On Monday, Turkey commemorated the third anniversary of the July 15 coup attempt. As a nation that has faced several military coups and coup attempts in the Republican Era, July 15, 2016, symbolizes a significant milestone regarding civil-military relations and the civilian control of the military on an institutional platform.

In contrast to previous attempts, the 15 July coup attempt was perpetrated by FETO members who infiltrated the Turkish Armed Forces in the last 40 years. Why did they mobilize a coup attempt against Turkey’s democratically elected government? More, how has the subsequent struggle period been conducted, and why did they fail?

Firstly, the main reason as to why the July 15 coup attempt failed is based on the fact that FETO- which symbolizes a certain radical mentality- has no collective support among different social groups in Turkey. This is a fundamental point that might be disregarded by biased experts who still cannot imagine how intense the anger against the group is all over Turkey. In other words, it is very obvious that there is no social base in Turkey having any sympathy for Gulenists anymore.

There is no social base in Turkey, from ideological right to left, having any sympathy for Gulenists anymore.

Besides its own marginal, radical, blinded, and even terrorism-tolerating base, this societal rejection is a fundamental fact across Turkey’s nationalist, secular, conservative, Kemalist and ethnically motivated groups. Consequently, this fact has to be counted as one of the main points that facilitated the collective resistance against the coup attempt during the night of July 15, 2016. By this, it should be reminded that it is not a secret that specific social groups in Turkey had previously supported military coups in the country. In cases of “certain conditions,” when the Turkish military’s specific cadres persuaded some civilian groups, the majority of the country’s media and leading figures of the judiciary, these conditions enabled a military coup. The military men had a higher possibility to execute this illegal activity (a military coup) within a “successful” framework, compared to the failed attempt in 2016.

Building on these facts and the main denial against the FETO criminal cult in general, it has to be stressed that Turkey has had a quite successful development trajectory, particularly during the last 15-20 years. During this period, the belief of the younger generations with regard to civil democracy and the increase of a rather diversified media – in contrast to previous eras where the media obeyed the military-dominated elite – made it possible for tutelage representatives to be elaborated critically.

Another critical point that made it impossible for the putschists to overthrow the civilian government on July 15 was the fact that Turkey’s president called for all citizens to go on the streets and resist against the military coup. Unfortunately, this civilian resistance, which left 250 dead and over 2,000 injured, is not taken into account seriously by particular prejudiced circles mostly represented in the Western world.

The unprecedented civilian resistance against the coup that left 251 dead and over 2,000 injured, is not taken into account by the West.

With regard to the future of civil-military relations in Turkey, while the mindset is changing, this gradual behavioral change ought to be strengthened. The democratic trend of dominating the military by legal civilian representatives has achieved broad acceptance among Turkey’s population. Furthermore, Turkey’s new system of government, which enables and fosters former high-ranked military commanders to enter active politics in a democratic way, will contribute to the civilian control of the military. An example of this is former Chief of General Staff, Hulusi Akar. After quitting his military career in 2018, he was appointed as Turkey’s defense minister in the first presidential cabinet under the new system. In one of his speeches, he underlined that he took the ministerial role in order to contribute to Turkey’s democratization process.

The Turkish Republic has faced serious difficulties in its 96 years, of which has no doubt seen military coups and coup attempts that have left disastrous results. Trials against the July 15 coup plotters are still taking place, and will likely continue for some time. Despite the civilian government’s determined will and several structural measures that have taken place and the change of mindset in Turkey, a potential junta within the Turkish Armed Forces must still be taken seriously. With this, simultaneously, the democratic government and military must continue to be revisited in accordance with Turkey’s constitution and all its related laws.

In his address to the United Nations on Tuesday, September 25, President Erdogan called on world leaders to take measures against the Gulenist criminal cult network. Two days later, this time during his trip to Germany, the Turkish President repeated his call and asked Germany to designate the Gulenist organization as a terrorist organization. Despite Turkey’s call for over two years now, the Gulenist cult members are still active in Western countries, from the United States to Germany and many others.

The organization operates in the disguise of charter schools in the U.S., think-tanks all over the Western world, and some online media networks such as news portals, and so on. While the Turkish public opinion is united against FETO, not everybody is well informed on the organization, and this is why they have difficulty in understanding Turkey’s insistence on this matter.

The very first question towards Turkish demands on the Gulenist network is on the terrorism charges. Many academics and journalists with some interest on this matter in the West question the terrorism charges. These questions are now being repeated after Erdogan’s recent remarks in the U.S. and Germany. They simply ask how an organization led by a “cleric” and which runs charter schools can engage in terrorism. Despite the amount of evidence delivered by the Turkish authorities, this evidence does not reach the ears that need to hear them.

Here is a brief story of the Gulenist network’s gradual and complex journey into terrorism:

It was quite uncommon to call the Gulenist organization – also known as FETO – a terrorist organization a few years ago. After all, terrorism is a form of political violence, and the group was not violent – until they became violent. With its school system to recruit and train young minds, the organization’s structure worked quite effectively in Turkey and abroad.

Gradually, the picture became clear as the recruits began to infiltrate state institutions – first in small numbers, then in masses. It became increasingly clear to the Turkish decision makers that the organization was stealing classified information, sometimes distorting it, and servicing it to foreign services or the media depending on the purpose.

By the end of 2013, there was no doubt about the fact that the members of the Gulenist criminal cult in various state institutions were well connected to each other and were well guided by a central authority in a clear command chain. This is essentially why they were called the “parallel state” by Erdogan – who was the organization’s primary target.

While it took the AK Party government some time to clarify the real purpose and structure of the Gulenists, once they did, there was no way back other than stopping them. As the government began to clean the Gulenists from state institutions, and as it became clear that the elected government will win this battle, Turkey witnessed the July 15 coup attempt in 2016.

The Gulenists in the military carried out a coup attempt, sent a squad to assassinate Erdogan, and killed 248 civilians and state security personnel in multiple spots. And this was the day that the Gulenists were no longer just a secret society infiltrating the state apparatus and being used by foreign services. The July 15 coup attempt also showed that the organization was capable of using violence on a massive scale.

We do not tend to call coup plotters as terrorists, neither in Turkey’s earlier coups nor on the global scale. However, this time, it is different. It was not the military that orchestrated the coup attempt but an organization whose leader is not a soldier and whose members were mostly civilians. This is how we saw a Gulenist ex-cop in military camouflage in a tank in Istanbul on that night. This is how we saw civilian engineers taking part in the coup attempt. This is how we saw civilian professors in the Akinci military base, the headquarters of the coup attempt on that night.

Gulenist academics and journalists also spent quite an effort to spread fake news that night about a manufactured story claiming that Erdogan was fleeing the country and so on. July 15 showed the entire Gulenist criminal network in its entirety on the mission. It was not a conventional coup attempt of soldiers unlike the coups that we know, but it was a joint coup attempt of Gulenist professors, police officers, engineers, and also soldiers. If terror is the use of violence by non-state actors targeting civilians in order to achieve their political objectives, Gulenists did this on the night of July 15 and, hence, they are a textbook example of terrorist organizations – a very innovative one.

Between 1831 and 1967, Greece experienced 12 military coups and 8 coup attempts. Following the military coup staged by a group of colonels in 1967, throughout the junta regime that reigned for seven years, political parties were closed, intellectuals, journalists, and writers were jailed and tortured, and many unidentified murders were committed. Following the Turkish operation in Cyprus on July 20, 1974, and the loss of U.S. support, the junta regime declined dramatically and civilians eventually took over on July 23.

After democracy was introduced in Greece in 1974, the colonels who plotted the 1967 coup were tried and all received life sentences. Despite this, the country still underwent a coup attempt that was prevented in 1975. When the leader of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), Andreas Papandreou – who was also sentenced to nine years during the 1967 junta – came to power with a landslide victory in 1981, the first thing he done was establish a new system against the threat of military coups. He performed a sweeping purge in the Greek army since the military was still harboring a group with pro-coup mindsets. Papandreou also marked radical changes in the legislation of the military. Among these changes, all military officers, including private soldiers, were authorized to inform political authorities when they see any sign indicating the intention of a coup attempt. Officers that failed to inform authorities, even when they were to receive a suspicious order, were tried and received life sentences on the charges of staging or attempting a military coup. Papandreou was right. 30 years later, in November 2011, some 16 generals were discharged from the military on the grounds that the armed forces were plotting a coup.

During the time that the socialist leader’s political and legal battle against military coup attempts was ongoing, Turkey was being ruled by a junta regime that was declared after the military coup on September 12, 1980. Moments before the coup, the U.S. Embassy in Ankara told the CIA’s former Turkey chief Paul Henze, “Our boys did it!” During the rule of their “boys,” 650,000 people were detained in Turkey, 1,683.000 were blacklisted based on illegal recordings, 230,000 were tried in a total of 210,000 cases. More, capital punishment was demanded for 7000 people, 517 were sentenced to capital punishment and 50,000 people were executed. 98,804 were tried for being a member of an illegal group, 30,000 were discharged from duty, 14,000 were denaturalized and 30,000 fled abroad as political asylum seekers.

With a provisional article added on the new constitution, which was adopted with a referendum in an atmosphere of great pressure, the Chief of General Staff, Kenan Evren, who led the coup, became the president of Turkey. I remember hearing this expression as a child at the time: “Look at this, Greece has tried junta leaders and is now taking measures against possible coups, but the picture of a junta leader is hung on the wall of the Greek Consulate in Istanbul.”

During the following years, we continuously heard comparisons between Turkey and Greece, with people claiming that Turkey did not fight against juntas as Greece did and that the Turkish people appreciated Greece on this matter. Although not as early as Greece, 30 years after the coup, the AK Party made it possible to try Kenan Evren and other coup plotters. Unlike his predecessors, the AK Party leader and then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan followed Papandreou’s lead in terms of demilitarization and took important steps to end the military tutelage regime in Turkey.

Having experienced three military coup attempts in the past, Turkey confronted yet another coup attempt on July 15, 2016. The attempted coup was orchestrated by Fetullah Gulen, a former religious clerk currently residing in the U.S. and was organized by Gulenist Terror Group (FETO) operatives, who infiltrated the Turkish military. The coup was repelled with the efforts of President Erdogan and the Turkish people. 248 people died and 2146 were injured during the insurrection. While the majority of coup plotters were tried and arrested, some of them fled to Greece and Germany. Germany, the founding member of the EU, and Greece, a country that knows well what a coup means, welcomed the military officers who had plotted and organized the attempted coup. A group of putschist military officers landed in Alexandroupoli, Greece, with a military helicopter following the July 15 coup attempt. Last month, the Greek Council of State decided to grant asylum to these eight officers based on the verdict that there is not enough competent evidence regarding the involvement of these individuals in the coup attempt and their affiliation with FETO. Shame on Greece, Germany, and especially, the U.S.

A 50-year-old evangelical pastor of the Izmir Resurrection Church has been living in Turkey since 1993. He has now become a source of controversy in the bilateral relationship between Turkey and the U.S. after Trump announced his plans to impose sanctions against Turkey. The U.S. President Donald Trump used a different tone when he tweeted about Turkey, sending a message that the sanctions against Turkey are on the table if Andrew Craig Brunson, an American citizen, is not released.

Before the criminal trial, the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs reviewed the status of Brunson in Turkey soon after the coup attempt on July 15. Brunson was informed that he was a “national security risk” with the decision of the Ministry of Interior’s Directorate General of Migration Management. Apart from a judiciary process, the Ministry went through another administrative process for Brunson.

In March 2018, the indictment charge against Brunson was released. According to this indictment, Brunson was allegedly responsible for “forming organized groups with the intention of committing a crime” and “political or military espionage.” The prosecution relied on the testimony of witnesses and authenticated evidence collected from the phone of Brunson. For instance, in relation to the aftermath of the coup attempt, Brunson said: “we were waiting for some events to shake the Turks […], the coup attempt was a shock, many Turks trusted the military as they did in the past […] We will eventually win.” A secret witness, DUA stated that Bekir Baz, a.k.a. Ramazan, a senior member of FETO, met with Brunson, advising him to establish an association to circumvent the restrictions in relation to the establishment of new churches. There have been three hearings in the trial process, and Brunson was released from prison and is now under house arrest.

“We were waiting for some events to shake the Turks […], the coup attempt was a shock, many Turks trusted the military as they did in the past […] We will eventually win”

While the criminal process took place in İzmir, Turkey, the threats coming from President Trump added another layer to the bilateral relations between the two countries. The question arises as to how the President will potentially give economic harm to the Turkish economy. Imposing sanctions is not new, and the Congress has raised the adoption of several laws to compel the administration to implement the sanctions. For instance, the National Defense Authorization Act, as in the final stage of the legislative process, will prevent the administration from delivering the F-35 aircraft to Turkey. The letter written by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, who was not in favor of introducing such a sanction, had revealed that the administration was not interested in imposing this sanction. However, the recent tweets appear to change this attitude, undermining the interest of the countries participating in the F-35 program.

Another example is the Turkey International Financial Institutions Act, which was passed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. According to the draft of this legislation, Congress will oblige the Secretary of Treasury to instruct the U.S. executive directors of well-known international financial institutions to vote against extending any “loan or financial or technical assistance” to Turkey. The increasingly aggressive attitude of the president will lead his administration to sign this law once it has passed Congress and to implement the obligation to instruct officials in the international financial institutions.

As to an existing law, Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) obliges the administration to impose sanctions against Russia, Iran, and North Korea. However, the administration can introduce a waiver, deciding to exclude Turkey from punitive measures based on a determination that the sanctions would run against the “vital national security interests” of the U.S. Despite this authority, the recent tweets of Trump show that the administration is no longer interested in issuing such a waiver to protect the relationship between the two countries.

U.S. President Trump had another one of his Twitter moments on Thursday. This time, the target was Turkey. He tweeted as follows: “The United States will impose large sanctions on Turkey for their long time detainment of Pastor Andrew Brunson, a great Christian, family man and wonderful human being. He is suffering greatly. This innocent man of faith should be released immediately!” The tone and means of the message is far from diplomatic conventions but this is not something unusual for Trump. There are stranger things in this matter.

First, who is Andrew Brunson and why was he jailed (currently under house arrest)? Brunson is an American pastor who has lived in Turkey over two decades. He was arrested on December 9, 2016, about 4 months after the failed coup attempt in Turkey. He was arrested for terrorism and spying charges. It is no secret that countries send spies to other countries, even to the ones they ally with. Hence, whether or not Brunson is one of them, it would not surprise anybody if some people spy in Turkey for the U.S. When people are found spying, they might be exchanged, which is not uncommon between countries. But there is more to this story.

To open it up further, Brunson was claimed to be linked to FETO (Fethullahist Terror Organization) which plotted the June 15, 2016 coup attempt and is responsible for killing 250 Turkish nationals and injuring thousands on the night of the coup attempt. Speaking of FETO, the leader of the organization and the mastermind of the coup attempt, Fethullah Gulen lives in his mansion in the U.S. Gulen is not a U.S. citizen but Turkey’s calls for his extradition does not find ears in the States. U.S. politicians keep referring to the issue as a matter of judiciary and avoid taking initiative. Yet, when it comes to the Brunson case in Turkey, Trump can easily threaten Turkey with “large sanctions.”

Something is not right in this picture. Why would the U.S. not extradite a non-U.S. (Turkish) citizen to Turkey despite the bloodshed he spilt in Turkey? Why would the U.S. allow the remnants of Gulen’s network to organize in the country, while some other partners of Turkey extradite the members of the organization? What would any sensible person think about such a situation? Gulen is a Turkish citizen who plotted a coup attempt in Turkey but seeks and finds support from the U.S. As a result, many, if not all, Turkish nationals see the July 15 coup attempt as an American project.

In fact, it is easy for the U.S. to end these suspicions by simply extraditing Gulen. But for some reason it is not. Why not? When this is the case, naturally, many Turkish nationals think the U.S. will not extradite Gulen because he knows too much! And because his extradition would hurt the American credibility in the eyes of its future partners in crime. Yes, this is the overwhelming public opinion in Turkey on the U.S.-Gulen affair. And who can claim this line of thinking does not make sense?

At the end of the day, the U.S. has not extradited Gulen so far despite Turkey’s insistence on the matter. Yet, the very same U.S. asks Turkey to release Brunson, who is suspected of spying in Turkey and being linked to Gulen’s coup attempt. This is not fair. This is the stronger side imposing its will on the side that it sees weaker. This is like a quote from the famous Melian dialogue: “While the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Well, the story might have a different end this time if the U.S. keeps alienating Turkey and pushing it to seek alternatives to its long-lasting alliance with the U.S. Hence, the question is, will the U.S. try to keep a significant ally on its side or push it closer to its global rivals?

Once, the Prussian King Frederic II chose a place in the southwest of Berlin for the construction of a palace for himself. But there was a massive mill in the land. So, if he were to have a palace in this place, the mill would both spoil the panorama and make noise. Upon that, the King went to the owner of the mill named sans-souci (carefree) and told him that he decided to buy the mill at that very moment, asking him to estimate a price for it. Sans souci refused to sell his mill and answered the King’s threats and objections as follows: “Of course, your majesty, your majesty could easily do that, if – begging your pardon – it were not for the Supreme Court in Berlin.” The King gave permission for the construction of the palace, whereas the mill remained within the complex. Eventually, the palace was named after the miller. Since then, those words of the miller are employed in such contexts related to justice in Germany and various other countries including Turkey.

As looked through the present-day perspective of Turkey, we see military coup plotters alongside the PKK militants in Berlin. Of course, there is a Supreme Court in Berlin, but the present justice system does not interdict their presence. One can contend that it is customary for the states regarded as democratic to protect several terror groups, which is true. However, the definitions, regulations and penalties with regard to terrorism, terrorists and terror crimes vary from country to country across the world. The approaches similar to Germany’s have also been displayed in the policies adopted by other European countries in the case of the PKK. Consequently, although it is unacceptable for Turkey, this approach of Germany can be evaluated within the norms of the European Union. But no matter what justification is employed, there is a fact that Germany can never explain today. How could Germany, one of the two founding states of the EU, harbor and protect the people who attempted to stage a coup in Turkey, who is an EU candidate? Being the leading state of the EU, Germany has to make it clear that on which EU criteria they protect the Gulenist Terror Group (FETO) militants.

The FETO operatives who attempted to stage a military coup in Turkey on July 15, 2016, which killed 248 people and wounded more than 2.000, fled to Germany shortly after the attempted coup. According to the data released by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, BAMF), a total of 1.059 people, including 288 with diplomatic passports and 771 with green (bureaucratic) passports, requested asylum between the time of the attempted coup and March 2018; and almost half of them were granted with asylum.

Also, Germany was not informed about the organizational structure of FETO solely through the channel of Turkey. On July 25, 2014, the intelligence service of Baden-Württemberg state released a comprehensive report about FETO on its website. But it turned out that the report was removed from the website following the coup attempt. As of August 2016, it became apparent thanks to the statements of the suspects and the witnesses and intelligence data that FETO members chose Germany as a harbor. Among the Turkish public, no one has doubts regarding FETO’s role in the failed coup. Hundreds of statements and analysis on the subject issued by many politicians of all political parties, including the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), can be found with a simple Google search. Despite that, the German Federal Intelligence Chief Bruno Kahl gave an interview to Der Spiegel on March 18, 2017, in which he claimed that FETO is a non-governmental organization engaging in religious and secular education activities and they were not convinced that FETO leader Fetullah Gulen was behind the coup attempt. These remarks stirred a great deal of reaction not only from Turkey, but from the German media and the Left Party of Germany.

In an article entitled “Wo Erdoğan Recht Hat?” (The Points Where Erdogan is Right About), which was published by TAZ on September 11, 2017, Jürgen Gottschlich covered the allegations on the criminal records of prominent FETO members and touched upon the possibility that Kahl either is not familiar with the issue at all or does deliberately protect the organization. Another article published by FAZ a few days later warned that in case it is found that the FETO operatives whose part in the coup attempt were proven were hiding in Germany, Berlin would not overcome the burden of harboring a criminal organization in its territory without taking legal proceedings.

The Left Party also issued a number of parliamentary questions on the subject. The replies given to these questions by the German government clarified Germany’s stance on FETO. One of the questions demanded to know that on which intelligence data Kahl’s remarks are based and whether Berlin was informed about the identity of the forces involved in the failed coup. The answer given to this question underscored that the organization was not monitored by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz or BfV). Of course, Germany could not have announced the contacts it had with FETO members it protects. But with the answer given to the second parliamentary question, the German government avowedly displayed its position. The government suggested that answering such a question is not possible for the vital interests of the German state.

Surely there is a Supreme Court in Berlin today. But it is alarming that a state of law who is the founding member of the EU is currently guarding coup plotters, which is not even kept as a secret. The German public will hopefully bring them to account one day.

If a student of civil-military relations in Turkey were to write a paper on the evolution of the civil-military relations before the military coup attempt on July 15, 2016, s/he would have questioned, “What happened to the military in Turkish politics?” The conclusion drawn from this paper would probably be that the military was pushed out of politics through many structural changes undertaken by the AK Party government and a judgment made within the public sphere that the military should not play a prominent political role in society. A final finding could be that the contributions of the EU had played an external role in consolidating Turkish civil-military relations in favor of civilian supremacy.

Regardless of how the central question is stated and what the answers are, civil-military relations in Turkey and the place of the military in the socio-political domains throughout the history of modern Turkey have been a controversial subject. Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the country has experienced four military coups. While the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) were able to perform a full-scale overthrow of the civilian governments and took over temporary rule during the 1960 and 1980 coup, it relied on more indirect means to bring about the forced resignation and replacement of the governments during the 1971 and 1997 coups. Due to the success of these four coups, it is not a surprise that Turkish politics has historically been dominated by the preferences of the military, and thus the nature of civil-military relations has been problematic in terms of improving democratic civilian supremacy over the military.

As a result of the ideological conflict between the military and AK Party, which has grown since the party rose to power in 2002, as well as a series of significant events since the beginning of the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials in 2008, there has been a substantial shift in the balance of civil-military relations in Turkey. Nevertheless, the question of how this rapid transformation of Turkish civil-military relations was achieved needs to be analyzed by looking at the external and internal dynamics of the AK Party era.

The AK Party government has made significant structural and political transformations in terms of civil-military relations and the military’s institutional and socio-political role, which have decreased the involvement of the military in politics since 2007. However, civil-military relations had not yet been fully civilianized before the July 15 military coup attempt. Following the suppression of the July 15 coup attempt, the unfinished democratization project of civil-military relations entered a new phase.

The June 24 presidential elections and the establishment of the new government model brought radical changes in civil-military relations as well. Initially, President Erdogan appointed his Chief of General Staff Gen. Hulisi Akar as Minister of National Defense. Following that, by presidential decree, the Chief of General Staff was positioned to operate under the Ministry of National Defense. Thirdly, by decree, the structure of the Supreme Military Council was re-designed in terms of the president’s autonomy over the final decision to determine promotions and assignments of colonels and generals and the number of ministers who can participate in Council meetings. Now, the decision regarding the promotion of the colonels and generals will be determined according to the absolute majority within the structure of the Supreme Military Council. The number of ministers who attend the Council meeting has also increased. The Vice-President and Ministry of Economy will be part of the Council meetings. But the question of whether Turkey reached a balance in civil-military relation remains due to the exceptional nature of civil-military relations in the country.

Ankara’s Four-Dimensional Strategy to Reconstruct Civil-Military Relations

To, ultimately, end the civil-military imbalance in post-July 15 Turkish politics, Ankara has attempted to restructure its entire state apparatus, in which security agents including the TAF will be positioned at the center. At the same time, the government has been trying to develop a comprehensive and long-term strategy for the newly emerging threats stemming from the regional insecurities in the Middle East. After the July 15 military coup attempt, the new period has entailed three crucial phases: lustration (de-Gulenization of the state) period, rehabilitation, democratic reconstruction of civil-military relations and modernization of the Turkish military. Ankara followed four-dimensional strategies in the post-July 15 coup attempt:

• Civilianization dimension is focused on democratic consolidation of the civil-military relations and requires that the TAF undergoes a full-fledged civilian control.
• Control-balance dimension sought to create a balance between the security forces in order to prevent a monopoly by the Chief of General Staff’s over the decision-making process within the army; and aimed to separate the security forces (Gendarmerie and Coast Guard Corps) from the chain of command to the Chief of General Staff to obtain a counter-balance.
• Ideological dimension sought to build ideational diversity within the officer core, but within the limits of their loyalty to the Constitution.
• Strategic dimension sought to redefine the national, regional, and international strategic mission of the TAF.

It is now that President Erdogan accomplished his first task by cleaning almost all the members of FETO within the TAF and other critical security institutions. The perception of TAF among the Turkish people has gained a very positive stance due to the increasing role of TAF in providing internal and regional security against threats emanating from the PKK and other terrorist organizations. TAF is more active militarily in Syria and Iraq to prevent terrorist activities against Turkey.

The second part of the post-July 15 civil-military relations is redesigned by civilian supremacy. But it does not necessarily mean that Turkey solved all its problems regarding civil-military relations. Under the presidency of Erdogan, the Ministry of National Defense will probably play a vital role in shaping Turkey’s military strategy and normalizing civil-military relations. The National Defense Ministry was in full control of the Chief of General Staff and responsible for daily military activities of TAF due to the exceptional status of Turkish military above its politics. Currently, the new minister has an important influence over the military institutions, and he has been closely working with the civilian authority in the post-July 15 Turkish atmosphere. Especially, TAF played an essential role in terms of recalibrating Turkey’s political strategy in Syria and Iraq and Turkey began to recalibrate its overall influence over the Syrian crisis.

President Erdogan’s central plan in the mid-term is to transform the Turkish military in accordance to the new regional and global geopolitical realities. TAF also wants to consolidate its adaptation capacity in order make the Turkish military more effective, deterrent, and professional. Therefore, the new minister Gen. Akar is seen as the most acceptable figure for TAF to make this transformation possible. However, since each of the aforementioned processes will take a long time to accomplish, there is a need for a comprehensive strategic roadmap for Turkey’s civil-military relations and for the strategic transformation of the military in order to increase the credibility of the TAF and minimize the security risks for Turkey in national, regional, and international security environments.

The Turkish Republic has faced several coups and coup attempts since its establishment in 1923 and even throughout the late 19^th and early 20^th centuries. This trend, unfortunately, did not change in subsequent times as it –once again– came into appearance in 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997 and even on 27 April 2007, when a so-called “e-memorandum” was issued by the ultra-secularist then-General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces in order to prevent the AK Party’s presidential candidate from being elected.

It’s ill-advised to acknowledge some un-informed Turkish academics who insisted on the thesis that the Turkish military had always respected Turkish democracy and that the only intent of the putschists was to restore the allegedly repeatedly failing Turkish democracy. Similar narratives do not merit consideration as they overlook or intentionally disregard significant factors. Proposing that the Turkish military thus far was able to intervene in politics without the support of foreign allies is imprudent. Thus, it’s quite logical to expect that subsequent to an alleged “restoration” process following coup regimes, even those supporting the tutelage military regimes may put pressure to put an end to this period. That’s it. Furthermore, without the pressure of external factors, neither Turkey would have given up its one-party CHP-regime in 1946, nor would it lend the power to civilians after each coup attempt. But these issues go beyond the borders of this column.

Turks are generally aware of the historical anti-democratic mechanisms and tutelage intending institutions in Turkey, which have been largely attenuated in the recent 15 years. Despite these democratic changes, which prioritized the civil actors in the Turkish political system, today, the question arises about how a military coup on July 15, 2016, could been attempted? Moreover and more importantly, how was the coup attempt prevented on this instance?

The main and striking factor in the prevention of the recent coup attempt was the people’s active will, who were able to directly thwart the execution of the coup. For the first time in Turkish history, people stood against the country’s own military and blocked an infiltrated faction of the military geared to take over the country’s leadership–as a result of this heroic resistance of unarmed civilians, 250 Turks were martyred by the armed forces.

On this instance in contrast with previous coups, the driving force behind the coup was not a Kemalist or ultra-secularist group, but rather the supporters of Fetullah Gulen, whose disciples infiltrated key state institutions over the last 40 years. The Gulenist cult members are widely acknowledged and designated today by all Turkish political parties and societal groups as a terrorist organization, called FETO. All left-wing, right-wing and conservative circles have no doubt regarding the perpetrators of the 15 July coup attempt.

This consensus is also a reason why during the night of the coup attempt, not only conservatives and nationalists took to the streets to prevent the coup –subsequent to President Erdogan’s call– but also some leftists and even some Kemalists deemed the coup attempt illegitimate and illegal. To understand the people’s actual motivations and their standpoints in a broader perspective, our book-publication, ‘Democracy Watch: Social Perception of 15 July Coup Attempt’ from 2016 may be a good reference to contextualize Turkish people and their perception of the 15th July coup attempt.

In the 1990s, when the armed forces still controlled Turkish politics by indirect mechanisms –such as the media etc. – this kind of collective civil mobilization against an anti-democratic armed actor would be unimaginable. Thus, both the partly successful de-militarization process of Turkey’s politics in the recent years via rise of civil-democratic politics and the fact that the coup was attempted by a prevalently hated group, the FETO, were important in thwarting the coup. This is also a fundamental reason why the state of emergency, which will end in the coming days, was not opposed by the majority of Turks since its main target was the FETO.

Furthermore, it should be stressed that the presidential leadership was a crucial factor in the failure of the attempt. By calling the citizens to go on streets and protect democratic rights, Turkish President Erdogan differentiated himself from previous Turkish political leaders and thus mobilized the country against an anti-democratic attempt. The result was ultimately a success, reaching yet another successful milestone paving the way to Turkey’s progressive democracy path.

Nowadays, questions also arise as to the plausibility of potential future coup attempts. Undoubtedly, steps such as the strengthening of people’s democratic sensitivities, sustaining the democratic transformation of Turkey’s political institutions, continuing the fight against illegal groups within the army such as FETO, and the establishment of a further professional-democratic understanding of the armed forces by stressing civilian control will be the main factors in minimizing the likelihood of future coup attempts – regardless of their affiliations. Of course, the importance and meaning of the Turkish armed forces for Turks is not to be disregarded or diminished and it’s true that this perception is based on a rather emotional, religious and historical backdrop. Nevertheless, this fact does not hinder the need to further develop a sincere democratic understanding of civil-military relations in Turkish politics.

In this sense, it’s important to stress the recent institutional step, according to which the chief of General Staff and force commanders will henceforth fall under the new Defense Minister – a civil person. As already known, the previous Chief of General Staff, General Hulusi Akar, quit his job as military official right after he was appointed as the new Defense Minister in Turkey’s first presidential cabinet last week. Thus, it seems that an interesting transition model was formulated in order to establish an effective increase in civil politics. Moreover, similar progressive steps to develop the civilian control of the military –by taking into account the needs of a strong and democratic military– will most likely provide beneficial in reducing the notion of coups in the minds of anti-democrats, let alone the likelihood of potential future coup attempts by factions of the army.

Within two years since the July 15 coup attempt, Turkey has overcome several monumental challenges. The first and foremost challenge was the coup attempt which was thwarted in its tracks by civilian initiative thus setting the path for future challenges. The coup attempt was undertaken by an illegal organization, FETO, which tried to usurp power from within the state bureaucracy. Members of this organization had systematically infiltrated state institutions for decades while keeping up a façade of merely being a civil society organization.

Turkish people took to streets upon President Erdogan’s call to confront the putschists and protect their democracy. Countless stories from that night have been recounted all illustrating that Turkish people will no longer tolerate anti-democratic forces to dictate their will. It was clear from the onset of the night of the July 15 coup attempt that the era of coups in Turkey was drawing to an end. Unlike previous military interventions, Turkish people’s resistance that night signaled a major turning point in the history of Turkish democracy.

The second challenge was to tackle an unequaled terror organization which had taken over many strategic institutions, subsequently permeating its grip on power through anti-democratic means. Turkey was already dealing with domestic and regional terror organizations like the PKK and DAESH. Confronting FETO, however, demanded a unique approach as this organization existed within the state itself. Turkey had to comb through the state bureaucracy to find out members of a highly secretive organization who received orders from outside rather than from their legitimate superiors in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Especially in the weeks and months immediately following the coup attempt, there was imminent fear of the potential of another coup attempt transpiring any moment. The recent trauma of the night of July 15 was compounded with the urgent need to find out the perpetrators and prevent yet another attempt.

The third challenge was to establish a multi-pronged approach to combat domestic and regional terrorism. Both DAESH and the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK, were posing immediate security threats especially along the Syrian border. Towns bordering Turkey were often subjected to rocket attacks and occasional destabilizing activities such as smuggling. Lack of stability on the Syrian side of the border created opportunities for the YPG, which was increasingly legitimized and encouraged by western support. Only a month after the coup attempt, Turkey decided to take the fight across the border into Syria both to demonstrate its resolve and to ensure that it would not simply sit by and watch the PKK gain ground. To this end, Turkey conducted the Euphrates Shield and Afrin operations in addition to maintaining a military presence in Idlib. Through its military intervention in northern Syria, Turkey’s fight against terrorism evolved from a defensive state to a new proactive approach after the coup attempt by fighting terror organizations across the border when necessary.

The fourth challenge was a political one: to rebuild the political system that suffered from decades of military and civilian tutelage system. The traditional tutelary system prevented the popular will from being fully reflected in the political arena and various state institutions had the ultimate say in state affairs. The AK Party years have challenged this system in a significant way and yet a comprehensive change to the system, which was demanded by people of all segments of the society, had still to be realized. The 2017 referendum on the transition to a presidential system represented the most significant overhaul of the governance system in Turkey. With the June 24 elections, Turkey has now transitioned to a full presidential system whereby the state institutions originally set up to oversee the civilian governments are now going to serve under the elected leaders. It will take time for the new system to be fully functional and there may even be hurdles along the way. Nevertheless, an elected president and an elected parliament are now at the center of the political system with the unelected and appointed civil and military bureaucratic institutions serving under them.

We will certainly continue to debate the reverberations of the July 15 coup attempt and its legacy for the country. But one overarching message is clear: Turkish people will no longer tolerate their democratic rights and popular will to be undermined and hijacked by cliques and terror groups from within and outside the state. This will most likely constitute the cornerstone of the country’s democratic maturity in the years ahead.

Two years ago, Turkey witnessed the coup attempt by the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO), which had been infiltrating critical state institutions for a long time. The putschists killed 241 people and 2195 others were injured. During the two-year period after the coup attempt, there have been serious investigations towards FETO-linked people in public institutions and the judiciary. These investigations aimed to purify state institutions from FETO domination.

After two years, understanding the attitudes and perceptions of people towards FETO is important. There have been some studies analyzing the psychological aspects of the coup attempt and its perpetrator. All these studies show that FETO is still perceived as the most dangerous terrorist organization by people and it differs from other organizations by choosing extraordinary methods. For instance, while it pretends to be “a peaceful religious community working for the sake of humanity” in the international arena, the members of this terrorist organization still manipulate investigations to commit more crimes. The complication of their methods in communication and giving orders still make them one of the most abnormal terrorist organizations in history.

All of these factors keep the hatred towards FETO among Turkish people alive. The second commemoration of the coup attempt took place with the participation of millions of people throughout the country. In cities, people prayed for the souls of the martyrs and the sake of Turkey. They also showed their anger and hatred towards FETO. This shows that there is a consensus among people, no matter their ideology or political view, that FETO is a dangerous terrorist organization, which does not hesitate to act against human dignity.

The hatred towards FETO makes July 15 one of the most critical junctures in Turkey’s history. After the coup attempt, millions of people gathered for democracy watches in order to show their respect to Turkish democracy. These events created a new atmosphere uniting people all around the country. The participation to commemoration ceremonies in masses shows that this spirit is still alive after two years. Thus, it is obvious that July 15 created a founding spirit for the future of the country.

Even if there is a consensus on July 15 and its meaning in Turkey’s history among Turkish people, there is a concern among people that foreign countries failed to understand FETO danger. The two-year lasting process after the coup attempt shows that foreign countries are not aware of the dangers of this terrorist organization. Obviously, one of the reasons of this misperception arises from the widespread belief among these countries indicating that this organization is not as dangerous as Turkey claims.

Since FETO is a multi-faced terrorist organization showing its “soft” and “peaceful” face to foreign countries, most of these countries are blind to see connections between this group and the July 15 coup attempt. This makes it difficult to fight against FETO in the international arena. Additionally, some groups in Turkey also try to soften perceptions against this group under the influence of the discourse of FETO. Nonetheless, it should be reminded that some Western countries – in comparison to their attitudes two years ago – have begun to take into account the role of FETO in the coup attempt. This reflects some success in Turkey’s fight against the terrorist organization.

Consequently, Turkey proceeds to convince other countries about its two-year lasting fight. The unquestionable consensus among Turkish people on FETO’s role as the perpetrator of the coup attempt also started to re-shape the approaches of foreign countries. It is obvious that, with the support of the people, Turkey will continue to progress in its fight against FETO in the domestic and international arena.

One of the most important actors on the night of July 15, 2016, was the personnel of the Directorate of Religious Affairs. Calling mosque staff in all cities to duty, the directorate consolidated the people’s resistance against the coup taking place in Istanbul and Ankara. In this respect, in an unprecedented way, mosques broadcasted messages calling people to go out on the streets and thwart the coup attempt. This process, during which the Directorate of Religious Affairs personnel faced dangers such as going through a conflict zone or being attacked by some Turkish citizens verbally and physically, was initiated with former President of Religious Affairs Mehmet Gormez’s verbal instruction on Ulke TV when he reached the TV channel through phone around 11:40 PM:

“I ask all of my devoted brothers out there, please each and every one of you run to the minarets. First recite salawats to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), then invite all people of Turkey to protect their rights and will.”

In addition to this verbal instruction on TV, the directorate personnel received a text written by Mehmet Gormez around 01:00 AM:

“My fellow devoted brother, doing whatever we can to protect the rights of our people is our duty. We can never allow this country and its people to be divided, deprived of peace and prosperity along with the will of people being infringed through coercion and violence. As the spiritual guides of our nation, we will stand with the people against all illegal initiatives. I call all of you to resist this heinous treachery [the coup attempt] in a nonviolent way by going up the minarets, the symbol of our freedom. Tonight, lights of minaret should remain on and the people of Turkey should be invited to protect their rights via reciting salawats.

Mehmet Gormez”

After this instruction of Mehmet Gormez, sounds of salawats, call to prayers, prayers and announcements rose from the minarets. Gormez had given the general framework to muezzins and let them do whatever they can within this framework. This situation revealed a rich potential of materials; while some muezzins recited salawats unceasingly, others were inviting people to resistance after salawats, praying in Turkish/Arabic, reciting “salat-ı ümmiye,” Turkey’s national anthem and poems.

Shaped through improvisation in terms of content, this rich material gave insight to the relations between the July 15-religion in particular and religion-state/politics/democracy/military in general along with how these relations were perceived by Turkish society. In addition, it also revealed how the directorate personnel viewed this sinister event and how they conveyed their views to the public along with uncovering how one of the most effective motivators functioned. In this respect, this material is crucial and for this reason it would be beneficial to look at what happened on the night of July 15 from this perspective through the common points that could be found among limited sources:

Looking at the mood of these calls and prayers, it is clear that there is an apparent and dominant “war of independence” or invasion psychology. This wasn’t a coup aiming to overthrow the government, but the state, call to prayer, the flag and independence – all of which are seen as synonymous. “Europe,” “the U.S.” “Zionists,” “Christians,” “heretics,” “hypocrites” and co-conspiring traitors are behind this coup attempt. This psychology had an impact on the frequent recitation of the Turkish national anthem written along with Arif Nihat Asya’s poem “Biz Kısık Sesleriz” [“We are the husky voices”]. Meanwhile, referred historical figures also reflect this psychology: Ulubatli Hasan, Mehmed the Conquerer, Abdulhamid II, Sütçü İmam…

National unity and solidarity are among the most underscored arguments during the calls made from minarets. Undoubtedly, this was the case because it wasn’t a solely military coup; it was perpetrated by a religious order which had a social correspondence. In this respect, with the addition of indiscriminate usage of heavy weaponry against the people, the coup was seen more of a threat than just a struggle for power between two parties or an attempt to shift power. This perception was due to the damage caused by violent political and social conflicts in Syria and Egypt in the near past being still fresh in the memory of people.

Protecting democracy and the national will were two points that were frequently expressed by religious officials when calling people to resist. People were invited to take the streets not only for the love of God or country, but also for the love of democracy, while it was highlighted that the national will, elected government, president or the Parliament could be altered with arms and coups, that was a clear threat.

Exactly two years has passed since the July 15, 2016, coup attempt in Turkey, but the fight against the terrorist organization led by the U.S.-based former imam Fetullah Gulen, officially known as FETO, remains at the top of the country’s agenda. The sustained importance of this issue stems from the discovery of new evidence about the organization as well as the opposition’s approach to Turkey’s crackdown on the FETO network.

In the wake of the July 15 coup attempt, Turkey launched a proactive campaign against FETO terrorism. It is necessary to note, however, that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s commitment to this struggle predated the failed coup. As a matter of fact, he described the group as a ‘parallel state’ in the immediate aftermath of the judicial coup attempt on December 17-25, 2013. A designated terrorist organization that the National Security Council (MGK) officially identified as a threat against Turkey’s national security, FETO suffered major setbacks since the July 15 coup attempt, as its operational capabilities within the country were completely eliminated – at least for the time being. The declaration of a state of emergency, coupled with a number of decreed issues within that legal framework, facilitated the dismissal of FETO members, affiliates and contacts from the public service. Others, who actively participated in the organization’s illegal activities, were brought to justice. Over the following months, Turkish courts handed down various sentences to defendants over their links to FETO and their complicity in the July 15 coup attempt.

The question today is whether Turkey’s struggle against this 50-year-old organization, which is half as old as the Republic itself, has reached its conclusion. In order to answer this question, we must provide the following analysis and support the claims mentioned in it.

First of all, FETO has never been a religious organization. Since its formation, the group operated as a terrorist organization. Provided that it successfully disguised itself as a faith community, however, resulted in an overall failure to understand the movement’s true nature until the July 15 coup attempt.

Fundamental qualities of the organization

In order to fully appreciate the challenges that Turkish authorities face in their fight against FETO, it is necessary to understand what kind of organization it really is. At the same time, it is crucial to raise awareness about the threat posed by FETO members, whom certain foreign governments continue to harbor, to host FETO members around the world.

According to many counterterrorism experts who describe FETO as a terrorist organization, the group does not share the organization structure and operational processes with others. Developing a deeper understanding of the organization, whose members are radicalized by Fetullah Gulen’s cult of personality, is also key to the success of ongoing efforts to defeat it. To be clear, it is not possible to argue that FETO is known or has been explained sufficiently.

The first defining feature of cult movements is that their authoritarian leaders are considered sacred by their followers. Since the organization’s establishment, Gulen’s most significant accomplishment was to identify himself as a holy person. As a self-proclaimed chosen person, Gulen repeatedly compared himself to the Prophet Muhammad over the years. At other times, he presented himself as the executioner of His wishes. In doing so, Gulen took necessary precautions to ensure his total control over the organization. As a paranoid individual, he single-handedly decided which of his followers would marry and how they would name their children. Gülen also monitored the communications of his closest associates in an effort to concentrate all powers in his own hands.

FETO is also quite capable of indoctrination, which is the second most important quality of cult movements. As a matter of fact, the entire organization is a reflection of Gülen himself. A closer look at the group would reveal that it shares the personality traits of its leader. As such, the organization shares Gülen’s sinister nature, desire for becoming a legend, fear of death, tendency to alienate others, eagerness to hide his true motives and lack of confidence. Gulen was able to accomplish this goal with the help of a powerful network of indoctrination. Over the years, recordings, preparation schools and educational institutions have been the most significant carriers of Gulen’s messages. It was thereby that the organization’s leader came to control the minds of recruits from their childhood onwards. Those individuals, whose minds came to be controlled, became main players within the ‘parallel state’ in later years. With a sense of absolute devotion, they swallowed all discourse and actions of Gulen and his organization without reservation. Despite the overwhelming evidence against Gulen, for example, many members of the organization continue to turn a blind eye to the criminal nature of its activities out of absolute devotion and the hope of a better future.

To be clear, the nature of FETO was unmistakably shaped by the objectives of its sponsors. For example, many people view the organization’s current state as a deviation from religious principles over time. Quite the contrary, FETO has never been a religious movement. Instead, it has always been a terrorist organization. Instead of undermining state authority through armed struggle like traditional terrorist organizations, it aimed to infiltrate various public institutions to create a ‘parallel state’ which would take over the country’s government when the time came. Almost all sources on FETO, however, lack a coherent analysis of its emergence – – even though Gulen has always been open about his ultimate goal. A careful analysis would reveal that only a handful studies delve into the organization’s relationship with the Peace Volunteers Movement, a product of Washington’s anti-communist campaign that started its activities in Turkey in the early 1960s (just as Gulen was starting out), or how much time Gulen used to spend at the American locale in Edirne and his links to intelligence officers during his military service.

At all stages of its evolution, FETO remained capable of easily adapting to changing political circumstances in Turkey and around the world.  In other words, it assumed the shape of its container. It used religion to conceal its true identity and seized the opportunities it entailed.

At which level is Turkey in its fight against FETO?

The first step taken in order to fight with FETO was to initiate investigations against kumpas davaları (trials that FETO promoted with manipulations and fake evidences) which were used by FETO for the purpose of providing a “legal” dimension to its illegal activities. By these illegal activities, FETO aimed to speed up its organizational structuration in public institutions such as the Turkish Armed Forces.

OHAL (state of emergency) was put into action following the July 15 failed coup attempt. Then, with the help of decree laws issued in this state of emergency, the elimination of FETO members in public officials and breaking their power in various fields mainly including the spheres of education, media and economy, were at the top of the agenda. Dismissal of persons, who take orders from their “brothers” and “sisters” in the organization instead of their chiefs in the public offices, can be understood in this context. In this way, public personnel who have connections with FETO were dismissed and legal proceedings against them were initiated for the reason of abusing the possibilities offered by the state.

In order to block activities of FETO in the field of education, nearly 2.000 schools, student dormitories and various courses in connection with the organization have been closed by the Ministry of National Education.

Also, precautions were taken against the economic power of FETO by dealing with companies such as Bank Asya and Group of Koza Ipek, who act as intermediaries for money laundering. Trustees were appointed to these companies and suspicious past activities of them were examined by ministries, institutions and organizations.

The process of removing the effects of FETO from the state, as the most important part of the fight against FETO, is not an individual-centered approach but rather it aims to remove groups whose activities were infected with terrorism/crime. Up to now, 287 lawsuits were filed against the coup attempt and 171 cases reached at decisions. In these cases, 2.140 people were sentenced.

Turkey continues to struggle with FETO even in the international arena. Various information and documents have been forwarded to interlocuters in order to struggle with the manipulations initiated by the terrorist organization. In this context, authority in FETO schools in many places, especially in the Balkans and African countries, were delivered to the Republic of Turkey.

FETO isn’t just a threat against Turkey

Starting with the judiciary and law enforcement, the officials conducting Turkey’s fight against FETO, along with the political leadership behind the agenda, cracked down on the organization’s network at unprecedented levels. Keeping in mind Gulen’s character traits, it is important to highlight that the organization cannot be completely incapacitated in a short period of time. After all, FETO isn’t limited to its public profile. Since April 2017, the Turkish National Police has identified the organization’s undercover cells within the state apparatus and security operations concentrated on those specific targets. In light of newly available evidence, the Turkish authorities concluded that FETO was an extremely potent covert organization. It is possible to argue that each visible component of the organization has a ‘parallel’ or hidden counterpart. For example, it became clear that all FETO members within the Turkish Armed Forces reported to other, ghost-like members (known as hidden imams within the group). Regardless of their ranks, those operatives received orders and instructions from individuals other than their superiors within the military hierarchy. This specific arrangement meant that FETO became a ‘parallel state’ par excellence and was indeed a terrorist organization seeking to seize control of the state apparatus.

In addition to generating revenue for the group, FETO schools across the world served as a source of new recruits who would be trained to become part of the ‘parallel state.’ For the sake of presenting itself as a peaceful movement, FETO used its educational institutions as a front. Although Turkey ended the group’s activities in the area of education, it is important to note that Gulen’s school network became the organization’s backbone in recent years. Gulen-affiliated schools in the United States, Europe, Central Asia and Africa carry on supporting the survival of the organization. According to information obtained from individuals, who were captured in Ukrain, Sudan, Kosovo, Azerbaijan and Gabon in recent months by the Turkish intelligence servcices, they served as principals or teachers at FETO schools.

FETO schools outside Turkey must be considered serious national security threats in host countries. After all, those institutions formed the backbone of the group’s presence in other countries. First and foremost, countries harboring identified FETO members are now the new centers of the organization. These countries violate international law and diplomatic norms by supporting a terrorist organization, which attempted to overthrow Turkey’s democratically elected government in 2016, to seem unreliable. At the same time, they render themselves defenseless against potential attacks by FETO members. It is no secret that the children of local elites in many countries, where the group operates, are enrolled in schools affiliated with Gulen. As a matter of fact, it is possible to argue that political elites in countries, where FETO launched educational institutions relatively early, are graduates of those schools. In this regard, the group forms ‘parallel states’ in those countries as well.

On July 15, 2016, Turkey encountered the single greatest act of rebellion in the history of the Republic – which it overcame thanks to the sacrifice of the ordinary people. In the wake of the coup attempt, the country launched an all-out offensive against FETO. Although significant progress has been made within the country, members of the organization, who fled Turkey ahead of the failed coup, continue a smear campaign against the country. In this regard, many countries, including Turkey’s self-proclaimed allies in the West, do not pay the due attention to the steps taken by Turks in the international arena. Although there is irrefutable evidence linking Gulen to the coup attempt in Turkey, those countries are unwilling to extradite senior leaders of the organization to Turkey. We must not forget that FETO is the product of an ‘intelligence thinking’ and the group’s structure and activities were shaped by the same line of thinking. As such, the organization poses a security threat not just to Turkey but also other countries where it remains operational. Let us hope that those who ignore the FETO threat today can see the group for what it really is before it is too late.

“Once innocence is lost, it’s not possible to find it again,” says Bauman. When people start to taint their God-given nature with or without intent, being aware of it or not, nothing will be like it used to before. In this respect, infer the following inspired by the verses “Are those who know equal to those who do not know?” (Az-Zumar 9) and “The darkness and the light are not equal” (Fatir 20): Are those who protect their candor, innocence and humanity equal to those who do not? Holy texts are full of examples who betray themselves, their society, nature and ultimately God himself by failing to protect their innocence. I believe it’s enough to remind Lucifer’s disobedience and Cain’s murder of his brother Able.

To comprehend the loss of innocence is the issue. Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) defines feeling guilty as “remorse” (Ibn Majah, Zuhd, 30). To feel remorse, one should be aware of its crime; moreover, one should reprimand himself/herself. We see that Prophet Jonah submits to the God Almighty by saying “Indeed, I have been of the wrongdoers” (Al-Anbya 87) despite being a prophet himself, while Lucifer constantly avoids facing his crime and loss of innocence through arrogance (Al-Baqarah 34) and trying to justify itself (Al-A’raf 12). This is where the soul and mind become devilish.

FETO’s dogmatism

2 years has passed since the heinous July 15 coup attempt perpetrated by FETO. Turkey was in intensive care for a year, trying to come back to life. Our state, its government (Justice and Development Party, or AK Party for short) and those who backed them both (Nationalist Movement Party, or MHP for short) have implemented meticulous policies throughout this process. We have experienced the individual and societal trauma caused by the attempted attack on the state organization and democratic system. It’s without doubt that some were victimized by false accusations and denouncements motivated by the purple brain or personal ambitions. We see that these wrongs are being corrected incrementally.

The discrepancy between FETO’s apparent facet and hidden agenda, thus it’s extreme form of dissimulation (taqiyya), have inflicted wounds to the minds of all Muslims, especially Islamists, the pious and nationalist-conservatives. Firstly, the treatment of this wound isn’t as easy as it seems. An indomitable will by a resolute political administration is required.

Let’s go back to where it all started. FETO, which was deemed innocent by the public prior to 2012, lost its innocence through the December 17-25 events and the July 15 coup attempt. We are facing a structure characterized by Hoffer’s “true believers” and Rokeach’s “closed [dogmatic] mind.” A mental and emotional rigidity with the potential of fanaticism… Caused by unshakeable belief and utmost devotion, this condition was defined as “being a hashhashin,” referring to Hasan as-Sabbah’s original assassins.

Why? Because with the mind-numbing opium, people transform into mindless drones. It’s possible to talk about Marx’s remark that “religion is the opium of the people.” In FETO’s hand, religion turns into an opiate. For this reason, its members don’t feel remorse about attempting to suspend democracy and infringe the constitution along with killing hundreds of people. According to their belief, remorse is only possible if they disobey FETO leader Gulen, their acclaimed “messiah.”

Considering Fromm described such structures as “authoritarian,” it’s easy to understand how the leaders of fascist organizations are idolized. In this respect, loyalty and trust is only reserved for the leader in FETO. The belief that only the leader represents the truth has invaded every cell of their being. They evaluate every knowledge and information only according to their narrow ideology and purpose. If the provided knowledge and information is compatible with the organization’s teachings, it is accepted easily; otherwise, they will deny. “They have hearts with which they do not understand, they have eyes with which they do not see, and they have ears with which they do not hear” (Al-A’raf 179) describes the type of dogmatic and fanatical people in such authoritarian organizations perfectly.

Fanaticism takes only one step from dogmatism. Fanatics possess all the traits of dogmatic thought process and personality. However, they’re more prone to employing violence. Regardless of religious exploitation, rigid authoritarian structures all possess psychosocial issues like seeing the world in black and white, failing to see the grey zones, monopolizing the truth, perceiving the future with a pessimistic outlook, feeling insecure and accepting only other members as their brothers and sisters. All of these could be observed in FETO; yet, there is more: fanaticism. Individual or organizational, fanaticism is characterized by violence and aggression caused by contracting consciousness. In this regard, FETO isn’t only a dogmatic organization, but also a fanatical one.

The December 17-25 events and the heinous July 15 coup attempt has shown that Gulenism believes the ends justify the means and that it is a terrorist organization using violence unfetteredly. Similar to FETO, the PKK with its Marxist and leftist discourse is also a dogmatic and fanatical organization. So, it’s not hard to understand how these two terrorist organizations have found common ground in inflicting harm to the Turkish people and the state. We see that once innocence is lost everything is permitted.

In psychology, such personalities are deemed as morbose and it’s contagious. Brainwashing, inculcation and persuasion  strategies uniform the members, rendering them into one dimensional personalities. Members of FETO and similar organizations always have strong reaction mechanisms; what I mean by this mechanism is that there is a discrepancy between how they appear and what they actually are. Then, lets ask the question again: did the FETO leader and his followers lose their innocence after December 17-25 and July 15? It’s apparent that this organization that employs and encourages dissimulation has used a different language while they speak with pious people, Kemalists, and with a fellow member. This means innocence never existed.

The July 15 resistance is a milestone

There is another question to ask: why does Turkey suffer a coup or a coup attempt, which is backed by external powers, every 10-15 years? The answer should be sought in terms such as trauma, instability and discontinuity. The 1960 military coup traumatized our grandfathers, 1980 coup traumatized our fathers, February 28, 1997, coup traumatized ourselves and the July 15 coup attempt traumatized our children. Could these traumatized generations attempt to develop the country, build a civilization or challenge imperialism and capitalism? They can hardly do it anymore. Due to political instability, development is interrupted. In turn, his interruption creates transitional periods, wasting generations in a decade or so. What needs to be done is clear; we need to be politically stable and achieve continuity in development.

In his book “The Foundations of Civilization,” Will Durant insistently underscores the importance of a resolute state structure, political stability and economic order. Durant also expresses that religion and morality along with advanced scientific researches, literature and arts are indispensable elements of a civilization. It’s high time that we leave our traumas behind, achieve development and stability, and rebuild our civilization. The heinous July 15 coup attempt taught us that coups are history in this country. Nevertheless, the state should be equally distanced from either secular or religious organizations and should try to pull them towards legitimate grounds. Why? “Too much trust is too much indeed,” says Shakespeare.

On July 12, 2018, the SETA Foundation in Istanbul organized a symposium about the July 15 coup attempt.

Moderated by Burhanettin Duran, AK Party spokesperson Mahir Unal and former Justice Minister Bekir Bozdag attended the first panel.

Unal began his speech by stating that “We don’t need to look at literature to observe what happened on July 15 because it occurred during our lifetimes. We just have to analyze the events correctly.”

While the trials of Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) members are still ongoing, Unal underlined that “When the two terms ‘FETO’ and ‘politics’ come together, we have to first assess the mission of Turkish politics.”

“Turkish politics cannot accept another organization or cloud above itself” – and this was something that FETO was trying to do; trying to place itself within a hegemonic space within the Turkish political sphere.

Flaws of the old system

During his speech, Unal emphasized the fact that the July 15 coup attempt cannot be observed without discussing the failures of the old governance system in Turkey.

He made this point by stating that “In 42 years, 36 governments changed.”

Comparing the governance system of Turkey to a car, Unal stated that under the old system there were two drivers – one that was elected by the people and one that assumed its hegemony. He stated that the old system was based on a tutelage regime, where elected officials were continuously blocked by unelected individuals.

Continuing, in his criticism of the old governmental system, Mahir Unal stated that every time the system gave an error, “we went to the people.” In reference to this, the AK Party spokesman said that “We [the AK Party] didn’t act with the power of the system for 16 years, but rather, with the power of politics.”

The people took control

Discussing the events that took place on the night of July 15, Unal stated that as soon as the Turkish people felt that the state was being overthrown, they “took to the streets and held on to the state with their bare hands.”

“The Turkish people did not shoot back at the putschists who fired at them. It was as if there was an invisible collective understanding of justice that night.”

Before finishing off his speech, the AK party spokesman underlined the importance of not comparing FETO to other terrorist organizations such as the PKK or Daesh. The reason for this being is because, as Unal stated, “FETO is a group that had infiltrated the state and wanted to take control of the space left free from the old tutelage regime.”

“FETO is a new type of terrorist organization, that doesn’t use guns. They operate in different ways. Unlike the PKK or Daesh, FETO can be analyzed as a smarter and sophisticated terrorist organization.”

July 15 in Parliament

Before beginning his speech, moderator Burhanettin Duran asked for former Justice Minister Bekir Bozdag to talk a little about his experience of July 15, as he is one of the figures that the Turkish people remember in Parliament.

Speaking little of the events that occurred in Parliament that night, Bozdag mentioned that the reason why he believed it was wrong for parliamentarians to hide in shelters (while FETO had dropped 2 bombs on Parliament that night) is because if people had seen that Parliament was shutdown, they would not have found the courage to take to the streets.

Following, Bozdag stated that “In order to understand July 15, we need to go back in time.” Giving reference to previous military coups that happened in Turkey, the former minister stated that “no one ever asked the question: what are you doing?”

There are two events that keep July 15 separate from previous military coups in Turkey. Bozdag listed these as 1) the fact that the putschists could not take hold of the President and 2) that the President chose to protect his and his country’s honor and that the Turkish people stood right behind him. This, Bozdag stated, was a “first for Turkish people.”

Bozdag compared the resistance displayed by Recep Tayyip Erdogan on that night to that displayed by Ataturk – the people of Anadolu stood with Ataturk, resisting against imperialists, just like the people stood with President Erdogan, resisting against FETO putschists.

One other important feature of July 15 is that “For the first time the justice system did not try to legitimize the coup” – something that occurred during the February 28, 1997, coup during the Erbakan era.

Wrapping up his speech, Bozdag asked the audience to think about one question: “What would have happened if the Turkish people had not answered the President’s call to take on the streets?”

In conclusion, Bozdag made statements appreciating the courage of President Erdogan that night, referring to how he flew to Ataturk Airport with his family, not knowing who was in control. Risking his and his family’s life, Bozdag criticized those that still call Erdogan a “dictator” when he “risked his own life for democracy’s sake.”

Ending the panel, Burhanettin Duran stated that “A new belief emerged within the Turkish people that people can resist against military coups and that they should do so. In fact, people were making references to Menderes stating that ‘we couldn’t take care of Menderes [who was hung after a military take over], but we will look after Erdogan.'”

On April 5, a shocking incident occurred at Osmangazi University in Turkey’s northwestern Eskisehir province. A research assistant in the Department of Education killed four staff members with whom he worked closely at the same university. After the incident, it was declared to the public that the ongoing dispute between the attacker and staff based on the FETO (Gulenist Terror Organization) investigation at the university might be one of the reasons for this mass killing.

Although the reason of this incident needs to be clarified after a detailed investigation, this event brought questions about the re-radicalization of the Gulenist terror cult to the forefront. After the July 15 coup attempt, a large number of members of this organization have been dismissed from public institutions and universities due to their links with FETO. As Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdag stated last January, the number of personnel dismissed through statutory decrees is 107,174. Even though most members of this terrorist organization were passivized, the ongoing debates show that there is fear they could turn into the lone-wolf terrorist as in the case of Daesh sympathizers in Europe.

The collective group identity of FETO

To understand the probability of re-radicalization of its members, it is important to evaluate psychological dimensions of the collective group identity of FETO. The messianic structure of this organization creates a shared system of meaning and identity for the members of this terrorist organization as in other radical groups. After the coup attempt, the measures taken to break the connections between members created a significant hole in this shared system of meaning and identity.

Nonetheless, it is obvious that the members of this organization behave as if they still have high emotional salience attached to their group identity and try to show it through symbolic and ritual behaviors. For instance, the head of this terrorist organization, Fetullah Gulen, had an interview with Wall Street Journal a couple of days after the coup attempt. In the interview, he gave messages to FETO members via using symbols such as poems and photos.

The symbolic and ritual behaviors became the most common methods of keeping system of meaning and identity intact among the members after the coup attempt. A lot of these members who were prisoned made each other believe that the Prophet visits them in jail. They tried to convince themselves that they would soon be free. As prominent social psychologist Turner indicates, giving greater emotional weight to common elements, reinforcing them with an ideology of linked fate, and frequently overestimating within-group uniformity causes a glorified identity among the members of a group. This method, as clearly seen from the examples, is highly used to keep the salience of FETO as a group.

The re-radicalization steps

Although these kinds of measures were taken to consolidate the group identity of this organization, it should be reminded that it does not represent the real situation. The Gulenist criminal cult attacked civilian people on the night of July 15, 2016 and 249 people died and more than 1,400 were wounded. As they have no legitimation in the eyes of people, it is impossible to make their glorified aims come true. Some members of the organization faced with this reality in time and decided to become confessors. The rising numbers of confessors should be evaluated with the rising disappointment of FETO members. The disappointment of FETO members grew parallel to the fact that this glorification was far from reality. As a result, increasing frustration caused aggression among members to FETO.

Overall, even if there is a tendency to re-radicalize FETO, it is impossible for this illegitimate group to mobilize their members as they claimed. However, people should be ready for both the glorification and overestimation tactics of this group in their aim to manipulate society.

As the series of trials continue in Turkish courts, a court in Izmir sentenced the lawyer of Fetullah Gulen, the criminal cult leader of Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO), to 12 years in prison. The lawyer Feti Ün was slapped a sentence of eight years in jail initially, but it has now been increased to 12 years in accordance to the Counterterror Act.

Following last year’s failed coup attempt by FETO, the Turkish government and security agencies have taken a range of steps to weed the terrorist elements out of different social, education and security institutions.

Although Gulen himself is based in the United States, his vast network is spread across the world, but its form had been strongest in Turkey. By tacking a wide range of steps, the Turkish government is working to prevent future attacks on the Turkish state.

The lawyer’s sentencing coincided with many other trials in which a number of policemen and soldiers were sentenced for coup related criminal charges and their links with FETO.

A Konya court sentenced six former police officers and the former assistant police director of Konya’s Aksehir district and a former security chief, separately. The sentences range from six years and 10 months to seven years and six months over FETO links.

A Samsun court also jailed a former doctor to six years and three months in prison for being members of an armed terrorist organization.

Meanwhile, eight of 36 suspects on trial concerning Turkey’s Central Bank staff in Ankara were released under judicial control.

Although the country paid a heavy price for resisting the July 15, 2016- coup attempt, that left 250 people martyred and some 2,200 injured, Turkey is expected to emerge stronger as the government takes on all the associated elements strongly.

*Written by Waseem Ahad. 

The Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO), which orchestrated the July 15 coup attempt that martyred 250 people and left nearly 2,200 injured, has also infiltrated various state institutions including ministries, schools and hospitals.

While Turkey is fighting against the criminal cult group at home, the group has a concrete diaspora abroad.

In regards to the fugitive members of FETO who are seeking safety abroad, deputy head of the Turkish parliament’s Human Rights Committee stated that they will be left “stateless.”

Speaking to the Anadolu Agency, Fatma Benli stated that “the FETO traitors who think that they are free abroad will be faced with the harsh realities of being left stateless.”

Stressing the importance of Turkey’s fight against FETO, Benli underlined that “Turkey is actually protecting the region and the world from these organizations while fighting the PKK, Daesh, and FETO.”

“The states backing Turkey in this fight are actually providing for their own security.”

In regards to states granting asylum to FETO terrorists, Benli urged for states to stop supporting FETO members in their countries and called on European countries and the US to carry out a joint fight against the terror group.

The deputy also warned that decisions made by some countries to harbor the criminal cult members will come back to bite them: “The states which are backing FETO should see that those who have betrayed their own country will one day betray them.”

While Ankara has been seeking the extradition of the criminal cult leader Fetullah Gulen, who is currently residing in the US, Turkey has also requested for the government in Germany to return FETO suspects who have sought asylum there.

http://thenewturkey.org/feto-and-its-role-in-stoking-the-kurdish-issue/

Turkey will not be brought to its knees

Speaking in Ankara, Prime Minister Binali Yildirim also made reference to FETO in his speech.

Yildirim claimed that FETO was trying “new tricks” in order to finish what they failed on July 15.

“Those who could not bring Turkey to its knees during July 15, are now trying to pull another trick.”

“They are saying: ‘How can we finish the job we attempted to do on July 15?’ They think that they can bring our nation to its knees with economic crisis talks, and chaos scenarios.”

The Prime Minister emphasized that “nobody, no power, can hurt this country when our nation has this love for its land and state.”

Following the July 15 coup attempt, which left 250 people martyred and nearly 2,200 injured, the Turkish government has been trying to tackle the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO), which has infiltrated state institutions, including the army and various ministries.

While the fight against the criminal cult members has been ongoing within Turkey, FETO is well known to have wings overseas. Mainly, the leader of the organization, Fetullah Gulen, is still residing in the US.

Following the coup attempt, while on many occasions Ankara requested for the extradition of Gulen, Washington refused on the basis of lack of evidence. Meanwhile, however, Justice Minister Abdulhamit Gul has confirmed that all procedures for extradition have been completed.

Minister Gul said: “For both parties, all conditions have been fulfilled for an extradition. We now wait for the extradition.” Earlier last week the Minister had also emphasized that Washington was bound by law to extradite the terrorist.

According to the extradition treaty, which was signed in 1979 and came to force in 1981, both countries are obliged to extradite an offender which “covers offenses in both countries that are punishable by more than a year in prison.”

The treaty adds that the countries “undertake to surrender to each other… all persons who are found within the territory of the requested party and who are being prosecuted for or have been charged with an offense.”

In response to a question on whether Gulen’s Turkish citizenship would be revoked, Abdulhamit Gul said it could be possible “through a demand from the Interior Ministry and by a cabinet decision.”

On July 15, 2016 FETO criminal cult leader Fetullah Gulen, who is currently based in the U.S., orchestrated a military coup which martyred 250 people and left 2,200 injured.

While the coup failed, it is known that the terrorist organization has infiltrated Turkish state institutions, including the military, ministries, schools and universities.

Since July 15 many operations have been conducted across Turkey with the desire to free the country from the members of this criminal cult that have hidden themselves under a civil organization blanket.

Within latest efforts, an operation was launched on Thursday across 11 provinces including capital Ankara in order to arrest over 130 officials suspected of being linked to FETO.

The suspects include 101 personnel from the Finance Ministry and 32 from the Labor and Social Security Ministry.

Among the suspects, 129 had already been dismissed from duty for suspected links to the group.

In addition to the operations, on Thursday the Council of Judges and Prosecutors dismissed 39 judges and prosecutors after they were accused of being linked to FETO.

According to a source of the council, the decision was taken after a probe into digital material, including records of encrypted programs that FETO members use and information gleaned from statements and confessions of judges and prosecutors.

The encrypted program used by FETO members, ByLock, is a smartphone app which is believed to have been cracked by Turkish security agencies, allowing them to identify tens of thousands of suspected FETO supporters.

http://thenewturkey.org/feto-and-its-role-in-stoking-the-kurdish-issue/

No obstacle left for Gulen’s extradition

While domestic developments in Turkey have been focused on capturing terrorists that remain in state institutions and domestic domains, has also confirmed that there is ‘no obstacle left’ in extraditing FETO leader from the U.S.

Speaking to reporters in south-eastern Gaziantep province, on Friday Abdulhamit Gul stated: “Recently all commitments have been fulfilled according to the agreements. That is to say there is no obstacle left formally for his (Gulen’s) extradition.”

Gul confirmed that all evidence against Gulen had been sent to the U.S. authorities and that now a state under the rule of law should do what is necessary.

The minister added: “We want the U.S. to extradite the leader of the terrorist organization which has killed 250 people in Turkey, of which there is evidence and has been documented in court decisions.”

Source: AA and other agencies

While a year has passed since the July 15 coup attempt, trials, especially those in Istanbul and Ankara, are proceeding swiftly. While there are newly opened cases, there are also those that have been concluded and upheld by the Supreme Court. The leading trials in Ankara and Istanbul along with the Akıncı Airbase trial continue with the defenses of the suspects. Despite factors including the hardships faced by the judiciary due to the increased workload following the dismissal of judges, FETO’s secretive and insidious nature, negative publicity abroad and multiple threats within the country, the coup attempt is being successfully fought against in courtrooms. Cem Duran Uzun, Dr. at the Faculty of Law at Çankaya University, spoke with Dr. Hüseyin Aydın, the attorney of President Erdoğan who is observing the trials, about the status of the coup attempt trials, uncovered truths, issues that are being faced, the performance of the judiciary and the future of the trials.

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The fight against FETO will take time

Mr. Aydın, at which stage are we in coup attempt trials and the fight against FETO? Could you outline the process?

First of all, we have to distinguish the fight against FETO and the coup attempt trials chronologically. In terms of administrative and legal proceedings, the fight against FETO goes back farther than the latter. We can mention December 17-25 as the date the fight against FETO took a new dimension. In this respect, we should evaluate the period between December 17-25 and July 15 and the period following July 15 separately. The successfulness of the fight and their conception is completely different than each other. In the former, even though President Erdoğan underscored the threat posed by FETO towards the state and public and emphasized the prominence of fighting this organization within the boundaries of law, we have seen that institutions weren’t able to keep up with the political will until July 15, unfortunately.

When the fight against FETO during the period between December 17-25 and July 15 is compared with the current, it could be argued that it was less successful in producing results. The presence of FETO-member judges and prosecutors, FETO members in said institutions and their overt and covert efforts to halt these investigations caused such a result.

After the July 15 coup attempt, the intelligence organization, security forces and Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) have increased their cooperation with the judiciary and significant progress was made in FETO investigations. Today, we are seeing that legal procedures are being taken against tens of thousands of FETO suspects, thousands of investigations are being conducted and we’re even seeing some cases being upheld by the judiciary. However, looking at the bigger picture, we are currently at the beginning of this fight and there is a long legal process awaiting us; especially when we consider the secretive structuring of the organization. More cases and trials may emerge after new evidence is found. It will definitely take time.

FETO-member prosecutors fled after obfuscating evidence

Could we claim that the judiciary largely uncovered FETO and perpetrators of the coup attempt? Is the judiciary successful in this matter?

We have to give credit where it’s due. No legal procedure took place after the 1960 coup, 1971 memorandum, nor the 1980 coup. Similarly, the February 28 postmodern coup took place in the near past; at the time, instead of investigating the coup, the judiciary preferred to be the accomplice of those who realized this postmodern coup. The judiciary in Turkey has such an unfortunate tradition. In this respect, we could say that the judiciary was on its tracks; while the July 15 coup attempt was going on and its success or failure was uncertain, we saw that the judiciary started investigations on putschists in Ankara, Istanbul, İzmir and many other cities around 23:00, even issuing warrants. This was a welcome development and we have to be thankful as a nation to those members of the judiciary who took the initiative.

Coup attempt investigations are mostly complete. Now criminal cases are being conducted. Some with fewer suspects are already concluded. Moreover, a criminal case was concluded in Erzurum and was upheld by the Supreme Court. Therefore, it became definite that this was a Gülenist coup attempt with the court decision. However, there are cases with numerous suspects; these are the crucial ones. The Akıncı Airbase trial along with the Ankara and Istanbul class action suits are still going on.

Is it possible to say that we know every nook and cranny of the coup attempt, so to speak?

We cannot say that all aspects of the coup attempt have been revealed by the judiciary. There are a couple of reasons. First of all, only a very limited portion of the TSK members involved in the coup attempt became confessors. This proves to be an issue when you try to uncover certain aspects of the coup attempt.

Secondly, during the coup attempt state institutions were caught off guard and weren’t prepared for it. As the putschists were aware of this situation, we believe they may have obfuscated evidence and documents that could be used against them during the coup attempt and even on the day after. We were unable to reach a part of the sought evidence because of this mass obfuscation. For instance, we have learned that those prosecutors who investigated the Akıncı Airbase were actually FETO members and that they have fled Turkey.

As a portion of the evidence is obfuscated and confessors are limited among the putschists, it could be said that certain aspects of the coup attempt are still in the dark. However, I can clearly say that there is a clear picture about who planned the coup, who lead it, who were involved in it and how it was done. If we consider that the leader of this terrorist organization resides abroad, we can easily assume that plans for the post-coup Turkey along with the coup preparation plans are abroad. Moreover, there is most probably information that was unbeknownst even to those who were in command. In this respect, it wasn’t possible to access to the said evidence, legally speaking.

Class action suits may be finalized in 2018

As you have said, certain cases are being concluded and new ones are being opened. In your opinion, how will these class action suits in Ankara and Istanbul proceed? When will these trials reach a conclusion?

We have previously experienced trials with hundreds of suspects and we have seen that they took 15 to 20 years to reach a conclusion, while many cases were dropped because of statute of limitations. In order to not have to go through the same experience in these trials, the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK) took some precautions and judges started to practice new methods. For instance, all of the courthouses are conducting these trials without any adjournment. This isn’t a practice that you would usually see in our judiciary system. These hearings take one or two months, so that a decision could be reached in a shorter time.

HSK has taken a precaution recently. The courts which are trying the coup attempt suspects aren’t only working on a single case; they work on multiple coup attempt cases. As these courts look at all cases regarding terror and terrorism, they are working on cases about FETO, PKK, Daesh and DHKP-C. Therefore, there are numerous cases they should work on. For this reason, HSK has appointed additional staff to these courts; the additional staff will probably work on other files than the coup attempt case. This will allow the presiding judge board to focus on the coup attempt cases and conduct uninterrupted hearings. Considering all of these precautions, I believe the class action suits, including Akıncı Airbase and General Staff cases, will be resolved in 2018.

What do suspects’ statements, their defenses and behaviors such as wearing t-shirts with the word “HERO” on it account for? Is there a common FETO strategy behind these? How could the judiciary counteract these strategies?

Even though it has taken a large hit with the investigations, FETO still maintains its organizational mobility in Turkey. We can say that these suspects are following a common defense strategy. This strategy is based on several pillars.

Firstly, they deny all and just lie. As I have said before, there are a limited number of confessors; the rest of them are denying their actions even though there is clear material evidence against them. Moreover, they’re claiming that they aren’t Gülenists, attempting to acquit FETO. Most of them are saying that FETO members might be among the putschists; however, none of the suspects admit that they are members. If all suspects are acquitted for not being FETO members, it won’t be possible to legally prove that FETO convened the coup. As suspects know this, they are saying what they are saying. They are trying not to accuse each other or make statements that might be used against one of their own.

Then, in order to create the image that the organization is still standing tall, they are trying to have high spirits and morale. As our imprisonment system has prison wings, they are able to consolidate. On the other hand, keeping morale high prevents them from unraveling and discourages confessors from confessing. Indeed, we have seen certain confessors renouncing confessions. It’s not hard to foresee that some of the current confessors are doing the same. This is their strategy.

Meanwhile, the organization is taking care of families of the incarcerated. As most of the relatives of the incarcerated, especially those of the TSK, had intra-organizational marriages, there is a significant solidarity. They are helping each other. It’s not a secret that the organization is providing material and moral aid to their families. Therefore, we can say that the organization has taken every necessary precaution in order to prevent them from falling apart and panicking.

While it can be argued that parents tended to disown their own children for their actions one day after the coup, this tendency is no longer relevant; we are observing that the organization is trying to have a hold on these families. We are currently focusing on the legal procedure; yet we don’t have a policy about other aspects of this organization, such as familial relations, their social circles and cutting their ties with FETO. Therefore, we have some shortcomings in these issues. I believe institutions should work on these issues.

Suspects are denying all as they are relying on the ECHR

Will their denials and attempts to acquit FETO save them? What are their goals?

Firstly, they believe denying actions despite clear material evidence doesn’t have serious legal consequences. It’s a gleam of hope; not all of them will be saved. Yet, even if one of them is saved by just denial, it’s a gain for the organization.

Secondly, the organization isn’t only limited to Turkey; FETO is present in over 160 countries. Therefore, admitting the organization’s involvement in the coup will have significant repercussions abroad. For this reason, their denial is about saving face.

Thirdly, there is a European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) process. Even if denying won’t produce results for them in Turkish courts, they might be hoping that their denials might lead to their acquittal at the ECHR.

Fourthly, I believe that they might be denying their actions just in case, as they are calculating that a political change might take place in Turkey and hope that their acquittal will be easier in such a political climate if they don’t admit anything.

Could it also be about projecting a strong and united image to their members abroad, encouraging them to stay together?

Indeed, let me provide an example. The organization’s civil administrator Kemal Batmaz didn’t say with whom he was staying on the night of the coup on purpose. However, he said the following: “Even if my statement or his testimony can save me, I won’t give his name. Even if I were to be executed or imprisoned for a lifetime, I won’t give his name.” He is a civil administrator of the organization; what he is saying is a message to all FETO members. I deliberately asked him whether he was encouraging other suspects to stay silent and not give names. He replied “Don’t evoke a thought that I wasn’t thinking of.” Nevertheless, the message was clear. Keeping a high morale and keeping the organization intact is what FETO members prioritize.

It’s not possible to block FETO’s concealed messages

There is an anger towards the putschists from all segments of society, regardless of their relation with those who were martyred or wounded on the night of the coup. They demand these putschists to be tried and punished swiftly. What are the duties of society, politicians and the media during these trials?

We have to agree that these are challenging trials for the judges, as well. Investigating a coup and putting the putschists on trial is unprecedented for our country. The judiciary never had the courage before. Considering all these challenges, we as the people have to be respectful to the legal procedure and contribute to the trials for a swift conclusion. Meanwhile, the principle of fair trial, a prominent component of international agreements and our legal procedure, is as important as the swiftness of the result. If we disregard this principle and allow misconduct, this might cause us to lose our righteous position because of a technicality. In order to avoid this possibility, we have to be patient and allow the trials to be conducted in the way they should be.

You have mentioned that these suspects act with a strategy and we have spoken about how they continue to communicate with each other. Is it possible to block their communications in prisons, preventing them from encouraging each other and showing resistance in trials? Can we talk about negligence, in this regard?

First of all, we should clarify that any person who is trained in the ways of such an organization would know how to act without any communication. Therefore, cutting their communications wouldn’t and won’t produce a completely different outcome. Such expectations are not realistic, as we’re talking about an organizational training that has transformed into a lifestyle.

What could’ve been done that wasn’t? We have a certain imprisonment system. This isn’t the first time that somebody is being tried according to Article 309 of Turkish Penal Code. Imprisonment doesn’t mean conviction. In this respect, the imprisoned have certain rights and you can’t just infringe your own laws. Visits from relatives, open and private conversations and legal advice are some of the said rights. Moreover, they can still relay concealed messages during these conversations. As you know, the organization has a system of concealed messages. For this reason, they don’t need to relay messages in an open way. This mustn’t be disregarded.

On the other hand, it’s not possible to keep all suspects apart from each other, both legally and technically. Prominent figures are being held in single rooms; however, this isn’t possible for all. We have a wing system in our prisons; there are 6-person, 8-person, 10-person and 16-person rooms. This system, therefore, becomes an advantage for them in terms of communications and solidarity. In addition, there are 485 suspects and they’re all in a mass trial, sitting next to each other and listening to what others are saying. Moreover, in our trials, the most prominent suspect’s name is the first in an indictment and our courts hear their defenses first. This prominent suspect’s statement and his/her defense style are a message to the rest. Therefore, it’s not possible to block open or conceal messages neither legally nor technically.

Civil and military administrators captured at Akıncı Airbase

Civil administrators of FETO have given their statements first at the Akıncı Airbase trial; a trial that you have been observing closely. Now, military suspects are defending themselves. What are some of the most striking details or information that you have heard during the trial?

There are striking details about civil administrators of the organization. First of all, all of them have worked at Kaynak Holding and its subsidiaries. They have FETO in their past. Moreover, most of them have relatives that are members of FETO. On the other hand, all of them were captured near the village of Akıncılar. Some claimed they were looking for land to buy; however, it’s not a suitable place to look for land. Others have said they were there, at 08:00 in the morning, to shoot a documentary about animal husbandry, while some claim they were there for a social event.

In terms of profiles, civil administrators are completely different from each other. All of their skills are complementary. For instance, we can say Kemal Batmaz has a great command of FETO’s ideology and terminology; thus, he has internalized the core principles of the organization. He is possibly FETO’s imam of Air Force. Nurettin Oruç seems more of an average person; however, uncovered evidence suggest that he is the imam of Gendarmerie. Moreover, Oruç’s connections in Germany are intriguing. Hakan Çiçek, on the other hand, looks like a people’s person. He’s seemingly a Kemalist and he’s not breaking his character even during trials. His U.S. connections and visitations are also intriguing. Aside from going to Pennsylvania, where FETO’s leader Fetullah Gülen resides, he seems to have visited other places for other reasons.

We believe Harun Biniş prepared the technical infrastructure of the putschist command, established their communications with others abroad and procured necessary equipment. Thus, we believe him to be the one who set up communications with Fetullah Gülen and prepared the technical infrastructure for the coordination of the coup. He is an electrical and electronic engineer that graduated from Bilkent University and he is an arrested suspect in the “Wiretapping Encrypted Telephones” case.

So, they have complemented each other and managed the coup attempt in coordination?

We can definitely say that. For instance, Hakan Çiçek isn’t your average person; he was managing the canteen at Fetullah Gülen’s FEM Preparatory School in Altunizade, Istanbul. He has been in the organization for a long time. Moreover, it was later found out that that very same preparatory school was where the young TSK personnel paid homage to FETO, especially those who have recently became lieutenants. There is such a connection. We can assume that Hakan Çiçek has continued to be in touch with these military personnel who have became members to the organization.

Witness testimonies suggest that there were more civil administrators at Akıncı Airbase. Is this possible?

It’s very probable. Some have mentioned numbers around 20-30 or even 40-50. However, some of these civil administrators may have been military personnel with civilian clothing; there are witness testimonies suggesting this. Nevertheless, we can say that there were more than just 5 civil administrators at the Akıncı Airbase on the night of the coup attempt; it is possible to assume that there were lower ranking civil administrators at the military base. Some of them have fled and we’re seeing that they all didn’t go in the same direction. Those who went to Akıncılar village were captured, while those went to separate directions may have fled.

Who are the more prominent military administrators of the coup attempt? Who were involved in its planning and application?

If we’re to speak about Akıncı Airbase, Chief of General Staff Hulusi Akar was greeted by four figures when he arrived at the airbase: Kubilay Selçuk, Ömer Faruk Harmancık, Hakan Evrim and Mehmet Dişli. Mehmet Dişli arrived there together with Akar. Then, Akın Öztürk came to the airbase. These were the people who surrounded Akar. Moreover, Akın Öztürk clearly says that Mehmet Dişli, Ömer Faruk Harmancık, Kubilay Selçuk and Hakan Evrim were putschists and claims that he has been trying to persuade them not to carry out the coup attempt. Therefore, these five figures are important. On the other hand, there were others on that night who were at the military base, coordinating the coup in other cities. Osman Kılıç is one of them; he’s being tried in the “Assassination Attempt of  President” case.

A figure we have scarcely heard of.

Kılıç is a prominent figure and an influential colonel. Similarly, Muzaffer Düzenli was at the Akıncı Airbase, coordinating the putschists in Istanbul. Gökhan Sönmezateş, who coordinated the operation in Muğla, is also a crucial figure. Mehmet Partigöç, who has signed the martial law decisions, is a very important figure. We believe that Partigöç was one of the brains behind this coup attempt, assessing his behavior at the court and his files. We can say that these are the higher-ranking figures.

No data to support “controlled coup” allegations

We know from the indictment that serious preparations were made for the coup attempt. How was the coup attempt thwarted despite these preparations? According to what data does the opposition allege this was a “controlled coup”?

First, we have to clarify that this coup wasn’t foreseen by the government. There was a lack of intelligence.

So, there are administrative and informative mistakes.

We may argue whether there were such mistakes. The second thing I want to emphasize is that intelligence was received on the day the coup took place. Once again, we may ask whether precautions taken after this intelligence were adequate or not. However, the allegation of a controlled coup implies that there is a force that commands and there is another force that is being commanded. Those who make this allegation aren’t overt about what they are saying. Yet, it is clear that they are claiming the coup was commanded by President Erdoğan and that the commanded forces were Gülenists. This is an irrational suggestion, as the coup targeted President Erdoğan. It’s not a secret that FETO is hostile to Erdoğan; the organization’s leader and members have been very clear about this. Would an organization hostile to Erdoğan submit their forces to him and allow him to mastermind a coup for his own benefit? Secondly, in order to support this allegation, you have to establish concrete relations between President Erdoğan and those who administered the coup attempt. As this is impossible and there is no evidence, this theory isn’t even mentioned in the files.

No concrete data, document, information or even suspect statements.

Exactly. Just by considering these two facts, it’s not possible to make such an allegation. They’re just interpreting, so to speak, the outcomes of the coup attempt and this is a faulty approach. Because the coup attempt failed, it has repercussions for the organization. Yet, those who planned this coup didn’t believe it would fail; they believed they would succeed. In this respect, we have to seek an answer for the following question: “If it was successful, who would benefit from it?” On the other hand, some are alleging that it was planned to fail right from the start. This isn’t true, not in any way. Looking at the evidence, we can say that it was a near perfect plan.

There are several factors which made the coup attempt a failure. Firstly, there was intelligence on an operation to the National Intelligence Organization (MİT). This was regarded as part of a larger plan and certain precautions, including flight restrictions, were taken by the General Staff. These precautions caused the putschists to think that the coup was uncovered and they decided to act earlier. The coup that was planned to start at 03:00 was rescheduled to 20:00-21:00. This rescheduling caused issues with the planning and its application.

After these, they failed to capture or kill President Erdoğan along with Prime Minister Yıldırım. In this respect, their failure is due to rescheduling. If the coup started at 03:00, they might’ve been successful. On the other hand, President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Yıldırım calling people to take the streets and resist the putschists was also an important factor. This wouldn’t be possible at 03:00. However, rescheduling the coup caused all plans to go awry for them and they were forced to make new plans. These plans were faulty and caused the failure of the coup. Therefore, claiming that the coup was rigged for failure right from the beginning is nothing but a farce.

Lastly, I want to ask: what should we do to explain the coup attempt trials better both in Turkey and abroad? Also, would you want to add anything?

First of all, as a nation, we have thwarted a serious attack on July 15. Only a few nations could have achieved this. Therefore, we have to be aware of the gravity of what we have achieved. This will allow us to see that we can overpower this organization. The fight against FETO is going well; the possibility of this organization reestablishing itself in Turkey and becoming a threat to our nation and state is largely removed.

Our people shouldn’t despair in this fight. We have achieved great things and I believe these achievements will lead to new achievements for our state and our people. This fight concerns all; it’s not only President Erdoğan’s or the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) cause. Regardless of political outlooks, it’s the fight of all citizens in Turkey. We have to put our differences, ideologies and political outlooks aside. No one should forget that this organization wouldn’t have been allowing any dissidents to exist, if they had been successful.

The Turkish government had commenced to negotiate with the PKK in order to resolve the most prominent issue that it inherited since the very first years of the Republic: the “Kurdish issue”. As a result of Erdoğan’s initiative in 2009, negotiations between the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and the PKK started. After a while, transcripts of proceedings between MIT and the PKK in Oslo were published in a daily. At the time, nobody knew that these were leaked by FETO, which had infiltrated the state and established a parallel structure over 40 years. Only two things were known about this organization then: firstly, it was a religious congregation with a significant financial power that opened schools all around the world and possessed multiple media outlets and business associations. Secondly, they had racist tendencies towards Kurds that were made apparent by their media outlets and speeches by Fetullah Gülen.

Known for being comparatively more sensitive towards Islam than western parts of Turkey, not many in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions really liked Gülen’s congregation due to their racist tendencies. Moreover, the majority of Kurds who still preserved the medrese and dergah traditions (traditional educational and religious institutions) inherited from the Ottomans didn’t perceive the said congregation as “religious” and didn’t find its leader’s residence in the US ordinary. Even though FETO infiltrated the bureaucracy, military and universities in the region, they were only able to gain a few followers among the people.

On February 7, 2012, during the early hours of the day, a news flash: Istanbul’s Specially Authorized Prosecutor Sadrettin Sarıkaya who was conducting an investigation into the PKK-linked KCK organization, requested MIT Undersecretary Hakan Fidan to come to the courthouse on Thursday. I have to repeat this as it isn’t a situation that could be comprehended at the first. Try to think of this event occurring in the UK. The then Prime Minister Erdoğan and his government initiates a reconciliation and peace process and a prosecutor in Istanbul calls the head of MIT to the courthouse as a suspect!

http://thenewturkey.org/fetos-civil-administrators-and-their-trips-abroad-before-the-coup-attempt/

Istanbul’s Specially Authorized Prosecutor Sadrettin Sarıkaya personally called MIT Undersecretary Hakan Fidan, former Undersecretary Emre Taner, former Deputy Undersecretary Afet Güneş and two other former MIT employees and demanded they give statements as a part of the KCK investigations. The prosecutor was accusing Fidan and his colleagues of having committed a crime for being part of the negotiations with the PKK in Oslo. There was another interesting situation. On the same day, the Prime Minister was in Istanbul to undergo a medical operation, which the public did not know about. However, due to security concerns, the time of the operation was changed. For this reason, when Hakan Fidan called the Prime Minister he was able to talk with him. Erdoğan sensed something foul about the situation and told Fidan not to go to the courthouse and give a statement. Even though Erdoğan said on TV after the incident, “They would first arrest the head of MIT and then me. I had authorized the head of MIT. So, they should personally call me to the courthouse”, nobody – with the exception of those who were interested in the Kurdish issue – cared much about this statement. It was widely known that the prosecutor was close to FETO. However, the incident was perceived by many as the group’s exaggerated sensitivity towards the Kurdish issue rather than a Gülenist attack on Erdoğan and the state.

The Gezi Park incidents in June 2013 followed this event. The protests were initially started by people whose concerns were environmental and who objected to a construction project that was to take place in a park in Taksim. Yet, it didn’t stay as a protest by environmentalists. After a little while Kemalists, later joined by the Alevis, joined the protests alleging that “their lifestyle was under threat.” It became apparent that FETO had a finger in this incident. Gülen and his organization tried to provoke the protesters with their associates within the police force through the use of violence. Zekeriya Öz, a fugitive Gülenist and a former prosecutor, tweeted the following on this subject: “If the PKK had participated in the Gezi Park protests, those who are governing now wouldn’t be in their seats. I don’t know who ordered them, but the PKK didn’t join.”

There were other prominent Gülenists that were trying to spark new conflicts by provoking the protesters that were completely organized over social media. For instance, a renowned Gülenist fugitive Emre Uslu, who now lives in the US, tweeted that PKK militants turned a car over which had female passengers with headscarves in Maltepe, Istanbul (however, such an event didn’t transpire). Efforts to evolve street protests into a civil war through constant provocations were apparent. While Gülen’s media outlets openly supported the Gezi Park protests, the Gülenists changed their tune towards the end when a group in İzmir vandalized their school. Participating in the Gezi Park protests with various reasons and motives, the majority of the youth seemed unaware of this effort to exploit the situation.

We started to hear that a new wave of street protests similar to the Gezi Park protests were to take place in November. These could’ve been just a rumor, of course. Still, I had heard this from an academic who lived in the US and from a journalist that had ties with FETO. The Gülenist journalist had said “I don’t know if 10 or 15 soldiers will be killed, but something will happen and Erdoğan will go.”

6 months after the Gezi Park protests, on January 9, 2013, three women including Sakine Cansız, who was one of the founders of the PKK and who supported the peace process, were killed at the Kurdish Information Bureau in Paris. These killings took place right after the government announced that they were negotiating with Abdullah Öcalan for the resolution of the Kurdish issue. This incident pitted the two sides against each other. It was a sensitive and fragile issue as after all there were negotiations with a terrorist organization and the Turkish public’s top enemy Abdullah Öcalan. The person who was caught by French security forces had a trace of gunpowder on his coat. His name was announced as Ömer Güney. According to the information gathered from the French security forces, Güney was close with the terrorist organization to an extent that he could be deemed a PKK sympathizer. This information consolidated the theories that it was an intra-organizational execution. There was great outrage and this outrage poured onto the street. The funeral of Cansiz in Diyarbakır was attended by tens of thousands of people.

Eleven months after the murder, the December 17-25 operation that was conducted by the Gülenists within the judiciary, security forces and media aiming to depose the government with the accusation that it was corrupt took place. For the first time, regardless of their political views, all witnessed and became aware of the intimidating operational capacity of FETO. During those days, Gülenist media outlets started to spread disinformation that MIT was responsible for the murder in Paris. Moreover, they alleged that Ömer Güney was actually a member of MIT. Yet, almost nobody cared about this subject as there were more pressing issues present.

In January 2014, PKK-affiliate KCK stated that the murder of the three women was carried out by FETO’s members within the state and that Ömer Güney was actively engaged with Gülenists. Ömer Güney, who was to be tried after a two-year long investigation by the Paris Prosecutor’s Office, was taken to a hospital for an ailment in his brain. In January, just one month before his trial, he died. It was later discovered that Ömer Güney was visited by three individuals from Turkey and that those individuals were FETO members.

Then, the terrible event known as the Kobane incident took place. Using Daesh’s attack on Kobane and the alleged inaction by Turkey as excuses, the leader of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) Selahattin Demirtaş and his colleagues called for countrywide streets protests on October 7. I said to myself “this must be the second Gezi Park protest that was being discussed.” Protesters built barricades and engaged with the security forces. 50 died and 682, 139 of them police officers, were wounded. 1,113 buildings, including 25 district governor offices, 67 police headquarters and 29 political party offices, were damaged.

One of FETO’s media outlets, Zaman Daily’s Editor-in-Chief Ekrem Dumanlı visiting Diyarbakır’s Mayor Gülten Kışanak and their open support for HDP while the aforementioned events were taking place were intriguing. When news of the visits by HDP deputy Ahmet Türk and former HDP deputy Nazmi Gür’s paid to Fetullah Gülen in 2014 in Pennsylvania was heard, it astonished many. There were many news pieces on FETO providing intelligence to the PKK and deciphering the code names of state operatives within the PKK. How the PKK dug trenches in many cities, especially in Diyarbakır, in order to start a war despite the people’s objections was made clear after the July 15 coup attempt. The FETO-member military officers and pilots bombed the Parliament with F-16s that flew from Diyarbakır. FETO militants did whatever they could to both provoke the public and enable the PKK.

Two years after these events two HDP deputies, one of them in prison, made two statements. These two statements are unprecedented, considering HDP’s disposition in the last two years. In his interview with journalist Ruşen Çakır, HDP deputy Sırrı Süreyya Önder said the following: “October 6-8 Kobane events might have never taken place, because the ‘prevalent state perspective’ [AK Party] was foreseeing solidarity with Kobane. I will be extremely clear about this; the said solidarity was obstructed by FETO-affiliated generals whose roles in the July 15 coup attempt is apparent. They put an extreme pressure on Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. Now, generals who commanded the units in Sur, Nusaybin and Cizre are being tried as the perpetrators of the coup attempt. I have seen how these generals obstructed the solidarity between Turkey and Kobane-Rojava.”

Accused of “being a member of a terrorist organization,” “inciting to commit crime” and “inciting the public to unlawful meeting and demonstration,” HDP deputy Ayhan Bilgen made a similar statement very recently during the session of his trial at Diyarbakır 5^th Heavy Penal Court:

“October 6-8 was a demonstration of a civil war in this country. Who incited these conflicts must be investigated thoroughly. It should be investigated whether these were the same people who wanted to depose the elected government on July 15.”

The fog of war is slowly fading, yet unfortunately it isn’t possible to talk about a social base that would support the reiteration of a peace process, not in the short-term. FETO is an important component of this issue and so is the PKK. How these two terrorist organizations came together after years and their role in all that transpired must also be taken into account.

On July 20, 2016, five days after the July 15 coup attempt, a state of emergency was declared in Turkey and has been further extended by the Parliament every three months since the coup attempt upon the demand of the Cabinet on the grounds of ongoing terror attacks and the state’s fight against the Fetullah Gülen Terror Group (FETO). The state of emergency enables the state to eliminate those threats and risks that could not be overcome under ordinary rules of law. As part of the emergency powers, state authorities are extended and fundamental rights and liberties are restricted compared to the ordinary period. Article 15 of the 1982 Constitution, which regulates restricting fundamental rights in states of emergency was borrowed from Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Therefore, Turkey’s legislation on state of emergency powers are in line with the standards of democratic states of law.

In a state of emergency, the Cabinet is vested with the authority to issue decree laws according to the final paragraph of Article 121 of the Constitution. Throughout the state of emergency declared following the July 15 coup attempt, a total of 26 decree laws have been issued. Within the scope of the decree laws, the civil servants affiliated with FETO have been dismissed from profession with an aim to purge FETO cliques from the public institutions. Also, the educational institutions, dormitories, healthcare facilities, media organizations, associations and foundations affiliated with or financed by FETO have been shut down.

According to the Constitution, the state of emergency decrees are accessible to all sorts of judicial review; however, Article 148 of the Constitution rules that a lawsuit cannot be filed in the Constitutional Court regarding the state of emergency decrees. The Constitutional Court refused the lawsuit filed by the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) on grounds of this provision. As a result, administrative objection means were clogged for the civil servants discharged and the institutions shut down as part of the decrees while their possibility of resorting to jurisdiction was also removed. With an aim to monitor the actions taken as part of the decree laws and upon the discussions questioning the review of the decisions, it was decided to establish an investigation Commission on the state of emergency decrees on January 23, 2017.

According to the decree law, the Commission consists of seven members elected from judges, prosecutors and public officials by the Prime Minister, Justice Minister, the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors, the Supreme Court of Appeals and the Council of State. Elected among senior bureaucrats, most of whom are judges, the Commission members were finalized on May 16. Selahaddin Menteş, the Deputy Secretary of the Justice Ministry, was elected as the chairman of the Commission.

Given that the number of files required to be examined by the Commission is more than 100,000, a secretariat and a group of assisting personnel were required within the Commission. Over the course of a long period since the decree on the establishment of the Commission was issued, all the preliminary works and preparations were completed. Around 200 personnel including rapporteurs, experts and officials were assigned to the service of the Commission, which is composed of seven members. The Military Court of Cassation office, which was shut down with a constitutional amendment, was allocated for the Commission.

http://thenewturkey.org/fetos-civil-administrators-and-their-trips-abroad-before-the-coup-attempt/

According to the manifest on the decree laws and their subsequently published rules of procedures, the Commission is to operate for two years, which can be extended if required. The application period is sixty days as of July 17, 2017, the date when the Commission started to accept applications, or as of the date when a new proceeding is conducted. The Commission can demand all kinds of data and documents it needs from relevant institutions and issues its decisions based on these files. The Commission decisions are fulfilled by the relevant state offices without any delay. Annulment actions can be filed against the Commission decisions in certain administrative courts in Ankara determined by the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors.

The establishment of the Commission has enabled the filing of both judicial and administrative applications regarding the state of emergency decrees. The main problem with regard to the proceedings conducted within the state of emergency decree laws was the absence of the possibility of objecting to them and that they were not reviewable. With the establishment of the Commission, the means to object to and monitor the proceedings were provided.

Throughout the state of emergency period, some occasional allegations of unjust treatment were made in the context of the fight against FETO and it was further claimed that the proceedings were abused to settle personal or political accounts. Thanks to the Commission, such claims and requests will be examined. Although it is suggested that every institution must monitor the decisions issued within itself instead of a central Commission, which will assure coherent and standardized implementations. In so doing, all the proceedings regarding one particular subject across the country will be examined by one centralized unit and the principles adopted with the Commission decisions will be a precedent for all the other institutions fighting against FETO. In other words, a uniform implementation will be ensured across the country, which will avert arbitrary decisions according to persons or institutions.

The establishment of the Commission also paves the way for judicial review alongside the administrative monitoring. After the Commission issues a decision, a person can file a lawsuit to an administrative court or the Council of State to object to the decision. Following the administrative procedures, they can file an individual application to the Constitutional Court and ultimately to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In so doing, a full-scale judicial review can be executed.

The assignment of only one administrative court in Ankara for the subject is criticized in terms of the natural judge principle. However, entitling only one court for the Commission decisions will enable stare decisis. The same court will be able to issue decisions by taking previous decisions in similar situations into account and prevent different implementations. Besides, a similar practice was adopted for the formerly established compensation commissions, which the ECHR did not regard as a breach of convention.

The investigation Commission on the state of emergency decrees is not a court but an administrative body. Therefore, the members of the Commission were appointed by the Prime Ministry, Justice Ministry and judicial institutions. So, the Commission cannot be expected to consist of completely independent and impartial judges. Still, the majority of the appointed members are judges. The objective of the Commission is to swiftly investigate the state of emergency proceedings through administrative mechanisms before they are litigated and to rectify the faults.

Before the Commission began to work, thousands of applications were already filed both in the Constitutional Court and the ECHR. The ECHR rejected the applications filed to itself with a decision issued on June 12, 2017, referring them to the State of Emergency Commission, which is a domestic remedy that must be exhausted before applying to the ECHR. Likewise, the Constitutional Court demanded the petitions it had on the subject to be referred to the Commission and the exhaustion of judicial procedures.

This Commission is not an unprecedented body for Turkey. Previously, two individual commissions were established to swiftly deal with the violations of rights through administrative means, both of which operated successfully for years. The first one was the “Counter-Terrorism Damage Assessment Commission” founded in 2004, while the other one was named “Human Rights Compensation Commission.” Both commissions were established through similar methods and members and recognized as effective domestic remedies by the ECHR.

When all the preparations and similar past experiences regarding the establishment of the Commission are considered, the negative campaign against the Commission through arguing that it deems to fail before it actually gets to work, is not helpful. Turkey’s fight against FETO and the purge of this terror group members from the state offices are vital for the country. The Commission is going to play an important role in ensuring that the fight on terror is carried out in accordance with the law and that the mistakes made during the process are being corrected. At this very initial stage, therefore, the Commission should be given time and support.

On 15^th of July 2016, a coup attempt was foiled in Turkey that was allegedly carried out by the Fetullah Gülen Terrror Group (FETO), led by Fetullah Gülen, the cult leader living in the US. Indeed, the group’s bad record on democracy is not new. Previously Gülen had openly supported the September 12, 1980 military coup with his article “Son Karakol” (“The Last Outpost”) published in the Sızıntı Magazine on October 1, 1980 – the first FETO publication that began in 1979. During the post-modern military coup of February 28, 1997, which targeted Necmettin Erbakan, the Prime Minister of Turkey and the leader of the Welfare Party, Gülen presented the pro-military Hürriyet daily with the headline: “You botched, just submit”. However, this attitude was interpreted by many as an effort by the group to establish a good relationship with the “real” authority in the country, rather than interpreting it as a sign of the group’s tendency to overtake the whole military institution to rule over the country. The group was going to try a military coup nearly two decades after, but this time by themselves.

During the coup attempt, FETO employed its civil administrators, called imams, who functioned under a strict organizational hierarchy that enabled them to exercise effective control over its affiliated state personnel. These imams were appointed as supervisors to various judges, prosecutors, military and police officers, who submitted to their commands. Hierarchical statuses of imams over these personnel were determined according to their closeness to Fetullah Gülen, to whom supernatural powers were attributed.

The Role of Civil Administrators in the Planning of the Coup

The most extensive indictment on the July 15 coup attempt, the Akıncı Indictment classifies the civilians at the Akıncı Airbase, the headquarters of the coup attempt, into two categories: “Civilian Suspects” and “Civilian Administrator Suspects”. Fetullah Gülen, Adil Öksüz, Kemal Batmaz, Hakan Çiçek, Nurettin Oruç and Harun Biniş are named as civil administrator suspects. Civil administrator suspects were caught together with the military personnel at the Akıncı Airbase on the morning of July 16, 2016.

These figures were caught on security footage and there are testimonies about their presence at the airbase. They are purported to have dictated who was going where, which actions were to be taken and which targets were to be attacked with helicopters and warplanes carrying high-ranking officers at the mess of the 143^rd Fleet at Akıncı Airbase. Hakan Çiçek, a suspect, has accepted that he was present at Akıncı Airbase, claiming that he was invited there for a social event by Commander Ahmet Özçetin, who is another suspect of this case. According to the indictment, they were actively involved in the preparation of the coup.

Testimonies recorded in the indictments state that the coup was planned at secret meetings led by Adil Öksüz, who was to inform Gülen about these meetings. Öksüz is claimed to have organized meetings abroad as well. Along with confessions and testimonies, the embankment analysis and flight records of Öksüz support these claims. Adil Öksüz is among the most prominent names in FETO and among the closest persons to Gülen. Demonstrating their relationship, investigations have revealed that there is footage in which Öksüz was sitting in Gülen’s chair, with a group of children as an audience.

http://thenewturkey.org/evidences-in-feto-indictments/

Deeming the November 1 election results as a threat to their existence, FETO rented a three-story villa in Konutkent, Ankara through the Empati Consultancy Company on November 9, 2015. According to witness statements in the indictments, coup preparation meetings were held at this house with the participation of FETO-affiliated Turkish Armed Forces officers on the following dates: December 27, 2015; January 9, 2016; January 16, 2016; January 30, 2016; February 20, 2016; February 29, 2016; March 14, 2016; March 30, 2016; May 5, 2016; May 27, 2016; June 4, 2016; June 15, 2016.

Attending the last meeting on July 9, 2016, Lieutenant Colonel Turgay Sökmen asserted that “a coup preparation with the participation of all forces was underway, that he would continue his work where he was going and that there weren’t any issues”. Öksüz led the prayer before the meeting and spoke on religious subjects. In one of his speeches, he said that “one of the first things to do on July 15 was to free [FETO] members out of the prisons they are incarcerated with the forces that was tasked with this duty”. In another speech, he said “my friends, I have just spoken with our elder [Fetullah Gülen], he sends his regards to all of you. I will be leaving for Istanbul on Saturday or Sunday and then will go abroad. If everything is fine, I will be seeing our elder on Tuesday and will return here on Wednesday or Thursday”.

Rear Admiral Halil İbrahim Yıldız, talking about the same meetings, said that there were some preparation meetings in Ankara and that Northern Sea Area Commander Read Admiral Ömer Faruk Harmancık told him that there was an almost-finished coup plan. Moreover, Harmancık told Yıldız that the plan was to be carried out on either July 15 or 22. According to Yıldız’s statements, during the meeting that Öksüz was present, it was asserted that the coup would take place after 03:00 o’clock. After this, Harmancık told Öksüz that everything was ready and Öksüz suggested he go to the US in order to show the coup plan to Fetullah Gülen in person. There are many testimonies and statements from both suspects and witnesses validating the roles of FETO member civil administrators during the coup preparation process.

Three Important Trips Abroad

There are three important trips abroad by civilian suspects at the same date during the process of preparation for the coup. Suspect Harun Biniş was unable to make these trips as he was being tried at the Ankara 2^nd Heavy Penal Court under the charge of illegal wiretapping for FETO/Paralel Devlet Yapılanması (PDY).

The first trip was undertaken when Öksüz, after the first coup preparation meeting on December 27, 2015, travelled to the United Kingdom on December 31. It seems that Batmaz was also in the UK, meanwhile, Hakan Çiçek and Nurettin Oruç were in Germany at that time. It is possible to surmise that they were feeling the pulse of FETO members in other countries right after the coup preparation meeting.

Secondly, after the meeting on March 14, 2016, there was a trip abroad between March 17-21, 2016. Besides FETO administrators Öksüz, Oruç, Çiçek and Batmaz, the highest-ranking suspect General Akın Öztürk’s son-in-law Lieutenant Colonel Hakan Karakuş also joined this travel. Following this travel to the US, it was observed that on the very same day, March 21, 2016, Gülen wore a khaki robe reminiscent of military uniforms and relayed the information on the coup with a secret message embedded in his statement published on the website www.herkul.org

http://thenewturkey.org/the-gulen-cult-between-modernism-and-narcissism/

Lastly, two days before the coup attempt, between July 11 and 13, Batmaz and Öksüz travelled to the US on the same plane. This travel is confirmed by entrance-exit analysis and flight records, and it was right before the coup took place. Witness statements assert that the date and hour of the coup approved by Gülen was at 03:00 on July 16. Plane tickets and the security footage also confirm this.

Beside these three important trips, Batmaz has 9 trips coinciding with other coup suspects and 7 of them with Adil Öksüz. Moreover, all civil administrator suspects, including Batmaz, claim that they do not know each other and that this is nothing but a coincidence. This is believed to have been a common tactic utilized by the accused suspects to hide their links to the organization.

Indeed, the footage of Batmaz and Öksüz at the airport two days before the coup shows the following: Batmaz leaving the plane and waiting for Öksüz to leave the plane, then both come together and Batmaz coming towards Öksüz while Öksüz is checking his baggage, talking with each other while walking, Batmaz looking at his back (probably to check whether they are being followed), exiting the airport and walking across the road together. Yet, even though Batmaz accepts that it is him on the footage, he claims he does not know Öksüz; moreover, he states that he does not remember some 925 phone calls he had with Adil Öksüz.

The trips, relationships, meetings and other evidence are strong enough to prove FETO members’ finger in the coup attempt, whereas the false denials of this evidence just functions as another form of evidence, which shows how the group members still continue to utilize a common tactic to escape punishment.

While the July 15 coup attempt and the immediate aftermath produced a unified synergy in favor of democracy, in the year since then this has not been the case. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) in particular initially stated they were against all kinds of coups, yet lately they have made certain unjustifiable allegations that could cast a shadow on the process of uncovering the truth about the night of July 15, 2016.

The most obvious indication of a unified anti-coup synergy was the spontaneous reaction by Turkish politicians on July 15 and July 16, and the Yenikapı Demonstration on August 7. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım and the Chairman of Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Devlet Bahçeli announced that they were never-ending advocators of democracy in all circumstances. CHP Chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu also made similar strong statements against the coup attempt. The main catalyst for this active resistance against the coup attempt was in fact the message conveyed by President Erdoğan via Face Time that night, when he called for a unified national reaction.

The next day, all politicians formed a more unified nationalist stance against the coup attempt. Chief of the General Staff Hulusi Akar too attended parliament at the moment, and was an indispensable component of this anti-coup bloc. In the session, the Chief of the Parliament İsmail Kahraman said “our national anthem is our manifesto and we are all united nation.” Prime Minister Yıldırım said “all those who are involved in the coup attempt are traitors, regardless of their military ranks” after thanking all political politicians for their support. Kılıçdaroğlu said “this is definitely a coup attempt against our Republic and our traditions.” Bahçeli too said that “with the coup attempt, coup collaborators embedded into the Turkish army were identified and clarified.” HDP Chairman Selahattin Demirtaş was not able to attend the parliamentary talks as he was out of the Ankara; however, HDP spokesman İdris Baluken asserted that they were against all kinds of military coups.

The most critical aspects of a joint declaration passed then by the four political parties’ was: “the condemnation of the coup attack against the people and the parliament” and “the protection of the national will by four main political parties in spite of their political differences.” Namely, high political tension among political parties before the coup attempt transformed into a unified national stance against the coup, especially in the first days.

In this atmosphere, the Yenikapı bloc was formed not only by political parties but also by the people, who came from various ideological segments of the society. The most prominent aspect of the Yenikapı bloc was the sharp stance against all kinds of coups and a clarity about the identities and aims of the perpetrators. A national stance, one that included the cooperation of civil and military institutions, soon emerged against FETO, whose mafia-like organization and illegal actions were uncovered. Unfortunately, this unity started to crumble in a short period of time. After the national declaration at the parliament, politicians reiterated anti-coup messages for days; however, the CHP and HDP’s hesitant disposition in this matter distanced them from their initial political reflexes.

The Yenikapı Demonstration on August 7 was organized as the second platform to demonstrate national unity against the coup attempt, after the first one in parliament on July 16. Yet, the HDP was the first to stay out of this second unified platform. Demirtaş made unjustifiable accusations about the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) involvement in the coup, both while he was in Turkey and abroad. Hence, the HDP once again fell into the trap of illegal activities, just like it had with its treatment of Kurdish politics, with its disposition towards the coup attempt. Idris Baluken’s tweet: “AKP-CHP-MHP partnership isn’t new; it’s an alliance against Kurds since June 7 with the excuse of the survival of the state and fight against terrorism” was the confirmation and declaration of the HDP’s excluding itself from the anti-coup alliance. The HDP’s absence at the Yenikapı Demonstration was also a sign of their unsustainable image in the new path of Turkish politics.

On the other hand, the CHP Chairman Kılıçdaroğlu declined to attend the Yenikapı Demonstration initially, saying “Erdoğan tried to increase his political influence on the people through criticizing the opposition party.” However, after Erdoğan and Yıldırım’s insistence, the CHP chairman changed his mind saying “we will attend the Yenikapı demonstration for the same reason we were at the parliament on the night of the coup attempt.” At the same time, he underlined that he would continue to be a legal part of the Turkish politics by accepting the invitation. The MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli announced that they were against the coup attempt, and beyond taking part in the demonstration, they also supported the government in these difficult days without wavering.  Bahçeli maintained his stable political stance behind the AK Party during the Yenikapı Demonstration and during the constitutional referendum campaign. The MHP saw itself as an important proponent of the political and institutional change the AK Party wanted to see in Turkey.

As a part of his “No” campaign in the lead up to the 16 April referendum, and a part of his general “anti-Erdoğan” campaign, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu tried again to discuss unproven speculative details of the coup attempt in the public sphere and thus he took unexpected risks both socially and politically. CHP politicians abused clear evidences of the coup attempt for their inter-party politics. By reiterating claims first made by Fetullah Gülen that “the coup was planned and controlled,” the CHP’s view converged with that of FETO.

These statements by Kılıçdaroğlu became a signal of just how marginalized he had become from the national political scene. In order to counteract Erdoğan’s politics, Kılıçdaroğlu started to voice uncertain statements that downplayed the treacherous and violent aspects of the coup attempt. Abstaining from the anti-coup bloc thus was a calculated political mistake, and the balance of national unity was tipped against the HDP and CHP politicians who involved themselves in that alliance.

In the CHP’s report on the July 15 Coup Attempt, the expression “controlled coup” was reiterated. These implications and disinformation about the coup attempt have created a controversial discourse that is also harmful to the fight against these kinds of illegal bloody attacks. In any case, these allegations circulated by the CHP did not bear fruit, and were seen by the public as more attempts by the party to criticize the AK Party’s policies.

What is being done by the CHP and HDP is actually an attempt to downplay the government’s success in thwarting the coup attempt through inter-party political quarrels. Ultimately, the CHP’s allegation that the government – which was in fact the main target of the coup attempt – was responsible for July 15 was viewed by the people as simply a part of the party’s constricted politics.

On the anniversary of the July 15 coup attempt, I have talked with a couple of young people of different socio-cultural and economic backgrounds, about their perception of the coup attempt and the post July 15th process. Before I present their perception and opinions, I have to confess the social scientists’, including me, misinterpretation about the sociology of youth in Turkey.

The crisis of belonging and selfishness are the common problems among young people in almost all countries in the world. This crisis brings the isolated and individualist or self-absorbed personalities obsessed with consumption, self-exposure, etc. Until last year, almost all social scientists in Turkey had the same opinion about the youth of Turkey that they are very apolitical, detached from all kinds of political world views, selfish, overconfident and conformist. However, on the night of the 15th July, the youth of Turkey shifted these perceptions and evaluations; thousands of young people were in the streets to stand against the coup attempt even though they had never experienced a coup before.

What was the coup about? Why did parts of the army occupy streets and what was their final purpose? Although they had so many questions in their minds, they were in the streets with their parents; they learned the answers to all of these questions through what they had seen in the streets. They saw real weapons, real tanks and real F-16 warplanes up close. They were eyewitnesses to hundreds of casualties and murders. Some of them were also wounded and even murdered by some soldiers firing bullets and dropping bombs from the F-16s. Mahir, Abdullah Tayyip, Mehmet Ali, Batuhan and many other young martyrs who were shot dead that night showed us how to re-read the sociology properly.

Today one year has passed since the coup attempt, and the perception and opinions of young people are very valuable to analyze the past year. Firstly, they witnessed one of the most important turning points in Turkey’s history and they consider themselves a bit lucky for experiencing this extraordinary event.

The reason for that is they think that we haven’t completely analyzed the background of this treacherous night yet. Within this context they naturally have some concerns about their future. “We feel the shadow of the future,” a young man puts it blankly. An 18-year-old university student says: “We know the murderer very well but not the contributors.” A 16-year-old high school student says that he saw the tip of the iceberg on that day and other ways of carrying out a coup might not be unlikely. The young interviewees add that the putschists’ mentality might still be alive in Turkey and FETÖ may use alternative sophisticated techniques to perpetrate a new attempt to overthrow the government.

For several decades FETÖ leaders tried to transform young people into the profile they wish. This profile is very submissive and not supposed to have any kind of critical thinking. According to the young people I talked with, this logic of FETÖ is not accidental; they used to train or create their own so-called “soldiers without any identity or belonging. No room for family or real identities was left to these young minds.

This young generation is very open to different societal experiences but very soon feel skeptical. “We do not want any kind of dystopia created by the events of July 15th” a 23-year-old teacher explains. The question that we have to ask ourselves is how we, as a society in general, prepare the youth in this uncertain phase? The issue is straightforward: it can be explained in simple terms. They do not want to be the object of any kind of ideology or belief and they have the self-imagination of being free subjects.

The Need for A Positive Agenda

Finally, I asked them about their views on the post July 15th period, the state of emergency and generally the current situation of Turkey. Most of them think that just a year is too short to understand and analyze the complexities of the July 15th events. Because of the fact that the coup attempt has been very complicated and multi-factored, the analyses have to be made in a cautious way.

However, the young men and women underline the significance that the whole investigative processes should be kept up fairly in the spirit of justice and the rule of law. The trials of the perpetrators and the suspects should not harm the legitimacy of civil resistance and should not hijack the July 15th resistance. “We have a great potential to tackle all the grave problems created by previous generations. But from now on we need a positive agenda,” a 19-year-old Kurdish university student says. “We do not want to be the part of a hurried culture or hurried politics,” a 15-year-old female Imam Hatip High School student expresses.

They are seeking alternatives. It signifies entirely different sets of youth policies in Turkey. The most important determinant of this demand is by far the aspect of education. But what kind of education are we talking about? A 21-year-old law school student summarizes it for us: “we don’t want any academic junk food; we demand real education!” Besides education, they demand a moral community in which they could find role models to follow.

Some young people think that there is a dearth of real role models in this period when they especially need it much more than ever before. In their opinions, if we cannot take a positive agenda serious, on the contrary a lot of individualism, atomization and fragmentation of societal ties will be the result instead of a desired sensitivity and compassion to function as main motives for the next generations. And if individualization and fragmentation of societal ties would be the outcome, a civil resistance against another July 15th like attempt could be difficult to imagine.

Turkish Interuniversity Board (ÜAK) strongly condemns the recent coup attempt to overthrow the democratically elected and legitimate Government of Turkey. Serving as an active voice of freedom and democracy, all our universities stand against this unacceptable and shameful attempt against our national will and our parliamentary democracy, the rule of law and freedom. Remembering the devastation in our recent history caused by the previous coups, we also invite all academics and students in the world to stand against this attempt.

Please note that the authorities are now in full control of the unwelcome attempt to depose The Grand National Assembly and overthrow the legal government in Turkey, and that all educational institutions, including universities, academies, community and vocational colleges and related educational establishments thereof are open and freely functioning.

We urge our international colleagues not to allow Islamophobia to cloud their judgments and acknowledge that we all members of Interuniversity Board of Turkey involving all rectors, fully support Turkish Grand National Assembly, its elected representatives of all political parties and endorse peoples’ resistance to the anti-democratic coup d’état attempt.

Interuniversity Board of Turkey

 

When the international responses to the democracy-suspending coups staged throughout Turkey’s political history are considered, the initial silence of the Western democracies in the face of the July 15 attempted coup makes more sense. Particularly in the context of the coups staged in May 27, 1960, March 12, 1971 and September 12, 1980, the policies adopted by the Western democracies stand out as evidence proving that they were defeated by the pragmatism of liberal democracy’s rhetoric of values.

In the aftermath of the 1960 coup, a number of prominent Western media outlets including New York Times, Le Monde, Wall Street Journal, Time, Die Welt, and BBC endeavored to convince their audience to the notion that the coup could be justified for some reasons while encouraging their governments to get in contact with the putschists.

Undeniably, the Turkish intelligentsia who were alienated from their own values and disturbed by then Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and ruling Democrat Party (DP) also contributed to such reflections of the coup in the Western media. Having received a negative response only from the French government among the European countries, the putschists achieved to make themselves accepted in the international arena with the support of the U.S. While Turkey’s dialogue with the European Community (EC) went on following the coup, the pro-Western statements of the putschists regarding NATO and the EC sufficed to convince the Western public opinion.

The West’s efforts to develop ties with the junta by condoning and almost affirming the 1960 coup also fomented the following coups. From 1960 to the end of the Cold War, the coup plotters did not confront any problem of legitimacy in the international arena due to the U.S.’s containment policy towards Russia and strategy of keeping Turkey by its side. Except for some weak protests, tepid condemnations and exceptional and insubstantial sanctions, the juntas in Turkey have always been affirmed by the Western liberal democracies.

Right after the first post-coup contact between then U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Fletcher Warren and the 1960 coup leader Cemal Gürsel, Washington provided financial aid to the junta, which pointed to the hasty demeanor of the U.S. Besides, barely two months passed since the 1960 coup when the U.S. deployed Jupiter ballistic missiles in Turkey against Russia, which was another sign of the volition of cooperation between the junta and the U.S. government.

The U.S. government’s approach to the 1960 coup in Turkey shows a great parallelism with the Obama administration’s approach to the 2013 Egyptian coup staged by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. As can be seen in the coup cases of 1960 Turkey and 2013 Egypt, the first coups staged against the governments formed as a result of free and transparent elections in developing democracies have been accepted as restoration, institutionalization and incorporation of democracy by the U.S. All kinds of support have been provided to military junta regimes including international recognition and financial aid.

The coup on March 12, 1971 was staged shortly after the White House exerted pressures on Süleyman Demirel’s government with regard to opium production, which showed that the approach of the U.S. to the 1960 coup was carried one step further. The junta administration chaired by Nihat Erim, who was assigned by the putschists, won the approval of Washington by banning opium production as requested by the U.S. In so doing, the junta gained legitimacy in the West.

As for the coup staged on September 12, 1980, no change was observed in the approaches of the U.S. and other Western democracies to the junta. It is a widely known anecdote that then CIA station chief in Turkey Paul B. Henze was rumored to have said: “Our boys have done it,” to then U.S. President Jimmy Carter while mentioning the 1980 coup. Although Henze denied saying so after 27 years from the incident in an attempt to recover his public image as a coup advocate, it is a general acceptance among political observers that the White House played a role in the 1980 coup. In view of the increasing influence of Russia in the region after the coup, a strategy was adopted to consolidate Turkey’s position as a U.S. ally.

The U.S.’s supportive attitude to the coups in Turkey has been a determinant in the international arena. Being aware of this factor, the coup plotters endeavored to receive the U.S. support before or during their coup attempts.

Therefore, the U.S. approach to the July 15 coup attempt is required to be examined in detail.

US Response to July 15 Coup Attempt

In the night of July 15, 2016, when it was understood that the military troops’ presence on the streets signalized a coup attempt, the first statement from the U.S. was issued by then Secretary of State John Kerry, who was in Russia in the meantime. After Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım spoke to a live TV broadcast at 11.05 p.m. and stated that there was a military insurrection that would not be allowed by the government, Kerry said at 11.57 p.m.: “I hope there will be stability and peace and continuity within Turkey.”

Stating that he was not informed on what exactly was happening in Turkey, Kerry chose not to articulate any expression showing support to the democratically elected government. While Kerry was issuing this statement, international TV stations had already begun to announce that a coup was being staged in Turkey. During the moments when the coup attempters shot and killed civilians, the U.S. administration continued to watch the incidents in a complete silence.

Retreating into silence and searching for a new position following Kerry’s “peace, stability and continuity” message, the U.S. gave the impression that they were disappointed since the “peace, stability and continuity” message that was issued at 11.57 p.m. would have meant something had the coup attempt succeeded. The timing of this message, which was issued while the elected government was not yet suppressed by the putschists and the government authorities kept resisting, passed into the history of U.S. diplomacy and democracy as a disgrace.

While Kerry’s statement encouraged the coup attempters even more, a number of senior diplomats representing Turkey called their counterparts at the U.S. Embassy and the White House to point out that such a statement was unacceptable. Highlighting that this statement of Washington, which did not give any support to the government, could be read as a support to the coup plotters, they asked the U.S. government to issue a statement siding with democracy.

In the statements, he issued to the international media outlets, Presidential Spokesperson İbrahim Kalın called the allies of Turkey to stand up against the coup attempt. Yet, those calls were not adequately answered by the U.S. administration.

At 12.13 a.m. in that night, a declaration by pro-coup soldiers was read at the TRT, claiming they had taken control of the country. The declaration stressed on the relations with NATO and reassured about the duties and commitments as part of the NATO alliance. The U.S. gave its next response when the TRT was taken over by the putschists.

The statement made on the White House’s official Twitter account only expressed that the incidents in Turkey were closely followed and President Obama was informed on the subject. It was 12.17 a.m. when the White House issued this statement. Only six minutes after this statement, a substantial move that turned the tables came from President Erdoğan. At 12.26 a.m., Erdoğan called people to take to the streets and resist the coup attempt. Upon that, people started pouring into streets to defy the insurrection, which was not foreseen by the coup plotters.

Within minutes, the putschists began to retreat in the face of the determined resistance of citizens. As from 02.00 a.m., the pro-coup troops were started to be detained. The first supportive statement from the U.S. was issued when it became obvious that the coup attempt would be foiled. At 02.05 a.m., the White House called authorities to support the elected government. But the word “coup” was abstained in the statement.

The U.S. only took a clear stance upon the failure of the coup attempt. Kerry stated on July 16 that he had a phone conversation with Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, adding that the U.S. provided full support to the democratically elected government and its democratic establishments. The U.S. officials preferred to issue statements that were supportive of the elected government by abstaining from using the word “coup”.

Given that the U.S. had also refused to call the Egyptian coup a coup, Washington gave the initial signals that they would adopt a strategy similar to their stance on the Egyptian coup with regard to the July 15. On July 24, 2016, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden paid a visit to Turkey to restore the damage of the policy Washington adopted in the coup night. Expressing that he stands for democracy and admires the resistance of Turkish people, Biden remarked that he was moved by the leadership and courage displayed by President Erdoğan during the night of the coup attempt.

During his visit, Biden underscored several times that the U.S. did not side with the coup, which might mean that the White House felt an embarrassment over its reticence in the night of July 15. The U.S. Vice President’s remarks that condemned the coup attempt and praised the resistance for democracy will pass into the history of Turkey-U.S. relations as trivia. On the other hand, Washington’s first statement during the night of the coup attempt will always be remembered: “We hope stability and peace and continuity.”

While theoreticians, who analyze world politics through media continue to guess what will happen throughout the year by looking at the New Year’s cover of The Economist, another magazine has been clearly conveying the developments to its readers without any encoded messages by events and people put on the cover. Considering the closest ones to home, this magazine covered many topics ranging from the headscarf discussions to Naim Süleymanoğlu’s success at the Olympic Games after filtering them through an American and Western perspective.

The New York-based magazine registered as TIME started to be published weekly in 1923, later spreading to Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia, South Pacific and South America over the years. The only constants of the magazine were its publication language being English and foretelling the future through local and international events or figures that were put on to the cover.

While Charlie Chaplin who made it to the cover in 1925 became a leading force in cinema, Mahatma Gandhi who was on a 1931 cover of the magazine became a world-renowned figure in the following years. Similarly, TIME had put Nazi Germany’s Commander of the Naval Forces Erich Raeder on its cover in 1942 and touched on his passive nature and military blunders. Raeder resigned from his post the following year; “he had no idea about submarine warfare. He never cared about it. He was obsessed with ships; yet, he failed to equip them with a substantial air force. He probably was the weakest link of the Nazi Army” were some of the comments that continued to haunt Raeder for many more years. Talking about the future of computers in 1983 and covering the internet in 1990s, the magazine was the most prominent conveyor of political developments.

Leaders deemed authoritarian by TIME were deposed via coups

Putting coups carried out in many countries to its cover, the magazine came to be known as a “coup-loving” publication because of its disposition towards the events. The 1953 Iran, 1954 Panama and 1973 Chile coups were all narrated as the fall of a dictator and the victory of the public.

TIME never skipped the coups in Turkey, as well. While the magazine is mostly known for its cover with Kenan Evren and the caption “Holding Turkey Together,” this wasn’t the first such incident at TIME.

In 1958, Adnan Menderes was put on the cover with the caption “Turkey’s Premier Menderes.” The magazine wrote the following about Menderes: “With his every year in office, Menderes has become more autocratic, more sensitive to criticism. Striking out in fury at anyone questioning his policies, he has half smothered both the press and opposition political parties under a blanket of repressive legislation.” Analogous to Menderes, Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh prior to the 1953 coup, Guatemala’s President Jacobo Arbenz prior to the 1954 coup and Chile’s President Salvador Allende prior to the 1973 coup were all put on the cover of TIME, while being mentioned in news pieces as “once democrats who resorted to authoritarianism.”

The Army is responsible for upholding the constitution

While it was not on the covers, the coup of May 27 1960 found itself a place in the magazine. Using a photograph which had a group of people celebrating the coup, TIME was justifying the coup with the following passage: “The Turkish army has long scrupulously observed the admonition of the late great Kemal Ataturk that the army should stay out of partisan politics. But it also remembered that Ataturk charged it with guarding the constitution.”

Kenan Evren: Holding Turkey Together

The coup of September 12 1980 was welcomed in the US with the exclamatory expression “our boys did it.” On the covers of TIME‘s Europe, Asia and South Pacific editions of September 29 1980 issue, there was the photograph of Kenan Evren. On the eight page, in a long feature article titled “Holding Turkey Together”, the events leading to the coup and Kenan Evren himself were extracted. The coup was mentioned in the following way:

“After months of rising terrorism by both the extreme left and extreme right, the country allowed itself to settle into a state of unaccustomed relaxation. Civilians waved at tanks rumbling through the streets of Istanbul. Automobile drivers shook hands with soldiers who manned the roadblocks. Storekeepers raised their bombproof shutters for the first time in months, and restaurants began to fill up again in the evenings. Some city dwellers looked far trimmer than usual, simply because they no longer packed pistols inside their coats or waistbands.”

February 28: “Military Sacked Erbakan”

TIME had signaled the postmodern coup of February 28 1997 from the very first days of the Welfare Party. Publishing an article titled “Secular State Suspended?” when the party came into power, the magazine was almost conveying the message “how could you allow such a government” as Necmettin Erbakan’s to the Turkish army. “He [Erbakan] is a populist, pro-Islamic politician whose party did not field a single female candidate in the last elections […] Last week Erbakan became the head of the first Islamist-majority coalition government in Turkey since Kemal Ataturk declared it a secular state in 1923,” wrote TIME.

Not pondering on the decisions of February 28, TIME had praised Mesut Yılmaz who became the prime minister after Welfare Party’s coalition was deposed by the military with an article titled “Mr. Secular”: “Turkish military believes that it is better to be sad than sorry in terms of Turkey’s secular future. President Süleyman Demirel becoming the chair of NATO member countries and Mesut Yılmaz, the leader of the lesser opposition party with 129 seats in a parliament of 550, becoming the prime minister verifies the military’s approach. While some argue that Yılmaz lacks the political mediation skills to form a sustainable government, his decision to withdraw from Libya and his stance against the rise of Islamic fundamentalism dissipate the suspicions. After all, the military sacked Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan for doing the opposite of the said decisions. Moreover, NATO will also love Yılmaz for taking these decisions.”

Perspective on April 27 E-Memorandum: “AK Party is a threat to the public”

TIME‘s comment on the e-memorandum of April 27 2007 was the following: “Military has always been a strong political actor in Turkey and it has carried out four coups against those threatening the country’s secular system since 1950. In 2007, the military published a concealed threat which led to snap elections. Practices like singing hymns in schools instead of mosques and organizing Holy Quran recitation competitions on April 23 which were introduced by the AK Party government were always seen as a threat to the very existence of the republic by the military.

Expediting the crisis by writing a condemning declaration against the ruling party electing the president, the military expected the Turkish voters agree with the generals’ view that pro-Islamic AK Party is a threat to the nation. With the coup attempt that will go down in history as e-memorandum, they hoped to sway the minds of the people as they did before. They aimed to force the AK Party to form a coalition, causing them to share the power.”

On July 15: Cemal Gürsel brought democracy

The coup attempt of July 15 was also covered by TIME and articles praising the previous coups in Turkey were being published on the magazine’s website while the coup was still going on. The article written by Lily Rothman was adding insult to injury even before the people were able to thwart the coup: “In that 1960 coup, General Cemal Gursel was named President, Premier and Defense Minister, leaving the world with hopes that the nation was on its way back to true democracy. It would only be eleven years, however, before a group of military leaders handed a radio newscaster a memorandum to read out loud, telling the people of Turkey that the government had once again ‘pushed our country into anarchy, fratricide and social and economic unrest’ and thus ‘the Turkish armed forces, fulfilling their legal duty to protect the republic, will take power.'”

“The country resists an attempted coup, but the worst could be yet to come”

Even before the coup was over, the magazine was praising the perpetrators and the coup itself. When the coup was thwarted, the first issue of TIME published after the coup included a photograph of Turkish people resisting the coup accompanied by the title “Turkey’s Longest Night”. In the subtitle, however, it was noted that “The country resists an attempted coup, but the worst could be yet to come.” The magazine referred to the coup as an “amateurish attempt.”

While President Erdoğan was described as oppressive, the magazine also argued that there were people in Turkey who wanted the army, the protector of the republic, to take action. The subtitle “the worst could be yet to come” was interpreted as Turkey entering a political deadlock and hinting that increasing polarization might create an armed conflict among the people.

Yet once again, TIME had sided itself with a coup. After all, Erdoğan had made it to the cover of the magazine even two years before the December 17-25 incidents, which acted as a precursor to the coup, and was criticized for allegedly becoming an autocrat.

TIME, praising all the military coups that happened since May 14 1950, Turkey’s transition into multiparty system, seized the opportunity to celebrate the July 15 coup perpetrated by FETÖ, not breaking with its tradition. Even after the coup attempt was thwarted by the people, the magazine continued to publish many articles that implied if the coup was successful, it would be better for Turkey, consolidating its putschist position.

Conducted by the Ankara 17th Heavy Penal Court and known to the public as “the July 15 coup attempt lawsuit” or “General Staff main lawsuit”, the first hearing of the case commenced on May 22. Defendants’ defenses are being heard in subsequent sessions. Similarly, “the main coup trials” were commenced in Istanbul on May 29. As the defense was covered by the media, Chief of Staff Hulusi Akar submitted a statement to the Parliament’s Coup Inquiry Commission, and the National Intelligence Organization’s (MİT) revealed the July 15 Coup Report to the public, making it the hottest topic of June.

Meanwhile, Parliament’s Coup Inquiry Commission also revealed its report and the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) prepared a 300 page long comment on the said report. While the CHP doesn’t clearly contest the idea that the coup was perpetrated by FETÖ, the main opposition party continued to allege that “the July 15 coup attempt was a foreseen, but an unavoidable coup that was controlled for an outcome.” Considering that the trials are at full throttle and the anniversary of the coup is drawing closer, it could easily be said that these discussions will become increasingly heated.

The Fight against FETÖ/PDY after July 15

Before talking about the course of cases and the prominent parts of indictments and defenses, it would be more beneficial to provide some information about the judiciary’s fight against FETÖ/PDY and the July 15 coup attempt. Firstly, it should be noted that the judicial process and trials against FETÖ/PDY had commenced prior to July 15. A day before the coup attempt, the joint indictment was completed and was accepted by the Ankara Heavy Penal Court. Moreover, new cases against FETÖ/PDY were opened in almost all cities and districts of Turkey.

Although the figures change by the day, according to the statement of Minister of Justice Bekir Bozdağ, today more than 160,000 people are part of these trials; 50,402 of them have been arrested, while 47,136 people were released under judicial control. 7,963 people were first detained and later were released. Civil servants like judges, prosecutors, military personnel and police officers constitute the majority of those who are arrested.

Besides these court cases against FETÖ, there are numerous cases and inquiries directly concerning the July 15 coup attempt. Among these cases, the most prominent one is the class action lawsuit against 221 suspects, including some members of the Peace at Home Council, on the events that took place at the General Staff Compound in Ankara. On the other hand, the case on the events which transpired at the Akıncı Airbase, the case on the attempted assassination of President Erdoğan in Muğla, and the case on the coup in Istanbul are other prominent class action lawsuits related to the coup attempt. There are also separate cases opened for each individual incident in cities like Ankara, Istanbul, Malatya, Diyarbakır, Sakarya, Kars, Ardahan, Edirne, Kocaeli, Manisa, Isparta and Şırnak. Therefore, the cases on the coup and FETÖ/PDY are being conducted simultaneously from two channels.

The indictments and evidence of prominent court cases in Ankara and Istanbul came to be known by the public and defendants’ defenses are being covered by the media. Considering the investigations and the court cases, it can be said that the judiciary is conducting challenging lawsuits with a superhuman effort. The challenge is twofold; while FETÖ/PDY’s emphasis on secrecy is one side of the problem, the other is the loss of personnel in the judiciary following the July 15 coup attempt. Almost one third of judges and prosecutors, amounting to around 4,000, were discharged from duty. Despite the gap and the lack in the numbers of senior judges and an ever-increasing work load, the judiciary’s handling of the process is above the standard.

Indictments and FETÖ/PDY’s Defense Strategy

It should be said that the general structure of FETÖ/PDY, their organization within the Turkish Armed Forces and all phases of the coup attempt, along with the perpetrators and their crimes, are mostly identified and clarified. Moreover, some cases are being concluded by now. The first lawsuit to be concluded in Ankara was of the Secretary-General of President Fahri Kasırga’s abduction and the suspect of this case were punished with an aggravated life imprisonment on June 15. On May 27, the first acquittal decision was given in Adıyaman; however, it should be expressed that the Court of Cassation is yet to approve both of these lawsuits.

Regarding the defense strategy, the suspects are acting in unison with a common narrative. Unlike any normal defendants, they are not only trying to save themselves; they are also trying to convey some sort of messages to other FETÖ members and both to the domestic and international public. They are conveying the message that FETÖ members are yet to be deciphered and they are still alive and kicking. They are trying to erase the traces of FETÖ and consolidate the opinion that it was a controlled coup. To achieve their goals, they are rejecting every accusation, with the exception of a few defendants, despite the findings and evidence. Secondly, they are refraining from accusing others. Lastly, they are refraining from mentioning FETÖ as the perpetrator of the coup.

All of the defendants are talking about their past services to the Turkish Armed Forces and their successes, drawing analogies to Ergenekon and Sledgehammer defendants who were victimized by FETÖ and trying to tap into the sympathy that is felt towards the victimized military personnel. Moreover, they are claiming that they aren’t FETÖ members; they are even alleging that they have fought against FETÖ for many years and were victimized by the organization in the past.

Despite being in the middle of the coup, they are refraining from accusing other suspects, and claiming that they have no information about who conducted the coup attempt or implying that the high-ranking officers of the Turkish Armed Forces were behind the coup attempt. Even though rejecting all claims may be considered as a natural reflex, their efforts to save other suspects and whitewash FETÖ are definitely unnatural. Furthermore, there is an impression that the suspects are forming groups and are trying to play certain roles. The common narrative itself indicates the existence of a prepared and orderly organization. Similarly, their leniency to deception and deceit through the distorted understanding of taqiyya also points out the involvement of FETÖ.

Those who are members of the Peace at Home Council and were active in the conducting of the coup are seen to be rejecting physical evidence such as clear recordings, witness testimonies and their confessions at the prosecutors’ office, ridiculing the court itself. Commander of the Akıncı Airbase Hakan Evrim, who was at the base where aircraft lifted off and landed for hours and who saluted FETÖ’s civilian imam Kemal Batmaz, alleges that there wasn’t a coup attempt and that he is not a FETÖ member. Similarly, Sinan Sürer, who fired on civilians entering the General Staff Compound, used ByLock and participated in the coup preparation meetings led by Adil Öksüz, rejects all claims despite recordings and hard evidence, even alleging that the gun he was holding was actually a phone. Former Staff Colonel Doğan Öztürk, on the other hand, asserts that he never saw Deputy Chief of Staff Yaşar Güler on the night of coup, even though he was recorded by security cameras while escorting Güler to the headquarters. There are many other defenses that are in the same vein as these.

It could be said that the main aims of these defenses are to whitewash FETÖ and to consolidate the notion that the coup was actually a ploy or it was a controlled coup attempt. It is clear that they are trying to create a perception in accordance with Fetullah Gülen’s previous claims about the coup. For this reason, they are making statements which accuse high-ranking military officers and the MİT.

With the condition of protecting the rights of defense and fair trial, FETÖ suspects should be barred from managing the judicial process and the public perception. Taking the sensitivities of the public, families of martyrs and veterans into consideration, the suspects must be prevented from showing off; however, legal errors that might cast a shadow on the trials and bring about Turkey’s condemnation at the European Court of Human Rights must be averted. Prejudiced circles and existent negative public opinion should be granted no quarter in this matter.

Turkey’s fight against the Gülenist Terrorist Organization (FETÖ) continues. Courts are accepting indictments against suspects which participated in the July 15 coup attempt that left 249 martyred and 2,186 wounded.

After the coup attempt 41,326 people were detained. Among the detainees, there were 2 Constitutional Court, 131 Supreme Court, 43 Council of State and 5 Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors members, along with 2 four-star generals, 6 major generals, 10 lieutenant generals and 184 brigadier generals.

Detainees not giving concrete information about FETÖ indicates that the terrorist organization is still influential. Despite facing life sentences, detainees are not talking or being forced to not talk about FETÖ.

Accused of planning and enforcing the attempted assassination of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Marmaris, and the killing of Erdoğan’s bodyguard Mehmet Çetin, Colonel Şükrü Seymen defended himself in court by saying “I have attempted a coup; even if the punishment is death, I do not regret it.” This defense is important in terms of how FETÖ is organized as Seymen refrained from uncovering who was behind the heinous act of the coup.

Radio Talks Reveal the Bloodthirsty Face of the Organization

The joint indictment on the events took place in the General Staff compound and the addendum of the indictment on Army Aviation Command revealed the bloodthirsty face of the terrorist organization through visuals and radio commands about the detainment of ranking officers by the putschists and slaughter of civilians.

The indictment regarding Army Aviation Command, where putschists lifted off with military helicopters that fired on civilians, clearly states that Gülenist soldiers were informed about the coup attempt prior to its execution. There are striking expressions.

http://thenewturkey.org/the-rise-and-fall-of-feto-in-turkish-politics/

Lieutenant Emre Erkan, a training officer at Army Aviation Command, said “today is the bloody Friday” to his company during muster on the morning of July 15. Ramazan Turgut, who expressed that he was serving as an artilleryman in Cyprus and started to serve at Army Aviation Command as a trainee from April 14, 2016 onwards, said “During the muster at 08:00 on the morning of July 15, Lieutenant Emre Erkan told the whole company that that day was the bloody Friday. We had training at 13:00. I attended the said class.”

Levent Çağrı Çakır also expressed that he attended the muster on the same morning and affirmed that Emre Erkan said “it is going to be the bloody Friday.”

In the indictment, it is expressed that Emre Erkan took the keys of the armory without any record keeping by Quartermaster Özgür Oprukçun. On the very same day, Battalion Commander Lt. Col. Yasin Candemir ordered Emre Erkan to distribute the weapons to the soldiers, Emre Erkan told the soldiers that “the terrorists might attack in the guise of police and soldiers,” and that soldiers collected ammunition and magazines from the room of the lieutenant colonel.

Second Lieutenant Tolgahan Akbuğa said “When we entered the armory, Lieutenant Emre Erkan gave each of us a G3 without looking at their serial numbers.”

Private Mustafa Turan said that Lt. Col. Özcan Karacan, who was tasked with dispatching and managing the helicopters on the night of the coup attempt, was giving orders to higher ranking officers. Turan added that it was obvious Karacan was giving orders to the personnel near the main entrance. “Lt. Col. Karacan came to me and said ‘if any police comes here, they are terrorists in guise. I order you to shoot them; we won’t let them capture here.’ I told him I would rather shoot myself than shooting at the police. He yelled at me and said ‘you don’t know the punishment of insubordination,'” said Turan.

Five Civilian Gülenists at Akıncı Military Base, the Heart of the Coup

The center of July 15 coup attempt was the Akıncılar Military Base. Images of Adil Öksüz, a Sakarya University staff member who led the coup attempt and was revealed to have visited the FETÖ leader Fethullah Gülen in Pennsylvania, with the putschists at the base were included in the indictment.

FETÖ members Kemal Batmaz, Harun Biniş, Nurettin Oruç and Hakan Çiçek were also confirmed to be at the military base. The aforementioned were found out to be in connection with Adil Öksüz and ordering ranking officers at the base despite being civilians, all of which were recorded via security cameras.

Kaygusuz: Hit the police department, destroy the compound

In the indictment on the events that transpired at Akıncı Military Base, there are visuals of putschists bombing Ankara Police Headquarters with military aircraft and radio communication between putschist pilots.

Dispatching and managing F-16 aircraft from Akıncı Base and relaying all attack orders to pilots, Staff Captain Mustafa Mete Kaygusuz ordered Pilot İlhami Aygül to hit the police department and destroy the compound.

An excerpt from the radio conversation between the base and the pilots:

Pilot İlhami Aygül: We are observing the clash in front of the police department.

Mustafa Mete Kaygusuz: Hit the police department, destroy the compound.

Aygül: Roger, we are firing on the area of conflict. Please confirm.

Kaygusuz: Confirmed.

Aygül: Roger. Is the police department compound the first or the second building near ANKAmall? We can also fire on the zone of conflict.

Kaygusuz: Fire on where the conflict is, where concentrated fire is taking place.

Aygül: Roger that. They are firing towards the road from the police department. We are firing on the compound.

Kaygusuz: You’re free to bomb the compound.

Kaygusuz: Have you hit the police department.

Aygül: We will be attacking it in two minutes.

Kaygusuz: Let’s hurry up. One more bomb, two bombs.

Aygül: Come again?

Kaygusuz: One more bomb there.

Aygül: Two bombs for the conflict zone.

Mustafa Mete Kaygusuz later confessed; he admitted that he became connected with FETÖ during his high school years and that he ordered pilots to bomb targets on the night of the coup attempt.

Prevent the Aircraft with the Presidential Seal from Flying

Talking with Oğuz Alper Emrah, one of the indictees of the Akıncı indictment, Ahmet Tosun described the presidential aircraft: “The aircraft you’re to prevent [from flying] is probably the presidential aircraft, it will have a seal on it. It’s a huge aircraft with the presidential seal on it.”

Ahmet Tosun said that the suspect Ahmet Özçetin, the staff colonel who served as the 4th Main Jet Operations Commander, was responsible for the F-16 bombing orders that martyred civilians.

“Ahmet Özçetin told me that the aircraft the president is in took off from either Antalya or Dalaman and asked me to investigate it, tracking the radar,” said Tosun.

Tosun added that the bombing of the interchange, Police Special Forces and Police Aviation Headquarters near the presidential compound, along with the supersonic fly-past over Kızılay and the General Staff compound were ordered by Özçetin.

President Erdoğan was the real target of the putschists

The real target of July 15 coup attempt was President Erdoğan. They were aiming to detain or assassinate him, as it would render their coup successful.

Two F-16s took off from Diyarbakır Airbase on July 12 and photographed the hotel President Erdoğan was staying at. On July 13, again two F-16s under the control of Air Forces Command Intelligence Department scanned the hotel and its vicinity.

Colonel Ali Yazıcı, who was Erdoğan’s Head Military Aide at the time, learned where Erdoğan was staying and relayed the information to Brigadier General Gökhan Şahin Sönmezateş, while departing from Antalya to reach the hotel in Marmaris on the night of July 15.

Statements of the bloodthirsty putschist Zekeriya Kuzu are included in the indictment on the assassination attempt of President Erdoğan, which resulted in two police officers being martyred.

In the indictment, it is stated that former master sergeant Zekeriya Kuzu, who is nicknamed “Pasha” and is the “base imam” for the Çiğli 2nd Main Jet Command Base, said the following to the police officers: “You will go through hell, it’s all starting now. (…) you said you were going to eradicate us, now we will eradicate you; if you even dare to raise your heads, we will kill you. Where is he [Erdoğan], which helicopter picked him up, to which airport he will land, when did the helicopter take off?”

Moreover, it is highlighted in the indictment that the putschists which were the part of the assassination team stepped on the heads of police officers with boots, fired around the officers and brutalized them.

Sergeant Aydın Özsıcak and Lt. Col. Davut Uçum, who were among the assassination team, also became the suspects of a reopened investigation on August 9, 2016 as FETÖ was connected to the death/assassination of Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu and his five companions.

Özsıcak and Uçum were charged with stealing Argus5000 CE and SKYMAP (which has the ability to record) from the helicopter wreck that became the grave of Yazıcıoğlu and his five friends on March 25, 2009; however, the investigation had resulted in dismissal of charges.

Giving his statement to Kahramanmaraş Deputy Public Prosecutor Kemal Yalçın, Özsıcak alleged that him being in the team attempting to assassinate Erdoğan and stealing equipment from the helicopter are “nothing but a coincidence.”

Putschists Coordinated the Dink Murder

Meanwhile, in the indictment of the Hrant Dink murder case, it was revealed that FETÖ planned the murder.

Participating in the coup attempt and captured wounded after the clash at Ankara Gendarmerie Command, Lieutenant Muharrem Demirkale, who is the Commander of Separatist Activities Intelligence Team at Istanbul Gendarmerie Intelligence, was revealed to be coordinating gendarmerie that had a part in Hrant Dink’s murder. Moreover, it was found out that Demirkale spoke with Specially Authorized Prosecutor Zekeriya Öz seven times on the phone the day before and after the murder.

Sergeant Yavuz Karakaya, who was detained on the charge of cooperating with the putschists at the Ankara Gendarmerie Command on the night of the coup attempt, was found out to be observing Ogün Samast and Hrant Dink before, during and after the murder.

FETÖ Dictated Three Books to Obscure the Dink Murder

In order to prove that police officers that are affiliated with them had nothing to do with the Dink murder, FETÖ made three writers write book on this murder. Adem Yavuz Arslan wrote Bi Ermeni Var, while Nazlı Ilıcak wrote Her Taşın Altında The Cemaat mi Var? and Bayram Kaya wrote Kördüğüm: 21 Numaralı Suikast Yolcusu. The FETÖ link with the murder was obscured through the said books.

FETÖ’s Media Organization Deciphered

Investigations into FETÖ’s media organization underscored how the Zaman daily influenced national newspapers and TV channels.

The indictments clearly show that Zaman acted at the behest of FETÖ in the media.

Publishing Deniz Baykal’s sextape, snatching of Adil Öksüz who is the black box of the coup attempt and serving manipulated images of the Hrant Dink murder were some of the operations that FETÖ executed in the media.

The official documents show that 1,000 of the Zaman 2,500 employees were journalists, while most of these journalists worked in various national newspapers and TV channels. Majority of these journalists were placed in various media outlets.

Trained at the Zaman daily, Cihan News Agency and Samanyolu TV, these journalists were put into crucial positions within TRT and many other national dailies and TV channels during the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials.

Between the years 2008 and 2014, almost all of the security and judicial correspondents of various newspapers and TV channels were originating from the Zaman daily. FETÖ realized the perception management through these journalists who were placed in national media outlets. Many other correspondents were polished by FETÖ. Even during the December 17-25, 2015 coup attempt, FETÖ correspondents were actively working in national media outlets.

For instance, let’s take a look at the indictment regarding the Hrant Dink murder case: it is stated that FETÖ placed Ercan Gün, who worked 14 years for Zaman, to FOX TV 11 days before the Dink murder and that the montaged photo of Ogün Samast holding a Turkish flag was published on FOX TV through his efforts.

Working for Zaman since 1993 and staying for 14 years, Ercan Gün’s transfer to FOX TV on January 8 2007, just days before the Hrant Dink murder, is evaluated as a deliberate effort to obscure the evidence. FOX TV News Director Ercan Gün was detained as a part of the investigation on the murder; however, FOX TV administration did not sever its ties with Gün. He is still shown as the news director in the staff page of the TV channel.

Ankara Representative Erdal Şen of Habertürk Daily Helped Adil Öksüz Escape

Originating from Zaman daily, Erdal Şen was revealed to be an active participant of the coup attempt.

Şen helped Adil Öksüz, FETÖ’s “Turkish Armed Forces imam” who was detained at Akıncı Airbase in Ankara only to be released with a suspicious decision, escape. It was found out that Şen helped Adil Öksüz hide in an apartment in the Üsküdar district of Istanbul.

Erdal Şen’s wife Emine Şennur Şen is also Adil Öksüz’s sister-in-law. Emine Şennur Şen was apprehended for using FETÖ’s ciphered communications application, ByLock.

At the Habertürk Headquarters on the Morning of the December 17 Coup Attempt

Administrators of the Habertürk daily and TV channel also attract the attention in the indictment about FETÖ’s media organization. It is stated that administrators who have transferred from Zaman to Habertürk knew of the 17-25 December coup attempt in 2013 beforehand.

Witness testimonies reveal that Habertürk TV News Coordinator Oğuz Usluer, Chief Editor Abdullah Kılıç and News Director Cuma Ulus came to the building at 07:00 on December 17, which was unusual for them, and worked on police summaries throughout the day.

It was also recorded that Usluer, while he was the broadcast coordinator of Habertürk TV, warned Editor Mehmet Yeşilkaya, as Yeşilkaya tried to cut off the reporter who was reading Hakan Şükür’s resignation letter; thus, Usluer allowed the whole letter to be read. Moreover, Usluer referred to the resignation letter as “a manifesto.”

Ankara Representative who published Deniz Baykal’s sextape is apprehended because of a FETÖ link

Yener Dönmez, who founded the Vahdet daily and closed it down after the July 15 coup attempt, published Deniz Baykal’s sextape on the website called Habervaktim while he was the Ankara representative of the Akit daily.

Deniz Baykal was forced to resign from his post of chairman in Republican People’s Party after the publishing of the said images. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu replaced him. FETÖ published images and documents of setup trials on the website Habervaktim.

Dönmez was detained as a part of the investigation into the images that allegedly showed Deniz Baykal. Dönmez was found out to be using ByLock. Moreover, Dönmez confessed that Deniz Baykal’s tape was sent to him by FETÖ-affiliated journalist Cevheri Güven. “Cevheri Güven called late at night. He said ‘something was sent to you, have you seen it.’ I learned that images of Deniz Baykal were relayed to the newspaper’s report line and then we decided to publish them,” said Dönmez. These quotes are directly taken from Dönmez’s statements.

As a part of the investigation into Deniz Baykal’s tape, 37 Gülenist police officers, including Ömer Altıparmak who is the former Head of the Intelligence Department at Security General Directorate, were apprehended.

Images, information and documents of Ergenekon and Balyoz trials are deleted

FETÖ completely deleted the recorded videos, information and documents of the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials.

The indictments regarding Hasan Hüseyin Özese, the Head Judge of Istanbul 13th Heavy Penal Court, and Hüsnü Çalmuk, a fellow judge, both of whom were tasked with the Ergenekon trial and were apprehended after the July 15 coup attempt, clearly state that FETÖ obscured the evidence.

Supervisory Board of Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors found out that the Istanbul 13th Heavy Penal Court irreversibly deleted all information and documents on computers by using the Wipe application before delivering them for inspection.

The court had video recorded all Ergenekon hearings that started on October 20 2008 and ended on August 5 2013. Even during the breaks between hearings, witnesses and secret witnesses were recorded. Through the deletion of the information and documents, along with video records, uncovering of any irregularities and mistrials is made impossible.

After the failure of the 17-25 December coup attempt, FETÖ formatted computers at Istanbul Security Directorate with the Wipe application and deleted the records of illegal wiretappings and technical surveillance.

The second declaration of the coup was to be announced on CNN Türk and FOX TV

The information that Gülenists regrouped after the coup declaration announced on TRT failed and that they wanted to announce a second one on CNN Türk and FOX TV was also included in the indictments.

In the joint indictment on the events which took place in the General Staff compound, it is underscored that the former Commander of Northern Sea Area Command Rear Admiral Ömer Faruk Harmancık, who commanded the coup at the Akıncı Airbase, called CNN Türk, FOX TV and the Honorary President of Doğan Holding Aydın Doğan’s bodyguard on the night of the coup attempt.

The statement of Major General Mehmet Dişli, who is the head of Strategic Transformation Department at the General Staff, is included in the indictment. He testifies that Harmancık said “we have prepared a second declaration and a broadcast vehicle will come soon; we want you to read this” to Chief of Staff Hulusi Akar.

After this exchange, it was found out that Harmancık called the CNN Türk building, which was raided by the putschists at 03:23, at 03:28 and 03:29 on July 16. Moreover, he called the line belonging to Doğan Holding which was being used by the security team in Bodrum at 06:34.

Aydın Doğan was on vacation in Bodrum during the coup attempt. Doğan stated that the line Harmancık called twice was being used by his security detail in Bodrum.

On the other hand, Harmancık called FOX TV’s Ankara office at 06:24. As it is known, the coup attempt in Ankara ended after Hulusi Akar was retrieved from Akıncı Airbase with a helicopter at 09:30.

It was revealed that Harmancık talked with Lt. Col. Ümit Gençer, who dictated the coup declaration at 23:30, eleven times. Ankara Public Prosecutor’s Office is continuing to investigate the communication traffic of Doğan Holding and FOX TV on July 15.

All of the information gathered in the text only covers a part of the statements given to the security forces and the prosecutor’s office. As more indictments are submitted to the courts and more Gülenist putschists confess to their crimes, the background of this bloody coup attempt will be revealed.

There is a new trend in the West. It has been a couple of years, I believe. Renowned intellectuals, strategists and media outlets are publishing comments, headlines and academic articles about Turkey and its president without remorse and conscience. They are openly advocating for a military junta over democracy, assassination or execution of a leader over the legitimate change in power.

Last summer, with instructions from Fetullah Gülen, a self-proclaimed scholar who continues to reside in Pennsylvania, US, his infiltrators within the army declared that they were seizing power in order to depose President Erdoğan and the government. While the people of Turkey were bewilderedly watching a presenter trying to read the junta’s coup declaration with hands shaking on TV, all hell was breaking loose on the streets. Bridges in Istanbul were closed and surrounded by military vehicles, meanwhile several police officers had gone up the towers of the bridge and were shooting with sniper rifles.

The sound of tanks moving on main roads, sonic booms of F16s and, gunfire on the streets were all mixed up. Everyone was in terror. Many deputies of both the government and the opposition were trying to survive within the parliament as F16s were dropping bombs on the compound. There also was an assassination attempt on President Erdoğan, who was at a hotel where he spent time with his grandchildren. There was an ongoing clash between the assassination team and presidential bodyguards at the hotel, while the headquarters of the National Intelligence Organization was under attack and the Chief of General Staff was being held as a hostage.

People across Turkey took to the streets and thousands in Ankara and Diyarbakır surrounded garrisons to prevent tanks from going out on the main roads. People tried to stop military vehicles and tanks using unimaginable methods.

Whatever was transpiring definitely was a strange situation. Turkey has experienced several coups; however, this time it felt different. It felt like an invasion, an attempt to colonize Turkey; this was what the majority of the people felt, at least. By dawn, the coup attempt was thwarted. There were lifeless bodies and severed limbs on the streets: the tragic stories of the deaths of hundreds of fathers and sons, siblings who stood side by side. Thousands of men, women, young and elderly were being hurried to hospitals.

Intellectuals infactuated with military juntas and assassinations

While bombs were being dropped and the screams of people reached the heavens, renowned academics in the US were tweeting about the coup attempt as if watching a sports match. For instance, Daniel Pipes wrote “He [Erdoğan] deserves to be ousted by a military coup. I hope it succeeds.”, while David Miller wrote “Erdogan was a megalomaniac ruining a great country. Who’s going to miss him?” These academics aren’t some minor figures and they weren’t the only ones writing in such a way. Hundreds of tweets just like the aforementioned ones later transformed into newspaper headlines, analyses in academic journals, and articles. Unbelievable! In the periodical Foreign Policy, Edward Luttwak criticized not the junta itself, but their failure to pull off the coup. According to Luttwak, they failed to realize the “first rule for a successful coup.” What was it? “Capturing or killing the head of the government, first and foremost”! The putschists, who wounded more than 2,000 and killed 246, have “violated the golden rule,” said Luttwak. It was crucial, as “they [the putschists] left the opportunity for Erdoğan to call the people to resist the coup”!

The world-renowned journal The Economist had the same connotation: “The sultan survives”! Similarly, an analyst of Fox News, Ralph Peters, made two obnoxious comments within a week: “Friday night’s failed coup was Turkey’s last hope to stop the Islamization of its government and the degradation of its society.” One week later, he wrote: “[…] now he [Erdoğan] has real support among half of the population, those for whom the fever of faith is the ultimate intoxicant. He polls better than Hitler did. “Mein Kampf” is no match for the Holy Koran.” For Peters, the people of Turkey sacrificing their lives to thwart the coup was not an issue. The one who should die, or deposed at least, according to Peters, was the president, and unfortunately he still alive and was standing tall. Furthermore, the situation was direr as Erdoğan’s supporters consolidated their belief in the president.

On the other hand, the Holy Quran of Muslims was being compared to Mein Kampf, which was written by the perpetrator of the largest genocide on earth. And the Quran was portrayed as a book that could surpass Mein Kampf in terms of atrociousness. This means that in the US and many parts of Europe, the direst of Islamophobic statements, and giving advice on how to violently depose a government and execute its leader is not a crime, but a component of freedom of speech!

The day after, those who believed that Erdoğan deserved the coup and should be executed advocated that Erdoğan designed the coup or at least knew of the coup with the same impunity as before. There were similar headlines published on reputable newspapers which acted in support of these allegations. The Guardian published Gülen’s statement on its website: “Turkey coup may have been ‘staged’ by Erdoğan regime”! 8 days after the coup, while people were still at hospitals or at the funerals of their loved ones, The Independent published a news piece titled “President Erdoğan’s Turkey is modelled on the Third Reich.” Later, the news outlet removed this piece from its website, probably out of shame! Michael Rubin, on the other hand, wrote an opinion on Foreign Affairs website the day of the coup which was titled “Erdogan Has Nobody to Blame for the Coup but Himself.”

Erik Jan Zürcher also wrote that even if the government hadn’t planned the coup, they were in the know and planned what to do after the coup. All of the Western media underscored that only Erdoğan was accusing Gülen and his henchmen for attempting a coup, while disregarding the statements of the main opposition party, other opposition parties, high-ranking generals and academics which were on the same page with Erdoğan. Including the most fervent enemies of Erdoğan, nobody had a doubt that the coup was ordered by Gülen; however, the Western media ignored all of these, as if there was an accord among them. Lastly, seven months after the coup attempt, the President of the German Federal Intelligence Service Bruno Kahl said “We don’t believe the coup attempt was made by Gülen” in his interview with the journal Der Spiegel. As the German intelligence is still intact, Kahl’s statement has only one meaning: “We are supporting Gülen.”

After thwarting the attempt, the government had to dismiss all members of this organization from the state, while closing down media outlets and private enterprises which supported the said organization. A state of emergency was announced for this reason and all of these were done. Then, these were deemed similar to the applications of Stalin and Hitler. However, no one drew a comparison with the time when East and West Germany were united and thousands of civil servants (who weren’t infiltrators like Gülenists) in East Germany were dismissed, even though it was a much more controversial process than the one in Turkey.

It’s not a crime to demand the head of a leader in the West!

The propaganda by the Western media which emerged with the July 15 coup attempt are continuing and getting worse by the day. Regardless of the issue, who and what kind of violent action is put against Erdoğan, the result doesn’t change. Turkey experienced this once again last week. Due to the referendum for a change in the system of government which is to take place on April 16, both the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the opposition are concerned with rallies in Turkey and abroad. There are more than 5 million Turkish citizens living in various countries of Europe. This population which has dual citizenship is able to cast their votes in Turkish elections.

Germany and the Netherlands didn’t show any kind of opposition against the Turkish parties which are advocating the no vote in the referendum during their rallies in their countries; however, this wasn’t true for AK Party. Last week, the Turkish FM’s travel permission was revoked by the Dutch government, while the minister of family and social policies was barred from entering the Turkish consulate (which is considered a territory of Turkey) in Rotterdam, later to be deported with a police escort. Moreover, they released attack dogs on people who took the streets to protest these actions and these people were also beaten by the police.

This treatment was not acceptable at any level; however, a single visual became embedded in the minds of Turks: a police dog biting the leg of a young male, while a police officer is keeping two protesters who are trying to help that person at bay with a baton. This visual was just like the ones showing torture at Abu Ghraib prison during the invasion of Iraq. After this, the main opposition party CHP demanded relations with the Netherlands to be suspended. Opposition parties and all people regardless of their opinion of Erdoğan condemned the treatment that was shown to the Turkish citizens and ministers. Meanwhile, the Blick daily in Switzerland published a Turkish headline: “Vote no against Erdoğan’s dictatorship.” Again, in Switzerland, a far-right crowd made a demonstration, probably with a permit as no police officers interfered, with ugly masks, calling the Turkish citizens to vote no in the referendum. These visuals were so abhorrent that Aykut Erdoğdu, a deputy of the main opposition party CHP, couldn’t hold himself and tweeted the following: “To whom the actions of these racist bastards in Europe are serving in the referendum?”

The target of those who carry out this abhorrent, anti-democratic and illegitimate campaign is the only politician who could garner 51.8% of the total votes in the first ballot. Anti-West sentiments increase among millions of supporters of Erdoğan and even those who oppose him. This rising hate is not because of Marinne Le Pen in France, Wilders in the Netherlands, or the neo-nazis in Germany; it is because of those who support the junta, see assassination as a legitimate method to depose an elected leader, and feign ignorance about a malicious organization which has infiltrated state institutions for 40 years!

Fethullah Gülen’s seemingly Islamic modern cult emerged in such an environment and spread over the years. He claimed to be a follower of Said-i Nursi, who Gülen never visited because he was a Kurd, as Gülen states in his own memoirs of youth, and was seemingly fighting against communism during the Cold War. Using the prestigious name of the persecuted Said-i Nursi, Gülen persuaded both Turks and Kurds that he was working for the benefit of Islam. Even though Gülen’s movement was criticized by other religious congregations for its depreciatory approach towards them and isolation from even the other disciples of Said-i Nursi, it was received rather well by both the society and the state.

Gülen supported and praised all military coups aiming to restore Turkey to its “factory settings” and preserve the status quo.

Gülen supported and praised all military coups aiming to restore Turkey to its “factory settings” and preserve the status quo. When the strictly secular Army deposed Erbakan and his government in 1997, Gülen praised what came to be known as the post-modern coup. Despite the harsh criticism of certain Islamic groups, some of the Muslims who weren’t followers of Gülen also believed that he was forced to make such statements against his own belief due to Turkey’s political environment.

Relocating to the US in 1999 and becoming famous for his schools all around the world, Gülen didn’t face any hardships after 9/11, which was suspicious for some, but not for the whole. Alongside conferences on interfaith dialogue and religious tolerance, Gülen started to pose as an admirer of Rumi and write about him, a strategy for the consumption of a Western audience; just like using Said-i Nursi had been for a Turkish audience. Even though the Rumi Center in the US was obviously named after Rumi, it was always Gülen’s name that was being propagated.

While certain individuals of the Kemalist Left in Turkey claimed that the Gülen Movement was a project of the US against the USSR in the Cold War, their allegations weren’t taken into consideration as these individuals opposed all religious groups.

So, the question is how the members of the Gülen Movement were able to infiltrate the most secular institution, the Army, to an extent to even attempt a military coup in a country that was ultra-secular until the near past? Against the practices of military school administrators, who examined the knees of young applicants to find and eliminate the ones that prayed regularly, Gülen advised his followers to do whatever is necessary, not to pray, and to drink alcohol, the end goal being to enter these military schools. Gülen and his followers used the same methods to infiltrate the judiciary, academia and the media.

Gülen advised his followers to do whatever is necessary, not to pray, and to drink alcohol, the end goal being to enter these military schools.

From the 1970s onward, they infiltrated every ideological movement in Turkey’s sociological structure, while concealing their true beliefs. None was aware of this function of the Gülen Movement; moreover, not every member was aware of each other. The truth is that they had become a widespread organization which was able to reach the elites of countries through their schools, media outlets, holdings and relief organizations. When the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came to power after weathering multiple storms (Erdoğan’s sentence, two trials to close the party down, the opposition of the whole media), the party was forced to open the door to this organization by assuming that at least they wouldn’t have any issue with their Muslim identity, unlike the Kemalist-secular ideology dominating the state. “Give them an inch and they will take a mile,” as the saying goes, but this wasn’t known at the time.

This seemingly Islamic modern and armed cult first revealed its true face, even if a little, while Turkey and the PKK were engaged in the reconciliation process. Targeting the process, Gülen started an operation through his members within the judiciary to make the head of the National Intelligence Organization stand trial for his role in the negotiations. However, first with the events of December 17-25, 2013 they tried to depose the government by claiming that it was corrupt, and then with the July 15 coup attempt, the organization was completely deciphered. Since then, Turkey has been working on cleansing the institutions of Gülenists and analyzing this cult.

Social scientists, political scientists and psychiatrists’ association are all trying to analyze and explain the leader and the members of this cult according to their own specializations. These analyses are one of the hottest topics in the media and everyone is trying to understand the organization. “Why did my arrogant but helpful neighbor change immensely after the coup attempt?” “They were our relatives and we knew their son was a Gülenist. However, we were shocked when we saw him on TV, among the putschists.” “Two sons stopped seeing their own mother as she is against Gülen, I really don’t understand it”. “The man [a Gülenist] fired his weapon and killed two people right before our eyes. Then recited bismillah before drinking water and then said that the ones he killed just moments ago went to heaven. What kind of a person does this and says that?” These are the questions that have emerged, which puzzle people when they are trying to understand the organization.

“The man [a Gülenist] fired his weapon and killed two people right before our eyes. Then recited bismillah before drinking water.”

I spoke to one of my friends, who was sentenced and was a member of a far left organization in the 1970s. “I know almost all kinds of leftist organizations around the world. We grew and lived within these organizations. Yet, I have never seen an organization giving its member an order, saying ‘you will stand here for 20 years and when the time comes, you will emerge’, let alone hearing of this order being carried out,” he said in utter bewilderment.

The members of this organization, with the instructions of their leader, stole the examination questions to infiltrate state institutions and became prosecutors, judges and teachers by usurping the rights of many thousands. Any threats to their organization were eliminated by slandering them, covering these slanders on their news channels, sentencing them via prosecutors and judges who are their members, and upholding their sentences in the higher courts once again with their own members. When they couldn’t achieve this, they sought vulnerabilities of these people to exploit and blackmail. Moreover, the members were ordered by their leader to “criticize or slander Gülen,” otherwise they may be exposed. Each and every one of them had experienced being untouchable.

They went from ultranationalism to being an international extra, ultimately to treason. How did they commit all these acts and how did they justify it to themselves?

Psychiatrists are explaining this situation as a “frenzy as a result of excessive narcissism.”

With outside observations and confessors from within, the Pandora’s Box has finally opened. Just like all other cults based on modern messianic apocalyptic scenarios and saviors, the Gülen Movement is also a cult. The members’ interactions with those who aren’t with the cult are limited, even if it’s their families. A narcissistic leader and a cult of narcissism. Most of them entered as they were mere children; however, these people, even the adults, have forsaken their own “selves” just to become a huge and singular “Self”. With harsh punishments (to be beaten by the leader himself, dismissals, threats) and rewards (being praised by the leader, receiving gifts, being exemplified), the bond between the leader and the members was strengthened. This narcissistic structure and its members seemingly didn’t have much problem with justifying all the amorality they were a part of. They claimed all of their amoral actions, which even an average person would abstain from committing, were to save the world. There wasn’t any illegal and amoral act left for them to commit. Moreover, they never believed they would lose; for them their leader is “the holy savior” and they are “the chosen.” What differentiates them from Daesh?

On the other hand, our experiences show that resorting to violence or committing massacres does not have anything to do with being a member of a terrorist organization which emerged from a Baath-ridden, post-American occupation Iraq; white and blue collared members of such a cult are also capable of committing these atrocities. We have seen this on the night of July 15, 2016. Psychiatrists are explaining this situation as a “frenzy as a result of excessive narcissism.” The questions regarding Gülen’s national and international connections and targets are yet to be answered.

After the purge of such a bloody military insurgency, Turkey, as a respectable member of the international community, which had held national elections since the 19th century, expected a positive reaction from its Western partners and Western media. This was an understandable expectation since Western countries represent themselves as markers of democracy, advocates of the supremacy of the will of the people, and guardians of legitimately elected governments, which may be discharged only again by elections.However, Turkey’s Western partners failed to raise a powerful voice against the July 15 coup attempt. They failed to raise even a feeble voice. After thirty-nine days, US Vice-President Joe Biden visited Ankara; no high-level politicians from Germany, France, or the UK visited Turkey. Most of the statements after the coup attempt were of the nature of expressing regret that the coup had failed.

Specifically, during the last days of July, James Clapper, the Director of US National Intelligence, complained by saying, “Many of our interlocutors in the Turkish Army have been either purged or arrested”; in the same vein, Joseph Votel, the Commander of US Central Command, was “concerned” about, not the coup attempt, but how US operations in the region will be affected by the attempt. Such statements raise the suspicion of whether the US might have been behind the coup attempt. A few days after the coup attempt, John Kerry, US Secretary of State, made a statement to the effect that operations against FETO members should not go too far, which was sufficient to establish a background for the criticisms directed at the US. Tens of articles of the kind supporting the failed coup were published in the mainstream Western media such as the New York Times, the Guardian, Time, CNN, the Washington Post, BBC, the Times, and Der Spiegel. It is no wonder that such publications led to deep disappointment in Turkey.

Anti-Turkey Stand of the Western Media in History

As one considers the background of perception management in the Western media against Turkey, it is seen that this disappointment goes far back into the past and has been practiced for decades by contemporary media outlets. Western media, to a large extent, has positioned itself against Turkey on many issues. For instance, Kemal Karpat, in his book entitled Politicization of Islam, in a section on press, talks about how European countries used the Western press against the Ottomans, helping us understand better the current state of affairs with the following example: “The foreign powers used their ‘free’ press to excoriate and condemn Abdulhamid without causing diplomatic incidents except on rare occasions. The French used Le Figaro, while the Russians enlisted Le Nord, a Brussels newspaper, into their service and financed the famous salon of Madame Olga Novikov in London, in which Turks were described as unfit for Western civilization and as promoters of ‘Muslim fanaticism’.” The excerpt underlines the fact that, since the 19th century, Western countries have sought to keep the Ottomans under control by using the press and financing certain lobbies to demonize the Turks.

A similar assessment is made by Orhan Koloğlu, in his book entitled The History of Press. Koloğlu recounts that, during the period 1828-1829, the beginning of the Greek uprising, thousands of Muslim children, women, and elderly were massacred by the Greeks; yet, the Western press pointed at the Ottoman State as the side that committed the massacres; such a blatant and overt disinformation campaign by the Western press was astonishing to the Ottomans. In the 19th century, the same attitude was exhibited by the Western press in the cases of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Armenia.

The Western media’s anti-Turkey publications after the July 15 coup attempt, and the two examples I presented from the 19th century, demonstrate that Western media outlets target the victimized rather than the guilty. As one traces back over the vital issues Turkey has faced, it is clear that the Western media has continued incessantly with the same publication strategy, unless the West had a direct self-interest at stake.

Edward Said’s Diagnosis

The anti-Turkey campaign conducted by the European and the American mainstream media is in perfect agreement with the emphasis made by Edward Said in his book Culture and Imperialism. In his work, Said tells about “the existence of an international media that invades insidiously an incomprehensively vast land.” Because, the matter of transforming many different events in many different places around the globe into news, after filtering them through Western interests, has begun to establish another method of hegemony.

To illustrate this, for example, the operations conducted by Turkey against the terror organizations DAESH and PKK have been distorted by both the New York Times and Der Spiegel to claim that “Turkey is killing civilians, invading the region, and killing the Kurds.” As visual misinformation, pictures of people killed by the Russian bombardments in the region were used non-factually. The increasing dosage of such publications after the July 15 coup attempt is proof that the anti-Turkey campaign is being escalated deliberately. On the night of July 15, NBC announced that “Erdogan, refused landing in Istanbul, is reported to be seeking asylum in Germany,” which was certainly a lie; yet, the channel has not apologized for this misinformation. The cover of a special Der Spiegel issue on Turkey on September 11, 2016, carries both visually and content-wise stamps of orientalism. On the cover, the magazine uses such expressions as, “Ein Land verliert die Freiheit” (a country loses its freedom) and “the dictator in fight with his own cities,” and pictures the minarets of the Blue Mosque (Sultanahmet Mosque) as fired rockets. In tone with Said’s emphasis, a typical distortion and otherization has been committed by the magazine. That is, the news is veiled as it is propagated.

Journalism as Fictionalism instead of Objectivity

The above excerpts from historians Karpat and Koloğlu show that the Western media has a long and prejudiced history against Turkey, which still continues today. In this historical stretch, it appears that there have been many politically charged, manipulated, and constructed news stories published and disseminated by the Western media against Turkey. Thus, disregarding the principle of objectivity, and other principles and regulations that define the realm of professional ethics are ignored when it comes to Turkey.

No doubt, Turkey has to respond to such campaigns and these efforts must include both public diplomacy and lobbying activities. However, deep prejudice and the absence of objectivity exhibited by the Western media against Turkey are major problems mostly related to the administrators of the biased newspapers and to their cultural capitals. It is difficult to find a direct remedy for this, because the manipulation of the media is a result of conscious and deliberate choice. In spite of this, Turkey should never give up in the attempt to remind prejudiced media managers of the fundamental principles of journalism and the simple facts and rules of democracy.

Turkey aborted the July 15 coup attempt and this was, to a certain extent, due to the fact that the government has gradually proven its legitimacy in the eyes of different ideological groups. Political institutions, however, have lagged behind society and this became apparent thanks to the suppression of the coup attempt and the way in which it was thwarted. Societal and political expectations instantly became closer and a sudden and strong overlap occurred on the night of July 15. National feelings and discourses in this instantaneous compromise seem to have been effective in creating today’s political atmosphere. However, the nationalist feeling will, undoubtedly, lose its current effect in the long run and more sophisticated concepts to elucidate the new consensus will come into play.Due to the structural problems of Turkish politics, the gap between political authority and peripheral values has always caused democracy-related problems. It is not only religion-state relations but also ethnic-sectarian differences that increase the complexity of this picture. The conservative-democrat characteristic of the political power in the last fifteen years has profoundly changed the never-ending dichotomy of center-periphery relations in Turkish society. The simple secular-religious dichotomy in politics was transformed into something new; relations altered; and Turkey has entered a new phase.

The number one reason for this change is that the suppression and exclusion of religious values from the political sphere have come to an end and this has happened at the expense of radical secularism in Turkey. The ideological polarization between central and peripheral values inflicted by political institutions has considerably weakened. Hence, both sides – namely, the secularist and conservative – have developed a capacity to unite against a new kind of enemy or for a different aspiration. By the same token, the two sides have met each other in practical life and their lifestyles have integrated with the elimination of the ideological differences. Daily issues instigated by ideological controversies have lost their old meanings. A new and shared public space and new relations have emerged. Fear of potential social problems stemming from living together, which was frequently voiced in the early years of the AK Party by the secularist camp, has lost its popularity. Since neither the secular nor the conservative camps have been discriminated, or given privilege, old political arguments cannot be revived.

Shortly before the July 15 coup attempt, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had said, “We will re-establish the State.” That was the outcome of the unveiled consensus that was already under way in the social sphere among different ideological groups, but which was to be reflected in political institutions as well. Obviously, Erdoğan’s position as the supreme commander – namely President of the Republic – has become one of the most critical turns in this road. Social policies to meet the needs of religious people who have been outmaneuvered for long and to bring new dynamics into society could only have been designed through such institutional means. Timing and the paths that Erdoğan has followed until now have been influential in his multi-faceted achievements as much as his use of rhetoric and the corresponding social realism in his political behavior.

Nationalism has undeniably enabled a stunning mass mobilization in this new consensus, especially with the developments in the international political conjuncture. However, the difference here is that the current nationalism, while mobilizing different ideological segments of Turkish society, has gained a wider social base and sophisticated as to integrate into other ideologies. In this political conjuncture, it is undeniable that nationalism has served as a glue to bind all segments of Turkish society, and that the glue has a dilute nature that will allow unbinding in due time. Because the feeling that has mobilized society is anti-militarism as much as it is nationalism. In Turkish society, today, there are strong uniting motivations, such as anti-militarism, participation in the public sphere, and democratic expectations. All of these motivations tend to transform policies, but they cannot be easily understood through either headcount or dichotomist structural analysis of the past. As different segments of Turkish society are fully participated in the process of production and division and sustain their contributions to the legitimacy mechanisms of political power, the needs of the social and political spheres will continue to follow each other.

The American Revolution was, to a large extent, identical to an independence war. The Americans objected to the authority of King George III and the British Parliament, but on no account were they slaves in shackles. In March 1770, British soldiers panicked when Americans threw snowballs at them and opened fire. Five Americans died, but in a short period of time the event became known as the Boston Massacre throughout the colonies, one of the smallest massacres in world history!American merchants decided to stop selling British tea and refused to unload the tea from the three ships anchored in Boston Harbor. On the night of December 16, 1773, a group of 60 Americans went to the harbor and threw the tea into the sea. The British Parliament was angered by this act and imposed a ban on the usage of Boston Harbor until the owners of the tea were fully compensated. Parliament also declared that Boston would be governed by British soldiers commanded by the British general, Thomas Gage.

The American Congress gathered in 1774. Congress sent a petition to George III and Parliament, asking for the harbor to be opened, the soldiers removed, and the taxes abolished. The petition did not solve the problem or bring peace. Skirmishes between Americans and British soldiers broke out, evolving into full-scale war. In the beginning, it seemed impossible that the Americans would win against Britain, a huge military world power that had recently won the Seven Years War. However, in 1778, things started to change. The old foe of Britain, France, decided to side with the American colonies. Then, Spain and the Netherlands also entered the war. In 1781, George Washington captured the biggest British army unit at Yorktown, in Virginia. The colonies gained independence and started construction of the new political system.

The Americans did fight for their independence against an imperial power with which they shared many social and cultural values. According to one interpretation, they preferred to set up a republic instead of a kingdom because they had conducted their independence war against the British kingdom. The colonies desired to achieve two important aims at the same time: to create a new common political entity and to keep their autonomy. The American founding fathers were also sensitive to achieving or, to put it better, protecting individual freedom. Thus, they created a federal system to please the colonies, and implemented checks and balances in the sense of constitutional governance traditions to serve individual freedom.

France was late with respect to Britain, both in having a constitutional order and achieving industrial revolution. It was poor and militarily weak. In hostility against Britain, France helped the American colonies to defeat the British Empire. The French people followed the fight of the Americans with great admiration. Ironically, they had to obey an emperor in their own country.

France was a country of three classes. The first class consisted of the Roman Catholic priests (the Church) who did not have to pay taxes as Catholicism was the official religion of France. This class had other privileges too. The second class, which included almost 30,000 people, lived in large manors, farms inherited by their ancestors. They had high social and official status, serving as generals, ambassadors, and ministers, and very few of them paid taxes. The third class was the largest, numbering almost 26 million. It included lawyers, merchants, doctors, farmers, etc. They were the people who paid taxes, even for basic needs. They also paid taxes to the church.

The French people were poor and in the seasons of bad harvest they went hungry. The state was also broke. King Louis XVI wanted to impose taxes on the aristocracy, but was not able to succeed in this. Social unrest seemed inevitable. As the American Declaration of Independence was translated into French and published, millions of French people read it and learned about freedom and equality.

Louis XVI pressed for taxes. The aristocracy declared that they would agree to be taxed, provided that the representatives of the three classes came together and united on the necessity of the taxes. The king accepted and the representatives of the three classes assembled. However, the representatives of the third class (named as the public, or the people) were discriminated against and made to understand that they were not as important as the other classes. The voting method in the Assembly also caused discontent among the representatives of the third class. As the third class included a huge majority of the French people, its representatives changed the name of the Assembly to the National Assembly and convinced some of the priests and aristocrats to act with them. Other aristocrats rushed to ask the king to stop the new Assembly from functioning, fearing that it would take decisions that would harm their interests. The king accepted and locked the meeting hall.

The new Assembly insisted on gathering and decided to write a new constitution. The king ordered the National Assembly to dissolve but his order was rejected. He then decided to use force and called upon his special guard unit of soldiers from Switzerland. The people in Paris, hearing that the king’s guardians were coming to suppress them, declared that they would resist. They attacked the Bastille on the July 4, 1789, to find an arsenal that had only a dozen prisoners being protected by almost ten soldiers. However, later on, in writing the history of the French Revolution, a story about the Bastille was produced that is comparable to the American Boston Massacre. The French Revolution grew to extensive violence that cost the lives of thousands, among which were not only aristocrats but also ordinary people.

After the French Revolution, France adopted a republican political structure. The newly emerged republic was based on the idea of equality for all citizens. It produced the French Declaration of Human and Citizen Rights. The French revolutionaries also took a position not only against the dynasty but also the religious establishment (the Church) and even religion itself, and created the French laïcité. More than two centuries after the French Revolution, the French people are still divided into two large groups: those who are for the Revolution and those who are against it.

Thus, the French revolution marked a break in French political history. Although it is debatable how successful it was in reaching its declared aims, the French Revolution proceeded to create a completely new political structure instead of restoring what the French people called the ancient regime.

Setbacks of Revolution

Now it is time to make a general observation about the results of revolutions. The term ‘revolution’ connotes, especially when used in romantic senses and contexts, radical changes that sweep completely away previous institutions, rules, and social and political entities. This approach is misleading. Revolution might mean significant change, but on no account does it lead to the change of everything. The idea that it can be possible to change everything at once and for forever is an unrealistic, false approach, denied by the nature of human life. In the case of the three classical revolutions, including the French, it is possible to detect continuity in social and political life. There is nothing surprising in this, as life depends upon repetition and continuity.

Turkish Political System up to July 15, 2016

Turkey lived through and witnessed an unprecedented event, not only in Turkish history but probably in the history of the world on July 15, 2016. The Turkish people defeated an attempted coup by the military without the use of weapons. In order to fully grasp what happened and why it is unique and so important, we need to point out the main characteristics of the Turkish political system before July 15, 2016.

The Turkish Republic was founded on October 29, 1923, after an independence war as a relatively plural and democratic political entity. Then, in 1925, it was turned into a single-party dictatorship that lasted until 1945. After the end of WWII, Turkey faced the truth that it had to make a choice between the democratic West and the totalitarian Soviet bloc. Due to several domestic and international factors, the political leadership of the time decided to unite with the West and started the process to transfer the closed political system into a democratic one. On May 14, 1950, Turkey had its first democratic elections, in which the opposition party – the Democrat Party (DP) – won and replaced the People Republic Party (PRP).

However, the PRP and its allies in the bureaucracy and society were discontent with the new regime. As early as 1952, only two years after the DP took office, army officers began to make plans to overthrow the democratic government. They started a military coup on May 27, 1960, the first coup in the history of the Turkish Republic. After a show trial, the army executed PM Adnan Menderes, and had a new constitution prepared that allocated the army a special and undemocratic position and, overall, established what we call a bureaucratic tutelage system. In the new political structure, the democratically elected government was given limited scope and the rest of state authority was reserved for the bureaucracy, with the army at the center.

All democratically elected governments showed discontent with the bureaucratic tutelage system and made small attempts to change its denominators. The biggest effort in this respect occurred after the AK Party came to power in November 2002. During the AK Party era, the bureaucratic tutelage system has been pushed back step by step. In his fight against bureaucratic state power, PM Erdoğan has needed allies in the bureaucracy as he, despite having political power, lacks bureaucratic cadres. Within the state structure, the main bureaucratic groups were the Kemalists and the Gülenists. As they were coming from similar religious and cultural backgrounds, Erdoğan allied with the Gülenists against the Kemalist cadres. However, the Gülenists were a deep-rooted, clandestine group with their own ambitions and plans. The aim of the Gülenists was to seize power within the bureaucracy so that, no matter which political party was in office, they would have the real power.

Erdoğan sensed the Gülenist make-up in the bureaucracy in 2010 and started preparations to take steps to curb the Gülenist bureaucracy. This was the beginning of a still ongoing fight between the two powers: democratically elected, legitimate, and transparent government on one side, and a hidden, bureaucratic, totalitarian power on the other.

The Gülenist movement made several attempts to take Erdoğan’s governments down. It tried to arrest the head of the National Intelligence Agency and, through him, reach Erdoğan in February 2012. The attempt failed. Then, the Gülenist gang tried to benefit from the Gezi Revolts in June 2013. An important effort to oust Erdoğan came from Gülen’s men in the police and judiciary on December 17-25, 2013. This attempt also failed.

The Coup Attempt of the Gülenist Army

Everyone in the country knew that the Gülenists had infiltrated the army, but no one was sure how large the infiltration was. It became clear on the night of July 15, 2016. The army officers who were FETO (Gülenist Terror Organization) members attempted a violent military coup. It was the bloodiest coup attempt in the history of the Republic. More than 200 people were killed and thousands were wounded. The people resisted the Gülenist officers and defeated the coup.

Many domestic and foreign observers of Turkish politics had expected such an attempt by the Gülenists. But why did it come on July 15, 2016? One might consider two reasons: 1) the judiciary was about to arrest many Gülenist officers who had participated in plot trials committed against army officers who were not Gülenists; 2) the government was about to have almost 2,000 Gülenist officers retired at the High Military Commission meeting in early August 2016. The Gülenists understood that they would lose an important part of their manpower in the army. This forced them to begin the coup as soon as possible. As the National Intelligence Agency learned of the attempted coup, the coup plotters changed their timing and began to implement their plan at 21:00 pm July 15, instead of 03:00 am on the night of July 16, 2016.

One point needs to be specifically mentioned here. The Gülenists had been able to present themselves to the outside world – though, of course, not to the Turkish people – as a peaceful movement of moderate Islam that defended secularism and fought radical Islam. They also managed to portray Erdoğan as a radical Islamist and Turkey as a country run by Islamists. To do this, they used totalitarian disinformation tactics. In fact, it is Gülen and his men who are radical. Gülen wishes to create a political system that resembles that of Iran. His ultimate aim is world domination.

The coup attempt failed. Several factors contributed to its failure. President Erdoğan and PM Binali Yıldırım declared that they would resist, even at the cost of their own lives. Erdoğan called on the people to defend democracy in the streets. Millions of people from every walk of life and political bent poured into the streets unarmed and challenged the soldiers. Public prosecutors issued a warrant to the police forces to arrest soldiers who were trying to overthrow the government. Turkish media, for the first time in the history of the Turkish republic, stood united against the coup attempt. The police bravely fought against the soldiers taking part in the coup, and army officers who opposed the coup attempt and were loyal to the constitutional order resisted in active or passive ways against the Gülenist officers.

The Gülenists tried to renew and accelerate the Kemalist bureaucratic tutelage system. That the coup attempt failed, or to put it better, that Turkish politics and the people defeated it, will have consequences for Turkish politics and the political system. Turkish politics will push the bureaucratic tutelage system back even further. It is certain that Turkey will be more democratic afterwards. After the failed coup attempt, Turkey began to reconstruct the state structure. Of special importance in this respect are the reforms in the army. For decades, the army in general and army generals in particular enjoyed a fairly autonomous position with regard to the democratic government. Generals saw themselves on a par with high-level politicians, and even thought of themselves as superior to the prime ministers.

Now, all of this is changing. Military schools at the level of high schools have been, rightly, closed down as they had been completely infiltrated by the Gülenists. Commanders of the army, navy, and air forces will be under the command of the Minister of National Defense, something that has been talked about for decades but has never come to pass. The National Intelligence Agency will be restructured.

More importantly, there is a spirit of reconciliation in the country. Turkish politics is excessively divided, but all main political parties united to oppose the coup. Political leaders now use softened language towards each other. People from all political parties participated in demonstrations against the coup. All of these developments give us hope for the future of Turkish democracy.

July Revolution of Turks      

It is not an exaggeration to call the Turkish people’s defeat of the coup attempt a revolution. It has the main characteristics of the classical revolutions. It caused or paved the way for sweeping political change. The Gülenists competed illegitimately for political power and lost the fight. Millions of people joined the resistance against the coup attempt. Now we can say that Turkey is among the countries that have a saga to support the democratic system. Turkey’s July 15 resistance against the coup attempt is no less than the British, American or French revolutions.

Consolidation of Democracy after an Attempted Coup D’état in Spain 

Spain suffered more than 50 military coups or attempted coups between 1814 and 1981. Most of these coups were held with the aim of increasing the authority of the state or “rescuing Spain” from external influences. The last failed coup attempt was named “23-F” and was over after a one-day domination by the putschists on February 23, 1981. It was held by the Civil Guard, a military force positioned between the army and the police. On the day of the attempt, 200 members of the Civil Guard broke into parliament and took almost 350 MPs hostage. According to the later revealed coup plot, Franco-era sympathizers of the Civil Guard aimed to arrest the leaders of all political parties and eliminate the political hierarchy to create a power vacuum that would be filled by them. This attempt, interestingly, has much in common with the failed coup of July 15, 2016, in Turkey, both in forms of practice and methods of struggle. It was defeated by strong statements against the coup from King Juan Carlos I of Spain and the uncompromising attitude of the Spanish media against the coup plotters. Moreover, lack of support from the vast majority of the armed forces prevented the spread of the coup throughout the country.

Immediately after the occupation of parliament, Juan Carlos gave the first public statement on television and called for the continuation of the democratic government. As the Commander in Chief of the Spanish army, his call for troops not to join the coup attempt was effective in preventing further incidents. Additionally, a state of emergency was declared in a short period of time and the troops loyal to the King were sent to parliament. One of the smart decisions of the king overtook the plans of the putschists: he formed a temporary cabinet consisting of undersecretaries to avoid the creation of a power vacuum in the country. After all measures, the putschists ended the occupation of parliament and surrendered.

This failed coup attempt pointed out the truth that, even if leaders were trying to empower democratic institutions, there was a requirement for the comprehensive restructuring of the Spanish armed forces. In fact, the leaders of this coup had made a similar attempt in 1978 and were sentenced to just seven months in prison. The lesson taken from this event was that, if putschists are not appropriately punished, members of the army will continue to consider the coup as an option. The Supreme Council of Military Justice conducted the trial and, according to the final judgment, the putschists largely responsible for the coup were sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment. After this attempt, drastic measures were taken to prevent further coups. In 1982, all military officers with any connection to previous coup attempts were dismissed from the army. Instead, pro-democracy bureaucrats and officers were designated to critical missions and appeared more in the press. The officers thought possibly to be involved in the coup were appointed to passive missions. Also, military governors in the Ministry of Defense were replaced by civilians and the prime minister did not place any officer in the government anymore.

Without doubt, the most important factor enabling the consolidation of democracy in Spain was the acceleration of the accession process to the EU (known as the European Economic Community (EEC) at that time). The European parliament gave instructions to accelerate the accession negotiations with Spain after the failed coup. The main objective of this decision was to establish Spanish democracy on a firm ground through full membership to the Union. As a result, Spain became a member of the EU in 1986 and Spanish democracy was taken under the wing of the EU.

Greece’s Transition to Democracy after a Failed Coup

Dominated by the junta between 1967 and 1974, Greece reopened its democratization process and began to struggle with political leaders of the junta period after overthrowing the juntaists. However, an elected civil government was exposed to a new coup attempt in February 1975 by Greek army officers sympathetic to the recently deposed junta regime. The democratically elected civil government of Greece was alerted to the coup attempt by the director of the Central Intelligence Service before the juntaists put their plan into action, and the juntaists were arrested in the early hours of February 24, 1975. This failed coup became known as “The Pyjamas Coup” because most of the juntaists were arrested in their nightwear.

After this attempt, the Greek government decided to move against all anti-democratic elements of the military: 500 officers were retired, 800 officers were assigned to passive missions and almost 100 suspended anti-juntaist officers were brought back to their posts to strengthen the government’s hand in fight against the juntaists. The juntaists were charged with the crimes of high treason and insurrection in the trial dubbed “Greece’s Nuremberg.” The leaders of the attempt were sentenced to death, which was later commuted to life imprisonment. The rest also were sentenced to prison terms ranging from a minimum of five years to life imprisonment.

As in the case of Spain, the largest contribution to the politics of the normalization and demilitarization efforts was provided by the country’s route to becoming a member of the EU. To restore a stable democracy, Greece became a member of the EU in 1981 without fulfilling all conditions and criteria. Although EU membership contributed to reducing the risk of a coup, Greece had to grapple with the problem of terrorism for many years until the 2000s, as did Spain.

Spain and Greece followed the same path in the transition to democracy after a failed coup. As can be seen, the EU played a critical role in the democratization of both countries and made some concessions to promote their memberships. However, when it comes to Turkey’s July 15 coup attempt case, the EU seems not to take any responsible steps to help Turkey expurgate the ruins of the coup attempt. In other words, Turkey is in a position that requires the country to take matters into its own hands. Also, both cases show that it is crucial to avoid any weakness in discharging junta elements from the security services, bureaucracy, civil society organizations, and the media, as long as remaining within the law. All of these measures are required to avoid manipulating the post-coup process and the threat of internal conflict. It should be recalled that the most important step is struggling with society’s perceptions that cause coups. Turkish society’s reaction to the July 15 coup attempt is one of the most concrete examples of increasing awareness about the damage that coups can cause to democratic institutions.

Picture: “After he burst into the Cortes, the Spanish parliament, the mustachioed Lieutenant-Colonel Antonio Tejero de Molina (C) brandishes his pistol 23 February 1981 on the tribunal of the Cortes, as he takes the cabinet and some 350 MPs hostage, during an attempted coup by a right-wing group of the paramilitary Guardia Civil. King Juan Carlos later the same day told the Spanish people in a television broadcast that he had ordered the armed forces to “take all necessary measures” to put down the coup. The King’s broadcast ended the coup.” AFP

At first glance, this may appear to hold some truth, given the Gülenists’ overt allegiance to liberal-democratic politics and in general to Western ways of doing things. Yet, below the iceberg, Gülenism has a real face, a dark obscurantist zeal for world domination, in terms of its goals, and the path chosen to achieve them contradicts almost everything that is Western. Gülenism is rather a radical nihilist subject, which is antagonistic to liberal modernity.Indeed, in the process of transition from a traditional to modern society, there emerge three generic types of subject. All of these types of subject are alternative responses to the question of how to handle the relationship between man and the outside world. In traditional society, the subject was conceptualized as an organic part of society and in which society was understood to be a transcendental and unchanging moral totality. The shift to the modern era has resulted in the loosening of society’s grip on the subject. The subject has become morally autonomous and free of society, but only at the cost of alienation. In other words, collective societal values have become optional, not a necessity for the subject. The subject has become “homeless” and is required to find meaning in order to continue its moral integrity on its own.Thus, in the modern era we have three generic types of subjectivity. The first is the Nietzschean “Last Man.” The Last Man is the subject that approaches alienation with open arms. Its motto is “world without values.” It rejects the values or collective responsibilities that overcome the individual for the sake of the bodily pleasures of the material world. The politics of the Last Man, the subject of negative nihilism, consists of apathy towards politics, therefore succumbing to individualism and limitless hedonism.The subject of radical nihilism, on the other hand, goes in the opposite direction. Its motto is “values without world.” It lives for higher values and is always ready to sacrifice its life for transcendental values that cannot find space in the world. It has a tense relationship with the outside world. Hence, its politics is shaped by either becoming introverted, like post-Ancient Greek stoics or the Dostoyevskian “Man of the Underworld,” in order to ease the pressure of worldly existence, or by becoming extroverted to destroy the world, like the fundamental terrorist groups such as Daesh in the modern era, for the sake of values.

The last form of subjectivity rests on positive nihilism. The motto of a positive nihilist is “world with values.” It embraces both values and the world by redefining the relationship between them. It follows not transcendental values, which are rather given and ahistoric, but immanent values, which are socially constructed and historical. So, it embarks on creating new values from scratch. It approaches the world as neither a valueless place nor a place antagonistic to its values. It strives to create itself and a world by constantly creating novel values. Its politics, therefore, hovers over the search for human emancipation, seeking more humane life here and now.

Who is a Gülenist?

Today, one can come across both negative nihilists and positive nihilists in the West. The ideal is to make positive nihilism the norm while the default comes to be negative nihilism. Despite their sheer differences, both positive and negative nihilistic types act open-heartedly in society. They strive for power and participate in political life, but only through legal and democratic political channels.

What about Gülenism? With what type of nihilism is the Gülenist affiliated? What are the basic tenets of Gülenist politics? In fact, a typical Gülenist is a radical nihilist, blending its offensive and defensive forms. It attaches itself to a set of transcendental values, which it thinks of as alien to this materialistic and ungodly world. With its fellow Gülenist members, it withdraws from the world and builds up a parallel universe, at the center of which the Messiah figure of Fethullah Gülen resides. Like a typical stoic, it rejects the world for the sake of its own values and for an unfettered moral life within its community. It rejects the outside world to enjoy inner freedom in its cosmic world. Up to this point, Gülenism is similar to any other collectivity of hermits, or a typical religious group that is disenchanted with modern life. Indeed, this is the image the Gülenists strive to present to the general public.

Unfortunately, there is more to Gülenism. It might sound odd, but the Gülenists act with a motivation to conquer the whole world. Hizmet (to be in the service of the whole of humanity) is a key word that defines the movement. It should be noted that the Gülenists operate in more than 100 countries across the globe. Gülen establishes his sermons on the theme of entering the hearts of the local people by offering various kinds of service, such as education and health, and talks highly of those “soldiers of Hizmet.” The mission of the soldiers of Hizmet is not only made up of helping people where they operate but also to marry the daughters or relatives of local notables to garner political influence for the cause. In each country, by enlarging its clout in civil society and infiltrating state apparatus, the Gülenists strive to control the strategic posts of power. This amounts to amplifying the Gülenists’ parallel world step by step and society by society towards the outside and, in the end, uniting the whole world under its own parallel world.

To achieve this, Gülenists pose a Janus-faced personality. This hypocritical personality speaks two separate and somewhat contradictory “languages.” With the “outside people” (a generic label given to non-members by the movement), the Gülenist talks like a typical individualist liberal-democrat; within the boundaries of its closed community, it communicates through an esoteric language that incessantly reminds the members of their collective responsibilities and the importance of self-sacrifice for the cause. It praises the society of free and equal individuals in its media outlets as it interacts with the general public, yet within the boundaries of its community it is allowed nothing but a very strict hierarchical structure that has formed around an infallible and omniscient Messiah figure.

Moreover, it talks around the importance of dialogue and tolerance among individuals and societies in the public sphere but does not hold back from resorting to build up exclusive and closed areas of control for itself in society behind closed doors and to use all kinds of violence against those whom it thinks of as an obstacle to its sacred mission when the opportunity presents itself. Hence, it abides by two completely different registers of morality. It does not hesitate to act completely in contrast to its value-system or pretend in order to hide its real self in the outside world. In Gülenism’s lexicon, this act of dissimulation and infiltration is of central importance, and is known as takiyye or tedbir.

Thus, eventually, Gülenism has grown from being a collective of introverted stoic-type radical nihilists to a collective of extroverted Daesh-type radical nihilists. It has slowly evolved from a figure that turns its back to the world to enjoy inner freedom and repose, to a figure that embarks on destroying the world of others for the sake of its own parallel world. This evolution from defensive to offensive radical nihilism has gradually progressed and reached its prime on the bloody night of July 15. Indeed, Gülenism is a clandestine terrorist organization acting outside the legitimate boundaries of democratic politics, attacking the very values of freedom and equality upon which the West was built. In short, it is remote and detrimental to the ideals of the West.

Why should not the West support the Gülenists?

As this Janus-faced structure of the Gülenists unfolds, the interests and ideals of the West will fall apart. The growing discrepancy between the faces, therefore, will put pressure on the West to make a hard choice between its interests and ideals. Until now, the West has seemed to side with interests, putting ideals on the back burner. Indeed, to recover the emergent contradiction between interests and ideals after July 15, the media outlets have been inundated by coverage that struggles to carve out a convenient narrative of the event. This has encapsulated various forms of coverage, such as denying the reality of the coup attempt, turning a blind eye to the Gülenists’ involvement in the coup and putting the spotlight on the purges of the Gülenists by state apparatus after July 15.

Nevertheless, in the long run, protecting the Gülenists will inextricably harm Western interests. Political actors are supposed to perform their identities through their actions as long as they want to maintain the existing definition of who they are. Therefore, sacrificing ideals to interests to such an extent may unleash an identity crisis and disrupt the actors’ ethical integrity. This may deepen the thriving problem of democratic deficit, which has been instigated by the ever-growing distance between the elite and the common people in the West. The rise of right-wing populism that is underway across the West may find more room to flourish and finally lead to a wave of political instability.

Moreover, not living up to its own ethical-political standards will also significantly erode the West’s moral standing in the international arena. True, hard power calls the final shot; however, soft power is a necessary ingredient for an efficient foreign policy and determines success in international politics. The loss of moral superiority and prestige will enervate the West’s leadership in world politics. In a nutshell, Gülenism is the fatal dagger to the very heart of the Western worlds’ ethical-political ideals and to its strategic interests as well.

In particular, many of the Iranians in Europe and the US suffer from a traumatic reading of their history as they are also misled by their limited familiarity with the social and political developments that take place in Turkey. From the morning of July 16 onwards, they chose to concentrate on those who were purged, detained or arrested for their connection with FETO, Fetullah Gülen Terror Organization, rather than on the 250 citizens who died or the thousands of others who risked their lives and were injured when resisting the putschists. Take, for example, the inflammatory comments Hamid Dabashi shared on social media recently, in which he irresponsibly compared President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan with, all at once, Kim Jong-un of North Korea, Adolf Hitler, Mussolini, Franco of Spain, Ioannis Metaxas of Greece and Juan Peron of Argentina. Ironically, what infuriated Mr. Dabashi so much was the historic huge gathering in Yenikapı/Istanbul on August 7 where millions of people, including the president, the prime minister and the leaders of the two main opposition parties, came together to peacefully denounce the putschists again.

The Incubus of the Past or the Burden of History

Such an attitude not only displays an academic frivolity not uncommonly found among some Iranian experts who know little about Turkey but also testifies an uncanny tendency among them, as among some of their Turkish counterparts, to exceed the limits of a scholarly comparison between Turkey and Iran. True, Iran and Turkey have, roughly from the early 19th century onwards, followed fascinatingly similar historical trajectories. But the underlying spirit in these trajectories has been noticeably different. Throughout their modernization processes from 19th century onwards although they converged in their struggle against the ever-increasing imperial pressures coming from the West, the struggle consolidated the extra-governmental elements in Iran while it was mainly organized around the state machine in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey.

Further, despite the major ups and downs, throughout the decades, popular elections played the determining role in Turkey, while Iran almost invariably appeased repression at home to remove foreign domination. It is quite problematic that, while some pro-regime figures in Iran tend to interpret every popular movement in the Middle East as inspired by the uprisings that brought about the Iranian Revolution of 1979, some of the anti-regime Iranians hasten to analyze almost every such movement, especially if it harbors an Islamic tone, as a prelude to an Islamic state.

Interestingly enough, however, these two opposite positions seem to agree on an unfavorable reading of the failed coup attempt in Turkey. Basically, the now well-known obsession against President Erdoğan and his policies constitute a common ground between the two opposite camps. It is no secret that the conservative circles inside Iran have long since turned against Erdoğan. They see him and the current regional policies of the Turkish government as an obstacle to taking full advantage of the ‘historical opportunity’ that has emerged for them from the widespread destabilization in the Middle East to realize their regional power aspirations. Many conservative figures in Iran condemned, inasmuch they did, the crushed coup attempt not on democratic grounds but for notably different motivations. The anti-regime Iranians, on the other hand, have mysteriously accused President Erdoğan of leaning towards authoritarianism and even totalitarianism, the two terms whimsically and irresponsibly used by Erdoğan’s opponents.

Diverse Political Readings

Also, reactions to the failed coup inside Iran have not only reflected the perceptions of Turkey by Iran’s political elite but have also reemphasized the political divides at home. Javad Zarif, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, was among the first to condemn the coup attempt. Hours after the attempt, he emphasized the significance of popular will and sided with the Turkish people. For the Moderate-Reformist figures, the failed coup attempt attested to the significance of the unalienable popular will and the futility of any move to run against it. Unsurprisingly, with the presidential elections less than a year away in Iran and the risk of Rouhani’s disqualification from running for president by the Guardian Council becoming more pronounced, the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and his close circle have used the failed coup attempt to send a democratic message to the conservative establishment in Iran to respect the popular will.

For the Principalists, the failed coup has provided the best opportunity to disfavor the Rouhani government on one obvious point, to wit, its rapprochement with the US, especially following the nuclear deal reached in 2015. In a statement at a gathering in Tehran, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei referred to the failed coup attempt in Turkey as a sign of the untrustworthiness of the US for its alleged involvement. Another conditional condemnation of the failed coup attempt came from Ali Akbar Valayeti, Khamenei’s aide in international affairs, who used it to criticize Turkey for its insistence on the removal of Asad in Syria. In an interview on 16 July 2016, only one day after the coup attempt, he expressed his hope that “a day would come when the Turkish administration would also respect the opinion and vote of the Syrian people” and claimed “Bashar al-Assad has also been elected through the ballot box.”

The crushing of the coup attempt marks a watershed, not only in Turkey but also in the entire region. As Javad Zarif put it, “Turkish people’s brave defense of democracy and their elected government proves that coups have no place in our region and are doomed to failure.” In order to secure a lasting solution to the regional crises, most significantly to the Syrian issue, both Turkey and Iran must cooperate as two governments with high popular support, as destabilization or unpopular rule in one inevitably affects the other. Based on the recent foreign policy moves, there is every reason to suggest that Turkey is determined to restore peace in the Middle East by maximizing regional cooperation.

The comments made by some Iranian scholars teaching at western universities not only demonstrate their misreading of the developments which recently took place in Turkey but also give insightful ideas about the limits of their objective thinking. Fortunately, many Iranians inside the country see any coup attempt as categorically damnable, as they welcome the popular resistance in Turkey that heroically crushed the putschists on July 15. They, as every people in the Middle East, appreciate the costs of ineffectual, unpopular and foreign-controlled governments for the region.

Turkey has lived through the biggest trauma in its recent history, as the members of the Fetullah Gülen Terror Organization (FETO) attempted a coup d’état on July 15, 2016. However, the heroic people of Turkey managed to quell this sordid attempt by literally standing unarmed against flying bullets and tank shells. Together with the people were the police, loyal soldiers and politicians, first and foremost being the president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. As a country which has just survived a coup attempt, Turkey has astonished many with its political resilience. While systematically neutralizing coup plotters in multiple governmental organizations, such as the military, judiciary, bureaucracy, health and education sectors, which had been infiltrated by the FETO, the government preserved its functionality and managed to perform as normal.

In the same vein, to the astonishment of many, the Turkish economy showed great resilience in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt. Even in the first working day after the coup attempt, there was no panic in the financial markets. The Turkish lira only marginally lost its value against the US dollar and there was no rush on banks or bonds. In fact, the effect of the coup attempt on the financial markets was barely discernable. The Turkish democracy and economy have survived major setbacks in recent years and proved their resilience, the true extent of which has been understood more clearly in the light of the failed coup attempt.

It was absolutely vital to take necessary steps and give relevant messages to soothe the financial markets at such a critical time. The policymakers managed this process well in a calm and professional manner. The statements were to the point and the policy actions met the needs of the financial markets. In this vein, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Şimşek underlined that the policymakers were implementing best practices and Turkey was committed to the market economy. Şimşek also assured that capital controls were out of the question. Moreover, The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey took immediate actions to ensure the efficient functioning of the banking sector and to relieve financial investors.

In addition to these statements and policy actions, a well-functioning financial system, strong public finances, a dynamic real sector and a moderate current account deficit helped the Turkish economy to stay afloat against the failed coup attempt.

After having endured financial troubles and two major financial crisis in 1994 and 2001, Turkey finally set out to establish financial infrastructure via several regulations and supervisory institutions such as Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency and Savings Deposit Insurance Fund. Having learnt the lesson from the financial troubles suffered, the Turkish financial system has become much more resilient than that of most countries in the world. That is why the Turkish financial industry stayed totally intact in the aftermath of the 2008-09 global financial crisis as financial industries around the world experienced hard times and even faced numerous bankruptcies, such as Lehman Brothers, as well as bail-outs, such as massive insurance company AIG. When we take a look at the important indicators of banking sector, such as credit growth, capital adequacy ratio, the non-performing loans ratio, return on assets and return on equity, it is clearly seen that the Turkish banking sector is not only financially robust, but also highly profitable compared to that of many countries and as far as historical records are concerned.

Public finance is also strong in Turkey. As of 2015, public debt as a share of GDP stood at only 33 percent in Turkey, while it is 249 percent for Japan, 178 percent for Greece, 104 percent for the US and 90 percent for the EU. While the interest burden was very high in the 1990s, as real interest rate of total domestic debt stock was more than 30 percent, it diminished tremendously as real interest rate plummeted to single digit levels in the 2000s. Moreover, Turkey has wiped off all debt owed to the IMF by paying the last installment of 421 million US dollars in 2013, which marked the end of the 52 year debt history with the IMF.

Real sector indicators such as the capacity utilization rate of manufacturing, real sector confidence index and firm entry & exit rates show that the current situation of the Turkish real sector provides a robust image. Current account deficit has been regarded as the Achilles heel of the Turkish economy, as Turkey relies on foreign capital inflows to finance the current account deficit, making it vulnerable to global economic fluctuations. However, although current account deficit and economic growth rates moved in the same direction until two years ago, with higher economic growth rates resulting in a widening current account deficit and lower economic growth rates reducing current account deficit, the economy has been growing in tandem with narrowing current account deficit for the last two years. To put this into numbers, current account balance as a share of GDP decreased from -7.7 percent in 2013 to -5.4 percent in 2014, before shrinking to -4.5 percent in 2015.

The Turkish economy showed the glimpses of its resilience in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt, such that the economy and financial system have worked very well without any instability; as if nothing major took place just a matter of days earlier. The Turkish economy survived serious challenges and actually fared markedly better than that of numerous countries, especially in Europe, in the last few years. It now faces a bigger challenge. However, Turkey, with its strong and healthy economy and financial system, has the required strength and resolution to overcome this challenge too, as the immediate aftermath of the failed coup attempt has attested.

Note: A longer version of this article was recently published by SETA Foundation with the title, “The Resilience of the Turkish Economy after the Failed Coup Attempt”

Was it a spontaneous call and a spontaneous mass response? I believe and will argue that while the timing and brutality of the coup attempt was unexpected, the possibility of a coup itself was not. It is an unfortunate tradition, or rather a curse that Turkey could never fully break, for Turkey’s right and center-right incumbent parties to be forced out of power by the military.The military in Turkey has a tradition of toppling down the democratically elected governments. The reasons vary but in general, the military elites tend to think that the public keep making the mistake of voting for the wrong guys. According to this ill opinion, politicians are nothing more than populist rhetoricians and do not care about the long-term interests of the country. Further, politicians do anything for reelection such as responding to the demands of the ordinary man on the street (a.k.a. democracy) rather than asking wisdom from the military which “only cares about the true interests of the nation”.

Accordingly, the military knows the true interests of the country but the elected politicians and voters just don’t get it. For such a viewpoint, the republic comes before democracy. The military is the defender of the republic and, when necessary, feels obliged to defend it against the people who elect the politicians. Until recently, such an understanding had a solid popular base in the society as well, not big enough to win the elections though. The supporters of the military tutelage especially in the bureaucracy, judiciary, and academia saw nothing wrong with the military hijacking democracy. Even today, some people shy away from calling the 1960 military intervention as a coup (darbe), but prefer to call it a revolution (ihtilal or devrim) instead.After all, the commonly heard phrase, “We are the soldiers of Mustafa Kemal [Mustafa Kemal’in askerleriyiz]” indicated that the military is under the command of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk rather than the current president or prime minister of the time. A coup plotter major and a judge associated with the coup arrested for being involved in the Gülenist coup attempt of July 15 both repeated the slogan “We are the soldiers of Mustafa Kemal.” Regardless of whether it was a genuine call or just a lip service to cover their Gülenist side, this slogan has always been in the back of coup plotters’ mind in the past and present. The military simply did not care about the higher civilian authorities who are alive and currently in office but chose to follow a ghost they created in their imagination.A former chief of the general staff had delicately summarized the military’s autonomy from the elected politicians, government, and any other higher authority in his secretly recorded tape in 2011. (Gulenists are argued to be behind the release and share of this voice recording, which is another proof that the coup is not a temporary problem, nor is it the problem of one single faction in the military. Rather it is a systematic problem of the Turkish military, which needs to be handled for once and for all.) The general, referring to the Article 35 of the Armed Forces Regulation which had been codified in order to justify the coups, stated “They talk about removing the article 35 or something of this sort. Remove it or not, we, as armed forces, exist for this. This is our natural historical mission. Nobody can give us advice on this. Nobody can tell us the opposite of it.”

I have made this long intro just to make one point clear. The Turkish armed forces have traditionally thought that, when it deems it necessary, it has the right to punish the politicians by crashing the democracy with a coup. But in fact, the military enforced all the previous coups (in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997) not because it had the right, but it had the might to do so. They had the tanks and civilians did not, this simple. As of 2016, the military still has the tanks and the civilians still don’t. Everybody knew this, so did President Erdoğan. And Erdoğan also knew that the military continues to be the same old military. Despite all the changes it went through, there was one untouched characteristic: they saw plotting a coup as a natural right of theirs.

Since his party came to power in 2002, Erdoğan has long been worried about a coup against his party, Justice and Development Party (AK Party). The AK Party has won five consecutive elections (a record in Turkish history) and received over 49 percent of the overall votes in the most recent one. However, the curse was still out there. Erdoğan and AK Party politicians kept their eyes open for the tanks in the streets of Ankara. For many, a coup was an inevitable end for the AK Party, which did not give up winning the democratic elections one after another. Erdoğan himself had lost his seat as the mayor of Istanbul in the aftermath of the 1997 coup and spent 4 months 10 days in prison. He was seriously warned a decade later in 2007 with a military memorandum and his party narrowly escaped from being closed by just one vote in the constitutional court in 2008.

Hence, Erdoğan and his followers long expected a coup and probably gave some thought to what to do if/when the day comes. Nobody did anything for the PM Menderes when he was arrested by a colonel in 1960 and was sent to death row in a year. Nobody came to the help of Demirel, Erbakan and all the other politicians in times of coups. But this time the story would be different. Erdoğan has long stressed that he did and will stand firm against any undemocratic intervention. He asked his followers to do the same and his followers had long promised to be ready. It was a matter of humor for the Turkish public opinion to see Erdoğan being greeted by his fans in shrouds (the cloth in which Muslims are buried upon death) in 2013. But the message was serious and clear: we are behind you ‘to death.’

In short, people did not flood into the streets to defend their PM Menderes in 1960 partly because they had no clue about how Menderes’ life would be brutally concluded by the junta and partly because they had no clue about what they could do to prevent or reverse the coup. The same went for the following coups of Turkey up until the one in 2016. This time, people were ready. They had been reminded of the bitter end of earlier politicians and were motivated to defend their votes and elected politicians against a coup. In other words, both Erdoğan and millions of his followers (plus, even greater millions of the entire Turkish electorate) were ready for a coup to occur.

The only error was, they long waited for a Kemalist coup to attempt to crash the Turkish democracy. However, the address was different this time as Gülenists were behind the coup. Nor was the brutality of the coup expected, as it was the most brutal attempt in Turkey ever, with 240 lost lives to defend the democratic regime. Nevertheless, Erdoğan and AK Party were clear on what to do against a coup and with this expectation, they transformed the Turkish electorate on what to do in case a junta tries to crash the democratic process in Turkey. Hence, Turkish voters had learnt their lesson, were ready and waiting for the coup even if they did not know when or from where exactly it would show up. I hope the Turkish military can also learn its lesson and eventually understand that it is not their job to teach people how not to vote. If there is one lesson the failed Gulenist coup attempt of July 15 can teach to the rest of the military, it is the unquestionable stupidity and extreme danger of plotting a coup in 21st century Turkey.

Note: The article picture at the top is a famous AK Party banner from 2013. Photos (from left): Former PM Menderes (text: you hanged him!), former PM and President Özal (text: you poisoned him!), and Erdoğan (text: we won’t feed him to you)

The psychological impact of the coup attempt has created a strong sense of betrayal in Turkish society, leading to the formation of a new sociological base. There were already disgruntlements among an extensive number of people over the Gülenists’ chronic double-dealings, their messianic culture, and their ambivalent discourse inconsistently and awkwardly juxtapose religious and secular values insincerely for pragmatic reasons. After the coup attempt, a sense of betrayal emerged against Gülenists, who, in fact, were never expected to resort to military power and to use it against civilians. Until the bloody coup attempt, Gülenists occupying governmental posts were accused of disobeying state authority by forming a parallel structure within the state and solely looking after the group’s own interests. With the coup attempt, however, they went one step further and targeted the state itself with the purpose of becoming rulers of the country. They aimed to reconstruct the state in accordance with their own vision by using every, including deadly, means possible, which is unpardonable to any Turkish citizen.President Erdoğan, making an analogy between chameleons and FETO members one week after July 15, came to the conclusion that chameleons would feel insulted by this comparison. Erdoğan declared that FETO members pathetically change their ideology, discourse, and ideas according to every political conjuncture. Today, many people in Turkey agree that Gülenists have no fair religious, national or universal agenda, except their own ends that justify all means in any given context. The unreliable and unrespectable characters of Gülenists constitute the main motive behind their exclusion from society.Another reason behind the sense of betrayal in Turkish society is the well-known charitable activities of Gülenists, who had been identified generally with their non-profitable organizations. Their primary agenda was presented as public education, for which they applied a variety of methods to reach different socio-economic classes of society. They organized several educational programs targeting not specifically one social group, but differing groups according to economic income, occupation, and family background etc. However, people realized that their sole purpose was indoctrination. They organized social aid gatherings for housewives and political discussions for academics and journalists. For different social groups, they utilized different discourses. Additionally, Gülenists were generally known for their dedication to the group’s ideals such as devoting their lives to hard work for little money. Teachers working at FETO schools, in addition to earning little, further denoted a fixed portion of their salary to the organization. Religious and universal values stood at the core, appealing to all social groups in Turkey.

Many had supposed that Gülenists were good people and that their activities would help society for the better. A good example is Bülent Ecevit, a former prime minister of Turkey and known to be a strong advocate of the Kemalist leftist political ideology. Ecevit supported the Gülen Movement by saying that Fetullah Gülen was the representative of moderate Islam vis-à-vis political Islam. However, with the uncovering of the secret agenda of the Gülenists and its messianic discourse, both concealed by the avowal of universal moral values, many people realized the terrible mistake they had made, which caused a strong sense of betrayal. Since the coup attempt, people in Turkey have fully grasped the fact that the Gülenists’ real intention was to take control of the state. Fetullah Gülen, the FETO leader, taught his disciples to obey all rules without question and to wait for the right time to seize power. It seems that the Gülenists sacrificed their lives to reach the promised day, to which they had dedicated their entire lives.

Although Turkish politics is passing through turbulent times, one can safely argue that the decades-old discourses and highly problematic hypocritical approaches of Gülenists have lost all plausibility. Moreover, the Gülenists have lost their legitimacy and credibility within society. A recent study shows that eighty-one per cent of Turkish citizens support Gülen’s extradition to Turkey and a subsequent trial. Many believe that the Gülenists’ will to seize power will not stop here and that they may seek to regroup in other countries in order to redesign their domestic politics. The foreign minister of Turkey, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, has already pointed out such a threat for some of the Turkic countries in which FETO has been established for decades, as in Turkey. As Gülenists attempt to turn Turkey from democratic to military rule, it is probable that they will try to apply similar methods to other countries in the near future. On the bloody night of July 15, Turkish people acknowledged that Fetullah Gülen and his followers pose a global threat since they did not hesitate to use heavy weapons against civilians when they tried to seize power.

FETO has lost all legitimacy in the eyes of Turkish society and, as a side effect, has united Turkish citizens from all ideological backgrounds and worldviews. Turkish citizens survived by defending their democracy against this religio-military attack. For Gülen, it seems that Turkey was only a step toward a broader goal; the organization will certainly continue to disseminate and realize its messianic purpose from East to West. The FETO leader should be considered not only a religious fanatic and fundamentalist in his own country but also a danger to the democratic world order.

Immediately after the coup attempt, the efforts of the Central Bank officers and economic management team helped to ward off the initial shock waves. In particular, Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Simsek’s statements for foreign investors played an important role in reassuring investors during this difficult process. Simsek stated that structural economic reforms will be on the agenda, investors’ confidence will be secured, daily life will not be affected and political decisions will be market friendly.There are five important points that stand out in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt.

The Central Bank’s Measures after the Coup Attempt

The measures taken by the Central Bank (CB) on July 17 have played a crucial role in easing the first shock waves created by the coup attempt. Official statements on supplying unlimited liquidity to banks and the assurance of financial stability have stabilized the banking system and the markets, so that possible financial repercussions on the morning of July 18, 2016, could be avoided.

The CB’s decision on July 19, of lowering the interest rates by 25 basis points of the upper band of the interest rate corridor, showed its strong belief in Turkey’s economic prospects. On July 22, the CB announced that meetings will be held with domestic and foreign investors, analysts and members of finance sector. The CB gave a strong message that the Turkish economy cannot be redesigned by a coup attempt.

The Economic Management Team’s Message to Domestic and Foreign Investors

Statements by President Erdogan, Prime Minister Yıldırım and especially Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Simsek supported the normalization process and economic stability, leading to a climate of trust for domestic and foreign investors and the financial markets.

Simsek’s meeting with 500 international investors via tele-conference was so effective in giving first-hand information about the latest developments, that the promise of unlimited liquidity in the markets and of sticking to the fiscal discipline convinced the markets and investors of the swift recovery.

The Declaration of a State of Emergency

The government declared a State of Emergency for a three-month period to root out the hidden FETO members. It should be underlined that the government’s main intention is only to fight against this terror organization, whose members disguise themselves within various bureaucratic, judiciary and military posts. Therefore, in the period of the State of Emergency, the Turkish government will pay the utmost attention to ensure investors’ confidence in the markets through market-friendly political decisions and ensuring that daily life is as unaffected as possible. It appears that a quick normalization will be realized thanks to the strong democracy, operative markets and continuously enriched investment atmosphere.

The Stable Position of the Stock Market and the Foreign Exchange Market

Although the stock market index (BIST100) declined and exchange rates rose after the coup attempt, such small fluctuations were halted by timely economic measures and comforting statements from politicians. Economic indicators will apparently be optimized soon.

International Rating Agencies’ Statements and Decisions

Immediately after the failed coup attempt, the international rating agencies unfortunately made controversial statements regarding Turkey. In fact, Turkey has a very strong fiscal position and very low levels of public debt and budget deficits. In addition, policymakers have already taken economic measures to prevent fluctuations. Despite all of the positive indicators, Moody’s has threatened to lower Turkey’s credit rating, possibly to the garbage level. Some believe that, with this decision, Moody’s has aimed to drive the markets into panic. Despite the admirable economic performance of Turkey, in the past, Moody’s has acted unrealistically slowly to increase rating levels.

Likewise, Standard & Poor’s has decreased Turkey’s credit rating from BB+ to BB, thus making a negative contribution and causing malicious damage to the reputation of the Turkish economy. Fitch’s decisions will be more important in the near future. Overall, the negative attitudes of the rating agencies seem unfair and prejudiced. These institutions should take into account the potential of Turkey’s economic performance and contributions to the world markets.

Turkey has experienced robust economic growth since 2002, thanks to political stability and reforms. The Turkish economy has grown uninterruptedly for the last 26 quarters. This performance has occurred despite the global financial crisis and the geopolitical risks in the Middle East. This performance will continue with new structural reforms.

Despite the failed coup attempt, economic experts estimate that strong domestic demand will trigger production and investment in the following months. It is not the first time that Turkey has been given such a low rating. Despite the prejudiced attitudes of some international rating agencies, the wheels of the economy should continue to accelerate. In addition to the concerted efforts of the public and private sectors, communication with foreign investors should be set to continue. While Turkey contends with FETO (FEtullah Gulen Terror Organization), economic reforms are on the agenda and the market economy continues to function in its own way.

Democracy and democratic values have long been at the epicenter of international affairs. Universally applied democracy has come to determine not only internal but also international affairs. Despite this, democracy has remained a controversial issue and, not in a few cases, has been used as a tool in the hands of those who claim to be standard bearers of democratic values: the West.

On July 15, the Turkish state structure was threatened by a coup attempt, which aimed to overthrow the Turkish government and democracy. Governmental institutions that represent democracy in Turkey such as the Grand National Assembly (TBMM) or media outlets were bombed and innocent civilians who strove to defend their nation were killed. More than 250 men, women and children were killed during the coup attempt organized by the Fetullah Gülen Terror Organization (FETO), which eventually failed to achieve its goal.

For the first time in Turkey, politics, the media and people united against the common enemy: the coup plotters. Nevertheless, during and after the coup attempt, another opponent actor emerged. Surprisingly, some international actors, both leading politicians and media outlets, were disappointed by the failure of the coup attempt and still fail to recognize the democratic values to which the Turkish citizens firmly adhered. Moreover, some of these actors strove to exacerbate the situation. At this point, it is fair to ask whether these international actors want a democratic or a non-democratic Turkey. It seems that their choice is a non-democratic Turkey, which will follow their recommendations and submit to their will.

The stance of these international actors can be analyzed under three subtitles: politics, the media and Turkish expats. With the exception of the latter, the behavior of the other actors was not fair –not only towards the Turkish state but also, most importantly, towards the Turkish citizens.

During the first hours of the coup attempt, state leaders and government representatives made vague statements. It was clear that their stance towards the coup attempt was to be shaped according to its outcome. As it became evident that the putschists were losing ground, only then did the state leaders begin to declare their support for the democratically elected government. This pattern was followed primarily by the US and other Western countries. A striking example is the message directed to the US citizens from the US embassy in Turkey in which the coup attempt was called an “uprising”.

While politicians were reluctant to make politically incorrect moves, the media acted as it habitually has done during the last years: it vilified Erdoğan. From the beginning of the coup attempt, Western media did not hesitate to announce that the Turkish government had fallen and that the military was in control. News about Erdoğan requesting asylum in Germany was widely broadcast. In addition, even when the president, the prime minister and other leaders declared that the state was in control of the situation and that this was just a coup attempt, Western media did not transmit this critical information to their audiences.

Fabricated news about Turkey occupied the headlines of the Western media and these were unfortunately not mere exceptions. In fact, Turkey has become immune to such kinds of hoax, though the Western public has not. The Western media almost unanimously began to accuse the Turkish government and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan directly or indirectly and are still trying to portray him as culpable in these events. First, the mainstream Western media did not mention the names of those who attempted the coup. They have been portraying FETO as a peaceful face of Islam and Western countries continue to harbor the organization’s leader and leading personalities in their respective countries. Moreover, the Western media and politicians forget that the organizers of the coup attempt–FETO–pose an imminent threat to the security of Turkey, and the measures taken in the aftermath of the coup are the same as any state would take to protect its own national security.

Second, the Western media focused solely on President Erdoğan, and did not mention at all how the putschists bombed the capital city, how the army helicopters killed more than 250 innocent women, men and children without mercy or even how the united people marched on the streets to protect their state. Most of the headlines raised concerns about the “authoritative tendencies of Erdoğan and the purge against the opposition groups.” By this, they concealed the reality and the message that the Turkish citizens gave on the streets. They refused to see that all political parties represented in parliament declared their opposition to the coup attempt. Similarly, the Western media refused to expose the support against the coup attempt in the streets and the squares of Kurdish-populated cities.

Third, the Western media and many journalists warned and even threatened the Turkish authorities against punishing the putschists. It can be said that they do not want the Turkish government to take proper measures against the putschists. Moreover, the Western media stated their defiance against the state of emergency declared by the Turkish government, a legal right in the constitution, and also accepted by the European Human Rights Convention. Their Orientalist approach towards Turkey shows that they still consider Turkey to be a typical Middle Eastern or a third-world country.

An important example that needs to be mentioned is WikiLeaks. Soon after the coup attempt, WikiLeaks posted on its official Twitter account that the Turkish citizens must get ready to fight as it was to publish approximately 300,000 emails from the AK Party that would shed light on the coup attempt and those behind it. It was a shame for WikiLeaks and the media outlets that made news of this statement as it resulted in a huge sham. The emails that were made public were mainly spam email followed by some inconsequential emails. Afterwards, many Turkish citizens mocked WikiLeaks, while the international media remained silent, pointedly not updating their previous news in this regard.

The media outlets in the Middle East were/are more neutral towards the coup attempt. They were divided into two opposing categories. The first category welcomed the coup attempt in Turkey, which has been considered as the last Ikhwan-like regime in the region. This view was shared by the Egyptian media, which is under the control of the Sisi government, an administration established after a military coup in 2013. Similarly, the media outlets controlled by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were also strongly pro-coup and anti-democracy. Those who are in favor of one-man rule and strictly authoritarian regimes consider Turkey to be one of the last remnants of the popular and democratic movements of the Middle East. The second view welcomed the crackdown of the coup attempt and declared its support of the Turkish people and their legitimate administration.

Lastly, the Turkish expats in different countries went out onto the streets to support the democratically elected Turkish government in its battle against the Gülenist Terror Organization that plotted the coup attempt. Many Turks gathered in front of Gülen’s mansion in Pennsylvania, requesting his extradition to Turkey. At a time when the Turkish people are intimidated by the West, the support of their expats was essential. However, some influential Turks living in the West and working for the Western think-tanks followed the policies of their host institutions, criticizing the Turkish government and President Erdoğan, but omitting the death toll and the outstanding resistance of the Turkish people.

To conclude, the domestic and international actors, in most cases, had opposite impacts on the events of July 15. While the domestic actors served as a catalyst for defending the unity of the state and the democratic values, the international actors mostly tended to obliterate the reality, especially through their biased media. For what it is worth, the Western antagonism did nothing but further unite the Turkish people. Today, the people are aware of their power and this has made them stronger than ever; a notion that the West has long taught but little supported.

While publicly adopting a rhetoric of intercultural dialogue and peaceful existence, the mystical movement has avoided close contact with any traditional Islamic groups or NGOs, and adopted a purely pragmatic mode of interaction with many political parties, aiming to penetrate critical state institutions. Adherents of the movement constituted a powerful web of institutions that extracted capital and human resources across a wide geography that spans from Latin America to Sub-Saharan Africa and from the United States to Central Asia. The main strategy was to recruit highly qualified youth from a variety of backgrounds and to indoctrinate them along the lines of Gülen’s messianic teachings based upon hiding real identities, forming secret networks and collaborating with main intelligence agencies, starting from the Cold War period.In Turkey, Gülenist groups managed to form a massive web of human cells, over the years, placed in the higher echelons of the security establishment, intelligence institutions, the judiciary, bureaucracy, academia and the business circles in the country. Their first attempt to topple President Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party, which were perceived to engage in open conflict with the secretive group, came with the 17-25 December conspiracies in 2013. Yet, the plot to discredit the president and his party through fabricated sleaze allegations did not work as planned and the Gülenists in the security establishment and judiciary were disclosed. While investigations were underway to unveil and exclude a substantial portion of Gülenist elements from the military in August 2013, they launched a preemptive strike and initiated the most unorthodox coup in Turkey’s political history, triggered by a distorted religious order.Although Turkey’s political establishment and society in general are not unfamiliar with military interventions, this coup was utterly unorthodox and unique because it was not executed by the central command of the Chief of Staff, but rather by a military junta controlled by Gülenist coup plotters from different army ranks. In this junta, lower-ranking officials who enjoyed a higher position in the distorted religious establishment as Big Brothers (“abi”) were giving orders to generals, along with some academics, bankers and business people associated with the group.

It emerged that the Gülenist soldiers and civilians involved in the coup attempt were carrying 1 dollar banknotes, allegedly blessed by Gülen himself, as a coded means of communication. The coup was also unorthodox from the perspective of organized violence against the close entourage of the president, the Chief of Staff and major commanders of the army, crucial state institutions and the civilian population. Unprecedented events, including the bombing of the Turkish National Assembly, the headquarters of the Intelligence Agency and Special Police Forces by F16s dropping laser-guided bombs, the assassination attempt targeting the president, and the use of high-tech attack helicopters, heavy artillery and tanks against civilians differentiated this coup from its predecessors.

The wide scope and inclusiveness of the democratic reaction to the coup was also unique in Turkish political history, as civilians in both urban and rural centers, municipal workers and NGOs resisted the initiative that planned to pull Turkey into the status of a third-world country. Frankly speaking, Turkey’s experimentation with democratic rule was interrupted on numerous occasions in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997, and the idea of “military-led modernization from above” has deep ideological roots that go back at least a century, reaching the Young Turks and early Kemalists.

Despite intensive dialogue and integration attempts with NATO, the European Union and Western institutions for over half a century, the shadow of a potential military takeover has never disappeared from the horizons of the world’s 18th largest economy. But, in previous military interventions, particularly those in 1960 and 1980, the country was struggling with acute socio-economic crises and there was a need for strategic change in development policy, which were used as precepts by the generals to justify the coups. Looking at the 15 July Gülenist coup attempt, it is very clear that there was no socio-economic basis for the coup as the Turkish economy was displaying a respectable growth performance in a global environment that has been demonstrating sluggish growth. There was also no strong social support for the attempted coup.

The Gülenist coup attempt was thwarted thanks to the strong leadership of President Erdoğan, the powerful reaction of the Police Special Forces and the noble sacrifices of civilians at a cost of around 250 martyrs and 2,000 wounded. Despite the huge humanitarian and psychological impact of the attempted coup, the potential impact on the economic structure constituted one of the most important crunch points. Turkey was caught by this heinous coup attempt while the economy was gaining steam, normalization attempts with Russia, Israel and Egypt in foreign policy were advancing with potentially significant economic contributions and strong growth prospects were expected for 2017.

Despite initial hesitation in the international markets, strong macroeconomic fundamentals and effective crisis management by the Central Bank and economic bureaucracy helped to keep the reflections on banking and financial sectors at a minimum. Despite a temporary hike in exchange rates, the stock exchange did not experience a collapse in the value of traded stocks, and there was no speculative attack or exodus of international investors. Perceived investment risks associated with Turkey in the eyes of international investors did not jump either. The rise in the CDS figures during the coup attempt that reflect the risk perceptions of the country for investors was roughly equal to the rise observed when previous Prime Minister Davutoğlu declared his resignation.

Every coup attempt creates multifaceted social, political and economic costs and, objectively speaking, the 15 July Gülenist coup attempt will not be seen as an exception. Since a state of emergency has been declared to normalize the security situation, short-term international investors might be a little jittery in the short term. But in the medium and long term, structural reforms and incentive packages that were announced to boost domestic and international investments before the coup will continue unabated. Notwithstanding the premature and politically motivated decisions by some international credit rating agencies, those investors who place their faith in Turkey with a long-term vision are bound to win as the economy has ample potential for growth.

The post-coup environment will witness a process of purification whereby Gülenist elements embedded in the state bureaucracy, academia, business circles and the media will face legal investigations and prosecutions. This purification process is bound to exclude harmful elements from the state establishment and the private sector, thereby contributing to Turkey’s socio-economic dynamism in the coming years.

How did Fitch and Moody’s react?

Whereas the S&P downgrade is regarded as having trivial direct effects, the verdicts to be rendered by Fitch and Moody’s, which have been holding Turkey in the investment zone since November 2012 and May 2013, respectively, will be critical.

Upon the shock, Moody’s put Turkey on negative watch, declaring that it would watch the country closely in the months to come. While the previously set official date for Moody’s decision on Turkey is August 5, it seems possible that the institution will extend the timeline for a thorough review. Fitch, on the other hand, primarily highlighted the risks that the Turkish banks could be exposed to in the near future. It is expected to complete its rating review by August 19.

Taken as a whole, statements from both agencies similarly focus on the political risks of the junta attempt that could possibly discourage investors and damage the economic reform agenda of the country. Therefore, their decisions are likely to be shaped to a great extent by the signals received on the medium-term political outlook and the government’s dedication to the reforms. Furthermore, macroeconomic indicators will also be closely watched, along with prospective policy moves.

What are the economic prospects for Turkey?

Having noted the concerns and arguments raised, it now makes sense to clarify some of the relevant issues from an objective perspective. The need for such a perspective arises from the misleading nature of some of the news stories globally disseminated through the international media.

Regarding the relevant misperceptions and worries, one basic fact to be aware of is the character of the foiled coup attempt. Turkey, with its upper-middle income economy and long years of approved political stability, is a modern country that has left military coups far behind in the 20th century. In this respect, the coup attempt that erupted on July 15 cannot be considered a classical military upheaval as it was plotted by FETO, the clandestine terrorist network that infiltrated the Turkish Army. Therefore, the courageous citizens and leaders of the Turkish Republic had every right to defend their democracy on the night of July 15 against the FETO threat that would undoubtedly destabilize the country in an irreparable way. Having thwarted the peril, Turkish people of all political wings are now proud and more interlocked than ever, cherishing hopes for a much stronger democracy.

In this sense, the critical point leading to the answer with regard to political stability lies at the heart of the purge of the network from the Army and bureaucracy. Hence, the three-month state of emergency declared in the country aims to complete this task in an efficient and expeditious way in order to eliminate any relevant future risks. The process will have no implications on economic activity, as guaranteed and soundly emphasized by the government.

Consequently, operations conducted against the terrorist organization of interest are vital for a stronger-than-ever stability in Turkey, supporting the fundamentals of the economy in the medium and long term. This is why credit rating agencies and all investors with an eye on the Turkish economy should assess the recent developments in the country primarily from that significant perspective.

On the other hand, there is no doubt that the macro outlook is an equally important pillar of the decisions of economic actors. In this respect, the Turkish economy’s dynamic growth potential is still undeniably promising and awaits the implementation of the structural reforms promised by the government. The reforms, also targeting a more investment-friendly environment, are expected to boost overall confidence and accelerate the economic performance in the medium term.

Aside from its growth prospects, Turkey is well recognized in terms of its exemplary fiscal discipline and resilient banking sector with steady capital adequacy ratios. While the current account deficit has always been a structural problem in the economy, it has gradually decreased and hit rock bottom recently. Although the decline has been supported considerably by import prices, the risk imposed by the deficit has eventually become weaker. Yet, the ongoing finance needs cannot be denied and, hence, the confidence of foreign investors in the Turkish economy is still of great worth.

In consequence, reminding of its credible history in terms of ability to repay, and underlining the ongoing efforts for strengthened political and economic prospects, Turkey invites all interested global associates to closely witness its sincere dedication to a bright future. In Turkey, business is as usual and will hopefully be even better than usual. All the country needs is fair and objective treatment built upon truthful information.

Algeria 1954-62

The influential film The Battle of Algiers (1966) by Italian director Gillo Pontecorvo re-creates epic battle scenes between the Arab population of Algiers and the ethnically French soldiers who control the movement, actions and outward behaviour of the society.  Anger rages on the streets and in the ‘casbah’ and the audience identifies with the guerrilla tactics of the FLN. The formal approach of the film is steeped in neo-realism with location shooting and some FLN members such as Saadi Yasef and the local population playing themselves. It also uses a grainy newsreel style of cinematography with high-contrast low-key lighting.

This is a key work in the history of cinema which converges the styles of Documentary and Fiction; it is also significant for its anti-colonial stance and empowering depiction of Algerian Muslims resisting the French cultural and political occupation of their land.

The spirit of this classic film converged with the real noise and resistance on the streets of Istanbul. I listened to the Mosques across the city frequently give the Azaan in-between prayer times and then recite empowering supplications in Arabic and brief instructions to resist in Turkish.

My friends described the atmosphere on the Boğaziçi bridge; a lot of young women chanting ‘Turks don’t back off…’ as they walked directly into the military coup’s fire before jumping to the ground.

‘Your ammunition will finish soon…’ was verbally thrown at the coup soldiers followed by ‘We’re going to win or we’re going to die…’

Cheers erupted from the unarmed civilians when a tank-like ‘toma’ vehicle was blown up.

Iran 1979

The book titled Staging a Revolution: The Art of Persuasion in the Islamic Republic of Iran (2002) edited by Peter Chelkowski and Hamid Dabashi sits comfortably in my personal book collection back in Canada but the content of the book showcases, summarizes and reflects the revolutionary zeal of the time.

The confidence in the destiny of the Iranian nation as it rose up and overpowered the Shah’s autocratic state while also calling upon their collective Islamic cultural history is shown through design that reflects a remarkable synthesis of classical, sacred subject matter and form with new materials, resources, formats and styles. Posters, banners, stamps, bank-notes, wrappers, murals and graffiti were all used just before, during and after this key period. Another notable comparison from this book are the early Soviet posters from the 1920’s and their powerful embrace and creation of a constructivist approach to Modernism to push their new message.

The revolutionary spirit of these posters and messages came to me upon hearing the calls of ‘Allahu Akbar!’ on the streets of Istanbul. Beyond ethnic, sectarian and political chasms the following days witnessed a mass celebration of flags and cheers across streets sometimes still scattered with tanks, overturned cars and the remnants of the failed coup. This was a resistance and reclamation of Istanbul, Ankara and Turkey which will have benefits for the culture of the Ummah around the world.

A New Turkey

Much has been written about the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the 1923 rise of the secular nation state of Turkey; loss of a wounded Empire, reclamation and sovereignty of borders from the Allied powers, Turkification of the people and the legacy of an ongoing divide between secular institutions and mentalities and religious rights. However it is also useful to look at the resistance of July 15-16, 2016 as historically important in a global and cultural context. Deccani Souls, The Battle of Algiers and Staging a Revolution remind us that contemporary Turkey also has a Muslim soul that is able to resist attempted militarized coups and the global hegemony.

That night saw how people with bare hands could stand tall against the putschists who had guns, tanks and jets, along with ruthlessness. On that night, over one hundred Turkish people were murdered as the putschists opened fire on them with guns paid for by the people of Turkey. In the following days, the Turkish people increasingly took to the streets in their millions all over Turkey to defend their country and democracy, literally from dusk to dawn. In the end, the coup attempt was mostly quelled at the expense of over two hundred people, who were martyred.The Turkish people have grown substantially richer and democracy has taken root as a much more citizen-friendly environment has emerged in Turkey in the AK Party (Justice and Development Party) period. Make no mistake: while the AK Party faced coup attempts and enormous obstacles, and even fought for its existence in a judiciary battle in 2009, it has almost always tried to foster democracy in Turkey. Hence, it is no surprise that the AK Party is very popular in Turkey, with apparently no matching predecessor in its almost one-hundred-year history.Prior to 2012, Western leaders and media outlets praised the AK Party government for its accomplishments both economically and politically, and Turkey was hailed as the poster boy of democracy. However, from 2012, the same Western leaders and media outlets started to criticise the AK Party government, and particularly its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, for growing increasingly authoritarian; however these claims failed to be substantiated. This situation made everybody wonder whether these accusations were simply employed as a pretext to discredit the AK Party and Erdoğan. At the same time, political turmoil in Turkey began to escalate relentlessly. First came the Gezi Park protests in 2013 by numerous illegal factions, as well as young people, from relatively wealthy Kemalist families, who had traditionally opposed the AK Party government and Erdoğan.After the failure of the Gezi Park protests, the second attack came on December 17-25, 2013, this time with the joint efforts of the FETO factions in the judiciary and police forces. The FETO apparently attacked the government and Erdoğan with never-proven and finally aborted judicial claims. The FETO members, who had infiltrated the Turkish police forces, even tried to detain Erdoğan and his son. The AK Party and Erdoğan survived this attack too.

In the following year, Erdoğan gained a political victory in the presidential election with 52 percent of the total votes, and became the first president of the Republic of Turkey to be directly elected by the constituents. However, the clouds above Turkey only darkened as the third attack came from another terrorist organisation, the PKK, apparently with the sole aim of toppling the president Erdoğan and the AK Party government. The PKK escalated violence relentlessly as it targeted military and police stations, as well as killing several hundreds of soldiers and–mostly Kurdish–civilians, since 2014. However, the PKK has paid a very heavy price as over 7,000 PKK terrorists have been neutralised by the Turkish military in the last year.

Then came the final attack. This was the biggest, such that it could not be compared to the previous attacks: a military coup attempt by the covert faction of the FETO in the military. The leader of the FETO is a cleric named Fetullah Gulen, who has been living in the US since 1999 in a massive manor very well protected by armed guards. From at least the 1970s, the FETO has tried to infiltrate every governmental body from universities to judiciary and military forces, with a special focus on key institutions and departments. It did everything to capture positions and titles in various governmental organisations, while disguising itself like a chameleon, as some of its member had lived unacceptable lives from the standpoint of Islam for decades, even though they were in fact adherents of a seemingly very conservative religious organisation.

The FETO ran smear campaigns against people in order to strip them of their titles and positions, only for those positions to be filled by FETO members. People were even murdered with the help of the FETO faction in the police force, and these empty chairs were taken by FETO members. In addition, the FETO had had a self-declared, but fake, charity network in order to raise money to run the organisation financially. It is estimated that the FETO had been commanding over 20 billion dollars. For decades, it raised money from its members as well as business persons from different walks of life by threatening them outright with imprisonment or death. No one knows how many people have been murdered or imprisoned by the FETO, though a conservative guess would be in the thousands, if not more.

All of this happened under the guise of a spiritual organisation, which is why the FETO was to hide itself for so long, until it tried to topple Erdoğan and the AK Party government. The FETO has only recently been accepted formally as a terror organisation by Turkey as its true face, which certainly amounts to nothing less than a terror organisation, has begun to surface. Although Turkey has suffered several coup attempts in the last 70 years, in none of them had congress buildings been bombed by jets or had people been opened fire upon and murdered. Now, the Turkish people intensely abhor Gulenist people and Gulen himself, the man behind the FETO and who continues to reside in the US under the protection of armed guards. The democracy in Turkey has definitely been damaged by this failed coup attempt, but its prospect is certainly much brighter in the hands of the Turkish people, who defended it at the expense of their lives.

To this end, they took over the state-run TV (TRT) and forced the anchorwoman to read the coup declaration. However, it is not possible to achieve a coup d’état merely by taking over a state media organ in this age of technology. At this point, the attitudes of other media institutions became important. In fact, the Turkish media did not obey the plotters’ order to “broadcast the coup declaration on other TVs as well.”To the contrary of this so-called order, other Turkish media organs, in live broadcasts, interviewed Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım and then President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and conveyed their messages to the People of Turkey. From CNN Turk to NTV, from A Haber to Ulusal Kanal and TVNET to TRT, the media in Turkey stood against the coup. The plotters barged into TRT and CNN Turk, and a possible raid to A Haber was averted by citizens of Turkey who were trying to guard the building against the coup-plotters. Police fought off the plotters’ attack on TURKSAT (state-run communication satellites), foiling their attempt to take control of all broadcasts.President Erdoğan’s messages on live broadcast, and reruns of his messages, played a tremendous role in raising national willpower and bringing the Turkish people to the streets to stop the tanks driven by the putschers. The Turkish media took sides with the government and the people, not the coup-plotters; therefore, they prevented the atmosphere of fear and panic from spreading, and contributed to the abortion of the coup attempt.This marks a milestone for the Turkish media. In the history of Turkish politics, the mainstream media had mostly supported coup plotters – from the May 27, 1960 military coup to the September 12, 1980 military coup, and from the February 28, 1997 post-modern coup to the April 27, 2007 military memorandum. Generally, the media has acted as their mouthpiece and broadcast accordingly. However, on July 15, 2016 – the date of the failed coup attempt by FETO (Fetullah Gülen Terror Organization) – the Turkish media set an excellent example of the power of journalism to oppose the perpetrators, and sided with democracy and freedom. Therefore, the media in Turkey has experienced a turning point in its history. Unfortunately, however, it is impossible to say the same for the international media.

The U.S. and British Media Back the Coup Plotters

International media, the U.S. and the British media in particular, lamented the failure of the coup attempt in Turkey. CNN, The New York Times, Fox News, The Independent, BBC, The Financial Times, the Washington Post and the Times were full of news stories in favor of the coup attempters rather than criticisms about the attempted coup.

The headlines in the aforementioned newspapers and TVs leaned heavily towards the perpetrators’ side, with comments such as “The Coup would have been better for Turkish democracy,” “People behind Erdoğan are like sheep,” “These must have been done for a successful coup,” “Fight against DAESH will be negatively affected,” “Erdoğan deserved the coup,” and “Authoritarian tendencies will increase in Turkey.”

The approach of the western media favored the failed coup, considering these news bites and assessments, which belittle the People of Turkey who resisted the coup attempt. A similar reaction, yet in a different tone, came from western politicians as well.

All in all, why the western media organs do not want democracy for Turkey while they defend democracy for themselves will remain an enduring question. For now, this question will remain unanswered and related discussions will continue. However, the Turkish media and the western media have approached the failed coup, attempted by the disciples of Fetullah Gülen in the military, from opposite sides; and that, in fact, affirms criticisms that the FETO (Fetullah Gülen Terror Organization) is “a network guided by the global powers.”