W

ildfires continued to burn across France, Spain and Greece on Thursday as scorching temperatures, strong winds and dry conditions fueled blazes that have killed firefighters, forced mass evacuations and destroyed thousands of hectares of land.

In southwestern France, authorities said a wildfire near Bordeaux was brought under control overnight after burning around 42,000 hectares of forest. Police arrested two people on suspicion of arson, though officials released no further details.

The fires have forced about 220,000 residents and tourists to evacuate, although around 60,000 have since returned as conditions improved. Businesses that had temporarily closed were gradually reopening.

Weather conditions around Bordeaux were expected to improve later Thursday, with forecasts of cooler temperatures, higher humidity and possible thunderstorms. However, authorities warned that the fire danger remained high.

In Greece, three firefighters were killed as crews battled separate wildfires driven by gale-force winds.

Deaths in Crete

Two firefighters died after becoming trapped between advancing fire fronts on the island of Crete, where hundreds of residents and tourists were evacuated by land and sea from communities threatened by fast-moving flames. A third firefighter was killed while responding to another wildfire in the Peloponnese.

Strong winds prevented firefighting aircraft from operating over parts of Crete, hampering efforts to contain the blaze.

Spain also remained on alert as firefighters battled at least 10 active wildfires across the country.

Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez described the situation as “extreme,” citing high temperatures, low humidity and powerful winds that have created dangerous fire conditions.

The largest fire continued to spread in the eastern province of Castellón, where more than 9,300 hectares have burned. Fire officials said crews worked overnight to secure the fire’s 82-kilometer perimeter in hopes of stabilizing it before temperatures rose again.

New wildfires also broke out in the northwestern provinces of Zamora and León, forcing more than 1,300 people to leave their homes, including residents near Arribes del Duero Natural Park.

A European Union wildfire response center

Sánchez said he had asked European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to support establishing a European Union wildfire response center for the western Mediterranean on Spain’s Balearic Islands.

Europe has endured repeated heatwaves this summer, with temperatures remaining well above seasonal averages across much of the continent.

Scientists say prolonged drought, extreme heat and strong winds have increased the frequency and intensity of wildfires across southern Europe, where emergency services have faced near-continuous firefighting operations in recent weeks.

The current wildfire season has already burned more land across the European Union than at the same point last year, underscoring the growing challenge posed by increasingly severe summer fire seasons.

(Source: Reuters)

U

kraine and nine European countries have announced the creation of a joint anti-ballistic missile coalition aimed at strengthening the continent’s defenses against emerging missile threats through closer military, technological and industrial cooperation.

The initiative, unveiled by the leaders of Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine and the United Kingdom, seeks to develop an integrated European missile defense architecture designed to improve protection against ballistic missile attacks.

In a joint declaration issued on Sunday, the participating countries described the coalition as a “purely defensive” initiative intended to bolster Europe’s collective security amid evolving regional threats.

“We believe that the protection of Europe requires a global solution of integrated missile defense architecture to deter and defeat future missile threats,” the leaders said.

The coalition’s centerpiece will be a flagship project to develop a shared anti-ballistic missile capability. Member states will coordinate on common operational requirements, technical standards and defense industrial cooperation while establishing a roadmap for deploying the coalition’s first operational systems.

Complement, rather than replace

Officials said the new initiative is intended to complement, rather than replace, existing national and multinational missile defense programs already operated or planned by participating countries.

“By bringing together our defense industrial base, our research, and our operational experience, we aim to build a shared anti-ballistic missile capacity for Europe,” the declaration stated.

The coalition also emphasized Ukraine’s battlefield experience gained during its defense against Russia’s invasion, describing Kyiv’s operational knowledge as a valuable contribution to the project.

“We acknowledge the unique experience of Ukraine, gained in defense against Russia’s war of aggression,” the statement said.

Beyond missile interception capabilities, participating countries agreed to explore joint research and development projects, expanded funding mechanisms, enhanced defense industrial collaboration and improved sharing of defense-related information and operational data.

The founding members said the coalition would remain open to additional countries that share its objectives and are willing to contribute to the development of a common European missile defense capability.

The announcement comes as European governments continue to increase defense spending and deepen military cooperation in response to heightened security challenges across the continent, with missile defense emerging as a key priority for NATO members and partner countries.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

G

erman federal prosecutors have charged a 50-year-old Ukrainian national with helping coordinate the 2022 sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines, marking the most significant legal step yet in one of Europe’s most consequential infrastructure attacks.

The suspect, identified only as Serhii K under German privacy laws, is accused of playing a leading role in the operation that destroyed the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines beneath the Baltic Sea, severing a major route for Russian natural gas exports to Europe months after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Federal prosecutors filed the indictment on Wednesday but declined to comment on its specific contents.

According to German public broadcaster ARD, Serhii K faces charges of attacking civilian energy infrastructure, causing explosions and destroying critical infrastructure.

The charges stem from an investigation into the September 2022 underwater blasts near Denmark’s Bornholm Island, which severely damaged both pipelines and disrupted Russian gas supplies to Europe during an already escalating energy crisis.

Court documents from December 2025 allege that Serhii K coordinated a team that used the sailing yacht Andromeda to transport explosives to the pipelines. Prosecutors claim he acted as the team’s on-board coordinator and operational leader rather than serving as a diver or explosives specialist.

The Berlin-based law firm Menaker, which represents the accused, has not commented publicly on the indictment.

German prosecutors confirmed that Serhii K is the same individual arrested in Italy in August 2025 following a German arrest warrant. Italy’s highest court later approved his extradition to Germany, where he was transferred in November 2025 to face investigation.

At the time of his arrest, German authorities alleged that the suspect had used forged identity documents to charter the Andromeda in the northern German port of Rostock before the vessel departed on the mission that investigators believe culminated in the sabotage operation.

Serhii K has denied any involvement in the explosions. His defense has maintained that he was serving with the Ukrainian armed forces and was inside Ukraine when the attacks occurred. His lawyers have argued that, even if military service were established, he would be entitled to what they describe as “functional immunity” under international law.

Ukraine denies involvement as investigation continues

The Nord Stream explosions remain among the most politically sensitive investigations in Europe, given their impact on regional energy security and the absence of any formal attribution of responsibility nearly four years after the attack.

Ukraine has consistently denied any state involvement in the sabotage or knowledge of any plot targeting the pipelines.

Speaking at a news conference in Dublin on Wednesday, Volodymyr Zelenskyy said it was too early to comment on the German indictment because Kyiv had not officially received details of the case.

“We have not officially received any details; at least I have not seen them,” Zelenskyy said, adding that it was premature to draw conclusions.

The twin Nord Stream pipelines, running beneath the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany, had been central to Russian gas exports to Europe before relations between Moscow and the West deteriorated sharply following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Although Nord Stream 2 had never entered commercial operation, both pipelines were rendered inoperable by the explosions, eliminating a key component of Europe’s energy infrastructure.

The investigation has involved authorities from Germany, Denmark and Sweden, with investigators examining evidence including vessel movements, explosive residue and maritime records.

The indictment represents the first formal criminal case brought by German prosecutors against an individual alleged to have participated directly in the sabotage. However, investigators have not publicly alleged that the Ukrainian government authorized or directed the operation.

The case is expected to proceed through Germany’s federal court system, where prosecutors will seek to prove that Serhii K coordinated the team responsible for carrying out one of the most significant attacks on critical energy infrastructure in recent European history.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

C

laims that the liberal order emerging after the Second World War had achieved absolute victory in parallel with the end of the Cold War have given way to debates regarding the serious problems associated with the international system, alongside the rapid pace of history and recent developments. When we link the continuity of systems to their ability to find solutions to problems that exist or arise outside the parameters of power, it will be universally acknowledged that a serious systemic crisis exists. The system, which has progressed through international organisations and economic parameters centred on liberal values, has clearly lost its legitimacy due to power struggles, the lawless behaviour of actors described as the system’s guardians, the pandemic, and its failure to produce solutions to the injustices suffered by innocent people, particularly in Palestine.

In parallel with the crises experienced and developments in international politics, various views have emerged regarding the future of the international system. In this context, shifting power dynamics in international politics and new organisational structures have brought with them expectations of a new global hegemony or order outside the West. It must be noted here that, militarily, the international system remains unipolar under US leadership; however, in political and economic terms, it possesses a structure that is either multipolar or progresses within the context of regional cooperation.

The essence of the debates surrounding the international system stems from this very point. The system we define as Western liberal hegemony essentially progresses on the basis of economic and political integration and the application of legal principles; military superiority has been viewed as a power element deployed only when the order it is assumed to uphold is threatened or damaged. Consequently, with the emergence of power centres outside the West in economic terms, the validity of the current international system has begun to be questioned.

The issue of the International System

The concept of ‘post-Western’ (post-Western or beyond the West) emerged in this context and signifies that the West no longer holds absolute dominance in global politics, economics and culture. Alongside rising powers in Asia, particularly China, the fact that regional powers such as India, Russia, the Gulf states, or Brazil, Indonesia and Turkey do not perceive the West as the sole centre of power and instead exhibit autonomous behaviour is seen as a sign of the post-Western world.

In this context, the fact that Europe and the US are no longer viewed as the sole centers of power, that liberal values are being questioned in the context of power shifts, and that a normative pluralism is being centralised—leading to the creation of new institutions that are, for the time being, purely economic in nature and a shift in the understanding of economic development—are defined as the hallmarks of the Post-Western world.

European Commission President Von der Leyen, in a recent statement regarding the need to maintain momentum in the European Union’s enlargement process, also made a significant remark concerning Turkey. According to Von der Leyen, the necessity of fully integrating the European continent is linked to the risk of Europe falling under Turkish, Russian or Chinese influence. Although negotiations do not currently indicate any active depth, Turkey remains a country with an ongoing EU accession process. It is not a new development on the EU side for the head of the EU’s executive body to imply a perception of threat regarding a potential member state. Throughout Turkey’s long history of having applied for membership, it is a common occurrence for similar implications or statements to suggest that its place is not in Europe. This statement alone warrants the question of the direction in which Turkey’s foreign policy is heading.

Beyond this recent example, it is possible to identify numerous instances where Turkey has been left in the lurch by Western actors, where cooperation has been shelved, and where the country has been exposed to serious security threats. In parallel with this, it has led to questions being raised as to the extent to which Turkey’s foreign policy practices—as demonstrated since the beginning of the AK Party’s rule—have diverged from the ‘Western-oriented’ aspect of the traditional foreign policy paradigm, or whether they have instead demonstrated continuity. Perhaps it is precisely here that one might ask whether the concept of ‘Post-Western’—in the context of the waning influence of the West and the consolidation of the position of ‘the others’—is viewed as a viable path for Turkey.

Turkey’s strategy

Foreign policy decision-makers have long held the view that the international system is in crisis and that states which fail to pay attention to shifts in power and shape their position accordingly—or fulfill the necessary requirements—will face serious vulnerabilities. Consequently, the characteristics defined by the ‘Post-Western’ concept are not a new development for Turkey. Ankara has adopted a stance that recognizes the situation where the post-Western state of the international system creates a greater need for security, and acts accordingly.

Turkey’s response to a world where the rule-of-law-based functioning of the international system, which was based on liberal values, has been replaced by a more aggressive world where states prioritize their national interests, has been to prioritize its domestic defene industry to ensure the necessity of defense. It is fair to say that, as of today, Turkey is not only meeting a significant portion of its defense needs domestically but has also established itself as a key player in the international system through its exports and modernization efforts. Consequently, it can be argued that Turkey’s security framework has seen a reduction in its dependent relationship with the West; this shift has enabled it to adopt autonomous behavior, thereby redefining its position within the international system.

Furthermore, in the energy sector—where Turkey is not self-sufficient and may face supply chain issues—it has diversified its partnerships. At the same time, economically, it has begun to avoid limiting itself to a narrow geopolitical framework regarding trade areas. This has naturally led to a proportional increase in the share of non-Western regions in its foreign trade volumes, raising the question of whether Turkey’s political approach is also undergoing a shift in the economic dimension.

Change noticed

The question of whether a Turkey that is independent in terms of security parameters, visionary regarding economic integration, and capable of resolving international crises and issues by asserting its weight on a theoretical and organizational basis is operating within a post-Western framework also offers insights into predicting the possible future of foreign policy.

Turkey has altered its approach to foreign policy with the advent of the AK Party era. Whilst the approach to foreign policy is shaped by what the country possesses and lacks, elements that are possessed but not considered valuable have been brought to the fore, whilst weaknesses that are not possessed—and which, in this respect, perpetuate a relationship of dependency—have been eliminated. Consequently, Turkey has begun to shape its foreign policy not around how it is perceived, but around how it perceives itself. Whereas it was previously perceived as an unwavering ally of the West or a strategic partner defined by shifting concepts, with the change in approach and the evolution of its self-definition, it now positions itself as an equal actor, aware of its own strengths and capable of even treating these as a bargaining chip.

Although this could be illustrated by dozens of examples, President Erdoğan’s message on the occasion of Europe Day stands out as the finest response to the changing methods and perceptions, and in this respect, to von der Leyen’s remarks. Erdoğan stated that Turkey has not deviated from its goal of full EU membership and continues to conduct relations without deviating from the principle of good faith, whilst asserting that the EU needs Turkey more than Turkey needs the EU. The assertion that an EU that does not admit Turkey would be left vulnerable both in meeting its security needs and in managing crises highlights how Turkey perceives the issue of membership through a strong narrative.

So, is Turkey operating within a post-Western framework? It is difficult to give a definitive ‘yes’ to this question. Indeed, one could even argue that Turkey has no agenda to problematise the West. Alongside statements from government officials indicating that they do not approach the possibility of Turkey’s membership of the EU or its potential participation in new security formations with a logic of substitution, the fact that Ankara has no intention of undergoing an identity shift in economic or political terms demonstrates that it does not have a Post-Western world objective.

However, in parallel with the shift in its perception of foreign policy, it is also a fact that Turkey has long been acting in a post-Western manner as a result of the narrow geopolitical understanding and logic of interests inherent in the historical Western paradigm. Consequently, Turkey shapes its foreign policy by correctly perceiving the West and acting in accordance with the system’s requirements; in this respect, it treats the West as it does other actors within the equation of national interests and cooperation.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

A

fter the end of the Cold War, the United States began to dominate the world as the sole superpower. Over the past 35 years, the Americans, maintaining this singularity, have tried to punish their enemies and the countries they declared as enemies by invading them. For this purpose, they occupied Afghanistan and Iraq, the latter having no connection to the 9/11 attacks while the former’s sheltering of Bin Laden did not require invasion of the whole country. Allies also did not withhold their support from the U.S. in these occupations.

Americans, together with Israel, who consider it their duty to attack countries they have labeled as enemies and try to legitimize it with excuses such as democracy and human rights, most recently attacked Iran on February 28. More than two months have passed but the Israel‑U.S. duo, which killed all Iranian leaders on the first day with Iran’s initial naivete, still have not achieved their goals. No regime has collapsed, no country has been occupied, Iran’s nuclear program has not been destroyed, and the Iranian army has not been neutralized. Moreover, Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz has plunged the whole world into an economic crisis.

In short, Iran is a big bite for the U.S. and Israel, and they could not swallow it. Although Trump repeatedly proclaimed victories, there is no real victory. If the allies had supported America, the outcome might have been different, but the allies declared they would not do anything for the U.S. by refusing to enter a war that the U.S. itself does not even have. Moreover, the U.S. was planning to occupy Greenland, NATO territory, just a few months ago.

Super‑power status open to debate?

The United States’ failure naturally opens its super‑power status to debate. Five years ago, while writing an academic paper on whether the U.S. is still a superpower, I observed that despite being the world’s most powerful country in many areas, the U.S. does not possess the power to control the entire world. For example, 24 % of global GDP belongs to the United States. With that share, it is impossible to dominate the remaining 76 % of the world. Militarily, the U.S. is the strongest country, but even in this field the days of policing the world are far behind.

However, while writing the paper I concluded that the U.S. remains a superpower thanks to its allies. Especially because many European states, Japan, South Korea, Canada, and numerous European allies accept U.S. leadership, America’s super‑power status continued.

The tide has turned, and now the United States is led by Donald Trump, a leader whose actions are uncertain even in his own country, whose statecraft is debated, and who does not hesitate to target his own allies. In the Iran war, Trump entered the conflict without any ally’s approval, simply because Israel wanted it. Even though he eyed Greenland and threatened to withdraw from NATO, he still expected support from allies. Yet his allies, not being as reckless, did not join a war that the U.S. itself had not started, leaving the U.S. (and Israel) alone.

Israel is an ally of the US more than Europe

Today, Israel is the United States’ closest ally. You will not see Israel suffering the insults Trump directed at Europeans. Conversely, Israel’s closest ally is not the United States. In other words, Israel will not go to war for the U.S.; they see the U.S. as a country whose resources will be exploited. Unfortunately, this is the painful truth many know but dare not say about U.S.–Israel relations.

As a result, the United States is more alone than ever, which provides a good opportunity to test its power. The Iran war became an example serving exactly this purpose. It is evident that the U.S. cannot maintain hegemony alone. Perhaps it could win a one‑on‑one war against Iran or another country, but the price would be heavy. Therefore, if it does not engage in an existential war, every war it joins will take pieces from its existence and further weaken it.

It is also necessary to emphasize the clumsiness of the American army. Americans are truly ahead in internet technology, which helps keep their economy strong. However, they struggle to keep up with changes in the weapons industry. While Iran managed to push away massive aircraft carriers with a few thousand‑dollar kamikaze drones and, according to claims, shot down an F‑35 with a lower‑technology air‑defense system, battlefields are filling with smaller, more effective weapons, yet the U.S. still relies on large‑scale armaments. Consequently, some of its assets have been destroyed or forced to withdraw from the region. If this trend continues, the United States’ biggest asset will be its nuclear weapons, whose production becomes easier over time. Thus, American hegemony in weaponry is rapidly declining.

Moreover, as long as the Trump administration governs, it is unlikely that Washington will abandon its current policies for a more rational foreign policy. Since American voters elected Trump, Americans themselves need to do a reckoning for their country and elect leaders who truly believe in the “America First” motto and think more sensibly. Otherwise, even if they do not realize it, their country is sliding downhill rapidly.

If this trend continues, the American era will end much earlier. Assuming the U.S. emerged as a superpower in 1945, its hegemony would not even last a hundred years. No hegemon lends its power to another country for free, alienates its friends, conducts arbitrary invasions, or hands state power to leaders who are blackmailed, have a dark past, and are incompetent.

F

ollowing Viktor Orbán’s defeat, the elections held in Hungary attracted considerable attention in Turkey. Various predictions were made based on election assessments and comparative analyses. Analyses comparing the election winner, Péter Magyar, with Orbán, in particular, interpreted the election results through classic dichotomies, such as democracy versus authoritarianism, liberal democracy versus populism, and the right versus the far right.

However, regrettably, many of these analyses relied on these clichéd distinctions and interpretations. Furthermore, the post-liberal rise in Hungarian and international politics was analyzed from a liberal perspective, resulting in erroneous interpretations. Initial assessments such as the return of liberal democracy, the retreat of authoritarianism, and the defeat of the far right and populism demonstrate an inability to understand the true nature of the sociopolitical transformation occurring in Hungary and around the world.

The true significance of the Hungarian election results

The clearest conclusion to be drawn from the election results is that there is a significant crisis of legitimacy and trust within the political landscape, rather than an ideological shift. Orbán was defeated by another post-liberal figure who uses similar language, draws on the same social base, and shares a similar perception of the crisis. In other words, contrary to what is often assumed, the new prime minister, Magyar, is not so much a liberal democrat as he is another figure who largely represents the post-liberal current due to the rhetoric he employs and the ideological position he occupies. From this perspective, the Hungarian elections should not be viewed as a regime change or political transformation but rather as a renewal and cleansing of actors within post-liberalism itself.

More precisely, Orbán’s defeat and the winner’s profile do not, contrary to many interpretations, signify that the social demands he represented and championed have disappeared. On the contrary, the election results indicate that post-liberal tendencies persist, but the current government has lost its ability to represent these demands.

The most significant indicator of this is that the dynamics underpinning the post-liberal quest remain firmly in place. The inequalities brought about by neoliberalism, the uncertainties arising from technological transformation, and the perceived cultural disintegration caused by liberal democracy continue to generate a strong need for security and meaning across broad sections of society. People still expect a political stance that delivers public services and defends their own values.

For this reason, the election results should be interpreted as a rearticulation of the social demands represented by post-liberalism, despite the fact that these demands are being discredited with labels such as populism, authoritarianism, and far-right extremism. When Orbán’s political platform could no longer meet these expectations, the electorate did not abandon that platform. Instead, they chose a new leader whom they believed could represent it more effectively. Thus, the transformation witnessed in the Hungarian elections is more indicative of a crisis of representation being resolved than an ideological rupture. Society did not change its demands; it simply updated its choice of who would represent them.

Why did Orbán lose?

The real breaking point that led to Orbán losing his 16-year reign was not the depletion of his ideological framework. As the standard-bearer of the post-liberal movement, Orbán began contradicting his own claims. Over time, he formed a new power bloc to replace the “corrupt elites” he had criticized. This network, centered on the distribution of state resources, became the focal point of accusations of corruption and nepotism.

In foreign policy, however, his decision to replace the “corrupt EU,” which he claimed was victimizing the Hungarian people through liberal democratic impositions, opposing moral values, and neoliberal economic policies, with Putin’s Russia and Trump’s U.S. began to backfire. The hegemonic rhetoric of foreign policy suffered as a result of the increasing visibility and influence of Russia and the U.S. Indeed, anti-elitist rhetoric has lost credibility and is now perceived as merely anti-EU.

Furthermore, the deterioration in economic performance has accelerated this crisis of legitimacy. Financial pressures arising from high inflation, interventionist policies, and tensions with the EU have undermined the government’s claims of “stability” and a “protective state.” Consequently, the disconnect between rhetoric and material reality has become more apparent. Orbán, the champion of the post-liberal movement he defines as “illiberal democracy,” was unable to maintain the moral and political framework he had established. This has led to the collapse of his credibility, reliability, consistency, and moral superiority claims. All of this has driven centrist voters, who were already opposed to Orbán and predominantly reside in major cities, as well as peripheral voters, where Orbán traditionally enjoys a high concentration of support, to seek an alternative.

The political significance of Magyar

Péter Magyar’s rise and electoral victory are most significant at this juncture. Magyar is neither a radical alternative nor an outsider to the political discourse established by Orbán. However, it cannot be said that he has abandoned Orbán’s ideology and “found the right path,” as is often assumed. On the contrary, Magyar is a figure who speaks a similar language yet promises to anchor it within a more rational, balanced, and trustworthy framework.

What sets Magyar apart is his promise to rebuild the political ground represented by Orbán and sustain it more honestly and fairly. Consequently, Magyar is not a representative of a classical liberal restoration, and his frequent emphasis on the rule of law should not be interpreted as such. He neither abandons the idea of a strong nation-state within the post-liberal framework nor entirely abandons the space for debate and politics of self-valorization opened up by the Orbán era. Instead, Magyar promises to embed post-liberalism and politics of self-valorization within a more rational, institutionalized, and sustainable framework. In this respect, Magyar does not aim to abandon the “post-liberal” approach t rather to fulfill their requirements honestly and successfully. Thus, the political significance of Peter Magyar should not be assessed as an ideological break in Hungarian politics but rather as a recalibration of the same line.

Taking all this into account, Magyar can essentially be described as the leader of a populist initiative that takes the form of “anti-Orbánism.” His strategy is based on an anti-corruption narrative and the idea of “cleansing the state of a handful of corrupt Orbánist elites.” This is a powerful manifestation of populism. By projecting an ethical stance, Magyar positions himself as a central figure in rebuilding a legitimate and just order. This is precisely the area that was most eroded during Orbán’s tenure, and Magyar has succeeded in winning over peripheral voters with this approach.

The difference in approach toward relations with the EU is also a significant indicator of anti-Orbánist populism in foreign policy. Unlike Orbán, who sometimes relies on a confrontational rhetorical style, Magyar aligns more closely with the principle of “a strong Hungary, a strong Europe” as a European nation. This approach largely stems from the perspective that Europe’s strategic autonomy is achievable through strong nation-states, which is somewhat anti-Russian and anti-American. Consequently, while Magyar’s ideology is similar to Orbán’s, his practical policies diverge.

The picture that emerges within this framework clearly demonstrates the following: Magyar embraces post-liberalism and promises to rescue it from Orbán’s grasp, purify it, and rebuild it through discipline. While preserving the mobilization generated by populism, Magyar aims to rebuild the institutional and economic foundations eroded by Orbán. In this respect, Magyar represents a more refined, accountable, and enduring version of post-liberalism. He seeks to reinforce this by upholding the same social sensitivities through the rule of law, institutional balance, and economic rationality.

A

planned withdrawal of 5,000 US troops from Germany may appear limited in scale, but analysts warn it reflects a far broader challenge confronting NATO and European security.

The decision, announced by Donald Trump, comes amid escalating tensions between Washington and its European allies. Disputes over tariffs, disagreements on support for Ukraine, and sharp rhetoric surrounding the Iran conflict have deepened divisions across the Atlantic alliance.

The troop reduction follows criticism from German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who accused the United States of mishandling tensions with Iran. In response, Trump signaled not only the withdrawal from Germany but also hinted at possible reductions in other European countries, including Italy and Spain.

Spain has already refused US requests to use its bases for operations linked to the Iran conflict, while Trump criticized both countries for what he described as insufficient support.

For years, Trump has argued that Europe relies too heavily on US military protection, frequently singling out Germany for failing to meet defense spending expectations.

A shift in US priorities

Despite the planned reduction, Germany still hosts tens of thousands of US troops, far fewer than during the Cold War, when troop levels reached around 250,000.

Officials in Washington suggest the shift reflects a broader strategic pivot. According to Pentagon leadership, the US intends to focus on regions where its military power is uniquely decisive, particularly in Asia and the Western Hemisphere.

European leaders, however, view the move as a sign of weakening commitment. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned that internal divisions now pose a greater threat to the alliance than external adversaries.

The withdrawal highlights Europe’s long-standing dependence on US military support, even as threats from Russia persist.

In response, key nations, including France, United Kingdom, and Germany, have pledged to significantly increase defense spending. Projections suggest European defense budgets could nearly double by 2030.

Yet financial investment alone may not be enough.

Europe’s defense industry remains fragmented, with multiple countries producing competing systems rather than coordinating efforts. This lack of integration drives up costs and slows development. For example, Europe manufactures several types of battle tanks, while the US focuses on a single main model, improving efficiency and scale.

Joint defense projects have also struggled. A high-profile effort between France and Germany to develop next-generation fighter jets has faced repeated delays due to disagreements over leadership and design priorities.

Capability gaps and strategic risks

One of the most urgent concerns is missile defense. European systems currently lack the scale and sophistication of US platforms such as Patriot and THAAD systems, which have been heavily deployed in recent conflicts.

At the same time, the Pentagon has canceled plans to deploy additional long-range missile units to Europe, further widening capability gaps.

The European Union is attempting to address these vulnerabilities by encouraging member states to source more defense equipment domestically. By 2030, at least half of defense procurement is expected to remain within the EU.

However, transitioning away from US systems presents risks, particularly as global demand for weapons increases amid ongoing conflicts.

A crossroads for NATO

Europe now faces a strategic choice. A faster path to rearmament would rely on continued US cooperation, but that depends on trust that appears increasingly strained.

The alternative is a slower, more independent route requiring greater spending, deeper industrial integration, and political willingness to pool sovereignty, an objective that has long proved elusive.

Despite the challenges, there are signs of progress. Defense companies such as Saab, Rheinmetall, and BAE Systems report record demand, while newer NATO members Sweden and Finland have rapidly integrated into the alliance.

Still, the withdrawal of 5,000 troops underscores a critical reality: Europe’s security architecture is entering a period of transition, with uncertain implications for the future of transatlantic cooperation.

(Source: CNN)

B

ulgaria’s Progressive Bulgaria coalition, led by former president Rumen Radev, was on course for a commanding victory in Sunday’s early parliamentary elections, according to near-final results released by the Central Election Commission (CEC) on Monday, raising the prospect of a single-party government in a country plagued by years of political instability.

With 87.2% of ballots counted as of 9:50 a.m. local time (0650 GMT), Progressive Bulgaria had secured 44.6% of the vote, maintaining a substantial lead over its rivals. The reformist We Continue the Change–Democratic Bulgaria coalition trailed in second place with 13.5%, narrowly ahead of the center-right GERB–SDS alliance, anchored by Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria, which stood at 13.3%.

The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), traditionally representing minority communities, garnered around 6.1%, while the nationalist Revival (Vazrazhdane) hovered just above the parliamentary threshold with approximately 4.4%.

A strong lead

Earlier preliminary results, based on a smaller share of counted votes, had already indicated a strong lead for Progressive Bulgaria, with support above 43%. Parallel vote counts conducted by polling agencies and reported by the state news agency BTA projected an even higher share nearing 45%, reinforcing expectations of a decisive outcome.

Seat projections based on partial results suggest Progressive Bulgaria could win around 134 seats in the 240-member National Assembly, comfortably surpassing the 121-seat threshold required to form a majority government. GERB–SDS and We Continue the Change–Democratic Bulgaria are projected to secure roughly 38 and 37 seats respectively, while MRF and Revival are expected to hold smaller blocs.

If confirmed, the result would mark a dramatic shift in Bulgaria’s political landscape, potentially ending a prolonged period of fragmentation that has seen the Balkan country hold eight parliamentary elections since 2021. Successive votes have failed to produce stable governing coalitions, leading to a cycle of short-lived administrations and caretaker governments appointed by the presidency.

Sunday’s election once again drew a crowded field, with 14 political parties and 10 alliances competing for seats. However, voter engagement remained subdued. The CEC reported turnout at just 34.63% as of 4:00 p.m. local time (1300 GMT) on election day, reflecting persistent public disillusionment with the political process.

Growing frustration with entrenched political elites

Analysts say Progressive Bulgaria’s surge reflects growing frustration with entrenched political elites and repeated governance failures. The coalition, which campaigned on promises of institutional reform, economic stability and a break from years of political deadlock, appears to have consolidated support across a broad segment of the electorate.

“The scale of this lead suggests voters are seeking a clear mandate and an end to the cycle of inconclusive elections,” said a Sofia-based political analyst. “Whether that translates into effective governance will depend on how the coalition manages internal cohesion and opposition pressure.”

Despite the strong showing, challenges remain. Bulgaria continues to grapple with economic disparities, corruption concerns and geopolitical pressures as a member of both the European Union and NATO. A decisive parliamentary majority could provide the political stability needed to pursue reforms, but expectations are likely to be high.

The CEC is required under Bulgarian law to announce final vote totals and the official seat distribution within four days of the election. The names of elected members of parliament must be published within seven days.

Until then, attention will remain focused on whether Progressive Bulgaria’s projected majority holds as the remaining ballots are counted. If it does, the result could mark the beginning of a new political chapter for Bulgaria after years of uncertainty and repeated trips to the polls.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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rominent left-leaning leaders from across the world are convening in Barcelona this weekend in a coordinated effort to strengthen progressive alliances and push back against the growing influence of far-right movements globally.

The gatherings are spearheaded by Spain’s Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez, and Brazil’s President, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who are co-hosting a series of high-level meetings bringing together political leaders, activists, and civil society representatives.

The initiative, dubbed the “Global Progressive Mobilization,” aims to rally support for multilateralism, democratic institutions, and coordinated action on issues such as climate change and social inequality. Organizers say the meetings will culminate in a joint declaration outlining shared priorities and strategies.

The summit comes amid shifting global dynamics, including policy changes under U.S. President Donald Trump, whose administration’s cuts to humanitarian aid, military actions, and critical stance toward NATO have unsettled traditional alliances and prompted renewed debate over international cooperation.

Prominent leaders to attend

Several prominent leaders are expected to attend, including South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum. Sheinbaum’s visit marks the first trip by a Mexican president to Spain since 2018, following years of diplomatic tensions related to historical grievances over Spain’s colonial legacy.

A parallel event organized by Spain’s ruling Socialist Party is set to draw around 3,000 participants, including current and former heads of state, hundreds of mayors, trade unions, and grassroots organizations. The two-day gathering will focus on mobilizing support for progressive policies and strengthening political networks across borders.

The meetings also reflect concerns among left-wing leaders following the rise of far-right parties in recent years, particularly after gains in the 2024 European Parliament elections. Organizers describe the Barcelona summit as a response to that trend, aiming to demonstrate that alternative political pathways remain viable.

International cooperation is important

Speaking ahead of the event, Sánchez emphasized the importance of international cooperation among progressive forces. “It is important that progressive parties and governments unite to show that there is something beyond domestic politics,” he said during a recent visit to China, where he met President Xi Jinping to discuss closer ties.

The summit follows recent political developments in Europe, including the electoral defeat of Hungarian nationalist leader Viktor Orbán, which Sánchez has pointed to as evidence that far-right momentum can be challenged.

Organizers say the overarching goal is to present a unified front against what they describe as “extreme right-wing movements” and to reinforce commitments to democratic governance and international collaboration.

The Barcelona meetings are expected to conclude with a joint statement from participating leaders, outlining coordinated efforts to address global challenges and strengthen progressive political movements worldwide.

(Source: Reuters)

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.S. Vice President JD Vance has described Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s electoral defeat as “very bad” for the United States, while pledging that Washington would maintain strong relations with Hungary’s incoming government.

Speaking in an interview with Fox News on Monday, Vance acknowledged that the loss had been anticipated but expressed disappointment at the outcome. “We certainly knew there was a very good chance that Viktor would lose that election,” he said, referring to the U.S. administration’s backing of Orbán ahead of the vote. “He’s one of the few European leaders willing to stand up to the bureaucracy in Brussels.”

Vance praised Orbán’s 16-year tenure as “transformational,” portraying him as a key ally who challenged European Union policies that Washington has also criticized in recent years. Despite his concerns, Vance struck a pragmatic tone, emphasizing continuity in bilateral ties. “I’m sad that he lost. We’ll work very well, I’m sure, with the next prime minister of Hungary,” he said.

Hungary’s opposition leader Péter Magyar and his Tisza party secured a decisive victory in Sunday’s election, according to official results. Orbán conceded defeat shortly after, stating that his party would “serve our nation from the opposition,” marking a dramatic shift in Hungarian politics after more than a decade and a half of his leadership.

A blow to Netanyahu

Orbán’s defeat is also being closely watched in Israel, where Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has long counted the Hungarian leader among his closest European allies.

The relationship between the two leaders has been both ideological and strategic. Netanyahu publicly endorsed Orbán during the campaign, describing him in a pre-recorded message as a guarantor of “safety, security, and stability.” His son, Yair Netanyahu, has also cultivated ties with Orbán’s Fidesz party and attended campaign-related events in Budapest.

Following the election, Netanyahu referred to Orbán as a “true friend of Israel” in a social media statement, while also congratulating Magyar on his victory — signaling a careful diplomatic balancing act as Israel adjusts to the new political reality in Hungary.

The partnership between Netanyahu and Orbán has extended beyond rhetoric. In 2025, Hungary announced its withdrawal from the International Criminal Court after the court issued arrest warrants against Netanyahu related to the Gaza war. The move made Hungary one of the few countries where Netanyahu could travel without legal risk.

Orbán also played a key role within the European Union by blocking joint statements critical of Israel, leveraging the bloc’s requirement for unanimity in foreign policy decisions. His departure from power could therefore alter EU dynamics regarding Israel.

Inspiration for Israeli opposition

In Israel, Orbán’s defeat is being interpreted by opposition figures as a sign that entrenched political systems can be challenged successfully.

Efrat Rayten, a member of the left-leaning Democrat party, described the result as “a message of hope.” She argued that the outcome demonstrated that even leaders with significant control over institutions and media are not immune to electoral defeat.

“The idea that a leader who controls the institutions and the media is immune to defeat has been shattered,” Rayten told CNN. “The lesson for Israel is unity, perseverance, and faith in civil society.”

Since Netanyahu returned to power in 2023, critics have frequently pointed to Hungary under Orbán as a model of democratic backsliding. Protests against judicial reforms in Israel have often included the slogan “Israel will not become Hungary,” reflecting concerns about institutional weakening.

A March 2026 report by the Zulat think tank characterized Israel as moving toward a “partially authoritarian” system, drawing parallels with Orbán’s governance. While noting differences between the two leaders, the report argued that recent policies in Israel risk undermining democratic checks and balances.

Israel’s political landscape remains deeply fragmented

Despite the optimism among Netanyahu’s opponents, analysts caution that Orbán’s defeat does not guarantee similar outcomes elsewhere. Israel’s political landscape remains deeply fragmented, and opposition unity — cited as a key factor in Hungary’s election — has historically been difficult to achieve.

Rayten emphasized that electoral change requires sustained public engagement beyond formal political institutions. “Change does not happen only in the corridors of Parliament,” she said. “It begins in the streets, with people who refuse to give up.”

As Hungary prepares for a new government under Magyar, both Washington and Jerusalem are recalibrating their strategies. For the United States, the transition represents a test of its ability to maintain alliances despite political shifts. For Israel, it marks the loss of a reliable ally within Europe — and potentially, a symbolic moment in its own ongoing political debates.

(Source: CNN and Anadolu)

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ivisions are emerging within NATO as several European countries resist supporting U.S.-Israeli military operations against Iran. The disagreement highlights growing unease across Europe about the direction and legality of the month-long war.

U.S. President Donald Trump has sharply criticized European allies, accusing them of failing to support Washington’s efforts. He described some partners as “unhelpful” and previously labeled them “cowards,” underscoring rising tensions within the alliance.

The dispute comes as the war intensifies, placing pressure on long-standing transatlantic relationships and raising questions about NATO cohesion during a major geopolitical crisis.

France and Italy restrict military cooperation

France has taken an unprecedented step by refusing to allow its airspace to be used for transporting U.S. weapons to Israel for operations against Iran. According to diplomatic sources, this marked the first such denial since the war began.

The French government said the decision was consistent with its policy since the start of the war. However, Israeli officials reacted strongly, accusing Paris of obstructing critical military logistics. In response, Israel signaled it could suspend defense procurement from France.

Italy has also imposed limits. Authorities reportedly denied permission for U.S. military aircraft to land at the Sigonella air base in Sicily en route to the Middle East. Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto later downplayed the move, saying it reflected standard procedures requiring specific authorization for operations beyond existing agreements.

Spain leads criticism of the war

Spain has emerged as one of the most outspoken critics of the U.S.-Israeli campaign. Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has openly questioned the strikes, while Defense Minister Margarita Robles emphasized that Spanish bases would only be used for NATO’s collective defense—not for offensive operations.

Madrid has gone further by fully closing its airspace to U.S. aircraft involved in attacks on Iran, citing adherence to international law.

Trump also criticized the United Kingdom for its limited involvement, despite its close alliance with Washington. His remarks coincided with a planned state visit by King Charles III to the United States, adding a diplomatic layer to the tensions.

Broader implications for NATO and the war

The disagreements extend beyond individual countries. Germany, which hosts the major U.S. military hub at Ramstein Air Base, initially placed no restrictions on its use. However, debate has intensified after Frank-Walter Steinmeier suggested the war may be illegal under international law.

Analysts say these fractures could weaken NATO unity at a critical moment, potentially complicating U.S. military planning and signaling a broader reluctance in Europe to be drawn deeper into the war.

As the war continues, Europe’s cautious stance reflects a balancing act: maintaining alliance commitments while avoiding escalation in a war that many leaders fear could spiral further across the region.

(Source: Reuters)

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he unilateral military intervention by the U.S. and Israel targeting Iran has not only shaken the security architecture of the Middle East but has also exposed the structural fault lines in the international system in all their starkness. This move, which goes beyond a mere conjunctural security crisis, is a strategic catalyst transforming the already deep-seated transatlantic alliance and the internal balance of Europe. This blatant projection of power by the U.S. is leading to the disintegration of the “normative power” discourse that Europe has championed for decades. Furthermore, it confirms the continent’s passive position in the new global power struggle, while clearly demonstrating that the search for “strategic autonomy” in Europe is no longer a debate about a vision but a geopolitical necessity.

The rapid transformation of transatlantic relations: From crisis to alignment

Until recently, transatlantic relations were experiencing one of the deepest cracks of the post-Cold War era. The increasingly diminished strategic priority given to Europe in the new U.S. National Security Strategy document, the openly expressed differences in vision at the Davos and Munich security summits, and especially Donald Trump’s pronouncements culminating in his rhetoric about annexing Greenland, had triggered a search in European capitals for a security architecture outside the American umbrella.

European decision-makers were trying to build a line of resistance against Washington’s unilateral impositions, centering on international law, the rules-based system, and institutional norms. They shaped their fundamental arguments in the face of crises on this normative basis, defending the liberal international order.

However, the war of the U.S. and Israel against Iran proved how fragile this line of resistance was. In a moment of systemic crisis, European capitals, unable to produce a new strategic solution, aligned themselves predominantly and rapidly behind the Trump administration. Although the discursive and structural reasons that recently distanced the continent from the U.S. have not disappeared, with the occurrence of U.S. and Israeli military intervention, Europe’s normative discourse gave way to a reflex of accepting geopolitical tutelage and a rising emphasis on autonomy.

Strategic fragmentation within Europe and the attitudes of the actors

Europe’s passive alignment in this process points to a deepening strategic fragmentation rather than a homogeneous bloc within the continent. The attitudes displayed by European actors during the crisis demonstrate that the European Union (EU) has failed to produce a common foreign policy understanding.

EU Institutional Governance and the Instrumentalization of Law: The European Commission and the European Parliament have refused to invoke international law in the face of the Iranian intervention. These institutions, ardent defenders of “rules-based order” in the Ukraine and Greenland crises , have avoided condemning the unilateral attack by the U.S. and Israel. Instead, they have shifted their rhetoric, directly targeting Tehran and adopting a position that supports and legitimizes the “regime change” agenda. This demonstrates that the EU has integrated its founding values, which it references in key crises, into the geopolitical vision of the U.S. Furthermore, the statements of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen have sparked a separate bureaucratic debate within the continent, questioning the Commission’s role in foreign policy.

The E3 (United Kingdom, France, Germany) and Support for the Operation: On the political level, the E3 bloc, setting aside its rhetoric regarding its own crises, adopted a discourse targeting Iran and supporting regime change, instead of discussing the international legal aspects of the attack. The most striking aspect of the process is the integration of Europe’s traditional power centers, both militarily and politically, into the Washington-Tel Aviv axis. The United Kingdom became a logistical part of the intervention by allowing the use of its military bases during the operation. On the French side, President Emmanuel Macron’s rhetorical reservation that the operation did not comply with international law did not change the geopolitical alignment on the ground. Despite this legal objection, the French government actively provided military deterrence support to the intervention by deploying warplanes to the Mediterranean. This profound asymmetry between rhetoric and action clearly confirms the normative inconsistency experienced by the continent.

Germany’s Deviation: Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s stance during his visit to the U.S. represents a turning point in terms of European integration and its position as a bloc in global relations. Beyond fully supporting the U.S. policy on Iran and its goal of regime change, Merz’s endorsement of Trump’s threat of economic sanctions against another EU member, Spain , signifies the dismantling by the U.S. of the principle of economic solidarity, which is the very foundation of the EU’s existence.

Isolated Minority: Countries that have openly spoken out against the violation of international law and condemned the attack by name, particularly Spain and, to a lesser extent, Norway and Denmark, have been isolated within their own continents, threatened by the U.S. for defending founding values, and made vulnerable to political and economic pressure (threats of embargo, etc.) by the European mainstream that has remained silent.

From normative crisis to the quest for hard power

Europe’s reaction to the U.S. and Israeli intervention in Iran is the clearest proof that the crisis is not merely a leadership failure, but a structural disintegration process taking place on the continent. While the continent mobilized international law and sovereignty norms against Russian revisionism in the Ukraine crisis, it has openly suspended these principles in the Iranian equation. The tacit approval by European leaders of the unilateral use of force and regime change agendas of the U.S.-Israel axis serves as evidence for objections arguing that the “rules-based order” rhetoric is not a universal principle for Europe but merely a geopolitical facade. The EU’s acceptance of Trump’s tutelage, considered until recently the greatest threat to its strategic autonomy, without producing any serious and visible strategic objection, is liquidating its normative power claim in the international system.

As analysts have pointed out, Europe’s current military capacity is not at a level to project hard power in the region without a normative veneer of legitimacy. This structural impasse, and its strategic insignificance in the recently evolving Middle East equation, has pushed Europe to construct a narrative of legitimacy in order to reconcile its own values ​​with its geopolitical capitulation. Lacking genuine diplomatic autonomy on the ground, Europe is distorting the causality of the crisis within its own normative illusion, effectively transforming into a passive logistical apparatus of the interventionist axis.

Recent developments and the intervention in Iran have made Europe’s normative double standards and selective solidarity globally visible, simultaneously pushing Europe from static acceptance towards a more pragmatic and harder rationality. Excluded and even humiliated in transatlantic relations, the continent, facing for the first time the reality that the rules-based system may not work for itself, is now softening its normative power illusions and turning towards hard power instruments and new strategic diversification efforts.

Europe’s passive stance towards intervention in Iran has reached a new stage, with leaders now speaking directly to Trump’s political rationality. Chancellor Merz ‘s statement, “It is not the time to lecture our allies,” thus relinquishing his claim to normative superiority, is no ordinary diplomatic maneuver. By directly linking the continent’s Iran policy to “geopolitical vulnerability towards Russia,” the German chancellor has demonstrated that Europe is now openly putting even its most fundamental founding principles on the geopolitical bargaining table to guarantee its own security.

However, the most tangible development accelerated by the Iranian intervention is taking place on the military front, and this transformation is largely shaped by France’s initiative. Paris, which argues that the next half-century will be the “age of nuclear weapons,” has operationalized its new nuclear doctrine with the geopolitical momentum created by the crisis.

With a strategic message delivered from the nuclear submarine base in Brest, France announced its intention to quantitatively increase its current inventory of around 300 warheads and to deploy its next-generation nuclear submarine, codenamed “The Invincible,” by 2036. The real breakthrough in this move, beyond mere national capacity building, is the “enhanced deterrence” architecture agreed upon with eight European countries, including the UK, Germany, and Poland. This new concept means the effective deployment of French nuclear strike force (force de frappe) across the entire European continent through bomber aircraft stationed at allied airbases and joint exercises. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s rationalization of this bloc as a “joint armament that will deter enemies from attacking” is essentially the most concrete manifestation of Europe’s growing conventional weakness and strategic unpredictability, and its eagerness to close this gap through a final, continental arms buildup.

Another specific step taken by France was aimed at overcoming another institutional crisis experienced by the EU. Europe’s institutional paralysis became a much more concrete security vulnerability as the conflict intensifying in the Gulf spilled over into the Eastern Mediterranean. The continent’s inability to generate institutional deterrence against threats to the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) was confirmed by a legal impasse in the case of the GCA. The GCA’s inability to invoke the EU’s mutual defense clause (42.7) against regional threats stems, in part, from the Union’s fear of being formally drawn into the war in the Middle East. Therefore, the GCA’s defense burden was left to Greece’s unilateral military buildup. However, shortly afterward, Macron announced the deployment of the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle to the Mediterranean, intending to, in a way, close this institutional gap.

What’s next for Europe

The current situation demonstrates that the U.S. and Israeli intervention in Iran represents not merely a foreign policy crisis for Europe, but a new and serious moment of confrontation. Above all, this process has brought to light the fundamental structural flaws in the EU’s capacity as a global actor in the Middle East. The most striking reality is that Europe, lacking independent military deterrence and an integrated power projection on the ground, cannot be a meaningful, decisive, and autonomous actor in the Middle East equation without the geopolitical patronage and leadership of the U.S. The continent’s inability to produce independent strategic thinking in times of crisis – as once again demonstrated in the Iran intervention – makes its diplomatic influence entirely dependent on Washington’s initiative and guidance on the ground.

This passivity and loss of initiative is leading to a deep strategic fragmentation within the EU rather than institutional integration. Instead of uniting around a common vision, the Union is producing asymmetrical and reactive policies driven by national security concerns. Moreover, this strategic fragmentation within the continent is directly fueled and deepened by Washington. Washington is openly imposing “taking sides” and unconditional alignment with the American axis on European capitals, leaving them no room for diplomatic maneuvering or the option of neutrality. The threat of sanctions against actors deviating from the mainstream, such as Spain, and the silence of Germany, the locomotive of the continent, are undermining the foundation of solidarity within the EU and turning its members into forced extensions of the U.S.’s unilateral policies.

The most striking historical irony revealed by the crisis in the context of transatlantic relations is the dramatic transformation in Europe’s discourse on security and identity. In recent crises and signs of transatlantic rupture, Europe clung tightly to the discourse of rules-based international order and international law; today, it is rapidly abandoning this normative shield. Values-based diplomacy is giving way to plans to expand the nuclear umbrella, led by France, military buildup, and pure hard power reflexes. Essentially, Europe’s shift towards hard power and militarization is a fundamental strategic recommendation that the U.S. has persistently urged and imposed on the continent in the context of sharing the defense burden. However, Europe is pursuing this goal not as an autonomous and visionary global power, but in a state of panic, having lost its normative credibility, fragmented internally, and subjected to external tutelage.

Having lost its normative power role that dictated diplomacy and rules in previous crises, Europe is increasingly transforming into a classic power politics actor in the increasingly normless global system, seeking to exist not through its values ​​but through its military capacity and geopolitical survival instincts.

(Originally published in Turkish by SETA Foundation)

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n Germany, in September 2013, a new party narrowly missed entering the federal parliament (Bundestag) in its first election, receiving only 4.7% of the vote. The Alternative for Germany Party, or AfD for short, founded in April 2013, quickly completed the necessary registration requirements at the federal level and qualified to participate in the parliamentary elections. At the time, it was not surprising that the AfD, considered by many to be a populist, anti-European party fueled by conspiracy theories and making empty promises and threats in its political rhetoric, failed to enter parliament. Indeed, experts had stated that German voters would never show interest in such political movements.

The most unpredictable turning point in the political history of Germany, which was rebuilt after World War II, was the dismissal of the AfD after the 2013 federal parliamentary elections, and its being seen as a politically insignificant movement. This policy of ignoring the AfD shaped the political attitude towards it. It paved the way for the unstoppable rise of the AfD in Germany, which began with the 2014 European Parliament elections. At the same time, it created rifts in the German social structure, opening the way for far-right and populist movements like PEGIDA and helping the AfD to build voter support.

Far-right movements in Europe, long ignored as in Germany, began to emerge as a rooted political movement from 2010 onwards. In January 2017, the “ENF (Europa der Nationen und der Freiheit)” political group in the European Parliament met in Koblenz, Germany. This meeting witnessed some very interesting encounters and statements. Nearly 40 far-right representatives from 9 countries that had far-right parties represented in the European Parliament at the time attended this meeting.

Led by Marie Le Pen of the French Front National, the meeting also featured speakers including Geert Wilders from the Netherlands, Frauke Petry from the AfD leadership in Germany, and Matteo Salvini representing the Lega Nord in Italy. The outcome of the meeting was quite alarming: Nine far-right European parties, led by Le Pen, who describe the European Union as an oppressive regime for the European people, pledged a new European future, declaring that the current EU and world system has ended and that the construction of a new future has begun.

The Bannon effect on the European far right

Another significant event at the Koblenz meeting was the celebration of Trump’s election as U.S. President in 2017 by representatives of European far-right movements, who called for a new wave of freedom in Europe, a “European Nationalism.” Even today, many consider the Koblenz meeting, although Steve Bannon did not directly attend, to be one of the first movements in Europe within the context of his “Global Populism” network, and the first example of the European far-right movement becoming jointly visible on the international stage.

Bannon’s success in Trump’s election, his subsequent impeachment, and his then-return to Europe present a rather interesting chain of events. His active involvement in European politics through “The Movement,” a Brussels-based foundation he established in 2017, his overt efforts to create a far-right, anti-EU supergroup within the European Parliament, and the similarities between these actions and the call made by far-right political parties at a meeting in Koblenz in 2017 are all highly noteworthy.

Following the Koblenz meeting, an examination of undeniable connections reveals that Steve Bannon met with numerous far-right populist politicians and political party officials in 2018-2019. One of Bannon’s biggest admirers is the leader of the Dutch PVV party, Geert Wilders. Many other far-right or right-wing populist politicians, including Alice Weidel of the AfD, Matteo Salvini of the Lega, UKIP leader Nigel Farage, Marine Le Pen of France, and Giorgia Meloni of Italy, also frequently met with Bannon.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Czech President Zeman are also among those who have met with Bannon in the past. His participation in Le Pen’s party general assembly in France in 2018, and his invitation to a conference in the Bundestag by the AfD, are examples of the unhidden connections within the Populist/Global Network that Bannon is trying to build.

Prior to the EU Parliament elections in May 2019, Bannon made various efforts to unite the European far right. Although his target of one-third of the vote was not achieved in the 2019 European Parliament elections, Bannon provided the European far right with an unprecedented opportunity, creating a political network of far-right and populist groups across Europe and even across the Atlantic.

Just as there was a tendency to ignore the rise of the far right, a large media outlet, looking at the results of the 2019 EU Parliament elections, lamented Bannon’s failure. However, what seemed like a failure to those trying to save the day, or even the moment, for European politics, actually brought together the European far right and populist political base. Bannon’s intervention gave further impetus to the European far right and populist movements. In Germany, the AfD became the main opposition party in the federal parliament after the 2017 Federal Parliament elections. In the 2025 elections, it increased its number of members in parliament to 152 as the main opposition party.

The far-right on the rise in Europe

In 2023, Wilders’ party PVV emerged as the leading party in the Dutch elections. In last year’s Czech elections, the right-wing populist party ANO, with Andre Babis, won as the leading party. Marine Le Pen reached the second round twice against Macron in the French presidential elections and lost, but increased her vote share each time. The party, formerly known as Front National, changed its name to Rassemblement National (RN) and won the local elections as the leading party. It is highly likely to be the leading party again in the elections to be held in March 2026. Furthermore, Le Pen is considered a sure winner of the 2027 presidential elections – providing she remains eligible to run.

The situation is no different across Europe. Far-right radical parties and right-wing populist parties, which have a significant presence in national elections, entered the EU Parliament in the 2024 elections with 187 members in three different groups. In the EU Parliament, far-right and right-wing radical parties formed a group under the name European Patriots (Patriots.eu), while anti-EU right-wing parties such as the European Conservatives and Innovators (ECR) and far-right radical parties like the AfD formed a group under the name ESN (Europe of Sovereign Nations). These far-right parties, constantly appearing to be seeking innovation and new directions across the EU, have increased their number of members in the parliament through name changes. The common characteristic of these groups is their anti-EU skeptical nature.

News that the Trump administration would focus on Italy, Austria, Poland, and Hungary leaving the EU, as outlined in the National Security Document (NSS) released in the U.S. in December 2025, sent shockwaves across Europe. While the White House denied these statements were included in the NSS, the fact that Bannon could, even years later, achieve his goal of creating an anti-European movement seems quite plausible after witnessing the examples of UKIP and Brexit.

Examinations of the released Epstein files indicate that Epstein and Bannon corresponded regularly between 2018 and 2019 regarding European politicians and the European far right and populist right-wing movements. In these communications, Bannon reportedly shared information about his influence on right-wing movements in Europe, specifying which politicians and parties he advised, and even naming the parties and politicians involved. While the AfD has not denied the portion of the conversations related to them, they have stated that the allegations of receiving advice from Bannon are untrue.

Anti-EU sentiment – ​​anti-immigrant sentiment – ​​Islamophobia

From the perspective of far-right and populist right-wing movements, it is possible to state that far-right political movements in Europe share three distinct common narratives. These narratives are: opposition to the European Union or the withdrawal of their countries from the European Union; xenophobia and hostility towards immigrants and foreigners, aiming to eliminate immigration to Europe; and the exclusion of Islam from the public sphere in Europe, imposing bans on Islam at the national level and restricting the rights of Muslims. According to AfD ideologue Björn Höcke, Muslims, considered foreign elements in Europe, should be expelled east of the Bosphorus. Bannon’s statements also periodically emphasize the need for a “very strict and aggressive stance against radical Islam.”

Another point worth emphasizing is the emboldening of far-right and populist movements in Europe following Trump’s re-election for a second term. It is noteworthy that these movements have brought Trump’s MAGA (Make America Great Again) or America First slogans to Europe. Babis’s campaign in the Czech Republic with the slogan “Czech Republic First,” and Hungarian Prime Minister Orban’s implementation of the MEGA (“Make Europe Great Again”) slogan during Hungary’s rotating presidency, demonstrate the spread of a different kind of Trumpism across Europe.

The stance of the Visegrad countries, members of the EU, on anti-immigrant sentiment has long been well-known. In other Western European countries, anti-immigrant sentiment and the halting of immigration are at the forefront of the main election slogans of political parties. Trump’s claims that Europe will lose its identity due to immigration by the end of 2025, and that the continent is destroying itself due to an immigrant invasion, have strengthened the rhetoric of right-wing populist and far-right parties in Europe. Even at the local level, in the German state of Bavaria, the AfD party has included in its party program the possibility of establishing a special team called AFA (Refugee Search and Deportation Police), similar to ICE in the U.S., if they come to power in that state.

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he European populist right is distancing itself from its origins as it searches for its identity. In a sense, Europe is abandoning itself. Faced with mounting migratory pressure, Europeans are attempting to create a divide between themselves and the newcomers. Yet the Enlightenment established civilized relations between individuals, not societies. The European value system claimed universality.

The phenomenon that legitimized colonialism in continental Europe was this claim of universality. In response, European thought sought ways to live in a multicultural, post-secular society. However, the popular response of European peoples manifested itself in the abandonment of this claim. They will need more time to realize that abandoning the claim to universality also means abandoning the hierarchy of civilizations.

Recognizing the decline

The European value system, based on the Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment, claimed universality and established a hierarchy among civilizations, while also creating a world system. Although not everyone believed in the system, it was important to be seen as part of it and to participate in its rituals, since the system operated in a Eurocentric manner. For around sixty years, dozens of institutions formed around the United Nations were revered as churches, determining the rituals of the new world order. These institutions collaborated with complementary elements of American capitalism, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO.

First, Europe abandoned the claims of its own value system. Then, the rest of the world lost faith in these values. Finally, the organizations that regulated the capitalist market lost their meaning. Furthermore, it has only recently become apparent that these developments signify a collapse rather than a transition. Those who argue that it is a transition claim that the world system is now dominated by five major powers, and that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council have lost their significance. They expect another country to join the US, China, the EU and Russia as the fifth member. Those who speak of the collapse of the system argue that the world is bigger than five.

Europe was not as accustomed to living with different cultures as it claimed to be. The Catholic and Protestant worlds of Europe had always demonstrated their quest for homogeneity through historical massacres. When the Enlightenment replaced religion, this quest for homogeneity became secularized within the context of nationalism. The Holocaust emerged as the catastrophe of modernity’s divisive quest for homogeneity.

After the Second World War, the economy took precedence over politics and the global market necessitated the legitimization of multicultural societies. However, the balance of the world system was disrupted by Turkey’s application for EU membership, the political crisis that began with Islamophobic attacks and the 2008 economic crisis. The influx of refugees, which peaked in 2015, and the shock of the pandemic after 2019 further intensified these crises. The Gaza massacre marked the point at which universal values were exhausted. By the beginning of the 21st century, Europe had lost its economic, political and human credibility.

Europe benefiting

The United States and Russia are the only remaining powers in a depleted Europe. The United States is anxious to protect its economic interests, while Russia is striving to preserve its political presence. Both powers seek to control the continent’s remaining countries, as if to demonstrate that they are not part of Europe. Each power engages with Europe’s populist right and supports nationalist and separatist political movements for different reasons. What they have in common is that neither wants a strong EU.

A fragmented Europe, akin to the Middle Ages, would retain its economic production and market power, but lose its political significance. Unable to produce even a common foreign policy, let alone the planned common army, Europe is doomed to remain an economic community without political will. The protectionist and passive stance of European nationalists coincides with the interests of non-European powers. This is why the populist right in Europe is simultaneously supported by both the US and Russia.

The US, keen to exert influence over the court ruling on Le Pen, is using Greenland as a pretext to crush Europe’s political power. By frightening markets with customs duties, the US is taking advantage of European peoples’ inability to protect their welfare. Meanwhile, Russia was aware that Europe could not fight back when it attacked Ukraine, which is under EU protection both politically and economically. Driven by a desire to preserve welfare without military engagement, Europe is facing significant challenges in both the economic and security spheres. With its market under threat from the US and its security architecture under threat from Russia, it seems unlikely that Europe will be able to preserve its political unity. The likelihood of Europe becoming more fragmented is quite high. Concerned about preserving their own identities, European populations are also being drawn towards federalism and ‘direct democracy’.

The main issue for those who support the European populist right is freedom of expression. However, what is actually meant by freedom of expression, as reflected in the names of Dutch and Austrian European populist right parties, is the ability to espouse views that do not align with democratic values. As provocations and rhetoric designed to attract media attention are increasingly framed in terms of freedom of expression, the fight against disinformation is becoming increasingly important in European countries. Legal regulations legitimized through disinformation originating particularly from Russia are also affecting the European populist right.

Independence

Another facet of freedom is independence. Russia views the European populist right as representing the people against the elites. Therefore, it supports the independence of European peoples in their opposition to their own elites. In European populist literature, politics against the elites is politics against the ‘established parties’. Europe’s established system also tries to prevent populists from participating in decision-making processes by drawing political boundaries.

In every European country, from Austria and the Netherlands to Italy and Hungary and the Czech Republic, politics now revolves around those in favor of and those opposed to integration with the EU. However, from the perspective of the European populist right, the sides in the political struggle are not pro-EU and anti-EU, but real people and Europeanized elites. It is hardly surprising that US populists also claim to support the ‘real people’. In this context, Musk’s speech of support at the AfD congress could be seen as an attempt to free the ‘real people’ from elite domination.

Another favorite topic of the populist right is ‘direct democracy’. The Swiss model of direct Democracy and confederalism are presented as a formula to save the EU’s political existence, but they actually conceal a Europe that has lost its political unity and declined in power. Paradoxically, therefore, the proponents of plebiscitary democracy, supported by both the US and Russia, are the European peoples themselves, who are concerned about preserving their identities. Those who advocate federal ideas based on the romantic notion that a unified political structure will emerge from a world of satisfied social interests also belong to the European populist right.

Another argument of the European populist right is that they alone can internalize the system of democratic values. This tendency makes the European populist right defensive and passive. The exclusionary tendencies of European peoples now stem not from a claim to greatness, but from a claim to authenticity. However, this claim to authenticity is increasingly diminishing amid new divisions. For example, this tendency towards division is evident among Germans, Bavarians and Munich residents. In the French populist right, the shift from Jean-Marie Le Pen’s view of French superiority to Marine Le Pen’s view of protecting ‘Frenchness’ represents an intellectual contraction. Such tendencies towards contraction and isolation are naturally supported by both the US and Russia.

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he United States’ military intervention in Venezuela on 3 January 2026 marked a significant turning point in the international system. The capture and transfer of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife to the United States as part of this operation constitutes a serious violation of international law and is a concrete manifestation of Trump’s ‘America First’ policy. Trump justified the intervention by claiming that Venezuela was a major player in international drug trafficking. However, his real aim was to gain control of the country’s oil resources, which he declared to be under temporary U.S. control.

The overt and covert reactions of European Union (EU) leaders to this operation are contributing to the erosion of international norms. This development reveals an approach that disregards the territorial integrity of sovereign states, raising concerns that similar scenarios could be repeated in other regions. The military operation in Venezuela adds a new dimension to Trump’s long-standing interest in Greenland.

A direct military attack by the US on Greenland is unlikely due to Denmark’s NATO membership. However, the US is likely to pose a real threat to Greenland by employing diplomatic, economic and hybrid pressure tactics. The intervention in Venezuela can be described as a precursor to neo-imperialism focused on oil and other resources, justified on security grounds. Given Greenland’s strategic location and mineral wealth, there is a high risk that this operation could trigger a similar or different one.

EU leaders’ passive stance towards the Venezuela operation, which disregards international law, highlights the possibility of a similar response in the Greenland scenario: diplomatic outcry without sanctions. In Greenland specifically, the NATO dimension is highly likely to cause a deep crisis in the already fragile transatlantic relationship. This study examines Greenland’s status, Trump’s statements and actions, how the European Union might react, and the future of transatlantic relations.

The status and geopolitical position of Greenland

Greenland is an autonomous part of the Kingdom of Denmark and, under the 2009 Selvstyre Act, has extensive administrative autonomy. With a population of around 56,000 people, mostly of Inuit origin, the island has full authority over matters such as education, health, natural resources and internal affairs. However, foreign policy, defense and monetary policy remain the responsibility of Copenhagen. Greenland is recognized as a people with the right to self-determination under the UN Charter, and independence is a legally recognized option.

While the majority of Greenland’s population wants independence from Denmark, they are also opposed to the idea of joining the United States. In a joint statement, Greenlandic Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen and Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen emphasised that the principle that ‘Greenland belongs to the Greenlanders’ forms the basis of sovereignty. The island possesses extraordinary wealth in rare earth elements, uranium and various other strategic mineral resources, which constitute a significant portion of the world’s reserves. These resources play a critical role in ensuring the continuity and strategic security of global supply chains.

Geopolitically, Greenland is a key strategic point in the Arctic region. The emergence of new sea routes as a result of glacial melting, triggered by climate change, has significantly intensified Russian and Chinese military and commercial activities in the area. The Trump administration perceives this development as an unacceptable threat within the framework of the US 2025 National Security Strategy. Unlike Venezuela, Greenland is protected by NATO and European Union defense mechanisms (Article 5 of the NATO Treaty and Article 42.7 of the EU Treaty) via its association with Denmark. Theoretically, any military operation or annexation attempt would trigger collective defense obligations. However, while this status partially protects Greenland from conventional interventions similar to those in Venezuela, it leaves it vulnerable to hybrid warfare methods.

The Trump administration’s statements and measures regarding Greenland

Located on the island under the 1951 U.S.-Denmark defense agreement, the U.S. Thule Air Base plays a strategic role in Arctic security. Trump’s interest in Greenland dates back to his first term in office, when he proposed buying the island in 2019, and intensified during his second term. This interest was not just rhetorical, but supported by concrete diplomatic initiatives and high-level visits. Notably, in March 2025, Vice President JD Vance visited the air base and accused Denmark of failing to invest adequately in the Greenlandic people and their security. He criticized the Copenhagen administration, stating: ‘Our message to Denmark is very simple: you have not done a good job for the Greenlandic people. You have not invested enough in them, and you have not invested enough in the security infrastructure of this magnificent continent.’

Although he criticized Copenhagen’s administration, he claimed that the US would adopt a respectful approach, emphasizing the Greenlanders’ right to self-determination. Although the visit was short, lasting only a few hours, and largely confined to the military base, it was perceived as provocative in Denmark and Greenland, and not welcomed by the local administration. Vance’s visit is seen as an early manifestation of Trump’s Greenland policy, and similar initiatives accompanied by senior officials such as National Security Advisor Mike Waltz have increased US pressure on the island.

At a press conference in Palm Beach in December 2025, Trump stated, “We need Greenland for national security, not for minerals. We should have it.’ He thus designated Greenland as a national security target and appointed Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry as special envoy to oversee the process of bringing Greenland under US control. Landry explicitly stated the goal of ‘making Greenland part of the US’ on X, drawing significant backlash in Denmark. Although Trump emphasized security over minerals, analysts have noted that mineral resources, particularly rare earth elements, were the primary motivation.

Trump’s characterization of Greenland as a ‘great real estate deal’ and his appointment of a special envoy have increased diplomatic pressure, while Landry’s implication that he will ‘lead the charge’ in negotiations suggests a transactional approach. Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen has described this appointment as completely unacceptable and warned the US ambassador in Copenhagen. Following the intervention in Venezuela, speculation about a similar military operation in Greenland has increased. However, due to the NATO factor, this appears unlikely. Instead, economic sanctions, influencing local elites or covert operations are more likely. Indeed, Trump’s personality makes him unpredictable and challenges international norms.

European Union reactions

In response to Trump’s statements on Greenland, the European Union (EU) showed diplomatic solidarity with Denmark and Greenland, but avoided taking harsh measures. EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen emphasized territorial integrity, stating: ‘We stand in full solidarity with the people of Denmark and Greenland,’ while Antonio Costa noted that Arctic security was a ‘priority issue’. French President Emmanuel Macron also expressed support for the sovereignty of Denmark and Greenland. As with the EU’s limited ‘concern’ statements following the intervention in Venezuela, diplomatic warnings rather than explicit condemnation are at the forefront in Greenland.

This stance stems from transatlantic dependence: trade, energy and the NATO partnership prevent the implementation of harsh measures. If the US were to intervene in Greenland, objections and diplomatic isolation via the UN are expected, while military or economic sanctions are unlikely. The EU supports Denmark’s investments in Arctic defense, which amount to billions of dollars, thereby strengthening the Union’s strategic autonomy. However, divisions within the Union, such as the close ties between some EU countries, like Hungary, and Trump, could weaken the response. The submissive stance adopted by EU leaders on the Venezuela issue could also emerge in the Greenland scenario, ultimately plunging transatlantic relations into a deep crisis and eroding international law.

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uropean leaders used the final day of the Munich Security Conference to counter sharp criticism from Washington, with the EU’s top diplomat rejecting what she called “Europe-bashing” and dismissing claims that the continent risks cultural or political collapse.

Kaja Kallas said talk of a declining, “woke” Europe was detached from reality.

“Contrary to what some may say, ‘woke, decadent Europe’ is not facing civilizational erasure,” she told delegates, arguing that the European project continues to draw interest from far beyond the continent.

Kallas welcomed remarks from Marco Rubio a day earlier stressing that the United States and Europe are historically bound together.

“The message that we heard is that America and Europe are intertwined, have been in the past and will be in the future. I think this is important,” she said.

But she cautioned that disputes will endure. “It is also clear that we don’t see eye to eye on all the issues, and this will remain the case.”

Roots of the dispute

Tensions flared after a U.S. national security strategy released in December warned that European migration trends and political choices could leave the continent “unrecognizable” within decades. European commentators reacted with alarm, with newspapers such as Le Monde saying readers were stunned by language suggesting Europe was engaged in “civilizational erasure.”

The document also accused European governments of limiting free speech and suppressing opposition, despite high press-freedom rankings across EU member states.

American officials in recent years have frequently framed their concerns using arguments critics link to the so-called “great replacement” narrative, an idea that has circulated widely in far-right movements.

In his own address, Rubio sought to soften the atmosphere, insisting the trans-Atlantic partnership remains fundamental even as Washington pushes hard on issues such as immigration, trade and climate.

He said the United States does not seek a break with Europe, a line many participants viewed as an attempt to steady relations after months of uncertainty.

Russia and Ukraine front and center

Beyond the exchange with Washington, Kallas urged Europeans to remain firm toward Russia as diplomatic efforts continue to explore ways to end the war in Ukraine.

“Let’s be clear-eyed about Russia. Russia is no superpower,” she said, describing the country as “broken” and warning that Moscow must not be allowed to secure more through negotiations than it has achieved militarily.

She argued that Europe’s security “starts in Ukraine” and said any settlement should involve limits on Russia’s military capacity, reparations for damage caused by the invasion and accountability for war crimes.

Other officials echoed the need for Europe to rely more on itself. Benjamin Haddad, France’s minister for European affairs, said Europeans should concentrate less on comforting words from U.S. speeches and more on strengthening their own defenses.

“The worst lesson we could draw,” he said, would be to relax instead of accelerating rearmament and support for Kyiv.

Despite the friction, Kallas said Rubio’s comments confirmed that the bond across the Atlantic remains real, even if increasingly complex.

Differences over migration, climate and trade are likely to persist, she said, but the task now is to manage them while preserving cooperation on shared security challenges.

If you want, I can adapt this into a punchier front-page style, a broadcast script, or a shorter news agency brief.

(Source: AFP)

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enter-left Socialist candidate António José Seguro won a commanding victory in Portugal’s presidential runoff, defeating hard-right populist André Ventura and securing a five-year term in the country’s largely ceremonial but influential top office.

With almost all ballots counted, Seguro captured roughly two-thirds of the vote, while Ventura received about one-third, according to official results.

The election was widely seen as a test of how far Portugal might follow the rightward political shifts visible elsewhere in Europe. Ventura, leader of the anti-establishment Chega (“Enough”) party, has surged in recent years and heads the second-largest force in parliament. His advance to the runoff already marked a breakthrough for the far right in a country that, since the end of dictatorship in 1974, has largely kept extremist parties at the margins.

A moderate consensus builder

Seguro, a veteran Socialist politician, campaigned as a moderate consensus builder. He pledged to work constructively with Portugal’s center-right minority government and won support from mainstream figures across the political spectrum who were eager to contain the rise of populism.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen quickly congratulated Seguro, saying Portugal’s commitment to shared European values remained strong.

Ventura, known for his theatrical speaking style and sharp criticism of immigration and traditional politics, said he would continue pushing for what he called a political “transformation” of the country. Despite losing, he significantly expanded his national profile and confirmed his party’s staying power.

Portugal’s presidency carries limited day-to-day executive authority. However, the head of state can veto legislation and, in exceptional circumstances, dissolve parliament and trigger early elections, powers that can prove decisive during times of instability.

That may be particularly relevant after Portugal held several general elections in recent years, reflecting one of the most turbulent political periods in decades.

Seguro will be sworn in next month, replacing outgoing President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, who is stepping down after serving the maximum two terms.

(Source: Aljazeera, the Assosicated Press)

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ndia and the European Union have reached a landmark free trade agreement that will create one of the world’s largest economic zones, covering nearly two billion people and accounting for about a quarter of global GDP.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the deal on Tuesday during von der Leyen’s visit to New Delhi, describing it as a historic breakthrough after nearly two decades of intermittent negotiations.

“We have concluded the mother of all deals,” von der Leyen said in a post on X. “We have created a free trade zone of two billion people, with both sides set to benefit.”

Modi hailed the agreement as a milestone for India and the EU, calling it a source of “many opportunities” for India’s 1.4 billion people and millions across Europe.

Trade liberalization and economic impact

According to Indian officials, the agreement will cover roughly 25 percent of global economic output and is expected to significantly boost Indian exports in sectors such as textiles, gems and jewelry, and leather goods.

EU officials described the pact as the most ambitious trade deal India has ever concluded. Under the agreement, tariffs on 96.6 percent of EU goods exports to India will be eliminated or reduced, saving European companies up to €4 billion ($4.74bn) annually in duties.

Key European exports benefiting from tariff reductions include machinery, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, aircraft and spacecraft. Tariffs on cars will be gradually reduced to 10 percent under an annual quota of 250,000 vehicles.

Tariffs on wine, spirits and beer will also be lowered, while duties on fruit juices and processed foods will be eliminated.

Services, investment and strategic goals

The deal grants EU service providers enhanced access to India’s market in areas such as financial and maritime services, while India sees Europe as a crucial source of investment and advanced technology.

Brussels expects EU exports to India to double by 2032. Bilateral trade in goods already reached €120 billion ($139bn) in 2024, with services trade accounting for an additional €60 billion ($69bn).

“The EU stands to gain the highest level of access ever granted to a trade partner in India’s traditionally protected market,” von der Leyen said.

The agreement comes amid rising global trade tensions, including US tariffs and Chinese export controls, prompting both India and the EU to diversify economic partnerships.

Formal signing of the deal is expected after legal vetting, a process likely to take five to six months, with implementation anticipated within a year, according to Indian government officials.

Alongside the trade pact, India and the EU also announced the launch of a security and defence partnership, underscoring what both sides described as a growing strategic relationship.

Trade talks between India and the EU were first launched in 2007 but gained renewed momentum in 2022 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and shifting global trade dynamics.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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wenty-six European Union member states on Sunday urged calm and restraint following recent US military action in Venezuela, stressing the need to uphold international law and the principles of the United Nations Charter.

In a joint statement issued by EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, the bloc said escalation must be avoided and emphasized that all actors are bound by international legal norms, regardless of circumstances. Hungary did not support the statement, standing apart from the rest of the EU.

“The European Union calls for calm and restraint by all actors, to avoid escalation and to ensure a peaceful solution to the crisis,” the statement said. It added that respect for international law and the UN Charter remains a cornerstone of global security.

UN security council

The statement recalled the “particular responsibility” of UN Security Council members to uphold international law, describing it as a pillar of the international security architecture. It underscored the EU’s longstanding position that the erosion of legal norms risks destabilizing the global order.

The EU reiterated its stance that Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro lacks democratic legitimacy and reaffirmed support for a peaceful, Venezuelan-led transition to democracy that respects the country’s sovereignty.

“The right of the Venezuelan people to determine their future must be respected,” the statement said, while stressing that any resolution to the crisis must be inclusive, democratic and negotiated by Venezuelans themselves.

While condemning transnational organized crime and drug trafficking, the EU emphasized that such challenges must be addressed through sustained international cooperation conducted in full respect of territorial integrity and national sovereignty.

The bloc said it remains in close contact with the United States, as well as regional and international partners, to support dialogue among all parties involved. The objective, it said, is to facilitate a negotiated and peaceful solution to the crisis.

The statement also called for the unconditional release of all political prisoners in Venezuela and confirmed that EU member states’ consular authorities are coordinating closely to ensure the safety of EU citizens, including those allegedly detained unlawfully.

US capture of Maduro sparks global reaction

The EU statement followed remarks by US President Donald Trump, who said that US military action in Venezuela resulted in the capture of Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. Trump also said Washington would assert control over Venezuela “for the time being,” including through the deployment of US troops if necessary.

Maduro and Flores were transferred to New York late Saturday and are being held at a federal detention facility in Brooklyn. They face US charges related to drug trafficking and alleged cooperation with criminal groups designated as terrorist organizations.

Maduro has denied all accusations, describing the operation as a kidnapping and insisting he remains Venezuela’s legitimate president. Officials in Caracas have called for his release.

Maduro pleads not guilty in US court

On Monday, Maduro pleaded not guilty to multiple narcotics-related charges during a court appearance in Manhattan, where he appeared shackled and wearing prison attire. His wife also entered a not-guilty plea. The next court date was set for March 17.

Maduro told the court he was innocent and said the charges were politically motivated. His defense lawyer said the case would involve extensive legal challenges, particularly concerning what he described as an unlawful military abduction.

Hours later, Venezuela’s Vice President Delcy Rodriguez was sworn in as interim president in Caracas. While expressing support for Maduro, she gave no indication that her administration would directly confront the US operation.

The US has long considered Maduro an illegitimate leader following the 2018 election. However, legal experts and several governments have questioned the legality of capturing a sitting head of state, warning that the move could undermine the rules-based international order.

Russia, China and several Latin American allies of Venezuela condemned the US action, while the UN Security Council convened to debate its broader implications.

Despite international concern, the Trump administration has defended the operation as lawful and necessary, framing it as part of a broader campaign against international drug trafficking.

As uncertainty surrounds Venezuela’s political future, the EU reiterated that restoring democracy, respecting sovereignty and upholding international law must remain central to any resolution of the crisis.

(Source: Anadolu Agency and Reuters)

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ne common feature of European populist parties has been their anti-establishment and alternative claims. They desired radical changes, such as opposition to the EU or NATO, or opposition to the common currency. However, over time, they have become more compatible with both global power and national hierarchies. They have not shied away from making concessions in order to realise their policies through power rather than by remaining in opposition. One of the most important reasons for the existence of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party was the 2015 refugee influx and Merkel’s acceptance of it with her ‘we can do it’ motto.

What popularised the AfD, however, were its ‘remigration’ policies based on opposition to refugees. When it was founded in 2013, it was a party of anti-EU conservative liberal professors and senior executives, feeding on elitist reactions rather than being a people’s party.

The 2015 refugee influx, accompanied by Islamophobic connotations and the fears it brought, helped the AfD movement gain traction within society, with nationalist radicals within the party coming to the fore. When the riots and assaults during New Year’s celebrations in Cologne at the end of 2015 were blamed on North Africans, the AfD’s rhetoric and fears had already found their social counterpart.

A party looking to the future

At the beginning of 2015, despite losing popularity after an internal power struggle, the party’s support surged from 3% to over 10% following the refugee influx and Merkel’s famous ‘We can do it’ statement. However, the party still lacked a clearly defined programme. The party, which had undergone a change in leadership, saw different factions rallying behind different names. It was filled with small groups of leaders comprising libertarians, conservatives and radical nationalists.

Populist parties such as the AfD position themselves not as nationalist parties looking to the past, but rather as parties focused on the future. Therefore, instead of reckoning with the past, they take on the task of cleansing the future. The AfD speaks not of a thousand years of history, but of a thousand years of hope. A protectionism based on the future rather than on past superiority distances populist parties from ‘crime’. Ultimately, there is no place for refugees in their clean future. In this context, they consider themselves protective rather than exclusionary.

Rather than ridding themselves of the dregs of the past, they are sanitising the future. Ultimately, this kind of pacifist attitude also protects populist parties from encountering criminal law. On the other hand, Höcke, one of the party’s radicals, makes subtextual references to the ‘thousand-year Reich’ when talking about the future, which actually shows that the message is intended to hit home. Furthermore, the AfD’s use of the term ‘old parties’ when referring to parties outside its own ranks can also be considered part of its future-oriented politics.

When it was first established, the AfD relied on conservative upper-middle-class reactions based on opposition to the single currency and the EU, while also managing to garner the reactions of the lower classes during the 2015 refugee wave. Today, however, it can easily abandon or postpone its policy of reducing the number of refugees and foreigners in order to share power. Moreover, it does not include the supremacy of the dominant culture, with its nationalist connotations, in its programme.

The understanding of dominant culture based on establishing a cultural hierarchy has been replaced by a more pacifist claim to preserve culture. In this sense, it is increasingly taking the place of conservative right-wing parties. The political stance defending German dominant culture (leitkultur) and based on opposition to refugees made the AfD the leading party in the last decade but failed to bring it into power. The AfD parliamentary group has seen that the path to sharing power lies in compromising on dominant culture and opposition to refugees and has therefore not hesitated to change its political stance.

The desire for power and east Germany

Across Europe, there is a growing tendency for populist parties to seek power through Melonization. Pragmatic populism increases its concessions on core policies as it approaches power. One of the common characteristics of European populist parties is their pragmatism regarding power. Populist parties that have managed to transform their anti-Semitism into Islamophobia, which is less harmful to them and even gains them sympathy, and their belief in the superiority of their own nation into claims that preserve their political identity, have few principles they will not abandon on the path to power. The development of the AfD is somewhat different. Other populist parties in Europe have come to power with radical rhetoric and gradually abandoned it on their path to power.

The AfD, on the other hand, presented itself with liberal and conservative rhetoric such as opposition to the euro and reached around 5 per cent, found its footing with radical rhetoric such as opposition to refugees and Islam, but finally surpassed 20 per cent with claims of preserving the dominant culture and reverse migration, softening its exclusionary rhetoric in order to share power. Its emergence as the leading party with around 25 per cent in the latest opinion polls has triggered the AfD’s desire for power, and the harshness of its rhetoric has softened. On the other hand, the Christian Democrats have directed their opposition particularly towards Chancellor Merz in order to force him into a coalition with them.

The conservative right, based on Christian Democrats, has long sought to counter populist parties by adopting their slogans, thereby further legitimising parties such as the AfD within the political spectrum. The opposition to power-sharing with populist parties, constructed like a ‘firewall’ in German politics, is losing its meaning as the AfD grows. The fact that the coalition does not allow any party to implement only its own policies also leads to populist parties accusing conservatives of not keeping their word. Parties that consider themselves large enough to share power, such as the AfD, are particularly putting pressure on conservative parties and forcing them into coalition with themselves.

Reactions rather than political concepts

They readily soften their political claims in order to overcome the political firewall that excludes them. It still seems sociologically impossible for parties like the AfD, which are based on reactions rather than political concepts, to have the majority needed to govern the country alone. Therefore, they must enter into a coalition and share power. Their quick abandonment of the political claims reflected in their slogans is actually partly due to their sociological limitations.

The AfD draws a large portion of its social support from East Germany. In a sense, East German opposition to reunification is concentrated in the AfD. East Germans perceive reunification as an unequal relationship and believe they have no influence in German politics. Although the proportion of foreigners in their cities is not high, their location on the front lines of the refugee influx fuels xenophobia. They are also not in line with the federal government’s anti-Russian policies. Russia, with whom they have collaborated for many years, is not an enemy in the eyes of East Germans.

On the other hand, while struggling with economic backwardness, they also find the environmental and green policies of the West German welfare state unnecessary. For this reason, the party they are furthest from is the Greens. However, apart from the CDU, the other traditional parties already have a significant share of the vote. Apart from the CDU, they have no serious political rival other than Sahra Wagenknecht’s Union (BSW), which has culturally right-wing and economically left-wing policies.

Their belief that East Germany’s backwardness and political problems can only be solved with strong leadership strengthens their inclination towards the AfD. On the other hand, the migration of qualified and young people from East Germany due to underdevelopment, while older and less educated people remain behind, also increases the tendency towards parties such as the AfD. Like other populist parties, the AfD also relies heavily on the theme that the people have been abandoned by the elite and those in power.

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eftwing independent Catherine Connolly has won Ireland’s presidential election by a decisive landslide, securing 63% of first-preference votes in a result that stunned the political establishment and delivered a major symbolic blow to the ruling coalition.

The 68-year-old Galway TD and long-time social justice campaigner will become the Republic’s 10th head of state, succeeding Michael D Higgins after his 14-year tenure.

Speaking at Dublin Castle on Saturday night after being officially declared president-elect, Connolly pledged to be “a president for all”, vowing to defend Irish neutrality, champion climate justice and give a platform to the marginalized.

“I will be a voice for peace, a voice that builds on our policy of neutrality, a voice that articulates the existential threat posed by climate change,” she said, switching between Irish and English. “Together, we can shape a new republic that values everybody and champions diversity.”

A shock for the political mainstream

Connolly secured 914,143 of 1,442,698 valid votes, far ahead of Fine Gael’s Heather Humphreys, who received 424,987 (29%). Fianna Fáil’s candidate, Jim Gavin – who had withdrawn following a financial scandal but remained on the ballot – won 103,568 votes (7%).

Despite the commanding win, turnout fell to 46%, unusually low for a presidential election, and more than 213,000 ballots were spoiled or invalid, reflecting frustration with the lack of choice and the perception of a two-horse race.

Though the presidency is largely ceremonial, Connolly’s victory is widely interpreted as a rebuke to the two big centrist parties that have dominated Irish politics for a century.

Her candidacy surged on the back of anger over Ireland’s housing and cost-of-living crises, missteps by government strategists, unity among leftwing parties, a viral, youth-driven online campaign.

Sinn Féin, Labour, the Social Democrats and People Before Profit all backed Connolly once her momentum became clear, giving her a rare pan-left coalition of support.

A more outspoken presidency ahead?

Connolly has long been a critic of western foreign policy and has accused the U.S. and U.K. of enabling genocide in Gaza. Her victory raises questions about how far she will test the traditionally soft-spoken boundaries of the presidency.

Political analysts say friction with the government is likely if she uses the Áras as a platform for moral advocacy in the tradition of Mary Robinson and Michael D Higgins—but with a more radical tone.

For her supporters, Connolly embodies a generational shift and a rejection of politics-as-usual.

She gained traction with younger voters through podcasts, cultural endorsements and viral videos—including a lighthearted football keepy-uppy clip that became a campaign trademark. She was publicly supported by musicians and artists such as Kneecap and The Mary Wallopers.

Outgoing president Higgins congratulated her in a statement, saying the office would offer “full support” as she prepares for her inauguration next month.

Connolly will take office amid high expectations from Ireland’s left — and deep unease within government ranks — setting the stage for a presidency unlike any other in recent decades.

(Source: The Guardian)

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urkey’s Defense Ministry said on Thursday that negotiations with the United Kingdom on the possible procurement of Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets are progressing positively and that Ankara expects the process to move toward a contract “at an appropriate time.” In the same briefing, the ministry also signaled Turkey’s readiness to contribute troops to an emerging multinational Gaza Task Force aimed at stabilizing the territory under a ceasefire agreement.

The remarks — the clearest indication in months that discussions over the aircraft are still on track — come as Ankara seeks to bolster its air force during the transition period before Turkey’s indigenously developed KAAN next-generation fighter becomes fully operational.

“Following the talks held with the United Kingdom, positive steps have been taken, and it is aimed to complete the procurement process at an appropriate time,” Defense Ministry sources said. “When the Eurofighter aircraft procurement reaches the contract stage, official announcements will be made by our side.”

Officials cautioned against speculation in foreign media about the size or configuration of the order, saying negotiations are ongoing and that “claims beyond this should not be taken seriously.”

Transition period until KAAN

The ministry said that Turkey’s air force capability will be supported by allied systems until the KAAN platform enters serial production and broad deployment.

“Until the deliveries of our domestically produced KAAN begin, the Turkish Armed Forces will acquire the systems required to fulfill its missions primarily from allies and other relevant countries,” the sources said, highlighting continued reliance on NATO interoperability.

Ankara has pursued the Eurofighter option partly to hedge against continued delays in export clearances. The fighter is jointly produced by the UK, Germany, Spain and Italy — meaning any final sale requires approval from all four governments. The UK is strongly supportive, while Berlin has been slower to sign off, citing broader EU-Turkey tensions.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan discussed the procurement last week in Qatar, where Turkey has positioned itself as a key actor in Gulf and Mediterranean security frameworks.

Turkey signals role in Gaza task force

The ministry also confirmed that Turkey stands ready to participate in a potential multinational Gaza stabilization mission, expected to fall under a broader International Stabilization Force (ISF) after months of ceasefire diplomacy.

“The Turkish Armed Forces, with the experience it has gained from previous peace missions, stands ready to assume any duties entrusted to it for the establishment and maintenance of peace, within the framework of international law,” the sources said.

Diplomatic contacts are underway between guarantor states of the Gaza ceasefire, including Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, and the U.S. Under the emerging architecture, the ISF would coordinate humanitarian relief, infrastructure rehabilitation and border security.

Defense officials said Turkey’s preparations are “ongoing in coordination with relevant state institutions,” reinforcing Ankara’s intention to play a central role not only diplomatically but also operationally.

Syria, SDF integration, and regional security calculus

The ministry also addressed developments in Syria, saying cooperation with Damascus continues to deepen after years of rupture between the two governments.

“Following the signing of the memorandum of understanding on Joint Training and Advisory Cooperation on Aug. 13, 2025, training, visits, advisory, and technical support activities aimed at enhancing Syria’s defense and security capacity are ongoing,” the statement said.

Turkey emphasized that it is closely watching the planned integration of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian Army — a process that could potentially end the group’s semi-autonomous command structure in the northeast.

“The integration of the SDF terrorist organization into the Syrian Army is of critical importance,” the ministry said. “This process must proceed in a manner that does not harm Syria’s political unity and territorial integrity.”

Turkey reiterated its red line of “One State, One Army,” viewing the re-centralization of the Syrian security sector as essential to its border security interests.

For now, the timing of a Eurofighter contract remains tied to intra-European negotiations. But Ankara’s public confirmation that talks are advancing — alongside an explicit signal about peacekeeping readiness in Gaza — suggests Turkey’s military diplomacy is entering a new phase as it seeks to leverage its experience in multinational stabilization missions from the Balkans to Libya.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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uropean leaders are sounding the alarm after a sudden surge in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) incursions across the continent, raising fears that what was once a nuisance has escalated into a strategic campaign of “hybrid warfare.”

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen warned lawmakers on Wednesday that the recent wave of drone overflights targeting airports, power plants, and defense facilities marked “something new and dangerous” in Europe’s security landscape.

“In just the past two weeks, MiG fighters have violated Estonia’s airspace, and drones have flown over critical sites in Belgium, Poland, Romania, Denmark, and Germany,” she said in a fiery speech before the European Parliament in Strasbourg. “Flights have been grounded, jets scrambled, and countermeasures deployed to ensure the safety of our citizens. Make no mistake. This is part of a worrying pattern of growing threats.”

The European Parliament is preparing a resolution this week describing the incidents as “acts of hybrid warfare” and citing possible involvement by “Russian agents” in coordinated drone operations meant to sow disruption and fear across the bloc.

From nuisance to threat

For years, European air safety agencies have been dealing with small drones straying into flight paths — mostly by accident. But the recent surge in mysterious and deliberate incursions has pushed governments into crisis mode.

Airport authorities in Denmark, Norway, and Germany were forced to close airspace temporarily after UAVs of unknown origin were spotted over runways. In Belgium, a defense contractor producing missile systems reported a “worrying increase” in unidentified drone sightings near its facilities.

“One incident may be a mistake. Two, a coincidence. But three, five, ten? This is a deliberate and targeted gray zone campaign against Europe. And Europe must respond,” von der Leyen declared.

While Russian involvement is suspected in several cases — particularly after Russian military drones briefly crossed into Poland and Romania — analysts caution that not every incident bears Moscow’s fingerprints.

“Some of these intrusions may be testing Europe’s defenses; others could be unrelated,” said Sander Starreveld, director of the aviation consultancy SIG Aviation. “But the pattern is concerning because it shows how easily drones can bypass conventional security systems.”

Drones are hard to see — and stop

According to the EU Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the number of reported drone-related incidents in European airspace jumped from about 500 in 2015 to nearly 2,000 in 2019 — and experts believe the true number is much higher today.

“Air traffic control systems are generally unable to detect small drones,” said Frédéric Deleau, vice president for Europe of the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers’ Associations. “Traditional radar is optimized for large aircraft, not lightweight carbon-fiber drones that can easily evade detection or appear as birds.”

To counter the growing threat, major airports across Europe have deployed specialized anti-drone technologies — including radar, radio-frequency scanners, acoustic sensors, and high-resolution cameras. But none offer complete protection.

“No single technology yet provides reliable coverage,” Deleau admitted. “The cat-and-mouse dynamic continues — as soon as one detection method improves, drone technology adapts.”

From hobbyists to hostile actors

For much of the last decade, unauthorized drone flights near airports were attributed to recreational users unaware of flight restrictions.

“Until recently, the main issue was that the average drone operator simply didn’t know where drones were permitted to fly,” Starreveld said. “You’d buy one, fly it near an airport, and call yourself a ‘pilot.’ Curiosity and carelessness were the main problems.”

That changed as regulators imposed stricter rules, awareness campaigns, and geofencing software that automatically prevents consumer drones from entering restricted areas. But the recent spate of incidents — many involving multiple UAVs operating in formation — appears to be intentional interference.

“What’s new in these incidents is the deliberate use of drones to disrupt air traffic,” Starreveld explained. “For airline pilots, that idea alone places these encounters in a completely different and deeply worrying category: criminal or strategic intent.”

Security experts describe these drone incursions as part of a “gray-zone” conflict — actions that fall short of open warfare but still seek to weaken, intimidate, or test an adversary.

“Russia, China, and even smaller actors understand the value of ambiguity,” said Dr. Helena Braun, a senior fellow at the European Security Centre in The Hague. “If you can cause chaos at a European airport without firing a shot, you demonstrate vulnerability and consume resources.”

Von der Leyen has called for a “European Drone Shield” — a continent-wide system integrating surveillance, intelligence sharing, and electronic countermeasures to neutralize UAVs before they threaten safety or infrastructure.

The proposal, modeled loosely on NATO’s air defense systems, would involve closer coordination between national air forces, intelligence agencies, and civilian aviation authorities.

But some EU diplomats worry the plan could take years to implement. “The pace of drone innovation is far faster than the EU’s policymaking process,” said one senior official familiar with the talks.

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uropean Union leaders on Wednesday discussed a new scheme to sustain long-term financial and military assistance to Ukraine by leveraging hundreds of billions of euros in frozen Russian assets, a move Moscow condemned as “theft.”

The proposal underscores the bloc’s growing resolve to act independently in supporting Kyiv amid the United States’ retreat from direct financial aid under President Donald Trump. Washington has halted most assistance to Ukraine, leaving European partners scrambling to fill the gap as the war with Russia grinds through its fourth year.

According to the European Commission, Ukraine’s budgetary and defense requirements for 2026 and 2027 are expected to total around 130 billion euros ($153 billion). The EU has already disbursed 174 billion euros in support since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022, but officials warn that the financial burden is becoming unsustainable without new mechanisms.

Frozen Russian sovereign assets

At the center of the debate are frozen Russian sovereign assets, primarily held in European institutions since the start of the war. The largest tranche — about 194 billion euros — is located in Belgium, while Japan holds roughly $50 billion, and smaller amounts are stored in the U.S., U.K., and Canada.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said her team was working on a “reparation loan” backed by these frozen assets. The concept would allow the EU to raise up to 140 billion euros ($165 billion) in financing for Kyiv, with repayment deferred until Russia pays reparations for the destruction caused by its invasion.

“We are not confiscating the assets, but we are taking the cash balances for a loan to Ukraine,” von der Leyen told reporters in Copenhagen. “Ukraine has to pay back this loan if Russia pays reparations. Russia is the perpetrator. It has caused the damage and must be held accountable.”

She added that the plan offered “a sound legal way” to provide Ukraine with immediate relief while keeping faith with international law and maintaining cohesion among the bloc’s 27 member states.

Legal and political hurdles

The initiative, however, faces stiff legal and political challenges. While several countries, including Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, have expressed strong support, others remain cautious about potential repercussions.

Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, who hosted the EU summit, praised the plan as “a good way forward” but admitted there were “some legal questions that have to be asked.”

The European Central Bank (ECB) has also raised concerns, warning that outright confiscation of Russian assets could undermine confidence in the euro and destabilize global markets. Belgium, home to the financial clearinghouse Euroclear, is particularly wary of acting unilaterally, fearing possible Russian retaliation and reputational damage.

“If we don’t take those assets into account, then it’s on our taxpayers — that’s for sure,” said EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, while acknowledging that the proposal is “not supported by everybody yet.”

The European Commission insists the scheme does not involve seizing Russian funds but using the profits generated by the frozen assets — mainly interest and investment returns — as collateral for the loan. That distinction, officials argue, could help the EU sidestep accusations of illegality while providing crucial funds to Kyiv.

Russia fumes over ‘theft’

The Kremlin swiftly denounced the EU’s discussions. Spokesman Dmitry Peskov said in a conference call with reporters that any move to repurpose Russian assets “amounts to plans to illegally confiscate Russian property — in Russian, we call it theft.”

Moscow has repeatedly warned that such actions would lead to retaliation and further strain relations with European capitals. Russia has already enacted laws allowing it to seize Western assets within its borders in response to similar measures.

Nonetheless, von der Leyen and several European leaders insist the bloc has both the legal and moral grounds to act. “Russia launched this war, caused the destruction, and must pay for it,” von der Leyen said. “Europe cannot wait indefinitely while Ukraine’s economy bleeds.”

France cautious, Nordics supportive

Among EU heavyweights, France has taken a cautious stance. President Emmanuel Macron expressed tentative support for the idea but stressed that Europe must remain “a place that’s attractive and reliable.”

“When assets are frozen, we respect international law,” Macron said, noting that any deviation could deter global investors.

Other northern European states have been more forthright. In a joint letter to their EU counterparts, Finland and Sweden called the reparation loan “a responsible and necessary step.”

“Investing in Ukraine is an investment in European security as a whole,” the letter said. “It is key that the loan to Ukraine is only to be repaid once Ukraine receives war reparations from Russia.”

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lthough the failure of the Trump-Putin summit to produce a ceasefire agreement greatly unsettled European leaders, they are still striving to ‘keep Trump on their side’ or ‘draw him to their side’ because they cannot feel secure against Russia without U.S. support. The most recent example of this is the ongoing debate in Germany over whether German soldiers should be part of the peacekeeping force that is being considered for deployment to Ukraine under security guarantees in the event of a possible ceasefire.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent initiatives regarding the Russia-Ukraine War, including his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska, have significantly stirred European politicians. Trump’s initial statements upon resuming his presidential duties and his attitude during his first meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the White House had unsettled Europeans. Trump and some politicians under his command accused Zelensky of being responsible for the continuation of the war and stated that Ukraine could not become a NATO member and should cede some of its territories to Russia.

These statements were seen as unwarranted concessions and caused concern. However, European leaders have since learned the American president’s political style and are now closely monitoring him, attempting to influence him for their own interests. They were not invited to the meeting in Alaska, but through the initiative of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, they held a teleconference with Trump prior to the Alaska meeting. In this way, they sought to ensure that Trump would exert pressure on Putin and prevent him from making statements that would upset Europe.

The Alaska summit

Following the Alaska Summit, Merz gathered numerous European leaders and took them to the White House, where they consulted with Trump on the summit’s outcomes. Although the failure to reach a ceasefire agreement at the summit greatly disturbed European leaders, they are striving to ‘keep Trump on their side’ or ‘draw him closer’ because they cannot rely on themselves against Russia without U.S. support. The most recent example of this is the ongoing debate in Germany about whether German soldiers should be part of the peacekeeping force that is being considered for deployment to Ukraine under security guarantees in the event of a possible ceasefire.

While it is unclear whether a ceasefire will happen and whether Putin would accept the deployment of European soldiers to Ukraine as part of a peacekeeping force in the event of a ceasefire, the heated debate on this issue in Germany and the rejection by a significant segment of the population of deploying German soldiers to Ukraine once again demonstrated Germany’s limits and concerns when it comes to Russia. Chancellor Merz’s refusal to deliver the Taurus missiles he had promised to Ukraine before taking office, unlike then-Chancellor Scholz, is another indication of these boundaries.

At this point, European leaders find themselves in a contradictory situation regarding the Ukraine-Russia-U.S. equation. There is a general expectation in Europe that Germany will assume a leadership role in this regard, particularly in Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic states, where this expectation is particularly high. The new coalition government’s steps to significantly increase defense spending are actually in line with this expectation. However, looking at Europe’s economically powerful countries, Germany, which has the strongest economy, appears to be pursuing more cautious policies on the Ukraine issue than France and the UK.

While Paris and London pursue a more active policy on sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine, Berlin, which is expected to take the lead, is constantly applying the brakes. This is one of the main reasons why Europe is becoming more dependent on the U.S. and is leading to the belief that Europe cannot counterbalance Russia on its own.

Can Europe balance Russia?

In fact, when viewed in terms of important indicators of power, Europe is much stronger than Russia, beyond balancing it if it acts collectively. Looking at Gross Domestic Product (GDP) figures, the most important indicator of economic power, the total GDP of the EU and the UK is approximately 11 times that of Russia. Similarly, in terms of total defense spending, an important indicator of military power, the EU and the UK also outstrip Russia. Considering that Germany’s GDP alone is more than twice that of Russia and that four countries in Europe (Germany, the UK, France and Italy) individually have a higher annual economic output than Russia, it is clear that Russia lags far behind Europe in economic terms.

Lack of military superiority over Russia

Another reason why Europe struggles to counterbalance Russia is that, despite appearing to spend more on military expenditure than Russia overall, it is far from establishing military superiority over Russia. European countries lack the same level of superiority over Russia in conventional weapons and ammunition production that the United States possesses, and they lag far behind Russia in terms of nuclear weapons. This situation means that if Europe were to become involved in the war in Ukraine against Russia, it would be entering a conventional war that could last a long time and be vulnerable to nuclear attack at any moment, which explains why it has so far avoided direct involvement in the war. For similar reasons, they will continue to stay away from direct involvement in the war in the future.

At this point, it should also be noted that Russia, despite the damage caused to its economy by the war, is preparing itself for a prolonged conflict by building a war economy and is in a better position in terms of weapons and ammunition production than it was at the start of the war. Furthermore, the fact that countries such as China, India and Iran have entered into economic or military relations that facilitate Moscow’s continuation of the war with Russia is another factor that has prompted Europeans to avoid confronting Russia without the United States. The fact that the United States, which has far greater military and economic power than Europe, chose diplomacy over direct confrontation and conflict with Russia during the Trump era, which could have been very damaging, also explains the cautious stance of Europeans towards Moscow.

One of the obstacles preventing European countries from emerging as effective actors against Russia is the disconnect between governments and their populations. European leaders who explain their position on the Ukraine issue as standing with Kiev against Moscow to their people as standing for freedom against despotism and for law against power politics have a serious credibility problem. This is because most of these same European leaders were complicit in the genocide carried out by Israel in Gaza during the same period, either directly or indirectly.

Growing gap between Europe and Europeans

Despite the fascist Netanyahu administration’s aggressive policies, which trample international law, not only in the Gaza genocide but also in the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria and Iran, they continued their support for Israel for a long time, and some, such as Germany, still maintain this support. The hypocritical policies of European countries are drawing serious reactions from European populations and leading to large protests. When it comes to Palestine, the attempts of leaders who turn their backs on freedom and justice to legitimize their policies against Russia through these concepts are not sufficiently accepted by the public, making it impossible for Europe to adopt a confident stance against Russia.

In summary, by neglecting to build a military force commensurate with its economic capacity to date, and by supporting the genocide in Gaza, Europe has squandered the last remnants of the values it has defended until now, such as the rule of law and the protection of human rights, weakening its ties with its people. Incapable of speaking with one voice in foreign policy, Europe has no choice but to seek the help of the U.S. to counterbalance Russia.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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he number of asylum applications to the European Union and associated countries fell by 23 percent in the first half of 2025, driven primarily by a dramatic reduction in applications from Syrians following the fall of President Bashar al-Assad. The figures released Monday by the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), mark one of the steepest mid-year declines in recent years and signal a significant shift in the continent’s migration dynamics.

According to the EUAA, overall asylum requests across the EU’s 27 member states, along with Switzerland and Norway (collectively referred to as the EU+), totaled 399,000 applications between January and June 2025. This represents a marked decrease compared to the same period in 2024, when the bloc recorded over 518,000 applications.

Sharp drop in Syrian asylum seekers

The most striking trend in the report is the sharp fall in applications from Syrians, who for much of the past decade constituted the largest group of asylum seekers in Europe. In May 2025, only 3,100 Syrians applied for asylum, down from around 16,000 in October 2024—a nearly fivefold decrease over just seven months.

“Monthly Syrian asylum applications fell drastically, reflecting changing conditions within Syria rather than policy shifts in the EU,” the EUAA said. “This downturn, the like of which has not been seen since the initial wave of COVID-19, is likely not due to any asylum policy changes in the EU+.”

The fall coincides with profound political changes in Syria following the ouster of longtime leader Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. The interim government, now led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, has launched a platform focused on stability and reconstruction to encourage displaced Syrians to return home.

Return migration to Syria accelerates

The new leadership has faced ongoing challenges, including Israeli military strikes, but international agencies report a surge in return migration. The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) estimates that as of mid-May 2025, over 500,000 Syrians have crossed back into the country.

At the height of Syria’s civil war, millions of people fled the country, with neighboring states like Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan absorbing the bulk of refugees, while over a million made their way to Europe. The recent trend suggests a gradual reversal of that exodus, though humanitarian organizations caution that conditions in parts of Syria remain precarious.

Venezuela becomes top source of asylum applications

With the decline in Syrian requests, Venezuelans have now become the largest group of asylum seekers in the EU+, surpassing both Afghans and Syrians. The report attributes this surge to a combination of factors, including the severe economic and political crisis in Venezuela and evolving United States immigration policies that may have shifted migration routes toward Europe.

Afghanistan remained the second-largest source country for asylum seekers, continuing a trend of high migration flows linked to instability and repression following the Taliban’s return to power.

Shifting destinations: Germany loses top spot

The EUAA report also notes a shift in the most popular destinations for asylum seekers. Germany, which had long been the leading destination during the peak years of the Syrian and Afghan migration crises, received fewer applications in early 2025 than Spain, Italy, and France.

This shift reflects changing migration networks, evolving border policies, and in some cases, the secondary movement of asylum seekers within Europe after their initial entry.

The overall decline in asylum applications is likely to be welcomed by governments across the EU that have faced sustained domestic pressure over migration levels in recent years. However, the drop is not attributed to stricter border enforcement or new asylum regulations, according to the EUAA.

Instead, the fall appears closely tied to developments in origin countries, particularly Syria, where the end of Assad’s rule has temporarily altered the calculus for many displaced people. Analysts caution, however, that the situation remains fluid and that migration flows could rise again if political or security conditions deteriorate.

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he administration of U.S. President Donald Trump is weighing unprecedented sanctions on European Union or member state officials involved in enforcing the bloc’s landmark Digital Services Act (DSA), two sources familiar with the matter told Reuters. The move would escalate growing tensions between Washington and Brussels over tech regulation and freedom of speech online.

According to the sources, senior State Department officials have held internal meetings to discuss potential punitive measures, which would likely come in the form of visa restrictions. A final decision has not yet been made, and it remains unclear which EU or member state officials would be targeted.

Washington has accused the EU of using the DSA to impose “undue” restrictions on freedom of expression, particularly against conservative voices, and to burden U.S. tech giants such as Meta Platforms, the parent company of Facebook and Instagram. The DSA, which came into force to make online spaces safer, requires tech companies to take stronger action against illegal content, including hate speech and child sexual abuse material.

In early August, Secretary of State Marco Rubio directed U.S. diplomats to lobby European governments and digital services authorities against the legislation. The State Department’s internal cable, seen by Reuters earlier this month, outlined a campaign to have the law amended or repealed.

Trump threatens tariffs on digital taxes

On Monday, Trump further raised the stakes by threatening countries with digital taxes, warning of “subsequent additional tariffs” on their exports to the U.S. if such measures were not withdrawn. “With this TRUTH, I put all countries with Digital Taxes, Legislation, Rules, or Regulations on notice that unless these discriminatory actions are removed, I… will impose substantial additional tariffs on that country’s exports to the U.S.A., and institute export restrictions on our highly protected technology and chips,” Trump posted on social media.

In February, Trump had already instructed his trade team to revive investigations into countries applying digital service taxes on U.S. tech companies.

The European Commission declined to comment on potential U.S. sanctions but has previously rejected censorship claims. “Freedom of expression is a fundamental right in the EU. It lies at the heart of the DSA,” a Commission spokesperson said. “It sets out rules for online intermediaries to tackle illegal content, while safeguarding freedom of expression and information online.”

Escalatory move

While trade partners often contest foreign regulations they consider discriminatory, sanctioning government officials over such legislation is extremely rare. The already strained relationship between the Trump administration and the EU has been marked by tariff threats, disputes over digital taxation, and frequent criticism of Europe’s treatment of U.S. tech firms.

The Trump administration has also shown a willingness to interfere in the internal politics of U.S. allies. It previously imposed sanctions on a Brazilian Supreme Court justice overseeing the trial of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and has accused European authorities of suppressing right-wing voices, including Germany’s AfD party.

Top U.S. officials, including Vice President JD Vance, have repeatedly criticized the EU’s approach, claiming it amounts to “censoring” Americans. European leaders, however, argue the law is designed to keep digital markets open and safe rather than target U.S. companies.

As of now, no final decision on sanctions has been reached, but the possibility reflects the administration’s hardline stance on what it perceives as European overreach in regulating the digital sphere.

(Source: Reuters)

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n the wake of geopolitical tensions and ongoing energy crises, Europe finds itself at the forefront of grappling with the phenomenon of energy blackmail, a strategic manipulation of energy resources for political and economic leverage, according to a new report by Danish Institute for International Studies. While the term gained prominence following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, its roots run deeper, predating Vladimir Putin’s tenure in the Kremlin.

Energy blackmail, characterized by coercion and market manipulation, has been a recurrent tool employed against European countries since the 1990s. The weaponization of energy resources, primarily oil and natural gas, has posed significant challenges to European energy security, with Russia often at the center of such tactics.

The European Union has been at the forefront of efforts to diversify its energy supply and reduce dependence on Russia, particularly since the events of 2022. However, the threat of energy blackmail persists, prompting EU policymakers to reassess strategies and implement countermeasures to safeguard energy security.

EU response

In response to the threat posed by energy blackmail, the EU has undertaken several measures aimed at bolstering energy resilience. These include diversifying supply routes, accelerating the deployment of renewable energy sources, investing in innovation, and enhancing cybersecurity measures to protect digital infrastructure.

The growing interconnectedness of energy systems, while enhancing efficiency, also introduces new vulnerabilities, particularly in the realm of cybersecurity. As such, comprehensive network management strategies and robust cybersecurity measures are crucial in safeguarding against cyber threats to the energy sector.

Complex landscape of energy geopolitics

As Europe navigates the complex landscape of energy geopolitics, the need for proactive measures to counter energy blackmail has never been more pressing. By implementing effective strategies and investing in resilience, the EU aims to ensure energy security and mitigate the risks posed by geopolitical tensions and digital vulnerabilities.

As the global energy landscape continues to evolve, Europe remains committed to safeguarding its energy sovereignty and resilience in the face of emerging threats and challenges.

The report highlights the ongoing efforts of European policymakers to address the threat of energy blackmail and underscores the importance of proactive measures in ensuring energy security amidst geopolitical tensions and digital vulnerabilities.

Source: Danish Institute for International Studies

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uropean Union lawmakers are on the brink of giving their final approval to the much-anticipated Artificial Intelligence Act, marking a significant milestone in the regulation of AI technology globally. Scheduled for Wednesday, the impending vote in the European Parliament is poised to cement the EU’s position as a leader in AI regulation, with the rules expected to come into effect later this year.

The culmination of a five-year journey since its initial proposal, the AI Act is poised to shape the future landscape of AI governance. According to Dragos Tudorache, a Romanian lawmaker who played a pivotal role in negotiating the draft law, the AI Act represents a paradigm shift towards a human-centric approach to AI, where humans retain control over the technology to harness its potential for societal progress and economic growth.

Despite initial concerns and lobbying efforts from major tech companies, including OpenAI, the AI Act has garnered broad support. However, it’s worth noting that OpenAI CEO Sam Altman’s remarks last year about the possibility of withdrawing from Europe due to regulatory constraints sparked a brief controversy before being clarified.

Risks and usages

Risk-based approach: Similar to existing EU regulations, the AI Act adopts a risk-based approach to regulate AI applications. Systems deemed low-risk, such as content recommendation algorithms, will face lighter regulations, while high-risk applications, like those in medical devices or critical infrastructure, will be subject to stricter requirements.

Prohibited uses: Certain AI applications are outright banned due to their perceived risks, including social scoring systems, certain predictive policing techniques, and emotion recognition systems in educational and workplace settings. Additionally, the use of AI for remote biometric identification by law enforcement is restricted, except for specific cases like combating serious crimes.

Generative AI: The emergence of general-purpose AI models, such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT, prompted policymakers to include provisions specific to generative AI. Developers of such models are required to disclose detailed information about the data used for training, adhere to copyright laws, and label AI-generated content as manipulated when applicable. Enhanced scrutiny is reserved for the largest and most powerful AI models, given concerns about their potential for serious accidents and the proliferation of harmful biases.

Influence

Global influence: Europe’s pioneering AI regulations are expected to influence AI governance worldwide, setting a precedent for other governments grappling with similar challenges. While the United States and China are also advancing their AI agendas, Europe’s proactive approach underscores its commitment to shaping the future of AI regulation.

Implementation and enforcement: Following final approval, the AI Act is set to become law by mid-2024, with provisions phased in gradually. Each EU member state will establish its own AI watchdog for enforcement, while a central AI Office in Brussels will oversee compliance, investigation, and supervision. Violations of the AI Act could result in hefty fines, signaling the EU’s intent to uphold rigorous standards in AI governance.

As Europe moves closer to formalizing the AI Act, the world watches closely, anticipating its impact on the future development and regulation of artificial intelligence on a global scale.

Source: The Associated Press

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urkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, during a joint news conference with Hungarian counterpart Peter Szijjarto, urged the European Union to adopt a strategic mindset and move away from employing “identity politics” in its dealings with Turkey. Fidan expressed hope that Hungary, assuming the rotating EU presidency in July, would make progress on issues such as updating the customs union and visa liberalization.

Fidan emphasized that Turkey-Europe ties should not become victims of the political calculations of certain countries. He expects the EU to adopt a more rational approach toward Turkey’s membership, contributing to regional prosperity and stability. Relations between the EU and Turkey, an official candidate for membership since 1987, have faced challenges due to political roadblocks and issues such as the Cyprus dispute and concerns about human rights.

The Balkans and Ukraine

Speaking on the events in the Balkans and Ukraine, Fidan expressed a desire for the swift resolution of the conflict in Ukraine through a fair peace process based on international law. Both Turkey and Hungary advocate for peace negotiations and reiterated their commitment to this belief. As part of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, Turkey will host Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto from March 1-3.

In response, Szijjarto thanked Turkey for contributing to Hungary’s energy security, highlighting Ankara’s role in supplying natural gas to Hungary. He emphasized the necessity of cooperation with Turkey for energy and economic security, stating that Europe cannot overcome challenges without collaboration with Turkey. Szijjarto acknowledged Ankara’s support in addressing the constant pressure of irregular migration and expressed Hungary’s continuous support for Turkey in this regard.

Turkey has been a key transit point for irregular migrants seeking to cross into Europe. The country, hosting over 4 million refugees, is taking measures at its borders to prevent a fresh influx of migrants and has received appreciation from Hungary for its role in addressing the migration issue.

Source: Daily Sabah

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n an unusual diplomatic move, China has extended an offer to support Hungary in public security matters, marking a shift from the traditional focus on trade and investment. The proposition comes amidst Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s visit to Beijing, highlighting the long-standing strategic partnership between the two nations.

Public Security Minister Wang Xiaohong expressed China’s intention to strengthen law enforcement and security ties with Hungary as they commemorate their 75th year of diplomatic relations. Wang emphasized a desire to make these efforts a “new highlight of bilateral relations,” particularly in combating terrorism and transnational crimes.

The discussions also encompass security and law enforcement capacity building under President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative, which seeks to enhance global connectivity through trade and infrastructure projects. During his visit to Budapest, Wang met with Interior Minister Sandor Pinter, signing documents on law enforcement and security cooperation, although specific details were not disclosed.

A diplomatic victory within the European Union

This security assurance comes at a time when Hungary, a Russian ally, has been working to reduce its dependence on Western countries. Hungary has notably resisted pressure to endorse the expansion of NATO in Europe and is the only NATO state that has not ratified Sweden’s application to join the security bloc.

China’s move is seen as a diplomatic victory within the European Union, especially considering Hungary’s growing affinity towards Beijing. The Central European nation’s divergence from EU positions on China-related matters has already strained the bloc’s collective stance.

Hungary’s willingness to align itself with China has led to opposition or abstention from EU positions critical of China on issues such as human rights. Additionally, despite warnings from the European Commission, Hungary hosts Huawei Technologies’ largest logistics and manufacturing base outside China.

Hungary’s growing independence

The security pact with Hungary showcases China’s diplomatic influence in the European Union, creating complexities within the EU’s approach to its relationship with China, characterized by differences on human rights, trade imbalances, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The move underscores Hungary’s growing independence in shaping its international relations.

On the occasion of the 75th anniversary of bilateral diplomatic ties, China expressed its commitment to working with Hungary to implement key consensus reached by their leaders. The goals include maintaining high-level exchanges, deepening political mutual trust, strengthening people-to-people exchanges, expanding cooperation across diverse fields, and enhancing communication and coordination in international and regional affairs. Wang emphasized the intention to elevate law enforcement and security cooperation to a new highlight of bilateral relations.

During his visit to Hungary, Wang held meetings with Hungarian Minister of Interior Sandor Pinter, where they signed documents related to law enforcement and security cooperation, marking another step in the ongoing collaboration between the two nations.

Source: Reuters

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he European Union is at a crossroads: it is struggling to deal with vital issues such as the Russian threat and the energy crisis, and trying to build a Europe that is more independent of the U.S. through greater cooperation with its neighbors. In 2024, Europe faces a busy agenda, including Russia’s war against Ukraine, Trump’s possible return as U.S. president, and EU parliamentary elections.

As we leave 2023 behind, the shattering events of the past period are challenging the European Union (EU) and all political actors. While the EU has been busy implementing its twin transformation agendas of the green consensus and digitalization, it has had to confront a changing geopolitical environment, first with the COVID-19 crisis, and then Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the growing energy crisis.

All these factors have led the EU to focus on urgent action. While Europe appeared more united at the beginning of the Ukraine crisis, the protracted war has led to the emergence of divergent voices. Finally, Israel’s response to Hamas’s attacks started badly and got worse.

The Russia-Ukraine war and the EU enlargement process

The 27 member states of the European Union have repeatedly expressed their commitment to providing Ukraine with all necessary assistance to defend its territory, fearing that a potential Russian victory could threaten the security of Europe as a whole. But as the war has dragged on, the spirit of solidarity and determination in Europe has waned. Decisions on providing financial aid to Ukraine are becoming increasingly difficult within the EU. The strategy of leaving it up to Kyiv to decide whether or not to open negotiations with Russia could be revisited in 2024.

EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has stated, “Our goal is a just and lasting peace, not a frozen conflict. The best way to bring stability and prosperity to Ukraine is EU membership. Europe can be the solution for a resurgent Ukraine.”

Von der Leyen’s comments were seen by many member states as premature and a step too far. Full membership talks with Ukraine and Moldova are due to start in 2024. Possible EU membership for war-torn Ukraine would be extremely costly for the Union. For this reason, even Poland and the Baltic states, two of Ukraine’s biggest political supporters, are hesitant and uneasy about opening negotiations with Kyiv: Ukraine’s accession to the EU would mean that member states would become Brussels’s paymasters rather than Brussels’s recipients. EU officials are trying to reassure nervous members that negotiations are just the beginning and that full membership could be years, if not decades, away.

The countries of the Western Balkans, some of which have been waiting at the EU’s doorstep for almost 20 years and all of which want to join, are watching with suspicion as Ukraine and Moldova try to become full members at record speed. Montenegro, Albania, and North Macedonia are expected to be given a concrete date for full membership, partly to reduce Russian and Chinese influence. Prospects are less rosy for Serbia and Kosovo, where ethnic conflicts are holding back progress.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other hand, is only slowly shedding its image as a dysfunctional state. Its biggest obstacle will be the potential struggle between Bosnian Serbs and other ethnic groups, provoked by Russia.

Proceedings against these two countries for breaches of the rule of law have stalled. Hungary’s anti-EU prime minister, Viktor Orbán, is likely to remain in power in 2024. There is hope for Poland, however, with former EU Council president and pro-European liberal Donald Tusk taking power in Warsaw.

When eight Central and Eastern European countries, Malta, and the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU 20 years ago, Brussels reluctantly adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, which is still in force and establishes the basis for the Union’s internal order (functioning as a form of constitution). The debate on updating this treaty will be much more relevant in 2024.

Meanwhile, EU citizens are far removed from these discussions. According to the Eurobarometer survey, 60% of EU citizens complain that they do not have enough influence on decisions taken in Brussels, yet they are generally optimistic about the future of the EU. Surprisingly, France is the least optimistic, given that it is one of the founding countries of the Union. The optimism rate there is less than 50%. The most optimistic citizens are the Danes, with 86%. In Germany, 58% are optimistic about the development of the EU in 2024.

Regional and global challenges

Europe’s response to the Gaza crisis started badly and got worse. The war in Ukraine gave the EU an opportunity to gain some geopolitical prominence. In the face of the war, the Union produced a number of policies, such as paying for arms to be sent in response to Russian aggression. But it failed to show the same unity and resolve when it tried to project a strong EU in response to the Israeli attacks on Gaza. Some European countries, notably Ursula von der Leyen’s Germany, instinctively sided with Israel and emphasized its right to defend itself. But others, such as Spain and Ireland, are more concerned with the plight of the Palestinians, warning of a humanitarian catastrophe. While Ukraine unites the continent, the Israeli conflict has the potential to divide it.

These developments undermine von der Leyen, who has been the face of a stronger and more geopolitical Europe since the Russo-Ukrainian war. The EU’s and von der Leyen’s influence extended beyond Ukraine. In a speech in March 2023, von der Leyen called for “de-risking” rather than “decoupling” economic relations with China, setting a new tone in relations with that country; she also has worked closely with the United States. New buzzwords such as “strategic autonomy” and “Team Europe” suggested that the bloc would play a full role in geopolitics as a third power in a bipolar world.

In terms of relations with the United States, the return of Donald Trump to the White House as president, despite the lawsuits against him, could mean the beginning of difficult times not only for the EU but also for NATO. Ukraine’s most important ally in terms of support, deterrence against Russia, and trade could be left out in the cold. If Trump becomes president again, Brussels would be forced to take over much of the military aid to Ukraine to avoid offending the unpredictable U.S. politician.

The German-American Chamber of Commerce predicts that Trump could punish Europe with high tariffs if he wins the presidency. In such a case, the EU would also have to raise tariffs and other fees against the U.S. This would likely trigger a new trade war, which would mean lower U.S.-European trade volumes and slower economic growth.

The worst-case scenario, say foreign policy experts in Brussels, is that if Trump worsens relations with China, the main trading partner of many European countries, the world could be set on an even more unstable path than it already is.

European elections in 2024 and possible scenarios

There will be nine parliamentary elections in Europe in 2024, most of which are expected to result in either a change of government or significant policy shifts in the countries concerned. Political fragmentation is therefore likely to become even more pronounced in Europe in 2024. Stable majorities for governments will be harder to come by, and countries governed by coalitions are likely to have to rely on multi-party agreements, further fueling political fragmentation across Europe.

Challenges such as the existence of a minority government in France, growing instability and infighting in Germany and Austria, the recent collapse of the coalition and election victory of the far-right Wilders in the Netherlands, and the reliance on small hardline parties in Spain will continue to constrain policymaking.

Growing discontent with the political establishment in general means that mainstream parties are also shifting towards more radical policies espoused by the far right and far left, especially on migration. In Austria, in particular, the far right is likely to enter government after the September 2024 elections, potentially becoming the largest party. In Portugal, early elections have been called for March 2024 after the fall of the government in November 2023. Polls suggest that the right-wing bloc, backed by the far-right Chega (Enough!) party, has a good chance of forming the next government in the country.

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lovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico expressed his support for Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s veto on a €50 billion European Union financial aid package for Ukraine. During a joint press conference in Budapest, Fico criticized Brussels for attempting to “punish” Hungary over its stance on funds for Ukraine.

Fico firmly stated that as long as he leads the Slovak government, he will not agree to a country being punished for defending its sovereignty.

Orbán, who has been in a standoff with other EU leaders, including a clash at the December European Council summit, argued against allocating funds from the EU budget for Ukraine.

He proposed a separate budget for aid to Ukraine to prevent any negative impact on the EU budget. Orbán reiterated that he does not want to jointly take up a loan and stressed the importance of aiding Ukraine in a way that does not harm the EU’s budget.

50 billion financial support plan

The €50 billion financial support plan for Ukraine, requiring unanimity, faced opposition from Hungary due to concerns about corruption in Ukraine, the effectiveness of Western support in the conflict, and the principle of EU budget support for member countries. Despite pressure from other EU leaders, Orbán remained steadfast in his position.

The EU leaders are set to discuss the issue at a summit on February 1, and Brussels is exploring ways to overcome Orbán’s veto. Last week, 120 Members of the European Parliament signed a petition urging actions to limit Hungary’s voting rights.

However, Fico supported Orbán’s proposal to find alternative sources for aid to Ukraine and criticized the EU for attempting to curtail Hungary’s voting rights. The upcoming summit will likely play a crucial role in shaping the EU’s approach to financial support for Ukraine and its long-term budget revisions.

EU budget

“If we aim to provide assistance to Ukraine, a necessity that I strongly advocate, we must ensure it doesn’t adversely impact the EU budget,” stated Orbán on Tuesday.

EU leaders are scheduled for another meeting on Feb. 1 to negotiate a deal on the financial package, with Orbán’s influential veto power remaining a significant factor.

Fico, expressing his support for Orbán’s stance, endorsed the idea of splitting the funding into four installments, subject to annual reassessment and potential blocking.

“I eagerly anticipate our gathering on Feb. 1 in Brussels, where we will observe and fully understand your rightful advocacy, as initiated during the last European Council meeting,” Fico conveyed to Orbán.

Sources: Anadolu, Politico, and Reuters

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n a significant display of dissent, Italy, Spain, and France refrained from participating in the U.S. and British strikes against the Houthi group in Yemen, underscoring divisions within the Western alliance. The divergence became apparent as these nations also declined to sign a joint statement issued by 10 countries justifying the military actions.

The disagreement highlights the complexity of addressing the Houthi rebels, who have been targeting civilian ships in the Red Sea, citing opposition to Israel’s military operations in the Gaza Strip.

U.S. and British warplanes, ships, and submarines conducted numerous airstrikes in Yemen in response to the Houthi attacks on one of the world’s busiest commercial shipping routes.

Support from Netherlands, Australia, Canada, and Bahrain

The Netherlands, Australia, Canada, and Bahrain supported the operation logistically and provided intelligence. Germany, Denmark, New Zealand, and South Korea joined in signing a joint statement with the six participating nations, defending the overnight attacks and warning of potential further actions to protect Red Sea trade if the Houthi provocations persisted.

Sources from Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s office disclosed that Italy opted not to sign the statement and was consequently not invited to participate in the military strikes. The decision was attributed to the need for parliamentary approval, which would have incurred a time delay, and Italy’s preference for a diplomatic approach to deescalate tensions in the Red Sea.

However, a later government statement clarified that “Italy supports the operations of allied countries, who have the right to defend their vessels, in the interest of global trade flows and humanitarian assistance.”

Spain and France

A French official, speaking anonymously, expressed concern that participating in the U.S.-led strikes would diminish France’s leverage in talks aimed at defusing tensions between Hezbollah and Israel. France has actively sought to prevent an escalation of conflicts in Lebanon in recent weeks.

U.S. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby avoided providing specific details on France’s participation, stating, “You’ve seen the list of people that participated. Internationally, even those who weren’t actively involved in the dropping of bombs – many of our coalition partners had signed up to the support, non-operational support.” The French foreign affairs ministry issued a statement placing responsibility for the escalation on the Houthis, signaling potential tacit support for the U.S. action.

Spanish Defence Minister Margarita Robles justified Madrid’s non-participation, emphasizing a commitment to peace and dialogue. She stated, “Every country has to give explanations for its actions. Spain will always be committed to peace and dialogue.”

Italian Defence Minister Guido Crosetto, expressing reluctance earlier in the week, emphasized the need to curb Houthi aggression without triggering a new war in the region.

The divergence in Western opinions on addressing the Houthi threat emerged last month during Operation Prosperity Guardian, where Italy, Spain, and France opted not to participate, citing reluctance to place their naval vessels under U.S. command.

All three nations currently contribute to an EU anti-piracy operation off the Horn of Africa. The Spanish defence minister suggested that the European Union might consider a new naval mission in the coming days, reflecting a sense of responsibility and commitment to peace by abstaining from intervention in the Red Sea for the time being.

Source: Reuters

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n a significant move, far-right Dutch politician Geert Wilders, the leader of the Party for Freedom (PVV), announced on January 8, 2024, that he is withdrawing a controversial 2018 proposal that called for the ban on mosques and the Quran. This decision, seen as a crucial concession to potential coalition partners, comes just a day before the resumption of talks to form the next government following the November 2023 elections.

Wilders’ withdrawal of the legislation is considered a key step in gaining the trust and support of three mainstream parties that he aims to include in a coalition government alongside the PVV. One of the party leaders, Pieter Omtzigt of the New Social Contract, had raised concerns about the compatibility of some of Wilders’ policies with the Dutch Constitution, which upholds liberties, including freedom of religion.

The proposed legislation, dating back to 2018, was part of a series of laws presented by Wilders that aimed to restrict what he labeled as “Islamic expressions.” The bill characterized Islam as a “violent, totalitarian ideology” and called for the prohibition of mosques, the Quran, Islamic schools, as well as the wearing of burqas and niqabs. The decision to withdraw this legislation indicates a potential softening of the PVV’s strident anti-Islam stance.

Wilders’ more moderate position

During a parliamentary debate last year, following the PVV’s success in winning 37 seats in the 150-seat lower house of the Dutch parliament in the November 2023 general election, Wilders hinted at a more moderate position regarding his party’s anti-Islam policies. This move is seen as an effort to align the PVV’s proposals with the Dutch Constitution, addressing concerns raised by potential coalition partners.

In response to the withdrawal of the legislation, Wilders stated during the parliamentary debate, “Sometimes I will have to withdraw proposals, and I will do that. I will show the Netherlands, the legislature, Mr. Omtzigt’s party — anybody who wants to hear it — that we will adapt our rules to the constitution and bring our proposals in line with it.”

Wilders is scheduled to resume coalition talks on January 9, 2024, with Pieter Omtzigt and the leaders of two other parties: the center-right People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy led by outgoing Prime Minister Mark Rutte and the Farmer Citizen Movement led by Caroline van der Plas.

Laws lack majority vote

Wilders presented the three laws to the parliament in 2017, 2018, and 2019; however, they failed to secure a majority in the lower house.

Regarding the suggested ban on Islamic expressions, the Council of State, an independent legislative watchdog, recommended Wilders discard the proposal. In a 2019 advisory statement, the council stated, “The Advisory Division urges the initiators to reject the bill as it is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the democratic constitutional state, principles that the initiators aim to safeguard.”

The withdrawal of the controversial legislation marks a significant development in Dutch politics, showcasing a potential shift in the PVV’s approach and creating room for broader cooperation within the political landscape.

Source: The Associated Press

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Birleşmiş Milletler Dünya Ekonomik Durumu ve Beklentileri (WESP) 2024 raporu, Avrupa’nın önümüzdeki yıl ılımlı bir ekonomik toparlanmaya hazır olduğunu gösteriyor. Ancak bölge, yüksek faiz oranları, sıkı maliye politikaları ve jeopolitik çatışmalar nedeniyle olumsuzluklarla karşı karşıya. Rapor, temkinli bir küresel ekonomik görünüm sunuyor ve küresel ekonomik büyümenin 2023’teki %2,7’den 2024’te pandemi öncesi %3,0 büyüme oranının altında %2,4’e yavaşlamasını öngörüyor.

Avrupa’nın ekonomik gidişatı parasal sıkılaştırmadan, geçmişteki faiz artışlarından ve reel ekonomiyi etkileyen azalan likiditeden etkilenmeye devam ediyor. Avrupa Birliği’nin (AB) 2024’te ortalama %1,2’lik bir büyüme yaşaması bekleniyor; bu, 2023’teki %0,5’ten mütevazı bir iyileşme ancak pandemi öncesi yaklaşık %2’lik büyüme hızının çok altında.

İyileşmenin tüketici harcamalarındaki artış, yavaşlayan enflasyon, artan reel ücretler ve güçlü işgücü piyasaları ile desteklenmesi bekleniyor. Ancak tüketici ve iş dünyası güveni düşük olmaya devam ediyor ve mali politikaların daha kısıtlayıcı hale gelmesi bekleniyor.

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n a landmark move after protracted deliberations, European Union negotiators have announced a significant breakthrough in reforming the bloc’s dated asylum system. The preliminary agreement, achieved following intense overnight discussions on December 20, 2023, sets the stage for a comprehensive overhaul of the EU’s migration policy framework.

As confirmed by the EU’s Spanish presidency, envoys from the member states, the European Parliament, and the European Commission, have concurred on the principal political aspects of the new Pact on Asylum and Migration. This accord arrives nearly three years after the pact’s introduction in September 2020, a period when the EU grappled with an unprecedented influx of refugees, primarily from conflict zones in Syria and Iraq.

The original asylum regulations had buckled under the strain of over a million undocumented arrivals in 2015, necessitating a robust response. However, progress on the new pact stalled as member countries contended over the distribution of responsibilities for processing migrants and the extent of mandatory solidarity among states.

Key points of consensus

Key points of consensus have now been reportedly reached on critical issues, including the initial screening of undocumented migrants, the application of biometric data, criteria for determining responsible EU countries for asylum claims, and the associated procedural mechanisms.

Amid fading hopes for reform, the EU had increasingly relied on external agreements to manage migration flows, exemplified by a controversial arrangement with Tunisia. Critics have accused such deals of outsourcing the bloc’s migration challenges at the expense of humanitarian considerations.

With the EU elections looming from June 6-9, the pressure is on to finalize the agreement. To implement the plan, officials and legislators emphasize that accord on all ten segments of the pact must be reached by February. This development represents a critical step toward a collective European approach to migration and asylum, balancing responsibility sharing and solidarity among member states.

Hungary and Poland opposition

In the year leading up to November 2023, European authorities have noted 255,332 irregular migrant arrivals, indicating a pressing need for coherent migration management. “The pact needs to be finalized before the European electorate casts their ballots,” insisted Margaritis Schinas, the European Commission’s Vice President, labeling the recent deal as the long-awaited keystone in the EU’s migration and asylum reform efforts.

The perilous journey across the Mediterranean has claimed the lives of countless refugees, many escaping the ravages of war and poverty. Such tragedies underscore the lethal consequences of Europe’s stringent immigration policies, increasingly scrutinized by advocates of human rights.

Amidst the backdrop of such humanitarian crises, right-wing factions in nations like Italy, Hungary, Poland, and Germany are amplifying their calls for more stringent immigration controls, placing the asylum system under the microscope as a central tenet of their political agenda.

Hungary and Poland, both of which have expressed opposition to the recent agreement, are next in line to assume the EU presidency following the impending elections. Despite their resistance, the pact was endorsed by a majority.

Source: The Associated Press and Aljazeera English

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he Cypriot government is calling on the European Union to reevaluate the safety of parts of Syria for the potential repatriation of refugees, as the Mediterranean island nation grapples with a record number of Syrian arrivals. Interior Minister Constantinos Ioannou expressed the urgency of this reassessment in an interview with Reuters, highlighting the island’s growing concerns over its capacity to handle the influx.

Cyprus, the easternmost outpost of the EU, has become increasingly strained as conflicts in the Middle East intensify, leading to a surge in refugees and asylum-seekers. “We have five times more migrants than any other frontline member state,” Ioannou stated, noting that the majority of these migrants are from Syria.

The Cypriot foreign ministry is set to formally raise this issue with Brussels. The discussions would include the status of certain regions in Syria, particularly Damascus and Tartous, which a February report by the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) assessed as having “no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected by indiscriminate violence.”

1,043 arrivals by boat in October alone

More than 5 million people have fled Syria during over a decade of civil war, primarily to Lebanon and Turkey. Despite a current stalemate in the conflict with President Bashar al-Assad’s forces controlling most of the country, refugees continue to leave. Cyprus has seen a marked increase in Syrian refugees, with 1,043 arrivals by boat in October alone, a three-fold increase from the previous year.

The island has also been a key point for migrants from Africa, especially since 2019, with many entering the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and being smuggled into the Greek Cypriot south. Although tightened security along the 180-km “green line” has reduced overall arrivals, the authorities remain concerned about potential new routes.

Offering Lebanon technical assistance

Ioannou mentioned that Cyprus is in close contact with Lebanon, which has intercepted numerous vessels. Cyprus has offered Lebanon technical assistance and joint patrols, and is advocating for more direct EU assistance to Lebanon. Additionally, Ioannou suggested the possibility of establishing “safe zones” outside the EU for processing asylum requests, similar to a plan Italy announced for centers in Albania.

The call from Cyprus comes as the United Nations refugee chief warns of potential further displacement in the region due to the Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza, as stated in a forum in Geneva.

The European Commission has not yet responded to requests for comment on this developing situation. Cyprus’s call for an EU rethink on Syria migration underscores the complex challenges faced by frontline states in managing refugee crises and balancing humanitarian responsibilities with national capacities.

Source: Reuters

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n a significant shift in defense partnerships, Niger has terminated its security and defense collaborations with the European Union, opting instead to fortify its military cooperation with Russia.

The move, announced by Niger’s Foreign Ministry on November 4, entails the discontinuation of the European Union Military Partnership Mission (EUMPM) in Niger, which had been initiated in February with the objective of bolstering the Niger Armed Forces’ capabilities to combat terrorist threats. The termination of this mission was accompanied by the revocation of privileges and immunities previously granted under the partnership.

Concurrently, the junta in Niger has also put an end to the 2012 EU civilian mission aimed at enhancing the country’s internal security forces. This cancellation of EU defense agreements coincides with a significant meeting in Niamey between Niger’s military leadership and a Russian delegation, culminating in a defense cooperation agreement signed by Russian Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel-General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and Nigerien Defense Minister Gen. Salifou Mody.

The pivot towards Russia

This pivot towards Russia follows a suspension of financial aid and security assistance by the EU in response to the military intervention in July that ousted Niger’s elected President Mohamed Bazoum. In a related development, on August 3rd, Niger’s military rulers had already declared the annulment of military pacts with France, a move that was met with skepticism from Paris due to concerns about legitimacy.

Despite these tensions, French President Emmanuel Macron announced in September the planned end-of-year withdrawal of approximately 1,500 French troops stationed in Niger as part of a broader regional counterinsurgency operation.

Niger’s realignment towards Russian military support marks a notable change in the geopolitical landscape of West Africa and reflects the increasing Russian influence in the region’s military affairs. The consequences of this shift, both for Niger’s internal stability and regional security dynamics, are yet to unfold as international observers watch closely.

Implications for the West African region

This pursuit has recently led to a notable pivot away from Western alliances towards Russia. The junta’s actions suggest a strategic realignment and a search for partners more aligned with its current political stance.

The broader implications of this shift are significant for the West African region, where France and the EU have traditionally held considerable influence. The departure of French troops and the cessation of EU security missions represent a withdrawal of Western military presence and, potentially, a vacuum that could be filled by other powers like Russia, as indicated by the newly signed defense cooperation agreement.

As Niger navigates these sanctions and repositions itself on the global stage, the dynamics of power and influence in the region are poised for change, with the junta’s maneuvers likely to invite further scrutiny from both regional bodies and the broader international community.

Sources: Anadolu Agency and AP

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n a surprising turn of events, Geert Wilders, an anti-Islam and Euroskeptic politician, is projected to be the unexpected winner of the Dutch election. According to an initial exit poll, his Party for Freedom (PVV) is expected to secure around 35 of the 150 seats in parliament, which is more than double the number they won in the previous election in 2021. This outcome is likely to have a significant impact on European politics.

Frans Timmermans’s Labor-Green alliance came in second place, winning 25 seats, a significant increase from their current 17 seats. Dilan Yeşilgöz, who is set to succeed outgoing Prime Minister Mark Rutte as the leader of the center-right People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) party, is projected to win 24 seats, which represents a loss of 10 seats according to the exit poll conducted by the national broadcaster NOS.

Yeşilgöz, who has made notable anti-Turkey statements throughout her political career, is recognized for her stance against immigration despite being an immigrant herself. Earlier this year, as Minister of Justice and Security she indicated that police officers and special investigating officers should be “neutral” and not wear a headscarf (hijab) at their work.

Forming a coalition government with Wilders?

However, the question remains whether other parties would be willing to form a coalition government with Wilders, as he would lack a majority in parliament despite being the largest party. In the past decade, mainstream party leaders have refused to work with Wilders in power-sharing arrangements. Nevertheless, in recent weeks, Wilders has expressed his desire to be part of a coalition after this election, downplaying his radical views on Islam and emphasizing other priorities.

The PVV still includes anti-Islam measures in its government program, such as banning mosques, the Quran, and Islamic headscarves in government buildings. Wilders is also a staunch Euroskeptic, advocating for a referendum on leaving the EU. Despite winning the most seats, it is unlikely that Wilders will become the prime minister. Yeşilgöz has already stated that she would not support Wilders as prime minister even if he had the largest share in parliament.

Pieter Omtzigt, a Dutch Christian Democrat MP has also ruled out joining forces with Wilders, citing his anti-Islam policies as contradictory to the freedoms of expression and religion protected by the Dutch constitution. Timmermans has firmly positioned himself against supporting Wilders as well.

After all the affairs and scandals in Dutch politics in recent years, such as the child benefits scandal in which thousands of families were wrongly accused of fraud on the basis of their ethnicity, it is remarkable that Dutch voters are once again choosing a right-wing party. The question of whether radical right-wing politics will last is no longer a question—it is here to stay for a while.

The PVV ultimately won due to so-called issue ownership, which in the case of the PVV was the subject of migration. In his victory speech, Wilders pledged to put an end to what he referred to as a “tsunami of asylum seekers and immigrants.”

It seems that the Dutch voted strategically to make a statement. In recent years, Wilders has appeared to move towards the center for Dutch people without migration background by putting them “first,” which was a very smart campaign strategy. Thus, he argued for more hospitals and care for Henk and Ingrid, but not for Fatima and Mohammed.

Wilders strategically appealed to Dutch voters without a migration background by prioritizing their concerns, such as healthcare, while maintaining his anti-Islam stance.

People with a migration background from different parts of the country are expressing their concerns about the increasing polarization within society.

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group of EU countries, known as the ‘Friends of Western Balkans’, is advocating for increased cooperation between the European Union and the Western Balkan states in the realm of foreign policy. Spearheaded by Austria, the coalition includes Croatia, Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Slovakia, and Slovenia, all of whom are pushing for the Western Balkans representatives to have more regular meetings with their EU counterparts.

The initiative, which was outlined in a non-paper seen by Euractiv, calls on EU institutions to establish a clear agenda for accelerated integration with definitive steps leading up to 2024 and beyond. The document was circulated in preparation for a joint ministerial meeting in Brussels with the six Western Balkan nations: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia.

Austrian Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg, who launched the ‘Friends of Western Balkans’ group, has been a vocal proponent of EU enlargement. The paper he initiated emphasizes the need for enhanced cooperation to effectively counter external pressures and harmful narratives from countries like Russia that are incompatible with EU values.

Proposals for deeper integration and security

The non-paper proposes a more structured exchange following established EU procedures and policies, including invitations to Western Balkan ministers to participate in EU Foreign Affairs Council meetings at least semiannually. It also suggests that Western Balkan ambassadors attend informal Political and Security Committee meetings on topics of common interest.

One of the prerequisites for joining the EU is alignment with the bloc’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which the document seeks to advance. The proposal includes providing Western Balkan ministers with Lines to Take (LTTs) to ensure their positions are in harmony with the EU during meetings with third countries.

Countering external influences and enhancing diplomatic ties

The initiative comes at a time when the EU is dealing with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and subsequent economic sanctions imposed on Moscow. Some Western Balkan countries, like Serbia, have so far hesitated to fully align with the EU’s policy. The EU’s chief diplomat, Josep Borrell, has emphasized the importance of following the EU foreign policy more closely, especially for countries with a record of non-alignment.

The push for integration also includes more coordinated visits to the Western Balkans by EU diplomats, regular workshops on human rights to support the justice chapters in EU accession negotiations, and increased cooperation on cybersecurity issues.

Regional response and next steps

The ideas proposed have reportedly received substantial support from the Western Balkans, with some leaders from the region having raised the issue both publicly and privately over the past year. The ministers from the region have previously expressed frustration with the moving goalposts in the EU’s enlargement process and have advocated for progressive integration before full accession.

The EU-Western Balkans ministerial meeting will precede a significant EU-Western Balkans summit in mid-December, where leaders are expected to further discuss integration and alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy.

Sources: Anadolu and Euractiv

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n a move that took many European leaders by surprise, Slovakia’s newly sworn-in Prime Minister, Robert Fico, announced on October 26, 2023, his government’s decision to discontinue military aid to Ukraine, marking a stark shift in the country’s stance. This announcement comes amidst growing tensions in Eastern Europe and as nations across the continent grapple with the evolving geopolitical landscape.

Robert Fico, leading Slovakia for the fourth time, communicated this change in policy during a session in parliament earlier this week. In the run-up to his recent election, Fico had openly campaigned on the promise of halting military aid to Ukraine, advocating for a more independent foreign policy and stronger border protection against illegal migration.

Fico conveyed to Members of Parliament (MPs) that while Slovakia would cease supplying weapons to Ukraine, the nation would continue to provide humanitarian aid to the war-affected country. The underlying tone of the Prime Minister’s message seemed to pivot towards transforming the European Union from an arms supplier to a mediator, championing the cause of peace in the region.

Slovakia’s new approach, the EU and NATO

Fico’s ascendancy to power has not only redefined Slovakia’s approach towards Ukraine but also towards larger European matters. His administration has expressed opposition to the Western sanctions imposed on Moscow, emphasizing that any such sanctions should only be backed after a thorough analysis of their impact on Slovakia. Fico was quoted saying, “If there are to be such sanctions that will harm us, like most sanctions have, I can see no reason to support them.”

Beyond the pressing matter of military aid, the new Slovakian government’s foreign policy is being keenly observed. Many see Fico’s rise as a potential disruptor to the European Union’s and NATO’s collective strategies, especially in the context of the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

Slovakia, a nation of 5.5 million, had been a staunch supporter of Kyiv, particularly since Russia’s invasion in February of the previous year. The country had not only donated arms but had also opened its borders to refugees escaping the conflict.

This pivot in policy direction also highlights the changing political dynamics within Slovakia. The Smer party, chaired by Fico, is part of a three-party coalition government, which also comprises the Hlas party and the Slovak National Party. While Fico is often viewed as a “pro-Russian populist” – especially given his criticism of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy – many within Slovakia believe he is merely prioritizing the nation’s interests over external pressures.

Russia’s allies?

Backing this stance, the coalition partner Slovak National Party (SNS) is no stranger to making headlines. Its chairman and former parliamentary speaker, Andrej Danko, has made controversial remarks in the past, suggesting that the Russian-occupied territories were not “historically Ukrainian.” Danko’s close interactions with Russian dignitaries, including a handshake with Russian President Vladimir Putin and a selfie with Russian State Duma Chair Vyacheslav Volodin, have raised eyebrows in international circles.

While the immediate repercussions of Slovakia’s decision are yet to be fully understood, early reactions from the international community have been a mix of concern and anticipation. Many view this development as a sign of the growing divisions within the European Union, with member states prioritizing national interests over collective decisions. This change is expected to be a prominent topic of discussion at the upcoming EU summit in Brussels, where leaders from across the continent will converge.

On the ground in Ukraine, the halt in military aid from Slovakia adds another layer to the multifaceted challenges the nation faces. Despite this setback, Ukrainian officials remain hopeful that other European nations will continue their support, both in terms of military aid and diplomatic efforts to bring peace to the region.

As Slovakia navigates its new foreign policy direction, Europe and the world will be watching closely. With the balance of power and alliances constantly shifting, Slovakia’s decisions could have ripple effects far beyond its borders.

In conclusion, as the European landscape continues to evolve, nations like Slovakia play a pivotal role in shaping the narrative. The choice to halt military aid to Ukraine may be just one decision, but it underscores the complexities and intricacies of international diplomacy in these tumultuous times. Only time will tell if this decision stands as a beacon of nationalistic prioritization or as a harbinger of a more fragmented European Union.

Sources: Euronews, AFP, Le Monde

O

n September 10, 2023, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) announced the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with India to establish a new economic corridor linking India, the Middle East, and Europe.

The Saudi crown prince announced the project on X, formerly Twitter, a day after it was announced by Saudi Arabia and the United States.

Bin Salman announced that, “As a culmination of what has been worked on during the last period, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United States of America, the Republic of India, the United Arab Emirates, and the Republic of France, The Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Italy and the European Union signed a memorandum of understanding regarding the project to establish a new economic corridor linking India, the Middle East and Europe.”

He added that the memorandum “crystallizes the foundations upon which it was built to achieve the Kingdom’s common interests, enhance economic interdependence with its partners from other countries, and reflect positively on the global economy in general.”

On September 9, the Saudi crown prince said, “The economic corridor will contribute to developing and rehabilitating the infrastructure that includes railways and ports and will help increase the exchange of goods and services.”

He continued, “The project will enhance economic integration and contribute to providing new and quality job opportunities in order to achieve long-term gains along the new cross-border corridors.”

The statement concluded that the MoU “requires continuing the pace of efforts that have been made, and immediately starting to develop the necessary mechanisms for their implementation, according to the time frame that was agreed upon based on what was stated in the memorandum.”

Economic cooperation: Beyond India and Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia and India signed more than 50 agreements during the G20 Summit, in the fields of information technology, communications, entrepreneurship, chemicals, energy, and advanced industries, according to the Saudi Ministry of Investment.

In his speech during the Saudi-India Investment Forum held in New Delhi, Saudi Investment Minister Khalid Al-Falih revealed that the Saudi Public Investment Fund, which manages assets exceeding $750 billion, is considering opening a branch in New Delhi. This indicates the sovereign fund’s interest in investing in Indian companies that have recently seen expansion and development.

The U.S. involvement in inking the agreement that will eventually link India to Europe through the Middle East suggests that Washington aims to mitigate the growing influence of China through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

In addition to India, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, Cyprus, Greece, and the rest of the European Union, the economic corridor will include shipping and rail routes.

Besides speeding up trade between India and the EU by 40%, the project aims to normalize relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. When launched, the project is likely to impact the Suez Canal negatively; approximately 12% of global trade and 30% of global container traffic currently pass through the Suez Canal.

Turkey, Egypt, and the India-Europe economic corridor

The economic corridor connecting India with Europe will also negatively impact another trade corridor that was supposed to be established between Iraq and Turkey, connecting the Gulf with Europe through Ankara, known as the Development Road Project. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan commented on establishing the economic corridor between India and Europe by saying, “We say that there is no corridor without Turkey.”

Speaking to journalists accompanying him to the G20 summit in India, Erdoğan added, “Turkey is an important production and trade base. The most convenient line for traffic from East to West must pass through Turkey.”

Erdoğan noted that many countries in the region, such as Qatar and the UAE, are in favor of Turkey’s proposed project, expressing hope that the Development Road Project will proceed as planned.

Some 2.7 million Indian workers work in Saudi Arabia and send billions of dollars in hard currency back home annually. The Saudi involvement in the economic corridor project reflects the growing economic ties bet3ween India and the Kingdom, which recently has been engaging in diversifying its economic resources to move away from oil dependency.

*Written by the staff of Politics Today

F

ar-right and racist ideology in Europe has a deep-rooted history and has shown the ability to transform itself into a political movement through political parties. Due to the basic functions of political parties in pluralist democracies, namely representation, agenda setting, public relations, awareness raising, and aspirations to power, political party status is a tremendous tool for the social organization of far-right and racist movements.

Especially in recent years, far-right parties have experienced a serious upward trend in European politics and have strengthened their presence in all regions of the European geography. Far-right parties have gradually gained popular support in several European countries, especially in Germany, France, and Italy, and have achieved significant electoral success. They have thus succeeded in becoming integrated actors in European countries’ political institutions.

Political parties are an important instrument for the functioning of democracy. They represent different segments of society, formulate policies, and seek to reflect the will of the people through elections. The inability of left-wing, liberal, and conservative political parties to offer convincing alternative solutions to the electorates’ problems, and the fact that they are too fragmented and divided to form coalitions, is seen by far-right parties as a window of opportunity to gain power in the coming years.

Ideology of European far-right parties

Although the ideologies of far-right parties in different parts of Europe differ to some extent, they are based on common points and references. These can be defined under four headings:

– Nationalism and cultural identity: Far-right and racist parties emphasize nationalism and cultural identity, placing great importance on the superiority and interests of a country or nation. Far-right parties try to attract support by focusing on national pride, national values, and cultural identity. They usually seek to unite society under the guise of a “sense of belonging” by distinguishing between “us” and “them.”

– Authoritarianism and strong leadership: Strong authoritarian leaders influence their followers by advocating discriminatory and authoritarian policies. They try to exploit society’s security concerns by emphasizing issues such as safety, order, and harsh punishment. Authoritarian leadership is used by the far right to achieve its political goals and to govern society.

– Racism and anti-immigrant sentiment: Far-right parties adopt ideological elements such as racism and anti-immigrant sentiments and show discrimination and hostility towards other groups, while defending the superiority of their own ethnic or national group. Anti-immigrant sentiment is central to the policies of these parties and often includes harsh restrictions on immigrants, racial or cultural discrimination, and policies of ethnic cleansing.

– Populism: Far-right and racist parties often use populist rhetoric. Populism aims to mobilize support by exploiting people’s emotional and economic concerns. Far-right parties present simplistic messages and answers to appeal to broad sections of the population.

The ideologies of far-right parties are based on elements such as nationalism, authoritarianism, racism, and anti-immigrant sentiments. These ideologies can spread under the influence of factors such as social discontent, economic crises, cultural conflicts, and security concerns.

Following another devastating war in Europe, destruction and humanitarian disasters were omnipresent across the continent. The suffering caused by the war led to discontent and insecurity in society, and political instability and economic difficulties paved the way for the emergence of far-right parties. Meanwhile the banning of ideologies such as Fascism and Nazism caused some far-right groups to operate underground.

Thus, Europe’s dominant countries, especially Germany, did not accommodate far-right parties into their political systems and ensured that they remained marginalized for a long time. During this period, far-right parties transformed themselves in order to win votes in elections, taking into account local social developments and the cyclical variability of world politics.

Until the 1980s, neofascist political parties generally carried on the mission of the Fascist and Nazi parties of the past. Labor migration in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s led to an increase in the immigrant population. With the periodic economic crises since the 1990s, some segments of society have become concerned about immigrants and different cultures. Economic uncertainties such as rising unemployment, ever-worsening financial difficulties, and income inequality have led to anti-immigrant sentiments among the local populations.

Since the 2000s, there has been a new wave of migration to Europe and an increase in the foreign population on the continent due to terrorist attacks, economic problems, and the Arab Spring. Although far-right parties have not completely changed their neofascist formation so as to turn this dynamic into an opportunity, they have mobilized and expanded their existing support base by resorting to populist politics that rely on social discontent and concerns, anti-immigration sentiments, and xenophobia in order to reach large masses. Now, far-right parties have changed their guise and softened their neofascist and Nazi rhetoric in order to win the support of non-radicalized conservative masses. Islamophobia and anti-immigrant policies against “non-white” immigrants have increased their popularity and begun to win votes.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, far-right parties have undergone their second evolution. True to their racist and anti-immigrant agenda, they have declared war on the globalizing world. Globalization refers to worldwide economic, political, social, and cultural interaction and integration, including elements such as advances in communication and transport technologies, free trade and investment policies, and the strengthening of international institutions. Globalization also features drawbacks such as income inequality, social and cultural conflicts, environmental degradation, and inequitable distribution of resources. The main reasons why far-right parties oppose globalization are nationalism, concerns about the loss of national sovereignty, economic effects (loss of wealth), and the preservation of cultural identity. While globalization brings about economic and cultural change, some parts of society react to this change.

Far-right parties, which have become the self-proclaimed “protectors” of the masses that find themselves on the losing end of the new globalized world, aim to convince the isolated masses that there are easy solutions to their problems through populist discourses and by mobilizing their thoughts and emotions against a specific enemy. Far-right parties, with their hatred of Islam and immigrants, and their stance against globalization, have gained serious momentum with the economic crisis triggered by the pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine War.

The rise of far-right parties in Europe

The rise of far-right parties in Europe has attracted attention and concern in recent years. Understanding the factors behind this rise will help us to understand the popularity and influence of far-right parties. Factors such as migration, economic uncertainty, cultural concerns, emphasis on national identity, and political crises are important factors influencing the rise of the far right.

Migration is an important factor in the rise of extreme right-wing parties. The large waves of migration and the so-called refugee crises in Europe have raised security concerns and fears of cultural conflict in certain milieus. Far-right parties use the issue of migration to spread fear and anxiety among the population and advocate harsh and restrictive immigration policies.

Economic insecurity and social injustice are other factors that have increased the popularity of far-right parties. Problems such as economic recession, unemployment, and income inequality drive people towards far-right parties. In particular, the loss of people’s welfare due to the global economic devastation caused by the pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine War have led to the far right’s emphasis on economic nationalism and protectionist policies finding a response in society.

Cultural concerns in Europe and the emphasis on national identity can also be linked to the rise of far-right parties. The issues of cultural diversity and the protection of cultural values are an important concern for a significant part of society. By emphasizing national identity, far-right parties exploit cultural concerns and advocate cultural protectionism.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine marked a pivotal moment in international relations, sparking outrage and condemnation from the global community while igniting deep-rooted tensions that had been simmering for decades. The invasion, which began in the early days of 2022, cast a dark shadow over the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. As Russian forces advanced, cities and towns across Ukraine were transformed into battlefields, with civilians caught in the crossfire and their lives altered by the devastating consequences of war.

In 77 Days of February, a group of distinguished writers from Reporters Magazine, the only Ukrainian publication dedicated to long-form literary journalism, present a remarkably powerful collection of 24 personal narratives. The anthology aims to give readers unprecedented access to first-hand accounts of the atrocities suffered during the early days of the invasion.

It also serves as a tribute to the indomitable spirit and fortitude of the Ukrainian people, who continue to demonstrate unwavering strength and pride in the face of adversity. Marichka Paplauskaite, editor-in-chief of Reporters Magazine, joins us for an interview about 77 Days of February and her accounts of enduring the war as a Ukrainian journalist.

Q. At the beginning of the book there is an emphasis on why it is important to talk about the war in Ukraine from the beginning, with a reference to memory being unreliable. Would you like to share that with our readers?

The initial months of the war presented a profoundly challenging period for us. My colleagues and I felt an overwhelming urge to contribute to the cause of our country, and given our writing skills, we set out to create narratives. The primary goal of our magazine, Reporters, was to tell the story of Ukraine through the lens of personal stories, moving away from traditional hard news and focusing on the encounters, sentiments and emotions of individuals. So when the war broke out, our choice was clear: to share these stories first with fellow Ukrainians and then with a global audience.

This book carries an intense emotional weight, because it was simply not possible to discuss this subject without emotion. It encompasses our homeland and our own firsthand encounters. At first, we wondered if it was premature to delve into such intimate experiences. However, as the war continues and the timing of victory is uncertain, we decided to tackle the subject now, while the wounds are still raw.

Human memory is indeed very fragile, especially when it comes to traumatic events. The mind tries to forget events that have caused suffering. That’s why what we have managed to capture in texts about the events and memories of the first months of the war seems very important to me.

Q. What has changed between the beginning of the war and now?

We have been living under the conditions of a full-scale war for a year and a half now. It’s unfortunate to admit it, but we have managed to get accustomed to the war. In our cities, we still hear the air raid siren every day, which always means that Russian missiles or Iranian drones used by Russia are heading towards our territory to commit new acts of violence against innocent people. Nevertheless, under these circumstances we continue our work and try to live, adapting to the conditions of war.

Q. As a journalist, you’ve had the opportunity to interact with various individuals impacted by the war, is there a story that was particularly inspiring to you?

It’s hard for me to say which story impressed me the most. Because all the stories in the book are incredibly personal. There is one change that happened to us journalists at the beginning of the war: we became the heroes of our own texts. For instance, there are two stories about Chernihiv by our author Vira Kuriko. Her husband went off to fight, and she returned twice to the city surrounded by Russians, describing the life of people under siege.

Another story is “Pasha and the Old Man” by Olga Omelyanchuk. Her acquaintance overheard a phone conversation in a basement. Someone was talking about a paralyzed old man whose relatives had left him in a flat in Irpin. At the time, fierce street battles were raging in the town. Olga found soldiers who agreed to find the old man and evacuate him. It was a risky operation. But the soldiers managed to navigate the streets where gunfire echoed and rescue the man. I am struck by the humanity of this story. It shows an example of how one can remain human even in times of war.

Another story I would like to mention is titled “The Sea”. It tells the story of fishermen from the Kiev Sea – a vast reservoir. Villages on one bank were occupied by Russians in the early days, while on the other bank there was a fishing base. In times of peace these men would have been considered poachers, but in times of war they became heroes. They would cross the sea in their boats and rescue people from the occupation. This was dangerous because the sea was still covered with ice and the Russians were shelling the boats. Nevertheless, these fishermen risked their lives to save others.

As you can see, these stories depict not only the horrors of war, but also courage, compassion, desperation, and light.

Q. How has covering these stories affected you? Have you had the space to reflect on your own grief?

When we were working on these stories, we had to prepare everything so quickly that we had no time to think. But afterwards I had some time to think and I realized that it’s not about the stories, it’s about the lessons I learned during the war and during my work as a journalist and editor living in Ukraine.

We feel that we must live now; if you want to do something, do it today. If you want to tell someone you love them, tell them today. It’s not only because of the conditions of our personal lives during the war in general, but also because there are many stories, for example about nameless graves, that remind us to appreciate what we have.

Q. What struggles do you face bringing these stories to a global audience?

It was so important for us to share our work with readers abroad because we are afraid that the war will be normalized, as I mentioned before. We still need support, and I absolutely understand that people abroad can lose interest in the war in Ukraine and think, “Well, it’s news from Ukraine again. But for us, it’s a real and ongoing tragedy, all the time, in every town.

We want people to not just read the stories, but to empathize and think about how they would feel and act in that situation. And I hope that through these stories our readers can form an emotional connection with Ukraine. I think the biggest challenge is that it’s incredibly difficult to comprehend the experience of war unless you’ve been through it. I’ve read numerous books about different conflicts around the world. But when it came to war in my own country, I wasn’t prepared.

War is the worst experience one can have. Our subconscious can block the desire to understand this experience because it’s too painful. That’s why I hope that the stories in the book, which are very emotional and personal, will give foreign readers a chance to somewhat grasp our reality.

Q. Could you tell us about networks of collaborations amongst journalists at this time?

Our team isn’t large; besides editors, we only have two full-time correspondents. However, we have a large pool of freelance authors across the country. When the war started, they all reported to me about the stories they were witnessing and wanted to describe. It was a unique time of unity for all citizens, and journalists were no exception. We worked as a single team, driven by the importance of documenting events of historic magnitude, recording the crimes of the Russians, and capturing new pages in Ukrainian history. It was a time of solidarity and professional unity within the journalistic community.

Q. How has misinformation made life more difficult for the Ukrainian people during the war?

Personally, I haven’t found this to be a problematic issue because we don’t watch or rely on Russian propaganda TV channels or anything of that sort. If we come across something that raises suspicion or doubt, we check it out. Sometimes, when we come across something dubious, we instinctively recognize its lack of credibility. We make sure to verify and re-verify; after all, we have colleagues in all regions of Ukraine.

For instance, when a Russian propaganda channel tried to dismiss the atrocities in Bucha as a hoax and labeled the alleged victims as actors, my colleagues and friends were in Bucha. They witnessed the bodies on the streets, took videos and photographs that unequivocally confirmed the reality of the situation. Russian propaganda doesn’t shake us because we are here, on the ground, witnessing everything first hand.

Q. What important remarks would you like to share with our readers?

The main message I want to convey is that the war is an ongoing reality and our struggle persists. Readers may peruse the accounts documented within the 77 Days of February and recognize the tragedies and turmoil depicted, but they have the privilege of closing the book and returning to their daily lives. The reality we face, however, remains unchanged, with analogous stories unfolding every day across Ukraine. Our need for support continues.

W

estern Europe is currently experiencing a wave of public desecrations of the Quran. In the Netherlands, the leader of PEGIDA tore pages from the Quran and trampled them. In Denmark and Sweden, activists have on several occasions burned copies of the Quran in front of buildings belonging to Islamic organizations.

What is striking is that the authorities in these countries have acted as mere bystanders, claiming that they are powerless to deal with such activities. They argue that the desecration of the Quran is a reprehensible act, but that it is legal and therefore cannot be stopped. Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson recently said, “It can be legal and still be horrible.”

Many Muslims in the countries concerned and around the world are outraged by the authorities’ passive attitude and are calling on them to act. In July, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution, introduced by Pakistan and Palestine, condemning such desecration and calling on states to close the legal loopholes that prevent them from tackling it.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been a vocal critic of the Swedish authorities’ refusal to stop such desecrations. This raises the stakes considerably, as Sweden’s accession to NATO has yet to be ratified by the Turkish parliament. President Erdoğan has indicated that this is unlikely to happen as long as copies of the Quran are being burned. Thus, the question of whether the Swedish authorities are right to claim that their hands are tied has become politically important.

Freedom of expression?

The Swedish authorities claim that rallies where the Quran is burned are protected by freedom of expression and therefore cannot be restricted, thus giving freedom of expression priority over other rights. However, Sweden is a party to the European Convention on Human Rights, which does not recognize such a hierarchy of rights. All rights in the convention are equal, and if they conflict, they must be weighed against each other. In the case of the desecration of the Quran, there is a conflict between freedom of expression and freedom of religion.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in its judgment in E.S. v. Austria, has shown how the right to freedom of expression must be balanced against the right of others to have their religious feelings protected. The case concerned an Austrian politician who had been fined for making derogatory remarks about the Prophet Mohammed. She claimed that the fine amounted to an unlawful interference with her freedom of expression.

The ECtHR disagreed: it recognized that religious groups must tolerate criticism by others of their religious beliefs. However, if that criticism incites hatred or religious intolerance, restrictions are justified. The applicant’s offensive attack on the Prophet Mohammed  went beyond the permissible limits of objective debate and her comments were likely to cause justified indignation among Muslims. The ECtHR reiterated that state parties have an obligation under the convention to maintain religious peace, i.e., the peaceful coexistence of religious and non-religious groups.