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he Trump administration is negotiating with Venezuela’s interim government to secure a direct ownership stake in the country’s oil resources, according to two US officials cited by US media Thursday.

The talks center on more than a dozen productive oil fields containing approximately 90 billion barrels in proven reserves, rather than Venezuela’s total estimated 300 billion barrels, Axios reported. A final agreement could double US oil reserves and reshape energy dynamics across the Western Hemisphere, the outlet said.

“Calling this agreement huge would be an understatement. It’s massive,” one official told Axios.

Under the proposed arrangement, Washington would receive an equity stake in the selected fields. Private companies, including American firms, would develop the sites and generate additional oil revenues for the Venezuelan government.

The negotiations are being led by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Venezuela’s Acting President Delcy Rodriguez, with White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller also involved, according to the report.

Strategic energy push amid global supply strains

The potential deal comes as global oil markets face disruption from wars in Iran and Ukraine, contributing to elevated prices. The US Strategic Petroleum Reserve has dropped to its lowest level in four decades, increasing pressure on Washington to secure new supplies.

Venezuela holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves, but years of underinvestment, mismanagement and declining production have left its energy sector operating far below capacity.

The Trump administration has made expanded US access to Venezuelan oil a central element of its energy and foreign policy in the region. Officials said the goal is to “secure the energy future of the Western Hemisphere for generations to come” while easing price pressures linked to the conflict in Iran.

US Energy Secretary Chris Wright is expected to travel to Venezuela next week to discuss ways for American companies to boost oil production in the country. The timing of any final agreement remains unclear.

The talks build on Washington’s broader efforts to rebuild Venezuela’s oil sector following the US capture of President Nicolas Maduro in January. The administration has since backed an interim government led by Rodriguez while pushing for greater American involvement in the country’s energy industry.

Amid concerns that Rodriguez could face domestic accusations of handing over national resources to the United States, the administration is emphasizing that the arrangement would benefit the Venezuelan people, Axios reported.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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section of a Himalayan glacier broke away on Wednesday morning, setting off a catastrophic flash flood that has killed at least 160 people and left nearly 1,500 missing across Nepal and Tibet, including more than 800 foreign nationals.

The flooding struck at roughly 8:40 a.m. local time along the Nepal-Tibet border, surprising residents and officials because there had been no rainfall to explain it. Nepal has confirmed 157 deaths, while Chinese authorities report three fatalities in Tibet’s Gyirong County.

Satellite imagery indicates that a chunk of glacier broke off at an elevation of about 5,200 meters (17,000 feet) and plunged roughly 1,200 meters down a mountainside, picking up rock and sediment along the way. The resulting avalanche slammed into the Lhende River in Tibet, temporarily damming it before the debris gave way and sent a wall of water downstream.

The event initially registered as a magnitude 4.4 earthquake, but the U.S. Geological Survey later determined the seismic signature came from the landslide itself, not a tectonic quake — ultimately measuring magnitude 5.2.

Where the flooding hit

The surge moved from the Lhende Khola into the Bhote Koshi and then the Trishuli River, with water levels in the Trishuli rising as much as 9 meters (27 feet) in just half an hour. Nepal’s Rasuwa district — including the towns of Timure and Syabru Besi — bore the brunt of the damage, with flooding also reaching Nuwakot and Dhading districts further downstream. Across the border, mud and debris struck Gyirong Port in Tibet’s Shigatse region. At least 19 bridges and roughly 40 kilometers (25 miles) of roads were destroyed.

Rescue crews have recovered 157 bodies in Nepal, and at least 65 injured people are being treated in local hospitals and in Kathmandu. More than 5,000 army and police personnel have been deployed with helicopters, drones and search dogs, though high water, mudslides and washed-out roads have slowed efforts to reach the worst-hit villages.

Local accounts describe scenes of sudden devastation. One Nepali businessman said relatives called in tears after their home was swept away entirely, while a teacher reported watching multiple trucks — with people inside — carried off by the floodwaters.

Nearly 1,500 people remain unaccounted for. In Nepal, 826 are missing, including close to 600 foreign nationals from more than two dozen countries — among them 177 from India, 63 from the United States, 34 from Australia, 33 from the United Kingdom and 25 from Canada. In Tibet’s Gyirong County, Chinese state media put the missing at 558, including 260 foreigners. Many of those affected were pilgrims en route to Kailash Mansarovar.

International response

India sent a rescue plane with roughly 10 tonnes of emergency supplies, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi pledged support in a call with his Nepalese counterpart, Balendra Shah. The Red Cross federation (IFRC) released 1.2 million dollars in emergency funding for relief operations in Nepal. The United Nations has deployed staff in Nepal and offered assistance in Tibet, with Secretary-General António Guterres offering condolences. The European Union activated its Copernicus satellite mapping service to help assess damage.

South Korea formed a task force after several of its nationals working at a hydropower project went missing, and plans to send a rapid-response team. The United States is sending a disaster response adviser and $500,000 in aid. Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney called the floods “absolutely devastating.” China’s President Xi Jinping ordered an all-out search-and-rescue effort in Tibet and called for measures to prevent further disasters.

It is too soon to say definitively whether climate change caused the glacier collapse, but the disaster fits a broader pattern of accelerating glacial melt across the Himalayas. Glaciers across the Hindu Kush Himalaya range lost ice 65% faster between 2011 and 2020 than in the prior decade, and Nepal’s glaciers have shed nearly a third of their volume over roughly 30 years. Satellite data showed unusually warm conditions and reduced snow cover around the glacier before it collapsed, and researchers are examining whether that instability played a role.

Officials expect the death toll to climb as rescue teams reach areas still cut off by damaged roads, high water and thick mud. In Tibet, authorities are also watching a still-dammed lake upstream from the disaster zone in Gyirong that could pose an additional flood risk.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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alaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s recent comments on Taiwan have intensified scrutiny over whether the Southeast Asian nation is drifting from its long-held policy of non-alignment and tilting toward Beijing amid intensifying US-China rivalry.

In an interview with Al Jazeera aired earlier this month, Anwar stated unequivocally that he viewed Taiwan “as part of China, period,” adding that this position was “accepted by all.” The remarks drew immediate praise from Beijing and sharp condemnation from Taipei, while reigniting debate among analysts and diplomats about Malaysia’s strategic orientation.

When pressed on whether he would condemn China if it resorted to military force should peaceful reunification fail, Anwar drew a controversial parallel to his own country’s territorial integrity. If a Malaysian state attempted to secede, he said, he would use force to “protect the sanctity and unity of” Malaysia.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomed the comments, with a spokesman reiterating that Taiwan is “an inalienable part of China’s territory” and that “China must and will be reunited.”

Taiwan’s government, however, warned that Anwar’s “one-sided support for China could negatively impact Taiwanese businesses’ confidence in investing in Malaysia.” The self-governing island, the world’s leading semiconductor producer, remains a major investor in Malaysia’s critical chip manufacturing sector.

Walking back or doubling down?

Facing questions from local media in the days following the interview, Anwar appeared to soften his stance, emphasizing that Malaysia respected China’s position but favored a peaceful resolution to tensions across the Taiwan Strait.

The apparent recalibration did little to quell speculation about Malaysia’s geopolitical leanings, particularly after Anwar courted further headlines by calling for strengthened defenses in the Bornean state of Sabah. He cited the development of US-backed military facilities in neighboring Philippines as partial justification for increased defense spending.

The Philippine government is upgrading military installations on the island of Balabac, located just 50 kilometers from the Malaysian islands of Banggi and Balambangan. Balabac was recently added to the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between Washington and Manila, granting US forces access to designated locations across the Philippines.

Anwar’s remarks have reinforced longstanding suspicions among Western observers that Malaysia is breaking from its traditional non-aligned posture and aligning more closely with China. The country has become one of the most enthusiastic recipients of Chinese investment under Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, and China now represents Malaysia’s largest trading partner.

Malaysia has also diverged sharply from Western positions on other geopolitical issues, most notably the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. Long a vocal critic of Israel, Malaysia under Anwar has been especially outspoken in its opposition to Israel’s war on Gaza.

The Sabah dimension

Some analysts, however, caution against reading Anwar’s comments as evidence of a strategic realignment.

Chee Meng Tan, an assistant professor of business economics at the University of Nottingham Malaysia, noted that Malaysia’s recognition of Taiwan as part of China dates back to the 1974 communiqué signed by then-Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries.

“What was new was Anwar’s statement on the potential use of force, which the One China policy does not explicitly require,” Tan said, suggesting the remarks should be viewed in the context of Anwar’s scheduled visit to China in September.

Anwar’s comments on the US-backed base in Balabac are also connected to Malaysia’s long-running territorial dispute with the Philippines over Sabah. Manila has claimed the territory since it joined Malaysia in 1963, a claim Kuala Lumpur has consistently rejected.

The Philippines reaffirmed its claim to Sabah in February, maintaining that its Maritime Zones Act 2024 preserved “existing and valid claims” over part of the state. In July, Malaysia lodged a formal protest with the United Nations over the Philippines’ claim to an extended continental shelf that Malaysia argued encroached on Sabahan waters.

Tan suggested that Anwar’s comments on the Balabac military buildup may represent “a ‘protect-my-border’ reflex rather than a pro-China gesture.”

Balancing act continues

Anwar’s call to bolster Sabah’s defenses also comes as Malaysia seeks to strengthen its military posture in Borneo, partly to reinforce its claims in the disputed South China Sea, where Malaysia is a claimant state alongside China, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Brunei.

While Malaysia has adopted a less confrontational stance on the South China Sea dispute than the Philippines, it has maintained robust defense ties with Western powers as a quiet counterweight to China’s military buildup in the contested waters.

This is exemplified by Malaysia’s continued commitment to the Five Powers Defence Arrangements, a multilateral security framework that also includes Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. While not a binding defense treaty, the arrangement commits members to consult in the event of an armed attack on Malaysia or Singapore.

Under the framework, annual military exercises involving personnel and assets from member countries are conducted. The arrangement maintains an air defense operations headquarters at a Malaysian Air Force base in Butterworth, Penang, headed by a senior Australian Air Force officer. Australia also maintains a rifle company in Butterworth and regular maritime patrol aircraft deployments to Malaysia.

As a central pillar of the arrangement, Malaysia facilitates a Western military presence in the region that analysts say provides a quiet deterrent against potential aggressors.

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he Strait of Hormuz has long been the lifeline for the energy production of the GCC states, enabling these oil-rich nations to export huge quantities of oil to consumers, particularly those in East Asian countries such as China, Japan, and South Korea. This allowed the GCC states to prosper, build their economies, foster population growth, and cultivate international relations, using energy as a tool of influence. However, the geopolitical shifts in the region, represented by the war between the United States and Iran in late February 2026, and the associated regional security dilemma, led to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran on March 4, 2026.

This has cast a shadow over the economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, which rely heavily on energy exports, and has also affected consumer economies, the industrial production cycle, supply chains, and global trade in general. Approximately 20% of global trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz daily, including roughly 16 million barrels of crude oil, representing more than 15% of global oil demand, estimated at 104 million barrels per day, according to 2025 figures.

In addition, about 10 billion cubic feet of liquefied natural gas (LNG) passes through the Strait, mostly from Qatar, which accounts for nearly 20% of global LNG trade. Therefore, a complete halt to shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz has severely disrupted energy exports and crippled the economies of the GCC countries, recovery from which is likely to take a considerable time. The disruption of energy exports through the Strait led to a supply gap estimated at around 10 million barrels per day.

Alternative options to bypass Hormuz

Countries with alternative export routes, such as the UAE’s Habshan-Fujairah crude oil pipeline, and Saudi Arabia’s 1,200 km. pipeline from Abqaiq in the Eastern Province to Yanbu on the Red Sea, were unable to fill the gap due to the limited capacity of these alternative routes. The limitation of the alternative oil export pipeline was compounded for Saudi Arabia when the Houthis closed the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb in July 2026, effectively choking off Saudi oil exports. Saudi Arabia alone exports between six and seven million barrels of crude oil per day, and the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz reduced this production to less than half.

Overall, the pumping capacity of both alternative routes — the UAE’s Habshan-Fujairah pipeline and the Saudi pipeline from the Eastern Province to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea — remained capped at only 3.5–5.5 million barrels per day. The war with Iran and its major repercussions, such as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, posed a genuine threat, primarily to the GCC with their economies that are significantly reliant on revenues from the export of hydrocarbons. The dilemma also disclosed gaps in the GCC’s security arrangements and revealed a clear absence of long-term plans, to ensure the sustainability of energy exports without total dependence on passage through the Strait of Hormuz.

Despite the multiple official statements of condemnation and calls for the indispensability of allowing free navigation through the Strait, future considerations can be viewed through two main perspectives. First, the lack of cooperation on energy export strategies. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz severely impacted some GCC members, such as Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait, due to the lack of alternative shipping routes. Second, the absence of a collective approach to security, particularly maritime security, within the GCC. This was manifested in the lack of a unified stance on the conflict, and the absence of a manifest collective security framework.

Collective energy export strategy

With regard to energy export strategies and economic security, the GCC countries need a joint strategy, to ensure the continuity of oil and gas exports during times of regional crisis that cause disruption to maritime shipping, such as when transit through the Strait of Hormuz becomes impossible. First, this requires the building of trust, as transboundary pipelines will traverse the territories of neighboring countries, with coastal states serving as the final export hub. If these final export hubs are to be the Omani ports on the Arab Sea, while avoiding the use of ports on the Sea of ​​Oman due to their proximity to Iran, this will pose a challenge for countries like Kuwait, as export routes will be long, and will pass through several GCC states’ territories.

Furthermore, a single export hub implies greater vulnerability, as it will represent a center of gravity for energy resources, making it susceptible to targeting or sabotage. Second, Saudi Arabia and the UAE may consider expanding their alternative pipeline capacity to accommodate their daily oil production. However, for the UAE, the alternative export terminal at the port of Fujairah on the Sea of ​​Oman remains vulnerable, due to its proximity to Iran. Likewise, for Saudi Arabia, the alternative oil pipeline in Yanbu on the Red Sea remains dependent on the status of the other maritime corridor, the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait.

Third, it is possible to invest in LNG and storage facilities in areas that do not require passage through any of the straits. This move could be linked to increasing storage capacity to accommodate mass LNG production, which would ensure the safe flow of LNG away from conflict zones, as it passes through the straits. However, the GCC states must reach a consensus on managing unified export hubs, and again, a common export hub would remain vulnerable to attacks and sabotage. Reaching a consensus on future security arrangements and energy export strategies is crucial for the GCC states, as divergent and unilateral approaches to security and energy issues have proven strategically costly.

Collective regional security approach is a must

When viewing the issue of their inability to secure energy exports, the GCC states appear to be constrained by divergent energy transportation strategies, each of which entails numerous challenges and risks. Therefore, the GCC states may need a comprehensive review of their security cooperation, to ensure a unified stance on regional crises and support mediation efforts, so as to reach solutions satisfactory to all members and regional actors alike.

The February 2026 outbreak of war serves as a wake-up call for GCC decision-makers to enhance coordination on security issues, ensuring the continuity of energy exports and regional security. Particular attention must be paid to maritime security through a collective approach, which is currently lacking. By ensuring a unified maritime security policy, the GCC states can strengthen their naval capabilities, guarantee the interoperability of systems, improve coastal patrols, and reduce defense spending through the concept of burden-sharing.

However, collective maritime security will only bear fruit by fostering a degree of coexistence with other actors, thus bringing relative calm to the region. This would allow the GCC states to address security issues in partnership with other regional actors, such as Iran, Iraq, and potentially Yemen, without foreign interference, and through joint investments, incentives, and shared interests, to build trust and counter geopolitical volatility.

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raqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zeidi’s visits to Washington, Tehran and Ankara in quick succession are significant in terms of demonstrating the new government’s approach to foreign policy. For Iraq, Washington and Tehran are two capitals closely linked to security, capital, historical influence and developments in Iraqi domestic politics. Ankara, on the other hand, represents the most concrete, stable and reliable economic route through which the country can access global markets. For this reason, al-Zaidi’s visit to Ankara immediately following his engagements in Washington and Tehran should not be viewed as a mere neighbourly visit. This visit demonstrates that Baghdad, which has placed economic development at the centre of its government program, views Türkiye not merely as a trading partner but as a strategic gateway in Iraq’s production, transport and energy equation.

The most significant aspect of the talks in Ankara is not the number of documents signed, but rather the needs of Iraq and Türkiye that they address. Five memoranda of understanding were signed between the two countries covering educational and academic cooperation, youth and sport, industrial property, rail and road transport via the Fishhabur–Ovaköy border crossing, and the development of transport infrastructure in Iraq in exchange for natural resources. Whilst the first three agreements broaden the social and institutional foundation of the relationship, the latter two are of direct strategic importance for Iraq’s economic future. This is because these agreements strengthen the necessary links to move the Development Corridor Project – which aims to connect the Grand Faw Port in Basra to the Turkish border via Iraq and from there to Europe – into the implementation phase.

The visit also demonstrates that the strong relations established between Iraq and Türkiye in recent years are being maintained by the new Iraqi government. During President Erdoğan’s visit to Baghdad in April 2024, 27 legal texts were signed, whilst 11 documents were signed at the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council meeting held in May 2025. The fact that Zaidi has included Ankara in the itinerary of his first foreign visit since taking office suggests that Türkiye has secured a permanent place in Iraq’s development plans.

Oil production but lack of control

Iraq has been producing oil for many years but has been unable to establish sufficient control over the routes by which this oil is transported. The fact that a very large proportion of oil revenues depends on exports via the southern ports and the Strait of Hormuz means that any military tension in the Gulf directly becomes a problem for the Iraqi budget. The closure of ports and disruption to tanker traffic affects not only oil companies but the entire state apparatus, from public sector wages to social spending. Road, rail and pipeline links via Türkiye therefore represent both a means of facilitating trade and a tool for economic security from Baghdad’s perspective.

This is where the true significance of the Development Corridor comes to the fore. If successful, the project—which is planned to link the Port of Faw to Türkiye via a network of approximately 1,200 kilometres of railways and motorways—will do more than simply transport containers from Basra to Türkiye. It will also create new industrial zones, logistics centres, energy networks and urban development areas along the route. Given Iraq’s young population and high unemployment rate, this transformation could provide an alternative to the limited employment opportunities currently available in the oil sector alone.

Türkiye plays a role in this equation that no other neighbour can easily fulfil. Iran is linked to Iraq through energy, trade and political networks, whilst the Gulf states can provide capital to Iraq. However, Türkiye is the only direct neighbour capable of connecting Iraq to the European market by road and rail, and to the Mediterranean via Ceyhan. Moreover, the economic foundation between the two countries will not be built from scratch. Trade volume between Türkiye and Iraq reached approximately 17 billion dollars in 2025, and Turkish companies have undertaken over 1,000 projects in Iraq with a total value of around 40 billion dollars. The setting of a medium-term trade target of 30 billion dollars during the Ankara talks demonstrates the will to roughly double the current level of trade.

Developments in the energy sector also demonstrated that the visit was not limited solely to the transport agenda. Although no long-term, comprehensive energy agreement was signed at the ceremony in Ankara, TPAO’s acquisition of a 15 per cent stake in the company managing BP’s operations in Kirkuk is a step that could transform Türkiye from merely being a buyer and transit country for Iraqi oil into a production partner.

A few days after the visit, Türkiye and Iraq signed a provisional agreement extending the use of the existing oil pipeline for another year, with a capacity of 750,000 barrels per day. This also showed that the talks in Ankara had begun to produce concrete results. Whilst time is being gained to prepare a broader energy agreement, Baghdad has secured the use of the only operational oil export pipeline. Given that the pipeline carries approximately 170,000 barrels per day, increasing the current capacity could be a significant step in Iraq’s efforts to reduce its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz.

The secret behind the fifth agreement!

The signing ceremony in Ankara also brought to light the main obstacle facing the Iraqi government. Whilst the signing of five agreements was expected, President Erdoğan’s realization that one agreement had not been signed, followed by Zaidi’s turn to Iraq’s Minister of Transport, Veheb al-Hasani, and the subsequent inclusion of the remaining documents in the signing process, were widely discussed in the media of both countries. Hasani later explained the incident as a technical and protocol-related disagreement. A spokesperson for the Iraqi Ministry of Transport, however, stated that there had been a prior dispute on the Iraqi side—involving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Oil—regarding the inclusion of the document in the visit’s program.

In contrast, some Iraqi and Turkish commentators alleged that the minister, who has a background in the Badr Organization, was attempting to slow down the Development Corridor agreement under Iranian influence. This claim could not be definitively confirmed, and the available information is insufficient to characterize the events as a definitive act of sabotage by Iran. However, the incident itself remains significant. Whether the problem stems from a lack of protocol, inter-institutional disagreement or political influence, it demonstrates that during the implementation of strategic decisions in Iraq, different ministries, parties and actors with external connections are not acting in unison. Viewed from this perspective, the success of the Zaidi government’s economic program will in fact depend not so much on how many agreements it signs abroad, but rather on the extent to which it can implement state decisions at home.

Economy in Ankara, missiles on the ground

The joint Saudi Arabian–US air strikes that took place immediately after the visit to Ankara once again demonstrated just how fragile the security environment is in which Zaidi’s development diplomacy is being conducted. US Central Command stated that the strikes targeted logistics and weapons sites belonging to groups it alleged were directed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Reports citing Iraqi and Iranian sources stated that at least 20 members of the Hashd al-Shaabi were killed. Baghdad condemned the strikes as a violation of its sovereignty, and Zaidi cancelled his visit to Riyadh, which had been scheduled for July 30. Thus, within a matter of days, Iraq – which had been discussing transport corridors and economic integration in Ankara – has once again been drawn into the military arena of US-Iranian tensions.

This development does not diminish the importance of the Ankara visit; on the contrary, it enhances it. This is because the path for Iraq to extricate itself from regional military rivalry does not lie solely in maintaining balanced relations with Washington and Tehran. Iraq must raise the cost of the conflict by developing its economic ties, thereby forcing countries to step back from clashing on its territory. It would be difficult to claim that the intensive trade, energy and transport networks to be established with Türkiye will provide Baghdad with an absolute security guarantee. However, these links will make Iraq’s stability more valuable to Türkiye, Europe, the Gulf states and international companies. Economic interdependence alone will not prevent war, but it will help Iraq move away from being perceived solely as a country defined by militias, military bases and spheres of influence.

Looking at Zaidi’s initial foreign policy moves, he is seeking investment from Washington, political balance from Tehran and economic links from Ankara. Among these three capitals, Türkiye stands out for offering the most viable route to turn Iraq’s geography into an economic advantage. Multi-billion-dollar deals in Washington could provide capital and technology. Relations with Tehran cannot be entirely disregarded in terms of internal stability. However, Iraq’s ability to generate non-oil revenue, open up to Europe, create new employment opportunities and reduce its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz depends to a large extent on the operationalisation of the routes extending northwards.

Ultimately, the visit to Ankara has done more than simply demonstrate Iraq’s growing rapprochement with Türkiye; it has also revealed the direction of the new government’s approach to development. The real issue is not the signing of the five documents. The real issue is whether the pipeline stretching from Ovaköy to Faw, the oil flowing from Kirkuk to Ceyhan, and the $30 billion trade target will make the Iraqi state stronger and more independent. If the Zaidi government can support these projects with institutional reform, transparency and state authority, relations with Türkiye could transform Iraq’s quest for balance in foreign policy into an economic strategy. Otherwise, the documents signed in Ankara will simply be added to the long list of agreements that Baghdad has accumulated over the years but has been unable to implement. .

(Originally published in Turkish by Middle East Africa)

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he United States and Iran traded threats over a new economic confrontation on Monday, with Washington preparing what it described as an unprecedented sanctions campaign and Tehran warning it could halt all oil exports from the Persian Gulf if the pressure continues.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent was due to unveil new sanctions targeting countries and companies that continue trading with Iran, describing the campaign as “the single greatest financial offensive ever marshaled against an adversary.”

The measures come after months of war between the United States, Israel and Iran that have damaged Iran’s military and economic infrastructure while disrupting energy markets and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

“The economic D-Day” will begin with the new measures, Bessent wrote in an opinion article published in the Financial Times, warning countries that continue doing business with Iran that they could face consequences.

Iran threans to halt oil exports

Iran responded with a threat to dramatically escalate the economic confrontation.

Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said Tehran could stop all oil exports from the Persian Gulf if the U.S. economic campaign continued.

“If the economic war continues, not a single drop of oil will be exported,” Rezaei said in a social media post, adding that Iran would regard countries supporting Washington’s economic campaign as participating in an act of war.

The warning raises the possibility of a further disruption to global energy markets. The Strait of Hormuz, through which a major share of the world’s oil supplies normally passes, has already been brought close to a standstill by the conflict.

Iran retains missile and drone capabilities that it has used against U.S. allies in the Gulf and has threatened commercial shipping in the strategic waterway.

The new U.S. sanctions campaign comes as Washington and Tehran remain far from a negotiated settlement. Although direct military strikes between the two countries have stopped for several weeks, the two sides have yet to resume substantive negotiations.

The conflict began on February 28 with U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran. Months of fighting have killed thousands of people, most of them in Iran and Lebanon, and inflicted extensive damage on Iranian infrastructure.

Iran also suffered the killing of its Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during the conflict, while the United States has reported 18 military personnel killed and more than 750 wounded.

Struggling economy but still standing

Despite the economic pressure, Tehran has maintained a defiant public stance. Iranian officials, however, have acknowledged that the country’s economy was already under severe strain before the war because of years of sanctions, high inflation, currency weakness and energy shortages.

The war has added to those problems by damaging infrastructure, disrupting trade and reducing production, leaving Tehran facing major reconstruction costs.

Iranian officials have warned that further economic pressure could deepen hardship, fuel public discontent and undermine the government’s legitimacy.

Washington is also seeking support from major trading partners, particularly China, which has remained one of Iran’s most important economic partners.

Bessent has urged Beijing to cooperate with the U.S. campaign, noting that China has historically obtained a large share of its oil imports from the Gulf.

China has rejected the use of economic pressure as a solution to the conflict.

“Sanctions and pressure do not help resolve the problem,” a spokesperson for China’s embassy in Washington said, while calling for diplomacy.

Calls for diplomacy continue

With direct U.S.-Iran talks stalled, several countries have attempted to mediate between the two sides. Qatar, Pakistan and Turkey have all been involved in diplomatic efforts aimed at preventing a further escalation.

Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, was expected to visit Tehran on Monday as part of Islamabad’s efforts to promote regional peace and security. Pakistani officials said the visit would include discussions on the latest developments and Washington’s threatened sanctions.

The economic confrontation comes at a particularly sensitive moment for global energy markets. Any further disruption to Gulf oil exports could send prices sharply higher and increase pressure on countries already struggling with elevated energy costs.

For Washington, the sanctions campaign is intended to force Iran back to the negotiating table by increasing the economic cost of refusing U.S. demands.

For Tehran, the threat to halt oil exports represents an attempt to demonstrate that Iran can impose significant costs on the United States and its allies if economic pressure continues.

The confrontation therefore risks developing into a wider contest over energy, trade and financial access, even as military operations remain suspended.

With neither side showing signs of abandoning its core demands, the latest exchange of threats suggests that the six-month conflict has entered a new phase — one in which economic pressure and control of global energy supplies could prove as important as military power.

(Source: Reuters)

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srael is facing growing international criticism after its warplanes struck an abandoned military airfield in northwestern Syria, with regional governments and international organizations warning that continued attacks threaten Syria’s sovereignty and regional stability.

The Israeli strikes targeted the disused Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase in Idlib province. Syrian officials said Israeli aircraft carried out eight separate strikes, damaging the runway and hitting a derelict structure inside a hangar. No casualties were immediately reported.

The Syrian Foreign Ministry condemned the operation as a violation of the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, saying Israeli attacks on Syrian territory have continued since December 8, 2024.

Damascus said it has pursued a policy of restraint in an effort to strengthen domestic stability and prevent a wider regional escalation.

Regional governments condemn Israeli strikes

Türkiye strongly condemned the Israeli operation and called for greater international pressure to end what it described as Israel’s continuing aggression against Syria.

“We call on the international community to display a more decisive stance to ensure an end to Israel’s aggression against Syria,” the Turkish Foreign Ministry said, urging accountability for actions it said disregarded international law.

Jordan described the strikes as an “unjustified hostile attack” and said they violated international law and Syrian sovereignty. Egypt similarly warned that repeated Israeli violations of Syrian territory and airspace could trigger a dangerous escalation and undermine wider regional peace efforts.

The Gulf Cooperation Council also condemned the strikes. Saudi Arabia denounced the attack in the strongest terms and rejected the targeting of the Abu al-Duhur facility, while Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait warned that continued military action against Syria threatened regional security.

GCC Secretary-General Jasem Mohamed al-Budaiwi called for stronger international action to protect Syrian territory and uphold regional stability.

U.N. and U.S. express concern

The Arab League also criticized the Israeli strikes, with Secretary-General Nabil Fahmy accusing Israel of using provocative military action to intensify regional tensions.

Pakistan expressed solidarity with Syria and described the strikes as a violation of international law that threatened regional stability. Islamabad called on the international community to ensure accountability.

At the United Nations, spokesperson Stephane Dujarric said the strikes represented another “alarming violation” of Syria’s territorial integrity and airspace.

“These airstrikes must stop, and we are opposed to them,” Dujarric told reporters.

The United States also expressed concern. Tom Barrack, the U.S. ambassador to Ankara and special envoy for Syria and Iraq, said Washington remained committed to diplomatic efforts and talks between regional parties.

Barrack said Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government had not adopted an aggressive posture toward Israel and had instead repeatedly favored de-escalation.

The latest strikes come as Syria seeks to consolidate its new political order and strengthen relations with regional and international partners. The growing criticism of Israeli military operations, meanwhile, reflects broader concerns that continued attacks could undermine efforts to stabilize Syria and prevent another escalation across the Middle East.

(Source: Daily Sabah)

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.S. government debt has surpassed $40 trillion for the first time, highlighting growing concerns about the country’s fiscal outlook as spending on social programs and interest payments continues to rise faster than government revenues.

The Treasury Department reported that total U.S. public debt reached $40.047 trillion on Tuesday. Of that amount, $32.266 trillion was debt held by the public, while $7.782 trillion represented intragovernmental holdings.

The debt has more than doubled since Donald Trump first took office in January 2017, when it stood at about $19.95 trillion. Around one-third of the increase occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic, when the Trump and Biden administrations borrowed heavily to finance emergency economic support.

Debt and interest costs continue to rise

Budget watchdogs have warned that the growing debt burden could eventually trigger a serious fiscal crisis unless lawmakers take steps to reduce spending, increase revenues, or pursue a combination of both.

“The more we borrow, the more we exacerbate inflation, squeeze out other priorities in the budget, and leave ourselves vulnerable to emergencies at home and turmoil abroad,” said Maya MacGuineas, president of the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget.

The debt reached $40 trillion less than five months after passing $39 trillion, underscoring the rapid pace of government borrowing.

The United States is also facing rising borrowing costs as investors demand higher yields on Treasury securities. Thirty-year Treasury yields recently reached their highest level in nearly two decades, while demand from foreign investors has weakened.

Higher Treasury yields can increase borrowing costs across the economy, affecting mortgages, auto loans and business financing.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent responded Wednesday by announcing that the government would double the size of some Treasury buyback operations to at least $4 billion per transaction, in an effort to support the longer-term bond market.

Trump has repeatedly called for lower interest rates. Asked whether Americans should be concerned about volatility in the bond market, he said he was not worried and argued that a strong U.S. economy should lead to lower rates

Trump and Biden both oversaw large increases

The growth in U.S. debt has accelerated under both Trump and former President Joe Biden.

Debt increased by about $7.8 trillion during Trump’s first term, with more than half of that increase accumulating during the final nine months as the government responded to the pandemic.

Since Trump returned to office in January 2025, the debt has risen by another $3.8 trillion, bringing the increase across his two terms to about $11.6 trillion so far.

During Biden’s four-year presidency, federal debt increased by approximately $8.4 trillion, driven partly by pandemic recovery spending as well as investments in infrastructure, clean energy and other government programs.

Trump’s second-term legislative agenda is also expected to add significantly to future borrowing. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that his major tax-and-spending package, known as the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, could add about $4.7 trillion to the national debt.

Meanwhile, the federal government continues to face large annual deficits. The Treasury reported a $432 billion deficit in July, the fourth-largest monthly deficit in U.S. history.

Interest becomes a major budget burden

Rising debt is making interest payments an increasingly important part of federal spending.

The government spends roughly $7 trillion annually, with about 60% going toward mandatory programs such as Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid and veterans’ benefits.

Interest payments on the national debt now account for roughly $1.1 trillion annually. In fiscal 2025, debt-service costs exceeded Pentagon spending for the first time.

During the first 10 months of fiscal 2026, interest costs surpassed Medicare spending, becoming the second-largest federal budget item after Social Security.

The pressure is expected to grow as the aging population increases demand for retirement and health care programs while tax revenues remain insufficient to cover federal spending.

The crossing of the $40 trillion threshold has therefore renewed concerns about whether Washington can stabilize its finances while maintaining major social programs, funding national priorities and managing the rising cost of borrowing.

(Source: Reuters)

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hinese President Xi Jinping called on China to maintain an “indomitable fighting spirit” in confronting challenges and defending the country’s interests, while praising the Communist Party’s handling of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests.

Xi made the remarks Monday during a major speech marking the 100th anniversary of the birth of former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin, who led the country from 1993 to 2002 and died in 2022.

Speaking before thousands of officials and delegates at the Great Hall of the People, Xi portrayed China as facing difficult challenges but said the country would remain resilient.

“With an indomitable fighting spirit and exceptional capabilities, we will actively confront major challenges, whether they be rough seas or even raging storms,” Xi said.

He called for the defense of China’s sovereignty, security and development interests, saying the country would continue building on what he described as its achievements in economic development and social stability.

The speech was notable for its reference to the 1989 Tiananmen protests, a subject that remains highly sensitive in China. Xi praised Jiang for supporting the Communist Party leadership’s decision during the crisis and for helping maintain stability in Shanghai.

Xi highlights Jiang’s role in 1989 crackdown

The Tiananmen protests began in April 1989 following the death of former Communist Party leader Hu Yaobang, whose removal from power had been associated with a political shift away from liberalization.

Thousands of students and other protesters gathered in Beijing and called for political reforms and greater democracy. On June 4, Chinese troops moved into central Beijing and fired on protesters, bringing the demonstrations to an end.

Jiang rose rapidly within the Communist Party after the crackdown. He became party general secretary later that year and eventually China’s top leader in 1993.

Xi’s remarks represented a rare acknowledgment in official Chinese discourse of the political turmoil surrounding Tiananmen. Discussion of the crackdown remains heavily restricted in mainland China, while references to the deaths and images of the violence are subject to censorship.

State media also recently highlighted Jiang’s support for the party leadership’s response in a documentary series marking his life, although it did not show footage of the killings.

China faces economic and geopolitical challenges

Xi also praised Jiang’s broader legacy, including the economic reforms and opening to the outside world that accelerated during his leadership.

China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001 with strong support from the United States, helping fuel a period of rapid economic growth and deeper integration into global markets.

Relations between Beijing and Washington have since deteriorated, with trade disputes and broader geopolitical tensions increasingly shaping the relationship.

Xi is expected to meet U.S. President Donald Trump in late September, with trade, artificial intelligence and Taiwan among the issues expected to feature in their discussions.

In Monday’s speech, Xi highlighted improvements in living standards and China’s economic achievements, while insisting that the country’s long-term prospects remained strong.

“The prospects for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation are bright,” Xi said, adding that the goal pursued by generations of Chinese leaders was gradually becoming a reality.

(Source: CNN)

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overnment bond markets across the United States, Japan and Europe are sending a warning to policymakers as long-term borrowing costs reach levels not seen in years, driven by rising government debt, inflation concerns and geopolitical uncertainty.

The sharp increase in bond yields is raising borrowing costs for governments, companies and households while making it more difficult for central banks to balance inflation against economic growth.

In the United States, 30-year Treasury yields rose above 5% to their highest level since 2007. Japan’s 10-year government bond yield climbed to just below 3%, its highest level in three decades. German, French and British long-term borrowing costs also reached multiyear or multi-decade highs.

The moves reflect growing concerns about the sustainability of government finances and the inflation outlook as geopolitical tensions, tariffs and the continuing war involving Iran reshape the global economy.

Rising debt and inflation pressure bond markets

The U.S. government debt burden is approaching $40 trillion, while other developed economies are also facing large fiscal deficits and growing borrowing requirements.

The prolonged conflict involving Iran has pushed oil prices higher, with crude recently rising above $90 a barrel. Higher energy prices are adding to inflation concerns and reducing expectations that central banks will be able to cut interest rates quickly.

At the same time, technology companies are borrowing heavily to finance the expansion of artificial intelligence infrastructure and data centers. That demand for capital is increasing competition with governments seeking to sell large amounts of debt.

“Bond yields’ recent surge suggests investors are losing patience with fiscal profligacy,” said Jonas Goltermann, chief markets economist at Capital Economics.

U.S. 30-year Treasury yields later eased slightly, with the yield last down 2.4 basis points at 5.286%. The 10-year Treasury yield stood around 4.71%, a level that markets are watching closely, with 5% increasingly viewed as an important threshold.

The New York Federal Reserve estimates the term premium — the additional return investors demand for holding longer-term government debt — at around 80 basis points, close to its highest level in 12 years.

Recent U.S. Treasury auctions have also highlighted rising borrowing costs. A 10-year Treasury sale cleared at a yield of 4.683%, the highest in 19 years, while a 30-year auction reached 5.216%, a 25-year high.

The increase in government bond yields has also weighed on stocks, with major indexes including the Nasdaq and Europe’s STOXX 600 falling on Tuesday.

Japan and Europe face growing pressure

Japan is experiencing a particularly significant shift in its bond market. Its 10-year borrowing costs have climbed to nearly 3%, while 30-year yields have moved above 4%.

Investors are increasingly expecting the Bank of Japan to raise interest rates as early as September as inflation concerns grow.

Higher Japanese bond yields could also affect U.S. markets because Japanese investors have traditionally been major buyers of U.S. government debt. More attractive returns at home could encourage them to reduce purchases of Treasuries.

Foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries declined in June, according to U.S. Treasury Department data, with Japan, Britain and China among the countries reducing their holdings.

European governments are facing similar pressures. Germany’s 10-year bond yield reached its highest level since 2011, while French yields rose to their highest since 2008. Britain’s 30-year borrowing costs approached levels last seen in May, which were the highest since 1998.

High government spending and debt in countries such as France and Britain have contributed to investor concerns. Climate-related events are also expected to increase pressure on government budgets.

The bond market selloff is significant because government bond yields serve as a benchmark for borrowing across the economy. Higher sovereign yields can translate into more expensive corporate loans, consumer credit and household mortgages.

Some investors, however, believe the recent rise in yields could make government bonds increasingly attractive and eventually encourage buyers to return to the market.

The broader concern for policymakers is whether higher yields represent a temporary adjustment or the beginning of a longer period in which investors demand substantially greater compensation for lending to governments.

With inflation still vulnerable to higher energy prices, government debt continuing to rise and geopolitical risks increasing, bond markets are placing greater pressure on policymakers to demonstrate control over both fiscal policy and inflation.

(Source: Reuters)

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merican President Donald Trump’s approval rating has fallen to 33%, the lowest level of his current presidency, as growing concerns over the war with Iran and rising gasoline prices weigh on his standing with American voters, according to a Reuters/Ipsos poll released Monday.

The four-day survey found that 64% of Americans disapproved of Trump’s performance, compared with 33% who approved. His approval rating fell from 35% in an earlier poll this month and matched the lowest level recorded during his previous presidency, in December 2017.

Trump returned to the White House in 2025 with approval from just under half of Americans, but his standing has weakened as the conflict with Iran has continued. The war has disrupted a significant share of global oil trade and pushed gasoline prices higher, adding pressure on U.S. households.

Most Americans expect Iran war to continue

The poll showed widespread concern that U.S. involvement in the conflict will last much longer than Trump initially suggested.

About 80% of Americans said they believed U.S. involvement in Iran would continue for an extended period, including 87% of Democrats and 71% of Republicans. Only 16% expected the conflict to end within a few weeks.

Trump initially suggested that the war could be resolved within weeks, but Iran has continued resisting U.S. and Israeli military pressure. The conflict has also disrupted oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, contributing to higher energy prices.

Trump has defended the rising cost of gasoline as necessary to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. At a rally in New York on Friday, he told supporters that paying somewhat more for gasoline was worthwhile to prevent what he described as an evil country from obtaining nuclear weapons.

However, only about one in five Americans said the war was worth the cost. Among Republicans, only about half considered the conflict worthwhile.

The economic impact of the war could become a major issue ahead of the Nov. 3 congressional elections, with Republicans seeking to defend narrow majorities in the House while Democrats increasingly see an opportunity to gain control of the Senate.

Democrats gain ground on economy

The poll also showed Democrats gaining an advantage over Republicans on economic issues. About 38% of registered voters said Democrats would handle the economy better, compared with 35% who preferred Republicans.

That represents a significant shift from previous years and comes as voters express increasing concern about the cost of living and gasoline prices.

Democrats were also viewed as better equipped to manage the cost of living, while Republicans continued to hold a narrow advantage on immigration.

About 40% of voters said Republicans had the better approach to immigration, compared with 38% who favored Democrats. The two-point Republican advantage was the smallest recorded during Trump’s current presidency. Republicans had held a 26-point advantage on immigration in January 2025.

Although Trump’s administration has overseen a sharp decline in border crossings and expanded immigration enforcement, Republicans have faced political pressure over deadly confrontations and the growing number of people held in immigration detention, including children.

The Reuters/Ipsos poll was conducted online among 1,166 U.S. adults nationwide and had a margin of error of three percentage points in either direction.

The findings point to growing political challenges for Trump as voters confront the economic consequences of the Iran conflict and prepare to vote in the November midterm elections.

(Source: Reuters)

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razil has begun consultations on possible retaliatory measures against the United States after Washington imposed new tariffs on Brazilian exports, escalating trade tensions between the two countries.

The Brazilian government said the new U.S. tariffs were “unjustified and arbitrary” and vowed to defend the country’s interests through all appropriate channels.

The consultations mark the first step in a process that could eventually lead Brazil to impose countermeasures on U.S. goods and services. No final decision has been made, and Brazilian officials are expected to hold further discussions with U.S. trade authorities before determining how to respond.

Brazil considers range of measures

The United States imposed a 25% surcharge in July on Brazilian goods, citing what Washington described as unfair trade practices. Brazil is also subject to a separate 12.5% tariff linked to allegations concerning enforcement of bans on forced labor.

Under Brazil’s “Reciprocity Law,” the government could respond with measures beyond traditional tariffs. Options under consideration include restrictions on U.S. audiovisual companies and the possible suspension of pharmaceutical and agricultural patents, according to sources cited by Reuters.

Brazilian officials are weighing the potential economic consequences, including possible disruptions to supply chains and higher domestic inflation, before deciding whether to proceed with retaliation.

Trade dispute escalates

The dispute is part of a broader expansion of U.S. tariffs under President Donald Trump, who has repeatedly argued that tariffs are necessary to address trade imbalances and protect American industries.

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva had previously pledged to invoke the Reciprocity Law if Washington imposed the new duties. The government has now begun the formal process by requesting further diplomatic consultations with U.S. trade authorities.

The move comes as relations between Brasilia and Washington have become increasingly strained. Brazil has described the U.S. tariffs as unjustified while seeking to defend its interests through diplomatic and legal channels.

For now, Brasilia has stopped short of imposing countermeasures. The coming consultations will determine whether the dispute can be resolved through negotiations or whether Brazil moves ahead with retaliatory actions that could further deepen trade tensions between the two countries.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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he Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, signed on August 7, 2026, in Mecca between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, marks a significant transformation in the security equation between the Middle East and South Asia. At the heart of the agreement lies the principle that an armed attack directed against one of the parties shall be deemed to have been directed against all three states. This provision goes beyond traditional defense  cooperation to establish a new security mechanism based on the principle of collective deterrence.

The agreement’s primary significance in terms of international relations stems from the convergence of the signatory states’ diverse power elements within a single security framework. Turkey possesses NATO’s second-largest military force, advanced operational capabilities and a defence industry that has grown significantly in recent years. Pakistan is the only Muslim state to possess nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, stands out for its energy resources, financial capacity and influence in Gulf geopolitics. For this reason, the Mecca Agreement constitutes a strategic configuration of complementary capabilities formed by complementary strategic capabilities, rather than a traditional military alliance between three similar states.

The international context in which the agreement emerged is also significant. Rising military tensions in the Middle East, the security of energy transport routes, Iran-centred conflict dynamics and the tendency of regional states to diversify their security guarantees are reinforcing the search for a new regional security order. Within this framework, the Mecca Agreement can be interpreted as a demonstration of the will of regional states to support their security needs increasingly through mechanisms established amongst themselves, rather than through guarantees provided from outside.

The concept of strategic autonomy is particularly significant here. Since the end of the Cold War, one of the fundamental pillars of the Middle Eastern security system has been the US military presence and bilateral security relations. The Mecca Agreement does not directly abolish this system. It is also explicitly stated that the parties’ existing bilateral or multilateral obligations remain in force. However, the agreement demonstrates the will of regional actors to establish their own deterrence mechanisms alongside the Washington- centred security architecture. This situation can be interpreted as a transition from a dependence on a single security centre to a multi-layered security architecture.

The significance of the agreement for the participants

From Turkey’s perspective, the agreement also has a unique dimension. Turkey is a member of NATO. The Mecca Agreement, whilst enabling Ankara to maintain its NATO membership, also allows it to expand its institutionalised defense relations with regional powers outside NATO. Turkey is thus positioning itself strategically from which it can forge links between the Euro-Atlantic security system and the Middle East–South Asia security spheres. However, the relationship between the collective defense obligation under the Mecca Agreement and Article 5 of the NATO Treaty will require detailed legal and strategic scrutiny in the coming period, particularly in the event of simultaneous crises.

Pakistan’s participation in the agreement, meanwhile, shifts the deterrence debate to a different level. Pakistan’s nuclear capability enhances the agreement’s psychological and strategic weight. However, it cannot be concluded from current statements that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence has been extended to Turkey or Saudi Arabia. Saudi officials have also stated that the agreement is not linked to nuclear purposes or an arms race. Consequently, based on the current data, it does not appear appropriate to characterise the Mecca Agreement as a nuclear umbrella agreement.

From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, the agreement represents a continuation of its policy of diversifying security partnerships. By linking its economic capacity with Turkey’s defense industry and Pakistan’s military capabilities, Riyadh may secure a greater degree of strategic manoeuvre. To the extent that this framework extends to areas such as defense industry investments, joint production, technology transfer, training, intelligence sharing and maritime security, it will acquire a lasting institutional character.

The principle of collective defense

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Agreement is the principle of ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’. This provision is reminiscent of NATO’s logic of collective defense. However, there is currently a significant institutional difference between the two organizations NATO is an institutional alliance with over seventy years’ history, underpinned by a military command structure, joint defense planning, force structure, standards and permanent political bodies. The implementation mechanisms of the Mecca Agreement, however, are not yet as transparent, based on the information made public.

For this reason, the true strength of the agreement will be measured not so much by its signing as by the extent to which it becomes institutionalized. Should a joint military committee be established, joint operational plans drawn up, regular exercises conducted, an intelligence-sharing mechanism put in place and defense industry projects undertaken jointly, the Mecca Agreement could evolve into a genuine collective defense system.

From Iran’s perspective, interpreting the agreement as a direct counter-alliance requires caution. The parties have specifically emphasized that the agreement does not target any particular state. Given Turkey’s shared border with Iran, its economic ties and regional diplomatic channels, the agreement’s potential to take on a sectarian dimension could entail significant strategic costs for Ankara. Consequently, the sustainability of the agreement will depend on maintaining a balance between the principle of collective defense and the policy of avoiding regional polarization.

Towards a new regional security architecture

From Israel’s perspective, the new framework presents a distinct area for strategic calculation. The convergence of Turkey’s NATO capabilities, Pakistan’s military strength and Saudi Arabia’s regional influence within a common security mechanism holds the potential to influence the balance of power in the Middle East. However, it is not possible to draw a definitive conclusion from current statements suggesting that the agreement constitutes an alliance formed against Israel.

A broader implication of the Mecca Agreement is the possibility of institutionalizing security cooperation within the Islamic world. Whilst the Organization of Islamic Cooperation is a broad political organization with 57 members, it lacks an effective collective defense mechanism. The tripartite structure emerging in Mecca could, if successful, form the core of a narrower yet highly operational security platform that could expand with the participation of other states.

At this point, the fact that the agreement is named ‘Mecca’ also carries symbolic significance. The signing of the agreement at the most important holy centre of the Islamic world lends it political and historical visibility beyond that of a purely military text. However, the agreement’s future legitimacy will be shaped not so much by its symbolic value as by its contribution to regional peace, its compliance with international law, and its capacity to prevent crises.

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he geopolitical upheavals experienced in the international security environment in recent years are fundamentally altering the position of defense spending within economic policy. Increasing strategic competition on a global scale – particularly deepening security risks in the Middle East, such as the Russia-Ukraine War and the US/Israel-Iran War– alongside energy supply security, supply chain continuity and the global race for critical technologies, is leading to a reshaping of defense spending. In particular, NATO’s decision to raise member states’ defense spending to 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the long term signals the start of a new era, not only in security policies but also in global industrial production and technology investment. This has sparked a debate as to whether defense spending could become the new engine of economic growth.

For many years, defense spending has been assessed within the framework of the opportunity cost approach. This approach argues that public resources allocated to defense have a restrictive effect—albeit to a relative degree—on economic growth, as they are diverted from productive sectors such as education, healthcare or infrastructure investment. However, the technological transformation and changes in the security architecture over the past twenty years have necessitated a reassessment of this approach. Today, defense expenditure is viewed not merely as current expenditure-focused public spending aimed at building military capability, but as multifaceted investments that support high-tech production, research and development (R&D) activities, and export capacity.

How do defense expenditures affect economic equilibrium?

The economic effects of defense expenditures are now analyzed not only from the perspective of fiscal policy but also from the perspectives of industrial policy and technological transformation. The economic impact of defense expenditures is realized through a multi-stage transmission mechanism. In the first stage, public expenditure stimulates demand, thereby increasing aggregate demand, expanding production volumes, raising capacity utilization rates and supporting industrial production. Due to their high capital intensity, defense projects generate increased production across numerous sub-sectors, notably machinery manufacturing, electronics, metallurgy, composite materials, software and communications technologies. Thus, defense expenditure creates a powerful multiplier mechanism that mobilizes a broad supply chain.

In the second stage, R&D investments come into play. Defense projects involve significant R&D expenditure due to their high-technology nature. Technologies developed within the defense industry are transferred to other sectors over time, thereby creating long-term positive effects on productivity.

The third stage is the external balance channel. Owing to its high technology intensity, the defense industry is one of the sectors with the highest export value per kilogram. The export of defense products contributes to the current account balance and, at the same time, enables countries to move up the global technology value chain. For this reason, the defense industry is today recognized as one of the strategic determinants of high-value-added exports.

However, the effectiveness of this transfer mechanism depends largely on domestic production capacity. In countries that procure defense systems largely through imports, increasing defense budgets lead to significant outflows of foreign exchange, whereas in economies with domestic production capacity, the same expenditure is channeled back into the economy in the form of increased production, employment, technology development and exports. Consequently, the economic return on defense expenditure is linked not so much to the size of the budget as to the extent to which expenditure can be channeled into the domestic industry.

In this new global context, Türkiye’s production capacity constitutes a notable advantage. As a result of the localization policies implemented over the past twenty years, dependence on foreign sources in the defense industry has been significantly reduced. Within the defense industry, capabilities in design, system integration and high-technology production have been markedly enhanced. Consequently, defense expenditure has evolved from a structure heavily reliant on imports to a production model that generates domestic added value.

What is the contribution of Turkish defense industry companies to the economy?

One of the most significant indicators of this transformation is Türkiye’s rise in global defense exports. Over the past twenty years, Türkiye’s share of global defense exports has grown steadily and, as a result, Türkiye has become one of the key suppliers in the global defense market. This rise in export performance demonstrates that the defense industry has transformed into a strategic production ecosystem that competes in international markets, exports technology and generates foreign exchange.

Institutional transformation is equally noteworthy. Whilst in 2009 ASELSAN was the sole company representing Türkiye amongst the world’s top 100 defense industry firms, in recent years TUSAŞ, ROKETSAN, ASFAT and MKE have joined ASELSAN on the same list. The fact that companies such as STM, HAVELSAN, FNSS and BMC have entered the global top 100 defense industry companies in different years demonstrates that Türkiye’s defense industry has evolved from a single-company-centered structure into a multi-stakeholder, deepened and technologically diversified industrial ecosystem.

This rise in international company rankings is directly reflected in Türkiye’s industrial performance. An analysis of the Istanbul Chamber of Industry’s ISO 500 survey reveals that defense industry companies are steadily strengthening their positions among Türkiye’s largest industrial organizations in terms of sales from production. It is particularly noteworthy that, as of 2025, TUSAŞ has become Türkiye’s seventh-largest industrial organization, while ASELSAN has become the ninth-largest. Export performance at the company level also confirms this transformation. While ASELSAN’s export revenues have reached an all-time high in recent years, TUSAŞ has risen to the status of a key manufacturer within global aerospace and defense supply chains, with export volumes hovering at the billion-dollar level. This picture demonstrates that the Turkish defense industry has gained international competitiveness not only in platform production but also in areas such as electronic systems, avionics solutions, software, engineering services and systems integration.

How will defense expenditure take shape in the coming period?

In this regard, NATO’s plan to accelerate defense investments over the next decade is of considerable importance for Türkiye. This does not merely signify a larger export market for Türkiye. It also holds the potential to strengthen Türkiye’s strategic position within the supply chains of NATO countries, thanks to its production infrastructure with high local content, advanced engineering capabilities and defense companies capable of competing on a global scale. The growing demand from Alliance countries for defense industry products is creating long-term investment and export opportunities for the Turkish defense industry.

In conclusion, the global defense economy has entered a new phase of structural transformation. Defense expenditure is regarded not merely as public spending to meet security needs, but as strategic investments that support technology development, high-value-added production and export capacity. In the coming period, competition between countries will be shaped not so much by the size of defense budgets, but by the capacity of industrial ecosystems to convert these budgets into production, technology and exports.

The defense industry infrastructure that Türkiye has established over the past 20 years, and in particular its clusters, will provide a significant competitive advantage during this new period of expansion in global defense spending. For this reason, the defense industry will continue to be one of the key pillars of both national security and Türkiye’s development strategy, which is based on sustainable growth, high-tech production and exports.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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istory rarely announces itself. But occasionally, a single agreement tells us that something fundamental has changed.

The defense pact signed in Mecca between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye may be one of those moments.

Its most consequential provision is remarkably simple: an armed attack against one of the three countries will be considered an attack against all three.

For Pakistan, this represents something bigger than another defense agreement.

For decades, Pakistan’s military power, including its nuclear deterrent, was viewed overwhelmingly through the prism of South Asia, particularly its rivalry with India. Pakistan was already a formidable military power, but the strategic reach of that power was largely geographically contained.

That is beginning to change.

Pakistan’s security sxtends beyonf South Asia

Pakistan is now part of a collective-defense architecture stretching from South Asia through the Gulf to Türkiye.

And consider what these three countries bring together.

Türkiye possesses NATO’s second-largest army and has transformed itself into a major defense producer, from drones and missiles to warships and advanced aerospace technology. US President Donald Trump himself recently described the Turkish military as “tremendous” and “powerful.”

Saudi Arabia brings enormous economic and energy influence and the political weight of one of the Arab and Islamic world’s most consequential states.

Pakistan brings one of the world’s largest militaries, considerable operational experience and, crucially, is the world’s only Muslim-majority nuclear-armed state.

The nuclear question is therefore unavoidable.

Nothing publicly released about the agreement says Pakistan has extended a nuclear umbrella over Saudi Arabia or Türkiye. It would be wrong to claim otherwise.

But deterrence is also about perception. Any state contemplating a major confrontation with one member must now factor in the possibility of Pakistani involvement. The presence of a nuclear-armed state within that collective-defense framework inevitably becomes part of the strategic calculation.

Also, it’s worth mentioning that for Türkiye and Pakistan, this is the culmination of something much older.

Ankara and Islamabad: A growing relationship

The relationship between Ankara and Islamabad has long gone beyond diplomacy. It is rooted in unusually strong political and public ties and has evolved into substantial military cooperation,  from training and joint exercises to defense-industrial collaboration and Turkish-built MILGEM warships for Pakistan.

The Mecca pact takes that relationship a significant step further: from close defense partners to countries formally bound by collective defense.

And its implications stretch beyond the three signatories.

India says it is closely following the agreement. Its “great friend” Israel will surely be watching closely too.

Just a day before the agreement was signed, Narendra Modi received a call from Benjamin Netanyahu. According to India’s Foreign Ministry, the two discussed developments in West Asia and reviewed progress in the India-Israel Special Strategic Partnership.

There is no evidence connecting that call to the Mecca pact, and India has explicitly rejected subsequent reports that it sought a defence agreement with Israel to counter it.

But the wider picture is difficult to ignore. From New Delhi to Tel Aviv, capitals will now be assessing what this new arrangement means for a strategic landscape already undergoing profound change.

Having ties to China and the US at the same time

Pakistan occupies an especially interesting position within it.

China remains Pakistan’s “all-weather” strategic partner. Yet Islamabad continues to engage Washington, while simultaneously playing an active mediating role between the United States and Iran.

Perhaps US Vice President JD Vance summed up Pakistan’s standing in Washington most simply when asked about Islamabad’s role in the latest diplomatic efforts: “Very good, we love Pakistan.”

That ability to maintain relationships across geopolitical divides is increasingly rare.

Pakistan can speak to Beijing and Washington, Riyadh and Tehran, and the wider Gulf — without being completely confined to any single geopolitical camp. And now it has added a collective-defense commitment with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye to that equation.

That puts Pakistan in a remarkably unusual strategic position.

The pact also reflects a wider transformation in the Middle East. For decades, regional security depended heavily on external powers. Years of war, uncertainty and shifting American priorities have increasingly encouraged regional states to look towards one another.

Is this agreement like NATO? Well, we still do not know how integrated military planning will become or how its obligations would work during an actual war.

But deterrence begins long before a shot is fired. It begins with the calculations an adversary makes before deciding whether to fire one.

Turkish military and technological power, Saudi economic weight and Pakistani conventional and nuclear strength are now connected through a formal mutual-defense commitment.

(A version of this article was first published in Turkish by Kriter)

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proposed agreement being discussed by Iran and Oman to help end five months of conflict between Iran and the United States would give Tehran authority over commercial vessels entering the Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz, according to Iranian and regional sources, potentially marking one of the most significant shifts in Gulf maritime security in decades.

The proposal, if finalized, would grant Iran oversight of inbound shipping through the strategic waterway, through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil trade passed before the conflict disrupted maritime traffic. Regional officials said negotiations remain ongoing, with key issues still unresolved, despite Iranian officials reporting substantial progress.

There was no immediate comment from Washington on the reported proposal. U.S. officials have consistently maintained that they would not accept Iranian control over navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, despite President Donald Trump’s recent assertions that an agreement to reopen the waterway could be close.

The talks are taking place amid broader diplomatic efforts to end the conflict that erupted in late February, when U.S. and Israeli military operations against Iran triggered months of fighting across the region.

According to a senior Iranian source and two regional officials familiar with the negotiations, the draft arrangement would require commercial vessels entering the Gulf to transit through Iranian-controlled waters, giving Tehran an unprecedented administrative role over maritime traffic.

Some form of control

One regional official described the proposal as representing “some form of control” already conceded in principle, though negotiators remain divided over how that authority would be implemented in practice.

“The concession has already been made regarding some form of control over Hormuz,” one regional source said, adding that details regarding inspections and oversight remain under discussion.

Another regional source said Gulf states are seeking a framework in which regional countries would supervise any inspections of commercial vessels and ensure that any payments required from shipping companies remain voluntary.

A senior Iranian official said Tehran is seeking to levy fees of between 5% and 7% of cargo values on ships using the strait, while Oman has proposed charges closer to 3%. The United States, however, continues to oppose any transit fees, insisting that Hormuz remain an international waterway with unrestricted access.

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said negotiations with Oman had reached “fundamental understandings” and suggested an agreement was nearing completion.

Speaking to Iran’s official IRNA news agency, Gharibabadi said the proposed arrangement was designed so that commercial vessels would pass through Iranian territorial waters on both inbound and outbound voyages.

He added that discussions had reached “the verge of being finalized.”

However, regional officials cautioned that significant differences remain, particularly over whether Iran’s authority would extend equally to ships leaving the Gulf, as well as the legal basis for any administrative role Tehran would exercise.

Regional energy infrastructure

The negotiations come as Iran has simultaneously intensified its warnings to Gulf Arab states against supporting any renewed U.S. military action.

According to several regional sources, Tehran has privately warned neighboring Gulf countries that any future American attack on Iranian territory would trigger retaliation against critical regional energy infrastructure.

“The Iranian warning was unequivocal: if America targeted Iran’s infrastructure, they would retaliate by striking Gulf energy facilities and other regional targets,” one Gulf source said.

Since the conflict began, Iran has repeatedly targeted regional allies of the United States with missile and drone attacks while also disrupting commercial shipping through Hormuz.

Iran says more than 3,400 people have been killed since the war began, while the United States has reported the deaths of 18 military personnel.

President Trump has increasingly emphasized diplomacy after months of military operations failed to reopen the waterway fully or compel Tehran to accept Washington’s demands.

Addressing supporters in Las Vegas, Trump said he preferred a negotiated solution despite warning that military action remained an option.

“I’d rather make a deal because I don’t want to kill people,” Trump said. “I do not want to kill people, but at some point we’re gonna.”

The reported negotiations reflect a notable evolution in the conflict, which has increasingly centered on maritime access rather than direct military confrontation.

Iran has argued that previous flexibility in negotiations only encouraged greater pressure from Washington, leading its leadership to conclude that stronger leverage is necessary before meaningful talks can proceed.

A major strategic shift from the pre-war status quo

The proposed arrangement would also represent a major strategic shift from the pre-war status quo, when commercial vessels transited the Strait of Hormuz without paying fees or seeking authorization from Iran.

The waterway remains one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors, serving as the primary export route for Gulf oil and liquefied natural gas.

Despite optimistic statements from Tehran and Washington about the prospects for diplomacy, officials involved in the talks stressed that no final agreement has been reached.

Political disagreements over shipping fees, inspection authority and the precise definition of Iranian control continue to complicate negotiations, while broader questions surrounding the future security architecture of the Gulf remain unresolved.

The talks also come as Trump faces growing domestic pressure to end a conflict that opinion polls suggest remains unpopular with American voters ahead of November’s congressional midterm elections.

Oil prices fell in recent days after Trump suspended plans for renewed military strikes, citing ongoing diplomatic efforts that he said could eventually lead to the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

(Source: Reuters)

I

ran is increasingly relying on economic disruption rather than direct military confrontation to pressure the United States into making concessions over the Strait of Hormuz, expanding threats to regional shipping routes and energy infrastructure as the conflict enters a prolonged phase.

According to Gulf officials, regional sources and analysts, Tehran believes that sustained pressure on global trade and energy markets will prove more effective than conventional military escalation in forcing Washington to reconsider its position.

Rather than seeking a decisive battlefield victory, Iran has adopted a strategy of calibrated escalation designed to steadily raise the economic and political costs of the conflict while avoiding an all-out regional war. The objective, analysts say, is to convince the United States and its allies that accommodating Iran’s demands over the Strait of Hormuz is less costly than continuing the current confrontation.

“Iran, from the beginning, has tried to out-escalate the United States by stretching out its escalation options so that it always has something new to bring every week — a new geography, a new type of weapon, a new type of target,” Michael Knights of the Washington Institute told Reuters.

He argued that Iran’s greatest leverage lies not in its ability to inflict military damage on the United States or Israel, but in its capacity to disrupt regional economies and global commerce.

“The bigger advantage they have is not that they can hurt America or Israel,” Knights said. “Their big advantage is that they can hurt the regional states and the global economy.”

Pressure beyond Hormuz

After demonstrating its ability to disrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz — a waterway that carried around one-fifth of global oil consumption before the conflict — Iran has signaled that its pressure campaign could extend well beyond the strategic chokepoint.

Threats directed at the Red Sea and Saudi energy infrastructure suggest Tehran is seeking to widen the geographical scope of the crisis, increasing the cost of protecting international shipping while testing Washington’s willingness to sustain a prolonged confrontation.

One Gulf source said commanders in Iran’s Revolutionary Guards believe recent developments have strengthened Tehran’s negotiating position.

“The Iranians believe that by widening the war and increasing the pressure, he will eventually give in,” the source said, referring to U.S. President Donald Trump. “Trump thinks he can hit the Iranians hard and bring them to the negotiating table, but they won’t bend.”

That assessment has shaped Tehran’s negotiating strategy, according to Iranian and regional sources.

Trump said on Monday that negotiations with Iran would take place after he canceled a planned military strike in hopes of securing an agreement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian officials, however, denied that talks with Washington were currently underway.

A senior Iranian source said Tehran’s leadership has concluded that previous attempts at flexibility only encouraged greater pressure from Washington, reinforcing the belief that meaningful negotiations can occur only after Iran establishes stronger leverage.

In Tehran’s view, the source said, Trump interprets concessions as weakness and responds only to sustained pressure.

Michael Singh, another senior fellow at the Washington Institute, said Iranian leaders appear convinced they still hold the initiative because the Trump administration remains uncertain about how far it is willing to escalate militarily.

“The Iranians are trying to press their advantage,” Singh said. “They’re interested in establishing sovereignty over the strait and exercising selective control over the waterway.”

Dispute over the Strait

At the heart of the standoff is the future administration of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors.

Regional sources say Oman has presented Tehran with a Gulf-backed proposal that would establish a mechanism for managing shipping through the strait, including voluntary user fees.

Iran, however, is reportedly seeking administrative authority over the waterway and the right to impose service charges on vessels passing through it.

Washington has rejected any arrangement that would allow Iran to exercise control over the strait, insisting it must remain an international waterway open to unrestricted commercial navigation.

Former U.S. diplomat Alan Eyre said Iran’s broader strategy is intended to deter further American military action while forcing Washington to lift its naval blockade and reconsider its negotiating position.

“They don’t want the U.S. to dictate the pace of events,” Eyre said.

War of endurance

Analysts say Iran’s campaign has already shifted the focus of regional and international efforts.

Rather than intensifying military pressure on Tehran, Gulf states and Western governments are increasingly concentrating on protecting commercial shipping and critical energy infrastructure.

The formation of a Saudi-led maritime coalition reflects that shift. According to Gulf sources, the initiative is primarily defensive, focusing on escorting commercial vessels, sharing intelligence and safeguarding vital sea lanes instead of confronting Iran directly.

Knights compared the effort to Europe’s Aspides naval mission in the Red Sea, which was established to protect merchant shipping rather than alter the regional military balance.

For Tehran, forcing rivals into an expensive defensive posture represents a strategic success despite its military disadvantages.

Unable to match U.S. military capabilities directly, Iran can still impose significant costs by compelling regional governments and foreign navies to devote increasing resources to securing global trade routes.

Each new threat, whether in the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait or elsewhere, increases the financial and military burden of keeping international commerce flowing.

Analysts describe the conflict as increasingly becoming a contest of endurance.

Iranian leaders appear to believe they can withstand economic pressure longer than the United States and its partners can tolerate repeated disruptions to global energy supplies and maritime trade.

The strategy also serves a diplomatic purpose.

By demonstrating an ability to expand the crisis whenever necessary, Tehran hopes to strengthen its bargaining position before any future negotiations.

“If there are going to be negotiations, they will define the terms,” said Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations. “Both sides are matching escalation with escalation.”

Despite intermittent diplomatic efforts, neither Washington nor Tehran has shown signs of backing down.

As both sides continue to test each other’s resolve through economic pressure, military deterrence and political signaling, analysts warn that a strategy intended to maximize leverage could still spiral into a wider conflict that neither side intends or is fully able to control.

(Source: Reuters)

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he fact that security dynamics in the international system have taken on a nature that transcends regional boundaries necessitates that NATO summits be interpreted from a broader perspective. For this reason, assessing NATO summits solely from the perspective of European security has become increasingly inadequate in recent years. Although the Russia–Ukraine War continues to dominate the Alliance’s agenda, the summits also provide a significant body of data in terms of illustrating how the relationship between Euro-Atlantic security and strategic developments in the Indo-Pacific is being redefined.

In particular, China’s rise, the deepening of the US-China great power rivalry on a global scale, growing awareness of the vulnerability of critical infrastructure and supply chains, and issues such as advanced technologies and maritime security are key areas that inevitably extend NATO’s security agenda beyond Europe. Consequently, the NATO summits held in recent years have conveyed strategic messages that concern not only Europe’s security architecture but also the future of the Indo-Pacific and, by extension, the global system.

The Indo-Pacific agenda in the capital of NATO’s closest ally in Asia

Viewed from this perspective, the Ankara Summit harbors a turning point that warrants careful analysis from an Indo-Pacific perspective. For the first time in NATO’s history, the Alliance’s Indo-Pacific agenda was brought to the table in the capital of NATO’s closest ally to Asia; moreover, it has laid the foundations for a new strategy regarding the region within NATO. At this very point, when the process is examined from a chronological perspective, a critical paradox emerges between the institutional visibility provided by the summits and NATO’s actual engagement with the Indo-Pacific.

Looking at the course of events, the foundations of the transatlantic approach within NATO were laid not, as is often stated, at the 2022 Madrid Summit, but in fact at the 2008 Bucharest Summit. With the Bucharest Summit, the impact of security developments outside Europe on the Alliance became more apparent, whilst global partnerships became an integral part of NATO’s long-term strategic vision. This approach was taken to a new level at the Madrid Summit, where China was defined for the first time as a ‘systemic challenge’ in the NATO Strategic Concept; whilst the leaders of the Indo-Pacific Quartet (IP4), comprising Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, were invited to a NATO summit for the first time.

Alongside this highly significant development, the approach that European-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security cannot be assessed in isolation from one another has gained institutional visibility not only at the rhetorical level but also in summit diplomacy. The 2023 Vilnius Summit holds particular significance as it represents the first stage in the attempt to institutionalize this initiative. Although the initiative to establish a NATO liaison office in Japan had the potential to become the Alliance’s first institutional presence in Asia and to demonstrate that NATO was supporting the US strategy of containing China, it could not be implemented due to objections led by France and supported by Germany.

At the 2024 Washington Summit, however, against the backdrop of US-China tensions and the emphasis on the ‘China Threat’, the rhetoric towards China hardened further, and Beijing was labelled as an actor providing indirect support to Russia by acting as a ‘decisive factor’ in the war in Ukraine. However, this hardening of rhetoric in Washington has not been reflected to the same extent in institutional expansion; and, partly due to the EU’s call for ‘strategic autonomy’, even the issue of the liaison office in Tokyo has not been brought back onto the agenda.

From visible strategies to covert operational warfare

The fundamental shift in NATO’s Indo-Pacific strategy became apparent at the summits in The Hague and Ankara. Declarations from previous summits, which contained detailed assessments of China and the Indo-Pacific, have been replaced by shorter texts focused on strengthening Europe’s defense capabilities. In this regard, issues such as increasing defense spending, developing the defense industry’s production capacity, burden-sharing and collective deterrence, issues centered on alliance-internal development, have gained a more pronounced priority compared to previous summits.

At the same time, it is a well-known fact that the participation of IP4 countries at leadership level has gradually declined during this period, and that, for the most part, the leaders of these countries sent their defense or foreign ministers to the summits up until the Ankara Summit. Similarly, the process that began with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s decision not to attend the summit in 2024 has been mirrored by other countries in subsequent years; by the time of the Ankara Summit, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung stood out as the only IP4 head of state to attend the two-day summit.

Although this pattern, stretching from 2008 to the present day, might at first glance be interpreted as indicating a decline in NATO’s interest in the Indo-Pacific, it is important to recognize the existence of a different trend during the same period. Whilst institutional visibility has relatively diminished, functional cooperation between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners has shifted towards more concrete areas. At the IP4 meetings held in Ankara, alongside common security issues such as the war in Ukraine, China, North Korea and Iran, defense industry, critical technologies, cyber security, strategic communication and industrial cooperation were brought to the fore. Similarly, Japan’s initiative to join NATO’s Defense Innovation Accelerator (DIANA) program demonstrates that technology-based cooperation with non-allied countries is being taken to a new level.

The signing of a memorandum of understanding between the US, Japan and South Korea during the summit, aimed at the deployment of small modular reactors (SMRs) in third countries, also demonstrates that security cooperation is not limited to the military sphere; it has expanded to encompass areas such as energy technologies, critical infrastructure and strategic production capacity. Consequently, the chronological progression and the developments that have stood out at the last two summits indicate a shift in the nature of engagement rather than a retreat in NATO’s Indo-Pacific policy. The political symbols, leaders’ photographs and initiatives to establish a NATO liaison office in Tokyo that characterized the Madrid and Vilnius periods are giving way to a partnership model that is increasingly less visible but more functional.

In other words, NATO’s relations with the Indo-Pacific are now deepening largely through defense industry, technological innovation, critical infrastructure, supply chains, cyber resilience and joint production capacity. The relative decline in institutional visibility does not imply a weakening of functional integration; on the contrary, the two processes are moving in opposite directions.

The China dilemma

Of course, attributing this transformation solely to Washington’s shifting strategic priorities and the challenges within NATO would result in a flawed analysis. Undoubtedly, the US has, particularly in recent times, been demanding that its European allies assume greater defense responsibilities and views the strengthening of Europe’s defense capabilities as one of the prerequisites for redirecting its strategic focus and resources more effectively towards the Indo-Pacific. However, this is not the sole factor explaining the transformation in NATO’s Indo-Pacific policy. Differing threat perceptions within the Alliance and the nature of economic relations with China also significantly shape this process.

The fact that 23 of NATO’s 32 members are also members of the European Union necessitates striking a delicate balance between the security narrative regarding China and economic interests. For many European countries, whilst China is an actor with whom strategic competition is becoming increasingly pronounced, it remains a partner that is difficult to do without in terms of trade, investment, critical technologies and supply chains.

Consequently, whilst shared security concerns regarding China are reflected in NATO documents, it appears difficult to speak of full consensus amongst allies regarding the extent to which this rhetoric will be translated into institutional and operational policies. At the Vilnius Summit, the blocking of the initiative to establish a NATO liaison office in Japan, led by France, can be regarded as one of the most concrete examples of this divergence.

Similarly, the diplomatic contacts that Western leaders have recently maintained with Beijing also indicate that a more pragmatic approach has been adopted, one in which competition and engagement are pursued simultaneously. The messages conveyed by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney during his visit to Beijing regarding the transformation of the global order, alongside US President Donald Trump’s pursuit of direct diplomatic contact with China and the messages he delivered during his visit to Beijing, demonstrate that competition in the security sphere does not imply a complete severing of economic and diplomatic ties.

This situation also partly explains the shift in tone observed in NATO’s rhetoric towards China. Consequently, the fact that China featured to a more limited extent at the Ankara Summit compared to previous years can be interpreted not as a weakening of the perception of threat, but rather as a reflection of the strategic balance being sought within NATO between security priorities and economic interdependence. It is precisely for this reason that the Ankara Summit represents a turning point, not signifying that NATO is distancing itself from the Indo-Pacific, but rather that it is redefining its engagement with the region by adapting to the strategic and economic realities brought about by the changing international system.

In the coming period, the key factor determining the direction of this transformation will be not so much the communiqués to be issued, but rather the concrete collaborations to be developed between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners in critical defense sectors. For this reason, the Ankara Summit appears worthy of being remembered not as a summit at which NATO distanced itself from the Indo-Pacific, but as a threshold at which the Alliance reformatted its strategic engagement with the region in line with new geopolitical realities.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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ildfires continued to burn across France, Spain and Greece on Thursday as scorching temperatures, strong winds and dry conditions fueled blazes that have killed firefighters, forced mass evacuations and destroyed thousands of hectares of land.

In southwestern France, authorities said a wildfire near Bordeaux was brought under control overnight after burning around 42,000 hectares of forest. Police arrested two people on suspicion of arson, though officials released no further details.

The fires have forced about 220,000 residents and tourists to evacuate, although around 60,000 have since returned as conditions improved. Businesses that had temporarily closed were gradually reopening.

Weather conditions around Bordeaux were expected to improve later Thursday, with forecasts of cooler temperatures, higher humidity and possible thunderstorms. However, authorities warned that the fire danger remained high.

In Greece, three firefighters were killed as crews battled separate wildfires driven by gale-force winds.

Deaths in Crete

Two firefighters died after becoming trapped between advancing fire fronts on the island of Crete, where hundreds of residents and tourists were evacuated by land and sea from communities threatened by fast-moving flames. A third firefighter was killed while responding to another wildfire in the Peloponnese.

Strong winds prevented firefighting aircraft from operating over parts of Crete, hampering efforts to contain the blaze.

Spain also remained on alert as firefighters battled at least 10 active wildfires across the country.

Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez described the situation as “extreme,” citing high temperatures, low humidity and powerful winds that have created dangerous fire conditions.

The largest fire continued to spread in the eastern province of Castellón, where more than 9,300 hectares have burned. Fire officials said crews worked overnight to secure the fire’s 82-kilometer perimeter in hopes of stabilizing it before temperatures rose again.

New wildfires also broke out in the northwestern provinces of Zamora and León, forcing more than 1,300 people to leave their homes, including residents near Arribes del Duero Natural Park.

A European Union wildfire response center

Sánchez said he had asked European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to support establishing a European Union wildfire response center for the western Mediterranean on Spain’s Balearic Islands.

Europe has endured repeated heatwaves this summer, with temperatures remaining well above seasonal averages across much of the continent.

Scientists say prolonged drought, extreme heat and strong winds have increased the frequency and intensity of wildfires across southern Europe, where emergency services have faced near-continuous firefighting operations in recent weeks.

The current wildfire season has already burned more land across the European Union than at the same point last year, underscoring the growing challenge posed by increasingly severe summer fire seasons.

(Source: Reuters)

I

ran is expected to receive the first shipment of hundreds of Chinese-made shoulder-fired air defense missile systems within weeks under a deal valued at between $60 million and $70 million, according to three sources familiar with the agreement cited by Reuters.

If completed, the purchase would represent one of Tehran’s largest known efforts to rebuild its short-range air defenses since months of fighting with the United States and Israel exposed weaknesses in its ability to protect military facilities and strategic infrastructure.

The contract reportedly covers between 300 and 400 man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), including the Chinese-made QW-12 and FN-16 missile systems.

According to Reuters, the agreement was signed through Zhongqing Baoshang International Investment, which the sources said acted as an intermediary between Iran and the Chinese supplier.

The total value of the contract is estimated at $60–70 million, although the sources cautioned that delivery schedules, quantities and implementation details could still change.

Iran’s foreign ministry did not immediately comment on the report.

China’s foreign ministry denied the claims, stating:

“The relevant reports are completely groundless. China has consistently played a role in promoting peace and ending the conflict.”

The parent company, Zhong Qing Bao Shang Group, also did not immediately respond to Reuters’ request for comment.

Air defense overhaul after months of war

Reuters said Iran is seeking to strengthen its defenses after U.S. and Israeli strikes targeted facilities connected to its missile, drone and air defense programs during the recent conflict.

Military analysts note that portable air defense systems are particularly valuable because they can be quickly deployed by small teams and relocated frequently, making them less vulnerable than fixed air defense batteries.

The reported purchase would significantly expand Iran’s inventory of short-range air defense weapons designed to engage Low-flying aircraft, helicopters, and drones.

The QW-12 and FN-16 are infrared-guided missile systems intended to protect military bases, energy infrastructure and other sensitive locations against aerial threats.

Defense experts cited by Reuters consider the QW-12 less advanced than newer Chinese systems such as the QW-18 and QW-19 but say it remains capable of providing an effective layer of short-range protection.

According to the sources, initial shipments were expected to leave Urumqi in western China before transiting through Pakistan into Iran.

The sources did not specify whether the transfers would occur by air or overland.

Pakistan firmly denied any involvement.

The military’s media wing, the Inter-Services Public Relations, called reports linking Pakistan to the transfer of Chinese air defense systems “absolutely concocted and false.”

Reuters also reported that Iran has explored overland transportation routes for Chinese military equipment and dual-use components to reduce the risk of disruption.

Growing military ties with China

The reported procurement comes amid expanding defense cooperation between China and Iran despite years of international sanctions on Tehran.

European and Middle Eastern security sources told Reuters they were aware of discussions involving possible Iranian purchases of several QW-series MANPADS, including the QW-12, QW-18 and QW-19 variants.

Reuters previously reported that Iran was also negotiating with China to acquire anti-ship cruise missiles, although it could not determine whether that agreement was finalized.

If the current deal proceeds, it would underscore Iran’s continued reliance on a combination of domestic weapons production and foreign suppliers as it rebuilds military capabilities following months of conflict.

(Source: Reuters)

W

hat do white supremacist Silicon Valley tech bros and terrorist mass shooters of mosques, synagogues, and migrant centers have in common?

They all subscribe to a death cult that dreams of a utopic world where there is racial and cultural hierarchy, and all non-white migrants are deported from Western countries and imperialism, hard power and exploitation to reign again in the global order.

The world is facing a new form of terrorism threat and fascism: it is called Accelerationism. Accelerationists disdain non-white migrants, Muslims, ethnic minorities, radicals and politicians that advocate for diversity, integrating migrants, decolonial justice, and the reparation for slavery and colonialism.

Death cults

On May 19, 2026, two teenagers attacked a San Diego Mosque, killing three people and livestreamed their shooting. A 75-page manifesto written by the shooters espoused Islamophobia, antisemitism, anti-Black racism, Hispanophobia, accelerationism and misogyny was later found online. This was not an isolated incident. On March 15, 2019, a gunman walked into the Al Noor Mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand, and murdered 51 Muslims while livestreaming the massacre on Facebook. He left behind a manifesto soaked in the language of accelerationism and had similarities with the San Diego shooters’ manifesto.  Accelerationism espouses the idea that Western/White civilization must be pushed to a violent breaking point so that white and “pure” ethnostates can rise from the ashes and reclaim their glorious past.

The terrorism in Christchurch and accelerationism have a long history. It echoed Anders Breivik’s 2011 massacre in Norway, where 77 people, most of them teenagers, were murdered in the name of protecting Europe from cultural Marxism and Muslim migration. It echoed the Pittsburgh synagogue shooting, the El Paso Walmart attack targeting Hispanic shoppers, the Buffalo supermarket massacre aimed at Black Americans.

Accelerationist terrorism is carried out in the name of ideological and cultural warfare, carried out by mostly young white men who believe that accelerating racial, cultural and religious conflict would hasten a white supremacist revolution, response and reaction.

AI and the far-right

The question the world has been too slow to ask is this: who is building the intellectual, ideological and political infrastructure that makes this violence justifiable?

Look no further than Silicon Valley.

Elon Musk, today the world’s richest man, owner of X (formerly Twitter), and now the single most powerful unelected figure in the United States, has spent recent years amplifying white nationalist accounts, and platforming “great replacement” conspiracy theories, and signal-boosting neo-Nazi rhetoric to hundreds of millions of followers across the world. His very public embrace of far-right European parties, his attacks on Muslim communities, his obsessive promotion of white demographic anxiety, are not the eccentricities of a distracted Trillionaire. When Musk performed a Nazi salute at a post-inauguration rally and the world shrugged, it confirmed what many had long suspected: white supremacy has found its most powerful champion not in the backrooms of a skinhead bar but in the boardrooms of the most valuable companies on earth.

Marc Andreessen, the venture capitalist and co-founder of Netscape, published his “Techno-Optimist Manifesto” in 2023, declaring that there is no problem “that cannot be solved with more technology” and that the “techno-capital machine” exists to serve humanity. What he did not say is whose humanity he had in mind. The effective accelerationist movement (e/acc) that Andreessen and his Silicon Valley peers champion is accelerationism with a smile: the same ruthless logic of letting destructive forces run unchecked, dressed up in the language of progress, technology and innovation. The merger of white nationalist politics and Silicon Valley capital is no longer a fringe concern. It is the ideology of most Far Right and white supremacist political movements.

Underneath all of it runs a single obsession: replacement. The “great replacement” theory, the paranoid anxiety that white Western populations are being deliberately displaced by non-white migrants, has migrated from the fever swamps of the internet into mainstream conservative politics across Europe, America, and Australia. Replacement paranoia is the connective tissue between the Christchurch shooter and the French Far Right, between the neo-Nazi accelerationist and the Arktos circle and the recently exposed Dialog list of Peter Thiel. This is an ideological project: a far-right internationalism that stretches from Budapest to Buenos Aires, from Washington to Warsaw, and united by the shared paranoid conviction that the non-white world and its peoples are an existential threat to Western civilization.

Techno-fascism

And now this far right international has acquired its most powerful tool yet: Artificial Intelligence.

The global AI economy is being built on a foundation that replicates, with algorithmic precision, the colonial extraction of previous centuries. The data that trains the large language models powering Silicon Valley’s fortunes is harvested from populations across the Global South, often without consent, without compensation, and without benefit. The content moderation labour that makes these platforms usable is outsourced to workers in Kenya, the Philippines, India and Pakistan, paid poverty wages to absorb the worst of humanity’s digital violence so that Western users need not see it.

Moreover, the rare earth minerals that power the hardware are extracted from the Congo, from Bolivia, from Indonesia, by workforces whose conditions would be unthinkable in any country whose citizens Musk and Andreessen consider fully human.

This is the new colonialism, not the colonialism of the gunboat and the governor-general, but of the server farm and the terms of service agreement. The Global South is being incorporated into the AI economy not as a beneficiary but as raw material: its people as cheap labour, its data as free resource, its governments as compliant hosts, and most consequentially the Silicon Valley tech bros dream of a hierarchical world where the Global South is exploited and enslaved.

The accelerationists and the tech bros, in both their violent and techno-utopian forms, agree on one thing: some lives are the fuel, not the destination.

In their hyper-technological and advanced futuristic utopian world, where Musk, Jeff Bezos, Peter Thiel and other billionaires will go for vacation to Mars, there is no place for Muslims, Africans and peoples of the Global South.

Violent death cults have always worn different suits and hoodies in different eras. Today they wear a hoodie or suit and call themselves disruption innovationists, Techno-Utopianists or efficiency strategists.

The mosques of Christchurch and the sweatshops of Nairobi are not separate stories. They are the same story, told in different registers of the same accelerationist logic: that some people exist to be exploited so that others may prosper and build a civilization that reaches Mars and beyond while the Global South is robbed of its wealth, labour and minds and rendered perpetually poor and miserable.

We should not look away.

All forms and manifestations of hatred, dehumanization and exploitation ought to be challenged and resisted – even when it’s clothed in the language of technological advancement or saving a particular civilization, culture or race.

O

nly one in three Americans support the U.S. war with Iran, while a large majority believe President Donald Trump has failed to clearly explain the conflict’s objectives, according to a new Reuters/Ipsos poll.

The nationwide survey, conducted from July 24 to 26 among 1,246 U.S. adults, found that support for the war has fallen to its lowest level since the conflict began five months ago. Only about one-third of respondents said they back the military campaign, while support has remained below 40% for five consecutive months.

Despite declining support for the war, Trump’s overall job approval rating rose three percentage points from the previous month to 37%, although it remains historically low for his presidency.

The poll found widespread uncertainty about the administration’s objectives in Iran.

Overall, 69% of respondents—including roughly 40% of Republicans—said Trump has not clearly explained why the United States is fighting in Iran.

Since the conflict began, Trump has cited multiple goals, including:

• Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
• Destroying Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities.
• Encouraging Iranians to overthrow their government.

The White House defended the administration’s approach. Spokesperson Olivia Wales said Trump would not base decisions on “fluid opinion polls” and reiterated that preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon remains the administration’s central objective.

Support lags far behind previous U.S. wars

Reuters noted that public backing for the Iran conflict is substantially lower than support recorded during the early stages of previous American military campaigns.

According to historical Gallup polling:

• Around 70% of Americans supported the Iraq War during its initial months in 2003.
• Approximately 90% backed military action in Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks in 2001.

By contrast, Reuters/Ipsos polling has shown support for military action against Iran never rising above 40% since the conflict began on February 28.

The survey suggests the war may become a significant political challenge for Republicans before November’s congressional midterm elections.

Independent voters surveyed by Reuters/Ipsos favored Democratic congressional candidates over Republicans by 36% to 20%. Independents also gave Democrats higher marks on economic issues, reflecting concern over rising living costs linked to the conflict.

The war has contributed to higher energy prices, with average U.S. gasoline prices climbing above $4 per gallon compared with about $3 before hostilities began.

Republican strategist Alex Conant, who served in President George W. Bush’s administration, said the conflict is making it harder for Republicans to focus on economic issues that they had hoped would dominate the election campaign.

Voters question the purpose of the war

Several voters interviewed by Reuters expressed uncertainty about the reasons for the war.

Alex Womack, a retired Marine from Georgia who previously supported Trump, said he no longer understood the purpose of the conflict.

“It’s not clear why we started a war with them. I have no idea,” Womack said.

Another Georgia voter, Rhyan Anderson, who voted for Trump in 2024 after supporting former President Joe Biden in 2020, argued that the administration should focus more on domestic priorities than overseas conflicts.

“My biggest thing is just focus on the people who are actually in the country,” Anderson told Reuters.

According to Reuters, 18 U.S. service members have been killed since the conflict began, while thousands of people have died in Iran and in Lebanon, where fighting between Israeli forces and the Iran-backed Hezbollah has continued.

The combination of rising fuel prices, uncertainty over the war’s objectives and persistent public skepticism presents a growing political challenge for Trump as his administration seeks to sustain support for a conflict that has now entered its sixth month.

(Source: Reuters)

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he 80-year-old global order established after the Second World War is unravelling. The security architecture of the Atlantic system, the economic and political framework of the Bretton Woods institutions, the liberal assumption that free trade would reduce conflicts by increasing interdependence, and global supply chains reliant on cheap energy and low-cost production no longer meet the needs of the new era. The world is transitioning, increasingly and more forcefully, to a new global competitive order that we define as ‘Second Mercantilism’.

In this new order, trade is no longer merely trade. A semiconductor factory, a container port, a data centre, a rare-earth elements mine, an LNG terminal, a satellite network, a submarine cable, a shipyard or an ammunition factory have all simultaneously become elements of economic, technological, geopolitical and military power. States are no longer competing solely for market share; they are vying for control over production capacity, critical technology, energy security, logistics routes, strategic minerals, data flows and supply chains.

Consequently, the old distinction between the global economy and the global security system has vanished. The economy is being securitised, security is being industrialised, technology is becoming geopolitical, and trade is increasingly and explicitly transforming into a tool of the struggle for national power. It is precisely in the midst of this major shift that NATO’s future lies.

In the 20th century, there was an ideological, military and nuclear balance between two major blocs. Today, however, competition is far more fragmented, far more technological and far more economic in nature. Russia represents an immediate and direct military challenge; China, long-term industrial, technological and systemic competition; regional powers, missile systems, unmanned systems and proxy wars; whilst non-state actors represent asymmetric threats.

Cyberspace, space, undersea infrastructure, energy networks, critical minerals, artificial intelligence and supply chains are becoming new arenas of competition. In such a world, it is impossible for NATO to continue on its current path based on the classic military alliance logic of 1949.

5 per cent: much more than just a budget target

The commitment by NATO members to raise their defense and security-related expenditure to 5 per cent of their GDP represents one of the most significant economic and political transformations in the Alliance’s history. However, it would be a grave mistake to interpret this decision merely as ‘spending more money’. For money, on its own, does not create deterrence.

You can increase your budget, but if you cannot produce sufficient ammunition, you cannot fight. You may possess the most advanced platforms, but if your critical components are reliant on a single external supplier, you cannot establish a sustainable defense capability. You can develop excellent air defense systems, but if your stockpile of interceptor missiles is depleted within a few weeks of intense fighting, your strategic resilience remains merely theoretical. You may possess very expensive fighter aircraft, but if their maintenance, engine, electronics, software and ammunition supply chains are fragile, you cannot manage the economics of a protracted war.

The Russia-Ukraine War, the crises in the Red Sea, the conflicts in the Middle East and the revolution brought about by unmanned systems on the battlefield have all demonstrated the same truth to us: the decisive factor in modern warfare is not merely technological superiority; it is the ability to scale up technology, produce ammunition continuously, rapidly replace losses and adapt industrial capacity to the pace of the war.

For this reason, NATO’s 5 per cent target must be a production doctrine, not merely an accounting decision. In this new era, NATO’s fundamental question should not be ‘How much are the Allies spending?’, but rather ‘How much can the Alliance produce, how quickly can it replenish its stocks, how long can it sustain operations, and how rapidly can it ramp up production in the event of war?’ It is precisely at this point that NATO must transition from a traditional alliance to a comprehensive defense economy.

NATO’s new requirement: A total defense economy

The concept of a total defense economy does not mean transforming the entire economy into a military economy. The issue is to restructure the boundaries between defense and the economy in line with the demands of the new era.

NATO can no longer consider military planning and industrial planning in isolation from one another. Defence ministries, economic and industrial ministries, energy policies and critical infrastructure investments cannot operate in separate spheres. This is because, in modern warfare, the distance between the front line and the production line has been eliminated.

For this reason, the Alliance’s new economic model must be built on five fundamental pillars:

Firstly, long-term and predictable joint demand must be established. If defense companies are to be asked to increase their capacity, they must be given a 10–15-year order outlook, not just a three-year one. Factories grow not on the basis of political statements, but on guarantees of sustainable demand.

Secondly, joint procurement mechanisms must be strengthened. The dozens of different standards for the same munitions, disjointed national tenders for the same requirement, duplicate investments amongst allies, and political protectionism that hinders economies of scale must be reduced.

Thirdly, redundancy must be established in critical production chains. In the new NATO economy, no strategic product should be dependent on a single factory, a single country or a single company. Alternative production centers must be established for engines, explosives, guidance systems, semiconductors, optical and radar components, batteries, critical minerals and software infrastructure.

Fourthly, a transition to a joint stockpiling system must be made. Ammunition, fuel, critical spare parts, air defense interceptors and strategic raw materials must be planned not solely on the basis of national stockpiling logic, but in terms of the Alliance’s overall resilience.

Fifthly, production-conversion capacity must be established in the event of war. Plans must be drawn up today to identify which elements of civilian industry – from automotive to electronics, from chemicals to metallurgy, and from software to logistics – can support defense production in the event of a crisis.

The view that this new architecture must evolve towards a ‘NATO Defence Economic Area’ has gained significant traction. This area should encompass common standards, long-term orders, mutual investments, cross-border production clusters, coordination on critical raw materials, the integration of SMEs into the system, joint testing and certification processes, and the reduction of political barriers to defense trade within the Alliance.

This is because, in the era of Second Mercantilism, the defense industry is not merely a sector in which companies operate. It is one of the main pillars of national power, technological sovereignty and alliance resilience.

The alliance cannot afford ‘internal strife’

However, NATO faces more than just Russia, China or other global challenges. One of the most significant issues the Alliance must overcome is strategic fragmentation within its own ranks.

NATO must shake off the image of a ‘row among boatmen’ – a situation where allies sometimes view one another as rivals, where bilateral political disputes hold collective security hostage, where defense industry restrictions are directed at alliance members, and where short-term domestic political calculations take precedence over long-term strategic objectives.

To put it more plainly, NATO cannot prepare for a new Cold War whilst engaged in an internal ‘brawl’. Weakening an ally’s defense capabilities on political grounds undermines the alliance’s overall deterrence. Disrupting an ally’s supply chain reduces the capacity NATO will require in a crisis. Imposing restrictions on parts, engines, ammunition or technology for an ally’s strategic platforms, whilst subsequently expecting that same ally to contribute more to the Alliance’s defense, is unsustainable.

Moreover, as the world moves towards far greater systemic competition, NATO’s squandering of its energy on internal disputes creates strategic space for its real rivals.

The Alliance cannot resolve every political issue between its members. Such an expectation is unrealistic. However, it must not allow bilateral disputes to paralyze its collective defence capabilities. Defence industry cooperation must be spared from becoming the first casualty of short-term political tensions. In this regard, the example of Türkiye is highly instructive.

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ommercial shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait dropped to its lowest level in months after Yemen’s Houthi movement launched attacks on Saudi oil installations along the Red Sea coast, raising fresh concerns over maritime security and global energy supplies.

Shipping data from Kpler showed that only 11 commodity vessels transited the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on Sunday, reflecting a sharp decline in traffic as ship operators reassessed risks following the latest escalation. The disruption comes as the Tehran-aligned Houthis seek to impose a blockade on Saudi exports, broadening the regional fallout from the ongoing U.S.-Iran conflict.

The reduced vessel traffic has already pushed physical crude prices in the Middle East, Europe, and Africa to two-month highs, highlighting growing concerns over the stability of key global shipping routes.

Among the vessels that passed through the strait were seven oil tankers, including two very large crude carriers (VLCCs) bound for Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu port to load crude oil. Another tanker linked to Russia also entered the Red Sea.

Hong Kong-flagged New Explorer

Meanwhile, four tankers exited the Red Sea carrying crude destined for Asian markets. These included the Hong Kong-flagged New Explorer, transporting approximately 2 million barrels of Saudi and Emirati crude to Ningbo, China, another tanker carrying 1 million barrels of Russian crude for China, and a vessel delivering roughly 750,000 barrels of Saudi crude to Pakistan.

A second Hong Kong-flagged VLCC, New Pearl, carrying 2 million barrels of Saudi crude to Zhoushan, China, was also reported leaving the Red Sea, becoming the fourth Chinese supertanker to transit the route since the Houthis declared a naval blockade.

The Houthi military said it targeted facilities operated by Saudi state-owned oil giant Aramco in the Red Sea cities of Yanbu and Jizan on Saturday, further escalating tensions in the region.

Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz also remained subdued over the weekend despite a pause in direct U.S. and Iranian strikes. Fewer than 10 commodity vessels crossed the strategic waterway each day, according to Kpler data.

On Sunday, seven vessels transited Hormuz, including three Iranian-linked product tankers leaving the Gulf. The previous day, only three vessels passed through the strait with their tracking systems switched off, including a VLCC heading to Qatar, a liquefied petroleum gas tanker bound for the United Arab Emirates, and a tanker carrying Qatari naphtha to Japan.

The continued disruption across both the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Strait of Hormuz underscores mounting risks to global shipping and energy markets as regional tensions remain high.

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ne of the greatest aspirations of a journalist with an interest in international relations is to cover events held in various parts of the world where global issues are debated (such as the NATO Summit, the UN General Assembly, the G20, etc.). In a professional climate where conventional media is losing its importance on the international stage day by day, and whilst the financial clout of the media is eroding and investment in certain sectors is being cut back, the likelihood of a journalist attending such summits is also declining day by day.

In the current climate, the hosting of an organization such as NATO in Turkey presented a significant opportunity for our colleagues in Turkey. Although journalists and television professionals, myself included, had only limited opportunities to engage with leaders due to the nature of the event, we did manage to soak up the atmosphere of the summit.

Turkey is the only NATO member state with a Muslim majority. The 2026 summit was set to have a distinct character for this reason alone. However, factors such as the ongoing tension between Iran and the US (which had been reignited just hours before US President Trump landed in Ankara when he ordered a new strike), the continuing disagreement between the US and its European allies, and the deadlock in the Russia-Ukraine war all served to make the summit even more significant.

Details of the Trump–Erdoğan meeting

The meeting that fuelled the intrigue at the NATO Summit was the encounter between President Erdoğan and US President Trump. Once the rumours circulating days beforehand – that ‘Trump would not attend the summit due to his anger towards NATO members’ – were dispelled, our focus shifted to the nature of the bilateral meeting. The last time a US President had made an official visit to Turkey was in 2009.

Following the visit by then US President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–1961) in 1959, the chain of visits continued with George H. W. Bush (1991), Bill Clinton (1999), George W. Bush (2004) and Obama (2009), had been interrupted during Trump’s first term and had not even been on the agenda during Joe Biden’s term (2020–2024). Whilst Trump’s visit marked a turning point in this sense, current issues (the F-35 procurement process, CAATSA, etc.) were also raising the stakes.

Despite the scrutiny that began days in advance, logistical and protocol details were kept strictly confidential right up to the last moment. Contrary to expectations, Trump’s aircraft landed at the newly opened Ankara Airport (and the fact that he returned from Esenboğa on an older model aircraft also raised questions. However, technical reasons related to security were cited as the justification). President Erdoğan welcomed Trump at the airport with a gesture reserved for a select few guests.

Upon arriving at the welcoming ceremony at the Presidential Complex, we noticed a different arrangement in the preparations. The ranks of the mehteran band, which usually performs at routine receptions, had been reinforced, and additional units of Janissary soldiers had been deployed. The two leaders’ delegations were also positioned on a platform that differed from the norm. The leaders’ senior advisers (foreign ministers, defense ministers, ambassadors) held their initial discussions on this platform. The flypast by the Turkish Stars, comprising six F-5s, which was part of the welcoming ceremony, was precise and went off without a hitch.

The most exciting moment of the entire process was the joint press conference. The format we are accustomed to in a standard leaders’ meeting is press conferences held in the main hall following discussions between the leaders and their delegations. On this occasion, however, it was announced that only a limited number of journalists would be allowed into President Erdoğan’s office. We were therefore swiftly directed towards the room.

The organizers informed us that journalists wishing to ask questions would need to be ‘quick off the mark’, as the format of the press conference would be modelled on the ‘Oval Office Rules’. I recalled the format we’d seen on TV screens. In those press conferences, held in a small room with Trump and the visiting leader flanked by their aides, it was the loudest who won and secured the floor. Once the floor was opened for questions, although American journalists took the lead with the first questions, my Turkish colleagues and I also managed to ask our questions by adopting a forceful and boisterous approach to secure the floor.

US President Trump gave the floor to ask my question, which touched on the Iran-US tensions. Throughout the meeting, Trump delivered positive messages, particularly regarding CAATSA restrictions and the F-35s. It is also worth noting that, unlike the bilateral meetings held in the Oval Office – which were characterised by Trump’s impulsive responses – there were no remarks from the Trump-Erdoğan talks in Washington or Ankara that would cause any friction.

The factors driving the relationship between the two leaders beyond the usual bounds to a positive momentum are seen as their ability to strike the right balance in their dialogue, the fact that their communication predates the presidency, and the continued flow of contact following Erdoğan’s message to Trump even after he lost the 2020 election. Another important factor is that Trump has framed the Erdoğan–Biden tension as a positive reference point. The animosity towards Biden, which he mentions in almost every speech, also lends extra credibility to those who have had difficulties with him. Ironically, in Trump’s political analysis, the Evangelical vote—which solidified following the release of Pastor Brunson—has also made a positive contribution to the new course of Turkey–US relations.

What happened at the summit?

Opportunities to engage with leaders at the NATO Summit are very limited. One such opportunity is the ‘doorstep’ – the area where leaders give impromptu interviews on the morning of the summit. Not every leader makes an appearance here. It generally provides an opportunity for leaders of small and medium-sized countries, who are often out of the spotlight, to make their voices heard. Danish Leader Frederiksen, commenting on Trump’s continued interest in Greenland, emphasized their stance by stating, “We will defend every inch of our land; this is why we are in NATO.” UK Prime Minister Starmer, who is due to step down upon his return, was cautious; he did not answer any questions and was not particularly talkative. Although French President Macron’s name was on the list, he was busy completing his now-traditional run at the time.

Even the order of arrival at the venue for the leaders’ summit has become a form of image management. Leaders from countries such as the US and France arrive last. Following the smooth participation of all 32 leaders in the much-anticipated session of the summit, attention turned to what was being discussed inside. The information received pointed to a positive atmosphere. It was noted that US President Trump listened to all the leaders who spoke. It was reported that Trump, who remained until the end of the session, did not address any contentious issues (such as the tensions with Spain, the Greenland issue, or tensions with European countries).

It was stated that Spanish Prime Minister Sánchez, in a constructive speech, emphasized that his country’s contribution to NATO should be measured not by mathematical figures but by the rate of achievement of strategic objectives. The extent to which Sánchez’s speech, which emphasized resolve, managed to cool Trump’s fixation on figures will become clear through future rhetoric and policies. It was noted that the US delegation heard the approach they had sought from all their allies during the leaders’ session.

Following the session, the summit effectively concluded with the leaders’ bilateral meetings and the press conferences they held. The most eagerly anticipated of these meetings was undoubtedly Trump’s. Before the US leader took to the podium following NATO Secretary-General Rutte—who had used the hall before him—there was not a single empty seat in the hall, nor even a suitable place to stand. The hall was completely cleared before the US President took to the stage; journalists were only allowed back in after security checks. Among the dozens of journalists vying for the chance to ask a question, the lucky ones were generally our American colleagues sitting in the front row, who had opted for colorful attire.

Trump’s summit marathon, during which he answered questions in a positive and conciliatory manner, concluded on a positive note despite the harsh messages that occasionally resurfaced in some of his press statements. President Erdoğan also held his final press conference as the host. Having followed all these proceedings, having observed that, unlike their foreign counterparts, Turkish journalists tend to include lengthy comments in their questions and drag out the subject before getting to the point, I feel it is worth emphasizing that there is a clear structural problem in this regard. As Turkish journalists, we do not know how to ask questions properly.

A farewell without the usual ‘See you next year’

The NATO Summit concluded without any major hitches. The international media community was highly satisfied with the facilities provided. The complimentary buffet service exceeded expectations, and the goody bags and kits presented to journalists were shared in vlogs. However, the development that particularly surprised the foreign leaders occurred right at the end. The gift of a revolver (firearm) engraved with their names, presented to them by Turkey, took the majority of the foreign leaders by surprise. Some were unable to take the gift home with them due to legal restrictions in their own countries, whilst others announced they would donate it to a museum.

Nevertheless, the message behind the gift hit home. The fact that the gift at a summit where tough issues were discussed was in keeping with realistic geopolitical conditions served as a powerful metaphor and message. It is also worth noting that the specially produced pen, manufactured using domestic resources, was well received.

As summits of this kind draw to a close, attention turns to the next one, and the scheduled date is marked. This time, however, there is a degree of uncertainty, as the likelihood that the summit will not be held next year has increased. In fact, there is no explicit rule stipulating that the summit must be held annually; a proposal that has recently come to the fore suggests extending the summit cycle to every two years.

It is expected that this process will be clarified by the end of this year; what is certain is that the next stop will be Albania. Although it seems impossible to predict the course regional developments will take by that date, it appears unlikely that the opportunities and agenda offered by Turkey will be presented within the framework of that summit.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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emen’s Iran-aligned Houthi movement announced a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia on Monday, threatening to expand the regional conflict linked to the ongoing U.S.-Iran war and raising concerns over global energy supplies and international shipping.

The Houthis said the “maritime embargo” would take effect immediately, describing it as retaliation against what they called Saudi Arabia’s continued blockade of Yemen. The announcement broadens the conflict beyond the Gulf, bringing the strategically vital Bab el-Mandeb Strait into focus after shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has already been severely disrupted.

The Saudi-led coalition said it would respond “with force” to the Houthi announcement and confirmed that additional security measures had been implemented to protect commercial and military vessels transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a critical route for Saudi oil exports.

The latest development raises the possibility of simultaneous disruptions at both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb, two of the world’s most important maritime energy corridors.

Analysts warn that a prolonged closure of Bab el-Mandeb could significantly reduce Saudi oil exports and further strain global energy markets already affected by the fighting in the Gulf.

Diplomacy continues despite escalation

The Houthi announcement came as diplomatic efforts to restore a ceasefire between Washington and Tehran appeared to continue.

A senior Iranian official told Reuters that mediators had presented Tehran with a proposal for a 10-day ceasefire aimed at preserving the interim agreement reached last month.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry confirmed that mediators had submitted proposals but did not disclose further details.

Separately, Pakistani officials said Iranian Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni had requested Islamabad to resume mediation efforts between the United States and Iran.

Despite renewed diplomatic contacts, military operations continued across the region.

U.S. Central Command launched another wave of strikes against targets in Iran, while President Donald Trump defended the attacks, saying they were carried out in response to recent Iranian attacks that killed American service members.

The Pentagon identified two U.S. soldiers killed in an Iranian strike on a U.S. base in Jordan last week and said unidentified remains believed to belong to a third missing soldier had been recovered. A fourth U.S. service member was killed separately in northern Iraq during the controlled detonation of unexploded ordnance from an Iranian drone.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said it launched missile attacks against U.S. military facilities in Jordan, Kuwait and Syria, while Bahrain reported repeated air raid sirens and Kuwait said its air defense systems intercepted Iranian drones overnight.

Shipping and oil markets under pressure

The Houthis’ announcement briefly pushed oil prices higher before markets stabilized amid hopes that diplomatic negotiations could prevent a broader regional war.

Insurance premiums for vessels operating in the Red Sea increased as shipping companies assessed the heightened security risks.

Meanwhile, the IRGC said two oil tankers had exploded after attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz via what it described as an “unsafe” route, though Reuters was unable to independently verify the claim.

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) also reported that a commercial vessel had been struck by an unidentified projectile off the coast of Oman.

The latest escalation underscores the widening geographic scope of the conflict, with military operations now stretching from Iran and the Gulf to Yemen, Jordan, Syria and Iraq.

While diplomatic initiatives remain underway, continued exchanges of military strikes and expanding maritime threats have raised fears that the conflict could further destabilize regional security and disrupt global energy and trade routes.

(Source: Reuters)

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pain reclaimed the FIFA World Cup title after substitute Ferran Torres scored an extra-time winner to secure a hard-fought 1-0 victory over defending champions Argentina in Sunday’s final, ending one of the tournament’s least spectacular championship matches with a dramatic finish.

Torres struck in the 106th minute, converting Spain’s 20th attempt on goal after more than 100 minutes of deadlock at New York/New Jersey Stadium. His decisive finish delivered Spain’s second World Cup title and completed another milestone for head coach Luis de la Fuente, who became the oldest coach to win the tournament at the age of 65.

The victory capped a remarkable period for Spanish football, with De la Fuente’s side extending its unbeaten run to 38 matches across all competitions after also winning the 2024 UEFA European Championship.

Spain controlled possession for most of the match and consistently pushed Argentina onto the defensive, registering 20 shots, including 12 on target. However, the European champions struggled to convert their dominance into goals as Argentina adopted a cautious approach focused on disrupting Spain’s rhythm.

The South American side rarely threatened in attack, producing only two attempts throughout the match and failing to record a single shot during the 90 minutes of regular time—a first in a World Cup final.

Spain’s breakthrough finally arrived in extra time after substitutes Ferran Torres and Nico Williams injected pace and creativity into an otherwise slow contest.

Messi unable to inspire Argentina

Argentina captain Lionel Messi, appearing in his third World Cup final, was largely contained by Spain’s organized defense and struggled to influence the match.

Teenage Spanish star Lamine Yamal, widely expected to provide attacking inspiration, also found little space against Argentina’s disciplined defensive setup.

Tensions boiled over after the final whistle as frustrated Argentine players became involved in a scuffle with their Spanish counterparts following a physically demanding contest.

De la Fuente praised his players after lifting football’s biggest prize, describing the squad as one that had “won everything.”

“I’m so proud of this generation of footballers who have remained true to our philosophy and continued improving it,” the Spain coach said after the match.

The triumph adds the World Cup to Spain’s recent European Championship success and reinforces the country’s position among international football’s elite.

Argentina coach Lionel Scaloni, whose side was unable to defend the title it won in Qatar in 2022, paid tribute to his players and to captain Messi despite the defeat.

Spain’s victory concluded the expanded 2026 FIFA World Cup, with Torres’ late strike proving enough to separate two of world football’s strongest teams after a tense and tactical final.

(Source: Reuters)

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hen one thinks of the Middle East and Iraq, the first thing that springs to mind is often oil. However, developments in Iraq over recent weeks have once again demonstrated that oil is no longer merely an economic resource, but a strategic factor that determines state capacity, foreign policy and the regional balance of power.

Following the tensions between Iran and the West, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz provided short-term relief in global energy markets. However, for Iraq, this process did not merely signify a return to normal oil sales. The Baghdad administration has also brought back onto the agenda its long-delayed objectives of increasing production and securing a higher quota within OPEC.

Whilst this may appear at first glance to be merely a matter of energy policy, there is a larger story behind the issue. As is well known, oil is both the most vulnerable and the seemingly strongest aspect of the Iraqi economy. Oil revenues bear the main burden of the state budget. Many sectors, ranging from public sector wages to infrastructure investment, and from security expenditure to social payments, are dependent on this revenue. Consequently, every fluctuation in international markets comes to the attention not only of the economic bureaucracy but also of political decision-makers in Baghdad. Even a slight decline in oil revenue can place significant pressure on the state.

The messages conveyed by the Iraqi government in recent weeks are therefore noteworthy. On the one hand, new international investments are being discussed; on the other, it is stated that production capacity can be rapidly increased. The recent interest shown by major energy companies in oil fields suggests that Baghdad wishes to draw up a long-term growth plan. The recent increase in production in the southern oil fields also emerges as a development serving the effort to boost capacity.

Turkey-Iraq talks

However, the main issue in Iraq is not merely about producing oil. The real challenge facing Iraq is determining via which routes, with what political guarantees and within what economic framework it will deliver the oil it produces to the world market. From this perspective, the renewed intensive energy talks between Turkey and Iraq carry particular significance. The topics on the agenda between Ankara and Baghdad point to a broader framework than merely the technical operation and capacity expansion of the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline: oil, natural gas, electricity, energy supply security and the energy dimension of the Development Corridor.

The Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline, which has passed through Turkey for years, has become one of the most critical elements of this equation. The recent talks between Ankara and Baghdad, which have focused on energy cooperation, do not merely signify the renewal of a technical agreement. It appears that the two countries are seeking ways to establish a new energy architecture that will adapt to the changing regional geopolitical landscape. The duration of the agreement, the pipeline’s capacity, the transport of oil to the Mediterranean, and Iraq’s need to diversify its export routes are all being discussed at the same table.

The situation is equally significant not only from Iraq’s perspective but also from Turkey’s. Turkey has long aimed to be a country that manages energy corridors. One of the fundamental and most important pillars of this strategy is the secure delivery of Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean. For this reason, stable energy relations with Baghdad will also serve as a key tool in building political trust. An energy corridor stretching from southern Iraq to the north, and from there to Turkey and the Mediterranean, will form part of a broader picture encompassing regional trade, transport and security.

Iraq, meanwhile, has learnt the hard way in recent years the risks of relying on a single export route or a single regional balance of power. Crises in the Strait of Hormuz, the prospect of regional war and the occasional disruption of export routes in the north are prompting Baghdad to develop alternative routes. Iraq must now define its energy security not only in terms of production capacity but also through the diversity of its export routes. Consequently, the future of the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline has become a key indicator of Iraq’s capacity for economic sovereignty.

Anti-corruption operations

Amidst all this, another notable development has been the anti-corruption operations being carried out domestically. The operations in Baghdad, which have targeted high-ranking figures, send a significant message regarding the corruption networks that have long been the subject of discussion within state institutions. Of course, it cannot be expected that a few operations will eliminate decades-old institutional problems. However, the rule of law and transparency in public administration will be just as decisive as oil in shaping international investors’ view of Iraq.

Similarly, the US’s resumption of dollar transfers to Iraq should not be interpreted merely as a technical financial decision. This step demonstrates that economic ties between Washington and Baghdad have not been completely severed, but that issues of security, militias and financial oversight remain on the table. It has once again become clear that economic and security issues cannot be addressed in isolation from one another.

Viewed in the light of these developments, Iraq today stands at what is perhaps one of the most critical economic thresholds of the post-2003 era. Whilst the country is striving to attract major energy investments on the one hand, on the other it is seeking to strengthen public administration, strike a balance in its foreign relations and keep as far away as possible from regional crises. If successful, it could not only become a country that increases its oil production but also emerge as a new regional actor at the centre of energy, trade and transport corridors.

However, it is clear that oil revenues alone will not be sufficient for this to happen. Institutional reforms, legal predictability, investment security and sustainable relations with neighbours are just as important as new oil fields. The fundamental challenge facing Iraq is not actually extracting oil, but utilising oil revenues for the benefit of the state. To the extent that Baghdad succeeds in this, it may cease to be a conflict zone where regional crises persist.

From Turkey’s perspective, too, it would be insufficient to view developments solely through the prism of the oil trade. Iraq’s transformation into a stable, economically strengthening country open to regional integration will serve Ankara’s interests across many areas, from security to trade, and from logistics to energy. Consequently, in the coming months, we will be monitoring not only whether Iraq can produce more oil, but also whether it can channel this oil into political stability and economic development.

(Originally published by Middle East Africa website in Turkish)

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urkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan warned on Thursday against the expansion of the Russia-Ukraine war into the Black Sea, saying attacks on civilian maritime infrastructure threaten regional stability and should not be tolerated.

Speaking alongside Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha after talks in Kyiv, Fidan said Türkiye remains committed to preventing the conflict from spreading into the strategically important waterway.

“We do not want the war to spread to the Black Sea,” Fidan said, stressing that peace and security in the region must be preserved.

He condemned attacks targeting civilian maritime assets, saying ports, oil tankers and fishing vessels should not become military targets.

“Targeting ports, tankers and fishing boats and putting civilians’ lives at risk is not something that can be justified,” Fidan said, urging all parties to act with restraint and responsibility.

Fidan said Türkiye continues to explore new strategic approaches with the warring parties and international mediators to break the deadlock in the conflict.

Call for negotiations

He reaffirmed Ankara’s support for continuing negotiations under the Istanbul format, arguing that direct talks between Russian and Ukrainian officials had produced valuable transparency and dialogue.

“I believe it would be very beneficial for the Türkiye negotiations, particularly the Istanbul talks, to continue,” Fidan said, adding that ongoing hostilities should not prevent diplomatic engagement.

The Turkish foreign minister noted that while U.S. negotiators later became involved in efforts to achieve a broader settlement, the conflict continues with an increasing risk of escalation.

Addressing potential post-war security arrangements, Fidan said security guarantees for Ukraine would likely include land, air and naval components.

He revealed that Türkiye has agreed to lead the maritime component of those guarantees in coordination with allied countries.

“Türkiye has accepted to lead the maritime component, and we have a common understanding with our allies on this issue,” he said, adding that planning work is already being carried out by the naval forces of participating allied nations.

Ukraine is ready for a ceasefire

For his part, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha reiterated Kyiv’s readiness for a ceasefire and voiced support for Türkiye as the venue for future high-level peace negotiations.

“We believe that negotiations, especially a possible meeting between President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and President Vladimir Putin, could take place in Türkiye,” Sybiha said.

He added that only a summit between the two leaders could inject new momentum into the peace process.

“As Ukraine, we are ready for a ceasefire,” Sybiha said.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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he United States has reimposed a naval blockade on Iranian ports and launched another wave of military strikes targeting Iran’s southern coast, intensifying hostilities and further eroding an interim peace agreement reached last month.

The U.S. military said the renewed blockade of vessels traveling to and from Iranian ports and coastal areas took effect at 20:00 GMT on Tuesday, as Washington sought to restrict maritime activity linked to Tehran amid escalating tensions in the Strait of Hormuz.

The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) also confirmed a fresh round of strikes targeting Iranian military infrastructure, saying the attacks were intended to degrade capabilities used to threaten commercial shipping in the strategic waterway.

Iranian media reported explosions in or near the southern cities of Sirik and Bandar Abbas following the announcement, while earlier reports said U.S. strikes had also targeted Abadan, home to the Middle East’s oldest oil refinery, as well as Mahshahr, Qeshm Island and Kish Island.

The latest operations follow a series of U.S. strikes launched a day earlier against targets including Bushehr and Bandar Abbas, marking another escalation in a conflict that resumed despite a memorandum of understanding signed in June aimed at halting hostilities.

Iran retaliates across the Gulf

Iran responded by launching attacks against U.S.-linked targets across the Gulf region, including strikes on Kuwait, Bahrain and Jordan, while also targeting two commercial vessels in Omani waters within the Strait of Hormuz, according to regional officials.

The United Arab Emirates said one crew member was killed in the attacks on the ships.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) acknowledged striking the two supertankers, saying they had ignored repeated warnings while navigating what it described as an unauthorized route through the strait.

The IRGC accused the United States of encouraging vessels to violate Iranian directives and warned that continued cooperation with what it called the “aggressor enemy” would prolong disruption to shipping and increase the risk of a global energy crisis.

Bahrain said its air defenses intercepted an Iranian aerial attack, while Kuwait’s armed forces reported engaging hostile aerial targets. Jordan also said Iranian projectiles targeted military facilities on its territory.

International concern grows

Regional mediators Qatar and Oman urged restraint as the fighting intensified.

Qatar condemned attacks on commercial shipping, while Oman called on all parties to respect international law governing navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

The International Maritime Agency expressed concern over the latest incidents, saying two seafarers had been killed and warning that the continuing cycle of military escalation threatened global maritime security.

Speaking at the White House, President Donald Trump blamed Iran for reigniting the conflict.

“They shot first, and that was a big mistake because we have been knocking the hell out of them,” Trump said, defending the renewed military campaign.

Trump also announced he was abandoning a previously proposed 20% fee on vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz, saying it would instead be replaced by expanded trade and investment agreements with Gulf allies.

“I have decided to replace the 20% United States Reimbursement Fee with trade and investment deals that the various Gulf states will be making into the United States,” he said.

Tehran says agreement no longer binding

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi accused Washington of violating the interim agreement and destroying the framework established to reduce tensions.

According to Iranian state media, Gharibabadi said Tehran no longer considers itself bound by the memorandum of understanding, including provisions related to navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

He rejected suggestions that renewed military pressure would force Iran back to negotiations, arguing that Washington had forfeited the diplomatic framework through its actions.

Analysts warned that the latest exchanges indicate the conflict is evolving into a prolonged confrontation rather than returning to full-scale war, raising concerns over regional stability and the security of one of the world’s most important energy transit routes.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

U

kraine and nine European countries have announced the creation of a joint anti-ballistic missile coalition aimed at strengthening the continent’s defenses against emerging missile threats through closer military, technological and industrial cooperation.

The initiative, unveiled by the leaders of Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine and the United Kingdom, seeks to develop an integrated European missile defense architecture designed to improve protection against ballistic missile attacks.

In a joint declaration issued on Sunday, the participating countries described the coalition as a “purely defensive” initiative intended to bolster Europe’s collective security amid evolving regional threats.

“We believe that the protection of Europe requires a global solution of integrated missile defense architecture to deter and defeat future missile threats,” the leaders said.

The coalition’s centerpiece will be a flagship project to develop a shared anti-ballistic missile capability. Member states will coordinate on common operational requirements, technical standards and defense industrial cooperation while establishing a roadmap for deploying the coalition’s first operational systems.

Complement, rather than replace

Officials said the new initiative is intended to complement, rather than replace, existing national and multinational missile defense programs already operated or planned by participating countries.

“By bringing together our defense industrial base, our research, and our operational experience, we aim to build a shared anti-ballistic missile capacity for Europe,” the declaration stated.

The coalition also emphasized Ukraine’s battlefield experience gained during its defense against Russia’s invasion, describing Kyiv’s operational knowledge as a valuable contribution to the project.

“We acknowledge the unique experience of Ukraine, gained in defense against Russia’s war of aggression,” the statement said.

Beyond missile interception capabilities, participating countries agreed to explore joint research and development projects, expanded funding mechanisms, enhanced defense industrial collaboration and improved sharing of defense-related information and operational data.

The founding members said the coalition would remain open to additional countries that share its objectives and are willing to contribute to the development of a common European missile defense capability.

The announcement comes as European governments continue to increase defense spending and deepen military cooperation in response to heightened security challenges across the continent, with missile defense emerging as a key priority for NATO members and partner countries.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

C

hina has successfully recovered the first-stage booster of an orbital launch vehicle for the first time, marking a significant advance in its efforts to develop reusable rocket technology and narrow the gap with the United States in commercial and strategic space capabilities.

The breakthrough came during the launch of the Long March-10B rocket from the Wenchang Spacecraft Launch Site on Hainan Island on Friday. According to Chinese state broadcaster CCTV, the rocket’s first-stage booster separated approximately six minutes after liftoff before returning to a floating platform, where it executed a controlled vertical landing.

Video released by state media showed the booster descending under powered flight and touching down on the offshore platform, with smoke visible near its upper section during the landing.

The mission also successfully placed a satellite into orbit, state media reported.

Historic breakthrough

China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), the state-owned company that developed the rocket, described the achievement as a “historic breakthrough” for the country’s reusable launch technology.

“This mission signifies a historic breakthrough in China’s reusable rocket technology and lays a solid foundation for accelerating improvements in China’s space access capabilities,” the company said in a statement.

The successful recovery represents a key step in Beijing’s broader ambition to become a leading space power while reducing the cost and turnaround time of future launches.

Reusable rockets have transformed the commercial launch industry by allowing expensive boosters to be recovered and flown multiple times, significantly lowering launch costs. The technology has become a cornerstone of U.S.-based SpaceX’s dominance of the global launch market after the company pioneered routine booster landings nearly a decade ago.

Blue Origin, another American space company, also achieved its first successful recovery of the New Glenn rocket’s first-stage booster last November.

Reusable rocket tests

China has intensified efforts to develop comparable capabilities through both its state-backed aerospace program and an expanding commercial space sector. Several Chinese companies have conducted reusable rocket tests in recent months, although earlier attempts experienced setbacks.

The Long March-10 series is expected to play a central role in China’s long-term space ambitions, including planned crewed missions to the Moon. Chinese authorities have identified reusable launch systems as a strategic priority for strengthening the country’s access to space and supporting future satellite, exploration and defense-related missions.

(Source: CNN)

C

anadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has described Saudi Arabia and Türkiye as the two most influential countries in shaping potential solutions to the Middle East’s ongoing crises, emphasizing the importance of direct engagement with regional powers over public criticism.

Speaking to reporters during an official visit to Jeddah on Friday, Carney said that meaningful progress on regional conflicts would depend largely on the role played by Riyadh and Ankara.

“The two most influential countries regarding potential solutions in the Middle East are Saudi Arabia and Türkiye,” Carney said.

Carney stressed that Canada remains deeply committed to developments in the Middle East but argued that constructive dialogue is more effective than criticizing governments from afar.

He said engaging directly with regional leaders does not imply endorsement of all their policies.

“Lecturing countries from a distance is an ineffective strategy,” Carney said. “It may be satisfying, but it is ineffective. Engagement can be effective. That does not mean it will always be decisive, but it can produce results.”

Talks with Erdoğan

Addressing Canada’s relations with Türkiye, Carney said he discussed unresolved bilateral issues during his recent meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Ankara.

He noted that the direct dialogue had yielded positive outcomes that would not have been possible through diplomacy conducted from Ottawa.

Diversifying Canada’s partnerships

The Canadian prime minister also highlighted his government’s efforts to reduce Canada’s heavy reliance on the United States by expanding international partnerships.

“We are overly dependent on the United States. That has been demonstrated,” Carney said. “Every Canadian strongly recognizes this, and we are seeking diversification.”

His remarks reflect Ottawa’s broader strategy of strengthening diplomatic and economic ties with a wider range of global partners as Canada seeks a more diversified foreign policy and trade agenda.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

T

he United States and Iran exchanged their heaviest military strikes since last month’s ceasefire on Wednesday, raising fears that the fragile truce between the two longtime adversaries has effectively collapsed as President Donald Trump declared the interim agreement with Tehran was “over.”

The renewed escalation unfolded as NATO leaders gathered in Ankara, where Trump confirmed that Washington had resumed military operations against Iran following what U.S. officials described as Iranian attacks on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.

According to the United States, the latest strikes were launched in response to Iranian attacks on three commercial vessels transiting the strategic waterway, one of the world’s most important oil shipping routes.

Iran responded by announcing missile and drone strikes against U.S. military facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait, marking one of the most significant direct confrontations between the two countries since fighting resumed.

The exchange represents the most serious breach of the preliminary ceasefire reached last month following weeks of conflict and negotiations mediated by regional partners.

“I think it’s over”

Speaking alongside NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on the sidelines of the alliance summit, Trump signaled that Washington no longer viewed the interim memorandum of understanding with Tehran as viable.

“I think it’s over,” Trump told reporters when asked about the agreement that had temporarily halted fighting.

The U.S. president also dismissed prospects for renewed engagement with Iran, saying he no longer wished to negotiate with Iranian leaders, whom he described as “sick people.”

His remarks suggested the diplomatic process that had accompanied the ceasefire has effectively broken down, even as military exchanges continue to intensify.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry accused Washington of undermining the agreement through both military action and economic pressure.

In a statement released Wednesday, Tehran said recent U.S. airstrikes, together with Washington’s decision to revoke Iran’s oil sales license, had rendered key parts of the ceasefire arrangement “ineffective.”

Iran also accused the United States of interfering with maritime arrangements governing passage through the Strait of Hormuz, arguing that such actions had made implementation of the truce increasingly impossible.

The ministry warned neighboring countries hosting U.S. military forces not to allow their territories to be used for further American attacks against Iran, an apparent reference to Gulf states including Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

The warning followed Iran’s announcement that it had launched missiles and drones against U.S. military targets in Bahrain and Kuwait earlier in the day.

Iran’s Revolutionary Guards also reported that one member of its naval forces had been killed while confronting U.S. drones near the southern port of Mashahr.

The latest military exchanges have raised concerns that the conflict could once again spread across the wider Gulf region, threatening global energy supplies and commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, which carries roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil exports.

Regional tensions grow as aviation warning expanded

The renewed fighting has already prompted international aviation authorities to strengthen safety warnings across the Middle East.

The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) announced that commercial airlines should avoid operating within both Iranian and Iraqi airspace because of the heightened risk of military activity.

The updated advisory remains in effect until August 31 and replaces an earlier warning that had also covered Lebanese airspace.

EASA continues to advise airlines to exercise caution when operating near Bahrain, Kuwait, Israel, Jordan, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates because of the potential for further military escalation.

The deteriorating security situation overshadowed discussions at the NATO summit in Ankara, where alliance leaders were expected to focus on defense spending, regional security and support for Ukraine.

Instead, much of the attention shifted to Trump’s remarks on Iran and his broader comments on NATO allies.

Criticism against Spain

The U.S. president also launched a sharp attack on Spain, accusing Madrid of failing to meet its defense commitments within NATO.

Trump said he had instructed Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent to halt all trade with Spain, calling the country “a terrible partner” in the alliance.

“I don’t want anything to do with Spain,” Trump told reporters.

He also criticized NATO over Greenland, renewing longstanding complaints about the Arctic territory and alliance burden-sharing.

The renewed conflict between Washington and Tehran comes after weeks of fragile diplomacy aimed at preventing another prolonged regional war.

Although the interim agreement had reduced direct military confrontation, tensions remained high over Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions, maritime security and regional influence.

With both sides exchanging military attacks and publicly questioning the viability of previous agreements, regional governments are increasingly concerned that the Gulf could once again become the center of a wider confrontation involving U.S. forces and Iranian-backed groups.

The latest developments also place additional pressure on NATO leaders meeting in Ankara, many of whom have emphasized the importance of preventing further instability in the Middle East while maintaining freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

As military operations continue and diplomatic rhetoric hardens, the future of any negotiated settlement between Washington and Tehran appears increasingly uncertain.

(Source: Reuters)

I

n the current climate, where the global energy architecture is undergoing structural upheavals and supply chains are being reconfigured, Turkey is rising far beyond the role of a mere ‘transit country’ or ‘bridge’ to become a ‘hub’ that shapes the rules of Eurasian energy geopolitics. The energy partnerships established with Azerbaijan form the most solid foundation and strategic complement to this vision, which Ankara has built with a long-term strategic vision. The infrastructure initiatives, whose foundations were laid with the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and which have reached an intercontinental dimension through the Southern Gas Corridor, confirm that Turkey is the sole strategic gateway opening up the Caspian Basin’s resources to global markets. This equation, in which Turkey plays a central role, not only constitutes one of the greatest supporters of regional stability but also acts as an asymmetric power element that counterbalances external interventions.

Turkey’s geopolitical leverage in Europe’s energy security

The radical disruptions in Europe’s energy supply chains, triggered by the Russia-Ukraine War, have elevated Turkey’s indispensable role in global energy security to an existential level. In this crisis environment, the security of Europe’s energy supply has become directly dependent on Turkey’s diplomatic and infrastructural capabilities. The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), which forms the backbone of the Southern Gas Corridor, and its European extension, the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), position Turkey as the system’s primary controller and distributor in the delivery of Caspian gas to the West. The planned phased increase in TANAP’s capacity to over 30 billion cubic metres and the integration of new fields in the Caspian Sea into the system mean that Europe’s energy strategy will run directly through Ankara. Through these projects, Turkey is not only contributing to the energy security of the European continent but is also gaining a very powerful geopolitical lever.

The Hormuz crisis and Ankara-centered stability for neighboring countries

Turkey’s pipeline diplomacy, which has demonstrated the country’s capabilities and maturity in energy geopolitics, is also the only rational way out for regions such as the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, where border disputes and political deadlocks are rife. In particular, the crises that have erupted recently around the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea clearly demonstrate the structural fragility caused by excessive reliance on maritime chokepoints in global energy trade. These routes, through which approximately one-fifth of global oil supplies and a significant portion of liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade pass, are extremely vulnerable to asymmetric attacks by non-state actors and the risks of regional conflict.

This situation, which constantly generates a geopolitical risk premium in global markets, makes secure land-based alternatives for the transport of Middle Eastern hydrocarbons to the West an existential necessity. It is precisely at this point that the seamless pipeline infrastructure established by Turkey with Azerbaijan offers a tried-and-tested, ready-made integration model for Gulf resources as well. In response to the high-cost and high-risk nature of maritime routes, Turkey is building a reliable land-based bridgehead connecting the Gulf directly to Europe through projects such as the Development Corridor, which runs via Iraq. Ankara’s vision could enable Middle Eastern resources to be channelled to global markets via Turkey’s secure transmission network, bypassing fragile chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz.

A similar situation applies to the Eastern Mediterranean. It has become clear that all alternative routes—such as EastMed, which have sought to bypass and exclude Turkey from the commercialization and delivery of the region’s hydrocarbon resources to Western markets—have failed from technical, political and financial perspectives. The flexibility of Turkey’s onshore infrastructure is positioning Ankara as one of the key decision-makers and a distribution hub for the integration of resources from the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean into global markets, following on from Caspian resources.

Turkey as a ‘green energy hub’ beyond fossil fuels

In the wake of wars and supply crises, Turkey has emerged as the most reliable hub to which global players are turning in their search for dependable suppliers. However, the future of this geopolitical capacity built by Ankara is not limited to conventional hydrocarbon resources or existing natural gas pipelines. In this new order, where the energy transition is gathering momentum, Turkey is also systematically implementing its strategy to transform itself into a regional clean energy hub in line with carbon-neutral targets.

The renewable energy potential of the Caspian region – comprising not only the Caspian Sea’s 157 gigawatt technical wind energy potential but also the ‘green energy’ capacity of the Karabakh and Eastern Zangezur regions – can only be integrated into global markets via Turkey’s national grid and transmission infrastructure. Plans to transport the renewable energy to be generated – in the form of electricity and green hydrogen – to Europe via the Nakhchivan corridor and Turkey could completely change the rules of the game. Adapting existing natural gas infrastructure—particularly TANAP—to facilitate hydrogen transport in the future will transform Turkey from a traditional natural gas trading hub into one of the key players shaping the clean energy markets of the future.

The shift from physical transportation to setting commercial rules

All these physical infrastructure and green transition projects lay the groundwork for Turkey’s strategy to evolve beyond its ultimate vision in energy geopolitics—that of being a ‘bridge country’—and become a price-setting hub. Ankara is crowning the physical network it has established through pipelines and electricity grids with the aim of creating an international trading centre where energy prices are set. In this regard, the natural gas trading centre being established in Thrace and initiatives to deepen national energy markets are transforming Turkey from merely a transit route for energy flows into a financial magnet where regional market conditions are shaped. The fact that critical suppliers such as Azerbaijan are adding volume and depth to this trading hub not only strengthens Ankara’s hand in global markets but also compels neighbouring countries to integrate into the market architecture established by Turkey in energy trade.

Within the context of Turkey’s national energy strategy, the relations it has developed with Azerbaijan go beyond a conventional trade agreement to constitute the construction of a geo-economic integration centred on Ankara. Turkey, which has served as a shield against Europe’s crises and assumed a rule-setting role in the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean under the traditional concept of energy security, is also striving to utilise its vast infrastructure advantage in integrating with the renewable energy revolution. As the energy architecture of the future is redesigned in line with the goals of a ‘carbon-neutral economy’, Turkey, with its autonomy, strategic vision and strong alliances, will continue to be one of the indispensable centres of gravity in the global energy order for decades to come.

(Originally published in Turkish by SETA Foundation)

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ürkiye has called on NATO allies to convert rising defense spending into concrete military capabilities, warning that higher budgets alone will not guarantee deterrence as the alliance confronts an increasingly complex security environment.

Speaking at the NATO Allies in Ankara event on Tuesday, National Defense Minister Yasar Guler said NATO’s credibility would ultimately depend on whether member states could translate political commitments into operational military strength, resilient defense industries and integrated security capabilities.

The event, organized in cooperation with Türkiye’s Communications Directorate, the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) and the Munich Security Conference, comes ahead of the NATO leaders’ summit in Ankara, where alliance members are expected to discuss defense investment, industrial cooperation and regional security challenges.

“Increasing defense spending is important, yet spending money alone does not produce deterrence,” Guler said.

He stressed that NATO must focus on building ready military forces, expanding ammunition stockpiles, strengthening logistics, improving integrated air and missile defense systems, enhancing command-and-control structures and increasing defense industrial production.

According to Guler, the alliance has entered a new strategic phase requiring both credible collective defense and the ability to respond rapidly to crises across multiple regions.

He said NATO’s role has evolved significantly since World War II, moving from collective defense during the Cold War toward crisis management and counterterrorism operations after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Today’s security environment, however, requires the alliance to maintain strong conventional deterrence while remaining prepared for emerging threats.

A stronger and more balanced NATO

The minister reiterated Türkiye’s support for a stronger and more balanced NATO in which European allies assume greater responsibility for their own defense while maintaining the transatlantic partnership and the United States’ security commitment as the foundation of the alliance.

However, he argued that burden-sharing should not be measured solely by defense budgets.

Instead, contributions should also reflect operational risks, geographical responsibilities, military readiness, participation in alliance missions, industrial production capacity and the ability to respond effectively during crises.

Guler highlighted Türkiye’s longstanding role within NATO, saying Ankara maintained one of the alliance’s largest and most capable armed forces while many European countries significantly reduced troop numbers, military stockpiles and defense manufacturing after the Cold War.

“Türkiye has never been merely a geographical frontline country,” he said.

“It has consistently assumed risks, carried responsibility in the field and contributed to deterrence when necessary.”

Türkiye, which joined NATO in 1952, currently fields the alliance’s second-largest army and possesses highly trained forces with extensive operational experience, joint operational capability and high readiness levels, he added.

The minister noted that Turkish forces continue contributing to NATO missions, exercises and deterrence operations across a wide geographic area stretching from the Baltic region to the Black Sea while also participating in maritime security, crisis management and military training activities.

Defense industry and regional security priorities

Guler also emphasized Türkiye’s expanding defense industry, describing it as an increasingly important contributor to NATO’s overall military capabilities.

He said the country has developed advanced technologies across multiple sectors, including unmanned systems, air defense, electronic warfare, precision-guided ammunition, naval platforms, aviation and command-and-control systems.

Over the next three years, Ankara plans to prioritize investments in air and ballistic missile defense, long-range strike capabilities and unmanned military systems to meet both national defense requirements and NATO capability targets.

These capabilities, he argued, should be viewed not only as national assets but also as resources capable of helping reduce NATO’s wider capability and production gaps if fully integrated into alliance planning.

Guler called for greater defense industrial cooperation among allies, arguing that joint production and technology sharing would strengthen NATO more effectively than restrictive policies.

“Türkiye favors cooperation over rivalry, joint production over exclusion and capability-based cooperation over restrictions in the defense industry,” he said.

Addressing European security, Guler welcomed initiatives aimed at strengthening Europe’s defense capacity but stressed that such efforts must reinforce rather than duplicate NATO’s existing structures.

“NATO-EU cooperation must be inclusive, integrating and mutually reinforcing,” he said.

Reinforcing unity

Looking ahead to the NATO summit in Ankara, Guler described the gathering as a critical opportunity for allies to reinforce unity and address key issues including defense investment, industrial production, support for Ukraine and the alliance’s future deterrence posture.

He said the summit should send a clear message that NATO’s collective defense commitment under Article 5 remains unwavering but must be supported by credible military power.

The minister also emphasized the importance of maintaining NATO’s 360-degree approach to security, arguing that the alliance must remain equally attentive to threats along both its eastern and southern flanks as well as challenges beyond the Euro-Atlantic region.

He identified the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf, Syria, Iraq, the Eastern Mediterranean, North Africa, the Sahel, the Black Sea and the Caucasus as interconnected parts of the same strategic environment requiring coordinated allied attention.

Guler said modern security extends beyond conventional military assets such as tanks, aircraft and warships, encompassing secure digital infrastructure, resilient supply chains, protected critical infrastructure, societal resilience and the ability to respond faster than potential adversaries.

He concluded by reaffirming Türkiye’s commitment to NATO, saying Ankara would continue contributing to the alliance’s deterrence and defense posture while supporting its adaptation to evolving global security challenges.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

F

ollowing approximately 100 days of tension, Iran and the US announced on Sunday 14 June that they had reached an agreement on a memorandum of understanding. On 17 June, the text of the 14-point memorandum of understanding was signed by US President Donald Trump and Iranian President Mesud Pezeşkiyan. Thus, an agreement has been reached that will launch a 60-day negotiation process between the two countries. The final outcome will be determined by the agreement reached at the conclusion of these 60 days of negotiations. From this perspective, it is fair to say that the current memorandum of understanding serves as a sort of ‘goodwill document’ to initiate the negotiation process between the two countries. This document also serves as a guide regarding the issues to be addressed during the negotiation process. In this context, it is worth examining in detail the matters covered by the Memorandum of Understanding.

Matters covered by the memorandum of understanding

The provisions set out in the 14-article Memorandum of Understanding are broadly divided into two categories. Some of these are provisions that come into force upon the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, whilst others are provisions expected to come into force subject to the outcome of the 60-day negotiations.

Accordingly, Articles 1, 4, 5, 10 and 11 of the Memorandum of Understanding cover the matters that come into force upon its signing. Article 1 stipulates that the US, Iran and their allies must immediately and permanently cease hostilities on all fronts where tensions persist, particularly in Lebanon. This article also emphasises that the parties shall henceforth refrain from initiating war or military operations against one another, shall not issue threats, and that Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity shall be guaranteed. Consequently, the implementation of this article extends not only to the US and Iran but also to Israel and Hezbollah. Indeed, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Arakchi stated in a statement that one party to the agreement consists of the US and Israel, whilst the other comprises Iran and Hezbollah. From this perspective, any potential conflict between Hezbollah and Israel is of critical importance. Given Israel’s statements that it will not withdraw from the territories it occupies in Lebanon, it is clear that this provision is also one of the factors rendering the agreement fragile.

Another important issue—the keeping of the Strait of Hormuz open and the regulation of transit—is addressed in Articles 4 and 5 of the Memorandum of Understanding. Accordingly, the US will lift its naval blockade against Iran within 30 days, commencing immediately after the signing of the agreement. In return, Iran will ensure that traffic through the Strait of Hormuz returns to pre-war levels within 30 days. It has been stated that Iran will not charge fees to ships transiting through the Strait of Hormuz for a period of 60 days. Once the 60-day period has ended, it is envisaged that Iran will reach an agreement with Gulf states, primarily Oman, regarding transit arrangements. It has also been stated that the US will withdraw its troops from the vicinity of Iran. According to statements by US officials, this does not imply that the US will withdraw from its bases in the region; rather, it refers to the restoration of the US military presence to its pre-war status.

Iran’s frozen assets

Another issue expected to be implemented following the signing of the memorandum of understanding concerns Iran’s frozen assets and restrictions on its oil sales. Under Articles 10 and 11 of the Memorandum of Understanding, the US Department of the Treasury will issue the necessary authorizations regarding Iran’s oil sales and related insurance, transport and banking transactions, which will remain in force until sanctions are lifted. In addition, Iran’s frozen assets will be released. The details regarding the implementation of these articles will be determined during the negotiation process.

In addition to the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding that come into force upon signature, there are also provisions that will come into force with the final agreement, which is expected to be signed following 60 days of negotiations. These provisions cover more fundamental issues than those that come into force upon the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding and require detailed technical information.

The sanctions imposed on Iran in connection with its nuclear program also constitute one of the provisions contained in the Memorandum of Understanding. The sanctions are addressed in Articles 6 and 7 of the Memorandum of Understanding. Accordingly, all sanctions imposed on Iran – primarily those enacted through United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and those unilaterally imposed by the US – will be lifted. In addition, the US will plan an investment program worth at least 300 billion dollars, with the assistance of its regional allies, to support Iran’s economic development. The program will operate entirely under US supervision. It is stated that this program has been established by the US as an alternative to Iran’s claim for war reparations. [OO1] The implementation of the program is contingent upon a final agreement following the negotiations. The issue of sanctions, meanwhile, constitutes one of the first matters to be addressed upon the commencement of negotiations.

An examination of the articles of the Memorandum of Understanding reveals that, alongside operational provisions, there are also articles containing general provisions. For example, Article 2 of the Memorandum emphasizes that Iran and the US shall respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and shall not interfere in each other’s internal affairs.

Finally, Articles 12, 13 and 14 regulate the operation of the Memorandum of Understanding. According to these articles, a mechanism will be established to monitor the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding. Once the provisions set out in Articles 1, 4, 5, 10 and 11 of the Memorandum of Understanding have entered into force, the two parties will commence 60 days of negotiations. The final agreement reached following the 60-day negotiations will also be confirmed by a UN Security Council resolution.

Risks and opportunities

One of the most significant aspects envisaged by the Memorandum of Understanding concerns Lebanon. Accordingly, it provides for an immediate cessation of hostilities in Lebanon and guarantees of Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, Israel has stated that it will not withdraw from the territories it occupies in Lebanon; not content with this, it has also launched attacks on Lebanese territory following the announcement that an agreement had been reached between Iran and the US. Similarly, the memorandum of understanding signed between Iran and the US has drawn predominantly negative reactions from within Israeli domestic politics.

Channel 14, based in Israel and a staunch supporter of Netanyahu, has levelled harsh criticism at Trump over the signed memorandum of understanding. This situation has prompted a reaction from US Vice-President JD Vance. Consequently, it is evident that the memorandum of understanding is highly fragile, given that Israel – one of its indirect parties – has adopted such an adversarial stance. However, as can be inferred from the reactions of Trump and his deputy Vance, the US administration appears determined to secure a final agreement. Yet, only time will tell whether this US determination will be sufficient to rein in Israel.

Another risk factor is the potential for new regulations governing transit through the Strait of Hormuz. According to the provision in the memorandum of understanding, Iran will temporarily allow transit through the Strait of Hormuz without charging any fees. However, once the 60-day period has expired, a new arrangement will be put in place in consultation with other Gulf states, primarily Oman. Indeed, Iran has previously held discussions with Oman on this matter. Iran maintains that transit through the Strait of Hormuz should be under the control of both Oman and Iran. In this regard, it proposes that a specific fee be charged in return for the service provided. Furthermore, Iran has raised the issue of distinguishing between military and civilian transit. Iran’s refusal to back down from these demands, coupled with the other side’s refusal to accept them, poses a risk to the negotiation process.

Although the signed memorandum of understanding contains elements of risk, it represents the highest-level interaction between the two countries since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. For the first time since then, the presidents of the two countries have signed a document aimed at securing peace. This not only signals the beginning of a new era but also demonstrates that 47 years of hostility have borne no fruit. The most concrete example of this is the tensions and conflicts that have arisen between the two sides over the past year. For this reason, the memorandum of understanding signed is more likely to evolve into a lasting agreement than previous ones.

Unlike other negotiations, the current talks are taking place against a backdrop where other options – primarily war – have already been tried alongside diplomacy. Given that war, as the most radical option, has proved fruitless, it is clear that the two sides have no alternative to diplomacy. Consequently, it is highly likely that the new process that has been initiated will result in peace. However, given that the negotiations leading to the KOEP lasted 18 months, it is clear that a 60-day period is not sufficient for a comprehensive agreement. It is therefore reasonable to assume that this period will be extended and that a longer-term process is on the cards.

(Originally published in Turkish by SETA Foundation)

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he United States has declined to extend the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) in its current form, triggering a 10-year countdown toward the trade pact’s expiration while opening negotiations aimed at reshaping North America’s trading relationship.

The decision, announced Wednesday following the agreement’s first six-year review, keeps the USMCA in force until 2036 but subjects it to annual reviews unless the three member countries agree to renew and amend the pact.

The move reflects the Trump administration’s push to bring more manufacturing back to the United States, reduce trade deficits with Canada and Mexico, and tighten rules designed to limit China’s access to North American supply chains.

“The United States did not agree to renew the USMCA in its current form,” U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greersaid in a statement.

“As a result, the USMCA is not renewed. The United States will continue to engage with Mexico and Canada to address the agreement’s shortcomings and our trade deficits with these countries.”

The agreement, negotiated during President Donald Trump’s first administration and implemented in 2020, replaced the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). It governs approximately $1.6 trillion in annual trade among the three countries and underpins one of the world’s most integrated manufacturing and supply chains.

Although the decision does not immediately alter tariff-free trade across North America, it formally launches negotiations over revisions that Washington says are necessary to strengthen domestic manufacturing and improve economic security.

A senior U.S. administration official said bilateral negotiations with Mexico are scheduled to resume during the week of July 20 in Mexico City. The talks will focus on strengthening regional rules of origin for automobiles and other industrial products while preventing countries such as China from benefiting indirectly from preferential North American trade access.

The United States argues that stricter local-content requirements would encourage manufacturers to relocate more production and supply chains to the United States.

Mexico and Canada seek compromise amid industry concerns

Mexican Economy Minister Marcelo Ebrard acknowledged that negotiations remain divided over Washington’s demands for stricter automotive content rules but expressed confidence that a compromise remains achievable.

“There is no difference that I can identify between Mexico, the United States and Canada that is so big that we cannot resolve it,” Ebrard said after holding virtual discussions with Greer and Canadian trade minister Dominic LeBlanc.

Mexico has resisted U.S. proposals requiring North American-built vehicles to contain 50% U.S.-made components, a measure that would increase the overall regional content requirement to 82%.

“We wouldn’t allow our industry to be at a disadvantage,” Ebrard said, describing protection of Mexico’s automotive sector as the central issue in ongoing negotiations.

LeBlanc said Canada would continue discussions with Washington while seeking the removal of U.S. tariffs on Canadian steel, aluminum, automobiles and lumber.

The Trump administration has argued that additional time is needed to address persistent U.S. trade imbalances, noting that America’s goods trade deficit reached $197 billion with Mexico and $48.3 billion with Canada in 2025.

Officials acknowledge that much of the Canadian deficit reflects U.S. energy imports, while the growing deficit with Mexico has been driven partly by manufacturers relocating supply chains from China to Mexico in response to U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods.

Although Washington hopes to negotiate revised trade protocols with both neighbors, officials indicated President Trump remains skeptical about the long-term benefits of the agreement despite having negotiated it during his first term.

Trump has repeatedly argued that the United States would perform better economically without the USMCA, even while calling it “the best agreement we’ve ever made” when it entered into force.

Undermining North America’s competitiveness

Business groups across North America have urged governments to preserve the agreement’s tariff-free framework, warning that greater restrictions could undermine the region’s competitiveness against manufacturers in Asia and Europe.

Ivan Espinosa, chief executive of Nissan, warned that requiring substantially higher U.S. content in vehicles could worsen affordability for American consumers.

“You cannot build all the parts in the U.S. The supply chain is not set up to do that,” Espinosa told Reuters. “We need something that is actually executable.”

Agricultural organizations have also urged negotiators to preserve the agreement, noting that Canada and Mexico together purchase more than one-third of U.S. agricultural exports.

Bryan Goodman, spokesperson for the Agricultural Coalition for USMCA, said the agreement remains vital for farmers, ranchers and rural communities that depend on integrated North American markets.

The coming negotiations are expected to determine whether the three countries can modernize the agreement while preserving the free trade framework that has shaped North American commerce for more than three decades.

(Source: Reuters)

G

erman federal prosecutors have charged a 50-year-old Ukrainian national with helping coordinate the 2022 sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines, marking the most significant legal step yet in one of Europe’s most consequential infrastructure attacks.

The suspect, identified only as Serhii K under German privacy laws, is accused of playing a leading role in the operation that destroyed the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines beneath the Baltic Sea, severing a major route for Russian natural gas exports to Europe months after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Federal prosecutors filed the indictment on Wednesday but declined to comment on its specific contents.

According to German public broadcaster ARD, Serhii K faces charges of attacking civilian energy infrastructure, causing explosions and destroying critical infrastructure.

The charges stem from an investigation into the September 2022 underwater blasts near Denmark’s Bornholm Island, which severely damaged both pipelines and disrupted Russian gas supplies to Europe during an already escalating energy crisis.

Court documents from December 2025 allege that Serhii K coordinated a team that used the sailing yacht Andromeda to transport explosives to the pipelines. Prosecutors claim he acted as the team’s on-board coordinator and operational leader rather than serving as a diver or explosives specialist.

The Berlin-based law firm Menaker, which represents the accused, has not commented publicly on the indictment.

German prosecutors confirmed that Serhii K is the same individual arrested in Italy in August 2025 following a German arrest warrant. Italy’s highest court later approved his extradition to Germany, where he was transferred in November 2025 to face investigation.

At the time of his arrest, German authorities alleged that the suspect had used forged identity documents to charter the Andromeda in the northern German port of Rostock before the vessel departed on the mission that investigators believe culminated in the sabotage operation.

Serhii K has denied any involvement in the explosions. His defense has maintained that he was serving with the Ukrainian armed forces and was inside Ukraine when the attacks occurred. His lawyers have argued that, even if military service were established, he would be entitled to what they describe as “functional immunity” under international law.

Ukraine denies involvement as investigation continues

The Nord Stream explosions remain among the most politically sensitive investigations in Europe, given their impact on regional energy security and the absence of any formal attribution of responsibility nearly four years after the attack.

Ukraine has consistently denied any state involvement in the sabotage or knowledge of any plot targeting the pipelines.

Speaking at a news conference in Dublin on Wednesday, Volodymyr Zelenskyy said it was too early to comment on the German indictment because Kyiv had not officially received details of the case.

“We have not officially received any details; at least I have not seen them,” Zelenskyy said, adding that it was premature to draw conclusions.

The twin Nord Stream pipelines, running beneath the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany, had been central to Russian gas exports to Europe before relations between Moscow and the West deteriorated sharply following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Although Nord Stream 2 had never entered commercial operation, both pipelines were rendered inoperable by the explosions, eliminating a key component of Europe’s energy infrastructure.

The investigation has involved authorities from Germany, Denmark and Sweden, with investigators examining evidence including vessel movements, explosive residue and maritime records.

The indictment represents the first formal criminal case brought by German prosecutors against an individual alleged to have participated directly in the sabotage. However, investigators have not publicly alleged that the Ukrainian government authorized or directed the operation.

The case is expected to proceed through Germany’s federal court system, where prosecutors will seek to prove that Serhii K coordinated the team responsible for carrying out one of the most significant attacks on critical energy infrastructure in recent European history.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

C

entral banks around the world are planning to reduce their holdings of U.S. dollars over the coming decade for the first time, reflecting growing concerns over geopolitical risks and policy uncertainty surrounding the world’s dominant reserve currency, according to a new survey released on Tuesday.

The findings, published by the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF), mark the first time its annual survey has found that more central banks intend to decrease their dollar allocations than increase them over the next 10 years.

The survey, which gathered responses from 90 central banks, sovereign wealth funds and public pension funds managing a combined $10 trillion in assets, points to a gradual transformation in global reserve management as policymakers prepare for a more fragmented international financial system.

Although the U.S. dollar remains the world’s primary reserve currency and has gained around 3% this year, respondents increasingly cited political uncertainty in the United States and rising geopolitical tensions as reasons to diversify their portfolios.

The shift comes amid broader debate over the future of the global monetary system following heightened international tensions, including the recent U.S.-Iran conflict, and changing global economic dynamics.

OMFIF Senior Economist Yara Aziz said public investors increasingly regard market volatility as a permanent feature rather than a temporary disruption.

“The old assumption that public investors can wait for the environment to normalize looks increasingly unrealistic,” Aziz wrote in the report.

Gold strengthens its role in reserve management

Despite expectations of reduced dollar holdings, the survey found no clear replacement for the U.S. currency.

Instead, reserve managers are gradually expanding holdings across a wider range of currencies while significantly increasing allocations to gold.

Nearly four out of five central banks surveyed, along with 60% of public investment funds, believe the international monetary system is evolving toward a more multipolar structure in which reserve assets become more diversified.

Currencies outside the traditional major reserve group are attracting greater attention.

Respondents reported increasing allocations to the Norwegian krone and the New Zealand dollar, while interest in the British pound also continued to grow.

Central banks also maintained plans to increase holdings of the euro and China’s renminbi, although respondents said structural limitations continue to constrain both currencies from becoming dominant alternatives to the dollar.

Even so, almost all respondents viewed the Chinese yuan as an effective tool for portfolio diversification.

Gold emerged as one of the strongest beneficiaries of changing reserve strategies.

Held by 82% of surveyed central banks, the precious metal has moved to the center of reserve management policies after reaching successive record highs over recent years.

In the next one to two years, gold is expected to see the largest increase in allocations among reserve assets, with a net 30% of respondents planning to expand their holdings.

Analysts say central banks increasingly value gold as a hedge against inflation, geopolitical instability and financial market volatility.

Artificial intelligence reshapes investment strategies

Beyond reserve diversification, the survey highlighted a rapid acceleration in the adoption of artificial intelligence across public financial institutions.

More than two-thirds of central banks said they plan to expand the use of AI in the near future, while none of the advanced economy central banks surveyed indicated they were satisfied with current levels of AI deployment.

Overall, only 9% of central banks said existing AI integration met their needs.

Most institutions currently use artificial intelligence for data analysis, research and administrative functions, although adoption varies significantly between developed and emerging economies.

Nearly 90% of central banks in advanced economies already use AI, compared with just 44% of those in emerging markets.

The report also found growing investor interest in physical assets.

Almost 60% of public investment funds intend to increase allocations to infrastructure and real estate over the next two years, making them the most popular asset classes outside traditional financial markets.

Emerging markets are also attracting renewed attention

Thirty-eight percent of public funds plan to increase investment in emerging economies, up sharply from 27% in last year’s survey.

At the same time, interest in expanding exposure to developed economies declined significantly, with only one-quarter of respondents planning to increase allocations compared with nearly half a year earlier.

Despite diversification efforts, the United States and China remained the most attractive investment destinations, largely because of their leading positions in artificial intelligence development and technological innovation.

The survey suggests that while the U.S. dollar is likely to remain the world’s dominant reserve currency for the foreseeable future, central banks are increasingly seeking broader diversification through gold, alternative currencies, emerging markets and new technologies to navigate a more uncertain global economic environment.

(Source: Reuters)

V

enezuela’s devastating twin earthquakes have rapidly evolved from a humanitarian catastrophe into the most serious political challenge facing interim President Delcy Rodriguez, as criticism mounts over the government’s handling of rescue efforts and long-standing weaknesses in the country’s emergency response system.

The twin earthquakes, which struck on June 24, have killed nearly 1,500 people, left tens of thousands missing and caused widespread destruction across parts of the country, particularly in the coastal state of La Guaira and the capital Caracas. Thousands remain displaced as emergency workers and volunteers continue searching through collapsed buildings for survivors.

While the initial public reaction focused on grief and shock, frustration has increasingly been directed at the government’s response, with residents, aid workers and analysts accusing authorities of reacting too slowly to one of the country’s worst natural disasters in decades.

For Rodriguez, who assumed the presidency following the removal of former President Nicolas Maduro earlier this year, the crisis represents the first major test of her administration.

In the immediate aftermath of the earthquakes, Rodriguez declared a national state of emergency, expressed condolences to victims’ families and appealed for international assistance.

However, critics argue that official rescue operations have failed to keep pace with the scale of destruction.

Residents from some of the worst-affected communities say they have relied largely on neighbors and volunteers rather than government emergency teams to search for trapped victims.

Mairet Perez, travelling from the Colombian border carrying relief supplies for relatives in La Guaira, described communities digging through rubble with little official assistance.

“Everyone in La Guaira is searching and digging out people with their bare hands,” she said. “And the government? What have they done? Nothing.”

She said some neighborhoods had still not been reached by government rescue teams days after the disaster.

The criticism has been echoed by political analysts who argue that years of economic decline, institutional weakness and underinvestment have left Venezuela poorly equipped to respond to a major emergency.

Phil Gunson, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, said the country’s emergency response capacity had deteriorated significantly over the past decade.

“The government response is anything from totally non-existent to, at best, completely inadequate,” Gunson said.

According to analysts, years of economic crisis, corruption, sanctions and declining public investment have weakened hospitals, emergency services, water systems and electricity networks, limiting the state’s ability to mount an effective disaster response.

International aid fills critical gaps

As domestic rescue efforts struggled, international assistance quickly became essential.

More than 20 foreign search-and-rescue teams have arrived in Venezuela, including personnel from the United States, Spain, Qatar and several Latin American countries.

The United States has deployed military aircraft carrying humanitarian supplies, medical equipment and specialist rescue personnel, while foreign governments have pledged additional financial and technical assistance.

Nevertheless, observers argue that the influx of international aid has also highlighted shortcomings within Venezuela’s own institutions.

Reports have emerged of delays affecting foreign rescue teams entering the country. Colombian firefighters were reportedly held for several hours at Caracas airport before receiving permission to proceed to affected areas.

Authorities have also restricted access to several disaster zones, requiring journalists and humanitarian organizations to receive official authorization before entering.

In some communities, frustrated residents reportedly broke through security cordons in an effort to begin rescue operations themselves.

Social media has also amplified criticism, with videos showing volunteers using basic tools to search collapsed buildings while appealing for additional equipment such as helmets, excavators and medical supplies.

The relative absence of Venezuela’s military from front-line rescue operations has drawn particular attention.

Civil society organizations noted that while soldiers have largely been deployed to regulate access into affected areas, many citizens expected a larger military role in search-and-rescue operations.

Some Venezuelans contrasted the limited deployment with the heavy military presence witnessed during political protests following the disputed 2024 presidential election.

Aid organizations also warn that previous legal restrictions imposed on nongovernmental organizations continue to complicate relief operations, as many community groups were weakened or forced to suspend activities in recent years.

Political consequences may extend beyond the disaster

Beyond the immediate humanitarian crisis, analysts believe the earthquakes could reshape Venezuela’s political landscape.

Rodriguez inherited power only six months ago after Maduro’s removal during a US-backed operation that dramatically altered the country’s political trajectory.

Although her administration has sought closer cooperation with Washington and international partners, Rodriguez remains a divisive figure because of her long association with the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) and her previous role as Maduro’s deputy.

Political scientist Javier Corrales of Amherst College said many Venezuelans continue to associate Rodriguez with the country’s prolonged economic collapse and institutional decline.

“She is seen as part of the problem,” Corrales said, noting that even some within the ruling party question her political direction following closer cooperation with the United States.

The earthquakes have also renewed scrutiny of Venezuela’s infrastructure.

Civil engineers note that although seismic building regulations were strengthened following the devastating 1967 Caracas earthquake, enforcement has often been inconsistent.

Experts argue that weak inspections, poor urban planning and substandard construction practices contributed to the collapse of numerous residential buildings during last week’s disaster.

Gunson also suggested that large-scale public housing programs developed under the governments of Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro may have left thousands living in buildings constructed below acceptable engineering standards.

For many survivors, the disaster has reopened wounds from previous natural disasters, with some families once again losing homes rebuilt after earlier floods and landslides.

Despite growing criticism, Rodriguez has continued touring affected communities while promising that reconstruction will begin as quickly as possible.

Her administration insists emergency operations remain ongoing and has pledged to coordinate reconstruction efforts alongside international partners.

Analysts caution that the political consequences of the disaster remain uncertain.

Natural disasters have historically transformed political fortunes, either strengthening governments that respond effectively or accelerating public dissatisfaction where responses are viewed as inadequate.

Some experts believe the influx of international aid could provide Rodriguez with an opportunity to demonstrate competent leadership if reconstruction proceeds transparently and efficiently.

Others warn that any perception of corruption, political favoritism or poor management could deepen existing public distrust.

For now, rescue workers continue searching through damaged neighborhoods as families await news of missing relatives.

While the immediate priority remains saving lives and assisting survivors, the earthquakes have also exposed the structural weaknesses that have accumulated over years of political and economic turmoil—weaknesses that now present Rodriguez with the defining challenge of her presidency.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

G

ulf Arab states are reassessing their long-standing security relationship with the United States following Washington’s emerging agreement with Iran, amid concerns that the proposed deal could reshape the regional balance of power and leave key security issues unresolved.

The framework agreement between the United States and Iran, announced after months of conflict and negotiations, has been welcomed across the Gulf as a step away from a wider regional war. However, analysts and diplomats say many governments in the region remain deeply uneasy about its long-term implications, particularly regarding Iran’s military capabilities and growing regional influence.

The agreement seeks to end hostilities between Washington and Tehran, reopen the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping and establish a process for broader negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions relief and economic reconstruction. While Gulf capitals support efforts to prevent another devastating conflict, many officials are questioning whether the arrangement adequately addresses their security concerns.

Trust in US erodes

For decades, Gulf monarchies have relied heavily on the United States as their principal security guarantor. American military bases, naval deployments and defence partnerships have formed the backbone of regional deterrence against external threats, particularly from Iran.

Yet confidence in those guarantees has gradually weakened over the past several years.

Regional observers point to a series of developments that have fuelled doubts, including the limited U.S. response to attacks on Saudi oil facilities in 2019 and Washington’s broader shift toward reducing its military footprint in the Middle East.

Those concerns have resurfaced following the latest U.S.-Iran agreement, which many Gulf officials view as another indication that Washington is increasingly prioritising diplomacy and strategic disengagement over long-term military commitments in the region.

The agreement also introduces new arrangements affecting navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors. Under the framework, Iran is expected to play a role in future discussions on managing commercial shipping alongside Oman and other regional stakeholders.

Possible Iranian influence on maritime security

For Gulf countries whose economies depend heavily on energy exports passing through the waterway, the prospect of expanded Iranian influence over maritime security has generated considerable debate.

Analysts argue that while reopening shipping lanes would benefit global energy markets, Gulf governments remain cautious about any arrangement that could strengthen Tehran’s leverage over regional trade.

The deal also leaves several contentious issues unresolved.

Although negotiations on Iran’s nuclear activities are expected to continue during a 60-day transition period, the current framework does not directly address Tehran’s ballistic missile programme or its relationships with armed groups across the Middle East.

Many Gulf governments have long regarded those issues as posing a more immediate security challenge than Iran’s nuclear ambitions alone.

During a regional tour following the announcement of the agreement, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio sought to reassure Gulf allies that Washington would continue consulting closely with them throughout negotiations and would not pursue policies that undermine their security.

Rubio emphasised that future discussions concerning Iran’s missile program would be coordinated with regional partners and reaffirmed America’s commitment to longstanding alliances in the Gulf.

Despite those assurances, regional analysts say trust has been weakened by years of uncertainty surrounding U.S. policy in the Middle East.

Diversifying military partnerships

Several experts argue that Gulf states increasingly believe they must prepare for a future in which they shoulder greater responsibility for their own defense.

As a result, some governments have accelerated efforts to diversify their military partnerships and defence procurement beyond traditional suppliers.

Turkey has emerged as one potential alternative source of military equipment and defense cooperation, reflecting a broader strategy of reducing dependence on any single security partner.

At the same time, Gulf countries continue to strengthen economic ties with the United States. Major investment commitments announced in recent years demonstrate that while questions persist over security arrangements, economic cooperation remains a central pillar of bilateral relations.

The proposed agreement with Iran also includes plans for a multibillion-dollar reconstruction and investment fund intended to support Iran’s economic recovery after the conflict.

Although Washington has indicated that Gulf participation would be important, several regional governments have said they have not yet committed funding and are awaiting further details before making any decisions.

For many Gulf leaders, preventing another regional war remains the immediate priority.

The recent conflict exposed the vulnerability of Gulf states to missile and drone attacks and highlighted the economic consequences of disruptions to energy exports and international shipping.

A

t least 32 people have been confirmed dead and around 700 injured after two powerful earthquakes struck Venezuela, causing widespread destruction in the capital Caracas and other parts of the country, according to authorities.

The twin quakes, measuring 7.2 and 7.5 in magnitude, hit less than a minute apart about 160 kilometers west of Caracas, triggering building collapses, damaging infrastructure and prompting fears that the final death toll could rise significantly as rescue efforts continue.

Emergency crews raced through the night to search for survivors trapped beneath the rubble of collapsed buildings. Images from Caracas showed rescue workers combing through debris while families gathered anxiously near disaster sites awaiting news of missing relatives.

Interim President Delcy Rodríguez said at least 32 people had been killed and hundreds injured, though officials cautioned that casualty figures remained preliminary.

Rescue efforts intensify

Search-and-rescue teams have been deployed across affected areas, with authorities focusing on collapsed residential buildings and heavily damaged neighborhoods.

Eyewitnesses described scenes of panic and devastation. One survivor in Caracas said residents struggled to escape amid dust clouds and falling debris.

“The scene was like a horror movie,” the survivor told Reuters, describing how people climbed over rubble to reach safety.

Several aftershocks have been recorded since the initial earthquakes, complicating rescue operations and raising concerns about further structural collapses.

Thousands of deaths feared

While official casualty figures remain relatively low so far, the U.S. Geological Survey’s Prompt Assessment of Global Earthquakes for Response (PAGER) system has warned that the eventual toll could be much higher.

According to updated USGS modeling, there is a 39% probability that fatalities could range between 1,000 and 10,000 people, and a 37% chance the death toll could reach between 10,000 and 100,000 if the most severely affected areas suffered extensive structural failures.

The agency also estimates economic losses equivalent to between 1% and 4% of Venezuela’s gross domestic product.

The United States announced it has activated a disaster assistance team and emergency task force to coordinate humanitarian support.

According to the U.S. State Department, Washington plans to send search-and-rescue specialists, medical supplies and humanitarian aid in cooperation with Venezuela’s interim government.

U.S. President Donald Trump said the earthquakes may have caused a “devastating number of deaths” and pledged American support for relief efforts.

Oil sector appears largely unaffected

Despite concerns about Venezuela’s energy infrastructure, authorities reported no immediate damage to major oil facilities.

Officials in Maracaibo, near the country’s main oil-producing region around Lake Maracaibo, said there were no reports of injuries or significant damage affecting petroleum operations.

Energy companies operating in Venezuela have begun assessing facilities, although industry sources warned that prolonged power outages could disrupt crude production in the coming days.

The disaster comes at a sensitive moment for Venezuela, which is undergoing a political transition following the removal of former President Nicolás Maduro earlier this year.

The country continues to face severe economic difficulties, with widespread poverty, fragile infrastructure and ongoing efforts to rebuild institutions after years of political turmoil.

As rescue operations continue and damage assessments expand, authorities fear the human and economic cost of the disaster could become one of the most severe natural catastrophes to strike Venezuela in decades.

(Source: Reuters)

T

he official visit to Türkiye by Niger’s President Abdourahamane Tchiani, at the invitation of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, marks a new strategic milestone in relations between Ankara and Niamey. The fact that Tchiani was accompanied during his visit by a large delegation, including the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, energy, mining, the economy, agriculture and trade, demonstrates that relations between the two countries are progressing on the basis of multi-dimensional cooperation spanning from security to energy, and from trade to institutional capacity-building. For this reason, the visit should be assessed not merely as a routine diplomatic engagement between the two countries, but within the context of shifting power balances in the Sahel and Niger’s quest to diversify its external partnerships.

According to a statement from the Communications Directorate of Türkiye, following the meetings between President Erdoğan and Tchiani at the Presidential Complex in Ankara, three agreements and a joint declaration were signed between Türkiye and Niger in the fields of education, health, trade and diplomacy. Within this framework, a protocol regarding the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on cooperation in higher education for the period 2026–2030, a joint declaration on the establishment of the Economic and Trade Partnership Commission (JETCO), a protocol on the joint operation and handover of the Niger-Türkiye Friendship Hospital, and a memorandum of understanding between the Diplomacy Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye and the National Institute for Diplomatic and Strategic Studies of the Republic of Niger.

To interpret the cooperation that has developed between Türkiye and Niger in recent years solely as a result of current security and economic needs would be an oversimplification. Relations between the two countries are based on a multidimensional cooperation where historical heritage, the pursuit of mutual trust and a shared strategic vision for the future intersect. The ties between the two countries stretch back to the cultural, political and strategic influence of the Ottoman Empire in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in Niger, during the 16th century. The relationships based on mutual trust that the Ottoman Empire established with local communities in the region, such as the Tebu and Tuareg peoples, who came under its administration, have left a historical legacy that continues to foster a positive perception of Türkiye in Niger.

Türkiye’s Africa policy

This historical legacy of the Ottomans gained further significance following Ankara’s institutionalization of its Africa policy through the ‘Action Plan for Opening Up to Africa’, launched by Türkiye in 1998. This process of opening up paved the way for diplomatic contacts with Niger to gain momentum from the 2000s onwards. The mutual opening of embassies by Türkiye and Niger in 2012, and the official visit to Niger by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in his capacity as Prime Minister in 2013, marked the beginning of a new era in bilateral relations.

Since then, Türkiye’s relations with Niger, which it regards as a strategic partner in Africa, have moved beyond diplomatic contacts to take on a more concrete character in areas such as energy, defense, trade, education and cultural cooperation. Ankara is strengthening the historical and cultural ties between the two countries through the Programme Coordination Office (PKO) of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) and the schools run by the Türkiye Maarif Foundation. In the health sector, one of the most significant steps,  the Niger-Türkiye Friendship Hospital, was opened in October 2019. Through these measures, Türkiye aims to establish a long-term, multi-dimensional partnership with Niger, rather than pursuing a policy focused solely on economic interests.

Following the coup in Niger in 2023, Türkiye did not sever its diplomatic ties and continued its strategic investments whilst maintaining its interest in Niger. On 17 July 2024, a high-level delegation, including Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Minister of National Defence Yaşar Güler and Minister of Energy Alparslan Bayraktar, visited Niamey. During the visit, significant agreements were signed in the fields of security, energy and trade, whilst decisions on cooperation in the fields of education and health were also taken. Furthermore, the signing of a declaration of intent for cooperation in the oil and natural gas sector during these talks, and the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on cooperation in the mining sector in October 2024, demonstrate that relations between the two countries have now extended to the energy and mining sectors as well.

The fight against terrorism

Other key issue that came to the fore between the two countries in recent years is cooperation in the fight against terrorism and in the field of security. Niger is one of the countries most affected by the rise in terrorist incidents in the Sahel in recent years. The country is exposed to terrorist activities by the Al-Qaeda-linked JNIM and the ISIS-linked ISSP, particularly in its western border regions via the Liptako-Gourma security zone, and by ISWAP and Boko Haram elements in the south-east via the Lake Chad Basin. In this context, where Niger has terminated its military cooperation with Western partners, notably France and the US, Türkiye is emerging as a reliable strategic partner thanks to its growing defense industry capacity, experience in counter-terrorism, security cooperation and active diplomatic initiatives.

These factors are strengthening the strategic dimension of relations between the two countries and ensuring that Türkiye is viewed as an important partner by Niger. In this context, Niger, which cooperates with Türkiye in the fields of defense and security, is importing various defence industry products from Türkiye to enhance its capacity in the fight against terrorism. Furthermore, the On-Site Training Support Protocol signed in April 2026 demonstrates that security cooperation between the two countries is not limited to the supply of defence industry products, but also encompasses military training support and intelligence. It is evident that, through these collaborations, Niger aims to achieve its objective of conducting more effective and successful counter-terrorism operations.

One of the key pillars of the developing relations between the two countries is the strengthening of economic ties and trade. Following the military intervention in Niger in 2023, the country has gone through a difficult period due to sanctions imposed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the suspension of financial support and security cooperation by Western partners. During this difficult period, Niger’s Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance, Ali Mahamane Lamine Zeine, visited Türkiye to strengthen economic and political ties. Within this framework, Türkiye has continued to develop its economic relations with Niger.

Investments in the energy, mining, construction and trade sectors have not only enhanced Türkiye’s economic presence in Niger but have also contributed to Niger’s efforts to diversify its development and external partnerships. Indeed, the fact that the volume of trade between Türkiye and Niger is projected to rise from approximately 38.9 million dollars in 2012 to 273 million dollars by 2025 is one of the concrete indicators of this economic rapprochement. In the same year, Türkiye’s exports to Niger amounted to 214 million dollars, whilst imports from Niger stood at 59 million dollars. Furthermore, the signing of the joint declaration on the establishment of JETCO during Tchiani’s visit to Ankara can be regarded as a significant step towards conducting economic cooperation on a more structured and institutionalized basis.

In conclusion, these developments demonstrate that the multi-dimensional cooperation between Türkiye and Niger, which has gained momentum since 2020, has moved beyond diplomatic rhetoric and has begun to produce tangible results through trade, institutional agreements and sectoral partnerships.

(Originally published in Turkish by the Middle East Africa website)

T

he U.S. Senate has voted to direct President Donald Trump to halt military action against Iran, marking the first time since the passage of the 1973 War Powers Act that both chambers of Congress have approved a resolution seeking to end a president’s involvement in an ongoing conflict.

The Senate approved the measure on Tuesday by a vote of 50-48, following its earlier passage in the House of Representatives. The resolution reflects growing unease in Congress over the war that began on February 28, when U.S. and Israeli forces launched attacks on Iran, and signals a widening split between Trump and some members of his own Republican Party.

Although the practical effect of the resolution remains uncertain, the vote represents one of the most significant congressional challenges to Trump’s foreign policy since he returned to office.

Historic congressional action

The measure was passed under the framework of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, legislation enacted after the Vietnam War to limit presidential authority to conduct military operations without congressional approval.

No previous war powers resolution had successfully passed both the House and Senate.

Under the legislation, Congress directed the president to remove U.S. armed forces from hostilities involving Iran. However, the White House maintains that the resolution has no legal force because it is not submitted to the president for signature or veto.

The administration also argues that active hostilities effectively ended following a ceasefire reached on April 7.

A White House official dismissed the vote as largely symbolic, saying it had “no significance” and noting that the resolution passed only because two Republican senators were absent.

Trump responded sharply to the vote, calling it “poorly timed and meaningless” in a social media post. He accused lawmakers who supported the measure of making negotiations with Tehran more difficult and providing “comfort” to Iran.

Republican support signals growing unease

The Senate vote largely followed party lines, but four Republicans broke ranks to support the resolution.

The Republican senators voting in favor were Susan Collins, Rand Paul, Bill Cassidy, and Lisa Murkowski.

Meanwhile, Democratic Senator John Fetterman voted against the measure, becoming the only Democrat to oppose it.

Two Republican senators, Mitch McConnell and David McCormick, did not participate in the vote.

The House had approved the same measure earlier this month by a margin of 215-208, with four Republicans joining Democrats in support.

The vote highlights growing frustration among lawmakers over a conflict that has become increasingly unpopular with the American public.

Public opinion turning against the war

According to a Reuters/Ipsos poll released Tuesday, only one-quarter of Americans believe the war against Iran has been worth its costs. A majority of respondents also expressed concern that any ceasefire or peace agreement could collapse.

The conflict has generated political challenges for the Trump administration as it seeks congressional approval for tens of billions of dollars in additional funding linked to military operations.

At the same time, several Republican lawmakers have recently shown greater willingness to oppose the president on key issues, including immigration spending and a proposed fund intended to compensate political allies whom Trump says were unfairly targeted by federal authorities.

T

he “Technological Republic” manifesto published by Palantir has sparked new debates. This is because the published manifesto can be read not merely as a corporate vision, but as an explicit declaration of the new regime of domination in the age we live in—a form of digital colonialism. This text, signed by Peter Thiel and Alex Karp, shifts artificial intelligence from being merely a technical tool and directly elevates it to a core element of geopolitical domination. The software industry’s famous rhetoric of a ‘moral debt’ owed to the United States demonstrates that technology is no longer viewed as a neutral field, but rather as a terrain for political and military mobilization—in other words, a kind of digital front.

In essence, the landscape we are witnessing here is a reproduction of classical colonialism in the digital age. Yesterday, the imperial mindset that derived its legitimacy from the claim of bringing civilization is today re-establishing itself through security justifications and notions of algorithmic superiority. Just as the rhetoric of the ‘white man’s burden’ once constructed a hierarchical world order, today’s AI-centerd technological discourse is producing a similar epistemic domination. Given that the idea that some cultures are “more inclined towards progress” whilst certain societies are “in need of guidance and management” is explicitly stated in the manifesto, it is difficult to claim that this mindset has been dismantled or left behind. Consequently, the necessity to fight no longer arises solely on the military battlefield or at diplomatic tables, but directly within the decision-making architecture of algorithms and in lines of code.

The dismantling of algorithmic ethics

The most striking aspect of the Palantir manifesto is that the specific oligarchic interests, which for years have been concealed behind masks of universality, transparency and the common good of humanity, are now being declared without any need for concealment. Whilst the tech giants have for a long time presented themselves as structures that transcend borders, stand above ideologies, and serve the greater good of humanity, with this manifesto we see the mask has fallen. The call contained in the manifesto, whilst inviting other companies to adopt a similar stance, promises to turn artificial intelligence into a weapon, to protect the supreme interests of Western society, and to turn technology into a tool for exercising dominance over the weak.

The rhetoric of universalism is, in fact, merely a strategic mask for expanding the market and gaining infrastructural influence, and a reflection of past capitalist experiences. In reality, particular interests continue to masquerade as universal values, whilst labelling regulatory interventions by other countries as resistance to progress. Globalised trade, which in the past was driven by the bourgeoisie in opposition to mercantilist rhetoric, today seeks to constantly fend off countries’ legitimate and legal regulatory measures by invoking the balance between freedom and security, under the pretext of ‘attacks on freedom’.

This Western-centric technological paradigm takes refuge in ‘acceptable margin of error’ defences whilst claiming human lives in Gaza and Iran. Rather than distinguishing the innocent and the oppressed, it does not shy away from systematic massacres carried out by code. Children, women, those in schools, those in hospitals; in the eyes of the code, they are reduced to nothing more than acceptable numbers. This brutality, which aligns with Karp’s rhetoric of “intimidating the enemy” as stated in the manifesto, points to the mental landscape of technology.

Thiel’s transhumanist vision and his obsession with “upgrading the human race”, also featured in the manifesto, are the outward expression of yet another corrupt mindset. Behind this mindset, one can discern a constant master-servant hierarchy, a perpetual elitist approach, and a claim to authority. Indeed, by directly asserting that some societies are superior to others, he regards domination through AI as quite reasonable. However, this is not the fault of the AI itself, nor is it sufficient to blame the AI. What matters is being able to see the mindset underlying the algorithm and to understand how this tainted mindset views “us”. The issue is recognizing that technology in general, and AI in particular, is not a neutral field, but a terrain for geopolitical mobilization.

In fact, with every crisis originating from a tech company, we see a fresh batch of dirty laundry being aired, yet we still fail to grasp the true scale of the issue. Whilst the fallout from Palantir’s manifesto continues, Elon Musk’s lawsuit against OpenAI, filed in 2026, has brought yet another storm to the fore. While Musk argues that the company has strayed from its mission ‘for the benefit of humanity’ and evolved into a profit-driven tyranny, he overlooks the efforts of his own AI company xAI, the allegedly transhumanist Neuralink, and SolarCity—a firm which exploits the energy needs of millions of people on a massive scale. Whilst he himself holds dominant positions in sectors such as energy, space, the global internet, smart vehicles, artificial intelligence and medicine, he criticises other companies’ attempts at hegemony. However, Musk is correct in pointing out that OpenAI, which set out claiming to work for humanity, has begun to contribute to turning AI into a weapon in wars.

Epistemic liberation and values-driven technology

Whilst the Western world repeatedly lays bare its mindset through these manifestos, lawsuits and revelations, the fact that the views of two figures in the Turkish agenda opposing this mindset have come to the fore actually prompted this article. Selçuk Bayraktar’s emphasis on the need to develop technology with a vision centered on moral, ethical and human dignity—in response to the Palantir manifesto—and his approach questioning the mindset behind technology are, in this regard, highly valuable. On the other hand, Esra Albayrak’s address at the World Decolonization Forum was significant in terms of questioning the colonialist mindset. This address, which reminded us that this mindset dominates the world it has occupied through the triad of ‘erasing identity, erasing language, and establishing mastery’, actually describes the triad of data exploitation, linguistic dominance and algorithmic control in the digital age.

Naturally, since the colonialism of the digital age is now carried out not with tanks but with algorithms, there is no need for vast territories. From digital publishing platforms to social media, from apps to technological tools, and from operating systems to software, acts of occupation continue to infiltrate our intellectual world at every point—whether at home or in our pockets. This open yet covert occupation manifests itself in the form of platform dependency, algorithmic steering, and the shaping of our mental landscape. For this reason, the struggle for decolonization continues, and the need for a struggle for independence in the digital world grows day by day. On the one hand, there is the aim of not falling behind in the technology race; on the other, the aim of serving humanity by blending technology with human values. A key dimension of the aspiration to be a refuge for the oppressed, a voice for the innocent, and a defender of the righteous and justice lies in the construction of a value-driven digital space.

A Human-centered direction in technology and Turkey

Faced with this global landscape, Turkey’s historic duty is to construct a new paradigm that blends algorithmic independence with human dignity, and to chart its own sovereign roadmap in opposition to Western-centered algorithmic hegemony. The current path to establishing epistemic independence on the intellectual plane lies in being able to give a unique voice to the thoughts and emotions that shape technology and the digital sphere. This is only possible by having a say in the trajectory of technological development.

In the initial phase, it is imperative to rapidly strengthen national data sovereignty, oversight mechanisms and domestic artificial intelligence infrastructure at the institutional level. Our priorities include both protective measures against existing threats and steps that support initiatives to shape the future. Whilst capitalizing on opportunities, we must not overlook risks such as algorithmic bias, privacy breaches and geopolitical dependency; the aim should be to transform the individual from a data object into a subject whose agency is safeguarded.

Whilst we may believe we are protected by simple user agreements; it is now clear that technology—as a force—and the discourse of those who produce it serve as a strategic tool for building global influence. We must therefore strive to understand that neither social media, nor large language models, nor the phones in our hands, nor other data-collecting technologies are innocent, and we must discern whom they serve and to what extent.

We must not overlook the fact that these discussions could enable today’s algorithms to quietly erode civil rights and the right to life. In fact, in the face of this mindset that reduces human beings to a data set, what is required is the establishment of a paradigm rooted in ‘our values’ to counter algorithmic hegemony. A civilizational initiative that centeres compassion, ethics and human will against systems that code our children as ‘acceptable losses’ is not merely a national but a global imperative.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

C

onservative candidate Abelardo De La Espriella has secured a narrow victory in Colombia’s presidential runoff election, defeating leftist Senator Ivan Cepeda in a closely contested race that signals a significant political shift in one of Latin America’s largest economies.

According to preliminary results released by Colombia’s national registrar on Sunday, De La Espriella won 49.66 percent of the vote, while Cepeda received 48.70 percent, leaving a margin of approximately 250,000 votes with nearly all ballots counted.

The result marks a major setback for the political movement of outgoing President Gustavo Petro, Colombia’s first left-wing president, whose reform agenda and security policies became central issues during the election campaign.

De La Espriella, a lawyer and political newcomer, campaigned on promises to crack down on crime, revive economic growth, reduce government spending and strengthen Colombia’s oil and gas sector.

Speaking to supporters in the coastal city of Barranquilla after the results were announced, he pledged to govern for all Colombians regardless of political affiliation.

“I will govern for all Colombians, for those who voted for me and for those who chose the other candidate,” De La Espriella told cheering supporters.

His campaign centered on criticism of Petro’s administration, which he accused of failing to contain armed groups, drug trafficking and insecurity in several regions of the country. He vowed to end negotiations with rebel and criminal organizations while expanding investment in the energy sector and reducing the size of the state by as much as 40 percent.

Despite advocating major economic reforms, De La Espriella has also promised to maintain some of Petro’s most popular social measures, including a 23 percent increase in the minimum wage and assistance programs for vulnerable communities.

The president-elect also received a congratulatory call from Donald Trump, who had publicly endorsed his candidacy during the campaign. The endorsement attracted attention both inside Colombia and internationally, highlighting growing ties between conservative political movements across the Americas.

Cepeda refuses to concede immediately

Although the preliminary count favored De La Espriella, Cepeda stopped short of immediately conceding defeat.

Addressing supporters in Bogotá, the veteran leftist politician said his campaign would await the completion of Colombia’s official verification process, which involves a ballot-by-ballot review supervised by judges and notaries.

Cepeda said his campaign was contesting results from roughly 33,000 ballot boxes out of more than 122,000 nationwide.

“We are open to dialogue; we are willing to reach agreements as long as they are respectful, genuine, and reflected in political actions that benefit the nation,” he told supporters.

While acknowledging the narrow margin, Cepeda emphasized that his supporters remain a powerful political force that must be represented in future national decisions.

The close result reflects a deeply polarized electorate divided between demands for stronger security measures and support for the social and environmental reforms introduced under Petro’s government.

De La Espriella will take office facing significant political and economic challenges.

Despite winning the presidency, he is expected to encounter resistance in Congress, where Cepeda’s coalition, the Historic Pact, remains one of the largest political blocs. No party controls a majority, meaning the incoming president will likely need to negotiate extensively to pass legislation.

Analysts say this reality may force De La Espriella to moderate some of his more ambitious proposals, particularly plans to dramatically reduce government spending and reshape state institutions.

The new administration must also address mounting public debt and sluggish economic growth while balancing demands for increased security spending.

Questions have additionally been raised about De La Espriella’s business record. During the campaign, Colombian media reported that several of his companies had been dissolved or faced financial difficulties, though his legal practice remained profitable. The president-elect rejected suggestions that these issues undermine his economic credentials.