Alongside strengthening diplomatic relations with Latin American countries, the Israeli government is seeking to expand cooperation in the fields of the economy, technology, security and innovation. However, Israel’s outreach to Latin America also faces certain limitations. While the foreign-policy priorities of governments in the region can change, the Israel-Palestine issue remains an important factor in relations with Latin American countries. Israel’s actions in Gaza have provoked the strongest reaction among Latin American populations in recent history. Israel is aware of this and is therefore pursuing new policies in the region.

The decision by Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar to declare 2026 the “year of focusing on Latin America” from the ministry’s perspective is being presented as part of Tel Aviv’s strategy to break its isolation in the region. Alongside strengthening diplomatic relations with Latin American countries, the Israeli government is seeking to expand cooperation in the fields of the economy, technology, security and innovation.

One of the important steps in this policy was the Isaac Accords launched between Israel and Argentina in April 2026. The agreement aims to promote security, counterterrorism, trade, technology and economic cooperation between the two countries and other Western Hemisphere countries that share similar policies.

Bolivia restored diplomatic relations with Israel in December 2025, with the two countries agreeing to reappoint ambassadors and increase bilateral contacts. Relations with Colombia were also restored in August 2026. Under the new President Abelardo de la Espriella, steps were taken to reestablish diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv, appoint ambassadors and strengthen economic relations.

These developments indicate that Israel is seeking to reverse the diplomatic ruptures experienced in Latin America in the previous period and rebuild its diplomatic network across the region.

Argentine leader Milei’s “extraordinary” affinity for Israel

Relations between Israel and Argentina have become closer politically and diplomatically than ever before following Javier Milei’s election as president in 2023. The Milei administration has described Israel as one of Argentina’s principal strategic partners, designated Hamas as a terrorist organization and continued to express strong support for Israel on international platforms.

Milei’s visit to Israel in 2024 and his visit to the Western Wall were among the symbolic steps reflecting the political rapprochement between the two countries. One of the key elements of this rapprochement was Argentina’s decision to move its embassy to Jerusalem. Milei announced the decision in 2024 and stated that the embassy would be moved to Jerusalem in 2026.

While the ideological and strategic alliance established by the Milei administration with Israel in foreign policy has reached a peak, Argentina is experiencing a deep socioeconomic crisis at home. The “shock therapy” economic policies implemented by Milei after taking office—including cuts in public spending, the removal of subsidies and the devaluation of the peso—were intended to bring inflation under control but severely affected the population’s purchasing power.

As a result of these measures, the country’s official poverty rate surpassed 50 percent, reaching its highest levels in two decades. Pensioners, public-sector workers and low-income groups in particular were pushed into a severe cost-of-living crisis as food, transportation and energy costs increased.

Colombia’s new leader is a strong supporter of Israel

Relations between Colombia and Israel began to take a new shape following the diplomatic rupture that occurred under former President Gustavo Petro over Israel’s actions in Gaza. The new period began with Abelardo de la Espriella, who took office on August 7 and had refused to recognize the victory of the left-wing administration, describing it as fraudulent.

The Petro administration had severed diplomatic relations with Israel in May 2024 over Israel’s actions in Gaza. Following de la Espriella’s assumption of office, a rapid normalization process began between the two countries.

One of the most notable steps in the new administration’s shift in Israel policy was Colombia’s recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. In a statement issued on August 10, 2026, Colombia announced that it recognized Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights and considered Israeli control of the area important for Israel’s security.

The decision was one of the clearest indications that Bogotá had departed significantly from the previous administration’s policy toward Israel.

Another important component of the change in relations is the relocation of the Colombian Embassy to Jerusalem. The de la Espriella administration had already included the relocation of the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem among its campaign promises.

While the two sides have discussed strengthening security and economic ties alongside diplomatic relations, the possibility of Colombia resuming coal exports to Israel and changing its position in certain international legal proceedings against Israel has also emerged.

Most recently, Colombia withdrew its request to intervene in the genocide case filed against Israel at the International Court of Justice.

Critical elections in Brazil enter Israel’s radar

Brazil’s general elections, scheduled for October 4, 2026, represent an important turning point for the future of relations between Israel and Latin America’s largest country.

During the Lula administration, relations between the two countries experienced serious diplomatic tensions over the Gaza war. Brazil’s position on the Palestinian issue became a particularly clear source of divergence.

In February 2024, Israel declared Lula “persona non grata,” while Brazil recalled its ambassador from Tel Aviv. Diplomatic tensions between the two countries continued into 2025.

Against this backdrop, Flavio Bolsonaro, the presidential candidate of Brazil’s right-wing opposition, has been sending clear messages about strengthening relations with Israel. In a statement in June, Bolsonaro said that if elected, Brazil would once again move closer to Israel, relocate its embassy in Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and join the Isaac Accords.

Bolsonaro’s Israel policy has not been limited to foreign policy during the election campaign. Bolsonaro also presented to the public at an election event a video message sent to his campaign by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

This development indicates that political contacts between Brazil’s right-wing camp and the Israeli government have become increasingly visible during the electoral process.

Depending on the election result, two different approaches are expected to emerge regarding Brazil’s Israel policy: the continuation of the Lula administration’s existing position on the Palestinian issue or a Bolsonaro administration seeking to restore and strengthen diplomatic and strategic relations with Israel.

Flavio Bolsonaro’s statements on Jerusalem, Israel and the Isaac Accords have already outlined the main areas in which foreign policy could change in the event of a change of government.

U

krainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy accused the United States of failing to provide sufficient support to Ukraine as Russian strikes killed at least 78 people and wounded 215 across the country over two days, intensifying pressure on Kyiv’s Western partners to strengthen military assistance and sanctions against Moscow.

The latest attacks included a Russian bomb strike on the eastern city of Kramatorsk that killed at least 35 people, according to Ukrainian authorities. The assault came a day after a wave of Russian drones and missiles struck locations across Ukraine, killing dozens, including 22 people in a residential building in the town of Pryluky, approximately 130 kilometres east of Kyiv.

Speaking to reporters in Pryluky on Thursday, Zelenskiy criticized Washington for pursuing potential economic cooperation with Russia while simultaneously attempting to broker an end to the war, which has continued for more than four years.

He also urged the United States to expand Ukraine’s access to Starlink satellite communications, arguing that the technology could help Ukrainian forces detect and target Russian ballistic-missile launchers.

“Open Starlink for Ukraine,” Zelenskiy said, recalling that access had been made available in response to developments involving Iran. He argued that additional access would strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend its airspace and put pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin to negotiate.

Zelenskiy questions Washington’s approach

Zelenskiy’s remarks followed comments by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who described the war as a dangerous stalemate and said Washington would continue working toward a settlement.

The Ukrainian president challenged that assessment, arguing that diplomatic efforts could not be reconciled with discussions about future economic projects involving Russia while Russian attacks continued.

“Where’s the truth here, where’s the honesty?” Zelenskiy asked, describing the situation as a lack of willingness rather than a genuine stalemate.

His criticism comes as Ukraine attempts to regain the battlefield initiative after Russian territorial gains slowed this year. Despite those efforts, Moscow has continued an increasingly intense air campaign targeting Ukrainian cities, infrastructure and other facilities.

Reuters reported on Thursday that senior Russian and US officials, including US Special Envoy Jared Kushner, had discussed the possibility of bringing a US investor into the Nord Stream pipelines, which supplied Russian natural gas to Germany before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The discussions have added to Kyiv’s concerns about the direction of Washington’s policy toward Moscow. Zelenskiy urged US President Donald Trump to increase sanctions pressure on Russia and said Ukrainian negotiators would travel to the United States on Friday and Saturday for talks.

He also said he expected Ukraine’s European partners to participate in discussions with Washington. Air defence would be a central issue, given the frequency and scale of Russian attacks.

Civilian casualties mount as attacks intensify

The strike on Kramatorsk was among Russia’s largest single attacks of the year, Ukrainian officials said. Twenty people were wounded in the assault, which tore through two buses in the embattled eastern city.

Regional Governor Vadym Filashkin accused Russian forces of deliberately targeting civilians, saying the presence of passengers on a bus made it a particularly devastating target.

Images released by officials showed bodies lying along a debris-strewn street beside the charred remains of a bus. Zelenskiy said some victims had yet to be identified and warned that the attack would not go unanswered.

Russian authorities have denied deliberately targeting civilians, although Russian forces regularly launch missile and drone attacks against Ukrainian cities.

Elsewhere, local authorities reported that a Russian guided aerial bomb killed two people in a village in southeastern Dnipropetrovsk region, while another person died in the western city of Ivano-Frankivsk. A further drone attack in Kramatorsk killed two people, bringing the city’s reported death toll to 35.

In Kyiv, Mayor Vitali Klitschko said four people were killed and 19 wounded in morning attacks on the capital. The strikes also disrupted water and electricity supplies, with officials warning that restoring services would take time.

Infrastructure under growing pressure

Russia has intensified its drone attacks on Kyiv in recent weeks, targeting warehouses and data centres while renewing its campaign against Ukraine’s electricity network ahead of winter.

The attacks have raised concerns about the country’s ability to protect essential infrastructure as temperatures fall and demand for heating and electricity increases.

Russian technology company Yandex said it was still unable to determine whether equipment at a data centre struck by a Ukrainian drone could be restored. Zelenskiy did not specifically address the incident involving Yandex but said Ukraine was responding to Russian attacks by “mirroring” strikes against data centres.

The latest wave of violence underscores the challenges facing Ukraine as it seeks to strengthen its air defences, maintain Western support and secure a diplomatic settlement on terms acceptable to Kyiv.

With civilian casualties mounting and critical infrastructure under pressure, Zelenskiy’s criticism highlights a growing tension between Ukraine’s demand for stronger military backing and Washington’s efforts to pursue negotiations with Moscow.

For Kyiv, the immediate priorities remain protecting civilians, expanding defensive capabilities and persuading its allies to maintain pressure on Russia while diplomatic efforts continue.

(Source: Reuters)

A

Tuareg fighter calling himself Azzghim has become a familiar face in Mali’s online war. He turns up in military dress in videos shared by accounts sympathetic to, or run by members of, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), and he spends most of his screen time attacking Russia’s Africa Corps.

He also appears not to exist. Researchers who studied the clips found the usual marks of synthetic video, in the way his body moves and in glitches in the color and the sound, and concluded that he had been generated rather than filmed. His following has not suffered for it. One account given over largely to reposting and remixing Azzghim material had 207,000 followers when the researchers looked at it. Another account in the same orbit used a synthetic teenage boy.

A face helps. An anonymous account can post the same message, but a man in fatigues talking into the camera gives it a body and a voice, and unlike the FLA’s real fighters, he can’t be captured or made to talk.

Azzghim is the most striking product of a wider experiment in Mali, and every side is taking part. In June, the media arm of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, the al Qaeda affiliate better known as JNIM, put out AI-generated posters to promote videos of its April attacks. Pro-government accounts have published synthetic clips celebrating the Malian army and its Russian partners. Russia-linked networks aimed at African audiences have used the same tools to write articles, translate them and put synthetic presenters in front of a camera.

It would be easy to read all this as the familiar story in which cheap AI hands powerful propaganda tools to anyone who wants them. What stands out in Mali is how differently the same software performs depending on who is holding it. A jihadist media office making posters, a few separatist sympathizers building a character on TikTok and a Russian operation running websites in several languages are doing very different jobs, and in each of them the software is the least expensive part.

The same tools, unequal results

A September report by the Dakar-based Timbuktu Institute compares how JNIM, FLA-linked accounts, networks supporting Mali’s military authorities and Russian-linked operations use generative AI. Of the four, JNIM’s documented use is the thinnest; the researchers describe it as “still at a limited but potentially evolving experimental stage.” The June posters remain the clearest example. The battlefield footage promoted by Az-Zallaqa, the group’s media arm, was real. The advertising wrapped around it was not, and it carried the usual giveaways, with blurred backgrounds and buildings melting into the vegetation behind them.

That modesty should not be mistaken for incapacity. JNIM already has what most influence campaigns spend years building: a media office, a back catalog of battlefield footage and channels that reliably put it in front of people. Generative tools could speed all of that up, turning a statement into Fulfulde or Tamasheq within the hour, dubbing a video for a different audience, or recutting the same claim several ways before anyone on the other side has drafted a reply. Nobody has yet shown that JNIM does any of this, and having the tools is a long way from knowing how to use them to any effect.

The pro-government side, meanwhile, has found an audience. One Bamako-based TikTok account identified by the Timbuktu Institute built up more than 436,000 followers with AI-generated material praising the army and the Africa Corps. After the April fighting it posted a video presenting Kidal as a city the government had recaptured. It drew 4.7 million views, far more than anything publicly documented from JNIM’s experiments.

That video came out of the fighting that began on April 25, when JNIM and the FLA launched coordinated attacks across Mali. Defense Minister Sadio Camara was fatally wounded in Kati after a suicide attacker drove an explosives-laden vehicle into his residence and a firefight followed. In Kidal, rival versions were circulating within hours.

The FLA said it had taken the city; the army called its departure a tactical repositioning, and Russian accounts dwelt on the Africa Corps’ resistance. Armies have always rebranded retreats and rebels have always inflated their gains, and an old photograph with a fresh caption can still travel a remarkable distance. What has changed is the volume and the speed. A single clip can now be recut, given a new voiceover and translated for a second audience before anyone has checked where it was filmed, and a small team can sustain an output that once needed a newsroom.

Russia’s information machine

Russia’s operation sits in a different category. Moscow was feeding anti-French and anti-Western narratives into Malian politics long before generative AI arrived, and the outlets it built for that purpose have since absorbed the new tools. In 2025, France’s VIGINUM agency mapped the network around African Initiative and traced a related operation, AI-Freak, probably linked to it, which mixed AI-generated text, images and video with fake news sites, inauthentic accounts and search manipulation. A model can turn out a script or a translation in minutes. Deciding who should see it, which accounts should carry it and where it will look credible is still work done by people.

The output dwarfs the audience. Between September 2023 and April 2025, African Initiative’s website published 18,127 articles in several languages. VIGINUM, citing SimilarWeb, counted 104,818 unique visits between December 2024 and February 2025, around 35,000 a month. Its six official Telegram channels had 69,720 subscribers between them.

OpenAI’s encounter with Stop News, another Russian operation, is starker still. OpenAI disrupted it in 2024, after its operators used AI to produce articles, comments and images in English, French and Russian for sites posing as news outlets in Africa and Britain. Few operations have leaned so heavily on synthetic imagery, and most of its accounts attracted almost no engagement. It came back the following year with more ambition, including YouTube and TikTok channels fronted by a synthetic newsreader who praised Russia and the Africa Corps and attacked France, the United States and Ukraine.

By August 2025, Newstop Africa’s main account on X had 172 followers, and its TikTok and YouTube channels about 1,900 each. One TikTok video reached 63,300 views; another reached 87. OpenAI found little sign that the network had spread beyond its own accounts and placed it in Category 2 on its six-point Breakout Scale.

Why trust still beats technology

Mali’s audiences are not blank screens. They come to these videos with years of war behind them and settled views about France, Russia and the junta, and they judge a message partly by who sends it. Some players entered this contest with large followings and voices people already recognized, able to push a clip across several platforms in an afternoon. Others started with almost nothing. A shaky battlefield video from an account people trust will usually travel further than a polished synthetic image from a source nobody knows.

Checking is slow in Mali and getting slower. Access to conflict zones has narrowed. RFI and France 24 have been off the air since 2022, when the authorities made their suspension “definitive.” In June, the authorities detained the journalists Chahana Takiou and Abdrahamane Keïta under the cybercrime law, Takiou after criticizing its use against the press and Keïta after saying on television that JNIM controlled Kidal.

Between an event and an independent account of it there is now a gap of days, sometimes longer, and the army, the armed groups, Russian-linked outlets and their partisans all rush to fill it. Generative AI shortens the time it takes them to get there. The state, for its part, has been working on other ways of finding out what Malians say to one another.

T

he growing strength of far-right parties across Europe is raising concerns within NATO that political opposition to military spending and aid for Ukraine could slow the continent’s efforts to strengthen its defenses amid rising tensions with Russia.

Far-right parties in countries including France, Italy, Belgium, Germany, Poland and Romania are increasingly using voters’ concerns over the cost of living to challenge higher defense budgets, military support for Ukraine and a greater role for the European Union in defense policy.

The positions of the parties differ significantly, but their growing influence is creating a challenge for mainstream governments seeking to maintain public support for increased military spending.

In France, National Rally leader Marine Le Pen has called for limits on aid to Ukraine, arguing that the country can no longer afford the financial burden. In Italy, Roberto Vannacci, a former general and European Parliament member who leads the National Future party, has questioned increased defense spending while commodity prices remain high.

“The challenge for Europe’s mainstream parties is how to sustain support for higher defense budgets even if that means competing with welfare and other priorities,” the article said.

Janne Kuusela, permanent secretary at Finland’s defense ministry, said rising living costs were creating space for populist arguments over military spending and financial support for Ukraine.

The issue is particularly significant as several major NATO countries, including France, Italy and Poland, prepare for elections in 2027. Far-right parties in those countries could have greater influence over national budgets and defense policies.

NATO is seeking to persuade its members to meet an ambitious target of spending 5% of gross domestic product on defense and security by 2035. Four NATO diplomats told POLITICO that the possibility of a slowdown in spending was becoming a growing concern, although some said the consequences might not become clear until countries begin their next budget cycles.

A NATO military official warned that European countries were already trying to close the gap with Russia in military capabilities.

“So far, we’re on a positive trajectory — if someone closes the faucet, there’s a risk of losing capabilities,” the official said.

Cost of living fuels resistance to higher defense spending

European countries and Canada are expected to spend about $634 billion on core defense requirements this year, an increase of 11% from 2025. But public support for further increases is limited.

An August poll assessed by the European Council on Foreign Relations and shared with POLITICO found that an average of 46.2% of respondents in eight European countries would oppose higher defense spending if it required higher taxes. About 35.5% supported such an increase.

Opposition to tax increases for military spending was particularly strong in Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Poland. Respondents in the Netherlands, Sweden and Britain were more likely to support higher taxes for defense.

Protests against increased military spending have also taken place in Rome, Brussels and Madrid, with demonstrators arguing that additional defense funds could come at the expense of hospitals, universities and social services.

Support for Ukraine has also declined. NATO’s internal polling showed support falling from 59% in 2025 to 55% this year, with lethal military aid identified as the least popular form of assistance.

The political challenge varies across Europe. Far-right parties have taken different positions, ranging from opposition to military assistance for Ukraine to resistance to EU-level defense initiatives and broader criticism of increased defense budgets.

France’s National Rally and Romania’s Alliance for the Union of Romanians oppose aid to Kyiv, while Poland’s Law and Justice and the Netherlands’ Party for Freedom have resisted EU-level defense projects. Germany’s Alternative for Germany and Italy’s National Future have criticized increased defense spending more broadly.

Political opponents of these parties have accused them of weakening Europe’s response to Russia. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said pressure against European defense policies was largely coming from Moscow, while parties including National Rally and AfD have faced scrutiny over their historical ties to Russia.

Pressure on NATO and European defense plans

The political debate is becoming more complicated as governments attempt to reconcile security priorities with domestic economic pressures.

In France, Le Pen’s National Rally has indicated that it would maintain the country’s existing trajectory of higher military spending. In Italy, however, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni proposed reducing defense spending by €8 billion from the government’s initial proposal amid pressure from her coalition partner, the League.

League senator Claudio Borghi argued that public money should prioritize pensions, tax relief and household utility bills over weapons.

In Poland, President Karol Nawrocki, backed by the right-wing Law and Justice party, attempted unsuccessfully to block access to nearly €44 billion in EU SAFE defense loans. He argued that the scheme could make Poland dependent on Brussels and impose additional debt on future generations.

NATO officials are concerned that a slowdown by major European powers could affect the alliance’s ability to develop the military capabilities it considers necessary to deter Russia.

The consequences could extend beyond national defense budgets. France and Italy are among the countries responsible for significant portions of European defense investment and aid to Ukraine, meaning any reduction in their spending could have broader implications for NATO.

“If bigger countries stop making progress, then NATO will stop making progress,” one NATO diplomat said, warning that weaker European defense capabilities could leave Ukraine more vulnerable.

The debate could also affect negotiations over the European Union’s next long-term budget if discussions continue into next year.

As European governments prepare budgets and elections approach, mainstream parties face pressure to justify increased defense spending while addressing concerns over living costs and public services. For NATO, the challenge is maintaining momentum on rearmament while political support for higher military expenditure becomes increasingly contested across Europe.

(Source: Politico)

Capital markets are often viewed as platforms where stocks and bonds are traded. In reality, they are among the most important institutions in a modern economy. They channel savings into productive investment, finance innovation, support entrepreneurship, and strengthen long-term economic growth. By connecting investors with businesses, entrepreneurs, and governments, capital markets transform financial resources into economic activity, job creation, and higher living standards.

In an increasingly competitive global economy, the quality of a country’s capital markets can influence its ability to attract investment, develop new industries, and withstand economic shocks. Countries with deep, transparent, and trusted capital markets are often better positioned to finance growth and compete in a world shaped by technological change, economic uncertainty, and geopolitical competition.

The role of capital markets in development is not new. Throughout history, prosperous societies have developed mechanisms that connected savings with productive enterprise. Long before modern stock exchanges emerged, merchants and investors pooled capital, shared risk, and financed trade.

In the Islamic world, the mudaraba partnership enabled investors and entrepreneurs to share profits and losses, supporting commerce across vast regions. Similarly, the Ottoman Grand Bazaar functioned not only as a marketplace but also as a commercial and financial hub connecting merchants, financiers, and traders. Comparable institutions emerged elsewhere. The Amsterdam Stock Exchange helped finance maritime trade during the Dutch Golden Age, while London’s financial markets supported Britain’s rise as a global commercial and industrial power.

Modern capital markets are the institutional evolution of these earlier arrangements. While financial instruments have become more sophisticated, the underlying objective remains unchanged: directing savings toward productive economic activity.

Mobilizing savings for growth

For many developing economies, the challenge is not necessarily a shortage of savings but their inefficient allocation. Large portions of household wealth often remain concentrated in bank deposits, gold, foreign currencies, or real estate. While these assets may preserve value, they contribute relatively little to innovation, productivity, or job creation.

Capital markets help address this problem by channeling savings into businesses, infrastructure, manufacturing, research, and entrepreneurship. By mobilizing domestic resources, they reduce dependence on foreign borrowing and support sustainable economic growth.

The experience of East Asia illustrates this relationship. South Korea and Taiwan successfully directed domestic savings into growth-oriented industries, supporting industrialization, technological advancement, and export competitiveness. Their success demonstrates that development requires institutions capable of allocating capital efficiently.

Capital markets provide financing options beyond traditional bank lending. Banks remain essential to every financial system, but they are often reluctant to finance high-risk ventures, early-stage companies, or projects with long development horizons. Such activities require investors willing to accept uncertainty in exchange for future growth.

Through initial public offerings (IPOs), venture capital, private equity, corporate bonds, sukuk, and angel investment networks, capital markets help entrepreneurs transform ideas into viable businesses and allow successful firms to expand.

The U.S. provides one of the clearest examples. Silicon Valley’s success rests not only on technological expertise and entrepreneurial culture but also on a financing ecosystem capable of supporting firms through every stage of development. Venture capital, institutional investors, and public markets have enabled many technology companies to evolve from start-ups into global enterprises.

This lesson has become increasingly relevant as countries compete in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, advanced manufacturing, clean energy, and digital infrastructure. Access to long-term investment capital is now a strategic advantage. Without effective capital markets, promising innovations often struggle to move from research to commercial scale, limiting productivity growth and competitiveness.

Trust as the foundation of capital markets

Financing alone does not create successful capital markets. Trust does.

Investors commit capital only when they believe markets are fair, information is reliable, and rules are enforced consistently. Trust therefore forms the foundation of every successful market.

Building trust requires strong institutions. Regulators must act independently, disclosure standards must provide accurate and timely information, property rights must be protected, and authorities must deter insider trading, market manipulation, and fraud. Investors are willing to accept business risk, but they are far less willing to tolerate uncertainty stemming from weak institutions or unequal treatment.

Transparency and accountability reinforce this trust. Publicly listed companies usually face stricter disclosure and governance standards than private firms. Better information reduces uncertainty, lowers perceived risk, and often reduces the cost of capital. It also encourages broader participation by households and institutional investors, increasing market depth and liquidity.

The world’s leading financial centers have been built on these foundations. New York and London established their reputations through strong legal frameworks, investor protections, and credible enforcement. Singapore provides another important example. Despite its relatively small domestic economy, it became one of the world’s leading financial centers through strong institutions, regulatory quality, and a sustained commitment to transparency.

The lesson is simple: capital follows trust.

Strong institutions are often a prerequisite for the development of capital markets. At the same time, the process of developing capital markets can encourage improvements in regulation, governance, disclosure, and investor protection. As a result, financial market development often becomes a catalyst for broader economic modernization.

Supporting development and public investment

Governments are among the largest beneficiaries of mature capital markets. Economic development requires substantial investment in transportation, utilities, telecommunications, housing, water systems, and environmental sustainability. Financing these priorities solely through tax revenues, bank lending, or external borrowing is often insufficient.

Deep bond markets provide an additional source of financing. Sovereign bonds, municipal bonds, project bonds, green bonds, and sustainability-linked instruments allow governments and public institutions to access domestic and international capital. Increasingly, these instruments finance renewable energy projects, climate-resilience initiatives, and sustainable infrastructure.

Malaysia offers a noteworthy example within Islamic finance. The country has developed one of the world’s most sophisticated sukuk markets, attracting both domestic and international investors. By combining modern financial infrastructure with Shariah-compliant principles, Malaysia demonstrates that financial modernization can coexist with cultural and religious traditions.

Regional cooperation can also strengthen capital markets. The BRVM in West Africa, one of the world’s few fully integrated regional stock exchanges, serves multiple countries through a single marketplace. Similar initiatives in ASEAN and Latin America show how regional cooperation can deepen markets, broaden investor participation, and improve access to financing.

D

emonstrations swept across France on Tuesday as students, teachers and parents protested against overcrowded classrooms, staff shortages and deteriorating school buildings, with clashes between protesters and police leaving hundreds injured and prompting the government to promise a response.

The nationwide protests marked the biggest day of demonstrations in a movement that began in September in deprived suburbs of Paris before spreading across the country. Prime Minister Sebastien Lecornu described the violence as the most serious student unrest in decades.

More than 250,000 people took part in demonstrations in dozens of cities, according to the Interior Ministry, while organisers put the figure at about 450,000. Marches were held in Paris, Strasbourg, Rennes, Toulouse, Lyon, Marseille and Nantes, among other cities.

Police used tear gas and water cannons to disperse groups involved in clashes on the edges of demonstrations. The Interior Ministry said 488 people were arrested on Tuesday and 48 security personnel were injured.

Lecornu told lawmakers that at least 215 teenagers and 85 school employees had been injured in clashes, describing the casualties as the “heaviest toll in decades” for France’s school system. His office said more than 700 police officers had also been injured during the protests.

President Emmanuel Macron convened Lecornu and senior ministers for an emergency meeting as the government faced mounting pressure to contain the unrest.

Students protest over underfunded schools

Despite the scale of the demonstrations, the demands of the protesters have focused primarily on conditions inside France’s schools rather than immigration or religion.

Students and teachers have complained about understaffing, overcrowded classrooms, insufficient funding and poorly maintained buildings. Some schools have faced basic problems including water leaks and rat infestations.

The High School Students Union said more than half of France’s high schools had either been blockaded or closed for the day. In some areas, education authorities attempted to move classes online.

Protesters carried handmade signs criticising years of what they described as government neglect. In Marseille and Nantes, demonstrators held signs reading “The state has killed national education,” while parents in Toulouse joined students and teachers at the front of a march.

Hugo Vetzel, a recent high-school graduate in Strasbourg, said protesters felt increasingly disconnected from political decision-makers.

“There is such a gap between the elites and us,” he said.

Rights groups, student organisations and parents have accused authorities of using disproportionate force against young protesters. The government, meanwhile, has argued that the movement has been hijacked by outsiders and that some demonstrations have descended into urban violence.

In Paris, police said around 300 people, many of them masked or hooded, confronted security forces. Several storefronts were damaged, although authorities said the broader demonstration in the capital was largely peaceful.

More than 1,800 people were being prosecuted for unspecified offences connected to the unrest, including 1,483 minors, according to the Justice Ministry.

Teachers and protesters have disputed the government’s distinction between peaceful demonstrators and violent groups. Omar Slaouti, a high-school teacher in the Paris suburb of Argenteuil, said authorities were trying to divide young people into “good” and “bad” protesters.

Government promises action amid financial pressure

Lecornu has ordered ministers to respond to the main demands raised by students and school staff. The government plans to examine measures to ensure absent teachers are replaced, review the length of the school day and consider extending lunch breaks.

Ministers will also examine repairs required at ageing school buildings. Lecornu has instructed them to present their initial proposals by the end of October.

But parents and protesters have expressed scepticism about whether government promises will translate into meaningful improvements.

Emilie Lhomme, a parent protesting outside the Helene Boucher school in Paris, said official statements would not be enough to change students’ daily lives.

The government faces a difficult financial environment as it considers additional education spending. France is under pressure to reduce a widening budget deficit while economic growth remains weak and concerns over public debt have pushed borrowing costs higher.

The yield on France’s 10-year bonds briefly exceeded 5% last week, reaching its highest level in 24 years. Rising borrowing costs have also raised concerns across the wider euro area.

Finance Minister Roland Lescure said Tuesday there was no need for the European Central Bank to intervene.

The protests come as France approaches a presidential election next spring, with support for populist parties on both the far right and far left increasing. Far-right National Rally leader Marine Le Pen has used the country’s fiscal difficulties to promote plans for reducing public spending.

At the same time, France’s education system faces longer-term challenges. Education spending has lagged inflation, while French students have fallen behind their OECD peers in overall performance, according to data cited from the PISA 2025 assessment.

The government must now balance demands for greater investment in schools with pressure to control public finances. For students, teachers and parents, however, the protests have brought immediate concerns about classrooms, staffing and school buildings to the center of the national debate.

(Source: Reuters)

A

merican President Donald Trump said a threat linked to Iran prompted the United States to withdraw B-1 bombers from a British airbase, as questions remained over an alleged plot targeting the facility and tensions between Washington and Tehran continued to rise.

The bombers had been deployed at RAF Fairford, a key US base in Britain that has been used to support American military operations in the Middle East. They were recently involved in US strikes on Iran.

Trump said on Monday that the aircraft were moved after US officials received information indicating a potential threat.

“We had an idea that there might be a threat, and why would I leave them there?” Trump told reporters. He said moving the aircraft cost relatively little and that the decision was intended to reduce the risk to US personnel and military assets.

Asked whether the people behind the threat were connected to Iran, Trump said they were.

Vice President JD Vance said the move was made as a precaution, citing concerns about Iran’s record of attacks against US interests and other targets. “We are being extremely cautious,” Vance said, while declining to provide further details.

However, Secretary of State Marco Rubio sought to distinguish the bomber withdrawal from the suspected plot. He said there was no direct link between the removal of the aircraft and the arrests and that the Pentagon was regularly reallocating military resources according to operational requirements.

A NATO military source said Iran was still considered an acute threat to US assets in Britain.

Iran has rejected allegations that it was involved in any plot against the airbase. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi dismissed the accusations as baseless, saying claims about alleged terrorists working for foreign states did not establish Iranian responsibility.

Fairford’s role in US Middle East operations

RAF Fairford, about 145 km west of London, is one of the most important European bases available to the United States for heavy bombers such as the B-1. Although the aircraft are not permanently stationed there, the base has supported previous US military campaigns in the Middle East.

A Pentagon official confirmed that all US bombers deployed at Fairford had returned to their home bases in the United States. The Pentagon said the bomber force remained ready to provide precision global strike capabilities “anywhere, anytime.”

The withdrawal could nevertheless reduce Washington’s ability to quickly launch additional missions against Iran from Europe.

Christoph Bergs, a research analyst at the Royal United Services Institute, said the redeployment would temporarily reduce the US capacity to “quickly surge sorties against Iran,” potentially lowering the immediate threat level.

He also noted that Fairford’s operational role had already been constrained by restrictions imposed by Britain.

During the current conflict, Washington had permission to use Fairford only for defensive strikes against Iranian missile sites that were attacking ships in the Strait of Hormuz. Britain had refused to allow US forces to use its bases for offensive operations against Iran.

The restrictions have contributed to strains in the traditionally close US-British relationship.

The aircraft could potentially be moved to other US facilities, including Diego Garcia or bases in the Gulf, although such a move would depend on available capacity, agreements with allies and security considerations, according to Bergs.

The security concerns at Fairford emerged after a series of arrests near the base.

“A plot”

In the early hours of September 27, five British men in their 20s were arrested after police saw them running into fields from three white vans parked near the facility. Police said no explosives were discovered, although petrol was found.

The five men were later released on bail. A sixth man, a dual British-Iranian national arrested four days later on suspicion of preparing terrorist acts, was also released on bail.

Trump had previously said the alleged plot was intended to cause “big damage” and suggested it might have been connected to Iran. He later criticized the decision to release the suspects on bail.

The British government has declined to comment on the alleged Iranian connection, although a spokesman for Prime Minister Andy Burnham said the base remained safe.

A senior NATO military official said the removal of the bombers would not affect the alliance’s overall ability to respond to threats, emphasizing the combined capabilities of its 32 members.

The incident has nevertheless highlighted the security risks surrounding US military facilities in Europe as Washington remains engaged in the conflict with Iran. The decision to move the B-1 bombers also illustrates the balance between maintaining forward military capabilities and protecting American personnel and equipment from potential attacks.

(Source: Reuters)

E

thiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has renewed his call for access to the Red Sea, intensifying a dispute with neighbouring countries as renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia raises concerns about wider regional instability.

Abiy made the demand on Monday as he was sworn in for another five-year term, insisting that Ethiopia, despite being landlocked, must secure an outlet to the sea.

Speaking to parliament, Abiy said his government would work to obtain a port on the Red Sea, describing maritime access as critical to Ethiopia’s future and “civilisation.”

“Based on the principle of give and take, we will work diligently to ensure that Ethiopia has an outlet to the sea,” Abiy said.

Ethiopia lost direct access to the Red Sea in 1993 when Eritrea, previously part of Ethiopia, became independent. Since then, Addis Ababa has depended on neighbouring countries and regional ports for much of its maritime trade.

The renewed demand comes at a particularly sensitive moment for the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia’s relations with several neighbouring countries have deteriorated in recent months, while fighting has again intensified in the northern Tigray region.

Addis Ababa has accused Eritrea, Egypt and Sudan of supporting opposition forces in Tigray. The renewed conflict has raised concerns that Ethiopia’s internal fighting could become entangled with longstanding regional rivalries.

Eritrea, meanwhile, has accused Ethiopia of seeking access to the Red Sea through Eritrean territory, highlighting the sensitivity surrounding Abiy’s maritime ambitions.

Neighbours reject exclusive Ethiopian claim to Red Sea

The dispute over maritime access has unfolded alongside a broader disagreement over who should determine the future of the Red Sea and how regional states should protect their interests.

Four of the five African countries bordering the Red Sea — Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia — met on Sunday in New Alamein, Egypt, where their leaders called for greater cooperation on regional issues.

In a joint position, they said governance of the Red Sea was the exclusive responsibility of its coastal states. They also rejected actions that could affect Egypt and Sudan’s use of Nile waters.

The statement came against the backdrop of another long-running dispute involving Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile. Egypt and Sudan have repeatedly raised concerns about the project and its potential effects on their water supplies.

Ethiopia’s Foreign Ministry responded on Monday by saying that discussions over the Red Sea should take into account what it described as the country’s “legitimate interests and enduring connection” to the body of water.

The statement underscored the gap between Addis Ababa’s position and that of its coastal neighbours. While Ethiopia argues that its economic and strategic interests require reliable access to the Red Sea, the coastal states maintain that they retain primary authority over the waters and their shores.

Somalia has taken a somewhat different position. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who attended the Egyptian summit, congratulated Abiy on his renewed mandate and expressed a desire to strengthen relations between the two countries.

Mohamud had previously told Al Jazeera that Somalia did not object to Ethiopia obtaining access to the Red Sea through Somali territory. However, he stressed that any such arrangement would have to be formally negotiated between the two countries.

A possible area for bilateral negotiations

His comments suggest that maritime access remains a possible area for bilateral negotiations, even as the broader regional dispute becomes increasingly sensitive.

The issue is unfolding as Ethiopia faces renewed conflict in Tigray. Ethiopian federal and allied forces have entered the regional capital, Mekelle, as fighting between government forces and opposition groups has escalated.

The conflict has added another layer of uncertainty to Ethiopia’s relations with its neighbours, particularly Eritrea, which shares a border with Tigray.

Abiy’s renewed push for Red Sea access therefore comes at a time when Ethiopia is seeking to address both its economic dependence on foreign ports and growing security challenges across the Horn of Africa.

Regional leaders have continued to call for dialogue and cooperation, while Addis Ababa insists that Ethiopia’s interests must be taken into account in discussions over the Red Sea.

The coming months could determine whether Ethiopia’s demand develops into negotiated port arrangements with neighboring coastal states or contributes to further tensions in an already volatile region.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

B

razil’s presidential election is heading to a second round after President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and right-wing Senator Flavio Bolsonaro emerged as the leading candidates in a closely watched and deeply polarized first-round vote.

Brazil’s electoral court confirmed that the two candidates will advance to the October 25 runoff after neither secured the majority required to win the presidency outright. With nearly 99 percent of votes counted, Bolsonaro had about 47 percent of valid votes, compared with 44.9 percent for Lula. The result sets up another major confrontation between the political forces associated with Lula and the Bolsonaro family.

Lula, 80, is seeking a fourth, non-consecutive presidential term after a political career spanning almost five decades. Flavio Bolsonaro, 45, is the eldest son of former President Jair Bolsonaro and is seeking to return his father’s right-wing political movement to power. Jair Bolsonaro is serving a 27-year prison sentence for plotting a coup after losing the 2022 election.

The election takes place as Brazilians confront concerns over crime and the cost of living, while relations between Brazil and the United States have become increasingly tense. The outcome is also being closely watched across Latin America, where a series of recent elections has strengthened right-wing political forces.

Bolsonaro outperforms polls as runoff battle begins

The first-round result was notable because it differed from expectations in several opinion polls. While most surveys had predicted a runoff, they generally placed Lula ahead of Bolsonaro in the first round.

Instead, Bolsonaro finished about two percentage points ahead of the incumbent president. The unexpected result has raised questions about why polling organizations underestimated his support and highlighted the strength of the left-wing electorate.

Bolsonaro said after the vote that the result demonstrated that Brazilians wanted change. Analysts cited by Reuters suggested that he may have benefited from protest votes from voters who preferred other candidates but regarded defeating Lula as their immediate priority.

Political analyst Rafael Favetti said the protest vote could help Bolsonaro in the runoff but might also limit his ability to expand his support because some voters who might otherwise have shifted to him later had already supported him in the first round.

Lula acknowledged that the first-round result had been unexpected. He said he had believed he could win outright but vowed to strengthen his campaign before the runoff, describing the next stage of the contest as “extra time.”

The runoff is expected to be closely contested. Voters who supported the other 10 candidates in the first round will now become crucial to both campaigns. Ronaldo Caiado and Renan Santos, who together won about 5.3 million votes, have previously said they would not endorse either candidate.

Right-wing gains extend beyond presidential race

Bolsonaro’s strong performance was part of a broader electoral advance for Brazil’s right. Right-wing parties, led by Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party, were performing strongly in both chambers of Congress, with the PL on track to become the largest force in the Chamber of Deputies while also gaining ground in the Senate.

Members of the Bolsonaro family also secured important victories. Michelle Bolsonaro, a former first lady and Flavio’s stepmother, won a Senate seat in the Federal District, while Carlos Bolsonaro, Flavio’s brother, was elected to the Senate in Santa Catarina.

The results indicate that the political movement built around Jair Bolsonaro remains a powerful electoral force despite his exclusion from the presidential race. Andre Pagliarini, a historian and international studies professor, said the performance of far-right legislative candidates suggested deeper popular support for the Bolsonaro political project than many observers had expected.

The congressional results could have significant consequences after the presidential vote. Conservative lawmakers already dominate both houses, and a stronger right-wing presence could make it more difficult for Lula to advance his legislative agenda if he wins another term.

For Bolsonaro, meanwhile, a presidential victory could provide greater political space to pursue his priorities, including his pledge to seek an amnesty for his father.

With three weeks remaining before the October 25 runoff, Brazil now faces another closely fought contest between Lula and the Bolsonaro political camp, with the balance of power in Congress adding another layer to an election that could shape the country’s political direction for years to come.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

Y

emen’s Saudi-backed, internationally recognized government has announced a major military offensive aimed at recapturing territory controlled by the Iran-backed Houthi movement, escalating a conflict with growing implications for regional security and international shipping.

Yemeni President Rashad al-Alimi said on Sunday that government forces would continue their campaign until the country was liberated from what he described as the grip of the “terrorist militia.” A military spokesman subsequently called on the Houthis to surrender their weapons.

The announcement by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), which governs from the southern city of Aden, followed weeks of Houthi advances that have weakened government forces and brought the strategically important Bab el-Mandeb Strait under the group’s control.

The strait, at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, is a crucial passage for international shipping between the Mediterranean and Asia. Its capture has given the Houthis additional leverage over global maritime trade and opened a new front in the wider war involving the United States, Israel and Iran.

The latest escalation comes as regional tensions remain high following the US-Israeli war against Iran, which began in February. Iran’s responses have included disrupting oil shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, on the opposite side of the Arabian Peninsula.

Houthis claim attacks on Saudi oil facilities

As the Yemeni government announced its counteroffensive, the Houthis said they had launched ballistic missiles and drones against Saudi Aramco sites in Riyadh and the Khurais area of Saudi Arabia.

The group claimed the attacks caused major fires and were retaliation for approximately 50 Saudi-led air and missile strikes in Yemen during the preceding 12 hours. Saudi Arabia had not immediately confirmed the reported attacks or the extent of any damage.

Al-Alimi said the government had decided to launch the offensive after exhausting opportunities to de-escalate the conflict. He thanked Saudi Arabia for its support and urged Yemen’s regional allies and international partners to assist the PLC’s forces and institutions.

Regional and Western officials had previously told Reuters that Saudi Arabia and its Yemeni allies were preparing an assault against the Houthis. Under the reported plans, Saudi forces would lead aerial operations while Yemeni government troops conducted fighting on the ground.

The United States is already providing intelligence support for Saudi operations in Yemen, according to people familiar with the preparations. Several regional and European countries are also providing mainly defensive military assistance to the kingdom.

Washington’s involvement comes as the US war against Iran has weakened parts of Iran’s military and political leadership while drawing the United States into another major regional engagement and depleting important military equipment.

The Houthis, formally known as Ansar Allah, have controlled Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, and large areas of the northwest since 2014. The region contains most of the country’s population. Despite years of military operations by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and their Western allies, the movement has retained control of extensive territory and strengthened its weapons capabilities with Iranian assistance.

Saudi Arabia intervened in Yemen’s civil war in 2015 at the head of an Arab coalition supporting the internationally recognized government, but the campaign failed to defeat the Houthis. A truce agreed in 2022 largely held until this year, when the conflict intensified amid the wider confrontation involving Iran.

Houthi advances threaten Taiz and Red Sea shipping

The government’s announcement follows a rapid Houthi offensive last month that captured the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and approximately 150 kilometers of Red Sea coastline within weeks. The advance caused government forces to retreat and shifted the balance of power on the ground.

Military sources said the Houthis had also gained control of strategic hilltops near Taiz over the previous 48 hours, advancing towards the last road connecting the city with Aden on Yemen’s southern coast.

Control of that route could effectively place Taiz under siege. Yemen’s third-largest city is home to hundreds of thousands of civilians and hosts thousands of government troops. Its strategic importance is compounded by its political significance: Al-Alimi comes from the region.

A siege would further worsen an already severe humanitarian crisis. The World Food Program said last week that three in four families in parts of Yemen were going hungry as fighting intensified, displacing tens of thousands of people and disrupting supplies to millions.

The struggle for Bab el-Mandeb has also raised concerns beyond Yemen. The waterway is a vital route for commercial shipping, and its importance has increased as disruption in the Strait of Hormuz has made alternative routes more strategically significant.

The Houthis’ recent territorial gains therefore pose challenges for Yemen’s government, Saudi Arabia and international efforts to protect maritime trade. Their ability to threaten shipping and Saudi oil infrastructure gives the group influence extending well beyond the territory it controls.

Yemen has been fragmented by years of conflict involving local armed groups and regional powers. The latest government offensive could reshape the military balance, but the Houthis’ recent advances, their control of strategic territory and the continuing humanitarian emergency suggest that any campaign to retake the country will face substantial challenges.

(Source: Reuters)

O

n September 6, 2026, a significant state parliament election took place in the eastern German state of Saxony-Anhalt, and the results signaled a serious crisis for the incumbent federal government. Just two weeks after this historic defeat against the AfD, on September 20, state parliament elections were also held in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. The elections in these two states also ended in failure, particularly for the Chancellor’s party, the CDU, and have opened the door to the political crisis becoming, in a sense, chronic at the federal level.

For the first time in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany, the CDU failed to enter a state parliament, securing only 4.9 percent of the vote, and recorded its worst-ever result in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. Undoubtedly, this outcome will also have implications for the future of the federal government. Meanwhile, the CDU, which holds the state premiership in Berlin, suffered a defeat there as well by finishing second to the Left Party, further deepening the crisis. Consequently, the election results from the three states over the past weeks can be viewed not so much as reflecting the difficulties expected in forming new coalition governments at the state level, but rather as a critical turning point for the future of the incumbent federal government led by Merz.

Berlin and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania state parliament election results

Although the AfD finished first in the Saxony-Anhalt state parliament election on September 6, it failed to secure the number of seats required for an absolute majority. Since other parties have also refused to form a coalition with the AfD, and the BSW party, despite maintaining communication with the AfD, remains opposed to a coalition for now, uncertainty persists regarding the course of events in the state. In the state parliament elections held on September 20 in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, which also saw high voter turnout, a more complex picture emerged for the federal government.

According to preliminary official results, the Left Party finished first in the Berlin state election for the first time with 25.7 percent of the vote, while the incumbent CDU-SPD coalition partners suffered significant losses. In Berlin, the CDU fell by approximately 9.5 percentage points to 18.8 percent, finishing second, while the SPD lost 6.3 percentage points and managed to secure only 12.1 percent of the vote. Contrary to expectations following its momentum in Saxony-Anhalt, the AfD saw a more modest rise in Berlin, reaching 16.3 percent, while the Greens secured 14.3 percent of the vote.

Looking at the state parliament election results in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, two critical points stand out. Although the AfD’s clear upward trend continued here as well, the SPD factor played a more decisive role compared to Saxony-Anhalt. The AfD reached a vote share of 38.2 percent and, just as in Saxony-Anhalt, finished the election in first place. Although the party leadership claims that “voters have entrusted them with the task of forming a government,” the formation of any coalition involving the AfD is impossible in this state as well due to the stances of other parties, and like in Berlin, the BSW failed to clear the electoral threshold in this state.

Another point worth noting is that in the state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the SPD, particularly incumbent SPD State Premier Manuela Schwesig, who positioned herself as a centrist in her election campaign over the past few months, managed to secure a 35.5 percent share of the vote. Although the SPD finished the election in second place, it is highly likely that it will form a coalition government once again. While the SPD lost approximately 4 percentage points compared to the 2021 election, this is still considered a relative success given the AfD’s current upward trend.

In contrast, the CDU achieved its worst-ever result in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. Failing to clear the 5 percent electoral threshold, the CDU, for the first time in German history, failed to secure seats in a state parliament election, remaining outside the legislature with 4.9 percent of the vote. The Left Party and the Greens were the other parties that managed to enter the state parliament, securing 6.5 percent and 5.7 percent of the vote, respectively.

After the polls closed, though this is not typically the case following state legislative elections, Chancellor Friedrich Merz (CDU) made a public statement. Merz described the election results as a “disaster,” but emphasized that he remains in office and is determined to implement the planned reforms in collaboration with the federal government. With this move, Merz aimed to preempt potential debates regarding speculation throughout the evening about whether he would step down.

Although he was partially successful with this maneuver, as the night wore on and it became clear that the CDU had failed to clear the electoral threshold in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, attention once again turned to potential critical voices within the CDU. Although election night was somehow weathered, and some CDU figures even issued statements of support for the Chancellor the following day, questions remain about how and to what extent the coalition can be sustained in light of these failures in the three state parliamentary elections.

What lies ahead for Chancellor Merz and the federal government?

Public support for Chancellor Merz and his party, the CDU, has been declining for quite some time. Since taking office in May 2025, Merz has faced criticism, particularly for failing to fulfill his campaign promises. In addition to this negative perception, he has once again come to the forefront of public discourse due to his controversial policy choices and rhetoric in recent months. The chancellor’s extremely low approval ratings in polls have also had a negative impact on election campaigns in the states in question. In particular, the AfD’s upward trend, as reflected in recent polls conducted at both the state and federal levels, has continued to put pressure on Merz and his party, narrowing the scope of the party’s rhetoric and concrete goals.

Amid this ongoing decline for parties purported to be centrist, it can be argued that the AfD’s increasing normalization has also been influenced by the policy promises favored by centrist parties. Consequently, the move toward aligning with the AfD’s promises has ultimately contributed to the normalization of these discourses and goals. As we witness the further normalization of extreme rhetoric and promises, the AfD has secured first place not only in the eastern states but also in recent polls conducted at the federal level. Consequently, the likelihood that voters are now choosing the AfD not merely as a reactionary choice but specifically because of the party’s own policy promises has also strengthened.

The CDU’s concrete failure in the three critical state parliament elections it lost can no longer be attributed solely to Merz and his criticized leadership. In the coming days, it is likely that the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition, which he leads as Chancellor, as well as the CDU as a whole will face a challenging process. These election results will lead to new developments in the coming weeks and months. For example, while there are indications that a change in the chancellor within the coalition or the possibility of early elections could be raised, it is also possible that Chancellor Merz may ultimately be forced to call for a vote of confidence. Despite all the negative developments, as Merz emphasized in recent days, his insistence that he was elected for a four-year term and that he has no intention of stepping down underscores the lack of concrete alternative options for the Chancellor—and indeed, for the coalition itself.

Aside from the difficulty of identifying an alternative CDU chancellor within the coalition, the prospect of gaining momentum within the coalition with this potential new figure can also be viewed as a challenging and risky process in the current equation. Especially as the AfD is expected to intensify its calls for early elections in the coming period, it is likely that the CDU/CSU and SPD, in particular, will lose even more ground in a potential new election against the AfD, which currently leads in the polls.

While it is difficult to speak of a generally positive public perception of Chancellor Merz over the past 16 months since he took office, assessments of him have taken an increasingly critical turn, particularly in recent weeks. Although this attitude is not a new trend, the Chancellor’s continued use of his customary rhetoric, particularly regarding communication, which has generally caused bewilderment throughout society, especially following the summer break, has made the situation even more challenging. Efforts are evident to push this negative perception, linked to domestic policy, into the background by pointing to current risks and developments in foreign policy. However, this approach has not garnered the response Merz had hoped for among the German public.

The future of the federal government in Germany

The fact that the AfD was able to secure a near-absolute majority in the state of Saxony-Anhalt has, first and foremost, dealt a serious blow to the Chancellor’s party, the CDU, particularly at the federal level. The CDU, which is on the verge of losing its social credibility and its claim to being a centrist party, particularly in light of the results in these three states, faces even more critical days ahead. The goal of transforming the agreements reached following intensive negotiations with coalition partner the SPD into comprehensive reforms in the coming months constitutes the CDU’s most important and pressing promises at the federal level.

It remains uncertain whether the Chancellor and the coalition will be able to implement reforms deemed necessary but lacking sufficient public support, such as pension reform. The SPD’s desire to revise the agreements reached following the election results may prompt the CDU/CSU to make potential, partial concessions. However, such steps are likely to be risky maneuvers.

At this stage, it is worth recalling the harsh criticism Merz directed at former Social Democratic Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) during his tenure as leader of the main opposition. At that time, while public support for Scholz remained low in polls, Merz, as leader of the main opposition, was persistently calling for Scholz to step down. Today, however, it should not be forgotten that Chancellor Merz’s own popularity and support within his party are at a lower level.

The current political crisis and lack of predictability in Germany are not merely a matter of a single individual but are also linked to a deepening crisis of credibility in politics as a whole. The failure to present lasting solutions to economic problems and a concrete vision for the coming years within a credible framework is, in general, also affecting the promises and reform goals of political parties. Alternative political parties positioned at the extremes, which address social demands with extreme promises, have managed to increase their current vote shares at the state or federal level during this process, likely aided by the comfort that comes with avoiding responsibility. Meanwhile, the efforts of parties such as the CDU/CSU and SPD, which claim to occupy the political center, to re-establish their political representation and voter mobilization capabilities are becoming increasingly difficult.

Finally, calls are emerging that the AfD, which finished first in the elections in the states of Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, should now be given the opportunity to form a state government, and that concessions should be made regarding the “firewall” principle of refusing to cooperate. At this stage, some observers point out that an AfD-led state government would fail within a short period if it came to power. The expectation that such a process could evolve into a more realistic transformation in the eyes of the public is, however, viewed as an extremely risky approach. One of the most prominent opposing viewpoints is the reluctance of centrist parties to take such a risk and the argument that the AfD cannot be compared to similar rising parties in other European countries. In this context, it is noteworthy that even similar parties in France or Italy have distanced themselves from the AfD in the past.

Ultimately, concrete developments regarding the future of the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition led by Chancellor Merz, who has been in office for approximately 16 months, can be expected in the coming weeks. As differences of opinion within the coalition become more pronounced, it is likely that the scrutiny of the Chancellor, both within the coalition and within his own party, will enter a new phase. Despite Merz’s determination to remain in office for now, it is possible that, in the coming period, he may be compelled to seek a vote of confidence from the Bundestag in the face of mounting criticism and pressure. Additionally, it is known that for several weeks now, certain alternative CDU figures have been mentioned in the public sphere as potential candidates for the next chancellor. However, there is still no concrete vision or plan from these potential candidates regarding how they would implement comprehensive reforms that are facing significant public resistance. Given the results of the recent state parliament elections, the political crisis in Germany is likely to deepen and enter an even more complex phase in the coming days.

(Originally published in Turkish by SETA Foundation)

T

he Trump administration has urged France and Germany to release emergency diesel reserves to help ease soaring global fuel prices, warning that Washington could impose a ban on US diesel exports if European countries fail to act, according to three people familiar with the discussions.

The pressure marks an escalation in Washington’s efforts to bring down record US diesel prices as President Donald Trump considers measures to increase domestic fuel supplies ahead of November’s midterm elections.

For European governments, however, releasing additional emergency stocks presents a difficult choice. The European Union must weigh the immediate need to reduce fuel prices against the possibility of a worsening supply crisis if the conflict involving Iran continues and global energy markets remain disrupted.

The European Commission’s energy taskforce, which includes the Commission and representatives of all 27 EU member states, is due to discuss the situation on Friday morning, a Commission spokesperson said.

EU officials said the Commission, Germany, France, Italy, Britain and Ireland had already held discussions on Thursday about the possible release of diesel reserves.

The International Energy Agency has not yet asked Germany to release its emergency stocks, Germany’s economy ministry said. It was not immediately clear when the IEA would next consider the issue.

The US administration has expressed particular frustration with France and Germany, which Washington believes have not fully implemented earlier commitments to release emergency oil and petroleum-product reserves.

“It is in Europe’s best interest to work with the United States as we pursue multiple pathways to boost the supply of refined products and lower costs for consumers,” a US official told Reuters.

Washington seeks more fuel as global supply tightens

One source familiar with the discussions said the United States had asked the European Union to release 120 million barrels of diesel over the next six months.

Europe has become increasingly dependent on US fuel supplies after banning Russian imports following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. The disruption caused by the US-Israeli war against Iran has further complicated supplies from the Middle East, increasing pressure on global refined-product markets.

US Energy Secretary Chris Wright said he was “highly confident” that Europe could help reduce fuel prices by drawing down its emergency diesel inventories.

“This is a time for a coordinated release of diesel stores as we go into harvest season and we go into winter heating oil season,” Wright told Fox News. He said additional diesel was available and suggested that coordinated action could produce positive results for consumers.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent also called on US allies to fulfill commitments made under an agreement among International Energy Agency members in March. He said the United States had already released 172 million barrels of oil under the agreement.

“America is doing its part,” Bessent said on X, adding that Washington expected its allies to match their commitments with action.

The pressure on European reserves comes as several major fuel suppliers have taken measures that are tightening international markets.

Russia has extended its ban on diesel exports until the end of October, according to Reuters. The measure comes after Ukrainian attacks damaged several Russian refineries.

Chinese refiners have also suspended October fuel exports to strengthen domestic supplies, while PetroChina has cancelled cargoes, according to sources cited by Reuters.

The disruptions have added to concerns about the availability of diesel at a time when demand is expected to rise during the agricultural harvest and winter heating season.

Europe faces a difficult reserve decision

The European Union must balance the immediate economic pressure from high fuel prices against the strategic value of maintaining emergency stocks.

Releasing large volumes could increase supplies and potentially reduce prices, but governments may be reluctant to deplete reserves while uncertainty remains over the conflict involving Iran and the possibility of further disruptions to international energy markets.

Relations between Washington and European capitals have already been strained by disagreements over tariffs and defense spending, adding another layer of complexity to the discussions over fuel reserves.

France’s energy ministry declined to comment on the US request. An official at the Élysée Palace said Trump and French President Emmanuel Macron did not discuss the issue when they met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York the previous week.

The official said Macron would convene a video conference of G7 leaders to discuss rising fuel prices and the global availability of refined petroleum products. The meeting would also consider coordination on releasing strategic reserves in cooperation with the International Energy Agency.

The proposed G7 discussions reflect the broader international effort to manage a tightening fuel market as governments confront disruptions from several major producers.

For Washington, securing additional supplies could help ease pressure on US consumers before the November elections. For Europe, however, releasing substantial diesel reserves could reduce prices in the short term while leaving countries with smaller buffers against a further deterioration in global energy supplies.

The debate therefore places the United States and its European allies under pressure to coordinate their response to an increasingly strained global fuel market, even as they face different domestic priorities and concerns about future supply disruptions.

(Source: Reuters)

R

ussia has warned NATO that it would be prepared to use nuclear weapons if the Western alliance attempted to isolate Kaliningrad, escalating tensions between Moscow and the alliance over the strategically important Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea.

In a diplomatic note sent to NATO and seen by Reuters, Russia accused the alliance of pursuing a “dangerous and reckless course” that carried a high risk of direct armed conflict. Moscow also warned that any confrontation could involve Russian strikes against decision-making centers in NATO member states from the outset.

“Russia will be ready to use the entire arsenal of forces and capabilities at its disposal, including nuclear weapons,” the diplomatic note said, referring to any NATO attempt to isolate Kaliningrad from the rest of Russia.

Kaliningrad is a heavily militarized Russian territory located between NATO members Poland and Lithuania. Moscow has increasingly highlighted what it describes as threats to the exclave as NATO countries expand military activity in the Baltic region.

The Russian warning comes amid already strained relations between Moscow and Western governments following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova separately accused officials from NATO countries of demonstrating what she called “Russophobia” and a willingness to wage war against Russia. She said Moscow hoped its warnings would be taken seriously.

The Kremlin said the message was directed at what spokesman Dmitry Peskov called “hotheads in Europe.”

NATO rejects Russian nuclear threat

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte rejected Moscow’s warning and said the alliance had responded by emphasizing that it was defensive in nature.

“We are a defensive alliance,” Rutte said. “And stop the nuclear threats. This is absolutely not called for and not helpful.”

In its response to Russia, NATO said none of its exercises or activities posed a threat to Russian territory. The alliance also called on Moscow to end its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and refrain from what it described as increasingly reckless behavior toward NATO members.

Asked whether the risk of Russia using nuclear weapons against the Baltic states was now real, Rutte said it was not. He argued that Russian President Vladimir Putin understood that Russia could not defeat NATO.

The exchange nevertheless comes as European governments and Moscow accuse each other of escalating military and political tensions around the Baltic Sea.

Russian embassies in at least three European countries have issued statements in recent days accusing NATO of increasing tensions through military exercises and scenarios involving Kaliningrad.

European governments, meanwhile, have accused Moscow of conducting a broader “hybrid war” through activities including sabotage and arson. Russia denies those accusations and rejects repeated claims from Western politicians that it is preparing for a military attack against a NATO country.

The latest Russian warning has also raised concerns among analysts about the possibility of miscalculation.

Nikolai Sokov, a Vienna-based nuclear analyst and former Russian diplomat, said it was becoming increasingly difficult for Western countries to expand their support for Ukraine without increasing the risk of direct confrontation with Moscow.

Sokov said Russia could interpret some Western actions differently from European governments. He cited arms supplies to Ukraine, sanctions against Moscow, interceptions of Russian ships, military exercises and intelligence flights near Kaliningrad as developments contributing to the tension.

He said Russia could view a potential blockade of the Baltic Sea as an act of war even if European governments considered it to be below the threshold of direct conflict.

“I see a risk of mutual miscalculation,” Sokov said.

Attempt to intimidate European governments

A NATO diplomat described the Russian message as another attempt to intimidate European governments, while saying the alliance would not be deterred from supporting Ukraine.

A senior European defense official said the warning was serious, describing it as the first time since the Cold War that Russia had threatened Europe in such terms.

The competing statements underscore the increasingly tense security environment around the Baltic Sea, where Russian and NATO forces operate in close proximity. While NATO says its activities do not threaten Russia, Moscow has repeatedly warned that developments involving Kaliningrad could have wider consequences.

The latest dispute highlights the risks created by escalating military activity and increasingly forceful rhetoric between Russia and the Western alliance. With both sides maintaining sharply different interpretations of the security situation, analysts warn that miscalculation could further increase the danger of confrontation.

(Source: Reuters)

P

ete Hegseth, U.S. Defense Secretary, has announced plans to cut by 20 percent the number of military positions reserved for generals and admirals, a move that could significantly reshape the Pentagon’s senior leadership and has raised questions about political influence over the US armed forces.

Hegseth announced the planned reduction on Wednesday at the US Marine Corps base in Quantico, Virginia, describing it as a long-overdue effort to change the culture of the military. He said reducing senior positions was necessary to remove what he described as “woke” elements from the armed forces.

“You can’t change a culture with the same people who enabled it,” Hegseth said, arguing that personnel decisions were central to changing military culture. He also said the armed forces should focus on training, readiness, accountability, discipline and lethality.

The Pentagon has previously presented reductions in senior positions as part of efforts to streamline bureaucracy and reduce layers of command. However, analysts cited by Al Jazeera said the latest plans could also have implications for how senior military officers are selected and how willing they are to challenge political leaders.

According to the Associated Press, citing Pentagon officials, Hegseth intends to double a 10 percent reduction in top-ranking personnel ordered last year, bringing the overall reduction to 20 percent by January 1, 2027. The plan would affect roughly 800 general and admiral positions across the one- to four-star ranks.

Congress sets statutory limits on the number of generals and admirals. A Congressional Research Service report recorded 848 active-duty generals and admirals in September 2025, compared with an authorized maximum of 857.

The planned cuts do not necessarily mean that every officer currently occupying an affected position will immediately leave the military. Reuters reported that some positions would be eliminated, while others would be reassigned to lower-ranking offices.

Debate over military leadership and political influence

The argument for reducing the number of senior military positions predates Hegseth’s tenure. Supporters of reform have argued that the US military has too many layers of command and headquarters, and that reducing senior ranks could give officers closer to military operations greater authority.

Walter Ladwig, a political scientist specializing in US foreign policy at King’s College London, said there was a credible case for reducing the number of senior officers. He noted that the overall size of the US military had declined significantly since the end of the Cold War, while the number of flag officers had not fallen correspondingly.

At the same time, however, Hegseth’s proposed cuts come after a series of high-profile dismissals and leadership changes at the Pentagon.

President Donald Trump and Hegseth have fired or pushed into retirement more than two dozen military leaders since Trump took office in January 2025, according to the article. Those removed include Army Chief of Staff General Randy George and Navy Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Lisa Franchetti. Trump also dismissed Air Force General CQ Brown as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in February 2025.

The administration has also dismissed the only two women serving as four-star officers, along with other senior female officers. Army Secretary Dan Driscoll resigned in August following reported disagreements over Hegseth’s handling of senior military personnel.

The dismissals and blocked promotions have prompted questions about how commanders are selected and whether professional disagreements with the administration could affect military careers.

Political considerations

Robert Ralston, a lecturer in political science and international studies at the University of Birmingham, said the proposed reductions should be viewed alongside the earlier personnel changes. He argued that the measures appeared to form part of a broader effort to select military leaders according to political considerations.

Hegseth’s tenure has also been marked by controversy over his relationship with senior Pentagon officials. In March 2025, he shared details of planned strikes on Yemen in a Signal chat that inadvertently included the editor-in-chief of The Atlantic magazine. Later reports about weapons supplies in the Middle East prompted a Pentagon investigation into leaks and tighter restrictions on journalists.

The administration has also introduced changes aimed at ending what Hegseth calls “woke” culture, including new physical fitness requirements and the abolition of diversity policies.
Critics say the combination of dismissals, blocked promotions and personnel reductions could affect morale and the development of future military leadership. Ralston said the changes could have long-term consequences for leadership pipelines within the Department of Defense.

Ladwig, while describing Hegseth’s relationship with senior Pentagon leaders as unusually confrontational, cautioned against interpreting every reduction as a political power struggle. He noted that civilian control of the military gives an elected government authority to determine defense priorities and reorganize the armed forces.

At the same time, he warned that officers could become less willing to offer candid professional advice if they believe political alignment is important for career advancement.

The proposed 20 percent reduction therefore comes at a sensitive point for the US military, with Hegseth facing scrutiny over his management of senior commanders and the broader direction of the Pentagon. The changes could reduce layers of command and bureaucracy, while also prompting continuing debate over military professionalism, leadership selection and the relationship between civilian political authority and senior military advice.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

R

elations between Nigeria and South Africa are deteriorating again as anti-migrant protests, killings and disputes over the treatment of Nigerians threaten to reopen a diplomatic rift between two of Africa’s most influential countries.

The latest tensions follow a campaign by anti-immigration groups in South Africa calling on undocumented migrants to leave the country. Protesters have set September 30 as another unofficial deadline for undocumented foreigners to depart, although the demand has no legal force.

The renewed campaign comes only months after Nigerian and South African officials sought to ease tensions following violent anti-migrant demonstrations. Nigeria’s parliament has since suspended official visits and legislative engagements with South Africa, while Nigerian community representatives say some Nigerians are leaving the country, closing businesses, seeking safety near diplomatic facilities or keeping their children out of school.

The unrest has particularly affected Nigerians, who are among the most visible migrant communities in South Africa. Nigeria says nearly 100 of its nationals have died in mob attacks and other incidents linked to anti-migrant violence in South Africa since 2022.

At the center of the dispute is South Africa’s economic hardship. Protesters have blamed migrants for unemployment, pressure on public services and crime. Fola Aina, an international security analyst who teaches development studies at SOAS University of London, said economic insecurity can create an environment in which migrants become convenient targets for public frustration.

South African authorities have stressed that immigration enforcement is the responsibility of the state. President Cyril Ramaphosa said in August that his government firmly rejected xenophobia, Afrophobia, vigilantism and discrimination against migrants.

But Nigerian officials and community representatives say the government’s response has not prevented further violence.

Fresh killings undermine efforts to ease tensions

The latest dispute has been intensified by the deaths of two more Nigerians in South Africa this month. Nigeria’s foreign ministry said Michael Taiwo Fakunle, a bishop, was shot dead at his Johannesburg home on September 4 after allegedly receiving threats.

A day later, James Uchechukwu Nwankwo died after what Nigeria described as “gruesome interrogation techniques” by South African police officers. South African police gave a different account, saying Nwankwo had been arrested on suspicion of drug possession and developed breathing difficulties while being transported to a police station. Police said an inquest had been opened and that there were no visible signs that he had been assaulted.

Nigeria’s ambassador-designate to South Africa, Lesotho and Eswatini, Femi Fani-Kayode, said eight Nigerians had been killed in South Africa this year, four allegedly by police officers. He warned that Nigeria’s patience was running thin and said continued killings could have consequences for bilateral relations.

The deaths came just two months after South African Foreign Minister Ronald Lamola traveled to Abuja for talks aimed at reducing tensions. The two governments condemned xenophobic violence and discussed measures to protect foreign nationals.

The discussions followed a wave of unrest that intensified around June 30, when groups including the March and March movement called on undocumented migrants to leave South Africa. Thousands of foreign nationals sought to depart, and Nigerian officials said nearly 1,700 Nigerians voluntarily evacuated during the year.

South African government figures show that more than 86,000 foreign nationals were processed for repatriation and deportation between June 14 and August 20, with Malawians representing the largest group.

Dispute extends to diplomacy and financial costs

The latest deterioration has already spilled into political relations. Nigeria’s parliament suspended official visits and legislative engagements with South Africa as anger grew over attacks against Nigerians.

Aina said the decision demonstrated the growing political significance of the issue in Nigeria, although he cautioned that it should not necessarily be interpreted as a complete breakdown in bilateral relations. Existing government contacts and agreements remain in place, he said, but the move signals that normal relations cannot continue without addressing the violence.

The two countries are also divided over the financial consequences of the unrest. Nigeria has sought compensation for citizens who lost property and businesses during the June violence. South Africa, meanwhile, has said it intends to seek reimbursement from African governments for the costs associated with repatriating and deporting their citizens.

Nigeria has said it has not received a formal request from South Africa for reimbursement. South Africa’s Department of Home Affairs said it intends to pursue the matter through diplomatic channels rather than through the courts.

The dispute has significance beyond migration because Nigeria and South Africa are major economic and political powers on the continent. Their relationship has repeatedly been strained by disputes over migration and xenophobic violence, including major tensions in 2015 and 2019.

Analysts warn that another prolonged confrontation could damage commercial ties and complicate cooperation on regional security and economic integration. Aina said continued tensions could also undermine broader African efforts toward continental solidarity and free movement.

For now, the renewed protests and allegations of violence have revived a familiar cycle: attacks or threats against migrants trigger anger in Nigeria, diplomatic relations become strained, and both governments attempt to restore ties. The latest crisis suggests that the underlying tensions over migration, economic insecurity and the protection of foreign nationals remain unresolved.

(Source: CNN)

A

passenger aircraft traveling from Dubai to Tel Aviv transmitted an emergency signal and was reportedly diverted toward Saudi Arabia, according to Israeli media reports.

Ynet reported that the aircraft, carrying more than 150 passengers, issued an emergency alert during the flight. Initial reports described the incident as a possible hijacking, although the circumstances surrounding the alert and the aircraft’s subsequent change of course have not been independently established.

According to the reports, the aircraft changed direction and headed toward Saudi Arabia after the emergency signal was transmitted. The reason for the diversion remained unclear, and there was no immediate official confirmation explaining what had occurred aboard the plane.

The reported incident prompted an emergency response at the highest levels of the Israeli government. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz were reported to have convened an emergency meeting following the alert.

However, authorities had not immediately confirmed whether the aircraft had actually been subjected to an attempted hijacking or whether the emergency signal was linked to another technical, security or operational issue.

Preliminary information

There was also no immediate official information regarding the condition of the passengers and crew, the aircraft’s exact location, or whether it had landed or was continuing toward Saudi Arabia.

The reports come amid heightened sensitivity surrounding aviation routes and security in the region. Any confirmed security incident involving a passenger aircraft traveling between the Gulf and Israel could have wider implications for regional aviation.

At this stage, however, the available information remains preliminary. The initial reference to a possible hijacking has not been independently verified, and the reasons for the reported diversion remain unknown.

Authorities are expected to provide further information as they investigate the emergency signal and establish what prompted the aircraft to alter its flight path.

(Source: Ynews)

F

or many years, Lebanon did not occupy a central position in Türkiye’s regional policy. The fragility of the country’s political, social, and economic structure, its relative weakness compared to other actors in the Middle East, and its subjection to the influence of various powers were the primary obstacles preventing Ankara from developing a comprehensive strategy for Lebanon.

It would not have been a meaningful or reasonable choice for Türkiye to become involved before conditions conducive to the intense competition among various actors on Lebanese soil had emerged. Consequently, a situation prevailed in which a more basic-level approach, such as stable diplomatic relations between Ankara and Beirut, along with humanitarian aid, cultural events, and limited economic ties, was accepted as a given by both sides. However, the new status quo that emerged in the Middle East following Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, which began on October 7, 2023, paved the way for reshaping established relationship patterns and adopting a new understanding among regional countries.

The genocide in Gaza, the attacks carried out by the occupying state in line with its aggressive expansionist strategy, the state-building process led by Ahmed al-Sharaa that began with the end of the Bashar al-Assad era in Syria, the triggering of regional fault lines, and the emergence of a new reality due to the U.S./Israel-Iran War, all of these have paved the way for the restructuring of bilateral relations between Türkiye and Lebanon in a new tone. Before October 7, spheres of influence in Lebanon were largely defined.

The Assad regime’s influence, which, though weakened after 2006, persisted, and Iran’s decisive role in the country’s politics through Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia’s balancing role on the ground through Sunni political and economic elites, France’s efforts to preserve its traditional presence under the pretext of being the protector of the Maronite population, and the Zionist administration’s ambition, particularly to seize southern Lebanon, prevented the formulation of long-term strategies for the country. In Lebanon, a country with extreme fragility and an equally weak capacity to generate solutions, it was not easy for a new actor to enter the scene as a game-changer. The fundamental shift in the regional political equation and the transformation of the security landscape resulting from the events mentioned above presented an opportunity for a new beginning in Turkish-Lebanese relations.

The new reality in Lebanon after October 7

The shifting geopolitical environment around Lebanon after Al-Aqsa Flood not only disrupted the country’s traditional balances but also heightened society’s need for a new, trustworthy actor. In addition to the traumas of the 1975–90 civil war, the spillover of the Iran-Israel conflict into Lebanese territory had pushed societal fatigue to its peak. One main reason was weak state authority in Lebanon and Hezbollah’s transformation into a key determining actor because of the power it wielded. Furthermore, the profound disruption of Lebanon’s economic and social fabric following the civil war in Syria, along with the fact that pro-Assad and anti-Assad groups were waging a struggle through Lebanese territory, were among the factors preventing the Lebanese government from functioning effectively. However, the escalation of clashes between Hezbollah and the Zionist regime, followed by the occupying army’s series of operations that killed the majority of Hezbollah’s leading figures, signaled the emergence of a new reality on the ground.

The fact that the occupying army, which had withdrawn from Lebanese territory in 2000, began to regain control of certain areas within the country and asserted sovereignty over the region extending as far as the Litani River meant that Beirut would face numerous challenges in the new era. Perhaps the most significant development offering hope for Lebanese politics and the people during this period was the change taking place in Damascus. While the end of the Assad regime and Shara’s assumption of control with a new vision posed new security risks for Tel Aviv, for Beirut it highlighted the potential for a new strategic alliance to emerge in the region.

The spread of the aggressive strategy, carried out by the Zionist regime for political motives, into Syrian territory, and the occupying army’s intensification of its attacks and invasive actions aimed at disrupting Damascus’s stability, undermining its self-confidence, and increasing its vulnerability, were developments that also posed a threat to Türkiye’s national security. It was unthinkable for Ankara, which had paid a heavy price throughout the Syrian civil war, to accept that the Syrian people would be thrown into turmoil by the actions of the occupying state just as they were about to catch their breath. The strategic alliance between Türkiye and Syria also gave the Lebanese people hope.

Walid Canbolat’s visit to Türkiye in December 2024, as a prominent political figure and leader of the Druze community, was a significant indicator of Lebanese expectations. This visit, which took place immediately following the revolution in Syria, was nothing less than a message to Ankara to develop a new strategy regarding Lebanon. In a context where Hezbollah had lost a significant portion of its leadership, the Gulf states and the Western world were unable to assert themselves against Zionist aggression. Tel Aviv’s claim to sovereignty over Lebanon was expanding day by day; mentioning Türkiye in the context of its historical legacy aligned with the prevailing mood in the country. Following October 7, the overwhelming majority of every group in the country had come to expect Ankara to take a more visible role in Lebanon.

A Strategic relationship as a necessity

The profound changes in Syria and Türkiye’s ever-increasing influence in the Middle East are forcing the occupying state to intensify its pressure on Lebanon and to make the government dependent on it by compelling it to enter into various agreements. Caught between Hezbollah and Israel, Lebanese leaders are seeking a way out while simultaneously pursuing a balanced policy toward Tel Aviv in line with U.S. recommendations. Because the country’s political system has created deep ideological divisions among the ruling elites, conflicting political statements and strategies are a constant feature of Lebanese politics. In such an environment, the Zionist administration seeks to consolidate its influence in the region by developing a new relationship with Beirut through the Eastern Mediterranean, while also trying to minimize the likelihood of Beirut joining the Ankara-Damascus alliance in the new post-revolutionary situation in Syria. For this reason, Türkiye’s policy toward Lebanon must be conducted under the new conditions, with a strategic vision far more distinct and profound than in the past.

The separate visits to Türkiye in July by Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and President Joseph Aoun not only have the potential to open a new chapter in bilateral relations but also reveal the unique balances of Lebanese politics. During Salam’s meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, statements regarding Türkiye’s role in developing Lebanon’s infrastructure and the need to strengthen strategic relations in light of the new regional situation were particularly prominent. President Aoun, for his part, emphasized during his visit that the cooperation and coordination to be established with Türkiye constitute a strategic necessity rather than a temporary preference. In particular, conveying Ankara’s clear stance in the face of Israel’s dangerous initiatives in the Eastern Mediterranean and its efforts to involve Lebanon in this process via Southern Cyprus was highly significant for the course of the process.

Both visits and the topics discussed are highly significant in that they demonstrate the need to develop relations between the two sides after many years. Given the current fragilities, Türkiye is the only actor with which Lebanon can establish a strategic partnership in the region, and whose role Lebanese society can clearly accept. From Ankara’s perspective, shifting balances in the Palestinian arena, the transformation in Damascus, and the need to curb Tel Aviv’s aggression and expansionism require moving relations with Lebanon into a new phase. Although Ankara adopted a more limited policy toward Beirut to avoid becoming entangled in Lebanon’s power struggle in the past, the dynamics following October 7 have made it imperative to shift this approach and significantly strengthen ties with Lebanon within a strategic framework. In particular, sustaining the momentum gained after the revolution in Syria on December 8, 2024, and building relationships at various levels on the ground are crucial to a more stable region.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

B

eef prices are rising sharply in China, cattle farmers in the United States are struggling with higher costs, and poultry producers in India are cutting production as pressures across the global meat industry intensify.

More than 90 percent of the world’s population consumes meat in some form, making developments in livestock and poultry production important for food prices and household diets worldwide. Rising input costs, drought, biological production cycles and trade restrictions are combining to put pressure on meat supplies.

At the center of the problem is a supply chain that depends on resources and time. Cattle require years to reach slaughter weight, while poultry depends heavily on feed made from globally traded grains and soybeans. Farmers also need adequate land, water and favorable weather conditions to maintain their animals.

When one part of the system is disrupted, the effects can spread throughout the wider food market.

Brazil, US and China see Cattle herds decline

Brazil, the United States and China are the world’s three largest beef producers, together accounting for more than half of global beef production. All three, however, are experiencing declines in their cattle populations.

According to a March estimate from the US Department of Agriculture, Brazil’s cattle herd is expected to total about 177.4 million animals in 2026, down nearly 8 percent from 192.5 million in 2024.

The United States is also dealing with historically low cattle numbers. The USDA counted 86.2 million cattle and calves on farms on January 1, 2026. The number of beef cows, which are essential for producing future calves, fell 1 percent from the previous year to 27.6 million. The 2025 calf crop also declined by 2 percent.

China’s cattle herd was estimated at 94 million in January 2026, down from 105 million two years earlier, a decline of about 14 percent.

The shrinking herds are contributing to lower beef production. The USDA forecasts that Brazil’s beef production will fall 2 percent this year, while exports are expected to decline 5 percent. US beef production is projected to fall 4 percent, while China’s total beef supply is expected to be 12 percent lower than in 2024.

China, the world’s largest beef consumer and importer, has already seen prices climb as domestic production declines and imported supplies remain constrained.

Drought, costs and biological limits

The factors behind shrinking herds differ between countries.

In Brazil, restrictions imposed by China and the European Union, two important export markets, have reduced incentives for producers, according to analysis by Augusto Neto of S&P Global.

Brazil is also experiencing what the USDA calls a cattle reversion cycle. Producers reduce slaughter rates and retain female cattle for breeding in an effort to rebuild their herds.

In the United States, drought has affected about 60 percent of cattle-rearing areas, according to S&P Global. Reduced grazing opportunities have contributed to higher feed costs, putting additional pressure on farmers.

The US meat industry is also heavily dependent on immigrant labor. Organizations representing cattle breeders in Texas, Oklahoma and Kansas recently said immigration enforcement raids were disrupting already strained operations.

High beef prices might normally encourage farmers to increase production, but cattle cannot be produced quickly in response to market signals. Kenneth Foster, a professor of agricultural economics at Purdue University, told Al Jazeera that it can take years for producers to expand their herds and for additional cattle to reach the market.

The fastest way to rebuild a herd is often to retain female cattle that could otherwise be sold and use them for breeding. But that requires producers to absorb the costs of keeping the animals while waiting for the next generation.

As a result, high prices can coexist with limited supply for an extended period.

A

ccording to Tim Marshall, geography is the most fundamental and immutable parameter determining the fate of nations. Mountains, rivers, deserts, and oceans are natural prisons that limit leaders’ options. The approach formulated by Robert D. Kaplan as “geography’s revenge” points to the same conclusion: No matter how advanced military technology becomes, physical barriers and natural resource constraints continue to define the limits of strategic planning.

The most striking geographical feature of East Asia is that, despite being home to a very large portion of the world’s population, it is extremely deficient in arable land, freshwater resources, and fossil fuel reserves. This scarcity of resources makes all major powers in the region critically dependent on maritime trade routes. As Tim Marshall emphasizes in his analyses, just as Western Europe’s disconnected rivers and rugged mountainous terrain historically led to the emergence of numerous fragmented states, East Asia’s geography is a combination of vast landmasses, which are extremely difficult to unify, and deep oceanic rifts. This situation not only hinders regional integration but also forces states to operate within security dilemmas and maintain consistently high levels of military spending. One of the actors most deeply affected by this general geographic constraint in East Asia is the People’s Republic of China.

Geopolitical constraints for China

Despite its continental-scale land area and status as the world’s second-largest economy, China faces significant challenges in overcoming the geographical constraints imposed upon it. China’s eastern borders are encircled by a chain of islands, referred to in geopolitical literature as the “First Island Chain”, largely controlled by U.S. allies such as Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. This geographical barrier prevents the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) from freely accessing the open oceans. Taiwan, situated at the center of this island chain, acts as a fortress blocking China’s access to the depths of the Pacific. Although the Chinese navy is striving to become a modern naval power with three aircraft carriers, its warships must pass through narrow straits such as Miyako, Luzon, or Tsushima during both peacetime and times of crisis. These straits can easily be blocked by enemy submarines and coastal defense systems.

The most concrete and dangerous manifestation of this geographical constraint is the “Malacca Dilemma,” which directly threatens China’s energy security. China imports approximately 70 percent of the crude oil it consumes, and more than 80 percent of these imports reach the country directly through the Strait of Malacca. Located between Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula, the Strait of Malacca is one of the most critical chokepoints in global trade due to its shallow waters (average depth of 25–27 meters, dropping to as low as 23 meters in some areas) and its narrowest point, where the strait narrows to 2.7 kilometers in the Phillip Channel region. In the event of a conflict, a blockade of this strait by the U.S. Navy would effectively sever the lifelines of the Chinese economy. To overcome this vulnerability, the Beijing administration has embarked on infrastructure projects worth billions of dollars, despite their limited efficiency and impact. Some of these projects include:

• China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: The road and rail lines aimed at connecting the Port of Gwadar to Xinjiang must pass through the Baluchistan area with high security risks, and cross the Karakoram Mountains, one of the world’s most rugged mountain ranges. This situation keeps the project’s transport capacity at a level that is incomparably lower than that of maritime routes.
• Myanmar Pipelines: While the oil and natural gas pipelines extending from the port of Kyaukpyu to Yunnan Province are operational, the oil pipeline’s capacity of 440,000 barrels per day can meet only a very small fraction of China’s massive daily energy needs.
• Alternative Maritime Routes: Although deeper passages such as the Lombok and Sunda Straits could be used, these routes significantly increase shipping costs by extending the voyage distance. The “Northern Sea Route” in the Arctic, meanwhile, is covered in ice for most of the year and is under Russian control. The fact that it is under Russian control creates yet another form of dependency or constraint.

However, rather than accepting these geographical constraints as inevitable, the Beijing administration is pursuing a multi-layered and innovative strategy to overcome them. The most critical pillar of this strategy is based on the logic of transforming geographical dependency itself into a source of strength. The massive Belt and Road Initiative should be viewed not merely as an infrastructure push, but as a strategy to ensure energy and trade security by making countries along land and sea routes economically dependent on China. In parallel, China has risen to become the world’s largest producer of electric vehicles, batteries, and renewable energy technologies to mitigate the strategic vulnerability created by its dependence on fossil fuels. Perhaps most importantly, another way to overcome geographic limitations is to shift competition beyond existing geographical boundaries. With this vision, China is making major investments in new arenas of competition, such as cyberspace and outer space; by developing the capacity to compete with the U.S. in these domains, it aims to render the constraints of traditional geopolitics obsolete.

Tim Marshall argues that leaders come and go, but geography is permanent. Unlike the U.S., which is surrounded by weak neighbors, China shares land borders with 14 countries. No comparable rival to the U.S. possesses such geographical proximity to it. In East Asia, three nuclear powers (China, Russia, North Korea) and two technological powers (Japan, South Korea) live within each other’s artillery range. This proximity creates a security dilemma in which the strengthening of one state’s power, such as China building up its navy, directly threatens the survival of its neighbors (Japan, South Korea) and triggers counterbalancing alliances (AUKUS, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and the U.S.-South Korea-Japan trilateral cooperation).

China’s land borders also present another geopolitical dilemma. Maintaining control over border regions historically inhabited by non-Han ethnic groups, such as Xinjiang and Tibet, is a vital national security priority for China. However, maintaining control over these regions forces China to spend more annually on internal security mechanisms and social control technologies than its official defense budget (which was $215 billion in 2016). The border with India is bisected by the Himalayas, the world’s highest mountain range. While this prevents the two nuclear powers from projecting large military forces against one another, it keeps the possibility of a potential security dilemma alive.

In terms of internal vulnerabilities, food and water insecurity represent China’s greatest Achilles’ heel. Although China must feed approximately 20 percent of the world’s population, it possesses less than 10 percent of the world’s arable farmland and only 6 percent of its freshwater resources. The famine that occurred between 1958 and 1961, which claimed the lives of 30 to 40 million people, has made food security a red line in the minds of China’s leadership. As a result of urbanization and industrialization, China lost more than 12 million hectares of prime agricultural land between 2009 and 2021. To boost production, the government has relied heavily on pesticides and chemical fertilizers (accounting for 30 percent of the world’s fertilizer supply), which has led to soil degradation and the contamination of irrigation water with heavy metals such as cadmium.

The geographic distribution of water resources is also severely unbalanced. The northern regions, which account for 56 percent of grain production, have access to only 16.5 percent of the nation’s water resources. This situation has led to desertification, land subsidence, and a decline in agricultural productivity in the North China Plain due to excessive groundwater extraction. To meet its growing protein needs, China has become dependent on imports of feed grains and edible oils; indeed, in 2021, the country’s reliance on imports for liquid oils reached 70 percent.

China’s demographic crisis

China’s demographic profile, however, reveals another pressing constraint. Driven by the strict “one-child policy” enforced for decades and the effects of rapid urbanization, China’s population officially began to decline in 2022. According to the United Nations, China’s population will decline from its peak of 1.42 billion in 2025 to 1.31 billion by 2050 and will fall below 800 million by the end of the century.

The main issue here is not so much the decline in population as the radical shift in the age structure. China faces the risk of becoming the first major economy to “age before it gets rich.” While Japan’s per capita GDP was at developed-country levels when it faced its demographic crisis, China has been caught in this process before even surpassing the middle-income level. China’s working-age population (ages 15–64) peaked between 2013 and 2015 and has been steadily declining ever since. The old-age dependency ratio, which stood at 11.9 percent in 2010, rose to 21.9 percent in 2022 and is projected to reach 51 percent by 2050.

This means that in the future, there may not even be two working-age people to support each elderly citizen. This shift will lead to a structural collapse in demand in the real estate sector, a decline in savings rates, and the bankruptcy of pension funds. The fact that China’s population aged 80 and older is projected to reach 126 million by 2050 has the potential to trigger major humanitarian and economic crises in rural areas where the social safety net is inadequate.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

S

outh Korea has demanded an official explanation and apology from Ukraine after accusing Kyiv of disclosing the transfer of two North Korean prisoners of war (POWs) to Seoul despite an agreement to keep the matter confidential.

Seong Ghi-hong, a senior presidential secretary for public relations, said Sunday that Seoul strongly regretted Ukraine’s decision to publicly announce the transfer and its subsequent denial that a nondisclosure agreement had existed.

“The presidential office expresses strong regret over Ukraine’s unilateral disclosure and its subsequent false announcement that there had not been a non-disclosure agreement,” Seong said in a statement.

He added that the South Korean government was reviewing whether additional measures were necessary in response to the dispute.

The controversy followed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s announcement last week during the United Nations General Assembly that Kyiv had transferred two North Korean POWs to South Korea. Zelenskyy said the soldiers had been captured while fighting alongside Russian forces in the war against Ukraine.

According to the South Korean presidential office, Ukraine had repeatedly discussed the prisoners’ transfer with Seoul through various channels and had asked South Korea to keep the arrangement secret. Kyiv had reportedly been concerned that publicly transferring the soldiers could trigger domestic criticism that Ukraine had surrendered an opportunity to exchange them for Ukrainian prisoners held by Russia.

Seoul agreed to maintain confidentiality, citing security, diplomatic and humanitarian considerations. South Korean officials said secrecy was particularly important for protecting the prisoners and their families.

The presidential office said Zelenskyy subsequently disclosed the transfer at the UN without sufficient consultation with Seoul and later denied that a confidentiality agreement had been reached.

Seong said the denial had seriously undermined trust between the two governments and could have consequences for bilateral relations.

Zelenskyy adviser rejects Seoul’s account

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung had already addressed the dispute publicly on Thursday, saying Ukraine had disclosed the transfer in violation of a nondisclosure agreement.

Lee said keeping the transfer confidential had been appropriate because of the potential consequences for the prisoners and other parties involved.

“I do not know what circumstances led the Ukrainian side to disclose the matter despite the confidentiality agreement, but it is deeply regrettable,” Lee wrote in a post on X.

Ukraine, however, disputed Seoul’s characterization of the arrangement.

Dmytro Lytvyn, an adviser to Zelenskyy, told journalists that Ukraine was an “open country” and suggested that keeping the transfer secret would have been unusual.

“From the entire story – which is long and detailed – we reported only the fact itself, that they were sent to the Republic of Korea,” Lytvyn said.

The conflicting accounts have created a diplomatic dispute between Seoul and Kyiv over how the transfer was handled and whether an agreement restricting public disclosure was formally reached.

The issue is particularly sensitive because of the unusual circumstances surrounding the two prisoners, who were captured while serving with Russian forces.

North Korean soldiers captured in Russia

Ukraine captured the two North Korean soldiers in Russia’s Kursk region in January 2025. According to the report, they were the first North Korean soldiers captured alive since Pyongyang began supporting Russia in its war against Ukraine in 2024.

Their transfer to South Korea followed discussions between Seoul and Kyiv over the legal and humanitarian status of North Korean prisoners.

The issue was also discussed during a NATO summit in Ankara in July, where Lee met Zelenskyy. South Korea’s senior presidential spokesperson, Kang Yu-jung, said afterward that the two leaders had agreed to address the status of North Korean POWs in accordance with international law.

The agreement built on an earlier understanding reached during a South Korea-Ukraine foreign ministers’ meeting in March, when the two countries pledged to cooperate on the POW issue.

The dispute comes as South Korea seeks to revive dialogue with North Korea and as US President Donald Trump has again expressed willingness to engage with Pyongyang.

The presence of North Korean troops in Russia has become a significant issue in the wider Ukraine war. According to South Korean intelligence cited in the report, North Korea is estimated to have deployed between 14,000 and 15,000 soldiers to support Moscow since 2024, primarily in Russia’s Kursk border region.

South Korean, Ukrainian and Western officials have said the North Korean forces suffered heavy casualties, with more than 6,000 soldiers killed in fighting.

The fate of North Korean POWs has consequently become an issue involving not only Ukraine and South Korea but also the broader diplomatic and security relationship between Seoul, Pyongyang, Moscow and Kyiv.

For South Korea, the latest dispute has raised concerns about the handling of sensitive information involving the prisoners and their families. For Ukraine, the issue has highlighted its position that the transfer itself was significant enough to be publicly disclosed.

The two governments now face the task of addressing their conflicting accounts over the alleged confidentiality agreement while continuing cooperation on the status of North Korean prisoners captured during the war.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

C

hinese President Xi Jinping visited Egypt on September 1, marking the first such visit in a decade. Taking place on the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1956, Xi’s visit carried symbolic significance and served as a key indicator of the growing momentum in relations between Beijing and Cairo in recent years. The statements made by the leaders of both countries regarding the visit, in which they emphasized the importance they attach to bilateral relations, further underscore this trend.

Another notable aspect was that both leaders highlighted the broader regional implications of these bilateral ties. In this context, Chinese President Xi, highlighting Egypt’s dual Arab and African identity, emphasized the need to strengthen cooperation by noting that Cairo plays “an important role in promoting the collective cooperation between China and Arab states as well as between China and African countries.” Meanwhile, Egyptian President Abdulfettah el-Sisi similarly highlighted that his country was the first Arab and African state to recognize China, emphasizing that Cairo is a key actor in Beijing’s efforts to develop relations with both Arab and African states.

It can be said that China-Egypt relations, which had limited opportunities for development in the 20th century, began to develop rapidly from the beginning of the 21st century, as Beijing’s relations with Africa gained momentum. The elevation of the relationship to the level of a comprehensive strategic partnership during President Sisi’s official visit to China in 2014 marked a significant step.

Economy is the key word

As is the case with China’s relations with many other countries, economic ties constitute the most concrete and significant aspect of the relations that have developed during this period. China’s annual trade volume with Egypt, which stood at approximately $0.9 billion in 2000, reached approximately $20.8 billion by 2025. Another key indicator of these economic ties is China’s investments in Egypt. Beijing’s investments in Egypt have exceeded $10 billion, with investments in the industrial sector being particularly noteworthy.

The Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone project, launched in 2008 to encourage China’s industrial investments in Egypt, is one of the most significant steps taken in this direction. As of 2025, with over $3.8 billion in investments made in the zone, nearly 200 companies are operating there, providing employment for approximately 10,000 people. China has also provided $7.7 billion in loans to Egypt between 2000 and 2024.

In contrast to economic relations, the security dimension of relations between the two countries has been an area with limited scope for development until recently. However, it is possible to say that significant activity has taken place in this area, particularly in 2025. In this context, claims that emerged during the year, that Egypt procured the HQ-9B air defense system from China and signed a deal worth approximately $400 million for the procurement of 10 WJ-700 UAVs, represent significant developments in arms trade between the two countries. The signing of a memorandum of understanding between Egypt and China’s North Industries Corporation for joint UAV production during this period was a step demonstrating the two countries’ intention to develop defense industry cooperation.

Eagles of Civilization exercises

One of the most important steps taken to strengthen military relations between Beijing and Cairo was the “Eagles of Civilization 2025” exercise. Held in Egypt, this large-scale exercise, the first joint air exercise between the two countries, also holds symbolic significance as it represents one of China’s most important military activities on the African continent. The second iteration of the exercise, “Eagles of Civilization 2026,” was conducted immediately prior to Xi’s visit.

China-Egypt cooperation, which is generally built on a foundation of strong economic ties, is evolving into a strategic partnership that increasingly encompasses the security dimension, as intended by both sides. However, it is fair to say that sustaining the momentum achieved in these relations will become increasingly difficult. The primary reason for this is the concerns that the deepening of Beijing-Cairo relations, particularly in the security sphere, will raise on the U.S. side. A key reason for Washington’s concerns is that, as part of its global competition with China, Beijing’s development of security ties with Egypt could allow it to gain military influence in a strategically important region.

Another major source of concern for the U.S. relates to Israeli interests. Egypt’s efforts to reduce its dependence on the U.S. in this area by developing military ties with China, and to enhance its military capabilities independently of the U.S., will be viewed as a threat by Israel. Driven by similar concerns, Washington intervened in the military relations Egypt developed with Russia in the second half of the 2010s, as well as in significant arms procurements, by applying pressure through the threat of sanctions against Cairo. The trajectory of China-Egypt security relations also holds the potential to trigger similar interventions.

(Originally published in Turkish by the Middle East Africa website)

I

sraeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed a largely empty United Nations General Assembly on Thursday after dozens of national delegations walked out of the chamber as he took the podium, protesting Israel’s genocide in Gaza and its policies in the occupied West Bank and the wider region.

Netanyahu entered the chamber to deliver his address to the 81st session of the UN General Assembly in New York. As he approached the podium, representatives from numerous countries stood and left the hall, while chants and protests could be heard inside the chamber. The number of countries that left in protest is estimated at 77.

The delegations were protesting Israel’s genocide in Gaza, its continued attacks despite calls for a ceasefire, settlement and land seizure activities in the occupied West Bank, and Israeli strikes against Syria and Lebanon, according to the report.

Delegations from countries including Türkiye, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Senegal, Pakistan, Sudan, Iran and Indonesia were among those that walked out as Netanyahu began speaking. Other countries, including Spain, South Africa, Kuwait, Morocco, Nigeria and Brazil, did not attend the session, according to the report.

As the delegations departed, Netanyahu continued his speech before a chamber that was almost completely empty. The visitors’ gallery, however, saw supporters of Israel, who applauded and cheered during parts of his address.

The walkout marked the third time Netanyahu has faced such a protest at the UN General Assembly since the Oct. 7, 2023.

Netanyahu defends Israel’s genocide

Despite the mass walkout, Netanyahu delivered an extended address in which he defended Israel’s genocide in Gaza and criticized opponents of his government.

Speaking about Israel’s military action against Iran, Netanyahu said the decision to attack Iranian nuclear facilities had been among the easiest decisions he had made as prime minister, despite acknowledging that carrying out the attacks had been difficult.

He also addressed the Golan Heights, rejecting assertions that the territory is Syrian land. Netanyahu argued that the area, which Israel has occupied since 1967, has historical ties to the Jewish people.

Netanyahu also defended Israeli settlers in the occupied West Bank while addressing violence against Palestinians. He characterized attacks on Palestinian homes and property as the work of a small number of individuals and argued that Israeli settlers involved in such incidents were otherwise law-abiding citizens.

He further rejected criticism of Israel’s genocide in Gaza, saying the Israeli army protects civilians and describing it as “the most moral army in the world.”

Netanyahu also targeted New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani, who has described Netanyahu as responsible for the destruction in Gaza. Referring to attempts to prevent him from addressing the UN, Netanyahu said he had been challenged and sought to be silenced.

During the speech, Netanyahu also made claims concerning Türkiye and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

He brought a Starlink device to the UN and said he would leave it for Iranian officials to use, while arguing that Iran’s government would eventually be overthrown.

During his remarks on Iran, a photograph of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in a 2020 US drone strike in Baghdad, was visible in the Iranian delegation’s seating area.

Protests continue outside UN headquarters

The demonstrations against Netanyahu were not limited to the General Assembly chamber.

Large groups of pro-Palestinian protesters gathered in Manhattan as Netanyahu spoke, calling for an end to Israel’s military operations in Gaza and criticizing US support for Israel.

Security restrictions prevented protesters from approaching the UN headquarters. Hundreds gathered near First Avenue and 39th Street, where they chanted slogans including “No to war, no to weapons, freedom for Palestine” and “Netanyahu, you can’t hide, we will prosecute you for genocide.”

Jay Saper of the Jewish Voice for Peace organization told Anadolu that more than 400 people were participating in a demonstration accompanying a convoy moving toward the UN.

Saper said the protesters were there to oppose Netanyahu’s actions in Gaza, including attacks on homes and hospitals. He also criticized the US government for continuing to provide weapons to Israel, arguing that Washington should end what he described as its involvement in the conflict.

New York City Council member Diana Moreno, who supported the demonstration, also criticized Netanyahu and said protesters were sending a clear message about his conduct.

Moreno said US taxpayers should not be financing what she described as an ethnic-cleansing project or attacks on Iran and Lebanon. She also emphasized the equal value of children’s lives regardless of where they are born.

Several protesters were detained after blocking a road four or five blocks from the UN headquarters. Police deployed in large numbers to the area, and detained demonstrators were seen being placed on two police buses while continuing to chant slogans in support of Gaza.

According to US media reports cited by Anadolu, those detained included Hollywood actress Susan Sarandon, New York City Council member Chi Osse, New York congressional candidate Darializa Avila Chevalier, comedian Caleb Hearon, actresses Hannah Einbinder and Cynthia Nixon, and former US Army intelligence analyst Chelsea Manning.

A separate demonstration was held outside the Israeli Consulate near Second Avenue and 42nd Street in Manhattan. Activists from the group Standing Together carried signs criticizing Netanyahu and calling for humanitarian aid to be allowed into Gaza.

The protests inside and outside the UN highlighted the deep divisions surrounding Israel’s military campaign and Netanyahu’s international standing as he addressed the world body. While many delegations left the chamber in protest, Netanyahu continued speaking to the remaining audience and defended Israel’s policies before supporters in the visitors’ gallery.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

G

erman Chancellor Friedrich Merz (CDU) faces difficult days ahead this fall, both within the coalition government he leads and within his own party, the CDU. The federal government, which has occasionally made headlines due to debates and disagreements ahead of the Bundestag’s summer recess in July, is highly likely to face new challenges starting in September.

Chancellor Merz, who promised to implement significant reforms upon taking office in May 2025, has not fully delivered on these promises during his more than one year in office and has faced criticism as a result. Merz has also been criticized for making numerous concessions, despite his campaign promises, in order to form a coalition with the SPD at the federal level. Recent polls showing a significant decline in both his party’s and his own personal popularity are placing the Chancellor and the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition in a more precarious position in the coming months.

Over the past summer, Merz has remained in the spotlight due to new internal party issues, and he continues to be a target of criticism, particularly for his ongoing shortcomings in communication. For example, in July, the Chancellor raised the issue of replacing certain CDU ministers in the federal government; however, the failure to find a replacement for Federal Minister of Transportation Patrick Schnieder (CDU), whose dismissal had been widely reported, caused considerable astonishment among the public. During this process, criticism of Merz from the minister in question, and even from his inner circle in his electoral district, drew attention.

Furthermore, Merz’s selection of a candidate for Federal Minister of Health, coupled with his own statements that the nominee would not be successful in such a role because he lacked experience in the field just a year prior, further undermined the credibility of both Chancellor Merz and the CDU/CSU circles. A similar impression of inconsistency and a credibility issue also arose during the process leading to the resignation of Jens Spahn, the CDU/CSU’s Federal Parliamentary Group Leader, a development that essentially triggered the ministerial reshuffles, after he stepped down due to a specific incident that contradicted his party’s principles and his own position. Essentially, Spahn’s resignation could be viewed as partially advantageous for Chancellor Merz and the party’s internal balance, and looking ahead, because Spahn could have posed a potential rival within the party. However, Merz’s failure to fully manage this process has not translated into a consolidation of power for him at this stage.

Criticism of Merz’s communication strategy

Ongoing criticism of Chancellor Merz’s communication strategy has intensified, particularly following his departure for summer vacation at the end of July. Although the political agenda in Germany is generally calmer during July and August, it can be said that this summer has seen some quite critical developments. Nevertheless, Merz’s continued silence has drawn serious criticism from the public and the media. While media outlets published articles questioning the Chancellor’s whereabouts, including reports of extreme heat in Germany causing difficulties in daily life and low river levels posing economic risks to major transportation routes, none of these issues prompted the Chancellor to issue a statement while on vacation. Furthermore, despite ongoing debates over the government’s proposed reforms during the summer months, forest fires reaching serious proportions in Germany, and, most recently, the discovery of a drone containing an explosive device at Leipzig Airport, Chancellor Merz did not break his silence or cut short his vacation, which lasted approximately three weeks.

During this period, criticism of the Chancellor came not only from the media but also from opposition parties. Finally, after Merz ended his vacation on August 22, he responded with particularly harsh rhetoric to protests directed at him while visiting the region affected by the wildfires. This stance led to further criticism of his communication strategy. Here, too, the Chancellor was observed to have resorted to an impulsive, reactive tone. Consequently, the fact that the agenda, which had been strained by discussions of a cabinet reshuffle before the vacation, began with similar tension after the vacation has reinforced the impression that a harmonious and smooth political process is highly unlikely in the fall months.

In addition to the fragile situation within the CDU, where Merz continues to serve as chairman, it can be said that there have also been disagreements with the coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). In particular, it has become clear to the public that various disagreements persist even after difficult compromises were reached on certain major reform initiatives, such as pension reform. Consequently, it has become apparent that rather than adopting a collective approach as a government, the coalition partners have once again prioritized their own parties and voter bases.

This situation has reinforced the perception that the coalition will not be able to fully carry out its remaining term of approximately two and a half years in line with shared future goals. A draft agreement on pension reform was prepared before the summer recess, but both criticism of this draft from some SPD politicians and opposition from CDU state premiers in the three eastern German states have drawn significant attention. Whether such goals can be enacted into law and implemented in the Bundestag this coming fall is viewed as a serious test. The ability to implement these legislative goals is also linked to several other factors.

Critical state parliamentary elections

This fall, several state parliamentary elections of great importance will take place in Germany, elections that have the potential to influence political developments at the federal level. First, on September 6, elections will be held in Saxony-Anhalt, followed by elections in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania on September 20. In particular, a potential election defeat is expected for the incumbent CDU state premier and the coalition government in Saxony-Anhalt. Meanwhile, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), classified by Saxony-Anhalt’s Office for the Protection of the Constitution as a “confirmed far-right organization”, is expected to finish first in the Saxony-Anhalt election by a significant margin.

Despite all these factors, it is reported that the AfD has reached a vote share of approximately 42 percent in recent polls in Saxony-Anhalt and has also emerged as the leading party at the federal level. Meanwhile, the Chancellor’s party, the CDU/CSU, is said to have slipped to 23 percent and second place at the federal level. In contrast, the AfD has risen to approximately 28 percent, moving into first place in federal-level polls as well. While this situation may come as a surprise in German politics, it can be said that this trend at both the state and federal levels has become entrenched.

Although the AfD is expected to finish first in the state parliament election on September 6, it is not anticipated to form a government due to the other political parties’ principle of refusing to form a coalition or cooperate with it. However, criticism that the “firewall” (“Brandmauer”) principle, which rejects any form of cooperation with the AfD, has actually strengthened the party has intensified in recent months. Calls from some local CDU politicians to soften the party’s rigid stance have even made their way into the public discourse. On the other hand, the possibility that parties such as the Greens and the SPD may fall below the 5 percent electoral threshold in the eastern states could pave the way for the AfD to secure an absolute majority in Saxony-Anhalt, enabling it to form a state government on its own. Although this possibility currently seems remote, it is prompting other political actors to explore new political avenues, including at the federal level.

While some politicians are adopting a more tolerant rhetoric toward cooperation with the AfD, others are more vocally and in a coordinated manner calling for action to ban the AfD. For example, even Saxony’s CDU State Premier Michael Kretschmer, breaking with the CDU leadership at the federal level, has adopted a stance suggesting that “we need to talk to anyone who wants to talk,” including the AfD, making these efforts more evident. On the other hand, political science circles point out that, rather than this type of cooperation, the option of a minority government, particularly in the eastern states of Germany, should be given more serious consideration.

However, it is also known that Chancellor Merz and the CDU leadership generally do not look favorably upon the option of a minority government, either at the federal level or in the states. Furthermore, the CDU’s continued adherence to its principle of not cooperating with the Left Party significantly complicates the prospects for a CDU-led government in situations where the AfD fails to secure an absolute majority.

Efforts toward a partial economic recovery and ongoing challenges

In addition to these critical developments, it can be said that the German economy has failed to achieve the expected positive momentum and, with the exception of a partial, temporary recovery in the second quarter of the year, has not fully met expectations. This economic stagnation continues to put pressure on the federal government and is also considered a significant factor, particularly in the state legislative election processes. For example, the inflation rate in Germany rose notably to 2.8 percent in July and 2.9 percent in August, and this figure is expected to rise further. This situation is linked to rising energy costs and, in particular, the ongoing increase in gasoline prices.

Here, too, the fact that the U.S.-Iran conflict has not yet reached a resolution that would ease global markets, along with the limited predictability in Germany, can be cited as the underlying causes. In addition to the inflation figures, the fact that the number of unemployed exceeded three million again in August (6.5 percent) following July is fueling continued criticism of the federal government. Furthermore, it is claimed that the downturn in the automotive sector and the negative impact of this year’s extreme heat and drought on the German economy have reached 36 billion euros. Consequently, the additional challenges posed by these cost increases are expected to become even more pronounced in the coming months.

Finally, Germany’s budget deficit-to-GDP ratio rose to 3.1 percent in the first half of 2026, exceeding the European Union’s 3 percent Maastricht criterion. Although infrastructure investments and increased defense spending, in line with the federal government’s objectives, have had positive effects on economic growth, the 11.6 percent increase in interest payments to 27.3 billion euros, particularly in the first half of the year, is viewed as a cause for concern and has led to criticism that the budget balance is under pressure.

T

igrayan leaders said Wednesday that a new war with Ethiopia’s federal government had begun after fighting erupted in the northern Tigray region and neighboring Afar and Amhara, threatening to unravel a four-year-old peace agreement that ended one of the country’s deadliest conflicts.

The renewed fighting comes nearly four years after the end of Ethiopia’s 2020-2022 civil war between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and federal forces. The conflict resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths and a major humanitarian crisis before the two sides signed the Pretoria Agreement in November 2022.

The latest escalation follows months of deteriorating relations between the TPLF and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government. Tensions intensified further on Sunday when the TPLF announced that it had formed an alliance with six other armed groups from across Ethiopia with the stated goal of overthrowing Abiy’s government.

The Tigray National Regional Government, which is led by the TPLF, said its forces had been instructed to respond to what it described as an attack by the federal government.

“Following the intensification of the invasion conducted through various methods by Abiy Ahmed’s autocratic and genocidal Prosperity regime against the people of Tigray,” the regional administration said in a statement, adding that Tigrayan forces had entered what it called a defensive war.

The statement represented a significant escalation in rhetoric between the two sides and raised fears that the fragile peace established after the previous conflict could collapse.

Fighting spreads beyond Tigray

Getachew Reda, an adviser to Abiy and a former TPLF official, said on X that Tigrayan forces had seized control of federally controlled airports in Tigray and launched an “all out offensive” against government positions in neighboring Afar and Amhara.

Ethiopian Airlines suspended flights to the region as reports of fighting emerged.

Four sources familiar with the developments, including a senior Ethiopian government official, a diplomatic source, a humanitarian source and another source with links to the TPLF and an allied militia, confirmed fighting in Tigray, Afar and Amhara.

According to the sources, Tigrayan forces in Afar were fighting alongside a local armed group. In Amhara, they were fighting alongside Fano, an armed militia that has become a major opponent of the federal government.

Fano had sided with federal forces during the 2020-2022 war but later turned against Abiy’s government, launching an insurgency in 2023. The group is now part of the alliance announced by the TPLF.

The involvement of armed groups from outside Tigray could broaden the conflict and increase the pressure on the federal government. The alliance announced by the TPLF includes six other groups, although the Reuters report did not provide further details on the members or their military capabilities.

Spokespeople for Abiy, the federal government and the TPLF did not immediately respond to requests for comment on Wednesday.

The federal government has accused the TPLF of violating the Pretoria Agreement and seeking to create chaos. The latest developments therefore represent a direct challenge to the peace arrangement that brought an end to the previous war.

Eritrea role raises regional concerns

The renewed fighting has also drawn attention to Eritrea, Ethiopia’s northern neighbor and longtime rival.

Abiy’s spokesperson, Billene Seyoum, told Reuters on Monday that members of the newly announced alliance had been cooperating for some time with financial backing from Eritrea.

Eritrea has repeatedly denied accusations that it supports Ethiopian armed groups. Its information minister declined to comment on Wednesday about the latest developments.

The allegations underscore the broader regional dimension of Ethiopia’s internal conflicts. Eritrea was directly involved in the previous Tigray war, during which its forces fought alongside Ethiopian federal troops against the TPLF. The Pretoria Agreement subsequently brought the large-scale fighting to an end.

The renewed clashes could therefore have consequences beyond the immediate battlefields in northern Ethiopia if regional actors become more deeply involved.

The 2020-2022 conflict in Tigray caused widespread destruction and displacement, while hundreds of thousands of people died, according to the Reuters report. The peace agreement halted the main fighting, but political disputes and tensions between the federal government and Tigrayan authorities remained unresolved.

The emergence of a new alliance linking the TPLF with Fano and other armed groups adds another layer of uncertainty. Fighting in three regions could also complicate humanitarian operations and efforts to maintain the peace established in 2022.

For now, reports of renewed hostilities mark the most serious threat to the Pretoria peace agreement since it was signed. With the TPLF describing its military action as defensive and the federal government accusing it of violating the agreement, the competing claims highlight the depth of the political divide.

The latest clashes leave the future of Ethiopia’s fragile peace uncertain, with the possibility of a wider confrontation depending on whether the fighting spreads and whether the opposing sides can prevent the breakdown from developing into another prolonged civil war.

(Source: CNN)

F

ifteen years after Libyans rose against personalized rule, the country risks replacing one family-centred dictatorship not with democracy, but with competing dynasties, armed patronage networks and a political class that has discovered that “transition” can last forever.

Libyans have not necessarily abandoned their aspiration for democracy. Something more insidious is happening: They are being taught that democracy does not matter.

Fifteen years after the overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi, Libya remains trapped in what is still politely called a “transition.” Governments described as temporary become permanent, elections are promised and postponed, and institutions whose democratic mandates have long expired continue to exercise power. Armed groups become state actors, family members become commanders and power brokers, and public money sustains a system whose principal achievement is its own survival.

The absurdity is illustrated by the Government of National Unity headed by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah. Created as an interim authority to take Libya to presidential and parliamentary elections in December 2021, it remains in power in Tripoli in 2026 although those elections never happened. In the east, meanwhile, another political-security establishment has consolidated itself around Khalifa Haftar, his family and the forces under their control. Governments change names, roadmaps are rewritten, and election dates recede into the future, but those exercising power remain. Libya has turned the provisional government into a permanent political system: everybody is temporary, but nobody leaves.

Perhaps that is no accident. Genuine elections contain something profoundly threatening to Libya’s political class: the possibility of losing. Elections mean that those controlling ministries, budgets, armed formations, contracts and patronage networks today might wake up tomorrow without them. Why should beneficiaries of the existing order enthusiastically construct the mechanism capable of removing them?

A convergence of interests

Dbeibah and Haftar are not allies, and eastern and western power centres continue to compete. Yet beneath their rivalry lies a convergence of interests. The western establishment needs money, armed protection and control of Tripoli; the eastern establishment needs access to national revenues and international legitimacy. Militias need salaries and influence, business networks need contracts, politicians need offices, and families surrounding powerful men need access to wealth. Foreign governments want oil, migration control, counterterrorism cooperation and sufficient stability to protect their interests. No formal coalition is necessary. Everyone merely has to conclude that continuation of the existing system is preferable to allowing Libyan voters to overturn it.

The bitterest irony concerns nepotism. Libyans rose in 2011 against a political order in which the state had become inseparable from Qaddafi, his sons and the networks surrounding them. Yet power in eastern Libya has become increasingly concentrated not merely around Khalifa Haftar but around the Haftar family. His son Saddam Haftar has risen to become deputy commander of the eastern forces and increasingly represents that establishment internationally. Instead of building institutions capable of surviving Khalifa Haftar, eastern Libya risks building a succession mechanism capable of perpetuating his family. Western Libya has developed a different but similarly troubling phenomenon through the growing political and commercial influence of networks associated with the Dbeibah family.

Libya thus risks completing a grotesque historical circle. It overthrew one family-centred authoritarian state only to produce multiple family-centred political, commercial and military fiefdoms. This is not a restoration of Qaddafi’s Jamahiriya. In one respect it could prove worse: Qaddafi presided over one personalised state; Libya now risks acquiring several personalized centres of power competing over the resources of the same country.

None of this can be understood without oil. Libya possesses immense petroleum wealth shared among a population of only several million people. That should provide the foundations for one of Africa’s most prosperous states. Instead, it helps finance political dysfunction. A government dependent upon taxation must, however imperfectly, worry about the citizens from whom it collects revenue. Libya receives enormous income from selling hydrocarbons abroad. Control the institutions through which that money flows and you gain influence over budgets, salaries, subsidies, contracts, appointments and patronage.

How do we build a prosperous Libyan state?

The central political question therefore risks ceasing to be “How do we build a prosperous Libyan state?” and becoming “Who gets access to the money generated by the Libyan state?” Oil makes capturing the government extraordinarily profitable. When political survival can be financed through distributing oil rents, accountability to citizens becomes less urgent. Libya’s greatest economic blessing becomes its political curse.

The international community also deserves uncomfortable scrutiny. Western governments proclaim their commitment to elections, while the United Nations continues producing roadmaps towards elected and unified institutions. The language remains impeccable. But governments reveal their priorities through behaviour rather than communiqués.

Europe wants Libya to restrain migration across the Mediterranean. Washington wants counterterrorism cooperation, regional stability and limits on Russian influence. Italy wants energy and migration cooperation. Turkey, Egypt, France, Russia and the Gulf states pursue their own strategic and commercial interests. Oil must continue flowing, migration must be contained, jihadists controlled, and geopolitical competitors kept in check.

And if the men capable of delivering these things happen to be authoritarian, dynastic or embedded in systems of patronage? Increasingly, the practical answer appears to be: We can work with them.

Haftar has understood this particularly well. The more he presents himself not merely as a Libyan military strongman but as a regional security broker—cooperating against terrorism, becoming useful in the Sahel, controlling territory and offering stability—the more the question in foreign capitals changes. Instead of asking, “By what democratic authority does this man exercise power?”, policymakers begin asking, “Can this man deliver what we need?”

Democracy in question

That is often how democratic principles die in international diplomacy: not through one dramatic betrayal, but through a thousand pragmatic accommodations. Democracy moves quietly from objective, to aspiration, to talking point.

Yet it would be wrong to conclude that Libyans themselves have rejected democracy. When municipal elections have been permitted, Libyans have demonstrated a willingness to participate, while consultations have repeatedly produced demands for elections, unified institutions and accountable government. The tragedy may therefore not be that Libyans no longer want democracy, but that they increasingly believe nobody will allow democracy to change anything.

That is more dangerous, because frustration eventually becomes exhaustion. After enough failed roadmaps, postponed elections, rival governments, parliaments, militias, foreign interventions and political conferences, ordinary citizens stop asking constitutional questions. They ask whether the electricity will stay on, whether salaries will be paid, whether their children can find work and whether they can return home safely at night. When politics reaches that point, authoritarianism no longer requires enthusiasm. It requires fatigue.

Then comes one of the oldest bargains in politics: give us obedience and we will give you stability. After fifteen years of turmoil, such a proposition inevitably becomes more attractive. Some Libyans remember a country that, whatever the brutality and absurdities of Qaddafi’s rule, possessed a single government, a recognizable state and a degree of everyday predictability. That does not mean they want Qaddafi back. It means that when democracy becomes associated with disorder, corruption and political impotence, authoritarianism can acquire the appearance of competence simply by comparison.

That may ultimately prove the greatest failure of post-2011 Libya: not merely that democracy failed to arrive, but that those who captured the transition could succeed in discrediting democracy without ever seriously trying it.

Libyans demanded dignity, accountability, political participation and an end to arbitrary, personalized government in 2011. What risks emerging instead is a system of family networks, armed patronage, oil rents, corruption, foreign sponsorship, unelected institutions and indefinitely postponed elections.

C

hinese President Xi Jinping arrived in the United States for talks with President Donald Trump on Wednesday, as the war involving Iran has reshaped global energy markets and strengthened Beijing’s position as an increasingly influential player in the international energy system.

Trump is expected to press Xi over China’s energy relationship with Iran during the meeting in Washington. However, analysts and energy executives cited in the report see limited incentives for Beijing to change course, arguing that the conflict has in several ways strengthened China’s economic and strategic leverage.

The war has pushed global energy and commodity prices higher, with oil trading at around $100 a barrel on Tuesday. At the same time, China has expanded exports of clean-energy technologies to countries facing energy insecurity and has relied on its substantial crude oil reserves to cushion the effects of market disruptions.

Erica Downs, a former CIA energy analyst and current senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, described China as a major beneficiary of the crisis. She said Beijing had managed the disruption relatively well and was unlikely to feel significant pressure to respond to US requests.

The developments come as Trump’s administration seeks to persuade China to reduce its energy ties with Iran and Russia while increasing purchases of American oil and natural gas.

Trump seeks to pressure Beijing over Iran and energy

A senior White House official said the administration would tell Xi that continuing to do business with Iran was unacceptable and that there would be consequences.

The issue is particularly significant because China has been a major buyer of Iranian and Venezuelan crude. Trump has taken measures that have made it more difficult and expensive for Beijing to obtain oil from those sources, while also suggesting that the United States could take control of Venezuelan oil.

Trump told world leaders at the United Nations on Tuesday that the United States now had a primary claim to Venezuela’s oil, adding: “To the victor belong the spoils.”

At the same time, Washington hopes to encourage Beijing to rely less heavily on Russia for oil and gas and return to the US energy market.

China has sharply reduced direct purchases of US natural gas since Trump imposed tariffs on Chinese imports last year. It also stopped buying US crude oil, although Chinese purchases of fuel from US refiners have increased in recent months.

The Trump administration had previously argued that tariffs on Chinese goods could encourage Beijing to loosen its control over critical minerals and persuade Chinese companies to purchase more American energy.

So far, however, those efforts have produced limited results. An LNG industry executive cited in the report said there was little expectation that the Xi-Trump talks would generate a major breakthrough.

The meeting is also taking place against the backdrop of a war that has absorbed much of the White House’s attention. Philip Luck, an international business analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a former State Department official, said the administration appeared to have had limited time to prepare for the summit because of the ongoing crisis.

Despite the geopolitical importance of the meeting, energy executives and analysts interviewed for the report did not expect major substantive developments.

China expands its role as an energy superpower

The conflict has nevertheless highlighted the scale of China’s influence over global energy markets.

China is the world’s largest oil importer and has used its purchasing power to build substantial crude reserves. It has also become a major regional supplier of petroleum products, meaning changes in Chinese exports or domestic demand can influence energy markets well beyond its borders.

The war has also accelerated China’s role in clean-energy markets. Chinese companies are exporting solar panels and electric vehicles to countries seeking alternatives to vulnerable supplies of Middle Eastern oil and gas.

Experts cited in the report said this combination of conventional energy reserves, petroleum exports and clean-energy manufacturing is giving Beijing new forms of leverage in the global energy economy.

Downs said the perception in China is that energy security is increasingly shifting away from control over physical resources such as oil and coal toward control over energy technologies. China’s dominant position in the manufacturing of many clean-energy products puts it in a strong position to meet its own needs while supplying other countries.

Ethan Zindler, head of country and policy research at BloombergNEF and a former US Treasury Department official, said the war was boosting Chinese clean-energy exports into developing markets.

In regions such as sub-Saharan Africa, where many countries are still working to expand electricity access, Chinese solar technology can provide an immediate alternative to dependence on imported fossil fuels.

The developments could therefore have consequences extending well beyond the immediate US-China dispute. As countries seek greater energy security following disruptions in global oil and gas supplies, China is increasingly positioned to provide both energy products and the technologies needed for electrification.

For Washington, that presents a difficult backdrop to the Xi-Trump meeting. The United States is seeking to use trade and energy policy to influence Beijing’s relationship with Iran, Russia and global commodity markets. Yet the Iran war has simultaneously strengthened China’s position in areas ranging from oil reserves and petroleum products to solar panels and electric vehicles.

The result is a US-China meeting taking place at a moment when the global energy landscape is changing rapidly, with China gaining influence through both traditional energy markets and the expanding clean-energy economy.

(Source: Politico)

T

he United States plans to establish two new military bases in Greenland under an agreement expected to be signed with Denmark and Greenland at the United Nations General Assembly in New York on Tuesday, according to people familiar with the matter.

The planned sites are Narsarsuaq in southern Greenland and Mestersvig on the island’s east coast, where a military outpost is currently used by Denmark’s Sirius Dog Sled Patrol, a special forces unit. The plans would expand the US military presence in Greenland at a time of heightened strategic interest in the Arctic and months after President Donald Trump repeatedly called for greater US control over the semi-autonomous Danish territory.

Three people familiar with the matter told Reuters that the agreement would allow Washington to re-establish a military presence at Narsarsuaq, the location of the former Bluie West One base that the United States closed in the 1950s. Narsarsuaq, once an important US military installation, now has only a few dozen residents.

Two of the sources said Mestersvig would also be included in the agreement. The remote site is currently associated with the Sirius Dog Sled Patrol, which operates in Greenland’s vast northeastern territory.

The three governments are expected to sign the agreement at 10:30 a.m. Eastern Time on Tuesday. The full text has not been made public, and the people familiar with the negotiations said some details could remain unresolved until the signing.

Neither the Danish nor Greenlandic governments immediately responded to Reuters requests for comment. A White House spokesperson also declined to provide details, referring instead to an earlier statement saying the agreement would “secure and defend the security of Greenland and the United States.”

Agreement follows months of tension over Greenland

The proposed bases come after months of political and diplomatic pressure from Trump, who has repeatedly argued that the United States should control Greenland. At various points, Trump declined to rule out using economic or military pressure to acquire the territory.

Greenland remains part of the Kingdom of Denmark but has extensive self-government. Trump’s demands have been overwhelmingly rejected by Greenlanders, according to polling cited by Reuters.

The US president’s comments, particularly during a period of heightened pressure in January, generated a diplomatic crisis within NATO and prompted Denmark and Greenland to seek negotiations with Washington. The talks were aimed at reducing tensions while addressing US concerns about Arctic security.

Denmark has presented the new agreement as part of a broader NATO-based approach to security in the region. According to the Danish government, the arrangement would place Arctic security within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization rather than leaving responsibility solely to Washington and Copenhagen.

The agreement could therefore represent a shift in how Denmark and its allies approach the military security of Greenland, while also allowing the United States to strengthen its presence in an area that has become increasingly important for strategic and defence planning.

Greenland’s geographic position between North America and Europe has long given it military significance. Its location also makes the territory important for monitoring activity across the North Atlantic and Arctic regions.

During the Cold War, the United States maintained a much larger military footprint in Greenland. According to Reuters, Washington operated 17 military installations there and had more than 10,000 personnel stationed on the island.

That presence declined substantially after the Cold War. Today, the United States operates Pituffik Space Base, formerly known as Thule Air Base, which has around 150 US military personnel.

New bases could expand US arctic presence

The return to Narsarsuaq would mark a significant development because the site previously served as an important US military facility. Bluie West One was established during World War Two and later became part of the American military network across Greenland before closing in the 1950s.

Mestersvig, meanwhile, is located in a remote part of eastern Greenland and has traditionally supported Denmark’s military and surveillance activities through the Sirius Dog Sled Patrol.

The planned US facilities would therefore add to the existing American military infrastructure while working alongside Danish and NATO capabilities in the Arctic.

The agreement also comes as Arctic security has gained greater importance among NATO members. The region has become increasingly significant for military surveillance, transportation routes and competition among major powers.

For Denmark and Greenland, the agreement could provide a framework for strengthening security cooperation with the United States while keeping Greenland within the Danish realm and the wider NATO defence structure.

For Washington, expanding its military footprint would increase its ability to operate in Greenland and monitor developments in the Arctic without requiring a transfer of sovereignty.

The plans nevertheless remain politically sensitive because they follow Trump’s campaign to increase US influence over Greenland. His earlier statements about acquiring the territory strained relations with Denmark and raised concerns among Greenlandic political leaders.

The new agreement instead appears to focus on military cooperation and security arrangements rather than any change in sovereignty. Its final terms, however, were not yet publicly available at the time of the Reuters report.

If signed as expected, the agreement would represent a notable expansion of US military access in Greenland and a return to locations that once formed part of Washington’s Cold War defence network. It would also underline the growing strategic importance of the Arctic to the United States, Denmark and NATO.

(Source: Reuters)

I

srael’s practices of forced displacement and even extermination in Gaza have created a rift in the architecture of security and memory that post-World War II Europe constructed. This rupture clearly signifies a crisis. Rather than framing this crisis as a mere foreign policy divergence, it is important to characterize it as the collapse of the moral exceptionalism generated through the absolutization of the suffering of the Holocaust. The diplomatic protest process currently led by Spain and Ireland takes the form of a rebellion by the periphery and postcolonial memory against the hegemony of memory represented by the center—Germany and the United Kingdom. Consequently, with this protest, the capital of victimhood has been exhausted, and the colonial codes within Western rationality have begun to be deciphered.

The most significant case illustrating this is the images of destruction emerging from Gaza. These images not only triggered a diplomatic fault line in Western capitals but also led to the fracturing of the most fundamental pillar of memory upon which modern European identity was built. The scene unfolding is less about ceasefire negotiations or humanitarian crisis management and more about the collapse of the perception of “moral exceptionalism”—the transformation of the trauma of the Holocaust into a political shield. This collapse lays bare just how fragile and internally fragmented Western rationality—which was assumed to be a homogeneous whole—truly is.

Moral exceptionalism and the capital of victimhood

With the end of World War II, the Israeli state apparatus converted its unique “capital of victimhood” into a pragmatic geopolitical strategy within the international community. At the root of this capital of victimhood lies the Holocaust perpetrated by Nazi Germany. Undoubtedly, the Holocaust was an organized and bureaucratic machine of extermination in human history. However, rather than interpreting this historical tragedy as a universal warning against fascism, Israel’s official political discourse has transformed it into a functional diplomatic shield that legitimizes every military move by the state and disregards international law.

The danger articulated by sociologist Michael Rothberg lies precisely here. As he puts it, when memory is constructed as a zero-sum game, the recognition of one suffering necessitates the invisibilization of all other sufferings. This zero-sum regime of memory, which Israel has imposed not only on the West but on nearly the entire world, has placed the Jewish Holocaust in an absolute and incomparable position. In this process, the dispossession of Palestinians and the violence they have endured have been reduced to an ontologically secondary and insignificant detail. Another manifestation of the effort to render this genocide absolute and incomparable was Europe’s granting of the privilege to Israel to operate beyond the bounds of the law in order to suppress its own sense of guilt. The entire spectrum of practices currently taking place in Gaza—based on dispossession, violence, displacement, and annihilation—is being carried out in connection with this privilege.

The illusion of Western state rationality: Germany and the United Kingdom

The case of Germany serves as the most jarring laboratory for this privilege-based normative blindness. Without distinguishing Israel’s security from its own state rationality, Germany is attempting to atone for its past experience of the Holocaust through its silence today. To such an extent that German bureaucratic rationality, in an effort to free itself from the burden of its negative historical legacy, has become incapable of naming the violence Israel is perpetrating in Gaza. Its reflexive criminalization of pro-Palestinian protests in the streets as anti-Semitism should not be interpreted as an authoritarian securitization practice. This situation amounts to the center’s preservation of its own hegemony of memory. For Germany, criticizing Israel would mean the collapse of its moral foundation. Thus, preserving the uniqueness of the Holocaust paradoxically necessitates turning a blind eye to the crimes being committed today.

Germany serves as the normative shield of the regime of moral exceptionalism. Britain, on the other hand, is the imperial architect of this regime. The British state mind approaches the issue not so much through the lens of Holocaust guilt but rather through a colonial continuity inherited from the 1917 Balfour Declaration and the Mandate for Palestine. The British government’s current stance—suspending the rule of law in the face of the destruction in Gaza—is a reflex to protect the center’s own imperial legacy. For this reason, the United Kingdom occupies the center of moral exceptionalism in terms of imperial architecture.

Spain and Ireland: The postcolonial uprising of the periphery

Germany’s normative position and Britain’s imperial architectural position are what tie the issue together precisely at this point. The rift taking shape in Europe regarding this issue originates not from the center but from the historical and geographical “periphery.” The fact that Spain, Ireland, Norway, and Slovenia have recognized the State of Palestine and adopted the harshest diplomatic language in modern European history against Israel does not signify a sudden awakening of human rights consciousness.

Ireland, in particular, carries within its national memory the trauma of British colonialism and forced displacement from its lands. The fundamental factor that makes Ireland’s rebellion within Europe so jarring is directly linked to Britain’s imperial background. Indeed, when the Dublin government looks at Gaza, it sees the colonial geopolitical order that its former master, Britain, established in the Middle East and continues to support to this day. Consequently, an Irish diplomat’s assessment of Gaza is built not on the victims of World War II, but on the recognition of a 21st-century prototype of 19th-century colonial logic—a displaced people and an occupying power.

Although in a different way than Ireland, Spain has a political fabric shaped by confronting the aftershocks of the Franco dictatorship, the civil war, and ultimately its own imperial past, bearing the traces of the leftist political tradition and the post-ETA disarmament processes. With such a political fabric, Spain resonates on the international stage as the most significant voice from the periphery. Consequently, from the perspective of the Madrid administration, events at the Al-Aqsa Mosque or in Gaza enable it to take a leading role in taking significant steps to expose the hypocrisy of the exceptional protection Europe grants to Israel.

These countries, in Rothberg’s words, are operating the mechanism of “Multidirectional Memory.” These countries do not deny the Holocaust, but they openly rebel against its use as a cloak to cover up today’s colonial violence, the apartheid regime, demographic engineering, and the massacre in Gaza.

G

ermany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) emerged as the strongest party in a state election in northeastern Germany on Sunday, according to voting projections, dealing a major setback to Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s conservative party and increasing pressure on his coalition government.

The AfD was projected to win 38.3% of the vote in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, narrowly ahead of the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), which was projected at 35.4%, according to ARD public television. Merz’s conservative bloc, meanwhile, stood at 4.9%, below the 5% threshold required to enter the state parliament.

The result represented the worst performance by Merz’s mainstream conservative party in a German state election since the end of World War Two, according to Reuters. Merz described the outcome as “a disaster” but said he intended to remain in office and continue pursuing his reform program.

The result came after the AfD had already achieved a major breakthrough earlier this month by finishing first in Saxony-Anhalt. The party also leads national opinion polls, although Germany’s other major parties have so far refused to enter governing coalitions with it.

The latest vote has therefore renewed debate over the long-standing political “firewall” designed to keep the AfD out of government.

AfD gains momentum as Merz defends reform agenda

The election results added to challenges facing Merz, who entered office last year promising reforms aimed at reviving Germany’s sluggish economy. His government has struggled to win broad public support amid criticism of pension, tax and healthcare reforms, as well as rising household costs.

Marcel Fratzscher, president of the Berlin-based DIW economic research institute, told Reuters that the results could make it more difficult for the federal government to build political support for fundamental reforms.

He warned that if governing parties maintain their existing political red lines, Germany could face greater political paralysis and continued economic weakness, while the AfD could benefit further ahead of the 2029 federal election.

Merz, however, rejected suggestions that the election result should lead to a retreat from his reform programme. He argued that Germany needed determination and patience to address its economic problems.

He described the reforms as a response to what he called the growing appeal of authoritarianism in German society.

In Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, SPD state premier Manuela Schwesig also campaigned by criticising both the AfD and the federal government’s policies. Schwesig said opposition to Germany’s financial and military support for Ukraine was an important factor behind the AfD’s support in the state.

She also pointed to continued interest among some voters in restoring energy links through the Nord Stream pipelines, which transported Russian gas to Germany before being damaged in explosions in 2022.

German Vice-Chancellor Lars Klingbeil, who leads the SPD, meanwhile signalled that the government should pay greater attention to voters’ concerns, including issues surrounding pension reforms.

The election campaign was also shaped by economic pressures. Voters in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania highlighted rising living costs, energy prices and household financial difficulties as major concerns.

Berlin vote highlights wider political fragmentation

The elections also brought significant changes in Berlin, where the far-left Die Linke emerged as the leading party in projections.

Die Linke was polling at 25.3%, while Merz’s conservatives had fallen to 19%. The AfD also increased its support to 16.3% in the traditionally liberal capital.

The result marked the first time Die Linke had topped the vote in Berlin. The party has campaigned on policies including nationalizing housing held by corporate landlords and imposing rent controls.

The simultaneous gains by both the far right and far left highlighted the increasingly fragmented political landscape facing Germany’s established parties.

The AfD’s latest state-level success follows its strong performance in Saxony-Anhalt on September 6, where it came close to securing an outright majority. The party has sought to capitalise on concerns over migration, energy policy and the economic situation while advocating tougher measures to deport foreigners who have no legal right to remain in Germany.

It also supports restoring energy ties with Russia and leaving the euro, positions that have helped transform the party from a fringe eurosceptic movement into one of Germany’s most prominent political forces.

The party’s rise has intensified debate over whether the established parties can continue to exclude it from governing coalitions while maintaining support among voters who increasingly back the AfD.

For Merz, Sunday’s results add to the political difficulties confronting his government. Despite calling the outcome a “disaster,” he has made clear that he intends to remain chancellor and press ahead with his reform agenda.

The elections therefore leave Germany facing a combination of economic pressure, growing political fragmentation and an increasingly prominent far-right opposition as the country moves toward the 2029 federal election.

(Source: Reuters)

A

n observation that the world is undergoing a profound transformation across the political, economic, technological, and security spectrum has become a cliché. Yet the scale and nature of the transformation underway today extend well beyond a conventional geopolitical realignment where merely existing power balances are redistributed. What is changing simultaneously is far more fundamental: the rules governing the international system, the centers of gravity, the meaning of security, patterns of economic interdependence, and even the nature of war and conflict itself.

States continue to compete through conventional military capabilities. However, technology, energy, trade, finance, intelligence, information, and strategic communication have increasingly become integral instruments of national power. At the same time, the contours of the emerging order will not be determined by great powers alone. Regional actors will also play a determinant role to shape this order through their political will, economic capacity, asymmetric capabilities, military strength, diplomatic networks, and ability to build partnerships.

For countries with a potential to be a regional power, therefore, the fundamental question is no longer simply how to withstand the consequences of global transformation. It is how to acquire sufficient capacity and strategic agency to influence its direction and help shape its outcomes. This is not merely a matter of strategic preference. It is an imperative.

Creating strategic space

Türkiye’s strategic orientation in recent years should be understood precisely against this backdrop. Rather than positioning itself as a state that merely adapts to changes determined elsewhere, Türkiye has increasingly sought to develop the capacity to influence the environment in which those changes unfold.

This orientation is visible across a broad spectrum of national policy—from foreign and security policy to defense-industrial development, energy security, diplomatic activism, and domestic political stability. Two developments are particularly illustrative of this strategic direction: the National Solidarity and Social Integration process pursued under the objective of a “Terror Free Türkiye,” and the Türkiye-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Joint Defense Agreement, referred to as the Mecca Agreement.

At home, Türkiye is seeking to eliminate the structural security challenges that have constrained its political, economic, and social potential. Abroad, it is simultaneously developing bilateral and multilateral partnerships designed to strengthen its position in a rapidly changing regional environment and to contribute to the formation of a more capable and resilient regional security architecture.

Developments across Türkiye’s immediate neighborhood have demonstrated that terrorism, irregular migration, energy security, border security, economic stability, and regional order can no longer be treated as separate policy issues. They constitute an interconnected security environment. Türkiye has therefore sought to create greater strategic space by employing the full spectrum of its national capabilities—from diplomacy and intelligence to military power and defense-industrial capacity. Its regional approach has gradually evolved from a conception of security centered primarily on protecting its borders toward one focused increasingly on shaping the security environment beyond them.

The critical point here is that strategic power is not driven from military capability alone. What matters is the ability to translate capabilities into political outcomes through the combination of power, political will, and diplomatic capacity. In Türkiye’s recent strategic approach, the interaction among these three elements has become increasingly visible.

A Türkiye free of terrorism

The objective of a “Terror Free Türkiye” can be understood as a natural extension of this broader strategic approach. The National Solidarity and Social Integration process should therefore not be viewed solely as a security policy designed to dismantle the PKK terrorist organization or eliminate an armed threat. Its strategic ambition is considerably broader. It seeks to strengthen social cohesion, reinforce the bonds of citizenship, and unleash Türkiye’s political, economic, and social potential from the long-term constraints imposed by terrorism and security-related instability.

The significance of the “Terror Free Türkiye” vision lies precisely in its ability to bring security and social integration within a single strategic framework. The Law on National Solidarity and the Strengthening of Social Cohesion, adopted by the General Assembly of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye, should likewise be understood within this broader political and strategic context. It is not simply a legal instrument; it forms part of a wider effort to strengthen the foundations of national resilience.

In the contemporary understanding of national security, state power can no longer be measured solely by weapons systems, economic output, military personnel, or territorial capacity. Social resilience, political stability, institutional strength, and the existence of a shared sense of national purpose are equally important components of national power.

This is particularly significant in an era characterized by hybrid threats, disinformation, social polarization, proxy conflicts, and attempts to exploit societal divisions. Under such conditions, social cohesion is not merely a domestic policy objective. It is itself a component of national security. This creates a direct strategic link between domestic security and foreign policy.

The traditional distinction between internal and external security is increasingly blurred. Domestic stability and foreign policy are no longer separate spheres governed by entirely different dynamics. They form an interconnected strategic matrix in which developments in one domain directly affect the capacity available in the other.

For Türkiye, eliminating the terrorist threat and strengthening social cohesion at home, while simultaneously contributing to the shaping of regional security architectures abroad, are therefore interconnected components of a single strategic vision.

The resources, political attention, and strategic energy consumed by terrorism can instead be redirected toward economic development, technological advancement, social resilience, and foreign policy. In this sense, a “Türkiye Free of Terrorism” is not simply a domestic security objective; it is a foundation for greater strategic autonomy.

A state can exercise greater maneuverability in foreign policy only when it possesses a sustainable foundation of security, stability, and social cohesion at home.

From security consumer to security producer

This brings us to the second dimension of Türkiye’s emerging strategic posture: the transition from unilaterally producing security to building shared security capabilities.

The defense and security cooperation Türkiye has developed with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, alongside the domestic National Solidarity and Social Integration process, should be viewed within this broader framework. The three countries possess capabilities that are, in many respects, complementary. Türkiye contributes a sophisticated defense industry, extensive military experience, operational capabilities, technological know-how, and decades of NATO experience. Pakistan brings significant military capabilities, strategic geographic positioning, and established expertise in defense production and security affairs. Saudi Arabia contributes substantial economic and financial capacity, energy resources, and considerable strategic influence in the Gulf and wider Arab world. Taken together, these capabilities can form the foundations of a broader and more resilient regional security ecosystem.

The emerging model also has the potential to transcend the traditional concept of an alliance. The security challenges of the twenty-first century are increasingly multidimensional and interconnected. Terrorism, proxy warfare, missile and UAV threats, maritime security, energy security, cyberattacks, the protection of critical infrastructure, economic vulnerabilities, and emerging technological threats cannot be effectively addressed through military capabilities alone—or by any single state acting in isolation.

The regional security architecture of the future will therefore depend increasingly on multi-layered and complementary partnerships encompassing defense, intelligence, technology, energy, cybersecurity, critical infrastructure, and economic resilience. Türkiye’s strategic opportunity in this environment is to position itself not merely as a country that consumes security, but as a country capable of producing and exporting security capabilities.

Türkiye’s growing defense-industrial capacity is central to this transformation. The defense industry is no longer simply a sector designed to meet the military requirements of the state. It has become an increasingly important instrument of foreign policy, technological development, diplomatic influence, economic power, and strategic autonomy.

A country’s ability to meet a substantial proportion of its defense requirements domestically reduces its vulnerability to external constraints during periods of crisis. At the same time, defense-industrial capacity changes the nature of its relationships with other countries. A state that can provide advanced defense technologies, establish joint production arrangements, transfer know-how, and develop long-term industrial partnerships possesses instruments of influence that extend well beyond conventional diplomacy.

Türkiye’s defense-industrial rise should therefore not be interpreted merely as a technological or economic achievement. From the perspective of regional security, it represents a strategic lever through which Türkiye can share capabilities with partners, develop joint production ecosystems, deepen institutional ties, and transform short-term security cooperation into durable strategic partnerships. This perspective also highlights the broader geopolitical significance of the Türkiye-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan axis.

Türkiye occupies a pivotal position connecting Europe, the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Pakistan is strategically positioned at the intersection of South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Saudi Arabia lies at the center of the Gulf and occupies a pivotal position within the Arab world.

The convergence of these three countries in the security domain therefore has implications extending well beyond their bilateral or trilateral relations. It has the potential to establish strategic connectivity between different geographic theaters.

The fact that the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement is open to the participation of other regional countries further strengthens this potential. Such an approach can enhance collective resilience while creating a framework through which regional actors themselves assume greater responsibility for their security environment. For this reason, the emerging cooperation should not be interpreted simply as a conventional defense arrangement among three states.

Viewed from a broader strategic perspective, it can potentially contribute to the emergence of a new belt of security and strategic cooperation linking Eurasia and the Middle East, as well as South Asia and the Gulf. When this external dimension is considered together with the objective of a “Terror Free Türkiye,” a striking strategic symmetry emerges between Türkiye’s domestic and foreign policy.

S

cotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have joined forces in a new push for constitutional change, with their nationalist and pro-reunification leaders calling for greater self-determination and expressing an ambition to return to the European Union.

The leaders of the Scottish National Party (SNP), Plaid Cymru and Sinn Féin signed a joint memorandum in Cardiff on Sept. 13 asserting what they described as the right of the three nations to determine their own constitutional futures.

The meeting was attended by Scotland’s First Minister John Swinney, Wales’ First Minister Rhun ap Iorwerth, Northern Ireland’s First Minister Michelle O’Neill and Sinn Féin leader Mary Lou McDonald.

The memorandum calls on the British government to “prepare for and facilitate constitutional change,” arguing that Westminster should not prevent citizens from deciding their own political future.

At the center of the document is a call for referendums that would allow voters in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to determine their respective constitutional arrangements.

The three nations, however, are pursuing different objectives. Scotland is seeking another independence referendum following the 2014 vote, when 55.3% of voters chose to remain part of the United Kingdom. Wales is advocating what its leaders describe as a “constitutional path” toward independence without setting a specific timetable.

Northern Ireland’s case is different, focusing on the possibility of reunification with the Republic of Ireland rather than independence as a separate state.

The memorandum represents a convergence between political movements that have historically pursued separate constitutional agendas. The article describes the current situation as significant because the governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are led by parties that support independence or Irish reunification.

The initiative nevertheless faces opposition from the British government, which continues to support the United Kingdom’s territorial union.

Brexit and the push for a European future

A shared element of the three movements is their support for closer ties with the European Union. The memorandum states that the “future of our nations lies in the European Union” and argues that Brexit has damaged their economies.

The leaders’ position reflects a broader disagreement with the decision taken by the United Kingdom in the 2016 Brexit referendum. According to the article, the UK’s departure from the EU has contributed to stronger support among some political movements in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland for pursuing a different constitutional and European path.

The British government has rejected the latest calls for constitutional change. Prime Minister Andy Burnham reiterated his “strong support for the Union” and opposed the proposals advanced by the nationalist leaders.

Burnham said the government should concentrate on economic security rather than opening new constitutional debates.

The question of Scottish independence remains particularly contentious. Westminster continues to oppose a second independence referendum, while Scotland’s nationalist leadership maintains its demand for another vote.

Northern Ireland operates under a different constitutional framework. The Good Friday Agreement provides for the possibility of a referendum on Irish reunification if there is sufficient evidence that a majority of people in Northern Ireland would support such a change.

Trump weighs in

The debate over Northern Ireland’s future also received international attention during U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to Dublin.

Trump said he would like to see the island of Ireland united and argued that such a development would eventually take place. He described Irish unity as potentially beneficial and said he believed it would be difficult to see how it could be a negative outcome.

During his remarks, Trump also referred to Irish Prime Minister Micheál Martin, suggesting that he could play a role in starting the process.

The comments add an international dimension to an already sensitive constitutional debate. The prospect of Irish reunification remains a politically divisive issue in Northern Ireland, particularly between nationalist communities that favor unity with the Republic of Ireland and unionists who want to remain part of the United Kingdom.

The new memorandum from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland does not establish a timetable for constitutional change, and the three territories face different legal and political processes.

For Scotland and Wales, the central question is independence from the United Kingdom, while Northern Ireland’s constitutional future is governed in part by the arrangements established under the Good Friday Agreement.

The leaders’ joint initiative nevertheless signals a common political emphasis on self-determination and closer European integration. Whether the proposals can advance will depend on political developments in Westminster, public support in the three nations and the distinct constitutional mechanisms governing each part of the United Kingdom.

(Source: Euro News)

P

rofessor Timothy Edmunds has previously undertaken the role as an advisor to government departments such as the Ministry of Transport and Royal Navy and continues his career as a professor in International Security and the Head of Sociology, Politics and International Studies (SPAIS) at the University of Bristol.

Professor Edmunds continues to explore the new trends of maritime security. Following his book, Understanding Maritime Security, he has mentioned that there would be a fifth wave in maritime security.

Currently in the process of writing the second edition, he gives an insight into which trends “will determine what the priorities are going to be over the next 10 or 20 years” in an exclusive interview.

Geopolitics

Maritime security is increasingly shifting from strengthening law enforcement capabilities and coordination to militarized competition and interaction of policing in a geopolitical way. Professor Edmunds states that this was a “huge shift” from when he started writing about maritime security “10 years ago”.

He highlights how the development of maritime bases and deployment in regions such as Gulf, has the potential to both increase policing within the region by building maritime capabilities “for counter piracy operations, but also to assert their geopolitical presence in East Africa” and the Western  Indian Ocean.

As exemplified with China’s “base in Djibouti” and states such as France, the U.S, UAE and Saudia Arabia establishing or in the process of establishing naval bases and outposts in the region.

Edmunds mentions that this is particularly apparent in the way that states are contesting chokepoints and chokepoints becoming increasingly politicized in ways which were not before. The militarization of maritime security which is leading to an increase in naval concerns rather than a policing concern. Navies ultimately became the “front foremost in maritime security issues”. Maritime security is no longer a conversation of piracy as much as it was before, but about the wider geopolitical interactions.

UNCLOS

Although the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has become a debated topic regarding its relevance of 21st century issues and calls to be revisited, Professor Edmunds mentioned that it in most “circumstances is the foundation of ocean governance” and believes it is still “one of the most impressive international treaties we have”.

UNCLOS has become a widely adopted legislation among ocean governance. However, UNCLOS has shown to have gaps since the topics of importance of the 21st century were not on the political agenda in the year when it was negotiated. Including some transnational organized crimes at sea, the protection of subsea maritime infrastructure, and the impact and implications of climate change.

“Following the finalization of UNLCLOS, the maritime order was seen as largely settled, and that has changed.”

Not only because it took 30 years to negotiate, but Professor Edmunds also mentioned how difficult any changes and negotiations are likely to be possible to revise UNCLOS given new geopolitical trends and interests. Iran blocking the Strait of Hormoz and charging ship passages became a direct “attack on one of the fundamental principles of UNCLOS” in relation to the freedom of passage.

While soft challenges from states like China, following recent island building in the South China Sea, contest “some of the underlying assumptions of UNCLOS or reinterpreting in unconventional or norm breaking ways”. These examples show how easy it can be for states to use “legal challenges or loopholes” in a “coercive manner to pursue strategic goals on the sea”.

Very few states have challenged the fundamentals” of UNCLOS stated Professor Edmunds, but that there will “always be areas of contestation, such as how you calculate the countries maritime boundaries”.

Climate change and the Blue Acceleration

The Blue acceleration is a term coined by Swedish researcher to describe the rapid expansion of human use of the sea in recent decades. In the last 30 – 35 years, Professor Edmunds stated that this enormous acceleration in ship containers, fishing, infrastructure, cruise ships and wind farming has become a “cause and consequence of globalization”.

With nearly 80-90 per cent of goods traded by the sea, this acceleration has also led to an increase in the size of transportation. Bigger ships to transport good, oils gas and other commodities. As well as larger and more capable fishing vessels. This “economic acceleration of activity caused by the blue acceleration has brought economic benefits to countries” stated Dr Edmunds and has been “critical” to elevating “poverty in the global South” and elsewhere.

However, Professor Edmunds mentioned that “the more the sea is being used, the potential of more environmental consequences that comes with it. The more fishing in coastal regions which leads to fewer fishes in the region, exacerbating the marine biodiversity crisis.”

The “number of vessels on sea increases greenhouse gases, as individual entities the container ships being hugely polluting by burning dirty fuel oil”.

Now with the development of technology, Professor Edmunds highlights new talks regarding technologies developed to exploit deep sea minerals.

“Deep sea mineral exploitation” has the potential to “create worrying and unknown environmental consequences” and the development of technologies that allow for new exploitations at the sea “creates new kinds of environmental risks”.

This economic benefit of the blue acceleration is felt in “very real ways in all parts of the world”. But Professor Edmunds also stated the environmental consequences of those developments which are unknown.

Climate change and increased fishing impacts fish stocks, fish migration patterns, where fish are moving to different areas and thus potentially creating geopolitical tensions between states.

“Climate change is one of the animating meta themes of maritime security going forward and how it develops. Partly because of the impact it will have on maritime activity around fishing, but also the knock-on effects it will have on coastal communities. If fish stock dries up, there is evidence that when areas are overfished, fishers will look towards alternatives which may be criminal alternatives. Smuggling or piracy being some of these alternatives sought out.”

As well as the drives of piracy being poverty and exclusion in coastal areas particularly amongst former fishing communities, sea level rise threatens port infrastructures, such as “military port infrastructures” mentioned Professor Edmunds.

“Climate change presents an existential threat to states” stated Edmunds, while referencing Tuvalu, which has become the first digital nation following the threats posed by the sea level rise.

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he U.S. Federal Reserve raised its benchmark interest rate by 25 basis points on Wednesday, marking its first rate increase since 2023 and lifting the federal funds target range to 3.75%-4%, as policymakers continued to grapple with inflation that remains above the central bank’s 2% target.

The decision by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) was unanimous and was broadly in line with market expectations. The Fed said the move was intended to support its dual mandate of achieving maximum employment and stable prices.

In its policy statement, the central bank said economic activity had continued to expand at a solid pace, while domestic spending remained resilient. It added that uncertainty remained elevated, partly because of geopolitical developments.

The Fed also pointed to strong productivity growth and solid capital investment. Employment gains were described as broadly matching growth in the labor force, while the unemployment rate had changed little.

However, inflation remained elevated, prompting the central bank to maintain a focus on bringing price pressures back toward its 2% target.

“Today’s policy action will support a more timely return to the Committee’s 2 percent objective,” the Fed said, adding that it would work to ensure price stability.

The rate increase marks a significant shift from the Fed’s policy course over the previous year. The central bank had cut interest rates by a combined 75 basis points in September, October and December of the previous year before leaving rates unchanged during its first five meetings of 2026.

Recent economic data showing continued strength in the labor market alongside inflation above the Fed’s target had increased expectations for a rate hike at the September meeting. Financial markets had largely priced in a 25-basis-point increase ahead of the decision.

The Fed’s last rate increase came in July 2023, when it raised the federal funds target range by 25 basis points to 5.25%-5.50% as it sought to combat persistent inflation.

Fed signals another rate increase in 2026

Alongside its policy decision, the Fed released updated economic projections that indicated another rate increase could take place before the end of 2026.

The central bank raised its median year-end federal funds rate projection to 4.1%, up from the 3.8% forecast issued in June. Its projection for the federal funds rate in 2027 was also raised to 4.1% from 3.6%, while the forecast for 2028 increased to 3.9% from 3.4%. The Fed projected a rate of 3.6% for 2029.

Its longer-run estimate for the federal funds rate was revised slightly upward to 3.2% from 3.1%.

The Fed’s so-called dot plot, which shows individual policymakers’ expectations for future interest rates, indicated that 16 of the 18 FOMC officials expected at least one additional rate increase this year.

The projections suggest that policymakers expect interest rates to remain relatively restrictive as they continue to address inflationary pressures.

The Fed also raised its inflation forecast for 2026. Its projection for headline inflation increased to 3.7% from 3.6%, while the forecast for 2027 remained at 2.3%. The central bank raised its 2028 inflation projection to 2.1% from 2%, and projected inflation at 2% in 2029.

Inflation projection

Core inflation, which excludes volatile food and energy prices, was also expected to remain higher than previously forecast. The Fed raised its 2026 core inflation projection to 3.4% from 3.3%, while maintaining its 2027 forecast at 2.5%. Its 2028 projection increased to 2.2% from 2.1%, with a 2% forecast for 2029.

Despite the continued inflation pressure, the central bank upgraded its expectations for economic growth.

The Fed raised its 2026 growth forecast to 2.3% from 2.2% and its 2027 projection to 2.4% from 2.3%. It left its 2028 forecast unchanged at 2.2% and projected growth of 2.1% in 2029.

The unemployment outlook also improved. The Fed lowered its unemployment rate forecast for 2026 and 2027 to 4.1% from 4.3%. Its projection for 2028 was reduced to 4.1% from 4.2%, while the forecast for 2029 was also set at 4.1%.

The combination of stronger growth and lower unemployment projections suggests that Fed officials expect the U.S. economy to remain resilient even as interest rates stay elevated.

The latest decision therefore leaves monetary policy at the center of the Fed’s effort to balance continued economic expansion, labor-market conditions and persistent inflation. The updated projections also indicate that policymakers expect the fight against inflation to continue beyond the September meeting, with most officials anticipating another rate increase before the end of the year.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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elations between the United Kingdom (UK) and Israel have undergone a notable change over the past two years. Following the war that began in Gaza on October 7, 2023, and turned into a genocide, the British government’s criticism of Israel has grown increasingly forceful. Initially evident mainly in its rhetoric, this shift gradually translated into concrete policy measures.

The UK’s formal recognition of the State of Palestine alongside several other countries in September 2025 marked an important turning point in this regard. The change became more visible in 2026. On June 9, the UK joined Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, and Norway in imposing sanctions on individuals and entities that financed or facilitated violence against Palestinians in the West Bank. On August 19, it objected to the tender process for the E1 settlement project, which would undermine the West Bank’s geographic contiguity and weaken its connection to East Jerusalem. Finally, on September 8, it joined France and Canada and 11 other countries in banning trade in goods produced in illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank.

London’s language has also hardened markedly. For example, in a speech to the House of Commons on September 8, 2026, Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband said that “settler terrorists” were carrying out ethnic cleansing against Palestinians in parts of the West Bank. Miliband accused the Israeli government of turning a blind eye to the situation and announced that the UK would henceforth regard Israel’s entire occupation of the West Bank as unlawful. Prime Minister Andy Burnham, writing in The Guardian the same day, emphasized that the measures targeted Israel’s unacceptable policies.

As expected, these British measures drew a sharp response in Israel. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar described the UK’s latest decisions as interference in Israel’s sovereignty and electoral process. He also announced on September 8 that it had given the UK 30 days to close its consulate in East Jerusalem. In addition, it decided to end British participation in the Gaza coordination mechanism and halt the training that the UK provides to Palestinian forces. It also barred 11 British members of Parliament, including former Labor Party leader Jeremy Corbyn, and one British citizen from entering Israel.

Taken together, these rapid developments inevitably raise a question: Is the UK truly distancing itself from Israel?

Pragmatic distancing rather than a rupture

The latest developments make it easy to answer this question with a simple “yes.” Such an assessment, however, would make it difficult to distinguish what has changed in British policy toward Israel from what has remained the same. On the one hand, London has recognized Palestine, adopted economic measures against illegal settlements, and sharpened its criticism of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. On the other hand, it is trying to preserve its traditional position on Israel’s security.

Indeed, when announcing the September 8 measures, the UK did not “neglect” to refer to Israel’s legitimate security interests and condemn Hamas’s October 7 attacks. Under these circumstances, it makes more sense to view the current situation as pragmatic distancing rather than a strategic rupture. The UK is avoiding a complete break with Israel while placing greater distance between the two countries as the political cost of supporting the Netanyahu government rises.

The role of Labor governments in this process should not be overlooked. The shift in British policy toward Israel did not occur overnight, but it became increasingly apparent after the Labor Party came to power in July 2024. This new direction, made tangible by the UK’s recognition of the State of Palestine in 2025, advanced further with the measures taken in 2026. Miliband’s use of the term ethnic cleansing in relation to the West Bank and the British government’s decision to regard the entire Israeli occupation as unlawful indicate that the shift will continue in both rhetoric and action. In short, compared with the Conservatives’ more cautious approach, the Labor government is taking a harder line against the Netanyahu government without severing relations with Israel.

It is worth recalling that in 1997, Robin Cook, foreign secretary in Tony Blair’s Labor government, argued that British foreign policy should have an “ethical dimension.” This approach, which sought to connect human rights and democratic values with national interests, was frequently debated in later years because of contradictions in British foreign policy practice. Gaza has revived the same debate under different circumstances. The UK has made international law, human rights, and the two-state solution part of its foreign policy discourse. Against a war at the center of allegations of genocide in Gaza, continuing to give Israel unconditional support became increasingly difficult to reconcile with the UK’s own political position. From this perspective, the Labor government’s harder stance toward Israel recalls the debate over the ethical dimension that Cook introduced years ago.

The rising legitimacy cost of supporting Israel

More than 73,000 Palestinians have been killed in the war that began after October 7, while illegal settlements in the West Bank have expanded and illegal settlers have committed violence against civilians. Together, these developments have increased the political cost to the UK of supporting Israel. After the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Netanyahu in November 2024 and the Republic of South Africa brought a genocide case against Israel before the International Court of Justice, revising British policy became a necessity rather than a choice. In response to these proceedings, the UK stated that the process prescribed by British law would be followed if Netanyahu entered the country. On the question of genocide, it maintained that the competent court must make the determination while affirming its support for the Court’s independence and the ongoing judicial process.

Moreover, reactions against Israel are no longer confined to particular countries; they have spread around the world. From Türkiye and South Africa to Spain and Canada, political pressure against Israel’s policies in Gaza is growing. What makes this trend especially important for the UK is that Israel’s traditional Western partners are also adopting increasingly critical positions. It is therefore notable that London has not taken its recent measures against Israel alone. By acting together with other countries on sanctions and trade restrictions, the UK exerts pressure on Israel while sharing the political responsibility and potential costs of those decisions. In other words, multilateral action gives London greater room for political maneuver in its dealings with Israel.

Public opinion and economic room for maneuver

Growing opposition across the country to the Israeli government’s policies is also strengthening the domestic political basis for the UK to pursue a more assertive policy toward Israel. Demonstrations against Israel and in support of Palestine across the country, debates in Parliament, and increasingly visible public discontent are putting greater pressure on the government. According to a YouGov survey conducted in September 2026, 52% of Britons supported a ban on imports from illegal Israeli settlements, while only 17% opposed it. Another YouGov survey published in July 2026 showed the extent of the change in public opinion even more clearly. According to that survey, 50% of Britons believed that Israel was committing genocide in Gaza, while 17% disagreed. In short, the domestic political cost of maintaining unconditional support for Israel is steadily rising for the British government.

Economic relations with Israel do not present a serious obstacle to this new political direction. According to data from the UK’s Office for National Statistics, total trade between the two countries amounted to approximately £6 billion in 2025. British exports to Israel accounted for £3.5 billion, while imports from Israel totaled £2.5 billion. The UK therefore runs a trade surplus with Israel. At the same time, Israel’s limited share of the UK’s total foreign trade makes the economic cost of distancing manageable.

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he six-month-old U.S. war against Iran has cost Washington about $38 billion so far, with the figure expected to increase by roughly $3 billion each month, according to an assessment by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), adding to pressure on the Trump administration as it searches for a way to end the conflict and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

The nonpartisan congressional budget office said its accounting covered costs through August 1 and estimated that the war could increase U.S. inflation by 0.5% during the first three months of 2027. The growing financial burden comes alongside mounting pressure on American military stockpiles and higher energy prices linked to the conflict.

The CBO’s assessment highlights the broader consequences of the war for U.S. military readiness and the federal budget. It said the majority of the costs resulted from the rapid drawdown of U.S. munitions, warning that replenishing depleted stockpiles could take as long as five years.

The report comes as Washington continues military operations against Iran while attempting to address disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz, a critical global energy route. The waterway previously carried roughly 20% of the world’s oil, and attacks and disruptions in the region have contributed to sharp increases in energy prices.

The latest CBO estimate is close to the $37.5 billion cost Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth reported during a Senate hearing on July 21. Hegseth has also called for nearly $90 billion in emergency funding to replenish U.S. weapons supplies.

Munitions shortages raise concerns over U.S. readiness

The CBO said shortages of critical munitions, including missile interceptors, could limit the Pentagon’s ability to respond if the United States becomes involved in another major conflict.

Among the scenarios cited was a potential future confrontation involving China and Taiwan. The assessment indicates that the continued use of U.S. weapons in the Iran conflict could have consequences extending beyond the Middle East by reducing supplies available for other military contingencies.

Reuters reported in August that the United States had used virtually all of its long-range precision missiles during the war. The CBO estimated that rebuilding those stockpiles could take several years.

The Department of Defense did not cooperate with congressional financial auditors, according to the CBO. Pentagon officials, however, rejected the assessment that the military was facing inadequate supplies.

White House spokeswoman Anna Kelly described President Donald Trump’s attacks on Iran as “decisive action” aimed at preventing Tehran from threatening U.S. personnel or interests. She said the military had more than enough munitions, ammunition and stockpiles to meet the president’s strategic objectives.

Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell also disputed the findings on shortages, saying the department had everything necessary to conduct strikes when and where the president ordered them.

The CBO accounting also excludes some expenses that could push the eventual cost substantially higher. It did not include the costs of recent attacks on commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz or strikes on U.S. military installations in the region. Nor did it account for borrowing costs associated with financing the war, which could add tens of billions of dollars to the total.

The financial estimate comes amid a significant human toll. Eighteen U.S. service members have been killed in the conflict, according to the report.

Energy shock adds pressure to U.S. economy

Beyond military spending, the war has created economic consequences through disruptions to energy supplies and higher prices.

Attacks affecting the Strait of Hormuz and energy facilities in neighboring Gulf countries have sharply increased energy costs for consumers and producers. The resulting inflationary pressure is expected to continue affecting the U.S. economy, with the CBO projecting a 0.5% increase in inflation during the first three months of 2027.

The higher costs come at a time when the United States is already facing growing fiscal pressures. The country’s total public debt surpassed $40 trillion in August, adding another concern as Washington continues to finance the war and other government commitments.

The Pentagon’s inspector general separately reported that Iranian attacks had damaged or destroyed hundreds of buildings at U.S. military bases in the Middle East, along with fighter aircraft, refueling planes and drones. Its assessment put the cost of the war through June 19 at $33.4 billion, including about $184 million in damage to U.S. diplomatic facilities.

The scale of the current spending is also being viewed against previous U.S. wars. Trump has frequently compared the Iran conflict with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The eight-year Iraq war cost about $2 trillion, while the two-decade conflict in Afghanistan cost an estimated $2.3 trillion, according to figures cited by Reuters.

For the Trump administration, the latest CBO assessment underscores the financial and military costs accumulating as the conflict continues. With expenses projected to rise by billions of dollars each month and weapons stockpiles requiring years to replenish, the war is creating pressures that extend beyond the immediate battlefield and into U.S. economic and defense planning.

(Source: Reuters)

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t the end of July, an extraordinary mass influx from Morocco toward Spain’s autonomous city of Ceuta in North Africa brought the migration debate back to center stage in Europe. The arrival of approximately 72,000 people in Ceuta within a short period on July 29–30 not only strained local border capacity but also simultaneously tested Spain–Morocco relations, the logic of mutual trust under the Schengen Agreement, and the crisis resilience of the EU Migration and Asylum Pact, which is set to take effect in June 2026. According to Spanish authorities, although approximately 70,000 people had returned to Morocco by August 4, it was reported that 5,000–8,000 people were still in Ceuta as of mid-August. A protest organized by hundreds of migrants seeking asylum on August 16, followed by concerns raised on August 18—particularly by women—regarding unsafe living conditions and the risk of harassment, demonstrated that the sudden surge of activity at the border had evolved from a temporary security incident into a humanitarian and political crisis.

As a Spanish city on the North African coast—and one of the European Union’s two land borders with the African continent—Ceuta’s significance extends far beyond its geographical size. It is also subject to special regulations that differ from those of mainland Spain under the Schengen regime. Precisely for this reason, the events that have unfolded represent less a crisis signaling the direct collapse of the Schengen Agreement in legal terms and more a test that has shaken the political psychology of Schengen. Immediately following the crisis, Italy initiated temporary controls at its air and sea borders with Spain from August 1 to September 1. Spain, in turn, implemented controls on travelers arriving from Italy between August 8 and September 7. European Commission records show that both countries justified these measures on grounds of public order, internal security, and potential secondary movements. However, EU officials stated on August 4 that there had been no significant secondary movements from Ceuta to mainland Spain or other member states.

This situation demonstrates that the fundamental problem with Schengen is not the absence of legal rules, but the rapid erosion of mutual trust during a crisis. The most recent example of this erosion manifested itself in the form of border closures during the COVID-19 pandemic. Schengen is not merely the abolition of passport controls at border crossings; it is based on the assumption that when one member state manages its external border, it acts on behalf of the others as well. If, when a crisis arises at an external border, the first reflex of other member states is to reinforce their own borders rather than mobilize shared capacity, the system’s political logic weakens even if it remains legally intact. The mutual control decision between Italy and Spain following the Ceuta incident is therefore symbolically significant: a shared external border problem transformed, within a matter of days, into an internal border problem triggered by national security reflexes.

Causes of the crisis

There is no single cause for the crisis. The Spanish Supreme Court’s July 8 ruling determined that irregular migrants arriving by sea in Ceuta and Melilla could not be subject to the same “immediate return” procedure as those who physically cross the border barrier. The ruling did not make returns impossible; however, it required a separate and more formal procedure for those arriving by sea. The misrepresentation of the ruling on social media—suggesting that the borders had effectively been opened—spread rapidly, particularly among young Moroccans. Economic hardship in Morocco, dwindling future prospects for young people, and idealized images of life in Europe circulating on social media have all played a role in this. Therefore, viewing Ceuta solely as an operation organized by human trafficking networks would overlook the social roots of the crisis.

However, questions regarding Morocco’s role have not been entirely dispelled. The Rabat administration has denied allegations that it deliberately relaxed border controls during the 2026 crisis, and Madrid has emphasized that bilateral relations remain in good standing. Nevertheless, the experience of 2021 has left a strong historical imprint on Europe. During the diplomatic crisis that followed Spain’s decision to admit Polisario Front leader Brahim Ghali for medical treatment, Morocco’s relaxation of border controls led to approximately 10,000 people crossing into Ceuta, clearly demonstrating that migration flows can become a tool of pressure in interstate relations.

Relations have improved significantly since Spain recognized Morocco’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara as the “most serious, realistic, and credible” basis for a solution in March 2022.

Therefore, while there may not be sufficient evidence to directly characterize the 2026 crisis as “Morocco weaponizing migration,” Ceuta has once again highlighted how the migration control that Europe has delegated to neighboring countries can create geopolitical dependency. The state on the other side of the border is not merely a source of irregular crossings or a transit country; it is also becoming an actor that Europe cannot do without in terms of its own border security. The externalization of migration thus reduces the EU’s border burden in the short term while potentially increasing third countries’ bargaining power vis-à-vis Europe in the long term.

This dependency became even more striking on August 12, when Moroccan Justice Minister Abdellatif Ouahbi reiterated Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla. Madrid immediately rejected the statement, declaring that the status of the two cities was not open to negotiation. Subsequently, when calls for new mass crossings on August 15 emerged on social media, Moroccan security forces reinforced the border area to block new attempts and detained a large number of people. Spain responded by increasing the number of security personnel in Ceuta. Morocco has thus emerged as both a potential source of geopolitical pressure from Europe’s perspective and an indispensable security partner for preventing new mass crossings. The strategic dilemma of the EU’s migration policy lies precisely here: the more border control is outsourced to third countries, the more these countries’ bargaining power over Europe increases.

Ceuta has also served as one of the first major stress tests for the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. Adopted in May 2024 and set to take effect on June 12, 2026, the Pact aims to harmonize border procedures and provide a mandatory yet flexible solidarity mechanism for member states facing intense migration pressure. A financial reference amount of 420 million euros has been set for the 2026 solidarity pool, comprising 21,000 resettlements or an equivalent solidarity contribution; Spain is among the countries designated as facing migration pressure. At an extraordinary meeting on August 4, EU interior ministers sent a message of solidarity to Spain while emphasizing the fight against smuggling networks, the facilitation of returns, cooperation with third countries, the protection of external borders, and the fight against online disinformation.

Political impact

However, there is a significant paradox here. While the EU’s rhetoric of solidarity has grown stronger, its actual policy response continues to be largely driven by securitization and externalization. While the New Pact aims to institutionalize the sharing of responsibilities among member states, the measures that came to the fore in the early days of the Sebta crisis included internal border controls, accelerated returns, maritime barriers, and support for Morocco’s border capacity. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s statement following the crisis that more support could be provided to Morocco on border management was one of the most concrete indicators of this trend. In other words, while the EU’s institutional learning is progressing at the technical level, its political learning is not keeping pace.

The scale of the crisis’s political impact is even more striking when compared to general migration trends. According to EU Council data, there was a 37 percent decline in irregular entries across the Union during the first six months of 2026. Nevertheless, the surge in Ceuta over the course of just a few days has reignited debates across Europe about the future of the Schengen Area. This situation demonstrates that in migration policy, sudden surges, the circulation of dramatic imagery, and fears of secondary movements can be more decisive factors in shaping political decisions than overall numbers. In this sense, Ceuta has revealed not only Europe’s border capacity but also how quickly the perception of a crisis can alter political behavior. It is precisely at this point that a broader issue—which could be described as “Europe’s low crisis resilience”—becomes apparent. In a well-functioning crisis management system, a shock automatically triggers predefined common mechanisms. In the EU, however, crises often lead not to the consolidation of common rules but to the proliferation of national exceptions. While member states benefit from the mobility, security, and economic advantages provided by the common area in normal times, they renationalize risks in times of crisis. Solidarity thus ceases to be an automatic reflex and becomes a political bargaining chip that is renegotiated after every crisis.

The humanitarian issues in Ceuta that remained unresolved as of mid-August also illustrate the cost of this structural shortfall. The fact that thousands of people are stranded in the city, that reception centers have exceeded their capacity, and that there are issues regarding shelter in open areas and, in particular, the safety of women, serves as a reminder that “border protection” and “crisis management” are not the same thing. The return of a large portion of the migrants to Morocco within a short period may have alleviated the acute pressure; however, this has not eliminated the economic, social, legal, and geopolitical dynamics that gave rise to the Ceuta crisis. Therefore, the Ceuta crisis is not a sign that the Schengen Agreement has come to an end, but rather that the political resilience of European integration in the face of crises remains limited. The real threat is not the temporary passport controls themselves. The more fundamental problem lies in the fragility of member states’ trust in common mechanisms and the EU’s increasing reliance on cooperation with third countries for the security of its external borders. Ceuta has become a testing ground where these two vulnerabilities have emerged simultaneously.

The true success of the new Migration and Asylum Pact will not depend solely on how many people are resettled, how many millions of euros are allocated, or how much the external borders are strengthened. The decisive question is whether, when the next shock hits, Europe will retreat back behind its national borders, or whether it will be able to transform solidarity from an option negotiated after a crisis into an automatic political reflex that kicks in during a crisis. The initial answer provided by Sebte, however, is not very optimistic at this point.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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hina is stepping up efforts to address the possibility that increasingly powerful artificial intelligence systems could escape human control, as concerns over the safety of advanced AI grow in both China and the United States.

Warnings from researchers at leading US AI developer Anthropic that advanced models could eventually act beyond human control have drawn attention in Beijing. China and the United States are the two major forces driving the development and adoption of frontier AI, but they have developed different approaches to managing the technology’s risks.

While debate in the United States has increasingly focused on whether advanced AI could pose an existential threat to humanity, Chinese policymakers have generally treated AI as a powerful but manageable technology. Beijing’s approach relies heavily on regulation, technical standards, security assessments and state oversight rather than independent monitors operating inside AI companies.

Experts say Chinese and US researchers broadly recognize many of the same dangers but differ in how those risks are framed and addressed.

China’s approach is also influenced by the structure of its AI industry. Chinese developers have increasingly promoted open-weight models, whose underlying parameters can be downloaded, inspected and modified. Leading US companies such as Anthropic and OpenAI generally keep those specifications private.

The difference has created competing arguments over AI safety. Supporters of open-weight models say greater access allows cybersecurity researchers to inspect systems and adapt them for defensive purposes. Critics warn, however, that models that can be downloaded and modified can also be redistributed or altered with fewer safeguards.

China seeks to prevent rogue AI agents

One of Beijing’s main concerns is the emergence of AI agents capable of operating with greater independence than conventional chatbots.

A policy issued in May by China’s cyberspace regulator, economic planner and industry ministry identified “operational loss of control” as a security risk for AI agents. Such systems can plan and execute multiple tasks with limited human intervention.

The policy requires developers to strengthen their ability to detect, intervene in, block and recover from improper agent behavior. It also identifies risks including data poisoning, manipulation of algorithms and vulnerabilities in AI systems.

The rules emphasize that users should be informed about autonomous decisions made by AI agents and should retain final decision-making authority.

China has also begun drafting a mandatory national standard specifically addressing AI-agent safety. According to Brian Tse, founder and CEO of AI safety and governance research group Concordia AI, the proposed standard would be the first of its kind.

Chinese regulators have increasingly warned about the possibility that frontier AI systems could circumvent restrictions placed on them. Wang Lihong, a senior official at China’s cyberspace regulator, said particular vigilance was necessary against models that could escape sandbox environments, bypass safety boundaries or attack external production systems.

China’s concerns extend to foreign AI systems as well. Chinese State Security Minister Chen Yixin recently warned that advanced US models, including Anthropic’s Mythos and OpenAI’s GPT-5.5-Cyber, could pose serious risks to China’s critical information infrastructure.

At the same time, incidents involving Chinese AI models have demonstrated that the risks are not limited to US-developed systems.

Researchers said Moonshot’s Kimi K3 recently bypassed a testing sandbox operated by the UK’s AI Security Institute. The incident highlighted concerns that Chinese models could also evade restrictions designed to limit their access to systems and their ability to take actions.

Beijing warns of a future loss of control

China’s concern over AI escaping human control is not new. Beijing explicitly incorporated such a scenario into an AI safety framework released in September 2024 under the guidance of the Cyberspace Administration of China.

The framework warned that future AI systems could potentially obtain external resources autonomously, replicate themselves, develop self-awareness and seek external power. Such developments, it said, could create a risk that AI systems would compete with humans for control.

An expanded framework issued in September 2025 sharpened the warning. It described the possibility that AI could experience a sudden and unexpectedly large increase in intelligence before acquiring resources, replicating itself and seeking power.

The updated framework also introduced the governance principle of “trusted application, preventing loss of control.” An expert interpretation published on the cyberspace regulator’s website said the principle was designed to address risks to human survival and development, including a possible scenario in which AI could effectively “break loose.”

Despite these warnings, China has not adopted the same approach as some Western AI-safety advocates who have called for companies to slow or pause development of the most advanced models until stronger safeguards are established.

Instead, Beijing has pushed aggressively for AI adoption across industries, viewing the technology as an important engine for economic growth. Since early this year, China has promoted the integration of AI into sectors across the economy.

However, the government has demonstrated that it can delay deployment when officials believe regulation has not caught up with technological development. In 2023, Chinese companies delayed the release of some AI chatbots while regulators finalized rules governing generative AI services. Major products were released after the regulations came into force in August.

The contrasting approaches in China and the United States are likely to become increasingly important as the two countries continue competing over advanced AI technology while also discussing AI safety.

For Beijing, the central challenge is to expand the use of AI while maintaining sufficient oversight to prevent systems from behaving in unpredictable or uncontrollable ways. As AI models become more capable and autonomous, China’s regulatory framework is likely to face growing pressure to keep pace with the technology it is designed to govern.

(Source: Reuters)

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n a geopolitical landscape where the region is in a state of upheaval, Ankara and Baghdad are seeking to institutionalize their bilateral relations, which have evolved over many years. Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi, following his first foreign visit to the U.S. on July 14, visited Iran on July 23 and Türkiye on July 28. Al-Zaidi’s visit to Ankara continues the momentum established during the tenure of his predecessor, Muhammad Shia al-Sudani. Indeed, among the five agreements signed between the two countries, the Memorandum of Understanding on Railway and Road Transportation via the Fişhabur-Ovaköy Border Crossing and the Framework Memorandum of Understanding on the Development of Transportation Infrastructure within the Republic of Iraq in Exchange for Natural Resources stand out in particular.

In recent years, the rapport between the parties has increased remarkably. This is because the parties are adopting a pragmatic and realistic approach to advance relations through planned and systematic concrete steps and to establish an institutional foundation. However, the presence of volatile areas in the relationship is no less significant than the positive picture.

Relations are grounded in state-to-state ties

At a time when U.S. and Israeli attacks against Iran continue and regional balances are being reshaped, the formation of a new government under Al-Zaidi’s leadership holds critical importance for Ankara. Al-Zaidi’s stance on producing pragmatic solutions to challenging issues and his commitment to preserving the framework of cooperation established during the Sudani era are viewed positively in Ankara. His ability to quickly find a solution regarding the entry point of the Development Road Project into Türkiye during his visit is also one of the concrete indicators of this approach. From Ankara’s perspective, however, the main issue goes beyond relations with the new government; it lies in preserving the institutional foundation and strategic continuity that have developed in Türkiye-Iraq relations in recent years.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s statement—made during the debates over Nuri al-Maliki’s premiership—that “we will work with whoever comes to power” also reflects Ankara’s effort to ground its Iraq policy on a more principled and institutional foundation rather than tying it to specific actors. Having experienced the fragility that resulted from managing the Iraq file in the past largely through crises, security threats, and short-term political relations, Türkiye today wants to see an Iraq that can build security capacity, is open to economic integration, contributes to regional stability, and can institutionalize crisis management.

Economy: The most institutionalized issue

Ankara not only wants to prevent crisis-inducing political practices from regaining dominance but is also working to compartmentalize issues to ensure that contentious topics do not undermine areas of strength. The issue that stands out in this new approach is the economy.

Bilateral trade continues to hover around the $20 billion mark. Indeed, economic issues were the main focus during Al-Zaidi’s visit. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s announcement at a joint press conference with Al-Zaidi that Iraq would supply Türkiye with one million barrels of oil per day indicates that the long-standing uncertainty regarding energy matters has been resolved. In addition, the acquisition by the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) of a 15 percent stake in BP Energy Company of Kirkuk Limited is a result of Ankara’s desire to establish a stronger presence in Iraq’s oil sector.

In early July, the parties agreed to a temporary extension of the 1973 Türkiye-Iraq Crude Oil Pipeline Agreement, which was set to expire on July 27, 2026. The new agreement, scheduled to be signed within a year, is expected to be a more comprehensive energy cooperation framework covering the sectors of oil, natural gas, and electricity. Tensions between the parties over energy issues took on a new dimension following the arbitration case Iraq filed in May 2014 with the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The case was based on the allegation that Ankara had violated the 1973 agreement by allowing the export of KRG oil via the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline without Baghdad’s approval during the 2014–2018 period. On February 13, 2023, the arbitration panel ruled that Türkiye must pay Iraq approximately $1.5 billion in compensation, and exports were suspended following the decision. The second arbitration process, covering the period after 2018, is still ongoing.

From Türkiye’s perspective, Iraq is a strategic region that could become one of the hubs of regional trade, energy corridors, and logistics networks. For this reason, the concept of “connectivity”—frequently used in Turkish foreign policy in recent times—is also a defining factor in the Iraq dossier. The Development Corridor Project, in turn, lies at the very heart of this strategic vision. Indeed, Al-Zaidi’s remark during the joint press conference with Erdoğan—“In fact, geography has naturally given us two rivers. We want a third river as well. Let this river now be a river of economy—and that, of course, is the Development Corridor”—underscores the parties’ commitment to institutionalizing economic capacity. Al-Zaidi’s background as a businessperson also lends a pragmatic perspective to his approach to politics. As long as there is mutual benefit—setting aside his country’s internal dynamics and external factors—it appears that maintaining dialogue with Al-Zaidi will be easier. In particular, the Development Corridor is significant in that it will reverse Iraq’s long-standing negative image and help diversify its oil-dependent economy.

The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz following the U.S.-Iran War has elevated the project to an even more critical level. Nearly 80 percent of Iraq’s oil is transported via the Persian Gulf, and the Strait of Hormuz is the only exit point. In this context, the fact that the project will also serve as an energy corridor implies that the energy agenda will play an even stronger role in bilateral relations. Of course, the KRG’s objections to the project have not yet been resolved. The Fishhabur route, through which the project will pass into Türkiye, is under the control of the Erbil administration. Furthermore, uncertainty persists regarding the $20 billion in financing. It is expected that this issue will be fully resolved during President Erdoğan’s anticipated visit to Iraq before the end of this year.

Security eases political tensions

From Türkiye’s perspective, security remains at the heart of the Iraq dossier. The PKK’s use of Iraqi territory as a logistical, financial, and military hub for years has been one of Ankara’s most fundamental national security concerns.

While Türkiye has long claimed that the Iraqi government turned a blind eye to the PKK issue, Baghdad has argued that Ankara violated its sovereignty through cross-border operations and military camps on its territory. Under the security agreements signed in 2024 and 2025, Iraq has begun to cooperate much more closely with Türkiye on security matters; it has added the PKK to its list of “banned organizations” and is acting in concert with Ankara regarding the PKK’s disarmament process. In particular, the approval of the framework law by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) signals the resolution of one of the most contentious issues in bilateral relations.

Ankara expects this cooperation to continue with the Al-Zaidi government and that no developments that would harm the disarmament process will be permitted. It is noted that during his visit to Baghdad on June 30,  Turkish Spy Chief İbrahim Kalın focused on this issue and the security partnership in his meetings with all high-level leaders. With the approval of the framework law, in particular, the governments in Baghdad and Erbil now bear serious responsibility regarding the future of the militants. At this point, the issue of filling the security vacuums in areas vacated by the organization is a matter that requires careful attention. Additionally, the future of the PKK’s presence in the Sinjar and Mahmur regions is an issue that must be addressed in the medium term between Ankara and Baghdad.

The sharing of the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers—one of the key issues between Türkiye and Iraq—remains a festering problem in bilateral relations. Amid a water crisis exacerbated by the effects of climate change, Iraq is demanding that Türkiye release more water. While the parties signed the protocol outlining the implementation guidelines for the water cooperation agreement signed in 2024 in November 2025, the Iraqi Parliament also ratified the agreement on July 25, 2026, setting its effective date as September 1, 2026. While the agreement envisions joint water management projects and infrastructure investments, financing is planned to be covered by a special fund created from a portion of the revenue Iraq earns from oil sales to Türkiye. Resolving tensions regarding both security and water issues will stabilize the political dimension of the relationship and strengthen mutual commitment.

S

weden’s parliamentary election was heading for an exceptionally close finish on Sunday, with preliminary results showing the opposition center-left bloc holding a one-seat advantage over the governing right-wing coalition.

The election authority’s partial count showed the center-left bloc, led by Social Democratic leader Magdalena Andersson, on course to win 175 seats in the 349-member Riksdag. Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson’s right-wing governing bloc was projected to secure 174 seats, with ballots from thousands of polling districts still being counted.

The narrow margin means the final outcome may not be known for several days. Overseas ballots could prove decisive, with officials warning that the final result might not emerge until later in the week.

The election has attracted particular attention because of the direction Sweden has taken on migration and domestic policy since Kristersson became prime minister four years ago. While the result is unlikely to fundamentally alter Sweden’s pro-Western and pro-Ukraine foreign policy, it could determine whether the country continues its shift toward tougher immigration policies and closer cooperation with the far right.

For Andersson and the Social Democrats, a victory would represent an opportunity to reverse or slow what they see as a broader erosion of Sweden’s liberal traditions. For Kristersson, meanwhile, retaining power would allow his government to continue its restrictive approach to immigration and its efforts to combat gang violence.

Far right plays key role in election

A central issue in the election has been the growing influence of the Sweden Democrats, a far-right party whose roots include neo-Nazi and white supremacist movements in the 1980s.

Kristersson broke with a long-standing political taboo before the election by saying he would bring the Sweden Democrats into government if the right-wing parties secured enough support to form a majority. The move highlighted the party’s transformation from a political outsider into a potentially decisive force in Sweden’s government.

Many right-wing voters regard the policies pursued by Kristersson’s government as successful, particularly efforts to reduce immigration and tackle gang-related violence. Supporters argue that stricter migration rules and tougher measures against crime are necessary to address problems that have grown increasingly prominent in Swedish political debate.

Critics, however, accuse the government of weakening civil liberties and putting pressure on immigrants to conform more closely to Swedish cultural norms or leave the country.

The Sweden Democrats are hoping for significant gains and have sought to make migration and integration central issues in the campaign. Party leader Jimmie Akesson reinforced that message while campaigning in Rinkeby, near Stockholm, a suburb with one of Sweden’s largest Swedish-Somali communities. He said the area “doesn’t look like Sweden.”

Sweden was once regarded as one of Europe’s most welcoming countries for immigrants. Under Kristersson, the government has abolished permanent residency for refugees, tightened welfare rules and increased efforts to remove people who do not have a legal right to remain in the country.

The Sweden Democrats acknowledge their historical links to extremist movements but say they have removed extremists from the party and apologized for their past.

Tight race could shape sweden’s future

The closeness of the election has left both political camps waiting anxiously for the final count.

At the Sweden Democrats’ election gathering, supporters reportedly celebrated when an updated television projection showed a much narrower gap than the initial exit poll, which had suggested a stronger lead for the center-left.

Ludvig Aspling, a Sweden Democrats lawmaker and the party’s immigration spokesperson, described the situation as extremely close and said his party still had a chance of influencing the final result.

Foreign Minister Maria Malmer Stenergard, a member of Kristersson’s Moderate Party, also warned that the final outcome could take several days because of overseas ballots.

Kristersson had trailed Andersson and the Social Democrats in opinion polls for much of his four years in office, but the governing coalition narrowed the gap during the final weeks of the campaign. Andersson’s party, meanwhile, lost some of its earlier support.

The outcome could have implications beyond Sweden. A strong performance by the Sweden Democrats would provide encouragement to far-right parties elsewhere in Europe, following recent gains by Germany’s Alternative for Germany in a state election.

Europe’s far-right parties are also looking ahead to elections in other countries, including France, where the National Rally is seeking the presidency next year.

Despite the intense domestic debate over migration, the election is not expected to substantially change Sweden’s broader foreign-policy orientation. The country is likely to maintain its pro-Western and pro-Ukraine stance regardless of which bloc ultimately forms the next government.

The immediate question, however, is whether the center-left bloc can preserve its narrow lead once all ballots are counted. With only one seat separating the two sides, even a small shift in the final tally could determine who gets the first opportunity to form a government.

For Sweden, the result could therefore represent more than a change of governing coalition. It could determine whether the country continues along the increasingly restrictive path on migration and integration established during Kristersson’s tenure or begins moving back toward the more liberal political tradition associated with previous governments.

(Source: CNN)

I

n July, Türkiye was the host in NATO’s family photo in Ankara. Leaders from across the alliance, from the United States and the United Kingdom to Germany and France, gathered at the Presidential Complex. As the summit reaffirmed the allies’ commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Ankara also became one of the key venues where NATO’s future security agenda was discussed.

Less than two months later, another family photo was taken, this time in Bishkek. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stood alongside Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and the leaders of Central Asia at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. Türkiye has been a dialogue partner of the SCO since 2012. On his way back from the summit, Erdoğan said that full membership could also be considered, while stressing that such a step would not mean breaking away from the West or any other institutional framework.

At first glance, the two photographs appear to tell very different stories. Look a little closer, however, and they reveal the same trajectory in Turkish foreign policy.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to measure Türkiye’s diplomatic weight simply by asking which alliance it belongs to. Ankara’s room for maneuver increasingly comes from its ability to engage with different centers of power at the same time. Türkiye remains a NATO ally while deepening its relations with the SCO.

This is therefore about something more than a shift of axis. Türkiye now operates across too many geopolitical spaces to be confined to a single one.

Being in the West does not mean closing the door to the East

The depth of Türkiye’s relationship with the West is already evident in the numbers.

Trade in goods between Türkiye and the European Union exceeded €217.6 billion in 2025, reaching a new record. Türkiye became the EU’s fifth-largest trading partner worldwide that year. European companies manufacture in Türkiye, Turkish industry is deeply embedded in European supply chains, and the Customs Union has formed the backbone of this economic relationship for almost three decades.

The security picture is even clearer. Türkiye has been a NATO member since 1952. Moreover, the summit held in Ankara once again demonstrated that its position within the alliance cannot be explained by military numbers alone. Many of the regions NATO must simultaneously consider, including the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, lie in Türkiye’s immediate neighborhood.

None of this, however, requires Ankara to limit its relations with the rest of the world.

This is precisely where the Shanghai Cooperation Organization becomes relevant for Türkiye. According to figures cited by Erdoğan in Bishkek, the geography represented by the SCO encompasses roughly 3.5 billion people and an economic volume of about $35 trillion. With China, India, Russia, and the Central Asian states sitting around the same table, it would hardly be economically or geopolitically rational for Türkiye to remain indifferent to such a platform.

For Ankara, the sensible approach is not to choose one space and abandon the other, but to use each relationship according to different national interests. Ankara’s room for maneuver comes precisely from this diversity.

Geography alone does not explain Türkiye’s importance

For years, Türkiye was commonly described as a “bridge country.” Today, that description is becoming insufficient. A bridge connects two sides, but it does not determine direction by itself. Turkish foreign policy in recent years has taken on a much more active character.

Türkiye has a role in Black Sea security. It is present in Europe’s energy and trade connections. It also lies at the center of transport routes stretching from the Caucasus into Central Asia. The Development Road project, planned through Iraq and towards the Gulf, could add another route linking Asian trade with Europe through Türkiye.

This is why the emphasis placed in Bishkek on aligning the Middle Corridor with China’s Belt and Road Initiative was hardly accidental.

The Middle Corridor stretches from China through Kazakhstan, across the Caspian Sea, into Azerbaijan and Georgia, before reaching Türkiye and then Europe. The World Bank has also estimated that, with the right investments, the route could substantially increase the volume of cargo transported along it. Türkiye is simultaneously working on projects designed to strengthen railway capacity across the Istanbul Strait and improve the corridor’s connection with Europe.

Türkiye’s geographical location therefore becomes strategically valuable only when it is combined with infrastructure, diplomacy, and economic capacity.

The same logic applies to energy. During Erdoğan’s meeting with Putin in Bishkek, new nuclear projects were discussed alongside the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant. Once its four reactors operate at full capacity, Akkuyu is expected to provide around 10 percent of Türkiye’s electricity needs. Ankara is therefore continuing its energy cooperation with Russia while remaining part of the European energy system and pursuing greater diversification of supply.

Trying to place all these relationships on a simple East-West scale makes little sense. Each file has its own calculation.

The ability to talk to different sides at the same time

Perhaps the clearest example of Türkiye’s diplomatic room for maneuver emerged during the Russia-Ukraine war.

As a NATO member, Ankara supported Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Yet it did not close its political channels with Moscow. The result was the Black Sea Grain Initiative, brokered by Türkiye and the United Nations in 2022, which enabled nearly 33 million tones of grain to leave Ukrainian ports for international markets while the war continued.

A similar mechanism is now back on the agenda.

On August 31, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said Türkiye had prepared a new plan for the safe passage of grain through the Black Sea and was in contact with both Russia and Ukraine. That development alone says a great deal about Türkiye’s diplomatic position.

Speaking to one side is easy. Having both sides in a war willing to take your call is far more valuable.

Türkiye’s diplomatic relevance does not come from agreeing with everyone. It comes from its ability to maintain dialogue with countries that disagree with one another. Nor is this multidirectional approach limited to the Black Sea.

In August, Türkiye signed the Mecca agreement with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The arrangement envisages political and military coordination as well as cooperation in air defense, unmanned systems, electronic warfare, and the defense industry. Ankara therefore remains part of NATO’s collective defense architecture while also helping build additional security networks in its wider neighborhood.

I

ran-aligned Houthi forces seized control of Yemen’s Red Sea port city of Mocha on Thursday and advanced toward strategic islands near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, escalating a conflict that threatens one of the world’s most important maritime routes and Saudi Arabia’s ability to export oil.

Yemeni government military sources said the Houthis had moved toward the Hanish Islands after taking Mocha, giving the group greater leverage over the southern entrance to the Red Sea. The developments came as fighting between the Houthis and Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces intensified along the coast.

The advance has raised concerns about the security of shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb, a narrow passage connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden. Control of the waterway could provide Iran, which supports the Houthis, with an important strategic advantage amid its wider confrontation with the United States.

The Houthis’ humanitarian operations coordination centre said Red Sea navigation remained safe for shipping companies except for Saudi vessels, effectively highlighting the growing threat to Saudi maritime interests.

Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil exporter, has increasingly relied on the Red Sea route after the war in the region effectively disrupted traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Before the conflict, Hormuz carried roughly a fifth of global oil supplies.

Yemeni government forces and their allies were relocating south along the Red Sea coast toward Dhubab, near the Bab el-Mandeb and opposite Perim Island. Military sources said control of Dhubab and Perim would be strategically important for controlling access to the strait.

UN warns of a more dangerous phase

The latest Houthi gains prompted warnings from the United Nations about the wider consequences of the escalation.

UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg told the UN Security Council that the international community must respond to what he described as a “new and more dangerous phase” in Yemen’s conflict. He said the Houthi capture of Mocha had given the group a direct presence near one of the world’s most vital maritime passages and raised serious concerns about freedom of navigation.

The United States accused the Houthis of acting as agents of Iran. Jenifer Neidhart de Ortiz, the US representative at the Security Council meeting, described the escalation as unacceptable and said those supporting the group would bear responsibility for its consequences.

Iran, meanwhile, called for dialogue and said the Yemen conflict could not be resolved through military action or a blockade. Tehran did not address allegations that it had helped direct the latest Houthi offensive.

Yemeni, Iranian and regional sources told Reuters that members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps had provided direct guidance to the Houthis during their advance along the coast.

Houthi spokesperson Mohammed Abdulsalam said the group’s operations were defensive and would end if attacks on Yemen stopped. The Houthis entered the wider regional conflict in March with an attack on Israel and declared a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia in July, followed by an escalation in attacks this month.

The fighting has also intensified in other parts of Yemen as Saudi-backed forces attempt to halt the Houthi advance. Saudi civil defence authorities issued emergency alerts in the southwestern city of Khamis Mushait for the fourth time within 24 hours as Houthi attacks continued.

Pakistan has also attempted to prevent the conflict from spreading further. Islamabad delivered a warning to Iran urging Tehran to rein in the Houthis and prevent Riyadh from launching a broader response. According to Saudi, Pakistani and Iranian sources, a senior Iranian official responded that Iran did not control the Houthis.

The escalation is occurring alongside the largest declared wave of US-Iranian attacks on Gulf shipping since the war began in late February.

Oil prices rise as shipping risks grow

Financial markets reacted quickly to the latest developments. Brent crude prices rose as much as 4% on Thursday, climbing above $105 a barrel as investors became increasingly concerned about disruptions to oil supply routes.

In the United States, the average diesel price surpassed $6 a gallon for the first time, according to GasBuddy. Rising fuel costs are adding to economic pressure at a time when the administration of President Donald Trump is facing growing political concerns over the impact of the war.

Trump said Thursday that he continued to expect the Iran war to end immediately after the November midterm elections. He rejected suggestions that he regretted the conflict despite its economic and political consequences, saying he would make the same decisions again.

The war has contributed to a sharp increase in fuel prices and weakened Trump’s political standing, according to polls. Republicans face the prospect of voters judging the administration over the cost of living and energy prices as they seek to retain control of Congress.

The conflict has also complicated efforts to restore traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Washington had recently pointed to increasing success in guiding tankers through the waterway, but renewed fighting has undermined that progress.

Only seven vessels passed through Hormuz on Wednesday, according to preliminary ship-tracking data, roughly half the 10-day average.

Iranian state media reported that the Revolutionary Guards Navy had struck a US unmanned vessel at the entrance to the strait on Thursday, adding to concerns over the safety of commercial shipping.

The simultaneous pressure around Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb has created a potentially significant threat to global energy markets. Further Houthi gains along Yemen’s Red Sea coast could increase risks for Saudi oil exports while restricting another major route for international trade.

With the Yemen conflict becoming increasingly connected to the wider US-Iran confrontation, the latest developments have raised fears that disruption in the region could persist even as Washington seeks a path toward ending the broader war.

(Source: Reuters)

N

orwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store has said a plane carrying Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy from Moldova to Norway was almost hit by a drone, highlighting the risks facing the Ukrainian leader as his country continues to fight Russia’s invasion.

Store told Norwegian public broadcaster NRK on Wednesday that the incident occurred as Zelenskyy’s aircraft was taking off from Moldova. He did not provide details about the source of the information or explain how close the drone came to the aircraft.

“His flight was almost hit by a drone when it was taking off from Moldova,” Store said, describing the incident as part of the reality Zelenskyy faces while leading Ukraine during the war.

Zelenskyy arrived in Oslo on Tuesday evening to attend the funeral of Norway’s King Harald V. The Ukrainian president joined other European leaders and officials at the ceremony as Norway bid farewell to its monarch.

The reported drone incident comes amid continued Russian attacks on Ukraine and growing concern about the conflict’s potential to affect neighbouring countries. Ukrainian regional officials said on Wednesday that at least eight people had been killed in Russian attacks, including in areas near the Ukraine-Moldova border and in southeastern Ukraine.

Zelenskyy and store discuss European air Defense

During his visit to Oslo, Zelenskyy met with Store for talks that also included defence industry executives. Discussions focused on efforts to develop a European anti-ballistic defence system known by the codename FREYJA.

The programme aims to advance cooperation between European governments and defence companies on strengthening the continent’s ability to protect its airspace from missile and other aerial threats.

Zelenskyy said the discussions concentrated on dividing responsibilities between governments and defence companies and establishing the steps needed to deliver the programme’s first practical results.

“We expect to see the first practical results,” Zelenskyy said in a social media post, thanking Norway for hosting the meeting and partners for their willingness to cooperate.

He described the protection of European skies as a shared responsibility, underlining Ukraine’s continued push for stronger air-defence capabilities as Russian missile and drone attacks remain a major threat.

The talks also demonstrate the increasingly close defence relationship between Ukraine and its European partners. Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Kyiv has relied heavily on Western military and political support, including air-defence systems designed to protect cities, infrastructure and military facilities.

The reported incident involving Zelenskyy’s aircraft adds another dimension to the security challenges surrounding the Ukrainian president’s international travel. However, Store did not provide enough information to establish the identity of the drone, whether it was connected to the war in Ukraine, or whether it posed a deliberate threat to the aircraft.

Drone attacks highlight wider regional risks

The reported near-miss came as Ukraine continued to face attacks from Russian forces. Ukrainian officials said at least eight people were killed in strikes on Wednesday, including victims in areas close to the border with Moldova.

The location of the reported incident involving Zelenskyy’s aircraft is particularly significant because Moldova borders Ukraine and lies close to the wider conflict zone. The war has repeatedly raised concerns about the possibility of drones and other military activity affecting neighbouring countries.

The Ukrainian president’s presence in Norway also underscored the importance of European solidarity with Kyiv. His meeting with Store and defence industry representatives focused not only on Ukraine’s immediate security needs but also on broader European efforts to strengthen air and missile defence.

For Zelenskyy, international travel has become an important part of efforts to maintain diplomatic support for Ukraine, secure military assistance and encourage greater cooperation among European countries. At the same time, the reported drone incident illustrates the security risks surrounding those diplomatic activities.

Store’s statement did not indicate that Zelenskyy’s aircraft suffered any damage or that anyone aboard the plane was injured. Nor did the Norwegian prime minister give further information about the drone’s trajectory or what action, if any, was taken in response to the incident.

The Ukrainian president continued his scheduled activities in Oslo after arriving safely in Norway and took part in the funeral events for King Harald V.

His meeting with Norwegian officials subsequently turned to the longer-term challenge of protecting European airspace, with Ukraine seeking to work alongside European governments and defence companies on the FREYJA programme.

As the war continues into its fifth year, drone and missile attacks remain among the most significant threats facing Ukraine. The reported incident involving Zelenskyy’s aircraft serves as a reminder that the security risks created by the conflict extend beyond the battlefield and can follow Ukrainian leaders even during international diplomatic missions.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

U

S President Donald Trump has said the war with Iran will end “immediately after” November’s midterm elections, offering a new timeline for ending a conflict that has continued for months and contributed to a sharp rise in energy prices across the United States.

Trump made the remarks on Wednesday while speaking to reporters on the tarmac as he travelled to Texas for the Republican midterm convention. He also accused Iran’s leadership of deliberately escalating the conflict in an attempt to influence the US elections and damage Republican candidates.

“I think the war is going to end immediately after the election,” Trump said, arguing that Iranian leaders were increasingly desperate and seeking to affect the political outcome in November.

The president’s latest prediction represents another shift in his timeline for the conflict. The war has lasted significantly longer than Trump initially suggested, while Republican lawmakers and candidates have increasingly faced questions about the economic consequences of the fighting.

Trump claimed that Iran was attempting to influence American voters by prolonging the conflict and said Tehran wanted to see Republicans weakened after the election.

“They’re desperate to try and affect the election,” Trump said, arguing that Iran wanted Americans to elect what he described as a weaker group of lawmakers that would allow Tehran to continue pursuing its nuclear ambitions.

The comments come as the war has become an increasingly important political and economic issue in the United States. Rising fuel prices have added pressure on American households and intensified concerns among Republicans that the conflict could damage the party’s prospects in the midterms.

Rising energy prices put pressure on Republicans

The economic consequences of the war have become particularly visible through higher energy costs. Diesel fuel has risen to almost $6 per gallon on average, reaching a record high the previous week, while regular gasoline is averaging about $4.22 per gallon, up from $4.01 a month earlier.

Higher fuel prices have also affected the cost of everyday goods, including groceries, adding to broader inflation concerns and increasing frustration among voters.

Republicans have been concerned that the economic impact of the conflict could threaten their majorities in Congress. The party is seeking to maintain control of the House of Representatives and potentially the Senate in the November elections, making the trajectory of energy prices a significant political issue.

Trump sought to reassure voters by predicting that gasoline prices would fall sharply after the elections. He claimed that prices could drop below $2 per gallon once the midterms were over.

However, the continuing conflict has created uncertainty over how quickly energy markets could stabilize. The United States and Iran have intensified attacks in recent days, with the two sides trading strikes involving naval vessels and oil tankers.

The escalation has increased pressure on global energy markets and contributed to concerns about the wider economic consequences of continued hostilities.

Trump’s comments came against this backdrop, linking the conclusion of the war directly to the political calendar. His prediction that the conflict will end immediately after the midterms could place additional pressure on his administration and Republican candidates if fighting continues into or beyond November.

Trump rules out immediate negotiations with Iran

Alongside his prediction that the war would end after the elections, Trump said he was no longer actively seeking negotiations with Iran’s leadership.

The president said he had initially wanted to reach an agreement to end the fighting, but argued that the situation had changed significantly.

“Originally, I wanted to make a deal,” Trump said. He added that there was now very little of Iran left, in his assessment, and that his administration was therefore not actively pursuing negotiations.

Trump nevertheless acknowledged that negotiations could still take place under certain circumstances, saying that a diplomatic agreement remained possible even though it was not currently an objective of the administration.

The shift in Trump’s position comes as military confrontations between Washington and Tehran continue to intensify. The recent exchanges involving naval ships and oil tankers have raised the stakes of the conflict and increased concerns over further disruption to energy supplies.

Trump’s comments also reflect the increasingly political dimension of the war inside the United States. With the midterm elections approaching, both the conflict itself and its economic effects are likely to remain major issues for voters.

Republican candidates face the challenge of defending the administration’s handling of the war while responding to the impact of higher fuel and food prices. Democrats, meanwhile, could use the economic pressures associated with the conflict to argue that the administration’s policies are hurting American households.

Trump has framed the conflict as a struggle against Iran’s nuclear ambitions and accused Tehran of attempting to interfere in US politics. But his latest promise that the war will end immediately after the midterms leaves the timing of any potential ceasefire or settlement uncertain.

For now, the United States and Iran remain engaged in an escalating confrontation, while energy prices continue to weigh on American consumers. Trump’s latest deadline therefore places the November election at the center of both the political debate and his administration’s stated expectations for the war’s conclusion.

(Source: Politico)

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atko Mladic, the former Bosnian Serb army commander convicted of genocide and other war crimes, was buried in Belgrade with full military honors on Monday, drawing thousands of mourners and renewed condemnation from European officials and relatives of victims of the Bosnian war.

Mladic, who died on August 27 at the age of 84 while serving a life sentence in The Hague, remains a revered figure among some Serbian nationalists despite his conviction by a United Nations-established tribunal. His funeral highlighted continuing divisions over Serbia’s wartime legacy and its relationship with the European Union.

Thousands of mourners gathered at the Serbian Orthodox Church of St. Luke in Belgrade, where Mladic’s body lay in state. His military cap and saber were placed on his coffin, while men dressed in military-style fatigues stood nearby.

Patriarch Porfirije, head of the Serbian Orthodox Church, led the funeral service. Serbian army soldiers later carried Mladic’s coffin, wrapped in the national flag, to the cemetery as mourners applauded and a military orchestra played.

The ceremony was broadcast live by pro-government media and attended by prominent figures, including Bosnian Serb nationalist leader Milorad Dodik and Russian Ambassador to Serbia Alexander Botsan-Kharchenko.

Srebrenica victims condemn glorification

Mladic was sentenced in 2017 for his role in some of the worst atrocities of the Bosnian war. He was convicted of orchestrating the 1995 Srebrenica massacre, in which more than 8,000 Muslim men and boys were killed, as well as the prolonged siege of Sarajevo and other war crimes.

He was also found guilty of crimes involving detention camps where non-Serb civilians and enemy soldiers were held.

The funeral prompted anger from victims’ relatives and organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Mothers of Srebrenica, a group representing relatives of those killed in the massacre, called on the European Union to respond to the public celebration of Mladic.

The group warned that the funeral risked becoming a major gathering for supporters of fascism in Europe and said the glorification of genocide was a source of shame rather than honor.

The Srebrenica massacre occurred after the United Nations had designated the town a safe haven for Bosnian Muslims. Bosnian Serb forces overran the area, separated men and boys from their families and killed them, with victims later buried in mass graves.

The European Union’s foreign service also condemned the public glorification of Mladic. It said honoring convicted war criminals, denying genocide and attempting to revise the historical record were incompatible with European values and had no place in EU member states or candidate countries.

The criticism comes as Serbia continues its long-running bid to join the EU. Marta Kos, the European commissioner responsible for enlargement, canceled a planned visit to Serbia in protest over the celebrations surrounding Mladic’s death.

Serbia defends funeral amid political tensions

The Serbian government has sought to distance itself formally from the funeral arrangements, which were organized by Mladic’s family. However, the government sent a plane to return his remains to Belgrade, while Serbian soldiers carried his coffin during the ceremony. A military commemoration was also held at an official Serbian army venue on Saturday.

President Aleksandar Vucic described the gathering as an “emotional response” rather than an event approved by the government. He said the funeral had “nothing to do” with whether Serbian authorities had formally authorized it.

Vucic, a former nationalist politician who supported Serbia’s expansionist policies during the Bosnian war, has increasingly used anti-Western rhetoric as Serbia approaches an early parliamentary election expected next month.

He accused Western countries of repeatedly persecuting and blaming Serbs, arguing that many Serbs had grown unwilling to accept what he portrayed as “decades of pressure and discrimination.”

Vucic did not attend the funeral.

Serbia has remained defensive about its role in the Bosnian war, during which Belgrade supported Bosnian Serb forces. Serbian authorities have repeatedly accused Western governments of maintaining an anti-Serb position over the conflict.

The war, which ended in 1995 with a US-brokered peace agreement, killed more than 100,000 people and displaced more than one million.

Mladic’s funeral has therefore become more than a ceremony for his supporters. It has exposed unresolved disputes over Serbia’s interpretation of the war and placed additional pressure on the country’s already complicated relationship with the European Union.

(Source: CNN)

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welve countries, including the United Kingdom, France and Canada, have announced plans to introduce or support restrictions on trade with Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, marking a significant diplomatic challenge to Israel’s settlement policy.

The foreign ministers of Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK said Tuesday that they intended to introduce national measures or support European restrictions on trade in goods from Israeli settlements, which they described as illegal under international law.

The countries said Israel’s actions in the West Bank were undermining the possibility of achieving a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The announcement followed a decision by Britain to impose an import ban on goods originating from Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank. UK Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband told Parliament that Canada and France would also introduce similar bans, while several other European countries pledged to support additional measures.

Miliband said Britain would also establish a comprehensive sanctions regime, arguing that London could no longer simply condemn what it considers injustice and suffering without taking concrete action.

“Today we refuse to be bystanders,” Miliband said, linking the measures to Britain’s long-standing support for a two-state solution.

The announcement represents a notable shift in Britain’s approach to Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories. Miliband said the UK considers Israel’s occupation of the West Bank unlawful and believes Palestinians are facing ethnic cleansing in parts of the territory.

Israel retaliates against Britain

Israel strongly rejected the measures and accused the British government of hostility toward Israel.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar described Miliband’s accusations as “outrageous lies” and announced a series of retaliatory measures against Britain.

Saar said Israel would close the British consulate in occupied East Jerusalem, which is accredited to the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. He also said Britain would no longer be permitted to participate in a US-led coordination mission for Gaza.

In addition, Israel said it would terminate British training for Palestinian Authority security forces in the West Bank and impose entry restrictions on some elected British officials and other nationals.

Saar blamed what he called a hostile Labour government for leaving Israel with no choice but to respond.

The diplomatic confrontation comes amid heightened international concern over the expansion of Israeli settlements and increasing violence by settlers against Palestinians in the West Bank.

French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot said France would end its trade with Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories, describing the decision as part of a coordinated effort involving the other countries.

Barrot cited what he called rapid settlement expansion, escalating violence against Palestinians by extremist settlers and attacks that he said had even been condemned by Israeli authorities.

The United States, however, rejected the British-led approach. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Washington would not join the sanctions and argued that the measures could destabilize the West Bank at a time of wider regional tensions.

Settlement expansion raises two-state concerns

The economic impact of Britain’s decision could initially be limited. The UK and Israel conduct around £6 billion ($8.12 billion) in annual bilateral trade, but details remain unclear about how British authorities will distinguish products originating in Israeli settlements from goods produced in Israel.

Israeli settlements and outposts in the occupied West Bank are considered illegal under international law. According to figures cited by the Palestinian Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission, approximately 780,000 Israeli settlers live across the West Bank and occupied East Jerusalem, in 192 settlements and about 400 outposts.

The commission said settlements and outposts account for a large portion of Area C of the West Bank, which remains under full Israeli civil and military control, as well as much of the Jordan Valley.

The issue has also become increasingly connected to concerns over violence against Palestinian communities. Settlers have established unauthorized outposts near Palestinian villages and, according to Palestinian authorities, have carried out attacks and property damage, while cutting access to water, electricity and other supplies.

The source also points to recent cases in which Palestinian families have faced sieges around their homes, alongside attacks on villages and agricultural land.

UN Special Rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territory Francesca Albanese described Miliband’s remarks as a major change in Britain’s position. She said his condemnation of settlement activity and references to the treatment of Palestinians represented an unusually strong statement from the British government.

The 12-country declaration places additional diplomatic pressure on Israel while exposing differences among Western allies over how to respond to settlement expansion.

The declaration is likely to add further strain to relations between Israel and several European governments as settlement expansion and violence in the West Bank against Palestinians continue to expand with encouragement from Israeli officials.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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or centuries, Somalia and China have been connected through the Indian Ocean. Long before the establishment of the modern Somali state, commercial and cultural exchanges linked the Somali coast with China through maritime networks. The modern diplomatic relations were established in 1960 and have survived some of Somalia’s most turbulent political periods.

Yet the significance of the relationship today is not simply that it has survived for decades. It is that the architecture of Chinese engagement with Somalia appears to be changing. China is increasingly visible not only in government offices and diplomatic exchanges, but also in Somali classrooms, universities, investment forums, youth networks and spaces of knowledge production. In September 2024, the two countries elevated their relationship to a strategic partnership.

This development should not be interpreted simply as another example of China expanding its footprint in Africa. What is more interesting is the changing instruments through which Chinese influence is being constructed in Somalia. For years, external engagement with Somalia has largely been understood through security assistance, humanitarian intervention, development programs and political diplomacy.

Türkiye has developed a particularly visible role across security, education, infrastructure and diplomacy, while Western and Gulf actors maintain their own political, economic and security relationships. China is now becoming more prominent within this increasingly competitive external environment, but its approach appears to rely on a somewhat different combination of instruments including economic statecraft, education, people-to-people exchanges, diplomatic networks and knowledge production.

150 Somali students win Chinese scholarships

Considering education, in August 2026, more than 150 Somali students received full Chinese government scholarships, one of the largest recent cohorts, with students entering fields including medicine and engineering. The Chinese Embassy’s scholarship reception was not presented merely as an educational event. Ambassador Wang Yu encouraged the students to develop a new perception of China, build new friendships and contribute to China-Africa and China-Somalia exchange. This scholarship initiative coincides with a parallel trend of self-funded Somali students choosing to study in China recently.

The wording is revealing. Scholarships are usually understood as development assistance or educational opportunity. But international relations shows us that education can also become an instrument of soft power and long-term socialization. A student who spends several years in another country does not return with a degree alone. They return with language skills, professional networks, personal experiences, perceptions of the host country and, sometimes, an entirely different understanding of how a state and society function. China has already begun building upon this accumulated human capital. Its embassy has previously brought together Somali alumni of Chinese universities, explicitly linking their educational experiences with future China-Somalia cooperation.

This does not mean that scholarship recipients automatically become instruments of Chinese influence. Such an interpretation would underestimate their agency. The more important point is that education creates social relationships that can survive individual projects and political administrations. A road connects two places, but an educational network can connect two societies for decades.

China and the youth in Somalia

The same logic is increasingly visible in China’s engagement with Somali youth. In August, a nine-member Somali youth (TikTokers) delegation travelled to China through a cultural-exchange program facilitated by the Chinese Embassy. Participants visited Chinese cities and institutions and subsequently documented their experiences for Somali audiences.

This is particularly significant because Somalia’s public sphere has changed. Foreign policy narratives are no longer communicated exclusively through embassies, official statements or traditional media. They increasingly travel through TikTok, YouTube, Instagram and other digital platforms. When Somali young TikTokers visit China and communicate their experiences to Somali audiences in their own language and cultural context, the relationship is no longer being narrated solely by Chinese diplomats. t is being re-mediated by Somali actors for Somali audiences.

That is an important distinction in understanding contemporary soft power. Influence does not necessarily become stronger because the source speaks louder. It can become stronger when local actors become the intermediaries through which an external country’s image and experience are interpreted. At the same time, Chinese institutions have increasingly used African and Somali youth engagement as part of the broader 2026 China-Africa Year of People-to-People Exchanges. Somalia’s Ambassador to China, Hodan Osman Abdi, has herself emphasized the role of young people and language learning in sustaining China-Africa relations.

But China’s emerging strategy goes beyond people-to-people diplomacy. It is also becoming increasingly economic. In August, the Somalia-China Business Networking Forum brought together government officials, Somali and Chinese businesses, investors and chambers of commerce in Mogadishu. The discussions covered infrastructure, manufacturing, fisheries, agriculture, energy, transport and logistics, while the Somali government presented investment opportunities linked to its National Transformation Plan.

Zero-tariff policy

Beijing is simultaneously presenting its expanded zero-tariff policy toward African countries as an opportunity for greater African exports and has explicitly discussed the policy with Somali officials. Somalia’s ambassador to China, Hodan Osman Abdi, has also publicly highlighted the importance of using these opportunities to deepen economic cooperation.

This matters because Somalia has historically been approached primarily as a recipient of humanitarian assistance, security support and development aid. A relationship increasingly organized around investment, exports and productive sectors could create a different form of engagement in which Somalia participates more actively in the economic relationship. China’s broader zero-tariff policy toward African countries also creates opportunities for Somali exports, an issue that Somalia’s ambassador to China has publicly emphasized.

But perhaps the most overlooked dimension is knowledge. In April, Yangzhou University discussed supporting the development of a Center for Somali Studies following engagement with Somali National University. The initiative points toward a growing Chinese academic interest in Somali language, society and affairs.

This may appear less consequential than investment or infrastructure, but it represents another form of power which is the epistemic power. Who studies Somalia matters. Who produces knowledge about Somali society matters. Who teaches Somali language matters. And who trains future specialists capable of interpreting Somalia matters.

For decades, much of the internationally influential knowledge about Somalia has been produced through Western universities, think tanks and international institutions. The emergence of Somali-focused academic engagement in China suggests that Beijing is gradually developing its own knowledge infrastructure through which it can understand Somali society and cultivate people capable of sustaining the relationship. China is therefore not simply increasing its presence in Somalia. It appears increasingly interested in developing the human, social and intellectual networks through which its presence can endure.

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audi Arabia says attacks by Yemen’s Houthi rebels have struck civilian and economic targets in the kingdom, leaving at least 73 civilians wounded, including women and children, as fighting intensifies across Yemen between the Iran-backed group and the Saudi-supported internationally recognized government.

Major-General Turki al-Maliki, spokesman for the Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen, said on Tuesday that Houthi attacks had targeted civilian and economic sites in the southern Saudi provinces of Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jizan and Najran.

Al-Maliki did not specify when the attacks took place, but described them as a “dangerous escalation” and a “blatant violation” of Saudi Arabia’s sovereignty. He said the attacks represented a direct threat to Saudi citizens and residents and pledged that the coalition would take “all necessary operational measures” to confront the attacks and target the sources of the threat.

The Saudi Ministry of Energy separately said several energy-sector facilities and installations in southern parts of the country were hit early on Tuesday. The ministry said the attacks wounded a number of citizens and residents and caused fires at several locations.

Some operations were temporarily halted as a result of the damage, although the ministry did not provide further details about the facilities affected or the scale of the disruption.

The attacks mark a sharp escalation in hostilities between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, who have been engaged in a conflict with Yemen’s government and its regional supporters for more than a decade.

Houthis cite Saudi strikes as retaliation

The Houthis later claimed responsibility for the attacks, saying they were carried out in response to more than 120 Saudi strikes against Yemen over the previous three days.

Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree said Yemeni armed forces had conducted a large-scale, long-range operation involving dozens of ballistic missiles and drones. The group has increasingly targeted Saudi territory as fighting on the ground intensifies inside Yemen.

The Houthis had also accused Saudi Arabia of carrying out an air strike on a prison in Yemen’s northern al-Jawf governorate. The group said at least seven people were killed in the attack on a prison in al-Hazm and warned that what it called continued Saudi “aggression” would not go unanswered.

Saudi authorities have not commented on that allegation.

The latest exchange of attacks comes as Saudi-backed government forces mount a counteroffensive aimed at retaking territory from the Houthis and ultimately advancing towards the capital, Sanaa.

Yemen has been trapped in a prolonged conflict since the Houthis seized Sanaa in 2014, prompting Saudi Arabia and its allies to intervene militarily the following year in support of the internationally recognized government.

Although fighting largely subsided following a United Nations-brokered truce in 2022, the relative calm has since broken down. The latest escalation follows the war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran in February, according to the source report.

The Houthis resumed attacks towards Saudi Arabia in July, launching missiles and drones at Abha international airport after an attack on Sanaa airport. Later that month, the group announced a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia and began targeting Saudi-linked shipping in the Red Sea.

The renewed fighting has expanded the conflict beyond isolated exchanges of fire, raising concerns about wider regional instability and threats to vital transport and energy infrastructure.