President Erdoğan attended the Inauguration Ceremony of the New Higher Education Academic Year at the Beştepe National Congress and Culture Center and discussed the nature and scope of upcoming educational reforms that would be set in motion.

During his speech, President Erdoğan discussed the current state of national education and the agenda for educational reform. With over 100,000 international students being hosted in Turkey, Turkey has become a favorite among students worldwide. International students are able to obtain education at prestigious Turkish universities with the scholarship program. Turkey Scholarships is a unique international program including university placements. The program provides above standard monthly stipends to beneficiaries, and includes housing, health insurance, tuition fee, Turkish language course and transportation costs. President Erdoğan noted that “Turkey has reached a capacity surpassing its borders.”

Highlighting the importance and need for technological development, President Erdoğan stated that Turkey should be among the global pioneers in the usage and development of digital technologies and that currently there are steps being taken to achieve this objective and that Turkey is duly committed to this pursuit. Underscoring the dependence of economic and social welfare on this development, President Erdoğan added that government support and aid will be provided to projects geared to advance competitiveness and productivity.

Speaking of progress in the career prospects for university students and graduates, President Erdoğan stated that career centers will be established in all universities and “From the onset of their first year in university, these centers will provide career guidance to students and work in close collaboration with the real sector.”

Referring to the new Human Resources Office established in the Presidential Complex, President Erdoğan stated that the “Human Resources Office will work closely to implement projects important for the future of university students. In this aspect, one of the first action plans that we will implement is to shift to a ‘talent management’ system”.

Underscoring the importance of educational reform, President Erdoğan said that: “It is vain to think that we can make great advancements if our universities and academicians have fallen to a state of stagnancy,” and noted: “If we want to build a safe future, we need to start from education.”

The president of the Council of Higher Education, Prof. Dr. Yekta Saraç also delivered a speech and stated that the most important concept for the Council of Higher Education, is “to facilitate change on a scientific basis, thus: to change”. Prof. Saraç noted that in order to stay abreast of the digital age, “there will be a transformation and focus on studies carried out by leading global universities and ‘open access’ will be introduced.”

The speeches delivered by world leaders on the 73rd anniversary of the United Nations in New York City proved once again that the UN is not capable of addressing the issues of international politics comprehensively. There was no common discourse regarding international terrorism, there was no common understanding of global security issues, and more importantly, there was no common agenda to reform the current UN structure.

We witnessed the fall of multilateral discourse and ignorance towards the fault lines of world politics. The problem here is not solely related to the organizational structure of the UN per se. Instead, the problems lie at the very nature of international politics, which have been under fundamental transformation particularly since the end of the Cold War.

International politics is becoming more fragmented, more competitive and more unpredictable. The Trumpian understanding of international politics deepens the ongoing crises around the world and causes uncertainty.

The UN was initially established to construct an international society mobilized around the idea of universal values to protect shared humanitarian norms and prevent conflicts. “The UN was not created to take humanity to heaven but to save it from hell;” the former United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold once said. Since the Cold War, however, the UN has not been successful in delivering peace, stability, and security in the international system. More importantly, the UN as a universal supranational organization has been ineffective and unproductive in dealing with global security issues.

At the very end of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama put forth the argument that the universalization of Western liberal democracy might be the final form of human government surpassing socialist views. He underlined that there was no other alternative socio-political system against the western countries that can console their superiority in the international order. Therefore, non-western societies were obliged to move toward the West and eventually embrace the western way of thinking.

However, Fukuyama’s the end of history thesis failed to predict the very nature of international politics, particularly its changing dynamics. The continuation of ethnic, religious, and sectarian conflicts across the world, the changing dynamics of international terrorism and the emergence of various global terrorist groups such as DAESH proved that the history did not end, and the west is not the only direction that the non-western societies have to look up to.

The Trump administration’s anti-globalist, nationalist, protectionist and well-established white supremacist rhetoric provokes us to rethink about the UN. The U.S. at the end of World War II created the UN, but today the U.S. itself is destroying it.

The problems are not only related to the U.S. perception of international politics and the UN’s role. The other powerful member-states are also responsible for the decreasing role of the UN in creating a more stable position in international politics. Russia, China, the U.K., and France are the same when it comes to building a shared sense regarding the role of the UN. More importantly, these states are responsible for creating instabilities. The Syrian Civil War is a textbook example to see the inefficiencies of the UN.

Even though the Assad regime has been disregarding principles of the UN Charter by using chemical weapons, barrel bombs and other internationally banned weapons against civilians since the beginning of the uprising in the country, the UN Security Council could not come up with any solution. The structure of the UNSC is influenced by the priorities of the five countries in regards to the Syrian Civil War in particular, the Middle East, and the rest of the world in general. As President Erdogan repeatedly underlines, the five permanent member states of the Security Council hold the will of the oppressed people in Syria.

The current organizational structure of the UN and the power-sharing mechanism do not represent an accurate geopolitical picture of international politics. The rise of new power centers and emerging regional actors should also be included in the decision making processes at the UN. There are no Muslim countries represented in the decision-making process.

The UN General Assembly recently condemned the U.S. decision on Al-Quds, but the veto power of the U.S. in the Security Council prevents the international society to rage against the pro-Israeli decision. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the existing UN structure will not only solve the crisis but also deepen the crisis towards a more radical line.

As can be seen in the case of the Syrian Civil War, the UN cannot even act timely to prevent a humanitarian disaster, and it is not effective in protecting human life from state violence. As President Erdogan underlined in his speech at the UNGA, the UN could only provide Turkey with 700 million USD to improve the conditions of refugees that Turkey is currently hosting.

In order to start a new initiative for UN reform, the UNGA should question President Trump’s speech as it reveals the main issues with the UN, and then, should refer to President Erdogan’s statements as a baseline to start thinking about its structure and possible reforms.

Turkey has been seeking a new status in international politics for some time. President Erdogan’s speech this week at the UN General Assembly in New York has made this crystal clear. In his speech President Erdogan alleged that the UN had lost its credibility due to the members of the Security Council avoiding their responsibilities such as providing stability, security, and peace. He implied that despite the great powers occupying seats of leadership in international institutions that are responsible for global governance, they seem to be reluctant to honor those responsibilities that fall on the shoulders of a leader.

Erdogan pointed that the current international system suffers a leadership problem. In a nutshell, whereas the U.S. has started to take an isolationist turn in its foreign policy by declaring the end of globalization and the liberal international order, the European powers and emerging powers such as China and Russia are only concerned with protecting their own national security. Nobody seems to take responsibility for common issues and help the societies that are unable to solve their security and humanitarian problems on their own.

After pinpointing this problem of leadership, President Erdogan offered a solution that incorporates redefining the global leadership. In an article written for Foreign Policy, which is compiled out of his speech at the UN General Assembly, he declared that “We must end the monopoly of a small number of nations and promote the collective leadership of countries that aim to resolve key global challenges. If the great powers prove unwilling or unable to act, the community of nations—under the umbrella of the United Nations or other organizations—must do what is necessary.” More specifically, he offered that the permanent membership in the UN Security Council should be abolished, the number of its members should be increased to 20 and in this new structure all nations should take turns sitting on the committee.

He argued that one of the members of that community of nations is Turkey. He posited that although Turkey is not a great power with regards to its military and economic capabilities, it has become a global power by taking part in the solution process of Iraq, Syria and many other places. More, Turkey hosts 4 million refugees and is among the top donors of humanitarian aid. All these entitle Turkey to claim a great power status.

In sum, President Erdogan asks for two things. One is that the main institutions that are responsible for keeping current international order afloat should be reformed in order to be able to accommodate rising powers such as Turkey, India, Brazil, and Germany. Only after this is done can the existing international institutions become relevant. Secondly, given its eagerness to take responsibility for international peace and security, Turkey should be recognized and treated as a great power. And more importantly, Turkey and other powers which are excluded from decision-making processes in the international institutions have all the right to build up new institutions to handle global governance if the great powers do not take any meaningful step to reform the existing ones.

Indeed, Turkey has undergone a fundamental transformation in its domestic politics. It has eliminated its authoritarian elite rule which had kept the country feeble and dependent on the global centers of power and replaced it with a popular democratic rule. This process of democratization in the domestic realm has increased Turkey’s demand for autonomy in international politics. This demand for autonomy has shaped around the claim for a new status in international politics. The question of whether Turkey will live up to its claim of being a great power in coming years is as interesting as the question of how the Western world and other great powers will accommodate “new” Turkey.

Turkey’s President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has long been calling for reform within the United Nations. Since his election to high office in Turkey, the President has been insisting that the UN should be an international body that works for the interests of all countries, rather than a few.

It’s with this distinction that the President’s “The World is Bigger Than Five” motto has received attention worldwide.

UN reform was on the President’s agenda during the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly.

During his speech at the UN on Tuesday, President Erdogan stated that the UN is “suffering from an unprecedented crisis of credibility,” adding that “the main reason for the current troubles of the UN is due to the Security Council’s failure to keep its promise of promoting peace and security around the world.”

“At a time when global leadership is desperately needed, it is crucial to improve the UN rather than destroy it.”

“If the global powers won’t help, the rest of the international community must take the matters into its own hands and launch a comprehensive UN reform process.”

Following his speech at the United Nations, the Turkish President also re-iterated his point in an article he wrote for Foreign Policy. In his article, Erdogan’s message was clear: “Don’t let major powers such as the United States undermine the liberal international order. Instead, reform it so it works better.”

Turkey’s biggest frustration with the UN is largely due to the lack of attention the body gave to the Syrian Civil War and the human catastrophes that are still taking place in the Middle East.

UN Youth proposal

In addition to his call for systematic reform, the President also urged for a UN Youth body to be created. The President added that Turkey will welcome for the headquarters of this body to be located in Istanbul.

Turkey has been active in youth diplomacy and is increasing its overseas representation by ensuring that the country’s youth are represented on an international level.

On Saturday 18 August, the AK Party held its Sixth Ordinary Congress in which it created new executive boards. Since the establishment of the party, all ordinary and extraordinary congresses have been seriously important in determining the party’s politics in the following terms. These congresses have been important not only due to the creation of new executive boards but also because they underline the party’s position on ongoing critical issues. The last Congress included important messages on current issues such as the ongoing U.S.-Turkey row and the state of the Turkish economy.

It is important to evaluate the changes in the newly formed executive boards of the party before going deeper into other issues. The AK Party, as was expected, made significant changes in both the Central Executive Board (MYK) and the Central Decision Board (MKYK). Almost half of these authorization bodies were renewed. More, both in the MYK and the MKYK, women and young people were appointed to sensitive positions. For instance, the youngest member of the MKYK is a 20-year-old female. This reflects the fact that, contrary to its rivals, the AK Party takes the rejuvenation of the party’s bodies as a serious issue and puts words into practice. The party places importance on young leading cadres both within its internal bodies and among its members of parliament; the AK Party currently has one of the youngest populations in the parliament.

As was mentioned, the Sixth Ordinary Congress was striking due to the strong messages that were given by President Erdogan during a speech he made in which he emphasized Turkey’s position on current ongoing issues. This was especially necessary to the ongoing crisis with the U.S. In his speech, President Erdogan heavily criticized the Trump administration’s latest discourse on Turkey and commented on the future of Turkey-U.S. relations. The most striking comment made in this regard was: “We will not surrender to those who act like a strategic partner but make us a strategic target.” This clearly reflects the fact that Turkey will not take a step back in its approach to the latest issue. Thus, contrary to all political and economic manipulative acts, Turkey is determined to protect its rule of law and autonomy.

Another prominent issue that arose in the Congress was President Erdogan’s call for a fight against exchange rate manipulations. Underlining the latest manipulations, Erdogan echoed his call for the Turkish people to challenge these manipulations. In addition to this, he announced new economic plans in order to prevent the vulnerability of the Turkish economy. All these developments indicate that Turkey’s fight against international manipulations on its economy will gain momentum in the upcoming period.

Beyond all these factors, the Congress and the formation of new executive boards are crucial for the party’s success in the upcoming local elections that will take place in March 2019. The executive bodies were without doubt formed in accordance with the requirements of the election campaign, and therefore the AK Party’s newly formed executive bodies include politicians that have strong local representation.

For all these reasons, the latest congress was not only important because of domestic policy issues, but also because it has reflections on Turkey’s relations and position in the international arena. The messages given at the Congress strongly underlines the fact that despite all manipulative acts coming from both national and international levels, Turkey will not make any concessions to its principals.

Last week, it became official that Turkey’s recently re-elected President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will make an official visit to the Federal Republic of Germany on September 28-29. During the visit, Germany’s President Frank-Walter Steinmeier will greet President Erdogan with military honors, and a meeting with Chancellor and CDU leader Angela Merkel has also been planned. This will be Erdogan’s first official visit to Germany as President, since his last visit was in February 2014 when he was Prime Minister.

Regarding the planned visit, though, some German media outlets and biased opposition politicians took – once again – an aggressive stance by focusing on President Erdogan personally. In this sense, it seems very opportunistic that in particular some opposition politicians, who generally sympathize with parties such as the HDP, are making aggressive and non-rational statements.

For instance, former Greens leader Ozdemir once again criticized the planned visit by stating that the Turkish President has to be treated differently in contrast to other “normal” presidents. In addition, politicians from the Left Party, which is officially in favor of uplifting the PKK ban in Germany in its election program, declared their discontent regarding the visit. Furthermore, the far-rightist AfD party, which is actually the main parliamentary opposition in Germany, also opposed the planned visit by bringing the visit in relation with potential and alleged conflicts within the Turkish community in Germany.

On the other hand, parties represented in the current grand coalition government made some rational, reasonable and careful statements by emphasizing the need for dialogue between the two countries.

Besides these political statements concerning particularly domestic concerns, one should also underline some issues which may become of great importance in order to strengthen bilateral relations in the upcoming near future. By this, it shouldn’t be that wrong to address some potential mutual expectations for both sides.

For instance, and more importantly, Turkey is likely to expect the strengthening of bilateral relations while the main emphasis will be set on economic relations. In addition, Turkey’s expectations in the fight against terrorism are also one of its greatest priorities. In the context of Germany, strong support for a long-lasting ally is expected. That is to say; in contrary to Germany’s current ambivalent behavior regarding the PKK terrorist organization and other terrorist organizations –even on German soil–, which are threatening Turkey’s security, an active fight against these terrorist organizations will be welcomed by Turkey.

Germany’s reasonable re-orientation in this field will definitely contribute to a positive future of bilateral relations. Furthermore, a blind non-acceptance of FETO affiliated groups, which are seen as a security threat by Turkey, will be expected. Henceforth, Turkey’s concerns, especially in this field, have to be taken seriously into consideration. Moreover, it wouldn’t be a bad step to treat Turkey as a partner on the same level. Unfortunately, both German politicians and media representatives prefer very striking double standards with regard to Turkey and Turkish personalities close to the government. While on the other hand, politicians from other countries are treated extremely different due to economic reasons. However, one must not disregard the fact that Turkey has a long and successful history with Germany. Turkey is also a NATO member and an EU candidate state of strategic importance.

Marginal and so-called ‘Turkey experts’ who are not – rightly so – taken seriously by anyone in Turkey, should be less welcome and less promoted on German television in comparison to the Turks that actually represent the majority of Turks living in Germany. The latter of these groups are without doubt deliberately and systematically disregarded. This ought to be changed if one honestly expects an improvement of mutual confidence.

On the other hand, Germany will most probably have some expectations as well. Whether these are sincere expectations is a question that goes beyond the borders of this column, but Germany will address the improvement of human rights and the rule of law. However, it’s most likely that the German government will stress the need to continue and develop efficient cooperation regarding the refugee crisis. In addition, it is also in the interest of Germany to develop economic potentials regarding both countries in the near future.

Thus, the Turkish President’s planned visit in September might enable the opportunity for both countries to broaden their horizons, to reduce tension and to deepen bilateral relations. We will see whether this chance will be taken into consideration. In the upcoming weeks, I will also continue to write on this issue in detail.

The AK Party is about to celebrate its 17th foundation anniversary. Since the party was established on August 14, 2001, it became one of the game changers in Turkish politics. Turkey went under a great transformation in the political, economic, and cultural areas under the AK Party governments. Understanding Turkey’s transformation in these prominent areas in the last seventeen years requires analyzing the main paradigms in AK Party politics.

One of the things that made the AK Party successful in politics is related to its catch-all characteristic. The party has overcome the classical line of right-wing politics via using catch-all party formation. To do so, the party offered a new political identity and a new style of politics in Turkish political structure and transformed the classical right-Islamist-center right political alignments. Instead of making politics for demands of certain sections in society, the AK Party, interested in all problems of Turkish people, has pursued a more inclusive political style and thus has become Turkey’s largest catch-all party.

As in all other catch-all parties, the party leadership was crucial to attract and mobilize the supporters of the party. Even though the role of Erdogan was very effective in the party’s politics since the beginning, his determinant role on the party had increased in time. As a founding father of the party, his discourse on the party’s politics was the key element not only in decision-making processes but also in shaping and reformulating the lines of the party’s structure in some circumstances. Thus, with the effect of Erdogan’s role and his undeniable charismatic leadership in Turkish politics, the AK Party also strengthened its popularity among masses and became invincible.

Another prominent issue that makes AK Party politics different than other political actors is its unique ideological position in the Turkish political sphere. Even if the party has never had a certain and clear-cut ideological baggage, it settled its ideological position as neither a right-wing nor a left-wing party; but as a conservative democratic organization. With the help of conservative democracy, the party integrated incompatible concepts such as traditional and modern, secular and religious, and morality and rationality, in its understanding and get massive support from various circles of society.

This unique ideological concept also made the party embrace all citizens regardless of their gender, ethnicity, beliefs, and worldviews. In accordance with this, the party emphasized fundamental rights and freedoms excessively in its program since the beginning. Human rights, freedom of speech, freedom of press, democratization, and civil society were the main issues that the party brought to the forefront of its agenda.

All of these factors created a strong bond between the masses and the party. President Erdogan has always been at the center of this special relationship. Erdogan’s leadership style also empowered and transformed this relationship in a positive way. Thus, the tie between a leader and the public came to a peak under his leading role. In other words, he fulfilled the duties of his predecessors, Menderes and Ozal, and transformed the line of politics fundamentally.

Obviously, there is a need to analyze the AK Party’s politics and its function in Turkey’s transformation process in detail. Additionally, there is also a need for evaluating Erdogan’s specific role in this transformation process since the beginning. The SETA Foundation is organizing a symposium in understanding the role of the AK Party on August 14 in Ankara. This special event will also help researchers and academics of Turkish politics to ask further questions in order to understand the role of the AK Party during the transformation of political, cultural, and social spheres in Turkey.

President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan made a 4-day official visit to Africa starting from July 25 on a special invitation.

Erdogan was invited to the 10th Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa as the Chairman of the Islamic Cooperation Organization,

He held bilateral meetings with the leaders of BRICS member states and other leaders who were invited.

Erdogan’s attendance at the summit served as the first high-level contact between Turkey and the BRICS. Bilateral relations and regional issues were discussed during the visit.

On his last day in the African continent, President Erdogan, made a special visit to Zambia, which marks a historical day as the first visit of the Republic of Turkey on a presidential level.

Erdogan also met with his counterparts from South Africa, Togo, and Angola in Johannesburg.

At the end of the visit, Erdogan shared his thoughts on Twitter: “I would like to thank all the leaders with whom we have discussed many issues, from the global economic situation to the Syrian issue, from the development of Africa to the economic and political relations we are developing with Asia.”

“We are aware that FETO is working to charm the Muslims in the Republic of South Africa into siding with it. Don’t you ever be deceived by the rhetoric they employ and the disguise they wear! Hypocrisy and deception are the tools they use most conveniently.”

“We met with important investors and business people operating in South Africa and exchanged ideas for the development of our relationships on the basis of a win-win approach and equal partnership.”

Africa was President Erdogan’s first visit abroad (if visits to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the NATO summit are excluded) after his victory in the July 24 presidential and parliamentary elections.

This was considered as a sign for better relations in the future that will continue to develop.

Participation in BRICS Summit

The BRICS group – made up of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – was established in 2006 to enhance cooperation between member countries and also other developing countries.

All 5 member states are also part of the G20.

The special invitation that Turkey received to attend the BRICS summit in South Africa and the fact that Turkey will also join the meetings of the ‘BRICS Plus’ platform, is considered to stem from the nature of the country’s emerging economy.

BRICS has three common characteristics besides representing emerging countries and emerging markets; high growth rates, potential forces in the global system, and their noteworthy locations in line with their regional dynamics.

BRICS covers a large area – ​​one fourth of the world’s surface – represents more than 3 billion people (roughly 40% of the world population) and covers 20 per cent of the world’s production, equaling about 17 trillion dollars of gross domestic product per year.

The result of a possible relationship to be developed between Turkey and the BRICS will strengthen Turkey’s hand in terms of its position in the global political system.

Visit to Zambia

Erdogan met Zambian President Edgar Lungu to discuss bilateral relations and exchange views on regional and international developments.

The visit to Zambia is the first visit made to this country at a presidential level.

This visit was of special importance especially for Turkey’s relationship with sub-Saharan states and for the further development and opening of new areas of relations with African countries.

The trade volume between Turkey and Zambia still remains at a considerably low level of approximately $25 million.

The steps to be taken in a medium-term and the projects to increase trade figures were discussed during the meeting.

Turkey promotes Zambia’s development in various fields through TIKA and aims to build relations with Africa were both parties “win together.”

*Written by Suna Nur Sarihan. 

Turkey’s official Anadolu News Agency reported that Brunson, 50, an evangelical Christian pastor originally from North Carolina, was let out of jail to serve home detention because of “health problems” which were not further specified.

Brunson was charged with spying for the PKK, a designated terrorist group in the U.S. and Turkey, and the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) which orchestrated the defeated coup attempt on July 15, 2016.

The cleric denies the charges.

The Izmir 2nd High Criminal Court said Brunson would be electronically monitored and barred from leaving his house. The cleric left prison with a police escort after completing certain procedures.

Brunson, who has lived in Turkey for 23 years serving as the pastor of Izmir Resurrection Church, is also prohibited from leaving Turkey.

The court decided to allow Brunson to live at his home address in Izmir, and as his trial continues his “abandonment of residence” is prohibited and he is also banned from leaving the country.

If convicted, he will face up to 15 years in prison for “committing crimes on behalf of terror groups without being a member” and another 20 years if he is found guilty of espionage.

The pastor’s detention has strained ties between Ankara and Washington. The two NATO Allies are already at loggerheads for some time.

Citing Brunson’s case and Turkey’s plan to buy the S-400 missile system from Russia, U.S. senators are pushing to delay Turkey’s acquisition of American-made F-35 fighter jets.

President Trump and Vice President Pence’s Twitter bluster

On Twitter, U.S. President Trump threatened to impose sanctions on Turkey if Ankara continues to refuse to free Brunson.

“The United States will impose large sanctions on Turkey for their long time detainment of Pastor Andrew Brunson,” Trump tweeted. “He is suffering greatly. This innocent man of faith should be released immediately!”

Trump called Brunson “a great Christian, family man and wonderful human being.”

Previous to this tweet, again on Twitter, Trump tweeted that the detention is a “total disgrace.” “He has done nothing wrong, and his family needs him!” Trump tweeted.

U.S. Vice President Mike Pence speaking in Washington D.C., at a conference on religious freedom hosted by the U.S. State Department, made a similar threat of “significant sanctions” against Ankara over the imprisoned pastor.

Pence, threatened President Erdogan and the Turkish government via Twitter to “be prepared to face consequences if Pastor Andrew Brunson is not released immediately.

Evangelical support for Pastor Brunson

The reason why Brunson’s detention has received so much attention is due to the evangelical Christian lobby in the U.S. – as they are among the president’s most reliable supporters. The White House has been pressured by these groups to take steps in order to ensure Brunson’s release.

On Wednesday Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also expressed his opinion about the decision of the Turkish court to place Brunson under house arrest.

“We welcome long overdue news that Pastor [Andrew Craig] Brunson has been moved from prison to house arrest in Turkey,” Pompeo said in a tweet.

Pompeo, described the court’s decision as “not enough” while he added that there is “no credible evidence” against Brunson.

Turkey’s response

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu also responded to the statements of the White House on Twitter, saying, “We will never tolerate threats from anybody.”

Turkey’s Foreign Ministry insisted that the Brunson Case is under Turkey’s jurisdiction as a sovereign state, and told the Anadolu Agency that the White House’s rhetoric was “unacceptable.”

“With regard to the Brunson case, necessary information has been provided to our U.S. counterparts on various occasions and it has been clearly expressed that this issue is totally within the competence of the independent Turkish judiciary,” the ministry added.

After the threats of Trump and Pence via Twitter, Ankara’s Ambassador to Washington, Serdar Kilic, said that the United States should not resort to threats against Turkey.

“My message was crystal clear; No one should expect Turkey to give in to threats and that as an Ally US should not resort to threats against us,” the Ambassador said in a post on his Twitter account, adding his disappointment that U.S. authorities had failed to take his explicit advice at all levels into consideration.

*Written by Suna Nur Sarihan

After the electoral victory of the AK Party on June 24, President Erdogan took his oath last Monday in parliament as the first executive president of Turkey. A large number of world leaders (22 presidents, 17 prime ministers) attended the ceremony in Ankara. Kurdistan Regional Government’s PM Nechirvan Barzani was among the guests, as he also attended the ceremony on official invitation from Turkey. This was Barzani’s first official visit to Turkey after the controversial independence referendum in September 2017.

Turkey took a firm approach against the September referendum as it stands against de facto secession attempts in the region. The referendum has become a turning point as the governments of Turkey, Iran and Iraq –all in favor of Iraq’s territorial integrity- cooperated to halt the one-sided independence move of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The cooperation gave quick results with the KRG’s back off, which did not only halt an ill-started independence move but also prevented further instability in Iraq that might likely have led to a civil war. The KRG, particularly the KDP, was surprised with Turkey’s firm anti-referendum stance. I, on the other hand, am still surprised by the KRG’s naivety not to expect such a reaction. Turkey, a country that has long struggled against ethnic secessionism, naturally positioned itself against a de facto secession attempt in its neighboring country.

After this background, one might jump to a conclusion that Turkey and the KRG were split and would be likely to stay so. Barzani’s visit to Turkey has shown the shortsightedness of such quick conclusions. After all, Turkey and the KRG share a border, host families dispersed across the borders, and further share common economic and security interests in a geography where actors are never in short supply of adversaries.

The economy of the Iraq Kurdistan Region (IKR) heavily depends on the flow of goods to and from Turkey and further needs the continuation of investments from Turkey. This is no charity job for Turkey, as the country also benefits from trade with the KRG. The governments of Turkey and IKR also share a more basic interest – security. Both Turkey and the KRG feel threatened by the PKK. The PKK uses the Turkey-Iraq border for its terror attacks against Turkey. The organization’s headquarters and many training camps are located in places under the jurisdiction of the KRG. For this very simple reason, Turkey wants to wipe out the PKK from KRG territories.

The KRG is also not happy with the presence of the PKK in its region. As PM Barzani stated 5 days before his official visit to Turkey, “The PKK uses KRG land it occupies as a base to attack Turkey.” The PKK controls a significant chunk of the KRG territories from Qandil Mountains to the Turkish border, which it calls Medya Defense Zones. The KRG, let alone building up an independent state, cannot even rule its regional territories. Further, the PKK is an imminent threat to the KDP as the two fell onto different sides in a former conflict during the mid-1990s. Further, the KRG has no neighbor that it can fully trust in a world where Turkey and the KRG are hostile to each other. For these reasons, the decision makers in Turkey and KRG are likely to cooperate in the future.

Nevertheless, the future of relations has to change as Turkey is no longer satisfied with the status quo in Iraq where the PKK can recruit, train, and operate in widespread safe havens. Turkey seems to be committed to wipe out the PKK from Iraqi territories but its alliance with the KDP could not provide such a result so far. Turkey sees such a termination for the PKK in Iraq possible only with the cooperation of the Iranian and Iraqi governments. Hence, Turkey prioritizes terminating PKK presence in Iraq with the help of the KDP but also increasingly more and more with the help of Iran and Iraq. Turkey’s rapprochement with Iran and Iraq seemed to alienate the KRG for a while, but Barzani’s visit implies that the KRG is also now aware that it’s not in its interest to abandon Turkey as a partner.

On July 12, 2018, the SETA Foundation in Istanbul organized a symposium about the July 15 coup attempt.

Moderated by Burhanettin Duran, AK Party spokesperson Mahir Unal and former Justice Minister Bekir Bozdag attended the first panel.

Unal began his speech by stating that “We don’t need to look at literature to observe what happened on July 15 because it occurred during our lifetimes. We just have to analyze the events correctly.”

While the trials of Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) members are still ongoing, Unal underlined that “When the two terms ‘FETO’ and ‘politics’ come together, we have to first assess the mission of Turkish politics.”

“Turkish politics cannot accept another organization or cloud above itself” – and this was something that FETO was trying to do; trying to place itself within a hegemonic space within the Turkish political sphere.

Flaws of the old system

During his speech, Unal emphasized the fact that the July 15 coup attempt cannot be observed without discussing the failures of the old governance system in Turkey.

He made this point by stating that “In 42 years, 36 governments changed.”

Comparing the governance system of Turkey to a car, Unal stated that under the old system there were two drivers – one that was elected by the people and one that assumed its hegemony. He stated that the old system was based on a tutelage regime, where elected officials were continuously blocked by unelected individuals.

Continuing, in his criticism of the old governmental system, Mahir Unal stated that every time the system gave an error, “we went to the people.” In reference to this, the AK Party spokesman said that “We [the AK Party] didn’t act with the power of the system for 16 years, but rather, with the power of politics.”

The people took control

Discussing the events that took place on the night of July 15, Unal stated that as soon as the Turkish people felt that the state was being overthrown, they “took to the streets and held on to the state with their bare hands.”

“The Turkish people did not shoot back at the putschists who fired at them. It was as if there was an invisible collective understanding of justice that night.”

Before finishing off his speech, the AK party spokesman underlined the importance of not comparing FETO to other terrorist organizations such as the PKK or Daesh. The reason for this being is because, as Unal stated, “FETO is a group that had infiltrated the state and wanted to take control of the space left free from the old tutelage regime.”

“FETO is a new type of terrorist organization, that doesn’t use guns. They operate in different ways. Unlike the PKK or Daesh, FETO can be analyzed as a smarter and sophisticated terrorist organization.”

July 15 in Parliament

Before beginning his speech, moderator Burhanettin Duran asked for former Justice Minister Bekir Bozdag to talk a little about his experience of July 15, as he is one of the figures that the Turkish people remember in Parliament.

Speaking little of the events that occurred in Parliament that night, Bozdag mentioned that the reason why he believed it was wrong for parliamentarians to hide in shelters (while FETO had dropped 2 bombs on Parliament that night) is because if people had seen that Parliament was shutdown, they would not have found the courage to take to the streets.

Following, Bozdag stated that “In order to understand July 15, we need to go back in time.” Giving reference to previous military coups that happened in Turkey, the former minister stated that “no one ever asked the question: what are you doing?”

There are two events that keep July 15 separate from previous military coups in Turkey. Bozdag listed these as 1) the fact that the putschists could not take hold of the President and 2) that the President chose to protect his and his country’s honor and that the Turkish people stood right behind him. This, Bozdag stated, was a “first for Turkish people.”

Bozdag compared the resistance displayed by Recep Tayyip Erdogan on that night to that displayed by Ataturk – the people of Anadolu stood with Ataturk, resisting against imperialists, just like the people stood with President Erdogan, resisting against FETO putschists.

One other important feature of July 15 is that “For the first time the justice system did not try to legitimize the coup” – something that occurred during the February 28, 1997, coup during the Erbakan era.

Wrapping up his speech, Bozdag asked the audience to think about one question: “What would have happened if the Turkish people had not answered the President’s call to take on the streets?”

In conclusion, Bozdag made statements appreciating the courage of President Erdogan that night, referring to how he flew to Ataturk Airport with his family, not knowing who was in control. Risking his and his family’s life, Bozdag criticized those that still call Erdogan a “dictator” when he “risked his own life for democracy’s sake.”

Ending the panel, Burhanettin Duran stated that “A new belief emerged within the Turkish people that people can resist against military coups and that they should do so. In fact, people were making references to Menderes stating that ‘we couldn’t take care of Menderes [who was hung after a military take over], but we will look after Erdogan.'”

On Monday 9, 2018, Recep Tayyip Erdogan was sworn in as Turkey’s new president under the new system of governance. At approximately 21:30, the President announced his new cabinet – an event that Turkey was anxiously waiting for.

Under the new presidential system, there are 17 ministries – all the faces, except for four are ministers that served in the previous cabinet, are new. These names are Mevlut Cavusoglu (Foreign Minister), Suleyman Soylu (Interior Minister), Abdulhamit Gul (Justice Minister) and Berat Albayrak (former Energy and Natural Resources Minister, now acting as Treasury and Finance Minister). Another name that is familiar is Hulusi Akar. Although Akar had not served under Erdogan’s previous cabinet, he was the previous Chief of General Staff and is now acting as the National Defense Minister.

While a full detail of the individuals selected will be provided, it can be observed that President Erdogan has placed importance on bureaucratic and technical knowledge when selecting his cabinet members. The majority of his cabinet are from bureaucracy and the private sector – all which have pursued successful careers and have satisfactory knowledge and experience within their fields. An interesting point that needs to be made here is that the majority of the cabinet are literally, non-political figures who are strangers to the public.

Who’s who?

1. Vice-President – Fuat Oktay

Fuat Oktay was born in Yozgat in 1964. After graduating from Cukurova University in 1985, Oktay completed his masters at Wayne State University. He completed his PhD in the field of Industrial Engineering. During the time that he was in the U.S., Oktay specialized in the field of automotive.

Oktay specialized in crisis management and worked with some organizations during the 2000 economic crisis in Turkey. At the same time, he was the Business Faculty lead at Beykent University.

Between 2008-2012 Oktay moved forward in the aviation sector. He was the Deputy Director General of Strategic Planning and Development department at Turkish Airlines. From 2012-2016, Oktay was the head of AFAD – an emergency services organization directly connected to the Turkish prime ministry.

Prior to his new role, Oktay was the undersecretariat of the prime ministry.

2. Justice Minister – Abdulhamit Gul

Justice Minister Abdulhamit Gul was born in Gaziantep. Graduating from the University of Ankara’s Faculty of Law, he began his political career with the Welfare Party and proceeded with the Virtue Party. After serving in many different positions, and having worked with what can be described as the major conservative political parties in Turkey, Gul was elected as MP to Gaziantep in 2015. In the cabinet re-shuffle that occurred on July 18, 2017, Gul was appointed as Justice Minister. He has remained in the same position.

3. Foreign Minister – Mevlut Cavusoglu

Mevlut Cavusoglu was born in 1968 in Alanya. After graduating from Ankara University’s Political Science department in 1988, Cavusoglu completed his masters in Economics at New York Long Island. Following, from 1993-1995, being granted the Jean Monnet scholarship, Cavusoglu completed his PhD at the London School of Economics.

In terms of his political career, Cavusoglu was first elected as MP for Alanya in 2002, then recurrently in the 2007, 2011 and 2015 elections. He has been serving as the Foreign Minister since August 29, 2014. Some circles have suggested that the main reason why Erdogan has re-selected Cavusoglu is due to the developments that have been occurring in regards to Manbij.

4. Interior Minister – Suleyman Soylu

Suleyman Soylu was born in 1969. After serving as the leader of the Democrat Party for a year and a half, Soylu joined the AK Party in 2012. Following the resignation of Efkan Ala, Suleyman Soylu has been the Interior Ministry since August 31, 2016. Just like Cavusoglu, commentaries have analyzed Soylu’s continuation as related to the fight against terrorism at home.

5. Defense Minister – Hulusi Akar

As mentioned, Huluski Akar, while a political figure due to his role as Chief of General Staff, was never a part of a political body/ party. His success in Operation Euphrates Shield, Operation Olive Branch and the continuing fight against terrorism within Turkey’s borders is the most likely reason why Erdogan has appointed him as the Defense Minister.

After completing his education in military schools in 1973, Akar served under many positions in the Turkish Armed Forces. In 2015 he was appointed as Chief of General Staff. An important event to note about Hulusi Akar is that he was taken hostage during the failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016, and was saved with an operation conducted the following day.

6. Minister of Education – Ziya Selcuk

Ziya Selcuk was born in 1961 in Ankara. Being a professor, Selcuk continued with his academic career at Gazi University for approximately 20 years. He has written many books on areas including communication, development and counselling.

Selcuk is one of the figures that was unknown to the general public, only due to his non-existence as a political figure.

7. Minister of Health – Fahrettin Koca

Dr. Fahrettin Koca was born in 1965 in Konya. He completed his education at Istanbul University Medicine School in 1988. After serving within many medical and health associations, in 1997, Koca established the Medipol Hospital and Medipol University.

8. Energy and Natural Resources Minister – Fatih Donmez

Fatih Donmez was born in 1965 in Bilecik. In 1987 he graduated from Yildiz Technical University’s Engineering department.

Since 1994, Fatih Donmez has been working in energy-related offices in Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. Previous to his current position, Donmez was serving under the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. Like many, Donmez is also a figure that has not been politically apparent.

9. Minister of Industry and Development: Mustafa Varank

Mustafa Varank was born in 1960 in Trabzon. After graduating from the Black Sea Technical University in 1981, Varank continued with his professional career in Istanbul as an engineer.

In 2003 he was selected as Deputy Directorate of the General Directorate of Highways.

10. Minister of Environment and Urbanization: Murat Kurum

Murat Kurum was born in 1976 in Ankara. He graduated from civil engineering from Selcuk University in 1999. After working in many private associations, he worked under TOKI from 2005-2006.

Prior to his new role, Kurum was the head of Emlak Konut, a state-run real estate developer.

11. Minister of Agriculture and Forestry: Bekir Pakdemirli

Bekir Pakdemirli was born in 1973 in Izmir. After completing his BA at Bilkent University’s School of Business Administration, he completed his masters at Baskent University and his PhD at Celal Bayar University, Economics department.

He was an entrepreneur within agricultural and automotive fields. Pakdemirli has also served under many private organizations and is a member of the Board of Directors of Turkcell, BIM and Albaraka.

12. Minister of Culture and Tourism – Mehmet Ersoy

Mehmet Ersoy was born in Istanbul in 1968 and is a graduate from Istanbul University. He established a travelling agency called ETS Tur.

13. Minister of Youth and Sports – Mehmet Muharrem Kasapoglu

Mehmet Muharrem Kasapoglu was born in Istanbul in 1976. He completed his BA at Marmara University’s Economics and Political Science department and his MA in Public Policy at the same university.

Prior to his new role, Kasapoglu was head of the state-owned sports betting company Spor Toto. .

14. Minister of Labor, Social Services and Family – Zehra Zumrut Selcuk

Zehra Zumrut Selcuk was born in Ordu in 1979. She completed her BA in economics at Bilkent University. She pursued her doctoral studies at Michigan University and Texas University respectively.

Prior to her new role in the cabinet, Selcuk was the Ankara representative of the Women and Democracy Association (KADEM).

15. Minister of Treasury and Finance – Berat Albayrak

Berat Albayrak was born in Istanbul in 1978. He graduated from Istanbul University’s Business School and then completed his MA at New York Pace University Lubin School of Business. His doctoral thesis was in the field of finance and banking, with the subject title of “The Finance of Renewable Energy Resources.”

Prior to his new role in the cabinet, Berat Albayrak was the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources.

16. Trade Minister – Ruhsar Pekcan

Ruhsar Pekcan was born in 1958. Pekcan pursued her BA and MA in the Electronics Department at Istanbul Technical University. Having worked in private associations involved in infrastructural development, Pekcan was the CEO of Karon Muhendislik San. Ve Tic. Ltd. Sti in Istanbul.

She is the one of the two women that are serving in the cabinet.

17. Minister of Industry and Technology – Mustafa Varank

Mustafa Varank was born in Trabzon in 1976. After completing his BA in Political Science and Public Administration at ODTU in 1999, he completed his MA at Indiana University.

After completing his education, Varank joined the prime ministry in 2011 and was appointed as advisor to the Prime Minister. Following, Varank was appointed as senior advisor to the President in 2014.

Turkey’s new cabinet was formed on Monday. After President Erdogan’s inauguration ceremony in the Parliament and Presidential Complex, Turkey’s new cabinet was announced by the President himself. President Erdogan also proclaimed the first vice president of Turkey, Fuat Oktay – coming from the bureaucracy. This cabinet was formed in accordance with the requirements of the presidential system, which began to be implemented after the elections. As part of the new state structure, some ministries were combined and the total number of ministries decreased to 16. Indeed, the ministries were combined to increase the efficiency of the state structure and bureaucracy under the new presidential system.

When names in the new cabinet are examined, it is seen that the main trigger behind its formation is expertise with bureaucratic and technical knowledge. Almost all names in the cabinet have significant experience in working areas of their ministries. It is also striking to see that President Erdogan paid attention to make a balance among the business world, bureaucracy, politics, and NGOs. Some names such as Ruhsar Pekcan (Minister of Commerce), Fahrettin Koca (Minister of Health), and Mehmet Ersoy (Minister of Culture and Tourism) have successful business careers in their area of expertise. Additionally, some ministers such as Mehmet Cahit Turan (Minister of Transport and Infrastructure) and Fatih Donmez (Minister of Energy and Natural Resources) are from the bureaucracy. The most surprising name in the cabinet is Hulusi Akar, who has been appointed to the Ministry of National Defense while serving as the Chief of General Staff of Turkey.

As well as the names, the function of the cabinet and ministries in the new term is crucial to understand the dynamics of the Turkish presidential system and state institutions. Above all, the place of the cabinet in the new system is quite different than the previously implemented parliamentary system. While the cabinet was holding executive power in the old system, this power belongs to the president in the new system.

The withdrawal of the prime ministry and the transformation of the cabinet are expected to bring new issues to the forefront such as efficiency, accelerated decision-making, transparency, and bureaucratic rationality in administrative bodies. Additionally, the function of presidential boards will increase the importance of advisorship and expertise in administration.

The previous system was lacking in providing efficiency and accelerated decision making processes among state institutions. It was even quite difficult to see the flow of information and interaction between state agencies. One of the reasons of this problem is ambiguity between policy formation and implementation in state bodies. Nonetheless, the new system foresees a clear-cut differentiation between them.

Newly-established nine presidential boards will develop strategies in crucial areas such as local government, energy, social policy, education, economy, health, culture, technology, and innovation. Thus, policy formulation will be the responsibility of these boards while ministries will charge in policy implementation much more than before.

Another striking innovation in state bodies under the new system is related to bureaucratic rationality, which is one of the indispensable requirements for development. Bureaucratic rationality distributes power among state agencies appropriately. The previous parliamentary system in Turkey lacked in providing bureaucratic rationality and clash of authority and lack of communication were common among ministries and other state institutions.

Nevertheless, the relationship between state agencies matters in the new system. It was designed to form efficient communication dependent on bureaucratic rationality. It should be reminded that one of the reasons of the development in Korea was the existence of bureaucratic rationality provided by planning boards in the system after the 1960s. Centralized policy-making under these boards also accelerated policy implementation.

The transformation of bureaucracy under the new system is anticipated also to bring cohesiveness between ministries. Ministries will be in more interaction and resilience of the bureaucracy will be lessened due to increasing demand in expertise.

After weeks of intensive campaigning and eager anticipation, Turkey successfully accomplished yet another test of democratic maturity by holding the combined general and presidential elections last Sunday. The fact that these elections constituted a milestone for the paradigmatic transition towards the presidential government system ensured that they were fiercely fought by both the government and the opposition parties with the notable addition of public relation initiatives by the presidential candidates. These were the first general elections that were held in the aftermath of the failed military coup attempt on July 15, 2016, and as such they represented the dawn of democratic normalization and a potential end to the state of emergency that was declared after the coup.

Despite all the hype and misinformation in mainstream international media accusing President Erdogan of authoritarianism and the government for suppressing the political opposition, pretty much all the stakeholders agreed that the elections were held in an open, free and fair environment. The campaign trail was peaceful and turned the whole country into a festival zone via vibrant promotion endeavors by the parties and candidates.

On election day, voter turnout was around 87 per cent which represented one of the highest participation rates in Turkey’s democratic history, comfortably surpassing most of the established democratic polities in the world. Electoral alliances ensured that the ten per cent threshold for entry to the parliament was not applied and almost 99 per cent of the votes cast for political parties were reflected as parliamentary representation.

The incumbent Justice and Development Party (AK Party), the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), the Iyi Party, the Democrat Party (DP), the Felicity Party (SP) and the Great Union Party (BBP) will be represented in the forthcoming parliament. The parliament will be one of the most representative and inclusive parliaments in Turkey’s political history. So there is no discussion concerning the procedural validity or democratic legitimacy of the election results.

When it comes to gauging the winners and losers of the elections, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan emerged undoubtedly as the biggest winner with yet another crystal clear victory over his political opponents. He received over 52 per cent of the total votes and was successfully elected in the first round as the first president of Turkey under the new presidential government system. Being the dominant political actor who placed his mark on Turkey’s political, economic and social transformation over the course of the 2000s, Erdogan managed an effective campaign and confirmed once again that he retains the confidence of the Turkish electorate going forward as the most credible leader.

Erdogan has been in power as Prime Minister and President for the last sixteen years without interruption and managed to record thirteen election victories. Despite risks of democratic fatigue and popular reaction to some of the government actions by certain social groups, the personal political popularity and societal approval of Erdogan seems to withstand the toughest tests of time. While clinching his latest landslide victory in the presidential elections, he managed to receive nearly eleven million votes more than his closest rival Muharrem İnce. It is really very difficult to cite another political leader in the modern democratic world with such strong and consistent democratic credentials.

The reluctance of Western media to understand and analyze the uniqueness of the deep bond between Erdogan and the Turkish society lets them to confuse unrivaled democratic legitimacy with authoritarianism. The Turkish President displays exceptional capacity to create a popular blend of socio-economic stability, structural transformation, improved public services, increased living standards and identity politics which is translated into sustained electoral success.

But it was also interesting to note that for the first time in these elections there was a ten per cent gap between Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (52 to 42 per cent) which indicated a performance divergence. Although the People’s Alliance, comprising the AK Party (295 MPs), MHP (49 MPs) and BBP (1 MP), which was born out of the popular resistance to the July 15 coup attempt clinched a clear parliamentary majority, Erdogan in his traditional balcony speech on election night frankly expressed that he received the ‘message of the electorate’ and will oversee a thorough post-election analysis.

So far, taking electoral demands, reactions, or signals swiftly into account through rational and well-researched analyses has been one of the greatest strengths of Erdogan. Therefore, it is pretty likely that he will gather detailed reports concerning the dynamics that affected AK Party votes in certain cities as a result of candidate selections for the parliament, performance of local administrations, or certain economic policies. Therefore, the post June 24 process will witness Erdogan’s multifaceted attempts to oversee a great transformation in the institutional structures of the Turkish state, while keeping the electoral strength of his AK Party in check going forward to the municipal elections next March.

Sunday’s elections also opened a new chapter in Turkish politics as the new electoral regulations allowed alliances between different political parties, thereby making the ten per cent national threshold obsolete. As voters made it absolutely clear that local representation is important to them, legal reforms could be made to lower the national threshold or create some form of single-member district system in the near future. Incidentally, strategic voting which implied certain shifts among allied political parties was one of the most important factors leading to surprising results in view of preceding public opinion polls. As the presidential government system becomes more institutionalized, it is highly likely that strategic voting and issue-based alliances among different political groups will become more pronounced. Therefore, leading political parties and their leaders will have to adopt their ways in line with the emerging patterns of pragmatic voting behavior.

The Nationalist Action Party (MHP) clearly gained from its alliance with the AK Party and the rising national sentiments in the wake of military operations in northern Syria, gathering critical parliamentary representation with 49 MPs. The leader of the MHP, Devlet Bahceli, was among the winners of the electoral process by managing to keep his party above the eleven per cent mark and maintaining his strategic alliance with Erdogan despite the recent internal division within his party which gave birth to the Iyi Party. In the context of the strong executive that will be formed with the presidential system, MHP has great potential of acquiring a degree of political effectiveness that goes much above its numerical presence.

Another winner who came stronger from the campaign trail and election experience was Muharrem Ince who ran as the presidential candidate of the CHP. Ince, a long-time domestic opponent of CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, was nominated as the presidential candidate in an almost futile race against the towering figure of President Erdogan probably in an attempt to undermine his future party leadership aspirations. Yet Ince as a pragmatic figure who could address the radical secular groups that characterize the backbone of the CHP as well as relatively conservative voters in central Anatolia displayed a surprising performance and personally received eight points higher than his party.

Differing from Kilicdaroglu in his more mature reactions, Ince congratulated Erdogan’s election victory and declared that he will continue his public meetings after the elections, signalling a leadership clash within the CHP. Both CHP and Kilicdaroglu were among the main losers as the party vote stood around a disappointing twenty two percent, while their strategic moves aimed at keeping the Iyi Party and the PKK-affiliated HDP above the ten per cent threshold caused numerous criticisms from within the party organization.

Meral Aksener, the leader of the newly established Iyi Party was another loser as she received unlimited public support from international media during the campign as the chief candidate that could undermine Erdogan’s authority. But despite all the media hype, Aksener’s personal electoral support did not even reach to the ten percent mark and her fragile party might well disintegrate in the parliament. Finally, HDP was another loser as the support for its leader Selahattin Demirtas fell three points to seven per cent, while party votes reached eleven per cent with the controversial tactical support of CHP supporters which was later criticized for legitimizing a terror-affiliated group.

As soon as election results were declared President Erdogan adopted a reconciliatory tone and expressed that the institutionalization of the presidential system will proceed through an inclusive process with the contributions of different social sectors, business actors and NGOs. He is keen to embark on a democratic normalization and development endeavor through which the state of emergency will be gradually lifted, structural reforms in the economy will be swiftly implemented and new productive synergies will be created to galvanize Turkey’s position as an emerging power in the global system. If the Western world decides to support this endeavor by accepting respectable and equitable forms of interaction with Turkey rather than portraying Erdogan as an ‘old-school third world dictator’ and blackmailing him through political or financial means, a positive environment of win-win situations could emerge sooner rather than later.

On 24 June, Turkish voters re-elected President Recep Tayyip Erdogan with 52,6 percent of the votes. His closest rival, the CHP’s candidate Muharrem Ince, received only 30,6 of the votes. By this, Erdogan got 11 million votes more than Ince, who consequently congratulated Erdogan on Monday due to his victory. The CHP Chairman Kilicdaroglu, however, rejected to congratulate Erdogan while stating that the AK Party is the loser of the elections. However, in the parliament, the People’s Alliance, which consists of the AK Party and the MHP, received more than 53,6 percent of the votes and thus achieved a majority with 344 seats in the parliament (AK Party 295 seats and MHP 50 seats, of 600). Interestingly, even Erdogan addressed his party’s parliamentary vote by stressing “we got the message,” while on Tuesday, CHP Chairman Kilicdaroglu, with no surprise and as expected, did not step down even though his party’s parliamentary votes decreased from 26 to 22 percent.

It’s perhaps too early to analyze all components of the election results in depth, but it’s quite possible to address some striking issues. First of all, these elections symbolize the ultimate transformation of Turkey’s system of government into a Turkish type of presidential system. The first step had been initiated in 2016 as the AK Party and MHP proposed a constitutional change, which was accepted by a majority in the referendum held on 16 April 2017. Now, the majority of Turks once again voted in favor of the new system by rejecting the opposition parties’ offer to turn back to a parliamentary one.

The majority of Turks once again voted in favor of the new system by rejecting the opposition parties’ offer to turn back to a parliamentary one.

The second striking issue concerns Turkey’s political stability. Apart from the fact that now eventually eight political parties will be represented in the parliament and cause a democratic diversity, the strict division of the executive and legislative branches will not cause any problems for the executive presidency. Furthermore, the fact that the President’s ministers cannot be selected from MPs anymore will cause a rather professionalization of a rapid and effective governmental acting.

The third issue is about the chronic wishful thinking of foreign media representatives. During the recent election period, we witnessed once again that several foreign media outlets disregarded various fact-based issues while supporting above all CHP’s candidate Muharrem Ince and his political campaign. It’s also not a secret that HDP’s candidate Demirtas and recently the Iyi Party’s leader Mrs. Aksener were supported by both foreign media outlets and politicians.

Although Iyi Party entered the parliament, Mrs. Aksener herself, due to not being an elected MP, will be out of the parliament and most probably her leadership will be questioned by other party leaders.

Although Mrs. Aksener’s party entered the parliament, she herself, due to not being an elected MP, will be out of parliament and it is most likely that her party leadership will be questioned by other party leaders. Thus, foreign analysts may also stop trying to manipulate their own audience by disregarding, for instance, populist and baseless statements by Muharrem Ince while permanently promoting him. Turkish voters have rejected populist and anti-refugee statements whereas Western voters increasingly favor similar promises – a fundamental difference between Turkish and Western ways of persuading voters.

Election results shows that Turkish voters reject populist and anti-refugee statements whereas Western voters increasingly favor such discriminative promises – a fundamental difference between Turkish and Western ways of persuading voters.

The fourth striking phenomenon is about the CHP’s chronic problem; that is to say, its lack of credibility. Even though the CHP tried to build a legal “National Alliance” and a de facto alliance with the HDP, it has been unsuccessful in persuading –in particular– Turkey’s conservative voters. It’s obvious that Turkey’s oldest party will never be as strong as to build the government due to its chronic problem of lacking self-criticism with regard to its radical secular past. If the CHP does not make any self-criticism in various fields there is no possibility to win any general election in Turkey. This has been proved once again.

CHP, Turkey’s oldest party, will never win any general election in Turkey if it does not face its chronic problem that of lacking self-criticism.

By not understanding Turkish voter dynamics and their preferences, it’s useless to count on foreign media support that build on baseless populism. But it seems that in the upcoming days the CHP will face a power struggle in order to elect a new party leader. By this, it’s typical for the CHP, that a person, who lost nine elections within eight years, still insist on the party’s chairmanship while commenting on the party’s presidential partial successful candidate Ince by saying that the voter turnout for him had been “below expectations.”

Turkey has entered a new era with a new system of government. It would not be wrong to state that the main objective of the opposition parties, which was to block Erdogan from winning in the first round and to cause a “divided government” between the legislative and executive branches ultimately ended in a fiasco.

Sunday’s elections in Turkey have finalized the transition to the presidential system with the victory of President Erdogan and his party. Erdogan has advocated and campaigned for this system change since his years as the Prime Minister, arguing that Turkey needed a political system based on the people’s will not on the will of the civilian and military bureaucratic elites. Having handled serious domestic and foreign policy crises over the years, including party closure cases and a failed coup attempt, Erdogan’s campaign for the presidential system has been accepted by the Turkish electorate. Sunday’s elections results are a proof of this reality.

The AK Party has passed legislation in the past year to prepare and adjust to the new system but there will be more work to be done in order to restructure the executive branch. The AK Party’s seats in parliament is short of a parliamentary majority, which means that it will need to recruit the support of other parties, starting with the MHP, to implement the party program and election promises. The MHP has worked with the AK Party and entered into an alliance in the elections, which provides a ground for further cooperation. As I wrote before the elections, the parliamentary distribution will not hamper the creation of the cabinet and functioning of the executive branch.

As the presidential system requires the restructuring of the political system and fine-tuning of the relationship between the executive and the legislative branches, many details have yet to be worked out. But, President Erdogan has created the necessary groundwork to implement his agenda effectively by striking an alliance with the MHP, which has achieved better than expected results in the election. For major legislative action as well as budget negotiations, Erdogan will likely seek support from the MHP. The MHP will continue to be a key role in the legislative process as it has in the past.

One of the most serious consequences of the elections might be the leadership question in the CHP. The CHP’s presidential candidate Ince has openly challenged the current party leader Kilicdaroglu in the past for electoral failures. Sunday’s results show a large gap between Ince’s votes (%30.64) and the CHP’s electoral showing (%22.64). Ince’s relative success and the party’s perceived failure can pave the road for Ince to challenge Kilicdaroglu once again. However, if there is an understanding between the two leaders that the party voters would vote strategically to ensure that the HDP passed the electoral threshold, such a inter-party rift may not be imminent. However, the 8% discrepancy will most likely force yet another debate around the CHP’s leadership.

While the adjustments to the new system are implemented, the March 2019 local elections will be just around the corner. Political parties will enter the new year in campaign mode and the local elections results can serve as an indicator of party performances. Local elections in Turkey always have a different dynamic than general elections, as they can depend much more on local politics. The March elections will not be different but it will have less impact on the executive branch. It will serve more as an indicator of satisfaction with party performances in parliament. Political parties will focus on agenda items that will help them in local elections. This could mean that parties would have more incentive to strike a compromise with President Erdogan to show the electorate that they are in the business of delivering their election promises instead of obstructing.

The June 24 elections are historic not only for sealing the deal on the adoption of the presidential system but also providing political stability for the next five years. There will always be crises and spoilers that will test the new system. However, in this last election, the Turkish public has spoken definitively.

The June 24 parliamentary and presidential elections resulted in a great victory for President Erdogan and the leading AK Party. While the party got 42.5 percent of the votes, President Erdogan has been selected to become the first president of Turkey under the presidential system by winning 52.5 percent of votes.

The MHP, the alliance partner of the AK Party, got 11.2 percent of the votes and passed the 10 percent threshold contrary to the claims of opinion polls. As a result, the People’s Alliance got the majority of seats in parliament. On the contrary, the Nation Alliance consisting of the CHP, the Iyi Party, and the Felicity Party faced with a disappointment because of the results.

The alliance could not get the majority in the parliament and none of the presidential candidates of this alliance succeeded in the elections. While the members of this alliance were aiming to push President Erdogan into a second-round runoff against Muharrem Ince, the presidential candidate of the CHP, the elections ended in the first round with the victory of Erdogan. Above all, the turnout in the elections was higher than 85 percent, which proves the health of Turkish democracy compared to other democracies in the world.

While the results of the elections are analyzed, it is seen that despite the sixteen years of experience in office, the AK Party is still the only party who can manage to get votes from various circles of society. Except from Igdir, Tunceli, and Hakkari, the party got MPs from all provinces, which show that the AK Party is the only party successful in bringing different groups together. Additionally, the party increased its votes in 17 provinces most of which are in Eastern and Southeastern regions of the country. Thus, contrary to some claims, the party still gets the great majority of votes from these two regions and Kurdish people support the AK Party governments in majority.

Nonetheless, the party experienced some decrease in its votes in the parliament especially in Istanbul, Ankara, Konya, Bursa, and Kayseri. During his balcony speech, President Erdogan stated that they had received the message of voters and would evaluate the results in order to understand the reasons lying behind this fall. In any case, the party obtained a significant victory in its 13th election in the last 16 years.

Another striking result of the election was the success of the MHP in parliamentary elections. While pre-election surveys were claiming that the party would get around 5-8 percent of the votes, the party got 11.2 percent and showed that it was still representing the center for nationalist voters. As its splinter party, the Iyi Party got 10 percent of the votes and fell behind the MHP. These results prove that despite all the manipulations and maneuvers of the Nation Alliance, the MHP can consolidate its voters in elections.

Last but not least, it is obvious that the CHP is the most unsuccessful party in the elections. The party faced with a sharp decline and lost approximately 4 percent of its votes. Because of the ongoing campaign among CHP voters, a significant amount of CHP supporters voted for the HDP in the parliamentary elections. The HDP substituted losses from Kurdish voters with the supports of the CHP and passed the threshold. Nonetheless, the results of the elections show that the CHP is in a crisis now and the gap between the party’s and Ince’s votes creates ambiguity in the future of the party. Thus, the results of the elections show that the leader of the CHP, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, is going to face challenges in holding the party’s chairmanship and controlling party organs in the next days.

During his years in office as Prime Minister, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan expressed his determination to resolve the Kurdish question at the cost of his political life. Considering the terror group PKK, which has been operating for the past 30 years and is condemned by all the political parties in Turkey, it was still hard to publicly suggest a solution on the subject back then. Firstly, 13 years ago, Erdogan delivered a speech in Diyarbakır province: “It is improper for major countries to condone the past mistakes since the problems are all ours. To be more specific, the Kurdish question is not a problem confronted by a certain part of the nation, but a problem that interests the entire nation, including myself.” In 2009, he said: “Whether you call it the Kurdish question, Southeast question or East question… No matter how we call it, we have initiated working on the question.”

With this, Erdogan embarked on the most venturous peace project in the history of the Turkish Republic, which is widely known as the Reconciliation Process. He kicked off works to negotiate with the outlawed PKK through their imprisoned leader Abdullah Ocalan, who was until then described as a “baby killer” by media outlets, the judiciary and the political parties that were dominated by the secular Kemalist tradition.

The Kurdish question was discussed thoroughly throughout the process, and every single taboo was faced. Introducing amnesty and building a new Turkey was being mentioned. A Committee of Wise People, which encompassed people from all segments and ideologies including nationalists, liberals, religious conservatives and seculars was formed. The Committee strived to explain the west and the east of the country to each other and convince people to the reconciliation process. Even the bases of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), who have recently formed an alliance ahead of the June 24 elections, listened to the suggestions. As the process went on, people stopped hiding their Kurdish identity and embraced it. Kurdish lessons were introduced in schools, and Kurdish political propaganda was allowed. In Nowruz celebrations that year, Ocalan, previously called a “baby killer,” addressed entire Turkey. All these developments were unimaginable for Turkey until then.

Everyone showed great enthusiasm to the process, but the first signs of the major problems in the process appeared during early 2015. After the general election held on June 7, 2015, PKK attacks abruptly gained speed with the influence of the new developments in Syria. In a short period, the reconciliation process was replaced by the ditches dug in cities and town centers, clashes and curfews. During this period, Turkey was simultaneously confronted with Daesh and PKK attacks. After a year, the military coup attempt organized by the Gulenist Terror Group (FETO) became the last straw for the Turkish nation.

Turkey faced a new fact particularly in the aftermath of the 2015 election: the ditches. Although the ditches were occasionally seen in several places before the election, the PKK systematically began digging ditches in many city and town centers following the election with the support of FETO operatives who infiltrated key state apparatuses and bureaucracy.

During the November 1 election held in the midst of this chaos, the pro-PKK Peoples’ Democratic Party’s (HDP) vote share declined and thus the party lost 21 of its 80 deputies assigned to the Parliament with the June 7 elections. The AK Party again came to power alone and the new government was eventually formed. Instead of the reconciliation process, the new government prioritized enabling public security. Stating that they regarded the ditches as a defense mechanism, HDP co-chairs expressed autonomy discussions in the shadow of terrorism.

In 2016, a bomb attack was organized to a military shuttle in Ankara that carried both military and civilian officers. 29 people were killed in the attack while dozens were injured. The PKK’s break-away faction, namely the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK), claimed responsibility for the attack.

During the ditch terror they inflicted, half of the population in Sırnak’s Cizre and Silopi districts, Diyarbakir’s Sur district and Mardin’s Nusaybin district were directly affected by the incidents. The number of people migrating from the four districts reached 93,000. The people were so enraged that Murat Karayilan, a senior PKK figure, had to express that the ditch strategy in the cities was wrong.

Turkey will go to the polls on Sunday. Currently, the counter-terror efforts are ongoing both inside and outside the country. When it comes to how the HDP views the ditches after all the incidents, the party co-chair Pervin Buldan and the party’s presidential candidate Selahattin Demirtas gave the following answers with regard to the ditches that led to hundreds of casualties and displaced thousands of people: Buldan claimed, “People dug ditches in self-defense,” whereas Demirtas stated, “I do not have issued a single remark that shows support to the ditches. We should have been more insistent and courageous in our attempts to get rid of them.” (Demirtas issued a written answer as he is currently under arrest.)

On 20 June, 2018, Anwar Ibrahim – Malaysia’s former prime minister who was sentenced to prison for sodomy in 2015 – gave a speech at SETA Istanbul.

Anwar has served a total of 11 years in prison, serving during different time periods, and was lastly sentenced by former Prime Minister Wajib Razak in 2015. Awar’s 3-year sentence by Wajib Razak was merely an attempt by the former premier to get rid of a feared political rival who was much more popular than him and who had gained the popular vote in the 2013 general election.

The release of Anwar Ibrahim was granted by the Pakatan Harapan coalition led by 92-year-old Matahir Mohamad.

Granted a full pardon by the King on the basis that there was a “miscarriage of justice,” Anwar has after 20 years of struggle, cleared his name.

After receiving the pardon, Anwar made it clear on various platforms that although it was not easy, he had “forgiven” those that sentenced him and the assaults that he had to endure.

Erdogan, a “brother” and “friend in difficulty”

During the event that took place at SETA Istanbul yesterday (Wednesday) SETA General Coordinator Burhanettin Duran made an opening speech. During this speech Duran highlighted the importance of events that are occurring in Malaysia and the correspondence of these events with the elections that are going to take place in Turkey on June 24.

Thanking Anwar for his attendance, Prof. Duran described Malaysia as a country that “plays a role in breaking the negative taboo against Muslims and in the fight against Islamophobia.”

Anwar began his speech by expressing his delight to be in Turkey – reminding the audience that he was in a prison cell only just last month. Prior to Anwar’s visit to Turkey, many circles were questioning the reason why he was visiting Turkey just before the country was to hold its parliamentary and presidential elections.

Before starting his speech, Anwar Ibrahim also felt the need to clarify this issue. Explaining that President Erdogan had invited him and his family to the country, Anwar emphasized that he was in Turkey “on this basis.”

“When I was arrested, Erdogan invited my family to Turkey – a brother and friend in difficulty – told Aziza (Anwar’s wife) ‘promise me when Anwar comes out of prison, you’ll visit us.’”

“That’s the basis I came here so there’s no confusion as to why I’m here before the elections,” Anwar said.

Underlining the respect he had for President Erdogan, Anwar stated: “From Pakistan to India – whether you agree with him or not – Recep Tayyip Erdogan is the only leader that is speaking out for the Muslim world.”

Institutional and governmental reforms

Reminding the audience that he was stripped from his freedom of speech, Anwar repeated that from now on he will speak his conscious.

“I was never made foreign minister because I’m not a good diploma. I speak my mind and I pay the price. Yes there was freedom to speak, but no freedom after I spoke.”

Throughout the hour-long speech that he made, Anwar repeatedly emphasized the importance of institutional governance in Muslim-majority countries.

“For a country to propel economically, reform is necessary,” he said.

Highlighting the fact that credit rating agencies “do not care if there is a growing gap between the rich and poor” and only care “about making a country more attractive,” Anwar stated that economics must be categorized in justice and compassion.

Continuously referring to corruptions in the region, Anwar described this as “institutionalized corruption” and stated that the future work of the Muslim world must be to reform institutions and governance.

Preserving his humor yet addressing a serious problem in the Muslim world, Anwar stated “Muslim leaders cannot go to Hajj and Umrah every year and then come back to their countries and talk Islam and justice, when they continue to shredder more money.”

Among the answers that he gave to questions regarding how he and his government will transform the system in Malaysia, Anwar listed elements such as the freedom of media, economy, care for people, health and housing – factors that he claimed were the most important.

The west cannot dictate

In reference to the hypocrisy occurring in the west, Anwar strongly expressed that he does not want the country to be dictated by the west.

“I do not want my country or myself to be dictated by the western or eastern agenda but by the Malaysian people themselves.”

“I’m a firm believer in collaboration and interchange. However, I don’t dictate my political position and will not be dictated by other’s discourses.”

Before finishing his speech, Anwar emphasized the need for reform and finished off by stating: “All we ask for is Muslim leaders to rule with their moral conscious.”

Anwar is expected to become the prime minister of Malaysia in two years, as he has said that he wants to stay as a back-bencher for a while.

On 24 June, Turkey’s presidential and parliamentary elections will be held. Subsequent to the declaration of the date of the snap elections, on 18 April, political parties in Turkey started their campaigns and published their election programs. The upcoming elections represent a final switch to Turkey’s new system of government which was accepted by a referendum on 16 April last year. The elections to take place in the next four days are also the first elections in Turkish history according to which both elections are executed simultaneously.

To get a clear perception of the recent election period, I’ll try to point out some crucial issues.

First of all, even though Western media outlets do not address this issue, the presidential elections are conducted in a diversified political atmosphere. There are six presidential candidates representing different political and societal expectations striving for the country’s highest political position. This is actually a diversity covering most of Turkey’s dominant political camps. In addition, ten political parties are participating in the parliamentary elections. The very interesting issue during this election period is the fact that at least six parties will definitely be in the parliament subsequent to the elections due to the new law on election alliances. According to this law, which was approved by a majority vote led by the ruling AK Party and the MHP in March 2018, the country’s 10 percent electoral threshold will still be in place but it will apply to the sum of the votes of the parties in the alliance. Thus, the number of MPs will be determined according to the sum of the votes of the election alliance. Interestingly, this issue which gives the possibility also to small political parties to join the parliament, is not addressed by foreign media due to the fact that this step has been initiated by the AK Party and MHP.

Furthermore, apart from President Erdogan and his party’s campaign, one has noticed that among the opposition only the CHP’s presidential candidate, Muharrem Ince, was able to make some striking statements. President Erdogan, for instance, while conducting his campaign, stressed the need for a strong executive and legislative organ in the upcoming period. Thus, he asked the people to vote for him as well as his AK Party in parliament. On the other hand, Ince insisted on an election campaign which differentiated itself from previous CHP discourses and biases. By this, Ince tried to portray himself within a rather conservative Muslim circles-friendly and pro-HDP image, which, however, totally contradicts the CHP’s traditional positions. It’s also fascinating that while Ince has been appointed as the party’s presidential candidate, CHP Chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu excluded all MP candidates, who are known to be close to Mr. Ince, with regard to the upcoming parliamentary elections. This image actually displayed who has the control of the party and who has concrete and real expectations from the election results.

By focusing on the other parties presidential candidates and their campaigns, its seems that no candidate was able to neither determine nor influence the political discourse during the recent two months. For instance, the MHP-split Iyi Party’s leader Meral Aksener, who runs as the Iyi Party’s presidential candidate, had no concrete proposal for Turkey’s future despite rather populist statements. For Mrs. Aksener, it’s also very frustrating due to the fact that President Erdogan did not address her once during the entire election campaign. To be honest, it cannot be said that there is public support regarding the Iyi Party even though Western politicians supported her as well.

The Kurdish left ethno-nationalist HDP’s presidential candidate Selahattin Demirtas and his party HDP, though, are extraordinarily supported by foreign media and even foreign political circles. By taking the HDP’s propaganda into consideration, the misleading conclusion above all in Western circles occurs, such as the false portrayal of the party as a quite liberal-leftist party that allegedly prioritizes human rights etc. By this, the party’s actual closeness and even links to the PKK terrorist organization is disregarded by foreign media and HDP supporters. For instance, it’s even ironical that the HDP’s presidential candidate, Selahattin Demirtas, was publicly supported by his brother Nurettin Demirtas, who lives as a PKK-terrorist in Iraq’s Qandil mountains. Of course, besides various statements and positions which do support the PKK, this fact has also been disregarded by HDP supporters and Western media.

Other performances of presidential candidates, such as the Felicity Party’s Chairman Temel Karamollaoglu and the Patriotic Party’s Chairman Dogu Perincek, have been also very low. Neither certain statements of these leaders were seriously taken into account by other leaders nor their election programs seem to persuade and do excite the electorate.

Thus, it’s quite obvious that the AK Party dominates the election campaign while the CHP seems to be divided into two parts. On the one hand, Muharrem Ince is trying to win the presidential election while Kilicdaroglu sets a focus on the parliamentary election and a potential inner-party rivalry subsequent to the elections. On the other hand, it’s striking that Ince makes use of populism by not explaining several promises in depth. For instance, Ince declares that he has no problem with women who wear headscarves while he does not explain his previous and well-known anti-positions just some years ago. The same counts for his populist statements with regard to HDP voters.

The AK Party stresses the new Turkish presidential system in the upcoming period while the CHP –and all other opposition parties except the MHP– do not explain how they schedule to switch back to a parliamentary system. This issue gets even more complex when Ince states that he wants to lead the country as an executive president while Mrs. Aksener calls for a rapid future plan. Finally, it’s also very bizarre that the dominant opposition parties do not address Turkey’s fight against terrorist organizations such as the PKK, FETO  in depth – neither in the candidates’ nor the parties’ program.

While the elections are coming closer, the political agenda is getting busier in Turkey. Amongst many developments in this regard over the past week, one is particularly interesting with regard to the electoral competition between the AK Party and HDP – the two major parties that share the votes of Turkey’s Kurdish constituency.

Huda-Par, a minor ethnic Kurdish party, had already declared that it would not be a part of the AK Party-led electoral coalition (which means that it will run for the parliamentary elections separately from the AK Party-MHP-BBP bloc also known as Cumhur Ittifaki). Nevertheless, this week Huda-Par announced that it will support AK Party leader Erdogan in the presidential elections, which will be held on the same day as parliamentary elections. While the color of the Kurdish votes in Turkey is the key to the electoral outcome, this recent move by Huda-Par deserves a closer look.

The Free Cause Party (Huda- Par or Hür Dava Partisi) is one of the many ethnic Kurdish parties in Turkey. The party was found in 2012 and has been active in the Turkish political landscape since then. In fact, the party has a troubled past given the allegations about its connection to the Kurdish Hizbullah, a terrorist organization which was responsible from multiple kidnapping and murder cases during the 1990s. Some see the party as a continuation of Kurdish Hizbullah, some see Hizbullah and Huda-Par totally unrelated, and some see Huda-Par as an output of an evolution from a radical violent organization to a peaceful political party. While there is no consensus on the relationship between the two organizations, the prevailing idea is that the two are not totally unconnected. Nevertheless, it is also a common understanding that the party as of today shows no intention to initiate or support a violent campaign and, hence, it is a legitimate member of Turkey’s league of political parties.

Huda-Par has so far failed to catch the voters’ attention as the Kurdish constituency of Turkey tend to split their votes between the incumbent AK Party and the secular ethic party HDP. On average, the AK Party receives the votes of conservative Kurds while the HDP attracts secular and ethnic nationalist Kurds. Huda-Par is ideologically somewhere between the AK Party and the HDP. It has both ethnic nationalist and conservative tendencies. To some, the party is beyond mere conservatism and can be called Islamist for its emphasis over the Islamic ummah, the Palestine cause, and the call for a system that will enable the Islamic way of life.

The distinction between Huda-Par’s Islamism and the AK Party’s conservativism might require further explanation. While both parties cherish Islamic values, the AK Party does so in a more conservative way. For the AK Party, Turkey should conserve its national culture and must not lose its connection with the country’s centuries long history going back to the Ottoman era. Islam has a central place in Turkey’s national culture and this culture must be protected according to the AK Party. But it is more like a conservative interpretation of Islam, or as some call it, the Turkish-Islam synthesis, which is quite peaceful with the secular character of the state and has nothing to do with the salafi interpretation of Islam.

Huda-Par seems to be more troubled with both the Turkish-Islam synthesis and many secular laws and regulations of the country. Hence, while the two parties ideologically differ, as one is merely conservative and the other more inclining toward Islamism, they share the emphasis over the role of Islam in society and both parties propagate conservative social policies. Among such policies one can count promoting the role of religion in the education of children, holding an anti-abortion stance, and policies aiming to minimize drug and alcohol consumption.

What does it mean for the AK Party to receive the support of Huda-Par in the presidential elections? At the end of the day, Huda-Par is just a minor party that cannot compete with the AK Party or the HDP for the Kurdish constituency. Nevertheless, Huda-Par’s decision to support Erdogan signals to the Kurdish constituency that this election is not between Turks and Kurds but between those that cherish Islam and those who do not.

Huda-Par’s approval of Erdogan also sends a signal to some confused, conservative or perhaps even Islamist but also Kurdish nationalist youth. It tells the Kurdish constituency that Erdogan’s electoral coalition with the Turkish nationalist MHP does not require conservative Kurdish nationalists to vote for other presidential candidates. This message means more than sheer numbers.

Huda-Par’s call will not only mobilize its own voters to vote for Erdogan, but it also sends a signal to the broader Kurdish masses. In other words, Huda-Par has signaled to the conservative Kurdish voters that Erdogan is still the closest candidate to them. How this message will be received will determine the winner of Turkey’s Kurdish votes, and perhaps even the winner of the presidential elections on June 24.

Turkey will hold one of the most critical elections in its history on June 24. They are critical because they are not an exchange of seats between political parties or transfer of power from one political party to another in a democratic country. On June 24, the people will rather decide whether the country should revert the old oligarchic regime in which the bureaucracy used to hold power and sovereignty or whether it should consolidate its burgeoning democratic regime in which power and sovereignty lay with the people. Besides, on June 24 the people will also decide whether the country should gain more autonomy in international politics or continue its age-old foreign policy of disengagement and dependency.

The AK Party-MHP alliance proposes to render the people’s will as the ultimate authority in the country’s political life and make Turkey great again in international politics. The CHP-Iyi Party-SP alliance, on the other hand, claims to restore the republican ideals of “Old Turkey,” which are characterized by modernist authoritarianism and bring the country back in line with the civilization, namely the West. Thus, the elections on June 24 will rather portray a moment of historical decision on the country’s regime type and national independence.

Indeed, the themes of democracy and independence will put their seal on the elections. Around these themes we have three scenarios for the post-election Turkey. In the first scenario, President Erdogan wins the presidential elections and the AK Party-MHP alliance gains the majority in parliament. This will mean that the people still hold on to their decision to switch to the presidential system on April 16, 2017. If this happens, the presidential system will be consolidated and democracy will be recognized as the only game in town.

For this will put pressure on the opposition to recognize the rule of the people’s will as the supreme will in politics and therefore the search for bringing the country back to an oligarchic regime will get shelved for good. This might also be accompanied by the democratization of the opposition’s view of international politics through its recognition of the country’s political authenticity and autonomous political will. More, terrorist organizations such as the PKK will face contraction of room for maneuver and FETO will give up hope for a comeback.

In the second scenario, President Erdogan wins the presidential election and the CHP-Iyi Party-SP alliance obtains the majority in parliament. This will display that the people still support the decision to switch to a presidential system and the consolidation of the democratic regime, yet they find the political actor –the AK Party-MHP alliance– unsuitable for this task. Encouraged with these results, the opposition will follow a politics of destabilization by blocking the presidential decrees in parliament and attempt to convince the people that the presidential system is not that good for the country. This will open up the door for changing the country’s direction back to oligarchy, emboldening the terrorist organizations such as the PKK and FETO and increasing the chances for foreign powers to influence the country’s domestic and foreign policies.

In the third scenario, President Erdogan loses the presidential election and the CHP-Iyi Party-SP alliance gains the majority in parliament. This will show that the people have changed their decision to switch to a presidential system and do not believe that President Erdogan or the AK Party-MHP alliance are suited for the task of democratizing the country’s domestic and international politics. In this situation, the opposition parties and their partners in the state apparatus will immediately attempt to take control of the country and embark on stifling the people’s demand for democratization. The people will doubtlessly show a considerable resistance to the restoration of the status quo ante at the outset, yet the lack of leadership and organization on the part of the popular front will in time give the upper hand to the oligarchic forces. In that political vacuum, the PKK will at once start a war of attrition in Northern Syria and Eastern Turkey whereas FETO will pick itself up and become a significant actor in the state apparatus once again.

Depending on the results of the election and whether the presidential election goes to the second round, one thing is certain: a new domestic makeup is waiting for Turkey.

The AK Party announced both the party’s parliamentary candidates and election manifesto for the upcoming elections last week. Both the candidate list and the election manifesto were based on the understanding of “strong parliament, strong government” motto. Thus, these two texts complement each other in showing the codes of the new era in Turkish politics. Furthermore, the election manifesto of the party also reveals the path of democratic transformation and economic development under the new system.

When examining the deputy candidate list of the party, major changes in the current lists attract attention. As a part of rejuvenation efforts in the party, 149 of the current AK Party deputies were not re-nominated. Contrary to the re-nominated 21 ministers, 5 ministers (Mehmet Simsek, Nihat Zeybekci, Naci Agbal, Faruk Ozlu and Omer Celik) did not find a place on the lists. This shows that President Erdogan is planning to make significant changes in his cabinet because ministers cannot be selected among deputies according to the new presidential system. Additionally, the list consisting of prominent names of the party’s leading cadre indicates that the parliament will continue to be a dominating power in the new system.

The other eye-catching aspect of the candidate list was the presence of a considerable number of female candidates. There are 126 female candidates, consisting 21% of the AK Party’s list. This data shows that the party aims to increase the number of female deputies compared to previous terms. Indeed, whether male or female, all nominated candidates were selected according to their previous performance in their electoral districts and their attendance record in parliament as President Erdogan stated.

There are 126 female candidates, consisting 21% of the AK Party’s list. This data shows that the party aims to increase the number of female deputies compared to previous terms.

When it comes to the election manifesto, it can be stated that the party is thinking ahead to plan the next term. Beyond the previous 2023 target, the party settles a long-term vision for Turkey towards 2053 and 2071. The election manifesto consists of eleven chapters and contains the details of both ongoing and 146 future projects in a comprehensive manner. Future projects were especially evaluated in the party program in detail. Among these 146 projects, there are the establishments of new nuclear power stations, new airports, highways, and high-speed trains; realizing new defense projects; establishing new green zones such as a huge city park in place of the Ataturk Airport; and the digital transformation of traditional sectors.

In addition to these projects, the manifesto emphasized further future plans to provide the economic and democratic transformation of Turkey. In regards to strengthening the Turkish economy, it is stated that the independence of the Central Bank will be maintained and instruments for currency liquidity will be applied. Furthermore, the mechanism and incentives to control the foreign exchange risk will be provided to firms and the free-market economy in Turkey will be strengthened.

To raise the democratic standards and consolidate its democracy, the AK Party promises to take new steps. Granting legal status to worship houses of Alevis (Cemevi) is one of them.

One of the most significant features of the election manifesto was on the democratic transformation of Turkey in the new era. In the manifesto, it is stated that Turkey will not make any concessions from high democratic standards and continue to show efforts to consolidate its democracy. In conjunction with this aim, a lot of new steps are promised to be taken. For instance, worship houses of Alevis (Cemevi) will be granted legal status in the new era. This commitment shows that the party will be focused on solving deep-rooted and structural issues to remove the obstacles in front of Turkey’s democratic transformation. Because of this reason, it should be stated that the manifesto is the most comprehensive and eye-catching document compared to previous election manifestos of the AK Party and other parties.

Many analysts take the rise of a particular person to political primacy as a sign of one-man rule or authoritarianism. The basic reason behind this crooked perception is that political life is taken as it happens to be merely in one single mode. This mode can be defined in terms of the situation within which the basis of socio-political order or the established laws and institutions are to an extent consented by all the participants.

Yet there is another moment of politics beside this moment of political normalcy. This is the moment of pre-political within which the political structures are dislocated and there is a sheer disagreement over the laws and socio-political institutions. In the former situation, we observe the rule of law and the rule through institutionalized mechanisms. In the latter, there is the primacy of a person or a group of people due to the collapse of institutions and the presence of a political vacuum.

The conditions that determine Turkish political life resembles the latter case. There are three characteristics of this special condition of Turkish politics. The first is the presence of formlessness. The post-1980 period testified the dissolution of Kemalist hegemony under the pressure of domestic opposition groups such as the conservatives, liberals and the Kurds. Combined with the globalization process, the statist Kemalist order in Turkey was deeply shaken. These internal and international challenges intensified the existing discrepancy between the societal demands and established political order and paved the way for a political vacuum and formlessness in the country that begged to be filled.

The second characteristic is the presence of a large consensus within society that the country needs a new political order. The support for democratization in almost all sections of society has demonstrated those political expectations. The demand for democratization has simply been signifying the desire for an alternative political order. This has been accompanied later by a high demand for political being in the face of formlessness and dual domination of bureaucratic oligarchy and foreign forces. This was manifested by the victory of the “yes” campaign in the referendum on constitutional change for the presidential system on April 16, 2017, and the failure of the June 15, 2016 military coup attempt, resisted by the people.

The last condition is the longtime absence of political leadership for realizing those political objectives. Turkish society has been in search for popular leadership with military and political virtù since the 1950s. Adnan Menderes (and his DP) and Turgut Ozal (and his ANAP) were candidates for that role of a liberator. However, both political figures or movements were successfully contained and ended by the then hegemonic state bureaucracy. They failed to get the oligarchic structures to roll back and replace them with a new form of political order.

The rise of President Erdogan to political primacy and the gradual establishment of a new political form have been a response to this pre-political situation in Turkey. Erdogan has risen to a leadership position in that political vacuum and has become the leader that has laid the foundations of a new political order in the country. He has led the process of political revolution, which is characterized with the replacement of an oligarchic political regime with popular democracy. The switch to a presidential system in a period of time from 2007 to today represents this process of democratization.

The next step in front of Erdogan is to transfer political power to the people by producing conditions that the country is ruled though laws. This may happen in two steps. The first step is the completion of the transition to a presidential system with the 24 June elections, which promises to put the popular will at the center of politics. The second step is the construction of a new constitution, which should be based on society values and play a role of balancer against the political forces such as the bureaucracy and big business. With all these done, Turkey will reach the moment of political normalcy and Erdogan will then retreat to a less prominent position. Under current conditions those criticisms of one-man rule towards Erdogan represent nothing but an utter ignorance of politics.

President Erdogan announced the AK Party’s election manifesto during the provincial congress of the AK Party’s Istanbul branch. Although the manifesto contains significant details about the party’s election strategy, it attracted the attention of masses due to its full-fledged summary of the political understanding of the AK Party movement since its establishment. The text was especially successful in reflecting the party’s reconciliatory approach integrating the past and present, tradition and modernity, morality and rationality.

The manifesto consists of three main sections summarizing the AK Party’s political experience since its establishment. The process up to the year 2002 was called “the foundation period,” while the party’s experiences up to 2018 was called “the resurrection.” The third section of the manifesto covering the post-2018 period was called “the rise.” These concepts were being used to integrate Turkey’s and the AK Party’s struggle for existence. The emphasis on “we” over “I” in the text was also significant in terms of reflecting this perspective. In accordance with this perspective, the Battle of Canakkale and the 15 July coup attempt was defined as integral parts of a whole. It was underlined that the AK Party had shared a common fate with Turkey’s people in overcoming these struggles.

The second section of the manifesto focused on Turkey’s transformation process under the AK Party governments. This process, called the resurrection, was described as a period during which the state began to serve the nation. In this part, it was stated that Turkey had become a prominent actor in its region thanks to economic developments and the resolution of deep-rooted social and cultural conflicts. It was also underlined that the implementation of effective and innovative policies had created a new country able to compete with the world. Furthermore, the representation of various religious and ethnic groups in the public space was reflected as the product of inclusive political approach of the party.

The third section of the manifesto focused on the post-election period. The June 24 elections were positioned as a critical threshold on the way of being a leading state in the world system. At this point, President Erdogan promised to create a more prosperous country for all. He particularly addressed the youth in this regard: “You are the future; to whom we give custody of our dreams for 2053 and 2071. We shall not order you. We shall not let anyone dictate things to you. We shall not work to put you in boxes. We will just work together with you.”

In this section of the manifesto, President Erdogan also drew attention to more stable governance, a stronger economy, and a better welfare system in the new term. Turkey’s 2023, 2053, and 2071 objectives and necessities to be successful in achieving them were underlined. Another striking part of this section was about the transformation of Turkey’s regional and global foreign policy after 2002. Despite the recent instability and violence surrounding the country, it was stated that Turkey keeps its position as a strong and independent country. At this point, Erdogan stressed that Turkey was fighting for having an honorable position in the new world system shaped after the 1990s and would continue to cooperate closely with Turkey’s counterparts in accordance with this aim. Moreover, it was emphasized that the provision of national security is a priority in foreign policy decision-making processes and Turkey would not make any concession in this issue. In this part, Turkey’s determination to get full membership in the EU was brought to the fore.

The AK Party’s manifesto for the June 24 elections is beyond being an ordinary election manifesto. The manifesto also reveals the AK Party’s approach to the country’s past and present realities.

On Sunday, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced his election manifesto at the provincial congress of the AK Party in Istanbul. The June 24 presidential election manifesto constitutes a textbook example that portrays how President Erdogan and AK Party think about Turkey’s current domestic and international politics. Moreover, it hints at the future of Turkish domestic and international affairs in the post-election period. More importantly, the election manifesto itself, after fifteen years of AK Party service in Turkey, demonstrates the very nature of the transformation of Turkish domestic and foreign policy, and underlines the changing nature of Erdogan’s way of doing politics and foreign policy. The foreign policy framework that appeared in the President’s speech on Sunday is significant for three reasons. Firstly, it symbolizes the emergence of a new Turkish foreign policy identity. Secondly, it indicates the new realist approach to Turkish foreign policy strategy, and lastly underlines the foreign policy practices that will be carried out in the future.

Foreign policy identity has always been a contested issue in the history of Turkish foreign affairs since the early republican era. The pre-2002 formulation of Turkish foreign policy has been constructed around the securitized Kemalist westernization project, homogenized the nation-state discourse, and marginalized the neighboring geography, particularly in the Middle East. The emergence of the AK Party fundamentally transformed the very nature of the Turkish foreign policy identity and reformulated it within the context of a liberalized internationalization project (it was not necessarily a westernization project), democratized the nation-state discourse (freedom from assertive nationalism), and desecuritized the political geography around Turkey. The new Turkish foreign policy approach invented around the idea of civilizational interaction, which has undergone transformation again because of the new security landscape that emerged following the Arab uprising, as it forced Turkey to obtain a new foreign policy approach mainly based on state-centrism.

President Erdogan’s election manifesto strongly underlined the necessity to become a strong state, not only a state in which institutional resilience is at the center, but also a state that has the ability to defend itself against regional threats. The foreign policy identity framed by the speech of President Erdogan is not a return to Kemalist foreign policy identity. Rather, it is an identity formulated around the idea of threat perception not only emanating from terrorism but also coming from the changing nature of Turkey’s interactions with the Western world. It is a product of the conversation between classical nationalism and new conservatism influenced by the rise of a new survival anxiety. The West is no longer a complementary component of Turkish foreign policy identity. In fact, the new Turkish foreign policy identity does not coexist with the West, but is a product of the practice of “national-native stance,” for which the West is not seen as an integral actor; rather it is gradually becoming an “empty signifier.” This stance, for sure, is not only valid for the Turkish perception of otherness. It is, in fact, becoming a new reality and integral part of the Western narrative towards Turkey.

The election manifesto does not only symbolize the emergence of a new foreign policy identity, it also underlines the consolidation of the new realist approach in foreign policy strategy. In the history of Turkish foreign policy, decision-makers have always been proud of being realist in terms of preference, without actually engaging in any realist policy toolbox. Turkish foreign policy under the AK Party in the last decade was no exception. However, the post- July 15 Turkish foreign policy formulation situated power as an integral part of its strategy, which was a long-anticipated move. The new realism manifested itself in the election manifesto as a reference point in formulating Turkey’s capacity and potential. While the capacity simply underlines the importance of the material military strength of Turkey, the potential highlights how Turkey can use its material capacity in delivering its new national-native stance. This is not limited to the formulation of power in foreign policy strategy. President Erdogan’s manifesto also emphasizes that unipolarity is over and a new international system is emerging, in which the U.S. is not the only power. This makes Turkey’s new realism approach more important in delivering its national security strategy, particularly in its surrounding regions. The role of Russia and other alternative power centers are particularly significant since President Erdogan strongly underlined in his manifesto that Turkey would work with Russia, Iran, and China just as much as it works with the U.S. and other western countries. This is the new reality for Turkish foreign policy. In this new realist approach, the West is not a reference point solely from a culturist perspective; it is an institutional component of Turkey’s national and regional security architecture.

The election manifesto also gives many clues about how Turkey will put its foreign policy strategy into practice following the elections. There are, of course, many foreign policy issues that President Erdogan has to deal with under the new presidential system. These include the PYD-PKK issue between Ankara and Washington, S-400s, Turkey-EU relations, Syria, the PKK in Syria, and so on. Erdogan’s critique of the U.S. regarding the PYD issue was the main foreign policy theme in his manifesto. Therefore, it will be the first foreign policy test for President Erdogan to see how he will deliver his new foreign policy thinking. On the other hand, the U.S. perspective on Turkey’s S-400 choice as the main air defense system is well known. In the following months, specifically in the post-election period, the U.S. Senate will try to impose a sanction against Turkey even though Trump himself is against it. It will certainly increase the tension between the two capitals. In addition to that, the question regarding Turkey–Russia relations still remains. Erdogan strongly highlighted that Turkey has a foreign policy perspective in line with the Ankara criteria, which will be presented in the AK Party’s election declaration as a Turkey-centered foreign policy.

This time, Erdogan’s way in Turkish foreign policy is a strategy to save the country first and to turn it into a regional powerhouse later on.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently made a statement that “if my people say ‘enough’ I am ready to step down.” Even though this statement is a sign of self-confidence in the run-up to the 24 June elections and commitment to democratic norms, the opposition in Turkey has taken it as a platform to give a content to its own election campaign, whose sole argument is to get rid of Erdogan. The source of excitement in the opposition is the chance to get the psychological upper hand after a long time has finally appeared.

Indeed, the opposition has long felt psychologically weak against the “People Alliance,” formed by the AK Party, the MHP and the BBP for its lack of presenting itself to the public as an alternative force for ruling the country. This political inferiority has evolved into a grave psychological weakness for the part of the opposition.

This political and psychological underdog position of the opposition has deeper reasons that are rooted in its sociological shortcomings. This sociological weakness has two dimensions. First of all, for a political force to win an election and to get the power position requires producing the largest power bloc by bringing as much societal demands as possible together. This collection of dispersed societal demands should produce a proper political project, a political unity that can attract and bring as many followers as possible in society. This is what the opposition has failed to achieve for a 15-year plus period against AK Party rule. The opposition has attempted to forge the largest power bloc by using every means, yet society has consistently showed that it finds those attempts unconvincing.

This leads to the second dimension of the sociological weakness of the opposition, which stems from its misreading of or taking a false position vis-a-vis the main political process in the country. Turkish society basically demands from all political actors to lead the struggle to end the domination of the bureaucratic oligarchy and the international forces. The opposition has failed to address this fundamental reality of Turkish political life. Even worse, it stands against and tend to stifle society’s demand of non-domination.

In the early years of AK Party rule, the opposition tended to deny this basic societal demand of non-domination by portraying it as a search for a religious state. This was accompanied by the claims that the AK Party works for an international conspiracy or aims at bringing the country into pieces in the context of the so-called “Great Middle Eastern Project.” After 2012, the opposition left aside its secularist-nationalist discourse and embraced a liberal-democratic discourse with a tint of secularism. So that, it started to assert that the AK Party desires to create a dictatorship in the country and works in tandem with terrorist groups such as Daesh in order to achieve this political end. Lately, the opposition has switched its discourse from liberal-democracy to republicanism. Accordingly, it has begun to contend that the AK Party seeks a regime change, which is simply replacing the republic with monarchy or one-man rule.

In all these years as the AK Party has pursued society’s demands for ending the domination of the bureaucratic elites and the international forces, the opposition has taken a stance against this fundamental demand of Turkish society. The opposition still sticks to its politics of ceasing and containing this societal demand of non-domination. The 24 June election will testify once again the struggle between the political forces that seek non-domination and those political forces that strive to strangle the societal demand of non-domination. Even though there is a common point of reference, which is anti-Erdoganism, the opposition remains rather a dispersed power bloc – it is composed of secular-nationalist Kemalists, Turkish nationalists, Islamists and Kurdish nationalists and separatists. The presence of large contradictions within the opposition bloc may easily be manipulated by the People Alliance. Thus, with this ostensible weakness and being positioned against the fundamental societal demand of non-domination, the prospect for the opposition to win the 24 June elections seems so bleak. In sum, in the face of these indicators the TAMAM campaign cannot be more than a passing fad.

On Monday 7 May, 2018, the International Mount of Olives Peace Awards found their recipients at the Cemal Resit Rey Concert Hall in Istanbul, Turkey.

Under the premiership of the Turkish presidency and organized by the Al-Quds Platform in Istanbul, the International Mount of Olives Peace Awards were rewarded to four different individuals for their long commitment to the Palestinian cause.

With the attendance of President Erdogan, First Lady Emine Erdogan, Turkey’s Minister of Culture and Tourism Numan Kurtulmus, Mayor of Istanbul Vasip Sahin and leader of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Mevlut Uysal, awards were given to Craig and Cindy Corrie on behalf of Rachel Corrie, to Noor Fitri, Benjamin Ladraa and to Muthir Hani on behalf of Naji al-Ali.

Opening the ceremony, chair of the Al-Quds Platform, Belkis Ibrahimhakkioglu thanked the President and guests for their attendance.

Drawing attention to the historical atrocities in Palestine, Ibrahimhakkioglu stated, “The 100. Anniversary of the Nakbah is nearly here. The map of Palestine was changed and the displacement of Palestinian people occurred in only 24 hours. Both Israel and the U.S. are going to celebrate their oppression. They are going to engulf a sense of enmity and blame others. And again, regardless of UN decisions, no one is going to do anything. Reactions are going to stay limited to on paper and the occupation in Palestine is going to continue.”

“Only a minimal number of voices are going to be heard. For this reason, we should increase the number of loud voices within these minimal voices. These loud voices should turn into strong and systematic programs.”

Speaking after Belkis Ibrahimhakkioglu, President Erdogan re-iterated his “the world is bigger than 5″ slogan in the name of finding peace for the decades-long Arab-Israeli conflict. The President also underlined what Ibrahimhakkioglu mentioned in her speech, and further stated that reform of the United Nations is now not a choice but a necessity, as countries – referring to the U.S. decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel – regardless of UN decisions – can act alone and go againt the international community.

Who are the recipients?

Rachel Corrie

Craig and Cindy Corrie, parents of Rachel Corrie, a U.S. citizen who was killed by the Israeli army in 2003 received their award from President Erdogan.

Corrie was in the Gaza Strip in 2003 as part of her work with the International Solidarity movement, a movement that looks worldwide for people to help with their nonviolent protests against the Israeli military in the West Bank.

After her death, The Rachel Corrie Foundation for Peace and Justice was founded to “support programs that foster connections between people, that build understanding, respect, and appreciation for differences, and that promote cooperation within and between local and global communities.”

After receiving their award from President Erdogan, during their speech, both Cindy and Craig Corrie upheld what their daughter stood for.

Thanking the Turkish public for standing by them since the death of their daughter, Cindy Corrie stated, “We are honored and humbled to be included among the recipients, and we are mindful of the fact that the people of Turkey have stood with our family since 2003 when Rachel was killed.”

Drawing attention to the continuing human rights infringements occurring in Palestine, Craig Corrie stated, “We have watched protesters and members of media brutally killed during these past weeks, as the people of Gaza have turned to the world, demanding their rights and an end to occupation and siege. As citizens of the world, we have an obligation to protect the lives of those everywhere, who at great risk, stand for freedom, and bear witness for us to injustice.”

Noor Fitri

Rewarded her award by Emine Erdogan, Noor Fitri was aboard on the Mavi Marmara. After being detained by the Israeli forces, she was finally set free to return to her own country. Upon arriving to Indonesia, she founded Adara Relief International, which is an organization that seeks to help those that have been affected by war, conflict and natural disasters.

Upon receiving her award, after thanking the Al-Quds Platform and the Turkish presidency for their support to the Palestinian cause, Fitri remembered the martyrs of Mavi Marmara and said, “I take this award for my brothers that were martyred on Mavi Marmara.”

Benjamin Ladraa

Benjamin Ladraa received his award from leader of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Mevlut Uysal. A young activist from Sweeden, Ladraa has drawn attention to the human rights abuses and the Israeli occupation with his steps. Having set off his journey in August 2017, Ladraa has walked through 11 countries and got to Turkey in March 2018.

Explaining the reasoning behind his particular method of resistance, Ladraa stated that “every step taken is important.” During his speech at the awards evening Ladraa emphasized how walking has allowed him to meet new people and to explain the situation in Palestine. His end aim is to go to Northern Cyprus and take a boat to Palestine – not knowing whether he will be granted entry by the Israeli forces.

Naji al-Ali

Naji al-Ali, forced to leave Palestine, and well known for his famous cartoon ‘Hanzala’ was assassinated by the Israeli secret service, Mossad, in 1987.

Hanzala was a cartoon depicting a young boy aged 10, who always had his back to the viewer, reflecting how the world has remained silent to the issues in Palestine.

Describing Hanzala, Naji al-Ali once wrote: “Hanzala was born at the age of ten and will always remain ten. At that age I left my country and only when Hanzala returns to Palestine will he grow up and exceed the age of ten. The rules of nature do not apply on him. He is an exception and things will only be natural in his case when he returns to Palestine. The child is a symbolic representation of myself and the group who lives and endures the situation we are all in. I offered him to the readers and called him Hanzala as a symbol of bitterness. In the beginning I offered him as a Palestinian child and with the development of his awareness he had a patriotic and a human outlook.”

When the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came to power in 2002, the tutelage regime consisting of military, judiciary and the main opposition party strived to overthrow the AK party with the closure cases filed against it, the issue of 367 members and the e-memorandum. Afterwards, they resorted to street protests such as the Gezi Park uprising and the October 6-7 incidents in order to achieve their goal. Ultimately, it was ruled that the government could be toppled through conventional methods and the July 15 coup attempt was organized. This insurrection, attempted by a group of Gulenist Terror Group (FETO) affiliated military officers who infiltrated the military, was repelled by the Turkish people.

Meanwhile, the government was endeavoring to break the taboos and barriers impeding societal peace, which were introduced by the tutelage system and the 1924, 1961 and 1982 constitutions. The government changed some of the obsolete laws that were copied from various European countries during the 1930s and aligned these laws with the EU. The 1915 Armenian incidents were confronted in every aspect as President Recep Tayyip Erdogan asked historians to establish an international committee on the subject.

For the first time in Turkey’s Republican history, a president sent his condolences to the families of the Armenians who lost their lives in 1915. In 2005, he said the following words in the southeastern province Diyarbakir: “Every country has made mistakes throughout its history. For great countries, ignoring past mistakes is not appropriate. The Kurdish question is not only the problem of a certain segment of the country, but the problem of the entire nation, including me.” He exerted efforts for the reconciliation process, which was the largest project undertaken in Turkey to introduce peace in society.

However, Turkey’s interlocutors during the process did not only consist of the other party of the conflict. The country had to address many countries, including superpowers and smaller states. Erdogan also abolished the headscarf ban in the public sphere, which had debarred many women from receiving university education or taking up a career for years. He also marked unprecedented achievements in public works and launched new transportation means across the country. Effective metro routes were built in metropolitan cities. He took great steps in the defense industry, made the country prosper whereas people enjoyed higher purchasing powers thanks to his efforts. Along with all these steps, he opened the country’s doors to three and a half million Syrians who fled the war.

In a nutshell, the government ruled out a great deal of national and global attacks by taking a reasonable degree of security measures. If any country were to experience only one tenth of what Turkey has undergone over the past years, it would also take the measures Turkey has taken. In the face of all these threats, a state of emergency was declared. Of course, a country who has to focus on her security will face some volatilities in democracy and freedoms. This situation is also valid for Turkey. But this is only a normal and temporary symptom.

A month ago, an expression remarked by the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) Chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu was captioned by the daily newspaper Cumhuriyet: “We will unseat Erdogan through elections.” This is a curious statement since the CHP leader seems to have implicitly admitted all the operations to overthrow Erdogan. The CHP does not aim to take over the presidential seat or become the ruling power. The party firstly suggested presenting former President Abdullah Gul as the joint presidential candidate of the opposition to run against Erdogan. Then they tried to convince Meral Aksener to run as a joint candidate. However, being an ambitious politician and aspiring to be a leader, Aksener gave a negative answer although Kilicdaroglu transferred 15 CHP deputies to Aksener’s newly-formed Iyi Party (Good Party). Eventually, the opposition parties agreed that each party will nominate a candidate to run for president, whereas the CHP, Iyi Party, Felicity Party (SP) and Democrat Party (DP) decided to form an alliance for the parliamentary election by excluding the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP).

These four parties have stressed that they have agreed to work towards unseating Erdogan and returning to the parliamentary system. In this country, the parliamentary system equals to a system in which politics is determined by the tutelage system, where the governments are volatile and elections are overruled through external ways – as past experiences have shown. However, it is not easy to bring up the matter frankly before the electorate. The alliance announced that it would declare its protocol last Thursday. Then, it was stated that the protocol was not yet ready and the event was postponed to Saturday. In another announcement made on Saturday, it was said that the event could not be organized as the agendas of the party leaders did not cohere.

Will they say “We do not have any mutually-agreed program on any subject. We only aim to unseat Erdogan, return to the parliamentary system and call early elections,” in front of the 50 million electorate. Of course, it is not easy for the leaders of the four parties, who share hardly any common features, to promise only chaos.

After long-during discussions, Turkish opposition parties formed an alliance before the June 24 parliamentary elections. As it was called the “Nation Alliance,” this cooperation brought the CHP, Iyi Party, Felicity Party, and Democrat Party together. During the announcement of the alliance, it was also emphasized that candidates from the Democrat Party would run under the Iyi Party in elections.

These four parties have been negotiating a possible alliance for a couple of months. Indeed, the Iyi Party and Felicity Party came to an agreement on a partial alliance in the second run of the presidential elections if no candidate would win a simple majority in the first round. Nonetheless, when the decision of snap elections was taken, these parties accelerated their negotiation process. Even if all of these parties have different ideologies, principles, and system of values, they ignored such fundamental issues to form a superficial alliance against President Erdogan and the AK Party.

The CHP’s leading cadre and voters are split between nationalists/Kemalists and left-wing circles. The Iyi Party is supposed to get votes from nationalists within the CHP and MHP. The Felicity Party gets a few votes from the National Outlook Movement – most of the supporters of which vote for President Erdogan and the AK Party. Thus, there seems no realistic common ground or purpose of the opposition parties for the future of Turkey except removing President Erdogan from power that was tried in different forms in the past. This reality was seen in the declaration paper of the alliance. There wasn’t any reasonable justification or purpose of the alliance on paper. These parties also failed to explain how they were going to work in a harmony after the elections.

All of these elements show that this alliance is not an organic but an induced alliance. Does the formation of the alliance among the leading cadres of these parties reflect the will of their voters? The answer of this question is “no”.  After the announcement of the alliance, supporters of the Felicity Party criticized the cooperation of their party with the CHP on social media. Especially the CHP’s historical discourse on women that wear headscarves came to the fore again. Additionally, CHP voters heavily attacked the involvement of the Felicity Party in the alliance and denominated this party with the words such as “backward,” “reactionary,” and “followers of sharia.” These words show that radical secularists in the CHP still have the same mentality against religious people.

When it comes to the Iyi Party, the voter transferability between the CHP and Iyi Party seems to accelerate after this alliance. The angry nationalists in the CHP have already turned their face to the Iyi Party. However, some acts of the CHP’s presidential candidate Muharrem Ince may increase voter transferability between these parties on behalf of the Iyi Party. For instance, Ince’s call for the release of Selahattin Demirtas and his plan to visit Demirtas in jail have raised tensions among the nationalists in the CHP.

Overall, it is seen that the induced and superficial alliance among these parties could not mobilize their voters yet. It can be stated that these parties may take some actions towards mobilizing their voters in the last 49 days of the elections. At this point, it is important to remember that the context is highly crucial on voting behavior. As the alliance among these parties is not the result of an organic and well-thought process but simply aims to overthrow the government with no serious preparation to govern the country, they will most probably suffer to persuade their voters to vote for the Nation Alliance.

Last week, this column claimed that Erdogan is more popular than his very own party amongst Turkey’s Kurdish electorate. As all the other major parties have nominated their presidential candidates for the upcoming June elections over the past week, now we have the full picture to evaluate the odds for the Kurdish votes in Turkey.

Amongst the contestants, the conservative Saadet Party nominated the party leader Temel Karamollaoglu. The self-claimed socialist and ethnic party HDP nominated the jailed ex-leader of the party, Selahattin Demirtas. While Demirtas is closer to the Kurdish voters than Karamollaoglu, both can be seen sympathetic by the Kurdish electorate unlike the following two contestants.

Iyi Party’s candidate Meral Aksener is known as an ultra-nationalist character, while the CHP’s candidate Muharrem Ince is also portrayed as a secular nationalist figure by the electorate. Naturally, the latter two of these candidates, Ince and Aksener, will not be the first choice of Turkey’s Kurdish electorate. Amongst the other two contestants, Karamollaoglu is also not a likely choice given his party’s marginal vote share in Turkey. This leaves Demirtas as the only significant challenger for the incumbent Erdogan to win over the votes of Turkey’s Kurds. After all, the HDP under Demirtas’s leadership and Erdogan’s AK Party shared the first spot in heavily Kurdish populated districts in the previous elections. Hence, the June presidential election in Turkey’s eastern and southeastern cities will be a pairwise election between Erdogan and Demirtas.

Both candidates have their pros and cons for Turkey’s Kurds. Demirtas is a young candidate who once promised “peace,” which was a magic word in the decades-long terror-worn region. Further, as a candidate running from prison, he might gain the sympathy of a number of Kurds. Nevertheless, he suffers from two significant problems. First, the very same masses saw that Demirtas has no power over the future of the Kurdish question while the PKK keeps hijacking his electoral successes. From the eyes of the PKK politburo, every vote for the HDP in the region is counted as a vote to support the PKK’s terror campaign.

For the PKK’s acting leader Cemil Bayik, the HDP would not even get 5 percent of the votes if it were not for the PKK. Since the PKK leadership sees the HDP secondary to the armed wing, they kept criticizing the HDP for failing to carry out its assignments given by the PKK leadership. Hence, Demirtas’s and the HDP’s agency and true capabilities are questioned for plausible reasons. The second handicap for Demirtas is his problematic record for the infamous 6-7 October events. During the Kobani siege of 2014, Demirtas severely criticized Turkey, which had already accepted tens of thousands Syrian Kurds fleeing the siege. In his remarks, Demirtas made a call for Kurds to go out and resist. The events spread to 35 cities and over 30 people lost their lives, including Yasin Börü, a 16 year old volunteering for a religious humanitarian aid organization. Börü was beaten, stabbed, burnt, and thrown off the roof by the pro-PKK crowd. Demirtas repeated his resistance calls on different occasions afterwards. While this is not a shame for pro-PKK Kurds, many conservative Kurds blame Demirtas for the events leading to Börü’s murder.

Erdogan, as the only other contestant who can expect to gain Kurdish votes on mass, has also pros and cons for the June elections. One disadvantage is to compete with Demirtas, who has a significant number of fans in the region and receives sympathy for running from behind the bars. Further, it is unclear how Erdogan’s electoral coalition with the nationalist MHP will affect the Kurdish votes for him. This is something that will unfold during the campaign process. On the other hand, his biggest advantage is that no other political leader of Turkey could ever recognize the Kurdish reality as much as him up to this day. After all, Erdogan is the leader who enacted the reforms from providing Kurdish elective courses in public schools to the starting of state TV channels broadcasting exclusively in Kurdish dialects, and to allowing political propaganda in the Kurdish language. He is the leader (both as PM and president) who recognized the Kurdish reality in unprecedented degrees and tried novel solutions such as the peace/resolution processes.

At the end of the day, it seems like the Kurdish votes will be split between Erdogan and Demirtas in the first round of the elections. Nevertheless, in case Erdogan is not elected in the first round, he will most likely compete with the main opposition party’s candidate Ince in the run-off stage. In such a scenario, Erdogan seems much closer to consolidating the Kurdish voters than his probable rival.

On Sunday (May 6) at a public meeting Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will declare a manifesto in run-up to the June 24 election, which is the first presidential election of the country. Erdogan’s decision to declare a manifesto is noteworthy because it will mark not only Turkey’s transition to the presidential system but also a new era in the country’s political life. For this reason, it is expected that Erdogan will stress on the achievements that Turkey has scored so far in its attempt to transform the old (Kemalist) regime and the direction that the country will take in the future.

Indeed, despite fiery disagreements on its character, everybody concedes that Turkey has undergone an epochal change under Erdogan’s leadership and that has brought the country into a new political reality. This political reality has two dimensions: freedom and power.

The emergence of a new political actor. Looking at the freedom dimension, at the center of this political reality lies the emergence of a new political actor. Before 2002 the periphery, which was mainly composed of conservatives and lower-classes, was scattered and thereby subject to the Kemalist hegemony. Kemalists, who successfully equated themselves within the political community, strived to include the periphery into this secular-nationalist whole or excluded them in the event of resistance.

Since the disorganized state of the periphery was the main cause of its subjection to the Kemalist hegemony, the AK Party under Erdogan’s leadership, first of all, aimed at bringing the periphery into unity through the discourse of conservative-democracy. This was the first step to produce a new political actor and facilitated the containment of the Kemalist hegemony. Secondly, as this new political actor came to fruition, the state was decoupled from Kemalism. This resulted in the dislocation of the Kemalist hegemony. And lastly, it has begun to expand and deepen its hegemony in society by incorporating various societal demands into its conservative-democratic whole. As a result, the periphery has evolved from being subject to Kemalist hegemony to a counter-hegemonic force and finally to a hegemonic force.

From oligarchy to democracy. The periphery’s rise to a hegemonic position transformed the political system from an oligarchy to democracy. Turkey shifted from a monarchy to republican regime in the 1920s, yet it failed to establish a democratic system. It rather portrayed an oligarchic political system in disguise of democracy up until the 2000s.

Kemalist oligarchy depended on the rule by a privileged secular-nationalist minority that included mainly the state bureaucracy, civil servants and the upper-classes. The line between whom to rule and be ruled was drawn by membership to the official ideology, that is secular-nationalism. Despite the presence of a multi-party parliamentary system, those political groups that did not bear the official ideology were not granted the right to rule. For the state was claimed to be possessed by the secular-nationalists. If the others had the chance to rule, they were limited by the bureaucratic tutelage or excluded from power by force.

After 2002, the rule of the game significantly changed with the advent of a new political actor. The political system began to be democratized. For this purpose, the place of power was emptied and freed from the Kemalist content. No particular political actor or ideology has given the right to own it forever and without entering into political struggle. Hence, the sphere of democratic politics enlarged and accordingly, the importance of elections mounted. Political actors started to compete for power by producing the most inclusive identity through incorporating as much societal demands as possible. Thus, the right to rule began to be determined by the ability to produce the largest power bloc, the majority.

All in all, the shift to a presidential system may be the most critical step in institutionalizing democratic politics in Turkey. It promises to further the empowerment of the elected representatives of people vis-à-vis the bureaucracy, enlargement of the sphere of politics and increase the influence of elections. In a nutshell, it places the popular will above any other will and at the center of politics. This is the core of the silent revolution that Erdogan has achieved in the last 15-plus years.

Last week, Turkey’s political agenda was mostly dominated by the opposition parties’ search for a candidate in the presidential elections. Since there was still ambiguity in the opposition parties’ electoral strategy despite the short period of time, leaders of the opposition parties had face-to-face meetings to convince each other about their strategy. The outcome of their search for a candidate reveals that the opposition parties failed to form a broad-based alliance against President Erdogan even if they acted in a manipulative way to do so. Nonetheless, it should also be reminded that the opposition parties will never give up finding a way to unite against President Erdogan until the elections.

The most controversial topic in the search for a candidate was the possible candidacy of former president Abdullah Gul. Even if Abdullah Gul served in high positions within the AK Party before, the Felicity Party proposed his name to other parties and tried to convince them on his candidacy. Although Abdullah Gul has stood aloof from the AK Party since 2014, his acceptance of the Felicity Party’s proposal was quite surprising in view of the fact that President Erdogan took a lot of risks to nominate him as a candidate in the 2007 presidential elections. During the 2007 elections, the opposition parties organized a series of rallies and the military and Constitutional Court tried to prevent holding elections. However, the AK Party and Erdogan stood firm against suppression and Gul was elected as the new president. Thus, his possible candidacy was seen as “betrayal” by the AK Party circles.

Last weekend, Gul conducted a press conference and stated that he would not be a candidate in the upcoming presidential elections. Nevertheless, he confirmed that there had been a proposal from the Felicity Party to him and he was willing to accept it if a very strong consensus was reached. As Gul stated, the leader of the Felicity Party, Temel Karamollaoglu, worked hard to convince Kilicdaroglu and Aksener on Gul’s candidacy. Even the HDP was about to join this alliance if the other parties accepted. Although there was not any principle or issue that these parties agreed on and they were ideologically incoherent, they just wanted to form an alliance against the election of President Erdogan under new the presidential system. At the end of the day, this event revealed the clear-cut dissociation between Abdullah Gul and the AK Party.

One of the reasons behind the failure of the Gul project was Aksener’s rejection of backtracking on the presidential bid on behalf of Gul. Due to Aksener insisting on her own candidacy, the broad-based consensus on Gul could not be reached. Both the Felicity Party and the CHP tried to convince her but she rejected to do so. Additionally, the CHP circles showed a great reaction even if Kilicdaroglu had a positive attitude about Gul’s possible candidacy. This process had two prominent outcomes in the opposition site’s election strategy. The first one was the failure of the Gul project. The second one was the failure of having a joint presidential candidate.

Two important strategies of the political opposition failed in the election process. However, this does not mean that the opposition parties will quit searching a way for uniting against President Erdogan and the AK Party. The next two months will be highly crucial in terms of the opposition parties’ new initiations. It can be said that because they failed to do so in the presidential elections, the parties will try to find a way to form an alliance in the parliamentary elections.

The election clock is ticking. Turkey will elect its next president, along with the next parliament, in less than two months on June 24^th. Over the past ten days, Turkey has spent quite an effort to figure out whether the opposition will run with a unity candidate to counter the incumbent Erdogan. The answer has finally come out. After their unsuccessful attempts to back a unity candidate, the opposition parties one by one stated that they will run with their own candidates. While the former president Abdullah Gul has kept silent until today, the signs indicate him as the would-be unity candidate if the negotiations could have been concluded, which did not.

While the option of forming an opposition bloc is not exhausted if the elections proceed to the run-off election of the second round, the option is no longer on the table for the first round. What does it mean for Turkey’s Kurdish electorate? Would a unity candidate such as Gul receive Kurdish votes? I doubt.

The Kurdish electorate, like other ethnic groups in Turkey, have secular and religious members. The more conservative Kurds tend to vote for the incumbent AK Party while the more secular Kurds tend to vote for the HDP. Such a dichotomy is of course subject to ecological fallacy, but holds intact on the macro scale. Based on this assumption, some might think that conservative Kurds would desert Erdogan and support another conservative politician such as Gul, especially as a response to the rising nationalist discourse of the country over the past couple of years. I doubt.

The plain fact is that Erdogan is more popular than his own party amongst Turkey’s conservative Kurds. A comparison of the last two votes, November 2015 general elections and the April 2017 referendum, confirms this conclusion. During the November general elections, the HDP asked the electorate, naturally, to vote for itself. During the April 2017 constitutional referendum, the HDP asked its electorate to vote “No”. While the two votes were different in kind, one a general election and one a constitutional referendum, they both witnessed a direct confrontation between the AK Party and the HDP in the region. The parties had intense campaign processes for both votes. The difference was, multiple candidates to win seats in the former, while Erdogan and the anti-Erdogan blocs competed in the latter.

Let’s just take a look at the differences in the electoral behavior in a number of predominantly Kurdish populated cities in these two votes. While the HDP votes reached 83.7% in Hakkari in November 2015, the No votes (HDP plus all the other opposition parties) reached only 67.6% with a drop of 16.1 points. To be fair, we can simply equate the “No” votes with the HDP votes in the case of Hakkari where there is literally no support for opposition parties other than the HDP. The same story is valid also for Sirnak where the HDP received 85.5% in 2015, but 71.7% a year and a half later – with a drop of 13.8 points. The HDP also lost over 10 points in Mus and Agri. Below you can see the list of the cities where the HDP received +20% of the votes in the November 2015 elections. The table shows the comparison of November 2015 and April 2017 votes in these cities. It appears like Erdogan is a tougher challenger than AK Party for the HDP.

Table: Comparison of HDP votes in November 2015 and “No” votes in April 2017

*“Yes” votes won in blue cities and “No” won in red cities in April, 2017.

*Only the cities where the HDP received +20% in the 2015 elections are included. The cities where Kurds live en masse but do not vote for the HDP are excluded (e.g., Malatya, Elazig, Adiyaman).

* The CHP also has a significant mass base in Ardahan, Tunceli, and Kars, which is why the “No” votes are much higher than the HDP votes.

This table does not explain the entire story. Neither does it give us the results for the next election on June 24^th. However, it gives us some insights on the electoral behavior of Turkey’s Kurds with regard to the AK Party and Erdogan vis a vis the HDP. It also tells us that Turkey’s conservative Kurds praise Erdogan highly. What it does not cover though are new developments that have occurred in the region over the past year and their expected impact on the elections in June, which is the subject for next Saturday.

As Turkey gets closer to the presidential election date – June 24 – the main historical dilemma of Turkish politics reemerges for the opposition politicians. The dilemma arises from three interrelated weaknesses of the Turkish opposition: the lack of ideological inclusiveness, the lack of leadership and the lack of shared values. The debates about who will be running as an opposition candidate against President Erdogan remains complicated. The strategy that the opposition blocks have embraced for the snap election is an important indicator of the weakness of the anti-Erdogan camp, which is composed of the secularist People’s Republican Party (CHP), the nationalist Good Party (IP, also known as Iyi Party), the Islamist Felicity Party (SP), and the Kurdish nationalist Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP).

The opposition strategy is based on three important dynamics, and each one of them, ironically, displays the weakness of the anti-Erdogan camp. The opposition bloc led by Kemal Kilicdaroglu who is the leader of CHP, first and foremost, noticed that the strategy based on only party politics cannot provide a strong leverage to defeat President Erdogan in the upcoming presidential election. Since the first democratic election held in 1950, the percentage of transitivity between different ideological parties has always been quite low in Turkey. On the other hand, the nature of transitivity between the parties located on similar ideological lines is relatively different, and the percentage compared to the first case is higher. Therefore, as the representative party of secular-nationalism in Turkey, the CHP cannot possibly gain any ideological and political ground in elections. For this presidential election, according to the new constitutional amendment, the presidential nominees should pass a 50 percent threshold to win. Thus, the best strategy for the anti-Erdogan camp is to find a presidential candidate who will be able to represent all sects of society.

Abdullah Gul, who was the last president of the parliamentary system before Erdogan, became one of the strongest alternatives for the anti-Erdogan block. However, at the same time, the ideological diversity among the opposition block became the main weakness of the anti-Erdogan camp and prevented them from supporting Gul as a nominee against Erdogan. While the CHP represents anti-Erdogan politics, which constructed itself around the assertive secularist discourse, the IP represents the nationalist right-wing, despite the fact that the party has a good percentage of Kemalist-secular representatives. The ideological position of the SP within Turkish politics can be located within the tradition of political Islam.

The pro-PKK Kurdish HDP in this picture illustrates a totally different ideological performance. To express the matter bluntly, the hybrid political and ideological nature of the anti-Erdogan block could not support Gul as a common candidate. The ideological diversity cannot be the only reason in analyzing the failure of the opposition block. The judgment of Gul among the opposition groups constitutes another determinant factor behind this failure. A potential candidate of CHP, Muharrem Ince, who also run as a candidate for leadership against Kemal Kilicdaroglu in CHP’s party congress, frames Gul as “an accomplice and brother of Erdogan.”

The weakness of the anti-Erdogan camp is not limited with the ideological divergence among the opposition block. The lack of leadership is another factor that shapes this vulnerability. From a historical perspective, the leadership has been an important factor in winning elections, sustaining power and transforming Turkish politics. Erdogan, as one of the strongest politicians and an influential actor, has been winning elections (12 times), maintaining power, and transforming Turkish politics since the AK Party came to power in 2002. The opposition bloc, on the other hand, never brought this kind of leadership into the political arena. The first attempt was in the 2014 presidential election, but it failed. This time, Abdullah Gul was constructed as the leader of the anti-Erdogan camp without the consideration that he could never win any single election as a leader of any political party in Turkey. More importantly, Abdullah Gul, as a political person has constructed his political personality along with Erdogan in Turkey. Other potential candidates on behalf of the anti-Erdogan camp do not also display strong leadership.

In addition to the leadership dilemma, the representation of societal values is another problem for the anti-Erdogan block. This, for sure, is a consequence of the historical and ideological trajectories of Turkish politics. The success of the AK Party is the ability to mobilize the basic values of Turkish society within daily politics. In this regard, AK Party and President Erdogan himself cannot be confronted by a hybrid nature of political discourses constructed by the anti-Erdogan block. For this anti-Erdogan block, there is no coherent political strategy regarding the question of how Turkey deals with current challenges emanating from domestic and regional issues, but an inadequate plan to defeat Erdogan in the upcoming election. At this stage, anti-Erdoganism is far from responding to the challenges of Turkey and has many weaknesses as an opposition strategy.

As Turkey moves towards its first presidential election, which will be held on 24 June, the political parties including the secularist People’s Republican Party (CHP), the nationalist Good Party (Iyi Party), the Islamist Felicity Party (SP), and the Kurdish nationalist Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) have struggled to team up against the alliance between the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Every alliance needs an ideological basis and the alliance among the opposition parties in Turkey is not an exception. However, the existing ideological distance between the parties poses a serious obstacle for them to form a working alliance.

This lack of shared ideological basis is sought to be evaded by resorting to negative politics, which is shaped around the principles such as democracy. And democracy is defined by a strategic goal with reference to opposing one-man rule, more particularly, Turkey’s shift to a presidential system and its main actor President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This equivalence between democracy and anti-Erdoganism might mobilize some sections of society, especially the loyal supporters of these parties. However, it falls short of persuading the majority of non-partisan, MHP constituents and the AK Party supporters. Not to mention the expected loss of votes owing to ideological contradictions among themselves.

Hence, the combined electoral support given to the alliance does not reach fifty percent of votes. This means that anti-Erdoganism is not enough to get the opposition to win the elections. There are two main reasons for why anti-Erdoganism is not sufficient for the opposition to get what they want. First of all, anti-Erdoganism is to be equivalent to democracy and Erdogan’s leadership in Turkey and the presidential system he backs are supposed to violate the fundamental principle of democracy, which is keeping the place of power empty. The AK Party rule for 15-plus years has complied with this principle of democracy. AK Party’s political life has been shaped around consolidating democracy by rolling back the military tutelage and extending the sphere of politics. And this politics of democratization has consistently attracted an ardent support from Turkish society.

Besides, the presidential system in Turkey allows for the presence of the opposition, agrees to share power and transfer it through free and fair elections, and abides by the democratic norms of separation of powers and the rule of law. The acquisition of one-man rule, therefore, does not live up to the requirements of a genuine one-man rule. Indeed, a system might be considered a man-rule, first of all, if it does not allow for a multi-party system and free elections. It needs to reject sharing power and transferring it. Secondly, a system can be described as one-man rule if it rejects checks and balances and the rule of law. That is, the rule must be arbitrary. The strong execution does not necessarily mean a one-man rule. This is what the opposition fails to grasp and tends to confuse about the presidential system in Turkey. The transition to this system received popular support and approval in the referendum on 16 April, 2017.

The second reason why anti-Erdoganism serves poorly for the opposition stems from the fact that democratic politics requires the creation of new societal demands or bringing the majority of existing societal demands together in a single political project. One can admit that despite its limited scope, the anti-Erdogan alliance brings some societal demands together. If anti-Erdoganism succeeds, the CHP believes that the “old Turkey,” which was shaped around the military tutelage, could be reinstituted and that the CHP would easily hold on to power. The HDP, too, thinks that the return of the old Turkey would create a political situation where the alienation of Kurds from the Turkish state and creation of an independent “Kurdistan” under the control of the PKK could be more likely. In the same vein, the Iyi Party feels very nostalgic about the old Turkey where the bureaucracy used to call the shots whereas the SP believes the return of the old Turkey would make it once again the main opposition party.

Sadly, the support for the old Turkey in Turkish society is not that large. Turkish society demands the further consolidation of democracy in national politics, justice in redistribution of wealth, development in the economic sphere and a powerful and autonomous Turkish state in regional and international politics. Anti-Erdoganism is far from responding to these societal demands and this makes it a poor idea in creating the largest and most inclusive power bloc in Turkish politics. If the opposition does not give up its polarization politics, it will most likely meet a decisive defeat in the upcoming election.

Turkey is a dynamic country, which often proved being able to overcome unexpected challenges. It does not seem to be a real challenge that the upcoming early elections, which were initially planned for November 2019, will now be held on 24 June of this year. President Erdogan announced this following his meeting with Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the MHP, whose offer was to hold the elections earlier than they had been planned.

To get a clear notion of what’s happening in Turkey, the following main points can be taken into consideration: First, what do the snap elections mean for the Turkish political system and the people’s attitude in general? Second, what about the main parties regarding the elections? And lastly, what do we expect during the two months until the election day?

First of all, the elections have a constitutional importance. These will be the first elections subsequent to the referendum on April 16, 2017, according to which Turkey’s old system of government has been transformed into a presidential system. Currently, Turkey is still leaded under a certain kind of semi-presidential system where a dual-executive exists. This will end with the elections on 24 June and Turkey will completely switch to the Turkish presidential system – abolishing, for instance, the office of the prime minister. On the day citizens go to the polls, both the election of the president and legislature will be held simultaneously. Consequently, the parties – or probable alliances – have to select their presidential candidate and MP candidates. Due to the fact that Turkish citizens have already experienced electing a president by popular vote, which occurred for the first time in August 2014, although the country’s political system is going to change, it can be stated that there are no complications expected during the election campaigns. Furthermore, until the Election Day, the current parliament will pass laws in order to bring harmony with the new system of government. Turkey has also been in the mood for elections for 22 months, since the AK Party and MHP started a collaboration. This created an expectation for holding elections both among the public and state apparatus.

Second, apart the marginal and Kurdish left-nationalist HDP, main parties welcomed the decision to hold elections earlier. Even the MHP-dissident Iyi Party’s leader Meral Aksener argued that her party is “the most prepared” one – even though the electoral board only confirmed that her party could participate in the elections on Sunday. CHP, the main opposition party, though, has neither announced a presidential candidate yet nor has a serious strategy regarding the elections. Officially, as a supporter of the parliamentary system, CHP’s main ambition was previously to win the elections and abolish the presidential system while bringing back the old one. However, due to the obvious lack of needed support, the CHP has to build alliances. However, as extensively explained, this will not be easy. Another interesting question is whether there will be any other potential candidates for the presidency. Most obviously, these uncertainty and speculations will continue for a short time.

On the other hand, due to an established alliance since the July 15 coup attempt in 2016 and formalizing the alliance a couple of months ago, the AK Party and MHP’s presidential candidate will be Recep Tayyip Erdogan. As it rightly stressed by Nebi Mis, it seems that during the one year subsequent to the referendum, the AK Party has made its local congresses across Turkey, which caused the party’s base and network being uninterrupted ready for elections, renewed the cadres under the leadership of Mr. Erdogan and concluded its process of building an alliance for the upcoming elections. The main opposition party, though, which has a total vote of approximately 25%, neither has found a presidential candidate yet nor could it even agree on its “alliance of principles” principles. Honestly, it’s not reasonable to think that a party and its incumbent leader, who lost 8 elections in 8 years, is going to prepare his party much better this time. No serious mind would require believing this and no political science theory would argue that this time it promises success.

Finally, domestically, the election campaigns will most probably resemble the 16 April referendum, while this time the concrete changing steps of the new system will be addressed more in depth. Opposition parties, on the other hand, have to decide what they want to achieve. Thus, either ambitions such as winning the elections in order to abolish the presidential system or pursuing to lead the country in accordance with the newly adopted system. Nevertheless, it seems that there will be an election period without many turbulences in contrast to previous ones. But it’s quite likely that externally, once again, particularly both foreign media outlets and political elites, will be biased to support a well-known anti-Erdogan and anti-AK Party discourse and discredit the elections generally. All in all, this election will be a step that will ultimately concretize Turkey’s upcoming five years.

Turkey has already entered the trajectory for the upcoming snap elections of June 24. Since the date was settled just a week ago, what is clear so far is the presidential candidacy of the incumbent Erdogan in the midst of many unknowns. We are still yet to know whether the opposition will run as a bloc with one agreed-on candidate or whether there will be a multitude of candidates to challenge President Erdogan. Despite no clear declaration so far from any portion of the anti-Erdogan camp, the latter scenario seems to be more likely. Given the opposition bloc that the CHP tried to form in 2014 did not work out well and Erdogan won the majority in the first round, the opposition parties now might try to push the race to the second round. And the most plausible strategy for it to multiply the number of candidates so that every segment of society will find its best match on the ballot. Hence, we can see President Erdogan on the ballot alongside challengers from a wide array of ideologies from ultra-nationalists to liberals, from conservatives to Islamists, from social democrats to socialists, from the sympathizers of the Kurdish question to hardcore Kurdish separatists, and so on. In such a scenario, Erdogan may or may not win the race in the first round. If he wins in the first round, it is the same film that we saw in 2014: a clear electoral victory that gives Erdogan to complete Turkey’s change toward a full-fledged presidential system. But what if the elections, in the midst of multiple candidates, postpone the victory to the second round?

Well, the route might be little bit longer in this case but there seems be to be no surprise at the end of the tunnel. The reason is clear. Erdogan is the Condorcet winner of Turkey, which means he will probably defeat any other candidate in the second round, in a head-to-head election. He will probably defeat a candidate who is more nationalist than himself but he will also defeat a candidate who is less nationalist. The same goes for the more or less conservative candidates, more or less liberal candidates, and so on. And this is how we connect the Condorcet method to another well-known electoral concept, the median voter.

If we can align the preferences of Turkish voters along a horizontal line from right to left, the median voter stands where Erdogan is. In other words, Erdogan is right on the spot. And this is the case for any given issue area. The median voter is as nationalist as Erdogan, no more, no less. The median voter is as conservative as Erdogan, no more no less. For any issue area from the Kurdish question to the proper role of the state in the economy, Erdogan has reserved the median spot. This is so partly because of Turkey’s political legacy. The Turkish median voter is not in the exact center but in the center-right of the ideological spectrum, where Erdogan is positioned. This is the reason why single party governments of Turkey’s democratic era have been formed by Menderes, Demirel, Ozal, and Erdogan but not by Inonu, Ecevit or Kilicdaroglu. Nevertheless, in Erdogan’s case, there is more to the story.

President Erdogan does not only match with the median voter on a few issue areas but in almost all areas. The median voter in Turkey is sympathetic to the Kurdish question but with a blend of religious brothership discourse that Erdogan shares. The median voter hates the socialist economic regulations but is also not easy with wild capitalism. The median voter is troubled with Turkey’s strict laicism in the past but also does not want a fundamentalist future. The median voter is proud of the Ottoman past but has no intention to give up the gains of the republic. You can list more of the issue areas, but you will see Erdogan just by the median voter in each. Hence, in some part, Erdogan represents the median voter in any given issue area.

Erdogan matches with the expectations of the median voter, but even further, he also has the capability to carry a great chunk of the electorate together with him along the spectrum in any issue area. In other words, he can change the center of gravity in our imaginary horizontal line. His skill to move the center of gravity on top of his representation of the median point are the two reasons why he is the Condorcet winner of Turkey.

As the Condorcet winner, Erdogan has managed to win elections regardless of the voting system, which varied in the parliamentary elections of the past, in the presidential election of 2014, in a number of referenda, and so on. It was so because Erdogan and the median voter have not fallen apart. This is why he kept winning one election after another and there seems to be no reason why he should not again. And he knows it. Erdogan knows that he will win in any pairwise election and that is the reason why he presents the elections in dichotomies as in the case of “me versus him.” In a nutshell, if politics is a game, Erdogan knows how to play it.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made a surprise visit to Turkey’s southern Hatay province last Thursday. As Operation Olive Branch continues to take ground, the visit was welcomed by a sizable audience, with the participation of some celebrities ranging from singers to national athletes.

Prior to the speech given in the late hours of the evening in the southern region of the Hatay Province, President Erdogan, accompanied by the Chief of General Staff Hulusi Akar, Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdag, Defence Minister Nurettin Canikli and Land Forces Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces Gen. Yasar Guler, visited the Turkish military units to inspect the progress and congratulate the military men for their celebrated efforts.

The operation in Afrin, beginning in January of this year and ending last month, has been hailed by people in Turkey and those in the northwestern regions of Syria as not only a success against the PKK/PYD tyranny, but also on the fact that it has become one of the numbered peaceful places within the calamitous ongoing Syrian Civil War.

During his speech at the central police station, Erdogan adulated the wholeness of the people as being the foundation to protecting collective sovereignty, praised the solidarity of the public figures and celebrities for their presence, and thanked all the civilian care networks such as AFAD (The Disaster and Emergency Management, Republic of Turkey) to the Health Ministry for their support and determined efforts to help those in need. Lastly, while displaying his gratitude and respect towards the indispensable efforts of the Turkish Military, he quoted Gazi Mustafa Kemal in saying “There is no such thing as protecting the line, there is only protecting the ground, and a unified ground is what makes a nation.”

In recent years the YPG, the Syrian branch of the internationally recognized terror organization PKK, has increased its activity emanating from Syria since they took advantage of the Civil War and occupied the northern regions in 2012. The PKK/YPG has mostly focused on carrying out cross-border missile attacks on the Provinces of Hatay and Kilis, having fired more than 90 rockets in 2018 alone.

So far, two Syrian and three Turkish citizens have been killed, with over 100 casualties, of which numerous are still in critical condition. Together with human deaths, some of those who have survived are effected by a slow bombardment that their homes, vehicles and neighborhoods were destroyed.

With the Afrin operation coming to an end, direction has now turned to the Manbij. Separated by the Euphrates river from the rest of the YPG/PKK controlled areas of northern Syria, Manbij is another important territory in which Turkey seeks to relieve the areas inhabitants from unwanted occupation while protecting Turkish lands from further terrorist threats.

While recently there has been speculation of French intervention in the region as a mediator between Turkey and the YPG, Ibrahim Kalin, the spokesperson for the Turkish Presidency has firmly indicated that Turkey “rejects any efforts to promote ‘dialogue,’ ‘contact’ or ‘mediation’ between Turkey and terrorist organizations.”

When compared to Turkish endeavors, both Euphrates Shield and Operation Olive Branch have not only conformed with International Law, U.N. Security Council resolutions and her right to self-defense under the U.N Charter, but has been an effective and efficient method in maintaining the unity of Syria’s territorial integrity.

The successful completion of Afrin operation seems to have ruffled some international feathers however, bringing previously absent players into the spot light. Considering much of the brutality is over when compared to the bulk of the civil war, Macron’s attempt to enter Syria through the back door not only remind us of the ignominious policies during the French Mandate for Syria, but suggest he still has some road to travel before becoming a man in international politics.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the U.S. Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, met for over three hours in capital Ankara on Thursday during which they discussed several issues, including bilateral ties and regional developments, particularly Syria and Iraq.

According to a Turkish presidential source, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to restrictions on talking to the media, Erdogan and Tillerson also exchanged views on the fight against terrorism.

During their meeting at the presidential complex, Erdogan “explicitly” told Tillerson Turkey’s priorities and expectations from the U.S. on bilateral ties and regional developments, the source added.

The meeting, which was closed to the media, started at 7.40 p.m. local time (1640GMT) and lasted for three hours and 15 minutes.

Tillerson is on a two-day working visit to Turkey.

He is expected to meet his Turkish counterpart Mevlut Cavusoglu on Friday to discuss bilateral relations, particularly the U.S. support for the PYD/PKK terrorist group, and international developments. The meeting is expected to be followed by a joint news conference.

Source: Anadolu Agency

During his press statement on January 8, 2018, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli clarified certain ambiguities surrounding the 2019 elections that were the main items on the political agenda. In this statement, Bahceli announced that MHP would not nominate any candidate, but support President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the 2019 presidential elections. More, MHP leader highlighted that his party is open to alliance with Erdogan’s AK Party for the parliamentary elections as well. This alliance, it was suggested, should be implemented into a legal framework, allowing parties to maintain their corporate identity and to identify the percentage of votes each party receives. President Erdogan responded to MHP’s call positively, which then led to the two parties establishing their own alliance commissions.

With this, Devlet Bahceli carried out the AK Party-MHP alliance, which was formed after the July 15 coup attempt and which aimed to ensure the survival of the state, on to a next level. This was a requirement necessitated by the presidential system, as political parties have to seek alliances in order to secure the election. Therefore, after party-member presidency, the political reflections of the presidential system began to be apparent on the road to 2019.

The content and political implications of the presidential system were not discussed during the referendum campaign due to the manipulations of the opposition, refusing to allow people to understand the importance of this political transformation in terms of democratization. For instance, the “no” bloc distorted the truth about certain amendments, such as decreasing the age to be eligible for parliamentary candidacy to 18 or increasing the number of deputies to 600. Moreover, opposition leader Kilicdaroglu claimed that the 4 million Syrians who are seeking refuge in Turkey would be naturalized if the referendum succeeded. These kinds of manipulations obstructed the essence of this new system and the political implications it would bring from being understood.

Not polarization, reconciliation

Analyzing the developments in Turkish domestic politics, it becomes obvious that political parties are experiencing changes brought by the presidential system. As it is known, a simple majority is sought in the presidential elections and this condition will shape Turkey’s political landscape.

First of all, the simple majority factor renders political and social reconciliation inevitable. In the new era, political parties will be inclined to be more inclusive, agreeable and appealing to voters. In this respect, “bloc politics” foreseen by the new system enforces political reconciliation instead of polarization. Thanks to these political blocs, the public will observe which parties are working with each other and will decide accordingly. Therefore, the success of the alliance political parties will form in the presidential system is to be determined by their appeal to the public.

In terms of seeking reconciliation and alliance that is brought by the new system, the AK Party and MHP have agreed on national stance and an alliance that appeals to the majority of the public. Considering this alliance, it could be asserted that the MHP is pursuing a realistic political stance. The party sought to transform its existing cooperation with the AK Party into an alliance since the July 15 coup attempt. Bahceli’s statement about being true to the “Yenikapi spirit” and desiring to incorporate the new system is the most important indicator of this. MHP is aware of the necessity of adopting a national unity discourse amid global and regional conflicts and that this discourse appeals to the public.

What caused MHP to depart from its previous bloc was the failure of this bloc to maintain a national stance, which inevitably discomforted the public. In other words, unlike the other bloc consisting of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) along with several smaller parties, which prefer to cooperate behind closed scenes, the AK Party and MHP are conducting their alliance negotiations transparently thanks to its public consent.

No coalition but pre-election alliance

The alliance-forming process between the AK Party and the MHP also revealed another tangible outcome of the presidential system: reconciliation between political parties in a different form other than a coalition in the parliamentary system. During the discussions on transitioning to the presidential system, it was expressed that the new system would eliminate coalition governments and provide opportunities for new forms of reconciliation and cooperation. There is significant difference between presidential and parliamentary systems in terms of reconciliation. Unlike in the parliamentary system, the presidential system also seeks reconciliation among the public instead of only party leaders and political elites.

While the public only observes coalition negotiations in the parliamentary system after casting votes, the presidential system allows the public to shape alliance discussions between political parties. This is due to the fact that alliances have to be formed prior to the elections. If the agreement is only among political elites, the public may punish their political parties by not voting for them. Therefore, the AK Party and MHP are conducting their alliance negotiations transparently and prior to the election, accepting to face any repercussions in the case of public dissatisfaction.

Coalitions formed under the parliamentary system do not necessarily allow the public to know which party will have executive power. However, in the case of the AK Party-MHP alliance, the public is aware that Erdogan will maintain executive power if he is elected. In addition, even if MHP withdraws its support from the AK Party after the elections, it will not create a political crisis, as it would do in a parliamentary system.

For all these reasons, the presidential system does not have coalitions, but pre-election alliances. The process between the AK Party and MHP is a reflection of this. Therefore, criticisms about not being able to eliminate coalitions despite transitioning into the presidential system are just not true.

The process between the AK Party and MHP reveals only a part of the reconciliatory aspect of the presidential system. If the president’s party fails to secure a majority in Parliament, the President will be inclined to reconcile with other parties that possess seats. If the AK Party fails to secure a majority of seats in the 2019 elections, its alliance with MHP will most probably permeate the Parliament as well. Indeed, Bahceli clearly stated that his party will do all that is required to render the new system permanent in 2019-2024 period.

In this sense, the presidential system enforces pre-election alliances, not government coalitions. These alliances will reveal the political blocs indicating social reconciliation rather than social polarizations. Considering its voter base, it had been inevitable for MHP to become party to a different bloc. Meanwhile, the discourse on national unity, which has gathered support by the general public and which is shared by the AK Party has allowed MHP to leave the “no” bloc and join powers with the government.

On Tuesday 6 February, CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu called on the government to form contact with the Assad regime in Syria in order to resolve the country’s on-going civil war.

Kilicdaroglu’s comments came as Turkey deepens its operation in Afrin, which has cleared approximately 1,100 terrorists from the Turkey-Syria border.

Operation Olive Branch was launched in Afrin on 20 January in order to clear the Turkey-Syria border from terrorists and to set the conditions enabling Syrian refugees in Turkey the opportunity to return to their home lands.

The PYD/YPG has forced thousands of Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens from their villages, leading to a mass migration flow into Turkey.

In response to Kilicdaroglu, on Thursday President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said “What will we talk about to a murderer who has killed 1 million of his citizens?”

The Syrian regime, despite the ceasefire, continues to shell Eastern Ghouta. On Wednesday regime attacks in the region left 33 dead – of which 13 were children.

“You can go arm in arm with terrorists when necessary… But, we haven’t so far walked with those taking that path with the permission of terror organizations, and we will not do so in the future.”

Operation Olive Branch, which began on 20 January, has remained on the political agenda of not only Turkey but the wider Middle East, Russia, the U.S. and NATO.

The operation conducted by the Turkish Armed Forces and the Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army in Afrin aims to clear the region of the estimated 7,000 terrorist militants. The Afrin region has remained a safe hideout for the PKK/YPG after the Assad regime handed it over in 2012.

While several announcements have been made on many fronts within the Turkish administration, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan underlined on Wednesday that the aim of the operation is to secure justice.

Addressing local officials at the presidential complex, President Erdogan stated that Turkey’s concern is the “establishment of justice, not land.”

The President added that with the success of the Afrin operation, Turkey will not only destroy the terrorists but will also enable 3.5 million refugees in Turkey to return to their homes safely.

During his speech, President Erdogan noted that in total 268 terrorists had been neutralized, while the Turkish army and Free Syrian Army forces had suffered the loss of 8 martyrs over the last four days.

Mis-portrayal in the media

During the first days of the operation, presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin warned that the Olive Branch Operation is not designed against the Kurdish population in Afrin.

Since the beginning of the operation, many YPG-affiliated media sources and journalists that sympathize with the terrorist organization have made it out to seem that Turkey is attacking Kurds in the region.

Speaking out against these claims, President Erdogan informed that the PKK/YPG/PYD terrorist group had released all Daesh prisoners under the condition that they would fight against the Turkish army and the FSA in Afrin.

“These terrorist organizations are all the same […] These are terrorist groups serving the same purpose in the same scenario with different roles.”

The President slammed those who mis-portrayed the operation and stated that “it is clear that this operation targets several terrorist organizations,” reminding that similar accusations were made against Turkey during the Operation Euphrates Shield. Turkey had neutralized “more than 3,000 Daesh and hundreds of PYD/YPG terrorists in Operation Euphrates Shield,” and President added that this enabled the conditions for thousands of Syrians to return to their homes.

“I wonder if those who attack Syria don’t notice these?”

Asserting Turkey’s determination to clear the region from all terrorists, the President also stated that the operation would last until the death of the last terrorist.

On Tuesday a report was published in the famous Italian sports newspaper “La Gazzetta dello Sport” about the important contributions Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made to Turkish football.

What major changes occurred throughout the last years in Turkish football –  the most popular sport of the Turks?

An enthusiastic football fan

Despite his intense program as President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan – who is by the way not surprisingly a former amateur footballer – is quite interested in football.

While he misses no important match, he always wears the scarf of the football team of the city he is rallying – not a common scene elsewhere. A gesture of solidarity with the local community.

Indeed football is believed to create a special bond between people, inevitably leading the government to spend and invest in this area.

*Used in La Gazzetta dello Sport, a collage of President Erdogan during his time as an amateur footballer. 

New and “smart” stadiums

La Gazzetta dello Sport highlights not only the number of stadiums built in Turkey in the last few years, but also investments such as the “Passolig” – security measures designed to prevent the entrance of hooligans and aggressors to the stadiums.

In the last 10 years 31 football stadiums were built in Turkey. No other country in Europe has built so many stadiums in such a short period.

The Vodafone Park, a stadium in Besiktas, which has a capacity for more than 40 thousand fans, is equipped with high-speed Wi-Fi network, HD monitors and interactive screens in different sizes, which instantly reflect the results of other games played elsewhere.

Vodafone Park is also Turkey’s first environmentalist stadium; with features such as intensive use of solar energy through solar tracker tools, reductions of greenhouse gases, no production of chemical or acoustic emissions, no air pollution, no risk of fire and rainwater harvesting.

*Collage of just a few of the stadiums built by the Turkish Football Federation in the last ten years. 

Turkey eager to hold 2024 UEFA European Football Championship

Turkey is a strong candidate for the 2024 UEFA European Football Championship. As La Gazzetta Dello Sport puts it; “With their capacities (from 50,000 to 15,000 viewers), high standards, the will to show them to the world, Istanbul is a candidate for the Champions League final of 2020, but the big target is the European 2024.”

The newspaper also wrote that Turkey is likely to host the EURO 2024, being among the favorite candidates together with Germany.

In regards to this possibility, during the UEFA 2024 European Football Championship Nomination Coordination Meeting, Youth and Sports Minister Osman Askin Bak stated: “With 31 stadium projects and an investment of approximately 4 billion liras in the last few years, we are proud of taking successful steps not seen in European history. If we get the chance to host this organization, it will make a serious contribution to our country and our cities. I believe that if Turkey is home to EURO 2024, EURO 2024 will make a big difference to the history of the championship as a role model country in the region.”

http://thenewturkey.org/amputee-football-championship-in-turkey-emotions-and-experiences/

The Turkish Amputee Team cherished by 70 million

Recently Turkey won the European Amputee Football Federation (EAFF) championship after beating England 2-1 in the final held at Istanbul’s Vodafone Park.

Vodafone Park was filled to its capacity –“a resounding confirmation of a palpable passion for the game,” as the Italian newspaper called it.

There is an inexpressible confidence in the potential of supporters. According to a federal poll, every citizen (including women and children) watches an average of 2.6 games per week.

The Amputee Football Championship also reflected that football is and remains a social phenomenon that brings together various communities in Turkey.

*Footballers of Turkey celebrate their victory as they raise the trophy after winning the European Amputee Football Federation (EAFF) European Championship final match between Turkey and England at Vodafone Park in Istanbul, Turkey on October 9, 2017.

*Written by Suna Nur Sarihan. 

Before a trilateral meeting, Putin acknowledged his Turkish and Iranian counterparts’ support in preventing the Syria’s disintegration. “It would not have been possible to end the military process in Syria without the roles of Turkish and Iranian leaders. With the support of Turkey and Iran, the disintegration of Syria was prevented,” he said.

The talks lasted two hours, with Putin saying that they were detailed and included all aspects of the Syrian settlement.

In a joint statement at the summit, three guarantors declared that they would continue to cooperate for the sake of reducing violence in Syria. The three presidents also reiterated their strong commitment to supporting the independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria.

The guarantor countries also emphasized the confidence-building measures in order to speed up the search for political solutions in Syria.

Fast, secure and continuous humanitarian aid; release of detainees and identification of missing persons were pointed out as the measures necessary.

Turkey and Russia, together with Iran, are the guarantor countries that brokered a cease-fire in Syria in December 2016, leading to the Astana talks, which are running parallel to the Geneva talks for peace in Syria.

Erdogan

President Erdogan said “The world has witnessed the positive results of establishing a close working environment between Turkey, Russia, and Iran on the Syrian issue.”

The talks in Astana, Kazakhstan are the “best example” of this, the Turkish leader added.

He pointed out; “Exclusion of terrorist elements — that target both Syrian political unity and territorial integrity and our country – from the process, will be among Turkey’s priorities.”

Turkey is stating from the beginning that it is against any form of “problem-solving” with the role of terrorist groups PYD, YPG which are PKK’s Syrian affiliates.

Erdogan repeated that Turkey cannot share a platform with any terrorist organization that poses a threat to its national security.

Erdogan referred to the Geneva talks under the auspices of the UN, and said the National Dialogue Congress would contribute to the Geneva process.

Putin

President Putin – claiming that the summit was a means to strengthen the territorial integrity of Syria – said the Astana process prevents the division of the country which is now moving towards a “new phase of political solution” and added that he sees the possibility of an end of the war.

He also expressed his gratitude to the Turkish and Iranian leaders for welcoming the idea of holding the Syrian National Dialogue Congress regarding the solution of the Syrian crisis.

“The presidents of Iran and Turkey supported the initiative to convene an all-Syrian forum-congress of the national dialogue in Syria. We agreed to hold this important event at the proper level and ensure the participation of representatives of different sectors of Syrian society,” Putin said after the talks in Sochi on Wednesday.

Rouhani

President Rouhani said “We are pleased to see that the three countries have agreed on Syria’s territorial integrity, independence and unity, and we are in close cooperation to ensure peace and stability in Syria.”

He said that the trilateral meeting is significant in opening up a “new prospect” to settle the situation in Syria.

Rouhani also emphasized that Iran is serious in its fight against international terrorism and is ready to offer help to other countries.

He also reiterated Iranian support for Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, saying there should be no foreign intervention in Syria’s internal affairs “without the consent of the legitimate government of Syria.”

Putin-Assad met on Monday

Before the summit with the Turkish and Iranian presidents, Putin met Assad who came to Sochi with an unannounced visit on Monday.

Putin informed Erdogan and Rouhani about the results of his 4 hour long meeting with Assad and about the regime’s “readiness to carry out constitutional reform and stage a free, UN-supervised election.”

Following the talks with Assad, the Russian President held phone conversations with the heads of the US, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which made analysts suggest that the violent conflict in Syria could be coming to an end.

Syria has been locked in a civil war since early 2011, when the Assad regime cracked down on pro-democracy protests with unexpected ferocity. This led to the military conflict between the Syrian opposition groups and the Assad regime over the war-torn country’s territory.

Now, in its seventh year, the war in Syria has killed hundreds of thousands of people and displaced more than 12 million, causing a refugee crisis all over Europe and its neighboring countries.

*Written by Suna Nur Sarihan.