposal.

It is impossible to separate neutrality from an independent judiciary. An independent judiciary – without the influence of any individual or institution, whether inside or outside of the judiciary – upholding the law with impartiality to avoid any bias or without any prejudice whatsoever is essential. In other words, a judge must decide independently and irrespective of any personal benefit, ideology, belief and world view.

Themis, the ancient Greek symbol of the principle of justice, in her blindfold demonstrates this need for neutrality and impartiality in judging a case. The principle of impartiality is of critical importance in the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. For this reason, the impartiality provided in international human rights documents finds its place side by side with the principle of independence. Article 10 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights all emphasize the principle of neutrality.

These examples show that the incorporation of the principle of neutrality in the proposal into the 1982 Constitution is compatible with human rights conventions and will address the deficiencies in the present system.

Another reason for this addition is related to the longevity of the bureaucratic tutelage in Turkey. The army was one of the basic elements of the judicial tutelage that was established by the 1961 Constitution, with the judiciary using it as a mean to maintain its control. During this period, the judicial tutelage preferred the protection of the guardianship of the state power against the political power along with the defense of its privileges, rather than protecting basic rights or establishing the rule of law.  The activities of the judiciary have always been defended with an emphasis of the independence of institutions, however those in power have often turned a blind eye to the principle of impartiality. In other words, the emphasis on neutrality in the current proposed Constitutional change is a result of the reaction to the bureaucratic tutelage, which is trying to take the power of the democratic governance of political power under its jurisdiction.

Supreme board of judges and prosecutors of Turkey (HSYK)

The new Constitutional proposal reduces the number of members of the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) of Turkey from 22 to 13, and ends the practice of direct election of judges from other judges in the HSYK. According to the proposal, the Minister of Justice and the undersecretary of the Minister will be members of the HSYK. Four members will be appointed by the President, and the remaining seven will be elected by the Parliament. The Parliament will select three of these members from the Supreme Court of Appeals, with two of these being a teaching fellow and the third being a barrister, and one elected from among the members of the Council of State.

The first point is an important departure from the old system and it abandons the method of selection of a number of members of the HSYK by judges and prosecutors. This process was first introduced as a democratic method by the AK Party in 2010. However, the practice of this method for seven years and two electoral terms has shown that it can have negative consequences posing a danger to the Turkish democracy.  Under the previous system, the HSYK members were elected by the judges and prosecutors of this country, but this election process became politicized, with blocks of voters following various political movements. The most powerful political movement was composed of the members of the Fetullah Gülen Terrorist Organization (FETO).  This caused great damage to the judiciary. The electoral procedure essentially insulated the courts from oversight, deterred judges and prosecutors from completing their primary duties, politicized the judiciary and encouraged the emergence of political or ideological camps among the judges and prosecutors. During the course of the HSYK election, the candidates were favored for their political views, beliefs, ethnic and sectarian identities rather than on their merit or professional experience. This should not be accepted under any circumstances for an institution such as the judiciary. This politicization of the judges was seen in the press releases of the HSYK, both before and after the two most recent elections in 2010 and 2014.

Additionally, all of the camps and political parties that were parts of the judiciary were opposed to the procedure of the election of the members. The main opposition party CHP proposed that only the highest courts be allowed to elect a member of the Constitutional Court. The election procedure was totally abolished in the proposal of the MHP.

The second important point is that a simple majority was insufficient for HSYK members to be elected by the Parliament. According to the proposal, the Justice and Constitutional Commissions of the Parliament appoint three out of five candidates to the HSYK. If candidates are not supported by a majority in the Commissions, three candidates must be elected through choosing by lot. In the General Assembly of the Parliament, there shall be two votes for each of the three candidates, with three out of five candidates presented for each open seat on the HSYK. In the event of no majority being secured, a lot will be drawn for the two candidates with the most votes.

It can be seen that the election of seven members by the Parliament by way of a qualified majority, was meant to prevent a simple majority and to force parties into a compromise. In response to these positive arrangements, we can say that the lack of recognition of the authority of the HSYK members to select a part of the Supreme Court and the Council of State is a deficiency of the proposal.

Removal of Military Courts

The proposal also provides a complete abolition of military prosecution. Article 13 of the proposal reads: “Military courts outside disciplinary courts cannot be established. In the event of a war, however, military courts may be set up to take charge of the crimes committed by soldiers in relation to their duties.”

The military jurisdiction is one of the most effective elements of the tutelage system that was later reformed with the establishment of the 1961 Constitution. After the 1960 military coup, the Military High Court of Appeals was established in the Constitution, and the Supreme Military Administrative Court was also added following the 1970 military memorandum.

In the aftermath of the 1980 coup, the power of the military jurisdiction was increased by enforcing its autonomy. With the 1960 coup d’état and the subsequent intervention of the army in the government, each Constitutional change has strengthened the so-called “guardianship function” of the military judiciary.

The present Constitution broadly defined the scope of the military courts to the point that was unacceptable in a democratic state of law, and in 2010 a Constitutional amendment partially addressed these issues. In spite of the steps taken to bring military tribunals under democratic rule of law standards, military courts were preserved as a separate judicial branch in addition to the civilian judicial jurisdiction. It is rare to find an independent military judiciary and a high court for military judiciary in Western democracies.

This is the case for the Supreme Military Administrative Court. It appears that military prosecution is an important tool for the military and for the system of judicial tutelage. In this system, the army develops “a two-headed structure in the judiciary” as a result of a desire to create its own autonomous domain independent of the civilian administration.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that one of the most important institutions in which FETO is organized is the military judiciary. This presence allowed a group to gain maximum leverage in the tutelary structure. Those who closely followed FETO pointed out that they were very powerful in the military judiciary, and included high level military judges. They were even almost completely controlled by them, and they had members in many important positions, such as the General Staff’s legal adviser. Additionally, the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office made a clear statement regarding the activities of the FETO in an indictment presented prior to the July 15 coup attempt. It should be noted, however, that the question of military jurisdiction cannot be explained solely within the scope of the FETO probe, and cannot be resolved with the expulsion of judges and prosecutors tied with FETO. For this reason, a complete removal of the military judiciary was long overdue.

With the absence of a military judiciary and a removal of two high military courts, the number of members of the Constitutional Court will decrease from 17 to 15. Additionally, because of the change in the government system, the provision that excludes the judicial review of the activities of the President is removed from the Constitution. Finally, judicial review is strengthened by removing the provision that excludes judicial review of the decisions of the Supreme Military Councils concerning the members of the military.

Fethullah Gülen’s seemingly Islamic modern cult emerged in such an environment and spread over the years. He claimed to be a follower of Said-i Nursi, who Gülen never visited because he was a Kurd, as Gülen states in his own memoirs of youth, and was seemingly fighting against communism during the Cold War. Using the prestigious name of the persecuted Said-i Nursi, Gülen persuaded both Turks and Kurds that he was working for the benefit of Islam. Even though Gülen’s movement was criticized by other religious congregations for its depreciatory approach towards them and isolation from even the other disciples of Said-i Nursi, it was received rather well by both the society and the state.

Gülen supported and praised all military coups aiming to restore Turkey to its “factory settings” and preserve the status quo.

Gülen supported and praised all military coups aiming to restore Turkey to its “factory settings” and preserve the status quo. When the strictly secular Army deposed Erbakan and his government in 1997, Gülen praised what came to be known as the post-modern coup. Despite the harsh criticism of certain Islamic groups, some of the Muslims who weren’t followers of Gülen also believed that he was forced to make such statements against his own belief due to Turkey’s political environment.

Relocating to the US in 1999 and becoming famous for his schools all around the world, Gülen didn’t face any hardships after 9/11, which was suspicious for some, but not for the whole. Alongside conferences on interfaith dialogue and religious tolerance, Gülen started to pose as an admirer of Rumi and write about him, a strategy for the consumption of a Western audience; just like using Said-i Nursi had been for a Turkish audience. Even though the Rumi Center in the US was obviously named after Rumi, it was always Gülen’s name that was being propagated.

While certain individuals of the Kemalist Left in Turkey claimed that the Gülen Movement was a project of the US against the USSR in the Cold War, their allegations weren’t taken into consideration as these individuals opposed all religious groups.

So, the question is how the members of the Gülen Movement were able to infiltrate the most secular institution, the Army, to an extent to even attempt a military coup in a country that was ultra-secular until the near past? Against the practices of military school administrators, who examined the knees of young applicants to find and eliminate the ones that prayed regularly, Gülen advised his followers to do whatever is necessary, not to pray, and to drink alcohol, the end goal being to enter these military schools. Gülen and his followers used the same methods to infiltrate the judiciary, academia and the media.

Gülen advised his followers to do whatever is necessary, not to pray, and to drink alcohol, the end goal being to enter these military schools.

From the 1970s onward, they infiltrated every ideological movement in Turkey’s sociological structure, while concealing their true beliefs. None was aware of this function of the Gülen Movement; moreover, not every member was aware of each other. The truth is that they had become a widespread organization which was able to reach the elites of countries through their schools, media outlets, holdings and relief organizations. When the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came to power after weathering multiple storms (Erdoğan’s sentence, two trials to close the party down, the opposition of the whole media), the party was forced to open the door to this organization by assuming that at least they wouldn’t have any issue with their Muslim identity, unlike the Kemalist-secular ideology dominating the state. “Give them an inch and they will take a mile,” as the saying goes, but this wasn’t known at the time.

This seemingly Islamic modern and armed cult first revealed its true face, even if a little, while Turkey and the PKK were engaged in the reconciliation process. Targeting the process, Gülen started an operation through his members within the judiciary to make the head of the National Intelligence Organization stand trial for his role in the negotiations. However, first with the events of December 17-25, 2013 they tried to depose the government by claiming that it was corrupt, and then with the July 15 coup attempt, the organization was completely deciphered. Since then, Turkey has been working on cleansing the institutions of Gülenists and analyzing this cult.

Social scientists, political scientists and psychiatrists’ association are all trying to analyze and explain the leader and the members of this cult according to their own specializations. These analyses are one of the hottest topics in the media and everyone is trying to understand the organization. “Why did my arrogant but helpful neighbor change immensely after the coup attempt?” “They were our relatives and we knew their son was a Gülenist. However, we were shocked when we saw him on TV, among the putschists.” “Two sons stopped seeing their own mother as she is against Gülen, I really don’t understand it”. “The man [a Gülenist] fired his weapon and killed two people right before our eyes. Then recited bismillah before drinking water and then said that the ones he killed just moments ago went to heaven. What kind of a person does this and says that?” These are the questions that have emerged, which puzzle people when they are trying to understand the organization.

“The man [a Gülenist] fired his weapon and killed two people right before our eyes. Then recited bismillah before drinking water.”

I spoke to one of my friends, who was sentenced and was a member of a far left organization in the 1970s. “I know almost all kinds of leftist organizations around the world. We grew and lived within these organizations. Yet, I have never seen an organization giving its member an order, saying ‘you will stand here for 20 years and when the time comes, you will emerge’, let alone hearing of this order being carried out,” he said in utter bewilderment.

The members of this organization, with the instructions of their leader, stole the examination questions to infiltrate state institutions and became prosecutors, judges and teachers by usurping the rights of many thousands. Any threats to their organization were eliminated by slandering them, covering these slanders on their news channels, sentencing them via prosecutors and judges who are their members, and upholding their sentences in the higher courts once again with their own members. When they couldn’t achieve this, they sought vulnerabilities of these people to exploit and blackmail. Moreover, the members were ordered by their leader to “criticize or slander Gülen,” otherwise they may be exposed. Each and every one of them had experienced being untouchable.

They went from ultranationalism to being an international extra, ultimately to treason. How did they commit all these acts and how did they justify it to themselves?

Psychiatrists are explaining this situation as a “frenzy as a result of excessive narcissism.”

With outside observations and confessors from within, the Pandora’s Box has finally opened. Just like all other cults based on modern messianic apocalyptic scenarios and saviors, the Gülen Movement is also a cult. The members’ interactions with those who aren’t with the cult are limited, even if it’s their families. A narcissistic leader and a cult of narcissism. Most of them entered as they were mere children; however, these people, even the adults, have forsaken their own “selves” just to become a huge and singular “Self”. With harsh punishments (to be beaten by the leader himself, dismissals, threats) and rewards (being praised by the leader, receiving gifts, being exemplified), the bond between the leader and the members was strengthened. This narcissistic structure and its members seemingly didn’t have much problem with justifying all the amorality they were a part of. They claimed all of their amoral actions, which even an average person would abstain from committing, were to save the world. There wasn’t any illegal and amoral act left for them to commit. Moreover, they never believed they would lose; for them their leader is “the holy savior” and they are “the chosen.” What differentiates them from Daesh?

On the other hand, our experiences show that resorting to violence or committing massacres does not have anything to do with being a member of a terrorist organization which emerged from a Baath-ridden, post-American occupation Iraq; white and blue collared members of such a cult are also capable of committing these atrocities. We have seen this on the night of July 15, 2016. Psychiatrists are explaining this situation as a “frenzy as a result of excessive narcissism.” The questions regarding Gülen’s national and international connections and targets are yet to be answered.

Even though this was a small-scale operation compared to the others, the structure of the Gülenist Organization in Turkey was first revealed through the said operation in the following years. Targeted by Gülen himself and accused of being an Al-Qaeda member, 66-year-old Mehmet Doğan was a retired imam. He had a small congregation gathered around him in Muş, a city in the southeast part of Turkey. His congregation consisted of followers of Said-i Nursi, one of the most influential religious figures of the 20th century in Turkey. This group, which also had a publishing company named Tahşiye (Annotate), had been criticizing certain Islamic statements by Fetullah Gülen. The group’s criticism wasn’t known by anyone in Turkey, except for the members of the group and Gülen.In a speech made online on April 6 2009, Gülen talked about a subject only his followers could understand: an organization, which was named Tahşiye. Listening to the speech, you may think that the Tahşiye members are terrorists, or you may think that there is a group named Tahşiye, which consists of innocent members who are to be framed! As Gülen’s followers understood his ciphered messages, the operations commenced immediately. The investigation conducted after the revelation of this scheme uncovered some interesting details: two days after Gülen’s speech, his media outlets, even series being aired on his TV channels, started to cover Tahşiye.First, the Zaman daily covered the group, which was followed by Tek Türkiye (“One” or “United” Turkey) three days later, a TV series being aired on the Gülen-affiliated Samanyolu TV channel. In the series, the gathered “Dark Council” had mentioned a group named Tahşiye. Moreover, on Gülen’s TV channels, the segments from the said TV series were used on news bulletins while covering Tahşiye, as if it was actual footage. While the subject was being covered by the Zaman daily every 3-5 days, another Gülen-affiliated newspaper, Bugün, was publishing news pieces stating that Tahşiye was an armed terrorist organization which had links with Al-Qaeda. Ultimately, 7-8 months later Mehmet Doğan and more than a 100 of his disciples were put into prison by Gülenist loyalists in the judiciary and security forces on charges of being Al-Qaeda supporters.

Even Daesh, which is known to be skillful in employing media and technology, is almost nothing when compared to the Gülenist Organization. While the Gülenist media conducted the usual media business on one side, they were working for the elimination of figures or organizations, which are critical of them or may disrupt their short-term, midterm or long-term targets. A short time after the news on the media, the Gülenists within the security forces and the judiciary were starting to operate and make comments on the issue which enforced the ideas been propagated by their own media outlets.

Thousands of Gülenists were able to fill posts in the judiciary, security forces and bureaucracy; sometimes they openly said they were Gülenists, sometimes they just assumed other identities, concealing their own identities: leftist, extreme leftist, right-wing, agnostic, deist, laic or Islamist, etc. This is also true for their members within the ranks of the media and the academia. To camouflage their identities like a chameleon until the time is right is the characteristic of this organization, which differentiates it from the other terrorist organizations.

It was recently revealed that they were also stealing the answers to various exams, including the military, civil service and university entrance exams. It should be expressed that these people, Gülenists, weren’t just waiting for the answers to the exams; they were also hard-working and diligent. In politics, they infiltrated not only the ruling party, but they have infiltrated almost all existing political, social and religious movements, including many NGOs.

Not all of the Gülenists have been found and put to trial yet, as it is an organization, which has been active for 40 years. The majority of the people of Turkey had at least an acquaintance, neighbor, colleague or even family member which was linked with this organization. This is another characteristic of the organization; none of the members of other secret organizations could have such day-to-day interaction with the people. Moreover, none of the other organizations’ members could look so ordinary to the surprise of the people.

The leadership of this terrorist organization, which resembles modern Western sects like the Moon or Scientology is also different from the leaders of all existing terrorist organizations. You can’t see any PKK or Daesh leaders speaking from different points of view on a singular subject, as if they have numerous different personalities. Gülen, on the other hand, can act as if he is a great humanitarian, the leader of a violent terrorist organization, a slanderer or just an ordinary person. He doesn’t even speak to his followers in a singular voice. It isn’t possible to cover each and every example; however, there was a speech of his to his followers that was uncovered recently:

“If I am to bring harm to Hizmet [“Service” – what the organization calls itself] and my annihilation is a way to protect my institutions, I’m ready to sacrifice my life. Even if it is a cardinal sin, I’m ready to face it. Considering this, you may think about what I’m further willing to do. (…) God willing, we’re ready to face every challenge for the Service. If such sacrifice is necessary, we will let the flames consume us. If we are talking about this issue extensively, all of our friends out there should also do so.”

In short, Gülen is saying commit suicide instead of endangering the organization, even if it means going to hell. Expressing this idea in longer sentences is not a coincidence; it is a method, of course. Looking at these speeches as a whole, it is easy to realize that he is trying to show that everything he says is consistent, while, in fact, it is contradictory.

It took a long time for Turkey to recognize and understand the threat of this organization,  which was thought to be comprised of friendly and charitable people. Even after the realization of the threat they pose, if the state could have made a propaganda film out of the events transpired on the night of July 15, get on to a time machine and show it on the night of July 14, one still would have had a hard time believing that the Gülenist Organization could be that brutal or bloodthirsty.

Moreover, if one had seen putschists firing on the elderly, who begged the putschists to give up their guns and stop this madness, in this hypothetical movie, one would have still said that the Gülenists were being demonized. However, all of this was not in a film; there never was a film. It was the cold harsh reality. The Parliament was bombed, the Chief of Staff was held hostage, and National Intelligence Organization was strafed by helicopter gunships. More than 2,000 people were wounded. All of the people in Turkey felt that this was more of an invasion than a coup. Even today, this harsh reality seems as unreal as a science-fiction film. As it was covered by foreign media outlets, not only do the supporters of the government believe that the coup was perpetrated by this organization; even the government’s fiercest critics are of the same mind with the government in this matter.

Who killed Karlov, the Russian Federation’s ambassador to Ankara? According to the initial findings, there are many signs, ranging from the schools the shooter went to, to his contacts, which suggest that he is a Gülenist. On the other hand, it isn’t a secret that Gülen had established his game with external parameters through his schools all around the world. His ambition and attempts to shape Turkish foreign policy aren’t also a secret anymore. Two years ago, the organization commenced an operation with its infiltrators within the security forces and the judiciary, accusing the government of being corrupt, which actually targeted Turkey’s relations with Iran and the Kurdish Regional Government in Northern Iraq. While the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials targeting the military allowed the organization to open space for their own members, it also eliminated military personnel, which argued that Turkey should prioritize the Russia-China axis. The “demonic Iran” propaganda, which was being propagated by the organization’s supporters, has also been deciphered, as the relations between the US and Iran entered a new phase. Now that the US is opening up to Iran, Gülenists aren’t even mentioning Iran anymore, even while talking about Syria.

Suspecting that the assassin was a Gülenist right from the beginning isn’t without reason. No one would be surprised if he were a Gülenist masquerading as an Al-Nusra militant. Turkey knows very well that Gülenists are like chameleons, always masquerading. This was experienced by everyone ranging from highest-ranking bureaucrats to the ordinary people, in every part of life, from ordinary events to foreign policy.

It is quite hard to believe the existence of Rasputins in a world where we consider politicians as solely pragmatic and voters as rational decision makers. However, both South Korea’s Choi Soon-sil and Turkey’s self-exiled cult leader Fethullah Gülen give us an idea how such an illogical, irrational influence on people can be established over time to be able to hold political and economic power even without attracting the media spotlight.While most media outlets focused their attention on the American elections, the streets of Seoul were filled with hundreds of thousands of people marching against President Park Chung-hee, calling for her resignation. Her approval rating reached its lowest level since she took office. Park is accused of giving official information, state secrets and transferring money to a mysterious woman, Choi Soon-sil, who has no official post, but has been the President’s closest friend. Some in South Korea say that it’s not the corruption they are shocked by – they have experienced many corruption scandals before – rather it’s the irrational behavior of their leader they find scandalous. Here is a bit of background.

Current president Park Geun-hye is the daughter of the former authoritarian president of South Korea, Park Chung-hee. Her father come to power by military coup in 1961 and stayed in power for two decades, until his assassination in 1979. That was not the first assassination attempt he saw, 4 years prior to his death, a North Korean spy had tried to kill President Park, but the assassin accidentally killed his wife, Yuk Young-Soo.

It is during this tumultuous time, after her mother’s death, that Geun-hye became susceptible to anything linking to her deceased mother. Very soon after her mother’s funeral, she met Choi Tae-min, who was a former soup factory worker, later pseudo-Christian (or some say shaman) cult leader claiming to heal people. Much like Rasputin, here was a rags-to-riches story of a soothsayer.

Choi Tae-min convinced the former dictator’s daughter that her mother did not die completely. Rather she had left an open path to reach her daughter when he saw her mother asking for help in a dream. Building a relationship with someone in such a vulnerable state, Choi was able to gain her trust and started to take advantage of this relationship. As a result, he collected a fortune based on his informal relationship with the president’s daughter. That type of relationship also gave him the power to enter into business dealings and to further expand her interests.

Many years after Park’s death, when finally South Korea had embarked upon a democratization process in 1987, Park Geun-hye appeared again on the political arena but this time not as a president’s daughter, but as an ambitious politician competing for parliament. After her long political career, Park Geun-hye finally got elected as President of South Korea in 2012. With Park’s election, Choi’s daughter Choi Soon-sil – characterized by the American embassy in Seoul in a WikiLeaks cable dated 2007 as the “Korean Rasputin” – allegedly became the power behind the throne. Choi, it is said, took full control of government, from preparing important speeches to gaining access to official secrets, and the Choi family transformed the Presidency into a puppet.

These shocking allegations have been revealed only recently. People have learnt about the relationship between the Choi family and Park Geun-hye, which had begun very early on in her life and continued seamlessly at every stage of Park’s success. The first event which exposed this dangerous sham was when Choi Soon-sil’s daughter was unfairly accepted to Ewha Womans University, a prestigious university in South Korea. This was the catalyst for wide spread protests, the perception that the “university entrance exam was the only way to climb the social ladder,” as was remarked by Kwon Jong-sang, a South Korean blogger, and through nepotism, the exam had been removed as a requirement for the powerful.

The interesting thing is that the Gülen cult works in much the same way. Suspicion was first raised about the organization when rumors emerged that exams for the military, police and other government institutions were stolen. Rigging the exam process to gain access to the state was seen as a crucial goal to attain power in the long run.

When it comes to the Turkish case, we see a similar pattern. An organization which tries to capture political power and state institutions using “celestial” power established in a long and historical context, with some differences. Fethullah Gülen, the cult leader just like father Choi, followed a more institutional path in order to gain power. While Choi had convinced the top of government directly, Gülen placed his loyal followers into the government and the state, step by step. The term “state infiltration” may be a Hollywood-style term for Westerners, but it was the exact case in Turkey. Gülenists had started the infiltration many decades earlier. He had even urged his followers to secretly infiltrate the state in a private meeting.

In terms of methodology, whereas the Chois were using pseudo-Christianity or according to some sources, shamanism as a base for cultic features, Fethullah Gülen’s was using Islamic teaching as a base for his miraculous, divine abilities.

Firstly, he had positioned himself above all other humans, and he was even setting up “meetings” with Prophet Muhammad every Thursday, according to one of his former followers. Probably in one of those meetings, he even received an order from the Prophet for “doubling the tweets” (referring to the tweets for the battle against the government by his followers in 2013). He also said that the Prophet came to the International Turkish Olympiads, an annual Gülenist event. After convincing his followers of his superior position, all members became ready for any order coming from the top of the pyramid.

Secondly, Gülen started establishing huge networks, foundations and businesses as well as collecting money from members. Even if some fundraising ended up being used for lobbying activities for Hillary Clinton, because the members are strictly tied to the cult, no objection were ever raised.

Thirdly, the most significant part was education. As mentioned above, many of his followers were stationed in police departments, army, judiciary, political parties, media etc. According to a statement from a military official facing charges of being a leader of the July 15 coup attempt, the military entrance exam’s questions were given to Gülenists as early as 1989. The long-term purpose of education was clear: to raise students from rural areas and use the promise of upward social mobility to make them loyal in order to carryout given tasks. When the government realized how it was entirely surrounded by Gülenists, it was very hard to get rid of the virus all at once. After all, it was a group of people hypnotized by a Choi-ish style, not rational foes.

Most people assume others, including political leaders, behave rationally, as is described in game theories. But the cases of South Korea’s Choi Soon-sil and Turkey’s Fethullah Gülen show even in our “modernity” this may not be the case: individuals, even those in important positions of responsibility, may be motivated by emotional and irrational thinking, instead of the rational reasoning one would expect from modern theories of political science.

Kobach’s proposal has confirmed fears among many Americans – from Hispanics, to African-Americans, to Muslims and a host of Christian and Jewish groups – that the bellicose talk that characterized Trump’s campaign might be more than just political pandering for votes, that the man may intend to do exactly what he promised to do, as soon as he is sworn in as President.Except for a vocal minority, a slew of world leaders have said they would like to give Trump a chance, that perhaps when confronted with the reality of his new job, he would sober up and review his ideas.  Yet there is little indication this is going to happen, and foreign leaders dealing with Trump may need to be more vocal of what a Trump presidency could mean for the rest of the world.

Trump himself has given little indication of what his policies would be, but the people – all white, and almost all men at this point – he has indicated for his cabinet are troubling enough. Journalists, trying to get a grasp on what a Trump presidency would look like, have questioned the potential cabinet members over the last two weeks on the most controversial proposals, and have been repeatedly told Trump will “not rule out” anything.

Trump’s handpicked Chief of Staff: a registry for all Muslims? No, but maybe a registry for “radical” Muslims. The head of the largest pro-Trump campaign fund: Japanese-style internment camps for Muslims? Maybe: “We’ve done it based on race, we’ve done it based on religion, we’ve done it based on region…There is precedent for it.” The man Trump has hired to be his chief strategist: the head of a news website that is a reincarnation of Nazi propaganda in all but name, with the addition of Muslims to the list of those who must be exterminated. Among Trump’s advisors are the most Islamophobic personalities in America, including Frank Gaffney, who helped coin the term “creeping Sharia,” and advocates Congressional hearings to summon all Muslim leaders to prove they do not have a connection to the Muslim Brotherhood, which, in Gaffney’s view, is behind every ill that seems to plague the world today.

Muslims are especially worried. The last two weeks have seen hundreds of incidents of public violence and attacks on Muslims being reported – Muslim women having headscarves pulled off on college campuses, worshippers finding graffiti at entrances to their mosques – many of them cases where the perpetrators took time to mention they felt they could commit these crimes because Trump had been elected president.

Trump’s half-baked foreign policy is just as worrying.

While campaigning, Trump said he would “bomb the shit out of ISIS.” His choice for National Security Advisor is General Michael Flynn, a man who has called Islam a “vicious cancer,” and repeatedly says Muslims are not following a religion, but an ideology, and should not enjoy the benefits of freedom of religion given to others. Flynn would oversee President’s Obama’s vast intelligence and military powers, including a drone program that has killed thousands of civilians in Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan.

Flynn apparently sees little distinction between say, the ideas of Syed Qutb, Hassan al-Banna, Osama bin Laden, or Ayatollah Khomeini.

As Muslim nations who have the resources and clout to combat Islamophobia take stock of Trump, there are indications many no longer expect anything promising from any American president, and would prefer a straight-talking Islamophobe to the neo-liberal whitewashing they say Hillary Clinton would have continued.

Yet there is little reason to believe, beyond a hunch, that Trump will play in their favor, or that the kind of bargaining Trump has indicated he would engage in on the world stage will end up with other nations being able to walk away with any positive conclusions.

Flynn, for instance, has written he believes the July 15th coup attempt in Turkey was perpetrated by Fetullah Gulen, and that Gulen must be extradited to face trial. It would undoubtedly be a change Ankara should be happy about – extradition was perhaps always a political decision, even if President Obama’s administration has insisted it is a legal process.

But a closer look at Flynn’s argument for extradition should trouble Turkish leaders, who have been the world’s most active advocates for a pragmatic, careful, effort at combating extremist groups like Daesh. Flynn, in explaining how Gulen’s followers are part of a “sleeper terror network” does not just advocate for rooting out the Gulenists, he also puts forth troublingly ambiguous assertions that can be applied to every Islamic movement in the world today. And Flynn has repeatedly praised Egypt’s military ruler, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, for his work to combat “extremists” in that country.

Trump has done the same, and while he has not given his blessing to the 2013 Rabia massacre, the President-elect has praised what he calls “strong leaders” in the past. When confronted this March about comments he made in 1990 about the Chinese regime’s killing of hundreds of civilians at Tiananmen Square, Trump did not exactly back down from previous statements. “That [statement in 1990] doesn’t mean I was endorsing that,” he said. “I said that was a strong, powerful government. They kept down the riot, it was a horrible thing.”

Trump may not be as Islamophobic or hawkish as his campaign statements, or his future cabinet members, make him out to be. Most likely, Trump in fact has little knowledge of the world he will soon be dealing with as the head of the sole superpower.

But it is precisely that ignorance that should worry world leaders, in a world were facts seem to matter little, and leaders change positions as often as their socks.

Trump, for instance, has advocated for partnering with Turkey to create a “safe zone” in northern Syria, something that the Syrian rebels, human rights groups and Ankara have long called for. And on at least one occasion, Trump has hinted he would work harder than the Obama administration to meet Turkey’s concerns about groups like the YPG, which Washington currently relies on to fight Daesh.

Yet there are reasons to believe Trump has no idea what he is talking about, and when he finally sits down with his advisors to chart a course in the Middle East, he is as likely to be wooed by his Islamophobic cabinet as by a phone call from a Muslim world leader.

In September 2015, a radio host asked Trump about Iran’s al-Quds force, which Washington has accused of being behind a number of international attacks on Western interests. Trump responded by saying “the Kurds, by the way, have been horribly mistreated… I’m a big fan of the Kurds.” When the host asked about Iran’s Hezbollah, Trump responded by talking about Hamas.

To explain his confusion, Trump then made a telling remark: “You know, those are like history questions. Do you know this one, do you know that one … But as far as the individual players, of course I don’t know them. I’ve never met them. I haven’t been, you know, in a position to meet them. If, if they’re still there, which is unlikely in many cases, but if they’re still there, I will know them better than I know you.”

“I will hopefully find General Douglas MacArthur,” Trump said, explaining that among his future advisors there would be a military expert like the acclaimed World War II General.

Fourteen months after that interview, Trump seems to have found his MacArthur, in Gen. Michael Flynn. Yet Flynn seems to be as ignorant and noncommittal as Trump himself. Flynn has lately praised the Turkish public’s victory over a mutinous faction of the military on the night of July 15th, but the night of the actual coup attempt, he had quite a different view.

As civilians died confronting tanks and jets in Turkey, Flynn was giving a speech at a meeting of an organization that lobbies for tougher measures against what it calls “radical Islamic terrorism.”

Flynn began by telling the audience he had just spoken with a Turkish military officer that he worked with as a member of NATO, then said Erdogan was “actually very close to President Obama.”

“If the military succeeds,” he continued, “one of the things that the military immediately said is, ‘We recognize our responsibilities with NATO, we recognize our responsibilities with the United Nations, we want to make sure that the world knows, we are, we want to be seen as a secular nation’.” The audience then broke out in applause, with Flynn raising a finger, saying “This is worth clapping for.

Military recruitment was the most applicable means of infiltration. The Turkish military has different statuses for its personnel, and the status system has gone through minor changes since it was established. Statuses vary from Generals to Officers, NCOs (non-commissioned officers), specialists and mandatory service personnel. Strategic and operational positions are run by generals and officers, and these were the statuses that became the chief targets of Gülenist Terror Organization (FETO). An Officer candidate is required to attend one of the military high schools, Kuleli, Işıklar or Maltepe, at the age of 13-14.The infiltration process began before the entrance examination for military high school. Gülenists invited talented middle-school students from religiously conservative and relatively poor family backgrounds to join the Quran recitation courses, small tutoring facilities or to the houses of the Gülen order, generally run by elderly FETO cadres (known as abi in Turkish). Here, students were given basic Islamic education and met with Gülen’s interpretation of Risale-i Nur (The Message of Light), authored by Said Nursi. During the 1980s, students recruited by Gülenists were encouraged, guided and even conditioned as officers before entering military high school. The prestigious image of the military uniform was a convincing incentive for a brilliant student to become an officer, and even the parents of the students perceived the uniform to be a sign of high social status.

Early infiltration of the military was based on the self-capacity of the candidate students motivated by the FETO cadres, but FETO members under cover as secular officers in the military were able to steal the exam questions to provide the answers to future cadets during late 1980s and early 1990s.  Lt. Col. Levent Türkkan, the aide de camp to Gen. Hulusi Akar for years and involved in the coup attempt on July 15 2016, confirmed that he was supplied in advance with the military high school entrance examination questions in 1989.

Each military student and their families were subjected to an intelligence inquiry by the national intelligence service, police and the gendarmerie intelligence units. Since the FETO candidate cadets were selected from among religiously conservative families, they had no chance of surviving in the military high schools. Thus, students were advised to adapt themselves to the Kemalist discourse during school days; however, their actual devotion and loyalty was to the FETO and they continued to pay visits to the houses of Gülenists in İzmir, Bursa and Istanbul, where the military high schools are located. During these visits, students were warned not to reveal their FETO identity, ordered not to take the Risale-i Nur booklets with them to the school campus, and even asked not to pray during their time at school.

Once they had passed the first two years at the school, they rarely encountered problems in being identified as Gülen-linked students and easily graduated from military high school and became qualified to enroll in the military academies, which is the next major step to becoming an Officer. The majority of the military academy students (army, navy and air force) came from the military high schools, and some students from the civilian high schools also enrolled at the academies. A similar path was followed by FETO students from the civilian high schools, taking the university entrance exam to enroll at the military academies. However, in this case, FETO members at private tutoring centers and the OSYM (Student Selection and Placement Center) played a vital role in enabling the students to enter the military academies by educating them and even providing the exam questions.

Senior FETO officers attending the interviews gave preference to crypto-FETO students who applied to become cadets at the academies. After being accepted into the academies, the students survived in the schools by pretending to share or sometimes by advocating secularist and Kemalist ideology, and they were successful in that regard. But, at the same time, they expressed their devotion and loyalty to FETO and paid regular visits to Gülenist houses. They were told in these houses that their duty was to graduate with honors degrees, which would enable them to be potential candidates for the status of General in the future. They were motivated, educated and helped with school assignments. Even if they were unlikely to be potential candidates for General status, FETO expected to benefit from their operational positions.

Who organized the coup attempt?

The July 15 coup plotters were mainly of the rank of Brigadier General, becoming generals in 2012, 2013 and 2014, entering the military high schools in the early 1980s and the military academies during the mid-1980s. The operational-level coup officers ranged from Lt. Colonels to Captains, who entered the military high schools in the early 1990s and 2000s. The pre-military school period and the entrance process into both the military high schools and the academies were vital for FETO to infiltrate the military, and it was mainly the Officers that FETO exploited. A former military personnel, on the condition of anonymity, states, “… after-school infiltration into officer status is not a desired procedure for FETO members, since it jeopardizes the compartmentalization” (this is an unconventional warfare definition for the division of the cellular structure of a secret organization).

The second status that FETO desired to infiltrate was NCO circles. NCOs play a significant role in technical and tactical military missions. Since the strategic aspect of NCO positions is rare, FETO made no long-running efforts to infiltrate NCOs. However, FETO aimed to infiltrate the NCO schools of the gendarmerie and the air forces, where the NCOs are mostly employed. The gendarmerie is the law enforcement agency and has the closest ties with local people in Turkey. It also has a widespread operational and intelligence network, at work in every corner of Turkey, and gendarmerie operations and intelligence are dependent on NCOs. On the other hand, the air force ground service also is dependent on NCOs, and no flights can be made without ground services. These two NCO circles were targeted for infiltration by FETO. However, the biggest infiltration effort against NCO status was made with the young Sergeants in their early 20s. Their youthful energy was usurped by the Gülenists.

FETO members in the military targeted NCOs who regularly prayed as true believers of Islam and victimized them for discharge from the military to divert attentions from FETO members in the military. During the 1990s, military personnel who were discharged from the Turkish armed forces were either ordinary Muslims or belonged to other branches of the Nur Order, of which the Gülenists allegedly claimed to be a part, but not the Gülenists themselves. This was a tactic utilized by FETO to survive in the military.

A discharged NCO states that, “… in 1997, my unit and I visited a commando unit for a military training. I asked a place to pray at noon and a senior NCO of the hosting unit who was a FETO member came by and warned me that I should not pray openly, instead I should hide my way of practicing Islam. I was shocked. I was not the member of an order and I told him that I am a Muslim and I have no intention of hiding my identity. He got very pissed …”

FETO had tried not only to infiltrate the military from outside but also to “desterilized” the strategic and operational units of true soldiers. The Special Forces (SF) became a primary target of FETO, and between 2004 and 2008 hundreds of elite SF warriors were transferred from their teams into regular army units.

When the figures involved in the military are analyzed above, the infiltration target is clearly seen. FETO had an agenda to capture and hold the strategic chain of command in the Turkish armed forces. The lately promoted Generals were perceived as the main group behind the coup attempt, but the real soldiers of the state were not involved in this treason.

It is a difficult but equally vital task for Turkey to fight against this terror organization abroad, considering that FETO members are very skilled in manipulation and deception. They have various tools to manipulate politics and public opinion outside of Turkey. Most people are unaware of their methods of deception. Revealing these methods and informing the countries that host FETO institutions will be a major challenge in the fight against Fetullah Gülen Terror Organization.

From an Education Empire to a Bureaucratic Empire

The FETO network and institutions are spread over more than 140 countries. Their main focus is the education sector, but their activities are not limited to it. Education is often a suitable and legitimate entry point to the countries in which FETO wants to become institutionalized. It concentrates its activities in civil society, targeting Turkish diaspora first and trying to reach the local elite. It continues its activities in the economic and cultural domains.

In the American context, FETO controls the charter schools network and uses US taxpayers’ money to finance these schools. FETO administers more than 150 charter schools in the US and these schools have more than 60,000 students. Some argue that FETO works in close cooperation with the US authorities, especially in Central Asia, where more than 90 percent of Turkish schools are owned by the FETO network. In Central Asia and the Balkan countries, it operates elite education institutions that usually offer strong training in the English language.

FETO has institutions in 42 of the 57 OIC countries and owns more than 2,000 schools all over the world. Its estimated assets reach 25 billion US dollars. Education institutions and well-trained teachers loyal to FETO are among its most important assets. In Germany, FETO owns more than 24 schools and more than 300 associations. The host countries often support or facilitate their education activities. But, in fact, FETO activities are banned in some countries due to security concerns.

FETO also instrumentalizes humanitarian aid with its affiliate NGOs. It tries to form business networks and aims to reach politicians, bureaucrats and other decision makers. It uses cultural and educational activities as the fundamental pillar of its PR campaign. Education, Turkish culture and the alleged Sufi version of “moderate Islam” are the major assets that FETO utilizes for legitimizing its operations in the international arena. It also lobbies business environments and politics but tries to differentiate the political and economic domains from those of culture and religion. Some politicians and religious NGOs in the US receive financial support from FETO. Education is often a useful cover and a source of funding to uphold its clandestine activities. It eventually targets and tries to manipulate elite-level bureaucratic and political posts.

Western Friendly “Moderate Muslims” as Opposed to “Islamic Radicalism”

FETO places special emphasis on PR campaigns in the transnational domain. Its education and “dialogue” activities are the main PR instruments. Inter-faith dialogue provides a platform on which FETO’s religious activities are concentrated. In the non-Muslim majority countries in particular, FETO tries to promote inter-faith and inter-cultural dialogue projects. The moniker of a FETO-affiliated institution gives the impression of a dialogue center promoting a “liberal and pro-dialogue” version of Islam as opposed to a more conservative or extremist version. It tries to portray its understanding of Islam as compatible with Western moral codes and political interests.

In its activities it refrains from presenting itself as solely an Islamic religious network or missionary Islamist network that tries to spread a religious message. It uses the label of hizmet (service) rather than da’wah (preaching of Islam). FETO’s transnational network is flexible, meaning that it tries to adapt to the priorities and needs of the countries in which it wants to become institutionalized.

Transnational Elite Network Par Excellence

FETO is a hierarchical and multilayered organization, ruled under a strict chain of command. In both Turkey and abroad, it targets elite-level students, businessmen, bureaucrats and politicians. It recruits smart students in the countries in which it operates and provides education opportunities in the higher education institutions in Turkey. It tries to form a permanent bond with the selected international student body. Before they were closed, FETO owned 15 universities in Turkey, and was also active in the administration of some state universities. Thousands of international students are educated in these higher education institutions. FETO maintains strong ties with the students educated in these institutions and further turns them into loyal subjects by appointing them to proper positions within the organizational hierarchy.

FETO is a network that concentrates its activities on the elite, rather than focusing on making a difference at the grassroots level. Unlike other traditional religious networks, it is not in the service of ordinary people. Almost all activities related to this organization specifically target the elite or potential elite of different kinds. It tries to reach high-level politicians or to train the people who will become elite bureaucrats or cultural and economic elites in their home countries. Focusing on education brings FETO legitimacy, which also helps it to become connected to the future elite in various countries. The version of education it offers is a modern Western-style education. It lacks almost any Islamic courses in its international curricula, a typical method used to disguise its real purposes. In underdeveloped countries that lack educational infrastructure, the strong education provided by FETO-affiliated institutions makes a big difference. One of the distinctive assets of FETO is the well-educated human resources that are ready to serve in different parts of the world.

The transnational networks of FETO may eventually become a Messianic elite diaspora network that may not only threaten Turkey’s interests but also manipulate the politics of the host countries. The FETO network increasingly recruits local followers from the countries in which it has become organized. Education is the innocent stage of recruitment, but the organization intends to increase its influence in bureaucracy and state apparatus. With its financial resources and educated human capital, it also manages to gain access to politicians and the business elite. Its visible face is in the areas of education and religious and cultural dialogue, but its secret aim is usually to take control of state apparatus and to manipulate the elite. Its members have gained experience of hiding themselves and deceiving people over more than four decades. Now, the main challenge for the Turkish government is to deal with the transnational dimension of FETO. Without the coordination and help of the countries that host FETO institutions, this struggle will be even more challenging. Therefore, diplomacy and international PR should be an important tool used in the struggle against FETO.

In particular, many of the Iranians in Europe and the US suffer from a traumatic reading of their history as they are also misled by their limited familiarity with the social and political developments that take place in Turkey. From the morning of July 16 onwards, they chose to concentrate on those who were purged, detained or arrested for their connection with FETO, Fetullah Gülen Terror Organization, rather than on the 250 citizens who died or the thousands of others who risked their lives and were injured when resisting the putschists. Take, for example, the inflammatory comments Hamid Dabashi shared on social media recently, in which he irresponsibly compared President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan with, all at once, Kim Jong-un of North Korea, Adolf Hitler, Mussolini, Franco of Spain, Ioannis Metaxas of Greece and Juan Peron of Argentina. Ironically, what infuriated Mr. Dabashi so much was the historic huge gathering in Yenikapı/Istanbul on August 7 where millions of people, including the president, the prime minister and the leaders of the two main opposition parties, came together to peacefully denounce the putschists again.

The Incubus of the Past or the Burden of History

Such an attitude not only displays an academic frivolity not uncommonly found among some Iranian experts who know little about Turkey but also testifies an uncanny tendency among them, as among some of their Turkish counterparts, to exceed the limits of a scholarly comparison between Turkey and Iran. True, Iran and Turkey have, roughly from the early 19th century onwards, followed fascinatingly similar historical trajectories. But the underlying spirit in these trajectories has been noticeably different. Throughout their modernization processes from 19th century onwards although they converged in their struggle against the ever-increasing imperial pressures coming from the West, the struggle consolidated the extra-governmental elements in Iran while it was mainly organized around the state machine in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey.

Further, despite the major ups and downs, throughout the decades, popular elections played the determining role in Turkey, while Iran almost invariably appeased repression at home to remove foreign domination. It is quite problematic that, while some pro-regime figures in Iran tend to interpret every popular movement in the Middle East as inspired by the uprisings that brought about the Iranian Revolution of 1979, some of the anti-regime Iranians hasten to analyze almost every such movement, especially if it harbors an Islamic tone, as a prelude to an Islamic state.

Interestingly enough, however, these two opposite positions seem to agree on an unfavorable reading of the failed coup attempt in Turkey. Basically, the now well-known obsession against President Erdoğan and his policies constitute a common ground between the two opposite camps. It is no secret that the conservative circles inside Iran have long since turned against Erdoğan. They see him and the current regional policies of the Turkish government as an obstacle to taking full advantage of the ‘historical opportunity’ that has emerged for them from the widespread destabilization in the Middle East to realize their regional power aspirations. Many conservative figures in Iran condemned, inasmuch they did, the crushed coup attempt not on democratic grounds but for notably different motivations. The anti-regime Iranians, on the other hand, have mysteriously accused President Erdoğan of leaning towards authoritarianism and even totalitarianism, the two terms whimsically and irresponsibly used by Erdoğan’s opponents.

Diverse Political Readings

Also, reactions to the failed coup inside Iran have not only reflected the perceptions of Turkey by Iran’s political elite but have also reemphasized the political divides at home. Javad Zarif, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, was among the first to condemn the coup attempt. Hours after the attempt, he emphasized the significance of popular will and sided with the Turkish people. For the Moderate-Reformist figures, the failed coup attempt attested to the significance of the unalienable popular will and the futility of any move to run against it. Unsurprisingly, with the presidential elections less than a year away in Iran and the risk of Rouhani’s disqualification from running for president by the Guardian Council becoming more pronounced, the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and his close circle have used the failed coup attempt to send a democratic message to the conservative establishment in Iran to respect the popular will.

For the Principalists, the failed coup has provided the best opportunity to disfavor the Rouhani government on one obvious point, to wit, its rapprochement with the US, especially following the nuclear deal reached in 2015. In a statement at a gathering in Tehran, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei referred to the failed coup attempt in Turkey as a sign of the untrustworthiness of the US for its alleged involvement. Another conditional condemnation of the failed coup attempt came from Ali Akbar Valayeti, Khamenei’s aide in international affairs, who used it to criticize Turkey for its insistence on the removal of Asad in Syria. In an interview on 16 July 2016, only one day after the coup attempt, he expressed his hope that “a day would come when the Turkish administration would also respect the opinion and vote of the Syrian people” and claimed “Bashar al-Assad has also been elected through the ballot box.”

The crushing of the coup attempt marks a watershed, not only in Turkey but also in the entire region. As Javad Zarif put it, “Turkish people’s brave defense of democracy and their elected government proves that coups have no place in our region and are doomed to failure.” In order to secure a lasting solution to the regional crises, most significantly to the Syrian issue, both Turkey and Iran must cooperate as two governments with high popular support, as destabilization or unpopular rule in one inevitably affects the other. Based on the recent foreign policy moves, there is every reason to suggest that Turkey is determined to restore peace in the Middle East by maximizing regional cooperation.

The comments made by some Iranian scholars teaching at western universities not only demonstrate their misreading of the developments which recently took place in Turkey but also give insightful ideas about the limits of their objective thinking. Fortunately, many Iranians inside the country see any coup attempt as categorically damnable, as they welcome the popular resistance in Turkey that heroically crushed the putschists on July 15. They, as every people in the Middle East, appreciate the costs of ineffectual, unpopular and foreign-controlled governments for the region.

Turkey has lived through the biggest trauma in its recent history, as the members of the Fetullah Gülen Terror Organization (FETO) attempted a coup d’état on July 15, 2016. However, the heroic people of Turkey managed to quell this sordid attempt by literally standing unarmed against flying bullets and tank shells. Together with the people were the police, loyal soldiers and politicians, first and foremost being the president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. As a country which has just survived a coup attempt, Turkey has astonished many with its political resilience. While systematically neutralizing coup plotters in multiple governmental organizations, such as the military, judiciary, bureaucracy, health and education sectors, which had been infiltrated by the FETO, the government preserved its functionality and managed to perform as normal.

In the same vein, to the astonishment of many, the Turkish economy showed great resilience in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt. Even in the first working day after the coup attempt, there was no panic in the financial markets. The Turkish lira only marginally lost its value against the US dollar and there was no rush on banks or bonds. In fact, the effect of the coup attempt on the financial markets was barely discernable. The Turkish democracy and economy have survived major setbacks in recent years and proved their resilience, the true extent of which has been understood more clearly in the light of the failed coup attempt.

It was absolutely vital to take necessary steps and give relevant messages to soothe the financial markets at such a critical time. The policymakers managed this process well in a calm and professional manner. The statements were to the point and the policy actions met the needs of the financial markets. In this vein, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Şimşek underlined that the policymakers were implementing best practices and Turkey was committed to the market economy. Şimşek also assured that capital controls were out of the question. Moreover, The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey took immediate actions to ensure the efficient functioning of the banking sector and to relieve financial investors.

In addition to these statements and policy actions, a well-functioning financial system, strong public finances, a dynamic real sector and a moderate current account deficit helped the Turkish economy to stay afloat against the failed coup attempt.

After having endured financial troubles and two major financial crisis in 1994 and 2001, Turkey finally set out to establish financial infrastructure via several regulations and supervisory institutions such as Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency and Savings Deposit Insurance Fund. Having learnt the lesson from the financial troubles suffered, the Turkish financial system has become much more resilient than that of most countries in the world. That is why the Turkish financial industry stayed totally intact in the aftermath of the 2008-09 global financial crisis as financial industries around the world experienced hard times and even faced numerous bankruptcies, such as Lehman Brothers, as well as bail-outs, such as massive insurance company AIG. When we take a look at the important indicators of banking sector, such as credit growth, capital adequacy ratio, the non-performing loans ratio, return on assets and return on equity, it is clearly seen that the Turkish banking sector is not only financially robust, but also highly profitable compared to that of many countries and as far as historical records are concerned.

Public finance is also strong in Turkey. As of 2015, public debt as a share of GDP stood at only 33 percent in Turkey, while it is 249 percent for Japan, 178 percent for Greece, 104 percent for the US and 90 percent for the EU. While the interest burden was very high in the 1990s, as real interest rate of total domestic debt stock was more than 30 percent, it diminished tremendously as real interest rate plummeted to single digit levels in the 2000s. Moreover, Turkey has wiped off all debt owed to the IMF by paying the last installment of 421 million US dollars in 2013, which marked the end of the 52 year debt history with the IMF.

Real sector indicators such as the capacity utilization rate of manufacturing, real sector confidence index and firm entry & exit rates show that the current situation of the Turkish real sector provides a robust image. Current account deficit has been regarded as the Achilles heel of the Turkish economy, as Turkey relies on foreign capital inflows to finance the current account deficit, making it vulnerable to global economic fluctuations. However, although current account deficit and economic growth rates moved in the same direction until two years ago, with higher economic growth rates resulting in a widening current account deficit and lower economic growth rates reducing current account deficit, the economy has been growing in tandem with narrowing current account deficit for the last two years. To put this into numbers, current account balance as a share of GDP decreased from -7.7 percent in 2013 to -5.4 percent in 2014, before shrinking to -4.5 percent in 2015.

The Turkish economy showed the glimpses of its resilience in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt, such that the economy and financial system have worked very well without any instability; as if nothing major took place just a matter of days earlier. The Turkish economy survived serious challenges and actually fared markedly better than that of numerous countries, especially in Europe, in the last few years. It now faces a bigger challenge. However, Turkey, with its strong and healthy economy and financial system, has the required strength and resolution to overcome this challenge too, as the immediate aftermath of the failed coup attempt has attested.

Note: A longer version of this article was recently published by SETA Foundation with the title, “The Resilience of the Turkish Economy after the Failed Coup Attempt”

The psychological impact of the coup attempt has created a strong sense of betrayal in Turkish society, leading to the formation of a new sociological base. There were already disgruntlements among an extensive number of people over the Gülenists’ chronic double-dealings, their messianic culture, and their ambivalent discourse inconsistently and awkwardly juxtapose religious and secular values insincerely for pragmatic reasons. After the coup attempt, a sense of betrayal emerged against Gülenists, who, in fact, were never expected to resort to military power and to use it against civilians. Until the bloody coup attempt, Gülenists occupying governmental posts were accused of disobeying state authority by forming a parallel structure within the state and solely looking after the group’s own interests. With the coup attempt, however, they went one step further and targeted the state itself with the purpose of becoming rulers of the country. They aimed to reconstruct the state in accordance with their own vision by using every, including deadly, means possible, which is unpardonable to any Turkish citizen.President Erdoğan, making an analogy between chameleons and FETO members one week after July 15, came to the conclusion that chameleons would feel insulted by this comparison. Erdoğan declared that FETO members pathetically change their ideology, discourse, and ideas according to every political conjuncture. Today, many people in Turkey agree that Gülenists have no fair religious, national or universal agenda, except their own ends that justify all means in any given context. The unreliable and unrespectable characters of Gülenists constitute the main motive behind their exclusion from society.Another reason behind the sense of betrayal in Turkish society is the well-known charitable activities of Gülenists, who had been identified generally with their non-profitable organizations. Their primary agenda was presented as public education, for which they applied a variety of methods to reach different socio-economic classes of society. They organized several educational programs targeting not specifically one social group, but differing groups according to economic income, occupation, and family background etc. However, people realized that their sole purpose was indoctrination. They organized social aid gatherings for housewives and political discussions for academics and journalists. For different social groups, they utilized different discourses. Additionally, Gülenists were generally known for their dedication to the group’s ideals such as devoting their lives to hard work for little money. Teachers working at FETO schools, in addition to earning little, further denoted a fixed portion of their salary to the organization. Religious and universal values stood at the core, appealing to all social groups in Turkey.

Many had supposed that Gülenists were good people and that their activities would help society for the better. A good example is Bülent Ecevit, a former prime minister of Turkey and known to be a strong advocate of the Kemalist leftist political ideology. Ecevit supported the Gülen Movement by saying that Fetullah Gülen was the representative of moderate Islam vis-à-vis political Islam. However, with the uncovering of the secret agenda of the Gülenists and its messianic discourse, both concealed by the avowal of universal moral values, many people realized the terrible mistake they had made, which caused a strong sense of betrayal. Since the coup attempt, people in Turkey have fully grasped the fact that the Gülenists’ real intention was to take control of the state. Fetullah Gülen, the FETO leader, taught his disciples to obey all rules without question and to wait for the right time to seize power. It seems that the Gülenists sacrificed their lives to reach the promised day, to which they had dedicated their entire lives.

Although Turkish politics is passing through turbulent times, one can safely argue that the decades-old discourses and highly problematic hypocritical approaches of Gülenists have lost all plausibility. Moreover, the Gülenists have lost their legitimacy and credibility within society. A recent study shows that eighty-one per cent of Turkish citizens support Gülen’s extradition to Turkey and a subsequent trial. Many believe that the Gülenists’ will to seize power will not stop here and that they may seek to regroup in other countries in order to redesign their domestic politics. The foreign minister of Turkey, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, has already pointed out such a threat for some of the Turkic countries in which FETO has been established for decades, as in Turkey. As Gülenists attempt to turn Turkey from democratic to military rule, it is probable that they will try to apply similar methods to other countries in the near future. On the bloody night of July 15, Turkish people acknowledged that Fetullah Gülen and his followers pose a global threat since they did not hesitate to use heavy weapons against civilians when they tried to seize power.

FETO has lost all legitimacy in the eyes of Turkish society and, as a side effect, has united Turkish citizens from all ideological backgrounds and worldviews. Turkish citizens survived by defending their democracy against this religio-military attack. For Gülen, it seems that Turkey was only a step toward a broader goal; the organization will certainly continue to disseminate and realize its messianic purpose from East to West. The FETO leader should be considered not only a religious fanatic and fundamentalist in his own country but also a danger to the democratic world order.

Second, and more critically for Turkish-American relations, there is also a broad agreement, including both right and left wing, conservative and secular journalists in Turkey, that the Gülenists were cultivated and nurtured by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the Cold War, both as a staunchly anti-Soviet and pro-American movement, and as an instrument with which to discipline the Turkish state and society while constructing a new kind of “moderate Islam.” Regardless of whether one accepts these arguments or dismisses them as conjectures based on circumstantial evidence, most Turks believe that the United States is behind the Gülenists in general and the recent military coup attempt in particular, as even the New York Times belatedly found out: “Turks can agree on one thing: US was behind failed coup.”At least since the 1990s, there has been a steady stream of news stories, columnists, and op-eds making the latter argument, namely, that the Gülenists are merely an extension of US intelligence within Turkish bureaucracy, military, police, business, and media. This argument has become increasingly widespread since 2014, and, in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt, the identification of the Gülenists as the main culprit of the failed coup, and the United States as Gülen’s primary foreign sponsor, has quickly become the basis of a national consensus. The disagreements, to the extent that they exist, implicitly revolve around whether the Gülenists have any significant autonomy from the United States, or whether they are merely an extension of the US’s intelligence apparatus without much autonomy or agency of their own. Despite this rather minor disagreement, however, the Turkish public mostly believe that the United States, using the Gülenists as its (at most semi-autonomous) instrument, condoned or even actively sought to overthrow the democratically elected government of Turkey on July 15, 2016.Third, following from the above, it is impossible for Turkish-American relations to be unharmed in a situation in which the Turkish public and the media, both pro- and anti-government, agree that the United States shelters a group that is officially designated as a “terrorist organization” by Turkey, and sometimes described as an esoteric religious cult with messianic pretensions, which orchestrated a military coup to overthrow the Turkish government. As mentioned earlier, the situation is even more severe if one believes, as many Turks do, that the Gülenists launched this military coup at the behest of the CIA or the US government.The suspicion of a US-backed military coup has a reasonable basis in Turkish history, since many historians and intellectuals concur that the United States backed the 1960 and the 1980 military coups, as well as the military memorandum (de facto coup) of 1971 and the so-called post-modern coup of 1997. Thus, for example, critical historian Professor Cemil Koçak of Sabancı University averred immediately after the failed coup that, “there cannot be a coup in Turkey without US approval” (Zaman, July 23, 2016). Many American observers who openly supported the military coup attempt (e.g. Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute, or the retired lieutenant colonel Ralph Peters on Fox TV) or who implicitly condoned it by issuing suspiciously equivocal statements that treated Turkey’s democratically elected government as being morally equivalent to a military dictatorship (e.g. Richard Haass of the Council for Foreign Relations, or Congressman Brad Sherman of California), convinced most Turks that at least a powerful faction with substantial influence among policy makers in the United States supported the failed military coup attempt in Turkey. Thus, Turkish-American relations have already suffered and are likely to suffer more in the near future as a result of the failed coup and the suspiciously anti-democratic US responses to the coup.

Fourth, there are two main options for Turkish-American relations going forward.  First, the United States may convincingly demonstrate that it will not employ the Gülenists, or any other similar instrument, to exert influence in the Turkish military, bureaucracy, judiciary, media, and politics-at-large. Exerting such influence through covert networks is against the spirit of a genuine “alliance” between two sovereign political entities. According to leading Turkish policy-makers, including President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Yıldırım, the minimum prerequisite for the pursuit of this option seems to be the extradition of Fethullah Gülen from the United States to Turkey, which would signal the willingness of the United States to recalibrate bilateral relations as a genuine alliance.

The second option is the breakup of the Turkish-American alliance, and Turkey’s realignment with one or several other great powers to balance against the United States, since the United States would then be reclassified as a hostile power for sheltering Gülen and the leading Gülenists, who are implicated in the failed coup plot. Moreover, the United States may even be designated as the foreign state sponsor of Gülenist terrorism against Turkey. Russia, Brazil, Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, Pakistan, and France are among the many middle or great powers with which Turkey has established amicable relations, at least for a limited time (in the case of Russia and Iran), under AK Party governments since 2002. Russia is the most likely and nearby great power with which Turkey may seek to build such a balancing coalition in the near future. Turkish Eurasianists, an ideologically pro-Russian group composed of Kemalists, Maoists, and other leftist nationalists, have advocated such a pro-Russian reorientation in Turkish foreign policy for almost the past two decades, as I argued and demonstrated in my articles in Turkish Studies(2015) and in Ab Imperio (2004). However, pro-Russian sympathies go far beyond this radical intellectual movement in Turkey after the failed military coup, for various reasons.

Russian President Putin was the first major world leader to call President Erdoğan on the day after the military coup attempt to state his support for the democratically elected government of Turkey, and Russia is the first country to which Erdoğan will be paying an official visit since the coup. These two observations alone are indicative of a palpable pro-Russian reorientation after the coup. There are even reports, emphatically accepted and circulated by some Turkish journalists, that Russian intelligence warned Erdoğan just hours before the impending coup, even though there is no official verification of these reports. Moreover, the Turkish pilots who shot down a Russian bomber aircraft in November 24, 2015, which brought Turkey and Russia to the brink of war, have been taken into custody as suspects in the Gülenist conspiracy. This incident is cited as evidence of Gülenists deliberately trying to instigate a military conflict between Russia and Turkey, in the service of US interests.

Fifth, any new alliance that Turkey may form with another great power, including Russia, is unlikely to be as asymmetric and as exclusive as the Turkish-American alliance has been since Turkey’s entry into NATO in 1952. There is at least one objective and one subjective/attitudinal reason for this. Objectively, there is no other great power whose military economic capabilities would massively overshadow Turkey’s capabilities as do those of the United States. Thus, if a Turkish-Russian alliance was to be established, for example, the difference in bilateral military economic capabilities would not be as incomparable or as asymmetric as the difference in bilateral capabilities in the Turkish-American alliance. I have argued elsewhere that the military economic capability gap between Russia and Turkey closed considerably with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, only to widen somewhat with the rise in oil prices in the early 2000s. Subjectively, if Turkish-American alliance breaks up precisely because of the anti-American public opinion that the asymmetry of this alliance engendered over time, it is unlikely that the Turkish public opinion would be convinced to be part of another asymmetric alliance.

Finally, despite all of the above, it is still more likely, for structural reasons and simple path dependence, that the Turkish-American alliance will persist after a lengthy and tortuous renegotiation, in which significant political capital will have to be spent on both sides of the Atlantic. If such a renegotiation of the alliance succeeds, in the end, Turkey will continue to be a key US ally as it has been since 1952, but Turkey’s status within the Western alliance might then resemble that of France, a country that has been a US ally but with a set of preferences and priorities that differ significantly from the United States in certain important respects.

It suffices to remember that, as late as 2003, France led the opposition to the Iraq War within NATO, and Turkey surprised the world, including many Turks themselves, by refusing to participate in the US-led invasion of Iraq (although French foreign policy in general changed significantly during Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidency). These kinds of disagreements are to be expected and should be respected and tolerated in a genuinely multilateral alliance. The American-British initiative to invade Iraq, executed with a “coalition of the willing,” and its disastrous consequences for millions of Iraqis and the wider Middle East, including Turkey, provides a tragic cautionary tale against the dangers of asymmetric alliances with unilateral decision making.

Democracy and democratic values have long been at the epicenter of international affairs. Universally applied democracy has come to determine not only internal but also international affairs. Despite this, democracy has remained a controversial issue and, not in a few cases, has been used as a tool in the hands of those who claim to be standard bearers of democratic values: the West.

On July 15, the Turkish state structure was threatened by a coup attempt, which aimed to overthrow the Turkish government and democracy. Governmental institutions that represent democracy in Turkey such as the Grand National Assembly (TBMM) or media outlets were bombed and innocent civilians who strove to defend their nation were killed. More than 250 men, women and children were killed during the coup attempt organized by the Fetullah Gülen Terror Organization (FETO), which eventually failed to achieve its goal.

For the first time in Turkey, politics, the media and people united against the common enemy: the coup plotters. Nevertheless, during and after the coup attempt, another opponent actor emerged. Surprisingly, some international actors, both leading politicians and media outlets, were disappointed by the failure of the coup attempt and still fail to recognize the democratic values to which the Turkish citizens firmly adhered. Moreover, some of these actors strove to exacerbate the situation. At this point, it is fair to ask whether these international actors want a democratic or a non-democratic Turkey. It seems that their choice is a non-democratic Turkey, which will follow their recommendations and submit to their will.

The stance of these international actors can be analyzed under three subtitles: politics, the media and Turkish expats. With the exception of the latter, the behavior of the other actors was not fair –not only towards the Turkish state but also, most importantly, towards the Turkish citizens.

During the first hours of the coup attempt, state leaders and government representatives made vague statements. It was clear that their stance towards the coup attempt was to be shaped according to its outcome. As it became evident that the putschists were losing ground, only then did the state leaders begin to declare their support for the democratically elected government. This pattern was followed primarily by the US and other Western countries. A striking example is the message directed to the US citizens from the US embassy in Turkey in which the coup attempt was called an “uprising”.

While politicians were reluctant to make politically incorrect moves, the media acted as it habitually has done during the last years: it vilified Erdoğan. From the beginning of the coup attempt, Western media did not hesitate to announce that the Turkish government had fallen and that the military was in control. News about Erdoğan requesting asylum in Germany was widely broadcast. In addition, even when the president, the prime minister and other leaders declared that the state was in control of the situation and that this was just a coup attempt, Western media did not transmit this critical information to their audiences.

Fabricated news about Turkey occupied the headlines of the Western media and these were unfortunately not mere exceptions. In fact, Turkey has become immune to such kinds of hoax, though the Western public has not. The Western media almost unanimously began to accuse the Turkish government and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan directly or indirectly and are still trying to portray him as culpable in these events. First, the mainstream Western media did not mention the names of those who attempted the coup. They have been portraying FETO as a peaceful face of Islam and Western countries continue to harbor the organization’s leader and leading personalities in their respective countries. Moreover, the Western media and politicians forget that the organizers of the coup attempt–FETO–pose an imminent threat to the security of Turkey, and the measures taken in the aftermath of the coup are the same as any state would take to protect its own national security.

Second, the Western media focused solely on President Erdoğan, and did not mention at all how the putschists bombed the capital city, how the army helicopters killed more than 250 innocent women, men and children without mercy or even how the united people marched on the streets to protect their state. Most of the headlines raised concerns about the “authoritative tendencies of Erdoğan and the purge against the opposition groups.” By this, they concealed the reality and the message that the Turkish citizens gave on the streets. They refused to see that all political parties represented in parliament declared their opposition to the coup attempt. Similarly, the Western media refused to expose the support against the coup attempt in the streets and the squares of Kurdish-populated cities.

Third, the Western media and many journalists warned and even threatened the Turkish authorities against punishing the putschists. It can be said that they do not want the Turkish government to take proper measures against the putschists. Moreover, the Western media stated their defiance against the state of emergency declared by the Turkish government, a legal right in the constitution, and also accepted by the European Human Rights Convention. Their Orientalist approach towards Turkey shows that they still consider Turkey to be a typical Middle Eastern or a third-world country.

An important example that needs to be mentioned is WikiLeaks. Soon after the coup attempt, WikiLeaks posted on its official Twitter account that the Turkish citizens must get ready to fight as it was to publish approximately 300,000 emails from the AK Party that would shed light on the coup attempt and those behind it. It was a shame for WikiLeaks and the media outlets that made news of this statement as it resulted in a huge sham. The emails that were made public were mainly spam email followed by some inconsequential emails. Afterwards, many Turkish citizens mocked WikiLeaks, while the international media remained silent, pointedly not updating their previous news in this regard.

The media outlets in the Middle East were/are more neutral towards the coup attempt. They were divided into two opposing categories. The first category welcomed the coup attempt in Turkey, which has been considered as the last Ikhwan-like regime in the region. This view was shared by the Egyptian media, which is under the control of the Sisi government, an administration established after a military coup in 2013. Similarly, the media outlets controlled by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were also strongly pro-coup and anti-democracy. Those who are in favor of one-man rule and strictly authoritarian regimes consider Turkey to be one of the last remnants of the popular and democratic movements of the Middle East. The second view welcomed the crackdown of the coup attempt and declared its support of the Turkish people and their legitimate administration.

Lastly, the Turkish expats in different countries went out onto the streets to support the democratically elected Turkish government in its battle against the Gülenist Terror Organization that plotted the coup attempt. Many Turks gathered in front of Gülen’s mansion in Pennsylvania, requesting his extradition to Turkey. At a time when the Turkish people are intimidated by the West, the support of their expats was essential. However, some influential Turks living in the West and working for the Western think-tanks followed the policies of their host institutions, criticizing the Turkish government and President Erdoğan, but omitting the death toll and the outstanding resistance of the Turkish people.

To conclude, the domestic and international actors, in most cases, had opposite impacts on the events of July 15. While the domestic actors served as a catalyst for defending the unity of the state and the democratic values, the international actors mostly tended to obliterate the reality, especially through their biased media. For what it is worth, the Western antagonism did nothing but further unite the Turkish people. Today, the people are aware of their power and this has made them stronger than ever; a notion that the West has long taught but little supported.

That night saw how people with bare hands could stand tall against the putschists who had guns, tanks and jets, along with ruthlessness. On that night, over one hundred Turkish people were murdered as the putschists opened fire on them with guns paid for by the people of Turkey. In the following days, the Turkish people increasingly took to the streets in their millions all over Turkey to defend their country and democracy, literally from dusk to dawn. In the end, the coup attempt was mostly quelled at the expense of over two hundred people, who were martyred.The Turkish people have grown substantially richer and democracy has taken root as a much more citizen-friendly environment has emerged in Turkey in the AK Party (Justice and Development Party) period. Make no mistake: while the AK Party faced coup attempts and enormous obstacles, and even fought for its existence in a judiciary battle in 2009, it has almost always tried to foster democracy in Turkey. Hence, it is no surprise that the AK Party is very popular in Turkey, with apparently no matching predecessor in its almost one-hundred-year history.Prior to 2012, Western leaders and media outlets praised the AK Party government for its accomplishments both economically and politically, and Turkey was hailed as the poster boy of democracy. However, from 2012, the same Western leaders and media outlets started to criticise the AK Party government, and particularly its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, for growing increasingly authoritarian; however these claims failed to be substantiated. This situation made everybody wonder whether these accusations were simply employed as a pretext to discredit the AK Party and Erdoğan. At the same time, political turmoil in Turkey began to escalate relentlessly. First came the Gezi Park protests in 2013 by numerous illegal factions, as well as young people, from relatively wealthy Kemalist families, who had traditionally opposed the AK Party government and Erdoğan.After the failure of the Gezi Park protests, the second attack came on December 17-25, 2013, this time with the joint efforts of the FETO factions in the judiciary and police forces. The FETO apparently attacked the government and Erdoğan with never-proven and finally aborted judicial claims. The FETO members, who had infiltrated the Turkish police forces, even tried to detain Erdoğan and his son. The AK Party and Erdoğan survived this attack too.

In the following year, Erdoğan gained a political victory in the presidential election with 52 percent of the total votes, and became the first president of the Republic of Turkey to be directly elected by the constituents. However, the clouds above Turkey only darkened as the third attack came from another terrorist organisation, the PKK, apparently with the sole aim of toppling the president Erdoğan and the AK Party government. The PKK escalated violence relentlessly as it targeted military and police stations, as well as killing several hundreds of soldiers and–mostly Kurdish–civilians, since 2014. However, the PKK has paid a very heavy price as over 7,000 PKK terrorists have been neutralised by the Turkish military in the last year.

Then came the final attack. This was the biggest, such that it could not be compared to the previous attacks: a military coup attempt by the covert faction of the FETO in the military. The leader of the FETO is a cleric named Fetullah Gulen, who has been living in the US since 1999 in a massive manor very well protected by armed guards. From at least the 1970s, the FETO has tried to infiltrate every governmental body from universities to judiciary and military forces, with a special focus on key institutions and departments. It did everything to capture positions and titles in various governmental organisations, while disguising itself like a chameleon, as some of its member had lived unacceptable lives from the standpoint of Islam for decades, even though they were in fact adherents of a seemingly very conservative religious organisation.

The FETO ran smear campaigns against people in order to strip them of their titles and positions, only for those positions to be filled by FETO members. People were even murdered with the help of the FETO faction in the police force, and these empty chairs were taken by FETO members. In addition, the FETO had had a self-declared, but fake, charity network in order to raise money to run the organisation financially. It is estimated that the FETO had been commanding over 20 billion dollars. For decades, it raised money from its members as well as business persons from different walks of life by threatening them outright with imprisonment or death. No one knows how many people have been murdered or imprisoned by the FETO, though a conservative guess would be in the thousands, if not more.

All of this happened under the guise of a spiritual organisation, which is why the FETO was to hide itself for so long, until it tried to topple Erdoğan and the AK Party government. The FETO has only recently been accepted formally as a terror organisation by Turkey as its true face, which certainly amounts to nothing less than a terror organisation, has begun to surface. Although Turkey has suffered several coup attempts in the last 70 years, in none of them had congress buildings been bombed by jets or had people been opened fire upon and murdered. Now, the Turkish people intensely abhor Gulenist people and Gulen himself, the man behind the FETO and who continues to reside in the US under the protection of armed guards. The democracy in Turkey has definitely been damaged by this failed coup attempt, but its prospect is certainly much brighter in the hands of the Turkish people, who defended it at the expense of their lives.

To this end, they took over the state-run TV (TRT) and forced the anchorwoman to read the coup declaration. However, it is not possible to achieve a coup d’état merely by taking over a state media organ in this age of technology. At this point, the attitudes of other media institutions became important. In fact, the Turkish media did not obey the plotters’ order to “broadcast the coup declaration on other TVs as well.”To the contrary of this so-called order, other Turkish media organs, in live broadcasts, interviewed Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım and then President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and conveyed their messages to the People of Turkey. From CNN Turk to NTV, from A Haber to Ulusal Kanal and TVNET to TRT, the media in Turkey stood against the coup. The plotters barged into TRT and CNN Turk, and a possible raid to A Haber was averted by citizens of Turkey who were trying to guard the building against the coup-plotters. Police fought off the plotters’ attack on TURKSAT (state-run communication satellites), foiling their attempt to take control of all broadcasts.President Erdoğan’s messages on live broadcast, and reruns of his messages, played a tremendous role in raising national willpower and bringing the Turkish people to the streets to stop the tanks driven by the putschers. The Turkish media took sides with the government and the people, not the coup-plotters; therefore, they prevented the atmosphere of fear and panic from spreading, and contributed to the abortion of the coup attempt.This marks a milestone for the Turkish media. In the history of Turkish politics, the mainstream media had mostly supported coup plotters – from the May 27, 1960 military coup to the September 12, 1980 military coup, and from the February 28, 1997 post-modern coup to the April 27, 2007 military memorandum. Generally, the media has acted as their mouthpiece and broadcast accordingly. However, on July 15, 2016 – the date of the failed coup attempt by FETO (Fetullah Gülen Terror Organization) – the Turkish media set an excellent example of the power of journalism to oppose the perpetrators, and sided with democracy and freedom. Therefore, the media in Turkey has experienced a turning point in its history. Unfortunately, however, it is impossible to say the same for the international media.

The U.S. and British Media Back the Coup Plotters

International media, the U.S. and the British media in particular, lamented the failure of the coup attempt in Turkey. CNN, The New York Times, Fox News, The Independent, BBC, The Financial Times, the Washington Post and the Times were full of news stories in favor of the coup attempters rather than criticisms about the attempted coup.

The headlines in the aforementioned newspapers and TVs leaned heavily towards the perpetrators’ side, with comments such as “The Coup would have been better for Turkish democracy,” “People behind Erdoğan are like sheep,” “These must have been done for a successful coup,” “Fight against DAESH will be negatively affected,” “Erdoğan deserved the coup,” and “Authoritarian tendencies will increase in Turkey.”

The approach of the western media favored the failed coup, considering these news bites and assessments, which belittle the People of Turkey who resisted the coup attempt. A similar reaction, yet in a different tone, came from western politicians as well.

All in all, why the western media organs do not want democracy for Turkey while they defend democracy for themselves will remain an enduring question. For now, this question will remain unanswered and related discussions will continue. However, the Turkish media and the western media have approached the failed coup, attempted by the disciples of Fetullah Gülen in the military, from opposite sides; and that, in fact, affirms criticisms that the FETO (Fetullah Gülen Terror Organization) is “a network guided by the global powers.”