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he Gulf countries’ reliance on U.S. military bases makes them vulnerable to Iran. Furthermore, their cooperation with the U.S., which creates instability in the Middle East, pits the Gulf countries against Iran. Iran views the U.S. as the Great Satan and enemy. Thus, Gulf countries that provide military bases and land access for U.S. regional policies are seen by Iran as the greatest threat to regime security.

The ongoing shadow conflicts between Iran and Israel reached a new level on June 13, 2025, when Israel launched large-scale attacks against Iran. Unlike the conflict theater of April 2024, the tension between the two countries turned into a direct military crisis this time. This crisis also created major security concerns in the Gulf countries.

The conflict between Israel and Iran has deeply affected the region’s geopolitical dynamics and the Gulf’s security strategies. Israel repeatedly targeted and struck Iranian-backed militias in Syria until December 8, 2024. Then, on June 13, 2025, Israel attacked Iran’s embassy in Damascus. The ongoing clashes between the two countries after this date produced asymmetric results in Israel’s favor and were a warning sign for the Gulf countries.

Following these events, the Gulf countries’ efforts to balance their relations with Iran and Israel became paramount. While maintaining security cooperation with the U.S. and Israel, the Gulf countries sought to strengthen diplomatic relations with Iran. This created a security paradox that complicated the region’s security paradigm.

Vulnerabilities in the Gulf’s security architecture

The security architecture of Gulf countries relies heavily on the military support and defense cooperation that the U.S. and its Western allies provide. Historically, these countries have relied on the U.S. security umbrella against direct or indirect threats from Egypt, Iraq, and, currently, Iran via proxies. At the same time, many U.S. allies, including Israel, cooperate directly and indirectly in the field of defense.

However, this situation creates several significant security vulnerabilities. First, the Gulf countries’ dependence on U.S. bases leaves them vulnerable to Iran. Furthermore, their cooperation with the U.S., which creates instability in the Middle East, positions the Gulf countries against Iran. The Gulf countries provide the U.S. with military bases and land access for its regional policies and view Iran as the greatest threat to their security because Iran views the U.S. as the Great Satan/enemy.

Conversely, the U.S. military presence in the Gulf could be targeted by Iran and draw a reaction from other regional actors. Iran has openly threatened to attack U.S. bases. The first such attack occurred on June 23, 2025, when Iran launched missiles at Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar.

Although there were no casualties from the attack, it exposed weaknesses in the Gulf’s security umbrella. Such attacks demonstrate the fragility of the Gulf countries’ security relations with the U.S. Trump and the U.S. administration responded weakly to the Houthis’ 2019 attack on Saudi Arabia’s oil production facilities, the kingdom’s most important source of income. This failure to meet the Gulf’s security expectations is evident.

However, Iran’s threat to close the Strait of Hormuz poses another major security risk for the Gulf. The Strait of Hormuz is a vital route for a significant portion of the world’s oil trade, impacting the energy exports of Gulf countries. Iran’s threat to close this route poses a significant geopolitical and economic threat. Closing the Strait of Hormuz could directly affect the security of regional energy routes and threaten the economic interests of Gulf countries. This further complicates Gulf countries’ relations with Iran and greatly affects regional security.

Qatar’s security paradox

Qatar is the country that best exemplifies this paradox in the Gulf’s security architecture. It has strong military ties with the United States and is home to Al-Udeid Air Base, the largest U.S. military base in the region. At the same time, however, Qatar plays an important role as a diplomatic mediator. Its relations with Hamas, in particular, have made Qatar a critical actor in raising international awareness of the humanitarian situation in Gaza.

This leaves Qatar in a paradoxical position in the Iran-Israel conflict. Qatar engages in dialogue with Iran while condemning Israel’s military attacks. For instance, Qatar condemns Israel’s attacks on Iran as “a clear violation of sovereignty,” yet, as a country hosting a U.S. military presence, Qatar’s stance is contradictory.

Following Iran’s 2025 missile attack, Qatar declared that it was under threat; however, no serious damage occurred thanks to the effective deployment of its missile defense systems. In reacting to Iran in this incident, Qatar emphasized the importance of maintaining regional stability.

This demonstrates Qatar’s efforts to mitigate security vulnerabilities while maintaining its role as a mediator for regional stability. This dual approach has established Qatar as a key player in the Gulf’s security architecture. However, maintaining this balance may not always be possible, as Qatar’s security ties with the U.S. could complicate regional diplomacy.

The strategic dilemmas and search for solutions of the Gulf countries

Gulf countries are engaged in various diplomatic efforts to prevent the Iran-Israel conflict from escalating. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman, for example, are deepening their relations with Iran in an attempt to reduce tensions in the region. This diplomatic opening was solidified by the agreement reached in March 2023 between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which was brokered by China.

However, the Gulf countries’ flexible security strategies also pose a risk. These countries are simultaneously exposed to pressure from both their Western allies and Iran. Although Gulf countries rely on their cooperation with the U.S. and the West for security guarantees, this situation could increase regional tensions.

Gulf countries continue to strive to prevent war from spreading to their regions while ensuring regional security cooperation. These efforts require a constant balancing act between ongoing communication with Iran and covert and/or overt relations with Israel. By maintaining this balance, Gulf countries aim to prevent a regional war. Nevertheless, this complex security architecture and strategic dilemma create uncertainty regarding the Gulf’s long-term security.

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he Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani recently celebrated 10 years in power. His father, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa, abdicated in his favor in 2013 when his son was 33 years old. The handover was significant and exemplary in that it did not involve a coup d’état which is quite common in the region; however, it coincided with a very difficult period. The Arab Spring was in full swing, and the state of Qatar found itself at odds with the authoritarian Arab regimes in the region for actively supporting popular uprisings.

Regional and international actors wondered whether the emir would change the country’s foreign policy which was based on Doha’s active partisanship. A U-turn in foreign policy was seen as normal, but what if he followed the path of his father? Would he be able to cope with the difficulties at a time when The Arab Spring was slowly turning against the people who were rebelling. The answer to this question was on everyone’s mind.

As soon as Sheikh Tamim came to power, he decided to continue the foreign policy inherited from his father and to use a slightly softer discursive language. But Sisi’s Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain wanted to hold Qatar accountable for supporting popular uprisings. In fact, they triggered a diplomatic crisis by withdrawing their ambassadors from Doha in March 2014.

The emir asked these countries to reconsider their decision, but to no avail. While dealing with hostile states, Sheikh Tamim also sought to revive the mediation diplomacy that had been a feature of Qatari foreign policy before the Arab Spring. For example, he acted as a mediator between Iran and the West, and brought the Taliban and American officials together in Doha to find a lasting solution.

The blockade of Qatar

In June 2017, Qatar’s neighbors, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and further afield Egypt, began to blockade Qatar by air, land, and sea. Qatar suddenly found itself on the verge of losing its independence. The angry four demanded full allegiance from Qatar. They made a series of demands, from the closure of Al Jazeera to a commission to verify that Qatar had fulfilled the commitments they had demanded—officially all this meant taking over Qatari sovereignty. If the emir accepted the demands, Qatar would become a kind of satellite state. If he didn’t, Qatar would face sanctions.

Although his country was besieged from all sides—even the sending of food was forbidden—the emir did not give up and, with the support of his closest ally, Turkey, and his neighbor Iran, he reduced the destructive aspect of the blockade and managed to keep his country afloat for four years until the Al-Ula agreement was signed in 2021, which lifted the blockade.

Qatar was able to emerge from the blockade without any significant damage, which was a great personal success for Sheikh Tamim. The effect of the soft power factor, invested in since Sheikh Hamad’s reign, was crucial to this success. Since Sheikh Hamad came to power, the Qatari government has been nurturing good foreign relations and making new friends. Thanks to soft power moves such as hosting the U.S. army at the Al Udeid Air Base, actively using the Al Jazeera media group in foreign policy, providing a base for the Turkish army, balancing Saudi Arabia with Iran, and attracting Western support through investment, the blockade was overcome with almost no serious repercussions.

The 2022 FIFA World Cup

Sheikh Tamim also continued to work to improve the country’s image at a time when its sovereignty was under threat. Under his leadership, Qatar organized the 2022 FIFA World Cup. He began preparations for the tournament as soon as he succeeded his father and managed to organize the world’s largest event at an unusual time, in November-December 2022, spending a total of almost $200 billion. The 2022 FIFA World Cup has always had an important place in the image of Qatar. For decades, Qataris have wanted to put Qatar on the map for all to see and thanks to this event, the whole world had the opportunity to get to know Qatar better. In addition, the fans gained knowledge about the Arab Muslim culture.

Meanwhile, Qatar’s investment in football encouraged its Arab neighbors and brought them into the competition. For example, Saudi Arabia brought top players, including Cristiano Ronaldo, to the Saudi Football League; bought Premier League’s Newcastle United; and invested heavily in e-sports and golf—all after Qatar boosted its image thanks to the World Cup.

On the domestic front, Sheikh Tamim allowed elections for the Shura Council, even though Qatar is an emirate. The first elections took in October 2021. By law, 30 of the council’s 45 members are elected by popular vote. Although the council does not share power, it is an important development that the members of such an institution are elected by the people. Sheikh Tamim also abolished the kafala (sponsorship) system before the World Cup in response to criticism of labor rights abuses.

Normalization of diplomatic ties

On the foreign policy front, relations with the blockading Arab states have been normalized and ambassadors have been appointed on a reciprocal basis. The Qatari government has also abandoned its active interventionist foreign policy in recent years and begun to play the role of mediator again. In particular, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan through Qatar and the Taliban’s opening to the world through Qatar are the most notable achievements of Qatari foreign policy in recent years. In the upcoming period, the Emirate of Qatar under Sheikh Tamim is expected to continue its mediation diplomacy and not to get involved in regional conflicts.

Among others, Sheikh Tamim is expected to play an active role in foreign policy, bring the conflicting parties in the region to Doha, pursue a policy of balancing between the great powers, continue to be involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, personally deal with issues of the Islamic world, and increase aid to other countries. In short, Qatar’s maverick foreign policy, handed down from father to son, will continue as it has for the past three decades.

It should be noted, however, that this will come at a price. Although Sheikh Tamim has improved relations with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt, it is certain that rivalry will continue. UAE leader Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) are locked in an unrelenting rivalry to become the leaders of the Gulf and even the Arab world.

If, despite their rivalry, they continue to be hostile to Sheikh Tamim’s Qatar, then competition will be inevitable. If the fierce competition is confined to MBZ and MBS, there is a possibility that Qatar under Sheikh Tamim will benefit from it. However, given that the latter has a different character and style from the other two leaders, it seems more likely that relations will be strained again and that the Qatari emir will refrain from aligning himself with either MBZ or MBS.

It is safe to say that Sheikh Tamim will somehow bring his country safely to shore with each new problem. In the last decade, he has successfully dealt with complex problems, effectively protecting his country and gaining valuable experience. It appears that Qatar is in safe hands and will continue on its chosen path without compromising its principles.

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ccording to the Qatar-based Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, discussions have taken place regarding the establishment of a joint naval force involving Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman. The primary objective of this coalition is to ensure the safety of navigation in the strategically significant Persian Gulf. China has actively participated in mediating the talks between Tehran, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi. On June 3, following this news, Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, Commander of the Iranian Navy, stated that several regional countries, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, will form a new naval coalition in the northern parts of the Indian Ocean.

During a television program, the Iranian Navy Commander stated that almost all littoral countries in the northern parts of the Indian Ocean are willing to support Iran and collaborate collectively to ensure security. He went on to say that while Iran and Oman have conducted numerous joint naval exercises in the past, other countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Iraq, Pakistan, and India are also keen on engaging in joint naval cooperation. Irani claimed that the “unjust” presence of foreign powers in the region would soon come to an end, and that the countries of the region would take responsibility for safeguarding it. Irani did not provide specific details about this development, and there have been no statements from the countries allegedly involved in the formation of this alliance.

On June 6, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin announced that Beijing is in favor of the concept of a joint naval force consisting of Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other regional countries. During a press conference, Wenbin stated that the preservation of peace and stability in the Middle East’s Persian Gulf region is crucial for the prosperity of the countries and people in the area, and plays a vital role in global peace, the advancement of global economic growth, and ensuring a sustainable energy supply. Wenbin highlighted China’s commitment to playing a positive and constructive role in promoting peace and stability in the region.

Response to Middle East NATO?

According to Iran’s state broadcaster, Press TV, the proposal to establish a regional naval alliance is seen as a response to U.S. and Israeli suggestions made last year to create a Middle East NATO. Commander Tim Hawkins, the spokesman for the U.S. 5th Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces, criticized Iran’s claim of forming a maritime security alliance, stating that Iran is the primary cause of regional instability and cannot claim to protect the waters it threatens. Hawkins mentioned that Iran has attacked or seized 15 international-flagged merchant ships in the past two years, and stated that the U.S. is reinforcing defenses around the Strait of Hormuz with its partners.

In contrast, the UAE government announced its withdrawal from the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) on May 31, expressing disappointment with the U.S. military’s perceived lack of response to Iran’s seizure of commercial tankers in April and May. Although UAE officials denied that their withdrawal from the CMF was a direct result of U.S. inaction against Iran’s maritime activities, a phone call on June 2 between UAE National Security Advisor Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan and his American counterpart Jake Sullivan suggests uncertainty and tension regarding the course of action in the absence of U.S. security guarantees.

Abu Dhabi’s disappointment with the perceived weaker U.S. commitments has led to a shift in the UAE’s foreign policy, emphasizing diplomacy and partnerships with China and Russia to address regional threats from Iran. This approach may reflect both the recognition of declining U.S. influence in a multipolar geopolitical environment and a strategy to secure stronger American commitments.

GCC Challenges

The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) member states have faced challenges in establishing effective joint military structures and agreeing on a common vision regarding threats and challenges. Factors contributing to this include a lack of appropriate strategic culture and military power, significant divisions and rivalries within the GCC, concerns about Saudi Arabia’s dominance, and the presence of private interests.

Despite making joint declarations, the GCC states are not a unified entity, and a joint military operation in the event of a conflict would likely have a limited value. Decision-makers within the GCC primarily focus on the quantity and technological advancement of their military equipment, rather than their ability to use it effectively. As a result, the security of these countries is seen as fragile. The issue of the GCC states’ actual combat value, effectiveness, and ability to cooperate in warfare remains unresolved.

Despite significant military expenditures, the GCC states have heavily relied on Western countries for military protection and security. However, the perception of the United States as an unreliable security guarantor has led the Gulf states to seek closer ties with major powers like China and Russia. They have also increased diplomatic efforts to counter the perceived threat from Iran. Consequently, the possibility of security cooperation between Iran and the Gulf states is not entirely out of question. Nour News, a news website close to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, suggested on Tuesday that Iran’s nuclear technology could even be potentially transferred to Saudi Arabia under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in accordance with international law.

Given that the countries involved have not denied the plan to establish a joint naval force, it can be inferred that discussions on this matter have taken place. However, it is important to note that the focus might be more on joint action or planning rather than forming a formal naval alliance. The Iranian Navy Commander’s statement regarding previous joint naval exercises by Iran and Oman, as well as the interest shown by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Iraq, and other countries in naval cooperation with Iran, could indicate Iran’s plans for joint exercises in the Gulf or Sea of Oman, similar to their annual exercises with China and Russia in the Indian Ocean.

Change in the course of relations

While the joint Iranian-Arab naval exercises will not be more than messaging, they will be an indication that Iran and the Gulf countries are making efforts to change the course of their relations. Although the details of this project have yet to be disclosed, it nonetheless is indicative of an important geopolitical shift that is taking place in the Middle East.

Both Riyadh and Tehran are looking for new options to manage regional equations, and Washington is no longer seen by the Gulf states as a security guarantor and a regional problem-solver. This includes China’s economic partnership plans in the region. Moreover, Washington’s pledge to build an alliance of democracies against autocracies in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine has also irritated some Gulf Arab countries.

The timing of an incident involving alleged “harassment” in the Strait of Hormuz amidst these ongoing developments is significant. On June 5, the U.S. Navy announced that its sailors, along with the UK Navy, had come to the aid of a ship reportedly harassed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the strategically important Strait of Hormuz.

In response to these allegations, on Monday, June 5, IRGC Navy Commander Abbas Gholamshahi stated that a distress call had been made by a Marshall Islands-flagged ship through the international channel, and Iranian forces had responded accordingly. Gholamshahi emphasized that certain hostile media outlets in violation of media ethics were attempting to spread misinformation, incite unrest, and legitimize the “illegitimate and unjustified presence of non-regional countries in the Persian Gulf.”

The escalation between Russia and Western states over NATO enlargement turned into a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, as Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a “special military operation” on February 24, 2022.

While the entire world is witnessing the largest attack of one country on another in Europe since World War II, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members are far from being decisive in condemning Russia for invading Ukraine. Geopolitics, the perceived U.S. retreat from the region, and deepened ties between Russia and the GCC states seem to force Gulf monarchies to strike a balance in this conflict.

A hesitant Gulf towards the Russian invasion

The day before the invasion, speaking on behalf of the GCC during a UN meeting, Abdulaziz Alateek, Saudi Arabia’s deputy permanent representative to the UN, conveyed the council’s concerns about the escalating situation in Ukraine and urged all parties to solve the crisis through political dialogue and diplomacy. Yet, as the military invasion and the conflict unfold, the GCC’s stance towards Russia’s aggression remains reticent.

At the time of writing this opinion article, none of the six GCC states have issued a press release on their foreign ministry websites openly condemning Russia. For its part, Qatar has pursued an active phone diplomacy with Ukraine as Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani received a phone call from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

Qatar’s foreign minister exchanged calls with his Russian and Ukrainian counterparts, and denounced the violence. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba also had a phone conservation with Bahrain’s foreign minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani to urge the GCC to call on Russia to cease the conflict.

Kuwait released a statement underlining that the “State of Kuwait stresses the importance of respecting Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty and affirms its full support to international efforts aimed at calming the situation, defusing escalation, promoting self-restraint and addressing international conflicts by peaceful means.” Kuwait’s sensitivities on state sovereignty might go back to painful memories of the Iraqi invasion of the Gulf monarchy in 1990.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) abstained from the UN Security Council vote on February 26 condemning Russia and asking Moscow to withdraw its troops. The UAE called the result a “foregone conclusion” and urged for dialogue avenues to be opened.

In 2019, the largest export item to Saudi Arabia, accounting for 18.8% of all exports, was barley with a value of $232 million. Wheat also constituted 32.7% and 6.1% of total Russian exports to Oman and the UAE respectively in the same year. Yet, the GCC is not as dependent on Russian grain as Egypt and Turkey.

Further, many improvements were made in domestic agricultural production in the GCC states and, particularly Saudi Arabia, has retained self-sufficiency in wheat and some other agricultural products as of 2014.

It is unlikely, therefore, that a possible deterioration of trade relations with Russia will cause food insecurity in the Gulf and the GCC states can sustain their food security in the high-risk scenario thanks to their diversified sources and strategies.

Military cooperation is another strategic and diversified layer of Russian-GCC relations. Since 2015, Russia is an emerging partner for GCC states in arms sales. According to the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, Russia’s arms exports to the GCC states rose from $48 million in 2015 to $331 million in 2020, the UAE being the largest recipient.

In 2018, Russia and the UAE signed a declaration of strategic partnership and engaged in joint investments in the military industrial sectors. Security cooperation between Russia and the UAE has grown significantly in Syria and Libya as well.

Furthermore, media reports went as far as to claim the Saudi acquisition of a Russian S-400 air defense system would be among the topics discussed during Lavrov’s Gulf tour in March 2021.

As of 2021, Russia-GCC engagement in Syria has been particularly cooperative, and relations with Russia have become too precious for GCC states to discard the conflict in Syria amid growing concerns over the U.S. retreat from the Middle East.

The United States factor

The GCC states’ response to the Russian invasion can equally be viewed from the Gulf monarchies’ changing relations with the U.S. The growing mistrust among GCC states towards the U.S. security commitments in the region is exacerbated by Washington’s militarily hesitant response to the Russian invasion, following its recent withdrawal from Afghanistan.

In the last eight years, the GCC states have witnessed the U.S. shifting many of its red lines. Most recently, the Trump administration’s inaction in the face of attacks against the Saudi oil facilities in 2019 stood as a sharp reminder for Gulf monarchies that the U.S. security blanket is not guaranteed.

Saudi Arabia dismissed the U.S. request to pump more oil into the market to reduce prices and reiterated the kingdom’s commitment to the OPEC+, an agreement reached in 2020 with OPEC countries and Russia. Receiving a phone call from President Biden on February 9, King Salman highlighted in a statement “the role of the historic OPEC Plus agreement in this regard and the importance of maintaining the agreement.” According to Robert Mason, Saudi Arabia also refused to cease military cooperation with Russia as a part of the kingdom’s hedging strategy.

The Gulf reconciliation at the Al-Ula Summit suddenly changed the regional atmosphere and the rhetoric of war among Saudi, Emirati, and Qatari decision-makers. The themes of building trust and confidence over broader regional security moved out of the Gulf context, given the new trend of Gulf diplomacy that favors economic interest over political conflict. The emerging Gulf portrait requires Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar to polish their international image as the region’s natural stabilizers and peaceful actors.

Although the Al-Ula Summit put an official end to the Gulf crisis, it threw a veil over political divergences for an unpredictable period of time, at which point it may lead to the redefinition of the Gulf states’ security interests. In fact, there is an intolerant ambiance in the post-Al-Ula era. Peace appears on the surface; however, beneath it lies the spirit of competition and aggression via the indirect foreign policies of Qatari and Emirati decision-makers who hide behind the foreign policy rhetoric of peace and stability for the eyes of the international community and, particularly, the United States.

Both Qatar and the UAE use their financial and media powers to challenge each other’s narratives as the central stabilizer establishing regional order. While other regional powers like Turkey, Israel, and Iran expect to benefit from the new Gulf diplomacy and its economic offers, the overall security perceptions of political actors in the Gulf and the Middle East continue to be unstable.

The central question here is to what extent Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE can tolerate each other’s regional aspirations in negotiating the process of regional order? As the Gulf states don’t have a joint foreign policy and a common defense agenda, establishing bilateral military relations with Gulf and non-Gulf actors independently seems inevitable.

It has been over a year now since Qatar and the UAE agreed on restoring bilateral ties and ending adverse statements against each other. However, the institutional rhetoric of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) on foreign policy and bilateral relations do not change rapidly as illustrated in a speech by Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, the foreign minister of Qatar, who stated, “It could take some time to move past this difficult period.”

Official delegations of Qatar and the UAE held a meeting in Doha in early February 2022, and stated their commitment to creating joint mechanisms and procedures for implementing the Al-Ula Declaration. Afterwards, the photograph of Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani and Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan shaking hands during the opening of the Olympic Games Beijing 2022 demonstrated the intention of the parties to portray a positive diplomatic ambiance at the highest level.

Before the Al-Ula declaration, Qatar and the Emirates continuously utilized their financial power through media and lobbying abroad to put pressure on each other. Recently, Qatar objected to the Abraham Accords signed between Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain, by criticizing the UAE’s efforts to initiate a diplomatic move without negotiating a solution to the Palestinian cause.

After the Al-Ula declaration, one might mention the continuity of the indirect competition over the Hollywood movie The Misfits that portrays Qatar as “Jazeeristan,” a terrorist state and a global financier of terrorism.

The movie, co-produced by the UAE, Paramount Pictures, and Highland Film Group, mentions actual Qatari institutions such as Al-Emadi Hospital, the Lekhwiya police force, and Al Jazeera supporting the state’s “terrorist” activities. Another incident of behind-the-scenes competition can be seen in the UAE’s attempts to encourage journalists in Africa to campaign against Qatar’s hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup.

In another case, the UAE’s ambassador to Israel, Mohamed Al Khaja, accused Al Jazeera of continuously manipulating the narrative of the Palestinian cause and shifting the credibility of the events from the truth.

Likewise, Qatari newspapers published the visit of Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, the foreign minister of the UAE, the first Emirati official to visit Damascus since 2011, to discuss “new horizons” by referring to the Syrian civil war as a brutal and multifaceted war that has killed innocent civilians.

One can also come across news in Qatari media criticizing the UAE’s labor sponsorship system as problematic given that thousands of migrant children lack schooling and access to healthcare because they are not issued birth certificates by the authorities as a result of being born to unmarried or single parents and not paying medical bills.

The marring of the UAE’s international image during its military involvement in the Yemeni civil war decreased the chances of the Biden administration perceiving the UAE as the primary peacebuilder in the Gulf. The Biden administration’s recent selection of Qatar as a major non-NATO ally to cooperate in security and investment sectors demonstrated that the U.S. foreign policymaking would not tolerate aggressive foreign policies against the region’s instability and neighbors.

The Biden administration’s intolerance of aggressive foreign policies and military activities benefited Qatar’s previous regional narratives during the blockade period.

As the issue of Muslim Brotherhood is no longer on the table in intra-Gulf discussions or a factor in the Gulf states’ relations with other countries, ideological war narratives  are now replaced with a competition over the display of state capacity to promote peace-building and regional stability.

The process favors Qatar for now, but all this is tied to the U.S. administration’s foreign policy. Upon realizing that, the UAE recently established a new foreign policy built upon the theme of “good neighborliness” so as not to return to the hostile competitive environment and to avoid recalling its notorious military aggression in Yemen.

The UAE’s diplomatic move to reconcile and improve ties with Turkey through highest level visits and positive statements about the visit of Israel President Isaac Herzog to the country in January 2022  indicate the UAE’s determination to diversify regional allies peacefully and independently of its Gulf neighbors. In this new era of narrative wars built upon peace rhetoric, Qatar as a major non-NATO ally of the United States, appears to be the UAE’s primary competitor.

During a visit to Europe while young, the former emir of Qatar Hamad bin Khalifa was asked by an immigration officer at a European airport where the state of Qatar was located. Today, there is an airport in Qatar named after him, the Hamad International Airport, and Qatar has become a well-known Middle Eastern country, especially after its political role in the Arab Spring and its remarkable successes in the fields of media, energy, and diplomacy. As a strategy, Qatar makes use of soft power tools, including sports. The country’s emir and his close advisors realize the importance of sports diplomacy in achieving the country’s goals of becoming a regional sports hub.

Qatar has invested time and effort, showing a massive capacity in order to gain the rights to organize the FIFA 2022 World Cup, one of the world’s most important global sports events. Qatar will become the first country in the region to host this major sports event.

Prior to hosting the 2022 World Cup and the 2030 AFC Asian Cup, Qatar has hosted nearly 500 international sports events since 2005, covering all types of sports and age groups. For example, Qatar hosted the 2006 Asian Games, the 2015 World Men’s Handball Championship, the 2015 World Boxing Championship, the 48th World Artistic Gymnastics Championship, the World Handball Championship for Intercontinental Champions Clubs, the 2019 ANOC World Beach Games, the 2019 Club World Cup, and the Club World Cup 2020. Finally, it hosted the 2021 FIFA Arab Cup in December, and the Turkish Super Cup final in January 2022. In 2021 alone, Qatar hosted 63 sport events, including six world championships.

Qatar’s hosting of the FIFA 2021 Arab Cup was a turning point for a number of reasons. After a long interval of almost two decades, the Arab Cup was finally organized in December 2021 and took place in Doha. For the first time, all Arab countries participated in the event, which was professionally organized. The Arab Cup was first launched in Lebanon in 1963, but due to regional instabilities could only be held 10 times.

Technically, Qatar wanted to test its ability to run the FIFA 2022 World Cup with the Arab Cup, which was a mini-test for the World Cup scheduled to kick off on December 2, 2022. Naturally, beyond the sports, these international organizations are linked to Qatar’s national interests. Qatar proved itself very successful at winning over the hearts and minds of the Arab peoples who follow this tournament.

Qatar’s hosting of the FIFA 2021 Arab Cup was a turning point for a number of reasons.

At sports events, Middle Easterners a savor moments of joy and foster the feelings of brotherhood and unity, putting aside conflicts and regional disagreements. In April 2021, at the draw ceremony of the FIFA Arab Cup at the Katara Opera House, FIFA President Gianni Infantino said that the Arab Cup, which took place for the first time under the FIFA umbrella, will unify the Arab world. He added, “The FIFA Arab Cup 2021… will be a great opportunity to unite the Arab world through football besides testing Qatar’s operational readiness for the prestigious FIFA World Cup in 2022.”

Meanwhile, the match that was scheduled to take place between Arab and world football legends under the auspices of the Arab Cup was cancelled as Arab players withdrew in protest of the presence of an Israeli coach. All the above contributed to highlighting the true pulse of the Arab peoples, and Qatar benefitted from allowing such freedom of expression.

Qatar does not limit itself to hosting Arab sports events and practices sports diplomacy in wider regions. The country recently hosted the Turkish Super Cup between Beşiktaş and Antalyaspor. On January 5, 2021, Qatar also hosted the African Super Cup.

Qatar advertises itself in a discreet manner through sports, especially since sports has a magic that can sometimes transcend politics and even contribute to finding solutions to political problems.

It is important to remember that one of the motives for the Gulf reconciliation was the desire of Qatar’s neighbors to benefit from the 2022 World Cup, whereby Emirati and Saudi airlines would see the benefits of transferring sports fans from all over the world to Qatar. Qatar has organized world sports events in a professional manner that is unprecedented in the region and has built cutting-edge infrastructure like stadiums equipped with the highest-level equipment and modern technology.

One such example is hologram technology, which was used for the first time in the Arab world in opening ceremonies, and in which a group of late artists sent messages calling for unity, brotherhood, and tolerance. These efforts have drawn praise from across the world, and continue to bolster Qatar’s image and reputation in both the international and regional public opinion.

Lebanon’s agony was compounded over the past few weeks as a result of statements made by the country’s newly appointed minister of information, George Cordahi, in a prerecorded online media interview that saw the light on September 10, 2021, but which was filmed in August 2021 and released after Cordahi was appointed in Najib Mikati’s government on September 10.

In the interview, Cordahi committed a series of blunders which highlight his very basic understanding of regional politics (or even politics, in general) and his skewed moral compass regarding what constitutes an admirable leader in his opinion (i.e., Bashar Assad and Vladimir Putin). However, all of that didn’t matter and quickly became a sideshow against the backdrop of the measures that were immediately enacted by the Saudi government following the airing of the episode by the online platform of Qatari state-owned Al Jazeera.

Riyadh seemed to have taken offense in Cordahi’s statements on Yemen, where he said that the Iran-aligned Houthi group was “defending itself … against an external aggression,” adding that “homes, villages, funerals and weddings were being bombed” by the Saudi-led coalition. He also called the 7-year war in Yemen “futile” and said it was “time for it to end.”

A diplomatic crisis spiraled out of control, with Riyadh fully halting Lebanese imports and ordering the “recall of the ambassador in Lebanon for consultations, and the departure of Lebanon’s ambassador to the kingdom within 48 hours.” Other countries within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) followed suit or took other measures, but the GCC appeared united in its stance against Lebanon – the Gulf’s unity on such a negative position towards Lebanon constitutes a precedent, with Oman and Qatar taking less escalatory measures than their counterparts.

The crisis goes well beyond Cordahi’s words regarding the war in Yemen.

Yet, while the blame for what transpired is being directed towards Cordahi, with several Lebanese politicians or sectarian leaders denouncing his statements and asking him to resign – including, in an indirect way, the incumbent prime minister – the crisis goes well beyond Cordahi’s words regarding the war in Yemen.

In fact, from an observer’s point of view, the current diplomatic crisis has been a long time coming with the perfect storm brewing over the years, especially since back in 2016 the so-called presidential deal was struck between Saad Hariri, Michel Aoun (and his U.S.-sanctioned son-in-law Gebran Bassil), and Hezbollah.

The deal birthed what was dubbed a neo-troika, which represents a power-sharing arrangement reminiscent of the one that existed during the Syrian regime’s occupation of Lebanon. However, this time, the main antagonists were the top leaders of the three main sects in Lebanon: the Maronites, the Shi`a, and the Sunnis. Yet, the neo-troika does not place all three parties on an equal footing within Lebanon’s power-sharing arrangement.

The ultimate weakening of Hariri and the disintegration of the political camp that was previously perceived to balance Hezbollah’s growing power, catapulted the Iran-funded and armed group into new echelons of influence in Lebanon. May 2018 resembled the final nail in the coffin, with Hezbollah and its allies winning a majority in the parliamentary elections allowing it to exercise control over the legislative, the executive, and the presidency. This inherently meant fully controlling the country’s foreign policy too.

Two major incidents exemplified Riyadh’s waning influence and Lebanon’s break from its traditional foreign policy positioning.

Two major incidents exemplified Riyadh’s waning influence and Lebanon’s break from its traditional foreign policy positioning. Both incidents were championed by none other than Gebran Bassil, Hezbollah’s main Christian ally in Lebanon. In February 2016, U.S.-sanctioned Gebran Bassil refused to condemn attacks on the Saudi embassy in Tehran and its consulate in Meshhad. Bassil, at the time, was a foreign minister and his decision broke with Arab unanimity within the Arab League.

Even Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, at the time, denounced the attacks, and said that his government had opened an investigation to punish the perpetrators. Moreover, Bassil refused to condemn drone attacks that targeted two major Saudi Aramco oil installations in September 2019. Bassil justified his stance by equating the Houthi attack on Riyadh to the Saudi-led Arab coalition on Sanaa while alluding to the policy of “dissociation” to avoid taking a stance. That did not bode well with Riyadh, given the gravity of the attack which obviously crossed all the red lines between Riyadh and Tehran.

Riyadh effectively realized – the hard way – that it went from hero to zero in Beirut in a span of only 15 years. This can be viewed as a record time for a country’s shift in allegiance given the size of investments Riyadh once held in Beirut, and especially since it engineered the end of the civil war in 1990 and funded Lebanon’s postwar reconstruction drive.

While Lebanon was previously seen as a satellite state were Riyadh and Damascus shared influence, the country today rotates in the Iranian orbit despite Riyadh and other powers, like the United States, retaining considerable influence there.

In today’s regional geopolitical setup, Lebanon falls within the “Iranian influence archipelago,” a reality supported by statements made by senior Iranian officials, the current Lebanese political state of affairs, and the fact that the international community includes the Lebanese dossier whenever it intends to negotiate with Tehran. After all, Najib Mikati’s government did not see the light despite the immense effort and pressure France’s Elysée exerted over 13 months up until French President Emmanuel Macron received a nod from the Iranians following the installment of their new hardline administration in Tehran.

Nevertheless, the recent Saudi escalation towards Lebanon appears to be a last hurrah despite the Saudis framing it as them cutting their losses in Lebanon and leaving. The developments in Iraq and Lebanon over the past two years – since the uprisings of October 2019 broke out in both countries – and the growing anti-Iranian sentiments in both countries, reinvigorated the Saudi drive to try and instrumentalize the new dynamics in order to attempt to roll back Iranian influence in the region.

The results of the Iraqi parliamentary elections that were held last month and the huge blow that the Iran-aligned militias were dealt, cemented the Saudi conviction, especially as Riyadh maintains good relations with the caretaker Iraqi PM – who until now remains the most favorable candidate to be reappointed to the position– and the winner of the parliamentary elections, Muqtada al-Sadr. Iraq’s influential Shi`ite cleric, al-Sadr, made a rare visit to Saudi Arabia in July 2017 and met with Mohammed bin Salman.

With today’s intertwinement of dossiers in the region, especially due to Iran’s bloated influence in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, the Saudis as much as the Iranians, view the regional chessboard as one unit where they can put pressure on each other in different places to gain concessions. Meanwhile, both had a major interest in engaging in an Iranian-Saudi dialogue that is taking place in Baghdad, an attempt to appease the administration of President Joe Biden. From one side, the Saudis want to appear like they’re breaking away from the zero-sum approach they pursued towards Iran during the days of Donald Trump’s administration, while the Iranians benefit from a semblance of regional diplomacy to try and keep “regional matters” away from the negotiation table in Vienna.

On July 11-12, Oman’s Sultan Haitham bin Tariq al-Said made his first overseas official trip since coming to power in January 2020, to Saudi Arabia. In the planned megacity of Neom, both King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman received Sultan Haitham, and the leaders discussed a variety of means of enhancing the Omani-Saudi relationship, including through the creation of a joint council to foster bilateral ties.

Historically, Oman has distinguished among its GCC neighbors through its independent foreign policy, with a special focus on mediation. Indeed, Oman has not participated in a number of GCC-wide initiatives, including efforts to stop protests in Bahrain in 2011 using the GCC’s Peninsula Shield Force, the war in Yemen, and it remained neutral during the GCC crisis between June 2017 and January 2021.

Although it has been a member of the GCC since its founding in 1981, Oman has always been outspoken against efforts to expand the reach of the regional body, in particular opposing the expansion of a common currency and monetary union, in addition to openly challenging Saudi efforts to upgrade the union in 2013.

Today, however, as Oman faces economic challenges following the drop in oil prices in 2014 and the more recent downturn spurred by the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as dwindling oil supplies, its posture towards its neighbors may change. The IMF in February said that Oman’s economy decreased 6.3 percent in 2020 and would experience a modest 1.8 percent growth in 2021.

Given this economic context, Oman became the first GCC state to announce plans to implement income tax beginning in 2022. It also received $1 billion in aid from Qatar at the end of last year. And in a bid to attract investors, Oman announced a reduction in income tax for small and medium businesses for 2020 and 2021 and will offer long-term residency permits for foreign investors as part of Vision 2040, which aims to diversify the state’s economy in the face of diminishing oil reserves.

It is perhaps unsurprising that Oman this summer has experienced protests, largely linked to unemployment among Omani nationals, especially young people – the same cause of protests that emerged in 2011.

Considering these challenges, it is perhaps unsurprising that Oman this summer has experienced protests, largely linked to unemployment among Omani nationals, especially young people – the same cause of protests that emerged in 2011. There are at least 65,000 unemployed Omanis, many of whom argue that expatriates are given preference for jobs, particularly in the private sector, even when Omanis have appropriate education for such jobs.

Of course, only time will tell how strong the bilateral ties between Oman and Saudi Arabia will prove to be. Thus far, the two countries have set up a coordination council, and the Saudi cabinet is said to have approved the drafting of agreements with Oman “in a slew of fields including commerce, culture, investment promotion and post and transport” – fields which would assist Oman’s economic position and likely help it create jobs that its citizens are increasingly demanding.

In addition, Oman is likely to work more closely with the Saudi leadership in its capacity in having joined UN-led efforts to mediate a ceasefire in Yemen potentially hosting the next round of Iran-Saudi talks.

Perhaps as important as what the council does or does not do in the future, however, is the fact that it has been established, signaling a potential recalibration of GCC relations, especially as the UAE-Saudi relationship has become strained in recent years. Indeed, in 2016, Saudi Arabia and the UAE established a similar body (the Saudi-Emirati Coordination Council) to facilitate bilateral ties, but the council met for the first time only in 2018.

In the past two years in particular, with the withdrawal of Emirati forces from Yemen in 2019, increasingly public differences in opinion about normalizing relations with Israel, and the most recent spat in OPEC+ about oil pricing and sustained production cuts, it is unclear where the coordination council stands and how effective (or relevant) it remains.

Despite uncertainty about what the newly established Omani-Saudi council may achieve, the Omani sultan’s visit to Riyadh, the first such visit by a leader in Oman in 10 years, signals an increasing and notable willingness to work alongside the GCC’s largest country – something which the Omani leadership has been more hesitant to do in the past. It will be instructive to see how other GCC states react to an emerging Omani-Saudi alliance and whether competition will emerge among the GCC states to engage with Oman.

In addition, the visit, importantly, demonstrates that Oman under its new sultan intends to remain an active mediator in the region, even while trying to address increasingly urgent economic challenges at home. Indeed, its efforts at mediation may grant Oman greater access to financial assistance from neighboring countries and regional powers alike, while carrying on the legacy of its long-serving Sultan Qaboos who pioneered Oman’s mediating role in the region.

Following the First Gulf War, the foreign ministers of Syria, Egypt, and the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), met in Damascus and agreed on a new security cooperation initiative for the Gulf which came to be known as the “Damascus Declaration.” Although the GCC states later moved away from implementing the declaration, it contained an important aspect related to Turkey which is key to understanding the dynamics that shape the region today.

The thorny relations between Damascus and Ankara in the 1990s due to water and terrorism issues had adversely affected Turkey’s relations with the Arab countries, including those in the Gulf. The declaration, which aimed to pressure Ankara on the international platform, criticized Turkey’s plan to construct a new dam on the Turkish-Syrian border, called foreign contractors not to cooperate with Turkey, and warned Ankara over its actions. The importance of the Damascus Declaration was that, for the first time, the GCC countries expressed public and clear support for Syria in its dispute with Turkey.

However, since then balances have changed rapidly in international politics. When it comes to the Middle East, one of the world’s least peaceful regions, dynamics change even faster. Turkish-GCC relations within the context of the Syrian war is an interesting case to show the degree to which several factors shape the convergence and divergence in their relationship in Syria, which is known as the “heart” of the Arab world.

When protests erupted in 2011 in Syria, the GCC stood by the opposition that aimed to topple the Bashar al-Assad regime and recognized the opposition bloc as the “legitimate representative” of the Syrian people. The GCC states, which were motivated by several factors, most importantly political and sectarian ones, aimed to weaken Iran’s hand and bring Syria, a country predominantly Sunni but ruled by a Nusayri family, back into the Arab sphere of influence. Ankara also was among the most vocal critics of the regime and the staunchest supporter of the opposition when it failed to convince the regime to make reforms.

In Syria, Turkey and the GCC countries stood by the opposition, but supported different factions, as they harbored different visions for the post-Assad era.

In Syria, Turkey and the GCC countries stood by the opposition, but supported different factions, as they harbored different visions for the post-Assad era. Thus, the Syrian theater became the first backdrop of rivalry between Turkey and GCC states, namely Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, based on ideological differences.

In recent years, the power dynamics in the region have started to shift again as some Gulf countries, which cooperated with Turkey against the Syrian regime in the initial years of the crisis, seem to have put their differences aside and in varying degrees have approached Damascus, pitting Syria against Turkey as they did in the 1990s. Now their priority is their interests, both political and economic, rather than the fate of the regime as was the case a decade ago.

Normalization suit 

In December 2018, the UAE, which once supported the Syrian opposition forces alongside Saudi Arabia and Qatar, reopened its embassy in Syria. The UAE justified the move by declaring, “Given the regional expansionism of Iran and Turkey, there is an Arab role to play in Syria that has become even more necessary.” In March 2021, the UAE reiterated its position: “Syria’s return to the Arab fold is essential and has nothing to do with who wants or who does not want it. It is a matter of public interest and the interests of Syria and the region.”

A day after the UAE reopened its mission, Bahrain announced that its mission in Damascus continues its duty, underlining its keenness to maintain relations with what it referred to as a “brotherly” country. Manama, in particular, emphasized the significance of strengthening and activating the “Arab role” in preventing the dangers of regional interference in Syria’s internal affairs.

In October of last year, Oman sent an ambassador to Syria, becoming the first Gulf state to do so since they downgraded or shut missions in Damascus in 2012. Meanwhile Kuwait has said it would reopen its mission in Damascus if there was an agreement among the 22-member Arab League.

So far, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, two countries that firmly supported the opposition, have not taken any step forward. Traditionally, Riyadh pursues a “wait and see” policy and seeks gradual and slow partial normalization. Prospects for change in the Saudi position have increased particularly after the reports that Saudi intelligence chief Khalid al-Humaidan met with his Syrian counterpart in Damascus, the first meeting of its kind since the conflict broke out in Syria.

If there is a change of heart in Riyadh regarding the return of Syria to the Arab fold, Qatar – Turkey’s closest Gulf ally and a critical center for opposition meetings – will be the only Gulf country not involved in the normalization suit with Syria.

Factors driving normalization

The first factor of the Gulf rapprochement to Syria is Russia’s position. In 2015, when Russia, the regime’s staunchest ally, militarily intervened in the war, the balances on the ground rapidly changed. Russia’s interference became the game-changer that also altered the perception of the GCC towards the opposition and eliminated the idea of toppling Assad by force.

In this context, Moscow, which built a perception of Russia as a crucial geopolitical actor in the region, started to deepen its relationship with each GCC state, and engaged in dialogue over the Syria file. In recent years, there has been increasing support by the GCC states of Russia’s role in Syria, particularly at a time when the U.S. influence is fading away.

The second factor that drives the GCC rapprochement with Damascus is related to both the domestic and international context. The assertive members of the GCC, namely the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have started to move away from a foreign policy focusing on hard power (military tools), while prioritizing soft power (diplomacy).

The economy plays a central role in this diplomacy. Restoring relations with Damascus, not only politically, but economically, is significant and especially in terms of the reconstruction of Syria. On the international level, the election of U.S. President Joe Biden has significantly influenced the shift of the Gulf foreign policy from hard to soft power as the new administration, unlike its predecessor, pushes for de-escalation in the region.

The last factor is the antagonism of Turkey’s growing role in Syria. When Turkey conducted military operations in northern Syria (Operation Olive Branch, Operation Peace Spring, Spring Shield) to eliminate terrorist elements, Saudi Arabia, along with the UAE and Bahrain, opposed them on the grounds of “threatening Arab national security.”

Ten years into the Syrian crisis, many commentators generally accept that President Bashar al-Assad’s government has “won” the gruesome conflict. But talk of peace and stability in the country requires speaking in relative terms because prolonged warfare and acts of terrorism continue to spill Syrian blood from Idlib to Homs to Deir Az Zor to Daraa.

Additionally, the impact of US-imposed sanctions makes reconstruction and redevelopment severely challenging for Syria—to say nothing about the catastrophic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on Syria’s severely impoverished, displaced, and starved citizens.

A major reason why finding a diplomatic settlement to the Syrian crisis has been so difficult comes down to the question of whether Assad could or should serve as the country’s head of state. The US and most European Union (EU) countries firmly maintain that Assad is entirely illegitimate. This pits most NATO countries against Russia and China.

The Damascus regime’s standing is a major flashpoint in Moscow and Washington’s geopolitical rivalry in the Middle East. With President Joe Biden focusing on countering Russian clout in the Middle East and other regions of the world, the new US leadership is likely to continue to see Syria as a high stakes conflict in terms of pushing back against Vladimir Putin’s international influence.

In the early stages of the Syrian conflict, from 2011 to 2015, some Gulf Arab monarchies were actively involved in the push to oust Assad’s regime. Aligned with the Obama administration and Turkey’s agendas in Syria, Gulf states gave Syria’s rebels significant support. This anti-Ba’athist “revolution” was expected to mark a geopolitical setback to Iran.

There were expectations that Assad’s regime was on the verge of falling to Sunni forces purportedly more favorable to Turkey and Gulf Arab monarchies, and far less amenable to Iranian interests. But Russia’s intensified military intervention in 2015 and the 2016/2017 battle of Aleppo led to the GCC states adjusting their positions on Syria.

Russia’s strong support for Assad made it clear to policymakers in Gulf capitals that regime change in Syria was no longer on the cards. Giving up on the idea of bringing down Assad, officials came to a de facto acceptance of his regime’s survival.

As the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and some other Arab states have feared Turkish military intervention in northern Syria and its implications for what they perceive to be a “neo-Ottoman” threat, Assad’s government has benefitted from various Arab regimes’ growing unease with Ankara’s foreign policy agenda. This was especially underscored in October 2019 when the UAE led a coalition of Arab states which stood unified against Turkey’s “Operation Peace Spring” in northern Syria.

What remains to be seen is how GCC members that want to do business with Syria face off with the US vis-à-vis the Caesar Act.

We must not overlook economics. Some in the Gulf want to profit from major reconstruction and business opportunities in post-conflict Syria. Yet what remains to be seen is how GCC members that want to do business with Syria face off with the US vis-à-vis the Caesar Act.

This legislation, which came into force in 2020, imposes stringent sanctions on major sectors of the Syrian economy and imposes secondary sanctions as well, meaning that third parties who do business with Syria may face punishment from the US Treasury. In the summer of 2020, the US government threatened the UAE and other Arab states with the Caesar Act. So far, President Joe Biden’s administration has not taken any softer stance.

Abu Dhabi would certainly like to see the Caesar Act lifted. Speaking alongside his Russian counterpart at a news conference in the UAE on March 9, the Emirati foreign minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan said the US’s economic pressure on Syria “as it is today makes the matter difficult”. For sure, if the UAE can convince the US to lift, or at least ease, the Caesar Act that would mark a major accomplishment in terms of Emirati lobbying capabilities in Washington.

Bahrain, which is under an increasing amount of Emirati influence, aligned with the UAE (rather than Saudi Arabia, as it might have done in the past) on both the questions of renormalizing relations with Syria and establishing full-fledged formalized ties with Israel. Yet it is safe to say that Manama must have at least received the ‘green light’ from Riyadh to restore diplomatic relations with Assad’s government in December 2018.

Oman, as the GCC state on warmest terms with the Islamic Republic of Iran, took a stance on the Syrian crisis that adhered to Muscat’s doctrine of “non-interference” and balanced geopolitical position in the region. Similar to Algeria’s sovereigntist governance ideology, Oman believes that independent nation-states must respect each country’s sovereign rights. Muscat also never saw Iran engaging in actions in Syria that threatened Omani interests, thus the Sultanate saw nothing substantial to gain from Assad falling to anti-Iranian forces.

It was unsurprising how Oman refused to sever diplomatic relations with Assad’s government. At the same time, the Omanis have been hosting members of the Syrian opposition, making it clear to all sides in the conflict that Oman is available to facilitate constructive dialogue between the parties in the interest restoring peace to Syria. Omani officials have visited Damascus as part of their efforts to help Syrians engage in dialogue that’s necessary for winding down the war.

Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar: Not Ready for Re-Normalization

Kuwait, where much of the financing for the Syrian opposition initially came from, has not joined the UAE and Bahrain in officially restoring formalized diplomatic relations with Assad’s government. But Kuwait’s position against Syria’s regime is less rigid than Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s.

Part of this must be understood within the context of Kuwait’s own demographic makeup and the government’s desire not to allow regional conflicts to inflame sectarian temperatures between Sunni and Shi’a citizens at home. Although the Russian, Iranian, and Syrian militaries along with Lebanese Hezbollah took actions in Syria that outraged many Sunnis in Kuwait, the atrocities committed by Assad’s jihadist enemies against religious minorities in Syria, including Shi’a/Alawite Muslims, raised fears among members of Kuwait’s Shi’a communities.

By taking a relatively ‘balanced’ position on the Syrian crisis that serves to only enhance Kuwait’s reputation as a consensus builder among Arab states, the Kuwaiti government has been somewhat careful about how it deals with Syria and the Assad regime.

Some experts contend that Saudi Arabia permitted Bahrain to formally re-accept Assad’s legitimacy as a trial balloon for Riyadh. Yet the last time in which the Saudi kingdom articulated its stance on Syria’s government was in 2019 when Riyadh affirmed its decision not to re-normalize relations with the Damascus regime.

To be sure, the day in which the Al Saud leadership decides to re-accept Assad as Syria’s legitimate head of state will mark a major watershed in Russia’s quest to facilitate the renormalization of Damascus’s position within the wider Sunni Arab world. For now, however, Riyadh is not ready to re-accept Assad.Qatar, which aligns with Turkey on many regional issues such as Syria, maintains that Assad’s government is illegitimate.

Officials from Doha continue to speak out against the Assad regime’s human rights abuses in various forums. That said, the 2017-2021 blockade of Qatar did require Doha to improve its relations with Tehran, although Syria remains a contentious regional issue where the Qatari and Iranian governments have agreed to disagree, although earlier in Syria’s civil war, prior to the eruption of the GCC crisis in 2017, the conflict was a greater source of friction between Doha and Tehran.

The inauguration of Joe Biden took place on January 20, 2021, after a troublesome process that ended with a mob attack on the United States Capitol. The 59th U.S. presidential elections were carried out with significant concerns and expectations, especially in the Middle East. As Donald Trump marked a turn in the U.S. perspective on the Middle East, almost all of the region’s political leaders were rooting for a less-likely Republican win in the elections.

However, Trump suffered several blows to his prestige throughout his term in office which eventually turned into an election win for the Democratic Party in November. Under these circumstances, the current pressing question regards the impact of the new Democratic administration under Obama’s former reliable aide and current U.S. president Joe Biden on U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East.

The Obama administration cornered some of the Arab states to the extreme on several issues and created impediments on security provision and the economy. Joe Biden was an integral part of these policies and had a substantial responsibility in these decisions. A brief synopsis of these issues reveals that the most salient stalemates regarded certain Middle Eastern countries’ support for Jihadist organizations, neglected security demands, and the unresolved Palestinian issue.

The Obama administration used the 9/11 attacks as leverage against the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, which disturbed bilateral affairs as Saudi assets were jeopardized with 28 ongoing lawsuits. Another issue was the neglected and stalled military procurement deals worth over $130 billion as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates were struggling with the outcomes of the Arab Spring. The Obama-Biden team did not allow the Arab countries to receive the aid that would support them in the political turmoil during and after the revolts which threatened to put an end to the monarchies.

The U.S.-Israel bilateral affairs also suffered great turbulences due to Obama and Biden’s desire to stop the illegal Israeli settlement advancements in the occupied Palestinian territories. The foreign policy choices regarding the Palestinian issue were among the fundamental reasons that brought the Democratic administration to an end in 2017.

The reasons behind the Saudi-Emirati unpleasant experience during the Obama-Biden administration are probably the issues that will keep the Middle East envoys to the U.S. busy in the near future. There were substantial military procurement deals just before the end of Trump’s term, among others, with the UAE for F-35 aircraft (50), AMRAAM long-range missiles (802), and MQ-9B UAVs (18) worth nearly $24 billion, and with Egypt and Kuwait for AH-64E attack helicopter modernization and exports (51).

It was announced that the foreign military sales that were approved at the last minute by Trump were going to be re-assessed by the Biden administration which caused serious concerns for the receiving parties. These concerns were confirmed when the Biden administration decided to halt immediately the foreign military sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, almost one week after the inauguration. President Biden clarified that U.S. foreign policy was not planning to help the Arab states involved in the Yemeni civil war. As this decision was ratified by Biden’s statement on the Yemeni civil war, the White House decided to stop any support for Yemen’s offensive operations, including the relevant arms sales.

The UAE was able to snatch the F-35, MQ-9B, and AMRAAM deals thanks to the Abraham Accords. However, the majority of these weapon systems are offensive and quite likely to be used against the Houthi rebels. Saudi Arabia can also suffer extensively from a U.S. foreign policy that does not actively engage against the Houthi rebels. The military procurement deals signed in 2017 worth $110 billion are not secure from this turbulence.

Furthermore, the Biden administration has already reversed the U.S. designation of the Houthis as terrorists. The U.S. retreat from offensive solutions in Yemen is going to jeopardize the majority of the plans and operations led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. There will be sanction arguments and discourse to enforce the complete Saudi-Emirati retreat from Yemen in the coming years.

The Yemeni civil war and Houthis are going to be a tremendous impediment to the U.S. relations with the GCC countries. This process may evolve into a conflict between the U.S. and Saudi-led countries regarding the offensive against the Houthi rebels – a conflict that will be similar to the tensions Turkey experienced as a result of Syrian border security and the YPG/PKK activities there.

The most significant practical implication of a Democratic administration in the U.S. seems to revolve around security concerns and military operations. However, other substantial issues still undermine bilateral affairs. President Biden’s position on the Abraham Accords was favorable during and after the Arab states reached a historic deal with Israel. However, it was clearly stated that the Biden-Harris administration is going to work towards reaching a two-state solution and that it will only partner with those who believe in this solution.

The two-state solution certainly irritates the Israeli administration, which indicates escalated tension between the U.S. and Israel in the short term. The Palestinian side rightfully complained about the illegal settlements built throughout its occupied land, and always received support on this front from the Obama-Biden administration. This support seems likely to be revived under the Biden-Harris leadership with a larger interest in the coming years.

The U.S. backlash over the Saudi-Emirati support for Jihadist groups is not expected to be as strong as it was during the Obama administration since the former have significantly reduced their illicit support for these organizations. However, the Biden-Harris administration may force the Saudi-Emirati administrations to end their activities in Yemen, Sudan, and Libya.

It is expected that the current U.S. administration will have a say in the ongoing turmoil in Libya. The Saudi-Emirati partnership should expect to be cornered in Yemen and in Libya in the near future as the honeymoon with Trump has come to an end and swift reversals in U.S. foreign policy and future impediments are on the horizon.

Sheikh Yamani, Saudi Arabia’s former oil minister (1962-86) once quipped that that the Age of Oil, like the Age of Stone, would come to an end long before the world ran out of oil. Reminiscent of history’s flow of game-changing trends implied in China’s ancient philosophy – the “I Ching” (易經) or “Book of Changes”, global paradigm shifts are afoot seemingly to help bring about Yamani’s “prophecy”.

Following Deng Xiaoping’s “Open Door Policy”, China has grown to be the “factory of the world”. The nation became a net importer of oil mostly from the Middle East. Fossil fuels have since driven China’s economy and turned it into the world’s largest oil and gas customer, representing 30% of China’s total energy demand and 25% of the world total.

China’s crude oil imports surpassed 10 million barrels per day in 2019, 55% from Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) with greatly increased imports from Saudi Arabia (16% of total).

Dependence on energy supplies from the Middle East, however, has national security concerns for China. Such supplies transit through the narrow “choke points” of Iran’s Strait of Hormuz, open to U.S. hostility, and the Malacca Strait near Singapore which hosts America’s 7^th Fleet.

China has been pushing hard to reduce energy intensity of its GDP growth, in pursuit of a green revolution to build a low-carbon energy system towards 2035 and 2050, part of the “China Dream” of national rejuvenation. China now formally pledges peak carbon emission by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060, targets likely to be incorporated in the coming Five Year Plan (2021-25).

With Climate Change rallying the world to embrace a greener future, including green-energy vehicles, these imperatives are bound to drastically reduce global demand for oil.

China has launched an ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to connect the world, including GCC countries and the rest of the Middle East.

In May 2017, China succeeded in extracting scalable quantities of methane hydrates (“inflammable ice”) in the South China Sea. Compared to coal, oil, and natural gas, methane hydrates are a lot less polluting but 10 times more energy- rich per unit. One cubic meter of methane hydrates is equivalent to 160 cubic meters of natural gas.

Global reserve of methane hydrates is estimated at twice as much as all other known fossil fuels combined, enough for 1,000 years’ human consumption. China’s gas hydrates reserve is estimated at 100 billion-ton oil-equivalents, 80 percent of such reserve is in the South China Sea.  The nation is expected to kick start commercial production by 2030.

China has launched an ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to connect the world, including GCC countries and the rest of the Middle East. This includes a “Digital Silk Road” for internet transactions and an “Arctic Silk Road” encompassing increasingly-navigable maritime routes through the Arctic.

China has launched a sovereign digital currency and a joint venture between the People’s Bank of China, the country’s central bank, and SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication), the world’s premier network for international transactions. This would turbo-charge RMB internationalization.

China is the largest importer of Saudi oil. However, China doesn’t share Saudi Arabia’s hostility towards Iran.

The BRI also provides alternative overland energy transit routes with pipelines through China-friendly territories including Central Asia and Pakistan’s port of Gwadar, bypassing Hormuz and the Malacca “choke points”.

China is the largest importer of Saudi oil. However, China doesn’t share Saudi Arabia’s hostility towards Iran. Despite some earlier Chinese arms sales and recent supply of Chinese COVID-19 vaccines, China doesn’t seem to have broader synergy with Saudi Arabia other than economic and energy interests. Saudi-China relations are deemed largely “functional, not strategic”, according to the Brookings Institution.

However, Brookings’ classification misses a more granular and subtle approach. According to Degang Sun,Professor of Political Science at the Institute of International Studies, Fudan University, China is establishing a non-aligned network of Middle East partnerships, a kind of ‘marriage without licence’, seeking common ground while preserving differences.

There are four categories –

• ‘Pivot states’ – regional powers with comprehensive strength which function as pivots or hubs in China’s global partnership network;
• ‘Node states’ – partners serving as bridges to facilitate cooperation between China and other great powers;
• ‘Key states’ – medium-sized powers with development potential which can exert influence on neighboring countries;
• ‘Stronghold states’ – smaller countries but exhibiting a strong desire for cooperation to function as China’s strongholds in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, the United States’ strategic interest in the Gulf has substantially changed as America has become energy self-sufficient or energy-surplus following extensive exploitation of homeland shale energies. Uncle Sam’s current interest shifts to boosting the security and economic interests of Israel, its immutable ally thanks to the bipartisan, politically and financially powerful Jewish constituency.

Hence, the recent rapprochement with Israel of the UAE and Bahrain under the so-called Abraham Accords brokered by Jared Kushner, ex-President Trump’s son-in-law.

China has no ambition of dislodging the United States from the Arab Peninsula. A cordial relationship with all Members of the GCC is in its best interest. The same applies to Iran, Israel, and Turkey. Nor does China want to be dragged in the proxy war in Syria involving Sunni-Shiite rivalry and self-interests of the United States, Russia, Israel, amongst others.

For China, one strategic interest in the Middle East and Central Asia is maintaining good relations with Islamic countries (including Turkey) with a Uyghur population. Some Uyghurs are suspected to be connected with the East Turkestan (Xinjiang) independence movement, which China brands a terrorist organization. International condemnation of Uyghur camps in Xinjiang is keeping Beijing on its toes.

A major reorganisation of US military operation in the Middle East was announced last month in a momentous decision reflecting the seismic geo-political shifts underway in the region. The move, the last of many gifts granted by Washington to Tel-Aviv under former President Donald Trump, saw Israel’s inclusion inside Central Command (CENTCOM). The decision means that for the first time in history the Zionist state will co-ordinate military operations alongside its Arab neighbours inside what is considered the most important US command unit in the world.

CENTCOM-an Arab NATO if you like- is one of eleven unified combatant command units within the United States Department of Defence that have been installed to combat threats. For critics however, the role of such command units is the preservation of US hegemony around the world. Spanning every region of the globe, together they coordinate American led military operations. Member states within a specific command unit carry out a range of operations including combined military exercises, offer security assistance and share information.

Israel until now was part of US military’s European command, EUCOM.  The rationale for this strategic gerrymander was over concerns that with Arab states not recognising the state of Israel, they would be reluctant to co-operate fully if Central Command officers were in regular contact sharing sensitive information with counterparts in the occupation state. The recent normalisation of relations between Israel and a number of Arab regimes however has calmed these concerns and opened a path to major geo-political shifts.

Announcing the new military arrangement, the US Department of Defence said: “in a sign of the changing political environment in the Middle East, the United States military will move Israel from the U.S. European Command’s area of responsibility to that of the U.S. Central Command.”

It mentioned that the “easing of tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbours subsequent to the Abraham Accords has provided a strategic opportunity for the United States to align key partners against shared threats in the Middle East.”

Since its inception, CENTCOM spearheaded every major US military intervention overseas including the two Gulf wars and in recent years the war on terror.

Set up in 1983 by the administration of Ronald Reagan, CENTCOM was added to Washington’s ever-increasing command units around the world, with responsibility for co-ordinating all US military CENTCOM in the Middle East as well as Central Asia and parts of South Asia.

Since its inception, CENTCOM spearheaded every major US military intervention overseas including the two Gulf wars and in recent years the war on terror. The Command unit coordinates operations stretching from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen in the West to Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan in the East. The easternmost reaches of this combatant area butt up against India, China, and Russia.

Pro-Israel groups that for years called on the Pentagon to include Israel within CENTCOM have welcomed the move. The Washington Institute for Near East for instance, which works to align US foreign policy with Tel-Aviv, said that Israel’s inclusion in Eucom was a “mismatch with the existing organizational boundaries.”

The pro-Israel group argued that the new arrangement would help CENTCOM respond to “common threats in a comprehensive manner”. Another influential pro-Israel lobby group, The American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) also welcomed the decision. “Moving Israel to @CENTCOM marks an important recognition by the Pentagon that Israel is truly a part of the Middle East” tweeted AIPAC. “As the U.S., Israel and our Arab allies confront a dangerous Iran, this move will strengthen the growing cooperation among our regional partners.”

Military normalisation has now been added to the political, diplomatic and economic normalisation with the biggest strategic gain for Israel.

Up till now Israel’s ongoing occupation of Palestine and its many human rights abuses hindered its formal inclusion within CENTCOM. This shift marks the culmination of the ongoing process of normalisation between the Zionist state and its Arab neighbours. Military normalisation has now been added to the political, diplomatic and economic normalisation with the biggest strategic gain for Israel. Moving Israel into Central Command’s area of responsibility will facilitate military cooperation in the confrontation with the Zionist states’ biggest foe, Iran.

On its website, deterring the Islamic Republic is listed by CENTCOM as its number one priority followed by supporting a political resolution in Afghanistan; “maintaining Defeat-ISIS Campaign in Syria and Iraq;” “Countering the UAS Threat” and “Weaponization of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Refugees.”

Given CENTCOM’s list of priorities, Israel’s inclusion in the command unit was the obvious next step following last year’s normalisation with the UAE and several other Arab states, especially as such cooperation existed unofficially. Tel-Aviv is said to have coordinated attacks on Iranian targets with CENTCOM, especially in the final year of the Trump administration when there was an escalation of hostilities with Tehran. Israeli intel, for instance  helped the US assassinate the head of the Quds Force, Gen. Qassem Soleimani last year in Baghdad airport.

Israel was also accused by Tehran of killing Iran’s top nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. The head of Iran’s Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), was targeted by an explosion and machine gun in December. In all likelihood such operations would have involved some form of co-operation with CENTCOM.

While it’s too early to say if Israel’s in-corporation into the command unit will increase the likelihood of hostile military operation, the shift as Benny Gantz, the Israeli defense minister said “will further boost cooperation between the IDF and the US Armed Forces in confronting regional challenges, along with other friends with whom we share interests.”

It signals a stronger desire to create a united front against Iran and, with the support of the Sunni block of countries, a willingness to take a tougher position against the Islamic Republic and its allies in the region.

As for the question of Palestine, with the Arab states now integrated with Israel militarily, there will be no incentive for Tel-Aviv to abide by international norms and grant Palestinians their right to statehood. For decades Arab leaders have insisted that the price of full normalisation with Israel and its integration into the Middle East was its withdrawal from the occupied territories and the creation of a Palestinian state.

In the wake of the Arab Awakening in 2011, ties between Turkey and the Gulf duo, namely Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), began to deteriorate. This is particularly true after the counterrevolution led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Egypt where they bankrolled the bloody coup against the democratically elected government of the late president Mohamed Morsi and installed their henchman Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

The failed coup in Turkey in 2016, the unjust blockade of Qatar in 2017, the Arab duo’s constant support of counterrevolutionary forces in Syria, Libya, and Sudan, and their anti-Turkey stance in the Eastern Mediterranean, have vitiated any chance to recuperate the fraught ties between Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

The rise of Mohamed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia and his alliance with UAE’s Mohammed bin Zayed made a deadly anti-revolutionary combination in the Middle East. This convergence of counterrevolutionary states ultimately resulted in putting Turkey and Saudi Arabia on the opposite sides of the conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Iraq.

Turkish-Saudi rapprochement is more likely

In the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia is a “real” country with a huge land mass, significant native population, natural resources and, of course, the custodian of Mecca and Medina. All these aspects make Saudi Arabia an important player in the region and beyond.

Therefore, in the long run, Turkey would naturally want to avoid a direct confrontation with Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, there is no such direct competition between Turkey and the UAE. In fact, the UAE is the pawn of major powers that are opposed to Turkey’s growing profile in many important regions of the world.

There is no match between the national power of Turkey and that of the UAE. That’s perhaps one of the reasons why we see direct criticism of the UAE by Turkish authorities.

Conversely, one could argue with great confidence that Saudi Arabia’s capacity to withstand Mohamed bin Salman’s perturbations and the kingdom’s chances to remain a major regional player are high, unlike the Emirati “sand castle” that is open to vulnerabilities of all sorts and is even open to collapse as a result of Mohammed bin Zayed’s erratic foreign policy decisions.

In the last few years, due to its reckless foreign policy, Saudi Arabia has squandered a lot of good will and this seems to have been realized in Riyadh, which used to be a considerable soft power and, for good reason, held the status of an arbiter among its fellow Muslim countries.

The Saudi reconciliation with Qatar after the three-year embargo which was later followed by the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt may pave the way for a possibility of Saudi-Turkish rapprochement.

Turkey does not pose any kind of threat to Saudi Arabia and its internal political consensus. What Turkey expects from Saudis, though, is to disassociate itself from UAE policies in the region, which Turkey feels are designed in Western capitals for the purpose of destabilizing the region.

Turkey has made sure to avoid direct confrontation with Saudi Arabia, while the Saudis are cognizant of the fact that they stand to lose a lot in any direct conflict with Turkey. All these factors make the rapprochement between Turkey and Saudi Arabia more likely. The Saudi reconciliation with Qatar after the three-year embargo which was later followed by the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt may pave the way for a possibility of Saudi-Turkish rapprochement.

The demands included closing Al-Jazeera TV, shutting the Turkish military base, and downgrading ties with Iran. Qatar rejected all demands. Besides Qatar, two other GCC member countries, Kuwait and Oman, have long been developing their ties with Turkey. In this regard, Turkey’s increased profile in the GCC and in the Middle East may prompt Saudis toward a reconciliation.

A substantial number of Saudi Arabia’s power brokers have always viewed the embargo on Qatar as a bad policy and have known that a direct confrontation with Ankara would be harmful for Riyadh. Saudis also know that the ghost of journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s brutal murder in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul will not disappear easily.

The Saudis and Emiratis mostly rely on the United States for their security, and regionally they rely on Egypt and Pakistan.

Though there have always been uncertainties in Saudi policies and abrupt changes can be expected, Saudis usually do not go beyond a certain point when it comes to confronting or criticizing the major Muslim countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Indonesia, and Egypt.

The Saudis and Emiratis mostly rely on the United States for their security, and regionally they rely on Egypt and Pakistan. Since Pakistan signed the bilateral security agreement with Saudi Arabia in 1982, it has been assisting the Saudis in areas like military training and defense production.

It is extraordinary that the Pakistan government allowed General Raheel Sharif, who retired as army chief in November 2016, to move to Saudi Arabia as a top military advisor. It’s not talked about in a pretentious way, but there is a Pakistani commitment to intervene in a decisive manner if Islam’s holiest cities come under threat and Saudi Arabia seeks help.

T

he first priority of Saudi Arabia and the UAE has always been the preservation of their regimes. They are now anxious as their chief security guarantor, the United States, is going through a tumultuous period in its domestic politics. The Biden administration appointees are not giving clear indications as to what sort of foreign policy goals they will pursue in the Middle East.

The multibillion-dollar investment in Egypt is also not sustainable since el-Sisi himself is engulfed in many crises and won’t be able to rescue the Saudis and Emiratis even if he wants to do so. On the other hand, Pakistan, which has long played a role in guaranteeing Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity and the regime’s security, holds significance for Saudi Arabia beyond a desire to cultivate religious ties and assert its soft power.

As the world’s fifth most-populous country and a nuclear power, Pakistan’s market and security dimensions have been attractive to the Saudis. However, Pakistan is wary of joining Saudi regional power games and its feckless rivalries with other countries in the region as was evident in its unwillingness to support the kingdom in the imprudent Yemen war. Therefore, the monarchies of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain feel very anxious in the fast-changing regional and global scenarios.

A Beleaguered UAE?

Saudis in particular would not want to annoy Turkey. Even after putting maximum pressure, the Saudis and Emiratis could not discourage their close ally Pakistan from deepening political and military ties with Turkey. It seems that Saudi Arabia has now realized that it can’t do much to stop the new realignments in its neighborhood, and any new realignment -with or without Iran- in the region will definitely not toe the line of abrasive Saudi policies.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-Saudi Arabia alliance has been one of the most durable alliances in Middle East politics in the last years. Despite the fact that the two countries have enjoyed strong relations during the past decade, the current form of strategic alliance dates back to 2015 when Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah passed away and Salman bin Abdulaziz came to power. Major players in the alliance have been King Salman’s son Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ).

The UAE-Saudi alliance involved Egypt and Bahrain over a short period and turned into a political axis. Even though it has many weaknesses, the UAE-Saudi alliance remained solid and somewhat unified in regional and foreign policy issues from Yemen to Libya, the hostility towards Turkey, Iran, and Qatar, and the warming relations with Israel.

Signals of change in Saudi Arabia

Hostility towards Turkey takes the lead in the foreign policy priorities of the axis countries. This situation became more acute following the coup attempt in Turkey in 2016. So much so that it has been debated internationally whether this axis financially supported the coup plotters in Turkey.

During the Riyadh and Abu Dhabi-led blockade against Qatar in 2017, Doha’s cooperation with Turkey was cited as a reason and the two countries stipulated that Turkey’s military base in Qatar needs to be removed. While the UAE-Saudi Arabia axis continued its anti-Turkey policies, it also followed similar policies in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Horn of Africa, Libya, Syria, Iraq, and lately in the Maghreb region.

However, members of this alliance do not have an entirely overlapping motivation in confronting Turkey. Indeed, while the UAE has adopted a stern anti-Turkey position in many respects, Saudi Arabia has demonstrated a somewhat more conciliatory attitude on certain issues than Abu Dhabi. Saudi government officials have different opinions on Turkey and the Saudi has government adopted a softer and warier policy.

Despite divergences, the history of bilateral relations between Saudi Arabia and Turkey shows that the leaderships of both countries have somehow succeeded in protecting the bilateral ties. However, following the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi in Saudi Arabia’s consulate in Istanbul and Turkey’s insistence on bringing those responsible for the murder to justice pushed some actors inside the Saudi government to take a firmer stance against Ankara.

Therefore, the hostility towards Turkey in Saudi Arabia has been local and limited to certain cliques in the Saudi government circles and, hence, should not be generalized to the entire Saudi leadership.

Preparation for the Biden administration?

With Joe Biden winning the 2020 U.S. presidential election, there have been some positive signs by the Saudi government towards Turkey. After the deadly earthquake in Izmir in October 2020, King Salman ordered aid to be sent to Turkey, using the expression “Our brothers in Turkey” – a noted, and important, improvement in bilateral relations. Unlike the UAE, Saudi Arabia was among the first countries to offer condolences to Turkey.

Following this step, a phone call between King Salman and Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan took place before the G-20 Summit, which was held online under the term presidency of Saudi Arabia. The two leaders exchanged views about improving bilateral relations, solving existing problems, and opening the door for dialogue that would further mend ties.

Another indicator was the statements by Prince Faisal bin Farhan, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, during a speech, where he stated that the relations with Turkey are “just perfect.” Faisal bin Farhan clarified that the informal boycott against Turkish products in Saudi Arabia was voiced in semi-official sources and argued that there was not even an unofficial boycott of Turkish products.

UAE remains stern against Turkey

Despite the positive developments between Turkey and Saudi Arabia, the UAE strategy towards Turkey does not show any signs of a constructive attitude to date. Even though the Emirati State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Anwar Gargash, made some positive comments on the Turkey-UAE relations, Abu Dhabi has not taken any concrete steps toward Ankara. On the contrary, during the past months, the UAE intensified and strengthened diplomatic relations with Greece, Armenia, and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC), all of which have problems with Turkey.

UAE officials hosted Armenian President Armen Sarkissian and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, and held talks with them on the development of relations and the protection of common interests. The UAE’s improving relations with Armenia pushed the country to adopt a more pro-Armenian policy in the recent Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the rapport with Greece in the East Mediterranean shows that the UAE targets Turkey when it comes to regional politics.

The cooperation declaration and various agreements signed between Greece and the UAE following the meeting between Mohammed bin Zayed and Kyriakos Mitsotakis indicate that they are not reflections of a responsive policy but rather resonate from  a long-term consensus that could trigger further instability in the region.

The latest UAE attempt was to establish cordial relations with France along with Greece, Armenia, and the GCASC. The UAE supported France’s destabilizing policies in the Eastern Mediterranean, Nagorno-Karabagh, and Libya, and stood against Turkey on all fronts.

Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s differing policies toward Turkey are a clear divergence between the alliance. Besides this, both countries are breaking up their partnership over Yemen. Mistrust first surfaced in February 2020, when the UAE withdrew its military presence from Yemen and did not adopt a wholesale aggressive rhetoric against Iran in the region.

The UAE supported France’s destabilizing policies in the Eastern Mediterranean, Nagorno-Karabagh, and Libya, and stood against Turkey on all fronts.

This caused a disturbance in Saudi Arabia and undermined the nature of the alliance. In addition, the UAE’s decision to normalize relations with Israel, pulling Bahrain and Sudan along, substantiated the divergence, caused further discomfort, and attested to the loss of a mutual vision on regional leadership between the two. The UAE’s normalization with Israel increased the pressure on Saudi Arabia.

However, Saudi officials know well that if they sign the normalization deal with Israel, their regional leadership quest will suffer an incurable loss of prestige. The Israeli normalization was another reason Saudi Arabia was disturbed by the UAE.

Given the divergences between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, their formidable alliance seems to be weakening. The UAE has suffered serious damage to its prestige in the eyes of the Arab people for initiating normalization with Israel and this may gradually bring about its isolation in regional politics.

The Saudi–UAE alliance concurrently targeting Turkey, Iran, and Qatar illustrates regional dimensions of rivalry and balance politics. Long before the recent rapprochement between the GCC countries, Saudi Arabia already refrained from a strict boycott on Qatar in 2017 and left the door open for dialogue to solve the political crisis in the Gulf.

However, until recently, the UAE has refused and resisted any dialog concerning the Gulf. Even the Saudi Arabia-initiated normalization with Qatar in early January 2021 was not embraced by the Emirati leadership. Despite Emirati unwillingness, Riyadh was keen on lifting the blockade on Qatar and Abu Dhabi had to follow suit.

Finally, Saudi-UAE divergence on Turkey is another dimension. Turkey’s perspective on the new alliance politics in the MENA region is that it expects the UAE to abandon confrontational language and actions and to adopt a constructive and cooperative attitude. The Turkish government is showing signs that it is willing to give cooperation with the UAE and Egypt a chance similar to the positive approach adopted recently toward Saudi Arabia.

Over a month ago, Kuwait concluded its parliamentary elections for the 16th legislative term. The governing structure in Kuwait differs from its Gulf neighbors as here the legislative branch, which is also known as the National Assembly, has significant influence not only in passing legislation but also by virtue of its oversight of the executive branch.

Although the outcome of the parliamentary elections might not have a direct effect on the region, this particular legislative term in Kuwait will be interesting to monitor for various reasons from its being the first parliament to be formed under the reign of the newly elected Emir, Sheikh Nawaf al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah, to the increasing pressure from the Kuwaiti people to reject normalization relations with Israel.

The outcome of the elections 

On December 5, 2020, despite the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions and the bad weather, Kuwaitis showed up in high numbers; the election turnout was around 70 percent. Out of the 342 candidates running across five electoral districts, only 50 were elected to the parliament, ten from each district. The outcome of the elections yielded significant results, with more than a 60 percent turnover; only 19 of the 44 incumbents were re-elected to an all-male parliament.

Although Adel Al-Asoumi, the chairman of the Arab Parliament, congratulated Kuwait for holding a “transparent and successful election,” there were no official reactions from the five other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries following the election in Kuwait.

Role of Kuwaiti parliament in foreign affairs 

While the parliament does not usually delve into matters of foreign affairs, it has the jurisdiction to propose and vote on laws that concern Kuwait in relation to other countries.

“There is no clear constitutional text that prevents the National Assembly from discussing foreign policy matters, but it is understood from the spirit of the constitution that the Emir handles the signing of international treaties and the relationships with other countries. However, the National Assembly theoretically can disapprove any treaty signed by the state,” Nabeel Nowairah, an independent analyst, told Politics Today.

“As an institution, the parliament does not have a huge role to play in Kuwait’s foreign policy but “individual MPs sometimes voice their opinion on certain matters happening in the region and take their own stance, occasionally coming off as provocative,” Daniel Tavana, postdoctoral fellow at the Council on Middle East Studies at Yale University, told Politics Today.

During the election cycle, the Palestinian cause was brought up multiple times, thus signaling that the topic is one of utmost priority for most Kuwaitis.

This was evident two weeks ago when a UK-based Emirati media outlet, Al Arab, published an article following the AlUla summit which was perceived as an insult towards the Kuwaiti Emir, as it took away from his role in resolving the Gulf dispute.

This prompted Kuwait’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to contact its Emirati counterpart to express their concern. While the issue was resolved on a state level, MP Ahmed Al Hamad spoke out on the incident and pointed out that the newspaper has a “limited opinion and is ignorant regarding Kuwait’s role in mediating the Gulf crisis.”

Kuwaiti “House of the People”

As the branch of government that represents the voice of the Kuwaiti people, the parliament discusses matters related to the region when they are of national importance.

During the election cycle, the Palestinian cause was brought up multiple times, thus signaling that the topic is one of utmost priority for most Kuwaitis.

Indicating the importance of rejecting ties with Israel and although the parliament had been in session for about a month, normalization with Israel was regarded as a priority by the foreign affairs committee, with one of its members, MP Abdullah Al Mudhaf, stating that they aim to solidify the boycott of the Zionist state.

In terms of legislation, on December 26, Kuwaiti MP Dr. Abdulaziz Al Saqobi, submitted a proposal to amend Law 21 of 1964, related to the boycott of Israeli goods, to include that Israel should be boycotted politically, electronically, and in terms of tourism.

The parliament’s role as the “House of the People” was clearly visible during the previous legislative term when 38 MPs released a statement demanding that the Kuwaiti government acknowledge its commitment to rejecting ties with Israel, after news broke that the United Arab Emirates had agreed to normalize ties with Israel.

The move came after the Kuwaiti people loudly voiced their support for the Palestinian people and 40 civil society organizations urged the parliament to “urgently pass a law that criminalizes normalizing relations with the Zionist Enemy.”

The parliament’s role as the “House of the People” was clearly visible during the previous legislative term when 38 MPs released a statement demanding that the Kuwaiti government acknowledge its commitment to rejecting ties with Israel.

In Kuwaiti politics, going against the Palestinian cause is a red line, and MPs and politically active persons are expected to have a firm stance against Israel. Such figures are favored by the public. Marzouq Al-Ghanim, the speaker of parliament, gained notable attention during the Arab Parliament in Amman when he threw the “deal of the century” document in the trash, claiming that it “belongs in the dustbin of history.”

Given that Article 70 of the Kuwaiti constitution stipulates treaties must be approved by a law to be enforced, when Kuwait and Saudi Arabia reached an agreement on December 24, 2019 over the Neutral Zone, a 5,770-square meter oil production zone shared by both countries, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was not deemed final without the approval of the parliament.

While the law passed as the majority of the members approved the MoU, six MPs rejected it. One of the MPs who voted against the bill, Mubarak Al Hajraf, during the session asked, “Did this agreement bring about equal sovereignty between both countries?”

Several influential political figures and former MPs Obaid Al-Wasmi and Saleh Al-Mulla, spoke on the matter pointing to the fact that reaching an agreement is vital as long as it does not infringe on Kuwait’s sovereignty and wealth.

The Neutral Zone has been a topic of national interest since 2015 when both countries halted oil production in Kuwait’s Wafra and Saudi Arabia’s Khafji oil fields, after growing tension following the Saudis’ approval to grant Chevron a 30-year concession without consulting Kuwait. The move was not welcomed by Kuwait as the Kuwaiti constitution states that no foreign country is permitted ownership of any of its oil resources.

Siding with allies, yet maintaining diplomacy 

Kuwait refrains from engaging in offensive military operations and tries to reduce regional tensions if they arise. Although this has been the governmental stance for decades, the parliament has played a role in reflecting public opinion regarding regional affairs.

One notable instance was back in 2016, when nine Shi’a MPs boycotted a parliamentary meeting which was scheduled to take place a day after 25 Kuwaitis were charged for allegedly having ties with Iran and Hezbollah. The incident caused polarization in Kuwait with some MPs calling for harsh measures on Iran, while others stating that the ruling was an indication of the increasing Saudi influence on Kuwaiti domestic issues.

Earlier in 2011, during the Bahraini uprising, there was internal pressure, including from the parliament, that Kuwait should refrain from establishing a military presence on the ground. Sticking to its diplomatic stance, the Kuwaiti government ended up sending naval forces and medical personnel.

Setting an example 

Since Kuwaiti citizens have the right to vote for the members of the legislative branch (except the 16 ministers who are appointed by the government), the Gulf country’s semi-democratic process is argued to be one of the freest governing structures in the region.

“Although there is no regional standard, given that every Gulf country has its own electoral and legislative institutions, the Kuwaiti parliament is the only one that has some autonomy and real law-making power,” stated Tavana.

Kuwait’s democratic process sets an example for the region, not only as a body that enacts laws but also in terms of its ability to hold the government accountable.

Ethno-religious diversity and the strategic location of the Balkans have always attracted global and regional actors. It is a geography where the interests of many neighboring and non-neighboring countries such as the EU countries, Russia, the U.S., Turkey, and the Gulf countries, intersect.

Although the Balkans are often associated with ethnic conflict, poverty, and corruption, the natural diversity, fertile lands, tourism opportunities and the peninsula’s location on the world’s major energy routes have mounted the interests of foreign actors in the region.

For Saudi Arabia, food security is a serious problem and, therefore, this is one of the most important reasons to maintain good relations with the Balkans. Turkey, on the other hand, uses its historical and cultural ties in order to exercise influence over various communities in the Balkans which for centuries were part of the Ottoman Empire, the ancestor of the modern-day Republic of Turkey.

To understand better the reasons behind the Turkish-Saudi competition in the Balkans, a brief history of the Saudi-Turkish ties is necessary.

Saudi Arabia-Turkey Relations

The relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia are complicated. Although up to the 2010s, the two countries maintained good ties, after the Arab Spring, bilateral relations have deteriorated.

The Arab Spring is not the only reason behind this dramatic turn. The collapse of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian War were important events for the Saudi-Turkish relations, and following these two events, the Balkans started to occupy a place in the foreign policy agendas of Ankara and Riyadh.

However, the involvement of Saudi Arabia with its Salafi version of Islam in the Balkans has endangered the influence of Turkey on the region’s Muslim communities. The rising economic and political influence of Riyadh in the Balkans later deepened the geopolitical and ideological competition between Ankara and Riyadh.

Following Turkey’s support for Qatar during the Gulf-Qatar crisis in 2017, which was only recently settled, the ties between Ankara and Riyadh became further strained. However, the real blow to the bilateral relations came after the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi was assassinated in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.

Turkey’s disclosure of the Saudi government’s role in the Khashoggi murder and the elevation of the issue to an international level was followed by Saudi Arabia’s semi-official embargo on Turkish products. In addition to the above, the two countries support opposing sides in the Libyan civil war.

Riyadh’s intentions for cultural, economic, and political influence in the Balkans are reciprocated by Ankara, which triggered a competition between the two.

Especially after the instability resulting from the Arab Spring in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia realized the need for new allies.

The Balkans, which needed foreign investments and which are well-known for their agricultural produce and arms industry, were considered a perfect choice. However, Riyadh’s intentions for cultural, economic, and political influence in the Balkans are reciprocated by Ankara, which triggered a competition between the two.

The Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs, the Diyanet, provides solid assistance to the Muslim communities and religious authorities in Bulgaria, North Macedonia, and Albania through its official advisers. For instance, some Bulgarian Muslim leaders receive financial support annually from the Diyanet, in addition to books on religion and the training of imams.

Mosques are the major spaces of competition between Saudi Wahhabism and Turkey’s moderate Sunni Islam. Both countries find opportunities in mosques to spread their language and culture. Mosques financed by Turkey provide free Turkish language courses, while mosques financed by Saudi Arabia provide free Arabic language courses.

However, Turkey is one step ahead of Saudi Arabia in the Balkans, because Ankara promotes a version of Islam closer to Balkan Muslims, thanks to their common historical and religious heritage. Another advantage for Turkey is the Turkish communities living in the Balkans and the Balkan communities living in Turkey.

Turkey focuses its efforts on the promotion of the Turkish language and culture, and on preserving the historical monuments in the Balkans dating back to the Ottoman period through various programs and scholarships provided by the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), Türkiye Scholarships (Türkiye Bursları), and the Yunus Emre Institute.

Ankara has also become a significant player in the region’s economy and infrastructure by building local schools and other public facilities. In addition, TİKA, which is engaged in the restoration of Ottoman historical structures, renovates schools, hospitals, and other facilities in Kosovo, North Macedonia, and other Balkan countries.

Turkish and Saudi Economic Influence in the Balkans

Economy is the easiest way to gain influence in the Balkans, where the investment percentages are low and the unemployment rates are high. These two reasons in particular push Balkan countries to re-establish their relations with Saudi Arabia and to strengthen ties with Turkey.

In the 2000s, Saudi Arabia provided various forms of aid to Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina and thus came to prominence in the Balkans not by using religion, but by the investments made by subsidiaries of Arab companies like the Al-Shiddi Group.

After the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia realized the importance of new allies outside the Middle East, allies which can also function as reliable providers of agricultural products.

Riyadh’s purchasing of weapons from Balkan countries increases its economic influence, and, in turn, this increases the dependence of Balkan countries on Saudi Arabia.

Both Turkey and Saudi Arabia use economic tools such as direct and indirect investments in the banking, tourism, hotel management, real estate, and agriculture sectors. Although Turkey has strong trade ties with the Balkan countries, nowadays Saudi Arabia is becoming a serious rival to Turkey.

Saudi Arabia-based companies have been buying up land in Bosnia, Serbia, and Bulgaria. The Al-Shiddi Group is building hotels, has undertaken an entire residential area project in Belgrade, the Serbian capital, acquired Serbia’s largest airline carrier, and has invested in FlyBosnia.

After three and a half years of paralyzing strife, the blockade of Qatar was brought to an end ahead of the 41^st Summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), turning the page on perhaps the darkest period in the union’s four decade history.

The diplomatic breakthrough was heralded by the arrival of Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad on a Qatar Airways flight to Al-Ula, Saudi Arabia. In an astonishing scene given the acrimony of the past few years, Sheikh Tamim was greeted and embraced on the tarmac by Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman—widely considered one of the two main architects of the blockade along with Muhammad bin Zayed, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi.

Despite the geniality on display between the two Gulf leaders, however, it is difficult to mask that the reconciliation is both limited and fragile. Ending the blockade does not resolve the underlying frictions between Gulf states that led to the crisis in the first place.

Moreover, the absences of Muhammad bin Zayed and the King of Bahrain from the summit given this year’s heightened importance, has led some observers to speculate that rapprochement with Qatar was a Saudi-led initiative that the other partners to the blockade perhaps felt less enthusiastic about bringing to an end without achieving concessions from Qatar.

Indeed, the only publicly-acknowledged requirement of Doha was to drop all pending lawsuits against the blockading countries in international fora. In other words, nothing that preceded the rift itself.

That being said, it is difficult to argue that reconciliation was not a win-win for the entire GCC. While the Gulf body was never a model of effective multilateralism, restoring unity offers mutual benefits for all its members, as well as its foreign partners who have had the extra burden of navigating its fractured politics since June 2017.

Normalizing ties within the GCC allows for the resumption of cross-border cooperation and coordination at a time when all six members face a confluence of challenges on political, economic, security and public health issues.

No GCC member, for example, is immune to the severe downturn in global energy prices, the Covid-19 pandemic, or the potential outbreak of war with Iran and its consequences. Addressing complex challenges like these will always be more effective as a united bloc.

Fragile and limited: Will conflict return? 

Discord among states in the Arab Gulf is common, often stretching back generations and tied to tribal rivalries and territorial disputes. Yet the acute tension between Qatar and its neighbors developed in the mid-1990s, when Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa took control of the state in a bloodless coup against his father.

In 2014, a significant diplomatic rupture occurred between the same GCC members (minus Egypt) that was only brought to a close after nine months of Kuwaiti-led mediation. At issue was Qatar’s support for revolutionary forces, especially Sunni Islamists who were making significant gains amid the upheaval, as well as its positive relations with regional powers Iran and Turkey, all of whom Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain felt threatened Gulf interests.

When Donald Trump visited Saudi Arabia shortly after becoming President of the United States in 2017, the Saudi-led axis felt it had received a green light from the new American leader to dramatically escalate the pressure on Doha and, perhaps, bring it to its knees once and for all. However, with the help of Turkey, Qatar was able to survive the initial shock of the blockade, ward off a potential military invasion, and steady itself in preparation of a long, drawn out affair.