I

was thirteen when I first read George Orwell’s 1984. Growing up in a politically unstable region, the novel felt like a commentary on the world outside my window.

Throughout human history, every iteration of state power deployed mechanisms of control to consolidate authority and resources for the ruling elite. Orwell’s genius lay in capturing this universal mechanics of state power.

Orwell imagined a state that demanded obedience through surveillance and controlling flow of information. Generative AI, state-controlled algorithms, digital identity systems, and automated public infrastructure now determine what citizens should believe, what resources they survive on, and whether authentic public opinion exists at all.

Unlike Orwell’s oppressive telescreens, contemporary technologies are carried voluntarily. Citizens willingly purchase, update, and carry the devices of their own oversight, surrendering their autonomy for digital convenience. In fact, digital architecture continuously fosters dependency of present life on these tools.

Consider the control of information. Orwell’s Ministry of Truth rewrote the past by destroying records and manufacturing official narratives. Today, mass reliance on generative artificial intelligence is quietly conditioning populations to trade cognitive friction for friction-free answers, outsourcing basic tasks, writing, and critical reasoning to algorithms. As individuals become dependent on quick machine outputs, they are systematically conditioned to think, articulate, and structure arguments in uniform mannerisms dictated by the statistical averages of large language models.

Modern digital control

This homogenization of thought acts as an organic counterpart to Newspeak. By funneling human expression through standardized stylistic templates and algorithmic consensus, generative AI flattens individual idiosyncrasy, critical divergence, and creative rebellion, conditioning society to accept machine-curated outputs as neutral truths rather than biased reflections of corporate training data.

Modern digital control decides which information gains visibility, which narratives are deprioritized, and which voices are quietly shadow banned. Information simply gets buried under automated streams of synthetic noise or throttled at the network level. In 2025 alone, human rights monitors documented over 300 internet shutdowns across more than 50 countries during periods of civil unrest and armed conflict.

When access to the internet is restored, the medium itself acts like a double-edged sword. For populations living under military occupation or authoritarian rule, the smartphones required to seek aid or document atrocities simultaneously expose their locations, networks, and identities to state intelligence apparatuses.

The danger of algorithmic governance is hardwired into the administrative machinery of Western democracies as well. Across the globe, governments are outsourcing public administration to automated risk-scoring models that lack basic transparency and due process.

In the Netherlands, the court system was forced to strike down the government’s SyRI (System Risk Indication) algorithmic risk model, which was deployed to detect welfare fraud by aggregating personal data across public agencies. The system disproportionately targeted low-income and racial minority neighborhoods with opaque scoring metrics, offering citizens no clear avenue for legal appeal.

Fraud-detection platforms

In the United States, automated fraud-detection platforms, such as Michigan’s MiDAS system, wrongly flagged tens of thousands of unemployed citizens for fraud, stripping them of benefits and imposing financial penalties without human oversight.

Algorithms inherit the assumptions, limitations and biases of the systems in which they are built. When an opaque risk score determines access to public benefits, or when a person cannot discover why a decision was made, technological efficiency can become a substitute for due process.

Unlike the centralized state apparatus of 1984, contemporary surveillance relies on a complex, transnational architecture connecting tech monopolies, data brokers, and defense contractors.

Silicon Valley tech giants control the cloud infrastructure and generative artificial intelligence models that feed public consciousness, while states purchase surveillance capabilities off the shelfs. This creates an asymmetric alignment of commercial profit and state security. Even as corporate frontier labs race to deploy increasingly autonomous models, acknowledging catastrophic safety risks and deceptive alignment failures in their technical disclosures, policymakers around the world actively resist binding international regulations in favor of technological dominance.

Former Anthropic safety researcher Jacob Coxon publicly warned of a 10 percent chance of AI causing human extinction within the decade, echoing warnings from pioneers like Geoffrey Hinton and institutions like the Centre for International Governance Innovation. Yet at the United Nations General Assembly, U.S. President Donald Trump explicitly dismissed existential concerns, declaring that official U.S. documentation would rebrand “artificial intelligence” as “Super Intelligence” (SI) and vowing not to rein in growth.

When public institutions become dependent on privately controlled infrastructure, who sets the limits on its use? Who can audit the systems making consequential decisions? And what happens when a technology becomes so deeply integrated into public administration, financial networks or national security that abandoning it carries prohibitive costs?

Is AI weightless?

Crucially, the popular illusion that AI is a weightless, virtual cloud conceals an intensely material reality, massive industrial facilities guzzling water, coal, and gas to train and run frontier models. This computational thirst is reviving fossil fuels, keeping aging coal plants online and burning gas to guarantee 24/7 baseline electricity. In regions across South Asia, including India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, where groundwater tables are already severely depleted and over 1.3 billion people face water stress, hyperscale data centers receive guaranteed municipal water concessions for evaporative cooling, prioritizing corporate server heat management over agricultural irrigation and drinking water. In developing nations across Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, data centers operate thousands of diesel generators as power backups, emitting nitrogen oxides and fine particulate matter directly into adjacent residential areas and driving up local rates of respiratory illness.

While compute power, proprietary software, and market capitalization are overwhelmingly concentrated in wealthy Northern nations, the physical, environmental, and human burdens are offloaded onto the Global South. The hardware supply chain depends on rare earth minerals like cobalt, lithium, and nickel extracted from open-pit mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo and across Southern Africa, destroying rainforest ecosystems and contaminating watersheds.

The lifecycle ends where it begins: millions of tons of high-performance server hardware, discarded after short 2 to 4-year operational lifespans, are shipped as electronic waste to toxic dumping grounds like Agbogbloshie in Ghana, where local workers burn components in open fires and face severe dioxin, lead, and mercury poisoning. Furthermore, the human labor required to train these models relies on low-wage workers in Kenya, Uganda, India, and the Philippines, paid fractions of Western minimum wages to review and filter toxic content without healthcare support.

The ultimate power of modern surveillance lies in its psychological efficiency and structural asymmetry. The modern Big Brother does not need a telescreen in every living room, it is enough to control the interconnected digital infrastructure through which society communicates, accesses knowledge, and survives.

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inance, the world’s largest cryptocurrency exchange, has suspended deposits and withdrawals following a massive security breach involving an estimated $6.3 billion in digital assets, an incident that could become the largest cryptocurrency theft ever recorded.

The exchange said Thursday that it had worked with industry partners and law enforcement agencies to identify and freeze affected assets, locating approximately $3 billion so far. The status of the remaining $3.3 billion remains unclear.

Binance co-founder Yi He pledged that the company would cover all losses resulting from the attack, while the exchange sought to reassure its global customer base that user funds remained safe.

According to Binance, preliminary findings suggest the breach may have originated from a compromised laptop belonging to one of its engineers. The attacker allegedly used the device to access an internal system and execute unauthorized withdrawals.

The company has temporarily halted all deposits and withdrawals while security teams investigate the incident, secure wallet infrastructure and trace the affected funds.

With approximately 335 million registered users worldwide and $162.8 billion in assets under custody, according to its 2025 annual report, Binance occupies a central position in the global cryptocurrency industry.

Bitcoin and ether tumble as investors reassess crypto risks

News of the breach triggered an immediate selloff across cryptocurrency markets during early Asian trading Friday.

Bitcoin fell more than 3% to $76,368, its lowest level in six weeks, while ether declined more than 3% to a two-month low of $2,178.

BNB, the cryptocurrency originally launched as Binance Coin, dropped 5% over the preceding 24 hours to approximately $709.70, according to CoinGecko.

The impact extended to publicly traded cryptocurrency companies. Shares of US-based exchange Coinbase Global declined 4.8% in extended trading, while bitcoin-focused company Strategy fell nearly 6%.

Industry analysts warned that the incident could undermine investor confidence in centralized cryptocurrency exchanges, particularly as digital assets were already facing pressure from elevated US interest rates and weakening demand from exchange-traded fund investors.

Tim Sun, a senior researcher at Hong Kong-based HashKey Group, said the breach could further weaken investors’ appetite for risk and encourage greater scrutiny of exchange security, financial stability and liquidity.

Aravind Srinivasan, head of systematic over-the-counter trading at cryptocurrency market maker GSR, described the incident as the largest hack in history.

Blockchain analytics firm Chainalysis and other industry specialists also indicated that the reported losses could make the attack the biggest cryptocurrency heist on record.

Crypto companies coordinate efforts to freeze stolen assets

Several major cryptocurrency companies have joined efforts to identify and freeze assets linked to the breach.

Stablecoin issuer Tether said it had frozen nearly $1.57 billion in affected funds, while Circle reported freezing more than $800 million.

Ripple also froze approximately $200 million, according to Binance’s Yi He.

World Liberty Financial, a cryptocurrency company linked to US President Donald Trump and his family, said it had coordinated with digital asset custodian BitGo to freeze funds associated with the incident.

Yi said approximately $27 million in stablecoins and another $2 million worth of World Liberty tokens had been frozen.

Binance maintains a Secure Asset Fund for Users, a reserve held entirely in bitcoin and designed to protect customer assets in the event of security breaches.

The company has not specified how much of that reserve would be needed to compensate users.

The attack adds to growing concerns over cryptocurrency security. According to blockchain research firm TRM Labs, hackers stole approximately $2.9 billion across nearly 150 cryptocurrency attacks last year.

In September, rival exchange Bitget reported the theft of roughly $350 million in digital assets.

Bernardo Brites, CEO of payments and stablecoin infrastructure company Trace Finance, warned that increasingly sophisticated hacking techniques, including the use of artificial intelligence to identify vulnerabilities, were making digital asset platforms harder to protect.

He suggested that the latest incident could accelerate a shift away from smaller exchanges that lack sufficient financial reserves to absorb major losses.

Binance.US, a separate cryptocurrency exchange, said it was unaffected by the breach. Coinbase also confirmed that its systems were not affected.

As investigators work to trace the remaining assets, the incident presents another major test of the cryptocurrency industry’s ability to safeguard customer funds and maintain confidence in centralized trading platforms.

(Source: Reuters)

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growing shift toward military spending among the world’s wealthiest countries is widening the gap between international development assistance and escalating humanitarian needs, potentially threatening human security and political stability, according to new research released Tuesday by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

The report warns that major donor governments are increasing defense budgets while reducing development assistance, creating additional financial pressures for countries already struggling with armed conflicts, natural disasters and economic instability.

Global military expenditure reached a record $2.9 trillion last year, equivalent to 2.5% of global gross domestic product, according to SIPRI data.

Meanwhile, official development assistance (ODA) has been declining since 2024, based on figures from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Researchers found that core development assistance began stagnating as early as 2021, although the underlying trend was temporarily obscured by increased support for Ukraine following Russia’s full-scale invasion and higher spending by donor countries on hosting refugees.

The largest reductions in core assistance have affected economic infrastructure and health programs, two areas considered essential to long-term development and human security.

Humanitarian funding gap could reach $179 billion by 2028

SIPRI researchers estimate that global development assistance requirements could climb to $326 billion by 2028, depending on the evolution of armed conflicts, natural disasters and other factors affecting humanitarian needs.

Under that scenario, the gap between required funding and expected assistance would reach $179 billion, exceeding the total amount of ODA commitments projected for that year.

The findings highlight a growing imbalance between governments’ military priorities and their commitments to international development.

Xiao Liang, a researcher with SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme, said wealthy countries in Europe and elsewhere had substantially increased defense spending in response to growing security threats.

However, those increases have coincided with significant reductions in other government expenditures, including humanitarian and development assistance.

Liang warned that declining aid could generate widespread insecurity for countries and populations dependent on international support.

He also cautioned that military expenditure was likely to continue increasing over the coming years, creating additional pressure on development assistance and competing budget priorities.

Nan Tian, director of SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme, described the findings as evidence of a sustained retreat from essential humanitarian and development commitments at a time when global needs are expanding.

However, the researchers stressed that the projected funding shortfall remains relatively small compared with the additional resources governments are committing to defense.

According to SIPRI, closing the anticipated aid gap would require redirecting only a fraction of planned increases in military spending, suggesting that meeting future development needs remains financially achievable.

Germany and Britain illustrate competing budget priorities

The report examines recent military and development spending policies in Germany and the United Kingdom, highlighting how governments have justified reductions in foreign assistance as necessary to finance higher defense expenditures.

Researchers found that the savings generated by these aid reductions would make only a marginal contribution to the military spending increases being planned.

The findings raise questions about the extent to which development assistance must be reduced to accommodate national security commitments.

SIPRI argues that treating military expenditure and development assistance as competing priorities overlooks the broader role of humanitarian and economic support in preventing instability.

Development programs can help address underlying sources of insecurity, including poverty, weak infrastructure and limited access to essential services.

The report comes amid increasing geopolitical tensions and militarization, with governments placing greater emphasis on strengthening their military capabilities.

Researchers acknowledge that countries face legitimate reasons to invest in defense as international cooperation weakens and security threats intensify.

However, they caution that military capabilities alone cannot guarantee lasting security, particularly when reductions in international assistance risk worsening the conditions that contribute to instability.

Liang emphasized that development aid should be regarded as complementary to defense expenditure rather than an alternative to it.

The findings underscore a central challenge facing major donor countries: balancing immediate military requirements with the long-term humanitarian and development investments needed to sustain international stability.

Without a change in current spending priorities, SIPRI warns, the widening aid gap could leave vulnerable populations facing greater insecurity even as global military expenditure continues to reach unprecedented levels.

(Source: SIPRI)

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he leaders of Norway and Finland have held rare direct talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in an effort to influence negotiations aimed at ending the war in Ukraine, marking a significant diplomatic departure from Europe’s longstanding policy of limiting high-level engagement with Moscow.

Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre spoke with Putin for approximately 90 minutes Tuesday, ahead of another round of US-brokered peace negotiations scheduled to take place in Abu Dhabi next month.

The conversation comes amid growing European unease over US President Donald Trump’s increasingly conciliatory approach toward Russia and deteriorating relations between Washington and Kyiv.

Western European leaders have largely avoided direct communication with Putin since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, concerns about being sidelined from negotiations have prompted renewed debate over whether Europe should establish its own diplomatic channels with Moscow.

Stubb described Tuesday’s conversation as frank and substantive, emphasizing that Finland and Norway, as Russia’s neighbors, have a direct security interest in the outcome of the conflict.

He said the initiative had been prepared in consultation with Ukraine and the United States and followed an October 20 meeting in Oslo involving US special envoy Steve Witkoff and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

The Nordic leaders subsequently contacted Zelenskyy to brief him on their discussion with Putin.

European concerns grow over Trump’s approach to Russia

The diplomatic initiative comes as Trump’s administration faces criticism from European allies over recent decisions concerning Russia and Ukraine.

Washington’s relationship with Kyiv has deteriorated following Trump’s criticism of Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy facilities, which he blamed for contributing to rising diesel prices in the United States.

Trump subsequently reached an agreement with Putin to release Russian diesel supplies to American and international markets despite existing sanctions on Russian oil.

His administration also suspended newly approved sanctions against Moscow, prompting criticism from European governments and members of his own Republican Party.

Ukraine has separately accused the United States of restricting access to Starshield, a military-grade satellite communications system used by Ukrainian forces.

Against this backdrop, Stubb and Støre are seeking to ensure that European security interests remain part of any negotiated settlement.

The Finnish president emphasized that the call did not signal weakening support for Ukraine or constitute negotiations on behalf of Europe.

Støre similarly argued that maintaining pressure on Russia and engaging diplomatically were not mutually exclusive.

However, the Kremlin’s account suggested that Putin had offered little indication of flexibility.

Moscow reiterated that any lasting peace agreement must fully account for what it describes as Russia’s legitimate interests, while accusing NATO and European Union countries of prolonging the conflict through confrontational policies.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov characterized the discussion as constructive but maintained that Putin’s position remained unchanged.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was more dismissive, suggesting that the Nordic initiative offered no new proposals and reflected European governments’ desire to secure a place in negotiations.

Moscow also continued to question Zelenskyy’s legitimacy. Russian presidential aide Yury Ushakov said the Ukrainian leader should travel to Moscow if he wanted direct negotiations with Putin.

Nordic initiative exposes divisions among European allies

The unexpected diplomatic outreach has received a mixed response across Europe, exposing disagreements over how governments should approach negotiations with Russia.

Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson expressed skepticism about the initiative, questioning whether Putin genuinely wanted peace and indicating that some European leaders had not been informed beforehand.

Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen warned against individual diplomatic initiatives that could undermine Europe’s collective position.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk also urged caution, emphasizing the need for vigilance in contacts with Moscow.

Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys argued that Europe must participate in negotiations over Ukraine’s future but should do so through a coordinated approach backed by concrete demands and diplomatic leverage.

The differing reactions reflect a broader challenge facing European governments as Washington takes the leading role in efforts to broker an agreement between Moscow and Kyiv.

While some leaders believe direct engagement is necessary to influence the diplomatic process, others fear that fragmented European initiatives could weaken their collective negotiating position.

The latest developments come as Ukraine continues to endure Russian attacks, with residential areas and civilian infrastructure suffering extensive damage.

For Norway and Finland, the immediate objective appears to be reopening communication with Moscow without abandoning their commitments to Kyiv.

Whether that approach can translate into meaningful influence over the forthcoming Abu Dhabi negotiations remains uncertain, particularly as Russia continues to insist on its existing conditions for ending the war.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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ula won Brazil’s presidential election, but Congress shifted to the right. Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party will hold 121 of the 513 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 28 of the 81 Senate seats, while the left will hold 124 seats in the lower house and 16 in the Senate. Lula secured the presidency, but he will have to govern alongside a more right-leaning Congress. Although the Workers’ Party has never secured a majority, the strengthening of its opponents will make building the support necessary to implement its agenda more difficult and politically costly.

Lula da Silva has made history in Brazilian democracy, both by securing a fourth presidential term and by becoming the first president to win a runoff election after finishing second in the first round.

In the October 4 first round, he trailed his rival, Flávio Bolsonaro, by 2.2 million votes. On October 25, however, he received 64.25 million votes, defeating Bolsonaro by approximately 4.4 million votes. The message from the ballot box is clear, but it has its limits: Winning the presidency does not mean gaining control over every center of power in the country. Although voters have given Lula a mandate to govern, doing so without negotiation and compromise will not be easy.

How did Lula achieve victory?

First, voter turnout played a decisive role. The abstention rate fell from 21.1 percent to approximately 19 percent, meaning that nearly three million fewer voters stayed home. Between the two rounds, Lula gained 10.3 million additional votes, while Flávio Bolsonaro gained only 3.6 million.

Second, Lula made important geographical gains. Following his October 4 defeat, he established two priorities: expanding his electoral base in the northeast and reducing voter abstention. He increased his vote total in the northeast from 21.4 million to 24.4 million and reclaimed Minas Gerais, the only state to switch sides, with 50.4 percent of the vote.

Third, his campaign successfully combined street-level mobilization with digital organizing. Large rallies were complemented by a digital army coordinated by lawmaker André Janones through the WhatsApp group “Exército do Lula” (Lula’s Army), which brought together approximately 11 million people.

Lula also introduced voter-friendly economic promises, including exempting gasoline from federal taxes, debt forgiveness for microbusiness owners, and an expansion of the Pé-de-Meia program. At the same time, he warned that Flávio would cut social spending and surrender Brazil’s sovereignty to Trump.

The more difficult question is how much of Lula’s victory reflected genuine support for his political agenda and how much resulted from opposition to the return of Bolsonarism. Initial analyses emphasize voter mobilization and grassroots organization. Concern about a possible Flávio victory was probably just as influential as enthusiasm for Lula himself.

Lula holds the Presidency, but the right gains strength in Congress

Lula won the presidency, but Congress shifted to the right. Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party (PL) will hold 121 of the 513 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 28 of the 81 Senate seats, while the left will hold 124 seats in the lower house and 16 in the Senate.

Lula will therefore have to govern alongside a more right-leaning Congress. Although the Workers’ Party (PT) has never secured a parliamentary majority, the strengthening of its opponents will make assembling the support required to implement its agenda more difficult and politically costly.

In the Chamber of Deputies, Centrão will play a crucial role in forming a majority. An informal political grouping composed predominantly of centrist and center-right parties, Centrão is known for its pragmatism and its practice of negotiating political support in exchange for influence over ministries, government appointments, and budgetary resources.

Hugo Motta, the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies and one of Centrão’s central figures, has already secured the support of 273 lawmakers, exceeding the 257 votes required for his reelection. However, this support does not automatically translate into votes for the government.

Passing budgets and reforms through Congress will force Lula into political negotiations, potentially requiring concessions on his policy agenda. Nevertheless, the outlook is not entirely pessimistic: Motta’s rapprochement with Lula during the election campaign could create room for compromise.

Lula will also face a more conservative Senate, where he must negotiate support for his reforms and government appointments. The election of the Senate president will be particularly important because it will determine who controls the legislative agenda and the pace of voting.

Moreover, upcoming vacancies on the Supreme Federal Court resulting from judicial retirements will make the Senate a key arena in the struggle over Brazil’s institutional balance.

Has Bolsonarism been defeated?

Flávio lost the presidency, but Bolsonarism retains considerable political strength. He received more than 59 million votes, while the Liberal Party (PL), despite lacking an outright majority, will become the largest individual party in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. According to a count conducted by local media, 16 of the elected governors supported his candidacy.

Following his defeat, Flávio announced that he would not recognize the result and would seek to annul the election.

His main argument centered on Supreme Federal Court Justice Cristiano Zanin’s decision to extend voting by two hours because of reported transportation difficulties, particularly in Salvador and São Paulo. Zanin had previously served as Lula’s lawyer.

The extension applied only to polling stations that remained open; those that had already closed were not reopened. It should also be noted that both campaigns had requested extensions, although their requests concerned different geographical areas.

The decision, described by the media as unprecedented, sparked legal debate, and the Electoral Public Prosecutor’s Office opposed extending voting hours.

However, the controversy does not, in itself, demonstrate that irregularities affected the election result. The president of the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) confirmed that the process was secure, while the presidents of both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies recognized Lula’s victory.

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wave of youth-led demonstrations is sweeping across Europe, with Generation Z protesters taking to the streets to demand affordable housing, better education, economic opportunities and political accountability, as growing frustration with established leadership fuels an increasingly influential movement.

Thousands of young demonstrators have mobilized across France, Italy, Belgium and Albania, while student-led protests in Serbia culminated in the electoral defeat of longtime leader Aleksandar Vucic following nearly two years of demonstrations.

Further protests are scheduled in Germany this weekend, highlighting the expanding geographical reach of a movement driven by young Europeans who say their governments have repeatedly ignored their concerns.

In Brussels, 19-year-old student Maya Gourdel has joined demonstrators demanding improvements to education and living conditions, adopting protest slogans inspired by the film The Hunger Games.

For many participants, the demonstrations represent more than frustration over individual government policies. They reflect a broader sense that younger generations are being denied economic security and meaningful opportunities.

Rising living costs and deteriorating schools fuel youth anger

Economic pressures have emerged as a central driver of the demonstrations, particularly among students facing expensive housing, limited employment prospects and deteriorating public services.

A European Union survey published in 2025 found that rising prices and living costs concerned 40% of people aged between 16 and 30.

Among the 92.7 million EU residents facing poverty or social exclusion that year, young adults aged 18 to 24 recorded the highest risk, at 26.3%, compared with 18.8% among people aged 65 and older.

In Italy, 21-year-old student Chiara described the protests as an expression of accumulated frustration with a political establishment that has failed to provide younger generations with a credible future.

She pointed to schools suffering from teacher shortages and deteriorating buildings, alongside the prospect of poorly paid employment and increasingly unaffordable accommodation.

Similar grievances have emerged in France, where 17-year-old student Bilal Narjissi criticized conditions at his school near Paris, citing previous rat infestations and an incident in which students were evacuated after a roof collapsed into a courtyard.

The demonstrations have occasionally escalated into violence, particularly in France, where thousands of businesses have reportedly been damaged or looted in recent weeks.

Police have deployed water cannons and stun grenades during confrontations with protesters.

The unrest has also intensified debate over generational inequality in government spending.

According to French think tank OFCE, people older than 60 represent approximately one-quarter of France’s population but own 60% of the country’s wealth.

A French government report published in October found that pension expenditure increased by 2.5 percentage points of GDP between 2000 and 2023, while education spending declined by half a percentage point.

Serbia’s political upheaval inspires protesters across Europe

Serbia has provided the movement with its most significant political victory so far, after student-led demonstrations helped bring an end to Vucic’s longstanding leadership through parliamentary elections.

The outcome followed nearly two years of protests against perceived corruption and authoritarianism.

Student protester Stasa Piletic described the election result as a moment of relief and victory, although the movement now faces the challenge of translating protest momentum into effective governance.

Elsewhere, Albania has witnessed growing demonstrations against Prime Minister Edi Rama’s government over allegations of corruption, inadequate education and limited employment opportunities.

Xyke Kurti, a 19-year-old architecture student, criticized the government for failing to respond to protesters’ demands, arguing that many young Albanians increasingly see their futures outside the country.

In Belgium, Gourdel similarly accused political leaders of ignoring peaceful appeals until demonstrations became more confrontational and attracted media attention.

The expanding movement illustrates a growing generational divide across Europe, with young people questioning whether existing political institutions can adequately address their economic and social concerns.

As further demonstrations approach in Germany, Europe’s governments face increasing pressure to respond to a generation demanding not only immediate financial relief but also meaningful influence over decisions shaping its future.

(Source: Reuters)

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he year 2026 became one of the major turning points in Iran’s history. The war, which intensified with joint US-Israeli airstrikes on Tehran on the morning of February 28, profoundly affected the political future of the Middle East and the balance of power in the region. Yet the Iranian people bore the war’s most severe social consequences. They experienced the conflict amid exhaustion and frustration caused by years of political developments, street protests that resulted in loss of life, economic crises and deepening polarization. To assess the impact of the war on Iranian society, it is first necessary to examine the social environment created by these developments in Iran.

Developments from 2009 to the Rouhani era

Although opposition movements had existed in Iran since the 1978 revolution, the 2009 presidential election and the protests that followed marked a major turning point in the public’s attitude toward politics and authority. At the time, a large majority of the population still believed that change and reform were possible. Allegations of electoral fraud, however, triggered months of protests, and for the first time the Islamic regime,including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei,was directly targeted by slogans. It should nevertheless be noted that the slogans of that period were much less intense than those heard today, and most did not challenge the foundations of the regime.

In the following years, despite mounting sanctions, a deteriorating economy and increasing pressure on opponents, a significant segment of society was not entirely opposed to the foundations of the regime. Against this backdrop, Hassan Rouhani, the reformists’ candidate, was elected president on expectations of change in the economy, mandatory hijab regulations and foreign relations. For many opponents, however, the Rouhani era also became a period in which hopes for reform were exhausted. A broad segment of society came to believe that a president like Rouhani was not necessarily lacking the will to pursue reform, but that Iran’s political structure prevented him from implementing it.

The core base of regime supporters, meanwhile, remained loyal to the government and the revolutionary leadership despite all the difficulties. Although a significant portion of this group shifted toward the opposition over the years, bloody protests and declining mutual tolerance deepened the divide between the two camps. Opponents accused regime supporters of backwardness and radical religiosity, while regime supporters accused opponents of treason and of serving as agents of foreign powers.

The death of Mahsa Amini in 2022 led to changes that had developed gradually in Iran and ultimately amounted to a quiet revolution in social life. The hijab requirement, which had been mandatory for decades and remained a constant issue on the national agenda, was largely abandoned by opposition-minded segments of society following the incident, although not officially. In cities such as Tehran, Isfahan, Rasht and Tabriz, women began demonstrating the courage to go outside without wearing the hijab. The process, during which hundreds of people lost their lives, became one of the largest expressions of accumulated social anger against practices such as mandatory hijab rules and the morality police.

From the 2025 protests to the 2026 war

By 2025, Iran had been severely weakened by high inflation, a rising exchange rate, reports of corruption and increasing political pressure. Demonstrations that began in Tehran at the end of December to protest worsening economic conditions quickly spread across the country. The protests, however, were met with one of the harshest crackdowns in Iran’s recent history. Iranian opposition sources and some foreign media outlets reported that more than 30,000 people had been killed, although official Iranian sources gave considerably lower figures. For many opponents, these events became an irreversible turning point.

The US-Israeli attacks that began a month after these bloody events made the divisions within society even more visible. In the course of our reporting, many Iranian opponents with whom we spoke said that years of accumulated anger toward the government,particularly the harsh crackdown on the latest protests,had convinced them that supporting the attacks was the only way to fight the regime. Regime supporters, meanwhile, maintained their backing for the new leadership despite the profound shock caused by the death of the revolutionary leader on the first day of the war, while expressing intense anger toward opponents who supported the US attacks.

The impact of the war on Iranian society

The Iranian people entered the February 2026 war carrying heavy problems and deep social wounds that had accumulated over many years. While the regime and its supporters were troubled by Iran’s loss of influence in the Middle East, opponents did not believe that there was any way out of the crises facing the country.

One of the possibilities that most frightened the public during the war was the damage or destruction of infrastructure and vital oil and energy facilities. A complete internet blackout lasting more than two months, daily increases in the prices of basic necessities, uncertainty about the country’s future, and waking up to the sound of bombardments severely affected the mental health of a society that had already accumulated years of trauma.

Since the beginning of the war, one of the greatest concerns expressed by many Iranians with whom we spoke both in Türkiye and Iran has been the uncertainty surrounding the country’s future. Sudden fluctuations in the exchange rate and the closure of trade routes have disrupted the operations of many businesses while making it increasingly difficult for people to make a living. From food and housing rents to automobile prices, it has become difficult even to speak of a price remaining stable for a full week. Opposition groups have reacted angrily to the continued allocation of national resources to military activities such as the missile program and to regional proxy forces such as Hezbollah while the population is struggling under these conditions. Indeed, during negotiations with the United States in April, demands that Israel withdraw from the territories it had occupied in Lebanon and end its attacks on Hezbollah were criticized by opponents as an indication that Iran’s fate was being tied to that of other countries and groups.

Against this backdrop, the internet shutdowns deserve particular attention. As mentioned above, Iran had already experienced nationwide internet restrictions during previous protests. But beginning in February, for the first time, communication with the outside world was completely cut off for more than two months. Internet access was unavailable except through Starlink and paid VPN/proxy services. Some Iranians identified as Starlink users were also subjected to demands for execution or severe punishment on espionage charges. For many Iranians who already felt isolated from the world, losing all communication with the outside world during the difficult days of the war made the situation even harder.

The scale of the social and economic difficulties becomes clearer when tens of thousands of online businesses whose activities were brought to a standstill by the internet shutdown are considered alongside other businesses forced to suspend operations because of the war, resulting in further unemployment.

Deepening social polarization under the shadow of war

One of the common factors bringing together different segments of Iranian society is a sense of patriotism and nationalism. Regardless of their ethnic origins or political views, the importance they attach to their Iranian identity and the territorial integrity of the country is clearly visible in their words and actions. Throughout the war, however, this sentiment has also led regime supporters and opponents to accuse one another of treason, particularly on social media.

For regime supporters, defending or supporting attacks by the enemy,the United States and Israel,is an unforgivable act of treason regardless of the justification. For opponents, however, the existing political order must be dismantled in order to protect their country’s future, and the only way to achieve this is to support attacks targeting the regime. Statements of support from US and Israeli officials toward the Iranian people, as well as assurances that civilians would not be targeted, were welcomed and defended by opposition groups. This helped foster a belief and hope among some opponents that the war would end with the regime’s downfall without causing harm to civilians or infrastructure.

Some Iranian officials, meanwhile, had hoped that an external attack would unite society, as happened during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. Yet in the more than four decades since then, Iran’s social dynamics, as well as public expectations and demands, have changed considerably. Moreover, the fractures that have emerged between different segments of society have become too deep to be repaired quickly or easily.

Regime supporters have, of course, also been affected by the negative consequences of the war described above and continue to suffer from them. Yet for this segment of society, preserving the government’s existence outweighs the hardships being experienced. Many say they are prepared, if necessary, to fight and make sacrifices with all their strength, both inside and outside the country.

Particularly during the first days of the war, this group gathered every night in the main squares of almost all cities, staging a continuous display of strength for months. This was a powerful message both to opponents supporting US and Israeli attacks and to enemy forces. Opposition groups, however, argued that these gatherings and demonstrations did nothing to improve the country’s or the war’s deteriorating situation, while instead disrupting daily life and wasting national resources. Opposition Persian-language channels broadcasting from Europe and the United States also reported allegations that citizens participating in the demonstrations were being provided with financial incentives. Ultimately, although the regime’s efforts strengthened the ranks of its supporters, they failed to create reconciliation between the different segments of society.

I

sraelis began voting Tuesday in a closely contested national election that could determine Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political future, three years after the October 7 attacks and amid growing public divisions over his leadership, successive wars and Israel’s increasing international isolation.

Polling stations opened at 7 a.m. local time and will close at 10 p.m., with approximately 7.3 million Israelis eligible to cast ballots, including 330,000 first-time voters.

The election is widely viewed as a referendum on Netanyahu, Israel’s longest-serving prime minister, who has spent 19 years in office and faces one of the most consequential political challenges of his career.

Opinion polls indicate a tight contest between Netanyahu’s Likud party and its right-wing allies and an opposition alliance led by Gadi Eisenkot, a former military chief who has positioned himself as an alternative to the incumbent’s leadership.

Neither bloc currently appears assured of securing the 61 seats required to form a majority in Israel’s 120-member parliament, raising the possibility of prolonged coalition negotiations or another election next year.

Netanyahu campaigns on wartime leadership as opposition demands accountability

Netanyahu has centered his campaign on his wartime record and close relationship with US President Donald Trump, who has publicly endorsed his reelection bid.

The prime minister has portrayed his leadership as essential to confronting Iran, suggesting Sunday that Trump would be prepared to take further military action against Tehran if Netanyahu remained in power.

Eisenkot rejected that argument, accusing Netanyahu of relying on fear and political threats to retain office.

The former military chief said he was confident Washington would cooperate with any Israeli leader chosen through democratic elections.

For many opposition supporters, the vote represents an opportunity to demand accountability for the security failures surrounding the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attacks, which killed approximately 1,200 people and resulted in 251 hostages being taken, according to Israeli figures.

Israel’s subsequent military offensive devastated much of Gaza and killed approximately 74,000 Palestinians, according to Gaza health authorities.

Eisenkot, who joined Netanyahu’s wartime cabinet following the attacks, resigned eight months later after criticizing the prime minister’s leadership.

Opposition groups have pledged to establish a national inquiry into the failures surrounding October 7.

Nilli Mor, a volunteer campaigning for the Democrats party led by former general Yair Golan, said she hoped the election would bring a new beginning for Israel.

Meanwhile, Netanyahu’s political future could once again depend on far-right coalition partners Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich.

Ben-Gvir, whose Jewish Power party has gained support in recent polls, expressed confidence Tuesday that Netanyahu would return to office.

Undecided voters and coalition arithmetic could determine outcome

With neither major bloc holding a decisive advantage, voter turnout and last-minute decisions could prove critical.

Approximately 13% of Israeli voters remained undecided, according to research by the Israel Democracy Institute.

Participation among Israel’s Arab minority could also influence the election’s outcome, potentially improving Eisenkot’s chances of forming an alternative government.

Although Eisenkot has ruled out formally joining forces with Arab parties, analysts suggest they could support a minority government to prevent Netanyahu from returning to power.

The election also comes amid growing dissatisfaction among some traditional Likud supporters, including voters concerned about Netanyahu’s ongoing corruption trial, in which he denies wrongdoing.

Political analyst Amotz Asa-El of the Shalom Hartman Institute predicted a narrow result rather than a decisive victory for either side.

Beyond domestic politics, the election carries significant implications for Israel’s regional strategy following military confrontations with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iran.

Eisenkot has pledged to prevent Iran from acquiring military nuclear capabilities, either through force or a diplomatic arrangement backed by Washington.

While he opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state, he has criticized rising settler violence against Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and rejected Netanyahu’s far-right coalition partners.

If neither Netanyahu nor Eisenkot succeeds in assembling a governing majority, Netanyahu could remain caretaker prime minister until another election is held.

For Israeli voters, Tuesday’s ballot represents a choice not only between competing political leaders but also over the country’s direction after three years of devastating conflict, deepening polarization and mounting diplomatic challenges.

(Source: Reuters)

O

n October 9, at the International Astronautical Congress in Antalya, Industry and Technology Minister Mehmet Fatih Kacır said Türkiye was building a launch site in Somalia for its own rockets and missiles and for the growing world demand for launches.

Reports of possible missile testing at the site had surfaced months earlier, but this time a minister was speaking in public. Somalia supplies the land, and much of what the deal means for both countries will be settled long before anything leaves the pad.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had confirmed four days earlier that construction was under way, and described it as a contribution to Africa’s space ecosystem. Kacır announced the completion of feasibility and design work in December 2025, and in Antalya he described the site as a very large area allocated to Türkiye. It belongs to Türkiye’s National Space Program, whose aim is to launch vehicles developed in Türkiye, and no date has yet been given for the first launch from Somali soil.

Türkiye’s relationship with Somalia grew closer during the 2011 famine and now runs through military training, maritime security and offshore energy exploration. The spaceport takes that cooperation into commercial launches, a business neither country has yet operated.

Somalia’s government has welcomed the project. What it has agreed to on land use, commercial revenue and oversight has not been published.

A coast close to the equator

Warsheikh sits about 2.3 degrees north of the equator. Europe’s spaceport at Kourou, in French Guiana, lies at roughly five degrees. A rocket flying east into a low-inclination orbit picks up speed from the Earth’s rotation and needs less energy to get there, and from Somalia’s eastern shore the flight path heads straight out over the Indian Ocean.

Kacır said the feasibility studies had ranked Somalia as the most favorable location, and pointed to cost as well: an equatorial launch, he said, can run about 30 percent cheaper than a comparable one from Türkiye.

He also set a target in Antalya. A 400-kilogram Turkish satellite is to reach a 550-kilometer orbit aboard the domestically developed Şimşek-1 by the end of 2027. Whether that mission will fly from Somalia, he did not say. The 2027 target gives the launcher a timetable. The Somali facility has no comparable public deadline.

Finding buyers is another matter. African governments have so far purchased launches abroad, from India, China, Europe and the United States. Their combined space budgets rose to $828 million in 2026 from $627 million a year earlier, although much of that money is tied to satellites, observatories and ground infrastructure.

A working spaceport on the continent would still give African operators one more option, if its prices and reliability can compete with established providers.

Ankara is looking further afield as well. Arif Karabeyoğlu, a board member of the Turkish Space Agency, said at the congress that the spaceport would serve global operators as well as Turkish vehicles. Turning that intention into contracts requires a safety record the facility has yet to build.

From Malindi to Alcântara

Somalia would not be the first African state to host a launch site run by a foreign partner. In 1967 Italy began sending satellites into orbit from platforms off the Kenyan coast near Malindi. Nine had gone up by 1988, when the launches stopped, although the ground installations stayed in use.

Kenya and Italy renegotiated the arrangement for the Luigi Broglio Space Centre in 2016, and the new agreement took effect in 2020. It provides for an annual land-use payment starting at $250,000, with a $50,000 increase every five years.

Kenya is entitled to half the profits from commercial services sold to third parties, has a role in managing the facility and retains authority over launch approvals. Yet in 2023 Kenya’s defense minister, Aden Duale, told a parliamentary committee that Kenyans had yet to see significant tangible benefits. The center, the committee heard, had been reluctant to disclose its commercial activities in full.

At Alcântara, in Brazil, the trouble lay on land. Quilombola communities displaced by the space program have contested the area for decades. Brazil signed its 2019 safeguards agreement with Washington while the dispute was still open, and only in September 2024 did a settlement clear the way for land titles.

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled on the case two months later, in a judgment covering 171 communities. Some 45,900 hectares were titled in March 2026, although other parts of the settlement remain unfinished. Around Warsheikh, the people who live and fish along the coast will have their own questions about access to land and sea once launches begin.

B

razilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has secured a historic fourth term in office after narrowly defeating right-wing Senator Flavio Bolsonaro in a dramatic presidential runoff, overcoming a first-round defeat.

The 80-year-old leftist leader won more than 51% of Sunday’s vote, compared with approximately 48% for Bolsonaro, the son of jailed former President Jair Bolsonaro. Electoral authorities declared Lula the winner after 98.76% of ballots had been counted.

The victory marks an unprecedented political comeback in modern Brazilian history, making Lula the first presidential candidate in nearly four decades to overturn a first-round defeat and win the subsequent runoff.

Bolsonaro had initially emerged ahead in the October 4 election, securing 47.03% of votes against Lula’s 45.16%, a difference of approximately 2.2 million ballots.

However, an intensive three-week campaign focused on economic concerns, social welfare programs and mobilizing absent voters helped Lula reverse the result.

His victory also represents a significant setback for Brazil’s right wing, which had hoped to return the Bolsonaro family to power.

Voting extension triggers controversy and legal threats

Sunday’s election was marked by confusion after a last-minute judicial decision extended voting hours by two hours following complaints from both presidential campaigns.

Lula’s campaign accused local authorities of deliberately reducing public transportation services in several cities, potentially preventing lower-income voters from reaching polling stations.

Bolsonaro’s campaign separately requested additional voting time in areas affected by heavy rainfall and flooding.

In Minas Gerais, authorities reported electricity outages at 349 polling locations, although electronic voting machines continued operating using backup batteries.

Supreme Court Justice Cristiano Zanin subsequently ordered polling stations that remained open to continue accepting voters until 7 p.m., two hours beyond the original closing time.

However, some polling stations had already closed and shut down their voting equipment before the decision was announced.

The resulting confusion prompted Bolsonaro to question the election’s legitimacy and pledge to seek annulment of the results.

Bolsonaro accused Zanin, who previously served as Lula’s personal lawyer before being appointed to the Supreme Court in 2023, of improperly changing election procedures.

Brazil’s Federal Police are also investigating allegations of election-related transportation disruptions across five states.

In Salvador, a court ordered the arrest of the city’s transportation secretary over allegations that he directed reductions in bus services.

The developments have raised concerns about potential legal disputes following an already deeply polarized presidential contest.

Higher turnout delivers Lula victory and challenges Trump

Increased voter participation appears to have played an important role in Lula’s comeback, particularly in northeastern Brazil, a longstanding stronghold of his Workers’ Party.

According to Andrei Roman, head of polling firm AtlasIntel, lower abstention may have contributed to the president’s victory.

Approximately 33.4 million Brazilians stayed home during the first round, representing nearly 21% of eligible voters and marking the highest general-election abstention rate since 1998.

Lula spent the final weeks of campaigning seeking to mobilize those voters, emphasizing household economic pressures and promising measures including free public transportation on weekends.

His victory also carries significant international implications, particularly for relations with the United States.

President Donald Trump has maintained close ties with the Bolsonaro family, while Lula has repeatedly criticized Washington’s tariff policies and what he describes as interference in Brazil’s domestic affairs.

Reuters reported that US State Department officials had pushed for sanctions against Brazil as part of efforts to weaken Lula’s administration and facilitate the Bolsonaro family’s political return.

Asked Sunday which candidate he preferred, Trump declined to publicly endorse either contender.

Lula, meanwhile, portrayed his victory as a defense of Brazilian sovereignty and democratic institutions against domestic and international pressure.

In his election-night address, the president said Brazilians had overcome external interference and rejected political misinformation.

“The election was a defeat for denialism,” Lula declared. “It was a defeat for lies.”

Despite the celebrations among his supporters, Lula begins his historic fourth term facing a divided electorate, threatened legal challenges and the difficult task of rebuilding political consensus in Latin America’s largest country.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

D

emocrats are increasingly optimistic about their chances of reclaiming control of the US Senate in November’s midterm elections, as President Donald Trump’s declining popularity and mounting economic concerns reshape competitive races across several traditionally Republican states.

With less than two weeks remaining before the November 3 elections, a new CNN poll conducted by SSRS shows Democrats holding a 10-point nationwide advantage over Republicans in voters’ congressional preferences.

Trump’s approval rating stands at approximately 33%, according to CNN’s Poll of Polls average, as rising living costs and the economic consequences of the US war with Iran weigh heavily on voters.

Despite the favorable national environment, Democrats face a difficult electoral map. They must gain at least four Republican-held Senate seats while defending their existing positions to secure a majority.

More than $300 million in advertising is expected to flow into the 10 most competitive Senate contests during the campaign’s final two weeks, according to AdImpact data cited by CNN.

North Carolina, Ohio and Alaska offer Democrats key opportunities

North Carolina currently represents Democrats’ strongest opportunity to capture a Republican-held Senate seat.

Former Democratic Governor Roy Cooper leads Republican Michael Whatley in polling, prompting Republican-aligned groups to scale back advertising investments in the state.

Democratic groups have reserved approximately $13.2 million in advertising for the final two weeks, compared with just $2.5 million from Republicans.

Ohio has emerged as another crucial battleground, with former Democratic Senator Sherrod Brown seeking to defeat Republican incumbent Jon Husted, who was appointed to replace Vice President JD Vance.

CNN’s polling average places Brown ahead by 49% to 44%, despite Trump’s double-digit victory in Ohio during the 2024 presidential election.

The contest has attracted substantial financial resources, with approximately $75 million in combined advertising scheduled for the campaign’s closing weeks.

In Alaska, former Democratic Representative Mary Peltola is mounting a competitive challenge against Republican Senator Dan Sullivan.

A New York Times/Siena poll released earlier this month showed Peltola leading by seven percentage points, although polling in the state remains limited.

The economic consequences of the Iran war have become an important campaign issue, particularly in Alaska, where high gasoline prices have intensified household financial pressures.

Meanwhile, Republican Senator Susan Collins faces one of her toughest reelection campaigns in Maine against Democrat Troy Jackson.

Recent polling indicates a closely contested race, with Democrats seeking to capitalize on dissatisfaction with Trump in a state won by former Vice President Kamala Harris in 2024.

Collins, however, has previously demonstrated an ability to win elections despite Maine’s preference for Democratic presidential candidates.

Texas and Michigan could determine Senate control

Texas has also emerged as an unexpectedly competitive battleground, with Democratic candidate James Talarico challenging Republican Attorney General Ken Paxton.

CNN’s polling average places Talarico ahead by 49% to 47%, although the contest remains within the margin of error.

Democrats hope Paxton’s political controversies could help them secure their first statewide victory in Texas in more than three decades.

Republicans, meanwhile, are preparing an extensive advertising campaign, with spending on the state’s Senate contest expected to exceed $380 million across the primary and general election campaigns.

Michigan represents another critical contest, where Democrat Abdul El-Sayed faces former Republican Representative Mike Rogers.

Polling shows El-Sayed at 49% and Rogers at 47%, with neither candidate holding a decisive advantage.

Democrats also face competitive contests in Iowa, where Josh Turek is narrowly ahead of Republican Ashley Hinson, and Kansas, where Adam Hamilton is challenging incumbent Senator Roger Marshall.

Kansas has not elected a Democratic senator in 94 years, but economic dissatisfaction has brought the traditionally Republican state into closer contention.

In New Hampshire, Democrat Chris Pappas appears better positioned against Republican John Sununu, while Democratic Senator Jon Ossoff holds an advantage over Republican challenger Mike Collins in Georgia.

Several additional states, including Nebraska, South Carolina, Minnesota and Mississippi, remain potential sources of electoral surprises.

The expanding battleground map has forced Republicans to devote resources to defending seats previously considered relatively secure.

For Democrats, however, favorable national polling alone will not guarantee victory. Their prospects depend on converting growing dissatisfaction with Trump into victories across several Republican-leaning states while protecting vulnerable Democratic seats.

With Election Day approaching, the outcome could determine whether Trump retains congressional support for his legislative agenda or faces a Democratic-controlled Senate during the final two years of his presidency.

(Source: CNN)

I

sraeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has declared that overthrowing Iran’s government remains Israel’s primary objective, raising the prospect of another military confrontation with Tehran despite growing doubts over whether Israel possesses the capabilities or international backing needed to achieve regime change.

Netanyahu’s remarks come ahead of Israel’s national elections next week, as his government faces declining public support and mounting questions about its regional security strategy.

The Israeli leader reiterated his position following discussions with US President Donald Trump on Sunday and a visit to Israel by US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth.

However, there has been no indication that Washington has agreed to participate in another offensive against Iran, particularly one explicitly intended to remove its political leadership.

Military analysts say Israel retains considerable offensive capabilities and could inflict substantial damage on Iranian military infrastructure. But they question whether air strikes, covert operations and cyberattacks could translate into the collapse of Tehran’s government.

Military superiority does not guarantee regime change

Israel has demonstrated its ability to strike targets deep inside Iranian territory, supported by advanced weapons systems, intelligence capabilities and aerial refueling assets.

Urban Coningham, a research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), said Israel could potentially reestablish air superiority and launch another campaign against Iranian targets.

Nevertheless, analysts distinguish between weakening a country’s military capabilities and removing its political leadership.

Netanyahu has portrayed Iran as a major security threat since his first term as prime minister in 1996, repeatedly advocating international action against Tehran.

The United States eventually joined Israeli military operations against Iran in June 2025 and participated again in the campaign launched on February 28, 2026.

Despite those interventions, Iran’s government remained in power.

Netanyahu himself acknowledged the limitations of aerial bombardment in March, suggesting that overthrowing the Iranian leadership would require a ground component.

Caglar Kurc, an assistant professor at Abdullah Gul University in Türkiye, said air strikes could weaken Iran’s military infrastructure without completely eliminating its capacity to retaliate.

He argued that achieving regime change would require deploying troops and maintaining a military presence inside Iran for years, a commitment Israel would struggle to sustain.

Experts also questioned whether intelligence operations or support for armed opposition groups could provide a viable alternative.

Although Israel retains intelligence networks inside Iran, deploying covert assets risks exposing them to Iranian counterintelligence operations.

Similarly, Kurdish and Baloch armed groups are not considered capable of independently defeating Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Iran retains retaliatory capabilities as US support remains uncertain

A renewed Israeli offensive would also carry substantial military and economic risks.

Sidharth Kaushal, a senior RUSI research fellow, said Iran likely retains significant missile stockpiles despite damage sustained during previous confrontations.

Its antiship missile capabilities remain particularly important, supported by domestic production and mountainous terrain that provides natural protection against aerial attacks.

Iran could also exploit the financial imbalance between inexpensive offensive drones and the considerably more expensive interceptor systems used by Israel.

Previous exchanges have already depleted portions of Israel’s interceptor inventories, potentially complicating its ability to sustain defensive operations during another prolonged confrontation.

Washington’s willingness to participate represents another major uncertainty.

According to a Financial Times report this week, an Israeli proposal for renewed strikes failed to secure Trump’s approval, although the disagreement did not necessarily rule out future American involvement.

With US midterm elections approaching, Trump faces domestic political pressure to avoid another escalation.

Without American participation, Israel would also lack access to certain specialized military capabilities, including the massive GBU-57 bunker-busting bombs deployed by US B-2 bombers against Iran’s Fordow and Natanz nuclear facilities in June 2025.

Analysts suggest Tehran could respond to an independent Israeli offensive by concentrating retaliatory strikes on Israel while avoiding American military installations and disruption to the Strait of Hormuz.

Such an approach could allow Iran to impose significant costs on Israel while reducing the likelihood of direct US intervention.

Ultimately, experts argue that Netanyahu faces a fundamental strategic obstacle: Israel may possess the military power to severely damage Iran, but destroying infrastructure and military installations does not necessarily create the conditions required to overthrow an established government.

Without a credible ground strategy, sustained international backing and a viable political alternative inside Iran, Netanyahu’s declared objective of regime change remains far more difficult to achieve than another round of devastating military strikes.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

G

lobal debt has surged beyond $365 trillion, placing governments under mounting financial pressure as rising interest payments consume public budgets and intensify economic frustration across Europe, where hundreds of thousands of protesters have taken to the streets demanding relief from soaring living costs.

According to the Institute of International Finance (IIF), worldwide debt held by governments, businesses and households increased by approximately $10 trillion during the first half of 2026, reaching a level equivalent to roughly $44,000 for every person on the planet.

The unprecedented debt burden comes as major economies face increasingly expensive borrowing conditions, forcing governments to allocate greater portions of their budgets to interest payments rather than public services.

The consequences have become particularly visible in France, where nationwide demonstrations over living costs, stagnant wages, unaffordable housing and underfunded education have highlighted growing dissatisfaction with the country’s economic direction.

More than 550,000 people participated in demonstrations across France on Saturday, according to the Interior Ministry, following weeks of student-led protests.

Similar demonstrations have erupted in Belgium, Italy and Portugal. While many gatherings remained peaceful, some descended into clashes, looting and fires.

France faces mounting debt crisis as borrowing costs surge

France has emerged as a major source of concern in European financial markets, with its government borrowing costs reaching their highest level since 2002.

The country currently pays approximately 5% to borrow money through 10-year government bonds, considerably higher than Germany’s 3.41%.

More strikingly, French borrowing costs have surpassed those of Italy and Greece, two countries that experienced severe financial difficulties during the eurozone sovereign debt crisis.

Only the United Kingdom, which operates outside the eurozone, currently faces higher borrowing costs among the major European economies examined.

The widening gap between French and German bond yields reflects investors demanding greater compensation for lending to Paris amid concerns about its fiscal outlook.

France’s public debt has reached approximately $4.2 trillion, equivalent to 118.5% of its gross domestic product, placing it fifth globally in absolute government debt.

The International Monetary Fund projects that France’s debt could climb to 121.8% of GDP by 2030, further complicating efforts to stabilize public finances.

Rising bond yields carry significant consequences for government spending.

When countries issue debt at higher interest rates, they must devote more resources to servicing their financial obligations, potentially leaving less funding available for hospitals, education, infrastructure and pensions.

Governments facing such pressures may eventually be forced to increase taxation, reduce public expenditure or borrow even more money.

The situation has revived memories of Europe’s sovereign debt crisis between 2010 and 2012, when soaring borrowing costs pushed countries including Ireland and Portugal into international financial assistance programs.

Global interest payments exceed annual defense spending

The debt challenge extends far beyond Europe.

The United States remains the world’s largest government debtor, with outstanding public debt reaching approximately $41.4 trillion, equivalent to 127% of its economy.

China follows with $22.5 trillion, or 104% of GDP, while Japan holds $8.7 trillion in government debt and has the highest debt-to-GDP ratio among major economies, at approximately 199%.

The United Kingdom’s government debt stands at $4.4 trillion, representing 102% of GDP, while Italy owes approximately $3.7 trillion, equivalent to 138% of its economy.

Germany, by comparison, carries $3.5 trillion in public debt, representing a significantly lower 65% of GDP.

The mounting financial obligations are accompanied by an increasingly expensive global interest bill.

Advanced economies paid more than $3.3 trillion in interest on government bonds over the past year, exceeding estimated annual worldwide spending on defense, artificial intelligence and clean energy individually.

Global defense expenditure stood at approximately $3.1 trillion, compared with $2.6 trillion for artificial intelligence and $2.3 trillion for clean energy.

The growing cost of servicing debt is also likely to affect households, as higher government borrowing costs can contribute to increased interest rates on mortgages, vehicle financing and consumer credit.

For policymakers, the challenge is balancing fiscal sustainability against growing public demands for economic relief.

With governments facing pressure to reduce deficits while citizens demand greater investment in essential services, the global debt surge is becoming not only a financial concern but an increasingly significant political challenge.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

T

housands of students and teachers marched through central Athens on Wednesday, demanding affordable housing, increased education funding and government action to address soaring living costs, as a widening wave of economic protests continued to spread across Europe.

The demonstrations, which also took place in several other Greek cities, including Thessaloniki and the western port city of Patras, reflect growing frustration over rising household expenses, deteriorating school conditions and the financial pressures facing university students.

Protesters carrying banners and placards marched through the Greek capital, accusing the country’s conservative government of failing to adequately support students and educators amid mounting economic difficulties.

One banner reading “From Greece to France, give money to education” highlighted the growing connection between demonstrations taking place across the continent.

Other protesters carried signs written in French declaring, “To study or to survive,” underscoring concerns that rising living expenses are forcing young people to choose between pursuing their education and meeting basic financial needs.

The protests come amid widespread demonstrations across several European countries, where rising fuel prices, stagnant incomes and increasingly unaffordable housing have intensified public dissatisfaction.

France has witnessed particularly significant unrest, with some demonstrations descending into violent clashes, while similar protests have also taken place in Italy and Albania.

Students demand affordable housing and greater government support

Housing affordability emerged as one of the central grievances among Greek students, many of whom say existing government assistance falls far short of covering their accommodation expenses.

Panagiotis Moschonas, a 20-year-old engineering student participating in the Athens demonstration, criticized the government for failing to introduce meaningful measures to address the financial difficulties facing university students.

He pointed specifically to the government’s student housing subsidy, arguing that the assistance was insufficient and poorly structured.

According to Moschonas, students receive a monthly rent subsidy of 120 euros, approximately $135, which does not even cover half the cost of accommodation.

He also criticized the fact that the subsidy is distributed at the end of the year rather than when students face their monthly rental obligations.

The complaints reflect broader concerns among young Europeans who are increasingly struggling to secure affordable accommodation while pursuing higher education.

Beyond housing, demonstrators called for greater public investment in schools and universities, arguing that education budgets have failed to keep pace with rising costs and growing institutional needs.

Wednesday’s demonstrations were accompanied by a teachers’ strike, although some schools remained open despite the industrial action.

Educators said worsening working conditions and financial pressures on their families had made further collective action necessary.

Teacher Ioannis Rompas said the strike reflected growing frustration among education workers who were struggling to cope with everyday expenses while witnessing the continuing deterioration of public schools.

“Today we are striking because this situation can’t continue for our families,” Rompas said, citing high living costs and the increasing difficulty of making ends meet.

He warned that conditions in schools were deteriorating significantly year after year, adding to the pressure facing teachers and students alike.

Police deployed as European protest movement widens

Greek authorities maintained a significant security presence throughout Wednesday’s demonstrations, with riot police closely monitoring protesters as they moved through central Athens.

Officers conducted spot checks and searched bags belonging to people approaching the demonstration areas.

Businesses along the protest route also took precautionary measures, with several shops and cafes lowering steel shutters to protect their premises against potential damage.

The security arrangements reflected concerns over possible violence, given that demonstrations in Greece have previously escalated into confrontations between protesters and police.

The latest mobilization comes as governments across Europe face mounting pressure to address the consequences of rising living expenses and public dissatisfaction with spending priorities.

Students and teachers have become increasingly prominent in the demonstrations, arguing that education and affordable housing should receive greater government attention.

The coordinated grievances emerging across national borders suggest that economic frustration is developing into a broader political challenge for European governments.

For Greek demonstrators, Wednesday’s march delivered a clear message: existing financial assistance and education policies are no longer sufficient to address the growing pressures facing students, teachers and their families.

With similar protests continuing elsewhere in Europe, the demonstrations in Athens highlight how rising living costs are increasingly translating into public demands for changes in government spending and social policy.

(Source: ABC News)

L

ibya’s eastern-based parliament has unanimously approved a controversial maritime agreement with Türkiye, reversing its previous rejection of the deal and marking a significant breakthrough in Ankara’s efforts to strengthen relations with military commander Khalifa Haftar.

The House of Representatives, based in the eastern city of Tobruk and aligned with Haftar, voted Tuesday to ratify the 2019 maritime memorandum signed between Türkiye and Libya’s former UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA).

The agreement establishes maritime boundaries between the two countries in the Mediterranean Sea and has long been a source of tension between Türkiye and neighboring Greece and Cyprus.

The decision represents a dramatic reversal for the eastern parliament, which unanimously rejected the agreement in 2020 and severed political ties with Ankara over its military support for the rival Tripoli-based administration.

Lawmaker Aisha al-Tabalqi told Reuters that specialized parliamentary committees had presented a comprehensive explanation of the agreement’s provisions before lawmakers voted to approve it.

Another lawmaker, Tarek al-Jeroushi, defended the decision, acknowledging that it could provoke objections from other countries but insisting Libya’s national interests must take priority.

He said the agreement would strengthen Libya’s standing as a political, military and economic partner to major regional and international powers.

Türkiye and Haftar move from confrontation to cooperation

The parliamentary approval underscores a broader transformation in relations between Ankara and eastern Libya, following years in which the two sides supported opposing factions in the country’s civil war.

Türkiye intervened militarily in Libya in late 2019 after signing security and maritime agreements with the Tripoli-based GNA, then led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj.

At the time, Haftar’s self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) had nearly surrounded Tripoli and appeared poised to defeat the internationally recognized administration.

Ankara’s deployment of military advisers and armed drones helped halt the LNA offensive, fundamentally changing the course of the conflict and establishing Türkiye as a major military and political player in western Libya.

Haftar’s forces, which have historically received support from Egypt and other regional powers, subsequently maintained an adversarial relationship with Ankara.

However, relations have improved considerably over the past year, with both sides pursuing closer military and diplomatic cooperation.

In July, Türkiye and Haftar’s forces reached an agreement to develop military facilities and advanced surveillance systems, signaling Ankara’s expanding engagement with eastern Libya.

Discussions have also emerged over the possibility of establishing a Turkish military presence in territories controlled by the LNA.

The latest parliamentary decision further consolidates that rapprochement, potentially allowing Türkiye to safeguard its strategic interests across Libya regardless of how negotiations over the country’s political future unfold.

The move comes as Libya continues to struggle with institutional divisions more than a decade after the civil war that followed the overthrow of longtime leader Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.

Greece condemns agreement as Mediterranean tensions resurface

The eastern parliament’s approval has already triggered a strong response from Greece, which has consistently opposed the 2019 maritime agreement.

In a statement Tuesday, the Greek Foreign Ministry argued that the memorandum “violated international maritime law and infringed upon the sovereign rights of other countries in the region.”

Athens urged Libya to “avoid actions that could undermine stability in the Mediterranean” and said it had informed its international partners and allies of its concerns.

Greece also pledged to take all appropriate measures to “defend its sovereign rights.”

The original agreement sparked protests from Athens and Nicosia because of competing interpretations of maritime boundaries and exclusive economic zones in the eastern Mediterranean, a region containing strategically important energy resources.

For Türkiye, securing approval from eastern Libya’s parliament represents an important diplomatic achievement, particularly because the institution previously opposed both the agreement and Ankara’s military involvement in the country.

The decision could strengthen Türkiye’s position in future negotiations over Mediterranean maritime jurisdiction while expanding its economic and security partnerships with Libya’s competing political authorities.

It also reflects Ankara’s evolving strategy of maintaining relationships with both western and eastern Libyan factions rather than relying exclusively on its traditional allies in Tripoli.

With political reunification efforts continuing under international mediation, Türkiye appears increasingly determined to preserve its influence regardless of which faction ultimately emerges from Libya’s prolonged political transition.

However, Greece’s immediate rejection demonstrates that the maritime agreement remains a contentious regional issue, with its latest approval potentially opening another chapter in the longstanding geopolitical dispute over the eastern Mediterranean.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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rtificial intelligence has spent a decade being sold as a technology story: smarter language models, autonomous agents, unprecedented productivity. But the more consequential story is financial. AI has become one of the largest capital-allocation cycles in modern economic history.

Capital is pouring into data centers, chip fabrication plants, cloud infrastructure, power generation, grid upgrades, energy storage, and cooling systems. Governments call AI a strategic priority. Technology giants call it a competitive necessity. Investors call it a once-in-a-generation opportunity. The logic is simple: if AI transforms business processes and creates new industries, today’s infrastructure will earn handsome returns tomorrow.

But a technology can transform an economy and still disappoint many of the investors who financed its early buildout. The central question is not whether AI will change the world; it almost certainly will. It is whether the revenues, productivity gains, and cash flows AI generates will justify the scale of money being spent, and whether they will arrive on time.

AI has become a macro story

Major technologies have always demanded heavy infrastructure spending long before the benefits showed up. Railroads, electrification, and the internet all reshaped economies. Each was also accompanied by exuberance, misallocated capital, and overinvestment. The internet changed global commerce, yet countless dot-com companies vanished because expectations outran economic reality.

Today’s cycle rhymes with that history, with one important difference. AI is not just software in the cloud. It depends on high-performance chips, hyperscale data centers, reliable electricity, fast connectivity, advanced cooling, and constant hardware refreshes. That makes it an industrial-scale investment theme, and capital-intensive stories are shaped not only by innovation but also by financing conditions, utilization rates, and return on invested capital.

The scale is extraordinary. Technology companies are spending hundreds of billions of dollars on AI capabilities. Utilities are planning capacity expansions to meet rising electricity demand. Chipmakers are racing to add production. Institutional investors are deploying record sums into digital infrastructure.

The effects reach well beyond tech. Engineering firms are winning construction contracts, energy developers are seeing demand for new generation, equipment makers are expanding, and banks are financing ever-larger projects. In that sense, AI has become a genuine growth engine.

But spending is not the same as profitability. Investors often confuse capital deployment with value creation. Building infrastructure generates economic activity today; earning an acceptable return on it is a separate challenge entirely.

The capital intensity problem

Every investment cycle eventually faces four questions: How much capital is required? Who provides it? What returns will it earn? And when will those returns arrive?

For AI, the answers are demanding. Data centers require enormous upfront investment and large operating budgets. High-performance hardware consumes vast amounts of electricity, needs sophisticated cooling, and can become obsolete within a few years. The initial outlay is only the beginning: companies must keep upgrading equipment, replacing aging chips, adding capacity, and running specialized operations. Financing costs, depreciation, utilization, and customer demand all become critical variables.

Governments worldwide are carrying elevated debt and facing fiscal pressure. There is no certainty that AI investment will push interest rates higher or crowd out other spending, but the interplay between public borrowing, private investment demand, and infrastructure constraints deserves attention. If the cost of capital stays structurally higher than investors expect, many AI valuations will face tougher scrutiny.

This matters most for companies whose market values rest on earnings expected many years out. When expectations are stretched, small changes in discount rates, growth assumptions, or margins can move valuations dramatically.

The gap between innovation and monetization

The biggest risk to the AI thesis may not be technological failure. It may be a timing mismatch between spending and returns. Markets often assume breakthroughs translate automatically into economic success. They rarely do.

Organizations typically need years to redesign workflows, integrate new systems, retrain employees, address cybersecurity risks, modernize legacy infrastructure, and adapt operating models. Many firms will adopt AI tools quickly. Fewer will transform their processes. Fewer still will achieve measurable economic benefits at scale.

That is the monetization challenge. Businesses may use AI extensively without generating enough new revenue to support today’s infrastructure spending. Consumers may enjoy AI-powered products while intense competition among producers holds profits down. We have seen this before: industries create enormous value for society yet earn only modest returns for investors. The gap between economic value creation and shareholder value creation is routinely underestimated.

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ATO is sending additional maritime patrol aircraft, surveillance equipment and intelligence personnel to the Black Sea following a series of deadly drone attacks on commercial vessels, as fears grow over the expanding consequences of Russia’s war in Ukraine for regional security and international shipping.

The announcement Tuesday follows at least six attacks on vessels over 10 days, several of which occurred near the coastlines of NATO members Romania and Bulgaria, leaving dozens of sailors dead or missing.

NATO spokesperson Colonel Martin O’Donnell confirmed that member states were strengthening their military presence in the region, with additional resources intended to improve monitoring and help identify potential threats.

“Allies have or will send additional maritime patrol aircraft, radar systems, explosive exploitation teams, intelligence personnel, drones and more to the Black Sea,” O’Donnell said.

He emphasized that improving the alliance’s ability to monitor developments and exchange information would be central to its response.

“The most important thing we can do, however, is to increase our situational awareness in the region through increased sensors and data sharing,” he added.

The decision came after NATO’s principal political decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council, discussed the deteriorating security situation during a meeting at the alliance’s headquarters in Brussels.

Although military analysts have suggested that Russia was almost certainly responsible for the attacks, NATO, Romania and Bulgaria have stopped short of formally attributing them to Moscow. The Kremlin has denied responsibility.

Deadly attacks raise alarm among NATO members

The latest escalation follows a succession of strikes against civilian shipping in one of Europe’s most strategically important maritime corridors.

On October 5, Romanian authorities reported that two people had been killed after a vessel caught fire and sank in Black Sea waters. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy subsequently accused Russia of carrying out the attack.

Further incidents followed, including drone strikes against two chemical tankers near Romania’s coastline last week that set the vessels ablaze and left seven sailors missing.

Other attacks near Romania and neighboring Bulgaria have heightened concerns about the safety of commercial shipping, with at least five additional cargo vessels reportedly targeted over the preceding 10 days.

Across the incidents, at least 23 sailors have been reported dead or missing.

NATO spokesperson Allison Hart said the alliance had already taken steps to reinforce its eastern defenses, including strengthening its ability to counter unmanned aerial threats.

“NATO has already strengthened our posture along the eastern flank, including with counter-drone capabilities,” Hart wrote on X.

The latest deployment represents an additional effort to protect regional security as the conflict increasingly affects maritime activity beyond Ukraine’s immediate coastline.

The Black Sea remains a critical route for international trade, particularly Ukrainian agricultural exports, making disruptions to commercial shipping a concern extending well beyond the countries directly involved in the conflict.

EU warns attacks threaten global food security

The European Union has condemned the latest incidents, warning that continued attacks on commercial vessels could have serious consequences for global food supplies.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas described the recent escalation as dangerous and unacceptable, pointing to six attacks in just 10 days involving drones suspected of originating from Russia.

Kallas suggested Moscow could be attempting to undermine Ukraine’s economy by disrupting maritime exports, particularly grain shipments that provide Kyiv with an important source of revenue.

The attacks come as global food markets face mounting pressure from droughts affecting several regions and the continuing war in the Middle East.

According to Kallas, further disruption to Black Sea shipping risks worsening an already fragile international food supply situation.

The growing security concerns have also placed renewed attention on NATO’s ability to respond to threats affecting its member states without becoming directly involved in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

For Romania and Bulgaria, both NATO members bordering the Black Sea, the attacks have brought the consequences of the war increasingly close to their territorial waters and commercial maritime infrastructure.

While the alliance has not announced direct military action against those responsible, its decision to deploy additional aircraft, radar systems and intelligence resources signals a heightened determination to monitor threats and reinforce its presence in the region.

With commercial vessels continuing to face potential attacks, the Black Sea is emerging as another increasingly volatile front in the wider security crisis surrounding the war in Ukraine.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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he war that erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on April 15, 2023, has evolved, after more than three years of fighting, into a conflict that can no longer be explained simply as a power struggle between two military organisations.

As of September 2026, the situation in Sudan points to a prolonged war of attrition in which military operations of varying intensity across different parts of the country, deepening economic fragmentation, a worsening humanitarian crisis and cross-border support networks involving external actors are increasingly reinforcing one another.

During the early stages of the war, the Khartoum and Darfur fronts formed the centre of the fighting. Today, however, the military centre of gravity has shifted significantly towards Kordofan, Darfur and the Blue Nile region.

The advances made by the SAF in and around Khartoum during 2025 enabled the Sudanese government to consolidate its control over the northern and eastern parts of the country. Although efforts to restore a degree of normality in the capital have begun, this does not mean that the war is approaching its end.

On the contrary, the RSF’s continued dominance in Darfur and the expansion of fighting into Kordofan and the Blue Nile region demonstrate that the geographical character of the conflict is changing.

North Kordofan, in particular, has become one of the war’s most critical strategic junctions since the summer of 2026. The SAF’s gains along routes around Bara in July and September are important for access to logistical corridors connecting El-Obeid with Darfur.

In response, the RSF has carried out drone attacks against SAF-controlled centres, particularly El-Obeid, attempting to offset pressure on the ground through long-range strikes.

Mutual attacks and new population movements continued in North Kordofan during the final week of September.

One of the most striking transformations in the conflict has been the way unmanned aerial vehicles have altered the war’s strategic character.

According to the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, more than 1,000 people were killed in drone attacks during the first five months of 2026.

Both sides have acquired the capability to strike targets far behind the front lines. Electricity infrastructure, fuel facilities, hospitals, markets and areas sheltering displaced civilians have all been affected by attacks.

Sudan’s war has thus evolved into a conflict in which conventional ground warfare is intertwined with cross-border technology and weapons supply networks, turning the country into a de facto testing ground for weapons manufacturers.

A New axis of conflict stretching from Darfur to Kordofan

Darfur continues to provide the RSF with military and economic depth in the war. The group’s capture of El Fasher in October 2025 consolidated its dominance across western Sudan.

As a result, an increasingly pronounced east-west division has emerged on Sudan’s de facto map of territorial control. The SAF largely controls the north, east and areas around Khartoum, while the RSF’s sphere of influence is concentrated in Darfur and parts of Kordofan connected to the region.

This does not, however, mean that a stable boundary has emerged between the two sides. On the contrary, Kordofan is becoming a transitional zone between their respective areas of control.

Control of El-Obeid is strategically important not only from a military perspective but also because of its position along the overland route linking Khartoum with Darfur.

Consequently, the possibility that the future of Sudan’s war will be determined less by Khartoum than by the Kordofan corridors, where control has repeatedly shifted between the parties in recent months, is becoming increasingly likely.

Meanwhile, renewed escalation in the Blue Nile region has added another dimension to the conflict.

The activities of the RSF and elements of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N) have transformed areas close to the Ethiopian and South Sudanese borders into a new security flashpoint.

Clashes around Geissan and Kurmuk in recent weeks, along with allegations concerning cross-border logistical routes, indicate that Sudan’s war is beginning to intersect more directly with instability in the Horn of Africa.

From military fragmentation to economic fragmentation

Perhaps one of the most significant dimensions of Sudan’s de facto fragmentation is emerging in the economic sphere.

In areas controlled by the SAF, the Sudanese pound’s black-market exchange rate against the US dollar has fallen by almost half since the summer of 2026. By contrast, the currency has followed a relatively more stable trajectory in some RSF-controlled areas.

According to figures for September 2026, the dollar was trading at approximately 7,500 Sudanese pounds on the black market in SAF-controlled areas, compared with around 4,200 pounds in RSF-controlled territories.

A significant share of Sudan’s gold, livestock, oilseed and gum arabic production is located in areas controlled by the RSF or in contested territories, further deepening the country’s economic fragmentation.

Consequently, control over the resources and trade routes that finance the war economy has become as decisive as territorial control itself.

Gold-producing areas, overland routes extending into Libya and Chad, Red Sea ports and oil infrastructure are now as important to the sustainability of the war as military bases.

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merican President Donald Trump’s approval rating has fallen to the lowest level of either of his presidential terms, according to a new Reuters/Ipsos poll, as mounting economic concerns and rising gasoline prices threaten to undermine Republican prospects in November’s crucial congressional elections.

The survey, released Monday, found that just 31% of Americans approve of Trump’s performance in office, down one percentage point from two weeks earlier and marking a new low for the president.

The findings come ahead of the November 3 midterm elections, when voters will determine whether Republicans retain control of the House of Representatives and Senate during the final two years of Trump’s presidency.

Democrats have opened their largest lead of the current election cycle, with 47% of registered voters saying they would support Democratic congressional candidates compared with 35% backing Republicans.

The 12-percentage-point advantage represents a significant widening from the previous Reuters/Ipsos survey, conducted two weeks earlier, which showed Democrats leading Republicans by seven points, 44% to 37%.

The results suggest Republicans face an increasingly difficult political environment as voters express frustration with the administration’s handling of the economy and the financial consequences of the war involving Iran.

Women voters drive widening Democratic advantage

One of the most significant findings of the latest survey is the growing preference for Democratic candidates among women, a voting bloc that could prove decisive in determining control of Congress.

According to the poll, 50% of female registered voters said they would support Democrats, compared with 32% who favored Republicans, giving the opposition party an 18-point advantage among women.

Male voters also leaned toward Democrats, although by a narrower margin.

The shift has helped Democrats expand their nationwide congressional lead at a time when Republicans are attempting to defend their majorities in both chambers.

A Democratic victory in either the House or Senate would significantly complicate Trump’s legislative agenda, potentially limiting his ability to advance key domestic policies and exposing his administration to greater congressional scrutiny.

However, national polling does not necessarily translate directly into election results.

The congressional generic ballot measures voters’ overall party preferences rather than support for individual candidates in specific races.

Control of Congress will ultimately depend on hundreds of district-level contests and individual Senate races, where electoral geography and Republican structural advantages could influence the outcome despite Democrats’ national lead.

Nevertheless, the widening gap signals a potentially challenging political landscape for the president’s party as the campaign enters its final stretch.

Economic frustration weighs heavily on Trump

The latest polling suggests economic dissatisfaction has become a major vulnerability for the White House, particularly following the sharp increase in gasoline prices linked to the US-Israeli military campaign against Iran launched in February.

The conflict has placed additional pressure on American households, with higher fuel costs contributing to broader concerns about living expenses.

According to the survey, 68% of Americans disapprove of Trump’s handling of the economy, including 37% of respondents who identify as Republicans.

The findings indicate that dissatisfaction with the administration’s economic performance extends beyond traditional Democratic voters and has begun affecting confidence within Trump’s own political base.

When asked which party would better manage the economy, 40% of respondents selected Democrats, compared with 33% who favored Republicans.

That finding presents another warning sign for the White House, given the importance of economic issues in shaping voter attitudes ahead of congressional elections.

Trump’s declining popularity also follows months of political controversy surrounding his administration’s foreign policy decisions, particularly the military campaign against Iran and its consequences for global energy markets.

With Republicans facing the possibility of losing one or both chambers of Congress, the November elections are emerging as a critical test of public confidence in Trump’s leadership.

The Reuters/Ipsos survey was conducted online over four days and gathered responses from 1,679 American adults, including 1,279 registered voters.

Its margin of error was two percentage points for all respondents and three percentage points for registered voters.

While the poll represents a snapshot of public opinion rather than a prediction of election results, its findings highlight the scale of the political challenge confronting Republicans.

With Election Day approaching, Democrats appear increasingly positioned to capitalize on voter dissatisfaction, while Trump faces mounting pressure to convince Americans that his administration can address their economic concerns.

(Source: Reuters)

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resident Emmanuel Macron appealed for calm on Sunday, a day after France suffered one of its worst days of unrest in ‌years, with thousands arrested and shops looted or damaged after protests over high prices and declining public services.

Fresh clashes broke out in Paris and Marseille, where riot police intervened to prevent attempts to ransack businesses.

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Nationwide demonstrations had erupted into riots on Saturday, with a town hall torched, shops pillaged and buildings covered in graffiti as violent groups clashed with police in cities across the country.

“Looking at these images, we have all asked ourselves: What was going ​through their minds? How can French people do this to France?” Macron said in a televised address to the nation.

“Nothing justifies it, nothing explains it, nothing excuses it. Tonight, ​we all feel anger and shame.”

Saturday’s unrest laid bare the deep anger at Macron, who leaves office in 2027 after a decade in power ⁠that has increasingly become defined by social discontent, a weak economy and ballooning debt.

Macron said those protesting peacefully had legitimate grievances and their actions should not be confused with those seeking to wreak ​havoc.

He stopped short of declaring a state of emergency, as demanded by some right-wing politicians, but said the government would act to allow prefects to ban protests if necessary to protect public buildings ​and local businesses.

Paris protests like a war zone

The government has blamed the violence on what it said were ultra-left groups, as well as criminals it said had instigated the looting.

One protester died on Saturday after suffering a cardiac arrest during demonstrations in Paris. Police made 2,400 arrests across France, while nearly 1,000 officers were injured, French Interior Minister Laurent Nunez said.

Police again clashed with protesters and fired tear gas at Place de la Republique on Sunday afternoon, ​and protesters had set fire to piles of bicycles. A Reuters witness said there appeared to be several hundred protesters in the area.

A massive clean-up operation took place in cities from Lille ​in the north to Marseille in the south and from Strasbourg in the east to Bordeaux in the southwest, where a masked mob invaded the residence of the local prefect.

“It’s like a war zone here!” exclaimed ‌Dutch entrepreneur Tije ⁠De Boer, who was visiting Paris with his children and said the unrest forced him to evacuate his hotel at Place de la Republique.

More than half a million people joined marches in scores of cities on Saturday, marking the convergence of a month-long student movement with broader social discontent against rising living costs and declining public services.

Several hundred shops damaged

While hundreds of thousands protested peacefully across France on Saturday, violent fringe groups targeted public buildings, looted luxury boutiques and supermarkets, and attacked police vehicles and officers.

Far-right National Rally leader Marine Le Pen, frontrunner going into next year’s presidential campaign, also ​called for calm, saying France must not become ​accustomed to images of the country being ⁠battered, abused and ransacked.

“Violence is not an opinion. Destruction is not a form of expression. And chaos cannot serve as a project for France,” she said in a video address.

Hard-left France Unbowed presidential candidate Jean-Luc Melenchon said Macron needed to answer the demands of protesting high-school students.

In Limoges, famed for ​its porcelain, the collapse of the town hall’s clock tower in a fiery blaze revived memories of the 2019 fire that devastated Paris’ ​Notre Dame cathedral. Mayor Guillaume ⁠Guerin said not enough officers from the national police had been deployed to his city.

“There was a clear, premeditated intention to burn down the town hall, and the people inside feared for their lives,” Guerin told Reuters on Sunday. He threatened to resign if the city did not receive the funds needed to repair the town hall.

Economy Minister Roland Lescure pledged support on Sunday for business owners who suffered losses. “Those ⁠who break ​things will pay, repair the damage and be held accountable for their intention to sow chaos,” Lescure said in ​a statement.

French retailer Carrefour’s (CARR.PA), opens new tab CEO Alexandre Bompard told French broadcaster BFMTV that 50 of the company’s shops had been damaged, including 20 that were looted, with losses from the damage running into the tens of millions of euros.

(Source: Reuters)

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kraine launched one of its largest drone assaults on Russia overnight Sunday, targeting oil facilities and industrial sites in St. Petersburg and leaving at least one person dead, Russian officials said, as a growing dispute between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and US President Donald Trump threatens to complicate efforts to end the war.

Russia’s Defense Ministry said its forces intercepted or neutralized 1,015 Ukrainian drones across 15 Russian regions, Russian-annexed Crimea and the Black Sea.

St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov described the attack as massive, saying fires broke out at the city’s oil terminal, the Ruchi oil depot and industrial warehouses in the southern Kolpinsky district.

At least five people were injured, while several apartment buildings and two houses sustained damage, according to Beglov.

The strikes also disrupted operations at St. Petersburg’s main airport, where authorities imposed temporary flight restrictions over safety concerns.

Elsewhere in the region, Russian e-commerce giant Ozon reported a fire at its logistics facility, while technology company VK said drones had struck its data center. The company said its services remained available.

Leningrad regional Governor Alexander Drozdenko said 145 drones were intercepted over the region, with approximately 20,000 residents left without electricity.

The scale of the attack marks a significant escalation in Ukraine’s campaign against Russian energy infrastructure, which Kyiv has increasingly targeted as part of its efforts to undermine Moscow’s ability to finance its military operations.

Trump and Zelenskyy clash over stalled ceasefire

The strikes come at a particularly sensitive moment in relations between Kyiv and Washington, with Trump publicly criticizing Ukraine’s continued attacks on Russian energy facilities while defending his decision to delay additional sanctions against Moscow.

On Sunday, Trump said imposing new sanctions risked pushing Russian President Vladimir Putin away from negotiations aimed at ending the conflict.

The US president also accused Zelenskyy of undermining diplomatic efforts through continued strikes on Russian oil infrastructure, claiming the Ukrainian leader did not want the war to end.

Their disagreement follows Trump’s October 11 announcement of an energy ceasefire between Moscow and Kyiv, an arrangement that quickly descended into uncertainty amid continued Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure.

Zelenskyy said Ukraine had temporarily refrained from targeting Russian energy facilities following the announcement, but Moscow had failed to reciprocate.

In a social media statement Sunday, the Ukrainian president said Russia had attacked Ukraine’s energy, oil and gas infrastructure 76 times over the preceding week.

Russian strikes overnight also hit energy facilities in four Ukrainian regions, leaving tens of thousands of families without electricity, he said.

“America should see that Russia is not taking any reciprocal steps in response to sanctions relief or agreements,” Zelenskyy wrote.

Speaking on NBC’s Meet the Press, Zelenskyy warned that easing economic pressure on Moscow would only strengthen Putin’s ability to continue the war.

He also revealed that intelligence sharing between Washington and Kyiv had resumed after being temporarily suspended.

While maintaining that he trusted Trump, Zelenskyy warned that any American decision to side with Russia would amount to a historic mistake.

Later Sunday, Zelenskyy said he had spoken with US presidential envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner about the outcome of negotiations between American and Ukrainian officials in Miami on October 9, as well as potential next steps in diplomacy.

Russia continues deadly attacks on Ukrainian cities

As Ukraine intensified its long-range drone campaign, Russian forces continued launching deadly strikes across Ukrainian territory.

An overnight attack on Kyiv killed a woman and injured three others, Mayor Vitali Klitschko said Monday. The strikes damaged a 25-story residential building, hit a subway station and affected a medical facility.

In the southern city of Zaporizhzhia, two Russian attacks Sunday killed a woman and wounded at least two other people, including a six-year-old girl, according to local officials.

Zelenskyy also reported that Russian strikes on residential buildings in the western Volyn region killed two people and injured 12, including two children.

He said Moscow had launched nearly 2,700 attack drones, 1,700 aerial bombs and 66 missiles against Ukraine over the past week.

The intensifying attacks on both sides underscore the challenges facing Washington’s diplomatic initiative, with Kyiv demanding concrete Russian commitments before agreeing to halt strikes on energy infrastructure.

For now, the competing military campaigns and increasingly public disagreements between Trump and Zelenskyy suggest that efforts to secure even a limited ceasefire remain deeply uncertain.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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n 1945, following the end of World War II, Germany began confronting its Nazi past and gradually turned this process of reckoning into a political tradition and culture. The Nuremberg Trials, denazification policies, investigations into Nazi crimes, the prosecution and punishment of perpetrators whenever they were apprehended regardless of how much time had passed, and a culture of remembrance that manifested itself in different forms over the years became the principal elements of this political process.

A tradition of confronting the past emerged. However, this reckoning was neither continuous nor uninterrupted. Particularly in West Germany, silence and social repression concerning the Nazi past persisted for a long time during the early postwar period.

One of the slogans traditionally associated with this process has been “Nie wieder,” meaning “Never Again.” On the one hand, the phrase draws a firm line between Germany’s Nazi past and the present; on the other, it calls upon German society to assume a political responsibility.

“Never Again” serves both as a reminder of the atrocities committed in concentration camps and as a political responsibility imposed upon society. Despite this political responsibility, however, the situation today appears to contradict the principle embodied in the slogan “Never Again.”

Never again?

Despite the call of “Never Again,” developments in Germany’s recent history have demonstrated that the country has not been immune to racist and far-right movements.

In addition to racist attacks in the early 1990s in places such as Solingen, Hoyerswerda and Rostock-Lichtenhagen, the racist and far-right National Socialist Underground (NSU) terrorist organization, which was exposed in 2011 after carrying out attacks against people of Turkish origin, entered German history through acts of terror that called into question the “never” in “Never Again.”

Meanwhile, research has shown that a layered form of far-right thinking had become embedded in the center of German society from around 2010 onward.

In the 2013 federal elections, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), which narrowly failed to enter parliament in its first election after receiving 4.7 percent of the vote, was initially not even taken seriously. Gradually increasing its vote share in subsequent federal and state elections, the AfD emerged from the 2025 Bundestag elections with approximately 21 percent of the vote and became the main opposition force.

In the state and local elections of 2026, it subsequently increased its support significantly and emerged as a potential governing force.

In the state elections held in Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate at the beginning of 2026, the CDU emerged as the largest party after narrowly increasing its vote share. However, its analysis of the results overlooked an important development: in both states, the far-right AfD had at least doubled its vote share.

For the CDU, these election victories created an environment in which it could feel comfortably secure until the September elections. But following the Saxony-Anhalt election, the CDU was forced to confront a harsh reality.

First, the CDU lost the election held in the state of Saxony-Anhalt at the beginning of September. It then suffered such a major loss of support in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern that it was excluded from the state parliament. Finally, it lost the Berlin state election.

In the meantime, the CDU also failed to achieve the expected breakthrough in the local elections held in Lower Saxony, one of the party’s traditional strongholds.

What is striking is that the AfD at least doubled its vote share in all these elections. With its high vote totals, it also won the elections in Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.

From one extreme to the other

The winner of the Berlin state election held on September 20, meanwhile, was Die Linke, or the Left Party. The other political extreme that doubled its vote and won an election, this time in the federal capital Berlin, was the Left Party.

What made the Berlin election particularly interesting was that a politician of Turkish origin, Elif Eralp, was serving as a leading figure within the Left Party and was likely to become the next governing mayor of Berlin.

Unlike Berlin, the states of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Saxony-Anhalt, where the far-right AfD won, are former East German states. The AfD therefore adopted a different electoral strategy in these states.

The far-right AfD made effective use of distrust and dissatisfaction with the federal government. By mobilizing voters and listening to them directly, it managed to turn the situation in its favor in both states and won overwhelming victories over the CDU.

More fundamentally, the sense of being treated as second-class citizens and the identity crisis experienced in the former East German states also played a role in the AfD’s success.

Although the AfD’s success is viewed as a warning to Federal Chancellor Friedrich Merz, it does not appear that Merz has fully recognized this warning. In his speech on election night on September 20, Merz accepted responsibility but stated that he would continue serving as chancellor and would not step down.

The most critical of the September elections was undoubtedly the Berlin state election. Under the state’s constitutional arrangements, the head of the Berlin state government also serves as the city’s “Governing Mayor.” Consequently, an election result in Berlin involving a CDU defeat would effectively have represented a major political loss of prestige for Chancellor Merz.

That is precisely what happened.

This time, however, the winning party was not one of the parties on the far right, but Die Linke, the party positioned at the opposite end of the political spectrum.

In the state, where the CDU suffered major losses, the far-right AfD doubled its vote share and became the third-largest party.

While the AfD increased its support in the other two states by mobilizing voters and listening to them individually, the Left Party and Turkish-origin candidate Elif Eralp used a similar strategy in Berlin and won the election.

The results also appeared to undermine the conventional assumption that low voter turnout benefits extremist parties, as turnout was higher than in previous elections.

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he order to limit a satellite system used by Ukraine for battlefield communications and drone operations came from inside the White House, according to two U.S. officials and a Western official briefed on the matter.

The officials said leaders at the Defense Department received a message that the SpaceX Starshield service for the Ukrainian military needed to be slowed.

The officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity, did not specify who in the White House made the decision or who was responsible for implementing the order. The Pentagon is the biggest customer of Starshield, which is the military-grade version of the Starlink service.

Ukrainian officials said this week that military-grade Starlink receptors stopped working in Ukraine when mounted on fast-moving objects, interfering with the performance of Ukrainian drones that rely on them for onboard guidance systems over Ukrainian territory.

A person in Ukraine’s Defence Ministry said on Thursday that the receptors were now working when in motion, but only at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour (160 kph).

US Pressures Ukraine Over Refinery Attacks

The move to temporarily restrict the vital communications system came as President Donald Trump has pressured Kyiv to stop its attacks on Russian refineries, which he has blamed for soaring energy prices that are denting his Republican Party’s prospects in the November midterm elections.

Experts say that surge in energy costs is mainly the result of the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran, which brought Iranian attacks on energy facilities and has largely shut the vital Strait of Hormuz.

In response to a request for comment about the order to limit Starshield, a senior U.S. official said: “No such request was ever made by the president.”

The White House did not respond to questions about whether other administration officials might have made the request.

Starshield was developed by SpaceX specifically for government and national-security customers, particularly the U.S. Department of Defense. Starshield uses the Starlink constellation as its backbone.

Ukrainian officials said the restrictions complicated strike missions against Russian forces and logistics in occupied territory and slowed interceptor drones used to shoot down incoming Russian Shahed drones.

Elon Musk, the CEO of SpaceX, said on X on Wednesday that because Starshield systems are owned and controlled by the U.S. government, any limits on speed or usage are decided by the U.S. military or the president.

SpaceX did not respond to a request for comment.

The Department of Defense and the Ukrainian embassy in Washington also did not respond to requests for comment.

Decline in Relations

Relations between Kyiv and Washington have deteriorated in recent days following a meeting in Miami on Oct. 9 that convened representatives from both countries as well as Europe and the World Bank.

Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, the Trump administration’s Middle East envoy, struck a tough tone with Ukraine in the meeting, according to a separate person familiar with the matter. They told Ukrainian officials that the U.S. was frustrated with Kyiv’s continued strikes on Russian refineries despite repeated requests from Washington to stop.

The U.S. delegation also explained Washington’s decision to strike a diesel deal with Russia, saying the White House hoped it would soften Moscow’s stance on peace talks.

That deal, under which Russia will supply more than 2.25 million barrels of diesel to U.S. and global markets, has triggered a backlash from some U.S. lawmakers, who say it will give Moscow cash to pursue its war without forcing Russian President Vladimir Putin to make concessions to end the conflict.

In the days that followed, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and Trump criticized each other, with Zelenskiy calling the U.S. decision on the Russian diesel deal “weak.” Trump called for elections in Ukraine and Zelenskiy’s ouster.

Behind the scenes, American officials threatened to stop providing intelligence to Kyiv about Russian missile launches that Ukraine uses to thwart attacks, as Reuters previously reported. Trump said on Tuesday Washington was still sharing intelligence with Ukraine.

Following the move to restrict Ukraine’s access to Starshield, the Ukrainians made calls on Tuesday and Wednesday to find answers from senior officials at the White House, State Department and Pentagon, a senior Ukrainian official said, adding that Kyiv was told it was a White House decision.

The Pentagon has spent billions of dollars on the Starlink and Starshield services. It has also bought dedicated Starshield satellites, including communications spacecraft for missile-warning missions and a spy constellation for the National Reconnaissance Office, Reuters reported in 2024.

(Source: Reuters)

T

he brief series of German state elections that began on September 6 and concluded on September 20 once again set off the alarm bells over the far right that have never truly fallen silent in Europe. The election results in Saxony-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Berlin not only confirmed the rise of the far right but also pointed to the inevitable collapse of the centrist-liberal political model that has spread across Europe in successive waves.

Rising living costs across Europe, mounting inflation driven by higher energy prices amid intensifying conflicts around the Strait of Hormuz and in Ukraine, the MAGA winds blowing from the United States, and provocations by the Kremlin have combined to transform the continent. As a result, the European Union no longer resembles the “garden” described by Josep Borrell, then the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, in 2022. On the contrary, it is increasingly becoming the jungle itself.

Although there is a strong tendency to assess Europe’s current situation in terms of changing circumstances, one important historical fact should not be overlooked. At the Nuremberg trials before the International Military Tribunal, which began after the Second World War and concluded on October 1, 1946, only the upper echelons of Nazism were brought to justice.

If we include the Baltic countries and Ukraine, which were occupied by Germany during the war, there were groups of collaborators who embraced Nazi ideology in nearly 20 countries. Add to these Italy and Spain, which sided with Germany, and even the British Union of Fascists, which emerged in Britain under the leadership of Sir Oswald Mosley, and it becomes possible to argue that the far right’s electoral visibility today represents merely the tip of the iceberg.

Surely, all these people, their ideologies and their political traditions did not simply evaporate and disappear after the Second World War ended.

Moreover, under the pressure of circumstances and the perceived Soviet threat, the way was opened for former Nazis to take positions in politics and the military in the Federal Republic of Germany. The United States also brought prominent figures who had worked on Hitler’s weapons programs to American soil, recruiting them for its own purposes and employing them in the Apollo space program and operations organized by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Since the 1980s, political movements reorganised by these ideological currents have sought ways to come to power under different identities in France, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium.

Although their electoral successes have so far been contained through coalitions between centrist and left-wing parties or through European Union sanctions, the rise of the far right has become increasingly difficult to prevent as Europe gradually ceases to be a society characterized by prosperity.

The economic crises generated by neoliberal policies originating in Britain and the United States since the 1980s have also provided the fuel for the present rise of Europe’s far right.

The Post-Second World War narrative has reached its end

The question that should now be asked is this: Is the far right Europe’s default setting? Could the European Union project, developed to reform Europeans’ racist and war-prone tendencies, have been rejected by the very societies it was intended to transform?

The longest period without war on European soil since the fall of the Western Roman Empire in AD 476 occurred after the Second World War. If we exclude the Soviet Union’s suppression of calls for freedom in Eastern Europe, this period of relative tranquillity lasted until 1991.

The civil war in Yugoslavia that began that year, followed by the genocide targeting Bosniaks, was not merely watched from the sidelines by Europe’s leading powers. Germany and France also became involved in the war and genocide by supporting Croats and Serbs in the hope of expanding their respective spheres of influence.

Germany and Italy achieved their present-day national unification only in the final quarter of the nineteenth century. In other words, the Europe we recognise within its contemporary borders has a history of only approximately 140 years. Apparently, in keeping with the nature of things, European peoples now wish to return to their roots.

In other words, the shrinking share of prosperity is reconnecting Europeans with what the author regards as their underlying regionalist and xenophobic identity.

The extent to which this assessment proves accurate will become apparent in April 2027.

Alongside elections scheduled for April 18 in the German states of Schleswig-Holstein and Saarland, and April 25 in North Rhine-Westphalia, the first round of France’s presidential election, planned for April 18, 2027, will provide a numerical measure of the momentum gained by far-right movements among European voters.

Opinion polls currently conducted in France indicate that the alliance models developed by centrist and left-wing parties over more than 40 years to block the far right are collapsing.

Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (Rassemblement National) currently leads with more than 35 percent of the vote. In a potential second round, Le Pen appears to lead her centre-right rival Édouard Philippe by 57 percent to 43 percent, while polling against a potential left-wing opponent, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, puts her ahead by 69 percent to 31 percent.

What would the simultaneous rise of the far right in Germany and France mean for the world, given that preventing these two countries from going to war with one another again was one of the fundamental reasons behind the creation of the European Union?

Would a political compass pointing towards the far right lead to the disintegration of the European Union, or could it produce an unpredictable outcome shaped by the circumstances of our age?

Could an alliance between the far-right movements of these two countries confront us with a more militaristic and aggressive conception of European unity?

Will Europe become the bait?

Given the trajectory of relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, it would not be surprising for Europe’s far right to organise itself along these lines.

It is worth examining Chinese President Xi Jinping’s September 23 visit to the United States, his first in 11 years, from this perspective.

Xi bypassed the United Nations General Assembly and travelled directly to Washington, where the principal items on the leaders’ agenda were US arms sales to Taiwan and the development of artificial intelligence.

However, particular attention should be paid to the following statement made by US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent immediately before the meeting:

“Today, we agreed to extend the period of economic détente between our two countries, which we call the ‘Busan Agreement’ and which was scheduled to expire on November 10. The agreement will be extended until January 10 to give us more time to explore what we can achieve in the economic sphere.”

This statement indicates that relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China are evolving towards the conditions of an “ideal Cold War”, even if they have not entered a period of complete détente.

As Washington and Beijing put their own relations back on track, Europe and Russia may be left to pay the price.

The geographical line along which a new Berlin Wall must be drawn, as required by the emerging bipolar world order, is shifting northwards towards the Black Sea.

Under these circumstances, Europe does not want to find itself on the menu at the negotiating table between Russia and the United States. Its shift towards the far right will therefore be inevitable, whatever the eventual outcome.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

W

ith less than three weeks before the midterm elections, Republicans have largely given up hope for a last-minute game-changer that will rescue their political fortunes. Instead, GOP candidates across the country are taking matters into their own hands, seeking distance from President Donald Trump’s most controversial policies to save their campaigns.

Faced with steep economic headwinds and low presidential approval ratings, Republican candidates in competitive Senate and House races are publicly dissenting from White House stances on trade, foreign policy, and energy. On Friday, Michigan Senate nominee Mike Rogers and Alaska Sen. Dan Sullivan became the latest high-profile Republicans to break ranks, voicing sharp opposition to an administration deal allowing diesel imports from Russia.

“You just don’t want to give that guy an inch,” Rogers told reporters ahead of an event in Michigan. Rogers argued for a temporary ban on diesel exports—an approach the White House considered but ultimately rejected—rather than relying on foreign imports from Moscow.

In Alaska, Sullivan’s office struck a similar tone. Nate Adams, a spokesperson for Sullivan, said the senator “believes American energy dominance is the answer to high prices, and that means producing more of it in Alaska, for Alaskans, by Alaskans, not importing it from Russia.”

A growing movement of dissent

The cracks in party unity extend far beyond fuel policy. Across several key battlegrounds, candidates are recalibrating their messaging to address local voter frustration over high costs and international friction:

• Foreign Policy & Conflict: In Iowa and Ohio, Senate candidate Rep. Ashley Hinson and Sen. Jon Husted have called for a prompt resolution to the ongoing war in Iran, pointing out that voters are feeling the strain at the pump and the grocery store.
• Agriculture & Trade: In Kansas, Sen. Roger Marshall publicly expressed frustration over administration plans to import foreign beef, a move aimed at lowering consumer prices that has angered domestic cattle ranchers. Meanwhile, Rogers released a campaign ad urging an end to the ongoing trade war with Canada.
• Immigration & Domestic Policy: In Florida, Rep. María Salazar criticized the administration’s broader deportation push, warning that certain policies go too far.

While midterms historically test the governing party, the current dynamic is particularly striking under Trump, whose political brand has long demanded absolute loyalty. Yet seasoned party strategists note that self-preservation has taken precedence.

“There’s been a little bit of a reset across the country where Republicans are saying what they want to say and less worried about repercussions,” said Ari Fleischer, former White House press secretary under President George W. Bush.

Kitchen-table pressures and White House reaction

The strategic shift reflects broader economic anxiety. Key metrics—including gas prices hovering well above $4 a gallon, elevated mortgage rates, and sustained high beef prices—have failed to improve in time to provide a late economic lift. Without a dramatic turn of events, GOP candidates are eager to demonstrate responsiveness to their local electorates.

The White House, however, maintains that the party remains closely aligned. Administration officials note that candidates continue to join the president at rallies and highlight his endorsement across social media.

According to White House sources granted anonymity to discuss internal deliberations, the administration is permitting candidates to tailor their stances to local realities—provided they do not attack the president directly. Trump himself downplayed Rogers’ ad calling for an end to Canadian tariffs, telling reporters he interpreted it as a push for Canada to finalize a deal rather than a direct rebuke.

RNC spokesperson Natalie Baldassarre emphasized that the party’s central focus remains winning majorities: “Republicans remain united behind the president’s agenda of cutting taxes, lowering drug costs, and securing our communities. We are laser-focused on winning, and our candidates will run the races necessary to best represent their districts.”

(Source: Politico)

G

ulf security has reached a historic turning point in recent years amid shifting global power balances and deepening regional crises. Qatari Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani’s call to bring the Gulf states and Iran together within a shared regional security framework stands out as one of the most tangible diplomatic manifestations of this search.

Al Thani’s description of the region’s recent conflicts as a “wake-up call” for all actors exposes the fundamental shortcomings of the existing security equation. Qatar’s proposal should therefore be understood not merely as an isolated diplomatic initiative by Doha, but as an expression of regional actors’ desire to assume greater responsibility and initiative over their own security.

Qatar’s proposed model

Underlying this ambition are the limitations of security policies pursued for decades. For a long time, Gulf states built their security strategies largely around military alliances and defence agreements with actors outside the region, particularly the United States.

However, recent conflicts have clearly demonstrated that external security guarantees alone are insufficient to establish regional stability. The direct targeting of energy facilities, critical infrastructure and maritime navigation routes has shown that security cannot be ensured solely through conventional military capabilities or alliance commitments.

Qatar’s vision does not seek to dismantle existing external alliances or military cooperation with the United States. On the contrary, it aims to add a homegrown, regional layer of security to the existing architecture.

Doha’s model envisages preserving the deterrent power of external security partnerships while establishing direct communication channels and confidence-building mechanisms between the Gulf states and Iran to prevent crises from escalating.

The greatest challenge facing this vision, however, lies in the structural difficulties of integrating Iran into such an architecture.

The crisis between the Gulf states and Tehran is not simply a temporary disagreement. Rather, it represents a deeply entrenched structure of mistrust shaped by ideological divisions, competition for regional influence, missile programmes, maritime security risks and the activities of non-state armed actors.

From Iran’s perspective, meanwhile, the US military presence in the region and new security partnerships with Israel are regarded as threats in their own right.

Given this profound asymmetry, the establishment of a NATO-style Gulf-Iran security alliance based on collective defence is unrealistic in the short or medium term.

The success of Qatar’s proposal should not, in any case, be measured against such maximalist expectations. A more feasible alternative would be a gradual approach to establishing regional security mechanisms.

In the initial phase, it would be possible to open military communication channels, establish common navigation rules to ensure maritime safety, limit attacks on energy infrastructure and activate direct diplomatic channels during crises.

Such concrete, small-scale measures could, over time, provide the foundation for a more institutionalised framework for regional dialogue.

Establishing the security equation

Another critical factor that will determine the extent to which Qatar’s call gains traction is the absence of a uniform perception of the Iranian threat among members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

While Qatar and Oman have traditionally pursued policies that keep channels of dialogue with Tehran open, the security calculations of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have been shaped by a more uncompromising approach.

Nevertheless, the restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in recent years through Chinese mediation has demonstrated that greater space has emerged for diplomacy across the Gulf.

Although this development has not ended the rivalry, it has revealed a willingness to make tensions more manageable.

Qatar’s proposal seeks to transform this current environment of dialogue into a permanent and institutionalised structure.

However, Doha cannot pursue this initiative alone. A more realistic path would involve GCC members first reaching a minimum level of consensus among themselves on security matters, before moving towards an expanded framework that includes Iran.

On the other hand, the inclusive structure proposed by Qatar does not contradict deterrence-oriented military cooperation initiatives such as the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement being developed between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan.

At first glance, robust defence alliances and dialogue-oriented security initiatives may appear contradictory. In reality, however, they represent two complementary dimensions of the same security equation.

While defence agreements and joint military structures strengthen deterrence capabilities, the regional dialogue mechanisms proposed by Qatar seek to reduce the risk of military confrontation arising from miscalculations.

The future of Gulf security will therefore rest not on a single alliance model, but on a multilayered architecture in which deterrence and diplomacy are pursued simultaneously.

This multilayered structure also offers strategic opportunities for Türkiye.

Ankara’s growing defence industry and security cooperation with Gulf countries strengthens regional deterrence, while the diplomatic channels it maintains with Tehran position Türkiye as a facilitating and balancing actor during periods of crisis.

Beyond all these regional and global dynamics, Qatar’s insistence on this proposal is directly rooted in its own economic and national security interests.

With its enormous LNG exports, major investments around the world and ambitious economic transformation objectives, Doha can sustain its position only within a stable and predictable regional environment.

Moreover, the extensive economic transformation visions being pursued by neighbouring countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE also require an uninterrupted environment of regional peace.

A large-scale war breaking out in the Gulf has the potential to directly paralyse the economic infrastructure and trade routes of the entire region, including Qatar.

Regional stability is therefore not an abstract aspiration for Qatar, but a prerequisite for its national development.

Doha’s mediation diplomacy on the global stage is also an extension of this logic. Its ability to communicate simultaneously with different, and even adversarial, actors gives Qatar a critical role as a “safety valve” during regional crises.

Mistrust between the parties

Ultimately, Prime Minister Al Thani’s call for a new security architecture encompassing the Gulf states and Iran is not a straightforward project that can be implemented in all its dimensions in the short term.

Deep-rooted mistrust between the parties, asymmetric threat perceptions, the prominent role occupied by external actors within the existing framework, and Iran’s reluctance to make concrete security commitments constitute the most significant obstacles to the process.

Nevertheless, it would also be a mistake to dismiss the proposal as a utopian diplomatic aspiration.

Recent crises have demonstrated the fragility of the existing externally dependent security structure. This reality is compelling regional actors to establish gradual and flexible dialogue mechanisms.

Qatar’s initiative clearly demonstrates that Gulf security can no longer be maintained solely under a security umbrella provided by external powers. Instead, the region needs a homegrown and inclusive approach in which regional countries assume direct responsibility.

Although time will tell to what extent this initiative can be institutionalised, the reality that a Gulf security architecture excluding Iran is unsustainable is becoming increasingly apparent.

The new security concept proposed by Qatar offers an indispensable vision for the Gulf’s future stability.

Although deep-rooted mistrust and asymmetric threat perceptions among the parties may slow the process, the limitations of the traditional externally dependent architecture are pushing regional actors towards flexible and gradual dialogue mechanisms.

The diplomatic initiative launched by Doha not only seeks to safeguard economic interests but also paves the way for regional countries to have a greater say in determining their own future.

In the long term, this multilayered structure, combining deterrence with diplomacy, represents the most rational roadmap for building lasting peace and collective security in the Gulf.

(Orignally published in Turkish by Kriter)

I

srael’s expanding military-controlled zones in Gaza and southern Lebanon are reshaping both territories despite US-brokered ceasefire agreements, as shifting boundaries, widespread demolitions and restrictions on civilian movement leave hundreds of thousands of displaced families uncertain about whether they will ever return home.

The so-called “Yellow Line”, used by Israel to demarcate areas under its military control, has emerged as a defining feature of the post-ceasefire landscape in both territories, according to separate Al Jazeera reports published on October 12 and 14.

In Gaza, Israeli control and access restrictions now cover approximately 65 percent of the territory, confining 2.1 million Palestinians to the remaining 35 percent. In southern Lebanon, Israeli troops continue to occupy a zone extending up to 10 kilometers into Lebanese territory, where entire villages have been demolished and residents remain unable to return.

Although the circumstances and agreements governing the two territories differ, analysts cited by Al Jazeera say the expanding military boundaries reflect a similar pattern of territorial control, population displacement and destruction of civilian infrastructure.

Gaza’s shrinking territory

A year after the US-brokered Gaza ceasefire, Israel has expanded its military-controlled territory beyond the original Yellow Line established under US President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan to end the war.

The agreement initially required Israeli forces to withdraw to the demarcation within 24 hours, with further withdrawals expected in subsequent phases.

Instead, Israeli troops have repeatedly moved the yellow concrete blocks marking the boundary farther west, bringing additional Palestinian neighbourhoods and agricultural areas under military control.

On Sunday, Israeli forces reportedly relocated the blocks dozens of metres west in Shujayea, southeastern Gaza City, forcing more Palestinian families to flee.

“It’s not simply about where the ‘Yellow Line’ is today but where it can move next,” Al Jazeera correspondent Ibrahim al-Khalili reported from Gaza City.

The original ceasefire arrangement left Israel controlling approximately 53 percent of Gaza, restricting Palestinians to 172 square kilometres of the 365-square-kilometre territory.

Research organisation Forensic Architecture estimated that Israeli control had expanded to 58 percent by December. In March, the Israeli military introduced an additional restricted area, described as the “orange line”, requiring humanitarian organisations to coordinate movements with the army.

According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), military control and access restrictions now cover 65 percent of Gaza.

The remaining population is concentrated within approximately 128 square kilometres, increasing population density to nearly 16,000 people per square kilometre, almost three times its prewar level.

Each resident has an average of just 61 square metres of land, compared with approximately 160 square metres before the war.

The humanitarian consequences are compounded by extensive destruction. The UN Satellite Centre estimates that 82 percent of Gaza’s structures have been damaged or destroyed, while the Food and Agriculture Organization says only 3 percent of its cropland remains both undamaged and accessible.

More than 950,000 Palestinians are living in displacement sites vulnerable to flooding, predominantly in tents and makeshift shelters.

Approaching the Yellow Line also poses significant dangers. Nearly 1,500 Palestinians have been killed across Gaza since the ceasefire was announced, according to figures cited by Al Jazeera.

Southern Lebanon faces a similar pattern

A comparable military demarcation has emerged in southern Lebanon, where Israeli forces continue occupying substantial territory despite a framework agreement signed with Lebanon in June.

The agreement, reached through US-brokered negotiations, was intended to facilitate a phased Israeli withdrawal and establish pilot zones where Lebanese Armed Forces personnel would replace Israeli troops and disarm Hezbollah forces.

However, Israel continues to occupy territory extending up to 10 kilometres north of the border, while demolitions of homes and infrastructure have continued behind the Yellow Line.

Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz has previously indicated that Israeli forces would not withdraw from Lebanon, raising concerns about an extended occupation.

The latest Israeli military campaign followed Hezbollah rocket fire on March 2, which the group described as retaliation for repeated Israeli violations of the November 2024 ceasefire and the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Israel subsequently intensified its military operations and reinvaded southern Lebanon, displacing more than 1.2 million people.

According to Al Jazeera, approximately 50 frontline villages, including Khiam and Bint Jbeil, have suffered extensive destruction.

Mohamad Bazzi, a New York-based political analyst originally from southern Lebanon, said the destruction reflected an effort to make entire communities uninhabitable.

“Israel’s primary goals were to empty, depopulate, and make those dozens of frontline villages and towns uninhabitable,” he told Al Jazeera, describing the approach as an application of the Gaza model to Lebanon.

Ahmad Baydoun, a Lebanese architect and open-source researcher based in the Netherlands, said the Yellow Line had effectively become a fixed military boundary despite the ceasefire.

He argued that continued demolitions suggested the ceasefire was being applied differently to Israeli-occupied territory than to the rest of Lebanon.

Displacement risks becoming permanent

Beyond the Yellow Line, discussions in Israel about establishing an additional “Grey Line” have intensified concerns about the future of southern Lebanon.

According to reports cited by Al Jazeera, the proposed boundary could extend approximately four kilometres into Lebanese territory, creating an uninhabited buffer zone where civilians would be prohibited from rebuilding their homes.

Restrictions also affect residents who remain in villages under Israeli control.

Baydoun said access to agricultural land increasingly depends on checkpoints and military coordination, describing the emerging system as the “West Bankification of those who remained”.

The consequences extend beyond immediate military operations.

Even if Israeli forces eventually withdraw, widespread destruction of housing, roads, agricultural land and essential infrastructure could prevent displaced communities from returning for years.

Ali, a displaced resident of Khiam currently renting accommodation in Hasbaiyya, said his hometown had become uninhabitable.

“Khiam is destroyed, there’s nothing, it’s uninhabitable for the next 10, 15, 20 years,” he told Al Jazeera.

Across Gaza and southern Lebanon, the expanding Yellow Lines have therefore become more than military demarcations. They increasingly determine where civilians can live, whether they can access their land and how much territory remains available for reconstruction.

With withdrawals stalled and destruction continuing, both territories face growing uncertainty over whether temporary ceasefire arrangements are evolving into prolonged systems of territorial control and displacement.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

I

srael will hold one of its most significant elections in recent years on October 27, 2026. What makes this election different from previous ones, and potentially historic, is that it will take place amid a war environment that emerged following the October 7, 2023, Al-Aqsa Flood attack and Israel’s subsequent military campaign in Gaza, launched with the stated aim of eliminating Hamas. The conflict subsequently spread to other countries in the region and at times involved five or six fronts simultaneously. This has been compounded by the war against Iran that began on February 28.

Although Israel has held elections in wartime before, it has never fought on so many fronts at once, maintained a state of war for such a long period, and perhaps has never been so severely strained militarily, economically, and politically. Add to all this the fact that Israel faces trials in international courts for the crimes of genocide it has committed in Gaza, has lost the support of Western public opinion—particularly in the U.S.—and that Western countries are, one by one, recognizing Palestine while adopting resolutions to impose sanctions on Israel, it would not be wrong to say that the elections Israel is holding under these conditions will amount to a referendum rather than merely an election.

For this reason, as we head into such a crucial election, one that may lead to a change in Israel’s current policies or the continuation of its policies of genocide and occupation, it would be helpful to address questions regarding the general mood of public opinion, developments within the ruling and opposition parties, the promises made by the parties and their leaders, and the predictions regarding the election outcome.

The general atmosphere ahead of the election

Netanyahu’s current government, formed at the end of 2022 with the support of far-right parties, has become increasingly weakened after four years in office. Its difficulties stem not only from foreign-policy failures, including international isolation, boycotts and sanctions over its policies in Gaza, but also from domestic problems such as protests over the so-called judicial reform, Netanyahu’s corruption trials, military-service exemptions for Haredi Jews, restrictions targeting civil society and the media, and economic and social problems caused by the wars.

The fact that residents have still not been able to return to areas evacuated after October 7 for security reasons, including communities around Gaza and along the Lebanese border, has further compounded these problems. Despite Israel’s attacks on Lebanon and Syria following the Gaza war and its subsequent war with Iran, moves that critics have linked to Netanyahu’s desire to remain in power by keeping the country in a permanent state of conflict, the failure to eliminate Hamas as claimed and achieve a decisive victory in Gaza, the resurgence of Hezbollah despite claims that it had been neutralized, Israel’s failure in Syria, and the inability to bring about regime change in Iran despite U.S. involvement in the war have all been interpreted by Netanyahu’s opponents as failures of his government. They have also undermined the notion of Israel as a secure country.

These security developments have naturally eroded Israelis’ confidence in their government and military and prompted some members of the largely immigrant population to return to their countries of origin.

Israeli voters are therefore heading to the polls under the shadow of security, economic and social problems in a way they have never experienced before. They will be deciding not merely which party or prime minister should govern the country, but what direction Israel itself should take.

Developments in the government and opposition camps

The parties forming the governing coalition centered on Netanyahu’s Likud appear likely to enter the election with largely the same personnel and political messaging. Following Likud’s internal primaries, the candidate list shaped by Netanyahu was submitted to the election authorities. The coalition’s ultra-Orthodox parties, Shas and United Torah Judaism (UTJ), are also expected to contest the election with their existing leadership and parliamentary teams. The only significant change within the coalition is that Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Power) and the Religious Zionist Party, which ran together on a single list in the previous election, will contest this election separately.

Despite Netanyahu’s insistence that the two parties should once again form an alliance in order to prevent the right-wing vote from being divided, Jewish Power leader Itamar Ben-Gvir rejected the request and announced that his party would run independently. Having lost hope of reaching an agreement with Ben-Gvir, Religious Zionist Party leader Bezalel Smotrich decided to form an alliance with Zehut, the party founded by former Likud lawmaker Moshe Feiglin, after polls indicated that the Religious Zionist Party would fail to cross the electoral threshold if it ran alone.

The main movement ahead of the election, however, has taken place within the opposition camp.

The first major development was the announcement by former minister and prime minister Naftali Bennett that he would return to active politics after previously declaring that he had ended his political career. Bennett first established the Bennett 2026 party and then announced that he would enter the election in alliance with Yair Lapid’s Yesh Atid party under the name Beyahad (Together).

The experience Bennett and Lapid gained from their previous coalition government appears to have given them a significant level of public support, and they quickly reached Netanyahu’s level in opinion polls.

The Bennett momentum, however, began to fade when former military chief of staff and Blue and White lawmaker Gadi Eisenkot resigned from his party and established the Yashar (Straight/Justice) Party. Eisenkot’s background as a former military officer, the absence of corruption allegations against him, and his more centrist political positioning compared with Bennett helped him gain public support, and he soon moved ahead of Netanyahu in opinion polls.

Another important opposition figure is Yisrael Beiteinu, led by Avigdor Lieberman and traditionally supported largely by Jews who immigrated from Russia. Lieberman previously formed alliances with Netanyahu but positioned his party against him from 2018 onward. In the most recent elections, Yisrael Beiteinu joined the anti-Netanyahu bloc and supported the change government. The party, which will also contest this election independently, has announced that it will support Eisenkot for prime minister.

On the left side of the opposition is the Democrats Party led by Yair Golan, formed through the merger of the Labor Party and Meretz. Seeking to prevent further erosion of Israel’s left-wing vote, Golan has positioned his party against Netanyahu and announced that it would support a potential Eisenkot government.

The most controversial group within the opposition camp has been the Arab parties. The Ra’am, Hadash, Ta’al and Balad parties previously ran together under the Joint List and won 13 seats. It had been estimated that if they united again in this election, they could win at least 15 seats. In this context, Hadash and Ta’al reached an agreement and sought to persuade Ra’am to join their alliance.

Meanwhile, Ra’am, led by Mansour Abbas, recruited Yoaz Segalovitz, a lawmaker from Yesh Atid, signaling that it intended to appeal not only to Arab voters but also to Jewish voters.

However, the Central Elections Committee’s announcement on September 24 that the Joint List and Ra’am, as well as Balad leader Sami Abu Shehadeh and Hadash lawmaker Ofer Cassif, had been barred from participating in the election changed the entire electoral dynamic.

At a time when neither the Netanyahu bloc nor the Eisenkot-led opposition bloc was expected to reach the 61 seats required to form a government in the 120-seat Knesset, Arab parties were widely expected to determine the outcome. The Central Elections Committee’s decision therefore required the various calculations surrounding government formation to be reconsidered from scratch.

Nevertheless, Arab parties are expected to appeal the committee’s disqualification decisions to the Supreme Court, while the court is also expected to overturn some of the bans, with possible exceptions involving certain individuals.

Even so, it is argued that such restrictive decisions targeting Arab parties could benefit Netanyahu. If Arab voters stay away from the polls in protest, Netanyahu could gain an advantage. In previous elections, there have also been instances in which measures were allegedly taken to discourage Arab voters from participating or prevent them from freely exercising their right to vote, with Netanyahu benefiting from the resulting circumstances.

Who is promising what?

Security issues have traditionally dominated Israeli elections. Parties and political leaders generally explain how they intend to make the country safer. In this election, however, neither the governing coalition nor the opposition appears to have much left to promise on security. The country has been living under wartime conditions for three years, and it remains unclear how much longer this situation will continue.

The governing camp argues that it will finish what it started and eliminate Hamas and empty Gaza of its population, but it has not presented a concrete plan explaining how this would be achieved. Netanyahu argues that not only attacks on Gaza but also military operations targeting the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria and Iran are necessary for national security, and he seeks to promote the promise of achieving success on all fronts.

With the exception of the Arab parties, the opposition has also failed to articulate a clear position on either the war in Gaza or the continuing conflict with Iran. Its main argument has been that, had it been in power, it would have resolved these problems by now.

The issue of Iran, in particular, has long been regarded in Israel as a national-security concern, meaning that the war against Iran is not subject to the same level of criticism. Instead, opposition figures emphasize that the objective of regime change in Iran is unrealistic.

Some opposition parties support a two-state solution, but under current circumstances none appears willing to state this position openly, preferring to leave such declarations until after the election.

Consequently, it appears unlikely that voters will hear a fundamentally different position on Gaza from either the government or the opposition. In other words, it cannot be assumed that if Netanyahu loses and Eisenkot becomes prime minister, the genocide in Gaza would necessarily end, the annexation of the West Bank would be halted, actions aimed at changing the status quo at the Al-Aqsa Mosque would cease, the occupations in Lebanon and Syria would end, or the war with Iran would be brought to a close.

The principal differences between the government and opposition concern Netanyahu’s corruption trials, military-service exemptions for Haredi Jews, and the judicial reform.

The governing camp regards the corruption cases against Netanyahu as a conspiracy, while the opposition calls for the trials to proceed as quickly as possible and for Netanyahu to receive what it considers an appropriate sentence and be barred from political activity.

The government and opposition are also diametrically opposed over military-service exemptions for Haredi Jews and judicial reform. The government seeks to institutionalize exemptions for the Haredi community and regards judicial reform as necessary to reduce what it describes as judicial overreach. The opposition, by contrast, considers Haredi military exemptions contrary to the law and the principle of equality and rejects them.

The opposition also views the judicial reform as part of what it describes as Netanyahu’s plan to take control of the state and is asking voters to support it in order to prevent this.

However, neither side appears to be discussing how to repair the economy, address the economic damage caused by the wars, or overcome Israel’s international isolation and sanctions. Nor are there significant campaign promises on these issues.

D

emocratic Congresswoman Ilhan Omar accused US President Donald Trump’s administration of using federal law enforcement to intimidate political opponents after immigration agents raided her Washington, DC-area home on Monday, less than a month before the November 3 midterm elections.

The search, conducted by agents from Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), drew condemnation from senior Democratic lawmakers, who described the operation as a disturbing escalation in the administration’s treatment of political rivals.

The US Department of Justice confirmed that federal agents had executed a court-authorised search warrant but did not identify Omar or disclose details of the investigation. No charges have been filed against the Minnesota representative.

Fox News, citing unidentified sources, reported that the investigation concerned allegations of immigration fraud involving documents submitted by Omar’s late father when she was a child. The allegations have not been established in court.

Omar, who arrived in the United States as a child refugee from Somalia and subsequently became a naturalised American citizen, rejected the allegations and accused the administration of pursuing a campaign of political intimidation.

“I’m ok. Make no mistake: this is an attempt to target political enemies and weaponize federal law enforcement,” she wrote on X.

“For ten years, Trump has targeted me with baseless lies and smear campaigns. This is just the latest escalation in his campaign of political intimidation,” she added.

“I will not be silenced.”

Democrats condemn raid as Trump denies involvement

Omar’s office described the operation as an “unprecedented escalation” and an “outrageous abuse of power”, maintaining that the congresswoman had committed no wrongdoing.

“No president should be able to use the power of the federal government to intimidate his political enemies,” her office said.

Senior House Democrats also condemned the search. Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries, Democratic Whip Katherine Clark and Democratic Caucus Chair Pete Aguilar issued a joint statement calling the raid “deeply disturbing”.

The lawmakers pointed to years of personal attacks against Omar by Trump and his political allies, questioning the timing of the operation just weeks before voters head to the polls.

The raid followed renewed criticism of Omar by Trump, who recently referred disparagingly to her Somali origins during a rally in Tennessee and suggested that Vice President JD Vance and other administration officials were investigating her.

Asked about the search hours after it took place, Trump denied any personal involvement, telling reporters that he had “nothing to do” with the operation and that the matter was up to the Justice Department.

Vance has previously accused Omar of immigration fraud without publicly presenting supporting evidence. During an interview with conservative podcaster Benny Johnson, he discussed conversations with Deputy White House Chief of Staff Stephen Miller about investigating the congresswoman.

Omar’s office dismissed those accusations as fabricated and defamatory.

The Justice Department has not publicly clarified the scope of its investigation or disclosed whether Omar herself is suspected of any criminal wrongdoing.

Long history of political attacks and threats

Omar, who represents a Minnesota congressional district that includes Minneapolis, was first elected to the House of Representatives in 2018.

She became the first African refugee elected to Congress and, alongside Palestinian-American Representative Rashida Tlaib, one of the first two Muslim-American women to serve in the House.

A member of the progressive group of Democratic lawmakers known as The Squad, Omar has frequently clashed with Trump over immigration, foreign policy and other political issues.

The president has repeatedly directed personal criticism at Omar, including remarks about her Somali background and suggestions that she should leave the United States.

Omar has previously said that Trump’s rhetoric has contributed to death threats against her and her family.

The congresswoman has also faced physical intimidation. In September, a Minnesota man was sentenced to 14 months in prison for spraying her with vinegar during a January town hall meeting in Minneapolis.

The incident occurred during heightened tensions surrounding the administration’s immigration enforcement operations, when Omar had publicly called for the abolition of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

Monday’s raid comes at a politically sensitive moment for Washington, with Republicans seeking to retain control of Congress in the November midterm elections and Democrats intensifying their criticism of the administration’s use of federal agencies.

While the Justice Department has confirmed that the search was authorized by a court, the absence of publicly disclosed charges or detailed information about the investigation has prompted questions from Democratic lawmakers about its purpose and timing.

Omar, meanwhile, has vowed to continue her political work despite the operation, insisting that the search will not deter her from speaking out against the administration.

(Source: Reuters)

O

ver the years, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s addresses to the United Nations General Assembly  have reflected the strategic deepening of Türkiye’s foreign policy vision and the global projection of the “Century of Türkiye” perspective. Taken together, these speeches constitute a manifesto for an emerging order-building actor at a time when the Western-centered established order has reached an impasse.

Over the past five years, the rhetorical trajectory of Türkiye , and consequently that of President Erdoğan , has undergone a marked acceleration in parallel with shifts in the global system. Türkiye’s evolution -from an actor seeking to heal the wounds of the pandemic and test its mediation capacity at the 77th General Assembly in 2022 to a power shaping the debate on a broad range of global issues, from cyberterrorism and artificial intelligence ethics to regional conflicts and global injustice, at the recently convened 81st General Assembly- confirms its positioning as an indispensable actor in the reconstruction of the global architecture.

The first stage of this strategic continuity was the period in which Türkiye demonstrated its active mediation and humanitarian diplomacy capabilities to the international community.

Mediation and the search for systemic reform

The 77th and 78th General Assemblies, held as the Russia-Ukraine war activated major geopolitical fault lines, marked a period in which Türkiye institutionalized its identity as a facilitator and mediator. The diplomatic rhetoric of the period was shaped by the confidence that came with being an actor capable of maintaining a balance between the parties to a conflict.

Türkiye’s most tangible achievements during this period were undoubtedly the Istanbul Agreement and the Black Sea Grain Initiative. This initiative, which enabled 33 million tonnes of grain to reach global markets, helped stabilize food prices and served as a global bridge against the threat of hunger. The initiativewas presented as one of the United Nations’ most significant diplomatic achievements of recent years and as one of the most successful applications of the principle of “functionalism” in international relations, demonstrating Türkiye’s capacity to resolve concrete crises.

The principle that “there are no winners in war and no losers in a just peace” became the central tenet underpinning the speeches at the 77th and 78th General Assembly.

During this period, Türkiye’s criticism of the UN Security Council largely remained constructive, focusing on improving the system through greater transparency, efficiency and democratization. Türkiye had not yet reached the conclusion that the system had completely collapsed. Instead, it continued to leave room for optimism that the existing structure could be reformed and made more effective in the pursuit of peace and justice.

However, during the 79th and 80th General Assemblies, this constructive language rooted in mediation would later give way to a much sharper and more systemic confrontation as Türkiye’s discourse evolved into an expression of the global conscience.

Exposing a moral collapse

The 79th and 80th General Assembly sessions coincided with a period in which Israel’s attacks on Gaza exposed what the article describes as the moral and humanitarian failure of the modern international system. President Erdoğan’s speeches during this period moved beyond the limits of pragmatic diplomacy toward a language of “conscience diplomacy” in opposition to global injustice.

The statement, “Not only children are dying in Gaza; the UN system is dying too,” was among the most striking expressions of Erdoğan’s 80th General Assembly address. The figures cited in the speech were presented as evidence of systematic and deliberate destruction, including nearly 100,000 civilian casualties, more than 20,000 children killed, and 146 children who reportedly died as a result of starvation being used as a weapon.

References in the 80th General Assembly speech to amputations carried out “without anesthesia” and to millions of people forced to search for food in garbage were presented as evidence that the demand for justice could no longer be addressed merely by reforming the existing system, but had become an urgent necessity.

The comparisons made in the 79th and 80th speeches between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Hitler, and the reference to what was described as a “murder network,” were presented not simply as rhetoric but as historical evidence of the post-1945 order violating the very values it had pledged to protect.

The inability of the UN Security Council to prevent the killing of 326 UN personnel by Israel, as cited in the article, and the tearing of the UN Charter at the UN podium by Israel’s permanent representative were described as evidence of the system’s failure.

At this stage, Türkiye sought to move its criticism onto the terrain of international law by calling for legal mechanisms, including the 1950 “Uniting for Peace” resolution, to be activated. This period, when systemic criticism reached its peak, was followed at the 81st General Assembly by a shift toward proposing a new regional and global architecture.

Türkiye as an “order-building” power and the evolution of the “The World Is Bigger Than Five” Doctrine

President Erdoğan’s address to the 81st General Assembly is presented as evidence of Türkiye’s transition from a crisis-managing actor to an order-building power seeking to shape a new global and regional system beyond individual crises.

The speech reflected a stage in which Türkiye sought to demonstrate its capabilities through concrete solutions and norm-setting, rather than merely criticism.

The vision outlined for Syria following the December 8 Revolution is presented as one of the clearest examples of this new period. Türkiye advocates a regional stability model centered on Syria’s territorial integrity and the legitimate expectations of its people, as well as a region free from terrorism, under the principle of “regional ownership.”

At the strategic level, the Development Road Project and the Organization of Turkic States were presented as potential “global centers of attraction,” reflecting Türkiye’s economic and political integration capacity.

The most notable aspect of the 81st General Assembly, however, was Türkiye’s emphasis on its role as a norm-setter. Warnings about cyberterrorism and technological hegemony demonstrated what the article describes as an advanced perspective on the security risks of the digital age.

The emphasis on artificial intelligence ethics, the Zero Waste movement , which has gained the support of 105 countries , and “climate justice” through Türkiye’s hosting of COP31 were presented as manifestations of Türkiye’s ambition to help establish global standards.

The phrase “The world is bigger than five,” first articulated by President Erdoğan from the UN podium in 2013 and subsequently becoming a defining theme of Türkiye’s approach to global politics, is described as having evolved into a sophisticated international law project.

During the 77th and 78th General Assemblies, the slogan emphasized reform within the existing system, including greater transparency, accountability and democratic representation at the Security Council.

During the 79th and 80th sessions, amid the Gaza war, it evolved into a criticism of the veto power as a shield protecting those accused of genocide. The 81st General Assembly then took the argument further, calling for alternative mechanisms and what the article characterizes as a legal transformation.

According to approach, the will of more than 190 countries should not be subordinated to that of five. When the Security Council becomes deadlocked, mechanisms such as the “Uniting for Peace” resolution and regional defense and development alliances could be used to bypass institutional paralysis.

A

merican President Donald Trump announced an immediate energy ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine on Sunday, catching Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy by surprise as Kyiv awaited details of the proposed agreement and reported continued Russian attacks on its energy infrastructure.

Trump declared on his Truth Social platform that both countries had agreed to halt attacks on energy facilities, following days of mounting pressure on Ukraine to stop targeting Russian oil refineries.

“Effective immediately, there is an ENERGY CEASEFIRE in the War between Russia and Ukraine. Both parties have agreed. Do not break it!” Trump wrote.

Neither Moscow nor Kyiv immediately confirmed that a formal agreement had been reached.

Zelenskiy subsequently said Ukraine supported an energy ceasefire but needed clarification from Washington, emphasizing that Russia must also comply with any arrangement.

“Ukraine supports the ceasefire, and it is important that Russia support it as well. We are awaiting details from the American side,” he said on Telegram.

The Ukrainian leader said he had discussed the announcement with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and Finnish President Alexander Stubb.

However, Zelenskiy reported that Russian forces continued striking Ukrainian energy infrastructure, including a combined heating and power plant in Kharkiv. A Ukrainian official confirmed that the attack occurred after Trump’s announcement.

Washington pressures Kyiv over Russian oil strikes

Trump’s announcement followed a sharp deterioration in relations between Washington and Kyiv over Ukraine’s attacks on Russian oil refineries, which the US president has blamed for contributing to rising global diesel prices.

On Saturday, Trump publicly warned Zelenskiy to stop targeting Russian refineries and suggested that Ukrainians should elect a new leader willing to reach an agreement with Moscow.

According to a person familiar with the situation, Washington also threatened to suspend intelligence sharing with Ukraine and block weapons procurement through the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) mechanism unless Kyiv halted its attacks on Russian energy facilities.

The White House did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the reported threats.

Zelenskiy maintained that Ukraine would suspend strikes against Russian refineries only if Moscow reciprocated by ending attacks on Ukrainian electricity and energy infrastructure.

The dispute comes amid rising global fuel prices following the outbreak of the Iran war in February. Higher diesel costs have become a political concern for Trump’s Republican Party ahead of November’s US midterm elections.

Zelenskiy rejected suggestions that Ukrainian strikes were primarily responsible for the increase, arguing that the conflict in the Middle East was a more significant factor.

Tensions were further heightened by Trump’s announcement on Friday of a diesel supply arrangement with Russia. Under the deal described by the US president, Moscow would immediately supply more than 300,000 metric tons of diesel to American and international markets, equivalent to approximately 2.25 million barrels.

Zelenskiy criticized the arrangement, warning that renewed economic cooperation with Moscow could embolden Russia and lead to further Ukrainian casualties.

The deal also drew criticism from US lawmakers, including Republican Senator Thom Tillis, who questioned its legality and warned that it could endanger American lives.

Zelenskiy offers elections in exchange for 60-day truce

The diplomatic confrontation also extended to Ukraine’s political leadership after Trump called for new presidential elections, which have been suspended since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Zelenskiy responded that Ukrainians alone should determine their country’s leadership and offered to organize elections if Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to a comprehensive 60-day ceasefire.

“Please tell Putin, give us two months, 60 days of total ceasefire, 60 days, and we will organise elections,” Zelenskiy said.

Ukrainian legislation prohibits elections during martial law because of security concerns.

Trump’s remarks drew criticism from residents in Kyiv, where some viewed his intervention in Ukraine’s electoral affairs as inappropriate while the country remained at war.

Meanwhile, Russian attacks continued on Sunday. Ukrainian authorities reported that three people were killed outside a grocery store in Kharkiv, while another three died in strikes on the western city of Ivano-Frankivsk.

Neighbouring Moldova also reported an incursion involving suspected Russian drones, which landed approximately 35 kilometres from its capital, Chisinau.

The continuing violence highlighted the uncertainty surrounding Trump’s ceasefire declaration, with neither a confirmed agreement nor evidence of an immediate halt to attacks on Ukrainian energy facilities.

For Kyiv, the central question remains whether Washington’s proposed arrangement will impose reciprocal obligations on Moscow or primarily restrict Ukraine’s ability to target Russian energy infrastructure.

(Source: Reuters)

Alongside strengthening diplomatic relations with Latin American countries, the Israeli government is seeking to expand cooperation in the fields of the economy, technology, security and innovation. However, Israel’s outreach to Latin America also faces certain limitations. While the foreign-policy priorities of governments in the region can change, the Israel-Palestine issue remains an important factor in relations with Latin American countries. Israel’s actions in Gaza have provoked the strongest reaction among Latin American populations in recent history. Israel is aware of this and is therefore pursuing new policies in the region.

The decision by Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar to declare 2026 the “year of focusing on Latin America” from the ministry’s perspective is being presented as part of Tel Aviv’s strategy to break its isolation in the region. Alongside strengthening diplomatic relations with Latin American countries, the Israeli government is seeking to expand cooperation in the fields of the economy, technology, security and innovation.

One of the important steps in this policy was the Isaac Accords launched between Israel and Argentina in April 2026. The agreement aims to promote security, counterterrorism, trade, technology and economic cooperation between the two countries and other Western Hemisphere countries that share similar policies.

Bolivia restored diplomatic relations with Israel in December 2025, with the two countries agreeing to reappoint ambassadors and increase bilateral contacts. Relations with Colombia were also restored in August 2026. Under the new President Abelardo de la Espriella, steps were taken to reestablish diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv, appoint ambassadors and strengthen economic relations.

These developments indicate that Israel is seeking to reverse the diplomatic ruptures experienced in Latin America in the previous period and rebuild its diplomatic network across the region.

Argentine leader Milei’s “extraordinary” affinity for Israel

Relations between Israel and Argentina have become closer politically and diplomatically than ever before following Javier Milei’s election as president in 2023. The Milei administration has described Israel as one of Argentina’s principal strategic partners, designated Hamas as a terrorist organization and continued to express strong support for Israel on international platforms.

Milei’s visit to Israel in 2024 and his visit to the Western Wall were among the symbolic steps reflecting the political rapprochement between the two countries. One of the key elements of this rapprochement was Argentina’s decision to move its embassy to Jerusalem. Milei announced the decision in 2024 and stated that the embassy would be moved to Jerusalem in 2026.

While the ideological and strategic alliance established by the Milei administration with Israel in foreign policy has reached a peak, Argentina is experiencing a deep socioeconomic crisis at home. The “shock therapy” economic policies implemented by Milei after taking office—including cuts in public spending, the removal of subsidies and the devaluation of the peso—were intended to bring inflation under control but severely affected the population’s purchasing power.

As a result of these measures, the country’s official poverty rate surpassed 50 percent, reaching its highest levels in two decades. Pensioners, public-sector workers and low-income groups in particular were pushed into a severe cost-of-living crisis as food, transportation and energy costs increased.

Colombia’s new leader is a strong supporter of Israel

Relations between Colombia and Israel began to take a new shape following the diplomatic rupture that occurred under former President Gustavo Petro over Israel’s actions in Gaza. The new period began with Abelardo de la Espriella, who took office on August 7 and had refused to recognize the victory of the left-wing administration, describing it as fraudulent.

The Petro administration had severed diplomatic relations with Israel in May 2024 over Israel’s actions in Gaza. Following de la Espriella’s assumption of office, a rapid normalization process began between the two countries.

One of the most notable steps in the new administration’s shift in Israel policy was Colombia’s recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. In a statement issued on August 10, 2026, Colombia announced that it recognized Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights and considered Israeli control of the area important for Israel’s security.

The decision was one of the clearest indications that Bogotá had departed significantly from the previous administration’s policy toward Israel.

Another important component of the change in relations is the relocation of the Colombian Embassy to Jerusalem. The de la Espriella administration had already included the relocation of the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem among its campaign promises.

While the two sides have discussed strengthening security and economic ties alongside diplomatic relations, the possibility of Colombia resuming coal exports to Israel and changing its position in certain international legal proceedings against Israel has also emerged.

Most recently, Colombia withdrew its request to intervene in the genocide case filed against Israel at the International Court of Justice.

Critical elections in Brazil enter Israel’s radar

Brazil’s general elections, scheduled for October 4, 2026, represent an important turning point for the future of relations between Israel and Latin America’s largest country.

During the Lula administration, relations between the two countries experienced serious diplomatic tensions over the Gaza war. Brazil’s position on the Palestinian issue became a particularly clear source of divergence.

In February 2024, Israel declared Lula “persona non grata,” while Brazil recalled its ambassador from Tel Aviv. Diplomatic tensions between the two countries continued into 2025.

Against this backdrop, Flavio Bolsonaro, the presidential candidate of Brazil’s right-wing opposition, has been sending clear messages about strengthening relations with Israel. In a statement in June, Bolsonaro said that if elected, Brazil would once again move closer to Israel, relocate its embassy in Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and join the Isaac Accords.

Bolsonaro’s Israel policy has not been limited to foreign policy during the election campaign. Bolsonaro also presented to the public at an election event a video message sent to his campaign by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

This development indicates that political contacts between Brazil’s right-wing camp and the Israeli government have become increasingly visible during the electoral process.

Depending on the election result, two different approaches are expected to emerge regarding Brazil’s Israel policy: the continuation of the Lula administration’s existing position on the Palestinian issue or a Bolsonaro administration seeking to restore and strengthen diplomatic and strategic relations with Israel.

Flavio Bolsonaro’s statements on Jerusalem, Israel and the Isaac Accords have already outlined the main areas in which foreign policy could change in the event of a change of government.

U

krainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy accused the United States of failing to provide sufficient support to Ukraine as Russian strikes killed at least 78 people and wounded 215 across the country over two days, intensifying pressure on Kyiv’s Western partners to strengthen military assistance and sanctions against Moscow.

The latest attacks included a Russian bomb strike on the eastern city of Kramatorsk that killed at least 35 people, according to Ukrainian authorities. The assault came a day after a wave of Russian drones and missiles struck locations across Ukraine, killing dozens, including 22 people in a residential building in the town of Pryluky, approximately 130 kilometres east of Kyiv.

Speaking to reporters in Pryluky on Thursday, Zelenskiy criticized Washington for pursuing potential economic cooperation with Russia while simultaneously attempting to broker an end to the war, which has continued for more than four years.

He also urged the United States to expand Ukraine’s access to Starlink satellite communications, arguing that the technology could help Ukrainian forces detect and target Russian ballistic-missile launchers.

“Open Starlink for Ukraine,” Zelenskiy said, recalling that access had been made available in response to developments involving Iran. He argued that additional access would strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend its airspace and put pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin to negotiate.

Zelenskiy questions Washington’s approach

Zelenskiy’s remarks followed comments by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who described the war as a dangerous stalemate and said Washington would continue working toward a settlement.

The Ukrainian president challenged that assessment, arguing that diplomatic efforts could not be reconciled with discussions about future economic projects involving Russia while Russian attacks continued.

“Where’s the truth here, where’s the honesty?” Zelenskiy asked, describing the situation as a lack of willingness rather than a genuine stalemate.

His criticism comes as Ukraine attempts to regain the battlefield initiative after Russian territorial gains slowed this year. Despite those efforts, Moscow has continued an increasingly intense air campaign targeting Ukrainian cities, infrastructure and other facilities.

Reuters reported on Thursday that senior Russian and US officials, including US Special Envoy Jared Kushner, had discussed the possibility of bringing a US investor into the Nord Stream pipelines, which supplied Russian natural gas to Germany before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The discussions have added to Kyiv’s concerns about the direction of Washington’s policy toward Moscow. Zelenskiy urged US President Donald Trump to increase sanctions pressure on Russia and said Ukrainian negotiators would travel to the United States on Friday and Saturday for talks.

He also said he expected Ukraine’s European partners to participate in discussions with Washington. Air defence would be a central issue, given the frequency and scale of Russian attacks.

Civilian casualties mount as attacks intensify

The strike on Kramatorsk was among Russia’s largest single attacks of the year, Ukrainian officials said. Twenty people were wounded in the assault, which tore through two buses in the embattled eastern city.

Regional Governor Vadym Filashkin accused Russian forces of deliberately targeting civilians, saying the presence of passengers on a bus made it a particularly devastating target.

Images released by officials showed bodies lying along a debris-strewn street beside the charred remains of a bus. Zelenskiy said some victims had yet to be identified and warned that the attack would not go unanswered.

Russian authorities have denied deliberately targeting civilians, although Russian forces regularly launch missile and drone attacks against Ukrainian cities.

Elsewhere, local authorities reported that a Russian guided aerial bomb killed two people in a village in southeastern Dnipropetrovsk region, while another person died in the western city of Ivano-Frankivsk. A further drone attack in Kramatorsk killed two people, bringing the city’s reported death toll to 35.

In Kyiv, Mayor Vitali Klitschko said four people were killed and 19 wounded in morning attacks on the capital. The strikes also disrupted water and electricity supplies, with officials warning that restoring services would take time.

Infrastructure under growing pressure

Russia has intensified its drone attacks on Kyiv in recent weeks, targeting warehouses and data centres while renewing its campaign against Ukraine’s electricity network ahead of winter.

The attacks have raised concerns about the country’s ability to protect essential infrastructure as temperatures fall and demand for heating and electricity increases.

Russian technology company Yandex said it was still unable to determine whether equipment at a data centre struck by a Ukrainian drone could be restored. Zelenskiy did not specifically address the incident involving Yandex but said Ukraine was responding to Russian attacks by “mirroring” strikes against data centres.

The latest wave of violence underscores the challenges facing Ukraine as it seeks to strengthen its air defences, maintain Western support and secure a diplomatic settlement on terms acceptable to Kyiv.

With civilian casualties mounting and critical infrastructure under pressure, Zelenskiy’s criticism highlights a growing tension between Ukraine’s demand for stronger military backing and Washington’s efforts to pursue negotiations with Moscow.

For Kyiv, the immediate priorities remain protecting civilians, expanding defensive capabilities and persuading its allies to maintain pressure on Russia while diplomatic efforts continue.

(Source: Reuters)

A

Tuareg fighter calling himself Azzghim has become a familiar face in Mali’s online war. He turns up in military dress in videos shared by accounts sympathetic to, or run by members of, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), and he spends most of his screen time attacking Russia’s Africa Corps.

He also appears not to exist. Researchers who studied the clips found the usual marks of synthetic video, in the way his body moves and in glitches in the color and the sound, and concluded that he had been generated rather than filmed. His following has not suffered for it. One account given over largely to reposting and remixing Azzghim material had 207,000 followers when the researchers looked at it. Another account in the same orbit used a synthetic teenage boy.

A face helps. An anonymous account can post the same message, but a man in fatigues talking into the camera gives it a body and a voice, and unlike the FLA’s real fighters, he can’t be captured or made to talk.

Azzghim is the most striking product of a wider experiment in Mali, and every side is taking part. In June, the media arm of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, the al Qaeda affiliate better known as JNIM, put out AI-generated posters to promote videos of its April attacks. Pro-government accounts have published synthetic clips celebrating the Malian army and its Russian partners. Russia-linked networks aimed at African audiences have used the same tools to write articles, translate them and put synthetic presenters in front of a camera.

It would be easy to read all this as the familiar story in which cheap AI hands powerful propaganda tools to anyone who wants them. What stands out in Mali is how differently the same software performs depending on who is holding it. A jihadist media office making posters, a few separatist sympathizers building a character on TikTok and a Russian operation running websites in several languages are doing very different jobs, and in each of them the software is the least expensive part.

The same tools, unequal results

A September report by the Dakar-based Timbuktu Institute compares how JNIM, FLA-linked accounts, networks supporting Mali’s military authorities and Russian-linked operations use generative AI. Of the four, JNIM’s documented use is the thinnest; the researchers describe it as “still at a limited but potentially evolving experimental stage.” The June posters remain the clearest example. The battlefield footage promoted by Az-Zallaqa, the group’s media arm, was real. The advertising wrapped around it was not, and it carried the usual giveaways, with blurred backgrounds and buildings melting into the vegetation behind them.

That modesty should not be mistaken for incapacity. JNIM already has what most influence campaigns spend years building: a media office, a back catalog of battlefield footage and channels that reliably put it in front of people. Generative tools could speed all of that up, turning a statement into Fulfulde or Tamasheq within the hour, dubbing a video for a different audience, or recutting the same claim several ways before anyone on the other side has drafted a reply. Nobody has yet shown that JNIM does any of this, and having the tools is a long way from knowing how to use them to any effect.

The pro-government side, meanwhile, has found an audience. One Bamako-based TikTok account identified by the Timbuktu Institute built up more than 436,000 followers with AI-generated material praising the army and the Africa Corps. After the April fighting it posted a video presenting Kidal as a city the government had recaptured. It drew 4.7 million views, far more than anything publicly documented from JNIM’s experiments.

That video came out of the fighting that began on April 25, when JNIM and the FLA launched coordinated attacks across Mali. Defense Minister Sadio Camara was fatally wounded in Kati after a suicide attacker drove an explosives-laden vehicle into his residence and a firefight followed. In Kidal, rival versions were circulating within hours.

The FLA said it had taken the city; the army called its departure a tactical repositioning, and Russian accounts dwelt on the Africa Corps’ resistance. Armies have always rebranded retreats and rebels have always inflated their gains, and an old photograph with a fresh caption can still travel a remarkable distance. What has changed is the volume and the speed. A single clip can now be recut, given a new voiceover and translated for a second audience before anyone has checked where it was filmed, and a small team can sustain an output that once needed a newsroom.

Russia’s information machine

Russia’s operation sits in a different category. Moscow was feeding anti-French and anti-Western narratives into Malian politics long before generative AI arrived, and the outlets it built for that purpose have since absorbed the new tools. In 2025, France’s VIGINUM agency mapped the network around African Initiative and traced a related operation, AI-Freak, probably linked to it, which mixed AI-generated text, images and video with fake news sites, inauthentic accounts and search manipulation. A model can turn out a script or a translation in minutes. Deciding who should see it, which accounts should carry it and where it will look credible is still work done by people.

The output dwarfs the audience. Between September 2023 and April 2025, African Initiative’s website published 18,127 articles in several languages. VIGINUM, citing SimilarWeb, counted 104,818 unique visits between December 2024 and February 2025, around 35,000 a month. Its six official Telegram channels had 69,720 subscribers between them.

OpenAI’s encounter with Stop News, another Russian operation, is starker still. OpenAI disrupted it in 2024, after its operators used AI to produce articles, comments and images in English, French and Russian for sites posing as news outlets in Africa and Britain. Few operations have leaned so heavily on synthetic imagery, and most of its accounts attracted almost no engagement. It came back the following year with more ambition, including YouTube and TikTok channels fronted by a synthetic newsreader who praised Russia and the Africa Corps and attacked France, the United States and Ukraine.

By August 2025, Newstop Africa’s main account on X had 172 followers, and its TikTok and YouTube channels about 1,900 each. One TikTok video reached 63,300 views; another reached 87. OpenAI found little sign that the network had spread beyond its own accounts and placed it in Category 2 on its six-point Breakout Scale.

Why trust still beats technology

Mali’s audiences are not blank screens. They come to these videos with years of war behind them and settled views about France, Russia and the junta, and they judge a message partly by who sends it. Some players entered this contest with large followings and voices people already recognized, able to push a clip across several platforms in an afternoon. Others started with almost nothing. A shaky battlefield video from an account people trust will usually travel further than a polished synthetic image from a source nobody knows.

Checking is slow in Mali and getting slower. Access to conflict zones has narrowed. RFI and France 24 have been off the air since 2022, when the authorities made their suspension “definitive.” In June, the authorities detained the journalists Chahana Takiou and Abdrahamane Keïta under the cybercrime law, Takiou after criticizing its use against the press and Keïta after saying on television that JNIM controlled Kidal.

Between an event and an independent account of it there is now a gap of days, sometimes longer, and the army, the armed groups, Russian-linked outlets and their partisans all rush to fill it. Generative AI shortens the time it takes them to get there. The state, for its part, has been working on other ways of finding out what Malians say to one another.

T

he growing strength of far-right parties across Europe is raising concerns within NATO that political opposition to military spending and aid for Ukraine could slow the continent’s efforts to strengthen its defenses amid rising tensions with Russia.

Far-right parties in countries including France, Italy, Belgium, Germany, Poland and Romania are increasingly using voters’ concerns over the cost of living to challenge higher defense budgets, military support for Ukraine and a greater role for the European Union in defense policy.

The positions of the parties differ significantly, but their growing influence is creating a challenge for mainstream governments seeking to maintain public support for increased military spending.

In France, National Rally leader Marine Le Pen has called for limits on aid to Ukraine, arguing that the country can no longer afford the financial burden. In Italy, Roberto Vannacci, a former general and European Parliament member who leads the National Future party, has questioned increased defense spending while commodity prices remain high.

“The challenge for Europe’s mainstream parties is how to sustain support for higher defense budgets even if that means competing with welfare and other priorities,” the article said.

Janne Kuusela, permanent secretary at Finland’s defense ministry, said rising living costs were creating space for populist arguments over military spending and financial support for Ukraine.

The issue is particularly significant as several major NATO countries, including France, Italy and Poland, prepare for elections in 2027. Far-right parties in those countries could have greater influence over national budgets and defense policies.

NATO is seeking to persuade its members to meet an ambitious target of spending 5% of gross domestic product on defense and security by 2035. Four NATO diplomats told POLITICO that the possibility of a slowdown in spending was becoming a growing concern, although some said the consequences might not become clear until countries begin their next budget cycles.

A NATO military official warned that European countries were already trying to close the gap with Russia in military capabilities.

“So far, we’re on a positive trajectory — if someone closes the faucet, there’s a risk of losing capabilities,” the official said.

Cost of living fuels resistance to higher defense spending

European countries and Canada are expected to spend about $634 billion on core defense requirements this year, an increase of 11% from 2025. But public support for further increases is limited.

An August poll assessed by the European Council on Foreign Relations and shared with POLITICO found that an average of 46.2% of respondents in eight European countries would oppose higher defense spending if it required higher taxes. About 35.5% supported such an increase.

Opposition to tax increases for military spending was particularly strong in Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Poland. Respondents in the Netherlands, Sweden and Britain were more likely to support higher taxes for defense.

Protests against increased military spending have also taken place in Rome, Brussels and Madrid, with demonstrators arguing that additional defense funds could come at the expense of hospitals, universities and social services.

Support for Ukraine has also declined. NATO’s internal polling showed support falling from 59% in 2025 to 55% this year, with lethal military aid identified as the least popular form of assistance.

The political challenge varies across Europe. Far-right parties have taken different positions, ranging from opposition to military assistance for Ukraine to resistance to EU-level defense initiatives and broader criticism of increased defense budgets.

France’s National Rally and Romania’s Alliance for the Union of Romanians oppose aid to Kyiv, while Poland’s Law and Justice and the Netherlands’ Party for Freedom have resisted EU-level defense projects. Germany’s Alternative for Germany and Italy’s National Future have criticized increased defense spending more broadly.

Political opponents of these parties have accused them of weakening Europe’s response to Russia. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said pressure against European defense policies was largely coming from Moscow, while parties including National Rally and AfD have faced scrutiny over their historical ties to Russia.

Pressure on NATO and European defense plans

The political debate is becoming more complicated as governments attempt to reconcile security priorities with domestic economic pressures.

In France, Le Pen’s National Rally has indicated that it would maintain the country’s existing trajectory of higher military spending. In Italy, however, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni proposed reducing defense spending by €8 billion from the government’s initial proposal amid pressure from her coalition partner, the League.

League senator Claudio Borghi argued that public money should prioritize pensions, tax relief and household utility bills over weapons.

In Poland, President Karol Nawrocki, backed by the right-wing Law and Justice party, attempted unsuccessfully to block access to nearly €44 billion in EU SAFE defense loans. He argued that the scheme could make Poland dependent on Brussels and impose additional debt on future generations.

NATO officials are concerned that a slowdown by major European powers could affect the alliance’s ability to develop the military capabilities it considers necessary to deter Russia.

The consequences could extend beyond national defense budgets. France and Italy are among the countries responsible for significant portions of European defense investment and aid to Ukraine, meaning any reduction in their spending could have broader implications for NATO.

“If bigger countries stop making progress, then NATO will stop making progress,” one NATO diplomat said, warning that weaker European defense capabilities could leave Ukraine more vulnerable.

The debate could also affect negotiations over the European Union’s next long-term budget if discussions continue into next year.

As European governments prepare budgets and elections approach, mainstream parties face pressure to justify increased defense spending while addressing concerns over living costs and public services. For NATO, the challenge is maintaining momentum on rearmament while political support for higher military expenditure becomes increasingly contested across Europe.

(Source: Politico)

Capital markets are often viewed as platforms where stocks and bonds are traded. In reality, they are among the most important institutions in a modern economy. They channel savings into productive investment, finance innovation, support entrepreneurship, and strengthen long-term economic growth. By connecting investors with businesses, entrepreneurs, and governments, capital markets transform financial resources into economic activity, job creation, and higher living standards.

In an increasingly competitive global economy, the quality of a country’s capital markets can influence its ability to attract investment, develop new industries, and withstand economic shocks. Countries with deep, transparent, and trusted capital markets are often better positioned to finance growth and compete in a world shaped by technological change, economic uncertainty, and geopolitical competition.

The role of capital markets in development is not new. Throughout history, prosperous societies have developed mechanisms that connected savings with productive enterprise. Long before modern stock exchanges emerged, merchants and investors pooled capital, shared risk, and financed trade.

In the Islamic world, the mudaraba partnership enabled investors and entrepreneurs to share profits and losses, supporting commerce across vast regions. Similarly, the Ottoman Grand Bazaar functioned not only as a marketplace but also as a commercial and financial hub connecting merchants, financiers, and traders. Comparable institutions emerged elsewhere. The Amsterdam Stock Exchange helped finance maritime trade during the Dutch Golden Age, while London’s financial markets supported Britain’s rise as a global commercial and industrial power.

Modern capital markets are the institutional evolution of these earlier arrangements. While financial instruments have become more sophisticated, the underlying objective remains unchanged: directing savings toward productive economic activity.

Mobilizing savings for growth

For many developing economies, the challenge is not necessarily a shortage of savings but their inefficient allocation. Large portions of household wealth often remain concentrated in bank deposits, gold, foreign currencies, or real estate. While these assets may preserve value, they contribute relatively little to innovation, productivity, or job creation.

Capital markets help address this problem by channeling savings into businesses, infrastructure, manufacturing, research, and entrepreneurship. By mobilizing domestic resources, they reduce dependence on foreign borrowing and support sustainable economic growth.

The experience of East Asia illustrates this relationship. South Korea and Taiwan successfully directed domestic savings into growth-oriented industries, supporting industrialization, technological advancement, and export competitiveness. Their success demonstrates that development requires institutions capable of allocating capital efficiently.

Capital markets provide financing options beyond traditional bank lending. Banks remain essential to every financial system, but they are often reluctant to finance high-risk ventures, early-stage companies, or projects with long development horizons. Such activities require investors willing to accept uncertainty in exchange for future growth.

Through initial public offerings (IPOs), venture capital, private equity, corporate bonds, sukuk, and angel investment networks, capital markets help entrepreneurs transform ideas into viable businesses and allow successful firms to expand.

The U.S. provides one of the clearest examples. Silicon Valley’s success rests not only on technological expertise and entrepreneurial culture but also on a financing ecosystem capable of supporting firms through every stage of development. Venture capital, institutional investors, and public markets have enabled many technology companies to evolve from start-ups into global enterprises.

This lesson has become increasingly relevant as countries compete in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, advanced manufacturing, clean energy, and digital infrastructure. Access to long-term investment capital is now a strategic advantage. Without effective capital markets, promising innovations often struggle to move from research to commercial scale, limiting productivity growth and competitiveness.

Trust as the foundation of capital markets

Financing alone does not create successful capital markets. Trust does.

Investors commit capital only when they believe markets are fair, information is reliable, and rules are enforced consistently. Trust therefore forms the foundation of every successful market.

Building trust requires strong institutions. Regulators must act independently, disclosure standards must provide accurate and timely information, property rights must be protected, and authorities must deter insider trading, market manipulation, and fraud. Investors are willing to accept business risk, but they are far less willing to tolerate uncertainty stemming from weak institutions or unequal treatment.

Transparency and accountability reinforce this trust. Publicly listed companies usually face stricter disclosure and governance standards than private firms. Better information reduces uncertainty, lowers perceived risk, and often reduces the cost of capital. It also encourages broader participation by households and institutional investors, increasing market depth and liquidity.

The world’s leading financial centers have been built on these foundations. New York and London established their reputations through strong legal frameworks, investor protections, and credible enforcement. Singapore provides another important example. Despite its relatively small domestic economy, it became one of the world’s leading financial centers through strong institutions, regulatory quality, and a sustained commitment to transparency.

The lesson is simple: capital follows trust.

Strong institutions are often a prerequisite for the development of capital markets. At the same time, the process of developing capital markets can encourage improvements in regulation, governance, disclosure, and investor protection. As a result, financial market development often becomes a catalyst for broader economic modernization.

Supporting development and public investment

Governments are among the largest beneficiaries of mature capital markets. Economic development requires substantial investment in transportation, utilities, telecommunications, housing, water systems, and environmental sustainability. Financing these priorities solely through tax revenues, bank lending, or external borrowing is often insufficient.

Deep bond markets provide an additional source of financing. Sovereign bonds, municipal bonds, project bonds, green bonds, and sustainability-linked instruments allow governments and public institutions to access domestic and international capital. Increasingly, these instruments finance renewable energy projects, climate-resilience initiatives, and sustainable infrastructure.

Malaysia offers a noteworthy example within Islamic finance. The country has developed one of the world’s most sophisticated sukuk markets, attracting both domestic and international investors. By combining modern financial infrastructure with Shariah-compliant principles, Malaysia demonstrates that financial modernization can coexist with cultural and religious traditions.

Regional cooperation can also strengthen capital markets. The BRVM in West Africa, one of the world’s few fully integrated regional stock exchanges, serves multiple countries through a single marketplace. Similar initiatives in ASEAN and Latin America show how regional cooperation can deepen markets, broaden investor participation, and improve access to financing.

D

emonstrations swept across France on Tuesday as students, teachers and parents protested against overcrowded classrooms, staff shortages and deteriorating school buildings, with clashes between protesters and police leaving hundreds injured and prompting the government to promise a response.

The nationwide protests marked the biggest day of demonstrations in a movement that began in September in deprived suburbs of Paris before spreading across the country. Prime Minister Sebastien Lecornu described the violence as the most serious student unrest in decades.

More than 250,000 people took part in demonstrations in dozens of cities, according to the Interior Ministry, while organisers put the figure at about 450,000. Marches were held in Paris, Strasbourg, Rennes, Toulouse, Lyon, Marseille and Nantes, among other cities.

Police used tear gas and water cannons to disperse groups involved in clashes on the edges of demonstrations. The Interior Ministry said 488 people were arrested on Tuesday and 48 security personnel were injured.

Lecornu told lawmakers that at least 215 teenagers and 85 school employees had been injured in clashes, describing the casualties as the “heaviest toll in decades” for France’s school system. His office said more than 700 police officers had also been injured during the protests.

President Emmanuel Macron convened Lecornu and senior ministers for an emergency meeting as the government faced mounting pressure to contain the unrest.

Students protest over underfunded schools

Despite the scale of the demonstrations, the demands of the protesters have focused primarily on conditions inside France’s schools rather than immigration or religion.

Students and teachers have complained about understaffing, overcrowded classrooms, insufficient funding and poorly maintained buildings. Some schools have faced basic problems including water leaks and rat infestations.

The High School Students Union said more than half of France’s high schools had either been blockaded or closed for the day. In some areas, education authorities attempted to move classes online.

Protesters carried handmade signs criticising years of what they described as government neglect. In Marseille and Nantes, demonstrators held signs reading “The state has killed national education,” while parents in Toulouse joined students and teachers at the front of a march.

Hugo Vetzel, a recent high-school graduate in Strasbourg, said protesters felt increasingly disconnected from political decision-makers.

“There is such a gap between the elites and us,” he said.

Rights groups, student organisations and parents have accused authorities of using disproportionate force against young protesters. The government, meanwhile, has argued that the movement has been hijacked by outsiders and that some demonstrations have descended into urban violence.

In Paris, police said around 300 people, many of them masked or hooded, confronted security forces. Several storefronts were damaged, although authorities said the broader demonstration in the capital was largely peaceful.

More than 1,800 people were being prosecuted for unspecified offences connected to the unrest, including 1,483 minors, according to the Justice Ministry.

Teachers and protesters have disputed the government’s distinction between peaceful demonstrators and violent groups. Omar Slaouti, a high-school teacher in the Paris suburb of Argenteuil, said authorities were trying to divide young people into “good” and “bad” protesters.

Government promises action amid financial pressure

Lecornu has ordered ministers to respond to the main demands raised by students and school staff. The government plans to examine measures to ensure absent teachers are replaced, review the length of the school day and consider extending lunch breaks.

Ministers will also examine repairs required at ageing school buildings. Lecornu has instructed them to present their initial proposals by the end of October.

But parents and protesters have expressed scepticism about whether government promises will translate into meaningful improvements.

Emilie Lhomme, a parent protesting outside the Helene Boucher school in Paris, said official statements would not be enough to change students’ daily lives.

The government faces a difficult financial environment as it considers additional education spending. France is under pressure to reduce a widening budget deficit while economic growth remains weak and concerns over public debt have pushed borrowing costs higher.

The yield on France’s 10-year bonds briefly exceeded 5% last week, reaching its highest level in 24 years. Rising borrowing costs have also raised concerns across the wider euro area.

Finance Minister Roland Lescure said Tuesday there was no need for the European Central Bank to intervene.

The protests come as France approaches a presidential election next spring, with support for populist parties on both the far right and far left increasing. Far-right National Rally leader Marine Le Pen has used the country’s fiscal difficulties to promote plans for reducing public spending.

At the same time, France’s education system faces longer-term challenges. Education spending has lagged inflation, while French students have fallen behind their OECD peers in overall performance, according to data cited from the PISA 2025 assessment.

The government must now balance demands for greater investment in schools with pressure to control public finances. For students, teachers and parents, however, the protests have brought immediate concerns about classrooms, staffing and school buildings to the center of the national debate.

(Source: Reuters)

A

merican President Donald Trump said a threat linked to Iran prompted the United States to withdraw B-1 bombers from a British airbase, as questions remained over an alleged plot targeting the facility and tensions between Washington and Tehran continued to rise.

The bombers had been deployed at RAF Fairford, a key US base in Britain that has been used to support American military operations in the Middle East. They were recently involved in US strikes on Iran.

Trump said on Monday that the aircraft were moved after US officials received information indicating a potential threat.

“We had an idea that there might be a threat, and why would I leave them there?” Trump told reporters. He said moving the aircraft cost relatively little and that the decision was intended to reduce the risk to US personnel and military assets.

Asked whether the people behind the threat were connected to Iran, Trump said they were.

Vice President JD Vance said the move was made as a precaution, citing concerns about Iran’s record of attacks against US interests and other targets. “We are being extremely cautious,” Vance said, while declining to provide further details.

However, Secretary of State Marco Rubio sought to distinguish the bomber withdrawal from the suspected plot. He said there was no direct link between the removal of the aircraft and the arrests and that the Pentagon was regularly reallocating military resources according to operational requirements.

A NATO military source said Iran was still considered an acute threat to US assets in Britain.

Iran has rejected allegations that it was involved in any plot against the airbase. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi dismissed the accusations as baseless, saying claims about alleged terrorists working for foreign states did not establish Iranian responsibility.

Fairford’s role in US Middle East operations

RAF Fairford, about 145 km west of London, is one of the most important European bases available to the United States for heavy bombers such as the B-1. Although the aircraft are not permanently stationed there, the base has supported previous US military campaigns in the Middle East.

A Pentagon official confirmed that all US bombers deployed at Fairford had returned to their home bases in the United States. The Pentagon said the bomber force remained ready to provide precision global strike capabilities “anywhere, anytime.”

The withdrawal could nevertheless reduce Washington’s ability to quickly launch additional missions against Iran from Europe.

Christoph Bergs, a research analyst at the Royal United Services Institute, said the redeployment would temporarily reduce the US capacity to “quickly surge sorties against Iran,” potentially lowering the immediate threat level.

He also noted that Fairford’s operational role had already been constrained by restrictions imposed by Britain.

During the current conflict, Washington had permission to use Fairford only for defensive strikes against Iranian missile sites that were attacking ships in the Strait of Hormuz. Britain had refused to allow US forces to use its bases for offensive operations against Iran.

The restrictions have contributed to strains in the traditionally close US-British relationship.

The aircraft could potentially be moved to other US facilities, including Diego Garcia or bases in the Gulf, although such a move would depend on available capacity, agreements with allies and security considerations, according to Bergs.

The security concerns at Fairford emerged after a series of arrests near the base.

“A plot”

In the early hours of September 27, five British men in their 20s were arrested after police saw them running into fields from three white vans parked near the facility. Police said no explosives were discovered, although petrol was found.

The five men were later released on bail. A sixth man, a dual British-Iranian national arrested four days later on suspicion of preparing terrorist acts, was also released on bail.

Trump had previously said the alleged plot was intended to cause “big damage” and suggested it might have been connected to Iran. He later criticized the decision to release the suspects on bail.

The British government has declined to comment on the alleged Iranian connection, although a spokesman for Prime Minister Andy Burnham said the base remained safe.

A senior NATO military official said the removal of the bombers would not affect the alliance’s overall ability to respond to threats, emphasizing the combined capabilities of its 32 members.

The incident has nevertheless highlighted the security risks surrounding US military facilities in Europe as Washington remains engaged in the conflict with Iran. The decision to move the B-1 bombers also illustrates the balance between maintaining forward military capabilities and protecting American personnel and equipment from potential attacks.

(Source: Reuters)

E

thiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has renewed his call for access to the Red Sea, intensifying a dispute with neighbouring countries as renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia raises concerns about wider regional instability.

Abiy made the demand on Monday as he was sworn in for another five-year term, insisting that Ethiopia, despite being landlocked, must secure an outlet to the sea.

Speaking to parliament, Abiy said his government would work to obtain a port on the Red Sea, describing maritime access as critical to Ethiopia’s future and “civilisation.”

“Based on the principle of give and take, we will work diligently to ensure that Ethiopia has an outlet to the sea,” Abiy said.

Ethiopia lost direct access to the Red Sea in 1993 when Eritrea, previously part of Ethiopia, became independent. Since then, Addis Ababa has depended on neighbouring countries and regional ports for much of its maritime trade.

The renewed demand comes at a particularly sensitive moment for the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia’s relations with several neighbouring countries have deteriorated in recent months, while fighting has again intensified in the northern Tigray region.

Addis Ababa has accused Eritrea, Egypt and Sudan of supporting opposition forces in Tigray. The renewed conflict has raised concerns that Ethiopia’s internal fighting could become entangled with longstanding regional rivalries.

Eritrea, meanwhile, has accused Ethiopia of seeking access to the Red Sea through Eritrean territory, highlighting the sensitivity surrounding Abiy’s maritime ambitions.

Neighbours reject exclusive Ethiopian claim to Red Sea

The dispute over maritime access has unfolded alongside a broader disagreement over who should determine the future of the Red Sea and how regional states should protect their interests.

Four of the five African countries bordering the Red Sea — Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia — met on Sunday in New Alamein, Egypt, where their leaders called for greater cooperation on regional issues.

In a joint position, they said governance of the Red Sea was the exclusive responsibility of its coastal states. They also rejected actions that could affect Egypt and Sudan’s use of Nile waters.

The statement came against the backdrop of another long-running dispute involving Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile. Egypt and Sudan have repeatedly raised concerns about the project and its potential effects on their water supplies.

Ethiopia’s Foreign Ministry responded on Monday by saying that discussions over the Red Sea should take into account what it described as the country’s “legitimate interests and enduring connection” to the body of water.

The statement underscored the gap between Addis Ababa’s position and that of its coastal neighbours. While Ethiopia argues that its economic and strategic interests require reliable access to the Red Sea, the coastal states maintain that they retain primary authority over the waters and their shores.

Somalia has taken a somewhat different position. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who attended the Egyptian summit, congratulated Abiy on his renewed mandate and expressed a desire to strengthen relations between the two countries.

Mohamud had previously told Al Jazeera that Somalia did not object to Ethiopia obtaining access to the Red Sea through Somali territory. However, he stressed that any such arrangement would have to be formally negotiated between the two countries.

A possible area for bilateral negotiations

His comments suggest that maritime access remains a possible area for bilateral negotiations, even as the broader regional dispute becomes increasingly sensitive.

The issue is unfolding as Ethiopia faces renewed conflict in Tigray. Ethiopian federal and allied forces have entered the regional capital, Mekelle, as fighting between government forces and opposition groups has escalated.

The conflict has added another layer of uncertainty to Ethiopia’s relations with its neighbours, particularly Eritrea, which shares a border with Tigray.

Abiy’s renewed push for Red Sea access therefore comes at a time when Ethiopia is seeking to address both its economic dependence on foreign ports and growing security challenges across the Horn of Africa.

Regional leaders have continued to call for dialogue and cooperation, while Addis Ababa insists that Ethiopia’s interests must be taken into account in discussions over the Red Sea.

The coming months could determine whether Ethiopia’s demand develops into negotiated port arrangements with neighboring coastal states or contributes to further tensions in an already volatile region.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

B

razil’s presidential election is heading to a second round after President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and right-wing Senator Flavio Bolsonaro emerged as the leading candidates in a closely watched and deeply polarized first-round vote.

Brazil’s electoral court confirmed that the two candidates will advance to the October 25 runoff after neither secured the majority required to win the presidency outright. With nearly 99 percent of votes counted, Bolsonaro had about 47 percent of valid votes, compared with 44.9 percent for Lula. The result sets up another major confrontation between the political forces associated with Lula and the Bolsonaro family.

Lula, 80, is seeking a fourth, non-consecutive presidential term after a political career spanning almost five decades. Flavio Bolsonaro, 45, is the eldest son of former President Jair Bolsonaro and is seeking to return his father’s right-wing political movement to power. Jair Bolsonaro is serving a 27-year prison sentence for plotting a coup after losing the 2022 election.

The election takes place as Brazilians confront concerns over crime and the cost of living, while relations between Brazil and the United States have become increasingly tense. The outcome is also being closely watched across Latin America, where a series of recent elections has strengthened right-wing political forces.

Bolsonaro outperforms polls as runoff battle begins

The first-round result was notable because it differed from expectations in several opinion polls. While most surveys had predicted a runoff, they generally placed Lula ahead of Bolsonaro in the first round.

Instead, Bolsonaro finished about two percentage points ahead of the incumbent president. The unexpected result has raised questions about why polling organizations underestimated his support and highlighted the strength of the left-wing electorate.

Bolsonaro said after the vote that the result demonstrated that Brazilians wanted change. Analysts cited by Reuters suggested that he may have benefited from protest votes from voters who preferred other candidates but regarded defeating Lula as their immediate priority.

Political analyst Rafael Favetti said the protest vote could help Bolsonaro in the runoff but might also limit his ability to expand his support because some voters who might otherwise have shifted to him later had already supported him in the first round.

Lula acknowledged that the first-round result had been unexpected. He said he had believed he could win outright but vowed to strengthen his campaign before the runoff, describing the next stage of the contest as “extra time.”

The runoff is expected to be closely contested. Voters who supported the other 10 candidates in the first round will now become crucial to both campaigns. Ronaldo Caiado and Renan Santos, who together won about 5.3 million votes, have previously said they would not endorse either candidate.

Right-wing gains extend beyond presidential race

Bolsonaro’s strong performance was part of a broader electoral advance for Brazil’s right. Right-wing parties, led by Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party, were performing strongly in both chambers of Congress, with the PL on track to become the largest force in the Chamber of Deputies while also gaining ground in the Senate.

Members of the Bolsonaro family also secured important victories. Michelle Bolsonaro, a former first lady and Flavio’s stepmother, won a Senate seat in the Federal District, while Carlos Bolsonaro, Flavio’s brother, was elected to the Senate in Santa Catarina.

The results indicate that the political movement built around Jair Bolsonaro remains a powerful electoral force despite his exclusion from the presidential race. Andre Pagliarini, a historian and international studies professor, said the performance of far-right legislative candidates suggested deeper popular support for the Bolsonaro political project than many observers had expected.

The congressional results could have significant consequences after the presidential vote. Conservative lawmakers already dominate both houses, and a stronger right-wing presence could make it more difficult for Lula to advance his legislative agenda if he wins another term.

For Bolsonaro, meanwhile, a presidential victory could provide greater political space to pursue his priorities, including his pledge to seek an amnesty for his father.

With three weeks remaining before the October 25 runoff, Brazil now faces another closely fought contest between Lula and the Bolsonaro political camp, with the balance of power in Congress adding another layer to an election that could shape the country’s political direction for years to come.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

Y

emen’s Saudi-backed, internationally recognized government has announced a major military offensive aimed at recapturing territory controlled by the Iran-backed Houthi movement, escalating a conflict with growing implications for regional security and international shipping.

Yemeni President Rashad al-Alimi said on Sunday that government forces would continue their campaign until the country was liberated from what he described as the grip of the “terrorist militia.” A military spokesman subsequently called on the Houthis to surrender their weapons.

The announcement by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), which governs from the southern city of Aden, followed weeks of Houthi advances that have weakened government forces and brought the strategically important Bab el-Mandeb Strait under the group’s control.

The strait, at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, is a crucial passage for international shipping between the Mediterranean and Asia. Its capture has given the Houthis additional leverage over global maritime trade and opened a new front in the wider war involving the United States, Israel and Iran.

The latest escalation comes as regional tensions remain high following the US-Israeli war against Iran, which began in February. Iran’s responses have included disrupting oil shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, on the opposite side of the Arabian Peninsula.

Houthis claim attacks on Saudi oil facilities

As the Yemeni government announced its counteroffensive, the Houthis said they had launched ballistic missiles and drones against Saudi Aramco sites in Riyadh and the Khurais area of Saudi Arabia.

The group claimed the attacks caused major fires and were retaliation for approximately 50 Saudi-led air and missile strikes in Yemen during the preceding 12 hours. Saudi Arabia had not immediately confirmed the reported attacks or the extent of any damage.

Al-Alimi said the government had decided to launch the offensive after exhausting opportunities to de-escalate the conflict. He thanked Saudi Arabia for its support and urged Yemen’s regional allies and international partners to assist the PLC’s forces and institutions.

Regional and Western officials had previously told Reuters that Saudi Arabia and its Yemeni allies were preparing an assault against the Houthis. Under the reported plans, Saudi forces would lead aerial operations while Yemeni government troops conducted fighting on the ground.

The United States is already providing intelligence support for Saudi operations in Yemen, according to people familiar with the preparations. Several regional and European countries are also providing mainly defensive military assistance to the kingdom.

Washington’s involvement comes as the US war against Iran has weakened parts of Iran’s military and political leadership while drawing the United States into another major regional engagement and depleting important military equipment.

The Houthis, formally known as Ansar Allah, have controlled Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, and large areas of the northwest since 2014. The region contains most of the country’s population. Despite years of military operations by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and their Western allies, the movement has retained control of extensive territory and strengthened its weapons capabilities with Iranian assistance.

Saudi Arabia intervened in Yemen’s civil war in 2015 at the head of an Arab coalition supporting the internationally recognized government, but the campaign failed to defeat the Houthis. A truce agreed in 2022 largely held until this year, when the conflict intensified amid the wider confrontation involving Iran.

Houthi advances threaten Taiz and Red Sea shipping

The government’s announcement follows a rapid Houthi offensive last month that captured the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and approximately 150 kilometers of Red Sea coastline within weeks. The advance caused government forces to retreat and shifted the balance of power on the ground.

Military sources said the Houthis had also gained control of strategic hilltops near Taiz over the previous 48 hours, advancing towards the last road connecting the city with Aden on Yemen’s southern coast.

Control of that route could effectively place Taiz under siege. Yemen’s third-largest city is home to hundreds of thousands of civilians and hosts thousands of government troops. Its strategic importance is compounded by its political significance: Al-Alimi comes from the region.

A siege would further worsen an already severe humanitarian crisis. The World Food Program said last week that three in four families in parts of Yemen were going hungry as fighting intensified, displacing tens of thousands of people and disrupting supplies to millions.

The struggle for Bab el-Mandeb has also raised concerns beyond Yemen. The waterway is a vital route for commercial shipping, and its importance has increased as disruption in the Strait of Hormuz has made alternative routes more strategically significant.

The Houthis’ recent territorial gains therefore pose challenges for Yemen’s government, Saudi Arabia and international efforts to protect maritime trade. Their ability to threaten shipping and Saudi oil infrastructure gives the group influence extending well beyond the territory it controls.

Yemen has been fragmented by years of conflict involving local armed groups and regional powers. The latest government offensive could reshape the military balance, but the Houthis’ recent advances, their control of strategic territory and the continuing humanitarian emergency suggest that any campaign to retake the country will face substantial challenges.

(Source: Reuters)

O

n September 6, 2026, a significant state parliament election took place in the eastern German state of Saxony-Anhalt, and the results signaled a serious crisis for the incumbent federal government. Just two weeks after this historic defeat against the AfD, on September 20, state parliament elections were also held in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. The elections in these two states also ended in failure, particularly for the Chancellor’s party, the CDU, and have opened the door to the political crisis becoming, in a sense, chronic at the federal level.

For the first time in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany, the CDU failed to enter a state parliament, securing only 4.9 percent of the vote, and recorded its worst-ever result in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. Undoubtedly, this outcome will also have implications for the future of the federal government. Meanwhile, the CDU, which holds the state premiership in Berlin, suffered a defeat there as well by finishing second to the Left Party, further deepening the crisis. Consequently, the election results from the three states over the past weeks can be viewed not so much as reflecting the difficulties expected in forming new coalition governments at the state level, but rather as a critical turning point for the future of the incumbent federal government led by Merz.

Berlin and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania state parliament election results

Although the AfD finished first in the Saxony-Anhalt state parliament election on September 6, it failed to secure the number of seats required for an absolute majority. Since other parties have also refused to form a coalition with the AfD, and the BSW party, despite maintaining communication with the AfD, remains opposed to a coalition for now, uncertainty persists regarding the course of events in the state. In the state parliament elections held on September 20 in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, which also saw high voter turnout, a more complex picture emerged for the federal government.

According to preliminary official results, the Left Party finished first in the Berlin state election for the first time with 25.7 percent of the vote, while the incumbent CDU-SPD coalition partners suffered significant losses. In Berlin, the CDU fell by approximately 9.5 percentage points to 18.8 percent, finishing second, while the SPD lost 6.3 percentage points and managed to secure only 12.1 percent of the vote. Contrary to expectations following its momentum in Saxony-Anhalt, the AfD saw a more modest rise in Berlin, reaching 16.3 percent, while the Greens secured 14.3 percent of the vote.

Looking at the state parliament election results in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, two critical points stand out. Although the AfD’s clear upward trend continued here as well, the SPD factor played a more decisive role compared to Saxony-Anhalt. The AfD reached a vote share of 38.2 percent and, just as in Saxony-Anhalt, finished the election in first place. Although the party leadership claims that “voters have entrusted them with the task of forming a government,” the formation of any coalition involving the AfD is impossible in this state as well due to the stances of other parties, and like in Berlin, the BSW failed to clear the electoral threshold in this state.

Another point worth noting is that in the state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the SPD, particularly incumbent SPD State Premier Manuela Schwesig, who positioned herself as a centrist in her election campaign over the past few months, managed to secure a 35.5 percent share of the vote. Although the SPD finished the election in second place, it is highly likely that it will form a coalition government once again. While the SPD lost approximately 4 percentage points compared to the 2021 election, this is still considered a relative success given the AfD’s current upward trend.

In contrast, the CDU achieved its worst-ever result in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. Failing to clear the 5 percent electoral threshold, the CDU, for the first time in German history, failed to secure seats in a state parliament election, remaining outside the legislature with 4.9 percent of the vote. The Left Party and the Greens were the other parties that managed to enter the state parliament, securing 6.5 percent and 5.7 percent of the vote, respectively.

After the polls closed, though this is not typically the case following state legislative elections, Chancellor Friedrich Merz (CDU) made a public statement. Merz described the election results as a “disaster,” but emphasized that he remains in office and is determined to implement the planned reforms in collaboration with the federal government. With this move, Merz aimed to preempt potential debates regarding speculation throughout the evening about whether he would step down.

Although he was partially successful with this maneuver, as the night wore on and it became clear that the CDU had failed to clear the electoral threshold in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, attention once again turned to potential critical voices within the CDU. Although election night was somehow weathered, and some CDU figures even issued statements of support for the Chancellor the following day, questions remain about how and to what extent the coalition can be sustained in light of these failures in the three state parliamentary elections.

What lies ahead for Chancellor Merz and the federal government?

Public support for Chancellor Merz and his party, the CDU, has been declining for quite some time. Since taking office in May 2025, Merz has faced criticism, particularly for failing to fulfill his campaign promises. In addition to this negative perception, he has once again come to the forefront of public discourse due to his controversial policy choices and rhetoric in recent months. The chancellor’s extremely low approval ratings in polls have also had a negative impact on election campaigns in the states in question. In particular, the AfD’s upward trend, as reflected in recent polls conducted at both the state and federal levels, has continued to put pressure on Merz and his party, narrowing the scope of the party’s rhetoric and concrete goals.

Amid this ongoing decline for parties purported to be centrist, it can be argued that the AfD’s increasing normalization has also been influenced by the policy promises favored by centrist parties. Consequently, the move toward aligning with the AfD’s promises has ultimately contributed to the normalization of these discourses and goals. As we witness the further normalization of extreme rhetoric and promises, the AfD has secured first place not only in the eastern states but also in recent polls conducted at the federal level. Consequently, the likelihood that voters are now choosing the AfD not merely as a reactionary choice but specifically because of the party’s own policy promises has also strengthened.

The CDU’s concrete failure in the three critical state parliament elections it lost can no longer be attributed solely to Merz and his criticized leadership. In the coming days, it is likely that the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition, which he leads as Chancellor, as well as the CDU as a whole will face a challenging process. These election results will lead to new developments in the coming weeks and months. For example, while there are indications that a change in the chancellor within the coalition or the possibility of early elections could be raised, it is also possible that Chancellor Merz may ultimately be forced to call for a vote of confidence. Despite all the negative developments, as Merz emphasized in recent days, his insistence that he was elected for a four-year term and that he has no intention of stepping down underscores the lack of concrete alternative options for the Chancellor—and indeed, for the coalition itself.

Aside from the difficulty of identifying an alternative CDU chancellor within the coalition, the prospect of gaining momentum within the coalition with this potential new figure can also be viewed as a challenging and risky process in the current equation. Especially as the AfD is expected to intensify its calls for early elections in the coming period, it is likely that the CDU/CSU and SPD, in particular, will lose even more ground in a potential new election against the AfD, which currently leads in the polls.

While it is difficult to speak of a generally positive public perception of Chancellor Merz over the past 16 months since he took office, assessments of him have taken an increasingly critical turn, particularly in recent weeks. Although this attitude is not a new trend, the Chancellor’s continued use of his customary rhetoric, particularly regarding communication, which has generally caused bewilderment throughout society, especially following the summer break, has made the situation even more challenging. Efforts are evident to push this negative perception, linked to domestic policy, into the background by pointing to current risks and developments in foreign policy. However, this approach has not garnered the response Merz had hoped for among the German public.

The future of the federal government in Germany

The fact that the AfD was able to secure a near-absolute majority in the state of Saxony-Anhalt has, first and foremost, dealt a serious blow to the Chancellor’s party, the CDU, particularly at the federal level. The CDU, which is on the verge of losing its social credibility and its claim to being a centrist party, particularly in light of the results in these three states, faces even more critical days ahead. The goal of transforming the agreements reached following intensive negotiations with coalition partner the SPD into comprehensive reforms in the coming months constitutes the CDU’s most important and pressing promises at the federal level.

It remains uncertain whether the Chancellor and the coalition will be able to implement reforms deemed necessary but lacking sufficient public support, such as pension reform. The SPD’s desire to revise the agreements reached following the election results may prompt the CDU/CSU to make potential, partial concessions. However, such steps are likely to be risky maneuvers.

At this stage, it is worth recalling the harsh criticism Merz directed at former Social Democratic Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) during his tenure as leader of the main opposition. At that time, while public support for Scholz remained low in polls, Merz, as leader of the main opposition, was persistently calling for Scholz to step down. Today, however, it should not be forgotten that Chancellor Merz’s own popularity and support within his party are at a lower level.

The current political crisis and lack of predictability in Germany are not merely a matter of a single individual but are also linked to a deepening crisis of credibility in politics as a whole. The failure to present lasting solutions to economic problems and a concrete vision for the coming years within a credible framework is, in general, also affecting the promises and reform goals of political parties. Alternative political parties positioned at the extremes, which address social demands with extreme promises, have managed to increase their current vote shares at the state or federal level during this process, likely aided by the comfort that comes with avoiding responsibility. Meanwhile, the efforts of parties such as the CDU/CSU and SPD, which claim to occupy the political center, to re-establish their political representation and voter mobilization capabilities are becoming increasingly difficult.

Finally, calls are emerging that the AfD, which finished first in the elections in the states of Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, should now be given the opportunity to form a state government, and that concessions should be made regarding the “firewall” principle of refusing to cooperate. At this stage, some observers point out that an AfD-led state government would fail within a short period if it came to power. The expectation that such a process could evolve into a more realistic transformation in the eyes of the public is, however, viewed as an extremely risky approach. One of the most prominent opposing viewpoints is the reluctance of centrist parties to take such a risk and the argument that the AfD cannot be compared to similar rising parties in other European countries. In this context, it is noteworthy that even similar parties in France or Italy have distanced themselves from the AfD in the past.

Ultimately, concrete developments regarding the future of the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition led by Chancellor Merz, who has been in office for approximately 16 months, can be expected in the coming weeks. As differences of opinion within the coalition become more pronounced, it is likely that the scrutiny of the Chancellor, both within the coalition and within his own party, will enter a new phase. Despite Merz’s determination to remain in office for now, it is possible that, in the coming period, he may be compelled to seek a vote of confidence from the Bundestag in the face of mounting criticism and pressure. Additionally, it is known that for several weeks now, certain alternative CDU figures have been mentioned in the public sphere as potential candidates for the next chancellor. However, there is still no concrete vision or plan from these potential candidates regarding how they would implement comprehensive reforms that are facing significant public resistance. Given the results of the recent state parliament elections, the political crisis in Germany is likely to deepen and enter an even more complex phase in the coming days.

(Originally published in Turkish by SETA Foundation)

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he Trump administration has urged France and Germany to release emergency diesel reserves to help ease soaring global fuel prices, warning that Washington could impose a ban on US diesel exports if European countries fail to act, according to three people familiar with the discussions.

The pressure marks an escalation in Washington’s efforts to bring down record US diesel prices as President Donald Trump considers measures to increase domestic fuel supplies ahead of November’s midterm elections.

For European governments, however, releasing additional emergency stocks presents a difficult choice. The European Union must weigh the immediate need to reduce fuel prices against the possibility of a worsening supply crisis if the conflict involving Iran continues and global energy markets remain disrupted.

The European Commission’s energy taskforce, which includes the Commission and representatives of all 27 EU member states, is due to discuss the situation on Friday morning, a Commission spokesperson said.

EU officials said the Commission, Germany, France, Italy, Britain and Ireland had already held discussions on Thursday about the possible release of diesel reserves.

The International Energy Agency has not yet asked Germany to release its emergency stocks, Germany’s economy ministry said. It was not immediately clear when the IEA would next consider the issue.

The US administration has expressed particular frustration with France and Germany, which Washington believes have not fully implemented earlier commitments to release emergency oil and petroleum-product reserves.

“It is in Europe’s best interest to work with the United States as we pursue multiple pathways to boost the supply of refined products and lower costs for consumers,” a US official told Reuters.

Washington seeks more fuel as global supply tightens

One source familiar with the discussions said the United States had asked the European Union to release 120 million barrels of diesel over the next six months.

Europe has become increasingly dependent on US fuel supplies after banning Russian imports following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. The disruption caused by the US-Israeli war against Iran has further complicated supplies from the Middle East, increasing pressure on global refined-product markets.

US Energy Secretary Chris Wright said he was “highly confident” that Europe could help reduce fuel prices by drawing down its emergency diesel inventories.

“This is a time for a coordinated release of diesel stores as we go into harvest season and we go into winter heating oil season,” Wright told Fox News. He said additional diesel was available and suggested that coordinated action could produce positive results for consumers.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent also called on US allies to fulfill commitments made under an agreement among International Energy Agency members in March. He said the United States had already released 172 million barrels of oil under the agreement.

“America is doing its part,” Bessent said on X, adding that Washington expected its allies to match their commitments with action.

The pressure on European reserves comes as several major fuel suppliers have taken measures that are tightening international markets.

Russia has extended its ban on diesel exports until the end of October, according to Reuters. The measure comes after Ukrainian attacks damaged several Russian refineries.

Chinese refiners have also suspended October fuel exports to strengthen domestic supplies, while PetroChina has cancelled cargoes, according to sources cited by Reuters.

The disruptions have added to concerns about the availability of diesel at a time when demand is expected to rise during the agricultural harvest and winter heating season.

Europe faces a difficult reserve decision

The European Union must balance the immediate economic pressure from high fuel prices against the strategic value of maintaining emergency stocks.

Releasing large volumes could increase supplies and potentially reduce prices, but governments may be reluctant to deplete reserves while uncertainty remains over the conflict involving Iran and the possibility of further disruptions to international energy markets.

Relations between Washington and European capitals have already been strained by disagreements over tariffs and defense spending, adding another layer of complexity to the discussions over fuel reserves.

France’s energy ministry declined to comment on the US request. An official at the Élysée Palace said Trump and French President Emmanuel Macron did not discuss the issue when they met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York the previous week.

The official said Macron would convene a video conference of G7 leaders to discuss rising fuel prices and the global availability of refined petroleum products. The meeting would also consider coordination on releasing strategic reserves in cooperation with the International Energy Agency.

The proposed G7 discussions reflect the broader international effort to manage a tightening fuel market as governments confront disruptions from several major producers.

For Washington, securing additional supplies could help ease pressure on US consumers before the November elections. For Europe, however, releasing substantial diesel reserves could reduce prices in the short term while leaving countries with smaller buffers against a further deterioration in global energy supplies.

The debate therefore places the United States and its European allies under pressure to coordinate their response to an increasingly strained global fuel market, even as they face different domestic priorities and concerns about future supply disruptions.

(Source: Reuters)

R

ussia has warned NATO that it would be prepared to use nuclear weapons if the Western alliance attempted to isolate Kaliningrad, escalating tensions between Moscow and the alliance over the strategically important Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea.

In a diplomatic note sent to NATO and seen by Reuters, Russia accused the alliance of pursuing a “dangerous and reckless course” that carried a high risk of direct armed conflict. Moscow also warned that any confrontation could involve Russian strikes against decision-making centers in NATO member states from the outset.

“Russia will be ready to use the entire arsenal of forces and capabilities at its disposal, including nuclear weapons,” the diplomatic note said, referring to any NATO attempt to isolate Kaliningrad from the rest of Russia.

Kaliningrad is a heavily militarized Russian territory located between NATO members Poland and Lithuania. Moscow has increasingly highlighted what it describes as threats to the exclave as NATO countries expand military activity in the Baltic region.

The Russian warning comes amid already strained relations between Moscow and Western governments following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova separately accused officials from NATO countries of demonstrating what she called “Russophobia” and a willingness to wage war against Russia. She said Moscow hoped its warnings would be taken seriously.

The Kremlin said the message was directed at what spokesman Dmitry Peskov called “hotheads in Europe.”

NATO rejects Russian nuclear threat

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte rejected Moscow’s warning and said the alliance had responded by emphasizing that it was defensive in nature.

“We are a defensive alliance,” Rutte said. “And stop the nuclear threats. This is absolutely not called for and not helpful.”

In its response to Russia, NATO said none of its exercises or activities posed a threat to Russian territory. The alliance also called on Moscow to end its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and refrain from what it described as increasingly reckless behavior toward NATO members.

Asked whether the risk of Russia using nuclear weapons against the Baltic states was now real, Rutte said it was not. He argued that Russian President Vladimir Putin understood that Russia could not defeat NATO.

The exchange nevertheless comes as European governments and Moscow accuse each other of escalating military and political tensions around the Baltic Sea.

Russian embassies in at least three European countries have issued statements in recent days accusing NATO of increasing tensions through military exercises and scenarios involving Kaliningrad.

European governments, meanwhile, have accused Moscow of conducting a broader “hybrid war” through activities including sabotage and arson. Russia denies those accusations and rejects repeated claims from Western politicians that it is preparing for a military attack against a NATO country.

The latest Russian warning has also raised concerns among analysts about the possibility of miscalculation.

Nikolai Sokov, a Vienna-based nuclear analyst and former Russian diplomat, said it was becoming increasingly difficult for Western countries to expand their support for Ukraine without increasing the risk of direct confrontation with Moscow.

Sokov said Russia could interpret some Western actions differently from European governments. He cited arms supplies to Ukraine, sanctions against Moscow, interceptions of Russian ships, military exercises and intelligence flights near Kaliningrad as developments contributing to the tension.

He said Russia could view a potential blockade of the Baltic Sea as an act of war even if European governments considered it to be below the threshold of direct conflict.

“I see a risk of mutual miscalculation,” Sokov said.

Attempt to intimidate European governments

A NATO diplomat described the Russian message as another attempt to intimidate European governments, while saying the alliance would not be deterred from supporting Ukraine.

A senior European defense official said the warning was serious, describing it as the first time since the Cold War that Russia had threatened Europe in such terms.

The competing statements underscore the increasingly tense security environment around the Baltic Sea, where Russian and NATO forces operate in close proximity. While NATO says its activities do not threaten Russia, Moscow has repeatedly warned that developments involving Kaliningrad could have wider consequences.

The latest dispute highlights the risks created by escalating military activity and increasingly forceful rhetoric between Russia and the Western alliance. With both sides maintaining sharply different interpretations of the security situation, analysts warn that miscalculation could further increase the danger of confrontation.

(Source: Reuters)

P

ete Hegseth, U.S. Defense Secretary, has announced plans to cut by 20 percent the number of military positions reserved for generals and admirals, a move that could significantly reshape the Pentagon’s senior leadership and has raised questions about political influence over the US armed forces.

Hegseth announced the planned reduction on Wednesday at the US Marine Corps base in Quantico, Virginia, describing it as a long-overdue effort to change the culture of the military. He said reducing senior positions was necessary to remove what he described as “woke” elements from the armed forces.

“You can’t change a culture with the same people who enabled it,” Hegseth said, arguing that personnel decisions were central to changing military culture. He also said the armed forces should focus on training, readiness, accountability, discipline and lethality.

The Pentagon has previously presented reductions in senior positions as part of efforts to streamline bureaucracy and reduce layers of command. However, analysts cited by Al Jazeera said the latest plans could also have implications for how senior military officers are selected and how willing they are to challenge political leaders.

According to the Associated Press, citing Pentagon officials, Hegseth intends to double a 10 percent reduction in top-ranking personnel ordered last year, bringing the overall reduction to 20 percent by January 1, 2027. The plan would affect roughly 800 general and admiral positions across the one- to four-star ranks.

Congress sets statutory limits on the number of generals and admirals. A Congressional Research Service report recorded 848 active-duty generals and admirals in September 2025, compared with an authorized maximum of 857.

The planned cuts do not necessarily mean that every officer currently occupying an affected position will immediately leave the military. Reuters reported that some positions would be eliminated, while others would be reassigned to lower-ranking offices.

Debate over military leadership and political influence

The argument for reducing the number of senior military positions predates Hegseth’s tenure. Supporters of reform have argued that the US military has too many layers of command and headquarters, and that reducing senior ranks could give officers closer to military operations greater authority.

Walter Ladwig, a political scientist specializing in US foreign policy at King’s College London, said there was a credible case for reducing the number of senior officers. He noted that the overall size of the US military had declined significantly since the end of the Cold War, while the number of flag officers had not fallen correspondingly.

At the same time, however, Hegseth’s proposed cuts come after a series of high-profile dismissals and leadership changes at the Pentagon.

President Donald Trump and Hegseth have fired or pushed into retirement more than two dozen military leaders since Trump took office in January 2025, according to the article. Those removed include Army Chief of Staff General Randy George and Navy Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Lisa Franchetti. Trump also dismissed Air Force General CQ Brown as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in February 2025.

The administration has also dismissed the only two women serving as four-star officers, along with other senior female officers. Army Secretary Dan Driscoll resigned in August following reported disagreements over Hegseth’s handling of senior military personnel.

The dismissals and blocked promotions have prompted questions about how commanders are selected and whether professional disagreements with the administration could affect military careers.