During Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring in the north of Syria, US President Donald Trump sent an unpleasant letter to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that was later returned to him during Erdoğan’s visit to the White House. But besides Trump’s undiplomatic language, he also made an offer to facilitate negotiations between Turkey and a so-called “General” on the Northern Syrian issue. However, there was a problem. The person Trump referred to as a “General”, was actually a wanted terrorist by Turkey on Interpol’s red notice list and the US relationship with Kobani has become a sore point Turkish-US relation

After Kobani’s name was mentioned alongside the other European politicians, Turkish President Erdoğan strongly took issue to the fact that Mazloum Kobani is terrorist wanted by Turkey. “Now we are at a point that some European countries such as France and Germany are negotiating with leaders of this terrorist organization. Again, some American authorities discuss with them. And in the face of these developments, we ask them ‘What is this situation?’ On the one hand, we talk about counter-terrorism, on the other, unfortunately, you open your doors to them and sit around the table with them. You even sent their letter as an addition to your letter” he told in a press interview.

Turkish President Erdoğan also said that Washington has to hand over Kobani to Turkey according to international law. “We have an extradition agreement. The USA has to give this man to us. Because this is the requirement of ‘wanted by the red notice’ he said.

Who is Mazloum Kobani?

Ferhat Abdi Şahin, who is better known by the adopted name of Mazloum Kobani and also as Mazloum Abdi, or by the nom de guerre Şahin Cilo, was born in Afrin, Syria in 1967. Despite a lack of information about his early life, sources say that he met with the so-called leader of the PKK Abdullah Ocalan when he was a child. It was during Ocalan’s years in Syria that the bond between them was said to have grown. Because of his close relationship with Ocalan, Kobani is considered to be Ocalan’s spiritual son.

According to sources, in 1990, when Kobani was 23 years old, he joined the PKK. From 1991-1996, he worked as a so-called Cilo Region Manager in Turkey’s Hakkari province. Kobani was responsible for the 22 August 1996 rocket attack that killed five people and wounded 11 others in Hakkari’s Şemdinli province. He was also responsible for the 8 November 1996 rocket attack that killed 17 people and wounded eight other at Hakkari’s Çukurca Province.

From 1997 to 2003, he was assigned as the PKK’s Europe Manager. In these years, he established the PKK’s Europe organizational scheme. He described this period as ‘political works’ during some interviews. Sources say that during this period he made a lot of connections with governmental institutions in the name of the PKK.

Besides his ‘political works’ in Europe, he also organized some activities such as festivals and camps mainly in the Netherlands to promote the PKK.

When Ocalan was captured at Kenya in 1999, Kobani was living in Europe. After 2003, he returned to Syria and according to Euronews he was imprisoned by the Syrian Government on five occasions and until 2009 he spent most of his time in prison.

In 2013, during the early years of the Syrian civil war, he began to work for the YPG as a so-called special forces manager and individual responsible for intelligence. It was during these years that Daesh began to strengthen in Syria and despite Turkey’s objections, the US decided to collaborate with the YPG with the purpose of defeating the Daesh.

In 2018, after Daesh was defeated, the US administration began to refer to Mazloum Kobani as ‘General Mazloum’. Particularly after the US Defense Ministry Spokesman Col. Robert Manning first referred to him as ‘General’ and argued that the US would continue to help the YPG as long as they fight against Daesh. The usage of the term ‘General’ was condemned by Turkey. After Manning’s statement, Turkish Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hami Soylu gave a press brief about the situation saying “the Pentagon Spokesman spoke nonsense on Afrin matter”.

When Turkish President Erdoğan met with US President Trump in the White House this November, a month after Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring, the Turkish delegation showed a short documentary about Kobani to US officials. In the documentary Kobani was shown to have “cost of the life of 313 Turkish security forces, honourable men and women whose sole duty and purpose was to protect and serve their people. He also killed five civilians during attacks on 29 police stations between 1991 and 1995. His preferred modus operandi, a method all too familiar to our fellow audience: Suicide.”

Following this crucial meeting that some Republican Senators also attended, some specialists commented about Kobani’s possible Washington trip. Luke Coffey, a foreign policy expert at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative policy think tank, was one of them. “Ferhat Abdi Şahin (aka Mazloum Kobanê) should NEVER be allowed to step foot on American soil” he said on his verified twitter account. He also made a special statement on Turkey’s state television TRT at beginning of Operation Peace Spring. “To defeat a terrorist organization by collaborating with another terrorist organization is a great insincerity. Entirely meaningless… If the citizens of the USA knew that the taxes that they paid to the government transferred to the YPG, which is an arm of the Neo Marxist PKK in Syria, they would not like this” he said.

After these developments Turkey’s Communications Director İbrahim Kalın wrote an article about the attitude of American politicians towards Kobani’s possible Washington visit. “Why would U.S. lawmakers roll out the red carpet for the top commander of a terrorist group, who is the subject of an Interpol Red Notice? The senators are extending an invitation to Şahin due to his role as the head of the YPG, which the U.S. has chosen to support as part of its counterterrorism strategy in Syria. This decision is riddled with too many contradictions to list. This invitation not only damages Turkish-American relations, but also constitutes a potential crime under U.S. law, given the YPG’s ties with the PKK.” he stressed.

“The Turkish public will not forget or forgive those who invited Şahin to the U.S. in order to legitimize him. Our NATO ally’s efforts to glorify a terror organization’s leader will be etched in our memory for many years. Şahin’s invitation to the U.S. will create a lasting wound in the hearts and minds of thousands of innocent Turkish families that have lost their loved ones” Kalın also emphasized.

Ahmet Hakan, a Turkish Journalist from Hurriyet Daily commented on the Kobani’s situation after the Trump- Erdoğan meeting. In his opinion the Kobani video that was shown to the US officials ended Kobani’s positive reputation. He also noted that Turkish journalists President Erdoğan watched the Kobani video together with President Erdoğan after the significant meeting. He noted that “having watched the video, we turned our sight to President Erdoğan, who told us: ‘I got Trump and the senators to watch this. I saw that Trump was influenced by the video’”.

After this diplomatic movement, there is still no clear consensus between Ankara and Washington on the issue of Mazloum Kobani. Following the meeting in the White House, international media has stressed that Erdoğan strengthened his hand against Trump. In particular, CNN International’s White House correspondent Kevin Liptak wrote an Opinion piece about the meeting entitled “Trump declares himself a ‘big fan’ of Turkey’s strongman leader Erdoğan,” and writing that “Erdoğan isn’t the only global strongman to have caught Trump’s attention. But no leader has appeared to get what he wants from Trump quite like Erdoğan.”

Written by Yeter Ada Şeko – ISTANBUL

As Turkey launched its Operation Peace Spring, an unfortunate phenomenon has been observed once again among European and German circles. Namely the continuation of a myth about the YPG. This begins with their practice of legitimizing the YPG as the representative of all Kurds – no matter whether they are living in Turkey, Syria or in Germany, and despite the strong evidence to the contrary.

Without taking into consideration the diversity within the Kurdish community, a false narrative is established in which YPG members, sympathizers and even its leading figures are only discussed within a positive and uncritical narrative. This disguises the true face of the PKK and its offshoot, the YPG in Northern Syria. A mistake rooted in both a lack of knowledge and an intention to shape public opinion, observable among politicians, artistic circles, media representatives, journalists and even think-tankers.

Most of the media outlets disregard or do not explicitly mention the fact that the PKK/YPG is officially listed as a terrorist organization by Turkey, EU, and the US. The term used to describe the terrorist organization in the media is the “prohibited Kurdistan Workers’ Party” which implies two incorrect meanings: First, Turkey’s supposed undemocratic political landscape where minority groups are not allowed political representation, and second the alleged legality of the PKK and its supposed leftist credentials. There are thousands of articles which either hide the PKK’s ethno-nationalist, separatist and armed character or mention that it is prohibited in the US, EU and Turkey without ever explaining why. It is by using this kind of language that a positive perception of the terrorist group is generally achieved.

If one focuses on the stances of German politicians and compares their approaches towards Daesh and to the YPG, particularly with the rise of Daesh (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria, it is noticeable that unfortunately one –secular– terror group was preferred in order to fight another terror group Daesh. This is despite the Western world’s powerful militarily superiority. The question is, if both are deemed to be abhorrent terrorist groups why was one of them acceptable, even to become an ally to the US and EU?

It appears the ethnic-separatist, neo-Marxist and totalitarian PKK/YPG is somehow deemed to be a lesser threat to Europeans and the West, who instead classify so called religiously inspired terrorism at the top of their hierarchy of evil.

In addition to the ideologically motivated stance of journalists and politicians with regard to the YPG, the most striking issue is the ambivalent behavior of academics’ and think-tankers’. Not for the first time, experts on the PKK/YPG were seen to disregard their own research on the YPG on television and radio. But why choose to disregard what you know? It would seem the societal, media and political pressure which underpins the YPG myth have led these academics to disregard their research, opinions and analyses regarding this terrorist group.

Academics spoke about the YPG as if it had no relation with the PKK while their own publications openly stress a PKK-YPG relationship. Unfortunately, popularity, professional “reputation”, financial dependence, and current political developments seem to trump academic integrity. Similarly, think-tankers, who are likely responsible to their sponsors have disregarded their own publications and have even made calls to support a terrorist organization.

Nevertheless, at the end of the day, more realist approaches appear to be winning favor. In this context, Germany’s defense minister and leader of the Christian Democrats recently proposed the establishment of an internationally controlled security zone in Syria in cooperation with Turkey and Russia. It is too early to tell whether these delayed proposals will have any effect on the current discourse and myths surrounding the PKK/YPG terrorist organization in Germany, the same applies to whether such moves will be taken seriously at all both domestically and internationally.

Countries such as Russia and Turkey will most likely reject such delayed calls after their history of disregarding previous efforts, particularly of Turkey. It should be remembered that during those times Western states took no responsibility but tried to put themselves in the foreground. Due to this, it seems rather unlikely that Turkey will accept certain states interrupting an ongoing process, particularly since the recent memorandum of understanding was signed between Turkey and Russia on north-eastern Syria. The picture will become clearer in the coming days and weeks.

The Turkish Armed Forces commenced its third cross-border military operation against the PKK/PYD in northern Syria on October 9, 2019. As the first incursion into the eastern part of the Euphrates River, this operation began in the wake of a series of fruitless bilateral negotiations between the US and Turkey over a projected safe zone in northeast Syria. Turkey’s security concerns grew considerably following US assistance to the PYD, which had strengthened its ability to build a potential PKK/PYD-led statelet on Turkey’s borders. The vast majority of Turks and Kurds (except in HDP circles) regard this as an existential threat.

It is once the PKK/PYD’s strategy is analyzed that Turkey’s security concerns can be better understood. Firstly, the PKK/PYD should be regarded as a holistic threat and did not separately emerge. For this reason there is no distinction between the YPG (the armed wing of the PYD) and the PYD, and between the HPG (the armed wing of PKK) and the PKK. The threat facing Turkey comes from the combination of the PKK and PYD (PKK/PYD) emanating from their shared ideology, organization, and methodology.

Over the past few years, the PKK/PYD approached the Syrian Civil War in a pragmatic way to achieve its objective of securing a vast area in Syria and Turkey. This involved a new strategy composed of four different elements: affiliating with state actors in Syria by leveraging the fight against Daesh (ISIS), achieving territorial aspirations in Syria, radicalizing youth, and increasing violence in urban areas across Turkey.

The PKK/PYD’s first strategy was to seek out military and political support in order to gain international sympathy and legitimize its territorial aspirations. The rhetoric of fighting against Daesh was instrumental in putting diplomatic pressure on Turkey and causing a postponement of a possible military offensive against the PYD in Syria. The PKK/PYD has managed to maintain the U.S. support until Turkey conducted Operation Olive Branch in Afrin in 2018. This operation signaled for the first time that the PKK/PYD could not be too certain of the future longevity of its tactical relationship with the US.

The security threats of a potential PKK/PYD statelet in northern Syria were brought to the forefront after rocket and mortar attacks on Turkish territory from PKK/PYD held areas in northeast Syria. These attacks targeted the Turkish border towns of Suruç, Akçakale, and Ceylanpınar in Şanlıurfa, and Kızıltepe and Nusaybin of Mardin provinces over the last few weeks. Moreover, modern weapons, ammunition and explosives sourced from the U.S. forces in Syria were said to be smuggled into Turkish territory. Furthermore, as part of their territorialization project, the PKK/PYD caused a demographic change in northeast Syria, forcing local non-PKK affiliated Kurds, Arabs and Turkmens to flee to Turkey as refugees.

The third strategy of the PKK/PYD is to achieve self-determination by using intimidation and coercion tactics in southeast Turkey. The PKK committed violent acts both in rural areas and urban centers with the help of municipalities run by pro-PKK political parties. Despite the fact that the PKK’s urban atrocities, which were clearly manifested during the “trench wars” in 2016, were crushed by Turkish security forces, and pro-PKK municipality mayors and staff were jailed, but the PKK’s desire for a future resurgence in Diyarbakır, Mardin, Van and Hakkari remains. These strategies and the U.S. support for the PKK/PYD made Turkish intervention in northeast Syria inevitable.

Tactical aspect of Operation Peace Spring

Unlike the deployment of numerous fighter jets for intensive airstrikes as was the case during Operation Olive Branch in Afrin, Operation Peace Spring began with a limited number of aircrafts providing constant airstrikes, which forced the PKK/PYD to hold on to their positions.

Meanwhile, Turkish artillery shelled predetermined target locations in order to render the PKK/PYD’s ability to use in-depth defensive tactics impossible. Turkish and Syrian ground forces were also supported with precise airstrikes from combat drones while they maneuvered to encircle the urban towns of Rasulayn and Tal Abyad.

The high fire power and mobility capability of the maneuver forces helped the Turkish Commandos and Syrian National Army break through the PKK/PYD defense lines easily. Under this continuous fire and with the quick maneuver of Turkish operation forces the PKK/PYD could not succeed, and eventually failed to confront the Turkish operation forces. In retaliation, the PKK/PYD fired a series of mortar shells in Turkish border towns.

As of October 17, the Turkish Armed Forces have operated in the area between Rasulayn and Tal Abyad, an area around 120 km in length and 10 km in width. The area captured reached 30 km in width with a total area of approximately 1200 km2. Following Turkey’s military advance, U.S. forces withdrew from Ain Issa, 700 Daesh (ISIS) members were released from prison in Ain Issa by the YPG terror group, 702 PKK/PYD members were killed and 24 others surrendered to operation forces according to Turkey’s Defense Ministry.

In response to the operations, many European countries including Germany, France, the Netherlands and Sweden, declared a ban on weapons sales to Turkey. In a speech by President Erdogan, Turkey’s reaction to Europe’s hostility towards the operation might be to open the borders to allow Syrian refugees to enter Europe. The fear of hosting further refugees could urge European countries to have greater cooperation with Turkey and encourage the return of refugees back to their homes in northeast Syria. The area between Rasulayn and Tal Abyad was not chosen randomly by the Turkish government. Turkey aims to clear the PKK/PYD from an overwhelmingly Arab populated area. This was the first area where the demographic change was carried out by the PKK/PYD terror group when they seized the territory in 2015.

The US-Turkey deal over Northern Syria

While the operation was in the process of capturing Ain Issa, Rasulayn and the surrounding areas, an agreement was reached between the U.S. and Turkey in Ankara on the evening of October 17. The agreement meets Turkey’s operation objectives and there will be no further military push except for emerging contingencies that may develop. Although, the US handover of Manbij was anomaly in the western part of the Euphrates River, the race to control Manbij caused no major security instability in the region, and expected to result in further cooperation by Turkey with Russia in northeast Syria.

The deal with the U.S. has surely helped Turkey keep the U.S. involved in Syrian geopolitics in a manner that might give Turkey an upper hand to balance Russian influence in Syria’s constitution-making process. Beyond that, the successful implementation of the deal might pave the way for the dissolution of the PKK/PYD. However, a set of technical preparations are needed for the implementation of the deal. The technical elements of the deal are expected to relate to the following:

Withdrawal of PKK/PYD members in a timely manner: the locations of the withdrawal and re-location destinations should be determined.

Rules of engagement: this is related to Turkey’s disengagement rules.

Arms collections: this requires a technical study of the designation of the weapons, platforms and systems to be collected. In this regard, a concrete designation of the types of ammunition, explosives and vehicles and military systems is needed.

How to implement the safe zone: Turkey may need to re-calibrate its military missions in Syria for bringing quicker stability in the region. In this context, new recruitments and a changing power composition may cause a contention between the US and Turkey, as a further attachment of Syrian National Army and non-PKK SDF fighters to the Turkish forces is expected.

Sub-military missions: the missions may include patrolling, observation, surveillance, supervision, investigations of complaints and other implied tasks.

Turkey should focus on its legitimate cause of its counter-terrorism operation while also implementing its plan for a safe zone. It is expected that the PKK/PYD might try to shift its focus of violent acts to other areas amid the disorientation of the withdrawal process. There is the likelihood that Operation Peace Spring might be resumed in the projected safe zone area if the PKK/PYD withdrawal is not successfully implemented as promised by the U.S.

Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring was launched with the purpose of establishing a safe zone to remove the YPG terror group from southern borders of Turkey. Now, Turkey’s military operation has been paused for 120 hours as a result of the deal reached with the US yesterday evening. Observers noted during the course of the operation so far that the images of Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK’s imprisoned leader, left hanging over walls in the border towns of Tal Abyad and Rasulayn. This is a clear indication of the YPG’s tie to the PKK, its sympathy with Ocalan, and its shared aspiration to establish an ideologically Marxist and ethno-nationalist statelet in the region.

Since the operation was launched, Western media and politicians along with PKK sympathizers and nationalist Kurdish social media users, have harshly criticized Turkey. They presented Turkey as an invading or occupying force with no intention to leave Syria in the long run. They have further portrayed Turkey’s fight against the YPG as being against international law, although, in fact, the operation was supported by local Arab Muslims and regional Christian groups.

A deeper analysis of such criticisms by Western journalists and politicians reveal the fact that these are deeply biased responses devoid of any engagement with facts. Some have accused Turkey of targeting civilians while others have described Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring as part of an oft-repeated plot to establish a Neo-Ottoman Empire.

It is so strange that Turkey’s security concerns emanating from the PKK terror threat over four consecutive decades are not properly addressed, and that neither NATO allies nor Western journalists or think-tankers paid due attention to the subject except a few thoughtful exceptions (I>; II).

Analysts have embellished and insisted on the narrative that Turkey’s military operations will result in strengthening Daesh (ISIS) and the Assad regime ignoring that this would only happen against Turkey’s interests in the region.

The narrative about Daesh prisoners, for example, ignores the fact that the Turkish Armed Forces have fought against this terror threat more than any other country in the world through military and security operations inside and outside the country. While instead, Western governments have chosen not to support a NATO ally in the fight against Daesh, but preferred to back a terror group, as President Trump indirectly admitted in a recent statement.

Despite Turkey’s ambitions to establish the security conditions required so that more than one million Syrians may be resettled in the north of Syria, some Western critics have argued that Turkey’s recent operations might cause the number of Syrian refugees heading to Europe to increase. Most of the critics do not address and disregard the fact that the YPG itself has succeeded in changing Northern Syria’s demographics causing many to flee to across the border.

Most observers of Turkey find that unlike their own opinions, the majority of Turks support the operations against the YPG, including politicians from the main opposition party the CHP. Others have also stated that the operation has strengthened President Erdogan’s domestic position without analyzing the reasons. Analysts have tried to dismiss support for President Erdogan by explaining it away as a simple “rally round the flag”, however without looking at the Turkish context in particular, these theoretical approaches fail to explain the reality on the ground. Instead a greater focus by western analysts appears to be on how the operation will supposedly make Turkey much more isolated in the global context.

It is interesting to note the disappointment expressed by foreign observers highly critical of Erdogan that the new mayor of Istanbul (CHP), who they have often lauded as a “hope” for Turkey, is also supportive of “Erdogan’s operation”. Demonstrating once again their failure to understand Turkey’s complex social dynamics and also exposing the way in which highly rigid, ideological narratives dominate their readings of Turkish politics. Some deliberately do not want to understand that most Turks fundamentally reject any kind of cooperation with the PKK’s offshoots.

On the other hand, discussions in Europe and in Germany have also focused on the fact that there are no European instruments that can be used to effectively oppose Turkey’s actions in the Syrian context, except for the somewhat symbolic steps made by some European authorities to halt arms exports to Turkey. Ultimately in the words of the Foreign minister of Luxembourg’s recent tweet, “We as Europeans are not able to stop that. This has to be told honestly to the people”.

Turkey’s security concerns are for the most part disregarded while those of a terrorist organizations are tolerated and even supported. Leading Western countries, think-tanks, and media representatives who aware of the dangers of PKK affiliated organizations, do not hesitate to challenge Turkey in favor of the YPG. This however appears to be rooted in a reading of Turkish politics and foreign affairs that disregards facts and opinions inside Turkey, and the conditions on the ground in Northern Syria. Such a situation cannot continue forever, and as Turkey is an important NATO player in the region, it will only be a matter of time until the importance of Turkey as an ally will be once again rediscovered.

Turkey’s cross-border military operation, Operation Peace Spring, was launched on October 9, 2019. The Turkish Armed Forces secured some critical targets including Rasulayn and Tal-Abyad. After the operation started, numerous fake news stories and manipulative content were published targeting Operation Peace Spring and the endeavor was turned into a propaganda war. With the YPG forces about to quickly lose their power and domination in Northern Syria militarily, they have turned to the long-standing support of Western nations as a way out. And for this, they are relying on their well-oiled propaganda machine.

Which tools are being used by the YPG in the propaganda war? First of all, the YPG’s main goal is getting the support of Western countries and encouraging them to use their foreign policy tools. And indeed, they appear to be successful in gaining the public support of most Western countries. These countries now threaten Turkey with embargoes and military measures to end the military operation. Finland, Norway, Netherlands, Germany, and France have already suspended arm sales to Turkey. European countries are trying to force Turkey to terminate its operation in the region.

But why are European countries acting so harshly towards the operation? One of the answers lies in the imagined idea of Rojava. For a long time, Rojava, the YPG-led autonomous region of Northern Syria, has been imagined in Western media as a democratic and pluralistic society flourishing in the heart of a troubled Middle East. However, the reality on the ground was quite different, with the YPG carrying out a campaign of violence, intimidation and displacement in order to secure territorial gains. 

After the capture of Northeast Syria by the YPG forces in 2012, the PKK’s long-lasting democratic autonomy project was implemented in Rojava. At this point, it is crucial to understand what the PKK’s democratic autonomy project is. Since 2007, both the PKK and ethno-nationalist separatist Kurdish political parties have underlined that the solution to the problems facing Kurds requires the creation of an autonomous region enabling Kurds to govern themselves, without the intervention of any other actor. This project began to be implemented with the establishment of Rojava with this region becoming a laboratory for this project. But the terrible abuses carried out in the name of establishing Rojava speaks for itself. 

Instead, most Western media channels depicted life in Rojava as a place where women and other vulnerable groups directly participated in political processes, and where decisions are taken by consensus. Indeed, most of this coverage paid specific attention to the secular policies of Rojava and compared it to the practices of the Daesh.  For instance, the New York Times Magazine defined Rojava as a “Dream of Secular Utopia in ISIS’ Backyard” and underlined how secular education policies were being implemented in the region.

Because of this reason, Western media channels have also represented the YPG as freedom fighters who ended the brutality of Daesh in the region. The operation by Turkey was therefore perceived as the fall of the Rojava dream. This was reflected in the remarkable headlines and stories by some Western newspapers and journals such as “Rojava Betrayed. An End to our Dream of Revolution?” and “Turkish Attack on Syria Endangers a Remarkable Democratic Experiment by the Kurds”. Therefore, the long-lasting glorification of Rojava in the Western media strengthened the hand of the YPG in the propaganda war.

Secondly, the cooperation between the United States and the YPG was instrumentalized to urge the Trump administration not to withdraw its support to the YPG. Since the Obama administration, the US had been aiding arms to the YPG forces, this aid became formalized during the Trump administration in order to speed up military operations in Raqqa and ensure victory over Daesh. Thus, the US media are now accusing the Trump administration of betraying “the Kurds”, who are considered to be “the US allies who ended the Daesh dominance in Northern Syria”. Since the Trump administration is under pressure, President Trump has been trying to satisfy public opinion and decrease the domestic fall out by threatening Turkey with new sanctions. Nevertheless, almost all leading Western newspapers and journals are not convinced about the rationale behind Turkey’s operation in the region and this has empowered the hand of the YPG in its propaganda.

The first days of the operation and the success of the Turkish Armed Forces on the ground show that success in a propaganda war has not changed the real situation for the YPG. Because of this, the YPG has been trying to find a new ally to push back against the Turkish army. In order to seek a way out the YPG appears to have shaken hands with the Assad regime and Russia. When for so long the Assad regime has been blacklisted for its brutal role in the Syrian civil war, including the use chemical weapons on civilians, how such an alliance will impact the YPG’s image into the future remains to be seen.

On October 9, Turkey launched Operation Peace Spring for which it had been preparing for months. Understanding that diplomatic efforts with regional and international actors could not prevent the establishment of a planned corridor by the YPG terror group in northern Syria, Ankara decided to take a unilateral step towards eliminating the threats against its territorial integrity and national interests. Acting within the framework of international rights and obligations and with the legitimacy of international law, Turkey emphasizes that the primary objective of Operation Peace Spring is to prevent a terrorist controlled corridor along its southern border.

In fact, within the scope of this, Turkey’s multi-staged plan began to be  implemented three years ago, on August 24, 2016, through Operation Euphrates Shield. Organized with the wide participation of the Turkish Armed Forces’ air and ground troops, Operation Euphrates Shield played a critical role in minimizing some of the negative consequences of the Syrian Civil War. The Operation made significant progress in blocking the PYD, the Syrian branch of the PKK, and the YPG, the military wing of PYD, from establishing a “terror corridor” in the region. The push back against this organization that is supported by the United States, Turkey’s now unreliable ally, through all kinds of weapons and ammunition, was crucial for Ankara. Turkey believed that YPG constituted a permanent threat along its southern borders. Therefore, eliminating the terror group was of vital significance not only for the national security of Turkey, but also for the long-term interests of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Operation Euphrates Shield may be seen as a  milestone in the history of modern Turkey.

The second operation was carried out between  January and March 2018 under the name Operation Olive Branch that was the next step in the process. Through this operation, an important area in the West of the Euphrates, including the city of Afrin, came under the Turkish control and the groups supported by Ankara. The city of Afrin was a strategic location for the YPG and regarded as one of its strongholds in the region. With these two operations, Turkey proved its determination to eliminate all kinds of threats directed to its national security.

In the last stage of this initiative, Turkey launched Operation Peace Spring. It was announced that the Turkish Armed Forces have initially aimed to control the area between the towns of Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ayn. In the later stages, the operation aims to create a safe zone, which will be 480 km long and 30 km deep on the other side of Turkey’s border with Syria. With Operation Peace Spring, Ankara aims to free a total of 13,500 square kilometers from terrorist elements and to achieve four goals to ensure its national security.

The first and primary objective of Operation Peace Spring is to prevent the establishment of a terror corridor in Northern Syria. Turkey aims to not only make terrorist elements leave the area but to also create a peaceful safe zone along its southern border where the Arab, Turkmen and Kurdish civilian population of the region can live in peace. For this, the liberation of the cities under the YPG control was vital.

Turkey’s second goal is to send a message to the international community and regional actors that Ankara is determined to use hard power when needed. Through Operation Peace Spring, Turkey once again shows its determination in the face of any anti-Turkey policies by global and regional actors, and that it will not hesitate to resort to military options if its national interests are threatened. While Turkey considered both diplomatic and military options in finding solutions to regional problems, it also demonstrated itself to be a decisive power in responding to initiatives which may attempt to undermine Turkey’s rights in other conflict zones such as the Eastern Mediterranean.

Another important objective of Operation Peace Spring is to create a safe zone for the return of the Syrians. As President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated, Syrian refugees who want to return to their country will be able to return to the cities that will be liberated and built after Operation Peace Spring. This step will be in line with the demands of various social groups inside Turkey that have criticized the government for its handling of Syrian refugees. It is understandable that Ankara aims to prevent further polarization over Syrian refugees.

Finally, Turkey plans to safeguard the territorial integrity of Syria, which it has been defending from the beginning of the civil war. Through Operation Peace Spring, Ankara reemphasized its commitment to ensuring the territorial integrity of Syria, which is ignored by external players involved in the conflict. From the very beginning of the war, Turkey has  tried to cooperate with other actors to protect Syria’s territorial integrity and to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Turkey has taken initiatives to settle the issue with Russia and Iran. It should be noted that former US President Barack Obama supported the terrorist organization the YPG instead of cooperating with Turkey, and thus, the formation of a terrorist state in the region became a serious possibility. This development clearly threatens the territorial integrity of Syria. In order to prevent the partition of Syria, Turkey decided to take a unilateral step and launched Operation Peace Spring.

Turkey has recognized that there may be a greater threat to its own interests in the future if such an ethno-nationalist Kurdish state is established, and has taken a decisive stance to eliminate this terror corridor despite international pressure. Due to this determination, Turkey could turn a deaf ear to regional and global actors. In spite of the serious reactions and threats by the US administration, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stressed that Operation Peace Spring will continue until it reaches its goals.

Several international organizations such as the European Union and the Arab League raised concerns about the operation but Turkey’s response to these statements were harsh. In one of his speeches, President Erdogan gave a strong response to the condemning messages by countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Reminding listeners that Saudi Arabia was responsible for thousands of civilian deaths in Yemen, he stressed that Riyadh had no right to criticize Turkey’s operation against terrorist organizations. He also mentioned that Sisi, who came to power with a military coup in Egypt, was a “democracy killer” and that Cairo would not be successful in its smear campaign against Turkey.

It should be reiterated that most of the governments in the Arab world are regimes that do not derive their legitimacy from the people, and do not reflect the views and will of their public. The foreign policies of these regimes do not go beyond the desires of their Western allies. These regimes are taking a position against Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring as they think Turkey’s actions could threaten their own interests or their Western allies. Therefore, it would be misleading to think that the statements made by these countries have also been endorsed by the Arab masses. In contrast, the Arab people support the leadership of Turkey led by President Erdogan in the Middle East as public opinion polls show that he is the most respected and trusted leader in the region.

With Operation Peace Spring, Turkey has taken a vital step towards ensuring peace and stability in the region. Despite facing all kinds of threats and pressure, Ankara has shown the international community that it will never allow a terrorist organization on its borders. With its military capacity, technical equipment and operational capability developed in recent years, the Turkish Armed Forces are one of the most important actors that have contributed to launching Operation Peace Spring. The operation is also endorsed and supported by almost all political parties represented in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Only the HDP, which has close links to the PKK/YPG terror group, did not support the operation. No doubt, Operation Peace Spring will take its place in the history books as a military operation through which Turkey’s future was saved by today’s leadership.

Turkey will no longer tolerate the presence of a terrorist group on its southern borders as the country’s leading figures recently announced their determination to start a military operation as soon as possible. As has been globally observed in recent days, the U.S.-backing of the YPG/PYD has decreased at the U.S. presidential level despite the heavy criticism and pressure from both the Republicans and Democrats. The following days will most likely involve a greater clarification of positions towards Turkey’s planned military operations.

Besides the operation’s potential scope and its military purpose which will be discussed in detail, it is interesting to observe that most of the U.S. and Western voices in general take a position that blindly supports the YPG, which is the Syrian branch of the PKK terrorist organization.

Turkey’s alliance with the U.S. and NATO has 67 years of history. The country has positioned itself long ago in the Western alliance, viewing it as a strategic partnership in the fight against regional and global terrorism. Given this, it is not understandable why most Western politicians, media representatives and social media users directly or indirectly prefer the YPG despite Turkey’s serious security concerns.

Turkey’s struggle against the PKK terrorism is disregarded. Instead, the U.S. and other Western democracies describe “Kurds” as friends or allies. Referring to “Kurds” instead of the more accurate YPG/PKK, reinforces a false narrative because not every Kurdish person is a YPG/PKK member or supporter, and further implies that opposition to the YPG and PKK is in reality opposition to the Kurdish people themselves. The more accurate question is whether the West has ever truly been friends of the Kurdish people when they have themselves been facing PKK terrorism for more than 35 years. But this reality is ignored when PKK propaganda in the form of political liaisons with PYD/YPG is widespread.

Unfortunately, this attitude is of fundamental concern and should not be ignored while Turkey conducts military strikes in the upcoming days. There should be research to discover the roots of Western and even some domestic support for the PKK. This issue is perhaps not well addressed today, but for future readers and researchers, it is important to understand the current positions of Western democracies, their media and even their civil representatives in favour of the PKK/PYD.

How it is possible that democracies and their media hide, disregard, downplay the activities of a neo-Marxist and ethnic-separatist terrorist organization? How can a terrorist organization such as the PKK, which is regarded as a prohibited terrorist organization both in Europe and the U.S. enjoy comfortable support by Western powers? This happens despite several reports, opinion pieces, studies, and interviews with experts from the Western world that prove the obvious connection between the PKK and PYD/YPG.

I doubt that a realism-based approach is able to explain such irrational positions. Furthermore, the preferred arguments that “defeating Daesh terrorism has to be the priority” does not answer why a terrorist organization such as the YPG is actively preferred by Western policymakers and even supported by civilians in order to fight another terror organization such as Daesh. Actually, this narrative has been reiterated for more than six to seven years and therefore more people in the West are inclined to play down the PKK’s actual role as a terrorist organization while disregarding the fundamental concerns of an ally.

The direct or indirect support of the PKK through its offshoot in Syria has perhaps functioned until now but it is clear that this blind stance will not guarantee a long-term approach. It is not acceptable that an ethnic-separatist and neo-Marxist terrorist organization is normalized.

In Turkey, there is one political party, the HDP, and only a few supporters from among radical Marxist groups that declared their support for the YPG. Turkey’s main opposition party, the CHP’s current stance is not to support a Turkish military strike openly against the YPG in Northern Syria. But this should not confuse observers. Although there are sympathizers of Kurdish separatism among the ranks of the CHP administration, the party rejects the existence of the YPG/PKK and supports the fight against it. This also counts for all other terrorist groups no matter what their political agendas are. A high majority of Turkish citizens oppose the PKK/PYD, Daesh, FETO and all other terrorist groups, and this is a stance which should be reflected in the allies of Turkey, which at the moment appears to only be Spain.

As a result of Turkey’s decisiveness, the White House announced that the U.S. forces in Syria will withdraw in expectation of a Turkish military operation into the region, opening the way for Turkey and the Syrian opposition to go after the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK terrorist organization. Since then, many experts have been discussing the potential scope and implications of the operation, but it is most likely that the operational plan of the joint Syrian-Turkish military operation will occur in Arab areas between Tal Abyad and Rasulayn and in the region of Manbij west of the Euphrates.

Immediately before and since the announcement by the White House, many developments have occurred on the ground in Syria and Turkey. Most notably, the U.S. soldiers evacuated their bases along the Turkish-Syrian border and left the area. With this move, the U.S opened the way for a joint Syrian-Turkish military operation between Tal Abyad and Rasulayn. A second development is ongoing on the Turkish side of the border where Turkish Armed Forces are amassing troops and equipment between Akcakale and Ceylanpinar, which are on the other side of the border from Tal Abyad and Rasulayn. This Turkish preparation also includes the buildup of howitzer and artillery positions suitably located to shell the strip between Tal Abyad to Rasulayn. The armed Syrian opposition, the Syrian National Army, has sent reinforcements to Jarablus to cross into Turkey and take position along the Syrian-Turkish border strip between Tal Abyad and Rasulayn.

On the other side, the region of Manbij is seeing an intensive arrival of reinforcements by the Syrian National Army and the Turkish Armed Forces. The Syrian opposition has sent massive reinforcements to the frontlines of Manbij chanting that they will liberate Manbij from the terrorists occupying the area. Additionally, the Turkish Armed Forces have been sending heavy armory and Special Forces through Jarablus towards the region of Manbij.

The region of Manbij is crucial as the Assad regime in the south and the Syrian opposition in the north are of equal distance to Manbij city, and both sides have ambitions to control this strategic area. This includes the Tishreen dam, which is located at the Euphrates in Manbij and is the second most important dam in Syria after the Tabqah dam. In case of a military operation, both sides may race for control over this area, and the YPG is likely to hand the region to the Assad regime which will improve its speed of advance. In this regard, the Syrian opposition may try to cut the advance route of the regime as they are stationed west of Manbij and received training on air-landing with Turkish helicopters. By cutting the route of the regime to Manbij, the Syrian National army can guarantee its control over the region. However, if they cannot act fast enough, the region will fall to the regime, opening its way towards the east of the Euphrates. From the Turkish perspective, Manbij is also of upmost importance as its liberation will enable the return of the Sulayman Shah tomb to its original place by the Euphrates River.

The joint Syrian-Turkish operation will firstly aim to liberate Arab areas from the YPG. By doing so, the operation will in its initial phase contradict critics who state that the main goal of the operation is demographic engineering. Additionally, by liberating Arab areas first, the number of recruits in the Syrian National Army may increase massively as the local Arab population and tribes are strong supporters of the Syrian opposition. The scope and possibility of a second stage towards Arab areas in the south or towards mainly Kurdish populated areas in Ayn al Arab and Qamishli may most likely be decided after the Trump-Erdogan summit on November 13.

Many Daesh members are held in makeshift camps, most notably the Al Hol camp in Syria, in which thousands of Daesh women are held together with their children. The camp is mainly divided into two sections, the first hosting foreign Daesh members, the second Syrian and Iraqi Daesh members. Not all of the inhabitants of the camps are Daesh members, especially children. However, the situation in the camp has a huge potential to create the next generation of Daesh, similar to Camp Bucca in Iraq whose inmates including Abu Bakr al Baghdadi formed Daesh out of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

This time the camp promises a long lasting resurgence of Daesh. Despite Turkey’s warnings, the US opted to go with a YPG-led organization and now the organization is incapable of dealing with the situation. However, small but effective steps can be undertaken to minimize the threat in the short-term, sparing some time to find a lasting solution to the issue of Daesh members.

The Al Hol camp situated in the governorate of Hasakah is inhabited by more than 68,000 people of whom 55% are children under the age of 12. In recent times, female Daesh members asserted their de-facto control over the Al Hol camp implementing Daesh methods within the camp. The female members formed so-called Hisba battalions within the camp and maintained order on their own. The inhabitants organize alleged Sharia-courses and propagate the ideology of Daesh.

The YPG’s lack of control over the camp was demonstrated again recently when a Turkestani Daesh member was heavily beaten up by Russian Daesh members of the camp when she refused to attend the courses. More dramatically, the YPG security discovered the dead body of a woman who was likely killed by the Daesh Hisba group in the camp.

If Daesh captives are left to the YPG who are reportedly incapable, and the issues are not addressed correctly, the Iraqi scenario will likely repeat itself, only more dangerously and brutally than before.

Previously other women and even a little girl were said to be killed by other female Daesh members inside the camp. Other incidents include the burning of tents and the harassment of women and children who do not comply with the rules of the Daesh Hisba in the Al Hol camp. As Turkey warned several times before, the YPG/SDF is overwhelmed with the task of how to deal with Daesh members in custody. Together with Sila Naz Engin, we wrote about the dangers of having terrorists in the hand of other terrorists.

A solution for al-Hol camp

I suggest a two-step approach to the situation. The first should address the urgent situation, ease current risks and win time. The second should be more lasting.

Firstly, the international coalition needs to force the YPG to divide the camps into many smaller ones. No camp should be inhabited by more than one thousand Daesh members. These camps might be bordering each other, but there should be no opportunity to establish contact between the camps for the inhabitants.

Secondly, the international coalition should establish a training center in Turkey to train personnel to manage the affairs in such camps. The training should not be limited to security personnel but also of social employees, teachers and religious scholars. It is important to use the experience of Turkey as a Muslim country and the experience of the Syrian opposition to determine how to deal with Daesh members and people traumatized by Daesh.

The rehabilitation center in Marea or Jarablus might be a good example of a model to follow. The rehabilitation camps have plenty of success stories including children who changed their goals from becoming a suicide bomber to becoming a successful student. Currently, there is no such center in YPG-held areas. After being adequately trained, the employees of these camps should be totally independent from militias on the ground, act under the Syrian Interim Government, be provided security guarantees from the international coalition, and should take total control over the camps and prisons in the area.

However, if Daesh captives are left to the YPG who are reportedly incapable, and the issues are not addressed correctly, the Iraqi scenario will likely repeat itself, only more dangerously and brutally than before.

Since groups such as the YPG and the SDF, extensions of the PKK terrorist organization, have started to gain international legitimacy and dominance politically and militarily, the Syrian crisis has become not only a regional problem for Turkey, but also an internal security threat. These terrorist groups have been depicted in the Western media as “freedom fighters” with the claim that they were fighting against Daesh. In contrast, Turkey’s security operations were portrayed as “attacks against the Kurds”. These were the most obvious indicators of an extensive and long-term strategy adopted by some western “allies” risking Ankara’s national security.

During the civil war in Syria, opposition groups close to Turkey lost their power while the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK, gained territorial control. Turkey, in the meantime, was not free from an intermittently active FETO threat. A controversial event that took place before the July 15 coup attempt concerning the capture of National Intelligence Organization (MIT) trucks allegedly carrying weapons to Syrian opposition groups, illustrates how fragile Turkey’s possible security operations abroad could have been. Therefore, Turkey had to delay a real encounter in Syria and tried to resolve its concerns through diplomatic negotiations.

After the fall of Aleppo to the Syrian regime and the start of the Astana process, the volume of armed conflicts in Syria drastically decreased. This was caused by the strong military response by the US against several Syrian army initiatives east of the Euphrates, which kept the region out of active military operations. As well as the regime’s own relief regarding its future security.

Recent developments in both Idlib province and the Eastern Euphrates have created different security concerns for Turkey. In Idlib, immigration is a significant challenge while the possibility of the establishment of a YPG led state east of the Euphrates has been the main concern. Turkey has pursued diplomatic channels in Idlib by engaging with Russia and Iran.  However, despite the Astana process, regions in the east and south of Syria were seized by the regime without much resistance from the opposition. But the Idlib region on the border with Turkey was left aside because of Ankara’s sensitivity. However, all the efforts by Turkey to find a diplomatic solution failed and the Syrian regime gained control of the Seyhun region after intensive attacks in August. This lead to a large number of Syrian civilians moving close to the Turkish border. In addition to concerns over Idlib, Turkey has also pursued a proactive path regarding the developments in the Eastern Euphrates. Adverse developments in the region threatening Turkish national security led Turkish authorities to take concrete measures. The unfulfilled promises made by the US to Turkey as well as the robust evidence showing the US’s delivered weapons to the YPG caused serious disappointments. President Erdogan finally made a statement saying that “if concrete steps are not taken [by the US] to resolve our concerns, we will start the operation in the safe zone to the east of the Euphrates until the end of September”.

Changing the status quo in Syria

Iran has supported the Syrian regime since the beginning of the Syrian crisis. When it was transformed from a popular revolution movement into outright civil war, Iran was involved in direct clashes in Syria through its proxy forces and military advisers.  As a result, although Iran has suffered from significant military and economic losses, it has been the most decisive country in terms of supporting the survival of the Ba’ath regime. Helping the regime maintain control over 70% of the country. Recently, Iran has been trying to solidify its gains in Syria by signing long-term trade agreements with the regime. Therefore, it would not be realistic to expect Iran will reduce its recent political support of Bashar al-Assad.

A large area with strategic value in terms of natural resources and farmland is still controlled by US-backed separatist groups (such as YPG and PYD). The region is still the subject of international intervention. These factors have led to the Syrian regime and its main supporters to understand that main threats to its survival come from the US, and not from Turkey. This situation has led to the intersection of mutual concerns about the YPG between Turkey and the Syrian regime.

These developments coupled with Israel’s increasing attacks on Syria and Iraq, have played a role in reestablishing Israel, the US and their Syrian partners like the YPG, as the main threat to both the Syrian regime and Iran, rather than the Syrian opposition.

For example, if as claimed, unmanned aerial vehicles used in the attacks on the Hashd-i Shabi bases in Iraq were removed from the areas under the control of YPG. This shows that the YPG participated in the anti-Iran coalition in the region.

Iran under pressure

Iran has been subject to heavy sanctions for the past six months, and the serious decrease in oil sales to around 200,000 barrels per day since May has left it facing a deep economic crisis. The ruling elite of Iran has been trying to minimize the public impact of the crisis by using its limited foreign exchange reserves, but it cannot prevent the economic indicators from worsening day by day. Iran’s major trading partners, particularly China, India, and the EU have significantly reduced their trade with them, and the alternative payment instrument INSTEX, which European countries have committed to, is practically ineffective since it does not cover oil sales. In this isolated position, trade with neighboring countries such as Iraq and Turkey have gained vital importance for Iran.

For this reason, Iran is now working to reduce the impact of problem areas with Turkey, to minimize its participation in Idlib operations, and to soften the rhetoric against Turkey in the press. Indeed, some Iranian observers connect the attitude change of Iran to the critical importance of Turkey during this sanctions period. In an environment where an immediate solution for the nuclear crisis between the US and Iran isn’t expected, Iran is unlikely to react to Turkey’s operations against terrorist positions in its southern border.

Tehran’s unwillingness to respond to Turkey’s actions in Syria is likely influenced by the fact that the Ankara administration has not challenged the legitimacy of the Damascus regime for quite some time, arguing that a new system is only possible through joint negotiations between all parties participating in the Astana and Geneva processes. Therefore, Turkey’s operations to remove the YPG within a limited area, and to enable a significant number of the Syrian refugees to move back, will not violate Iran’s red line.

Turkey’s operations against YPG will most likely stretch Turkey-US relations even more. In recent years, the tension between Turkey and the United States has been welcomed by Russia and Iran. The stress in Turkey-US relations will be reflected in Turkey’s policy towards the region and Iran. If the US takes punitive steps towards Turkey, then Turkey will undertake its own countermeasures. For example, by showing less sensitivity towards the US’s unilateral sanctions on Iran. Such a situation would be an appropriate scenario for Iran.

The creation of safe zones by Turkey in agreement with the United States is the main problem for Iran. Because the Tehran administration is aware that the US and its regional allies pose the greatest challenge to its survival and its regional policies. If Turkey takes steps for its own national security rather than participating in the US-led coalition, this will be seen as a lesser evil.

Another reason that Turkey’s probable operations in Syria will pose less of a problem for Iran is related to the deepening cooperation of the PKK/YPG with the US instead of regional patrons. These groups are frequently mentioned in policies against Iran. As the summer has shown, although the US maintains its policy of maximum pressure on Iran, it seems unwilling to retaliate against Iran’s steps to escalate military tensions. Although the US   has relied on the Israeli air force in the region, the need for surrogate organizations will increase in the coming days. Therefore, Iran will not be disturbed by the weakening of the YPG, as a US proxy organization, adjacent to the Iraq-Syria border.

As a result, at the current stage of the Syrian crisis, Turkey has noted the failure of relying on diplomatic efforts. The countries that have influence over Syria and the armed organizations controlling some areas achieved these gains through direct military involvement, not through diplomatic negotiations. In such an environment, it was not a realistic approach by Turkey to expect that other parties would understand and support responses to its own security threats. From Iran to the United States, from Israel to Hezbollah, all parties have tested the nerve endings of each other and have opted for the most dangerous options. The lack of immediate action by Turkey may lead to the situation in Idlib expanding across the entire country, and Turkey’s already damaged reputation will be thoroughly questioned. If Turkey enters into the field in Syria using its hard power, it will be closely followed by other parties including Iran, but the only country that could demonstrate a practical response would be the United States.

On 2 September, 2019 the pro-Kurdish media outlet Kurdistan 24 stationed in the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) released a public statement explaining that while they have previously worked in northeastern Syria with the permission of the local YPG administration, they were recently banned from doing so. Despite an approximately one month long negotiation, Kurdistan 24 failed to convince the YPG administration to remove the ban. Kurdistan 24’s ability to report from YPG-held areas ended when Kurdistan24 TV aired a talk show in which Hülya Oran (alias Besê Hozat), a leading PKK figure and KCK (PKK’s administrative umbrella) co-chair, was allegedly insulted. This decision by the YPG not only confirms its status as the Syrian branch of the PKK, but also highlights their hypocrisy as self-proclaimed defenders of freedom and of the Kurdish cause. This step is also noteworthy since it comes after growing tensions between the KRG in Iraq and the PKK.

The decision of the YPG to ban Kurdistan 24 shows again that the YPG and the PKK terrorist organization are inseparable organizations. Reports that the YPG’s decision making bodies are dominated by PKK veterans from the Qandil Mountains appear to be corroborated. The ban of the Kurdish media outlet by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq is not surprising, as the head of the US supported Syrian Democratic Forces, Ferhat Abdi Sahin (alias Mazloum Kobane in the SDF, and Sahin Cilo in the PKK), was close friends with Hülya Oran and were active in the Qandil Mountains together. Furthermore, most of the SDF officials answered to orders from Oran in northern Iraq and Turkey, before they went to Syria to operate as partners of the US.

It is interesting that the YPG’s relative openness to media and press ended when a leading PKK figure was criticized. The media has been as an essential part the YPG’s strategy of winning hearts and minds in the west by portraying themselves as defenders of human rights, and especially women’s rights. For this reason, many foreign journalists can enter YPG-held areas and report about the situation on the ground. By doing this, the YPG won many sympathizers among the western journalists and effectively disguised its nature as a branch of the internationally recognized terror organization, namely the PKK. Remembering the critical coverage of some journalists of the YPG, one wonders if it is the case that the YPG doesn’t allow criticism of senior figures of the PKK only, or if the YPG has different standards for Kurdish and western media outlets.

Lastly, this move by the YPG can also be seen as an attempt to retaliate in the name of the PKK against the KRG in northern Iraq. Since the launch of the Operation Claw by Turkey, the PKK has lost strategic hills in the Hakurk region, and the PKK has accused the KRG of collaboration with Ankara. Attempts by the PKK to provoke the local population against the Turkish Armed Forces were undermined by Prime Minister Nacirvan Barzani who blamed the PKK for an attack on a Turkish base and demanded the PKK withdraw from northern Iraq, so that Turkey could stop its operations against them. The step to ban Kurdistan 24 overlaps with a time in which the Iraqi Kurds actively supported Ankara’s fight against the PKK, and might be a way of retaliation.

The Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that Turkey had informed the US and Russia about a planned military operation against the YPG (also known as the People’s Protection Units). An important question in this regard is: Can the YPG fight and resist against a joint Turkish-Syrian military operation? To put the answer with the words of Aldar Xelil, a leading Kurdish figure, “If they [Turkey] enter, our territory will be destroyed,” stating that they have no illusion of a victory against Turkey. However, the answer to the question of why the YPG has no chance against a joint Turkish-Syrian military operation also answers how the US has miscalculated its position in negotiations with Turkey for long.

First of all, the terrain along the Syrian-Turkish border east of the Euphrates is clearly favorable for a joint Turkish-Syrian military operation and a huge disadvantage for the YPG who lack fire power superiority, air superiority and technology. The Turkish Armed Forces as the second biggest army in the NATO alliance has an asymmetric superiority against the YPG in all military terms, and the Syrian National Army as Turkey’s partner forces is the equal counterpart to the YPG. While Turkey will change the balance of power immensely, the Syrian National Army will diminish the advantages of a non-state armed actor in a war environment against a conventional army. Briefly, when the most effective non-state armed actor Daesh lost the same terrain against the YPG who enjoyed US air support, the YPG has no chance against a joint operation by Syrian National Army and the Turkish Armed Forces.

A second reason for the YPG to lose will be its untrustworthy alliance formed with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and its limited number of voluntary fighters. The SDF was formed to combat Daesh, not Turkey and not the Syrian opposition. When Turkey enters the region, the YPG will find itself surrounded by “betrayers” who will refuse to put up a fight which is not theirs as the alliance’ commitment to the SDF components are low. Also many non-YPG elements of the SDF have sympathies either with the Syrian opposition or with Turkey and, in addition to this, many US-trained recruits may desert to the winning side. The pragmatic nature of the alliance won’t prove itself reliable in case of a hopeless war. Additionally, the border stretch from which Turkey will launch its operation is just too long for the YPG to patrol, and the YPG has been too reliant on forced recruitment that are not the most stable force. Holes in the frontline are unavoidable for the YPG. On the other side, the Syrian National Army comprises of voluntary fighters alone.

The last reason is that US support has made the YPG vulnerable. The YPG controls cities and towns with administrative buildings, military bases and permanent stations. The group also acquired vehicles and other supplies from the US. All of these reduce the mobility of the YPG, make them a static force and therefore turn them into easy targets for the Turkish Armed Forces. Over the years of incessant US support, the YPG has been fighting under air backing which will prove devastating if they were to change sides and be attacked by airstrikes. The YPG doesn’t have the experience of the rebels in Idlib who have fought for years against an enemy with air-power. The YPG has become too used to air-support and their experience in war without air support is mainly limited to its loss of 200 villages in a week south of Ayn al-Arab (Kobane) in its fight against Daesh.

The Afrin region in Syria was liberated by the Turkish Armed Forces and the Syrian National Army during Operation Olive Branch. Since then, the security of the region has been a main topic. Based on a dataset of two months of YPG attacks, I wrote earlier how the YPG is trying to sabotage security and how the YPG propaganda machine defends these terrorist attacks. Bellingcat published a report about the insurgency of the YPG in Afrin. The YPG has explicitly tried to undermine efforts to increase security as a strategy, but security is also undermined by crimes of Syrian National Army fighters and as a result of mass migration towards Afrin due to the forced displacement by the Assad regime of residents living in Ghouta, Homs, Hama and Deraa. While security in Afrin is better than in Deir Ezzor, Raqqa, Idlib, or Deraa, especially after the ‘Peace Operation’ targeting criminal gangs, it is very important to improve the security of the region for the sake of the people. This column will discuss some possible ways of improving security in Afrin.

1. Cleansing of Tel Rifaat

One of the main sources of the relative insecurity in Afrin is Tel Rifaat. The YPG is using the area protected by the Russians and the Assad regime in order to infiltrate Afrin, conduct terrorist attacks and intimidate locals cooperating with the Turkish authorities. As long as Tel Rifaat remains a safe-haven for the YPG, the security in Afrin will always be threatened. Turkey needs to find a way to clean the area, but until now, the Russian and Assad regime are rejecting any attempts, while not doing anything against the YPG themselves. The source of insecurity in Afrin will likely remain over the foreseeable future. Therefore, the only way of dealing with Tel Rifaat remains in trying to prevent infiltration from Tel Rifaat to Afrin as much as possible. In this regard, the wall in construction between Afrin and Tel Rifaat might ease the threat.

As long as Tel Rifaat remains a safe-haven for the YPG, the security in Afrin will always be threatened.

2. Strong Turkish footprint model

The Turkish Armed Forces currently have a light footprint in Afrin. Turkish soldiers are mainly located inside their bases and go on patrols with massive precautions and protective measures. The Turkish role is limited to advice, training and logistic support to the Syrian National Army and the Free Syrian Police in Afrin. If this changes and Turkey implements its New Southeast Strategy in Afrin, the security of the region might improve significantly. On the other side, a strong Turkish footprint model would directly risk Turkish soldiers and result in the impression of a Turkish annexation of Afrin, which may have other diplomatic and political consequences. Turkey’s engagement in Syria is based on the aim to preserve Syria’s territorial integrity and such a move might harm Turkey’s reliability.

If Turkey implements its New Southeast Strategy in Afrin, the security of the region might improve significantly. 

3. Forming a hierarchic governance

The security apparatus in Afrin is divided into four autonomous sections: The Free Syrian Police, the Syrian National Army, the free courts and local councils. All are officially related to the Syrian interim government. This could be changed entirely towards hierarchic governance in which a government oversees the work of all three sections and has full control over them, basically to establish an alternative government to the Assad regime in the northwest of the country. This move could also be empowered by popular elections in the region. However, this move is a double edged sword. While on the one hand it may boost the role of the Syrian opposition and challenge the Assad regime in its entirety, on the other, it will re-draw the dynamics of the Syrian conflict with its risks as well as its opportunities.

Since Trump’s decision to withdraw troops from Syria immediately, Turkish and American delegates discussed this topic very intensively. However, the U.S. soon changed its mind from a full imminent withdrawal to a slow troop reduction. Turkey and the U.S. focused on the establishment of a safe-zone along the Turkish-Syrian border. Without going into other details like depth and territorial control, the Special Representative for Syria Engagement and the Special Envoy for the International Coalition, James Jeffrey, made it clear that the YPG will have to withdraw from the zone leaving the areas to other forces, which have not yet been decided. While negotiations continue, the U.S. has already started constructing facts. The YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces began to change its name, again.

On June 14, the Syrian Democratic Forces announced the formation of the ‘Tal Abyad Military Council’ in the border town of Tal Abyad. The conference was organized in a hall attended by the Syrian Democratic Forces, the YPG and the women wing of the YPG. Two days later, the SDF held a ceremony on open terrain, announcing the formation of the ‘Kobane Military Council,’ again attended by representatives from the Syrian Democratic Forces, the YPG and the YPJ.

The Syrian Democratic Forces officially argued that, “The main goal of establishing these councils is to unify the military and security forces in the region, to involve local leaders in decision-making and to consolidate and institutionalize the institutional work within Syrian democratic forces by empowering and activating the military institutions within it,” proving the Turkish argument that locals are excluded from the decision-making process in YPG-held areas.

This move by the U.S. and the Syrian Democratic Forces is not new. After the PKK changed its name in Syria to the YPG, they re-branded themselves as the Syrian Democratic Forces. In Manbij, where Turkey and the U.S. had an agreement that the YPG will withdraw, the SDF formed the Manbij Military Council. The SDF also formed the Deir Ezzor Military Council, the Al-Bab Military Council and the Jarablus Military Council showing the aim of the YPG-dominated SDF to attack Turkey-secured areas in northern Aleppo.

This new attempt to re-name the YPG once again is a desperate act as proven by the experience of the Manbij Military Council, which is involved in clashes with the Turkey-trained National Army and as shown by the Turkish insistence that the YPG has to withdraw from Manbij. Similarly, current attempts by the U.S. and the Syrian Democratic Forces to form alleged local councils in border towns to Turkey will neither ease Turkey’s concerns, nor have any meaningful change for Turkey-U.S. negotiations, except for useless debate, the U.S. winning some time and sabotaging negotiations.

Some experts in Washington, such as Nicholas A. Heras, labeled the formation of military councils as, “a milestone along the road toward achieving the US (not Turkish) vision for the so-called Safe Zone,” but even for the U.S. vision, this move is meaningless. What is currently being done is only the formation of an YPG-front group upon the YPG model – a make up with no real life implications apart from the production of new flags and banners. The alienation of the local people will just continue after this.

If the U.S. wants to have any real change on the ground in order to step forward for the discussed safe zone, the U.S. should first start by forbidding the entry of the YPG into Tal Abyad. If the U.S. fails to do this, it’s useless to talk about any safe zone.

The local people of Deir Ezzor, driven by tribal dynamics, organized wide-scaled demonstrations against the YPG-dominated governance in their areas. The demonstrators cut off roads from Deir Ezzor to Hasakah and burned tires. The frustration of the local Arab population in Deir Ezzor is grounded in the unequal share of oil incomes, relations of U.S. partner forces with the Assad regime, arbitrary arrests, forced conscription, and the limited freedom of movement imposed by the YPG. Slogans of the demonstrators also included: “No to Kurdish occupation.” As negotiations to end the demonstrations began, tribe leaders handed over a 20-point demand list with a 72-hour ultimatum. The overall situation in Deir is miserable and being exploited by Daesh, which waged an insurgency in the region. Therefore, a new approach is urgently needed. Deir Ezzor was once a stronghold of the Syrian opposition against the Assad regime, and should become so again.

Reasons behind the unrest in Deir Ezzor

Since the capture of the Deir Ezzor region by U.S. partner forces dominated by the Marxist YPG, the new governors have been perceived as occupiers by the local people. As the YPG lacks the outreach into Deir Ezzor’s tribal society, people living in the region were banned from leaving their areas. Anyone leaving the area for medical reasons has to name a guarantor to ensure that he or she has returned. A practice formerly used by Daesh.

Since the capture of the Deir Ezzor region by U.S. partner forces dominated by the Marxist YPG, the new governors have been perceived as occupiers by the local people. 

According to DeirezZor24 News – a Syrian activist network – commanders of U.S. partner forces like Fawaz Al-Teraikhim are blackmailing people to pay or be arrested on charge of belonging to Daesh.

Other reasons for the people in Deir Ezzor to demonstrate against the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces include the arbitrary arrests and the forced recruitment of youth. As the Deir Ezzor region is a tribal area, solidarity with these people are high.

Picture reads: “In SDF prisons, Arabs are 100 percent and Kurds 0 percent. Where is Justice?”

The overall security situation in the region is weak. An incident resembling this is for instance in Bassirah, where demonstrations took place, masked men kidnapped a shop owner, took a copy of his shops keys and threatened him by telling him that if he changed the locks, they will burn the shop and return to kidnap and kill him.

The revenue income of the oil-rich region has been a main topic of the local people. They are angry about the fact that the YPG supplies the Assad regime with oil from the region and hence demand a stop of oil deliveries to the regime.

Picture reads “They export oil to our children’s killer.”

The local population regards the current governance backed by the Americans as occupiers. A local who wanted to remain anonymous told the author, “Deir Ezzor is governed by Kurds; some of them not even Syrian Kurds. The people of Deir Ezzor are all Arabs. No Kurd is living here at all.”

On May 1, tribal elders in Deir Ezzor gathered together and handed over a 20-point demand list to the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces, giving the other side a 72-hour ultimatum. Tribes demanded the release of detained and the cessation of raids, to hand the administration to the local people, to treat the people of Deir ez-Zor like the people of Raqqa and Hasakah, and to allow them to enter and exit the area with sponsorship or the guarantee of another person. Tribes also demanded the abolishment of compulsory recruitment.

On May 1, tribal elders in Deir Ezzor gathered together and handed over a 20-point demand list to the YPG-dominated SDF, giving the other side a 72-hour ultimatum.

Since the administrative performance of the U.S. partners in Deir Ezzor have proved to be very bad, Daesh terrorists are exploiting the situation to their own advantage. Once the terrorist organization controlled the entire area, but after their military lost, Daesh changed its tactics to guerilla warfare. To perform efficient guerilla warfare, either a safe zone or popular support is needed. As Daesh does not have a safe zone, they need to move amongst the people as fish swims in the sea, which they seem capable of doing as the local population is frustrated with the YPG-dominated governance of their home towns. To eliminate this supportive environment for Daesh, the region has to be governed by its own people.

Daesh attacks in Syria and Iraq between January 16 and April 15

Remaking Deir Ezzor the stronghold of the Syrian opposition

Picture reads “Return it to the way it started.”

In this regard, one suggestion could be to turn Deir Ezzor to a Syrian opposition stronghold backed by the U.S. and Turkey. This idea would address the call of the local people to ‘return it to the way it started.’ Displaced peoples in the Euphrates Shield areas who originate from Deir Ezzor could be relocated to their hometowns. Additionally fighters from Deir Ezzor within the National Army like the 20th Brigade, Jaysh al Sharqiyyah and Ahrar al Sharqiyyah could be relocated as well. By sending convoys similar to the evacuations from Ghouta and Homs to northern Syria, these people and fighters could be sent in convoys to Deir Ezzor. The U.S. could actively work together with the local people in Deir Ezzor. By doing so, the revolutionary flag would once again wave over the area, preventing the possibility of the Assad regime reaching a deal with the YPG in order to control the oil-rich region. Most importantly, locals would not feel like they are being governed by occupiers, which will help ensure the defeat of Daesh.

Since the declaration of the ‘imminent’ military operation by President Erdogan in the east of the Euphrates and the U.S. decision to withdraw from Syria, many discussions have risen about the fate of the region. With Trump’s initiative, both sides are discussing the establishment of a 20-mile zone in northern Syria along the Turkish border. In order to protect its national security, Turkey is trying to eliminate the terrorist threat and trying to accelerate the return of refugees to safe zones. However, one important dynamic behind Turkey’s decisiveness to enter the east of the Euphrates is overlooked. Turkey’s local Syrian partners are pushing the government to conduct a military operation east of the Euphrates in order to expand their areal control and to return home.

Turkey’s partners want to increase their balance of power against the Assad regime and other actors involved in the crisis by increasing their areal control. The U.S. is not the only country that has to manage a relationship with local partners, as Turkey also fought together with different factions of the Free Syrian Army in two military operations against Daesh and the Marxist-Kurdish YPG. During a time in which the YPG controls vast territories, historical enmities, territorial disputes, ethnic and ideological tensions between Arabs and the Syrian Kurds are a driving motivation of local actors, such as tribes, to push Turkey into the east of the Euphrates.

High level meetings between U.S. and Turkish delegations have been continuing since the U.S. decision to leave Syria. While both sides are discussing the way to finalize the U.S. withdrawal and how to address Turkey’s national security concerns, the U.S. is seemingly in a search for a solution as to how they will protect the YPG. The U.S. attitude is not only underestimating the Turkish threat perception and the important issue of the return of Syrian refugees, but is also overlooking a facilitator factor that is pushing Turkey to go for Manbij and the east of the Euphrates.

If all legitimate Turkish concerns were to be addressed, but the interests of Turkey’s Syrian partners ignored, Turkey’s new power inside Syria will force Turkey to widen its sphere of influence. Many Syrian communities inside Turkey and in Syria have evolved a direct relation to Turkey, in which the country is seen as a leader. Many actors of the Syrian community want to bandwagon with Turkey in order to expand their own areas of control and therefore are pushing Ankara to open them the gate to Manbij and east of the Euphrates.

Turkey’s local Syrian partners are pushing the government to conduct a military operation east of the Euphrates in order to expand their areal control and to return home.

Why does Turkey have to care about the demands of its clients in Syria? Ankara has built a strong relationship with the Syrian community and military actors of the Syrian opposition. With the start of the Astana process and the Euphrates Shield Operation, Turkey’s role has increased a lot. Turkey’s institutions got in touch directly with the Syrian opposition society. From the Turkish Armed Forces to the Health Ministry, Turkey has become hugely embedded in Syria. However, the relationship between Turkey and the Syrian opposition is not one sided. Turkey has to care about the demands of its Syrian partners, as the entire Turkish Syrian policy is built upon cooperation with them.

Turkey’s leverage in Syria, its military operations and presence in Syria are based on Turkey’s Syrian partners. Ankara needs the Syrian opposition in order to be able to achieve its goals. More, the relation between Turkey and its Syrian partners are grounded in mutual interests in their animosity against the Assad regime, Daesh, and the YPG. While Turkey is a crucial supporter of the Syrian opposition, the Syrian opposition is likewise crucial for Turkey as an enabler in Syria.

During Operation Euphrates Shield, Turkey’s armed partners on the ground were visibly unprofessional, weak and unskilled, but the training provided by Turkish soldiers showed their results in Operation Olive Branch, in which the newly formed National Army displayed high capabilities. In contrast to the U.S. strategy, which trains, equips and lets the YPG fight on its behalf, Turkey trained, equipped and fought together with its local partners. The difference in this strategy can also be observed via the U.S. army losses and by the Turkish army in Syria. While the U.S. lost half a dozen soldiers, Turkey lost 71 soldiers in Operation Euphrates Shield and 41 soldiers in Operation Olive Branch. This difference is also a result of Turkey’s approach to the National Army, as Ankara does not view the National Army as a proxy but as a legitimate partner.

U.S. attitude does not only underestimate the Turkish threat perception and the return of Syrian refugees, but also overlooking a facilitator factor that is pushing Turkey to go for Manbij and the east of the Euphrates.

The National Army was formed by the Turkish-trained Free Syrian Army factions under the umbrella of the Syrian Interim Government. The gathering of the leaders of different Free Syrian Army factions elected the Chief of Staff to which 9 different offices including the Military Court, the Military Police and which the Finance Offices respond to. The Chief of Staff also controls three corps. Among the 29 Free Syrian Army factions, 13 were formerly supported by the U.S. – either by the CIA via MOM operation room or by the Pentagon. 10 factions were formed after the end of the direct U.S. support to the Free Syrian Army in northern Aleppo. The formation of the National Army is an important asset in Turkey’s Syrian policy, which also means more leverage for Turkey’s partner to push Turkey to increase its role in Syria, even if Turkey didn’t prefer to do so.

The National Army has become way oversized for the tiny area from Afrin to Jarabulus. The asymmetric situation between their controlled areas and their size and capabilities results in the need to expand. The National Army factions want to bandwagon with Turkey in order to increase their control and are pushing Ankara to green light a military operation to Manbij and east of the Euphrates. By gaining more territory, the armed Syrian opposition not only wants to increase its balance of power against the Assad regime, but also wants to return back to their hometowns. Thousands of fighters from the National Army originated from currently YPG-held areas. Factions like Jaysh al-Sharqiyyah, 20th Brigade, Ahrar al-Sharqiyyah, Thuwwar al-Jazira, Jaysh al-Ahfad and Hasakah Shield entirely originate from eastern Syria. The armed Syrian opposition is aware that it cannot launch an operation on its own, without the backing of Turkey, as Russia and the U.S. are still involved in the Syrian war. Therefore, the National Army is pushing its backer Turkey to take action.

Turkey might have its own agenda to fight the YPG, but Turkey’s Syrian partners and local actors see Turkey as a vehicle to achieve their own agenda and to liberate their hometowns.

Turkey might have its own agenda to fight the YPG, but Turkey’s Syrian partners and local actors in Syria see Turkey as a vehicle to achieve their own agenda and to liberate their hometowns. In order to bandwagon and gain from the Turkish government, these actors need Turkey to act. While many discuss how to address threats towards Turkey’s national security, the role of Turkey’s partners in Syria is overlooked. The Syrian opposition sees a new chance in the east of the Euphrates to push its own agenda and to boost its position.

The Syrian opposition is aware that they need more area control in Syria in order to have a stronger position against the Assad regime on the negotiation table. In order to re-gain a strong position like it did in 2013, the Syrian opposition will push Turkey into the east of the Euphrates with its entire means. A more comprehensive perspective in which the needs and demands of Turkey’s partners is needed in order to find a common ground for the period in Syria after the U.S. withdrawal. Otherwise, even if the U.S. might think that it has addressed Turkey’s national security needs, it might not convince Turkey as the needs of its partners in Syria were ignored.

As the latest statements and decisions made by the U.S., such as leaving 400 troops in Syria and planning to continue their support to the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces until 2020, with a $350 million indicates that the U.S. does not want to reach an agreement with Turkey. If the U.S. isn’t going to address Turkey’s security concerns and since Turkey is being pushed from inside by the Turkish people and the Syrian opposition to launch a military operation towards Manbij and the east of the Euphrates, the best for Turkey would be not to withstand this and push and conduct another military operation soon.

From Ankara’s perspective, the PKK (the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and its Syria-based offshoot pose the most serious threat to Turkey’s national security. In recent years, multiple states have provided support to the PKK-linked People’s Protection Units (YPG) to advance their own geo-strategic interests. Of all the Arabian Peninsula monarchies, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has received the most blame in Turkey for its backing of the YPG. Yet recently more Turks are paying closer attention to the deepening relationship between the Kurdish, Marxist group and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which must be understood within the framework of Riyadh aligning closely with Abu Dhabi’s increasingly anti-Turkish foreign policy agenda in the greater Arab/Islamic world.

The deepening of Saudi Arabia’s partnership with the YPG unfolds against the backdrop of scores of other issues that have severely tested Ankara-Riyadh relations in recent years from the Qatar crisis to the Jamal Khashoggi saga, and geopolitical competition in the Horn of Africa to the politics of post-2011 Egypt, as well as the failed coup plot against Turkey’s government in 2016.

Last year, the media in Turkey began paying closer attention to Riyadh’s links with the YPG. In November Yenisafak published an article about the Saudi and Emirati governments sending military forces to parts of northeastern Syria under the YPG’s control. Although Riyadh and Abu Dhabi deployed such forces to serve within the U.S.-led coalition fighting Daesh, a general perception across Turkey was that this move on the part of both Gulf states was meant to counter Turkish influence in Syria via the YPG.

The deepening of Saudi Arabia’s partnership with the YPG unfolds against the backdrop of scores of other issues that have severely tested Ankara-Riyadh relations in recent years.

The same newspaper put out a piece in 2017, only five days after the Saudi/UAE-led bloc began sieging Qatar, that featured a photo of the PKK terrorist organization’s founder, Abdullah Ocalan, with officials from Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Cairo. Shortly after that article’s publication, the Saudi Minister for Gulf Affairs paid a visit to YPG-controlled Raqqa and met with Brett McGurk, the then-U.S. special envoy to the coalition against ISIS, to discuss the reconstruction of that Syrian city, which ISIS had previously declared the capital of its so-called Caliphate. By August 2018, officials in the Kingdom had pledged USD 100 million to the reconstruction of areas in Syria that the YPG occupied, and two months later Saudi Arabia made that payment.

Saudi Arabia’s backing for the YPG is perhaps best understood within the context of the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ), who is the UAE’s de facto ruler, bringing Saudi Arabia into greater alignment with Abu Dhabi regional vision. Pushing back against Turkish influence in Syria, as well as throughout the greater Arab/Islamic world from Somalia to Iraq and Qatar to Libya, requires the unity of powerful Arab states, naturally making Saudi Arabia a key player in this regard from Abu Dhabi’s standpoint.

For the Emiratis, media has been an important pillar of their strategy for countering Ankara’s clout in northern Syria. During Operation Olive Branch’s launch, and in the following months of the YPG’s fall from Afrin, a host of UAE-based media outlets like Gulf News and The National published articles about Turkish military intervention in that Syrian Kurdish canton with titles such as the following: “Turkey-led forces pillage and loot in newly-captured Afrin”; “Turkey says it has besieged Syrian town of Afrin”; “Fear grips city seized by pro-Turkey rebels”; and “Fears for civilians in Afrin as Turkish forces close in”. Throughout Operation Olive Branch, Emirati media platforms labeled the YPG not as a terrorist organization, but instead as a “resistance movement”.

In March 2018, the month when Turkey’s military brought an end to the YPG’s control of Afrin, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) was meeting with Egypt’s leadership in Cairo, where he issued a statement claiming that Turkey, Iran, and other groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood made up a “triangle of evil” in the Middle East. The language was so similar to that of MbZ’s statements that the influence of the Abu Dhabian crown prince over his Saudi counterpart was crystal clear.

In March 2018, when Turkey’s military brought an end to the YPG’s control of Afrin, Saudi Crown Prince MbS said that Turkey, Iran, and other groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood made up a “triangle of evil” in the Middle East. 

By January 2019, high ranking diplomats from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, along with Bahrain, Egypt, and Jordan, met in the Hashemite Kingdom at the King Hussein Bin Talal Convention Center on the Dead Sea. They discussed several issues, but Syria was central to the talks which focused on devising strategies for pushing back against Iran and Turkey’s influence in the war-torn Arab country. That same month, the UAE’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash voiced strong opposition to Ankara’s plan for establishing a buffer zone in northern Syria, stating that Turkey’s aims vis-à-vis the Syrian Kurds were a cause of concern for Abu Dhabi as well as Washington. Last month, Gargash stated  that international concerns about the YPG’s fate were “legitimate” given the armed group’s “pivotal role” in the defeat of ISIS in Syria.

Evidentially, Riyadh is joining Abu Dhabi in viewing strengthened relationships between the Arab states of the Gulf region and the YPG as a realistic and sound strategy for countering Ankara and Tehran in Syria. Unquestionably, Riyadh deepening ties with the YPG will continue to please the Emirati leadership in Abu Dhabi. Yet the question is how much risk will Saudi Arabia take in backing the PKK-linked group in terms of consequences vis-à-vis Turkey? It is legitimate to ask whether Saudi-YPG relations could lead to any direct clash between Ankara and Riyadh in Syria, or elsewhere in the region.

Media outlets in Turkey will likely continue covering Gulf states’ relations with the YPG, probably resulting in anti-Saudi sentiments increasing in Turkey roughly five months after Khashoggi’s killing in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. As officials in Ankara, along with human rights and civil society organizations worldwide, refuse to drop to Khashoggi file, Riyadh’s support for the YPG can trigger further escalations of tension in Turkish-Saudi relations at a dangerous time for the region, as well as for the bilateral relationship. With the Qatar crisis unlikely to resolve in the foreseeable future, combined with the possibility of another Turkish military operation against the YPG in Syria, there is much potential for friction between Ankara and Riyadh to reach new heights.

Turkey’s announcement that its military forces recently waged joint operations with Iran against the PKK against the backdrop of deepening of Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the YPG highlight how Ankara and Riyadh’s agendas in Syria are becoming increasingly incompatible with each other. Indeed, the Levant’s security architecture has changed drastically since the Syrian crisis erupted eight years ago. Although Turkey’s Syria agenda was quite aligned with Saudi Arabia’s regional foreign policy during the earlier parts of the Syrian crisis, underscored by Ankara, Riyadh, and Doha collectively supporting Jaish al-Fatah in an effort to oust the Ba’athist regime in Damascus, dynamics quickly shifted in a direction that pitted Turkey and Saudi Arabia increasingly against each other.

Turkey’s announcement that its military forces recently waged joint operations with Iran against the PKK against the backdrop of deepening of Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the YPG highlight how Ankara and Riyadh’s agendas in Syria are becoming increasingly incompatible with each other.

Following the intensification of Russia’s direct military intervention in Syria, it became clear that Bashar al-Assad’s government was no longer on the verge of potentially falling to Sunni Islamist rebels. At that point Ankara and Riyadh’s threat perceptions from the Syrian crisis became increasingly divergent with the Turkish leadership seeing the forces of Kurdish separatism (as opposed to the survival of Assad’s regime) as the gravest menace to Turkey, and Saudi Arabia viewing expanding and consolidating Iranian influence in Syria as the top threat to Riyadh’s interests in the country.

The odds are good that if the Saudi Kingdom continues sponsoring the YPG, Ankara-Riyadh relations will deteriorate further. It is also a safe bet than the Saudi-YPG partnership could prove far more injurious to Saudi-Turkish relations than any of these other matters that have further pitted these two Sunni Muslim powers against each other at a time in which they are competing for a leadership role in the Islamic world.

Wall Street Journal reported over the weekend that the U.S. was planning to leave behind around 1,000 American soldiers after its withdrawal from Syria. The report was quickly denied by General Joseph Dunford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for being “factually incorrect.” Gen. Dunford added, “There has been no change to the plan announced in February and we continue to implement the President’s direction to draw down U.S. forces to a residual presence.”

The key wording here seems to be “a residual presence” given that President Trump had initially declared all U.S. forces would leave Syria. After much political pressure from Congress, news reports suggested 200 to 400 U.S. forces would be left behind. However, Joseph Votel, the commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), declared in February in his congressional testimony, “The fact is the president made a decision, and we are going to execute his orders here to withdraw all forces from Syria.” It is clear from these and other media reports in recent months that there is quite a bit of uncertainty among military leaders about how the U.S. withdrawal is going to be implemented.

U.S. policymakers and military planners have been negotiating with Turkey about creating a safe zone but they have yet to reach an agreement.

How many U.S. troops would remain behind in Syria is actually less important than their mission. U.S. policymakers and military planners have been negotiating with Turkey about creating a safe zone but they have yet to reach an agreement about the main parameters of how such a zone might be established and protected. While Turkey is intent on assuming the responsibility for such a region with the idea that it could start repatriating some of the refugees to the zone, the U.S. has been proposing to involve European allies in protecting the area. Turkey is opposed to this proposal as it sees an attempt to protect the YPG forces once the U.S. forces leave. As the U.S. wants to have its cake and eat it too, Turkey refuses to give any guarantees that it would not conduct military operations against the YPG forces. It would clearly be illogical for Turkey to reassure the U.S. that it will not attack the Syrian branch of the PKK.

The U.S. withdrawal decision was met with much skepticism in Turkey. The distinction between the withdrawal and the support for the YPG had to be made. Withdrawal from Syria did not necessarily mean the end of U.S. support for the YPG. Over the past three months, we have seen that there was a strong willingness especially in Congress to continue to support the YPG. The debate has been framed as whether or not to “abandon” and let Turkey “slaughter” Kurds with U.S. senators like Lindsey Graham pushing back against an immediate withdrawal while trying to reassure Turkish concerns by paying a visit to Ankara. Bilateral meetings between the U.S. Envoy James Jeffrey as well as Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan have yet to produce concrete results in terms of creating a safe zone that would satisfy Turkish security concerns.

YPG has been playing a rather smart game by slowing down the anti-ISIS operations to keep U.S. military engaged on the ground as long as possible.

Regardless of how many forces the U.S. will leave behind, the mission assigned to these troops will be the critical issue going forward. YPG has been playing a rather smart game by slowing down the anti-ISIS operations to keep U.S. military engaged on the ground as long as possible. Knowing that the U.S. military leadership is not all that excited about a quick exit from Syria, they also made strategic arguments including the possibility that Russia would be the kingmaker as the YPG would be forced to negotiate with the Assad regime.

Trump administration officials would surely be concerned about how it might look if Turkey conducted military operations against their “allies” the day they depart Syria. In this sense, there needs to be an acknowledgement of the misguidedness of allying with a group like the YPG instead of promoting it as a success story. Without coming to terms with admitting such a policy failure, the U.S. will not be able to achieve meaningful cooperation with Turkey. That will neither accomplish security and stability on the ground nor help achieve U.S. policy goals in northern Syria.

In the pre-war era of Syria, Arab tribes would send their youth to Gulf countries in order to provide families with additional income. With the war, many tribespeople had to flee and are now working in Turkey. For the tribes of Syria, the civil war has partially moved Turkey to the previous role of Gulf countries. Tribesmen in Turkey are sending parts of their income to their relatives in Syria and are organizing themselves in political and social structures. The tribes of Syria, and especially those in YPG-held areas, could play a significant role in enabling Turkey to push against the terror threat posed by the YPG on the bases of mutual interest.

For example, the tribes of Manbij have been divided geographically. While some live in Turkey and the Euphrates Shield areas, others still live in Manbij. In order to unite again in their hometowns, the tribes of Manbij released a statement that they reject the Manbij roadmap between Turkey and the U.S. and that they demand a direct Turkey-supported military operation by the National Army to liberate their hometowns from the YPG. Bushaban – the biggest tribe in Manbij – was historically moved by the Assad regime to Manbij as part of the Arabization policy. Therefore, the Bushaban tribe has a historical dispute with Syrian Kurds and is alienated by the current Kurdish governance within their hometowns. In the eyes of the tribes of Manbij, Turkey is the only foreign actor involved in Syria, who might enable them to get rid of the Marxist-Kurdish YPG.

The tribes of Syria, and especially those in YPG-held areas, could play a significant role in enabling Turkey to push against the terror threat posed by the YPG on the bases of mutual interest.

The tribes of Raqqa and DeirEzzor, which are located in the south of the discussed safe-zone, have their share in pushing Turkey to the east of the Euphrates. The six biggest tribes in the regions are Walda, Afadla, Sabkha, Ougaidat, Baggara, and Busaraya. Being grounded in historical enmities, territorial disputes, ethnic and ideological tensions, the tribes of the region have a hostile relation to the YPG. The Walda tribe for example was partially moved by the Assad regime in the 60s to Qamishli and Hasakah and are seen by the Syrian Kurds as ‘strangers who took their historic lands’ and were excluded by the YPG from any participation or voting in Qamishli and Hasakah. The Baggara tribe has a violent past with Syrian Kurds as they helped the Assad regime crackdown the Kurdish rebellion in 2004 and fought against the alliance between Syrian Kurds and the Bedouin Shammar tribe in 1944.

The Bedouin Shammar tribe is an exception among the tribes in eastern Syria, hostile to the Arab tribes and allied with the Syrian Kurds. Currently, the Shammar tribe is militarily organized under the Sanadid Forces as a close ally of the YPG. The Ougaidat tribe also played an important role in the said crackdown and the war. While the Afadla and the Busaraya tribe have expressed their rejection of the YPG in Arab cities, the Sabkha tribe demanded that cities should be governed by its own people.

While all these tribes have fellow tribespeople living in Turkey as refugees, they also welcome a bigger Turkish role in their hometowns and prefer Turkey and Turkey-trained armed Syrian opposition to the U.S.-backed YPG forces. The Walda, Afadla, and Sabkha tribes have welcomed the possible role of Turkey in the liberation of Raqqa, but were frustrated to see the U.S. preferring to work with the YPG. In the eyes of the Busaraya tribe, Turkey is a natural ally to contain the role of the YPG and Iran in Syria. The Baggara tribe also prefers Turkey and Turkey-backed Syrian rebels over the YPG and Iran, and has been specially organized and trained under the 20th Brigade by Turkey in northern Aleppo. Turkey has welcomed many leaders of the Ougaidat tribe in Turkey and is organized in northern Aleppo under the Jaysh al Sharqiyyah formation.

As tribes in Northern Syria share Turkey’s interest of kicking YPG out and US’ interest to contain Iran, they are looking forward for a Turkish operation in the east of the Euphrates.

Many tribesmen of the listed six above are also fighting under the umbrella of the National Army. In the past, all of these listed six tribes were formerly important supporters of the Free Syrian Army and provided many factions with supply and fighters. For these tribes, Turkey has to back a military operation east of the Euphrates to get rid of the invaders, and to re-gain control back over their hometowns. Therefore, in addition to many smaller tribes, these tribes are trying to push Turkey to take action. Another reason why these tribes prefer Turkey is their animosity against Iran and Iranian-backed Shia militias. The rejection of the Iranian role in Syria is hugely spread among the tribespeople. As tribes in Northern Syria share Turkey’s interest of kicking YPG out and US’ interest to contain Iran, they are looking forward for a Turkish operation in the east of the Euphrates.

The non-YPG elements in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) obtained different attitudes in their relation within this umbrella. While some like the Sanadid Forces allied with the YPG based on mutual interests, others joined them because they perceived the YPG as the lesser evil in comparison to Daesh. For example, many of the fighters in south DeirEzzor are from the Shaitat tribe, while many others joined the Turkish-trained Ahrar al-Sharqiyyah in northern Aleppo. In case Turkey gets into these areas, many of the non-YPG elements within the SDF might defect and join the Turkish-trained umbrella as many of their relatives already joined the National Army.

In general, the tribes in YPG-held areas are sympathetic towards Turkey with the exception of the Shammar tribe. While Turkey and the U.S. discuss a potential safe-zone in northern Syria, especially in the areas below the 20-mile line, there are tribes who are close to Turkey and see opportunities in cooperating with Ankara in order to get rid of the YPG, prevent an Iranian expansion, and to ensure their own governance. While discussions about the declared partial withdrawal of the U.S. continues, depending on the goodwill of the U.S. and Turkey, the tribes in the region could function as a vehicle to ensure an agreement while preserving Turkish and American interests.

The advance of the U.S. supported YPG-led SDF forces seems to have slowed down although President Trump had announced that it was a matter of a week before the last patch of territory in Daesh hands could be retrieved. It is no secret that SDF is against the U.S. departure from the region and it has slowed down operations in the past, such as during the Raqqa operation. In their calculation, the longer the operations against Daesh take, the more likely that the U.S. would prolong its presence on the ground. In the meantime, the administration has been persuaded to leave a residual U.S. force (400 soldiers), which would certainly make SDF happier than a sudden and full U.S. withdrawal. This is where the Turkish public opinion will be uneasy once again about the U.S. strategy. Leaving a residual force can easily look like the U.S. is more preoccupied with protecting the SDF forces rather than with precluding the return of Daesh.

Leaving a residual force of 400 soldiers can easily look like the U.S. is more preoccupied with protecting the SDF forces rather than with precluding the return of Daesh. This is where the Turkish public opinion will be uneasy once again about the U.S. strategy.

The partial reversal of the withdrawal decision by leaving roughly 400 U.S. soldiers in Syria will not surprise Turkey. There has been much debate on the advisability of a complete withdrawal and the argument that the U.S. would be “abandoning Kurds” to their fate seems to have been effective. Turkey has strongly opposed the idea that it was waiting for the U.S. to attack and “slaughter” Kurds as was argued in the Western media. It has been strongly lobbying the U.S. for a policy that would satisfy Turkish national security concerns in the form of creating a safe zone in northern Syria. Turkey also argued that the Manbij agreement could be a model to work with the U.S. but limited, if at all, progress has been achieved there. In the current situation, a U.S. residual force in the region may not necessarily be a problem if it is done in coordination with Turkey. In other words, for the sake of a healthy Turkish-American relationship going forward, the U.S. presence in the region can no longer appear as providing American protection for the YPG.

President Trump’s willingness to take Turkish concerns seriously is a plus but devil is in the details.

President Trump’s willingness to take Turkish concerns seriously is a plus but devil is in the details especially in the Syrian scene. It has been a major disadvantage for the U.S.-Turkey relations to have the divergence on Syria strategy dominate the conversation for several years now. There are signs of a broader conversation developing including bilateral as well as the regional issues. However, the U.S. support for the YPG will continue to be a factor consuming every other potential positive development. In the Turkish public opinion, the U.S. pullout decision was closely associated with the end of such support. It was clear the military leaders saw the decision as a hasty one and the public relations campaign to “protect the Kurds” was closely associated with that view. Now that the administration has agreed to leave a residual force to relieve the political pressure from Congress, the mission will have to be defined clearly and carefully. “Peacekeeping” will likely be an unconvincing one, especially if a clear strategy to work with Turkey on the ground is not crafted.

The importance of the U.S. working with Turkey on Syria should not be underestimated. It would be a clear commitment to Turkish security and reduce bilateral tensions, in the meantime, strengthening the NATO alliance. Perhaps even more importantly, it would serve as an anchor in preventing further instability in Syria, enabling the eventual political resolution of the civil war. This kind of coordination and cooperation between the two allies would not be solely in the interest of Turkish national security but for the sake of regional stability. This may sound like wishful thinking in an environment where virtually every actor seems to work at cross purposes. Nevertheless, it is arguably the only way for true stability and peace.

Turkey has long called for the establishment of some sort of a safe zone in Syria over the course of the conflict. Such calls were primarily aimed at preventing regime violence against civilians and the opposition. Turkish calls on the international community to act on the principle of responsibility to protect were ignored and Russia’s direct military intervention ended any prospect of such a scenario. As the conflict evolved, the U.S.-led coalition narrowly defined its mission in terms of counterterrorism against Daesh only. Furthermore, the U.S. investment in the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK, precluded any cooperation between the U.S. and Turkey, which could have worked to establish such a zone. Today, as the U.S. withdraws, Turkey sees a safe zone as the only option to protect its national security along the Syrian border.

The course of the conflict, in other words, has shifted from a rebellion by the opposition against the Assad regime to a de facto failed state in which international powers conducted operations against terror organizations. At the same time, Syria became a battleground for regional powers with their various proxies on the ground. In an environment where there have been very little and piecemeal instances of international cooperation, a lasting solution remained elusive at best. The U.S. decision to work “by, with, and through” the YPG has simply complicated this picture by creating a major crisis between two NATO allies. Furthermore, the U.S. has refused to provide leadership to resolve the conflict through years of indecision. President Trump’s decision to withdraw, even if many argue about its manner and timing, ironically provides a clear direction of the U.S. policy in Syria. The U.S. is leaving the country, that much we know.

As the U.S. withdraws, Turkey sees a safe zone as the only option to protect its national security along the Syrian border.

As the U.S. military is gearing to depart Syria within a matter of months, the central question for the U.S. planners seems to be how to ensure that the YPG is not attacked by Turkey. Turkish policymakers are quite puzzled by this priority as the real question should be about how to ensure the national security of a NATO ally is protected. Turkey is determined to prevent the YPG from achieving an autonomous zone for its operations. A sure way for Turkey to accomplish this goal is to create a safe zone under Turkish military’s control supported by opposition forces. Turkey hopes to repatriate significant numbers of refugees to settle in this new zone. Such a zone would not only satisfy Turkey’s national security concerns but also create conditions for the repatriation of refugees. The establishment of a safe zone under Turkish control would contribute to stabilization efforts that have long relied on sub-state actors such as the YPG. True stabilization can only happen through the commitment of serious state actors like Turkey.

Creating a safe zone would not only satisfy Turkey’s national security concerns but also create conditions for the repatriation of refugees. 

If a safe zone under Turkey’s control materializes with the support and coordination of the U.S., Turkey-U.S. relations can benefit from a serious confidence building measure after years of mistrust. It would alleviate the Turkish concerns about a continued commitment to the protection of and support for the YPG even after the U.S. withdrawal. For the U.S military, protecting their “local allies” in the fight against Daesh seems to be a priority but the administration needs to recognize that such a policy has a destabilizing effect on the dynamics on the ground, not to mention asking a NATO ally to look the other way when its national security is threatened. The U.S. withdrawal without leaving a power vacuum and a renewed instability on the ground can only happen with Turkey. If the U.S. and Turkey can work together on establishing a safe zone in northern Syria with the goal of achieving stability and security, it would go a long way in repairing years of mutual distrust.  

The debate on the U.S. withdrawal from Syria suffers from a couple of frequently repeated arguments that do not reflect the realities of the conflict, especially in northern Syria. Some argue that the U.S. should not abandon their allies on the ground and leave them to their fate, which would amount to a “betrayal of the Kurds.” This line of thinking makes a couple of flawed assumptions starting with equating the PKK’s Syrian affiliate the YPG with Syrian Kurds in general. The reality is that the YPG does not represent even the majority of the Kurds in Syria, nor are they reliable partners as they have been promoted. Since the beginning of the conflict, they refused to fight the Assad regime, maintained connections with Russia, and prolonged the anti-Daesh fight as much as possible to ensure the U.S. remained in Syria as their protectors.

The U.S. military has openly promoted the “accomplishments” of the Syrian Democratic Forces, a rebranding of the YPG, despite the fact that U.S. intelligence community as well as high-level officials have repeatedly admitted on the record that the YPG is the “Syrian militia” of the PKK. The U.S. military officials, especially those at CENTCOM, have expressed displeasure about Turkey as they have perceived Turkish efforts in northern Syria as hindering their anti-Daesh mission despite the fact that Turkey has been part of the anti-Daesh coalition from the beginning. Turkey’s reservations and repeated warnings against allying with the YPG seem to have been received by the U.S. military more as an annoyance than legitimate national security concerns of a NATO ally.

Some argue that the U.S. should not abandon their allies on the ground and leave them to their fate, which would amount to a “betrayal of the Kurds.” This line of thinking makes a couple of flawed assumptions starting with equating the PKK’s Syrian affiliate the YPG with Syrian Kurds in general.

The disconnect between the U.S. and Turkey on the YPG issue has widened and deepened in recent years. As both the Obama and Trump administrations adopted a policy of “by, with, and through” local partners to fight Daesh, Turkish concerns have been ignored until very recently. President Trump’s withdrawal decision created an opening for repairing the long-simmering tensions between the two countries contingent on a rethinking of the U.S. partnership with the YPG. In the early days of the decision, I commented that the withdrawal might not translate to an immediate halt to the U.S. support for the YPG. Today, all indications are that the U.S. policy planners are trying to convince Turkey to forego any potential military operations against the YPG once the U.S. leaves. However, Turkey’s refusal to commit to not fighting the Syrian branch of the PKK should surprise no one. While the “betrayal of the Kurds” argument might have some currency among at least some policymakers, reassuring a NATO ally should take priority.

Turkey has not only supported the U.S. withdrawal decision but also offered ways to make it an orderly and successful process by leaving no room for a political vacuum. Turkey’s insistence on establishing a safe zone along the border with Syria in the north aims to achieve two main goals, which would ensure its national security and allow for stability in the region. First, the YPG would no longer control the border, which would reassure Turkish security concerns about arms transfers into Turkey and the PKK control in the region. Second, significant numbers of refugees would be settled in northern Syria to relieve Turkey of some of the political burden of hosting more than 3.6 million refugees. From the American perspective, however, the safe zone appears to be a demarcation zone where Turkey and the YPG would be separated from each other so that the U.S. forces would not leave the YPG at the “mercy” of Turkey. Just as the two NATO allies’ approaches to the YPG has diverged, their conceptions of the function of the potential safe zone are not aligned. Once again, their basic disagreement about the YPG spells potential for disaster in bilateral relations.

By establishing a safe zone along the border with Syria in the north, Turkey aims to achieve two main goals: First, the YPG would no longer control the border, which would reassure Turkish security concerns about arms transfers into Turkey and the PKK control in the region. Second, significant numbers of refugees would be settled in northern Syria to relieve Turkey of some of the political burden of hosting more than 3.6 million refugees. 

It is time for a truly honest and in-depth strategic conversation between the two allies about the U.S. relationship with the YPG. Characterizing it as a tactical and temporary alliance will not suffice as the withdrawal discussions show that the U.S. feels it owes the YPG as if it is actually a strategic partner for the long haul. Turkey needs reassurance that this is not the case and the reassurance cannot be in words only. The U.S. policy planners need to make it clear to Turkey that they are not looking for ways to protect the YPG as part of their withdrawal plan.

The U.S. withdrawal symbolizes a new phase for local and regional actors in Syria. Particularly for Ankara, the U.S.’ “slow and coordinated” pull out strategy, which involves 2,000 troops in North East Syria, is a game changer; it was an unexpected move that no one saw it coming two weeks ago in Ankara. However, President Erdogan had a very strong expectation that President Trump would take responsibility to reshape Turkish-American relations before it would be too late. He never gave up on maintaining his communication with President Trump.

The mobilization of Turkish troops and the declaration of high military readiness in the region following Erdogan’s Ankara speech was a direct message not for the YPG but for the U.S. government to change its policy towards the YPG. More importantly, Turkey’s unexpected yet comprehensive air strike against PKK positions in Northern Iraq was a strong sign that Turkey would extend same military campaigns against YPG positions in Syria. In this regard, it was the last chance for the Turkish-American relations to reevaluate the escalation on the YPG issue. Otherwise, Turkey would have been militarily involved in the North East Syria where the U.S. has been operating alongside YPG forces. During the phone call on December 14, as it is claimed, President Erdogan strongly stressed Turkey’s position on military action, and it was followed by Trump’s decision.

At this stage, the operational and strategic dynamics, as well as the new geopolitical calculations among the actors involved in the Syrian conflict should be reconsidered. The post-American Syria revealed the dynamics, especially for Turkey. Hence, President Erdogan should reevaluate his overall strategy on Syria. Turkey’s priority, as president Erdogan repeatedly expresses, is to eliminate the YPG threat for Turkey’s imminent national and regional security concerns.

The cooperation between the U.S. and the YPG, and the U.S. operational military presence in NE Syria were some of the important dynamics that restricted Turkey’s freedom of military action against the YPG. Trump’s withdrawal means that Turkey gained freedom of military action in eastern Syria, yet the development brings a challenging road-map for Turkey to achieve its strategic priorities. If Turkey delivers its priorities on the ground and redesigns the current balance of power, the Syrian conflict is likely to be reshaped soon.

Following the cleaning of the Manbij pocket from the YPG forces, Turkey will reach its initial goal to take full control alongside its border in the western part of the Euphrates River. This might bring Turkey freedom of military action not only to reshape the overall region including Idlib but also to accommodate refugees.

The challenges that Turkey has to reconsider are multidimensional. First and foremost, what type of military move, in an operational manner, that Turkey will adopt following the U.S. withdrawal is significant. It seems that Turkey’s first military mission is to establish a full-scale military control in the Manbij pocket where Turkey and the U.S. had already agreed, yet the YPG maintains its presence there. The intense military mobilization of Turkey and Turkey-trained National Army near the Turkish border and inside Jarablus demonstrate that Ankara will take military action in Manbij.

Even though the regime tends to mobilize its militias towards the Manbij pocket to retake the city from the YPG, Turkey certainly perceives Manbij as a military threshold to maintain its military deterrence. At this stage, deterrence for Turkey is the use of threats to dissuade the Syrian regime from initiating an undesirable act in the region. Following the cleaning of the Manbij pocket from the YPG forces, Turkey will reach its initial goal to take full control alongside its border in the western part of the Euphrates River. This might bring Turkey freedom of military action not only to reshape the overall region including Idlib but also to accommodate refugees. Up until now, 300,000 returned to their homes in the western part of the River.

Following the takeover of Manbij, Turkey’s second military move against the YPG is expected to be alongside the border. This military operation will have a different character as the YPG would probably want to defend Ayn Al Arab (also known as Kobane), Rasul Ayn, and Tel Abyad against Turkey’s military action. The YPG’s search for a new ally at this stage is one of the significant steps that can influence Turkey’s potential military action, yet it seems that no credible actor at this stage can prevent Ankara from taking military action in these regions.

The strategy that Turkey might adopt following the liberation of Manbij has two broad aims. While the first aim for Turkey is to disassemble the YPG’s territorial continuity alongside the Turkish-Syrian border, the second one is to provide a safe haven for the refugee community who were forcefully displaced by the YPG. If this will is the case, Turkey is set to accomplish its original aim to establish a secure zone alongside its Syrian border. This also means that fighting against Daesh is a secondary mission that should be carried out following the establishment of a safe zone for Turkey’s military presence.

Trump’s decision brought many opportunities to repair especially the U.S.’s wrong strategy of working with a terrorist organization to fight against another terrorist organization, but at the same time brought Syria into a new rivalry between the regional countries.

This probably brings the third dimension for Turkey’s post-American roadmap in Syria. Fighting against Daesh at this stage is a complicated issue from a military perspective in which Turkey has the capacity, yet the geographical distance where Daesh militants operate makes Turkey’s military engagement riskier. While Turkey was calculating a limited military operation against the YPG in its borderline, now Turkey has to reconsider its military strategy.

This requires a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy for Turkey to clean the area from YPG and Daesh, hold the liberated territories to sustain military presence and finally to build the post-conflict places. More importantly, Turkey’s potential far-reaching military operation towards the southern flank of Syria might also bring the Syrian regime, Russia and Iran into the geopolitical rivalry in the region, which is a situation Turkey would not want to get into. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson said that “Syrian government should assume control of areas vacated by the U.S.” This means that Russia does not tend to accommodate with Turkey’s own roadmap for the post-American withdrawal. Therefore, cooperation with Russia and the U.S. is the most significant part of Turkey’s strategy in NE Syria.

The game changer development for Turkey would be a potential and quick dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces. If the non-YPG forces (mainly the Arab forces) inside the SDF decide to detach themselves from SDF, then Turkey’s strategy has to take the Syrian regime’s move towards the eastern part of the Euphrates into account

The game changer development for Turkey would be a potential and quick dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces. If the non-YPG forces (mainly the Arab forces) inside the SDF decide to detach themselves from SDF, then Turkey’s strategy has to take the Syrian regime’s move towards the eastern part of the Euphrates into account, which poses another trouble, not just for Turkey but also for the U.S.  

The Syrian crisis is fundamentally localizing geopolitics, in which each actor has strategically different priorities regarding every single terrorist formation in Syria. Trump’s decision brought many opportunities to repair especially the U.S.’s wrong strategy of working with a terrorist organization to fight against another terrorist organization, but at the same time brought Syria into a new rivalry between the regional countries. Undoubtedly, Turkey needs a comprehensive strategy for its Syrian road-map following the American withdrawal.

The trial against Bajan Rafakan and Ekim Alptekin is set to begin in the U.S. on 11 February, 2019, which is directly related to the extradition of Fetullah Gulen – the leader of the Fetullah Terrorist Organization, which staged the failed coup attempt in Turkey on July 15, 2016.

Bajan Rafakan, the ex-business partner of Michael Flynn – former U.S. national security advisor – pleaded not guilty on Tuesday to charges against him that he secretly lobbied for Turkey to extradite Gulen, who is currently residing in the U.S.

Rafakan, who was the former director of U.S. Export-Import Bank and Ekim Alptekin – a Turkish businessman – were accused of ‘secret’ lobbying and ‘lying’ about their work. Rafakan pleaded not guilty in a federal court in Virginia and is set to defend the charges against him at a trial starting on February 11, 2019. Alptekin, who denied the charges made against him on Monday via a spokesman, is not expected to attend the trial as he is not currently in the U.S.

The accusations made against Rafakan and Alptekin are working with Turkish government officials on a so-called secret plan to return Gulen, who is currently living in exile in Pennsylvania, to Turkey.

Fetullah Gulen was the mastermind of the failed coup attempt in Turkey, and while the Turkish government has made called for his extradition, the U.S. administration has rejected this plea on the claim of ‘lack of evidence.’

Rafakan, who is a co-founder of the consultancy firm, Flynn Intel Group, is accused of a rarely enforced law, which requires lobbyists to disclose their work when working with foreign actors. Prosecutors accuse both Rafakan and Alptekin for providing false statements to the Justice Department about their work.

The case against Rafakan and Alptekin was built mostly on information provided by Flynn, who admitted that he lied about his role in lobbying activities and has been cooperating with the Justice Department in the case.

On Tuesday, the White House stated that U.S. President Trump told Turkish President Erdogan that his administration will ‘take a look’ at the possibility of extraditing Gulen, but added that Trump made no commitment in this regard.

The extradition of Gulen has remained one of the most troubled issues between Turkey and the U.S. among others, such as the U.S. support for the YPG in northeast Syria that has now taken a different direction as to please the Turkish government.

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi

The U.S.-Turkey relationship is going through interesting times, as both allies are willing to work through their differences despite serious disagreements over a host of issues. Turkey has been pressing the U.S. as well as the international community to take a firmer stand against those responsible for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.

When asked about the extradition of Gulen to Turkey, Trump denied getting involved in the legal process but stated that the U.S. is looking for “whatever we can do for Turkey.”

The Turkish position puts President Trump in an awkward position, as he appears inclined to accept that the Crown Prince Mohammad bin Selman was not responsible. Trump also pledged that the relationship with Saudi Arabia would not be affected by the Khashoggi affair. Despite this disagreement, President Trump made some positive statements about President Erdogan and Turkey, citing the release of Pastor Andrew Brunson last month. Most recently, when asked about the extradition of Gulen to Turkey, Trump denied getting involved in the legal process but stated that the U.S. is looking for “whatever we can do for Turkey.”

There is also the U.S. support for the YPG that continues to be a sticking point. However, both the American and Turkish leaderships express willingness to work through these differences largely because the two NATO allies have a lot more to gain by working together than at cross purposes. 

For some analysts, the Khashoggi case has been a useful tool for Turkey to play politics in a geostrategic power struggle.

For some analysts, the Khashoggi case has been a useful tool for Turkey to play politics in a geostrategic power struggle. It is important to note that the Saudi failure to provide an explanation for what happened to Khashoggi lasted weeks. Every explanation the Saudis provided was quickly falsified by facts and Turkey insisted on accountability as well as national sovereignty. For all intents and purposes, the Saudi behavior forced Turkey to leak facts and made it all too easy to pursue a “drip drip strategy,” if there was ever such a conscious strategy in the first place.

The U.S. media’s pressure on the Trump administration to take a clear stance was indirectly owed to Turkey’s unwillingness to let this murder be covered up. Turkey made a careful distinction between King Salman and the rest of the Saudi leadership, creating at least some wiggle room without abandoning full accountability for Khashoggi’s murder. President Trump may have preferred that the issue goes away somehow but his administration continued to engage Turkey on the matter. This dynamic of persistent engagement despite deep differences is interesting and might provide a blueprint at least for the next two years.

Both on the issue of Gulen’s extradition and the U.S. support for the YPG, there seems to be a similar dynamic at play. Turkey has requested Gulen’s extradition and pushed hard for it politically but understands the political constraints on the Trump administration. This does not mean Turkey will contend itself with the status quo and give up on the extradition request. Turkey will continue to bring up the issue and pressure the U.S. side to act against the Gulen network all the while engaging instead of confronting the administration. With regard to the YPG issue, Turkey again insists that the U.S. should stop supporting the organization because of its links to the PKK. Yet, it continues to engage the new U.S. team on the Syria policy without accepting any kind of normalization of the YPG.

Time will tell if this is all we can hope for but continuous engagement through crises may be the solution for the time being.

All the minefields in the U.S.-Turkey relationship need careful analysis and comprehensive policy coordination and there is a long way to go before that happens. Nevertheless, it is important to underline that the two sides are both willing to listen to each other’s positions and engage in a meaningful way. It is not clear if this dynamic will be sustainable in the medium and long terms but it should be considered a start in any case.

Time will tell if this is all we can hope for but continuous engagement through crises may be the solution for the time being. However, we should not lose sight that a comprehensive strategic dialogue would produce more concrete and sustainable results in the long run.   

The final declaration of the Istanbul summit, which included Turkey, Russia, Germany, and France was interpreted by some authorities as Turkey having changed its Syria policy. The reason for those comments was the insistence of Russia and France to include the Assad regime in the process of democratic transition in Syria and Turkey’s silence on the Russian and French demand on that matter.

In effect, during the summit Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan clearly expressed that for Syria to transit to a democracy, Assad had to leave his seat and the future of Syria had to be decided by the Syrian people, including the opposition groups and civilians which now reside outside of the country. Almost 3,5 million of them have taken refuge in Turkey from the start of the civil war.

Indeed, Turkey has followed the policy of regime change or democratic transition from the very beginning of the Arab Revolt in Syria. The inclusion of Assad to the process of democratic transition does not necessarily mean that Turkey’s policy on Syria has changed. To remind the reader, once the toppling of the Assad regime by the opposition through a military struggle proved impossible, especially with the Russian intervention in September 2015 and the U.S.’s policy shift of seeking regime change in Syria to providing support to the YPG against Daesh, the political solution to the Syrian crisis has become more salient. Turkey, to an extent, has conceded to a shift from a military to political solution to the Syrian crisis.

Turkey still maintains its position at the outset to remove the Assad regime in Syria. What has changed is merely the path towards that end, the political solution replaced the military solution to the crisis.

However, it can’t be argued that shifting from military to political means constitutes a policy change. The policy change does include not a change in means but a change in ends. Turkey still maintains its position at the outset to remove the Assad regime in Syria. What has changed is merely the path towards that end, the political solution replaced the military solution to the crisis.

Turkey’s current policy towards Syria is shaped around preparing the ground for political change, shift from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one. The final step for ending the crisis in Syria harbors holding free elections in the country, which is expected to be resulted with the loss of Assad and its supporters since they constitute the minority. For that goal, Turkey has been struggling to sustain and enlarge its military presence in the country.

Turkey’s military operations in Syria – Operation Euphrates Shield and Operation Olive Branch – to purge terrorist groups from Jarabulus and Afrin respectively and the Idlib concord with Russia to protect civilians in the region and the Manbij concord with the U.S. to cleanse the region from the terrorist elements can be mentioned in this context.

Turkey’s policy of keeping and enlarging its military presence in Syria has two aims: Sustaining Turkey’s national security against YPG and Daesh terror and achieving democratic change in Syria.

More, President Erdogan declared that after Manbij, Turkey will hold another large-scale military operation towards the east of the Euphrates in order to dismantle terrorist elements from the region. This will also serve the same purpose of sustaining and enlarging Turkey’s military presence in Syria to make possible the political solution to the crisis. Having military presence on the ground and transferring it to political force at the table constitutes Turkey’s current policy towards the Syrian crisis.

Thus, Turkey’s military operation in northern Syria cannot be reduced to its struggle with the YPG. This policy of keeping and enlarging Turkey’s military presence serves for a double purpose: Sustaining Turkey’s national security against YPG and Daesh terror and achieving democratic change in Syria. It includes both defensive and revisionist goals. However, Turkey’s revisionism in Syria should not be interpreted as territorial expansion. One of the clauses of the declaration of the Istanbul summit clearly expresses that Syrian territorial integrity is to be respected and maintained. All countries signing the declaration agree on that Syria should continue its sovereign independence.

Turkey’s position in Syria should not be interpreted as territorial expansion. One of the clauses of the declaration of the Istanbul summit clearly expresses that Syrian territorial integrity is to be respected and maintained.

Nevertheless, it is still not clear that whether the two great powers, the U.S. and Russia, and Iran as well, will adjust to that policy of democratization in Syria. Turkey and European countries, especially Germany, will seek to end the crisis in Syria by finally democratizing the country. Both countries have borne the brunt of the undemocratic political conditions in Syria. Germany suffers from the refuge flood whereas Turkey suffers from both refuge flood and terrorist threats.

Mid-June this year the Assad regime began an extensive operation in southwest Syria aiming to get control of the last rebel stronghold region. The assault led to the displacement of 320,000 civilians and the regime made considerable territorial progress. However, the current situation in Syria’s southwest also questions the reliability of Russia and the U.S. as both states were guarantors for the de-escalation zone in Deraa.

Following large scale attacks from regime-allied militias and the Russian air force, Syrian rebels first lost ground at the Lajat valley. With time, and with the mediation of Russia, some rebel leaders negotiated a reconciliation agreement with the Assad regime. Even though Russia was (and still is) an active part of the ongoing military assault, it succeeded to position itself as a mediator between the rebels and the regime. To the cost of the Assad regime gaining control over the strategic Nassib border crossing to Jordan, thousands of displaced Syrians began heading home after the rebels and the regime reached a deal in southwest Syria.

While over the years the U.S. convinced Syrian rebels in Deraa to stop their military activities against the Assad regime in exchange for guarantees, the Russians promised to hold back the regime from attacking Deraa. Nevertheless, before the imminent start of the operation in southwest Syria, the U.S. informed the military opposition that they should not expect U.S.-support and political protection against the regime assault. On the other hand, Russia declared the end of the de-escalation zone in southwest Syria.

With the start of the assault in southwest Syria, Russia and the Assad regime gave the Syrian opposition two options: Reconcile with the regime or resist at the cost of a humanitarian crisis through heavy aerial bombardment. Rebels who were in a patron-client relation with the U.S. found themselves abandoned in front of a military superior Russian fire power.

Russia and the U.S. broke their deals with Israel and Jordan

Russia and the U.S. not only abandoned the armed Syrian opposition. Both states had initially made important promises to Jordan and Israel, which they failed to keep. While Jordan feared a new refugee wave, the Israeli government rejected the possibility of Iran-backed militias at the northern edge of the Golan Highs, which is occupied by Israel. Against all agreements between Jordan, the U.S. and Russia on one side, and Israel, the U.S. and Russia on the other, 60 thousands refugees are at the Jordan border and Iran-backed militias are part of the ongoing campaign in Deraa approaching the Israeli border, day-by-day.

For Israel the Russian intervention in Syria came at the cost of a growing Iran-backed militia and Hezbollah presence in Syria with better equipment and supplies. Therefore, the Israeli administration tried to find a solution with Russia and requested U.S. help against any Iranian aggression. Israel did not only limit itself to this, but also took action by itself by bombarding strategic Iranian positions with Syria. Geographically, Syrian rebels in southwest Syria were also a de-facto buffer between Israel and Hezbollah and other Iran-backed militias. With the current developments, Israel faces a bigger threat from Iran and its proxies to its northern border.

Possible impacts of the broken deals in southwest Syria for northern Syria

In southwest Syria it was the U.S. who abandoned Syrian rebels and opened the way for a Russia-backed regime assault. One may argue that the U.S. lacked any military presence in Deraa in order to stop the Russian assault. However, seven years of war in Syria has showed that the cost of such an assault could become exorbitant if the U.S. decided to supply Syrian rebels with weapons and ammunition. Rising costs of a military operation is a strong argument for Russians to keep their promises. Thus, if the U.S. administration wanted to protect Syrian rebels, it would have done so.

The situation in southwest Syria also draws to the question as to whether the U.S. will abandon its partner forces in northeast Syria – the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – in the face of a possible Russian assault. It’s known that the Assad regime want to re-gain the control of all of Syria. Until today, the U.S. has protected their partner force from various regime operations in Tabqah and DeirEzzor by using air force, but this may change in the future despite the Pentagon’s plans to expand their investment into their partner forces.

The YPG-dominated SDF may become frightened of how reliable their patron really is. It can be stated that the fear of the U.S. abandoning the YPG-dominated SDF is growing within the ranks of the partners of the U.S. In addition to the developments in southwest Syria, the Manbij roadmap between Turkey and the U.S. led to frustration within the SDF. Especially as the war against Daesh is coming to a near end, the YPG’s trust in the U.S. administration is declining.

One may argue that the nature of cooperation between the U.S. and SDF is quite different from the nature of the U.S. backing the southern front. While the rebels in southwest Syria were part of a “Train & Equip” program of the MOC operation room connected to the CIA, the “Train & Equip” program for the SDF is approved by the U.S. Congress as part of Pentagon’s efforts to eliminate Daesh.

In addition to these developments, the U.S. is only watching while Iran and Iran-backed militias are heading towards Israel despite Israel’s security concerns. If the U.S. isn’t willing or is not able to ease Israel’s security concerns by taking action due to Russian superiority in Syria, what guarantees that the U.S. will secure its partner forces from a decisive Russian position? On the other side, one can also argue that the patron-client relation between the U.S. and SDF is different to that with Syrian rebels in the southeast, as the U.S. installed several military bases in northeast Syria and invested a lot in its client.

However, with the above argument in mind, U.S.-backed forces have already began negotiating the handover of Raqqa to the Assad regime, and reports suggest that a delegation of the regime visited the city, which was captured from Daesh after 1784 airstrikes of the international coalition. According to reports, the negotiations included the arrest of members of an Arab brigade within the SDF – the Raqqa Revolutionaries Brigade. The YPG-dominated SDF and the Assad regime have reportedly agreed for the SDF to hand over the control of the Tishreen and Tabqa dams on the Euphrates River in northern Syria to the regime. Part of the negotiations between the SDF and the regime was also a full handover of Manbij, but both sides couldn’t agree on the role of the U.S. in this case.

Prior to the Trump-Putin summit in Helsinki on July 16, reports emerged suggested a possible deal between the two sides in regards to Syria, which includes Russian and the Assad regime’s expansion of outreach to northeast Syria. According to the Washing Post, this was proposed by McGurk. However, during the press conference given by the two leaders, Syria was only mentioned regarding Israel’s security concerns and the future re-constriction efforts in Syria.

The U.S. decision to abandon rebels in southern Syria facing Russian pressure also meant abandoning Israel and Jordan in many ways. This development may also affect the U.S. position in northern Syria. U.S. partner forces and the SDF have a different patron-client relationship with the U.S. in comparison to southern rebels. The U.S. invested a lot, proved to be ready to protect its client against the regime and officially plans to further invest in its client. Nevertheless, the U.S. retraction in southwest Syria led the SDF to question how reliable the U.S. administration would be in front of real Russia pressure. In this regard, the SDF had negotiations on its own with the regime and agreed to hand over two strategic dams to Assad, trying to ease its dependence from its patron and trying to prevent the regime from risking a confrontation by opening the way for negotiations and deals.

Wise countries plan their mid and long-term moves after analyzing threats and benefits. These moves might seem unrelated with each other, causing their purpose to remain blurred. However, when the smoke clears after some time, all dots connect and reveals a picture.

Turkey’s long-term counter terrorism operations are just like this. This process has proven that there is a strategic mind in Ankara. Turkey has seen the schemes in the region threatening its very survival and put a comprehensive plan into action in order to thwart them.

In 2014, Ankara saw that a terror corridor was being formed in North Syria. This terror corridor was planned to span from northern parts of Iraq, going along the Turkish border, up until the Mediterranean Sea. This planned corridor was a threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity. The October 6-8 incidents and the democratic autonomy attempts in 2014 were a part of this plan.

Ankara’s long-term action plan against this scheme has three stages:

In the first stage, terrorist elements within Turkey were aimed and the terrorist threat was minimized with trench operations launched on August 24, 2015.

During the second stage, the march of terror was halted with cross-border operations, preventing terrorist elements from reaching the Mediterranean Sea. Launched on August 24, 2016, Operation Euphrates Shield divided the corridor into two parts by the west, while the following Operation Olive Branch prevented terrorist elements from accessing the Mediterranean Sea. With checkpoints established in Idlib, preventative measures against terrorism were consolidated.

In the third stage, Turkey aims to dissolve the corridor, eliminating the terrorist threat surrounding Turkey. To achieve this goal, Turkey has put a plan on the east-west axis into action. Grip on the terrorist PKK is tightening, from west to east and east to west.

I’ll convey the details of two crucial developments.

Firstly, the negotiations with the U.S. regarding the PKK’s withdrawal from Manbij are coming to an end. Diplomatic circles are expressing that the low-level meetings have resulted in an agreement and that ministers will put the finishing touches to the said agreement. Indeed, it’s possible to see the signs of this agreement in Foreign Minister Cavusoglu’s statements. Cavusoglu stated that a road map might be announced after his meeting with U.S. Secretary of State, Pompeo on June 4. According to this road map, the PKK will withdraw from Manbij, the Turkish military will oversee this withdrawal, Manbij’s security would be provided by a local police force formed by Arabs as it was the case in Afrin, and the U.S. will maintain its military presence in the region. After everything is settled in Manbij, it’s supposed that France’s military presence in the city won’t be needed. If the U.S. adheres to the agreement, Turkey will push the PKK out of Manbij and towards the East. This will be a strategic and crucial success for Turkey in counter-terrorism.

Secondly, the other stage of this grip is north of Iraq. The low profiled cross-border military operation there aims to disrupt the connection between Sinjar and Qandil, preventing the YPG from receiving logistic support. This operation has gained momentum. Qandil is being sieged rather silently. Then, Qandil will be interned and the line will be pushed towards the West.

Looking at the bigger picture, it is possible to state that Ankara has patiently weaved a plan thread-by-thread.

The PKK terror group and all of its offshoots use women not only as suicide bombers, but also as propaganda tools in order to soften their negative images among global audiences. Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, particularly female members of the PKK have become famous under the mask of their combat against Daesh in northern Syria. Accordingly, even their uniform, for example, became fashionable and were sold by H&M’s clothing retailer chains. At that time, some rumors about female terrorists were also quite sensational – such as male Daesh fighters being afraid to combat the female branch of the PKK, because they believed that those killed by women will go to hell. The Independent covered this story referring to a PKK-affiliated YPG female member. It does not matter whether it is true or not, it became obvious that it was just an ‘interesting’ story to cover for the media, as long as you ignore the bloody face of the PKK.

Although listed as a terror group by many Western states and Western-based institutions such as NATO and the EU, various Western media outlets have paved the way for the PKK and its offshoots to feature in their reports within a positive and overwhelmingly feministic image. It seems that it is not an aimless effort. Rather, it even may be a conscious editorial policy in order to moderate the image of the PKK and the YPG in the eyes of the global media audience and then open the matter of its illegal status to discussion (and reappraisal). Therefore, the PKK has chosen a feminist discourse in an effort to gain more support from the “free world.”

In 2015, for example, alongside many newspapers such as the Guardian, Daily Mail, even the BBC, made numerous reports about YPJ members and their “heroic” fight against Daesh in Syria. As an example, in 2014, the British broadcaster filmed a short documentary titled ‘Who are the female fighters of the PKK?’ and the following year it published a picture gallery headlined ‘PKK fighters prepare for battle with IS.’ While the first one claims that nearly 40% of PKK members are women with a lot of footage showing them singing, smiling and enjoying their lives, the second one focuses on the personal stories of female members. They literally resemble them as if they are at a girl’s school, although the topic in discussion is an organization that has carried out numerous bloody attacks on officials and civilians on European and Turkish soil.

In fact, this made-up image is not new. Under the rule of Abdullah Ocalan, who has been in prison since 1999, the PKK attempted to reinvent itself as ‘a social movement with self-administration at a local level, an alternative type of economy, ecologism and feminism as central pillars.’ In addition, Jenna Krajeski, an Istanbul-based journalist, conducted an interview with Sebahat Tuncel, a politician under investigation due to suspected links with the PKK, who named the group a feminist movement and its leader Ocalan a feminist. Moreover, a New York Times article, dated January 29, 2018, written by Nujin Derik, a female YPG member, again writes about how female members of the YPG were ‘instrumental in the defense of Kobane and the liberation of Raqqa – where a major objective was the freeing of the Yazidi women the jihadists had taken there as slaves.’ However, the other side of the medallion is completely different, as seen in the PKK’s misuse of females and its emotional exploitation of femaleness.

The other side of the medallion

The PKK has carried out suicide attacks through female members in many cases. Zeynep Kinaci is known to be the first instance of the PKK using a pregnant woman as a suicide bomber. She killed six Turkish soldiers on June 30, 1996. A few months later, Leyla Kaplan, while pregnant, triggered explosives at a police department in Adana. She reportedly witnessed beforehand a PKK male commander execute a young woman who had denied to carry out the bombing. In the 1990s, female terrorists had performed 11 of the PKK’s 15 suicide attacks in Turkey. The latest example was on January 28, when Avesta Khabur, a 20-year-old from the YPG’s women unit YPJ, blew herself up targeting a Turkish battle tank and soldiers in Syria’s Afrin. After the attack, her unit called her “a model of free Kurdish women,” likening her to prior female PKK suicide bombers.

It is such a contradiction for a self-proclaimed ‘feministic’ organization to use its women members as suicide bombers, whether they are pregnant or not. This is not just limited to these events. The women have also been abused by male members of the PKK. According to a report by the Interior Ministry of the Republic of Turkey, the PKK regards the family as an institution of the feudal system and Abdullah Ocalan expressed that women shouldn’t be limited to a single male.

Many high-ranking leaders of the group, including Ocalan, sexually abused women who were subsequently executed due to false accusations of being agents. In late 1984 (or early 1985), Saime Askin, a senior female member and harsh critic of sexual abuse in PKK ranks, faced execution in the group’s Lolan camp based in Iraq. Besides, the Report on Trafficking in Persons issued by the U.S. State Department claimed that the YPG, the Syrian wing of the PKK, continues to recruit and use boys and girls, including children under the age of 15. In a similar vein, the Human Rights Watch’s interviews reveal that many children appeared in the YPG’s “youth centers” without the knowledge of their families. Families later found out that their children were forcibly recruited by the YPG. Since 2012, the group has used boys and girls under the age of 18 at checkpoints and bases in the Afrin, Kobane and Jazira cities of Syria.

Apparently, the outlawed PKK uses women not only as suicide bombers but also abuses and even executes them if they oppose the decisions of their so-called “top leaders.”  Furthermore, the organization emotionally exploits ‘femaleness’ by instrumentalizing female members as means of propaganda. Its feminist discourse makes the group in no way innocent, but the female-dominated portrayal of the PKK has already earned sympathy in the Western world. The PKK’s bloody face against the Turkish state, Turkish and Kurdish civilians and even its own members who oppose the group cannot be justified by the media. Shouldn’t the international media take action against these human rights abuses instead of praising them? Doesn’t the indifferent attitude of the media agents, which falsely portray the women in the PKK, mean that they are playing an indirect role in crimes committed by the terrorist organization? These are questions that are worthy of extensive thought.

U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. will be “coming out of Syria, like, very soon. Let the other people take care of it now.” However, Trump previously promised the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan that he will immediately stop arm deliveries to the YPG in Syria, which didn’t happen. As the Pentagon’s 2019 Budget projection illustrates, the Pentagon predicts that U.S. troops will not leave Syria at least until the end of 2019. Within the State Department there is an internal dispute about U.S. policy on Syria. However, it’s not the Trump administration who seek to leave Syria soon, but the military and Pentagon deciding on U.S. affairs in Syria. Pentagon, CENTCOM and SOCOM are prioritizing their partnership with the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces over U.S. long-term interests.

From fighting Daesh to becoming strategic partners

The Obama administration decided to work with the Syrian branch of the PKK in order to fight Daesh. The US-YPG cooperation to fight Daesh rapidly advanced to a strategic partnership in Syria. Pentagon and CENTCOM’s partnership with the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces expanded to more than just fighting Daesh as U.S. soldiers joined a demonstration against Turkey in Manbij where Abdullah Ocalan posters and pro-PKK banners were seen everywhere.

Over time, the U.S. Army established at least 18 military bases in Syria, except two in south Syria. All of them are located in areas controlled by the YPG. Two of the military bases in northern Syria are used as military airports where U.S. Apache helicopters are stationed.

In addition to the military bases in northern Syria, which indicates the U.S. projection to stay long, the Justification for Fiscal Year 2019 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) foresees the U.S.-YPG partnership in Syria at least until the end of 2019. The Pentagon’s budget projection for support to the YPG in 2019 doesn’t hint at big clashes and military operations against Daesh, but rather depicts a growing U.S.-YPG partnership.

300 million U.S.-dollars are planned as funds for the U.S.-YPG partnership in 2019. While half of the funds are reserved for weapons, ammunition and vehicles, 12% are planned to be invested in military bases costs and transportation costs. One third of the budget is expected to be spent in operational sustainability.

Weapons that are intended to be supplied to the YPG include AK-47 rifles, Machine Guns (PKM), Heavy Machine Guns (DShK), RPG-7 Launcher, Sniper Rifles, 60mm and 120mm Mortars.

The Pentagon’s budget projection also foresees around 30 thousand militants to be trained and to the frontlines in addition to another 35 thousand militants of the YPG as so-called Internal Security Forces. According to the budget projection, the Pentagon plans to pay each fighter a monthly stipend payment range from $200 to $400. As written in the budget projection, the Pentagon is currently paying 10 thousand militants a monthly stipend payment.

In contrast to Trump’s declaration to withdraw from Syria, policy makers in the U.S., the military and Pentagon reportedly have other plans.

While for now the requested budget for the “train & equip” program in Syria for 2019 has to be accepted, the budget program for 2018 is already ongoing. It is unclear if the budget projection for 2019 will be blocked by the Trump administration, but until the end of 2018 the program will continue.

The increase of directly paid militants to 65 thousand until the end of 2018, the maintenance of military bases and the continuing support for the YPG even long after the forecasted end of Daesh in Syria suggests that the U.S. will remain in Syria for a long time, with their new strategic partner: Marxist-Leninist YPG militants.

Inter U.S. state conflict about Syrian policy

President Donald Trump told his advisers he wants an early exit of U.S. troops from Syria and he publically announced, “We’ll be coming out of Syria, like, very soon.”

A short period after Trump’s announcement, Brett McGurk, U.S. Special Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS said at the U.S. Institute for Peace in Washington: “We are in Syria to defeat ISIS. That is our mission and our mission isn’t over and we are going to complete that mission.”

Brett McGurk’s statement that Turkey failed to advance along the Marea line, but that the SDF (YPG) have been very successful, especially in Manbij, shows how short-sighted and single-minded the perspective of U.S. cadres in charge of U.S. policies around Syria are. Much wrong his statement is in military terms, as Operation Olive Branch illustrated, both politically and logically it is not a smart idea to compare a NATO army with a militant organization.

Shortly after Trump declared his intention to leave Syria, the U.S. Army were busy in establishing new military bases around Manbij in order to protect a designated terrorist organization from its NATO ally Turkey and the Syrian Opposition factions who were supported by the U.S. as well. The establishment of two additional bases in the Manbij region should not only be seen as a message to Turkey and the Syrian Opposition, but also a message towards internal conflicts within the U.S. as the bases became public after the announcement of the President.

The U.S. military deciding on the country’s foreign policies and its relations with other allied states is a story we’ve seen before in Syria. Shortly before the visit of former U.S. Foreign Minister Rex Tillerson, Maj. Gen. Jamie Jarrard, the Special Operations commander said: “We’re very proud of our positions here, and we want to make sure everybody knows it.” Lt. Gen. Paul Funk who accompanied Jamie Jarrard on his visit to Manbij went further and said: “You hit us, we will respond aggressively. We will defend ourselves.”

The U.S. Foreign Department under Rex Tillerson tried to find another policy for the Syrian crisis, especially regarding NATO ally Turkey. His dismissal is also a de-facto end to his efforts to de-escalate tension between Turkey and the U.S. over U.S. support for YPG militants. As Anadolu Agency reports, the U.S.-Turkey working group meeting has been delayed until the new U.S. Secretary of State takes office.

U.S. SOCOM commanders are growingly frustrated at policymakers in Washington for a lack of strategic guidance to further the counter-Daesh mission according to a report by NBCNews. The limited military view of SOCOM commanders backs their partners in the Syrian Democratic Forces more than U.S. strategic long-term interests.

Trump agreed in a National Security Council meeting this week to keep U.S. troops in Syria a little longer in order to defeat Daesh but wants them out relatively soon, a senior administration official said on Wednesday.

However, it seems that it is the Pentagon and CENTCOM who decide over when to finish Daesh entirely in Syria. As known for followers of the Syrian war, the International Coalition stopped fighting Daesh and months before the start of the Operation Olive Branch.

Later, Pentagon and CENTCOM blamed Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch for their pause in fighting Daesh, merely because YPG militants left the frontlines in order to fight against the Turkish military and Free Syrian Army. In reality, this development made clear that the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces are dominated by the YPG, disabling any military operation if the YPG militants refuse to fight.

While once the International Coalition conducted up to 1500 airstrikes per month in summer last year, the number of airstrikes against Daesh have been reduced to below 150 per month this year according to Press Releases by Centcom.

On the other side, according to Associated Press during the National Security council meeting, Trump insisted for a rapid withdrawal from Syria. As has been reported, the President was presented with several consequences that would occur if the U.S. were to remain in Syria, and only one if they were to withdraw – which was that with full withdrawal, Russia and Iran would take advantage.

The Trump administration has not the political vision and capacity for a genuine Syria policy. The weakened administration has effectively empowered the military over deciding on issues relating to foreign policy and issues that will have long-term impacts on U.S. relations with regional actors. The Pentagon’s agenda for Syria lacks strategic guidance and it is short-sighted and single-minded as it prioritizes the U.S. partnership with the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces over U.S. long-term interests in the Middle East. However, the internal U.S. wrangle over their policy will most likely continue.

The powers active in Syria have met for the second round of talks to discuss reaching a permanent ceasefire in Syria. Being held in Turkey’s capital city Ankara, the meeting between the Presidents of Iran, Russia and Turkey on Wednesday (04/04/2018) pledged to cooperate on reconstruction and aid, and vowed to protect Syria’s territorial integrity.

Talks come one day after Putin and Erdogan’s meeting cementing the construction of Akkuyu, Turkey’s first nuclear Power Plant to be built in Mersin.

The second trilateral summit of the Astana Process broadly acknowledged the cooperation required to fight terrorism in the region. Highlighting the need for more de-confliction zones to reduce further violence in areas such as Idlib, international support in building infrastructure and humanitarian aid was stressed.

Emphasizing their unified opposition towards “separatists agendas” in the region, achieving a long lasting ceasefire as well as cooperating on determining the most suitable option of what Syria as a state will look like are among the most pertinent questions to tackle. The noticeable difference between the first Sochi summit in November 2017 and Ankara this week however was the absence of Syrian representatives and United States officials.

While the three presidents unanimously agreed on terrorism being the main concern for Syria, President Erdogan stressed the need to counter the YPG/PYD threat it faces along the Syria-Turkey border. Having recently cleared the Afrin region from terrorist activity, Erdogan asserted that Turkey will not stop in the endeavor to clear Manbij and other YPG occupied areas from terrorism, adding; “without peace in Syria, there isn’t peace in Turkey.”

Although Turkey has maintained that the YPG/PKK terror threat is of ultimate concern for the territorial integrity and security of Turkey, the bulk of the YPG controlled areas in northern Syria remain funded by the United States. With mixed statements coming from the White House, which seems to have become the only continuity of the Trump administration, Macron’s statement last week regarding France being a potential mediator of a Turkey-YPG talks together with Trump’s beguiling remarks suggesting ‘an exit could happen very soon may’ holds the potential to once again complicate an already complex region.

With the U.S.’s diminishing role in the region as a power with the capacity to direct the future makeup of the Syrian territories, the ‘Daesh argument appears to have recently become somewhat thin. One indication of the weakening Daesh approach for the U.S was highlighted when Brett McGurk, the special Presidential envoy for defeating Daesh suggested that the “U.S. mission of defeating IS (Daesh) isn’t over, and we are going to complete this mission,” while General Joseph Votel’s speech at the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington highlighted that “IS (Daesh) forces in Syria had been mainly defeated.” Perhaps if one combined the two statements, it may assist in deciphering Trumpian discourse and his layman explanation of; “we’ll be coming out of Syria, like, very soon.”

Nonetheless, as the U.S. and France attempt to indirectly complicate Syria, Iran, Russia and Turkey still have much to resolve, directly, before the end of the Syrian War can be called.

Although the trio’s negotiations have been a positive step towards reducing conflict and producing a lasting ceasefire, the levels of peace required to achieve reconstruction have been difficult to achieve. Ongoing conflict between various factions of the opposition forces and the Syrian regime have inhibited a concrete result towards reaching a stage of mutual cooperation on the ground. While the Idlib and Eastern Ghouta campaigns have largely subsided, smaller proxy battles between regional forces continue to pop up also. One example has been the clashes between Tahir-al Sham and Jabhat Tahrir Suriya in areas such as Dar Taizzah.

Russia, being Assad’s main source of funding has substantial air power in Syria, having also cooperated with joint operations such as Operation Olive Branch, Iran maintains a heavy presence through its militia proxies which have secured most of Syria’s western coastal regions from the An-Nusayriyah Mountains to the Anti-Lebanon Mountains. Turkey, working jointly with the Free Syrian Army maintains influence of opposition controlled areas alongside full control of Syria’s north-west. While the support of different actors in Syria could create difficulty within the talks going forward, considering the growing bi-lateral relations between the three countries outside of their engagement with Syria, the talks could be a platform for political maturity in establishing peace through their respective allies on the ground.

One topic that will need to be ironed out before reconstruction of Syria can commence, is a political settlement. While all three have adamantly maintained that Syria’s territorial integrity is of upmost importance and suggested setting up a constitution committee for reforms, Russia and Iran have proposed a federal system, whereas Turkey has insisted Syria remains a unitary state. However, a federal system housing the numerous actors, perspective, ideologies and motives could be detrimental in the long-term and lead to further internal conflict.

Similarly, in order for amendments of the Syrian constitution to be successful, support will be needed not only from the UN Special Envoy for Syria Steffan de Mistura, but also from the Syrian Regime and opposition forces. Given Assad’s disdain for the UN, for the time being constitutional reforms appear unlikely.

Even so, as reminded by President Erdogan on Wednesday, the talks are not intended as an alternative for a UN peace process in Syria. The fact remains that while over 400,000 have lost their lives, more than 12 million people need humanitarian assistance, with 5.6 million people having fled to bordering countries. 3.6 million Syrians reside in Turkey. Lebanon and Jordan are the other two countries which have opened their doors to the remaining bulk of refugees.

Albeit, politics may be politics, however Turkey, Russia and Iran in the Astana Process are the only actual presence in Syria with the ability to formulate and initiate peace in a part of the world that has quite simply seen disaster, but appear to have a desire to so too. While certain new European leaders should be wary of becoming a Trump pawn in the region, the reality remains that the three leaders are still in the early stages of achieving actual peace and face the daunting task of establishing security through interests. While combat begins to ease, the military makeup of the Astana Process may begin to resemble one of political dialogue going forward. A stage, which if reached would be the first ray of sunlight to peep through the dark clouds of the last 7 years.

It was only in January when former Secretary of State Tillerson announced a Syria policy with several goals (ensuring no return of Daesh, countering Iran, and the return of refugees) but with no clear strategy to achieve them. President Trump made his views known at least partially by removing Tillerson not long afterward. Following the Pompoe and Bolton appointments, President Trump just announced last week that the U.S. would pull out of Syria “very soon.” Tillerson’s policy announcement had suggested an open-ended U.S. military commitment in Syria but Trump’s statement refers back to his campaign rhetoric that promised overwhelming firepower against Daesh yet saw Syria as somebody else’s problem.

Ironically, the Obama administration had refused to intervene in Syria early in the conflict until the emergence of Daesh, to which it responded with a policy of supporting “local partners” such as the YPG in northern Syria. Trump continued this policy because he wanted to declare victory against Daesh but has not created a major initiative to resolve the Syrian crisis. Trump did not seem to mind that Russia and other regional powers like Turkey took the lead in the diplomatic track. While U.S. military leaders and diplomats criticized Turkey’s most recent Afrin operation, President Trump himself avoided any public comments on the issue. Clearly, this policy disconnect between the White House, Pentagon and the State Department is partially responsible for these differences but it is also because Trump is not committed to Syria for the long haul.

If he follows through with his promise despite grumblings from U.S. military leaders on the ground about the lack of strategy and an early withdrawal, President Trump will actually be more in line with the public opinion that does not see the Syrian civil war as America’s problem but is willing to tolerate a campaign against Daesh without a long-term commitment. Many foreign policy analysts have questioned the wisdom of withdrawing from Iraq prematurely and not intervening in Syria early in the conflict. However, it seems that the somewhat conflicted American public opinion that sees a need in fighting Daesh but is against serious military commitments in the Middle East wins the day for both Presidents Obama and Trump.

Of course, geopolitics and strategic interests have a way of undermining the weight of public opinion and presidents often prioritize national interests, which they sometimes have the luxury of defining. Both Obama and Trump defined defeating Daesh as national interest but Syria’s stability was not a core U.S. interest. During the campaign, Trump had benefited immensely from his tough talk on Daesh while criticizing the Iraq war (albeit belatedly). His latest announcement about getting out of Syria is reminiscent of his predecessor’s approach as well as a reflection of the American public’s non-interventionist inclination.

It remains to be seen whether, when and how Trump may be able to end U.S. military presence in Syria. For this to happen, the Trump administration would have to define what the primary U.S. national interest in the region is. For the new comers to his administration, the answer is Iran and they may argue that being in Syria is essential to countering Iran among other goals. On Iran, Trump will likely pull the U.S. out of the nuclear deal but it is not clear whether the administration will seek to create a comprehensive policy to counter or contain Iran. It may just be that Trump orders U.S. troops out of Syria without a larger Syria policy. Similarly, he might pull the U.S. out of the nuclear deal without an Iran policy in place. This would mean more uncertainty for the region. This would also mean the continuation of the weakening U.S. leadership in the Middle East trend but it may just be what Trump would label as “America First.” And perhaps, that’s what many Americans want.

The U.S. and Turkey have been pursuing conflicting strategies in northern Syria for a while now. Turkey adamantly pursued to end the U.S. support for the YPG while the Trump administration has seen the group as its “local partner” in the coalition’s anti-Daesh efforts. Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch has recently ended the YPG’s control over Afrin, a city in which the U.S. has declared no interest but expressed “concern” about the Turkish operation. While Turkey is focused on clearing its borders from the YPG and Daesh, the U.S. is insisting that Turkish military operations distract from the fight against Daesh.

The strategies of the two countries diverge from one another so much that they carry the potential to come head to head in Manbij. However, negotiations in bilateral strategy talks, a mechanism established following the former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster and Secretary of State Tillerson’s visits to Turkey, could yield a cooperation deal in Manbij, which could potentially be broadened. In such an optimistic scenario, the anti-Daesh fight would actually be strengthened while Turkey’s security concerns vis-à-vis the YPG could be met. A deal that pushes the YPG back east across the Euphrates and establishes a U.S.-Turkey coordinated patrol of Manbij can be the basis of broadened cooperation in northern Syria.

Today, Turkey is pushing the U.S. to end the YPG control in Manbij, a promise made by Vice President Joe Biden under the Obama administration. The capture of the town was so alarming that Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield in August 2016, only a month after the failed coup attempt of July 2016, in order to prevent further spread of the YPG control in the area. For Turkey, the PKK was trying to accomplish what it could not inside Turkey by creating an autonomous zone in northern Syria through the YPG. By intervening for the first time militarily in Syria, Turkey took the matter into its own hands as multiple U.S. reassurances about the short-term and tactical nature of its support for the YPG did not materialize.

Turkey has been able to change the strategic environment on the ground through its military operations at the expense of both the YPG and Daesh. Clearing its border from both terrorist organizations seems to be its current strategy. The U.S. strategy only partially overlaps with the Turkish strategy but that could be considered as a glass half full. Through an arrangement as described above, diversification of the governing structure of Manbij more representative of the ethnic makeup of the area could be accomplished. U.S.-Turkey military cooperation in patrolling the city can be a trust building measure. Such success in Manbij would not erase the overall strategic differences between the two allies but it would pave way for a broader and meaningful strategic conversation.

The U.S.-Turkey strategic realignment will be very difficult to achieve as the U.S. keeps its exclusive focus on Daesh while ignoring Turkey’s legitimate security concerns regarding the YPG. However, if Manbij can serve as a success story of military and political cooperation on the ground, both Ankara and Washington can build upon it. Regular strategic conversations to coordinate policy are a must between the American and Turkish governments and it can start with Manbij. This is true not only for their Syria policies but other regional issues as well.

As the Trump administration is gearing up to pull the U.S. out of the Iran nuclear deal, a new era of uncertainty and tensions will likely emerge. President Trump has championed “America first,” a slogan that at times manifested itself as unilateralism in foreign policy. The recent addition of the Pompeo-Bolton duo to the administration promises more unilateralism than multilateralism. The administration will likely find an unwilling Europe to corner Iran, and Turkey is not likely to take a confrontational stand against Iran. Yet, if the U.S. and Turkey can work together in northern Syria, they could broaden their regional strategic conversation that might also include Iran in the near future. A cooperation in Syria between two NATO allies is not a wishful thinking; it is a matter of whether they will.

Ever since Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch in northwestern Syria, its goals have been mischaracterized and quite a few myths continue to thrive. One of these is that Turkey is conducting the operation because it cannot tolerate any “Kurdish” gains in northern Syria. It has become commonplace to describe the PKK-linked YPG as “American-backed Kurdish militias” or simply “Kurds” as if they represent the majority or all of Syrian Kurds. In fact, the YPG has sought to dominate the region at the expense of Kurdish groups not aligned with the PKK.

Back in the fall of 2014 during the battle for Kobani, the YPG refused to allow a large contingent of Peshmerga forces to help with the fight against Daesh. At the time, Turkey had even allowed the Kurdish Peshmerga forces from Iraq to travel through its territory – a first in Turkish history – to arrive in Kobani. From the beginning, the YPG has only been interested in creating a PKK stronghold in northern Syria. This is clearly unacceptable for Turkey but it is a far cry from an “obsession” with any Kurdish political gain in Syria. If anything, Turkey has encouraged unity among Syrian Kurds and sought to convince the PYD to join the opposition forces against Assad. Turkey also supported non-PYD Kurdish representation in a national dialogue congress.

Another major myth has been the YPG’s “effectiveness” as ground forces against Daesh. It should be remembered that the PYD had made a deal with the Assad regime at the beginning of the Syrian uprising. It was only after the sudden rise of Daesh that the YPG started to promote itself as “staunchly secular” and fearless fighters against Daesh. The Obama administration decided to utilize them as “local partners” against Daesh in an environment where the American public was opposed to any “boots on the ground.” Ever since then, the YPG has dominated the military battlefield largely thanks to US military support including critical air cover and protection.

The devil’s bargain continued under the Trump administration but the YPG’s utility is now proving limited at best. The political commitment of the YPG to the PKK’s goals in Syria is so strong that they announced that they would redeploy their forces from the Daesh fight to Afrin against Turkey. The irony should not be escaping anyone that the YPG is willing to abandon the fight against Daesh – the very rationale for the US support – in order to fight a US NATO ally. Some analysts have suggested that the US can broker a deal with Turkey and somehow convince the YPG to sever ties with the PKK. However, Turkey’s Afrin operation has exposed that the congruity between the two is so deep and organic that the PKK’s strategic and political goals take priority over the fight against Daesh.

The myths about the YPG can be maintained so far as the US policymakers choose to ignore realities on the ground for political expediency or the lack of a coherent Syria policy. Turkey’s Afrin operation has already exposed many of the ill-conceived notions about the YPG. It is time for the US to coordinate with Turkey strategically and rely on its NATO ally for its policy goals. Establishing stability in northern Syria is a common goal but it cannot come at the expense of Turkey’s national security. Ensuring that Daesh does not come back is also a common goal but the YPG cannot be relied upon to achieve it. Abandoning the myths about the YPG would serve the US well. Then comes the hard task of crafting a realistic Syria policy that is coordinated with Turkey and one that can achieve lasting stability.

With the escalation of the Syrian Civil War, attacks on Turkey’s border towns began to increase from 2012 onwards. In order to refresh our memories, let’s remember that 5 Turkish citizens were killed in the Akcakale district of Sanliurfa on October 2, 2012, as a result of attacks conducted from Syria. Meanwhile, the memories of the bomb attack that took place in Reyhanli on May 11, 2013, are still fresh. There is now a clock tower at the location of the bombing in Reyhanli in order to ensure that the passing time never lets us forget our losses. There were numerous attacks in 2015 and 2016, which caused the death of citizens not only in border towns but also in cities like Ankara and Istanbul. Tens of civilians, most of them being children, were massacred at a wedding in Gaziantep as a result of a suicide bomb attack on August 20, 2016. This was the final straw that led Turkey to launch Operation Euphrates Shield (OES) on the Syrian border on August 26, 2016, with the aim to establish a safe zone in the eastern bank of the Euphrates. The operation was accomplished within 7 months.

After cleaning Daesh from Azez, Jarabulus and al-Bab, with the success of the operation, Turkey provided prominent support in terms of education, health and security to the region in order to establish stability and peace. During my visit to Azez in November, I was able to personally witness the efforts of both the Turkish government and Turkish NGOs in the region. Even though the operation was able to provide some security to the border towns, this time there were instances of harassing fire coming from YPG-occupied regions such as Afrin. Launched at 17:00 pm on January 20, 2018, Operation Olive Branch (OOB) forced Turkey to fight cross-border terrorism with similar motives to Operation Euphrates Shield. In this respect, Operation Olive Branch has three sociological motives: (1) establish security and peace within Turkey, (2) help the local populace that is oppressed by the YPG, and (3) provide a secure way and settlement to Syrians in Turkey who want to return to their hometowns.

Considering that Turkish border towns have become the target of demographic-engineering based on ethnicity and sectarianism that terrorist organizations like the YPG and Daesh tried to achieve in Syria, Operation Olive Branch has both a sociological and historical significance. The sociological motivation behind the operation is what ensures it sociological support.

Higher sociological resilience

My visits to Kilis and Hatay prior to Operation Euphrates Shield help me draw a comparison with the contemporary situation. Prior to the OES, Daesh used missile attacks on these cities. When we were frightened by the sounds of two missiles that hit Kilis during a meeting there, those living in the city were rather calm and told us that they were used to it, stating that the missiles had probably fell on an empty field. They seemed careless, but also angry. When I asked for the reason of this attitude, an NGO representative said: “Miss, we are alone here. The people of Kilis are all alone!” For this reason, in comparison to Operation Olive Branch, we were unable to talk about any public support when OES was launched.

In other words, we can assert that there was a lack of social awareness during OES. Meanwhile, I witnessed the solidarity among people in Kilis and Reyhanli, especially those we interviewed during the first week of OOB. We can talk about a higher sociological resilience when compared to the past. Two factors are important in this respect. Firstly, people began to feel more secure in their personal and social lives after OES. Therefore, the success of OES became a leading factor that increased public support and awareness for OOB. A nurse I spoke to who was working at Kilis Public Hospital summarized the shift in public perception with the following words: “Two years ago, we as the people of Kilis, believed that we were all alone. We felt trapped. For this reason, we couldn’t truly understand what OES meant. Now, it’s different. The whole city stands as one.”

During my prior visit to the area, when walking around the cities, I used to often see daytime shows playing on TVs in coffeehouses and stores. However, this time people were watching news channels and following the developments about the operation. When interviewing people, I realized that many of them were using military strategy terms. It was very clear that not only did they care, but they also followed the developments of the operation very closely.

Standing together with Syrians

One of the aspects that I was interested in during my visit to Kilis and Reyhanli was whether the attacks had raised tensions between the local Turks and the Syrian people living there. I previously witnessed tensions caused due to the swift change in demographics. The main reason of these tensions was the failure of extending public services to the region at the same rate that Syrians were moving in. Syrians almost three-fold of the local populace moved into the city. Otherwise, it is false to draw a correlation between Syrians and criminal activities. After 5 years, we can now see that Turks and Syrians have learned to live together.

We visited all the locations that YPG missiles hit in Kilis and Reyhanli and spoke with the local people. Despite the recent mosque attack in Kilis, the city center was surprisingly crowded. We walked around the Asit neighborhood, which harbors classical Kilis houses and came to a Syrian household that was victim of a missile attack. We entered the house and spoke with the people living there. “The missile hit around the evening. There were 10 people in the room. It dropped down from the ceiling. Thank God it didn’t explode, so no one was injured,” the householders said. Seeing the damage, it was a miracle that no one got injured. A young Kilis resident we came across while walking said to us: “When they [terrorists] kill, they don’t care whether we are Turks or Syrians. Here, we are trying to survive together.”

During my visit to patients who survived the YPG’s attack on the mosque at Kilis State Hospital, I met Mr. Hasan who migrated from Aleppo to Kilis 4 years ago. “Thank God the missile hit the mosque after the prayer had already finished. Otherwise, the number of losses may have been higher,” he said. He has 6 children and he provides for the family alone. “I need to get out of hospital as soon as I can and return to my family and my work,” he told me, while adding: “May God help Turkey. We know that if God helps Turkey, he would also be helping us.”

We also went to visit the Kilis Oncupinar Temporary Refugee Center, which is right across the Barsaya Mountain. Since my last visit, the security procedures have become stricter. Even though we got the approved permission by the governorate, we were hardly allowed to enter after a meticulous ID check. There are 12,000 refugees living at the center. We were right at the border with Syria and were able to hear very clearly the sounds of conflict. When we were frightened by every sound of shooting, those living there said: “Don’t worry, those are our missiles.” They had enough war experience to distinguish the sounds of “their” missiles and those that belonged to the YPG. Comparing this with the traumas of the Syrian Civil War, these sounds probably mean little for them. They were saying that when the Turkish Armed Forces and the Free Syrian Army take control of villages near Afrin, missiles would no longer be able to hit the city center of Kilis. Despite the smoke rising from the Barsaya Mountain, children at the camp kept playing with their marbles. Refugees, most of whom came from Idlib, believe that the liberation of Afrin will open the way for Idlib. However, they also told me that the stability of Idlib would be determined with their return.

Responsibility of local administrators

Communication between the local administration and the local population in border towns is key for the sociological management of Operation Olive Branch. The approach local administrators in the area take are crucial for the operation. For example, a governor I met emphasized that the immediate response and support for the reconstruction of houses damaged by missiles is more important for the management of the people than we assume during a conflict process. The increasing appearance of local administrators, especially of the governor, in social life, would have a sincere effect on the people living in these cities. A local administrator I interviewed stated: “Actually, we had taken certain precautions against the possible provocations during the funerals of those who have been killed by the YPG’s missile attacks. However, there weren’t any incidents. People stood together. This is an important social support and it also allows us to do our work with high morale and stamina.”

As the U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson explained the shift in U.S. policy priorities in Syria towards an attempt to limit Iranian influence by close cooperation with the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), questions have emerged regarding how realistic such policies would be. This is especially relevant in regards to the long YPG-Iran cooperation in Syria, of which signs are still visible in Afrin. Therefore, it is questionable as to how the very same YPG will “limit” Iranian influence in Syria.

Iran’s cooperation with the YPG before Kobane

While the U.S. officially listed the YPG as the Syrian branch of the PKK, with the battles in Ayn al Arab – better known as Kobane – the U.S. suddenly deleted the YPG from their list of terrorists. The U.S. decision to work with the YPG in Syria led to serious concerns in Turkey as the government in Ankara began questioning why a NATO ally was supporting a terrorist organization that threatens the national security of another NATO member.

Before the U.S. began to cooperate with the YPG in Syria, Iran, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Assad regime were among the main allies of the terrorist group. This was to such an extent that the Assad regime handed over certain areas at the southern border of Turkey to the YPG in order to neutralize the Syrian Kurds who were an active part of the Syrian opposition at the time. With such control in Syria, YPG militants eliminated important Kurdish figures and organizations in their areas of control, weakening opposition against the Assad regime.

Before the U.S. began to cooperate with the YPG in Syria, Iran, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Assad regime were among the main allies of the terrorist group.

More, YPG presence in Afrin and Aleppo city made them de-facto allies with Iran and Iran-backed militias. The YPG in the Sheikh Maqsoud district neutralized an important frontline for the besieged regime forces in Aleppo and lately besieged the city. The YPG in Afrin played an important role in supplying the Iran-backed militias in the besieged pockets of Nubbl and Zahra and for the siege of Aleppo, which resulted in the capture of the city by the Assad regime and Iran-backed militias. YPG militants in Afrin, Aleppo city, Ayn al-Arab and rural Hasakah had mainly been supplied by Iran and the Assad regime.

Iran’s cooperation with the YPG-dominated SDF

Tillerson states that the U.S. wants to maintain an open-ended military presence in Syria, not only to fight Daesh, but also to provide a bulwark against Iranian influence, to ensure the departure of the Assad regime, and to create conditions for the safe return of refugees. But these claims, namely supporting the SDF in northeast Syria as a tool against Iran, are problematic.

The SDF alliance was formed to fight Daesh and not Iran or the Assad regime. While some Arab units in the SDF had previous links to Syrian rebels who fought against the Assad regime, others have maintained important relations with the Assad regime and Iran. For example, one of the largest Arab components of the SDF, the al-Sanadid Forces, which are a tribal army of the Shammar tribe, has strong relations with Iran.

YPG militants in Afrin, Aleppo city, Ayn al-Arab and rural Hasakah had mainly been supplied by Iran and the Assad regime.

It is said that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps were cooperating with the Sanadid Forces. Another example is Liwa Suqour al-Raqqa, a brigade that had links to the Assad regime. The largest local Syrian rebel faction in Raqqa – Liwa Thuwwar al-Raqqa – fought against Liwa Suqour al-Raqqa due to its links with the Assad regime and dismantled the group. However, the U.S.-backed and YPG-dominated SDF arrested the leaders of Liwa Thuwwar al-Raqqa.

Until today, the SDF has not fought one single battle against Iran-backed militias. Skirmishes with the Assad regime didn’t last for too long either. The most fragile tension between the SDF and the Assad regime erupted recently in Deir al-Zor over the fight for oil stations as the U.S.-led coalition stroke Assad regime militias, killing at least 100 Assad militias and Russian mercenaries as well. Even if the U.S. manages to break the YPG’s cooperation with Iran, the alliance formed in the SDF was not formed in order to combat Iran.

Does Iran support the YPG in Afrin?

With the launch of Operation Olive Branch, led by the Turkish Armed Forces and the National Army – a unit of all Free Syrian Army factions operating in the Euphrates Shield areas in northern Aleppo – Iran’s tacit support for the YPG became one of the most interesting topics. Senior Iranian diplomats and the Iranian president called for the end of the operation and emphasized their resentments against the Turkey-led operation.

While Iran’s president Rouhani called on Turkey to stop its military operation in the northern Syrian enclave of Afrin, claiming that it will only result in more deaths on both sides, he also stated: “We wish that Turkey’s operation in Syria will end at the earliest time.”

Statements made in the Iranian parliament were harsher. Member of Parliament, Muhammed Kasim Osmani, labeled President Erdogan a dictator and accused Turkey of committing war crimes worse than Saddam Hussein or Daesh in Syria. More, foreign ministry spokesman Behram Kasimi said: “Iran is following the developments in Afrin closely and concerned. We hope this operation at the Syrian-Turkish border will end soon, finishing the crisis in the area. Chaos in Afrin will enable takfiris to regroup and re-strengthen in Syria’s north.”

While many Turkish analysts and experts claimed that the statements made from Iranian officials were only “rhetoric,” developments in Afrin are confusing. If the claims made by pro-Iranian and pro-regime Al-Masdar News and some others on the ground are true, Iran and the Assad regime might then be providing the YPG in Afrin with supplies through Nubble and Zahra.

As Kino Gabriel, spokesman for the SDF said: “There are different ways to get reinforcements to Afrin, but the fundamental route is via the regime forces. There are understandings between the two…” On February 18, a senior member of the YPG told Reuters in a propagative tone that the terror group and the government of Bashar al-Assad have agreed for the regime army to enter Syria’s Afrin. On the following day, Syrian state TV announced that the regime forces would enter Afrin “within hours.” However, militias allied to the Syrian regime, the so-called National Defense Forces, did not enter Afrin and no official statement in this direction has yet been made.

Interestingly, it would not be the Assad regime, but the Popular Mobilization Forces who would enter Afrin. Popular Mobilization Forces was founded, supplied, backed and controlled by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. As known, the Russians tried to integrate the Popular Mobilization Forces into the 5th Corp of the Syrian Army in order to weaken Iran-backed militias. However, the project was only partially successful.

Who is Supplying the YPG with Iranian Weapons?

During Operation Olive Branch, the YPG has used, visually confirmed, Iranian weapons. Among them are Iran-produced 107mm rockets, which were also found earlier in Turkey during anti-terror operations against the PKK. More remarkable was however the Iranian-produced Toophan guided anti-tank missile, which was used to target Turkish Armed Forces in Afrin. The Toophan missiles are an Iranian copy of the American TOW missiles. In addition to the Toophan system, the YPG in Afrin also used an Iranian Safir 4×4 vehicle with a mounted 106mm M40 A2 gun. These Safir vehicles were previously used in Syria only by Iran-backed Shia militias. The Assad regime is known to have no access to these vehicles. Along these, there is also ambiguity about the number of U.S.-supplied weapons transferred to Afrin.

There now remains intriguing questions as to how, where and when the YPG obtained Iranian military equipment. Does Iran’s military support for the YPG continue after Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch? Does the intense use of ATGMs by YPG militants in Afrin suggest an ongoing supply for the terrorist group? It is claimed that prior to Operation Olive Branch, the YPG in Afrin reportedly never used Konkurs. It was only after the launch of the operation that the YPG began to intensively use Konkurs systems.

It is extremely difficult to trace the chief actors of this arms delivery and it therefore remains an open question as to who supplied the YPG with Iranian weapons: Is it the Iranians themselves, the Assad regime, or the Americans providing Iranian weapons?

Ankara and Washington have “reached an understanding” to normalize ties following a period of tensions, Turkey’s foreign minister said on Friday.

Speaking alongside his visiting U.S. counterpart Rex Tillerson at a press conference in Ankara, Mevlut Cavusoglu said: “We’ve reached an understanding to normalize our relations [with the U.S.].”

“Of course, there are steps which have been taken for this. Both sides have expectations of each other,” Cavusoglu said.

“We clearly expressed [to the U.S. side] our expectations with regard to the fight against FETO and the PKK terrorist organizations, and the U.S. support for the YPG.”

The Turkish-led Operation Olive Branch is now fighting the terrorist YPG/PKK in northern Syria. FETO, the Fetullah Terrorist Organization, is responsible for a 2016 defeated coup that martyred 250 people and injured 2,200.

“We assume that our vital security concerns have been taken serious [by the U.S.],” Cavusoglu added.

Saying that his meeting with Tillerson dealt with “result-oriented” steps, Cavusoglu said: “We agreed to establish some mechanisms which will cover and evaluate all the issues.”

Cavusoglu said the agreed-upon mechanism will address separate issues, including Iraq’s territorial integrity, Syria, terrorism, and consulates.

PYD/PKK in Manbij issue

Asked about the terrorist YPG/PKK presence in Manbij, Syria — a standing bone of contention between Ankara and Washington — Cavusoglu said the mechanism handling the Syria issue will prioritize Manbij.

“We should be sure that the YPG crossed to the eastern side of the Euphrates River, and we should see its execution together,” Cavusoglu said, adding that it is important who control these cities and provides security for their stability.

The terrorist YPG/PKK should first withdraw from Manbij, northern Syria for Turkey to take steps with the U.S. based on trust, Cavusoglu added.

Cavusoglu said Turkey and the U.S. will work in coordination to assure stability in other cities of Syria.

The YPG is the armed Syrian offshoot of the PKK terror organization, which has waged a more than 30-year war against the Turkish state, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths.

Relations between the two countries have been strained over U.S. support for the terrorist group PYD/YPG/PKK in northern Syria, with the U.S. calling the group a “reliable ally” in the fight against Daesh, amid strong Turkish objections.

For his part, Tillerson said: “We stand shoulder to shoulder with Turkey against terrorist threats.”

The U.S. will work on promises given to Turkey on Manbij, northern Syria, he added.

After the Turkish-led Operation Olive Branch clears the terrorist PYD/YPG/PKK from Afrin, northern Syria, Turkish leaders say it will proceed to do the same with Manbij, where both terrorist and U.S. forces are stationed, raising the specter of a confrontation.

Syria’s territorial integrity

The two countries also reaffirmed their commitment to preserving Syria’s territorial integrity and national unity.

“We will decisively stand against all attempts to create faits accomplis and demographic changes within Syria,” the statement said.

Ankara and Washington highlighted that “there can only be a political solution to the Syrian crisis.”

The two countries, the statement also said, agree to intensify their cooperation to “bring about this result within the framework of established parameters, namely” UN Security Council Resolution 2254 and the Geneva process.”

Syria has been locked in a devastating civil war since March 2011, when the Bashar al-Assad regime cracked down on pro-democracy protests with unexpected ferocity.

While UN officials say hundreds of thousands of people have been killed in the conflict, Syrian regime officials say the death toll is closer to 10,000.