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he Ankara Summit clearly demonstrated which issues lie at the heart of NATO’s security agenda. The strong emphasis in the summit communiqué on collective defense, the transatlantic bond and Article 5 of the Washington Treaty once again underscored that the Alliance’s fundamental priority is deterrence and defense. Russia’s long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security, continued support for Ukraine, increased defense spending, the expansion of industrial production capacity and the development of new military capabilities formed the main framework of the Ankara Summit.

This picture is perfectly clear. Whilst the Russia-Ukraine War continues, it was to be expected that NATO would prioritize deterrence on its eastern flank. Indeed, the summit communiqué provides for the provision of 70 billion euros’ worth of military equipment, aid and training support to Ukraine by 2026, and for at least equivalent levels to be maintained in 2027. Similarly, the increase in defense investment by European allies and Canada, the announcement of new procurement worth over 50 billion dollars, and the emphasis on expanding defense industry production capacity demonstrate that NATO prioritizes the conversion of expenditure into tangible military capability, alongside its spending ratios.

360-degree security and the southern dimension of NATO in Africa

Another statement in the Ankara Summit Declaration indicates that this discussion must be addressed within a broader context. NATO states that it is continuing its 360-degree approach to deterrence and defense. This approach acknowledges that the Alliance’s security is not limited solely to its eastern flank, the Russian threat, or conventional military capabilities. Strategic competition, widespread instability, hybrid threats, terrorism, energy security, sea lanes, cyberspace, space, unmanned systems, artificial intelligence and critical infrastructure are all different components of the same security landscape.

It is precisely for this reason that NATO’s southern flank is one of the areas that requires more careful consideration following the Ankara Summit. However, Africa is not at the centre of this debate. NATO’s main agenda is, of course, not centered on Africa. Nor should it be expected to be. Nevertheless, Africa is a dimension that cannot be overlooked when seeking to understand the security architecture of the southern flank. The vast geography stretching from the southern Mediterranean to the Sahel, and from the Red Sea to the Horn of Africa, is one of the areas that tests what NATO’s 360-degree security approach means in practice.

At this point, it is necessary to make a conceptual distinction. NATO’s approach to Africa is not the same as the Africa policies of individual NATO member states. NATO is an organization comprising allies with different historical experiences, geopolitical priorities and bilateral relations. France, Italy, Turkey, the US, the UK and Spain do not all view Africa in the same way. Some allies focus more on North Africa, some on the Sahel, some on the Horn of Africa, whilst others prioritize maritime security and trade routes. Furthermore, the fact that many countries are members of both NATO and the European Union can, at times, lead to a blurring of priorities and instruments.

This diversity need not be a weakness. If managed correctly, it could foster a richer debate within NATO regarding its southern flank. After all, each ally possesses field experience, diplomatic networks, defense capabilities and development tools in different geographical regions. The real challenge lies in transforming this diversity into a shared understanding of security. Following the Ankara Summit, what NATO needs is not to produce a centralized, one-size-fits-all policy towards Africa, but rather to develop more realistic channels of cooperation with security institutions, regional organizations and relevant countries in Africa.

A security line stretching from migration to the Red Sea

The issue of migration is one of the most visible aspects of this. In European public discourse, Africa is often brought to the fore through debates on irregular migration. Locations such as Lampedusa, Ceuta and the Canary Islands highlight the link between stability in North Africa and Europe’s border management. However, viewing migration solely as a security threat is an incomplete approach. War, poverty, climate pressures, food insecurity and weaknesses in state capacity are among the root causes of human mobility. NATO’s recognition of climate change as a threat multiplier is also significant in this regard. Climate change may not, in and of itself, directly cause conflict. However, it can exacerbate resource scarcity, economic vulnerability, displacement and local tensions.

That said, the scale of migration originating from Africa should not be exaggerated. African migrants do not constitute the largest group of migrants accepted by NATO countries. A significant proportion of migration movements in Africa take place within the continent itself. Consequently, viewing Africa solely as the source of migration towards Europe is both analytically flawed and fails to establish a sound basis for partnership. A more appropriate approach is to develop sustainable mechanisms that strike a balance between shared responsibility, humanitarian protection, border management, development and the building of local capacity with countries along migration routes.

The second key issue that makes the African dimension of the Southern Flank significant is maritime security and trade routes. The call in the Ankara Summit Declaration for Iran to fully respect freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates that NATO views maritime security not merely as a traditional military issue, but as a strategic matter linked to global trade and energy security. The same logic applies to the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb–Suez corridor. The Houthis’ attacks on commercial vessels have highlighted just how vulnerable this corridor is. The diversion of ships around the Cape of Good Hope has increased transit times, fuel costs, insurance expenses and the strain on global logistics.

For this reason, Red Sea security is not merely a matter for the countries in the region. Europe’s energy supply, production chains and commercial competitiveness also depend on this route remaining open and secure. The war in Sudan, the fight against terrorism in Somalia, inter-state tensions in the Horn of Africa and security vacuums in the Sahel are developments that indirectly but significantly affect NATO’s southern flank. The conclusion to be drawn from this is not that NATO should expand militarily into Africa. A more realistic need is to establish more regular cooperation with African countries and regional institutions in the areas of maritime security, early warning, intelligence sharing, border security, counter-terrorism capabilities and crisis prevention.

Partnership amidst competition and Turkey’s contribution

Great power competition is also a significant part of this picture. Russia’s efforts to deepen its security ties in areas such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Sudan, and to develop a more institutionalized presence through mechanisms such as the post-Wagner African Corps, are trends being closely monitored by NATO. China’s influence in Africa, meanwhile, is advancing through ports, transport corridors, digital infrastructure, mining and investments in critical minerals. Resources such as cobalt, manganese, platinum group metals, lithium and graphite have become critical for the defense industry, the energy transition and advanced technology production.

Nevertheless, it would be an oversimplification to view Africa merely as a stage for competition between Russia, China, the US or Europe. African states are the actors who determine their own security preferences and development priorities. For NATO and its allies, the path to achieving a lasting impact lies in establishing partnerships with Africa based on respect for sovereignty, local ownership, technology sharing and mutual benefit. Relations with Africa’s security architecture must also be built upon this understanding. The African Union, regional economic communities, IGAD, ECOWAS and other regional structures are the pillars of joint security production.

Turkey’s experience offers a notable example in this debate. As a NATO ally, Turkey is one of the countries that has transformed its defense industry capacity into tangible military capability. The developing capabilities in areas such as unmanned aerial vehicles, electronic warfare, munitions, and land and sea platforms are directly linked to the discussions on industrial base and production depth emphasized at NATO’s Ankara Summit. However, Turkey’s role in Africa should not be interpreted solely through the prism of defense industry exports.

The training activities carried out in Somalia through TURKSOM represent an approach focused on capacity-building for local security institutions. Turkey’s integration of humanitarian aid, education, health, infrastructure and diplomacy with security support demonstrates that a more holistic approach to security is possible for the southern flank. The Ankara Declaration, signed between Ethiopia and Somalia, has also highlighted the importance of preventive diplomacy. Whilst mediation is not an alternative to military deterrence, it is a complementary element of the security architecture in terms of managing crises before they escalate into armed conflict.

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he geopolitical upheavals experienced in the international security environment in recent years are fundamentally altering the position of defense spending within economic policy. Increasing strategic competition on a global scale – particularly deepening security risks in the Middle East, such as the Russia-Ukraine War and the US/Israel-Iran War– alongside energy supply security, supply chain continuity and the global race for critical technologies, is leading to a reshaping of defense spending. In particular, NATO’s decision to raise member states’ defense spending to 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the long term signals the start of a new era, not only in security policies but also in global industrial production and technology investment. This has sparked a debate as to whether defense spending could become the new engine of economic growth.

For many years, defense spending has been assessed within the framework of the opportunity cost approach. This approach argues that public resources allocated to defense have a restrictive effect—albeit to a relative degree—on economic growth, as they are diverted from productive sectors such as education, healthcare or infrastructure investment. However, the technological transformation and changes in the security architecture over the past twenty years have necessitated a reassessment of this approach. Today, defense expenditure is viewed not merely as current expenditure-focused public spending aimed at building military capability, but as multifaceted investments that support high-tech production, research and development (R&D) activities, and export capacity.

How do defense expenditures affect economic equilibrium?

The economic effects of defense expenditures are now analyzed not only from the perspective of fiscal policy but also from the perspectives of industrial policy and technological transformation. The economic impact of defense expenditures is realized through a multi-stage transmission mechanism. In the first stage, public expenditure stimulates demand, thereby increasing aggregate demand, expanding production volumes, raising capacity utilization rates and supporting industrial production. Due to their high capital intensity, defense projects generate increased production across numerous sub-sectors, notably machinery manufacturing, electronics, metallurgy, composite materials, software and communications technologies. Thus, defense expenditure creates a powerful multiplier mechanism that mobilizes a broad supply chain.

In the second stage, R&D investments come into play. Defense projects involve significant R&D expenditure due to their high-technology nature. Technologies developed within the defense industry are transferred to other sectors over time, thereby creating long-term positive effects on productivity.

The third stage is the external balance channel. Owing to its high technology intensity, the defense industry is one of the sectors with the highest export value per kilogram. The export of defense products contributes to the current account balance and, at the same time, enables countries to move up the global technology value chain. For this reason, the defense industry is today recognized as one of the strategic determinants of high-value-added exports.

However, the effectiveness of this transfer mechanism depends largely on domestic production capacity. In countries that procure defense systems largely through imports, increasing defense budgets lead to significant outflows of foreign exchange, whereas in economies with domestic production capacity, the same expenditure is channeled back into the economy in the form of increased production, employment, technology development and exports. Consequently, the economic return on defense expenditure is linked not so much to the size of the budget as to the extent to which expenditure can be channeled into the domestic industry.

In this new global context, Türkiye’s production capacity constitutes a notable advantage. As a result of the localization policies implemented over the past twenty years, dependence on foreign sources in the defense industry has been significantly reduced. Within the defense industry, capabilities in design, system integration and high-technology production have been markedly enhanced. Consequently, defense expenditure has evolved from a structure heavily reliant on imports to a production model that generates domestic added value.

What is the contribution of Turkish defense industry companies to the economy?

One of the most significant indicators of this transformation is Türkiye’s rise in global defense exports. Over the past twenty years, Türkiye’s share of global defense exports has grown steadily and, as a result, Türkiye has become one of the key suppliers in the global defense market. This rise in export performance demonstrates that the defense industry has transformed into a strategic production ecosystem that competes in international markets, exports technology and generates foreign exchange.

Institutional transformation is equally noteworthy. Whilst in 2009 ASELSAN was the sole company representing Türkiye amongst the world’s top 100 defense industry firms, in recent years TUSAŞ, ROKETSAN, ASFAT and MKE have joined ASELSAN on the same list. The fact that companies such as STM, HAVELSAN, FNSS and BMC have entered the global top 100 defense industry companies in different years demonstrates that Türkiye’s defense industry has evolved from a single-company-centered structure into a multi-stakeholder, deepened and technologically diversified industrial ecosystem.

This rise in international company rankings is directly reflected in Türkiye’s industrial performance. An analysis of the Istanbul Chamber of Industry’s ISO 500 survey reveals that defense industry companies are steadily strengthening their positions among Türkiye’s largest industrial organizations in terms of sales from production. It is particularly noteworthy that, as of 2025, TUSAŞ has become Türkiye’s seventh-largest industrial organization, while ASELSAN has become the ninth-largest. Export performance at the company level also confirms this transformation. While ASELSAN’s export revenues have reached an all-time high in recent years, TUSAŞ has risen to the status of a key manufacturer within global aerospace and defense supply chains, with export volumes hovering at the billion-dollar level. This picture demonstrates that the Turkish defense industry has gained international competitiveness not only in platform production but also in areas such as electronic systems, avionics solutions, software, engineering services and systems integration.

How will defense expenditure take shape in the coming period?

In this regard, NATO’s plan to accelerate defense investments over the next decade is of considerable importance for Türkiye. This does not merely signify a larger export market for Türkiye. It also holds the potential to strengthen Türkiye’s strategic position within the supply chains of NATO countries, thanks to its production infrastructure with high local content, advanced engineering capabilities and defense companies capable of competing on a global scale. The growing demand from Alliance countries for defense industry products is creating long-term investment and export opportunities for the Turkish defense industry.

In conclusion, the global defense economy has entered a new phase of structural transformation. Defense expenditure is regarded not merely as public spending to meet security needs, but as strategic investments that support technology development, high-value-added production and export capacity. In the coming period, competition between countries will be shaped not so much by the size of defense budgets, but by the capacity of industrial ecosystems to convert these budgets into production, technology and exports.

The defense industry infrastructure that Türkiye has established over the past 20 years, and in particular its clusters, will provide a significant competitive advantage during this new period of expansion in global defense spending. For this reason, the defense industry will continue to be one of the key pillars of both national security and Türkiye’s development strategy, which is based on sustainable growth, high-tech production and exports.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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he Russia-Ukraine War continues to be the primary catalyst for the process of change and adaptation that NATO is currently undergoing. Russia’s loss of its status as a partner within the Western security architecture following the attack it launched in February 2022, and its subsequent classification as a ‘threat’, has shaped the political and geopolitical dimension of the issue, whilst the military and technological aspects of the war’s conduct have also presented challenges to the Alliance’s defense and deterrence capabilities. Measures relating to this process featured as key issues on the agenda of the Ankara Summit and in the Summit Declaration.

Political-geopolitical dimension

It comes as no surprise that the Ankara Summit Declaration defines Russia as a long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security and stability, as the prevailing view amongst the vast majority of allies is that Russia’s objectives are not limited to Ukraine. This view underpins the rapid increase in defense spending across the Alliance, the removal of barriers to defence industry production, and the strong continuation of military and non-military support for Ukraine.

Since February 2022, NATO’s top priority has been to strengthen the Alliance’s capabilities, whilst the second has been to ensure the sustainability of Ukraine’s combat capabilities. To date, 99 per cent of the military aid provided to Ukraine has come from NATO allies. We can see that this resolve has been maintained at the Ankara Summit, as evidenced by the scale of the support package announced. Whilst the allies have pledged 70 billion euros’ worth of military aid to Ukraine for 2026, this figure has also been set as the baseline for the following year.

What is particularly noteworthy here is that this aid will be funded largely by the European Union (EU). With the Ukraine Support Facility adopted in April 2026, the EU had decided to provide Ukraine with 30 billion euros in financial aid and 60 billion euros in military aid for the period 2026–2027. It should be recalled that in March 2025, all US military aid to Ukraine was cut off, and the flow of American weapons to Ukraine could only be maintained through the intervention of European countries.

On the other hand, the statement in the Ankara Summit Declaration that Ukraine is contributing to transatlantic security by fighting against Russia is significant, as it indicates that the allies recognize Ukraine as a major military power. Speaking at the Defence Industry Forum held on the sidelines of the summit, Ukrainian President Zelensky emphasized that his country is no longer an actor seeking security but one that produces it, and that Ukraine has become an ‘extraordinary source of defense capability’ for Europe. Whilst there is some truth in Zelensky’s remarks, linking this to NATO membership does not seem realistic at this stage, as the war is ongoing and, even if a lasting peace were to be achieved, the US administration’s unequivocally negative stance on the matter is well known.

Military and industrial dimension

The Russia-Ukraine War has highlighted the critical importance of defense industry production and innovation in the theatre of war. With the intensive use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), artillery munitions and various missile systems, the war has turned into an industrial race in design and production. The rapid, innovative and high-volume production of these systems has had a direct impact on the combatants’ success on the ground. This can be seen in the changing nature of UAV warfare. Today, on the battlefield, UAV systems are being used not merely to target isolated tactical elements, but to shape the battlefield itself.

New-generation UAV systems have played a major role in the war taking on a distinctly positional character from late 2023 onwards and in manoevristic operations coming to a virtual standstill. The ‘kill zones’—areas 10–15 kilometers deep where artillery fire and electronic warfare have intensified alongside the use of UAV systems—have transformed the war into a series of battles taking place in isolated areas. Efforts by the opposing sides to gain the upper hand, whether through kamikaze attacks using UAVs or by deploying them to drop explosives from above, are concentrated in these zones.

The race for innovation, which is characterized by constant dynamism on the Russia-Ukraine warfront, is also taking place in the field of unmanned maritime and land vehicles. For example, whilst it has been observed over the past year that Ukraine has begun to utilize unmanned maritime systems (UMS) much more intensively and effectively, we are now seeing new-generation amphibious operation trials aimed at deploying unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) – transported by UMS – to critical areas. Ukraine’s recent operation on the Kinburn Peninsula has been described as the first unmanned amphibious operation in history.

Ukraine’s increasing military power

Looking at the current course of the war, it is clear that Ukraine has, over the past few months, acquired an increasing ability to strike targets within Russia. Ukraine is specifically targeting bridges, motorways, railways and fuel tankers with the aim of disrupting Russia’s logistical capabilities. The reason for this is to thwart Russia’s ability to launch a new offensive during the spring and summer months. Similarly, these attacks aim to isolate the Donbas region from occupied Crimea through the selection of specific geographical targets (thereby blocking the use of the corridor between them). Judging by the results of Ukraine’s attacks and the pace of Russian advances, it appears that this objective has so far been achieved with considerable success.

The impact of these systems on the war extends beyond the battlefield. As a result of drone and missile attacks by both sides, the agricultural sectors of both Ukraine and Russia have suffered serious damage. Long-range missile and UAV attacks are disrupting the production of grain, wheat and sunflower oil, either directly or indirectly, whilst the targeting of Russian ships carrying wheat in the Sea of Azov by UAV systems is also producing negative consequences for the global market.

Similarly, it must be noted that unmanned systems are also having an impact on the sociological dimension of the war. For example, it is well known that UAV systems flying at low altitude and then diving create great fear amongst the civilian population. Last week, a spokesperson for the Ukrainian Air Force highlighted this situation, emphasizing that Russia’s jet-powered Shahed UAVs were flying at high speed at low altitude and that Russia’s aim was to force the residents of Kyiv to flee the city. In this regard, the prospect of unmanned systems becoming part of systematic intimidation and terror-inducing operations targeting the civilian population in the medium to long term represents a critical risk.

NATO’s comprehensive budget

All these factors have led NATO to establish a comprehensive budget and adopt reform processes in the fields of unmanned systems and their countermeasures (counter-UAS). Whilst it was announced at the Ankara Summit that the Alliance would undertake defense procurement worth 50 billion dollars, the ‘Drone Edge’ initiative, worth 40 billion dollars, was also launched to support anti-UAV systems. By the end of 2027, the allies have committed to increasing the number of UAV operators fivefold. Consequently, unmanned systems – which are shaping modern warfare – constitute a significant part of NATO’s military capability requirements, an issue that has largely been brought to the fore through discussions on budget increases.

Similarly, new steps are being taken to remove obstacles to defense industry cooperation – an area Turkey has long advocated for, but whose importance within the Alliance has only become apparent in recent years, and which can be understood in the context of production shortcomings. Initiatives announced at the Ankara Summit, such as ‘NATO Front Door for Industry’ and ‘NATO Engine’, aim to achieve greater integration of defense industries on a transatlantic scale.

Until now, the focus within NATO has been on military interoperability; however, modern warfare has highlighted the necessity of industrial interoperability to meet defense industry requirements. Indeed, the interoperability issues observed with Western-manufactured 155-millimeter artillery ammunition in the Ukrainian theatre had already demonstrated the inevitable need for close coordination between military operations and defense production.

Consequently, the Russia-Ukraine War remains NATO’s top priority. Despite transatlantic divisions and pro-Russian allegations leveled at Donald Trump, the fact that Russia continues to be defined as a long-term threat in the Ankara Summit Declaration is noteworthy in this regard. Similarly, the continuation of strong support for Ukraine also points to the same conclusion. In this sense, whilst the dynamics of transatlantic relations will determine the political dimension of the transformation taking place within NATO, the Russia–Ukraine War and the war’s innovation dynamics will continue to shape the process of change and adaptation in the Alliance’s military capabilities.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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he 36th NATO Summit, held in Ankara on July 7-8, 2026, saw US President Trump state that he had attended the summit solely out of respect for President Erdoğan; the ‘NATO 3.0’ agenda was realized; and, contrary to some experts’ expectations, there was no rift within the alliance. Türkiye’s excellent hosting, which continues to make the country the talk of the town, the efforts by the Israeli delegation throughout the summit to shift the agenda and overshadow the summit were equally striking.

The main factor driving Israel to make such desperate moves was Trump’s pre-summit remarks, in which he suggested that Türkiye might be supplied with F-110 jet engines and the fifth-generation F-35 fighter jets—which had been withheld since 2019—and that the CAATSA sanctions, in place since 2020, might be lifted. On the other hand, Türkiye’s hosting of the summit during such a critical period, President Erdoğan’s meetings on the sidelines of the summit with over 40 heads of state and government on the sidelines of the summit, and, of course, the organization of a defense industry exhibition showcasing Türkiye’s national and domestically produced defence industry products – a first in NATO history – have driven Israel to distraction.

The most significant reason driving Israel to such a state of exasperation and pushing it to make irrational moves is the sense of insecurity that has arisen both within Israel and in the American public sphere due to the stalemate in the war against Iran and the fact that, contrary to promises, an absolute victory has not yet been achieved. Conversely, the fact that Türkiye is viewed as one of the factors hindering Israel’s success due to its role in the war against Iran, coupled with the fact that relations between Türkiye and the US have come to take precedence over those between Israel and the US, is seen as a cause setting off alarm bells and leading Israel to pull out all the stops simultaneously.

It would therefore be useful to highlight the ‘Israel factor’ in Turkish-American relations by examining the rivalry between Türkiye and Israel, mediated through the US and Trump, and the methods Israel employed to persuade the Trump administration to withdraw its support for Türkiye.

Israel’s divergent stance as Turkish-US relations improve

Despite the improvement in Turkish-US relations during Trump’s first term—following the strained relations of Obama’s second term, which is regarded as a crisis period—full normalization could not be achieved due to the dominance of the Zionist lobby over Trump. Indeed, despite all claims of an improvement in bilateral relations, the Pastor Brunson crisis, the Halkbank crisis, threats of economic attacks and the imposition of CAATSA sanctions on Türkiye following its exclusion from the F-35 program all took place during the Trump era. Following the Biden era, which was marked by very frosty Turkish-American relations, Trump’s second presidential term was of paramount importance for both Türkiye and Israel, and both countries had high expectations of Trump from their respective perspectives.

However, Trump had not forgotten what he had gone through after losing the 2020 election; whilst he projected a warm image to the public, it was said that behind the scenes he had distanced himself from Netanyahu, viewing the latter’s relationship with Biden as a betrayal. At the same time, he did not hesitate to publicly express his affection and respect for President Erdoğan, thereby drawing a clear distinction between Erdoğan and Netanyahu. We saw the repercussions of this distinction clearly when, due to developments in Syria, Netanyahu complained to Trump at the White House about Türkiye and President Erdoğan. Indeed, Trump’s response to Netanyahu – “you must be reasonable too” – caused great disappointment on the Israeli side, whilst in Türkiye it was interpreted as Trump taking Türkiye’s side.

Similarly, whilst Trump supported Israel’s attacks on Gaza on the one hand, he did not remain indifferent to the prospect of reaching a ceasefire in Gaza through Türkiyey’s mediation on the other. Similarly, regarding developments in Syria, he has aligned himself closely with Türkiye’s position; despite all of Israel’s objections, he recognised Ahmed Shara as a legitimate interlocutor and provided the necessary support to ensure Syria’s territorial integrity.

The speeches and pledges made by Trump during his Middle East tour in May and at the meeting he held in New York in September with the heads of state and government of Muslim countries, on the occasion of the opening of the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly, are also significant in that they demonstrate that the US occupies a different position from Israel regarding the region’s future. This is because the ceasefire process in Gaza began after this date.

The Iran card

Realizing it could not influence Trump through Gaza and Syria, Israel attempted to win him over by playing the Iran card; however, it was once again disappointed when, in June 2025, despite Trump ordering strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities during the 12-Day War, he refrained from intervening in the conflict. However, by any means necessary, Israel managed to drag the US into war with Iran on 28 February, hoping that this would enable it to achieve the regime change in Iran it had long dreamt of and thereby reorganise the region as it saw fit. Yet Israel’s plans failed, and the Iranian people reacted strongly against the assassination of their religious leader, standing firmly behind their government.

The deadlock in the war with Iran has, on the one hand, led the US to reassess its approach to the region, whilst on the other, it has prompted a re-evaluation of its alliance with Israel. It was during this period that Türkiye stepped in once again; together with Qatar and Pakistan, it opened the door to negotiations, making it possible to secure a ceasefire between the US and Iran. Israel, however, found itself isolated as the sole country wishing for the war to continue; whilst continuing its attacks on the Lebanese front, it began doing everything in its power to undermine the ceasefire between the US and Iran.

Israel’s stance has been criticised on numerous occasions by both Trump and Vice-President JD Vance. The events unfolding in the region are particularly telling in demonstrating just how hollow Israel’s long-standing rhetoric about ‘actors posing a threat to it in the region’ really is. For far from certain actors in the region posing a threat to Israel, it has become undeniable that Israel itself constitutes a threat to the entire region and is the sole actor destabilising the region.

This situation has also put a strain on the so-called unshakeable alliance between Israel and the US. For Israel, particularly due to the aggressive and intransigent policies it has pursued under Netanyahu’s leadership, has become an unbearable burden for the US. Given this, it has become inevitable for the Trump administration to opt to work alongside a strong, conciliatory actor such as Türkiye, which prioritises regional stability. However, this situation has thoroughly infuriated Israel. Believing itself to be—and to remain—the US’s sole ally in the region, Israel has jeopardised both its own future and the region’s stability by resorting to endless intrigues aimed at discrediting, and even weakening, the US’s other regional ally, Türkiye.

Israel’s attempts to overshadow the NATO Summit

Türkiye is the country that has shown the strongest reaction to Israel’s attacks on Gaza and the crimes of genocide it has committed there. Whilst, on the one hand, it has given concrete expression to its response by imposing certain sanctions on Israel in accordance with its own domestic law, on the other hand, it is monitoring proceedings before both the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice, and is fighting to ensure that Israel is brought to justice and receives the necessary punishment for the genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity it has committed. In addition to this, Türkiye’s position regarding developments in Syria and its role in the Iran War have led Israel to target Türkiye, giving rise to the narrative that ‘after Iran, the new target is Türkiye’.

At a time when Israel was attempting to position Türkiye as the ‘new Iran’, and just before the critical NATO summit, Trump’s announcement to Türkiye that F-110 jet engines and F-35 fighter jets would be supplied, and that CAATSA sanctions would be lifted, naturally caused the Israeli administration to panic. As a result, Netanyahu—who had been unable to reach Trump in the run-up to the summit—appeared on US media outlets during the summit, stating: “Türkiye is not a good ally; Israel is the US’s true ally, the sale of F-35s to Türkiye would jeopardize Israel’s security and that of other US allies in the region (by which he meant Greece and the Greek Cypriots), and the CAATSA sanctions imposed on Türkiye must never be lifted”, in an attempt to influence American public opinion and, thereby, exert pressure on Trump to back down.

Whilst the whole world was discussing just how wonderfully Türkiye had hosted the summit, noting that, thanks to President Erdoğan, differences of opinion within NATO had not spilled over into the summit, and that, ultimately, a consensus had emerged in the final communiqué regarding the strengthening of NATO—and whilst praise for Türkiye was at its peak— it has been observed that certain journalists—who are clearly funded by Israel and Jewish capital—have been questioning Türkiye’s role within NATO, criticizing the security measures taken for the summit, and, worse still, raising issues that have absolutely no connection to the summit and relate entirely to processes governed by Türkiye’s domestic law, thereby asking questions and writing articles aimed at creating the perception that there is no democracy or fair trial in Türkiye.

At the conclusion of the summit, the fact that Israel was found to be behind the so-called intelligence suggesting a possible attack on the new Air Force One aircraft—a gift from Qatar which Trump used on his visit to Ankara—was viewed as an attempt by Israel to cast a shadow over the summit. Furthermore, by doing so, they sought to spread the perception that Türkiye is unsafe, whilst also sabotaging the process by presenting a pretext to derail the negotiations between the US and Iran. It must not be forgotten that, in the world, the sole country capable of carrying out such attacks is Israel rather than Iran, and history is replete with examples of this.

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ermany’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) marked a turning point both in the shaping of the post-Second World War European security architecture and in Germany’s reintegration into the international system. Following its defeat in 1945 and the subsequent division between East and West Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) found itself on the front line of the Cold War.

Within this geopolitical reality, under the leadership of its first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, Germany saw ‘integration with the West’ (Westbindung) as the sole means of regaining the country’s sovereignty, securing its safety and forging lasting ties with the Western world. Germany’s membership of NATO, which took shape in line with Adenauer’s strategic vision and was formalized on 6 May 1955, represented not merely participation in a military alliance, but also a historic paradigm shift that reinforced Germany’s democratic identity and redefined the balance of power in continental Europe.

With its NATO membership, Germany began to re-establish a regular army and rearm. The fact that Germany was on the ‘hot front’ of the Cold War—a situation in which it could become the direct centre of hostilities in a potential conflict—is best understood through Chancellor Adenauer’s statement: ‘The sole aim of Germany’s rearmament is to contribute to the preservation of peace.’

Germany’s NATO objectives: Peace or the pursuit of economic interests?

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Cold War giving way to regional hot conflicts, the late 1990s and early 2000s saw Germany playing an active role within NATO. In addition to its participation in the Kosovo Peacekeeping Force (KFOR) in the Balkans, Germany’s deployment of troops to the US-led operations in Afghanistan in 2001, at NATO’s request, is particularly noteworthy. Germany’s participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – established by a United Nations resolution and subsequently placed under NATO command – with a force that at times exceeded 5,000 troops, is regarded as the largest overseas military mission in modern German history.

In an interview given during a visit to German troops in Afghanistan in 2010, the then German President Horst Köhler stated that Germany’s overseas military mission should be viewed in a different light, remarking: “As a country of our size, as a country focused on foreign trade and therefore dependent on it, we must recognise that military intervention may also be necessary to protect our interests when required or in emergencies – for example, to secure free trade routes or to prevent regional instability – as such instability would undoubtedly have a negative impact on our opportunities in terms of trade, employment and income. ‘All of this must be discussed, and in my view, our situation is not all that bad…’ he had stated.

Horst Köhler’s remarks, made at a time when there had also been military casualties, raised questions about the constitutionality of Germany’s role in ISAF whilst also sparking intense domestic political debate; Horst Köhler subsequently resigned from the office of President.

Similar remarks were made by the then Federal Minister of Defence, Peter Struck, in December 2002, when the decision was taken to continue sending troops to Afghanistan. In a speech to the Federal Parliament, Struck said: “To clarify the matter, I had mentioned that our security is also defended in the Hindu Kush. ‘When we combat international terrorism alongside our allies and partners—using military means where necessary—in the very places where it originates, Germany becomes a safer place. Our security is further enhanced when the Bundeswehr successfully participates in the reconstruction process in the Balkans and Afghanistan, in accordance with democratic principles, thereby helping to establish the secure environment urgently required in these regions.”

These remarks, which are still the subject of debate today, signalled the dawn of a new era in German foreign policy at the time they were made. They marked the beginning of a new phase in which German foreign policy was no longer confined to defending its own borders, but also encompassed international preventive efforts. National interests were aligned with international interests, thereby justifying a military presence beyond Germany’s borders.

Despite all the past debates, although the number of troops is smaller, Germany still maintains a military presence at 17 locations with 2,000 troops as part of various NATO missions.

NATO or a European common defense system, or both?

Another initiative coinciding with this turning point in Germany’s foreign policy from a military perspective was the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP – Gemeinsame Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik), which was proposed at the European Union summit in Cologne in 1999 under Germany’s presidency and officially incorporated into the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. The CSDP, which was officially implemented in 2009, also led to the establishment of the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs through the provisions added to the Treaty of Lisbon. Just as in the NATO Treaty, the provision for a call for assistance and support, to be activated at the request of a member state, was also incorporated into the Treaty of Lisbon, thereby giving the CSDP practical effect. The first to invoke this provision, by requesting assistance and support, was French President Hollande following the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015.

With 23 member states within NATO, the EU began setting strategic objectives through the CSDP to enable the EU to meet the expectations placed upon it as a security actor operating on a global scale. In 2020, under Germany’s Presidency, the ‘Strategic Compass’ was launched as the key document of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), setting out a clear direction and defining both the policy’s objectives and the necessary resources to achieve them. The first joint threat analysis by EU Member States was drawn up. The Strategic Compass also aims to foster even better cooperation in the field of security and defence and to enable the EU to respond more swiftly and effectively to crises through forward planning.

The EU Global Strategy, developed in 2016, stands out as a new and shared commitment regarding the security policies of Member States, whilst steps were also taken that same year to establish the EU Common Defence Fund under the CSDP.

Although the CSDP may at first glance appear to be an alternative to NATO, it is a structure without a standing army or an existing military chain of command. Since 2020, whilst the EU has undertaken various global missions under the CSDP, joint operations with NATO have also taken place.

Within the EU, a group of countries led by France argue that Europe must become an independent military and strategic actor, separate from the other side of the Atlantic. However, the former Warsaw Pact members that joined the Union through eastern enlargement—Poland, Romania, Hungary and the Baltic states—view NATO as an irreplaceable security umbrella for Eastern Europe. These states, which view Russia as a direct existential threat, currently regard the CSDP’s military deterrence as inadequate and position NATO—which hosts US nuclear and conventional capabilities—as the absolute preference for their own national defence. These countries advocate that the transatlantic bond must not be severed.

Furthermore, the rule within the EU requiring unanimous decision-making on CSDP matters hinders the EU’s ability to respond swiftly and effectively to crises. This situation impedes the CSDP’s operational capabilities.

Germany, meanwhile, is endeavouring to strengthen the CSDP whilst simultaneously seeking to bolster its role within NATO by increasing its defence budget. Ahead of the NATO summit, Germany – which had been criticised by the US President for not increasing its defence budget sufficiently and for failing to provide adequate support within NATO – has already countered Trump’s criticisms through Chancellor Merz, stating that defence spending has now reached 4 per cent of annual gross domestic product.

The debate over the relationship between NATO and the EU’s CSDP was also raised during Chancellor Merz’s meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during his visit to Ankara. President Erdoğan emphasised to Chancellor Merz that preserving the ‘Transatlantic Bond’ was crucial for strengthening NATO’s European pillar, and stressed that Turkey could support the European Union’s defence initiatives provided they complemented NATO. This situation demonstrates, on the one hand, that the CSDP is being closely monitored in Ankara and, on the other, that it has once again been emphasised that, from Turkey’s perspective, a common defence strategy against global threats must be defined within the framework of NATO. However, Merz’s statement that ‘a new European NATO is being established’ has failed to provide any indication as to what role the CSDP will play within NATO.

Turkey-Germany relations in the context of NATO

Relations between Turkey and Germany, which form NATO’s south-eastern flank, have followed a contentious course due to geopolitical shifts, diverging strategic priorities, Germany’s approach to Turkey’s cross-border operations, and the ‘clash of national interests’ between the two countries within the alliance. The fundamental strategic disagreement between Turkey and Germany stems from the asymmetrical nature of their threat perceptions. As a border state directly affected by instability in its immediate region (Syria, Iraq and the Mediterranean), Turkey prioritizes issues such as ‘counter-terrorism’ and ‘safeguarding territorial integrity’—not only its own but also that of its neighbors—whilst Germany has adopted a stance that disregards Turkey’s determination in the fight against terrorism.

During the Syrian civil war, following an increase in the ballistic missile threat against Turkey, Turkey requested an air defense system from NATO. In response to this request, Germany deployed the Patriot missile defense system to Kahramanmaraş; however, in 2015, despite the threat persisting, Germany withdrew the Patriot missile defence systems prematurely, citing Turkey’s counter-terrorism policies as justification. This situation, which led to a serious loss of trust in Germany and called into question NATO’s deterrent capability, persisted until recently.

Despite the friendly and warm remarks made by Merz in Ankara, Germany; its embrace of the PKK and FETÖ, the fact that these organizations still find a foothold in Germany, and the German state’s belief that by providing a platform for these terrorist organizations it could politically weaken Turkey, indicate that relations will not improve in the short term and that the alliance between the two countries within NATO will continue to be turbulent for some time to come.

Among the key issues included in the latest coalition agreement—that is, the government program—regarding Germany’s role within NATO are improvements to the federal armed forces’ contingents deployed as part of NATO’s defense efforts and an increase in military equipment. It has been stated that, due to its geographical location in Europe, Germany will be further strengthened as a central hub of NATO. Similarly, the government program views NATO as one of the cornerstones of the transatlantic partnership and emphasizes its indispensability for European security.

Among the objectives is the commitment to work towards establishing a European Defence Union with the aim of strengthening NATO’s European pillar. This objective is also in line with the argument that Germany must become more Europeanized in order for NATO to remain ‘Transatlantic’. In doing so, it also intends to pursue a trilateral cooperation protocol with France and the United Kingdom.

Whilst Germany is moving towards becoming a logistics hub within NATO, it will, at the same time, seek to bring together its EU member allies under a common budget and logistics framework by utilizing the CSDP mechanisms within the EU to strengthen NATO. In the long term, it will seek to secure its economic and political leadership on the European continent through its strength in the defense industry and its military power.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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he military operation launched by the US and Israel against Iran on February 28, 2026, which has now evolved into a fragile ceasefire, has reopened the debate on NATO’s institutional and geographical boundaries. The Trump administration’s stance, demanding that its European allies make their airspace and military bases available for use, as well as deploying active naval assets to the Strait of Hormuz, has triggered a structural tension within the Alliance.

Whilst Article 5 of the Treaty limits the obligation of collective defense to attacks on the territories of member states in Europe or North America, Article 6 further narrows this geographical scope by clarifying the definition of the ‘North Atlantic area’. Although the fact that the Washington–Tehran crisis unfolded entirely outside NATO’s formal area of responsibility provided a legal basis for the Alliance to refrain from taking the initiative as an actor, strategic considerations have been the decisive factor here. Although the Alliance claims to be a ‘global security actor’, its members prefer to define the organization as a regional defense pact, whilst avoiding turning their ‘out-of-area’ engagements into an institutional obligation.

Trump’s demands and Europe’s alliance dilemma

The most striking manifestation of the crisis at the operational level is the profound asymmetry between the expectations of the hegemonic power and the allies’ capacity to resist. Washington’s demands have gone beyond a classic burden-sharing debate to become a test of loyalty for the allies. The main objection raised from the European side in the face of this demanding stance is the political rejection that the process has been escalated without consultation with the allies and that ‘the war in question is not Europe’s war’. During this process, Spain adopted the toughest stance by closing its military bases and airspace to US use; Italy demanded strict prior coordination, whilst France and the UK raised various reservations regarding the allocation of bases.

However, despite these restrictive decisions, the European continent – led by Germany – effectively served as a vital logistical base for American military operations. As the crisis deepened and Iran began retaliatory strikes against Gulf states, France, Italy and the UK deployed their military forces to the region to fend off missile and drone attacks, thereby taking up active positions on secondary fronts. On the other hand, whilst the closure of the Strait of Hormuz dealt a severe blow to Europe’s economic interests, the capacity limitations of their own armed forces and their reluctance to be drawn into a conflict imposed by the US led European states to reject Trump’s demand to reopen the strait by military force. This collective refusal by Europe paved the way for Trump to accuse his allies of disloyalty and to threaten to withdraw the US from NATO.

This situation has left European decision-makers facing a classic ‘alliance dilemma’. Allies found themselves caught between, on the one hand, the fear of being drawn into a conflict in the Middle East (entrapment) in the name of US regional interests, and, on the other, the anxiety of being abandoned (abandonment) without the protection of the American security umbrella in the face of the Russian threat. This structural impasse has pushed Europe towards a strategy of ‘active inertia’, one that appeases the US politically whilst refraining from military engagement.

Legal basis for operations outside Article 5

Two historical precedents in which NATO was able to take action even in crises falling outside the scope of Article 5 provide an important comparison of how this structural limitation can be overcome. The Alliance’s military engagement in the Bosnian crisis (1992–1995), which it experienced during the post-Cold War period, was based on a process of deriving legitimacy directly through the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) phased authorisation mechanisms. Similarly, in Libya, the Alliance’s basis of legitimacy was derived not from its own founding articles but from the UN Security Council’s authorisation to protect civilians (Resolution 1973);

NATO became the institutional vehicle implementing this authorisation due to its command-and-control capabilities, yet the composition of participants remained variable, with members such as Germany remaining on the sidelines. The possibility of this scenario being repeated in the Iran crisis is structurally precluded: Russia and China’s veto powers on the Security Council block any Bosnia- or Libya-style authorisation from the outset. This has reinforced the conclusion that NATO has no capacity to take institutional action on the Iran issue, either within its own Articles 5 and 6 framework or through the UN; consequently, the only realistic option remaining is individual or coalition-based action centred on the US-Israel axis.

Furthermore, the Alliance’s structural fissures are manifesting themselves in various ways on the ground. The Alliance’s past operations against piracy in the Gulf of Aden or its missions to combat terrorism and smuggling in the Mediterranean demonstrate a modest yet functional capacity for action that underpins NATO’s claim to protect global trade routes. However, these historical examples are fundamentally at odds with the military and political nature of the threat in the Strait of Hormuz: Whilst operations in the Gulf of Aden or the Mediterranean are policing-style missions conducted against weak and non-state actors, patrolling under the NATO flag in the Strait of Hormuz amounts to engaging in a direct show of force with a sovereign state possessing advanced ballistic capabilities.

Indeed, this structural incompatibility came to the fore as recently as 2019, amidst the deepening US-Iran nuclear crisis and a situation where attacks on oil tankers were threatening global trade. At that time, rather than uniting under a common umbrella, NATO members established two separate naval forces, each operating independently and guided by opposing strategic rationales: the US-led IMSC (2019), focused solely on military deterrence, and the French-led EMASOH (2020), which aimed solely at diplomatic de-escalation without being drawn into the US–Iran conflict. The fact that this two-pronged structure, with its conflicting objectives, has been established outside NATO has clearly demonstrated that the Alliance lacks a shared perception of threat and the capacity for joint decision-making in ‘out-of-scope’ crisis regions.

Turkey as a NATO member

The evasive manoevres of European allies are transforming into a far more complex geographical and strategic equation centered on Turkey, which forms the Alliance’s south-eastern flank. Turkey’s long-standing border with Iran and its reflexes to preserve the regional balance of power, combined with a normative opposition to Israel’s military doctrine, are keeping Ankara away from kinetic conflict and forcing it into a conciliatory diplomacy.

Whilst this strategy of isolation is accepted by Washington, strategic infrastructure integrated into NATO, such as the Kürecik radar and Incirlik Air Base, which Turkey hosts on its own territory, creates structural pressure and the risk of ‘spatial entrapment’. To prevent these facilities from being instrumentalized by the US for unilateral operational intelligence or pre-emptive strikes, Ankara has blocked American manoevres by strictly limiting the rules of use within the Alliance’s formal defense framework. This stance demonstrates that geographical realities shape a security framework far more decisively than Alliance texts.

Ultimately, the ‘active inaction’ strategy developed by European states whilst caught in the ‘alliance dilemma’, alongside Turkey’s efforts to restrict the use of NATO infrastructure under its sovereignty to counter the risk of ‘spatial drift’, have clearly demonstrated that the allies will not unconditionally align themselves with a hegemonic power’s unilateral regional conflict. Although Donald Trump has sought to portray the Alliance as a weak and ‘ineffective’ institution in the eyes of the public, citing the allies’ rhetorical distancing and limited support as justification, the logistical and operational realities on the ground point to the exact opposite.

The difficulties the US has faced throughout the crisis against Iran, which possesses asymmetric capabilities, have clearly highlighted the limits of unilateral force projection, despite its military superiority. Ultimately, this crisis has paradoxically demonstrated the extent to which a hegemonic power needs the strategic depth and structural alliance architecture offered by its allies in order to consolidate its regional presence and project power.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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he fact that security dynamics in the international system have taken on a nature that transcends regional boundaries necessitates that NATO summits be interpreted from a broader perspective. For this reason, assessing NATO summits solely from the perspective of European security has become increasingly inadequate in recent years. Although the Russia–Ukraine War continues to dominate the Alliance’s agenda, the summits also provide a significant body of data in terms of illustrating how the relationship between Euro-Atlantic security and strategic developments in the Indo-Pacific is being redefined.

In particular, China’s rise, the deepening of the US-China great power rivalry on a global scale, growing awareness of the vulnerability of critical infrastructure and supply chains, and issues such as advanced technologies and maritime security are key areas that inevitably extend NATO’s security agenda beyond Europe. Consequently, the NATO summits held in recent years have conveyed strategic messages that concern not only Europe’s security architecture but also the future of the Indo-Pacific and, by extension, the global system.

The Indo-Pacific agenda in the capital of NATO’s closest ally in Asia

Viewed from this perspective, the Ankara Summit harbors a turning point that warrants careful analysis from an Indo-Pacific perspective. For the first time in NATO’s history, the Alliance’s Indo-Pacific agenda was brought to the table in the capital of NATO’s closest ally to Asia; moreover, it has laid the foundations for a new strategy regarding the region within NATO. At this very point, when the process is examined from a chronological perspective, a critical paradox emerges between the institutional visibility provided by the summits and NATO’s actual engagement with the Indo-Pacific.

Looking at the course of events, the foundations of the transatlantic approach within NATO were laid not, as is often stated, at the 2022 Madrid Summit, but in fact at the 2008 Bucharest Summit. With the Bucharest Summit, the impact of security developments outside Europe on the Alliance became more apparent, whilst global partnerships became an integral part of NATO’s long-term strategic vision. This approach was taken to a new level at the Madrid Summit, where China was defined for the first time as a ‘systemic challenge’ in the NATO Strategic Concept; whilst the leaders of the Indo-Pacific Quartet (IP4), comprising Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, were invited to a NATO summit for the first time.

Alongside this highly significant development, the approach that European-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security cannot be assessed in isolation from one another has gained institutional visibility not only at the rhetorical level but also in summit diplomacy. The 2023 Vilnius Summit holds particular significance as it represents the first stage in the attempt to institutionalize this initiative. Although the initiative to establish a NATO liaison office in Japan had the potential to become the Alliance’s first institutional presence in Asia and to demonstrate that NATO was supporting the US strategy of containing China, it could not be implemented due to objections led by France and supported by Germany.

At the 2024 Washington Summit, however, against the backdrop of US-China tensions and the emphasis on the ‘China Threat’, the rhetoric towards China hardened further, and Beijing was labelled as an actor providing indirect support to Russia by acting as a ‘decisive factor’ in the war in Ukraine. However, this hardening of rhetoric in Washington has not been reflected to the same extent in institutional expansion; and, partly due to the EU’s call for ‘strategic autonomy’, even the issue of the liaison office in Tokyo has not been brought back onto the agenda.

From visible strategies to covert operational warfare

The fundamental shift in NATO’s Indo-Pacific strategy became apparent at the summits in The Hague and Ankara. Declarations from previous summits, which contained detailed assessments of China and the Indo-Pacific, have been replaced by shorter texts focused on strengthening Europe’s defense capabilities. In this regard, issues such as increasing defense spending, developing the defense industry’s production capacity, burden-sharing and collective deterrence, issues centered on alliance-internal development, have gained a more pronounced priority compared to previous summits.

At the same time, it is a well-known fact that the participation of IP4 countries at leadership level has gradually declined during this period, and that, for the most part, the leaders of these countries sent their defense or foreign ministers to the summits up until the Ankara Summit. Similarly, the process that began with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s decision not to attend the summit in 2024 has been mirrored by other countries in subsequent years; by the time of the Ankara Summit, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung stood out as the only IP4 head of state to attend the two-day summit.

Although this pattern, stretching from 2008 to the present day, might at first glance be interpreted as indicating a decline in NATO’s interest in the Indo-Pacific, it is important to recognize the existence of a different trend during the same period. Whilst institutional visibility has relatively diminished, functional cooperation between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners has shifted towards more concrete areas. At the IP4 meetings held in Ankara, alongside common security issues such as the war in Ukraine, China, North Korea and Iran, defense industry, critical technologies, cyber security, strategic communication and industrial cooperation were brought to the fore. Similarly, Japan’s initiative to join NATO’s Defense Innovation Accelerator (DIANA) program demonstrates that technology-based cooperation with non-allied countries is being taken to a new level.

The signing of a memorandum of understanding between the US, Japan and South Korea during the summit, aimed at the deployment of small modular reactors (SMRs) in third countries, also demonstrates that security cooperation is not limited to the military sphere; it has expanded to encompass areas such as energy technologies, critical infrastructure and strategic production capacity. Consequently, the chronological progression and the developments that have stood out at the last two summits indicate a shift in the nature of engagement rather than a retreat in NATO’s Indo-Pacific policy. The political symbols, leaders’ photographs and initiatives to establish a NATO liaison office in Tokyo that characterized the Madrid and Vilnius periods are giving way to a partnership model that is increasingly less visible but more functional.

In other words, NATO’s relations with the Indo-Pacific are now deepening largely through defense industry, technological innovation, critical infrastructure, supply chains, cyber resilience and joint production capacity. The relative decline in institutional visibility does not imply a weakening of functional integration; on the contrary, the two processes are moving in opposite directions.

The China dilemma

Of course, attributing this transformation solely to Washington’s shifting strategic priorities and the challenges within NATO would result in a flawed analysis. Undoubtedly, the US has, particularly in recent times, been demanding that its European allies assume greater defense responsibilities and views the strengthening of Europe’s defense capabilities as one of the prerequisites for redirecting its strategic focus and resources more effectively towards the Indo-Pacific. However, this is not the sole factor explaining the transformation in NATO’s Indo-Pacific policy. Differing threat perceptions within the Alliance and the nature of economic relations with China also significantly shape this process.

The fact that 23 of NATO’s 32 members are also members of the European Union necessitates striking a delicate balance between the security narrative regarding China and economic interests. For many European countries, whilst China is an actor with whom strategic competition is becoming increasingly pronounced, it remains a partner that is difficult to do without in terms of trade, investment, critical technologies and supply chains.

Consequently, whilst shared security concerns regarding China are reflected in NATO documents, it appears difficult to speak of full consensus amongst allies regarding the extent to which this rhetoric will be translated into institutional and operational policies. At the Vilnius Summit, the blocking of the initiative to establish a NATO liaison office in Japan, led by France, can be regarded as one of the most concrete examples of this divergence.

Similarly, the diplomatic contacts that Western leaders have recently maintained with Beijing also indicate that a more pragmatic approach has been adopted, one in which competition and engagement are pursued simultaneously. The messages conveyed by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney during his visit to Beijing regarding the transformation of the global order, alongside US President Donald Trump’s pursuit of direct diplomatic contact with China and the messages he delivered during his visit to Beijing, demonstrate that competition in the security sphere does not imply a complete severing of economic and diplomatic ties.

This situation also partly explains the shift in tone observed in NATO’s rhetoric towards China. Consequently, the fact that China featured to a more limited extent at the Ankara Summit compared to previous years can be interpreted not as a weakening of the perception of threat, but rather as a reflection of the strategic balance being sought within NATO between security priorities and economic interdependence. It is precisely for this reason that the Ankara Summit represents a turning point, not signifying that NATO is distancing itself from the Indo-Pacific, but rather that it is redefining its engagement with the region by adapting to the strategic and economic realities brought about by the changing international system.

In the coming period, the key factor determining the direction of this transformation will be not so much the communiqués to be issued, but rather the concrete collaborations to be developed between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners in critical defense sectors. For this reason, the Ankara Summit appears worthy of being remembered not as a summit at which NATO distanced itself from the Indo-Pacific, but as a threshold at which the Alliance reformatted its strategic engagement with the region in line with new geopolitical realities.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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he Republic of Turkey hosted a NATO Summit once again after a gap of twenty-two years. Whilst the Ukraine–Russia War has triggered a shift in the perception of threats in Europe, the emergence of new security risks stemming from a potential US/Israel–Iran conflict has further heightened the importance of the Summit. Statements made by heads of state and government prior to the Summit indicated that it would be the most significant gathering in recent years in terms of ‘outcomes and decisions taken’.

In this context, the fact that NATO’s future vision was shaped in Ankara, given that NATO is itself a security organization, holds particular significance. Turkey’s central position within NATO, as well as its capabilities in the defense and aerospace sectors, are drawing attention in the context of the Alliance’s future. When the final communiqué is considered, it is evident that NATO is transitioning to a new security architecture referred to as the ‘3.0 era’.

Whilst Ankara hosted the 36th NATO Summit of Heads of State and Government, defense spending and the defense industry were at the heart of the strategic decisions taken by the Alliance in Ankara. Ensuring that Alliance partners adhere to the stated commitment regarding the targeted defense spending limits was a priority. In parallel, the development of defense and security cooperation and relations came to the fore. Discussions held throughout the Summit centered on the role of the capabilities achieved by the Turkish defense industry in the Alliance’s future, and how and to what extent these capabilities could be utilized.

In addition to the statements made, the Defence Industry Forum held as part of the Summit addressed potential areas for Alliance partners to work together and build a sustainable ecosystem. Hosted by the President of the Turkish Defence Industry, Prof. Dr Haluk Görgün, and organized at TUSAŞ as part of the NATO Summit Defence Industry Forum (NSDIF), a reception was held where the capabilities of the Turkish defense industry were demonstrated to participating delegations through both flight displays and an exhibition in the static display area.

Burden-sharing among allies

As part of the Summit, the defense industry forum (NSDIF) – which marked a number of firsts – was held at the ATO Congresium. As announced by NATO, bilateral and multilateral military, security and cooperation agreements were signed for the first time under the NSDIF’26 framework. The agreements, estimated to have a total value exceeding 50 billion dollars, were primarily structured around the following key areas: defense investments and the Alliance partners’ ‘5 per cent’ commitment, capacity enhancement through multinational cooperation, the development of defense industry partnerships, and the improvement of processes from serial production to sustainment. Within the framework of NSDIF’26, emphasis was placed on the importance of developing high-tech and innovation-focused solutions tailored to the evolving battlefield.

NATO’s long-standing target of 2 per cent defense spending was accepted by Alliance partners as a radical increase to “5 per cent” in response to the growing and evolving threat perception. Recently, assessments have been carried out regarding the independent and collective activities undertaken to achieve this objective. Whilst the aim is to significantly increase burden-sharing within the Alliance, the objective is to enter a new era in which allies outside the US (Europe and Canada) directly assume their own security responsibilities. Whilst the concept of “strategic autonomy” is being defined within the Alliance, the initial objective is to establish the financial infrastructure.

The aim is for Alliance partners to increase their defense spending to 5 per cent of their gross domestic product (GDP), which represents a significant economic volume, whilst also developing production capabilities beyond mere procurement. However, the fact that multinational projects implemented, particularly in Europe, have failed to deliver the desired results, due both to their lengthy timelines and their structural nature, has opened the door to alternative approaches: the “Trusted Partner”. Although Turkey has been a NATO member for a quarter of a century, the fact that its capabilities in the defense industry have not been ‘effectively’ utilized within the Alliance has been a subject of debate, particularly over the last 10 years. Turkey, an Alliance member that has also been subject to both covert and overt embargoes, is now being highlighted as a central actor in NATO’s new era.

Mass production capacity and centralized production

The Ukraine–Russia War has highlighted the inadequacy of stockpiles and inventories amongst the world’s armed forces in the face of protracted conflict. Furthermore, a similar scenario has manifested itself in various forms within the US-Israel-Iran triangle. In the face of the reality of the ‘war of attrition’, which has been redefined in the present day, it is imperative that allies ensure their stocks of ammunition and military equipment are sustainable. The signing of supply agreements at the summit, totalling over 50 billion dollars, aims to transform the defence industry from a purely commercial sector into a direct deterrent. In this context, particular attention was drawn to items with high consumption rates, such as artillery ammunition, aircraft bombs and air defence missiles. In this regard, the allies’ efforts – for example, Canada’s increase in artillery ammunition production capacity and Turkey’s allocation of additional funding for the ‘Iron Dome’ air defence systems – were the first examples to be highlighted.

Attention was drawn to the negative effects of projects implemented in a multinational framework in European countries, both on the execution of the projects and on production capacity and capabilities. In assessments aimed at improving this situation, ‘project management’ and ‘autonomous/centralised’ approaches emerged as key priorities. The aim is for key actors in projects to be carried out on a multinational basis, as well as allied nations acting as subcontractors, to implement more effective process management. In this way, both the production capabilities and key areas such as sustainment and logistics of projects carried out on a multinational basis are being improved. Furthermore, Turkey’s long-standing vision of “lifting covert and overt embargoes between allies” aligns directly with this topic addressed at the Summit.

NATO is demonstrating increasing sensitivity regarding the management of interoperability amongst allies. Multinational collaborations are being implemented whilst taking into account the operational needs of the allies. The decision taken at the Ankara Summit to strengthen the transport aircraft fleet, in addition to the NATO-led tanker aircraft fleet, underscored this commitment. The fleet to be established with A400M transport aircraft will be operated to meet the operational needs of the allies. In addition to the transport fleet, in which the Turkish defence industry also holds a share, Turkey will take a leading role in establishing a space-based communications and early warning system through the IMECE project.

The allocation of an additional $24 billion budget for the Iron Dome is significant not only for Turkey but also for the Alliance’s air and missile defence capabilities. Roketsan’s demonstration of its missile systems in the field of precision-guided systems also attracted attention. Turkey’s capabilities in mass production and high technology are being utilised more actively than ever before to meet diverse requirements. In particular, Turkey has gained increasing importance in recent times with solutions such as cyber security and encrypted communications. As emphasised at the Summit, NATO aims to structure its capabilities not only around assets such as ships and aircraft, but also through integrative elements such as cyberspace, communications and intelligence.

Conclusion: An increasing role and key messages

As part of the NATO Defence Industry Forum, the capabilities of the Turkish defense industry were demonstrated to participating delegations at a reception held at TUSAŞ, through both flight displays and an exhibition in the static display area. The delegations were greeted by the modern instruments of the battlefield on display: the Altay tank, ARMA armored vehicles, MKE’s TOLGA air defense solution, ROKETSAN’s ballistic missiles, and Baykar and TUSAŞ’s manned and unmanned aerial platforms. In addition to all this, demonstrations were held to showcase the current state of the aviation sector: the GÖKBEY general-purpose helicopter, the T129 ATAK attack helicopter, the HÜRKUŞ basic trainer aircraft, the HÜRJET advanced jet trainer, the ANKA III strategic bomber, the ANKA-S, the Bayraktar AKINCI UAV and the Bayraktar TB3 unmanned aerial vehicle, all of which demonstrated their capabilities through flight displays.

The capabilities of the Turkish defense industry were demonstrated to delegates not merely through a ‘catalogue’, but directly at the production facilities and via live flight demonstrations. The presence of both executives and project engineers from the relevant companies on site enabled the evaluation of both the products and potential partnerships. In short, the reception provided a unique platform for increasing defense and aerospace exports and establishing new partnerships.

Turkey’s production of systems that are fully compliant with NATO standards (STANAG) and have proven themselves on the battlefield supports strategic interoperability within the Alliance. This, in turn, enables Turkey to export significant quantities of defense systems to its Alliance partners. According to 2025 figures, 56 per cent of Turkey’s exports, totaling 10.56 billion dollars, were made directly to the European Union, NATO member states and the United States. These figures are, in themselves, a testament to the quality and reliability of Turkish defence industry products, which meet Western standards. Furthermore, there is a growing interest in products that have proven themselves on the battlefield.

This reinforces the desire to implement ‘joint projects’, as seen during Belgium’s recent high-level visit to Turkey. The Belgian firm developing the turret proposed to Turkish land vehicle manufacturers: “Let’s integrate our turret into your armoured vehicle and sell them together.” In every discussion regarding Turkey, the door to cooperation is being opened with the message: “You have high-quality products, and we want to benefit from working with you.” Meanwhile, Spain’s supply of the HÜRJET fighter aircraft, Portugal’s warships, Italy’s unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and Poland’s electronic warfare systems are strengthening Turkey’s central position within the Alliance in this field.

In short, the Ankara Summit is more than just a platform for delivering political messages; it represents a critical turning point where the obstacles to defense industry cooperation among allies will be discussed. It was clearly emphasized at this summit that any form of export restriction or covert embargo imposed by allies against one another under the NATO umbrella ultimately weakens the Alliance’s own collective deterrence. It is abundantly clear that Turkey’s high-tech production capacity is not a competitive factor to be excluded or restricted amongst allies. Turkey’s position should be viewed as that of a ‘regional production hub’ which will optimize the Alliance’s overall capabilities whilst also reducing logistical costs.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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he 80-year-old global order established after the Second World War is unravelling. The security architecture of the Atlantic system, the economic and political framework of the Bretton Woods institutions, the liberal assumption that free trade would reduce conflicts by increasing interdependence, and global supply chains reliant on cheap energy and low-cost production no longer meet the needs of the new era. The world is transitioning, increasingly and more forcefully, to a new global competitive order that we define as ‘Second Mercantilism’.

In this new order, trade is no longer merely trade. A semiconductor factory, a container port, a data centre, a rare-earth elements mine, an LNG terminal, a satellite network, a submarine cable, a shipyard or an ammunition factory have all simultaneously become elements of economic, technological, geopolitical and military power. States are no longer competing solely for market share; they are vying for control over production capacity, critical technology, energy security, logistics routes, strategic minerals, data flows and supply chains.

Consequently, the old distinction between the global economy and the global security system has vanished. The economy is being securitised, security is being industrialised, technology is becoming geopolitical, and trade is increasingly and explicitly transforming into a tool of the struggle for national power. It is precisely in the midst of this major shift that NATO’s future lies.

In the 20th century, there was an ideological, military and nuclear balance between two major blocs. Today, however, competition is far more fragmented, far more technological and far more economic in nature. Russia represents an immediate and direct military challenge; China, long-term industrial, technological and systemic competition; regional powers, missile systems, unmanned systems and proxy wars; whilst non-state actors represent asymmetric threats.

Cyberspace, space, undersea infrastructure, energy networks, critical minerals, artificial intelligence and supply chains are becoming new arenas of competition. In such a world, it is impossible for NATO to continue on its current path based on the classic military alliance logic of 1949.

5 per cent: much more than just a budget target

The commitment by NATO members to raise their defense and security-related expenditure to 5 per cent of their GDP represents one of the most significant economic and political transformations in the Alliance’s history. However, it would be a grave mistake to interpret this decision merely as ‘spending more money’. For money, on its own, does not create deterrence.

You can increase your budget, but if you cannot produce sufficient ammunition, you cannot fight. You may possess the most advanced platforms, but if your critical components are reliant on a single external supplier, you cannot establish a sustainable defense capability. You can develop excellent air defense systems, but if your stockpile of interceptor missiles is depleted within a few weeks of intense fighting, your strategic resilience remains merely theoretical. You may possess very expensive fighter aircraft, but if their maintenance, engine, electronics, software and ammunition supply chains are fragile, you cannot manage the economics of a protracted war.

The Russia-Ukraine War, the crises in the Red Sea, the conflicts in the Middle East and the revolution brought about by unmanned systems on the battlefield have all demonstrated the same truth to us: the decisive factor in modern warfare is not merely technological superiority; it is the ability to scale up technology, produce ammunition continuously, rapidly replace losses and adapt industrial capacity to the pace of the war.

For this reason, NATO’s 5 per cent target must be a production doctrine, not merely an accounting decision. In this new era, NATO’s fundamental question should not be ‘How much are the Allies spending?’, but rather ‘How much can the Alliance produce, how quickly can it replenish its stocks, how long can it sustain operations, and how rapidly can it ramp up production in the event of war?’ It is precisely at this point that NATO must transition from a traditional alliance to a comprehensive defense economy.

NATO’s new requirement: A total defense economy

The concept of a total defense economy does not mean transforming the entire economy into a military economy. The issue is to restructure the boundaries between defense and the economy in line with the demands of the new era.

NATO can no longer consider military planning and industrial planning in isolation from one another. Defence ministries, economic and industrial ministries, energy policies and critical infrastructure investments cannot operate in separate spheres. This is because, in modern warfare, the distance between the front line and the production line has been eliminated.

For this reason, the Alliance’s new economic model must be built on five fundamental pillars:

Firstly, long-term and predictable joint demand must be established. If defense companies are to be asked to increase their capacity, they must be given a 10–15-year order outlook, not just a three-year one. Factories grow not on the basis of political statements, but on guarantees of sustainable demand.

Secondly, joint procurement mechanisms must be strengthened. The dozens of different standards for the same munitions, disjointed national tenders for the same requirement, duplicate investments amongst allies, and political protectionism that hinders economies of scale must be reduced.

Thirdly, redundancy must be established in critical production chains. In the new NATO economy, no strategic product should be dependent on a single factory, a single country or a single company. Alternative production centers must be established for engines, explosives, guidance systems, semiconductors, optical and radar components, batteries, critical minerals and software infrastructure.

Fourthly, a transition to a joint stockpiling system must be made. Ammunition, fuel, critical spare parts, air defense interceptors and strategic raw materials must be planned not solely on the basis of national stockpiling logic, but in terms of the Alliance’s overall resilience.

Fifthly, production-conversion capacity must be established in the event of war. Plans must be drawn up today to identify which elements of civilian industry – from automotive to electronics, from chemicals to metallurgy, and from software to logistics – can support defense production in the event of a crisis.

The view that this new architecture must evolve towards a ‘NATO Defence Economic Area’ has gained significant traction. This area should encompass common standards, long-term orders, mutual investments, cross-border production clusters, coordination on critical raw materials, the integration of SMEs into the system, joint testing and certification processes, and the reduction of political barriers to defense trade within the Alliance.

This is because, in the era of Second Mercantilism, the defense industry is not merely a sector in which companies operate. It is one of the main pillars of national power, technological sovereignty and alliance resilience.

The alliance cannot afford ‘internal strife’

However, NATO faces more than just Russia, China or other global challenges. One of the most significant issues the Alliance must overcome is strategic fragmentation within its own ranks.

NATO must shake off the image of a ‘row among boatmen’ – a situation where allies sometimes view one another as rivals, where bilateral political disputes hold collective security hostage, where defense industry restrictions are directed at alliance members, and where short-term domestic political calculations take precedence over long-term strategic objectives.

To put it more plainly, NATO cannot prepare for a new Cold War whilst engaged in an internal ‘brawl’. Weakening an ally’s defense capabilities on political grounds undermines the alliance’s overall deterrence. Disrupting an ally’s supply chain reduces the capacity NATO will require in a crisis. Imposing restrictions on parts, engines, ammunition or technology for an ally’s strategic platforms, whilst subsequently expecting that same ally to contribute more to the Alliance’s defense, is unsustainable.

Moreover, as the world moves towards far greater systemic competition, NATO’s squandering of its energy on internal disputes creates strategic space for its real rivals.

The Alliance cannot resolve every political issue between its members. Such an expectation is unrealistic. However, it must not allow bilateral disputes to paralyze its collective defence capabilities. Defence industry cooperation must be spared from becoming the first casualty of short-term political tensions. In this regard, the example of Türkiye is highly instructive.

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ne of the greatest aspirations of a journalist with an interest in international relations is to cover events held in various parts of the world where global issues are debated (such as the NATO Summit, the UN General Assembly, the G20, etc.). In a professional climate where conventional media is losing its importance on the international stage day by day, and whilst the financial clout of the media is eroding and investment in certain sectors is being cut back, the likelihood of a journalist attending such summits is also declining day by day.

In the current climate, the hosting of an organization such as NATO in Turkey presented a significant opportunity for our colleagues in Turkey. Although journalists and television professionals, myself included, had only limited opportunities to engage with leaders due to the nature of the event, we did manage to soak up the atmosphere of the summit.

Turkey is the only NATO member state with a Muslim majority. The 2026 summit was set to have a distinct character for this reason alone. However, factors such as the ongoing tension between Iran and the US (which had been reignited just hours before US President Trump landed in Ankara when he ordered a new strike), the continuing disagreement between the US and its European allies, and the deadlock in the Russia-Ukraine war all served to make the summit even more significant.

Details of the Trump–Erdoğan meeting

The meeting that fuelled the intrigue at the NATO Summit was the encounter between President Erdoğan and US President Trump. Once the rumours circulating days beforehand – that ‘Trump would not attend the summit due to his anger towards NATO members’ – were dispelled, our focus shifted to the nature of the bilateral meeting. The last time a US President had made an official visit to Turkey was in 2009.

Following the visit by then US President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–1961) in 1959, the chain of visits continued with George H. W. Bush (1991), Bill Clinton (1999), George W. Bush (2004) and Obama (2009), had been interrupted during Trump’s first term and had not even been on the agenda during Joe Biden’s term (2020–2024). Whilst Trump’s visit marked a turning point in this sense, current issues (the F-35 procurement process, CAATSA, etc.) were also raising the stakes.

Despite the scrutiny that began days in advance, logistical and protocol details were kept strictly confidential right up to the last moment. Contrary to expectations, Trump’s aircraft landed at the newly opened Ankara Airport (and the fact that he returned from Esenboğa on an older model aircraft also raised questions. However, technical reasons related to security were cited as the justification). President Erdoğan welcomed Trump at the airport with a gesture reserved for a select few guests.

Upon arriving at the welcoming ceremony at the Presidential Complex, we noticed a different arrangement in the preparations. The ranks of the mehteran band, which usually performs at routine receptions, had been reinforced, and additional units of Janissary soldiers had been deployed. The two leaders’ delegations were also positioned on a platform that differed from the norm. The leaders’ senior advisers (foreign ministers, defense ministers, ambassadors) held their initial discussions on this platform. The flypast by the Turkish Stars, comprising six F-5s, which was part of the welcoming ceremony, was precise and went off without a hitch.

The most exciting moment of the entire process was the joint press conference. The format we are accustomed to in a standard leaders’ meeting is press conferences held in the main hall following discussions between the leaders and their delegations. On this occasion, however, it was announced that only a limited number of journalists would be allowed into President Erdoğan’s office. We were therefore swiftly directed towards the room.

The organizers informed us that journalists wishing to ask questions would need to be ‘quick off the mark’, as the format of the press conference would be modelled on the ‘Oval Office Rules’. I recalled the format we’d seen on TV screens. In those press conferences, held in a small room with Trump and the visiting leader flanked by their aides, it was the loudest who won and secured the floor. Once the floor was opened for questions, although American journalists took the lead with the first questions, my Turkish colleagues and I also managed to ask our questions by adopting a forceful and boisterous approach to secure the floor.

US President Trump gave the floor to ask my question, which touched on the Iran-US tensions. Throughout the meeting, Trump delivered positive messages, particularly regarding CAATSA restrictions and the F-35s. It is also worth noting that, unlike the bilateral meetings held in the Oval Office – which were characterised by Trump’s impulsive responses – there were no remarks from the Trump-Erdoğan talks in Washington or Ankara that would cause any friction.

The factors driving the relationship between the two leaders beyond the usual bounds to a positive momentum are seen as their ability to strike the right balance in their dialogue, the fact that their communication predates the presidency, and the continued flow of contact following Erdoğan’s message to Trump even after he lost the 2020 election. Another important factor is that Trump has framed the Erdoğan–Biden tension as a positive reference point. The animosity towards Biden, which he mentions in almost every speech, also lends extra credibility to those who have had difficulties with him. Ironically, in Trump’s political analysis, the Evangelical vote—which solidified following the release of Pastor Brunson—has also made a positive contribution to the new course of Turkey–US relations.

What happened at the summit?

Opportunities to engage with leaders at the NATO Summit are very limited. One such opportunity is the ‘doorstep’ – the area where leaders give impromptu interviews on the morning of the summit. Not every leader makes an appearance here. It generally provides an opportunity for leaders of small and medium-sized countries, who are often out of the spotlight, to make their voices heard. Danish Leader Frederiksen, commenting on Trump’s continued interest in Greenland, emphasized their stance by stating, “We will defend every inch of our land; this is why we are in NATO.” UK Prime Minister Starmer, who is due to step down upon his return, was cautious; he did not answer any questions and was not particularly talkative. Although French President Macron’s name was on the list, he was busy completing his now-traditional run at the time.

Even the order of arrival at the venue for the leaders’ summit has become a form of image management. Leaders from countries such as the US and France arrive last. Following the smooth participation of all 32 leaders in the much-anticipated session of the summit, attention turned to what was being discussed inside. The information received pointed to a positive atmosphere. It was noted that US President Trump listened to all the leaders who spoke. It was reported that Trump, who remained until the end of the session, did not address any contentious issues (such as the tensions with Spain, the Greenland issue, or tensions with European countries).

It was stated that Spanish Prime Minister Sánchez, in a constructive speech, emphasized that his country’s contribution to NATO should be measured not by mathematical figures but by the rate of achievement of strategic objectives. The extent to which Sánchez’s speech, which emphasized resolve, managed to cool Trump’s fixation on figures will become clear through future rhetoric and policies. It was noted that the US delegation heard the approach they had sought from all their allies during the leaders’ session.

Following the session, the summit effectively concluded with the leaders’ bilateral meetings and the press conferences they held. The most eagerly anticipated of these meetings was undoubtedly Trump’s. Before the US leader took to the podium following NATO Secretary-General Rutte—who had used the hall before him—there was not a single empty seat in the hall, nor even a suitable place to stand. The hall was completely cleared before the US President took to the stage; journalists were only allowed back in after security checks. Among the dozens of journalists vying for the chance to ask a question, the lucky ones were generally our American colleagues sitting in the front row, who had opted for colorful attire.

Trump’s summit marathon, during which he answered questions in a positive and conciliatory manner, concluded on a positive note despite the harsh messages that occasionally resurfaced in some of his press statements. President Erdoğan also held his final press conference as the host. Having followed all these proceedings, having observed that, unlike their foreign counterparts, Turkish journalists tend to include lengthy comments in their questions and drag out the subject before getting to the point, I feel it is worth emphasizing that there is a clear structural problem in this regard. As Turkish journalists, we do not know how to ask questions properly.

A farewell without the usual ‘See you next year’

The NATO Summit concluded without any major hitches. The international media community was highly satisfied with the facilities provided. The complimentary buffet service exceeded expectations, and the goody bags and kits presented to journalists were shared in vlogs. However, the development that particularly surprised the foreign leaders occurred right at the end. The gift of a revolver (firearm) engraved with their names, presented to them by Turkey, took the majority of the foreign leaders by surprise. Some were unable to take the gift home with them due to legal restrictions in their own countries, whilst others announced they would donate it to a museum.

Nevertheless, the message behind the gift hit home. The fact that the gift at a summit where tough issues were discussed was in keeping with realistic geopolitical conditions served as a powerful metaphor and message. It is also worth noting that the specially produced pen, manufactured using domestic resources, was well received.

As summits of this kind draw to a close, attention turns to the next one, and the scheduled date is marked. This time, however, there is a degree of uncertainty, as the likelihood that the summit will not be held next year has increased. In fact, there is no explicit rule stipulating that the summit must be held annually; a proposal that has recently come to the fore suggests extending the summit cycle to every two years.

It is expected that this process will be clarified by the end of this year; what is certain is that the next stop will be Albania. Although it seems impossible to predict the course regional developments will take by that date, it appears unlikely that the opportunities and agenda offered by Turkey will be presented within the framework of that summit.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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urkish defense technology company HAVELSAN has advanced four of its domestically developed software solutions into NATO’s certification process after successfully completing interoperability tests during the alliance’s Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exploration, Experimentation, Examination Exercise (CWIX) in Poland.

According to information released on Saturday, HAVELSAN’s DOOB-HQ, KAPI, Embedded NONC2 ATA DLP and LYNX systems passed the Assurance Verification and Validation (AV&V) tests required for NATO certification.

The successful evaluations confirmed the systems’ compliance with NATO’s Federated Mission Networking (FMN) standards, enabling them to operate seamlessly alongside allied command-and-control networks during multinational military operations.

The CWIX exercise serves as NATO’s primary platform for testing interoperability among member and partner nations’ command-and-control systems. Certification under the FMN Spiral 4 framework is considered a key prerequisite for participation in NATO missions scheduled between 2025 and 2027.

Expanding HAVELSAN’s NATO portfolio

The addition of four new capabilities further expands HAVELSAN’s portfolio of NATO-compatible technologies in command and control, secure data sharing, system integration and tactical communications.

HAVELSAN has participated in the annual CWIX exercise since 2012, steadily increasing the number of certified systems. Previous certifications include DOOB and KAŞİF in 2019, ADVENT CMS and ADVENT MARTI in 2023, KARTAL and NONC2 ATA DLP in 2024, and six additional products in 2025, including DOOB-HQ, DOOB-TACTICAL, OCTOPUS and TDLYM.

This year’s CWIX exercise, held from June 6 to 26 in Poland, brought together more than 3,000 personnel, 780 systems and representatives from 46 countries, including NATO allies and European Union members.

HAVELSAN participated with 43 personnel and 16 systems spanning multiple operational domains, including command and control, maritime operations, cyber defense, communications, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defense, modeling and simulation, and tactical data links.

New operational focus areas

The company also debuted several capabilities in new operational focus areas, including LYNX and Embedded NONC2 ATA DLP in the Air domain, ADVENT TALAY/REI in the Geospatial, Meteorological and Oceanographic (GEOMETOC) domain, KAPI in Federated Mission Networking, ICS SENTINEL in Cyber, and FIVE in Modeling and Simulation.

HAVELSAN General Manager Mehmet Akif Nacar said the successful certification process demonstrates that Türkiye’s domestically developed defense software meets NATO’s highest interoperability standards.

“The inclusion of four new capabilities in NATO’s certification process is concrete evidence that our national software solutions have gained international recognition and meet the highest interoperability standards,” Nacar said.

He added that HAVELSAN plans to build on its expanded participation in joint operations, cyber defense and modeling and simulation by introducing artificial intelligence-supported command-and-control capabilities in future NATO exercises.

Nacar said the company remains committed to developing technologies that meet the operational requirements of the Turkish Armed Forces while delivering internationally competitive defense solutions.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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resident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said NATO must evolve into an alliance that strengthens its members rather than creating dependency, as Türkiye concluded its hosting of the 36th NATO Summit with calls for greater burden-sharing, stronger defense industrial cooperation and renewed diplomatic efforts to address global conflicts.

Speaking at a press conference following the two-day summit at the Presidential Complex in Ankara on Wednesday, Erdoğan said the meeting marked a significant step toward building a stronger alliance at a time when Euro-Atlantic security faces unprecedented challenges.

“NATO should be an alliance of allies that strengthen one another, not one of countries dependent on each other,” Erdoğan said, arguing that genuine deterrence depends not only on defense spending but also on technological superiority, industrial capacity and sustainable military production.

The summit, the first NATO leaders’ meeting ever held in Ankara and Türkiye’s second time hosting the alliance after more than two decades, brought together heads of state and government from all member countries.

Erdoğan said allied leaders agreed on the need for European members to assume greater responsibility for collective defense while maintaining fair burden-sharing within the alliance.

“We have laid the foundations for a stronger NATO in which European allies undertake greater responsibility and military capabilities are reinforced through equitable burden-sharing,” he said.

Türkiye highlights military contributions

The Turkish president stressed that Türkiye has become one of NATO’s leading military contributors after decades of confronting regional conflicts and terrorism largely on its own.

He noted that Türkiye commands NATO’s second-largest land army and has safeguarded the alliance’s southeastern flank for decades while making substantial contributions to NATO missions, operations and common funding.

Erdoğan announced that Turkish F-16 fighter jets will deploy to Estonia beginning in August as part of NATO’s Air Policing mission.

He also said Türkiye will continue commanding the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) until September 2026 and will assume command of the NATO Response Force during 2028-2029.

“Türkiye has always fulfilled its responsibilities within the alliance, taking risks and paying the price when necessary,” Erdoğan said.

Defense industry emphasized

A central theme of Erdoğan’s remarks was Türkiye’s growing defense industry, one of the country’s key strategic advantages.

He said Türkiye now manufactures its own fighter aircraft, tanks, warships and air defense systems while ranking among the world’s leading producers of unmanned aerial and naval vehicles.

“True deterrence comes from three dimensions: advanced technology, sufficient scale and sustainable production,” Erdoğan said.

He welcomed the adoption of the “Ankara Strategy” during the NATO Defense Industry Forum, saying it would strengthen cooperation between NATO and defense manufacturers.

Erdoğan also renewed calls for the removal of remaining restrictions on defense trade among allies and argued that European Union defense initiatives should complement NATO rather than duplicate its efforts.

He warned that excluding non-EU allies such as Türkiye from European defense projects would limit their effectiveness.

Ukraine, Middle East discussed

The summit also addressed ongoing security crises, including Russia’s war in Ukraine and instability across the Middle East.

Erdoğan reiterated Türkiye’s offer to facilitate renewed peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.

“The war has become a machine of destruction that claims tens of thousands of casualties every month,” he said. “There are no losers in a just peace.”

Turning to the Middle East, Erdoğan welcomed the Islamabad Agreement, which Türkiye has supported, while expressing concern over continued violence in Lebanon and Gaza.

He said attacks in Lebanon have displaced civilians and destroyed cities, while the humanitarian crisis in Gaza continues.

“There is no room in our region for new tensions or new conflicts,” Erdoğan said. “Humanity needs peace, stability and security.”

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ATO leaders gathered in Ankara on Wednesday for the second day of a high-stakes summit dominated by renewed military tensions between the United States and Iran, the ongoing war in Ukraine, and growing debates over defense spending and alliance unity.

The summit, hosted by Türkiye, was expected to focus primarily on strengthening NATO’s collective defense capabilities. However, fresh military exchanges in the Middle East quickly shifted attention toward regional security and the risk of a broader conflict.

The United States launched new strikes against Iranian targets overnight, saying the attacks were a response to Iranian assaults on commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Iran retaliated by launching missiles and drones at U.S. military facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait, marking the most significant escalation since the two countries reached a preliminary ceasefire agreement last month.

Speaking alongside NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte before the main summit session, U.S. President Donald Trump declared that the interim understanding with Tehran was effectively finished.

Defense spending remained another major issue throughout the summit. Rutte praised Trump’s long-standing pressure on allies to increase military expenditures, arguing that recent commitments represented a significant transformation in European defense policy.

“When you have achieved this, this is a huge win,” Rutte said, noting that European allies and Canada had dramatically increased investments in military capabilities over recent years.

Trump nevertheless criticized several NATO members, reserving particularly strong criticism for Spain, which he accused of failing to contribute adequately to the alliance. He even suggested ending trade with Spain, calling it “a terrible partner in NATO.”

Ukraine on the Agenda

Meanwhile, Ukraine remained high on the summit agenda as Russia continued large-scale attacks across the country.

According to Ukrainian officials, Russia launched another overnight assault involving missiles and drones, highlighting Kyiv’s continued need for advanced air defense systems. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy urged NATO partners to accelerate military assistance, particularly in strengthening Ukraine’s ability to intercept cruise missiles and other aerial threats.

Russia, for its part, reported intercepting hundreds of Ukrainian drones overnight while accusing Kyiv of attacking energy infrastructure deep inside Russian territory, including oil refineries and fuel facilities.

The renewed violence reinforced concerns that diplomatic efforts to end the more than four-year war have stalled despite repeated international mediation attempts.

A comprehensive 360-degree security approach

Beyond immediate military challenges, NATO leaders also discussed the alliance’s long-term strategy. Türkiye emphasized the importance of maintaining a comprehensive 360-degree security approach that addresses threats on both NATO’s eastern and southern flanks while strengthening cooperation on cyber security, infrastructure protection, and defense industrial production.

Alliance officials stressed that military readiness now extends beyond traditional armed forces and includes resilient supply chains, secure communications, and the ability to counter cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.

The deteriorating security situation in both Eastern Europe and the Middle East has underscored NATO’s growing challenge of responding simultaneously to multiple crises while maintaining unity among its members.

As discussions continued behind closed doors, leaders faced mounting pressure to produce concrete commitments on defense capabilities, support for Ukraine, and coordinated responses to instability in the Middle East.

With tensions rising on several fronts, the Ankara summit is expected to shape NATO’s strategic priorities for the coming years, testing the alliance’s ability to balance collective defense, crisis management, and political cohesion in an increasingly uncertain global security environment.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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ürkiye has called on NATO allies to convert rising defense spending into concrete military capabilities, warning that higher budgets alone will not guarantee deterrence as the alliance confronts an increasingly complex security environment.

Speaking at the NATO Allies in Ankara event on Tuesday, National Defense Minister Yasar Guler said NATO’s credibility would ultimately depend on whether member states could translate political commitments into operational military strength, resilient defense industries and integrated security capabilities.

The event, organized in cooperation with Türkiye’s Communications Directorate, the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) and the Munich Security Conference, comes ahead of the NATO leaders’ summit in Ankara, where alliance members are expected to discuss defense investment, industrial cooperation and regional security challenges.

“Increasing defense spending is important, yet spending money alone does not produce deterrence,” Guler said.

He stressed that NATO must focus on building ready military forces, expanding ammunition stockpiles, strengthening logistics, improving integrated air and missile defense systems, enhancing command-and-control structures and increasing defense industrial production.

According to Guler, the alliance has entered a new strategic phase requiring both credible collective defense and the ability to respond rapidly to crises across multiple regions.

He said NATO’s role has evolved significantly since World War II, moving from collective defense during the Cold War toward crisis management and counterterrorism operations after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Today’s security environment, however, requires the alliance to maintain strong conventional deterrence while remaining prepared for emerging threats.

A stronger and more balanced NATO

The minister reiterated Türkiye’s support for a stronger and more balanced NATO in which European allies assume greater responsibility for their own defense while maintaining the transatlantic partnership and the United States’ security commitment as the foundation of the alliance.

However, he argued that burden-sharing should not be measured solely by defense budgets.

Instead, contributions should also reflect operational risks, geographical responsibilities, military readiness, participation in alliance missions, industrial production capacity and the ability to respond effectively during crises.

Guler highlighted Türkiye’s longstanding role within NATO, saying Ankara maintained one of the alliance’s largest and most capable armed forces while many European countries significantly reduced troop numbers, military stockpiles and defense manufacturing after the Cold War.

“Türkiye has never been merely a geographical frontline country,” he said.

“It has consistently assumed risks, carried responsibility in the field and contributed to deterrence when necessary.”

Türkiye, which joined NATO in 1952, currently fields the alliance’s second-largest army and possesses highly trained forces with extensive operational experience, joint operational capability and high readiness levels, he added.

The minister noted that Turkish forces continue contributing to NATO missions, exercises and deterrence operations across a wide geographic area stretching from the Baltic region to the Black Sea while also participating in maritime security, crisis management and military training activities.

Defense industry and regional security priorities

Guler also emphasized Türkiye’s expanding defense industry, describing it as an increasingly important contributor to NATO’s overall military capabilities.

He said the country has developed advanced technologies across multiple sectors, including unmanned systems, air defense, electronic warfare, precision-guided ammunition, naval platforms, aviation and command-and-control systems.

Over the next three years, Ankara plans to prioritize investments in air and ballistic missile defense, long-range strike capabilities and unmanned military systems to meet both national defense requirements and NATO capability targets.

These capabilities, he argued, should be viewed not only as national assets but also as resources capable of helping reduce NATO’s wider capability and production gaps if fully integrated into alliance planning.

Guler called for greater defense industrial cooperation among allies, arguing that joint production and technology sharing would strengthen NATO more effectively than restrictive policies.

“Türkiye favors cooperation over rivalry, joint production over exclusion and capability-based cooperation over restrictions in the defense industry,” he said.

Addressing European security, Guler welcomed initiatives aimed at strengthening Europe’s defense capacity but stressed that such efforts must reinforce rather than duplicate NATO’s existing structures.

“NATO-EU cooperation must be inclusive, integrating and mutually reinforcing,” he said.

Reinforcing unity

Looking ahead to the NATO summit in Ankara, Guler described the gathering as a critical opportunity for allies to reinforce unity and address key issues including defense investment, industrial production, support for Ukraine and the alliance’s future deterrence posture.

He said the summit should send a clear message that NATO’s collective defense commitment under Article 5 remains unwavering but must be supported by credible military power.

The minister also emphasized the importance of maintaining NATO’s 360-degree approach to security, arguing that the alliance must remain equally attentive to threats along both its eastern and southern flanks as well as challenges beyond the Euro-Atlantic region.

He identified the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf, Syria, Iraq, the Eastern Mediterranean, North Africa, the Sahel, the Black Sea and the Caucasus as interconnected parts of the same strategic environment requiring coordinated allied attention.

Guler said modern security extends beyond conventional military assets such as tanks, aircraft and warships, encompassing secure digital infrastructure, resilient supply chains, protected critical infrastructure, societal resilience and the ability to respond faster than potential adversaries.

He concluded by reaffirming Türkiye’s commitment to NATO, saying Ankara would continue contributing to the alliance’s deterrence and defense posture while supporting its adaptation to evolving global security challenges.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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resident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said the upcoming NATO Leaders’ Summit in Ankara will serve as the strongest platform for sharing experience among allies, while urging greater solidarity within the alliance to address growing regional and global security challenges.

Speaking at the NATO Parliamentary Summit in Istanbul on Monday, Erdoğan said the alliance faces a historic turning point as wars, terrorism, irregular migration and geopolitical instability reshape the Euro-Atlantic security environment.

“It is my belief that the Ankara Summit will be the strongest platform for sharing experience,” Erdoğan said, referring to the NATO Heads of State and Government Summit scheduled to take place in the Turkish capital on July 7-8.

Addressing parliamentary representatives from NATO member states, Erdoğan said the Istanbul meeting carried added significance ahead of the leaders’ summit and thanked participants for contributing to cooperation among allied legislatures.

Global security environment changing rapidly

Erdoğan said traditional assumptions about international security were no longer sufficient to explain today’s rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape.

“Europe-Atlantic security is passing through a historic turning point,” he said, pointing to conflicts, regional crises, terrorism and irregular migration along NATO’s eastern and southeastern borders.

He argued that growing instability had replaced predictability in international affairs and warned that existing international institutions had suffered a loss of credibility in the face of recent conflicts.

Referring to developments in Gaza and Lebanon, Erdoğan said recent massacres had left deep scars on humanity’s conscience while undermining confidence in international organizations.

“In this environment, preserving NATO’s deterrence and strengthening solidarity among allies has become even more critical,” he said.

The Turkish president stressed that Türkiye remains one of NATO’s leading contributors, citing its strategic location, military capabilities and more than seven decades of participation in the alliance.

Sharing borders stretching more than 1,800 kilometers with conflict regions, Türkiye continues to play an active role in NATO missions and peacekeeping operations while sharing its experience in crisis management with allies, he added.

Erdoğan said international interest in the Ankara summit extends well beyond NATO member states.

“Our fundamental expectation from the summit is to achieve outcomes that strengthen the spirit of alliance while respecting the national security sensitivities of all allies,” he said.

Defense cooperation and regional diplomacy

Erdoğan also called for a fairer sharing of defense responsibilities within NATO and urged the removal of barriers affecting defense industry cooperation among allies.

“If we want to confront today’s challenges successfully, we must ensure balanced burden-sharing while removing obstacles to defense industry trade,” he said.

He noted that Türkiye continues to increase defense spending in line with commitments adopted at the recent NATO summit in The Hague and remains among the alliance’s five largest contributors to NATO missions and operations.

Despite these contributions, Erdoğan argued that Türkiye’s role in European security is sometimes overlooked.

He called for Ankara’s inclusion in European Union defense and security initiatives, saying Türkiye’s defense capabilities should not be excluded because of narrow political considerations.

“We must establish a security and defense network stretching from Texas to Ankara without reservations or conditions,” he said.

The president said the Ankara summit would place particular emphasis on defense industry cooperation through a NATO Defense Industry Forum, where Türkiye plans to showcase its latest defense technologies and discuss measures to deepen industrial collaboration among allies.

Participants would also review key regional and international developments, including the situations in Ukraine, Iran, the Gulf region and Palestine, he said.

Erdoğan reaffirmed Türkiye’s commitment to supporting efforts aimed at turning the ceasefire between the United States and Iran into a lasting settlement, saying Ankara would continue working alongside Pakistan, Qatar and other friendly countries.

Turning to Palestine, Erdoğan said lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved without ending the Israeli occupation and establishing an independent Palestinian state.

“An independent, sovereign and territorially contiguous Palestinian state within the 1967 borders must be established,” he said.

He also warned against actions that could undermine regional stability, particularly attacks targeting Lebanon, and urged NATO parliamentarians to support efforts aimed at preventing further escalation.

Erdoğan reiterated Türkiye’s readiness to continue mediating efforts to end the Russia-Ukraine war through dialogue, saying Ankara remains one of the few allies trusted by both sides.

“As a country that can speak with both parties and has initiated successful diplomatic processes, we will continue to contribute actively to peace efforts,” he said.

The event concluded with a family photograph hosted by Turkish Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş as part of the NATO Parliamentary Summit in Istanbul.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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oday’s international system heralds a new historical era marked by major upheavals and multi-layered power struggles. In this age, where global balances are being shaken, the Western-centred order is being called into question, and energy wars, proxy conflicts and economic competition are intensifying, states can only survive not merely through their military might, but through their diplomatic flexibility, historical depth and strategic acumen.

It is precisely in such a period that the decision to hold the NATO Summit in Turkey is not merely a routine organizational choice, but signifies the reaffirmation of Turkey’s weight within the global system on an international scale.

To assess this development merely as a technical preference within the diplomatic calendar would, of course, be an oversimplification. For the positioning of Turkey as a central nation by NATO—the world’s most powerful military-political alliance—during such a critical period is a clear consequence of the strategic influence Ankara has built up in recent years.

Undoubtedly, Turkey has become a state closely monitored by global power centres not merely due to its geographical advantages, but also because of its crisis-resolution capacity, multifaceted diplomatic approach and independent political reflexes.

Diplomatic paradigm and the ancient Turkish state mindset

The paradigm developed by Turkey under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in foreign policy has largely transcended the classic ‘peripheral state’ mentality. For many years, Turkey was viewed merely as an outpost of the Western security architecture; today, it has transformed into a power centre capable of devising its own strategy, negotiating with global actors when necessary, and making independent moves when required. We cannot explain this transformation solely through the technical tools of modern politics; rather, behind this success lies the ancient Turkish state experience and the accumulated heritage of civilization.

In Turkish political thought, the state has been viewed not merely as an administrative mechanism, but as the bearer of the historical order. Indeed, Yusuf Has Hacib, in the Kutadgu Bilig, speaks of four fundamental elements that sustain the state: justice, reason, happiness and contentment. In other words, according to him, the greatness of a ruler is measured not merely by the strength of his army, but by his ability to interpret the changing conditions of the world. Today, the delicate balance Turkey has established between East and West is precisely a contemporary manifestation of this historical philosophy of the state. For Ankara is no longer a passive but a decisive actor.

There is a Turkey that is working to prevent the spread of war in the Black Sea, capable of establishing grain corridor diplomacy, and able to maintain contact with both Moscow and Kyiv simultaneously. There is a Turkey that shapes normalization processes in the Middle East, develops diplomatic influence in Africa, deepens integration with the Turkic world, and plays a central role in the European security architecture. The hosting of the NATO Summit in Turkey is, in fact, a natural consequence of this multi-layered influence.

One of the most striking aspects of President Erdoğan’s foreign policy is his transformation of Turkey from a country that merely reacts defensively into a state capable of making strategic moves. Self-confidence has been a defining element of this approach. Turkey has emerged not merely as a country exposed to the consequences of global decisions, but as an actor influencing the very process by which those decisions are shaped. Undoubtedly, this situation also represents a significant shift in mindset within modern Turkish foreign policy.

At the core of this changing mindset lies the historical continuity referred to as the ‘Turkish state mind’. The Turkish state tradition has always been noted for its ability to maintain balance even during chaotic periods. Nizam al-Mulk, the Grand Vizier of the Great Seljuk Empire, states in his Siyasetname (policy) that the survival of the state can be safeguarded not only through force, but also through reason, diplomacy and stability. In his view, a statesman must be able to employ both hard power and wisdom simultaneously. The multi-dimensional diplomacy pursued by today’s Turkey is a reflection of this historical legacy.

The Antalya Diplomacy Forum and the new narrative being forged

Indeed, in recent years Turkey has built up significant capacity not only in the military sphere but also in the diplomatic arena. One of the most significant examples of this is undoubtedly the Antalya Diplomacy Forum. Despite its relatively short history, the forum has become one of the key meeting places in global politics. The fact that leaders from vastly different political traditions—from Africa to Europe, and from Asia to Latin America—can come together on the same platform demonstrates the new sphere of influence Turkey has established in global diplomacy.

The success of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum cannot be explained by organizational ability alone. The real issue is Turkey’s development of a new diplomatic discourse and paradigm. Whilst most Western-centric diplomatic platforms are now unable to adequately address global crises, a more inclusive and multi-polar approach is attracting attention in Antalya.

Here, Turkey is not merely the host but also the bearer of a new international discourse. The Antalya Diplomacy Forum has, in effect, become an intellectual showcase of the Turkish state’s vast capacity.

This is because the forum demonstrates Turkey’s claim to be not merely a military or economic power, but also an intellectual centre. Bringing together different actors in world politics around the same table is not merely a logistical achievement, but a capacity to generate trust. Diplomacy, after all, is not just the management of states, but also the management of trust.

This situation gains even greater significance when viewed from a civilizational perspective. Al-Farabi states that, in his conception of a virtuous state, the ruler’s fundamental duty is to establish social order based on justice and wisdom. According to him, politics is not brute force, but the art of guiding society through higher reason. The active diplomacy Turkey has pursued in recent years is, in every sense, an example of this very mindset.

This is one of the key aspects of the language President Erdoğan has established in international politics. He is striving to reposition Turkey not merely through economic or military parameters, but alongside its historical identity. The relations developed with the Turkic world, the outreach to Africa, diplomatic activities in the Islamic world, and the balanced relations maintained with the West are all components of this broad vision.

The hosting of the NATO Summit in Turkey is therefore not merely a security-focused development. This choice also demonstrates that Turkey is once again recognized as a central power within the international system. For the world of politics now realizes that it is impossible to achieve a balance without Turkey. From energy routes to migration crises, and from Black Sea security to the equations of the Middle East, Ankara now plays a decisive role in numerous issues.

Turkey’s diplomatic capacity and policy of balance

Another notable aspect here is Turkey’s policy of balance. Throughout history, great Turkish states have sustained their existence by maintaining a balance between different centres of power. Ottoman diplomacy is one of the most significant examples of this. Today, too, Turkey is able to develop its relations with Asia whilst being part of the Western alliance; defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity whilst maintaining contact with Russia; and establish strategic integration with the Turkic world whilst increasing economic cooperation with the Gulf. This multifaceted policy requires a high level of diplomatic capacity.

At the current juncture, Turkey is not a passive observer of crises, but one of the central nations demonstrating the will to produce solutions.

The hosting of the NATO summit in Turkey and the rising prestige of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum are reflections of this reality. The self-confidence displayed by Turkey under President Erdoğan’s leadership in foreign policy is, in fact, the re-emergence of historical state wisdom.

And perhaps the most significant aspect of this entire process is this: the Turkish state tradition has, throughout history, not only generated power; it has also brought order. This historical lineage, stretching from the Seljuks to the Ottomans and from the Ottomans to the Republic, is one of the rare political traditions that has managed to preserve its state reflex even during times of crisis. The multifaceted diplomacy Turkey is currently pursuing is, in fact, the continuation of this ancient state memory in the modern world.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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planned withdrawal of 5,000 US troops from Germany may appear limited in scale, but analysts warn it reflects a far broader challenge confronting NATO and European security.

The decision, announced by Donald Trump, comes amid escalating tensions between Washington and its European allies. Disputes over tariffs, disagreements on support for Ukraine, and sharp rhetoric surrounding the Iran conflict have deepened divisions across the Atlantic alliance.

The troop reduction follows criticism from German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who accused the United States of mishandling tensions with Iran. In response, Trump signaled not only the withdrawal from Germany but also hinted at possible reductions in other European countries, including Italy and Spain.

Spain has already refused US requests to use its bases for operations linked to the Iran conflict, while Trump criticized both countries for what he described as insufficient support.

For years, Trump has argued that Europe relies too heavily on US military protection, frequently singling out Germany for failing to meet defense spending expectations.

A shift in US priorities

Despite the planned reduction, Germany still hosts tens of thousands of US troops, far fewer than during the Cold War, when troop levels reached around 250,000.

Officials in Washington suggest the shift reflects a broader strategic pivot. According to Pentagon leadership, the US intends to focus on regions where its military power is uniquely decisive, particularly in Asia and the Western Hemisphere.

European leaders, however, view the move as a sign of weakening commitment. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned that internal divisions now pose a greater threat to the alliance than external adversaries.

The withdrawal highlights Europe’s long-standing dependence on US military support, even as threats from Russia persist.

In response, key nations, including France, United Kingdom, and Germany, have pledged to significantly increase defense spending. Projections suggest European defense budgets could nearly double by 2030.

Yet financial investment alone may not be enough.

Europe’s defense industry remains fragmented, with multiple countries producing competing systems rather than coordinating efforts. This lack of integration drives up costs and slows development. For example, Europe manufactures several types of battle tanks, while the US focuses on a single main model, improving efficiency and scale.

Joint defense projects have also struggled. A high-profile effort between France and Germany to develop next-generation fighter jets has faced repeated delays due to disagreements over leadership and design priorities.

Capability gaps and strategic risks

One of the most urgent concerns is missile defense. European systems currently lack the scale and sophistication of US platforms such as Patriot and THAAD systems, which have been heavily deployed in recent conflicts.

At the same time, the Pentagon has canceled plans to deploy additional long-range missile units to Europe, further widening capability gaps.

The European Union is attempting to address these vulnerabilities by encouraging member states to source more defense equipment domestically. By 2030, at least half of defense procurement is expected to remain within the EU.

However, transitioning away from US systems presents risks, particularly as global demand for weapons increases amid ongoing conflicts.

A crossroads for NATO

Europe now faces a strategic choice. A faster path to rearmament would rely on continued US cooperation, but that depends on trust that appears increasingly strained.

The alternative is a slower, more independent route requiring greater spending, deeper industrial integration, and political willingness to pool sovereignty, an objective that has long proved elusive.

Despite the challenges, there are signs of progress. Defense companies such as Saab, Rheinmetall, and BAE Systems report record demand, while newer NATO members Sweden and Finland have rapidly integrated into the alliance.

Still, the withdrawal of 5,000 troops underscores a critical reality: Europe’s security architecture is entering a period of transition, with uncertain implications for the future of transatlantic cooperation.

(Source: CNN)

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akan Fidan met Mark Rutte in Ankara on Wednesday, as part of the NATO chief’s official visit to Türkiye, amid a broader focus on defense cooperation and regional security challenges.

According to diplomatic sources, the talks were held within the framework of ongoing engagement between Türkiye and the NATO alliance. Rutte is also scheduled to meet Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan later during his visit.

Speaking separately in Istanbul, Rutte praised Türkiye’s rapidly advancing defense sector, describing it as a “defense industrial revolution” from which NATO allies could draw important lessons. His remarks came during a visit to Aselsan, one of the country’s leading defense firms.

Central to NATO’s security

Rutte emphasized that boosting defense production and innovation is now a top priority for the alliance, particularly as global security challenges intensify. He said these issues would be central at NATO’s upcoming summit in Ankara in July, stressing that increased military spending alone would not be sufficient without stronger industrial output.

He highlighted the need for greater production of key capabilities such as air defense systems, drones, ammunition, radar technologies and space-based systems. “We have to do better, we have to do more,” Rutte said, noting that NATO could “learn a lot” from Türkiye’s recent progress in these areas.

Describing the global security environment as increasingly volatile, Rutte pointed to a range of threats spanning multiple domains—from missile and drone attacks to cyber warfare. He referenced Russia’s war in Ukraine, China’s military expansion, and Iran’s regional activities as key sources of instability, adding that Türkiye is directly exposed to several of these risks.

Rutte also revealed that NATO had intercepted ballistic missiles heading toward Türkiye from Iran on four separate occasions, underscoring the alliance’s commitment to collective defense.

Arms exports across Europe

Highlighting Türkiye’s growing role in the defense industry, he noted that Turkish firms are expanding internationally, with exports and operations across Europe. He cited recent deals involving Aselsan, including the sale of advanced electronic warfare systems to Poland and operations in countries such as Albania and Romania.

Founded in 1975 and headquartered in Ankara, Aselsan has grown into one of Türkiye’s largest defense companies and ranks among the top 50 globally in its sector. The company reached a market value of $30 billion in January 2026, marking a significant milestone for the country’s defense industry.

Rutte concluded by stressing the importance of innovation and human capital, pointing to the relatively young workforce at Aselsan as a key driver of its success. He urged engineers and industry leaders to accelerate production and technological development to meet the alliance’s evolving security needs.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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ulgaria’s Progressive Bulgaria coalition, led by former president Rumen Radev, was on course for a commanding victory in Sunday’s early parliamentary elections, according to near-final results released by the Central Election Commission (CEC) on Monday, raising the prospect of a single-party government in a country plagued by years of political instability.

With 87.2% of ballots counted as of 9:50 a.m. local time (0650 GMT), Progressive Bulgaria had secured 44.6% of the vote, maintaining a substantial lead over its rivals. The reformist We Continue the Change–Democratic Bulgaria coalition trailed in second place with 13.5%, narrowly ahead of the center-right GERB–SDS alliance, anchored by Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria, which stood at 13.3%.

The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), traditionally representing minority communities, garnered around 6.1%, while the nationalist Revival (Vazrazhdane) hovered just above the parliamentary threshold with approximately 4.4%.

A strong lead

Earlier preliminary results, based on a smaller share of counted votes, had already indicated a strong lead for Progressive Bulgaria, with support above 43%. Parallel vote counts conducted by polling agencies and reported by the state news agency BTA projected an even higher share nearing 45%, reinforcing expectations of a decisive outcome.

Seat projections based on partial results suggest Progressive Bulgaria could win around 134 seats in the 240-member National Assembly, comfortably surpassing the 121-seat threshold required to form a majority government. GERB–SDS and We Continue the Change–Democratic Bulgaria are projected to secure roughly 38 and 37 seats respectively, while MRF and Revival are expected to hold smaller blocs.

If confirmed, the result would mark a dramatic shift in Bulgaria’s political landscape, potentially ending a prolonged period of fragmentation that has seen the Balkan country hold eight parliamentary elections since 2021. Successive votes have failed to produce stable governing coalitions, leading to a cycle of short-lived administrations and caretaker governments appointed by the presidency.

Sunday’s election once again drew a crowded field, with 14 political parties and 10 alliances competing for seats. However, voter engagement remained subdued. The CEC reported turnout at just 34.63% as of 4:00 p.m. local time (1300 GMT) on election day, reflecting persistent public disillusionment with the political process.

Growing frustration with entrenched political elites

Analysts say Progressive Bulgaria’s surge reflects growing frustration with entrenched political elites and repeated governance failures. The coalition, which campaigned on promises of institutional reform, economic stability and a break from years of political deadlock, appears to have consolidated support across a broad segment of the electorate.

“The scale of this lead suggests voters are seeking a clear mandate and an end to the cycle of inconclusive elections,” said a Sofia-based political analyst. “Whether that translates into effective governance will depend on how the coalition manages internal cohesion and opposition pressure.”

Despite the strong showing, challenges remain. Bulgaria continues to grapple with economic disparities, corruption concerns and geopolitical pressures as a member of both the European Union and NATO. A decisive parliamentary majority could provide the political stability needed to pursue reforms, but expectations are likely to be high.

The CEC is required under Bulgarian law to announce final vote totals and the official seat distribution within four days of the election. The names of elected members of parliament must be published within seven days.

Until then, attention will remain focused on whether Progressive Bulgaria’s projected majority holds as the remaining ballots are counted. If it does, the result could mark the beginning of a new political chapter for Bulgaria after years of uncertainty and repeated trips to the polls.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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lovenia’s newly appointed parliament speaker, Zoran Stevanović, has announced plans to hold a national referendum on whether the country should withdraw from NATO, signaling a potential shift in the country’s foreign and security policy.

Speaking to Slovenia’s public broadcaster RTVSLO, Stevanović said the vote would fulfill a campaign promise made by his political movement. “We promised the people a referendum on the issue of leaving NATO, and we will hold this referendum,” he said, emphasizing that the decision should ultimately rest with voters.

Stevanović, a leading figure in the anti-establishment Truth party, framed the proposal as part of a broader effort to reassert Slovenia’s sovereignty. He stressed that his position was not aligned with any foreign power, rejecting claims that his stance reflects pro-Russian sympathies. “I have no pro-Russian views, only pro-Slovenian ones,” he said. “Slovenia must conduct its policy independently and sovereignly.”

The speaker outlined a vision of foreign policy based on non-alignment and broad international cooperation. While advocating engagement with global powers, he cautioned against what he described as subordination to external interests. “Good relations with everyone, but in the interest of Slovenia,” he added.

Stevanović also indicated a desire to scale back Slovenia’s involvement in international conflicts, saying the country should avoid interference in foreign military and diplomatic disputes. “Slovenia never benefits from this,” he said, suggesting a more restrained approach to global engagement.

Moscow visit

In a move likely to draw attention among Western allies, Stevanović confirmed plans to travel to Moscow in the near future. He said the visit would aim to “build bridges” and promote dialogue despite growing geopolitical divisions between East and West.

The proposal to reconsider NATO membership comes at a time of heightened debate over the alliance’s future. Recent criticism from figures such as former U.S. President Donald Trump has added to questions about transatlantic unity, particularly amid ongoing geopolitical tensions and security challenges.

However, Stevanović appeared to draw a distinction between Slovenia’s NATO membership and its place in the European Union. He acknowledged that public support for leaving the EU is limited, noting that Slovenia continues to benefit from its membership in the bloc. This suggests that any push for a referendum would focus narrowly on NATO rather than a broader realignment away from European institutions.

In addition to the NATO proposal, Stevanović said his party intends to pursue other policy goals, including advocating for Slovenia’s withdrawal from the World Health Organization, further underscoring its critical stance toward international organizations.

Slovenia’s foreign policy

Stevanović’s rise to the speakership follows parliamentary elections in March that left liberal parties short of a majority. The outcome allowed a coalition of right-wing and smaller “kingmaker” parties, including the Truth party, to play a decisive role in shaping the country’s leadership.

Political analysts say the prospect of a NATO withdrawal referendum introduces a new level of uncertainty into Slovenia’s foreign policy. The country has been a member of the alliance since 2004 and has participated in various NATO missions and initiatives.

Any move to leave NATO would have significant implications for Slovenia’s security posture and its relationships with Western allies. It could also signal broader shifts within European politics, where debates over sovereignty, defense commitments, and international alignment have become increasingly prominent.

For now, it remains unclear when the proposed referendum might take place or whether it would gain sufficient political and public support to pass. Nevertheless, the announcement marks a notable development in Slovenia’s political landscape and raises important questions about the future direction of its foreign policy.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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ivisions are emerging within NATO as several European countries resist supporting U.S.-Israeli military operations against Iran. The disagreement highlights growing unease across Europe about the direction and legality of the month-long war.

U.S. President Donald Trump has sharply criticized European allies, accusing them of failing to support Washington’s efforts. He described some partners as “unhelpful” and previously labeled them “cowards,” underscoring rising tensions within the alliance.

The dispute comes as the war intensifies, placing pressure on long-standing transatlantic relationships and raising questions about NATO cohesion during a major geopolitical crisis.

France and Italy restrict military cooperation

France has taken an unprecedented step by refusing to allow its airspace to be used for transporting U.S. weapons to Israel for operations against Iran. According to diplomatic sources, this marked the first such denial since the war began.

The French government said the decision was consistent with its policy since the start of the war. However, Israeli officials reacted strongly, accusing Paris of obstructing critical military logistics. In response, Israel signaled it could suspend defense procurement from France.

Italy has also imposed limits. Authorities reportedly denied permission for U.S. military aircraft to land at the Sigonella air base in Sicily en route to the Middle East. Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto later downplayed the move, saying it reflected standard procedures requiring specific authorization for operations beyond existing agreements.

Spain leads criticism of the war

Spain has emerged as one of the most outspoken critics of the U.S.-Israeli campaign. Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has openly questioned the strikes, while Defense Minister Margarita Robles emphasized that Spanish bases would only be used for NATO’s collective defense—not for offensive operations.

Madrid has gone further by fully closing its airspace to U.S. aircraft involved in attacks on Iran, citing adherence to international law.

Trump also criticized the United Kingdom for its limited involvement, despite its close alliance with Washington. His remarks coincided with a planned state visit by King Charles III to the United States, adding a diplomatic layer to the tensions.

Broader implications for NATO and the war

The disagreements extend beyond individual countries. Germany, which hosts the major U.S. military hub at Ramstein Air Base, initially placed no restrictions on its use. However, debate has intensified after Frank-Walter Steinmeier suggested the war may be illegal under international law.

Analysts say these fractures could weaken NATO unity at a critical moment, potentially complicating U.S. military planning and signaling a broader reluctance in Europe to be drawn deeper into the war.

As the war continues, Europe’s cautious stance reflects a balancing act: maintaining alliance commitments while avoiding escalation in a war that many leaders fear could spiral further across the region.

(Source: Reuters)

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he Netherlands’ caretaker government has signaled it is exploring ways to reduce reliance on U.S. control over advanced fighter jet software, with State Secretary for Defence Gijs Tuinman saying the country could potentially bypass American restrictions on the F-35.

Speaking on the Boekestijn & De Wijk podcast on BNR Nieuwsradio, Tuinman discussed Europe’s preparedness for a possible large-scale Russian attack on NATO territory, the future of European defense cooperation without U.S. backing, and concerns about dependency on American software updates for the F-35 Lightning II.

Tuinman said that by the end of 2028 the Netherlands aims to have key capabilities in place to counter the Russian threat. These include the delivery of new tanks, additional F-35 fighter jets, ordered Tomahawk missiles and expanded artillery systems.

He emphasized that strengthening deterrence against Russia is a central priority for The Hague and its NATO allies.

Reducing dependence on U.S. software

A major point of discussion was whether Dutch F-35 aircraft could face operational limits if the United States chose to withhold critical software updates.

Tuinman said the Netherlands is working closely with Norway and soon with Poland to reduce Europe’s dependence on U.S.-controlled software systems for the aircraft over the next 18 to 24 months.

“If that happens, we will see whether the Americans really clarify their position,” he said, referring to the possibility of Washington stepping back as a close defense partner.

“You can crack the software”

In a striking remark, Tuinman suggested that alternatives exist if cooperation on software updates were refused.

“I’m going to say something I should never tell you, but I’ll say it anyway,” he said on the podcast. “In the end, you have another option. You can also crack the F-35’s software. Just like an iPhone. I won’t say anything more about that.”

The comment underscores growing unease in parts of Europe about strategic autonomy and the risks of heavy reliance on U.S.-supplied defense technology, particularly as geopolitical tensions rise and questions linger over long-term American commitments to European security.

Dutch officials have not indicated that any such step is planned, but Tuinman’s remarks reflect a broader debate within NATO about sovereignty, interoperability and technological control in an increasingly uncertain security environment.

(Source: Hablerler)

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ATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said Wednesday that Ukraine must remain the alliance’s top priority, warning against distractions such as territorial disputes over Greenland while Russia continues its attacks on Ukraine.

Speaking at a panel discussion during the World Economic Forum in Davos, Rutte emphasized that European and US security depends on sustained military, financial, and political support for Kyiv.

Rutte stressed that while issues like Greenland should be addressed through dialogue, they should not overshadow the war in Ukraine.

“Focus in Ukraine should be our number one priority, and then we can discuss all the issues, including Greenland,” he said, noting that Russian missiles and drones are continuing to strike Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.

Warning against diplomatic distractions

The NATO chief expressed concern that excessive attention to secondary disputes could weaken collective resolve at a critical moment in the conflict.

“As we speak, Russian attacks are ongoing,” Rutte said, warning that losing focus could undermine efforts to support Ukraine’s defense.

Rutte acknowledged the importance of diplomatic initiatives and financial backing, including the EU-led €90 billion ($105 billion) support package, but said immediate military assistance remains essential.

He underscored the need to ensure Ukraine has sufficient resources to defend itself against Russian aggression.

Transatlantic unity at the core of NATO

Highlighting NATO’s integrated defense system, Rutte reaffirmed the alliance’s reliance on strong cooperation between Europe and the United States.

He noted that European countries have increased defense spending in response to US expectations and stressed mutual commitment within the alliance.

“I have no doubt the US will come to the rescue here, and we will come to the rescue of the US,” Rutte said, emphasizing NATO’s collective security principle.

Rutte concluded by stressing that NATO’s effectiveness depends on unity and sustained investment in defense capabilities on both sides of the Atlantic, particularly as the war in Ukraine continues to shape the security landscape in Europe and beyond.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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ATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte on Tuesday rejected renewed concerns about the United States’ long-term commitment to the alliance, saying Washington remains engaged despite U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s expected absence from a key meeting of allied foreign ministers.

The Brussels gathering on Wednesday comes at a critical moment for the 32-member alliance, as Russia’s war on Ukraine approaches its fourth year and high-stakes negotiations continue in Moscow and across Europe about Kyiv’s political and territorial future.

Rubio will not attend the meeting, an unusual move given Washington’s central leadership role in NATO. His absence follows U.S. President Donald Trump’s 28-point draft proposal for ending the war, which unsettled European allies last month by suggesting Ukraine would not join NATO and that the alliance would halt further expansion.

Speaking to reporters, Rutte sought to calm fears, stressing that the top U.S. diplomat’s schedule is overloaded.

“He’s working extremely hard to take care not only of the situation in Ukraine, but many other issues which are on his plate,” Rutte said. “I totally accept him not being able to be here tomorrow, and I would not read anything in it.”

A senior U.S. State Department official, speaking anonymously, echoed that view, saying Rubio had already held dozens of engagements with NATO counterparts this year and that it is “impractical” to expect his presence at every meeting.

Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau will represent Washington instead, and is expected to press allies to meet the Trump administration’s demand that all NATO members spend 5% of their GDP on defense — a sharp increase from the current 2% guideline.

Ukraine membership blocked despite ‘irreversible path’ pledge

Trump’s initial peace plan suggested a freeze on NATO enlargement and excluded Ukraine from eventual membership — despite repeated alliance commitments that Kyiv has a place in NATO once conditions allow.

Rutte acknowledged the political reality: “Right now, as you know, there is no consensus on Ukraine joining NATO,” he said, noting opposition not only from the Trump administration but from Hungary and Slovakia.

Still, he insisted that Ukraine remains on an “irreversible path” toward eventual membership, as NATO leaders affirmed at their 2024 Washington summit.

The NATO chief also said controversial elements of Trump’s early proposals have been revised significantly following European input.

“You need to start somewhere. You need to have proposals on the table,” Rutte said, adding that NATO-related issues in any future settlement “will be dealt with separately, and that obviously will include NATO.”

Tensions rise as allies warn of Russia’s next move

The upcoming foreign ministers’ meeting takes place as European officials warn that Russian President Vladimir Putin could threaten another European country within three to five years if Moscow prevails in Ukraine.

European leaders view Russia’s invasion as an existential threat, and fear that uncertainty over U.S. leadership and NATO unity risks undermining deterrence at a decisive juncture.

The Trump administration maintains that European allies must shoulder greater responsibility for their regional security, especially as Washington reorients part of its strategic focus toward challenges in the Asia-Pacific.

U.S. signals shifting posture in Europe

Concerns about a potential U.S. military drawdown have intensified. Romania announced in October that the United States would reduce its troop presence there by up to 3,000 personnel as part of a broader global force review.

The administration is expected to unveil its updated troop plans for Europe in early 2026.

Trump has also unsettled NATO officials with recent remarks describing the alliance in transactional terms — emphasizing U.S. arms sales to member states and implying that Washington stands somewhat apart from the organization it has led for 75 years.

“We’re selling a lot of weapons to NATO, and that’s going, I guess, to Ukraine for the most part,” Trump said during an October meeting with Finnish President Alexander Stubb. “That’s up to them, but they’re buying weapons from the U.S.”

Wednesday’s session in Brussels will center on strengthening support for Ukraine, coordinating deterrence measures across NATO’s eastern flank, and assessing the long-term security implications of the war.

Rutte underscored that the alliance remains united despite political pressures on both sides of the Atlantic.

“At this pivotal moment, NATO’s strength lies in its shared commitment,” he said. “The work continues, with or without any single individual at the table.”

(Source: The Associated Press)

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n recent weeks, serious tensions have emerged in the Eastern European security landscape. On September 9-10, 2025, 19 Russian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) entered Polish airspace via Belarus. At least three UAVs were shot down by Polish and NATO forces. NATO-affiliated Dutch F-35s, Polish F-16s, Italian AWACS aircraft, and German Patriot systems responded to the violation. Moscow claimed the UAVs were targeting Ukraine and that the incursion into NATO airspace was unintentional. However, in the West, these violations were perceived as a deliberate “provocation.” Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk described the incident as a real threat to civilians and invoked Article 4 of the NATO Treaty, which initiated a consultation process among the alliance’s 32 members.

Article 4 of NATO activates the collective consultation mechanism when a member state perceives a threat to its security, though this does not automatically entail direct military intervention. Article 5, on the other hand, defines collective defense and requires all members to respond if one member is attacked. However, Article 5 does not automatically come into effect. It has only been invoked once historically, following the September 11 attacks on the United States. In this latest incident, Poland did not invoke Article 5, instead requesting allied solidarity under Article 4. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte emphasized that this was not an isolated incident and stressed the importance of maintaining deterrence on the eastern flank.

The nature of the incident has sparked debate about whether it was a “provocation” or a “probing” operation. It has been assessed that the UAVs were flying along planned routes, and Moscow’s aim was to test NATO’s reactions, integration, and operational procedures. The performance of the QRA (Quick Reaction Alert) system, AWACS, and Patriot systems was observed, and critical operational intelligence was obtained prior to the Zapad 2025 exercise, which took place from September 12-16. This demonstrates that Russia gathered information on the military and political responses by testing NATO’s defense reflexes.

Western reactions and strategic concerns

Along with Poland, Western capitals have assessed the incident as a provocation. However, the U.S. administration’s indecisive and contradictory stance has disappointed Europeans and raised questions about NATO’s effectiveness as a deterrent. This situation could encourage Moscow to continue similar violations. Europe’s political fragmentation makes it easier for Russia to make strategic calculations. Notably, Germany, Italy, and France’s cautious stance against the risk of escalation contrasts with the demand for tough measures by eastern flank countries such as Poland, Estonia, and Lithuania, highlighting coordination problems within NATO.

Militarily, NATO’s air defense systems have responded swiftly. Polish F-16s, Dutch F-35s, German Patriot systems, and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) networks have been rapidly deployed, demonstrating technical capacity. However, cost-effectiveness is a serious weakness. Using $100,000 AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles to shoot down $10,000 Gerber UAVs is not a sustainable defense solution. This situation shows that NATO’s expensive air defense systems are inadequate against low-cost, asymmetric threats, and there is an urgent need for inexpensive, rapidly produced UAV countermeasure solutions.

Poland’s measures and economic impacts

Poland has emerged as a key player in global security, providing over $4 billion in military aid to Ukraine and playing a central role in transit routes through Western Europe. The country is home to over one million Ukrainian refugees and hosts 10,000 U.S. troops, a missile defense base, and a permanent garrison. These developments have increased Poland’s military and diplomatic influence, ensuring its central role in NATO’s deterrence and defense strategy on the eastern flank.

To enhance border security and reduce potential risks, Poland closed its temporary border crossings with Belarus, reopening them on September 25. The decision to close the border was made due to the Zapad 2025 exercise and the incursion of 21 Russian UAVs into Polish airspace, which caused serious disruptions to trade flows. The annual €25 billion trade between China and Europe has been affected by the temporary border closures, raising concerns about potential economic losses. Prime Minister Tusk stated that security considerations take precedence over economic concerns and that he reserves the right to close the border crossings again in the event of future threats.

Political differences and debates within NATO

The recent violations of Polish and Romanian airspace by Russian drones, as well as the incursion of MiG-31 fighter jets into Estonian airspace, have tested NATO’s resilience and readiness. Despite the growing Russian threat, there are still political differences over deterrence in Europe. Germany, Italy, and the US are cautious about the risk of escalation, while Baltic and Eastern European countries are demanding tougher measures.

Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson emphasized that NATO members must act jointly and consistently against threats. He stated that they would respond to airspace violations with force if necessary. Policy debates within NATO have intensified, with the question of “at what threshold should a response be given” coming to the fore. Moscow has noted that NATO can respond militarily, yet it is hesitant in political and financial terms. This reinforces the perception that similar provocations could be repeated.

This situation tests NATO’s military capacity, political will, and coordination ability. Considering both military and political outcomes, this crisis demonstrates the inevitability of restructuring the European security architecture. A more robust defense strategy is needed to deter hybrid threats and low-cost asymmetric attacks.

This has reopened discussions on NATO’s defense concept along its eastern flank. Gaps in low-altitude air defense have been observed in Poland and the Baltic States, underscoring the necessity for NATO to adopt a layered, continuous, and rapid-reaction-focused defense posture.

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uropean leaders are sounding the alarm after a sudden surge in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) incursions across the continent, raising fears that what was once a nuisance has escalated into a strategic campaign of “hybrid warfare.”

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen warned lawmakers on Wednesday that the recent wave of drone overflights targeting airports, power plants, and defense facilities marked “something new and dangerous” in Europe’s security landscape.

“In just the past two weeks, MiG fighters have violated Estonia’s airspace, and drones have flown over critical sites in Belgium, Poland, Romania, Denmark, and Germany,” she said in a fiery speech before the European Parliament in Strasbourg. “Flights have been grounded, jets scrambled, and countermeasures deployed to ensure the safety of our citizens. Make no mistake. This is part of a worrying pattern of growing threats.”

The European Parliament is preparing a resolution this week describing the incidents as “acts of hybrid warfare” and citing possible involvement by “Russian agents” in coordinated drone operations meant to sow disruption and fear across the bloc.

From nuisance to threat

For years, European air safety agencies have been dealing with small drones straying into flight paths — mostly by accident. But the recent surge in mysterious and deliberate incursions has pushed governments into crisis mode.

Airport authorities in Denmark, Norway, and Germany were forced to close airspace temporarily after UAVs of unknown origin were spotted over runways. In Belgium, a defense contractor producing missile systems reported a “worrying increase” in unidentified drone sightings near its facilities.

“One incident may be a mistake. Two, a coincidence. But three, five, ten? This is a deliberate and targeted gray zone campaign against Europe. And Europe must respond,” von der Leyen declared.

While Russian involvement is suspected in several cases — particularly after Russian military drones briefly crossed into Poland and Romania — analysts caution that not every incident bears Moscow’s fingerprints.

“Some of these intrusions may be testing Europe’s defenses; others could be unrelated,” said Sander Starreveld, director of the aviation consultancy SIG Aviation. “But the pattern is concerning because it shows how easily drones can bypass conventional security systems.”

Drones are hard to see — and stop

According to the EU Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the number of reported drone-related incidents in European airspace jumped from about 500 in 2015 to nearly 2,000 in 2019 — and experts believe the true number is much higher today.

“Air traffic control systems are generally unable to detect small drones,” said Frédéric Deleau, vice president for Europe of the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers’ Associations. “Traditional radar is optimized for large aircraft, not lightweight carbon-fiber drones that can easily evade detection or appear as birds.”

To counter the growing threat, major airports across Europe have deployed specialized anti-drone technologies — including radar, radio-frequency scanners, acoustic sensors, and high-resolution cameras. But none offer complete protection.

“No single technology yet provides reliable coverage,” Deleau admitted. “The cat-and-mouse dynamic continues — as soon as one detection method improves, drone technology adapts.”

From hobbyists to hostile actors

For much of the last decade, unauthorized drone flights near airports were attributed to recreational users unaware of flight restrictions.

“Until recently, the main issue was that the average drone operator simply didn’t know where drones were permitted to fly,” Starreveld said. “You’d buy one, fly it near an airport, and call yourself a ‘pilot.’ Curiosity and carelessness were the main problems.”

That changed as regulators imposed stricter rules, awareness campaigns, and geofencing software that automatically prevents consumer drones from entering restricted areas. But the recent spate of incidents — many involving multiple UAVs operating in formation — appears to be intentional interference.

“What’s new in these incidents is the deliberate use of drones to disrupt air traffic,” Starreveld explained. “For airline pilots, that idea alone places these encounters in a completely different and deeply worrying category: criminal or strategic intent.”

Security experts describe these drone incursions as part of a “gray-zone” conflict — actions that fall short of open warfare but still seek to weaken, intimidate, or test an adversary.

“Russia, China, and even smaller actors understand the value of ambiguity,” said Dr. Helena Braun, a senior fellow at the European Security Centre in The Hague. “If you can cause chaos at a European airport without firing a shot, you demonstrate vulnerability and consume resources.”

Von der Leyen has called for a “European Drone Shield” — a continent-wide system integrating surveillance, intelligence sharing, and electronic countermeasures to neutralize UAVs before they threaten safety or infrastructure.

The proposal, modeled loosely on NATO’s air defense systems, would involve closer coordination between national air forces, intelligence agencies, and civilian aviation authorities.

But some EU diplomats worry the plan could take years to implement. “The pace of drone innovation is far faster than the EU’s policymaking process,” said one senior official familiar with the talks.

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erman and Swedish fighter jets intercepted a Russian reconnaissance aircraft over the Baltic Sea on Sunday, the latest in a string of military incursions testing NATO’s air defenses.

According to Germany’s defense ministry, NATO ordered Berlin’s “quick reaction alert force” to investigate an unidentified aircraft flying without a flight plan or radio contact. German Eurofighter Typhoons identified the plane as a Russian IL-20M reconnaissance aircraft before handing the escort over to Swedish NATO partners. The German jets then returned to their base in Rostock-Laage.

Sweden’s air force confirmed it monitored the Russian aircraft, describing its movements as occurring in international airspace. Still, the interception adds to growing unease in the Baltic region, where NATO has faced multiple airspace violations in recent weeks.

Estonia accuses Russia of violating airspace

On Friday, Estonia accused three Russian MiG-31 jets of entering its airspace for 12 minutes, prompting Tallinn to invoke NATO’s Article 4, which allows members to consult on security threats. Earlier this month, Poland triggered the same provision after more than a dozen Russian drones crossed into its territory, with Prime Minister Donald Tusk calling it “the closest we have been to open conflict since World War II.” Romania also reported Russian drone intrusions.

Russia’s Ministry of Defense has denied all allegations of airspace violations, calling some of them provocations. But NATO allies say the pattern points to deliberate pressure.

“This is exactly what Russia wants — to divert our attention away from helping Ukraine and to focus on our own backyard,” Estonia’s Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur said. “That is a key goal behind these kinds of provocations.”

U.S. President Donald Trump, asked about the incidents, struck a cautious tone: “Well, I don’t love it. I don’t love it when that happens. Could be big trouble.”

The repeated confrontations underscore escalating tensions between NATO and Russia, with the Baltic region now a flashpoint for potential miscalculation.

(Source: Reuters)

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ussia has staged one of its largest military exercises since the invasion of Ukraine, showcasing nuclear-capable weapons alongside conventional forces in drills with Belarus that NATO officials say mark a dangerous escalation of Europe’s security crisis.

The Zapad-2025 maneuvers, which began last week, involved thousands of troops, warships, nuclear-capable bombers, and hundreds of combat vehicles. Moscow highlighted scenarios that included the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons and unveiled deployment options for its new Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile, which it says will soon be stationed in Belarus.

The display came just days after about 20 Russian drones breached Polish airspace, which Warsaw condemned as a “provocation” and NATO described as reckless. In response, the alliance announced a new “Eastern Sentry” initiative to reinforce air defenses across Poland and the Baltic states. “Within this alliance of 32 countries, we all live on the eastern flank,” NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte said in Brussels, underscoring that the threat extends far beyond frontline states.

Lowered nuclear threshold

The exercises are the first since Moscow revised its nuclear doctrine in 2024, declaring that any conventional attack on Russia involving a nuclear-armed ally of Ukraine would be treated as a joint nuclear strike. Analysts say this change significantly lowers the threshold for nuclear use. Belarus, now formally under Russia’s nuclear umbrella, has already hosted Russian tactical nuclear weapons and is expected to receive Oreshnik systems later this year.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has boasted that Oreshnik’s warheads can reach speeds of Mach 10 and strike European capitals within minutes, making it impossible to know whether they carry conventional or nuclear payloads until impact. Military analysts warn that their forward deployment in Belarus effectively restores a Cold War-style “nuclear fortress” on NATO’s doorstep.

NATO scrambles to respond

The alliance’s rapid announcement of Eastern Sentry reflects growing fears of miscalculation. Germany, France, and the Netherlands are contributing aircraft and missile defense systems, while Poland is closing sections of its eastern airspace and accelerating its military modernization program. “This brings us closer to open conflict, closer than ever since World War II,” Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned.

Defense experts caution that NATO faces a costly dilemma: intercepting Russia’s low-cost drones with advanced fighter jets is unsustainable. Calls are growing for investments in layered counter-drone defenses, a lesson drawn from Ukraine’s battlefield experience.

For Russia, the drills send a political message as much as a military one: that it retains escalation dominance despite its grinding war in Ukraine. For NATO, the challenge is to reinforce deterrence without triggering direct confrontation.

“This is a dangerous moment,” a senior NATO official told reporters. “We must be firm, but we must also avoid giving Moscow the escalation it is trying to provoke.”

With the U.N. General Assembly set to meet later this month, the Zapad exercises and drone provocations ensure that Russia’s confrontation with the West will dominate the agenda — and keep Europe on edge as the war in Ukraine drags into its fourth year.

(Source: The Associated Press)

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ATO leaders scrambled Thursday to confront the implications of a major escalation in the war in Ukraine after multiple Russian drones violated Polish airspace during strikes on Ukraine, deepening fears of a broader regional conflict.

The incident, which left damage in the Polish village of Wyryki near Lublin, marked the most serious airspace violation of NATO territory since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Authorities in Poland said clearance operations continued Thursday, with troops securing debris from downed drones.

European leaders reacted with alarm, describing the breach as a deliberate provocation by Moscow. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer held urgent talks with French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, while Germany pledged to “extend and expand air policing over Poland.”

“It was clear that Russia was continuing to ramp up its aggression, systematically stepping up its attacks through a campaign of increasingly belligerent actions,” Starmer’s office said.

NATO’s supreme commander in Europe, U.S. Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, acknowledged that it remained unclear how many drones crossed into Poland or whether they were deliberately fired there. “But we will learn lessons. We will learn of things that we need to enhance our posture, to handle these limited incursions,” he said in Vilnius, Lithuania.

Poland strikes defiant tone

Polish leaders vowed a strong response while urging calm. Prime Minister Donald Tusk, addressing troops at an air base in Lask, praised NATO’s rapid deployment of allied jets, including support from the Netherlands.

He pledged to push forward with an ambitious military modernization program, highlighting Poland’s plan to take delivery of its first F-35 fighter jets next year under a U.S. support package.

President Karol Nawrocki, visiting a base in Poznan-Krzesiny, dismissed the incident as an intimidation attempt. “Poland doesn’t get scared by Russian drones,” he said. “This was an attempt to test our abilities, the ability to react.”

Poland also announced temporary air traffic restrictions in its eastern regions and will close its border with Belarus at midnight, citing Russian-Belarusian war games starting Friday. Officials said some drones may have entered Polish airspace from Belarus.

NATO and global repercussions

The foreign ministers of Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania issued a joint statement calling the drone incursion “a deliberate and coordinated strike constituting an unprecedented provocation and escalation of tension.”

Finnish President Alexsander Stubb, after meeting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kyiv, said, “The line between war and peace has been blurred. We now live in an age of uncertainty.”

The U.N. Security Council scheduled an emergency session for Friday at Poland’s request.

Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump offered an ambiguous response on social media: “What’s with Russia violating Poland’s airspace with drones? Here we go!” His administration has pledged to maintain a strong U.S. military presence in Poland, reaffirmed during Nawrocki’s recent visit to Washington.

The Kremlin denied targeting Poland, repeating claims from its Defense Ministry that Russian forces struck only Ukrainian territory and were open to discussions with Polish officials.

Expanding drone war

The incursion highlights the growing reliance on drones in the conflict. Ukraine said Thursday it had intercepted 62 out of 66 Russian drones overnight, while also expanding its own fleet of interceptor drones. Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal announced a new deal with Britain to co-produce advanced drones for the battlefield.

But analysts warned the clash over Polish airspace underscored the war’s dangerous spillover potential. A report by the European Council on Foreign Relations concluded that Russian President Vladimir Putin was testing Europe’s resolve, betting on political divisions and wavering commitments.

“Inconsistency between words and deeds seem to have eroded Europe’s credibility in Russia’s eyes,” the think tank wrote.

While Poland has reported previous airspace violations since 2022, officials said Wednesday’s incident was unprecedented in scale and seriousness. For many NATO capitals, it raised the specter of the alliance being dragged closer to direct confrontation with Moscow.

“Russia is probing NATO’s defenses and our willingness to respond,” said one senior European diplomat. “This is no longer just Ukraine’s war — it is a security challenge for the entire alliance.”

(Source: The Associated Press)

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ll 32 NATO members are set to meet the alliance’s longstanding target of allocating at least 2% of their gross domestic product (GDP) to defense this year, according to new figures released on Thursday. However, only three countries have so far achieved a more ambitious spending benchmark agreed by alliance leaders earlier this summer.

The 2% goal, established in 2014 in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, had long been a source of tension between the United States and its European allies, with Washington repeatedly urging members to shoulder more of the collective defense burden. Former U.S. President Donald Trump, in particular, pressed European nations to step up military investments during his first term, often criticizing what he described as “free riding” on U.S. security guarantees.

The latest data shows that this pressure, combined with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and a rapidly evolving security landscape, has produced a significant increase in military expenditures across Europe. As recently as 2024, more than 10 NATO countries were still falling short of the 2% target, sparking concerns about readiness and transatlantic unity.

The 2% minimum goal

This year, however, all allies will meet or exceed the 2% minimum, marking a historic first for the alliance as it commemorates its 75th anniversary. Seven members are expected to spend exactly 2.0% of their GDP on defense, while most others hover slightly above that mark.

Poland emerged as the biggest spender in relative terms, dedicating 4.48% of its GDP to defense, followed by Lithuania at 4% and Latvia at 3.73%. These three nations—located on NATO’s eastern flank and among the most vocal about the threat posed by Moscow—are also the only ones to have already met the alliance’s newly introduced target of 3.5% of GDP for defense spending.

That benchmark, agreed at a NATO summit in The Hague in June, represents a major shift in the alliance’s long-term ambitions. Under the new plan, members committed to reaching 3.5% by 2035 as part of an even broader initiative that envisions allocating 5% of GDP to defense and security-related infrastructure over the next decade. This would include not only traditional military spending but also investments in cyber defense, resilient supply chains, and transport networks capable of handling heavy military equipment in times of crisis.

Germany increased defense spending

Speaking at the inauguration of a new ammunition production facility in Unterlüß, Germany, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte welcomed the progress made by allies but stressed that higher budgets must translate into real-world capabilities. “Cash alone doesn’t provide security,” Rutte said, standing beside a newly unveiled production line operated by German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall. “Deterrence doesn’t come from 5%. Deterrence comes from the capability to deter and, if necessary, fight potential enemies.”

Germany, long criticized for its defense underinvestment, is now on track to meet the 2% threshold for the first time in decades, driven by a multi-year €100 billion special fund launched after the war in Ukraine began. France, Italy, and several Southern European nations have also edged past the target amid increasing concerns over Russian aggression, tensions in the Middle East, and the need to secure Europe’s southern flank from irregular migration and terrorism threats.

However, the new spending commitments are not without controversy. Some NATO members, particularly in Western Europe, have expressed reservations about the feasibility of meeting the 3.5% and 5% benchmarks in the face of slowing economic growth, high inflation, and domestic social spending pressures. Critics argue that a sharp increase in defense budgets may come at the expense of investments in climate transition, public health, and education.

Burden-sharing

Supporters of the plan, on the other hand, argue that the world has entered a period of prolonged geopolitical competition that leaves no room for complacency. “The days when Europe could rely on U.S. security guarantees without paying its fair share are over,” said a senior diplomat from a Northern European member state, speaking on condition of anonymity. “If we want to preserve the rules-based international order and deter aggression from Russia or any other adversary, we have to put our money where our mouth is.”

The debate over burden-sharing is expected to intensify ahead of the next NATO leaders’ summit in Warsaw in 2026, where progress toward the 3.5% spending goal will be formally reviewed. With Washington pushing for more equitable transatlantic contributions and Eastern Europe continuing to rearm at a record pace, the alliance faces the challenge of balancing ambition with economic reality.

For now, NATO officials are touting the achievement of full 2% compliance as a major milestone that strengthens deterrence at a critical time. But as geopolitical rivalries deepen and new security challenges emerge, the question remains: will allies sustain this momentum over the next decade—or will the spending surge prove to be a short-lived response to immediate threats?

(Source: Reuters)

The European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) is the latest step taken against the spiral of mistrust that emerged with the Russia-Ukraine war. The project was launched under the leadership of Germany, whose defense weaknesses have been on the agenda since the start of war in February 2022, drawing attention to its poor combat readiness and lack of basic military equipment.

Despite frequent warnings since the beginning of the war to increase ammunition production in European countries and to invest more in air and missile defense, European defense industry production has fallen further behind Russia. Meanwhile, as Russia shifted to a form of war economy, it significantly increased its production rate, further exacerbating insecurity in Europe.

Moreover, increased drone and missile strikes behind the front lines, intense attacks on critical infrastructure, and Russian missiles falling within NATO’s borders have put the need for air and missile defense in Europe back on the agenda. The ESSI is therefore expected not only to reduce vulnerability in this area, but also to encourage an overall increase in military spending on the continent and the development of a common understanding of defense.

The project aims to establish a layered air and missile defense network through the joint procurement and operation of the German Iris-T, American Patriot and Israeli Arrow-3 defense systems, thereby creating a cost-effective and interoperable network.

Why ISSI Is Needed for European Security?

Two fundamental challenges have played a driving role in the emergence of ESSI. The first is the fact that the development of missile and unmanned systems technology, as seen in recent conflicts and the war in Ukraine, could extend warfare behind the front lines.

The increasing use of large numbers of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which can be quickly and inexpensively produced and act as “missiles” with a saturation effect on air defense systems (neutralizing technologically superior enemy systems through numerical superiority), has reemphasized the importance of a multi-layered air and missile defense architecture.

Can ESSI Succeed?

The project is unlikely to succeed for a number of reasons. So far, the continent has failed to adopt a common position on security, defense and foreign policy. Although the project has been on the agenda for about a year and a half, no serious progress has been made except for the recruitment of new members due to the high cost of the systems to be procured. In addition, Germany and France have different approaches to war and common defense. All this inevitably puts the future of ESSI in a stalemate.

In the aftermath of the Ukraine war, France has become more emphatic about European strategic autonomy and the development of the European defense industrial ecosystem. However, it is noteworthy that the delays in the new generation aircraft and tank projects with Germany cannot be overcome.

French President Emmanuel Macron’s contradictory statements since the beginning of the war and his inability to find common ground with German Chancellor Scholz make it even more difficult to develop common policies, a situation that was recently repeated during the debate on the possible deployment of troops in Ukraine.

France’s refusal to participate in the ESSI, and even its frequent open criticism of the initiative, is one of the incompatibilities demonstrated by these differences. France considers the ESSI to be a project that will damage the Union’s defense industrial ecosystem, as it provides for the procurement of weapons systems from outside the EU.

It is worth recalling that France, along with Greece and Southern Cyprus, vetoed the delivery of urgently needed 155mm ammunition and unmanned systems to Ukraine from outside the EU.

We know that the ESSI is not a new concept, dating back to August 2022. The lack of a tangible outcome of the initiative, despite the long time that has passed and the rapid expansion of Russia’s capabilities, indicates that Europe has not overcome its traditional sluggishness when it comes to defense projects.

Despite the announcement of large defense budgets by many European countries, especially Germany, the extent to which these will be translated into reality and military modernization is a big question mark.

While the launch and success of an initiative like ESSI would be highly desirable for European security, the current picture suggests that it will not be easy to achieve. Even if successful, ESSI will only address a small part of Europe’s defense vulnerabilities, as most countries lack sufficient offensive capabilities to provide a deterrent.

While ESSI is an attractive idea, Europe must make a fundamental shift in its defense policy which is abandoning free riding under American security guarantees and developing its own defense. While France and the United Kingdom have the self-confidence that comes with having nuclear weapons, it will not be easy for other countries on the continent to undertake serious defense projects unless their dependence on the United States changes. This has also been the main criticism of Donald Trump, who is running for re-election in the US presidential elections.

Turkey, on the other hand, has signaled that it wants to maintain its participation in the European defense and security architecture by joining this initiative alongside Greece, just as it did with its NATO membership. Turkey does not currently have a procurement agenda for an external missile defense system. However, the goal is to increase the interoperability of Turkish systems with their European counterparts and, in the long term, to include Turkish defense industry products among the systems to be procured under the ESSI project although the latter goal is likely to face significant obstacles.

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n a stern message to the West, Russian President Vladimir Putin cautioned on Monday, March 18, 2024, that direct conflict between Russia and the U.S.-led NATO military alliance would dangerously escalate global tensions, bringing the planet perilously close to World War Three. While underscoring the gravity of the situation, Putin emphasized that few desire such a catastrophic scenario.

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has precipitated the most profound crisis in Moscow’s relations with the West since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Despite recurrent warnings of the risks of nuclear confrontation, Putin reiterated that he has never contemplated employing nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent remarks regarding the potential deployment of ground troops in Ukraine have underscored the gravity of the situation. While some Western nations have distanced themselves from such a proposition, others, particularly in Eastern Europe, have signaled support.

Macron’s remarks

Responding to questions regarding Macron’s remarks and the potential for conflict between Russia and NATO, Putin remarked, “everything is possible in the modern world.” He stressed the gravity of the situation, cautioning that any such conflict would bring the world to the brink of a catastrophic global war, a scenario of grave concern to all parties involved.

Putin also highlighted the presence of NATO military personnel in Ukraine, noting that Russian forces have intercepted communications in English and French on the battlefield. He expressed concern for the personnel involved, citing their significant casualties.

Regarding the escalating situation on the ground, Putin suggested that continued attacks by Ukraine may prompt Russia to establish a buffer zone using Ukrainian territory to safeguard its borders. However, he refrained from divulging specific details, emphasizing the need to prevent the influx of foreign armaments into Russian territory.

Putin’s comments come against the backdrop of a full-scale invasion of Ukraine initiated by Russia in February 2022, culminating in a major European conflict. Despite the ongoing hostilities, Putin reiterated his commitment to peace talks, urging international efforts to seek a peaceful resolution to the crisis in Ukraine.

Russian elections

In addressing criticisms of Russia’s recent elections, which the U.S. deemed neither free nor fair, Putin rebuffed Western accusations, asserting that U.S. elections themselves lack democratic integrity. He also criticized the U.S. for employing state power against former President Donald Trump, characterizing the situation as a “catastrophe.”

When questioned about the fate of opposition leader Alexei Navalny, who died under unexplained circumstances in a Russian prison in February, Putin confirmed that a prisoner exchange deal had been agreed upon before Navalny’s death. He reiterated his approval for the exchange, with the condition that Navalny not return to Russia.

Putin’s remarks underscore the gravity of the situation in Ukraine and the broader geopolitical tensions between Russia and the West, highlighting the urgent need for diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the crisis and prevent further destabilization in the region.

Source: Reuters

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ATO has initiated a comprehensive exercise, the Nordic Response 2024, aimed at safeguarding its newly expanded Nordic territory. More than 20,000 soldiers from 13 nations, including a record-breaking participation of over 4,000 Finnish soldiers, will partake in drills over nearly two weeks in the northern regions of Finland, Norway, and Sweden, starting from March 4, 2024.

The Nordic Response 2024 marks a significant moment for Finland, participating for the first time as a NATO member in an exercise focused on the collective defense of the alliance’s regions. This is emblematic of the evolving security landscape in the Baltic Sea region.

Historical Shift in Alliances

Finland, with its 1,340-kilometer border with Russia, joined NATO in April 2023 after decades of military non-alignment. The joint application for NATO membership by Finland and Sweden in 2022 reflected a profound shift in public opinion, spurred by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Nordic Response 2024 underscores the newfound commitment to collective defense in the face of geopolitical challenges.

Led by Norway, the Nordic Response 2024 is a testament to the alliance’s adaptability. It expands beyond traditional borders due to NATO’s enlargement, with Finland and Sweden actively participating. The exercise involves land, sea, and air components, with contributions from Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United States.

The High North holds strategic importance for NATO, and the exercise aims to enhance preparedness for large-scale joint operations in challenging weather conditions. Over 50 submarines, frigates, corvettes, aircraft carriers, and various amphibious vessels will participate, along with more than 100 fighter jets, transport aircraft, maritime surveillance aircraft, and helicopters.

NATO’s commitment to regional defense cooperation

Brigadier Tron Strand from the Royal Norwegian Air Force stressed the exercise’s relevance amid the current security situation in Europe. He emphasized the need to “fight back and stop anyone who tries to challenge our borders, values, and democracy.”

Finland’s new President, Alexander Stubb, will inspect the drill alongside Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre on March 7. This marks President Stubb’s first foreign trip since being sworn in on March 1, underscoring the significance of the exercise for Finland’s new leadership.

The Nordic Response 2024 stands as a testament to NATO’s commitment to regional defense cooperation and its ability to adapt to the evolving geopolitical landscape. The exercise reinforces the alliance’s determination to ensure the security and stability of its expanded Nordic territory.

Source: The Associated Press

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urkey’s parliament ratified Sweden’s NATO membership bid on January 23, 2024, overcoming a 20-month delay and eliminating a significant obstacle to expanding the transatlantic military alliance. The vote, with 287 in favor and 55 against, took place in Turkey’s general assembly, where President Tayyip Erdoğan’s ruling alliance holds a majority.

Sweden initially applied for NATO membership in 2022, seeking to enhance its security amid Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The approval process had faced hurdles, with Turkey and Hungary raising objections, particularly concerning the two countries’ protection of groups deemed as terrorists.

While Turkey had previously endorsed Finland’s NATO membership in April of the previous year, the approval for Sweden had been delayed. The Turkish Parliament’s approval was hailed by U.S. Ambassador Jeff Flake, who stated that Turkey’s commitment to NATO demonstrated a lasting partnership.

Hungary is yet to approve Sweden’s bid

Swedish Foreign Minister Tobias Billstrom welcomed the parliamentary approval, expressing anticipation for President Erdoğan to sign the ratification document. President Erdoğan is expected to sign the legislation in the coming days, leaving Hungary as the sole member state yet to approve Sweden’s accession.

Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban, known for his amicable relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, invited his Swedish counterpart for negotiations on joining the bloc. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg urged Hungary to complete its national ratification promptly.

The Turkish delay in approving Sweden’s bid had allowed Turkey to extract concessions, including urging Stockholm to take a tougher stance on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), considered a terrorist group by the EU and the U.S. In response, Sweden introduced a new anti-terrorism bill and, along with Finland, Canada, and the Netherlands, eased policies on arms exports to Turkey.

US welcomes Turkey’s move

President Erdoğan had linked the ratification to U.S. approval of the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey. The White House supports the sale, and analysts anticipate a swift deal following Turkey’s approval of Sweden’s bid. However, there is no clear timeframe for the U.S. Congress to approve the deal.

In a related development, the U.S. welcomed Turkey’s approval of Sweden’s NATO membership bid, with National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan emphasizing its importance to President Biden. Sullivan stated that Sweden’s NATO membership would make the U.S. and the alliance “safer and stronger.”

The situation unfolds as global leaders navigate the complexities of NATO expansion and regional dynamics, with particular attention to Turkey’s evolving relations with both Sweden and the wider NATO alliance.

Sources: Reuters and Anadolu Agency

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urkey’s parliamentary foreign affairs commission has given the green light to Sweden’s NATO membership bid, signaling a crucial step forward in the enlargement of the Western alliance. After 19 months of intricate negotiations and diplomatic maneuvering, the commission, dominated by President Tayyip Erdogan’s ruling AK Party, voted in favor of Sweden’s bid after an extensive four-hour debate.

The commission’s approval sets the stage for the next decisive step – a vote in the parliament general assembly, where the Turkish President Erdogan’s party maintains a majority. Anticipation is high for a swift passage in the assembly, potentially within the coming weeks, which would lead to Erdogan formally signing Sweden’s NATO membership into law.

Fuat Oktay, the head of the commission, tempered expectations for an immediate general assembly vote, emphasizing that the timing would be decided by the parliament speaker. He cautioned against interpreting the commission’s decision as indicative of the speed at which the general assembly would ratify the bid. Parliament is scheduled for a two-week recess in early January, adding an additional layer of complexity to the timeline.

Broad political support and Swedish enthusiasm

The approval in the commission saw broad political support, with Erdogan’s AK Party, its nationalist MHP allies, and the main opposition CHP all voting in favor of ratification. The small Islamist Felicity party and the right-nationalist Iyi party cast votes against Sweden’s NATO membership.

In response to the commission’s approval, Swedish Foreign Minister Tobias Billstrom expressed his country’s eagerness to join NATO. The sentiment was echoed by Boris Ruge, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy, who termed the commission’s decision “excellent news” for the alliance.

Diplomatic complexities and conditionalities

The path to Sweden’s NATO membership has been riddled with diplomatic complexities and conditions set by Turkey. In May of the previous year, Erdogan raised objections to both Sweden’s and Finland’s requests to join the alliance, citing concerns about their perceived protection of individuals Turkey deems terrorists and defense trade embargoes.

While Finland’s bid was ratified in April, Sweden faced a waiting period until it took steps to address Turkey’s specific security concerns, particularly those related to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). In response, Stockholm introduced a comprehensive anti-terrorism bill, making membership in a terrorist organization illegal. This move was seen as a significant step in fulfilling the agreement signed with Turkey the previous year.

Additionally, Sweden, along with other NATO members such as Finland, Canada, and the Netherlands, took measures to relax Turkey’s arms-export policies, further easing the path to ratification.

U.S. support and congressional challenges

The U.S. State Department has welcomed the Turkish parliamentary committee’s approval of Sweden’s NATO bid. A spokesperson conveyed the U.S.’s anticipation of swift passage by the full parliament, recognizing Sweden as a highly capable defense partner that would strengthen the alliance.

However, the sale of F-16 jets to Turkey, a key element linked to the NATO membership ratification, faces hurdles in the U.S. Congress. Some lawmakers have vowed to oppose the deal unless Ankara approves Sweden’s NATO membership bid. While the Biden administration has expressed support for the sale, the timeline for congressional approval remains unclear.

Strategic implications and ongoing tensions

The approval of Sweden’s NATO bid carries significant strategic implications for the alliance, particularly in the Baltic Sea region. Turkey’s diplomatic maneuvering over the past 18 months, coupled with its complex relationship with Russia amid the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, has added layers of complexity to NATO’s dynamics.

As the conflict in Ukraine continues and diplomatic relations between NATO members evolve, the ratification of Sweden’s NATO membership remains a critical development with far-reaching consequences. The international community is closely monitoring the situation, recognizing its potential impact on regional security and broader geopolitical dynamics.

The upcoming vote in the parliament general assembly will be a key moment to watch, as it is expected to pave the way for Sweden’s formal inclusion in NATO and further shape the alliance’s strategic landscape in a rapidly evolving global context.

Sources: Anadolu Agency and Reuters

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n a recent development that has caught the attention of international onlookers, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made clear on December 18, 2023, that Russia harbors no intentions of launching an offensive against NATO member states. This declaration comes as a reinforcement to President Vladimir Putin’s dismissal of such allegations as “complete nonsense” during an earlier broadcast.

The statements from the Russian officials were in direct response to comments made by U.S. President Joe Biden earlier in the month. According to Lavrov, President Putin has made it known to all, including President Biden, that Russia is free of any territorial ambitions concerning NATO countries and has resolved its historical territorial disputes, pointing out that this includes Japan.

Lavrov’s remarks, aired on the Channel One TV channel, emphasized that it was not Moscow but the West that severed ties, with no efforts from the Russian side to instigate such a break. “We never sought to break off these relationships,” Lavrov stated, suggesting that the current strained relations speak volumes about a “very desperate situation” from Washington’s perspective.

“President Putin has termed the idea of Russia attacking NATO countries as nonsense. Our country is not engaged in territorial disputes with NATO members, and this extends globally, without exception,” Lavrov communicated. This statement was a direct response to the remarks made by US President Joe Biden earlier in the month, which had insinuated a different narrative.

Moreover, Lavrov expressed that the deterioration of relations was not initiated by Moscow. “The severing of diplomatic ties came from the West. Russia has always been open to maintaining a relationship, and we have not pursued any disengagement,” he asserted.

Highlighting the strain in international relations, Lavrov pointed to the actions of the West as creating an adversarial climate. “They’ve pushed us into a corner, branding us as foes.”

“Erroneous policy”

During a segment with Rossiya-1 TV channel, President Putin not only labeled the allegations of potential aggression towards NATO as groundless but also accused President Biden of leveraging these claims to rationalize what he termed an “erroneous policy” towards Russia.

The back-and-forth comments underscore a period of heightened tensions and a complex geopolitical chess game, with both sides aiming to manage international perceptions amidst ongoing global concerns.

The unfolding narrative continues to evolve as world leaders weigh in and diplomatic channels work overtime to navigate the intricacies of these international relations. Observers are keeping a close watch on the situation, hoping for de-escalation and a return to more stable diplomatic engagements.

Sources: Yeni Safak and Anadolu Agency

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erman Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has issued a stark warning about the potential consequences of Donald Trump winning the 2024 US presidential election, labeling it a “catastrophe” for Europe. Pistorius expressed these concerns during a panel discussion at the Berlin Foreign Policy Forum on November 28.

Pistorius’ comments highlight the apprehension in Europe regarding the impact of the U.S. election on transatlantic relations. He noted that regardless of whether a Democrat or Republican wins the election, European nations will need to assume greater responsibility for the continent’s security. This is particularly pertinent given the potential for the U.S. to focus more on the Indo-Pacific region, potentially leading to reduced engagement in Europe.

Trump’s presidency from 2017 to 2021 was marked by repeated criticisms of America’s European allies over their contributions to the financial and military responsibilities of NATO. His approach had raised concerns about the stability of NATO and the future of US military presence in Europe.

Growing concerns in European countries

Pistorius’ statements reflect growing concerns in European countries about the need to enhance their own defense capabilities and security measures, especially in the context of shifting global power dynamics and U.S. foreign policy priorities.

Pistorius’ words serve as a reminder of the significant impact that the US presidential election could have on global politics. European leaders appear increasingly mindful of the need to prepare for potential changes in the US’s strategic priorities, emphasizing the interconnected nature of international relations and the importance of regional self-reliance in defense and security matters.

Pistorius warns

Pistorius pointed out that should they proceed with that action, it’s likely their ability to sustain the same level of involvement in Europe will be compromised.

Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s initiative for a European air defense system (ESI) revealed a gap in Europe’s defense capabilities, particularly regarding protection against long-range missiles. As a result, Germany decided to procure the Israeli Arrow 3 system to address this shortfall.

Pistorius acknowledges that this decision created tension with France. French President Emmanuel Macron disagreed with the urgency of the situation, believing that Europe had sufficient time to develop its own system, as he did not perceive an immediate threat. Pistorius, however, expressed a different viewpoint, suggesting that the threat level was significant enough that waiting a decade to develop a European solution was not feasible. This difference in threat assessment and response strategy highlights the complexities and challenges in coordinating defense policies within Europe.

Source: TRT World

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n response to a recent surge in migrants, Finnish authorities have begun erecting concrete barriers topped with barbed wire at select border crossing points with Russia, officials reported on November 22. Finland has announced the closure of three additional crossings, leaving only the Arctic Salla crossing open for migrants seeking asylum.

This month alone, around 600 migrants, largely from the Middle East and Africa and lacking proper visas and documentation, have entered Finland. This figure marks a significant increase from the few dozen recorded in the previous months. The arrivals include individuals from countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Kenya, Morocco, and Somalia.

“We are taking these necessary steps to maintain order and ensure the security of legal border traffic,” stated Tomi Tirkkonen, deputy commander of the Kainuu border guard district.

Suspicions of Russian officials’ involvement

The Finnish government’s recent decision to close four key southeastern border crossings with Russia raised suspicions of Russian officials’ involvement in the migrant influx. Prime Minister Petteri Orpo has indicated that further action may be required, leading to the additional closures of the Vartius, Kuusamo, and Salla crossings. As a result, Raja-Jooseppi will stand as the sole Finnish checkpoint accepting asylum applications from Russian arrivals.

Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen expressed concerns over Russia’s potential use of migrants as part of a hybrid warfare strategy against Finland, stating, “We have evidence that Russian border authorities are not just allowing, but actively aiding individuals without proper documentation to reach the border zone.”

Despite Russia’s denial of any foul play, the Finnish ambassador in Moscow was summoned to discuss the closure of the most actively used checkpoints.

Critical levels at the Vartius and Salla checkpoints

The migrant situation has reached critical levels at the Vartius and Salla checkpoints, with daily arrivals ranging from 30 to 70 individuals. Governor of Russia’s northern Murmansk region, Andrei Chibis, criticized Finnish authorities for not allowing migrants to cross, labeling the situation a “humanitarian crisis.”

The influx has included young men, families with children, and women, with photos and border guard data highlighting the unusual spike in numbers. The EU border and coast guard agency, Frontex, is set to provide assistance to Finland as it manages the situation.

Finland’s decision to join NATO, a direct response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine, is seen by many as the catalyst for Russia’s alleged retaliation in the form of migrant maneuvers. Analysts remain uncertain of Russia’s primary motives behind such actions, as the geopolitical implications continue to unfold.

Source: Associated Press

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ATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg issued a stern warning to allies on Thursday, November 9, 2023, about the risks of integrating Chinese technology into their critical digital infrastructure. Speaking at NATO’s first annual Cyber Defense Conference in Berlin, Stoltenberg urged that the lessons from dependence on Russian energy must extend to technology, highlighting the need for caution to avoid similar vulnerabilities.

Stoltenberg’s concerns are rooted in the belief that China, while not a direct adversary, poses a challenge to the West’s values, interests, and security, particularly in the digital realm. He accused China of attempting to reshape the future of cyberspace with little transparency and scant regard for human rights, using technology as a tool for domestic repression.

The NATO chief pointed to China’s global export of state surveillance technologies, including facial recognition, and its efforts to push new internet protocols at the United Nations, which he sees as a threat to the concept of a free and open internet.

Strengthened cooperation among NATO

Amidst these challenges, Stoltenberg called for strengthened cooperation among NATO members in the development of new technologies and cybersecurity strategies. He emphasized the critical role of the private sector in this endeavor, advocating for more collaborative planning and exercises to secure cyberspace for NATO’s collective population.

High-level officials, including German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and representatives from Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Albania, Finland, and the United Kingdom, attended the conference, underscoring the broad concern and commitment to cybersecurity among NATO countries.

The warning from Stoltenberg reflects growing NATO apprehensions about technological dependencies and the strategic implications of relying on Chinese infrastructure. These concerns tie into larger geopolitical tensions and highlight the need for a concerted approach to national security and economic interdependence in the digital age.

“Challenge the notion of a free and open cyberspace”

“It is also proposing new internet protocols at the United Nations, to challenge the very notion of a free and open cyberspace,” Stoltenberg said.

“Through NATO, we can work together to strengthen our own cyber-security, build a secure cyberspace for all, and keep our 1 billion people safe,” he said. “It is not possible to keep our nations safe without the private sector. So, we need to talk, to plan and exercise more together,” added Stoltenberg.

Stoltenberg’s message reinforces the alliance’s focus on strategic foresight and adaptability in navigating the complex interplay of technology, security, and international relations, stressing the importance of safeguarding critical infrastructure in a rapidly evolving global landscape.

Sources: Anadolu Agency and BNN Network

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n a significant turn of events that could reshape the landscape of international arms control, NATO allies have suspended their participation in the Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), a pivotal Cold War-era security agreement. This development came shortly after Russia announced its formal withdrawal from the treaty.

Signed in November 1990, amidst the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, the CFE treaty was designed to avert the accumulation of armed forces along the borders of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. While the pact was signed over three decades ago, full ratification was not achieved until two years later.

NATO defended its decision to freeze the treaty, stating that the alliance could not continue to comply with the agreement while Russia failed to do so, calling such a situation “unsustainable.”

NATO’s expansion towards Russian borders

Moscow’s withdrawal has been attributed partially to NATO’s expansion towards Russian borders—a longstanding grievance of the Kremlin. The withdrawal process was set in motion by Russian lawmakers who endorsed a bill put forward by President Vladimir Putin to denounce the CFE.

U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan remarked that the suspension of the treaty by NATO members enhances their defensive capabilities by lifting certain restrictions that are no longer applicable to Russia, thereby bolstering deterrence and defense.

In response to the withdrawal, the German Foreign Ministry affirmed that Germany and its allies remain part of the treaty, suggesting that reimplementation might be possible if Russia alters its approach. The ministry reiterated Germany’s commitment to the treaty’s weapons limits and condemned Russia’s decision to withdraw, stating it undermines another foundation of European security.

The disruption of the CFE treaty adds to a series of deteriorations in arms control agreements involving Russia and the United States. This includes the suspension of the New START Treaty by Russia earlier this year and the mutual withdrawal from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019.

A continued erosion of arms control frameworks

Experts like William Alberque, director of Strategy, Technology, and Arms Control at The International Institute for Strategic Studies, called for increased transparency and measures to prevent the escalation of military competition into an arms race.

With the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact shortly after the CFE’s inception and unsuccessful attempts to renegotiate its terms, the treaty has faced challenges for years. Russia’s suspension of its participation in 2007 and the recent full withdrawal signal a continued erosion of arms control frameworks.

The Russian Foreign Ministry blamed the West for its withdrawal, suggesting that dialogue for the treaty’s viability was ignored by NATO members. The ministry also cited the security developments in Ukraine and NATO’s expansion as reasons for the treaty’s unsuitability from Russia’s perspective.

Despite the withdrawal, NATO has expressed its ongoing commitment to reducing military risks and preventing conflict through continued dialogue and assessments of the security environment’s impact on the Euro-Atlantic region.

The future of arms control in Europe remains uncertain, with NATO’s latest move marking a pivotal moment in a rapidly evolving security landscape.

Source: The Associated Press

Rather than a “New Cold War,” we are now witnessing the culmination of an economic war with Russia, where the financial, energy, and capital markets are the battlegrounds. In his timely book, Economic War: Ukraine and the Global Conflict between Russia and the West, political risk analyst and consultant Maximilian Hess takes the reader through the period in which the seeds of economic warfare are sprouting into full bloom: from the initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 to Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 and beyond.  

The book skillfully delves into various economic fronts around the world, demonstrating the weaponization of economic tools such as pipelines, mining, credit, and cryptocurrencies. Each chapter unfolds like a chess game between Russia and the West, allowing the reader to map the moves of the contestants both chronologically and regionally, including Russia’s response to Western sanctions and what is at stake for each party.

There were a number of disputes in the early and mid-2000s between Russia and Ukraine over gas supplies and the terms thereof that led Russia to cut off deliveries and precipitated gas supply crunches in the wider European market. What I think people forget is that Nordstream 2 and Nordstream 1 were never intended to increase the total amount of Russian gas that could be pumped to Central Europe.

Instead, they were designed to ensure that Russia didn’t have to do it through Eastern Europe, in particular through Ukraine, so that Russia could then increase the leverage of its gas policy over Ukraine. We should have understood this risk at the time of Nordstream 2, because it was essentially designed to give Russia the same kind of leverage over other Eastern European states that it had gained over Ukraine.

Q. Why do you think Putin choose to invade Ukraine specifically in February 2022?

I think he thought it was an important time economically, when the West was weak and divided. He hoped that the sanctions response and the economic response would be less intense than it might have been at another time. Thinking in terms of change in 2020 and 2021, the end of the Trump administration and then the Biden administration that follows made it clear that there would be a concerted sanctions strategy.

He hoped that European unity would be weak and insufficient to resist him. Inflationary pressures from COVID-19 had already increased, and Russia had already begun to cut off its gas supplies to Europe. At the same time, he was preparing his troops to invade Ukraine and saw it as a moment when the West would be relatively weak economically and relatively vulnerable. Therefore, less likely to act against him and less likely to act in support of Ukraine. Which, of course, turned out to be a very big strategic miscalculation on his part.

Q. Has Russia’s strategy of crippling Europe with gas cuts failed?

Largely, I think it has failed. Not because of any failure within the strategy itself but because of collaborative actions on the part of the West. Intelligence was shared by the United States, by officials who had spoken on the record and had reached the assessment that there was a small chance that Russia wouldn’t invade Ukraine in October 2021, simply the brutal nature of Russia’s onslaught in February, and the fact that the Europeans saw an army of the largest form that had taken this action in Europe since World War II, made it clear to many European leaders that they had no other choice.

Putin was preparing, and did prepare, for a scenario in which Europe was fully on board with the sanctions regime through Russia’s fortress balance sheet strategy, the Kremlin’s process of building up large reserves of ‘hard currencies’ and gold. But now that the initial pain of that gas strategy is being felt, and inflation has been at such high levels for a year and a half. There are obviously still many politicians, particularly in Europe, such as former French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who are calling for a softer approach to Russia on these issues. That’s why Putin’s strategy is not one that is over; by threatening more economic pain, he can also undermine support for Ukraine in the long term. Global gas markets are much more fragile, and we could still see a new spike in gas prices this winter as a result of the Kremlin’s actions.

Q. Did Putin pull out of the Black Sea grain deal in an attempt to revive the inflation weapon?

I believe very strongly that this is what he is trying to do. It also gives him the tool of offering grain to African countries to gain more support there. I think we should be prepared for more actions by the Kremlin to deliberately try to stir up inflationary pressures, possibly trying to find a way to drive up prices, as well. The Kremlin really has only one major option, which is to threaten an export embargo and actually take action to make it look credible. That option is difficult because Russia’s budget is now so skewed toward the military.

Since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war, NATO and its close partners have increasingly provided military support to Ukraine. The  nature of the support has changed over time and some policies that were previously avoided in order not to cross Russia’s “red lines” have been chosen. For instance, after much controversy, Germany authorized the delivery of Leopard tanks to Ukraine. Britain provided Challenger tanks. Poland and Slovakia gave Ukraine MiG-29 aircraft. This military support has had a significant impact on the course of the war. Thanks to the military aid given to Ukraine, countries have removed Soviet legacy weapons from their inventories. These were mostly replaced by American military equipment. With the intensive military support provided, the Ukrainian army has become considerably more modernized than it was before the war.

However, Ukraine does not believe that the current military support is sufficient, at least in the long term. On July 11, the first day of NATO’s Vilnius Summit, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy slammed NATO for its lack of a timeline for his country’s future NATO membership, calling it “unprecedented and absurd.” Ukraine’s main goal in the summit is to be presented with a road map for NATO membership. In this regard, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and senior Ukrainian officials have frequently made statements and succeeded in putting pressure on NATO. It was even stated that Zelensky’s participation in the summit would be meaningless if there was no signal from the Alliance in this direction. Thus, Ukraine’s possible future NATO membership and the security guarantees that could be provided until then became one of the main items on the agenda ahead of the Vilnius summit.

In September 2022, Zelensky announced that Ukraine was already a de facto NATO member and that it was applying for membership in order to formalize its status. Ukraine is currently awaiting an official invitation to become a member in response to this application. In Ukraine’s view, if accession to NATO is not assured at the end of the war, a new war with Russia will be inevitable. The only way to prevent this is to deter Russia by Ukraine becoming a NATO member.

While Ukraine’s NATO membership will only be possible after the end of the war, it will be difficult to draw a clear road map with concrete security guarantees in the interim period, as security guarantees are inherently ambiguous. In a climate of uncertainty, many countries are more likely to avoid such commitments and to show a desire to maintain military support for Ukraine. Only a clear commitment by the United States can resolve this dilemma.

On the other hand, NATO’s top priority since the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has naturally been to strengthen the Alliance’s eastern flank. In this scope, various measures have been taken, in particular to increase the Alliance’s level of combat readiness. New multinational battlegroups were established and deployed to Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia; Turkish soldiers are serving in the groups deployed to Bulgaria and Hungary.

Of course, mobilizing such a large multinational force in a short period of time is a very demanding and costly endeavor which requires the member states to increase their military expenditures in many dimensions such as personnel, logistics, and equipment.

Lastly, by ratifying Finland’s accession in March 2023, Turkey had demonstrated its historic and principled support for NATO’s open-door policy and sent a message to Sweden, which was given the green light by Turkey on the first day of the Summit. Indeed, the trilateral memorandum had broken the deadlock in Madrid last year and shown that a diplomatic compromise could be reached quickly. This is because such major summits always offer the possibility of last-minute solutions, and this was the case with Turkey’s last-minute green light for Sweden’s NATO membership. Turkey will expect Sweden to continue to increase its efforts against the fight against terrorism in its all forms in the coming period.

Since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war, the scope of support for Ukraine has been diverse and constantly expanding. Supporting Ukraine has now become a trend with weapons and platforms of strategic value being provided to the country. The support has been effective, especially in Ukraine’s newly launched operation. Yet, this effect is only visible in certain areas and the military support is not enough to ensure Russia’s withdrawal from all regions it occupied. The main reason for this is that such support could deepen the war or escalate the conflict by provoking unpredictable responses from Russia.

Military support in the absence of air superiority—as is currently the case of Ukraine against Russia—prevents Ukraine from achieving the capability to drive Russia completely out of the region and regain some of its territory. There may be different and more rapid developments once the F-16s are delivered and deployed to the battlefield after the training period. But for now, military support is not enough to ensure Russia’s defeat or to force Moscow to negotiate peace.

Can Ukraine become a NATO member? It seems unlikely that NATO will support this. Yes, at least 21 NATO members support Ukraine’s membership, but the continued occupation is one of the biggest obstacles to membership. NATO is unlikely to take such a risk.

Security guarantees could be considered in this context, but they are not very possible without agreement and foresight on how the future of the war will develop. Even now, security guarantees are unlikely within NATO. Even with the support of countries at the level of bilateral relations, it seems that member countries will not be able to provide Ukraine with a security guarantee that could end the conflict with Russia.

In the meantime, NATO’s strategy document, the new Strategic Concept, published last year, does not address the China issue in detail. However, this is the first time that China has been identified as a strategic challenge, given NATO’s post-Cold War history and transformation. At this stage, China poses more of a political and economic challenge than a military threat to NATO, the Alliance’s member countries, and the region they shape. It appears that NATO is not yet ready to portray China as a threat.

The U.S. perspective in the Sino-American rivalry is to transform NATO into a global organization, but not all NATO members share this view. For the time being, it does not seem possible for NATO as a whole to act against China. However, depending on how the dimensions of the Washington-Beijing rivalry evolve in the coming period, NATO may renew its position internally. That said, in the short term, it is not possible to define China as a threat.

Military assistance to Ukraine and its NATO membership are two separate matters. In fact, there is almost complete consensus among Alliance members to provide military assistance to Ukraine. Although some NATO members, such as Germany, were initially reluctant, they have come around to Washington’s line under pressure from their domestic public opinion, Europe, and the United States.

In the early stages of the Russia-Ukraine war, Berlin was only prepared to provide Ukraine with troops, but it has now supplied the country with Leopard 2 tanks and advanced air defence missiles. From this point of view, NATO, which has organized itself very quickly and decisively to support Ukraine militarily, will continue this support until it achieves its goals with regard to Russia.

There are already problems with the production of ammunition for certain weapons due to their intensive use on the Ukrainian front, yet, one of the most important factors determining the course of the struggle between NATO and Russia will be the production of weapons and ammunition, given that Russia is experiencing similar problems to a much greater extent.

The issue of Ukraine’s NATO membership, which is expected to be one of the main items on the agenda at the Vilnius summit, has caused serious disagreement between member states. Some, particularly the Baltic and several Eastern European countries, argue that Ukraine should become a member of NATO quickly, while others, such as the United States and Germany, where there is intense internal debate on the issue, oppose such a quick decision.

Those in favor of a more cautious approach suggest to wait until the end of the war to decide on the issue, fearing that Ukraine’s possible NATO membership during the war would draw them into direct armed conflict with Russia and would also complicate peace negotiations with Russia. They are considering postponing a decision in the hope that, at the end of the war, there will be a weakened Russia unable to oppose Ukraine’s NATO membership. Therefore, it seems unlikely that a decision on Ukraine’s NATO membership will be taken at the Vilnius summit.

However, given the establishment of a NATO-Ukraine Council and the strong likelihood that Ukraine will not be required to meet the preconditions of the Membership Action Plan for the accession of new members, such as the fight against corruption, which was previously included in the Membership Action Plan adopted at the Bucharest Summit, the door will be left open for Ukraine’s membership in the medium term. This issue will be closely linked to the development of NATO’s Russia policy and the outcome of the war. Moreover, Russia’s policy towards the West will be crucial to Ukraine’s NATO membership.

For NATO members, such as Italy and Spain, which have not yet resolved their economic problems caused by the Euro debt crisis, increasing their military spending from 1.5% to more than 2% would mean additional problems for their budget balances. In addition, the military spending of NATO members such as Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and Ireland remains well below the Alliance’s target. It should be recalled that NATO has set the 2% limit as a minimum target, and Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has persistently called for more than 2% military spending in the member states he has visited.

While Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has created a strong motivation for NATO to increase military spending, the disruptions it has caused to energy and food supplies, and prices, and the resulting economic challenges have left many members struggling to find the financial resources to increase their military spending. It is worth noting that NATO members, especially those with growing economic problems, will find it difficult to meet the Alliance’s targets for increasing military spending.

Meanwhile, the U.S. administration wants to see its NATO allies on its side in the fight against China, just as it has done with Russia. Yet, it is no secret that there are members who have reservations about this; Germany, France, and Turkey are among such countries, albeit for different reasons.

In the aftermath of the Trump era, European NATO members are struggling to trust the United States, making it difficult for them to follow Washington’s lead, especially when it comes to a policy towards China. The same reluctance was also present about a policy towards Russia; however, the Russia-Ukraine war helped to remove this reluctance and align countries behind the U.S. Now Washington wants to capitalize on this shock momentum and rally its European allies behind its line against China.

In addition to the shock effect of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the U.S. has another advantage in rallying the Europeans behind it: “American friends” in Europe. These “American friends,” commonly known as Atlanticists, are everywhere in Europe. They are in power in countries like Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland, and are partners in coalition governments in countries like Germany.

Given that China has not made a mistake similar to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, but instead is trying to create a sphere of influence for itself through economic cooperation, and given its close economic ties with some European countries, it will not be as easy for Washington to rally NATO members behind its fight against Beijing as it has been to rally them against Moscow.

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ome 10,000 personnel from 25 countries, including Japan and Sweden, will take part in NATO military drills kicking off on June 12, 2023, and lasting until June 23, which some observers believe aims at sending a message to Russia, with the participation of of 250 fighterjets.

Organized by Germany, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), launched the largest military drills in its history with the aim of highlighting the unity of its member states in the face of potential threats, especially from Russia. Exercises will be carried out in the airspace of Germany, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Latvia.

Named The Air Defender 23, the drills aim at enhancing joint operation and protection from drones and potential cruise missiles targeting cities, airports within the NATO territory.

The idea of ​​the exercises was launched in 2018 following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. According to the commander of the German Air Force, General Ingo Gerhartz, the drills don’t target a specific country,

Noting that NATO is determined to defend “every inch” of its territory, adding, “We are a defense alliance, and these maneuvers were planned on this basis.”

A message to Russia

At the same time, U.S. ambassador to Germany, Amy Gattmann, told reporters that these military drills have the goal of sending a message, especially to Russia.

“I would be pretty surprised if any world leader was not taking note of what this shows in terms of the spirit of this alliance, which means the strength of this alliance. And that includes Mr. [Vladimir] Putin,” Gutmann said referring to Putin.

Russia’s war against Ukraine sent a wake-up call to NATO that was established nearly 75 years ago to confront the Soviet Union.

Finland and Sweden – which have long maintained formal neutrality to avoid any conflict with Moscow – asked to join NATO after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.

While the German-led exercises have been planned since 2018, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year prompted NATO to prepare seriously for the possibility of an attack on its territory.

250 fighter jets

Germany will temporarily close its airspace, in preparation for exercises aimed at joint cooperation to repel any attack on NATO. The United States will participate with 100 warjets, and Germany with 64, including 30 Eurofighters, 16 Tornadoes, and 5 A400M warjets, in addition to the F-35s, a NATO AWACS reconnaissance warjet and a Japanese Air Force transport warjet.

NATO forces will train on rescue operations behind enemy lines and setting targets, as well as dealing with withdrawal of forces in the event of loss or withdrawal.

A NATO spokesperson added that “During the large-scale exercises, 24 helicopters will be stationed at (Lechfeld) Air Base in Bavaria.”

Last year, NATO conducted, its annual nuclear exercises, Steadfast Noon, with the participation of 14 countries and dozens of warjets of various models, over northern and western Europe. This year’s military drills gain a specific signifigance, not because it is the largest in NATO’s history, but because it comes amidist the Russia-Ukraine war.