After Turkey and the allied Syrian opposition factions launched Operation Euphrates Shield and Operation Olive Branch, both areas in northern Aleppo and Afrin were cleaned from Daesh and YPG militants. After the success of these military operations, the Syrian opposition and Turkey invested in reconstructing, re-organizing, and re-building these liberated areas. However, the war-torn region faced a new security challenge, especially after the massive arrival of new internally displaced peoples (IDPs) from Ghouta, Homs, Hama, Derra, DeirEzzor, Raqqa, and Manbij. While Daesh and YPG cells have tried to sabotage the new administration of the Syrian opposition with terror attacks, other criminal gangs took advantage of the situation.

Although Turkey invested a lot to help the Free Syrian Police and the National Army recruit and train, criminal gangs exploited the weak security situation to harm the local population. Only after both Turkish-trained structures reached a certain level, on 19 November, the National Army and the Free Syrian Police started a wide-scale operation targeting those criminal gangs with the support of Turkey. The entire operation also gives a hint about the future security problems awaiting in Syria.

After Turkey trained the National Army and the Free Syrian Police, the two structures were able to kick-start a wide-scale operation targeting criminal gangs operating in Syria. 

Catching the big fish first

The security operation by the National Army and the Free Syrian police successfully disbanded the Shuhada al Sharqiyyah faction after a day-long fight. Shuhada al Sharqiyyah is a DeirEzzor originated faction that had to flee from its hometown towards northwest Syria due to the Daesh threat. After the liberation of Al-Bab from Daesh, Shuhada al Sharqiyyah broke the ceasefire with regime forces at Tadef and tried to escalate the situation. After this incident, Ahrar al Sharqiyyah, which is a component of the National Army, cut its ties with Shuhada al Sharqiyyah, and the faction was disbanded.

Over time, Shuhada al Sharqiyyah reorganized itself under the leadership of Abdurrahman el Huseyn, who is also known as Abu Hawl. While some claims suggest the faction to have up to 400 fighters, figures near 100-150 seem more realistic. After the faction reorganized itself in Afrin, it started to commit several crimes against the local population, including robbery, extortion, and other criminal activities.

On the evening of 18 November, a curfew was declared over Afrin, and the day after, the National Army and the Free Syrian Police started a joint operation with the support of the Turkish Armed Forces in order to disband the faction, to arrest its members, and to hand them to the criminal court. With the start of the operation, the Shuhada al Sharqiyyah faction showed fierce armed resistance using heavy weapons. This resistance led to clashes between both sides, which continued over midnight. Nevertheless, the National Army and the Free Syrian Police succeeded and arrested the faction members. During the clashes, several members of Shuhada al Sharqiyyah were killed and injured.

With these clashes ending in a determinate result of disbanding Shuhada al Sharqiyyah, the National Army, the Free Syrian Police and Turkish authorities displayed their decisiveness to combat criminal gangs in northern Aleppo and Afrin. With the end of these clashes, the leadership of the National Army published a new statement, saying:  “Our Security Operation Will Continue!”

In clearing the Shuhada al Sharqiyyah, the Turkish authorities, Free Syrian Police and National Army displayed their decisiveness to combat criminal gangs in northern Aleppo and Afrin. 

The second phase

On 20 November, the National Army leadership published a statement saying that they will continue with their security operation. The operation continued in Al-Bab in which several criminals were arrested and handed over to the Military Police of the Free Syrian Police. In contrast to the first day of the operation, criminal gangs have not attempted to resist against the National Army or the Free Syrian Police, as the decisiveness of the operation had become crystal clear.

Also, in contrast to the first day, the Military Police played a bigger role in arresting several in Al-Bab. However, a commander in the Northern Brigade, which is a component of the National Army told the author that all operations were spearheaded by the National Army. As seen on several images, the operation was conducted with heavy weapons in case of resistance from armed criminal gangs. Among the arrested in Al-Bab were Mohammed Abdulkarim Jard, Abdurrazzaq Waki and some remnants of Shuhada al Sharqiyyah in the village of Tal Aisha, north of Al-Bab.

During the same day, the Free Syrian Police captured a bomb loaded vehicle inside Azaz, which may be another sabotage and terrorism attempt by either YPG or Daesh militants. Due to the geographical situation of Azaz, which is close to YPG-held Tal Rifaat, YPG militants are the most likely suspects. Also, on the same day, Firka Hamza, which is a component of the National Army, handed over its checkpoints in Basuta in the Afrin region to the Free Syrian Police. At the end of the day, the Chief of Staff of the National Army published a statement, which imposed a curfew over Jarabulus for 21 November.

On 21 November, the security operation continued in Jarabulus, and a curfew was imposed on the city. Several criminals were arrested by the National Army and the Military Police of the Free Syrian Police and with the withdrawal of the National Army, the city control was fully handed over to the Free Syrian Police again. Within the third day of the operation, the Jarabulus court published a statement calling for people to file criminal complaints. At the end of the day, the leadership of the National Army published a new statement imposing a curfew over Al-Rai.

With the start of the operation on 22 November in Al-Rai, a criminal subgroup of the Jaysh al Sharqiyyah faction, which is a component of the National Army, surrendered themselves to the National Army and the Military Police. Together with other criminals in Al-Rai, the Military Police arrested 17 people. At the end of the day, the locations of Azaz and Akhtarin were declared as the next target of the operations. On 23 November, the Military Police arrested 3 different criminal gangs and 3 individuals in Azaz and Akhtarin. The Marea and Tel Rifaat Military Councils declared that they will also arrest criminals in Marea and hand them over to the Military Police.

The last operation was conducted on 24 November in Jinderes which is located in the Afrin region. The National Army and the Military Police arrested around 50 criminals and 8 criminals surrendered themselves to the authorities. At the end of the day, the National Army leadership published a statement declaring the end of the operation while pointing out that efforts against criminal gangs will continue.

After the security operation

While the entire operation began with a huge challenge, and all operations following were reported by several media outlets as “internal fighting among Turkey-backed groups,” in reality, it was a “clean up” operation, with the backing of Turkish Armed Forces. An important period of training, organization, supply and supervision by Turkey, the National Army, and the Military Police of the Free Syrian Police, succeeded to disband a strong faction, which proved the effectiveness of Turkish efforts inside Syria.

While some media outlets reported efforts in Syria as “internal fighting among Turkey-backed groups,” in reality, there was a “clean up” operation with the backing of Turkish Armed Forces in order to wipe criminal gangs from Afrin and Aleppo. 

However, the entire operation also gives us a hint about what will affect Syria’s security after peace, or at least after a more permanent ceasefire and de-escalation. Criminal gangs in the war-torn country have profited a lot from unstable conditions of Syria and the absence of state authority.

In all areas in Syria, criminal gangs are causing harm to the civil population. While areas controlled by the Russian and Iranian-backed Assad regime and U.S.-backed YPG still haven’t started wide scale operations to confront these criminal gangs, Turkey has put its weight behind such an operation in order to improve the living conditions of Syrians inside Syria, and to further accelerate the return of refugees.

Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy has undergone a massive transformation, particularly in the fight against the PKK, while the extra-territorial military operations have expanded towards Syria and Iraq where the PKK has been consolidating its political and military influence since the dissolution of the Syrian and Iraqi sovereignties.

Turkey began to operationalize its new counter-terrorism strategy with Operation Euphrates Shield (2016) in Syria and carried out its military operation against the PKK in Afrin with Operation Olive Branch (2018). Even though, these two military operations have different geopolitical aspects and execution methodologies, both military operations had the same strategic objectives: to de-territorialize the PKK in Syria, to eliminate its military capacity including manpower, and to weaken its international cooperation especially with the countries that provide militarily and political support to the PKK since the rise of DAESH.

Turkish authorities believe that the reactionary struggle against the PKK is not the best strategy to degrade and defeat the PKK’s terrorist campaign against Turkey. The best approach, according to Turkish authorities, should be designed by considering three interrelated variables: political decisiveness, Turkey’s military advantages and sustainability of military operations not only within Turkey but also in extraterritorial spaces such as Syria and Iraq.

Political decisiveness became a central element of the new counter-terrorism strategy following the collapse of the peace process in 2015. Turkish security forces have been able to defeat the PKK’s violent activities through domestic counter-terrorism operations; even though the PKK aimed to establish “liberated zones” by implementing violent urban tactics to widen the conflict zones towards significant city centers in southern Turkey.

The central rationality behind the PKK’s strategic consideration was the Syrian Civil War, in which Turkey has had to deal with many security and political challenges. In such a conflictual environment, the PKK could enjoy its territorial expansion. However, Turkey’s early military reactions against the PKK in the city centers of southeastern Turkey during the urban conflict between 2015 and 2016 have made substantial progress, and the PKK lost its entire terrorist mobilization and public support across the region.

Following domestic-counter terrorism operations, Turkey started to expand its actions towards the PKK in Syria. During this period, Turkey’s priority was to roll back the PKK’s geopolitical expansion along Turkey’s Syria border. Afrin, in this context, was a strategic threshold for Turkey to see how Ankara would be able to maintain its political decisiveness under the regional security vacuum that was somehow antagonistic and the U.S.’s apparent strategy over the presence of the PKK in Syria in the fight against DAESH.

Turkey’s military advantages along with its increasing capacity in defense technologies became central to sustain its military operations and ultimately defeated the PKK in Afrin. Operation Olive Branch resulted in a military and political victory for Turkey. Following the 58 days of the clash, the PKK was defeated and had to leave from the city centers. Following the triumph of Afrin, the Manbij agreement with the U.S. over the issue of the PKK presence showed how Turkey used its political decisiveness and military capacity to change the facts on the ground. From a domestic counter-terrorism struggle to Afrin and Manbij, Turkey has also shown its willingness regarding the continuation of the military offensive against the PKK, even though the regional and international conjuncture is against this policy.

Now, Turkey aims to maintain its counter-terrorism strategy against the PKK in Qandil where the PKK has settled as a safe haven thanks to the lack of Iraq’s sovereignty, the geographical sophistication of the region and the military capacity that the PKK has been building for almost 40 years. At his stage, Turkey has similar strategic goals: securing its border security against terrorist infiltration, eliminating the PKK’s presence in northern Iraq by holding terrorist camps in the region to isolate the PKK from its stronghold in Qandil and preventing the logistical mobilization of the PKK.

Turkey’s military operation now targets the PKK’s two strategically important locations in the region: Khakurk and Qandil. Turkish forces have already secured almost 500 sq. km in Khakurk and opened a safe corridor that reaches the Qandil Mountain since the beginning of the operation in March 2018. This time, the military strategy is not only targeting to eliminate PKK terrorists but also aiming to clean and hold the territory where the PKK has any presence.

The execution of military tactics in operational level on the ground is different compared to the OOB and OES in Syria due to the topographical feature of the region. But, the political decisiveness, Turkey’s military advantages, notably its technological superiority over the PKK, and willingness to maintain military operations toward the center of the Qandil Mountains seem to change the nature of the conflict between Turkey and the PKK.

This will be the first comprehensive counter-terror operation against the PKK. The regional dynamics are also behind Turkey’s military offensive. If Turkey can manage the dynamics emanating from the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and the central Iraqi government in favor of its new strategy, the PKK cannot sustain its presence in the region. But this does not necessarily mean that the PKK threat for Turkey will disappear in the near future.

Source: Suriye Gündemi

At this stage, there are two critical strategic challenges for Turkey in its fight against the PKK. The first challenge is about the question of how the PKK will transform its overall strategy in Syria and Iraq after the fall of Qandil. More importantly, the real challenge for Turkey is whether the PKK can find another safe haven in Syria or Iraq. The second challenge for Turkey is about the question of how Turkish military can maintain its military presence in northern Iraq particularly in the Qandil area. The Defense Minister of Turkey announced that Turkey would not withdraw its military force until the PKK is ultimately defeated in Iraq.

Turkey now has 14 different military bases in northern Iraq. Compared to the previous military operations against the PKK in this region, the presence of Turkish military troops in different places provide more space to maneuver. However, the continuation of Turkey’s military presence might undermine the relations between Ankara and Baghdad. Therefore, the success of the new counter-terrorism strategy is also part of a regional agreement between Iraq, Turkey, and Iraq against the PKK. Iran is currently neutral toward Turkey’s ongoing operation. If Turkey’s military strategy can succeed in the short term to defeat the PKK in Iraq, then reaching a midterm consensus between Turkey, Iraq, and Iran will be easier.

Over the past years, the U.S. military involvement in the Syrian crisis has become a widely discussed topic across the globe. The recent announcement of President Trump to withdraw American troops from Syria has not only further complicated the situation for the international actors involved in the crisis but also enabled speculations about the future of the Turkish-American confrontation in Syria. In fact, such a decision can bear either dire consequences, or yield positive outcomes for Turkey. It is important to investigate the implications of Trump’s unsettled withdrawal decision for Turkey, and evaluate this new development in relation to the Ankara-Washington disagreement over the issue of American support for the YPG. Unfortunately, it is still unclear whether Trump’s unexpected decision will facilitate Ankara’s strategy in Northern Syria or not.

Despite the fact that Ankara has not made an explicit announcement on this issue, Turkey is likely to appreciate the American act of pulling out of Syria, if the timing and methodology simultaneously correspond with Turkey’s strategy against the PKK in the country. If so, one might question what the Turkish strategy towards the PKK-YPG in Syria is. Turkey’s strategy is first and foremost to minimize the territorial control of the PKK-YPG in the country and restore U.S.-Turkey relations. The acceptable end scenario for Ankara is to create a new “territorial space,” in which the PKK-YPG cannot obtain any sort of military force that can politically or militarily influence the northeastern part of the country. This ‘space’ can only be achieved if the U.S. stops backing the PKK-YPG. Otherwise, the Turkish-American relations may enter an irreversible direction since Turkey seems to be willing to carry out its military action against PKK’s region under U.S. protection. At this stage, the latter is not what Turkey wants to do in the near feature. In that case, the recent statement of President Trump to withdraw American troops from Syria is a crucial move that can influence Turkey’s short-term game plan in Northern Syria. There are two important but interrelated scenarios about Trump’s post-American Syrian strategy that can destabilize Turkey’s strategic concerns and more importantly create more chaos in Northern Syria. The irony here is that Trump himself is faithfully echoing Obama’s hands-off policy in Syria which is the main driving factor behind Turkish-American confrontation.

The first scenario is about timing. The preference to downgrade U.S. involvement in Syria in the fight against Daesh is problematic if the Trump administration really wants to restrain Iranian influence over Syria. The strategy of disengagement makes sense only if it is applied at the right time. The Obama administration made a similar mistake in Iraq in 2011, with a post-American Iraq easily slipping into Iran’s hands. The power vacuum that emerged after the U.S. retrenchment from Iraq was one of the driving factors behind the rise of Daesh. The timing of the U.S. withdrawal might also provide more space for the Assad regime to gain leverage, which is not an intention of the original U.S. strategy in Syria. It is needless to say that Russia will become a more significant actor in a post-American Syria. Overall, it is expected that an uncontrolled and untimely American withdrawal from Syria may bring extra costs for Turkey in Syria.

The second scenario relates to methodology. A critical assessment of such a striking development is essential for Turkey in assuring long-term military leverage against the PKK threat in the region. In this regard, the methodology that the U.S. pursues in pulling out its ground troops is really a matter of Turkey’s policy towards a post-American Syria. But, nobody thinks that the U.S. will completely remove itself from Syria, even Trump himself. Thus, many questions still remain regarding the direction of American military presence in the country.

If the U.S. maintains its military presence to protect the current structure of the SDF as it is now, for which the PKK-YPG is the primary military component, then Turkey’s ‘military deterrence’ oriented strategy vis-a-vis the PKK presence in Syria will remain. The main strategy for Turkey is only acceptable in the condition of the demobilization of the PKK. The latest attempt of the U.S. to transform the Syrian Democratic Forces into a political party to be named as Syria’s Future Party does not bring any solution to Turkey’s concerns for the future of Syria. Ankara sees the new party as an extension of the U.S. strategy to attribute another label to the PKK. Ankara, in fact, perceives this move as an attempt to cover up the PKK’s terrorist motivations. Turkey believes that a comprehensive strategy should consist of a broad communal consent, in which the PKK-centric political project cannot be sustainable.

The strategic value of the U.S. disengagement from Syria for Turkey is not apparent since Ankara did not expect that the U.S. would change its overall strategy. Ankara still thinks that Trump’s act is not realistic and applicable in the near future. It is also interesting to witness that President Trump’s military withdrawal incentive irrationally contradicts the claims put forth by CENTCOM in favor of furthering American military presence in Syria, especially in Manbij where Ankara and Washington are most likely to confront against each other in the near future.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made a surprise visit to Turkey’s southern Hatay province last Thursday. As Operation Olive Branch continues to take ground, the visit was welcomed by a sizable audience, with the participation of some celebrities ranging from singers to national athletes.

Prior to the speech given in the late hours of the evening in the southern region of the Hatay Province, President Erdogan, accompanied by the Chief of General Staff Hulusi Akar, Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdag, Defence Minister Nurettin Canikli and Land Forces Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces Gen. Yasar Guler, visited the Turkish military units to inspect the progress and congratulate the military men for their celebrated efforts.

The operation in Afrin, beginning in January of this year and ending last month, has been hailed by people in Turkey and those in the northwestern regions of Syria as not only a success against the PKK/PYD tyranny, but also on the fact that it has become one of the numbered peaceful places within the calamitous ongoing Syrian Civil War.

During his speech at the central police station, Erdogan adulated the wholeness of the people as being the foundation to protecting collective sovereignty, praised the solidarity of the public figures and celebrities for their presence, and thanked all the civilian care networks such as AFAD (The Disaster and Emergency Management, Republic of Turkey) to the Health Ministry for their support and determined efforts to help those in need. Lastly, while displaying his gratitude and respect towards the indispensable efforts of the Turkish Military, he quoted Gazi Mustafa Kemal in saying “There is no such thing as protecting the line, there is only protecting the ground, and a unified ground is what makes a nation.”

In recent years the YPG, the Syrian branch of the internationally recognized terror organization PKK, has increased its activity emanating from Syria since they took advantage of the Civil War and occupied the northern regions in 2012. The PKK/YPG has mostly focused on carrying out cross-border missile attacks on the Provinces of Hatay and Kilis, having fired more than 90 rockets in 2018 alone.

So far, two Syrian and three Turkish citizens have been killed, with over 100 casualties, of which numerous are still in critical condition. Together with human deaths, some of those who have survived are effected by a slow bombardment that their homes, vehicles and neighborhoods were destroyed.

With the Afrin operation coming to an end, direction has now turned to the Manbij. Separated by the Euphrates river from the rest of the YPG/PKK controlled areas of northern Syria, Manbij is another important territory in which Turkey seeks to relieve the areas inhabitants from unwanted occupation while protecting Turkish lands from further terrorist threats.

While recently there has been speculation of French intervention in the region as a mediator between Turkey and the YPG, Ibrahim Kalin, the spokesperson for the Turkish Presidency has firmly indicated that Turkey “rejects any efforts to promote ‘dialogue,’ ‘contact’ or ‘mediation’ between Turkey and terrorist organizations.”

When compared to Turkish endeavors, both Euphrates Shield and Operation Olive Branch have not only conformed with International Law, U.N. Security Council resolutions and her right to self-defense under the U.N Charter, but has been an effective and efficient method in maintaining the unity of Syria’s territorial integrity.

The successful completion of Afrin operation seems to have ruffled some international feathers however, bringing previously absent players into the spot light. Considering much of the brutality is over when compared to the bulk of the civil war, Macron’s attempt to enter Syria through the back door not only remind us of the ignominious policies during the French Mandate for Syria, but suggest he still has some road to travel before becoming a man in international politics.

In the past two weeks, there have been many developments that gave us clues about how we should think about the future of the PKK in the region. Firstly, the Turkish Armed Forces and TAF-backed Free Syrian Army captured Afrin city center within 58 days of the launch of the operation. The PKK/YPG had vowed that Afrin would be Turkey’s Vietnam. Secondly, Turkey began to intensify its political and military pressure on the PKK/YPG presence in Tel Rifaat. Various Turkish and Arab media channels reported that the center of Tel Rifaat city was encircled after Russian military officers pulled out of the areas, allowing the TAF and TAF-backed FSA to enter. Although TAF has yet to confirm this new development, it would be appropriate to claim that the fall of Tel Rifaat is just a matter of time. The main irony that the PKK faced in Tel Rifaat was that the PKK/YPG had seized the area with Russian air support, and has now lost it with Russian political support for Turkey.

Thirdly, Turkey and the U.S. have been working on the Manbij issue since Ankara launched the Afrin operation. Following the Afrin military campaign, Ankara and Washington established working groups in order to discuss a number of issues, including the stabilization of Manbij and the prevention of possible undesirable clashes. The stabilization of Manbij is now one of the determining factors between the two capitals to de-escalate the current crisis that emanated from the PKK in Syria. The signals coming from the U.S. underline that Turkey and the U.S. may reach an agreement to remove the PKK/YPG forces from Syria’s Manbij. Fourthly, Turkey’s strong political decisiveness to carry out its counter-terrorism campaign against PKK presence in Iraq’s Sinjar destabilized the PKK’s project to consolidate its power in Northern Iraq. Turkey requested the Iraqi government to clean the PKK forces from Northern Iraq, and indicated that the TAF would carry out a cross-border operation there anytime if necessary. Following the pressure from Turkey, the Iraqi government announced that its national army would take control of Sinjar, and remove the HPG militants (PKK armed wing coming from the Qandil Mountain) from there. More importantly, the U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis told reporters at the Pentagon that “there is a PKK threat in Sinjar, across the Northern Iraq border against Turkey,” adding that the U.S. also wants the group to pull out from the area.

All the aforementioned developments that took place in the last two weeks underline that while Turkish troops are making sweeping territorial gains in northern Syria and recalibrating Turkish military deterrence against the PKK in northern Iraq, the PKK is gradually losing its strategic positions that it gained since the rise of Daesh in Syria and Iraq. The strategic and territorial losses of the PKK enables one to question the future of the terrorist organization in both Syria and Iraq. While it may seem that the PKK is strategically positioned in order to expand its sphere of influence in the mentioned countries, the reality in the region following the success of Turkey’s military action is that the PKK is dramatically overstretched and faces a complicated future.

The PKK’s weakness

There are many driving factors behind the failure of the PKK’s ongoing political project. While the lack of geopolitical and demographic depth constitute the main weakness of the group in Syria and Iraq, the over-reliance on external support, particularly on U.S. air support, can be counted as its main vulnerability. These factors are most likely to shape the PKK’s complicated future.

After the simultaneous loss of Afrin, Tel Rifaat and Manbij in a very short period of time, the PKK/YPG will only be able to maintain its territorial control in the eastern part of the Euphrates through U.S. support. However, it will not be able to easily sustain the control of the region anymore. Due to the unpredicted future of the Syrian crisis and the Turkish political and military pressure, the PKK can no longer control its territory without external support. The increasing rapprochement between Turkey and the U.S. over the problem of the PKK shows that the two sides will reach an understanding as Turkey vows to continue its military campaign against the PKK. This situation prevents the PKK from acquiring a geopolitical depth in Syria. More importantly, except in Afrin, the Kurds do not represent the majority of the population in any territory controlled by the PKK in northern Syria. A recent example shows that there is an increasing revolt against the terrorist organization’s presence in Tel Rifat, Manbij and Raqqa. The local people do not tend to accept the PKK-based political ideology, for which Abdullah Ocalan is considered as the main producer. This demographic and political imbalance undermines the PKK’s presence in Syria. The same is also valid for Sinjar. The PKK’s construction of Yezidis as an integral part of the Kurdish ethnicity does not correspond to the reality of the history of the Sinjar region. Therefore, the lack of demographic and political depth will prevent the PKK from maintaining control in the region.

The fertile lands suitable for agriculture are just as important as the demographic map in Syria. The northern part of Syria is known to have very fertile lands. While the PKK/YPG controls 57%, the Syrian regime now only holds 27% of the fertile agricultural lands. In addition to agricultural lands, the PKK also holds a good percentage of oil-rich regions in eastern Syria. Therefore, the struggle over the control of fertile lands will also shape the complicated future of the PKK in Syria.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the U.S.-backed political project of the PKK is incompatible with the geopolitical realities of the region. This structural element is one of the most important factors that make it harder for the PKK to sustain it territorial and political control in the region. The PKK will only be able to survive if it receives air support from the coalition. In the near future, especially in the absence of Daesh, the PKK is expected to face another difficulty on the international arena. The propaganda machine for the PKK has also lost its functionality after Turkey’s Afrin operation. This will certainly affect the image of being an effective ground force in the fight against Daesh. As a result, it can be safely argued that the PKK faces a very complicated future in both Syria and Iraq.

Middle Eastern politics is boiling once again. The rumor is that France will replace U.S. troops in Syria. While there are some signs of this, these are ambiguous at best. U.S. President Trump said in a speech in Ohio that the U.S. will be getting out of Syria “very soon.” On the other side of the Atlantic, French President Macron met with a delegation of the Syrian Democratic Forces (the late brand of the PYD) and declared his support for the organization. Pro-PKK sources even claimed that in the meeting Macron promised to send troops to prevent a further Turkish “aggression” against the SDF. Of course, many questions regarding this replacement scenario remain unanswered. Did Trump really mean what he said? Can he really pull troops out of Syria given CENTCOM’s years-long investment in the PYD/SDF? Can Macron really send troops to Syria? Even if he does, would they be just symbolic forces or can France really take the risk of a military encounter with other forces on the ground, particularly with Russia, given the recently heated relations between Russia and NATO? Hence, such a replacement in the near future is not probable, but possible. Anything is possible in the contingent world of politics anyway. Nevertheless, from Turkey’s point of view, such scenarios are worth attention but no more. Even if it happens, which is still not and may never be on the horizon, it is not a game changer for Turkey.

Regardless of which country arms and protects the PKK’s offshoot in Syria, Turkey seems to be decisive in its struggle to counter the PKK threat beyond its borders. Turkey’s Afrin offensive has resulted in the quick demise of the PKK’s Afrin project. Nevertheless, Afrin is just the first step of a more comprehensive offensive against the terrorist organization. For Turkey, the PKK has to be cleaned off from the areas it currently holds in Iraq and Syria. Turkey’s western allies might have difficulty to understand the country’s rationale, but to put it simply, Ankara does not want the PKK to send suicide bombers across the border from Iraq or Syria. The organization has cost thousands of lives in Turkey and it is time to terminate the group once and for all. If the PKK is terminated, that’s not going to happen in Turkey. The terrorist organization does not have any arms depots, school or training camps in Turkey. The PKK’s 40 year-long bloodshed did not suffice it to take a single village in Turkey. Conversely, the organization entirely resides on territories in Iraq and Syria.

The PKK’s headquarters, training camps and arms depots all are in Iraq and Syria. All the territories that the organization controls are beyond Turkish borders, whether it be Qandil, Sinjar, Manbij, or Haseke. The organization trains its recruits in camps in Iraq and Syria and sends them to Turkey through the territories that it controls. The PKK even runs schools in these places where it teaches children the “heroic” act of killing Turks. With the fall of Afrin, the organization will no longer be able to teach children in the city to be “heroes” by joining the PKK. Elementary schools in Afrin will no longer have the pictures of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan on its walls or in school textbooks. The city will no longer hold ceremonies for the PKK’s suicide bombers who both killed and died in Turkey. Afrin was just one of the PKK’s recruitment and training centers. Turkey is persistent to handling the rest of these arms depots, recruitment and training centers, and its entire organizational network and military capacity one way or another. Turkey is more dedicated than ever to counter the PKK wherever it seeks shelter, whatever name it makes up to call its offshoots, and whichever country it receives support from. The question is not whether it will, but when and where. Turkey’s “allies” that arm, train, and protect the PKK may keep the group safe in some zones for some time, but this was not enough to stop Turkey in Afrin and may not be enough in the next battleground.

The U.S. and Turkey have been pursuing conflicting strategies in northern Syria for a while now. Turkey adamantly pursued to end the U.S. support for the YPG while the Trump administration has seen the group as its “local partner” in the coalition’s anti-Daesh efforts. Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch has recently ended the YPG’s control over Afrin, a city in which the U.S. has declared no interest but expressed “concern” about the Turkish operation. While Turkey is focused on clearing its borders from the YPG and Daesh, the U.S. is insisting that Turkish military operations distract from the fight against Daesh.

The strategies of the two countries diverge from one another so much that they carry the potential to come head to head in Manbij. However, negotiations in bilateral strategy talks, a mechanism established following the former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster and Secretary of State Tillerson’s visits to Turkey, could yield a cooperation deal in Manbij, which could potentially be broadened. In such an optimistic scenario, the anti-Daesh fight would actually be strengthened while Turkey’s security concerns vis-à-vis the YPG could be met. A deal that pushes the YPG back east across the Euphrates and establishes a U.S.-Turkey coordinated patrol of Manbij can be the basis of broadened cooperation in northern Syria.

Today, Turkey is pushing the U.S. to end the YPG control in Manbij, a promise made by Vice President Joe Biden under the Obama administration. The capture of the town was so alarming that Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield in August 2016, only a month after the failed coup attempt of July 2016, in order to prevent further spread of the YPG control in the area. For Turkey, the PKK was trying to accomplish what it could not inside Turkey by creating an autonomous zone in northern Syria through the YPG. By intervening for the first time militarily in Syria, Turkey took the matter into its own hands as multiple U.S. reassurances about the short-term and tactical nature of its support for the YPG did not materialize.

Turkey has been able to change the strategic environment on the ground through its military operations at the expense of both the YPG and Daesh. Clearing its border from both terrorist organizations seems to be its current strategy. The U.S. strategy only partially overlaps with the Turkish strategy but that could be considered as a glass half full. Through an arrangement as described above, diversification of the governing structure of Manbij more representative of the ethnic makeup of the area could be accomplished. U.S.-Turkey military cooperation in patrolling the city can be a trust building measure. Such success in Manbij would not erase the overall strategic differences between the two allies but it would pave way for a broader and meaningful strategic conversation.

The U.S.-Turkey strategic realignment will be very difficult to achieve as the U.S. keeps its exclusive focus on Daesh while ignoring Turkey’s legitimate security concerns regarding the YPG. However, if Manbij can serve as a success story of military and political cooperation on the ground, both Ankara and Washington can build upon it. Regular strategic conversations to coordinate policy are a must between the American and Turkish governments and it can start with Manbij. This is true not only for their Syria policies but other regional issues as well.

As the Trump administration is gearing up to pull the U.S. out of the Iran nuclear deal, a new era of uncertainty and tensions will likely emerge. President Trump has championed “America first,” a slogan that at times manifested itself as unilateralism in foreign policy. The recent addition of the Pompeo-Bolton duo to the administration promises more unilateralism than multilateralism. The administration will likely find an unwilling Europe to corner Iran, and Turkey is not likely to take a confrontational stand against Iran. Yet, if the U.S. and Turkey can work together in northern Syria, they could broaden their regional strategic conversation that might also include Iran in the near future. A cooperation in Syria between two NATO allies is not a wishful thinking; it is a matter of whether they will.

With Olive Branch Operation (20 January-18 March), Turkish Armed Forces and the Turkish-backed National Army (Free Syrian Army) captured Afrin in less than two months. Some analysts insist that the PKK/PYD did not lose the city but it was just a case of strategic exit only to strike back harder. Well, if true, it is very kind of the PKK to leave the city to the Olive Branch forces with a perfect timing right on March 18^th, to salute the anniversary of the iconic Canakkale War (Gallipoli Campaign) of 1915. Nevertheless, leaving aside the irony, there is still some truth to this absurd claim. The easy takeover of Afrin was a result of strategic planning, but not of the PKK. Turkey planned and executed how the city would be captured with full control from day one. There occurred some unexpected developments such as the temporary closure of the airspace by Russia in the early days of the operation but with no damage to the overall flow.

Hence, the YPG forces fled the city not as a result of their strategic planning, but out of despair. What was the YPG’s strategy then? Looking at the statements of PKK/PYD spokespeople, from the PKK leaders in Qandil to the commanders on the ground in Afrin, it was to wage a defense battle. On top of such statements, the full stack of ammunition depots around the city center, food storages in the PYD offices, and attempts to infiltrate into the city with new forces, it seems obvious that the goal was to wage a defense battle.

What about the Turkish strategy then? It was more of an encirclement as a form of siege warfare than rapid domination. While the operation was criticized in some circles for being slow for reasons still mysterious to me, it was proceeding smoothly at a steady pace. Almost too smoothly especially when compared to Turkey’s Euphrates Shield Operation (24 August 2016-29 March 2017), which witnessed stronger resistance by DEASH especially in the Battle of Al Bab. Now, let’s come to how this strategy flowed smoothly.

First, significant actors in Syria – Russia and the U.S – were informed about Turkey’s decisiveness to fulfill its self-defense. Russia agreed as a result of persistent diplomatic exchanges and the U.S. had to agree. Hence, the operation could avoid the cases of friendly fire and prepared the international community for what to come.

With the start of the operation, Turkish artillery and air force crushed the PYD fortifications and forces (and later the regime militia who were invited to help the PYD) in the outskirts of Afrin and neighboring towns. As Turkey captured the heights surrounding Afrin one by one, PYD forces went blind against Turkey’s surveillance and detection superiority. Turkey could use its reconnaissance points from the south in northern Idlib, from the east in Azaz, and from the west and north in neighboring Turkish towns. As the pre-constructed reconnaissance points and constant air surveillance met even closer ground surveillance with the captured heights, the blindfolded PYD doomed to fail. While the Olive Branch Forces were moving forward on multiple fronts, the PYD was left with no chance to concentrate its forces. As the villages were taken one by one, more significant towns such as Rajo and Cinderes were being encircled.

Nevertheless, Turkey’s encirclement strategy, which is known for not letting easy retreat, left an exit door – or a golden bridge, as it is called in the military literature – open for the YPG militants. The bridge was not big enough for a collective retreat but it allowed individual militants to flee their positions. Like in Cinderes and Raco, Afrin center had this exit door open until the day before the final takeover. As the militants tried to flee through the only exit left for them to vacate the civilian populated areas, what welcomed the Turkish forces in the city were full stacked ammunition depots. Hence, the PYD’s strategy(!) of giving Afrin to Turkey was not chosen by the PYD but forced by Turkey.

On the 58^th day of the military campaign Operation Olive Branch, Turkey declared its victory against the PKK/YPG in Afrin. Following the collapse of the PKK’s defense strategy and its unexpected isolation within the geopolitical struggle, the city is now under full control of the Turkish Armed Forces and the TAF-backed Free Syrian Army. One way or another, it is clear that this military-political victory of Turkey will provide more opportunities for strategic manoeuvres in Ankara’s next military move, particularly towards its ongoing military campaign against the PKK in northern Syria. Upon the liberation of Afrin city, with the surprisingly little resistance by the PKK, Turkey is now reconsidering its military and political options to minimize the PKK’s role in the midterm, and de-territorialize the PKK and YPG in Syria and Iraq.

Speaking in Ankara, a day after the TAF and Free Syrian Army cleared Afrin, President Erdogan vowed to further Turkey’s fight against terrorism beyond Afrin. In his speech, Erdogan said: “We have eliminated most of the terror corridors in the region,” and “we will continue this process until we entirely eliminate this corridor that includes Manbij, Qamisli, Ayn al Arab (also known as Kobani) and Rasuylayn.” President Erdogan also underlined that Turkey’s next military move will take place in Manbij – a region that is still under the control of the U.S.-backed PKK/YPG forces. Following the visit of former U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to Turkey to negotiate about the PKK issue in Manbij, Turkey’s foreign minister Cavusoglu expressed that the YPG will hand over the governance of Manbij to the Turkey-led Free Syrian Army in the presence of the U.S. military units there. However, after Trump’s unexpected Pompeo move, as the new Secretary of State, Cavusoglu made a minor revision in his early announcement about the agreement with Tillerson over the issue of Manbij. Cavusoglu stated that Turkey and the U.S. have not reached an “agreement,” but a common “understanding” regarding the issue of the U.S.-PKK alliance in Syria. At this stage, there is still an ambiguity regarding the position of the new State Secretary in negotiations with Turkey.

While the U.S. administration’s stance towards Turkey remains unclear, President Erdogan said that Turkey would also continue its fight against the PKK in Sinjar, a region that has been controlled by the PKK since 2014. Now, the foreign and security policy circles in Ankara are speculating how Turkey will carry out its military campaign against the PKK in Iraq. Turkey sees Sinjar just as strategically important as Afrin and other PKK-controlled regions. The geographical proximity of Sinjar to Turkey, and the role of Sinjar as a hub between Qandil and northern Syria threatens Turkey’s national security, and provides the PKK with more space to freely mobilize its militants and military equipment. It is crucial to note that the PKK’s presence in Sinjar threatens Iraq’s territorial integrity as well as the political stability of northern Iraq.

The strategic rationality behind Turkey’s move against the PKK in Sinjar is very simple. Turkey believes that the PKK’s presence in Sinjar does not meet with the regional geopolitical expectations, similar to the PKK experience in Afrin. Turkey and Iraq recently reached a tacit agreement over the PKK issue in northern Iraq. Iran seems to share a similar perspective regarding the PKK presence in northern Syria and Iraq. The KRG’s independence referendum showed how an intra-regional competition turned into an ad hoc realistic alliance in the presence of a common threat. Therefore, it is possible to claim that the PKK lacks an intra-regional support in maintaining its political and military presence in Sinjar. More critically, the PKK does not benefit from the U.S. air protection in Sinjar. Thus, the security and foreign policy centers in Ankara believe that the PKK will be isolated if Turkey decides to intervene against the PKK in Sinjar.

However, this does not necessarily mean that Turkey will take unilateral action against the PKK in Iraq. There are three alternative scenarios that should be taken into consideration. First and foremost, Turkey will try to evacuate the PKK from Sinjar by encouraging the Iraqi central government to take military action. Secondly, Turkey and Iraq will take a joint military action against the PKK together, if the PKK does not peacefully hand over the city. The recent visit of Hulisi Akar, Turkish Chief of General Staff, was the first step in convincing Iraq to take military action against the PKK. After his visit, the two countries underlined the importance of commonality in the fight against terrorism. The third and yet undesired option is part of Turkey’s ongoing military activism in the region against the PKK. At domestic, regional and international levels, Turkey benefits from its trans-frontier military initiatives as the active use of military forces provide a strategic superiority for Turkey to contain security threats and strengthen its diplomatic relations. The launch of Operation Olive Branch is a good example in understanding how the use of power consolidates Turkey’s diplomatic efforts on regional and international scales.

Articulated as such, according to the third option, Turkey is likely to act unilaterally against the PKK in Sinjar. Many in the governmental circles believe that Turkey might also use its new proxy forces against the PKK in Iraq. It is fair to conclude that Turkey wants to secure its borders, and also its regional strategic priorities. The use of military power will be part of this strategy in the future until Syria and Iraq reach a level of sustainable stability and security. The regional dynamics, as well as the new trends in Turkish security and foreign policy, enables Turkey to carry out its military campaign beyond Afrin.

In June, 2015, I came across two Syrians in Şanlıurfa’s Akçakale district who were contemplating the Syrian border facing Tell Abyad with hopeless eyes. A black smoke remaining from the U.S. bombardment wreathed the town, which was covered with yellow dust as far as the eye could reach. Having received a substantial amount of military aid from the U.S., the terror group PKK and its Syrian offshoot Democratic Union Party (PYD) were advancing towards Daesh deployments in Tell Abyad thanks to the generous help of the American jets. However; that war, which was almost visible to the naked eye, was not similar to the wars on the other fronts of Syria. Daesh was leaving the areas it occupied without hardly any resistance and heading towards Raqqa, the city the terror group used as its Syrian headquarters at the time. Daesh militants looked as if they were willfully handing over Tell Abyad to the PYD.

The PYD’s attempt to carry out a demographic massacre in north Syria came to light with this war. In Tell Abyad, the PKK blatantly displaced the locals from the land they had been living on for centuries, which eventually started to be vocally expressed and recorded in various international reports. However, nothing was done to stop this crime against humanity. Of course, the PKK and the PYD’s displacement policy did not begin in Tell Abyad. The organization, which started organizing and collecting a base under the name of “Apocular” in eastern and southeastern Turkey during the 1970s, initially kicked off a sweeping process of destruction against religious functionaries along with the members of various Kurdish organizations such as the Revolutionary Democratic Culture Association (DDKD), the Revolutionary Eastern Culture Clubs (DDKO), Kawa and Rizgari. Becoming the only dominant organization in the region through this method, the PKK implemented the exact same method 40 years later in Syria.

The Baath regime, which got into trouble with its armed opponents in Syria in 2011, made an agreement with the PKK leadership in Mount Qandil and assigned the security to the PKK militants in many regions, including Qamishli, Al-Hasakah, Afrin and Ayn al-Arab (Kobani). In return for this generosity of the Assad regime, the PKK took over the role of silencing the opponents of the regime in these areas. On June 27, 2013, the PKK militants launched a fusillade attack on a group of Kurdish civilians who were protesting against the regime in Amuda district. Five civilians, including a 5-year-old girl, were killed in the incident. The terror group’s attacks on dissident Kurds continued. Several leaders including Mashaal Tammo, Abdullah Bedro and Sherzad Rashid were assassinated by the PYD militants. With these methods, the PYD built an empire of fear in north Syria and consolidated its power. No one was able to raise their voice against the organization. The terror group’s next step was displacing the Kurds who were not supporting the PKK. With compulsory military service, detentions, arrests, arbitrary fines and heavy taxes, the Kurds not adhering to the PYD and the PKK were displaced. Tens of thousands of Syrians were forced to leave Afrin, Qamishli, Amuda, Ayn al-Arab and Al-Hasakah.

The legitimacy guise tailored for the PYD

After eliminating the potential problems, the PYD focused on its efforts to form a state in these areas. During the first weeks of 2014, the PKK declared three cantons in north Syria named Afrin, Kobani and Jazira. Nine months later, Daesh took action to capture Kobani. A legitimacy guise was tailored for the PYD during the Daesh-PYD war with the contributions of the international press. Daesh’s attack on Kobani became the top topic on the international agenda whereas foreign correspondents paid visits to Kobani to market the terror group. So, the PYD militants were declared “heroes who defended their people against barbaric Daesh militants.” During this period, many countries offered considerable military support to the PYD. From then on, Washington became the PYD’s boss instead of Damascus. The U.S. authorities firstly helped the establishment of an operational group named Euphrates Volcano by uniting the PYD’s armed wing People’s Protection Units (YPG) with several minor armed groups. Soon after, the group was renamed as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

After Kobani was “liberated”, many trucks carrying weapons and ammunition were sent to the SDF, in which the YPG operatives formed the backbone whilst the PKK commanded all the decision mechanisms. The aids were coordinated from a U.S. base established in Rimelan district. The YPG militants, who were endeavoring to secure a few checkpoints with ineffective weapons until that point, were being transformed into a regular army.

The next target after Kobani was Tell Abyad, which was occupied by Daesh at the time. Following a low-intensity conflict that lasted a few days, Daesh abandoned Tell Abyad. But the nightmare was not over for the locals. Having lived under the oppression of Daesh for more than two years, the locals of Tell Abyad were forced to leave their villages after the district was captured from Daesh.

On June 23, 2015, a source of mine whose family lives in Tell Abyad sent this text message to me:

“The PKK members gathered families in a school in Hammam Turkmen and threatened them saying ‘This place has become a military zone, so leave the village. If you don’t leave, we will make American jets bomb your houses by giving your coordinates as Daesh targets.’ Some families are now leaving the village out of fear.”

To research this incident, I made a few more contacts and after verifying it published the story in a national newspaper. The neighborhoods of the locals who refused to leave their homes were shelled the next day, upon which they had to be abandoned and most of the victims are currently living in refugee camps. Following this event many people brought this issue to the agenda. As someone bearing witness to this atrocity, I can safely say that the PKK/PYD and the U.S. connived on this crime against humanity in Tell Abyad. In Hammam Turkmen neighborhood, where the closest Daesh positions were 30 kilometers away at the time, 20.000 Syrian Turkmens were displaced in this manner.

The PYD has changed the demographics of Syria

Afterwards, hundreds of thousands of Syrians were forcibly displaced from the towns of Manbij, Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, which were occupied by the PKK/PYD with the support of U.S. air forces. All of this happened before the eyes of the U.S. The terror group, seeking to consolidate its territorial power in Syria, used many methods to change the demographic structure of the country. Hundreds of Arabs were imprisoned and tortured after being accused of Daesh membership. Those who raised livestock had their cattle seized. Those who owned farmlands had their farms burned. People who did not want to leave had their children forcibly conscripted and sent to the front lines. Most of the people who lived in these areas had to leave to escape such treatment.

The city of Tell Rifaat, belonging to the district of Azaz just south of the Turkish border, is one of the places where PYD/PKK’s strategy of forced displacement has been employed to its greatest extent. PYD/PKK surrounded Tell Rifaat, which lies along the Azaz-Aleppo road, in 2016 and subsequently started shelling civilian settlements in the region. The rebels in Tell Rifaat, seeing no other way out of this situation, had to hand over the region to the PYD to save the lives of the civilians living there. However, despite being spared death, they were not spared exile. The PYD forced 250.000 civilians to leave this region by employing the methods described. Tell Rifaat, once one of the largest settlements in the area, is now a ghost town.

The PKK turned the Daesh attack on Iraq/Sinjar, just like the one on Kobani, into propaganda, and used it to dominate the Yazidi population. The PYD began conscripting Yazidis once the attack was repelled even though during the Daesh attack on Sinjar it did not take a position that would change the course of the battle. The PKK, which had previously created a division called YPJ (Yekineyen Parastina Jin/Women’s Defense Units), created a division consisting solely of Yazidis called YPŞ (Yekineyen Parastina Şengal/Sinjar Resistance Units). Many young Yazidis were transported to Syria over the Rabia border crossing and given mandatory military training by the PKK in the organization’s military camp in Qamishli. Syrian Yazidis were also brought to this camp. After receiving a short military training, some Iraqi Yazidis were sent back to Sinjar while others were sent to Syrian front-lines.

Undoubtedly, the crimes and the demographic massacre of the PKK and the PYD are not limited by these actions. Some local councils founded by Syrian rebels are keeping records of some of the exiled Syrians. But these records are very limited. No credible number exists on how many people have been forcibly displaced from their homes so far. According to current records, the number of Syrians exiled from towns such as Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, Qamishli, Al-Darbasiyah, Al-Shaddadah, Rmelan, Al-Qahtaniyah, Al-Hasakah, Tell Brak and Tabqa exceeds two million. Not only Arabs but also Turkmens, Kurds and Assyrians have suffered from these policies. The displaced people, now living in very hard conditions, are dreaming of the day they will return to their homes.

Aiming to eliminate terrorist elements of PKK/YPG, The Operation Olive Branch (OOB) launched by Turkey on January 20 revealed how local, regional and international actors in the Syrian crisis are intertwined. Both Syrian “revisionist actors” and regional actors, trying to maintain or maximize their gains along with minimizing damage, openly voiced their discomfort regarding Turkey’s novel “boots on the ground” strategy, which priorities Turkey’s military power as a foreign policy tool. More than just voicing, they have also taken certain steps seeking to obstruct Turkey’s military depth in Afrin. Iranian-led Shiite militia in support of Assad moving to Afrin to fight against Turkey, together with PKK/YPG last month, was one of the most significant indicators of the aforementioned situation. Meanwhile, despite having different motives, we have seen both Russia and the U.S. become agitated because of the Afrin operation.

Even though it is wary about Turkey’s “boots on the ground” strategy, Moscow calculates that this strategy will escalate the tensions between Ankara and Washington and force Turkey to become closer with Russia; therefore, their approach towards Turkey remains the same. Meanwhile, Washington doesn’t want to strengthen Russia’s hand and is aware that disregarding threats to Ankara’s very existence may deteriorate Turkish-American relations further, evolving into something more than a conjunctural crisis. In this respect, the recent diplomatic traffic between Turkey and the U.S. indicates that the U.S. policymakers have become “more concerned” about Turkey’s assertiveness in Syria and that the U.S. desires to reconcile with Turkey rather than exacerbate the schism between the two NATO partners.

The “boots on the ground” strategy which could be defined as eliminating threats before they reach the country’s borders is clearly yielding positive results for Turkey’s national security. The picture is actually clear; taking the Operation Euphrates Shield and outposts being established in Idlib into consideration, Ankara will achieve a military and political depth in Syria that includes territories northwest of the Euphrates with OOB; a depth that Turkey won’t relinquish in the near future. With the possible addition of Manbij to the aforementioned territories as a result of negotiations with the U.S., Turkey might secure targets in its “game plan” more easily in the short-term.

Turkey’s Game Plan in Afrin

Turkey’s Afrin operation is the continuation of the new national security strategy that was shaped more clearly after the July 15 coup attempt. According to this strategy, Turkey could only contain threats emerging in Syria and Iraq, as a result of the power vacuum, with efficient deployment of military assets. In this respect, the strategy foresees the utilization of military power in the field and in cross-border operations instead of reserving it.

Considering the larger region which includes Syria and Iraq along with protruding military power and the said region’s political and geopolitical realities, the following are Ankara’s aims for the future:

• Minimizing the PKK existence on both Syrian and Iraqi borders
• Consolidating diplomacy in order to assure Syria’s territorial integrity
• Consolidating diplomatic compromise with Russia and Iran achieved in Astana and Sochi
• Weakening the U.S.’ political and military ties with PKK/YPG

In order to simultaneously achieve the aforementioned targets, Turkey has to overcome certain trials. Ankara’s security strategy mostly focuses on the minimization of the PKK threat. However, the efficient deployment of military power won’t suffice on its own; the complex network of regional and international relations has to be managed simultaneously.

First of all, eliminating the cross-border threat of the PKK with military force requires a meticulous balance between the seemingly conflicting interests of Russia and the U.S. Every improvement in Turkish-Russian relations in regards to PKK/YPG and Syria has an impact on Turkish-American relations; therefore, the relations between Turkey and Russia is at the center of it all. On the other hand, consolidation of diplomacy and the maintenance of the reconciliation between Turkey, Russia and Iran are necessity for preserving Syria’s territorial integrity. Inclusion of Washington to this process might bring balance between Moscow-Regime-Tehran, consolidate the diplomatic initiative and work in favor of Turkey. It shouldn’t be forgotten that certain regional actors like Israel and Iran might attempt to undermine this diplomatic process. Tehran’s approach to Turkey could be clearly understood from Iran’s deployment of militia and armed forces of the Syrian regime which forced Russia to become the intermediary between PKK/YPG and the Syrian regime in Afrin. Iran could be asserted as the leading “most unreliable” actor that could prevent Turkey from achieving its aforementioned goals.

Syria’s territorial integrity isn’t all about the dynamics between Turkey and PKK/YPG. In other words, Turkey may have thwarted PKK/YPG from controlling a united swath of land with Operation Euphrates Shield and OOB; however, it isn’t possible to foresee how the diplomatic process along with the preparation of a new constitution will shape Syria, especially east of the Euphrates. This is important as it is a reminder that the Syrian conflict isn’t only about the power struggle between the regime and the opposition.

A part of Turkey’s game plan, consolidation of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Ankara is relatively easy. Russia desires the schism between Turkey and the U.S. to widen and deepen. Meanwhile, we know that Russia needs Turkey in resolving the Syrian crisis and this is the main reason for Russia giving the green light to Turkey’s Afrin operation. Moscow knows that Turkey’s presence on the field tests the relations between the U.S. and PKK/YPG, forcing the U.S. to act more carefully. On the other hand, Moscow also believes that counterbalancing Iran’s field advantage and prominent influence over the regime with Turkey is useful. Besides the Syrian crisis the tensions between Turkey and NATO, along with the EU, makes Russia’s investment in Turkey even more worthwhile. Therefore, the consolidation of relations between Ankara and Moscow has become one of the pillars of security policies. Yet, symmetricity of this consolidation is crucial.

Turkey-U.S. Relations

The aim to weaken the U.S.’ relations with PKK/YPG and reinforcing cooperation rather than conflicts have become a crystallized subject in terms of the ever-complicating network of regional and international relations. In order to dismiss the PKK as an issue between Turkey and the U.S., territories under the control of the terrorist organization on both banks of Euphrates has to diminish, its armed capacity has to be minimized and its partnership with the U.S. should end. Even though the PKK won’t be able to hold on to the west side of the Euphrates because of OOB, Iran’s and the Syrian regime’s certain initiatives on the field might make it harder for Turkey to completely control Afrin.

Yet, Turkey needs to “reconcile” and “find a midway” with the U.S. to realize the remaining two aims. Minimizing PKK/YPG activities to the east of the Euphrates through military intervention is among the options. However, realization of this intervention without any kind of reconciliation with the U.S. might escalate the crisis in Turkish-American relations. There is hope for a settlement between Turkey and the U.S. after the former U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson’s visit to Ankara. If the U.S. leaves Manbij to the Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army, Ankara might revise the options regarding the east of the Euphrates. This obviously doesn’t mean Turkey will consent to the PKK existence in the said region.

The other options include reinforcing the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which consists mostly of PKK/YPG militants with Arabs and Kurds that aren’t affiliated with the terrorist organization, thus diluting the existence of terrorist elements, and recalling all the heavy weaponry provided to the YPG after the military phase against Daesh is over. A concrete step has to be yet taken to realize these options. Meanwhile, if Washington seeks a “local power” to limit Iranian influence over Syria in a post-Daesh setting, it has to be aware of the issues that might emerge as a result of building this strategy on the YPG. Therefore, Turkey is still one of the leading actors that could prevent revitalization of Daesh and aide the dismantling of Iran’s influence in Syria.

It’s definite that Turkey won’t back down and will force the U.S. to sever its ties with PKK/YPG. At this point, Turkey has to be militarily active on the field; Turkey’s military activities might persuade the U.S. to agree with Turkey’s demands.

Secondly, the necessity to implement a strategy that would thwart both Russia and Iran’s attempts to undermine Turkey’s fight against PKK in Syria. Iran is the most “anti-Turkey” country involved in the Syrian crisis. While Moscow handles issues in a more pragmatic way, Tehran always sees events through an ideological lens; the Shiite militia’s latest performance in Afrin proves this. It should be remembered that “military activism” and deterrence will be key in counterbalancing Iran.

Since Turkey implemented “boots on the ground” strategy in northern Syria, the Syrian crisis has become more complicated. Only those who are determined will land on both feet at the end of this crisis.

Some local security sources spoke to Anadolu Agency on condition of anonymity that the YPG/PKK terrorists force civilians to dig two-meter deep, two-meter wide and kilometers-long ditches in order to block the entrance of Turkish military forces into Afrin.

Turkey has been watching the YPG by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which show how the terrorist organization prevent residents to leave the city. Another video footage captured by Turkish UAVs show how a mine planted by the YPG killed civilians as they tried to leave the city.

As part of their defense strategy, the YPG/PKK had started digging ditches, building tunnels, making barricades, and planting bombs much earlier. It is commented that the ditches and tunnels in Afrin seem professional and this evokes the question if the YPG received a foreign support or training to build them.

Since the first day of the operation, both Turkish military and political authorities have repeatedly pointed out that the operation is targeting only YPG/PKK terrorists in order to establish security and maintain stability along Turkey’s borders as much as to protect civilians from the YPG cruelty, already known to thousands of locals who were forced to leave their houses by force of arms.

The political invalidation of the Arab world has been one of the most important consequences of the recent developments in the Middle East. It seems that Gulf countries seem to have no strategy for dealing with Iran, and they are short-sighted in not supporting Turkey, even though Turkey is the only country capable of pushing back against Iran in the region.

The Gulf has always been a sub-region that characterized the scattered nature of the Arab world. The Arab Spring caused a political rift among Gulf countries, which took varying approaches to the crises and actors shortly after they emerged. This rift deepened after the 2013 military coup in Egypt and evolved into a full-blown crisis in 2014. The conflict between Gulf countries reached its peak in mid-2017 as the trio of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain enforced a diplomatic, political and economic embargo on Qatar.

Oman continues to maintain its non-conflictual foreign policy, and Kuwait too has a relatively neutral stance. Qatar, on the other hand, represents the opposition against the UAE-Saudi Arabia coalition. While Qatar and Turkey usually act in unison, backed by the US and Israel, UAE and Saudi Arabia along with Egypt pursue policies against Turkey and Qatar. These two parties step on each other’s toes when it comes to nearly every issue existing in the Middle East.

Their approaches to Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch (OOB), launched on January 20 with the aim of eradicating terrorist elements from the border, are also similar. In this respect, Turkey’s military operation has caused the schisms between the Gulf countries to resurface once again. Right after the initiation of the operation, Turkey invited the ambassadors of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar, along with other respective countries’ diplomats residing in Ankara, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and briefed them about the operation, in an effort to win their support.

Same old story in the Gulf

Despite the briefing, especially Saudi Arabia and UAE stood against Turkey’s OOB. Allegedly enforcing the regional policies of the US and Israel, the leadership of these two countries continued to be in close relations with Washington and Tel Aviv. As it was also the case with the previous operation, Brett McGurk, the most prominent US official responsible in Syria and a fervent supporter of the PKK/YPG, met with representatives from the UAE and Saudi Arabia during his visit to Abu Dhabi. Egyptian and Israeli representatives were also present at this meeting. These four countries are known for their anti-Turkey policies in the region. In one of his previous statements, McGurk had alleged that the operation would rejuvenate Daesh in Syria.

Being the most fervent anti-Turkey Gulf country, the UAE described the operation as an infringement on Syria’s sovereignty. UAE Foreign Minister Anwar Gargash went further by saying through social media that the operation was a threat to the security and unity of Arabs.

Gargash tweeted “the developments regarding Afrin created the need to redefine and restore Arab national unity.” Thus, he claimed that inaction would lead to the marginalization of Arabs in the region, and tried to rally the Arab public against Turkey.

With the influence of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, Egypt under the Sisi administration described the operation as an assault on Syria’s security. In its statement, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs alleged that OOB was undermining the political resolution efforts in Syria along with infringing on political agreements.

Moreover, officials of both the UAE and Egypt responded positively to the PYD/YPG’s call for support. Their reactions could be seen as the continuation of the US and Israeli sustenance to the terrorist organization. Meanwhile, this should be regarded as an attempt to consolidate the new divide in the region. Considering these statements, the YPG is hopeful of receiving military and financial support from the UAE and Egypt.

It’s known that Saudi Arabia has a similar perspective. After Raqqa was recaptured from Daesh and the city was razed to the ground by the US in late 2017, reports about Saudi Arabia sending a representative to the annihilated city and promising $1 billion to the US’ new ally the YPG for reconstruction were leaked. Despite all this, Turkish President Erdoğan called Prince Salman of Saudi Arabia, the ruler of the largest and most important Gulf country, and exchanged opinions about the aim of the operation and expectations. According to Anadolu Agency, Erdoğan announced that Turkey would allow the gradual return of Syrian refugees in Turkey to the liberated towns. During the call, both leaders underscored the importance of preserving Syria’s territorial integrity and developing a political resolution to the conflict.

Qatar continues to support Turkey

Ostracized by other Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Qatar continued to side with Turkey, which has been the case since the beginning of the Syrian crisis. Declaring its support for Turkey’s OOB, Qatar described the operation as a necessity in terms of assuring national security. In his statement, Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani asserted that developments in Syria were a direct threat to Turkey’s national security and announced his country’s support for all countries like Turkey who seek to preserve their own national security.

The Qatari Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lulwah al-Khater announced “Qatar’s support to Turkey initiative which aims to preserve national security and prevent terrorist attacks.” Al-Khater also expressed that OOB was legitimately launched by Turkey to preserve Syria’s territorial integrity along with national security concerns.

Qatari media followed a similar approach and showed support for the operation. For instance, Al-Watan daily reported on the operation with the following title: “Erdoğan: Operation Olive Branch is to eliminate terrorists.” The photo used for this news article had Syrians holding posters that said “We support the Turkish military operation which aims to liberate our people in Afrin from YPG.” The same article also relayed President Erdoğan’s statements which expressed Syria and Turkey’s fates are intertwined, that Turkey wouldn’t be secure unless Syria is secure. Similarly, al-Raya and al-Arab dailies reported that Russia and the US’ reckless policies have forced Turkey to launch the operation and secure its own national security.

Regional crises and the chaos in the Middle East has always forced powers to constantly shift their positions. This creates challenges in maintaining interstate cooperation.

Given that, the OOB has caused some confusion in the Gulf. Anti-Turkey Gulf countries are facing a dilemma in terms of the Syrian crisis. On one hand, they don’t want Turkey to be more active in the region. On the other, they are aware that Turkey is the only country in the region that can counterbalance Iran. They especially know well that Turkey and Iran are waging a proxy war in Syria. Considering both Turkey and Iran, the Gulf countries believe Iran is a larger threat to them; therefore, one would expect them wanting Turkey to be more powerful. However, despite all these factors, the UAE and Saudi Arabia followed a similar policy with Iran, creating one of the most significant paradoxes in recent history, while Kuwait chose neutrality.

A total of 3,444 terrorists have been “neutralized” since the start of Operation Olive Branch in Syria’s northwestern Afrin region, the Turkish General Staff said in a statement on Wednesday morning.

Turkish authorities often use the word “neutralized” in their statements to imply the terrorists in question either surrendered or were killed or captured.

On Jan. 20, Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch to clear YPG/PKK-Daesh terrorists from Afrin, northwestern Syria.

According to the Turkish General Staff, the operation aims to establish security and stability along Turkey’s borders and the region as well as to protect Syrians from the oppression and cruelty of terrorists.

The operation is being carried out under the framework of Turkey’s rights based on international law, UN Security Council resolutions, its self-defense rights under the UN charter, and respect for Syria’s territorial integrity, it said.

The military also said only terror targets are being destroyed and that “utmost care” is being taken to avoid harming civilians.

Source: AA

Turkey’s president said on Wednesday he hopes the northwestern Syrian city of Afrin would be liberated from terrorists “by this evening.”

The route in eastern Afrin terrorists use to enter and exit will be closed soon, Recep Tayyip Erdogan told a gathering of village and neighborhood heads at the presidential complex in the capital Ankara.

On Jan. 20, Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch to clear YPG/PKK and Daesh terrorists from the region of Afrin, near Turkey’s southern border.

According to the Turkish General Staff, the operation aims to establish security and stability along Turkey’s borders and the region as well as to protect Syrians from the oppression and cruelty of terrorists.

The operation is being carried out under the framework of Turkey’s rights based on international law, UN Security Council resolutions, its self-defense rights under the UN charter, and respect for Syria’s territorial integrity, it said.

The military also said only terror targets are being destroyed and that “utmost care” is being taken to avoid harming civilians.

Source: AA

Evidence of the terrorist YPG/PKK using young children uncovered in the Turkish-led operation in Syria’s Afrin region confirms what many international rights watchdogs already reported: the terrorist recruitment of minors.

The memory cards of cameras seized during the ongoing Operation Olive Branch in Syria’s Afrin region, launched on Jan. 20 against YPG/PKK-Daesh terrorists, show children — age 13-17 — bearing arms, training with weapons, and living in poor conditions in the mountains.

In a December 2016 report Iraq: Armed Groups Using Child Soldiers, Human Rights Watch documented 29 cases in northern Iraq of children recruited by armed groups affiliated to the terrorist PKK.

According to the report, children under age 15 took part in fighting, staffed checkpoints, and cleaned and prepared weapons.

The same PKK activity was also documented in a November 2013 United Nations report called Children and Armed Conflict.

The report said Kurdish armed groups recruited boys and girls age 14-17 in Syria’s Hasakah region.

The 2014 U.S. State Department Human Rights Report also said the terrorist PKK — the YPG/PKK’s parent group — regularly recruited children in the past, though the number of child soldiers recruited by the PKK that year was unknown.

The report also said PKK had kept up abducting and conscribing young people, adding that it was not generally clear whether they joined by force or volunteered.

Families of allegedly abducted children staged several protests during the year demanding the terror group free their children, it added.

Kidnapping children

In 2015, the U.S. Trafficking in Persons Report said Kurdish children were sometimes kidnapped and forced to participate in PKK forces, according to uncorroborated reports.

In the 2016 report, the U.S. said the YPG/PKK continued to recruit and use boys and girls, including children younger than 15.

According to the report, the YPG/PKK reportedly took the children to indoctrination and training camps.

In April 2015, a 16-year-old girl in Aleppo was allegedly recruited by YPJ/PKK female terrorists against the wishes of her family, said the report.

The forced recruitment of children by the YPG/PKK was also documented in reports of German-based Kurdwatch.

In a May 2015 report, Kurdwatch said the PYD/YPG/PKK kidnapped 12-year-old Fatimah S.A.

Quoting a family member, the report said: “The girl simply disappeared. Her parents are PYD supporters. However they weren’t asked if they wanted to send the girl to the military.

“The YPG claims that the girl decided by her own free will. Her parents were not even allowed to accompany their daughter. They were promised that after two weeks training, Fatimah would be allowed to return if she wants.”

According to the International Criminal Court, the enlistment and conscription of child soldiers under age 15, as well as using them to participate actively in hostilities, is a war crime.

According to the Turkish General Staff, Operation Olive Branch aims to establish security and stability along Turkey’s borders and the region as well as to protect Syrians from terrorist oppression and cruelty.

The operation is being carried out under the framework of Turkey’s rights based on international law, UN Security Council resolutions, its self-defense rights under the UN charter, and respect for Syria’s territorial integrity, it said.

The military also said only terror targets are being destroyed and that “utmost care” is being taken to avoid harming civilians.

Source: AA

Ever since Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch in northwestern Syria, its goals have been mischaracterized and quite a few myths continue to thrive. One of these is that Turkey is conducting the operation because it cannot tolerate any “Kurdish” gains in northern Syria. It has become commonplace to describe the PKK-linked YPG as “American-backed Kurdish militias” or simply “Kurds” as if they represent the majority or all of Syrian Kurds. In fact, the YPG has sought to dominate the region at the expense of Kurdish groups not aligned with the PKK.

Back in the fall of 2014 during the battle for Kobani, the YPG refused to allow a large contingent of Peshmerga forces to help with the fight against Daesh. At the time, Turkey had even allowed the Kurdish Peshmerga forces from Iraq to travel through its territory – a first in Turkish history – to arrive in Kobani. From the beginning, the YPG has only been interested in creating a PKK stronghold in northern Syria. This is clearly unacceptable for Turkey but it is a far cry from an “obsession” with any Kurdish political gain in Syria. If anything, Turkey has encouraged unity among Syrian Kurds and sought to convince the PYD to join the opposition forces against Assad. Turkey also supported non-PYD Kurdish representation in a national dialogue congress.

Another major myth has been the YPG’s “effectiveness” as ground forces against Daesh. It should be remembered that the PYD had made a deal with the Assad regime at the beginning of the Syrian uprising. It was only after the sudden rise of Daesh that the YPG started to promote itself as “staunchly secular” and fearless fighters against Daesh. The Obama administration decided to utilize them as “local partners” against Daesh in an environment where the American public was opposed to any “boots on the ground.” Ever since then, the YPG has dominated the military battlefield largely thanks to US military support including critical air cover and protection.

The devil’s bargain continued under the Trump administration but the YPG’s utility is now proving limited at best. The political commitment of the YPG to the PKK’s goals in Syria is so strong that they announced that they would redeploy their forces from the Daesh fight to Afrin against Turkey. The irony should not be escaping anyone that the YPG is willing to abandon the fight against Daesh – the very rationale for the US support – in order to fight a US NATO ally. Some analysts have suggested that the US can broker a deal with Turkey and somehow convince the YPG to sever ties with the PKK. However, Turkey’s Afrin operation has exposed that the congruity between the two is so deep and organic that the PKK’s strategic and political goals take priority over the fight against Daesh.

The myths about the YPG can be maintained so far as the US policymakers choose to ignore realities on the ground for political expediency or the lack of a coherent Syria policy. Turkey’s Afrin operation has already exposed many of the ill-conceived notions about the YPG. It is time for the US to coordinate with Turkey strategically and rely on its NATO ally for its policy goals. Establishing stability in northern Syria is a common goal but it cannot come at the expense of Turkey’s national security. Ensuring that Daesh does not come back is also a common goal but the YPG cannot be relied upon to achieve it. Abandoning the myths about the YPG would serve the US well. Then comes the hard task of crafting a realistic Syria policy that is coordinated with Turkey and one that can achieve lasting stability.

On March 3, 2018, Turkey’s Office of the Prime Ministry, Directorate General of Press and Information organized a visit consisting of foreign reporters and non-governmental organizations to Syria.

The aim of the visit was to inform reporters of the situation in Afrin and give information about Operation Olive Branch, which until this day has seen the neutralization of around 3,000 terrorists. In addition to the staff that organized the trip and the reporters, members of NGOs also attended. The group was reportedly composed of 20 people in total.

There was a wide range of reporters, including individuals from the BBC and Al-Jazeera. A reporter who attended the visit spoke to The New Turkey on the condition of anonymity and explained their experience.

A group of reporters are seen before the visit. Picture obtained from source. 

The trip to Syria began in Azaz, a city northwest of Syria, roughly 30 kilometres from Aleppo – n area that was included in Operation Euphrates Shield. The source emphasized that Turkey is pursuing a vital role in the re-normalization of life standards in Syria. “Turkey is trying to ensure Azaz becomes an example city for the rest of Syria. It is doing this by helping schools, re-building infrastructure and by helping the local administrations. It even has a PTT [a Turkish post-office] there.”

“Assad regime forces had bombed a mosque in Azaz. Today Turkey’s Presidency of Religious Affairs is re-building that mosque,” the source said.

Explaining that they had the chance to speak to the local populace when they were there, the source told us that the local population see Assad as the sole reason for this crisis. “The people there say that the whole reason for this crisis [in Syria] is because of Assad.”

After visiting the Azaz region, the group was taken to the village of Mersawa. The source told us that the village only consists of 15 families; half of them had left their homes due to the situation in the country. In comparison to the situation in Azaz, the standard of life in Mersawa is lower.

“We spoke to a couple of families in Mersawa. There are only around 15 families left, as most of them have migrated and left their homes. AFAD and the Turkish Red Crescent provided these families with survival necessities such as food and blankets.”

A picture depicting the help provided by AFAD in Mersawa. Picture obtained from source. 

When asked about the situation of the civilians in operation areas, the source told us that “they [the Turkish Armed Forces and the Free Syrian Army] are very sensitive against the civilians. It feels like there is a political order that warns ‘do everything to protect the civilians.'”

The source also added that some members of the Free Syrian Army said that the sensitivity in protecting civilians is “causing the operation to proceed much more slowly and that there is a clear separation between the PKK and the Kurdish population of Syria.”

A total of 3,055 terrorists have been “neutralized” so far since the start of Operation Olive Branch in Syria’s northwestern Afrin region, the Turkish General Staff said in a statement on Thursday.

Turkish authorities often use the word “neutralized” in their statements to imply the terrorists in question either surrendered or were killed or captured.

The military also added that air-and-land operations were continuing.

On Jan. 20, Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch to clear YPG/PKK and Daesh terrorists from Afrin, northwestern Syria.

According to the Turkish General Staff, the operation aims to establish security and stability along Turkey’s borders and the region as well as to protect Syrians from oppression and cruelty of terrorists.

The operation is being carried out under the framework of Turkey’s rights based on international law, UN Security Council resolutions, its self-defense rights under the UN charter, and respect for Syria’s territorial integrity, it said.

The military further said only terror targets are being destroyed and that “utmost care” is being taken to avoid harming civilians.

Source: AA 

With the escalation of the Syrian Civil War, attacks on Turkey’s border towns began to increase from 2012 onwards. In order to refresh our memories, let’s remember that 5 Turkish citizens were killed in the Akcakale district of Sanliurfa on October 2, 2012, as a result of attacks conducted from Syria. Meanwhile, the memories of the bomb attack that took place in Reyhanli on May 11, 2013, are still fresh. There is now a clock tower at the location of the bombing in Reyhanli in order to ensure that the passing time never lets us forget our losses. There were numerous attacks in 2015 and 2016, which caused the death of citizens not only in border towns but also in cities like Ankara and Istanbul. Tens of civilians, most of them being children, were massacred at a wedding in Gaziantep as a result of a suicide bomb attack on August 20, 2016. This was the final straw that led Turkey to launch Operation Euphrates Shield (OES) on the Syrian border on August 26, 2016, with the aim to establish a safe zone in the eastern bank of the Euphrates. The operation was accomplished within 7 months.

After cleaning Daesh from Azez, Jarabulus and al-Bab, with the success of the operation, Turkey provided prominent support in terms of education, health and security to the region in order to establish stability and peace. During my visit to Azez in November, I was able to personally witness the efforts of both the Turkish government and Turkish NGOs in the region. Even though the operation was able to provide some security to the border towns, this time there were instances of harassing fire coming from YPG-occupied regions such as Afrin. Launched at 17:00 pm on January 20, 2018, Operation Olive Branch (OOB) forced Turkey to fight cross-border terrorism with similar motives to Operation Euphrates Shield. In this respect, Operation Olive Branch has three sociological motives: (1) establish security and peace within Turkey, (2) help the local populace that is oppressed by the YPG, and (3) provide a secure way and settlement to Syrians in Turkey who want to return to their hometowns.

Considering that Turkish border towns have become the target of demographic-engineering based on ethnicity and sectarianism that terrorist organizations like the YPG and Daesh tried to achieve in Syria, Operation Olive Branch has both a sociological and historical significance. The sociological motivation behind the operation is what ensures it sociological support.

Higher sociological resilience

My visits to Kilis and Hatay prior to Operation Euphrates Shield help me draw a comparison with the contemporary situation. Prior to the OES, Daesh used missile attacks on these cities. When we were frightened by the sounds of two missiles that hit Kilis during a meeting there, those living in the city were rather calm and told us that they were used to it, stating that the missiles had probably fell on an empty field. They seemed careless, but also angry. When I asked for the reason of this attitude, an NGO representative said: “Miss, we are alone here. The people of Kilis are all alone!” For this reason, in comparison to Operation Olive Branch, we were unable to talk about any public support when OES was launched.

In other words, we can assert that there was a lack of social awareness during OES. Meanwhile, I witnessed the solidarity among people in Kilis and Reyhanli, especially those we interviewed during the first week of OOB. We can talk about a higher sociological resilience when compared to the past. Two factors are important in this respect. Firstly, people began to feel more secure in their personal and social lives after OES. Therefore, the success of OES became a leading factor that increased public support and awareness for OOB. A nurse I spoke to who was working at Kilis Public Hospital summarized the shift in public perception with the following words: “Two years ago, we as the people of Kilis, believed that we were all alone. We felt trapped. For this reason, we couldn’t truly understand what OES meant. Now, it’s different. The whole city stands as one.”

During my prior visit to the area, when walking around the cities, I used to often see daytime shows playing on TVs in coffeehouses and stores. However, this time people were watching news channels and following the developments about the operation. When interviewing people, I realized that many of them were using military strategy terms. It was very clear that not only did they care, but they also followed the developments of the operation very closely.

Standing together with Syrians

One of the aspects that I was interested in during my visit to Kilis and Reyhanli was whether the attacks had raised tensions between the local Turks and the Syrian people living there. I previously witnessed tensions caused due to the swift change in demographics. The main reason of these tensions was the failure of extending public services to the region at the same rate that Syrians were moving in. Syrians almost three-fold of the local populace moved into the city. Otherwise, it is false to draw a correlation between Syrians and criminal activities. After 5 years, we can now see that Turks and Syrians have learned to live together.

We visited all the locations that YPG missiles hit in Kilis and Reyhanli and spoke with the local people. Despite the recent mosque attack in Kilis, the city center was surprisingly crowded. We walked around the Asit neighborhood, which harbors classical Kilis houses and came to a Syrian household that was victim of a missile attack. We entered the house and spoke with the people living there. “The missile hit around the evening. There were 10 people in the room. It dropped down from the ceiling. Thank God it didn’t explode, so no one was injured,” the householders said. Seeing the damage, it was a miracle that no one got injured. A young Kilis resident we came across while walking said to us: “When they [terrorists] kill, they don’t care whether we are Turks or Syrians. Here, we are trying to survive together.”

During my visit to patients who survived the YPG’s attack on the mosque at Kilis State Hospital, I met Mr. Hasan who migrated from Aleppo to Kilis 4 years ago. “Thank God the missile hit the mosque after the prayer had already finished. Otherwise, the number of losses may have been higher,” he said. He has 6 children and he provides for the family alone. “I need to get out of hospital as soon as I can and return to my family and my work,” he told me, while adding: “May God help Turkey. We know that if God helps Turkey, he would also be helping us.”

We also went to visit the Kilis Oncupinar Temporary Refugee Center, which is right across the Barsaya Mountain. Since my last visit, the security procedures have become stricter. Even though we got the approved permission by the governorate, we were hardly allowed to enter after a meticulous ID check. There are 12,000 refugees living at the center. We were right at the border with Syria and were able to hear very clearly the sounds of conflict. When we were frightened by every sound of shooting, those living there said: “Don’t worry, those are our missiles.” They had enough war experience to distinguish the sounds of “their” missiles and those that belonged to the YPG. Comparing this with the traumas of the Syrian Civil War, these sounds probably mean little for them. They were saying that when the Turkish Armed Forces and the Free Syrian Army take control of villages near Afrin, missiles would no longer be able to hit the city center of Kilis. Despite the smoke rising from the Barsaya Mountain, children at the camp kept playing with their marbles. Refugees, most of whom came from Idlib, believe that the liberation of Afrin will open the way for Idlib. However, they also told me that the stability of Idlib would be determined with their return.

Responsibility of local administrators

Communication between the local administration and the local population in border towns is key for the sociological management of Operation Olive Branch. The approach local administrators in the area take are crucial for the operation. For example, a governor I met emphasized that the immediate response and support for the reconstruction of houses damaged by missiles is more important for the management of the people than we assume during a conflict process. The increasing appearance of local administrators, especially of the governor, in social life, would have a sincere effect on the people living in these cities. A local administrator I interviewed stated: “Actually, we had taken certain precautions against the possible provocations during the funerals of those who have been killed by the YPG’s missile attacks. However, there weren’t any incidents. People stood together. This is an important social support and it also allows us to do our work with high morale and stamina.”

Turkey’s deputy prime minister said Thursday that during Turkey’s current counter-terrorist Operation Olive Branch in Syria, there have been no civilian casualties or injuries.

Speaking at Anadolu Agency Editors’ Desk, Bekir Bozdag said: “To date, no civilians have died or even been hurt in Turkish Armed Forces operations.”

Bozdag also said Turkey’s fight against the terrorist PYD/PKK in Afrin, northwestern Syria, near Turkey’s border, is providing tremendous support for Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Anyone who backs or patronizes the terror group PYD/PKK, including the U.S., will face a response by Turkey, Bozdag said.

The U.S. has called the PYD/PKK a “reliable ally” in its fight against Daesh, against strong objections by Turkey, which has documented that the group is an offshoot of the terrorist PKK.

In its 30-year terrorist campaign against Turkey, the PKK — recognized as a terrorist group by the U.S., EU, and Turkey — has taken some 40,000 lives.

Addressing reports of Syrian regime forces or regime-backed forces seeking to intervene, Bozdag added that if the Bashar Al-Assad regime enters Afrin posing as the YPG/PYD/PKK they will be targeted, and if militias enter, they will be targeted too.

On Jan. 20, Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch to clear PYD/PKK and Daesh terrorists from Afrin, northwestern Syria.

According to the Turkish General Staff, the operation aims to establish security and stability along Turkey’s borders and the region as well as to protect Syrians from terrorist oppression and cruelty.

The operation is being carried out under the framework of Turkey’s rights based on international law, UN Security Council resolutions, its self-defense rights under the UN charter, and respect for Syria’s territorial integrity, it said.

The military also said only terror targets are being destroyed and the “utmost care” is being taken to avoid harming civilians.

Source: AA

As the U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson explained the shift in U.S. policy priorities in Syria towards an attempt to limit Iranian influence by close cooperation with the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), questions have emerged regarding how realistic such policies would be. This is especially relevant in regards to the long YPG-Iran cooperation in Syria, of which signs are still visible in Afrin. Therefore, it is questionable as to how the very same YPG will “limit” Iranian influence in Syria.

Iran’s cooperation with the YPG before Kobane

While the U.S. officially listed the YPG as the Syrian branch of the PKK, with the battles in Ayn al Arab – better known as Kobane – the U.S. suddenly deleted the YPG from their list of terrorists. The U.S. decision to work with the YPG in Syria led to serious concerns in Turkey as the government in Ankara began questioning why a NATO ally was supporting a terrorist organization that threatens the national security of another NATO member.

Before the U.S. began to cooperate with the YPG in Syria, Iran, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Assad regime were among the main allies of the terrorist group. This was to such an extent that the Assad regime handed over certain areas at the southern border of Turkey to the YPG in order to neutralize the Syrian Kurds who were an active part of the Syrian opposition at the time. With such control in Syria, YPG militants eliminated important Kurdish figures and organizations in their areas of control, weakening opposition against the Assad regime.

Before the U.S. began to cooperate with the YPG in Syria, Iran, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Assad regime were among the main allies of the terrorist group.

More, YPG presence in Afrin and Aleppo city made them de-facto allies with Iran and Iran-backed militias. The YPG in the Sheikh Maqsoud district neutralized an important frontline for the besieged regime forces in Aleppo and lately besieged the city. The YPG in Afrin played an important role in supplying the Iran-backed militias in the besieged pockets of Nubbl and Zahra and for the siege of Aleppo, which resulted in the capture of the city by the Assad regime and Iran-backed militias. YPG militants in Afrin, Aleppo city, Ayn al-Arab and rural Hasakah had mainly been supplied by Iran and the Assad regime.

Iran’s cooperation with the YPG-dominated SDF

Tillerson states that the U.S. wants to maintain an open-ended military presence in Syria, not only to fight Daesh, but also to provide a bulwark against Iranian influence, to ensure the departure of the Assad regime, and to create conditions for the safe return of refugees. But these claims, namely supporting the SDF in northeast Syria as a tool against Iran, are problematic.

The SDF alliance was formed to fight Daesh and not Iran or the Assad regime. While some Arab units in the SDF had previous links to Syrian rebels who fought against the Assad regime, others have maintained important relations with the Assad regime and Iran. For example, one of the largest Arab components of the SDF, the al-Sanadid Forces, which are a tribal army of the Shammar tribe, has strong relations with Iran.

YPG militants in Afrin, Aleppo city, Ayn al-Arab and rural Hasakah had mainly been supplied by Iran and the Assad regime.

It is said that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps were cooperating with the Sanadid Forces. Another example is Liwa Suqour al-Raqqa, a brigade that had links to the Assad regime. The largest local Syrian rebel faction in Raqqa – Liwa Thuwwar al-Raqqa – fought against Liwa Suqour al-Raqqa due to its links with the Assad regime and dismantled the group. However, the U.S.-backed and YPG-dominated SDF arrested the leaders of Liwa Thuwwar al-Raqqa.

Until today, the SDF has not fought one single battle against Iran-backed militias. Skirmishes with the Assad regime didn’t last for too long either. The most fragile tension between the SDF and the Assad regime erupted recently in Deir al-Zor over the fight for oil stations as the U.S.-led coalition stroke Assad regime militias, killing at least 100 Assad militias and Russian mercenaries as well. Even if the U.S. manages to break the YPG’s cooperation with Iran, the alliance formed in the SDF was not formed in order to combat Iran.

Does Iran support the YPG in Afrin?

With the launch of Operation Olive Branch, led by the Turkish Armed Forces and the National Army – a unit of all Free Syrian Army factions operating in the Euphrates Shield areas in northern Aleppo – Iran’s tacit support for the YPG became one of the most interesting topics. Senior Iranian diplomats and the Iranian president called for the end of the operation and emphasized their resentments against the Turkey-led operation.

While Iran’s president Rouhani called on Turkey to stop its military operation in the northern Syrian enclave of Afrin, claiming that it will only result in more deaths on both sides, he also stated: “We wish that Turkey’s operation in Syria will end at the earliest time.”

Statements made in the Iranian parliament were harsher. Member of Parliament, Muhammed Kasim Osmani, labeled President Erdogan a dictator and accused Turkey of committing war crimes worse than Saddam Hussein or Daesh in Syria. More, foreign ministry spokesman Behram Kasimi said: “Iran is following the developments in Afrin closely and concerned. We hope this operation at the Syrian-Turkish border will end soon, finishing the crisis in the area. Chaos in Afrin will enable takfiris to regroup and re-strengthen in Syria’s north.”

While many Turkish analysts and experts claimed that the statements made from Iranian officials were only “rhetoric,” developments in Afrin are confusing. If the claims made by pro-Iranian and pro-regime Al-Masdar News and some others on the ground are true, Iran and the Assad regime might then be providing the YPG in Afrin with supplies through Nubble and Zahra.

As Kino Gabriel, spokesman for the SDF said: “There are different ways to get reinforcements to Afrin, but the fundamental route is via the regime forces. There are understandings between the two…” On February 18, a senior member of the YPG told Reuters in a propagative tone that the terror group and the government of Bashar al-Assad have agreed for the regime army to enter Syria’s Afrin. On the following day, Syrian state TV announced that the regime forces would enter Afrin “within hours.” However, militias allied to the Syrian regime, the so-called National Defense Forces, did not enter Afrin and no official statement in this direction has yet been made.

Interestingly, it would not be the Assad regime, but the Popular Mobilization Forces who would enter Afrin. Popular Mobilization Forces was founded, supplied, backed and controlled by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. As known, the Russians tried to integrate the Popular Mobilization Forces into the 5th Corp of the Syrian Army in order to weaken Iran-backed militias. However, the project was only partially successful.

Who is Supplying the YPG with Iranian Weapons?

During Operation Olive Branch, the YPG has used, visually confirmed, Iranian weapons. Among them are Iran-produced 107mm rockets, which were also found earlier in Turkey during anti-terror operations against the PKK. More remarkable was however the Iranian-produced Toophan guided anti-tank missile, which was used to target Turkish Armed Forces in Afrin. The Toophan missiles are an Iranian copy of the American TOW missiles. In addition to the Toophan system, the YPG in Afrin also used an Iranian Safir 4×4 vehicle with a mounted 106mm M40 A2 gun. These Safir vehicles were previously used in Syria only by Iran-backed Shia militias. The Assad regime is known to have no access to these vehicles. Along these, there is also ambiguity about the number of U.S.-supplied weapons transferred to Afrin.

There now remains intriguing questions as to how, where and when the YPG obtained Iranian military equipment. Does Iran’s military support for the YPG continue after Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch? Does the intense use of ATGMs by YPG militants in Afrin suggest an ongoing supply for the terrorist group? It is claimed that prior to Operation Olive Branch, the YPG in Afrin reportedly never used Konkurs. It was only after the launch of the operation that the YPG began to intensively use Konkurs systems.

It is extremely difficult to trace the chief actors of this arms delivery and it therefore remains an open question as to who supplied the YPG with Iranian weapons: Is it the Iranians themselves, the Assad regime, or the Americans providing Iranian weapons?

Ankara and Washington have “reached an understanding” to normalize ties following a period of tensions, Turkey’s foreign minister said on Friday.

Speaking alongside his visiting U.S. counterpart Rex Tillerson at a press conference in Ankara, Mevlut Cavusoglu said: “We’ve reached an understanding to normalize our relations [with the U.S.].”

“Of course, there are steps which have been taken for this. Both sides have expectations of each other,” Cavusoglu said.

“We clearly expressed [to the U.S. side] our expectations with regard to the fight against FETO and the PKK terrorist organizations, and the U.S. support for the YPG.”

The Turkish-led Operation Olive Branch is now fighting the terrorist YPG/PKK in northern Syria. FETO, the Fetullah Terrorist Organization, is responsible for a 2016 defeated coup that martyred 250 people and injured 2,200.

“We assume that our vital security concerns have been taken serious [by the U.S.],” Cavusoglu added.

Saying that his meeting with Tillerson dealt with “result-oriented” steps, Cavusoglu said: “We agreed to establish some mechanisms which will cover and evaluate all the issues.”

Cavusoglu said the agreed-upon mechanism will address separate issues, including Iraq’s territorial integrity, Syria, terrorism, and consulates.

PYD/PKK in Manbij issue

Asked about the terrorist YPG/PKK presence in Manbij, Syria — a standing bone of contention between Ankara and Washington — Cavusoglu said the mechanism handling the Syria issue will prioritize Manbij.

“We should be sure that the YPG crossed to the eastern side of the Euphrates River, and we should see its execution together,” Cavusoglu said, adding that it is important who control these cities and provides security for their stability.

The terrorist YPG/PKK should first withdraw from Manbij, northern Syria for Turkey to take steps with the U.S. based on trust, Cavusoglu added.

Cavusoglu said Turkey and the U.S. will work in coordination to assure stability in other cities of Syria.

The YPG is the armed Syrian offshoot of the PKK terror organization, which has waged a more than 30-year war against the Turkish state, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths.

Relations between the two countries have been strained over U.S. support for the terrorist group PYD/YPG/PKK in northern Syria, with the U.S. calling the group a “reliable ally” in the fight against Daesh, amid strong Turkish objections.

For his part, Tillerson said: “We stand shoulder to shoulder with Turkey against terrorist threats.”

The U.S. will work on promises given to Turkey on Manbij, northern Syria, he added.

After the Turkish-led Operation Olive Branch clears the terrorist PYD/YPG/PKK from Afrin, northern Syria, Turkish leaders say it will proceed to do the same with Manbij, where both terrorist and U.S. forces are stationed, raising the specter of a confrontation.

Syria’s territorial integrity

The two countries also reaffirmed their commitment to preserving Syria’s territorial integrity and national unity.

“We will decisively stand against all attempts to create faits accomplis and demographic changes within Syria,” the statement said.

Ankara and Washington highlighted that “there can only be a political solution to the Syrian crisis.”

The two countries, the statement also said, agree to intensify their cooperation to “bring about this result within the framework of established parameters, namely” UN Security Council Resolution 2254 and the Geneva process.”

Syria has been locked in a devastating civil war since March 2011, when the Bashar al-Assad regime cracked down on pro-democracy protests with unexpected ferocity.

While UN officials say hundreds of thousands of people have been killed in the conflict, Syrian regime officials say the death toll is closer to 10,000.

Washington’s indefinite policy in Syria and increasing active support to the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and its variations violate U.S. national law alongside international agreements and principles recognized at the international level under the umbrella of the United Nations and other regional organizations.

With the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists (AUMF), which was passed by Congress following the September 11 attacks, the U.S. Armed Forces were authorized to exercise military power across its borders with an aim to prevent possible terror attacks against the country. However, the Obama administration reinterpreted the limits of the authorization and expanded its scope by employing the phrase “Al-Qaeda and associated forces.” With this broad interpretation, the Obama administration also encompassed the military force that would be employed against Daesh within the scope of the authorization. In brief, the national law system acknowledged that the U.S. Armed Forces have been involved in Syria due to the fight against Daesh. Resorting to further military power or unauthorized engagements however is against the AUMF.

In 2015, the Obama administration agreed with several non-state actors including the YPG and the Democratic Union Party (PYD), repeatedly asserting that they would cooperate in the fight against Daesh. The U.S. identified these actors as “coalition partners” by predicating on its own judicial system. However, the notion of coalition partnership comprises some problematic and questionable aspects in legal terms. First of all, the U.S. administration interpreted the AUMF in an utterly broad way and selected and supported a coalition partner within this context. Secondly, the U.S. administration allowed the involvement of the YPG and the PYD among these partners, which are both known for their association with the outlawed PKK. Thirdly, the strategy initially defined as anti-Daesh fight ceased to be the primary objective and sustaining the coalition partnership was prioritized. In this respect, the current situation explicitly violates U.S. national law as the legislative body of the country only authorized to fight against Daesh within the scope of fighting against “Al-Qaeda and associated forces.” The U.S. administration’s defence of any coalition partner means exceeding the authority vested by national law.

Furthermore, the National Defense Authorization Act formed the legal grounds of the U.S. administration’s support to Syrian opposition groups as from 2015 and set certain criteria in choosing the groups to be supported. These groups must be “appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian opposition.” The YPG and the PYD, which are the offshoots of the PKK, do not comply with these criteria in terms of their objectives and other traits. Although these groups are closely allied to the PKK and organize terrorist attacks against Turkey – who is initially accepted as an “ally,” all kinds of military support have been provided to them as they were included in the scope of opponent groups.

The U.S. Patriot Act, as a federal law, criminalizes providing “material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.” As a result of the authority vested by the law, the PKK has been listed as a terror group by the U.S. Department of State since it has inflicted heavy damage to many countries, particularly to the U.S. and Turkey. Aside from being recognized as a terror group on various lists, the PKK was also recognized as a terrorist organization posing a serious threat by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case “Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.” Hence, the support the U.S. administration provides to the offshoots of the PKK constitutes serious contradictions and casts doubts on the rule of law principle.

The indications of International Law

The situation does not differ when considered from the perspective of international law. Even though terrorism is widely considered a controversial topic in international law, sovereign nations are aware that they must cooperate to prevent terrorist acts and to eradicate terrorist groups. The fact that terrorism is an international issue that does not recognize borders leads nations to cooperate. The norms of international law reiterate that sovereign nations must not support terrorism or any terrorist group. International agreements signed under the umbrella of the UN and many other intergovernmental regional organizations explicitly prohibit providing financial aid and the sales of weapons to terrorist groups.

The duty of vigilance was first accepted by the UN General Assembly and then became “a widely recognized principle of international law. It means that “every state has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating” in plans or actions to commit terrorist acts in another state. This very fundamental principle was emphasized in the International Court of Justice, “Armed Activities” case, as customary international law. In the present situation, even a “tactical” relationship between the U.S. and the named terrorist groups is a failure to uphold the duty of vigilance. The toleration displayed by the U.S. Armed Forces towards groups like the YPG and PYD, which harbor terrorist elements, amounts to a violation of international law.

Germany on Wednesday banned several rallies planned by a PKK-affiliated organization in northwestern cities.

According to Cologne police, rallies by PKK-affiliated organization NAV-DEM scheduled for today (Thursday) in Cologne and Leverkusen were forbidden due to repeated violations of the law and crimes committed by members of the group in recent weeks.

PKK/PYD supporters in Germany launched a campaign last month against Turkey’s ongoing counterterrorism operation in northern Syria and held demonstrations across the country in which they carried banned flags and posters of the PKK terrorist group.

In a press release Wednesday, Cologne police recalled that the PKK has been listed as a terrorist organization in Germany and said it would not allow NAV-DEM’s demonstrations planned for Thursday as members of the group were likely to again carry outlawed symbols of the terrorist group.

Turkey has long criticized German authorities for tolerating PKK activities and pressured Berlin to take stricter measures.

The PKK has been banned in Germany since 1993 but is still active with nearly 14,000 followers among the country’s Kurdish immigrant population, according to the country’s domestic intelligence agency BfV.

PKK’s continued propaganda, recruitment and fundraising activities remain the main source of political tensions between Turkey and its NATO partner Germany.

Supporters of the PKK and its Syrian branch PYD have organized radical and violent protests across Germany since Jan. 20, when Turkey began a military operation against terrorist targets of the PKK/PYD in northwestern Syria.

Turkey has stressed that Operation Olive Branch is being conducted within the framework of Turkey’s sovereign rights based on international law, UN Security Council resolutions and self-defense rights under the UN Charter.

The PKK, which is listed as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the U.S. and the EU, waged a terror campaign against Turkey for more than 30 years, killing nearly 40,000 people.

Source: AA

Many anti-personnel landmines, which are banned by the Ottawa Treaty, have been found in areas liberated from terrorists during the Turkish Armed Forces’ ongoing operation in Syria’s Afrin region.

On January 20, 2018, Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch in order to clear the PYD/PKK and Daesh terrorists from Afrin, northwestern Syria.

Since then, many different types of arms, ammunition, tools and materials have been seized.

Several anti-personnel landmines were also found in areas cleared of terrorists between Sunday and Monday.

Since it came into force in 1999, the Ottawa Treaty, which outlaws anti-personnel mines, have been ratified or acceded by 163 countries.

The mines, which are difficult to detect, pose a threat to civilians living in the region.

During Operation Olive Branch, many shelters, hideouts and concrete sites, abandoned by the PKK/YPG and Daesh terrorists, have also been seized.

The shelters were found under trees, which were knowingly planted there in order to prevent detection of their locations by unmanned aerial vehicles. The entrance of the shelters were also covered by nylon canvas for camouflage.

Source: Anadolu Agency

On Monday 12 February, the Turkish Armed Forces announced that a total of 1,369 PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG and Daesh terrorists have been “neutralized” since the launch of Operation Olive Branch in Syria’s Afrin region.

Turkish authorities often adopt the word “neutralized” to imply the terrorists in question either surrendered or were killed or captured.

In a published statement, the Turkish General Staff said that the airstrikes conducted by the Turkish Armed Forces overnight destroyed 15 terrorist targets used for shelter as well as ammunition depots and weapon pits.

According to information gathered from the region, 103 PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG and Daesh terrorists were neutralized on Sunday.

Operation Olive Branch was launched on January 20, 2018, with the aim to secure the Turkey-Syria border and to grant Syrians the right to live free of terror.

Relations between Turkey and Europe were already strained and policies adopted by several European countries in regards to the July 15 coup attempt led to more of a crisis between Ankara and the western bloc. Although European countries criticize Turkey on democracy, they did not openly side with democracy throughout the July 15 incidents, which gave the impression that they covertly supported the coup attempt. The bloc’s negative attitude towards the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government, which was subjected to the coup attempt, continued throughout 2016. EU member states issued diatribes to the declaration of an emergency state and steps taken by the government to purge the putschist Gulenist Terror Group (FETO) operatives from public institutions. At the end of this tense period, the European Parliament called for the accession negotiations between Turkey and the European Union to be suspended on November 24, 2016. The tension Turkey had particularly with Germany, Austria and the Netherlands reached its peak when Turkish ministers were prevented from attending meetings scheduled in these countries as part of the April 16 referendum campaign.

Trying to reason anti-Turkey policies in Germany

Another development that hindered Ankara’s relations with Brussels was the anti-Turkey propaganda utilized by far-right parties as part of their national election campaigns in the Netherlands, Germany and Austria. Alarmed by the rise of far-right and xenophobic parties in these countries, center parties embraced the arguments of the far-right, employed anti-refugee and Islamophobic rhetoric in their election campaigns and vowed to adopt a harsher stance against Turkey so as not to lose their voter base. These states protected FETO operatives who pose a serious threat to Turkey’s national security and condoned the PKK, which led Ankara to issue severe criticisms to these countries. More, smear campaigns conducted against the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the European media were regarded as disrespect to the democratic will of the Turkish people, and was interpreted as another indication of the bloc’s attempt to interfere in Turkey’s domestic affairs.

Known as Germany’s “backyard” in the EU, both Austria and the Netherlands form a bloc together with Germany, which troubles Turkey-European Union relations.

The fact that Germany, which among European countries has the closest ties with Turkey, and Austria and the Netherlands, known as Germany’s “backyard” in the EU are the leading countries of the bloc that have troubled relations between the two parties, signifies that the main source of the problem is a struggle for influence.

Having a substantial population of Turkish descent and being Turkey’s largest trade partner, Germany has always tried to interfere with Ankara’s policies through various means. This has included supporting the PKK, or using the EU accession negotiations and the issue of economic aid as threats. Over the past years, Berlin began to lose the chance to interfere with Turkey’s domestic polity due to the AK Party’s pro-independence policies. Relations between the two countries reached a new low when Germany supported the July 15 coup attempt and opposed to the April 16 referendum. While the anti-Turkey left in Germany ran propaganda against the AK Party government, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) slammed Chancellor Angela Merkel for the refugee agreement signed with Turkey. This led to the German government to adopt stricter policies against Ankara.

Turkey’s convergence with the United Kingdom, France and Italy

Alongside these problems confronted in relations between Turkey and Germany, the Ankara administration leaned towards other European actors with whom more rational relations could be established. In an attempt to diversify its foreign policy, the government took steps to liberate Turkey’s relations with Europe from the monopoly of the EU and Germany. In this scope, Turkey took a number of steps to improve relations with the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain and eastern European countries, especially in economic terms.

The main factors that played a role in helping to improve relations with the U.K. included Brexit, Donald Trump’s election as the U.S. President and the focus on economic cooperation in foreign policy. As Brexit is expected to cost a high price, London set off a quest to compensate this cost with alternative partnerships, and looked for a way to develop closer relations with Turkey within this framework. As Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim expressed during the visit he paid to London to attend the Somali Conference held in May 2017, unlike other European countries, the U.K. displayed overt support to Turkey during the July 15 coup attempt. This nevertheless has been a factor that accelerated the convergence between Theresa May’s government and Ankara.

In an attempt to diversify its foreign policy, Ankara took steps to liberate Turkey’s relations with Europe from the monopoly of the EU and Germany and tried to improve relations with the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain and eastern European countries.

With the election of Trump, who utters unfavorable comments on the European allies of NATO and has adopted the slogan “America first,” the British government is aware that it can no longer rely on the U.S. administration – especially when in the midst of the Brexit process. Departing from the EU and keeping its distance from the U.S, in its search for new partners to balance its foreign policy, the U.K. made a rational choice by cooperating with Turkey. As for Ankara, cooperation with the U.K. is of major importance especially in the field of defense, since Turkey has recently had problems in purchasing military equipment from the U.S. and other European countries such as Germany and Austria.

During Theresa May’s visit to Turkey in January 2017, the British BAE Systems and Turkish Aerospace Industries, Inc. (TAI) signed an agreement as a first step towards co-producing fighter jets, which on the Turkish side reflected an improvement of relations with London while confronting other problems in the west. Within the agreement that is worth $125 million, BAE Systems agreed to offer service in designing and developing Turkey’s national TF-X fighter jet and to transfer technologies to Turkish engineers. The production of the first prototype of TF-X jets is set to be complete by 2023. A total of 250 jets are planned to be produced for $7 billion.

In addition to the U.K., Turkey signed other significant air defense agreements with France and Italy. During President Erdogan’s visit to France on January 5, 2018, an agreement for the co-production of SAMP-T air defense systems was signed between the French-Italian consortium Eurosam and Turkey’s Aselsan and Roketsan. With this agreement, Turkey made it clear that it does not intend to remain dependent on a single country in the field of defense, and that Ankara aims to diversify its security and foreign policies by procuring similar weapon systems from its European allies in addition to the S-400 air defense systems purchased from Russia. During the abovementioned visit, Turkish Airlines also signed an agreement to purchase a total of 25 Airbus A350-900 planes.

Anti-Turkey sentiments are dissolving in Europe

Having minimized problems with the U.K. and France due to partnerships in economy and defense, the Turkish administration has also endeavored to disperse anti-Turkey sentiments created in Europe by Germany and others by taking steps towards improving its relations with Italy, Spain and eastern European EU members. The opposition to the predominance of Germany in the EU by countries such as Italy, Poland and Hungary catalyzed Turkey’s developing ties with these countries. Member states who wish to decrease their dependency on Germany within the EU have not abstained from answering Ankara’s call for cooperation since they regard developing economic relations with Turkey as part of the steps to be taken in this respect.

To restore relations, Berlin needs to give up on regarding Ankara within its own domain of influence and must not allow the anti-Turkey left diaspora in Germany to monopolize the country’s policies on Turkey.

Taking considerable steps with regard to developing relations with European countries, Turkey has repeatedly underlined that it wishes to establish rational relations with Germany on the basis of mutual respect to each other’s sovereignty and cooperation in counter-terrorism. The latest friendly meetings between the foreign ministers of the two countries indicated that the tension between Ankara and Berlin might soon come to an end. In terms of its relations with Turkey, Germany does not wish to remain isolated in Europe with only a few allies such as Austria and the Netherlands. To that end, the country does not want to keep relations strained since other European countries are gradually improving their ties with Ankara. However, in order to restore relations, Berlin needs to give up on regarding Ankara within its own domain of influence and must not allow the anti-Turkey left diaspora in Germany to monopolize the country’s policies on Turkey.

Operation Olive Branch and Europe

Operation Olive Branch kicked off by Turkey against the PKK/YPG deployed in Afrin has been an important test for the European countries wishing to establish rational relations with Ankara. It must be underlined that the European countries that have not so far acted in solidarity with Ankara in its fight against terrorism have faced a serious quandary during Operation Olive Branch. On one hand they assume that the economic relations, which they seek to restore with Turkey, will be undermined if they adopt a policy in favor of the YPG and the PKK. On the other, governments are concerned that if they side with Ankara’s intervention, they will face the pressure of PKK lobbies in the media and political circles of their countries.

Hesitant behavior displayed by European countries with regard to the terror groups that target Turkey illustrates the fact that they still side with the YPG and the PKK during the Afrin operation.

If European states had supported Turkey during the operation, they would have had a chance to restore strained relations with Ankara due to their policies in the aftermath of the July 15 coup attempt. In this way, they could have also prevented the convergence between Turkey and Russia. Some people in Europe defend this view while others regard the Afrin operation as a new opportunity to attack and slam Turkey. Although the Turkish Armed Forces have taken all measures to prevent any harm to civilians, circles claiming that Turkey is violating human rights in the operation with the weapons provided by EU countries are trying to put pressure on European governments.

Despite all these pressures, statements issued by the British and Dutch foreign ministers explicitly underlined Turkey’s right to ensure self-defense and border security, which were read as covert support to Operation Olive Branch. Contrary to this, German and French officials criticized Turkey due to the pressures of PKK proponents and anti-Turkish lobbies in their countries. However, the criticisms issued are much more tepid than expected, which can be seen as an indication of their reluctance to escalate tensions with Turkey.

Nevertheless, hesitant behavior displayed by European countries with regard to the terror groups that target Turkey illustrates the fact that they can still take sides against Ankara and side with the YPG and the PKK during the Afrin operation.

The military operation Turkey launched in Afrin, Operation Olive Branch, officially kicked off on 20 January with air raids conducted by Turkish jets against the terror group, the PKK, and its Syrian offshoot, the People’s Protection Units (YPG). Prior to this, Turkish authorities had already expressed on various platforms that the Afrin operation would be launched. Two weeks before the operation began Syrian regime forces initiated a large-scale assault in Idlib soon after the Khmeimim Air Base, which is currently operated by Russia, came under mortar fire and was attacked by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Idlib is among the de-escalation zones agreed on during the Astana process. However, the influence of several groups in the region, including Tahrir al-Sham, which is reportedly linked to Al-Nusra Front, has created ambiguity concerning the policies to be implemented regarding these groups. Tahrir al-Sham’s presence in Idlib is occasionally underlined by the U.S. and is employed to legitimize various policies concerning the most significant area Turkey has influence in Syria.

The multifaceted attack involved simultaneous use of a large number of UAVS and targeted Russia’s military presence in a region, which according to the Astana talks, is under the watch of Turkey. A crisis between Turkey and Russia was avoided as Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that he knew who was behind the incidents and that Turkey was not involved. Consequently, as well as disrupting Russia’s military presence, the motive of the attack may have been to hamper the cooperation between Turkey and the countries involved in the Astana process. Certain steps, such as Russia opening the air base it controls in Syria to Turkish jets during Operation Olive Branch, indicates that mutual trust between the two countries is gradually improving. It can also be observed that Russia seems to comprehend Turkey’s concerns within the context of the operation and regards the U.S. accountable for the incidents, as the U.S. provided the YPG weaponry.

Turkey kicked off the operation in order to purge terrorists deployed in Afrin, which is geopolitically crucial for Ankara. More importantly, the fact that Turkey has specified Manbij as the second target, where U.S. troops are currently deployed on the ground of repelling the Daesh threat, may lead to a serious crisis between Turkey and the U.S. In addition, the U.S. recently announced that it plans to form a new “North Army” at the southern border. While U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and the Pentagon subsequently modified the initial announcement, it was also stated that a 30,000-strong new border security force, answerable to the “North Army” would be established in order to protect Syria’s borders with Turkey, Iraq and Jordan. The force was planned to control passes at the northern, eastern and southern borders of Syria and to cut Syria’s ground liaison with its neighbors other than Lebanon (and Israel).

Grounds of the Afrin operation

Turkey has a number of concrete reasons to launch the Afrin operation. Firstly, and most importantly, the region poses an immediate threat to Turkey’s national security. It is well known that a large number of PKK militants passing the border through this location have been trying to turn the Nur Mountains in south-central Turkey into a terror base. As seen over the past couple of months, the terror group went as far as to infiltrate the interior zones of Turkey such as Fethiye and Mugla. Consequently, Turkey’s fight against the PKK can be extended to different regions and different ways of fighting can be employed as the group ends prioritizing Syria or receives orders from the power groups it is affiliated with.

Another ground for the operation is related to Afrin’s geographical location. If the terror group attempts to form a corridor that reaches the Mediterranean by making use of the chaos in Idlib, Afrin is the only area that will allow for such a corridor. The PKK previously adopted a similar opportunism and seized control in Manbij by taking advantage of the chaos that emerged during Operation Euphrates Shield. When U.S. diplomats in Washington also began to support the YPG along with military officials in the field, Ankara reached the end of its tether and decided to start the operation.

Currently, Turkey believes that it is meaningless to waste more time to convince the Trump administration. More, Ankara intends to demonstrate that it has increased its power in the field and has left behind its domestic crises that peaked in July 2016, and which shackled the country in many aspects including the Syrian issue. The Syrian Civil War has illustrated that forces who cannot actively launch operations in the field do not have any influence on the negotiation table, whilst their most fundamental security concerns are not taken seriously even by their allies. Turkey eventually kicked off the Afrin operation, which had already been delayed for a long time, in order to eliminate the threats posed to the country’s internal security and in order to display a stronger presence on the negotiation table in the subsequent phases of the Syrian crisis.

Effects of the operation on Iran-Turkey rapprochement

Iran is undoubtedly another country that has close interest in the latest developments in the region. Although the country has recently been on the agenda due to the street demonstrations in its various cities and towns, Iran is still closely following the developments regarding Syria and the Shia militia commanded by the administration is still maintaining its activities. Tehran was pleased to see that Turkey updated its Syria policies with the Astana process in early 2016. Since then, Turkey and Iran displayed similar attitudes on various regional issues including the referendum in Iraq and the blockade on Qatar. Turkey’s recent rapprochement with Iran has played a role in Ankara’s clear stance with regard to the latest incidents in Iran. Otherwise, it was discerned with whom the conflicts and chaos in the region favor.

Turkey’s military intervention against the YPG, which had turned into a U.S.-paid army and which had seized control in a substantial part of Syria, especially towards the Iraqi border by going beyond the traditional Kurdish geography, may be interpreted from different perspectives by Iran. First, Tehran criticized Turkey’s intervention since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis and emphasized the “sovereign rights” of Syria. Defending its own and Russian presence in Syria on the grounds that it was agreed with the Damascus regime, the Tehran administration asserted that all kinds of interventions by Turkey and other countries lacked legal ground.

In this context, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Behram Kasimi’s statement that Iran is concerned about Turkey’s Afrin operation and Iranian Chief of Staff Mohammad Bagheri’s emphasis on Syria’s territorial integrity are not surprising. However, aside from the official statements and diplomatic expressions, it is obvious that the operation will drive a wedge between Turkey and the U.S. and lead Ankara to align itself with Russia and Iran. Therefore, it would be unreasonable to expect a practical reaction from Tehran towards Turkey’s military operations in limited locations such as Afrin and Manbij. As a matter of fact, the Iranian administration knows that it is not the only determinant in Syria and that it is not realistic to expect the regime to control the entire country at this phase. By any means, Tehran is aware that it needs to cooperate with a country or a power group. Given Iran’s sensitivity to the presence of the regime and the “resistance line,” the country is unlikely to give a harsh reaction to Turkey’s presence in Syria.

Although Turkey mostly underlines the threat posed by the YPG due to the group’s affiliation with the PKK, it can be contended that the group is likely to be assigned to hinder the “Shia belt” in the south. This is of vital importance for Israel and Saudi Arabia considering the relations the group built with Saudi Arabia by means of Raqqa and several Arab tribes largely due to the heavy weaponry provided to the YPG. Given that the “Border Protection Unit” is expected to protect Syria’s borders with Iraq and Jordan, the YPG and its variations can soon head south as they are blocked by regime forces in the Deir ez-Zor and Abu Kamal line. Likewise, it will not be a surprise if the U.S.-backed opponents on the Syria-Jordan border head north in order to completely block the Syria-Iraq border.

Whether Tehran and the groups that it allies with will accept this situation is out of the question as Tehran explains its presence and struggle in Syria through this “line.” In this case, the YPG will become the mutual target of both Ankara and Tehran with different motives and in different regions. Furthermore, the U.S. will expect this new “army” to hinder logistic support sent from land and some groups within the Popular Mobilization Forces (Al-Hashd Al-Sha’abi) commanded by Iran within a possible Israel-Hezbollah conflict, which seems unavoidable yet dubious when it will take place. The situation becomes clearer when considering the fact that the YPG is Washington’s most effective fighting force. Tillerson only recently stated that the key target of U.S. policy in Syria is to decrease Iran’s influence.

It is highly unlikely that Iran will respond harshly to the Afrin operation. As underlined above, Iran’s red lines concerning intervention in Syria are the presence of the regime and the securing of the resistance line. As Turkey does not directly threaten these concerns, it is possible for Tehran to be more empathetic to Ankara’s priorities in Syria. At this point, Turkey’s articulate expression of its intentions and objectives within the context of the operation has been useful. Informing the Syrian regime through a written note before the operation begun also played a major role in toning down the reactions of Iran and Russia.

On Tuesday 6 February, CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu called on the government to form contact with the Assad regime in Syria in order to resolve the country’s on-going civil war.

Kilicdaroglu’s comments came as Turkey deepens its operation in Afrin, which has cleared approximately 1,100 terrorists from the Turkey-Syria border.

Operation Olive Branch was launched in Afrin on 20 January in order to clear the Turkey-Syria border from terrorists and to set the conditions enabling Syrian refugees in Turkey the opportunity to return to their home lands.

The PYD/YPG has forced thousands of Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens from their villages, leading to a mass migration flow into Turkey.

In response to Kilicdaroglu, on Thursday President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said “What will we talk about to a murderer who has killed 1 million of his citizens?”

The Syrian regime, despite the ceasefire, continues to shell Eastern Ghouta. On Wednesday regime attacks in the region left 33 dead – of which 13 were children.

“You can go arm in arm with terrorists when necessary… But, we haven’t so far walked with those taking that path with the permission of terror organizations, and we will not do so in the future.”

The PKK’s Syrian branch, the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD) has been elevated to the status of a major political actor just across the Turkish border. The organization had remained a low level one since its formation in 2003 by the PKK until the Syrian Civil War, which began in 2011. Its rise and spread has paralleled the rise and spread of the war in Syria with a short lag. The PYD developed a tacit mutual understanding with the Syrian regime forces and despite sporadical small scale clashes between them, the two parties tolerated each other as they prepared for a military encounter with the rebel forces. The growth of Daesh in Syria threatened both sides but it also created an opportunity for the illicit partnership of the regime and the PYD. As Daesh grew stronger in Syria, it militarily suppressed other rebel forces and became a “useful” enemy for both the regime and the PYD, as they depicted themselves as the only alternative to a future Syria ruled by Daesh brutality. Eventually Daesh was defeated and lost its strongholds on many fronts against Russia and Iran-backed regime forces, Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army and the U.S.-backed PYD.

While the PYD first expanded its territory with the withdrawal of regime forces starting from 2012, it gained further pockets of land with the erosion of Daesh control. As Daesh was losing ground, the PYD exponentially increased the amount of territory under its control. The organization happened to rule hundreds of thousands in four self-declared cantons: Cizire (Jazira or Al-Haseke), Euphrates (formerly Kobani or Ain al-Arab), Shahba (which is only partly under the PYD control) and Afrin. As Daesh lost its self-declared capital to the U.S.-backed YPG forces with interesting twists, now major cities and districts such as Raqqa, Manbij, Haseke, Kobani, Qamisli, Afrin, Tel Abyad, Tel Rifaat, are all fully or partially under the control of the PYD. Nevertheless, such a speedy expansion in land and resources was not a smooth process – it not only relied on U.S. military and diplomatic support but also on U.S. toleration of vast human rights violations, including ethnic cleansing via forced mass displacements.

In the summer of 2015, 15 Syrian rebel groups accused the PYD of deliberately displacing thousands of Arabs and Turkmens. A year later the Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported serious human rights abuses committed by the PYD, including torture in custody, which in some cases led to the death of the detained. Considering the fact that the HRW could only visit a limited area (only Jazira canton for the aforementioned report) due to security concerns, it begs further questions for areas where the PYD’s rule was and still is more contested and more controversial.

In an earlier account, the British daily newspaper, the Times, reported that “thousands of civilians have fled their homes in northern Syria as Kurdish forces carry out what appears to be a campaign of ethnic cleansing against Sunni Arabs.” The report refers to the PYD as “Kurdish forces” and this is problematic as the organization also has a reputation for suppressing any Kurdish organization that falls apart from the PKK’s pre-determined lines. The formerly mentioned HRW report indicated that not only non-Kurds but that Kurdish opposition members have also been “convicted in apparently unfair trials” by the PYD. This is no surprise to observers who already know that the PYD left no political network other than its own by targeting Iraq’s Kurdistan Democratic Party affiliates (i.e., the Kurdish National Council, KNC) in Syria.

The cases of vast human rights abuses committed by the PYD, specifically forced displacements, are not limited with the findings of HRW. In its report ‘US ally’s razing of villages amounts to war crimes,’ Amnesty International stated that by deliberately demolishing civilian homes, in some cases razing and burning entire villages, displacing their inhabitants with no justifiable military grounds, the Autonomous Administration [the PYD] is abusing its authority and brazenly flouting international humanitarian law, in attacks that amount to war crimes.” In order to reach this conclusion, Amnesty International did not only talk to locals but also used satellite images to see the full scale of the demolition, which showed almost entirely demolished villages.

As people escape from the brutality of war in order to keep their beloved ones in a safe distance, the incoming groups that fill the vacuum usually take advantage of such situations. As Syria Direct reported based on the statements of “Kurdish activists, residents and a police officer from Qamishli in northern Al-Hasakah,” according to the conscription regulations of the PYD, “real estate and other property belonging to residents who have fled the canton will be held by self-administration authorities, with any income, such as rent, generated by the holdings going to “develop the society.”” The same report, based on witness accounts, highlights the pattern of confiscation even for those who have not fled yet. As expressed by a witness, “At first, [the PYD’s Asayish branch] offered to rent the residence, but we refused,” then “they asked to buy it” but when the owners refused again, “The third time, they confiscated our [the owners’] apartment.” It is unfortunate that UN reports under-stress such immense human rights abuses by simply describing them as “some reports alleging forced displacements” and rationalizing the implementations that “reportedly looted houses belonging to Arab villagers” with references to the war conditions.

The PYD, under U.S. military and diplomatic protection, has committed vast human rights violations ranging from arming children to training them in terror camps. As of today, the entire PYD-controlled areas are full of PKK leader Ocalan’s posters along with dead suicide bombers who are called “heroes.” It is unfortunate that the PYD is cheered within international circles for its alleged “liberal values,” while in fact its school books are full of the jailed leader of an internationally recognized terrorist organization (see link for a sample textbook and witness accounts). It is also unfortunate that the very same totalitarian structure is celebrated for holding elections, which do not allow opposition parties to compete by torturing their members or arresting its leader. Despite the given double standards to the unconditional U.S. support for the PYD, and despite the politically guided one-sided media coverage of it, some reports could come out to show what lies beneath the mask. Nevertheless, these reports and accounts are just a drop in the bucket and more effort is needed to grasp the real reign on terror in northern Syria, not only for the displaced non-Kurdish people, but also, and especially, for Kurdish residents being forcefully conscribed to the ranks of the organization in their childhood.

According to the World Council of Arameans (WCA), Christians in Syria are facing more and more oppression from the YPG and the so-called security forces “Asayesh.”

On 19 January, 7 Christians, 4 Armenians and 3 Arameans (also known as Syriacs), were abducted by the terrorist group and forced to the front lines in Afrin, Syria, where the Turkish Armed Forces are currently conducting Operation Olive Branch.

The WCA informed that while following intense negotiations, all of them were released, 20-year-old Aramean Saliba A., who was kidnapped in broad daylight, still remains in the hands of the group.

Saliba was first held near Qamishli – a northeastern Syrian city near the border with Turkey – where the PYD/PKK has a base, but his current condition and location is unknown.

According to reports by the Anadolu Agency, a friend of Saliba stated that: “Everyday they kept telling us that he will be released soon. Then they said tonight, then they said tomorrow morning. After 10 days, we stopped believing their empty promises and are concerned about Saliba’s well-being.”

The Asayesh, a so-called security force operating in areas controlled by the YPG tell the local minority groups that those who have been kidnapped are handed over the to YPG. However, locals claim that the YPG tells them to contact the Asayesh.

“They’re playing games with us and trying to make us scared. They want us to abandon our homeland so that they can seize more of our properties and land.”

Kidnapped university students

In addition to the case of Saliba A., the WCA reported that two more Christians were recently kidnapped.

Isho Hanna and Elias Hanna, both aged 19, were on their way to university in Haskah when the Asayesh kidnapped them. Their whereabouts are still unknown.

Teens are continuously being forced to the front lines by the terrorist organization.

According to a local anonymous source, this happens because “these people [Asayesh] consider themselves the new rulers of our region.”

Johny Messo, head of the WCA, strongly condemned the on-going terror campaign by the PYD/PKK terrorists.

“Our people on the ground keep telling us about all sorts of human rights violations, including the confiscation of land, intimidations, threats and a rising wave of kidnappings. This must immediately end. We demand that the Kurdish YPG forces respect Syria’s native Arameans. We further call on the U.S. to make this critical message clear to the YPG.”

On 20 January the Turkish Armed Forces started Operation Olive Branch, which aims to clear terrorists in the Afrin region of Syria.

While numbers vary, there are between 8,000-10,000 terrorists in the region. Approximately 700 of them have been neutralized since TAF began the operation.

Unlike the U.S., which has justified its cooperation with the PYD/YPG on the basis of “fighting against DAESH,” Turkey is fighting against all terrorist groups in Syria.

Despite the fact that Turkey called for the Trump administration to stop arming and assisting the YPG, the U.S. have remained doing so. Only recently during a phone call between the presidents of the two countries it was stated that Trump promised to stop arming the terrorist group.

Although it will take a matter of time to see whether the U.S. will keep its promise, the fact that the PYD/PKK and DAESH have agreed on a deal to fight together re-emphasizes the ignorance of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.

According to security sources as reported by the Anadolu Agency, in order to aid their fight against the Turkish Armed Forces and the Free Syrian Army, PYD/PKK released Daesh members from prisons in Afrin, Raqqa ad Deir ez-Zour on the basis that they fight against the Turkish forces.

Around 400 DAESH terrorists were taken to the town of Jinderes, south of Afrin.

The PYD/PKK convinced these Daesh terrorists by promising an end to their punishment, having their names struck off the terrorist list and ensuring that their home countries stop tracking them.

This not only re-iterates the argument made by the Turkish government that the U.S. ought to stop financing terrorism in order to fight against another form of terrorism, but also rebuts the absurd claims that Turkey was once apparently “helping ISIS [Daesh].”

Terrorism has been affecting the Turkish economy through many channels since the 1980s. In general, terrorism creates uncertainty, reduces investment expenditures and household consumption, increases regional inequality, restrains human capital formation, and forces people to migrate from their homelands. These negative effects of terrorism have hindered the Turkish economy from reaching its potential for almost the past 40 years.

Although terrorist incidents slowed down after the initiatives of the AK Party, with the deepening of the civil war in Syria, terrorist attacks have increased over the last three years. Due to both these attacks and geopolitical strains in the Middle East, total exports to Iraq and Syria, tourism revenues of south-eastern Anatolia and regional investment activities have decreased. The failed coup attempt also affected the Turkish economy negatively, especially in the third quarter of 2016. All these incidents combined led to the Turkish economy ending 2016 with a weak growth performance.

Thanks to the government’s fiscal measures to support the economy and a vibrant real sector, the Turkish economy recovered faster than expected by many economists and international institutions.  In the third quarter of 2017, Turkey outperformed all G20 countries in terms of economic growth. After many predicaments over the last few years, the Turkish economy learned how to deal with both internal and external shocks. If for example a Scandinavian country had experienced similar incidents, the economy would not have recovered easily and smoothly.

Regional risks have not disappeared for Turkey yet. It seems that 2018 will be a strenuous and critical year for fighting terrorism. Although Turkey had carried out diplomatic efforts to persuade regional and global actors, especially the United States, to stop providing weapons and ammunition to terrorist organizations and to halt terrorist activities along the Turkish-Syrian border, Turkey’s security concerns were not fully addressed. Recent news about the formation of a 30,000-member border force with PKK/YPG members in northern Syria was the last straw. The PKK/YPG terrorist organization tried to occupy the majority of the Turkish–Syrian border, thus posing a threat to Turkey. As a result, the Turkish General Staff started Operation Olive Branch in order to “establish security and stability along Turkey’s borders and the region as well as to protect Syrians from terrorist oppression and cruelty.” 

Despite fighting with many internal and external terrorist organizations, the economic outlook is quite positive this year. The Turkish economy is expected to grow by around 5% in 2018. According to a Bloomberg analysis which is based on many indicators, Turkey is seen as one of the most attractive emerging markets in 2018.

Striking a blow against terrorist organizations is crucial to maintain not only political stability, but also economic stability. Finance Minister Naci Agbal indicated that “Turkey is carrying out the ongoing operation with determination and its accomplishments will go on to eliminate risks to the economy.”

Since military operations are inherently risky, it is generally expected that macroeconomic variables will fluctuate at the first stage. However, this was not the case for the Turkish economy. The Borsa Istanbul stock exchange broke an all-time record more than once during the first week of the operation, reaching 120,000 points. The Turkish lira appreciated against the dollar. The surge of the stock market and the appreciation of the TL are indicators that both domestic and international investors have confidence in the future of the Turkish economy and that they do not consider Operation Olive Branch as a potential threat for the economy. With a few exceptions, most of the major global actors underlined that Turkey has a legitimate interest to protect its borders. While this is minimal support, given that as a NATO member Turkey deserved both military and logistic support from its allies, the given support was important for investor confidence.

Since military operations have monetary costs, increasing military expenditures can also cause pressure on public finance. However, as a country whose public deficit and debt figures are well below the world average, Turkey has more than enough fiscal space to finance OEB. The short-term economic costs of this operation are low. Besides, it is highly probable that the long-term effects of this operation are positive for the Turkish economy. By ensuring border security, alleviating the risk of terrorism, and by promoting regional stability, the ongoing operation in Afrin is expected to contribute to the Turkish economy, paving the way for new investments in south-eastern Anatolia, to increasing the volume of exports from Turkey to the Middle East.

The civil war in Syria has not only affected Turkey in terms of the refugee crisis it caused but has also enabled terrorist organizations to raise to the sphere, taking advantage of the chaos in the region.

Turkey’s military intervention in Afrin came due to this very reason: the PYD/YPG terrorist organization had settled to create a terror corridor on the Turkish-Syrian border, which inevitably became a matter of national security for Ankara.

The Afrin region in Syria was handed over to the PYD/YPG in Syria in 2012 by the Assad regime. Since then, the terrorist group has forced the migration of the local population, including Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens.

Thousands have been displaced due to the insecurity in Afrin.

With the operation taking place, the Turkish Red Crescent has announced that it is preparing for the accommodation of over 50,000 people near Afrin.

With the aim to re-store peace and authority in the region, the Turkish Armed Forces and the Free Syrian Army gave start to Operation Olive Branch, which began on 20 January.

Since the operation began, the forces have cleared Afrin and its surrounding areas from 649 terrorists.

In addition to this, the Turkish Armed Forces lost 7 members of its personnel serving in the area.

Regardless of the fact that the European Union recognizes the PKK as a terrorist organization, the bloc has continuously remained silent to Turkey’s concerns.

The latest event reflecting this was when Member of the European Parliament Kati Piri downplayed the threat posed by the group.

Piri is associated with the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament, and has been a member of the EP since 2014.

During an interview published on Saturday 27 January, Piri stated that “For us [the EU], the PKK and its variations are not a threat. There are no attacks of PKK in the Netherlands, Belgium or France.”

While this not only goes against the understanding of the term “alliance,” it also reflects the problematic approach towards terrorism, which is threat to the entire world regardless of its source and target.

Acting as a Rapporteur during a meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, Piri ignored comments made by the FM in regards to discussions made about the PKK.

Criticizing this stance, the FM stated “They have appointed one PKK sympathizer lady for a country of 80 million. I only say ‘lady’ out of courtesy. I told her about the situation for two hours.”

“She didn’t note anything I said, but put everything the PKK said in her report. We should not take a rapporteur like this into account.”

Linking the situation to the current Operation Olive Branch in the Afrin region of Syria, the FM said: “In Operation Olive Branch, we have been very strong both in the field and at the table. We have both breathed down on the terrorists in the field, and done what had to be done in terms of diplomacy.”

Underlining the fact that the operation is being held in line with internal law, Cavusoglu added: “Everyone has seen how serious Turkey is with this operation. The friends, countries we call allies, the so-called allies, the [terrorist] YPG supporters, and the neighbors have seen it. We have no doubts about the steps we can take in the days to come.”

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared the imminent start of the Afrin operation in order to cleanse part of its southern border from PKK-affiliated YPG terrorists. The Turkish Armed Forces deployed several units to the Turkish border shared with the Afrin region, while the Turkish-backed Syrian rebels in northern Syria, who were part of the Euphrates Shield Operation, also prepared for the Afrin operation.

On 20 January, the Turkish Armed Forces began Operation Olive Branch in order to clear the Afrin region from YPG militants. The operation was set with a huge bombardment of YPG warehouses and strategic military positions. In addition to these airstrikes, the Turkish Armed Forces also targeted several YPG positions across Afrin with artillery shelling.

Operation Olive Branch came shortly after Russia withdrew its soldiers from the Afrin region in order to avoid being shelled by Turkey. The Russian withdrawal was a result of several high-negotiations between the Turkish and Russian Chiefs of Staff – who had previously met in Russia prior to the start of the military operation.

Operation Olive Branch is being conducted with a similar method like Operation Euphrates Shield, which was conducted in order to clear northern Aleppo from Daesh militants. Once again, the Turkish Armed Forces are being accompanied by Turkey-backed Syrian rebels. In contrast to the Euphrates Shield however, the main focus of Operation Olive Branch is to eliminate YPG militants in Afrin. Another difference between the two operations is also the terrain – when compared to Afrin, northern Aleppo is easier to operate as Afrin is located around mountains. More, another difference observed in the two scenarios is that the YPG have controlled Afrin for much longer than Daesh had controlled northern Aleppo.

YPG’s control of Afrin

The YPG has controlled the Afrin region since mid-2012 after the Assad regime plainly handed over the area. The terrorist organization’s control of Afrin was until Operation Olive Branch, as no other faction on the ground had attacked the region. In 2015, the YPG formed an alliance with Jaysh al Thuwwar, forming the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces. At the beginning of 2016, the YPG and Jaysh al Thuwwar captured the strategic Minnagh military airport and Tel Rifaat from Syrian rebels. Russia supported this effort with intense airstrikes. The last expansion of areas controlled by the YPG was during the Euphrates Shield Operation. The YPG took advantage of the immense fighting between Daesh and the Turkish-backed Syrian rebels and by doing so, the group tried to link up with YPG militants in Manbij. Even though the group did not succeed with this strategy, they managed to gather some new territories in northern Aleppo.

The presence of the YPG in Afrin and expanded territories around Tel Rifaat is estimated to have composed of 7,000 militants. In addition to the YPG militants, Jaysh al Thuwwar also has up to several hundred fighters under its command. Especially due to the forceful recruitment in Afrin, the YPG was able to increase its number to the 7,000 based in Afrin.

The depth of the operation

The difficulty of the operation in Afrin also depends on the aims and depth pursued by the government. In general, Turkey seems to have two different options. The first includes the entire cleansing of the Afrin region, which will take time as besieged YPG elements will fight until the very end. Additionally, the mountainous terrain in Afrin will give the terrorist group an opportunity to adopt guerilla tactics against the Turkish Armed Forces and the Syrian rebels. As the YPG is led by PKK veterans who have experienced this type of warfare, this will increase the difficulty of the operation. Within this scenario the operation should not be endangered but will take some time.

The second option includes the possibility of besieging YPG elements in Afrin and to cut any of their links with the world by capturing the Arab-majority areas around Tel Rifaat and Minnag. By doing so, Turkey would also have a route from the Euphrates Shield areas in northern Aleppo towards the rebel-held areas in Idlib. As the YPG forced the Arab population out of their homes in Tel Rifaat and surrounding areas, those areas are sparsely populated. Thus, as the YPG is likely to use civilians as a shield against the Turkish Armed Forces and the Syrian rebels, Tel Rifaat and surrounding areas will be easier to capture.

However, the Turkish strategy seems to intend to capture all of Afrin as Operation Olive Branch began with the aim to capture all strategic hills in the mountains of Afrin. With this strategy, the Turkish Armed Forces and Syrian rebels decided to attack the YPG from its strongest positions. If successful, the terrorist group will lose the possibility to retreat from the villages towards the mountains in order to conduct a guerilla warfare against the armed forces and rebels.

Media propaganda

In addition to the military difficulties, Turkey will also face propaganda warfare by the YPG and PKK media outlets as well as from western journalists and analysts who sympathize with the terrorist group. Even if Turkey tries to avoid civilian causalities as seen during the Euphrates Shield Operation in contrast to what Russia did in Aleppo or what the U.S. did in Raqqa, civilian causalities may still occur. However, as part of their media strategy against Turkey, the YPG will propagate by exaggerating any civilian casualties. This can be foreseen and it is inevitable for western media agencies to play a role in this situation. In addition to the western media, UAE-sponsored media will also join the campaign through reporting false news generated by the YPG.

Only days after the start of Operation Olive Branch, YPG-affiliated media sources claimed several fake reports about destroyed Turkish tanks, and the killing/detention of Turkish soldiers and Syrian rebels. Their propaganda was spread on social media and was also shared on the official accounts of the YPG, YPG commanders and YPG-linked websites.

An example of this includes a tweet of the YPG’s so-called political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD). The picture tweeted showed a residential building engulfed in flames stating “PYD Rojava” with the caption: “Turkish terrorist army targets civilian homes in Afrin.” Shortly after the post it was discovered that the image was from a fire incident that took place in Kuwait in 2016.

Saleh Moslem, a senior leader of the PYD tweeted: “Turkey massacres in Afrin” with a picture of injured kids. However, it was revealed that the photograph was from the Assad regime’s attacks on Eastern Ghouta.

Also, another picture shared on Twitter claimed that “kids are being targeted by Turkish army.” However, it turned out that the picture was taken from a post on January 1, 2017, during a Russian airstrike on Syria.

Examples of fake-propaganda by YPG sources could be expanded to an innumerable amount. The media strategy obducted by the YPG does not try to be reliable or valid, but seeks to de-legitimize the Turkish-led operation with all means.

The main challenges of Operation Olive Branch will be the terrain in Afrin, which gives the YPG an opportunity to seek defense in the mountains. Nevertheless, the plan of the Turkish Armed Forces is to capture the strategic hills in order to entirely eliminate all YPG militants in Afrin. In addition to the military difficulties to be embraced, Turkey has to ready itself for a propaganda war with the terrorist organization. A genuine media strategy by the YPG, in addition to journalists who openly sympathize with the group, will seek to de-legitimize the operation conducted in Afrin.

Speaking about Operation Olive Branch during a live television broadcast in Syria’s northern city of Afrin, presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin stated that the military campaign was launched in order to secure Turkey’s borders and its citizens from terror threats.

“When it becomes an issue of national security Turkey fulfills the responsibilities [through] its own capabilities. It is our responsibility to save Turkish citizens and Turkey’s borders. For this, we don’t need permission from anyone.”

“The PKK, or another terrorist organization, can never come to a position to determine the destiny of Kurdish people in this area. Neither the Kurds nor the Turks nor the knowledge, history and conscience of these Anatolian lands permits this.”

Reiterating Turkey’s call to the U.S. administration to stop supporting the PKK/PYD in Syria, Ibrahim Kalin stated, “Who can oppose the argument that the Syrian territory should be cleared of all terrorist elements? If someone opposes this, that means they have some other plan. In such a case, we will sit down and make a new assessment over that plan.”

“Our expectation [of the U.S.] is actually very basic, simple, clear and concrete: to end [its] support of the YPG and PYD. When this is accomplished, then we will say this is [the guarantee] from the U.S. for us. Then let’s talk about the current situation and future of Syria as well as the interests of the Syrian people.”

“Our expectation from the U.S. administration is to completely cut their support to the YPG and PYD. This is a solid guarantee. This is also a necessary step [to be] taken on the ground.”

While Turkey has consistently called for the U.S. regime to stop sponsoring the YPG terror, the Trump administration justified its support in terms of its fight against Daesh. However, reminding that the Daesh threat in Syria had been eliminated, Ibrahim Kalin emphasized that there was no need for the U.S. to continue to support the terrorist group.

On Wednesday 20 January, head of the Union of European Turkish Democrats (UETD) and former European Parliament member Zafer Sarikaya stated how Turkey’s military activity in Afrin is important for the security of Europe.

According to Ceyhun, “Europe’s safety, NATO’s prestige and border, and protection of EU values begins on Turkey’s border.”

More, similar to President Erdogan and presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin, Sarikaya criticized claims that Turkey’s operation in Afrin was against the Kurdish population.

In regards to this, he stated: “Turkey is a country which embraced around 200,000 Kurdish-origin brothers from Ayn al-Arab [Kobani] in a day.”

The operation in Afrin has been held in high regard due to the fear of another migrant crisis. Already there are approximately 3.5 million Syrian refugees in Turkey – had Turkey not intervened in Afrin, where the YPG terrorist group have been in control since 2012 – a new wave of migration could have occurred in Europe.

The YPG militants in Afrin have deserted the population in Afrin and have forcefully removed people (especially from Arab origin) from their homes.

Echoing this, Sarikaya underlined that “if terrorism in Syria is not cleared, a new wave of migration will occur.”

In addition to Sarikaya, another prominent European politician – former member of the European Parliament Ozan Ceyhun – emphasized how Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmens that live in Afrin have suffered from the YPG’s terror.

“If Turkey had not intervened in Afrin, most of the civilians in Afrin would have to escape. This would cause a new wave of refugees.”

Ceyhun dismissed the criticisms made towards the Turkish government in regards to its activities in Afrin, calling the western portrayal of the situation as a “disgrace.”

Highlighting the importance of the Afrin operation for the security of Europe, Ceyhun stated that “If Europe and the EU want to protect their own values, then they should support Turkey’s operation.”

Operation Olive Branch, which began on 20 January, has remained on the political agenda of not only Turkey but the wider Middle East, Russia, the U.S. and NATO.

The operation conducted by the Turkish Armed Forces and the Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army in Afrin aims to clear the region of the estimated 7,000 terrorist militants. The Afrin region has remained a safe hideout for the PKK/YPG after the Assad regime handed it over in 2012.

While several announcements have been made on many fronts within the Turkish administration, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan underlined on Wednesday that the aim of the operation is to secure justice.

Addressing local officials at the presidential complex, President Erdogan stated that Turkey’s concern is the “establishment of justice, not land.”

The President added that with the success of the Afrin operation, Turkey will not only destroy the terrorists but will also enable 3.5 million refugees in Turkey to return to their homes safely.

During his speech, President Erdogan noted that in total 268 terrorists had been neutralized, while the Turkish army and Free Syrian Army forces had suffered the loss of 8 martyrs over the last four days.

Mis-portrayal in the media

During the first days of the operation, presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin warned that the Olive Branch Operation is not designed against the Kurdish population in Afrin.

Since the beginning of the operation, many YPG-affiliated media sources and journalists that sympathize with the terrorist organization have made it out to seem that Turkey is attacking Kurds in the region.

Speaking out against these claims, President Erdogan informed that the PKK/YPG/PYD terrorist group had released all Daesh prisoners under the condition that they would fight against the Turkish army and the FSA in Afrin.

“These terrorist organizations are all the same […] These are terrorist groups serving the same purpose in the same scenario with different roles.”

The President slammed those who mis-portrayed the operation and stated that “it is clear that this operation targets several terrorist organizations,” reminding that similar accusations were made against Turkey during the Operation Euphrates Shield. Turkey had neutralized “more than 3,000 Daesh and hundreds of PYD/YPG terrorists in Operation Euphrates Shield,” and President added that this enabled the conditions for thousands of Syrians to return to their homes.

“I wonder if those who attack Syria don’t notice these?”

Asserting Turkey’s determination to clear the region from all terrorists, the President also stated that the operation would last until the death of the last terrorist.

The significance of the Afrin operation for Turkey must be evaluated through two main aspects: The place of the operation in Turkey’s counter-terror efforts and Ankara’s role in the regional geopolitical equation. In this scope, the most feasible alternative to carry the counter-terrorism fight across the border and prevent the PKK from becoming a regional actor in post-Daesh Syria seems to create a strategic state in Afrin. As the operation is viewed through the current situation and risks, it presents a generic scenario. However, it can be estimated that the situation may change at any moment depending on momentary factors and influence the progress of the overall process.

The operation will take place in winter conditions and in a relatively rugged terrain that occupies approximately 2,000 km² of area. The offensive will take place based on a joint military operation concept against the hybrid terror elements comprising around 6,000-8,000 operatives deployed in fortified lines of defense in rural and residential areas. It can be said that the maneuvers of the operation unit will be provided with land forces having mobile firepower in addition to local paramilitary elements whereas fire support will be provided both from land and air.

Air offensives on the PKK/YPG positions with fire support elements from land are expected, at the initial stage, to concentrate on the Dikmetas village, Minagh Air Base and Tel Rifat town located in the east of Afrin, Sheikh al-Hadid village, Jandaris town and Burj Abdullah village in the south of Afrin, where the main defense lines of the PKK and the YPG are located. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) are expected to segregate Afrin by getting through the PKK/YPG defense lines from eastern and southern sectors, and controlling the east and south of Afrin.

The risks entailed

In the subsequent phase, PKK/YPG elements may withdraw to the center of Afrin with forward operating TSK units from the northern and western sectors of Afrin. Following this phase, the PKK/YPG may enter clashes, particularly in Afrin’s city center, and force the TSK and FSA forces to collateral damage. Meanwhile, various terror assaults against the TSK and FSA forces may be organized in Afrin, such as attacks with improvised explosives, tactical weapons or assassination attempts.

As the operation kicks off, it is highly possible that the PKK/YPG units might organize attacks in the region where Operation Euphrates Shield was launched by advancing from Manbij, and the border security units on the Turkey-Syria border by advancing from Malikiye-Kamisli-Tel Abyad-Ayn al-Arab line. Syrian regime units may cooperate with the PKK/YPG on the Tel Rifat-Zahraa line and attempt manipulative military actions in order to clog the progress of the TSK and the FSA.

The extension of the operation may lead the Russian and Syrian regime to bring forward speculations regarding the use of Syrian air space. In such a case, Turkey could be forced to enter a direct armed engagement with Hayat Tahrer al-Sham in Idlib. Apart from the ordinary Kurdish people, groups who were radicalized by the PKK in Afrin may raise difficulties in enabling stability and security in the region after the completion of the operation, and might try to problematize Turkey’s presence in Afrin in the international sphere.

The main factors that will determine the success of the operation include speed, coordination, the ability to cooperate with local units and the sensitivity in survival measures. Considering the current situation and risks, the military targets of the operation are the PKK/YPG units for the time being. However, engagement with different threats is also possible during the later stages of the operation.

The Afrin operation is a strategic move in terms of supporting Turkey’s counter-terrorism efforts, geopolitical position and eliminating national security threats. More importantly, the success that is achieved through the operation in Afrin may be employed to intervene in other areas controlled by the PKK/YPG.

Following Operation Euphrates Shield (OES), Turkey brought a new dimension to its military activity in Syria in order to minimize the PKK’s strength in northern Syria and to “de-territorialize” the terrorist group in the middle term. With the Afrin operation, the aforementioned military activity has spread in a wider geographical area in the western flank of the Euphrates.

The operation, which had been in preparation phase for a long time, started on January 20 with the offensive phase, short after President Erdogan’s “Afrin operation has actually started on the ground” statement.

While the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) declared the name of the operation as “Olive Branch,” it made reference to decisions made by the UN Security Council’s decisions with regards to the war on terror and ‘self-defence’ element in Article 51 of the UN Charter – as it did in OES.

There are a number of push factors that shape Turkey’s strategy towards the PKK’s presence in northern Syria. However, for now, Turkey will try to actualize the strategy differently in two geographical areas. Turkey’s first goal is to minimize the PKK’s presence and capacity and force it to withdraw from the areas it controls in the western flank of the Euphrates.

Afrin is one of the critical thresholds

Afrin constitutes one of the critical thresholds to realize this strategy. The PKK captured Afrin in 2011 based on an agreement with the Assad regime and it declared it as a canton in 2013. Since 2014, Afrin has been ruled by a cadre, which includes high-level PKK leaders. As stated by Talal Silo, who was a former SDF figure, individuals from the PKK’s Qandil Mountain ranks such as Khalil Tafdam, Haji Ahmad Houdro, Mahmoud Barhoudan used to administer Afrin. With the intensification of the Syrian Civil War and the Assad regime’s tacit consent, the PKK first eliminated Kurdish opposition and secured absolute authority in the region. The group then displaced non-Kurdish residents through a “subtle demographic engineering.”

In this context, residents of 42 villages and towns (Tel Rifat, Menagh, Sheikh Issa etc.) in northern Syria, whose numbers are estimated to be around 250,000, were deported by YPG militants in 2016. Following Turkey’s downing of a Russian jet, the PKK captured the Tel Rifat-Menagh axis east of Afrin from the FSA with Russian air support and consolidated its power in these regions.

On the other hand, the PKK utilized Afrin as a base for its attacks in Turkey. For this reason, the Afrin operation has a strategic importance in Turkey’s fight against terrorism. The Afrin-Amanos connection in the region had an importance with regards to the PKK’s attacks towards Turkey’s Mediterranean region. The PKK used to transfer its forces from the Hassa county to the Amanos region via its elements deployed in Afrin and its surrounding villages, also making use of the mountainous terrain.

The PKK threat towards Turkey was not limited to this. Afrin has been one of the crucial centres of the PKK’s ideological and armed training until today. Members of the PKK who used to receive training on weapons and explosives in the camps based in this region carried out attacks in Turkey. Hence, Afrin had become a harbor for the radical leftist organizations in Turkey.

The strategic goal of the Afrin operation

Although the goal of the operation was declared as bringing peace and stability to the region, taking inspiration from the olive trees there, it is safe to state that Turkey will have to face a formidable challenge in order to achieve its mission. Herein, along with difficulties on military-technical and operational levels, Ankara’s stated strategic goals for the middle and long term is likely to face geopolitical challenges.

In military terms, although Turkey drew some lessons from OES on tactical, operative and strategic levels, there are some differences in the nature of enemy identification at least with regards to Afrin. It is not difficult to expect the PKK to build its defense on its social base, where the latter is strong.

During the first stage, TAF is carrying out its land operation against shelters and weapon placements of PKK members fortified in rural areas. At this stage, although the PKK plans to stop TAF and FSA elements by making use of topographical conditions in parts of Afrin, taking the joint nature of the operation and the imbalance of power between the two parties into consideration, this plan is very unlikely to materialize. In this respect, it will not be possible for the PKK to keep rural areas under its control. Hence, the terrorist organization is expected to move its main defense to residential areas and to fight an urban warfare. Taking the PKK’s capacity into consideration, clashes in urban areas will be heavier.

These circumstances may prolong the duration of the operation and may also turn the diplomatic stage against Turkey. For this reason, Ankara would move first to minimize the strength of the PKK in Afrin, then capture strategic points and consolidate the FSA’s control there, and then fully minimize and “de-territorialize” the PKK in the western flank of the Euphrates.

A new page in the Syrian theatre

At this juncture, it appears that Turkey cannot confine itself to the Afrin operation. The importance of the Afrin operation for Ankara is to pressure, especially the United States, for the elimination of the PKK presence along the Turkish border in the eastern flank of the Euphrates, not to mention Manbij. In other words, Turkish military presence and fortification in the western flank of the Euphrates will function as an element of pressure on military and political levels against the PKK and the U.S. in the eastern flank of the river.

As long as Turkey’s military determination goes smoothly on tactical and operative stage, Washington should be prepared to take steps backwards or to lose Turkey.

The Russian position is estimated to affect Turkey’s military success in the western flank of the Euphrates. The execution of the Afrin operation indicates the presence of some sort of an agreement between Turkey and Russia. It is possible to speculate on the dynamics on which this agreement was built, but it would be wrong to think that the parties are engaging in this process based on expectations of “absolute gains.”

It is very clear that the Afrin operation has opened a new page in the Syrian theatre. This page poses some risks for Turkey as much as it does for Syria in general and for U.S. foreign policy. The perusal of this process by the U.S. is very crucial for the minimization of these risks.

Turkey has been in a long on-going preparation process for an extensive military operation against the PYD/YPG, which the country deems as a threat to both its own national security and to the territorial integrity of Syria. Ankara has been in constant dialogue with countries across the region along with prominent actors in Syria in order to establish political and military premises.

Turkey has launched an operation targeting Afrin, the western end of the terror belt. While the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) had deployed military forces to the region near Afrin, it has also established a base in Idlib, south of Afrin, effectively surrounding the city. In addition to this, thousands of Syrian opposition soldiers, who were trained through the “train-and-equip” program, were deployed against the PYD/YPG. Turkey is pursuing an initiative similar to the Operation Euphrates Shield (OES), which was launched right after the July 15 coup attempt, and which simultaneously cleansed the defined areas from both Daesh and the PYD/YPG. Operation Olive Branch (OOB) was launched a short time after President Erdogan’s announcement on 20 January, 2018, at 17:00. While the TSK announced the name of the operation as “Olive Branch,” references were made to decisions made by the United Nations Security Council and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.

What are the geopolitical and demographic features of Afrin?

Located in northwest Syria, Afrin is a district in the Aleppo Province. The district consists of seven towns: Central, Bulbul, Jandairis, Rajo, Sharran, Shayk al Hadid and M’abatli. Its border with Turkey renders the district important in terms of geopolitics. Its surface area is 1850 km², corresponding to 2% of the total surface area of Syria. Afrin is located in a mountainous region and its elevation is between 700-1269 meters. The distance between its easternmost and westernmost points is 55 kilometers, while the distance between its northernmost and southernmost points is 75 kilometers.

According to the 2004 census in Syria, 64,758 people live in the town center and the total population of the district is 172,095. The city is mostly populated by Kurds. However, Arab and Turkmen and a small population of Yazidis also reside in the region. The city experienced a population increase after the 2011 revolution, as the Syrian regime did not target the city. Yet, figures provided regarding the population of Afrin are contradictory – especially numbers released by pro-PKK/PYD sources are exaggerated. It is estimated that around 300,000 people live in the Afrin District.

Why is Afrin important for the PYD/YPG?

Following the 2011 revolution, the PYD/YPG terrorist organization made an agreement with the Assad regime handed Afrin to PYD, which declared it as its canton in 2013. Since October 29, 2014, the region has been managed by an administration appointed by the PYD. The terrorist organization has eliminated all Kurdish opposition in the region, especially the Kurdish National Council, and has established its hegemony over the region.

After the downing of the Russian aircraft, the terrorist organization captured territories between Tell Rifat and Menagh to the east of Afrin from the Free Syrian Army (FSA) with the support of Russian aircrafts. With this, the terrorist organization forced the Arab population in the region to immigrate. The group then attacked the town of Azez but failed to capture it. Since October 2016, the PYD/YPG has attempted to march on Al-Bab with the occasional air support from coalition forces. However, this march was stopped with the OES.

The YPG claims that it manages Afrin through 47 councils and 898 communes (communities) that organize the people. Even though the region is isolated from the PYD/YPG located on the eastern bank of the Euphrates, it is managed by prominent figures of the PKK such as Halil Tefdem, Ahmed Hudro, Mahmud Berhudan, Behcet Abdo and Nocin, who all receive their orders from Qandil under the chain of command of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK).

This region acts like a springboard for the organization, which will allow it to access the Mediterranean Sea. Moreover, the terrorist organization attempts to establish a line of supply through the Amanos Mountains in Turkey in order to mobilize militants with weapons. The TSK and security forces have killed over 40 terrorists trying to cross the border from Afrin. The terrorist organization sees Afrin as an important source of recruitment. They are forcibly recruiting girls and boys aged between 16-18 for their “Self-Defense Force.” There are several boot camps established by the group where these teenagers are trained.

What are some of the alternative scenarios to the Afrin offensive?

Operation Olive Branch was launched at 17:00 on 20 January with military aircraft belonging to the Turkish Air Forces, which entered Syrian air space and began targeting terrorist targets in Afrin. The TSK announced that 108 different locations used as shelter and arsenal by the PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG in Afrin and its surrounding towns were destroyed by 72 aircrafts. In addition, the TSK informed that lines of defense, command centers and border outposts of the terrorist organization were targeted by the Turkish forces from land and air.

During the pre-operation assessments, there were various scenarios about the Afrin offensive. Initially, re-capturing towns like Tell Rifat and Menagh in order to completely surround YPG militants in the region was being discussed. However, the first stage of the offensive indicates that an extensive military operation against the PKK in Afrin will take place.

The extent of the military operation will depend on negotiations made with Russia, as due to the result of an agreement made with the Syrian regime, Russia continues to control Syrian air space. It is known that Moscow is trying to persuade the Turkish regime to pursue a small-scale operation. However, it is definite that Turkey needs an extensive military operation in order to permanently remove the terrorist threat from Afrin.

The operation was launched with intense air raids and support vehicles. After the lines of defense are softened, ground war could be expected to be intensified around the Menagh Air Base-Tell Rifat to the east of Afrin and Shayk al Hadid-Jandairis-Burj Abd Allah to the south of Afrin.

It could be expected that land forces of the TSK and FSA will simultaneously penetrate the defense lines of the PKK/YPG on the southern and eastern sectors, effectively isolating Afrin. In the following stage, the TSK may force PKK/YPG militants to retreat to Afrin by pushing from northern and western sectors. These terrorist elements may attempt to use civilians in Afrin as human shields in order to draw the Turkish armed forces into urban warfare.

The PYD/YPG had been preparing for a probable military operation by Turkey. The PKK controls over 1500 km² of territory including Afrin and its surrounding cities, where Russia has also begun to establish checkpoints.

It could be assessed that PKK/PYD militants, whose numbers are around 5000-6000, along with Jaysh al-Thuwar elements consisting of approximately a couple of hundred of militants, may attempt to halt the TSK and FSA through asymmetric warfare and hybrid methods. It is known that the terrorist organization has been digging trenches, forming tunnels, placing Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and mines to certain locations. Moreover, with the courtesy of the U.S., the YPG may attempt to transport anti-tank weaponry that is currently located on the eastern bank of the Euphrates to Afrin. Considering the topography of the region, terrorist elements may attempt to use mountainous parts that are located towards the midwest and northwest of Afrin.

Nevertheless, the terrorist organization does not stand much chance against the TSK and FSA on the plains towards Afrin as well as around Tell Rifat and Menagh regions. It should not be forgotten that Turkey has learned valuable lessons from OES, especially in terms of fighting against anti-tank weaponry and asymmetric warfare methods, and has new inventory such as Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), which could counter such attempts. All in all, Turkey is much better equipped for the Afrin offensive.

What has Turkey learned from Operation Euphrates Shield?

When drawing comparisons between the OES and OOB, there are both similarities and differences. Even though Turkish forces encountered PKK/YPG elements on the bank of the Sanjur River after capturing Jarabulus, it was essentially an operation against Daesh.

OES cleared a territory of 2200 km² from terrorist elements. While the conflict was mostly on the plains, it was concluded with urban warfare in Al-Bab and surrounding towns. Regime forces along with the PKK constantly harassed the TSK and TSK-backed Syrian opposition forces. As Daesh adopted hybrid and asymmetric strategies along with using civilians as human shields, the TSK had to exact the operation meticulously and steadily. Daesh had carried out asymmetric attacks throughout the OES, attempting to halt the march of the TSK and Syrian opposition forces through bombed car and suicide bomber attacks. The fact that Daesh was effectively using anti-tank weaponry was one of the greatest challenges of the operation. As Turkey engaged in urban warfare for the first time on a cross-border operation, there were certain handicaps regarding military equipment and experienced personnel. Moreover, Syrian opposition forces were not very effective during the initial train-and-equip program.

The majority of these handicaps were addressed with the experience gained from OES. While increasing the number of UCAVs improved close air support and precision strike capacities, protection systems against anti-tank weaponry that is implemented within Turkish tanks made the TSK a force to be reckoned with. There are more personnel in the force who are experienced in asymmetric hybrid conflicts. Meanwhile, Syrian opposition forces are trained and equipped better than before. There is a significant improvement in their battle-readiness. In this respect therefore, when compared to the OES, Turkey is more advantageous in the current operation.

Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim speaks at a meeting with media representatives at Vahdettin Mansion in Istanbul, Turkey on January 21, 2018.

Operation Olive Branch aims to create 30-kilometer-deep (approx. 19 miles) safe zone in northwestern Afrin region of Syria, Turkish prime minister said Sunday.

“First goal [of the operation] is to create a safe area there and then we can take concrete steps to eliminate terrorist elements,” Binali Yildirim told media representatives in Istanbul.

He said there are 8,000-10,000 terrorists in Afrin and Turkey would clear all the terrorists on its borders.

Yildirim said Russia, the U.S. and Iran were informed about Turkish plan ahead of the operation.

“There is confusion in U.S. [regarding the operation]. Everyone speaks different things,” he said, adding that they also did not voice a firm opposition to the operation.

Source: AA

A retired U.S. army officer has said the United States made a “terrible mistake” by supporting Syrian Kurds (PYD/PKK).

In an exclusive interview with Anadolu Agency, Edward J. Erickson, who is currently a professor at the Marine Corps University, talked about the recent developments in Syria’s Afrin and the relations between the U.S. and Turkey.

“The Afrin operation is a continuation of Operation Euphrates Shield,” Erickson said.

Turkish military units are already deployed in Afrin, a district of Aleppo province near the Turkish-Syria border, which is under siege by the PYD/PKK terrorist organization. The PYD/PKK is the Syrian offshoot of the PKK terrorist group, which has been designated a terrorist organization by Turkey, the U.S. and the EU.

“What is happening to Turkey right now is in the same way my country (U.S.) was sucked in to Iraq and Afghanistan, Turkey is being sucked in to Syria,” Erickson said. “It is very difficult to draw the line and say ‘we are going to stop right here’, that is Turkey’s problem.”

United States’ problem is to be a player in Iraq and in Syria, Erickson said. “We tried to support the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and failed, they collapsed. Our next client, the next choice was the YPG, the Kurds.”

“The problem now is in Afrin, as you know there are not just the rebel forces, there are also YPG, Kurdish forces. This has brought Turkey and United States into direct competition.”

U.S. arming of PYD/PKK

When asked about the U.S. arming of PYD/PKK, Erickson said the U.S. needed a group on the ground to fight against Daesh.

“We then sent weapons to Kurds. We promised Turkey – our president, our secretary of state, defense Trump, Tillerson and Mattis – that we will get the weapons back. I don’t think Turkey believes that, personally I don’t believe that. I don’t think Syrian Kurds will return weapons. This is going to lead to big problems between Turkey and the U.S,” he said.

“I think we made a mistake, personally. I don’t speak for the U.S. government. I think the United States made a terrible mistake supporting Syrian Kurds.”

When asked about his opinion on what is United States’ policy in Syria, Erickson said initial Obama policy was that “Assad must go.”

“And when the situation in Syria became so complicated, the Obama administration changed that to ‘maybe Assad can stay but we got to work with it, somehow’,” he said.

“The Trump administration has not revealed (its policy) on what Assad will be,” he added.

Erickson said currently there are 2,000 U.S. soldiers fighting against Daesh in Syria, but their future is unknown after Daesh is crushed.

“ISIS is almost crushed. The question is after ISIS is crushed, what will the Americans do? Will they stay there, will they leave? Will they encourage the PYD to attack Assad? We really don’t know,” he said.

“We are waiting for America’s national military policy,” he added. “Right now, the only government that can function and govern in Syria is the Assad regime. Nobody likes that, but it is the reality.”

Source: AA

Turkey has legitimate security concerns over insurgency inside its borders, U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis said Sunday, according to U.S. media reports.

“Turkey is a NATO ally. It’s the only NATO country with an active insurgency inside its borders. And Turkey has legitimate security concerns,” Mattis told reporters in a plane headed for Asia.

His remarks came amid Turkey’s ongoing military operation against terror groups in the Afrin region.

Noting that the overall success against Daesh “does not remove many of Turkey’s concerns,” Mattis said it is “easy to understand” why Ankara is worried that the conflict will extend beyond the Syrian border.

”Turkey was candid,“ Mattis told reporters. “They warned us before they launched the aircraft that they were going to do it. We are very alert to it. Our top levels are engaged and we’re working through it.”

Turkey’s operation was carried out against the PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG and Daesh terrorist groups under the framework of Turkey’s rights based on international law, the UN Security Council’s decisions and self-defense rights under the UN charter.

Arab media have shed the spotlight on Turkey’s ongoing Operation Olive Branch to dislodge the PYD/PKK terrorist group from northern Syria’s Afrin city.

Most newspapers cited President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s statements that the operation targets PYD/PKK terrorists in the city.

“Erdogan: Olive Branch to defeat terrorists”, headlined Qatar’s Al Watan newspaper.

The daily published a picture of Syrians waving a banner reading “We back Turkish military operation to shield our people from PYD terror”.

The Qatari Raya newspaper cited Erdogan’s criticism during a recent party conference of U.S. plans to create a PYD/PKK force in northern Syria.

“Turkey launches Olive Branch Operation in Afrin”, read the main headline of the Saudi-funded Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper.

The daily said Ankara has informed Damascus of its military operation in Afrin and cited Erdogan’s statements that the operation will include Manbij.

The Saudi newspaper pointed out to the Turkish military’s statement that the operation aims to achieve “security and stability” along the Turkish border and in the region and end the presence of PYD/PKK and Daesh in Afrin.

Bahraini newspaper Al-Ayam cited Turkish Foreign Minister Mavlut Cavusoglu’s statements that the operation “only targets terrorists” and that Turkey “has informed all sides of what we are doing”.

The Kuwaiti daily Al-Rai headlined “Turkey launches Olive Branch against the Kurds of Afrin and ‘angry’ Russia … withdraws its soldiers”.

“Erdogan: Manbij will be next … and gradually we will clear the borders of this terrorist filth,” reads another headline by the daily.

Source: AA

According to information gathered by an Anadolu Agency correspondent in the area, some movement was seen at the 10th Tanker Base Command of Incirlik Base as part of the ongoing ‘Operation Olive Branch’.

While some Turkish fighter jets took off from the base, others remained on alert. Meanwhile, military cargo planes kept arriving and leaving the base.

Turkish ground forces have started to move into Syria’s Afrin with Free Syrian Army, Turkish General Staff said earlier on Sunday.

The operation — aimed at eliminating PYD/PKK and Daesh elements from Syria’s Afrin — was launched at 5 p.m. (GMT1400) on Saturday. It was being carried out under the framework of Turkey’s rights based on international law, UN Security Council’s decisions, self-defense rights under the UN charter and respect to Syria’s territorial integrity, the military added.

Afrin has been a major hideout for the PYD/PKK since July 2012 when the Assad regime in Syria left the city to the terror group without putting up a fight.

The Turkish cities of Kilis and Hatay across the Syrian border are within the firing range of the PYD/PKK group from Afrin, which sits atop a hill. The terror group has also used Amanos Mountains to penetrate from Syria into Turkey.

The PYD/PKK depends on Afrin to connect to the Mediterranean from northwestern Syria.

The terrorist organization has also threatened the gains made from Operations Euphrates Shield and Idlib de-escalation zone over Afrin.

A quarter of Syria land and 65 percent of Turkey-Syria border are currently under occupation of the terrorist organization.

Operation Euphrates Shield began in August 2016 and ended in late March 2017 to improve security, support coalition forces and eliminate the terror threat along the Turkish border.

Source: AA