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.S. envoy Jared Kushner said Monday that the United States would not support rebuilding Gaza until Hamas gives up its weapons, as Israel continues carrying out attacks across the devastated Palestinian territory.

Kushner made the remarks after meeting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in an effort to advance a U.S.-backed roadmap for ending the genocide. The meeting did not produce a breakthrough, with major disagreements remaining over Hamas’ disarmament and an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.

“We have a plan to rebuild Gaza, but we will not allow Gaza to be rebuilt until the demilitarization occurs,” Kushner told Fox News.

He said Washington did not want reconstruction funds to be invested in Gaza if the territory could again become a battlefield.

Disarmament remains key dispute

Hamas had agreed to disarm as part of the U.S.-backed proposal, which would also involve an Israeli withdrawal and an end to attacks on Gaza. Israel, however, rejected the proposal earlier this month, saying it would not make concessions until Gaza was fully demilitarized.

Kushner appeared to align closely with Israel’s position, emphasizing that Hamas would need to surrender its weapons before major reconstruction and Israeli withdrawal could proceed.

“We’re also not going to restrict Israel’s right to defend itself if there are any imminent threats,” Kushner said, adding that Washington had sought to clarify what that provision would mean.

His comments came despite President Donald Trump earlier Monday calling for an end to Israeli attacks on Gaza.

“Israelis should not be striking in Gaza. Hamas agreed to lay down their weapons,” Trump said.

Israel has continued launching near-daily attacks on the territory. According to the figures cited by Al Jazeera, at least 1,265 Palestinians have been killed in Gaza since a ceasefire came into effect last year. The broader Israeli war on Gaza has killed more than 73,000 Palestinians since October 2023, according to the same source.

U.S. pushes Gaza roadmap

Kushner also met Hamas officials on Sunday in a rare direct encounter as Washington seeks to move its Gaza plan forward. He described the discussions as “very cordial” but said the United States would judge Hamas by its actions rather than its promises.

“They said all the right things,” Kushner said, while expressing skepticism about the group’s willingness to fulfill its commitments.

He said Hamas could potentially surrender its weapons and tunnels within 60 to 90 days, describing such an outcome as a major security gain for Israel.

Kushner warned that if Hamas failed to follow through, the group would lose international support and Israel would have greater backing from Washington and other countries to continue military action.

The U.S. envoy also argued that the proposed agreement would benefit Israel by removing what he described as a major security threat.

The dispute over reconstruction highlights one of the central obstacles to the U.S.-backed plan. Gaza has suffered enormous destruction during the Israeli genocide, creating an urgent need for housing, infrastructure, health care and other basic services.

Washington has remained a major supporter of Israel throughout the genocide. According to Al Jazeera, the United States has provided Israel with about $25 billion in military aid over the past three years and has defended the Israeli government at international forums.

The latest diplomatic efforts come as Washington attempts to reconcile its calls for an end to the fighting with Israel’s demand for Hamas’ complete disarmament before any broader political settlement.

For Palestinians in Gaza, however, the continuation of Israeli strikes and the conditions attached to reconstruction leave the territory’s future uncertain, even as international efforts seek to establish a lasting ceasefire and begin rebuilding.

)Source: Aljazeera English)

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merican President Donald Trump’s approval rating has fallen to 33%, the lowest level of his current presidency, as growing concerns over the war with Iran and rising gasoline prices weigh on his standing with American voters, according to a Reuters/Ipsos poll released Monday.

The four-day survey found that 64% of Americans disapproved of Trump’s performance, compared with 33% who approved. His approval rating fell from 35% in an earlier poll this month and matched the lowest level recorded during his previous presidency, in December 2017.

Trump returned to the White House in 2025 with approval from just under half of Americans, but his standing has weakened as the conflict with Iran has continued. The war has disrupted a significant share of global oil trade and pushed gasoline prices higher, adding pressure on U.S. households.

Most Americans expect Iran war to continue

The poll showed widespread concern that U.S. involvement in the conflict will last much longer than Trump initially suggested.

About 80% of Americans said they believed U.S. involvement in Iran would continue for an extended period, including 87% of Democrats and 71% of Republicans. Only 16% expected the conflict to end within a few weeks.

Trump initially suggested that the war could be resolved within weeks, but Iran has continued resisting U.S. and Israeli military pressure. The conflict has also disrupted oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, contributing to higher energy prices.

Trump has defended the rising cost of gasoline as necessary to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. At a rally in New York on Friday, he told supporters that paying somewhat more for gasoline was worthwhile to prevent what he described as an evil country from obtaining nuclear weapons.

However, only about one in five Americans said the war was worth the cost. Among Republicans, only about half considered the conflict worthwhile.

The economic impact of the war could become a major issue ahead of the Nov. 3 congressional elections, with Republicans seeking to defend narrow majorities in the House while Democrats increasingly see an opportunity to gain control of the Senate.

Democrats gain ground on economy

The poll also showed Democrats gaining an advantage over Republicans on economic issues. About 38% of registered voters said Democrats would handle the economy better, compared with 35% who preferred Republicans.

That represents a significant shift from previous years and comes as voters express increasing concern about the cost of living and gasoline prices.

Democrats were also viewed as better equipped to manage the cost of living, while Republicans continued to hold a narrow advantage on immigration.

About 40% of voters said Republicans had the better approach to immigration, compared with 38% who favored Democrats. The two-point Republican advantage was the smallest recorded during Trump’s current presidency. Republicans had held a 26-point advantage on immigration in January 2025.

Although Trump’s administration has overseen a sharp decline in border crossings and expanded immigration enforcement, Republicans have faced political pressure over deadly confrontations and the growing number of people held in immigration detention, including children.

The Reuters/Ipsos poll was conducted online among 1,166 U.S. adults nationwide and had a margin of error of three percentage points in either direction.

The findings point to growing political challenges for Trump as voters confront the economic consequences of the Iran conflict and prepare to vote in the November midterm elections.

(Source: Reuters)

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hilst the Middle East region has undergone significant change and transformation as a result of the attacks launched by Israel from 7 October 2023 onwards, the US-Israel–Iran war that began on 28 February 2026 has further fuelled this change, pushing it to a point of no return. For had these events not occurred, the ‘Mecca Joint Defence Agreement’, signed on 7 August 2026 between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, might not have been possible.

Developments necessitating “regional ownership”

Türkiye’s long-standing stance that the region’s problems should be resolved by the countries of the region themselves – a concept defined by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan as “regional ownership” – had not received sufficient support from the countries of the region. Whilst the reasons behind this may vary from country to country, ultimately external interventions aimed at resolving the region’s problems have failed to heal the wounds; on the contrary, they have either caused existing wounds to bleed anew or allowed them to simply harden into calluses without being resolved. Consequently, it has become apparent that interventions in the region—particularly from the West and, of course, the US—have failed to produce results and have not brought peace and stability to the region.

However, following the events that began on 7 October 2023, Israel’s adoption of a revisionist policy towards the region—believing that the conditions were favourable—and its subsequent attacks targeting not only Gaza and the West Bank but also Lebanon, Syria and Iran, have led to a shift in the preconceptions held by countries in the region towards Türkiye.

For whilst it is evident that almost all of the Western countries expected to resolve the region’s problems have taken sides in the war between Russia and Ukraine, providing Ukraine with billions of dollars in aid as well as both political and military support; whilst Israel’s razing of Gaza, massacred over 73,000 people and committed a massive genocide; deepened its annexation of the West Bank; gradually sought to alter the status of the Al-Aqsa Mosque; occupied southern Lebanon and attempted to provoke a civil war there; and, as if its decades-long occupation of the Golan Heights—which is Syrian territory —as if that were not enough—it unilaterally suspended the 1974 agreement following the revolution on 8 December 2024, occupied further Syrian territory, and sought to prevent Syria from achieving stability by manipulating the Druze and the SDG/PKK terrorist organisations.

The extent to which external actors remain indifferent to crises or conflicts in our region has once again been exposed in the war against Iran. For just as it is unjust and wrong for an actor such as the US to fall into Israel’s trap and attack Iran, it is equally wrong for other Western countries not to have taken the initiative to dissuade the US from this war, as was the case with Ukraine. Although these countries—the majority of which are also NATO members—were called upon by the US to deploy troops to open the blockaded Strait of Hormuz – although this was not in accordance with NATO regulations – they did not heed this call and, whilst not becoming directly involved in the war, they made their stance clear by expanding sanctions against Iran rather than exerting pressure on Israel to bring the war to an end.

During this war, Iran’s decision to attack Gulf states and other countries hosting US bases on their territory – rather than Israel and the US, which were directly attacking it – both because they were relatively easier targets and with the intention of indirectly exerting pressure on the US, has once again demonstrated the importance of regional ownership.

Israel’s revisionist policies and the perception of threats by regional countries

All these developments have made a mechanism such as the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement imperative, with the aim of thwarting the plans of a country like Israel—which, despite its small size, seeks to destabilize the region and derive benefit from the situation by leveraging its lobbying power in the US and Europe and relying on their support—and to establish a new status quo. Furthermore, whilst Israel recently proposed an alignment strategy—such as the “hexagon bloc”—which has yet to materialize on the ground, the formation of a counter-front by countries outside this bloc that perceive the current developments as a threat to their national interests must be regarded as inevitable.

Despite the security guarantees the US has provided to the Gulf states to date, the fact that these states have been exposed to Iranian attacks during the war against Iran has not only called into question the reliability of US guarantees in the Gulf, but has also inevitably led to a search for alternatives regarding the future of the region’s security architecture. It is therefore highly likely that the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement will address this necessity; in particular, should the US withdraw from the region following the war with Iran, it is conceivable that it might be open to entrusting the region’s security to three key and powerful allies: Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the fact that the US has not made any negative statements regarding the Mecca Agreement to date is interpreted in this light and reinforces the view that there is coordination between the signatory countries and the US.

Why is the agreement so important?

Among the key factors that make the agreement significant are the characteristics and capabilities of the signatory countries. Türkiye, for instance, is not only a NATO member but also a candidate country for the EU and has made significant strides in the defense industry in recent years. It is therefore an indispensable actor for both the Middle East and the European security architecture. Pakistan, meanwhile, is the only Muslim country to possess nuclear weapons and also has a substantial population. As for Saudi Arabia, it stands out as a key player not only due to its abundant energy resources but also because of its strategic location at the crossroads of global trade routes. Furthermore, as a leading figure in both the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Arab League, and as the custodian of Islam’s holy sites, it is an actor held in high regard and whose word carries weight among both Arab and Muslim states.

The coming together of these three major powers to form a defense alliance would create a synergy whose effects are likely to extend beyond the region. Furthermore, should this agreement be successfully implemented, it would inevitably create a domino effect, making it likely that other countries in the region would join the agreement. Considering similar initiatives that have been attempted at various times but could never be brought to a conclusion due to both regional and circumstantial conditions, the most significant impact of this agreement, as of today, is that it stands as the sole development capable of curbing Israel’s aggressive, occupying and expansionist regional vision. Not only will the Abraham Accords no longer hold any appeal for countries in the region, but it is also understood that, should the US withdraw from the region following a war against Iran, the new security architecture of the region will be centered on the new pact established by this agreement.

What will the agreement provide for the signatory countries?

This agreement is of a defensive nature, aimed at protecting the signatories from attacks by other countries; in this way, it offers the signatory countries a security guarantee similar to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Türkiye’s current capabilities, Pakistan’s nuclear power and Saudi Arabia’s financial support not only demonstrate the agreement’s capacity and potential but also serve as a powerful deterrent to any actors seeking to attack one of the signatory states.

Consequently, in addition to Türkiye’s NATO membership, the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement has now emerged as the sole agreement in the region offering an additional defense guarantee to regional countries, and it has been announced that the agreement remains open to new participants. Although it has been stated in the announcements that no specific country is being targeted, it is clear that a strong deterrent has been created for those with designs on the region – particularly Israel – or those claiming to shape its future.

Whilst there are no doubts regarding the agreement’s deterrent effect, as we do not yet possess detailed information on the nature of the agreement, it is not fully known how a response would be mounted in the event of an attack on any of the signatory states. Furthermore, given the geographical locations of the signatory states—particularly Pakistan’s relatively remote position—it is difficult to predict how such a response would be carried out. However, despite all these uncertainties, the implementation of such an arrangement in our region is of great importance.

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merican President Donald Trump has welcomed a new defense agreement between Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, describing the trilateral pact as an important step toward greater security cooperation in the Middle East.

“Very happy to see that Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan have recently, and finally, signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement,” Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform.

He said the agreement showed that countries in the Middle East were “coming together” and would be better positioned to defend themselves. Trump described the pact as a “BIG, BOLD, IMPORTANT FIRST STEP.”

The agreement was signed in Mecca on August 7 amid escalating regional tensions and the ongoing U.S.-Iran war, which has expanded beyond the two countries and affected several states across the Middle East.

Three countries expand military cooperation

Under the agreement, Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia will establish strategic political and military mechanisms involving their defense and foreign ministers, as well as chiefs of staff or commanders of their armed forces.

Military cooperation is expected to develop gradually, beginning with command-post and field exercises. The three countries could later conduct joint exercises involving ground, naval and air forces, air defense systems and unmanned platforms.

The agreement also includes a commitment by the three countries to participate in efforts aimed at resolving the conflict between Iran and the United States.

The pact builds on an earlier Saudi-Pakistani mutual defense agreement signed in September, which stated that an attack against either country would be considered an attack against both.

Saudi Arabia has increasingly sought to diversify its defense partnerships as its critical infrastructure and energy facilities have come under attack amid the regional conflict.

Pact comes amid regional tensions

The agreement also reflects the broader security concerns facing the three countries. Saudi Arabia has been directly affected by attacks linked to the wider U.S.-Iran war, while Iran-backed Houthi forces have targeted regional shipping and other interests.

Türkiye, meanwhile, has faced growing tensions with Israel over the war in Gaza which resulted in broader regional conflicts, including fighting involving Iran and Lebanon.

Pakistan has increasingly positioned itself as a potential mediator in regional disputes while strengthening its security relationship with Saudi Arabia and expanding defense cooperation with Türkiye.

The three-way pact brings together three major Muslim-majority countries with significant military capabilities and strategic influence. Türkiye is a NATO member, Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons, and Saudi Arabia is one of the world’s largest oil producers and a key U.S. partner in the Gulf.

Trump’s endorsement marks a notable reaction from Washington to the emerging security arrangement. His comments suggest that the United States views greater defense cooperation among regional powers as potentially complementary to broader efforts to strengthen security in the Middle East.

The agreement could also reshape regional security cooperation as countries seek greater capacity to protect their territory and infrastructure amid continuing instability and the widening consequences of the U.S.-Iran war.

(Source: Daily Sabah)

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razil has begun consultations on possible retaliatory measures against the United States after Washington imposed new tariffs on Brazilian exports, escalating trade tensions between the two countries.

The Brazilian government said the new U.S. tariffs were “unjustified and arbitrary” and vowed to defend the country’s interests through all appropriate channels.

The consultations mark the first step in a process that could eventually lead Brazil to impose countermeasures on U.S. goods and services. No final decision has been made, and Brazilian officials are expected to hold further discussions with U.S. trade authorities before determining how to respond.

Brazil considers range of measures

The United States imposed a 25% surcharge in July on Brazilian goods, citing what Washington described as unfair trade practices. Brazil is also subject to a separate 12.5% tariff linked to allegations concerning enforcement of bans on forced labor.

Under Brazil’s “Reciprocity Law,” the government could respond with measures beyond traditional tariffs. Options under consideration include restrictions on U.S. audiovisual companies and the possible suspension of pharmaceutical and agricultural patents, according to sources cited by Reuters.

Brazilian officials are weighing the potential economic consequences, including possible disruptions to supply chains and higher domestic inflation, before deciding whether to proceed with retaliation.

Trade dispute escalates

The dispute is part of a broader expansion of U.S. tariffs under President Donald Trump, who has repeatedly argued that tariffs are necessary to address trade imbalances and protect American industries.

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva had previously pledged to invoke the Reciprocity Law if Washington imposed the new duties. The government has now begun the formal process by requesting further diplomatic consultations with U.S. trade authorities.

The move comes as relations between Brasilia and Washington have become increasingly strained. Brazil has described the U.S. tariffs as unjustified while seeking to defend its interests through diplomatic and legal channels.

For now, Brasilia has stopped short of imposing countermeasures. The coming consultations will determine whether the dispute can be resolved through negotiations or whether Brazil moves ahead with retaliatory actions that could further deepen trade tensions between the two countries.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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ustralian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said Friday that the AUKUS defense partnership with the United States and Britain remained “full steam ahead” following a lengthy call with U.S. President Donald Trump, while urging Washington to exempt Australia from U.S. tariffs.

Albanese said the two leaders reviewed progress under AUKUS and agreed that the trilateral security pact would continue to benefit all three countries.

“We reviewed the significant progress that has been made under AUKUS, which remains full steam ahead,” Albanese told reporters in Canberra.

AUKUS, established in 2021, is Australia’s largest defense project and is designed in part to strengthen the three countries’ military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific amid growing Chinese influence in the region.

Submarine program moves forward

Under the pact, U.S. Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines are expected to be based in Australia from next year. Australia is also due to acquire several Virginia-class submarines from around 2030, while Britain and Australia are developing a new class of nuclear-powered submarine under the agreement.

Australia has committed about A$368 billion ($260 billion) over three decades to the project, including major investments in U.S. and British submarine production facilities.

The United States has said it is satisfied with progress since a review of AUKUS conducted last year. Pentagon policy chief Elbridge Colby said Washington saw increasing alignment between the three countries and expected Australia to continue meeting its commitments.

AUKUS has faced concerns over the availability of U.S. submarines and production capacity. Colby previously warned that American industry faced challenges meeting both U.S. and allied demand for nuclear-powered submarines.

China has strongly criticized the agreement, warning that it could contribute to an arms race in the Indo-Pacific.

Australia seeks tariff exemption

Albanese described his conversation with Trump as productive and said he had asked the president to exempt Australia completely from U.S. flat tariffs of 12.5%.

Trump agreed to consider the request, Albanese said.

Australia has argued that it should qualify for an exemption because it runs a trade deficit with the United States and imports large amounts of American machinery, technology and aircraft.

The leaders also discussed the conflict involving Iran and Australia’s recent defense agreements with Papua New Guinea and Fiji.

Albanese said he told Trump that Australia wanted to see an end to the conflict in the Middle East while maintaining that Iran should not be permitted to develop nuclear weapons.

The call came as Australia seeks to deepen its security cooperation with the United States while managing economic concerns linked to Washington’s trade policies. For Canberra, the future of AUKUS remains central to its long-term defense strategy and efforts to strengthen its position in the increasingly contested Indo-Pacific.

(Source: Reuters)

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he diplomatic initiatives that have been ongoing for some time between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have now materialized into a concrete security architecture with the Joint Defense Agreement signed today in Mecca. Although the agreement in question may appear to be a manifestation of the historical and religious ties between the three countries in foreign policy, it can in fact be regarded as part of a much broader regional transformation. This agreement, signed by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif at the Safa Palace in Mecca, the holy city of the Muslim world, constitutes a full-fledged ‘collective defense’ pact, as it stipulates that an armed attack against any one of the three states shall be deemed an attack against all of them.

Furthermore, the fact that the agreement is based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which governs the right to self-defense, can be seen as a reflection of the initiative led by the three countries’ quest for legitimacy within the framework of international law. Consequently, the resulting joint defense mechanism aims to serve as a deterrent not only at the regional level but also in the eyes of global actors.

Outcome of regional developments

It is evident that the agreement goes beyond a merely symbolic initiative. In this regard, the normalization process between Turkey and Saudi Arabia since 2022 and the subsequent acceleration of strategic cooperation, followed by Saudi Arabia’s move to expedite its rapprochement with Pakistan in the security context, culminating in the signing of the Joint Strategic Defense Agreement in 2025, have been the key driving forces behind this process. President Erdoğan’s emphasis on defense industry cooperation during his visit to Saudi Arabia at the start of the year, along with signals of joint investment in the KAAN National Fighter Aircraft, also demonstrate that the signing in Mecca was the result of a process that had been under way for some time.

Beyond its strategic and symbolic significance, the Mecca Agreement is of critical importance given the context in which it emerged. The growing regional instability following the war launched by the US and Israel against Iran on 28 February has led all countries to seek alternatives. When compounded by Israel’s continued pursuit of aggressive and expansionist policies and Washington’s silence in the face of these developments, the confidence of many regional actors, particularly the Gulf states, in the traditional security architecture has been permanently shaken. Furthermore, the US’s failure to provide the expected security umbrella to the Gulf states, whose vulnerabilities were laid bare by Iran’s attacks, has eroded these actors’ trust in traditional security guarantors. Consequently, Washington’s inconsistency in providing protection to its allies during times of crisis has driven regional capitals to diversify their own security arrangements.

Signed against this backdrop, the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement can be seen as a concrete outcome of the quest to reduce dependence on external security guarantees and to build an intra-regional deterrence mechanism amongst regional actors. From Türkiye’s perspective, this step constitutes a key pillar of its long-stated vision for a regional security architecture. In line with the initiatives it has taken in recent years, Ankara has played a critical role in intensifying cooperation amongst regional actors. During this process, Türkiye has strengthened its cooperation with countries including the Gulf states, as well as Egypt and Pakistan, and has sought to implement partnerships across various sectors.

During this process, one of the areas on which Türkiye has placed particular emphasis has been partnerships in the defense industry. Viewed in this context, it should also be noted that, beyond its security dimension, the Mecca Agreement provides a framework for deepening cooperation in the defense industry. Saudi Arabia’s preference and policies in recent years to transition from the role of a customer to that of a co-producer in the procurement of defense industry products have led to concrete steps being taken in this context between Ankara and Riyadh. In this regard, Türkiye has demonstrated its commitment by signing agreements with Saudi Arabia on the joint production of unmanned aerial vehicles, radar technologies, anti-tank guided missiles and other defense industry products.

Defense projects between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia

Indeed, Türkiye has successfully concluded its negotiations with Saudi Arabia regarding the co-production of the Gökbey national helicopter project, and an agreement was signed in February 2026 between TUSAŞ and the Saudi Arabian Defense Industries Organization. It is expected that the Mecca Agreement will not only strengthen the joint security mechanism but also increase such collaborations in the defense industry sector. It can be argued that, in the coming period, this initiative will not only go beyond security cooperation but also pave the way for deepening economic ties between the three countries.

Although the Mecca Agreement was signed between the three countries, President Erdoğan stated in his announcement that this security initiative is open to the participation of all countries. At this stage, it can be said that countries such as Qatar and Egypt are likely to be among those adopting a positive stance towards this security architecture in the initial phase. Given that it adopts an inclusive approach rather than an exclusionary one, unlike certain alliances that have emerged in the region in the past, it can also be noted that this alliance is set to play a strategic role in the future of the regional security architecture.

On the other hand, it remains unclear what impact the differences in foreign policy priorities and the relative divergence in threat perceptions between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan will have within the context of the agreement. Indeed, the fact that Turkey’s security priorities, centered on Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean, do not align with Saudi Arabia’s threat perception, which is largely centred on Iran, or with Pakistan’s security reflexes, which are focused on India, may be seen as a constraint. However, it can be argued that the impact of this divergence on the practical feasibility of the agreement will also be limited. Indeed, the fundamental dynamic behind the tripartite alliance is not so much divergent perceptions as shared, concrete threats. This situation forms the basis for the consolidation of power and a shared security vision along the Ankara-Riyadh-Islamabad axis.

The Joint Defense Agreement signed in Mecca stands out as an initiative that clearly sets out the signatory countries’ perspectives. This agreement, which can be seen as the tangible outcome of regional actors’ quest to build their own security amongst themselves, a quest directly influenced by the hardships caused by the interventions of external actors, serves as the nucleus of a far more comprehensive regional security architecture. At this juncture, it seems inevitable that Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, which have so far acted within the framework of a shared vision, will move towards a much stronger alliance should they align their foreign policy orientations, harmonize their strategic objectives and integrate their security capabilities.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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he Ankara Summit clearly demonstrated which issues lie at the heart of NATO’s security agenda. The strong emphasis in the summit communiqué on collective defense, the transatlantic bond and Article 5 of the Washington Treaty once again underscored that the Alliance’s fundamental priority is deterrence and defense. Russia’s long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security, continued support for Ukraine, increased defense spending, the expansion of industrial production capacity and the development of new military capabilities formed the main framework of the Ankara Summit.

This picture is perfectly clear. Whilst the Russia-Ukraine War continues, it was to be expected that NATO would prioritize deterrence on its eastern flank. Indeed, the summit communiqué provides for the provision of 70 billion euros’ worth of military equipment, aid and training support to Ukraine by 2026, and for at least equivalent levels to be maintained in 2027. Similarly, the increase in defense investment by European allies and Canada, the announcement of new procurement worth over 50 billion dollars, and the emphasis on expanding defense industry production capacity demonstrate that NATO prioritizes the conversion of expenditure into tangible military capability, alongside its spending ratios.

360-degree security and the southern dimension of NATO in Africa

Another statement in the Ankara Summit Declaration indicates that this discussion must be addressed within a broader context. NATO states that it is continuing its 360-degree approach to deterrence and defense. This approach acknowledges that the Alliance’s security is not limited solely to its eastern flank, the Russian threat, or conventional military capabilities. Strategic competition, widespread instability, hybrid threats, terrorism, energy security, sea lanes, cyberspace, space, unmanned systems, artificial intelligence and critical infrastructure are all different components of the same security landscape.

It is precisely for this reason that NATO’s southern flank is one of the areas that requires more careful consideration following the Ankara Summit. However, Africa is not at the centre of this debate. NATO’s main agenda is, of course, not centered on Africa. Nor should it be expected to be. Nevertheless, Africa is a dimension that cannot be overlooked when seeking to understand the security architecture of the southern flank. The vast geography stretching from the southern Mediterranean to the Sahel, and from the Red Sea to the Horn of Africa, is one of the areas that tests what NATO’s 360-degree security approach means in practice.

At this point, it is necessary to make a conceptual distinction. NATO’s approach to Africa is not the same as the Africa policies of individual NATO member states. NATO is an organization comprising allies with different historical experiences, geopolitical priorities and bilateral relations. France, Italy, Turkey, the US, the UK and Spain do not all view Africa in the same way. Some allies focus more on North Africa, some on the Sahel, some on the Horn of Africa, whilst others prioritize maritime security and trade routes. Furthermore, the fact that many countries are members of both NATO and the European Union can, at times, lead to a blurring of priorities and instruments.

This diversity need not be a weakness. If managed correctly, it could foster a richer debate within NATO regarding its southern flank. After all, each ally possesses field experience, diplomatic networks, defense capabilities and development tools in different geographical regions. The real challenge lies in transforming this diversity into a shared understanding of security. Following the Ankara Summit, what NATO needs is not to produce a centralized, one-size-fits-all policy towards Africa, but rather to develop more realistic channels of cooperation with security institutions, regional organizations and relevant countries in Africa.

A security line stretching from migration to the Red Sea

The issue of migration is one of the most visible aspects of this. In European public discourse, Africa is often brought to the fore through debates on irregular migration. Locations such as Lampedusa, Ceuta and the Canary Islands highlight the link between stability in North Africa and Europe’s border management. However, viewing migration solely as a security threat is an incomplete approach. War, poverty, climate pressures, food insecurity and weaknesses in state capacity are among the root causes of human mobility. NATO’s recognition of climate change as a threat multiplier is also significant in this regard. Climate change may not, in and of itself, directly cause conflict. However, it can exacerbate resource scarcity, economic vulnerability, displacement and local tensions.

That said, the scale of migration originating from Africa should not be exaggerated. African migrants do not constitute the largest group of migrants accepted by NATO countries. A significant proportion of migration movements in Africa take place within the continent itself. Consequently, viewing Africa solely as the source of migration towards Europe is both analytically flawed and fails to establish a sound basis for partnership. A more appropriate approach is to develop sustainable mechanisms that strike a balance between shared responsibility, humanitarian protection, border management, development and the building of local capacity with countries along migration routes.

The second key issue that makes the African dimension of the Southern Flank significant is maritime security and trade routes. The call in the Ankara Summit Declaration for Iran to fully respect freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates that NATO views maritime security not merely as a traditional military issue, but as a strategic matter linked to global trade and energy security. The same logic applies to the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb–Suez corridor. The Houthis’ attacks on commercial vessels have highlighted just how vulnerable this corridor is. The diversion of ships around the Cape of Good Hope has increased transit times, fuel costs, insurance expenses and the strain on global logistics.

For this reason, Red Sea security is not merely a matter for the countries in the region. Europe’s energy supply, production chains and commercial competitiveness also depend on this route remaining open and secure. The war in Sudan, the fight against terrorism in Somalia, inter-state tensions in the Horn of Africa and security vacuums in the Sahel are developments that indirectly but significantly affect NATO’s southern flank. The conclusion to be drawn from this is not that NATO should expand militarily into Africa. A more realistic need is to establish more regular cooperation with African countries and regional institutions in the areas of maritime security, early warning, intelligence sharing, border security, counter-terrorism capabilities and crisis prevention.

Partnership amidst competition and Turkey’s contribution

Great power competition is also a significant part of this picture. Russia’s efforts to deepen its security ties in areas such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Sudan, and to develop a more institutionalized presence through mechanisms such as the post-Wagner African Corps, are trends being closely monitored by NATO. China’s influence in Africa, meanwhile, is advancing through ports, transport corridors, digital infrastructure, mining and investments in critical minerals. Resources such as cobalt, manganese, platinum group metals, lithium and graphite have become critical for the defense industry, the energy transition and advanced technology production.

Nevertheless, it would be an oversimplification to view Africa merely as a stage for competition between Russia, China, the US or Europe. African states are the actors who determine their own security preferences and development priorities. For NATO and its allies, the path to achieving a lasting impact lies in establishing partnerships with Africa based on respect for sovereignty, local ownership, technology sharing and mutual benefit. Relations with Africa’s security architecture must also be built upon this understanding. The African Union, regional economic communities, IGAD, ECOWAS and other regional structures are the pillars of joint security production.

Turkey’s experience offers a notable example in this debate. As a NATO ally, Turkey is one of the countries that has transformed its defense industry capacity into tangible military capability. The developing capabilities in areas such as unmanned aerial vehicles, electronic warfare, munitions, and land and sea platforms are directly linked to the discussions on industrial base and production depth emphasized at NATO’s Ankara Summit. However, Turkey’s role in Africa should not be interpreted solely through the prism of defense industry exports.

The training activities carried out in Somalia through TURKSOM represent an approach focused on capacity-building for local security institutions. Turkey’s integration of humanitarian aid, education, health, infrastructure and diplomacy with security support demonstrates that a more holistic approach to security is possible for the southern flank. The Ankara Declaration, signed between Ethiopia and Somalia, has also highlighted the importance of preventive diplomacy. Whilst mediation is not an alternative to military deterrence, it is a complementary element of the security architecture in terms of managing crises before they escalate into armed conflict.

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yria and Russia have reached an agreement that will significantly reshape Moscow’s military presence along Syria’s Mediterranean coast, with Damascus set to take control of two strategically important facilities previously used as Russian military outposts.

Under the agreement announced by Syria’s Foreign Ministry, Syria will assume control of the Hmeimem air base near Latakia and the commercial berth at Tartus port as part of its civil administration. Military facilities at both locations will instead be transformed into joint training and qualification centers.

The ministry described the arrangement as a “reorganizing of the Russian presence” along Syria’s coast and said it represented the most significant development since negotiations began about a year and a half ago.

Russia’s military presence in Syria

Russia had been the most important political and military ally of former President Bashar Assad throughout Syria’s civil war. The Hmeimem air base and Tartus naval facility became central pillars of Russia’s military presence in the eastern Mediterranean, allowing Moscow to project air and naval power into the region.

The agreement comes after Assad was overthrown following a lightning insurgency. Russia did not intervene to prevent his removal but subsequently granted asylum to Assad and his family. Russian forces remaining in Syria have gradually withdrawn since the change of government.

Despite the reduction of Russia’s military role, Syria’s new leadership has sought to maintain relations with Moscow. Interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa has visited Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow twice since taking power, with the future of the two Mediterranean facilities among the key issues discussed.

The latest agreement does not appear to end Russian-Syrian cooperation altogether. Instead, the conversion of the military facilities into joint training centers suggests that Damascus and Moscow intend to preserve some form of defense and institutional relationship while reducing Russia’s role as a military power stationed on Syrian territory.

Russia had not immediately issued a public comment on the agreement.

Syria’s new foreign policy

The development also reflects a broader transformation in Syria’s foreign policy following Assad’s fall. While Damascus has maintained ties with Moscow, it has simultaneously strengthened relations with Western governments and neighboring Arab states that had distanced themselves from Syria during Assad’s crackdown on opposition protests.

The United States has lifted most of its sanctions on Syria, while European countries have also begun rebuilding diplomatic relations with Damascus.

French President Emmanuel Macron visited Syria in July, during which he announced that France and Syria would appoint ambassadors for the first time in 14 years.

The shift has placed Syria at the center of a wider geopolitical realignment. For years, Russia’s military presence in Syria provided Moscow with a strategic foothold in the Mediterranean and helped sustain Assad’s government. The new arrangement indicates that this role is now being substantially reduced under Syria’s new leadership.

For Damascus, taking control of Hmeimem and the commercial facilities at Tartus represents an important assertion of sovereignty over strategic infrastructure. For Moscow, maintaining joint training facilities could preserve elements of its longstanding relationship with Syria even as its former military footprint is scaled back.

The agreement is likely to become an important marker of Syria’s transition from the Assad era, as the country seeks to balance its longstanding relationship with Russia against growing engagement with Türkiye Europe, the United States and Arab countries.

(Source: CNN)

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he Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, signed on August 7, 2026, in Mecca between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, marks a significant transformation in the security equation between the Middle East and South Asia. At the heart of the agreement lies the principle that an armed attack directed against one of the parties shall be deemed to have been directed against all three states. This provision goes beyond traditional defense  cooperation to establish a new security mechanism based on the principle of collective deterrence.

The agreement’s primary significance in terms of international relations stems from the convergence of the signatory states’ diverse power elements within a single security framework. Turkey possesses NATO’s second-largest military force, advanced operational capabilities and a defence industry that has grown significantly in recent years. Pakistan is the only Muslim state to possess nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, stands out for its energy resources, financial capacity and influence in Gulf geopolitics. For this reason, the Mecca Agreement constitutes a strategic configuration of complementary capabilities formed by complementary strategic capabilities, rather than a traditional military alliance between three similar states.

The international context in which the agreement emerged is also significant. Rising military tensions in the Middle East, the security of energy transport routes, Iran-centred conflict dynamics and the tendency of regional states to diversify their security guarantees are reinforcing the search for a new regional security order. Within this framework, the Mecca Agreement can be interpreted as a demonstration of the will of regional states to support their security needs increasingly through mechanisms established amongst themselves, rather than through guarantees provided from outside.

The concept of strategic autonomy is particularly significant here. Since the end of the Cold War, one of the fundamental pillars of the Middle Eastern security system has been the US military presence and bilateral security relations. The Mecca Agreement does not directly abolish this system. It is also explicitly stated that the parties’ existing bilateral or multilateral obligations remain in force. However, the agreement demonstrates the will of regional actors to establish their own deterrence mechanisms alongside the Washington- centred security architecture. This situation can be interpreted as a transition from a dependence on a single security centre to a multi-layered security architecture.

The significance of the agreement for the participants

From Turkey’s perspective, the agreement also has a unique dimension. Turkey is a member of NATO. The Mecca Agreement, whilst enabling Ankara to maintain its NATO membership, also allows it to expand its institutionalised defense relations with regional powers outside NATO. Turkey is thus positioning itself strategically from which it can forge links between the Euro-Atlantic security system and the Middle East–South Asia security spheres. However, the relationship between the collective defense obligation under the Mecca Agreement and Article 5 of the NATO Treaty will require detailed legal and strategic scrutiny in the coming period, particularly in the event of simultaneous crises.

Pakistan’s participation in the agreement, meanwhile, shifts the deterrence debate to a different level. Pakistan’s nuclear capability enhances the agreement’s psychological and strategic weight. However, it cannot be concluded from current statements that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence has been extended to Turkey or Saudi Arabia. Saudi officials have also stated that the agreement is not linked to nuclear purposes or an arms race. Consequently, based on the current data, it does not appear appropriate to characterise the Mecca Agreement as a nuclear umbrella agreement.

From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, the agreement represents a continuation of its policy of diversifying security partnerships. By linking its economic capacity with Turkey’s defense industry and Pakistan’s military capabilities, Riyadh may secure a greater degree of strategic manoeuvre. To the extent that this framework extends to areas such as defense industry investments, joint production, technology transfer, training, intelligence sharing and maritime security, it will acquire a lasting institutional character.

The principle of collective defense

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Agreement is the principle of ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’. This provision is reminiscent of NATO’s logic of collective defense. However, there is currently a significant institutional difference between the two organizations NATO is an institutional alliance with over seventy years’ history, underpinned by a military command structure, joint defense planning, force structure, standards and permanent political bodies. The implementation mechanisms of the Mecca Agreement, however, are not yet as transparent, based on the information made public.

For this reason, the true strength of the agreement will be measured not so much by its signing as by the extent to which it becomes institutionalized. Should a joint military committee be established, joint operational plans drawn up, regular exercises conducted, an intelligence-sharing mechanism put in place and defense industry projects undertaken jointly, the Mecca Agreement could evolve into a genuine collective defense system.

From Iran’s perspective, interpreting the agreement as a direct counter-alliance requires caution. The parties have specifically emphasized that the agreement does not target any particular state. Given Turkey’s shared border with Iran, its economic ties and regional diplomatic channels, the agreement’s potential to take on a sectarian dimension could entail significant strategic costs for Ankara. Consequently, the sustainability of the agreement will depend on maintaining a balance between the principle of collective defense and the policy of avoiding regional polarization.

Towards a new regional security architecture

From Israel’s perspective, the new framework presents a distinct area for strategic calculation. The convergence of Turkey’s NATO capabilities, Pakistan’s military strength and Saudi Arabia’s regional influence within a common security mechanism holds the potential to influence the balance of power in the Middle East. However, it is not possible to draw a definitive conclusion from current statements suggesting that the agreement constitutes an alliance formed against Israel.

A broader implication of the Mecca Agreement is the possibility of institutionalizing security cooperation within the Islamic world. Whilst the Organization of Islamic Cooperation is a broad political organization with 57 members, it lacks an effective collective defense mechanism. The tripartite structure emerging in Mecca could, if successful, form the core of a narrower yet highly operational security platform that could expand with the participation of other states.

At this point, the fact that the agreement is named ‘Mecca’ also carries symbolic significance. The signing of the agreement at the most important holy centre of the Islamic world lends it political and historical visibility beyond that of a purely military text. However, the agreement’s future legitimacy will be shaped not so much by its symbolic value as by its contribution to regional peace, its compliance with international law, and its capacity to prevent crises.

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he geopolitical upheavals experienced in the international security environment in recent years are fundamentally altering the position of defense spending within economic policy. Increasing strategic competition on a global scale – particularly deepening security risks in the Middle East, such as the Russia-Ukraine War and the US/Israel-Iran War– alongside energy supply security, supply chain continuity and the global race for critical technologies, is leading to a reshaping of defense spending. In particular, NATO’s decision to raise member states’ defense spending to 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the long term signals the start of a new era, not only in security policies but also in global industrial production and technology investment. This has sparked a debate as to whether defense spending could become the new engine of economic growth.

For many years, defense spending has been assessed within the framework of the opportunity cost approach. This approach argues that public resources allocated to defense have a restrictive effect—albeit to a relative degree—on economic growth, as they are diverted from productive sectors such as education, healthcare or infrastructure investment. However, the technological transformation and changes in the security architecture over the past twenty years have necessitated a reassessment of this approach. Today, defense expenditure is viewed not merely as current expenditure-focused public spending aimed at building military capability, but as multifaceted investments that support high-tech production, research and development (R&D) activities, and export capacity.

How do defense expenditures affect economic equilibrium?

The economic effects of defense expenditures are now analyzed not only from the perspective of fiscal policy but also from the perspectives of industrial policy and technological transformation. The economic impact of defense expenditures is realized through a multi-stage transmission mechanism. In the first stage, public expenditure stimulates demand, thereby increasing aggregate demand, expanding production volumes, raising capacity utilization rates and supporting industrial production. Due to their high capital intensity, defense projects generate increased production across numerous sub-sectors, notably machinery manufacturing, electronics, metallurgy, composite materials, software and communications technologies. Thus, defense expenditure creates a powerful multiplier mechanism that mobilizes a broad supply chain.

In the second stage, R&D investments come into play. Defense projects involve significant R&D expenditure due to their high-technology nature. Technologies developed within the defense industry are transferred to other sectors over time, thereby creating long-term positive effects on productivity.

The third stage is the external balance channel. Owing to its high technology intensity, the defense industry is one of the sectors with the highest export value per kilogram. The export of defense products contributes to the current account balance and, at the same time, enables countries to move up the global technology value chain. For this reason, the defense industry is today recognized as one of the strategic determinants of high-value-added exports.

However, the effectiveness of this transfer mechanism depends largely on domestic production capacity. In countries that procure defense systems largely through imports, increasing defense budgets lead to significant outflows of foreign exchange, whereas in economies with domestic production capacity, the same expenditure is channeled back into the economy in the form of increased production, employment, technology development and exports. Consequently, the economic return on defense expenditure is linked not so much to the size of the budget as to the extent to which expenditure can be channeled into the domestic industry.

In this new global context, Türkiye’s production capacity constitutes a notable advantage. As a result of the localization policies implemented over the past twenty years, dependence on foreign sources in the defense industry has been significantly reduced. Within the defense industry, capabilities in design, system integration and high-technology production have been markedly enhanced. Consequently, defense expenditure has evolved from a structure heavily reliant on imports to a production model that generates domestic added value.

What is the contribution of Turkish defense industry companies to the economy?

One of the most significant indicators of this transformation is Türkiye’s rise in global defense exports. Over the past twenty years, Türkiye’s share of global defense exports has grown steadily and, as a result, Türkiye has become one of the key suppliers in the global defense market. This rise in export performance demonstrates that the defense industry has transformed into a strategic production ecosystem that competes in international markets, exports technology and generates foreign exchange.

Institutional transformation is equally noteworthy. Whilst in 2009 ASELSAN was the sole company representing Türkiye amongst the world’s top 100 defense industry firms, in recent years TUSAŞ, ROKETSAN, ASFAT and MKE have joined ASELSAN on the same list. The fact that companies such as STM, HAVELSAN, FNSS and BMC have entered the global top 100 defense industry companies in different years demonstrates that Türkiye’s defense industry has evolved from a single-company-centered structure into a multi-stakeholder, deepened and technologically diversified industrial ecosystem.

This rise in international company rankings is directly reflected in Türkiye’s industrial performance. An analysis of the Istanbul Chamber of Industry’s ISO 500 survey reveals that defense industry companies are steadily strengthening their positions among Türkiye’s largest industrial organizations in terms of sales from production. It is particularly noteworthy that, as of 2025, TUSAŞ has become Türkiye’s seventh-largest industrial organization, while ASELSAN has become the ninth-largest. Export performance at the company level also confirms this transformation. While ASELSAN’s export revenues have reached an all-time high in recent years, TUSAŞ has risen to the status of a key manufacturer within global aerospace and defense supply chains, with export volumes hovering at the billion-dollar level. This picture demonstrates that the Turkish defense industry has gained international competitiveness not only in platform production but also in areas such as electronic systems, avionics solutions, software, engineering services and systems integration.

How will defense expenditure take shape in the coming period?

In this regard, NATO’s plan to accelerate defense investments over the next decade is of considerable importance for Türkiye. This does not merely signify a larger export market for Türkiye. It also holds the potential to strengthen Türkiye’s strategic position within the supply chains of NATO countries, thanks to its production infrastructure with high local content, advanced engineering capabilities and defense companies capable of competing on a global scale. The growing demand from Alliance countries for defense industry products is creating long-term investment and export opportunities for the Turkish defense industry.

In conclusion, the global defense economy has entered a new phase of structural transformation. Defense expenditure is regarded not merely as public spending to meet security needs, but as strategic investments that support technology development, high-value-added production and export capacity. In the coming period, competition between countries will be shaped not so much by the size of defense budgets, but by the capacity of industrial ecosystems to convert these budgets into production, technology and exports.

The defense industry infrastructure that Türkiye has established over the past 20 years, and in particular its clusters, will provide a significant competitive advantage during this new period of expansion in global defense spending. For this reason, the defense industry will continue to be one of the key pillars of both national security and Türkiye’s development strategy, which is based on sustainable growth, high-tech production and exports.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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ugust 7, 2026, marks a historic turning point at which the cards of Afro-Eurasian geopolitics and the global security architecture were reshuffled. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s working visit to Saudi Arabia brought together Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, who had arrived in Saudi Arabia the day before the visit, and General Asim Munir at the same table. The defense-focused trilateral ‘Mecca Agreement’, were signed following months of diplomatic maneuvering, and were announced at a time of rising military tensions in the region and US-Iran conflict threatening Gulf security.

Analyzing this critical development from the perspective of Islamabad is of vital importance for understanding Pakistan’s defense network, which stretches from Africa to the Gulf; its chronic and hybrid challenges in internal security; and its foundational role at the crossroads of Afro-Eurasia.

From nuclear power to regional security architecture: Pakistan’s role

As the only nuclear-armed state in the Muslim world, Pakistan constitutes the most deterrent and high-calibre military human capital component of this alliance. The bilateral defense pact signed with Saudi Arabia in 2025 was a consequence of Riyadh’s quest for military assurances, including nuclear deterrence, against potential security threats. However, Turkey’s inclusion in this equation as an official and institutional partner elevates Pakistan’s role as a bilateral ‘security provider’ to a much broader and more balanced framework.

From the perspective of the Islamabad administration, this agreement is not merely a single Gulf commitment, but the culmination of a multi-layered strategy stretching from the Horn of Africa to the Persian Gulf. Indeed, the Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation signed last week between Pakistan and Somalia, a year after it was approved by the Somali Cabinet, demonstrated Islamabad’s determination to play an active role in ensuring the security of navigation in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

Furthermore, the Kuwaiti Parliament’s approval in late July of the long-awaited defense cooperation agreement with Pakistan, alongside the pursuit by actors such as Bahrain and Jordan of reciprocal defense agreements modelled on the Saudi model, has cemented Islamabad’s position as the region’s ‘security architect’. Consequently, the Turkey–Saudi Arabia–Pakistan triad forms the backbone not only of these three countries but also of a broader Afro-Eurasian security network.

Synergy of capital, technology and military manpower

Viewed from the perspective of Islamabad, the tripartite alliance is more than just a military pact; it is an industrial lever that brings together finance and high technology. For many years, Pakistan’s military diplomacy has provided Saudi Arabia with training, military personnel and security support, whilst in return it has relied on Gulf funding. However, when the high technology, unmanned systems and operational capabilities of the Turkish defense industry are added to this equation, Pakistan finds an opportunity to move beyond being a passive exporter of security and position itself at the center of a tripartite industrial synergy.

When Saudi Arabia’s financial strength, Turkey’s advanced defense technology and Pakistan’s regional military expertise and growing production infrastructure are combined, a domestic and independent defense bloc and an integrated ecosystem emerge at the very intersection of Afro-Eurasia. At a time when Pakistan is grappling with financial difficulties, this agreement enables it to secure direct Saudi investment whilst also modernizing its domestic defense industry through joint defense projects with Turkey, thereby opening up new market opportunities for both Turkish and Pakistani defense companies.

Internal security challenges and allegations of sabotage

Pakistan’s ambitious foreign policy on the global stage is being tested by chronic internal security challenges and regional hybrid threats. The Islamabad administration has long been grappling with violence perpetrated by the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, whilst in the south-west it has been combating separatist actions by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) targeting economic infrastructure and Chinese projects.

However, the recent escalation of social tensions and protests in Pakistan-administered Kashmir (Azad Kashmir) has added a new dimension to the security equation. Strategic circles in Islamabad argue that the unrest erupting in Kashmir is not merely the result of local administrative or economic grievances; rather, they contend that it has been exacerbated by the instigations of external actors who are displeased with Pakistan’s key role in its independent balancing diplomacy with Iran and within the now-concrete Turkey-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Tripartite Alliance, which is now taking concrete form. This situation illustrates that, whilst Islamabad is fighting the actions of the TTP and the BLA on the one hand, it is also forced to contend with the hybrid front opened up via Kashmir by forces seeking to undermine the regional influence of the Tripartite Alliance.

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istory rarely announces itself. But occasionally, a single agreement tells us that something fundamental has changed.

The defense pact signed in Mecca between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye may be one of those moments.

Its most consequential provision is remarkably simple: an armed attack against one of the three countries will be considered an attack against all three.

For Pakistan, this represents something bigger than another defense agreement.

For decades, Pakistan’s military power, including its nuclear deterrent, was viewed overwhelmingly through the prism of South Asia, particularly its rivalry with India. Pakistan was already a formidable military power, but the strategic reach of that power was largely geographically contained.

That is beginning to change.

Pakistan’s security sxtends beyonf South Asia

Pakistan is now part of a collective-defense architecture stretching from South Asia through the Gulf to Türkiye.

And consider what these three countries bring together.

Türkiye possesses NATO’s second-largest army and has transformed itself into a major defense producer, from drones and missiles to warships and advanced aerospace technology. US President Donald Trump himself recently described the Turkish military as “tremendous” and “powerful.”

Saudi Arabia brings enormous economic and energy influence and the political weight of one of the Arab and Islamic world’s most consequential states.

Pakistan brings one of the world’s largest militaries, considerable operational experience and, crucially, is the world’s only Muslim-majority nuclear-armed state.

The nuclear question is therefore unavoidable.

Nothing publicly released about the agreement says Pakistan has extended a nuclear umbrella over Saudi Arabia or Türkiye. It would be wrong to claim otherwise.

But deterrence is also about perception. Any state contemplating a major confrontation with one member must now factor in the possibility of Pakistani involvement. The presence of a nuclear-armed state within that collective-defense framework inevitably becomes part of the strategic calculation.

Also, it’s worth mentioning that for Türkiye and Pakistan, this is the culmination of something much older.

Ankara and Islamabad: A growing relationship

The relationship between Ankara and Islamabad has long gone beyond diplomacy. It is rooted in unusually strong political and public ties and has evolved into substantial military cooperation,  from training and joint exercises to defense-industrial collaboration and Turkish-built MILGEM warships for Pakistan.

The Mecca pact takes that relationship a significant step further: from close defense partners to countries formally bound by collective defense.

And its implications stretch beyond the three signatories.

India says it is closely following the agreement. Its “great friend” Israel will surely be watching closely too.

Just a day before the agreement was signed, Narendra Modi received a call from Benjamin Netanyahu. According to India’s Foreign Ministry, the two discussed developments in West Asia and reviewed progress in the India-Israel Special Strategic Partnership.

There is no evidence connecting that call to the Mecca pact, and India has explicitly rejected subsequent reports that it sought a defence agreement with Israel to counter it.

But the wider picture is difficult to ignore. From New Delhi to Tel Aviv, capitals will now be assessing what this new arrangement means for a strategic landscape already undergoing profound change.

Having ties to China and the US at the same time

Pakistan occupies an especially interesting position within it.

China remains Pakistan’s “all-weather” strategic partner. Yet Islamabad continues to engage Washington, while simultaneously playing an active mediating role between the United States and Iran.

Perhaps US Vice President JD Vance summed up Pakistan’s standing in Washington most simply when asked about Islamabad’s role in the latest diplomatic efforts: “Very good, we love Pakistan.”

That ability to maintain relationships across geopolitical divides is increasingly rare.

Pakistan can speak to Beijing and Washington, Riyadh and Tehran, and the wider Gulf — without being completely confined to any single geopolitical camp. And now it has added a collective-defense commitment with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye to that equation.

That puts Pakistan in a remarkably unusual strategic position.

The pact also reflects a wider transformation in the Middle East. For decades, regional security depended heavily on external powers. Years of war, uncertainty and shifting American priorities have increasingly encouraged regional states to look towards one another.

Is this agreement like NATO? Well, we still do not know how integrated military planning will become or how its obligations would work during an actual war.

But deterrence begins long before a shot is fired. It begins with the calculations an adversary makes before deciding whether to fire one.

Turkish military and technological power, Saudi economic weight and Pakistani conventional and nuclear strength are now connected through a formal mutual-defense commitment.

(A version of this article was first published in Turkish by Kriter)

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he Russia-Ukraine War continues to be the primary catalyst for the process of change and adaptation that NATO is currently undergoing. Russia’s loss of its status as a partner within the Western security architecture following the attack it launched in February 2022, and its subsequent classification as a ‘threat’, has shaped the political and geopolitical dimension of the issue, whilst the military and technological aspects of the war’s conduct have also presented challenges to the Alliance’s defense and deterrence capabilities. Measures relating to this process featured as key issues on the agenda of the Ankara Summit and in the Summit Declaration.

Political-geopolitical dimension

It comes as no surprise that the Ankara Summit Declaration defines Russia as a long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security and stability, as the prevailing view amongst the vast majority of allies is that Russia’s objectives are not limited to Ukraine. This view underpins the rapid increase in defense spending across the Alliance, the removal of barriers to defence industry production, and the strong continuation of military and non-military support for Ukraine.

Since February 2022, NATO’s top priority has been to strengthen the Alliance’s capabilities, whilst the second has been to ensure the sustainability of Ukraine’s combat capabilities. To date, 99 per cent of the military aid provided to Ukraine has come from NATO allies. We can see that this resolve has been maintained at the Ankara Summit, as evidenced by the scale of the support package announced. Whilst the allies have pledged 70 billion euros’ worth of military aid to Ukraine for 2026, this figure has also been set as the baseline for the following year.

What is particularly noteworthy here is that this aid will be funded largely by the European Union (EU). With the Ukraine Support Facility adopted in April 2026, the EU had decided to provide Ukraine with 30 billion euros in financial aid and 60 billion euros in military aid for the period 2026–2027. It should be recalled that in March 2025, all US military aid to Ukraine was cut off, and the flow of American weapons to Ukraine could only be maintained through the intervention of European countries.

On the other hand, the statement in the Ankara Summit Declaration that Ukraine is contributing to transatlantic security by fighting against Russia is significant, as it indicates that the allies recognize Ukraine as a major military power. Speaking at the Defence Industry Forum held on the sidelines of the summit, Ukrainian President Zelensky emphasized that his country is no longer an actor seeking security but one that produces it, and that Ukraine has become an ‘extraordinary source of defense capability’ for Europe. Whilst there is some truth in Zelensky’s remarks, linking this to NATO membership does not seem realistic at this stage, as the war is ongoing and, even if a lasting peace were to be achieved, the US administration’s unequivocally negative stance on the matter is well known.

Military and industrial dimension

The Russia-Ukraine War has highlighted the critical importance of defense industry production and innovation in the theatre of war. With the intensive use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), artillery munitions and various missile systems, the war has turned into an industrial race in design and production. The rapid, innovative and high-volume production of these systems has had a direct impact on the combatants’ success on the ground. This can be seen in the changing nature of UAV warfare. Today, on the battlefield, UAV systems are being used not merely to target isolated tactical elements, but to shape the battlefield itself.

New-generation UAV systems have played a major role in the war taking on a distinctly positional character from late 2023 onwards and in manoevristic operations coming to a virtual standstill. The ‘kill zones’—areas 10–15 kilometers deep where artillery fire and electronic warfare have intensified alongside the use of UAV systems—have transformed the war into a series of battles taking place in isolated areas. Efforts by the opposing sides to gain the upper hand, whether through kamikaze attacks using UAVs or by deploying them to drop explosives from above, are concentrated in these zones.

The race for innovation, which is characterized by constant dynamism on the Russia-Ukraine warfront, is also taking place in the field of unmanned maritime and land vehicles. For example, whilst it has been observed over the past year that Ukraine has begun to utilize unmanned maritime systems (UMS) much more intensively and effectively, we are now seeing new-generation amphibious operation trials aimed at deploying unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) – transported by UMS – to critical areas. Ukraine’s recent operation on the Kinburn Peninsula has been described as the first unmanned amphibious operation in history.

Ukraine’s increasing military power

Looking at the current course of the war, it is clear that Ukraine has, over the past few months, acquired an increasing ability to strike targets within Russia. Ukraine is specifically targeting bridges, motorways, railways and fuel tankers with the aim of disrupting Russia’s logistical capabilities. The reason for this is to thwart Russia’s ability to launch a new offensive during the spring and summer months. Similarly, these attacks aim to isolate the Donbas region from occupied Crimea through the selection of specific geographical targets (thereby blocking the use of the corridor between them). Judging by the results of Ukraine’s attacks and the pace of Russian advances, it appears that this objective has so far been achieved with considerable success.

The impact of these systems on the war extends beyond the battlefield. As a result of drone and missile attacks by both sides, the agricultural sectors of both Ukraine and Russia have suffered serious damage. Long-range missile and UAV attacks are disrupting the production of grain, wheat and sunflower oil, either directly or indirectly, whilst the targeting of Russian ships carrying wheat in the Sea of Azov by UAV systems is also producing negative consequences for the global market.

Similarly, it must be noted that unmanned systems are also having an impact on the sociological dimension of the war. For example, it is well known that UAV systems flying at low altitude and then diving create great fear amongst the civilian population. Last week, a spokesperson for the Ukrainian Air Force highlighted this situation, emphasizing that Russia’s jet-powered Shahed UAVs were flying at high speed at low altitude and that Russia’s aim was to force the residents of Kyiv to flee the city. In this regard, the prospect of unmanned systems becoming part of systematic intimidation and terror-inducing operations targeting the civilian population in the medium to long term represents a critical risk.

NATO’s comprehensive budget

All these factors have led NATO to establish a comprehensive budget and adopt reform processes in the fields of unmanned systems and their countermeasures (counter-UAS). Whilst it was announced at the Ankara Summit that the Alliance would undertake defense procurement worth 50 billion dollars, the ‘Drone Edge’ initiative, worth 40 billion dollars, was also launched to support anti-UAV systems. By the end of 2027, the allies have committed to increasing the number of UAV operators fivefold. Consequently, unmanned systems – which are shaping modern warfare – constitute a significant part of NATO’s military capability requirements, an issue that has largely been brought to the fore through discussions on budget increases.

Similarly, new steps are being taken to remove obstacles to defense industry cooperation – an area Turkey has long advocated for, but whose importance within the Alliance has only become apparent in recent years, and which can be understood in the context of production shortcomings. Initiatives announced at the Ankara Summit, such as ‘NATO Front Door for Industry’ and ‘NATO Engine’, aim to achieve greater integration of defense industries on a transatlantic scale.

Until now, the focus within NATO has been on military interoperability; however, modern warfare has highlighted the necessity of industrial interoperability to meet defense industry requirements. Indeed, the interoperability issues observed with Western-manufactured 155-millimeter artillery ammunition in the Ukrainian theatre had already demonstrated the inevitable need for close coordination between military operations and defense production.

Consequently, the Russia-Ukraine War remains NATO’s top priority. Despite transatlantic divisions and pro-Russian allegations leveled at Donald Trump, the fact that Russia continues to be defined as a long-term threat in the Ankara Summit Declaration is noteworthy in this regard. Similarly, the continuation of strong support for Ukraine also points to the same conclusion. In this sense, whilst the dynamics of transatlantic relations will determine the political dimension of the transformation taking place within NATO, the Russia–Ukraine War and the war’s innovation dynamics will continue to shape the process of change and adaptation in the Alliance’s military capabilities.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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audi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan are set to sign a trilateral defense agreement on Friday, marking a significant expansion of security cooperation among three of the Muslim world’s most influential military powers as conflict with Iran reshapes the strategic landscape of the Middle East.

The agreement will be signed in the Saudi Red Sea city of Jeddah during a summit attended by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, is also expected to participate in the high-level meeting, underscoring the military significance of the pact.

Regional officials familiar with the negotiations said the agreement follows nearly a year of discussions aimed at strengthening defense coordination among the three countries amid mounting security challenges across the Gulf and surrounding waterways.

Although officials have confirmed that an agreement will be signed, none of the governments has publicly disclosed the precise scope of the pact or the commitments each country will undertake.

The trilateral accord comes at a time of heightened instability following the U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran earlier this year and Tehran’s subsequent retaliation against military installations, energy infrastructure and strategic targets across the Gulf. The conflict has exposed vulnerabilities in regional security arrangements while threatening one of the world’s most critical energy corridors.

The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil supplies normally pass, has experienced repeated disruptions since hostilities escalated. Commercial shipping has slowed considerably as insurers raised premiums and shipping companies rerouted vessels due to fears of further attacks.

Against this backdrop, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan have increasingly sought closer strategic coordination, reflecting concerns that existing regional security mechanisms may not adequately address evolving threats.

A Turkish official confirmed that the defense agreement would be signed but declined to provide further details.

Expanding strategic partnership

The agreement would bring together three countries with considerable military and geopolitical influence.

Türkiye possesses NATO’s second-largest military and has significantly expanded its domestic defense industry over the past decade, becoming a leading exporter of drones, armored vehicles and missile systems.

Saudi Arabia remains one of the world’s largest defense spenders and has accelerated efforts to modernize its armed forces while investing heavily in domestic military manufacturing as part of its Vision 2030 economic transformation program.

Pakistan, meanwhile, is the only Muslim-majority nation possessing nuclear weapons and maintains one of Asia’s largest standing armies. Islamabad has long maintained close defense ties with Riyadh, including military training, intelligence cooperation and joint exercises.

Security analysts say combining the capabilities of the three countries could create one of the region’s most significant military partnerships, although its effectiveness will ultimately depend on the operational mechanisms established under the agreement.

Building on existing cooperation

The new arrangement appears to build upon the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement signed between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in September 2025.

According to Saudi officials who previously described the agreement, the bilateral pact treats an attack against either country as an attack against both and provides for cooperation using “all military means.”

Whether Türkiye will assume identical obligations under the expanded framework remains unclear.

Reuters reported earlier this year that negotiations were underway to broaden Saudi-Pakistani security cooperation to include Türkiye, reflecting Ankara’s growing role in regional diplomacy and defense affairs.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said in January that Ankara supported establishing broader regional security platforms capable of promoting stability through multilateral cooperation rather than relying exclusively on outside powers.

Friday’s signing appears to represent the first major institutional step toward realizing that vision.

Maritime security takes center stage

Regional media reports suggest maritime security will feature prominently in discussions during the Jeddah summit.

The three countries have already backed Saudi Arabia’s recently announced multinational maritime initiative aimed at protecting commercial shipping through the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

The initiative gained urgency after repeated attacks on commercial vessels and energy infrastructure during recent regional conflicts disrupted global trade routes.

The Houthis in Yemen have also intensified attacks against Saudi-linked shipping in the Red Sea, further complicating regional security calculations.

Meanwhile, tensions in the Strait of Hormuz have highlighted the vulnerability of energy exports from Gulf producers, particularly Saudi Arabia, whose economy remains heavily dependent on oil exports.

Analysts say closer military coordination could improve intelligence sharing, naval patrols and joint responses to emerging threats affecting maritime commerce.

T

he 36th NATO Summit, held in Ankara on July 7-8, 2026, saw US President Trump state that he had attended the summit solely out of respect for President Erdoğan; the ‘NATO 3.0’ agenda was realized; and, contrary to some experts’ expectations, there was no rift within the alliance. Türkiye’s excellent hosting, which continues to make the country the talk of the town, the efforts by the Israeli delegation throughout the summit to shift the agenda and overshadow the summit were equally striking.

The main factor driving Israel to make such desperate moves was Trump’s pre-summit remarks, in which he suggested that Türkiye might be supplied with F-110 jet engines and the fifth-generation F-35 fighter jets—which had been withheld since 2019—and that the CAATSA sanctions, in place since 2020, might be lifted. On the other hand, Türkiye’s hosting of the summit during such a critical period, President Erdoğan’s meetings on the sidelines of the summit with over 40 heads of state and government on the sidelines of the summit, and, of course, the organization of a defense industry exhibition showcasing Türkiye’s national and domestically produced defence industry products – a first in NATO history – have driven Israel to distraction.

The most significant reason driving Israel to such a state of exasperation and pushing it to make irrational moves is the sense of insecurity that has arisen both within Israel and in the American public sphere due to the stalemate in the war against Iran and the fact that, contrary to promises, an absolute victory has not yet been achieved. Conversely, the fact that Türkiye is viewed as one of the factors hindering Israel’s success due to its role in the war against Iran, coupled with the fact that relations between Türkiye and the US have come to take precedence over those between Israel and the US, is seen as a cause setting off alarm bells and leading Israel to pull out all the stops simultaneously.

It would therefore be useful to highlight the ‘Israel factor’ in Turkish-American relations by examining the rivalry between Türkiye and Israel, mediated through the US and Trump, and the methods Israel employed to persuade the Trump administration to withdraw its support for Türkiye.

Israel’s divergent stance as Turkish-US relations improve

Despite the improvement in Turkish-US relations during Trump’s first term—following the strained relations of Obama’s second term, which is regarded as a crisis period—full normalization could not be achieved due to the dominance of the Zionist lobby over Trump. Indeed, despite all claims of an improvement in bilateral relations, the Pastor Brunson crisis, the Halkbank crisis, threats of economic attacks and the imposition of CAATSA sanctions on Türkiye following its exclusion from the F-35 program all took place during the Trump era. Following the Biden era, which was marked by very frosty Turkish-American relations, Trump’s second presidential term was of paramount importance for both Türkiye and Israel, and both countries had high expectations of Trump from their respective perspectives.

However, Trump had not forgotten what he had gone through after losing the 2020 election; whilst he projected a warm image to the public, it was said that behind the scenes he had distanced himself from Netanyahu, viewing the latter’s relationship with Biden as a betrayal. At the same time, he did not hesitate to publicly express his affection and respect for President Erdoğan, thereby drawing a clear distinction between Erdoğan and Netanyahu. We saw the repercussions of this distinction clearly when, due to developments in Syria, Netanyahu complained to Trump at the White House about Türkiye and President Erdoğan. Indeed, Trump’s response to Netanyahu – “you must be reasonable too” – caused great disappointment on the Israeli side, whilst in Türkiye it was interpreted as Trump taking Türkiye’s side.

Similarly, whilst Trump supported Israel’s attacks on Gaza on the one hand, he did not remain indifferent to the prospect of reaching a ceasefire in Gaza through Türkiyey’s mediation on the other. Similarly, regarding developments in Syria, he has aligned himself closely with Türkiye’s position; despite all of Israel’s objections, he recognised Ahmed Shara as a legitimate interlocutor and provided the necessary support to ensure Syria’s territorial integrity.

The speeches and pledges made by Trump during his Middle East tour in May and at the meeting he held in New York in September with the heads of state and government of Muslim countries, on the occasion of the opening of the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly, are also significant in that they demonstrate that the US occupies a different position from Israel regarding the region’s future. This is because the ceasefire process in Gaza began after this date.

The Iran card

Realizing it could not influence Trump through Gaza and Syria, Israel attempted to win him over by playing the Iran card; however, it was once again disappointed when, in June 2025, despite Trump ordering strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities during the 12-Day War, he refrained from intervening in the conflict. However, by any means necessary, Israel managed to drag the US into war with Iran on 28 February, hoping that this would enable it to achieve the regime change in Iran it had long dreamt of and thereby reorganise the region as it saw fit. Yet Israel’s plans failed, and the Iranian people reacted strongly against the assassination of their religious leader, standing firmly behind their government.

The deadlock in the war with Iran has, on the one hand, led the US to reassess its approach to the region, whilst on the other, it has prompted a re-evaluation of its alliance with Israel. It was during this period that Türkiye stepped in once again; together with Qatar and Pakistan, it opened the door to negotiations, making it possible to secure a ceasefire between the US and Iran. Israel, however, found itself isolated as the sole country wishing for the war to continue; whilst continuing its attacks on the Lebanese front, it began doing everything in its power to undermine the ceasefire between the US and Iran.

Israel’s stance has been criticised on numerous occasions by both Trump and Vice-President JD Vance. The events unfolding in the region are particularly telling in demonstrating just how hollow Israel’s long-standing rhetoric about ‘actors posing a threat to it in the region’ really is. For far from certain actors in the region posing a threat to Israel, it has become undeniable that Israel itself constitutes a threat to the entire region and is the sole actor destabilising the region.

This situation has also put a strain on the so-called unshakeable alliance between Israel and the US. For Israel, particularly due to the aggressive and intransigent policies it has pursued under Netanyahu’s leadership, has become an unbearable burden for the US. Given this, it has become inevitable for the Trump administration to opt to work alongside a strong, conciliatory actor such as Türkiye, which prioritises regional stability. However, this situation has thoroughly infuriated Israel. Believing itself to be—and to remain—the US’s sole ally in the region, Israel has jeopardised both its own future and the region’s stability by resorting to endless intrigues aimed at discrediting, and even weakening, the US’s other regional ally, Türkiye.

Israel’s attempts to overshadow the NATO Summit

Türkiye is the country that has shown the strongest reaction to Israel’s attacks on Gaza and the crimes of genocide it has committed there. Whilst, on the one hand, it has given concrete expression to its response by imposing certain sanctions on Israel in accordance with its own domestic law, on the other hand, it is monitoring proceedings before both the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice, and is fighting to ensure that Israel is brought to justice and receives the necessary punishment for the genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity it has committed. In addition to this, Türkiye’s position regarding developments in Syria and its role in the Iran War have led Israel to target Türkiye, giving rise to the narrative that ‘after Iran, the new target is Türkiye’.

At a time when Israel was attempting to position Türkiye as the ‘new Iran’, and just before the critical NATO summit, Trump’s announcement to Türkiye that F-110 jet engines and F-35 fighter jets would be supplied, and that CAATSA sanctions would be lifted, naturally caused the Israeli administration to panic. As a result, Netanyahu—who had been unable to reach Trump in the run-up to the summit—appeared on US media outlets during the summit, stating: “Türkiye is not a good ally; Israel is the US’s true ally, the sale of F-35s to Türkiye would jeopardize Israel’s security and that of other US allies in the region (by which he meant Greece and the Greek Cypriots), and the CAATSA sanctions imposed on Türkiye must never be lifted”, in an attempt to influence American public opinion and, thereby, exert pressure on Trump to back down.

Whilst the whole world was discussing just how wonderfully Türkiye had hosted the summit, noting that, thanks to President Erdoğan, differences of opinion within NATO had not spilled over into the summit, and that, ultimately, a consensus had emerged in the final communiqué regarding the strengthening of NATO—and whilst praise for Türkiye was at its peak— it has been observed that certain journalists—who are clearly funded by Israel and Jewish capital—have been questioning Türkiye’s role within NATO, criticizing the security measures taken for the summit, and, worse still, raising issues that have absolutely no connection to the summit and relate entirely to processes governed by Türkiye’s domestic law, thereby asking questions and writing articles aimed at creating the perception that there is no democracy or fair trial in Türkiye.

At the conclusion of the summit, the fact that Israel was found to be behind the so-called intelligence suggesting a possible attack on the new Air Force One aircraft—a gift from Qatar which Trump used on his visit to Ankara—was viewed as an attempt by Israel to cast a shadow over the summit. Furthermore, by doing so, they sought to spread the perception that Türkiye is unsafe, whilst also sabotaging the process by presenting a pretext to derail the negotiations between the US and Iran. It must not be forgotten that, in the world, the sole country capable of carrying out such attacks is Israel rather than Iran, and history is replete with examples of this.

A

proposed agreement being discussed by Iran and Oman to help end five months of conflict between Iran and the United States would give Tehran authority over commercial vessels entering the Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz, according to Iranian and regional sources, potentially marking one of the most significant shifts in Gulf maritime security in decades.

The proposal, if finalized, would grant Iran oversight of inbound shipping through the strategic waterway, through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil trade passed before the conflict disrupted maritime traffic. Regional officials said negotiations remain ongoing, with key issues still unresolved, despite Iranian officials reporting substantial progress.

There was no immediate comment from Washington on the reported proposal. U.S. officials have consistently maintained that they would not accept Iranian control over navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, despite President Donald Trump’s recent assertions that an agreement to reopen the waterway could be close.

The talks are taking place amid broader diplomatic efforts to end the conflict that erupted in late February, when U.S. and Israeli military operations against Iran triggered months of fighting across the region.

According to a senior Iranian source and two regional officials familiar with the negotiations, the draft arrangement would require commercial vessels entering the Gulf to transit through Iranian-controlled waters, giving Tehran an unprecedented administrative role over maritime traffic.

Some form of control

One regional official described the proposal as representing “some form of control” already conceded in principle, though negotiators remain divided over how that authority would be implemented in practice.

“The concession has already been made regarding some form of control over Hormuz,” one regional source said, adding that details regarding inspections and oversight remain under discussion.

Another regional source said Gulf states are seeking a framework in which regional countries would supervise any inspections of commercial vessels and ensure that any payments required from shipping companies remain voluntary.

A senior Iranian official said Tehran is seeking to levy fees of between 5% and 7% of cargo values on ships using the strait, while Oman has proposed charges closer to 3%. The United States, however, continues to oppose any transit fees, insisting that Hormuz remain an international waterway with unrestricted access.

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said negotiations with Oman had reached “fundamental understandings” and suggested an agreement was nearing completion.

Speaking to Iran’s official IRNA news agency, Gharibabadi said the proposed arrangement was designed so that commercial vessels would pass through Iranian territorial waters on both inbound and outbound voyages.

He added that discussions had reached “the verge of being finalized.”

However, regional officials cautioned that significant differences remain, particularly over whether Iran’s authority would extend equally to ships leaving the Gulf, as well as the legal basis for any administrative role Tehran would exercise.

Regional energy infrastructure

The negotiations come as Iran has simultaneously intensified its warnings to Gulf Arab states against supporting any renewed U.S. military action.

According to several regional sources, Tehran has privately warned neighboring Gulf countries that any future American attack on Iranian territory would trigger retaliation against critical regional energy infrastructure.

“The Iranian warning was unequivocal: if America targeted Iran’s infrastructure, they would retaliate by striking Gulf energy facilities and other regional targets,” one Gulf source said.

Since the conflict began, Iran has repeatedly targeted regional allies of the United States with missile and drone attacks while also disrupting commercial shipping through Hormuz.

Iran says more than 3,400 people have been killed since the war began, while the United States has reported the deaths of 18 military personnel.

President Trump has increasingly emphasized diplomacy after months of military operations failed to reopen the waterway fully or compel Tehran to accept Washington’s demands.

Addressing supporters in Las Vegas, Trump said he preferred a negotiated solution despite warning that military action remained an option.

“I’d rather make a deal because I don’t want to kill people,” Trump said. “I do not want to kill people, but at some point we’re gonna.”

The reported negotiations reflect a notable evolution in the conflict, which has increasingly centered on maritime access rather than direct military confrontation.

Iran has argued that previous flexibility in negotiations only encouraged greater pressure from Washington, leading its leadership to conclude that stronger leverage is necessary before meaningful talks can proceed.

A major strategic shift from the pre-war status quo

The proposed arrangement would also represent a major strategic shift from the pre-war status quo, when commercial vessels transited the Strait of Hormuz without paying fees or seeking authorization from Iran.

The waterway remains one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors, serving as the primary export route for Gulf oil and liquefied natural gas.

Despite optimistic statements from Tehran and Washington about the prospects for diplomacy, officials involved in the talks stressed that no final agreement has been reached.

Political disagreements over shipping fees, inspection authority and the precise definition of Iranian control continue to complicate negotiations, while broader questions surrounding the future security architecture of the Gulf remain unresolved.

The talks also come as Trump faces growing domestic pressure to end a conflict that opinion polls suggest remains unpopular with American voters ahead of November’s congressional midterm elections.

Oil prices fell in recent days after Trump suspended plans for renewed military strikes, citing ongoing diplomatic efforts that he said could eventually lead to the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

(Source: Reuters)

O

ne of the most significant turning points in Turkish political life undoubtedly took place on the night of July 15, 2016. The coup attempt, which arose from a mutiny by a group within the military affiliated with the FETÖ organization, was thwarted thanks to the resolute stance demonstrated by the public and the strong political will displayed by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This event not only directly influenced political processes but also served as a catalyst for a profound transformation in Turkish political culture. On the night of July 15, whilst the public’s silence in the face of the military largely came to an end, a clear tendency to embrace the political mechanism emerging from the manifestation of civilian will also became evident.

Following the failed coup attempt on July 15, social and political codes in Türkiye began to be restructured within a new paradigm. By opening the door to an understanding of the risks posed by—or that could be created by—movements characterized by external dependencies and a high degree of esotericism, July 15 brought about a historic turning point in terms of redefining the perception of security in Türkiye and reorganizing the relationship between the military and politics from the ground up.

The radical changes in these two areas have not only had a clear impact on domestic politics and the structuring of institutions, but have also been felt just as distinctly in Türkiye’s approach to international politics and its foreign policy practices. In this new reality, where the approach to countering external threats has shifted, Ankara’s strategic choices—particularly regarding the Middle East—exhibited a striking parallelism with both the region’s own conditions and the domestic transformation taking place within the country.

The strategy to contain Türkiye in the run-up to July 15

The foreign policy vision set out and the policies implemented following the 3 November 2002 elections, which brought the Justice and Development Party to power, enabled Türkiye to reposition itself in global politics and, in particular, to become a founding actor in the Middle East. In particular, the status quo that emerged as a result of the popular revolutions in the region during the 2011 Arab Spring bore the hallmarks of Ankara’s new global political vision. However, in the strategic transformations in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and Libya, the significant electoral success of Islamist and conservative parties—which reflected broader societal trends rather than those of groups aligned with the West—completely altered the perspective of the US and other Western actors on the region.

Furthermore, with the open support provided by Russia and Iran to prop up Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, a serious attempt was made to put a brake on the Middle East’s drive towards independence. During this process, in which Ankara’s relations with the region were taken to a new level, the unease arising amongst global and regional actors evolved into a situation characterized by a succession of initiatives aimed at restricting Turkey’s room for maneuver. The sudden emergence in 2013 of events in Türkiye, Egypt and Bangladesh—which shared similar backgrounds, support bases and rhetoric—constituted steps taken to stem the new momentum within the Muslim world. Alongside the violent protests at Gezi Park in Türkiye, the Tamarod protests in Egypt and the Shahbag protests in Bangladesh were a reflection of a coordinated strategy.

Following the overthrow of Mohamed Morsi in Egypt on July 3, 2013, through a coup, Ankara’s stance on this event led to the emergence of a new dynamic in the region. Alongside the deepening crisis in Syria, the efforts of certain regional actors to bring the popular revolutions to an end and restore the authoritarian status quo led to a narrowing of Türkiye’s foreign policy parameters, driven by both external and internal factors.

During this period, the terrorist organizations that emerged in northern Syria (ISIS and the YPG), alongside the PKK’s tendencies to undermine stability within the country, constituted attempts to erode the government in power before July 15 and, consequently, the legitimate and civilian political will. In particular, the deliberate efforts by members of FETÖ, who had infiltrated the security bureaucracy to a significant extent, to slow down decision-making and implementation processes and to prevent the government from exercising its proper authority through the dissemination of manipulative information, formed part of a plan to undermine Türkiye’s distinctive and independent character in global politics and reduce it to the status of an ineffective actor.

Against a backdrop of growing threats to Türkiye’s border security from Syria, the aircraft crisis with Russia has gone down in history as one of the profound challenges Ankara has faced. The tension that arose between Moscow and Ankara following the downing of a Russian SU-24 aircraft that had violated Turkish airspace caused serious difficulties for Türkiye, a country that was becoming increasingly isolated in the region and whose security concerns were being disregarded by the Western world.

However, under the leadership of President Erdoğan, and following the decision-making elite’s prudent management of the situation, the crisis between Ankara and Moscow was largely resolved, whilst at the same time Türkiye began to adopt a more resilient stance in the face of regional and global challenges. The fact that the collapse anticipated by FETÖ members and their external supporters did not materialize – due to Ankara’s protection of the country’s security and stability through alternative strategies and its continued resolute policy in the face of all threats – led to the attempt on the night of July 15 to overthrow the government by coup and eliminate Türkiye’s sovereignty.

Post-July 15 purge and Türkiye’s new Middle East policy

Following July 15—one of the longest nights in the history of the Republic—and the failure of FETÖ members’ attempts to eliminate the country’s political autonomy and restrict its capacity for action, Ankara began to pursue an action-oriented policy within a new paradigm. During this process, in which security and the perception of threat were formulated in a manner consistent with the reality on the ground, the security bureaucracy took steps—particularly through the purging of harmful elements within the military—within the framework of the hierarchical relationship that should exist between the government and the military.

On 24 August 2016, to send a message to the entire world and to demonstrate in concrete terms that it would combat all forms of terrorism without making any categorical distinctions, Ankara launched Operation Euphrates Shield in northern Syria, with the support of the Free Syrian Army. As part of this operation, which resulted in a crushing victory over ISIS elements, Ankara made a highly strategic move aimed at eliminating threats to its borders originating from Syrian territory and establishing a safe zone for Syrians in the north of the country.

By demonstrating a radical model of alignment between theory and practice through Operation Euphrates Shield, Türkiye not only altered the balance of power on the ground through its military activism but also assumed both an independent and a founding role in initiating a new process regarding Syria’s future. The fact that, for many years, US and European actors refrained from taking constructive and realistic steps to end the civil war in Syria and ensure the safe return of Syrians led Ankara, following July 15, to adopt a stance that engaged Russia more closely under a new framework.

The establishment of a Syria-focused dialogue framework involving Türkiye, Russia and Iran, and the Astana Talks, which represented an alternative initiative to resolve the crisis in the country, went down in the records as a concrete positive contribution of the July 15 events. Alongside its fight against Daesh, Türkiye—which is determined to prevent the PKK/YPG structure in Syria from undermining Syria’s territorial integrity in any way—carried out the Olive Branch and Peace Spring operations in line with its concept of strategic autonomy, despite reactions from the Western world, thereby consolidating its position as a game-changer in the region.

Having swiftly observed the outcomes of its post-July 15 purification efforts in Syria, Ankara adopted a more active strategy to escape the atmosphere of constriction and isolation that had emerged following the reversal of the post-Arab Spring process. During this period, the transformation of the domestic political system also facilitated Türkiye’s ability to pursue independent foreign policy practices.

The establishment of a new model, in which the executive branch has been strengthened and communication between institutions has been accelerated under the Presidential System of Government, played a decisive role in minimizing the negative effects of the July 15 coup attempt and in enhancing Ankara’s global standing. As a reflection of this, Türkiye demonstrated its influence in the region to all parties by openly supporting Doha against the blockade imposed by the Gulf Cooperation Council countries aimed at disciplining Qatar. Furthermore, following the purge within the country’s civil and security bureaucracy, the acceleration of developments in the defense industry and Türkiye’s transformation into a major security producer have enabled Ankara to reposition itself in global politics. This situation has undoubtedly led to a reassessment of ties with Ankara among regional actors and the reactivation of previously frozen relations.

Although the July 15 coup attempt appears to be an intervention in the political mechanism due to its direct targeting of President Erdoğan and his administration, it is clear that this failed attempt was actually the result of a will to eliminate Türkiye’s subjectivity in the global arena. Considering that a significant portion of classical or postmodern coups in Turkish political life have occurred as a result of Ankara establishing contact with alternative actors or presenting a new global political vision, it is evident that the FETÖ mechanism was activated to undermine the effects of President Erdoğan’s new perspective on the international stage and to transform Türkiye back into a secondary actor.

Having overcome this organized threat against the country’s sovereignty and independence, Türkiye, having largely purged harmful elements from its ranks, has begun to develop more original strategies in the global arena. The most concrete manifestation of this is Türkiye’s founding and decisive role in the Middle East. Changing the status quo in the region and successfully balancing regional actors, Ankara has become one of the most effective actors in both Middle Eastern and global politics over the past decade.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

G

ermany’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) marked a turning point both in the shaping of the post-Second World War European security architecture and in Germany’s reintegration into the international system. Following its defeat in 1945 and the subsequent division between East and West Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) found itself on the front line of the Cold War.

Within this geopolitical reality, under the leadership of its first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, Germany saw ‘integration with the West’ (Westbindung) as the sole means of regaining the country’s sovereignty, securing its safety and forging lasting ties with the Western world. Germany’s membership of NATO, which took shape in line with Adenauer’s strategic vision and was formalized on 6 May 1955, represented not merely participation in a military alliance, but also a historic paradigm shift that reinforced Germany’s democratic identity and redefined the balance of power in continental Europe.

With its NATO membership, Germany began to re-establish a regular army and rearm. The fact that Germany was on the ‘hot front’ of the Cold War—a situation in which it could become the direct centre of hostilities in a potential conflict—is best understood through Chancellor Adenauer’s statement: ‘The sole aim of Germany’s rearmament is to contribute to the preservation of peace.’

Germany’s NATO objectives: Peace or the pursuit of economic interests?

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Cold War giving way to regional hot conflicts, the late 1990s and early 2000s saw Germany playing an active role within NATO. In addition to its participation in the Kosovo Peacekeeping Force (KFOR) in the Balkans, Germany’s deployment of troops to the US-led operations in Afghanistan in 2001, at NATO’s request, is particularly noteworthy. Germany’s participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – established by a United Nations resolution and subsequently placed under NATO command – with a force that at times exceeded 5,000 troops, is regarded as the largest overseas military mission in modern German history.

In an interview given during a visit to German troops in Afghanistan in 2010, the then German President Horst Köhler stated that Germany’s overseas military mission should be viewed in a different light, remarking: “As a country of our size, as a country focused on foreign trade and therefore dependent on it, we must recognise that military intervention may also be necessary to protect our interests when required or in emergencies – for example, to secure free trade routes or to prevent regional instability – as such instability would undoubtedly have a negative impact on our opportunities in terms of trade, employment and income. ‘All of this must be discussed, and in my view, our situation is not all that bad…’ he had stated.

Horst Köhler’s remarks, made at a time when there had also been military casualties, raised questions about the constitutionality of Germany’s role in ISAF whilst also sparking intense domestic political debate; Horst Köhler subsequently resigned from the office of President.

Similar remarks were made by the then Federal Minister of Defence, Peter Struck, in December 2002, when the decision was taken to continue sending troops to Afghanistan. In a speech to the Federal Parliament, Struck said: “To clarify the matter, I had mentioned that our security is also defended in the Hindu Kush. ‘When we combat international terrorism alongside our allies and partners—using military means where necessary—in the very places where it originates, Germany becomes a safer place. Our security is further enhanced when the Bundeswehr successfully participates in the reconstruction process in the Balkans and Afghanistan, in accordance with democratic principles, thereby helping to establish the secure environment urgently required in these regions.”

These remarks, which are still the subject of debate today, signalled the dawn of a new era in German foreign policy at the time they were made. They marked the beginning of a new phase in which German foreign policy was no longer confined to defending its own borders, but also encompassed international preventive efforts. National interests were aligned with international interests, thereby justifying a military presence beyond Germany’s borders.

Despite all the past debates, although the number of troops is smaller, Germany still maintains a military presence at 17 locations with 2,000 troops as part of various NATO missions.

NATO or a European common defense system, or both?

Another initiative coinciding with this turning point in Germany’s foreign policy from a military perspective was the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP – Gemeinsame Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik), which was proposed at the European Union summit in Cologne in 1999 under Germany’s presidency and officially incorporated into the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. The CSDP, which was officially implemented in 2009, also led to the establishment of the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs through the provisions added to the Treaty of Lisbon. Just as in the NATO Treaty, the provision for a call for assistance and support, to be activated at the request of a member state, was also incorporated into the Treaty of Lisbon, thereby giving the CSDP practical effect. The first to invoke this provision, by requesting assistance and support, was French President Hollande following the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015.

With 23 member states within NATO, the EU began setting strategic objectives through the CSDP to enable the EU to meet the expectations placed upon it as a security actor operating on a global scale. In 2020, under Germany’s Presidency, the ‘Strategic Compass’ was launched as the key document of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), setting out a clear direction and defining both the policy’s objectives and the necessary resources to achieve them. The first joint threat analysis by EU Member States was drawn up. The Strategic Compass also aims to foster even better cooperation in the field of security and defence and to enable the EU to respond more swiftly and effectively to crises through forward planning.

The EU Global Strategy, developed in 2016, stands out as a new and shared commitment regarding the security policies of Member States, whilst steps were also taken that same year to establish the EU Common Defence Fund under the CSDP.

Although the CSDP may at first glance appear to be an alternative to NATO, it is a structure without a standing army or an existing military chain of command. Since 2020, whilst the EU has undertaken various global missions under the CSDP, joint operations with NATO have also taken place.

Within the EU, a group of countries led by France argue that Europe must become an independent military and strategic actor, separate from the other side of the Atlantic. However, the former Warsaw Pact members that joined the Union through eastern enlargement—Poland, Romania, Hungary and the Baltic states—view NATO as an irreplaceable security umbrella for Eastern Europe. These states, which view Russia as a direct existential threat, currently regard the CSDP’s military deterrence as inadequate and position NATO—which hosts US nuclear and conventional capabilities—as the absolute preference for their own national defence. These countries advocate that the transatlantic bond must not be severed.

Furthermore, the rule within the EU requiring unanimous decision-making on CSDP matters hinders the EU’s ability to respond swiftly and effectively to crises. This situation impedes the CSDP’s operational capabilities.

Germany, meanwhile, is endeavouring to strengthen the CSDP whilst simultaneously seeking to bolster its role within NATO by increasing its defence budget. Ahead of the NATO summit, Germany – which had been criticised by the US President for not increasing its defence budget sufficiently and for failing to provide adequate support within NATO – has already countered Trump’s criticisms through Chancellor Merz, stating that defence spending has now reached 4 per cent of annual gross domestic product.

The debate over the relationship between NATO and the EU’s CSDP was also raised during Chancellor Merz’s meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during his visit to Ankara. President Erdoğan emphasised to Chancellor Merz that preserving the ‘Transatlantic Bond’ was crucial for strengthening NATO’s European pillar, and stressed that Turkey could support the European Union’s defence initiatives provided they complemented NATO. This situation demonstrates, on the one hand, that the CSDP is being closely monitored in Ankara and, on the other, that it has once again been emphasised that, from Turkey’s perspective, a common defence strategy against global threats must be defined within the framework of NATO. However, Merz’s statement that ‘a new European NATO is being established’ has failed to provide any indication as to what role the CSDP will play within NATO.

Turkey-Germany relations in the context of NATO

Relations between Turkey and Germany, which form NATO’s south-eastern flank, have followed a contentious course due to geopolitical shifts, diverging strategic priorities, Germany’s approach to Turkey’s cross-border operations, and the ‘clash of national interests’ between the two countries within the alliance. The fundamental strategic disagreement between Turkey and Germany stems from the asymmetrical nature of their threat perceptions. As a border state directly affected by instability in its immediate region (Syria, Iraq and the Mediterranean), Turkey prioritizes issues such as ‘counter-terrorism’ and ‘safeguarding territorial integrity’—not only its own but also that of its neighbors—whilst Germany has adopted a stance that disregards Turkey’s determination in the fight against terrorism.

During the Syrian civil war, following an increase in the ballistic missile threat against Turkey, Turkey requested an air defense system from NATO. In response to this request, Germany deployed the Patriot missile defense system to Kahramanmaraş; however, in 2015, despite the threat persisting, Germany withdrew the Patriot missile defence systems prematurely, citing Turkey’s counter-terrorism policies as justification. This situation, which led to a serious loss of trust in Germany and called into question NATO’s deterrent capability, persisted until recently.

Despite the friendly and warm remarks made by Merz in Ankara, Germany; its embrace of the PKK and FETÖ, the fact that these organizations still find a foothold in Germany, and the German state’s belief that by providing a platform for these terrorist organizations it could politically weaken Turkey, indicate that relations will not improve in the short term and that the alliance between the two countries within NATO will continue to be turbulent for some time to come.

Among the key issues included in the latest coalition agreement—that is, the government program—regarding Germany’s role within NATO are improvements to the federal armed forces’ contingents deployed as part of NATO’s defense efforts and an increase in military equipment. It has been stated that, due to its geographical location in Europe, Germany will be further strengthened as a central hub of NATO. Similarly, the government program views NATO as one of the cornerstones of the transatlantic partnership and emphasizes its indispensability for European security.

Among the objectives is the commitment to work towards establishing a European Defence Union with the aim of strengthening NATO’s European pillar. This objective is also in line with the argument that Germany must become more Europeanized in order for NATO to remain ‘Transatlantic’. In doing so, it also intends to pursue a trilateral cooperation protocol with France and the United Kingdom.

Whilst Germany is moving towards becoming a logistics hub within NATO, it will, at the same time, seek to bring together its EU member allies under a common budget and logistics framework by utilizing the CSDP mechanisms within the EU to strengthen NATO. In the long term, it will seek to secure its economic and political leadership on the European continent through its strength in the defense industry and its military power.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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ran is increasingly relying on economic disruption rather than direct military confrontation to pressure the United States into making concessions over the Strait of Hormuz, expanding threats to regional shipping routes and energy infrastructure as the conflict enters a prolonged phase.

According to Gulf officials, regional sources and analysts, Tehran believes that sustained pressure on global trade and energy markets will prove more effective than conventional military escalation in forcing Washington to reconsider its position.

Rather than seeking a decisive battlefield victory, Iran has adopted a strategy of calibrated escalation designed to steadily raise the economic and political costs of the conflict while avoiding an all-out regional war. The objective, analysts say, is to convince the United States and its allies that accommodating Iran’s demands over the Strait of Hormuz is less costly than continuing the current confrontation.

“Iran, from the beginning, has tried to out-escalate the United States by stretching out its escalation options so that it always has something new to bring every week — a new geography, a new type of weapon, a new type of target,” Michael Knights of the Washington Institute told Reuters.

He argued that Iran’s greatest leverage lies not in its ability to inflict military damage on the United States or Israel, but in its capacity to disrupt regional economies and global commerce.

“The bigger advantage they have is not that they can hurt America or Israel,” Knights said. “Their big advantage is that they can hurt the regional states and the global economy.”

Pressure beyond Hormuz

After demonstrating its ability to disrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz — a waterway that carried around one-fifth of global oil consumption before the conflict — Iran has signaled that its pressure campaign could extend well beyond the strategic chokepoint.

Threats directed at the Red Sea and Saudi energy infrastructure suggest Tehran is seeking to widen the geographical scope of the crisis, increasing the cost of protecting international shipping while testing Washington’s willingness to sustain a prolonged confrontation.

One Gulf source said commanders in Iran’s Revolutionary Guards believe recent developments have strengthened Tehran’s negotiating position.

“The Iranians believe that by widening the war and increasing the pressure, he will eventually give in,” the source said, referring to U.S. President Donald Trump. “Trump thinks he can hit the Iranians hard and bring them to the negotiating table, but they won’t bend.”

That assessment has shaped Tehran’s negotiating strategy, according to Iranian and regional sources.

Trump said on Monday that negotiations with Iran would take place after he canceled a planned military strike in hopes of securing an agreement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian officials, however, denied that talks with Washington were currently underway.

A senior Iranian source said Tehran’s leadership has concluded that previous attempts at flexibility only encouraged greater pressure from Washington, reinforcing the belief that meaningful negotiations can occur only after Iran establishes stronger leverage.

In Tehran’s view, the source said, Trump interprets concessions as weakness and responds only to sustained pressure.

Michael Singh, another senior fellow at the Washington Institute, said Iranian leaders appear convinced they still hold the initiative because the Trump administration remains uncertain about how far it is willing to escalate militarily.

“The Iranians are trying to press their advantage,” Singh said. “They’re interested in establishing sovereignty over the strait and exercising selective control over the waterway.”

Dispute over the Strait

At the heart of the standoff is the future administration of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors.

Regional sources say Oman has presented Tehran with a Gulf-backed proposal that would establish a mechanism for managing shipping through the strait, including voluntary user fees.

Iran, however, is reportedly seeking administrative authority over the waterway and the right to impose service charges on vessels passing through it.

Washington has rejected any arrangement that would allow Iran to exercise control over the strait, insisting it must remain an international waterway open to unrestricted commercial navigation.

Former U.S. diplomat Alan Eyre said Iran’s broader strategy is intended to deter further American military action while forcing Washington to lift its naval blockade and reconsider its negotiating position.

“They don’t want the U.S. to dictate the pace of events,” Eyre said.

War of endurance

Analysts say Iran’s campaign has already shifted the focus of regional and international efforts.

Rather than intensifying military pressure on Tehran, Gulf states and Western governments are increasingly concentrating on protecting commercial shipping and critical energy infrastructure.

The formation of a Saudi-led maritime coalition reflects that shift. According to Gulf sources, the initiative is primarily defensive, focusing on escorting commercial vessels, sharing intelligence and safeguarding vital sea lanes instead of confronting Iran directly.

Knights compared the effort to Europe’s Aspides naval mission in the Red Sea, which was established to protect merchant shipping rather than alter the regional military balance.

For Tehran, forcing rivals into an expensive defensive posture represents a strategic success despite its military disadvantages.

Unable to match U.S. military capabilities directly, Iran can still impose significant costs by compelling regional governments and foreign navies to devote increasing resources to securing global trade routes.

Each new threat, whether in the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait or elsewhere, increases the financial and military burden of keeping international commerce flowing.

Analysts describe the conflict as increasingly becoming a contest of endurance.

Iranian leaders appear to believe they can withstand economic pressure longer than the United States and its partners can tolerate repeated disruptions to global energy supplies and maritime trade.

The strategy also serves a diplomatic purpose.

By demonstrating an ability to expand the crisis whenever necessary, Tehran hopes to strengthen its bargaining position before any future negotiations.

“If there are going to be negotiations, they will define the terms,” said Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations. “Both sides are matching escalation with escalation.”

Despite intermittent diplomatic efforts, neither Washington nor Tehran has shown signs of backing down.

As both sides continue to test each other’s resolve through economic pressure, military deterrence and political signaling, analysts warn that a strategy intended to maximize leverage could still spiral into a wider conflict that neither side intends or is fully able to control.

(Source: Reuters)

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he military operation launched by the US and Israel against Iran on February 28, 2026, which has now evolved into a fragile ceasefire, has reopened the debate on NATO’s institutional and geographical boundaries. The Trump administration’s stance, demanding that its European allies make their airspace and military bases available for use, as well as deploying active naval assets to the Strait of Hormuz, has triggered a structural tension within the Alliance.

Whilst Article 5 of the Treaty limits the obligation of collective defense to attacks on the territories of member states in Europe or North America, Article 6 further narrows this geographical scope by clarifying the definition of the ‘North Atlantic area’. Although the fact that the Washington–Tehran crisis unfolded entirely outside NATO’s formal area of responsibility provided a legal basis for the Alliance to refrain from taking the initiative as an actor, strategic considerations have been the decisive factor here. Although the Alliance claims to be a ‘global security actor’, its members prefer to define the organization as a regional defense pact, whilst avoiding turning their ‘out-of-area’ engagements into an institutional obligation.

Trump’s demands and Europe’s alliance dilemma

The most striking manifestation of the crisis at the operational level is the profound asymmetry between the expectations of the hegemonic power and the allies’ capacity to resist. Washington’s demands have gone beyond a classic burden-sharing debate to become a test of loyalty for the allies. The main objection raised from the European side in the face of this demanding stance is the political rejection that the process has been escalated without consultation with the allies and that ‘the war in question is not Europe’s war’. During this process, Spain adopted the toughest stance by closing its military bases and airspace to US use; Italy demanded strict prior coordination, whilst France and the UK raised various reservations regarding the allocation of bases.

However, despite these restrictive decisions, the European continent – led by Germany – effectively served as a vital logistical base for American military operations. As the crisis deepened and Iran began retaliatory strikes against Gulf states, France, Italy and the UK deployed their military forces to the region to fend off missile and drone attacks, thereby taking up active positions on secondary fronts. On the other hand, whilst the closure of the Strait of Hormuz dealt a severe blow to Europe’s economic interests, the capacity limitations of their own armed forces and their reluctance to be drawn into a conflict imposed by the US led European states to reject Trump’s demand to reopen the strait by military force. This collective refusal by Europe paved the way for Trump to accuse his allies of disloyalty and to threaten to withdraw the US from NATO.

This situation has left European decision-makers facing a classic ‘alliance dilemma’. Allies found themselves caught between, on the one hand, the fear of being drawn into a conflict in the Middle East (entrapment) in the name of US regional interests, and, on the other, the anxiety of being abandoned (abandonment) without the protection of the American security umbrella in the face of the Russian threat. This structural impasse has pushed Europe towards a strategy of ‘active inertia’, one that appeases the US politically whilst refraining from military engagement.

Legal basis for operations outside Article 5

Two historical precedents in which NATO was able to take action even in crises falling outside the scope of Article 5 provide an important comparison of how this structural limitation can be overcome. The Alliance’s military engagement in the Bosnian crisis (1992–1995), which it experienced during the post-Cold War period, was based on a process of deriving legitimacy directly through the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) phased authorisation mechanisms. Similarly, in Libya, the Alliance’s basis of legitimacy was derived not from its own founding articles but from the UN Security Council’s authorisation to protect civilians (Resolution 1973);

NATO became the institutional vehicle implementing this authorisation due to its command-and-control capabilities, yet the composition of participants remained variable, with members such as Germany remaining on the sidelines. The possibility of this scenario being repeated in the Iran crisis is structurally precluded: Russia and China’s veto powers on the Security Council block any Bosnia- or Libya-style authorisation from the outset. This has reinforced the conclusion that NATO has no capacity to take institutional action on the Iran issue, either within its own Articles 5 and 6 framework or through the UN; consequently, the only realistic option remaining is individual or coalition-based action centred on the US-Israel axis.

Furthermore, the Alliance’s structural fissures are manifesting themselves in various ways on the ground. The Alliance’s past operations against piracy in the Gulf of Aden or its missions to combat terrorism and smuggling in the Mediterranean demonstrate a modest yet functional capacity for action that underpins NATO’s claim to protect global trade routes. However, these historical examples are fundamentally at odds with the military and political nature of the threat in the Strait of Hormuz: Whilst operations in the Gulf of Aden or the Mediterranean are policing-style missions conducted against weak and non-state actors, patrolling under the NATO flag in the Strait of Hormuz amounts to engaging in a direct show of force with a sovereign state possessing advanced ballistic capabilities.

Indeed, this structural incompatibility came to the fore as recently as 2019, amidst the deepening US-Iran nuclear crisis and a situation where attacks on oil tankers were threatening global trade. At that time, rather than uniting under a common umbrella, NATO members established two separate naval forces, each operating independently and guided by opposing strategic rationales: the US-led IMSC (2019), focused solely on military deterrence, and the French-led EMASOH (2020), which aimed solely at diplomatic de-escalation without being drawn into the US–Iran conflict. The fact that this two-pronged structure, with its conflicting objectives, has been established outside NATO has clearly demonstrated that the Alliance lacks a shared perception of threat and the capacity for joint decision-making in ‘out-of-scope’ crisis regions.

Turkey as a NATO member

The evasive manoevres of European allies are transforming into a far more complex geographical and strategic equation centered on Turkey, which forms the Alliance’s south-eastern flank. Turkey’s long-standing border with Iran and its reflexes to preserve the regional balance of power, combined with a normative opposition to Israel’s military doctrine, are keeping Ankara away from kinetic conflict and forcing it into a conciliatory diplomacy.

Whilst this strategy of isolation is accepted by Washington, strategic infrastructure integrated into NATO, such as the Kürecik radar and Incirlik Air Base, which Turkey hosts on its own territory, creates structural pressure and the risk of ‘spatial entrapment’. To prevent these facilities from being instrumentalized by the US for unilateral operational intelligence or pre-emptive strikes, Ankara has blocked American manoevres by strictly limiting the rules of use within the Alliance’s formal defense framework. This stance demonstrates that geographical realities shape a security framework far more decisively than Alliance texts.

Ultimately, the ‘active inaction’ strategy developed by European states whilst caught in the ‘alliance dilemma’, alongside Turkey’s efforts to restrict the use of NATO infrastructure under its sovereignty to counter the risk of ‘spatial drift’, have clearly demonstrated that the allies will not unconditionally align themselves with a hegemonic power’s unilateral regional conflict. Although Donald Trump has sought to portray the Alliance as a weak and ‘ineffective’ institution in the eyes of the public, citing the allies’ rhetorical distancing and limited support as justification, the logistical and operational realities on the ground point to the exact opposite.

The difficulties the US has faced throughout the crisis against Iran, which possesses asymmetric capabilities, have clearly highlighted the limits of unilateral force projection, despite its military superiority. Ultimately, this crisis has paradoxically demonstrated the extent to which a hegemonic power needs the strategic depth and structural alliance architecture offered by its allies in order to consolidate its regional presence and project power.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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he Democratic primary for Michigan’s open U.S. Senate seat has become one of the most expensive and closely watched congressional races in recent history, with pro-Israel lobbying group AIPAC and affiliated political action committees pouring more than $60 million into efforts to support U.S. Representative Haley Stevens and defeat progressive challenger Abdul El-Sayed. 

The race, which will determine the Democratic nominee to replace retiring Senator Gary Peters, has evolved into a national referendum on campaign finance, U.S. policy toward Israel and the growing influence of pro-Palestinian voices within the Democratic Party.

El-Sayed, a physician, epidemiologist and former public health official, has made opposition to outside political spending a central theme of his campaign, arguing that wealthy special interests are attempting to shape the outcome of the election. Stevens, a four-term congresswoman, has defended her record while distancing herself from the independent expenditures made on her behalf. 

According to Federal Election Commission records cited by Al Jazeera, AIPAC’s political arm, the United Democracy Project (UDP), has spent more than $30.6 million on the Michigan race, the largest expenditure by the organization in a single contest. Combined with spending by other political action committees and an estimated $6.5 million from a nonprofit advocacy group, outside support for Stevens has exceeded $60 million. 

The role of nonprofit organizations in U.S. elections

The spending has eclipsed previous records for Senate primaries and has intensified scrutiny of the role of super PACs and nonprofit organizations in U.S. elections.

AIPAC directs the United Democracy Project and is also its largest donor, contributing roughly $30 million of the PAC’s $100 million fundraising total this election cycle. The remaining funding comes largely from wealthy pro-Israel donors, including hedge fund manager Paul Singer, businessman Robert Kraft, investor Marc Rowan and entertainment executive Haim Saban, according to campaign finance disclosures. 

Additional support for Stevens has come through a network of newly established political committees and nonprofit organizations.

One of the largest, A Stronger Michigan, has spent more than $17 million and is backed primarily by the nonprofit Center Forward. Other committees, including Michigan Forward 2026, Center Forward Committee and Unite to Win, have also invested heavily in television advertising and voter outreach. Some of these groups receive funding from corporations, trade associations and nonprofits whose donors are not fully disclosed under U.S. campaign finance laws. 

Although the campaigns themselves cannot legally coordinate with independent expenditure groups, the unprecedented level of outside spending has dominated the political debate ahead of Tuesday’s primary.

Large Arab presence

At a campaign rally in Dearborn, a city with one of the country’s largest Arab American communities, supporters repeatedly criticized AIPAC rather than Stevens herself.

Michigan state legislator Alabas Farhat told supporters they would make the organization “burn” millions of dollars by electing El-Sayed, while several speakers, including Representatives Rashida Tlaib and Ilhan Omar, criticized U.S. support for Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. 

El-Sayed has argued that Stevens’ campaign has become dependent on outside financial support tied to pro-Israel interests.

Speaking at a recent rally, he said America’s political system allows “billionaires and corporations and special interests like AIPAC to buy and sell politicians.” During a televised debate, he linked Stevens’ congressional votes supporting aid to Israel with the organization’s financial backing of her campaign. 

Stevens has rejected suggestions that the outside spending defines her candidacy.

During a recent debate, she argued that campaign finance reform remains a broader national issue affecting candidates across the political spectrum, saying there was little difference between super PACs supporting either campaign. Critics, however, point to the disparity in spending, noting that groups backing El-Sayed have spent only about $3.5 million. 

Strong grassroots fundraising

While outside groups have dominated television advertising, El-Sayed has outraised Stevens in direct campaign contributions from individual donors. Campaign finance records show El-Sayed has raised approximately $14.5 million compared with Stevens’ $11.9 million, reflecting strong grassroots fundraising despite the flood of independent expenditures supporting his opponent.

AIPAC has defended its involvement, saying it represents Americans who believe a strong U.S.-Israel relationship serves both countries’ interests.

The organization has rejected claims that it acts on behalf of a foreign government, describing itself as a coalition of pro-Israel Americans participating in the democratic process. In a recent message to supporters, AIPAC described the Michigan Senate contest as “critical.”

Political analysts say the outcome of the race could have implications far beyond Michigan.

A victory for El-Sayed would represent one of the highest-profile electoral successes for a progressive candidate critical of unconditional U.S. support for Israel and could signal changing attitudes among Democratic voters, particularly after months of debate over the wars in Gaza and the Middle East. Supporters argue such a result would weaken AIPAC’s influence within the Democratic Party, while opponents view the race as an important test of mainstream Democratic support for the U.S.-Israel alliance.

The contest also carries national political significance because the Michigan Senate seat is expected to be highly competitive in November. The Democratic nominee will likely face former Congressman Mike Rogers, and the outcome could help determine which party controls the U.S. Senate after the general election.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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he 36th NATO Summit, held in Ankara on July 7-8, 2026, addressed critical agenda items not only concerning key themes such as the Russia-Ukraine War, defense spending or European security, but also within the context of NATO’s policies towards neighboring regions. In this context, the Summit can also be seen as a platform for redefining relations with the Middle East, North Africa and Gulf countries, which form the Alliance’s southern flank. NATO’s relations with the Gulf countries, which have been caught in a spiral of strategic uncertainty due to the US-Iran conflict, were specifically addressed at this Summit.

The summit held in Ankara demonstrates that the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), launched with the Gulf states at the 2004 Istanbul Summit, has regained strategic importance 22 years later. As will be recalled, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, launched at the 2004 Istanbul Summit, marked the starting point of NATO’s institutional engagement with the Gulf states. However, over the span of 22 years, this initiative has failed to deliver the transformative impact that was anticipated. The potential of the Ankara Summit to revitalise this framework deserves to be assessed from both a symbolic and a strategic perspective.

The primary aim behind the establishment of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative was for NATO to contribute to the security architecture in the Middle East and the Gulf region in an inclusive and collaborative manner. In particular, the Gulf states’ reliance on external sources for security and their fragile structure were the underlying reasons for this initiative. However, in 2004, only four out of the six Gulf states joined the initiative, meaning full inclusivity could not be achieved. Nevertheless, NATO continued to invest in the initiative, hoping that other Gulf states might eventually join Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, which had already joined the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

At this stage, the fact that membership of this initiative remains limited to four countries, with Saudi Arabia and Oman continuing to remain outside it, can be regarded as both a symbolic shortcoming and a structural weakness. The fact that Saudi Arabia and Oman, two of the most critical countries when it comes to the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf and the security of the Strait of Hormuz, are not part of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative can be cited as the main reason why this initiative has remained a ‘limited-impact’ framework to date. Indeed, this situation also highlights the limitations that the Gulf states’ divergent security perceptions and foreign engagements may impose on cooperation with NATO. Consequently, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative’s failure to demonstrate the expected trajectory of development can be explained not only by fluctuations in NATO’s regional priorities but also by the divergent approaches of the Gulf states.

NATO-Gulf cooperation in the shadow of crisis

From the perspective of Gulf geopolitics, it can be argued that the key factor distinguishing the 2026 Ankara Summit from the 2004 Istanbul Summit was the context in which the meetings took place. The Istanbul Summit was held in the wake of the largest wave of expansion in NATO’s history and against a relatively optimistic global backdrop. The Ankara Summit, however, took place in an uncertain geopolitical environment in which a conflict between the US and Iran, which had started on February 28, was directly affecting the Gulf states and posing a serious threat to their security. This situation has distinctly set this year’s IIG session apart from the routine diplomatic contacts of previous years.

In this context, NATO foreign ministers and representatives from the Gulf states came together at a meeting held on the margins of the summit. At the meeting, a consensus was reached on strengthening cooperation in the face of the security challenges posed by the conflict in the Gulf region. This approach can be interpreted as a sign that the initiative may be evolving beyond a purely rhetorical framework of cooperation towards a crisis-management-centered function. A notable aspect here is the shift in the rhetoric of European allies. The fact that the stability of the Gulf is now framed not merely as a regional issue but as an integral part of European security and energy supply security can be interpreted as a shift in rhetoric that enhances the strategic significance of the IIG. This shift also points to the concretization, specifically in the context of the Gulf, of the ‘360-degree security’ approach that has long been debated within the Alliance.

On the other hand, from the perspective of representation, it is noteworthy that whilst the foreign ministers of NATO countries attended the meeting, only Kuwait, among the Gulf states, was represented at the level of foreign minister. The attendance of State Minister for Foreign Affairs Mohammed bin Abdulaziz al-Khulaifi from Qatar, State Minister for Defense Mohammed bin Mubarak Fadil al-Mazrui from the UAE, and Director-General for Bilateral Relations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Abdullah al-Khalifa, from Bahrain, highlights that, despite strong diplomatic messages and rhetoric on cooperation, the Gulf states had limited expectations of the summit.

In terms of positive outcomes, however, it was observed that discussions took place at the summit regarding the possibility of taking some concrete steps between NATO and the Gulf states within the framework of the GCC. In this context, the agreement reached between Qatar and NATO on a partnership program to frame civil and military cooperation between the two sides, and the fact that the establishment process for a regional centre for peace support operations planned to be set up in Qatar is approaching its final stage, can be regarded as concrete steps in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative’s transition beyond being merely a consultative platform.

State Minister al-Khulaifi, who attended the summit on behalf of Qatar, emphasized in his statement that his country attaches great importance to the IIG and is ready to implement concrete outcomes. Kuwait, another country taking concrete steps in cooperation with NATO and hosting the GIG-NATO regional centre, launched the Kuwait-NATO Political and Security Dialogue Mechanism in January 2026. Sheikh Jarrah Jabir al-Ahmed al-Sabah, Kuwait’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, who attended the Ankara summit, also proposed in his statement that the GCC Ministerial Summit be held in Kuwait in 2027.

The future of NATO-Gulf cooperation

At this stage, it remains unclear whether NATO’s renewed engagement with the Gulf states is the result of a temporary momentum generated by current crises, or the outcome of a process aimed at implementing lasting structural measures. Given the Gulf states’ quest for security, having recognized the ineffectiveness of a security mechanism entirely dependent on the US during the Iran conflict, it is reasonable to suggest that they may wish to consider NATO as a new alternative security provider. Indeed, the Gulf states, which already maintain strong partnerships with NATO member states such as the US and Turkey, may also aim to formalize institutional cooperation with NATO.

Turkey’s role in this process, as the host of the Ankara Summit, is also noteworthy. Having hosted the 2004 Istanbul Summit during the enlargement process, Turkey has, by 2026, become a more central actor on the Alliance’s southern flank, owing both to its geographical location and its growing defense industry capacity. Efforts to position the reconstruction process in Syria as a bridge between NATO’s sphere of influence and Gulf capital can also be cited as one of the concrete manifestations of this central role. The progress Turkey has made in the defense industry sector and its transformation into a significant actor in terms of military deterrence have made Ankara an important security partner for the Gulf states.

Consequently, the Ankara Summit has had limited yet positive implications for the future from the perspective of the Gulf states. The interactions revealed by the Summit, particularly regarding the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, demonstrate that an initiative which had seen relatively limited progress over the past 22 years has been able to regain significance in the wake of the crisis. At this stage, the most significant question mark concerns whether this momentum will translate into a permanent institutional framework.

Whether the NATO–ICI dialogue will remain a temporary reaction to the geopolitical uncertainty created by the US–Iran conflict will become clear through the concrete steps the parties take in the future. Key factors in this regard will include whether key actors such as Saudi Arabia and Oman will join the initiative, and to what extent the emerging cooperation programm will be reflected in practice. Consequently, the most tangible dynamic in NATO’s future in the Gulf can be identified as the success of the transition from rhetorical solidarity to sustained institutional cooperation.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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t least nine people have died after thousands of migrants crossed from Morocco into the Spanish enclave of Ceuta in one of the largest surges in recent years, prompting local authorities to declare a humanitarian emergency and request military assistance.

Authorities in Ceuta said between 1,500 and 2,000 migrants had entered the enclave over the past 10 days, with hundreds more arriving on Thursday alone. Regional President Juan Jesús Vivas described the situation as an “absolute humanitarian and social emergency” and urged Spain’s central government to deploy troops to help restore control at the border.

Spain’s Interior Ministry rejected calls to declare a national emergency, saying such measures do not apply to migration crises, but announced that 60 soldiers would be deployed to reinforce border security.

Video footage showed groups of migrants entering the territory by sea, many using inflatable flotation devices to swim around border barriers from the Moroccan coast. Others crossed by land after scaling border fences, according to Spanish media reports.

Some migrants were heard shouting “Viva España!” as they entered the enclave.

Zakaria Zarroqui, a migrant rights activist, told Reuters the latest influx resembled the mass crossing in May 2021, when about 10,000 Moroccan and sub-Saharan migrants entered Ceuta within days.

“The situation remains out of control as we speak,” Zarroqui said, adding that people continued gathering in the Moroccan border town of Fnideq in an attempt to reach the Spanish territory.

Ceuta and Melilla

Ceuta, together with the nearby Spanish enclave of Melilla, forms the European Union’s only land border with Africa and has long been a focal point for migrants seeking to reach Europe.

The surge follows a recent ruling by Spain’s Supreme Court that migrants intercepted at sea while attempting to reach Ceuta or Melilla cannot automatically be returned to Morocco.

“It has been a slow trickle since the Supreme Court’s ruling, but today has been an explosion,” a spokesperson for Spain’s Guardia Civil told Reuters.

Spain’s Interior Ministry said it was working closely with Moroccan authorities to respond to the increase in irregular crossings, accusing human smuggling networks of exploiting the court ruling to encourage migrants to attempt the journey.

Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska is expected to visit Ceuta on Friday to assess the situation and coordinate the government’s response.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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he fact that security dynamics in the international system have taken on a nature that transcends regional boundaries necessitates that NATO summits be interpreted from a broader perspective. For this reason, assessing NATO summits solely from the perspective of European security has become increasingly inadequate in recent years. Although the Russia–Ukraine War continues to dominate the Alliance’s agenda, the summits also provide a significant body of data in terms of illustrating how the relationship between Euro-Atlantic security and strategic developments in the Indo-Pacific is being redefined.

In particular, China’s rise, the deepening of the US-China great power rivalry on a global scale, growing awareness of the vulnerability of critical infrastructure and supply chains, and issues such as advanced technologies and maritime security are key areas that inevitably extend NATO’s security agenda beyond Europe. Consequently, the NATO summits held in recent years have conveyed strategic messages that concern not only Europe’s security architecture but also the future of the Indo-Pacific and, by extension, the global system.

The Indo-Pacific agenda in the capital of NATO’s closest ally in Asia

Viewed from this perspective, the Ankara Summit harbors a turning point that warrants careful analysis from an Indo-Pacific perspective. For the first time in NATO’s history, the Alliance’s Indo-Pacific agenda was brought to the table in the capital of NATO’s closest ally to Asia; moreover, it has laid the foundations for a new strategy regarding the region within NATO. At this very point, when the process is examined from a chronological perspective, a critical paradox emerges between the institutional visibility provided by the summits and NATO’s actual engagement with the Indo-Pacific.

Looking at the course of events, the foundations of the transatlantic approach within NATO were laid not, as is often stated, at the 2022 Madrid Summit, but in fact at the 2008 Bucharest Summit. With the Bucharest Summit, the impact of security developments outside Europe on the Alliance became more apparent, whilst global partnerships became an integral part of NATO’s long-term strategic vision. This approach was taken to a new level at the Madrid Summit, where China was defined for the first time as a ‘systemic challenge’ in the NATO Strategic Concept; whilst the leaders of the Indo-Pacific Quartet (IP4), comprising Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, were invited to a NATO summit for the first time.

Alongside this highly significant development, the approach that European-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security cannot be assessed in isolation from one another has gained institutional visibility not only at the rhetorical level but also in summit diplomacy. The 2023 Vilnius Summit holds particular significance as it represents the first stage in the attempt to institutionalize this initiative. Although the initiative to establish a NATO liaison office in Japan had the potential to become the Alliance’s first institutional presence in Asia and to demonstrate that NATO was supporting the US strategy of containing China, it could not be implemented due to objections led by France and supported by Germany.

At the 2024 Washington Summit, however, against the backdrop of US-China tensions and the emphasis on the ‘China Threat’, the rhetoric towards China hardened further, and Beijing was labelled as an actor providing indirect support to Russia by acting as a ‘decisive factor’ in the war in Ukraine. However, this hardening of rhetoric in Washington has not been reflected to the same extent in institutional expansion; and, partly due to the EU’s call for ‘strategic autonomy’, even the issue of the liaison office in Tokyo has not been brought back onto the agenda.

From visible strategies to covert operational warfare

The fundamental shift in NATO’s Indo-Pacific strategy became apparent at the summits in The Hague and Ankara. Declarations from previous summits, which contained detailed assessments of China and the Indo-Pacific, have been replaced by shorter texts focused on strengthening Europe’s defense capabilities. In this regard, issues such as increasing defense spending, developing the defense industry’s production capacity, burden-sharing and collective deterrence, issues centered on alliance-internal development, have gained a more pronounced priority compared to previous summits.

At the same time, it is a well-known fact that the participation of IP4 countries at leadership level has gradually declined during this period, and that, for the most part, the leaders of these countries sent their defense or foreign ministers to the summits up until the Ankara Summit. Similarly, the process that began with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s decision not to attend the summit in 2024 has been mirrored by other countries in subsequent years; by the time of the Ankara Summit, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung stood out as the only IP4 head of state to attend the two-day summit.

Although this pattern, stretching from 2008 to the present day, might at first glance be interpreted as indicating a decline in NATO’s interest in the Indo-Pacific, it is important to recognize the existence of a different trend during the same period. Whilst institutional visibility has relatively diminished, functional cooperation between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners has shifted towards more concrete areas. At the IP4 meetings held in Ankara, alongside common security issues such as the war in Ukraine, China, North Korea and Iran, defense industry, critical technologies, cyber security, strategic communication and industrial cooperation were brought to the fore. Similarly, Japan’s initiative to join NATO’s Defense Innovation Accelerator (DIANA) program demonstrates that technology-based cooperation with non-allied countries is being taken to a new level.

The signing of a memorandum of understanding between the US, Japan and South Korea during the summit, aimed at the deployment of small modular reactors (SMRs) in third countries, also demonstrates that security cooperation is not limited to the military sphere; it has expanded to encompass areas such as energy technologies, critical infrastructure and strategic production capacity. Consequently, the chronological progression and the developments that have stood out at the last two summits indicate a shift in the nature of engagement rather than a retreat in NATO’s Indo-Pacific policy. The political symbols, leaders’ photographs and initiatives to establish a NATO liaison office in Tokyo that characterized the Madrid and Vilnius periods are giving way to a partnership model that is increasingly less visible but more functional.

In other words, NATO’s relations with the Indo-Pacific are now deepening largely through defense industry, technological innovation, critical infrastructure, supply chains, cyber resilience and joint production capacity. The relative decline in institutional visibility does not imply a weakening of functional integration; on the contrary, the two processes are moving in opposite directions.

The China dilemma

Of course, attributing this transformation solely to Washington’s shifting strategic priorities and the challenges within NATO would result in a flawed analysis. Undoubtedly, the US has, particularly in recent times, been demanding that its European allies assume greater defense responsibilities and views the strengthening of Europe’s defense capabilities as one of the prerequisites for redirecting its strategic focus and resources more effectively towards the Indo-Pacific. However, this is not the sole factor explaining the transformation in NATO’s Indo-Pacific policy. Differing threat perceptions within the Alliance and the nature of economic relations with China also significantly shape this process.

The fact that 23 of NATO’s 32 members are also members of the European Union necessitates striking a delicate balance between the security narrative regarding China and economic interests. For many European countries, whilst China is an actor with whom strategic competition is becoming increasingly pronounced, it remains a partner that is difficult to do without in terms of trade, investment, critical technologies and supply chains.

Consequently, whilst shared security concerns regarding China are reflected in NATO documents, it appears difficult to speak of full consensus amongst allies regarding the extent to which this rhetoric will be translated into institutional and operational policies. At the Vilnius Summit, the blocking of the initiative to establish a NATO liaison office in Japan, led by France, can be regarded as one of the most concrete examples of this divergence.

Similarly, the diplomatic contacts that Western leaders have recently maintained with Beijing also indicate that a more pragmatic approach has been adopted, one in which competition and engagement are pursued simultaneously. The messages conveyed by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney during his visit to Beijing regarding the transformation of the global order, alongside US President Donald Trump’s pursuit of direct diplomatic contact with China and the messages he delivered during his visit to Beijing, demonstrate that competition in the security sphere does not imply a complete severing of economic and diplomatic ties.

This situation also partly explains the shift in tone observed in NATO’s rhetoric towards China. Consequently, the fact that China featured to a more limited extent at the Ankara Summit compared to previous years can be interpreted not as a weakening of the perception of threat, but rather as a reflection of the strategic balance being sought within NATO between security priorities and economic interdependence. It is precisely for this reason that the Ankara Summit represents a turning point, not signifying that NATO is distancing itself from the Indo-Pacific, but rather that it is redefining its engagement with the region by adapting to the strategic and economic realities brought about by the changing international system.

In the coming period, the key factor determining the direction of this transformation will be not so much the communiqués to be issued, but rather the concrete collaborations to be developed between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners in critical defense sectors. For this reason, the Ankara Summit appears worthy of being remembered not as a summit at which NATO distanced itself from the Indo-Pacific, but as a threshold at which the Alliance reformatted its strategic engagement with the region in line with new geopolitical realities.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

W

ildfires continued to burn across France, Spain and Greece on Thursday as scorching temperatures, strong winds and dry conditions fueled blazes that have killed firefighters, forced mass evacuations and destroyed thousands of hectares of land.

In southwestern France, authorities said a wildfire near Bordeaux was brought under control overnight after burning around 42,000 hectares of forest. Police arrested two people on suspicion of arson, though officials released no further details.

The fires have forced about 220,000 residents and tourists to evacuate, although around 60,000 have since returned as conditions improved. Businesses that had temporarily closed were gradually reopening.

Weather conditions around Bordeaux were expected to improve later Thursday, with forecasts of cooler temperatures, higher humidity and possible thunderstorms. However, authorities warned that the fire danger remained high.

In Greece, three firefighters were killed as crews battled separate wildfires driven by gale-force winds.

Deaths in Crete

Two firefighters died after becoming trapped between advancing fire fronts on the island of Crete, where hundreds of residents and tourists were evacuated by land and sea from communities threatened by fast-moving flames. A third firefighter was killed while responding to another wildfire in the Peloponnese.

Strong winds prevented firefighting aircraft from operating over parts of Crete, hampering efforts to contain the blaze.

Spain also remained on alert as firefighters battled at least 10 active wildfires across the country.

Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez described the situation as “extreme,” citing high temperatures, low humidity and powerful winds that have created dangerous fire conditions.

The largest fire continued to spread in the eastern province of Castellón, where more than 9,300 hectares have burned. Fire officials said crews worked overnight to secure the fire’s 82-kilometer perimeter in hopes of stabilizing it before temperatures rose again.

New wildfires also broke out in the northwestern provinces of Zamora and León, forcing more than 1,300 people to leave their homes, including residents near Arribes del Duero Natural Park.

A European Union wildfire response center

Sánchez said he had asked European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to support establishing a European Union wildfire response center for the western Mediterranean on Spain’s Balearic Islands.

Europe has endured repeated heatwaves this summer, with temperatures remaining well above seasonal averages across much of the continent.

Scientists say prolonged drought, extreme heat and strong winds have increased the frequency and intensity of wildfires across southern Europe, where emergency services have faced near-continuous firefighting operations in recent weeks.

The current wildfire season has already burned more land across the European Union than at the same point last year, underscoring the growing challenge posed by increasingly severe summer fire seasons.

(Source: Reuters)

T

he Republic of Turkey hosted a NATO Summit once again after a gap of twenty-two years. Whilst the Ukraine–Russia War has triggered a shift in the perception of threats in Europe, the emergence of new security risks stemming from a potential US/Israel–Iran conflict has further heightened the importance of the Summit. Statements made by heads of state and government prior to the Summit indicated that it would be the most significant gathering in recent years in terms of ‘outcomes and decisions taken’.

In this context, the fact that NATO’s future vision was shaped in Ankara, given that NATO is itself a security organization, holds particular significance. Turkey’s central position within NATO, as well as its capabilities in the defense and aerospace sectors, are drawing attention in the context of the Alliance’s future. When the final communiqué is considered, it is evident that NATO is transitioning to a new security architecture referred to as the ‘3.0 era’.

Whilst Ankara hosted the 36th NATO Summit of Heads of State and Government, defense spending and the defense industry were at the heart of the strategic decisions taken by the Alliance in Ankara. Ensuring that Alliance partners adhere to the stated commitment regarding the targeted defense spending limits was a priority. In parallel, the development of defense and security cooperation and relations came to the fore. Discussions held throughout the Summit centered on the role of the capabilities achieved by the Turkish defense industry in the Alliance’s future, and how and to what extent these capabilities could be utilized.

In addition to the statements made, the Defence Industry Forum held as part of the Summit addressed potential areas for Alliance partners to work together and build a sustainable ecosystem. Hosted by the President of the Turkish Defence Industry, Prof. Dr Haluk Görgün, and organized at TUSAŞ as part of the NATO Summit Defence Industry Forum (NSDIF), a reception was held where the capabilities of the Turkish defense industry were demonstrated to participating delegations through both flight displays and an exhibition in the static display area.

Burden-sharing among allies

As part of the Summit, the defense industry forum (NSDIF) – which marked a number of firsts – was held at the ATO Congresium. As announced by NATO, bilateral and multilateral military, security and cooperation agreements were signed for the first time under the NSDIF’26 framework. The agreements, estimated to have a total value exceeding 50 billion dollars, were primarily structured around the following key areas: defense investments and the Alliance partners’ ‘5 per cent’ commitment, capacity enhancement through multinational cooperation, the development of defense industry partnerships, and the improvement of processes from serial production to sustainment. Within the framework of NSDIF’26, emphasis was placed on the importance of developing high-tech and innovation-focused solutions tailored to the evolving battlefield.

NATO’s long-standing target of 2 per cent defense spending was accepted by Alliance partners as a radical increase to “5 per cent” in response to the growing and evolving threat perception. Recently, assessments have been carried out regarding the independent and collective activities undertaken to achieve this objective. Whilst the aim is to significantly increase burden-sharing within the Alliance, the objective is to enter a new era in which allies outside the US (Europe and Canada) directly assume their own security responsibilities. Whilst the concept of “strategic autonomy” is being defined within the Alliance, the initial objective is to establish the financial infrastructure.

The aim is for Alliance partners to increase their defense spending to 5 per cent of their gross domestic product (GDP), which represents a significant economic volume, whilst also developing production capabilities beyond mere procurement. However, the fact that multinational projects implemented, particularly in Europe, have failed to deliver the desired results, due both to their lengthy timelines and their structural nature, has opened the door to alternative approaches: the “Trusted Partner”. Although Turkey has been a NATO member for a quarter of a century, the fact that its capabilities in the defense industry have not been ‘effectively’ utilized within the Alliance has been a subject of debate, particularly over the last 10 years. Turkey, an Alliance member that has also been subject to both covert and overt embargoes, is now being highlighted as a central actor in NATO’s new era.

Mass production capacity and centralized production

The Ukraine–Russia War has highlighted the inadequacy of stockpiles and inventories amongst the world’s armed forces in the face of protracted conflict. Furthermore, a similar scenario has manifested itself in various forms within the US-Israel-Iran triangle. In the face of the reality of the ‘war of attrition’, which has been redefined in the present day, it is imperative that allies ensure their stocks of ammunition and military equipment are sustainable. The signing of supply agreements at the summit, totalling over 50 billion dollars, aims to transform the defence industry from a purely commercial sector into a direct deterrent. In this context, particular attention was drawn to items with high consumption rates, such as artillery ammunition, aircraft bombs and air defence missiles. In this regard, the allies’ efforts – for example, Canada’s increase in artillery ammunition production capacity and Turkey’s allocation of additional funding for the ‘Iron Dome’ air defence systems – were the first examples to be highlighted.

Attention was drawn to the negative effects of projects implemented in a multinational framework in European countries, both on the execution of the projects and on production capacity and capabilities. In assessments aimed at improving this situation, ‘project management’ and ‘autonomous/centralised’ approaches emerged as key priorities. The aim is for key actors in projects to be carried out on a multinational basis, as well as allied nations acting as subcontractors, to implement more effective process management. In this way, both the production capabilities and key areas such as sustainment and logistics of projects carried out on a multinational basis are being improved. Furthermore, Turkey’s long-standing vision of “lifting covert and overt embargoes between allies” aligns directly with this topic addressed at the Summit.

NATO is demonstrating increasing sensitivity regarding the management of interoperability amongst allies. Multinational collaborations are being implemented whilst taking into account the operational needs of the allies. The decision taken at the Ankara Summit to strengthen the transport aircraft fleet, in addition to the NATO-led tanker aircraft fleet, underscored this commitment. The fleet to be established with A400M transport aircraft will be operated to meet the operational needs of the allies. In addition to the transport fleet, in which the Turkish defence industry also holds a share, Turkey will take a leading role in establishing a space-based communications and early warning system through the IMECE project.

The allocation of an additional $24 billion budget for the Iron Dome is significant not only for Turkey but also for the Alliance’s air and missile defence capabilities. Roketsan’s demonstration of its missile systems in the field of precision-guided systems also attracted attention. Turkey’s capabilities in mass production and high technology are being utilised more actively than ever before to meet diverse requirements. In particular, Turkey has gained increasing importance in recent times with solutions such as cyber security and encrypted communications. As emphasised at the Summit, NATO aims to structure its capabilities not only around assets such as ships and aircraft, but also through integrative elements such as cyberspace, communications and intelligence.

Conclusion: An increasing role and key messages

As part of the NATO Defence Industry Forum, the capabilities of the Turkish defense industry were demonstrated to participating delegations at a reception held at TUSAŞ, through both flight displays and an exhibition in the static display area. The delegations were greeted by the modern instruments of the battlefield on display: the Altay tank, ARMA armored vehicles, MKE’s TOLGA air defense solution, ROKETSAN’s ballistic missiles, and Baykar and TUSAŞ’s manned and unmanned aerial platforms. In addition to all this, demonstrations were held to showcase the current state of the aviation sector: the GÖKBEY general-purpose helicopter, the T129 ATAK attack helicopter, the HÜRKUŞ basic trainer aircraft, the HÜRJET advanced jet trainer, the ANKA III strategic bomber, the ANKA-S, the Bayraktar AKINCI UAV and the Bayraktar TB3 unmanned aerial vehicle, all of which demonstrated their capabilities through flight displays.

The capabilities of the Turkish defense industry were demonstrated to delegates not merely through a ‘catalogue’, but directly at the production facilities and via live flight demonstrations. The presence of both executives and project engineers from the relevant companies on site enabled the evaluation of both the products and potential partnerships. In short, the reception provided a unique platform for increasing defense and aerospace exports and establishing new partnerships.

Turkey’s production of systems that are fully compliant with NATO standards (STANAG) and have proven themselves on the battlefield supports strategic interoperability within the Alliance. This, in turn, enables Turkey to export significant quantities of defense systems to its Alliance partners. According to 2025 figures, 56 per cent of Turkey’s exports, totaling 10.56 billion dollars, were made directly to the European Union, NATO member states and the United States. These figures are, in themselves, a testament to the quality and reliability of Turkish defence industry products, which meet Western standards. Furthermore, there is a growing interest in products that have proven themselves on the battlefield.

This reinforces the desire to implement ‘joint projects’, as seen during Belgium’s recent high-level visit to Turkey. The Belgian firm developing the turret proposed to Turkish land vehicle manufacturers: “Let’s integrate our turret into your armoured vehicle and sell them together.” In every discussion regarding Turkey, the door to cooperation is being opened with the message: “You have high-quality products, and we want to benefit from working with you.” Meanwhile, Spain’s supply of the HÜRJET fighter aircraft, Portugal’s warships, Italy’s unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and Poland’s electronic warfare systems are strengthening Turkey’s central position within the Alliance in this field.

In short, the Ankara Summit is more than just a platform for delivering political messages; it represents a critical turning point where the obstacles to defense industry cooperation among allies will be discussed. It was clearly emphasized at this summit that any form of export restriction or covert embargo imposed by allies against one another under the NATO umbrella ultimately weakens the Alliance’s own collective deterrence. It is abundantly clear that Turkey’s high-tech production capacity is not a competitive factor to be excluded or restricted amongst allies. Turkey’s position should be viewed as that of a ‘regional production hub’ which will optimize the Alliance’s overall capabilities whilst also reducing logistical costs.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

I

ran is expected to receive the first shipment of hundreds of Chinese-made shoulder-fired air defense missile systems within weeks under a deal valued at between $60 million and $70 million, according to three sources familiar with the agreement cited by Reuters.

If completed, the purchase would represent one of Tehran’s largest known efforts to rebuild its short-range air defenses since months of fighting with the United States and Israel exposed weaknesses in its ability to protect military facilities and strategic infrastructure.

The contract reportedly covers between 300 and 400 man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), including the Chinese-made QW-12 and FN-16 missile systems.

According to Reuters, the agreement was signed through Zhongqing Baoshang International Investment, which the sources said acted as an intermediary between Iran and the Chinese supplier.

The total value of the contract is estimated at $60–70 million, although the sources cautioned that delivery schedules, quantities and implementation details could still change.

Iran’s foreign ministry did not immediately comment on the report.

China’s foreign ministry denied the claims, stating:

“The relevant reports are completely groundless. China has consistently played a role in promoting peace and ending the conflict.”

The parent company, Zhong Qing Bao Shang Group, also did not immediately respond to Reuters’ request for comment.

Air defense overhaul after months of war

Reuters said Iran is seeking to strengthen its defenses after U.S. and Israeli strikes targeted facilities connected to its missile, drone and air defense programs during the recent conflict.

Military analysts note that portable air defense systems are particularly valuable because they can be quickly deployed by small teams and relocated frequently, making them less vulnerable than fixed air defense batteries.

The reported purchase would significantly expand Iran’s inventory of short-range air defense weapons designed to engage Low-flying aircraft, helicopters, and drones.

The QW-12 and FN-16 are infrared-guided missile systems intended to protect military bases, energy infrastructure and other sensitive locations against aerial threats.

Defense experts cited by Reuters consider the QW-12 less advanced than newer Chinese systems such as the QW-18 and QW-19 but say it remains capable of providing an effective layer of short-range protection.

According to the sources, initial shipments were expected to leave Urumqi in western China before transiting through Pakistan into Iran.

The sources did not specify whether the transfers would occur by air or overland.

Pakistan firmly denied any involvement.

The military’s media wing, the Inter-Services Public Relations, called reports linking Pakistan to the transfer of Chinese air defense systems “absolutely concocted and false.”

Reuters also reported that Iran has explored overland transportation routes for Chinese military equipment and dual-use components to reduce the risk of disruption.

Growing military ties with China

The reported procurement comes amid expanding defense cooperation between China and Iran despite years of international sanctions on Tehran.

European and Middle Eastern security sources told Reuters they were aware of discussions involving possible Iranian purchases of several QW-series MANPADS, including the QW-12, QW-18 and QW-19 variants.

Reuters previously reported that Iran was also negotiating with China to acquire anti-ship cruise missiles, although it could not determine whether that agreement was finalized.

If the current deal proceeds, it would underscore Iran’s continued reliance on a combination of domestic weapons production and foreign suppliers as it rebuilds military capabilities following months of conflict.

(Source: Reuters)

W

hat do white supremacist Silicon Valley tech bros and terrorist mass shooters of mosques, synagogues, and migrant centers have in common?

They all subscribe to a death cult that dreams of a utopic world where there is racial and cultural hierarchy, and all non-white migrants are deported from Western countries and imperialism, hard power and exploitation to reign again in the global order.

The world is facing a new form of terrorism threat and fascism: it is called Accelerationism. Accelerationists disdain non-white migrants, Muslims, ethnic minorities, radicals and politicians that advocate for diversity, integrating migrants, decolonial justice, and the reparation for slavery and colonialism.

Death cults

On May 19, 2026, two teenagers attacked a San Diego Mosque, killing three people and livestreamed their shooting. A 75-page manifesto written by the shooters espoused Islamophobia, antisemitism, anti-Black racism, Hispanophobia, accelerationism and misogyny was later found online. This was not an isolated incident. On March 15, 2019, a gunman walked into the Al Noor Mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand, and murdered 51 Muslims while livestreaming the massacre on Facebook. He left behind a manifesto soaked in the language of accelerationism and had similarities with the San Diego shooters’ manifesto.  Accelerationism espouses the idea that Western/White civilization must be pushed to a violent breaking point so that white and “pure” ethnostates can rise from the ashes and reclaim their glorious past.

The terrorism in Christchurch and accelerationism have a long history. It echoed Anders Breivik’s 2011 massacre in Norway, where 77 people, most of them teenagers, were murdered in the name of protecting Europe from cultural Marxism and Muslim migration. It echoed the Pittsburgh synagogue shooting, the El Paso Walmart attack targeting Hispanic shoppers, the Buffalo supermarket massacre aimed at Black Americans.

Accelerationist terrorism is carried out in the name of ideological and cultural warfare, carried out by mostly young white men who believe that accelerating racial, cultural and religious conflict would hasten a white supremacist revolution, response and reaction.

AI and the far-right

The question the world has been too slow to ask is this: who is building the intellectual, ideological and political infrastructure that makes this violence justifiable?

Look no further than Silicon Valley.

Elon Musk, today the world’s richest man, owner of X (formerly Twitter), and now the single most powerful unelected figure in the United States, has spent recent years amplifying white nationalist accounts, and platforming “great replacement” conspiracy theories, and signal-boosting neo-Nazi rhetoric to hundreds of millions of followers across the world. His very public embrace of far-right European parties, his attacks on Muslim communities, his obsessive promotion of white demographic anxiety, are not the eccentricities of a distracted Trillionaire. When Musk performed a Nazi salute at a post-inauguration rally and the world shrugged, it confirmed what many had long suspected: white supremacy has found its most powerful champion not in the backrooms of a skinhead bar but in the boardrooms of the most valuable companies on earth.

Marc Andreessen, the venture capitalist and co-founder of Netscape, published his “Techno-Optimist Manifesto” in 2023, declaring that there is no problem “that cannot be solved with more technology” and that the “techno-capital machine” exists to serve humanity. What he did not say is whose humanity he had in mind. The effective accelerationist movement (e/acc) that Andreessen and his Silicon Valley peers champion is accelerationism with a smile: the same ruthless logic of letting destructive forces run unchecked, dressed up in the language of progress, technology and innovation. The merger of white nationalist politics and Silicon Valley capital is no longer a fringe concern. It is the ideology of most Far Right and white supremacist political movements.

Underneath all of it runs a single obsession: replacement. The “great replacement” theory, the paranoid anxiety that white Western populations are being deliberately displaced by non-white migrants, has migrated from the fever swamps of the internet into mainstream conservative politics across Europe, America, and Australia. Replacement paranoia is the connective tissue between the Christchurch shooter and the French Far Right, between the neo-Nazi accelerationist and the Arktos circle and the recently exposed Dialog list of Peter Thiel. This is an ideological project: a far-right internationalism that stretches from Budapest to Buenos Aires, from Washington to Warsaw, and united by the shared paranoid conviction that the non-white world and its peoples are an existential threat to Western civilization.

Techno-fascism

And now this far right international has acquired its most powerful tool yet: Artificial Intelligence.

The global AI economy is being built on a foundation that replicates, with algorithmic precision, the colonial extraction of previous centuries. The data that trains the large language models powering Silicon Valley’s fortunes is harvested from populations across the Global South, often without consent, without compensation, and without benefit. The content moderation labour that makes these platforms usable is outsourced to workers in Kenya, the Philippines, India and Pakistan, paid poverty wages to absorb the worst of humanity’s digital violence so that Western users need not see it.

Moreover, the rare earth minerals that power the hardware are extracted from the Congo, from Bolivia, from Indonesia, by workforces whose conditions would be unthinkable in any country whose citizens Musk and Andreessen consider fully human.

This is the new colonialism, not the colonialism of the gunboat and the governor-general, but of the server farm and the terms of service agreement. The Global South is being incorporated into the AI economy not as a beneficiary but as raw material: its people as cheap labour, its data as free resource, its governments as compliant hosts, and most consequentially the Silicon Valley tech bros dream of a hierarchical world where the Global South is exploited and enslaved.

The accelerationists and the tech bros, in both their violent and techno-utopian forms, agree on one thing: some lives are the fuel, not the destination.

In their hyper-technological and advanced futuristic utopian world, where Musk, Jeff Bezos, Peter Thiel and other billionaires will go for vacation to Mars, there is no place for Muslims, Africans and peoples of the Global South.

Violent death cults have always worn different suits and hoodies in different eras. Today they wear a hoodie or suit and call themselves disruption innovationists, Techno-Utopianists or efficiency strategists.

The mosques of Christchurch and the sweatshops of Nairobi are not separate stories. They are the same story, told in different registers of the same accelerationist logic: that some people exist to be exploited so that others may prosper and build a civilization that reaches Mars and beyond while the Global South is robbed of its wealth, labour and minds and rendered perpetually poor and miserable.

We should not look away.

All forms and manifestations of hatred, dehumanization and exploitation ought to be challenged and resisted – even when it’s clothed in the language of technological advancement or saving a particular civilization, culture or race.

O

nly one in three Americans support the U.S. war with Iran, while a large majority believe President Donald Trump has failed to clearly explain the conflict’s objectives, according to a new Reuters/Ipsos poll.

The nationwide survey, conducted from July 24 to 26 among 1,246 U.S. adults, found that support for the war has fallen to its lowest level since the conflict began five months ago. Only about one-third of respondents said they back the military campaign, while support has remained below 40% for five consecutive months.

Despite declining support for the war, Trump’s overall job approval rating rose three percentage points from the previous month to 37%, although it remains historically low for his presidency.

The poll found widespread uncertainty about the administration’s objectives in Iran.

Overall, 69% of respondents—including roughly 40% of Republicans—said Trump has not clearly explained why the United States is fighting in Iran.

Since the conflict began, Trump has cited multiple goals, including:

• Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
• Destroying Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities.
• Encouraging Iranians to overthrow their government.

The White House defended the administration’s approach. Spokesperson Olivia Wales said Trump would not base decisions on “fluid opinion polls” and reiterated that preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon remains the administration’s central objective.

Support lags far behind previous U.S. wars

Reuters noted that public backing for the Iran conflict is substantially lower than support recorded during the early stages of previous American military campaigns.

According to historical Gallup polling:

• Around 70% of Americans supported the Iraq War during its initial months in 2003.
• Approximately 90% backed military action in Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks in 2001.

By contrast, Reuters/Ipsos polling has shown support for military action against Iran never rising above 40% since the conflict began on February 28.

The survey suggests the war may become a significant political challenge for Republicans before November’s congressional midterm elections.

Independent voters surveyed by Reuters/Ipsos favored Democratic congressional candidates over Republicans by 36% to 20%. Independents also gave Democrats higher marks on economic issues, reflecting concern over rising living costs linked to the conflict.

The war has contributed to higher energy prices, with average U.S. gasoline prices climbing above $4 per gallon compared with about $3 before hostilities began.

Republican strategist Alex Conant, who served in President George W. Bush’s administration, said the conflict is making it harder for Republicans to focus on economic issues that they had hoped would dominate the election campaign.

Voters question the purpose of the war

Several voters interviewed by Reuters expressed uncertainty about the reasons for the war.

Alex Womack, a retired Marine from Georgia who previously supported Trump, said he no longer understood the purpose of the conflict.

“It’s not clear why we started a war with them. I have no idea,” Womack said.

Another Georgia voter, Rhyan Anderson, who voted for Trump in 2024 after supporting former President Joe Biden in 2020, argued that the administration should focus more on domestic priorities than overseas conflicts.

“My biggest thing is just focus on the people who are actually in the country,” Anderson told Reuters.

According to Reuters, 18 U.S. service members have been killed since the conflict began, while thousands of people have died in Iran and in Lebanon, where fighting between Israeli forces and the Iran-backed Hezbollah has continued.

The combination of rising fuel prices, uncertainty over the war’s objectives and persistent public skepticism presents a growing political challenge for Trump as his administration seeks to sustain support for a conflict that has now entered its sixth month.

(Source: Reuters)

T

he 80-year-old global order established after the Second World War is unravelling. The security architecture of the Atlantic system, the economic and political framework of the Bretton Woods institutions, the liberal assumption that free trade would reduce conflicts by increasing interdependence, and global supply chains reliant on cheap energy and low-cost production no longer meet the needs of the new era. The world is transitioning, increasingly and more forcefully, to a new global competitive order that we define as ‘Second Mercantilism’.

In this new order, trade is no longer merely trade. A semiconductor factory, a container port, a data centre, a rare-earth elements mine, an LNG terminal, a satellite network, a submarine cable, a shipyard or an ammunition factory have all simultaneously become elements of economic, technological, geopolitical and military power. States are no longer competing solely for market share; they are vying for control over production capacity, critical technology, energy security, logistics routes, strategic minerals, data flows and supply chains.

Consequently, the old distinction between the global economy and the global security system has vanished. The economy is being securitised, security is being industrialised, technology is becoming geopolitical, and trade is increasingly and explicitly transforming into a tool of the struggle for national power. It is precisely in the midst of this major shift that NATO’s future lies.

In the 20th century, there was an ideological, military and nuclear balance between two major blocs. Today, however, competition is far more fragmented, far more technological and far more economic in nature. Russia represents an immediate and direct military challenge; China, long-term industrial, technological and systemic competition; regional powers, missile systems, unmanned systems and proxy wars; whilst non-state actors represent asymmetric threats.

Cyberspace, space, undersea infrastructure, energy networks, critical minerals, artificial intelligence and supply chains are becoming new arenas of competition. In such a world, it is impossible for NATO to continue on its current path based on the classic military alliance logic of 1949.

5 per cent: much more than just a budget target

The commitment by NATO members to raise their defense and security-related expenditure to 5 per cent of their GDP represents one of the most significant economic and political transformations in the Alliance’s history. However, it would be a grave mistake to interpret this decision merely as ‘spending more money’. For money, on its own, does not create deterrence.

You can increase your budget, but if you cannot produce sufficient ammunition, you cannot fight. You may possess the most advanced platforms, but if your critical components are reliant on a single external supplier, you cannot establish a sustainable defense capability. You can develop excellent air defense systems, but if your stockpile of interceptor missiles is depleted within a few weeks of intense fighting, your strategic resilience remains merely theoretical. You may possess very expensive fighter aircraft, but if their maintenance, engine, electronics, software and ammunition supply chains are fragile, you cannot manage the economics of a protracted war.

The Russia-Ukraine War, the crises in the Red Sea, the conflicts in the Middle East and the revolution brought about by unmanned systems on the battlefield have all demonstrated the same truth to us: the decisive factor in modern warfare is not merely technological superiority; it is the ability to scale up technology, produce ammunition continuously, rapidly replace losses and adapt industrial capacity to the pace of the war.

For this reason, NATO’s 5 per cent target must be a production doctrine, not merely an accounting decision. In this new era, NATO’s fundamental question should not be ‘How much are the Allies spending?’, but rather ‘How much can the Alliance produce, how quickly can it replenish its stocks, how long can it sustain operations, and how rapidly can it ramp up production in the event of war?’ It is precisely at this point that NATO must transition from a traditional alliance to a comprehensive defense economy.

NATO’s new requirement: A total defense economy

The concept of a total defense economy does not mean transforming the entire economy into a military economy. The issue is to restructure the boundaries between defense and the economy in line with the demands of the new era.

NATO can no longer consider military planning and industrial planning in isolation from one another. Defence ministries, economic and industrial ministries, energy policies and critical infrastructure investments cannot operate in separate spheres. This is because, in modern warfare, the distance between the front line and the production line has been eliminated.

For this reason, the Alliance’s new economic model must be built on five fundamental pillars:

Firstly, long-term and predictable joint demand must be established. If defense companies are to be asked to increase their capacity, they must be given a 10–15-year order outlook, not just a three-year one. Factories grow not on the basis of political statements, but on guarantees of sustainable demand.

Secondly, joint procurement mechanisms must be strengthened. The dozens of different standards for the same munitions, disjointed national tenders for the same requirement, duplicate investments amongst allies, and political protectionism that hinders economies of scale must be reduced.

Thirdly, redundancy must be established in critical production chains. In the new NATO economy, no strategic product should be dependent on a single factory, a single country or a single company. Alternative production centers must be established for engines, explosives, guidance systems, semiconductors, optical and radar components, batteries, critical minerals and software infrastructure.

Fourthly, a transition to a joint stockpiling system must be made. Ammunition, fuel, critical spare parts, air defense interceptors and strategic raw materials must be planned not solely on the basis of national stockpiling logic, but in terms of the Alliance’s overall resilience.

Fifthly, production-conversion capacity must be established in the event of war. Plans must be drawn up today to identify which elements of civilian industry – from automotive to electronics, from chemicals to metallurgy, and from software to logistics – can support defense production in the event of a crisis.

The view that this new architecture must evolve towards a ‘NATO Defence Economic Area’ has gained significant traction. This area should encompass common standards, long-term orders, mutual investments, cross-border production clusters, coordination on critical raw materials, the integration of SMEs into the system, joint testing and certification processes, and the reduction of political barriers to defense trade within the Alliance.

This is because, in the era of Second Mercantilism, the defense industry is not merely a sector in which companies operate. It is one of the main pillars of national power, technological sovereignty and alliance resilience.

The alliance cannot afford ‘internal strife’

However, NATO faces more than just Russia, China or other global challenges. One of the most significant issues the Alliance must overcome is strategic fragmentation within its own ranks.

NATO must shake off the image of a ‘row among boatmen’ – a situation where allies sometimes view one another as rivals, where bilateral political disputes hold collective security hostage, where defense industry restrictions are directed at alliance members, and where short-term domestic political calculations take precedence over long-term strategic objectives.

To put it more plainly, NATO cannot prepare for a new Cold War whilst engaged in an internal ‘brawl’. Weakening an ally’s defense capabilities on political grounds undermines the alliance’s overall deterrence. Disrupting an ally’s supply chain reduces the capacity NATO will require in a crisis. Imposing restrictions on parts, engines, ammunition or technology for an ally’s strategic platforms, whilst subsequently expecting that same ally to contribute more to the Alliance’s defense, is unsustainable.

Moreover, as the world moves towards far greater systemic competition, NATO’s squandering of its energy on internal disputes creates strategic space for its real rivals.

The Alliance cannot resolve every political issue between its members. Such an expectation is unrealistic. However, it must not allow bilateral disputes to paralyze its collective defence capabilities. Defence industry cooperation must be spared from becoming the first casualty of short-term political tensions. In this regard, the example of Türkiye is highly instructive.

C

ommercial shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait dropped to its lowest level in months after Yemen’s Houthi movement launched attacks on Saudi oil installations along the Red Sea coast, raising fresh concerns over maritime security and global energy supplies.

Shipping data from Kpler showed that only 11 commodity vessels transited the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on Sunday, reflecting a sharp decline in traffic as ship operators reassessed risks following the latest escalation. The disruption comes as the Tehran-aligned Houthis seek to impose a blockade on Saudi exports, broadening the regional fallout from the ongoing U.S.-Iran conflict.

The reduced vessel traffic has already pushed physical crude prices in the Middle East, Europe, and Africa to two-month highs, highlighting growing concerns over the stability of key global shipping routes.

Among the vessels that passed through the strait were seven oil tankers, including two very large crude carriers (VLCCs) bound for Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu port to load crude oil. Another tanker linked to Russia also entered the Red Sea.

Hong Kong-flagged New Explorer

Meanwhile, four tankers exited the Red Sea carrying crude destined for Asian markets. These included the Hong Kong-flagged New Explorer, transporting approximately 2 million barrels of Saudi and Emirati crude to Ningbo, China, another tanker carrying 1 million barrels of Russian crude for China, and a vessel delivering roughly 750,000 barrels of Saudi crude to Pakistan.

A second Hong Kong-flagged VLCC, New Pearl, carrying 2 million barrels of Saudi crude to Zhoushan, China, was also reported leaving the Red Sea, becoming the fourth Chinese supertanker to transit the route since the Houthis declared a naval blockade.

The Houthi military said it targeted facilities operated by Saudi state-owned oil giant Aramco in the Red Sea cities of Yanbu and Jizan on Saturday, further escalating tensions in the region.

Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz also remained subdued over the weekend despite a pause in direct U.S. and Iranian strikes. Fewer than 10 commodity vessels crossed the strategic waterway each day, according to Kpler data.

On Sunday, seven vessels transited Hormuz, including three Iranian-linked product tankers leaving the Gulf. The previous day, only three vessels passed through the strait with their tracking systems switched off, including a VLCC heading to Qatar, a liquefied petroleum gas tanker bound for the United Arab Emirates, and a tanker carrying Qatari naphtha to Japan.

The continued disruption across both the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Strait of Hormuz underscores mounting risks to global shipping and energy markets as regional tensions remain high.

O

ne of the greatest aspirations of a journalist with an interest in international relations is to cover events held in various parts of the world where global issues are debated (such as the NATO Summit, the UN General Assembly, the G20, etc.). In a professional climate where conventional media is losing its importance on the international stage day by day, and whilst the financial clout of the media is eroding and investment in certain sectors is being cut back, the likelihood of a journalist attending such summits is also declining day by day.

In the current climate, the hosting of an organization such as NATO in Turkey presented a significant opportunity for our colleagues in Turkey. Although journalists and television professionals, myself included, had only limited opportunities to engage with leaders due to the nature of the event, we did manage to soak up the atmosphere of the summit.

Turkey is the only NATO member state with a Muslim majority. The 2026 summit was set to have a distinct character for this reason alone. However, factors such as the ongoing tension between Iran and the US (which had been reignited just hours before US President Trump landed in Ankara when he ordered a new strike), the continuing disagreement between the US and its European allies, and the deadlock in the Russia-Ukraine war all served to make the summit even more significant.

Details of the Trump–Erdoğan meeting

The meeting that fuelled the intrigue at the NATO Summit was the encounter between President Erdoğan and US President Trump. Once the rumours circulating days beforehand – that ‘Trump would not attend the summit due to his anger towards NATO members’ – were dispelled, our focus shifted to the nature of the bilateral meeting. The last time a US President had made an official visit to Turkey was in 2009.

Following the visit by then US President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–1961) in 1959, the chain of visits continued with George H. W. Bush (1991), Bill Clinton (1999), George W. Bush (2004) and Obama (2009), had been interrupted during Trump’s first term and had not even been on the agenda during Joe Biden’s term (2020–2024). Whilst Trump’s visit marked a turning point in this sense, current issues (the F-35 procurement process, CAATSA, etc.) were also raising the stakes.

Despite the scrutiny that began days in advance, logistical and protocol details were kept strictly confidential right up to the last moment. Contrary to expectations, Trump’s aircraft landed at the newly opened Ankara Airport (and the fact that he returned from Esenboğa on an older model aircraft also raised questions. However, technical reasons related to security were cited as the justification). President Erdoğan welcomed Trump at the airport with a gesture reserved for a select few guests.

Upon arriving at the welcoming ceremony at the Presidential Complex, we noticed a different arrangement in the preparations. The ranks of the mehteran band, which usually performs at routine receptions, had been reinforced, and additional units of Janissary soldiers had been deployed. The two leaders’ delegations were also positioned on a platform that differed from the norm. The leaders’ senior advisers (foreign ministers, defense ministers, ambassadors) held their initial discussions on this platform. The flypast by the Turkish Stars, comprising six F-5s, which was part of the welcoming ceremony, was precise and went off without a hitch.

The most exciting moment of the entire process was the joint press conference. The format we are accustomed to in a standard leaders’ meeting is press conferences held in the main hall following discussions between the leaders and their delegations. On this occasion, however, it was announced that only a limited number of journalists would be allowed into President Erdoğan’s office. We were therefore swiftly directed towards the room.

The organizers informed us that journalists wishing to ask questions would need to be ‘quick off the mark’, as the format of the press conference would be modelled on the ‘Oval Office Rules’. I recalled the format we’d seen on TV screens. In those press conferences, held in a small room with Trump and the visiting leader flanked by their aides, it was the loudest who won and secured the floor. Once the floor was opened for questions, although American journalists took the lead with the first questions, my Turkish colleagues and I also managed to ask our questions by adopting a forceful and boisterous approach to secure the floor.

US President Trump gave the floor to ask my question, which touched on the Iran-US tensions. Throughout the meeting, Trump delivered positive messages, particularly regarding CAATSA restrictions and the F-35s. It is also worth noting that, unlike the bilateral meetings held in the Oval Office – which were characterised by Trump’s impulsive responses – there were no remarks from the Trump-Erdoğan talks in Washington or Ankara that would cause any friction.

The factors driving the relationship between the two leaders beyond the usual bounds to a positive momentum are seen as their ability to strike the right balance in their dialogue, the fact that their communication predates the presidency, and the continued flow of contact following Erdoğan’s message to Trump even after he lost the 2020 election. Another important factor is that Trump has framed the Erdoğan–Biden tension as a positive reference point. The animosity towards Biden, which he mentions in almost every speech, also lends extra credibility to those who have had difficulties with him. Ironically, in Trump’s political analysis, the Evangelical vote—which solidified following the release of Pastor Brunson—has also made a positive contribution to the new course of Turkey–US relations.

What happened at the summit?

Opportunities to engage with leaders at the NATO Summit are very limited. One such opportunity is the ‘doorstep’ – the area where leaders give impromptu interviews on the morning of the summit. Not every leader makes an appearance here. It generally provides an opportunity for leaders of small and medium-sized countries, who are often out of the spotlight, to make their voices heard. Danish Leader Frederiksen, commenting on Trump’s continued interest in Greenland, emphasized their stance by stating, “We will defend every inch of our land; this is why we are in NATO.” UK Prime Minister Starmer, who is due to step down upon his return, was cautious; he did not answer any questions and was not particularly talkative. Although French President Macron’s name was on the list, he was busy completing his now-traditional run at the time.

Even the order of arrival at the venue for the leaders’ summit has become a form of image management. Leaders from countries such as the US and France arrive last. Following the smooth participation of all 32 leaders in the much-anticipated session of the summit, attention turned to what was being discussed inside. The information received pointed to a positive atmosphere. It was noted that US President Trump listened to all the leaders who spoke. It was reported that Trump, who remained until the end of the session, did not address any contentious issues (such as the tensions with Spain, the Greenland issue, or tensions with European countries).

It was stated that Spanish Prime Minister Sánchez, in a constructive speech, emphasized that his country’s contribution to NATO should be measured not by mathematical figures but by the rate of achievement of strategic objectives. The extent to which Sánchez’s speech, which emphasized resolve, managed to cool Trump’s fixation on figures will become clear through future rhetoric and policies. It was noted that the US delegation heard the approach they had sought from all their allies during the leaders’ session.

Following the session, the summit effectively concluded with the leaders’ bilateral meetings and the press conferences they held. The most eagerly anticipated of these meetings was undoubtedly Trump’s. Before the US leader took to the podium following NATO Secretary-General Rutte—who had used the hall before him—there was not a single empty seat in the hall, nor even a suitable place to stand. The hall was completely cleared before the US President took to the stage; journalists were only allowed back in after security checks. Among the dozens of journalists vying for the chance to ask a question, the lucky ones were generally our American colleagues sitting in the front row, who had opted for colorful attire.

Trump’s summit marathon, during which he answered questions in a positive and conciliatory manner, concluded on a positive note despite the harsh messages that occasionally resurfaced in some of his press statements. President Erdoğan also held his final press conference as the host. Having followed all these proceedings, having observed that, unlike their foreign counterparts, Turkish journalists tend to include lengthy comments in their questions and drag out the subject before getting to the point, I feel it is worth emphasizing that there is a clear structural problem in this regard. As Turkish journalists, we do not know how to ask questions properly.

A farewell without the usual ‘See you next year’

The NATO Summit concluded without any major hitches. The international media community was highly satisfied with the facilities provided. The complimentary buffet service exceeded expectations, and the goody bags and kits presented to journalists were shared in vlogs. However, the development that particularly surprised the foreign leaders occurred right at the end. The gift of a revolver (firearm) engraved with their names, presented to them by Turkey, took the majority of the foreign leaders by surprise. Some were unable to take the gift home with them due to legal restrictions in their own countries, whilst others announced they would donate it to a museum.

Nevertheless, the message behind the gift hit home. The fact that the gift at a summit where tough issues were discussed was in keeping with realistic geopolitical conditions served as a powerful metaphor and message. It is also worth noting that the specially produced pen, manufactured using domestic resources, was well received.

As summits of this kind draw to a close, attention turns to the next one, and the scheduled date is marked. This time, however, there is a degree of uncertainty, as the likelihood that the summit will not be held next year has increased. In fact, there is no explicit rule stipulating that the summit must be held annually; a proposal that has recently come to the fore suggests extending the summit cycle to every two years.

It is expected that this process will be clarified by the end of this year; what is certain is that the next stop will be Albania. Although it seems impossible to predict the course regional developments will take by that date, it appears unlikely that the opportunities and agenda offered by Turkey will be presented within the framework of that summit.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

T

en years have passed since the coup attempt of July 15, 2016. From the very first day, the state launched a comprehensive campaign against the damage caused by FETÖ, the perpetrator of the coup attempt, within the system. With the support of society, a restoration of the state’s institutional structure was undertaken; this did not stop at merely erasing the traces of FETÖ, but also involved intensive efforts to thoroughly eliminate the effects of the tutelage mechanisms within the system. Of course, this is not a process that has been fully completed. It is clear that, just as FETÖ, which infiltrated the system over many years, may still have a small number of dormant cells within it, so too do the external links it established from the very beginning continue to exist.

Consequently, we must remain vigilant regarding the potential for FETÖ, and, naturally, similar organisations, to cause harm to the system, even if they cannot go as far as staging a coup. However, another matter of at least equal importance is to recognise what else was actually prevented on the night of July 15, 2016, when the coup attempt was thwarted. Under the leadership of President Erdoğan, the Turkish nation stood up to the coup plotters on July 15, thereby saving not only democracy but also the country’s independence and future.

This is because developments that emerged particularly prior to the coup attempt – and which have continued to accelerate over the past decade – indicate that politics has taken on a new dimension globally. Thanks to President Erdoğan’s leadership and the public’s confidence in him, Turkey is putting up a strong fight during this challenging period. The loss of ground in foreign policy faced by many states in recent years, particularly France, has not affected Turkey. On the contrary, Turkey has expanded its sphere of influence by utilizing both soft and hard power elements simultaneously.

The world from 2016 to the present

Over the past decade, numerous studies have been conducted analyzing the causes and consequences of the 15 July coup attempt, covering topics ranging from FETÖ’s infiltration of the state from the 1970s onwards to the point where it gained sufficient power to attempt a coup. At this juncture, it is worth focusing on the developments that have taken place in the world and in Turkey over the ten-year period following the coup attempt. Indeed, the past decade has witnessed one of the most rapid periods of transformation in human history. First and foremost, the course of global politics has shifted. Donald Trump, who emerged victorious from the US Presidential Election in November 2016, effectively ushered in a new style of leadership.

The Covid-19 pandemic that emerged in 2020 led to a reassessment of states’ capacities and crisis-management capabilities. In a sense, the importance of being able to make swift decisions to cope with extraordinary circumstances was once again highlighted. Particularly in the early stages of the pandemic, international organizations proved ineffective, mechanisms for inter-state cooperation collapsed, and borders were closed on both sides. With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the prospect of a redrawing of the map in Northern Europe emerged. Indeed, Sweden and Finland, fearing that they might be next after Ukraine, hastily applied for NATO membership. During this period, in which the functions of international organizations were called into question, NATO remained an exception to the rule.

Indeed, not only did NATO’s membership increase, but expectations of its members also rose. Meanwhile, the ongoing Syrian Civil War came to an end at the end of 2024 with the overthrow of the Assad regime. Israel launched a genocide as part of its policy of depopulating Gaza. The terrorist state of Israel also carried out attacks against Iran and Lebanon, and in particular carried out assassinations targeting numerous figures within the Iranian state administration. This brief summary alone may suffice to illustrate the chaotic picture the world has faced over the past decade.

It is possible to say that the current process actually signals a paradigm shift in a sense. In fact, for almost the past twenty years, a security-oriented perspective, in which the reflexes of the nation-state have strengthened, has prevailed worldwide. States have prioritized their own national interests rather than adopting a universal perspective that emphasizes international cooperation mechanisms. To such an extent that the European Union (EU), which had already been losing ground following the UK’s departure in 2016, saw its influence further weakened due to its inability to present a united front in the face of global developments.

In particular, there was no unified voice among EU member states on defense and security policies. The voices of international organizations outside NATO were scarcely heard. Indeed, the very existence and functions of these organizations, including the United Nations, were called into question. Even if their existence were to continue, calls for significant structural changes were frequently voiced.

The longest decade in Turkish politics

Undoubtedly, the coup attempt orchestrated by FETÖ had significant repercussions on Turkish politics. One of the coup’s consequences, albeit not a direct one, was the adoption of a new system of government. With the constitutional amendments approved by a referendum in 2017, the country transitioned to a presidential system of government, thereby putting an end to the dual leadership in the executive branch. In the 2018 elections, President Erdoğan was elected as the first president under the new system.

In addition, far-reaching changes took place, particularly within the security and judicial bureaucracies. Whilst the country’s defense and security capabilities were strengthened on the one hand, they were also purged of FETÖ elements and genuinely nationalized on the other. Following the events of July 15, Turkey carried out the Euphrates Shield operation in 2016, the Olive Branch operation in 2017, the Peace Spring operation in 2019 and the Spring Shield operation in 2020 to prevent any security vulnerabilities. This prevented the formation of a ‘terror corridor’ along the line stretching from the Syrian border to the Mediterranean. During the same period, support was provided to Azerbaijan to regain its territories in Karabakh. In the Eastern Mediterranean, attempts by the Greek Cypriot Administration and Greece to expand their maritime zones were thwarted.

A clear stand was taken against Israel’s genocide and massacres targeting Palestinians. During this period, Turkey also faced a series of other challenges at home. It is fair to say that the most significant of these was the earthquake centered on Kahramanmaraş on the night of February 6, 2023, the effects of which were felt intensely across 11 provinces. In the earthquake, which claimed the lives of over 50,000 people, hundreds of thousands of homes were rendered uninhabitable. It is clear that this situation has also had a negative impact on the economy. This event, occurring just as the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic were beginning to be overcome, increased the pressure on economic management.

Turkey was directly or indirectly affected by almost all of these challenging processes. In contrast, Turkey emerged successfully from these trials, unlike many other states. Firstly, it was ensured that domestic developments did not lead to any weakness in state capacity. Although the security forces were most adversely affected by the coup attempt, both the Armed Forces and the law enforcement agencies continued their work without losing their capacity. The positions of the expelled FETÖ members were filled within a short time. Cross-border operations and domestic operations demonstrated that the security forces were able to carry out their duties without any weaknesses emerging. During the same period, Turkey also made significant strides, particularly in the security and defense sectors. Reducing dependence on foreign sources in the defense sector is one of the most important means of the country achieving true independence.

Historically, whenever Turkey’s national interests clashed with those of Western countries, it faced severe sanctions and embargoes from the opposing side. The most striking example of this was when, following the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation, numerous countries simultaneously imposed embargoes on Turkey. From that point onwards, Turkey endeavored to establish its own national defense industry with the limited resources available at the time. These efforts intensified significantly during the Özal era, which began in 1983. However, subsequently, particularly amidst the chaotic environment of the 1990s, this process experienced various setbacks due to the impact of successive economic and political crises.

The real breakthrough, however, began with the AK Party’s rise to power and has gained significant momentum, particularly over the last decade. President Erdoğan, recognizing the shifting global balance of power and correctly interpreting the trends in new technology, launched a major initiative in the defense industry. Defence companies have increased their exports to various parts of the world. The progress made in this area is closely linked not only to the companies’ growing capacity to adapt to new technologies but also to their ability to identify new markets.

Given their status as critical sectors, simply producing high-quality equipment in the defence and security fields is not sufficient in itself. The country’s political power serves as the most important means of selling to other states. Turkey’s sphere of influence, which has grown thanks to the efforts of President Erdoğan, has also ensured that production in these sectors generates economic revenue through exports. Consequently, over the past decade, Turkey has become one of the world’s leading defense industry suppliers.

A strong Turkey under Erdoğan’s leadership

Meanwhile, President Erdoğan has steadily increased his influence in non-Western societies. Moreover, it is not only within the Islamic world but also amongst oppressed nations in various parts of the world, particularly in Africa and South America, that Erdoğan has been viewed almost as their natural leader. The interesting aspect is that the Western world has also accepted this role of Erdoğan’s. As exemplified by US President Trump’s favor towards him, as seen once again at the most recent NATO summit, Erdoğan has been recognized as the spokesperson for a vast region. It can be said that this process has begun to transform Turkey from a regional actor into a global power. The ‘Turkey Century’ vision is, in fact, a clear expression of this endeavor. In the coming period, it will be possible to see the positive results of the steps taken in terms of both soft and hard power more clearly.

It is also important to emphasize that these steps have not been limited to the fields of foreign policy and security. For example, Turkey demonstrated its ability to heal the wounds caused by an earthquake that deeply affected 11 cities, leaving some of them almost in ruins, within a short period of time. Hundreds of thousands of homes were built in the earthquake-stricken areas; in effect, new towns were established. Moreover, this process was carried out without disrupting ongoing public investment projects in other parts of the country. Just as in the political sphere, strong leadership was a key factor here. It is worth noting in passing that this process also demonstrated the benefits of the Presidential System of Government. The country continued to grow in a stable and determined manner without descending into the chaotic climate characterized by the coalitions that existed prior to the AK Party’s time in power.

It is clear that, had the 15 July coup attempt been successful, Turkey’s capacity to deal with problems, whether arising from external sources or from within the country itself, would have been extremely limited. In particular, it is easy to foresee that an independent foreign policy aligned with the country’s interests could not have been pursued. Indeed, the primary objective of the coup attempt was to reduce Turkey to a weakened state, with no room for manoeuver outside the Western world, and particularly the US, and where the expression of national will was suppressed. In contrast, the response of the people, under the leadership of President Erdoğan, ensured that these plans were turned on their head. The fact that the country weathered a coup attempt characterized by disproportionate use of violence, in which 253 people lost their lives, thousands were injured, and bombs rained down on cities, has boosted the nation’s self-confidence and enhanced the country’s standing in the international community.

At the same time, the importance of strong and resolute leadership has been demonstrated once again. President Erdoğan not only ensured the coup attempt failed by directing the nation onto the streets on the night of 15 July, but also strengthened the country’s power through the steps he took afterwards. It is clear that these developments are instructive in many respects. What is particularly striking is that Erdoğan’s resolute stance and determined attitude have strengthened Turkey’s position amongst nations. Of course, state administration and politics are closely linked to institutionalization and the full fulflilment of duties by professional teams. However, to be fair, it is important to emphasize the following point in particular: both the resistance witnessed on the night of July 15 and Turkey’s rapidly rising global standing in the aftermath are, to a large extent, the result of President Erdoğan’s leadership skills.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

I

ndia’s student protest movement has gained momentum online after demonstrations against examination paper leaks triggered a wave of social media posts criticizing Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government.

The protests, led by students demanding the resignation of Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan, intensified after a march toward Parliament on July 20 brought central New Delhi to a standstill.

According to protesters, more than 100 students were injured during a police crackdown. Police denied allegations of excessive force, but videos recorded by demonstrators circulated widely across social media platforms.

The footage showed scenes from the protests, including clashes between police and demonstrators, tear gas, baton charges, and students fleeing the area. The videos quickly spread on Instagram and other platforms, generating memes, commentary, and calls for further demonstrations.

“If nothing, we are televising our revolution,” protester Avanshika Singh told Al Jazeera during the demonstrations.

Cockroach Janta Party leads campaign

Young protesters said social media had become a central tool for documenting events and mobilizing support.

Posts criticizing the government and demanding accountability over repeated examination paper leaks have spread widely, while official posts by the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party have reportedly been flooded with comments calling for the education minister’s resignation.

The protests have also inspired demonstrations in other Indian cities, including Mumbai, Bengaluru, Patna, Lucknow, and Aizawl.

The demonstrations are being organized by the Cockroach Janta Party, a political pressure group formed after remarks by India’s chief justice comparing young people to “cockroaches” and “parasites” sparked backlash online.

The group has said protests will continue peacefully until three demands are met: the resignation of Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan, assurances that criminal cases will not be pursued against protesters, and compensation for families of students who died by suicide following exam paper leaks and cancellations.

A reversal of social media dominance

Political analysts say the movement represents a significant shift in India’s online political landscape.

Modi and the BJP were among the earliest political forces in India to effectively use social media to build support. However, analysts say Generation Z protesters are now using the same platforms to challenge the government’s narrative.

Cultural critic Anurag Minus Verma described the protests as an example of online irony and meme culture being transformed into a political organizing tool.

“The criticism and hate directed at Modi in the capital is not only acceptable now, but even cool,” Verma told Al Jazeera.

Prime Minister Modi addressed the issue on social media, saying that “nothing is more important than the welfare and future of our youth” and noting that the government had established fast-track courts to punish those responsible for examination paper leaks.

The response was quickly challenged online by leaders of the Cockroach Janta Party, who continued to criticize the government’s handling of the crisis.

As protests continue in New Delhi, organizers say social media remains central to their strategy, allowing students to document events in real time and build support beyond the streets of the capital.

(Source: Aljazeeera English)

T

he stability of political regimes is assessed through the nature of the relationship between the normative power of the constitutional order and the depth of social legitimacy. The mere existence of a constitution, the meticulous construction of the institutional architecture, or the explicit definition of the principle of the separation of powers in legal texts does not, in itself, guarantee the security of the regime. The true resilience of regimes is revealed in the attitudes of social actors towards the source of legitimacy during times of crisis. In this context, coups are not merely power struggles targeting the institutional continuity of the state; they are attempts to forcibly answer the question of who will exercise sovereignty.

In political science literature, a coup is defined as an attempt by an organized group within the state apparatus to seize executive power through the use of force or the threat of force, by suspending constitutional and legal procedures. In this context, coups signify not merely a transfer of power, but the detachment of political legitimacy from its institutional foundation and its subsequent reconstruction through power relations. Studies on coups indicate that such interventions are more likely to occur in regimes characterized by a low level of institutionalization, where the capacity for consensus among civilian political actors is weak and power centers within the state are fragmented. In systems where political institutions are not sufficiently entrenched, power struggles may turn to the direct use of force rather than relying on electoral, parliamentary or legal mechanisms.

Discussions on military tutelage reveal that when the military goes beyond its role as an institution ensuring security against external threats to assume a supervisory and directive role over the political sphere, it weakens democratic processes. When the military positions itself as the ultimate guardian of the regime or the arbiter of its ideological boundaries, it limits the decision-making capacity of elected civilian authorities and erodes democratic accountability. In such a structure, the military begins to be perceived as a legitimate actor capable of intervening in politics. This situation becomes one of the fundamental structural obstacles to democratic consolidation.

Institutional veto capacity

Analyses of democratic fragility emphasize that the institutional veto capacity of anti-regime or extra-systemic actors is decisive during periods of crisis. Situations such as economic crises, social polarization, governance failures or loss of legitimacy can increase the fragility of the political system, creating a fertile ground for anti-democratic interventions. During periods when coordination among the state’s key institutions breaks down and social consensus weakens, coups emerge as the result of a broader regime crisis. For this reason, modern literature explains coups not so much in terms of the will of individual actors, but rather through institutional weaknesses, power balances and fragilities within the regime’s structure.

When Turkish political history is examined through these theoretical frameworks, it becomes apparent that the tension between democratic representation and authoritarian power centers is a persistent feature. From the time of Ottoman modernization onwards, the positioning of the military and bureaucratic elites as the state’s founding and protective actors has led to political legitimacy being constructed in a state-centered manner rather than from a social base. During the Republican era, this structure gained institutional continuity; following the transition to a multi-party system, however, a structural conflict emerged between political legitimacy derived from elections and the tradition of tutelary intervention.

Given this historical background, the coup attempt that took place on the night of July 15, 2016, cannot be regarded as an isolated security incident. This event marks a critical threshold in Turkey’s tradition of intervention, which spans nearly two centuries, and constitutes a historic turning point in the societal defense of democratic legitimacy. The uniqueness of the event is evident in the scale of the attempt, the level of violence involved, and the nature of the societal reaction it provoked.

Pre-Republican political structure

To understand the sociological roots of coups in Turkey, one must examine the pre-Republican political structure. During the classical period of the Ottoman Empire, whilst central authority appeared strong, power relations were shaped by the balance between the palace bureaucracy, the military elite and regional power centres. With the process of modernisation, the centralisation of military reforms within state transformation significantly increased the political weight of the army.

The deposition of Sultan Abdülaziz in 1876 is one of the clearest indications of the Ottoman state elite’s capacity to intervene in the transfer of power. The power structure established by the Committee of Union and Progress after 1908, meanwhile, deepened the institutional intertwining of military-political relations. Consequently, the mindset that the military elite possessed the right to determine the direction of the state became deeply entrenched.

The central role of the military in the founding of the Republic not only failed to bring this historical legacy to an end but also provided it with a new basis of legitimacy. The military background of the founding generation fostered the notion that the military bore a special responsibility for the regime’s survival. In subsequent periods, this understanding formed the institutional basis for the tutelary mindset that argued democratic politics must be kept within certain limits.

Prime Minister Adnan Menderes

The transfer of power in Turkey following the 1950 elections represented a historic advance in terms of democratic representation. However, this transition did not eliminate tutelary reflexes. The coup of 27 May 1960 is the clearest illustration of this reality.

May 27 signifies the overthrow by armed force of an elected, democratic and legitimate government – that is, the will of the people as expressed. The execution of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and two of his ministers following the intervention constituted a punishment directed against the will of the people. This event represents a deep fracture in the collective memory of Turkish democracy. One of the coup’s most significant consequences was the normalization of military intervention as a legitimate political tool. An event as horrific and repugnant as the coup itself is the fact that this tragedy was declared a public holiday and celebrated for years…

The constitutional order established after 1961 granted military and bureaucratic institutions the power of veto over the system. Thus, a hybrid structure emerged—democratic in appearance, but fundamentally encircled by mechanisms of tutelage.

The March 12, 1971, memorandum demonstrated that the political arena could be forcibly restructured without directly seizing power. The fact that Parliament remained open does not imply that the intervention was of a civilian nature, as political decision-making processes were shaped under military pressure.

The coup of September 12, 1980, on the other hand, radically transformed Turkey’s social and institutional fabric. Parliament was closed, political parties were dissolved, and fundamental rights and freedoms were suspended. This period marked a phase in which state violence intensified on an institutional scale. Detentions, torture, bans and a climate of severe repression produced deep traumas in the collective memory.

A

n internal Israeli government document obtained by Al Jazeera has revealed that Israeli authorities collected information on more than 150 international humanitarian organizations in 2013, identifying several prominent charities as supporters or critics of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement against Israel.

The spreadsheet, accessed through an Israeli government ministry website, listed basic information on international charities, including directors’ names, contact details and areas of operation. A separate comments section, however, contained assessments of some organizations’ positions on Israel and the Palestinian issue.

Among the organizations singled out were Oxfam, which the document described as “active in global BDS efforts,” as well as France-based Première Urgence International, labelled a “critic of Israel,” Geneva-based Defense for Children International, described as “involved in anti-Israel campaigning,” and Spain’s Mundubat, characterized as “highly involved in BDS.”

Responding to the findings, Oxfam said the comments reflected allegations rather than objective assessments of its work.

The organization said it does not support or promote the BDS movement and operates under humanitarian principles and international legal standards. It reiterated its position that Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank violate international humanitarian law.

Experts say file shows early monitoring strategy

Analysts interviewed by Al Jazeera said the document offers insight into Israel’s approach to monitoring international civil society organizations during a period when the BDS movement was gaining international momentum.

The document dates from October 2013, a year marked by several high-profile boycott initiatives, including physicist Stephen Hawking’s withdrawal from a conference in Israel, academic boycott campaigns, and efforts by religious organizations to oppose products originating from Israeli settlements.

Mayssoun Sukarieh, a senior lecturer at King’s College London, said Israel was beginning to feel the impact of the growing BDS campaign and may have been gathering information that later informed legislation targeting boycott supporters.

In 2017, Israel enacted a law barring entry to foreign nationals who publicly support the BDS movement.

Tania Hary, executive director of the Israeli human rights organization Gisha, said the document demonstrated government monitoring of humanitarian organizations rather than addressing legitimate security concerns.

She argued the file reflected long-standing scrutiny of organizations providing assistance to Palestinians living under Israeli occupation.

Giovanni Fassina of the European Legal Support Center said the document illustrated what he described as an early phase of Israel’s broader efforts to track organizations supporting Palestinian rights.

NGOs respond

Several organizations named in the document disputed the characterizations.

Germany’s Medico International said it had never endorsed the BDS movement, although it supports the right of individuals and groups to advocate for boycotts as a form of political expression.

By contrast, the Palestine Solidarity Association of Sweden acknowledged its support for the BDS campaign, describing it as a nonviolent strategy aimed at promoting Palestinian rights and encouraging Israel to comply with international law.

The report comes amid continued debate over the relationship between Israel and international humanitarian organizations operating in the occupied Palestinian territories.

Aid groups have repeatedly raised concerns over restrictions on humanitarian access to Gaza, administrative requirements imposed on international organizations, and increased scrutiny of aid operations during the conflict that began in October 2023.

The Israeli Ministry of Welfare and Social Affairs, through whose website the document was reportedly accessed, did not respond to Al Jazeera’s request for comment.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

F

ebruary 28, 2025 was one of the darkest days of the Ukraine-Russia War. Yet, for Ukraine, the catastrophe is unfolding not on the front lines but in Washington, right at the gates of the White House. In the early days of his second presidential term, Donald Trump opens proceedings by publicly mocking Ukrainian President Zelensky’s attire in front of the press, in a manner contrary to diplomatic protocol, before the President has even had a chance to enter the residence. Whilst Zelenskyy thought he would have to make do with this cold shower at the door, inside the White House he was subjected to a barrage of heavy criticism, this time joined by Vice-President James David Vance.

In a sense, those 10 minutes – during which all the aid the US had provided over the past three years was thrown in his face – must have felt like a decade, not only to the Ukrainian President but also to the European countries that had supported Ukraine. Donald Trump consistently maintained his line of accusing his predecessor, Joe Biden, over the Ukraine–Russia War right up until August 2025.

The Trump–Putin summit held on August 15, 2025, at Elmendorf–Richardson Air Force Base in Alaska had further reinforced the impression that all hope for Ukraine had been completely dashed. Furthermore, events at the White House just three days later, on August 18, 2025, reinforced the perception that the US had completely capitulated to Russia’s position on the war in Ukraine. That day, Trump lined up European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Finnish President Stubb, French President Macron, German Chancellor Merz, Italian Prime Minister Meloni, British Prime Minister Starmer, Ukrainian President Zelensky and NATO Secretary-General Rutte before him, and dictated his expectations regarding the course of the Ukraine–Russia War.

Furthermore, by catching this group off guard in front of the media, he forced them to speak on the validity of his own views. However, the evolving relations between the People’s Republic of China and Russia, the support Moscow provided to the Tehran regime during the Iran war, and Russia’s reluctance to sit down at the negotiating table have shifted the course of events.

A changing wind from Alaska to Ankara

On 8 July 2026, the image presented by the Trump–Zelensky duo when they faced the media at the NATO Summit in Ankara was very different from the unpleasant scenes witnessed a year and a half earlier. Beyond the positive messages conveyed, Trump had warmed relations to the point of joking with Zelensky about Ukraine’s drone and missile strikes on Moscow. When Trump asked, “Would you like to go to Moscow?”, Zelensky replied, “I don’t think so; there are far too many Ukrainian drones there.”

Clearly, the US President was also extremely pleased with Ukraine’s dominance, achieved through drones and guided missiles, extending as far as 2,000 kilometers into Russian airspace. Indeed, during the summit, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte remarked: “Some key targets deep inside Russia have been struck. ‘Over the past two months, Ukraine has been hitting targets more successfully’.” It is clear that Ukraine has not only made significant strides in the field of FPV drones and guided missiles.

There has also been an increase—the details of which we are not yet fully aware—in the quality and quantity of satellite-based electronic intelligence provided to Ukraine by NATO member states. The fact that around 100 naval vessels operating for the Russian ‘Ghost Fleet’ were struck by Ukrainian drone attacks in the Sea of Azov in the week following the NATO Summit is a matter that warrants attention in terms of the level these capabilities have reached. Looking back a little further, we can conclude that events took place which led Trump to lose hope that Russia and Putin would make peace with Ukraine in the final quarter of 2025.

The balance of power was redrawn in 2026

From the very first days of 2026, the nature and scale of Ukraine’s drone attacks saw a significant increase. Whilst all logistics routes supplying food and fuel to Crimea were paralyzed, almost all of the peninsula’s fuel depots and main electricity transmission stations were taken out of action by July. Petrochemical plants and refineries across Russia were struck 200 times in six months. This represents an 11-fold increase compared with the first six months of 2025. In May alone, 16 highly successful attacks were carried out against Russian refineries.

It has become commonplace for Ukrainian kamikaze UAVs to reach a range of 2,000 kilometers, or for FPV drones to strike targets more than 100 kilometers behind the front line. Having lost 40 per cent of its oil refining capacity, Russia has reached the point of banning diesel exports following its decision to ban the export of petrol and aviation fuel. Having been reduced to the point of having to import refined oil from India, Russia was unable to parade tanks and mobile missile launchers on Red Square during the traditional Second World War Victory Day commemorations on May 9.

As the military balance rapidly shifted against Russia, US President Trump’s behavior towards Ukrainian President Zelensky at the G7 Summit in Paris and the NATO Summit in Ankara, held between and June 15-17, signaled that even tougher times lay ahead for Moscow. At the summit, a commitment of 70 billion euros was made to provide Ukraine with military equipment, ammunition and training by 2026. Furthermore, following statements from some NATO member states that ‘we have nothing left to give to Ukraine’, the alliance decided to take an unprecedented step. Led by Canada, an initiative was launched to establish the ‘Defense, Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB)’ with the participation of certain NATO member states.

The bank, scheduled to become operational in 2027, aims to provide low-cost financing of up to 100 billion pounds for defense projects. The members set to participate in this bank project include Turkey, Albania, Belgium, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania and Ukraine. It is clear that the Alliance does not wish to see a repeat of the chaos that ensued regarding support for the Kyiv administration from the outset of the war in Ukraine and intends to find an institutional solution to this.

The US has no further expectations of a Russia under Putin’s rule

Returning to the final communiqué of the NATO Summit in Ankara, it appears that the mobilization launched against the Russian threat directed at Ukraine – and even Poland and the Baltic states – will continue with an open-ended timeline. The communiqué, referencing the NATO Hague Summit Communiqué dated June 25, 2025, emphasised that Russia poses a long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security and stability. In other words, NATO members will channel more of their economic capacity into deterrence and defense against threats originating from Russia.

The emphasis on Russia as a “long-term threat” could be interpreted as the US having given up hope on the Putin administration. The visits to Moscow by US Special Envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff – which the Kremlin has been awaiting for nearly two months but which have yet to materialize – could also be seen as a manifestation of this “loss of hope”. Reports by the Russian TASS news agency in the first week of July stated that this visit, which Moscow was apparently eagerly awaiting, “could take place by the end of the summer, though a definite date has not yet been set”.

A report published in the British newspaper The Telegraph on July 10, 2026, however, indicates that the growing aversion towards Russia, particularly in Washington and other NATO capitals, is set to increase exponentially. According to the British newspaper’s report, the Dutch intelligence services, the AIVD (Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service) and the MIVD (Military Intelligence and Security Service), have discovered that doorbell cameras at hundreds of homes along the routes leading from NATO bases in the Netherlands to airports and seaports have been hacked. So, who would want access to the footage from hundreds of doorbell cameras?

According to the Dutch intelligence services, the culprits are cybercriminals backed by Moscow. Their aim is to determine the contents and quantities of arms shipments to Ukraine. According to The Telegraph, this Russian operation is not limited to the Netherlands. Across Europe, thousands of doorbell cameras are under the control of Russian intelligence. In other words, the Ukraine-Russia War has reverted to the ‘factory settings’ established at the outset by the US-UK duo. The objective is no longer limited to simply expelling Russia from Crimea and the Donbas region, which it has annexed. The ultimate goal has been updated to create the conditions necessary to topple Putin’s regime in Moscow.

(This article was originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

Y

emen’s Iran-aligned Houthi movement announced a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia on Monday, threatening to expand the regional conflict linked to the ongoing U.S.-Iran war and raising concerns over global energy supplies and international shipping.

The Houthis said the “maritime embargo” would take effect immediately, describing it as retaliation against what they called Saudi Arabia’s continued blockade of Yemen. The announcement broadens the conflict beyond the Gulf, bringing the strategically vital Bab el-Mandeb Strait into focus after shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has already been severely disrupted.

The Saudi-led coalition said it would respond “with force” to the Houthi announcement and confirmed that additional security measures had been implemented to protect commercial and military vessels transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a critical route for Saudi oil exports.

The latest development raises the possibility of simultaneous disruptions at both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb, two of the world’s most important maritime energy corridors.

Analysts warn that a prolonged closure of Bab el-Mandeb could significantly reduce Saudi oil exports and further strain global energy markets already affected by the fighting in the Gulf.

Diplomacy continues despite escalation

The Houthi announcement came as diplomatic efforts to restore a ceasefire between Washington and Tehran appeared to continue.

A senior Iranian official told Reuters that mediators had presented Tehran with a proposal for a 10-day ceasefire aimed at preserving the interim agreement reached last month.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry confirmed that mediators had submitted proposals but did not disclose further details.

Separately, Pakistani officials said Iranian Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni had requested Islamabad to resume mediation efforts between the United States and Iran.

Despite renewed diplomatic contacts, military operations continued across the region.

U.S. Central Command launched another wave of strikes against targets in Iran, while President Donald Trump defended the attacks, saying they were carried out in response to recent Iranian attacks that killed American service members.

The Pentagon identified two U.S. soldiers killed in an Iranian strike on a U.S. base in Jordan last week and said unidentified remains believed to belong to a third missing soldier had been recovered. A fourth U.S. service member was killed separately in northern Iraq during the controlled detonation of unexploded ordnance from an Iranian drone.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said it launched missile attacks against U.S. military facilities in Jordan, Kuwait and Syria, while Bahrain reported repeated air raid sirens and Kuwait said its air defense systems intercepted Iranian drones overnight.

Shipping and oil markets under pressure

The Houthis’ announcement briefly pushed oil prices higher before markets stabilized amid hopes that diplomatic negotiations could prevent a broader regional war.

Insurance premiums for vessels operating in the Red Sea increased as shipping companies assessed the heightened security risks.

Meanwhile, the IRGC said two oil tankers had exploded after attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz via what it described as an “unsafe” route, though Reuters was unable to independently verify the claim.

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) also reported that a commercial vessel had been struck by an unidentified projectile off the coast of Oman.

The latest escalation underscores the widening geographic scope of the conflict, with military operations now stretching from Iran and the Gulf to Yemen, Jordan, Syria and Iraq.

While diplomatic initiatives remain underway, continued exchanges of military strikes and expanding maritime threats have raised fears that the conflict could further destabilize regional security and disrupt global energy and trade routes.

(Source: Reuters)

S

pain reclaimed the FIFA World Cup title after substitute Ferran Torres scored an extra-time winner to secure a hard-fought 1-0 victory over defending champions Argentina in Sunday’s final, ending one of the tournament’s least spectacular championship matches with a dramatic finish.

Torres struck in the 106th minute, converting Spain’s 20th attempt on goal after more than 100 minutes of deadlock at New York/New Jersey Stadium. His decisive finish delivered Spain’s second World Cup title and completed another milestone for head coach Luis de la Fuente, who became the oldest coach to win the tournament at the age of 65.

The victory capped a remarkable period for Spanish football, with De la Fuente’s side extending its unbeaten run to 38 matches across all competitions after also winning the 2024 UEFA European Championship.

Spain controlled possession for most of the match and consistently pushed Argentina onto the defensive, registering 20 shots, including 12 on target. However, the European champions struggled to convert their dominance into goals as Argentina adopted a cautious approach focused on disrupting Spain’s rhythm.

The South American side rarely threatened in attack, producing only two attempts throughout the match and failing to record a single shot during the 90 minutes of regular time—a first in a World Cup final.

Spain’s breakthrough finally arrived in extra time after substitutes Ferran Torres and Nico Williams injected pace and creativity into an otherwise slow contest.

Messi unable to inspire Argentina

Argentina captain Lionel Messi, appearing in his third World Cup final, was largely contained by Spain’s organized defense and struggled to influence the match.

Teenage Spanish star Lamine Yamal, widely expected to provide attacking inspiration, also found little space against Argentina’s disciplined defensive setup.

Tensions boiled over after the final whistle as frustrated Argentine players became involved in a scuffle with their Spanish counterparts following a physically demanding contest.

De la Fuente praised his players after lifting football’s biggest prize, describing the squad as one that had “won everything.”

“I’m so proud of this generation of footballers who have remained true to our philosophy and continued improving it,” the Spain coach said after the match.

The triumph adds the World Cup to Spain’s recent European Championship success and reinforces the country’s position among international football’s elite.

Argentina coach Lionel Scaloni, whose side was unable to defend the title it won in Qatar in 2022, paid tribute to his players and to captain Messi despite the defeat.

Spain’s victory concluded the expanded 2026 FIFA World Cup, with Torres’ late strike proving enough to separate two of world football’s strongest teams after a tense and tactical final.

(Source: Reuters)

T

urkish defense technology company HAVELSAN has advanced four of its domestically developed software solutions into NATO’s certification process after successfully completing interoperability tests during the alliance’s Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exploration, Experimentation, Examination Exercise (CWIX) in Poland.

According to information released on Saturday, HAVELSAN’s DOOB-HQ, KAPI, Embedded NONC2 ATA DLP and LYNX systems passed the Assurance Verification and Validation (AV&V) tests required for NATO certification.

The successful evaluations confirmed the systems’ compliance with NATO’s Federated Mission Networking (FMN) standards, enabling them to operate seamlessly alongside allied command-and-control networks during multinational military operations.

The CWIX exercise serves as NATO’s primary platform for testing interoperability among member and partner nations’ command-and-control systems. Certification under the FMN Spiral 4 framework is considered a key prerequisite for participation in NATO missions scheduled between 2025 and 2027.

Expanding HAVELSAN’s NATO portfolio

The addition of four new capabilities further expands HAVELSAN’s portfolio of NATO-compatible technologies in command and control, secure data sharing, system integration and tactical communications.

HAVELSAN has participated in the annual CWIX exercise since 2012, steadily increasing the number of certified systems. Previous certifications include DOOB and KAŞİF in 2019, ADVENT CMS and ADVENT MARTI in 2023, KARTAL and NONC2 ATA DLP in 2024, and six additional products in 2025, including DOOB-HQ, DOOB-TACTICAL, OCTOPUS and TDLYM.

This year’s CWIX exercise, held from June 6 to 26 in Poland, brought together more than 3,000 personnel, 780 systems and representatives from 46 countries, including NATO allies and European Union members.

HAVELSAN participated with 43 personnel and 16 systems spanning multiple operational domains, including command and control, maritime operations, cyber defense, communications, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defense, modeling and simulation, and tactical data links.

New operational focus areas

The company also debuted several capabilities in new operational focus areas, including LYNX and Embedded NONC2 ATA DLP in the Air domain, ADVENT TALAY/REI in the Geospatial, Meteorological and Oceanographic (GEOMETOC) domain, KAPI in Federated Mission Networking, ICS SENTINEL in Cyber, and FIVE in Modeling and Simulation.

HAVELSAN General Manager Mehmet Akif Nacar said the successful certification process demonstrates that Türkiye’s domestically developed defense software meets NATO’s highest interoperability standards.

“The inclusion of four new capabilities in NATO’s certification process is concrete evidence that our national software solutions have gained international recognition and meet the highest interoperability standards,” Nacar said.

He added that HAVELSAN plans to build on its expanded participation in joint operations, cyber defense and modeling and simulation by introducing artificial intelligence-supported command-and-control capabilities in future NATO exercises.

Nacar said the company remains committed to developing technologies that meet the operational requirements of the Turkish Armed Forces while delivering internationally competitive defense solutions.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

U

.S. President Donald Trump on Thursday declassified a series of documents that he said revealed Chinese interference in U.S. elections, renewing his long-standing focus on election security despite previous intelligence assessments concluding that Beijing did not alter the outcome of the 2020 presidential election.

In a 25-minute televised address from the White House, Trump claimed the documents exposed “shocking vulnerabilities” in the U.S. electoral system and alleged that China had obtained personal information from approximately 220 million American voter records.

The president also accused members of the U.S. intelligence community of suppressing information about China’s activities and urged Congress to pass stricter election laws, including voter identification requirements, proof of citizenship for voter registration and limits on mail-in voting.

The address comes ahead of November’s midterm elections, as Republicans seek to defend narrow majorities in Congress amid political headwinds linked to the Iran conflict and rising energy prices.

However, Trump’s claims appeared to conflict with findings by the U.S. intelligence community. A declassified intelligence assessment issued in 2021 concluded that no foreign government attempted to alter any technical aspect of the 2020 presidential election, including voter registration systems, ballots, vote tabulation or certified results.

CIA thinks otherwise

The assessment, conducted under then-Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe—now serving as CIA director under Trump—found that while China had collected publicly available information on American voters and political trends for years, it did not attempt to interfere directly in the election outcome.

According to Reuters, two people familiar with the matter said the voter data cited by Trump consisted largely of publicly available voter files that political campaigns and consultants routinely purchase and could not be manipulated to alter election results.

Some White House officials reportedly expressed concern before the speech that releasing the documents could create a misleading impression about the nature of China’s activities.

Trump nevertheless argued that the newly declassified material demonstrated significant weaknesses in U.S. election security and reiterated claims that large numbers of non-citizens were registered to vote, although he did not provide evidence that those registrations resulted in illegal ballots being cast.

Rare voter fraud

Election experts and previous studies have consistently found that voter fraud and non-citizen voting in U.S. elections are rare.

Democratic Senator Mark Warner, vice chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, rejected Trump’s assertions, saying the U.S. intelligence community had unanimously concluded that China “did not even try to change a single vote” in the 2020 election.

The president also renewed his call for lawmakers to approve the SAVE America Act, legislation that would require photo identification to vote, proof of U.S. citizenship for voter registration and tighter restrictions on mail-in ballots. The measure has passed the Republican-controlled House of Representatives but remains stalled in the Senate amid Democratic opposition.

Despite Trump’s assertions about election vulnerabilities, the declassified documents released Thursday did not provide evidence that votes in the 2020 election were altered or manipulated, according to Reuters.

(Source: Reuters)

U

.S. Vice President JD Vance has accused members of the Israeli government of attempting to influence American public opinion against U.S. diplomatic efforts to end the war with Iran, describing the campaign as an effort to prolong the conflict.

In an interview with podcaster Joe Rogan released on Wednesday, Vance defended last month’s U.S.-Iran interim peace agreement and alleged that Israeli officials sought to derail negotiations through a coordinated influence campaign.

“I know beyond a shadow of a doubt that there have been people within the Israeli government who are trying to shift us away from that policy because they want to continue the military campaign,” Vance said.

The vice president cited a recent Time magazine report alleging that a former Trump campaign manager had been hired on behalf of Israel to oversee a digital campaign aimed at shaping American public opinion regarding Israel and the Iran conflict.

“There’s a literal foreign influence campaign being funded to tank the very deal that I was pursuing,” Vance said, adding that a “well-funded” effort had sought to undermine negotiations.

He also claimed that he had personally faced intense criticism because of his diplomatic outreach.

“People are attacking me viciously for quite literally trying to accomplish the negotiation objective that the president set for the country,” Vance said.

The issue becomes problematic

While acknowledging that allies and adversaries routinely attempt to influence U.S. policy, Vance said the issue becomes problematic when such campaigns shape American political decision-making.

“It doesn’t bother me that Israel tries to do this,” he said. “What does bother me is when those operations, those influence campaigns, actually affect American political judgement.”

Asked whether the United States would have entered the latest conflict with Iran without Israeli influence, Vance replied: “Yes, yes I do.”

He nevertheless reiterated President Donald Trump’s long-standing position that Iran should not acquire nuclear weapons.

“I think the president, separate from any influence from Israel, believes very strongly—and I agree with this—that Iran should not have a nuclear weapon,” Vance said.

The remarks highlight growing public differences between Washington and Israel over U.S. policy toward Iran, particularly following the collapse of last month’s interim peace agreement amid renewed military exchanges.

Former Israeli diplomat Alon Pinkas described Vance’s comments as unprecedented, saying no sitting U.S. vice president had previously accused Israel of actively working to undermine American foreign policy through an influence campaign.

Separately, Vance also addressed the controversy surrounding the late convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein, alleging that Epstein had unspecified high-level connections to both U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

W

hen one thinks of the Middle East and Iraq, the first thing that springs to mind is often oil. However, developments in Iraq over recent weeks have once again demonstrated that oil is no longer merely an economic resource, but a strategic factor that determines state capacity, foreign policy and the regional balance of power.

Following the tensions between Iran and the West, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz provided short-term relief in global energy markets. However, for Iraq, this process did not merely signify a return to normal oil sales. The Baghdad administration has also brought back onto the agenda its long-delayed objectives of increasing production and securing a higher quota within OPEC.

Whilst this may appear at first glance to be merely a matter of energy policy, there is a larger story behind the issue. As is well known, oil is both the most vulnerable and the seemingly strongest aspect of the Iraqi economy. Oil revenues bear the main burden of the state budget. Many sectors, ranging from public sector wages to infrastructure investment, and from security expenditure to social payments, are dependent on this revenue. Consequently, every fluctuation in international markets comes to the attention not only of the economic bureaucracy but also of political decision-makers in Baghdad. Even a slight decline in oil revenue can place significant pressure on the state.

The messages conveyed by the Iraqi government in recent weeks are therefore noteworthy. On the one hand, new international investments are being discussed; on the other, it is stated that production capacity can be rapidly increased. The recent interest shown by major energy companies in oil fields suggests that Baghdad wishes to draw up a long-term growth plan. The recent increase in production in the southern oil fields also emerges as a development serving the effort to boost capacity.

Turkey-Iraq talks

However, the main issue in Iraq is not merely about producing oil. The real challenge facing Iraq is determining via which routes, with what political guarantees and within what economic framework it will deliver the oil it produces to the world market. From this perspective, the renewed intensive energy talks between Turkey and Iraq carry particular significance. The topics on the agenda between Ankara and Baghdad point to a broader framework than merely the technical operation and capacity expansion of the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline: oil, natural gas, electricity, energy supply security and the energy dimension of the Development Corridor.

The Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline, which has passed through Turkey for years, has become one of the most critical elements of this equation. The recent talks between Ankara and Baghdad, which have focused on energy cooperation, do not merely signify the renewal of a technical agreement. It appears that the two countries are seeking ways to establish a new energy architecture that will adapt to the changing regional geopolitical landscape. The duration of the agreement, the pipeline’s capacity, the transport of oil to the Mediterranean, and Iraq’s need to diversify its export routes are all being discussed at the same table.

The situation is equally significant not only from Iraq’s perspective but also from Turkey’s. Turkey has long aimed to be a country that manages energy corridors. One of the fundamental and most important pillars of this strategy is the secure delivery of Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean. For this reason, stable energy relations with Baghdad will also serve as a key tool in building political trust. An energy corridor stretching from southern Iraq to the north, and from there to Turkey and the Mediterranean, will form part of a broader picture encompassing regional trade, transport and security.

Iraq, meanwhile, has learnt the hard way in recent years the risks of relying on a single export route or a single regional balance of power. Crises in the Strait of Hormuz, the prospect of regional war and the occasional disruption of export routes in the north are prompting Baghdad to develop alternative routes. Iraq must now define its energy security not only in terms of production capacity but also through the diversity of its export routes. Consequently, the future of the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline has become a key indicator of Iraq’s capacity for economic sovereignty.

Anti-corruption operations

Amidst all this, another notable development has been the anti-corruption operations being carried out domestically. The operations in Baghdad, which have targeted high-ranking figures, send a significant message regarding the corruption networks that have long been the subject of discussion within state institutions. Of course, it cannot be expected that a few operations will eliminate decades-old institutional problems. However, the rule of law and transparency in public administration will be just as decisive as oil in shaping international investors’ view of Iraq.

Similarly, the US’s resumption of dollar transfers to Iraq should not be interpreted merely as a technical financial decision. This step demonstrates that economic ties between Washington and Baghdad have not been completely severed, but that issues of security, militias and financial oversight remain on the table. It has once again become clear that economic and security issues cannot be addressed in isolation from one another.

Viewed in the light of these developments, Iraq today stands at what is perhaps one of the most critical economic thresholds of the post-2003 era. Whilst the country is striving to attract major energy investments on the one hand, on the other it is seeking to strengthen public administration, strike a balance in its foreign relations and keep as far away as possible from regional crises. If successful, it could not only become a country that increases its oil production but also emerge as a new regional actor at the centre of energy, trade and transport corridors.

However, it is clear that oil revenues alone will not be sufficient for this to happen. Institutional reforms, legal predictability, investment security and sustainable relations with neighbours are just as important as new oil fields. The fundamental challenge facing Iraq is not actually extracting oil, but utilising oil revenues for the benefit of the state. To the extent that Baghdad succeeds in this, it may cease to be a conflict zone where regional crises persist.

From Turkey’s perspective, too, it would be insufficient to view developments solely through the prism of the oil trade. Iraq’s transformation into a stable, economically strengthening country open to regional integration will serve Ankara’s interests across many areas, from security to trade, and from logistics to energy. Consequently, in the coming months, we will be monitoring not only whether Iraq can produce more oil, but also whether it can channel this oil into political stability and economic development.

(Originally published by Middle East Africa website in Turkish)

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urkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan warned on Thursday against the expansion of the Russia-Ukraine war into the Black Sea, saying attacks on civilian maritime infrastructure threaten regional stability and should not be tolerated.

Speaking alongside Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha after talks in Kyiv, Fidan said Türkiye remains committed to preventing the conflict from spreading into the strategically important waterway.

“We do not want the war to spread to the Black Sea,” Fidan said, stressing that peace and security in the region must be preserved.

He condemned attacks targeting civilian maritime assets, saying ports, oil tankers and fishing vessels should not become military targets.

“Targeting ports, tankers and fishing boats and putting civilians’ lives at risk is not something that can be justified,” Fidan said, urging all parties to act with restraint and responsibility.

Fidan said Türkiye continues to explore new strategic approaches with the warring parties and international mediators to break the deadlock in the conflict.

Call for negotiations

He reaffirmed Ankara’s support for continuing negotiations under the Istanbul format, arguing that direct talks between Russian and Ukrainian officials had produced valuable transparency and dialogue.

“I believe it would be very beneficial for the Türkiye negotiations, particularly the Istanbul talks, to continue,” Fidan said, adding that ongoing hostilities should not prevent diplomatic engagement.

The Turkish foreign minister noted that while U.S. negotiators later became involved in efforts to achieve a broader settlement, the conflict continues with an increasing risk of escalation.

Addressing potential post-war security arrangements, Fidan said security guarantees for Ukraine would likely include land, air and naval components.

He revealed that Türkiye has agreed to lead the maritime component of those guarantees in coordination with allied countries.

“Türkiye has accepted to lead the maritime component, and we have a common understanding with our allies on this issue,” he said, adding that planning work is already being carried out by the naval forces of participating allied nations.

Ukraine is ready for a ceasefire

For his part, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha reiterated Kyiv’s readiness for a ceasefire and voiced support for Türkiye as the venue for future high-level peace negotiations.

“We believe that negotiations, especially a possible meeting between President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and President Vladimir Putin, could take place in Türkiye,” Sybiha said.

He added that only a summit between the two leaders could inject new momentum into the peace process.

“As Ukraine, we are ready for a ceasefire,” Sybiha said.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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he United States has reimposed a naval blockade on Iranian ports and launched another wave of military strikes targeting Iran’s southern coast, intensifying hostilities and further eroding an interim peace agreement reached last month.

The U.S. military said the renewed blockade of vessels traveling to and from Iranian ports and coastal areas took effect at 20:00 GMT on Tuesday, as Washington sought to restrict maritime activity linked to Tehran amid escalating tensions in the Strait of Hormuz.

The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) also confirmed a fresh round of strikes targeting Iranian military infrastructure, saying the attacks were intended to degrade capabilities used to threaten commercial shipping in the strategic waterway.

Iranian media reported explosions in or near the southern cities of Sirik and Bandar Abbas following the announcement, while earlier reports said U.S. strikes had also targeted Abadan, home to the Middle East’s oldest oil refinery, as well as Mahshahr, Qeshm Island and Kish Island.

The latest operations follow a series of U.S. strikes launched a day earlier against targets including Bushehr and Bandar Abbas, marking another escalation in a conflict that resumed despite a memorandum of understanding signed in June aimed at halting hostilities.

Iran retaliates across the Gulf

Iran responded by launching attacks against U.S.-linked targets across the Gulf region, including strikes on Kuwait, Bahrain and Jordan, while also targeting two commercial vessels in Omani waters within the Strait of Hormuz, according to regional officials.

The United Arab Emirates said one crew member was killed in the attacks on the ships.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) acknowledged striking the two supertankers, saying they had ignored repeated warnings while navigating what it described as an unauthorized route through the strait.

The IRGC accused the United States of encouraging vessels to violate Iranian directives and warned that continued cooperation with what it called the “aggressor enemy” would prolong disruption to shipping and increase the risk of a global energy crisis.

Bahrain said its air defenses intercepted an Iranian aerial attack, while Kuwait’s armed forces reported engaging hostile aerial targets. Jordan also said Iranian projectiles targeted military facilities on its territory.

International concern grows

Regional mediators Qatar and Oman urged restraint as the fighting intensified.

Qatar condemned attacks on commercial shipping, while Oman called on all parties to respect international law governing navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

The International Maritime Agency expressed concern over the latest incidents, saying two seafarers had been killed and warning that the continuing cycle of military escalation threatened global maritime security.

Speaking at the White House, President Donald Trump blamed Iran for reigniting the conflict.

“They shot first, and that was a big mistake because we have been knocking the hell out of them,” Trump said, defending the renewed military campaign.

Trump also announced he was abandoning a previously proposed 20% fee on vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz, saying it would instead be replaced by expanded trade and investment agreements with Gulf allies.

“I have decided to replace the 20% United States Reimbursement Fee with trade and investment deals that the various Gulf states will be making into the United States,” he said.

Tehran says agreement no longer binding

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi accused Washington of violating the interim agreement and destroying the framework established to reduce tensions.

According to Iranian state media, Gharibabadi said Tehran no longer considers itself bound by the memorandum of understanding, including provisions related to navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

He rejected suggestions that renewed military pressure would force Iran back to negotiations, arguing that Washington had forfeited the diplomatic framework through its actions.

Analysts warned that the latest exchanges indicate the conflict is evolving into a prolonged confrontation rather than returning to full-scale war, raising concerns over regional stability and the security of one of the world’s most important energy transit routes.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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he United States has used unmanned surface vessels (USVs) in combat for the first time, marking a significant milestone in modern naval warfare after the US military confirmed that autonomous sea drones were employed in strikes against an Iranian naval facility.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) said three one-way Corsair sea drones struck a submarine and ship maintenance facility at Iran’s Bandar Abbas Naval Base on Monday as part of operations aimed at reducing Iran’s capacity to target commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.

The attack represents the first known offensive use of US autonomous surface vessels, highlighting a shift in naval strategy toward unmanned maritime systems after similar technologies gained prominence during the Russia-Ukraine war.

Autonomous sea drones enter frontline combat

The Corsair is an autonomous surface vessel developed by Texas-based defense technology company Saronic. Measuring approximately 24 feet (7.3 meters) in length, the vessel has a range exceeding 1,000 nautical miles, can travel at speeds above 35 knots, and is capable of carrying payloads of nearly 1,000 pounds (453 kilograms).

Designed with a modular architecture, the platform can perform intelligence, surveillance, logistics, force protection and one-way strike missions while operating with limited human intervention.

Until now, USVs in the US military had primarily been deployed for reconnaissance, maritime security and search-and-rescue operations rather than offensive missions.

The combat debut follows Saronic’s rapid growth since its establishment in 2022.

The company expanded its shipbuilding capacity by acquiring Louisiana-based Gulf Craft in 2025 and later announced a $300 million expansion of its production facilities. In December 2025, the US Navy awarded Saronic a $392 million production contract for the Corsair, accelerating the transition from prototype development to operational deployment.

Since then, the company has secured $1.75 billion in funding, reaching a valuation of $9.25 billion while broadening its portfolio of autonomous maritime systems and command-and-control technologies.