Turkey’s main opposition party the CHP is experiencing another intra-party conflict. Although the CHP has faced many internal conflicts during the past decade, the latest conflict differs from previous ones and clearly reveals the existence of splinter groups within the party. The press conference of the CHP’s 2018 presidential candidate, Muharrem Ince, revealed that the party is facing a crisis in uniting the splinter groups within the party, and the most recent incident may cause a serious intraparty opposition movement in the upcoming days.

So what happened? Rahmi Turan, a journalist writing for Sözcü newspaper, wrote in his column that one of the candidates planning to run for the CHP’s chairmanship had a meeting with President Erdoğan. According to Turan’s claims, the President promised to help this candidate win the chairmanship of the CHP in the upcoming party congress.  

Although the public did not pay much attention to Turan’s claims in the beginning, the CHP Chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu went on to state that Turan’s claims were indeed true. After Kılıçdaroğlu’s statements, there were some speculation that it may have been referring to Muharrem İnce or Metin Feyzioğlu, the Head of the Union of Turkish Bar Associations. At this point, Turan made another statement claiming that it was Muharrem İnce who met with President Erdoğan.

It did not take much time to discover that there was in fact no meeting held between President Erdoğan and Muharrem Ince, and that they were groundless claims. Thus, the question arises: what were the reasons for making these unfounded allegations? And why didn’t Kılıçdaroğlu reject the claims in the first instance?

It is certain that this latest incident is related to the ongoing conflict between two splinter groups within the party. The Kemalists/nationalists and the leftists. The party has been experiencing a struggle between both groups over the last decade. While Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the Chairman, and his team active in the party administration are drawn from the leftist circle within the party, Muharrem Ince and his followers represent the Kemalist/nationalist bloc. Both groups are struggling over the party’s administration.

The struggle between the two groups is clearly seen during the party’s congresses. There have been four extraordinary and three ordinary congresses in the last decade under the chairmanship of Kılıçdaroğlu. In each congress, the Kemalist/nationalist circle within the party have tried to win the party administration. Ince himself ran against Kılıçdaroğlu two times, in 2014 and 2018, and lost both elections.

Nevertheless, the June 24 presidential elections empowered the position of Muharrem Ince within the party. Since Ince received  31% of the votes as a presidential candidate of the CHP against Erdoğan, while the CHP only recieved 22 % of the votes in the parliamentary elections. Ince later started another intraparty opposition movement after the elections. However, he suspended his initiative because of the local elections.

It is obvious that Muharrem Ince is the only threat against Kılıçdaroğlu’s chairmanship and the leftist circle’s hegemony within the CHP. Ince clearly underlined this conflict between the two groups during his press conference. Because of this,, this latest incident was an effort to discredit Ince’s position before the upcoming congress, and to prevent the rise of an intraparty opposition movement against Kılıçdaroğlu. Nevertheless, it seems that the initiative of the leftist bloc has already failed and the conflict between the two groups will continue until the congress.

After Turkey began its military operations in Northern Syria on October 9, public debate focused on how the military operation would affect Turkey’s relations with Western countries, especially the US, and whether the operation would change the power balance in Syria. Turkey and the US then came to an agreement to suspend the operation for five days while the US oversaw the withdrawal of the YPG from the region. After the de-escalation of the conflict in Northern Syria, Turkey’s main opposition party, the CHP, changed its position towards the operation, again. As I wrote earlier, from its inception, Operation Peace Spring received the support of all of Turkey’s political parties, except the HDP. Even the resolution of the Turkish Assembly renewing authorization for the Turkish Armed Forces to launch a military operation in Northern Syria received the support of the AK Party, CHP, MHP, and Iyi Party. It was the first time since the July 15, 2016 coup attempt that all political parties were unanimous on an issue.

However, this did not last long. Turkey’s opposition parties adopted their critical positions again. Especially the CHP, which turned back to its harsh position towards the government’s Syria policy. Indeed, even if the CHP had supported the military operation from the beginning, there was a lot of criticism from the party’s pro-HDP circles towards the operation.

For instance, Canan Kaftancıoğlu, head of the Istanbul branch of the CHP, criticized Turkey’s military operation in a written statement and underlined that the operation should not be conducted. Moreover, Sezgin Tanrıkulu, the CHP’s Istanbul MP, blamed Turkey for “invading” Syrian territories and killing civilians living in that area.

The CHP’s flip-flopping position on the Syria issue shows a clash of opinions between two different blocs within the party. While Kemalist and nationalist circles support the operation without any hesitation since they see the operation as Turkey’s right to secure its borders, pro-HDP circles within the CHP are clearly against the operation, and do not acknowledge that the CHP has supported to the operation from the start. The prominent names of this pro-HDP circles, Canan Kaftancığlu, Sezgin Tanrıkulu and Aytuğ Atıcı have been explicitly criticizing the operation and calling it an “invasion”. When it comes to Kemalist and nationalist circles, the leading figures of this group including Muharrem İnce, Umut Oran, and Tanju Özcan supported the military operation. Thus, it is obvious that the recent shift in the CHP’s position after Turkey’s agreement with the US over Syria is also related to the dominance of the pro-HDP group in the party politics. Since the members of this group were clearly against the operation from the beginning, and did not favor the official stance of the party that supported the operation, their hegemony in the party caused the shift in the CHP’s position.

Why did the CHP support the operation although pro-HDP circles are dominant in the party? When the operation started on October 9, the mobilization of nationalist sentiments in the country forced the CHP to support the operation. Although the pro-HDP circles of the CHP were clearly against to the operation, it was not an option for the CHP to oppose to the operation while all of the Turkish public was united in favor of the operation. In other words, the CHP had to perform a pragmatic action to prevent a negative reaction from the public, especially its voters, a certain amount of whom are nationalist voters. Nevertheless, rising tensions in US-Turkey relations, the escalation of a diplomatic crisis with the US, as well as the ambiguity of Russia-Turkey relations during the operation forced the CHP to change its discourse. At this point, the pro-HDP group’s position towards the Syria issue became dominant in the party’s official stance.

The recent statements of the CHP’s Chairman, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, reflects the recent shift in the discourse of the party and the dominance of pro-HDP groups. Even if Kılıçdaroğlu is closer to the pro-HDP groups rather than Kemalist and nationalist circles as the chairman of the party, he had to support the operation because of the increasing nationalist sentiments in Turkey. Nevertheless, Kılıçdaroğlu criticized the government after the agreement and said that Turkey should not be involved in the Syrian issue anymore and should stay away from “the quagmire of Middle East”. Moreover, to strengthen his position in the political atmosphere where nationalist sentiments are still on the rise, Kılıçdaroğlu focused on Trump’s letter to Erdoğan and problematize it as a matter of honor for Turkey.

Indeed, incidents in the last two weeks show that the CHP’s position towards the Syrian issue is more compatible with Western perspectives, as the party does not see the establishment of a Kurdish state in Northern Syria as a threat to Turkey. This party position is shaped by the former bureaucrats of the Foreign Ministry who are influential within the party and in pro-HDP circles. This group includes prominent names within the party such as Ünal Çeviköz and Faruk Loğoğlu, and since the beginning of the Syrian crisis this group defended the idea that the Turkish government should have negotiated with the Assad regime. According to their approach, Turkey’s quest to build a safe-zone on the border is nothing but a “demographic engineering project”, as was stated in the final report of the CHP’s Syria Conference. Since these groups were critical of the operation from the beginning, their discourse became the main determinants of the CHP’s position in time.

Because of this, Turkey’s operation to Northern Syria showed again that pro-HDP groups within the CHP are more powerful than its Kemalist and nationalist circles. It also proves that the pro-HDP group dominates the party’s discourse on critical issues. Even if the increasing nationalist sentiment during the operation forced the party to support the operation in the beginning, it did not take so long for the CHP to adopt its traditional approach to the Syria issue which is highly dominated by the pro-HDP group.

Turkey’s main opposition party has held a conference in Istanbul on Syria recently. While the conference was mostly conducted with the participation of academics and journalists interested in the issue, its aim was to bring together middle level officials from the Syrian government in an informal platform. However, the conference could not achieve its intended impact since it did not include broader participation and the outcome of the conference was one sided.

Before understanding the reasons behind holding the conference, it is necessary to evaluate the critical junctures of the CHP’s Syria policy. After the Syrian civil war erupted in 2011, the CHP’s approach to finding a resolution to the conflict was to support a power-sharing mechanism bringing together all parties, including the Assad regime. From the CHP’s perspective, involvement of representatives of the Assad regime was crucial to a peaceful transition. In accordance with this, the CHP made three formal visits to Assad from 2011 to 2013.

However, after the war escalated and reports by international organizations proved that the Assad regime used chemical weapons against civilians in 2013, the CHP ended meetings with the regime and adopted a relatively neutral approach compared to their previous one. Even with the rising nationalism in Turkey after 2016, the CHP kept this approach towards the Syrian conflict. For instance, the party supported cross-border military operations in Syria although it had reservations on the issue.  

Nonetheless, the party has been experiencing another shift in its Syria policy and the conference reflects this change. Since the last year, the CHP had again started to underline the importance of Assad’s involvement in the negotiation process. Because of this, the party invited representatives of the regime to the conference, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not give them permission to enter Turkey.

It is not exaggeration to say that since the CHP has strengthened its position in domestic politics, it has also started to deal with foreign policy issues more. The party’s relative success in the latest local elections accelerated the CHP’s quest for a new strategy in foreign policy. Thus, the CHP’s recent shift in its Syria policy should be evaluated within this framework.

Nevertheless, the party did not completely leave its relatively neutral approach in Syrian conflict. Since a potential cross-border military operation is on the table, the CHP did not invite any official YPG representatives to the conference. But at the same time, the party did invite some pro-YPG experts such as Professor Amy Austin Holmes to hear their perspectives.

After the conference, the invitation of Amy Austin Holmes caused a crisis for the party, and the decision to invite her was harshly criticized especially on social media. Beyond this issue, the most problematic issue of the CHP’s initiative was the final declaration of the conference.

As the report states, the party sees the safe zone as “demographic engineering” which may deteriorate the future relations between various ethnic groups in the region. According to the report, the stakeholders should count on peace building rather than further escalation of the conflict to find an effective solution. Furthermore, the party clearly stated that they want the Turkish government to work with the Syrian regime for a resolution of the conflict. Another problematic issue was the final declaration report’s lack of attention to the YPG’s threat to Turkey’s security in the region.

All of these factors show that CHP’s new approach to Syrian policy will get a negative reaction from the public including its own voters. Since the YPG threat is still alive and Turkey will prioritize its security, the CHP’s new policy may get even more negative reactions from the public.

Recent disputes between the CHP and the Iyi Party have reached a deadlock. Last week, I mentioned that the different responses of these two parties towards recent incidents in Turkish politics may shift the composition of alliances in the long term. The recent announcement of the Iyi Party’s spokesperson shows that the Nation Alliance may be on the verge of shifting towards in another direction due to the changing environment in Turkish politics.

The Iyi Party’s Spokesperson Yavuz Agıralioglu announced that if the CHP keeps its relations with the HDP intact, the Iyi Party will no longer take part in the Nation Alliance. This statement shows that the ongoing disputes between two parties has deep-rooted causes. The Iyi Party had been complaining about the CHP’s cooperation with the HDP in the appointment of trustees in some municipalities, and the HDP’s active involvement with the Nation Alliance during the local elections. Thus, the latent crisis has come to the surface recently.

Nonetheless, it is impossible to say that the Nation Alliance will collapse due to the ongoing crisis. Understanding the rationale behind this issue requires examining the characteristics of pre-electoral alliances. In general, pre-electoral alliances are classified into two categories: active and passive alliances. In active alliances, the position of political parties in the alliance and their perception towards the issues at the agenda may change in time. When it comes to passive alliances, since political parties have a consensus on their positions rather than interests, the alliance is robust against challenging issues.

It is obvious that the Nation Alliance is indeed an active alliance compared to the People’s Alliance, which is clearly a passive one. Because of this issue, although the People’s Alliance can keep firmly grounded in the local and national values (yerlilik ve millilik) of Turkey, the change in the interests of one of the members of the Nation Alliance may create serious consequences for all members.

However, although the dispute between the CHP and the Iyi Party cannot be underestimated for the future of this alliance, it will not bring the collapse of the cooperation between the two parties. Since these parties’ interests are not adversarial yet, their cooperation to overthrow the AK Party government and President Erdoğan will seem to be maintained.

Nevertheless, it is also inescapable for these parties to keep their alliances without losing the support of their electorate. The Iyi Party may especially suffer from its cooperation with the CHP-HDP alliance if it becomes official. The Iyi Party’s nationalist supporters may withdraw their supports from the party due to the HDP’s increasing influence in the Nation Alliance block.

Moreover, since the parliamentary elections in Turkey require the building of formal alliances through declaring the reason of the alliance with a document, the Iyi Party cannot convince its electorate to have a formal alliance with the HDP. Because of this reason, as the latent figure of the opposition block, the HDP’s role is still ambiguous and stays under the surface.

Thus, it is too early to say that the Nation Alliance is collapsing due to the failure of cooperation and coordination mechanisms between the CHP and Iyi Party. Nevertheless, it seems that the Iyi Party should convince its supporters to have an alliance with the CHP which does not hide its close relations with the HDP anymore. Beyond all, as there are still four years until the elections, it is difficult for all political parties to keep their positions on currently shaky political ground.

A year has passed since Turkey switched from a parliamentary system to a presidential form of governance. Turkey’s new presidential system had been a hot topic of discussion for politicians, especially last year. Pro and anti-presidential system camps discussed the issue within certain parameters in accordance with their political calculations and ideology. Nevertheless, the lack of knowledge in the discussions shows that there is still a further need of understanding the main characteristics of the Turkish version of the presidential system.

Previous discussions reflected that political parties had been debating the from an ideological point of view. As a result, there were two main compositions as pro and anti-presidential system camps, which prevented an in-depth evaluation of the proposed new system. While anti-presidential system camps conducted an aggressive stigmatizing campaign against the system, pro-presidential system groups failed in discussing the issue out of ongoing political paradigms.

Does the system provide division of power in practice? How does Turkish bureaucracy accord to the new presidential system? There is a need of thinking outside of the box to find clear answers.

Due to this, there is still a failure in understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the system. Does the system provide division of power in practice? Is there an efficient check and balances system in the new structure? How does Turkish bureaucracy accord to the new presidential system? There is a need of thinking outside of the box in order to find clear answers to these questions.

President Erdogan recently stated that if there is a lack in the new government system, it will be corrected in time. Nonetheless, since most political parties approach this issue from a rigid angle, there is no chance to create a joint platform in order to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the system from a more broad perspective.

Moreover, recent political incidents created new ruptures in the ideological stance and discourse of political parties against the new system. For instance, after the March 31 local elections, the CHP’s perception towards the system significantly changed, as it enabled the party to form pre-electoral alliances with other political parties. As a result of this opportunity, the CHP maximized its gains in the election. This was a click moment for the CHP to utilize 50 percent +1 vote prerequisite in Turkey’s presidential system. With this, the CHP managed to form an alliance with the Iyi Party and HDP in Istanbul, Ankara, and Antalya.

Recent political developments in Turkey created an environment, in which political parties now revise their approaches to the presidential system.

Since the CHP realized the advantages that the new system brings for the main opposition party, its direction of criticism towards the system shifted. Kemal Kilicdaroglu- CHP Chairman- recently declared that they were also aware of the shortcomings of Turkey’s old parliamentary system and that they never supported it. Kilicdaroglu also claimed that they were supporting a well-established presidential system, like the one in the U.S.

However, the CHP’s arguments against the presidential system were quite different during the 2017 referendum and its aftermath. For instance, while the CHP had been against switching to a presidential system during the referendum due to finding the system “authoritarian, less democratic, and less representative,” it always underlined that everything was fine with Turkey’s parliamentary democracy, which goes back to 1876. During the June 24 parliamentary and presidential elections, one of CHP’s promises was to switch back to the parliamentary system.

Overall, it should always be kept in mind that most political parties in Turkey may reserve their positions under the new circumstances –even if they have a sharp ideological stance. The latest discussions on Turkey’s presidential system has shown this fact once again. Nonetheless, it is still not easy to guess the future positions of political parties in the upcoming years.

It has been exactly one year since Turkey officially switched to its current presidential system. This is a system that is on the one hand, oriented by global principles and on the other, by Turkey’s own dynamics based on previous and certain political experiences.

Given the current conditions, Turkey’s president is also a member of a political party (currently Erdogan is a member of the AK Party). This was prohibited between 1961-2017. Thus, with the new system, a new kind of politics occurred. In addition, there are current circumstances where the parliamentary majority consists of the AK Party-MHP alliance, and where some metropolitans are led by CHP mayors. This has led to arguments casting doubt on the performance of the new presidential system.

In the last 40 years, many efforts were made in order to reform Turkey’s system of government, which finally became reality in 2017-2018.

Firstly, one has to stress that the Turkish presidential system and the general historical search to solve Turkey’s chronic problem with its political system cannot be limited to the AK Party era or in particular to President Erdogan himself. Certain politicians in the past have gradually tried to circumvent significant problems of Turkey’s previous and lacking parliamentary system by making the offer to switch to either a semi-presidential system or to a system like the one in the U.S. In this sense, in the last 40 years, many efforts were made in order to reform Turkey’s system of government, which finally became reality in 2017-2018.

As I generally addressed in this column, I tend to not believe that Turkey’s opposition circles are really aiming to shift back to a parliamentary system. By this, I don’t mean the political elite, in particular around the CHP, but the secular-oriented Kemalist Turkish voters. During the presidential election in 2018 for instance, the CHP’s candidate, Muharrem Ince, interestingly stated that he does not aim to immediately switch back to the parliamentary system as soon as he is elected. According to Ince’s words, he wanted to work for approximately 2 years under the presidential system and then consider a shift back to the parliamentary system.

Interestingly, even the CHP chair Kemal Kilicdaroglu said that they had never requested to shift back to the old parliamentary system.

But to be honest, with regard to Turkey’s very dynamic political agenda, two years is not an actual persuasive time projection. These words had been interpreted by some voices that even the CHP was considering to accept the presidential system in the long-run. Maybe not in the exact words of Ince, but during his visit to Istanbul’s new mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, CHP chair Kemal Kilicdaroglu said that they [the CHP] had never requested to shift back to the old parliamentary system. This reveals –or most likely will clearly show in the near future- that Turkey’s current presidential system will be established in the future.

Maybe it does not seem that clear at the moment, but the opposition’s categorical rejection of the presidential system –as has been the case in previous years- most likely shifted to a rather cautious tone. This becomes obvious in the criticism by the CHP’s chairperson regarding the previous parliamentary system. By this, one should also take into account a fundamental development. Namely, the AK Party recently lost mayoral elections in Turkey’s main cities, Ankara and Istanbul. This has been interpreted as a result of the “blocs-oriented politics,” which is a result of Turkey’s new presidential system.  

To re-emphasize; the main idea of the new system of government is based on transparent policy-making, which additionally requires pre-electoral alliances in order to achieve the needed majority of 50 percent +1 vote prerequisite. Thus, the need to establish alliances also make it possible for the opposition to gather an alliance against the ruling government.

The debate over Turkey’s system of government have come to an end with the presidential system. But minor changes are possible.

As a consequence, in my opinion, discussions about Turkey’s system of government have come to an end despite several wishful thinking ambitions. I guess that in the long-run some minor changes may be made to reduce new regulations or shortcomings in the implementation of Turkey’s presidential system. However, a potential call or goal to re-shift to a pure parliamentary system does not seem very convincing. As I have already pointed out, the ability of opposition parties to form an alliance and to gather together is related to the fact that the new presidential system is well established, even though this fact is yet to be noticed.

In this context, it might be useful to look at the historical implementation and societal acceptance process of France’s new system of government after 1958/62 by center-right parties. Until that time, French leftists initially opposed the new semi-presidential system. However, in the following years it became clear that even French socialists, who of course differentiate themselves from Turkish leftists or particularly CHP members, got used to the new system and decreased their categorical rejection to the new system.

Who won and who lost the local elections in Turkey? The answer to this question depends on your perspective. For instance, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli said prior to the elections that their target was to receive 52 percent of the vote share for the People’s Alliance, and the Alliance received 51.6 percent. Also, considering that 51.41 percent of the electorate opted for “yes” in the 2017 constitutional referendum and 52.6 percent voted for Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the 2018 presidential election, it is obvious that the current ruling party in Turkey is preserving its power.

On the other hand, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) Istanbul mayoral candidate, Ekrem Imamoglu, won the recent mayoral election by receiving 54.3 percent with the support of the Iyi Party and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). Although this vote share has only been achieved in Istanbul and represents an alliance, no other CHP candidate has so far received such a high score. This vote share has also been marked as the highest rate a mayoral candidate has so far received in the history of Istanbul municipal elections. Beside this, the CHP’s Ankara candidate Mansur Yavas won the mayoral race in Ankara by receiving 50.93 percent of the vote, which was about four points higher than the ruling Justice and Development Party’s candidate Mehmet Ozhaseki.

The CHP has achieved quite a success in Turkey’s local elections. Does it mean the end of conservative politics in Turkey?

Since the CHP candidates won in Turkey’s capital city Ankara and most populous city Istanbul, it can be said that the alliance led by the CHP has achieved quite a success. So, is it possible to claim that the fears over the CHP persisting for years in the entire political spectrum aside from the CHP base have been overcome? Or, as many claim nowadays, has the heyday of the conservative politics led by Erdogan come to an end? My answer to the second question would be: “No, it has not. Muslim conservative values have been consolidated rather than decline all across Turkey, particularly in Istanbul and Ankara.”

First of all, Yavas is a former MHP member. So, he has a nationalist-conservative political background considering the stance of the MHP, which has been juxtaposed with the Western far-right movements for years in Europe (such a juxtaposition is problematic in many respects but this is the subject of another debate). He firstly became a mayoral candidate from the MHP for the local election held on 18 April, 1999, and was elected as the mayor of Ankara’s Beypazari district with 51 percent of the vote share. He was re-elected for the district in the 2004 election, and ran for Ankara mayor’s office from the MHP in 2009, but could not win the metropolitan race. When he was not nominated by the MHP in 2013, he passed to the CHP and ran for the metropolitan mayor’s office again from the CHP in 2014, but did not win then either. And finally, in the 2019 local election, he managed to become the mayor of Ankara. However, neither in his election campaign nor in any of his statements has he remarked a word that shows his allegiance to the CHP.  He has refused to wear the CHP badge and announced that he will not wear it. Yavas celebrated his Ankara victory with his friends by shouting Allah-u Akbar, demonstrating his belonging to the Turkish nationalist tradition.

Mansur Yavas celebrated his Ankara victory with his friends by shouting Allah-u Akbar and demonstrating his belonging to the Turkish nationalist tradition.

For the first time in the history of the CHP, a candidate has ceaselessly issued statements with religious and conservative underpinnings during his campaign. On his first day in office as Istanbul mayor, Imamoglu made an unprecedented act that was not seen even in the periods of the AK Party or late Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party. He summoned a religious clerk to his office and made him recite the Quran. Also, maintaining separate time periods allocated to men and women for municipality swimming pools (one of the reasons for closing the Welfare Party in 1998 was allocating separate sections for men and women in swimming pools), and keeping the alcohol ban in the cafes and restaurants owned by the municipality were among the election promises of İmamoğlu. Although several names within pro-CHP media outlets and a few CHP politicians tepidly reacted to such promises during the first weeks of his campaign process, İmamoğlu has continued to pursue his politics with a religious and conservative emphasis for six months.

The CHP Chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu did not appear in the media and abstained from issuing any public statements throughout the election campaign due to the fear that the CHP’s shadow might jeopardize Imamoglu’s image. Pleased with the election result, Kilicdaroglu hinted after the election that the same political rhetoric would continue. Brushing all the questions such as “Is this rhetoric sustainable?” and “What will the CHP base think after a while?” aside, it must be stressed that the CHP candidate received votes from the conservative Turkish and Kurdish people thanks to this new political discourse that propagated separate sections for men and women in pools, alcohol-free restaurants and cafes, freedom for different clothing styles, and prevention of any kind of discrimination against women in hijab in public and private sectors.

Ekrem Imamoglu received votes from the conservative people thanks to his political discourse that propagated separate sections for men and women in pools, alcohol-free restaurants, etc.

In this political atmosphere and the post-truth world (a world where lies comprise the only remaining truth, to quote an academic studying intellectual history), such acrobatic maneuvers of the CHP can work and have apparently worked in the recent period. It is dubious whether a normal political praxis will replace acrobatics and turn into a political stance, or whether the lifestyle of Muslim conservatives will stop being a space of intervention for the CHP. Nevertheless, it is undoubted that the successive election victories of the AK Party led by Erdogan for the past 17 years despite all the challenges in modern Turkey obliged the CHP to lean towards (at least ostensibly) to the values it has been against for 95 years.

As is known, Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Board (YSK) announced that the mayor elections in Istanbul will re-run on June 23, 2019. There have been and still are discussions on various reasons behind the decision, which has been addressed in detail by various analysts.

The AK Party and the CHP will have to re-organize themselves and establish a new strategy in order to broaden their electorate. Two of the previous 8 mayor candidates who competed in the March 31 elections (TKP and DSP’s candidates) have resigned in favor of the CHP’s candidate, Ekrem Imamoglu. The left-nationalist Kurdish HDP had already resigned its candidate during the previous election on March 31 in favor of Imamoglu. The HDP announced once again that it will continue its previous decision of supporting Imamoglu.

Under these conditions, it seems clear that Turkey’s entire political landscape will be shaped by an election atmosphere, when the election re-run is just limited to the election of the mayor of Istanbul. This is because Istanbul is Turkey’s most important city and therefore the results are of great significance for all parties, their future strategies and national projections. The creation of a political leader is not that easy in Turkey and there are certain illusions underpinned on social media. By this, I’m trying to stress the interesting increase of Ekrem Imamoglu’s popularity and his actual lack of strategy. With no doubt, Imamoglu is getting pushed into the foreground by both the Turkish public and certain media outlets, along with, interestingly, foreign media and political circles.

Although it’s only Istanbul re-electing its mayor, Turkey’s entire political landscape is shaped by an election atmosphere as the result will shape the future of all political party strategies. 

However, if one actually analyzes Imamoglu’s mostly preferred discourses, statements and his political orientations, one will notice that he is acting like a populist politician with an objective of maximizing his electorate. By this, Imamoglu does not care about his party’s traditional line, party base or political orientation, which actually conflicts with his current actions and discourses.

Subsequent to the initial election on March 31, even though it was not clear whether Imamoglu had actually won the elections and while the YSK had not yet announced any official statement, Imamoglu took a journey to Ankara in order to visit the Mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. This is a very popular gesture in particular secularist Kemalist voters and political circles. This was a deliberate move and so was his signing of the official memorial book as “the Mayor of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality.” This act was a violation of the law due to the lack of official mandate, which he had not yet received from the YSK at that time.

Imamoglu acted in a similar way when he recently visited the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, subsequent to the YSK’s announcement that elections will be re-run on June 23. Imamoglu once again signed an official book in Northern Cyprus as “the Mayor of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality,” although he had already given back his official mandate due to the cancellation of elections.

While walking on the corridors of the municipality accompanied by cameras, Imamoglu showed that he will eat the same lunch as all employees do. This was interpreted as dishonest and unconvincing populism.

During his approximately three weeks in office as mayor of Istanbul, Imamoglu continued to behave and act in a populist manner. For instance, while walking the corridors of the municipality accompanied by cameras, Imamoglu had the goal to send the message that he will eat the same lunch as all employees do. This act was also interpreted as an act of dishonest and unconvincing populism.

It is well-known and a global preference that new politicians in particular are biased to populist moves, which is not problematic above all regarding parties such as the CHP or HDP. However, it is worth to analyze and focus on the issue of how Imamoglu and the CHP cadres in Istanbul, who are led by the controversial figure, Canan Kaftancioglu, will shape the party’s future. This question becomes a fundamental one due to several changes in the party’s general orientation, especially in the last couple of months, which also continued subsequent to March 31.

For instance, it was no secret that the HDP, which is the political branch of the PKK, openly supported the CHP’s candidate – although the CHP did not address questions concerning an obvious CHP-HDP cooperation. Not a single CHP politician both on the national or local level dared to criticize this cooperation or to take an open position. Furthermore, Ekrem Imamoglu did not seem to have any problem in admiring the former HDP chairman, Selahattin Demirtas’s political line.

Additional questions, in particular from conservative and nationalist circles who do not see Demirtas as a legitimate politician but rather as a political mouthpiece for the PKK, did not receive any concrete answers from CHP cadres. However, it is actually known that both traditional CHP voters and members challenge this friendly strategy while enduring the situation to the motivation of becoming the winning side in Istanbul. The same counts for the party’s Istanbul provincial chief, Canan Kaftancioglu, and her political views, which are definitely incompatible with traditional CHP notions. Kaftancioglu’s problematic stance regarding several leftist violent groups are disturbing many civilian politicians, also among CHP circles. Despite this, and her previous statements – even supporting a terrorist organization’s leader – Kaftancioglu recently made clear that her views have not changed.

While heading to the elections on June 23, some may argue that the CHP is transforming itself into a more “open” political party. In addition, it might also be suggested that in the long-run, the party will diminish its radical Kemalist-secular stance, which can be counted as one of the obstacles to universal democracy. However, it’s likely that by transforming itself from a Kemalist party into a populist, aggressive and radical-leftist welcoming party, the CHP’s credibility will still continue to decrease in the long-run.

By not addressing issues of national security, such as the PKK and FETO, the CHP does not seem fit to face potential challenges in a particular areas of concern. At the end of the day, the electorate will make its decision whether a rather populist figure such as Imamoglu and his quasi-co-candidate for Istanbul, Kaftancioglu, will be preferred. Or whether there will be a long-term request for the CHP to transform into a stable, social-democratic political party. The realization of the latter seems to be very difficult to deal with both in terms of content and method. It’s up to the CHP electorate.

As Ekrem Imamoglu was awarded the election certificate of Istanbul mayoral election 17 days after the election and preparing to take the mayor’s office, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) filed an extraordinary objection to the Supreme Election Council (YSK) to interrogate the question posed by the AK Party’s mayoral candidate Binali Yildirim: “Why did the number of votes I received increase by 16 thousand after 10 percent of the ballots were recounted and the vote difference between the two of us fell to 13.729?” In the petition presented to the YSK, the cancellation and renewal of the Istanbul metropolitan mayoral election was requested on the grounds of “the unlawfulness and the closing gap in the vote difference between the two parties as a result of the incidents and circumstances effective in the results and impartialness of the election.”

According to the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) deputy chair and spokesperson Faik Oztrak: “AK Party’s objection comprised the re-submission of the subjects already resolved by the YSK rather than the incidents and circumstances effective in the election results and impartialness.” President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said: “Whether we like it or not, the YSK is authorized to rule the final decision.” Then, both sides have issued various statements, harsh or reasonable, on what the YSK ruling must be.

Eventually, the YSK ruled its final decision with 7 out of 11 votes. The Council found the AK Party’s objection right and decided for the rerun of the Istanbul mayoral election on June 23. In light of the AK Party’s objections, it was ruled that “225 balloting committee leads and 3.500 balloting committee members were found to be not employed by the government despite the explicit provision in the election law and the ballots cast in these ballot boxes were effective in the vote difference.” The YSK also ruled for “filing criminal complaint against the district electoral board chairs and members and ballot board leads who made unlawful assignments.”

A storm was raised after that point. The CHP Chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu declared the list of the judges who opted for “yes” in the YSK ruling, saying: “The YSK has become the address of injustice, unlawfulness, inequality and remorselessness. They cannot usurp democracy, justice and rights by hiding behind their juridical titles.” These words that target the YSK caused reaction from the institution. This time, the YSK issued a statement on behalf of all its members, not referring to the decision given with 7 out of 11 votes. The statement condemned all the remarks that contained threats and insults and pointed out that “it is unacceptable to personally target or defame the judges due to their decisions.

The YSK, which was founded in Turkey in 1950 and has been responsible for the general conduct and supervision of elections, has always performed this duty honorably.

Nevertheless, the YSK, which was founded in Turkey in 1950 and has been responsible for the general conduct and supervision of elections since then, has always performed this duty honorably. Even during the period of military tutelage that started in the early Republican period and continued until quite recently, the parties not favored by the system could manifest themselves in elections and managed to come to power. These parties were tried to be rendered ineffective with innumerable methods with the support or direct appeal of the CHP or through the judiciary, the most important leg of the tutelage regime. There are at least 50 different examples of this for the past 50 years.

The parties upholding Muslim conservative traditions, such as late Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party, Virtue Party, and pro-Kurdish parties such as the Democracy Party (DEP), the People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) were closed. Their governments were dissolved with coups while their political leaders were imprisoned. Despite all, the one with popular support has always been obvious. Late Adnan Menderes’ Democrat Party (Menderes was executed during the 27 May, 1960, coup with the support of the CHP), Erbakan’s Welfare Party (On 28 February, 1997, the party’s government was overthrown with a coup supported by the CHP, the party was closed, and its leader and members were banned from politics), and Erdogan’s AK Party have confronted various closure cases, memorandums, and cancelled elections ever since their establishment. But still, they won the elections thanks to the healthy functioning of the election mechanism.

So, in such an order, the CHP is the only unrivaled party in Turkey in objecting to the election results. The party filed its first objection in 1946, when the multi-party system had just been introduced, in an election environment based on “open vote, secret counting.” Since then, it has become almost traditional for the party to blame each winning party for gerrymandering and the electorate for being ignorant and stupid in every election. The CHP has also lately claimed that President Erdogan’s presidency is illegitimate irrespective of the fact that he was elected president in the first round of elections with a 52 percent vote share.

In the 2014 local election, the mayoral elections in 14 places, including Yalova and Agri, were renewed with a YSK decision. In the renewed Yalova election, the municipality changed from the AK Party to the CHP.

Of course, throughout history, a number of parties objected to election results in Turkey with claims of “errors and irregularities,” which can be been observed in every corner of the world, including the U.S. and Europe. The objections were answered in accordance with the popular will within a system that thoroughly examines each determinant within the laws. In the 2014 local election, the mayoral elections in 14 places, including Yalova and Agri provinces, were renewed with a YSK decision. In the renewed Yalova election, in which 75.813 voters cast ballots, the municipality changed from the AK Party to the CHP. The same year, BDP (former name of today’s Peoples’ Democratic Party-HDP) candidate Sirri Sakik won the Agrı mayoral election by receiving only 10 more votes, to which AK Party objected with the claim of irregularities. Agri provincial electoral board ruled for the recount of some ballot boxes. The provincial electoral board also accepted the BDP’s objection and the election was rerun. Sakik was elected as Agri mayor in the renewed election by increasing the vote difference from 10 to 2851. In a nutshell, the system always functioned in favor of the people’s will.

Despite this history, the CHP has been voicing claims that democracy suffered a blow since the announcement of the YSK’s decision to cancel and renew the Istanbul mayoral election. This is not a surprise, neither the reactions from the West. But the most curious reaction came from former President and AK Party co-founder Abdullah Gul, who tweeted: “What I felt in 2007 when the Constitutional Court made its unfair 367 ruling, that is what I felt yesterday when another high court, the Supreme Election Council, made its decision.” What was the 367 ruling? Are these two incidents really similar? Although Gul’s motivation was different while saying these words, he activated Turkish society’s collective memory on the subject of coups against democracy amid the CHP’s claims of “unfair elections, blow on democracy.”

The 367 ruling: what happened in 2007?

According to Article No 102 of the Turkish Constitution at the time, the president could be elected with a maximum of four parliamentary rounds of voting. The decisional quorum was a qualified majority of two-thirds (367 votes) of full membership for the first two rounds, and an absolute majority (267 votes) for the third and fourth rounds. In an interview he gave to Cumhuriyet newspaper on 26 December, 2006, former Supreme Court of Appeal prosecutor Sabih Kanadoglu argued that the qualified majority of 367 votes was not only the decisional quorum but was also the necessary quorum for the opening of the session, claiming that the decision would be invalid unless at least 367 parliament members attend the voting. Following him, then Chief of General Staff Yasar Buyukanit said that he hoped the next president would be faithful to the republic not only in words but in deeds.

While Kemalism rallies were organized all over the country and the media covered a slew of threat messages that instilled fear, then Prime Minister Erdogan decided not to run for president. In other words, the leader of the party that enjoys the largest popular support in Turkey could not run for president in this atmosphere of pressure and nominated Abdullah Gul instead. The first round of the elections was held on 27 April, 2007. There were two parties in the parliament at the time. The CHP did not attend the session, 357 votes were cast, and Gul received 352. Following the voting, in spite of the explicit constitutional article that is comprehensible for any literate person, the CHP appealed to the Constitutional Court for the objection of the election with the 367-ruling argument. In the evening of the same day, a press release that would later be referred as “e-memorandum” was published on the official website of the General Staff, which stated that Gul’s candidacy was not wished. With its decision issued on May 1, the Constitutional Court ruled the presence of at least 367 parliament members in the Plenary Session, and cancelled the first round of the parliamentary voting. So, the relevant constitutional article, despite its explicitness, was violated by the Constitutional Court due to the pressure of the military and the appeal of the CHP.

Upon that, the AK Party decided for an early election and 27 June, 2007, was determined as the election date. The ruling party won the election by receiving 47 percent of the vote. But although it was de-facto against the constitution, there was a scandalous condition that ruled: “367 parliament members must attend the session.” The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) entered the Parliament by exceeding the election threshold in the early election. The crisis was eventually solved when MHP leader Devlet Bahceli said: “The AK Party can nominate whomever it wishes. As we have entered the Parliament, the 367 obstacle will be overcome.” Receiving 341 votes in the first round and 337 votes in the second round, Abdullah Gul was elected as the 11th president of Turkey by receiving 339 votes in the third round of the parliamentary voting, which was attended by 448 parliamentarians.

Of course, there is no similarity between the “367 ruling” and “the decision of rerunning the elections upon the objection appeals of a political party on the grounds of irregularities.” What really matters is the motivation of the CHP leader Kilicdaroglu, who once signed that scandalous appeal. Enjoying the support of the military and the judiciary at the time, the CHP organized secularism rallies, threatened people and made the election cancelled by appealing to the Constitutional Court despite its 19.2 percent vote share. The discrepancy between the two cases is evident but Kilicdaroglu insists on ignoring this. There is one more sentence in Gul’s tweet: “We haven’t made any progress since then.” Of course, Gul uttered this remark by targeting the AK Party, with which he parted ways a long time ago, but his words allowed the CHP an opportunity to give an account of a past deed. While even the former president from the AK Party, whose presidency was once hampered through illegitimate ways, is siding with the CHP now (the party even offered him presidential candidacy for the 2018 elections), the CHP must issue an explanation at least for the 367 ruling even if they cannot explain or justify what they have done against democracy throughout the Republican history. Then we may make progress.

Since its foundation, the AK Party has rightfully been designated as a ‘political party of public service’ as the AK Party’s leadership has always focused its political energy on Turkey’s public administration deficit. During the first decade of its political power, a steady economic growth had been accompanied with various ameliorations primarily in the fields of transportation and health. From the problem of overcrowded classrooms in education to the revolutionary changes for the benefit of disabled citizens, the AK Party’s politics of public service has achieved significant success in various fields of social life.

Thanks to its organizational and communicational capabilities, which were directly inherited from the Welfare Party, the AK Party has been in political power for 17 years. As Recep Tayyip Erdogan has successfully been taking the leading role, the rest of the AK Party’s cadres seems to be successful as well. However, the AK Party’s reliance on Erdogan’s leadership for winning general and local elections has concluded with the weakening of the AK Party’s organizational structure and the linkage between the electors and the political party.

The AK Party’s reliance on Erdogan’s leadership for winning elections has concluded with the weakening of the AK Party’s organizational structure.

Learning the need to remain close to the people from the AK Party’s political success, Ekrem Imamoglu draws himself away from the hate discourse of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and instead adopts a much more moderate political discourse that mainly relies on projects and services. Nonetheless, people will not find Imamoglu’s political discourse credible and convincing until the CHP itself abandons its discriminatory and exclusionist political discourse.

Although Imamoglu’s political promises influences Turkey’s young voters, mature voters hesitate about the CHP’s sincerity due to its negative political record. Being highly discontented about its political history, Turkish electors cannot easily be convinced to vote for the CHP even though they personally feel sympathy for its municipal candidate. Highly valuing the AK Party’s policies and public services, Turkish electors are inclined to vote for the ruling AK Party if only the linkage between the candidate and the electors could have been restored.

Populism or public service?

In the recent years, populism has become one of the most controversial and frequently-used concepts of politics. Amongst the leftist political parties, Bulent Ecevit was the most populist political leader. Holding up Ecevit as an example, Muharrem Ince appealed to populist political discourses both in his struggle for the CHP’s chairmanship and Turkey’s presidency. As soon as his candidacy for Turkey’s presidency was announced, Ince had adopted a populist language to convey his political message to large masses of people. Yet, his politics backfired due to the insincerity of his attitudes and expressions.

People still hesitate to vote for Imamoglu as the CHP never adopts a service-based political vision and neglects political sensitivities of the people in forming its alliances.

With reference to his inclusive and reconciliatory discourses, Imamoglu adopts a populist political attitude as well. As opposed to the CHP’s exclusionist political discourse, Imamoglu’s electoral campaign aimed at appealing to large masses of people, including the AK Party’s voters. In the printed bulletins, Ekrem Imamoglu has even adopted a cunning electoral strategy by emphasizing his surname ‘Imamoglu.’ In other words, he appears to imitate the AK Party’s political discourses which has always been criticized by the CHP for abusing the religious feelings of Turkey’s electorate. Nonetheless, people still hesitate to vote for Imamoglu, as the CHP never adopts a service-based political vision and always neglects political sensitivities of the people in forming its alliances with other political parties.

In contrast, the AK Party has succeeded to strengthen its political discourses by changing the sociology of Turkey’s electorate and creating a new class of electors, and taking the resolution of Istanbul’s urban problems (such as urban poverty, lack of infrastructure, population density) into the center of its political agenda. Yet, as the AK Party won both general and local elections thanks mainly to Erdogan’s strong leadership. The linkage between the people and the AK Party has weakened. As Turkey’s economic problems exacerbate, Turkish electors have begun to adopt a new electoral attitude that is separated from political ideologies and allegiances.

As Turkey’s economic problems exacerbate, Turkish electors have begun to adopt a new electoral attitude that is partly different from political commitments.

In such a political and economic milieu, Imamoglu strives to gain the support of Turkey’s public opinion by adopting a moderate and inclusive political discourse. Imitating Binali Yildirim’s moderate political stance and the AK Party’s public service-based political vision, the CHP aims at gaining the votes of those electors who are less political and who could have voted for different political parties. Nonetheless, the CHP’s political sincerity is still open to dispute.

Consequently, winning Istanbul’s municipal elections is almost equal to winning Turkey’s elections. Therefore, political discourses pertaining to Istanbul’s governance that are developed by the competing candidates for the local elections of June 23 will certainly shape Turkey’s political future.

A quite interesting phenomenon of the Turkish politics is the fact that center-left or generally social-democratic circles and political parties differentiate themselves from mainstream leftist movements particularly from Western democracies. Moreover, it is also striking that Western media outlets and political actors prefer Turkey’s leftist parties as a kind of “dialog partner,” while disregarding the stiff differences between Turkey’s left and the West’s left. Despite several confusing trends, it is weird that Turkey’s main center-left political party, namely the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), regularly address Syrian refugees in a discriminatory tone – similar to that of European far-right circles.

A recent case once again displayed the main position of certain CHP politicians and the lack of criticism regarding such obviously racist discourses within “leftist” cadres. The recently elected mayor of the western Turkish province of Bolu, Tanju Ozcan (CHP), who was the CHP’s MP for Bolu between 2011-2019, gave an order to the departments of the Bolu municipality to stop providing relief to refugees. According to the mayor’s letter to the municipality’s Culture and Social Works department, the CHP mayor declared to cut aid for Syrian refugees living in Bolu. Mayor Özcan argued that the aid had reached an unbearable level and that the people of Bolu “have cared for them for seven years, giving them our children’s livelihood. After this, I won’t give a single penny to Syrian refugees from the Bolu Municipality budget.”

There are only 1500 Syrian refugees living in Bolu – out of the 4 million Syrian refugees in Turkey. Nonetheless, the presence of refugees in Bolu and the “costs” seem to be a serious problem for the newly elected CHP mayor.

CHP representatives and Turkish secularists in general, unfortunately, tend to have a negative bias against people from Muslim-majority countries.

However, the main point I want to focus on is not the lacking capabilities of a municipality in western Turkey, but the general negative discourse of the CHP, despite it being a “leftist” or center-left political party. CHP representatives and Turkish secularists in general, unfortunately, tend to have a negative bias against people from Muslim-majority countries – no matter whether they are wealthy tourists or refugees. As a recent example, regardless of being a refugee, a famous Turkish comedian discriminated against Arab investors in Turkey, while not mentioning the thousands of other foreigners, for instance from Western countries.

The negative tone against Syrian refugees, especially among CHP or Turkish secularists and the nationalist Iyi Party, is trying to be legitimized through arguments referring to the economic conditions of the country. By this, it is stated that over 4 million refugees cause certain difficulties for the state and its economy due to the long-lasting use of the country’s capabilities. However, it should be emphasized that on the other hand, there is not a negative mood among the general Turkish population.

By elaborating the CHP mayor’s recent order in Bolu, one also remembers that in the past couple of years, other leading figures of Turkey’s main opposition party took an anti-refugee stance, resembling the discourse of far-right parties in Europe. For instance, the CHP’s popular presidential candidate, Muharrem Ince, made use of several populist statements during his campaign in 2018, while particularly addressing Syrian refugees in Turkey, who he criticized for crossing back to Syria to celebrate the Muslim Eid holiday. Ince stated, “If you can go there, I will not allow you to return back, you should stay over there, my people are unemployed here.” A similar discourse was also adopted by the party’s chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu during the 2017 referendum campaign, when he compared Turkish soldiers in northern Syria with Syrian refugees that escaped to Turkey.

Unlike global social-democratic notions, Turkey’s main opposition has been targeting Syrian refugees in order to make a use of anti-immigrant sentiment in Turkey. 

All in all, it is not the first time that Turkey’s opposition has been targeting Syrian refugees in order to utilize on anti-immigrant sentiment in Turkey. Unlike global social-democratic notions, forms of discrimination and racism are available for CHP circles. This becomes more obvious when no outcry occurs among the electorate as leading party figures regularly target refugees or other people – even investors – from Muslim-majority countries. Under these conditions, Turkey’s main center-left, social-democratic party, has to take a decision and transform its electoral base. Even though there are certain phases in the party’s program concerning a globally accepted stance against refugees in general, the reality among the party’s cadres and its actual mentality does not fit the global expectations and center-left positions.  

Ovacık, a small district in a far corner of Turkey, has been a popular place all over Turkey since 2014. This is certainly due to the fact that the district mayor has been Turkey’s one and only mayor from the Communist Party. While the word “communist” was accepted as derogatory for years in Turkey, a neighbor of USSR and a NATO ally since 1952, even the honey produced in Ovacık is today called “communist honey” thanks to former Ovacık Mayor Fatih Mehmet Maçoğlu’s performance. Of course, in this context, the word does not refer to an ideology but is rather employed as a symbol, a trademark for the district. Finally, Maçoğlu was elected as the mayor of Tunceli province thanks to his successful performance in Ovacık. He is now the mayor of a city with a population of 90 thousand.  

Soon as he was elected Ovacık mayor, Maçoğlu encouraged the production of organic chickpeas, beans and honey in the district, of which the population is around 3 thousand. The products were put up for sale on the municipality’s website through a cooperative formed by the municipality. As Maçoğlu claims, he procured Turkey’s best quality honey that contains 216 thousand different minerals from its producers and marketed it in all 81 provinces of Turkey under the guidance of the municipality. An average of 3 tons of honey was sold per day. Maçoğlu says: “We introduced the natural honey produced on Dersim Mountains, Munzur foothills and highlands as ‘communist honey.’ They are calling from all 81 provinces, including Çanakkale, Trabzon, Rize, Mardin, Isparta and Istanbul, asking ‘Is there any communist honey?’ Even bees got used to us, they’ve become communists!”

Also, a ton of chickpeas and a ton of dried beans are sold per day under the guidance of the municipality. This is one of the most acclaimed activities of Maçoğlu since he gave scholarships to students with the income earned from the sales of chickpeas and beans sown in public lands. The communist mayor added 10 thousand bookshelves and 2 libraries in the municipality building. Unlike his peers, Maçoğlu does not use an official car, but drives his own car or uses public transportation. The municipality was in debt when he came to office, and throughout his term in office, he paid the debts and did not borrow any money. In January every year, he publicly announced the annual profit-loss account statement of the municipality on the municipality’s website and on a giant placard hung on the municipality building.

While endorsing the CHP’s mayor candidates in the west of Turkey, the HDP pursued propaganda in Tunceli by accusing Maçoğlu of being a Kemalist and a CHP supporter.

After this successful performance, Maçoğlu ran for Tunceli municipality and was elected as the new mayor of Tunceli. Born in 1968 in Ovacık, Maçoğlu is a laboratorian. While working as a health officer in Tunceli State Hospital’s emergency service, he quitted his job and ran for Ovacık municipality. His opponent was the previous mayor Mustafa Sarıgül, who won from the Republican People’s Party (CHP) in the 2009 local election, but eventually passed to the Peace and Democracy Party (the former name of today’s Peoples’ Democratic Party-HDP) by resigning from the CHP in 2013 to protest the party’s approach to the reconciliation process and the constitutional drafting process.

In the latest local election, Maçoğlu’s biggest opponent was an HDP candidate. He became a candidate from the Turkish Communist Party with the endorsement of Socialist Assemblies Federation, while the HDP formed the Revolutionary Force Union by allying with three other parties. The HDP harshly attacked its opponent in Tunceli. According to former CHP deputy Hüseyin Aygün’s tweet before the election, HDP said the following while attacking its opponent: “You are the new trustee of Dersim. You are a Kemalist, your victory will only favor the CHP. Continue your chickpeas-beans communism in Ovacık. You made the headlines in Sözcü (a radical Kemalist newspaper in Turkey). You are a Kemalist, not a communist. AK Party (the ruling Justice and Development Party) will win if you run for the election.” While endorsing the CHP’s mayor candidates in the west of Turkey, the HDP pursued propaganda in Tunceli by accusing Maçoğlu of being a Kemalist and a CHP supporter. Despite all, the party failed to sabotage the popular support Maçoğlu enjoys.

When Maçoğlu was elected as mayor on the night of March 31, he tweeted “People of Dersim have won.” If you ask why he articulated the former name of the province instead of saying Tunceli, or why the HDP accused him of being a Kemalist and CHP supporter as if they were insults, the answers are long. But to answer briefly, CHP changed Dersim’s name as Tunceli in 1935, where the majority of the population are Kurdish and Alevi. This change was announced as: “The last seedbed of feudalism is being removed. As in every corner of Turkish community, a new spirit of civilization and progress will prevail in Tunceli from now on.” Just as the West named its colonial practices beginning from the 19th century as a “civilizing mission,” the Kemalist ideology in Turkey undertook a similar “mission” that can be characterized as social engineering.

When Maçoğlu was elected as mayor on the night of March 31, he tweeted “People of Dersim have won.” Saying Dersim instead of Tunceli had deeper historical connotations.

Since the rulers of the Kemalist ideology borrowed their body of knowledge from the West, they attempted to shape society with a “civilizing mission” in a self-orientalist reflex. When things did not go as they wished, they “civilized” people by using force. The operation that claimed more than 13 thousand lives in Dersim about 81 years ago (around 1937-38) was also considered a civilizing mission. Aside from all the casualties, leaders of 5 tribes, including Seyit Rıza, were executed; while the surviving girls were given out for adoption by the state. In 1927 and 1935, censuses were conducted in Dersim. So, according to the archives collected by Necmettin Sahir Sılan, who was a bureaucrat at the time, the state used to know all the details about the population in Dersim. Dersim sent a total of 6 deputies to the First Parliament that fought the national war of independence. Sabiha Gökçen, Kemal Atatürk’s adopted daughter and the first female fighter pilot of Turkey, was also among the leading names of the Dersim operation.

And one day in 2011, the “Dersim incident,” described as “the secret everybody knows about,” was confronted as part of Turkey’s collective memory. Then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said: “If an apology is needed on behalf of the state, I apologize,” and urged CHP Chair Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu to apologize on behalf of his party, which was ruling Turkey at the time. However, upon a question on the subject during a university talk, Kılıçdaroğlu said: “I don’t think this incident must be remembered as the darkest tragedy of the Republican history.” During those days, CHP deputy Gülsün Bilgehan Toker, the granddaughter of late İsmet İnönü, gave a response that put CHP ideology in a nutshell: “If the girls of Dersim had not been given out for adoption, they would have remained in Medieval times. At the homes they were sent to, they were brought up very well, learned to set dinner tables very well,” and added: “The current chairman of the CHP was born and raised in Dersim, which is the biggest success of the Republic.” 

Almost all of Turkey’s elected mayors have begun their service after receiving their official certificates of election. Due to the recount of votes in some provinces by the Supreme Electoral Council (YSK), some candidates are still waiting for the completion of the legal process in order to get their certificates that will authorize their selection. It seems that the ongoing process in Istanbul may take more time due to the new applications for recounts of votes in some districts. Furthermore, the legal process may continue in Istanbul even after the authorization of one of the candidates as mayor.

In addition to the long-lasting legal process in Istanbul, Turkey is also busy with the first actions of some newly-elected and excited mayors. Since a significant number of mayors in cities changed with the 31 March local elections, newly-elected mayors are trying to gain support by opting in for populism. This is a worrying issue for the electorate and for future local governance in Turkey.

Since newly-elected mayors intend to broaden their impact, the people of Turkey have been subject to an enormous number of populist actions in the last week. The most problematic populist action belongs to the newly-elected mayor of Bolu, Tanju Ozcan, from the CHP. As a former member of parliament, Ozcan took a shocking decision to cut public grants for Syrian refugees in his province. Indeed, the most shocking side of this incident was his discourse towards refugees; he dehumanized them and blamed them for being a burden on the shoulder of Turkish people.

Newly elected mayors in Turkey are trying to gain support by opting in for populism. This is a worrying issue for both the electorate and for future local governance in Turkey. 

Although Ozcan was elected as a candidate by a social democratic party, his actions and discourse are similar to politicians of extreme right parties in Europe. Due to increasing criticism towards him, the Foundation of Social Democracy (SODEV) made an official announcement and condemned Ozcan for being inconsistent with the rules of social democratic municipalism. Nevertheless, Ozcan continued to defend his actions and underlined that he would not let any refugee receive aid from the municipality.

Another eye-catching example of populism in local governance is the superficial actions of new mayors in some issues. Even though most of them promised to solve long-lasting structural problems in the cities they ran their election campaigns, it seems that they have chosen to ease the way to increase their popularity among the masses. For instance, some mayors from the CHP, including the mayor of Ankara, started to clean the statues of Ataturk, even though there was simply no dirt. These mayors also added “TC,” an abbreviation of Turkish Republic, on the boards of municipalities.

Some mayors from the CHP, including the mayor of Ankara, started to clean the statues of Ataturk, even though there was simply no dirt.

Indeed, these kinds of superficial and populist actions show the true characteristic of the CHP’s political approach. Mostly new-elected mayors from the CHP showed great sensitivity and respect towards conservative values during their election campaigns. They underlined the importance of unity and solidarity in that period. However, after being election, they turned back to their true colors.

Will this process bring nationalist-secularist reflexes of the CHP into Turkey’s political life again? Are the populist actions of newly-elected mayors the first signs of this? It is a well-known fact that symbolic acts have always been important in Turkish politics. If the revival of the CHP in local governance brings back old habits, it will not be a surprise for Turkish people to face dominant nationalist-secularist reflexes in public life.

Turkey is heading towards the final phase of its local elections, which will be held on 31 March. With no doubt, Turkey’s policymakers called for a new system of government due to various difficult experiences in the past, as building adequate and strong governments was not that easy. It was quite understandable that parties, which heavily criticized each other and even defamed one another, came together in order to find a common base for the country. As a consequence, citizens supporting each party casted doubt on the sincerity of politicians.

Nevertheless, the new presidential system entailed not a totally new, but a rather structural and stability oriented phenomenon, namely pre-election alliances. These alliances have been firm enough to be continued even in the local elections.

Turkish politics nowadays has established the roots of a two-block political landscape, although not both blocks have concrete political ambitions and systematic preferences. As is known, the “People’s Alliance,” consisting of the AK Party and MHP was established right before the 16 April, 2017, referendum and continued during the parliamentary and presidential elections last year. On the other hand, parties around the main opposition party, the Kemalist-secular CHP, made efforts to bring together entirely different, and indeed ideologically conflicting groups, such as the Kurdish-ethnic HDP, the conservative SP and the Turkish-nationalist-oriented Iyi Party.

The second bloc has less of a chance and more difficulty to persuade and broaden its electorate. This is due to their lack of a coherent election program and the lack of a shared future projection. While the People’s Alliance refers itself to a set of compatible ambitions and narratives, the Nation Alliance is based on incompatible narratives and only has one common objective – to get rid of President Erdogan.

Despite the actual alliance-seeking efforts by the CHP and other parties, they have oddly come to refuse the existence of such an alliance, even in provinces where it is obvious that the candidate is an umbrella one. If a CHP-led alliance does not have the courage to openly conduct a campaign, then political engineering will be an option, and this option will fail on election day. As a stark comparison to the Nation Alliance, President Erdogan and Devlet Bahceli have openly stressed the main framework of the People’s Alliance with regard to the local elections.

The People’s Alliance was established on the night of the July 15, 2016, coup attempt, when the AK Party and MHP leaders took a strong position against the Gulenist putschists. In addition to this, these two parties had previously come together to get work done in Turkish politics. For instance, the MHP did not boycott Abdullah Gul’s bid for presidency in the parliament in 2007 (despite strong opposition from both the pro-tutelage Kemalist officers within the CHP and the Turkish Armed Forces). More, in 2007, both parties came together to lift the headscarf ban, which resulted in a closure trial against the AK Party in 2008. Both party leaders also resisted the violent Gezi Protests in 2013.

Today, the People’s Alliance describes its main character as standing for the “people’s will,” with the only aim to “serve the nation.” However, the Nation Alliance does not seem to have any concrete political position or self-description. This ambivalence and blurriness leads to a lack of transparency. And because of this situation, the People’s Alliance has described the CHP-led alliance as the “product of secret bargaining and political engineering.”

Kemalist-secular authorities and traditional Kemalist voters are unsatisfied with a quasi-alliance between the CHP and HDP due to the fact that the latter is the political arm of the PKK terrorist organization. Senior CHP figures have announced their candidacy from the Democratic Left Party (DSP) as a protest against CHP’s alienation. This has therefore caused dispute between the CHP and DSP, and the CHP has accused the DSP for dividing votes. However, DSP Chairman Onder Aksakal has rejected such accusations and stressed that the CHP is the only actor responsible for the success of the AK Party. Aksakal also underlined the CHP’s previous efforts that failed and that were not compatible with its traditional values. These were, namely, nominating a non-CHP politician as CHP’s presidential candidate in 2014, supporting the ultra-nationalist Iyi Party with 15 CHP MPs in 2018, and of course, not accepting any electoral defeats since 2010 after Kilicdaroglu became chairman.

The 31 March local elections will most likely contribute to the transformation of Turkey’s political landscape. By this, it can be inferred that a two-bloc system will be entrenched in the future. The continuing efforts of the People’s Alliance are reinforcing this trend, while the CHP-led alliance lacks a sincere and concrete narrative. While it lacks a concrete narrative, this does not exclude the actual existence of the Nation Alliance. Time will show whether this alliance will transform in the long-run due to the political pressure felt from the electorate.

With the help of Kemalist civil society elements, in February 1997, the Turkish army toppled the government that was formed by the Islamist Welfare Party (RP) and the right-wing liberal True Path Party (DYP). The coup was called a “postmodern” coup, owing to the indirect role of the army. The army did not take control of the rule in the country as it had done twice after the 1960 and 1980 coups. It threatened the government that if it did not step down, then the army would intervene and take control of the country’s rule.

Indeed, the army was restless from the beginning of the RP-DYP coalition government. It was deemed as another nail in the coffin after the landslide victory of the RP in the 1994 local elections. In 1994, the RP won many of the municipalities in the country, including Istanbul and Ankara. The army was very well aware that losing Istanbul and Ankara was a sign of a coming political revolution that might carry away the Kemalist regime. They are the most crowded cities and in the meantime, the election results in these cities carry a symbolic meaning for the general elections and the power relations in the country. Whoever rules Istanbul, rules the country.

On its 22nd anniversary, the February 28 coup was still able to stir a heated debate in Turkey. The opponents of the coup take a liberal-democratic stance and portray it as great political violence. They argue that the coup was a suppression of the basic rights of the conservative-religious sections of society by an authoritarian state.

According to the defenders of the Ferbruary 28 coup, it was a “process,” which implies the eternity of Kemalist rule in Turkey, that was interrupted after the Kemalist state bureaucracy lost its political struggle against the AK Party in the 2000s.

The proponents of the coup on the other hand take a national security stance and defend it on the basis of the struggle against the infiltration of religious reactionary groups such as the Gulenists into state structures. They argue that had the February 28 coup been successful, the July 15, 2016, by the Gulenist cadres in the state bureaucracy, including the army, would have not taken place. According to the defenders of the Ferbruary 28 coup, the February 28 “process,” which implies the eternity of Kemalist rule in Turkey, was interrupted after the Kemalist state bureaucracy lost its political struggle against the AK Party in the 2000s.

These two alternative narratives fail to understand the political meaning of this critical event. February 28 is a way more important event for Turkish politics than what these narratives tell us. It can be reduced neither to authoritarianism nor to a national security matter. According to the standing 1982 Constitution, Turkey in essence, was not a democracy at that time. Due to the lack of a better world, the regime was said to be democratic, which means that the political rule rests on the national well, yet major decisions were taken by the National Security Council (MGK). The army-dominated MGK was the governing body of the country, and the elected government was only playing a minor role in it. The regime was therefore an oligarchy, based on the rule of the coalition of bureaucracy and big business. Thus, the coup cannot be viewed as an attempt to transgress democracy. How can a non-existing thing be violated?

Nor can the coup be called a national security measure. It was against the majority of society; it was an encroachment of the national will. How can a policy that violates the national will be viewed as a national security measure?

Then, what was the February 28 coup? It was a special moment in Turkish politics. It was a moment of the political. The political moment showed that the Kemalist regime is neither eternal nor natural. It is rather contingent, like all other political regimes. This was a huge blow to the regime, since its political legitimacy and strength was based on the perception of its naturalness and everlastingness. The coup and the events that opened the way for it opened up an un-repairable crack in the Kemalist political totality.

What was the February 28 coup? It was a special moment in Turkish politics. It was a moment of the political. The political moment showed that the Kemalist regime is neither eternal nor natural. It is rather contingent, like all other political regimes.

Thus, the coup was a futile attempt to hide the groundlessness of the existing Kemalist political order. It was a hopeless attempt to over-turn the dislocation of the regime at the face of sociological developments. That’s why the Kemalists were claiming that February 28 was a “process,” not a onetime strike at the national will, and would “continue for a millennium.” And that’s why it was handled in such a ruthless manner.

This political dimension of the coup explains why the Kemalist regime was easily toppled within the period during the early 2000s. If the liberal-democratic critique of the coup was correct, that is that the Kemalist regime was notoriously powerful to crush the national will and encroached on democracy, it would not have been possible for the AK Party to dislocate it from such power in a short period of time. And Turkey would not have evolved into a democracy in the following years.

In Turkey, one of the favorite songs of those defining themselves as “leftist” is Mills (Değirmenler in Turkish) by Bulent Ortacgil, of which the lyrics go: “You, me, against the windmills. Consciously, each of us as a vanished warrior. We flow into seas as rivers. Maybe the finest way ever is this way…”

The song is about an impossible love, which is relevant to the left wing in Turkey in the sense they consider their fight to be an impossible love, and although they know they will lose in the end, the fight is still noble to them.

This is a specific mentality, an ode to defeat that is internalized and which has almost become part of genetic codes for a certain political segment. To put otherwise, it is a victim mentality based on finding excuses for failure and defeat. There is a famous Winston Churchill quote, which was also often repeated by the late Turkish President Suleyman Demirel: “No excuse can replace success.”

When I look at the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) nowadays, I recall Ortacgil’s Mills and this particular Churchill quote Demirel was fond of because there are roughly three blocs within the party. The first one is the core crowd gathering around CHP Chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu. The second is the crowd around Muharrem Ince, who are looking forward to seeing a CHP defeat in the 31 March local elections, and the third is the group who either passed to the Democratic Left Party (DSP) or resigned from the CHP since they could not become candidates. If the CHP enjoys an election victory under the leadership of Kilicdaroglu on March 31, the second and third groups will resolve. However, if the opposite holds true and the party faces a defeat, the last two groups will revolt and even draw a part of the first group to their side in an attempt to call for an extraordinary meeting.

One does not need to be a clairvoyant or an analyst to know the CHP and the corridor whispers to be able to predict all these things. Everything is pretty obvious.

Developments within the CHP reflect Kilicdaroglu’s purge attempts within the party. Rather than having ideological concerns, his motivation is to consolidate power and undermine rivals. 

Although the CHP is currently focused on the local election, all the leading names in the party, including Kilicdaroglu, are currently eyeing what will happen on the morning of April 1. While determining the candidates almost by himself, his main concern has been to gain strength by April 1. This is why Kilicdaroglu did not nominate anyone who acted with Ince before and has been siding with candidates who have stayed loyal to him, even though some of these individuals are accused of corruption.

Lately, CHP member Gursel Tekin issued a quite nuanced and strict written statement and a group of CHP mayors resigned while some names passed to the DSP. Also, former chairmen known as “the lords of the CHP” convened and Bodrum Mayor Mehmet Kocadon resigned from the CHP and became a candidate for Mugla Metropolitan Municipality.

All these developments reflect Kilicdaroglu’s purge attempts within the party, but rather than having ideological concerns, Kilicdaroglu’s motivation here is to consolidate his power and undermine his rivals.

But of course, such developments will negatively affect the CHP’s vote share. In that case, Kilicdaroglu will probably argue that the CHP could not win since the groups divided the party and accentuated their own identities rather than the party identity. So, his excuse for defeat is already at hand. 

Why does the CHP fail to address larger masses?

Looking at from a more general perspective, it is evident in Turkish politics that the ruling party has won all elections since 2002, with vote shares varying between 35 and 49 percent, whereas the main opposition party has always remained between 20 and 25 percent.

The AK Party has occasionally suffered declines in its vote share. However, although such fluctuations have been experienced, the CHP’s vote share hardly changed, indicating the fact that the party failed to address groups other than its own base.

Kilicdaroglu’s excuse for a possible defeat is already at hand. He will argue that the CHP failed due to the group divisions in the party, which accentuated their own identities rather than the party identity.

Since he was assigned as chairman of the party, Kilicdaroglu has been scrutinizing underlying reasons of this situation. But while doing so, he has been acting like a surgeon, searching for a cure by applying trial-and-error method on a patient lying on the operation table.

We might quickly forget about such things, but still can try taking a step back and look at the general picture: We have seen a different CHP in each election period.

Do you remember the nationalist group transferred by Kilicdaroglu in 2011 to come to the forefront in the party’s image and discourse that included names like Emine Ulker Tarhan and Suheyl Batum?

Or, do you remember the leftist, socialist, and Alevi groups that came to the forefront by emphasizing Gezi Park protests during the electoral period in 2015?

And currently, in the run up to the local elections, Kilicdaroglu has once again changed the image of the party and addressed the electorate with a different message. This time, he is directly engaging in populist behavior, accentuating the rhetoric he adopted in the June 24 elections last year. While creating ambiguities and gaps in his party’s ideology, he is prioritizing winning and leaning towards a political opportunism that can be summed up with the motto, “No matter who you are, vote for me to undermine the AK Party.”

It’s not fair for me to give advice to the CHP, but in my opinion, the party’s biggest problem since the 1950s has been that they do not have a genuine or original opinion to present to Turkey.

During the periods when the center of politics was divided and the nation was led by coalitions, the lack of ideas was not evident on the surface. But in the last 16 years, whether we like it or not, this political center has shifted towards the AK Party and Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Kilicdaroglu is acting like a surgeon, searching for a cure by applying trial-and-error method on a patient lying on the operation table.

The problem is not just that the CHP does not have any ideas worth expressing to the Turkish people. More crucially, the CHP is under the illusion that its criticisms of the current government, at least some of which are quite accurate, are ideas, and has for a long time been under the spell of laziness that has restricted their ideas and discourse to these limits.

Today we know very well what the CHP is against and what it thinks should not happen in the country. But we do not know what it is for and what it can actually promise Turkey.

Criticism is obviously something that is in the very nature of being in opposition and is an extremely important element from society’s point of view. It is ridiculous to criticize the CHP for their criticisms towards the government and their works. The problem is not that the CHP criticizes, but that it does not say anything else. Due to this reason, the CHP is restricted to a discourse, the main limits of which are determined by the government.

As long as this basic parameter does not change, no matter how many times the CHP changes its strategy, it will not be able to achieve any meaningful change in its number of votes. The CHP does not need political engineering or clever strategies, but needs to come up with new ideas. In other words, the CHP needs to focus on politics rather than engineering, develop a political discourse and use strategies that bring this to the forefront.

But of course, such a new political idea that has failed to emerge in the last 16 years will not miraculously emerge right before the elections. Meaning that the CHP will experience an election just like the ones in the past. We will see whether the path that was chosen, namely “what if it works”, will work or not.

Then let us return to the beginning of this article. Everyone in the CHP, from its leader to its doorman, is not only aware of the criticisms I have expressed here, but feels them in their bones. Due to this, they compete with each other more than competing with their electoral opponents, and again, everyone in the CHP is more curious about the morning of April 1 rather than the eve of March 31.

Turkey’s opposition parties including the CHP, the Iyi Party and the HDP have established a holy alliance to stop the ruling AK Party-MHP bloc. The political system, especially after the introduction of the presidential system in April 2017, has started to be structured by bipolarity. The underlying motive for both of the alliances is similar, the will to power. However, they are shaped by two different and rather opposing ideological frameworks based on their positions within the political system.

The opposition seeks to detach the AK Party-MHP bloc from power, and thus adopts a discourse of liberty. This discourse strives to convince the electorate that the ruling power is oppressive and excluding the majority of society. The ruling AK Party-MHP bloc, in contrast, puts forward a discourse of power in order to maintain and strengthen its grasp on power. This discourse seeks to persuade the electorate that its rule is inclusive and should continue to sustain the security and welfare of the country.

The CHP, Iyi Party, and HDP alliance, designed to topple the AK Party-MHP bloc, is shaped by two different and rather opposing ideological frameworks based on their positions within the political system. 

Therefore, the result of the power struggle, including the upcoming local elections on 31 March, between these two political blocs will be determined by a couple of factors. The first one is the persuasive power of each discourse or policy. For the ruling bloc, the electorate will look at whether its interests are tied to the continuation of the existing order. If the electorate feel that an election loss for the ruling bloc will destabilize the political system and lead to an insecure environment, both with respect to the economy and politico-military matters, they tend to vote for the ruling AK Party-MHP bloc. More specifically, if the AK Party-MHP ruling bloc convinces the electorate that it’s loss of power will impair the fight against terrorism (PKK, FETO and DAESH) and deteriorate the country’s economy, which had recently taken a downturn, it will guarantee the election victory.

Thus, the opposition should convince the electorate that a change in power or the replacement of the ruling bloc with the opposition will not harm the fight against terrorism and improve the country’s economy. The opposition should persuade the electorate that there is an alternative to the ruling power and that alternative is itself.

For the ruling bloc in Turkey, the electorate will look at whether its interests are tied to the continuation of the existing order. The opposition need to convince the electorate that a change in power will not harm Turkey’s fight against terrorism and will improve the country’s economy. 

This leads us to the second factor. The opposition should demonstrate that the alliance between the three political parties –here we can include the Islamist Felicity Party (SP)– form a strong and dependable force for ruling the country. The opposition alliance is formed by two secular-nationalist political parties –the CHP and the Iyi Party– and the Kurdish nationalist HDP. The integrity and coordination between the CHP and the Iyi Party is not a strong one since the CHP tilts towards the Left whereas the Iyi Party has right-wing tendencies. This creates a serious divergence of opinions over some critical issues. The relations between these two parties have already created serious ideological debates among their members and caused some party members to resign and shift sides.

The opposition is not offering a clear-cut economic program to fight with the existing economic problems such as rising inflation and unemployment rates as well as not providing a comprehensive program for urban planning

As we add the Kurdish nationalist HDP, which is the political representative of the PKK armed terrorist group, the internal contradictions of the opposition bloc intensively rises. Not only the right-wing Turkish nationalist Iyi Party members and its grassroots have reacted to this rapprochement with the HDP, but left-wing CHP members and its grassroots showed displeasure with the decision to ally with the HDP. The inclusion of the HDP into the alliance has decreased the chances for the opposition to be able to weaken the ruling bloc in the upcoming local elections. This will more likely be perceived by the electorate that the opposition bloc may endanger the fight against terrorism, especially Turkey’s struggle with the PKK’s Syrian branch, the YPG.

Moreover, the opposition is not offering a clear-cut economic program to fight with the existing economic problems such as rising inflation and unemployment rates. Not to mention that the opposition bloc has not provided a comprehensive program for urban planning and government in the run-up to the local elections. In sum, despite the rising public displeasure with the existing ruling power, the opposition seems to fail to offer itself as an alternative in the elections.     

Last week was very hectic for Turkey’s foreign policy agenda. U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. will withdraw from Syria after a telephone conversation he had with President Erdogan. Since Turkey has been very determinant on having another military operation in Syria towards the east of the Euphrates in order to wipe the U.S.-backed YPG forces out, possible outcomes of this withdrawal decision have been increasingly debated. How will Turkey renew its road map for a possible operation towards the east of the Euphrates under new circumstances? Will an ongoing balance of power among Turkey, Iran, and Russia change after the withdrawal? The answers to these questions are highly crucial to clarify the blurred picture.

In addition to its foreign policy agenda, the latest incidents created enormous effects in domestic affairs. It is obvious that one of the controversial issues in Turkey’s local election agenda will be the military operation towards the east of the Euphrates. Due to this reason, it is necessary to evaluate the positions of Turkey’s political parties and how they interpret this issue.

After President Erdogan clearly underlined that Turkey will pursue a new military operation in Syria, the deputy chairman of the CHP stated that his party will only support diplomatic and “peaceful” solutions rather than military operations in the region. Nevertheless, the party did not propose any recommendation for implementing a diplomatic solution for this long-standing intractable conflict, which has caused the death and displacement of millions. Kilicdaroglu, leader of the CHP, was also cautious about the possible military operation and underlined creating channels of dialogue. It is obvious that the CHP is taking a firm stand on this issue and is waiting for further developments. Furthermore, it is obvious that the CHP favors direct negotiations with the Assad regime in order to bring a solution to the conflict.

How will Turkey renew its road map for a possible operation towards the east of the Euphrates under new circumstances? Will an ongoing balance of power among Turkey, Iran, and Russia change after the withdrawal?

The HDP, on the contrary, is openly attacking the possible military operation of Turkey in Syria. The co-chairman of the party stated that Turkey and Russia should leave Syrian territories and that Syrian people should use their self-determination rights. Furthermore, the withdrawal decision of the U.S. was not found persuasive by the party due to the previous similar announcements of the U.S.

Contrary to the official statement of the party, HDP circles harshly criticized the decision of the U.S. through social media channels. They even initiated a petition campaign to the White House urging for the U.S. support the Kurds in its fight against Turkey. These circles define the Turkish army as “predator” and “invasive.” They claim that Turkey will invade Kurdish territories in Northern Syria and cause an irreversible human catastrophe. These groundless claims are also very popular in the Western media and are increasingly being circulated nowadays.

All developments until now show that Turkey’s military operation in Syria may be one of the determinants of the result in Turkey’s upcoming local elections.

It is obvious that Turkey’s possible operation towards the east of the Euphrates will be one of the hot topics of local election campaigns. Even if the CHP hesitates to take a firm stand under current conditions, it may instrumentalize Turkey’s possible military operation to criticize the government in the long-term. However, the HDP may take a harsher position, including mobilizing its supporters, like it did before. All developments until now show that Turkey’s military operation in Syria may be one of the determinants of the result in Turkey’s upcoming local elections.

There are three and a half months until the local elections in Turkey and each week as the political dynamics in the country are changing, names of the candidates, details of negotiations, and the nature of alliances are also changing.

The CHP and Iyi Party have agreed upon 21 cities – 11 has been taken by the CHP and the remaining 10 that the Iyi Party has a potential. There are rumors that the two parties will also come to an agreement on 19 other districts. However, details of these districts and the names to be put forward are expected to become clear next week.

After the party assembly meeting for determining candidates for local elections yesterday, Seyit Torun – deputy head of the CHP – made a press conference and announced 67 candidates of the CHP. Torun declared that CHP’s candidate for Ankara is Mansur Yavas, for Istanbul is Ekrem Imamoglu, Adana is Zeydan Karalar, and Antalya, Muhittin Bocek. In addition to these cities, Torun declared candidates for other cities including Ahmet Meric in Agri, Tanju Ozcan in Bolu, Rasim Yilmaz in Nigde, Ali Akyildiz in Sivas, and Fatma Kaplan Hurriyet in Kocaeli.

Within the framework of its alliance with the Iyi Party, CHP withdrew its candidate – Ahmet Akin – from Balikesir. Another controversial city during the alliance negotiations between the two parties was Adana. It was later decided that the Iyi Party will support CHP’s candidate and Zeydan Karalar was announced as the candidate for Adana yesterday. The Iyi Party will also support CHP’s Antalya candidate – Muhittin Bocek – who is currently the mayor of Konyaalti (a district of Antalya).

The most discussed candidate between the CHP and Iyi Party has been Mansur Yavas. He was finally announced as CHP’s candidate and according to the alliance between the two parties, the Iyi Party will support Mansur Yavas in Ankara.

In the local elections of 2014, Mansur Yavas was CHP’s candidate in Ankara, and he received 43.82% of the votes. AK Party’s Melih Gokcek won the elections in Ankara with 44.82% of the total votes.

There are discussions that CHP is currently having some problems in deciding about its candidate for Izmir, who will run against AK Party’s Nihat Zeybekci – ex-minister of economy. The current mayor of Izmir belongs to the CHP but is not running in the upcoming elections. There are rumors that Kemal Kilicdaroglu – head of the CHP – is planning to announce a “surprise” candidate.

On the other side of the equilibrium, the AK Party and MHP have decided to go through the cities that have already been announced. It is rumored that MHP has decided to withdraw its candidates in a couple of cities and is speculated that the AK Party will withdraw its candidates in Igdir and Kars, and support the MHP’s candidates. In the People’s Alliance so far, while the MHP has not nominated candidates in Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir, the AK Party has not nominated candidates in Igdir and Kars.

According to reports from HaberTurk, the AK Party will not nominate candidates in Adana, Manisa, Mersin, and Osmaniye, where the MHP currently controls the municipalities.

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi

Chair of the main opposition in Turkey, Kemal Kilicdaroglu paid a two-day visit to Berlin last week. Besides his lunch meeting with Turkey’s Ambassador to Germany, the leader of the Kemalist-left CHP came together with the members of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD).

Actually, it might be a potential opportunity and dynamic that Turkish social-democrats meet with German social-democrats in order to develop a mutual support in the light of universal social democracy. Such steps might be interesting and fruitful particularly in a country where social-democracy had a political success in the past and flourishing trajectory in a relatively global comparison. Surely, this phenomenon has been true for many years. However, is not valid now when one takes into account the result election results and polls regarding both the SPD and CHP. That is to say, similar to other Western countries, social-democratic and center-left parties face huge difficulties in achieving popular support among citizens.

Kilicdaroglu met some leading personalities of the SPD and delivered a speech during a panel organized by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation – a known establishment close to the SPD. Furthermore, the CHP chair published an op-ed article in the country’s most renowned “conservative” daily, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung – interestingly he did not prefer the country’s renowned left or left-liberal pieces.

Why did the CHP chair publish an op-ed article in one of Germany’s most renowned “conservative” newspapers, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, but not in a renowned left or left-liberal newspaper?

The main points I want to emphasize however are Kilicdaroglu’s statements he made regarding “democracy” and his expectation regarding Germany’s support during Turkey’s fight against terrorism. These two points are of great importance in my opinion because it’s interesting to address a Kemalist politician’s perception of “democracy” and his actual actions on the other hand. In addition, even though the CHP chair stressed that Germany should take into account Turkey’s sensitivities in its fight against terrorism, he unfortunately did not shy to come together with individuals who are sympathetic to the PKK.

Firstly, even though Kilicdaroglu criticized Turkey’s democracy standards both during his meetings and in his op-ed piece, there have not been any critical stances regarding his own party in general and regarding the democratic deficits in the process of, for instance, electing a new CHP chairperson. That is to say, even though Kilicdaroglu has not gained any real success since he became party chair in 2010, for instance by losing all elections since that date – exactly 9 – he still intends to retain that position while systematically preventing dissent voices among other CHP circles. But actually, and absurdly, neither the German media nor German social democrats addressed this fundamental problem.

Even though the CHP chair stressed that Germany should take into account Turkey’s sensitivities in its fight against terrorism, he unfortunately did not shy to come together with individuals who are sympathetic to the PKK.

Why? Wouldn’t it be more honest if the CHP started a democratization process within its own party? One has to emphasize that there is unfortunately a one-man hegemony in Turkey’s main opposition party. But despite these actual facts, the call for a change is permanently missing. One might understand the Kemalist-leftists insisting on continuing the status quo, but why do German SPD circles not problematize this lacking behavior in the name of democracy? Critical German circles should face these questions.

Furthermore, during his meeting with a SPD politician, Kilicdaroglu stated that Turkey moved away from “the values of Atatürk.” In this sense, the CHP’s criticism lacking stance with regard to Turkey’s initial era is also a problematic issue. There are no critical positions or statements with regard to the single-party era and several other problematic actions during this period. And here again, German social-democrats and German left-liberal media representatives deliberately maintain their silence while these voices are generally used to criticizing every little component in Turkish politics and political history in general.

Kilicdaroglu criticized Turkey’s stance of democracy, but wouldn’t it be more honest if he began a democratization process within his own party? For instance by leaving his seat after losing 9 elections.

The second point worth to address is Kilicdaroglu’s op-ed statements and his contradicting actions. While Kilicdaroglu wrote that Germany should take into account Turkey’s sensitivities in its fight against terrorism, he came together with controversial Left Party members, who openly stand for the abolishment of the PKK ban in Germany. As is known and despite lacking actual implementation, the PKK terrorist organization is officially banned in Germany since 1993. However, parliamentarians such as Sevim Dagdelen are supporting the PKK-friendly discourse in Germany, calling for the abolishment of the PKK ban and do not accept the PKK as a terrorist organization. The Left Party in general also stressed this call in its last federal election program of 2017 (Left Party election program 2017, p. 112). Thus, the question arises as to whether Turkey’s second biggest political party, which acts as the main opposition party as well, does not have any information about these facts? Or, did the CHP leadership deliberately take this step in order to achieve some –local elections motivated– goals in so-called HDP strong provinces?

During Kilicdaroglu’s two-day visit to Germany he did not problematize Germany’s ambivalent behaviors with respect to issues such as the PKK and FETO. Further, the CHP chair did not mention any concrete words regarding these problematic topics in his op-ed piece. He also met with members of the Left Party, which stands for the abolishment of the PKK ban, which is actually not in compliance with Turkey’s main strategic security interests. All in all, the likely purpose of Kemal Kilicdaroglu in creating this image or spirit of a universal social-democratic alliance in order to strengthen the party’s local elections campaign does not seem very convincing.

Turkey’s local elections in 2009 will be the ‘first’ local elections in the new presidential system, both President Erdogan and his political competitors are going through a rigorous process making their final tunes in deciding the candidates of local administrators. It was recently announced by the party spokesperson that the candidates for about 40 municipalities have been decided and now waiting to be announced by the President Erdogan tomorrow.

President Erdogan and his party have still an advantage over their competitors since the last elections as the recent public opinion polls reflect. The AK Party attached importance to polls (temayül yoklaması) in deciding the candidates. In these polls two criteria are important: the first is how candidates perceive success and the second what would be the voting inclination of voters towards candidates.

Like all local elections in Turkish political history, three cities are the most important battle grounds in the competition: İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir. Experts argue that the results in these major cities will have an important impact on the next presidential elections

Change is expected in the AK Party candidate profiles that more than half the candidates will probably be new names. For Istanbul, the candidate of AK Party is finalized: Binali Yildirim – the former and last Prime Minister of the parliamentary system who has gained esteem through his former administrative responsibilities. In Ankara, polls show that Mehmet Ozhaseki – previous Minister of Environment and Urban Planning – who has a considerable experience in local administrations (as major of Kayseri between 1998-2015)- will be the final candidate. For Izmir the mentioned name was Mahmut Ozgener – 38th President of Turkish Football Association – who was an important political figure in İzmir, but sources close to the party tell that the AK Party’s candidate for İzmir will be Nihat Zeybekci, former minister of economy.

President Erdogan’s main competitor, Kemal Kilicdaroglu – head of CHP (Republican People’s Party) – has long been flirting with Meral Aksener’s Iyi Party to come up with a common candidate in major three major cities Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir in order to consolidate opposition votes against the AK Party candidate as they are aware that one victory in Ankara or Istanbul against AK Party will have a psychological effect.

On the other hand, People’s Alliance shows glimpses of survival even though both leaders, Erdogan and Bahceli, publicly announced before that there would be no alliance in the local elections. However, both leader got together in the presidential palace recently and some say that they reached to an understanding for a partial agreement on some cities. President Erdogan wants the support of MHP in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir in return for supporting MHP’s candidates in three other cities. HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party) which has been losing public support over the past five years, will apparently support CHP’s candidates in the western cities but it will depend on the candidate’s profile. CHP will be facing a grave dilemma of with whom to form an alliance: Turkish nationalist Iyi Party or Kurdish nationalist HDP?

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi. 

On Sunday 22 April, Turkey’s main opposition party CHP announced that 15 MPs had resigned and joined the Iyi Party. This action was taken under the conditions when it was not yet clear whether the Iyi Party could take part in the June 24 early elections. After this move by the CHP, it was announced that the Iyi Party could take part in the elections. This incident created a rapprochement between the two parties and turned into an official alliance in time. Nowadays, Turkey has been witnessing another rapprochement between the CHP and the Iyi Party and wonders whether it will turn into another pre-electoral alliance again.

Indeed, there have been some rumors of unofficial meetings taking place between the party officials for some weeks now. Some of these meetings have been verified by party officials, but it was emphasized that the agenda of those meetings were not related to local elections and possible alliances. Nevertheless, the leaders of the CHP and the Iyi Party had their first official meeting last week.

The CHP and the Iyi Party are trying to find a way to make not a broad but a limited cooperation and are seeking to find a proper and well-designed method to provide it.

The agenda of this meeting, of course, was the upcoming local elections and the possible advantages and limitations of forming an alliance. As reflected in the press, the parties are negotiating on several scenarios in order to form an alliance in 9 provinces. In other words, the CHP and the Iyi Party this time are trying to find a way to make not a broad but a limited cooperation and are seeking to find a proper and well-designed method to provide it.

Nonetheless, the picture is not yet clear even though the sides are asserting the opposite. For instance, Istanbul, Ankara, Antalya, Mersin, and Adana, are expected to be an issue of negotiation between the two parties. However, previous election results reflect the fact that these parties fail to win the elections by forming an alliance, even if ceteris paribus. Additionally, surveys conducted to see possible outcomes of the alliance prove the probability its limited success.

Under current conditions, the CHP forming an alliance with HDP in Istanbul and Iyi Party in Ankara seems to be more reasonable. However, when taking into consideration previous election results, even this will not bring about the intended outcome.

Of course, both the CHP and Iyi Party are aware of this fact as they conduct surveys and prepare simulations. Due to this reason, the CHP has been trying to broaden the boundaries of a possible alliance by involving the HDP. Kilicdaroglu had a meeting with a former HDP MP, Ahmet Turk, last week solely for this purpose. The Iyi Party on the other hand, has announced that they will not accept any scenarios that suggest bringing the Iyi Party and HDP together. This means that the CHP will have to make a choice between these two parties by calculating the gains and losses of the two options.

Under current conditions, forming an alliance with the HDP in Istanbul and with the Iyi Party in Ankara seems to be more reasonable. However, when taking into consideration previous election results, even this will not bring about the intended outcome. More, it is not an easy job to find candidates running for election under any possible alliance. For instance, Mansur Yavas, one of the possible joint candidates for Ankara, underlined that he would not run under a party and demanded a broad consensus on his name. Finding a proper way and good candidates for alliances is a complex issue.

The lack of trust between the CHP and the Iyi Party might be the biggest deficiency for a possible alliance.

Last but not least, the lack of trust between the CHP and the Iyi Party might be the biggest deficiency for a possible alliance. The sharp break of the Nation Alliance after the June 24 elections caused mutual accusations and severe criticisms between the two parties. None of the parties took the responsibility of the failure of alliance and blamed each other instead. Since only 5 months has passed since this process, both parties will primarily have to pay attention to building trust between themselves.

Less than five months are left to the local elections in Turkey. Political parties have already started the process of selecting their candidates. Even though it is not yet officially confirmed, Iyi Party is going to nominate Ümit Özdağ for İstanbul, Şengül Hablemitoğlu for İzmir, and İsmail Koncuk for Adana according to party sources. Before selecting the right candidate, all political parties are setting a roadmap to follow in the upcoming elections. Analyzing these roadmaps is crucial to understand main dynamics of the upcoming process.

As the governing party, the AK Party has begun to make some preparations for possible candidates. The party will organize a meeting for the party delegates in the following days in order to settle the criteria for candidate selection. Even though this criteria has not yet been clarified, President Erdogan underlined that the party would determine candidates with the participation of all party branches. Furthermore, the AK Party is focusing on choosing candidates who have a good reputation in their electoral districts. In accordance with this aim, party officials are paying close attention to the results of surveys conducted in various electoral districts to see the reflections of possible candidates.

While there have been some names debated in the press as possible candidates, the head of the local administration branch of the party announced that the process would be finalized at the end of the month. According to official statements coming from other party sources, some provincial and district heads will resign in order to run for the position of mayor.

AK Party officials are paying close attention to the results of surveys conducted in various electoral districts in order to assess the reflections of possible candidates.

When it comes to the main opposition party, the CHP is still facing serious issues, which is preventing the party from focusing on local elections. While on the one hand Muharrem Ince’s role within the party is still being questioned, the latest controversial speech of CHP deputy Ozturk Yilmaz on the Adhan (Islamic call to prayer) raised tensions within the party again. Because of this reason, the CHP spokesman warned all party officials to obey the rules of the party and to stay away from provocative speeches.

Despite these issues, the party is still discussing the possibilities and limitations of forming an alliance with other opposition parties. The CHP had a meeting with representatives from the Iyi Party and the HDP in previous weeks. Nevertheless, it is still a question as to whether the party will form an alliance or not, and how opposition parties will approach the idea of forming an alliance in the local elections. Thus, it seems that these parties will wait until last minute to announce whether they will be forming an alliance or not.

The HDP, on the contrary, is openly seeking to form an alliance, especially with the CHP. The party officials frequently call for uniting against the AK Party to gain more municipalities and weaken the party on a local level. Although the HDP officials see the formation of the “democracy block” as an obligation, the other parties have not yet replied to this call yet. Some CHP officials have welcomed this idea and are trying to convince party leadership to respond positively.

The main opposition party, the CHP, has not been able to focus on local elections due to the party being pre-occupied with the unclear role of Muharrem Ince within the party and the recent controversy regarding the Adhan.

Consequently, while parties have accelerated their preparations for the upcoming local elections, their candidates and strategies are still unclear. After the candidates are announced, all parties will start their local election campaigns on local and national levels.

The Student Oath that was mandatorily recited in primary schools at the beginning of every school day for 76 years was abolished in 2013. Then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan reminded Turkey of the situation in Europe at the time that inspired the Oath: “During the 1930s, such practices such as Hitler’s and Stalin’s were common to shape society. You can’t see any of these practices in developed countries, which muster children to recite a text containing racist slogans.”

This oath, which reads: “I am a Turk, honest and hardworking. My principle is to protect the younger, to respect the elder, to love my homeland and my nation more than myself. My ideal is to rise, to progress. My existence shall be dedicated to the Turkish existence,” was written in 1932 by then National Education Minister Resit Galip, who was referred to as a close friend by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

Recited in schools as of 1933, the oath prescribed the model citizen of the Turkish Republic. With this prescription and other additional measures in the Republic of Turkey, which was established on the renunciation of a heritage, Turkey’s 1000 years of history and identity were downplayed by disregarding that the country is the remnant of a great empire that encompassed Kurds, Circassians, Abkhasians, Muslims and non-Muslims. Excluding all the other identities, only a constructed idea of “Turkishness” was recognized as part of the efforts to establish an ethnicity-based nation state.

Following the memorandum released in 1971 by the military, the guard of the country back then, two prayer-like phrases were added to the oath. “O Great Atatürk, who had created our life of today; on the path that you have paved, in the country that you established, I swear to walk incessantly with the purposes that you have set. How happy is the one who says “I am a Turk.”

During the term of the government that was founded after the post-modern military coup on February 28, 1997, it was ordered that the oath would be recited at the beginning of every school day instead of only the first day of the week. In fact, schoolchildren were not the only group forced to recite the oath, adults imprisoned during the military junta periods were also forced to recite it for numerous times until they screamed and cried. This was done in almost every prison, including the Diyarbakir and Mamak Prison – the latter being one where most of the prisoners supported Turkist ideology.

The recital was defended by contending that the oath strengthened the younger generations’ sense of belonging to Turkish citizenship on a constitutional ground and secured administrative stability, adding that objecting to the mandatory recital in schools is not based on any scientific ground. This is what the Council of State has said in a nutshell, who issued a verdict on the application filed by the Education and Science Workers’ Union (Eğitim-Sen) five years ago for the annulment of the provision that abolished the mandatory recital of the oath.

Following the State of Council’s verdict, Pandora’s box has been opened again. Everyone has voiced their own opinion on the Student Oath according to their political affiliations. As a requirement of his party’s historical mission, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) Deputy Chair Faik Oztrak said: “As the Council of State reminded us once again, our Student Oath, which is based on Atatürk nationalism, does neither exclude any ethnicity nor aim any polarization. The oath represents the ideals of the nation and the Republic within the country’s integrity while internalizing the notions of love and respect. It symbolizes the aim of development. If there is a legal order, then the oath will be recited in schools again.”

The Parliamentary Constitution Committee Chairman and former Justice Minister Bekir Bozdag, on the other hand, responded by hinting at the tutelage regime of the old Turkey that used to be ruled by the military and the judiciary: “With the Student Oath verdict, the Council of State overstepped its limits of governing compliance with the laws, attempted to assume the position of the executive body and disregarded the discretionary power of the executive body. In brief, it avowedly violated the Constitution and the relevant law.”

Meanwhile, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli did not only side with the Council of State’s decision, but also targeted Bozdag in a way that evokes the 76 years of collective memory: “Mr. Bozdag can say that he is Kurdish and he is free to do so. There is no one attempting to silence him. So, he is entitled to evaluate the situation according to his own temper and disposition. The Turkish nation bestowed him a senior position. So, he cannot think of denigrating the Turkish nation.”

A journalist friend of mine once said: “Nationalism is anteroom to racism.” This disease was inflicted on our territory by the West in the guise of nationalism some 200 years ago and in the form of racism during the 1930s. The Republic of Turkey paid heavy costs for the efforts to build an ethnicity-based nation that ignores multiculturalism and diversity although it was the remnant of a grand empire.

The old Turkey was a period when the nation was reduced to only one ethnicity as prescribed in the Student Oath, multiculturalism was disregarded, and the ones not conforming to this model were not even considered proper citizens. Of course, the present situation of the country is not flawless, but the old Turkey is already left behind.

In today’s Turkey, in which 4 million Syrian refugees are hosted and more than 600 thousand Syrians are to receive education, this oath does not have any relevance or validity. In this sense, President Erdogan announced in a determined demeanor that he will not condone the practices reminiscent of the single-party period’s CHP: “Does the recital of a uniformist text by our children every morning have any sense? What is the point of criticizing our Constitution Committee Chairman through his ethnicity and disposition? You claim that you are not segregationist, but you are insulting and threatening the Constitution Committee Chairman who has been a parliamentary member and a minister. We are standing behind him.”

The Republic of Turkey commemorated its 95th anniversary on Monday 29 October. On this day in 1923, the Turkish Parliament in Ankara proclaimed the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, and Mustafa Kemal Pasha was unanimously elected as Turkey’s first president by the Turkish Parliament (It’s noteworthy to mention that President Mustafa Kemal was granted the surname “Atatürk” (Father of the Turks) in 1934 by the Turkish Parliament). Since 1924, it’s a common state tradition to celebrate “Republic Day” in Turkey and for the Turkish diaspora in other countries to celebrate abroad.

On this occasion, it would be interesting to address some strange behaviors and points that Turkish people still face in 2018. In doing so, I will emphasize some anomalies and a so-called conscious/deliberate lack of information, which is characteristic for some circles in Turkey.

Despite its multi-ethnic structure, the official name of the newly established Republic – Turkey – has been previously adopted as a synonym by the West in addressing the Ottoman State hundreds of years ago. In addition, Turkey has been a de facto republic since the establishment of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in April 1920 – during its “National Struggle” against the invaders in Anatolia.

Today, it’s a little strange that many people in Turkey are still confused in elaborating on Turkey’s recent history. Above all, there is still a lack of communication between certain kinds of political stances and their representatives. For instance, the behavior of Turkey’s certain ultra-secularist circles, which generally insist on the emphasis of the word “republic” while disregarding its additional and necessary democracy component, is meaningless.

Critical voices against Turkey’s initial single-party era, in which a liberal democratic platform with more than a single-party did not exist, are still not able to dominate the discourse. Even – and unfortunately – in academic circles, this critical point cannot be discussed in depth within a concrete and universal framework. There is interestingly still a non-critical –and perhaps a tutelage-like- domination of a Kemalist discourse and history narrative in the media, bureaucracy and academic circles.

Even though Turkey’s education standards have increased in the last 20-30 years, there is a deliberate bias that misuses the “establishment of the republic” as a political instrument to attack or at least harshly criticize groups that do not shy away with their criticism towards any kind of Kemalism. Consequently, an absurd image occurs according to which secularist-Kemalists are proudly “protecting the republic,” while all other Turkish people, who do not accept the explicit and same narrative, are allegedly acting “against the republic.”

Some go far as to abuse the republican term to insult people’s traditions and beliefs. However, it should be clear that conservative Turks do not have a problem with the (or a) “republic” (in general), nor do they have a problem with its additional and indispensable component – democracy. The latter one is generally disregarded and lacking within those circles that use the term “republic” as an aggressive slogan and reduce its meaning to a commanding person-based ideology. Thus, it’s not surprising that Kemalist circles ignore the fact that, for instance, Iran is also a republic, while there is currently no actual democracy there, and that the U.K. is not a republic, and is a functioning democracy. It seems that a quasi-deliberate lack of knowledge or a kind of fetishism with regard to the term “republic” and its universal meaning exists in Turkey today.

There’s no doubt that the establishment of the republic was an indispensable and expected outcome in Turkey’s democratization path. As one focuses on the Ottoman trajectory of democratization, it can be seen that the first parliamentary experiences had already taken place between 1876-1878 when the Ottoman Parliament was established and a new constitution was written. Despite its short lasting period, the point to be stressed and remembered here is that Turkey’s parliamentary tradition had not just fallen from the sky in 1923.

95 years after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, many people still prefer to extremely glorify a splendiferous narrative by disregarding and playing down certain and key historical facts. But is this manipulative incline really necessary? It’s not possible to build on actual facts without any exaggerations, which consequently causes and reveals problematic situations among Turkey’s different societal sects?

Still, many people and the main opposition party in Turkey fail to address or question the single-party regime’s continuation until 1946 and ultra-glorify this time period without any kind of critical reflection. Turkey’s main opposition in particular has no will to do this although it contradicts its own “social democratic” values. Why did Turkey experience such a period while there were, for instance, more political parties, and more voices during the Ottoman constitutional monarchy between 1909-1913? A number of questions can be raised in this regard.

It should be kept in mind that in Turkey today while on the one hand there is no actual problem with the country’s republican character, on the other hand, certain secularist circles aggressively disregard its  democracy component. In my opinion, one would be less biased if one analyzes the country’s historical and institutional trajectory free from censorship (including the single-party era) and emotional-ideological illusions.

Nowadays, Turkey’s political agenda is full with international issues. The new term in Turkey-U.S. relations after the release of Pastor Brunson has become a matter of curiosity in the last couple of days. Moreover, the missing Saudi journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, seems to have shifted the U.S. approach against Saudi Arabia and thus will affect the current dynamics in the Middle East.

Under this ambiguous environment, Turkey’s domestic agenda and the upcoming local elections have become of secondary importance for the public. Nonetheless, political parties have already began to concentrate on their possible strategies in the local elections.

As part of their preparations for local elections, Turkey’s political parties held consultation and evaluation meetings in order to draw a road map. All parties had an idea on the possibilities and limitations in choosing the right candidate. The governing AK Party, for instance, underlined that the upcoming elections would be a turning point for Turkey’s future and it was an obligation to increase both the vote rate and the number of mayors in order to successfully implement the new presidential system. Party officials and members contributed to the ongoing discussions on possible electoral strategies in accordance with this purpose.

One of the major issues that will determine electoral strategy is whether the AK Party and the MHP will form an alliance in order to maximize their benefits. Since the unofficial meetings between the two parties have just started, it is still not possible to clarify this issue. Nevertheless, it should be underlined that both parties pay a significant attention to forming an alliance and are trying to form a consensus on possible ways of achieving this. It seems that the further details of this issue will surface in the following days.

On the other hand, preparation meetings held by the MHP and the Iyi Party revealed the increasing tension between these two parties. Even though both parties have had hot discussions since the June 24 elections, the degree of discussions altered in the last days. The Iyi Party blamed the MHP for betraying nationalist ideals by forming an alliance with the AK Party.

Since the Iyi Party faced serious existential crises after the June 24 elections and was about to collapse, it is now trying to find a new identity and purpose for existence. In accordance with this aim, the party is working to develop a nationalistic stance instead of its catch-all approach, which failed in the previous elections.

The main opposition party, the CHP, has also been discussing possible election strategies. During the meetings held, party officials criticized the party’s current discourse on being so elitist and left-wing oriented. The solution proposed for this problem was to adopt rightist and populist discourse in the upcoming local elections in order to change the image of the party.

At this point, the CHP faces a serious dilemma in deciding whether or not to form an alliance with the Iyi Party and the HDP. Due to the fact that the Nation Alliance failed in the last elections, the party is hesitant to cooperate with these parties. While an intra-party group is working hard to convince the sides to form an alliance with the HDP, some party officials are wary of this and are aware of the risks.

However, the supporting group sees this as the only way of achieving success in the local elections. The more nationalist wing of the party wants to form an alliance with the Iyi Party, especially in Ankara and some provinces in the Mediterranean and Aegean.

Even if consultation and evaluation meetings were a stage for drawing a road map for the local elections, political parties still need more time to finalize their strategies. Due to this, parties are expected to focus more on domestic policy in the upcoming days.

Almost 24 years ago, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the current president of Turkey, had been elected as Mayor of Istanbul. Although he was one of the most popular candidates, the media did not pay much attention to his election campaign, which was so intrinsic and far beyond being ordinary. Erdogan not only proposed a unique and comprehensive map for local government, he, at the same time, foresaw a new type of governance for the country. Unlike other candidates, he was aware of the changing world order and grounded his campaign in consensual rhetoric.

“Erdogan-type politics” has become a role model in local administration since that time. Candidates standing for mayoral elections in Istanbul and other metropolitan cities claimed their dedication to follow his type of politics if they were to be elected. It must be emphasized that reflections of Erdogan-type politics on a local level still need to be examined in detail. Since he has become a role model for mayors, the main characteristics of his leading style should be understood.

Nowadays, the questions of “what is the true character of a successful mayor” and “what do people expect from mayors” has come to the forefront again. Since political parties have begun their search for the most suitable candidates, they have been taking these questions seriously. More, as was reflected in the press, some parties conducted surveys and opinion polls in order to find the best candidates serving the interests of the public. For instance, the CHP decided to use multiple methods in determining its candidates – including opinion polls, tendency surveys, and preparation reports. It is expected to see all parties to use diverse methods in determining their candidates in local representation.

Political parties take the expectations of the public into consideration. As it is one of the main characteristics identified with Erdogan-type politics, sincerity and honesty are very crucial for the personality of candidates. Surveys also show that people tend to vote for candidates that they perceive as one of them. Thus, candidates that have strong ties with the public in their electoral district have a higher chance of being selected.

Another characteristic of a proper candidate is being innovatory and reformist. The public expect to see candidates to have their own agenda beyond the political party they represent. They appreciate projects based on innovation themes or concepts rather than ordinary projects. Moreover, people want candidates to propose both short and long-term projects resolving the current problems in the local area. Indeed, Erdogan-type politics was successful in proposing both short and long-term solutions to existing local problems. For instance, Erdogan was successful in resolving the garbage problem in Istanbul in the short-term and the city’s water problem in the long-term. Thus, these capabilities are still crucial for the election of a mayor in the current period.

The public also tend to vote for candidates who they can contact when they need to. Indeed, mayors are failing to “reach people’s hearts” with the growing effect of social media. Especially after the popularity of social media, people have been increasingly complaining about the gap between politicians and society. Although social media is a good tool for politicians to reach out to the wider public, since being a high-context culture, people in Turkey still prefer direct contact. As President Erdogan pays attention to this himself, he has underlined that mayors ought to get in contact with people face-to-face rather than relying on social media channels.

There are a lot of issues that need to be underlined in answering the question as to what people expect from mayors. Nevertheless, even if this is not examined in detail, the characteristics of Erdogan-type politics are still crucial in order to be a successful mayor. Political parties should pay more attention to this since local elections are only around the corner.

On Monday, the 57th anniversary of the execution of Turkey’s first democratically elected Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, was commemorated by the Turkish people. At the commemoration on Sunday, Turkey’s current Interior Minister, Suleyman Soylu, who has an important closeness and relation to Menderes, actually summarized Menderes’ political perception of the majority of contemporary Turks by stressing“I want to ask you, what did Adnan Menderes want except democracy? What else did he want except this country’s development, its progress, and the fact not to be humiliated due to people’s beliefs? What other aspirations did he have except constructing dams, building roads for this country, develop the country’s agriculture, and, to develop the country’s industry?”

Menderes has still a fundamental meaning for Turkish democracy and a special place in the minds of Turks with regard to the country’s past and future. It wouldn’t be even that wrong to mention that both left and right-wing oriented Turks remembered his era and his destiny while having for the first time actively resisted against putschists on Turkey’s streets during the recent coup attempt on 15 July 2016.

Menderes was hung by the military junta on September 17, 1961 subsequent to the coup d’état against his ruling DP government on May 27, 1960. Besides Menderes, Fatin Rustu Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan, who were the Foreign Minister and Finance Minister at that time, were also executed by the junta as well. During that time, the Prime Minister had been arrested together with various DP members by the putschists while the judiciary of the junta accused him among other things of violating the constitution and contradicting “Ataturk reforms.”

Menderes symbolized an important figure for Turkish citizens who wanted to end the single-party-regime of the CHP, which ruled the country from 1923 to 1950. Apart from his political experience as a member of the short-lived Free Republican Party (FRP), which was closed down by the government after four months in 1930, Menderes entered into politics as a member of the only party in the country, the CHP on the eve of President and CHP Chairman Mustafa Kemal’s visit to Aydin. Even though it was not Menderes’ purpose to be elected as a CHP MP, he was mentioned on the CHP candidate list, which was based on Mustafa Kemal’s personal decision and which Menderes later noticed. Thus, Menderes became a CHP MP until his expulsion in 1945, at which time the DP was initiated by some similar minded politicians. After the multi-party system was introduced in Turkey also due to external factors in 1946, Turkish citizens became more and more aware of Menderes and his popularity increased during the opposition years (1946-50).

In the first “controversial” democratic election in 1946, for which the DP did not have the necessary time to mobilize and organize itself, the DP had won only 62 seats in parliament. Therefore, it remained in the opposition until May 14, 1950 when it ultimately won the election, receiving 53 percent of all votes. The 1950 elections constituted a watershed in the history of modern Turkey due to the fact that until that time parliamentary politics was perceived merely as an extension of the Kemalist state bureaucracy and administration led, by the single-party-regime. Thus, for the first time, a so-called popular electorate received the opportunity to express its political choice against an ultra-secularist statist approach, represented by the CHP elites.

The DP’s main objective under the Menderes administrations (1950-60) was to change things as soon as possible by addressing the main motto, “Enough! It is the nation’s turn to speak” (Yeter! Söz Milletin) Actually, the DP internalized some of the liberal ideas of the Progressive Republican Party, which had been closed down in 1925, even prior to the establishment of the Free Republican Party – a reaction by the single-party-regime, which early noticed that Turkish people do not accept CHP’s policies.

It can be said that in contrast to the CHP, the DP represented a relatively tolerant and respectful position regarding religion, religious lifestyles and free-market capitalism – despite its similar Kemalism-based stance. However, the DP cadres did not have the necessary power to ensure a comprehensive liberalization of the entire economy for a long period. In other words, the nature of Turkey’s economy did not lend itself to wide-ranging liberalization with additional unexpected declines particularly in the agricultural sector. Nevertheless, these facts do not have a decisive importance regarding Menderes himself as a symbol of Turkish democracy and the people’s will.

Subsequent to the deposing of his last government (1957-1960) by the Turkish Armed Forces on May 27,1960, Menderes was arrested along with various leading party members and put on trial until September 17, 1961. When the junta hung two of his ministers and Menderes himself, several policies which had been implemented by the DP governments in the 1950s that allegedly contradicted with “Atatürk reforms” were cancelled by the junta.

Moreover, the Kemalist version of secularism, after an alleviation period of 10 years between 1950 and 1960 again gained importance as was the case from 1923 until 1950. More interestingly, various projects in the field of economy, which were initiated by the Menderes administration, were also canceled by the junta as well.

Today, for many Turks, although analyzing or reading political developments from a right – or left-wing perspective, it has to be admitted that for most people today Prime Minister Menderes is accepted as a personality who represented the people’s voice – despite political and human weaknesses, which are common in every era. Thus, to understand Turkey’s current political dynamics and the people’s negative stance against potential contemporary tutelage biases, one has to understand those developments in Turkey’s history. Most people still are in the opinion that Turkey owes much to Adnan Menderes due to his struggle for democracy, because otherwise it’s still believed that a quasi-single-party-regime would have continued.

With the rise of discussions around local elections, the electoral strategy of opposition parties in Turkey have come to the forefront again. Especially the main opposition party, the CHP, became the focus of these discussions last week. The party’s possible strategy was not only an issue of concern among other parties; it was also a puzzle for intra-party circles. Even though the CHP’s strategy in local elections is not clear yet, taking into consideration discussions made, it is possible to see a latent alliance among the CHP and other opposition parties.

As occurred just before the June 24 elections, the party once again conducted a research on possible outcomes of forming alliances in local elections. Even if the results of this research were not shared with the public, it becomes an obligation for the party to keep its current position in the local administration as reflected on the press. Due to this reason, there are several scenarios on the table for the CHP’s local election strategy.

Nowadays, the main scenario focuses on the outcomes of a possible alliance between the CHP and the HDP during local elections. A similar scenario was also present during the June 24 election period. Due to the fact that the CHP found this alliance ineffective in comparison to the alliance with the Iyi Party (IP) and the Saadet Party (SP), party circles convinced the leaders to choose the second option. Although there was not an official alliance between the CHP and HDP during the June 24 elections, the CHP maintained its latent support for the HDP’s electoral campaign. This was to such an extent that some CHP circles voted for the HDP in the parliamentary elections. Post-election surveys indicate that the HDP passed the threshold with the votes it obtained from CHP supporters.

Due to these reasons, another latent alliance between the CHP and HDP is the most powerful scenario on the agenda. As reflected in the media, the party sees this alliance as beneficial – especially in metropolitan cities. Istanbul, of course, becomes the main target of the CHP in local elections and the party designs its electoral campaign by focusing on this city. The results of the 2014 local elections reflect the fact that it is not possible for the CHP to “win” Istanbul by only forming an alliance with the HDP. Thus, the party is trying to broaden the boundaries of this alliance by involving other parties and political circles.

At this point, the possibility of forming an alliance with IP (Iyi Party) is also on the agenda. However, because the official alliance between the CHP and IP was broken soon after the June 24 elections, it is difficult for these two parties to re-form an alliance. More, rising nationalistic tendencies within the IP makes it impossible for the party to get together with the HDP. Finally, IP officials blamed the CHP for failure in the parliamentary elections, and therefore, it will not be easy to convince these individuals to forming another alliance with the HDP.

Even though the official alliance between CHP and IP was broken soon after the elections, the close relation between CHP and HDP continues. The similarity in discourse among these two parties increases the possibility of an alliance to occur during local elections. It is almost certain to see a latent alliance in Istanbul and Ankara, and it will not be a surprise to see an alliance in other electoral districts. However, seeing as the votes of this alliance will not be enough for the CHP to gain Istanbul, the party will try to find a new way to convince Meral Aksener’s IP.

The opposition in Turkey is now trying to polarize society through statements made by artists. Does every artist have to be a blind opponent of their country’s government and why does Turkey’s opposition throw a tantrum when artists call for unity?

There is a topic that has been keeping Turkish media busy these days: statements made by prominent artists about contemporary Turkish politics and how these statements have angered the opposition.

Ahmit Umit, a crime fiction author, Bulent Ortacgil, and Mazhar Alanson, both songwriters and singers are famous and reputable in their fields.

Nevertheless, they are not mentioned in Turkey’s opposition media outlets with a favorable connotation due to statements they made in interviews during the past month. Not only media outlets, but social media users were also busy lynching these artists on Twitter.

But what exactly did these artists say, which unleashed such a storm of criticism?

In an interview a month ago, Ahmet Umit made statements such as;

“I believe that we will be able to overcome the problems in our country by accepting each other for who we are and keeping in mind that ‘this is our country and it will be to our benefit if it develops and grows.’ We will never get anywhere if we separate each other. If we unite and start to show empathy towards each other, we become a strong country and nobody can divide us.”

“You can’t be the opposition by only criticizing the government, their deficiencies should be criticized, but their positive policies should also be supported.”

“This country belongs to all of us, we are all on the same ship. If you try puncturing a hole in the lower surface of the ship, we’ll all go down. If there is no Turkey, there’s no us.”

“I love my country. I have traveled all over the world, and I have never seen another country with such a beautiful history and geography. I will live in this land as long as I die.”

A few weeks later, in an interview, Alanson stated:

“We have become polarized nowadays. We have to solve this.”

“The majority of this country is Muslim and live their lives accordingly. That’s how it is.”

“Laicism will never fade away in this land as some claim it will. No one should be afraid. If we accept the facts of our country, we will all be happier.”

“I love Ataturk, but I also love my Prophet.”

In an interview published a day later, Ortacgil made similar remarks;

“What happened on July 15th was terrible. I have been against all kinds of coups throughout my life. On July 15, hundreds of people were killed to stop the coup attempt. A great disaster happened that night.”

“We have to negotiate with the opposition as well as with the government. The results of the election must be respected.”

“When we look at the vote share as well, will you just ignore 52 percent in government? Or the remaining 48 percent in the opposition? The president was elected with 52 percent of the votes. The opposition must accept it. And if the government considers the demands of the opposition, this problem will be solved.”

All these statements are legitimate, sensible, prudent, and aim to bring a divided society together. Social media users who tried to lynch these artists on social media criticized their works and suggested that artists should always be in opposition to the government, as “so-called leftists.”

Fatih Yasli from the Turkish newspaper BirGun went further and claimed, “the new regime is attempting to push its normality on the opposing side through names that are listened to, watched, and respected, and through individuals who have not been labeled ‘partizan,’ but are accepted as ‘neutral.’”

He added that, “this regime has not been able to establish a ‘cultural hegemony’ in the past 16 years and knows pretty well that it won’t be able to do it from now on.”

“They are well aware that they do not have their own novelists, directors, poets, and musicians, or rather that all in their arms reach are below the average and have no prestige.”

This critique from Yasli raised questions – whether establishing a “cultural hegemony” was a positive thing, or what particular statements made these 3 artists pro-government and pro-AK Party. They’re already famous and well respected for the work they produce, so what would they gain from being partisan? And even if they hold a positive stance towards the government, is this enough to call them ‘toady,’ lynch them and underestimate their identity as an artist?

Support for these artists came from one of Turkey’s most popular singers, Haluk Levent, who emphasized that “the artists of this country also have the right to agree with the government. You cannot call every artist that likes the government ‘toady.’”

A somewhat different scenario: Making U-turns after coming under fire

In the above situations, the opposition tried to criticize these artists for the opinions they displayed. However, the case of Derya Koroglu, from the well-known Turkish music band ‘Yeni Turku’ shows the extent of ‘neighborhood pressure’ from the opposition.

After an interview with Sabah’s Tuba Kalcik, Derya Koroglu stated: “Do not believe the words they ‘made me say’ by intentionally putting parts of my speech together. There is no change in my position.”

The only important and ‘political’ statements made in the interview in regards to Turkish politics were, “In Turkey, the left needs to listen to the demands of the people,” and that “Yeni Turku emerged from a leftist worldview, but at the same time we can be considered as ‘conservative’ since we preserve and protect our national values.”

Sabah newspaper published a section of the voice recording of Koroglu’s speech, in which it became clear that these were indeed his own words, reflecting his own opinion. There was no addition to the interview or to the artist’s explanations.

This case is one of my examples that reflect how the opposition’s oppression can make people shy away from their own opinions.

Koroglu’s attitude after the interview clearly showed how violent the opposition can be in terms of ‘neighborhood pressure,’ which was falsely accepted by the opposition camp to be exclusive to the conservatives.

Kalcik, who conducted the interview, made the following remarks after the events took fold: “They can only keep their ideology alive with such hatred. They punish those who do not speak as ‘they’ wish by marginalizing them.”

Kalcik concluded with her final words: “They are trying to lock these artists up in ghettos. They’re trying to destroy their reputation by claiming ‘You either belong with us or you deserve to be levelled-down.’ I wonder in which direction this intolerance will go…”

*Written by Suna Nur Sarihan 

Although two months have passed since Turkey’s June 24 elections, the main opposition parties are still struggling with intra-party conflicts. Despite all efforts to consolidate leadership before the upcoming local elections, the latest situation reflects that these conflicts will continue to escalate and de-escalate for quite a while. The latest developments in the CHP reflect the fact that the party administration refuses to face reality, which makes it impossible for the party to keep their votes together in the upcoming elections. So, the CHP administration may face a sharper opposition after March 2019.

Last week, the ongoing crisis within the CHP re-surfaced again. The party’s assembly convened in order to evaluate the outcomes of the presidential elections. Surprisingly, the presidential candidate of the party, Muharrem Ince, was not invited to this meeting. In other words, the party discussed reasons behind the failure in the presidential elections without inviting its presidential candidate – the person who, is most likely, to know the reasons behind this failure better than other participants.

Indeed, the agenda of the meeting was shifted to the possible outcomes of the ongoing intra-party opposition and their reflections on the local elections. Kemal Kilicdaroglu – leader of the party – explained the background of their discussions with Ince after the elections. He admitted that he accepted to hand over the chairmanship of the party to Ince after the party’s failure in the parliamentary elections. Nonetheless, he claimed that Ince’s attitude after the elections did not give him any confidence and that he was worried about the possible dissolution of the party within a week had he quitted.

Kilicdaroglu’s statements are in fact contradictory and far from the reality when we look at the background of the latest division within the party. Firstly, Kilicdaroglu did not explain which attitudes of Ince changed his decision to quit the chairmanship. It seems that these attitudes were not only related to Ince’s statements to reporters about a private conversation between the two. If Kilicdaroglu wants to convince supporters of the CHP about his position against Ince, he needs to put more effort in doing so.

Another contradiction with what Kilicdaroglu has been saying is about his stance against leadership change in the party. In his statements at the Party Assembly, Kilicdaroglu accepted his role in the failure of the party during the elections. Even though he accepted to quit the chairmanship, he changed his mind after Ince’s attitudes in the post-election period. However, Kilicdaroglu does not regard leadership change as a necessity to the party’s success. If Kilicdaroglu was really ready for a leadership change, there would be no trouble in finding a suitable candidate. This situation reflects that the issue of leadership change is a win-lose game for Kilicdaroglu against his rival Ince. If it was to be a principal issue, he would meet the requirements of the situation.

Despite his failure in fighting for party chairmanship, Ince is still active in bringing the opposition within the party together. After the meeting of the Party Assembly, Ince refused accusations made by Kilicdaroglu and accused him of lying to the public in order to protect his seat. In addition to Ince, the meeting also cause disappointment among party supporters. A majority of party supporters even announced that they will not go to the polls in the upcoming elections if Kilicdaroglu continues to blame the critical voices  harshly and accuse them of intentionally supporting the AK Party.

The latest meeting of the CHP drove a bigger wedge between the CHP leadership and the party’s supporters. If the party cannot find a cure to heal this relationship, it may face a larger intra-party split in the following days.

An analysis on Turkish elections was published in Foreign Policy, entitled “Turkey’s Opposition Lost to Erdogan, Then It Lost Its Mind.” The article reads: “Since June 24, when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan celebrated his thirteenth consecutive electoral victory, his opponents have been in a headfirst free fall. Their sad state captures the fundamental problem of Turkish politics: The opposition is out of ideas and lacking in inspiration and its leaders care more about keeping their seats than keeping their country afloat.”

It is an entirely different discussion as to whether the opposition had a mind to lose, but it is obvious that their current situation is saddening. Ever since Kemal Kilicdaroglu became the chairman of the main opposition, Republican People’s Party (CHP), on May 23, 2010, he changed the Central Executive Board of the party nine times, organized five conventions, renewed the party assembly numerous times, and assigned a total of 300 new names throughout this period. But all these changes did not save Kilicdaroglu from facing nine election defeats within eight years. And this time, the party did not only lose the election but also took a heavy blow despite the CHP’s presidential candidate Muharrem Ince earning eight points higher than the vote share of his party in the presidential elections.

I assume that they are referring to these factors when they say that the opposition is out of its mind. On the night of the elections, the party’s deputy chairmen argued on televised programs that the presidential election would definitely make it to the second round according to the results they obtained. When Ince could not be reached for a long period after the results were announced, it was claimed that Ince was abducted by Erdogan, and most of the electorate believed this absurd claim. Ince said: “I was not abducted. Those claiming or believing such a thing must be schizophrenic.” A week later, the deputy chairmen of the party had to admit that they lied during the election night and were in fact already informed about the results after some party members exposed what happened that night.

However, it is true that Ince’s vote share in the presidential election was eight points higher than the CHP’s vote share in the parliamentary election, which naturally led Ince proponents to demand a change in the leadership and call for an extraordinary convention in the party. Kilicdaroglu blamed Ince by arguing that the latter only cares about his seat, to which Ince responded: “I do not care about my seat, but organizing a convention is essential.” Upon that, the party’s head office suggested holding the convention if 615 signatures could be gathered amongst the delegates. For a couple of weeks, several deputy chairmen of the CHP and Ince quarreled through Twitter. Kilicdaroglu proponents blamed Ince for being “rude and shallow” and being a “denigrator,” to which Ince responded: “If I am to get elected, I will be your chairman, too. I understand that you are under pressure.”

Two weeks later, Ince proponents announced that they gathered the required number of signatures to organize the convention. However, the head office stated that “Out of 618 signatures, four are duplicated, five do not belong to a delegate, 31 are revoked, 4 are forged, and 5 are not signed in the relevant date. Consequently, the sufficient number of signatures could not be collected and thus the convention will not be organized.” When the revoked signatures triggered speculations that Kilicdaroglu exercised pressure on the delegates, the head office said: “They revoked their signatures just as they signed, which is very natural.” After this statement, eight Ince proponents went on a hunger strike. They waited with placards reading “I love living and keeping everything alive. But I am hopeless. Either I die, or I will see the convention. The choice is yours.” But they ended the strike when the head office did not give any response.

Sad, isn’t it? The CHP and its leader Kilicdaroglu, who faced nine election defeats, did everything to hinder Ince’s competing in the convention although they had presented Ince as the presidential candidate only two months ago. Amid all the debates, Kilicdaroglu contented himself with changing the Central Executive Board for the tenth time.

Meanwhile, the oppositional Good Party (Iyi Party) Chairwoman Meral Aksener left the first party meeting after receiving a 7.29 percent vote share despite all the hype revolving around her in both the national and international media. On the next day, she announced that she had left her seat and would not become a candidate in the party convention. But she returned only a week later. The party members did not know that Aksener would leave, and they did not know whether she would run for chairperson when she returned, and now they are not sure if she will stay even if she becomes the chairwoman. According to rumors, Koray Aydin, one of the leading figures of the Iyi Party, will join the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) while several other members are said to join the CHP or the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party). According to another rumor, Aydin will not join the MHP but become the chairman of the Iyi Party while the other party members will either remain independent or join other parties.

This is the current state of the parties and their leaders who vowed to make a change and govern Turkey only two months ago.

The ongoing leadership crisis within CHP reached a deadlock after recent developments. Muharrem Ince, CHP’s candidate in the latest presidential elections, started to collect signatures from the delegates to conduct an extraordinary congress to run for the party’s chairmanship.  As a result of strenuous efforts, Ince and his team announced that they gathered 630 signatures and fulfilled the required threshold. In retaliation, current leadership of CHP made an official announcement and claimed that the number of submitted signatures were not enough to call for an extraordinary congress. All of these developments triggered an enormous crisis within the CHP and divided the party into factions.

It is obvious that the future of the party will be shaped in line with the positions and interactions among these factions. The biggest opposition faction in the party consists of those in favor of Muharrem Ince taking lead. Even if Ince’s supporters were passivized in the party by Kilicdaroglu during the election campaign, they became successful in convincing delegates to sign for the extraordinary congress. Whether they reach a certain number of signatures to conduct the congress or not, the results indicate that they have convinced almost half of the delegates. It is no longer possible to ignore these delegates demanding change in the party’s chairmanship. If CHP’s existing leading cadre chooses to ignore these demands, it can create an even bigger schism in the party structure soon. Moreover, if this group builds an influence over other dissatisfied delegates in the party-a small but effective group organized around Selin Sayek Boke and Ilhan Cihaner-, they may have a chance to recall a congress in the future.

Another possible strategy of this faction is applying to court to solve the signature crisis. Even if this strategy requires time and energy to succeed eventually, some prominent figures in the party have already supported applying to court. Nonetheless, the leader of this group, Muharrem Ince, announced that he did not prefer to apply to court because he wanted to protect the honor of the party. Thus, Ince and his group seem to prefer alternative methods in their continuing struggle.

One of the alternative methods discussed at this point is the splitting of CHP into two parties. Some supporters of Ince want him to establish another party as an alternative to CHP. These supporters defend the idea that it is not possible for CHP to seize power because of the settled perceptions about it. This group believes that if Ince founds a new party, he may have a chance to run for power. Nonetheless, it seems that Ince and his supporters will persist in their struggle within the party until the last minute.

Beyond all these factors, the most powerful group in the party is Kilicdaroglu’s supporters who are loyal to his chairmanship. It is a well-known fact that after coming to the chairmanship, Kilicdaroglu created his own team both among the leading cadre and the party delegates. Whether he is successful or not, this group loyally supports his leadership without any reservations. In other words, even if CHP’s votes showed a very significant drop in the latest elections, this group would remain supporting him without hesitation. Thus, it seems unlikely to see a change in the party’s chairmanship in the short term.

Regardless of whether he will ultimately be successful or not, Ince’s stance in the party will affect the party’s position in the upcoming term. If this crisis remains unresolved until the local elections, CHP would most probably continue losing votes. Will the factions within CHP come up with different strategies in the following days? Well, this is the matter of curiosity nowadays.

Since the elections held in Turkey on June 24, Turkey’s “social democrats” have been – once again – facing internal chronic problems. It was merely just a matter of time and how a new power struggle within Turkey’s main opposition and oldest political party – the Republican People’s Party (CHP) – would occur again.

Previously, my elaboration was that Muharrem Ince’s nomination as the party’s presidential candidate was only a strategic maneuver by the party leadership and Chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu himself in order to exclude Ince in the long run from the party’s future. It was clear that Kilicdaroglu knew that neither his party nor the party’s alliance was going to achieve a majority in parliament. He was also aware that his party’s candidate was not going to win the presidential race. Indeed, Ince lost in the first round.

Nevertheless, Ince subsequently described himself as successful by comparing his 51-day performance with the performance of the CHP. Kilicdaroglu refuted these claims indirectly, while not addressing his party’s overall disastrous election results. In this sense, the current CHP chairman, who lost nine elections in eight years, still insists on keeping the party’s chairmanship, while accusing Ince without directly calling out his name.

Kilicdaroglu also slammed his party fellows ironically for “selfish interests,” stressing his criticism with the words, “some people eye for upper positions, which is unacceptable.” Furthermore, the demand for an extraordinary party congress by the so-called supporters of Ince has ultimately revealed the already known competition between Kilicdaroglu and Ince. Although supporters of Kilicdaroglu reject a congress by arguing that the party should focus on the upcoming local elections in 2019, others – and particularly CHP sympathizers on social media – are calling for “change.” Within these circumstances, party officials have been carrying an inner-party struggle for over two weeks.

But what’s the main problem in Turkey’s main opposition party, which used to be called a “social democratic” political party? If one focuses on the party’s membership and electoral profiles, one notices the striking fact that in contrast to its “social democrat” label, CHP voters prefer attributions and descriptions such as so-called Ataturk-focused ultra-nationalism and a historically well-known aggressive secularism (perhaps similar to the French laïcité). But, do these two components count as enough to describe the party as social democratic in a modern and contemporary sense?

Most of the CHP electorate do not have any problem with being described as “left-nationalist secularists.” However, in the sense of a universal understanding of social democracy, this kind of definition may not be well-fitting. In addition, when focusing on the country’s voter dynamics, it seems that elitist circles and capital owners in particular prefer the CHP as a harbor of political identity, and not as an instrument to pursue social democratic objectives – as it is usual in an average democratic country. With regard to its policies concerning, for instance, refugees, the CHP unfortunately resembles European far-right parties, aiming to forcefully send refugees back to their war-torn countries.

It seems that one of the main problems within the CHP and in particular some other Turkish parties, which insist on being an identity party, is the fact that regardless of losing elections, their party chairperson does not leave office. If one compares this phenomenon with, for instance, the German social-democrat chairpersons in the last 13 years, one notices that following losses in the general election, most of the leaders resigned. Just recently former SPD leader resigned due to his lack of success in the 2017 elections. This happened despite his “success” to form a subsequent coalition government with the Christian Democrats. The party decided that he ought to step down, which may not be imaginable for Turkey’s CHP – even though the Turkish social democrats permanently point to German or Western democratic standards. In such cases though, the practices of global social democrats are dis-regarded.

“Even if Ismet Inonu or Bulent Ecevit were to lead the party today, its votes would not exceed 35 percent”

In regards to the CHP, the main problem is not solely the person who leads the party. As one pro-CHP surveyor once stated>; “even if Ismet Inonu or Bulent Ecevit were to lead the party today, its votes would not exceed 35 percent.” This may be true due to the party’s historical and political “baggage.” Thus, what can be done to solve this chronic perception? If the CHP wants to overcome its permanent crisis, a comprehensive self-criticism regarding the party’s past, its existential meaning and its future goals seem indispensable. However, transforming the Kemalist and left-nationalist CHP into a modern social-democratic political party seems very difficult. This is because denying the party’s anti-democratic past is perceived as unacceptable for most CHP sympathizers. Though, Turkey’s societal dynamics and the majority of political preferences of the country’s voters regularly point out this fact.

Thus, perhaps a better option could be dissolving the party, as Atilla Yayla, professor for political science, proposed in 2013:

“The CHP does not allow, for instance, being democratic such as the German social democrats. Neither does it allow the transformation into a democratic social democratic party, nor does it give the opportunity to other movements to create a strong left-democrat party. Regarding such a party, there is no meaningful and legitimate place in a democracy. The CHP has to be closed down. I do not imply that the Constitutional Court should ban the CHP but the CHP should dissolve itself. The CHP should either transform itself into a foundation or a museum concerning the “single-party-regime.” Then, the void left from the CHP should be filled by real democratic social democrats who start a strong political movement.” (Atilla Yayla, August 1, 2013)

As the ballot boxes were closed at 5.00 p.m. in the June 24 presidential and parliamentary elections, everyone started waiting for the results impatiently. The elections marked a turning point in Turkey’s history since the new governance system was to be introduced after that. So, the voter turnout was around 87.5 percent. As from 6.30 p.m., early results of the counting started to be announced on television channels. Only a few hours later, it became certain that Recep Tayyip Erdogan would win the presidential race by a landslide and thus there would not be any need for a second tour of the presidential elections. But the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) administrators argued against this.

The pro-CHP broadcaster Halk TV only released the number of the opened ballot boxes and ignored the overall results for hours as opposed to other broadcasters. At 8.00 p.m., the CHP Election Monitoring and Coordination Committee members Bulent Tezcan, Tuncay Ozkan, Muharrem Erkek and Onursal Adiguzel organized a press meeting at the party’s head office. During the press conference, the CHP Deputy Chairman Tezcan said: “Muharrem Ince’s vote share is around 40 percent while Erdogan’s is 46 percent. Ince will win the election, we will disclose all the rigs.” The other members standing beside Tezcan during his speech did not utter a single word, but only threw strained glances with a crooked smile glued on their faces.

Two hours later, the same team issued another statement. The vote shares were not announced this time: “Some groups began celebrating too soon. We are closely monitoring the results. The figures show that the presidential election will wrap up in the second round.” And one hour later, an array of baseless allegations started to circulate on social media. Firstly, CHP supporters wrote tweets which suggested that Fox TV’s broadcasting was cut off, which were shared and retweeted by thousands of people.

In the midst of these rumors, Fox TV’s live broadcast was ongoing. After a while, a second tweet that would be shared by thousands were tweeted. This tweet claimed that even the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) Supreme Electoral Council members resigned in the face of the rigged elections while Erdogan called Ince and threatened him to walk out of the presidential race by telling him that his wife was abducted. Ince did not make any public appearance in the meantime. So, the CHP electorate rushed to the party’s head office and started waiting anxiously.

Then, a new development was announced by Fox TV, which supported Ince throughout the electoral process. Fox TV anchorman Ismail Kucukkaya said that he wrote to Ince on WhatsApp to ask his whereabouts, upon which Ince answered: “The man has won.” By that time, the other broadcasters had already announced Erdogan’s victory, being the latest of his unremitting victories since the first election he ran for in 1994, in which he was elected as Istanbul Mayor. As a result, President Erdogan’s vote share was 52.6 percent while Ince’s was 30.6 percent.

The following day, Muharrem Ince appeared before the press: “First of all, I would like to begin with the false news running on social media. They are all lies. The claims such as the abduction of my wife and a group of colonel’s hostage-taking me are the products of a bunch of schizophrenic minds. But taking them seriously is another problem. There is no such a thing. There are 10 million votes between [me and Erdogan]. We are not evading, we are not being threatened. Erdogan is the winner of the elections.” Ince also congratulated Erdogan, adding that he aimed to double his vote share in the future.

However, Ince’s announcement did not change the situation. Many CHP proponents, who, considering their social media profiles, are most probably university graduates and professionals, started spreading another rumor on twitter: “Ince’s statements have already showed that he is being threatened.”

The CHP Chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu was also incensed. Apparently, he was furious at Ince, whose vote share in the presidential election was seven points higher than the CHP’s vote share in the parliamentary election. He defended the exact opposite of the bare truth in his statement: “The AK Party is the only losing party in the elections. The party has become a lame duck. Also, a dictator cannot be congratulated.” Kilicdaroglu, who has lost eight elections during his chairmanship, answered the resignation calls as follows: “In our party, we have no place for those who only care about remaining in office.”

A series of confessions began to be made within the party following Ince’s statement. They explained the backdrop of the party deputy chairs’ announcements during the election day. One of the most striking statements were issued by Hakan Bayrakci, the president of pro-CHP surveying company SONAR: “The results were evident in the polls but they would have crucified me had I declared that Erdogan would win.” The latest poll announced by Bayrakci before the elections suggested that the presidential race will wrap up in the second round.

The trauma experienced by the CHP electorate since the election day is surely in the realm of psychiatry. However, an odd picture is revealed considering the reason for the CHP deputy chairs’ announcements, the claims of rig and the following confessions, and some groups call upon people to take to the streets.

The main opposition party CHP faced with the rise of an intraparty opposition after the elections. Indeed, this phenomenon is not new for the CHP. After every failure in parliamentary and presidential elections, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the chairman of the party, was criticized harshly and was put under pressure for resignation. Nonetheless, the party delegates, who were appointed by Kilicdaroglu, re-elected him in each congress despite criticisms. The opposition in CHP got into action again after the June 24 elections with the demand of changing the party leadership.

Despite all the similarities, there is a significant difference between the latest mobilization of the opposition movement and the previous ones. The opposition movement now has a popular candidate for leadership who attracted the masses more than Kilicdaroglu: Muharrem Ince. Even if Ince was defeated by President Erdogan in the presidential elections, he got 30.6 percent of the votes which is approximately 8 percent higher than what the CHP got in parliamentary elections under the leadership of Kilicdaroglu. Some prominent names of the party interpret these results as an indicator of the de facto leadership of Muharrem Ince in the CHP.

Actually, Ince already ran for the chairmanship of the party against Kilicdaroglu twice. His first candidacy for chairmanship was in 2014 but he got only 415 votes against Kilicdaroglu’s 740 votes. The second one, on the other hand, was more recent. Just two months ago from the decision of snap election, Ince once again became a candidate for chairmanship of the party against Kilicdaroglu. During his short-term candidacy process, Ince blamed Kilicdaroglu for threatening delegates who supported him and forcing them to withdraw their signature to support Ince’s candidacy for chairmanship. At the end of the congress, Ince was defeated by Kilicdaroglu again.

While Ince was maintaining his criticisms towards Kilicdaroglu, the decision of snap elections totally changed the direction. Even though Kilicdaroglu worked hard for the joint candidacy of Abdullah Gül, he nominated Ince as the presidential candidate of the CHP at the end of the process. By this way, Kilicdaroglu passivized his main rival in the CHP. Ince’s failure in the elections would mean a decline in his competition against Kilicdaroglu. Additionally, while Ince was conducting his election campaign, Kilicdaroglu dissolved the names close to Ince in the CHP and prepared the candidate list for the parliamentary elections in accordance with this aim.

Nevertheless, Ince gained high popularity among the masses during the campaign process. He obtained sympathy among not only supporters of the CHP, but also the supporters of other parties. In the same period, Kilicdaroglu lost his authority within the party supporters. For instance, the CHP announced that Kilicdaroglu and Ince were going to organize joint meetings in some provinces. However, Ince’s supporters in the party reacted against this decision that they perceived an action damaging Ince’s image among the masses. As a result, these joint meetings were canceled.

After the elections, Ince underlined his success by highlighting his 30.6 percent – a figure the CHP has not reached in 41 years. He also criticized Kilicdaroglu. First, Ince stated that rather than persuading other parties to support the candidacy of Gul, Kilicdaroglu could have announced his nomination for the presidential elections earlier. Secondly, Ince criticized Kilicdaroglu for not congratulating Erdogan and his approach to the results. In this point, Ince stated that Kilicdaroglu should try to find the reasons of the decline in the votes of the party rather than emphasizing the decrease in the voting rates of the AK Party. All these indicators show that Ince may run for the chairmanship of the party again. Whether the support of the delegates will be enough for Kilicdaroglu to keep his chairmanship will be clear soon.

After weeks of intensive campaigning and eager anticipation, Turkey successfully accomplished yet another test of democratic maturity by holding the combined general and presidential elections last Sunday. The fact that these elections constituted a milestone for the paradigmatic transition towards the presidential government system ensured that they were fiercely fought by both the government and the opposition parties with the notable addition of public relation initiatives by the presidential candidates. These were the first general elections that were held in the aftermath of the failed military coup attempt on July 15, 2016, and as such they represented the dawn of democratic normalization and a potential end to the state of emergency that was declared after the coup.

Despite all the hype and misinformation in mainstream international media accusing President Erdogan of authoritarianism and the government for suppressing the political opposition, pretty much all the stakeholders agreed that the elections were held in an open, free and fair environment. The campaign trail was peaceful and turned the whole country into a festival zone via vibrant promotion endeavors by the parties and candidates.

On election day, voter turnout was around 87 per cent which represented one of the highest participation rates in Turkey’s democratic history, comfortably surpassing most of the established democratic polities in the world. Electoral alliances ensured that the ten per cent threshold for entry to the parliament was not applied and almost 99 per cent of the votes cast for political parties were reflected as parliamentary representation.

The incumbent Justice and Development Party (AK Party), the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), the Iyi Party, the Democrat Party (DP), the Felicity Party (SP) and the Great Union Party (BBP) will be represented in the forthcoming parliament. The parliament will be one of the most representative and inclusive parliaments in Turkey’s political history. So there is no discussion concerning the procedural validity or democratic legitimacy of the election results.

When it comes to gauging the winners and losers of the elections, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan emerged undoubtedly as the biggest winner with yet another crystal clear victory over his political opponents. He received over 52 per cent of the total votes and was successfully elected in the first round as the first president of Turkey under the new presidential government system. Being the dominant political actor who placed his mark on Turkey’s political, economic and social transformation over the course of the 2000s, Erdogan managed an effective campaign and confirmed once again that he retains the confidence of the Turkish electorate going forward as the most credible leader.

Erdogan has been in power as Prime Minister and President for the last sixteen years without interruption and managed to record thirteen election victories. Despite risks of democratic fatigue and popular reaction to some of the government actions by certain social groups, the personal political popularity and societal approval of Erdogan seems to withstand the toughest tests of time. While clinching his latest landslide victory in the presidential elections, he managed to receive nearly eleven million votes more than his closest rival Muharrem İnce. It is really very difficult to cite another political leader in the modern democratic world with such strong and consistent democratic credentials.

The reluctance of Western media to understand and analyze the uniqueness of the deep bond between Erdogan and the Turkish society lets them to confuse unrivaled democratic legitimacy with authoritarianism. The Turkish President displays exceptional capacity to create a popular blend of socio-economic stability, structural transformation, improved public services, increased living standards and identity politics which is translated into sustained electoral success.

But it was also interesting to note that for the first time in these elections there was a ten per cent gap between Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (52 to 42 per cent) which indicated a performance divergence. Although the People’s Alliance, comprising the AK Party (295 MPs), MHP (49 MPs) and BBP (1 MP), which was born out of the popular resistance to the July 15 coup attempt clinched a clear parliamentary majority, Erdogan in his traditional balcony speech on election night frankly expressed that he received the ‘message of the electorate’ and will oversee a thorough post-election analysis.

So far, taking electoral demands, reactions, or signals swiftly into account through rational and well-researched analyses has been one of the greatest strengths of Erdogan. Therefore, it is pretty likely that he will gather detailed reports concerning the dynamics that affected AK Party votes in certain cities as a result of candidate selections for the parliament, performance of local administrations, or certain economic policies. Therefore, the post June 24 process will witness Erdogan’s multifaceted attempts to oversee a great transformation in the institutional structures of the Turkish state, while keeping the electoral strength of his AK Party in check going forward to the municipal elections next March.

Sunday’s elections also opened a new chapter in Turkish politics as the new electoral regulations allowed alliances between different political parties, thereby making the ten per cent national threshold obsolete. As voters made it absolutely clear that local representation is important to them, legal reforms could be made to lower the national threshold or create some form of single-member district system in the near future. Incidentally, strategic voting which implied certain shifts among allied political parties was one of the most important factors leading to surprising results in view of preceding public opinion polls. As the presidential government system becomes more institutionalized, it is highly likely that strategic voting and issue-based alliances among different political groups will become more pronounced. Therefore, leading political parties and their leaders will have to adopt their ways in line with the emerging patterns of pragmatic voting behavior.

The Nationalist Action Party (MHP) clearly gained from its alliance with the AK Party and the rising national sentiments in the wake of military operations in northern Syria, gathering critical parliamentary representation with 49 MPs. The leader of the MHP, Devlet Bahceli, was among the winners of the electoral process by managing to keep his party above the eleven per cent mark and maintaining his strategic alliance with Erdogan despite the recent internal division within his party which gave birth to the Iyi Party. In the context of the strong executive that will be formed with the presidential system, MHP has great potential of acquiring a degree of political effectiveness that goes much above its numerical presence.

Another winner who came stronger from the campaign trail and election experience was Muharrem Ince who ran as the presidential candidate of the CHP. Ince, a long-time domestic opponent of CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, was nominated as the presidential candidate in an almost futile race against the towering figure of President Erdogan probably in an attempt to undermine his future party leadership aspirations. Yet Ince as a pragmatic figure who could address the radical secular groups that characterize the backbone of the CHP as well as relatively conservative voters in central Anatolia displayed a surprising performance and personally received eight points higher than his party.

Differing from Kilicdaroglu in his more mature reactions, Ince congratulated Erdogan’s election victory and declared that he will continue his public meetings after the elections, signalling a leadership clash within the CHP. Both CHP and Kilicdaroglu were among the main losers as the party vote stood around a disappointing twenty two percent, while their strategic moves aimed at keeping the Iyi Party and the PKK-affiliated HDP above the ten per cent threshold caused numerous criticisms from within the party organization.

Meral Aksener, the leader of the newly established Iyi Party was another loser as she received unlimited public support from international media during the campign as the chief candidate that could undermine Erdogan’s authority. But despite all the media hype, Aksener’s personal electoral support did not even reach to the ten percent mark and her fragile party might well disintegrate in the parliament. Finally, HDP was another loser as the support for its leader Selahattin Demirtas fell three points to seven per cent, while party votes reached eleven per cent with the controversial tactical support of CHP supporters which was later criticized for legitimizing a terror-affiliated group.

As soon as election results were declared President Erdogan adopted a reconciliatory tone and expressed that the institutionalization of the presidential system will proceed through an inclusive process with the contributions of different social sectors, business actors and NGOs. He is keen to embark on a democratic normalization and development endeavor through which the state of emergency will be gradually lifted, structural reforms in the economy will be swiftly implemented and new productive synergies will be created to galvanize Turkey’s position as an emerging power in the global system. If the Western world decides to support this endeavor by accepting respectable and equitable forms of interaction with Turkey rather than portraying Erdogan as an ‘old-school third world dictator’ and blackmailing him through political or financial means, a positive environment of win-win situations could emerge sooner rather than later.

On 24 June, Turkish voters re-elected President Recep Tayyip Erdogan with 52,6 percent of the votes. His closest rival, the CHP’s candidate Muharrem Ince, received only 30,6 of the votes. By this, Erdogan got 11 million votes more than Ince, who consequently congratulated Erdogan on Monday due to his victory. The CHP Chairman Kilicdaroglu, however, rejected to congratulate Erdogan while stating that the AK Party is the loser of the elections. However, in the parliament, the People’s Alliance, which consists of the AK Party and the MHP, received more than 53,6 percent of the votes and thus achieved a majority with 344 seats in the parliament (AK Party 295 seats and MHP 50 seats, of 600). Interestingly, even Erdogan addressed his party’s parliamentary vote by stressing “we got the message,” while on Tuesday, CHP Chairman Kilicdaroglu, with no surprise and as expected, did not step down even though his party’s parliamentary votes decreased from 26 to 22 percent.

It’s perhaps too early to analyze all components of the election results in depth, but it’s quite possible to address some striking issues. First of all, these elections symbolize the ultimate transformation of Turkey’s system of government into a Turkish type of presidential system. The first step had been initiated in 2016 as the AK Party and MHP proposed a constitutional change, which was accepted by a majority in the referendum held on 16 April 2017. Now, the majority of Turks once again voted in favor of the new system by rejecting the opposition parties’ offer to turn back to a parliamentary one.

The majority of Turks once again voted in favor of the new system by rejecting the opposition parties’ offer to turn back to a parliamentary one.

The second striking issue concerns Turkey’s political stability. Apart from the fact that now eventually eight political parties will be represented in the parliament and cause a democratic diversity, the strict division of the executive and legislative branches will not cause any problems for the executive presidency. Furthermore, the fact that the President’s ministers cannot be selected from MPs anymore will cause a rather professionalization of a rapid and effective governmental acting.

The third issue is about the chronic wishful thinking of foreign media representatives. During the recent election period, we witnessed once again that several foreign media outlets disregarded various fact-based issues while supporting above all CHP’s candidate Muharrem Ince and his political campaign. It’s also not a secret that HDP’s candidate Demirtas and recently the Iyi Party’s leader Mrs. Aksener were supported by both foreign media outlets and politicians.

Although Iyi Party entered the parliament, Mrs. Aksener herself, due to not being an elected MP, will be out of the parliament and most probably her leadership will be questioned by other party leaders.

Although Mrs. Aksener’s party entered the parliament, she herself, due to not being an elected MP, will be out of parliament and it is most likely that her party leadership will be questioned by other party leaders. Thus, foreign analysts may also stop trying to manipulate their own audience by disregarding, for instance, populist and baseless statements by Muharrem Ince while permanently promoting him. Turkish voters have rejected populist and anti-refugee statements whereas Western voters increasingly favor similar promises – a fundamental difference between Turkish and Western ways of persuading voters.

Election results shows that Turkish voters reject populist and anti-refugee statements whereas Western voters increasingly favor such discriminative promises – a fundamental difference between Turkish and Western ways of persuading voters.

The fourth striking phenomenon is about the CHP’s chronic problem; that is to say, its lack of credibility. Even though the CHP tried to build a legal “National Alliance” and a de facto alliance with the HDP, it has been unsuccessful in persuading –in particular– Turkey’s conservative voters. It’s obvious that Turkey’s oldest party will never be as strong as to build the government due to its chronic problem of lacking self-criticism with regard to its radical secular past. If the CHP does not make any self-criticism in various fields there is no possibility to win any general election in Turkey. This has been proved once again.

CHP, Turkey’s oldest party, will never win any general election in Turkey if it does not face its chronic problem that of lacking self-criticism.

By not understanding Turkish voter dynamics and their preferences, it’s useless to count on foreign media support that build on baseless populism. But it seems that in the upcoming days the CHP will face a power struggle in order to elect a new party leader. By this, it’s typical for the CHP, that a person, who lost nine elections within eight years, still insist on the party’s chairmanship while commenting on the party’s presidential partial successful candidate Ince by saying that the voter turnout for him had been “below expectations.”

Turkey has entered a new era with a new system of government. It would not be wrong to state that the main objective of the opposition parties, which was to block Erdogan from winning in the first round and to cause a “divided government” between the legislative and executive branches ultimately ended in a fiasco.

The June 24 parliamentary and presidential elections resulted in a great victory for President Erdogan and the leading AK Party. While the party got 42.5 percent of the votes, President Erdogan has been selected to become the first president of Turkey under the presidential system by winning 52.5 percent of votes.

The MHP, the alliance partner of the AK Party, got 11.2 percent of the votes and passed the 10 percent threshold contrary to the claims of opinion polls. As a result, the People’s Alliance got the majority of seats in parliament. On the contrary, the Nation Alliance consisting of the CHP, the Iyi Party, and the Felicity Party faced with a disappointment because of the results.

The alliance could not get the majority in the parliament and none of the presidential candidates of this alliance succeeded in the elections. While the members of this alliance were aiming to push President Erdogan into a second-round runoff against Muharrem Ince, the presidential candidate of the CHP, the elections ended in the first round with the victory of Erdogan. Above all, the turnout in the elections was higher than 85 percent, which proves the health of Turkish democracy compared to other democracies in the world.

While the results of the elections are analyzed, it is seen that despite the sixteen years of experience in office, the AK Party is still the only party who can manage to get votes from various circles of society. Except from Igdir, Tunceli, and Hakkari, the party got MPs from all provinces, which show that the AK Party is the only party successful in bringing different groups together. Additionally, the party increased its votes in 17 provinces most of which are in Eastern and Southeastern regions of the country. Thus, contrary to some claims, the party still gets the great majority of votes from these two regions and Kurdish people support the AK Party governments in majority.

Nonetheless, the party experienced some decrease in its votes in the parliament especially in Istanbul, Ankara, Konya, Bursa, and Kayseri. During his balcony speech, President Erdogan stated that they had received the message of voters and would evaluate the results in order to understand the reasons lying behind this fall. In any case, the party obtained a significant victory in its 13th election in the last 16 years.

Another striking result of the election was the success of the MHP in parliamentary elections. While pre-election surveys were claiming that the party would get around 5-8 percent of the votes, the party got 11.2 percent and showed that it was still representing the center for nationalist voters. As its splinter party, the Iyi Party got 10 percent of the votes and fell behind the MHP. These results prove that despite all the manipulations and maneuvers of the Nation Alliance, the MHP can consolidate its voters in elections.

Last but not least, it is obvious that the CHP is the most unsuccessful party in the elections. The party faced with a sharp decline and lost approximately 4 percent of its votes. Because of the ongoing campaign among CHP voters, a significant amount of CHP supporters voted for the HDP in the parliamentary elections. The HDP substituted losses from Kurdish voters with the supports of the CHP and passed the threshold. Nonetheless, the results of the elections show that the CHP is in a crisis now and the gap between the party’s and Ince’s votes creates ambiguity in the future of the party. Thus, the results of the elections show that the leader of the CHP, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, is going to face challenges in holding the party’s chairmanship and controlling party organs in the next days.

In two weeks, Turkish people will go to the polls to elect the members of their Parliament and President. In this process, political parties are still running their campaigns in order to increase their votes. The running AK Party is designing its campaign on the basis of the progress made by Turkey under the AK Party governments. Furthermore, the party also proposes new projects to accelerate this progress in the new era, which is called “the rise.” Nonetheless, some opposition parties cannot keep away from falling into the trap of populism and use populist discourse in accordance with their strategic needs. Because of this reason, it is important to examine prominent dimensions of election strategies of political parties.

Because the AK Party had already initiated its campaign towards the next elections and conducted meetings throughout the country before the announcement of snap elections, it is the most prepared party compared to others. After the snap election decisions, the party accelerated and broadened the scope of the campaign.

Indeed, the party’s electoral strategy has depended on a two-dimensional political space. In the first space, the party prefers traditional methods based on direct contact with masses and visiting people’s houses. It is well known that President Erdogan cares about this method very much and urges party branches to listen to the demands of people face to face. Additionally, the party also organizes mass meetings in each province of the country in order to reach to people as part of this method in the field.

On the other side, the party also prefers to use innovative methods via internet and social networks. All party representatives use social media channels actively especially to widen their voter base. The details of the AK Party’s election strategy are shared day by day on the party’s official website and social media channels. The combination of these two dimensions turns the party’s campaign into a more dynamic and active process. This is one of the reasons that makes the party’s campaign more successful compared to the strategies of other parties.

The main opposition party CHP also uses two-dimensional methods in its campaign strategy. Nonetheless, the gap between the presidential election campaign and parliamentary campaign causes some crisis within the party structure. Because Kilicdaroglu and Ince are conducting their election campaigns separately, they have a contradictory discourse. For instance, they have different opinions about each other’s success and possible vote rate in the elections.

Even if Kilicdaroglu eliminated the intra-party opposition movement cadres, most of who are close to Muharrem Ince rather than himself, the possible scenarios after the elections indicate that there can be another escalation in the intra-party opposition movement to change Kilicdaroglu’s leadership. As a result of this dispute, the party supporters do not want Kilicdaroglu to get ahead of Ince during the election campaign. For this reason, Kilicdaroglu had to cancel the joint meetings he planned to have with Ince. Additionally, Ince’s use of populist discourse in the campaign causes Kilicdaroglu to remain in the background. Thus, it is possible to say that this duality in party politics may bring another escalation in intra-party opposition after the elections.

Other political parties also use diversified political campaigns. The MHP pays attention to direct contact with people rather than organizing large-scale meetings. The Iyi Party, on the other side, tries to introduce itself to the masses and designs its campaign on this basement. All parties will maintain their campaigns until the elections. However, according to YSK rules, pre-election restrictions will be implemented by June 14 and parties will have to re-organize their campaign strategies according to these restrictions.