From the War on Terror to the far-right conspiracies, Islamophobia manifests in various forms. In today’s world, systemic Islamophobia continues to cast a long and dark shadow over the lives of Muslims across continents. Rooted in historical and contemporary contexts, this pervasive form of discrimination and prejudice has significant implications for individuals, communities, and societies at large.

Systemic Islamophobia operates within power structures, institutions, and cultural biases, perpetuating inequality, marginalization, and the violation of human rights. Implicitly and explicitly, Islamophobia is reinforced by various layers of society, including governments around the world.

While its manifestations may differ from one region to another, systemic Islamophobia shares commonalities across countries and societies. It operates as a product of historical legacies, geopolitical dynamics, cultural narratives, and power imbalances. It thrives in contexts where Muslims are viewed as the “Other,” perpetuating stereotypes, prejudices, and negative portrayals that undermine their rights, dignity, and societal inclusion.

The impact of systemic Islamophobia is far-reaching. Muslim individuals and communities face challenges in various domains of life, as the titles included in this Bundle will show. They experience heightened surveillance, racial profiling, and discriminatory legislation, hindering the realization of fundamental human rights and the pursuit of justice and equality. Furthermore, the interconnetedness of discrimination makes the issue even more pressing for all.

Recognizing and understanding systemic Islamophobia is essential for dismantling its deeply entrenched structures. It requires comprehensive analysis, dialogue, and collective action which this collection hopes to envoke.

The Rise of Global Islamophobia in the War on Terror: Coloniality, Race, and Islam delves into the complex and far-reaching consequences of the ‘War on Terror’ on global perceptions of Muslims. The book examines the intersection between Islamophobia, and various social, economic, and political factors that have shaped its prevalence.

The authors convincingly argue that the ‘War on Terror’ has not only intensified anti-Muslim racism but has also provided a framework that perpetuates a global Islamophobic narrative. By framing Muslims a perpetual enemy, this conflict has fostered a climate of fear and suspicion, fueling the growth of nativist and populist movements worldwide.

One of the book’s strengths lies in its comprehensive analysis of the different forms and manifestations of Islamophobia. Through an examination of localized histories, conflicts, and contemporary geopolitical realities, the authors map out the intricate ways in which Islamophobia has taken shape across the global North and South. This approach adds depth to the understanding of the diverse factors contributing to the rise of anti-Muslim sentiment.

The book offers a nuanced and comprehensive analysis of the connections between interpersonal and institutional racism. While highlighting the deeply rooted nature of Islamophobia, the book also sheds light on the activism and resistance that have emerged to confront this issue. By featuring narratives of individuals and groups challenging Islamophobia, the authors provide hope and inspiration for those seeking to combat this pervasive form of discrimination.

Naved Bakali and Farid Hafez, The rise of global Islamophobia in the War on Terror: Coloniality, race, and Islam (Manchester University Press 2022) ISBN: 978-1-5261-6175-8, 264 pages

Islamophobia in France: The Construction of the “Muslim Problem” presents a groundbreaking examination of the multifaceted nature of Islamophobia in the country. Authored by Abdellali Hajjat and Marwan Mohammed, the book challenges the prevailing notion that Islamophobia arises solely from individual bias but rather that Islamophobia in France is deeply entrenched within existing structures of power and control.

The book sheds light on pivotal moments in French history that have contributed to the marginalization of Muslim communities. It highlights the 2004 ban on veils in schools, followed by the 2010 legislation that prohibited face-covering clothing in public spaces, primarily targeting women who wear burqas. President Emmanuel Macron’s public statements regarding the hijab’s compatibility with French ideals further illustrate the pervasive Islamophobia within the country. These cultural biases not only perpetuate discriminatory practices but also position the Muslim population as scapegoats for broader issues surrounding immigration in France.

Hajjat and Mohammed go beyond surface-level analysis to uncover the structural dimensions of Islamophobia in France. They argue that French elites strategically employ Islamophobia as a state technology to exert control and contest the presence of specific groups of postcolonial immigrants and their descendants. By exploring the data on Islamophobia and examining its functioning in contemporary French society, the authors paint a comprehensive portrait of the mechanisms through which Islamophobia operates.

Islamophobia in France is an English translation of Abdellali Hajjat and Marwan Mohammed’s Islamophobie: Comment les e´lites franc¸aises fabriquent le “proble`me musulman.” and an essential contribution to the field, providing a nuanced and insightful examination of the systemic nature of Islamophobia and its consequences on Muslim communities in France.

Abdellali Hajjat and Marwan Mohammed, Islamophobia in France: The Construction of the “Muslim Problem” (University of Georgia Press, 2023) ISBN-10 0820363251, 306 pages

In The New Crusades: Islamophobia and the Global War on Muslims Khaled A. Beydoun presents an essential examination of Islamophobia from a legal and ground-up perspective. Drawing on his intellectual prowess and moral imperative, Beydoun presents a compelling analysis of the network of anti-Muslim campaigns unfolding worldwide and offers a comprehensive analysis of how Islamophobia is utilized by both democratic and authoritarian regimes to persecute Muslim populations.

The New Crusades does not shy away from challenging the established narratives. It delves into the role of the War on Terror in fueling and intensifying anti-Muslim campaigns around the world. Beydoun skillfully illustrates how Islamophobia operates as a unifying thread, perpetuating state and social bigotry and igniting hate-mongering from both liberal and right-wing factions. Through trenchant analysis and firsthand accounts from Muslims on the ground, the author brings to light the various manifestations of Islamophobia in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and beyond.

The book’s global perspective sets it apart, as Beydoun incorporates on-site experiences, interviews, and a diverse range of contexts. This approach enhances the authority of the narrative and makes it accessible and engaging for scholars, students, and the general public.

The New Crusades unravels the distinct systems of demonization and oppression that have emerged across the post-9/11 geopolitical landscape. Whether it is the imposition of hijab bans in France, state-sponsored hate speech and violence in India, or the existence of concentration camps in China, Beydoun examines how Islamophobia operates as a global phenomenon, perpetuating discrimination on multiple fronts.

The book powerfully reveals the unsettling reality that Islamophobia remains one of the few acceptable forms of hate in the world today. By exposing this truth, Beydoun calls attention to the urgent need for collective action against Islamophobia and its far-reaching consequences. By weaving together social science, law, and captivating narratives, the author highlights the pervasive impact of Islamophobia on Muslims across the globe.

Khaled A. Beydoun, The New Crusades: Islamophobia and the Global War on Muslims (University of California Press, 2023) ISBN: 9780520356306, 390 pages

In Fear of a Muslim Planet: Global Islamophobia in the New World Order Arsalan Iftikhar, a renowned American Muslim human rights lawyer, offers a comprehensive exploration of global Islamophobia. The book refers to the chilling reminder of the Christchurch massacre, where a white supremacist perpetrated a horrific act of violence against Muslim worshippers in New Zealand. Iftikhar draws attention to the manifesto left by the attacker, titled “The Great Replacement,” which espoused the belief that Muslims posed a threat and sought to replace white people. This incident serves as a starting point for exploring the dangerous legacy of this theory and its influence on extremist acts.

Iftikhar goes on to emphasize that the victims of the “Great Replacement” theory extend beyond Muslims alone. The tragic attack on the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, which targeted Jewish congregants, exemplifies the broader impact of this ideology including the infamous actions of Norwegian terrorist Anders Breivik.. The perpetrator’s anti-Semitic and Islamophobic motivations, fueled by anti-immigration sentiments, underline the interconnected nature of discrimination.

Throughout the book, Iftikhar critiques the presidency of Donald Trump, which he argues has contributed to the exacerbation of Islamophobia in America. He dissects Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric and policies, including his claim that “Islam hates us” and his call for a complete ban on Muslims entering the US. Iftikhar contends that Trump’s leadership has fueled the growth of Islamophobia.

The book goes beyond the United States and the Western world to shed light on global Islamophobia. Iftikhar highlights the genocidal levels of Islamophobia in countries like China and Myanmar, where Muslim communities face severe oppression. Additionally, he addresses the European focus on policing Muslim women’s hijab, exposing discriminatory policies that curtail religious freedom.

Arsalan Iftikhar, Fear of a Muslim Planet: Global Islamophobia in the New World Order (Skyhorse Publishing, 2021) ISBN-13 978-1510761872, 288 pages

The Suspect: Counterterrorism, Islam, and the Security State offers a captivating and deeply personal exploration of the impact that two decades of policing and counterterrorism have had on the state of mind of Muslims in Britain. Drawing from his own experiences, author Rizwaan Sabir takes readers on a compelling journey through British counterterrorism practices and the pervasive policing of Muslims.

Sabir’s narrative describes his wrongful arrest and detention on suspicion of terrorism. He recounts the distressing process of being unjustly made a target in the “war on terror.” With candor and vivid detail, he outlines the events leading up to his arrest, including being found in possession of the Al-Qaeda Training Manual, which he had downloaded for legitimate postgraduate research purposes. Sabir sheds light on the excruciating experience of being subjected to suspicion and surveillance solely based on his Muslim identity.

Throughout the book, Sabir recounts the harrowing aftermath of his arrest. He vividly describes the relentless monitoring and scrutiny he faced upon release from custody. This included frequent stop-and-search encounters, detentions at the border, surveillance by police and government departments, and an attempt by the UK military to recruit him into their psychological warfare unit. The author’s firsthand account provides a chilling insight into the intrusive and discriminatory practices endured by Muslims in the name of national security.

Sabir argues that the profound harm inflicted on individuals like him is not merely the result of government planning errors but rather a deliberate consequence of employing a counterinsurgency warfare approach to combat terrorism and police Muslim communities. Through his writing, Sabir advocates for and building networks of solidarity and support to challenge the injustices perpetuated by these policies and practices.

The Suspect serves as a powerful call to action, urging readers to recognize and resist the profound injustice faced by Muslims. By sharing his story, Sabir empowers readers to challenge the harmful narratives and practices that perpetuate the policing of Muslims.

Rizwaan Sabir, The Suspect: Counterterrorism, Islam, and the Security State (Pluto Press, 2022) ISBN: 9780745338484, 256 pages

H

umza Yousaf became the first minister of Scotland after narrowly winning the election for leader of the Scottish National Party. The health secretary received 52.1 percent of SNP members’ ballots, defeating finance secretary Kate Forbes, who received 47.9 percent.

Yousaf became Scotland’s first leader from an ethnic group and the first Muslim to head a democratic Western European country after he was sworn in as first minister on Wednesday, March 29, 2023, following a parliamentary decision on March 28.

In his victory speech, he said his “immediate priority will be to continue to protect every Scot as far as we can from the harm inflicted by the cost of living crisis, to recover and reform our NHS and other vital public services, to support our wellbeing economy and to improve the life chances of people across our country”. In addition, he attributes his success to his family, saying, “from the Punjab to our Parliament, this is a journey over generations that reminds us that we should celebrate migrants who contribute so much to our country”.

It is a narrow win over Forbes, an SNP rising star who campaigned as a change candidate, occasionally criticizing Yousaf and the SNP’s performance in government. Yousaf is close to former minister Nicola Sturgeon and campaigned on the promise of continuity — but the outcome underlines the difficult challenge he’ll face in rebuilding a party shaken by a contentious election.

Despite Yousaf winning the SNP leadership race, new polling performed by Ipsos Scotland between 17 and 21 of March suggests that the Scottish public are more favorable towards Kate Forbes than towards Humza Yousaf, while Nicola Sturgeon remains the most popular Scottish and Westminster political leader – ahead of all her potential successors – as well as beating Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, who has a favorability rating of 20%, in contrast to Sturgeon’s rating of 46%.

The First Minister’s newly appointed cabinet revealed:

• Shona Robison, the new Deputy First Minister, will take on the Finance portfolio, including responsibility for the Scottish Budget
• Michael Matheson becomes the Cabinet Secretary for NHS Recovery, Health and Social Care
• Jenny Gilruth joins Cabinet for the first time as Cabinet Secretary for Education and Skills
• Màiri McAllan joins Cabinet for the first time as Cabinet Secretary for Net Zero and Just Transition
• Neil Gray joins Cabinet for the first time as Cabinet Secretary for Wellbeing Economy, Fair Work and Energy
• Mairi Gougeon remains Cabinet Secretary for Rural Affairs, Land Reform and Islands
• Angus Robertson remains Cabinet Secretary for Constitution, External Affairs and Culture
• Shirley-Anne Somerville becomes Cabinet Secretary for Social Justice
• Angela Constance returns to Cabinet as the new Cabinet Secretary for Justice and Home Affairs

On Thursday, March 20, Parliament was requested to ratify the new ministerial nominations.

Humza Yousaf commented:

“The Cabinet team I have unveiled reflects the priorities that we will pursue as a government – including tackling child poverty, improving public services and building a fairer, greener economy”.

Controversies

Yousaf was one of 86 MSPs who supported the Scottish Gender Recognition Reform bill in December, which would have made it simpler for trans and non-binary people to acquire a gender-recognition certificate (GRC).

The legislation would have made it easier for trans people in Scotland to formally change their gender identity – without the need for a gender dysphoria diagnosis – and would have reduced the age at which a person can file for a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC) from 18 to 16 years old. It would also reduce the time it takes to obtain formal acknowledgment of one’s gender from two years to a few months.

The measure was approved by the Scottish Parliament in December 2022 by a vote of 86 to 39.

The decision has sparked a lot of discussion about devolution and Scottish independence. The decision comes just two months after Scotland lost a supreme court attempt to conduct a secession vote without Westminster’s permission.

The measure was eventually blocked by the UK government under section 35, which Yousaf and others called an “unprecedented attack” on the Scottish parliament.

Concerns about the bill’s potential effect on women’s rights led the UK government to halt its implementation, citing a conflict with the UK Equality Act. Women’s rights activists have said that this strategy would undermine the safety of women-only spaces.

In an interview with Times Radio, Scotland’s former first minister Alex Salmond criticized Yousaf’s battle over Westminster, saying, “concentrate on self-determination, not self-identification.”

Concerns over a potential independent Scotland

Yousaf, reaffirmed his commitment to take an independent Scotland to the EU while maintaining the rights of Scottish voters over their ‘constitutional future’, saying “as we make the case for Scottish independence, we will continue to govern well and demonstrate to the people of Scotland the benefits of decisions about their lives being taken here in Scotland”.

Prime Minister Rishi Sunak has warned new First Minister Humza Yousaf about plans for a second Scottish independence referendum. Sunak told Westminster’s Liaison Committee: “I think in elections people vote on all sorts of different things and I don’t think it’s appropriate to try and hijack a general election for one issue”.

“People in Scotland will vote on the various issues they think are important to them.” He added that Scottish voters made their votes known in the 2014 referendum.

The British Prime Minister then continued: “As I’ve always said, I think actually what people in Scotland want is to see their two governments working together to deliver for them.”

In a narrow diplomatic victory for China, the U.N.’s highest human rights body voted on October 6 against a proposal from Britain, Turkey, the United States, and other predominantly Western nations to hold a debate on alleged human rights abuses against Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in China’s western Xinjiang province.

The loss – 19 against, 17 for, 11 abstentions – is just the second time in the council’s 16-year history that a proposal has been rejected, and analysts see it as a setback for accountability efforts, the West’s moral authority on human rights, and the United Nations’ reputation.

The vote was a test of political and diplomatic influence between the West and Beijing, and it would have been the first time that China’s human rights record merited a distinct agenda item at the council.

Human rights groups ‘disappointed’

“This is a disaster. This is really disappointing,” said Dolkun Isa, President of the World Uyghur Congress, whose mother died in a camp and whose two brothers are missing. “We will never give up, but we are really disappointed by the reaction of Muslim countries,” he added.

In a statement, more than 60 Uyghur rights organizations from across the globe urged the United Nations and its human rights experts to “take concrete action according to their mandates.”

An Advocate for ISHR in China and Latin America, Raphael Viana David, said, “While, in recent years, the Council has been able to scrutinize international crimes in Palestine, Ukraine or Myanmar, and to investigate systemic racism and police violence in the United States, Council members sent today a dreadful message: China remains so far untouchable”.

On Twitter, Phil Lynch, head of the International Service for Human Rights, described the voting record as “shameful” and further addressed Muslim nations in the statement, “OIC states fail to stand with Uyghur Muslims. Somalia the only African state to actually stand against systemic discrimination. Ukraine’s abstention betrays values of solidarity and accountability to which it appeals”. Somalia was the only Muslim nation in favor for the debate, despite the country’s close diplomatic ties with China.

In a meeting on August 18th at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced China’s pledge of debt forgiveness for 17 African countries in an effort to establish connections and shift western influence away from the continent.

There is a likelihood that investments with China are the reason why numerous Muslim countries, abstained or voted against the resolution due to ‘seeking closer ties.’

China’s response

Before the voting, the Chinese ambassador Chen Xu stated Beijing’s “China firmly opposes and categorically rejects the draft decision”. He also stated that “The U.S. and some other countries, in disregard of their own serious human rights violations, are indulged in pointing fingers at others”. He reiterated that the “international community must not allow any attempt to politicize or instrumentalize human rights issues” as it sets a dangerous precedent.

China’s Foreign Ministry issued a lengthy statement after the vote, claiming that “For some time now, the U.S. and some other Western countries have been misinforming the public about Xinjiang and seeking political manipulation in the name of human rights simply to smear China’s image and contain China’s development”.

He reaffirmed that “The issues that the Human Rights Council truly needs to focus on are the serious human rights violations concerning the U.S., the UK and some Western forces, including systemic racism and racial discrimination, the rights of refugees and migrants, rampant gun violence, unilateral coercive measures, and massive killings of innocent civilians in overseas military operations”.

The U.S. ambassador, Michele Taylor, said that the purpose of the proposal for the debate was to “provide a neutral forum for discussion” that would allow China to voice its opinions and hear the opinions of others.

“No country represented here today has a perfect human rights record,” she said. “No country, no matter how powerful, should be excluded from council discussions. This includes my country — the United States — and it includes the People’s Republic of China.”

Q

Queen Elizabeth II lived a remarkably long life and was the longest reigning monarch in the history of the country. She was considered as a symbol of stability, service and embodiment of Britishness. Her passing is a rare historic moment and while many are mourning her departure, this event has also resurfaced grievances among people in the U.K.’s former colonies as well as generating critical reactions domestically.

The death and legacy of the Queen prompted a number of national and local British Muslim organizations to offer their condolences and tributes. Well known scholar Abdal Hakim Murad devoted a Friday sermon at Cambridge Mosque to the subject of kingship, Islam and the implications of the current King being sympathetic to Islam. The Queen’s passing was widely discussed on social media with popular Muslim YouTubers such as Paul Williams discussing the positive things Charles has said about Islam.

The National Anthem was even sung in Regents Park mosque to mark the accession of the new King. Some Muslims are convinced that Charles is a secret Muslim and others have made the dubious claim that the Queen was a descendent of the Prophet. London-based researcher Muhammad Ahmedullah told Politics Today, “The idea that the symbol of British power, the Queen and the Monarchy, could somehow be related to and descendant from the founder of Islam can be deeply comforting for people experiencing powerlessness and lacking the intellectual, creative and critical tools to confront their predicament head on without relying on mythical reassurances.”

Muslims growing up in Britain in the1970s and 1980s, appear to be more sympathetic to the deceased monarch and have affection for her as an individual. They could be described as “Queenist,” while not necessarily being Monarchist. Amir Suleman, a media professional from Peterborough, noted to Politics Today he experienced a sense of personal loss, adding “The more I digest her passing, I only now begin to realise how important she was to me personally. She was always ‘there’… It was just normal to always have the Queen. I’m 48 years old and she was, like most, the only monarch we’ve ever had and there are many memories associated with her.”

For political commentator Sami Hamdi, the experience of living in a Britain with its freedoms and opportunities made him appreciate what the late monarch represented “I cannot lie… A deep sadness grips me for a Queen who (for me) was the powerful symbol of the stability of the refuge and sanctuary in which I was born and raised (and which was not, and is not, afforded to my family elsewhere),”he said to Politics Today.

Attitudes are changing, nearly a third of the public, most of whom are young people, want to abolish the monarchy, some polls suggest that less than 40 percent of people from minorities  favour keeping the institution. Underlying this sentiment is the view that the Royal Family is symbolic of privilege and inequality and the fact that the ancestors of the U.K.’s Muslims lived and died under British colonialism. The contemporary legacies of the British Empire can be seen in Africa and the Middle East and this history continues to contaminate relations between India and Pakistan in relationship to Kashmir, in addition to ongoing reverberations of Her Majesty’s Government’s mass exploitation of Indian natural resources.

Though the Queen was not personally responsible for these events – she was always silent on these matters.  Her defenders will argue that she had no political power, however, this narrative is difficult to maintain when considering evidence that indicates that she lobbied for changes in the law to hide her private wealth and that the Royals vetted more than a thousand laws through the mechanism of the Queen’s consent.

The extraordinary queuing to pay last respects to the Queen have been interpreted and exploited in a way that equates feelings of sadness about her death with joy at the unquestioned accession of Charles. Loyalty to the Crown is an implied aspect of British identity.

As Afroze F Zaidi has argued, citizenship has become conditional, for Muslim Britons in light of the U.K.’s counter-terror policy, Prevent. A recent report by the Institute of Race Relations shows that British Muslims have their citizenship reduced to “second-class” status and analysis of government data by the Muslim Council of Britain indicates that around 50% of Muslims live in poverty. This is at time when the new King has inherited his mother’s vast wealth while the public will be forced to continue subsidising their lifestyles to the tune of $33 million in the next two years.

Charles to his credit, has has a long track record of supporting charitable  causes such as the Prince’s Trust  and is  patron of the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, where he gave his famous 1993 speech on “Islam and the West“.  According to the author of “Charles At Seventy: Thoughts, Hopes and Dreams“, Charles opposed the Iraq war, disagreed with the burqas and niqab bans in Europe,  told ministers he has  sympathy for the Palestinians and studies the Quran. In a recent speech to faith leaders in Buckingham Palace, King Charles spoke of his personal duty:

“…to protect the diversity of our country, including by protecting the space for faith itself and its practice through the religions, cultures, traditions and beliefs to which our hearts and minds direct us as individuals.”

However, community historian Yahya Birt cautions British Muslims, “…not to be easily charmed by Charles and rush unthinkingly for the photo, career and funding opportunities and the imperial gongs at the crowning of a new Islamophilic monarch.”

Over the last decade, Charles has had 95 meetings in the Middle East and eight were with repressive monarchies. Many of these occurred just before or after  acts of repression against opposition activists, the media or religious minorities and he has played a key role in promoting £14.5-billion worth of UK arms exports to these. The arrests of protesters questioning his right to being King are not encouraging sign for a country that prides itself on the right to free speech.

Also, cancelling hospital appointments and closing food banks on the date of the funeral of the Queen are not the best way to generate good among those in difficult circumstances. As Zara Mohammed, Secretary General of the Muslim Council of Britain notes, “The reign of King Charles III, will force Britain to enter a period where difficult conversations on history, the past and the future direction of the country need to be had.”

He has become Head of State of 14 countries in addition to the UK. Some of them have already signalled that they want to become Republics, while staying as Commonwealth members. How will he navigate this and the legacies of colonialism? Will he make the Royal Family more relevant and accountable to the concerns of all British people?

Can his enthusiasm for Islam and Multiculturalism pacify the current government which is in denial about its institutional Islamophobia? Britain certainly could do with a figure head that brings communities together, who could help heal the ever widening social divides on the basis of race, religion, class and work for a more equitable society. It remains to be seen if the new monarch can play this role.

T

here has been an uproar in France after French-Algerian author, Hamid Ait-Taleb, who holds two master’s degrees from the Sorbonne, changed his name to “Xavier Le Clerc” over the lack of job offers due to his North African-sounding name. Le Clerc made the statement during a radio interview on September 7, 2022.

In an interview with Radio France Inter, Le Clerc said soon after he changed his name, he got hundreds of calls offering him jobs, where in the past he never got called back after job applications.

Ait-Taleb is the author of the novel A Man without a Title, which speaks of his father’s journey into integration, identity, and poverty in France.

It is not clear whether Le Clerc’s father was with the Harkis, the Algerians who fought under French command during the country’s War of Independence in 1954-1962.

Upon arrival in France, Le Clerc’s father was employed in Normandy as a laborer by an agricultural company.

Surprising?

The statement made by Le Clerc came as a shock to some French, but France’s history of racism especially against Harkis is known to many and does not surprise people with migrant backgrounds in the country.

Le Clerc came out and spoke about the reason that pushed him to change his name after he was subjected to criticism including accusations against him of “betraying his roots and identity.”

Some 1.1 million people have watched the interview with Le Clerc with politicians and figures jumping on the bandwagon and noting that this comes as no surprise to them given the history of France and the rise of the far-right in the country.

Danièle Obono, member of the French National Assembly, tweeted that the case of Xavier Le Clerc is no exception, noting that discrimination in employment is known: an applicant of North African origin is 31.5% less likely to get a job than a white French applicant.

Farida Amrani, a Moroccan-origin member of the French National Assembly, noted that she was asked once in her electoral district how she became an MP while having a migrant background.

In France, a French Name?

According to a study, the gap between French with Maghribi origins and white French when it comes to employment is 15%.

In another study, the French American Foundation concluded that a French name gives universal access to all facets of French society.

France, due to its colonial history, hosts large migrant communities. Muslims make up 6.6% of the population of France or 8.8 million people—the largest Muslim population in a single European country.

As in the rest of Europe, racism in France is on the rise recently. In the most recent general elections an increasing number of French people voted for right-wing candidates whose discourse was mainly focused on their anti-migrant rhetoric.

Muslims find themselves in an increasingly hostile environment in France, which to date refuses to recognize its colonial past and integrate its Muslim population.

T

he Konya 2021 Islamic Solidarity Games were concluded in August 2022, yet their end marks the beginning of a new understanding. Türkiye has united all Muslim countries through sports, which has never simply been a random series of activities: it has always held the potential to serve a greater purpose—solidarity. That being said, we should examine the key notions to understand better what solidarity through sports actually means. 

The Sports Aspect of Diplomacy

It is well known that political institutions and organizations utilize multiple tools and apparatuses to pursue their goals. Information technologies and globalization opened the way for further influence to resonate through multiple channels, targeting different audiences. Political authorities benefit from this ever-growing scope of interaction as well. In fact, political authorities have been generally successful in adapting to utilizing new instruments and opportunities, including the expanding reach of diplomacy that has grown exponentially to include a wide range of activities within its scope.

Any event can be considered an act of diplomacy as long as it contains diplomatic elements. Even a coffee break can create a diplomatic moment. Both the environment and the topic of a meeting can affect the process and outcome of diplomacy. In other words, means and context are highly linked and are intertwined with the results of a diplomatic act. Undoubtedly, in a peaceful context, diplomacy can flourish better. 

Especially in the last decades, sports diplomacy and its positive impact have led politicians to choose such peaceful events for diplomatic purposes. Fun and entertainment have proven their significance for diplomacy long ago. Singing contests and international tournaments are the most known examples.

Sports and games are among the best tools of diplomacy with international attraction and a huge networking capacity that brings many nations together, with or without historical ties, for friendly competition. These are the features that diplomacy looks forward to harvesting. Every international game is a potential diplomatic gathering. High-level politicians, usually ministers, come together on the occasion of sports and exchange ideas, giving messages of unity.

Konya: Sports and the City

Famous travelers talk about the spirit of places in their travelogues. Like humans, cities are also born, grow up, and have certain sui generis features. This usually occurs in a process whereby a people and location shape each other mutually. Peoples and cities form unities with distinctive characteristics. In this manner, sports events are affected by the nature of cities where they are held, while at the same time they affect the city in return. Many factors such as history, nation, and geography play decisive roles in this formation.

Konya has undergone the same process. Gracious people of former times came together, as we did today, and created a new event to provide this need. Scholars, politicians, good-willed locals, and many other sound-minded people convened in Konya and provided something new to the world and gained people’s trust by standing together.

Thanks to their cooperation for a fair world, Konya Province blossomed as a center for solidarity, protection, and peace. The spirit of unity was so strong that throughout generations, it gathered many poets, dervishes, and scholars that helped this spirit resonate even further.

Tracing back history provides strong clues about what we do today and why we do it. The Islamic Solidarity Games can be seen as the most recent addition to the chain that links the present with the past. We, as the Ministry, work for solidarity and aimed to unite people, once again, in Konya. Despite ill-intentioned political authorities across the world that don’t abstain from utilizing harmful means, we strive for peace and harmony with tools that promote the spirit of solidarity. Remember—there is always darkness, it is light that endeavors.

Konya as the Sports Capital of Muslim Countries

Games have evolved in parallel with the evolution of human society. The Olympics took their present shape after public diplomacy became involved. Diplomats, politicians, and policymakers began to see games as an opportunity to create new connections and form new alliances. In this way, games came to serve the purposes of the former.

The Islamic Solidarity Games are one of the best examples of this. On an individual and country level, the games attracted the highest attendance so far. The games accomplished multiple goals at once with the ultimate aim of creating unity among Muslim countries.

Fifty-four countries joined the games and athletes from these countries competed for medals. The Konya Games were also accompanied by academic and cultural activities carried out by academics and experts from across the world.

Konya was furnished with optimal infrastructure and superstructure, as well as human capital. In other words, the games have influenced the city permanently. Konya was chosen as the “Sports Capital of Muslim Countries” and gained a new dimension for its harmonic spirit. The games refreshed the spirit of the city and reminded everyone of its legacy, as well as its vision for the future.

Final Remarks

The Konya 2021 Islamic Solidarity Games are a multidimensional event. The collective structure of the games, and any event carried out by our Ministry, lets people draw their own conclusion. A volunteer working for the games’ organization may regard the games completely differently than an athlete or a politician. This pluralism is a highly positive asset which we purposefully sought. 

The games were a huge success for us. Not only for the medals or records, but also for successfully executing a nine-day-long event that gathered various people who came from thousands of kilometers away and who spoke different languages, but were united by the language of sports. When we speak of solidarity, that is what we mean: our ability to surpass our differences and all obstacles, and come together as one.

No one can say the world is ignoring Xinjiang.

Testimonies of the Turkic Uyghurs who managed to escape the province have reverberated, provoking reactions ranging from disbelief to outrage.

The danger, however, is that we might narrow down the issue to a narrative of authoritarian China abusing the rights of minorities and therefore needing to be confronted.

We should not forget that this particular repression of Muslims in Xinjiang harnesses all the tools of the globalized modern age: capitalism and progress which often mean the policing, exploitation, and dehumanization of the recipients of the so-called help.

For this purpose, it is important to position Chinese state violence at the crossroads of the post-socialist neoliberal development and the surge in Islamophobia since the West’s “war on terror” was launched. Is this not a part of the centuries-long global imperial history?

Although the People’s Republic of China was born from the resistance to imperialism, it has reproduced the tenets of imperialism to create the infrastructure for political violence.

Following the footsteps of European colonialists, the communist state-builders also look down on indigenous people in their frontier territories, treating them as incapable of self-rule, and, at the same time, extracting their resources.

Is there anything new in China’s behavior?

Some would argue that for the first time in history mass surveillance is being used on such a scale, and that this could give China an award for inventions on suppressing its own people.

Because authorities labeled Uyghurs as threatening the order, a long list of beneficiaries in the guise of technology companies are allowed to pitch their solutions, advance the dehumanizing project, and thrive.

In Xinjiang, most non-Han people live outside of the detention facilities, but their lives resemble one huge open-air prison

Anything more seductive than making money from mass surveillance and incarceration? The capitalist accumulation process never stops – it continues to be reinvented! That is why the pre-criminal offences of thought and action were added to the long list of “extremist but not serious terrorist crimes.”

This accompanied by capital-driven development dispossessed Uyghurs, producing a neo-colonial system at a frontier of global capitalism.

In Xinjiang, most non-Han people live outside of the detention facilities, but their lives resemble one huge open-air prison. With their movements being tracked, passports taken away, and phones monitored all the time, Uyghur people are far from free – even in comparison to other places in China.

The Chinese visionaries of state violence in the right context

The Soviet model reeducated citizens through forced labor and collective training. On the other hand, Western imperial powers targeted certain ethnic groups who had independence aspirations by deploying some sort of eugenics.

It seems that China borrows from both streams of imperialism which combine the use of propaganda and justify mass detentions of a segment of the population. Therefore, it becomes inevitable that special measures against the target group will be accepted by the rest of Chinese society, which view them as the necessary steps to provide safety, and not aimed at an erasure of identity. All the while the government abuses segments of the population to display its ability to protect the others.

This landscape of terror could have looked different if things in the West had played out differently.

It is the West’s response to 9/11 that allowed China to embrace anti-Muslim rhetoric. Places such as Guantanamo Bay continue to inspire others to justify torture and preemptive punishments. Now, the U.S. and European institutions face accusations of hypocrisy when denouncing China’s policies.

In these moments, many ask about the rationale behind Trump’s ban on Muslims, the criminalization of asylum-seekers, or the efforts to influence the country’s minority demographics.

Is the Chinese government working alone to achieve similar goals?

Looking back, forced labor has prevailed in China for centuries, with the Chinese Civil War itself constituting a show-off of nationalists and communists making use of reeducation for the broad population.

Then, after the communists won the war, millions were pushed into a penitentiary state mechanism – this later evolved along with Chinese society and brutal labor camps persisted in a wide range of settings.

One of the Chinese’s colonial endeavors was transforming the region for their own purposes, exploiting its natural resources, and dispossessing its people.

Uyghurs are stripped of the most lucrative job opportunities, and are kept under the strict eye of the watchtower in which a relationship of superiority and inferiority is duplicated.

China’s colonial project includes the subjugation of the indigenous population and social engineering. Han people, who have settled or been settled by a decree, in Xinjiang, disrupt the social structure of the region. As a result, the proportion of Han Chinese has risen from 6% to roughly more than 40%, forming a counterweight to Muslim Uyghurs.

Should we place all the guilt on the leadership of China?

Xinjiang has been rebooted to deploy tactics that are already on the rise around the globe, particularly in the borderlands, where the colonial settings have been replaced.

Reinforcing these mechanisms once again normalizes the century-long process of the spread of concentration camps.

The struggle against the terror campaign in Xinjiang should be considered alongside labor camps and mass incarceration in other parts of the world. If anti-imperialism means standing with the colonized, the fight should go beyond China and be linked to other places where it is globally connected.

In a critical time for Boris Johnson, Nusrat Ghani’s allegations have roiled the Conservative Party. The prime minister is awaiting the outcome of a pivotal inquiry into lockdown-flouting parties in Downing Street that took place during a period when government-backed public health restrictions prohibited most social gatherings.

In an interview with the Sunday Times, Nusrat Ghani said that when she was fired as transport minister during a reshuffle in 2020, she was informed that “Muslimness” had been mentioned as a concern at a Downing Street meeting.

“At the post-reshuffle meeting with the whips, I asked what the thinking was behind the decision to fire me…that my ‘Muslim woman minister’ status was making colleagues uncomfortable and that there were concerns ‘that I wasn’t loyal to the party as I didn’t do enough to defend the party against Islamophobia allegations.”

The accusations made by Ghani have been previously echoed by former Tory peer Baroness Sayeeda Warsi, the country’s first female Muslim cabinet minister and a persistent campaigner against Islamophobia. When she learned that Javid had been named chancellor, she stated in a tweet “It’s a shame… that it’s taken four years and a leadership contest to finally drag my colleagues kicking and screaming to address this issue.”

To be an Anti-Muslim bigot is to be rewarded and elevated to a party post but to speak out against it is to be shunned and politically exiled.

There has been criticism from the wider British Muslim community on Ghani’s role as a Conservative MP in normalizing anti-Muslim bigotry through government initiatives such as Prevent. Ghani’s definition of Islamophobia is markedly different from the standard definition, which is as follows: “Intense dislike or fear of Islam, especially as a political force; hostility or prejudice towards Muslims.”

“Thus, if the archetypal radicalizer in the first decade after 9/11 was the almost pantomime figure of Abu Hamza with his eye-patch, hook hands and wild rhetoric; his counterpart in the last ten years was likely to be smartly dressed, soft-spoken and to mouth platitudes about social justice and human rights,” she continued as saying.

Prevent has faced criticism not only from civil organizations but international bodies including the UN.

In a report on anti-Muslim hate and discrimination by UN Special Rapporteur, Ahmed Shaheed, on Freedom of Religion or Belief submitted, it stated the key issues form the Prevent Strategy:

• That the Prevent duty was leaving students fearful of exercising their rights to freedom of expression and belief.
• The Prevent duty risked being counter-productive by driving children to discuss issues related to terrorism, religion, and identity outside the classroom and online, where simplistic narratives are promoted and go unchallenged.

The language used by media outlets and politicians, notably during the “war on terror,” has contributed to the normalization of this bigotry. As with other types of discrimination, it is critical to hear the victims’ voices loudly.

Despite mounting worries from the British Muslim community over escalating Anti-Muslim prejudice, the conservative party has failed to settle on a definition. Islamophobia, as defined by the All-Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, is “rooted in racism and is a type of racism that targets expressions of Muslimness or perceived Muslimness.”

The Labour Party, Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru, and the Mayor of London have all endorsed this term, but the Conservative Party has rejected it. The Tory government’s refusal to adopt the definition of Islamophobia despite the support of the definition by cross party parliamentarians is a reflection of the party’s stance towards Muslims and Islam.

A YouGov poll conducted on behalf of Hope Not Hate (an non-partisan organization tackling racism and fascism) show Conservative members showing worrying beliefs in Islamophobic myths, don’t want a Muslim to be Prime Minister, and overwhelmingly reject even the very idea that the Conservative Party has a problem with this issue.” 67% believe  “there are areas in Britain that operate under Sharia law,” as opposed to just 18% who oppose this. 39% of members believe that “Islamist terrorists reflect a widespread hostility to Britain amongst the Muslim community”.

Although the Conservatives are in power and have the responsibility of bringing this problem to the forefront, Islamophobia is not only a Conservative issue; the Labour Party is not exempt.

According to a report conducted by the Labour Muslim Network in Nov 2020 on Islamophobia and the Muslim experience, 29% of Muslim members and supporters have directly experienced Islamophobia in the Labour Party, 37% have directly witnessed Islamophobia within the Labour Party and 44 % don’t think the party takes it seriously.

Regardless of how strongly one may disagree with Nusrat Ghani, justice requires that we contextualize this moment within the larger framework of Islamophobia that Muslims suffer. In the end, when we tolerate one person’s persecution, we all lose. While we are not compelled to demonstrate sympathy or solidarity with one person, we must evaluate all angles in the injustice of Anti-Muslim bigotry, Anti- Muslim hatred, Islamophobia (which all mean the same thing).

Changing a word’s spelling, but the intent remains the same, defining the issue is never the problem, genuine change usually is.

Last month, Congresswoman Ilhan Omar (D-MN) was referred to as a terrorist and “suicide bomber” by Rep. Lauren Boebert, who has made several Islamophobic remarks towards Omar, and other members including Rep. Rashida Tlaib. Yet again, these remarks went unchecked, leading Muslim staff within Congress to send an open letter to House leadership. Signed by a total of 440 House and Senate staffers, 62 being Muslim, the letter urged leaders to act in the face of heightened Islamophobia, especially within the building, by rejecting and condemning anti-Muslim bigotry.

“Witnessing unchecked harassment of one of only three Muslim members of Congress – and the only visibly Muslim member – we feel that our workplace is neither safe nor welcome,” the letter to House Leadership read.

In the last two decades, mainstream U.S. political discourse has dehumanized Muslims and served as a justification for their persecution domestically and abroad.

From the post-9/11 surveillance apparatus structured by the Patriot Act to the gruesome wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that took the lives of millions, the common denominator was the use of Muslims as political collateral. Islamophobia is the manifestation of the dehumanization of Muslims, which was institutionalized through these kinds of policies.

Many Muslims have joined the political sphere to lobby for their full rights and protections under the U.S. constitution.

Muslims in America have mobilized and organized against racist domestic and foreign policy across this time by creating advocacy organizations, mutual aid groups, and community centers. They have worked to counter the discrimination faced by Muslims in America at a grassroots level. Many Muslims have even joined the political sphere to lobby for their full rights and protections under the U.S. constitution.

The number of Muslims running for office and participating in political decision-making has risen worldwide. With the emergence of Muslims being elected into spaces such as Congress, Parliamentaries, and state legislatures, unhinged right-wing attacks on Muslim candidates and elected officials have been on the rise, too.

Given the rise of anti-Muslim rhetoric, bigotry, and violence fueled by political parties, transnational white supremacists, and Islamophobic hate group networks, this bill seems like an obvious step towards humanizing and protecting Muslims in the U.S. and across the world.

But even with the disturbing statistics portraying the need to work against anti-Muslim bigotry and rhetoric, republicans spent their time mocking the Islamophobia bill during the hearing, further demonstrating the dehumanization of Muslims.

The bigotry displayed by politicians such as Boebert’s factors into an extensive history of Islamophobia, and Xenophobia in general, being weaponized against ethnic and religious minorities within positions of power, mainly to provoke fear and cause division. It is also a product of the threat felt when an individual such as Ilhan Omar, a Black Muslim woman who’s also an immigrant, brings a new political perspective that represents more than just White Americans in discourse and policy.

The U.S. is in the midst of confronting the skeletons in its closet. One of the most common and consistent forms of Islamophobia within the U.S. has been structural. It has reflected itself within the historical roots of our political dynamics via common attempts of anti-Muslim legislation and perpetuated by deeply politicized dialectic Islamophobia through different modes.

These methods consist of consistent misrepresentations of Muslims within media, policing and surveillance, and unequal treatment within the legal system. The cherry on top has been the repetitive use of anti-Muslim rhetoric and statements made by political candidates and government officials heightened through social media.

Silence is not an option. To deinstitutionalize Islamophobia within our political systems, it must start with Congress taking a firm stance against the rising dehumanization of Muslims and open anti-Muslim bigotry. This is not an issue that is limited to political figures such as Congresswoman Omar- it is directly affecting hundreds of Congressional staffers and millions of U.S. Americans.

Furthermore, our duty as Americans is to ensure all are treated equally within our political and legal system. As Muslims continue the fight against institutionalized Islamophobia through grassroots advocacy efforts, we must continue to vocalize our demands for justice and equality with our elected officials and the American public.

Despite the national outrage caused by last summer’s terrorism attack in London, Ontario, when a right-wing extremist used his truck to target and kill four members of a Canadian Muslim family, Islamophobia continues to persist in Canadian politics. Earlier this month, the Alliance Citoyenne Quebec, a marginal party competing in next month’s municipal elections, issued a statement declaring that: “Islam is contrary to fundamental Quebec values. Islam is a cancer that is slowly growing inside Quebec society.”

The statement was released by the proudly Islamophobic party’s candidate for mayor of Quebec City, Alain Giasson, in response to the candidacy of Boufeldja Benabdallah. Benabdallah is running in the Cap-aux-Diamants district for Équipe Marie-Josée Savard, the heir-apparent of outgoing mayor Régis Labeaum, who will be stepping down from politics.

Giasson told CTV News that: “The trigger [for the statement] was the fact that the co-founder of the Islamic Cultural Centre of Quebec [Benabdallah] is up for election… His whole adult life in Quebec City, he has worked very publicly for the Islamization of Quebec.”

This justification is even more startling considering that in 2017, six Muslim men were shot dead at the Islamic Cultural Centre. The murder victims were: Ibrahima Barry, 39; Mamadou Tanou Barry, 42; Khaled Belkacemi, 60; Aboubaker Thabti, 44; Abdelkrim Hassane, 41; and Azzedine Soufiane; 57. Nineteen other worshippers were injured.

After decades of campaigning, Benabdallah helped to launch the region’s first Muslim cemetery in 2019. Giasson cites this move as proof of Islamization. Benabdallah, who has lived in Canada for more than 50 years now, told media that: “I was really hurt that there are still people who don’t see me as a citizen, who just see me as a religion.”

Although the party’s statement was subject to a hate speech complaint, Elections Quebec, the agency that oversees campaigns across the province, refused to intervene because of its proclaimed “neutrality,” saying that there is “no Quebec law that addresses the content of political platforms.” Note, this comes only months after the national government held a conference on the importance of combatting Islamophobia in Canada.

In Quebec, the majority of its citizens are still Catholic, and historically the Catholic Church “took advantage of this situation to guide the French-Canadian population through institutions and symbolism.” Although Québécois finally started to embrace secularism with the rest of Canada, spurred on by the Quiet Revolution (1960–1970), many Quebecois still saw – and continue to see – other religions as a threat to their own Christian identity.

As Quebec has increasingly become more multicultural with the arrival of new immigrants, the divisions have intensified. The white, Francophone population often express their outrage towards demands from minorities who request reasonable accommodation for their religious practices. The government of Quebec eventually created the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences in 2007. However, the resulting report further erased the presence of religious difference in the province by “recommend[ing] that agents of the state be banned from wearing any religious symbols.”

This is why earlier this year, the Quebec Superior Court upheld the new Quebec law barring civil servants in positions of “authority” from wearing religious symbols at work, saying that “Quebec had the right to restrict the religious symbols donned by government employees.” The law mainly targets Muslim women and members of other minority religions, not Christians, which demonstrates a clear bias against some groups over others.

This is a key feature of the brand of secularism that Quebec has embraced, after the French model. This kind of secularism claims to be neutral, instead of geographically linked to the West and favoring Christianity. As a result, other religions are marginalized.

Today, the problem of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hatred is not limited to Quebec or Canada; a significant portion of Western society also questions if Muslims can be good citizens. Many scholars now argue that Muslims are perceived as dangerous or threatening to society if they are openly Muslim. The result has been stark: Muslims in the West are tolerated only so long as they do not make any political claims and practice their religion in private. When Muslims do become politically active, Islamophobia flourishes. Although the national conversation is improving, the stark reality is that almost half of Canadians (46%) still viewed Islam unfavorably in a 2017 poll conducted by the Angus Reid Institute.

Muslims in the West are tolerated only so long as they do not make any political claims and practice their religion in private.

Fortunately, the Alliance Citoyenne Quebec is a marginal party: in the previous election, Giasson only received 0.61 per cent of the vote. Furthermore, in 2017, the party ran 13 candidates, whereas only five are running this year on election day, November 7. Nevertheless, it should not take two massacres for Canadian politicians to firmly address the scourge of Islamophobia that persists in Canadian society and politics. The country’s secular institutions are only fueling the problem, not offering any working solutions.

According to Bayat, Islamic political movements experience certain phases. The first phase is the experimentation, in which the movement gains power. Then, they face the paradoxes of being in power in addition to failure to realize their promises. In the end, the appeal, energy, symbols, and sources of legitimacy of political Islamism evaporate.

Bayat believes that this procedure does not lead to an anti-Islamic approach. However, the supporters of political Islamism tend to resecularize it which negatively affects their political career and their ability to hold on to power and remain as the winner their political career and simultaneously give up their religious ends and ambitions.

In recent years, scholars have tried to apply the post-Islamism theory to different cases, specifically the contexts where political Islam has been active in the past decades. Yadullah Shahibzadeh is among those who have followed political Islam in Iran. In his book Islamism and Post-Islamism in Iran: An Intellectual History, he explains the crisis of political leadership in post-1979 revolution Iran.

By detecting “Islamist totalism” in Iranian politics, he follows the career of Islamists in power. He discusses the challenges they faced with democracy, and the challenges with Islamist and non-Islamist reformists in their effort to guarantee democracy in Iran. Shedding light on Iranian political and intellectual history after the 1979 revolution, Shahibzadeh focuses on Iranian Muslim intellectuals and their understanding of politics and democracy in reference to their religious background and religiosity.

He argues that by providing a large amount of epistemological, ethical, and political insights to society, Iranian Muslim intellectuals have contributed to the transformation of Iranian Islamism into post-Islamism. Therefore, the past, solid Islamic ideology in terms of its avid eagerness to preserve political power and dominance has been enormously weakened and delegitimized.

Although the discussions on post-Islamism were more concerned with Iran, Egypt, and Turkey, after the downfall of the Baathist regime, Iraq also entered the current scholarship on post-Islamism. In Patriotic Ayatollahs: Nationalism in Post-Saddam Iraq, Caroleen Sayej has followed the attitudes of Islamist parties and activists in post-2003 Iraq and has provided a deep analysis of senior Iraqi clerics in the Iraqi political sphere.

Sayej focuses on Shiite clerics’ pronouncements and fatwas on political issues, and narrates their ideas and ideals on contested issues such as democracy. In Patriotic Ayatollahs, she narrates the most important Shiite religious scholars and their followers’ positions. For her, they have selected a progressive and secular approach in post-2003 Iraq. The case becomes more critical as most Shiite politicians and political leaders lived in Iran for years and were influenced by the theory of the “Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist” which is currently prevalent in Iran.

In other words, the Iranian experience has pushed the Iraqi Shiite religious scholars toward a post-Islamist inclination in Iraqi politics. Sayej’s main contributions to the issues of post-Islamism in this work are, first, her reference to the role of high-ranking religious leaders in insisting on the necessity of democracy and its legitimacy over any Islamic theocracy; and second, the vital role that nationalism plays in the political thinking and behavior of an Arab Muslim nation in the Middle East amidst sectarian temptations and tendencies.

In other words, the importance of Sayej’s work lies in the fact that she illustrates a path in which a transnational Shiite movement has been replaced by a local endeavor to guarantee a democratic system and to reinterpret Islamism in a way that deals with personal and communal piety and not with structural-political issues.

Are Knudsen and Basem Ezbidi have edited several articles and published them in a volume called Popular Protest in the New Middle East: Islamism and Post-Islamist Politics. The editors have considered a group of political uprisings in different parts of the Middle East, known generally as the “Arab Spring,” whose immediate outcome was overthrowing decades-long political regimes and substituting them with unstable states.

More than any other place, in post-Mubarak Egypt and post-Ben Ali Tunisia, Islamist political movements have gained power: the Freedom and Justice Party and the Ennahda Movement, respectively. In addition to a foreword by Asef Bayat, the authors have provided insightful analyses of Islamist and post-Islamist trends in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Turkey.

Popular Protest in the New Middle East deliberately moves away from the generalizations and abstractions of post-Islamism attributed to the Muslim world as a whole. The book, an essential read for all those interested in the subject, has applied the concept of post-Islamism and its related notions to different cases in Middle Eastern countries and dealt with the concept in relation to Muslim political activists’ experiences in the past decades in their countries and dealt with the concept in relation to Muslim political activists’ experiences in the past decades in their countries.

Last but not least in this grouping is a selection of articles edited by Mohammed Abu Rumman and published under the title Post-Islamism: A New Phase or Ideological Delusions? It discusses the main problems of post-Islamism as a term and concept. To put it concisely, the authors believe that although post-Islamism is controversial, they have decided to use it “in the absence of a more fitting label.”

Drawing on the experience of the Arab Revolutions, the authors ascertain that the revolutionaries failed to achieve certain of the classical goals of political Islam such as the Islamic state due to ideological delusions and sociological realities. The authors refer to the transformations of Islamists’ experiences in countries such as Iran, Iraq, Indonesia, and Jordan, and try to read the changes in different countries of the Middle East.

Published in 2018 and appearing later than the other works on post-Islamism, Post-Islamism: A New Phase or Ideological Delusions? draws on a range of theories and past discussions of the term. In each article, authors have used, challenged, and developed the theory of post-Islamism, based on its rich literature, and have contributed to this discussion by direct reference to different Muslim countries.

On May 27, the Austrian government presented an Islam Landkarte (Islam Map) as a novel contribution and a breakthrough tool to fight “political Islam.” However, this map has been around for years. The project was initiated back in 2012, by Ednan Aslan, the head of the Institute for Islamic Theological Studies at the University of Vienna and the Documentation Center for Political Islam which was set up by the government.

Nine years later, Susanne Raab, minister for integration from the ruling conservative party (ÖVP), launched a website with an interactive map listing the names and locations of more than 600 mosques and Muslim organizations in Austria as well as their alleged connections abroad.

The map is designed to serve as a monitoring tool for the Documentation Center for Political Islam which is a data-collecting center for integration policy and security agencies. However, the data it collects is problematic to the extent that it is outdated and incorrect; some of the names recorded on the website are no longer actively in service. The most problematic part, however, is that it publishes private addresses of organizations.

When starting a non-profit organization in Austria, individuals have the possibility to register the organization using their personal address. As a result, when the Islam Map was published, not only the addresses of organizations but also personal addresses of individuals were made public.

In her presentation, Minister Susanne Raab (ÖVP) further explained that the “Islam Map” does not mean a general suspicion of all Muslims and the intention is exclusively to fight “political ideologies, not religion.”

Even though, Austrian officials categorize the map as an instrument of combatting “political Islam,” which is an ambiguous term as adopted by the Austrian government that describes any Islamist movement seeking to restructure society according to religious ideas and opposing democratic principles, there is no general agreement on what exactly can be labelled as an Islamist movement.

This has resulted in the listing of cultural centers for Bosnian and Albanian immigrants, youth organizations or even sports clubs, without any proof or any links to extremism. Faika El-Nagashi, the spokeswoman for integration of the Greens party which is part of the ruling coalition, affirmed that “no Green minister or MEP was involved or even told about it. The project mixes Muslims with Islamists and is the contrary to what integration policy should look like.”

There was a massive backlash against this action, not only from the Muslim community in Austria but also from the University of Vienna, which was added as a partner to this project.

There was a massive backlash against this action, not only from the Muslim community in Austria but also from the University of Vienna, which was added as a partner to this project. University officials have since distanced themselves and prohibited the use of the university logo on the map’s page with the argument that “the logo on the site gives the impression that the University has scientifically edited and reviewed the contributions, which is not the case.” Meanwhile, the logo has been removed and instead “A project of the University of Vienna – Institute for Islamic Theological Studies – Islamic Religious Education” has been added to the website.

Muslim Youth Austria announced legal action against the violation of personal and data protection rights. An announcement or complaint does not exist yet, however, as a spokeswoman of the organization has declared that “the publication of all names, functions and addresses of Muslims and Islamic institutions represents an unprecedented border crossing and the organization will exhaust all legal possibilities against it.”

While Muslim Youth Austria demands the end of this criminalization of Muslims and that the Islam Map be removed from the internet, the association for Jewish Austrian Students in Austria showed solidarity and sharply criticized the map.

While Muslim Youth Austria demands the end of this criminalization of Muslims and that the Islam Map be removed from the internet, the association for Jewish Austrian Students in Austria showed solidarity and sharply criticized the map. The students told Politics Today that Muslims must not feel “observed and placed under general suspicion and at the same time fear because locations of Muslim institutions are exposed to the public, which is a handbook case of discrimination.”

On May 31, the spokesperson for the secretary general at the Council of Europe, Daniel Holtgen, stated that “[u]nfortunately, the ‘Islam Map’ of Austria overshoots the mark, serves existing resentments and therefore has a potentially counterproductive effect. Many Muslims perceive the form and timing of the publication as extremely discriminatory. They feel stigmatized and feel their security threatened by the publication of addresses and other details. The ‘Islam Map’ of Austria should therefore be withdrawn in its current form.”

In fact, the launching of an interactive “Islam Map” serves as a watch list or a blacklist. The map will only serve as another blow to the presence of Islam in the country, as the map disclosing Muslim organizations not only caused controversy in the country but also led to a spate of Islamophobic incidents. Moreover, the map stirs up prejudices and puts all Muslims under general suspicion. Prior to the introduction of the “Islam Map,” the Documentation and Counseling Center Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Racism – also known as the Dokustelle Österreich – released the “Anti-Muslim Racism Report” with 1,402 cases of racism against Muslims in 2020 alone. This records an increase of approximately 33% from the previous year.

After barely a week since the website of the controversial map was launched, the government decided to take the map offline. Not only was it criticized by Austria’s Muslim community, various people from all walks of life reacted on the website. The Catholic Church, for example, joined the criticism and rejected the map. The head of the church stated that Islam is now “under general suspicion.” He wondered why Islam has a map and other faith communities do not.

Ümit Vural, the head of the IGGOE, warned against stigmatizing all Muslims living in Austria as a potential danger. His organization stated that several Muslims had already been attacked and a mosque was vandalized since the map became available online. Muslim Austrians Initiative chairman Tarafa Baghajati told broadcaster ORF, “Imagine if we had a Judaism map or a Christianity map in Austria.”

It is without doubt that this map is an indirect attack on all Muslims in Austria, many of whom are of Turkish descent. Tanju Bilgiç, spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, who has been calling for an end to Islamophobia for a long time now, declared the map to be “xenophobic, racist, and anti-Islamic.”

Although the “Islam Map” has been taken offline, the attention it got from anti-Muslim, racist groups is worrying. The map definitely signifies a general suspicion of the Muslim community. The growing Islamophobia in Austria and the rest of Europe makes Muslim Europeans, and especially young Muslim Europeans, feel concerned about their future. The social pandemic of hate crimes against Muslims is destroying European values, which once were held in high esteem.

Austria along with France are currently at the forefront of criminalizing Muslim civil society. The Documentation Center for Political Islam, established in July 2020, has released one of its projects, which has been met with fierce criticism. An “Islam Map” showing the addresses of 623 mosques and Muslim civil society institutions was presented and has created a large societal backlash in Austria.

The Documentation Center for Political Islam

Johann Gudenus of the far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ, Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs), who has since resigned due to his involvement in the Ibiza-gate, was the first to present the idea of a Documentation Center for Political Islam when his party was still in a coalition with the Christian democratic Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP, Österreichische Volkspartei) in 2018. After the Ibiza-gate put an abrupt end to the alliance, the project was now reintroduced and implemented by the ÖVP.

This time, however, the Greens are the ÖVP’s coalition partners. It did not help the Greens to water down the name somewhat in the government agreement and to rename the fund, which was highly subsidized by the state and thus exempt from parliamentary control, the “Austrian Fund for the Documentation of Religiously Motivated Political Extremism (Political Islam).” For what was in parenthesis and henceforth politically communicated applied: a documentation center for so-called political Islam.

The center has an annual budget of half a million euros and is designed to designate Muslim associations with which public authorities can and cannot cooperate – i.e., those which are blacklisted from public funding and space. It is part of the National Strategy for the Prevention of Extremism and Deradicalization, an internationally increasingly challenged concept.

After the project began its work in mid-2020, a first report was presented in December of the same year, which was scientifically very poor and essentially rehashed previously published rumors. But the goal had been achieved: Chancellor Sebastian Kurz had announced in November 2020 following the militant attack in downtown Vienna that he wanted to introduce a new criminal offense for “political Islam.” The Documentation Center could perfectly serve the purpose of identifying this “political Islam.”

But political Islam, for the Austrian government, was not militancy. Rather, it is imagined to pave the ground intellectually for militant action. Hence, political Islam is about thought. And one could add religious practice. Several legislations and political measures had been implemented in the past, linking the Hijab ban or the closure of mosques to the fight against political Islam. One was the ban of the hijab, another two were the closing of mosques. While all three measures have been repealed by the courts, the government still continues its fight against personal Muslim belief and organized Muslim communities.

Relaunch of the “Islam Map”?

The Documentation Center for Political Islam had its second press conference, where Minister for Integration, Susanne Raab, alongside Muslim theologian Mouhanad Khorchide from the University of Münster in Germany, political scientist Elham Manea, and Muslim theologian Ednan Aslan presented their latest findings. These scholars are known for their support of many anti-Muslim legislations implemented by the ÖVP under the leadership of Sebastian Kurz.

The “Islam Map” was originally launched in 2012 by Ednan Aslan and met only low-voiced critique. But the relaunch was different. While Aslan tried to convince the public that the Islam Map was no Islamism Map, the fact that the project was now financed and presented under its name meant that the 623 addresses were now potentially seen as a target by being linked to “political Islam.” And since the government has presented a bill to make political Islam a criminal offense, what are the implications of being on such a map?

Clearly, the addresses of individuals and institutions on this map have been made vulnerable. When the far-right Identitarian Movement started hanging signs with the words “Beware: Political Islam nearby” next to several mosques, a new dimension of this threat became clear. Very soon, criticism came from the European Council, the Conference of European Rabbis, the Austrian Bishops’ Conference, Muslim Youth Austria, and many others.

The rector of the University of Vienna requested the logo of the university be removed from the website and distanced the university from the project. While the Documentation Center for Political Islam took the map offline as a first reaction, its director said that the information will only be made public by logging in via an account.

Protecting Muslims against “political Islam”

The Minister for Integration reaffirmed that she does not want to stir up “general suspicion against Muslims.” And indeed, we should take her words seriously. Because for her, it seems, the Muslim associations and mosques do not represent the vast majority of Muslims. This is in line with a widespread narrative in continental European countries that follows a divide-and-rule politics by marginalizing organized Muslims and substituting their voices with state-funded and self-proclaimed “liberal” Muslim voices.

If the 623 sites of organized Islam according to Austrian Integration Minister Raab are not “the Muslims,” then she is indeed consistent in stigmatizing 623 Muslim institutions as potentially dangerous, while all the time pretending to save the Muslims. In a way, this is another episode in the recurrence of a colonial mindset that pretends to save the many good – read obedient – Muslims from the bad ones, i.e., those who claim their own agency.

What is needed

Currently, Austria’s political leadership sees Muslims as a walking danger that is criminalized with surveillance programs like this map, intimidated by raids, and problematized as a national security threat. This hawkish politics against the Muslim minority has to stop. Otherwise, the Muslim minority that makes around nine percent of the whole population, will be further estranged and the societal divide instigated by the government will create the ground for major conflicts.

Fasting during Ramadan is one of the most important expressions of faith by followers of Islam. From sunrise to sunset, Muslims abstain from eating, drinking, and other specified human activities. Many Muslims collectively spend time during the nights and days of Ramadan performing acts of worship and, above all, reciting the Quran and repeating remembrances of God, Allah.

One of the most challenging issues in relation to Ramadan is determining its beginning and end based on the crescent moon. Since the beginning of the month is bound to sighting the moon in the lunar calendar, the exact declaration of the new month is difficult. Therefore, for many years, announcing the sighting of the crescent moon has been a challenging task. Many Muslim scholars and jurists believe that the beginning and end of Ramadan can only be determined by spotting the moon with the naked eye and that using modern tools to calculate the appearance of the crescent is not religiously valid.

However, especially in recent decades, others have emphasized the calculability of the lunar month. As a result, Muslims and Muslim-majority states are divided over the start of the month. Although it is the same as any month of the lunar calendar, the beginning and end of Ramadan is important as it determines the start and end of the month of fasting.

Declaring the sighting of the crescent moon is not the sole issue regarding Ramadan that is disputed among Muslims. Based on the sect and school of thought to which they belong, Muslim jurists also differ on various aspects of fasting during Ramadan.  These include the exact time of the beginning and end of fasting, what invalidates fasting, and the fitrah payment, a charity given to the poor at the end of Ramadan.

Among the disputed points is the challenging issue of the end of Ramadan. The day and usually its following days are among the most important feasts in most Islamic countries and Muslims living in non-Islamic countries. In recent decades and with the bureaucratization of urban life in the world, the performance of the rituals of the feast of Ramadan mostly depend on the official calendars that are enforced by the states.

In recent decades and with the bureaucratization of urban life in the world, the performance of the rituals of the feast of Ramadan mostly depend on the official calendars that are enforced by the states.

The lives of Muslims today, like those of worshippers of other religions, are shaped by a network of physical/biological, sacred/religious, and secular/political times and calendars. Muslims living in Islamic and non-Islamic countries and working in modern institutions have difficulty matching the biological time of fasting with their working hours during Ramadan. While Muslims tried to regulate their work with fasting in premodern societies, now many Muslims are forced to adapt their fasting to modern work. This unconformity has caused some Muslims to complain about this issue as their efficiency in the labor market decreases during Ramadan: they cannot compete and reach their full potential at work. On the other hand, the need to work affects their ability to worship as they would like.

Muslim states and the announcement of the sighting of the crescent moon

Apart from having to match the biological time of fasting with the demands of the labor market, the intersection of religious time and secular/political time has also caused problems. Almost all Muslim-majority countries designate certain days to the holiday of Eid al-Fitr. This closure for administrative and economic reasons has a long history and is determined by the states long ago. It is a challenging task due to the difficulties of determining the exact time of the end of Ramadan. This is made more complicated by the fact that in some Islamic countries Muslims belong to different sects which may not declare the same day as Eid al-Fitr.

Due to this fact, we see that sometimes countries that are located, for the most part, on the same meridian (line of longitude), for instance Iran and Saudi Arabia, or different parts of a country (for example, Iraqi Kurdistan and the Arab regions of Iraq) declare different first and last days of Ramadan. There was also the interesting case of Muammar Gaddafi, the former Libyan leader, who always announced the Feast of Ramadan on a different day that that announced by Saudi Arabian authorities.

In addition to governments, there are rivalries and disputes among religious elites and religious interest groups that lead to unanimity on the declaration of Eid on an exact day. Although most of the differences in declaring the Feast of Ramadan result from different jurisprudential views, the role of the rivalries and disputes between clerics cannot be ignored.

In Iran, the first and last days of Ramadan are declared by the Supreme Leader. The Iranian state propagates that the declaration is binding for all citizens regardless of any school of thought within the Shiism they follow.

Iranian Shiite religious scholars are an example. In Iran, the first and last days of Ramadan are declared by the Supreme Leader. The Iranian state propagates that the declaration is binding for all citizens regardless of any school of thought within the Shiism they follow. However, followers of other Shiite clerics, who consistently challenge the religious legitimacy of the Iranian state, provide their understanding of the start and end of Ramadan based on reports of the moon’s appearance received by their witnesses. Their followers do not attend the state-run feast prayers and prefer to join those held by their beloved clerics. These differences in announcing the end of Ramadan and of congregational prayers contest the state’s religious authority and legitimacy.

Transforming a local issue into a state one

Until very recently, the majority of Muslims lived in rural areas. The “local” determined many religious issues and believers solved their religious problems by referring to the “nearest” sources of authority and reference embodied in the local imam, saint, or other “men of Allah.” They generally did not know what others thought and did, even in nearby neighborhoods. Gradually and by becoming part of modern nation states, believers became connected to centers of political power. They had to adapt themselves to the state calendar. On the other hand, technological developments, such as the telephone, radio, television, and recently the internet, contributed to being notified of state decisions regarding the lunar calendar.

Muslim communities in countries where Islam is not the majority religion deal with the issue of the exact dates of Ramadan in a variety of ways. Some trust calendars prepared by international Muslim organizations, others seek the opinion of their local religious institutions, and others yet refer to the announcements of their country of origin.

In conclusion, spotting the new moon is something that any Muslim can do. However, moving away from traditions of moon sighting, which are still prevalent among Muslims in rural areas, has caused a significant dependence on state-run media. Nowadays, most Muslims do not know how and when the new moon can be sighted. Living in air- and light-polluted urban areas makes it generally impossible for millions of Muslims to spot the moon.

On the other hand, Muslims are deeply involved in state calendars and cannot easily swim against the current. Muslim states have other expediencies and interests in religious matters as well; they consider international necessities, regional realities, and their denominational structures.

A good example is Iraq. Sunnis generally obey Saudi Arabia in announcing the Feast of Ramadan, Arab Shiites generally follow their high-ranking Iraqi clerics, and a minority listens to the Iranian Supreme Leader. The Iraqi government declares the holiday to include the days heralded by the followers of both denominations.

In a nutshell, for the first time in history, Muslims have found themselves in a node of modernization, transnational sectarian networks, and state policies. They are obliged to obey state calendars, whether they live in a Muslim country or not. At the same time, they can expand their individuality by seeking information about the beginning and end of Ramadan from non-state sources via modern technologies. This has added to the rising crisis of authority among traditional Islamic actors in the contemporary world.

As a result, the fact that one cannot known with certainty when Muslims who live kilometers away from one another will celebrate the Feast of Ramadan and being obliged to live according to predetermined state calendars have led to unprecedented confusion and disputes among Muslims and Muslim-majority states. This phenomenon is another example of the Muslim world’s rising, new social, cultural, and symbolic mobility and crisis.

November 11, 2001 marked the beginning of an era of American terror – an era of reckless massacre, carpet bombing, pillage and rape, and the use of radioactive weaponry against Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan. The War on Terror expanded into Georgia, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Eretria, and programs like extraordinary rendition were active in collaboration with oppressive, tortuous regimes across the Muslim world.

The U.S. government intelligence agencies tapped into foreign government, social circles, and religious networks abroad to mass gather information in pursuit of political and military warfare. Reflectively, the U.S. government organized and executed a discriminatory, racist, anti-Muslim security and surveillance apparatus that (to this day) targets, monitors and entraps Muslims on the basis of their religious identity and practice.

Government programs like the Patriot Act, which Biden has taken credit for establishing the foundation of, greatly expanded the surveillance capabilities of U.S. law enforcement agencies in the pursuit of identifying threats to national security. This was weaponized and translated into the political imprisonment of community leaders like Dr. Sami al-Arian, the first to be charged under the Patriot Act.

As a Palestinian Muslim, he was targeted by the U.S. government for advocating for Palestinian human rights. The targeting of Muslims through discriminatory domestic policy is aligned with America’s foreign policy interests, as seen in the hyper-surveillance and targeting of Palestinians to protect Israel’s (fracturing) hegemony of support in American government and society.

Under the Trump administration, the Department of Homeland Security relaunched the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program as the Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention (TVTP) program. CVE and TVTP trains teachers, mental health workers, imams and others to use faulty social science and racialized indicators to identify those who are supposedly vulnerable to ‘radicalization’ within the Muslim community. The government maps and tracks religious, political, and social activity across Muslim communities.

For example, NYPD agents would document how often Muslims students prayed during school trips, which Egyptian businesses shut their doors for daily prayers, which restaurants would show al-Jazeera, and which Newark businesses sold halal products and alcohol.

According to law enforcement documents, the NYPD post-9/11 eyed and interpreted signs of Muslim religiosity as ‘radicalization.’ For example, NYPD agents would document how often Muslims students prayed during school trips, which Egyptian businesses shut their doors for daily prayers, which restaurants would show al-Jazeera, and which Newark businesses sold halal products and alcohol.

The report Mapping Muslims: NYPD Spring and its Impact on American Muslims outlines how the NYPD surveillance program, as a case study on the impacts of the American surveillance system as a whole, has suppressed religious practice, stifled speech and association, sowed suspicion and distrust, and censored student activists in the Muslim community.

Sowing Distrust and Fracturing Brotherhood

The surveillance of Muslims and the Muslim community at large is often done through the hiring of informants. Informants are people who are typically already in a position to know or learn information from the target individual or community. They can make up to $100,000 annually, and some are hired in exchange for legal favors; such as dismissing criminal charges or expediting immigration proceedings.

As Muslims are overwhelmingly aware of the heightened surveillance of their communities, many Muslims have admitted to being more hesitant to create new relationships with new members like converts.

Since 2009, paid FBI informants have played a ‘central role’ in nearly 50% of all domestic terrorism cases. The known presence of informants in the Muslim community, both at colleges and mosques, has raised suspicion in meeting new people, the development of political and social programming, and maintaining the unity and trust among community.

As Muslims are overwhelmingly aware of the heightened surveillance of their communities, many Muslims have admitted to being more hesitant to create new relationships with new members like converts, and there is greater suspicion around those who express politically or socially radical views. 

Political Censorship

Muslims have also reported self-censorship in discussing mainstream political issues among themselves – cafe owners have admitted to refraining from broadcasting Arabic news channels in cafes, and Muslim students admit to altering language, including regular clarifications and qualifiers when discussing current affairs.

To be coerced to speak in a way that would be pleasing to the government or the average American is to shape the very language to causes native to Muslims and Islam – and this will have long-term implications. The neutering of political speech and advocacy creates a ‘controlled opposition’ to racist and imperial domestic and foreign policy. This restricts Muslims from openly referencing how Islam informs our plight for justice and our political, social, and economic actions against injustice.

How are Muslim communities guarding themselves?

In response to the state targeting religious spaces and networks, numerous human rights and civil rights organizations have emerged in educating and advocating for the Muslim community. Organizations like the Center for Constitutional Rights, CLEAR, the Coalition for Civil Freedoms, the Muslim Legal Fund of America, CLCMA, and CAIR provide educational and legal resources to equip mosques, student organizations, religious centers, and individuals to protect themselves and their communities.

Muslims and Muslim organizations continue to organize and mobilize against the injustice inflicted upon our communities and families domestically and abroad, while facing backlash from the government, U.S. allies, and non-government actors; all invested in the Islamophobia industry and the hindrance of a united Muslim society in the U.S.

In attempting to fracture our communities, sow distrust and suspicion, and censor our political and religious language – the government is recognizing brotherhood and dialogue as the most powerful tools for organizing our community. To continue to build strong relationships with one another and engage in creative and honest discussion on the issues that plague us locally and nationally, internally and externally, is what will protect and strengthen the Muslim community from the act of terror that is government surveillance in America.

The recent Swiss referendum to ban the wearing of the burka and niqab in public places follows similar decisions by the governments of France, Belgium, and Austria, reinforcing the mediatized perception of Muslims as the “difficult-to-integrate “other” in Europe.” This development converges with the state level institutionalization of anti-Muslim sentiment by the likes of Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, who wants to form a common front against “political Islam.”

An EU level policy idea already floated by French President Emmanuel Macron, who believes that “Islam is a religion that is in crisis today all over the world,” and the implication that the presence of Muslims in Europe are a threat to domestic security and the national identity.

The truth of course, is far more complex. European Muslims are well aware of the complex socio-political challenges before them and are increasingly challenging Islamophobic narratives as their communities grow and younger people become active agents of transformative social change. This has led to the emergence of various political leaders and social influencers who have become vocal public figures and are positively impacting their communities and wider societies. This can be seen in the rise  of assertive Muslim politicians in mainstream parties across Europe such as the Italian MP  Khalid Chaouki,  Mahinur Özdemir the first  hijab-wearing MP in Belgium and emergence of the DENK party in the Netherlands.

In Britain, despite facing various socio-economic inequalities, Muslims are an essential part of the U.K’s economic and cultural fabric.  Around 10,000 of National Health Service (NHS) doctors and nurses are Muslim; they were at the NHS front line during the Covid-19 crisis, and at forefront of community responses to the pandemic.

They have also made significant strides in mainstream politics at local and national governance level, with some achieving senior positions, such as the current Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, Baroness Sayeeda Warsi, a former cabinet member of the Conservative government and the recently elected Leader of the Scottish Labor Party –Anas Sarwar. Muslim Leaders have also emerged from faith based NGOs such as the Muslim Council of Britain, which recently elected its first every  female leader,  Zara Mohammed,  while others lead think-tanks, such as Halima Begum, CEO of  the Runnymede Trust.

In the media, sports and cultural industries, the journalist Mehdi Hasan became internationally known as an anchor for Al-Jazeera English and is currently host of a NBC news program. The writings of Guardian columnist Nesrine Malik are among the sharpest commentaries of race, religion and politics and Nadiya Hussain, is a household name after winning the Great British Bake Off competition, and has hosted several TV programs for the BBC. Other British Muslims have reached the highest levels of their chosen fields in the world of sport like the long-distance runner ‘Mo’ Farah, a four-time  Olympic gold medalist,  Moin Ali, who has captained the English Cricket team and Amir Khan  a former Light-Welterweight world boxing champion.

Like other European states, Britain needed the post-war labor of immigrants from its former colonies, which resulted in a multiculturalist model that enables Muslims and other minorities to achieve a large degree of social mobility.

Though currently going through immensely turbulent times, the U.K is still viewed by outsiders with a degree of admiration for its historical achievements, continuing political influence on the world stage and soft power of its creative industries. Like other European states, Britain needed the post-war labor of immigrants from its former colonies, which resulted in a multiculturalist model that enables Muslims and other minorities to achieve a large degree of social mobility.

These advances are all the more noteworthy given the tough challenges that this faith group encountered and continues to experience today. Social polarization has reached levels not seen for decades, as forms of prejudice multiply –particularly racism and Islamophobia, which are rationalized in the name of freedom of speech.

The continued fallout from BREXIT, presence of refugees, growth of the far-right and unresolved anxieties about security have shaped a climate of suspicion towards ‘outsiders.’ Muslims are often the focus of mistrust and accused of being the “enemy within,” their faith incompatible with “British Values” and alleged to have a unique vulnerability to criminality and violence.

Before his election as leader, Anas Sarwar was subjected to racist slur from within the Labor party and another senior member withdrew her support for Sarwar after seeing a picture of his hijab-wearing wife.

Most of the leaders and influential figures highlighted here have struggled with racist and Islamophobic abuse on a regular basis. Some of shared on social media while others have faced institutional barriers and media attacks. A recent instance was when the leader of the Runnymede Trust was misrepresented by Conservative MPs in a Women and Equalities questions session in the House of Commons. Before his election as leader, Anas Sarwar was subjected to racist slur from within the Labor party and another senior member withdrew her support for Sarwar after seeing a picture of his hijab-wearing wife.

These and many other incidents vindicate the observation by Sayeeda Warsi over a decade ago, when she argued that prejudice against Muslims had “passed the dinner-table test.” Islamophobia and racism has quantifiably worsened in recent years to the point of being normalized in the media and political establishment.

Muslim journalists like Nesrine Malik regularly receive abusive emails and are trolled on their social media and Nadiya Hussain has often encountered racial and religious discrimination both on the street and within the industry that she works in. Furthermore, athletes like Moin Ali and Mo Farah have both complained about racism  they have experienced during their careers.

Representation in the elite levels of political power while symbolically encouraging, is not enough. Most of the politicians highlighted above downplay their faith so they don’t fall out of favor with their party leaders or alienate the voting public.  Other figures are only able to secure positions because their political values align with the party leadership.  This is illustrated in cases of former Conservative cabinet member  Sajid Javid, who denied the existence of Islamophobia, citing his own appointment as proof and  Munira Mirza –an advisor to Boris Johnson,  was selected  to lead the Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities, even though she believes institutional racism is a myth.

To shape a more amicable future, Western European governments would need to reset relationships with their Muslim citizens and conduct honest conversations that acknowledge failed policies and misperceptions. This looks highly unlikely given the converging political consensus that appears to be forming against Muslim political visibility.

European Muslims communities also need to do better and resolve their internal divisions and nurture infrastructures that help cultivate visionary leadership which can address the multidimensional challenges confronting their communities and wider societies. The increasing number of talented Muslims entering public life raises the possibility that this can become a reality.

National armed forces typically do not use snipers, heavily armed infantry divisions, and fighter-bombers to quell all unarmed peaceful protests – and during peace time. But Myanmar’s Tatmadaw, or the defense services, do.

Consequently, as evidenced in the thousands of social media comments, the overwhelming majority of public opinion in Myanmar has irreversibly turned against the armed forces. The multiethnic public views the Tatmadaw as a ruthless occupying force at best – and a downright terrorist mafia at worst.

For the country’s non-Burmese ethnic nationalities or national minorities such as the Karen, Kachin, Shan, Chin, Mon, Rakhine, Rohingya, and so on, the Tatmadaw – primarily commanded by majoritarian Burmese and exclusively by Buddhists – has been an alien colonial occupier.

If these communities in distress self-organize armed resistance, the Tatmadaw typically resorts to a variation of the old British era “pacification” military campaigns. It has burned entire ethnic minority villages, forcibly relocated villagers into controllable areas, or simply violently deported them across the borders into neighboring Thailand, India, or China.

To date, Myanmar under the military’s dominance is home to possibly the longest low-intensity civil war in the world, which ensued after World War II ended. There are about two dozen ethnic armed organizations, with varying troops all across the border regions, which are the ancestral homelands of myriad of ethnic minorities. The Tatmadaw’s war crimes and crimes against humanity are well-documented, and include rape as a weapon of communal subjugation, forced labor, summary execution, torture, murder, and so on.

In Myanmar’s western region of Rakhine that is adjacent to Bangladesh, the army has been engaged in systematic and sustained campaigns of terror against the Rohingya ethnic minority for the last 40 years. One of the major reasons the United Nations General Assembly established the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar as early as 1993 was the credible news reports of crimes against humanity against this Muslim minority.

In 2016 and 2017, the Burmese army waged the largest genocidal attacks on this unarmed, destitute, and vulnerable Muslim population of roughly two million. The attacks made the international community stand up and pay attention to the situation.

According to the report of the UN International Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, in the span of 10 months, the army destroyed about 39,000 homes, mosques, schools, rice warehouses, and businesses while killing an estimated 10,000 Rohingyas of all ages and mass-raping women. The two campaigns of genocidal terror triggered the survival flight of a total of 840,000 survivors into neighboring Bangladesh.

The Burmese army has built expansive prison complexes and interrogation or torture centers all across the country where human rights activists, journalists, pro-democracy dissidents, and all types of regime critics are forced to confess to crimes they did not commit.

The Burmese military leaders have long discarded the pledge of the founder of the Myanmar Armed Forces Aung San to build a democratic federated union of multiethnic nations.

Since the commercial opening which followed the collapse of the one-party military dictatorship of General Ne Win with its economically ruinous socialist economy, the military in Myanmar has become the most dominant economic player. The generals, their families, and cronies have raked in their ill-gotten gains to the tunes of billions of dollars while the public at large remained pauperized. Roughly five million working-age Burmese of all backgrounds have left the country as migrant workers for greener pastures across Southeast Asia’s middle-income countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore.

Politically, the Burmese military leaders have long discarded the pledge of the founder of the Myanmar Armed Forces Aung San to build a democratic federated union of multiethnic nations who join voluntarily along the principle of ethnic group equality and the right to self-determination. Successive generations of military leaders since the first coup of 1958 have typically been scornful of liberal democratic principles. They view the federal, power-sharing arrangement as a formula for Balkanization.

Against the founding principles extensively worked out and articulated well by Aung San, who is widely viewed as the primary architect of the country’s independence from Britain, the top military commanders, who have had a disproportionate share of power and influence over this nationalist institution, have built a radically different version of the armed forces.

The new incarnation of the Tatmadaw sees itself as the only cohesive national organization capable of keeping the fractious multiethnic country together. The military officer corps sees itself as ideologically “pure”- as a nationalist and selfless body of competent men vis-à-vis bickering, incompetent politicians and unruly activists.

Half a century of total control over society, politics, and the economy is long enough for this ruling and/or dominant institution to forge itself as a distinct social class, with its class, economic, and political interests. Typically, in military-controlled polities, the military is referred to as a state within the state. In the Burmese case, the military has become a separate society within the society at large.

Historically, the Tatmadaw was founded as a local proxy against the British in Burma in December 1942 under the patronage of fascist Japan with the nationalist Aung San, Aung San Suu Kyi’s martyred father, as its first commander-in-chief.

Aung San’s vision of this force was that it would be a crucial instrument in the wider popular struggle for liberation to end a century of British colonial rule and, post-independence, to turn it into a professional military, in a federated democratic union of multiethnic peoples.

Suu Kyi herself has repeatedly identified herself with the armed forces – even while the troops have been engaged in vicious military operations – expressing her “genuine affection” for the generals whom she called “my siblings because they are my father’s sons.” She has defended the Tatmadaw against genocide allegations at numerous international fora – most shockingly at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). She has publicly praised this institution as it launched brutal military operations against other minorities such as Buddhist Rakhine on the western coast.

Since she was first elected MP in the 2012 by-elections, Suu Kyi has sought to help open the doors for the hermit-like army leaders, particularly with respect to the militaries in western democracies. Apparently, she was motivated by her desire to trigger some kind of re-professionalization of the Tatmadaw so that it will be a cooperative partner in her main project of democratic reforms. But her reforms were becoming a serious threat “the military elite’s institutional and personal interests – in terms of political influence, bureaucratic dominance, and financial interests.

Shocked, angered, and globally friendless (save for Russia and China), the coup leaders in Myanmar responded to the protests at home in the only way they know: organized terror. Over the last 36 days, the Burmese military has gone on to commit widespread crimes against humanity against completely unarmed, peaceful protesters – estimated to be over 20 million across the country.

On March 4, 2021, Michelle Bachelet, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva, officially called on the Myanmar army to end the murder and enforced disappearances of civilian populations in over 570 locations throughout Myanmar. Over 50 civilians have been murdered – some by military snipers from roof tops of urban buildings – while over 1,750 have been detained. What is more, an unknown number of protesters and citizens alike have been forcibly disappeared by the Tatmadaw and other security units deployed by the State Administration Council (SAC), the military junta.

It is a great irony that the Tatmadaw, which was founded in December 1942 as a nationalist armed liberation force for the colonized, ethnically diverse peoples of colonial Burma by the revolutionary democrat Aung San, has categorically morphed into the country’s most universally hated and feared organization used as the primary instrument of repression and exploitation against humanity by criminals in generals’ uniforms.

This once venerable institution is now at war with the entire society, who now cheer gleefully at the latest news of a soldier being killed in the Rohingya area in a bomb blast, assumed to have been committed by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, dubbed as “Muslim terrorists.”

Whatever the immediate outcome of this violent confrontation between civil society and the military will be, one thing is certain: the Burmese military has lost the nation irretrievably. Without a nation that supports it the Tatmadaw once and for all has stopped being a national defense service. The overwhelming majority in Myanmar view and treat the Tatmadaw as terrorists that must be repelled by any means possible.

As China’s leaders steer their country to the center of world affairs, they are becoming increasingly frightened. They fear encirclement by hostile neighbors and distant enemies. They fear disloyalty from their own citizenry, especially the talented youth who are intrigued by foreign cultures. Above all, China’s political elites fear one another. Treachery at the very top—where raw power carries the gravest dangers—that is the constant terror of party and military factions who see every crack in their facade of unity as an omen of sudden collapse, a long-dreaded Chinese sequel to the fall of the Soviet Union.

When China’s rulers feel that control is slipping through their fingers, they focus on two nemeses that seem to generate the deepest troubles—the United States and the Islamic world. After decades of ambiguity, Sino-American relations have fallen into a downward spiral with no end in sight. Their disputes are far-reaching and mutually reinforcing. Even if compromise emerges on a single issue—trade or climate change—it can’t forestall confrontation in countless other areas, especially military deployments and human rights.

Long-term antagonism with the United States shapes Beijing’s thinking at every level, leading to the securitization of all politics—foreign and domestic. Issues that could once be seen as primarily economic or religious are now viewed through the lenses of police and military headquarters. This shift in perspective has profoundly altered China’s attitudes to Islam and to Muslim societies. Inside of China, the regime has reimagined Islam as a menace instead of a national resource. At the same time, across Asia and Africa, Chinese leaders have chosen to back repressive governments that portray political dissent as the work of “Islamic” terrorists.

These alliances are a sharp break from China’s previous efforts to avoid deep involvement in Muslims’ regional and national quarrels. A long decade of revolutions and civil wars made those disputes more tumultuous precisely as Beijing launched its Belt and Road Initiative, popularly known as the New Silk Road.

In response, China’s rulers turned their view of the Muslim world upside down. At first, the lands of Islam were supposed to create a bridge spreading Chinese power into Europe, the Indian Ocean, and Africa. Instead, warring Muslim societies seemed to morph into a set of spears aimed at China’s heartland through its ever vulnerable western and northern frontiers.

The specter of dual encroachments—American from the sea and Islamic from the land—is animating a growing belligerence in China’s behavior in world affairs and toward its own people.

The specter of dual encroachments—American from the sea and Islamic from the land—is animating a growing belligerence in China’s behavior in world affairs and toward its own people. After Mao, Chinese diplomacy followed a patient opportunism, assuming that international peace would encourage domestic development, eventually creating a stronger nation that could assert itself more confidently in contests for global leadership. Today that patience has disappeared—replaced by a sense that time is running out because China’s enemies are determined to halt its rise while they still have the power to prevail.

This is the misguided logic that seems to justify—indeed, compel—massive assaults on domestic freedoms that prudent defenders of the status quo would normally regard as self-defeating. Sure enough, Beijing’s campaigns of repression have already provoked backlashes from several directions at once. Western and Islamic governments, global human rights advocates, and United Nations bodies are censoring Chinese officials with greater boldness by the day.

Chinese people who once looked forward to wider freedom—like Hong Kong they often said—now see their future foreshadowed in the surveillance state of Xinjiang. The persecution of religion extends beyond Uighurs to Muslims in general and to all worshipers outside of state-control. And religion is just one of many basic liberties vanishing across the mainland.

Freedoms of speech, association, and legal representation are non-existent for most of the population. Even party members are prohibited from gathering in groups of three of more without prior permission—a sure sign that the supreme leaders trust no one, including their professed allies.

Most damaging of all is the growing hostility against ordinary Chinese citizens who travel abroad to study, work, and shop.

Most damaging of all, however, is the growing hostility against ordinary Chinese citizens who travel abroad to study, work, and shop. More and more, they discover that their nation is further than ever from enjoying the international respect they have craved for generations and hoped was finally in their reach. The sting is particularly painful in the Islamic world. Chinese people in all walks of life are feeling the disdain of Muslims in one country after another—lands where they until a few years ago they were unknown or welcome curiosities.

The revulsion is sharpest in the vernacular press and online media across Asia and Africa. In Indonesian, Malay, Urdu, Turkish, Arabic, and Persian, audiences gasp at a flood of films, photos, interviews, police records, and data sets—all testifying to cruelties too shocking to ignore.

Time after time, citizens learn that the inhumane treatment of Chinese Muslims is enabled by open collaboration of their own governments, the very politicians who try to outdo one another in claiming world leadership of Islam as a political and ethical force for creating a more just society.

These shifts in public opinion are perilous for rulers in the Islamic world as well as China. Silk Road dreams for hemispheric integration are dimming as great powers scramble for spheres of influence. China and Russia continue to pry Europe away from the Atlantic alliance, but they increase the risk of entrapment in new proxy wars across Asia and Africa.

In a quest for geopolitical advantage, China is casting its lot with the most despised reactionaries of Islamdom—the predatory generals of Egypt and Syria, the feuding tyrants of the Persian Gulf, and the fossilized police states of Central Asia. The overt persecution of political and religious dissent demolishes any pretense that Beijing will nourish the universalistic values of Chinese civilization to fashion a more ethical global order.

Having chosen such a calamitous course, China’s rulers will find it difficult to reverse direction. Limits on candid debate greatly reduce the possibilities of auto-correction or anything resembling political learning. The result is a drastic impoverishment of Chinese statecraft precisely when it most needs to help manage global crises instead of aggravating them.

According to the official French narrative, the “values ​​of the Republic” express the citizens’ affiliation to the country and their perception of themselves. Therefore, the concept of the nation is inherent in the concept of the “Republic.”

The French concept of the “Republic” is not limited to the abstract political system and its institutions; it also evokes historical moments and symbols dating back to the French Revolution and with it comes a package of values, meanings, ideas, charters, and legislation.

On this basis, specific values and intellectual commitments are presented as conditional to the French identity, defining whether one belongs to the “French nation” or is excluded from French society. Currently, French Muslims are subjected to this trial.

In a speech on October 2, 2020, President Emmanuel Macron coined the term “Islamic separatism” by stating that the Muslim suburbs, which he described as “ghettos,” have been witnessing a tendency to secede from the Republic. He then asked the representatives of Muslim institutions in France, when he summoned them on November 18, to illustrate their commitment to a “charter of republican values” and sign it within a few days. He stipulated the inclusion of specific contents in this charter, one of which was to strictly define Islam as a belief and not a political movement.

It should be noted that Macron exclusively asked the Muslim citizens of France to declare this special loyalty to the Republic by resorting to drawing up this new charter — as if the general charters and legal texts do not suffice or make an exception for Muslims citizens, like for instance the Charte de laïcité, which has been present in every classroom for years.

The campaign against “separatism” does not target mosques alone; it also pursues civil society organizations such as the Collective Against Islamophobia in France (CCIF), an organization that works against racism and discrimination.

In the context of the 2013 debate revolving around Islam and Muslims, warnings were raised about secularism being “under threat” and that “the values ​​of the Republic are in danger.”

This resulted in the “secularism charter” being issued for schools. However, the political values, which emphasize the strict separation of religion and politics, did not prevent senior French politicians from dictating a specific direction of religious practice and Muslim presence, enforced through a Council of Imams that would allow control, for example, of the sites of the imamah and the rhetoric in mosques.

The above official orders are accompanied by the cultural examination and placement of French Muslims, their mosques, and institutions under the political microscope, and successive announcements of the closure of dozens of their institutions and mosques.

The campaign against “separatism” does not target mosques alone; it also pursues civil society organizations such as the Collective Against Islamophobia in France (CCIF), an organization that works against racism and discrimination.

These developments came in the context of a wave of heightened populism that has been mounting in France since the end of the summer of 2020. On September 17, for instance, deputies boycotted a parliament meeting attended by Maryam Pougetoux, the president of the Students’ Union at the Paris-Sorbonne University (UNEF), because she is a Muslim who wears a headscarf, which allegedly contradicts the stipulated “values ​​of the Republic.”

This coincided with the start of the trial against those accused of carrying out the Charlie Hebdo attack, and the satirical newspaper’s continued publication of comics that are insulting to Muslims and their beliefs.

Following this, a number of bloody assaults took place, including the brutal murder of a French teacher and the killings in Notre-Dame de Nice by a homeless man who had just entered the country a few days prior to the attack.

One of the possible interpretations of “separatism” in this context includes some aspects of cultural diversity and the right to difference.

However, this concept of “separatism” is hazy and loose, raising the fear that it could be abused by politicians and the executive bodies in a country where the extreme right is aggressively rising and trying to sweep the elections.

One of the possible interpretations of “separatism” in this context includes some aspects of cultural diversity and the right to difference. In any case, it is clear that some of the leading French elites are used to showing discontent with manifestations of diversity in the public sphere. Even the former French Minister of the Interior Gerard Collomb described the appearance of Pougetoux on a French television screen on May 19, 2018 as a “shocking matter” due to her being “different from French society.”

There are clear contradictions emerging from this cultural campaign of the new ruling class in France that mixes political and electoral interests and politically aligned business leaders and entrepreneurs.

The most evident example is that the same government that speaks of freedom is now seeking to restrict other freedoms and expand the powers of the police and security forces, causing nationwide fear and protest.

The brutal attack on the black music producer Michel Zecler on November 21 was a shocking point in this development, since the recorded incident brought to mind the persistent complaints of suburban residents in regard to police brutality and the suspected racist motives behind it.

Freedom of expression as a public value has increasingly been stressed during the cultural escalation in France, especially since the armed attack on the Charlie Hebdo office in 2015. At the time, President François Hollande rallied with world leaders in a march that was also joined by French Muslims and representatives of their institutions despite the fact that they were being targeted by the humiliating comics in the satirical newspaper.

These comics together with the slogan “Je suis Charlie” turned into a cultural expression linked to the values ​​of the Republic. However, the unprecedented emphasis on freedom of expression has paradoxically been accompanied by increasing insults and contempt directed at Muslims and their religion, with officials not expressing the slightest discomfort about these offenses.

Invoking freedom of expression in this selective manner has placed the French official discourse in a crisis of credibility. The French leadership ignores the reference to this freedom in other situations and does not welcome content that does not suit its taste – in fact, it even resorts to measures to curb it.

Marco Perolini, a discrimination and racism researcher at Amnesty International, wrote, “The French government is not the champion of free speech that it likes to think it is.”

Within a context of international Islamophobia and the persecution of Muslim populations in many countries, it has become more and more commonplace amongst Muslims to lament the lack of unity in the ummah, the global community of believers.

Many Muslim rulers seem all too ready to neglect solidarity with Muslims for the sake of narrowly defined national interests.

Certainly, the most prominent example is Palestine. Despite unrelenting Israeli colonization and the entrenchment of apartheid, several important Muslim countries have taken the bold step of normalizing relations with Israel, and appear to be abandoning the Palestinian cause.

Unfortunately however, Palestine is far from the only example. A number of Muslim countries in Southeast Asia have pushed back boats of Rohingya refugees fleeing Myanmar.

Meanwhile, the governments of many Muslim countries have shied away from criticizing China for its cultural genocide of the Uyghur people in Xinyang, where Muslims are openly targeted for imprisonment and “re-education” for praying, avoiding pork and alcohol, or fasting during the holy month of Ramadan.

Despite these violations, no Muslim state joined an initiative in July 2019, when 23 countries sent a letter to the president of the UN Human Rights Council demanding action against China.

Far from campaigning for the rights of Muslims, Muslim states sided with the oppressor.

Indeed, four days later, 27 member states of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) signed a counter letter, praising “China’s remarkable achievements in the field of human rights,” and thanking it for its firm measures against “religious extremism.” Far from campaigning for the rights of Muslims, in other words, Muslim states sided with the oppressor.

However, the situation is not completely grim. In November 2019, Gambia, with the support of the OIC, filed a genocide case against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

The case is ongoing, but the evidence of genocide committed by the Myanmar military is overwhelming, and the court has already ruled in favor of Gambia’s request for provisional measures.

Many historians note that, outside of the earliest days of Islam, the Muslim ummah has never truly functioned as a unified political entity as a result of the state-based international system being deeply entrenched. The ummah has always been predominantly a spiritual community of believers, not a political force.

Gambia, a West African country many thousands of kilometers away from Myanmar, took the case to the ICJ. This shows that Muslim countries can act in solidarity to advance the rights of Muslims, even when their national interests are not directly at stake.

Nevertheless, that does not preclude the possibility of creating a strengthened ummah, unified in the face of current challenges. The question is one of political will.

In this regard, the Gambia case is an important precedent.

The fact that Gambia, a West African country many thousands of kilometers away from Myanmar, took the case to the ICJ shows that Muslim countries can act in solidarity to advance the rights of Muslims, even when their national interests are not directly at stake.

What is needed urgently is a rethinking of what the ummah should look like in today’s world, and of the concrete framework and institutions that need to be built.

Freedom of movement

International legal standards protecting the rights of refugees and other migrants are sorely inadequate, with millions – more and more of whom are Muslim – unable to secure protection from human rights violations.

Liberal citizenship is also being weakened as Islamophobic policies in many countries target Muslim minority communities for exclusion. A new, modern ummah can and should act as a counterforce to these trends, and put forward a more inclusive form of citizenship: a Muslim citizenship that would allow all believers access to safety.

It is proposed that Muslim countries should issue common travel documents, providing freedom of movement. Similar to the EU, any citizen would be allowed to enter, reside, and work in any other Islamic bloc country, with equal rights and duties as citizens of that country.

Refugees from Muslim countries would automatically have the right to protection, not as a refugee with the limited rights that often entails, but as a citizen of the ummah. Borders within the Islamic bloc would, for most practical purposes, cease to exist.

This is the case in the EU, and while progress has not been linear (and the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in some steps back), it is clear that the EU is moving toward a form of common citizenship that will transcend individual states.

Refugees from Muslim countries would automatically have the right to protection, not as a refugee with the limited rights that often entails, but as a citizen of the ummah. Borders within the Islamic bloc would, for most practical purposes, cease to exist.

This is the case in the EU, and while progress has not been linear (and the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in some steps back), it is clear that the EU is moving toward a form of common citizenship that will transcend individual states.

What is needed urgently is a rethinking of what the ummah should look like in today’s world, and of the concrete framework and institutions that need to be built.

There are potential pitfalls to this proposal, not least that Islamophobic governments could use it to advance even more exclusionary policies towards Muslims.

Despite this being a serious concern, Muslim countries should not refrain from taking steps towards greater unity simply because of the abusive practices of other states.

Countries that wish to exclude Muslims will, unfortunately, find ways to do so. The first obligation of the Islamic bloc should be to protect other members of the ummah, and to provide them with a safe haven if necessary.

Universal rights

Providing for freedom of movement is only half of the picture, since it would not be able to protect Muslim minorities who are unwilling or unable to leave their country of nationality.

Therefore, the ummah must have effective mechanisms to highlight violations of the rights of Muslims and put effective pressure on abusive governments.

Attempting to continue stale debates on the alleged lack of compatibility of the international human rights regime with Islamic religious laws and values is pointless. Even worse, it plays into the Islamophobic narrative that Islam is incompatible with modern norms.

The undeniable reality is that the vast majority of Muslims everywhere by and large accept the universal validity of international human rights standards.

Contrary to the wishes of their people, many Muslim governments have spent far too much time and energy at international meetings arguing against universal standards in a transparent effort to use religion to deflect criticism of their own oppressive practices.

This has damaged the credibility of those governments and, in the eyes of many, Islam itself.

The 2020 presidential election showed record number turnout from American Muslim communities. 70 percent voted for Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden, while 17 percent voted for Donald Trump. As American Muslim communities voted overwhelmingly Democrat in the previous years, their vehement opposition to another Trump presidency does not come as a surprise. Trump reminded American Muslims of the violence they experienced under George W. Bush. Islamophobia in its rawest form was on display in the very onset of his presidency from the announcement of the Muslim Ban on immigrants coming from Muslim-majority countries to halting assistance to Syrian refugees to valorizing the death of Muslim prisoners “dipped in pigs’ blood.”

American Muslims did not always vote Democrat, however. Prior to 2001, 80 percent of American Muslims were Republican and 70 percent of registered Muslims voted for the Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush in 2000. However, 9/11 changed the political landscape of American Muslims.

The violent policies and wars of post-9/11 America are embedded in the memories of Muslims today. Domestically, Muslims were targeted as a suspect population and government policies as well as the social climate of socio-political exclusion drastically shaped American Muslim life. Muslims faced deportation (sometimes regardless of citizenship status), interrogation, surveillance, random searches and acts of hate crime. Violence against Muslims was institutionalized. This became evidently clear with the wars on Iraq and Afghanistan. The state convinced the American people they were fighting acts of violence as they destroyed Muslim-majority countries to oblivion. American Muslims watched in anxiety as the state created Islam its enemy.

By 2017, 47 percent, nearly half of American Muslims believed neither party was friendly towards the interest of American Muslims. For some, the Obama presidency revealed that the Democratic establishment did not relieve Muslims from the expansion of the War on Terror, but accelerated it.

Just as it was apparent with Obama, Joe Biden and his VP pick, Kamala Harris are not anti-Islamophobia candidates.

Just as it was apparent with Obama, Joe Biden and his VP pick, Kamala Harris are not anti-Islamophobia candidates. Just as violence against Muslims happens through various methods, including war, both Biden and Harris are vicious allies of the military. Biden was directly involved in the advancement of the Iraq war and just recently professed his intention to keep special operations in the Middle East, while Harris voted against even a moderate cut in the gargantuan military budget in the middle of the COVID-19 crisis.

Yet some American Muslims responded differently to these challenges than others. What formed was a more radical politic: a group of American Muslims who understood that in order to combat state violence, you needed to avoid collaboration and instead, actively fight against it. Other Muslims however, were satisfied with Obama’s presidency. They believed that by welcoming law enforcement into their mosques, and accepting CVE grants (which gave access to private information on congregants and community members), there would be more trust between the state and Muslim communities, emphasizing they have nothing to hide.

The election of Donald Trump however, grayed the political differences of American Muslims. For the last four years many segments of the American society, including Muslims, became occupied with getting Trump out of office. The term ‘resistance’ became mainstream and suddenly the “soul of the country was on the ballot.”

A group that took advantage of the horrors that Trump represented and Muslims’ desire to see anyone else in office was Emgage. Emgage is the American Muslim community’s first “issue advocacy organization” and refers to themselves as the “political home for Muslim Americans.” In anticipation of the 2020 election, Emgage promised the Biden campaign one million Muslim votes and stated that their aim is to get many American Muslims registered to vote before the 2020 election. Of course, there is not any concrete proof Emgage succeeded in their promise, but the bigger controversy lies with their tendency to disregard the community’s concerns with the U.S.’s foreign policy ills for a so-called ‘seat at the table.’

As Palestine has always been an important foreign policy issue for American Muslims, Emgage disregarded a serious and sensitive issue as many high ranking members, including board members, worked with Islamophobic and anti-Palestinian organizations such as the Muslim Leadership Initiative, the Anti-Defamation League and the American Jewish Committee. Notable board member Farooq Mitha, who also served as Biden’s Muslim Engagement Advisor and now is on his Pentagon transition team, formerly helped the Obama administration “to normalize ties between Israel and Arab nations under the banner of Track II diplomacy” and boasted to former employees that he was a member of AIPAC, the largest pro-Israel lobbying group in the U.S.

Eventually, a campaign called “Drop Emgage” was formed. The group calls on Emgage to “formally end its current normalization activities” and asserts that “Farooq Mitha does not represent the views or will of our communities.” They end their claims by urging “all people of conscience to no longer tolerate unprincipled leadership threatening our community.” Subsequently Emgage was removed as a member from their umbrella organization, U.S. Council of Muslim Organizations USCMO.

The politics of American Muslim communities will see a starker divide.

It is a flaw to consider all Muslims who voted for Biden as pro-Biden. It is more appropriate to view them as anti-Trump. While Biden pleasantly shocked some by saying “Inshallah” on the debate stage, others remember humiliating White House iftars that told us who the “good” Muslims in our communities are and why they must support war overseas. As the country’s electoral process forces American Muslims to concede to establishment Democrats, they have to reconcile that their politics is not in fact unified, and more divided than ever.

The politics of American Muslim communities will see a starker divide based on the probable return of a newly-termed CVE strategy, the continuation of the Islamophobic wars under Biden and the re-emergence of gatekeepers who claim they know what is best for Muslims.

Yet, there is another theory. As we continue to see more and more organizers prioritize fighting Islamophobia in its grandeur scale, we can hope for American Muslims who will unite together and pressure a Biden presidency to confront these challenges. We can look forward to the younger generation of Muslims and the emergence of a more radical politic that pushes for universally just policies which fights against state violence on local and international levels. We will also see more Muslims running for office and calling for an end of unnecessary and unconstitutional surveillance on their communities.

The future of Muslims in America is entirely dependent on whether we are willing to set aside the convention and be innovative in ways to empower our communities.