Despite President Donald Trump repeatedly saying that US troops are staying in Syria in order to ‘secure the oil’, data indicates that Syria has no remarkable oil reserves. When considering the US’s position as the world’s richest oil-producing country, specialists say that Washington does not need Syrian oil at all.  So why are the Northern Syrian oil fields so important to Trump? A recent panel discussion at SETA, Istanbul provided some answers.

During Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring on the Northern Syria border, US President Donald Trump made a number of statements on his twitter account and at press conferences. There were several subjects he showed particular attention to during this period, and one of them was the oil fields in Northern Syria.

Despite agreeing to withdraw all troops from the region, a small contingent of US troops stayed behind. After a meeting between the Turkish government and a US delegation led by the US Vice President Mike Pence, Trump stated: “Early this morning, the government of Turkey informed my administration that they would be stopping combat and their offensive in Syria, and making the ceasefire permanent… We’ve secured the oil, and, therefore, a small number of U.S. troops will remain in the area where they have the oil. And we’re going to be protecting it, and we’ll be deciding what we’re going to do with it in the future”.

After his statements on Syrian oil responses were made by the President of the Syrian Arab Republic Bashar al-Assad, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

Al-Assad made a striking statement about Trump on Syrian State Television saying. “I tell you he’s the best American president. Why? Not because his policies are good, but because he’s the most transparent president. All American presidents commit crimes and end up taking the Nobel Prize and appear as a defender of human rights and the ‘unique’ and ‘brilliant’ American or western principles. But all they are is a group of criminals who only represent the interests of the American lobbies of large corporations in weapons, oil and others” he said.

Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu speaking from the 24th Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) Council of Ministers Meeting in Turkey’s Mediterranean resort city of Antalya highlighted that the US or any other country does not have legitimate right to Syrian oil according to international law. He commented “the US admits that it is in Syria especially for the oil reservoirs. We are talking about a country that does not hide it is there to seize it for oil wealth, and we see that it also supports terrorist organizations such as YPG and PKK with the income obtained from the revenue” he stated.

Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that the U.S’s attempts to control the Syrian oil fields are illegal. “Their attempt, deep down, to rob the Syrian Arab Republic and take control of the oil fields, it is illegal and does not bring anything good to the Syrian settlement, it only retains a serious irritant, a serious threat in this part of Syria” he highlighted.

In spite of the US government’s interest in the Syrian oil fields, the numbers simply do not add up. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s 2018 data (EIA), Syria is ranked 75th in the world for the total production of petroleum and other liquids. EIA’s data also show that the US is the world’s richest country according to oil production rates. According to EIA the ten oil-rich countries are; United States, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Canada, China, Iraq, Iran, United Arab Emirates, Brazil, and Kuwait.

EIA’s report also shows that the US produces almost 17.936,000 barrels per day (bpd). On the other hand, Syria’s oil production is 28,000 bpd according to 2018 numbers. Based on the same report, in 2011, the US’s oil production was 10.150,000 bpd while the Syrian Arab Republic’s production was 370,000 bpd. The report shows that after the Syrian civil war began, the production of oil in Syria sharply decreased.

During a panel discussion organized by SETA Istanbul Office titled ‘Syrian Oil Source: The role of the US, Russia, and regional actors’, Syrian Interim Government Treasury Secretary Abdulhakim Almassri, a member of Syrian Interim Government, Fatih Shaban, and a specialist from the Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM) Oytun Orhan explained the situation on the ground.

According to Almassri, prior to the Syrian civil war, official records stated that there was 380,000 barrels of oil produced per day. On the other hand, unofficial records which are based on Almassri’s source, suggest that the more accurate figure is one million barrels. “The production of oil was just twenty per cent of Assad regime’s income. However, just seven per cent of this income used to be added the government budget. The rest of it was passed to personal accounts.” he said at the program.

Further to Almassri’s comments, a recent TRT World news broadcast ‘The War in Syria: Protests over oil in SDF controlled Deir Ezzor‘ highlighted the importance of oil on the ground. The report found that oil is the key to everyday life in the region. One of the traditional refinery owners interviewed on the program, Ali Jasem told TRT World that despite there being 1,500 traditional refineries, only one or two of them operate every day. “No one knows where the oil is taken. Despite the fact we are in oil-rich area, we bring the oil from Al Jafra, other oil fields. Men are working hard to earn just two dollars every day. Our condition is becoming difficult here. And we are also losing money” Jasem said. According to TRT’s other local sources, the oil fields were controlled by the SDF, and this terrorist organization only gave a limited amount of oil to locals.

Almassri also argued that the US transferred control over the oil fields to the SDF, led by the YPG terrorist organization, to keep them under the control of Washington and that manoeuvers by Russia were a motivation for the US’s actions in the region. “Washington works with the SDF. Russia took control of the coasts. So where is Iran in the region? Russia tries to move away Iran from the region. Particularly, the places that have natural gas” said Almassri, and added that Russia entered into a 25 years deal with the Syrian regime to search for gas on the Syrian Mediterranean shore. Almassri emphasized that the Mediterranean shore of Syria has great potential for natural gas sources.” If this natural gas is found in the next three years, Syria will be the 3rd richest country in the world on the natural resource table,” he said.

Like Almassri, Shaban argued that the actual motivation for occupying the oil fields were more strategic, with the US trying to strengthen its position in the region. “The US is trying to keep a balance between the sides, and the rise of Turkey in the area has disturbed the US administration. There is also the issue of protecting Israel, otherwise, Syrian oil does not have significant importance for the US” Shaban said.

Shaban further pointed out that after the deal between Russia and the Syrian, Moscow made striking movement in the area. “In fact, the US is not interested in Syrian oil at all. Russia’s existence in the region and the establishment of a base on the Mediterranean caused the US’s existence there. Because the shore Russia took control of has great potential for natural gas reserves. In the near future, Russia is going to have a Syrian energy source, and Moscow sees the Syrian civil war as an important step to becoming a superpower again” he added.

Oytun Orhan, a specialist from the Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM) also shared his perspective on the Northern Syria energy sources saying “Syria has limited energy sources. The important thing here is the geopolitical position of Syria. If we consider Syria’s location, whoever controls this country, they are going to have a great power over the region”.

Written by Yeter Ada Şeko – ISTANBUL

The U.S. Senate confirmed Trump’s nominee for U.S. ambassador to Turkey, David Satterfield. An esteemed career foreign service officer, Satterfield’s time with the foreign service goes back to the early 80s where he served in Jeddah, Tunis, Beirut, and Damascus. He then moved on to become the Director of the Executive Secretariat staff from 1990 to 1993 when he served on the National Security Council Staff as Director for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until 1996. After, he was appointed Director of the Department of State’s Office of Israel and Arab-Israeli affairs until 1998 when he was confirmed by the Senate as Ambassador to Lebanon.

Satterfield played a crucial role in the Middle East after the September 11 attacks and invasion of Iraq, acting as Deputy Assistant Secretary until 2004 and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs until May 2005. He subsequently took on the role of Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for Iraq in August of 2006 and then Director General of the Multinational Force and Observers. Since 2014, he has served as Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for Libya and in 2017, he was appointed as Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs.

Satterfield’s relationship with Ankara will extend beyond Turkey’s borders as he must consider the scope of the turmoil in the region.

Satterfield enters the arena as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey at a time when the bilateral relationship is not exactly at an all-time high. The U.S. is essentially harboring a Turkish fugitive, Fetullah Gulen, and working with the YPG who Turkey considers a terrorist threat while Turks have purchased an S400 missile system from Russia. Satterfield has his work cut out for him, but his resume proves that he might be the best shot at reconciling these deeply rooted tensions.

With Turkey as a rising regional power and a NATO ally, it is in the U.S. strategic interest to use diplomacy as a conduit for a better relationship. Satterfield made it clear in an April 15 telephone briefing. Maintaining security, fostering transparency and liberal values, and upholding rules-based institutions should be at the top of his agenda, and using his experience as a diplomat from the First and Second Gulf Wars has the potential to point relations in the right direction.

Satterfield is a seasoned veteran when it comes to foreign service. So, will he offer Turkey carrots or come down hard with sticks?

His relationship with Ankara will extend beyond Turkey’s borders as he must consider the scope of the turmoil in the region. Iran is planning to increase its uranium enrichment beyond the limits of the JCPOA, and the crisis in Syria continues unabated. The U.S. cannot afford more failed diplomatic efforts with its allies, especially in a region as fragile as the Middle East, but Satterfield’s experience serving the Clinton and W. Bush administrations shows a promising trajectory of U.S.-Turkey relations. He now has the ability to work alongside James Jeffrey, the Secretary’s Special Representative for Syria Engagement and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, who has expressed open mindedness and optimism vis-a-vis Turkey. The State Department duo is poised to actively engage with the Turks to find common ground and reconstruct the alliance. The U.S. needs level-headed, capable diplomats to conduct foreign affairs and foster good relationships, and Satterfield is as qualified as they come.

The only smudge on his record isn’t even a smudge at all. In 2005, two members of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) were indicted in U.S. courts for disclosing classified information to Israeli officials. Satterfield was mentioned as a “government official” in the indictment and served as a witness for the defense. The complicated case involving U.S. national security was eventually dropped by the Justice Department and Satterfield was dismissed unscathed. Even after this, he still preserved a good reputation on both sides of the aisle.

Satterfield is a seasoned veteran when it comes to foreign service. So, will he offer Turkey carrots or come down hard with sticks? The U.S. cannot expect to leverage its power everywhere. Turkey needs reassurance and the Americans need an olive branch. A better relationship will only come when they recognize the value of soft power and come to a consensus like allies should.

The year of 2019, and especially its first half, will go into the history of Turkey-U.S. relations as a critical turning point. At no point during the 70 years of bilateral relations, there existed such a strong opposition towards Turkey in Washington, as there is today. Within the first five months of the year, almost 10 bills and resolutions regarding Turkey were introduced in the U.S. Congress. Turkey’s plan to purchase the S-400 air defense systems has brought all groups in the U.S. opposing Turkey together, with Congress coming first. From the Armenian lobby to the Greek lobby, from the Jewish lobby to Neo-con think-tanks and the Central Command (CENTCOM), a wide range of actors are working to block progress in politics and diplomacy by using anti-Turkish propaganda. Statements made and the bills that are introduced show that the common point of all this propaganda is Ankara’s purchase of the S-400 systems.

Upon a brief examination of the latest developments in relations between Turkey and the U.S., a difference in discourse between Ankara and Washington on the subject of the S-400 can be clearly observed. Turkey defines the S-400 agreement as one that is complete and finalized. It must be noted that despite this, statements made by U.S. authorities portray the situation regarding the S-400 systems as one where Ankara can still be convinced. Within the last few weeks, reports citing anonymous sources emerged in the U.S. stating that Turkey was offered to indefinitely delay the purchase of the S-400s and that Ankara was evaluating this option. But these claims were dismissed by Turkish authorities.

At no point during the 70 years of bilateral relations, there existed such a strong opposition towards Turkey in Washington, as there is today.

A statement pushing the boundaries of diplomacy regarding the Istanbul elections was published by the U.S. Department of State. The expression in the statement that the U.S. “took note” of the decision to cancel the election is one that is hard to understand diplomatically. On the other hand, it has been expressed that regarding Syria, the meetings between the two countries are positively progressing. The 50% tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminum exports to the U.S. introduced during the Brunson crisis were also reduced to 25%. Beyond these topics, anti-Turkey propaganda and the pressure applied on the administration in regards to the S-400 issue continues.

Anti-Turkish sentiment in the U.S. Congress

On the subject of Turkey, most of the pressure applied on the administration comes from Congress. It’s no secret that whenever Trump closes his doors and starts engaging with Turkey, members of Congress come forward with statements, bills and resolutions opposing Turkey. It must be emphasized that this anti-Turkish sentiment in Congress causes great damage to bilateral relations. Attempting to keep Ankara on Washington’s side by applying pressure on the subject of defense while Turkey is trying to overcome national security matters is not an attitude that is possible to explain in strategic terms. Due to the fact that there is a “diffusion of power” in the global arena against the U.S., the administration is planning a national security strategy that prioritizes rivalry between great powers. In such a situation, the approach of applying pressure on an actor, especially one that has played a critical role during the Cold War era, should not be expected to serve the interests of the U.S. in any way.

Within the last three months, seven bills directly concerning Turkey were introduced to the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. All these bills had both Democrat and Republican representatives as their sponsors. This is important in illustrating the scale of anti-Turkish sentiment in the U.S. Congress. It is also worth mentioning that almost all of these bills referred to Turkey’s purchase of the S-400s. In other words, seven bills opposing Turkey were introduced to the U.S. Congress within a span of three months, of which all were supported by both Republican and Democrat representatives, and all of these bills included opposition to the purchase of S-400 air defense systems, whether relevant to the bill or not.

Anti-Turkey sentiment in the U.S. Congress is high. Within the last three months, seven bills directly concerning Turkey were introduced, all with the support of both Democrat and Republican representatives.

The first of these bills is the National Defense Authorization Act of 2019. This act is also known as the defense budgeting bill. While its general purpose is drawing the limits of Pentagon’s budget, it also contains many sections regarding foreign policy. Parts of this bill are dedicated to Turkey and request a report from the U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense regarding Ankara’s purchase of the S-400s. The National Defense Authorization Act of the previous year also requested a report on the same subject and this was presented to Congress in November. However, this time it was requested for the report to be updated and that until this report was submitted, the delivery of F-35s to Turkey to be stopped. Prior to this bill, the temporary spending bill that ended the temporary spending crisis between Trump and Congress and allowed the Federal Government to reopen also requested the U.S. Department of Defense, in consultation with the State Department, to submit a report regarding the status of the Turkish-American alliance and Turkey’s purchase of the S-400s. Until the report is submitted, or until November 1, 2019, the transfer of any F-35 aircraft or equipment to Turkey has thus been banned.

The first bill that directly concerned Turkey was introduced on March 28, 2019, by Republican Oklahoma Senator James Lankford, Democratic New Hampshire Senator Jeanne Shaheen, Republican North Carolina Senator Thamos Tillis and Democratic Maryland Senator Chris Van Hollen. The bill titled “Protecting NATO Skies Act” states that no F-35 aircraft should be transferred to Turkey until the U.S. government confirms that Turkey will not receive any S-400 air defense systems. The bill also states that no intellectual property and data regarding the maintenance of F-35s must be transferred to Turkey and that no storage facilities for these aircrafts should be established in the country.

The bill also emphasizes that Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 systems is within the scope of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and states that “such a purchase would endanger the integrity of the NATO alliance, would adversely affect ongoing operations of the United States Armed Forces, including coalition operations in which the United States Armed Forces participate, would result in a significant impact to defense cooperation between the United States and Turkey, and would significantly increase the risk of compromising United States defense systems and operational capabilities.” A similar bill was also introduced to the House of Representatives. Of course, it must be expressed that the points of whether these bills will be considered alone or appended to another bill, or whether they’ll undergo changes, are not clear but they are important in reflecting the opinions of Congress.

Other bills suggesting to call the events of 1915 a so-called “Armenian Genocide” were introduced to the Senate and House of Representatives in April. These bills are non-binding. But the fact that Rashida Tlaib, a Muslim U.S. representative who is of Palestinian origin, was among the sponsors of one of these bills presents a situation that must be carefully considered. Another bill introduced to the U.S. Senate was titled “Defending United States Citizens and Diplomatic Staff from Political Prosecutions Act.” This bill directly targeted Turkey and was aimed at Turkish citizens working at U.S. diplomatic missions who have been found to be in contact with the Gulenist Terror Group, also known as FETO. But in this bill as well in the section regarding the outlook of Congress towards Turkey, it was stated that an agreement between Turkey and Russia regarding the S-400s would negatively impact relations between Turkey and the U.S.

There is also another bill that deserves special attention due to the potential it carries of creating many serious strategic consequences if passed into law. This is the bill titled “Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act” introduced by Democratic representative Bob Menendez and Republican representative Marco Rubio, both of whom are members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In the section titled “Findings”, the bill emphasizes the importance of cooperation with the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC), Israel and Greece, and states that it opposes behaviors and attitudes in the Mediterranean, Aegean and the Middle East (all but naming Turkey) that are one-sided, in violation of international law and against the principle of maintaining good relations with neighboring countries. It also draws attention to the statement made during the trilateral meeting held between Israel, GCASC and Greece on March 21 that any “ill-intentioned activities” would be defended against, and supports this sentiment. The same section also mentions that Turkey has purchased S-400 systems from Russia and could be subjected to CAATSA sanctions due to this.

The bill emphasizes that the U.S. must ensure energy supply security between its allies. In this section, which expresses that energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean will lead to the economic benefit of Europe, the importance of building the Southern Gas Corridor and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline in reducing Europe’s energy dependency on Russia is stressed. The bill suggests removing the arms embargo on the GCASC, the creation of a U.S. Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center to help energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean between Israel, GCASC, Greece and the U.S., providing Greece with 3 million dollars of foreign military financing assistance, and providing Greece with 2 million dollars and GCASC with 2 million dollars of funding for international military education and training support.

If the Menendez & Rubio bill on the Eastern Mediterranean passes, it will change the existing military status quo in the region.

There are two points that deserve extra attention in the Eastern Mediterranean bill: First, if the bill passes, the U.S. will have officially interfered on the matter of energy resources in the E. Mediterranean in favor of the interests of Israel, Greece and GCASC. Secondly, the U.S. will change the existing military status quo in the region by removing the arms embargo on the GCASC. The U.S. also enforced an arms embargo on Turkey following the Cyprus Peace Operation, but removed this without Ankara hanging its Cyprus policy. The arms embargo on GCASC was kept in place. Despite the fact that many bills put forward with pressure of the Greek lobby recommended the removal of the embargo, these attempts failed. The difference in this case is that alongside the subject of energy in the Eastern Mediterranean, this bill also mentions reducing Europe’s energy dependency on Russia and blocking the transfer of F-35 aircrafts to Turkey until it abandons its plans on the S-400s. This greatly increases the chances that Congress will pass this bill into law. Moreover, the fact that the main sponsors of the bill are Rubio and Menendez, two influential representatives from both sides of the aisle, shows the gravity of the situation.

It can be said that the Greek, Armenian, Jewish and all other anti-Turkish lobbies have found an opportunity to employ all their strategies against Turkey in Congress. There are almost no representatives with a favorable attitude towards Turkey, including Muslim representatives as well. The efforts of Congress to oppose Turkey today are severe enough to cause strategic cracks in relations between the two countries. And the subject of S-400s has been transformed from a technical matter to a political problem between Turkey and the U.S.

Turkey and F-35 

Turkey has repeated the same statements since the day it signed the S-400 agreement. Turkish authorities expressed that this was a finalized agreement and that Ankara urgently needed air defense systems. The administration also added that a joint technical study on the S-400 systems could be conducted with the U.S. in terms of assessing its risks. However, the discourse on the subject changed as the issue became more politicized in the U.S. The U.S. expected this issue to be resolved by Turkey accepting not to activate these systems. Concerns regarding the deployment and activation of these systems were being voiced, but with pressure from the Congress on the administration, the completion of Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 systems have become unacceptable. During budget meetings in Congress, both U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan stated that in the case of Turkey completing the purchase of S-400 systems, the transfer of F-35s will not be allowed. The nuance in the discourse shows how political pressure has affected the administration.

In addition to this, the U.S. has prepared steps that will be taken against Turkey, meaning, the plan to exclude Ankara from the F-35 program. Shanahan confirmed that they met with partners of the F-35 program regarding Ankara’s exclusion from the program after Pentagon stopped the transfer concerning F-35s to Turkey and the manufacture of F-35 parts by Turkish firms. However, the details of this process are even more interesting. In the report presented by the Pentagon to Congress in November, possible complications that may occur in Ankara’s exclusion and legal and judicial concerns along with all precautions that will be taken regarding these concerns are evaluated and plans for all possible scenarios on this subject are clearly described.

An official from the Pentagon stated, “In a letter on July, Secretary Mattis voiced the complications that may occur if Turkey is excluded. And following this the Congress told us to go and take all precautions for the possible situation. And that is what we worked on.” Talks are being held with partnering countries on this subject and strangely enough, more than whether Turkey should be excluded or not, these meetings focus on who will take on the business and production parts that the Turkish defense industry handles, along with where and how this production can be done, meaning its feasibility in the event that Turkey is excluded. In other words, the only worry for partners regarding Turkey’s exclusion is how countries and shareholders remaining in the project will slice up the pie of work that will be created.

One of the most important aspects of the S-400 crisis that must be emphasized is that for the U.S., this subject is no longer a technical matter that can be overcome, but one that is very much a political matter. The perception created in the U.S. is on such a level that it’s being said in meetings of the U.S. National Security Council that Turkey has purchased the S-400 systems especially to operate outside of NATO and that it intends to use these systems against the alliance.

The U.S. expected the S-400 issue to be resolved by Turkey accepting not to activate these systems. 

In meetings concerning national security, it is being discussed that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan believes the U.S. and NATO countries supported FETO’s failed coup attempt and that in case there is another coup attempt and NATO supports this, S-400s could be used against the alliance. The biggest factor in the creation of this perception has been the propaganda from think tanks known for their support for FETO and other terror groups such as the PKK/YPG and names that are well-respected in the U.S. with no tolerance against Turkey. For example, Turkey’s expectation towards Trump bringing sanity back to the U.S.’ Turkey policy by handling the S-400 crisis together with President Erdogan is being attempted to be nullified.

Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), Eric Edelman, who is known for his close relations with FETO and FDD Vice President Jonathan Schanzer discussed this subject in an article published in the Wall Street Journal. Both stated that Trump must not show any tolerance towards Turkey. The article is carefully written and penned as if to constitute a briefing for Trump, and describes Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 systems as a “serious national security threat for the U.S.” The article is almost an attempt to block any moves Trump can make on the subject of the S-400s. At the same time, propaganda about removing U.S. nuclear weapons under the authority of NATO from Turkey is being brought into public discussion by similar organizations and media institutions. Thus, it seems very difficult for the U.S. administration to escape this torrent of manufactured perceptions and focus on the long-term strategic interests of the U.S. These manufactured perceptions also make it impossible for Turkey to express its anxieties regarding its national security and explain its commitment to multinational partnerships such as NATO.

What in the aftermath?

It is not in the interests of the U.S. to pressure Turkey through its national security. Turkey lies in a circle of fire. There’s Russia on one end of the circle and the U.S. on the other. In an environment where global politics is evolving towards such a multipolar order, U.S. pressuring Turkey as if it is the absolute hegemon will not yield any results. Let alone an ally that has thousands of years of state tradition, the U.S. can no longer exert authority on small states such as Venezuela, Cuba, or North Korea, or a state that has been under embargos for years, such as Iran. Russians have taken the Assad regime in Syria at the verge of death from the hands of the U.S. and has revived it. It is unknown why the U.S., seeing Russia and China in every corner in international politics, expects the pressure policy that it engages in at the risk of alienating an actor such as Turkey to yield results.

It is not in the interests of the U.S. to pressure Turkey through its national security. Turkey lies in a circle of fire. There’s Russia on one end of the circle and the U.S. on the other.

Turkey may have economic vulnerabilities and this pressure policy of the U.S. may have an effect on the economy to a certain point, but it will not lead to changes in Turkey’s national security strategy. This is because Turkey is not an actor that can easily be overcome in the region. Second, its national security strategy is based on the security balances and the threats in the region, and it will not negotiate on these points. Third, the acceleration of its national defense industry initiative is another goal that will be executed in parallel to its national security strategy. Turkey has long expressed that it no longer wishes to be exclusively a buyer of military equipment and that it is making investments and engaging in programs towards this goal. Thus, its national defense industry initiative is directly related to the security balances and threats in the region. Turning Turkey back from this point will interfere with the future prosperity of the country.

There is currently a diffusion of power in the global arena. There is no longer a singular hegemon, but regional hegemons. The U.S. is part of this hegemony in every region. It has updated its strategy for the “new cold war” that it has entered with China and Russia according to the principles of competition with great powers and in every region, even in space, is attempting to decrease the influence and presence of Russia and China. Losing Turkey in such an environment would lead to a great loss for the U.S. and Europe in the long run. Whether this policy of pressure will help solve problems between the U.S. and Turkey is still being discussed, but what is obvious is that it is leading to a level of distrust that has never been seen before between the two governments.

The role of the U.S. in the Palestine-Israel issue has been debated for a long time. Until 2017, the U.S. has shown care in following a balanced policy at least on a discourse level between the parties. But, no matter whether the U.S president was a democrat or republican, a chief priority for the U.S. in designing its Middle East policies was to ensure Israel’s security whereas any remark regarding Palestinians was avoided, which has been evaluated as a relatively partial attitude.

Since the foundation of the state of Israel in 1948, the U.S. has always intervened in the developments concerning Israel. The role of Washington in motivating particularly the Arabs during both Arab-Israeli wars and the peace agreements Israel signed with Egypt and Jordan after the wars cannot be denied. Besides, the U.S. has precluded decisions made against Israel in the United Nations (UN) and other international platforms but it also has respected the principle decisions of the UN regarding the Israel-Palestine issue. The country has also been attentive to the coherence between UN decisions and official statements of the U.S. Department of State and White House.

In contrast to the conventional U.S. policy regarding the Israel-Palestine issue, Trump gave signals of his pro-Israel stance from the first days of his presidency.

It must also be noted that the Oslo Accords that created the present status quo in the Israel-Palestine issue were also carried into effect with the efforts of the U.S. But the atmosphere of convergence between the parties thanks to the agreements was disturbed after the assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who signed the Oslo Accords, as a result of rising conservative tendencies in Israel. Several attempts by different parties remained inconclusive. Eventually, with Donald Trump’s inauguration as the U.S. President on 20 January, 2017, the U.S. has ended its somehow balanced policies on the Israel-Palestine issue. In contrast to conventional U.S. policies, Trump gave signals of his pro-Israel stance from the first days of his presidency.  

Trump’s pro-Israel policy

Before his election as the U.S. president, Trump opened a campaign office in the Jewish settlement of Karnei Shomron located nearby Nablus governorate in the West Bank and donated to the organizations in the settlement by saying that the Jewish settlers would not impede a possible peace. But at that time, the UN Security Council Resolution 2334, which was taken since the U.S. did not use its veto power, ruled that all kinds of Jewish settlements are forbidden and the existing ones are required to be evacuated urgently in reference to previous decisions. Despite the ruling, Trump did not find it risky to disregard international law. As one of the most highlighted promises of Trump was to solve the Israel-Palestine issue, he took his first steps in this regard as soon as he came to office.

The appointment of Jared Kushner, Jason Greenblatt and David Friedman by Donald Trump shows that left the so-called peace process to the hands of solely pro-Israel figures.

Trump firstly appointed his son-in-law Jared Kushner as his senior advisor and assigned him to solve the Israel-Palestine issue. He also appointed his former chief legal officer Jason Greenblatt as a negotiator. Lastly, he assigned David Friedman, a conservative Jewish, as the U.S. ambassador to Israel, thus handing the so-called peace process to a team solely of pro-Israel figures. Even Israel was surprised by the appointment of Friedman as ambassador since it was thought that a person who has organic ties with the Jewish settlements would not be an ambassador as a requirement of the conventional U.S. policy. Naturally, Palestine does not expect this team to treat both sides equally and to offer a fair formula for peace. However, the developments over the past two years went far beyond this expectation and came to the point of annihilating the Palestinian administration and people.

The most important development in this context is undoubtedly Trump’s Jerusalem announcement. The U.S. recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel with a law enacted in 1995, but all the presidents coming to office as of that date delayed its enforcement on the grounds of security concerns until Trump. Similarly, Trump continued his predecessors’ policy of signing a six-month waiver overriding the law when he came to power but added the note that he would review the situation. After the end of the six-month period, Trump did not sign another waiver and announced that the U.S. officially recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Then, the proceedings to transfer the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem were completed on 14 May, 2018, within a short span of time contrary to the estimations.

The opening of the U.S. embassy in Jerusalem with a ceremony on 14 May, 2018, resembled a religious ritual rather than a formal ceremony.

Following a quick restoration, the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem was opened as the U.S. Embassy with a ceremony on 14 May, 2018, that resembled a religious ritual rather than a formal ceremony. Meanwhile, around 60 Palestinian civilians who gathered at the Israel-Gaza border to protest were killed by Israeli soldiers who fired into the crowd. The U.S. held Hamas accountable for the fatalities by arguing that the Israeli soldiers used their right of self-defense as Hamas sent civilians to the region, which clearly displayed the stance of the U.S. So, despite all the UN decisions in force, warnings issued by the countries in the region, and the calls of the EU and other international organizations for common sense; the U.S. ignored the current status of East Jerusalem, which is Palestinian territory, and recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.  

Imbued with the narrative of the Israeli administration, Washington firstly limited and then stopped all economic and social aid to the Palestinian administration on the pretext that the funds were paid to families of individuals imprisoned for or killed while allegedly committing attacks against Israel. Subsequently, the U.S. stopped providing aid to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which provides basic health, education, relief and social services to around 5 million Palestinian refugees in camps located in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria alongside Gaza and occupied Palestinian territory. This move cut off another life vein of Palestinian people. 

To restrict the political representation of Palestinians, the U.S. shut down the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) office in Washington, annulled the U.S. Embassy in East Jerusalem and forced the proceedings here to be conducted by the U.S. Embassy in West Jerusalem. Imposing sanctions on the international organizations and institutions including Palestine as a member, the U.S. administration left the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHRC) on the grounds that they engage in anti-Israel behaviors. In addition, it imposed sanctions on the judges of the International Criminal Court that conducted ex-officio investigations on the Gaza flotilla raid in 2010, violations during the 2014 Gaza attack, the restrictions regarding Al-Aqsa Mosque, the extortion of Palestinian lands and properties, and the disproportionate use of force by the Israeli military against those joining the Great March of Return. All these steps demonstrate that the U.S. has been going any length to back Israel.

Despite all the UN decisions in force, warnings by regional governments, and the calls of the EU & international organizations for common sense, the U.S. ignored the current status of East Jerusalem, which is Palestinian territory.

As a consequence of all these incidents, the U.S. administration has lost its role as a mediator and turned into a biased actor that only prioritizes Israel’s interests and disregards international law and practices along with its own values to that end. Although he claims that his prior missions include solving the Israel-Palestine conflict, Trump seemingly wishes to design the region in line with Israel’s demands by using force when necessary rather than offering a fair solution to the issue. This is proven by the information leaked about the so-called “deal of the century”, which is trying to be completed by engaging in consultations only with Israel and several Arab states in the region without including Palestine in the process. 

The myth of peace between Israel and Palestine

Israel Hayom, a daily newspaper owned by Sheldon Adelson who is known for his close ties with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, published a news report attributed to unnamed authorities from Israel’s foreign ministry. The report included a text that was alleged to comprise several articles of the so-called peace accord. Although this content is not accepted as an official document, it is thought that Trump and his team intentionally leaked the text. Since Kushner, who managed the process until that time, had previously stated that the plan would be announced after the month of Ramadan, it is believed that the published content might be relevant due to its timing and some revisions might be made according to the responses.

The news report read that the agreement consists of ten articles. According to the first article, the agreement will enter into force upon its ratification by Israel, PLO and Hamas. The document read that a Palestinian state called “New Palestine” will be established in West Bank and Gaza, with the exception of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. The new Palestine will not be allowed to create an army. The only weapons it will be allowed to possess will be light weapons for the police. The Israeli army will take on the defense of Palestine and Palestine will pay Israel in return. Hamas will deposit all its weapons and receive salaries. Jerusalem will not be divided or shared between Israel and New Palestine and will be the capital of both Israel and New Palestine. The parties will not be allowed to buy property from each other. The Israeli Jerusalem municipality will be responsible for all areas of the city except for education, which will be dealt with by the new Palestinian government. Taxes will be collected from Palestinians to pay for the services provided by the municipality. The present status of the holy sites will continue. Democratic elections will be held in Palestine within one year. One year after the elections and establishment of the government, Palestinians held in Israeli prisons will be released gradually over the course of three years.

The U.S.’ longstanding pro-Israel stance has turned into a gradually intensifying oppression mechanism over the past two years, which has stalemated Palestine in economic and social terms.

For Palestinians’ freedom of travel, a seaport and airport will be established in New Palestine within five years. Until then, Palestinians will use airports and seaports in Israel. These areas will be under Israeli control for security concerns. The Jewish settlements in the Area C of the West Bank, which constitutes around 65 percent of the West Bank, will remain the same and new roads will be built in certain spots to connect these settlements. In addition to the lands in Gaza, Egypt will lease new land to Palestine for use other than residence. The leasing price will be determined subsequently. A highway connecting the West Bank and Gaza Strip will be established. China will pay 50% of its cost, while South Korea, Australia, Canada, the U.S. and the EU will each pay 10%. The Jordan Valley will remain under Israeli control. The road in this area will be widened to connect Palestine and Jordan. The border between Palestine and Jordan will be under Palestinian control.

The U.S. will pay 20% of the cost for all these infrastructure and development projects and the EU 10%, while Gulf states will fund 70% as they are the most direct beneficiaries of the deal.

The last part regarding the stages of implementation reads that if Hamas or the PLO refuses to sign the deal, the U.S. will cancel all financial support to the Palestinians, and if the PLO signs the deal but Hamas or Islamic Jihad refuses, the leaders of these two movements will be considered responsible. In a new war between Israel and the Gaza Strip, the U.S. will back Israel in targeting these leaders. It also adds that If Israel refuses to sign the deal, the U.S. will cease all financial support.

As can be seen, the deal that has been shaped by the U.S administration protects the present gains of Israel while failing to meet the demands of Palestinians on the subjects such as the 1967 borders, the status of Jerusalem, Jewish settlements and return rights of Palestinian refugees stated in the UN resolutions. Since Israel has developed closer ties with the Sunni Arab states in the region with the support of the U.S. within the recent period, the possibility of these countries supporting Palestine has been ruled out. Contrarily, they started pressing on Palestinians to make them accept the above-mentioned deal. These states try to dodge the issue by paying the amounts stated in the deal instead of paying regard to the rights and demands of Palestinian people.

The U.S.’ longstanding pro-Israel stance has turned into a gradually intensifying oppression mechanism over the past two years, which has stalemated Palestine in economic and social terms. Although accepting the deal seems like the only viable way to survive for the Palestinians, this so-called peace deal, which does not offer any noteworthy gain to Palestine despite all concessions, is likely to turn into a subjugation agreement that might cause the complete annihilation of Palestine.

With U.S. President Donald Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear deal signed between Iran and the P5+1 countries in May 2018, Iran’s nuclear activities have moved to the top of the international agenda again. While the two-stage sanctions imposed by the United States began to be implemented in November and targeted the country’s economic infrastructure, some countries were granted a six-month exemption, especially on oil sales. The six-month exemption granted to Iran’s major oil importers such as China, India and Turkey ended in May this year. Negotiations between the countries that were granted exemptions and the U.S. did not reach any conclusion. Thus, these countries subsequently made statements that they had stopped purchasing oil from Iran.

Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the multilateral agreement, which had a tremendous impact in the international community and had been approved by the UN Security Council, was met with great reactions by many countries. In the statements made after Trump’s withdrawal, EU countries in particular emphasized the importance of the agreement and indicated that they were behind it. However, pressure exerted on different actors by the U.S. in the past year has yielded desirable results for the Trump administration. For instance, the INSTEX mechanism, which was expected to allow European countries to eliminate Iran’s commercial concerns and allow for money transfer without encountering U.S. sanctions, was born dead after one year of effort. On the other hand, in the one year period that passed, almost all large European companies withdrew from Iran and there was a 80% decrease in the trade volume between the continent and Iran. Therefore, even if the aforementioned mechanism had worked, it would not have been functioning effectively since there were not many companies pursuing business with Iran.

In one year, almost all large European companies withdrew from Iran and there was a 80% decrease in the trade volume between the continent and Iran.

Iran sanctions and Turkey

Just like other countries with close political and economic relations with Iran, Turkey stated that the U.S.’ unilateral withdrawal from the Nuclear Deal was not right and that sanctions imposed on Iran were unacceptable. In this respect, it can be indicated that Turkey’s Iran policies in the last year have been overlapping with Ankara’s policies with other important actors such as the EU, Russia and China. This can be summarized as giving theoretical support to Iran but not taking steps against the Trump administration in sanction areas such as oil export or money transfer, which the U.S. is sensitive against. For this reason, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who failed to find the support he expected during his visit to Europe, stated that Tehran expected concrete steps to be taken rather than political support during his visit to Turkey. An important factor that should not be disregarded in Turkey’s cease of oil purchases from Iran is that the country’s biggest client, Tüpraş, is a private company and makes decisions in line with its own strategy rather than the government’s political stance – just like many other European and even Russian companies.

However, there are also other factors to take into account in order to understand Turkey’s frustration on the Iran sanctions. Bilateral relations between Turkey and the U.S. hit bottom low with the failed July 15, 2016, coup attempt, which was implicitly supported by the Obama administration. Relations between the two countries have not yet reached the desired level despite the remedial steps taken. Trump’s own demands such as withdrawing from Syria and minimizing relations with the YPG were stuck in the security bureaucracy around him. These bureaucrats are known to hold negative views on Turkey.

Turkey has many problematic policy areas with the U.S. and the country did not want the issue of Iran sanctions to be added to these.

Crises such as the Halkbank case and the S-400/F35 issue, which have been ongoing since the Obama period, have been the main obstacles in transforming Ankara’s principal attitude towards Iran into practice. To be clearer, Turkey, which has many problematic policy areas with the U.S., did not want the issue of Iran sanctions to be added to these. Considering the disputes on military equipment purchases and the Israeli plan of expansion, also known as “Deal of the Century” will increase current tensions between the U.S. and Turkey, the Turkish government’s pursuit of a flexible policy on the issue of Iran is a very understandable attitude.

The peak in tension between the U.S. and Iran

Hassan Rouhani’s statement in May where he announced Iran’s counter-measures and stated that they would resume sensitive nuclear activities, particularly uranium enrichment, two months later if the economic expectations of Iran were not met, increased tension in relations between the two countries. However, the real alarming development was the attacks on the important oil facilities and tankers in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, in a way that reminded of the threats made by Iranian officials on the lines of “If we cannot sell oil from the Gulf, nobody can.” These attacks on the most important supporters of Trump’s anti-Iran policies and the simultaneous mortar attacks near the U.S. embassy in the secure Green Zone in Baghdad showed that the political tension could turn into a military conflict.

As a result of the regional visits made by U.S. officials, sending additional troops to the region and mediation attempts made by Iraqi officials, the tension has been settled to a great extent. More, criticisms made against National Security Advisor John Bolton, who is known as the architect of the hawkish anti-Iran policies, before the cameras, eased tension for now. Yet, there is still curiosity regarding whether Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to Tehran (who had been visited by Trump recently), will lead to a conciliation. If a positive result does not find ground from the prospective visit, and if Iran resumes nuclear activities in July, tension may escalate again.

In fact, the main problem in bilateral relations was the gap between the expectations of the parties rather than the lack of mediation attempts. After Trump left the deal, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s setting out of the “conditions for normalization,” which targeted Iran’s regional and defense policies, tools and non-state allies, the designation of the Revolutionary Guard Corps – Iran’s most important security agency – as a foreign terrorist organization, and sanctions imposed on several state officials were effective in terms of Iranians reaching to a consensus about who the real target was. As a matter of fact, even President Rouhani, who is known as a moderate in Iran and who has made his willingness to negotiate with the U.S. explicit on various occasions albeit indirectly within the last process, has emphasized in his statements that the ultimate goal of the Trump administration has been a regime change in Iran.

The political tension between Iran and the U.S. can turn into a military conflict.

Accordingly, statements made by Trump, such as, “We just don’t want them to have nuclear weapons; it’s not too much to ask” or “Iran has a chance to be a great country with the same leadership” did not have much reflection in Iran. On the other hand, if Trump is serious in his statements, Iranian officials demand practical steps to be taken – such as extending exemptions in oil sales, the U.S. to return to the nuclear deal, or Bolton’s dismissal from office. In the absence of such a concrete step, it can be predicted that Iranians will maintain the risky strategy that they call “maximum resistance.”

In case the differences of expectation between the parties cannot be overcome in a short time by the influence of mediators, it can be predicted that the tension will escalate quickly. One of the main steps that Iran will take before an economic destruction like Venezuela is to put pressure on the U.S. by rapidly resuming its nuclear activities and secondly, by increasing its retaliatory attacks against the U.S. or, more likely, against its regional partners, in order to show that it does not refrain from the escalation of regional tensions. In this respect, the months ahead will be decisive. Yet, according to the commonly accepted view that is shared by many analysts, the Iranian economy is in a state that cannot resist in the face of zero oil exports. The financial crisis has already begun to influence the fighting capacity of its regional proxies. As a matter of fact, according to some Iranian commentators, Trump’s statement, “I don’t want war,” or his attitude of ignoring the sabotages in the Gulf is a tactical approach that aims to save time and prevent a military loss by making Iran kneel down on its knees.

Turkey’s stance towards Iran

Turkey maintains its stance that prioritizes Iran’s political and economic stability and keeps its distance from the regional polarization against Iran. Ankara has argued that the problems between Iran and the United States should be resolved through diplomatic negotiations and that heavy economic sanctions will not only affect the people of the country, but will also have an effect on regional peace and stability. As a matter of fact, suffering from great economic loss in the energy, tourism and export sectors, there has been an increase in the wave of migrants coming to Turkey from Afghanistan and Iran. 

Turkey maintains its stance that prioritizes Iran’s political and economic stability and keeps its distance from the regional polarization against Iran.

Turkey, which has experienced how the Iraq and Syria crisis opened space for the PKK terrorist organization, continues dialogue with all parties in order to prevent the Iran crisis from reaching a similar stage. It is therefore trying to closely watch the mobility in the field. The statement made by the Iranian branch of the PKK, PJAK, “We are ready to fight with Iran,” and the attack on the IRGC forces where one Iranian soldier was killed in the Chaldoran region and on the zero-point of the border, shows that the organization has an intention to maintain its legionary status regarding Iran. Due to this, it wants to turn itself into a more important position and permanent partner in the eyes of the U.S. and its regional allies. The organization has started to disrupt balance in U.S.-Iran relations, which until now, has been to the detriment of Iran. This is clearly an act of positioning.

Whether the Trump administration continues its policies of dragging Iran into economic bankruptcy or whether the tension between the two countries turns into a military encounter, it will undoubtedly become of the most important points on the agenda concerning all of the Middle East region. It is fair to state that this issue will also remain as a high priority foreign policy concern for Turkey.

In early May, Iran announced a 60-day deadline after which the country would start enriching uranium of higher levels than currently allowed under the JCPOA unless some sanctions relief were provided. The U.S. had already withdrawn from the agreement and European allies have been trying to keep the deal alive. Under the pressure of increasing sanctions against oil as well as non-oil exports, the question of how long Iran would continue to honor the deal has been a pressing one. Iranian President Rouhani’s announcement of a partial departure from the agreement is a sign that the JCPOA might just crumble this summer. If that happens, tensions between the U.S. and Iran will keep rising, coming dangerously close to a military confrontation.

President Trump does not seem to want an actual war with Iran. After all, he was elected on a platform that heavily criticized America’s foreign military interventions and promised an “America First” agenda. It is likely that Trump wants to get a JCPOA 2.0 on his own terms, which may resemble Obama’s agreement in content but it will nevertheless be Trump’s deal. For Trump to “get a deal” with Iran, however, it is almost certain that it would have to wait for his potential second term. Trump has been quite an anti-Obama president, as he has sought to reverse Obama’s policies while trying to rebrand any perceived achievements as his own. This might just end up being the case with Iran, where a second term Trump get a deal and claim victory no matter how much it might resemble the original JCPOA. This is pretty much what happened with the renegotiation of NAFTA that ended up creating a NAFTA 2.0 in the form of the USMCA.

It is likely that Trump wants to get a JCPOA 2.0 on his own terms, which may resemble Obama’s agreement in content but it will nevertheless be Trump’s deal.

Trump appears all too happy using strong (and sometimes extreme) rhetoric against countries like Mexico, China, North Korea and Iran. So far, his rhetoric turned out to be a simple tactic of “raising the hand” to get a better deal. It has arguably worked with Mexico and, to some extent, with China but it remains to be seen whether it would work with North Korea and Iran. North Korea has been content with reaping the benefits of international diplomatic recognition without a full commitment to denuclearization. Trump seems interested in a deal with Iran despite his “maximum pressure” campaign. He reportedly tried to meet with Iranian President Rouhani on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York but reverted to the full pressure campaign once the meeting did not materialize. This indicates that the road ahead with Iran may not be as clear.

For one thing, Iran has resisted U.S. pressure campaigns before and despite domestic opposition in addition to the devastating impact of sanctions. Granted that the difference this time is that the Trump administration seems determined to apply an all-out economic pressure campaign as long as necessary. It also cooperates with the Gulf nations plus Israel to push back against Iran’s regional influence. Hawks within the Trump administration are accused of pushing for war although Trump himself said he was only interested in ensuring a no nuclear Iran, which shows he would like a deal of his own with Iran eventually.

Trump appears all too happy using strong rhetoric against countries like Mexico, China, North Korea and Iran. So far, this has turned out to be a simple tactic of “raising the hand”.

The question, of course, is whether a period of mutual escalation may prove uncontrollable and a conflict becomes unavoidable. In the most recent round of escalation, Trump used the danger of Iran to sell Saudi Arabia more weapons systems despite Congress’ opposition. Gaining an economic benefit out of this escalation may have been his main preoccupation to begin with. News reports indicated that Trump authorized the deployment of 1,500 American soldiers to the region although the hawks in the administration and generals on the ground expected more troops. Again, this is another indication that Trump is happy with a “controlled escalation” with Iran that allows him to look tough and brand any inch given by Iran (if at all) as his own achievement.

A military conflict is always a distinct possibility as escalation can certainly get out of control. However, neither side has much to gain from a military conflict. Thus, Trump will likely continue the pressure campaign until Iran gets to the table ready to make serious concessions, which is not very likely any time soon ahead of the 2020 U.S. presidential elections. Until then, the region will have to contend with increased tensions and escalatory moves. How long this state of affairs can be kept under wraps without provoking a military conflict is anyone’s guess. In the short and medium term, the interplay between Trump’s need for a deal on his own terms and Iran’s capacity to sustain the economic and political fallout from the U.S. maximum pressure campaign will determine the nature of the standoff. 

Since 2010, Turkey’s deteriorating relations with the United States have peaked with three problematic areas. The first is the U.S. siding with the PKK affiliated PYD and its military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG) throughout the Syrian crisis. Secondly, the U.S. refusal to extradite Fetullah Gulen, the so-called Muslim cleric who is behind the July 15, 2016, failed coup attempt in Turkey. Third is related to U.S. skepticism about Turkey’s loyalty to the West when Ankara decided to purchase S400s from Russia, allied with Iran and Qatar during the Qatar crisis and called the U.S. a “partner in bloodshed” over President Donald Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. In addition, Turkey’s efforts to unveil the Khashoggi murder in Istanbul damaged the Trump administration’s prestige and legitimacy when Trump openly refused to impose sanctions on those responsible for the murder of the Saudi journalist, viewing weapon sales as an important source of U.S. jobs and standing by the Saudi Crown Prince, Muhammed bin Salman (MbS).

U.S. and YPG Relations

If there is one single issue that has bedeviled Turkey-U.S. relations, it is the PKK issue. The strong belief  in Turkey that Washington covertly supported the PKK especially after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, peaked with the Trump administration’s supply of weapons to the YPG and consideration of the YPG as a legitimate and efficient fighter against the DAESH. Following Turkey’s Olive Branch operation (January 2018), the two sides agreed on a plan on the withdrawal of the YPG from Manbij in March 2018. However, the Trump administration became reluctant to cooperate with Turkey in the east of the Euphrates and the northern Syrian city of Manbij. Washington also had assured Ankara that there would be a definite withdrawal of YPG forces from the area after its capture from DAESH. These promises however, were not kept in a timely fashion and Turkey’s suggestion for the establishment of a safe zone in Syria to curb the refugee flow to Turkey fell on deaf ears.

If there is one single issue that has bedeviled relations between Turkey and the U.S., it is the PKK issue.

Interestingly, although Trump agreed on the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria in January 2019 as DAESH was already defeated, only a few weeks later Trump threatened to “devastate” the Turkish economy if Ankara attacked Kurdish forces in Syria after U.S. forces left. This openly showed that the “strategic partnership” during Clinton’s period and “model partnership” during Obama’s period between Turkey and the United States took an entirely different shape. The current relationship between the two countries can be defined best as a “volatile partnership” as U.S. policies towards Turkey are quite unpredictable. Put it differently, the relationship that was structured in the Cold War at a time when Turkey had no choice but to claim its place in the West, now changed.

Today, Turkey sees itself as emerging from the shadow of the U.S. as an independent geopolitical actor that owes fealty to no one. President Erdogan views Turkey’s traditional ties with the West, including NATO, as unequal and at times unfavorable to Turkey’s interests. Therefore, Turkey under Erdogan, from the U.S. perspective, has been out of orbit. In this context, the July 15 coup attempt was perceived by a large percentage of Turks as an American attempt to topple President Erdogan.

FETO

Relations between Ankara and Washington have aggravated since the coup attempt, as the leader of FETO, Fetullah Gulen, has been a long term resident of Pennsylvania. Gulen has resided in the U.S. since 1999 and his fingerprints are explicit on all over the failed coup attempt. While the Turkish government’s passing of a state of emergency to conduct a purge in all government offices and business sector is still in progress, Turkey’s demand to extradite the mastermind of the failed coup remains unfulfilled.

As U.S. policies towards Turkey are quite unpredictable, the current engagement between the two can be defined at best as a volatile relationship.

The July 15, 2016, coup attempt led to Turkey’s upgrading relations with Russia and Iran as Turkey was estranged from its Gulf allies, and the United States who remained silent in the face of the coup whereas the Iranian and Russian leaderships publicly condemned the coup attempt within hours and supported Erdogan unreservedly.

In a nutshell, the two policies of Washington; the denial of repeated requests made by Ankara for the extradition of Gulen and the dispatch of trucks of arms to YPG three days after President Donald Trump promised that the United States would not supply any more weapons to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) pushed Turkey straight into Russia’s and Iran’s arms. Turkey’s rapprochement with Russia peaked with Turkey’s decision to buy S400s.  

Turkey’s S400 deal

Ankara’s intention to purchase an advanced air defense system, the S400, from Russia highlights diverging interests and perspectives between the two sides. According to Washington, Russian S400s are incompatible with NATO hardware equipment and deployment of such equipment risks the leaking of sensitive NATO military data to Russia as Turkey, at the same time, operates the F-35, the newest high-tech jet in the American military.

Although American officials including Scaparrotti (Commander of European Command) and Vice President Pence warned Ankara of “grave consequences” which could result in U.S. sanctions, Ankara openly declared that Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 missile defense systems is a “done deal” and cannot be canceled. 

Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar underlined that Turkey fulfilled its financial commitments regarding the F-35 program and said that Turkey’s exclusion from the F-35 project would be “illegal and immoral.” In addition, according to Turkish officials, removing Turkey from the F-35 project would generate significant problems in the production of the jet fighter if the Turkish supply chain was disrupted. Here the issue is that the deal with Russia involves joint production and technology transfer to Turkey, whereas Washington has been reluctant to provide this.

Washington urges Turkey to purchase Patriots instead of the S400s, but Ankara has said that it would only be possible if the right terms were agreed upon.

Most importantly, the United States has rejected to sell Patriot systems and air defense systems to Turkey for different reasons since 1990s and wanted to prevent Turkey from purchasing these systems from China and Russia. While rejecting Turkey’s request of technology transfer or the ability to buy these technologies at a reasonable price due to being a NATO ally, NATO has transferred high military technology to non-NATO countries such as New Zealand and Sweden.

In 2011, Turkey asked for patriot systems against missiles thrown from Syria. The U.S. rejected. In a way Turkey was left defenseless by its allies against the Syrian army supported by Russia. Today, Washington urges Turkey to purchase Raytheon Co Patriot defense systems instead of the S400s, but Ankara has said that, even though it would like to make such a deal, it would only be possible if the right terms were agreed upon. Although the purchase of S400s does not lead to a firm strategic partnership between Turkey and Russia, it has caused damage to the reliability of the partnership between Turkey and the U.S.

The Qatar crisis and beyond

The Qatar crisis is noteworthy as it clarified that Turkey and the U.S. are on opposing camps in the Gulf and Middle East. With the Qatar crisis, which came soon after Trump’s visit to Riyadh, the 13-point ultimatum were given by Saudi Arabia to Qatar as the price for lifting the trade and diplomatic embargo of the country. One of the ultimatums urged Qatar to terminate the Turkish military presence in Qatar and end any joint military cooperation with Turkey inside Qatar. The most important of all, the blockade of Qatar led to an immense solidarity between the trio; Turkey, Qatar and Iran.

Ankara’s immediate response to the blockade on Qatar was to stand by Doha. Turkey sent military forces to Qatar to deter any invasion as a symbolic gesture, given the unlikelihood of an overt attack, but one which crystallized the sharp division between the two camps. On the one side were Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies (the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain) who are against Doha, and on the other side were Turkey, Iran and, to a lesser extent, Russia, which support Doha. Interestingly, while Trump voiced his support for Riyadh’s maneuver and implicitly accused Qatar of being a sponsor of terrorism, former U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson called on the Saudi-led coalition to ease its blockade of Qatar, saying the cutoff was hindering the fight against DAESH and provoking food shortages. Washington’s confused policy toward the crisis soon ended with the signature of a $12 billion deal to sell Qatar dozens of F-15 jets as Qatar hosts the largest U.S. military base in the Middle East.

The Qatar crisis and the following tectonic changes in Saudi Arabia under MbS’s de facto administration is noteworthy with respect to understanding the newly emerging distribution of power in the region. This has been an ongoing process since the fall of Morsi and the empowerment of Sisi in Egypt as a proxy of Israel and the United States. In this framework, it can be said that Turkey under President Erdogan has been in the opposing camp despite its institutional links with the West such as NATO membership, EU membership candidacy, its efforts to support NATO in Afghanistan and so on.

Unfortunately, the strategic U.S.-Turkey partnership is a thing of the past.

When looked at closely, Erdogan’s attitude towards Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and the recognition of the Golan Heights as Israeli territory, the Turkish President has been extremely critical more than that of any other Arab country leader. Turkey’s unveiling of the Khashoggi murder is a response to the allegations that Turkey is sponsoring radical Islamist ideology. Former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s accusation of Turkey supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and former chief strategist Steve Bannon’s statement in an interview with the Saudi-owned Asharq Al-Awsat that Turkey is “more dangerous than Iran” pushed Turkey to unveil the Khashoggi murder. Thus, Ankara demonstrated to the world how the U.S. under Trump turned a blind eye to a brutal murder as it did not suit their economic and strategic interests to act otherwise. This, at the same time, was a diplomatic success for Turkey as the murder proved the current Saudi administration under the control of MbS as much more threatening and illegitimate than the Muslim Brotherhood, which only demands reform from the long lasting monarchs in the region.

In a nutshell, almost thirty years after the Cold War, the United States and Turkey often find themselves on different sides of a variety of important issues. Many of the problems in U.S.-Turkey relations are structural. Had Erdogan never come to power, there would still be a strain between the two countries due to the transformations in global politics. At a time when the U.S. sees the limited and transactional relationship with Turkey as serving U.S. interests, Turkey is trying to prevent bilateral relations from reaching a new low. The issue is to what extent Ankara and Washington will be able to formulate a new approach to the current problematic relations. Unfortunately, the strategic U.S.-Turkey partnership is a thing of the past.

On April 8, the U.S. put the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on the foreign terrorist organization (FTO) list. This is the first time in modern history that a country has designated a sovereign state’s official army as a terrorist entity. For this reason, it is a case of first impression in terms of international law. Given the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” policy on Iran, it is no surprise at all. As a predictable reprisal, Iran identified the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) as a terrorist group. Therefore, the following question arises: How will these reciprocal acts affect U.S.-Iran relations and what consequences will it bring for Iran with regards to its internal and regional politics?

What is Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps?

IRGC was formed right after the Iranian Revolution in 1979 on the purpose of preserving the Islamic Revolution and Khomeini’s Velayet-e Faqih doctrine. It earned a reputation for its role in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). Initially, IRGC was only a military organization and the idea behind it was that the regular army was not trustworthy since it was a remainder from the Shah’s era. However, over time it increased its political and economic power, especially during the presidency of Ahmadinejad.

Today, IRGC is a critical element of Iran’s regional military operations as well as its domestic political balances. The IRGC coordinated proxy wars and conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon. An elite unit called Quds Force, which is commanded by the famous Qassem Soleimani, has especially played an essential role in maintaining Iran’s regional influence.

The Basij forces, which are a paramilitary organization that operate under the IRGC, are very instrumental in suppressing public protests within the domestic context. It owns banks, billion-dollar corporations, media platforms (websites, newspapers, news agencies), universities, and cultural institutions. It also has close ties with some airline companies such as the U.S.-sanctioned Mahan Air. By this way, its rich social capital places it beyond a mere military organization. The IRGC is only accountable to the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. This fact provides it with political impunity.

U.S.-Iran relations after the IRGC decision

IRGC itself or the people and entities affiliated with it had already been sanctioned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury before. Starting from 2007, IRGC had been sanctioned for various reasons including support for terrorism, Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile program, and violation of human rights. According to the State Department’s factsheet, in 2007, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury designated the Quds Force as a terrorist supporting organization.

In 2017, the same authority designated IRGC as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist for its connection with the Quds Force. However, the FTO designation is an unprecedented move. Unlike the previous designations, the State Department listed IRGC as a terrorist entity as a whole. This act brings military action to the table. Therefore, more than producing adverse economic outcomes, this new designation will rather generate severe political and military consequences.

Since listing the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as a foreign terrorist organization, IRGC forces in Syria and Iraq have now become military targets for the U.S. military.

The possibility of a military confrontation in the region is particularly tangible. U.S. military personnel can be attacked by the Iranian military and Shia fighters coordinated by IRGC in Syria and Iraq. Accordingly, on April 9, the General Staff of Iran’s Armed Forces stated that they would “spare no effort” in fighting against “terrorist CENTCOM.” Likewise, IRGC forces in Syria and Iraq have now become military targets for the U.S. military. This escalation could spark a broader incalculable regional conflict.

Iran nuclear deal in total jeopardy

One of the primary issues strictly engaged with this designation is the destiny of the nuclear deal. Trump announced that the U.S. pulled out of the nuclear deal on May 8, 2018. After this withdrawal, sanctions began to be re-imposed on Iran. Other contracting parties have been working with Iran to save the deal since. However, without U.S. assurance to other countries, it is impossible to carry out the deal.

The FTO designation holds other countries, entities, or people, who supply “material support” to IRGC, to account differently from previous designations. Since the IRGC is a fundamental part of the Iranian economy, countries that conduct business with Iran will reconsider their business carefully as it is highly likely for their activities to be interpreted as material support to a foreign terrorist organization. Consequently, the odds that Iran will become more isolated after Trump’s decision is very high.

Since IRGC is Iran’s official army branch, this move could trigger an existential conflict between the U.S. and Iran. More, this means that thousands of Iranian people who are completing their mandatory military duty under the IRGC will be conceptualized as terrorists. Apart from the conscription problem, IRGC has other branches that operate on various domains of the country – namely media, banking, finance, construction, transportation, social aid networks, and education.

All these people connected with these branches could be labeled as terrorists. For these reasons, there is no doubt that FTO designation will help IRGC consolidate public support. This move will undermine all attempts taken by U.S. governments to push the Iranian people to turn their backs on their government.

Trump’s decision to list the IRGC as a foreign terrorist organization will help the IRGC consolidate public support.

When it comes to internal power balances in Iran, one thing is certain that reformist forces will lose power and hardliners will gain the upper hand after the decision in concern. On April 9, various Iranian lawmakers went to the parliament wearing IRGC uniforms to show their rage against the U.S. Tehran’s reformist MP, Mahmoud Sadeghi, was one of them. Similarly, Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, spokesman of the reformist Khatami government (2001-2005), said that despite all the differences of opinion inside, they are united against “the enemy” by supporting the Iranian armed forces. It is reasonably foreseeable that Iranians from all walks of life will be united behind the IRGC.

Returning to the question posed at the beginning of this piece, it is possible to conclude that relations between the U.S. and Iran are now far from the prospect of détente. Trump’s decision has also reiterated that the U.S. has no clear strategic vision to contain Iran. The rationale behind the decision will produce unwanted consequences that will contrast with the intended outcome.

Iranians are famous for their unconditional support for their government in extraordinary situations. This is why the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK) organization has no material base in Iran. Since they sided with Saddam Hussein against their own country during the Iran-Iraq War, Iranians hate them no matter which political stance they take before the Islamic Republic.

Showing the same strategic deficiency, this never prevents the U.S. government from supporting the MEK on various platforms. Likewise, regardless of their political backgrounds, a substantial amount of Iranians will back the IRGC. Hence, the IRGC will become more powerful, instead of declining in strength. Hardliners in Iran will enlarge their influence on different institutions and domains so that change from within will be improbable.

Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy has been in transformation particularly since the start of the Arab uprisings that began in Tunisia in late 2010. While Saudi Arabia previously followed close cooperation with the United States in regional and global politics, its foreign policy had a different turn in the post-Arab revolutions era. This was mainly because of two reasons: First, the Obama administration in the U.S. made unexpected moves that irritated the Saudi leadership. While Obama was not as keen as Saudi Arabia in preventing the success of Arab revolutions, his moves to restore U.S. relations with Iran received cold reaction from the regime in Riyadh.

Another decision that caused mistrust between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. was the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act. The JASTA allowed for U.S. citizens to sue foreign governments that were believed to be involved in terrorist activities in the U.S. The bill was originally intended to allow families affected by the 9/11 terrorist attack to sue Saudi Arabia, which allegedly played a role in the attacks on the World Trade Centre buildings in New York. As the uncertainty towards Saudi Arabia grew in the U.S. leadership, Riyadh’s trust in Washington also loosened. The problem also continued in the post-Obama era, despite the efforts by U.S. President Donald Trump to re-gain the trust of Saudi Arabia.

As China is becoming a vital player in the Middle East and Africa, Saudi Arabia considers Beijing as an actor, which can bring foreign policy benefits for Riyadh.

In the face of these developments, the Saudi leadership had sought for alternatives in order to establish long-term alliances that could bring political and economic benefits in regional and global politics. An important actor in this regard is China. Beijing is important for Riyadh for a number of reasons: First of all, China is one of the biggest oil importers for Saudi Arabia. As Chinese economic growth continues, Beijing will sustain its level of oil imports from Saudi Arabia. For Riyadh, China is a crucial market, which brings huge revenue from oil.

Another reason for China’s rise as an important partner for Saudi Arabia is related with global geopolitics. As China is increasingly becoming a player in the Middle East and Africa, Saudi Arabia considers Beijing as an actor, which can bring foreign policy benefits for Riyadh. For this reason, Saudi Arabia has increasingly sought to deepen its relationship with Beijing.

Finally, the new foreign policy strategy of Saudi Arabia is also a reason for deepening relations between Riyadh and Beijing. Since 2015, King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz of Saudi Arabia has initiated a new approach in Saudi foreign policy, which includes increasing interactions with wider geographies in the world, including Asia. Under this active and multi-dimensional foreign policy strategy, Saudi Arabia has increased its interaction with global actors such as Russia and China.

Despite Trump’s efforts to reassure the Saudi leadership of U.S. support, Riyadh has been more careful due to the uncertainty and continuing mistrust between the two countries.

The Saudi interest in advancing relations with China can be observed from the high level visits made from Riyadh to Beijing. The frequency of these visits increased after 2015, following the leadership change in Saudi Arabia. In 2016, former Defence Minister, Mohammad bin Salman, visited China in order to bolster economic cooperation between the two countries.

In 2017, Saudi premier King Salman made a month-long trip to Asia, which included China. It is reported that the Saudi King signed deals worth as much as $65 billion with the Chinese leader. More recently, the Saudi Crown prince visited China in February 2019. Apart from signing a number of economic agreements, MbS showed strong support with the Chinese administration in Beijing’s controversial policies in the Xinjiang region towards Uighur Muslims.

Saudi Arabia no longer considers the United States as its sole partner in global and regional politics. Despite Trump’s efforts to reassure the Saudi leadership of U.S. support, Riyadh has been more careful due to the uncertainty and continuing mistrust between the two countries. Moreover, economic objectives, geopolitical concerns, and the unstable regional political environment has forced Saudi Arabia to seek for new alternatives in global politics. As a result, Saudi Arabia sought to develop stronger ties with China. It can be argued that turning this cooperation into a strategic partnership is the next step in line for relations between Riyadh and Beijing.

Since the beginning of Trump’s presidency, the U.S. has put enormous effort to contain Iran in both political and economic terms. During his election campaign, Trump pledged to tear the nuclear deal (JCPOA) and his anti-Iran tone was pretty harsh. After his election, he started to realize his election promises one-by-one. His attitude towards international acts and agreements was uncompromising. The U.S. withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and UNESCO in 2017. JCPOA, which was formalized in 2015 by P5+1 countries and which began to be implemented in early 2016, was a target too. JCPOA was also binding in terms of international law since it was ratified as a UN Security Council resolution.

Trump’s general policy choice reflects a radical rupture from the priorities of the Obama era, and this is not an exception in the case of the Middle East. The president’s Middle East policy centers around various crucial themes. The most significant of them is containing Iran. For Trump, Iran has expanded its regional influenced during the Obama era thanks to the “worst deal ever made,” also known as the nuclear deal. According to Trump, by giving Iran lifeline support, JCPOA has paved the way for Iran’s “terrorist activities” along the region. Therefore, this should be stopped.

With the Trump administration, the U.S. government has launched a regime change discourse against Iran. The president has employed numerous anti-Iran figures in his team such as Mike Pompeo, John Bolton, Rudy Giuliani, and others.

The U.S. President’s policy is a pillar for other policies related to the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and other anti-Iran Gulf countries desperately seek Trump’s support in their endeavor to confront Iran. In this direction, the U.S. makes billion dollar arms deals with Saudi Arabia and supports every action against Iran in the region. Saudi Arabia’s Qatar move, which was directly against Iran and Turkey, also received U.S. support. The coordinated efforts of Israel and the U.S. function to undermine Iran’s political and economic power. Accordingly, I argue that Trump’s Iran policy has two dimensions – both politic and economic.

The nuclear deal and economic war against Iran

On May 8, Donald Trump announced that the United States has pulled out of the nuclear deal. He also announced that sanctions will be re-imposed by the U.S. soon. The first round of U.S. sanctions came into effect on July 7. These sanctions were primarily targeting Iran’s trade with precious metals, its import of auto parts, and commercial passenger aircrafts. But the most striking sanctions were imposed on November 5. The aim of these sanctions was to cut all oil exports from Iran and devastate the country’s economy. In addition to that, 700 individuals and companies were put on the sanctions list. In order to avoid serious backlash, the U.S. granted waivers to 8 countries, including Turkey. However, these countries will also be expected to cut their oil trade with Iran in a short period of time.

Trump was not alone in his campaign against Iran. Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, also fully supported his decision of exiting the JCPOA. More, prior to Trump’s decision, he tried to persuade the international community that “Iran has lied” about its nuclear activities and that it “cheated.” Netanyahu, in his televised public performance a week before Trump’s announcement of U.S. withdrawal from the deal, claimed that Iran had lied when it said that it never chased after a nuclear weapon. He added that, “Even after the deal was made, Iran continued to preserve and expand its nuclear know-how for use at a later date.” His claim was based on an alleged secret operation conducted by MOSSAD to acquire “atomic archive documents” in a secret warehouse in Tehran. Netanyahu’s efforts were not limited to this performance. Again in September, when he stepped to address the UN General Assembly, he claimed that Israel had discovered another secret nuclear facility in Tehran and that he had proof of it. According to Netanyahu, Iran had equipment for developing a nuclear bomb in this facility.

Regime change discourse, Arab NATO, and the Warsaw Summit

With the Trump administration, the U.S. government has launched a regime change discourse against Iran. The president has employed numerous anti-Iran figures in his team, such as Mike Pompeo, John Bolton, Rudy Giuliani, and others. The State Department’s and Secretary Pompeo’s Twitter accounts work vigorously to disseminate regime change discourse among Iranians, be it diaspora or those living in the homeland. In addition to that, in 2011, the U.S. had launched its first Farsi language Twitter account in order to address Farsi-speaking Iranians directly. Pompeo and his team began to use this account to promulgate their position against Iran. All these efforts are signs of a public relation campaign to create a dominant discourse, which would produce an intended change in the Iranian government’s behavior.

Iranian women took off their hijabs and hang them on a stick during their protests in Tehran. Some Iranian diaspora, however, questioned the authenticity of these protests and the integrity of Masih Alinejad for having ties with U.S. neo-cons.

In this endeavor, the U.S. government takes any opportunity it can. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met with Masih Alinejad, a famous Iranian-American social media activist. Alinejad runs the #whitewednesday campaign, which encourages women to take off their hijabs in Iran on Wednesdays and record it with a camera. Women share these videos on social media and Alinejad also promotes them on her own Twitter account. These videos go viral and show how Iranian women resist imposed dress codes. During the protests in January 2018, the Iranian women that took off their hijabs and hang them on a stick began to be called the “daughters of Revolution Street,” since their protests occurred on the revolution street of Tehran. However, some of the Iranian diaspora have questioned the authenticity of these protests and the integrity of Masih Alinejad for having ties with U.S. neo-cons. Pompeo’s meeting with Alinejad empowered the arguments of their critics. This move apparently shows how Alinejad’s campaign functions in a certain way in the regime change rhetoric of the U.S. administration.

Another policy that the Trump administration has adopted is trying to pull other countries on their sides against Iran. In that vein, the U.S. and Israel organized an anti-Iran summit in Warsaw on February 14. 60 countries were represented at the Summit. However, EU states sent their low-level diplomats and it disrupted the summit’s intended anti-Iran character. Robert Giuliani, former New York Mayor and one of Trump’s lawyers, said that he was representing Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) at the summit. MEK is designated as a terrorist organization by Iran. It was once listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. in 1997, but was then de-listed in 2012. In the recent years, Trump’s team has been coordinating with MEK members and their presence was so visible in so many occasions, including during the Warsaw Summit.

Robert Giuliani, former New York Mayor and one of Trump’s lawyers, said that he was representing Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) at the anti-Iran summit in February in Warsaw. MEK is designated as a terrorist organization by Iran.

One of the functions of the Warsaw Summit was to create a base for a new regional security alliance against Iran. This has been articulated as the “Arab NATO” by some U.S. officials. Officially known as the Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA), this planned organization would contain Iran militarily through six Gulf countries plus Egypt and Jordan. Netanyahu especially took the chance to bolster his anti-Iran position and convince other Arab countries “to advance the common interest of the war with Iran.” According to Mike Pence, along with Netanyahu, they “broke bread with leaders from Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.” Given the diplomatic gap between Israel and other Arab countries (it only has formal diplomatic ties with Egypt and Jordan), Netanyahu’s efforts were reflecting a significant re-orientation towards Arab countries in order to confront Iran.

Turkey’s stance

Turkey’s approach to the U.S. policy on Iran has not been changed from the very beginning. President Erdogan repetitively emphasized that Turkey needs Iranian oil and gas and that there are no alternatives for Turkey. Erdogan also condemned the re-imposed sanctions on the ground that they are against international law. The president’s remarks have been reiterated by a number of senior figures in the government. Despite the fact that the U.S. and Israel will increase their pressure on Iran, Turkey is likely to preserve its position.

The presidential crisis in Venezuela is among the top topics occupying the world agenda. The crisis has reached its apex with the U.S. assigning Venezuelan National Assembly President Juan Guaidó as the acting president of the country on January 23, 2019; and tension still prevails in the country with no prospect of getting temperate.

In fact, the debates leading up to the crisis were ignited with the re-election of Nicolás Maduro as the President of Venezuela. Socialist President Maduro was elected for his second 6-year term in presidential office on the election held on May 20, 2018. Although his victory did not reverberate much in the international arena at first, a number of individuals and institutions voiced their objection to the situation. Aside from the Lima Group, which comprises the representatives of 17 Latin American countries who first met in 2017 to resolve the Venezuelan crisis ongoing since 2012, the U.S. and the EU also questioned the legitimacy of the elections and proclaimed that they will not recognize the election results. So, it can be said that the debates that grew and evolved into the current crisis were first ignited at that time.

Considering the course of events, the presidential elections in Venezuela, which is an internal affair of the country in its essence, became a major topic on the global agenda in a short period due to the involvement of global forces and turned into an instrument of power struggle. The debates questioned the legitimacy of the Venezuelan administration under Maduro’s rule and caused polarization regarding which state supports the ruling power and which state does not. Many different aspects of the issue have been approached in visual and printed media. What about Turkey? This piece will focus on Turkey’s approach to the crisis, the possibility of a military coup in Venezuela (probably backed by the U.S.) amid the rapidly changing turn of events, and the country’s future.

A post-modern coup method at work

As the presidency of Donald Trump began in the U.S. in 2017, the U.S. underwent substantial changes in terms of its methods and approaches. This situation has manifested itself in many points within the past two years. The U.S. administration is not very eager to perform its “responsibilities” in other lands stemming from being a global power. This situation can be seen in many instances, including the Paris Agreement on climate change, trade wars, and customs agreements such as NAFTA. Apparently, as much as the country still looks to make the most of the opportunities it enjoys for being the global hegemon, it also adopts a policy that is unwilling to shoulder responsibilities and burden related to the rest of the world.

Of course, this is not solely related to the president’s personal choices; and the clearest thing that can be said  is that the ways of doing things have changed around the world. Things do no longer work out with old, traditional procedures and practices. The countries comprehending this fact adopt new positions and policies that are in line with the new context, which lead to less ambiguity. In the case of the U.S., this new situation was reflected on the implementation of different policies while interfering with the internal affairs of other countries, as seen in the Venezuelan crisis.

The ways of doing things have changed around the world. Things do no longer work out with old, traditional procedures and practices.

Viewing the recent history of Latin America, it is seen that the U.S. played a direct or indirect role in most of the military coups staged in the region so far. Up until the early 2000s, U.S. interests in the continent coincided with military dictatorships in Latin America and therefore the former sustained close relations with junta regimes. So, the U.S. has confronted serious problems and accusations at both national and international levels. The developments in the recent period also hint that the Washington administration is likely to follow a different strategy in the new period. Instead of military sanctions and interventions, it now prefers to impose economic and political sanctions on other countries.

Military interventions have a heavy cost for the American economy. In fact, it does not seem coincidental that the Venezuelan crisis has been discussed in terms of its legitimacy ever since its beginning. This period indicates the legitimacy of all kinds of forces other than military force and hard power. The most common practice of Washington in this new political context is employing the tactic of imposing economic sanctions and interfering with the internal affairs of countries through these sanctions. Undoubtedly, this is not a new tactic as it was used in Africa before and is still being employed in countries like Iran, North Korea, and Russia. This also has a considerable effect on negotiations. In other words, the U.S. is able to strain countries that it targets without attempting large-scale military interventions unlike the past.

Rather than pursuing high-cost military interventions, the U.S. is now able to strain countries that it targets by imposing economic and political sanctions. 

Apparently, the issue of “being recognized as a president” that haunts elected leaders will be a more common phenomenon from now on. It would be useful to look at the Venezuelan crisis through this lens. Accordingly, while it is true that some issues have been experienced in democratic processes and some human rights violations have been observed in the country, although they do not reach a level to undermine the legitimacy of the administration, it is not an ethical policy to intervene in another country’s internal affairs – let it be the U.S. or another country. As much as the role of the ruling power in the persistence of the crisis, the opposition also has a role, since it always relies on foreign powers and therefore sets the ground for military intervention. Consequently, the latest U.S. intervention in Venezuela is overt support to a coup in a post-modern way.

The sole concern of the U.S. in this context is not Venezuela; the superpower rather seeks to send a message to the world. In my opinion, the process run against the Maduro administration is the product of an unsuccessful policy. Every step taken by the U.S. on the matter of Venezuela is actually sustaining the Maduro administration. Without the U.S. intervention, the Venezuelan administration would change with a radical move due to the low oil prices, hyperinflation and serious welfare loss. The Venezuelan people had already lost much of their strength to endure, so the Maduro administration would fall without any intervention.

The latest U.S. intervention in Venezuela is overt support for a coup in a post-modern way. 

Turkey’s stance and effect on the trajectory of the crisis  

Although relations between Turkey and Venezuela do not have a particularly long-standing history, the close relation and increased contact between the two countries leaders have improved economic and political ties in the recent period. Therefore, Turkey has clearly recognized Maduro as the legitimate leader of Venezuela and supported him, which has been considered a proper action and a principled decision. This approach is also in line with international law.

Turkey’s approach to the Venezuelan crisis is not solely on the governmental level. The Turkish public have also shown close interest to the subject. The most important factor underlying this interest is the July 15 coup attempt and its aftermath in Turkey. Undoubtedly, the Turkish people have encountered difficult times during the past 3 years and this process has not completely ended yet. Although the level of this relation is in the right direction in terms of principles, it would be more appropriate for Turkey to behave more carefully in its support to Maduro. This is due to the fact that, while the chances are low, Turkey needs to consider a Venezuela without Maduro. It is inevitable for Turkish foreign policy makers to come up with alternative scenarios and draw a roadmap that pays attention to Turkey’s interests. Regardless of the premise of international law, the Trump administration has already started threatening countries and institutions that engage in trade activities with the Maduro administration. This is most likely to continue.

Turkey should act as a mediator

The relations established between Turkey and Venezuela in a short span of time should be predicated on equal terms that does not violate the sovereignty of any party. Consequently, Turkey has a serious potential of acting as a mediator in the solution of the issue, thus the country should take on a proactive role in consideration of the trust it enjoys and without needing to wait for the results of the developments. Turkey can contribute to the stability of Venezuela by abstaining from getting involved in the crisis and focusing on the solution.

Ankara can also advise the Maduro administration to act in a more moderate manner in the face of the incidents and foreign provocations, which will help the legitimate government act within the framework of international law.

Of course, these endeavors should not only be limited to the political sphere. As negotiations continue, the urgent needs of the Venezuelan people – such as food, healthcare, hygiene – should also be provided. As is known, the Maduro administration does not accept foreign aid coming from countries that stand against him, as these countries use aid for show casing. Thanks to the positive impression that Turkey has in Venezuela, it is able to deliver humanitarian aid through its various institutions such as the Turkish Red Crescent, Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) and the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) as well as a variety of Turkey-based non-governmental organizations. This may also positively affect the mediating talks and avert an illegitimate political or economic intervention on an international scale.

More, Ankara can also advise the Maduro administration to act in a more moderate manner in the face of the incidents and foreign provocations, which will help the legitimate government act within the framework of international law.

What next? Military intervention or civil war?

The first two questions that come to mind in the context of the Venezuelan crisis are whether a military intervention led by the U.S. is tabled, or whether the crisis will evolve into a civil war.

Although the Trump administration (especially Vice President Mike Pence and National Security Advisor John Bolton) insist that a military intervention is being tabled for Venezuela, this is a low possibility due the new global political strategy adopted by the U.S. On the other hand, it will be against the nature of politics to contend that a military intervention is definitely off the table. Supported by the Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó, this discourse aims to intimidate the Maduro administration.

Aside from heavy costs and its contradiction with international law, the U.S. is avoiding military intervention for three other important reasons. First, is the problem of location. Although the U.S. can exercise military interventions in different corners of the world, it will not prefer to do so when its “backyard” is in question. The U.S. will not want to see the presence of an unstable region in its proximity and cannot afford a possible migration wave caused by it. So, unless the Maduro administration surrenders easily, the U.S. administration will be negatively affected.

Secondly, the U.S. has drawn the support of a substantial number of countries in the continent against the Maduro administration, although only on the political realm. However, as indicated by many analysts, a military intervention will not enjoy the same amount of support. Countries like Brazil and Argentina will probably give no support to such a move. Therefore, the U.S. will not attempt such an act without the approval of Latin American countries, but will increase economic and political oppression in the following period.

Last but not least, such an intervention is not favored by countries like Russia, China and Turkey. This is a significant aspect of the issue in terms of its conformity to international law, since Russia and China are members of the UN Security Council and stand against a possible intervention.

The second question is whether a civil war might break out in Venezuela. It must be noted that the possibility of a civil war is higher than that of a military intervention. If the process is not effectively managed and the external support to the opposition continue, which seems very likely, a civil war might break out. Also, if the options suggested by the U.S. fail, the country will not refrain from igniting a civil war since the situation has turned into a matter of prestige for the Trump administration. The statements issued by the U.S. authorities agree that there is no return. The Venezuelan opposition, which is completely dependent on foreign support, also seems determined in igniting a civil war.

The G20 was defined as the principal platform of global economic governance in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008 as a reflection of the need to conduct a collective crisis-response strategy at the time. While the global crisis exploded in the U.S. sub-prime mortgage market and then spread to Europe and the emerging economies, a coordinated response strategy was devised that will encourage all stakeholders to share the burden of reestablishing stability and providing liquidity to the international markets. The G20 was among the few grand projects that President Obama took over from George W. Bush and continued unabated during his two terms as the U.S. President, since the collective action spirit of the group was in perfect conformity with the coordinate crisis response strategy, as well as the positive image that the U.S. wanted to disseminate globally.

In the early post-crisis years, the G20 was presented as the highest international platform to formulate common strategies aimed at ensuring stability in global trade and financial markets. It was also construed as an inclusive forum on which key political leaders from both the global and emerging powers might come together with representatives from the main regional organizations in order to produce multilateral solutions to pressing global problems. To its credit, the G20 contributed to crucial improvements in the governance of global finance by supporting macro-prudential policies, enlarging the IMF’s lending capacity and increasing transparency procedures of banks and financial institutions in international markets.

However, for the BRICS countries led by China and India, the G20 process carried a much deeper symbolic value in terms of the reconfiguration of the global system. The G20 Summits represented a perfect opportunity for these countries to express their grievances and objections concerning the uneven architecture of global governance, while demanding more say in the running of international political and economic institutions. Likewise, representatives of the developing world were able to raise their voices at the G20 concerning unfair practices in global trade and finance regimes, while pushing for structural reforms at the IMF, World Bank and the WTO for more inclusive and fair development.

However, as the intensity of the global financial crisis faded away and especially as the U.S. economy began to display a robust performance, the expectations of Washington and its main allies from the G20 process were significantly curtailed. The U.S. administration itself did not take the macro-prudential regulations produced by the G20 very seriously; while the institutional reform initiatives for voting and representation at the IMF were never materialized. The U.S. maintained its veto power at the IMF and despite all criticisms the uneven distribution of voting rights among the global and emerging powers were preserved in almost its original form. Moreover, comprehensive transformations took place in the global architecture of world politics and domestic political stages of key global players, which significantly weakened the common agenda of participatory governance at the G20.

As the intensity of the global financial crisis faded and as the U.S. economy began to display a robust performance, the expectations of Washington and its main allies from the G20 process were significantly curtailed. 

The unilateralism of the Trump administration, which was expressed through withdrawal from multilateral international regimes and regional organizations, neo-protectionist economic policies and trade wars, triggered widespread perceptions that the major sponsor of the G20 has cut its support to multilateralism. Moreover, rising geo-political tensions between the U.S. and Russia in critical conflict zones increasingly led to the adoption of hard-power assets, leading some observers to conclude that the prospects of physical military confrontation are higher than the Cold War. Finally, the rising tide of neo-protectionism and trade wars between the U.S. and China heightened concerns regarding the future growth potential of the world economy and the prospective trajectories of global trade and finance. To sum up, American unilateralism, rising tensions between Washington and Moscow in geo-political matters, and trade wars between Washington and Beijing contributed to pessimistic expectations on the eve of the Buenos Aires Summit.

The official theme of this year’s Summit was determined as ‘Fair and Sustainable Development’ with sub-themes on energy efficiency, environment protection, development financing, digital economy, excess steel-production capacity, and modern agriculture. However, key problems in the world economy remain in need of global attention which include the shortage of development capital required to maintain major infrastructure investments. As the development of finance resources of the World Bank are not enough to spur global growth, the entrance of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank to the scene must be welcomed developments. But the U.S. and the Western world are generally suspicious of China’s intensions for global dominance, which causes a cautious reception to the financing opportunities that originate from Beijing. Structural reforms in macro-economic policy making and governance are also needed to rejuvenate global growth dynamics. Objectivity of international credit ratings agencies and prudent regulation of financial markets also constitute other areas of major concern.

Rising geo-political tensions between the U.S. and Russia in critical conflict zones has increasingly led to the adoption of hard-power assets, leading some observers to conclude that the prospects of physical military confrontation are higher than the Cold War. 

Another area of friction that attracts attention concerns ongoing trade wars between the U.S. and China that carry the potential of undermining global growth prospects via deeper and wider confrontation. Neo-protectionism and trade wars which gained momentum via tough political rhetoric, accusations of industrial-technological espionage and sharp tariff increases between Washington and Beijing across a range of sectors raised concerns among the major players of the world economy. On the eve of the G20 Buenos Aires Summit, it looked like Trump was adamant to force China into a corner by using the trade wars card so that he could elicit the best possible deal from them. But if Chinese President Xi Jinping does not offer big enough trade concessions in bilateral negotiations in the future, it is pretty likely that nothing concrete will come out from the G20 proceedings and the agenda of trade wars will be carried towards an indefinite future. As the U.S. economy continues to break historical records in growth, employment and productivity figures and China begins to struggle to maintain the momentum of its export-led growth strategy, a prolonged agenda of trade wars might trigger wider destabilizing effects that might hurt all emerging economies.

The G20 Buenos Aires Summit was shadowed by the new trade deal signed between the U.S., Mexico and Canada (or the so-called US-Mexico-Canada Agreement-USMCA), which was carved out to replace NAFTA via intensive U.S. diplomacy. The message that President Trump tried to give to the global audience through the USMCA was that the U.S. will redefine the conditions of its bilateral and multilateral dealings on the basis of a renewed notion national interest, rather than concerns for regional or global stability.

If Chinese President Xi Jinping does not offer big enough trade concessions in bilateral negotiations in the future, it is pretty likely that nothing concrete will come out of the G20 proceedings and the agenda of trade wars will be carried towards an indefinite future. 

Over the course of last two years, the global image of the U.S. has already been significantly tarnished thanks to the controversial steps towards the NAFTA partners; decision to construct a wall on the Mexican border against migrants; threats towards NATO partners and the EU; withdrawal from various UN platforms, as well as the Paris Climate Accord. The tendency of the U.S. to act in disregard for international law, established norms and previous commitments might trigger collective responses from the EU, China, Russia and emerging powers against unilateral sanctions and trade wars.

While observers will wait for signals of a rapprochement between the U.S. and Russia on the Ukraine crisis, and a trade deal between the ‘G-2’ of the U.S. and China to end the vicious circle of trade wars, swift progress on both counts in the near future remain unrealistic. The new world of multi-polarity will be characterized by issue-based confrontations that are bound to continue.         

The relationship between the U.S. and Southeast Asian Association of Nations (ASEAN) is crucially interconnected within mutual interests. However, the Trump administration has failed to meet the expected sustainable and consultable ASEAN policies.

The U.S. government’s majorly contributive move towards supporting ASEAN perspectives is based on two distinct policies, which involve security and economic policies as observed in territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the formation of the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) during the Obama era. Hence, the Trump administration has contradicted the U.S.’s existing role for being inconsistent by encouraging irrelevant narratives due to certain fundamental principles.

On the other hand, how ASEAN member states perceive the above-mentioned approach gives some insights about the current relationship. For instance, known as a robust character and strong statesman, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, the prime minister of Malaysia, stated that “there is a need for the U.S. President Donald Trump to be consistent, including over policy matters on Asia.”

Among the member states, countries such as Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia have comparatively felt disaffected more than other by countries by the changing characteristics and uncertainties of U.S. policy. This is quite understandable when considering the divisions between member states and their relationships with the U.S. and China.

Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, the prime minister of Malaysia, stated that “there is a need for the U.S. President Donald Trump to be consistent, including over policy matters on Asia.”

During the Obama era, the U.S. was leading its relationship with ASEAN in a determined policy known as a ‘pivot to Asia.’ This policy aimed at re-structuring security and economic policies by supporting each other, while preferring mainly the advancement of economic relationships. Obama himself engaged significantly with member states with his official state visits, and he also attended ASEAN summits as well.

In contrast to Obama, Trump’s ASEAN policy is surrounded on narratives of his ‘America first’ agenda and protectionism as a mainstream policy. In fact, no surprise should come out of this contradiction considering his administration had delivered initial signals on how he would construct, in essential, trade-based relations with ASEAN before his presidential victory in 2016.

There is no doubt that, at least in certain terms, Trump’s policy of U.S.-economy victimization is labeled as a deconstruction process flapped out of a well-established relationship during the Obama era. Indeed, Trump called for punishment to be applied to certain countries including some member states of ASEAN, which are responsible for contributing to the trade deficit that put the U.S. at a disadvantage.

In this regard, Trump’s absence on the 33rd ASEAN Summit held in Singapore on 11-15 November meant an isolation from exchanging ASEAN interest where leaders of major regional and global powers such as Japan, South Korea, Russia, Australia, New Zealand, India, and China took part.

In contrast to Obama, Trump’s ASEAN policy is surrounded on narratives of his ‘America first’ agenda and protectionism as a mainstream policy.

Although U.S. Vice-President Mike Pence represented the U.S. government, his discourse and statements during the meetings with various leaders were far from rebuilding a constructive relationship with ASEAN.

Pence re-iterated the importance of U.S. security policy of the Asia-Pacific region, while stressing that “empire and aggression have no place in the Indo-Pacific.” With this obviously Pence was referring to China and North Korea and security issues related to the South China Sea and North Korea nuclear issue, which are still considered as potential threats to the interest of the U.S. and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region.

As is known, the U.S. has a special approbation to the free access of the sea ways, which connects regional allies bound to energy sources in the Middle East and global commercial activities connecting the Indian Ocean and the Pacific region.

As seen in the above-mentioned statement of Pence, the U.S. has deprived from a multiple approach in its engagement with ASEAN. And no doubt that Pence clearly did not cater the expectations of ASEAN in the context of improvement of the economic relationship, which in fact was considered extremely essential during the current global economic recession.

Due to these uncertainties, ASEAN leaders do not have any predictable hope of boosting the relationship with the U.S., in particular, pertaining to engagement and improvement in trade and investment opportunities the region offers.

Though the U.S. administration merely focuses on security issues, it is too difficult to gain the upper hand in competition with China without cementing economic relationships and gaining engagement with and popular support of ASEAN people.

ASEAN has already acquired the position of being a strong global economic power house in terms of sustainable economic development, direct foreign investment, and increasing trade by applying liberal economic policies.

In addition, ASEAN has been re-structuring economic connectivity among the member states and strategic partners on the basis of bilateral treaties for further advancement since the establishment of ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) commencing from the end of 2015.

It is quite clear that the U.S. under Trump’s presidency does not have any significant tendency for a combination of multiple policies with ASEAN, even after the mid-term elections, which resulted in the Democratic upper-hand in Congress. The upcoming few years of Trump’s administration will be tested as to whether it will re-evaluate its relationship with ASEAN or not.

On November 5, the United States announced a new wave of economic sanctions targeting Iran’s economy, including key sectors such as oil trade, banking, shipping, and air traffic. While sanctions focus on damaging Iran’s economy, they will also have an impact on countries having business with Tehran. The United Arab Emirates is among these countries that will be most affected by the economic sanctions imposed on Iran.The UAE, which has recently been in close cooperation with the U.S., will not be able to protect its current level of trade with Iran. The U.S. decision not to include the UAE among the countries the Trump administration issued a waiver to is an indication of the fact that trade relations between Abu Dhabi and Tehran will deteriorate, despite the long historical ties between the two countries.

Despite political differences and different approaches on regional issues, trade relations between the UAE and Iran have always been strong, mainly because of political dynamics such as geography, expatriates, and cultural similarities. While trade between the two countries decreased during the international sanctions imposed on Iran in 2010, it rapidly increased following the JCPOA agreement in 2015. In recent years, the UAE has become Iran’s most important commercial partner after China. In 2017, 29% of Iran’s imports came from the UAE. As Iran’s most important non-oil importer, the UAE exports products such as electronics, food, textile, construction materials, automotive and industrial tools. In 2013, 96% of exports from the Gulf Cooperation Council countries to Iran were carried out by the UAE, while the figure for imports stood around 62%.

The U.S. decision not to include the UAE among the countries the Trump administration issued a waiver to is an indication of the fact that trade relations between Abu Dhabi and Tehran will deteriorate.

However, with Washington’s sanctions on Tehran, we will witness a significant negative impact on trade between Iran and the UAE. This is particularly observed in the following period of U.S. sanctions on Iran that began in August 2018. In 2017, the UAE’s non-oil exports to Iran were $17 billion, compared to $6 billion in the first 8 months of 2018. As a result of this decrease, Iranian businessmen have started to turn to alternative markets such as Europe, Qatar, and Turkey.

As one of the most prosperous emirates in the UAE, Dubai has been the biggest trade partner of Iran. Around 3,000 ships and boats carry goods between Dubai and Iranian ports via the Persian Gulf. The 150-km long distance is the most important driving factor that allows for Iran to export from Dubai, which is a regional hub for global trade. The Jabal Ali Port is the main point of departure for the goods that are exported to Iran. In addition to that, the majority of Iranian citizens living in the UAE reside and work in Dubai. It is estimated that there are around 10,000 Iranian companies operating in the field of bilateral trade between Iran and Dubai.

In 2017, the UAE’s non-oil exports to Iran were $17 billion, compared to $6 billion in the first 8 months of 2018.

Dubai also plays an important role in the oil trade between Iran and the UAE. However, it is expected for Dubai’s imports of 140 thousand barrels of oil per day to be reduced gradually reduced to the U.S. sanctions on Tehran. Emirati officials announced that oil trade between the two countries will reduce to a mere zero by the end of November. Thus, as one of the biggest importers of Iranian condensate in the UAE, Dubai will be the most affected emirate due to U.S. sanctions. In order to find other alternative markets for condensate imports, the UAE has been in contact with the U.S., Australia, and Equatorial Guinea, other important exporters of that product.

It should also be noted that there is some level of disagreement between the Abu Dhabi emirate, which is the most influential in foreign policy in the UAE, and Dubai, particularly with regards to the UAE’s policies towards Iran. In this context it can be stated that Dubai, which has a high volume of trade with Iran, is not comfortable of the aggressive policies pursued by Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Muhammad bin Zayed Al-Nahyan against Tehran. In 2014, the Emir of Dubai and the UAE’s Vice President Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum called for the international community to end sanctions imposed on Iran. Emir Al-Maktoum argued that these sanctions will not only damage Iran’s economy, but will also hurt global trade.

Dubai, which has a high volume of trade with Iran, is not comfortable of the aggressive policies pursued by Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Muhammad bin Zayed Al-Nahyan against Tehran.

Despite Dubai’s stance, the overall Emirati policy against Iran has been deteriorating as the country has joined the Saudi Arabia-U.S.-Israel alliance, which aims to prevent Iranian expansion in the region. As a result, unlike the eight countries that the U.S. granted waivers to, the UAE preferred not to be included within this group. The Emirati leadership particularly emphasized that it will join the U.S. in implementing the sanctions on Iran.

Sanctions imposed on Iran by the U.S. will seriously affect the UAE – the most important trade partner of the country in the Gulf region. In particular, the UAE emirates of Dubai and Sharjah are concerned by the loss of an important export market. Therefore, while U.S. sanctions will have negative consequences for Tehran, they will also impact neighbouring countries that have strong trade relations with the country, especially those in the Gulf region.

The U.S.-Turkey relationship is going through interesting times, as both allies are willing to work through their differences despite serious disagreements over a host of issues. Turkey has been pressing the U.S. as well as the international community to take a firmer stand against those responsible for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.

When asked about the extradition of Gulen to Turkey, Trump denied getting involved in the legal process but stated that the U.S. is looking for “whatever we can do for Turkey.”

The Turkish position puts President Trump in an awkward position, as he appears inclined to accept that the Crown Prince Mohammad bin Selman was not responsible. Trump also pledged that the relationship with Saudi Arabia would not be affected by the Khashoggi affair. Despite this disagreement, President Trump made some positive statements about President Erdogan and Turkey, citing the release of Pastor Andrew Brunson last month. Most recently, when asked about the extradition of Gulen to Turkey, Trump denied getting involved in the legal process but stated that the U.S. is looking for “whatever we can do for Turkey.”

There is also the U.S. support for the YPG that continues to be a sticking point. However, both the American and Turkish leaderships express willingness to work through these differences largely because the two NATO allies have a lot more to gain by working together than at cross purposes. 

For some analysts, the Khashoggi case has been a useful tool for Turkey to play politics in a geostrategic power struggle.

For some analysts, the Khashoggi case has been a useful tool for Turkey to play politics in a geostrategic power struggle. It is important to note that the Saudi failure to provide an explanation for what happened to Khashoggi lasted weeks. Every explanation the Saudis provided was quickly falsified by facts and Turkey insisted on accountability as well as national sovereignty. For all intents and purposes, the Saudi behavior forced Turkey to leak facts and made it all too easy to pursue a “drip drip strategy,” if there was ever such a conscious strategy in the first place.

The U.S. media’s pressure on the Trump administration to take a clear stance was indirectly owed to Turkey’s unwillingness to let this murder be covered up. Turkey made a careful distinction between King Salman and the rest of the Saudi leadership, creating at least some wiggle room without abandoning full accountability for Khashoggi’s murder. President Trump may have preferred that the issue goes away somehow but his administration continued to engage Turkey on the matter. This dynamic of persistent engagement despite deep differences is interesting and might provide a blueprint at least for the next two years.

Both on the issue of Gulen’s extradition and the U.S. support for the YPG, there seems to be a similar dynamic at play. Turkey has requested Gulen’s extradition and pushed hard for it politically but understands the political constraints on the Trump administration. This does not mean Turkey will contend itself with the status quo and give up on the extradition request. Turkey will continue to bring up the issue and pressure the U.S. side to act against the Gulen network all the while engaging instead of confronting the administration. With regard to the YPG issue, Turkey again insists that the U.S. should stop supporting the organization because of its links to the PKK. Yet, it continues to engage the new U.S. team on the Syria policy without accepting any kind of normalization of the YPG.

Time will tell if this is all we can hope for but continuous engagement through crises may be the solution for the time being.

All the minefields in the U.S.-Turkey relationship need careful analysis and comprehensive policy coordination and there is a long way to go before that happens. Nevertheless, it is important to underline that the two sides are both willing to listen to each other’s positions and engage in a meaningful way. It is not clear if this dynamic will be sustainable in the medium and long terms but it should be considered a start in any case.

Time will tell if this is all we can hope for but continuous engagement through crises may be the solution for the time being. However, we should not lose sight that a comprehensive strategic dialogue would produce more concrete and sustainable results in the long run.   

According to a recent NBC News report, the White House is looking for ways to extradite Fetullah Gulen, the leader of FETO, which plotted the failed coup attempt on 15 July 2016 in Turkey, which left 250 victims dead and more than 2,000 injured. According to the report, the “Trump administration officials asked federal law enforcement agencies to examine legal ways of removing” Gulen. The Justice Department, FBI, Homeland Security Department and naturally the White House, are all reported to be involved in the process. Now you might be thinking that this was denied by the U.S. administration, as on Friday, the Justice Dept denied any potential extradition. This in itself was unusual, as it’s not typical for the Justice Department to comment on matters pertaining to potential cases of extradition. However, the fact that something like this has been on the agenda this week was quite serious.

The initial report by NBC News suggests that the extradition of Gulen could take place in order to ease Turkey’s pressure on Saudi Arabia in regards to the Jamal Khashoggi murder, which brought Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman to the forefront as a brutal murderer. As expressed in the report, this is an option, but could also be false. Hence, the focus here isn’t on the language of the report, which describes Gulen as an “Erdogan foe,” and an “exiled cleric,” nor is it the link with the Khashoggi case. Rather, Gulen’s extradition is far more important than any of these. With various sources claiming different stories, if the Trump administration has actually considered the extradition of Fetullah Gulen, this would be a game changing move.

With various sources claiming different stories, if the Trump administration has actually considered the extradition of Fetullah Gulen, this would be a game changing move.

For over two years, the U.S. has underestimated the significance of Gulen for Turkey. It’s as if the U.S. administration doesn’t care about hosting the individual responsible for Turkey’s bloodiest coup ever. What annoyed the Turkish public and the politicians as well is the perception that the U.S. was behind the coup attempt. There seemed to be no other explanation for why a capable state like the U.S. would host such a most-wanted terrorist despite its ally’s persistent requests. If the extradition process was to take place, the Turkish perception of the U.S. would take a new turn.

As for my own part, with all these different stories in the media, I’m still having trouble in understanding why the U.S. would want to extradite Gulen after all the damage done to its relations with Turkey. Once he returns to Turkey, Gulen will eventually inform the Turkish authorities on his foreign connections. After all, the reasons for the inquiries over him before the coup attempt were more about the spying activities of his organization in Turkey. It is impossible for an organization like FETO to maintain its network in such an effective manner without support from outside. If the U.S. were really to extradite him, this would show that the administration is not afraid of what Gulen would spill during his questioning by Turkish authorities. This will give back the U.S. the credibility it lost within the Turkish public opinion and decision makers.

The U.S. administration has underestimated the significance of Gulen for Turkey. It’s as if the administration doesn’t care about hosting the individual responsible for Turkey’s bloodiest coup ever.

Nevertheless, there must be a reason why the potential extradition of Gulen was high on the agenda this week – 2 years after the failed coup attempt. It’s hard to figure out why the U.S. has insisted to protect Gulen for so long, and then suddenly various rumors emerge about the administration wanting to extradite him. When taking this development into consideration with the recent bounties on the PKK’s top three leaders, one does ask whether the U.S. is reformulating its policy with Turkey.

While the debate on Gulen’s extradition and the U.S. listing three PKK terrorists on the Rewards for Justice Program will remain live, we’ll have to wait and see if any concrete results come out of these steps.

As the U.S. pushed Turkey away with the hope that coercion will make Turkey realign its foreign policies in harmony with U.S. interests, Turkey has searched and found new channels of cooperation in the international arena. Such cooperation channels with the European countries, Russia, Iran, and Qatar showed that the coercion is not pulling Turkey to the U.S. orbit but pushing it further away. Hence, if the U.S. does take any positive move in helping Turkey fight FETO, this could be interpreted as a way of compensating the damage caused to bilateral relations between Ankara and Washington.

While the debate on Gulen’s extradition and the U.S. listing three PKK terrorists on the Rewards for Justice Program will remain live, we’ll have to wait and see if any concrete results come out of these steps. If they do produce sincere results, this will reflect itself as an unrepresented boost in relations between Turkey and the U.S.

The international arena is experiencing a turbulent period in which the effects of political, economic, and commercial decisions taken by President Donald Trump are clearly being felt. During his election campaign, Trump influenced the agenda with his statements on the actions he will take on issues closely related to the global political and economic system. Using the motto “America First,” the U.S. President made it clear to the whole world that his ultimate goal is to protect the interests of the American nation. Thus, he first decided to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement, which he believed was in contradiction with the country’s interests. Then, again arguing to protect the interests of the American people, he began to implement trade sanctions on many actors such as China, Russia, the EU, and Turkey. However, these sanctions not only affected the targeted states but also hit global trade.

Lastly, on May 2018, Trump unilaterally withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which is also known as the Iran nuclear deal, although the other signatories of the deal, P5+1 countries, strictly opposed the decision. He charged the Tehran regime with supporting terrorist actions and organizations widening the chaos in the Middle East, producing ballistic missiles, and continuing its nuclear program despite the JCPOA. The withdrawal of the country followed Trump’s announcement on the re-implementation of the sanctions that had been suspended after the nuclear deal. In order to increase the pressure of sanctions and to further isolate Iran, Trump also threatened other states and corporations: “Anyone doing business with Iran will NOT be doing business with the United States!”

Trump’s “America First” motto and his withdrawal from the JCPOA has not only affected targeted states, but has also hit global trade.

The new round of U.S. sanctions

The first round of the two-phase sanctions began to be imposed on August 6, and from that time on, Iran has been unilaterally blocked to have or access the U.S. dollar and precious metals like gold and silver, and so on. The automotive and aviation industries are also being isolated from the international system. The second round targeting Iran’s petroleum, the largest income source of the government revenues, and shipping industries and port operators to diminish the country’s petroleum and petrochemical products exports to zero began to be re-imposed on November 5. On the same day Washington granted temporary waivers to 8 states – China, India, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Italy, Greece and Turkey. The U.S. administration claims that it is trying to cut off Iranian oil exports since the Tehran regime uses the revenues obtained from the petroleum industry to fund terrorist organizations and conduct terrorism in different parts of the world.

Leading by the remaining P5+1 countries, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and Germany, the EU and Turkey have expressed their opposition to Trump’s decision many times and intend to maintain their trade relations with Iran. Especially the position of China and India is crucial for Iran as these two countries are its largest crude oil importers. They all have searched for new types of payment systems to avoid U.S. interruption while doing business with Iran. The EU has begun to implement “blocking statute” to enable EU companies to continue their commercial relations with Iran and compensate the damages that may arise from the sanctions. Later on, the EU, China and Russia also agreed on founding a special purpose vehicle that could channel new payment mechanisms alternative to using U.S. dollars. The two biggest buyers of Iranian crude, China and India, reached a deal with the Tehran regime on using their national currencies. Turkey has been evaluating whether to use Turkish Lira and/or establishing a barter system that could facilitate exporting its goods and services to Iran in response to its crude oil imports.

The two biggest buyers of Iranian crude, China and Iran, have reached a deal with the Tehran regime on using their national currencies during business. Now, Turkey is evaluating whether to do the same.

What are the effects of sanctions on Turkey-Iran energy relations?

Turkey, as a growing economy, imports approximately 90 percent of its oil and 95% gas and Iran has been one of its primary suppliers. In 2017, the country imported about 45 percent of crude oil and 17 percent of natural gas it consumed from Iran. In other words, Iran was the largest crude oil and the second largest natural gas supplier of Turkey.

As the new round of sanctions does not cover Iran’s natural gas sector, contrary to the previous ones, it’s expected that Turkey’s natural gas supply from Iran will not be affected and the country will not be subjected to U.S. sanctions. However, the amount of Iranian crude oil in total crude oil imports of Turkey has begun to decline as Trump decided to re-impose the Iran sanctions on May 2018. Turkey’s biggest crude oil importer TUPRAS began to gradually reduce the amount of oil supplied from Iran in order to balance the internal market. According to Turkey’s Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EPDK), in April 2018, the amount of Iranian crude oil was 67 percent of the total crude oil imports, which decreased to 51% in May. A sharp drop was experienced in June as it fell to 15 percent. However, the amount increased in July and August, reaching respectively to 38 and 31 percent.

At that point, it should be highlighted that Turkey did not stop importing crude oil from Iran even during the internationalized sanctions throughout 2010-2015. This signals that Turkey will continue to import Iranian oil during the unilaterally imposed U.S. sanctions. In addition, Iran’s 38 percent share in total crude oil imports of January 2018 is also remarkable. This could be interpreted as a sign that import amounts may vary from time to time. Moreover, Iran has been one of the two countries where Turkey imports most of its crude oil since 2011. Accordingly, TUPRAS, supporting President Erdogan’s statements, has announced that Turkey will continue to import crude oil from Iran.

Following the Trump administration’s sanctions on Iran, growing economies that are highly dependent on imported energy resources are in need of tight cooperation more than ever.

What’s next for the waivers?

As the exception granted by the Trump administration will last for only 180 days, the 8 waivers, including Turkey, now need to plan how to manage their relations with Washington and Tehran. Japan and South Korea are expected to cut their Iranian crude imports completely while China, India and Turkey seem decisive to pursue their imports. However, as the shares of Greece, Italy and Taiwan are rather low and, contrary to other waivers, they did not make a clear statement on unilaterally imposed sanctions, their future positions are unclear. Besides, since the waiver is limited to 1.1 million barrels of Iranian oil per day, the waivers also need to collaborate on how to allocate this amount.

It is expected that during the 180-day exception period, China, India and Turkey will investigate alternative ways and conduct intensive diplomatic efforts engaging at political and financial levels to maintain their oil trade with Iran. It would also be beneficial for both the three-waivers and Russia and the EU to create a counter-block to convince the Trump administration to reconsider its unilaterally imposed sanctions. Growing economies that are highly dependent on imported energy resources are in need of tight cooperation more than ever.

The last season of the much-acclaimed House of Cards features the story of the first woman American president Claire Underwood (Hale). The storyline is quite a bit of a commentary on the current debates in U.S. politics, women’s participation in politics, relations with Russia, impeachment of a president or even a Supreme Court judge among others. In the first two years of Trump’s presidency, many controversies have dominated the political debate but the president has not been seriously threatened despite much political ruckus. With Democrats in the House majority now, more political turmoil awaits the U.S. public as a number of investigations may be conducted in the coming months. Not to mention the Mueller probe that may have fatal consequences for President Trump. The midterms created a split in Congress, which promises major political showdowns between the President and House Democrats. As further infighting appears to be on the horizon, Trump may turn to foreign policy to project an image of strength despite his domestically inclined America first agenda.

Democrats will have to play their “cards” carefully as they will not want to be seen as “obstructionists” who are only interested in going after President Trump personally instead of serving the interests of the American people. The Democratic Party leadership has signaled that they want irrefutable evidence out of the Mueller probe and broad Republican support before considering impeachment. No matter what comes out of the Mueller probe, however, it will come down to a political decision and a judgment call by Democrats. Given the high likelihood that President Trump will continue to enjoy strong support by Republicans, Democrats dead set on impeachment will probably be disappointed. However, this does not mean that the administration will not face serious pressure from Congress in all fronts, both in terms of congressional investigations and public policy.

Trump’s removal of the Attorney General Jeff Sessions and his replacement of Matthew Whitaker instead of Rod Rosenstein is instructive as the president wants the Mueller investigation to be neutralized, denying ammunition to the House Democrats. Democrats have been threatening to investigate Sessions’ replacement with Whitaker but it is not clear if they can prevent him from overseeing the Mueller probe in a way aligned with his public statements against the investigation. Clearly, this investigation has the potential to determine the relationship between the president and the House Democrats in the next two years. In all likelihood, the drawn-out process will make legislation extremely difficult, if not impossible. In that case, Trump may simply turn to foreign policy to win points in the eyes of the American public heading to the 2020 presidential election.

One obvious place will be the Middle East, particularly Iran. The administration already pulled out of the JCPOA and snapped back sanctions, issuing 6-month waivers to 8 countries including Turkey. Squeezing Iran and bringing them to the table on the administration’s terms seems to be the ultimate goal here, as is clear from the Secretary of State Pompeo’s article in Foreign Affairs. Iran will likely wait to see the results of the 2020 elections before committing to negotiations despite the harsh sanctions. In that case, Trump may try to exert more pressure on Iran with additional sanctions, perhaps refusing to extend further waivers to countries trading with Iran. Pushing against pro-Iranian forces in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen is another strategy the administration could pursue but so far Trump has not devised a comprehensive regional strategy against Iran. House Democrats have promised to investigate Trump’s relationship with the Saudis as well, which may limit his ability to increase pressure against Iran in the Persian Gulf.

Another foreign policy issue candidate to display strength and whip up domestic support would be North Korea. However, President Trump’s rhetoric on this one reached such heights in the past that a repeat of it would come dangerously close to war. Both Iran and North Korea issues carry the risk of escalation and miscalculations but Trump’s deeply anti-war agenda was part of how he won the presidency in the first place. If he comes too close to or engages in yet another war, he will lose domestic support even from his constituency. So far, President Trump has been able to shape or at least change the public debate whenever he wanted to a large extent. As he might seek to bolster his image abroad, the alliances and institutions he has attacked so far may not be there to help him. In that case, the unilateral action may be his only choice. The U.S. presidents have leaned on foreign policy issues when they felt trapped at home but that can have costly consequences at home as well.

President Trump has enjoyed Republican support in both houses of Congress until now, succeeding in cutting taxes, deregulation and Supreme Court appointments among others. In the next two years, he will be faced with a House intent on preventing his agenda and investigating his administration. As major legislation will be close to impossible to pass through Congress, he may choose to play his foreign policy card in the lead up to 2020. It is not clear if it will be enough, however, and he will have to play his hand just as well as the House Democrats.

The Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear deal signed between Iran and the P5+ countries last May, as well as its simultaneous announcement that it will be re-imposing sanctions in two stages in August and November, has carried tensions stemming from Tehran’s nuclear activities back to the top of the international agenda. While there are some technical details regarding the nuclear deal among Trump’s objections, “normalization requirements” announced later by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo show that the U.S. actually intends to achieve a new and extensive deal regarding all of Iran’s regional policies.

Trump is a “deal breaker.” The Trump administration has withdrawn from old agreements not only with countries traditionally regarded as rivals, such as China and Russia, but also with countries such as Germany and Canada, long-time close allies of the U.S.

The fact that on the global stage the Trump administration has withdrawn from old agreements and abolished old practices not only with countries traditionally regarded as rivals, such as China and Russia, but also with countries such as Germany and Canada, which the U.S. previously had maintained very close political relations with, illustrates the fact that Trump’s “deal breaker” attitude and tendencies to make attempts towards “changing the rules of the game” are not exclusive to the Iran nuclear deal. Moreover, according to many observers, these “rules of the new era” are not simply due to Trump. The state apparatus in the U.S. as a whole wants to shape the grounds on which a global system that will last until the second half of the 21st century will be built before it is too late.

Trump Administration’s actions and their consequences

An important portion of the sanctions Trump described as “toughest ever” were imposed in August and concern topics such as oil trade, insurance processes, and the use of sea ports. The more severe sanctions had been left to November to give any third-party countries with important trade relations with Iran time to adapt. The fact that the sanctions will be imposed on the 40th anniversary of the beginning of the Iran Hostage Crisis, where supporters of the Iranian Revolution took over the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, reminds us of the saying “actions have their consequences.”

With the warning that sanctions will take place in November, countries such as South Korea, Japan, and France stopped importing oil from Iran by September and even countries opposed to single-sided sanctions on principle, such as India and Turkey, have significantly reduced the volume of their trade with Iran. As the severe sanctions take effect it is seen as a certainty that Iran’s oil exports will fall from their level of 2.5 million barrels per day in May to below 1 million barrels. Due to this reason, the Iranian Rial has lost 65% of its value versus the dollar in a few months with labor strikes and other forms of protest already becoming commonplace in the country.

As the severe sanctions take effect, Iran’s oil exports will fall from their level of 2.5 million barrels per day in May to below 1 million barrels. Considering that the Iranian Rial has already lost 65% of its value versus the dollar in a few months, a serious economic breakdown is not unlikely.

Iran does not have many options to resist against the policy of severe economic sanctions the Trump administration has inherited from the Obama administration and continued in a harsher manner. Even though many countries support Iran politically on this matter, with some EU members even trying to build alternative payment methods to bypass threats of sanction violation penalties from the U.S., it will not be easy for any such action and measure to help Iran access the global financial system.

Especially considering U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton’s announcement that if the sanctions of November do not have the expected effect unspecified measures may be employed, means that the Trump administration wants to resolve the Iranian matter as quickly as possible. Thus, Iran – as the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Zarif has expressed – keeps employing backdoor diplomacy channels in the hope of reaching to a point of agreement with the U.S., despite its persistent tough public stance. On the other hand, the Rouhani government has been implementing monetary transparency laws and measures such as FATF despite the internal opposition to render the excuses of the U.S. ineffective.

Iran sanctions and regional policies

Moreover, the heavy economic sanctions aiming to reduce Iranian oil exports to zero are not the only tool that can put pressure on Iran. On September 22, an Iranian military parade held in the city of Ahvaz, which has an Arab majority and is rich in petrol reserves, was attacked and two different organizations claimed responsibility for the attack. Prior to this event, there were heavy clashes along the Iraqi border between separatist Kurdish organizations and Iranian security forces.

The fact that influential people close to the Trump administration are often actively participating in meetings of organizations such as the People’s Mujahedin of Iran shows that the siege on Iran may continue via different manners. Similarly, we must take note of the proliferation of organizations opposed to the Iranian regime founded abroad as well as international news stations being broadcast in Persian and aimed at the Iranian public, along with the efforts to make Reza Pahlavi, the eldest son of the last Shah of Iran, a more prominent public figure.

It can be seen that the U.S., while officially telling Iran that it has no plans of regime change, intends to signal that it has a limit to its patience and in case that Tehran does not comply with an important portion of the demands put forward then regime change will not be off the table. Hassan Rouhani pointed out this fact in a speech held on October 13, the beginning of the academic year, at Tehran University, and stated that the ultimate goal of the U.S. in Iran is regime change and it will not succeed in this goal.

It will not be wrong to claim that in terms of regional policies some of the U.S.’ regional allies have found courage due to the Trump administration’s policies. Especially Saudi Arabia and Israel seem to want to resolve the Iranian threat for good during Trump’s tenure. It also seems possible that Trump, just like with the NAFTA deal that he previously called “very bad” and then renewed, might be open to sign a new agreement that does not entirely exclude Iran from the regional equation with the intention to use it during the U.S. elections. So, not disregarding the possibility that the KSA-Israel-UAE triangle may cause provocations with the hopes of escalating military tensions between Iran and the U.S., the Tehran administration refrains from making any moves that may cause unrest in the region in practice despite its high-pitched threats.

This is why despite Tehran’s threats after the Ahvaz attack, it did not take any action against Saudi Arabia or the UAE, and in contrast to its response to the evacuation of Aleppo in 2016, it did not object to the agreement between Turkey and Russia regarding Idlib and stated that it will respect the agreement despite not being part of it. Similarly, in its meetings with European countries, Iran signals that it is ready to stop the conflict in Yemen and use its influence on Houthis in case a mechanism that will ease the pressure of sanctions and allow the continuation of international trade is put into place.

Again, Iran’s support for the creation of the Iraqi government with names that are more in line with the U.S. and the West rather than names under its control such as Maliki and Amiri is another important point. All these moves indicate that Iran intends to ease regional tensions in the short term and focus on the ongoing economic crisis in the country.

Iran’s intentions to ease regional tensions and get along with its neighbors will reflect positively on Ankara-Tehran relations despite being due to external pressure.

Iran’s intentions to ease regional tensions and get along with its neighbors will reflect positively on Ankara-Tehran relations despite being due to external pressure. Especially the reduction of disputes regarding Iraq and Syria, as well as a potential economic role Ankara might play in a time when economic sanctions weigh heavy on Tehran, along with the rising price of maintaining a relationship of cooperation with Saudi Arabia, which has proved itself as an unpredictable actor first due to its blockade on Qatar and later an even bigger scandal despite Turkey’s patient show of good will, will lead to a relative improvement in Turkey-Iran relations even though relations have historically been constrained to a narrow trend with little change.

Negative scenarios regarding Iran sanctions

Possible consequences of the sanctions imposed are not all positive scenarios for regional politics. If private talks between the U.S. and Iran do not yield any results and the hopes of a political resolution are ditched and/or European countries, in the announcement they are expected to make in the following days regarding the new financial mechanism, fail to satisfy Tehran’s expectations, tension in the region can continue to rise. In this case, as discussed above, the countries that constitute the regional leg of Trump’s strategy regarding Tehran can make unexpected moves to provoke Iran.

The possibility that Tehran might give up hope of a political resolution for reasons such as the crippling economy due to sanctions, increasing pressure from regional rivals and internal opposition provoking street protests, may cause U.S.-Iran tensions to rise to their highest level of the last 40 years.

Tensions with Iran can be directly caused by the U.S. intervention. For example, the military operation the U.S. is expected to conduct against Al-Hashd Al-Sha’abi (Popular Mobilization Units – PMU) in Iraq, which was postponed due to Iraq being in the process of forming a government can begin. Israel, which claims that Iran has begun to move missiles to Iraq like Syria, can conduct direct operations against Tehran’s proxies in Iraq like it does in Syria. This situation can result in a severe and bloody period in Iraq similar to that of 2005-2007. In this case, Iran and its allies can take concrete action against U.S. troops stationed on the east of Euphrates, which is an issue Iran has been extremely vocal about.

The possibility that Tehran might give up hope of a political resolution for reasons such as the crippling economy due to sanctions, increasing pressure from regional rivals and internal opposition provoking street protests, may cause U.S.-Iran tensions to rise to their highest level of the last 40 years, and this situation would have severe consequences for the entire region, including Turkey.

The Americans are nervous that the UN will accuse them of human rights violations in Yemen and so should take a stand against the Saudis there. They can start with ending the Saudi travel ban on journalists.

Did Trump really tweet about the ‘cover up’ of the Khashoggi murder in such a manner, that it appeared he derided the amateurism of those carrying out the ghastly killing? It’s almost as though he is saying if the Saudis had paid him a decent wedge, that his own people could have done the job much more professionally.

Far fetched? Perhaps. But the horror story of despot getting into power in the White House and giving his Gulf Arab oil sheikh friends in the Middle East the green light to flex their muscles and behave badly – really badly – is not. It’s a reality which we are all living with as America is forced to re-examine its relations with Saudi Arabia whose benighted 33 year old Crown Prince has shown the world a glimpse of the brutality which is carried out habitually to anyone who dares to think. Just to think. Mohammad bin Salman cannot take any kind of comment or even humble advice from even those in his own court and is running Saudi Arabia along fierce, autocratic lines, which is expected of him, from his peers.

We shouldn’t be so shocked about Khashoggi who was only one of many who were renditioned and it is only down to the sensational amateurism of MbS’s henchmen – and the current Turkish investigation – that we know all the gory details.

But it isn’t so much the murder itself, but more the abysmal, half-cocked effort to cover it up which has spurned a broader morality check from Western governments, with Germany taking the initiative to block its own arms sales to the Gulf Arab kingdom. The wholesale impunity afforded to the Saudi Prince, via Trump’s absurdly inexperienced wannabe something son-in-law Jared Kushner, has resulted in the derailment to attention, to Saudi Arabia’s nefarious techniques in governing; or rather preserving the existence of its elite, the Saudi royal family, which the British enshrined during the first world war as they created a cluster of clients states in the Middle East whose very existence was based on their savagery, lack of trust of one another and reverence to the colonial model.

Seven Pillars

Indeed, T E Laurence, a polemic loner and somewhat awkward British serving officer said of the Saudis and their neighbors “The Arabs are even less stable than the Turks. If properly handled they would remain in a state of political mosaic, a tissue of small jealous principalities incapable of cohesion.”

The House of Saud was favored by the British for this reason and, not withstanding its savagery and reputation to never take prisoners as it swept across the (then) fractured country, its firebrand leader united a vast country, what is known as Saudi Arabia today. But there came a price. Wahhibism – a uniquely crafted interpretation of Islam not entirely unlike what Daesh practices against its non-believers – was also seen as a strong point, much later, after the second world war, where it was seen as a shining counterweight to the rapid expansion of communism. But the price the British paid then was savagery. And it’s the price that Trump is now paying with the Khashoggi attempted rendition and many like his.

Does the young prince believe he is more modern than his ancestors as he at least gives his enemies a chance to repent and to return to the kingdom? Khashoggi was a traitor. He had lived a rich and prosperous life as a devoted surf of his Saud rulers. He gained their trust and respect. They shared all their secrets with him over thirty years until the day he decided that he wanted to not only leave their propinquity, but to also use that privileged inside information against them to gain their respect and attention – but in so doing, possibly destroy them.

When President Erdogan of Turkey referred in his own parliament to the “Political killing” of Khashoggi, no western journalists picked this up, but his own parliamentarians knew what he meant. Khashoggi was a Muslim Brotherhood supporter – an organisation which the Saudis hate more than even Iran – and he was hoping to set up a TV channel in Turkey, a country which is aiming to take for itself more hegemony in the region, directly out of Saudi Arabia’s hands. The murder was not only a message to Saudi dissidents, but also to Turkey’s leader: don’t think you can ever get away with a stunt like that. 

Yemen rules

Yet the murdering and rendition itself is nothing new. MbS had been doing this for well over a year, detaining and murdering anyone who he feared might dare to comment on his ideas, let alone present himself as a threat to his tumultuous leadership. But it took the Khashoggi affair to gain the attention and imagination of the world’s media. It was like he did this to one of ours.

Although the West, neither today nor historically, cares not about such atrocities as long as they are kept from the weary eyes of its media or politicians who fear that this ugly proximity to Arab brutality might affect them getting re-elected in the age of Twitter. And the media in the U.S. (and U.K. also) is more guilty for one small, but important detail which Trump’s own support base should care about.

If Western media, and in particular the left leaning Washington Post isn’t guilty for sending its Saudi columnist to his death when they agreed to his articles being published in Arabic, they are certainly guilty for allowing Trump to let the Saudis get away with what they are doing in Yemen – a war and subsequent famine which befits no superlatives in the English language in its biblical level of cruelty and rancorous savagery.

Saudi US-made jets pound these poor people who, skeletons who resort to eating leaves, have no energy to run when they see the jets coming. World records are made everyday with infant mortalities as parents leave their frail babies in the hospital and don’t turn around as people starve – not due to lack of food but money to buy it.

With up to 100,000 dead so far and a contingent of Congress members eager to show Saudi Arabia it has to adapt to Washington rules, there has never been a better time to push for the end of the war in Yemen – which is largely a by product of America over selling the Iran threat to insecure Saudis who are addicted to US arms sales. Saudi Arabia loses 50bn dollars a year in Yemen.

The repugnant reality of the relationship between Washington and the Saudis is that it is western jobs and morally bankrupt politicians who are procuring the justification to sell arms to the Saudis. And the media is part of that collusion.

The Khashoggi murder and all its wretched detail has garnered a momentum of consciousness and probing, probably for all the wrong reasons. But how can we live with ourselves if we are to turn a blind eye to thousands dying in Yemen, who are certainly less worthy of their fate than a merely one journalist with grandiose ideas about his career?

Wrangle with Saudis

Most western editors who have the power to cover Yemen chose not to, as they know that if the U.S. business being done with the Saudis is seen in all its glory with its southern neighbor, it’s not going to score them any points with White House and State department mandarins and, in this era of high lay offs in the newsroom, might even cost them their jobs. But there’s another reason which is far more shameful and leaves us all with blood on our hands.

The Saudis for quite some time now impose a travel ban on western journalists wishing to work in the north of Yemen, where the real story of humanitarian calamity can be captured. Saudi Arabia does not issue journalists with special visas to enter the country. It is this rule, which western media largely complies with – and respects – which should be now at the heart of politicians zealous consciousness as they wrangle with the Saudi question.

How can the Trump administration accept such an arrangement when Yemen is a sovereign state and not a protectorate of Riyadh? When will journalists who sit in each day at Washington press conferences put their hands up and ask the ex Fox moronic press mannequins, the simple question “why does President Trump allow such a rule which prevents us from traveling to Yemen to report there?” The British may have created the house of Saud and planted the seeds for their present day savagery, but it will have to be American journalists who will stand up and stop Trump keeping such traditions alive.

John Cusack, the American actor, may be right about Trump being mentally ill. It’s not important. What is important is that Trump acts now to pull this ruling Saudi family out of the middle ages and convince them that the historical ‘no prisoners’ rule of their ancestors is no longer conducive with the modern world and that the West no longer considers them an asset when they continue to divide the middle east along outdated British imperial lines. Trump needs to show the Saudi Crown Prince the errors of his ways before it’s too late. And Yemen would be a good start for him, MbS and the American media to redeem themselves.

Turkey and the U.S. started joint patrols in the northern Syrian city of Manbij on Thursday, November 1 based on a long waited deal between the two countries. Since the days of Turkey’s Euphrates Shield Operation (Aug 24, 2016 – Mar 29, 2017) in the Jarabslus-Al Bab-Mare triangle, Turkey had been waiting for a role in the future of Manbij. Turkey cleaned this area from Daesh forces with the operation but did not enter Manbij. This decision was taken as a response to the guarantees Turkey received from the U.S. regarding the future of the city, which included that the PYD would not rule the city, and further, withdraw its forces out of the city. The deal was brokered between Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on June 4 but was delayed by the U.S. side until this moment. Despite this delay, the two countries finally came to the next stage of carrying out joint patrols on top of two other significant developments in bilateral relations.

First, based on Pompeo’s remarks, Turkey will be granted a waiver from the U.S. oil sanctions against Iran, which is essential as Iran is a major energy source for Turkey. The news came out on Friday, just three days before the second phase of sanctions were set to go into effect on November 5. The second big news also came out on the very same day as the U.S Treasury Department stated that the blacklisting of two Turkish ministers, Abdulhamit Gul and Suleyman Soylu, had been lifted. Turkey corresponded in the same way by lifting its own bans towards the American counterparts. The bans were placed initially by the U.S. to put pressure on Turkey over the Brunson affair. The softening also followed the release of Andrew Brunson.

All the three developments (joint patrols in Manbij, waiver from the Iran sanctions, and mutual removal of bans over ministers) are good news for the future of the troubled relations between the two countries. Nevertheless, there are still plenty of reasons to worry about the future of relations between Turkey and the U.S. First, Turkey still perceives a great deal of threat originating from U.S. actions. Two such perceptions have quite solid bases as the U.S. still hosts Fetullah Gulen, the criminal cult leader of FETO, which carried out a failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016, in which the organization sent a squad to assassinate President Erdogan, bombed the Turkish parliament, and murdered 250 Turkish citizens. Further, the U.S. still supports the PKK’s Syrian offshoot, the PYD, in Northern Syria. Until these two matters are resolved, relations cannot go back to normal. Given that Turkey is also pressuring the PYD in the east of Euphrates nowadays, Turkey-U.S. relations are still fragile and have not passed the test of time in Syria. These are all the crisis points between the two used-to-be allies.

These crises cost Turkey a lot, not only in terms of the economy as the Turkish Lira lost quite a deal of its value vis-a-vis the USD as the tension rose in the late summer. Turkey’s even bigger cost was its sense of security as the U.S. is still the primary reason why Turkey cannot eliminate FETO and the PYD completely. Despite these, Turkey had one major gain from these crises. Ankara has learnt how to survive, not only without American support, but also despite the American efforts to hurt the country politically and economically. Turkey has learnt how to carry out cross-border military operations in a country where U.S. forces are settled in favor of Turkey’s adversaries.

Turkey has also learnt how to negotiate for its interests rather than prioritizing the possible American reactions. Turkey has learnt how to coordinate its actions with other global powers such as Russia based on mutual respect and understanding. Further, Turkey has learnt how to set a negotiation table where the future of Syria is discussed without the U.S. Perhaps the right way to interpret the recent warming in the bilateral relations is about the American recognition of Turkey as a rational and effective international actor whether the U.S. supports or tries to undermine this effective role. This recognition, if supported with a genuine respect toward Turkey’s security needs, can save the exhausted bilateral relation.

On 2 October 2018, Jamal Khashoggi, a journalist and critic of the policies of the current Saudi monarchy, was killed in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. His status as columnist with the Washington Post in the U.S., the international response to the nature of his death, and the uncertainty surrounding what happened has created a wave of international press coverage and concern.

President Trump’s response to the incident has been tempered by Saudi oil exports accounting for 13 percent of global crude production and the Kingdom is still perceived to be able to help control oil prices in OPEC as a swing producer. This will be particularly important as the U.S. imposes new sanctions on Iranian oil exports after 5 November 2018. President Trump also claims that more than $110 billion in arms sales are at stake.

Whilst agreeing with Saudi Arabia’s ‘rogue killers’ theory, President Trump sent Secretary of State, Michael Pompeo, to meet with the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammad bin Salman. He then sent a different message, calling the conflicting Saudi version of events surrounding the murder ‘the worst cover up ever‘. In a televised address on 23 October, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan went a step further, saying the murder was premeditated and that he holds intelligence on what happened. The Saudi prosecutor has since agreed that the murder was premeditated.

Germany has quickly haltered arms exports to the Kingdom while urging other EU states to do the same. Quite late in the process, President Trump sent CIA Director, Gina Haspel, to Turkey to assist in the investigation and Secretary of the Treasury, Steven Mnuchin, travelled to six countries in theMiddle East, including Saudi Arabia, visiting the Terrorist Financing Targeting Centre and having meetings in preparation for Iran sanctions. Although he did not participate in the Future Investment Initiative (FII) which has been boycotted by various business and political leaders (including from France, Australia and the Netherlands), he did meet with Mohammad bin Salman who stressed the importance of the U.S.-Saudi strategic partnership.

The initial Saudi response has been to absolve members of the royal family over the incident by firing 5 top officials and arrested 18 other Saudis. In the economic sphere, the Saudi oil minister, Khalid al-Falih, has said that global oil demand will be met no matter what. The international oil price has already dropped from $85 to $76 since the murder. The move has calmed fears amid a global sell-off caused by this incident, along with budget issues for the Italian government and Brexit. It is also helping President Trump in the lead up to the mid-term elections by its knock on effect in gas pump prices, but oil policy could change and stability will be key up to the elections in on 6 November.

In a state department news conference on 23 October, Secretary of State Pompeo announced that the Trump administration would be revoking the US visas of 21 Saudi suspects implicated in the incident. He also talked about the possibility of targeted sanctions on those responsible for Khashoggi’s death. This was after a bipartisan group of senators sent a letter to President Trump in early October which triggered an investigation through the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. The Act was originally intended to punish Russian officials responsible for the death of Russian tax accountant Sergei Magnitsky in a Moscow prison in 2009, specifically preventing implicated officials from travelling to the US or using the US banking system.

Like the Russian case but in contrast to U.S. sanctions against Iran led by the White House under Executive Order, President Trump has given the U.S. Congress responsibility for longer term responses related to the Khashoggi case. Much depends on the congressional testimony of Gina Haspel once she returns to the U.S. and on Turkish officials or further media revelations concerning the circumstances surrounding the death of Jamal Khashoggi. There does appear to be congressional appetite for sanctions on arms sales to Saudi Arabia if there is sufficient evidence to suggest Saudi officials were involved in the murder, but this is yet to be determined.

President Trump’s assertion that U.S. arms deals to Saudi Arabia are worth $110 billion has been cited as being incorrect given that the deals have not all been signed or paid for. Therefore they cannot equate to up to 600,000 jobs at risk and Congress is probably aware of this.

If further measures are implemented against Saudi Arabia, no matter what the Saudi threats would be in response, whether concerning oil production or moves to purchase more weapons from US adversaries such as Russia and China, the Kingdom will remain tied to the U.S. and its security umbrella against Iran. In turn, the Saudis can also be relatively confident that the U.S. needs Riyadh’s compliance to help maximise pressure on Iran, so its response is likely to be relatively low key.

Still, economic fallout from this incident could yet be felt in the Kingdom, the region and in global markets if a set of more robust sanctions are imposed. Saudi Vision 2030, including the diversification away from oil, remain priorities and part of Mohammad bin Salman’s portfolio, along with defence. Continued state intervention in the economy, including the arbitrary detention of hundreds of princes and businessmen at the Ritz-Carlton hotel in Riyadh in November 2017 and capital flight remain real issues in the diversification process. Saudi Arabia is heavily invested in states and markets across the region and internationally through aid, trade and investments. The Public Investment Fund alone (on whose board Mohammad bin Salman sits) has $557 billion of investments, with many in western markets. But it is conceivable that deals such as the $20 billion deal with Blackstone Group Infrastructure Fund could be arranged to maximise privacy and continued investment under almost any conditions. The issue of providing jobs to millions of youth in Saudi Arabia will also be of paramount importance going forward and favours greater economic engagement in the Saudi economy, under the right conditions, not less.

Regionally, Saudi Arabia is a lynchpin of President Trump’s Middle East policy which seeks to contain Iran and support Israel, Jordan and Egypt. In return, the Trump administration has continued to support the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen and remained inarticulate over Saudi and Emirati attempts to isolate Qatar. Should the U.S. and U.K. follow Germany’s lead by suspending arms sales to the Kingdom it would send a strong signal and potentially give Riyadh an incentive to bring its intervention in Yemen to a negotiated end. This could change the overall dynamic of U.S.-Saudi relations in the Middle East and put the bilateral relationship under further pressure. For example, Saudi Arabia was against the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, blamed the U.S. for the loss of its ally President Mubarak in Egypt and turmoil there in 2012 – 2013, and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that threatened a U.S.–Iran rapprochement. However, such a move might boost U.S. standing in the Middle East more broadly, especially after President Obama’s ‘red lines’ were exceeded by the Syrian government’s repeated use of chemical weapons. The question is whether the Trump administration has the political will to entertain a new approach to the Middle East and develop its capacity in doing so.

President Trump has been clear that human rights and democracy promotion do not form part of his foreign policy agenda. He instead relies on personal relationships, reassurances and ‘alternative facts.’ This policy would need to be revisited if Congress supports the return of the U.S. to favour more of a values based foreign policy.

The SETA Foundation held a panel today in order to discuss the possible effect that the Jamal Khashoggi can have on the politics of the Middle East.

Moderated by Kemal Inat, Berdal Aral, Ferhat Unlu and Huseyin Alptekin were the three panellists.

Before starting the panel, Kemal Inat stated that there were three aspects to the Jamal Khashoggi case. A humanitarian aspect, regional and international politics aspect, and finally an aspect regarding Saudi Arabia’s domestic politics.

In terms of the geopolitical consequences, Inat underlined how the fact that the event took place in Istanbul could have the potential to reconstruct foreign policy with countries close to Turkey. Second, the fact that Jamal Khashoggi was a columnist for the Washington Post automatically puts the U.S. in the frame, and thus event has given the opposition the opportunity to utilize Trump’s closeness with the Saudi regime in the upcoming mid-term elections. Finally, the fact that Saudi Arabia is the only prominent regime in the region that is supporting Israel, also brings a question as to whether this event will have the consequence of changing Israel’s place in the geopolitical spectrum.

Berdal Aral from Istanbul Medeniyet University approached the issue from a international and human rights law perspective.

He first began by informing the audience of diplomatic immunity, as this was an issue that has been laid on the table after the Saudi consulate general refused to allow Turkish authorities to search the consulate.

While he highlighted the immunity provided to diplomats, Aral highlighted that these diplomats, are by international law, “required to respect the rule of law in the hosting country and are forbidden from using the diplomatic missions for events apart from national policy.”

“The murder of Jamal Khashoggi is an extraordinary situation as it was committed in the consulate. It’s difficult to find such examples in history.”

This event also damaged Turkey. It was a “disrespect to its national sovereignty.”

“There is a violation of international law.”

Berdal Aral also emphasized how Saudi Arabia has tried to extend its use of force to a different country, which is why this event, the way it took place, the actors involved, and the consequences that will be drawn from it, “are nothing like the events we’ve seen before.”

Referring to Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s call for the people involved in the murder to be held to account in Istanbul, Ardal explained that this was in Turkey’s right to request to do so. However, he also reminded the audience that not only will Saudi Arabia resist, but they also have to uplift the diplomatic immunity of the consulate workers in order for a judicial review to begin.

Echoing statements made by Berdal Aral, Ferhat Unlu, a journalist from Sabah, also highlighted how the Jamal Khashoggi case was different from previous ones.

“There have been many murders since the Cold War committed by intelligence services. However, this one is very different.”

“The Saudi officials didn’t even feel the need to provide fake ID to the people that flew here [to Istanbul] to commit the murder.”

Although there is no concrete evidence that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman ordered the murder, Unlu stated how it’s extraordinary for people that can be described as the Prince’s “right-wing men” to commit such a crime without having their identities covered.

It’s clear that all members of the hit squad are close allies of MbS, and therefore how can we expect for this crime to be committed without the prior knowledge of the Saudi regime?

Observing the issue from an intelligence perspective, Unlu also underlined that the Director of the CIA, Gina Haspel, came to Turkey in order to see what evidence the Turkish authorities have. He also added that there are some background reports that state Haspel listened to the recording of the murder.

Finally touching upon the future of Saudi Arabia-US relations, Unlu stated how “Although Trump will not cancel arms trade deals, he has to accept that this was an infringement on human rights and therefore, we can expect changes in relations between the two countries.”

Huseyin Alptekin, a Professor of International Relations at Istanbul Sehir University tried to answer the following questions: “Why Turkey? Why now? Why Khashoggi? Why Saudi Arabia?”

In regards to the “why Turkey?” question, Alptekin highlighted that although relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia were not in crisis mode, they had deteriorated in the previous years due to certain disagreements between the two countries.

“The Middle East is not a number one priority for the U.S. anymore,” stated Alptekin, and therefore, Mohammed bin Salman and Saudi Arabia tried to take advantage of this space in regional politics.

Alptekin described MbS as someone “that needs to prove himself.” “Those before him didn’t have to prove themselves, because they already had this. However, the way MbS came to power was through some kind of coup. Let’s remember the Ritz Carlton event.”

Thus, Alptekin described MbS as having “power” but no “legitimacy.”

In general however, Alptekin observed the Jamal Khashoggi case as a “critical juncture.”

He stated that “although critical junctures do not tell us what happen next, they tell us that anything can happen.”

In this regard, Turkey’s stance on the Khashoggi case is an example of Ankara trying to expand its boundaries of what can happen. The Turkish government could have made deals with the Saudi and U.S. governments behind closed doors. However, it has displayed a consistent tactic and has been able to place this issue as number one on the international agenda.

Alptekin finished his words by stating that “Saudi Arabia will not be able to commit such an operation like this in Turkey again.”

World War I had begun following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, but the geopolitical reason behind the war traces back to the power competition among the European states in the late 19th-century. Even though Ferdinand’s assassination was a crystallization of the already-broken strategic balance within European politics, it unearthed the influence of geopolitics on international politics: The intensified geopolitical antagonism in the Balkans that took place back in the day constitutes a great example in that regard.

One hundred years later, this time in the Middle East, another example reveals the mentality behind geopolitics. The disappearance of the journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, at the hands of Trump’s close ally, in the Saudi consulate general in Istanbul, displays the very nature of the violent geopolitics of the contemporary Middle East. The incident does not only expose the strategic rationality behind the brutal operation led by the MbS coalition but also underlines the competitive nature of regional geopolitics.

Competing narratives on the murder of Khashoggi

There have been two broad categories of competing narratives since Khashoggi’s first disappearance in the Saudi consulate. The first one revolves around the idea of fundamental human rights and freedom, for which killing a dissident journalist at the hand of a rogue apparatus of the Saudi regime constitutes the case. Contrary to the moral logic, the second narrative points out the reality of the geopolitics of the Middle East in general, and the geopolitics of Saudi Arabia in particular.

The latter is gradually becoming the main narrative and shaping our perception of the murder of Khashoggi. These two narratives enable us to understand the already-worsening political landscape in the Middle East. It is crucial to keep in mind that the region has a unique anarchical trajectory, and the ongoing legitimacy crisis of the existing international order shapes the very future of this region via geopolitics. Also, needless to say, the U.S. is an active influencer of the geopolitics in the Middle East.

The U.S. narrative regarding the disappearance of Khashoggi depicts the Trump administration’s complicated relationship with the Middle East. It is widely accepted that the U.S. is a liberal democracy, in which the rule of law, the freedom of speech and free market economy are at the center. This perception might be partly true within the borders of the U.S., but it does not play into reality abroad. The U.S. had never been a real proponent of ideal liberal democracy in shaping its foreign policy priorities abroad, especially in the Middle East. More importantly, the existing U.S. strategy in the Middle East constitutes the most troubling strategic obstacle preventing the achievement of a stable order in the region.

In other words, the U.S. itself is undermining the potential of establishing a stable region in the Middle East. The intention here is not to argue that without the U.S., the Middle East region would overcome its issues overnight. The U.S.’s Middle East grand strategy is only achievable through rogue actors that have no perception of universal values. From the PKK to Saudi Arabia and from Israel to the UAE and Egypt, the U.S. can only deliver its strategic objectives through rouge entities or regimes, who are also incapable of delivering their own grand strategies without the support of the U.S. in the region. It is no secret that, in every single incident, the Trump administration stands by the rogue regime or entity at stake.

The Khashoggi murder is no exception for the U.S.

Regarding the disappearance of Jamal Khashoggi, however, the U.S. embraced two different narratives simultaneously. The mainstream media, particularly the Washington Post, where Jamal Khashoggi contributed as a columnist, disseminated the intelligence information shared by anonymous Turkish intelligence sources and pushed the Trump administration to take some responsibility to clarify whether his most popular ally, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, also known as MbS, has any responsibility behind the disappearance of Khashoggi.

While the media and some of high profile Republicans and Democrats frame the Khashoggi case within the context of American universal values, the Trump administration determined its strategy in line with its arms deal with Saudi Arabia, the containment strategy of Iran, the fragile balance of power in the Gulf region, and the U.S.-Israel master plan on Palestine. However, Turkey’s cautious approach gradually pushed Saudi Arabia to accept its responsibility, and the Trump administration had to change its ways of framing the issue.

Here, the problem for the Trump administration is not the action of the Crown Prince against a dissident journalist, but it is the intelligence information shared by Turkey.

At this stage, if Trump decides to retreat MbS because of his brutality, which is unlikely to happen, it will not be a decision of American liberal principles, but a decision motivated by the increasing unpredictability of MbS’s actions in the Middle East.

Turkey and the Khashoggi murder

When it comes to Turkey, besides the moral aspect of the Khashoggi murder, the mentality of geopolitics is also a determining factor not only in understanding the nature of Khashoggi’s death but also in determining Ankara’s foreign policy agenda. From the geopolitical angle, Turkey did not initially want to disrupt its relationship with the Saudi state but desired to influence Saudi’s anti-Turkey position in the region. During the first stage of the disappearance of Khashoggi, Ankara decided to provide details about Khashoggi’s killing at the Saudi consulate to shape the perception of international media to test the waters. This stage was crucial for Ankara to locate the Khashoggi murder as an international issue rather than formulating it as a Turkish-Saudi problem.

More importantly, Ankara pushed the Trump administration to take a leading role in addressing the issue to confront Saudi Arabia. The central rationality behind Ankara’s behavior was to create an international moral awareness to put pressure on Saudi Arabia and push the Saudi authorities to accept the crime that they committed. It was clear for Turkey that Saudi Arabia would not accept its responsibility if Turkey had not gradually shared the intelligence information with the international media.

In the second stage, Ankara started to intensify its intelligence sharing to ultimately show that Saudi Arabia had the responsibility in organizing every single stage of the Khashoggi operation. Following the 17 days of intelligence sharing by Turkey, Saudi Arabia had to confirm that something went wrong during the interrogation of Khashoggi in the consulate. During this stage, Saudi Arabia quickly became an international flashlight as international actors began to change their attitudes against MbS.

In the third stage, President Erdogan himself began to lead the process by sharing his perception with the international audience. On Tuesday, President Erdogan gave a very detailed timeline explaining that the Saudi team planned the brutal killing of Khashoggi. In his speech, Erdogan did not directly accuse the Saudi leadership but highlighted that a Saudi probe, which has resulted in the arrest of 18 people so far, has not yet reached the high-level representatives in the Kingdom’s inner circle.

It is clear that Ankara has a moral duty to clarify what happened in the consulate as well as various geopolitical concerns. Within this context, underlying the role of MbS in Saudi politics carries a critical role in explaining the geopolitical dimension of Khashoggi’s murder. For Turkey, there is profound geopolitical disagreement between Ankara and Riyadh regarding regional affairs.

While Saudi Arabia’s support of the U.S. strategy towards the PYD/YPG in Syria is an essential one for Turkey, MbS’s role in the Palestinian case demonstrates another issue, in which Saudis seem to be an integral part of a long-term U.S.-Israel strategy to redesign the region. Qatar is also a critical disagreement point in Turkish-Saudi relations. From Libya to Yemen, Turkey and Saudi Arabia compete with each other.

President Erdogan intentionally highlighted in his speech the difference between the King of Saudi, Selman and politically responsible name behind the murder by saying that the killing was premeditated. At this stage, Turkey is trying to carry out its position one step forward to weaken the legitimacy of MbS internationally and to deter Saudi Arabia’s anti-Turkish geopolitical ambitions in the Middle East. The intelligence knowledge that Turkey has can also shift the U.S. position against MbS.

Khashoggi’s murder revealed the complex nature of geopolitics in the region, but how it is going to influence the future of the region remains a big question mark.

Following his election to the U.S. presidency in late 2016, Donald Trump produced two political strategies towards the Middle East. The first one is the plan dubbed as the “deal of the century,” which aims to solve the Palestine-Israel conflict. Although this has not been made public, Trump has slowly been trying to implement this plan. The second is the Middle East Strategic Alliance initiative that has recently dominated the U.S. agenda towards the region.

In this context, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo held a meeting on September 28, 2018, with the participation of six countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the foreign ministers of Egypt and Jordan. After the meeting, it was stated that the U.S. administration would provide full support to the establishment of a Middle East Strategic Alliance consisting of GCC +2 countries in order to combat armed organizations in the Middle East, to bring peace in Syria and Yemen, and to stop the harmful activities of Iran. In the following period, the U.S. media reported that Trump had planned to hold a Washington Summit with the leaders of the GCC +2 countries on 12-13 October. However, this never happened.

The Jamal Khashoggi incident, which took place on October 2, determined the agenda of Middle East politics. A Saudi citizen and a columnist for the Washington Post, Khashoggi disappeared after he entered the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. This incident created a global reaction against the Saudi regime, which is believed to be behind what happened to Jamal. More, a serious campaign against Saudi Arabia began from many spheres in the U.S. and the cooperation between the Trump administration and Riyadh has been heavily criticized. These developments made a negative impact on Trump’s Middle East Strategic Alliance initiative, which already suffers from different structural problems.

The first of these problems is the crisis between Qatar and other Gulf neighbors, namely, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. In June 2017, these countries started a political and economic embargo against Qatar, which further deepened the crisis between countries in the region. The main reason for the rapid deterioration of the crisis is the harsh steps taken by Mohammad bin Salman, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia and Mohammad bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces. These policies increased the mistrust among the members of the GCC, and countries such as Oman and Kuwait have initially preferred to stay out of this anti-Qatar campaign. Both countries even criticized the Saudi and Emirati initiatives against Qatar. Therefore, it can be said that the unresolved Gulf crisis is the main obstacle for Washington’s Middle East Strategic Alliance initiative.

Another disagreement among the members of the GCC is the different attitudes taken in regards to Iran. While Saudi Arabia has been the champion of demonizing Iran, countries like Qatar and Oman have not pursued hostile policies. In fact, Oman has maintained good relations with Iran for many years and has signed numerous deals with the Tehran administration, especially in the field of energy. During the past few years, Oman has not criticized Iranian involvement in the civil war in Yemen and this attitude of Muscat has further angered the regime in Riyadh.

Another dispute among the Gulf Cooperation Council members has been taking place between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The disagreements between the two countries have increased in recent years. The first of these disputes is the status of the Khafji oil field, which the two countries jointly used for many years. However, due to the number of disagreements between the two, Saudi Arabia suspended its oil production, forcing Kuwait to do the same. Since then, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have failed to reach a consensus on the solution of this problem.

The second dispute surrounds the embargo on Qatar. Kuwait’s mediation efforts during the embargo on Doha were not accepted by Riyadh or Abu Dhabi. It is noted that Riyadh in particular failed to take a step for the solution of these problems. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s failure to address these issues, which were planned to be discussed during his visit on October 1, 2018, indicates that the Saudi administration has followed an uncertain policy in relations with Kuwait.

Another issue that hinders Trump’s Middle East Strategic Alliance initiative is Egypt’s reluctant attitude. Initial signs of Cairo’s reluctance in joining Saudi Arabia’s efforts to counter Iran was seen during Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen. The Egyptian army did not provide full-scale support to the operation, leading to a temporary crisis between Riyadh and Cairo. Egypt has also followed a different path from Saudi Arabia in Syria. The Sisi regime had multiple meetings with Bashar Assad and further engaged in military and intelligence cooperation with Damascus. Additionally, Sisi’s close relations with Russia is another sign of Egypt’s reluctance to join a U.S.-led campaign as Cairo aims to follow a balanced policy between Russia and the U.S.

One of the most important obstacles in establishing an Arab alliance against Iran is the possible discomfort of the Shiite population living in these states. The Shiites living in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait, would be alienated from such an alliance and from the U.S. policy to encourage a sectarian divide.

Future of the Middle East Strategic Alliance Project initiated by U.S. President Donald Trump is vague and doubtful. The future of the Trump administration in U.S. politics, the process of political transformation in the region and the deepening of the political divisions between the Gulf countries can be stated as the most important obstacles of this project.

We have been living in a unipolar world since the end of the Cold War. The U.S. has been the sole major power. However, the structure of the international system has been evolving away from unipolarity due to the disproportional growth rates among states. Accordingly, there are states that speedily head to gain the status of major power. China in particular has increased its military and economic capacity in a short span of time, which is expected to reach the level of development that facilitates it to challenge the primacy of the U.S. So, a bipolar world is rising.

Besides, recently, new regional powers have emerged. Brazil, South Africa, and Turkey, are among those powers. The rise of regional powers, though it does not complicate things much at the global level, puts pressure on the U.S., which, as the only major power, engages in the politics of regions such as the Middle East as an off-shore balancer. Losing the control of a region may undoubtedly have political repercussions on the international level. That may give way to penetration of another extra-regional power or worse lead to the emergence of a regional hegemon, which may happen to rise as a global power in the long run.

Russia’s enhancement of its influence and Turkey’s tendency to act autonomously in the Middle East can be cited in this context. The relative decline of U.S. power in the Middle East has prompted Russia to fill the power vacuum and has urged Turkey to start the process of uplifting its status from a balancer to a hegemon in the region.

Current U.S. foreign policy faces the problem of accommodating China and regional powers like Turkey. So far under the Trump presidency, the U.S. has countered this problem by developing a unilateralist and isolationist foreign policy. This foreign policy basically seeks to contain and overturn the power shift that is now taking place. The Trump administration has taken policies that range from trade war to military tour de force for that purpose. This has been accompanied by the securitization of China and regional power like Turkey in the media.

Nevertheless, especially owing to the domestic political necessities like the upcoming elections for the Senate, the Trump administration has started to take contrary decisions towards these countries. The release of Pastor Andrew Brunson last week, who had been in prison for about two years in Turkey on accusations of aiding the PKK, was reciprocated by signaling to lift some of the economic sanctions that had been imposed on Turkey earlier this year.

Here we should note that Trump seems to plan to use the release of Brunson in his election campaign in order to mobilize the Evangelical and conservative voters to go to the polls and vote for the Republicans for the Senate. Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, has recently expressed that some sanctions could be lifted. This marks that the period of tension, which was grown by mutual retaliatory political moves, seems to enter into a period of relative normalcy.

However, this should not increase the hopes for bilateral relations. As noted above, relations between Turkey and the U.S. will not be normalized unless the U.S. agrees to accommodate Turkey by admitting its new international status, which is an autonomous regional power. Indeed, in the past, relations between the two countries have witnessed several low points, including the Cyprus crisis in the 1970s. Yet, the reason behind these kinds of tensions was not structural. Turkey was merely expecting for its sovereign rights to be expected. It did not seek to change its status and position in international politics.

Today, Turkey seeks to adjust the international order according to recent changes in its domestic politics and the distribution of power in the region. Turkey does not want to keep playing its traditional role of the “outsider” balancer in its vicinity by following the U.S. leadership and national interests. Instead, it desires to establish itself as an autonomous powerhouse in the region. The U.S. has so far responded to Turkey’s new foreign policy attitude by supporting the terrorist organizations such as the PKK and FETO (led by U.S.-based criminal cult leader Fetullah Gulen), which strives to curb the country’s potentials and capabilities.

In response to this attitude, Turkey has continuously given the message that it will not take a step back. For instance, last week President Erdogan signaled a new wave of military operations in the south of the country and stated that Turkey was adamant to cleanse the east of the Euphrates River from all terrorist (PKK) elements. This, no doubt, will be a new test on how “healthy” the relations between Turkey and the U.S. are.

The disappearance of Jamal Khashoggi after entering the Saudi consulate in Istanbul has become an issue of global reach. It was initially thought that the incident would become a source of tension between Saudi Arabia and Turkey. However, with the involvement of the U.S. administration, the issue has actually become source of discontent between Riyadh and Washington. In addition to calls made from Turkey and the international community, calls from Europe and the U.S. have exerted increasing pressure on Saudi Arabia. The main reason for this is the existence of strong accusations that the Riyadh administration may have been responsible for the disappearance of Khashoggi.

Jamal Khashoggi was one of the leading intellectual figures of Saudi Arabia. This is one of the main reasons why the issue has attracted global attention. Although he pursued a critical stance, Khashoggi has always been in close contact with government circles within the Saudi regime. He was considered as one of the “living memories” of the Saudi state. He served as an advisor to Turki Al-Faisal, who served as the head of Saudi Arabia’s intelligence service for many years.

By taking measures through the U.S. and Turkey, Saudi Arabia is trying to resolve the issue with minimum damage to its current position. Turkey is directly involved within the Khashoggi case, as the event took place in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. So, Turkey has also felt pressure as a result of Khashoggi’s disappearance. Although the event took place in a diplomatic mission, it has also challenged Turkey’s regional and global image as a safe haven for dissent throughout the Arab world. In recent years Istanbul has increasingly become a safe place for opposition figures from oppressive regimes of the Middle East, particularly from Syria and Egypt.

Despite the seriousness of the event, Ankara has not yet taken a direct position against Saudi Arabia. The importance of good relations and strategic cooperation in different areas between the two countries has forced both governments to take a cautious stance against each other with regards to the Khashoggi incident. Ankara wants to avoid confrontation with Riyadh and has included the international community in the process of determining what has happened to the Saudi journalist. By doing so, Ankara has shared the burden of its responsibility with the international community. In addition to Turkey’s efforts, Saudi Arabia has also acted in a way not to damage relations with Turkey.

The U.S. is another actor within the Jamal Khashoggi case, for two particular reasons. First, Khashoggi was a resident columnist for one of the leading U.S. newspapers, the Washington Post. He was living in the U.S. with a residence permit from the authorities. Khashoggi was also one of the most respected Arab journalists in the U.S. and Europe, with a solid network in the press and academia. Therefore, his disappearance has drawn a huge reaction from American and European intellectual circles. The U.S. administration has not been able to remain silent in the face of the call for clarification of the issue.

Another dynamic that forced the U.S. administration to pay close attention to the Khashoggi case was the close relationship between the Trump administration and the regime in Riyadh. The Trump administration has continued to support the Saudi regime despite its role in the war in Yemen and the embargo on Qatar. Trump has also placed Saudi Arabia at the center of his Middle East strategy. The strong claims that the Saudi regime may have a role in the Khashoggi incident left the Trump administration in a difficult position. Various reactions from the U.S. government, media, and business circles created tension between Washington and Riyadh.

It can be said that the disappearance of Jamal Khashoggi is a landmark event that may have the potential to reset Saudi Arabia’s relationship with regional and international actors. The international community will continue to pressure Riyadh to resolve the issue and to punish those who are responsible. The result of the investigations will determine the positions of regional and global actors towards Saudi Arabia.

Following U.S. President Donald Trump’s tweet, “Trade wars are good, and easy to win,” in March, additional tariffs on products imported from China officially began in July. The U.S. introduced an additional 25 percent tariffs on Chinese products worth $34 billion. Trump even stated that he could obtain an extra 500 billion dollars with this move.

A huge trade deficit

When the trade figures between the two countries are looked at, China is expected to be worse off in the short-term, with an estimated $15 trillion economy. According to figures U.S. trade authorities issued in 2016, China’s total foreign trade volume (imports and exports) to the U.S. amounted to $578.2 billion. $115.6 billion of this amount was sold to China and $462.6 billion was purchased from China. This shows that the U.S. has a trade deficit with China at a level of $347 billion.

“Trumpian response”

The reason for the “trade war” between the two largest economies in the world is due to the fact that Trump announced an increase of tariffs – 25 percent on steel and 10 percent on aluminum. The first part of the $50 billion was implemented on Chinese technology products due to “technology abuse and unfair trade practices.” In this decision, the Trump administration relied on Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which aimed to prevent what it claims are unfair trade practices and theft of intellectual property. This legislation gives the president the authority to unilaterally impose fines or other penalties on a trading partner if it is deemed to be unfairly harming U.S. business interests.

The additional 25 percent tariffs targeting China’s defense, aerospace, and manufacturing sectors include 818 products worth $34 billion – including nuclear reactors, gas turbines, air and gas liquefiers, furnaces, and commercial dishwashers. China is expected to re-engage in additional tariffs on U.S. products as retaliation. Trump complained about the fact that U.S. automotive producers paid a 25 percent tariff, while Chinese firms conducted the same job and only paid 2.5 percent.

Against Trump’s policy, China retaliated in a similar manner. In the final stage, the two countries mutually agreed to apply customs duties of 25 percent on imported goods worth $16 billion. Thus, the total volume of products covered by additional tariffs in mutual trade have increased by $50 billion. Preparations are underway in order to expand additional customs to include other products.

The rise of protectionism

While the trade war continues, opportunities for negotiations have not been completely removed. It is possible for Trump and Xi to meet at the G20 to be held in Argentina in November, and to keep track of the outcome after these bilateral talks. However, it does seem difficult to reach a solution in the short-term.

While the “winner” of this trade war between the U.S. and China is uncertain at this time, it is highly likely that this will affect the global economy. This is because mutual taxes are often linked to world supply chains – which means that the prices of many products around the world can suddenly increase. Given that the U.S. adopts tariff regulations as a bargaining item not only against China, but also the EU, Russia, and Turkey, a political and economic isolation of the U.S. is not unlikely. According to the American Chamber of Commerce (ACC), 74 percent of the members of the ACC are still planning to expand their investments in China.

Protectionism itself is behavior against the very principles of the G20. The U.S. is essentially going against the principles that it once advocated and guaranteed under the global financial system, including the World Trade Organization. More, Trump’s protectionist stance is not only applied in economics, but in the fields of politics and culture too. The Muslim Ban is a perfect example in assessing how Trump mixed these two spheres in his very early political actions. The “huge wall” to be built across the Mexican border is another example. In addition to all these, a recent row was encountered due to Trump’s announcement of extra tariffs on imports from Canada.

Moreover, as we have seen in the Pastor Brunson case, Trump insisted on using this protectionist stance as a coercive diplomatic tool. With these in mind, it is not difficult to state that Trump’s America is going against the liberal values the country once promoted, and may become unrecognizable soon. To put it bluntly, Trump does not hesitate from treating partner countries like enemies. Even though these policies adopted by the president increases his popularity among the blue-collar American voters who are suffering from globalization, they are at the same time in direct conflict with the greater interests of the country.

A dangerous model

China, which holds the leadership in production in many sectors, is defined as the “production base of the world.” Worldwide, 90% of automobiles, 80% of computers, 50% of refrigerators, and 41% of vessels are produced in this country. With a population approaching 1.4 billion, foreign investment is attracted to the country due to the advantage of cheap labor. With this advantage, China has unbalanced trade relations with many countries. It is therefore reasonable for these partner countries to develop commercial measures against China.

As China continues its economic development by making use of the free trade system, Trump’s stance has been interpreted as the rise of protectionism. It is quite ironic to now mention the country once seen as the symbol of free trade as one implying protectionist measures. However, the president insists upon using tariffs as a tool in response to the rise of China. What is important is that Trump’s protectionist policy is a “bad example” for other partner countries with unbalanced trade relations with China.

Triggered by various motives, Trump’s protectionist policies against Mexico, Canada, China, the EU, and Turkey, hurts the conventional political economy of the U.S. based on the global free market regime.

On 10 September, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo confirmed that Washington has released $1.2 billion military aid to Egypt. The aid package includes $1 billion for the budget of fiscal year 2018 and $195 million, which was originally allocated for the previous fiscal year. The U.S. administration had decided to suspend the transfer of the $195 million due to the human rights records of the Sisi regime in Egypt. However, increasing cooperation between the two countries led Washington to eventually release this aid.

It was surprising for many that the U.S. government’s decision came a day after an Egyptian court sentenced 75 people to death, including a senior member of the Muslim Brotherhood Mohamed Beltagy, the Deputy Head of the Freedom and Justice Party Essam al-Erian, Salafi preacher Safwat Hegazy, former youth minister Osama Yassin and al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya leader Tarek al-Zumer. The court also sentenced the Muslim Brotherhood’s supreme leader, Mohammed Badie, to life in prison and the son of former President Mohammad Morsi, Osama Morsi, to 10 years in prison. A total of 739 people were charged after their supposed responsibility during the dispersal of Rabaa Square protests. Many international human rights organizations and civil society groups criticize the Sisi regime for its unjust treatment of the civilian opposition.

The U.S. government however, falls short of criticizing the Egyptian regime on its human rights record and continues to provide military assistance. This was reflected in the recent statement released by the State Department, in which the Trump administration emphasized that, “Cairo is a vital partner in the regional politics of Washington and that cooperation between the two countries in security will continue.”

There are three main dynamics for Egypt’s strategic role in the U.S. foreign policy regarding the Middle East. The first reason is ultimately the security of Israel. Traditionally, the most important element in ensuring Israel’s security – which is the main determinant of U.S. policy in the Middle East – is the existence of a government in Egypt that is loyal to the U.S. A government in Cairo that does not cause problems for Israel has always been a key factor for Washington and Tel-Aviv. This was the case during the periods of Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak.

The second dynamic is forcing the Egyptian regime to follow a foreign policy pattern, which is in line with the priorities of the U.S. The U.S. has aimed to control Egypt’s regional and international policy via various instruments such as financial aid, military assistance, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic support.

Finally, as one of the most influential Muslim countries, Egypt is of great importance for the U.S. in regards to its political agenda in the Middle East. By keeping Egypt under control, Washington aims to strengthen its hand in confronting other regional actors such as Russia, Iran, and to some extent, Turkey. In this regard, the U.S. is thus able to prevent Egypt from forming a close relationship with these actors, which would otherwise form a coalition against Washington.

U.S. policy towards Egypt has been in line with these dynamics in the past years, particularly since 2011. Washington did not support the presidency of Mohammad Morsi – an individual that had been elected in the first free and democratic elections the country held in decades. The main reason for Washington’s attitude was Morsi’s affiliation with the moderate Islamic civil society organization, the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, the U.S. was quick to support the military coup of July 3, 2013, which toppled the Morsi government. U.S. support for the post-coup Sisi regime was evident in many regards. This became much clearer after the election of Donald Trump in January 2017. During the Trump era, relations between the two countries transformed into a strategic alliance.

Despite the fact that thousands of civilians oppose the military coup in Egypt, the U.S. administration continues to support the Sisi regime. Washington also ignores the Sisi regime’s violations of human rights, pressure on civil society, and the repression on the freedom of expression. There is no doubt that the U.S. clearly ignores democratic values and is continuing its support for a repressive regime. This attitude of the U.S. only encourages other repressive regimes in the region and prevents the emergence of democratic political structures throughout the Middle East. For this reason, it should be underlined that the U.S. administration’s statements of democratization in the Middle East do not reflect reality. Rather, Washington is currently the largest obstacle for democratic governments in the region.

On August 6, 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump signed a new Executive Order named “New Iran E.O.” in order to re-impose sanctions. On the day the U.S. announced its withdrawal from the JCPOA, the U.S. Department of the Treasury determined two different ‘wind-down’ periods to indicate that the sanctions will gradually enter into force. Offering only one piece of the sanctions, the Executive Order aims to target companies that do business in different sectors that are central for Iranian business, such as the automotive sector. The other portion of the sanctions will come into effect on November 4, 2018 – the end of the 180-day wind-down period.

It is fair to state that the Trump administration is desirous of punishing the Iranian regime. However, the administration’s tough stance is, in fact, twofold. By framing a ‘zero’ policy, the U.S. administration not only intends to strain the financial capacity of the Iranian government, but also demands other countries to reduce their exports from Iran to zero. At this point, it is significant to differentiate sanctions as primary and secondary, of which the latter will indirectly and potentially treat U.S. allies as suspects of violating the sanctions.

When U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton said that the administration intends to “say no waivers” in order to go beyond “where the sanctions were in 2015,” the administration apparently set the bar relatively higher than previous international sanctions. However, this zero policy can bring certain paradoxical consequences. If this policy will be a genuinely zero policy in the sense that the goal of the U.S. administration is to give irreparable economic harm to the regime, it needs to avoid using waivers to specific countries. Otherwise, the financial structure of the regime will be able to take a breath through the payments made by these countries that are awarded these waivers. In this first scenario, the collapse of the government, if very much desired by the administration, hardly appears in the short term. Therefore, the tough stance on the Iranian administration becomes questionable.

While the zero policy might appear as the only option for Trump, who is keen on bringing the Iranian government empty-handed to the negotiation table, the legal, political, and economic aspects of this policy are troublesome. Especially, in the global trade of crude oil, experts argue that the zero policy can force a significant amount of oil out of the market, leading to a drastic price change because of the high global demand for oil. In order to seek for a plausible way to minimize market disruptions to augment production, President Trump has approached  other allies such as Saudi Arabia. It remains difficult to assess to what extent juggling the production capacities of partners remains an effective plan. On the other hand, President Trump bemoaned the so-called “OPEC Monopoly” for raising oil prices. This implies that he can easily find a way to remove his guilt for the long-term high market price of oil.

When viewed from the legal and political angles of the policy, the picture is the same. The Department of Treasury, working with the Department of State and Department of Energy, will be the ‘guardian’ of the implementation of the sanction law. Transactions in U.S. dollars would suffice for the Department of the Treasury to claim extraterritorial jurisdiction to fine the individuals or entities having business ties with different Iranian sectors, such as energy and automotive sectors. It’s not a big hurdle for the Department of Treasury to impose fines or add individuals to the list of Specifically Designated Nations (SDN) based on evidence collected by intelligence or other means.

The more difficult challenge is related to the political outcomes of the decision to impose sanctions against countries. For instance, many major oil exporters from Iran are EU countries, Turkey, India, China, South Korea, and Japan. Unless they change their oil trade routes, they can be caught by secondary sanctions. The potential effect of the sanctions can be far-reaching, reaching U.S. allies, great powers, or developing countries. Furthermore, Iran’s geopolitical position, integrating the Middle East and Central Asia, will complicate the attempts made by neighboring countries such as Turkey to cut trade with Iran. This might obstruct the implementation of the zero policy if these neighboring countries prioritize their own economic and commercial interests in trading with Iran, rather than following the Trump administration’s demand to cutting all imports of Iranian oil.

The new Executive Order leaves many questions unanswered. The prime one is whether the U.S. would issue waivers from the sanctions if requested by its allies, which are unwilling to jeopardize or deteriorate their bilateral relationships with the U.S. Brian Hook, a senior State Department official, told reporters that the administration would consider waivers based on “case-by-case.” While this revives the hopes for many countries, it also brings to question the intended harsh effect on the Iranian regime.

The paradoxical situation is unlikely to be clarified in the future due to the fact that, just like the process in 2015, the current process is not clear. Unlike the current procedure, during the 2015 process, P5+1 countries sat at a table with Iran and the sanctions that were to be lifted were predictable. Nevertheless, receiving a waiver will be contingent on the negotiations to be held between the U.S. and its allies such as Turkey. For this reason, it would be beneficial for the two countries to solve existing problems rapidly and expediently in order to condense all of their focus on the future of sanctions that will come into full effect as of November 4.

It has been long argued that the world is coming out of the age of liberal world order. While this is a common argument nowadays, many also acknowledge that the liberal world order was just another utopia, which we never reached anyway. As put by Richard Haas, the system we lived in “was neither liberal nor worldwide nor orderly.” It is hard to disagree with Haas. The liberal world order was not liberal domestically or internationally as states continued to commit vast human rights violations against their citizens or the citizens of other countries. Not only were resources, but the order was also distributed unevenly across the globe. And, the so-called order had multiple phases and cases of disorder, instability, anarchy, and war, which left many, quoting from Hobbes, with nasty, brutish and short lives.

Human rights were a key issue of the liberal world order. Its relevance increased with greater stress on the responsibility to protect and humanitarian interventions to prevent crimes against humanity. Nevertheless, despite its increasingly more central role in discourse, many countries have ignored the question of human rights. Not only the rogue states or the states in the periphery of the system but key U.S. allies and main pillars of the UN Security Council have been responsible for vast human rights violations from Saudi Arabia to Israel, China and so on. The U.S., the system’s central country and key player, has also not cared about human rights in places where it embraced a civilizing and democratizing mission. The country not only targeted multiple wedding parties with lots of civilian casualties from Afghanistan to Iraq and Yemen in its “surgical” strikes, but also erected torture centers from Guantanamo to Abu Ghraib. Beyond these direct killing and torture cases, the U.S. has also been the primary sponsor of human rights violations committed by countries like Israel, where it has become a regular practice to shoot unarmed crowds whether they protest or play football on the beach.

Why do we have this recent haze and craze then if the liberal world order that we mourn for now has never been born? I believe the primary reason for this is that we have lost not the system (which was unborn anyway) but our faith in it. We believed in its existence so much that we tried our best not to see how phony it was. Many simply looked the other way and pretended not to see genocides from Bosnia to Rwanda, all happening at a time when the liberal world order was uncontested by systemic powers. Why it took so long to notice that the liberal world order was a huge scam. The answer is twofold I believe.

Before giving the answer, just a reminder, some people never believed in its existence. Go ask a Palestinian to see how this liberal order has affected him/her. Many in the West believed its existence though, until it ended in the West as well. It ended in the West in two ways. Trump, the leader of the leading country of this order, dropped the language of the liberal world order altogether. Under his leadership, the U.S. no longer propagates a global human rights discourse. In fact, in one of the recent cases, Israel killed 58 Palestinians and wounded over 1200 over the U.S. decision to recognize the contested city of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Israeli troops killed 16 unarmed Palestinians –including a 14-year-old boy and a man in a wheelchair- the very same day when Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner were opening the embassy. In other words, the U.S. perhaps has not changed the way it acts but it now speaks more irresponsibly in the speeches (and tweets) of its leader and in the symbolic steps it takes.

A second reason why the West dropped its faith in the liberal world order is the anti-migration measures being taken in Europe and the U.S. As the irregular immigrants end up in detention camps and cages (literally cages), the Western audience has slowly started to figure out the fact that the age of human rights was not so much about the tanned humans.

The liberal world order, was not a liberal order but it was still more orderly than the critics assume. I believe this is the main contrast with the pre-Trump era. What shocks people now is not the killings or tortures around the world but simply the unpredictability of the system and the impolite attitudes of Trump. The so-called liberal world order can handle cruel political leaders who can lead to vast human rights abuses, but it should be done in a “polite” way. This was how the system worked and this is how it will work after Trump. We will not have a bright future in the post-Trump era, the miseries will not end, but we will have a more polite president. As for other issues with regard to the liberal character of the order from international trade to international institutions, that’s the place where we should look for the real change under the Trump administration.

Turkey-U.S. relations are at a new low and it should not come as surprise to anyone that Trumpian foreign policymaking has a lot to do with it. It was less than a month ago that President Trump snubbed most European leaders in a NATO summit in Brussels and seemed to have a warm relationship with President Erdogan, symbolized by the now famous fist bump.

Yet within a month, Trump has given Turkey an ultimatum over the Brunson case, clearly trying to satisfy his Evangelical supporters. As Erdogan refused to bow down to such pressure, Trump announced the doubling of tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminum that had been imposed earlier this year. Trump was not only impatient with the legal process but also bypassed diplomatic talks between Ankara and Washington, which were designed to resolve the outstanding legal issues between the two countries. As a result, the Turkey-U.S. relationship has become the latest victim of Trumpian foreign policymaking.

This is not the first time that the President has attacked an ally with an eye to retain or increase domestic support on a given issue. Trump attacked Mexico based on his immigration agenda while imposing tariffs on Canada as a result of his economic agenda at home. He threatened to impose tariffs on European imports, which seems to be on hold for the moment after European leaders convinced Trump to work on a new trade agreement.

Trump continues to threaten allies with sanctions for doing business with Iran based on his campaign promise to rip apart the Iran deal, which he did. In all of these instances, President Trump’s domestic agenda has driven the foreign policy agenda while he makes little effort to synthesize the two. In this sense, “America First” has come to mean undermining America’s alliances if it served the administration’s domestic political agenda.

Similarly, President Trump has questioned the very institutions that the U.S. has helped build since the start of the Cold War, including NATO – undermining perhaps the most important institution for U.S. global leadership. Trump’s relentless attacks on NATO were meant to serve his nationalist domestic agenda. The reduction of the debate on NATO’s global role and mission to a budgetary matter, often expressed in terms of financial contributions of member states, was a message to the domestic audience that the U.S. would insist on everybody paying their “fair share.” This message could resonate with a constituency sensitive to government spending and skeptical of the U.S.’ global role. It also sends a message that international organizations are there to serve, first and foremost, U.S. interests rather than sustaining an international system.

Trumpian foreign policy will have long-lasting implications for the global system as well as America’s alliances with countries like Turkey. Turkey is already faced with monumental challenges emanating from the regional instability caused by civil wars in Iraq and Syria. Turkey has also been a strong advocate of international institutions like the UN and NATO assuming larger responsibilities to achieve stability in the region. The U.S., however, chose a unilateralist path under Trump, eroding the effectiveness of multilateral institutions.

Despite these realities, Turkey was working with the U.S. in order to find a resolution to outstanding legal issues between the two countries through diplomatic channels. But the Trump administration’s sanctions and tariffs on Turkey, motivated by domestic political calculations, make it impossible to repair the relationship in the short term.

Trumpian foreign policy will continue to damage U.S. credibility and standing within its allies as well as its competitors. While U.S. allies like Europe and Turkey are going to struggle to effectively address these challenges, they are unlikely to simply roll over. The clear message from the Turkish leadership in the latest currency crisis was that Turkey would not give in to unreasonable demands. Clearly, this is not a desirable state of affairs between two NATO allies, but it is the reality of a new era in which the U.S. government does not hesitate to punish its allies and undermine the very institutions it helped build over decades. Even if the Turkey-U.S. relationship is somehow put back on track, Trumpian foreign policy will continue to introduce much instability into the international system for the foreseeable future.

Many in Turkey and around the world got shocked as the Turkish Lira depreciated tremendously against the U.S. dollar in the last few days. It goes without saying that this sharp depreciation has nothing to do with economic fundamentals in any sense. This is irrationality and hysteria in action. And for many, it is utterly political as well, as the U.S. president Donald Trump has made it very clear in a tweet that reads “I have just authorized a doubling of Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum with respect to Turkey as their currency, the Turkish Lira, slides rapidly downward against our very strong Dollar! Aluminum will now be 20% and Steel 50%. Our relations with Turkey are not good at this time!” [Italics added by me] So, it looks like the hegemonic power of the world, the U.S., is going rogue “financially” against its so-called ally, Turkey.

Turkey has undergone five major financial attacks in the last two years. First in November 2016, second in January 2017, third in October-November 2017, fourth in May 2018. This is the last and by far the biggest one. The first three financial attacks, however intense were they, pale significantly in comparison to the last two. And the last one we are witnessing nowadays is an outlier still, in which the Turkish Lira lost its value by around 40 percent within the space of a couple of days.

Such a dramatic devaluation necessitates equivalently dramatic economic reasons if we are to adhere to an economic explanation. Yet there is none. As an economist, it is really difficult for me to try to understand and “analyze” what is going on economically. I wrote several articles both in English and in Turkish for the past two years regarding this very same subject and tried to show that these financial speculations, or “financial attacks” have their roots not in economics but in politics for the most part.

To reiterate briefly, although the Turkish economy has its own weaknesses such as a high current account deficit, as other countries have their own, the Turkish economy looks quite healthy. In addition, external debt to GDP ratio is 53 percent as of 2017. Public debt to GDP ratio, on the other hand, is only 28 percent. This ratio is one of the lowest in the whole world. Moreover, the Turkish financial system is quite healthy with a 16.3 percent of capital adequacy ratio. This holds for non-financial firms too. Short-term foreign exchange liabilities of non-financial firms in Turkey is lower than their short-term financial assets.

I should add that in the last quarter, the Turkish economy fared considerably well, too. The average economic growth rate for the last five quarters is 7.4 percent in Turkey. In addition, the unemployment rate, though relatively high, decreased by more than one percentage point to 9.6 percent in the last year.

Further, no macroeconomic indicator of Turkey went sour in the aforementioned period. Yet Turkey has now been suffering a very dramatic devaluation.

It is apparent for most people in Turkey that the U.S. has been exerting its financial influence on Turkey in order to promote its political aims regarding Turkey. And this is not the first time the U.S. is doing this. Take Chile in the 1970s. From 1970 to 1973, the U.S. strived hard to overthrow the democratically elected President Salvador Allende. As a small part of this endeavor, which is named Project FUBELT, the then President Nixon ordered the CIA to “make the [Chilean] economy scream” in 1970 in an effort to destabilize the country.

Note that these points are not speculations, but declassified facts as Collin Powell, the then U.S. Secretary of State, expressed in 2003 that “with respect to (…) Chile in the 1970s and what happened with Mr. Allende, it is not a part of American history that we’re proud of. I can’t justify or explain the actions and decisions that were made at that time.”

The Turkish economy looks strong enough to weather this irrational and politically motivated financial attack, though it will certainly make a dent in the short term. However, one should note that the U.S. government itself is undermining the very legitimacy of its “strong” currency by abusing its “power” to promote its political ends. This will certainly have important ramifications for the U.S. globally in the medium and long-term.

As the relations between Turkey and the U.S. have turned tense, the economic cost of the tension is increasing for Turkey with the USD skyrocketing vis-a-vis the Turkish Lira. The outcome is heavy for the Turkish economy but it is not what Turkey deserved when bilateral relations are examined retrospectively.

The Turkey-U.S. alliance had better days over the past seven decades. While it’s not in its best mood today, it’s not in its worst either. Turkey served as a significant pillar of the containment strategy of the USSR during the Cold War era. The logic was simple. Turkey would not be part of the Soviet sphere of influence. It would allow the American intelligence to operate freely from Turkey to monitor the Soviets. It would host NATO military bases. It would be okay for the nuclear-tipped Jupiter rockets to be deployed in its own soils to deter the Soviets. It would also be okay if the U.S. uninstalls its military equipment on a whim. It would be ready to absorb a possible offense from the Soviets so that the “West” would save some time for its defense, and so on. This way, Turkey was a key part of the Western defense strategy against the USSR. This way, the Black Sea has never been a Soviet lake, the Soviets could not rule the Eastern Mediterranean, and they could not have direct access to the Middle East. In return for this great strategic favor, Turkey would get NATO’s word for its collective defense against any possible Soviet aggression and, further, would receive economic aid and cheap credit from the West.

Nevertheless, this seemingly plausible anti-Soviet alliance was tested multiple times. The opium crisis and Turkey’s military intervention against the Greece-backed junta in Cyprus let to the most memorable crisis between the allies. While the U.S. placed an arms embargo on Turkey from 1975 to 1978, Turkey responded by closing the military bases that were hosting American troops in the country. The crisis did not last long though. As Turkey changed its opium policy in a way to satisfy the American demands, the U.S. ended the embargo and did not push Turkey too hard on the Cyprus matter. Yet, it costed Turkey to diverge from the American orientation with its shrinking economy in the late 1970s. After all, it was and is still costly to annoy a superpower. Annoying the global sheriff led the Turkish economy in the late 1970s to something very much reminiscent of today.

The U.S. will fail to leave a smooth legacy in the Middle East without the support of Turkey. Thus, there’s still time to transform relations from a lose-lose to a win-win situation.

The Turkey-U.S. alliance did not die as did the enemy, that is the Soviets, died in 1991. By the time it became clear that the old enemy was collapsing, the U.S. had already found new enemies. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1990 was about to be the first rogue state of the new world order. As a loyal American ally, Turkey provided assistance to the U.S. for its first Gulf War against Saddam. It was an easy military win but not a final victory with a persistent legacy. It was not the end but a whole new start for Turkey.

With its role in the war, Turkey seemed happy to show its utility as an ally in the post-Cold War era but what it did not know was Iraq would never be a stable neighbor again for the next 17 years until now. The power vacuum in its neighbor was filled by the PKK and Turkey has witnessed years of terror attacks originating from Iraq. For that reason, Turkish policymakers did not welcome the idea of a second Gulf War across its borders in 2003.

The Turkish parliament denied the U.S. permission to use the base in Turkey to store its military equipment before the invasion of Iraq in 2003. This was the most significant turning point and the heaviest crisis between the allies after the opium crisis of the 1970s. The alliance has become a pseudo-alliance since then. The Syrian War was and still is proof of the fact that Turkey is not being treated as a genuine ally by the U.S. Turkey’s refugee problem due to the Syrian Civil War has been disregarded by the U.S. as it rejected Turkey’s calls for joint action. Further, Turkey was left alone when it got really close to a war with Russia after it downed a Russian jet in 2015. By the time Turkey found a formula to get out of the tight corner it got stuck to in the course of the Syrian War, the U.S. had already started to cook a new alliance with Turkey’s long-time adversary, the PKK (its Syrian branch PYD to be precise).

As long as the U.S. does not change its policies regarding the PYD and FETO, Turkey will see its alliance with the U.S. as no more than a pseudo-alliance no matter how much it hurts the Turkish economy.

Further, the U.S. is also hosting the FETO (Fethullahist Terror Organization) network on American soil. FETO is the organization that carried out the coup attempt of June 15, 2016. These two issues are direct threats to Turkey’s very basic national security and far more significant than the following crises whether it be last year’s visa crisis or today’s Brunson crisis. It seems like as long as the U.S. does not change its policies regarding the PYD and FETO, Turkey will see its alliance with the U.S. as no more than a pseudo-alliance no matter how much it hurts the Turkish economy. This may not sound as a big problem for a superpower like the U.S. Nevertheless, it should also see that it can win wars in Iraq or Syria but cannot leave a smooth legacy without Turkey.

The bilateral relations can still change course from a lose-lose scenario to a win-win one. Perhaps American policymakers no longer need Turkey to contain Russian expansion for now, but it will not help the U.S. to alienate Turkey and push it to the revisionist camp of the American hegemony. I still think the U.S. is not blind to lose Turkey altogether and will flex its muscles in its dealing with Turkey. If it does not, Turkey has its own instruments. It cannot hurt the USD by threats on Twitter, but Turkey is a growing country in its capabilities, population, and significance on the world scale.

As the financial pressure increases over Turkey, it will search for an exit, which may lead to an increasing financial linkage to China, which I believe will not please American interests. As Turkey will try to overcome the current financial risks with domestic structural reforms and a quest for new international economic partners, it is still not too late to resurrect the pseudo-alliance. Some easier solutions on the Brunson or Halkbank matters based on mutual respect can spill over toward something better and bigger.

Relations between Turkey and the U.S. are underway fundamental challenges following the U.S. administration’s reaction to Pastor Andrew Brunson, who has been under house arrest since July 8. The tension reached peak due to the remarks made by Washington and Ankara regarding the freezing of two American officials’ assets – namely interior and justice ministers. However, given President Erdogan’s treatment of the issue, the continuation of diplomatic contact between the two countries at the highest level of crisis, and the preferences of President Trump, an expectation emerged that will help to overcome the Brunson crisis. It should be expected that the Brunson crisis will be overcome shortly. However, both sides have to intensify efforts in order to close down the deeply-rooted political rift in Turkey-U.S. relations.

One of the primary things that have to be accomplished shortly after the resolution of the tension is to redefine bilateral relations on a very realistic ground. For this reason, both sides need to communicate and understand the significant global, regional and domestic challenges that constrain relations. To do so, both sides should avoid conceptualizing bilateral ties within the framework of “strategic partnership,” “model partnership” and “alliance” – terms that have never entirely fulfilled the Turkish-American cooperation objectives. This, in turn, requires also the recalculation of the long-term strategic vision of Turkish foreign policy. It is important to note that Turkish-American relations are at the center of Turkish foreign policy if the existing foreign policy engagements of Turkey are taken into consideration, particularly in the Middle East region.

At this stage, both sides should analyze the real damages caused following the multidimensional conjectural crisis in Turkey-U.S. relations. Later on, it is also necessary to make a list of possible short-term problems that have been encountered in Turkey-U.S. relations and make clear what can be done and what cannot be to recover bilateral relations.

Managing the lack of trust in bilateral relations

The most important issue that both sides should bear in mind about damage assessment is the lack of trust in bilateral relations. The lack of trust between states is one of the oldest hidden rules of international relations. States usually do not trust each other. There is a simple explanation for that; a state can never be sure whether the intention of another state is good or not. It is possible to make a list of issues that fueled the lack of mutual trust between Turkey and the U.S. One of the most important reasons, and perhaps the most unlikely to be overcome soon is the role of the U.S. in the July 15 coup attempt. It is not possible to say that Turkish public opinion on this subject is very positive, given that Fetullah Gulen, the commander of the July 15 military coup, remains free in the U.S. and other members of FETO perceive the U.S. as a safe haven. The issue of lack of trust is not limited to this. With the support of the U.S., the PYD-YPG, the political and military branch of the PKK, enjoys its terrorist insurgency against Turkey. This further deepens the lack of trust between the two countries. Turkey strongly believes that providing more space to the PYD-YPG consolidates the PKK’s political and military power that ultimately undermine Turkey’s national security.

The crisis of the lack of trust in bilateral relations is not one-sided. The U.S. administration does not perceive Turkey as a “reliable ally.” From the U.S. strategic view, Turkey refuses to join the U.S. strategy towards Iran, continues to work with Russia, and undermines Trump’s Israel strategy. Therefore, the lack of trust is reciprocal.

The second issue emerges as a result of the lack of trust. Turkey has a serious difference as compared to the U.S. in addressing global issues. Turkey criticizes the U.S.-centric international order, believes that the international order should be reformed and underlines that the U.S. undermines the very nature of the international order, which is based on universal norms and institutions. Therefore, Turkey seeks to establish a more balanced international order. To do so, Turkey is working with the alternative power centers such as Russia and China to develop an alternative relationship and seeks to consolidate its relations with the rising powers to balance out the U.S.-centric international order.

Harmonization of foreign and security policies

Even if the conjectural crises experienced in bilateral relations are to be overcome shortly, the harmonization of foreign and security policies, which is the primary driving factor of the lack of trust, is crucial for the re-positioning of Turkey-U.S. relations. However, the issues that the two countries have to deal with in the near future are very complex in nature. One of the first issues that both sides should think about is Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy. Turkey does not embrace any foreign policy option that could threaten U.S national security and territorial integrity, unlike the U.S. administration. If Washington D.C. maintains its current strategy regarding PKK presence in northern Syria and does not prevent the PKK from threatening Turkey’s national security, the U.S. may face a stricter face of Turkish military activism in the region. Immediately after the Brunson crisis is overcome, both sides have to develop a more comprehensive strategy on how the Manbij model will be implemented towards the other regions in northern Syria. This strategy should not be handled separately from the general solution to the Syrian crisis.

Even if the PKK problem in Syria is overcome, it is unlikely that the two countries will share the same strategy on Israel after the Brunson crisis. A new political structure has emerged in Washington and the Middle East following the Trump administration’s Al-Quds decision. The Washington administration has an agenda that gives Israel a “blank check” on its policy towards Palestine. In the region, there is also a turning point in the policy of Arab states towards Palestine. Turkey is the only country in the region that has many objections against the policy of “abandoning Palestine.” Turkey’s Israel policy will be directly affected by its relations with the U.S.

After the Brunson crisis, the more difficult issue that the two countries are unlikely to overcome is Turkey’s desire to obtain an air defense system from Russia. Provided that the Turkish administration ultimately receives the S-400 systems at the end of 2019, the U.S. administration might impose a series of additional sanctions against Turkey. One of the first results of this purchase will be seen in Turkey-U.S. military relations. The U.S. considers removing Turkey from the F-35 program. Another short-term problem that can potentially disrupt bilateral relations is the Trump administration’s strategy towards Iran. Turkey believes that the new U.S. strategy on the Iranian nuclear program would destabilize the region and undermine Turkey’s trade relations with Iran. Turkey’s early reaction against the U.S. administration’s decision about imposing new sanctions against Tehran highlights that Turkey will not follow the U.S. strategy. Therefore, the U.S.-Iran conflict would bring more instability to the U.S.-Turkey relations.

As long as there is no structural change on the regional or global level, it is not true that Turkey-U.S. relations will collapse. In this transition period, it is necessary to contain the costs of damage for both sides. Therefore, in the post-Brunson Turkey-U.S. relations, both sides should carefully follow a damage control policy. One of the most fundamental things that the Turkish administration should be aware of is the fact that under the Trump administration no single strategic logic can run bilateral relations and other regional issues. For this reason, it would be more appropriate for Turkey to remind itself that the tensions in Turkey-U.S. relations are shaped by mutual foreign policy choices rather than a single actor-centered determination.

The U.S. withdrawal of the Iran nuclear deal and the fresh round of sanctions imposed on Monday present a test to U.S. allies including Europe and Turkey. President Trump campaigned on getting rid of the “worst deal” ever, pulled out of the agreement, imposed sanctions on Iran and promised to isolate the country despite warnings by European allies as well as Turkey. Although President Trump made a rhetorical gesture to Iran’s President Rouhani about meeting face-to-face without preconditions, the U.S. is set to ratchet up the pressure and seek to isolate Iran ahead of the November elections. If anything is clear, Europe is less than thrilled about having to cooperate with the U.S. and states like Russia, China, and India will most likely continue to do business with Iran. Under these conditions, a renewed U.S.-Iran standoff in the coming months might have serious consequences not only for the region but for U.S. allies as well.

In the absence of a leadership, Europe will likely limit itself to protecting the financial interests of European companies but will not be able to produce a comprehensive deal.

European leaders have already expressed their dismay with the Trump administration’s decision to re-impose sanctions underlining that the deal had been working. Furthermore, they are working on providing legislative cover for those businesses adversely affected by U.S. action. The U.S. leadership has been touting Iran’s growing economic problems as part of the success of their pressure campaign but the Iranian regime survived heavy international pressure before. When it finally came to the negotiating table to make the 2015 deal, there was a broad unity among the P5+1 powers and others. The Trump administration’s unilateralist approach will, in all likelihood, be even less effective in isolating Iran and more punishing against U.S. allies.

The Trump administration says it is open to making a more comprehensive deal but declines to take the lead on forging a framework and doing the diplomatic heavy lifting. In the absence of such leadership, Europe will likely limit itself to protecting the financial interests of European companies but will not be able to produce a comprehensive deal. It is doubtful if it can save the Iran deal in any meaningful way. The element of surprise is a signature feature of the Trump presidency as we have seen the President declare his willingness to work toward no trade barriers with the EU. Yet, on Iran, he will most likely pursue a hardline policy until he can declare some sort of “victory.” This dynamic in the wake of November elections makes it almost certain that we will witness increased pressure on Iran and heightened regional tensions.

The Trump administration’s unprecedented sanctions and additional penalties imposed on Turkish entities for facilitating trade with Iran would deepen the divide, potentially setting the bilateral ties on a course of complete breakdown.

If the U.S. makes good on its promise to actually start penalizing companies doing business with Iran, Europe, as well as Turkey, will find themselves in a difficult position. Turkey relies on Russia and Iran for most of its energy needs and it cannot easily give up on especially Iranian natural gas. The Obama administration provided Turkey with waivers but doing business with Iran continued to be a significant source of tension in the bilateral relationship. It is not clear whether the White House will be willing to provide exemptions to Turkey but President Erdogan already indicated Turkey’s energy needs as his first priority on this issue. The Trump administration’s unprecedented sanctions on a NATO ally have already severely strained the Turkey-U.S. relationship and additional penalties imposed on Turkish entities for facilitating trade with Iran would deepen the divide, potentially setting the bilateral ties on a course of complete breakdown. Let us hope that the most recent talks between the two sides on the Iran sanctions produce tangible results and that they are not reversed by hasty decisions.

Finding a comprehensive solution to the standoff with Iran would remove a significant source of tension from the region but it will probably not be possible in the short and medium terms, barring a major reversal by President Trump or the Iranian regime. In the meantime, both Europe and Turkey will have to figure out a way to work with a unilateralist U.S. administration in order to protect their economic interests as well as energy needs. The already troubled Turkey-U.S. ties, however, will almost certainly experience the most duress as a result.

When a glance is taken at the history of Turkey-U.S. relations, it becomes evident that the relations follow a rough course. Even though the tradition of initiating this relation dates back to the Cold War era (1945), one could tell that the contact that was attempted in the 19th century at the last Ottoman period was full of issues. Along with the 1947 Truman Doctrine, Turkey had attracted American attention on a strategic level. As a result of the 1952 NATO membership, Turkey became part of a relation that was going through an institutionalization process on military and political levels.

Unfortunately, since then, cooperation between Turkey and the U.S. has not been exempt from issues. Putting the idea of being exempt aside, it is possible to argue that the course of Turkish-American relations has had direct impacts on Turkish politics. The cause of these issues has been the fact that the U.S. administration portrays Turkey as a passive operator of its own strategies. In other words, the U.S. has considered Turkey as a country to facilitate American foreign policy objectives in the Middle East without hesitation. This consideration has prepared the ground for an interfering character over time. The American interference in Turkish politics, including the facilitation of military-coups and enforcement of a series of unjustified political methods, have resulted in the deterioration of relations between the two countries. Consequently, this situation has given birth to a deep trust problem in bilateral relations. Since 1945, due to a lack of structural change in international systems, the conjunctural crises in Turkey-U.S. relations have been left behind and repaired in one way or another. However, along with the 2003 Iraq invasion, the fluctuations experienced in relations have taken deeper structural forms as opposed to short-term interest discrepancies.

Even though the international system continues to be U.S.-centric, Turkey’s perception of this system, the partial transformation experienced within the system (proliferation of power centers), the change of Ankara’s priorities in terms of its foreign policy, as well as the tensions and fractions experienced in the geopolitical environment involving Turkey make it even more difficult to overcome the crises in Turkey-U.S. relations.

Therefore, it is not possible to take the newly emerged Pastor Brunson crisis out of this context. It is also not quite possible to overlook the new evangelist, conservative and extreme right religio-political identity of U.S. foreign policy that has accelerated under the Trump administration when examining the Pastor Brunson case. More importantly, it is worth noting that the Brunson case is likely to be used for leverage in the upcoming elections by the Trump-Pence duo. The difference between Trump and Pence is also notable here. Trump is very likely to make use of any tools at his disposal to continue his presidency, and this fact is not only limited to Turkey. Trump’s interactions with countries such as Iran, North Korea, and Russia also prove this point. However for the vice president, Pence, this situation contains more ontological reasons. Pence’s expressions, relationships, and foreign policy engagements lie in the heart of evangelist political existence. The cases of Pastor Brunson and Jerusalem both represent a ‘clash of civilizations’ and even a ‘religious-conflict.’ This should be noted as the most significant exposal of the messianic wave in U.S. foreign policy.

The reparation of Turkey-U.S. relations is now more challenging

Today, the crucial pillars of the Turkey-U.S. relations have been weakened, and this makes it even more challenging to overcome the bilateral crises.

The Cold War led Turkey to position itself in the Western bloc under American supervision. However, Turkey no longer positions itself as such. Furthermore, the current international system is no longer unipolar, which enables regional actors to obtain wider impact zones. It is possible to examine the Middle East, where most actors have acquired independent policies apart from American interests to comprehend this phenomenon.

Nowadays, being part of the Western bloc represents nothing but a means of strategic, economic and political engagement for Turkey. Thus, U.S. supervision is no longer seen as necessary when it comes to Turkish foreign policy. More importantly, the Turkey-U.S. relations are now being redefined with factors including anti-Americanism and American-suspicion. From now on, the U.S. is positioned as ‘the other’ of Turkish foreign policy and Turkish state identity. Turkey is no longer an advocate or critic of an American-centric liberal international system, and that is not because Turkey disapproves a liberal world order, but because it is one of those state actors that advocate a fair restructuring.

It is now evident that Turkey and the U.S. have lost intersections when it comes to their foreign policy objectives. The U.S. is reluctant to respond to Turkey’s security concerns, and as compared to the beginning of the 2000s, there is less cooperation between the two states. In fact, due to the cases of S-400s, Jerusalem, Syria, Iraq and Iran, they are far apart regarding opinion. Turkey’s regional foreign policy priorities do not approve American regional foreign policy approaches and generate ‘troubles.’ Iran sets a good example in this regard. Even though Turkey is upset about Iran’s regional policies, and disapproves the Iranian Nuclear program just as much as the U.S., it does not support the harsh American policy towards Iran.

Even though it is possible to argue that the military pillar of the Turkey-U.S. relations, NATO, stands still, it cannot compromise the issues experienced as a whole. Within this framework, it is clear that even more challenging periods are awaiting, and it can be argued that relations between the two can worsen.  If Turkey can level up in the international system and increase its share of power through the new system change, it could also fix the asymmetric issues in its relations with the U.S. More importantly, if Turkey has taken the initiative to step out of the Western bloc, it should create a new identity complying with real power capacity and means. The first thing that comes to mind in such a context is the ‘alternative world’ definition. The issue that requires attention is that actors such as Russia cannot replace the U.S., as superpowers. Instead of leaning towards power dilemmas, Turkey should establish its own independent identity. Despite the issues experienced by the U.S., Turkey’s foreign policy practices still carry a transatlantic nature. This character cannot be changed all of a sudden. Therefore, Ankara should be careful regarding reducing costs. It is necessary for Turkey to stand firm against the insistent and menacing behaviors, the country should respond to every single step taken by the U.S. determined to proceed with its independent foreign policy.

On August 1, 2018, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) under the Department of the Treasury  announced that two high-level government officials of Turkey, namely Minister of Justice Abdulhamit Gul and Minister of Interior Suleyman Soylu were sanctioned. The main motivation of taking the measure was the detention of Pastor Brunson.

The OFAC relied on an Executive Order which was signed by President Trump to mainly target individuals from different countries, such as Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Serbia and so on. The President finds his authority to issue this Executive Order in widely different laws. For instance, the first one was the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which was the one of the charges brought against Hakan Atilla. The second law was the National Emergencies Act (NEA) that was enacted in 1976 and gives the President the authority to declare “national emergency” under certain circumstances. The third law mentioned in the Executive Order was the notorious Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Magnitsky Act) which was enacted in 2012 to target certain Russian officials who were responsible for the loss of Sergei Magnitsky’s life in a prison under serious human rights violations. While the target was initially Russian individuals, Congress invented this legal tool, giving it to the executive power to target other foreign individuals as well. The final legal text was the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which is related to the immigration and citizenship law in the domestic law of the U.S.

The recent action taken by OFAC raises a question as to how the Executive Authority chooses this legal basis. Although OFAC mentioned the Magnitsky Act specifically in its announcement, it is not precise whether the Magnitsky Act was the only legal basis of this decision. In other words, OFAC explained that the action taken “pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, “Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption,” which builds upon Treasury’s Global Magnitsky Act authorities, albeit it did not specify whether the Magnitsky Act was the only basis. Therefore, it was unclear whether the other abovementioned laws, such as IEEPA or NEA, were at issue when deciding to impose sanctions. These laws require the President to determine whether the situation in Turkey constitutes a national emergency or unusual or extraordinary threat for the U.S.

Since OFAC frequently mentions “serious human rights abuses” in their claim, it is implied the only legal basis relied on was the Magnitsky Act. The OFAC’s allegations against two ministers raise several doubts whether OFAC interpreted the text of the Magnitsky Act properly. Section 1263 of the Magnitsky Act requires two different things for the president to determine. First, the president needs to determine the violation of human rights occurred, and second, the targeted individual is responsible for this violation. According to this one page explanation, these determinations hardly appear. The responsibility was understood by OFAC as a mere political responsibility which does not necessitate any concrete evidence to show why these people officials bear responsibility.

The other problematic aspect of the interpretation of the Magnitsky Act is related to the level of seriousness of the abuse of human rights. The text of the law specifies this level as “gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” It also gave examples of internationally recognized human rights as torture and extrajudicial killings. However, OFAC left no detailed analysis of what level of human rights abuses in Turkey attained to qualify the situation in Turkey as “serious human rights abuses.” It is difficult to declare Turkey as a country of “serious human rights abuses” based on the alleged violation of rights of one individual. Nevertheless, in the case of Brunson it is not plausible to claim that the principles of due process and fair trial are seriously violated by the Turkish authorities.

The future of the relationship between the U.S. and Turkey is difficult to predict because of the unexpected and unclear scope of the sanctions. At first glance, claiming the responsibility of these two individuals implies that OFAC put the responsibility on the two government officials exclusively. However, then it is reported that the scope of sanctions against Turkish officials may broaden, including many more individuals and entities. It is fair to conclude that these legal tools were used to gain a leverage in U.S. domestic and foreign policy.

The U.S.-Turkey relationship is faced with yet another crisis, this time over the Brunson case. Crises are increasingly becoming the rule rather than the exception largely because of the underlying strategic dissonance between the two NATO allies. The U.S. and Turkey continue to fundamentally diverge over the PYD’s position in northern Syria, the Turkish purchase of the Russian S-400s, and arms transfers. The legal cases such as the Gulen extradition, the Halkbank case, and the Brunson case further deepen the existing discord. Added to this picture, the Trump administration’s domestic political troubles are pushing the relationship to the brink.

In the latest episode, Vice President Pence’s need to satisfy the demands of his evangelical constituency ahead of the November elections seems to override the need to engage Turkey rather than punish it. Pence’s harsh rhetoric was matched by President Trump’s social media message on the matter, which was clearly coordinated. As with many other foreign policy issues, President Trump used harsh rhetoric despite the welcome progress underlined by high level administration officials such as the Secretary of State Pompeo just days earlier. There is a chance diplomatic channels may produce a result acceptable to both sides on the Brunson case, but the ultimatum-like rhetoric used against Turkey would only make it harder to arrive at a political understanding, if any.

The ongoing efforts in the U.S. Congress to block the transfer of F-35s to Turkey indicates the detrimental effect of domestic political calculations on foreign policy. Congress has asked the Pentagon to provide a report evaluating the implications of Turkey’s potential purchase of Russian S-400s. Lawmakers cited the Brunson case to justify this move but the potential blockade of the transfer of the planes would hurt the very strategic partnership that the F-35 project is supposed to strengthen. President Erdogan has already pointed to international arbitration in case of such a move, which would only cause delays in the program and further damage the U.S.-Turkey security partnership.

The U.S.-Turkey relationship certainly has the capacity to overcome this latest crisis but a lot more effort is required to put it on the right track. Both sides had been avoiding public statements that would damage the ongoing working groups for a while now. But the most recent spat shows that domestic political considerations can be spoilers and it is crucially important to prevent such mishaps. The Turkish public continues to be deeply distrustful of the U.S. and the American public opinion is shaped by negative media coverage as well. Turkish politicians have made a serious effort to work with the Trump administration on all problem areas through various proposals and mechanisms to resolve problems but it is clear they will not respond well to sanction threats. The U.S. leaders need to give time and space to diplomatic channels instead of issuing counterproductive threats.

President Trump’s style of raising the stakes in order to secure a deal that benefits the U.S. seems to be at work here. However, raising the stakes based on domestic political calculations and adopting a maximalist approach cannot provide solutions in an already troubled relationship. The U.S. support for the PYD was already a move that was unilateral in its approach despite assurances provided to Turkey. Now, if the Trump administration goes down the road of unilateralism seeking to force Turkey’s hand, the relationship will only suffer damaging the national interest of both allies. The U.S.-Turkey relationship can hopefully overcome this latest crisis but we will almost certainly see more crises in the future given the instability and unpredictability in the region as well as the increasing insecurity and distrust among NATO allies.

In a speech delivered on December 5, 2017, German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel, member of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), stated that it would not be beneficial for the U.S. to leave European countries alone regarding rising powers in the Middle East and other Asian countries. He went on to suggest that the European Union and Germany are required to defend their own interests more self-confidently. A few days after Gabriel’s statement, SPD Chair Martin Schulz also made a similar emphasis during the party’s congress. Adopting an unrealistic rhetoric, Schulz called for the establishment of a “United States of Europe” by 2025.

While representatives of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU), a center-conservative party, did not brush off this suggestion made by Schulz as an idealistic one, they expressed that such a thing was not possible in the short-run. As can be recalled, CDU leader and German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, emphasized in a speech she made in May 2017 that Germany needed a foreign policy less dependent on the U.S. In this speech, Merkel also stressed that with the inauguration of Donald Trump, the U.S. was no longer a reliable ally, adding that therefore Europe is required to determine its own fate from now on.

During his speech, Gabriel pointed out that the EU has been gradually losing its influence and that Germany in particular needed to take a more active role in foreign policy. Another notable statement made by Gabriel is that new areas of crises have emerged in the east of Europe, which have disrupted stability in the region. Within this framework, the German Foreign Minister claimed that the Syria summit between the presidents of Russia, Turkey and Iran in Sochi must be read as the “old empires rising,” adding that “the major powers gathered in Sochi are not friends, but they have plenty in common. They base their identity both at home and abroad on their historical greatness. And that is the crucial factor that distinguishes them from us: they invest considerable capital in throwing their weight about to show the West from time to time.”

Can Germany defy the U.S.?

Gabriel also underscored that Turkey does not refrain from launching military operations or having dispute with the U.S. in order to protect its own interests against the Syrian offshoots of the outlawed PKK’s quests for an autonomous region, adding that the EU and the U.S. remain passive in the face of such problems. Within this scope, one of the most noteworthy expressions of Gabriel is undoubtedly “We need to realize that we can either try to shape the world ourselves or wait to be shaped by the rest of the world.”

Within the German parliamentary system, in which a new government has failed to be formed for over three months, not only are transatlantic relations being questioned, but a divergence from the conventional foreign policy sustained since the Second World War is also occurring. How can we evaluate these developments? While it must be noted that the choices and statements made by the federal government and foreign ministry who are temporarily in charge must not be read within long-term foreign policy plans, it is evident that Germany has adopted this stance since 2014. Consequently, the latest statements are not directly linked to the Trump administration.

It would also be useful to recall the statements made by the former non-partisan German President Joachim Gauck, former Foreign Minister from the SPD Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Defense Minister Ursula Gertrud von der Leyen from the CDU at the 2014 Munich Security Conference, who called for a more active Germany in world politics before the statements made by Merkel in May 2017 and the SPD politicians in December 2017. Along with the discussions that have been ongoing for a long time in regards to whether Germany would become a more active foreign policy actor with less dependence on the U.S., the positions of the three countries referred to with their historical past, particularly Turkey, have also been considered within this context.

Is Gabriel’s emphasis on Russia, Iran and Turkey a defiance?

As a number of studies indicate, although the German public supports the idea of an institutionally more active EU under the leadership of Germany and France, they do not give as much credit to Germany’s increasing military expenditure, which is vital for realizing this idea. Such conventional and compulsorily passive stance of Germany, which is the fourth largest economy in the world, also reflects the actual and traditional foreign policy approach of the SPD. However, it has been observed that a trend of change (at least on the level of rhetoric for the time being) has been adopted by both the CDU/CSU alliance and the SPD as of 2014. This tendency has discursively become much more explicit due to the foreign policy priorities of Trump.

Meanwhile, German public opinion and leading media circles who read the statements of Gabriel as a defiance to transatlantic relations indicate through a more realistic perspective that Germany cannot successfully stand by itself and that therefore there is no alternative other than siding with the U.S. In this case, what can we understand from Germany’s emphasis that countries like Russia, Iran and Turkey are increasing their prominence in regions where the U.S. is claimed to be ceding?

The German political elites’ divergence from the U.S. or the formation of a (military) alternative within the present state of the EU does not seem possible, at least in the short run. It is not certain that a possible concurrence of Germany and France will be agreed upon by all other EU Member States. It must be noted that one of the reasons for Germany’s new quest in defense is Brexit, which will see the EU lose the United Kingdom – a military power who is also a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Therefore, Germany cannot possibly lead a formation that would offer an alternative to the U.S. for the time being. Cognizant of this, the German administration endeavors to mark some provocative maneuvers in order to improve relations with the U.S. to some extent. Undoubtedly, one of the leading maneuvers in this sense has been the gesture towards prominent countries in places where a vacuum of power has been observed within the declining influence of the U.S.

The project of an “active Germany” and Turkey-Germany relations

One of the most noteworthy aspects of Gabriel’s remarks for the Turkish public opinion is his emphasis on “old empires” while referring to Russia, Iran and Turkey. This emphasis may have been made with an aim to highlight that the uni-polar world order lead by the U.S. “Empire” is about to come to an end. Although this statement may not turn out to be correct in all respects, this possibility decreases as the current position of Germany cannot allow the country to consider a notable detachment or embark on new alternatives aside from the U.S. in the short run. For this reason, Gabriel’s statement can be said to underline the fact that the situation is not promising for the U.S. either, and that the U.S. administration is required to support the institutional transformation of the EU and contribute to a stronger and more realistic Western alliance.

Furthermore, although Germany had adopted an irrational approach to Turkey, the country currently signalizes a return to a more realistic foreign policy. This choice can be read as a message against the U.S. and the historic alliance with Germany. Drawing on an “uncontrollable” Turkey, Iran and Russia, which can be interpreted as an element of threat through a conventional transatlantic viewpoint, Gabriel signalizes that better relations can be established with these countries with a perspective of a more active foreign policy that pays particular regard to the economic interests of the EU and Germany, contrary to the old state traditions. Calling for a more reconciliatory approach with Russia with stress on economic cooperation, Gabriel is known to be siding with the Trump administration in regards to Iran and supporting the maintenance of the nuclear agreement deal made with Tehran. As for Turkey, Germany is expected to pursue a realistic perspective while it is estimated that German foreign policy will endeavor to establish a partnership with the Ankara administration on equal terms instead of an asymmetrical relationship.

Stating that Germany cannot act alone in international politics, Gabriel has consistently underlined that Germany is required to act with the EU in order to secure Europe in cooperation with Russia. Parallel to this, Germany is closely observing Turkey’s foreign policy choices that prioritize the country’s own interests as Turkey is a NATO ally which does not act under the control of the U.S.

It is fair to state that Germany will seek to develop close ties with Turkey with a more realistic perspective in the following period. Although German politics and media will probably try to affect Turkish politics due to the upcoming 2019 elections in Turkey, a return to a more realistic ground is inevitable in the long run.

As can be seen from the German Foreign Minister’s approach, Germany’s attitude towards Russia is not in line with the U.S. and the projects implemented with Russia, such as Nord Stream II, indicate that Germany is prioritizing its own interests despite the U.S. Refusing Trump’s Iran policy may also increase the possibility of establishing closer ties between Berlin and Ankara.

The fact that Germany is avoiding a future projection that is dependent on the U.S. will consolidate the need to search for other alternatives both inside and outside of the EU. Since alternatives within the EU are extremely limited in the short-term, establishing more realistic relations with Turkey will probably be considered as one of Berlin’s long-term projections.

While it does not seem possible to implement this approach into practice in the near future, it still needs to be considered by Germany. Over the past four years, the German administration has diverged from a rational approach in its relations with Turkey. However, it is possible for Berlin to pay regard to the realities of Ankara in a more reasonable way, which must not be overlooked due to the presence of the U.S. and the EU. In doing so, following the formation of a new federal government in the near future, rather than radical changes, small yet realistic steps can be taken in German foreign policy in order to re-establish relations between Turkey and Germany as the positive atmosphere and constructive outcome of the most recent Gabriel – Cavusoglu meeting demonstrates.