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ermany’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) marked a turning point both in the shaping of the post-Second World War European security architecture and in Germany’s reintegration into the international system. Following its defeat in 1945 and the subsequent division between East and West Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) found itself on the front line of the Cold War.

Within this geopolitical reality, under the leadership of its first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, Germany saw ‘integration with the West’ (Westbindung) as the sole means of regaining the country’s sovereignty, securing its safety and forging lasting ties with the Western world. Germany’s membership of NATO, which took shape in line with Adenauer’s strategic vision and was formalized on 6 May 1955, represented not merely participation in a military alliance, but also a historic paradigm shift that reinforced Germany’s democratic identity and redefined the balance of power in continental Europe.

With its NATO membership, Germany began to re-establish a regular army and rearm. The fact that Germany was on the ‘hot front’ of the Cold War—a situation in which it could become the direct centre of hostilities in a potential conflict—is best understood through Chancellor Adenauer’s statement: ‘The sole aim of Germany’s rearmament is to contribute to the preservation of peace.’

Germany’s NATO objectives: Peace or the pursuit of economic interests?

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Cold War giving way to regional hot conflicts, the late 1990s and early 2000s saw Germany playing an active role within NATO. In addition to its participation in the Kosovo Peacekeeping Force (KFOR) in the Balkans, Germany’s deployment of troops to the US-led operations in Afghanistan in 2001, at NATO’s request, is particularly noteworthy. Germany’s participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – established by a United Nations resolution and subsequently placed under NATO command – with a force that at times exceeded 5,000 troops, is regarded as the largest overseas military mission in modern German history.

In an interview given during a visit to German troops in Afghanistan in 2010, the then German President Horst Köhler stated that Germany’s overseas military mission should be viewed in a different light, remarking: “As a country of our size, as a country focused on foreign trade and therefore dependent on it, we must recognise that military intervention may also be necessary to protect our interests when required or in emergencies – for example, to secure free trade routes or to prevent regional instability – as such instability would undoubtedly have a negative impact on our opportunities in terms of trade, employment and income. ‘All of this must be discussed, and in my view, our situation is not all that bad…’ he had stated.

Horst Köhler’s remarks, made at a time when there had also been military casualties, raised questions about the constitutionality of Germany’s role in ISAF whilst also sparking intense domestic political debate; Horst Köhler subsequently resigned from the office of President.

Similar remarks were made by the then Federal Minister of Defence, Peter Struck, in December 2002, when the decision was taken to continue sending troops to Afghanistan. In a speech to the Federal Parliament, Struck said: “To clarify the matter, I had mentioned that our security is also defended in the Hindu Kush. ‘When we combat international terrorism alongside our allies and partners—using military means where necessary—in the very places where it originates, Germany becomes a safer place. Our security is further enhanced when the Bundeswehr successfully participates in the reconstruction process in the Balkans and Afghanistan, in accordance with democratic principles, thereby helping to establish the secure environment urgently required in these regions.”

These remarks, which are still the subject of debate today, signalled the dawn of a new era in German foreign policy at the time they were made. They marked the beginning of a new phase in which German foreign policy was no longer confined to defending its own borders, but also encompassed international preventive efforts. National interests were aligned with international interests, thereby justifying a military presence beyond Germany’s borders.

Despite all the past debates, although the number of troops is smaller, Germany still maintains a military presence at 17 locations with 2,000 troops as part of various NATO missions.

NATO or a European common defense system, or both?

Another initiative coinciding with this turning point in Germany’s foreign policy from a military perspective was the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP – Gemeinsame Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik), which was proposed at the European Union summit in Cologne in 1999 under Germany’s presidency and officially incorporated into the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. The CSDP, which was officially implemented in 2009, also led to the establishment of the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs through the provisions added to the Treaty of Lisbon. Just as in the NATO Treaty, the provision for a call for assistance and support, to be activated at the request of a member state, was also incorporated into the Treaty of Lisbon, thereby giving the CSDP practical effect. The first to invoke this provision, by requesting assistance and support, was French President Hollande following the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015.

With 23 member states within NATO, the EU began setting strategic objectives through the CSDP to enable the EU to meet the expectations placed upon it as a security actor operating on a global scale. In 2020, under Germany’s Presidency, the ‘Strategic Compass’ was launched as the key document of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), setting out a clear direction and defining both the policy’s objectives and the necessary resources to achieve them. The first joint threat analysis by EU Member States was drawn up. The Strategic Compass also aims to foster even better cooperation in the field of security and defence and to enable the EU to respond more swiftly and effectively to crises through forward planning.

The EU Global Strategy, developed in 2016, stands out as a new and shared commitment regarding the security policies of Member States, whilst steps were also taken that same year to establish the EU Common Defence Fund under the CSDP.

Although the CSDP may at first glance appear to be an alternative to NATO, it is a structure without a standing army or an existing military chain of command. Since 2020, whilst the EU has undertaken various global missions under the CSDP, joint operations with NATO have also taken place.

Within the EU, a group of countries led by France argue that Europe must become an independent military and strategic actor, separate from the other side of the Atlantic. However, the former Warsaw Pact members that joined the Union through eastern enlargement—Poland, Romania, Hungary and the Baltic states—view NATO as an irreplaceable security umbrella for Eastern Europe. These states, which view Russia as a direct existential threat, currently regard the CSDP’s military deterrence as inadequate and position NATO—which hosts US nuclear and conventional capabilities—as the absolute preference for their own national defence. These countries advocate that the transatlantic bond must not be severed.

Furthermore, the rule within the EU requiring unanimous decision-making on CSDP matters hinders the EU’s ability to respond swiftly and effectively to crises. This situation impedes the CSDP’s operational capabilities.

Germany, meanwhile, is endeavouring to strengthen the CSDP whilst simultaneously seeking to bolster its role within NATO by increasing its defence budget. Ahead of the NATO summit, Germany – which had been criticised by the US President for not increasing its defence budget sufficiently and for failing to provide adequate support within NATO – has already countered Trump’s criticisms through Chancellor Merz, stating that defence spending has now reached 4 per cent of annual gross domestic product.

The debate over the relationship between NATO and the EU’s CSDP was also raised during Chancellor Merz’s meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during his visit to Ankara. President Erdoğan emphasised to Chancellor Merz that preserving the ‘Transatlantic Bond’ was crucial for strengthening NATO’s European pillar, and stressed that Turkey could support the European Union’s defence initiatives provided they complemented NATO. This situation demonstrates, on the one hand, that the CSDP is being closely monitored in Ankara and, on the other, that it has once again been emphasised that, from Turkey’s perspective, a common defence strategy against global threats must be defined within the framework of NATO. However, Merz’s statement that ‘a new European NATO is being established’ has failed to provide any indication as to what role the CSDP will play within NATO.

Turkey-Germany relations in the context of NATO

Relations between Turkey and Germany, which form NATO’s south-eastern flank, have followed a contentious course due to geopolitical shifts, diverging strategic priorities, Germany’s approach to Turkey’s cross-border operations, and the ‘clash of national interests’ between the two countries within the alliance. The fundamental strategic disagreement between Turkey and Germany stems from the asymmetrical nature of their threat perceptions. As a border state directly affected by instability in its immediate region (Syria, Iraq and the Mediterranean), Turkey prioritizes issues such as ‘counter-terrorism’ and ‘safeguarding territorial integrity’—not only its own but also that of its neighbors—whilst Germany has adopted a stance that disregards Turkey’s determination in the fight against terrorism.

During the Syrian civil war, following an increase in the ballistic missile threat against Turkey, Turkey requested an air defense system from NATO. In response to this request, Germany deployed the Patriot missile defense system to Kahramanmaraş; however, in 2015, despite the threat persisting, Germany withdrew the Patriot missile defence systems prematurely, citing Turkey’s counter-terrorism policies as justification. This situation, which led to a serious loss of trust in Germany and called into question NATO’s deterrent capability, persisted until recently.

Despite the friendly and warm remarks made by Merz in Ankara, Germany; its embrace of the PKK and FETÖ, the fact that these organizations still find a foothold in Germany, and the German state’s belief that by providing a platform for these terrorist organizations it could politically weaken Turkey, indicate that relations will not improve in the short term and that the alliance between the two countries within NATO will continue to be turbulent for some time to come.

Among the key issues included in the latest coalition agreement—that is, the government program—regarding Germany’s role within NATO are improvements to the federal armed forces’ contingents deployed as part of NATO’s defense efforts and an increase in military equipment. It has been stated that, due to its geographical location in Europe, Germany will be further strengthened as a central hub of NATO. Similarly, the government program views NATO as one of the cornerstones of the transatlantic partnership and emphasizes its indispensability for European security.

Among the objectives is the commitment to work towards establishing a European Defence Union with the aim of strengthening NATO’s European pillar. This objective is also in line with the argument that Germany must become more Europeanized in order for NATO to remain ‘Transatlantic’. In doing so, it also intends to pursue a trilateral cooperation protocol with France and the United Kingdom.

Whilst Germany is moving towards becoming a logistics hub within NATO, it will, at the same time, seek to bring together its EU member allies under a common budget and logistics framework by utilizing the CSDP mechanisms within the EU to strengthen NATO. In the long term, it will seek to secure its economic and political leadership on the European continent through its strength in the defense industry and its military power.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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erman federal prosecutors have charged a 50-year-old Ukrainian national with helping coordinate the 2022 sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines, marking the most significant legal step yet in one of Europe’s most consequential infrastructure attacks.

The suspect, identified only as Serhii K under German privacy laws, is accused of playing a leading role in the operation that destroyed the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines beneath the Baltic Sea, severing a major route for Russian natural gas exports to Europe months after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Federal prosecutors filed the indictment on Wednesday but declined to comment on its specific contents.

According to German public broadcaster ARD, Serhii K faces charges of attacking civilian energy infrastructure, causing explosions and destroying critical infrastructure.

The charges stem from an investigation into the September 2022 underwater blasts near Denmark’s Bornholm Island, which severely damaged both pipelines and disrupted Russian gas supplies to Europe during an already escalating energy crisis.

Court documents from December 2025 allege that Serhii K coordinated a team that used the sailing yacht Andromeda to transport explosives to the pipelines. Prosecutors claim he acted as the team’s on-board coordinator and operational leader rather than serving as a diver or explosives specialist.

The Berlin-based law firm Menaker, which represents the accused, has not commented publicly on the indictment.

German prosecutors confirmed that Serhii K is the same individual arrested in Italy in August 2025 following a German arrest warrant. Italy’s highest court later approved his extradition to Germany, where he was transferred in November 2025 to face investigation.

At the time of his arrest, German authorities alleged that the suspect had used forged identity documents to charter the Andromeda in the northern German port of Rostock before the vessel departed on the mission that investigators believe culminated in the sabotage operation.

Serhii K has denied any involvement in the explosions. His defense has maintained that he was serving with the Ukrainian armed forces and was inside Ukraine when the attacks occurred. His lawyers have argued that, even if military service were established, he would be entitled to what they describe as “functional immunity” under international law.

Ukraine denies involvement as investigation continues

The Nord Stream explosions remain among the most politically sensitive investigations in Europe, given their impact on regional energy security and the absence of any formal attribution of responsibility nearly four years after the attack.

Ukraine has consistently denied any state involvement in the sabotage or knowledge of any plot targeting the pipelines.

Speaking at a news conference in Dublin on Wednesday, Volodymyr Zelenskyy said it was too early to comment on the German indictment because Kyiv had not officially received details of the case.

“We have not officially received any details; at least I have not seen them,” Zelenskyy said, adding that it was premature to draw conclusions.

The twin Nord Stream pipelines, running beneath the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany, had been central to Russian gas exports to Europe before relations between Moscow and the West deteriorated sharply following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Although Nord Stream 2 had never entered commercial operation, both pipelines were rendered inoperable by the explosions, eliminating a key component of Europe’s energy infrastructure.

The investigation has involved authorities from Germany, Denmark and Sweden, with investigators examining evidence including vessel movements, explosive residue and maritime records.

The indictment represents the first formal criminal case brought by German prosecutors against an individual alleged to have participated directly in the sabotage. However, investigators have not publicly alleged that the Ukrainian government authorized or directed the operation.

The case is expected to proceed through Germany’s federal court system, where prosecutors will seek to prove that Serhii K coordinated the team responsible for carrying out one of the most significant attacks on critical energy infrastructure in recent European history.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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o see what effects the shift of the world’s centre of gravity from the Europe-Middle East axis towards the People’s Republic of China-South Asia axis has brought about, it is sufficient to note the visits to Beijing by US President Trump and, shortly afterwards, Russian President Putin within the space of a week, and to realize that Europe was not even mentioned during these visits. We can see how Europe’s equilibrium has been disrupted by developments in Beijing through the shifting stance of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen over the course of a month.

In a speech delivered on 20 April 2028 at the 80th anniversary event of the newspaper Die Zeit, she stated: “We must succeed in uniting the European continent as a whole so that it does not fall under Russian, Turkish or Chinese influence. We must think on a larger, geopolitical scale,” Von der Leyen stated. She must have quickly realized that the so-called power she represents does not belong in the league of superpowers, neither in terms of energy, defense nor technology, as she received the necessary lesson regarding the strategic importance of Turkey-EU relations during her telephone conversation with President Erdoğan on 19 May. In fact, this fundamental lesson was the result of a series of Turkey-centered developments throughout May.

The hard mathematics of geopolitics

Looking at the sequence of events, the visit to Turkey on 11 May by Queen Mathilde of Belgium, accompanied by a large delegation of businesspeople, can be considered the first link in this chain of developments. During the visit, Belgian Foreign Minister Maxime Prevot, responding to questions from TRT Haber, made the following remarks that explicitly targeted the President of the European Commission, serving as proof of how the EU’s perspective on Turkey has shifted: “Of course, the European Union needs Turkey. Turkey also needs Europe. In my view, it was illogical to use a phrase that places Turkey, China and Russia on the same level, on the same platform, as stated by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. You are a stabilizing force. For this reason, we must take Turkey’s strategic role in Europe’s future security architecture into account more than ever before.”

The developments necessitating a reorientation of von der Leyen’s course did not end there. On Monday 18 May, as part of Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to Germany, the third meeting of the Turkey-Germany Strategic Dialogue Mechanism was held after a 12-year hiatus. The fear of Russia and US pressure must have put Berlin in such a state that German Foreign Minister Wadephul felt compelled to make the following remarks regarding this meeting: “After many years, we have re-engaged in strategic dialogue with Turkey. We wish to devote more time to this, as we want to examine the issues in greater depth. I am pleased that we have re-engaged on this path; we have reached a new level of quality in bilateral relations.”

For Wadephul’s quest for quality to achieve its aim, he must first begin with self-criticism. For instance, he could start by addressing the covert embargoes imposed on Turkey’s submarine manufacturing and the Akkuyu nuclear power plant. Or, if he were to explain how the investigation files regarding the NSU (National Socialist Underground) terrorist organization’s murder of eight Turks were deleted on 11 November 2011 – the very day the Federal Prosecutor’s Office took over the case – we might be able to move a little closer to the desired quality in Turkey-Germany relations. To understand Germany’s real concern, it is sufficient to look at the Welt newspaper’s report, also dated 18 May. Following the US’s suspension of Tomahawk missile deliveries to Germany, Berlin is seeking a solution in the Turkish defense industry.

What is interesting is that the Berlin-Paris duo, which has favored Greece since the 1970s under the banner of Hellenic romanticism, still cannot raise its voice against Athens, which is blocking Turkey’s participation in the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) program. On the contrary, the overwhelming majority of member states are now aware that this 150-billion-euro program for joint defense procurement cannot achieve its objectives without Turkey, and have adopted the approach of bypassing the Greek obstacle by entering into independent agreements with Turkey. Indeed, reports have begun to emerge in the press suggesting that France is also making moves to join this initiative. However, it has been made clear to Paris, which is attempting, on the one hand, to stir up trouble in the Caucasus and, on the other, to upset the balance in the Eastern Mediterranean to Turkey’s detriment by aligning with the Greek Cypriot administration, that cooperation with Turkey in this area is impossible.

The Berlin-Paris axis: Coming to terms with Turkey

Although Turkey’s well-intentioned appeals have failed to yield results, the shifting geopolitical balances in the world are ultimately teaching the Berlin-Paris axis that it must come to terms with Turkey. The European Union, led by Germany, has now realized that it will be on the menu in any potential global power-sharing agreement between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. What they must now do is make up for the time and money they have squandered so generously since the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1992. Furthermore, they must admit that the energy they have expended on stalling Turkey has also been in vain.

The current state of the European Union was summarized by Germany’s former Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, on 4 May 2026 during a program he attended at the Harvard Kennedy School, part of Harvard University in the US. “The US and Germany have become a nation of lawyers. Other countries can build a national railway network in 20 years. Why can’t we build an urban rail line in 20 years?” As can be seen, Scholz, unlike von der Leyen, prefers to turn the spotlight on himself rather than targeting Turkey.

I do not believe Scholz chose this phrase, ‘a country of lawyers’, by chance. This phrase reminded me of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s 1993 book *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century*, in which he served as National Security Advisor to former US President Carter. In this work, Brzezinski warned the US administration, which was intoxicated by the victory of the First Cold War, that it needed to redirect its resources towards structural reforms as a matter of urgency. Had this warning been heeded, it is certain that we would not be seeing Donald Trump in the White House today.

In his book, Zbigniew presented a 20-point list of measures that needed to be implemented for the structural reforms the US required. The tenth item on this list concerns the issue of becoming a ‘nation of lawyers’, to which Scholz also refers. Brzezinski summarizes his complaint about this situation under the heading ‘The Presence of Parasites in the Legal System’ as follows: ‘One-third of the world’s lawyers work in the US. Legal fees paid in tort cases alone amount to three per cent of the US gross domestic product. This ratio is three times higher than in the countries with which the US competes. This high ratio has a deterrent effect on investors.”

Borrell’s garden has become a jungle

Instead of investing in technology and industry, or establishing a common defence and energy policy, the European Union, which offers those living within its borders a fantasy paradise, is now at a loss as to what to do in the face of developments centred on the People’s Republic of China. Yet on 13 October 2022, Josep Borrell, then the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, addressed students at the European Union Diplomatic Academy and brazenly likened the world beyond the European Union’s borders to a wild forest.

According to Borrell, the European Union represented a well-tended garden, that is, the best political harmony humanity could achieve. However, there was a danger that the forest might invade the garden, and according to Borrell, the European Union’s gardeners should go into the forest and engage with the rest of the world. Fortunately, thanks to the inflation driven by rising energy prices over the past four years, we now have the opportunity to observe a Europe that has turned into a jungle, where the far right is constantly gaining strength, from the island of stability that is Turkey.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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xchanges between US President Donald Trump and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz are becoming increasingly heated. Merz was initially one of the European leaders with whom Trump got on best. While leaders of major European nations, such as France and Spain, found themselves embroiled in disputes with Trump following his inauguration for a second term in early 2025, Merz’s first meeting with Trump at the White House in June 2025 ended without incident. Trump’s warm welcome and words of praise were also well received in the German media.

Merz’s praise for Trump, his avoidance of raising issues between the two countries, and his assertion that the US was an indispensable partner for Germany all played a key role in ensuring the meeting’s positive outcome. Furthermore, Merz brought a copy of his German grandfather’s birth certificate as a gift and did his utmost to win over the American president.

Despite Trump’s threats regarding Greenland and the economic toll of his tariffs on European industry, the positive start to the Trump-Merz relationship proved resilient for a long duration. This was because Merz was one of the European leaders who was most vocal in advocating a cautious and conciliatory approach in response to Trump’s aggressive policies. Unlike France, Spain and the UK, Germany continued to unconditionally support Israel’s actions in the Middle East during Merz’s tenure. While the aforementioned countries recognized the State of Palestine in response to Israel’s actions, Germany’s refusal to recognize Palestine also contributed to Trump’s satisfaction with Merz.

Finally, Merz’s statements supporting the war initiated by the U.S. and Israel against Iran—which was in violation of international law—had also greatly pleased Trump. The German Chancellor, who supported Israel during last year’s 12-Day War by stating, ‘This is the dirty work Israel is doing for all of us,’ entered into a heated dispute with Iranian leaders by demanding regime change prior to the Israel/U.S. offensive that began on February 28 of this year, earning the appreciation of the Trump-Netanyahu duo.

Regarding the US and Israel’s stance on attacking Iran with the aim of changing its regime, Merz argued that this was in accordance with international law. Shortly after the war began, the German chancellor visited Trump at the White House. While he expressed his support for the US and Israel, he remained silent in the face of Trump’s harsh criticism of the Spanish and British prime ministers, who had announced during the meeting that they would not allow their countries’ bases to be used for the war. Clearly, Merz’s stance also pleased the American president.

Angering Trump

It was clear that the German chancellor would anger Trump by changing his stance on Iran and making critical statements as events took a turn for the worse, given that he had pursued an Iran policy aligned with the US and Israel. The deterioration in the relationship between Trump and Merz became apparent when the US and Israel realized that effecting a regime change in Iran would be more difficult than they had anticipated. They had not even managed to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, which had been closed by Tehran. Merz’s rejection of Trump’s request for assistance against Iran in reopening the Strait of Hormuz infuriated the American president.

Merz’s rejection of this request, accompanied by the question, ‘Did they ask us when they started the war?’, led to an intense response from Trump, given that the German chancellor had previously adopted a stance in his pre-war statements along the lines of ‘Yes, the regime in Iran must change’ and ‘Go on, do our dirty work for us’. Now that the process was not going as planned and the global cost of the war was rising daily, Merz’s reluctance to offer support was causing Trump distress.

It should be noted that both parties believed they were justified in their actions. Merz feels vindicated in his stance, arguing: ‘Our support was purely rhetorical; you entered this war confidently without the need to consult us, so do not ask us to join now. We are already occupied with a war against Russia in Ukraine, and our military strength is insufficient. Trump, on the other hand, believed he was in the right, reasoning, ‘You said the regime in Iran must change. You said our attack was in accordance with international law, so why aren’t you supporting us?’

Damaging a relationship

These differences in position and perspective appear to have damaged the relationship between the two leaders, as well as US–German relations, to an extent that will be difficult to repair. The German chancellor’s remarks in a speech on 27 April further enraged Trump. In the speech, she stated that ‘the US would not be able to end the war against Iran in the short term because the Iranians are stronger than anticipated and the Americans lack a truly persuasive negotiating strategy’, and that ‘the entire American nation has been humiliated by the Iranian regime’. Trump, who has threatened to withdraw American troops from Germany, said that ‘it is hardly surprising that Germany is in such a dire state, both economically and in other respects, under the leadership of Merz, who has no idea what he is talking about’.

Unable to contain his anger, Trump took his criticism of the German chancellor a step further, accusing Merz of being ‘completely ineffective’ in the war in Ukraine thus far and stating that ‘instead of meddling in other matters, he should be trying to put his “ruined country” back in order’. Trump’s remarks that the German chancellor should devote more time to ending the war between Russia and Ukraine, followed by his instruction to the defense minister to withdraw 5,000 troops from Germany, may prevent Merz from further escalating this dispute. This is because, while US interest in and support for Ukraine has diminished significantly under Trump, an escalation of tensions between Washington and Berlin could leave Germany and other European countries in an even more difficult position with regard to Russia.

The failure of the US and Israel to achieve their objectives in the unjust war they launched against Iran, coupled with Iranian resistance, is causing a rift among even Trump’s most loyal supporters. The US could face serious problems with its allies and Israel if the Strait of Hormuz were to close for an extended period.

(This article was originally published in Turkish by the Middle East Africa website)

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series of photographs recently circulated in the global public sphere once again laid bare a reality that is well-known but rarely spoken of. Japan Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s visit to the US provided the backdrop for scenes that have sparked much debate in Japan. The fact that the images of Takaichi dancing at a dinner party were featured prominently on the White House’s official website caused a shockwave across the country.

However, the real issue was not the dancing footage, but the psychological subservience displayed by the Japanese delegation throughout the visit. Whilst defending his decision not to inform allies in advance of the Iran operation, Trump remarked, “Who knows better about surprise than Japan?”, alluding to the surprise air raid on the US fleet at Pearl Harbor during the Second World War. Takaichi’s silence in the face of this mocking attitude drew criticism.

Her description of the leader of a country that had dropped atomic bombs on their cities as the only person “who can achieve peace across the world” was viewed by the Japanese public as a humiliating situation. What has transpired is not merely the result of a single act of diplomatic discourtesy or individual lack of judgement. Rather, these events represent the manifestation of a dependency relationship, woven thread by thread since 1945, brought into the open by a current incident.

From defeat to ‘alliance’

With the end of the Second World War, the US, acting as a hegemonic power, initiated a profound process of restructuring in both Japan and Germany. This process was framed as support for democratization and economic development. In reality, however, a structural control mechanism was established over both countries that surpassed even the most refined forms of colonialism.

The picture is striking when looking at the Japanese example. The constitution drafted under US supervision in 1947 stripped Japan of its right to maintain armed forces and declare war. Theoretically, this was presented to the Japanese people as a peace-oriented arrangement. In practice, however, it transformed Japan into a state that had to hand over its defense entirely to the US and seek Washington’s approval in every political crisis. Today, there are over 50,000 US troops and approximately fifty bases on Japanese territory. This military presence resembles not forces deployed in an allied country for the sake of shared interests, but rather a guarantee force stationed by a hegemon to secure its own sphere of influence.

Germany’s situation is, in essence, no different. Divided by the four major powers following the Second World War, Germany was reorganized as West Germany under the NATO umbrella, with every step of this reorganization subject to Washington’s approval. Even today, there are approximately 35,000 American troops in Germany. In this respect, Germany is not much different from Japan. The fact that Germany’s efforts to construct a natural gas pipeline with Russia (the Nord Stream project) were derailed by US pressure has laid this reality bare. The sabotage and explosion of the Nord Stream pipeline in 2022 have also starkly revealed just how harsh and ruthless this dynamic operates.

The illusion of sovereignty: From economic miracle to compliant growth

The post-war economic rise of both countries serves as a kind of veil for their relationship of dependency. Japan’s economic miracle and Germany’s ‘Wirtschaftswunder’ were achieved not in spite of the structural constraints these countries faced, but precisely because of the safeguards those constraints provided. The US’s open market provided a vast area for these countries’ exports; the security umbrella established against the Soviet threat, meanwhile, enabled these states to keep defense spending to a minimum, thereby allowing them to redirect resources towards industrial investment.

This was not a gift, but a transaction. In return, Japan and Germany relinquished their ability to make strategic decisions independently; they often had to subordinate their national interests to Washington’s global agenda, and at times were compelled to accept policies that entailed heavy economic costs. The Plaza Accord, which Japan signed under US pressure in the late 1980s, demonstrated just how heavy the price of this acquiescence could be. What befell the Japanese Prime Minister is also the result of this semi-colonial dependency, systematically cultivated over many years.

Window-dressing democracy: How was South Korea polished up?

Following Japan and Germany, another country we must address here is South Korea. Frankly, South Korea is in no way inferior to these nations. The 1950–53 Korean War was the first major proxy war of the Cold War. In the North, there was a communist regime backed by the Soviet Union and China; in the South, an authoritarian government supported by the US. With the end of the war, South Korea was transformed into the Western bloc’s most advanced outpost in the region. The buffer role of preventing communism from spreading south resulted in South Korea being presented on the international stage as a representative of the democratic and free world, regardless of what transpired in its domestic politics.

Yet South Korea’s recent political history stands in stark contrast to this portrayal. From 1961 to 1979, the country was ruled by Park Chung-hee’s military junta, which systematically suppressed left-wing tendencies, trade unions and the opposition. Following his assassination in 1979, another military coup took place, and Chun Doo-hwan carried out the Gwangju massacre in 1980. This massacre was largely ignored in the West, with the US administration playing a decisive role in covering up the events.

Despite this sordid past, South Korea continues to be presented by the West as a success story of Asian democracy.

Just how unfounded this privileged international perception of South Korea is has become even more apparent in recent years with a succession of scandals. In 2016, the then-President Park Geun-hye was removed from office and put on trial on charges of accepting millions of dollars in bribes from major corporations to influence state decisions. While this scandal laid bare the corruption of business world-political relations, the arrest of the Samsung Group chairman also exposed the intertwined nature of business and politics. Yet, these scandals have been presented to Western public opinion as examples proving the strength of South Korea’s democracy and commitment to the rule of law, simply because they were brought to light. The President’s trial has been cited as proof that accountability mechanisms are functioning.

In December 2024, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol declared a state of emergency, characterizing opposition parties as representatives of anti-state forces. This move was declared invalid by parliament within hours, and the President was removed from office. These developments inevitably raise the question of how a leader in a country presented as a consolidated democracy could attempt such autocratic measures. On the other hand, despite all this, it is puzzling that South Korea’s position in the upper echelons of international organizations’ democracy indices remains unchanged. For the existential contrast with North Korea renders South Korea indispensable to the West. This indispensability, in turn, brings with it a systematic display designed to mask its weaknesses.

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ince Donald Trump took office as president of the United States at the beginning of 2025, his desire to annex Greenland, his openly expressed intentions to annex Canada, and his threats of higher tariffs against European countries have led Germany, like many other European countries, to express its desire for a “rules-based international order.” Almost everyone, including politicians, journalists, academics, and various segments of society, is trying to understand how the U.S., which Germany has relied on until now, is behaving so lawlessly and moving towards a ruleless world. Faced with this overt power politics from their “ally” across the Atlantic, even targeting Europe, they are expressing both disappointment and are now trying to develop strategies to adapt to this new world.

Defending the Rules—Selectively

Germans and other Europeans take great pleasure in portraying themselves as the new protectors of the rule of law, as the United States, which emerged as the “founder and protector” of the post-World War II international political system, has transformed into a power that threatens this rules-based order. They enjoy making statements along the lines of, “America betrayed the rules-based order, but we will continue to defend it and uphold the rule of law.” They particularly favor Ukraine as an example, explaining how a significant portion of Germany and other Europeans heroically supported Ukraine’s “struggle for rights and freedoms” against the Russian occupation.

However, when it comes to the Middle East, Germany appears to be pursuing a policy that completely disregards the rules of international law. A country that champions a rules-based international order and criticizes others for violating it would be expected to oppose Israel’s genocide in Gaza, its attacks on Lebanon and Syria, and its unjust war of aggression against Iran. Similarly, Germany, which claims to value the rules, should also oppose the U.S. attack against Iran. Indeed, in 2015, it was one of six countries that signed an agreement with Iran to peacefully resolve the issue stemming from that country’s nuclear activities.

When the U.S., with Trump’s presidency, decided to withdraw from the agreement and reimpose harsher sanctions against Iran, Germany and other EU countries had the opportunity to keep Iran in the agreement. They could have defied U.S. sanctions and maintained trade and economic relations with Iran, thereby ensuring Tehran’s adherence to the agreement despite Washington’s stance, but they failed to do so. At the time, they created The Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) mechanism, giving the impression that they were trying to maintain trade with Iran, but subsequently succumbed to U.S. sanctions and were unable to effectively operate this mechanism.

Support for Israel

In the subsequent period, Germany, along with many other European countries, moved away from its classic “critical dialogue” policy towards Iran and adopted an approach aligned with the pressure and sanctions policies of the U.S. and Israel. The point we have reached now is that Germany, which once called on the U.S. to exercise restraint on Iran, has been replaced by a Germany that openly supports the U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran. Particularly during the presidency of Friedrich Merz, who took office in May 2025, Germany’s stance towards Iran hardened, resulting in further deterioration of relations between the two countries due to the reactions and statements from Iran.

German Chancellor Merz’s statement during the 12-Day War, which began with Israel’s attack on Iran, that “This is Israel’s dirty work for all of us,” was a clear endorsement of an attack and an aggressor launched in violation of international law. Merz, who justified this attack as “part of Israel’s right to protect its existence and ensure the security of its citizens,” did not bother to explain how such legitimacy could be possible in a war of aggression. When Germany speaks of a “rules-based order,” the first element that comes to mind is international law, and according to international law, “war of aggression” is explicitly prohibited. Only the use of military force in self-defense or in accordance with a UN Security Council resolution is legitimate.

Neither of these justifications existed in Israel’s war against Iran, which began on June 13; there was no Security Council resolution authorizing military intervention against Iran, nor was there any Iranian attack targeting Israel. Israel’s attempt, like the U.S. on numerous occasions before, to legitimize its attack on Iran by framing it as a preventive war and claiming it as self-defense is not an acceptable approach under current international law. Despite this, the German Chancellor’s support for this war, which violates international law, constitutes a clear distortion of the principles of a rules-based international order.

Anti-Iranian stance

Germany’s stance of supporting Israel in its unjust attack on Iran, as it did during the Gaza genocide, has further deteriorated relations between Berlin and Tehran. During this process, Germany, traditionally known for its more moderate and conciliatory policy in Iran-Western relations—a natural consequence of its status as a trading nation—has increasingly adopted a harsher stance towards Iran. This tension is evident in the statements of German Chancellor Merz. Following the widespread protests in Iran in January, which resulted in thousands of deaths, Merz stated that the Iranian regime’s days were numbered and demanded that the Revolutionary Guard Corps be added to the EU’s list of terrorist organizations.

Germany’s stance, targeting the Iranian regime and supporting Israeli aggression, has provoked strong reactions from the Iranian side. In a social media post in January, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that “Of all governments, the one in Germany is perhaps the worst placed to address ‘human rights’,” and asked, “What, then, does Mr. Merz have to say about his wholehearted support for the mass murder of 70,000 Palestinians in Gaza?” Araghchi’s message on February 5 on X, stating, “Germany was once the engine of Europe’s progress; now it has turned into an engine of regression… We Iranians have unfortunately been faced with several other examples of Merz’s political naivety and distasteful character,” is significant in demonstrating the current state of German-Iranian relations.

Germany’s stance targeting Iran continued even during the period when the U.S. was preparing for an attack on the country and increasing its threats. During this process, Chancellor Merz adopted a supportive position towards the U.S., stating that they “supported the U.S. initiatives to remove Iran as a factor destabilizing the region.” This stance by Merz was met with criticism from some in the German opposition. Fabio de Masi, leader of the BSW party, criticized Germany for not taking a similar decision to British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s statement that the UK would not allow the U.S. to use its military bases in a potential attack on Iran, and accused Merz of acting like “Trump’s lackey.”

Referring to the stance of then-Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who openly opposed the illegal U.S. aggression against Iraq in 2003, he stated that the current German government should adopt the same approach, saying, “Merz must stop being Donald Trump’s lackey and refrain from indirectly dragging Germany into an aggressive war that violates international law.”

The influence of the Zionist lobby on Germany’s policy towards Iran and the Middle East in general has been significant. However, as de Masi points out, during the Iraq War under Social Democratic Chancellor Schröder, Germany was able to take an anti-war stance despite this lobby and pressure from the U.S. Now, the Social Democrats are partners in the coalition government, but they are not raising an effective voice of opposition to Merz’s excessive subjugation of German-Iranian relations to the influence of the Zionist lobby and the U.S.

Beyond Germany moving far from the independent foreign policy of the Schröder era under Christian Democratic foreign policy leadership, the Merz-Wadephul duo appears to be bringing Germany’s Middle East policy closer to the Israel-U.S. axis even more than during the terms of previous Christian Democratic chancellors. The fact that Germany is doing this at a time when it views Trump’s foreign policy as a threat to the “rules-based international order” seems to require explanation.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

G

ermany is set to push through an €83 billion rearmament drive that heavily favors European defense companies, with only a small fraction of contracts going to U.S. weapons makers, according to procurement documents obtained by POLITICO.

The plan, drawn up for the Bundestag’s budget committee, details 154 major defense contracts scheduled between September 2025 and December 2026. Of that total, just €6.8 billion — about 8 percent — is earmarked for U.S.-made equipment, a sharp break from Berlin’s recent status as one of Washington’s most reliable arms customers.

European focus

The largest projects on the list are dominated by European industry. Topping the bill is the €26 billion F-127 frigate program, to be led by German naval giant ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS). Another €4 billion is allocated for Eurofighter Tranche 5 jets built by Airbus, BAE Systems, and Leonardo, with €1.9 billion more for radar upgrades.

The army stands to receive €3.4 billion for new Boxer armored vehicles produced by Rheinmetall and KNDS, alongside €3.8 billion for a new wheeled tank destroyer. Additional funding will go to Taurus cruise missile modernization, IRIS-T SLM air defense systems, and a troubled “Eurodrone” project, which still requires significant development.

By contrast, U.S.-made systems appear only sparingly: €150 million for Boeing torpedoes linked to the P-8A patrol aircraft and €5.1 billion for Raytheon’s Patriot missile batteries, supplemented by smaller missile and radio packages.

Shift from Washington

The figures mark a striking pivot. Between 2020 and 2024, Germany approved more than $17 billion in U.S. foreign military sales, peaking at $13.9 billion in 2023 amid heightened demand following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. That spree briefly made Berlin one of the top buyers of American arms worldwide.

Now, Berlin is signaling a longer-term bet on European strategic autonomy. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, NATO’s European members sourced 64 percent of their arms from the U.S. in recent years. Washington — and particularly President Donald Trump — has urged allies to keep buying American.

In July, Trump struck a trade deal with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, touting “hundreds of billions” in future European purchases of U.S. defense equipment. A joint statement promised that the EU would “substantially increase procurement” from the U.S., with American government support.

But defense spending remains in the hands of national governments, and Germany’s procurement plan undercuts that pledge.

Modernization and politics

The plan highlights Germany’s intent to upgrade across all services, from naval frigates and submarine warfare systems to drones, trucks, radios, and ammunition. Some politically sensitive projects are also included, such as €2.3 billion for Taurus cruise missile modernization — under pressure from Ukraine, but still withheld from direct transfer.

For Chancellor Friedrich Merz, the program balances Germany’s NATO commitments with an industrial strategy to bolster Europe’s defense sector. Yet the sidelining of U.S. suppliers could strain Berlin’s relationship with Washington, just as NATO grapples with Russian provocations in the Baltic and the ongoing war in Ukraine.

Analysts say the document illustrates a growing divide: Europe doubling down on self-reliance while Trump’s America demands loyalty to U.S. arms exports. Whether that divergence deepens may depend on how Berlin manages both its alliances and its defense industry priorities in the coming years.

(Source: Politico)

The European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) is the latest step taken against the spiral of mistrust that emerged with the Russia-Ukraine war. The project was launched under the leadership of Germany, whose defense weaknesses have been on the agenda since the start of war in February 2022, drawing attention to its poor combat readiness and lack of basic military equipment.

Despite frequent warnings since the beginning of the war to increase ammunition production in European countries and to invest more in air and missile defense, European defense industry production has fallen further behind Russia. Meanwhile, as Russia shifted to a form of war economy, it significantly increased its production rate, further exacerbating insecurity in Europe.

Moreover, increased drone and missile strikes behind the front lines, intense attacks on critical infrastructure, and Russian missiles falling within NATO’s borders have put the need for air and missile defense in Europe back on the agenda. The ESSI is therefore expected not only to reduce vulnerability in this area, but also to encourage an overall increase in military spending on the continent and the development of a common understanding of defense.

The project aims to establish a layered air and missile defense network through the joint procurement and operation of the German Iris-T, American Patriot and Israeli Arrow-3 defense systems, thereby creating a cost-effective and interoperable network.

Why ISSI Is Needed for European Security?

Two fundamental challenges have played a driving role in the emergence of ESSI. The first is the fact that the development of missile and unmanned systems technology, as seen in recent conflicts and the war in Ukraine, could extend warfare behind the front lines.

The increasing use of large numbers of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which can be quickly and inexpensively produced and act as “missiles” with a saturation effect on air defense systems (neutralizing technologically superior enemy systems through numerical superiority), has reemphasized the importance of a multi-layered air and missile defense architecture.

Can ESSI Succeed?

The project is unlikely to succeed for a number of reasons. So far, the continent has failed to adopt a common position on security, defense and foreign policy. Although the project has been on the agenda for about a year and a half, no serious progress has been made except for the recruitment of new members due to the high cost of the systems to be procured. In addition, Germany and France have different approaches to war and common defense. All this inevitably puts the future of ESSI in a stalemate.

In the aftermath of the Ukraine war, France has become more emphatic about European strategic autonomy and the development of the European defense industrial ecosystem. However, it is noteworthy that the delays in the new generation aircraft and tank projects with Germany cannot be overcome.

French President Emmanuel Macron’s contradictory statements since the beginning of the war and his inability to find common ground with German Chancellor Scholz make it even more difficult to develop common policies, a situation that was recently repeated during the debate on the possible deployment of troops in Ukraine.

France’s refusal to participate in the ESSI, and even its frequent open criticism of the initiative, is one of the incompatibilities demonstrated by these differences. France considers the ESSI to be a project that will damage the Union’s defense industrial ecosystem, as it provides for the procurement of weapons systems from outside the EU.

It is worth recalling that France, along with Greece and Southern Cyprus, vetoed the delivery of urgently needed 155mm ammunition and unmanned systems to Ukraine from outside the EU.

We know that the ESSI is not a new concept, dating back to August 2022. The lack of a tangible outcome of the initiative, despite the long time that has passed and the rapid expansion of Russia’s capabilities, indicates that Europe has not overcome its traditional sluggishness when it comes to defense projects.

Despite the announcement of large defense budgets by many European countries, especially Germany, the extent to which these will be translated into reality and military modernization is a big question mark.

While the launch and success of an initiative like ESSI would be highly desirable for European security, the current picture suggests that it will not be easy to achieve. Even if successful, ESSI will only address a small part of Europe’s defense vulnerabilities, as most countries lack sufficient offensive capabilities to provide a deterrent.

While ESSI is an attractive idea, Europe must make a fundamental shift in its defense policy which is abandoning free riding under American security guarantees and developing its own defense. While France and the United Kingdom have the self-confidence that comes with having nuclear weapons, it will not be easy for other countries on the continent to undertake serious defense projects unless their dependence on the United States changes. This has also been the main criticism of Donald Trump, who is running for re-election in the US presidential elections.

Turkey, on the other hand, has signaled that it wants to maintain its participation in the European defense and security architecture by joining this initiative alongside Greece, just as it did with its NATO membership. Turkey does not currently have a procurement agenda for an external missile defense system. However, the goal is to increase the interoperability of Turkish systems with their European counterparts and, in the long term, to include Turkish defense industry products among the systems to be procured under the ESSI project although the latter goal is likely to face significant obstacles.

A

lthough modern German foreign and security policy has periodically evolved at critical junctures in the international system, especially after the unification of Germany, overall, the country has elicited respect in the eyes of the international community as a power with a considerable anti-militarist and “multilateralist” tradition. However, as of October 7, 2023, Germany has begun to gradually lose credibility in the global public opinion.

Since October 7, 2023, Israel has been waging a large-scale military offensive by land, air, and sea against the Gaza Strip, a narrow strip of land measuring about 365 square kilometers and one of the most densely populated places in the world. Israel is carrying out one of the heaviest conventional bombing campaigns in the history of modern warfare in Gaza, home to some 2.3 million people, almost half of them children. Israel drops an average of 6,000 highly destructive bombs on Gaza every week. These disproportionately heavy Israeli attacks have caused more destruction in just two months than the damage inflicted on the Syrian city of Aleppo between 2012 and 2016, the Ukrainian city of Mariupol, or the Allied bombing of Germany in World War II.

Since the start of the Israeli military operation, more than 26,000 Palestinians have been killed, including more than 10,000 children, and nearly 65,000 Palestinians have been injured, most of them seriously. Added to this, 120 journalists, 167 humanitarian workers, and 135 UN workers have been killed, and more than 355,000 homes have been damaged or destroyed, representing more than 60% of all buildings. The internal displacement of 1.9 million Palestinians—about 85% of the total population—and their forced migration to less-populated areas, the failure to protect civilians, and the collapse of the health system as hospitals turned into war zones have made Gaza uninhabitable. The experience of epidemics, the deliberate collapse of the humanitarian aid system by Israel, and the increasing pressure for mass migration to neighboring countries have put Gazans at even greater risk.

Israel’s case before the International Court of Justice and international pressure

Based on the fact that Israel’s attack on Gaza constitutes a war crime in all its dimensions, South Africa, which with the strong support of the global public opinion, has been a signatory to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide on December 29, 2002. Knowing that Israel was violating the UN Genocide Convention, South Africa filed a complaint against it at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on December 29, 2023, in The Hague, the UN’s highest court. South Africa also sought an injunction to prevent Israel from committing genocide in Gaza. The case is based on the UN Genocide Convention, which Israel has signed. The Convention defines genocide as an act “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.”

The ICJ announced its decision on South Africa’s request for precautionary measures on January 26, 2024. Although it did not accept South Africa’s request for an immediate ceasefire, it ruled that South Africa was justified in a number of precautionary decisions and upheld the suspicion of genocide by ordering Israel to refrain from genocidal acts in Gaza. Within the framework of the ICJ’s decisions, a period of one month was set for Israel to take and report measures in accordance with the ICJ’s binding instructions to prevent and stop Israeli activities that may constitute genocide. The point to note here is that the Israeli government must report all statements that constitute the crime of genocide to the ICJ prosecution. Therefore, starting with Netanyahu himself, he will have to report the genocidal rhetoric of his radical Zionist and religious extremist ministers to the ICJ.

The court’s decision is a valuable exception to the failures and double standards of many Western countries which remain silent and complicit in Israel’s ethnic cleansing of Palestinians. The ongoing case against Israel before the ICJ for its crimes against the Palestinians has the potential to raise awareness of justice in Western countries and will also provide support for increasing international pressure on Israel’s disregard for international law and norms, as well as trigger the growth of solidarity with the Palestinian cause. More than 50 countries, led by Turkey, are already supporting South Africa’s genocide case against Israel. On the other hand, other countries, including the U.S. and Germany, see Israel’s attacks in Gaza as part of the fight against terrorism. The ICJ’s decision on preventive measures, however, has prompted the German government to retreat somewhat from its unconditional solidarity with Israel.

Staatsräson: Germany’s mobilization for Israel at home and in the world

The German state uses the concept of “Staatsräson” to describe its sense of “special responsibility” towards Israel, which was established as a Zionist Jewish state just three years after the systematic murder of six million Jews in the Holocaust. Former German chancellor Angela Merkel used this concept in her speech to the Knesset, the Israeli parliament, in 2008. Her successor, Olaf Scholz, also emphasized the concept in the government statement issued on October 7, following Operation Al-Aqsa Flood. The statement read, “There is only one place for Germany to stand now: next to Israel. This is what we mean when we say: Israel’s security is part of Germany’s raison d’état.” Scholz used the phrase “raison d’état,” or, in German, Staatsräson. However, although Germany’s guarantee of state responsibility towards Israel is a serious responsibility in terms of international law, what this means for the German public has never been explained in its legal dimension. The state obligation towards Israel, although an integral part of the German state, has not been given constitutional status despite being internalized.

The main meaning of “national interest” is the principle that a state has the right to invoke the primacy of its own interests to legitimize its own policies, to priorities state interests over other values, and to exempt itself from accountability to its own people. At this point, Merkel’s move towards Israel can be interpreted as a prescient and masterful one. In its relations with Israel, the German government has used the seal of state sovereignty to exempt itself from the responsibility of explaining to the public why it supports Israel, even though it is a state that has committed war crimes since its foundation.

After October 7, German politics, especially leading media organizations and the most important institutions and actors of German society, took hyperactive and coordinated action in line with Israel’s interests as the executor of the state seal. These actors’ aim is to silence any internal criticism of Israel in the eyes of the German public through anti-Semitic McCarthyism—a witch hunt, in other words— and to absolve Israel of its war crimes in Gaza through active diplomacy in the international arena.

Anti-Semitic McCarthyism in German public opinion

“McCarthyism” refers to the politics of fear and the design and widespread use of this policy, and more specifically to the anti-communist skepticism that began in the late 1940s and continued in the United States until the late 1950s. Allegations of having left-wing convictions or associations, which often turned out to be unproven or false, plunged the United States into an anti-communist hysteria. McCarthyism led to many people being fired, discredited, and even imprisoned, and the campaign and accompanying political repression posed a serious threat to free speech and political liberties in the United States. In Germany, the basis for McCarthyism with anti-Semitic motives was provided by the introduction of the “securitization paradigm.”

In international relations and national politics, securitization is the process of transforming political issues that need to be controlled by state actors into “security” issues. This allows the use of extraordinary means in the name of security. More specifically, since the early 1990s, securitization has been a central concept of the group known as the “Copenhagen School.” Securitization shows how dominant political actors present relevant issues as “security issues” in order to mobilize public interest and support for their sanctions. By referring to a so-called exceptional or threatening security situation, it is argued that problems can only be controlled and solved through extraordinary measures, partly bypassing democratic rules and procedures. The first of these extraordinary measures is the introduction of anti-democratic practices.

Thus, at the beginning of the October 7 process, the German government, with the support of the majority of the civil society and the mainstream media organizations loyal to the state, started to apply anti-democratic sanctions and began targeting the masses that could cause trouble with intimidation and criminal sanctions.

W

hen the Herero and Nama tribes revolted against German colonialists and killed 120 Germans on January 12, 1904, the German colonial administration ruling the region now known as Namibia began a massacre that would last four years and culminate in the murder of 70,000 people. Known as the first genocide of the 20th century, the figures show that for every German killed, the troops of the then German Empire killed 583 people.

The Germans then launched World War I, which resulted in the deaths of approximately 18 million people. Germany’s ambition to turn the world into a battlefield rekindled in the late 1930s, and then Chancellor Hitler declared war—which was to turn into World War II—on almost the entire world. Driven by nationalistic sentiments, the war ended with the death of 52 million people, including millions of Jews. Understanding that the Germans would not let the world live in peace, the world powers occupied Germany at the end of the war; today, Germany forms its foreign policy based on this legacy.

Since the end of World War II, German politicians have painted a peaceful picture of their country. They constantly emphasize their commitment to international law, human rights, the rule of law, democracy, and other cherished values. In order to show that they have no imperial designs and to avoid any misunderstanding, they even hesitated to lead the European Union. This policy actually worked, convincing foreigners that, as a state, Germany stood for peace and economic development.

However, as soon as Israel launched its latest attack on Gaza, the German government openly supported Tel Aviv’s genocidal plans and showed its true face. Almost all officials in Berlin—and the German head of the EU Commission, Ursula von der Leyen—constantly state that Israel has the right to defend itself. Their unwavering support is so explicit that they even avoid expressing concern for the lives of civilians. Israel’s massacre continues and the death toll has exceeded 25,000, but Germany does not even call for a ceasefire. It also intervened in favor of Israel in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) case brought by South Africa regarding Israel’s genocidal attacks in Gaza.

There is a special relationship between Germany and Israel that is said to be based on shared Western values, beliefs, and certain historical events. According to official German statements, the Germans, as the children of the perpetrators of the Jewish Holocaust, acknowledge the guilt of their ancestors and give assurances that they will prevent any possible massacre of Jews. It is good to see Germany admitting its wrongdoing, but, strangely, its response to past mistakes is another mistake.

Germany’s pro-Israel stance shows that it is once again on the wrong side of history. The best reminder of its current wrongdoing has come from one of Germany’s victims: Namibia. The President of Namibia Hage Geingob stated on X that his country rejects Germany’s support for the racist Israeli state’s genocidal intent against innocent civilians in Gaza. Recalling Germany’s genocide in Namibia in 1904-1908, Geingob advised the German government to atone for the said genocide first.

In other words, he told the German government to look at its own history before defending Israel. The Namibian president also emphasized the mistake and brutality of supporting Israel’s genocide at the ICJ. Geingob warned that Germany cannot, on the one hand, express its commitment to the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and, on the other, support an ongoing genocide while claiming to stand on moral high ground.

The Namibian president’s statement is unique not just because of its support for Palestine and calling out Israel for the genocide It is perpetuating, but also for questioning Germany’s and the Western world’s true commitment to moral values.. There is a clash of civilizations over the Gaza genocide with the developed West on one side and developing and impoverished Africa on the other. There is a clash between power and poverty.

While colonized Namibia opposes Israel’s mass murder of civilians and illegal colonization in general, Germany does not seem to have learned any lessons from its past. Germany’s logic of defending Israel is completely irrational: Germany thinks (or pretends to think) that it can salve its conscience by supporting a genocide perpetrated by the grandchildren of Nazi victims.

Humanity, though, demands that a new massacre be prevented, regardless of who is perpetrating it. Moreover, allowing one community to victimize another is contrary to moral values. From a legal perspective, a state cannot defend actions (in this case, by Israel) that are considered occupation and genocide under international law. If Berlin claims to abide by international law, it cannot support Israel.

However, despite the undeniable facts, the Germans prefer genocide to the values they claim to uphold. This shows that Germany’s and, on the whole, the Western world’s disrespect towards the South, the East, the Muslim world, or the whole non-Western world in general, continues. Values are only words for them and they preserve them only as such.

Namibia stands on the right side of history

Namibia, on the other hand, stands on the right side of history and strives to bring Israel to justice for its crimes. The African country is far more underdeveloped than even Gaza and needs foreign aid to keep up with the rest of the world. Rich countries can reward Namibia with lucrative aid if it sides with Israel, but it has preferred to stand with the oppressed.

We can now ask: who is more civilized? From a materialistic perspective, those with advanced economies and well-run political systems can be considered civilized. However, human beings are not machines. They have feelings and moral values that distinguish them from animals. When a person does not consider morality and justice in their actions, their humanity is diminished and they become a threat to society.

Time has shown that improvements in human life have not improved human beings in the same way. A good education and better living standards do not always make a person more decent, honest, moral, and merciful. History shows us that developed countries like Germany have killed more people in the 20th and 21st centuries than the rest of the world combined.

In contrast to the developed world, poor countries act more rationally, do not condone oppression, and are now taking steps to end it. In other words, poverty is superior to power: Namibia’s and Germany’s stances against Israel’s crimes clearly show that Africans are more civilized when it comes to humanity. It seems that those who are advancing in technology have sacrificed their values and are currently without sense or logic to guide them towards morality.

Germany might produce excellent cars, but has lost the goodness in its heart; Namibia does not provide the world with cutting-edge technology, but remains good at heart. The ongoing Gaza genocide has revealed that while German civilization is fighting to defend genocide, Namibian civilization is fighting to prevent it.

I

n a surprising turn of events, Germany has announced its decision not to oppose the sale of Eurofighter jets to Saudi Arabia. This unexpected move comes as a notable departure from Germany’s previous stance on arms sales to the Middle Eastern nation. Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock conveyed this decision after a meeting with Israeli President Isaac Herzog and Foreign Minister Israel Katz in Jerusalem.

Historically, Germany has been reluctant to endorse arms sales to Saudi Arabia due to concerns about human rights violations and regional stability. However, the latest statement by Baerbock suggests a shift in perspective, highlighting Saudi Arabia’s contribution to Israel’s security.

Baerbock emphasized that Saudi Arabia plays a crucial role in enhancing Israel’s security by intercepting missiles launched by Yemen’s Houthi rebels. The Foreign Minister acknowledged Riyadh’s efforts to counter the threat posed by the Houthis and stated that Germany would not stand against the idea of Britain providing more Eurofighters to Saudi Arabia.

The decision underscores the intricate geopolitical dynamics of the region and how nations collaborate in response to shared security concerns. Baerbock noted, “Saudi Arabia is a key contributor to Israel’s security and is helping to stem the risk of a regional conflagration.”

Rationale Behind the Decision

The shift in Germany’s stance appears to be rooted in the recognition of Saudi Arabia’s strategic role in maintaining regional stability. Baerbock’s statement suggests that the German government sees Saudi Arabia as a valuable partner in addressing common security challenges, and this perception has influenced its decision on Eurofighter sales.

The Eurofighter is a joint project involving the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and Spain. As Germany’s approval is required for sales of these fighter jets, the decision not to oppose the sale to Saudi Arabia reflects a coordinated effort among the participating nations.

Houthi rebels have been a source of regional instability, targeting vessels in the Southern Red Sea and threatening Israel-bound ships. In response to these attacks, the United States recently announced the creation of a multinational mission named Operation Prosperity Guardian to counter Houthi aggression.

A significant shift in German foreign policy

The geopolitical landscape in the Middle East has been further complicated by the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas. The Israeli onslaught on Gaza has resulted in a humanitarian crisis, with significant international concern about potential war crimes or genocide. This complex situation adds layers of intricacy to diplomatic relations in the region.

Germany’s decision not to oppose Eurofighter sales to Saudi Arabia marks a significant shift in its foreign policy approach to arms deals in the Middle East. The acknowledgment of Saudi Arabia’s role in enhancing regional security and countering common threats demonstrates the evolving nature of diplomatic relationships in a dynamic geopolitical environment. The implications of this decision will likely reverberate across international relations, prompting further analysis of the evolving alliances in the Middle East.

Source: Anadolu Agency

T

he course adopted by German decision-makers in the face of Israel’s attacks on Gaza clearly violates the principles of law, democracy, and human rights that Germany’s foreign policy claims to promote. It also exposes the fact that in the hierarchy of objectives, support for Israel is at the top with  the protection of human rights and the promotion of freedoms lagging behind.

Decision-makers in Berlin have been severely criticized for their policy towards direct Israeli attacks on civilians in Gaza, which appear to contradict Germany’s general foreign policy principles. The question and criticism regard why Germany, whose foreign policy advocates the development of democracy and the protection of human rights, which claims to promote a peaceful foreign policy, and which in the case of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict claims to advocate a two-state solution, openly supports Israel’s gross violations of human rights and its attempts to separate Gaza from Palestine.

A couple of observations on foreign policy might prove insightful for analyzing Berlin’s position. The first point to emphasize is that there is not always harmony between the principles expressed at the level of foreign policy discourse and the objectives pursued by a state. What is more, a country’s foreign policy objectives do not always serve its own interests. A number of internal or external factors can cause a country’s foreign policy to deviate from a rational line and foreign policy goals can be set that serve the interests of narrow but influential circles rather than the country’s national interests.

The following specific questions can be asked about Germany’s policy towards the Israeli attacks on Gaza: How can we evaluate Germany’s Gaza policy in terms of its foreign policy principles? What are the goals of Germany’s Gaza policy and what is the hierarchy, i.e., the order of priority, between these goals? To what extent do these goals and the path Berlin is taking to achieve them serve German interests?

Berlin’s policy of contradictions

An analysis of the rhetoric of German politicians and the basic texts of German foreign policy show that among the fundamental principles of its foreign policy are the protection and promotion of international law, the promotion of peace, freedom and democracy in the world, the protection of human rights, the strengthening of the transatlantic partnership, and integration within the European Union. Yet, Berlin’s policy towards the Middle East, in general, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in particular, seriously contradict these principles.

In fact, a closer look reveals that these goals are themselves full of contradictions. For example, on the one hand, Germany advocates a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and, on the other hand, it is one of the countries that provides the most economic and military support to Israel, making a two-state solution more and more impossible.

This contradiction arises from the fact that the main objective of Germany’s Middle East policy is premised on Israel’s security which is seen as a part of the German state’s national goals and as Germany’s historical responsibility. Placing this goal at the top of the hierarchy of objectives makes it difficult to achieve other goals, such as supporting a two-state solution, promoting peace in the region by helping to build civilian infrastructure in the Palestinian territories, preventing violence that could radicalize the peoples of the region, and developing Germany’s economic relations with the countries in the region.

Israel’s policy of usurping the Palestinian territories in the order of “first, occupation; second, changing the demography of the occupied territories through settlers (civilian/armed occupiers) and intimidation; and third, annexation” makes it impossible to implement the secondary objectives of German regional policy.

This contradiction is illustrated, for example, by the fact that Berlin feels obliged to act in accordance with its main objective of “protecting and supporting Israel” and continues to provide economic and military aid to this state, despite the fact that every two-three years Israel bombs countless civilian infrastructure facilities in the Gaza Strip which Germany and other countries have built countless times in support of peace. Similarly, Berlin claims to be in favor of a two-state solution, but does not take any steps to dissuade Israel from pursuing these policies. On the contrary, it continues to provide uninterrupted economic and military support to Tel Aviv, despite the fact that the loss of integrity of the territories in the region under Palestinian administration by Israel’s annual construction of thousands of new housing units for Jewish settlers armed “civilian” in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, makes the establishment of a Palestinian state almost impossible.

This contradiction becomes even more apparent when viewed from the perspective of Germany’s general foreign policy principles. After the October 7, 2023 attack on Jewish settlements in the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories by Hamas, German leaders made statements stressing Israel’s right to defend itself; however, they failed to mention the blockade, oppression, and massacres Israel has been carrying out against Gaza before this attack.

Furthermore, German politicians preferred to remain silent about Israel’s attacks after October 7, which have clearly exceeded the limits of self-defense, targeting Palestinian children, women, civilian settlements, hospitals, schools, and civilians who have sought shelter in UN-guarded buildings. Weeks after the state-sponsored massacre started, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock continue to support the actions of the Israeli state led by a religious extremist or racist fanatic Zionist cadre, claiming that “Israel has the right to defend itself.”

Support for Israel as a Priority

The German decision-makers have clearly violated the principles of law, democracy, human rights, and freedom that German foreign policy promotes, while at the same time demonstrating that in the hierarchy of objectives, support for Israel is at the top and the protection of human rights and promotion of freedoms take a back seat. Is this surprising? Well, it is not the first time that Germany has acted in this way. Germany has repeatedly shown that when there is a mismatch between principles, goals, and interests, it does not act according to principles, but according to the goals that best serve Germany’s interests. When there were coups in Algeria in 1992, Egypt in 2013, and Turkey in 1997 and in 2016 (a failed attempt), the governments in Germany did not side with democracy but with the coup plotters.

Human rights, the promotion of democracy, and the promotion of freedoms are concepts that are routinely instrumentalized in order to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries. Germany is not alone in doing so. Similar to other countries, German leaders know when and in which areas of foreign policy to use these concepts and when to ignore them—the decision is based on Germany’s national interests. However, how are Germany’s national interests served by the extremely pro-Israeli policies of the current SPD-Greens-FDP coalition government in the face of Israel’s massacres in Gaza? Also, to what extent is this policy of “supporting Israel in whatever it does” compatible with Germany’s national interests towards the region? The answers to these questions are closely related to the extent of the influence of the Zionist lobby in Europe—and especially in the U.S.—on German foreign policy and the actors through which it exerts this influence.

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n a joint statement released on December 28, 2023, the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom expressed deep concern over Iran’s recent actions, condemning the country’s increased production of highly enriched uranium. The statement followed the release of a report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on December 26, revealing that Iran had elevated its rate of uranium enrichment up to 60% at Natanz and Fordow.

The four nations characterized Iran’s move as a significant step backward, warning that it would lead to a tripling of Iran’s monthly production rate of highly enriched uranium. The joint statement emphasized the lack of credible civilian justification for Iran’s actions and underscored the proliferation-related risks associated with the production at Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant.

One of the key points of concern raised in the statement was Iran’s decision to revert to a cascade configuration previously discovered by the IAEA in Fordow earlier in the year. The countries expressed doubt about Iran’s willingness to cooperate transparently with the IAEA, highlighting delays in declaring changes as a cause for skepticism.

“Iran’s lack of goodwill”

The U.S., France, Germany, and the UK, condemned Iran’s actions, characterizing them as a demonstration of Iran’s lack of goodwill toward de-escalation. The statement noted the “reckless” behavior occurring in a tense regional context, raising concerns about the broader implications for regional stability.

The joint statement called on Iran to reverse its steps immediately and de-escalate its nuclear program. Additionally, the countries urged Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA to provide assurances of the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program. The reinstatement of inspectors suspended in September 2023 was emphasized as crucial for maintaining transparency and adherence to international agreements.

Despite the condemnation, the joint statement reaffirmed the commitment of the U.S., France, Germany, and the UK to a diplomatic solution. The countries emphasized their determination to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, underscoring the importance of diplomatic efforts in addressing the escalating situation.

This development has raised concerns about the stability of the region and the potential consequences of Iran’s nuclear activities. As tensions escalate, diplomatic efforts will play a crucial role in navigating the complex geopolitical landscape and ensuring a peaceful resolution to the situation.

Iran responds to the statement

In response to recent claims regarding Iran’s uranium enrichment activities, Mohammad Eslami, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), reaffirmed the country’s commitment to existing protocols and dismissed the allegations as media hype.

During a cabinet meeting on Wednesday, Eslami addressed the reports, emphasizing that the attention garnered by Iran’s enrichment program is not new and had already been addressed in the Director General’s report to the Board of Governors. He regarded the claims as sensationalized and serving a particular agenda.

Eslami clarified that the AEOI remains steadfast in its commitment to established protocols, denying any deviation from ongoing activities. He urged the public to discern attempts by certain parties, particularly Western powers, to divert attention from other geopolitical matters, such as the situation in Gaza, by focusing on Iran’s nuclear program.

Highlighting that Iran’s nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes, Eslami reiterated the country’s adherence to international obligations and standards. The statement aimed to assure the international community that Iran’s nuclear program operates within the framework of established regulations and is not a cause for alarm.

Sources: Anadolu Agency and Tehran Times.

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he Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry announced it has summoned envoys from the United States, Germany, and France over allegations of their countries’ involvement in the “illegal financing operations” of a local media outlet, Abzas Media. The ministry contends that these actions constitute a violation of Azerbaijani law and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

During the meetings, Azerbaijan expressed “serious objection” to the financial interactions between the Abzas Media news portal and organizations registered in the aforementioned countries, specifically naming the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), FreedomNow, and the New Democracy Fund. According to the Foreign Ministry, these entities have illicitly transferred financial resources to support the activities of Abzas Media.

The Azerbaijani statement emphasized that under national law, the financing of local media by foreign individuals, legal entities, or state institutions is prohibited. The ministry also accused the embassies of the U.S., Germany, and France of engaging in activities that interfere with the internal affairs of Azerbaijan.

National sovereignty and foreign engagement

Azerbaijan has made it clear that it condemns these alleged activities and reserves the right to respond with appropriate measures in line with its national legislation. This situation underscores the tension between national sovereignty and foreign engagement, particularly in the realm of media and information.

Abzas Media has spotlighted the tension between media freedom and a nation’s control over its financial affairs. The case of Abzas Media underscores a broader debate about the extent to which Western nations should be involved in promoting “free” press. Baku views the western funding of media outlets as a violation of their financial sovereignty and an unwelcome intrusion into their domestic affairs.

The response from the embassies involved in these allegations, and the subsequent steps by the Azerbaijani government, will be closely watched. These developments could have significant implications for diplomatic relations.

The U.S. and France’s humanitarian and diplomatic backing for Armenia has been met with disapproval from Baku, with Azerbaijani officials claiming that such actions have “seriously damaged” the bilateral relationship. channel Kanal 13, on unrelated charges of unauthorized construction.

Giorgi Gogia, the associate Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch, strongly condemned the actions of the Azerbaijani authorities, describing them as part of a “longstanding pattern” of pursuing punitive criminal charges against critics.

Source: Anadolu Agency and Human Rights Watch.

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erman Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has issued a stark warning about the potential consequences of Donald Trump winning the 2024 US presidential election, labeling it a “catastrophe” for Europe. Pistorius expressed these concerns during a panel discussion at the Berlin Foreign Policy Forum on November 28.

Pistorius’ comments highlight the apprehension in Europe regarding the impact of the U.S. election on transatlantic relations. He noted that regardless of whether a Democrat or Republican wins the election, European nations will need to assume greater responsibility for the continent’s security. This is particularly pertinent given the potential for the U.S. to focus more on the Indo-Pacific region, potentially leading to reduced engagement in Europe.

Trump’s presidency from 2017 to 2021 was marked by repeated criticisms of America’s European allies over their contributions to the financial and military responsibilities of NATO. His approach had raised concerns about the stability of NATO and the future of US military presence in Europe.

Growing concerns in European countries

Pistorius’ statements reflect growing concerns in European countries about the need to enhance their own defense capabilities and security measures, especially in the context of shifting global power dynamics and U.S. foreign policy priorities.

Pistorius’ words serve as a reminder of the significant impact that the US presidential election could have on global politics. European leaders appear increasingly mindful of the need to prepare for potential changes in the US’s strategic priorities, emphasizing the interconnected nature of international relations and the importance of regional self-reliance in defense and security matters.

Pistorius warns

Pistorius pointed out that should they proceed with that action, it’s likely their ability to sustain the same level of involvement in Europe will be compromised.

Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s initiative for a European air defense system (ESI) revealed a gap in Europe’s defense capabilities, particularly regarding protection against long-range missiles. As a result, Germany decided to procure the Israeli Arrow 3 system to address this shortfall.

Pistorius acknowledges that this decision created tension with France. French President Emmanuel Macron disagreed with the urgency of the situation, believing that Europe had sufficient time to develop its own system, as he did not perceive an immediate threat. Pistorius, however, expressed a different viewpoint, suggesting that the threat level was significant enough that waiting a decade to develop a European solution was not feasible. This difference in threat assessment and response strategy highlights the complexities and challenges in coordinating defense policies within Europe.

Source: TRT World

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mnesty International has released a report on November 23, 2023, accusing Germany of failing to effectively tackle systemic racism, pointing to ingrained structural issues and a lack of recognition of the root causes. Presented in Berlin, the report provides a critical analysis of Germany’s approach to hate crimes, police behavior, and historical injustices.

Julia Duchrow, Secretary General of Amnesty International’s German section, asserted that despite Germany’s commitment in the 1960s to protect all people from racial discrimination and violence, the nation continues to struggle with racism.

Duchrow highlighted several high-profile cases that have exposed these shortcomings, including the murders by the National Socialist Underground (NSA) and racial attacks in Munich, Halle, and Hanau.

Discriminatory practices sanctioned by the state

The report criticizes discriminatory practices sanctioned by the state, such as the headscarf ban for Muslim women in public service and the prohibition of demonstrations in support of Palestinian rights. According to Duchrow, these forms of state discrimination are as pressing as the issues caused by non-state actors.

Amnesty International’s report draws attention to the problem of racist stereotypes within German law enforcement, specifically mentioning the controversial term “clan criminality.” The human rights organization is calling for an investigation into racism in the police force and for concrete steps to be taken to address and prevent it.

The report insists on the necessity of independent bodies to investigate police misconduct. Amnesty International urges Germany to establish these at both federal and state levels to ensure thorough and unbiased investigations into all allegations of racially motivated behavior by police.

Call to action

This call to action emphasizes the importance of accountability and the need for Germany to live up to its international commitments to fight racial discrimination. The detailed findings and recommendations from Amnesty International aim to prompt German authorities to take decisive and transparent actions to address these deep-rooted issues.

Amidst growing concerns over racial profiling and discrimination, Amnesty International’s recommendations aim to prompt German legislators and policymakers to take concrete actions to reform the current system. The move towards independent investigations reflects a broader global trend emphasizing the importance of transparency and accountability in law enforcement.

Source: Anadolu Agency.

In a groundbreaking move, Germany, France, and Italy have reached an accord on the future regulatory approach to artificial intelligence (AI), as per a joint document reviewed by Reuters. This consensus is a pivotal moment that is likely to hasten the ongoing policy discussions at the European Union level regarding AI governance.

The joint paper delineates a framework emphasizing “mandatory self-regulation through codes of conduct” specific to foundational AI models. These models, which are critical to generating diverse AI outputs, will now be subject to a new regulatory regime that focuses on their application rather than on the technology per se.

Amidst active dialogue among the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the EU Council, this tri-nation agreement marks a significant stride towards a unified EU stance on AI. The document outlines the introduction of “model cards” — detailed descriptions provided by developers that clarify a machine learning model’s capabilities and limitations, rooted in the best practices of the AI development community.

An AI governance body

A novel feature of the proposed regulatory framework is the establishment of an AI governance body. Tasked with formulating guidelines and ensuring compliance with model card standards, this body will play a crucial role in overseeing the responsible deployment of AI technologies.

In a move supportive of innovation, the agreement initially recommends against the immediate imposition of sanctions. However, it does propose the eventual creation of a sanctions mechanism to address persistent violations of the established code of conduct.

Germany’s Economy Ministry, alongside the Ministry of Digital Affairs, has taken a leadership role in the discussions, advocating for regulatory measures that focus on AI’s application rather than the underlying technology itself. Digital Affairs Minister Volker Wissing lauded the agreement, stressing the importance of regulating AI applications to ensure Europe’s competitiveness in the global AI market.

Delicate balance needed

Economic Affairs State Secretary Franziska Brantner expressed the delicate balance needed between capitalizing on AI’s potential and curtailing its risks, especially in an area that is still navigating uncharted legal territory.

This trilateral consensus comes at a critical juncture as global governments increasingly prioritize AI, with Britain hosting its inaugural AI safety summit just last month. Germany is also set to host a digital summit in the city of Jena, which is expected to gather political, business, and academic thought leaders to further delve into AI and its broader implications.

The agreement will likely influence upcoming discussions when German and Italian officials meet in Berlin for talks later this week, with AI regulation undoubtedly a key agenda item. The collaborative stance of Germany, France, and Italy signifies a concerted effort to steer AI development in a direction that is innovative yet ethically sound and well-regulated.

Sources: Reuters and CNBC

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n what has been reported as a nearly tenfold increase, Germany has significantly ramped up its arms exports to Israel. According to a statement from the German Economic Ministry on Wednesday, November 9, 2023 exports worth almost €303 million ($323 million) have been approved up to November 2, compared to €32 million for the entirety of 2022.

The surge in military exports follows an attack on Israel by Hamas on October 7, which has led to an expedited processing of permit applications by German officials. A total of 185 permits have been granted post-attack, emphasizing Germany’s commitment to Israel’s security as a primary concern.

German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, at a NATO meeting in Brussels, confirmed that requests from Israel for naval munitions are being considered. He stated that discussions with Israel on how to proceed with these requests are ongoing, signaling further material and military support could be expected.

A key defense partner for Israel

This development comes as Germany continues to position itself as a key defense partner for Israel, supplying primarily components for air defense systems and communications equipment. Despite the significant increase, these exports still represent a minor share of Germany’s total military exports, which reached 8.76 billion euros in the first nine months of 2023.

German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock also weighed in on the broader security context, discussing potential peace solutions for the Gaza Strip at the G7 foreign ministers’ meeting in Tokyo. Baerbock underscored the need for “clever solutions” and practical steps toward a two-state solution, though she acknowledged the complexity and potential for a long-term endeavor.

As Germany accelerates its defense support to Israel, it also calls for peace and stability in the region, advocating for sustainable solutions that would address the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Sources: Anadolu Agency, Reuters and Middle East Monitor

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new study has brought to light the pervasive nature of racism faced by Muslim men in Germany, with over 40% reporting experiences of racial discrimination in their daily lives. The findings, released on November 7, by the German Center for Integration and Migration Research (Dezim) in Berlin, indicate that 41.2% of Muslim men feel affected by racism.

The report underscores discrimination encounters in public offices and interactions with authorities, including the police. A notable 39% of Muslim men recounted more frequent experiences of discrimination within the police force, while a significant 51% reported adverse experiences when dealing with public offices and authorities.

Muslim women also face substantial discrimination, with 46% reporting similar experiences in offices and authorities. The figure drops to 25% when referring to interactions with the police.

Discrimination in Germany’s healthcare system

The study also highlighted discrimination in Germany’s healthcare system. Frank Kalter, the director of the Dezim Institute, noted that individuals who are racially characterized often receive inferior appointments and their grievances are less acknowledged.

This alarming revelation comes at a time when Germany’s government, led by Chancellor Olaf Scholz, is expressing concern over rising anti-Muslim racism in the aftermath of the recent Gaza war that began on October 7. Government spokesman Steffen Hebestreit stated that any attacks on Muslims, whether for religious reasons or otherwise, are “absolutely unacceptable.”

The nearly 5 million Muslims residing in Germany have an inherent right to protection, he asserted at a news conference in Berlin.

Last week, the Berlin-based Alliance Against Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Hate (CLAIM) warned of escalating anti-Muslim racism amidst the intensifying conflict between Israel and Palestine. Rima Hanano, head of CLAIM, emphasized the urgent need to address the uptick in anti-Muslim racism, which threatens social cohesion.

CLAIM has documented numerous instances of anti-Muslim threats, violence, and discrimination in a short span, including attacks on mosques. The organization highlighted that many incidents likely go unreported, particularly in the realm of online hate speech.

The NGO advocates for comprehensive measures to counter anti-Muslim racism and safeguard those affected. “It is imperative for our democracy and societal cohesion to actively combat anti-Muslim racism, antisemitism, and other misanthropic ideologies,” CLAIM asserts, emphasizing the immediate need for action.

The recent study and calls from advocacy groups serve as a stark reminder of the challenges facing Muslim communities in Germany and the importance of concerted efforts to foster an inclusive and equitable society.

Source: Anadolu Agency

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he German coalition government of Chancellor Olaf Scholz for the first time has uncovered a national security strategy. The strategy described Russia as the biggest security threat “for the foreseeable future,” and China as “simultaneously a partner, competitor and systemic rival.” The national security strategy aims to spend at least 2% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, starting next year, in line with the ceiling set by NATO.

On June 14, the German government announced that it broke away from the policy of “change through trade” on which German chancellors counted for years, especially Gerhard Schroeder, Angela Merkel, and Willy Brandt, to deal with countries with authoritarian regimes, to bring about change, but especially to enable industrial Germany to build up its strength as Europe’s largest economy (despite having one of the largest U.S. bases).

At a press conference in Berlin, Scholz summarized Germany’s new national security strategy, which was delayed for more than a year, by saying that Germany is “strong,” noting that it wants to have a security strategy based on three foundations: integration, flexibility, and sustainability.

The strategy suggests that Germany would play a more active role in Europe, after decades of focusing on economic investments and dependence on the U.S. and NATO for security.

Three pillars

The new national security strategy is based on three pillars.

Active defense: A commitment to high military spending, including reaching NATO’s goal of 2% of GDP on defense, and focusing on deterrence.

Flexibility: This goal concerns Germany and its allies, and focuses on protecting their values, reducing economic dependency, deterring and defeating cyberattacks, and defending the UN Charter and rule of law.

Sustainability: A commitment to tackling issues such as climate change, and energy and food crises.

Schultz noted that it was important for Berlin to discuss security guarantees for Ukraine with partners, including the postwar period, considering that “it is clear the Russian president wants to annex parts of the Russian backyard,” naming Ukraine and Belarus.

Russia and China

It is true that the national security strategy only mentions Russia and China by name, but a further reading indicates that it reflects a shift that began some time ago in the priorities of German security policy from combating terrorism, military interventions, and sending the German army on external missions towards focusing on combating terrorism and preventing conflicts between countries.

The 80-page document addresses Germany’s infrastructure, calling for the need to “reduce unilateral dependence on energy and raw material supplies by diversifying sources,” in reference to Germany’s dependence on Russian energy.

The German strategy pointed towards “the need to continue to monitor investments in order to avoid dependence on a specific party in the basic infrastructure, and to confront the issue of sensitive technology transfer.”

The German government said it would also develop a strategy to strengthen Germany’s ability to counter hybrid threats, including cyber-threats, which would require strengthening the capabilities of intelligence services.

In addition, the German national security document contained several references to security threats posed by climate change such as famine, disease, and conflict, as well as extreme weather conditions and damage to Germany’s critical infrastructure.

It seems that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has changed Germany’s security calculations, pushing it to adopt a more proactive strategy that enables Berlin to defend itself. It has also been revealed that Germany has revised its policy of dependence on Russia for energy and is showing more caution towards China while also continuing to engage with the latter.

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ome 10,000 personnel from 25 countries, including Japan and Sweden, will take part in NATO military drills kicking off on June 12, 2023, and lasting until June 23, which some observers believe aims at sending a message to Russia, with the participation of of 250 fighterjets.

Organized by Germany, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), launched the largest military drills in its history with the aim of highlighting the unity of its member states in the face of potential threats, especially from Russia. Exercises will be carried out in the airspace of Germany, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Latvia.

Named The Air Defender 23, the drills aim at enhancing joint operation and protection from drones and potential cruise missiles targeting cities, airports within the NATO territory.

The idea of ​​the exercises was launched in 2018 following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. According to the commander of the German Air Force, General Ingo Gerhartz, the drills don’t target a specific country,

Noting that NATO is determined to defend “every inch” of its territory, adding, “We are a defense alliance, and these maneuvers were planned on this basis.”

A message to Russia

At the same time, U.S. ambassador to Germany, Amy Gattmann, told reporters that these military drills have the goal of sending a message, especially to Russia.

“I would be pretty surprised if any world leader was not taking note of what this shows in terms of the spirit of this alliance, which means the strength of this alliance. And that includes Mr. [Vladimir] Putin,” Gutmann said referring to Putin.

Russia’s war against Ukraine sent a wake-up call to NATO that was established nearly 75 years ago to confront the Soviet Union.

Finland and Sweden – which have long maintained formal neutrality to avoid any conflict with Moscow – asked to join NATO after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.

While the German-led exercises have been planned since 2018, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year prompted NATO to prepare seriously for the possibility of an attack on its territory.

250 fighter jets

Germany will temporarily close its airspace, in preparation for exercises aimed at joint cooperation to repel any attack on NATO. The United States will participate with 100 warjets, and Germany with 64, including 30 Eurofighters, 16 Tornadoes, and 5 A400M warjets, in addition to the F-35s, a NATO AWACS reconnaissance warjet and a Japanese Air Force transport warjet.

NATO forces will train on rescue operations behind enemy lines and setting targets, as well as dealing with withdrawal of forces in the event of loss or withdrawal.

A NATO spokesperson added that “During the large-scale exercises, 24 helicopters will be stationed at (Lechfeld) Air Base in Bavaria.”

Last year, NATO conducted, its annual nuclear exercises, Steadfast Noon, with the participation of 14 countries and dozens of warjets of various models, over northern and western Europe. This year’s military drills gain a specific signifigance, not because it is the largest in NATO’s history, but because it comes amidist the Russia-Ukraine war.

The German traffic light coalition, consisting of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), the Greens, and the Free Democratic Party (FDP), is clearly closer to the opposition parties in Turkey than to the Turkish government. What are the reasons for this positioning? What interests is the German government pursuing? How do the German coalition parties getting closer to the Turkish opposition affect bilateral relations between Ankara and Berlin?

German think-tanks and their agendas

To better understand the position of the coalition government in Germany vis-à-vis Turkish domestic politics, the agenda of the German parties in Turkey should be presented first. Several state-funded German institutes and think-tanks, such as the Goethe Institute, are active in Turkey. In addition to the non-partisan state-sponsored institutes and foundations, there are political foundations, each of which is linked to a party. These foundations are supported by the state with an uneven budget.

A total of four political foundations are active in Turkey and all coalition parties have an office in the country: the social-democratic Friedrich Ebert Foundation (SPD) has been in Turkey since 1988; the social-liberal Heinrich Böll Foundation (Greens) has been in the country since 1994; and the liberal Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FDP) since 1991. In addition to these three political foundations, the largest opposition party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), is also active in Turkey since 1983 with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

What do these German political foundations do in Turkey? Their activities consist primarily of seminars, workshops, panels, and conferences attended by politicians, academics, journalists, human rights activists, and so forth. According to these German political foundations, the events organized are intended to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. For the most part, the countries where these think-tanks operate are developing countries or emerging markets. Turkey is classified here as an emerging market.

What interests do German political foundations pursue in Turkey? Although they officially have the aforementioned goals, the pursued interests look quite different. German political foundations mainly try to influence a country’s domestic policy so that, in the long run, the country will act according to Germany’s interests. In my book Germany’s Minority Policy in Romania, I researched the extent to which German foundations and institutes play a role in Romania’s transformation process and how this affects bilateral relations between Berlin and Bucharest.

In Turkey, German political foundations pursue a similar goal. However, since the Turkish government led by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan does not pursue the same interests as the German political foundations, the latter cooperate with the opposition parties.

Is the German-Turkish Relationship Taking a New Turn?

The German government’s lack of neutrality with regard to Turkish domestic and foreign policy has and will continue to have an impact on Turkish-German relations. Before last year’s federal elections, for example, FDP leader and now finance minister Christian Lindner stated that cooperation with Turkey would only be possible without President Erdoğan in power. The Greens repeatedly made it clear that Turkish military operations in Northern Syria should be sanctioned. Despite these statements, no serious impact on the interstate relations has yet manifested.

In Germany, there are generally two foreign policy strategies: a Europe-centric and a transatlantic foreign policy. With regard to German foreign policy, the SPD and the Greens, in particular, have a large stake. While the SPD pursues the Europe-centric foreign policy, the Greens symbolize the transatlantic foreign policy. Because of this constellation in the coalition government, the two parties are in conflict on several occasions. The best example is the current conflict in Ukraine.

While the SPD takes a cautious stance toward Moscow, the Greens pursue a more aggressive approach. The two parties are also in conflict, although not as obviously and strongly as on Russia, on Germany’s Turkey policy. While the Greens openly and directly criticize Turkey’s foreign policy decisions like cross-border military operations, the SPD tries to find diplomatic solutions.

In short, the three parties in the German government are closer to the Turkish opposition than to the Turkish government because of their ideological backgrounds. The German parties’ political foundations have been active in Turkey for some time, even before they became part of the German government. With these factors in mind, cooperation between the coalition government and the Turkish opposition parties seems natural. When the election campaign officially starts in Turkey, this collaboration will become even more apparent.

The inflation rate in Germany has reached 7.3 percent, the highest level in forty years. Although an increase in inflation was expected, this number has surprised most economists. The Russia-Ukraine war has further increased the already rising energy prices and exacerbated the inflation. Consumer prices rose by 7.3 percent in March 2022 compared to March 2021. While the inflation rate was 4.9 percent in January and 5.1 percent in February of this year, the current inflation rate of 7.3 percent shows a significant increase.

The German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Wirtschaftsweisen) expects a record inflation of 6.1 percent for 2022. This would be the highest rate since reunification. By comparison, last year’s inflation was 3.1 percent. Now the coalition government in Germany is discussing how to pursue its Russia policy that has a significant impact on the economy, especially in the energy sector.

Disagreement among economists

Not only Germany is struggling with economic difficulties, but the whole euro zone is affected by the Russia-Ukraine war. The European Central Bank might raise interest rates, but it wants to keep insisting on its loose monetary policy. Michael Heise, chief economist at HQ Trust, describes the situation, as follows: “For European monetary policy, the situation is getting more difficult from week to week. High inflation and further disruptions in production processes threaten to slow economic growth to zero.”

The so-called Wirtschaftsweisen (economic experts), who advise the German government on economic issues, have set their forecast for economic growth in Germany’s gross domestic product at 1.8 percent for 2022, significantly lowering expectations.

Other economists warn against a complete halt to imports of Russian energy, as inflation could otherwise rise to as much as 10 percent. Institute for Economic Research President Marcel Fratzscher claims that “some companies would probably have to stop production and put more people on short-time work.”

Other economists, in turn, claim that an import freeze from Russia is a distinct possibility. For the German economy, this would pose a major challenge, but it would not be impossible. Economist Veronika Grimm has pointed out that the German government should not only pay attention to economic developments, but also draw on moral and ethical values.

According to the YouGov survey conducted in March, 15.2 percent of the German population can no longer pay their living expenses. The respondents also stated that their situation was currently threatening their very existence. In January, this rate was 11 percent.

23.6 percent of people with a net income of at least 2,500 euros said they were no longer able to meet regular expenses because prices were rising disproportionately to wages. In January, this figure was only 17 percent.

The German coalition government had announced a relief package to offset rising prices. Among other things, the traffic light coalition has decided to reduce the energy tax for three months to make gasoline and diesel cheaper. In addition, employees will receive a one-time energy allowance of 300 euros on their gross salary and families will receive a 100-euro bonus per child on their child allowance. The relief package adopted for the month of February has cost the German government 16 billion euros.

According to the YouGov survey, 53.4 percent of respondents said they are very worried about rising prices of goods and services. Three months ago, the figure was 44 percent. Therefore, 61.3 percent would like to receive further support from the state. In their view, the federal government’s relief package is not enough to mitigate the effects of inflation.

Uncertain future

The Russia-Ukraine war has been very damaging to the German economy. Currently, the voices are not yet so loud due to the current economic situation. Still the Russia-Ukraine war dominates the political discourse. However, Federal Finance Minister Christian Lindner is already warning that Germany is facing hard times.

“The Ukraine war is making us all poorer. I have serious concerns about economic development. Growth is declining, prices are hiking. In the long term, we will have to lay new foundations for prosperity. Germany must renew its growth model of a social and ecological market economy,” he said.

Lindner’s statement and the YouGov survey show that Germany is sailing towards an economically unstable and uncertain future. Until the outbreak of the COVID19 pandemic, in recent years, the German people had been spoiled by strong economic growth.

While Germany was still able to manage the pandemic confidently, the Russia-Ukraine war has revealed the limits of the German economy. Only the future can tell to what extent the fluctuations in the German economy will affect German domestic policies and foreign politics.

The Russia-Ukraine war marks a historic turn in German foreign and security policy. Chancellor Olaf Scholz has announced that Germany wants to invest €100 billion in rearming the military. Almost all parties in the Bundestag support this historic decision. While the AfD remains passive, the Left Party is divided.

One of the first consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine for Germany and for its new Ukraine policy was the cancellation of the very important and, at the same time, very controversial Nord Stream 2 project. Manuela Schwesig of the SPD, head of the government of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (MV), announced her intention to dissolve the Stiftung Klima- und Umweltschutz MV (MV Climate and Environmental Protection Foundation).

The foundation originally served to protect the Nord Stream 2 project from American sanctions. Several investors such as Shell and the Austrian energy company OMV have also withdrawn from the project. The German company Uniper estimates a loss of €900 million. The German environmental aid organization Deutsche Umwelthilfe even speaks of the Nord Stream 2 project being terminated definitely. The pipeline, which cost billions, will go down as one of Europe’s biggest misinvestments.

Another figure affected by the termination of the Nord Stream 2 project is former SPD Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. He was the main initiator of the gas pipeline by actively lobbying for it. Now the Taxpayers’ Association is calling on Chancellor Scholz to confiscate Schröder’s office equipment in Berlin.

Schröder’s long-time office manager and speechwriter Albrecht Funk ended his co-operation employment with Schröder after more than 20 years of working together.

The football club BVB Dortmund has withdrawn Schröder’s honorary membership and Hannover 96 is considering kicking the former chancellor out. The pressure exerted on Schröder at different levels shows that Schröder’s distancing himself from Putin is of high importance in Germany.

Schröder is the best-known German politician who maintains a good relationship with Putin. If Schröder were to step down and end his relations with Putin, Germany and Russia would lose a trustworthy mediator in a possible diplomatic solution.

How other German parties responded

While there is a general consensus within the coalition government on Germany’s rearmament, and the largest opposition parties (CDU/CSU) also support this decision, reactions differ among the marginal parties AfD and Left Party. CDU foreign policy expert Norbert Röttgen praised Chancellor Scholz’s decision to increase Germany’s armament and said he was positively surprised.

The AfD, on the other hand, which is known for its close ties to Russia, for the time is internally discussing its future attitude towards Russia. Several sections in the party are calling for a change in the course of the AfD’s policy on Russia. AfD MP Joachim Wundrak, for example, is in favor of sanctions against Russia, but they should not be so far reaching as to harm Germany.

The AfD parliamentary group leader Alice Weidel calls Russia’s invasion illegal under international law, but rejects arms deliveries to Ukraine and favors a diplomatic solution between Russia and Ukraine.

In the Left Party, the situation looks much more complicated. Here there is an open conflict between the foreign policy spokesperson Gregor Gysi and the former parliamentary group leader Sahra Wagenknecht. Wagenknecht and six other Left Party MPs had issued a statement categorically rejecting German arms deliveries to Ukraine and imposing economic sanctions against Russia. Gysi clearly criticizes Wagenknecht and says that her statement would in effect deny Ukraine’s right of self-defense.

Gysi accuses Wagenknecht of lack of emotion and empathy for the Ukrainian people, and at the same time questions the current course of the Left Party. Wagenknecht responds to Gysi’s accusations, calling his statements defamation of character and stating that she holds sympathy for the Ukrainian dead and injured. Wagenknecht, however, continues to stand by her position and emphasizes the possibility of resolving the war diplomatically.

Russia-Ukraine impact on German politics

The developments in the Russia-Ukraine war have influenced several levels of German politics. Germany’s rearmament, the sanctions against Russia, the cancellation of the Nord Stream 2 project and its consequences for Gerhard Schröder, and the diverging positions between and within political parties show the importance of the relationship between Germany and Russia.

The Russia-Ukraine war will not only change Germany’s attitude towards Russia but will also have far-reaching consequences for German foreign and security understanding. Germany’s discourse on military issues will be conducted differently in the future.

The fact that this change is taking place at a time when pacifist parties are in government can be seen as a paradox; however, this change can occur specifically because no opposition party of significant size is objecting to German rearmament and, as a result, the move is not up for debate.

On February 19, 2020, the right-wing extremist terrorist Tobias R. shot nine people with a migration background in a café in Hanau, Germany. The xenophobic attack targeted Muslims and showed that Germany has a serious problem with radical right-wing terror. The new German government declared that it wants to fight right-wing terror, and now, the question is how serious Germany is about this declaration.

Right-wing extremism is not a new phenomenon

Since the end of World War II, right-wing extremist ideas have been a taboo in Germany, and the aim has been to “de-Nazify” the German population. The strategy was to prevent a similar scenario to that which occurred between 1933 and 1945. Despite this, right-wing extremist political currents can still be found today. In addition to the minor parties NPD (National Democratic Party of Germany) and Der Dritte Weg (The Third Path) or the right-wing extremist movements PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident) and Identitäre Bewegung (Identitarian movement), the AfD (Alternative for Germany) is a symbol of how strongly right-wing extremism is present at the political level in Germany.

The entry of the AfD into the German parliament in 2017 as the biggest opposition party and the re-election of the right-wing extremist party to parliament in 2021 show that right-wing extremism is not a temporary problem but one that has deeper roots.

Although right-wing extremist attacks were a problem for society as a whole in Germany, it was not until the reunification of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1990 that the Federal Criminal Police Office of Germany (BKA) began to collect statistics for victims of right-wing extremist attacks. In 2002, the BKA introduced the system of definitions known as “Politically Motivated Crime” (PMK-System) in order to better record the number of victims. The system is considered inaccurate, and as a result the BKA’s victim figures differ from the victim figures of non-governmental organizations.

The federal government has been recording the number of victims of right-wing extremist attacks since 1990; as of September 2020, 109 victims have been registered. The newspapers Frankfurter Rundschau, Der Tagesspiegel, and Die Zeit, after a joint investigative research, recorded 187 victims for the same period; the Amadeu Antonio Foundation counts at least 213 victims.

Muslims are the main target

Since the reunification of Germany, Muslims have been the main target of right-wing extremist attacks. Between 1991 and 1993, there was an increase in racist attacks among the German population. At that time, the asylum debate was a very controversial issue, which is why asylum seekers were the main target of right-wing extremist attacks. The riots in Hoyerswerda (1991) and Rostock-Lichtenhagen (1992) were sensitive because the police, in particular, took a passive stance and even fuelled the mood against foreign citizens through populist statements.

Attack in Hanau – Insecurity grows for Muslims

On February 19, 2020, a right-wing extremist attack occurred in Hanau in which nine people with migration background were killed, six of them were Muslims. Politicians reacted to the attack with shock. Angela Merkel, chancellor at the time, said that racism is a poison and that such attacks were aimed at dividing society. The far-right party AfD did not make a clear statement and did not classify the attack as politically motivated or right-wing extremism, but as an act of a a lone wolf.

German public reacted with shock to the attack in Hanau shows that Germany does not realize the problem of right-wing extremism.

The fact that the general public reacted with shock to the attack in Hanau shows that Germany does not realize – or does not want to accept – the problem of right-wing extremism, especially against Muslims. The number of right-wing extremist attacks on Muslims and their religious institutions increases every year. In 2020, the German Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) recorded 1,026 Islamophobic attacks, 103 of which were directed against mosques.

In 2010, the BMI recorded “only” 22 attacks on mosques. In 2022, armed attacks on mosques and Muslims continue. A desecration of 30 Muslim graves in Iserlohn, an arson attack on a mosque in Chemnitz, and an armed attack on praying Muslims in Halle are current examples of how Muslims in Germany have to live – namely, in fear of hate attacks because of their faith.

Federal government remains passive – until now?

Under Merkel, Germany did not always prioritize the problem of right-wing extremist attacks. The statements by former interior minister Horst Seehofer (CSU) that Islam does not belong in Germany, the book by Thilo Sarrazin (SPD) Germany Abolishes Itself (Deutschland schafft sich ab), and the xenophobic statements by Tübingen mayor Boris Palmer (Greens) show that Islamophobic ideas can be found in all political parties. With the murder of politician Walter Lübcke (CDU) in 2019, Germany was punished for its passivity: the district president of Kassel had spoken out in support of refugees and was subsequently killed by right-wing extremist Stephan Ernst.

The roots of right-wing extremism in Germany run deep. The AfD and other parties have members who hold xenophobic views. The new minister of the interior, Nancy Faeser (SPD), at least gave some hope of Islam being accepted in German politics and society when she stated, “Islam, of course, belongs in Germany.

However, the number of victims and attacks on mosques show that the tendency further excludes Muslims from society. If Germany wants to preserve a stable political environment and avoid further polarization in society, it must be more active. Otherwise, Otherwise, more German state officials could become victims of right-wing extremist terror along with countless other innocent civilians, as in the case of Walter Lübcke.

Shortly before officially handing over her office to Olaf Scholz, former German chancellor Angela Merkel approved an arms deal that caused much criticism. Since the start of the year and by November 29, 2021, Germany had exported weapons and armaments worth €0.18 billion. With the approval of the arms deal shortly before the government change, the value of arms exports rose to €9.04 billion which means that Germany broke its 2019 record of €8.015 billion worth of arms exports.

Furthermore, Germany exported 65.8 percent of its arms and armaments to third countries (non-EU states) in 2021. Last year, the percentage of arms exports to third countries was 50.1; €1.6 billion worth of arms exports were reported to have been exported to EU countries, and €1.5 billion to NATO members and states on an equal level with the alliance. While €4 billion worth of weapons were exported, €5 billion worth of military equipment was exported.

The export of military equipment worth €4.34 billion to Egypt was approved. This means that almost half of the approved arms deals were destined for Egypt, making it by far the largest destination for German arms exports. It was announced that the export of three warships and 16 air defense systems to Egypt was approved on December 7, 2021.

Criticism from the left spectrum

The approved arms deals were criticized by the German Left Party and the Greens. Statistics on German arms exports from 2021 were published by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action upon the request of Left Party politician Sevim Dağdelen. Dağdelen criticized Chancellor Scholz and the SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany) based on the statistics records.

The German government is preparing to set certain criteria for approving and rejecting arms export deals.

The SPD was in government with the CDU (Christian Democratic Union of Germany) for the last two legislative terms (2013-2021). Dağdelen criticized the fact that despite the arms exports to dictatorships, the SPD did not have to face any consequences and even won the election, and called Scholz a “crook” (Gaunerstück).

The Greens are now in government and are mainly responsible for arms exports. They, too, criticized Merkel’s approved arms deals. In response, Minister of Foreign Affairs Annalena Baerbock announced that the German government wants to control arms exports better in the future. To this end, the German government is preparing to set certain criteria for approving and rejecting arms export deals.

“Traffic light coalition” must maintain its credibility

After the arms deal was announced, the current German government is under pressure. It is expected that especially the SPD and the Greens will not view the decision of German arms exports the same way. The SPD sees Germany as a trading state and wants to continue with arms exports without any restrictions, as it is one of the country’s most important sources of revenue. The Greens, on the other hand, want to review arms export deals in light of human rights issues. It is a matter of question now whether realpolitik or value-based politics will win.

In May 2021, the current minister of economic affairs and climate action and Green politician Robert Habeck said that the German government should supply weapons to Ukraine.

Interestingly, statements by the Greens and their actual position do not match in some cases. In May 2021, the current minister of economic affairs and climate action and Green politician Robert Habeck said that the German government should supply weapons to Ukraine. Habeck’s statement contradicted those of Baerbock, who is against arms deliveries to Ukraine.

The Greens are under pressure mainly because, as a party, they are a pacifist one; however, their credibility was lost after the Kosovo War in 1999. At that time, the Greens were in government and were responsible for Germany becoming actively involved in a war for the first time since World War II. Then, realpolitik had prevailed over value-based politics.

Double standards?

Germany’s approved arms deals to third countries where human rights are violated shows a lack of credibility. While Germany and France outwardly pioneer defending human rights, they cause further human rights violations by allowing arms exports to dictatorships. Morality and political ethics are only of discursive value, with no essential value – and perhaps even a weapon to use against “others.”

Statements by CDU politician Kiesenwetter about the competition with China and Russia summarize this paradox quite well, showing that moral values are only important in domestic politics, but in international affairs, Germany acts no differently than authoritarian regimes like the aforementioned two countries.

The silence of the SPD and Olaf Scholz illustrate that the German federal government wants to continue this policy. The Greens will appear to oppose it in their statements; however, their lack of credibility and effectiveness will impede them from having any  real say on the issue. In the end, it seems highly likely that Germany will continue its current unchecked policy of arms exports.

According to a survey conducted in autumn 2021 by the German Chamber of Commerce Abroad (AHK), the majority of German companies in Turkey consider the country a favorable investment location. There is a lot of potential for Turkey and Germany to benefit from each other as economic partners, but political developments are hindering the realization of this potential.

Risk factors from the perspective of German companies

Turkey is currently struggling with a steadily increasing inflation rate and a constantly depreciating currency. However, Turkey also boasts a high growth rate and high exports. A total of 7,000 German companies are active in Turkey, 327 of which are members of AHK. Of these members, 77 German companies participated in the AHK survey.

With regard to short-term developments, German companies are rather skeptical about economic developments in Turkey. While 34 percent expect the economy to become worse, 40 percent of the companies surveyed expect the economy to remain unchanged. Only 26 percent of respondents expects economic conditions to improve in the coming months.

In the survey, 62 percent of the participating companies stated that the economic-political situation in Turkey is the biggest business risk. In addition, 48 percent of respondents indicated rising energy and commodity prices in Turkey as another risk factor. It should be added that the skeptical attitude is due to the pandemic-related restrictions in logistics and postponed investments. This is why around half of the respondents indicated that they are planning to adjust their own supply chains.

AHK survey & German companies in Turkey

With regard to the AHK survey, it is clear that German companies will continue to prefer Turkey as an investment location. According to the survey, 70 percent of the companies surveyed assess the economic situation in Turkey as positive. While 57 percent of the companies surveyed expect an improvement of the situation in the coming 12 months, only five percent expect a negative development. Furthermore, 59 percent of the German companies surveyed want to increase their employment in Turkey.

While the willingness of German companies to invest in Turkey was 25 percent in spring of 2021, it is 43 percent now.

While the willingness of German companies to invest in Turkey was 25 percent in spring of 2021, it is 43 percent now, according to the survey. The fact is that German companies are used to economic turbulences in Turkey. In 1990, for example, the inflation rate was 140 percent and yet none of the big German companies withdrew from the market.

With regard to the tourism industry, Germany is one of Turkey’s most important partners. In 2019, the number of German tourists that visited Turkey reached 5 million – 11.2 percent of the total number of tourists. This made Germany the second most important country for the Turkish tourism industry after Russia. Alanya is a good example: at present, almost 10,000 Germans who decided to move from Germany to Turkey live in the Turkish Mediterranean city.

Political problems hinder relations 

Trade relations at the state level, corporate investment in the country, and the influx of German tourists show that German-Turkish relations have great potential on all three levels: macro, meso, and micro. Due to political obstacles, however, this potential cannot be fully materialized. The best example is the failed investment plans of the German car brand Volkswagen.

Volkswagen wanted to open a factory in Manisa that would create at least 4,000 jobs in the Aegean region. With this investment, the company planned to increase further its market presence in southeastern Europe. Labor in Turkey is much cheaper and more profitable for the German car company compared to other EU countries such as Romania or Bulgaria.

Volkswagen was criticized domestically on several occasions for offering such a large project to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Eventually, Volkswagen’s investment plans were officially cancelled due to the coronavirus pandemic in July 2020, as the car company did not want to take any risks. But there were also political objections from the employee representatives on the supervisory board, which contributed significantly to the failure of the billion euro project.

This example shows that the political hurdles are currently very high for Turkish-German economic relations to function smoothly, and yet both sides would benefit immensely by a reciprocal relationship with intensive exchange on both economic and cultural levels. The micro level, i.e., the German population, is basically well-disposed towards Turkey. This is shown above all by the figures in the tourism industry.

The meso level, i.e., the German companies, show a high willingness to invest and would even like to become more active in Turkey. However, the main problem is at the macro level: interstate relations between the two countries are far from perfect condition. The new coalition government in Germany also does not look ready to significantly improve relations with Turkey. Therefore, as a result of political obstacles, neither state can act on a rational basis based on maximum profit.

Tareq Alaows is one of the initiators of the Seebrücke (1) Initiative and a member of Flüchtlingsrat (2) Berlin. In February 2021, he launched his candidacy for the Green Party to represent Oberhausen in North Rhine-Westphalia. Although there was a public interest in his candidacy, he decided to withdraw due to threat calls that he received against him, and people close to him. Politics Today interviewed Tareq Alaows about his experience as a Syrian refugee in Germany and the political participation and representation of refugees in Germany.

Q. Could you please briefly introduce yourself and tell us about your journey as a Syrian refugee to Germany?

I left Syria in July 2015. After traveling to Lesbos, Greece through Turkey, I took the Balkan route. I took most of the way to Germany from Athens on foot, and I finally arrived in the German city of Dortmund in September 2015. I had studied law back in Syria, and for more than five years now, I work as a jurist, who is engaged in providing legal aid for refugees during their asylum and residency processes in Germany. I am a political activist too and one of the initiators of the political movement called the Seebrücke. I am still a part of the coordination circle and serve as the press secretary.

Q. When and how have you become politically active in Germany?

Well, I haven’t become politically active ever since I arrived in Germany. I furthered my work in the humanitarian field, which I had started much earlier in Syria and continued here in Germany. But the central issue of my work was no longer human rights in Syria, but human rights in Germany. I took the cause for people, who came here as refugees.

I had no other choice than to become politically active. When I arrived here, I saw that our legal rights as refugees were not being properly applied in practice. I was detected in a military center in the middle of nowhere. When I wanted to buy something, I was supposed to walk five kilometers to the nearest supermarket. There were no buses or trains or any other means of transportation. After two months, I was transferred to Bochum. There, I was supposed to live in a basketball hall at a school with sixty other people. Families, men, women, children, all of us, were in one room, and we were not allowed to do anything that we wanted.

I lived in this situation, where we could not even enjoy our basic human rights for six months and I could not stand it anymore. I had to react to this situation and started an action. I organized the people in our accommodation and set a protest camp in front of the City Hall.

Q. Quite naturally, you demanded to live in dignity. How did German authorities react to this? What was your experience with the first protest?

We managed to make our demands heard thanks to our protest in front of the City Hall. Thereafter, we were organized under Refugee Strike Bochum and continued to be active in the negotiations. We observed the implementation process of our demands in regard to the asylum policy in Bochum in the following years. We started to have regular meetings with the City Hall. There, we did only talk about our problems, but also provided solutions. The administration in the city hall was responsible and saw that we, as refugees, were a part of the solution. In the end, we learned a lot from each other.

Q. To protect your basic rights and demands, you have democratically organized and taken a political role at the local level. But what has motivated you to take an active part at the federal level?

During my political activism at the local level, I recognized that everything I said reached the German politicians in my city better than what the German activists or the political parties in the opposition were saying. Because I was talking about my life and the very conditions that I was living in. I think they could not argue against it.

And I see that I am not an exception. I know thousands of refugees from different countries, as well as people from Germany, who are doing a great job here in uplifting the refugee voices and working to maintain the human rights for refugees.

I just have been lucky to have the media attention, which helped shed light on and bring solutions to the issues we -as refugees- encountered. But the question eventually transformed into how could we represent these persons, who have arrived in this society?

I was eventually transformed from being a normal person running for candidacy to a target of racism and hate speech. People who target me are not targeting me as Tareq Alaows but target a person of color with a refugee background, a person who showed the courage to claim his rights to be represented in the German parliament.

I just run for the elections, and this is a democratic right. At the end of the day, it will be German voters’ decision to elect or not to elect me. But the right-wing party viewed it differently. They were afraid of me being elected in a democratic way and they did everything to stop me.

Q. What did exactly happen, and you decided to withdraw your candidacy?

I was receiving hundreds of comments and messages on the internet, that said that they knew where I am living, where I am walking, and where I am eating, and I had to be careful. And I saw that most of the messages were written in the “we” form, and not in the “I” form. It was like groups in the background and not like single persons. There were two people in my team, who were deleting those racist comments and messages on social media and documenting things that are relevant for my safety for the police.

I just run for the elections, and this is a democratic right. It’s the German voters’ decision to elect or not to elect me. But the right-wing party viewed it differently.

Most of the messages were anonymous and we could not tell by whom they were sent, or which persons or groups were doing it, so, there was nothing we could do. For me, it was a very dangerous situation, and nobody could calculate consequences. I had to protect my family and people working with me. I had no guarantee for my safety. So, I had to withdraw my candidacy in the elections. But as a jurist and political activist, I still defend the basic human rights of refugees.

Q. What was the reaction of the Green Party, or of other political parties, to this incident?

Both the Green Party and other democratic parties learned something from this experience. The Green Party, of which I was a candidate, accepted my withdrawal from candidacy and drafted a document in order to avoid a possible future incident as such and to establish a mechanism to counsel and support victims of such racisms. I think every political party in Germany must start debates about racism in politics and work for developing awareness.

Q. Your experience, then, highlights that there are serious obstacles concerning the participation and representation of minorities in political life in Germany. How do you think it could be overcome?

This could be overcome only by empowering those people in politics, who are victims of racism and encouraging them to get involved in democratic processes. Because the only way to fight against racism in politics is to have more people with a refugee or a minority background in politics. We can talk about democracy if every group in our society, including the minorities and the newcomers, are represented. Otherwise, it is nothing but a mock debate. We need to have more democratic environments and dialogue between members of the host society and the newcomers.

We also need to work to create awareness among the youth via programs for young persons, immigrants, or non-immigrants and let them be involved in these political debates. Above all, we need to put it in a context; when we talk about refugees we talk about humans.

Importantly, all these debates and dialogues need to be translated to a legal basis. We need more clear and strict laws against racism and extremism both on online platforms and in real life. Racism is not an opinion, it is a criminal act, and we have to name it and fight against it.

Although I decided to cancel my candidacy for the German federal elections of 2021 and continue my work in the humanitarian field, I am optimistic that political parties in Germany have learned something from that experience.

The elections held in Germany on September 26, 2021, produced interesting results. The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) increased its votes by 1.8% to become the first party after nearly 23 years, while Chancellor Angela Merkel‘s Christian democratic alliance of two political parties – the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU) – lost 7.7% of votes with Armin Laschet and came in second position.

No party could get enough votes to form a single party government. Compared with the 2017 elections, the far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD) received only 10.3%, a drop of 2.3% compared to 2017. Another significant change was the withdrawal from political life of Angela Merkel who had been Germany’s chancellor uninterruptedly since 2005.

Angela Merkel: “We can do this”

Chancellor Merkel led not only Germany but Europe as a whole in the fight against the Euro crisis, the so-called immigration crisis, Brexit, and COVID-19. In particular, her slogan “We can do this” (Wir schaffen das), which she put forward on August 31, 2015 during the European “migrant crisis”, was later used in many other crises.

This concept, also known as “welcoming culture” (Willkommenskultur), became a concept that presented Germany’s positive attitude towards immigrants, especially in the eyes of politicians and public institutions. However, politics in Germany did not evolve as optimistically as the slogan would have one believe: the AfD, a new political party, used Merkel’s slogan against her to rise in politics.

The rapid rise and fall of the AfD

The AfD was established in 2013 with anti-Muslim and anti-immigration policies and increased in popularity rapidly. In 2015, intense immigration to Europe from Middle Eastern countries, primarily Syria, and Germany’s reception of approximately 1.2 million immigrants in 2015 and 2016, caused the AfD to find quick social support and to rise in the 2017 elections. This rise started to decline before reaching high levels.

Given the legacy of WW II, it was unknown whether support for the AfD, Germany’s first far-right party in recent times, would continue given the fact that violations of Muslims’ rights and attacks against Muslims, Islamic organizations, and foreigners have been increasing across the country. The AfD had received 4.7% of the votes in 2013, and it turned the 2015 immigration crisis into an opportunity and received 12.6% of the votes in the 2017 federal elections.

Elections in Germany and the far right

The most important factor in the drop in AfD votes is that the party lost credibility by not making specific policy recommendations for the problems that Germany is facing.

First of all, although the vast majority of Muslims in Germany are peaceful and tolerant, the AfD has created hostile rhetoric about Islam. It incites fear, classifies people, and pits groups against each other, especially during elections. The AfD conflates the concepts of Islam, immigration, and terrorism. On the other hand, COVID-19 underlined the codependency and interconnectedness of all segments of German society.

Although the vast majority of Muslims in Germany are peaceful and tolerant, the AfD has created hostile rhetoric about Islam.

The AfD claimed that internal security deteriorated due to the increasing number of foreigners and Muslims in Germany. However, the police crime statistics, which have been recorded since 1993, demonstrate the crime rates have been constantly decreasing.

The AfD’s asylum policy consists of harsh political demands and provocative slogans: they want to close the borders, exercise deportation, and cut off social support. Even the right of asylum provided by international law means nothing to them. The party wants to abolish individual protection and asylum guarantees. However, statistics reveal that Germany needs more foreign labor every year. If the AfD’s policy propositions had, in fact, been realized, there would have been serious problems in the labor supply in Germany as was the case in the U.K.

Elections and Germany’s domestic politics: immigration and Islamophobia

Although public support for the AfD has declined, having received 10.3% or 4,803,902 votes in a country with a high population like Germany suggests that it still has many supporters across German society. The AfD’s active use of digital platforms and social media is enhancing its popularity, especially among the youth. The AfD is the vanguard party for young people under 30. While 19% of voters under 30 voted for the AfD, 18% preferred the CDU.

The AfD is followed by the Green Party with 13% of the votes. This figure shows that the middle-aged and elderly population prefer the traditional parties; however, this points to a danger lurking in  Germany’s future. On the one hand, cases of violence related to discrimination and xenophobia are increasing in society, and on the other hand, votes for the far-right AfD are decreasing.

This may seem like a contradiction, but it shows that people with far-right ideas resort to violence more than in the past. Research has shown that 38% of AfD voters are strictly populist and 35% are partially populist. The majority (56%) of AfD voters seem to have embraced far-right views: 27% are potentially far-right advocates while 29% explicitly adhere to far-right ideology.

The September 2021 elections in Germany show that hopefully for at least four years, Muslims and foreigners will not face extra legal restrictions as the new German government is not expected to step up the abuses of the rights of Muslims or foreigners. The so-called Traffic Light Coalition (Ampelkoalition) consisting of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, the Free Democratic Party, and the Greens declared a coalition agreement that promised granting some rights to immigrants.

For instance, children who were born in Germany will receive German citizenship immediately at birth if one of the parents has lived in Germany for at least five years. Another important promise for immigrants is that they can become dual citizens. The conditions for acquiring German citizenship after five years of residing in the country could be made easier in Germany.

In other words, there is a room for hope. However, the AfD still poses a threat to Germany’s future. Time will tell whether the AfD will opt for further radicalizing its voter base and try to make them more aggressive towards Muslims and foreigners in an effort to gloss over its election loss.

German foreign policy during the Merkel era was characterized by pragmatism and balance. Merkel’s focus in foreign policy was clearly on the stability of the EU and maintaining relations with important third countries. The future German government, probably consisting of a traffic light coalition, may experience several conflicts in foreign policy decision-making. Accordingly, these conflicts may lead to Germany increasingly losing influence in international politics.

Merkel’s foreign policy

When Merkel took over the chancellorship in 2005, the first item on the agenda was to repair the damaged transatlantic relationship with the U.S. The Schröder-Fischer government had opposed the Iraq war in 2003, which caused the U.S. to put its relations with Germany on hold. Merkel’s election led to Germany acting again in a pro-transatlantic manner and adopting a more distanced stance towards Russia. However, the EU no longer acted as independently as it had during Schröder’s time, but had increasingly come under the influence of the United States.

The ongoing euro crisis since 2009, the Ukraine crisis in 2014, the ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015, and Brexit in 2016 were to endanger Europe’s stability and put Germany to the test. The fact that Trump was elected in 2016 was to make the situation much more difficult for Germany and Europe. Merkel was left on her own to find new approaches for her foreign policy strategy. She had increasingly distanced herself from her initial strategy of looking to Western partners for foreign policy, and instead shifted to a foreign policy strategy characterized by pragmatism and balance, with German state interests at the forefront.

However, the pragmatic approach was also necessary for Germany to remain relevant in international politics. The EU was threatening to break apart more and more, especially due to the influx of refugees. By opening EU borders, Merkel accepted to endanger the stability of her own national borders. By virtue of its Eurosceptic stance, the far-right party AFD (Alternative for Germany) had already gained fundamental support from a certain section of the population anyway. The ‘refugee crisis’ and the approach of the ostensibly conservative CDU (Christian Democratic Union) further strengthened the right-wing extremists.

The fact that there has been so little focus on foreign policy so far could have to do with the fact that no real foreign policy strategy has yet been formulated by the future German government.

Experts have little hope

CDU chancellor candidate Armin Laschet has already criticized the fact that in the coalition negotiations there was little talk of foreign and security policy issues. This is very worrying, he said, as Germany plays an important role in international politics and should also assume this role in order not to lose its influence as an important player. The fact that there has been so little focus on foreign policy so far could have to do with the fact that no real foreign policy strategy has yet been formulated by the future German government. Most experts are critical of the absence of hardly any overlapping points in  foreign policy strategy.

Political scientist Johannes Varwick has commented that apart from general commitments to NATO and the EU, which he describes as “usual foreign policy platitudes,” no concrete points have been formulated. Expert Gustav C. Gressel of the European Council on Foreign Relations also denounces the little attention that has been paid to foreign policy issues and emphasizes that the points of overlap between the coalition parties are very few.

The fundamental difference with the Merkel era is that the German federal foreign office will most likely be run by the Greens. The Greens are known for their transatlantic foreign policy, so, on the one hand, the focus will be on the stability of relations with the U.S., and, on the other hand, a tougher stance on Russia and China are expected.

It should also be underlined that in German foreign policy the dominant role is usually played by the chancellor. Therefore, it can be expected that Olaf Scholz and the SPD will try and probably succeed to a large extent in realizing their foreign policy ideas. This, in turn, will inevitably lead to tensions within the coalition, as the Greens and the FDP will not always want to subordinate themselves to the SPD.

If the SPD has a different idea than its coalition partners on fundamental issues such as the Russia and China policy, which is also quite possible, and if it always gets its way on these important points, the other parties in government will clash with the SPD as a result of not being able to implement their promises and act according to their political stances.

That is why experts justifiably fear that Germany will continue to play a reactive rather than an active role in the international arena. A German foreign policy strategy based on consensus cannot exist at all if there are hardly any overlaps. The result will be that the German government will act far too cautiously in international politics and, as before, will find answers to emerging crises too late. In a nutshell, one should not put too much hope in the future federal government being an influential player in international politics.

The New York Times saw fit to give the title of “Leader of the Free World” to Angela Merkel after Donald Trump’s election in 2017. It is questionable if Merkel, who after 16 years of governing Germany will voluntarily leave her office following the federal elections of September 26, deserves this title. At the moment, the world consists of a West and an EU that have lost their internal unity, and are suffering from an erosion of moral and value superiority. Therefore, when evaluating Merkel’s legacy, it is essential to analyze the developments around the world in the last 30 years.

Breeze of freedom

When Merkel was first elected chancellor in 2005, it was 15 years after the West announced its victory over communism. The two Germanies had merged, and a breeze of freedom was blowing through the world. Moreover, the process of the formation of the European Union had accelerated, and no direct threat remained against the West after the removal of the risk factor coming from Eastern European countries, all of which had begun to join NATO and the EU.

Perhaps most importantly, China was a Third World country which acted as a workshop for the West, far from the challenging model and economic power that it is today. In light of the political atmosphere described above, famous American political scientist Francis Fukuyama had declared the “End of History” hailing the ascension of a Western liberal order and the West’s final victory. However, what is the state of the world and Europe today, 16 years later, as Merkel, the “Leader of the Free World,” prepares to leave office?

Europe and the world are much more unstable and chaotic now than when Merkel first took office, while Europe and the U.S. received a nasty blow in terms of moral superiority. On the other hand, China is now a world power which aims to use its economic power to create an order in line with those of the U.S. and Europe. Meanwhile, Russia threatens Europe’s security just as it did in the Soviet era, and Europe struggles to be the center of weight and appeal with Britain leaving the EU, numerous economic crises, and the rise of the far right. The question is what was Merkel’s role in creating today’s unstable, contemporary world.

It is important to underline that Merkel takes responsibility when it is necessary. For example, even though she wanted to leave politics along with the office of chancellor in 2017, she changed her mind after the election of Donald Trump.

First, it is important to underline that Merkel takes responsibility when it is necessary. For example, even though she wanted to leave politics along with the office of chancellor in 2017, she changed her mind after the election of Donald Trump. The anecdotes of Ben Rhodes, who was an advisor to Barack Obama when he was U.S. president, have offered us some details on the subject.

According to Rhodes, on November 8, 2016, eight days after Trump’s election, Obama privately visited Merkel in Berlin. Obama asked Merkel whether she’ll run again for chancellor during their dinner at the Adlon Hotel. Merkel told him that she feels a responsibility to run again to ensure the continuity of the liberal order after Trump’s election. Indeed, one week after this meeting, Merkel publicly announced that she would run again for office. This is undoubtedly evidence that Merkel has a character that does not shy away from taking on responsibility when it is called for.

Results of a passive attitude

Looking at the material results of Merkel’s policies, one can claim that her patient style did not pay off. Her attitude, patient according to some, “passive” according to others, separated Russia from the West and turned it into a threat for the West once more. The fact is that as the leader of perhaps the most important country in Europe, Merkel didn’t interfere with the EU’s signing of a free trade agreement with Ukraine despite all the opposition from Russia, which resulted in 13,000 deaths in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea by Russia, and the de facto division of Ukraine in two. In the end, the relationship between Europe and Russia was structurally damaged to the point that they were on the brink of an actual war. Merkel’s pre-crisis passive attitude and post-crisis weak management have dragged the E.U.-Russia relations into a long-term uncertainty.

What happened with Turkey during Merkel’s time in office is similar to what happened with Russia. Following its EU candidacy at the 1999 EU summit in Copenhagen, Turkey started a serious reform and entered a serious economic lunge by triplicating its GNP in a short time. However, after Merkel became chancellor, together with Sarkozy, president of France at the time, they virtually blocked Turkey’s EU accession.

Even though this might be understandable considering her party’s values, it has led to a crisis in both Turkey-EU and Turkey-Germany relations. What is more, Merkel’s exclusionary policies have led to Turkey expanding its foreign policy, first and foremost with Russia, and have interrupted Turkey’s reform dynamic by alienating it from the EU. Even though Merkel started to realize Turkey’s importance after the Syrian refugee crisis, it seems to be quite difficult for Turkey and the EU to build a relationship based on trust following this course of events.

Shortsightedness

In the end, we can say that the state of the world affairs is seriously different today than it was 16 years ago when Chancellor Merkel first took office. Then, the West and Europe enjoyed more stability and power than they do now. However, as Germany’s longest standing leader, Merkel perhaps could have intervened in some way to prevent events from taking the course that they did.