Two successful football players of the German national team, who are both of Turkish descent and were born in Germany, posed for photos with Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in London. Following this, the head of the German football federation (DFB) criticized the national team players while German media outlets and nearly all major political party representatives –also German chancellor Merkel– subsequently commented on the issue in a similar negative and critical tone.

Regarding the major criticisms of Ilkay Gundogan and Mesut Ozil, besides racist comments on social media, three arguments and exaggerated positions are striking.

First of all, it’s addressed –above all by German politicians with Turkish origin– that the two national football players are German citizens and consequently they should, according to them, have nothing to do with the Turkish President, whom Gundogan called “my President.” According to this argument, both players’ president is only the German President, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, whom the two players later also met, most probably due to the collective mobbing and weird pressure-like environment by German political, sports and media circles. Besides the fact that Gundogan has dual-citizenship and consequently the Turkish President is legally also his President, it’s a populist and meaningless request to force a person with a so-called “hybrid emotional identity,” consisting of both Turkish and German components, to accept only one country’s identity.

It’s also not a question of loyalty to pose for a photo with a President but rather an act of freedom of opinion and expression. Furthermore, the debate becomes more hypocritical, irrational and exaggerated when social media users and media outlets cast doubt on the “Germanness” of the two. While last week many media representatives focused on the alleged doubtfulness of Ozil’s and Gundogan’s Germanness, no one in Germany addresses the same issues when, e.g., ethnic German politicians, who have very close relations with foreign political leaders, meet these leaders. These Germans are perhaps criticized for their political positions but no one evaluates them with regards to their Germanness. Similarly, following the release of the photo, some right-wing and nationalist commentators even addressed that Ozil does not sing the German national anthem. According to this point of view, this reveals additionally that Ozil is actually not a “real German.”

The second major criticism is about the meeting’s negative effect on the “integration process” of people with a migration background. Both football players are actually good examples for successful integration in Germany, unless assimilation is the main goal of this process. Apart from that, some stressed that both guys were not aware of what they are doing or talking about. This argument though is very insulting, above all, due to meaning the lack of their mental capacity. However, as the Vice President of the Federal Parliament rightly addresses this point –and as the only one among German politicians– football players also have the right to speak and to interfere in issues apart from sports.

The third criticism concerns the claim that football players are instrumentalized by President Erdogan for the elections on June 24. It is also difficult to understand this argument because even if the football players would actively support the President and his policies, which was not the aim by meeting him, there would be no legal and other barriers–except the exaggerated attitude by German authorities. And what would the DFB do as a consequence and against the position of even two-thirds of Germans, who don’t support the idea to kick Gundogan and Ozil out of the national team?

Excluding two of the most successful football players right before the World Championship because of political and media pressure? Furthermore, the right to freedom of opinion protects not only ideas or positions of domestic issues, it’s a phenomenon having a universal meaning. Though, the issue gets very often disregarded when people with Turkish roots are at stake. For Turks, the behavior of politicians and even DFB representatives, who told Gundogan and Ozil that there act was not appropriate and that one has to “talk” with them, gets perceived as an act of arrogance. People ask; who gave these people the right to judge about the position of other people –Turks- and even ideas?

One should keep in mind that Turkey goes head to head with Germany in the battle to host the European Football Championship in 2024. This could also be another reason regarding the discussion initiated by the head of the German DFB. Nevertheless, the country has a diverse potential which is also represented in its successful national football team. There are many professional German football players with Turkish origin who feel themselves belonging to both Turkey and Germany. Nearly forcing these people to decide for one of the two countries, is not the best option German society would prefer. German institutions, media outlets, politicians and intellectuals should rather prevent the recently increasing nationalist discourse from developing itself hegemonic among German society. By this, one should also stop abusing the integration process in a strange disguise and in particular with regard to German citizens with Turkish roots.

Is it not bizarre: even before French President Emmanuel Macron welcomed his guest Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Friday 5 January, in Paris – for what after listening live on air to the press conference were very good bi-lateral talks indeed – that some in Europe’s anti-Turkey lobby had already pressed the panic button, pre-event and pre-press conference!

Probably shocked to witness the Turkish government not only continuing with, but now bringing its successful 360 degree foreign policy (back) to Europe, too, anything seems apparently justified to erect roadblocks.

It is however a shrinking group of self-styled Turkey ‘experts’ who would not hesitate to whenever, wherever – and even if the topic has got nothing to do with Turkey – somehow manage to utter negative statements about whatever contemporary Turkey is up to.

Rather alarmingly they continue to find a number of willing hosts and thus multipliers, unfortunately. My case study today follows. Why would otherwise a very successful European television channel – Euronews – reserve airtime? At stake: a broadcast from the day before President Erdogan took off for France and now available in a printable online summary, ‘What next for EU-Turkey relations?’ quoted Mr. Marc Pierini, an analyst with Carnegie Europe.

Someone with so many years of being on location in this enterprising nation should basically know better but here is what he said yesterday and what was still online as the two President’s prepared to meet before their press conference which kicked off at a few minutes after 1600 hours local time: ‘On the question of negotiations between the EU and Turkey, I don’t believe the visit will bring progress because the dismantling of the rule of law, in the context of European values, is now enshrined in Turkish law.’

If this well-respected commentator would have only waited until after the meeting as from the onset President Erdogan’s trip had a totally different agenda anyway.

Macron and Erdogan seal deals, re-vitalize ties

Please note: this is an opinion piece and not a factual, minute by minute summary of President Erdogan’s trip to Paris. Shortly before his departure the president told reporters in Turkey that today’s face-to-face was a vital step in the furthering of bi-lateral relations, as well as for peace and the wider region in general, too; French commentators pre-event focused besides others on defense (industry) issues and the relevance to maintain contact plus Syria and the fight against terror. Turkish colleagues had mentioned Jerusalem, immigration and many other bi-lateral concerns besides the items already listed above. Yes, some in Europe referred to Erdogan’s visit (plus the Germany trip by Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu the day thereafter) as a charm offensive, but this is a totally different linguistic style and seen from a journalistic perspective still very much acceptable.

Before the two leaders addressed the media a number of protocols were signed, most notably Eurosam which concerns a consortium involving France, Italy and Turkey with regards to Turkey’s very own missile defense development capacities yet with so much wider economic and strategic relevance. Another priority protocol signed, which will be put into effect between Turkish Airlines THY and Airbus allows for closer cooperation in a sense of financial guarantees and acquiring new Airbus airplanes.

President Macron spoke first highlighting the importance of cultural, intellectual but as well strategic bi-lateral relations. The fight against terror, the economy and the on-going crisis in Syria were stressed. With a view to Turkey’s full EU membership Macron said that Turkey must stay solidly anchored to the EU and Europe. His guest in turn recalled that his country was by now waiting for 54 years outside the EU’s doors and that it is understandable when many of his citizens display EU fatigue.

But it seems that the Turkish delegation did not travel all the way to Paris to obtain a fixed date for EU accession. He and his delegation came to talk hard talk; talk tangible politics and this is exactly what he achieved, statesmanlike yet frank, same as his French host.

Economic and defense cooperation, agricultural cooperation and the fight against terror paired with the wider regional situation including Syria topped both leaders’ agendas.

The Turkish president came across as a real statesman. I would of course not say Emmanuel Macron did not, but somehow I got the impression that Ankara talks regional and global threats and politics whereas France still talks more Europe. Erdogan warned of global terror threats by DAESH but as well by FETO and the PKK, and discussed Jerusalem and the Palestine question and the United Nations.

Macron acknowledged that due to its 9000 kilometers long border with Syria and Iraq it would be Turkey facing (terror) threats first.

Both leaders need one another. Macron can gain regional and global stature via Turkey; Turkey can gain renewed influence in other European capitals via Paris. Both nations’ business communities prosper as a windfall profit so to speak. Both nations’ civil societies become closer to each other as another bonus.

Gardeners of terrorism

A term coined by the Turkish president during the press conference is important. He referred specifically to those supporting terror either professionally including journalists or otherwise as the gardeners of terror. What he probably meant was that there is a core, but a much wider soft periphery of people who under various disguises float ideas either outright promoting, or latently supporting terrorism and that his government has started to locate, and judge those people by means of an independent judiciary.

Coming back to my opening paragraphs and if an Open Letter would be allowed incorporated into this short analysis: ‘Dear Sir, what would your proud nation do if heinous terrorists and coup plotters bomb your nation’s parliament, kill innocent citizens and plan on establishing a military dictatorship? Imagine your nation would do the same as the Turks hopefully re-gain control – how would you punish the perpetrators, the criminals, the murderers and above all else, their sympathizers who might still be plotting for a second try? Would you sit idle and wait for exactly this to happen? And what if a journalist misuses her or his professional immunity to actively support those coup plotters, either before, during or after the attempt to destroy a nation’s democracy? Would you let her or him walk free as one profession must be exempted from the rule of law? Turkey’s rule of law was not abolished by the government post-coup; it was almost destroyed by the coup plotters themselves instead. It did not work out. Turkey more than ever belongs to Europe and Europe more than ever needs a strong Turkey. Faithfully yours…’

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan held a joint press conference with Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin after a meeting held in Sochi, Russia.

President Erdogan arrived to the Russian Black Sea resort of Sochi on Monday morning. This is Erdogan’s third visit to Russia and the sixth meeting with Putin this year. The two leaders discussed Russian-Turkish bilateral relations, the joint fight against terrorism and the Syrian peace settlement.

Erdogan stated that relations between Ankara and Moscow were pleasing as they have reached “a very advanced level.” During the visit an agreement to focus on political rather than military solutions for Syria was also made.

Improvement in trade relations

Putin underlined that bilateral relations between the two states have been restored since the downing of the Russian warplane by Turkey over the southern Turkish border, two years ago.

He added that the two sides are likely to fully compensate the decline that occurred in the trade volume over the last year. The reason behind this optimism is that the trade volume between Turkey and Russia has increased by 36 percent in the first 9 months of 2017.

Emphasizing that certain limitations should be lifted in order to accelerate the increase in trade volume, Putin told reporters that during the meeting with Erdogan, they discussed in detail the issue of removing remaining restrictions on agricultural products.

Affirming his counterpart, Erdogan said that “in order to reach the target we declared as 100 billion dollars, we have to remove all obstacles including the visa before our businessmen. It is of great importance that the visa exemption is restored.”

Turkey’s Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant to be launched in 2023

President Putin stated that the issues of strategic cooperation were also discussed at the meeting and that the construction of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant is currently on the top of the political agenda.

He said that the construction by Rosatom will begin soon, and that the projected date for the completion of the plant is 2023 – the 100^th anniversary of the Republic of Turkey.

Focus on a political solution in Syria

The two leaders also discussed regional and international issues, including recent developments in the Syrian crisis.

“We believe that the Astana meetings and de-escalation zones have contributed to a certain extent to reduction of violence in this region,” Erdogan stated.

“We have agreed that at present, grounds allowing us to focus on the political solution of the [Syrian] issue have emerged,” he said, also pointing out that Ankara stresses the importance of the joint statement by Putin and his US counterpart Donald Trump on Syria, issued after the recent contacts of the two leaders in Vietnam.

Putin agreed that the joint work of Russia, Turkey and Iran as guarantors of the Astana peace settlement process for Syria had already given results. He emphasized, however, that the long-term stabilization efforts in Syria should be strengthened, especially with regard to a political settlement.

During Putin’s visit to Ankara on Thursday, many issues were laid on the table including Syria, northern Iraq and bilateral relations.

During a news conference delivered by Putin and Erdogan, Erdogan told reporters that the two parties had “discussed regional issues including Iraq and Syria. We both agree on the territorial integrity of Iraq and Syria.”

While new peace talks for solving the Syrian crisis were laid by the UN earlier this week, Erdogan said that “As Turkey and Russia, we have reconfirmed our determination to maintain our joint will and close cooperation to find a political solution for the Syrian conflict.”

In reference to the referendum that took place in KRG-controlled areas in northern Iraq, Erdogan re-emphasized that this vote had “no legitimacy” in terms of the Iraqi constitution and international law.

Syria

In regards to the process in Syria, Putin stated that the establishment of de-escalation zones in Syria have given “significant momentum” to the Geneva process, referring to the peace talks between the Syrian regime and opposition envoys.

Thanking Erdogan for his commitment and effort to solve the Syrian issue, Putin added that “it was really difficult to carry out the workings of these de-escalation zones.”

During a meeting in Kazakh capital Astana on May 4, the guarantor countries – Russia, Turkey and Iran – signed a deal to establish de-escalation zones in Syria.

S-400 payments and bilateral relations

Both Erdogan and Putin said that they had a “productive” meeting and exchanged views on the areas of regional politics, trade and energy.

Erdogan mentioned that the two leaders agreed to boost economic ties even further, noting that the trade volume between the two countries had increased over 22 percent in the first seven months of the year.

He reiterated Turkey’s desire to increase mutual trade volume up to $100 billion.

The S-400 defense missiles that Turkey purchased from Russia have been on the security agenda not only for the two countries but for NATO and the western security alliance.

The S-400 is Russia’s most advanced long-range anti-aircraft missile system and carries three types of missiles capable of destroying targets including ballistic and cruise missiles.

It can track and engage up to 300 targets at the same time and has an altitude ceiling of 27 kilometers (17 miles).

On Friday a Russian presidential aide confirmed that Moscow has received an “advance payment” from Turkey for the S-400 missile defense system.

Earlier this week Turkish Defense Industry Undersecretary Ismail Demir confirmed that the delivery of the missile system would begin within two years.

While once a close ally with the Kurdistan Regional Government, the Turkish administration had urged the Kurdish administration to postpone the referendum and sit at a negotiating table with the Baghdad government.

The US has also maintained this position, claiming the independence referendum will harm the fight against terrorism in the Middle East.

Turkish President Erdogan has called the independence referendum as a “betrayal” emphasizing that “You will be left in the middle anyway, from the moment we start implementing sanctions.” “It will be finished when we close a valve. All your income is over.”

The decision to hold the referendum has not only diminished relations with Turkey but also with Iran, that the country has already closed its border with northern Iraq.

Speaking in Ankara, President Erdogan said “the moment that [Turkish] trucks do not work in northern Iraq, they will not be able to find food and clothes.”

He added, “Frankly, we did not give credence until the last moment that Barzani would make a mistake like this.”

“This means that we were wrong. The decision, which was taken without a prior consultation or meeting, is a betrayal to our country in an era where our relations were at their best level in history.”

The President re-iterated comments that he made earlier, claiming that the referendum was unconstitutional and lacked international support.

The only country recognizing and supporting the idea of an independent Kurdistan is Israel. Concerning this, the President asked “Who will accept your independence? Israel? But the world is not constituted only of Israel.”

In regards to Israel being the only country supporting the referendum, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu also stated that “Israel’s support alone will not be enough for the KRG. No one’s support will be enough. No one will side with them the next day.”

In an interview aired live on 24 TV news networks, Cavusoglu re-emphasized that “saying ‘we support Iraq’s territorial integrity’ is not a statement in vain. If Iraq appeals to Turkey with such a request, we will provide support to Iraq for protecting its territorial integrity.”

The Foreign Minister had already warned the KRG administration that if any Turkmen residents in the disputed territories are targeted that the Turkish military will intervene.

In most recent deelopments, Turkey’s General Consulate to Erbil announced on Wednesday that from Friday 29 September onwards, flights to and from Turkey from Erbil and Sulaymaniyah will be paused.

The statement released informed that this matter includes Turkish Airlines, AtlasGlobal and Pegasus – Turkish companies that operate flights from and to northern Iraq.

The maneuver comes as the KRG refused to hand over airports to the Baghdad administration.

The terror in Rakhine State has once again emerged on the political agenda. Since 25 August mass atrocities against the Rohingya Muslims have been noted by the UN, indicating that these crimes can amount to crimes against humanity.

Following the crimes committed by the Myanmar security forces and Buddhist mobs, including mass rape, murder and gang violence, Rohingya Muslims escaping violence have begun seeking refuge in Bangladesh.

According to the latest survey of Inter Sector Coordination Group (ISCG), an information hub for the agencies working with the Rohingya issue in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 429,000 Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh since the 25^th of August. 145,000 have taken refuge in the camps while 196,000 Rohingya are still staying on hills and under tents. According to estimates, 88,000 are living with relatives who had left previously.

An issue that has been raised regarding the accommodation of the Rohingya in the refugee camps is the sanitary and living conditions. In fact, many elderly are noted to die on the way or arrive sick to the camps. Those that are currently living in the camps are close to death for lack of sanitary drinking water and muddy living conditions.

Hope for assistance: ASEAN fund may be used to help

The atrocities committed against the Rohingya Muslims have occupied the political agenda for a couple of weeks now, and has reached peak as many world leaders called for the international community to take action during the United Nations General Assembly this week.

While Turkey has maintained the lead in providing humanitarian assistance to the Rohingya in need, as the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), accompanied by First Lady Emine Erdogan, delivered 1,000 tons of aid, lately the Philippines explained that the ASEAN trust fund may be used to help persecuted Rohingya fleeing to Bangladesh.

Secretary Catalino Cuy of the Interior and Local Government, who chairs the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime, announced the move after the closing session in Manila on Thursday.

According to the Minister, the mass exodus of the Rohingya from Myanmar to Bangladesh can be categorized as irregular movement and therefore can potentially benefit from the trust fund.

Buddhist terror?

In spit of discussions surrounding the Rohingya crisis, this matter has emerged on a different extension: it is not being labelled “Buddhist terror.”

The President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, highlighted this matter during a speech made at an intercultural event in New York hosted by the Turkish American National Steering Committee (TASC).

While harshly criticizing the use of “Islamic terror” in world media and political discourse, the President stated that “nearly 1 million Rohingya are being subjected to genocide and are fleeing to Bangladesh,” “we never said it was Buddhists who killed them. This is indeed the case, but we never put it as such. Now I call on those who want to endear Buddhists to the world: What gives you the right to say ‘Islamic terror?”

In criticism of those labelling Daesh as an “Islamic terrorist group,” Erdogan highlighted a double standard between Islam and other faiths by asserting, “whoever kills a soul, it is as if they have killed entire humanity. This is among the principles of our faith. Nobody should dare associate Daesh with Islam or Muslims. It is a terrorist group.”

Since August 2017, the crimes taking place against the Rohingya have once again gained an international dimension.

The Rohingya, which has been described by the United Nations as the world’s most persecuted peoples, have faced heightened fears of attack from the Myanmar military and Buddhist mobs since 2012.

In latest reports, the UN has documented mass gang rapes, killings – including infants and young children – brutal beatings and disappearances committed by the security personnel.

UN investigators have also labelled such violations as crimes against humanity.

Since the beginning of the outbreak of the crisis, the government of Turkey has led the way in providing humanitarian aid to the refugees that have crossed the border to Bangladesh. Latest reports state this figure to be around nearly 400,000, while approximately 3000 Rohingya have lost their lives on their struggle to escape the violence.

After the visit by TIKA, assisted by First Lady Emine Erdogan, where 1,000 tons of aid was delivered to the Rohingya Muslims who had fled violence, President Erdogan raised the issue at the UN General Assembly claiming that the international community has remained silent once again “just like it did in Syria.”

While the de facto leader of Myanmar, Aung Sang Suu Kyi, a former Nobel Peace recipient did not attend the UN General Assembly due to increasing criticism from the international community, she said on Tuesday that her government will grant access to international observers in the conflict-hit Rakhine state.

While official statements indicate an open investigation and freedom to provide aid, the Myanmar government have reported attempts of Buddhist mobs to destroy a ship carrying aid to the displaced people in western Rakhine.

According to a press release from Suu Kyi, the riot began on Wednesday when around 50 people forced staff of the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) to unload the aid from a ship at a jetty in Rakhine state capital Sittway.

8 people have been detained for interrogation after police dispersed a crowd comprising around 300 people by firing warning shots and water cannons.

US to provide aid to those displaced

While British Prime Minister Theresa May announced earlier this week that the UK government will stop providing military assistance and training to the Myanmar army, the US announced on Wednesday that it would provide nearly $32 million in humanitarian aid in order to help address the ongoing Rohingya crisis.

“The rapid influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees has stained resources and overwhelmed humanitarian agencies and local authorities,” the US State Department said in announcing the new funds.

The aid will provide a range of needed services including emergency shelter, food, water and health assistance.

Further, the statement by the State Department added that “the United States calls upon all parties to allow for unfettered humanitarian access to people in Rakhine State, Burma [Myanmar], and we also encourage other donors to join us in providing additional humanitarian assistance for those affected by the crisis.”

Total US humanitarian funding for internally displaces people in Myanmar and refugees since last October now stands at $95 million.

Iraq’s Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) is set to hold an independence referendum next week, which has drawn severe criticism from both Turkey and the US.

Residents in provinces controlled by the KRG are due to vote on September 25 on independence from Baghdad.

The oil-rich province of Kirkuk is among the contested areas where the vote is planned.

Regardless of calls for negotiations before the referendum, Barzani has announced that he will not be able to agree terms with Baghdad.

The KRG President continuously called for Baghdad to provide an alternative to the referendum if the Iraqi government wanted to see the referendum postponed. However, recent announcements are in directions that suggest the two parties will only sit together after the referendum has occurred.

Barzani stated that “Baghdad has failed to provide alternative solutions,” so therefore “we will sit at a negotiating table after the referendum.”

He also added that becoming a full autonomous state “can take up to two years.”

The central government of Iraq is opposed to the poll, claiming that it would affect the war against Daesh, cause instability and violate the Iraqi Constitution.

The referendum was also on the agenda during the 72^nd session of the UN General Assembly. During his speech, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called on northern Iraq’s KRG to suspend its referendum for independence, stating that it would further engender instability in the region.

Baghdad and the regional government need to achieve compromises “on the basis of territorial integrity and the realization of the ideals to build a common future,” Erdogan told UN members.

“Steps such as demands for independence that can cause new crises and conflicts in the region must be avoided,” he said.

Potential sanctions

Following his speech at the UN, talking to reporters, Erdogan also warned of sanctions against the KRG if they intend to proceed with the planned referendum.

“We have always supported” the KRG, Erdogan told reporters. “We think this approach of theirs amounts to ignoring the Republic of Turkey, which has stood by them and counted them as a close ally.”

“The cabinet will undoubtedly evaluate this situation and assess possible sanctions, which will not be ordinary,” he warned.

Since violence erupted in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, the UN has stated that an approximate of 421,000 Rohingya Muslims have crossed from Myanmar to Bangladesh since August 25.

“Many of the new arrivals, who walked for days throughout jungle in intense heat and monsoon rains, are already sick and malnourished by the time they reach the teeming settlements of Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh,” Joel Millman, spokesman for the UN’s International Agency for Migration (IOM) told a news conference at the UN in Geneva on Tuesday.

More than 170,000 newly arrived Rohingya refugees are yet to receive primary healthcare services Millman added.

The refugees are fleeing a fresh security operation in which security forces and Buddhist mobs have killed men, women and children, looed homes and torched Rohingya villages. According to Banglades, around 3,000 Rohingya have been killed in the crackdown.

The World Health Organization launched an urgent immunization program on Saturday to vaccinate 150,000 newly arrived children.

The Rohingya, described by the UN as the world’s most persecuted people, have faced heightened fears of attack since dozens were killed in communal violence in 2012.

Further, the international organization documented mass gang rapes, killings – including infants and young children – brutal beatings, and disappearances committed by security personnel. In a report, UN investigators said such violations may have constituted crimes against humanity.

Humanitarian assistance

In response to the crimes occurring in Myanmar, the Turkish government led humanitarian assistance to Rohingya Muslims. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), with the assistance of First Lady Emine Erdogan, delivered 1,000 ton of aid to those fleeing violence.

While Turkish President Erdogan has repeatedly called for the end to the violence, he maintained his position during the 72^nd session of the UN General Assembly.

In his speech, Erdogan stated that “just like Syria, the international community has not given a good account of itself” in regards to helping Rohingya Muslims.

Erdogan continued claiming that “if this tragedy [in Myanmar] is not stopped, the history of humanity will face another dark stain.”

Further, President Erdogan claimed that the lack of international action confirmed the “relevance of the re-structure of the UN, and the Security Council,” elaborating the fact that “the world is bigger than five.”

De facto leader of Myanmar, former Nobel Peace recipient, Aung San Suu Kyi, did not attend the UN GA due to increasing criticism involving her government in an ethnic cleansing.

Diplomatic response

As a response to the increasing violence against the Rohingya, UK Prime Minister Theresa May announced that the UK will “stop all defense engagement and training of the Burmese military.”

The UK is suspending all its engagement with Myanmar’s military until the action against the country’s Muslim Rohingya minority is halted, British PM said Tuesday.

“We are very concerned about what is happening to the Rohingya people in Burma [Myanmar]. The military action against them must stop,” May told the UN GA in New York.

Noting that “too many vulnerable people” had to flee for their lives, May said: “Aung San Suu Kyi and the Burmese government need to make it very clear that the military action should stop.”

“The British government is announcing today that we are going to stop all defense engagement and training of the Burmese military by the Ministry of Defense until this issue is resolved,” she added.

Last year, the UK spent around £305,000 (some $412,000) as part of a training program provided to the Myanmar military on democracy, leadership and English language. The program offered by the Ministry of Defense does not include combat training.

Myanmar blocks resolution on Rohingya

Following the absence of Suu Kyi at the UN GA, the government of Myanmar also blocked a resolution at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Authored by Indonesia, the resolution “expressed concern over the humanitarian crisis in the region and urged all parties to respect the rule of law, exercise maximum self-restraint and stop the ongoing violence against the Rohingya in Rakhine state.”

While governor Suu Kyi has spoken out and denied involvement of the military in the crimes against the Rohingya, questions still arise as to the reason why she is reluctant to operate with the international community.

Ahead of the 72^nd session of the United Nations General Assembly, President Erdogan, Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, Deputy Prime Minister Recep Akdag and Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces Hulusi Akar have begun their visits in New York.

Rohingya

In spite of crimes that are taking place in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, Turkey has led the effort in humanitarian aid. With delivering aid through the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), assisted by First Lady Emine Erdogan, Turkey has delivered 1.000 ton of aid to the Rohingya Muslims.

While official figures are unknown, it has been reported that over 400,000 Rohingya have crossed the border to Bangladesh. While the de facto leader of Myanmar, a former Noble Peace recipient, Aung San Suu Kyi announced that she will miss the UN General Assembly as criticism on her handling of the Rohingya crisis grows, President Erdogan is expected to deliver a speech highlighting the attempt of ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya, urging the international community to get to action.

Erdogan: UN in need of structural reform

During the groundbreaking ceremony for the building of new Turkevi (Turkish House) center in New York, President Erdogan highlighted in his speech that the UN needs “structural reform” in order to make it more inclusive and ensure that it is able to fulfill its mission towards world peace.

“Despite all it shortcomings, the UN remains the sole global umbrella organization where everyone can make their voices heard and seek solutions to their problems,” the President said. “However, the world is not the world during which the UN was founded.” Erdogan stated that the structure of what is arguably the most impactful UN organ, the Security Council, is unjust, resulting in a global organization that is unable to perform its duties as a vanguard of world peace.

“The UN needs to be reformed so that it can adapt to a changing world,” Erdogan said. “Today, reforming the UN is on the agenda. However, that reform is not what we understand from the word ‘reform.’”

His speech at Turkevi was referring to a reform-themed meeting on Monday at the onset of the UN General Assembly attended by U.S. President Donald Trump.

Trump, who had promised UN reform as one of the goals of his four year tenure said during the meeting that the organization suffered from “bureaucracy and mismanagement.”

Erdogan has on numerous occasions said “the world is bigger than five”, a reference to the five permanent Security Council members: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

P5 countries have abused their veto power to defend national interests, rendering the UN dysfunctional in face of global crisis. The most recent example has been the Syrian war, which has continued for 7 years, and resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people and the displacement of millions.

 

The PKK rally in Cologne, Germany, on September 16 raised questions once again on Germany’s democratic standards and commitment to bilateral relations with Turkey.

The PKK, listed as a terrorist organization by the US and by the European Union, resumed its armed campaign in July 2015 regardless of government efforts to sit around a table and negotiate solutions. Since resuming its armed campaign, the PKK have been responsible for the deaths of some 1,200 Turkish security personnel and civilians, including a number of women and children.

The rally in Cologne saw a mass number of PKK members and sympathizers gather, chanting hatred against the Turkish President and freedom for the leader of the terrorist organization, Abdullah Ocalan.

While German federal elections are on the brink, and since an anti-Turkey political atmosphere has been evolved during political campaigns, allowing the PKK to hold a rally during this time has only served to deteriorate relations further. During the election campaigns German politicians including Merkel and Schulz called for the re-negotiations of Turkey’s membership bid to the EU.

While the government have been salient in ensuring a peaceful relationship with Germany is maintained, acknowledging that the elections climate has given rise to tensions, in response to the PKK rally in Cologne, Turkey summoned the German ambassador to Ankara.

In a statement published, the Foreign Affairs Ministry stated: “We condemn the organization of a rally in the German city of Cologne by the extensions of the PKK terrorist organizations, and the allowing of terror propaganda. We have voiced our reaction in a strong manner to Germany’s ambassador to Ankara, who was called to the ministry.”

Turkey’s fight against the PKK

The Turkish state have continued with their counter-terrorism policies and have, according to the Interior Ministry, neutralized 46 PKK terrorists in the past week.

In a statement detailing operations held between Sept. 11 and Monday, the ministry said: “During the operations, a total of 29 terrorists were killed; 11 of them surrendered while six others were captured alive.”

The operations were held in Diyarbakir, Mardin, Igdir, Sivas, Siirt, Bingol, Tunceli, Hakkari and Sirnak; 28 shelters and 49 improvised explosive devices were also destroyed.

The independence referendum for Kurds in northern Iraq is set to take place on September 25 despite international disapproval. Masoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Regional Government insists on pursuing the referendum knowing that neither Turkey nor the United States support the decision.

Ankara and Washington

There have been many arguments as to why the two countries do not support the proposed independence referendum. While the US has been a long advocate of Kurdish autonomy, President Trump has stated that the timing of the referendum is wrong and that it will negatively affect the fight against Daesh. Moreover, he has called for the KRG to maintain diplomatic dialogue with Baghdad, something the US is willing to lead and observe.

Being a neighbor, the independence referendum will have a highly significant impact on the domestic and foreign politics of Turkey. Not only due to regional stability depending on the territorial integrity of Iraq, the domestic fight against the PKK also has the ability to be shaped by the independence referendum in northern Iraq. While relations between the KRG and Turkish state have been maintained on stable levels, the potential fear of the PKK hijacking an independent Kurdish state has always remained salient. Continuous remarks and warnings have been issued against the KRG from both President Erdogan and Prime Minister Yildirim, urging the KRG to defect from their decision to hold the planned referendum.

United Nations

Other than Turkey and the US, the United Nations Secretary General has also warned against the Iraqi Kurdish referendum. Gutteres stated that the unilateral decision to hold the independence vote ‘would detract from the need to defeat Daesh,’ underlining the worries of Turkey and the US.

“The Secretary-General believes that any unilateral decision to hold a referendum at this time would detract from the need to defeat ISIL, as well as the much-needed reconstruction of the regained territories and the facilitation of a safe, voluntary and dignified return of the more than three million refugees and internally displaced people,” Stephane Dujarric said in a statement, referring to the Daesh militant group.

Iraq

With the unilateral territory and sovereignty of Iraq at stake, Vice President Nouri al-Maliki warned the KRG of creating a ‘second Israel’ in northern Iraq. Israel has been the most prominent country in support of the referendum, as it sees a Kurdish state as an end to its own isolation in the region.

With the latest developments, the Iraqi Supreme Court has ruled to suspend the Kurdish referendum on Monday 18 September until it makes a final ruling on the case at the request of Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.

The office of the Iraqi PM Abadi said that he filed the court case against Kurdish President Masoud Barzani and the Kurdish parliament speaker Yousif Mohammed.

The statement said Abadi called on the court to not allow “any region or province to separate from Iraq.”

On 15^th September, the Iraqi Kurdish parliament voted to hold an independence referendum planned by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), which is currently opposed by Baghdad, Turkey and the United States.

The resolution passed by an absolute majority with 65 out of 68 deputies in the chamber, while three MPs rejected the resolution.

The referendum is due to take place on 25 September 2017.

Ankara and Washington call for the suspension of the referendum

Both Ankara and Washington have urged the KRG to call off the independence referendum, on the basis that it will increase the isolation of Kurds in the region and will affect the fight against terrorist organizations.

While the US has long been a supporter of Kurdish autonomy, it claims that the current referendum is not suitable due to its timing. It claims that the referendum will further de-stabilize the region and affect the fight against DAESH.

Moreover, President Donald Trump has called for the KRG to engage in serious dialogue with Baghdad, which Washington “has repeatedly indicated it is prepared to facilitate.”

In attempts to persuade the KRG, US envoy Brett McGurk visited Masoud Barzani, leader of the KRG, in order to call off the referendum and to engage in a new diplomatic initiative.

Likewise, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has claimed that the initiated referendum lacks reason and experience. In a statement made, he stressed that Turkey would not allow steps that would threaten Iraq’s territorial integrity.

In addition, Prime Minister Binali Yildirim called the Iraqi Kurdish region’s decision to hold an independence referendum a “false step.”

The independence referendum carries importance for Turkey not only due to potential territorial changes in the region, but also in concern of its fight against the PKK, which is recognized as a terrorist organization by both the US and Europe.

The Turkish government had commenced to negotiate with the PKK in order to resolve the most prominent issue that it inherited since the very first years of the Republic: the “Kurdish issue”. As a result of Erdoğan’s initiative in 2009, negotiations between the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and the PKK started. After a while, transcripts of proceedings between MIT and the PKK in Oslo were published in a daily. At the time, nobody knew that these were leaked by FETO, which had infiltrated the state and established a parallel structure over 40 years. Only two things were known about this organization then: firstly, it was a religious congregation with a significant financial power that opened schools all around the world and possessed multiple media outlets and business associations. Secondly, they had racist tendencies towards Kurds that were made apparent by their media outlets and speeches by Fetullah Gülen.

Known for being comparatively more sensitive towards Islam than western parts of Turkey, not many in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions really liked Gülen’s congregation due to their racist tendencies. Moreover, the majority of Kurds who still preserved the medrese and dergah traditions (traditional educational and religious institutions) inherited from the Ottomans didn’t perceive the said congregation as “religious” and didn’t find its leader’s residence in the US ordinary. Even though FETO infiltrated the bureaucracy, military and universities in the region, they were only able to gain a few followers among the people.

On February 7, 2012, during the early hours of the day, a news flash: Istanbul’s Specially Authorized Prosecutor Sadrettin Sarıkaya who was conducting an investigation into the PKK-linked KCK organization, requested MIT Undersecretary Hakan Fidan to come to the courthouse on Thursday. I have to repeat this as it isn’t a situation that could be comprehended at the first. Try to think of this event occurring in the UK. The then Prime Minister Erdoğan and his government initiates a reconciliation and peace process and a prosecutor in Istanbul calls the head of MIT to the courthouse as a suspect!

http://thenewturkey.org/fetos-civil-administrators-and-their-trips-abroad-before-the-coup-attempt/

Istanbul’s Specially Authorized Prosecutor Sadrettin Sarıkaya personally called MIT Undersecretary Hakan Fidan, former Undersecretary Emre Taner, former Deputy Undersecretary Afet Güneş and two other former MIT employees and demanded they give statements as a part of the KCK investigations. The prosecutor was accusing Fidan and his colleagues of having committed a crime for being part of the negotiations with the PKK in Oslo. There was another interesting situation. On the same day, the Prime Minister was in Istanbul to undergo a medical operation, which the public did not know about. However, due to security concerns, the time of the operation was changed. For this reason, when Hakan Fidan called the Prime Minister he was able to talk with him. Erdoğan sensed something foul about the situation and told Fidan not to go to the courthouse and give a statement. Even though Erdoğan said on TV after the incident, “They would first arrest the head of MIT and then me. I had authorized the head of MIT. So, they should personally call me to the courthouse”, nobody – with the exception of those who were interested in the Kurdish issue – cared much about this statement. It was widely known that the prosecutor was close to FETO. However, the incident was perceived by many as the group’s exaggerated sensitivity towards the Kurdish issue rather than a Gülenist attack on Erdoğan and the state.

The Gezi Park incidents in June 2013 followed this event. The protests were initially started by people whose concerns were environmental and who objected to a construction project that was to take place in a park in Taksim. Yet, it didn’t stay as a protest by environmentalists. After a little while Kemalists, later joined by the Alevis, joined the protests alleging that “their lifestyle was under threat.” It became apparent that FETO had a finger in this incident. Gülen and his organization tried to provoke the protesters with their associates within the police force through the use of violence. Zekeriya Öz, a fugitive Gülenist and a former prosecutor, tweeted the following on this subject: “If the PKK had participated in the Gezi Park protests, those who are governing now wouldn’t be in their seats. I don’t know who ordered them, but the PKK didn’t join.”

There were other prominent Gülenists that were trying to spark new conflicts by provoking the protesters that were completely organized over social media. For instance, a renowned Gülenist fugitive Emre Uslu, who now lives in the US, tweeted that PKK militants turned a car over which had female passengers with headscarves in Maltepe, Istanbul (however, such an event didn’t transpire). Efforts to evolve street protests into a civil war through constant provocations were apparent. While Gülen’s media outlets openly supported the Gezi Park protests, the Gülenists changed their tune towards the end when a group in İzmir vandalized their school. Participating in the Gezi Park protests with various reasons and motives, the majority of the youth seemed unaware of this effort to exploit the situation.

We started to hear that a new wave of street protests similar to the Gezi Park protests were to take place in November. These could’ve been just a rumor, of course. Still, I had heard this from an academic who lived in the US and from a journalist that had ties with FETO. The Gülenist journalist had said “I don’t know if 10 or 15 soldiers will be killed, but something will happen and Erdoğan will go.”

6 months after the Gezi Park protests, on January 9, 2013, three women including Sakine Cansız, who was one of the founders of the PKK and who supported the peace process, were killed at the Kurdish Information Bureau in Paris. These killings took place right after the government announced that they were negotiating with Abdullah Öcalan for the resolution of the Kurdish issue. This incident pitted the two sides against each other. It was a sensitive and fragile issue as after all there were negotiations with a terrorist organization and the Turkish public’s top enemy Abdullah Öcalan. The person who was caught by French security forces had a trace of gunpowder on his coat. His name was announced as Ömer Güney. According to the information gathered from the French security forces, Güney was close with the terrorist organization to an extent that he could be deemed a PKK sympathizer. This information consolidated the theories that it was an intra-organizational execution. There was great outrage and this outrage poured onto the street. The funeral of Cansiz in Diyarbakır was attended by tens of thousands of people.

Eleven months after the murder, the December 17-25 operation that was conducted by the Gülenists within the judiciary, security forces and media aiming to depose the government with the accusation that it was corrupt took place. For the first time, regardless of their political views, all witnessed and became aware of the intimidating operational capacity of FETO. During those days, Gülenist media outlets started to spread disinformation that MIT was responsible for the murder in Paris. Moreover, they alleged that Ömer Güney was actually a member of MIT. Yet, almost nobody cared about this subject as there were more pressing issues present.

In January 2014, PKK-affiliate KCK stated that the murder of the three women was carried out by FETO’s members within the state and that Ömer Güney was actively engaged with Gülenists. Ömer Güney, who was to be tried after a two-year long investigation by the Paris Prosecutor’s Office, was taken to a hospital for an ailment in his brain. In January, just one month before his trial, he died. It was later discovered that Ömer Güney was visited by three individuals from Turkey and that those individuals were FETO members.

Then, the terrible event known as the Kobane incident took place. Using Daesh’s attack on Kobane and the alleged inaction by Turkey as excuses, the leader of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) Selahattin Demirtaş and his colleagues called for countrywide streets protests on October 7. I said to myself “this must be the second Gezi Park protest that was being discussed.” Protesters built barricades and engaged with the security forces. 50 died and 682, 139 of them police officers, were wounded. 1,113 buildings, including 25 district governor offices, 67 police headquarters and 29 political party offices, were damaged.

One of FETO’s media outlets, Zaman Daily’s Editor-in-Chief Ekrem Dumanlı visiting Diyarbakır’s Mayor Gülten Kışanak and their open support for HDP while the aforementioned events were taking place were intriguing. When news of the visits by HDP deputy Ahmet Türk and former HDP deputy Nazmi Gür’s paid to Fetullah Gülen in 2014 in Pennsylvania was heard, it astonished many. There were many news pieces on FETO providing intelligence to the PKK and deciphering the code names of state operatives within the PKK. How the PKK dug trenches in many cities, especially in Diyarbakır, in order to start a war despite the people’s objections was made clear after the July 15 coup attempt. The FETO-member military officers and pilots bombed the Parliament with F-16s that flew from Diyarbakır. FETO militants did whatever they could to both provoke the public and enable the PKK.

Two years after these events two HDP deputies, one of them in prison, made two statements. These two statements are unprecedented, considering HDP’s disposition in the last two years. In his interview with journalist Ruşen Çakır, HDP deputy Sırrı Süreyya Önder said the following: “October 6-8 Kobane events might have never taken place, because the ‘prevalent state perspective’ [AK Party] was foreseeing solidarity with Kobane. I will be extremely clear about this; the said solidarity was obstructed by FETO-affiliated generals whose roles in the July 15 coup attempt is apparent. They put an extreme pressure on Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. Now, generals who commanded the units in Sur, Nusaybin and Cizre are being tried as the perpetrators of the coup attempt. I have seen how these generals obstructed the solidarity between Turkey and Kobane-Rojava.”

Accused of “being a member of a terrorist organization,” “inciting to commit crime” and “inciting the public to unlawful meeting and demonstration,” HDP deputy Ayhan Bilgen made a similar statement very recently during the session of his trial at Diyarbakır 5^th Heavy Penal Court:

“October 6-8 was a demonstration of a civil war in this country. Who incited these conflicts must be investigated thoroughly. It should be investigated whether these were the same people who wanted to depose the elected government on July 15.”

The fog of war is slowly fading, yet unfortunately it isn’t possible to talk about a social base that would support the reiteration of a peace process, not in the short-term. FETO is an important component of this issue and so is the PKK. How these two terrorist organizations came together after years and their role in all that transpired must also be taken into account.

While the July 15 coup attempt and the immediate aftermath produced a unified synergy in favor of democracy, in the year since then this has not been the case. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) in particular initially stated they were against all kinds of coups, yet lately they have made certain unjustifiable allegations that could cast a shadow on the process of uncovering the truth about the night of July 15, 2016.

The most obvious indication of a unified anti-coup synergy was the spontaneous reaction by Turkish politicians on July 15 and July 16, and the Yenikapı Demonstration on August 7. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım and the Chairman of Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Devlet Bahçeli announced that they were never-ending advocators of democracy in all circumstances. CHP Chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu also made similar strong statements against the coup attempt. The main catalyst for this active resistance against the coup attempt was in fact the message conveyed by President Erdoğan via Face Time that night, when he called for a unified national reaction.

The next day, all politicians formed a more unified nationalist stance against the coup attempt. Chief of the General Staff Hulusi Akar too attended parliament at the moment, and was an indispensable component of this anti-coup bloc. In the session, the Chief of the Parliament İsmail Kahraman said “our national anthem is our manifesto and we are all united nation.” Prime Minister Yıldırım said “all those who are involved in the coup attempt are traitors, regardless of their military ranks” after thanking all political politicians for their support. Kılıçdaroğlu said “this is definitely a coup attempt against our Republic and our traditions.” Bahçeli too said that “with the coup attempt, coup collaborators embedded into the Turkish army were identified and clarified.” HDP Chairman Selahattin Demirtaş was not able to attend the parliamentary talks as he was out of the Ankara; however, HDP spokesman İdris Baluken asserted that they were against all kinds of military coups.

The most critical aspects of a joint declaration passed then by the four political parties’ was: “the condemnation of the coup attack against the people and the parliament” and “the protection of the national will by four main political parties in spite of their political differences.” Namely, high political tension among political parties before the coup attempt transformed into a unified national stance against the coup, especially in the first days.

In this atmosphere, the Yenikapı bloc was formed not only by political parties but also by the people, who came from various ideological segments of the society. The most prominent aspect of the Yenikapı bloc was the sharp stance against all kinds of coups and a clarity about the identities and aims of the perpetrators. A national stance, one that included the cooperation of civil and military institutions, soon emerged against FETO, whose mafia-like organization and illegal actions were uncovered. Unfortunately, this unity started to crumble in a short period of time. After the national declaration at the parliament, politicians reiterated anti-coup messages for days; however, the CHP and HDP’s hesitant disposition in this matter distanced them from their initial political reflexes.

The Yenikapı Demonstration on August 7 was organized as the second platform to demonstrate national unity against the coup attempt, after the first one in parliament on July 16. Yet, the HDP was the first to stay out of this second unified platform. Demirtaş made unjustifiable accusations about the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) involvement in the coup, both while he was in Turkey and abroad. Hence, the HDP once again fell into the trap of illegal activities, just like it had with its treatment of Kurdish politics, with its disposition towards the coup attempt. Idris Baluken’s tweet: “AKP-CHP-MHP partnership isn’t new; it’s an alliance against Kurds since June 7 with the excuse of the survival of the state and fight against terrorism” was the confirmation and declaration of the HDP’s excluding itself from the anti-coup alliance. The HDP’s absence at the Yenikapı Demonstration was also a sign of their unsustainable image in the new path of Turkish politics.

On the other hand, the CHP Chairman Kılıçdaroğlu declined to attend the Yenikapı Demonstration initially, saying “Erdoğan tried to increase his political influence on the people through criticizing the opposition party.” However, after Erdoğan and Yıldırım’s insistence, the CHP chairman changed his mind saying “we will attend the Yenikapı demonstration for the same reason we were at the parliament on the night of the coup attempt.” At the same time, he underlined that he would continue to be a legal part of the Turkish politics by accepting the invitation. The MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli announced that they were against the coup attempt, and beyond taking part in the demonstration, they also supported the government in these difficult days without wavering.  Bahçeli maintained his stable political stance behind the AK Party during the Yenikapı Demonstration and during the constitutional referendum campaign. The MHP saw itself as an important proponent of the political and institutional change the AK Party wanted to see in Turkey.

As a part of his “No” campaign in the lead up to the 16 April referendum, and a part of his general “anti-Erdoğan” campaign, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu tried again to discuss unproven speculative details of the coup attempt in the public sphere and thus he took unexpected risks both socially and politically. CHP politicians abused clear evidences of the coup attempt for their inter-party politics. By reiterating claims first made by Fetullah Gülen that “the coup was planned and controlled,” the CHP’s view converged with that of FETO.

These statements by Kılıçdaroğlu became a signal of just how marginalized he had become from the national political scene. In order to counteract Erdoğan’s politics, Kılıçdaroğlu started to voice uncertain statements that downplayed the treacherous and violent aspects of the coup attempt. Abstaining from the anti-coup bloc thus was a calculated political mistake, and the balance of national unity was tipped against the HDP and CHP politicians who involved themselves in that alliance.

In the CHP’s report on the July 15 Coup Attempt, the expression “controlled coup” was reiterated. These implications and disinformation about the coup attempt have created a controversial discourse that is also harmful to the fight against these kinds of illegal bloody attacks. In any case, these allegations circulated by the CHP did not bear fruit, and were seen by the public as more attempts by the party to criticize the AK Party’s policies.

What is being done by the CHP and HDP is actually an attempt to downplay the government’s success in thwarting the coup attempt through inter-party political quarrels. Ultimately, the CHP’s allegation that the government – which was in fact the main target of the coup attempt – was responsible for July 15 was viewed by the people as simply a part of the party’s constricted politics.

While theoreticians, who analyze world politics through media continue to guess what will happen throughout the year by looking at the New Year’s cover of The Economist, another magazine has been clearly conveying the developments to its readers without any encoded messages by events and people put on the cover. Considering the closest ones to home, this magazine covered many topics ranging from the headscarf discussions to Naim Süleymanoğlu’s success at the Olympic Games after filtering them through an American and Western perspective.

The New York-based magazine registered as TIME started to be published weekly in 1923, later spreading to Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia, South Pacific and South America over the years. The only constants of the magazine were its publication language being English and foretelling the future through local and international events or figures that were put on to the cover.

While Charlie Chaplin who made it to the cover in 1925 became a leading force in cinema, Mahatma Gandhi who was on a 1931 cover of the magazine became a world-renowned figure in the following years. Similarly, TIME had put Nazi Germany’s Commander of the Naval Forces Erich Raeder on its cover in 1942 and touched on his passive nature and military blunders. Raeder resigned from his post the following year; “he had no idea about submarine warfare. He never cared about it. He was obsessed with ships; yet, he failed to equip them with a substantial air force. He probably was the weakest link of the Nazi Army” were some of the comments that continued to haunt Raeder for many more years. Talking about the future of computers in 1983 and covering the internet in 1990s, the magazine was the most prominent conveyor of political developments.

Leaders deemed authoritarian by TIME were deposed via coups

Putting coups carried out in many countries to its cover, the magazine came to be known as a “coup-loving” publication because of its disposition towards the events. The 1953 Iran, 1954 Panama and 1973 Chile coups were all narrated as the fall of a dictator and the victory of the public.

TIME never skipped the coups in Turkey, as well. While the magazine is mostly known for its cover with Kenan Evren and the caption “Holding Turkey Together,” this wasn’t the first such incident at TIME.

In 1958, Adnan Menderes was put on the cover with the caption “Turkey’s Premier Menderes.” The magazine wrote the following about Menderes: “With his every year in office, Menderes has become more autocratic, more sensitive to criticism. Striking out in fury at anyone questioning his policies, he has half smothered both the press and opposition political parties under a blanket of repressive legislation.” Analogous to Menderes, Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh prior to the 1953 coup, Guatemala’s President Jacobo Arbenz prior to the 1954 coup and Chile’s President Salvador Allende prior to the 1973 coup were all put on the cover of TIME, while being mentioned in news pieces as “once democrats who resorted to authoritarianism.”

The Army is responsible for upholding the constitution

While it was not on the covers, the coup of May 27 1960 found itself a place in the magazine. Using a photograph which had a group of people celebrating the coup, TIME was justifying the coup with the following passage: “The Turkish army has long scrupulously observed the admonition of the late great Kemal Ataturk that the army should stay out of partisan politics. But it also remembered that Ataturk charged it with guarding the constitution.”

Kenan Evren: Holding Turkey Together

The coup of September 12 1980 was welcomed in the US with the exclamatory expression “our boys did it.” On the covers of TIME‘s Europe, Asia and South Pacific editions of September 29 1980 issue, there was the photograph of Kenan Evren. On the eight page, in a long feature article titled “Holding Turkey Together”, the events leading to the coup and Kenan Evren himself were extracted. The coup was mentioned in the following way:

“After months of rising terrorism by both the extreme left and extreme right, the country allowed itself to settle into a state of unaccustomed relaxation. Civilians waved at tanks rumbling through the streets of Istanbul. Automobile drivers shook hands with soldiers who manned the roadblocks. Storekeepers raised their bombproof shutters for the first time in months, and restaurants began to fill up again in the evenings. Some city dwellers looked far trimmer than usual, simply because they no longer packed pistols inside their coats or waistbands.”

February 28: “Military Sacked Erbakan”

TIME had signaled the postmodern coup of February 28 1997 from the very first days of the Welfare Party. Publishing an article titled “Secular State Suspended?” when the party came into power, the magazine was almost conveying the message “how could you allow such a government” as Necmettin Erbakan’s to the Turkish army. “He [Erbakan] is a populist, pro-Islamic politician whose party did not field a single female candidate in the last elections […] Last week Erbakan became the head of the first Islamist-majority coalition government in Turkey since Kemal Ataturk declared it a secular state in 1923,” wrote TIME.

Not pondering on the decisions of February 28, TIME had praised Mesut Yılmaz who became the prime minister after Welfare Party’s coalition was deposed by the military with an article titled “Mr. Secular”: “Turkish military believes that it is better to be sad than sorry in terms of Turkey’s secular future. President Süleyman Demirel becoming the chair of NATO member countries and Mesut Yılmaz, the leader of the lesser opposition party with 129 seats in a parliament of 550, becoming the prime minister verifies the military’s approach. While some argue that Yılmaz lacks the political mediation skills to form a sustainable government, his decision to withdraw from Libya and his stance against the rise of Islamic fundamentalism dissipate the suspicions. After all, the military sacked Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan for doing the opposite of the said decisions. Moreover, NATO will also love Yılmaz for taking these decisions.”

Perspective on April 27 E-Memorandum: “AK Party is a threat to the public”

TIME‘s comment on the e-memorandum of April 27 2007 was the following: “Military has always been a strong political actor in Turkey and it has carried out four coups against those threatening the country’s secular system since 1950. In 2007, the military published a concealed threat which led to snap elections. Practices like singing hymns in schools instead of mosques and organizing Holy Quran recitation competitions on April 23 which were introduced by the AK Party government were always seen as a threat to the very existence of the republic by the military.

Expediting the crisis by writing a condemning declaration against the ruling party electing the president, the military expected the Turkish voters agree with the generals’ view that pro-Islamic AK Party is a threat to the nation. With the coup attempt that will go down in history as e-memorandum, they hoped to sway the minds of the people as they did before. They aimed to force the AK Party to form a coalition, causing them to share the power.”

On July 15: Cemal Gürsel brought democracy

The coup attempt of July 15 was also covered by TIME and articles praising the previous coups in Turkey were being published on the magazine’s website while the coup was still going on. The article written by Lily Rothman was adding insult to injury even before the people were able to thwart the coup: “In that 1960 coup, General Cemal Gursel was named President, Premier and Defense Minister, leaving the world with hopes that the nation was on its way back to true democracy. It would only be eleven years, however, before a group of military leaders handed a radio newscaster a memorandum to read out loud, telling the people of Turkey that the government had once again ‘pushed our country into anarchy, fratricide and social and economic unrest’ and thus ‘the Turkish armed forces, fulfilling their legal duty to protect the republic, will take power.'”

“The country resists an attempted coup, but the worst could be yet to come”

Even before the coup was over, the magazine was praising the perpetrators and the coup itself. When the coup was thwarted, the first issue of TIME published after the coup included a photograph of Turkish people resisting the coup accompanied by the title “Turkey’s Longest Night”. In the subtitle, however, it was noted that “The country resists an attempted coup, but the worst could be yet to come.” The magazine referred to the coup as an “amateurish attempt.”

While President Erdoğan was described as oppressive, the magazine also argued that there were people in Turkey who wanted the army, the protector of the republic, to take action. The subtitle “the worst could be yet to come” was interpreted as Turkey entering a political deadlock and hinting that increasing polarization might create an armed conflict among the people.

Yet once again, TIME had sided itself with a coup. After all, Erdoğan had made it to the cover of the magazine even two years before the December 17-25 incidents, which acted as a precursor to the coup, and was criticized for allegedly becoming an autocrat.

TIME, praising all the military coups that happened since May 14 1950, Turkey’s transition into multiparty system, seized the opportunity to celebrate the July 15 coup perpetrated by FETÖ, not breaking with its tradition. Even after the coup attempt was thwarted by the people, the magazine continued to publish many articles that implied if the coup was successful, it would be better for Turkey, consolidating its putschist position.

On July 15, 2016, Turkey foiled a military coup attempt orchestrated by the Fetullah Gülen Terror Group (FETO), which has infiltrated every sphere of public life in guise of a simple religious congregation for decades. Motivated to seize power in the country, this insurrection was organized by brainwashed FETO operatives who can use every means possible to reach their goals and have neither discernment nor respect for any values. The FETO cult has been revealed to have a peculiar organizational structure that is unprecedented over the course of the Republican period. On July 15, the Turkish nation was confronted with the most dangerous and shadowy criminal enterprise in its history. Abusing the legitimate means of the state in order to reach their illegal goals and ideals under the protection of global power groups, this cult now poses a threat not only to Turkey, but also to Islam and to the future of the Muslim world.

Along with infiltrating every sphere of life, FETO has also designed and controlled the country’s political life with numerous masterful perception operations that shaped opinions in public and private sector for years. The terror group seized power by manipulating the business world and using intelligence organizations, security-related institutions and the judiciary in line with their own goals and interests. But how could FETO obtain such widespread influence? What kind of tactics and methods did the terror group employ to grow to such an extent? To put it otherwise, how was the groundwork of this deception laid? And most importantly, how could the group’s infiltration activities and coup and chaos plans remain covered for years? How could it be unraveled that FETO is actually a criminal enterprise in guise of a religious congregation?

So far, much has been said with regard to the plotting and deceiving skills of FETO and its leader Fetullah Gülen. FETO’s former attempts to wreak havoc on Turkey include the Roboski sabotage in 2011, the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) operation in 2012, the Gezi Park incidents in 2013, the Dec. 17-25 judicial coup attempt case in 2013, the operations on MIT trucks in Hatay and Adana provinces on Jan. 1 and 19, 2014, and the Kobani uprising on Oct. 6-8, 2014.

The retrospective inquiries conducted in the archives of the judiciary and the security directorate and the confessions of several FETO members following the Dec. 17-25 judicial coup attempts revealed that FETO had developed a chain of ploys to stage a coup as of the year 2008. Having designed and controlled almost all the political movements in the country including the main opposition party, FETO was eventually confronted with the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has constituted the greatest impediment to the terror cult so far. When the chronology of the FETO’s operations and plots are examined in retrospect, this is the first aspect catching the eye in the picture. Also, in the chain of ploys unraveled in the Tawhid-Salaam Jerusalem file that was uncovered subsequently.

In 2009, FETO also influenced the opposition parties. The terror group heavily influenced the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) administration and then intervened in the inner affairs of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) to a serious extent. The MHP establishment could recover from FETO’s harm only after the July 15 attempted coup. Nevertheless, FETO could never achieve its goals regarding the AK Party administration. When the group failed to intervene in the AK Party, it planned to topple Erdoğan during his term as prime minister by sabotaging the government’s Syria policy through wiretapping Erdoğan’s meetings at his Dolmabahçe office with former Syrian National Coalition for Opposition and Revolutionary Forces (SNCORF) President Ahmad Moaz al-Khatib and Hakan Fidan, the chief of National Intelligence Service (MIT). All their ploys were interrelated and complementary to one another. The ploys eventually upset President Erdoğan but never managed to impact his power or determination. Understanding that they would not achieve their goals with their plots in guise of legal case files, the global deception group FETO executed its ultimate plan on July 15 but failed once again.

Intelligence Repository

The most important feature of FETO that turned the group into a global power is its ability to effectively use the intelligence it obtains in accordance with its own agenda. FETO particularly stands out with its high competence in intelligence and espionage activities. The group managed to organize and form networks at every spot promising power, strategic information or money. By organizing within the civil service, MIT, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and the General Directorate of Security, FETO founded a deep intelligence network in the realm of “security bureaucracy.” All the collected data were accumulated in a major intelligence repository. To achieve their goals, FETO used and manipulated the data and documents available in the repository against the persons or groups they wanted to eliminate.

Millions of Wiretapping Cases

FETO’s wiretapping activities across the country reached several million lines. Wiretapping international and national communication traffic of the state administration, the terror cult irrevocably destroyed the data stored in a total of 2,003 computers at police departments in December 2013 and January 2014. The data and servers at the Istanbul Security Directorate were deleted with no possibility of return. Still, some vital data was obtained with regard to the FETO-linked judges and prosecutors endeavoring to justify the illegal wiretappings of FETO, which was motivated by the goal of absolute power. The FETO-linked judges and prosecutors were the key operatives of the terror cult who abused legal means for the sake of the group’s interests.

In the inquiries which began prior to the July 15 and were completed in the aftermath of the coup attempt, it was found that the FETO-linked judges and prosecutors had direct or indirect contacts with other FETO operatives based in the U.S., Spain, Germany, Austria, British Indian Ocean Territory, Sudan and France. More interestingly, it was revealed that the FETO-linked judges and public prosecutors who worked at different units had conversations with the same international telephone numbers. It was also found that some relatives of these judges and prosecutors, who were in charge of Turkey’s most significant investigations over the past 15 years, had economic ties with the business circles now being investigated for financing FETO.

The terror group has a colossal archive which includes technical surveillance and wiretapping records acquired with advanced devices, illegal recordings of public personnel, and information on the students affiliated with the group, including their families. This archive partakes of the group’s memory, encompassing data on each spot inside and outside the country where the terror group has been active. The data recorded by every operative with regard to their own unit are much more profound and detailed than the data found in most intelligence agencies. The comprehensiveness of their archive stems from the fact that each FETÖ member has operated as an intelligence agent.

Liquidation and Occupation

FETO liquidated the targeted persons or groups through a three-phased strategy that has used the personal information available in the intelligence and archive records.

In the first phase, intelligence was collected about the person to be liquidated. The data regarding the targeted person or group was conveyed to the writers holding sway over public opinion and then announced to masses that was merely an allegation.

The second phase was employed after these allegations had a broad repercussion through the journalists affiliated with FETO in the mainstream media. The allegations became controversial topics across the country by means of the reports released by certain media outlets, such as the daily newspapers Taraf, Zaman, Bugün and the TV station Kanaltürk.

In the final phase, some operations to manipulate and shape opinions were made through social media and press organs with an aim to “spur anti-government sentiments,” “mobilize the masses” and “undermine state institutions and bureaucracy.” In the summons issued for intelligence chief Hakan Fidan on Feb. 7, 2012, and in the Dec. 17-25 process, professionally executed strategies were pursued to overthrow the government with these methods.

FETO has innumerable illegal methods to use against its targets, which vary according to the targeted person’s profession, family life, personal weaknesses or social status. The group tried to economically damage its self-employed targets in a way contradicting the free competition conditions in the market or had them audited on various pretexts by its members who had infiltrated the civil service. FETÖ exerted pressure on its targets mainly through its disciples in the civil service.

Some of their methods can be listed as follows:

1- Sending anonymous letters or e-mails regarding the personal or professional life of the targeted person which contain aspersions on the person to discredit them before the public or the institution they work for. Opening civil or penal lawsuits against the persons, imprisoning them based on the aspersions, defaming them in their personal, social or professional life, impeding their appointment or promotion, disrupting their family order, etc.

2- Asserting various claims against the targeted institution or its administrators and employees via internet by using various servers that hide the claimer’s identity. Releasing footage or tapes of the targeted persons which pry into their private life and cannot be verified. Announcing such leaks to the larger masses through their legal offshoots who give credit to the relevant website.

3- Announcing doctored digital data to public that is obtained with illegal methods through the medium of FETO offshoots in security units or strategic institutions.

4- The targeted person is forced either to pay large amounts of “himmet”, the word referring to donations to Gülen charities, or fulfill another demand compelled by FETÖ with threats and blackmail such as releasing digital data on their private life or ostracizing them from their professions by filing a penal or civil lawsuit against them.

All these practices demonstrate that FETO is a terror group which has become organized in civil society for years, infiltrated key state institutions by using different guises and has operated like an intelligence organization connected to international power groups. This is the structure of the terror cult Turkey has been fighting against.

May 2017 has been a historic month for Turkish diplomacy. President Erdoğan had one-on-one meetings with leaders of prominent countries including the US, Russia, China and India. The importance of the month for Turkish foreign policy is due to the number, diversity and timing of meetings, rather than their content. These meetings may have the potential to shape the future of Turkish foreign policy, which has been stuck in a defensive mode since 2014 due to the Syrian Civil War and domestic political issues, and now is expected to take a new direction. Turkey’s active involvement in the Qatar crisis is also an important sign of returning to pro-active diplomacy and mediation efforts.

These proactive steps taken to shape Turkey’s foreign policy vision and its framework were not indicative of a clear strategic disposition, but were tactical attempts to widen Turkey’s shrinking economic and strategic field. For these steps to acquire a strategic quality, Turkey has to make an agreement with at least Russia, the US or the EU, which Turkey has fluctuating relations with.

Turkey’s relations with the US are expected to stay fragile due to Washington’s insistence on supporting the PKK in Syria. With the EU, Germany will be the determining factor but stagnant relations seem likely to continue until Germany’s federal parliamentary elections. Among these three actors, Russia seems to be the most viable option for a positive structural change in the short run.

Whether to cooperate with Russia in strategic terms is a vital question for Turkey. This cooperation has the potential to directly affect Turkey’s relations with the EU and the US. However, contrary to economic relations, Russia seems to be refraining from negotiations with Turkey at an equal level, along with binding diplomatic actions. Ankara’s negotiation with Moscow to buy the S-400 air missile defense system is an important move that has strategic value, but any strategic effort with Russia has the potential to be overshadowed by friction between the two countries when it comes to Syria.

Limitations of Strategic Cooperation

The most prominent diplomatic meetings in May were the ones with the leaders of the US and Russia. The main focus of both the meetings was to manage the effects of the Syrian Civil War on Turkey and limit the support being given to the PYD/YPG. The crisis which emerged with the downing of the Russian SU-24 aircraft by the Turkish Armed Forces in November 2015 ended with Erdoğan and Putin’s meeting in Sochi in May 2016. While the normalization process between the two countries is often described as being complete, there are still disparities in bilateral relations.

Due to their diverging positions with the US and EU, Turkey was forced to take the path of least resistance during this process. Even though Turkey tried to use the relations with Russia as a counterbalance for the strained relations with the West, it could be said that it was not a complete success. Despite the warm messages from the Moscow, Russia has utilized Turkey’s isolation from the West for its own interests.

http://thenewturkey.org/rebalancing-turkey%E2%80%99s-foreign-policy/

Breaking away from this strategic congestion difficult because without a significant detachment from the West, Turkey has little chance to develop a strategic relation with Russia. This kind of disengagement would leave Turkey more vulnerable and in a disadvantaged position as Turkey and Russia’s strategic vision on the Middle East, the Balkans and the Black Sea are mostly contradictory.

Russia would see Turkey’s disconnection from the West as a sign of weakness and a chance to impose its own will. It is also possible for Turkey to have worse tension with Russia than it does today with the EU and the US. Turkey seemingly will have a hard time in overcoming this paradox in the short term. Conducting meticulous diplomacy that does not antagonize any of these actors should be Turkey’s priority.

Despite the disparities on Syria’s future, Turkey and Russia establishing a joint political platform during the Astana Summit is a positive development. Even though Russia takes Turkey’s concerns about the PYD into consideration, it has also kept the possibility for cooperation with the Syrian Kurds on the table. Russia is simultaneously attempting to keep relations with Turkey at a certain level and not letting the US have all the influence over the PYD. For Russia, a partial agreement with Turkey on Syria means counterbalancing Iran’s influence in Syria. Restraining Iran would also prove useful for the regime.

Meanwhile, Turkey having various operations in Syria, such as the Operation Euphrates Shield, which aimed to establish a presence on the field, serves as a potential risk to the relations with Russia. A closer look at this complex web of relations reveals that all actors are trying to counterbalance each other, especially in the context of Syria. Turkey, due to its strained relations with the US and EU, is at a disadvantaged in this game.

Search for Balance in Trade

In terms of trade, limitations on Turkish agricultural exports to Russia were largely removed and a partial agreement reached between Turkey and Russia. Meanwhile, Russia continues to enforce limitations on tomatoes, which are an important agricultural export item for Turkey. After the meeting between the Turkish and Russian leaders, Turkish tourism business leaders were relieved and entered the new tourism season with more hope. The issues in fields where mutual interest is at hand were resolved quickly and the two sides cooperate in many cases; however, it is not possible to talk about similar progress or agreement in strategic issues.

The most important field of cooperation between Turkey and Russia that has a strategic aspect is energy. While multinational platforms like the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization diversify Turkey’s economic and diplomatic relations in terms of both quantity and quality, these platforms offer little strategic value for Turkey. None of Turkey’s strategic priorities can be addressed with a deeper level of cooperation with these organizations.

Turkey’s economy is dependent on the EU, whose member countries account for Turkey’s largest foreign trade volume. While Indian, Chinese and especially the Gulf markets have gained prominence for Turkey, the volume of Turkey’s exports to these countries is still below a level that could compete with trade with the EU. Chinese and Indian markets do not offer a rich potential that could lead to the creation of substantial employment in Turkey in the short and midterm. In terms of exports, Turkey has yet to find alternative markets that can compensate if there are any hiccups with the EU market. Turkey’s fragility in its European relations lies in trade, rather than security and diplomacy. Turkey’s alternatives to the European markets are much more limited than Europe’s. Creating market options besides the European one has become a strategic aspect for Turkey.

A game-changing strategic agreement in terms of economy, security and foreign policy seems impossible for Turkey in the short term. Turkey and Russia’s joint initiative on the de-confliction zones in Syria is an important venue for strategic cooperation. Most pressing issue for the Kremlin is, however, the choice between tactical ally in Syria, the PYD, and a possible strategic partnership with Turkey. Turkey’s most essential dilemma, on the other hand, is to try to achieve a strategic alliance either with the US or with Russia, while keeping which one would be the right choice in mind, to overcome the impasse in foreign policy and security aspects that were caused by the Syrian Civil War. The disagreement of the said two powers causes the elongation of the Syrian war. On the other hand, an agreement between them could leave Turkey out of the loop.

Turkey’s fight against the Gülenist Terrorist Organization (FETÖ) continues. Courts are accepting indictments against suspects which participated in the July 15 coup attempt that left 249 martyred and 2,186 wounded.

After the coup attempt 41,326 people were detained. Among the detainees, there were 2 Constitutional Court, 131 Supreme Court, 43 Council of State and 5 Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors members, along with 2 four-star generals, 6 major generals, 10 lieutenant generals and 184 brigadier generals.

Detainees not giving concrete information about FETÖ indicates that the terrorist organization is still influential. Despite facing life sentences, detainees are not talking or being forced to not talk about FETÖ.

Accused of planning and enforcing the attempted assassination of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Marmaris, and the killing of Erdoğan’s bodyguard Mehmet Çetin, Colonel Şükrü Seymen defended himself in court by saying “I have attempted a coup; even if the punishment is death, I do not regret it.” This defense is important in terms of how FETÖ is organized as Seymen refrained from uncovering who was behind the heinous act of the coup.

Radio Talks Reveal the Bloodthirsty Face of the Organization

The joint indictment on the events took place in the General Staff compound and the addendum of the indictment on Army Aviation Command revealed the bloodthirsty face of the terrorist organization through visuals and radio commands about the detainment of ranking officers by the putschists and slaughter of civilians.

The indictment regarding Army Aviation Command, where putschists lifted off with military helicopters that fired on civilians, clearly states that Gülenist soldiers were informed about the coup attempt prior to its execution. There are striking expressions.

http://thenewturkey.org/the-rise-and-fall-of-feto-in-turkish-politics/

Lieutenant Emre Erkan, a training officer at Army Aviation Command, said “today is the bloody Friday” to his company during muster on the morning of July 15. Ramazan Turgut, who expressed that he was serving as an artilleryman in Cyprus and started to serve at Army Aviation Command as a trainee from April 14, 2016 onwards, said “During the muster at 08:00 on the morning of July 15, Lieutenant Emre Erkan told the whole company that that day was the bloody Friday. We had training at 13:00. I attended the said class.”

Levent Çağrı Çakır also expressed that he attended the muster on the same morning and affirmed that Emre Erkan said “it is going to be the bloody Friday.”

In the indictment, it is expressed that Emre Erkan took the keys of the armory without any record keeping by Quartermaster Özgür Oprukçun. On the very same day, Battalion Commander Lt. Col. Yasin Candemir ordered Emre Erkan to distribute the weapons to the soldiers, Emre Erkan told the soldiers that “the terrorists might attack in the guise of police and soldiers,” and that soldiers collected ammunition and magazines from the room of the lieutenant colonel.

Second Lieutenant Tolgahan Akbuğa said “When we entered the armory, Lieutenant Emre Erkan gave each of us a G3 without looking at their serial numbers.”

Private Mustafa Turan said that Lt. Col. Özcan Karacan, who was tasked with dispatching and managing the helicopters on the night of the coup attempt, was giving orders to higher ranking officers. Turan added that it was obvious Karacan was giving orders to the personnel near the main entrance. “Lt. Col. Karacan came to me and said ‘if any police comes here, they are terrorists in guise. I order you to shoot them; we won’t let them capture here.’ I told him I would rather shoot myself than shooting at the police. He yelled at me and said ‘you don’t know the punishment of insubordination,'” said Turan.

Five Civilian Gülenists at Akıncı Military Base, the Heart of the Coup

The center of July 15 coup attempt was the Akıncılar Military Base. Images of Adil Öksüz, a Sakarya University staff member who led the coup attempt and was revealed to have visited the FETÖ leader Fethullah Gülen in Pennsylvania, with the putschists at the base were included in the indictment.

FETÖ members Kemal Batmaz, Harun Biniş, Nurettin Oruç and Hakan Çiçek were also confirmed to be at the military base. The aforementioned were found out to be in connection with Adil Öksüz and ordering ranking officers at the base despite being civilians, all of which were recorded via security cameras.

Kaygusuz: Hit the police department, destroy the compound

In the indictment on the events that transpired at Akıncı Military Base, there are visuals of putschists bombing Ankara Police Headquarters with military aircraft and radio communication between putschist pilots.

Dispatching and managing F-16 aircraft from Akıncı Base and relaying all attack orders to pilots, Staff Captain Mustafa Mete Kaygusuz ordered Pilot İlhami Aygül to hit the police department and destroy the compound.

An excerpt from the radio conversation between the base and the pilots:

Pilot İlhami Aygül: We are observing the clash in front of the police department.

Mustafa Mete Kaygusuz: Hit the police department, destroy the compound.

Aygül: Roger, we are firing on the area of conflict. Please confirm.

Kaygusuz: Confirmed.

Aygül: Roger. Is the police department compound the first or the second building near ANKAmall? We can also fire on the zone of conflict.

Kaygusuz: Fire on where the conflict is, where concentrated fire is taking place.

Aygül: Roger that. They are firing towards the road from the police department. We are firing on the compound.

Kaygusuz: You’re free to bomb the compound.

Kaygusuz: Have you hit the police department.

Aygül: We will be attacking it in two minutes.

Kaygusuz: Let’s hurry up. One more bomb, two bombs.

Aygül: Come again?

Kaygusuz: One more bomb there.

Aygül: Two bombs for the conflict zone.

Mustafa Mete Kaygusuz later confessed; he admitted that he became connected with FETÖ during his high school years and that he ordered pilots to bomb targets on the night of the coup attempt.

Prevent the Aircraft with the Presidential Seal from Flying

Talking with Oğuz Alper Emrah, one of the indictees of the Akıncı indictment, Ahmet Tosun described the presidential aircraft: “The aircraft you’re to prevent [from flying] is probably the presidential aircraft, it will have a seal on it. It’s a huge aircraft with the presidential seal on it.”

Ahmet Tosun said that the suspect Ahmet Özçetin, the staff colonel who served as the 4th Main Jet Operations Commander, was responsible for the F-16 bombing orders that martyred civilians.

“Ahmet Özçetin told me that the aircraft the president is in took off from either Antalya or Dalaman and asked me to investigate it, tracking the radar,” said Tosun.

Tosun added that the bombing of the interchange, Police Special Forces and Police Aviation Headquarters near the presidential compound, along with the supersonic fly-past over Kızılay and the General Staff compound were ordered by Özçetin.

President Erdoğan was the real target of the putschists

The real target of July 15 coup attempt was President Erdoğan. They were aiming to detain or assassinate him, as it would render their coup successful.

Two F-16s took off from Diyarbakır Airbase on July 12 and photographed the hotel President Erdoğan was staying at. On July 13, again two F-16s under the control of Air Forces Command Intelligence Department scanned the hotel and its vicinity.

Colonel Ali Yazıcı, who was Erdoğan’s Head Military Aide at the time, learned where Erdoğan was staying and relayed the information to Brigadier General Gökhan Şahin Sönmezateş, while departing from Antalya to reach the hotel in Marmaris on the night of July 15.

Statements of the bloodthirsty putschist Zekeriya Kuzu are included in the indictment on the assassination attempt of President Erdoğan, which resulted in two police officers being martyred.

In the indictment, it is stated that former master sergeant Zekeriya Kuzu, who is nicknamed “Pasha” and is the “base imam” for the Çiğli 2nd Main Jet Command Base, said the following to the police officers: “You will go through hell, it’s all starting now. (…) you said you were going to eradicate us, now we will eradicate you; if you even dare to raise your heads, we will kill you. Where is he [Erdoğan], which helicopter picked him up, to which airport he will land, when did the helicopter take off?”

Moreover, it is highlighted in the indictment that the putschists which were the part of the assassination team stepped on the heads of police officers with boots, fired around the officers and brutalized them.

Sergeant Aydın Özsıcak and Lt. Col. Davut Uçum, who were among the assassination team, also became the suspects of a reopened investigation on August 9, 2016 as FETÖ was connected to the death/assassination of Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu and his five companions.

Özsıcak and Uçum were charged with stealing Argus5000 CE and SKYMAP (which has the ability to record) from the helicopter wreck that became the grave of Yazıcıoğlu and his five friends on March 25, 2009; however, the investigation had resulted in dismissal of charges.

Giving his statement to Kahramanmaraş Deputy Public Prosecutor Kemal Yalçın, Özsıcak alleged that him being in the team attempting to assassinate Erdoğan and stealing equipment from the helicopter are “nothing but a coincidence.”

Putschists Coordinated the Dink Murder

Meanwhile, in the indictment of the Hrant Dink murder case, it was revealed that FETÖ planned the murder.

Participating in the coup attempt and captured wounded after the clash at Ankara Gendarmerie Command, Lieutenant Muharrem Demirkale, who is the Commander of Separatist Activities Intelligence Team at Istanbul Gendarmerie Intelligence, was revealed to be coordinating gendarmerie that had a part in Hrant Dink’s murder. Moreover, it was found out that Demirkale spoke with Specially Authorized Prosecutor Zekeriya Öz seven times on the phone the day before and after the murder.

Sergeant Yavuz Karakaya, who was detained on the charge of cooperating with the putschists at the Ankara Gendarmerie Command on the night of the coup attempt, was found out to be observing Ogün Samast and Hrant Dink before, during and after the murder.

FETÖ Dictated Three Books to Obscure the Dink Murder

In order to prove that police officers that are affiliated with them had nothing to do with the Dink murder, FETÖ made three writers write book on this murder. Adem Yavuz Arslan wrote Bi Ermeni Var, while Nazlı Ilıcak wrote Her Taşın Altında The Cemaat mi Var? and Bayram Kaya wrote Kördüğüm: 21 Numaralı Suikast Yolcusu. The FETÖ link with the murder was obscured through the said books.

FETÖ’s Media Organization Deciphered

Investigations into FETÖ’s media organization underscored how the Zaman daily influenced national newspapers and TV channels.

The indictments clearly show that Zaman acted at the behest of FETÖ in the media.

Publishing Deniz Baykal’s sextape, snatching of Adil Öksüz who is the black box of the coup attempt and serving manipulated images of the Hrant Dink murder were some of the operations that FETÖ executed in the media.

The official documents show that 1,000 of the Zaman 2,500 employees were journalists, while most of these journalists worked in various national newspapers and TV channels. Majority of these journalists were placed in various media outlets.

Trained at the Zaman daily, Cihan News Agency and Samanyolu TV, these journalists were put into crucial positions within TRT and many other national dailies and TV channels during the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials.

Between the years 2008 and 2014, almost all of the security and judicial correspondents of various newspapers and TV channels were originating from the Zaman daily. FETÖ realized the perception management through these journalists who were placed in national media outlets. Many other correspondents were polished by FETÖ. Even during the December 17-25, 2015 coup attempt, FETÖ correspondents were actively working in national media outlets.

For instance, let’s take a look at the indictment regarding the Hrant Dink murder case: it is stated that FETÖ placed Ercan Gün, who worked 14 years for Zaman, to FOX TV 11 days before the Dink murder and that the montaged photo of Ogün Samast holding a Turkish flag was published on FOX TV through his efforts.

Working for Zaman since 1993 and staying for 14 years, Ercan Gün’s transfer to FOX TV on January 8 2007, just days before the Hrant Dink murder, is evaluated as a deliberate effort to obscure the evidence. FOX TV News Director Ercan Gün was detained as a part of the investigation on the murder; however, FOX TV administration did not sever its ties with Gün. He is still shown as the news director in the staff page of the TV channel.

Ankara Representative Erdal Şen of Habertürk Daily Helped Adil Öksüz Escape

Originating from Zaman daily, Erdal Şen was revealed to be an active participant of the coup attempt.

Şen helped Adil Öksüz, FETÖ’s “Turkish Armed Forces imam” who was detained at Akıncı Airbase in Ankara only to be released with a suspicious decision, escape. It was found out that Şen helped Adil Öksüz hide in an apartment in the Üsküdar district of Istanbul.

Erdal Şen’s wife Emine Şennur Şen is also Adil Öksüz’s sister-in-law. Emine Şennur Şen was apprehended for using FETÖ’s ciphered communications application, ByLock.

At the Habertürk Headquarters on the Morning of the December 17 Coup Attempt

Administrators of the Habertürk daily and TV channel also attract the attention in the indictment about FETÖ’s media organization. It is stated that administrators who have transferred from Zaman to Habertürk knew of the 17-25 December coup attempt in 2013 beforehand.

Witness testimonies reveal that Habertürk TV News Coordinator Oğuz Usluer, Chief Editor Abdullah Kılıç and News Director Cuma Ulus came to the building at 07:00 on December 17, which was unusual for them, and worked on police summaries throughout the day.

It was also recorded that Usluer, while he was the broadcast coordinator of Habertürk TV, warned Editor Mehmet Yeşilkaya, as Yeşilkaya tried to cut off the reporter who was reading Hakan Şükür’s resignation letter; thus, Usluer allowed the whole letter to be read. Moreover, Usluer referred to the resignation letter as “a manifesto.”

Ankara Representative who published Deniz Baykal’s sextape is apprehended because of a FETÖ link

Yener Dönmez, who founded the Vahdet daily and closed it down after the July 15 coup attempt, published Deniz Baykal’s sextape on the website called Habervaktim while he was the Ankara representative of the Akit daily.

Deniz Baykal was forced to resign from his post of chairman in Republican People’s Party after the publishing of the said images. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu replaced him. FETÖ published images and documents of setup trials on the website Habervaktim.

Dönmez was detained as a part of the investigation into the images that allegedly showed Deniz Baykal. Dönmez was found out to be using ByLock. Moreover, Dönmez confessed that Deniz Baykal’s tape was sent to him by FETÖ-affiliated journalist Cevheri Güven. “Cevheri Güven called late at night. He said ‘something was sent to you, have you seen it.’ I learned that images of Deniz Baykal were relayed to the newspaper’s report line and then we decided to publish them,” said Dönmez. These quotes are directly taken from Dönmez’s statements.

As a part of the investigation into Deniz Baykal’s tape, 37 Gülenist police officers, including Ömer Altıparmak who is the former Head of the Intelligence Department at Security General Directorate, were apprehended.

Images, information and documents of Ergenekon and Balyoz trials are deleted

FETÖ completely deleted the recorded videos, information and documents of the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials.

The indictments regarding Hasan Hüseyin Özese, the Head Judge of Istanbul 13th Heavy Penal Court, and Hüsnü Çalmuk, a fellow judge, both of whom were tasked with the Ergenekon trial and were apprehended after the July 15 coup attempt, clearly state that FETÖ obscured the evidence.

Supervisory Board of Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors found out that the Istanbul 13th Heavy Penal Court irreversibly deleted all information and documents on computers by using the Wipe application before delivering them for inspection.

The court had video recorded all Ergenekon hearings that started on October 20 2008 and ended on August 5 2013. Even during the breaks between hearings, witnesses and secret witnesses were recorded. Through the deletion of the information and documents, along with video records, uncovering of any irregularities and mistrials is made impossible.

After the failure of the 17-25 December coup attempt, FETÖ formatted computers at Istanbul Security Directorate with the Wipe application and deleted the records of illegal wiretappings and technical surveillance.

The second declaration of the coup was to be announced on CNN Türk and FOX TV

The information that Gülenists regrouped after the coup declaration announced on TRT failed and that they wanted to announce a second one on CNN Türk and FOX TV was also included in the indictments.

In the joint indictment on the events which took place in the General Staff compound, it is underscored that the former Commander of Northern Sea Area Command Rear Admiral Ömer Faruk Harmancık, who commanded the coup at the Akıncı Airbase, called CNN Türk, FOX TV and the Honorary President of Doğan Holding Aydın Doğan’s bodyguard on the night of the coup attempt.

The statement of Major General Mehmet Dişli, who is the head of Strategic Transformation Department at the General Staff, is included in the indictment. He testifies that Harmancık said “we have prepared a second declaration and a broadcast vehicle will come soon; we want you to read this” to Chief of Staff Hulusi Akar.

After this exchange, it was found out that Harmancık called the CNN Türk building, which was raided by the putschists at 03:23, at 03:28 and 03:29 on July 16. Moreover, he called the line belonging to Doğan Holding which was being used by the security team in Bodrum at 06:34.

Aydın Doğan was on vacation in Bodrum during the coup attempt. Doğan stated that the line Harmancık called twice was being used by his security detail in Bodrum.

On the other hand, Harmancık called FOX TV’s Ankara office at 06:24. As it is known, the coup attempt in Ankara ended after Hulusi Akar was retrieved from Akıncı Airbase with a helicopter at 09:30.

It was revealed that Harmancık talked with Lt. Col. Ümit Gençer, who dictated the coup declaration at 23:30, eleven times. Ankara Public Prosecutor’s Office is continuing to investigate the communication traffic of Doğan Holding and FOX TV on July 15.

All of the information gathered in the text only covers a part of the statements given to the security forces and the prosecutor’s office. As more indictments are submitted to the courts and more Gülenist putschists confess to their crimes, the background of this bloody coup attempt will be revealed.

In recent years, Turkey’s defense industry has been developing rapidly. At the very beginning of the 2000s, the country’s rate of dependency on foreign industrial suppliers was around 80%. It now is able to create weaponry and systems with its local resources. In this regard, The 13th International Defense Industry Fair (IDEF 2017) was important in demonstrating the development of Turkey’s defense industry.

Turkish firms showcased their weapons and weapon systems. The National Corvette MilGem, National Attack Helicopter T129 ATAK, National Main Battle Tank ALTAY, National Assault Rifle MPT-76, National Combat Aircraft TF-X, Turkish Light Utility Helicopter T625, Armed Hürkuş, Missiles (Cirit, Kaplan, Mızrak, Hisar, Som, Bora), National Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Bayraktar TB2, Anka and Karayel, Göktürk-1 Satellite and Armored Combat Vehicle are some examples.

There are many other ongoing weapon and weapon systems projects like these that have been completed and are being used by the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and the police force. The era of direct procurement from abroad is soon to be over. From joint production and partial design, Turkey evolves towards creating genuine and unique designs.

Strategic Value

The defense industry is actually an integral component of a country’s grand strategy, national security strategy, defense strategy and hierarchy of military doctrines. The success of these strategies mostly relies on military capacity, consisting of national weapons and weapon systems. Therefore, we can talk about the development of military technology in accordance with the aims determined by the hierarchy of strategies.

While the security threats that emerged with the Arab Spring in the Middle East indicated the scope of possible threats posed by states and non-state actors, it also underscored the importance of having and utilizing domestic military technology. Turkey has repeatedly experienced the said strategic value of the defense industry. From the hardships faced before and after the Cyprus Peace Operation to the ones that are faced in fighting terrorism, from direct and indirect embargoes from Western countries to internal and external actors trying to halt the development of the Turkish defense industry, the country has experienced many difficulties. However, despite these past experiences, the Turkish defense industry has started to attract increasing international attention and become a rather hot topic over the last fifteen years. Two Turkish defense firms are now among the world’s top hundred defense firms. According to a 2016 evaluation by Defense News, ASELSAN has risen from 62nd rank to 58th, while TUSAŞ from 78th to 72nd. It should be pointed out that no other member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation is on this list.

Despite being in a better condition than in previous decades, the Turkish defense industry has to employ multiple methods to meet its strategic aims in shorter periods. The defense industry has critical projects for the future; the national combat aircraft TF-X is one of them. There are alternative solutions for Turkey to eliminate the deficiencies in terms of qualified personnel capacity and technical infrastructure in a short time. According to TUSAŞ General Director Temel Kotil, “The TF-X will be a fifth generation combat aircraft. When we develop this aircraft, we will become the fourth ranking country in this field. TUSAŞ will collaborate with BAE Systems for the initial stage of the project. We are planning to have the first flight in 2023 and employ the aircraft by 2029.”

Political Value

In fact, President Erdoğan’s will for the development of national defense industry allowed the sector to become what it is today. He enforced an approach that relied on local solutions and national power to ensure security and stability. In this respect, it was decided to minimize external dependencies with all kinds of incentives and support for the domestic the defense industry. While the rate of domestic resources being used to meet security needs was 24% in 2002, it rose to 41.6% in 2007 and 54% in 2011. Today, it is around 68%. Having 80% locality in terms of the defense industry, which is seen in developed countries, is what Turkey aims to achieve in the shortest time possible.

Fighting against terrorist organizations like the PKK/PYD and Daesh in recent years, Turkey once again observed the necessity of a local defense industry in its struggle for power with regional and global actors. The US’ strategic armament support to the YPG, and Western countries enforcing a direct or indirect arms embargo on Turkey as a tool during times of strained relations are now frequent occurrences. European countries are either not delivering the promised products or doing whatever they can to delay the delivery. Meanwhile, the systems that are being developed entering the inventory to ease Turkey’s anti-terror strategies and extraterritorial operations are necessary for building up a military power capacity. Looking at the transformation in anti-terror operations due to the use of UAVs is a telling enough sign.

http://thenewturkey.org/securing-turkeys-borders-a-proactive-strategy-with-high-tech-approach/

Müjdat Uludağ of the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM) stated the following: “The tensions between countries are undoubtedly affecting defense industry cooperation negatively. Especially countries with powerful defense industries are enforcing an industrial policy which aims to prevent new actors from emerging, just to protect their own positions. Turkey’s priority is to establish a completely independent defense industry. Yet, Turkey is also open to cooperation in the defense industry with allied countries; because the real threat is common issues faced by countries, like global terrorism. Common threats require common resolutions.

Keeping this in mind, our institution continues to have bilateral and multilateral cooperation with many countries around the world. We have ongoing cooperation projects with the countries of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Asia-Pacific countries with developed technological infrastructure, South American countries and allies in the Middle East. Turkey will maintain its win-win policy in these defense industry cooperation strategies. In this respect, we expect more active support from our NATO allies against all terrorist activities that pose a threat to Turkey.”

Nevertheless, it is important to make this a goal not only championed by the political establishment, but also by the bureaucracy. Universities and research centers must be engaged in this process and collaborate with the defense industry. This will ease the development of the defense industry and allow its value to be understood by the public. It is obvious that there are certain deficiencies in the cooperation between the defense industry, universities and research centers in our country, especially when compared to other countries. However, according to Kotil, there are hopeful developments in this field:

“The interest in developing technologies in the universities, innovation, intellectual and industrial property, and entrepreneurship has increased in the recent years, showing a parallel with the diversification of support and incentive programs. In this respect, we can say that industrial cooperation both in our firm and country is rapidly developing. With a proactive approach, various policies are being developed and mechanisms created to strengthen the ties with universities. With the implemented applications, strategic cooperation with universities is expected. In this context, TUSAŞ has R&D cooperation protocols with 25 universities, KOOP (long-term internship) with two universities, integrated education program with three universities and Program for Training Defense Industry Researchers (SAYP) protocol with sixteen universities. As a part of these protocols, we are sharing certain information with university staff in engineering departments and research centers about our technological road map and how to conduct projects together. On the other hand, we are working on cooperation protocols regarding research and education with many other universities. A holistic view of Turkey suggests that the country has more potential in developing cooperation between the universities and the industry. For this reason, we try to understand the expectations of universities. We want to improve our cooperation with mutual trust, long-term common goals and win-win principles.”

Therefore, these kinds of cooperation will have positive outcomes in the future. Providing figures will clarify the importance of the subject: today, only at Teknopark Istanbul, there are 170 R&D firms and their 2,750 R&D personnel started around 600 national projects up to today. Moreover, the numbers of firms, personnel and projects are increasing by the day.

Economic Value

Beside its political and strategic yields, the defense industry also has important economic outcomes. Especially with the incentives for exporting and the development of products that can compete on the international market, the defense industry contributed to the economy of the country. Around $196 million in defense and aviation exports in 2004 skyrocketed to $1.673 billion in 2016. The total defense and aviation turnover of $1.855 billion in 2006 is now around the $6 billion mark. As the figures suggest, the capacity and the income of the sector were at lower levels thirteen years ago. Yet, it still lags behind powers that focus on this sector.

Uludağ evaluated the situation in his following statement:

“Our defense and aviation exports are sevenfold when compared to the 2002 data. While the said rise shows that our defense industry is improving in terms of competence, it also indicates to a huge potential waiting to be tapped. As platforms, we have achieved important exports in land vehicles in the past. We are aiming to reach high figures in exports in the global markets in parallel with our business development plans for ship and helicopter platforms along with UAV systems. To reach this target, we are working in coordination with certain public institutions in providing long-term loans for products by the defense and aviation industry that have high strategic value. Meanwhile, the platforms and systems we produce are being used by TSK and our security forces; this will prove to be an advantage for the firms. Yet, our firms focusing on the international markets and strategically prioritizing their efforts with a holistic outlook is also crucial for reaching higher figures in exports.”

Therefore, it could be said that the defense industry may build up a momentum with steady steps and cling onto the international markets. A $25 billion export target has been set for 2025. While this target may be deemed as impossible in the short-term, it is quite possible with the value-added that will be provided by nationalized production of software and hardware. According to the 2016 report of SSM, SSM has approved 269 projects which amounted to TL123 billion. Looking at the distribution of the projects, it could be seen that 47.58% is for domestic development, 8.18% for domestic direct procurement, 20.07% for R&D, 8.5% for joint production projects, and 10.78% is for foreign direct procurement. Therefore, support for projects that are more local than others will bring the desired economic value with it.

Turkey is the world’s sixth largest armament importer and fifteenth largest armament exporter. According to SIPRI data, Turkey spent $15 billion on its defense budget in 2016. Transitioning from a procurer of weapons to producer of weapons contributed to our exports. Turkey’s leading export partners in terms of the defense industry are the US, Germany, Malaysia, the Gulf countries and Azerbaijan. 34.3% of the exports were done with NAFTA members, 23.7% with the EU, 18.5% with Middle Eastern countries, 8.6% with Far Eastern countries, and 7.5% with CIS countries.

There are many steps to be taken for Turkey to have a defense industry that can compete globally; however, looking at the efforts, we easily can say that Turkey is on the right track. The more independent its military technology, the more powerful Turkey will be. In this respect, the private sector has to contribute more and take the initiative.

Turkey is fighting against multiple security threats in a region mired in conflict. To not have any vulnerabilities in its fight, Turkey has to increase and consolidate its military capacity. In this sense, the defense industry has to adopt the network-centric warfare doctrine and shape its efforts accordingly. On the other hand, there are certain risks that obstruct the national defense industry. The Gülenist Terrorist Organization’s (FETÖ) activities serve as a break for certain crucial projects. Similarly, embargoes enforced by Western countries bring the risk of slowing down these projects. However, the most important risk is that immense efforts to improve the defense industry may be halted by bureaucratic procedures. Despite all the hardships and challenges, Turkey must continue developing its national defense industry and seek ways to accelerate even further.

President Erdoğan’s meeting with US President Trump was overshadowed by the Pentagon’s decision to provide heavy weaponry to the YPG. Meanwhile, Trump’s mind was preoccupied with rumors of impeachment over allegations his administration shared state secrets with Russian officials. Some circles in Washington, on the other hand, tried to prevent the one-on-one meeting of Erdoğan and Trump.

The Pentagon’s hasty decision to equip the PKK/PYD with heavy weaponry was due to a possible revision in the planning of the Raqqa offensive after the two leaders’ meeting. There were no substantial changes in the planned Raqqa offensive, which is being coordinated by the Pentagon, but Turkey was able to relay its concerns about the PYD/YPG and the demographic engineering in the region at the highest official level. Turkey was also able to secure certain guarantees about the fight against the PKK, and made clear the fact it would actively continue its fight against the terrorist organization. Moreover, Turkey emphasized that it wouldn’t stand idle as the PKK/PYD, Daesh, and Iran-backed Shiite militias carried out ethnic and sectarian cleansing in the region.

Trump’s statement underscoring the strategic and military partnership between Turkey and the US was crucial. Even though the Turkish delegation returned to the country with a cautious optimism, this statement was perceived as the herald of a new era in Turkey-US relations, which had been on the decline since May, 2013. No one was expecting all the issues between the two countries to be resolved in an instant, but the image of the two leaders standing side by side was interpreted as the beginning of a more promising period for bilateral relations.

This was not the only indication that the level of understanding and cooperation between the US and Turkey could be on the mend.

Factors prompting the normalization of Turkey-US relations

The normalization in relations between Turkey and Israel, which had been in a crisis since the Mavi Marmara incident, will cause a gradual change in how Turkey is perceived both by the Trump administration, which has been especially sensitive on the issue, and circles that are associated with the Israeli lobby in Washington, which have advocated anti-Turkey sentiments for some time now. While Turkey will continue to advocate for the basic rights of the people of Jerusalem and Palestine, it will be more careful to avoid tensions with Israel. There are concrete efforts to increase the common interests of the two countries, especially in energy, tourism and trade.

Another issue that both Turkey and the US converge on in this new era is Iran’s expansionist policies in the Middle East. In particular, Iran-backed militia forces which are trying to gain ground using a sectarian discourse and ideology are posing a threat to the interests of many countries and local elements in the region. Checking these militias, whose presence is rationalized as a necessary counter to Daesh, brings Turkey, the US and many other countries in the region on common ground.

http://thenewturkey.org/will-the-trump-administration%E2%80%99s-syria-policy-change-after-the-chemical-attack/

Enclosing Sunni countries with a “Shiite crescent” – a policy that was covertly endorsed by the Obama administration to limit the Sunni governments in the region much to the chagrin of traditional allies like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf countries and Israel – is no longer sustainable. The Trump administration, which is yet to take over the control of security and foreign policy from the Obama administration’s military and civil bureaucrats, will realize that cooperation with Turkey could yield more effective results than surrounding the country with terrorist organizations like the PKK/PYD and Shiite militia forces.

Turkey’s success in Operation Euphrates Shield already debunked the myth that the PKK/PYD is the most effective force in the fight against Daesh. If Brett McGurk, the US envoy to the coalition against Daesh, and an Obama administration appointee who has built his own career on the an alliance with the PKK/PYD, and certain CENTCOM officials take a step back, the permanent and constructive possibilities of coordination with Turkey will become more apparent.  Turkey can provide a solution that is sustainable given the region’s sectarian and ethnic patterns, unlike the PKK/PYD, which has only sought to exploit these dangerous fault-lines.

The US’s persistent support to the PKK/PYD is antagonizing moderate Syrian Kurds who are being dominated by the terrorist organization, along with Arabs in Northern Syria who have been forced from their own lands, not to mention Washington’s own ally, Turkey. If the Trump administration is to adopt a controlled chaos strategy in the Middle East, just like the Obama administration, instead of an orderly one, they can continue their alliance with PKK/PYD; however, if the US wants to stabilize the region and win over the allies it has offended, they have to widen their narrow perspective. In this respect, Erdoğan and his team went to Washington with a comprehensive plan.

Another development which may cause the Trump administration to revise its relations with Turkey is the level of popular support President Erdoğan has demonstrated through the constitutional amendment referendum. Certain circles in Washington have been trying to prove that Erdoğan has little support and will not remain in office long, a campaign that began with the Gezi Park Protests in May, 2013. Having emerged with the clear support of the people both in the July 15 coup attempt and the April 16 constitutional referendum, Erdoğan has shown that he is has the backing of Turkey, and he is not going anywhere. Decision makers in Washington, along with leaders of other countries will have to acknowledge this sooner or later.

Erdoğan, at his meeting with Trump, expressed a sincere hope for more cooperation between the two countries, while also highlighting Turkey’s concerns on the road to normalization. Ankara is eagerly waiting to see how Trump will respond to its call. It is still not clear whether the relationship between the two countries is to become strategic in terms of regional politics. Another question that the whole world anxiously awaits the answer to is whether Trump will be left standing after his ongoing power struggle with the Washington establishment.

On Sunday April 16, fifty-five million Turkish citizens will cast a historic vote on the possibility of transforming the Turkish republic from a parliamentary to a presidential system. This change has been a long time coming. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his ruling AK Party have been advocating the transformation for over a decade. Former prime minister and Erdoğan’s mentor, the late Necmettin Erbakan, had advocated the presidential system since at least the 1990s because of the instability of the current parliamentary system. In its ninety-three year history, there have been 65 different governments in the Turkish republic for an average of 16 months for each government. If the stable AK governments of the last 15 years were not taken into account, the average length of each government would be much less.

Ever since the current parliament approved the 18 constitutional amendments for this transformation last January, there has been much tension in the debate but little clarity. The nation has been polarized by the yes “Evet” and no “Hayır” campaigns. Instead of focusing on the merits of the constitutional amendments and the presidential system, most of the criticism has focused on the fears that the new presidential system could serve as a platform for authoritarianism, or worse dictatorship, by the overwhelming personality traits of the strong president.

But to be fair, an objective analysis should focus on the merits of the amendments and the proposed presidential system aside from the character of the sitting president. Once such analysis is conducted, one must assess the proposed changes to evaluate the checks and balance mechanism in the amendments to guard against the possibility of authoritarian rule.

The key argument for a presidential system is in providing political stability for the government, headed by a president elected popularly for a fixed five-year period. In such a system, the government will not be vulnerable to threats of needless vote of confidence in parliament or partisan political maneuvers designed to extract concessions from the largest party in coalition-type governments, which have been the hallmark of much of Turkey’s modern history. The main reason a government in a presidential system is strong is because it would be formed by a popularly elected president, with cabinet members who mostly represent his political ideology and programs, and thus govern in a more harmonious and effective manner.

Even though they have to adhere to the political programs of the president, many cabinet members and senior government officials would often times be non-partisan experts or technocrats, appointed on their merits because of their management skills and qualifications. In contrast, parliamentary governments tend to represent conflicting ideologies, programs, strategies and tactics. Because different ministers in such coalition governments belong to different political parties, or worse, are subject to sectarian or ethnic quotas, it’s not uncommon for one ministry or government agency to be the main obstacle to the implementation of the programs of another ministry or agency, thus leading to confusion, economic stagnation or political paralysis in the country.

Moreover, when a partisan cabinet member takes over a particular ministry, especially a service type, such as transportation, health, or energy, rather than calling on civil servants or career officials, the minister would often appoint his partisan officials in the most important positions within the ministry as rewards to his supporters regardless of the national interest. With the high turnover of coalition governments, this practice becomes endemic, which potentially leads to the spread of government inefficiency and corruption. On the other hand, with its strong grip on the executive branch, a presidential system generates strong bureaucracy resulting in political stability, government efficiency, and potentially sustained economic development and growth.

Furthermore, a presidential system by definition strengthens the separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches of government since members of parliament cannot simultaneously hold legislative and executive positions. This strengthens the role of parliament as a watchdog over the executive branch. On the other hand, the parliamentary system’s weakest point is the blurring of the separation of powers where the government (with most ministers and their deputies being members of parliament) controls both the legislative and executive branches making it almost impossible to hold government officials accountable to the representatives of the people. In short, in a presidential system the accountability function of the parliament is not only restored but also strengthened as potential cover-ups and corruption (as a result of the failure of the government to investigate itself) would be largely curtailed and under check.

Furthermore, the presidential system not only reinforces the separation of powers between the different branches of government but also establishes the appropriate balance between them. For example in the American presidential system, while Congress makes laws and passes budgets, the President could veto any of its bills. But Congress could also override the presidential veto with a two-third majority vote, as each branch can then check the other.

In addition, the interpretation of laws is the domain of the Supreme Court, where both Congress and the executive branch are subject to the orders of the judiciary, while neither Congress nor the President could dismiss a judge. Nor the President could dissolve Congress, or Congress dismisses the President without elaborate impeachment proceedings, followed by a trial in the Senate. In short, a good “checks and balances” system distributes power to the three branches of government in order to limit any potential abuse of power.

Perhaps the area where the presidential system is most effective is in implementing foreign policy. It provides a unified and consistent national security policy making it very difficult for foreign powers to exploit domestic disputes and differences or playing rivals against each other within a coalition government for partisan advantages. On the other hand, because of different policy positions on many fronts such as military interventions, security policy, trade, or foreign relations, coalition governments tend to invoke weak responses or even paralysis, especially on the most contentious issues.

Since the emergence of its fifth republic in the late 1950s, France functioned as a semi-presidential system, with a president largely in charge of foreign policy, and a prime minister, largely in charge of domestic policy. But the system has demonstrated its inherent weakness as both powerful positions clashed repeatedly especially when they represented different political parties. The Islamic Republic of Iran adopted this model in 1979, but abandoned it ten years later when the inevitable rivalry led to confusion, economic instability, political paralysis, and lack of accountability.

However, the underlining assumption of the presidential system is having independent judiciary, government transparency, strong and vibrant civil society institutions, and robust and independent media, not only representing the interests of the citizenry, especially the most vulnerable among them, but also holding all government branches accountable to the people.

On the other hand, the strength of the parliamentary system is in fragmenting political power so that no party or individual could accumulate so much power, especially within a tribal or primitive society, and turn it into an authoritarian regime or repressive dictatorship with little or no oversight. But this genuine concern is dealt with through strong civil society institutions and constitutional safeguards of personal freedoms, civil and political rights, bill of rights including freedoms of expression, assembly, and beliefs, and protections for vulnerable minority communities and political oppositions.

In addition, one way to limit any potential executive presidential abuse of power is to distribute this power to the provinces and local authorities allowing for its exercise over several jurisdictions. Fortunately, Turkey has a long history of having strong local governments with considerable power and effective administration that are subject to periodic, free, and fair democratic elections. For example, Turkey has 81 cities, 30 of these are metropolitan municipalities and others have municipalities and also provinces, while Istanbul has 39 district municipalities, with each elected periodically by their constituencies.

So how do the proposed amendments to the constitution fare with such a transformation? Could the new proposed constitution allow for a one-man rule or a potential dictatorship as the critics contend?

Clearly, there is no doubt that after spending fifteen years as the central figure in Turkish politics, the character and presence of President Erdoğan is dominating and overwhelming. But the proper assessment requires that one evaluate the text of the amendments for the potential abuse of power aside from personal or political calculations or fear of the unknown.

Much of the proposed executive powers transferred from the prime minister to the president are standard and routine: heading the government, appointing ministers, or holding executive power (Article 104). But the new constitution also strengthens the separation of powers in many areas. Any member of parliament must resign if appointed to the executive branch (Article 106).

Parliament can hold any member of the executive branch accountable, including the initiation of preliminary investigations (by simple majority), the launch of official investigations (by three-fifths majority) and dismissal (by two-third majority), which is quite similar to the American system of impeachment (Article 105). While the President could issue executive orders (same as the American system), parliament could annul these decrees by a simple majority (Article 104).

However, the most disturbing aspect of the new amendments is the ability of the President to dissolve parliament (already in the current constitution.) But even this authority carries with it a huge political risk. Because the new constitution calls for simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections (Article 77), if the president dissolves parliament, he would also shorten his term and would have to stand for elections himself, in addition to have the concurrence of three-fifths of the members of parliament (Article 116), a requirement that is much more that any party has ever assembled in Turkish political history.

Moreover, unlike the American constitutional system that requires a two-third majority for a veto override, the proposed Turkish constitution allows the parliament to override a presidential veto with a simple majority (Article 89). But perhaps the most sweeping reforms enacted with the new amendments include the total abolishment of military courts (Article 142), which has a long and ugly history of abuse against civilians. In addition, the president’s ability to declare a state of emergency would be subject to parliamentary approval, while the parliament could extend, remove or shorten it.

While states of emergency could be extended for up to four months at a time, every presidential decree issued during a state of emergency would still need parliamentary approval (Article 119). While the U.S. president nominates all federal judges and Supreme Court justices, the new Turkish constitution allows the president to nominate 12 out of 15 for the Constitutional Court (Article 146) and 6 out of 13 members of the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (Article 159), while parliament appoints the remaining members.

Polls in Turkey vary widely and internal polling of major political parties show a slight edge for the “yes” campaign with about 10 percent as undecided. Hence, the vote for the referendum could go either way. Even though the proposed constitutional amendments would solve many of Turkey’s endemic political problems, there are still concerns and fears of the critics for a potential authoritarian rule, but they have been blown out of proportion. As the response to last summer’s coup has aptly demonstrated, the Turkish public is keen on preserving its democracy, strengthening its political institutions, holding power to account, and is not prepared to cede its sovereignty or future.

The main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) Chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu has made an allegation this week; actually, it would be more accurate to say that he has reiterated an allegation that he had made in January. “On July 15, a controlled coup attempt was realized,” said he.

We have a saying in Turkish which can be roughly translated as “it’s not enough to claim insanity; to be truly insane, you have to blab nonsense.” It seems that the main opposition leader has found his source of nonsense. In fact, the members of Fetullah Gülen’s cult loved this allegation and immediately showed their support. Even though this allegation doesn’t acquit them, they believe that it will eventually catch up with Erdoğan, causing him to lose support. They even could be the originators of the allegation, as it’s not something they haven’t done. They have already fabricated countless contradictory versions about what happened on July 15. Gülen himself and his men have made these claims at various times through different channels both in Turkey and abroad. The most famous is the following: “The junta was organized by Erdoğan. The junta consisted of Kemalist personnel, maybe some of our [Gülen’s] men were also in it; however, Erdoğan was aware of the coup attempt.” I’m not sure whether it’s his original idea or not, but the main opposition leader essentially implied the same: “President Erdoğan allowed the coup which was attempted by Gülen’s infiltrators within the army.”

Let’s suppose that the president was aware of the coup attempt beforehand and allowed Gülenists to attempt the coup in order to uncover and disarm all Gülenists within the state, while consolidating his own power. With this purpose, he has “let the organization which infiltrated the very heart of the republic just pass by.” Are such calculations and risk analyses possible? Who was Erdoğan going to trust? NATO or the EU? The international community would just publish a couple of statements which condemn the coup –that even didn’t happen after the coup in Egypt – and have no practical use. Or, when the junta controlled all garrisons, main roads and bridges, and the headquarters of National Intelligence Organization, Police Special Forces, along with the Parliament, was under attack, with what force could Erdoğan save the country? Did he have any kind of militia? Forget the country; how was he going to save his own life? Did Erdoğan have some sort of metaphysical or diabolic power, according to these allegations?

A true Junta is the successful one!

As far as it could be understood, the main opposition leader implied that a junta in Turkey has to be successful. If he had just made this statement before July 15, he could’ve had a point. As you know, the tradition in Turkey is to open your eyes in the morning to a junta. Whenever Turkey diverges from its assumed role, a junta appears. The junta deposes the government, hangs the prime minister along with some ministers, while jailing and torturing thousands. This was exactly what happened on May 27 1960. Citizens learned that the military seized control of the country at 04:36 on May 27 with a broadcast from Ankara on the radio. The leader of the coup General Cemal Gürsel announced the members of the National Unity Committee which was to handle legislation instead of the parliament. The next day the National Unity Government was formed. A couple of days later, Minister of the Interior Namık Gedik committed suicide, while Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Finance Minister Hasan Polatkan were executed.

The first military coup of Turkey which was carried out after the transition into the multiparty system was nothing short of a shameful event in the young republic’s history.

On March 12 1971, however, a different kind of military coup was realized. This time the military deposed the Süleyman Demirel government with a memorandum broadcasted on the state-run TRT, which was signed by three force commanders and the chief of general staff.

At 03:00 on September 12 1980, the military once again seized the power. Consisting of the Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren and force commanders, the National Security Committee announced the coup declaration via the only TV channel of the time, TRT. The reason was the same as the 1971 coup: “Turkish Armed Forces came together under the chain of command and seized the control of the whole country to fulfill the duty of protecting the Republic of Turkey in the stead of its people, as it is stated in the Internal Service Code.” With the following declarations, commanders were assigned to regions under martial law. At 05:30, notifications signed by the chief of general staff were sent to Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit and Necmettin Erbakan.

It was written “Turkish Armed Forces have seized the control of the state. Your government has been abolished and your parliamentary membership has been dismissed. Please listen to the instructions of the officer who brought you this notification” on the said notifications. None objected. The first ones to be executed right after the coup were the leftist Necdet Adalı and right-winger Mustafa Pehlivanoğlu. Junta Leader Kenan Evren expressed that they were being impartial by saying “we have executed one from the left and one from the right.” Executions of 7000 people were requested, while more than 500 were executed. Moreover, almost a thousand people died of executions, torture, under suspicious conditions in prison or by committing suicide.

Considering all these experiences, Gülen, who still lives in the US, was right to believe that the Turkish government could be deposed with a military coup. This organization which named themselves as the Hizmet Hareketi (Service Movement) and infiltrated the military since the 1980s clearly calculated the following: When a threat to the status quo appeared, there always was a way, even if the other methods were exhausted; to depose the government with a junta. No political party leader had ever resisted the coup; they weren’t able to do so, as the people had never taken to the streets during coups. The tradition was that the people would react against the junta in the first elections after the coup by electing an anti-status quo party. Nevertheless, many components of the democratic system would be damaged more by each coup.

Indeed, Osman Özsoy, one of Gülen’s well-known followers, had answered questions on a foreign TV channel owned by Gülen a month before the coup. The true meaning of the broadcast was understood after the July 15 coup attempt.

“We don’t have to tell everything on the TV screen. I will just say that beautiful days await us. Hectic days await our friends within the Service Movement. Don’t be fooled by the fact that 50% of the people support Erdoğan. I’m a professor of political science, heed what I will say: if the people are told that there is a curfew, none will go out on the streets. Even imams will be afraid to go to attend their mosques. All coups in Turkey were carried out on Fridays.  The people of Turkey don’t have such sensitivity to protect democracy. They are only a crowd. Maybe a couple of leftists will go out on the streets for rights and freedoms; however, none of the intellectuals of the right will go out on the streets. I guess the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has 5-6 million members and you can seize all their properties …”

What was he implying? “We will depose them and seize the power. Because there will be no opposition as none will stand against a coup, including the 50% of Turkey’s population who support Erdoğan.”

None could truly imagine that all kinds of people who love their country, regardless of their view of Erdoğan, would go out on the streets and stand against tanks in most imaginative ways. Erdoğan had a close call; while his plane was lifting off from Marmaris, there was an armed conflict at the hotel he was staying. His bodyguard was killed. There were also bizarre events. A think-tank named Stratfor published the coordinates of Erdoğan’s plane over the internet while he was flying towards Istanbul. There were countless speculations about Erdoğan fleeing Turkey; Gülen’s followers also spread these lies. TRT was captured, Türksat headquarters was bombed. President Erdoğan addressed the public through CNN Türk Ankara Bureau Chief Hande Fırat’s mobile phone using Face Time: “This attempt against the unity of our country will face defeat with the people’s will. They will pay for what they have done and we will not let them reign free. I beseech the people to gather at town squares and airports. I have known no power over the power of the people.” After this 2-3 minute-long address, people from all cities took the streets. You know the rest.

After three coups, a leader stood against the putschists for the first time and called the people to take the streets, which they did. Despite hundreds of martyrs and thousands of wounded, an epic of democracy was realized.

The mother of a young male who was killed by the putschists on the night of the coup said the following to a journalist: “Those putschists had calculated everything. Everything! But they were unable to calculate my son Recep.” The junta failed because of people like her son Recep.

By the way, a little note: a controlled coup isn’t a completely unsuitable concept for this attempt, as there are very concrete suspicions about the international dimension of Gülen’s cult and that they are being employed as a subcontractor for certain forces. At least those who have attempted the coup know who are aiding them. The people have their own opinion as well.

The hotly debated referendum on Constitutional amendments that is to be held on April 16th is not confined within Turkey alone. It also happens to be one of the most important topics that leads the debate among European politics within the framework of the referendum in Turkey.

Why are the European countries and the politicians of the EU so anxious about the amendments to the Constitution in Turkey?

The fact that Turkey’s politics has attracted so much interest in Europe is nothing new. In fact, developments in Turkey have always been important for Europe. This is because since the last days of the Ottoman Empire, a number of European countries have often struggled to exercise influence over Turkey. When looking at the late 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, the Ottoman state was the subject of the struggle for influence between England, France, Russia, and Germany. The Republic of Turkey, which was established as the Ottoman Empire’s successor, formed into a sphere of influence for German and British politics until the Second World War where it remained under the influence of the United States.

During the post-Cold War era, the influence of the EU on Turkey increased substantially with Germany in particular taking the lead and in direct competition with the US. With Berlin making headway to penetrate Ankara, the institutional structure of the EU and the nature of Turkey’s relations with the EU being the point in question.

Europe’s Politics of Influence

There were two important reasons behind the efforts of the Western powers to include Turkey in their spheres of influence: First, Turkey’s weaknesses in economic and military affairs over the last 150 years had allowed the possibility for these countries to influence its politics. Second, the fact that Turkey is straddled in a uniquely strategic location between the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus has made it a country necessary to be controlled by these states.

It can be seen that the interventions of Europe have consistently tried to direct the politics of Turkey and this effort changed shape according to the international conjuncture. In some periods, the European countries that faced off Istanbul / Ankara with demands for land also showed themselves as the forces that helped to “protect” the territorial integrity of Ottoman / Turkey in other periods and portrayed themselves as the forces that demanded the opposite in various ways. In both cases, they have influenced Ottoman / Turkish politics and have tried to manipulate this for their own agenda.

European intervention in Turkish politics continued well after the Second World War. These interventions sometimes came directly in support of the various coups that took place in Turkey, and sometimes by way of pressure on Ankara under the guise of human rights and democracy. At times the UN has also given support to terrorist organizations that have threatened Turkish security and have also created circumstances designed to corrode the economic activity of Ankara.

Europe on the “No” Front

Defaming undesirable politicians, keeping a tab on the local media and using that media to create a smear campaign against Turkey have become increasingly popular methods of the Europeans to topple those that they are against in Turkey. Their aim is to discredit the politicians that are their chosen targets, overthrown by way of elections, with the goal of having them replaced with those who are easier and more open for manipulation.

Since the cost of overthrowing politicians – which cannot be changed through the polls – have become a heavy financial burden, their primary objective has been manipulation of the electorate by media campaigns.

For this reason, the elections and referenda held in Turkey have been the focus of interest for European countries. The April 16 referendum points to a process in which Turkey will undergo a fundamental change in its administration system and for this reason, it has become a point of interest for Europe.

Within this framework, it is evident that many circles in Europe have made their position on the referendum clear and have shown support for the “no” campaign. Turkish politicians and NGOs opposed to the constitutional change are freely permitted to work for the campaign whilst Turkish ministers and other senior politicians of the AK Party have been prevented from participating in events among the Turkish diaspora in Europe on the grounds that “Turkish politics should not be carried into Europe.”

Despite the fact that the PKK is designated as a terrorist organization in Europe, it has held rallies in favor of the “no” campaign there, yet the Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu was barred from addressing Turkish citizens at the Turkish Consulate General in Rotterdam, with the Dutch government also refusing permission for his plane to land in the country. Yet again, Germany failed to intervene in a rally of the terrorist organization PKK, with posters of Ocalan and other slogans and symbols of the terrorist organization clearly on display despite the fact that the German Interior Ministry had prohibited these only days earlier. In addition, Fatma Betul Sayan Kaya, Minister of Family and Social Policy, meeting with Turkish voters in Rotterdam was hindered by violence, detained by the Dutch police at the consulate before being deported to Germany, as Turkish supporters of the minister who had gathered in protest were attacked by police dogs.

Now let’s look at this picture calmly. Turkish government ministers have been prevented from being able to conduct a campaign in NATO member countries of the Netherlands and Germany, whilst the PKK, a terrorist organization, is free to hold a public rally and campaign against the constitutional amendment in Frankfurt, Germany, another NATO member country. Whilst the ringleaders of the terrorist organization were freely able to participate in a PKK rally in Cologne, the German Constitutional Court prohibited a meeting organized by Turkish citizens who were supporting the Turkish government protesting the failed coup. This meeting was also to feature a video address by the Turkish President Erdogan that was also banned.

The same Constitutional Court had also ruled that the German authorities could prevent Turkish politicians from conducting election campaigns amongst the Turkish diaspora in Germany, but approved HDP politicians who have an arrest warrant in Turkey on charges of support for terrorism, allowing them to work for the referendum in Germany.

These facts make it explicitly clear that Turkey’s NATO allies have shown preference not with Ankara but with the outlawed PKK, which is the country’s foremost security threat today. Continuation of these policies will undoubtedly be decisive in the shaping of Turkey’s future alliance preferences as well as its general security policies.

An Obsessive Hostility

At this point, it is useful to look at why Europeans are so enthusiastically opposed to the constitutional amendment. For example, what is the uniting factor that made the German political parties hold hands siding with the “no” campaign in the Turkish referendum? All political parties, from Christian democracies to Social Democrats, from the Liberals to the Greens movement, from the anti-immigrant AfD to the extreme leftist Die Linke, are making an effort in order for the Turkish people to reject the constitutional amendment. The voices that say, “The referendum to be held in Turkey concerns Turks, let’s not break our bilateral relations by interfering with Turkey’s internal affairs,” have diminished so much so that they can hardly be heard.

German television broadcasts debate programs regarding Turkey every evening, insult Turkish leaders with calls for sanctions against Ankara flying through the air. It seems that for years, the campaigns against President Erdogan in the media have surpassed their own personal views and they now believe that they have no other option other than overthrowing Erdogan. They have difficulty recognizing that the majority of Turkish people and Turks living in Europe love and have preferred him again and again at every election. It is clear that they do not want to understand anymore, nor do they hold back in expressing their fury at the choices of the people.

Perhaps the increasing anger is fueled by the Turkish people’s growing love of Erdogan, which has demonstrated the failure of their defamation campaign that they have conducted against him. As prisoners of their anger, this also paves the way for making mistakes in their politics against Turkey. They are now struggling to manage the turmoil they have tried to sow in their own people against Turkey, against their ruling power in Turkey and its people. Anti-Turkish lobby (consisting of dissidents of Turkey and their German sympathizers) in Germany, who are behind this effort, have now become more influential in Germany’s Turkish politics. Blocking the Turkish ministers’ meetings while allowing PKK rallies shows the effectiveness and the power that this lobby wields.

The fact that the Turkish issue has taken up so much space in European politics and the public agenda, combined with the fact that so many negative perceptions about Turkey are floating in the air, constitute a serious obstacle to European countries and the EU’s rational policy monitoring of Ankara. Is there any chance that European politicians, obsessed with overthrowing Erdogan from power, can be freed now from this pathological interest? At this point, it is useful to underline again what this means in terms of Turkey. As far as the current power balances are concerned, the hostile policies of Erdogan-obsessed European countries that are more powerful than Turkey in terms of economic and military, might have the potential to harm Turkey. This damage may be far less than the damage that Turkey will incur at the hands of those who try to “wheel-align” our democracy, often with the support of terrorist organizations such as the PKK, all the while appearing friendly and an ally of Turkey.

There is a new trend in the West. It has been a couple of years, I believe. Renowned intellectuals, strategists and media outlets are publishing comments, headlines and academic articles about Turkey and its president without remorse and conscience. They are openly advocating for a military junta over democracy, assassination or execution of a leader over the legitimate change in power.

Last summer, with instructions from Fetullah Gülen, a self-proclaimed scholar who continues to reside in Pennsylvania, US, his infiltrators within the army declared that they were seizing power in order to depose President Erdoğan and the government. While the people of Turkey were bewilderedly watching a presenter trying to read the junta’s coup declaration with hands shaking on TV, all hell was breaking loose on the streets. Bridges in Istanbul were closed and surrounded by military vehicles, meanwhile several police officers had gone up the towers of the bridge and were shooting with sniper rifles.

The sound of tanks moving on main roads, sonic booms of F16s and, gunfire on the streets were all mixed up. Everyone was in terror. Many deputies of both the government and the opposition were trying to survive within the parliament as F16s were dropping bombs on the compound. There also was an assassination attempt on President Erdoğan, who was at a hotel where he spent time with his grandchildren. There was an ongoing clash between the assassination team and presidential bodyguards at the hotel, while the headquarters of the National Intelligence Organization was under attack and the Chief of General Staff was being held as a hostage.

People across Turkey took to the streets and thousands in Ankara and Diyarbakır surrounded garrisons to prevent tanks from going out on the main roads. People tried to stop military vehicles and tanks using unimaginable methods.

Whatever was transpiring definitely was a strange situation. Turkey has experienced several coups; however, this time it felt different. It felt like an invasion, an attempt to colonize Turkey; this was what the majority of the people felt, at least. By dawn, the coup attempt was thwarted. There were lifeless bodies and severed limbs on the streets: the tragic stories of the deaths of hundreds of fathers and sons, siblings who stood side by side. Thousands of men, women, young and elderly were being hurried to hospitals.

Intellectuals infactuated with military juntas and assassinations

While bombs were being dropped and the screams of people reached the heavens, renowned academics in the US were tweeting about the coup attempt as if watching a sports match. For instance, Daniel Pipes wrote “He [Erdoğan] deserves to be ousted by a military coup. I hope it succeeds.”, while David Miller wrote “Erdogan was a megalomaniac ruining a great country. Who’s going to miss him?” These academics aren’t some minor figures and they weren’t the only ones writing in such a way. Hundreds of tweets just like the aforementioned ones later transformed into newspaper headlines, analyses in academic journals, and articles. Unbelievable! In the periodical Foreign Policy, Edward Luttwak criticized not the junta itself, but their failure to pull off the coup. According to Luttwak, they failed to realize the “first rule for a successful coup.” What was it? “Capturing or killing the head of the government, first and foremost”! The putschists, who wounded more than 2,000 and killed 246, have “violated the golden rule,” said Luttwak. It was crucial, as “they [the putschists] left the opportunity for Erdoğan to call the people to resist the coup”!

The world-renowned journal The Economist had the same connotation: “The sultan survives”! Similarly, an analyst of Fox News, Ralph Peters, made two obnoxious comments within a week: “Friday night’s failed coup was Turkey’s last hope to stop the Islamization of its government and the degradation of its society.” One week later, he wrote: “[…] now he [Erdoğan] has real support among half of the population, those for whom the fever of faith is the ultimate intoxicant. He polls better than Hitler did. “Mein Kampf” is no match for the Holy Koran.” For Peters, the people of Turkey sacrificing their lives to thwart the coup was not an issue. The one who should die, or deposed at least, according to Peters, was the president, and unfortunately he still alive and was standing tall. Furthermore, the situation was direr as Erdoğan’s supporters consolidated their belief in the president.

On the other hand, the Holy Quran of Muslims was being compared to Mein Kampf, which was written by the perpetrator of the largest genocide on earth. And the Quran was portrayed as a book that could surpass Mein Kampf in terms of atrociousness. This means that in the US and many parts of Europe, the direst of Islamophobic statements, and giving advice on how to violently depose a government and execute its leader is not a crime, but a component of freedom of speech!

The day after, those who believed that Erdoğan deserved the coup and should be executed advocated that Erdoğan designed the coup or at least knew of the coup with the same impunity as before. There were similar headlines published on reputable newspapers which acted in support of these allegations. The Guardian published Gülen’s statement on its website: “Turkey coup may have been ‘staged’ by Erdoğan regime”! 8 days after the coup, while people were still at hospitals or at the funerals of their loved ones, The Independent published a news piece titled “President Erdoğan’s Turkey is modelled on the Third Reich.” Later, the news outlet removed this piece from its website, probably out of shame! Michael Rubin, on the other hand, wrote an opinion on Foreign Affairs website the day of the coup which was titled “Erdogan Has Nobody to Blame for the Coup but Himself.”

Erik Jan Zürcher also wrote that even if the government hadn’t planned the coup, they were in the know and planned what to do after the coup. All of the Western media underscored that only Erdoğan was accusing Gülen and his henchmen for attempting a coup, while disregarding the statements of the main opposition party, other opposition parties, high-ranking generals and academics which were on the same page with Erdoğan. Including the most fervent enemies of Erdoğan, nobody had a doubt that the coup was ordered by Gülen; however, the Western media ignored all of these, as if there was an accord among them. Lastly, seven months after the coup attempt, the President of the German Federal Intelligence Service Bruno Kahl said “We don’t believe the coup attempt was made by Gülen” in his interview with the journal Der Spiegel. As the German intelligence is still intact, Kahl’s statement has only one meaning: “We are supporting Gülen.”

After thwarting the attempt, the government had to dismiss all members of this organization from the state, while closing down media outlets and private enterprises which supported the said organization. A state of emergency was announced for this reason and all of these were done. Then, these were deemed similar to the applications of Stalin and Hitler. However, no one drew a comparison with the time when East and West Germany were united and thousands of civil servants (who weren’t infiltrators like Gülenists) in East Germany were dismissed, even though it was a much more controversial process than the one in Turkey.

It’s not a crime to demand the head of a leader in the West!

The propaganda by the Western media which emerged with the July 15 coup attempt are continuing and getting worse by the day. Regardless of the issue, who and what kind of violent action is put against Erdoğan, the result doesn’t change. Turkey experienced this once again last week. Due to the referendum for a change in the system of government which is to take place on April 16, both the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the opposition are concerned with rallies in Turkey and abroad. There are more than 5 million Turkish citizens living in various countries of Europe. This population which has dual citizenship is able to cast their votes in Turkish elections.

Germany and the Netherlands didn’t show any kind of opposition against the Turkish parties which are advocating the no vote in the referendum during their rallies in their countries; however, this wasn’t true for AK Party. Last week, the Turkish FM’s travel permission was revoked by the Dutch government, while the minister of family and social policies was barred from entering the Turkish consulate (which is considered a territory of Turkey) in Rotterdam, later to be deported with a police escort. Moreover, they released attack dogs on people who took the streets to protest these actions and these people were also beaten by the police.

This treatment was not acceptable at any level; however, a single visual became embedded in the minds of Turks: a police dog biting the leg of a young male, while a police officer is keeping two protesters who are trying to help that person at bay with a baton. This visual was just like the ones showing torture at Abu Ghraib prison during the invasion of Iraq. After this, the main opposition party CHP demanded relations with the Netherlands to be suspended. Opposition parties and all people regardless of their opinion of Erdoğan condemned the treatment that was shown to the Turkish citizens and ministers. Meanwhile, the Blick daily in Switzerland published a Turkish headline: “Vote no against Erdoğan’s dictatorship.” Again, in Switzerland, a far-right crowd made a demonstration, probably with a permit as no police officers interfered, with ugly masks, calling the Turkish citizens to vote no in the referendum. These visuals were so abhorrent that Aykut Erdoğdu, a deputy of the main opposition party CHP, couldn’t hold himself and tweeted the following: “To whom the actions of these racist bastards in Europe are serving in the referendum?”

The target of those who carry out this abhorrent, anti-democratic and illegitimate campaign is the only politician who could garner 51.8% of the total votes in the first ballot. Anti-West sentiments increase among millions of supporters of Erdoğan and even those who oppose him. This rising hate is not because of Marinne Le Pen in France, Wilders in the Netherlands, or the neo-nazis in Germany; it is because of those who support the junta, see assassination as a legitimate method to depose an elected leader, and feign ignorance about a malicious organization which has infiltrated state institutions for 40 years!

The various discussions that have commenced with the election of US President Donald Trump have continued on a global scale as well as within the United States. Two main reasons exist for these debates. The first is xenophobia and Islamophobic rhetoric that is prevalent in his discourse. The second is the current order who cannot accept Trump as President and the attitude of the media establishments regarding this stance. Generally speaking, it is possible to narrow this down to two focal points, with one side being in favor of Trump and the other firmly opposing his election. Media conglomerates had also been at the center of this debate during the election campaign, taking their positions with either party.

As per tradition for Presidential elections, a number of the pioneering media establishments in US media made statements supporting either the Democratic or the Republican Party. But many of the endorsements came from outlets that traditionally remain silent, and this time there was an unprecedented across the board sentiment against one candidate, Trump. For example, USA Today had announced that for the first time in its 34 year history it would weight in on an election, saying that it would stand against Trump. Foreign Policy magazine, breaking tradition for the first time in almost 50 years, said it would endorse Hillary Clinton. Another magazine, The Atlantic, published an editorial piece throwing their unwavering support behind Clinton and opposed Trump’s presidency. In its 159-year history, the only other time this had taken place was when the magazine endorsed Abraham Lincoln in 1860 and Lyndon B. Johnson in 1964. In addition, leading broadcasting services CNN and NBC were also firmly against Donald Trump. The Washington Post, one of the most widely circulated newspapers in the United States instead preferred to use the phrase “Trump is not suitable for the US Presidency” whilst The New York Times made known their position for Hillary Clinton by stating that their support for her was a result of her intellect, experience, toughness and courage spanning over a career of almost 40 years of continuous public service.

As the November 8 2016 Presidential election drew near, such statements that indicated the position of many media establishments increased substantially with virtually the entire US media showing support for Hillary Clinton against Donald Trump. The mainstream media firmly believed that the Democratic Party would win. Similarly, many of the public polls and surveys conducted throughout the election campaign predicted and in fact, confirmed, that Clinton would be victorious. The result was contrary to all expectations. Despite the propaganda campaign, Trump won the election and like the first signals that he had given during the beginning of the election campaign, his tirade of vilification and condemnation against the media multiplied substantially.

Trumps’ fury at US media

Launching a barrage of attacks on the American media, Trump’s expressions have surpassed the line of criticism with his stinging, voracious attacks that have bordered on dragging names through the mud as well as going so far as threatening to litigate legal cases aimed at shutting down some outlets. Trump has repeatedly said that the “media are the biggest liars on earth” and his repetitive use of this statement clearly is a reflection of his attitude. In his first official White House press conference, the dialogue between himself and reporters from CNN and the BBC in front of the world was a striking example of this attitude. During the press conference, Donald Trump refused to answer a question from a CNN reporter and turned to the CNN camera saying that “Not you. Your organization is terrible.”

During a press conference held at Trump Tower, Donald Trump turned to CNN executive Jeff Zucker and derided the network saying, “CNN news network is completely false. I hate your network, everyone at CNN is a liar and you should be ashamed….” Referring to the NBC News network and Time magazine, Trump also condemned the establishments saying “the media is trying to marginalize me by lying.”

During the Obama presidency, tradition called for the Associated Press to ask the first question at White House briefings. Trump did not allow for this to happen.

Without a doubt, photographs clearly showed the Trump inauguration had a far lower turnout than the 2009 inauguration of Barack Obama. A Time magazine correspondent incorrectly reported that Trump had removed a bust of Martin Luther King Jr. from the Oval office, adding more fuel to Trump’s media fury. Regardless, despite the passing of these events, Trump’s battle with the media over Twitter has not diminished. During the most intensive Twitter rants, he continued to name names and on more than one occasion, has made many generalisations concerning the “false” reporting of the American media. On February 6^th 2017, Trump made outright attacks on the American media. Launching a Twitter tongue-lashing against the New York Times who had revealed embarrassing White House revelations, he said in one message that “The failing NY Times writes total fiction concerning me. They have gotten it wrong for two years, and now are making up stories & sources!” His vendetta against the media continued with attacks on CNN, ABC, and NBC, claiming these news organisations were making a deliberate attempt to bring people into the streets and that they wanted to replace him with a President of their choice.

Undoubtedly, media establishments outside of the US are also receiving their fair share of criticism.

When looking at Trump’s vitriol towards the media and the media’s approach to Trump, it goes without saying that it is a battle that has only just begun.

Media remembers “ethics” after Trump experience

The constant humiliation of news establishments by Trump and his treatment of reporters during the press conference have opened a new front line regarding freedom of the press, freedom of expression and the position of media within a democratic society. Gary Gutting wrote an op-ed for the New York Times, where, after painting a picture of the current climate, he concluded, “recent events, here and elsewhere, revive the worry, expressed by Plato, that populist democracy can readily pave the way to dictatorship. Resisting this threat (and this temptation) is the first duty of today’s patriots.” In his piece, Gutting essentially built a wall against the Trump administration, tying it up with the founding principles of the US and the principles of democracy.

A more direct response to Trump’s media attack came from Reuters in the form of an editorial from its editor-in-chief Steve Adler, entitled “Covering Trump the Reuters Way.” In his piece, Adler noted that the worldwide news agency operated in more than 100 countries around the world and stressed principles of neutrality and independence in the face of challenges such as censorship, legal prosecution, visa denials, and even physical threats to journalists. Adler stressed Reuters would continue to pursue critical reporting on the Trump administration because it’s part of their own journalistic principles.

In a news commentary headline, the BBC asked whether Trump’s accusation of media “not reporting terrorist attacks” was true, by running a long assessment of the terrorist attacks around the world one by one and whether they were covered by the BBC. One can ascertain that the BBC had in fact relayed news regarding terrorists attacks to its readership and that it had related this information on the basis of its professionalism of its journalistic integrity, and that Trump, whether deliberately or ignorantly, was trying to blame the media.

Evidently, media organisations around the world took issue with Trump’s accusations and found themselves defending their journalistic integrity. It is clear that these accusations against the media will increase in the future. At this point, it is necessary to examine the journalistic ethics and the universal principles of journalism. Quite frankly, leaving Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric to the side, the moral position of the language used by the US and UK media can also be debated. Have those same media organisations who have taken a stance against Trump’s humiliating and insulting discourse been able to uphold their “journalism ethic” of fairness and impartiality when it comes to different countries and peoples? What kind of general publication policy did these outlets have when Turkey, Iraq and Palestine were the subject concerned? Did they apologise for inaccuracies and false news reports then?

Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction; the BBC’s reporting of Turkey

When looking into American history, it can be claimed that it has a relatively free and neutral media. The basis of this is the principle of liberty that was relayed to the press by the first amendment of the US constitution in 1791. However an observation of this picture shows us that this understanding of freedom is limited largely to the benefit of the US. During the US occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan and in addition to this, the illegal occupation of Palestine and the massacre of thousands of people resulting from continuous attacks by Israel, the media has either played the role of the three monkeys or have been the congratulatory fifth arm of imperialism, or has either supported or provoked attempts through propaganda like journalistic practices. When it came to covering Israeli assaults on Gaza, for instance, outlets went out of their way to give coverage to rockets being fired into nearby Israeli settlements, with almost no casualties being caused, while thousands were being killed in Gaza.

In 2003, the global public opinion on the existence of nuclear weapons and the subsequent invasion of Iraq was largely swayed by US/UK media outlets, including NYT, CNN, the BBC, and Reuters. Prior to the 1990 war on Iraq, images of badly oiled birds from the Gulf were regularly shown by CNN, convincing the world of the evilness of Saddam Hussein. The same media establishments continued this ethic throughout the occupation. In this regard, the US media could be considered an echo chamber for the White House or the Pentagon.

In this context, we can also give the example of the double standard of the Western media who used patronising language towards Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and their support for illegal attempts to topple the Turkish President, a President voted in by the Turkish people.

The publications produced by the BBC and CNN against the Turkish government are not that particularly difficult to pinpoint either. In June 2013, during the Gezi Park protests, CNN broadcast live from Gezi Park for hours, and used language that incited protests and street violence. In fact, they presented the news as if there was a civil war. If that wasn’t enough, CNN then used a public meeting attended by more than a million people at the Kazlicesme suburb of Istanbul in support of Erdogan and portrayed it as if it was something that was held in opposition to him.

In addition to this, Christiane Amanpour, CNN’s foreign news presenter cut shortthen Prime Minister Erdogan’s adviser on live television, which was seen by many as extremely offensive. Many of BBC’s broadcasts on Turkey were shaped in a similar fashion.

The personal views of many of these journalists, despite pledges to follow ethical practices of objectivity, have often come out in their writing as well as other communication.

A tweet by a BBC journalist on January 28 2017 during Theresa May’s visit to Turkey saying that there was “a lot of gold” at the Turkish presidential palace has turned into a source of mockery by many Twitter users.

In 2013, a Turkish news journalist with the BBC was similarly ridiculed for choosing to provide a platform to a small group of government opponents. The protesters, the reporter tweeted, were saying “Let’s not be the standing man, but the man that stops. Let’s stop the economy.”

When it came time to choose headlines, these media outlets have usually given space to opposition voices whose rhetoric is far from objective, again a break with what should be journalistic ethics. A December 2014 meeting between Turkish President Erdogan and Russian President Putin, for instance, was headlined with a quote from a critic who described it as the “summit of the honourable lonely ones”.

On July 15 2016, virtually the entire Western media targeted Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in a language that clearly indicated that it had chosen to ignore public sentiment in the country, instead taking sides with Fetullah Gulen’s army faction during the coup attempt. On July 16, Reuters described Fetullah Gulen as a Muslim preacher, and gave Gulen space in the headline, to describe the coup attempt as having been “staged.”

By way of reporting the failed coup attempt in this malicious manner, the Reuters news agency lost its impartiality and signed off the broadcast from the FETO perspective. The Reuters news agency shared these clear statements and content throughout the night of the coup attempt in its broadcast despite the clear national will of the Turkish people, and its legitimate government represented by the elected President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

It is possible to expand these examples, not just in the context of Turkey but in the context of other countries as well. Therefore, the media in the US and the global media oligarchs that have put up a front in their battle against Donald Trump claiming journalistic ethics and integrity by no means absolves them of their own sins.

On the contrary, their malicious reporting and behaviour has confirmed the existence of a structure that is used unashamedly in the pursuit of their own agenda. This attitude will not surpass a double-faced standard. A coin has two faces. Trump has shown that he is on one side of this coin, taking a hard stance against the global media empires, in particular the ones in the US. This stance, in fact has been scorned and belittled by elitist circles for quite some time. On the other side of the coin are the media organisations.

Since the very beginning of the election campaign, the US media channels, by taking a position against Donald Trump, in their pursuit of their agenda have been defeated in two ways. Firstly, if to take into consideration French sociologist Jean Beaudrillard’s words, “the silence of the masses do not speak to the screens, but have turned their backs,” then without a doubt, it is clear that much of the American public has little connection with the American media, and that the media is playing its own tune with its audience being only itself.

Secondly, the widespread assumption of the American media, inspired by classical media theories, have thrown out the window the idea that they can inspire and distort the thinking of the masses. Many people in America did not vote as the media thought they would, handing Trump enough votes to win office. In the presidential election, the party supported by the US media establishment lost the election and the cold reality that emerged was that there was little relationship between the media and the people of America, and that very few cared for what was being said on television or at the very least, ignored what was being said. Without a doubt, the fury of the American media establishment is caused by this cold reality. The American media establishment should take an equitable and broadminded approach for all and that it should raise the flag of tolerance for those who are devoid of a powerful voice. Otherwise, once Trump raises his own anger and fury, it can be seen that the curtain of the American media conglomerates will fall furthermore with terrifying consequences.

Some of the French say “Britain has a real democracy under the cover of monarchy, while France has a real monarchy under the cover of democracy.” Thus, it’s not the system of government which determines democracy; it can either exist or not exist in both situations. On the other hand, the French president is the most powerful one on the world, beside the periods of cohabitation. This power and influence becomes more prominent with the president’s individual character. For instance, François Mitterrand was regarded as a demigod. Similarly, former French president Valery Giscard D’Estaing expressed the extent of presidential authority during an interview on his experiences. “The office of the French President holds so much power that you become the most powerful man [completely disregarding the possibility of a women president] in France, which you can understand from the looks of women in the whole of France,” he said. Even though D’Estaing’s perception of presidential power can be regarded more in line with a sexual fantasy, it’s definite that the President of the Fifth Republic has prominent authority and power due to a system that was gifted by Charles de Gaulle. This gift is called the semi-presidential system, and it’s definitely more powerful in comparison with a president in a parliamentary system, however, the odd part is that the French president has more power even than the US president.

“The same person not being both the prime minister and the president is absolutely normal; however, it is also definite that the state can’t be dicephalus,” Charles de Gaulle said at the time, making a distinction between the roles of the president and the prime minister, while signifying that the principal rule was of the president. Regardless of the person occupying it, the office of the prime ministry is nothing but an ornament in France. While saying “a president who abides by the constitution is a man of the people and he is elected to shape the destiny of his people,” de Gaulle has expressed the very essence of the president’s authority. The French President appoints the ministers, has the right to abolish the parliament, determines the country’s foreign policy, and can gather all powers unto himself/herself during the times of crisis.

In France, many amendments regarding the authority of the president were implemented since 1958; however, most of these amendments produced an increase in the presidential authority. For instance, with an amendment in 2000 the president’s term was decreased from 7 years to 5 years and it was prohibited for the president to be elected more than twice; however, as the parliamentary elections were to be held right after the presidential elections, the risk of cohabitation was also removed. In this sense, the president became more engaged in the matters, because cohabitation periods were similar to the coalition between politically incompatible parties, causing the president to be isolated.

We can understand Turkey’s both old and current systems by evaluating the power of the French president. For years, the Ministry of National Education described the president as “ceremonial” in the schoolbooks they prepared and compared with the German president. When we became adults and saw the system functioning, we understood that it was more than just ceremonial. The system of government’s name was always the parliamentary system, since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. Separation of powers wasn’t implemented at the time of Atatürk, the republic’s charismatic founder, and his successor İsmet Pasha had also followed this trend.

After the transition from a single-party system to a multiparty system in 1950 and following the military coup which resulted in the hanging of Prime Minister Menderes, the 1961 constitution consolidated the power of the state institutions against the elected officials. Similarly, the 1982 constitution which was prepared by the junta which orchestrated the September 12 1980 coup, immensely increased the power of the president. It was believed that the tutelage existing since the foundation of the republic could be perpetuated by the president who was elected by the parliament and was under the influence of the military. For many years, they were successful in achieving their aims. As was made clear with the coup that resulted in the hanging of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, no ruling political party, besides the one they supported, would be able to fully control the government.

In the first years of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), the Minister of the National Education said “I was powerless in appointing bureaucrats and colleagues in my ministry.” As it required the approval of the president, it was impossible for ministers to appoint their own personnel. President Ahmet Necdet Sezer was stonewalling all appointments. This resulted in either the deadlocking of the system or the appointment of a person favored by the president. With the right to veto, the president was the most engaged head of the executive. In other words, the president of the parliamentary system didn’t have less authority than the French president in a cohabitation period.

For many years, these “safety fuses” which were implemented with the 1961 constitution functioned. The Constitutional Court of Turkey made a decision to renew these safety fuses, a decision which would be deemed scandalous in the years to follow. Hayrünnisa Gül, the wife of the presidential candidate Abdullah Gül, wore hijab. This was unacceptable for both the military and the main opposition party. For them, a first lady wearing hijab couldn’t enter the Presidential Palace. Let alone the first lady, a woman wearing hijab wasn’t allowed into the presidential palace ever before, even as a guest! Meanwhile, the smaller parties in the parliament were pressured by the military to not support Gül, even though, according to the constitution, Gül had received enough votes to become the president. With the statements from the military, and the CHP’s, the main opposition party of the time (and still today), appeal to the Constitutional Court, the court decided that the vote Abdullah Gül received wasn’t adequate. The poll was canceled.

This illegitimate crisis, which aimed to block a politician’s way to Çankaya (the location of the old presidential palace) just because his wife wore hijab, and triggered a new development. Previously, there was a president which the military tutelage employed to “shape the upper ranks of bureaucracy and limit politics” and had consolidated power pushing the limits of the parliamentary system. This time, something new happened: to resolve the crisis, the AK Party amended the constitution in 2007. The amendment was put to a referendum and was passed by a simple majority of the public’s votes. The president was now to be elected by popular vote. This amendment in 2007 added a new layer to the president’s power with the clause of “popular vote” by changing the Article 104 of the 1982 Constitution. It could be said that the long effective system backed by the military tutelage, which tried to keep the government’s reigns out of the hands of parties like AK Party, benefitted the AK Party government at the end, despite all the suffering it has caused.

The referendum in October 2007 transformed Turkey into a country that is governed through “a de facto semi-presidential system.” As the rest of the system wasn’t designed with a presidential system in mind, it created crises which the national will had to resolve every time they emerged. This caused the presidency to become “an executive with ambiguous limitations and authorities that could expand according to the characteristics of a person.” In this form, it’s pretty similar to the French system; however, this doesn’t mean that it has no quirks. Both the president and the prime minister are powerful in this system. Beside the ones that could emerge in a time of “cohabitation,” this system is prone to crises even if both of the executives are of the same party!

Even though the international community didn’t understand what was going on, the July 15 coup attempt, which was orchestrated by a parallel and parasitic structure within the state institutions, aimed to reestablish the status quo by deposing the government. Now the government started to fight against this organization which infiltrated the state, while continuing to fight against PKK and Daesh. A state of emergency was declared in Turkey. The AK Party government is now cooperating with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which came to the fore as a result of the political conjuncture, to pass a constitutional amendment.

This amendment is aiming to change the system of government, instead of a full new social contract. It foresees replacing the existing faux semi-presidential system with a complete presidential system. “It is easy to criticize; however, believe me, what he is doing is really hard. He is driving a car and someone intentionally crashes into his car. But he doesn’t stop. While driving, he is repairing his car and he is changing the tires of the car without stopping,” a Parliament member and friend of President Erdoğan said about the man.  Erdoğan, it should be remembered, was sentenced to prison as soon as he emerged as a prominent politician, and faced party closure trials and memorandums that tried to force his policies in a certain direction.

Despite all the illegitimate attempts aiming to depose him, Erdoğan received 51.79% of the votes in the first round of presidential elections and became the president. The highest percentage of votes to be received by any candidate at the first round in Turkey, and one of the highest in the world. The people will vote on the constitutional amendment this spring while Erdoğan keeps driving the car. If it is accepted, Turkey will be governed with a new system.

Following the terrorist attack on the Reina nightclub during the New Year celebrations, a number of messages appeared in social media that praised the callous attack. These messages not only praised the attack but also openly targeted the secular lifestyle. Columnists who are critics of current government policies lost no time in using these messages twisting it to their own agenda, and the lifestyle debate, which had already begun before the New Year, was revived with even more fervor.

As in every year, the lifestyle debate this year took place during the New Year’s celebrations. Glamorous New Year’s preparations and stuffed turkey recipes as well as images of people beating Santa Claus also made its way into the media. But these discussions which have turned into an annual ritual were not very prolonged. So much so that a well-known cleric known as Cübbeli Ahmet Hoca, raised eyebrows when he declared that chess was forbidden, the lifestyle debate was taken out of the context of New Year’s celebrations. But the attack on the nightclub resurfaced the lifestyle debate when the debate had only just bitten the dust.

The President of Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) issued a statement regarding the dispute and reaffirmed the public, saying that lifestyles in Turkey were under no threat and protected by the state. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also made a number of statements to dispel any question of a danger to normal everyday life and that it had not been for the past 14 years. Fortunately, many people in the public arena also protested the numerous attempts to link terrorism with the current lifestyle debates – an effort that was seen by many to mask the true face of terrorism – and to prevent the rise of social tensions exploiting a dominant social pattern in Turkish society.

Terror attacks allegedly made in the name of Islam in Turkey are not dissimilar to those that have taken place in Europe. No doubt that these attacks are intended to convey messages to both the targeted country and the world. Many terror experts agree that terror attacks often have many other goals than the incident itself. It was evident that the rampage at Reina was intended to disrupt and create a tension on the secularist-conservative duality balance in Turkish society. However, there are structural obstacles to activate this line of tension.

Firstly, the relationship between state and religion in Turkey is unique to the country and it has capacity to cope with this tension. Moreover, the tension has long become a central dynamic for Turkish society, in which both conservative and secular segments transform one another. The Diyanet, the view of leading political parties, and also the tendencies of these two groups themselves guarantee the presence and futures of secularists and conservatives in Turkey. Occasional conflicts and tensions between secularists and conservatives, though sometimes disturbing, should be seen as natural in this way.

In fact, Turkey’s modern political history is almost based on this disturbing tension. For example, the February 28, 1997 coup was a severe blow to the large number of conservatives and to their upward mobility. But, by the end of the process, the conservative block achieved in winning the political power that opened new spaces for secularists and conservatives to engage one another and even to establish new alliances. Since then, there is no doubt the lifestyle debate in Turkey has become less intense under the Justice and Development Party (AK Party). The official Islam portrayed by the Diyanet does not posit it as a religion against or in relation to secularism. Turkish Islam marries both traditional Islamic and traditional secular practices shaped within the same tradition. In Turkey, neither Islamic nor secular practices resemble those in Europe, especially when one considers the transformative power that each group is able to exercise over one another. On the other hand, religious communities in Turkey, nourished by various Islamic sources, draw their justifiability by the very presence of the Diyanet, with the institution owing this to the high level of its social acceptance.

Nevertheless, the controversial field has occasionally been exploited by other groups, and the Fetullah Gülen Terror Organization (FETO) has been a bitter example of this. The group turned into a terror organization gradually in the last three years. But it should be remembered that the group owed its success largely to infiltrating state institutions by disguising themselves as secularists. The group, which principally promised upward social mobility to middle classes conservative Muslims by offering them a quality education, exploited the secular-conservative tension and found room for hiding its various illegal and unlawful acts. The official Islam in Turkey represented by the Diyanet acts as a guarantor, which can call various religious sects (cemaats) in the country to account. The presence of the Diyanet is also a guarantee for secularists. Although some statements of certain Muslim clerics caused contention, especially among conservative people themselves, outlandish statements are generally viewed with a veiled sarcasm. What is important to remember is that the secularists in Turkey generally do not give credit to radical interpretations of the religion they believe in.

The debate on lifestyles between secularists and conservatives and its association with increasing social tension is actually related to the nation’s past experiences. Secularists are afraid that conservatives are eager to take revenge for the February 28th coup, which caused much suffering and traumatized many of them. Indeed, the secularists see it a zero-sum-game: if religious life is not constrained, their own lifestyle would then be under threat. They are disturbed by official praise for religious life and believe that this praise poses a threat and jeopardizes their own lifestyle. However, the struggles in the political sphere should not lead us to overlook the class features of secularist and conservative circles that have been intertwined in the last twenty-thirty years.

There are two major political parties in Turkey that represent both lifestyles: the AK Party and the CHP. Despite this, boundaries of secularism and religiosity are neither solid nor static. With the AK Party government, the conservatives found opportunity to express themselves, while this led the secular circles to have concerns about their future. This anxiety was expressed during the 2013 Gezi Park protests, in which the secular wave created almost a kind of terror in the country. Yet a critical view on the Gezi protests enables us to see that it was not actually secularism, producing terror but the involvement of certain ideological groups, mainly radical leftist groups, which terrorized the protests.

Additionally, some ethnic groups in Turkey could negatively contribute to the secularist-conservative tension. For example, when the HDP, a Kurdish nationalist political party with separatist tendencies, realized that it cannot merely survive with the votes of Kurds, it aspired to gain secular Alevi votes and prepared an Alevi “package” claiming to meet their identity demands. Indeed, the overlapping of secularist-conservative tension with ethnic separatism is a worst case scenario for Turkey, and has the real potential to give birth to brutal conflict. On the other hand, ethnicity-based ideological tensions regard the division between the secularist-conservative lifestyles a favorable ground to exploit. But the peculiarity of state-religion relations in Turkey structurally prevents manipulations in this field.

The strength of the secularists-conservatives duality, which Turkish society was built upon, finds the beginning in the birth of the Republican Era. Today, political parties still pay attention to this tension and win votes through it. However, secularism and religiosity/conservatism, though in a conflict, have created their own idiosyncrasy in Turkish society. Seculars and conservatives experience and discover one another in this process. Both are being diversified, intertwined and transformed. The transformation of this into terror is possible only through an intervention or by way of a non-local force from outside of the social formation. This unique relationship of secularism and religiosity/conservatism in Turkey becomes even more critical in a period when terror is rising in the name of Islam around the world.

As a historic background, it should be stated that humor magazines in Turkey have positioned within power relations since the late Ottoman Empire and have manipulated political and artistic ground through sarcastic caricatures. Accordingly, Sultan Abdulhamid II was drawn as a sneaky, hidebound and cruel killer. As for the periods of the Party of Union and Progress (CUP) and early years of the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the magazines that were dominated by secular-nationalist caricaturists lapsed into silence and somehow canonized the reforms without interrogating and criticizing even totalitarian trends. For instance, Atatürk was and still is the uncriticizable holy figure of humor magazines. Even Markopaşa, one of the most opposite and punished magazines of the history of the Republic of Turkey criticized Ismet İnönü, known also as the national chief, by reason of the fact that he deviated from Kemalist principles. This magazine, controlled by the ‘Westist’ thinkers, consolidated the position of the secular republicanism while it marginalized the religion and tradition not only in political system also in everyday life.

Ali Ulvi Ersoy’s caricature published on May 30, 1960 in Cumhuriyet newspaper, following the military coup of May 27, 1960 and dedicated to the Grand Turkish Army (Büyük Türk Ordusu).

As a result of the rigid perspective, all these magazines provided an intellectual basis for the execution of Menderes, the legitimate president. Humor magazines, as a representation of cultural hegemony, have moved in concert with the junta in modern Turkish history that is full of military coups and conspiracies, so much so that they produced fun and erotism-oriented publications in spite of socio-political conflicts between 1960s and 1990s. Although many scholars and politicians were murdered by unknown assailants especially in 1993, the magazines generally ignored the essential question. What is more, the 1997 military memorandum was approved by caricaturists. The hegemony war between conservatives and seculars, between nationalists and socialists, between traditionalists and reformists turned into a tense cultural segregation after AK Party was founded and Erdogan became prime minister.

Before and After 2002

Humor can understandably be an ideological and subjective providing that it makes opposition in a principle sense. The basis of the principle should be conscience, justice and courage. However, humor publications in Turkey are biased, unfair and tutelary; so much so that they have supported the military coups experienced since the late Ottoman era, also that they felt free to describe the ousted leaders as animals on account of supporting the official authority based on nationalist Kemalism. Not only Abdulhamid II, also Adnan Menderes, the elected president, who was executed by hanging was harshly criticized by humorists. They did not utter a word about militarism. Further, same attitude was continued in March 12 (1971), September 12 (1980), February 28 (1997), April 27 (2007) and even in July 15 (2016). In fact, the figure of Erdogan in the periodicals accompanies previous ousted or, at least, ‘chastened’ leaders. He was drawn as monkey, camel, cow, frog and snake and depicted as bigoted and vulgar character. He was ‘orientalistically’ associated with Hitler. Also, the AK Party supporters were stereotyped as ignorant and amorphous mass. Electoral system and even democracy was questioned whenever AK Party won the elections.

Penguen Magazine cover dated August 7, 2008. The magazine summarized a top court’s decision not to close the AK Party as “AKP was not closed, but warned” with a smiling picture of then prime-minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan with a scar on his face. The court decision did not please Penguen magazine, which always represents itself as democratic.

As for the political opposition in Turkey, they were instead sympathized. Terrorist groups such as PKK, DHKP-C and TAK were never criticized by leftist humorists dominating this field. The term “terror” was linked only to Erdogan, the State and the government. The unprincipled view can be conceptualized as “Tayyip-phobic humor”. Today, humor without Erdogan is almost impossible. The opposition made by humorists concentrated merely on his “evil” existence. He is known as the crux of every problem in Turkey, in Middle East and even in the world. The humorists, who define humor as cliché-breaker, produce rude and rigid clichés ironically themselves. What is more, some of these are indisputably Islamophobic. The magazine covers that are intolerant about religion, tradition and pedagogy are full of ‘ugly’, ‘repellent’ and ‘terrorist-like’ Muslim types. The language of the publications is mainly slang, swearing and humiliation rather than irony and lambency.

One of the deadlocks of humor publishing, not only in Turkey also in all over the world, is the ambivalence between censorship and freedom of expression. Humorists generally tend to reduce the freedom into unlimited liberty and to define the censorship as restriction of freedom. However, just as freedom does not refer to a free hand, censor is not antithesis of freedom. The concept freedom that becomes vague and gets more complicated each passing day in the contemporary culture is paradoxically is positioned in an absolute positiveness, therefore its destructive mission in the context of consumption-based worldview is ignored in some way. According to the overall impression gaining from the statements made by humorists, AK Party has dominated humor magazines and sued for damages, so much so that Turgut Çeviker, a humor historian, describes AK Party era as the most radical period in which caricaturists are suppressed and humorists are marginalized. However, considering the cases, it is easily seen that almost all of them were dismissed in favor of caricaturists. Moreover, these cases were somehow seen as a resistance mark against the political power.

Leman Magazine cover dated March 16, 2016. The cover portrays the Ankara bombings of March 13, 2016, which were claimed by the TAK terror organization, a branch of the PKK, yet the magazine redirected the blame on Erdoğan and connected the issue with the debate on presidentialism.

Humor magazines that have taken a stand against the AK Party government in every crisis and that have seen Erdogan as responsible in all local or global trouble categorize and discriminate the society. On the one hand they underline the importance of peace and solidarity in interviews, but on the other hand, with their works, they provoke the differentiations and cultural tectonic faults of contemporary Turkey as Turks and Kurds, Alevis and Sunnis and, seculars and conservatives. In this respect, we can conceptualize this non-principle approach as a “humor dictatorship”. As an indication of this approach, although they highlighted Berkin Elvin and Ali Ismail Korkmaz who lost their life during the Gezi Park protests, they said nothing about Yasin Börü and Serap Eser who killed by the PKK and its extensions. Similarly, they frequently dealt with Kobane, but never Aleppo.

Without doubt, most humorists in Turkey are not elite but elitist and they are away from the real problems of the society in which they live. Throughout the history of the republic, they have satirized civilians rather than elites, so much so that they have taken active roles in legitimizing the military tutelage against democratic regime. They have been more rigid and bigoted than even religious dogmatism despite the fact that they define themselves as creative, cliché-breaker and reformist. Hence, in the magazines, while facts give their places emotion-based ideologies, opposition turn into vulgar aggression. Since Tanzimat era, political power and cultural power are separate and even vis-a-vis. Therefore even if governments are determined by elections, the Power is mostly at the settled elitists’ hands, and more interestingly, although humor magazines that describe themselves as ‘unofficial weekly’ reproduce the discourse of those who see themselves more equal than others. In other words, just as humor magazines in Turkey stand in the heart of official history and ideology, they are not dependent upon, for and together with the society.

Globalization followed the secularization process, yet both parties, especially Europe, did not experience any substantial shift in their views about each other. The contrary would have been expected from a world which has been encompassed by liberal capitalism, being shaped by consumer societies and becoming uniform in fields ranging from architecture to lifestyle for the last three decades. However, it didn’t happen. Maybe it’s for the better, as diversity brings with it a cultural richness.The subconscious emerged to the conscious when Paris dropped the act in the mid-2000s and spoke plainly. While this process was named and formed differently among different EU member countries, it meant the same thing: Turkey should never become a full member, yet it shouldn’t stray too far from EU. In other words, if Turkey was a vessel, it had to anchor itself at the EU port.

Turkey should never become a full member, yet it shouldn’t stray too far from EU. In other words, if Turkey was a vessel, it had to anchor itself at the EU port.

Despite these facts, it is obvious that Turkey had been passionate, strenuous, and patient about achieving full membership, until very recently. Just like the Westernization efforts and policies of the Ottomans in their last two centuries, the accession to the EU became somewhat a state policy for Turkey. Even though Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had implemented laws which were borrowed from France, Switzerland and Italy, his Kemalist followers and their party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), resisted the necessary regulations for full membership for decades. The supporters of the Kemalist ideology, who didn’t have any issue with complying with Europe’s legal system in 1930s, came up with many “Turkish exceptions” until the turn of the millennium, just to conserve some extra acquis. Seemingly contradictory, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), even though it represented conservative Muslims, was more enthusiastic about becoming a full member of the EU, as for both the party administration and their voter base, EU membership was synonymous with the hope of having a more democratic country.

40 years after applying to the European Economic Community, Turkey finally gained the status of candidate country to EU in 1999. In a country where the Necmettin Erbakan government was recently deposed by the military and there was an economic crisis, the reforms which started with the Bülent Ecevit government in order to comply with the Copenhagen criteria were accelerated during the AK Party rule. Erdoğan wanted to exact these changes; not because of pressure from the IMF, the US, EU or the international community, but out of sincerity. Erdoğan was incarcerated for 4 months due to a poem he read and, thus, couldn’t become an MP. When he was invited to the Elysee Palace by French President Jacques Chirac as the chair of the ruling party, Erdoğan had expressed his thoughts and aims clearly. Catherine Colonna, the presidential spokesperson at the time who later became the EU Minister of the socialist government, didn’t even try to hide her bewilderment: “This is the first time I see such a Turkish politician. He told Chirac that he wanted to provide all democratic and human rights to the Turkish people, just like France did; however, he added that if we wouldn’t support him in EU accession, he would create an Ankara criteria and move on, leaving the Copenhagen criteria aside.” Then, Erdoğan was elected as an MP, became the Prime Minister and accelerated all reforms to comply with the Copenhagen criteria, along with abolishing the death penalty.

The Justice and Development Party (AK Party), even though it represented conservative Muslims, was more enthusiastic about becoming a full member of the EU.

After heated discussions, the EU decided to start membership negotiations with Turkey in December 2005. However, to Turkey’s surprise, the EU’s policies and political discourse shifted simultaneously with this decision. Those who were once stating that there weren’t any obstacles for a democratic Turkey which respected human rights, adopted a contrarian position. Even France, which supported Turkey during the country’s far less democratic years, implemented legislation which allowed countries to become an EU member after a referendum. After Chirac, a group of MPs from Nicolas Sarkozy’s party pushed a constitutional reform at the National Assembly which targeted Turkey’s membership. The article was like a general knowledge quiz: “For admitting countries which have a population more than the 5% of Europe into membership a referendum is a must.” Without mentioning its name, Turkey was almost included into the French Constitution! The Senate rejected the draft. If it weren’t so, it would have been a ridiculous situation for France. However, even though the admittance of new countries to the EU is not decided by referendum according to the French constitution, during his visit to Turkey in 2014, President François Hollande reiterated that the probable membership of Turkey would be put to the people; thus, a referendum would be held.

Of course, all of these discussions had a negative effect on both Ankara and the Turkish public. The number of people believing the EU will never admit Turkey as a member increases with each new development, and they wouldn’t be wrong to think so. Then, there was an unthinkable development in 2009, especially for the ones who knew the Turkey of the 1990s. Erdoğan stepped forward with the wide support of the public to achieve social peace by resolving one of the most important issues in the history of the republic. Despite the opposition from the CHP and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), along with other efforts to thwart Erdogan both from within and outside of the country, the AK Party started to negotiate with the PKK to resolve the Kurdish Problem which had already cost the lives of 40,000 people. This initiative was expected to resonate with the EU, even though it wasn’t done for the sake of full membership. It didn’t happen. Regardless, Erdoğan continued to tear down taboos in Turkey.

Without mentioning its name, Turkey was almost included into the French Constitution!

He extended his condolences for the 1915 events, unlike previous Turkish prime ministers who claimed that Turks didn’t kill any Armenians, but that they themselves were instead slaughtered by Armenians. Moreover, Erdoğan called for the formation of an international commission which would investigate the events that took place in 1915, dubbed as a “genocide” in Turkey perpetrated by a powerful majority, and he stated that he would respect the decision of this commission. Europe chose to resist Turkey’s membership more fiercely despite the unexpected developments. France disallowed the opening of five chapters that needed to be addressed for the membership process, while eight more chapters weren’t opened due to the Additional Protocol and another six were blocked by the Greek Cypriot Administration. Even though some of these chapters were opened later, only the Science and Research chapter, out of a total of 35 chapters, was resolved, or closed temporarily. In addition, leaving the 14 chapters that were blocked by EU members aside, none of the chapters which were opened after the Science and Research chapter were ever closed, not even temporarily.

Looking at the tempo of the 53 years old relationship, it is impossible to give even an approximate date for Turkey’s membership. Moreover, maybe the EU will cease to exist in an uncertain future. Looking at Brexit and now the discussions in Italy, it is not very possible to think positively about the EU’s future. Besides the extreme right-wing Front National in France being openly against the EU, there is an increasing animosity towards globalization and the bureaucrats in Brussels by the whole political spectrum on the eve of presidential elections in EU co-founder France. The EU has truly become the “tête de turc”, the cause of all problems, in Europe!

If the issue is about money and finance, it should be stressed that Turkey is not wealthier than Europe, yet Turks are sharing their meals with Syrians. They didn’t lose their jobs because of Syrians.

Actually, this process was apparent for a time. Starting with European Coal and Steel Community and followed by the EEC and the EU, this union was a structure which united economies. When the time had come to embark on a project which would unite Europeans, it was all about “common values”. This would be possible through the preparation of a European constitution which based itself on democracy, individual freedoms and human rights. However, this constitution was rejected in EU co-founder France and then in Netherlands by referendum, making it only a dream. The Lisbon Agreement, right from the beginning is inadequate in achieving this unity.

Regarding the current situation, the European Parliament evaluated the developments in Turkey from its own perspective and decided to suspend the negotiations. However, this advisory decision was disregarded by the EU. Why? Do the bureaucrats of Brussels and European governments have a soft spot for Turkey, unlike the European Parliament? Unfortunately, the difference in positions is due to the migration agreement which was signed between Turkey and Brussels. The EU, the champion of human rights, is hesitant because Turkey might abolish the agreement and open the floodgates for 2 million Syrians, comprised of Yazidis, Alevis, Sunnis, Kurds, Arabs and Turkmens. If the issue is about money and finance, it should be stressed that Turkey is not wealthier than Europe, yet Turks are sharing their meals with Syrians. They didn’t lose their jobs because of Syrians.

At the current point, the bridge between Brussels and Ankara isn’t functioning well for both sides, as it did before; because a lot of water has really passed under the bridge. It’s not a giving that Erdoğan will do it, but if he lets the Turkish people decide on EU membership, even the famous “anchor” won’t survive, let alone the aim to become a member.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s two-day visit to Pakistan on November 16 is largely viewed as a fresh move to give impetus to Islamabad-Ankara bilateral ties in trade, defence, education, and other sectors. Next year will mark the 70th year of Pakistan-Turkey diplomatic ties, which Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has pledged to celebrate with “zeal and enthusiasm.”

The current trade volume between Islamabad and Ankara is recorded at around $500 million in 2014-15, with exports to Turkey recorded at $309.19 million and imports at $191.05 million, according to Pakistan’s Ministry of Commerce. In August, Pakistan and Turkey agreed to eliminate 85% of tariffs in an attempt to enhance trade, part of a larger Free Trade Agreement (FTA) under negotiation.

Ahead of Erdogan’s visit, Pakistan declined to extend the visas of 108 Turkish nationals and their families, all teachers at a network of private schools with ties to Fethullah Gulen. Turkish officials, including President Erdogan, have been calling for Islamabad to close the Gulen-linked schools for months, saying they were part of a terror organization behind the coup attempt and years of attempts at destabilization in the country, and were a threat to Pakistan as well.

“We have to be very careful with such organizations and their causing risk and threat for the security and stability of every country where they have presence,” Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said in Islamabad this August.

In his address to a joint session of Pakistan’s parliament, the third such occasion, Erdogan expressed his gratitude by saying that “I am thankful for the solidarity demonstrated by the Pakistan on this matter… And for their decisive stance against this organization.”

“It is imperative to dismantle this evil network,” Erdogan said. “The terrorist organization is a threat to the security and public order of Pakistan.”

Islamabad had already set a November 20 deadline for Pak-Turk staff to leave the country. However, Erdogan assured the students who were studying in the Pak-Turk schools would be taken care of with the highest standards, and Islamabad has said arrangements will be made to ensure the schools continue to function, but under a new administration.

http://thenewturkey.org/sino-turkish-relations-in-the-age-of-global-transformation/

Many Pakistanis have witnessed three military administrations themselves; and have praised Erdogan and the public’s success at foiling the July 15 coup. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif himself was jailed and exiled after a military coup in 1999, after a coup by the head of the military, Gen. Pervez Musharraf. Musharraf, who spent his childhood in Turkey, has repeatedly praised the Turkish military for its role in leading Turkey. Sharif returned from exile in 2007, and months of street protests by his followers and other civilian leaders forced Musharraf’s resignation within a year.

During Erdogan’s visit, Sharif told Parliament the way Turkey “defeated this illegal assault on democracy was remarkable.” In May, Sharif acted as a witness at the marriage of President Erdogan’s daughter in Istanbul, a reflection of the closeness of the two leaders, who head countries trying to emerge from a long history of military interventions.

While political leaders in Pakistan have agreed with Islamabad’s decision to deport the Pak-Turk teachers, some, like Hamid Mir, a political commentator and a senior journalist based in Islamabad, have speculated the actions may have been a product of the Sharif-Erdogan relationship, and that Islamabad and Ankara failed to make a public case for why the steps should be taken.

Support for Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

Erdogan offered support for Islamabad at a time of heightened cross border tensions in the disputed region of Kashmir, where scores of civilians have been killed since September in firing between Pakistani and Indian soldiers.

Referring to the Kashmir issue, Erdogan said the dispute of Kashmir should be resolved by Islamabad and New Delhi in line with UN resolutions and the wishes of Kashmiri people.

He stressed the need for stepped up cooperation against terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and its affiliate Daesh who he said are the agents of the war carried out against Islam.

He pledged Pakistan-Turkey ties would be deepened further through the Strategic Cooperation Council, which was established in 2009 between Ankara and Islamabad.

Since then, both the countries have signed 51 agreements and documents within the council.

Under the new arrangements between Pakistan and Turkey, 500 Pakistani students would be able to go to Turkey for PhD scholarships every year in light of a document signed between Pakistan’s Higher Education Commission and the Turkish higher education body.

Sharif lauded Turkey’s bid for Pakistan to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). “Our close relationship serves as a stability factor in the region,” Sharif said of Pakistan-Turkey cooperation.

Pakistan has already applied for the membership of the 48-member organization. Turkey has been supporting Pakistan’s membership in the NSG—the 48-member group, which regulates international nuclear commerce.

Turkey is supporting a call for a criteria-based approach for admitting non-NPT countries.

Earlier, Pakistan Army Chief General Raheel Sharif while welcoming Erdogan, said Islamabad and Ankara have brotherly relations and both countries are time-tested friends.

A statement from the Presidency stated that Erdogan agreed to the idea floated by President Mamnoon Hussain regarding a long-term bilateral defence cooperation agreement.

Islamabad and Turkey are already pursuing a number of defence collaboration projects with Anakara is helping Islamabad with the midlife upgrade of Khalid-Class Submarines and the two sides also collaborated in building a Naval Fleet Tanker.

In addition, Turkey is interested in purchasing MFI-17 Super Mushshak aircraft from Pakistan.

Expanding Economic Cooperation

Pakistan and Turkey have agreed on the elimination of 85% of tariffs, a deal that will include regulatory duties and additional duties in case of Pakistan and additional duties and mass housing fund duties in case of Turkey.

Pakistan’s exports to Turkey are likely to increase by $500million to $600 million in a short span of time. Major trade items between Pakistan and Turkey include fabrics, beverages, spirits and vinegar, plastics, chemicals and machinery.

Pakistan’s exports are concentrated in construction, transportation, other business services and government services while imports are concentrated in transportation, other business services, travel, construction, and government services.

“In the next few years, with the passage of time trade and commerce relations between the two countries will reach new heights,” said Hassan Askari Rizvi, a noted political analyst. Both the leaderships have pledged to expand trade at a time when a number of Turkish companies have been working in Pakistan, he added. ”The relationship is mutually beneficial for both Islamabad and Ankara,” Rizvi concluded.

European countries, the so-called cradles of civilization, the advocates of democracy, are scandalously supporting and backing unscrupulous terrorists and their followers.What started as an “Anti-Erdoğan” policy, especially since the Gezi Park protests, has now turned into a dangerous attitude supporting terror, a fact that should actually horrify the world, yet, tragically, seems as if nobody is aware or feels ashamed of.I do not intend to say there is no need to plead for Turkey’s policy of investigating organizations and individuals who support and act on behalf of terrorism. This is already self-evident. The opposite would have been improper and peculiar. Is there any country on this planet which is not trying to counter domestic terrorism to provide security for its people and nation?However, that is not the point. The point is how Western countries inconceivably and scandalously embrace terrorists as a state policy.

There is an idiom in German, which says, “I think I am in the wrong movie” (Ich glaube ich bin im falschen Film) to describe a situation, which is totally incomprehensible and nonsensical. This idiom describes exactly the position of Europe, especially Germany, but also the position other pro-PKK European politicians and countries take currently on issues concerning Turkey.

Imagine there is a newspaper in your country (here the daily newspaper Cumhuriyet), which leaks official secrets on its front page. It is indeed an opposition media organization, but this does not matter in this case at all. Besides, the so-called leaked information is more a defamation against the state than representation of the truth. It was a story about trucks used by the MIT (National Intelligence Service of Turkey). The trucks were on a secret mission carrying humanitarian aid to displaced people in Syria.

The state of course investigated the responsible people, especially the editor-in-chief of the newspaper, Can Dündar. However, foreign diplomats, the representatives of various nations in Turkey, attended the trial and took group selfies to show support for Dündar. This behaviour does not meet international standards of diplomacy. What is more, recently Germany gave him citizenship out of a clear blue sky. Since then, Can Dündar has been honoured with an award for freedom from the city government of Paris. It is also worth pointing out that he won a Freedom of Press Award.

If Dündar is a journalist, then, one wonders why Edward Snowden is charged with treason. Instead of being honoured with a German citizenship and awarded with a freedom of speech award, Snowden is imprisoned in an embassy for years without any attention from Western state leaders. Quite tragic. If Snowden could succeed at just being enough anti-Erdoğan and leaking things putting his personality or the Turkish government in a tight spot, he could have higher chances of being embraced by Germany. Pity for him.

Yet, what are we supposed to do with ethical journalism when it comes to leaking official secrets? Is the leaking of official secrets something that be considered part of the freedom of the press? It is doubtful. If the criminal act committed by Dündar is considered a matter of freedom of press, then, how should we evaluate Snowden’s case?

Germany, in fact, generally seems to have no problem receiving all kinds of people looking to thwart democratically elected governments, including coup plotters, with open arms.

Firstly, the man now referred to as President of Egypt, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has been welcomed as a “democrat.”  Sisi got no private lessons on democracy and human rights from top German officials, as it is often done enthusiastically with Turkish president Erdoğan. It seems like Germany has sometimes a problem with elected presidents when it comes to coup plotters. Besides, el-Sisi has been “democratized” with a magic wand, namely a newspaper article by Germany. The same magicians apparently work to make a dictator out of Erdoğan through media coverage. That is not how it should work with democracy and dictatorship.

Take for instance the case of FETO (Fetullah Gülen Terror Organization). Western countries again seem to be failing at taking the right position and supporting democracy, liberty, and freedom in Turkey. Germany opened its arms to the coup plotters, allowing them to remain in the country and seek political asylum. So, what was the fault of Syrian refugees? Was it that they were running for their lives and sought shelter in Europe?

The PKK and its affiliated terrorist organizations are responsible for at least 7 suicide attacks in the last two years in Turkey, and have killed more than 600 people, 377 of them from security forces. In the midst of intensified PKK violence, the HDP co-chair Figen Yüksekdağ said their party “leans on the PYD”, the Syrian branch of the PKK.  HDP co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş openly praised an independent Kurdistan in Turkey and said, “There will be the reality of Kurdistan in the next century.”

HDP lawmakers also apparently never see any harm in attending PKK terrorists’ funerals. There is clear evidence that HDP MPs and municipalities backed PKK terrorists. Consequently, they lost their immunity and then now face legal prosecution.

Unsurprisingly, Germany was very reactionary, eager and supportive of the HDP politicians turning a deaf ear and blind eye to their ties to PKK.

Does it still make sense to re-emphasize that the PKK is listed as a terrorist organization by several states and organizations, including NATO, the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. A differentiation between “my terrorist” and “your terrorist” does not help to build world peace. Nor representing the operations against the PKK and its supporters as violations against the Kurdish people.

We believe we are in the wrong movie. The supposedly universal standards of democracy are upside down and hardly recognizable. A democratic state taking a hard line with terrorists and coup plotters is accused of being undemocratic, while criminals are welcomed and praised in Western democracies.

Turkey aborted the July 15 coup attempt and this was, to a certain extent, due to the fact that the government has gradually proven its legitimacy in the eyes of different ideological groups. Political institutions, however, have lagged behind society and this became apparent thanks to the suppression of the coup attempt and the way in which it was thwarted. Societal and political expectations instantly became closer and a sudden and strong overlap occurred on the night of July 15. National feelings and discourses in this instantaneous compromise seem to have been effective in creating today’s political atmosphere. However, the nationalist feeling will, undoubtedly, lose its current effect in the long run and more sophisticated concepts to elucidate the new consensus will come into play.Due to the structural problems of Turkish politics, the gap between political authority and peripheral values has always caused democracy-related problems. It is not only religion-state relations but also ethnic-sectarian differences that increase the complexity of this picture. The conservative-democrat characteristic of the political power in the last fifteen years has profoundly changed the never-ending dichotomy of center-periphery relations in Turkish society. The simple secular-religious dichotomy in politics was transformed into something new; relations altered; and Turkey has entered a new phase.

The number one reason for this change is that the suppression and exclusion of religious values from the political sphere have come to an end and this has happened at the expense of radical secularism in Turkey. The ideological polarization between central and peripheral values inflicted by political institutions has considerably weakened. Hence, both sides – namely, the secularist and conservative – have developed a capacity to unite against a new kind of enemy or for a different aspiration. By the same token, the two sides have met each other in practical life and their lifestyles have integrated with the elimination of the ideological differences. Daily issues instigated by ideological controversies have lost their old meanings. A new and shared public space and new relations have emerged. Fear of potential social problems stemming from living together, which was frequently voiced in the early years of the AK Party by the secularist camp, has lost its popularity. Since neither the secular nor the conservative camps have been discriminated, or given privilege, old political arguments cannot be revived.

Shortly before the July 15 coup attempt, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had said, “We will re-establish the State.” That was the outcome of the unveiled consensus that was already under way in the social sphere among different ideological groups, but which was to be reflected in political institutions as well. Obviously, Erdoğan’s position as the supreme commander – namely President of the Republic – has become one of the most critical turns in this road. Social policies to meet the needs of religious people who have been outmaneuvered for long and to bring new dynamics into society could only have been designed through such institutional means. Timing and the paths that Erdoğan has followed until now have been influential in his multi-faceted achievements as much as his use of rhetoric and the corresponding social realism in his political behavior.

Nationalism has undeniably enabled a stunning mass mobilization in this new consensus, especially with the developments in the international political conjuncture. However, the difference here is that the current nationalism, while mobilizing different ideological segments of Turkish society, has gained a wider social base and sophisticated as to integrate into other ideologies. In this political conjuncture, it is undeniable that nationalism has served as a glue to bind all segments of Turkish society, and that the glue has a dilute nature that will allow unbinding in due time. Because the feeling that has mobilized society is anti-militarism as much as it is nationalism. In Turkish society, today, there are strong uniting motivations, such as anti-militarism, participation in the public sphere, and democratic expectations. All of these motivations tend to transform policies, but they cannot be easily understood through either headcount or dichotomist structural analysis of the past. As different segments of Turkish society are fully participated in the process of production and division and sustain their contributions to the legitimacy mechanisms of political power, the needs of the social and political spheres will continue to follow each other.

The American Revolution was, to a large extent, identical to an independence war. The Americans objected to the authority of King George III and the British Parliament, but on no account were they slaves in shackles. In March 1770, British soldiers panicked when Americans threw snowballs at them and opened fire. Five Americans died, but in a short period of time the event became known as the Boston Massacre throughout the colonies, one of the smallest massacres in world history!American merchants decided to stop selling British tea and refused to unload the tea from the three ships anchored in Boston Harbor. On the night of December 16, 1773, a group of 60 Americans went to the harbor and threw the tea into the sea. The British Parliament was angered by this act and imposed a ban on the usage of Boston Harbor until the owners of the tea were fully compensated. Parliament also declared that Boston would be governed by British soldiers commanded by the British general, Thomas Gage.

The American Congress gathered in 1774. Congress sent a petition to George III and Parliament, asking for the harbor to be opened, the soldiers removed, and the taxes abolished. The petition did not solve the problem or bring peace. Skirmishes between Americans and British soldiers broke out, evolving into full-scale war. In the beginning, it seemed impossible that the Americans would win against Britain, a huge military world power that had recently won the Seven Years War. However, in 1778, things started to change. The old foe of Britain, France, decided to side with the American colonies. Then, Spain and the Netherlands also entered the war. In 1781, George Washington captured the biggest British army unit at Yorktown, in Virginia. The colonies gained independence and started construction of the new political system.

The Americans did fight for their independence against an imperial power with which they shared many social and cultural values. According to one interpretation, they preferred to set up a republic instead of a kingdom because they had conducted their independence war against the British kingdom. The colonies desired to achieve two important aims at the same time: to create a new common political entity and to keep their autonomy. The American founding fathers were also sensitive to achieving or, to put it better, protecting individual freedom. Thus, they created a federal system to please the colonies, and implemented checks and balances in the sense of constitutional governance traditions to serve individual freedom.

France was late with respect to Britain, both in having a constitutional order and achieving industrial revolution. It was poor and militarily weak. In hostility against Britain, France helped the American colonies to defeat the British Empire. The French people followed the fight of the Americans with great admiration. Ironically, they had to obey an emperor in their own country.

France was a country of three classes. The first class consisted of the Roman Catholic priests (the Church) who did not have to pay taxes as Catholicism was the official religion of France. This class had other privileges too. The second class, which included almost 30,000 people, lived in large manors, farms inherited by their ancestors. They had high social and official status, serving as generals, ambassadors, and ministers, and very few of them paid taxes. The third class was the largest, numbering almost 26 million. It included lawyers, merchants, doctors, farmers, etc. They were the people who paid taxes, even for basic needs. They also paid taxes to the church.

The French people were poor and in the seasons of bad harvest they went hungry. The state was also broke. King Louis XVI wanted to impose taxes on the aristocracy, but was not able to succeed in this. Social unrest seemed inevitable. As the American Declaration of Independence was translated into French and published, millions of French people read it and learned about freedom and equality.

Louis XVI pressed for taxes. The aristocracy declared that they would agree to be taxed, provided that the representatives of the three classes came together and united on the necessity of the taxes. The king accepted and the representatives of the three classes assembled. However, the representatives of the third class (named as the public, or the people) were discriminated against and made to understand that they were not as important as the other classes. The voting method in the Assembly also caused discontent among the representatives of the third class. As the third class included a huge majority of the French people, its representatives changed the name of the Assembly to the National Assembly and convinced some of the priests and aristocrats to act with them. Other aristocrats rushed to ask the king to stop the new Assembly from functioning, fearing that it would take decisions that would harm their interests. The king accepted and locked the meeting hall.

The new Assembly insisted on gathering and decided to write a new constitution. The king ordered the National Assembly to dissolve but his order was rejected. He then decided to use force and called upon his special guard unit of soldiers from Switzerland. The people in Paris, hearing that the king’s guardians were coming to suppress them, declared that they would resist. They attacked the Bastille on the July 4, 1789, to find an arsenal that had only a dozen prisoners being protected by almost ten soldiers. However, later on, in writing the history of the French Revolution, a story about the Bastille was produced that is comparable to the American Boston Massacre. The French Revolution grew to extensive violence that cost the lives of thousands, among which were not only aristocrats but also ordinary people.

After the French Revolution, France adopted a republican political structure. The newly emerged republic was based on the idea of equality for all citizens. It produced the French Declaration of Human and Citizen Rights. The French revolutionaries also took a position not only against the dynasty but also the religious establishment (the Church) and even religion itself, and created the French laïcité. More than two centuries after the French Revolution, the French people are still divided into two large groups: those who are for the Revolution and those who are against it.

Thus, the French revolution marked a break in French political history. Although it is debatable how successful it was in reaching its declared aims, the French Revolution proceeded to create a completely new political structure instead of restoring what the French people called the ancient regime.

Setbacks of Revolution

Now it is time to make a general observation about the results of revolutions. The term ‘revolution’ connotes, especially when used in romantic senses and contexts, radical changes that sweep completely away previous institutions, rules, and social and political entities. This approach is misleading. Revolution might mean significant change, but on no account does it lead to the change of everything. The idea that it can be possible to change everything at once and for forever is an unrealistic, false approach, denied by the nature of human life. In the case of the three classical revolutions, including the French, it is possible to detect continuity in social and political life. There is nothing surprising in this, as life depends upon repetition and continuity.

Turkish Political System up to July 15, 2016

Turkey lived through and witnessed an unprecedented event, not only in Turkish history but probably in the history of the world on July 15, 2016. The Turkish people defeated an attempted coup by the military without the use of weapons. In order to fully grasp what happened and why it is unique and so important, we need to point out the main characteristics of the Turkish political system before July 15, 2016.

The Turkish Republic was founded on October 29, 1923, after an independence war as a relatively plural and democratic political entity. Then, in 1925, it was turned into a single-party dictatorship that lasted until 1945. After the end of WWII, Turkey faced the truth that it had to make a choice between the democratic West and the totalitarian Soviet bloc. Due to several domestic and international factors, the political leadership of the time decided to unite with the West and started the process to transfer the closed political system into a democratic one. On May 14, 1950, Turkey had its first democratic elections, in which the opposition party – the Democrat Party (DP) – won and replaced the People Republic Party (PRP).

However, the PRP and its allies in the bureaucracy and society were discontent with the new regime. As early as 1952, only two years after the DP took office, army officers began to make plans to overthrow the democratic government. They started a military coup on May 27, 1960, the first coup in the history of the Turkish Republic. After a show trial, the army executed PM Adnan Menderes, and had a new constitution prepared that allocated the army a special and undemocratic position and, overall, established what we call a bureaucratic tutelage system. In the new political structure, the democratically elected government was given limited scope and the rest of state authority was reserved for the bureaucracy, with the army at the center.

All democratically elected governments showed discontent with the bureaucratic tutelage system and made small attempts to change its denominators. The biggest effort in this respect occurred after the AK Party came to power in November 2002. During the AK Party era, the bureaucratic tutelage system has been pushed back step by step. In his fight against bureaucratic state power, PM Erdoğan has needed allies in the bureaucracy as he, despite having political power, lacks bureaucratic cadres. Within the state structure, the main bureaucratic groups were the Kemalists and the Gülenists. As they were coming from similar religious and cultural backgrounds, Erdoğan allied with the Gülenists against the Kemalist cadres. However, the Gülenists were a deep-rooted, clandestine group with their own ambitions and plans. The aim of the Gülenists was to seize power within the bureaucracy so that, no matter which political party was in office, they would have the real power.

Erdoğan sensed the Gülenist make-up in the bureaucracy in 2010 and started preparations to take steps to curb the Gülenist bureaucracy. This was the beginning of a still ongoing fight between the two powers: democratically elected, legitimate, and transparent government on one side, and a hidden, bureaucratic, totalitarian power on the other.

The Gülenist movement made several attempts to take Erdoğan’s governments down. It tried to arrest the head of the National Intelligence Agency and, through him, reach Erdoğan in February 2012. The attempt failed. Then, the Gülenist gang tried to benefit from the Gezi Revolts in June 2013. An important effort to oust Erdoğan came from Gülen’s men in the police and judiciary on December 17-25, 2013. This attempt also failed.

The Coup Attempt of the Gülenist Army

Everyone in the country knew that the Gülenists had infiltrated the army, but no one was sure how large the infiltration was. It became clear on the night of July 15, 2016. The army officers who were FETO (Gülenist Terror Organization) members attempted a violent military coup. It was the bloodiest coup attempt in the history of the Republic. More than 200 people were killed and thousands were wounded. The people resisted the Gülenist officers and defeated the coup.

Many domestic and foreign observers of Turkish politics had expected such an attempt by the Gülenists. But why did it come on July 15, 2016? One might consider two reasons: 1) the judiciary was about to arrest many Gülenist officers who had participated in plot trials committed against army officers who were not Gülenists; 2) the government was about to have almost 2,000 Gülenist officers retired at the High Military Commission meeting in early August 2016. The Gülenists understood that they would lose an important part of their manpower in the army. This forced them to begin the coup as soon as possible. As the National Intelligence Agency learned of the attempted coup, the coup plotters changed their timing and began to implement their plan at 21:00 pm July 15, instead of 03:00 am on the night of July 16, 2016.

One point needs to be specifically mentioned here. The Gülenists had been able to present themselves to the outside world – though, of course, not to the Turkish people – as a peaceful movement of moderate Islam that defended secularism and fought radical Islam. They also managed to portray Erdoğan as a radical Islamist and Turkey as a country run by Islamists. To do this, they used totalitarian disinformation tactics. In fact, it is Gülen and his men who are radical. Gülen wishes to create a political system that resembles that of Iran. His ultimate aim is world domination.

The coup attempt failed. Several factors contributed to its failure. President Erdoğan and PM Binali Yıldırım declared that they would resist, even at the cost of their own lives. Erdoğan called on the people to defend democracy in the streets. Millions of people from every walk of life and political bent poured into the streets unarmed and challenged the soldiers. Public prosecutors issued a warrant to the police forces to arrest soldiers who were trying to overthrow the government. Turkish media, for the first time in the history of the Turkish republic, stood united against the coup attempt. The police bravely fought against the soldiers taking part in the coup, and army officers who opposed the coup attempt and were loyal to the constitutional order resisted in active or passive ways against the Gülenist officers.

The Gülenists tried to renew and accelerate the Kemalist bureaucratic tutelage system. That the coup attempt failed, or to put it better, that Turkish politics and the people defeated it, will have consequences for Turkish politics and the political system. Turkish politics will push the bureaucratic tutelage system back even further. It is certain that Turkey will be more democratic afterwards. After the failed coup attempt, Turkey began to reconstruct the state structure. Of special importance in this respect are the reforms in the army. For decades, the army in general and army generals in particular enjoyed a fairly autonomous position with regard to the democratic government. Generals saw themselves on a par with high-level politicians, and even thought of themselves as superior to the prime ministers.

Now, all of this is changing. Military schools at the level of high schools have been, rightly, closed down as they had been completely infiltrated by the Gülenists. Commanders of the army, navy, and air forces will be under the command of the Minister of National Defense, something that has been talked about for decades but has never come to pass. The National Intelligence Agency will be restructured.

More importantly, there is a spirit of reconciliation in the country. Turkish politics is excessively divided, but all main political parties united to oppose the coup. Political leaders now use softened language towards each other. People from all political parties participated in demonstrations against the coup. All of these developments give us hope for the future of Turkish democracy.

July Revolution of Turks      

It is not an exaggeration to call the Turkish people’s defeat of the coup attempt a revolution. It has the main characteristics of the classical revolutions. It caused or paved the way for sweeping political change. The Gülenists competed illegitimately for political power and lost the fight. Millions of people joined the resistance against the coup attempt. Now we can say that Turkey is among the countries that have a saga to support the democratic system. Turkey’s July 15 resistance against the coup attempt is no less than the British, American or French revolutions.

It is a difficult but equally vital task for Turkey to fight against this terror organization abroad, considering that FETO members are very skilled in manipulation and deception. They have various tools to manipulate politics and public opinion outside of Turkey. Most people are unaware of their methods of deception. Revealing these methods and informing the countries that host FETO institutions will be a major challenge in the fight against Fetullah Gülen Terror Organization.

From an Education Empire to a Bureaucratic Empire

The FETO network and institutions are spread over more than 140 countries. Their main focus is the education sector, but their activities are not limited to it. Education is often a suitable and legitimate entry point to the countries in which FETO wants to become institutionalized. It concentrates its activities in civil society, targeting Turkish diaspora first and trying to reach the local elite. It continues its activities in the economic and cultural domains.

In the American context, FETO controls the charter schools network and uses US taxpayers’ money to finance these schools. FETO administers more than 150 charter schools in the US and these schools have more than 60,000 students. Some argue that FETO works in close cooperation with the US authorities, especially in Central Asia, where more than 90 percent of Turkish schools are owned by the FETO network. In Central Asia and the Balkan countries, it operates elite education institutions that usually offer strong training in the English language.

FETO has institutions in 42 of the 57 OIC countries and owns more than 2,000 schools all over the world. Its estimated assets reach 25 billion US dollars. Education institutions and well-trained teachers loyal to FETO are among its most important assets. In Germany, FETO owns more than 24 schools and more than 300 associations. The host countries often support or facilitate their education activities. But, in fact, FETO activities are banned in some countries due to security concerns.

FETO also instrumentalizes humanitarian aid with its affiliate NGOs. It tries to form business networks and aims to reach politicians, bureaucrats and other decision makers. It uses cultural and educational activities as the fundamental pillar of its PR campaign. Education, Turkish culture and the alleged Sufi version of “moderate Islam” are the major assets that FETO utilizes for legitimizing its operations in the international arena. It also lobbies business environments and politics but tries to differentiate the political and economic domains from those of culture and religion. Some politicians and religious NGOs in the US receive financial support from FETO. Education is often a useful cover and a source of funding to uphold its clandestine activities. It eventually targets and tries to manipulate elite-level bureaucratic and political posts.

Western Friendly “Moderate Muslims” as Opposed to “Islamic Radicalism”

FETO places special emphasis on PR campaigns in the transnational domain. Its education and “dialogue” activities are the main PR instruments. Inter-faith dialogue provides a platform on which FETO’s religious activities are concentrated. In the non-Muslim majority countries in particular, FETO tries to promote inter-faith and inter-cultural dialogue projects. The moniker of a FETO-affiliated institution gives the impression of a dialogue center promoting a “liberal and pro-dialogue” version of Islam as opposed to a more conservative or extremist version. It tries to portray its understanding of Islam as compatible with Western moral codes and political interests.

In its activities it refrains from presenting itself as solely an Islamic religious network or missionary Islamist network that tries to spread a religious message. It uses the label of hizmet (service) rather than da’wah (preaching of Islam). FETO’s transnational network is flexible, meaning that it tries to adapt to the priorities and needs of the countries in which it wants to become institutionalized.

Transnational Elite Network Par Excellence

FETO is a hierarchical and multilayered organization, ruled under a strict chain of command. In both Turkey and abroad, it targets elite-level students, businessmen, bureaucrats and politicians. It recruits smart students in the countries in which it operates and provides education opportunities in the higher education institutions in Turkey. It tries to form a permanent bond with the selected international student body. Before they were closed, FETO owned 15 universities in Turkey, and was also active in the administration of some state universities. Thousands of international students are educated in these higher education institutions. FETO maintains strong ties with the students educated in these institutions and further turns them into loyal subjects by appointing them to proper positions within the organizational hierarchy.

FETO is a network that concentrates its activities on the elite, rather than focusing on making a difference at the grassroots level. Unlike other traditional religious networks, it is not in the service of ordinary people. Almost all activities related to this organization specifically target the elite or potential elite of different kinds. It tries to reach high-level politicians or to train the people who will become elite bureaucrats or cultural and economic elites in their home countries. Focusing on education brings FETO legitimacy, which also helps it to become connected to the future elite in various countries. The version of education it offers is a modern Western-style education. It lacks almost any Islamic courses in its international curricula, a typical method used to disguise its real purposes. In underdeveloped countries that lack educational infrastructure, the strong education provided by FETO-affiliated institutions makes a big difference. One of the distinctive assets of FETO is the well-educated human resources that are ready to serve in different parts of the world.

The transnational networks of FETO may eventually become a Messianic elite diaspora network that may not only threaten Turkey’s interests but also manipulate the politics of the host countries. The FETO network increasingly recruits local followers from the countries in which it has become organized. Education is the innocent stage of recruitment, but the organization intends to increase its influence in bureaucracy and state apparatus. With its financial resources and educated human capital, it also manages to gain access to politicians and the business elite. Its visible face is in the areas of education and religious and cultural dialogue, but its secret aim is usually to take control of state apparatus and to manipulate the elite. Its members have gained experience of hiding themselves and deceiving people over more than four decades. Now, the main challenge for the Turkish government is to deal with the transnational dimension of FETO. Without the coordination and help of the countries that host FETO institutions, this struggle will be even more challenging. Therefore, diplomacy and international PR should be an important tool used in the struggle against FETO.

In particular, many of the Iranians in Europe and the US suffer from a traumatic reading of their history as they are also misled by their limited familiarity with the social and political developments that take place in Turkey. From the morning of July 16 onwards, they chose to concentrate on those who were purged, detained or arrested for their connection with FETO, Fetullah Gülen Terror Organization, rather than on the 250 citizens who died or the thousands of others who risked their lives and were injured when resisting the putschists. Take, for example, the inflammatory comments Hamid Dabashi shared on social media recently, in which he irresponsibly compared President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan with, all at once, Kim Jong-un of North Korea, Adolf Hitler, Mussolini, Franco of Spain, Ioannis Metaxas of Greece and Juan Peron of Argentina. Ironically, what infuriated Mr. Dabashi so much was the historic huge gathering in Yenikapı/Istanbul on August 7 where millions of people, including the president, the prime minister and the leaders of the two main opposition parties, came together to peacefully denounce the putschists again.

The Incubus of the Past or the Burden of History

Such an attitude not only displays an academic frivolity not uncommonly found among some Iranian experts who know little about Turkey but also testifies an uncanny tendency among them, as among some of their Turkish counterparts, to exceed the limits of a scholarly comparison between Turkey and Iran. True, Iran and Turkey have, roughly from the early 19th century onwards, followed fascinatingly similar historical trajectories. But the underlying spirit in these trajectories has been noticeably different. Throughout their modernization processes from 19th century onwards although they converged in their struggle against the ever-increasing imperial pressures coming from the West, the struggle consolidated the extra-governmental elements in Iran while it was mainly organized around the state machine in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey.

Further, despite the major ups and downs, throughout the decades, popular elections played the determining role in Turkey, while Iran almost invariably appeased repression at home to remove foreign domination. It is quite problematic that, while some pro-regime figures in Iran tend to interpret every popular movement in the Middle East as inspired by the uprisings that brought about the Iranian Revolution of 1979, some of the anti-regime Iranians hasten to analyze almost every such movement, especially if it harbors an Islamic tone, as a prelude to an Islamic state.

Interestingly enough, however, these two opposite positions seem to agree on an unfavorable reading of the failed coup attempt in Turkey. Basically, the now well-known obsession against President Erdoğan and his policies constitute a common ground between the two opposite camps. It is no secret that the conservative circles inside Iran have long since turned against Erdoğan. They see him and the current regional policies of the Turkish government as an obstacle to taking full advantage of the ‘historical opportunity’ that has emerged for them from the widespread destabilization in the Middle East to realize their regional power aspirations. Many conservative figures in Iran condemned, inasmuch they did, the crushed coup attempt not on democratic grounds but for notably different motivations. The anti-regime Iranians, on the other hand, have mysteriously accused President Erdoğan of leaning towards authoritarianism and even totalitarianism, the two terms whimsically and irresponsibly used by Erdoğan’s opponents.

Diverse Political Readings

Also, reactions to the failed coup inside Iran have not only reflected the perceptions of Turkey by Iran’s political elite but have also reemphasized the political divides at home. Javad Zarif, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, was among the first to condemn the coup attempt. Hours after the attempt, he emphasized the significance of popular will and sided with the Turkish people. For the Moderate-Reformist figures, the failed coup attempt attested to the significance of the unalienable popular will and the futility of any move to run against it. Unsurprisingly, with the presidential elections less than a year away in Iran and the risk of Rouhani’s disqualification from running for president by the Guardian Council becoming more pronounced, the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and his close circle have used the failed coup attempt to send a democratic message to the conservative establishment in Iran to respect the popular will.

For the Principalists, the failed coup has provided the best opportunity to disfavor the Rouhani government on one obvious point, to wit, its rapprochement with the US, especially following the nuclear deal reached in 2015. In a statement at a gathering in Tehran, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei referred to the failed coup attempt in Turkey as a sign of the untrustworthiness of the US for its alleged involvement. Another conditional condemnation of the failed coup attempt came from Ali Akbar Valayeti, Khamenei’s aide in international affairs, who used it to criticize Turkey for its insistence on the removal of Asad in Syria. In an interview on 16 July 2016, only one day after the coup attempt, he expressed his hope that “a day would come when the Turkish administration would also respect the opinion and vote of the Syrian people” and claimed “Bashar al-Assad has also been elected through the ballot box.”

The crushing of the coup attempt marks a watershed, not only in Turkey but also in the entire region. As Javad Zarif put it, “Turkish people’s brave defense of democracy and their elected government proves that coups have no place in our region and are doomed to failure.” In order to secure a lasting solution to the regional crises, most significantly to the Syrian issue, both Turkey and Iran must cooperate as two governments with high popular support, as destabilization or unpopular rule in one inevitably affects the other. Based on the recent foreign policy moves, there is every reason to suggest that Turkey is determined to restore peace in the Middle East by maximizing regional cooperation.

The comments made by some Iranian scholars teaching at western universities not only demonstrate their misreading of the developments which recently took place in Turkey but also give insightful ideas about the limits of their objective thinking. Fortunately, many Iranians inside the country see any coup attempt as categorically damnable, as they welcome the popular resistance in Turkey that heroically crushed the putschists on July 15. They, as every people in the Middle East, appreciate the costs of ineffectual, unpopular and foreign-controlled governments for the region.

When it comes to the Turkish diaspora around the world, Germany plays the most significant role. A large portion of almost 3 million ethnic Turks living in Germany generally follow and react to major events taking place in Turkey, which concomitantly ignites the exhausting debate on the “failed integration” of Turks in Germany. On July 31, thousands of people gathered in Cologne for a public meeting under the motto “No to coup – Yes to democracy”. There were people from a variety of ideological and political backgrounds, including conservative and liberal Turks. There were official representatives of the AK Party, the Turkish government and the oppositional Kemalist Association (ADD).Short speeches were held and the speakers emphasized the need for a united spirit against the enemies of democracy. Several days before the demonstration, the organizers (UETD – United European Turkish Democrats) announced that they wanted to broadcast President Erdoğan’s address from Turkey via video link. However, this was not allowed, according to a court decision by the German Constitutional Court (BVerfG) on July 30, 2016 (BverfG, 1 BvQ 29/16). One should underline that constitutional or public law stand where politics and law intersect. Therefore, to understand the reason or motivation behind the decision, one has to look at the dogmatic legal base of the decision and the current political climate.Currently, there is a political tension between Turkey and Germany and, despite the intense cooperation with regard to the refugee crisis, there have been many incidents in the last few months that have harmed the bilateral relations. In Germany, there was, for example, a polemical incident in which Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan – both his persona and politics – was impertinently debated on talk shows and in political as well as satirical magazines. Although the refugee deal between Turkey and the European Union demonstrated that both partners needed each other, the “Böhmermann-case”, the chronic antagonism towards the Turkish government in the German mainstream media and the “Armenian genocide” resolution passed by the German parliament are some of the factors that have caused severe strain in the long-standing relationship between Germany and Turkey. There was such a tense political atmosphere that the live video broadcast of President Erdoğan was banned.

The question is how the decision was justified. The main arguments enumerated in the decision of the higher administrative court are as follows: the freedom of assembly according to Art. 8 (1) of the German Constitution gives Germans the right to assemble peacefully. Accordingly, (2) outdoor assemblies can be restricted. Article 15 I of the assembly law (VersG) functioned as the basis for the limitation of video screen use, whereby a legal restraint can be ordered by the authority if there is a likelihood of a risk of danger to public safety or public order during a demonstration. According to the court, a live-streamed speech of President Erdoğan would emotionalize demonstrators in such a way that an aggressive mood could develop in the crowds. Due to this potential negative response, felonies by the demonstrators were predicted by the court. Additionally, they purported that oppositional demonstrating groups would be antagonized by the live stream, which would result in a series of criminal altercations between the opposing groups.

It is obvious that this type of reasoning contains many problems. Firstly, as Professor Nils Schacks pointed out on Verfassungsblog.de, the minimal requirements for a concrete danger in the context of article 15 I VersG were not met: the danger of social misconduct had to be predicted ex ante when the court decision was made. The reality was that there were no concrete indications of criminal behaviour by the demonstrators. Furthermore, if other protesting groups were to interfere with the demonstration, this would imply a criminal threat to the demonstrators that would then necessitate police intervention to provide security for the event. Ex post, the demonstration in Cologne took place peacefully, even though many more people attended than initially expected.

In fact, previous speeches by President Erdoğan in person in Germany had never resulted in civil disorder. Additionally, as legal analyst Christian Rath of Die Tageszeitung stated, the freedom of assembly in Article 8 of the German Constitution includes the right of the demonstrators to appoint the speaker(s) for the gathering. Other opinions focused primarily on the persona of Erdoğan rather than the actual right to choose the speakers for the demonstration. In this regard, Heribert Prantl of Süddeutsche Zeitung incorrectly stated that it was not possible to compare Erdoğan’s live broadcast to the Pope. However, if the speaker was the main criterion for a public broadcast, it should be legally impossible to justify how, in 2011, a significant functionary of the terrorist organization PKK was allowed to be live streamed in a football stadium in Cologne from Iraq. This is a clear violation of the right and principle of equality according to Art. 3 (1) of German Constitution. Furthermore, within the spirit of Art. 8 I of the constitution, this view is surprising, as it is a classically broad constitutional right, which even gives Nazis the right to march and demonstrate.

But perhaps the most important assumption made by German officials regarding the demonstration in Cologne, aside from the purely legal viewpoint, was that it was portrayed as a simple “pro-Erdogan” event in many media reports. The demonstration was a clear message from the supporters of Turkish democracy; however, the repercussions were even worse as hysteria dominated the political debate on Turks supporting this event. Currently, the already limited dual citizenship for Turks is so seriously doubted and discussed in the measures of an “Anti-Terror-Catalogue” that one option is to cancel it. Finally, it has to be pointed out that a speech by a supreme Turkish authority could have been interpreted as a strong and symbolic behaviour for representative democracy. This has to be considered through the lens of traditional civil rights in which public communication is constitutive for a free democratic order.

Turkey has lived through the biggest trauma in its recent history, as the members of the Fetullah Gülen Terror Organization (FETO) attempted a coup d’état on July 15, 2016. However, the heroic people of Turkey managed to quell this sordid attempt by literally standing unarmed against flying bullets and tank shells. Together with the people were the police, loyal soldiers and politicians, first and foremost being the president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. As a country which has just survived a coup attempt, Turkey has astonished many with its political resilience. While systematically neutralizing coup plotters in multiple governmental organizations, such as the military, judiciary, bureaucracy, health and education sectors, which had been infiltrated by the FETO, the government preserved its functionality and managed to perform as normal.

In the same vein, to the astonishment of many, the Turkish economy showed great resilience in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt. Even in the first working day after the coup attempt, there was no panic in the financial markets. The Turkish lira only marginally lost its value against the US dollar and there was no rush on banks or bonds. In fact, the effect of the coup attempt on the financial markets was barely discernable. The Turkish democracy and economy have survived major setbacks in recent years and proved their resilience, the true extent of which has been understood more clearly in the light of the failed coup attempt.

It was absolutely vital to take necessary steps and give relevant messages to soothe the financial markets at such a critical time. The policymakers managed this process well in a calm and professional manner. The statements were to the point and the policy actions met the needs of the financial markets. In this vein, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Şimşek underlined that the policymakers were implementing best practices and Turkey was committed to the market economy. Şimşek also assured that capital controls were out of the question. Moreover, The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey took immediate actions to ensure the efficient functioning of the banking sector and to relieve financial investors.

In addition to these statements and policy actions, a well-functioning financial system, strong public finances, a dynamic real sector and a moderate current account deficit helped the Turkish economy to stay afloat against the failed coup attempt.

After having endured financial troubles and two major financial crisis in 1994 and 2001, Turkey finally set out to establish financial infrastructure via several regulations and supervisory institutions such as Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency and Savings Deposit Insurance Fund. Having learnt the lesson from the financial troubles suffered, the Turkish financial system has become much more resilient than that of most countries in the world. That is why the Turkish financial industry stayed totally intact in the aftermath of the 2008-09 global financial crisis as financial industries around the world experienced hard times and even faced numerous bankruptcies, such as Lehman Brothers, as well as bail-outs, such as massive insurance company AIG. When we take a look at the important indicators of banking sector, such as credit growth, capital adequacy ratio, the non-performing loans ratio, return on assets and return on equity, it is clearly seen that the Turkish banking sector is not only financially robust, but also highly profitable compared to that of many countries and as far as historical records are concerned.

Public finance is also strong in Turkey. As of 2015, public debt as a share of GDP stood at only 33 percent in Turkey, while it is 249 percent for Japan, 178 percent for Greece, 104 percent for the US and 90 percent for the EU. While the interest burden was very high in the 1990s, as real interest rate of total domestic debt stock was more than 30 percent, it diminished tremendously as real interest rate plummeted to single digit levels in the 2000s. Moreover, Turkey has wiped off all debt owed to the IMF by paying the last installment of 421 million US dollars in 2013, which marked the end of the 52 year debt history with the IMF.

Real sector indicators such as the capacity utilization rate of manufacturing, real sector confidence index and firm entry & exit rates show that the current situation of the Turkish real sector provides a robust image. Current account deficit has been regarded as the Achilles heel of the Turkish economy, as Turkey relies on foreign capital inflows to finance the current account deficit, making it vulnerable to global economic fluctuations. However, although current account deficit and economic growth rates moved in the same direction until two years ago, with higher economic growth rates resulting in a widening current account deficit and lower economic growth rates reducing current account deficit, the economy has been growing in tandem with narrowing current account deficit for the last two years. To put this into numbers, current account balance as a share of GDP decreased from -7.7 percent in 2013 to -5.4 percent in 2014, before shrinking to -4.5 percent in 2015.

The Turkish economy showed the glimpses of its resilience in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt, such that the economy and financial system have worked very well without any instability; as if nothing major took place just a matter of days earlier. The Turkish economy survived serious challenges and actually fared markedly better than that of numerous countries, especially in Europe, in the last few years. It now faces a bigger challenge. However, Turkey, with its strong and healthy economy and financial system, has the required strength and resolution to overcome this challenge too, as the immediate aftermath of the failed coup attempt has attested.

Note: A longer version of this article was recently published by SETA Foundation with the title, “The Resilience of the Turkish Economy after the Failed Coup Attempt”

Was it a spontaneous call and a spontaneous mass response? I believe and will argue that while the timing and brutality of the coup attempt was unexpected, the possibility of a coup itself was not. It is an unfortunate tradition, or rather a curse that Turkey could never fully break, for Turkey’s right and center-right incumbent parties to be forced out of power by the military.The military in Turkey has a tradition of toppling down the democratically elected governments. The reasons vary but in general, the military elites tend to think that the public keep making the mistake of voting for the wrong guys. According to this ill opinion, politicians are nothing more than populist rhetoricians and do not care about the long-term interests of the country. Further, politicians do anything for reelection such as responding to the demands of the ordinary man on the street (a.k.a. democracy) rather than asking wisdom from the military which “only cares about the true interests of the nation”.

Accordingly, the military knows the true interests of the country but the elected politicians and voters just don’t get it. For such a viewpoint, the republic comes before democracy. The military is the defender of the republic and, when necessary, feels obliged to defend it against the people who elect the politicians. Until recently, such an understanding had a solid popular base in the society as well, not big enough to win the elections though. The supporters of the military tutelage especially in the bureaucracy, judiciary, and academia saw nothing wrong with the military hijacking democracy. Even today, some people shy away from calling the 1960 military intervention as a coup (darbe), but prefer to call it a revolution (ihtilal or devrim) instead.After all, the commonly heard phrase, “We are the soldiers of Mustafa Kemal [Mustafa Kemal’in askerleriyiz]” indicated that the military is under the command of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk rather than the current president or prime minister of the time. A coup plotter major and a judge associated with the coup arrested for being involved in the Gülenist coup attempt of July 15 both repeated the slogan “We are the soldiers of Mustafa Kemal.” Regardless of whether it was a genuine call or just a lip service to cover their Gülenist side, this slogan has always been in the back of coup plotters’ mind in the past and present. The military simply did not care about the higher civilian authorities who are alive and currently in office but chose to follow a ghost they created in their imagination.A former chief of the general staff had delicately summarized the military’s autonomy from the elected politicians, government, and any other higher authority in his secretly recorded tape in 2011. (Gulenists are argued to be behind the release and share of this voice recording, which is another proof that the coup is not a temporary problem, nor is it the problem of one single faction in the military. Rather it is a systematic problem of the Turkish military, which needs to be handled for once and for all.) The general, referring to the Article 35 of the Armed Forces Regulation which had been codified in order to justify the coups, stated “They talk about removing the article 35 or something of this sort. Remove it or not, we, as armed forces, exist for this. This is our natural historical mission. Nobody can give us advice on this. Nobody can tell us the opposite of it.”

I have made this long intro just to make one point clear. The Turkish armed forces have traditionally thought that, when it deems it necessary, it has the right to punish the politicians by crashing the democracy with a coup. But in fact, the military enforced all the previous coups (in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997) not because it had the right, but it had the might to do so. They had the tanks and civilians did not, this simple. As of 2016, the military still has the tanks and the civilians still don’t. Everybody knew this, so did President Erdoğan. And Erdoğan also knew that the military continues to be the same old military. Despite all the changes it went through, there was one untouched characteristic: they saw plotting a coup as a natural right of theirs.

Since his party came to power in 2002, Erdoğan has long been worried about a coup against his party, Justice and Development Party (AK Party). The AK Party has won five consecutive elections (a record in Turkish history) and received over 49 percent of the overall votes in the most recent one. However, the curse was still out there. Erdoğan and AK Party politicians kept their eyes open for the tanks in the streets of Ankara. For many, a coup was an inevitable end for the AK Party, which did not give up winning the democratic elections one after another. Erdoğan himself had lost his seat as the mayor of Istanbul in the aftermath of the 1997 coup and spent 4 months 10 days in prison. He was seriously warned a decade later in 2007 with a military memorandum and his party narrowly escaped from being closed by just one vote in the constitutional court in 2008.

Hence, Erdoğan and his followers long expected a coup and probably gave some thought to what to do if/when the day comes. Nobody did anything for the PM Menderes when he was arrested by a colonel in 1960 and was sent to death row in a year. Nobody came to the help of Demirel, Erbakan and all the other politicians in times of coups. But this time the story would be different. Erdoğan has long stressed that he did and will stand firm against any undemocratic intervention. He asked his followers to do the same and his followers had long promised to be ready. It was a matter of humor for the Turkish public opinion to see Erdoğan being greeted by his fans in shrouds (the cloth in which Muslims are buried upon death) in 2013. But the message was serious and clear: we are behind you ‘to death.’

In short, people did not flood into the streets to defend their PM Menderes in 1960 partly because they had no clue about how Menderes’ life would be brutally concluded by the junta and partly because they had no clue about what they could do to prevent or reverse the coup. The same went for the following coups of Turkey up until the one in 2016. This time, people were ready. They had been reminded of the bitter end of earlier politicians and were motivated to defend their votes and elected politicians against a coup. In other words, both Erdoğan and millions of his followers (plus, even greater millions of the entire Turkish electorate) were ready for a coup to occur.

The only error was, they long waited for a Kemalist coup to attempt to crash the Turkish democracy. However, the address was different this time as Gülenists were behind the coup. Nor was the brutality of the coup expected, as it was the most brutal attempt in Turkey ever, with 240 lost lives to defend the democratic regime. Nevertheless, Erdoğan and AK Party were clear on what to do against a coup and with this expectation, they transformed the Turkish electorate on what to do in case a junta tries to crash the democratic process in Turkey. Hence, Turkish voters had learnt their lesson, were ready and waiting for the coup even if they did not know when or from where exactly it would show up. I hope the Turkish military can also learn its lesson and eventually understand that it is not their job to teach people how not to vote. If there is one lesson the failed Gulenist coup attempt of July 15 can teach to the rest of the military, it is the unquestionable stupidity and extreme danger of plotting a coup in 21st century Turkey.

Note: The article picture at the top is a famous AK Party banner from 2013. Photos (from left): Former PM Menderes (text: you hanged him!), former PM and President Özal (text: you poisoned him!), and Erdoğan (text: we won’t feed him to you)

The psychological impact of the coup attempt has created a strong sense of betrayal in Turkish society, leading to the formation of a new sociological base. There were already disgruntlements among an extensive number of people over the Gülenists’ chronic double-dealings, their messianic culture, and their ambivalent discourse inconsistently and awkwardly juxtapose religious and secular values insincerely for pragmatic reasons. After the coup attempt, a sense of betrayal emerged against Gülenists, who, in fact, were never expected to resort to military power and to use it against civilians. Until the bloody coup attempt, Gülenists occupying governmental posts were accused of disobeying state authority by forming a parallel structure within the state and solely looking after the group’s own interests. With the coup attempt, however, they went one step further and targeted the state itself with the purpose of becoming rulers of the country. They aimed to reconstruct the state in accordance with their own vision by using every, including deadly, means possible, which is unpardonable to any Turkish citizen.President Erdoğan, making an analogy between chameleons and FETO members one week after July 15, came to the conclusion that chameleons would feel insulted by this comparison. Erdoğan declared that FETO members pathetically change their ideology, discourse, and ideas according to every political conjuncture. Today, many people in Turkey agree that Gülenists have no fair religious, national or universal agenda, except their own ends that justify all means in any given context. The unreliable and unrespectable characters of Gülenists constitute the main motive behind their exclusion from society.Another reason behind the sense of betrayal in Turkish society is the well-known charitable activities of Gülenists, who had been identified generally with their non-profitable organizations. Their primary agenda was presented as public education, for which they applied a variety of methods to reach different socio-economic classes of society. They organized several educational programs targeting not specifically one social group, but differing groups according to economic income, occupation, and family background etc. However, people realized that their sole purpose was indoctrination. They organized social aid gatherings for housewives and political discussions for academics and journalists. For different social groups, they utilized different discourses. Additionally, Gülenists were generally known for their dedication to the group’s ideals such as devoting their lives to hard work for little money. Teachers working at FETO schools, in addition to earning little, further denoted a fixed portion of their salary to the organization. Religious and universal values stood at the core, appealing to all social groups in Turkey.

Many had supposed that Gülenists were good people and that their activities would help society for the better. A good example is Bülent Ecevit, a former prime minister of Turkey and known to be a strong advocate of the Kemalist leftist political ideology. Ecevit supported the Gülen Movement by saying that Fetullah Gülen was the representative of moderate Islam vis-à-vis political Islam. However, with the uncovering of the secret agenda of the Gülenists and its messianic discourse, both concealed by the avowal of universal moral values, many people realized the terrible mistake they had made, which caused a strong sense of betrayal. Since the coup attempt, people in Turkey have fully grasped the fact that the Gülenists’ real intention was to take control of the state. Fetullah Gülen, the FETO leader, taught his disciples to obey all rules without question and to wait for the right time to seize power. It seems that the Gülenists sacrificed their lives to reach the promised day, to which they had dedicated their entire lives.

Although Turkish politics is passing through turbulent times, one can safely argue that the decades-old discourses and highly problematic hypocritical approaches of Gülenists have lost all plausibility. Moreover, the Gülenists have lost their legitimacy and credibility within society. A recent study shows that eighty-one per cent of Turkish citizens support Gülen’s extradition to Turkey and a subsequent trial. Many believe that the Gülenists’ will to seize power will not stop here and that they may seek to regroup in other countries in order to redesign their domestic politics. The foreign minister of Turkey, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, has already pointed out such a threat for some of the Turkic countries in which FETO has been established for decades, as in Turkey. As Gülenists attempt to turn Turkey from democratic to military rule, it is probable that they will try to apply similar methods to other countries in the near future. On the bloody night of July 15, Turkish people acknowledged that Fetullah Gülen and his followers pose a global threat since they did not hesitate to use heavy weapons against civilians when they tried to seize power.

FETO has lost all legitimacy in the eyes of Turkish society and, as a side effect, has united Turkish citizens from all ideological backgrounds and worldviews. Turkish citizens survived by defending their democracy against this religio-military attack. For Gülen, it seems that Turkey was only a step toward a broader goal; the organization will certainly continue to disseminate and realize its messianic purpose from East to West. The FETO leader should be considered not only a religious fanatic and fundamentalist in his own country but also a danger to the democratic world order.

Immediately after the coup attempt, the efforts of the Central Bank officers and economic management team helped to ward off the initial shock waves. In particular, Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Simsek’s statements for foreign investors played an important role in reassuring investors during this difficult process. Simsek stated that structural economic reforms will be on the agenda, investors’ confidence will be secured, daily life will not be affected and political decisions will be market friendly.There are five important points that stand out in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt.

The Central Bank’s Measures after the Coup Attempt

The measures taken by the Central Bank (CB) on July 17 have played a crucial role in easing the first shock waves created by the coup attempt. Official statements on supplying unlimited liquidity to banks and the assurance of financial stability have stabilized the banking system and the markets, so that possible financial repercussions on the morning of July 18, 2016, could be avoided.

The CB’s decision on July 19, of lowering the interest rates by 25 basis points of the upper band of the interest rate corridor, showed its strong belief in Turkey’s economic prospects. On July 22, the CB announced that meetings will be held with domestic and foreign investors, analysts and members of finance sector. The CB gave a strong message that the Turkish economy cannot be redesigned by a coup attempt.

The Economic Management Team’s Message to Domestic and Foreign Investors

Statements by President Erdogan, Prime Minister Yıldırım and especially Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Simsek supported the normalization process and economic stability, leading to a climate of trust for domestic and foreign investors and the financial markets.

Simsek’s meeting with 500 international investors via tele-conference was so effective in giving first-hand information about the latest developments, that the promise of unlimited liquidity in the markets and of sticking to the fiscal discipline convinced the markets and investors of the swift recovery.

The Declaration of a State of Emergency

The government declared a State of Emergency for a three-month period to root out the hidden FETO members. It should be underlined that the government’s main intention is only to fight against this terror organization, whose members disguise themselves within various bureaucratic, judiciary and military posts. Therefore, in the period of the State of Emergency, the Turkish government will pay the utmost attention to ensure investors’ confidence in the markets through market-friendly political decisions and ensuring that daily life is as unaffected as possible. It appears that a quick normalization will be realized thanks to the strong democracy, operative markets and continuously enriched investment atmosphere.

The Stable Position of the Stock Market and the Foreign Exchange Market

Although the stock market index (BIST100) declined and exchange rates rose after the coup attempt, such small fluctuations were halted by timely economic measures and comforting statements from politicians. Economic indicators will apparently be optimized soon.

International Rating Agencies’ Statements and Decisions

Immediately after the failed coup attempt, the international rating agencies unfortunately made controversial statements regarding Turkey. In fact, Turkey has a very strong fiscal position and very low levels of public debt and budget deficits. In addition, policymakers have already taken economic measures to prevent fluctuations. Despite all of the positive indicators, Moody’s has threatened to lower Turkey’s credit rating, possibly to the garbage level. Some believe that, with this decision, Moody’s has aimed to drive the markets into panic. Despite the admirable economic performance of Turkey, in the past, Moody’s has acted unrealistically slowly to increase rating levels.

Likewise, Standard & Poor’s has decreased Turkey’s credit rating from BB+ to BB, thus making a negative contribution and causing malicious damage to the reputation of the Turkish economy. Fitch’s decisions will be more important in the near future. Overall, the negative attitudes of the rating agencies seem unfair and prejudiced. These institutions should take into account the potential of Turkey’s economic performance and contributions to the world markets.

Turkey has experienced robust economic growth since 2002, thanks to political stability and reforms. The Turkish economy has grown uninterruptedly for the last 26 quarters. This performance has occurred despite the global financial crisis and the geopolitical risks in the Middle East. This performance will continue with new structural reforms.

Despite the failed coup attempt, economic experts estimate that strong domestic demand will trigger production and investment in the following months. It is not the first time that Turkey has been given such a low rating. Despite the prejudiced attitudes of some international rating agencies, the wheels of the economy should continue to accelerate. In addition to the concerted efforts of the public and private sectors, communication with foreign investors should be set to continue. While Turkey contends with FETO (FEtullah Gulen Terror Organization), economic reforms are on the agenda and the market economy continues to function in its own way.

While publicly adopting a rhetoric of intercultural dialogue and peaceful existence, the mystical movement has avoided close contact with any traditional Islamic groups or NGOs, and adopted a purely pragmatic mode of interaction with many political parties, aiming to penetrate critical state institutions. Adherents of the movement constituted a powerful web of institutions that extracted capital and human resources across a wide geography that spans from Latin America to Sub-Saharan Africa and from the United States to Central Asia. The main strategy was to recruit highly qualified youth from a variety of backgrounds and to indoctrinate them along the lines of Gülen’s messianic teachings based upon hiding real identities, forming secret networks and collaborating with main intelligence agencies, starting from the Cold War period.In Turkey, Gülenist groups managed to form a massive web of human cells, over the years, placed in the higher echelons of the security establishment, intelligence institutions, the judiciary, bureaucracy, academia and the business circles in the country. Their first attempt to topple President Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party, which were perceived to engage in open conflict with the secretive group, came with the 17-25 December conspiracies in 2013. Yet, the plot to discredit the president and his party through fabricated sleaze allegations did not work as planned and the Gülenists in the security establishment and judiciary were disclosed. While investigations were underway to unveil and exclude a substantial portion of Gülenist elements from the military in August 2013, they launched a preemptive strike and initiated the most unorthodox coup in Turkey’s political history, triggered by a distorted religious order.Although Turkey’s political establishment and society in general are not unfamiliar with military interventions, this coup was utterly unorthodox and unique because it was not executed by the central command of the Chief of Staff, but rather by a military junta controlled by Gülenist coup plotters from different army ranks. In this junta, lower-ranking officials who enjoyed a higher position in the distorted religious establishment as Big Brothers (“abi”) were giving orders to generals, along with some academics, bankers and business people associated with the group.

It emerged that the Gülenist soldiers and civilians involved in the coup attempt were carrying 1 dollar banknotes, allegedly blessed by Gülen himself, as a coded means of communication. The coup was also unorthodox from the perspective of organized violence against the close entourage of the president, the Chief of Staff and major commanders of the army, crucial state institutions and the civilian population. Unprecedented events, including the bombing of the Turkish National Assembly, the headquarters of the Intelligence Agency and Special Police Forces by F16s dropping laser-guided bombs, the assassination attempt targeting the president, and the use of high-tech attack helicopters, heavy artillery and tanks against civilians differentiated this coup from its predecessors.

The wide scope and inclusiveness of the democratic reaction to the coup was also unique in Turkish political history, as civilians in both urban and rural centers, municipal workers and NGOs resisted the initiative that planned to pull Turkey into the status of a third-world country. Frankly speaking, Turkey’s experimentation with democratic rule was interrupted on numerous occasions in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997, and the idea of “military-led modernization from above” has deep ideological roots that go back at least a century, reaching the Young Turks and early Kemalists.

Despite intensive dialogue and integration attempts with NATO, the European Union and Western institutions for over half a century, the shadow of a potential military takeover has never disappeared from the horizons of the world’s 18th largest economy. But, in previous military interventions, particularly those in 1960 and 1980, the country was struggling with acute socio-economic crises and there was a need for strategic change in development policy, which were used as precepts by the generals to justify the coups. Looking at the 15 July Gülenist coup attempt, it is very clear that there was no socio-economic basis for the coup as the Turkish economy was displaying a respectable growth performance in a global environment that has been demonstrating sluggish growth. There was also no strong social support for the attempted coup.

The Gülenist coup attempt was thwarted thanks to the strong leadership of President Erdoğan, the powerful reaction of the Police Special Forces and the noble sacrifices of civilians at a cost of around 250 martyrs and 2,000 wounded. Despite the huge humanitarian and psychological impact of the attempted coup, the potential impact on the economic structure constituted one of the most important crunch points. Turkey was caught by this heinous coup attempt while the economy was gaining steam, normalization attempts with Russia, Israel and Egypt in foreign policy were advancing with potentially significant economic contributions and strong growth prospects were expected for 2017.

Despite initial hesitation in the international markets, strong macroeconomic fundamentals and effective crisis management by the Central Bank and economic bureaucracy helped to keep the reflections on banking and financial sectors at a minimum. Despite a temporary hike in exchange rates, the stock exchange did not experience a collapse in the value of traded stocks, and there was no speculative attack or exodus of international investors. Perceived investment risks associated with Turkey in the eyes of international investors did not jump either. The rise in the CDS figures during the coup attempt that reflect the risk perceptions of the country for investors was roughly equal to the rise observed when previous Prime Minister Davutoğlu declared his resignation.

Every coup attempt creates multifaceted social, political and economic costs and, objectively speaking, the 15 July Gülenist coup attempt will not be seen as an exception. Since a state of emergency has been declared to normalize the security situation, short-term international investors might be a little jittery in the short term. But in the medium and long term, structural reforms and incentive packages that were announced to boost domestic and international investments before the coup will continue unabated. Notwithstanding the premature and politically motivated decisions by some international credit rating agencies, those investors who place their faith in Turkey with a long-term vision are bound to win as the economy has ample potential for growth.

The post-coup environment will witness a process of purification whereby Gülenist elements embedded in the state bureaucracy, academia, business circles and the media will face legal investigations and prosecutions. This purification process is bound to exclude harmful elements from the state establishment and the private sector, thereby contributing to Turkey’s socio-economic dynamism in the coming years.

That night saw how people with bare hands could stand tall against the putschists who had guns, tanks and jets, along with ruthlessness. On that night, over one hundred Turkish people were murdered as the putschists opened fire on them with guns paid for by the people of Turkey. In the following days, the Turkish people increasingly took to the streets in their millions all over Turkey to defend their country and democracy, literally from dusk to dawn. In the end, the coup attempt was mostly quelled at the expense of over two hundred people, who were martyred.The Turkish people have grown substantially richer and democracy has taken root as a much more citizen-friendly environment has emerged in Turkey in the AK Party (Justice and Development Party) period. Make no mistake: while the AK Party faced coup attempts and enormous obstacles, and even fought for its existence in a judiciary battle in 2009, it has almost always tried to foster democracy in Turkey. Hence, it is no surprise that the AK Party is very popular in Turkey, with apparently no matching predecessor in its almost one-hundred-year history.Prior to 2012, Western leaders and media outlets praised the AK Party government for its accomplishments both economically and politically, and Turkey was hailed as the poster boy of democracy. However, from 2012, the same Western leaders and media outlets started to criticise the AK Party government, and particularly its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, for growing increasingly authoritarian; however these claims failed to be substantiated. This situation made everybody wonder whether these accusations were simply employed as a pretext to discredit the AK Party and Erdoğan. At the same time, political turmoil in Turkey began to escalate relentlessly. First came the Gezi Park protests in 2013 by numerous illegal factions, as well as young people, from relatively wealthy Kemalist families, who had traditionally opposed the AK Party government and Erdoğan.After the failure of the Gezi Park protests, the second attack came on December 17-25, 2013, this time with the joint efforts of the FETO factions in the judiciary and police forces. The FETO apparently attacked the government and Erdoğan with never-proven and finally aborted judicial claims. The FETO members, who had infiltrated the Turkish police forces, even tried to detain Erdoğan and his son. The AK Party and Erdoğan survived this attack too.

In the following year, Erdoğan gained a political victory in the presidential election with 52 percent of the total votes, and became the first president of the Republic of Turkey to be directly elected by the constituents. However, the clouds above Turkey only darkened as the third attack came from another terrorist organisation, the PKK, apparently with the sole aim of toppling the president Erdoğan and the AK Party government. The PKK escalated violence relentlessly as it targeted military and police stations, as well as killing several hundreds of soldiers and–mostly Kurdish–civilians, since 2014. However, the PKK has paid a very heavy price as over 7,000 PKK terrorists have been neutralised by the Turkish military in the last year.

Then came the final attack. This was the biggest, such that it could not be compared to the previous attacks: a military coup attempt by the covert faction of the FETO in the military. The leader of the FETO is a cleric named Fetullah Gulen, who has been living in the US since 1999 in a massive manor very well protected by armed guards. From at least the 1970s, the FETO has tried to infiltrate every governmental body from universities to judiciary and military forces, with a special focus on key institutions and departments. It did everything to capture positions and titles in various governmental organisations, while disguising itself like a chameleon, as some of its member had lived unacceptable lives from the standpoint of Islam for decades, even though they were in fact adherents of a seemingly very conservative religious organisation.

The FETO ran smear campaigns against people in order to strip them of their titles and positions, only for those positions to be filled by FETO members. People were even murdered with the help of the FETO faction in the police force, and these empty chairs were taken by FETO members. In addition, the FETO had had a self-declared, but fake, charity network in order to raise money to run the organisation financially. It is estimated that the FETO had been commanding over 20 billion dollars. For decades, it raised money from its members as well as business persons from different walks of life by threatening them outright with imprisonment or death. No one knows how many people have been murdered or imprisoned by the FETO, though a conservative guess would be in the thousands, if not more.

All of this happened under the guise of a spiritual organisation, which is why the FETO was to hide itself for so long, until it tried to topple Erdoğan and the AK Party government. The FETO has only recently been accepted formally as a terror organisation by Turkey as its true face, which certainly amounts to nothing less than a terror organisation, has begun to surface. Although Turkey has suffered several coup attempts in the last 70 years, in none of them had congress buildings been bombed by jets or had people been opened fire upon and murdered. Now, the Turkish people intensely abhor Gulenist people and Gulen himself, the man behind the FETO and who continues to reside in the US under the protection of armed guards. The democracy in Turkey has definitely been damaged by this failed coup attempt, but its prospect is certainly much brighter in the hands of the Turkish people, who defended it at the expense of their lives.

To this end, they took over the state-run TV (TRT) and forced the anchorwoman to read the coup declaration. However, it is not possible to achieve a coup d’état merely by taking over a state media organ in this age of technology. At this point, the attitudes of other media institutions became important. In fact, the Turkish media did not obey the plotters’ order to “broadcast the coup declaration on other TVs as well.”To the contrary of this so-called order, other Turkish media organs, in live broadcasts, interviewed Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım and then President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and conveyed their messages to the People of Turkey. From CNN Turk to NTV, from A Haber to Ulusal Kanal and TVNET to TRT, the media in Turkey stood against the coup. The plotters barged into TRT and CNN Turk, and a possible raid to A Haber was averted by citizens of Turkey who were trying to guard the building against the coup-plotters. Police fought off the plotters’ attack on TURKSAT (state-run communication satellites), foiling their attempt to take control of all broadcasts.President Erdoğan’s messages on live broadcast, and reruns of his messages, played a tremendous role in raising national willpower and bringing the Turkish people to the streets to stop the tanks driven by the putschers. The Turkish media took sides with the government and the people, not the coup-plotters; therefore, they prevented the atmosphere of fear and panic from spreading, and contributed to the abortion of the coup attempt.This marks a milestone for the Turkish media. In the history of Turkish politics, the mainstream media had mostly supported coup plotters – from the May 27, 1960 military coup to the September 12, 1980 military coup, and from the February 28, 1997 post-modern coup to the April 27, 2007 military memorandum. Generally, the media has acted as their mouthpiece and broadcast accordingly. However, on July 15, 2016 – the date of the failed coup attempt by FETO (Fetullah Gülen Terror Organization) – the Turkish media set an excellent example of the power of journalism to oppose the perpetrators, and sided with democracy and freedom. Therefore, the media in Turkey has experienced a turning point in its history. Unfortunately, however, it is impossible to say the same for the international media.

The U.S. and British Media Back the Coup Plotters

International media, the U.S. and the British media in particular, lamented the failure of the coup attempt in Turkey. CNN, The New York Times, Fox News, The Independent, BBC, The Financial Times, the Washington Post and the Times were full of news stories in favor of the coup attempters rather than criticisms about the attempted coup.

The headlines in the aforementioned newspapers and TVs leaned heavily towards the perpetrators’ side, with comments such as “The Coup would have been better for Turkish democracy,” “People behind Erdoğan are like sheep,” “These must have been done for a successful coup,” “Fight against DAESH will be negatively affected,” “Erdoğan deserved the coup,” and “Authoritarian tendencies will increase in Turkey.”

The approach of the western media favored the failed coup, considering these news bites and assessments, which belittle the People of Turkey who resisted the coup attempt. A similar reaction, yet in a different tone, came from western politicians as well.

All in all, why the western media organs do not want democracy for Turkey while they defend democracy for themselves will remain an enduring question. For now, this question will remain unanswered and related discussions will continue. However, the Turkish media and the western media have approached the failed coup, attempted by the disciples of Fetullah Gülen in the military, from opposite sides; and that, in fact, affirms criticisms that the FETO (Fetullah Gülen Terror Organization) is “a network guided by the global powers.”

Literally every digital social media platform from end-to-end encryption to FaceTime communication tools were put to use both by the officers in the attempted coup, by the civilians and the political forces. The latter included the President himself, who not only tweeted his anti-coup message to mobilize his eight million followers to resist the putschists but also used a popular news channel and connected through FaceTime video chat app on the iPhone, calling on all the people to stage anti-coup protests by taking to the streets and guarding critical check-points including the bridges and airports. Seeing the President alive and well through the improvised video link assured the people of the authenticity and urgency of the call. The people’s power and many Internet platforms not only stopped the participating soldiers but also deterred many other soldiers waiting their turn at the barracks. Most of the social forces posted statements on Twitter, including many MPs and political parties.Those mainstream TV channels that managed to stay on air were quick to side and sync with the digital social media platforms helping to mobilize and inform the public. Soon after the people took to the streets to stop the coup attempt, they did crush the coup. While the military tried to take control of the state-run TRT – as it had done in the previous military coups – this soon proved futile because other private mass communication channels propitiously reported about the perplexing situation, conveyed the unanimous anti-coup message of the political class and even urged the people to march in the streets to stop the coup. This has showcased the immense mobilizing role of new communication technologies such as digital mass media in crushing the attempted military coup.Make no mistake: this is not an ode to the enfolding romantic tale of social media’s liberation power. Rather it is to understand the powerful sources of massive civilian uprising against the cruel bombings and brutal attacks by the military. Digital social media disseminated the overall anti-coup attitude of the activists as well as the lay people. Indeed, such a power proved critically instrumental in mobilizing the people; showing the power of the small street activism that has eventually triggered the ongoing mass protests. For example, the feeds following hashtags such as #DarbeyeHayır (No to the Coup) and #MilletçeMeydanlardayız (The whole nation is at the maidans) were already trending for hours.

According to the data provided by Somera, the number of tweets increased by 223 percent and a total of 34.818.329 interactions was shared, reaching to a staggering of 15 million people. After 10:00 PM on July 15th, the buzz regarding the attempt started to rise, as President Erdoğan did a FaceTime on CNN Turk the first peak occurred. The next morning, the attempt failed and the second peak happened.

[The graphical analysis is produced by Somera for SETA]

As soon as the tanks blocked the roads, including the famous Bosporus bridge in Istanbul, amidst gunshots and flying F16’s, the citizens, who just happened to be there as they were returning home after work, started live-streaming through the social media platforms such as Facebook or Twitter. It is important to emphasize that the most shocking as well as mobilizing were the horrific images of tanks ruthlessly running over the civilians as well as appalling images of F-16’s bombing the Turkish Parliament building.

To be sure, the President’s video-chat and above-mentioned image sharing proved much more effective than other uses. Fearing that a possible military coup would ruin the lives and upend the country’s future prospects they tuned in to listen to the Prime Minister, Binali Yıldırım, who connected to the NTV news TV channel through a phone call confirming what was feared most, that this was indeed a coup attempt and that the public did not know the whereabouts of the PM. It was, however, the social media feeds that later carried the night with live-stream and critical information on the worsening of the situation. From the beginning of the coup attempt until 16 July midnight, there were approximately 180 tweets posted from the official Twitter account of the Prime Ministry itself. Clearly those tweets aimed to mobilize the people. The Presidency posted 35 tweets, whereas the main opposition party CHP’s official page posted 7 tweets and MHP 24 tweets.

While all the TV channels were importantly unified against the coup attempt and strongly condemned it, they were clearly out powered by the power of images and narratives presented live-stream at the social media platforms across the country. Only few minutes before the midnight, a couple of soldiers managed to enter in the offices of TRT where at gun-point they forced the anchor, Tijen Karas, to read the statement written by the junta which claimed that the government had been overthrown and that the people should return home leaving the streets to the tanks and officers for their safety.

In order to maintain the momentum of protests the day after the military coup attempt, the Internet communication platforms continued to play vital roles in convincing the people to stay at the city centers during the following nights to deter any remnants of the putschists to stage another coup. One can only hope that the anti-coup protests and the use of digital and visual media would be an opportunity for understanding the necessity of responsible use of open Internet. The latter heralds a transforming social space beyond the traditional political practice by promising to fill the destructive gap within those highly connected yet disenfranchised social forces. It may also help to stop the existential polarization in a society otherwise driven by social and political divisions.

For an in-depth analysis about the role of all counter-coup forces please see Turkey’s failed military coup Turkey’s Stillborn Junta Coup Attempt: Process, Responses And Prospects.

The dilemma begins when the rights, or values, of two individuals clash with each other. Within the last several decades, individuals who hold strong religious beliefs have been challenged, in particular, by artists and public figures. While the Christian religion dominated discussions in the 1970s and 1980s, the famous “Rushdie Affair” in the late 80s switched the focus towards Muslims and issues connected to the Islamic religion. Primarily after 9/11, free speech was demonstrated in the form of movies (Theo van Gogh), cartoons (Jyllands-Posten), and non-fictional books (Oriana Fallaci or Thilo Sarrazin). Each of these affected Muslims and were stored in their collective memory. The history of the idea of free speech could be summed up in a radical thesis: From the death penalty of Socrates to the “Burn a Qur’an Day,” the protagonists have alternated but the extremes have remained.

The dilemma begins when the rights, or values, of two individuals clash with each other.

The most recent major cause célèbre on the subject occurred in Germany in March 2016, and can be found in legal texts such as Erdoğan vs. Böhmermann. The German comedian Jan Böhmermann used his television show to demonstrate the extents, and test the limits of free speech in Germany by giving a practical example in the form of a poem. This poem was called Schmähkritik (abusive criticism), which is a legal concept by the German Constitutional Court and will be defined later, and contained 24 lines that were filled with profanities and, more importantly, Islamophobic and anti-Turkish stereotypes targeting the President of Turkey.

Before the broadcast, Böhmermann demanded that the Turkish flag be displayed as his background, and that his reading of the poem be accompanied by a German instrumental song which was substantiated by oriental rhythms. Combined, these two elements were intended to ensure that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan knew that this poem was intended for him. This poem became the center of debate in daily German politics for weeks and, even more seriously, provoked a diplomatic issue between the states of Germany and Turkey. The media asked many legal scholars for their opinions regarding the limits of free speech, and not surprisingly, individual scholars used radically different arguments to justify their views.

For instance, one legal scholar favored the interpretation that the whole situation of the satire should be seen in relation to the bigger picture: Böhmermann, so his defenders said, used harsh words, indeed, but this display of disdain for the President of Turkey is not supposed to be seen as isolated; rather, it should be seen as highlighting a theme that was occurring in many forms of media, from cinema to books. This view is also favored by the administrative tribunal of Berlin in it’s decision whether the poem can be read out loud in front of the Turkish embassy in Berlin. This was prohibited by the court with the reference to the mentioned argument that poem singularly is an insult and not protected by free speech.

The court decision proves that the poem itself is a criminal act in the form of an insult, without a doubt.

This court decision proves that the poem itself is a criminal act in the form of an insult, without a doubt. But Böhmermann’s use of a clearly insulting poem shows us the scope of, and the lack of limitations on, free speech in Germany. This leads us to the interesting question: should an evident illegal act as codified in criminal codes in the majority of legal systems around the world become legal simply by announcing beforehand that your intention with your future actions is to insult someone? What’s more, if we take a look at the big picture, then the whole preparation and background of the poem – aside from the content – must be taken into consideration.

One consideration is that Böhmermann stated that this part of the show and poem was directed at the President of Turkey by naming him. Another consideration is that Turkish subtitles of the poem were displayed on the screen while Böhmermann read the poem aloud. The announcement that free speech is provided under the German constitution was not made, nor was the fact that there exists a German legal requirement of “showing the limits of free speech“presented in the Turkish language, so that an intention to inform the Turkish president about these legal subtleties can’t be seen by the moderator. After examining these more subtle attacks that exist outside of the pure content of the poem, it becomes clear that this manifestation of free speech as entertainment must be limited. Böhmermann’s “criticism” had no political dimension, except to unleash vulgar attacks on the person of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

It is a legal principle that rights are not absolute. The legal history of the United States provides us with the metaphorical example of “shouting fire in a crowded theater,” which basically means that, under certain circumstances, the freedom of speech is not boundless. With regards to the Böhmermann case, Article 5 paragraph 2 of the the German Constitution explicitly states that free speech finds its “limits in the provision of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young persons, and in the right to personal honour”. Examples of the referenced general laws can be found in Section 103 (Defamation of organs and representatives of foreign states), 130 (Incitement of hatred) or 185 (Insult) of the German Criminal Code. The German Federal Constitutional Court constructed the so-called Schmähkritik so as to limit the freedom of expression in their jurisdiction. This type of criticism does not intend an intellectual discussion and, on the contrary, puts the defamation of the person in the foreground.

This is especially the case when the sphere of intimacy is attacked, such as a person‘s sexual life, or human dignity is violated and therefore outweighs, or overrules, the freedom of expression (BVerfG, Beschluss v. 03.06.1987, Az. 1 BvR 313/85). In short, from a legal perspective, the requirements of Section 103 and 185 of the German Criminal Code is compiled so that individuals who behave as Böhmermann has behaved will be found culpable. Erdoğan has already reported an offense which was authorized by the Federal Government. But one of the most difficult things to do within the context of law is to predict a sentence. Two lawyers, three opinions.

Nevertheless, the law is pragmatic and will find a solution. But what about other norms that are non-binding, such as morality?

Nevertheless, the law is pragmatic and will find a solution. But what about other norms that are non-binding, such as morality? Professor Uwe Volkmann from Goethe University of  Frankfurt rhetorically asked in his Verfassungsblog “A rock bottom and one more rock bottom and one more rock bottom” whether the way Böhmermann delivered his poem shall be the way that public discourse should be led in the future. Volkmann warns that society will be stultified if debates are led with jargon à la Böhmermann. The sophistication of public debate should be respected and, in the meantime, he expresses his regrets that decency within discussions has been lost.

Within this context, we should more intensely debate the ethics of art, instead of giving a free pass to anything that is connected to, or claims to be, art. When the incredibly complex act of peacefully living together is taken into consideration, especially in multi-cultural societies, the law should not periodically educate people about what they are allowed to say and what they should keep to themselves in private. Rather, a sense of decency has to be a norm within society. It might be important to recall the categorical imperative of Immanuel Kant which connects morality and law in a utopian but adjusted manner: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.”

While Turkey was West-oriented, the Iranian revolution of 1979 created tension with Ankara, as Turkey’s ruling secular elite viewed Iran’s new regime as a threat. This perception was in part fuelled by the belief that Tehran had been the main sponsor of terrorist groups in Turkey with the intention of exporting its particular brand of Islamism to neighboring countries. In turn, Iran’s new regime viewed Turkey as a threat to its revolutionary objectives, given Turkey’s secular ideology and its membership of NATO.

During the Iran-Iraq war, as Sunni Arab states and Western powers united behind the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, Turkey maintained a neutral position.

However, disregarding such differences, during the Iran-Iraq war, as Sunni Arab states and Western powers united behind the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, Turkey maintained a neutral position and Ankara viewed the Saddam Regime as a more ominous threat. Consequently, Iran did not pursue a confrontational policy toward Turkey, which enabled both countries to preserve the status quo between one another. Relations between the two countries began to improve following the Gulf War as they pursued cooperative measures to address issues that threatened the territorial integrity of both states, particularly the ‘Kurdish question’.

Following the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in Turkey in November 2002, Ankara-Tehran bilateral relations blossomed. Although the leading figures in the AK Party called their political vision ‘conservative democracy’, the Iranians perceived the new government as being formed of those with an Islamic agenda and welcomed this government in their immediate neighboring country, which stressed the importance of improving relations with regional countries in almost all aspects.

During the past decade, a number of factors have motivated the two states to enhance their bilateral economic relations: Tehran’s desire for a reliable trading partner; Iran’s struggle under the crippling economic sanctions imposed by Western countries; and Ankara’s demand for Iran’s energy resources. Within the period of 2000 to 2011, reportedly, bilateral trade between the two partners increased from $1 billion to $16 billion, and the number of Turkey-based Iranian companies increased from 300 to more than 2,000 firms. Within Turkey’s framework of ‘zero problems’, ongoing relations between both countries have been based on ‘mutual pragmatism’, rather than competition, due to the mutual understanding that both parties will benefit more and preserve their interests by doing so.

Following the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in Turkey in November 2002, Ankara-Tehran bilateral relations blossomed.

Against the background of such friendly exchanges between the two neighbors, however, relations have been strained due to the fact that both countries have been at odds on a number of issues in the Middle East, namely Iran’s support for the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, Iran’s only ally in the Middle East, who could seriously endanger Turkey’s influence in the region. Iraq has also been a field of growing competition between Turkey and Iran, as Iran has been trying to fill the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of American forces in Iraq.

Additionally, the Sunni-Shiite sectarian conflict fuelled by Iran has drawn both countries into the conflict in Iraq on opposing sides. Turkish leaders always warned of such a threat and sought to reduce sectarian tensions; in view of this, Turkey’s diplomatic missions to Iraq have always included visits not only to the Sunni but also to the Shiite leading figures of the country. In contrast, Shiite Iran, which competes (with Saudi Arabia) for the leadership of Islam, has used the sectarian divide to further its ambitions.

Other sources of tension between Iran and Turkey have been the Kurdish and the Palestinian issues. Iran’s attempt to support Palestine (and oppose Israel) has been used as a way to enhance its popularity in the Arab world, while Turkey’s assertive support for Palestinians has been an important factor contributing to the deterioration of Iran’s popularity in the Arab world. This particular policy of Turkey has been translated by Tehran as a threat to Iran’s role as the main state sponsor of anti-Israel movements.

 Turkish leaders always warned of and sought to reduce sectarian tensions; in view of this, Turkey’s diplomatic missions to Iraq have always included visits not only to the Sunni but also to the Shia leading figures of the country.

Turkey and Iran have clashed over other issues as well. Turkey views itself as a regional leading power. Many Arab countries also regard Turkey, with its relatively democratic political system and high economic growth rate, as a model for their own political development.

Although these are major divergences and challenges, Ankara and Iran have more shared objectives, which could push them closer rather than break them apart. Both countries have many common interests that could enable them to overcome their differences. After the comprehensive nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), between Iran and world powers was reached, Turkey could once more play a major role as a gateway between Iran and the West. This is particularly important as Western countries try to find ways to reach Iran and tap into its $500 billion economy.

Furthermore, Iran is still an important partner for Turkey in other areas. For example, tourism has intensified as a trade activity between both countries in recent years, which could bring vitality to commercial activities in Turkey if given the chance to increase. According to reports from Turkey’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 1.7 million Iranians visited Turkey in 2015, ranking Iran as the sixth leading source of visitors to Turkey from among 90 countries.

The foreign policy agenda of the Rouhani administration known as ‘prudence and moderation’ aims at ending Iran’s isolation on the global stage. Since Turkey is a NATO member, Iran needs Turkey’s cooperation to send constructive signals when approaching the West. From the perspective of geopolitics and the regional balance of power, Iranian leaders should view their Turkish counterparts as key regional geopolitical, strategic and economic partners due to the fact that the Arab Gulf countries have been Iran’s competitors and rivals rather that its natural allies.

Even after the JCPOA was reached, Turkey was among the nations that welcomed the deal and lifted sanctions on Iran regardless of the fact that some of its allies had opposed the plan.

Due to all of these landscapes as well as common interests and objectives, the leaderships of both Iran and Turkey must come to realize that they need each other’s cooperation now more than at any other time in the past. Iranian policy makers should understand that Turkey can play an important role in building bridges between the West and Tehran. It has been proven to Iran that Turkey is a reliable and trusted partner. Turkey faithfully sided with Iran, supporting its neighbor at a most vulnerable time, when tensions reached their height over Iran’s controversial nuclear program.

President Erdoğan repeatedly vouched for Iran’s compliance and peaceful intentions with its nuclear program at a time when there was growing alarm regarding the threat of Iran developing a nuclear arsenal. This was a significant psychological boost for the Iranians as the key question was Iran’s lack of compliance with IAEA safeguards. Even after the JCPOA was reached, Turkey was among the nations that welcomed the deal and lifted sanctions on Iran regardless of the fact that some of its allies had opposed the plan.

Strengthening the economic partnership between the two countries may reduce the sense of vulnerability each has toward the other. Both partners should increase the level of bilateral direct investment as an option to soften the impact of possible tensions emanating from political differences in the future. The leaderships of the two countries are well aware that having a strong economy and forming mutual dependencies through establishing economic partnerships with neighbors are prerequisites of achieving the status of a strong regional power. In this context, it would be beneficial for both nations to pursue pragmatic bilateral trade policies and concentrate on lessening political tensions, factors that would enable them to gain more than they would lose.

A brief look into the international and domestic media coverage on Turkey, as well as the academic debate, in recent years reveals a rather bleak picture of a country divided along several fault lines, namely the seculars vs. the conservatives, Turks vs. Kurds, and the Sunni vs. the Alawites. Among these, most of the attention has been given to the divide between the conservatives and the seculars although the recent terror attacks has brought the Kurdish issue to the forefront.

Many claim that the policies of the current governing party, the Justice and Development Party (JDP), and especially the rhetoric and style of its founder and the current president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has divided the country into two camps: the conservatives who support him on one side and the seculars who oppose him on the other. The polarisation of Turkish society between these two camps is treated almost as a given both inside and outside the country.

The polarisation of Turkish society between these two camps is treated almost as a given both inside and outside the country.

Claims regarding the division of the Turkish society on the basis of adherence to Islamic values and practices are nothing new. Religion and its role in society and politics has always been a contested issue in Turkey. In the early years of the Republic, the westernisation process, especially some of the reforms initiated by the founding cadre, was met with a degree of societal backlash, which often drew harsh reactions from the state. Although the tension of those early days has subsided, the supporters of the founding ideology have always carried deep suspicions about religion and the conservative elements in Turkish society. When expounding on his ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis, Samuel P. Huntington claimed that Turkey has an internal clash of civilizations, and it is a ‘country torn’ between Western civilization and its rival Islamic civilization.

However, the rise to power of the JDP in 2002 and its continuing dominance in Turkish politics gave rise to more intense claims regarding the polarisation of Turkish society. In 2007, millions of secular Turks took to the streets to prevent the election of a conservative president, a position that was first held by the founder of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and that was regarded as nearly sacred by many secular Turks. Again in 2010, during the constitutional amendment referendum, there was significant mobilisation and political tension between the secular opposition and the Government. Finally, in May and June 2013, the Gezi Park protests turned into a showdown between the government and the secular opposition. These protests received widespread attention outside the country and further inflamed the claims regarding the polarisation in society.

We previously assessed this claim, regarding whether social and political attitudes have become polarised in Turkish society.

We previously assessed this claim, regarding whether social and political attitudes have become polarised in Turkish society, in a study that analysed data from the period of 1990-2011, when conservative politics became more prevalent and the political scene was dominated by what we label as ‘the religiously-oriented political parties’. In this study, we used data from the World Value Surveys (1990, 2001, 2007 and 2011) and the European Value Surveys (2001 and 2009). The results of this analysis have been published in the journal Social Currents.

In doing so, we drew extensively from the ‘the culture wars’ debate in the US because of the similarity between the claims and the rigorousness of the methodology used by American social scientists to assess these claims. In the 1990s, some in the public debate claimed that American society was polarised between liberals and conservatives, which was akin to a ‘culture war’. In the early 1990s, political scientist James D. Hunter (1991) claimed that American society was divided between the ‘orthodox’ and ‘progressive’ camps, which rallied around issues such as abortion, gun control, and gay rights. During his famous speech in the 1992 Republican National Convention, presidential candidate Pat Buchanan declared that there was an ongoing war for the soul of America.

In the early 1990s, political scientist James D. Hunter (1991) claimed that American society was divided between the ‘orthodox’ and ‘progressive’ camps, which rallied around issues such as abortion, gun control, and gay rights.

In line with the empirical tradition in the American social sciences, academics approached the issue by developing measures of polarisation and testing their hypotheses with survey data rather than reaching conclusions based on circumstantial evidence, which was what was happening in the public debate in the US at the time, as well as what is happening in Turkey today.

In their seminal study, sociologist Paul DiMaggio and his colleagues defined polarisation in four dimensions: (1) if attitudes were becoming more dispersed than concentrated (the dispersion principle); (2) if attitudes were moving to separate modes (bimodality principle); (3) the extent to which opinions in one domain were dependent on opinions in other domains (the constraint principle); and (4) the extent to which individual characteristics and identities determined attitudes (the consolidation principle). When they explored these dimensions with survey data, they found no evidence of widespread polarisation between 1972 and 1994 except for views on the issue of abortion. Remarkably, they found increasing agreement on the issues of crime, racial integration, and women’s rights.

Although their methodology and findings drew some criticism, the academic research into the ‘culture wars’ debate showed that polarisation was limited to specific issues and debunked the myth of increasing division of American society into two camps based on religious conservatism. Similar claims still resurface from time to time in the popular discourse, but American sociologists seem confident that no such polarisation exists in the US.

There was some evidence that the differences increased in 2007, when political tensions were high, but these differences disappeared later.

Following this debate, we assessed the differences between the people who reported that they would vote for the religiously-oriented political parties (ROP) and those who reported a preference for secular-oriented political parties (SOP) between 1990 and 2011 in Turkey. The ROP category consisted of the three political parties established by Necmettin Erbakan, the father of conservative politics in Turkey, and his followers. We also included the current governing party JDP and the Grand Unity Party, which subscribes to what is known in Turkey as the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, to this category. The SOP category included all other political parties, including those of the center-right and the center-left, as well as the far-left and nationalist parties.

We assessed polarisation in four areas: family and sexuality, gender roles, economic and social justice, and democracy. Regarding family and sexuality, we assessed attitudes towards abortion, divorce, and homosexuality. With regard to gender roles, we assessed attitudes towards women’s participation in the labor force and working mothers. When assessing the issues of economic and social justice, we analysed attitudes towards income inequality and individual vs. government responsibility. Finally, we assessed people’s perceptions of military rule and democratic political rule.

Any polarisation that was caused by those events did not have any lasting impact. Extrapolating from this finding, we expect that the Gezi Park protests will also not have a long-lasting effect.

The results of our analyses revealed that people who voted for ROP differed only slightly in terms of their attitudes towards family and sexuality and gender roles. However, this difference in attitudes with regards to gender roles was not a pronounced difference, and there were no significant differences in attitudes towards democracy, nor in attitudes towards economic and social justice. Furthermore, there was no evidence of a steady increase in differences over time between the two groups. In fact, attitudes towards family and sexuality and gender roles moved in the same direction in both of the groups. There was some evidence that the differences increased in 2007, when political tensions were high, but these differences disappeared later.

To sum up, whatever the current tensions in the political sphere are, Turkish society is not being torn apart on the basis of religion nor its politics. As in the case of the ‘culture wars’ debate in the US, the popular claims based on circumstantial evidence cannot and should not be used to make overreaching claims about society. Some may argue that the Gezi Park protests of 2013 changed the societal dynamics significantly and created polarisation that has not been seen before. Unfortunately, our analyses did not cover the most recent period, as the relevant data are not available. However, similar claims were made during and after the 2007 protests. Any polarisation that was caused by those events did not have any lasting impact. Extrapolating from this finding, we expect that the Gezi Park protests will also not have a long-lasting effect. Also, we are in the process of planning for a data collection effort of our own in order to assess the current situation. We will be happy to utilise any secondary data that becomes available as well.

The continued geopolitical negligence of the U.S. in the Middle East during the Obama administration has resulted in several missed opportunities to stabilize the chaotic situation on the ground in Syria.

Since Turkey’s warnings about the Syrian crisis were disregarded by Washington, so far the Syrian issue has continued to be one of the contentious issues between the two sides until now. The reason behind this situation has stemmed from the way American foreign policy has been conducted by the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama – along the contours of the Obama Doctrine over the past five years. As a result, the Middle East’s regional problems have become more complex and intractable.

Washington’s insistence on no boots on the ground and leading behind a strategy that relied on some state and non-state actors’ cooperation on the ground has so far failed to be successful in bringing a solution to the problems of the fractured states of both Iraq and Syria.

Unfortunately, the net result of Obama’s strategy of non-strategy in the Middle East has worked at the expense of Turkey’s security interests – hence Ankara has left alone in assuming and overcoming most of the soft and hard security problems emanating from the on-going civil war in Syria. Thus, this situation has become the main source of a real problem that has badly hurt the two sides’ relations.

The continued geopolitical negligence of the U.S. in the Middle East during the Obama administration has resulted in several missed opportunities to stabilize the chaotic situation on the ground in Syria. Unlike the U.S., Russia witnessed the halfhearted support given by the U.S. to moderate forces in Syria from the inception of the crisis and did not abstain from providing support to both the Syrian regime and to its main supporters on the ground such as Iran and their non-state proxies including Hezbollah and others.

Obama’s inattention toward the brutality of the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad at the inception of the Syrian crisis has first resulted in the failure of the central government in Syria that gave rise to a significant power vacuum. This power vacuum was soon filled by both radical groups like DAESH and others as well as by regional powers that are essentially waging proxy wars in Syria. This spill in nature of Syrian civil war has propelled Iran and Saudi Arabia as the main regional contenders in Syria, which has made the situation in the country more chaotic.

Later, when the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreement was signed as the result of Washington’s implementation of a new political engagement policy with Iran, the confrontation between Riyadh and Tehran naturally increased. This competitive situation between the main contenders of the Syrian crisis remained unchanged until the moderate opposition forces in summer 2015 achieved success on the ground with the renewed support of some Gulf States.

However, during this time span when DAESH also gained more territory in Syria due to the retreat of the Assad regime, the Obama administration decided to prioritize the fight against this radical group rather than focus on the root causes of the problem. With this mindset, the U.S. preferred to establish the anti-DAESH coalition of nearly 60 countries, which Turkey also joined. Yet, Ankara has constantly warned the U.S. and its allies that DAESH is not the cause of problems related to security in Syria, and a comprehensive approach to Syria’s problems should be pursued.

Turkey has continued to be part of the anti-DAESH coalition by both opening up its bases for coalition use and becoming part of the air operations launched in Iraq. It has also supported the Geneva peace talks and the Vienna ceasefire that was encouraged by the Obama administration. At the same time, however, Ankara has continued to stress the necessity of creating a DAESH-free safe zone in northern Syria even just before the Russian air assault began in Syria on September 30, 2015.

Unfortunately, though, Turkey was not successful in persuading Washington to this effect. Hence, the situation in Syria in the aftermath of Russian intervention has become even more intricate than before, both for Turkey as well as for others that are already involved in this humanitarian crisis.

For Turkey, the avoidance or deference of the main source of the problem of the Syrian crisis – the Assad regime – will continue to feed the eruption of both old and new security threats that are emanating from Syria. It is no surprise then that the risk of flow of refugees that are heading to Europe via Turkey along with risk of terrorism stemming from radical foreign fighters who are extending beyond Syria’s borders to reach European cities becomes an observable reality.

For Turkey, the avoidance or deference of the main source of the problem of the Syrian crisis – the Assad regime – will continue to feed the eruption of both old and new security threats that are emanating from Syria. It is no surprise then that the risk of flow of refugees that are heading to Europe via Turkey along with risk of terrorism stemming from radical foreign fighters who are extending beyond Syria’s borders to reach European cities becomes an observable reality.

Furthermore, Washington’s current preferred alliance with the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is closely cooperating with the PKK in Syria in the fight against DAESH remains another serious point of friction between the two sides where Ankara rightfully rejects all kinds of terrorism and naturally expects its NATO ally to show respect and understanding in this regard. The details of this cooperation and ties between PYD and PKK is very well explained at one of SETA’s latest report.

What is more serious today is that, especially after its intervention in Syria to bolster the Assad regime, Russia has become more concerning for several reasons. First, after seizing the territories belonging to the moderate opposition with the help of Iranian ground forces and Assad regime forces, Russia has now created a new flow of refugees headed to Turkey and beyond. Thus, Moscow has come to a position that it can divide the West and European Union by using the refugee issue that is directly resulting from the chaotic situation present in Syria.

Also, by bolstering its military presence there, Russia is now becoming another military factor that should be taken seriously into account especially from the perspective of NATO’s southern flank, as it may influence the future military balance of the eastern Mediterranean. Another reality concerns Russia’s support to the PYD. In the face of this complex Syrian picture, the newest and latest ceasefire-based approach of Washington’s Syrian initiative, which aims to create a transitional government in Syria, is doom to fail unless it is simultaneously supported by the creation of a safe zone in Syria since the current military imbalance on the ground now has the capacity to stall the political negotiation process due to the radically changed position of some of the warring sides. For instance, whereas the moderate opposition has simultaneously lost their previous power and their influence in affecting the future of the Syrian political negotiations in Geneva, the Assad regime has almost lost is apathy for further negotiations due to its recent territorial gains. That is why Turkey continues to firmly support the idea of a safe zone. This time, the Obama administration should not miss its last chance to take action.

It is time to take the initiative back from Russia and operate for the stabilization of war-torn Syria. For this reason and while continuing the political transition negotiations, the international community led by the U.S. and other Western powers should be accompanied by the parallel process of the creation of a safe zone in Syria to bring the Assad regime and others to the table to launch the creation of a transitional government in Syria.

If the U.S. inspired some kind of a NATO-based deterrence mission – similar to the coalition of the willing that existed in Kosovo – it could provide air-cover for this safe zone mission on the ground, which would surely help deter the newly built and fortified Russian capabilities in Syria that can be a real concern both to Turkey’s as well as NATO’s southern flank’s future operational plans in the Mediterranean. This Western/NATO support for a safe zone in Syria is also expected to pressure Russia to take action to assure the Assad regime is present at the negotiation table.

With the international community having assured the stabilization of Syrian-based problems via establishing a safe zone, it can then concentrate on an all-out war against DAESH to finalize the job of eradicating this radical group both in Syria and Iraq. Certainly, this would be a win-win situation not only for Turkey and other regional powers but also for the entire international community that is currently suffering from the devastating side effects of the Syrian civil war.

The theoretical aspect of the settlement process embraced a threefold position.  The first represented “the rights-centered approach” and was based on the notion of political equality between Turks and Kurds as basic to the redefinition of citizenship in constitutional terms. The two other component of this position were intertwined and involved local administrative or political centrifigulism that can be described as local or regional self-rule, expressed in the PKK’s political discourse as “democratic autonomy.”The scope of self-rule can be formulated as a kind of shared sovereignty as seen in federal political structures or as a form of administrative self-rule, a variant of unitary political systems. The third form of centrifigulism may emerge at the regional level that may or may not require the sharing of sovereignty.The post-2013 process of settlement created a plural political environment conducive to the elaboration of all political options for the solution of the age-long Kurdish issue in a peaceful and democratic way. This contributed to the belief in the possibility of the successful resolution of the issue through democratic negotiations in both Turkish and Kurdish popular understanding. Thus, for the first time in Republican history “the Kurds’ right to secede” was uttered loudly and without any legal sanctions by Kurdish nationalist activists and political parties.

During the settlement process, a strategically motivated tactical approach was masterminded by the PKK-HDP side, however. The latter used the time span of the process as an opportunity for the consolidation of their hold on the Kurdish populace as their instrumental support base. The HDP through the political discourse of going beyond an ethnic Kurdish party and becoming a Turkey-wide political formation procured the support of the socialist Turkish left, and increasingly turned into a platform of anti-Erdoğan rhetoric as reflected in the 2014 presidential campaign of Selahattin Demirtaş, the leader of the HDP. The prevailing motto of Demirtaş’s political campaign was “We will not allow you to become president.” This was a kind of demonization of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the main political figure thanks to whose political will the Kurdish issue became a clause in the chapter of politics.

The campaign proved to be inconclusive, but powerful enough to sever ties between the “negotiating parties.” Added to this was the IS offensive against the city of Kobani that triggered the arousal of a pan-Kurdish feeling among Kurds. This was again used as an influential step by the PKK-HDP block in order to modulate the process for their sectarian political gains. In the end, when Erdoğan witnessed the political cost of the process, he declared that “there is no negotiation table anymore” and put an end to the process. Ready for a new phase in their military campaign, the PKK, who gained advantage of the process by transferring heavy weaponry and militants into city centers, murdered two police officers in their homes in Suruç in July 2015 and ended the ceasefire. PKK leadership has two new block-partners in this new war: on the one hand, the Russians, the Iranians and the Assad regime through the PKK’s Syrian branch, the PYD,  and, on the other, the military support of the US who saw the PYD as a substitute power for its own soldiers in the field war against IS. Again, all anti-Turkey calculations were masked under the pretext of the war on IS that ended up with generous support delivered to the PKK via the PYD.

On top of all this, the HDP adopted a political discourse during the PKK offensives in cities, namely Diyarbakir, Sur, Cizre, Silopi and Nusaybin, amenable to declaring it PKK’s legal wing. HDP municipalities allow their vehicles to be used by PKK militants to dig the trenches and build barricades in city streets. Thus emerged a non-peace positional equation which came into existence by the maximalist political stance of the PKK-HDP block, and AK Party’s turn to its statist shield nurtured by the age-long survival syndrome shared by the ruling Kemalist establishment in the past.

The dramatic rupture that led to the renewal of the conflict through violent means carried the sides back to their original positions: integration  through assurance of political equality vs some form of shared sovereignty, be it local self-rule, federation, or independence. The conclusion that can be drawn from the experiences of the settlement process is that the solution may lie somewhere in the middle; the implication of which calls for the creation of “a politically space” in the form of a negotiation space, not one of political opportunism. What is obvious is that an enduring solution is possible only with the support and will of the AK Party, and it is not possible if the PKK-HDP block opposes it. It is the AK Party that holds the capacity to introduce political, legal and economic standards, and it is the PKK-HDP block that may contribute to the process by not resorting to violence.