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he United States and Iran traded threats over a new economic confrontation on Monday, with Washington preparing what it described as an unprecedented sanctions campaign and Tehran warning it could halt all oil exports from the Persian Gulf if the pressure continues.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent was due to unveil new sanctions targeting countries and companies that continue trading with Iran, describing the campaign as “the single greatest financial offensive ever marshaled against an adversary.”

The measures come after months of war between the United States, Israel and Iran that have damaged Iran’s military and economic infrastructure while disrupting energy markets and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

“The economic D-Day” will begin with the new measures, Bessent wrote in an opinion article published in the Financial Times, warning countries that continue doing business with Iran that they could face consequences.

Iran threans to halt oil exports

Iran responded with a threat to dramatically escalate the economic confrontation.

Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said Tehran could stop all oil exports from the Persian Gulf if the U.S. economic campaign continued.

“If the economic war continues, not a single drop of oil will be exported,” Rezaei said in a social media post, adding that Iran would regard countries supporting Washington’s economic campaign as participating in an act of war.

The warning raises the possibility of a further disruption to global energy markets. The Strait of Hormuz, through which a major share of the world’s oil supplies normally passes, has already been brought close to a standstill by the conflict.

Iran retains missile and drone capabilities that it has used against U.S. allies in the Gulf and has threatened commercial shipping in the strategic waterway.

The new U.S. sanctions campaign comes as Washington and Tehran remain far from a negotiated settlement. Although direct military strikes between the two countries have stopped for several weeks, the two sides have yet to resume substantive negotiations.

The conflict began on February 28 with U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran. Months of fighting have killed thousands of people, most of them in Iran and Lebanon, and inflicted extensive damage on Iranian infrastructure.

Iran also suffered the killing of its Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during the conflict, while the United States has reported 18 military personnel killed and more than 750 wounded.

Struggling economy but still standing

Despite the economic pressure, Tehran has maintained a defiant public stance. Iranian officials, however, have acknowledged that the country’s economy was already under severe strain before the war because of years of sanctions, high inflation, currency weakness and energy shortages.

The war has added to those problems by damaging infrastructure, disrupting trade and reducing production, leaving Tehran facing major reconstruction costs.

Iranian officials have warned that further economic pressure could deepen hardship, fuel public discontent and undermine the government’s legitimacy.

Washington is also seeking support from major trading partners, particularly China, which has remained one of Iran’s most important economic partners.

Bessent has urged Beijing to cooperate with the U.S. campaign, noting that China has historically obtained a large share of its oil imports from the Gulf.

China has rejected the use of economic pressure as a solution to the conflict.

“Sanctions and pressure do not help resolve the problem,” a spokesperson for China’s embassy in Washington said, while calling for diplomacy.

Calls for diplomacy continue

With direct U.S.-Iran talks stalled, several countries have attempted to mediate between the two sides. Qatar, Pakistan and Turkey have all been involved in diplomatic efforts aimed at preventing a further escalation.

Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, was expected to visit Tehran on Monday as part of Islamabad’s efforts to promote regional peace and security. Pakistani officials said the visit would include discussions on the latest developments and Washington’s threatened sanctions.

The economic confrontation comes at a particularly sensitive moment for global energy markets. Any further disruption to Gulf oil exports could send prices sharply higher and increase pressure on countries already struggling with elevated energy costs.

For Washington, the sanctions campaign is intended to force Iran back to the negotiating table by increasing the economic cost of refusing U.S. demands.

For Tehran, the threat to halt oil exports represents an attempt to demonstrate that Iran can impose significant costs on the United States and its allies if economic pressure continues.

The confrontation therefore risks developing into a wider contest over energy, trade and financial access, even as military operations remain suspended.

With neither side showing signs of abandoning its core demands, the latest exchange of threats suggests that the six-month conflict has entered a new phase — one in which economic pressure and control of global energy supplies could prove as important as military power.

(Source: Reuters)

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.S. government debt has surpassed $40 trillion for the first time, highlighting growing concerns about the country’s fiscal outlook as spending on social programs and interest payments continues to rise faster than government revenues.

The Treasury Department reported that total U.S. public debt reached $40.047 trillion on Tuesday. Of that amount, $32.266 trillion was debt held by the public, while $7.782 trillion represented intragovernmental holdings.

The debt has more than doubled since Donald Trump first took office in January 2017, when it stood at about $19.95 trillion. Around one-third of the increase occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic, when the Trump and Biden administrations borrowed heavily to finance emergency economic support.

Debt and interest costs continue to rise

Budget watchdogs have warned that the growing debt burden could eventually trigger a serious fiscal crisis unless lawmakers take steps to reduce spending, increase revenues, or pursue a combination of both.

“The more we borrow, the more we exacerbate inflation, squeeze out other priorities in the budget, and leave ourselves vulnerable to emergencies at home and turmoil abroad,” said Maya MacGuineas, president of the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget.

The debt reached $40 trillion less than five months after passing $39 trillion, underscoring the rapid pace of government borrowing.

The United States is also facing rising borrowing costs as investors demand higher yields on Treasury securities. Thirty-year Treasury yields recently reached their highest level in nearly two decades, while demand from foreign investors has weakened.

Higher Treasury yields can increase borrowing costs across the economy, affecting mortgages, auto loans and business financing.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent responded Wednesday by announcing that the government would double the size of some Treasury buyback operations to at least $4 billion per transaction, in an effort to support the longer-term bond market.

Trump has repeatedly called for lower interest rates. Asked whether Americans should be concerned about volatility in the bond market, he said he was not worried and argued that a strong U.S. economy should lead to lower rates

Trump and Biden both oversaw large increases

The growth in U.S. debt has accelerated under both Trump and former President Joe Biden.

Debt increased by about $7.8 trillion during Trump’s first term, with more than half of that increase accumulating during the final nine months as the government responded to the pandemic.

Since Trump returned to office in January 2025, the debt has risen by another $3.8 trillion, bringing the increase across his two terms to about $11.6 trillion so far.

During Biden’s four-year presidency, federal debt increased by approximately $8.4 trillion, driven partly by pandemic recovery spending as well as investments in infrastructure, clean energy and other government programs.

Trump’s second-term legislative agenda is also expected to add significantly to future borrowing. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that his major tax-and-spending package, known as the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, could add about $4.7 trillion to the national debt.

Meanwhile, the federal government continues to face large annual deficits. The Treasury reported a $432 billion deficit in July, the fourth-largest monthly deficit in U.S. history.

Interest becomes a major budget burden

Rising debt is making interest payments an increasingly important part of federal spending.

The government spends roughly $7 trillion annually, with about 60% going toward mandatory programs such as Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid and veterans’ benefits.

Interest payments on the national debt now account for roughly $1.1 trillion annually. In fiscal 2025, debt-service costs exceeded Pentagon spending for the first time.

During the first 10 months of fiscal 2026, interest costs surpassed Medicare spending, becoming the second-largest federal budget item after Social Security.

The pressure is expected to grow as the aging population increases demand for retirement and health care programs while tax revenues remain insufficient to cover federal spending.

The crossing of the $40 trillion threshold has therefore renewed concerns about whether Washington can stabilize its finances while maintaining major social programs, funding national priorities and managing the rising cost of borrowing.

(Source: Reuters)

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overnment bond markets across the United States, Japan and Europe are sending a warning to policymakers as long-term borrowing costs reach levels not seen in years, driven by rising government debt, inflation concerns and geopolitical uncertainty.

The sharp increase in bond yields is raising borrowing costs for governments, companies and households while making it more difficult for central banks to balance inflation against economic growth.

In the United States, 30-year Treasury yields rose above 5% to their highest level since 2007. Japan’s 10-year government bond yield climbed to just below 3%, its highest level in three decades. German, French and British long-term borrowing costs also reached multiyear or multi-decade highs.

The moves reflect growing concerns about the sustainability of government finances and the inflation outlook as geopolitical tensions, tariffs and the continuing war involving Iran reshape the global economy.

Rising debt and inflation pressure bond markets

The U.S. government debt burden is approaching $40 trillion, while other developed economies are also facing large fiscal deficits and growing borrowing requirements.

The prolonged conflict involving Iran has pushed oil prices higher, with crude recently rising above $90 a barrel. Higher energy prices are adding to inflation concerns and reducing expectations that central banks will be able to cut interest rates quickly.

At the same time, technology companies are borrowing heavily to finance the expansion of artificial intelligence infrastructure and data centers. That demand for capital is increasing competition with governments seeking to sell large amounts of debt.

“Bond yields’ recent surge suggests investors are losing patience with fiscal profligacy,” said Jonas Goltermann, chief markets economist at Capital Economics.

U.S. 30-year Treasury yields later eased slightly, with the yield last down 2.4 basis points at 5.286%. The 10-year Treasury yield stood around 4.71%, a level that markets are watching closely, with 5% increasingly viewed as an important threshold.

The New York Federal Reserve estimates the term premium — the additional return investors demand for holding longer-term government debt — at around 80 basis points, close to its highest level in 12 years.

Recent U.S. Treasury auctions have also highlighted rising borrowing costs. A 10-year Treasury sale cleared at a yield of 4.683%, the highest in 19 years, while a 30-year auction reached 5.216%, a 25-year high.

The increase in government bond yields has also weighed on stocks, with major indexes including the Nasdaq and Europe’s STOXX 600 falling on Tuesday.

Japan and Europe face growing pressure

Japan is experiencing a particularly significant shift in its bond market. Its 10-year borrowing costs have climbed to nearly 3%, while 30-year yields have moved above 4%.

Investors are increasingly expecting the Bank of Japan to raise interest rates as early as September as inflation concerns grow.

Higher Japanese bond yields could also affect U.S. markets because Japanese investors have traditionally been major buyers of U.S. government debt. More attractive returns at home could encourage them to reduce purchases of Treasuries.

Foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries declined in June, according to U.S. Treasury Department data, with Japan, Britain and China among the countries reducing their holdings.

European governments are facing similar pressures. Germany’s 10-year bond yield reached its highest level since 2011, while French yields rose to their highest since 2008. Britain’s 30-year borrowing costs approached levels last seen in May, which were the highest since 1998.

High government spending and debt in countries such as France and Britain have contributed to investor concerns. Climate-related events are also expected to increase pressure on government budgets.

The bond market selloff is significant because government bond yields serve as a benchmark for borrowing across the economy. Higher sovereign yields can translate into more expensive corporate loans, consumer credit and household mortgages.

Some investors, however, believe the recent rise in yields could make government bonds increasingly attractive and eventually encourage buyers to return to the market.

The broader concern for policymakers is whether higher yields represent a temporary adjustment or the beginning of a longer period in which investors demand substantially greater compensation for lending to governments.

With inflation still vulnerable to higher energy prices, government debt continuing to rise and geopolitical risks increasing, bond markets are placing greater pressure on policymakers to demonstrate control over both fiscal policy and inflation.

(Source: Reuters)

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.S. envoy Jared Kushner said Monday that the United States would not support rebuilding Gaza until Hamas gives up its weapons, as Israel continues carrying out attacks across the devastated Palestinian territory.

Kushner made the remarks after meeting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in an effort to advance a U.S.-backed roadmap for ending the genocide. The meeting did not produce a breakthrough, with major disagreements remaining over Hamas’ disarmament and an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.

“We have a plan to rebuild Gaza, but we will not allow Gaza to be rebuilt until the demilitarization occurs,” Kushner told Fox News.

He said Washington did not want reconstruction funds to be invested in Gaza if the territory could again become a battlefield.

Disarmament remains key dispute

Hamas had agreed to disarm as part of the U.S.-backed proposal, which would also involve an Israeli withdrawal and an end to attacks on Gaza. Israel, however, rejected the proposal earlier this month, saying it would not make concessions until Gaza was fully demilitarized.

Kushner appeared to align closely with Israel’s position, emphasizing that Hamas would need to surrender its weapons before major reconstruction and Israeli withdrawal could proceed.

“We’re also not going to restrict Israel’s right to defend itself if there are any imminent threats,” Kushner said, adding that Washington had sought to clarify what that provision would mean.

His comments came despite President Donald Trump earlier Monday calling for an end to Israeli attacks on Gaza.

“Israelis should not be striking in Gaza. Hamas agreed to lay down their weapons,” Trump said.

Israel has continued launching near-daily attacks on the territory. According to the figures cited by Al Jazeera, at least 1,265 Palestinians have been killed in Gaza since a ceasefire came into effect last year. The broader Israeli war on Gaza has killed more than 73,000 Palestinians since October 2023, according to the same source.

U.S. pushes Gaza roadmap

Kushner also met Hamas officials on Sunday in a rare direct encounter as Washington seeks to move its Gaza plan forward. He described the discussions as “very cordial” but said the United States would judge Hamas by its actions rather than its promises.

“They said all the right things,” Kushner said, while expressing skepticism about the group’s willingness to fulfill its commitments.

He said Hamas could potentially surrender its weapons and tunnels within 60 to 90 days, describing such an outcome as a major security gain for Israel.

Kushner warned that if Hamas failed to follow through, the group would lose international support and Israel would have greater backing from Washington and other countries to continue military action.

The U.S. envoy also argued that the proposed agreement would benefit Israel by removing what he described as a major security threat.

The dispute over reconstruction highlights one of the central obstacles to the U.S.-backed plan. Gaza has suffered enormous destruction during the Israeli genocide, creating an urgent need for housing, infrastructure, health care and other basic services.

Washington has remained a major supporter of Israel throughout the genocide. According to Al Jazeera, the United States has provided Israel with about $25 billion in military aid over the past three years and has defended the Israeli government at international forums.

The latest diplomatic efforts come as Washington attempts to reconcile its calls for an end to the fighting with Israel’s demand for Hamas’ complete disarmament before any broader political settlement.

For Palestinians in Gaza, however, the continuation of Israeli strikes and the conditions attached to reconstruction leave the territory’s future uncertain, even as international efforts seek to establish a lasting ceasefire and begin rebuilding.

)Source: Aljazeera English)

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merican President Donald Trump’s approval rating has fallen to 33%, the lowest level of his current presidency, as growing concerns over the war with Iran and rising gasoline prices weigh on his standing with American voters, according to a Reuters/Ipsos poll released Monday.

The four-day survey found that 64% of Americans disapproved of Trump’s performance, compared with 33% who approved. His approval rating fell from 35% in an earlier poll this month and matched the lowest level recorded during his previous presidency, in December 2017.

Trump returned to the White House in 2025 with approval from just under half of Americans, but his standing has weakened as the conflict with Iran has continued. The war has disrupted a significant share of global oil trade and pushed gasoline prices higher, adding pressure on U.S. households.

Most Americans expect Iran war to continue

The poll showed widespread concern that U.S. involvement in the conflict will last much longer than Trump initially suggested.

About 80% of Americans said they believed U.S. involvement in Iran would continue for an extended period, including 87% of Democrats and 71% of Republicans. Only 16% expected the conflict to end within a few weeks.

Trump initially suggested that the war could be resolved within weeks, but Iran has continued resisting U.S. and Israeli military pressure. The conflict has also disrupted oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, contributing to higher energy prices.

Trump has defended the rising cost of gasoline as necessary to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. At a rally in New York on Friday, he told supporters that paying somewhat more for gasoline was worthwhile to prevent what he described as an evil country from obtaining nuclear weapons.

However, only about one in five Americans said the war was worth the cost. Among Republicans, only about half considered the conflict worthwhile.

The economic impact of the war could become a major issue ahead of the Nov. 3 congressional elections, with Republicans seeking to defend narrow majorities in the House while Democrats increasingly see an opportunity to gain control of the Senate.

Democrats gain ground on economy

The poll also showed Democrats gaining an advantage over Republicans on economic issues. About 38% of registered voters said Democrats would handle the economy better, compared with 35% who preferred Republicans.

That represents a significant shift from previous years and comes as voters express increasing concern about the cost of living and gasoline prices.

Democrats were also viewed as better equipped to manage the cost of living, while Republicans continued to hold a narrow advantage on immigration.

About 40% of voters said Republicans had the better approach to immigration, compared with 38% who favored Democrats. The two-point Republican advantage was the smallest recorded during Trump’s current presidency. Republicans had held a 26-point advantage on immigration in January 2025.

Although Trump’s administration has overseen a sharp decline in border crossings and expanded immigration enforcement, Republicans have faced political pressure over deadly confrontations and the growing number of people held in immigration detention, including children.

The Reuters/Ipsos poll was conducted online among 1,166 U.S. adults nationwide and had a margin of error of three percentage points in either direction.

The findings point to growing political challenges for Trump as voters confront the economic consequences of the Iran conflict and prepare to vote in the November midterm elections.

(Source: Reuters)

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hilst the Middle East region has undergone significant change and transformation as a result of the attacks launched by Israel from 7 October 2023 onwards, the US-Israel–Iran war that began on 28 February 2026 has further fuelled this change, pushing it to a point of no return. For had these events not occurred, the ‘Mecca Joint Defence Agreement’, signed on 7 August 2026 between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, might not have been possible.

Developments necessitating “regional ownership”

Türkiye’s long-standing stance that the region’s problems should be resolved by the countries of the region themselves – a concept defined by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan as “regional ownership” – had not received sufficient support from the countries of the region. Whilst the reasons behind this may vary from country to country, ultimately external interventions aimed at resolving the region’s problems have failed to heal the wounds; on the contrary, they have either caused existing wounds to bleed anew or allowed them to simply harden into calluses without being resolved. Consequently, it has become apparent that interventions in the region—particularly from the West and, of course, the US—have failed to produce results and have not brought peace and stability to the region.

However, following the events that began on 7 October 2023, Israel’s adoption of a revisionist policy towards the region—believing that the conditions were favourable—and its subsequent attacks targeting not only Gaza and the West Bank but also Lebanon, Syria and Iran, have led to a shift in the preconceptions held by countries in the region towards Türkiye.

For whilst it is evident that almost all of the Western countries expected to resolve the region’s problems have taken sides in the war between Russia and Ukraine, providing Ukraine with billions of dollars in aid as well as both political and military support; whilst Israel’s razing of Gaza, massacred over 73,000 people and committed a massive genocide; deepened its annexation of the West Bank; gradually sought to alter the status of the Al-Aqsa Mosque; occupied southern Lebanon and attempted to provoke a civil war there; and, as if its decades-long occupation of the Golan Heights—which is Syrian territory —as if that were not enough—it unilaterally suspended the 1974 agreement following the revolution on 8 December 2024, occupied further Syrian territory, and sought to prevent Syria from achieving stability by manipulating the Druze and the SDG/PKK terrorist organisations.

The extent to which external actors remain indifferent to crises or conflicts in our region has once again been exposed in the war against Iran. For just as it is unjust and wrong for an actor such as the US to fall into Israel’s trap and attack Iran, it is equally wrong for other Western countries not to have taken the initiative to dissuade the US from this war, as was the case with Ukraine. Although these countries—the majority of which are also NATO members—were called upon by the US to deploy troops to open the blockaded Strait of Hormuz – although this was not in accordance with NATO regulations – they did not heed this call and, whilst not becoming directly involved in the war, they made their stance clear by expanding sanctions against Iran rather than exerting pressure on Israel to bring the war to an end.

During this war, Iran’s decision to attack Gulf states and other countries hosting US bases on their territory – rather than Israel and the US, which were directly attacking it – both because they were relatively easier targets and with the intention of indirectly exerting pressure on the US, has once again demonstrated the importance of regional ownership.

Israel’s revisionist policies and the perception of threats by regional countries

All these developments have made a mechanism such as the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement imperative, with the aim of thwarting the plans of a country like Israel—which, despite its small size, seeks to destabilize the region and derive benefit from the situation by leveraging its lobbying power in the US and Europe and relying on their support—and to establish a new status quo. Furthermore, whilst Israel recently proposed an alignment strategy—such as the “hexagon bloc”—which has yet to materialize on the ground, the formation of a counter-front by countries outside this bloc that perceive the current developments as a threat to their national interests must be regarded as inevitable.

Despite the security guarantees the US has provided to the Gulf states to date, the fact that these states have been exposed to Iranian attacks during the war against Iran has not only called into question the reliability of US guarantees in the Gulf, but has also inevitably led to a search for alternatives regarding the future of the region’s security architecture. It is therefore highly likely that the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement will address this necessity; in particular, should the US withdraw from the region following the war with Iran, it is conceivable that it might be open to entrusting the region’s security to three key and powerful allies: Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the fact that the US has not made any negative statements regarding the Mecca Agreement to date is interpreted in this light and reinforces the view that there is coordination between the signatory countries and the US.

Why is the agreement so important?

Among the key factors that make the agreement significant are the characteristics and capabilities of the signatory countries. Türkiye, for instance, is not only a NATO member but also a candidate country for the EU and has made significant strides in the defense industry in recent years. It is therefore an indispensable actor for both the Middle East and the European security architecture. Pakistan, meanwhile, is the only Muslim country to possess nuclear weapons and also has a substantial population. As for Saudi Arabia, it stands out as a key player not only due to its abundant energy resources but also because of its strategic location at the crossroads of global trade routes. Furthermore, as a leading figure in both the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Arab League, and as the custodian of Islam’s holy sites, it is an actor held in high regard and whose word carries weight among both Arab and Muslim states.

The coming together of these three major powers to form a defense alliance would create a synergy whose effects are likely to extend beyond the region. Furthermore, should this agreement be successfully implemented, it would inevitably create a domino effect, making it likely that other countries in the region would join the agreement. Considering similar initiatives that have been attempted at various times but could never be brought to a conclusion due to both regional and circumstantial conditions, the most significant impact of this agreement, as of today, is that it stands as the sole development capable of curbing Israel’s aggressive, occupying and expansionist regional vision. Not only will the Abraham Accords no longer hold any appeal for countries in the region, but it is also understood that, should the US withdraw from the region following a war against Iran, the new security architecture of the region will be centered on the new pact established by this agreement.

What will the agreement provide for the signatory countries?

This agreement is of a defensive nature, aimed at protecting the signatories from attacks by other countries; in this way, it offers the signatory countries a security guarantee similar to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Türkiye’s current capabilities, Pakistan’s nuclear power and Saudi Arabia’s financial support not only demonstrate the agreement’s capacity and potential but also serve as a powerful deterrent to any actors seeking to attack one of the signatory states.

Consequently, in addition to Türkiye’s NATO membership, the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement has now emerged as the sole agreement in the region offering an additional defense guarantee to regional countries, and it has been announced that the agreement remains open to new participants. Although it has been stated in the announcements that no specific country is being targeted, it is clear that a strong deterrent has been created for those with designs on the region – particularly Israel – or those claiming to shape its future.

Whilst there are no doubts regarding the agreement’s deterrent effect, as we do not yet possess detailed information on the nature of the agreement, it is not fully known how a response would be mounted in the event of an attack on any of the signatory states. Furthermore, given the geographical locations of the signatory states—particularly Pakistan’s relatively remote position—it is difficult to predict how such a response would be carried out. However, despite all these uncertainties, the implementation of such an arrangement in our region is of great importance.

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merican President Donald Trump has welcomed a new defense agreement between Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, describing the trilateral pact as an important step toward greater security cooperation in the Middle East.

“Very happy to see that Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan have recently, and finally, signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement,” Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform.

He said the agreement showed that countries in the Middle East were “coming together” and would be better positioned to defend themselves. Trump described the pact as a “BIG, BOLD, IMPORTANT FIRST STEP.”

The agreement was signed in Mecca on August 7 amid escalating regional tensions and the ongoing U.S.-Iran war, which has expanded beyond the two countries and affected several states across the Middle East.

Three countries expand military cooperation

Under the agreement, Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia will establish strategic political and military mechanisms involving their defense and foreign ministers, as well as chiefs of staff or commanders of their armed forces.

Military cooperation is expected to develop gradually, beginning with command-post and field exercises. The three countries could later conduct joint exercises involving ground, naval and air forces, air defense systems and unmanned platforms.

The agreement also includes a commitment by the three countries to participate in efforts aimed at resolving the conflict between Iran and the United States.

The pact builds on an earlier Saudi-Pakistani mutual defense agreement signed in September, which stated that an attack against either country would be considered an attack against both.

Saudi Arabia has increasingly sought to diversify its defense partnerships as its critical infrastructure and energy facilities have come under attack amid the regional conflict.

Pact comes amid regional tensions

The agreement also reflects the broader security concerns facing the three countries. Saudi Arabia has been directly affected by attacks linked to the wider U.S.-Iran war, while Iran-backed Houthi forces have targeted regional shipping and other interests.

Türkiye, meanwhile, has faced growing tensions with Israel over the war in Gaza which resulted in broader regional conflicts, including fighting involving Iran and Lebanon.

Pakistan has increasingly positioned itself as a potential mediator in regional disputes while strengthening its security relationship with Saudi Arabia and expanding defense cooperation with Türkiye.

The three-way pact brings together three major Muslim-majority countries with significant military capabilities and strategic influence. Türkiye is a NATO member, Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons, and Saudi Arabia is one of the world’s largest oil producers and a key U.S. partner in the Gulf.

Trump’s endorsement marks a notable reaction from Washington to the emerging security arrangement. His comments suggest that the United States views greater defense cooperation among regional powers as potentially complementary to broader efforts to strengthen security in the Middle East.

The agreement could also reshape regional security cooperation as countries seek greater capacity to protect their territory and infrastructure amid continuing instability and the widening consequences of the U.S.-Iran war.

(Source: Daily Sabah)

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razil has begun consultations on possible retaliatory measures against the United States after Washington imposed new tariffs on Brazilian exports, escalating trade tensions between the two countries.

The Brazilian government said the new U.S. tariffs were “unjustified and arbitrary” and vowed to defend the country’s interests through all appropriate channels.

The consultations mark the first step in a process that could eventually lead Brazil to impose countermeasures on U.S. goods and services. No final decision has been made, and Brazilian officials are expected to hold further discussions with U.S. trade authorities before determining how to respond.

Brazil considers range of measures

The United States imposed a 25% surcharge in July on Brazilian goods, citing what Washington described as unfair trade practices. Brazil is also subject to a separate 12.5% tariff linked to allegations concerning enforcement of bans on forced labor.

Under Brazil’s “Reciprocity Law,” the government could respond with measures beyond traditional tariffs. Options under consideration include restrictions on U.S. audiovisual companies and the possible suspension of pharmaceutical and agricultural patents, according to sources cited by Reuters.

Brazilian officials are weighing the potential economic consequences, including possible disruptions to supply chains and higher domestic inflation, before deciding whether to proceed with retaliation.

Trade dispute escalates

The dispute is part of a broader expansion of U.S. tariffs under President Donald Trump, who has repeatedly argued that tariffs are necessary to address trade imbalances and protect American industries.

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva had previously pledged to invoke the Reciprocity Law if Washington imposed the new duties. The government has now begun the formal process by requesting further diplomatic consultations with U.S. trade authorities.

The move comes as relations between Brasilia and Washington have become increasingly strained. Brazil has described the U.S. tariffs as unjustified while seeking to defend its interests through diplomatic and legal channels.

For now, Brasilia has stopped short of imposing countermeasures. The coming consultations will determine whether the dispute can be resolved through negotiations or whether Brazil moves ahead with retaliatory actions that could further deepen trade tensions between the two countries.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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ustralian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said Friday that the AUKUS defense partnership with the United States and Britain remained “full steam ahead” following a lengthy call with U.S. President Donald Trump, while urging Washington to exempt Australia from U.S. tariffs.

Albanese said the two leaders reviewed progress under AUKUS and agreed that the trilateral security pact would continue to benefit all three countries.

“We reviewed the significant progress that has been made under AUKUS, which remains full steam ahead,” Albanese told reporters in Canberra.

AUKUS, established in 2021, is Australia’s largest defense project and is designed in part to strengthen the three countries’ military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific amid growing Chinese influence in the region.

Submarine program moves forward

Under the pact, U.S. Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines are expected to be based in Australia from next year. Australia is also due to acquire several Virginia-class submarines from around 2030, while Britain and Australia are developing a new class of nuclear-powered submarine under the agreement.

Australia has committed about A$368 billion ($260 billion) over three decades to the project, including major investments in U.S. and British submarine production facilities.

The United States has said it is satisfied with progress since a review of AUKUS conducted last year. Pentagon policy chief Elbridge Colby said Washington saw increasing alignment between the three countries and expected Australia to continue meeting its commitments.

AUKUS has faced concerns over the availability of U.S. submarines and production capacity. Colby previously warned that American industry faced challenges meeting both U.S. and allied demand for nuclear-powered submarines.

China has strongly criticized the agreement, warning that it could contribute to an arms race in the Indo-Pacific.

Australia seeks tariff exemption

Albanese described his conversation with Trump as productive and said he had asked the president to exempt Australia completely from U.S. flat tariffs of 12.5%.

Trump agreed to consider the request, Albanese said.

Australia has argued that it should qualify for an exemption because it runs a trade deficit with the United States and imports large amounts of American machinery, technology and aircraft.

The leaders also discussed the conflict involving Iran and Australia’s recent defense agreements with Papua New Guinea and Fiji.

Albanese said he told Trump that Australia wanted to see an end to the conflict in the Middle East while maintaining that Iran should not be permitted to develop nuclear weapons.

The call came as Australia seeks to deepen its security cooperation with the United States while managing economic concerns linked to Washington’s trade policies. For Canberra, the future of AUKUS remains central to its long-term defense strategy and efforts to strengthen its position in the increasingly contested Indo-Pacific.

(Source: Reuters)

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ugust 7, 2026, marks a historic turning point at which the cards of Afro-Eurasian geopolitics and the global security architecture were reshuffled. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s working visit to Saudi Arabia brought together Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, who had arrived in Saudi Arabia the day before the visit, and General Asim Munir at the same table. The defense-focused trilateral ‘Mecca Agreement’, were signed following months of diplomatic maneuvering, and were announced at a time of rising military tensions in the region and US-Iran conflict threatening Gulf security.

Analyzing this critical development from the perspective of Islamabad is of vital importance for understanding Pakistan’s defense network, which stretches from Africa to the Gulf; its chronic and hybrid challenges in internal security; and its foundational role at the crossroads of Afro-Eurasia.

From nuclear power to regional security architecture: Pakistan’s role

As the only nuclear-armed state in the Muslim world, Pakistan constitutes the most deterrent and high-calibre military human capital component of this alliance. The bilateral defense pact signed with Saudi Arabia in 2025 was a consequence of Riyadh’s quest for military assurances, including nuclear deterrence, against potential security threats. However, Turkey’s inclusion in this equation as an official and institutional partner elevates Pakistan’s role as a bilateral ‘security provider’ to a much broader and more balanced framework.

From the perspective of the Islamabad administration, this agreement is not merely a single Gulf commitment, but the culmination of a multi-layered strategy stretching from the Horn of Africa to the Persian Gulf. Indeed, the Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation signed last week between Pakistan and Somalia, a year after it was approved by the Somali Cabinet, demonstrated Islamabad’s determination to play an active role in ensuring the security of navigation in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

Furthermore, the Kuwaiti Parliament’s approval in late July of the long-awaited defense cooperation agreement with Pakistan, alongside the pursuit by actors such as Bahrain and Jordan of reciprocal defense agreements modelled on the Saudi model, has cemented Islamabad’s position as the region’s ‘security architect’. Consequently, the Turkey–Saudi Arabia–Pakistan triad forms the backbone not only of these three countries but also of a broader Afro-Eurasian security network.

Synergy of capital, technology and military manpower

Viewed from the perspective of Islamabad, the tripartite alliance is more than just a military pact; it is an industrial lever that brings together finance and high technology. For many years, Pakistan’s military diplomacy has provided Saudi Arabia with training, military personnel and security support, whilst in return it has relied on Gulf funding. However, when the high technology, unmanned systems and operational capabilities of the Turkish defense industry are added to this equation, Pakistan finds an opportunity to move beyond being a passive exporter of security and position itself at the center of a tripartite industrial synergy.

When Saudi Arabia’s financial strength, Turkey’s advanced defense technology and Pakistan’s regional military expertise and growing production infrastructure are combined, a domestic and independent defense bloc and an integrated ecosystem emerge at the very intersection of Afro-Eurasia. At a time when Pakistan is grappling with financial difficulties, this agreement enables it to secure direct Saudi investment whilst also modernizing its domestic defense industry through joint defense projects with Turkey, thereby opening up new market opportunities for both Turkish and Pakistani defense companies.

Internal security challenges and allegations of sabotage

Pakistan’s ambitious foreign policy on the global stage is being tested by chronic internal security challenges and regional hybrid threats. The Islamabad administration has long been grappling with violence perpetrated by the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, whilst in the south-west it has been combating separatist actions by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) targeting economic infrastructure and Chinese projects.

However, the recent escalation of social tensions and protests in Pakistan-administered Kashmir (Azad Kashmir) has added a new dimension to the security equation. Strategic circles in Islamabad argue that the unrest erupting in Kashmir is not merely the result of local administrative or economic grievances; rather, they contend that it has been exacerbated by the instigations of external actors who are displeased with Pakistan’s key role in its independent balancing diplomacy with Iran and within the now-concrete Turkey-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Tripartite Alliance, which is now taking concrete form. This situation illustrates that, whilst Islamabad is fighting the actions of the TTP and the BLA on the one hand, it is also forced to contend with the hybrid front opened up via Kashmir by forces seeking to undermine the regional influence of the Tripartite Alliance.

H

istory rarely announces itself. But occasionally, a single agreement tells us that something fundamental has changed.

The defense pact signed in Mecca between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye may be one of those moments.

Its most consequential provision is remarkably simple: an armed attack against one of the three countries will be considered an attack against all three.

For Pakistan, this represents something bigger than another defense agreement.

For decades, Pakistan’s military power, including its nuclear deterrent, was viewed overwhelmingly through the prism of South Asia, particularly its rivalry with India. Pakistan was already a formidable military power, but the strategic reach of that power was largely geographically contained.

That is beginning to change.

Pakistan’s security sxtends beyonf South Asia

Pakistan is now part of a collective-defense architecture stretching from South Asia through the Gulf to Türkiye.

And consider what these three countries bring together.

Türkiye possesses NATO’s second-largest army and has transformed itself into a major defense producer, from drones and missiles to warships and advanced aerospace technology. US President Donald Trump himself recently described the Turkish military as “tremendous” and “powerful.”

Saudi Arabia brings enormous economic and energy influence and the political weight of one of the Arab and Islamic world’s most consequential states.

Pakistan brings one of the world’s largest militaries, considerable operational experience and, crucially, is the world’s only Muslim-majority nuclear-armed state.

The nuclear question is therefore unavoidable.

Nothing publicly released about the agreement says Pakistan has extended a nuclear umbrella over Saudi Arabia or Türkiye. It would be wrong to claim otherwise.

But deterrence is also about perception. Any state contemplating a major confrontation with one member must now factor in the possibility of Pakistani involvement. The presence of a nuclear-armed state within that collective-defense framework inevitably becomes part of the strategic calculation.

Also, it’s worth mentioning that for Türkiye and Pakistan, this is the culmination of something much older.

Ankara and Islamabad: A growing relationship

The relationship between Ankara and Islamabad has long gone beyond diplomacy. It is rooted in unusually strong political and public ties and has evolved into substantial military cooperation,  from training and joint exercises to defense-industrial collaboration and Turkish-built MILGEM warships for Pakistan.

The Mecca pact takes that relationship a significant step further: from close defense partners to countries formally bound by collective defense.

And its implications stretch beyond the three signatories.

India says it is closely following the agreement. Its “great friend” Israel will surely be watching closely too.

Just a day before the agreement was signed, Narendra Modi received a call from Benjamin Netanyahu. According to India’s Foreign Ministry, the two discussed developments in West Asia and reviewed progress in the India-Israel Special Strategic Partnership.

There is no evidence connecting that call to the Mecca pact, and India has explicitly rejected subsequent reports that it sought a defence agreement with Israel to counter it.

But the wider picture is difficult to ignore. From New Delhi to Tel Aviv, capitals will now be assessing what this new arrangement means for a strategic landscape already undergoing profound change.

Having ties to China and the US at the same time

Pakistan occupies an especially interesting position within it.

China remains Pakistan’s “all-weather” strategic partner. Yet Islamabad continues to engage Washington, while simultaneously playing an active mediating role between the United States and Iran.

Perhaps US Vice President JD Vance summed up Pakistan’s standing in Washington most simply when asked about Islamabad’s role in the latest diplomatic efforts: “Very good, we love Pakistan.”

That ability to maintain relationships across geopolitical divides is increasingly rare.

Pakistan can speak to Beijing and Washington, Riyadh and Tehran, and the wider Gulf — without being completely confined to any single geopolitical camp. And now it has added a collective-defense commitment with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye to that equation.

That puts Pakistan in a remarkably unusual strategic position.

The pact also reflects a wider transformation in the Middle East. For decades, regional security depended heavily on external powers. Years of war, uncertainty and shifting American priorities have increasingly encouraged regional states to look towards one another.

Is this agreement like NATO? Well, we still do not know how integrated military planning will become or how its obligations would work during an actual war.

But deterrence begins long before a shot is fired. It begins with the calculations an adversary makes before deciding whether to fire one.

Turkish military and technological power, Saudi economic weight and Pakistani conventional and nuclear strength are now connected through a formal mutual-defense commitment.

(A version of this article was first published in Turkish by Kriter)

T

he 36th NATO Summit, held in Ankara on July 7-8, 2026, saw US President Trump state that he had attended the summit solely out of respect for President Erdoğan; the ‘NATO 3.0’ agenda was realized; and, contrary to some experts’ expectations, there was no rift within the alliance. Türkiye’s excellent hosting, which continues to make the country the talk of the town, the efforts by the Israeli delegation throughout the summit to shift the agenda and overshadow the summit were equally striking.

The main factor driving Israel to make such desperate moves was Trump’s pre-summit remarks, in which he suggested that Türkiye might be supplied with F-110 jet engines and the fifth-generation F-35 fighter jets—which had been withheld since 2019—and that the CAATSA sanctions, in place since 2020, might be lifted. On the other hand, Türkiye’s hosting of the summit during such a critical period, President Erdoğan’s meetings on the sidelines of the summit with over 40 heads of state and government on the sidelines of the summit, and, of course, the organization of a defense industry exhibition showcasing Türkiye’s national and domestically produced defence industry products – a first in NATO history – have driven Israel to distraction.

The most significant reason driving Israel to such a state of exasperation and pushing it to make irrational moves is the sense of insecurity that has arisen both within Israel and in the American public sphere due to the stalemate in the war against Iran and the fact that, contrary to promises, an absolute victory has not yet been achieved. Conversely, the fact that Türkiye is viewed as one of the factors hindering Israel’s success due to its role in the war against Iran, coupled with the fact that relations between Türkiye and the US have come to take precedence over those between Israel and the US, is seen as a cause setting off alarm bells and leading Israel to pull out all the stops simultaneously.

It would therefore be useful to highlight the ‘Israel factor’ in Turkish-American relations by examining the rivalry between Türkiye and Israel, mediated through the US and Trump, and the methods Israel employed to persuade the Trump administration to withdraw its support for Türkiye.

Israel’s divergent stance as Turkish-US relations improve

Despite the improvement in Turkish-US relations during Trump’s first term—following the strained relations of Obama’s second term, which is regarded as a crisis period—full normalization could not be achieved due to the dominance of the Zionist lobby over Trump. Indeed, despite all claims of an improvement in bilateral relations, the Pastor Brunson crisis, the Halkbank crisis, threats of economic attacks and the imposition of CAATSA sanctions on Türkiye following its exclusion from the F-35 program all took place during the Trump era. Following the Biden era, which was marked by very frosty Turkish-American relations, Trump’s second presidential term was of paramount importance for both Türkiye and Israel, and both countries had high expectations of Trump from their respective perspectives.

However, Trump had not forgotten what he had gone through after losing the 2020 election; whilst he projected a warm image to the public, it was said that behind the scenes he had distanced himself from Netanyahu, viewing the latter’s relationship with Biden as a betrayal. At the same time, he did not hesitate to publicly express his affection and respect for President Erdoğan, thereby drawing a clear distinction between Erdoğan and Netanyahu. We saw the repercussions of this distinction clearly when, due to developments in Syria, Netanyahu complained to Trump at the White House about Türkiye and President Erdoğan. Indeed, Trump’s response to Netanyahu – “you must be reasonable too” – caused great disappointment on the Israeli side, whilst in Türkiye it was interpreted as Trump taking Türkiye’s side.

Similarly, whilst Trump supported Israel’s attacks on Gaza on the one hand, he did not remain indifferent to the prospect of reaching a ceasefire in Gaza through Türkiyey’s mediation on the other. Similarly, regarding developments in Syria, he has aligned himself closely with Türkiye’s position; despite all of Israel’s objections, he recognised Ahmed Shara as a legitimate interlocutor and provided the necessary support to ensure Syria’s territorial integrity.

The speeches and pledges made by Trump during his Middle East tour in May and at the meeting he held in New York in September with the heads of state and government of Muslim countries, on the occasion of the opening of the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly, are also significant in that they demonstrate that the US occupies a different position from Israel regarding the region’s future. This is because the ceasefire process in Gaza began after this date.

The Iran card

Realizing it could not influence Trump through Gaza and Syria, Israel attempted to win him over by playing the Iran card; however, it was once again disappointed when, in June 2025, despite Trump ordering strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities during the 12-Day War, he refrained from intervening in the conflict. However, by any means necessary, Israel managed to drag the US into war with Iran on 28 February, hoping that this would enable it to achieve the regime change in Iran it had long dreamt of and thereby reorganise the region as it saw fit. Yet Israel’s plans failed, and the Iranian people reacted strongly against the assassination of their religious leader, standing firmly behind their government.

The deadlock in the war with Iran has, on the one hand, led the US to reassess its approach to the region, whilst on the other, it has prompted a re-evaluation of its alliance with Israel. It was during this period that Türkiye stepped in once again; together with Qatar and Pakistan, it opened the door to negotiations, making it possible to secure a ceasefire between the US and Iran. Israel, however, found itself isolated as the sole country wishing for the war to continue; whilst continuing its attacks on the Lebanese front, it began doing everything in its power to undermine the ceasefire between the US and Iran.

Israel’s stance has been criticised on numerous occasions by both Trump and Vice-President JD Vance. The events unfolding in the region are particularly telling in demonstrating just how hollow Israel’s long-standing rhetoric about ‘actors posing a threat to it in the region’ really is. For far from certain actors in the region posing a threat to Israel, it has become undeniable that Israel itself constitutes a threat to the entire region and is the sole actor destabilising the region.

This situation has also put a strain on the so-called unshakeable alliance between Israel and the US. For Israel, particularly due to the aggressive and intransigent policies it has pursued under Netanyahu’s leadership, has become an unbearable burden for the US. Given this, it has become inevitable for the Trump administration to opt to work alongside a strong, conciliatory actor such as Türkiye, which prioritises regional stability. However, this situation has thoroughly infuriated Israel. Believing itself to be—and to remain—the US’s sole ally in the region, Israel has jeopardised both its own future and the region’s stability by resorting to endless intrigues aimed at discrediting, and even weakening, the US’s other regional ally, Türkiye.

Israel’s attempts to overshadow the NATO Summit

Türkiye is the country that has shown the strongest reaction to Israel’s attacks on Gaza and the crimes of genocide it has committed there. Whilst, on the one hand, it has given concrete expression to its response by imposing certain sanctions on Israel in accordance with its own domestic law, on the other hand, it is monitoring proceedings before both the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice, and is fighting to ensure that Israel is brought to justice and receives the necessary punishment for the genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity it has committed. In addition to this, Türkiye’s position regarding developments in Syria and its role in the Iran War have led Israel to target Türkiye, giving rise to the narrative that ‘after Iran, the new target is Türkiye’.

At a time when Israel was attempting to position Türkiye as the ‘new Iran’, and just before the critical NATO summit, Trump’s announcement to Türkiye that F-110 jet engines and F-35 fighter jets would be supplied, and that CAATSA sanctions would be lifted, naturally caused the Israeli administration to panic. As a result, Netanyahu—who had been unable to reach Trump in the run-up to the summit—appeared on US media outlets during the summit, stating: “Türkiye is not a good ally; Israel is the US’s true ally, the sale of F-35s to Türkiye would jeopardize Israel’s security and that of other US allies in the region (by which he meant Greece and the Greek Cypriots), and the CAATSA sanctions imposed on Türkiye must never be lifted”, in an attempt to influence American public opinion and, thereby, exert pressure on Trump to back down.

Whilst the whole world was discussing just how wonderfully Türkiye had hosted the summit, noting that, thanks to President Erdoğan, differences of opinion within NATO had not spilled over into the summit, and that, ultimately, a consensus had emerged in the final communiqué regarding the strengthening of NATO—and whilst praise for Türkiye was at its peak— it has been observed that certain journalists—who are clearly funded by Israel and Jewish capital—have been questioning Türkiye’s role within NATO, criticizing the security measures taken for the summit, and, worse still, raising issues that have absolutely no connection to the summit and relate entirely to processes governed by Türkiye’s domestic law, thereby asking questions and writing articles aimed at creating the perception that there is no democracy or fair trial in Türkiye.

At the conclusion of the summit, the fact that Israel was found to be behind the so-called intelligence suggesting a possible attack on the new Air Force One aircraft—a gift from Qatar which Trump used on his visit to Ankara—was viewed as an attempt by Israel to cast a shadow over the summit. Furthermore, by doing so, they sought to spread the perception that Türkiye is unsafe, whilst also sabotaging the process by presenting a pretext to derail the negotiations between the US and Iran. It must not be forgotten that, in the world, the sole country capable of carrying out such attacks is Israel rather than Iran, and history is replete with examples of this.

G

ermany’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) marked a turning point both in the shaping of the post-Second World War European security architecture and in Germany’s reintegration into the international system. Following its defeat in 1945 and the subsequent division between East and West Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) found itself on the front line of the Cold War.

Within this geopolitical reality, under the leadership of its first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, Germany saw ‘integration with the West’ (Westbindung) as the sole means of regaining the country’s sovereignty, securing its safety and forging lasting ties with the Western world. Germany’s membership of NATO, which took shape in line with Adenauer’s strategic vision and was formalized on 6 May 1955, represented not merely participation in a military alliance, but also a historic paradigm shift that reinforced Germany’s democratic identity and redefined the balance of power in continental Europe.

With its NATO membership, Germany began to re-establish a regular army and rearm. The fact that Germany was on the ‘hot front’ of the Cold War—a situation in which it could become the direct centre of hostilities in a potential conflict—is best understood through Chancellor Adenauer’s statement: ‘The sole aim of Germany’s rearmament is to contribute to the preservation of peace.’

Germany’s NATO objectives: Peace or the pursuit of economic interests?

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Cold War giving way to regional hot conflicts, the late 1990s and early 2000s saw Germany playing an active role within NATO. In addition to its participation in the Kosovo Peacekeeping Force (KFOR) in the Balkans, Germany’s deployment of troops to the US-led operations in Afghanistan in 2001, at NATO’s request, is particularly noteworthy. Germany’s participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – established by a United Nations resolution and subsequently placed under NATO command – with a force that at times exceeded 5,000 troops, is regarded as the largest overseas military mission in modern German history.

In an interview given during a visit to German troops in Afghanistan in 2010, the then German President Horst Köhler stated that Germany’s overseas military mission should be viewed in a different light, remarking: “As a country of our size, as a country focused on foreign trade and therefore dependent on it, we must recognise that military intervention may also be necessary to protect our interests when required or in emergencies – for example, to secure free trade routes or to prevent regional instability – as such instability would undoubtedly have a negative impact on our opportunities in terms of trade, employment and income. ‘All of this must be discussed, and in my view, our situation is not all that bad…’ he had stated.

Horst Köhler’s remarks, made at a time when there had also been military casualties, raised questions about the constitutionality of Germany’s role in ISAF whilst also sparking intense domestic political debate; Horst Köhler subsequently resigned from the office of President.

Similar remarks were made by the then Federal Minister of Defence, Peter Struck, in December 2002, when the decision was taken to continue sending troops to Afghanistan. In a speech to the Federal Parliament, Struck said: “To clarify the matter, I had mentioned that our security is also defended in the Hindu Kush. ‘When we combat international terrorism alongside our allies and partners—using military means where necessary—in the very places where it originates, Germany becomes a safer place. Our security is further enhanced when the Bundeswehr successfully participates in the reconstruction process in the Balkans and Afghanistan, in accordance with democratic principles, thereby helping to establish the secure environment urgently required in these regions.”

These remarks, which are still the subject of debate today, signalled the dawn of a new era in German foreign policy at the time they were made. They marked the beginning of a new phase in which German foreign policy was no longer confined to defending its own borders, but also encompassed international preventive efforts. National interests were aligned with international interests, thereby justifying a military presence beyond Germany’s borders.

Despite all the past debates, although the number of troops is smaller, Germany still maintains a military presence at 17 locations with 2,000 troops as part of various NATO missions.

NATO or a European common defense system, or both?

Another initiative coinciding with this turning point in Germany’s foreign policy from a military perspective was the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP – Gemeinsame Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik), which was proposed at the European Union summit in Cologne in 1999 under Germany’s presidency and officially incorporated into the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. The CSDP, which was officially implemented in 2009, also led to the establishment of the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs through the provisions added to the Treaty of Lisbon. Just as in the NATO Treaty, the provision for a call for assistance and support, to be activated at the request of a member state, was also incorporated into the Treaty of Lisbon, thereby giving the CSDP practical effect. The first to invoke this provision, by requesting assistance and support, was French President Hollande following the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015.

With 23 member states within NATO, the EU began setting strategic objectives through the CSDP to enable the EU to meet the expectations placed upon it as a security actor operating on a global scale. In 2020, under Germany’s Presidency, the ‘Strategic Compass’ was launched as the key document of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), setting out a clear direction and defining both the policy’s objectives and the necessary resources to achieve them. The first joint threat analysis by EU Member States was drawn up. The Strategic Compass also aims to foster even better cooperation in the field of security and defence and to enable the EU to respond more swiftly and effectively to crises through forward planning.

The EU Global Strategy, developed in 2016, stands out as a new and shared commitment regarding the security policies of Member States, whilst steps were also taken that same year to establish the EU Common Defence Fund under the CSDP.

Although the CSDP may at first glance appear to be an alternative to NATO, it is a structure without a standing army or an existing military chain of command. Since 2020, whilst the EU has undertaken various global missions under the CSDP, joint operations with NATO have also taken place.

Within the EU, a group of countries led by France argue that Europe must become an independent military and strategic actor, separate from the other side of the Atlantic. However, the former Warsaw Pact members that joined the Union through eastern enlargement—Poland, Romania, Hungary and the Baltic states—view NATO as an irreplaceable security umbrella for Eastern Europe. These states, which view Russia as a direct existential threat, currently regard the CSDP’s military deterrence as inadequate and position NATO—which hosts US nuclear and conventional capabilities—as the absolute preference for their own national defence. These countries advocate that the transatlantic bond must not be severed.

Furthermore, the rule within the EU requiring unanimous decision-making on CSDP matters hinders the EU’s ability to respond swiftly and effectively to crises. This situation impedes the CSDP’s operational capabilities.

Germany, meanwhile, is endeavouring to strengthen the CSDP whilst simultaneously seeking to bolster its role within NATO by increasing its defence budget. Ahead of the NATO summit, Germany – which had been criticised by the US President for not increasing its defence budget sufficiently and for failing to provide adequate support within NATO – has already countered Trump’s criticisms through Chancellor Merz, stating that defence spending has now reached 4 per cent of annual gross domestic product.

The debate over the relationship between NATO and the EU’s CSDP was also raised during Chancellor Merz’s meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during his visit to Ankara. President Erdoğan emphasised to Chancellor Merz that preserving the ‘Transatlantic Bond’ was crucial for strengthening NATO’s European pillar, and stressed that Turkey could support the European Union’s defence initiatives provided they complemented NATO. This situation demonstrates, on the one hand, that the CSDP is being closely monitored in Ankara and, on the other, that it has once again been emphasised that, from Turkey’s perspective, a common defence strategy against global threats must be defined within the framework of NATO. However, Merz’s statement that ‘a new European NATO is being established’ has failed to provide any indication as to what role the CSDP will play within NATO.

Turkey-Germany relations in the context of NATO

Relations between Turkey and Germany, which form NATO’s south-eastern flank, have followed a contentious course due to geopolitical shifts, diverging strategic priorities, Germany’s approach to Turkey’s cross-border operations, and the ‘clash of national interests’ between the two countries within the alliance. The fundamental strategic disagreement between Turkey and Germany stems from the asymmetrical nature of their threat perceptions. As a border state directly affected by instability in its immediate region (Syria, Iraq and the Mediterranean), Turkey prioritizes issues such as ‘counter-terrorism’ and ‘safeguarding territorial integrity’—not only its own but also that of its neighbors—whilst Germany has adopted a stance that disregards Turkey’s determination in the fight against terrorism.

During the Syrian civil war, following an increase in the ballistic missile threat against Turkey, Turkey requested an air defense system from NATO. In response to this request, Germany deployed the Patriot missile defense system to Kahramanmaraş; however, in 2015, despite the threat persisting, Germany withdrew the Patriot missile defence systems prematurely, citing Turkey’s counter-terrorism policies as justification. This situation, which led to a serious loss of trust in Germany and called into question NATO’s deterrent capability, persisted until recently.

Despite the friendly and warm remarks made by Merz in Ankara, Germany; its embrace of the PKK and FETÖ, the fact that these organizations still find a foothold in Germany, and the German state’s belief that by providing a platform for these terrorist organizations it could politically weaken Turkey, indicate that relations will not improve in the short term and that the alliance between the two countries within NATO will continue to be turbulent for some time to come.

Among the key issues included in the latest coalition agreement—that is, the government program—regarding Germany’s role within NATO are improvements to the federal armed forces’ contingents deployed as part of NATO’s defense efforts and an increase in military equipment. It has been stated that, due to its geographical location in Europe, Germany will be further strengthened as a central hub of NATO. Similarly, the government program views NATO as one of the cornerstones of the transatlantic partnership and emphasizes its indispensability for European security.

Among the objectives is the commitment to work towards establishing a European Defence Union with the aim of strengthening NATO’s European pillar. This objective is also in line with the argument that Germany must become more Europeanized in order for NATO to remain ‘Transatlantic’. In doing so, it also intends to pursue a trilateral cooperation protocol with France and the United Kingdom.

Whilst Germany is moving towards becoming a logistics hub within NATO, it will, at the same time, seek to bring together its EU member allies under a common budget and logistics framework by utilizing the CSDP mechanisms within the EU to strengthen NATO. In the long term, it will seek to secure its economic and political leadership on the European continent through its strength in the defense industry and its military power.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

I

ran is increasingly relying on economic disruption rather than direct military confrontation to pressure the United States into making concessions over the Strait of Hormuz, expanding threats to regional shipping routes and energy infrastructure as the conflict enters a prolonged phase.

According to Gulf officials, regional sources and analysts, Tehran believes that sustained pressure on global trade and energy markets will prove more effective than conventional military escalation in forcing Washington to reconsider its position.

Rather than seeking a decisive battlefield victory, Iran has adopted a strategy of calibrated escalation designed to steadily raise the economic and political costs of the conflict while avoiding an all-out regional war. The objective, analysts say, is to convince the United States and its allies that accommodating Iran’s demands over the Strait of Hormuz is less costly than continuing the current confrontation.

“Iran, from the beginning, has tried to out-escalate the United States by stretching out its escalation options so that it always has something new to bring every week — a new geography, a new type of weapon, a new type of target,” Michael Knights of the Washington Institute told Reuters.

He argued that Iran’s greatest leverage lies not in its ability to inflict military damage on the United States or Israel, but in its capacity to disrupt regional economies and global commerce.

“The bigger advantage they have is not that they can hurt America or Israel,” Knights said. “Their big advantage is that they can hurt the regional states and the global economy.”

Pressure beyond Hormuz

After demonstrating its ability to disrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz — a waterway that carried around one-fifth of global oil consumption before the conflict — Iran has signaled that its pressure campaign could extend well beyond the strategic chokepoint.

Threats directed at the Red Sea and Saudi energy infrastructure suggest Tehran is seeking to widen the geographical scope of the crisis, increasing the cost of protecting international shipping while testing Washington’s willingness to sustain a prolonged confrontation.

One Gulf source said commanders in Iran’s Revolutionary Guards believe recent developments have strengthened Tehran’s negotiating position.

“The Iranians believe that by widening the war and increasing the pressure, he will eventually give in,” the source said, referring to U.S. President Donald Trump. “Trump thinks he can hit the Iranians hard and bring them to the negotiating table, but they won’t bend.”

That assessment has shaped Tehran’s negotiating strategy, according to Iranian and regional sources.

Trump said on Monday that negotiations with Iran would take place after he canceled a planned military strike in hopes of securing an agreement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian officials, however, denied that talks with Washington were currently underway.

A senior Iranian source said Tehran’s leadership has concluded that previous attempts at flexibility only encouraged greater pressure from Washington, reinforcing the belief that meaningful negotiations can occur only after Iran establishes stronger leverage.

In Tehran’s view, the source said, Trump interprets concessions as weakness and responds only to sustained pressure.

Michael Singh, another senior fellow at the Washington Institute, said Iranian leaders appear convinced they still hold the initiative because the Trump administration remains uncertain about how far it is willing to escalate militarily.

“The Iranians are trying to press their advantage,” Singh said. “They’re interested in establishing sovereignty over the strait and exercising selective control over the waterway.”

Dispute over the Strait

At the heart of the standoff is the future administration of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors.

Regional sources say Oman has presented Tehran with a Gulf-backed proposal that would establish a mechanism for managing shipping through the strait, including voluntary user fees.

Iran, however, is reportedly seeking administrative authority over the waterway and the right to impose service charges on vessels passing through it.

Washington has rejected any arrangement that would allow Iran to exercise control over the strait, insisting it must remain an international waterway open to unrestricted commercial navigation.

Former U.S. diplomat Alan Eyre said Iran’s broader strategy is intended to deter further American military action while forcing Washington to lift its naval blockade and reconsider its negotiating position.

“They don’t want the U.S. to dictate the pace of events,” Eyre said.

War of endurance

Analysts say Iran’s campaign has already shifted the focus of regional and international efforts.

Rather than intensifying military pressure on Tehran, Gulf states and Western governments are increasingly concentrating on protecting commercial shipping and critical energy infrastructure.

The formation of a Saudi-led maritime coalition reflects that shift. According to Gulf sources, the initiative is primarily defensive, focusing on escorting commercial vessels, sharing intelligence and safeguarding vital sea lanes instead of confronting Iran directly.

Knights compared the effort to Europe’s Aspides naval mission in the Red Sea, which was established to protect merchant shipping rather than alter the regional military balance.

For Tehran, forcing rivals into an expensive defensive posture represents a strategic success despite its military disadvantages.

Unable to match U.S. military capabilities directly, Iran can still impose significant costs by compelling regional governments and foreign navies to devote increasing resources to securing global trade routes.

Each new threat, whether in the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait or elsewhere, increases the financial and military burden of keeping international commerce flowing.

Analysts describe the conflict as increasingly becoming a contest of endurance.

Iranian leaders appear to believe they can withstand economic pressure longer than the United States and its partners can tolerate repeated disruptions to global energy supplies and maritime trade.

The strategy also serves a diplomatic purpose.

By demonstrating an ability to expand the crisis whenever necessary, Tehran hopes to strengthen its bargaining position before any future negotiations.

“If there are going to be negotiations, they will define the terms,” said Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations. “Both sides are matching escalation with escalation.”

Despite intermittent diplomatic efforts, neither Washington nor Tehran has shown signs of backing down.

As both sides continue to test each other’s resolve through economic pressure, military deterrence and political signaling, analysts warn that a strategy intended to maximize leverage could still spiral into a wider conflict that neither side intends or is fully able to control.

(Source: Reuters)

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he military operation launched by the US and Israel against Iran on February 28, 2026, which has now evolved into a fragile ceasefire, has reopened the debate on NATO’s institutional and geographical boundaries. The Trump administration’s stance, demanding that its European allies make their airspace and military bases available for use, as well as deploying active naval assets to the Strait of Hormuz, has triggered a structural tension within the Alliance.

Whilst Article 5 of the Treaty limits the obligation of collective defense to attacks on the territories of member states in Europe or North America, Article 6 further narrows this geographical scope by clarifying the definition of the ‘North Atlantic area’. Although the fact that the Washington–Tehran crisis unfolded entirely outside NATO’s formal area of responsibility provided a legal basis for the Alliance to refrain from taking the initiative as an actor, strategic considerations have been the decisive factor here. Although the Alliance claims to be a ‘global security actor’, its members prefer to define the organization as a regional defense pact, whilst avoiding turning their ‘out-of-area’ engagements into an institutional obligation.

Trump’s demands and Europe’s alliance dilemma

The most striking manifestation of the crisis at the operational level is the profound asymmetry between the expectations of the hegemonic power and the allies’ capacity to resist. Washington’s demands have gone beyond a classic burden-sharing debate to become a test of loyalty for the allies. The main objection raised from the European side in the face of this demanding stance is the political rejection that the process has been escalated without consultation with the allies and that ‘the war in question is not Europe’s war’. During this process, Spain adopted the toughest stance by closing its military bases and airspace to US use; Italy demanded strict prior coordination, whilst France and the UK raised various reservations regarding the allocation of bases.

However, despite these restrictive decisions, the European continent – led by Germany – effectively served as a vital logistical base for American military operations. As the crisis deepened and Iran began retaliatory strikes against Gulf states, France, Italy and the UK deployed their military forces to the region to fend off missile and drone attacks, thereby taking up active positions on secondary fronts. On the other hand, whilst the closure of the Strait of Hormuz dealt a severe blow to Europe’s economic interests, the capacity limitations of their own armed forces and their reluctance to be drawn into a conflict imposed by the US led European states to reject Trump’s demand to reopen the strait by military force. This collective refusal by Europe paved the way for Trump to accuse his allies of disloyalty and to threaten to withdraw the US from NATO.

This situation has left European decision-makers facing a classic ‘alliance dilemma’. Allies found themselves caught between, on the one hand, the fear of being drawn into a conflict in the Middle East (entrapment) in the name of US regional interests, and, on the other, the anxiety of being abandoned (abandonment) without the protection of the American security umbrella in the face of the Russian threat. This structural impasse has pushed Europe towards a strategy of ‘active inertia’, one that appeases the US politically whilst refraining from military engagement.

Legal basis for operations outside Article 5

Two historical precedents in which NATO was able to take action even in crises falling outside the scope of Article 5 provide an important comparison of how this structural limitation can be overcome. The Alliance’s military engagement in the Bosnian crisis (1992–1995), which it experienced during the post-Cold War period, was based on a process of deriving legitimacy directly through the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) phased authorisation mechanisms. Similarly, in Libya, the Alliance’s basis of legitimacy was derived not from its own founding articles but from the UN Security Council’s authorisation to protect civilians (Resolution 1973);

NATO became the institutional vehicle implementing this authorisation due to its command-and-control capabilities, yet the composition of participants remained variable, with members such as Germany remaining on the sidelines. The possibility of this scenario being repeated in the Iran crisis is structurally precluded: Russia and China’s veto powers on the Security Council block any Bosnia- or Libya-style authorisation from the outset. This has reinforced the conclusion that NATO has no capacity to take institutional action on the Iran issue, either within its own Articles 5 and 6 framework or through the UN; consequently, the only realistic option remaining is individual or coalition-based action centred on the US-Israel axis.

Furthermore, the Alliance’s structural fissures are manifesting themselves in various ways on the ground. The Alliance’s past operations against piracy in the Gulf of Aden or its missions to combat terrorism and smuggling in the Mediterranean demonstrate a modest yet functional capacity for action that underpins NATO’s claim to protect global trade routes. However, these historical examples are fundamentally at odds with the military and political nature of the threat in the Strait of Hormuz: Whilst operations in the Gulf of Aden or the Mediterranean are policing-style missions conducted against weak and non-state actors, patrolling under the NATO flag in the Strait of Hormuz amounts to engaging in a direct show of force with a sovereign state possessing advanced ballistic capabilities.

Indeed, this structural incompatibility came to the fore as recently as 2019, amidst the deepening US-Iran nuclear crisis and a situation where attacks on oil tankers were threatening global trade. At that time, rather than uniting under a common umbrella, NATO members established two separate naval forces, each operating independently and guided by opposing strategic rationales: the US-led IMSC (2019), focused solely on military deterrence, and the French-led EMASOH (2020), which aimed solely at diplomatic de-escalation without being drawn into the US–Iran conflict. The fact that this two-pronged structure, with its conflicting objectives, has been established outside NATO has clearly demonstrated that the Alliance lacks a shared perception of threat and the capacity for joint decision-making in ‘out-of-scope’ crisis regions.

Turkey as a NATO member

The evasive manoevres of European allies are transforming into a far more complex geographical and strategic equation centered on Turkey, which forms the Alliance’s south-eastern flank. Turkey’s long-standing border with Iran and its reflexes to preserve the regional balance of power, combined with a normative opposition to Israel’s military doctrine, are keeping Ankara away from kinetic conflict and forcing it into a conciliatory diplomacy.

Whilst this strategy of isolation is accepted by Washington, strategic infrastructure integrated into NATO, such as the Kürecik radar and Incirlik Air Base, which Turkey hosts on its own territory, creates structural pressure and the risk of ‘spatial entrapment’. To prevent these facilities from being instrumentalized by the US for unilateral operational intelligence or pre-emptive strikes, Ankara has blocked American manoevres by strictly limiting the rules of use within the Alliance’s formal defense framework. This stance demonstrates that geographical realities shape a security framework far more decisively than Alliance texts.

Ultimately, the ‘active inaction’ strategy developed by European states whilst caught in the ‘alliance dilemma’, alongside Turkey’s efforts to restrict the use of NATO infrastructure under its sovereignty to counter the risk of ‘spatial drift’, have clearly demonstrated that the allies will not unconditionally align themselves with a hegemonic power’s unilateral regional conflict. Although Donald Trump has sought to portray the Alliance as a weak and ‘ineffective’ institution in the eyes of the public, citing the allies’ rhetorical distancing and limited support as justification, the logistical and operational realities on the ground point to the exact opposite.

The difficulties the US has faced throughout the crisis against Iran, which possesses asymmetric capabilities, have clearly highlighted the limits of unilateral force projection, despite its military superiority. Ultimately, this crisis has paradoxically demonstrated the extent to which a hegemonic power needs the strategic depth and structural alliance architecture offered by its allies in order to consolidate its regional presence and project power.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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he Democratic primary for Michigan’s open U.S. Senate seat has become one of the most expensive and closely watched congressional races in recent history, with pro-Israel lobbying group AIPAC and affiliated political action committees pouring more than $60 million into efforts to support U.S. Representative Haley Stevens and defeat progressive challenger Abdul El-Sayed. 

The race, which will determine the Democratic nominee to replace retiring Senator Gary Peters, has evolved into a national referendum on campaign finance, U.S. policy toward Israel and the growing influence of pro-Palestinian voices within the Democratic Party.

El-Sayed, a physician, epidemiologist and former public health official, has made opposition to outside political spending a central theme of his campaign, arguing that wealthy special interests are attempting to shape the outcome of the election. Stevens, a four-term congresswoman, has defended her record while distancing herself from the independent expenditures made on her behalf. 

According to Federal Election Commission records cited by Al Jazeera, AIPAC’s political arm, the United Democracy Project (UDP), has spent more than $30.6 million on the Michigan race, the largest expenditure by the organization in a single contest. Combined with spending by other political action committees and an estimated $6.5 million from a nonprofit advocacy group, outside support for Stevens has exceeded $60 million. 

The role of nonprofit organizations in U.S. elections

The spending has eclipsed previous records for Senate primaries and has intensified scrutiny of the role of super PACs and nonprofit organizations in U.S. elections.

AIPAC directs the United Democracy Project and is also its largest donor, contributing roughly $30 million of the PAC’s $100 million fundraising total this election cycle. The remaining funding comes largely from wealthy pro-Israel donors, including hedge fund manager Paul Singer, businessman Robert Kraft, investor Marc Rowan and entertainment executive Haim Saban, according to campaign finance disclosures. 

Additional support for Stevens has come through a network of newly established political committees and nonprofit organizations.

One of the largest, A Stronger Michigan, has spent more than $17 million and is backed primarily by the nonprofit Center Forward. Other committees, including Michigan Forward 2026, Center Forward Committee and Unite to Win, have also invested heavily in television advertising and voter outreach. Some of these groups receive funding from corporations, trade associations and nonprofits whose donors are not fully disclosed under U.S. campaign finance laws. 

Although the campaigns themselves cannot legally coordinate with independent expenditure groups, the unprecedented level of outside spending has dominated the political debate ahead of Tuesday’s primary.

Large Arab presence

At a campaign rally in Dearborn, a city with one of the country’s largest Arab American communities, supporters repeatedly criticized AIPAC rather than Stevens herself.

Michigan state legislator Alabas Farhat told supporters they would make the organization “burn” millions of dollars by electing El-Sayed, while several speakers, including Representatives Rashida Tlaib and Ilhan Omar, criticized U.S. support for Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. 

El-Sayed has argued that Stevens’ campaign has become dependent on outside financial support tied to pro-Israel interests.

Speaking at a recent rally, he said America’s political system allows “billionaires and corporations and special interests like AIPAC to buy and sell politicians.” During a televised debate, he linked Stevens’ congressional votes supporting aid to Israel with the organization’s financial backing of her campaign. 

Stevens has rejected suggestions that the outside spending defines her candidacy.

During a recent debate, she argued that campaign finance reform remains a broader national issue affecting candidates across the political spectrum, saying there was little difference between super PACs supporting either campaign. Critics, however, point to the disparity in spending, noting that groups backing El-Sayed have spent only about $3.5 million. 

Strong grassroots fundraising

While outside groups have dominated television advertising, El-Sayed has outraised Stevens in direct campaign contributions from individual donors. Campaign finance records show El-Sayed has raised approximately $14.5 million compared with Stevens’ $11.9 million, reflecting strong grassroots fundraising despite the flood of independent expenditures supporting his opponent.

AIPAC has defended its involvement, saying it represents Americans who believe a strong U.S.-Israel relationship serves both countries’ interests.

The organization has rejected claims that it acts on behalf of a foreign government, describing itself as a coalition of pro-Israel Americans participating in the democratic process. In a recent message to supporters, AIPAC described the Michigan Senate contest as “critical.”

Political analysts say the outcome of the race could have implications far beyond Michigan.

A victory for El-Sayed would represent one of the highest-profile electoral successes for a progressive candidate critical of unconditional U.S. support for Israel and could signal changing attitudes among Democratic voters, particularly after months of debate over the wars in Gaza and the Middle East. Supporters argue such a result would weaken AIPAC’s influence within the Democratic Party, while opponents view the race as an important test of mainstream Democratic support for the U.S.-Israel alliance.

The contest also carries national political significance because the Michigan Senate seat is expected to be highly competitive in November. The Democratic nominee will likely face former Congressman Mike Rogers, and the outcome could help determine which party controls the U.S. Senate after the general election.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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he 36th NATO Summit, held in Ankara on July 7-8, 2026, addressed critical agenda items not only concerning key themes such as the Russia-Ukraine War, defense spending or European security, but also within the context of NATO’s policies towards neighboring regions. In this context, the Summit can also be seen as a platform for redefining relations with the Middle East, North Africa and Gulf countries, which form the Alliance’s southern flank. NATO’s relations with the Gulf countries, which have been caught in a spiral of strategic uncertainty due to the US-Iran conflict, were specifically addressed at this Summit.

The summit held in Ankara demonstrates that the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), launched with the Gulf states at the 2004 Istanbul Summit, has regained strategic importance 22 years later. As will be recalled, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, launched at the 2004 Istanbul Summit, marked the starting point of NATO’s institutional engagement with the Gulf states. However, over the span of 22 years, this initiative has failed to deliver the transformative impact that was anticipated. The potential of the Ankara Summit to revitalise this framework deserves to be assessed from both a symbolic and a strategic perspective.

The primary aim behind the establishment of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative was for NATO to contribute to the security architecture in the Middle East and the Gulf region in an inclusive and collaborative manner. In particular, the Gulf states’ reliance on external sources for security and their fragile structure were the underlying reasons for this initiative. However, in 2004, only four out of the six Gulf states joined the initiative, meaning full inclusivity could not be achieved. Nevertheless, NATO continued to invest in the initiative, hoping that other Gulf states might eventually join Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, which had already joined the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

At this stage, the fact that membership of this initiative remains limited to four countries, with Saudi Arabia and Oman continuing to remain outside it, can be regarded as both a symbolic shortcoming and a structural weakness. The fact that Saudi Arabia and Oman, two of the most critical countries when it comes to the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf and the security of the Strait of Hormuz, are not part of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative can be cited as the main reason why this initiative has remained a ‘limited-impact’ framework to date. Indeed, this situation also highlights the limitations that the Gulf states’ divergent security perceptions and foreign engagements may impose on cooperation with NATO. Consequently, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative’s failure to demonstrate the expected trajectory of development can be explained not only by fluctuations in NATO’s regional priorities but also by the divergent approaches of the Gulf states.

NATO-Gulf cooperation in the shadow of crisis

From the perspective of Gulf geopolitics, it can be argued that the key factor distinguishing the 2026 Ankara Summit from the 2004 Istanbul Summit was the context in which the meetings took place. The Istanbul Summit was held in the wake of the largest wave of expansion in NATO’s history and against a relatively optimistic global backdrop. The Ankara Summit, however, took place in an uncertain geopolitical environment in which a conflict between the US and Iran, which had started on February 28, was directly affecting the Gulf states and posing a serious threat to their security. This situation has distinctly set this year’s IIG session apart from the routine diplomatic contacts of previous years.

In this context, NATO foreign ministers and representatives from the Gulf states came together at a meeting held on the margins of the summit. At the meeting, a consensus was reached on strengthening cooperation in the face of the security challenges posed by the conflict in the Gulf region. This approach can be interpreted as a sign that the initiative may be evolving beyond a purely rhetorical framework of cooperation towards a crisis-management-centered function. A notable aspect here is the shift in the rhetoric of European allies. The fact that the stability of the Gulf is now framed not merely as a regional issue but as an integral part of European security and energy supply security can be interpreted as a shift in rhetoric that enhances the strategic significance of the IIG. This shift also points to the concretization, specifically in the context of the Gulf, of the ‘360-degree security’ approach that has long been debated within the Alliance.

On the other hand, from the perspective of representation, it is noteworthy that whilst the foreign ministers of NATO countries attended the meeting, only Kuwait, among the Gulf states, was represented at the level of foreign minister. The attendance of State Minister for Foreign Affairs Mohammed bin Abdulaziz al-Khulaifi from Qatar, State Minister for Defense Mohammed bin Mubarak Fadil al-Mazrui from the UAE, and Director-General for Bilateral Relations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Abdullah al-Khalifa, from Bahrain, highlights that, despite strong diplomatic messages and rhetoric on cooperation, the Gulf states had limited expectations of the summit.

In terms of positive outcomes, however, it was observed that discussions took place at the summit regarding the possibility of taking some concrete steps between NATO and the Gulf states within the framework of the GCC. In this context, the agreement reached between Qatar and NATO on a partnership program to frame civil and military cooperation between the two sides, and the fact that the establishment process for a regional centre for peace support operations planned to be set up in Qatar is approaching its final stage, can be regarded as concrete steps in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative’s transition beyond being merely a consultative platform.

State Minister al-Khulaifi, who attended the summit on behalf of Qatar, emphasized in his statement that his country attaches great importance to the IIG and is ready to implement concrete outcomes. Kuwait, another country taking concrete steps in cooperation with NATO and hosting the GIG-NATO regional centre, launched the Kuwait-NATO Political and Security Dialogue Mechanism in January 2026. Sheikh Jarrah Jabir al-Ahmed al-Sabah, Kuwait’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, who attended the Ankara summit, also proposed in his statement that the GCC Ministerial Summit be held in Kuwait in 2027.

The future of NATO-Gulf cooperation

At this stage, it remains unclear whether NATO’s renewed engagement with the Gulf states is the result of a temporary momentum generated by current crises, or the outcome of a process aimed at implementing lasting structural measures. Given the Gulf states’ quest for security, having recognized the ineffectiveness of a security mechanism entirely dependent on the US during the Iran conflict, it is reasonable to suggest that they may wish to consider NATO as a new alternative security provider. Indeed, the Gulf states, which already maintain strong partnerships with NATO member states such as the US and Turkey, may also aim to formalize institutional cooperation with NATO.

Turkey’s role in this process, as the host of the Ankara Summit, is also noteworthy. Having hosted the 2004 Istanbul Summit during the enlargement process, Turkey has, by 2026, become a more central actor on the Alliance’s southern flank, owing both to its geographical location and its growing defense industry capacity. Efforts to position the reconstruction process in Syria as a bridge between NATO’s sphere of influence and Gulf capital can also be cited as one of the concrete manifestations of this central role. The progress Turkey has made in the defense industry sector and its transformation into a significant actor in terms of military deterrence have made Ankara an important security partner for the Gulf states.

Consequently, the Ankara Summit has had limited yet positive implications for the future from the perspective of the Gulf states. The interactions revealed by the Summit, particularly regarding the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, demonstrate that an initiative which had seen relatively limited progress over the past 22 years has been able to regain significance in the wake of the crisis. At this stage, the most significant question mark concerns whether this momentum will translate into a permanent institutional framework.

Whether the NATO–ICI dialogue will remain a temporary reaction to the geopolitical uncertainty created by the US–Iran conflict will become clear through the concrete steps the parties take in the future. Key factors in this regard will include whether key actors such as Saudi Arabia and Oman will join the initiative, and to what extent the emerging cooperation programm will be reflected in practice. Consequently, the most tangible dynamic in NATO’s future in the Gulf can be identified as the success of the transition from rhetorical solidarity to sustained institutional cooperation.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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he Republic of Turkey hosted a NATO Summit once again after a gap of twenty-two years. Whilst the Ukraine–Russia War has triggered a shift in the perception of threats in Europe, the emergence of new security risks stemming from a potential US/Israel–Iran conflict has further heightened the importance of the Summit. Statements made by heads of state and government prior to the Summit indicated that it would be the most significant gathering in recent years in terms of ‘outcomes and decisions taken’.

In this context, the fact that NATO’s future vision was shaped in Ankara, given that NATO is itself a security organization, holds particular significance. Turkey’s central position within NATO, as well as its capabilities in the defense and aerospace sectors, are drawing attention in the context of the Alliance’s future. When the final communiqué is considered, it is evident that NATO is transitioning to a new security architecture referred to as the ‘3.0 era’.

Whilst Ankara hosted the 36th NATO Summit of Heads of State and Government, defense spending and the defense industry were at the heart of the strategic decisions taken by the Alliance in Ankara. Ensuring that Alliance partners adhere to the stated commitment regarding the targeted defense spending limits was a priority. In parallel, the development of defense and security cooperation and relations came to the fore. Discussions held throughout the Summit centered on the role of the capabilities achieved by the Turkish defense industry in the Alliance’s future, and how and to what extent these capabilities could be utilized.

In addition to the statements made, the Defence Industry Forum held as part of the Summit addressed potential areas for Alliance partners to work together and build a sustainable ecosystem. Hosted by the President of the Turkish Defence Industry, Prof. Dr Haluk Görgün, and organized at TUSAŞ as part of the NATO Summit Defence Industry Forum (NSDIF), a reception was held where the capabilities of the Turkish defense industry were demonstrated to participating delegations through both flight displays and an exhibition in the static display area.

Burden-sharing among allies

As part of the Summit, the defense industry forum (NSDIF) – which marked a number of firsts – was held at the ATO Congresium. As announced by NATO, bilateral and multilateral military, security and cooperation agreements were signed for the first time under the NSDIF’26 framework. The agreements, estimated to have a total value exceeding 50 billion dollars, were primarily structured around the following key areas: defense investments and the Alliance partners’ ‘5 per cent’ commitment, capacity enhancement through multinational cooperation, the development of defense industry partnerships, and the improvement of processes from serial production to sustainment. Within the framework of NSDIF’26, emphasis was placed on the importance of developing high-tech and innovation-focused solutions tailored to the evolving battlefield.

NATO’s long-standing target of 2 per cent defense spending was accepted by Alliance partners as a radical increase to “5 per cent” in response to the growing and evolving threat perception. Recently, assessments have been carried out regarding the independent and collective activities undertaken to achieve this objective. Whilst the aim is to significantly increase burden-sharing within the Alliance, the objective is to enter a new era in which allies outside the US (Europe and Canada) directly assume their own security responsibilities. Whilst the concept of “strategic autonomy” is being defined within the Alliance, the initial objective is to establish the financial infrastructure.

The aim is for Alliance partners to increase their defense spending to 5 per cent of their gross domestic product (GDP), which represents a significant economic volume, whilst also developing production capabilities beyond mere procurement. However, the fact that multinational projects implemented, particularly in Europe, have failed to deliver the desired results, due both to their lengthy timelines and their structural nature, has opened the door to alternative approaches: the “Trusted Partner”. Although Turkey has been a NATO member for a quarter of a century, the fact that its capabilities in the defense industry have not been ‘effectively’ utilized within the Alliance has been a subject of debate, particularly over the last 10 years. Turkey, an Alliance member that has also been subject to both covert and overt embargoes, is now being highlighted as a central actor in NATO’s new era.

Mass production capacity and centralized production

The Ukraine–Russia War has highlighted the inadequacy of stockpiles and inventories amongst the world’s armed forces in the face of protracted conflict. Furthermore, a similar scenario has manifested itself in various forms within the US-Israel-Iran triangle. In the face of the reality of the ‘war of attrition’, which has been redefined in the present day, it is imperative that allies ensure their stocks of ammunition and military equipment are sustainable. The signing of supply agreements at the summit, totalling over 50 billion dollars, aims to transform the defence industry from a purely commercial sector into a direct deterrent. In this context, particular attention was drawn to items with high consumption rates, such as artillery ammunition, aircraft bombs and air defence missiles. In this regard, the allies’ efforts – for example, Canada’s increase in artillery ammunition production capacity and Turkey’s allocation of additional funding for the ‘Iron Dome’ air defence systems – were the first examples to be highlighted.

Attention was drawn to the negative effects of projects implemented in a multinational framework in European countries, both on the execution of the projects and on production capacity and capabilities. In assessments aimed at improving this situation, ‘project management’ and ‘autonomous/centralised’ approaches emerged as key priorities. The aim is for key actors in projects to be carried out on a multinational basis, as well as allied nations acting as subcontractors, to implement more effective process management. In this way, both the production capabilities and key areas such as sustainment and logistics of projects carried out on a multinational basis are being improved. Furthermore, Turkey’s long-standing vision of “lifting covert and overt embargoes between allies” aligns directly with this topic addressed at the Summit.

NATO is demonstrating increasing sensitivity regarding the management of interoperability amongst allies. Multinational collaborations are being implemented whilst taking into account the operational needs of the allies. The decision taken at the Ankara Summit to strengthen the transport aircraft fleet, in addition to the NATO-led tanker aircraft fleet, underscored this commitment. The fleet to be established with A400M transport aircraft will be operated to meet the operational needs of the allies. In addition to the transport fleet, in which the Turkish defence industry also holds a share, Turkey will take a leading role in establishing a space-based communications and early warning system through the IMECE project.

The allocation of an additional $24 billion budget for the Iron Dome is significant not only for Turkey but also for the Alliance’s air and missile defence capabilities. Roketsan’s demonstration of its missile systems in the field of precision-guided systems also attracted attention. Turkey’s capabilities in mass production and high technology are being utilised more actively than ever before to meet diverse requirements. In particular, Turkey has gained increasing importance in recent times with solutions such as cyber security and encrypted communications. As emphasised at the Summit, NATO aims to structure its capabilities not only around assets such as ships and aircraft, but also through integrative elements such as cyberspace, communications and intelligence.

Conclusion: An increasing role and key messages

As part of the NATO Defence Industry Forum, the capabilities of the Turkish defense industry were demonstrated to participating delegations at a reception held at TUSAŞ, through both flight displays and an exhibition in the static display area. The delegations were greeted by the modern instruments of the battlefield on display: the Altay tank, ARMA armored vehicles, MKE’s TOLGA air defense solution, ROKETSAN’s ballistic missiles, and Baykar and TUSAŞ’s manned and unmanned aerial platforms. In addition to all this, demonstrations were held to showcase the current state of the aviation sector: the GÖKBEY general-purpose helicopter, the T129 ATAK attack helicopter, the HÜRKUŞ basic trainer aircraft, the HÜRJET advanced jet trainer, the ANKA III strategic bomber, the ANKA-S, the Bayraktar AKINCI UAV and the Bayraktar TB3 unmanned aerial vehicle, all of which demonstrated their capabilities through flight displays.

The capabilities of the Turkish defense industry were demonstrated to delegates not merely through a ‘catalogue’, but directly at the production facilities and via live flight demonstrations. The presence of both executives and project engineers from the relevant companies on site enabled the evaluation of both the products and potential partnerships. In short, the reception provided a unique platform for increasing defense and aerospace exports and establishing new partnerships.

Turkey’s production of systems that are fully compliant with NATO standards (STANAG) and have proven themselves on the battlefield supports strategic interoperability within the Alliance. This, in turn, enables Turkey to export significant quantities of defense systems to its Alliance partners. According to 2025 figures, 56 per cent of Turkey’s exports, totaling 10.56 billion dollars, were made directly to the European Union, NATO member states and the United States. These figures are, in themselves, a testament to the quality and reliability of Turkish defence industry products, which meet Western standards. Furthermore, there is a growing interest in products that have proven themselves on the battlefield.

This reinforces the desire to implement ‘joint projects’, as seen during Belgium’s recent high-level visit to Turkey. The Belgian firm developing the turret proposed to Turkish land vehicle manufacturers: “Let’s integrate our turret into your armoured vehicle and sell them together.” In every discussion regarding Turkey, the door to cooperation is being opened with the message: “You have high-quality products, and we want to benefit from working with you.” Meanwhile, Spain’s supply of the HÜRJET fighter aircraft, Portugal’s warships, Italy’s unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and Poland’s electronic warfare systems are strengthening Turkey’s central position within the Alliance in this field.

In short, the Ankara Summit is more than just a platform for delivering political messages; it represents a critical turning point where the obstacles to defense industry cooperation among allies will be discussed. It was clearly emphasized at this summit that any form of export restriction or covert embargo imposed by allies against one another under the NATO umbrella ultimately weakens the Alliance’s own collective deterrence. It is abundantly clear that Turkey’s high-tech production capacity is not a competitive factor to be excluded or restricted amongst allies. Turkey’s position should be viewed as that of a ‘regional production hub’ which will optimize the Alliance’s overall capabilities whilst also reducing logistical costs.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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ran is expected to receive the first shipment of hundreds of Chinese-made shoulder-fired air defense missile systems within weeks under a deal valued at between $60 million and $70 million, according to three sources familiar with the agreement cited by Reuters.

If completed, the purchase would represent one of Tehran’s largest known efforts to rebuild its short-range air defenses since months of fighting with the United States and Israel exposed weaknesses in its ability to protect military facilities and strategic infrastructure.

The contract reportedly covers between 300 and 400 man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), including the Chinese-made QW-12 and FN-16 missile systems.

According to Reuters, the agreement was signed through Zhongqing Baoshang International Investment, which the sources said acted as an intermediary between Iran and the Chinese supplier.

The total value of the contract is estimated at $60–70 million, although the sources cautioned that delivery schedules, quantities and implementation details could still change.

Iran’s foreign ministry did not immediately comment on the report.

China’s foreign ministry denied the claims, stating:

“The relevant reports are completely groundless. China has consistently played a role in promoting peace and ending the conflict.”

The parent company, Zhong Qing Bao Shang Group, also did not immediately respond to Reuters’ request for comment.

Air defense overhaul after months of war

Reuters said Iran is seeking to strengthen its defenses after U.S. and Israeli strikes targeted facilities connected to its missile, drone and air defense programs during the recent conflict.

Military analysts note that portable air defense systems are particularly valuable because they can be quickly deployed by small teams and relocated frequently, making them less vulnerable than fixed air defense batteries.

The reported purchase would significantly expand Iran’s inventory of short-range air defense weapons designed to engage Low-flying aircraft, helicopters, and drones.

The QW-12 and FN-16 are infrared-guided missile systems intended to protect military bases, energy infrastructure and other sensitive locations against aerial threats.

Defense experts cited by Reuters consider the QW-12 less advanced than newer Chinese systems such as the QW-18 and QW-19 but say it remains capable of providing an effective layer of short-range protection.

According to the sources, initial shipments were expected to leave Urumqi in western China before transiting through Pakistan into Iran.

The sources did not specify whether the transfers would occur by air or overland.

Pakistan firmly denied any involvement.

The military’s media wing, the Inter-Services Public Relations, called reports linking Pakistan to the transfer of Chinese air defense systems “absolutely concocted and false.”

Reuters also reported that Iran has explored overland transportation routes for Chinese military equipment and dual-use components to reduce the risk of disruption.

Growing military ties with China

The reported procurement comes amid expanding defense cooperation between China and Iran despite years of international sanctions on Tehran.

European and Middle Eastern security sources told Reuters they were aware of discussions involving possible Iranian purchases of several QW-series MANPADS, including the QW-12, QW-18 and QW-19 variants.

Reuters previously reported that Iran was also negotiating with China to acquire anti-ship cruise missiles, although it could not determine whether that agreement was finalized.

If the current deal proceeds, it would underscore Iran’s continued reliance on a combination of domestic weapons production and foreign suppliers as it rebuilds military capabilities following months of conflict.

(Source: Reuters)

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hat do white supremacist Silicon Valley tech bros and terrorist mass shooters of mosques, synagogues, and migrant centers have in common?

They all subscribe to a death cult that dreams of a utopic world where there is racial and cultural hierarchy, and all non-white migrants are deported from Western countries and imperialism, hard power and exploitation to reign again in the global order.

The world is facing a new form of terrorism threat and fascism: it is called Accelerationism. Accelerationists disdain non-white migrants, Muslims, ethnic minorities, radicals and politicians that advocate for diversity, integrating migrants, decolonial justice, and the reparation for slavery and colonialism.

Death cults

On May 19, 2026, two teenagers attacked a San Diego Mosque, killing three people and livestreamed their shooting. A 75-page manifesto written by the shooters espoused Islamophobia, antisemitism, anti-Black racism, Hispanophobia, accelerationism and misogyny was later found online. This was not an isolated incident. On March 15, 2019, a gunman walked into the Al Noor Mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand, and murdered 51 Muslims while livestreaming the massacre on Facebook. He left behind a manifesto soaked in the language of accelerationism and had similarities with the San Diego shooters’ manifesto.  Accelerationism espouses the idea that Western/White civilization must be pushed to a violent breaking point so that white and “pure” ethnostates can rise from the ashes and reclaim their glorious past.

The terrorism in Christchurch and accelerationism have a long history. It echoed Anders Breivik’s 2011 massacre in Norway, where 77 people, most of them teenagers, were murdered in the name of protecting Europe from cultural Marxism and Muslim migration. It echoed the Pittsburgh synagogue shooting, the El Paso Walmart attack targeting Hispanic shoppers, the Buffalo supermarket massacre aimed at Black Americans.

Accelerationist terrorism is carried out in the name of ideological and cultural warfare, carried out by mostly young white men who believe that accelerating racial, cultural and religious conflict would hasten a white supremacist revolution, response and reaction.

AI and the far-right

The question the world has been too slow to ask is this: who is building the intellectual, ideological and political infrastructure that makes this violence justifiable?

Look no further than Silicon Valley.

Elon Musk, today the world’s richest man, owner of X (formerly Twitter), and now the single most powerful unelected figure in the United States, has spent recent years amplifying white nationalist accounts, and platforming “great replacement” conspiracy theories, and signal-boosting neo-Nazi rhetoric to hundreds of millions of followers across the world. His very public embrace of far-right European parties, his attacks on Muslim communities, his obsessive promotion of white demographic anxiety, are not the eccentricities of a distracted Trillionaire. When Musk performed a Nazi salute at a post-inauguration rally and the world shrugged, it confirmed what many had long suspected: white supremacy has found its most powerful champion not in the backrooms of a skinhead bar but in the boardrooms of the most valuable companies on earth.

Marc Andreessen, the venture capitalist and co-founder of Netscape, published his “Techno-Optimist Manifesto” in 2023, declaring that there is no problem “that cannot be solved with more technology” and that the “techno-capital machine” exists to serve humanity. What he did not say is whose humanity he had in mind. The effective accelerationist movement (e/acc) that Andreessen and his Silicon Valley peers champion is accelerationism with a smile: the same ruthless logic of letting destructive forces run unchecked, dressed up in the language of progress, technology and innovation. The merger of white nationalist politics and Silicon Valley capital is no longer a fringe concern. It is the ideology of most Far Right and white supremacist political movements.

Underneath all of it runs a single obsession: replacement. The “great replacement” theory, the paranoid anxiety that white Western populations are being deliberately displaced by non-white migrants, has migrated from the fever swamps of the internet into mainstream conservative politics across Europe, America, and Australia. Replacement paranoia is the connective tissue between the Christchurch shooter and the French Far Right, between the neo-Nazi accelerationist and the Arktos circle and the recently exposed Dialog list of Peter Thiel. This is an ideological project: a far-right internationalism that stretches from Budapest to Buenos Aires, from Washington to Warsaw, and united by the shared paranoid conviction that the non-white world and its peoples are an existential threat to Western civilization.

Techno-fascism

And now this far right international has acquired its most powerful tool yet: Artificial Intelligence.

The global AI economy is being built on a foundation that replicates, with algorithmic precision, the colonial extraction of previous centuries. The data that trains the large language models powering Silicon Valley’s fortunes is harvested from populations across the Global South, often without consent, without compensation, and without benefit. The content moderation labour that makes these platforms usable is outsourced to workers in Kenya, the Philippines, India and Pakistan, paid poverty wages to absorb the worst of humanity’s digital violence so that Western users need not see it.

Moreover, the rare earth minerals that power the hardware are extracted from the Congo, from Bolivia, from Indonesia, by workforces whose conditions would be unthinkable in any country whose citizens Musk and Andreessen consider fully human.

This is the new colonialism, not the colonialism of the gunboat and the governor-general, but of the server farm and the terms of service agreement. The Global South is being incorporated into the AI economy not as a beneficiary but as raw material: its people as cheap labour, its data as free resource, its governments as compliant hosts, and most consequentially the Silicon Valley tech bros dream of a hierarchical world where the Global South is exploited and enslaved.

The accelerationists and the tech bros, in both their violent and techno-utopian forms, agree on one thing: some lives are the fuel, not the destination.

In their hyper-technological and advanced futuristic utopian world, where Musk, Jeff Bezos, Peter Thiel and other billionaires will go for vacation to Mars, there is no place for Muslims, Africans and peoples of the Global South.

Violent death cults have always worn different suits and hoodies in different eras. Today they wear a hoodie or suit and call themselves disruption innovationists, Techno-Utopianists or efficiency strategists.

The mosques of Christchurch and the sweatshops of Nairobi are not separate stories. They are the same story, told in different registers of the same accelerationist logic: that some people exist to be exploited so that others may prosper and build a civilization that reaches Mars and beyond while the Global South is robbed of its wealth, labour and minds and rendered perpetually poor and miserable.

We should not look away.

All forms and manifestations of hatred, dehumanization and exploitation ought to be challenged and resisted – even when it’s clothed in the language of technological advancement or saving a particular civilization, culture or race.

O

nly one in three Americans support the U.S. war with Iran, while a large majority believe President Donald Trump has failed to clearly explain the conflict’s objectives, according to a new Reuters/Ipsos poll.

The nationwide survey, conducted from July 24 to 26 among 1,246 U.S. adults, found that support for the war has fallen to its lowest level since the conflict began five months ago. Only about one-third of respondents said they back the military campaign, while support has remained below 40% for five consecutive months.

Despite declining support for the war, Trump’s overall job approval rating rose three percentage points from the previous month to 37%, although it remains historically low for his presidency.

The poll found widespread uncertainty about the administration’s objectives in Iran.

Overall, 69% of respondents—including roughly 40% of Republicans—said Trump has not clearly explained why the United States is fighting in Iran.

Since the conflict began, Trump has cited multiple goals, including:

• Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
• Destroying Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities.
• Encouraging Iranians to overthrow their government.

The White House defended the administration’s approach. Spokesperson Olivia Wales said Trump would not base decisions on “fluid opinion polls” and reiterated that preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon remains the administration’s central objective.

Support lags far behind previous U.S. wars

Reuters noted that public backing for the Iran conflict is substantially lower than support recorded during the early stages of previous American military campaigns.

According to historical Gallup polling:

• Around 70% of Americans supported the Iraq War during its initial months in 2003.
• Approximately 90% backed military action in Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks in 2001.

By contrast, Reuters/Ipsos polling has shown support for military action against Iran never rising above 40% since the conflict began on February 28.

The survey suggests the war may become a significant political challenge for Republicans before November’s congressional midterm elections.

Independent voters surveyed by Reuters/Ipsos favored Democratic congressional candidates over Republicans by 36% to 20%. Independents also gave Democrats higher marks on economic issues, reflecting concern over rising living costs linked to the conflict.

The war has contributed to higher energy prices, with average U.S. gasoline prices climbing above $4 per gallon compared with about $3 before hostilities began.

Republican strategist Alex Conant, who served in President George W. Bush’s administration, said the conflict is making it harder for Republicans to focus on economic issues that they had hoped would dominate the election campaign.

Voters question the purpose of the war

Several voters interviewed by Reuters expressed uncertainty about the reasons for the war.

Alex Womack, a retired Marine from Georgia who previously supported Trump, said he no longer understood the purpose of the conflict.

“It’s not clear why we started a war with them. I have no idea,” Womack said.

Another Georgia voter, Rhyan Anderson, who voted for Trump in 2024 after supporting former President Joe Biden in 2020, argued that the administration should focus more on domestic priorities than overseas conflicts.

“My biggest thing is just focus on the people who are actually in the country,” Anderson told Reuters.

According to Reuters, 18 U.S. service members have been killed since the conflict began, while thousands of people have died in Iran and in Lebanon, where fighting between Israeli forces and the Iran-backed Hezbollah has continued.

The combination of rising fuel prices, uncertainty over the war’s objectives and persistent public skepticism presents a growing political challenge for Trump as his administration seeks to sustain support for a conflict that has now entered its sixth month.

(Source: Reuters)

T

he 80-year-old global order established after the Second World War is unravelling. The security architecture of the Atlantic system, the economic and political framework of the Bretton Woods institutions, the liberal assumption that free trade would reduce conflicts by increasing interdependence, and global supply chains reliant on cheap energy and low-cost production no longer meet the needs of the new era. The world is transitioning, increasingly and more forcefully, to a new global competitive order that we define as ‘Second Mercantilism’.

In this new order, trade is no longer merely trade. A semiconductor factory, a container port, a data centre, a rare-earth elements mine, an LNG terminal, a satellite network, a submarine cable, a shipyard or an ammunition factory have all simultaneously become elements of economic, technological, geopolitical and military power. States are no longer competing solely for market share; they are vying for control over production capacity, critical technology, energy security, logistics routes, strategic minerals, data flows and supply chains.

Consequently, the old distinction between the global economy and the global security system has vanished. The economy is being securitised, security is being industrialised, technology is becoming geopolitical, and trade is increasingly and explicitly transforming into a tool of the struggle for national power. It is precisely in the midst of this major shift that NATO’s future lies.

In the 20th century, there was an ideological, military and nuclear balance between two major blocs. Today, however, competition is far more fragmented, far more technological and far more economic in nature. Russia represents an immediate and direct military challenge; China, long-term industrial, technological and systemic competition; regional powers, missile systems, unmanned systems and proxy wars; whilst non-state actors represent asymmetric threats.

Cyberspace, space, undersea infrastructure, energy networks, critical minerals, artificial intelligence and supply chains are becoming new arenas of competition. In such a world, it is impossible for NATO to continue on its current path based on the classic military alliance logic of 1949.

5 per cent: much more than just a budget target

The commitment by NATO members to raise their defense and security-related expenditure to 5 per cent of their GDP represents one of the most significant economic and political transformations in the Alliance’s history. However, it would be a grave mistake to interpret this decision merely as ‘spending more money’. For money, on its own, does not create deterrence.

You can increase your budget, but if you cannot produce sufficient ammunition, you cannot fight. You may possess the most advanced platforms, but if your critical components are reliant on a single external supplier, you cannot establish a sustainable defense capability. You can develop excellent air defense systems, but if your stockpile of interceptor missiles is depleted within a few weeks of intense fighting, your strategic resilience remains merely theoretical. You may possess very expensive fighter aircraft, but if their maintenance, engine, electronics, software and ammunition supply chains are fragile, you cannot manage the economics of a protracted war.

The Russia-Ukraine War, the crises in the Red Sea, the conflicts in the Middle East and the revolution brought about by unmanned systems on the battlefield have all demonstrated the same truth to us: the decisive factor in modern warfare is not merely technological superiority; it is the ability to scale up technology, produce ammunition continuously, rapidly replace losses and adapt industrial capacity to the pace of the war.

For this reason, NATO’s 5 per cent target must be a production doctrine, not merely an accounting decision. In this new era, NATO’s fundamental question should not be ‘How much are the Allies spending?’, but rather ‘How much can the Alliance produce, how quickly can it replenish its stocks, how long can it sustain operations, and how rapidly can it ramp up production in the event of war?’ It is precisely at this point that NATO must transition from a traditional alliance to a comprehensive defense economy.

NATO’s new requirement: A total defense economy

The concept of a total defense economy does not mean transforming the entire economy into a military economy. The issue is to restructure the boundaries between defense and the economy in line with the demands of the new era.

NATO can no longer consider military planning and industrial planning in isolation from one another. Defence ministries, economic and industrial ministries, energy policies and critical infrastructure investments cannot operate in separate spheres. This is because, in modern warfare, the distance between the front line and the production line has been eliminated.

For this reason, the Alliance’s new economic model must be built on five fundamental pillars:

Firstly, long-term and predictable joint demand must be established. If defense companies are to be asked to increase their capacity, they must be given a 10–15-year order outlook, not just a three-year one. Factories grow not on the basis of political statements, but on guarantees of sustainable demand.

Secondly, joint procurement mechanisms must be strengthened. The dozens of different standards for the same munitions, disjointed national tenders for the same requirement, duplicate investments amongst allies, and political protectionism that hinders economies of scale must be reduced.

Thirdly, redundancy must be established in critical production chains. In the new NATO economy, no strategic product should be dependent on a single factory, a single country or a single company. Alternative production centers must be established for engines, explosives, guidance systems, semiconductors, optical and radar components, batteries, critical minerals and software infrastructure.

Fourthly, a transition to a joint stockpiling system must be made. Ammunition, fuel, critical spare parts, air defense interceptors and strategic raw materials must be planned not solely on the basis of national stockpiling logic, but in terms of the Alliance’s overall resilience.

Fifthly, production-conversion capacity must be established in the event of war. Plans must be drawn up today to identify which elements of civilian industry – from automotive to electronics, from chemicals to metallurgy, and from software to logistics – can support defense production in the event of a crisis.

The view that this new architecture must evolve towards a ‘NATO Defence Economic Area’ has gained significant traction. This area should encompass common standards, long-term orders, mutual investments, cross-border production clusters, coordination on critical raw materials, the integration of SMEs into the system, joint testing and certification processes, and the reduction of political barriers to defense trade within the Alliance.

This is because, in the era of Second Mercantilism, the defense industry is not merely a sector in which companies operate. It is one of the main pillars of national power, technological sovereignty and alliance resilience.

The alliance cannot afford ‘internal strife’

However, NATO faces more than just Russia, China or other global challenges. One of the most significant issues the Alliance must overcome is strategic fragmentation within its own ranks.

NATO must shake off the image of a ‘row among boatmen’ – a situation where allies sometimes view one another as rivals, where bilateral political disputes hold collective security hostage, where defense industry restrictions are directed at alliance members, and where short-term domestic political calculations take precedence over long-term strategic objectives.

To put it more plainly, NATO cannot prepare for a new Cold War whilst engaged in an internal ‘brawl’. Weakening an ally’s defense capabilities on political grounds undermines the alliance’s overall deterrence. Disrupting an ally’s supply chain reduces the capacity NATO will require in a crisis. Imposing restrictions on parts, engines, ammunition or technology for an ally’s strategic platforms, whilst subsequently expecting that same ally to contribute more to the Alliance’s defense, is unsustainable.

Moreover, as the world moves towards far greater systemic competition, NATO’s squandering of its energy on internal disputes creates strategic space for its real rivals.

The Alliance cannot resolve every political issue between its members. Such an expectation is unrealistic. However, it must not allow bilateral disputes to paralyze its collective defence capabilities. Defence industry cooperation must be spared from becoming the first casualty of short-term political tensions. In this regard, the example of Türkiye is highly instructive.

O

ne of the greatest aspirations of a journalist with an interest in international relations is to cover events held in various parts of the world where global issues are debated (such as the NATO Summit, the UN General Assembly, the G20, etc.). In a professional climate where conventional media is losing its importance on the international stage day by day, and whilst the financial clout of the media is eroding and investment in certain sectors is being cut back, the likelihood of a journalist attending such summits is also declining day by day.

In the current climate, the hosting of an organization such as NATO in Turkey presented a significant opportunity for our colleagues in Turkey. Although journalists and television professionals, myself included, had only limited opportunities to engage with leaders due to the nature of the event, we did manage to soak up the atmosphere of the summit.

Turkey is the only NATO member state with a Muslim majority. The 2026 summit was set to have a distinct character for this reason alone. However, factors such as the ongoing tension between Iran and the US (which had been reignited just hours before US President Trump landed in Ankara when he ordered a new strike), the continuing disagreement between the US and its European allies, and the deadlock in the Russia-Ukraine war all served to make the summit even more significant.

Details of the Trump–Erdoğan meeting

The meeting that fuelled the intrigue at the NATO Summit was the encounter between President Erdoğan and US President Trump. Once the rumours circulating days beforehand – that ‘Trump would not attend the summit due to his anger towards NATO members’ – were dispelled, our focus shifted to the nature of the bilateral meeting. The last time a US President had made an official visit to Turkey was in 2009.

Following the visit by then US President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–1961) in 1959, the chain of visits continued with George H. W. Bush (1991), Bill Clinton (1999), George W. Bush (2004) and Obama (2009), had been interrupted during Trump’s first term and had not even been on the agenda during Joe Biden’s term (2020–2024). Whilst Trump’s visit marked a turning point in this sense, current issues (the F-35 procurement process, CAATSA, etc.) were also raising the stakes.

Despite the scrutiny that began days in advance, logistical and protocol details were kept strictly confidential right up to the last moment. Contrary to expectations, Trump’s aircraft landed at the newly opened Ankara Airport (and the fact that he returned from Esenboğa on an older model aircraft also raised questions. However, technical reasons related to security were cited as the justification). President Erdoğan welcomed Trump at the airport with a gesture reserved for a select few guests.

Upon arriving at the welcoming ceremony at the Presidential Complex, we noticed a different arrangement in the preparations. The ranks of the mehteran band, which usually performs at routine receptions, had been reinforced, and additional units of Janissary soldiers had been deployed. The two leaders’ delegations were also positioned on a platform that differed from the norm. The leaders’ senior advisers (foreign ministers, defense ministers, ambassadors) held their initial discussions on this platform. The flypast by the Turkish Stars, comprising six F-5s, which was part of the welcoming ceremony, was precise and went off without a hitch.

The most exciting moment of the entire process was the joint press conference. The format we are accustomed to in a standard leaders’ meeting is press conferences held in the main hall following discussions between the leaders and their delegations. On this occasion, however, it was announced that only a limited number of journalists would be allowed into President Erdoğan’s office. We were therefore swiftly directed towards the room.

The organizers informed us that journalists wishing to ask questions would need to be ‘quick off the mark’, as the format of the press conference would be modelled on the ‘Oval Office Rules’. I recalled the format we’d seen on TV screens. In those press conferences, held in a small room with Trump and the visiting leader flanked by their aides, it was the loudest who won and secured the floor. Once the floor was opened for questions, although American journalists took the lead with the first questions, my Turkish colleagues and I also managed to ask our questions by adopting a forceful and boisterous approach to secure the floor.

US President Trump gave the floor to ask my question, which touched on the Iran-US tensions. Throughout the meeting, Trump delivered positive messages, particularly regarding CAATSA restrictions and the F-35s. It is also worth noting that, unlike the bilateral meetings held in the Oval Office – which were characterised by Trump’s impulsive responses – there were no remarks from the Trump-Erdoğan talks in Washington or Ankara that would cause any friction.

The factors driving the relationship between the two leaders beyond the usual bounds to a positive momentum are seen as their ability to strike the right balance in their dialogue, the fact that their communication predates the presidency, and the continued flow of contact following Erdoğan’s message to Trump even after he lost the 2020 election. Another important factor is that Trump has framed the Erdoğan–Biden tension as a positive reference point. The animosity towards Biden, which he mentions in almost every speech, also lends extra credibility to those who have had difficulties with him. Ironically, in Trump’s political analysis, the Evangelical vote—which solidified following the release of Pastor Brunson—has also made a positive contribution to the new course of Turkey–US relations.

What happened at the summit?

Opportunities to engage with leaders at the NATO Summit are very limited. One such opportunity is the ‘doorstep’ – the area where leaders give impromptu interviews on the morning of the summit. Not every leader makes an appearance here. It generally provides an opportunity for leaders of small and medium-sized countries, who are often out of the spotlight, to make their voices heard. Danish Leader Frederiksen, commenting on Trump’s continued interest in Greenland, emphasized their stance by stating, “We will defend every inch of our land; this is why we are in NATO.” UK Prime Minister Starmer, who is due to step down upon his return, was cautious; he did not answer any questions and was not particularly talkative. Although French President Macron’s name was on the list, he was busy completing his now-traditional run at the time.

Even the order of arrival at the venue for the leaders’ summit has become a form of image management. Leaders from countries such as the US and France arrive last. Following the smooth participation of all 32 leaders in the much-anticipated session of the summit, attention turned to what was being discussed inside. The information received pointed to a positive atmosphere. It was noted that US President Trump listened to all the leaders who spoke. It was reported that Trump, who remained until the end of the session, did not address any contentious issues (such as the tensions with Spain, the Greenland issue, or tensions with European countries).

It was stated that Spanish Prime Minister Sánchez, in a constructive speech, emphasized that his country’s contribution to NATO should be measured not by mathematical figures but by the rate of achievement of strategic objectives. The extent to which Sánchez’s speech, which emphasized resolve, managed to cool Trump’s fixation on figures will become clear through future rhetoric and policies. It was noted that the US delegation heard the approach they had sought from all their allies during the leaders’ session.

Following the session, the summit effectively concluded with the leaders’ bilateral meetings and the press conferences they held. The most eagerly anticipated of these meetings was undoubtedly Trump’s. Before the US leader took to the podium following NATO Secretary-General Rutte—who had used the hall before him—there was not a single empty seat in the hall, nor even a suitable place to stand. The hall was completely cleared before the US President took to the stage; journalists were only allowed back in after security checks. Among the dozens of journalists vying for the chance to ask a question, the lucky ones were generally our American colleagues sitting in the front row, who had opted for colorful attire.

Trump’s summit marathon, during which he answered questions in a positive and conciliatory manner, concluded on a positive note despite the harsh messages that occasionally resurfaced in some of his press statements. President Erdoğan also held his final press conference as the host. Having followed all these proceedings, having observed that, unlike their foreign counterparts, Turkish journalists tend to include lengthy comments in their questions and drag out the subject before getting to the point, I feel it is worth emphasizing that there is a clear structural problem in this regard. As Turkish journalists, we do not know how to ask questions properly.

A farewell without the usual ‘See you next year’

The NATO Summit concluded without any major hitches. The international media community was highly satisfied with the facilities provided. The complimentary buffet service exceeded expectations, and the goody bags and kits presented to journalists were shared in vlogs. However, the development that particularly surprised the foreign leaders occurred right at the end. The gift of a revolver (firearm) engraved with their names, presented to them by Turkey, took the majority of the foreign leaders by surprise. Some were unable to take the gift home with them due to legal restrictions in their own countries, whilst others announced they would donate it to a museum.

Nevertheless, the message behind the gift hit home. The fact that the gift at a summit where tough issues were discussed was in keeping with realistic geopolitical conditions served as a powerful metaphor and message. It is also worth noting that the specially produced pen, manufactured using domestic resources, was well received.

As summits of this kind draw to a close, attention turns to the next one, and the scheduled date is marked. This time, however, there is a degree of uncertainty, as the likelihood that the summit will not be held next year has increased. In fact, there is no explicit rule stipulating that the summit must be held annually; a proposal that has recently come to the fore suggests extending the summit cycle to every two years.

It is expected that this process will be clarified by the end of this year; what is certain is that the next stop will be Albania. Although it seems impossible to predict the course regional developments will take by that date, it appears unlikely that the opportunities and agenda offered by Turkey will be presented within the framework of that summit.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

F

ebruary 28, 2025 was one of the darkest days of the Ukraine-Russia War. Yet, for Ukraine, the catastrophe is unfolding not on the front lines but in Washington, right at the gates of the White House. In the early days of his second presidential term, Donald Trump opens proceedings by publicly mocking Ukrainian President Zelensky’s attire in front of the press, in a manner contrary to diplomatic protocol, before the President has even had a chance to enter the residence. Whilst Zelenskyy thought he would have to make do with this cold shower at the door, inside the White House he was subjected to a barrage of heavy criticism, this time joined by Vice-President James David Vance.

In a sense, those 10 minutes – during which all the aid the US had provided over the past three years was thrown in his face – must have felt like a decade, not only to the Ukrainian President but also to the European countries that had supported Ukraine. Donald Trump consistently maintained his line of accusing his predecessor, Joe Biden, over the Ukraine–Russia War right up until August 2025.

The Trump–Putin summit held on August 15, 2025, at Elmendorf–Richardson Air Force Base in Alaska had further reinforced the impression that all hope for Ukraine had been completely dashed. Furthermore, events at the White House just three days later, on August 18, 2025, reinforced the perception that the US had completely capitulated to Russia’s position on the war in Ukraine. That day, Trump lined up European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Finnish President Stubb, French President Macron, German Chancellor Merz, Italian Prime Minister Meloni, British Prime Minister Starmer, Ukrainian President Zelensky and NATO Secretary-General Rutte before him, and dictated his expectations regarding the course of the Ukraine–Russia War.

Furthermore, by catching this group off guard in front of the media, he forced them to speak on the validity of his own views. However, the evolving relations between the People’s Republic of China and Russia, the support Moscow provided to the Tehran regime during the Iran war, and Russia’s reluctance to sit down at the negotiating table have shifted the course of events.

A changing wind from Alaska to Ankara

On 8 July 2026, the image presented by the Trump–Zelensky duo when they faced the media at the NATO Summit in Ankara was very different from the unpleasant scenes witnessed a year and a half earlier. Beyond the positive messages conveyed, Trump had warmed relations to the point of joking with Zelensky about Ukraine’s drone and missile strikes on Moscow. When Trump asked, “Would you like to go to Moscow?”, Zelensky replied, “I don’t think so; there are far too many Ukrainian drones there.”

Clearly, the US President was also extremely pleased with Ukraine’s dominance, achieved through drones and guided missiles, extending as far as 2,000 kilometers into Russian airspace. Indeed, during the summit, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte remarked: “Some key targets deep inside Russia have been struck. ‘Over the past two months, Ukraine has been hitting targets more successfully’.” It is clear that Ukraine has not only made significant strides in the field of FPV drones and guided missiles.

There has also been an increase—the details of which we are not yet fully aware—in the quality and quantity of satellite-based electronic intelligence provided to Ukraine by NATO member states. The fact that around 100 naval vessels operating for the Russian ‘Ghost Fleet’ were struck by Ukrainian drone attacks in the Sea of Azov in the week following the NATO Summit is a matter that warrants attention in terms of the level these capabilities have reached. Looking back a little further, we can conclude that events took place which led Trump to lose hope that Russia and Putin would make peace with Ukraine in the final quarter of 2025.

The balance of power was redrawn in 2026

From the very first days of 2026, the nature and scale of Ukraine’s drone attacks saw a significant increase. Whilst all logistics routes supplying food and fuel to Crimea were paralyzed, almost all of the peninsula’s fuel depots and main electricity transmission stations were taken out of action by July. Petrochemical plants and refineries across Russia were struck 200 times in six months. This represents an 11-fold increase compared with the first six months of 2025. In May alone, 16 highly successful attacks were carried out against Russian refineries.

It has become commonplace for Ukrainian kamikaze UAVs to reach a range of 2,000 kilometers, or for FPV drones to strike targets more than 100 kilometers behind the front line. Having lost 40 per cent of its oil refining capacity, Russia has reached the point of banning diesel exports following its decision to ban the export of petrol and aviation fuel. Having been reduced to the point of having to import refined oil from India, Russia was unable to parade tanks and mobile missile launchers on Red Square during the traditional Second World War Victory Day commemorations on May 9.

As the military balance rapidly shifted against Russia, US President Trump’s behavior towards Ukrainian President Zelensky at the G7 Summit in Paris and the NATO Summit in Ankara, held between and June 15-17, signaled that even tougher times lay ahead for Moscow. At the summit, a commitment of 70 billion euros was made to provide Ukraine with military equipment, ammunition and training by 2026. Furthermore, following statements from some NATO member states that ‘we have nothing left to give to Ukraine’, the alliance decided to take an unprecedented step. Led by Canada, an initiative was launched to establish the ‘Defense, Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB)’ with the participation of certain NATO member states.

The bank, scheduled to become operational in 2027, aims to provide low-cost financing of up to 100 billion pounds for defense projects. The members set to participate in this bank project include Turkey, Albania, Belgium, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania and Ukraine. It is clear that the Alliance does not wish to see a repeat of the chaos that ensued regarding support for the Kyiv administration from the outset of the war in Ukraine and intends to find an institutional solution to this.

The US has no further expectations of a Russia under Putin’s rule

Returning to the final communiqué of the NATO Summit in Ankara, it appears that the mobilization launched against the Russian threat directed at Ukraine – and even Poland and the Baltic states – will continue with an open-ended timeline. The communiqué, referencing the NATO Hague Summit Communiqué dated June 25, 2025, emphasised that Russia poses a long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security and stability. In other words, NATO members will channel more of their economic capacity into deterrence and defense against threats originating from Russia.

The emphasis on Russia as a “long-term threat” could be interpreted as the US having given up hope on the Putin administration. The visits to Moscow by US Special Envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff – which the Kremlin has been awaiting for nearly two months but which have yet to materialize – could also be seen as a manifestation of this “loss of hope”. Reports by the Russian TASS news agency in the first week of July stated that this visit, which Moscow was apparently eagerly awaiting, “could take place by the end of the summer, though a definite date has not yet been set”.

A report published in the British newspaper The Telegraph on July 10, 2026, however, indicates that the growing aversion towards Russia, particularly in Washington and other NATO capitals, is set to increase exponentially. According to the British newspaper’s report, the Dutch intelligence services, the AIVD (Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service) and the MIVD (Military Intelligence and Security Service), have discovered that doorbell cameras at hundreds of homes along the routes leading from NATO bases in the Netherlands to airports and seaports have been hacked. So, who would want access to the footage from hundreds of doorbell cameras?

According to the Dutch intelligence services, the culprits are cybercriminals backed by Moscow. Their aim is to determine the contents and quantities of arms shipments to Ukraine. According to The Telegraph, this Russian operation is not limited to the Netherlands. Across Europe, thousands of doorbell cameras are under the control of Russian intelligence. In other words, the Ukraine-Russia War has reverted to the ‘factory settings’ established at the outset by the US-UK duo. The objective is no longer limited to simply expelling Russia from Crimea and the Donbas region, which it has annexed. The ultimate goal has been updated to create the conditions necessary to topple Putin’s regime in Moscow.

(This article was originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

U

.S. President Donald Trump on Thursday declassified a series of documents that he said revealed Chinese interference in U.S. elections, renewing his long-standing focus on election security despite previous intelligence assessments concluding that Beijing did not alter the outcome of the 2020 presidential election.

In a 25-minute televised address from the White House, Trump claimed the documents exposed “shocking vulnerabilities” in the U.S. electoral system and alleged that China had obtained personal information from approximately 220 million American voter records.

The president also accused members of the U.S. intelligence community of suppressing information about China’s activities and urged Congress to pass stricter election laws, including voter identification requirements, proof of citizenship for voter registration and limits on mail-in voting.

The address comes ahead of November’s midterm elections, as Republicans seek to defend narrow majorities in Congress amid political headwinds linked to the Iran conflict and rising energy prices.

However, Trump’s claims appeared to conflict with findings by the U.S. intelligence community. A declassified intelligence assessment issued in 2021 concluded that no foreign government attempted to alter any technical aspect of the 2020 presidential election, including voter registration systems, ballots, vote tabulation or certified results.

CIA thinks otherwise

The assessment, conducted under then-Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe—now serving as CIA director under Trump—found that while China had collected publicly available information on American voters and political trends for years, it did not attempt to interfere directly in the election outcome.

According to Reuters, two people familiar with the matter said the voter data cited by Trump consisted largely of publicly available voter files that political campaigns and consultants routinely purchase and could not be manipulated to alter election results.

Some White House officials reportedly expressed concern before the speech that releasing the documents could create a misleading impression about the nature of China’s activities.

Trump nevertheless argued that the newly declassified material demonstrated significant weaknesses in U.S. election security and reiterated claims that large numbers of non-citizens were registered to vote, although he did not provide evidence that those registrations resulted in illegal ballots being cast.

Rare voter fraud

Election experts and previous studies have consistently found that voter fraud and non-citizen voting in U.S. elections are rare.

Democratic Senator Mark Warner, vice chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, rejected Trump’s assertions, saying the U.S. intelligence community had unanimously concluded that China “did not even try to change a single vote” in the 2020 election.

The president also renewed his call for lawmakers to approve the SAVE America Act, legislation that would require photo identification to vote, proof of U.S. citizenship for voter registration and tighter restrictions on mail-in ballots. The measure has passed the Republican-controlled House of Representatives but remains stalled in the Senate amid Democratic opposition.

Despite Trump’s assertions about election vulnerabilities, the declassified documents released Thursday did not provide evidence that votes in the 2020 election were altered or manipulated, according to Reuters.

(Source: Reuters)

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.S. Vice President JD Vance has accused members of the Israeli government of attempting to influence American public opinion against U.S. diplomatic efforts to end the war with Iran, describing the campaign as an effort to prolong the conflict.

In an interview with podcaster Joe Rogan released on Wednesday, Vance defended last month’s U.S.-Iran interim peace agreement and alleged that Israeli officials sought to derail negotiations through a coordinated influence campaign.

“I know beyond a shadow of a doubt that there have been people within the Israeli government who are trying to shift us away from that policy because they want to continue the military campaign,” Vance said.

The vice president cited a recent Time magazine report alleging that a former Trump campaign manager had been hired on behalf of Israel to oversee a digital campaign aimed at shaping American public opinion regarding Israel and the Iran conflict.

“There’s a literal foreign influence campaign being funded to tank the very deal that I was pursuing,” Vance said, adding that a “well-funded” effort had sought to undermine negotiations.

He also claimed that he had personally faced intense criticism because of his diplomatic outreach.

“People are attacking me viciously for quite literally trying to accomplish the negotiation objective that the president set for the country,” Vance said.

The issue becomes problematic

While acknowledging that allies and adversaries routinely attempt to influence U.S. policy, Vance said the issue becomes problematic when such campaigns shape American political decision-making.

“It doesn’t bother me that Israel tries to do this,” he said. “What does bother me is when those operations, those influence campaigns, actually affect American political judgement.”

Asked whether the United States would have entered the latest conflict with Iran without Israeli influence, Vance replied: “Yes, yes I do.”

He nevertheless reiterated President Donald Trump’s long-standing position that Iran should not acquire nuclear weapons.

“I think the president, separate from any influence from Israel, believes very strongly—and I agree with this—that Iran should not have a nuclear weapon,” Vance said.

The remarks highlight growing public differences between Washington and Israel over U.S. policy toward Iran, particularly following the collapse of last month’s interim peace agreement amid renewed military exchanges.

Former Israeli diplomat Alon Pinkas described Vance’s comments as unprecedented, saying no sitting U.S. vice president had previously accused Israel of actively working to undermine American foreign policy through an influence campaign.

Separately, Vance also addressed the controversy surrounding the late convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein, alleging that Epstein had unspecified high-level connections to both U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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he United States has reimposed a naval blockade on Iranian ports and launched another wave of military strikes targeting Iran’s southern coast, intensifying hostilities and further eroding an interim peace agreement reached last month.

The U.S. military said the renewed blockade of vessels traveling to and from Iranian ports and coastal areas took effect at 20:00 GMT on Tuesday, as Washington sought to restrict maritime activity linked to Tehran amid escalating tensions in the Strait of Hormuz.

The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) also confirmed a fresh round of strikes targeting Iranian military infrastructure, saying the attacks were intended to degrade capabilities used to threaten commercial shipping in the strategic waterway.

Iranian media reported explosions in or near the southern cities of Sirik and Bandar Abbas following the announcement, while earlier reports said U.S. strikes had also targeted Abadan, home to the Middle East’s oldest oil refinery, as well as Mahshahr, Qeshm Island and Kish Island.

The latest operations follow a series of U.S. strikes launched a day earlier against targets including Bushehr and Bandar Abbas, marking another escalation in a conflict that resumed despite a memorandum of understanding signed in June aimed at halting hostilities.

Iran retaliates across the Gulf

Iran responded by launching attacks against U.S.-linked targets across the Gulf region, including strikes on Kuwait, Bahrain and Jordan, while also targeting two commercial vessels in Omani waters within the Strait of Hormuz, according to regional officials.

The United Arab Emirates said one crew member was killed in the attacks on the ships.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) acknowledged striking the two supertankers, saying they had ignored repeated warnings while navigating what it described as an unauthorized route through the strait.

The IRGC accused the United States of encouraging vessels to violate Iranian directives and warned that continued cooperation with what it called the “aggressor enemy” would prolong disruption to shipping and increase the risk of a global energy crisis.

Bahrain said its air defenses intercepted an Iranian aerial attack, while Kuwait’s armed forces reported engaging hostile aerial targets. Jordan also said Iranian projectiles targeted military facilities on its territory.

International concern grows

Regional mediators Qatar and Oman urged restraint as the fighting intensified.

Qatar condemned attacks on commercial shipping, while Oman called on all parties to respect international law governing navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

The International Maritime Agency expressed concern over the latest incidents, saying two seafarers had been killed and warning that the continuing cycle of military escalation threatened global maritime security.

Speaking at the White House, President Donald Trump blamed Iran for reigniting the conflict.

“They shot first, and that was a big mistake because we have been knocking the hell out of them,” Trump said, defending the renewed military campaign.

Trump also announced he was abandoning a previously proposed 20% fee on vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz, saying it would instead be replaced by expanded trade and investment agreements with Gulf allies.

“I have decided to replace the 20% United States Reimbursement Fee with trade and investment deals that the various Gulf states will be making into the United States,” he said.

Tehran says agreement no longer binding

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi accused Washington of violating the interim agreement and destroying the framework established to reduce tensions.

According to Iranian state media, Gharibabadi said Tehran no longer considers itself bound by the memorandum of understanding, including provisions related to navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

He rejected suggestions that renewed military pressure would force Iran back to negotiations, arguing that Washington had forfeited the diplomatic framework through its actions.

Analysts warned that the latest exchanges indicate the conflict is evolving into a prolonged confrontation rather than returning to full-scale war, raising concerns over regional stability and the security of one of the world’s most important energy transit routes.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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he United States has used unmanned surface vessels (USVs) in combat for the first time, marking a significant milestone in modern naval warfare after the US military confirmed that autonomous sea drones were employed in strikes against an Iranian naval facility.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) said three one-way Corsair sea drones struck a submarine and ship maintenance facility at Iran’s Bandar Abbas Naval Base on Monday as part of operations aimed at reducing Iran’s capacity to target commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.

The attack represents the first known offensive use of US autonomous surface vessels, highlighting a shift in naval strategy toward unmanned maritime systems after similar technologies gained prominence during the Russia-Ukraine war.

Autonomous sea drones enter frontline combat

The Corsair is an autonomous surface vessel developed by Texas-based defense technology company Saronic. Measuring approximately 24 feet (7.3 meters) in length, the vessel has a range exceeding 1,000 nautical miles, can travel at speeds above 35 knots, and is capable of carrying payloads of nearly 1,000 pounds (453 kilograms).

Designed with a modular architecture, the platform can perform intelligence, surveillance, logistics, force protection and one-way strike missions while operating with limited human intervention.

Until now, USVs in the US military had primarily been deployed for reconnaissance, maritime security and search-and-rescue operations rather than offensive missions.

The combat debut follows Saronic’s rapid growth since its establishment in 2022.

The company expanded its shipbuilding capacity by acquiring Louisiana-based Gulf Craft in 2025 and later announced a $300 million expansion of its production facilities. In December 2025, the US Navy awarded Saronic a $392 million production contract for the Corsair, accelerating the transition from prototype development to operational deployment.

Since then, the company has secured $1.75 billion in funding, reaching a valuation of $9.25 billion while broadening its portfolio of autonomous maritime systems and command-and-control technologies.

Shift in naval warfare

Military analysts increasingly view unmanned surface vessels as a transformative capability for future naval operations.

Compared with conventional warships that require large crews and significant financial investment, autonomous vessels can be produced at lower cost, deployed in larger numbers and operate in high-risk environments without exposing personnel to danger.

The concept gained prominence during the Russia-Ukraine war, where Ukraine employed maritime drones to challenge Russia’s naval superiority in the Black Sea, forcing Moscow’s fleet to adapt its operations.

Iran and Yemen’s Houthi movement have also used one-way naval drones to threaten commercial shipping in strategic waterways.

The latest strike follows another milestone for the Corsair after the vessel was reportedly used last month to help rescue two crew members from a downed US Army helicopter off the coast of Oman.

The vessel was operated by Task Force 59, the US Navy’s unit dedicated to unmanned maritime systems.

Defense analysts say the Bandar Abbas operation could signal a broader transformation in US naval doctrine, with autonomous vessels increasingly operating alongside traditional warships as part of distributed and networked fleets capable of carrying out reconnaissance, logistics and combat missions.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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he death of longtime Republican Senator Lindsey Graham has renewed debate over his enduring influence on U.S. foreign policy, with supporters praising his commitment to American leadership abroad and critics pointing to his advocacy for military intervention and unwavering support for Israel.

Graham, who died on Saturday at the age of 71 following what his office described as a brief and sudden illness, was one of the most recognizable Republican voices on national security issues for more than two decades. Throughout his career, he consistently championed military action, backed strong U.S. alliances with Israel, and maintained a hardline stance toward Iran, Russia and China.

His passing prompted tributes from U.S. President Donald Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and several Republican lawmakers, while also drawing criticism from anti-war advocates and Palestinian rights groups, who argued that Graham’s legacy was defined by support for prolonged military conflicts.

Political analysts say two themes are likely to dominate assessments of Graham’s career: his advocacy for interventionist foreign policy and his transformation into one of Trump’s closest allies.

Michael Hanna, U.S. Program Director at the International Crisis Group, said Graham had cultivated a long-standing reputation for promoting military solutions to international crises.

“He was a major supporter of the Iraq War and remained a strong advocate for the use of military force throughout his career,” Hanna said, adding that Graham played an influential role in encouraging the Trump administration’s hardline approach toward Iran.

Strong backing for Israel

Support for Israel remained central to Graham’s foreign policy positions. He repeatedly called for expanded U.S. military assistance to Israel and defended its military operations following the October 7, 2023 attacks and the subsequent war in Gaza.

In 2021, Graham successfully pushed for an additional $1 billion in U.S. military assistance after visiting Israel, where he posed alongside Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu holding a sign reading “More for Israel.”

Netanyahu paid tribute to Graham following his death, describing him as one of Israel’s strongest supporters in Washington and recalling that the senator often advocated for greater U.S. assistance than Israel itself requested.

Graham’s rhetoric on the Gaza war frequently drew international criticism. He defended Israel’s military campaign in Gaza in uncompromising terms and made several controversial remarks about the conflict that human rights advocates condemned as inflammatory.

Palestinian advocacy groups said Graham consistently supported policies that contributed to escalating violence in the region, while critics described him as one of the most outspoken proponents of military solutions in U.S. foreign policy.

Graham was also among the leading congressional advocates for confronting Iran militarily. Earlier this year, he publicly supported U.S. military action against Tehran and maintained close contact with President Trump as tensions between Washington and Iran escalated.

Analysts say Graham’s influence was one of several factors shaping the administration’s approach, although decisions ultimately rested with the president.

Alliance with Trump

Although Graham was an outspoken critic of Trump during the 2016 Republican presidential campaign—calling him “unfit for office” and “a kook”—the senator later became one of the president’s closest political allies.

The two frequently met at the White House and appeared together at public events, with Graham emerging as a trusted adviser on national security and foreign affairs.

Following Graham’s death, Trump called on South Carolina Governor Henry McMaster to appoint Graham’s sister, Darline Graham Nordone, to temporarily fill the Senate seat, describing the move as a fitting tribute to the late senator.

Observers say Graham’s death comes at a time when the Republican Party is increasingly divided over foreign policy, particularly regarding military intervention abroad.

Recent polling indicates younger Republican voters are less supportive of overseas military operations and more skeptical of interventionist policies than previous generations.

Hanna said Graham represented a generation of Republican leaders whose worldview was shaped by post-Cold War American global leadership and extensive military engagement overseas.

While his Senate seat is expected to remain in Republican hands, analysts suggest his absence could further accelerate debates within the party over the future direction of U.S. foreign policy, military intervention and Washington’s role in global conflicts.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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ran launched a new wave of missile and drone attacks against U.S.-linked military installations across the Gulf on Sunday, targeting sites in Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan and Oman after the United States carried out another round of strikes on Iranian military infrastructure.

The latest exchange marks a significant escalation in the conflict, with both sides intensifying military operations despite previous diplomatic efforts to contain hostilities.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said it had entered the fifth phase of its retaliatory campaign, claiming missile and drone strikes against U.S. military facilities in Bahrain and radar installations in Oman.

The IRGC said it targeted military infrastructure in Juffair, Bahrain, as well as long-range aerial surveillance and vessel-detection radar systems in Oman, claiming the radar facilities were destroyed.

It warned that continued U.S. military operations in the Strait of Hormuz would further disrupt global energy markets.

“The only way to open the Strait of Hormuz to vessel traffic is to end the interventions of the aggressive U.S. military in this strait and respect the sovereignty of countries over their own coastal waters,” the IRGC said.

Earlier, Iranian forces claimed they struck a U.S. missile base in Kuwait, saying two HIMARS launchers and missile storage facilities were destroyed.

Iran also said it targeted military sites in Jordan, including Prince Hassan Air Base, although Jordan said its air defenses intercepted four missiles that entered its airspace.

US expands strikes across southern Iran

The latest Iranian attacks followed a new wave of U.S. air and naval strikes against dozens of military targets across southern Iran.

According to the U.S. military, the operation targeted air defense systems, coastal radar installations, missile and drone facilities, naval assets and other military infrastructure.

Iranian media reported explosions in Bandar Abbas, Qeshm Island, Sirik and Jask along the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz, as well as several locations in Khuzestan province.

Authorities also reported that at least one civilian was killed and four others injured after a U.S. strike hit an agricultural water pumping station near Mahshahr.

Following Iran’s retaliation, several Gulf countries activated emergency measures.

Bahrain’s Interior Ministry urged residents to seek shelter and avoid open areas as air defense systems responded to incoming threats.

Kuwait’s military announced that its air defenses had engaged “hostile aerial targets,” while authorities advised residents not to panic if they heard explosions resulting from interception operations.

Jordan confirmed intercepting four missiles launched from Iranian territory before they reached their intended targets.

Strait of Hormuz tensions fuel oil market concerns

The renewed fighting has heightened fears over the security of the Strait of Hormuz, a maritime corridor through which roughly one-fifth of global oil shipments normally pass.

Brent crude prices climbed above $79 per barrel as traders reacted to the increased risk of prolonged disruption to global energy supplies.

Analysts warned that depleted global oil inventories leave markets more vulnerable to sustained conflict than during previous crises.

While both Washington and Tehran continue to exchange military strikes, experts suggest neither side is likely to seek a prolonged war due to the potentially severe economic consequences, particularly for global energy markets and regional stability.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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anadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has described Saudi Arabia and Türkiye as the two most influential countries in shaping potential solutions to the Middle East’s ongoing crises, emphasizing the importance of direct engagement with regional powers over public criticism.

Speaking to reporters during an official visit to Jeddah on Friday, Carney said that meaningful progress on regional conflicts would depend largely on the role played by Riyadh and Ankara.

“The two most influential countries regarding potential solutions in the Middle East are Saudi Arabia and Türkiye,” Carney said.

Carney stressed that Canada remains deeply committed to developments in the Middle East but argued that constructive dialogue is more effective than criticizing governments from afar.

He said engaging directly with regional leaders does not imply endorsement of all their policies.

“Lecturing countries from a distance is an ineffective strategy,” Carney said. “It may be satisfying, but it is ineffective. Engagement can be effective. That does not mean it will always be decisive, but it can produce results.”

Talks with Erdoğan

Addressing Canada’s relations with Türkiye, Carney said he discussed unresolved bilateral issues during his recent meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Ankara.

He noted that the direct dialogue had yielded positive outcomes that would not have been possible through diplomacy conducted from Ottawa.

Diversifying Canada’s partnerships

The Canadian prime minister also highlighted his government’s efforts to reduce Canada’s heavy reliance on the United States by expanding international partnerships.

“We are overly dependent on the United States. That has been demonstrated,” Carney said. “Every Canadian strongly recognizes this, and we are seeking diversification.”

His remarks reflect Ottawa’s broader strategy of strengthening diplomatic and economic ties with a wider range of global partners as Canada seeks a more diversified foreign policy and trade agenda.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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he United States and Iran exchanged another round of military strikes on Thursday, sharply escalating tensions in the Gulf and raising fresh concerns over the stability of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical global energy corridor.

The latest escalation came after U.S. forces launched a second wave of attacks against Iranian military infrastructure overnight, with Washington saying the operation was intended to safeguard freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz following Iranian attacks on commercial shipping.

Iran responded hours later by launching missile and drone strikes against U.S. military facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait, marking another direct exchange between the two countries despite previous diplomatic efforts to halt the conflict.

The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) said its latest operation struck approximately 90 military targets across Iran, including air defense systems, coastal surveillance installations, missile and drone storage sites, naval assets and military logistics infrastructure along Iran’s southern coastline.

The strikes followed an earlier round of attacks this week in which U.S. forces targeted more than 80 Iranian military sites.

Speaking to reporters while returning from the NATO summit in Türkiye, U.S. President Donald Trump defended the operation, describing it as retaliation for Iran’s attacks on commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

“We just hit them very hard,” Trump said. “Every time they hit us, we’re going to hit them 20.”

Earlier, Trump declared that the interim agreement intended to halt fighting between Washington and Tehran was effectively “over.”

Iran retaliates against US bases

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced that it had carried out strikes against U.S. military positions in Bahrain and Kuwait in response to the American attacks.

The Guards warned that further retaliation would follow if the United States launched additional strikes against Iranian territory.

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf said the Strait of Hormuz would operate only under what he described as “Iranian arrangements,” adding that U.S. “bullying and breaking its commitments no longer come without a cost.”

Iranian state media reported that three people were killed and several others injured in U.S. strikes near Ahvaz in southwestern Iran.

Multiple locations along Iran’s southern coast were reportedly hit, including Bandar Abbas, home to Iran’s largest commercial port and major naval facilities belonging to both the Iranian Navy and the Revolutionary Guards.

Additional strikes were reported in Konarak, Chabahar and Iranshahr, where a firefighter was killed during an attack on the city’s airport. Iranian media also reported damage to a railway bridge near Aqqala in northern Iran.

Oil prices climb

Global oil prices rose as markets reacted to renewed fighting and concerns that continued hostilities could threaten shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil supplies normally pass.

Brent crude futures rose more than 1% to nearly $79 per barrel, while U.S. West Texas Intermediate crude also gained more than 1%.

The latest exchange follows a familiar pattern seen during previous rounds of fighting, with Iranian attacks on commercial shipping followed by U.S. military retaliation and subsequent Iranian strikes on American military facilities in the Gulf.

Despite the escalating military exchanges, analysts say both sides may still be seeking to strengthen their negotiating positions while avoiding a broader regional war, although the collapse of the interim agreement has significantly reduced prospects for an immediate diplomatic breakthrough.

(Source: Reuters)

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resident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said NATO must evolve into an alliance that strengthens its members rather than creating dependency, as Türkiye concluded its hosting of the 36th NATO Summit with calls for greater burden-sharing, stronger defense industrial cooperation and renewed diplomatic efforts to address global conflicts.

Speaking at a press conference following the two-day summit at the Presidential Complex in Ankara on Wednesday, Erdoğan said the meeting marked a significant step toward building a stronger alliance at a time when Euro-Atlantic security faces unprecedented challenges.

“NATO should be an alliance of allies that strengthen one another, not one of countries dependent on each other,” Erdoğan said, arguing that genuine deterrence depends not only on defense spending but also on technological superiority, industrial capacity and sustainable military production.

The summit, the first NATO leaders’ meeting ever held in Ankara and Türkiye’s second time hosting the alliance after more than two decades, brought together heads of state and government from all member countries.

Erdoğan said allied leaders agreed on the need for European members to assume greater responsibility for collective defense while maintaining fair burden-sharing within the alliance.

“We have laid the foundations for a stronger NATO in which European allies undertake greater responsibility and military capabilities are reinforced through equitable burden-sharing,” he said.

Türkiye highlights military contributions

The Turkish president stressed that Türkiye has become one of NATO’s leading military contributors after decades of confronting regional conflicts and terrorism largely on its own.

He noted that Türkiye commands NATO’s second-largest land army and has safeguarded the alliance’s southeastern flank for decades while making substantial contributions to NATO missions, operations and common funding.

Erdoğan announced that Turkish F-16 fighter jets will deploy to Estonia beginning in August as part of NATO’s Air Policing mission.

He also said Türkiye will continue commanding the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) until September 2026 and will assume command of the NATO Response Force during 2028-2029.

“Türkiye has always fulfilled its responsibilities within the alliance, taking risks and paying the price when necessary,” Erdoğan said.

Defense industry emphasized

A central theme of Erdoğan’s remarks was Türkiye’s growing defense industry, one of the country’s key strategic advantages.

He said Türkiye now manufactures its own fighter aircraft, tanks, warships and air defense systems while ranking among the world’s leading producers of unmanned aerial and naval vehicles.

“True deterrence comes from three dimensions: advanced technology, sufficient scale and sustainable production,” Erdoğan said.

He welcomed the adoption of the “Ankara Strategy” during the NATO Defense Industry Forum, saying it would strengthen cooperation between NATO and defense manufacturers.

Erdoğan also renewed calls for the removal of remaining restrictions on defense trade among allies and argued that European Union defense initiatives should complement NATO rather than duplicate its efforts.

He warned that excluding non-EU allies such as Türkiye from European defense projects would limit their effectiveness.

Ukraine, Middle East discussed

The summit also addressed ongoing security crises, including Russia’s war in Ukraine and instability across the Middle East.

Erdoğan reiterated Türkiye’s offer to facilitate renewed peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.

“The war has become a machine of destruction that claims tens of thousands of casualties every month,” he said. “There are no losers in a just peace.”

Turning to the Middle East, Erdoğan welcomed the Islamabad Agreement, which Türkiye has supported, while expressing concern over continued violence in Lebanon and Gaza.

He said attacks in Lebanon have displaced civilians and destroyed cities, while the humanitarian crisis in Gaza continues.

“There is no room in our region for new tensions or new conflicts,” Erdoğan said. “Humanity needs peace, stability and security.”

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ATO leaders gathered in Ankara on Wednesday for the second day of a high-stakes summit dominated by renewed military tensions between the United States and Iran, the ongoing war in Ukraine, and growing debates over defense spending and alliance unity.

The summit, hosted by Türkiye, was expected to focus primarily on strengthening NATO’s collective defense capabilities. However, fresh military exchanges in the Middle East quickly shifted attention toward regional security and the risk of a broader conflict.

The United States launched new strikes against Iranian targets overnight, saying the attacks were a response to Iranian assaults on commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Iran retaliated by launching missiles and drones at U.S. military facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait, marking the most significant escalation since the two countries reached a preliminary ceasefire agreement last month.

Speaking alongside NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte before the main summit session, U.S. President Donald Trump declared that the interim understanding with Tehran was effectively finished.

Defense spending remained another major issue throughout the summit. Rutte praised Trump’s long-standing pressure on allies to increase military expenditures, arguing that recent commitments represented a significant transformation in European defense policy.

“When you have achieved this, this is a huge win,” Rutte said, noting that European allies and Canada had dramatically increased investments in military capabilities over recent years.

Trump nevertheless criticized several NATO members, reserving particularly strong criticism for Spain, which he accused of failing to contribute adequately to the alliance. He even suggested ending trade with Spain, calling it “a terrible partner in NATO.”

Ukraine on the Agenda

Meanwhile, Ukraine remained high on the summit agenda as Russia continued large-scale attacks across the country.

According to Ukrainian officials, Russia launched another overnight assault involving missiles and drones, highlighting Kyiv’s continued need for advanced air defense systems. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy urged NATO partners to accelerate military assistance, particularly in strengthening Ukraine’s ability to intercept cruise missiles and other aerial threats.

Russia, for its part, reported intercepting hundreds of Ukrainian drones overnight while accusing Kyiv of attacking energy infrastructure deep inside Russian territory, including oil refineries and fuel facilities.

The renewed violence reinforced concerns that diplomatic efforts to end the more than four-year war have stalled despite repeated international mediation attempts.

A comprehensive 360-degree security approach

Beyond immediate military challenges, NATO leaders also discussed the alliance’s long-term strategy. Türkiye emphasized the importance of maintaining a comprehensive 360-degree security approach that addresses threats on both NATO’s eastern and southern flanks while strengthening cooperation on cyber security, infrastructure protection, and defense industrial production.

Alliance officials stressed that military readiness now extends beyond traditional armed forces and includes resilient supply chains, secure communications, and the ability to counter cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.

The deteriorating security situation in both Eastern Europe and the Middle East has underscored NATO’s growing challenge of responding simultaneously to multiple crises while maintaining unity among its members.

As discussions continued behind closed doors, leaders faced mounting pressure to produce concrete commitments on defense capabilities, support for Ukraine, and coordinated responses to instability in the Middle East.

With tensions rising on several fronts, the Ankara summit is expected to shape NATO’s strategic priorities for the coming years, testing the alliance’s ability to balance collective defense, crisis management, and political cohesion in an increasingly uncertain global security environment.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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he United States and Iran exchanged their heaviest military strikes since last month’s ceasefire on Wednesday, raising fears that the fragile truce between the two longtime adversaries has effectively collapsed as President Donald Trump declared the interim agreement with Tehran was “over.”

The renewed escalation unfolded as NATO leaders gathered in Ankara, where Trump confirmed that Washington had resumed military operations against Iran following what U.S. officials described as Iranian attacks on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.

According to the United States, the latest strikes were launched in response to Iranian attacks on three commercial vessels transiting the strategic waterway, one of the world’s most important oil shipping routes.

Iran responded by announcing missile and drone strikes against U.S. military facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait, marking one of the most significant direct confrontations between the two countries since fighting resumed.

The exchange represents the most serious breach of the preliminary ceasefire reached last month following weeks of conflict and negotiations mediated by regional partners.

“I think it’s over”

Speaking alongside NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on the sidelines of the alliance summit, Trump signaled that Washington no longer viewed the interim memorandum of understanding with Tehran as viable.

“I think it’s over,” Trump told reporters when asked about the agreement that had temporarily halted fighting.

The U.S. president also dismissed prospects for renewed engagement with Iran, saying he no longer wished to negotiate with Iranian leaders, whom he described as “sick people.”

His remarks suggested the diplomatic process that had accompanied the ceasefire has effectively broken down, even as military exchanges continue to intensify.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry accused Washington of undermining the agreement through both military action and economic pressure.

In a statement released Wednesday, Tehran said recent U.S. airstrikes, together with Washington’s decision to revoke Iran’s oil sales license, had rendered key parts of the ceasefire arrangement “ineffective.”

Iran also accused the United States of interfering with maritime arrangements governing passage through the Strait of Hormuz, arguing that such actions had made implementation of the truce increasingly impossible.

The ministry warned neighboring countries hosting U.S. military forces not to allow their territories to be used for further American attacks against Iran, an apparent reference to Gulf states including Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

The warning followed Iran’s announcement that it had launched missiles and drones against U.S. military targets in Bahrain and Kuwait earlier in the day.

Iran’s Revolutionary Guards also reported that one member of its naval forces had been killed while confronting U.S. drones near the southern port of Mashahr.

The latest military exchanges have raised concerns that the conflict could once again spread across the wider Gulf region, threatening global energy supplies and commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, which carries roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil exports.

Regional tensions grow as aviation warning expanded

The renewed fighting has already prompted international aviation authorities to strengthen safety warnings across the Middle East.

The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) announced that commercial airlines should avoid operating within both Iranian and Iraqi airspace because of the heightened risk of military activity.

The updated advisory remains in effect until August 31 and replaces an earlier warning that had also covered Lebanese airspace.

EASA continues to advise airlines to exercise caution when operating near Bahrain, Kuwait, Israel, Jordan, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates because of the potential for further military escalation.

The deteriorating security situation overshadowed discussions at the NATO summit in Ankara, where alliance leaders were expected to focus on defense spending, regional security and support for Ukraine.

Instead, much of the attention shifted to Trump’s remarks on Iran and his broader comments on NATO allies.

Criticism against Spain

The U.S. president also launched a sharp attack on Spain, accusing Madrid of failing to meet its defense commitments within NATO.

Trump said he had instructed Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent to halt all trade with Spain, calling the country “a terrible partner” in the alliance.

“I don’t want anything to do with Spain,” Trump told reporters.

He also criticized NATO over Greenland, renewing longstanding complaints about the Arctic territory and alliance burden-sharing.

The renewed conflict between Washington and Tehran comes after weeks of fragile diplomacy aimed at preventing another prolonged regional war.

Although the interim agreement had reduced direct military confrontation, tensions remained high over Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions, maritime security and regional influence.

With both sides exchanging military attacks and publicly questioning the viability of previous agreements, regional governments are increasingly concerned that the Gulf could once again become the center of a wider confrontation involving U.S. forces and Iranian-backed groups.

The latest developments also place additional pressure on NATO leaders meeting in Ankara, many of whom have emphasized the importance of preventing further instability in the Middle East while maintaining freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

As military operations continue and diplomatic rhetoric hardens, the future of any negotiated settlement between Washington and Tehran appears increasingly uncertain.

(Source: Reuters)

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ürkiye has called on NATO allies to convert rising defense spending into concrete military capabilities, warning that higher budgets alone will not guarantee deterrence as the alliance confronts an increasingly complex security environment.

Speaking at the NATO Allies in Ankara event on Tuesday, National Defense Minister Yasar Guler said NATO’s credibility would ultimately depend on whether member states could translate political commitments into operational military strength, resilient defense industries and integrated security capabilities.

The event, organized in cooperation with Türkiye’s Communications Directorate, the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) and the Munich Security Conference, comes ahead of the NATO leaders’ summit in Ankara, where alliance members are expected to discuss defense investment, industrial cooperation and regional security challenges.

“Increasing defense spending is important, yet spending money alone does not produce deterrence,” Guler said.

He stressed that NATO must focus on building ready military forces, expanding ammunition stockpiles, strengthening logistics, improving integrated air and missile defense systems, enhancing command-and-control structures and increasing defense industrial production.

According to Guler, the alliance has entered a new strategic phase requiring both credible collective defense and the ability to respond rapidly to crises across multiple regions.

He said NATO’s role has evolved significantly since World War II, moving from collective defense during the Cold War toward crisis management and counterterrorism operations after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Today’s security environment, however, requires the alliance to maintain strong conventional deterrence while remaining prepared for emerging threats.

A stronger and more balanced NATO

The minister reiterated Türkiye’s support for a stronger and more balanced NATO in which European allies assume greater responsibility for their own defense while maintaining the transatlantic partnership and the United States’ security commitment as the foundation of the alliance.

However, he argued that burden-sharing should not be measured solely by defense budgets.

Instead, contributions should also reflect operational risks, geographical responsibilities, military readiness, participation in alliance missions, industrial production capacity and the ability to respond effectively during crises.

Guler highlighted Türkiye’s longstanding role within NATO, saying Ankara maintained one of the alliance’s largest and most capable armed forces while many European countries significantly reduced troop numbers, military stockpiles and defense manufacturing after the Cold War.

“Türkiye has never been merely a geographical frontline country,” he said.

“It has consistently assumed risks, carried responsibility in the field and contributed to deterrence when necessary.”

Türkiye, which joined NATO in 1952, currently fields the alliance’s second-largest army and possesses highly trained forces with extensive operational experience, joint operational capability and high readiness levels, he added.

The minister noted that Turkish forces continue contributing to NATO missions, exercises and deterrence operations across a wide geographic area stretching from the Baltic region to the Black Sea while also participating in maritime security, crisis management and military training activities.

Defense industry and regional security priorities

Guler also emphasized Türkiye’s expanding defense industry, describing it as an increasingly important contributor to NATO’s overall military capabilities.

He said the country has developed advanced technologies across multiple sectors, including unmanned systems, air defense, electronic warfare, precision-guided ammunition, naval platforms, aviation and command-and-control systems.

Over the next three years, Ankara plans to prioritize investments in air and ballistic missile defense, long-range strike capabilities and unmanned military systems to meet both national defense requirements and NATO capability targets.

These capabilities, he argued, should be viewed not only as national assets but also as resources capable of helping reduce NATO’s wider capability and production gaps if fully integrated into alliance planning.

Guler called for greater defense industrial cooperation among allies, arguing that joint production and technology sharing would strengthen NATO more effectively than restrictive policies.

“Türkiye favors cooperation over rivalry, joint production over exclusion and capability-based cooperation over restrictions in the defense industry,” he said.

Addressing European security, Guler welcomed initiatives aimed at strengthening Europe’s defense capacity but stressed that such efforts must reinforce rather than duplicate NATO’s existing structures.

“NATO-EU cooperation must be inclusive, integrating and mutually reinforcing,” he said.

Reinforcing unity

Looking ahead to the NATO summit in Ankara, Guler described the gathering as a critical opportunity for allies to reinforce unity and address key issues including defense investment, industrial production, support for Ukraine and the alliance’s future deterrence posture.

He said the summit should send a clear message that NATO’s collective defense commitment under Article 5 remains unwavering but must be supported by credible military power.

The minister also emphasized the importance of maintaining NATO’s 360-degree approach to security, arguing that the alliance must remain equally attentive to threats along both its eastern and southern flanks as well as challenges beyond the Euro-Atlantic region.

He identified the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf, Syria, Iraq, the Eastern Mediterranean, North Africa, the Sahel, the Black Sea and the Caucasus as interconnected parts of the same strategic environment requiring coordinated allied attention.

Guler said modern security extends beyond conventional military assets such as tanks, aircraft and warships, encompassing secure digital infrastructure, resilient supply chains, protected critical infrastructure, societal resilience and the ability to respond faster than potential adversaries.

He concluded by reaffirming Türkiye’s commitment to NATO, saying Ankara would continue contributing to the alliance’s deterrence and defense posture while supporting its adaptation to evolving global security challenges.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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ollowing approximately 100 days of tension, Iran and the US announced on Sunday 14 June that they had reached an agreement on a memorandum of understanding. On 17 June, the text of the 14-point memorandum of understanding was signed by US President Donald Trump and Iranian President Mesud Pezeşkiyan. Thus, an agreement has been reached that will launch a 60-day negotiation process between the two countries. The final outcome will be determined by the agreement reached at the conclusion of these 60 days of negotiations. From this perspective, it is fair to say that the current memorandum of understanding serves as a sort of ‘goodwill document’ to initiate the negotiation process between the two countries. This document also serves as a guide regarding the issues to be addressed during the negotiation process. In this context, it is worth examining in detail the matters covered by the Memorandum of Understanding.

Matters covered by the memorandum of understanding

The provisions set out in the 14-article Memorandum of Understanding are broadly divided into two categories. Some of these are provisions that come into force upon the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, whilst others are provisions expected to come into force subject to the outcome of the 60-day negotiations.

Accordingly, Articles 1, 4, 5, 10 and 11 of the Memorandum of Understanding cover the matters that come into force upon its signing. Article 1 stipulates that the US, Iran and their allies must immediately and permanently cease hostilities on all fronts where tensions persist, particularly in Lebanon. This article also emphasises that the parties shall henceforth refrain from initiating war or military operations against one another, shall not issue threats, and that Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity shall be guaranteed. Consequently, the implementation of this article extends not only to the US and Iran but also to Israel and Hezbollah. Indeed, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Arakchi stated in a statement that one party to the agreement consists of the US and Israel, whilst the other comprises Iran and Hezbollah. From this perspective, any potential conflict between Hezbollah and Israel is of critical importance. Given Israel’s statements that it will not withdraw from the territories it occupies in Lebanon, it is clear that this provision is also one of the factors rendering the agreement fragile.

Another important issue—the keeping of the Strait of Hormuz open and the regulation of transit—is addressed in Articles 4 and 5 of the Memorandum of Understanding. Accordingly, the US will lift its naval blockade against Iran within 30 days, commencing immediately after the signing of the agreement. In return, Iran will ensure that traffic through the Strait of Hormuz returns to pre-war levels within 30 days. It has been stated that Iran will not charge fees to ships transiting through the Strait of Hormuz for a period of 60 days. Once the 60-day period has ended, it is envisaged that Iran will reach an agreement with Gulf states, primarily Oman, regarding transit arrangements. It has also been stated that the US will withdraw its troops from the vicinity of Iran. According to statements by US officials, this does not imply that the US will withdraw from its bases in the region; rather, it refers to the restoration of the US military presence to its pre-war status.

Iran’s frozen assets

Another issue expected to be implemented following the signing of the memorandum of understanding concerns Iran’s frozen assets and restrictions on its oil sales. Under Articles 10 and 11 of the Memorandum of Understanding, the US Department of the Treasury will issue the necessary authorizations regarding Iran’s oil sales and related insurance, transport and banking transactions, which will remain in force until sanctions are lifted. In addition, Iran’s frozen assets will be released. The details regarding the implementation of these articles will be determined during the negotiation process.

In addition to the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding that come into force upon signature, there are also provisions that will come into force with the final agreement, which is expected to be signed following 60 days of negotiations. These provisions cover more fundamental issues than those that come into force upon the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding and require detailed technical information.

The sanctions imposed on Iran in connection with its nuclear program also constitute one of the provisions contained in the Memorandum of Understanding. The sanctions are addressed in Articles 6 and 7 of the Memorandum of Understanding. Accordingly, all sanctions imposed on Iran – primarily those enacted through United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and those unilaterally imposed by the US – will be lifted. In addition, the US will plan an investment program worth at least 300 billion dollars, with the assistance of its regional allies, to support Iran’s economic development. The program will operate entirely under US supervision. It is stated that this program has been established by the US as an alternative to Iran’s claim for war reparations. [OO1] The implementation of the program is contingent upon a final agreement following the negotiations. The issue of sanctions, meanwhile, constitutes one of the first matters to be addressed upon the commencement of negotiations.

An examination of the articles of the Memorandum of Understanding reveals that, alongside operational provisions, there are also articles containing general provisions. For example, Article 2 of the Memorandum emphasizes that Iran and the US shall respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and shall not interfere in each other’s internal affairs.

Finally, Articles 12, 13 and 14 regulate the operation of the Memorandum of Understanding. According to these articles, a mechanism will be established to monitor the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding. Once the provisions set out in Articles 1, 4, 5, 10 and 11 of the Memorandum of Understanding have entered into force, the two parties will commence 60 days of negotiations. The final agreement reached following the 60-day negotiations will also be confirmed by a UN Security Council resolution.

Risks and opportunities

One of the most significant aspects envisaged by the Memorandum of Understanding concerns Lebanon. Accordingly, it provides for an immediate cessation of hostilities in Lebanon and guarantees of Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, Israel has stated that it will not withdraw from the territories it occupies in Lebanon; not content with this, it has also launched attacks on Lebanese territory following the announcement that an agreement had been reached between Iran and the US. Similarly, the memorandum of understanding signed between Iran and the US has drawn predominantly negative reactions from within Israeli domestic politics.

Channel 14, based in Israel and a staunch supporter of Netanyahu, has levelled harsh criticism at Trump over the signed memorandum of understanding. This situation has prompted a reaction from US Vice-President JD Vance. Consequently, it is evident that the memorandum of understanding is highly fragile, given that Israel – one of its indirect parties – has adopted such an adversarial stance. However, as can be inferred from the reactions of Trump and his deputy Vance, the US administration appears determined to secure a final agreement. Yet, only time will tell whether this US determination will be sufficient to rein in Israel.

Another risk factor is the potential for new regulations governing transit through the Strait of Hormuz. According to the provision in the memorandum of understanding, Iran will temporarily allow transit through the Strait of Hormuz without charging any fees. However, once the 60-day period has expired, a new arrangement will be put in place in consultation with other Gulf states, primarily Oman. Indeed, Iran has previously held discussions with Oman on this matter. Iran maintains that transit through the Strait of Hormuz should be under the control of both Oman and Iran. In this regard, it proposes that a specific fee be charged in return for the service provided. Furthermore, Iran has raised the issue of distinguishing between military and civilian transit. Iran’s refusal to back down from these demands, coupled with the other side’s refusal to accept them, poses a risk to the negotiation process.

Although the signed memorandum of understanding contains elements of risk, it represents the highest-level interaction between the two countries since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. For the first time since then, the presidents of the two countries have signed a document aimed at securing peace. This not only signals the beginning of a new era but also demonstrates that 47 years of hostility have borne no fruit. The most concrete example of this is the tensions and conflicts that have arisen between the two sides over the past year. For this reason, the memorandum of understanding signed is more likely to evolve into a lasting agreement than previous ones.

Unlike other negotiations, the current talks are taking place against a backdrop where other options – primarily war – have already been tried alongside diplomacy. Given that war, as the most radical option, has proved fruitless, it is clear that the two sides have no alternative to diplomacy. Consequently, it is highly likely that the new process that has been initiated will result in peace. However, given that the negotiations leading to the KOEP lasted 18 months, it is clear that a 60-day period is not sufficient for a comprehensive agreement. It is therefore reasonable to assume that this period will be extended and that a longer-term process is on the cards.

(Originally published in Turkish by SETA Foundation)

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aiwan has conducted its most comprehensive civil defense and wartime preparedness exercise to date, simulating a cascading national emergency that began with a Chinese blockade and earthquake before escalating into cyberattacks, sabotage, civil unrest and a full-scale military invasion. The drills, observed exclusively by Reuters, underscore Taipei’s growing efforts to strengthen national resilience as military pressure from China continues to intensify.

Held over two days in central Taiwan’s Nantou County, the exercise brought together more than 370 government officials, military officers and emergency responders. Organizers described the scenario as a realistic test of the island’s ability to maintain essential government functions during a complex, multi-dimensional crisis.

The exercise reflected President Lai Ching-te’s broader strategy to prepare Taiwan’s civilian institutions for conflict, drawing lessons from the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, where attacks on civilian infrastructure, information warfare and prolonged disruptions have become defining features of modern warfare.

Officials participating in the drill confronted a rapidly deteriorating scenario beginning with a Chinese naval blockade coinciding with a magnitude 6.8 earthquake that killed dozens of people and damaged critical infrastructure. According to the exercise, Beijing exploited the natural disaster to launch cyberattacks, spread disinformation, hijack television broadcasts and sabotage key facilities before initiating a full-scale military assault.

Rare access to the closed-door exercise

Reuters, which was granted rare access to the closed-door exercise, reported that officials were required to coordinate responses across multiple agencies while simultaneously maintaining emergency services, public order and communications under wartime conditions.

“Our adversary is right on our doorstep, just across the Taiwan Strait. That is very close,” Chi Lien-cheng, Taiwan’s minister without portfolio overseeing the exercise, told Reuters.

“If you don’t defend your own country, who else will defend you?” he added, while acknowledging that Taiwan still faced significant shortcomings in resources and preparedness.

The drills represent a shift from Taiwan’s previous emergency exercises, which had often been criticized as overly scripted and symbolic. This year’s program was designed to expose weaknesses and force officials to make decisions under increasingly realistic battlefield conditions.

The first day focused on a lengthy tabletop simulation, while the second featured field exercises that included counter-drone operations, emergency food distribution and coordination between civilian authorities and military reserve forces.

One scenario involved a Chinese drone strike on the county’s emergency response headquarters, forcing officials to activate a backup command center after 75 personnel were declared missing.

Emergency responders also rehearsed protecting power stations, maintaining healthcare services and restoring communications while coping with widespread infrastructure failures.

Civil-military coordination takes center stage

A key objective of the exercise was strengthening cooperation between Taiwan’s civilian institutions and its armed forces.

Military reserve units coordinated directly with local governments, while officials monitored unfolding events through advanced tactical mapping systems and interactive digital platforms that tracked emergency resources in real time.

Lin Fei-fan, deputy secretary-general of Taiwan’s National Security Council, said demonstrating societal resilience was intended to strengthen deterrence against Beijing.

“The message to our adversary is clear: when they know Taiwan’s society is prepared, they will have to think very carefully about whether to launch such a costly war against Taiwan — one that may not succeed,” he said.

Taiwanese officials have increasingly argued that modern conflicts require not only military readiness but also the ability of civilian governments, businesses and communities to continue functioning during sustained attacks.

Lessons from Ukraine have featured prominently in Taiwan’s planning, particularly regarding the importance of decentralized command structures, resilient communications networks and maintaining essential public services.

This year’s drills included moving hospital operations underground, testing backup government facilities and inviting professional cybersecurity experts to attack official networks in simulated cyber warfare.

Participants also faced extensive information warfare scenarios.

In one simulation, local television broadcasts were replaced with Chinese propaganda while false information spread rapidly through social media and printed leaflets. Officials were required to identify disinformation, hold emergency press briefings and reassure the public.

Community leaders also took part in the training

Lee I-yuan, a 75-year-old borough chief who participated in the exercise, said the simulations highlighted the growing importance of combating false information during crises.

“If the other side attacks, they will definitely use AI to spread false information,” he said.

The drills assigned Nantou County, Taiwan’s only landlocked county, a strategic wartime role as a logistical rear base where civilians fleeing frontline regions could seek shelter while government agencies relocated critical operations inland.

Local officials were questioned extensively about emergency preparedness, including the availability of food supplies, infant formula, reserve manpower and medical resources.

Some participants struggled to answer detailed questions as commanders deliberately increased pressure throughout the exercise.

“We can’t actually put them through a real war, so we can only use scenarios to help them understand that war is extremely cruel — all situations will be severe and urgent,” one official involved in the exercise told Reuters.

China, which considers democratically governed Taiwan part of its territory, has never ruled out using force to achieve reunification.

While the resilience exercise concluded, Taiwan’s defense ministry reported that China had simultaneously conducted another combat readiness patrol around the island involving warships and at least 22 military aircraft, including nuclear-capable H-6 bombers.

Beijing accused President Lai of escalating tensions across the Taiwan Strait.

Chinese Foreign Ministry and Taiwan Affairs Office officials said Lai’s policies were increasing the risk of conflict, describing him as a “creator of crises” in cross-strait relations.

Taiwan rejects China’s sovereignty claims, insisting that only the island’s 23 million people can determine their future.

As military activity around Taiwan continues to increase, Taipei hopes its expanding civil defense program will strengthen national resilience while reinforcing its message that any attempt to seize the island by force would face not only military resistance but also a prepared and functioning civilian society.

(Source: Reuters)

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he United States has declined to extend the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) in its current form, triggering a 10-year countdown toward the trade pact’s expiration while opening negotiations aimed at reshaping North America’s trading relationship.

The decision, announced Wednesday following the agreement’s first six-year review, keeps the USMCA in force until 2036 but subjects it to annual reviews unless the three member countries agree to renew and amend the pact.

The move reflects the Trump administration’s push to bring more manufacturing back to the United States, reduce trade deficits with Canada and Mexico, and tighten rules designed to limit China’s access to North American supply chains.

“The United States did not agree to renew the USMCA in its current form,” U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greersaid in a statement.

“As a result, the USMCA is not renewed. The United States will continue to engage with Mexico and Canada to address the agreement’s shortcomings and our trade deficits with these countries.”

The agreement, negotiated during President Donald Trump’s first administration and implemented in 2020, replaced the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). It governs approximately $1.6 trillion in annual trade among the three countries and underpins one of the world’s most integrated manufacturing and supply chains.

Although the decision does not immediately alter tariff-free trade across North America, it formally launches negotiations over revisions that Washington says are necessary to strengthen domestic manufacturing and improve economic security.

A senior U.S. administration official said bilateral negotiations with Mexico are scheduled to resume during the week of July 20 in Mexico City. The talks will focus on strengthening regional rules of origin for automobiles and other industrial products while preventing countries such as China from benefiting indirectly from preferential North American trade access.

The United States argues that stricter local-content requirements would encourage manufacturers to relocate more production and supply chains to the United States.

Mexico and Canada seek compromise amid industry concerns

Mexican Economy Minister Marcelo Ebrard acknowledged that negotiations remain divided over Washington’s demands for stricter automotive content rules but expressed confidence that a compromise remains achievable.

“There is no difference that I can identify between Mexico, the United States and Canada that is so big that we cannot resolve it,” Ebrard said after holding virtual discussions with Greer and Canadian trade minister Dominic LeBlanc.

Mexico has resisted U.S. proposals requiring North American-built vehicles to contain 50% U.S.-made components, a measure that would increase the overall regional content requirement to 82%.

“We wouldn’t allow our industry to be at a disadvantage,” Ebrard said, describing protection of Mexico’s automotive sector as the central issue in ongoing negotiations.

LeBlanc said Canada would continue discussions with Washington while seeking the removal of U.S. tariffs on Canadian steel, aluminum, automobiles and lumber.

The Trump administration has argued that additional time is needed to address persistent U.S. trade imbalances, noting that America’s goods trade deficit reached $197 billion with Mexico and $48.3 billion with Canada in 2025.

Officials acknowledge that much of the Canadian deficit reflects U.S. energy imports, while the growing deficit with Mexico has been driven partly by manufacturers relocating supply chains from China to Mexico in response to U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods.

Although Washington hopes to negotiate revised trade protocols with both neighbors, officials indicated President Trump remains skeptical about the long-term benefits of the agreement despite having negotiated it during his first term.

Trump has repeatedly argued that the United States would perform better economically without the USMCA, even while calling it “the best agreement we’ve ever made” when it entered into force.

Undermining North America’s competitiveness

Business groups across North America have urged governments to preserve the agreement’s tariff-free framework, warning that greater restrictions could undermine the region’s competitiveness against manufacturers in Asia and Europe.

Ivan Espinosa, chief executive of Nissan, warned that requiring substantially higher U.S. content in vehicles could worsen affordability for American consumers.

“You cannot build all the parts in the U.S. The supply chain is not set up to do that,” Espinosa told Reuters. “We need something that is actually executable.”

Agricultural organizations have also urged negotiators to preserve the agreement, noting that Canada and Mexico together purchase more than one-third of U.S. agricultural exports.

Bryan Goodman, spokesperson for the Agricultural Coalition for USMCA, said the agreement remains vital for farmers, ranchers and rural communities that depend on integrated North American markets.

The coming negotiations are expected to determine whether the three countries can modernize the agreement while preserving the free trade framework that has shaped North American commerce for more than three decades.

(Source: Reuters)

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rtificial intelligence is rapidly reshaping the U.S. technology industry, with major companies accelerating workforce reductions as they restructure operations, automate tasks and redirect investment toward AI-driven growth.

Technology firms are increasingly citing artificial intelligence as a primary reason for layoffs, reflecting a broader shift in corporate strategy aimed at boosting productivity, lowering costs and streamlining operations.

Data from outplacement firm Challenger, Gray & Christmas show AI has become the leading justification for announced job cuts in the United States.

Nearly 40% of layoffs announced in May were attributed to artificial intelligence, a sharp increase from 7% in January, 10% in February, 25% in March and 26% in April.

The technology sector has been at the center of the trend.

Layoffs announced by technology companies during the first five months of 2026 rose 66% from the same period a year earlier, reaching 123,653 positions, making it the industry with the highest number of job cuts this year.

Economists caution that artificial intelligence is not the only factor behind the reductions. They say many companies are also responding to overhiring during the COVID-19 pandemic, persistent cost pressures and broader restructuring efforts aimed at improving profitability.

Major technology firms restructure around AI

Software giant Oracle reported one of the largest workforce reductions, revealing that its global full-time employee count declined by 21,000 over the past year.

A filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) showed Oracle employed 141,000 full-time workers as of May 31, down from 162,000 a year earlier.

The company said the adoption and deployment of artificial intelligence technologies across its operations had resulted in workforce reductions and could continue to do so.

Software development platform GitLab also announced significant restructuring as it shifts its business model toward AI-powered services.

The company said it will reduce its workforce by about 14%, eliminating roughly 350 jobs while simplifying management structures and withdrawing operations from 22 countries as it expands infrastructure for AI-related workloads.

Meta is pursuing a different strategy, combining layoffs with workforce redeployment.

According to U.S. media reports, the social media company plans to cut around 8,000 jobs while transferring approximately 7,000 employees into new AI-focused positions.

Chief Executive Mark Zuckerberg reportedly told employees that the restructuring was necessary as competition in artificial intelligence intensifies, warning that success in the sector is not guaranteed.

Meta has already implemented multiple rounds of layoffs this year, including a 10% reduction in staff at its Reality Labs division in January, followed by additional cuts affecting hundreds of employees in March.

Broader industry transformation

Several other major technology companies have also announced workforce reductions linked to AI investments and organizational restructuring.

Financial software company Intuit said it will eliminate 17% of its full-time workforce to improve operational efficiency and focus more resources on strategic priorities, including artificial intelligence.

Networking equipment maker Cisco plans to cut approximately 4,000 jobs as it redirects investment toward AI and other growth businesses.

Cloudflare announced the elimination of more than 1,100 positions as it redesigns its organizational structure and internal processes for the AI era.

Cryptocurrency exchange Coinbase said it would reduce its workforce by around 14%, citing market conditions and its ongoing AI transformation.

Financial technology company PayPal has announced plans to reduce its workforce by 20% over the next three years while integrating artificial intelligence throughout its operations.

Social media platform Snap also joined the growing list of companies restructuring around AI, announcing plans to lay off about 1,000 employees—roughly 16% of its workforce—and eliminate more than 300 vacant positions.

Chief Executive Evan Spiegel said rapid advances in artificial intelligence were reducing repetitive tasks and accelerating business processes, making organizational changes necessary.

Other companies undertaking AI-related restructuring this year include Angi, Atlassian, Block, Crypto.com and Wix.

The wave of layoffs highlights how artificial intelligence is reshaping employment across the technology industry, with companies increasingly seeking to automate routine work while investing heavily in AI infrastructure and specialized talent.

While businesses argue the changes are necessary to remain competitive in a rapidly evolving market, the trend has also intensified concerns about the long-term impact of artificial intelligence on employment, particularly in administrative, software development and support functions.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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resident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said the upcoming NATO Leaders’ Summit in Ankara will serve as the strongest platform for sharing experience among allies, while urging greater solidarity within the alliance to address growing regional and global security challenges.

Speaking at the NATO Parliamentary Summit in Istanbul on Monday, Erdoğan said the alliance faces a historic turning point as wars, terrorism, irregular migration and geopolitical instability reshape the Euro-Atlantic security environment.

“It is my belief that the Ankara Summit will be the strongest platform for sharing experience,” Erdoğan said, referring to the NATO Heads of State and Government Summit scheduled to take place in the Turkish capital on July 7-8.

Addressing parliamentary representatives from NATO member states, Erdoğan said the Istanbul meeting carried added significance ahead of the leaders’ summit and thanked participants for contributing to cooperation among allied legislatures.

Global security environment changing rapidly

Erdoğan said traditional assumptions about international security were no longer sufficient to explain today’s rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape.

“Europe-Atlantic security is passing through a historic turning point,” he said, pointing to conflicts, regional crises, terrorism and irregular migration along NATO’s eastern and southeastern borders.

He argued that growing instability had replaced predictability in international affairs and warned that existing international institutions had suffered a loss of credibility in the face of recent conflicts.

Referring to developments in Gaza and Lebanon, Erdoğan said recent massacres had left deep scars on humanity’s conscience while undermining confidence in international organizations.

“In this environment, preserving NATO’s deterrence and strengthening solidarity among allies has become even more critical,” he said.

The Turkish president stressed that Türkiye remains one of NATO’s leading contributors, citing its strategic location, military capabilities and more than seven decades of participation in the alliance.

Sharing borders stretching more than 1,800 kilometers with conflict regions, Türkiye continues to play an active role in NATO missions and peacekeeping operations while sharing its experience in crisis management with allies, he added.

Erdoğan said international interest in the Ankara summit extends well beyond NATO member states.

“Our fundamental expectation from the summit is to achieve outcomes that strengthen the spirit of alliance while respecting the national security sensitivities of all allies,” he said.

Defense cooperation and regional diplomacy

Erdoğan also called for a fairer sharing of defense responsibilities within NATO and urged the removal of barriers affecting defense industry cooperation among allies.

“If we want to confront today’s challenges successfully, we must ensure balanced burden-sharing while removing obstacles to defense industry trade,” he said.

He noted that Türkiye continues to increase defense spending in line with commitments adopted at the recent NATO summit in The Hague and remains among the alliance’s five largest contributors to NATO missions and operations.

Despite these contributions, Erdoğan argued that Türkiye’s role in European security is sometimes overlooked.

He called for Ankara’s inclusion in European Union defense and security initiatives, saying Türkiye’s defense capabilities should not be excluded because of narrow political considerations.

“We must establish a security and defense network stretching from Texas to Ankara without reservations or conditions,” he said.

The president said the Ankara summit would place particular emphasis on defense industry cooperation through a NATO Defense Industry Forum, where Türkiye plans to showcase its latest defense technologies and discuss measures to deepen industrial collaboration among allies.

Participants would also review key regional and international developments, including the situations in Ukraine, Iran, the Gulf region and Palestine, he said.

Erdoğan reaffirmed Türkiye’s commitment to supporting efforts aimed at turning the ceasefire between the United States and Iran into a lasting settlement, saying Ankara would continue working alongside Pakistan, Qatar and other friendly countries.

Turning to Palestine, Erdoğan said lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved without ending the Israeli occupation and establishing an independent Palestinian state.

“An independent, sovereign and territorially contiguous Palestinian state within the 1967 borders must be established,” he said.

He also warned against actions that could undermine regional stability, particularly attacks targeting Lebanon, and urged NATO parliamentarians to support efforts aimed at preventing further escalation.

Erdoğan reiterated Türkiye’s readiness to continue mediating efforts to end the Russia-Ukraine war through dialogue, saying Ankara remains one of the few allies trusted by both sides.

“As a country that can speak with both parties and has initiated successful diplomatic processes, we will continue to contribute actively to peace efforts,” he said.

The event concluded with a family photograph hosted by Turkish Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş as part of the NATO Parliamentary Summit in Istanbul.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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entral banks around the world are planning to reduce their holdings of U.S. dollars over the coming decade for the first time, reflecting growing concerns over geopolitical risks and policy uncertainty surrounding the world’s dominant reserve currency, according to a new survey released on Tuesday.

The findings, published by the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF), mark the first time its annual survey has found that more central banks intend to decrease their dollar allocations than increase them over the next 10 years.

The survey, which gathered responses from 90 central banks, sovereign wealth funds and public pension funds managing a combined $10 trillion in assets, points to a gradual transformation in global reserve management as policymakers prepare for a more fragmented international financial system.

Although the U.S. dollar remains the world’s primary reserve currency and has gained around 3% this year, respondents increasingly cited political uncertainty in the United States and rising geopolitical tensions as reasons to diversify their portfolios.

The shift comes amid broader debate over the future of the global monetary system following heightened international tensions, including the recent U.S.-Iran conflict, and changing global economic dynamics.

OMFIF Senior Economist Yara Aziz said public investors increasingly regard market volatility as a permanent feature rather than a temporary disruption.

“The old assumption that public investors can wait for the environment to normalize looks increasingly unrealistic,” Aziz wrote in the report.

Gold strengthens its role in reserve management

Despite expectations of reduced dollar holdings, the survey found no clear replacement for the U.S. currency.

Instead, reserve managers are gradually expanding holdings across a wider range of currencies while significantly increasing allocations to gold.

Nearly four out of five central banks surveyed, along with 60% of public investment funds, believe the international monetary system is evolving toward a more multipolar structure in which reserve assets become more diversified.

Currencies outside the traditional major reserve group are attracting greater attention.

Respondents reported increasing allocations to the Norwegian krone and the New Zealand dollar, while interest in the British pound also continued to grow.

Central banks also maintained plans to increase holdings of the euro and China’s renminbi, although respondents said structural limitations continue to constrain both currencies from becoming dominant alternatives to the dollar.

Even so, almost all respondents viewed the Chinese yuan as an effective tool for portfolio diversification.

Gold emerged as one of the strongest beneficiaries of changing reserve strategies.

Held by 82% of surveyed central banks, the precious metal has moved to the center of reserve management policies after reaching successive record highs over recent years.

In the next one to two years, gold is expected to see the largest increase in allocations among reserve assets, with a net 30% of respondents planning to expand their holdings.

Analysts say central banks increasingly value gold as a hedge against inflation, geopolitical instability and financial market volatility.

Artificial intelligence reshapes investment strategies

Beyond reserve diversification, the survey highlighted a rapid acceleration in the adoption of artificial intelligence across public financial institutions.

More than two-thirds of central banks said they plan to expand the use of AI in the near future, while none of the advanced economy central banks surveyed indicated they were satisfied with current levels of AI deployment.

Overall, only 9% of central banks said existing AI integration met their needs.

Most institutions currently use artificial intelligence for data analysis, research and administrative functions, although adoption varies significantly between developed and emerging economies.

Nearly 90% of central banks in advanced economies already use AI, compared with just 44% of those in emerging markets.

The report also found growing investor interest in physical assets.

Almost 60% of public investment funds intend to increase allocations to infrastructure and real estate over the next two years, making them the most popular asset classes outside traditional financial markets.

Emerging markets are also attracting renewed attention

Thirty-eight percent of public funds plan to increase investment in emerging economies, up sharply from 27% in last year’s survey.

At the same time, interest in expanding exposure to developed economies declined significantly, with only one-quarter of respondents planning to increase allocations compared with nearly half a year earlier.

Despite diversification efforts, the United States and China remained the most attractive investment destinations, largely because of their leading positions in artificial intelligence development and technological innovation.

The survey suggests that while the U.S. dollar is likely to remain the world’s dominant reserve currency for the foreseeable future, central banks are increasingly seeking broader diversification through gold, alternative currencies, emerging markets and new technologies to navigate a more uncertain global economic environment.

(Source: Reuters)

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ulf Arab states are reassessing their long-standing security relationship with the United States following Washington’s emerging agreement with Iran, amid concerns that the proposed deal could reshape the regional balance of power and leave key security issues unresolved.

The framework agreement between the United States and Iran, announced after months of conflict and negotiations, has been welcomed across the Gulf as a step away from a wider regional war. However, analysts and diplomats say many governments in the region remain deeply uneasy about its long-term implications, particularly regarding Iran’s military capabilities and growing regional influence.

The agreement seeks to end hostilities between Washington and Tehran, reopen the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping and establish a process for broader negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions relief and economic reconstruction. While Gulf capitals support efforts to prevent another devastating conflict, many officials are questioning whether the arrangement adequately addresses their security concerns.

Trust in US erodes

For decades, Gulf monarchies have relied heavily on the United States as their principal security guarantor. American military bases, naval deployments and defence partnerships have formed the backbone of regional deterrence against external threats, particularly from Iran.

Yet confidence in those guarantees has gradually weakened over the past several years.

Regional observers point to a series of developments that have fuelled doubts, including the limited U.S. response to attacks on Saudi oil facilities in 2019 and Washington’s broader shift toward reducing its military footprint in the Middle East.

Those concerns have resurfaced following the latest U.S.-Iran agreement, which many Gulf officials view as another indication that Washington is increasingly prioritising diplomacy and strategic disengagement over long-term military commitments in the region.

The agreement also introduces new arrangements affecting navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors. Under the framework, Iran is expected to play a role in future discussions on managing commercial shipping alongside Oman and other regional stakeholders.

Possible Iranian influence on maritime security

For Gulf countries whose economies depend heavily on energy exports passing through the waterway, the prospect of expanded Iranian influence over maritime security has generated considerable debate.

Analysts argue that while reopening shipping lanes would benefit global energy markets, Gulf governments remain cautious about any arrangement that could strengthen Tehran’s leverage over regional trade.

The deal also leaves several contentious issues unresolved.

Although negotiations on Iran’s nuclear activities are expected to continue during a 60-day transition period, the current framework does not directly address Tehran’s ballistic missile programme or its relationships with armed groups across the Middle East.

Many Gulf governments have long regarded those issues as posing a more immediate security challenge than Iran’s nuclear ambitions alone.

During a regional tour following the announcement of the agreement, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio sought to reassure Gulf allies that Washington would continue consulting closely with them throughout negotiations and would not pursue policies that undermine their security.

Rubio emphasised that future discussions concerning Iran’s missile program would be coordinated with regional partners and reaffirmed America’s commitment to longstanding alliances in the Gulf.

Despite those assurances, regional analysts say trust has been weakened by years of uncertainty surrounding U.S. policy in the Middle East.

Diversifying military partnerships

Several experts argue that Gulf states increasingly believe they must prepare for a future in which they shoulder greater responsibility for their own defense.

As a result, some governments have accelerated efforts to diversify their military partnerships and defence procurement beyond traditional suppliers.

Turkey has emerged as one potential alternative source of military equipment and defense cooperation, reflecting a broader strategy of reducing dependence on any single security partner.

At the same time, Gulf countries continue to strengthen economic ties with the United States. Major investment commitments announced in recent years demonstrate that while questions persist over security arrangements, economic cooperation remains a central pillar of bilateral relations.

The proposed agreement with Iran also includes plans for a multibillion-dollar reconstruction and investment fund intended to support Iran’s economic recovery after the conflict.

Although Washington has indicated that Gulf participation would be important, several regional governments have said they have not yet committed funding and are awaiting further details before making any decisions.

For many Gulf leaders, preventing another regional war remains the immediate priority.

The recent conflict exposed the vulnerability of Gulf states to missile and drone attacks and highlighted the economic consequences of disruptions to energy exports and international shipping.

M

ore than 5,300 people remain trapped in online scam compounds in Myanmar near the Thai border despite a multinational crackdown launched last year, according to a Thai-based human rights organization that has urged authorities to intensify rescue efforts.

The Civil Society Network for Human Trafficking Victim Assistance (CSNHTV) said thousands of victims continue to be held in four scam compounds located in territory controlled by the Myanmar Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), where criminal syndicates continue to operate extensive online fraud and human trafficking networks.

In a letter addressed to Thai police, the organization called for immediate action to dismantle the remaining compounds and free those still being held against their will.

According to the group, approximately 1,600 of those trapped are Chinese nationals, while around 200 are from Myanmar. Victims also include citizens of the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, Brazil, Russia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Zimbabwe.

“Many of these compounds have yet to be dismantled or subjected to rescue operations to free all remaining victims,” the organization said.

It warned that the criminal syndicates continue to carry out online fraud targeting victims across the world, particularly in the United States and Europe.

Multibillion-dollar criminal industry

Scam centers across Southeast Asia, especially in Myanmar and Cambodia, have evolved into a sophisticated transnational criminal industry worth billions of dollars.

Originally linked to casinos and online gambling operations during the COVID-19 pandemic, the compounds have expanded into hubs for online investment scams, romance fraud, cryptocurrency schemes and other cybercrimes targeting victims worldwide.

Many of those recruited to work in the centers were lured by false job offers before being trafficked across borders and forced to participate in online scams.

A report released by the United Nations in February found that many scam compounds are staffed by foreign nationals trafficked by organized criminal gangs and subjected to serious human rights abuses.

The report documented widespread cases of torture, sexual abuse, forced abortions, food deprivation, solitary confinement and other forms of cruel treatment used to coerce victims into carrying out online fraud.

“The litany of abuse is staggering and at the same time heart-breaking,” said Volker Türk.

Türk added that many survivors face additional hardships after escaping the compounds, often encountering disbelief, stigma or even punishment instead of receiving protection and rehabilitation.

Calls for stronger regional cooperation

Rights groups say dismantling scam compounds requires closer cooperation between governments in the region, as many operations are protected by armed groups controlling parts of Myanmar’s border areas.

Although thousands of trafficking victims have been rescued during joint operations conducted by Thailand, Myanmar and neighboring countries over the past year, humanitarian organizations warn that thousands more remain trapped, highlighting the continued reach of criminal networks exploiting vulnerable migrants through forced labor and online fraud.

(Source: Aljazeera)

R

ecent legislative amendments have brought about changes to the structure of the National Security Council in Turkey, which has played a decisive role in domestic politics throughout the history of the Republic. With the establishment of the Directorates of Internal Security Research and Assessment, External Security Research and Assessment, and Defense Planning Coordination, the expanding nature of security in the global arena has been taken into account. Furthermore, such an expansion should also be viewed as a consequence of Turkey’s changing foreign policy and geopolitical perceptions.

President Erdoğan delivered a speech highlighting key points at the opening of the National Security Conferences, a series planned to articulate Turkey’s approach to security. Alongside an emphasis on historical state tradition, the speech drew attention to the harmonious coordination between Turkey’s institutions in the face of the region’s ongoing and seemingly endless ‘ring of fire’, whilst also heralding the National Security Council’s return to its core remit. In light of the reforms implemented and this announcement, it is worth asking whether there has been a shift in Turkey’s security culture alongside its evolving foreign policy approach.

The relationship between foreign policy and security culture

Security culture is a concept frequently used in the study of International Relations (IR). In this context, it is defined as the totality of norms that shape how a state or society perceives security, defines threats and formulates responses to the security challenges it faces. Security culture, centered on the perception of threats, helps us understand what a state regards as a threat, or which policies it views as such, and, in parallel, the values by which it defines itself and the historical memory through which it does so. At the same time, the behavioral framework that develops through these elements forms a state’s established code of conduct in the international arena.

Consequently, the perception of security becomes a concept directly linked to foreign policy as a natural outcome of these definitions and perceptions. For when a state’s strategic mindset and self-definition change as a product of an internal process, foreign policy is naturally updated, which in turn implies a shift in the reference points of the security narrative. Just as a definition of interests, resulting from a protectionist mindset and a narrow geopolitical narrative, reflects a limited context, such a narrative also leads to the perception of security threats being viewed from a considerably broader perspective.

What is Turkey’s security culture?

The most fundamental element shaping Turkey’s security culture has been the identity redefined alongside the establishment of the state. With the acceptance of a Western identity as the cornerstone of the state, foreign policy was entirely shaped by a Western geopolitical narrative, and security culture was naturally shaped by the perception of areas outside the West as sources of threat. Paradoxically, despite waging war against the West, Turkey has constructed its security culture on a plane identical to that of the West, defined its perception of threat as originating from outside the West, and sought to meet its security needs through Western organizations or alliances.

Historical experiences inherited from the Ottoman Empire led to the new state being security-focused; the new Republic, through discourses on national sovereignty, territorial integrity and the unity of the state, necessitated a strong state structure. This, in turn, led to Turkey’s security culture becoming state-centered, and institutions have largely defined their roles as significant power factors in domestic politics by relying on this discourse.

The Middle East and the Caucasus represented the core regions perceived as threats by this security culture; the attempt to demonize Islam, the Kurdish issue and the identities defined through these factors were framed as problems for Turkey. As a result of the geopolitical narrative reflecting a narrow hinterland, distant regions did not even fall within the scope of this security culture. Consequently, Turkey’s security culture has reflected a framework synonymous with the West and its interests; adherence to the NATO concept, both during and after the Cold War, has been Ankara’s foremost priority.

The shift in the security paradigm

Since 2002, the changes in Turkish foreign policy have naturally led to a shift in the security paradigm, as they also signified a significant transformation of identity. Firstly, the norms guiding foreign policy have diverged, and Turkey has begun to perceive its historical ties not as a threat but as a source of strength. A foreign policy approach has begun to prevail in which Turkey defines itself through an identity that, without disregarding Western values, places greater emphasis on its own identity elements, an identity that, in the simplest terms, can be expressed by the concept of our ‘heartland’. In parallel with this shift in self-definition, the definitions of interests and threats have changed, and the geopolitical perspective has expanded from a framework confined to the West to encompass a much broader geography stretching as far as Africa, Asia and the Americas.

So, what has changed in Turkey’s security culture? First and foremost, Turkey has become a country that understands very clearly that it must ensure its own security. In particular, the situation into which European states have fallen following the war in Ukraine continues to be discussed as an example illustrating just how accurately Ankara has assessed the situation. In this respect, from its very inception, Turkey has moved away from relying on international coalitions and policies dictated by them, and has begun to define its own security framework. In the words of Erdoğan, Turkey has shattered the glass ceiling over it and has transformed into an actor capable of redefining concepts at a regional level, writing its own narrative and shaping its own future. This situation has been interpreted as a reflection of self-confidence; by enhancing its own capabilities, Turkey has been able to devise solutions through its own policies whenever it perceives a threat to its security.

Regions where the traditional security culture held a perception of security threats have largely come to be viewed as areas for cooperation; security has been perceived not merely as a need secured by closing oneself off within borders, but rather as synonymous with taking proactive action. Security has been linked to the deepening of relations and increased mutual interdependence; where security vulnerabilities have arisen as a result of this approach, necessary measures have been taken to expand security boundaries. In this context, cross-border operations have constituted one of the most significant indicators of the shift in Turkey’s security paradigm. Consequently, security boundaries have been expanded, and Turkey has risen to the status of a state capable of implementing its own policies, demonstrating that security can also be ensured through new points established beyond its borders. Furthermore, it is a fact that, in line with Turkey’s evolving and expanding geopolitical understanding, the country now maintains military bases in many countries.

A

t least 32 people have been confirmed dead and around 700 injured after two powerful earthquakes struck Venezuela, causing widespread destruction in the capital Caracas and other parts of the country, according to authorities.

The twin quakes, measuring 7.2 and 7.5 in magnitude, hit less than a minute apart about 160 kilometers west of Caracas, triggering building collapses, damaging infrastructure and prompting fears that the final death toll could rise significantly as rescue efforts continue.

Emergency crews raced through the night to search for survivors trapped beneath the rubble of collapsed buildings. Images from Caracas showed rescue workers combing through debris while families gathered anxiously near disaster sites awaiting news of missing relatives.

Interim President Delcy Rodríguez said at least 32 people had been killed and hundreds injured, though officials cautioned that casualty figures remained preliminary.