On December 26, 2019, Turkey’s official gazette (Resmi Gazete) published the Memorandum of Understanding ratified by the Turkish President on Security and Military Cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Libya’s UN Recognized Government of National Accord.

Earlier, on December 7, 2019, the official gazette published the ratified Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Libya’s Government of National Accord on the Delimitation of the Maritime Jurisdiction Areas in the Mediterranean.

The entry into force of the aforementioned documents marked the creation of a legal framework for Ankara to declare its rights in the Eastern Mediterranean (gas exploration and transit routes), and also to have a legal framework for providing military-technical assistance to the Libyan Government of National Accord, as its regional ally.

Further statements made by President Erdogan regarding his readiness to send Turkish troops to Libya to support the Government of National Accord has attracted growing attention in the Russian media and analysts. According to the Turkish president, The Grand National Assembly of Turkey will consider the relevant request in early 2020.

Let us note that until now the Russian media’s engagement with the topic of the Eastern Mediterranean was limited to the situation in Syria. Very little was written and said in Russia about the struggle between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the “consortium” of Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and Israel over the large gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean and over the corridors supplying produced gas to the European market.

Nevertheless, the signing of the above-mentioned documents by the Turkish Republic and the Government of National Accord brought Libya to the top of Russian news feeds very quickly.

In particular, on December 16, 2019, Vedomosti, an influential business newspaper in Russia, published an article by Ivan Safronov titled “Turkey is preparing for the invasion of Libya”. Below there is the following text, “Russia hopes that the decision to send troops will be postponed until the meeting between Putin and Erdogan” (the meeting dedicated to the commissioning of the Turkish Stream gas pipeline is scheduled for January 8, 2020).

Let us quote the publication: “The position of the Russian side cannot be changed,” a senior diplomatic source of Vedomosti says: supporters of Haftar and Saraj should sit at the negotiating table, simultaneously ceasing hostilities. According to him, the Russian negotiators will try to convey this position to each of the parties to the conflict in order to at least temporarily maintain the status quo and avoid the entrance of Turkish military forces to Libya at least until the meeting between Putin and Erdogan, which is scheduled for January 8”.

Also on December 26, 2019, the influential Russian Internet edition Gazeta.ru published an article by Nino Dzhgarkava entitled “Waiting for an invitation: Erdogan is preparing to send troops to Libya”. Under the heading there is the following text: “Erdogan in January will ask Parliament to allow the military to be sent to Libya”. As the newspaper notes, “the threat of military conflict in the region has become even close”.

Here is how a Russian observer assesses the possible consequences for the situation in Libya of the possible entry of Turkish troops into the country: “After Turkey has opened up the opportunity for troops to enter Libya, the UAE, Egypt, and even Russia, who support the field marshal (Haftar), may be involved in the conflict, at least diplomatically. Ankara’s actions cause tension in Turkey’s relations with the European Union and the USA”.

The publication also notes the allegations made by President Erdogan to Russia, on the use of PMC “Wagner” to support the Libyan National Army, led by Khalifa Haftar. The Turkish leader estimated the number of “Wagner” fighters, located in Libya, at about two thousand people.

The final subtitle in the article by N. Dzhgarkava is quite characteristic: “Abandoned by all Sarraj”.

Let us quote a few lines: “Both from Turkey and from the GNA, the conclusion of the Memorandum carries more demonstrative measures aimed at external players. The recognized government so far has not really felt the support of either the European Union or the UN. At the same time, the Haftar detachments managed to achieve significant progress in eight months – some forces are already several kilometers from Tripoli. When in April Haftar announced plans to occupy the capital of Libya, the Sarraj government was very disappointed with the reaction of the European Union, especially France. The GNA directly accused her (France) of supporting the Libyan National Army and even severed diplomatic ties with Paris”. Furthermore: “Thus, the GNA, feeling itself abandoned by Europe and, in particular, by Italy, went to cooperate with Turkey, despite the threat of deterioration in relations with the EU.”

It is clear, that the above-mentioned articles of reputable Russian media fix the current situation and, without making forecasts of the development of the situation, set a critical date – January 8, 2020 – when the Libyan issue will be discussed in a face-to-face format between the presidents of Russia and Turkey.

It is clear that before these talks between presidents Putin and Erdogan, the Russian side will try to give itself answers to several basic questions. It is the answer to these questions that will determine the initial position of the Russian side at the negotiating table.

1. How final is the decision of the Turkish president to send troops to Libya? Bearing in mind that the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) is dominated by a tacit coalition between AK Party – MHP, and obtaining of TGNA consent can be considered as a formality.
2. To what extent is the Turkish army able to cope with its task of changing the balance of forces in Libya in favor of the Government of National Accord led by Fayez Sarraj, when taking into account the current situation, remoteness of the Libyan theater of operations and the potential of the warring party?
3. How will Turkey’s support of the Government of National Accord of Fayez Sarraj, and Russia’s, albeit less openly and unambiguously, preference for the Libyan National Army and Khalifa Haftar, affect Russian-Turkish relations?

And finally, bearing in mind the strategic nature of modern Russian-Turkish relations, how can Libya be prevented from becoming a new Syria in their relationship, moreover, not as in 2019, but as in 2015?

As we remember because of Turkey and Russia’s different positions on Syria, in 2015 there was a grave crisis, which was later overcome with great difficulty and which still, sometimes, unpleasantly echoes in Russian-Turkish relations.

At the same time, after the statements of the President Erdogan it should be important for the Turkish side that the topic of gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean enter the Russian foreign policy agenda. And, moreover, that with understanding Russia meet the legitimate demands of Turkey to take its interests into account in regards to the gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Russian Federation, which has so far distanced itself from the growing dispute in the region will inevitability reconsider its position on gas from the Eastern Mediterranean. Because it is clear that the gas is the subject of the main debate in the region, and not the economic interests of different countries inside Libya. Although Libya is a country rich in energy resources, at the same time, it is in need of a political settlement, reconciliation and restoration of its economy.

In this regard, it is necessary to make reference to the meeting in Astana format, which took place between Presidents Putin, Erdogan and Ruhani, on September 16, 2019 in Ankara. It is worth recalling that then in Ankara all three leaders, literally with one voice, spoke about the prospect of replicating the successful work experience of the Astana format to other regional conflicts. Then the situation in Yemen was on the agenda, but today Libya came to the fore, which gradually began to supplant even Syria from the Russian-Turkish agenda.

Hopefully, both Russia and Turkey, taught by the bitter experience of Syria, in January 2020 will attempt to replicate the experience of resolving the Syrian conflict in the Astana format to the Libyan process. It can be noted that intensive preparations for these negotiations by the parties are already underway and they will be important both for Russian-Turkish relations and for the region as a whole. However, the Russian and Turkish leaders have already proven their ability to agree on the most complex and painful issues based on mutual consideration of interests. In this sense, Libya should not become a break point for them, but instead become a new area of regional dialogue and cooperation.

Oman represents a different model among GCC countries with its unique political, economic and social structure. The country differs from its fellow neighbours in terms of political orientation, economic development as well as social and cultural life. While the country particularly avoids taking sides in regional conflicts and other foreign policy issues, it plays a mediating role especially in the disputes between Iran and regional and global actors. Unlike other Gulf countries such as the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain, the Omani government keeps the ratio of foreigners to its own population at a certain level in order to allow its citizens to benefit more from the already limited resources in the country. An interesting fact with the expatriates who reside in Oman is the fact that they are far better integrated into Omani society than expats in other Gulf countries who experience some form of segregation. This is mainly due to Oman’s centuries-old culture of hosting people from different countries and being a trade hub between continents.

Oman also differs from other Gulf countries such as Qatar and the UAE in terms of its economic capabilities as well as structure. Despite Oman’s economy being heavily dependent on oil exports, the country’s reserves are limited. Because of the lack of enough natural resources, the Omani regime has tried to increase the welfare level of the country by using the existing reserves as effectively as possible, and allocating returns towards economic development and infrastructure. These limited reserves caused Oman to lag behind other Gulf countries with regards to economic development. As a result, Oman has made little progress in terms of becoming an international trade hub, despite the strategic location of the country. Additionally, Oman’s GDP per capita also remained the lowest among the GCC countries. Although it has lagged behind other Gulf countries economically, Oman has been undertaking a new initiative to bring a sustainable development model for the country and to make a rapid progress towards a post-petroleum economy.

On 27-28 January 2019, the Omani government announced its Vision 2040 program where it detailed a new strategic road map that would allow the country to transform its economic structure. There is no doubt that the most important motivation that pushed Sultan Qaboos’ leadership to define a new strategy is the disappearing natural resources in the country. It is estimated that the oil and natural gas reserves of Oman will end before 2040. If new discoveries cannot be made, the country will supply its energy needs through imports and will have to replace their exports with goods other than oil. This depressing trend is pushing the Omani leadership to find alternative ways to restructure the country’s economy.

The fact that the Omani economy is heavily dependent on energy products is a serious challenge for restructuring its economy in the post-oil era. In current numbers, the Omani economy is 70% based on exports from the energy sector. The disappearance of this high volume of exports and the increasing imports in order to meet the energy needs will mean a serious burden for the country’s economy. In addition to this trend, the Omani economy is also struggling with high unemployment, which increases the pessimistic future for the country’s economic Outlook.

By implementing the Vision 2040, Oman’s main priority is to diversify its economic activities and establish an economic environment where dependence on hydrocarbon products is kept at a very limited level. Aiming to adopt an economic development model in this direction, Oman aims to stand out in fields such as production, industry, tourism, trade, mining and port management. The country also aims to replace hydrocarbon based energy resources with renewable energy options.

Within the scope of the policy of diversifying the economic activities, one of the areas Oman attaches special importance to is the transforming the country into global trade hub. By increasing the capacities of its ports in southern regions Oman aims to attract regional and international investors. In this context, significant efforts are being made to expand the ports in the cities of Duqm and Salalah along the Indian Ocean in the hope that these ports can also serve as alternative to Jabal Ali Port in Dubai.  

Attracting foreign investments to Oman is another important target of the Vision 2040 strategy. The Omani administration organizes a number of events where international investors are being informed about potential projects in the country. The Omani government also made significant legal changes that would help investors easily tackle investment procedures. Within the context of these developments, there has been a significant increase in foreign direct investments in Oman in 2019. A recent example of such investment came from China. Under the newly signed privatization agreement on December 17, 2019, Oman’s state-owned Electricity Transmission Company, known as Nama, sold a 49% stake to the Chinese state-owned State Grid Corporation of China for $1 billion.

While struggling with these concerns regarding the future of the economy, Oman is also dealing with problems in foreign policy. Although Muscat remains neutral on many regional issues, Omani leadership is concerned that the new political dynamics of the region may also affect the country. For instance, the aggressive foreign policies of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are not welcomed by the Omani leadership, as the country prefers to remain neutral in foreign policy. The continuation of this approach would bring some level of tension between these two countries and Oman. The civil war in Yemen also put Oman in a difficult position in pursuing a neutral foreign policy. This is mainly due to the fact that both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi consider Oman to be a passage for Iranian arms to Houthis in Yemen who are fighting against Saudi and Emirati backed forces. Although the Muscat administration rejects these claims, the continuation of the conflict in Yemen remains a cause of tension between Oman and its northern neighbours. Given this grim picture, Oman has to be careful not only in managing its economic direction, but also political relations with neighbouring actors that have strong natural resources reserves.

As Sultan Qaboos has been recently admitted to a hospital in Belgium due to health problems, the uncertainty over Oman’s leadership is also a source of concern for the country. As the uncertainty continues, Oman has focused on economic development while insisting on continuing a neutral foreign policy. With its inclusive social fabric, cultural pluralism, economic structure and neutral foreign policy position, Oman represents a unique case among the GCC countries. These aspects would allow the Omani leadership to become successful in its attempt to transform the country, particularly economically.

Once again the global community’s attention was turned to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, the Netherlands. On Tuesday, the 10^th and Wednesday 11^th December, lawyers and legal experts representing Gambia and Myanmar made their presentations before the court with varying degrees of persuasion. Gambia, with the support of the members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation filed a case before the ICJ alleging that the Myanmar’s military, the Tatmadaw, committed acts of genocide against the Rohingya. While the final ruling on the case can take some time, hearings related to Gambia’s request for provisional measures for the immediate protection of the Rohingya people were heard.

In attendance was Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s once highly esteemed civilian leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi has more recently been the recipient of global condemnation for her silence and complicity in the Rohingya persecutions and was now, in a twist many would not imagined, fronting the court to defend her country’s horrendous actions. Indeed, when the Gambia, a tiny West African nation took Myanmar to the ICJ on November 11, on charges of genocide against the Rohingya community, humanity at large was ethically and morally “absolved” of its inaction. Gambia’s moral foreign policy and sense of duty to the continuing suffering of the Rohingya ought to be commended and reverberate a globally as a warning against regimes that torture, massacre and maim their citizens at will.

The Rohingya Muslim genocide

The Rohingya, a minority ethnic group from Myanmar’s North-Western Rakhine state, and the nation’s only overwhelmingly Muslim community has faced a sporadic military suppression for years. However, in 2017 the world witnessed a coordinated and large-scale persecution and of the Rohingya from Rakhine state. Consequently, since 25 August 2017, approximately 742,000, fled to neighbouring Bangladesh seeking refuge.

Despite the censorship and cover up of Myanmar’s military regime, testimonies from survivors painted a horrific picture of what happened during the military crackdowns. Narratives of pain, trauma and anguish have been documented among Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. In their report Forced Migration of Rohingya: The Untold Experience (2018) the Ontario International Development Agency (OIDA) noted how nearly 24,000 Rohingya were killed by the military, 34,000 thrown and burnt in fires by vigilante groups aided by the military, and of the despicable mass gang rapes of Rohingya women and girls.

In addition to the genocide, a comprehensive ethnocide against the Rohingya was carried out, with mosques and other cultural sites razed and destroyed by vigilante youths led by extremist Buddhist monks. In his book Myanmar’s Enemy Within: Buddhist Violence and the Making of a Muslim Other (2017) Francis Wade illustrates how Buddhist nationalism coupled with Islamophobic rhetoric borrowed from India’s Hindu-Nationalists and far-right movements in the West fuelled and exacerbated the continuing persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar.

The Rohingya have been massacred en-masse, their homes destroyed, and their history and material culture erased from Rakhine state, those in Bangladeshi refugee camps have been rendered stateless, while the few who remain in Myanmar live under an apartheid style regime.

Humanity is on trial at the ICJ

Never has a nation brought charges of genocide against another nation to the ICJ. Gambia’s effort to seek accountability and ultimately redress for the persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar set a new precedent in foreign policy, the moral leadership of nation states, and for global justice against the worst human rights violations.

The plight facing the Rohingya has been catastrophic. The violence and persecution by the Myanmar military and the resulting humanitarian crisis that it occasioned did not receive equal global outrage and immediate action. Hence, it is understandable that many are praising and appreciating Gambia’s legal initiative at the ICJ – a defence which is long overdue. In their presentations before the court, lawyers for Gambia laid out documented details of  “mass shootings, throat slitting, infanticide, torture, rape and burning down of villages, carried out systematically and together amounting to the destruction of the Rohingya as a group, in whole or part”. This was excruciating evidence presented before the court as many watched online and across social media platforms globally.

Despite this, Aung San Suu Kyi’s defence was one of total denial, with her presence at The Hague eliciting widespread criticism and daily protests outside the court. Interestingly, throughout her speech before the court, Aung San Suu Kyi decidedly avoided to use the term “Rohingya”. Indeed this is a reflection of Myanmar’s state policy: one predicated on denial and the non-recognition of Rohingya persecution, suffering and even their very identity and citizenship of  Myanmar.

To be clear, the trial of genocide at the ICJ will not immediately lessen the Rohingya’s plight and suffering in Myanmar, and in those in refugee camps; but it sends a clear message to the military regime: the world will hold them accountable for their actions now and in the future. What the Rohingya will need is comprehensive and long-term humanitarian support that will rebuild and stabilize their livelihoods, and more importantly, the political will which will one day enable them to return to a safe and secure homeland in Rakhine state.

Seven years ago when the civil war erupted in Syria, the Balkans considered itself far away from the war zone. However, when Daesh (ISIS) gained prominence in early 2014 and emerged as an influential non-state actor across eastern Syria and northwestern Iraq, the terror group began recruiting fighters quickly, and the Balkans became a region with some of the highest numbers of foreign fighters joining Daesh’s ranks.

Studies conducted at research centers based in western Balkan countries such as Albania, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have shown that people, who joined the Daesh terror group often lack education, are members of marginalized groups with extremist ideologies, and experience poor emotional and economic situations. Most importantly is the lack of access to correct knowledge about their faith which causes vulnerable young people to be influenced by propaganda from various groups.

In the Balkans, the largest number of fighters joining Daesh came from Kosovo, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to a lesser extent from Serbia, Montenegro and Northern Macedonia. According to the Extremism Research Forum-Albania Report, 144 people joined extremist groups in 2013. The Ministry of Interior and the Albanian National CVE Coordinator reported that the number of Daesh fighters from Albania dropped to 0 in 2015. This was the result of Albania’s 2014 Penal Code amendments criminalizing participation in, and recruitment of, citizens to engage in armed conflicts abroad.

According to a European Commission report on Albania, 45 individuals have returned from Syria while 26 are believed to have died, 73 individuals remain in Syria. Before Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring, last month, around 50 children from Albania were living for months in Syrian camps. Turkey’s ambassador to Tirana, Murat Ahmet Yoruk, said last month in a press conference that the repatriation of Daesh fighters including children and women from Syria was a priority. Yoruk said that Turkey was exchanging information with the Albanian government but did not give any more details about when a repatriation effort might be expected.

The Extremism Research Forum– Kosovo report noted that 400 people have travelled from Kosovo to Syria or Iraq between 2012 and 2017. One third have already returned to Kosovo. Country Reports for terrorism by the U.S Department of State in 2018 shows that 74 of them are deceased. 133 of these individuals have returned while approximately 196 remain in conflict zone, which includes 40 children who were born in the conflict zone to Kosovo citizens. Generally, the age of fighters from Kosovo varies from 21 and 30.

Currently trials and investigations are continuing in Kosovo for 52 suspects and 21 cases. What is important to emphasize is that the prosecutors lack experience in these kinds of cases which Kosovo has never faced before. In April 2019 , according to the New York Times, the Justice Minister of Kosovo Ablerad Tahiri told journalist that “a planned operation to bring back some of our citizens from Syria ended successfully.” Among the group were four men suspected of being Daesh fighters who were arrested, 32 women and 74 children. Nine of these children had lost parents during the fighting in Syria. The justice minister claimed that these women and children are victims and deserve to reintegrate in the society. Meanwhile the number of Kosovo fighters that remain in Syria is around 90, and it is still not clear if any operation will be organized for their return.

Citizens of North Macedonia have also been included in Daesh recruitments, too. According to the Extremism Research Forum Report (2017) in early 2018 the number of Daesh fighters from North Macedonia reached 140 men, and 14 women. North Macedonia has the second highest number of returnees in the Western Balkans which is 80.

As a country with different ethnic groups – Macedonians, Albanians, Turks and Albanians from North Macedonia were the largest group to join Daesh. Taking in consideration the political situation between Albanians and Macedonians, often threats of violent extremism is misused by political elites. According to a research report by Regional Cooperation Group (RCG) a good example is the “Montra Case” where in 2012, “five ethnic North Macedonians were killed under (still) unclear circumstances”. The Interior Minister of North Macedonia said at the time that it was a ‘horrific assassination that was perpetrated by followers of radical Islam’ however, no relevant evidence was provided to confirm this.

The RCG report also stated that there were two large law-enforcement operations known as “Cell 1” and “Cell 2” in August 2015 in which 14 individuals were arrested under suspicion of conducting recruitment, financing or facilitating the travels of foreign fighters from North Macedonia to Syria and Iraq. To prevent radicalization the new government of North Macedonia introduced two strategies in March 2018 – the “Prevention of Violent Extremism” and an updated “Strategy on Countering Terrorism”.

Bosnia and Herzegovina historically been known to be a magnet when it comes to attracting foreign fighters. Bosnia’s State Investigations and Protection Agency reports show that between 2012 and 2016 around 200 men and 70 Bosnian women and a total of around 60 children travelled to Syria and Iraq. As the country made an effort to enforce laws in order to prevent recruitment, the number of individuals going to Syria fell sharply in 2016. In March 2019, two people were supposed to be repatriated to Bosnia with one successfully returned. Currently, Bosnian authorities are expecting to repatriate nine people, while 120 are still imprisoned in Northern Syria with repatriation procedures in process. In 2017, 46 people were reported by the Ministry of Justice.

The biggest challenge facing Bosnia right now alongside other Western Balkans countries is the treatment of returnees. In an Interview with the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) The Bosnian Security Minister Dragan Mektic said that “they will be treated according to our laws and the evidence we have and which is given to us by our partner countries. We are part of the global coalition for the battle against ISIS since the very beginning, we have been part of that process for a long time and we will fulfil all our obligations from our participation in that coalition”.

While civil society groups argue that women and children are victims, academics argue that even women should be investigated and prosecuted on a case-by-case basis as was done in Kosovo. However, Bosnian officials argue that extremism will still continue to be a threat for the country. What has raised the issue even more is a statement by the French President Emmanuel Macron in an interview for The Economist calling Bosnia a “ticking time-bomb” claiming that the country contains a danger from returning jihadists. However, this declaration was criticized by Bosnian officials and Islamic Community in Bosnia since according to them they are doing the best to deal with this issue, albeit being a huge challenge.

Serbia has one of the smallest numbers of Daesh fighters from the Balkans. According to the Interior Ministry of Serbia, 49 individuals joined the so-called Islamic State and most of them were from Novi Pazar, a city with Muslim majority in Serbia. The BIRN investigations show that there are 20 Serbian women in Syrian camps and until now Serbian authorities have not taken any measures to bring them home. The only politician that has spoken out about this issue is Muamer Zukorlic, a leader of a small Bosniak party and an MP in the Serbian parliament. He stressed that the state must do more, especially when it comes to saving the children. However, according to the US State Department Report the level of Daesh recruitments activities in Serbia are low.

When the influx of Daesh recruits began in 2012 and in the following years, the situation in Montenegro caused this issue become highly politicized so that even though the number of fighters was small compared to other Western Balkan countries, in 2015 the state responded by developing a Countering Violent Extremism Strategy. Balkan Insight writes that according to the latest European Commission report on Montenegro, 23 individuals went to Syria among them five women and three children. Out of that number six have reportedly died, while 10 returned to Montenegro. The first case to be persecuted by High court of Podgorica was in 2015 with the trial still ongoing.

What made the issue of Daesh recruitments in the Balkans, especially in Kosovo and Albania, all the more sensitive was when in April 2019, The New York Times broadcast video footage showing camps in Syria holding relatives of Daesh fighters. In the video, viewers could clearly hear voices speaking in Albanian saying “Oj Sare!” (Hey Sara!) “Ku eshte Sara?” (Where is Sarah?) Public reaction was immediate, prompting both the Kosovo and Albanian governments to take steps to return their citizens. Kosovo has the highest number of returnees and it seems to be the most successful country in the Balkans in terms of repatriating its citizens, however this all happened with the help of the United States.

Currently, Balkans countries especially Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina are facing major challenges on how to deal with returnees. National and international organizations are conducting different training programs for psychologists as well as sociologists. The Balkans as a poorer region of Europe lacks expertise and often seeks help from the EU on dealing with cases.

Other neighboring states of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, do not have a high number of individuals who have gone to fight in Syria. In Bulgaria, some members of the Roma community include a Muslim majority were accused of recruiting individuals to go to Syria but there is no exact number. Croatians were shocked when in 2015 a Croatian citizen who joined Daesh was said to have been killed in Syria. These countries are usually used as transit routes for terrorists from Europe to Syria and Iraq. As part of the EU, they enforced laws and strategies according to EU requests.

Unlike other Western states who have often publicly refused to accept the repatriation of their foreign fighters, Balkan states have shown leadership by taking responsibility for their citizens, especially women and children. However, despite statements by some Balkan representatives that returnees are unlikely to pose a public risk, the long term issues that may arise with the return of battle-hardened fighters still remains of utmost concern. For now, many Balkan states face the challenging process of integrating returnees, an unfamiliar situation which will require thoughtful responses.

Written by Antigona Imeri – ISTANBUL

Current concerns about Daesh (ISIS) detainees have been growing but almost all of the fears are emanating from European foreign fighters. At the same time, other states have had an important number of their citizens join Daesh as well, particularly post-Soviet Central Asian states. Currently, there are thousands of Daesh foreign fighters detained in prisons, which are now under the control of Turkey, Iraq and non-state actors in Syria. And today, Turkey, Iraq and other actors in Syria have concentrated on the repatriation of European detainees. There are, however, a similar number of radicalized detainees from Central Asia and Europe. While democratic states in Europe worry about the future of its citizens if foreign fighters return home, due to the lack of laws to efficiently deal with those people, authoritarian states in Central Asia have a more flexible legal approach. However, it is the inability of these states to distinguish between radical Islamist groups, their discrimination against mainstream Islamic practices, and corruption that may lead to even bigger security threats.

After failing to establish long term territorial control in Syria and Iraq, Daesh is attempting to build up its network elsewhere, including in Afghanistan and Central Asian states. While much as the world is concerned with European foreign fighters, it should also be looking at the issue of terrorists from Central Asian states who were some of the most infamous fighters of Daesh, and played an important role in its military activities.

Since 2013, at least 5,000 foreign fighters from Central Asia have joined Daesh, over 2000 of them female, and the real number of recruits may be even bigger. Additionally, many of these foreign fighters have children who were born in Syria. They grew up in detention camps alongside radicalized Daesh members. Estimates claim that the number of Uzbekistan’s citizens who joined Daesh exceeds 1,500 people. While Tajikistan, which has a population four times smaller than Uzbekistan is estimated to have at least 1,300 citizens who joined Daesh. These states are followed by Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan with at least 500 each and by Turkmenistan with at least 400 foreign fighters who joined Daesh. It is important to note that these numbers are dated between 2015 and 2016, except those for Kazakhstan. It is believed that the total number of fighters from Central Asian states in the ranks of Daesh exceeds 5,000. Some of these countries like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan conducted several operations to repatriate their citizens, while the threat posed by these terrorist fighters remains high, especially due to the unstable situation in Afghanistan.

In trying to deal with security threats, Central Asian governments moved in the wrong direction by discriminating against the broader Muslim population and their religious practices. This included proscriptions on religious activities and limitations on religious networks, and frequent amendments to laws on radicalization. For instance, Turkmenistan tried to ban the import of any religious books; Kazakhstan attempted to ban Islamic clothes and on the establishment of any Islamic societies; Tajikistan attempted to ban religious political parties and put an age limitation on visiting mosques but actually these efforts play into the hands of extremists. The Central Asian States have important problems such as corruption, forced secularism, poverty, high unemployment rates, and the feeling of alienation for conservative Muslims, which may gradually promote radicalization of the Central Asian population.

Moreover, an important part of the terrorist attacks that happened in the last decade in the world were conducted by terrorists originally from Central Asian states. While some of the most brutal terrorist attacks undertaken in recent years were by individuals of Uzbek origin. Several politicians and individuals from Central Asian countries have also been involved in the evolution of Daesh as well. For example, the Tajik special military forces commander Gulmurod Khalimov joined Daesh and later recruited his employees within the Tajikistan military.

In this context, analysis shows that a serious threat might be in the revival of Daesh in Central Asia. At the moment, while the international community is focused on the threat of European radicalized fighters, there should be a larger concern about Daesh recruits from Central Asian states, with reports that Daesh is trying to organize these fighters in exile within the chaotic situation of Afghanistan. While Central Asian countries are repatriating their radicalized citizens from Syrian territories, in order to provide security after their return these states need another approach. Post-Soviet countries have attempted to secure their border with Afghanistan, but there is still a huge number of ethnic diaspora groups in Afghanistan, which may result in further radicalization into Central Asian states. The authoritarian rule of these states in line with the general discrimination of Islamic practices will only fuel radicals who try to organize in exile. These states may able to control their citizens within their borders with an iron fist, but they cannot do it for the diaspora who in return will influence the situation within their own country.

Today, Central Asian states may rely heavily on Russia’s military force in case of any attacks from the outside, but if the state has a weak government and the institutions are not developed enough, such as in the case of Kyrgyzstan, then this may lead towards serious attempts by Daesh groups to establish a terror network. This was the case in Tajikstan where a large number of attacks have already occurred. Moreover, in the case of a recent terrorist attack, the threat was felt on the Tajik-Uzbek border. So in fact, there is a huge risk that some of the Central Asian countries could become the new locus for the revival of Daesh.

Consequently, today there is a need to concentrate on the fate of Daesh (ISIS) foreign fighters from Central Asia, just as the international community does with Europe. There is also a need to develop rehabilitation centers, hospitals, schools to de-radicalize fighters in the post-Soviet States and to encourage these states to loosen the harsh restrictions on Islamic activities, and to differ between radical Islamist groups and other Islamic institutions who operate freely around the world.

The author is thankful to Liliya Sayfulina for her contribution to this article.

Turkey has angered Greece and Egypt after it signed a new maritime deal with Libya’s UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) that declared Turkey and Libya as ‘neighbors’ with adjacent coastal zones.

The Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus stated that they will petition against the decision at The International Court of Justice in The Hague in order to safeguard their offshore drilling rights. Greek authorities also expelled the Libyan Ambassador over the deal.

Egypt disputed the validity of the deal arguing that Feyyaz Sarraj’s government didn’t have the authority to make the deal unilaterally without the backing of Libya’s parliament.

“It violates the (U.N.) Law of the Sea. The sea zones of Turkey and Libya do not meet, and nor is there a sea border between the two states,” said Stelios Petsas, Government spokesperson of Greece.

The reactions of the opposing states caught the attention of NATO who held a meeting in London to discuss the issue and was attended by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The issue was discussed along with the French, German and the British representatives. President Erdoğan said: “As we made the necessary explanations, France continued to be disturbed about the deal. I then told Macron that France is not the guarantor state of the region, Turkey is and we would protect the rights of our cognates in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.”

However, the agreement was labelled as a ‘memorandum of understanding’ which is an agreement between two or more parties outlined in a formal document that is not legally binding until accepted by both parliaments which both Turkey and Libya announced were ratified. Therefore, Sarraj’s authority is not a matter of question.

What does Turkey gain from the Libya Deal?

The bilateral agreement between Turkey and Libya delineates the exclusive maritime zones of both countries, especially in the areas that Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus have declared as their own, in order to push Turkey out of lucrative oil and gas exploration.

Turkish authorities are keen to prevent opposing states from excluding Turkey’s right to benefit from the maritime territory that it claims in the southern Mediterranean and to defend the rights of Northern Cyprus from the illegal unilateral actions of the Greek Cypriot Administration in Southern Cyprus.

This is especially the case after Israel and Egypt announced the launch of a regional gas forum for the Mediterranean states in January, which excluded Turkey and Lebanon. Seven energy ministers, including those from Israel, Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Jordan, Italy and the Palestine came together for a meeting in Cairo to mark the launch of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum.

Turkey’s claims to the East Mediterranean

According to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, a country is able to stretch its territorial waters only 12 nautical miles out to sea, when it comes to the exclusive economic zone, where it has the rights to fishing, mining and drilling, the area can extend for an additional 200 miles.

However, if the maritime distance between the two countries is less than 424 miles, exclusive economic zones are determined through bilateral agreement of the two coastal states.

Greek authorities argue that the borders outlined in new agreement between Turkey and Libya overlap with the continental shelf of the islands in the southern Mediterranean, especially Crete. Turkish authorities answer to the claims by arguing that all islands are treated differently in terms of maritime borders.

There are several reasons why Turkey does not accept the declaration of Crete’s exclusive economic zone. Firstly, Turkey is situated very close to Crete. International Sea Law suggests that every island is treated differently in terms of delimitation of maritime borders especially since the conflict of the Greek Islands. The close proximity to another state’s coast serves as an important variable in terms of delimiting continental shelf areas.

The situation of the Greek Islands is already a sensitive subject for Turkey. The attempts to push Turkey’s maritime borders further north in the Mediterranean to prevent them from benefiting from the area obviously backfired with a counteraction. A deal between Turkey and Libya was planned over ten years thanks to the efforts of Cihat Yaycı. Cihat Yaycı is a flag officer of the Turkish Navy who is the architect of this plan. “To this day, Turkey acted as the reacting state that opposes initiatives and agreements signed by the Greek and the Greek Cypriot Administration” pointing out that Turkey has finally jumped into action.

Secondly, Turkey is not a party to the 1958 Geneva Convention and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Therefore, the claims that Greece has of the Eastern Aegean islands being entitled to continental shelf just as any other island, pointing to the 1958 Geneva Convention Article 1(b) and 1982 Convention Articles 76 and 121 is rejected by Turkey.

This is where law suggests that one should look and see if these rules have become a part of customary law and therefore applicable to Turkey even if it is not a party. In the 1958 Geneva Convention Article 1(b), only 31 out of 66 states voted for the articles’ inclusion while the rest remained uncommitted. As for the other two articles of the 1982 Convention, many states including Turkey opposed the position that all islands have a submarine area, stating that each should be examined and treated separately. Therefore, the given articles in the convention are not a part of customary law and therefore are in no way binding for Turkey.

The maritime deal has significantly redrawn boundaries within the Eastern Mediterranean, and will strengthen Turkey’s position in ongoing negotiations in the region. While neighboring states have asserted jurisdictional positions that have aimed to exclude Turkey, the deal between Turkey and Libya will ensure that the distribution of resources in the Eastern Mediterranean cannot occur without Turkey’s participation. Thus, ensuring that the future resolution of disputes in the region will only be resolved through consensus.

Written By Ahsen Akdemir – ISTANBUL 

Austrian Author Peter Handke was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature on Monday despite his record of denying the Bosnian Genocide during the 1992-1995 Bosnian War and his outspoken personal support for former Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic. A move which led to a swift diplomatic response and strong condemnation by journalists and human rights activists. Despite strong reactions from all over the world calling for the award to be revoked, Handke received his prize on the International Human Rights Day.

In response, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Northern Macedonia and Turkey all announced that their diplomats would boycott the Nobel Prize ceremony in Stockholm.

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kosovo Behgjet Pacolli blasted the award decision saying: “Today is a shameful day for Europe and humankind the awarding of Nobel Prize to Handke. It shows that Europe has amnesia of what happened to us in Kosovo, Bosnia and Croatia. We have to counter these revisionist attempts. Grateful to all who spoke loudly against this act.”

Albania’s Acting Foreign Minister Gent Cakaj criticized the decision saying: “Justification of war atrocities during the Yugoslavia break-up must not be rewarded.” he wrote on his Twitter account.

While Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also slammed The Swedish Academy’s decision. During an event held on the occasion of Human Rights Day in the capital Ankara, he announced that Turkey also would not participate in the Nobel ceremony. Saying: “Awarding the Nobel Prize in Literature to a racist individual will not mean anything other than awarding human rights violations,” He also added that this action tarnished the reputation of the award saying: “Nobel extinguished itself. Nobel ended up itself. Now Nobel has turned into a position that acting politically and ideologically. For me, Nobel has no significance. And we won’t attend this ceremony certainly. Furthermore, we ask some friend countries to not attend this programme” he said. 

The Swedish Academy awarded the Prize to Peter Handke “for an influential work that with linguistic ingenuity has explored the periphery and the specificity of human experience.” On the Academy’s website he was also described as “one of the most influential writers in Europe after the Second World War”. The Academy has hesitated to discuss Handke’s views on the Bosnian Genocide and his connection to Slobodan Milosevic just as much as Handke’s himself avoided talking about the criticisms during his speech at the Academy. 

Handke’s denial of the Bosnian Genocide and support for Slobodan Milosevic was highly extensive. Handke visited Miloševic during his detention in The Hague and is remembered for making a famous speech at Milosevic’s funeral in Požarevac, Serbia, in 2006. In which he said: “The world, the so-called ‘world’ knows everything about Yugoslavia and Serbia. The world, the so-called ‘world’ knows everything about Slobodan Milosevic, so-called ‘world’ knows the truth this is why so-called ‘world’ is absent today. And not just today and not just here. I do not know the truth but I watch, I listen, I feel, I remember. This is why I am here today at Yugoslavia’s side, at Serbia’s side, at Slobodan Milosevic’s side.”

Handke also wrote about how the Serbs were misunderstood and were unfairly judged for the bloodshed that occurred during the breakup of the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. In one of his books ‘A Journey to the Rivers: Justice for Serbia’ published 1996, Handke attempts to vindicate Serbia claiming that the media covered the war from a Bosnian perspective. In a review of Handke’s book by David Rieff of The Los Angeles Times, Rieff argued that Handke largely based his book on personal opinions rather than any factual analysis saying: “There is virtually no reporting and only the crudest sort of historical analysis… More astonishing, Handke, so full of opinions about the real nature of the Bosnian conflict about which, he states over and over again, he and not the various reporters who actually covered the war has the truest sense, declined to set foot in Bosnia itself”.

The award of the prize to Handke also provoked the ire of many journalists, particularly those who personally reported on the Bosnian War. Cristiane Amanpour of CNN criticized Handke’s award on Twitter saying: “I was there. We all know who’s guilty”.

The Times Reporter Anthony Loyd tweeted: “Her dress torn, mute with shock, a Bosnian woman is found by the roadside after weeks in a Bosnian Serb detention camp, June 1993. Those of us there know and remember the war’s realities”.

While Santiago Lyon of the Associated Press tweeted: “Shame on Nobel Prize and shame on Handke for his blindness and willful denial of genocide in Bosnia. I was there as a photojournalist and saw it firsthand”.

Another journalist Peter Maass of The Intercept heavily criticised the rewarding of Handke. Maass claimed that some of Academy’s jurors were inspired by books which the claimed the Bosnian Genocide was the creation of a PR company that worked for the US, thus falling for a conspiracy theory about the Bosnia war. Maass says: “Here’s what shocks me most about this Nobel Prize disaster. It’s not that the Nobel jurors fell for conspiracy theories. That’s terrible enough, of course. The worst is that the elevation of Peter Handke has also raised from the nearly dead a discredited rewrite of history and genocide. We are going back in time”.

Maass gave a scathing rebuke to the Academy after the award ceremony saying: “At that moment, the Swedish royal family and the Swedish Academy will have officially and fully endorsed the work of a genocide denier”.

This was an opinion that was also shared by Swedish journalist Christina Doctare, who returned her 1988 Nobel Peace Prize in protest of the Handke decision.

After the Swedish Academy’s controversial decision, two issues come to mind. Firstly, has this irrevocably tarnished the credibility of the Nobel Prize? Secondly, at a time in which far-right populism is rising, is the Academy complicit in the mainstreaming extremist views? While the Swedish Academy may believe its decision to award Peter Handke was a purely artistic one, in reality the award signalled a worrying endorsement of hate.

Written by Yeter Ada Şeko – ISTANBUL

The SPD’s party conference took place in Berlin where the delegates confirmed the new leadership of Saskia Esken and Norbert Walter-Borjans, and five new vice chairpersons among other executive figures. The SPD also approved a draft of social reforms which may be used to negotiate with the CDU/CSU coalition partners in the upcoming weeks.

Among the new vice chairpersons was 30-year-old Kevin Kühnert, the leader of the Young Socialists (Jusos), the SPD’s youth organization. Some voices have argued that no other youth politician has been as powerful as Kühnert.

During the party conference, some significant decisions were also made. Namely, the SPD eventually, and surprisingly for some hasty commentators, decided to continue to support Merkel’s current grand coalition government with the majority of the SPD delegates voting against a motion to quit the party. Saskia Esken stressed that she was and still is “sceptical about the future of this grand coalition. But with this resolution, we give the coalition a realistic chance of continuing – no more, no less.”

However, it is likely that the new leaders will be inclined to renegotiate the terms under which they will continue to lend their support to Merkel’s government. The SPD’s new co-leaders are in favour of tougher climate protection measures, much more investment in Germany’s infrastructure and a rise in the so-called minimum wage. But these issues will not be raised as an ultimatum, since the party seeks to remain in the coalition.

Following the party conference, however, some polls stated that the votes of the SPD are still decreasing, while others stressed a limited increase. For instance, according to the Emnid surveys, the SPD increased 1 point and achieved 16 percent while the Greens, stood at 20 percent (CDU: 28, AfD: 13, FDP: 9, Left Party: 8). According to another polling institution (Forsa), the SPD decreased its votes to 11 percent subsequent to the election of the new co-leaders, and therefore further deteriorated its popularity among already averse voters.

In addition to the obvious lack of a hopeful mood among German voters regarding the new SPD leadership, it is likely that the party will try to insist on a more left-leaning tax and fiscal approach in the coalition government. Though, it is striking that leading CDU and CSU figures have also started to urge the Social Democrats not to blackmail the coalition partner, as the CDU’s chairperson and defence minister, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer recently stated. According to Kramp-Karrenbauer, it is not acceptable to make preconditions such as “if these requirements are not met, then we go.”

Moreover, a leading CDU politician, Armin Laschet, criticized the SPD decisions to invest an additional 450 billion Euros in the upcoming years, stating that it had nothing to do with Germany’s current problems. Laschet also explained that there was already a huge budget, but the problems in Germany were not due to a lacking budget but obstacles in the fields of planning and approval procedures. According to Laschet, what was needed was the acceleration of these processes in order to develop required infrastructure.

Given the current conditions, it seems that in the upcoming weeks, particularly after the Christmas break, a tense talk on the continuation of the coalition might be very likely, despite current pro-coalition positions by the SPD leadership. The main problem though is the centre-left’s general lack of future perspectives. Even though the party was recently able to cement its ambitions to return to actual social-democratic policies it is unlikely that these policies can be implemented by the new co-leaders, who do not cause any kind of euphoria among the masses.

The rising popularity of the far-right in general, and, more importantly from the SPD’s perspective, the increasing support of the ecological Greens Party among centre-left circles, is increasingly threatening the 150 years old SPD. Thus, their goal of extending the party’s current votes  up to 30 percent of the electorate during the next federal elections is unconvincing given the new party program. Whether the new party program will be the only component to remerge as a successful centrist party, or whether other important factors need to be considered will be the most pressing task facing the SPD, the answers to which the SPD would need to soon find and immediately implement.

The NATO Summit in London has ended, but its outcomes are still a main topic of discussion for member countries. Since the main issue of concern was the future function of NATO, to save it from being “brain-dead”, as President Macron put it, the outcomes of the Summit have attracted the attention of the public as well as decision-makers. However, the final declaration of the Summit was far away from resolving all ambiguities related to the organization.

Although the declaration did not meet expectations, it was valuable to see the possible direction of NATO in the near future. The declaration underlined the importance of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which emphasizes that an attack against one ally shall be considered an attack against all members. The declaration also emphasized the importance of joint action against common threats such as terrorism and “security for all”.

Nevertheless, the Summit did not answer the question of how NATO would provide security for all members while its members had conflict of interests among each other. When the ongoing conflicts between Turkey and Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean issue was put to the NATO Secretary-General Stoltenberg, he stated that NATO was not part of the process to resolve issues between two countries. Indeed, this position clearly contradicts the final declaration of the Summit, and does not clarify the role of the organization when disputes arise between the member states.

Furthermore, the Summit could not draw a road map for renewing the function of NATO in the changing global order. The final declaration shows that unity against Russia’s “aggressive policy” is still at the top of the agenda for the organization. Moreover, the Summit paid attention to another rising challenger from the Far East, China, for the first time in its history. Although China’s increasing role in the defense industry and investments in 5G technology had been perceived as a challenge against NATO’s influence, NATO officially acknowledged this issue for the first time. “We recognize that China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance”, stated the final declaration. Thus, NATO seems to be paying more attention to China’s increasing role in the global order.

As well as these structural problems, the NATO Summit also could not meet expectations in resolving ongoing problems on the ground. The issue of foreign Daesh fighters was one of the topics leaders discussed during the summit. But, the sarcastic dialogue between Trump and Macron showed that European countries are maintaining their position of refusing to accept the return of foreign fighters. “Would you like some nice ISIS fighters? I could give them to you. You could take everyone you want,” asked Trump to Macron, but could not get a positive response.

The Summit also revealed that member states have differing interests in regional and international politics which also varies their security concerns. For instance, Turkey’s security concerns about YPG terrorism in Northern Syria is still not acknowledged by member states. Despite this, President Erdoğan’s emphasis that Turkey is determined to provide security in the region was a clear message to the member states criticizing Turkey’s military operation in the Northern Syria.

Overall, the London summit showed that NATO needs a more strategic approach to set long-term goals in a changing world order. It still suffers from trying to emphasize a common understanding of security for all member states without establishing a unified understanding of what that common threat might be. Whether China will fill this gap or not will be understood in the following years.

This past Saturday, the junior partner of the coalition government, the Social Democrats (SPD) announced the party’s election of its new co-leaders Norbert Walter-Borjans and Saskia Esken. It was a surprise that these two won, as the current Vice Chancellor and Finance Minister Olaf Scholz and his partner, Klara Geywitz, were expected to be elected by the party’s members. Nevertheless, the SPD base decided that Walter-Borjans and Esken will lead the party. The pair previously pushed for renegotiation of the coalition between the SPD and Chancellor Merkel’s CDU. It must kept in mind that over the past 10 years, there has been a CDU/CSU-SPD coalition government, which according to some circles is harming the country’s traditional political balance.

The results have been evaluated partly as a shock for the Berlin political establishment and elites while some media outlets used a more negative tone. Media representatives commented on the results with headlines like: “the SPD is abolishing itself”, “adieu, social democrats”, “the end of the grand coalition” and other similar negative statements and predictions. This is actually based on the fact that the new leaders previously stated that they will insist on renegotiating the current coalition agreement at the SPD party convention this upcoming Friday. Delegates will have to decide on the future of the remaining two years of the coalition.

How can the current conditions and the general perspective within the framework of German politics be assessed and evaluated?

First of all, the results should be taken cautiously into consideration without positive or negative exaggerations. Even though some supportive voices of the grand coalition describe the SPD’s vote as a negative outcome, it is no doubt a fact that this represents the SPD’s legitimate will – and is not limited to the votes of certain delegates. Some criticize the fact that a small number of SPD members, who took part in the elections (217,000), will determine the future of the country’s federal government. However, this kind of comparison is not fair or even acceptable because every party has its own legitimate means to determine who will lead and make decisions.

As a comparison, it shouldn’t be forgotten that in the past year, the Liberals (FDP), which on several occasions acted as the junior partner of the CDU-led coalition government, were the key actors in deciding the country’s future government for four years – despite having a low number of votes in comparison to other rival parties. Thus, in such situations, which are actually influenced by the country’s parliamentary tradition, the question arises, who decides where the line of legitimacy is to be drawn, and which point of view is the most legitimate one?

The second point regarding the new SPD duo and the future of the coalition government has to be addressed from the point of view of the party’s legitimate self-evaluation. It is no secret that the SPD’s popularity among voters has decreased more and more while it has participated in grand coalition governments. The building of coalition governments has not contributed to the SPD’s popularity but has had the opposite effect. Therefore, some voices in the party have called for a return to fundamental social-democrat positions and to reject positions that continuously resemble those of the CDU/CSU. Whether it is true that the SPD is increasingly resembling the CDU or vice versa is another interesting issue, which, however, goes beyond the limits of this piece. Nevertheless, the image of two main German centrist parties permanently echoing the same policy lines has disturbed both voters on the centre-left and centre-right.

If delegates ultimately come to a decision that ends the grand coalition government at Friday’s SPD convention, then Merkel will search for a new but unlikely coalition (with the Greens or/and FDP), or she will make efforts to govern the country under a minority government – an unprecedented situation in post-1945 Germany, and a situation which Chancellor Merkel does not favour and has ruled out several times. If both potential options also fail, new elections will be held subsequent to a pseudo-confidence vote which will intentionally trigger an early election. However, it is a risky move due to the obvious threat by the far-right AfD which may have the potential to increase even more of its votes and thus unfortunately become the country’s second largest party.

For this reason, the Social Democrats have to think carefully about where they currently stand and what kind of effect their upcoming decisions may have on the entire country’s future. In contrast to the other duo (Scholz and Geywitz), the new co-leaders Walter-Borjans and Esken seem very unpredictable, which, most likely will change once they are confronted with the reality federal politics. As one has witnessed recently, both politicians are currently in favour of not immediately ending the coalition at the party convention, despite heavy pressure from left-wing members of the party to conduct an election on the future of the coalition.

Over the past years the reputation and popularity of the SPD has gradually decreased, but whether this will fundamentally change by switching to the opposition is ultimately a risky gamble. As one of the previous SPD chairpersons and one of Germany’s most famous politicians, Franz Müntefering, recently stated, at the end of the day the voters will show whether they accept the decision to switch to the opposition, a decision Müntefering believes the people will not welcome.

As a final word, it is a very situation case that a high-profile political figure such as Olaf Scholz, who was once the Vice Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, was not able to be elected as a co-leader by his own party. This is an issue or problem that parliamentary systems appear to be occasionally facing. The same uncertainty also applies to prime ministers/chancellors and various types of coalition combinations which may occur subsequent to elections if the people’s will is not represented in the subsequently established coalitions.

On November 13, 2019, upon the invitation of U.S. President Donald Trump, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan paid a working visit to the United States. Watching from the sidelines, Russia observed the visit attentively and waited for the outcomes.

The Russian State News Agency, TASS, reported on the visit with the following title: “With or Without the West? Erdogan Makes a Choice in Washington.” The primary question that TASS focused on in regards to the meeting between the two leaders, was whether Turkey’s position in the NATO alliance would change.

In fact, it is necessary to separate Russian coverage of the meeting made by Russian mainstream media, such as television channels and newspapers, on the one hand, with high circulation and broader impact, and think tanks on the other, such as the Russian Council and the Institute of the Middle East, whose publications address a smaller audience who are professionally interested in specific countries. There was a noticeable difference in how both groups covered President Erdogan’s visit to Washington.

Publications from Russian mainstream media targeted at a wider audience, which include the aforementioned TASS Agency, focused on the problematic relations between the West and Turkey, especially in the framework of the NATO Alliance. This is despite the fact that some politicians in Russia consider President Trump to be a leader who is trying to be a businessman in politics, is always ready for dialogue and compromise, and that is just enveloped in a “bad environment,” which refers almost entirely to outside the perimeter of the White House, including Congress, the Pentagon, and the Department of State. Just remember how the State Duma applauded the election of Donald Trump, hoping that he will change the course of relations between the U.S. and Russia. Today the widely accepted opinion of President Trump in Russia is that “he is a good guy, but without power and in a bad environment”.

On the eve of President Erdogan’s visit to Washington, this “bad environment” presented itself in two unpleasant surprises for U.S.-Turkish relations. This came in the form of two bills. One seeking the adoption of sanctions against Turkey due to its operations in Syria, the other which aimed to recognize the events of 1915 as a “genocide of the Armenian people”. The meeting between the two presidents was closely observed by Russia to see, first, how the meeting would enable both parties to resolve old issues, and, how they would be able to deal with new challenges.

The other problems in the relations between U.S and Turkey includes Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring in Syria, American support for the YPG in Syria, Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense systems, the U.S.’s proposal to supply the Patriots to Turkey, extradition of Fetullah Gulen (FETO criminal cult leader) to Turkey, the “Halkbank” case and so on.

The final press conference between Presidents Erdogan and Trump did not provide much news to the Russian media. They noticed Trump’s favorable tone and compliments to the Turkish president, as well as Erdogan’s return of the famous unpleasant letter to Trump.

The Turkish and U.S presidents again spoke about their goal to increase the trade turnover between two countries by five times, from the average value of USD 20 billion up to 100 billion. Interestingly, Trump’s wording about this target was misunderstood by the Russian media, even the central TV-channels. The Russian media incorrectly understood that Trump proposed a “trade deal” to Erdogan worth up to $100 billion if Turkey refused to use the Russian S-400 air defense systems. As a result, when Erdogan, once again, announced that the Russian-Turkish deal was in motion, it was interpreted in Russia as a rejection of $100 billion ‘in cash’.

During this same time, there were many observers in Russia who were surprised by the fact that Turkey is still trying its best to normalize bilateral relations, with the U.S in despite the problematic relations. What is equally as surprising to them is what Turkey is doing with the NATO Alliance. According to them NATO has lost its sense and meaning after the end of the Cold War, and is facing an identity crisis.

Russian Turkologists and think-tankers on Turkey

Russian think tanks, like the Russian Council and the Institute of Middle East, both located in Moscow, draw a picture that differs significantly from the one that is being shown to everyday Russians through the mass media.

Firstly, Russian analysts are completely devoid of any illusions regarding the possibility of Turkey leaving the NATO alliance whether it be short, medium or long term. Secondly, the fact that Turkey acts more independently in the present day and is building its own security architecture using the S-400, or the fact that it is more profitable for Turkey to leave NATO, does not necessarily entail that this is what Turkey wants. This is an axiom.

In addition to this, the existence of the very serious problems in Turkish-American relations is not a reason for the Turkish leadership to break its ties with the United States, as this would allow distortions towards alternative world centers of power, including Russia. The skill of maintaining a permanent balance in the international arena while simultaneously maintaining its position as an important country for many foreign players is a key advantage for Turkey. Of course,  it will not give this up.

As for the opinion of Russian think tanks, which is also supported by the author of this article, at this stage, there are currently a number of unresolvable problems when it comes to the bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States. These problems include the U.S. support to the YPG, the extradition of Fetullah Gulen to Turkey, and the purchase of S-400 systems in Turkey, which, in one way or another, has negatively affected Turkey’s ability to remain in the F-35 fighter jet program.

Briefly, what could be solved by the Washington visit of President Erdogan was solved. The resolution on the events of 1915 was blocked. However, the problems that cannot be solved today are being confined by Turkey. In other words, Turkish diplomacy seeks a way to separate zones of cooperation from problem areas.

Having carried out Operation Peace Spring in Syria and creating a security corridor along the Turkish-Syrian border, the Turkish leadership has finally set in motion the removal of YPG militants and is proceeding with arrangements to send Syrian refugees living in Turkey to these territories. Obviously, Turkey does not want to be the sole sponsor of this process and will seek financial support from the West. The search for this financial assistance will take place in the European Union as well as in the United States.

A further point, which I suppose may exist between Turkey and Russia is connected to the extradition foreign Daesh fighters. It is clear that Turkey, as the Turkish leadership often says, does not want to become a “hotel for terrorists”. But in order to deport criminals who are in Turkey, the Turkish leadership needs to mold a political response with a proper understanding of the situation both in the West and in the U.S. Turkey must try to avoid any matters or steps that may be interpreted abroad as “blackmailing”. Especially with this sensitive issue, when this is a classic cliché regarding President Erdogan that appears again and again in the West.

Given the fact that the Turkish economy needs a constant influx of foreign investment, it is no coincidence that before the negotiations with Trump, Erdogan met with major American business people. The goal of attracting a large capital into Turkey is not of any less importance for the Turkish leadership than the current situation in Syria. In parallel, the country’s credit and investment ratings should be sorted, which, to a large extent, relies heavily on the United States. If Erdogan’s trip to the U.S. were to be looked at from this perspective, it would be seen as follows:

1. Erdogan’s visit to the United States and meeting with Trump balanced the intensity of the dialogue between him and Vladimir Putin.
2. Although Trump spoke at the final press conference in general terms, his statements about Turkish-American relations and his relations with Erdogan were extremely positive. Thus, he sent a signal of “stability” to the stock exchange and to investors.
3. The most odious anti-Turkish initiatives in the United States were removed from the agenda.

By obtaining the U.S’s approval for Operation Peace Spring and negotiating in Washington, Erdogan clarified Turkish-American dialogue and sent a message to his partners in the Astana Process (both Russia and Iran) that Turkey was not building exclusive relations with them, and was not going to break away from the West. According to the Russian point of view, Turkey today concludes its most important agreements with Russia and will continue to do so in the near and continuing future. Since these breakthroughs have been achieved between Turkey and Russia, Turkey will continue to try to balance the ongoing dialogue in the West, even if it does not bring significant results for Turkey today.

Naturally, the situation may somehow change after the presidential elections in the U.S in year 2020, if a new administration comes into power in the White House. But there is hardly a voice among Russian analysts who expect rapid changes in the current triangle between Russia, Turkey and the U.S. For Turkey, Russia will be a country to develop the projects and dialogue, which it may not do with the West. While in the U.S., Turkey’s hard battle to address its concerns, and the existence of anti-Turkish voices will continue without any breakthroughs.

As the NATO summit celebrates the organization’s 70^th anniversary this week in London, this summit will not only discuss ongoing security issues, but unlike previous meetings will also include a more in-depth discussion on the future of NATO itself. Since French President Emmanuel Macron recently stated that NATO was  “brain dead” in his criticisms of Turkey’s actions in Syria, and far from meeting the security needs of member states, there have been increasing discussions on what should be the focus of NATO into the future.

Indeed, Macron’s statement is crucial to understand NATO’s position in the world. Since it was established during the Cold War era in response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union, its function since the end of this era has always been controversial. Although member states have had changing security concerns in the post-Cold War era, NATO has generally functioned well to overcome these security threats. However, disputes among the member states on the future role and function of NATO has been increasing in recent years.

One of the main reasons for this dispute is the rising tensions between the US and European countries over NATO’s short and long-term strategy. The US has criticized the contribution of European member states to NATO and has argued that the US does not get value in return. For instance, one of the prominent issues of disagreement is the disproportionate defense expenditure of NATO members. President Trump in particular has been highly vocal in his criticisms of European countries who did not meet their pledge to increase expenditure on defense spending to 2% of GDP. However, in a gesture of reconciliation before the summit, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced widespread defense spending increases across NATO, also highlighting that nine allies will meet the 2% target this year, an increase from three allies a few years ago.

Alongside this issue of expenditure, NATO indeed has more serious problems which may shape the future of the organization. These include relations of NATO members with Russia, terrorism threats, the intractable Syrian conflict, and the refugee crisis. Resolution of these issues will not be straight forward as many members hold differing positions on these issues. A situation which may continue to be a source of tension between member states into the future.

The latest example of this conflict was seen in the case of the defense plan for the Baltics. Turkey refused to sign the plan. This dispute is also related to the ongoing disagreements between the member states. During Turkey’s military operation in Northern Syria, Turkey could not get the support of NATO member states as it wanted. Because of this reason, Turkey blocked the recent plan to protest the double standards by NATO allies who clearly support the security of the Baltic countries and Poland but not Turkey.

As is seen in the case of this recent dispute, NATO member states do not have a common security strategy especially in the long term. This Summit will provide a platform for member states to discuss the current problems and create a common security strategy. However, it is obvious that since most of these problems are intractable and long-lasting, it will not be possible to solve them in the short run. Without solving the current problems and satisfying the security needs of member states, it is not possible to have a consensus on a common security strategy. Despite this, the Summit may be useful to discuss how NATO can change to meet the needs of a new global order.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), institutionalized in 1981 at the height of the Iraq-Iran war, was created to provide a unified security umbrella to the bloc’s micro-states who find themselves unable to face powerful political and economic challenges. The GCC consists of all Arab states of the Gulf, except Iraq, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Interestingly, all of six GCC nations are Sunni-led monarchies, with some of them having sizeable Shia populations. There is a total ban on political parties in all of these countries. Only Kuwait and Bahrain have elected chambers with legislative powers. Overall, the GCC has a population of some 50 million, half of whom are expatriates.

Apart from inter-governmental cooperation within the council, all of these countries seek to ally with countries with common regional interests. While, almost all of them have deep-rooted ties with the United States, not all wish to mortgage all their interests in Washington. On the other hand, countries like Qatar, Oman and Kuwait have charted paths unfavorable to US policies in the Gulf region. Actually, it was when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 that GCC members’ dependence on the US consolidated. This was the first major security crisis the bloc faced as it was not able to prevent the invasion of Kuwait. Since US-led forces drove Saddam Hussein’s army out of Kuwait in 1991, GCC members have individually signed major defense pacts with Washington.

The second challenge to GCC regimes came in 2011 with the onset of the Arab Spring movements. However, all member states managed to dodge the pro-democracy protests, except for Bahrain, where the authorities crushed Shia-led protests demanding a constitutional monarchy and an elected Prime Minister. Unlike other GCC members, Kuwait demonstrated its determination to be an independent player within the GCC by refusing to send troops to Bahrain to quell anti-government protests.

The third watershed moment for the GCC came on June 5, 2017 when Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain, along with non-GCC member Egypt, severed diplomatic ties with Qatar. Kuwait and Oman stayed neutral. This became known as the Qatar Diplomatic Crisis or Qatar Blockade.

In an effort to solve the rift within the unified Gulf house, Kuwait’s Emir Sheikh Jaber al-Sabah engaged in shuttle diplomacy, traveling between the Qatari, Saudi and Emirati capitals shortly after the crisis erupted. The prospect of the Qatar Crisis escalating tensions between GCC members and outsiders — chiefly Turkey and Iran— added to an already volatile security environment in the Gulf. But despite all efforts, the Kuwaiti mediation didn’t bear any fruit. Being a small kingdom itself, the first concern for Kuwait was seeking to prevent an escalation in regional tensions that could result in military action being taken against Qatar, or a forced regime change in Doha. “The next could be Kuwait,” was a leading concern in Middle Eastern media at that time. Meanwhile, Turkey’s role in mitigating the crisis through its timely support to Qatar germinated hopes in Kuwait. In a show of solidarity, Turkey sent cargo ships and hundreds of planes loaded with food, and sent fresh military reinforcement to break the blockade against Qatar.

Apart from such rumblings, Kuwait’s uneasiness within the GCC continued. Despite Saudi and UAE pressure, it did not participate in the fratricidal Yemeni war imposed by the Western arms industry. Kuwait has consistently opposed Saudi Arabia’s misuse of its role as an older brother in the GCC, and its relations with Saudi’s rival Iran are relatively warm. Following the 2016 attack on Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran, it had declined to follow Saudi Arabia’s lead in severing diplomatic relations with Iran.

A critical issue of concern for Kuwait in its relations with Saudi Arabia is the failure to come to an understanding on the Neutral Zone, an area of 2,230 square miles between the two countries. This area was left undefined when the borders were defined during the Al Uqair Convention in 1922. The oil fields in the shared area are also known as Khafji and Wafra. Kuwait opposed the inclusion of US energy giant Chevron in the operation and the Saudis unilaterally ceased production. Kuwait says that as a result it was denied $18 billion in revenue and has sought to be compensated. Kuwait opposes the extraction of crude oil by Saudi Arabia in the area unless the Kingdom recognizes the area as a Kuwaiti governorate. Experts believe that the Neutral Zone’s oil capacity could add up to 500,000 bpd oil output. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman wants to resume production in the common oil fields as soon as possible. In Kuwait’s political corridors, Crown Prince Bin Salman is now referred to as “little Saddam.”

It is in this backdrop that Kuwait has been approaching actors such as Turkey who could help provide some form of protection and safeguard its interests within the GCC and beyond. In recent years, there have been repeated high-level meetings between the leaders of both countries. At a 2017 meeting between Kuwaiti Emir Sheikh al-Sabah and Turkish President Erdogan, Mr. Erdogan emphasized the long-term strategic importance of the economic partnership between the two countries, saying that Kuwait is Turkey’s gateway into the Gulf, while Turkey is Kuwait’s route into Europe and central Asia.

The close relationship between the two nations is also demonstrated by the fact that their collaborations extend into the humanitarian sphere. For example, in recent years, Kuwait hosted three International Humanitarian Pledging Conferences for Syria, to support the three million displaced Syrian refugees hosted by Turkey. Kuwait also funded the construction of the Sabah Al-Ahmad village in southern Turkey, which is now home to over 15,000 refugees. As greater stability returns to the region, and refugees return home, so will prosperity increase, and the work of rebuilding Syria will begin in earnest.

Turkey is also adding a military dimension to its relations with Kuwait. Both nations recently signed a military cooperation agreement. According to the agreement signed by both deputy chiefs of staff during the Turkey-Kuwait Military Cooperation Committee meeting, the two nations plan to share their military experiences and coordinate their activities from 2019 onwards.

Furthermore, there has been a consolidation of bilateral trade between the two countries in recent years, Turkish construction companies in Kuwait have been awarded 30 projects worth $6.5 billion, including the Kuwait international airport. Ankara is now working hard to acquire a bigger share of contracts from Kuwait’s 2035 Development Plan. Turkey’s Foreign Economic Relations Board has a target of increasing trade with Kuwait to $3 billion annually in 2020.

These facts suggest a major future increase of trade between Turkey and Kuwait, and the deepening of economic ties. There are already over 250 Kuwaiti firms active in Turkey, while 180,000 Kuwaitis now visit Turkey for tourism each year. Kuwaitis may visit Turkey without a visa, and over 6,000 Kuwaitis own real estate in Turkey. Turkey is also in a customs union with the EU, making it an ideal base for Kuwaiti businesses seeking access the EU’s 500-million strong market. Reciprocally, Kuwait provides an ideal base for Turkish investors in the Gulf region. It is clear that Turkish and Kuwaiti multidimensional ties are set to grow rapidly in the coming years.

Turkey’s main opposition party the CHP is experiencing another intra-party conflict. Although the CHP has faced many internal conflicts during the past decade, the latest conflict differs from previous ones and clearly reveals the existence of splinter groups within the party. The press conference of the CHP’s 2018 presidential candidate, Muharrem Ince, revealed that the party is facing a crisis in uniting the splinter groups within the party, and the most recent incident may cause a serious intraparty opposition movement in the upcoming days.

So what happened? Rahmi Turan, a journalist writing for Sözcü newspaper, wrote in his column that one of the candidates planning to run for the CHP’s chairmanship had a meeting with President Erdoğan. According to Turan’s claims, the President promised to help this candidate win the chairmanship of the CHP in the upcoming party congress.  

Although the public did not pay much attention to Turan’s claims in the beginning, the CHP Chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu went on to state that Turan’s claims were indeed true. After Kılıçdaroğlu’s statements, there were some speculation that it may have been referring to Muharrem İnce or Metin Feyzioğlu, the Head of the Union of Turkish Bar Associations. At this point, Turan made another statement claiming that it was Muharrem İnce who met with President Erdoğan.

It did not take much time to discover that there was in fact no meeting held between President Erdoğan and Muharrem Ince, and that they were groundless claims. Thus, the question arises: what were the reasons for making these unfounded allegations? And why didn’t Kılıçdaroğlu reject the claims in the first instance?

It is certain that this latest incident is related to the ongoing conflict between two splinter groups within the party. The Kemalists/nationalists and the leftists. The party has been experiencing a struggle between both groups over the last decade. While Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the Chairman, and his team active in the party administration are drawn from the leftist circle within the party, Muharrem Ince and his followers represent the Kemalist/nationalist bloc. Both groups are struggling over the party’s administration.

The struggle between the two groups is clearly seen during the party’s congresses. There have been four extraordinary and three ordinary congresses in the last decade under the chairmanship of Kılıçdaroğlu. In each congress, the Kemalist/nationalist circle within the party have tried to win the party administration. Ince himself ran against Kılıçdaroğlu two times, in 2014 and 2018, and lost both elections.

Nevertheless, the June 24 presidential elections empowered the position of Muharrem Ince within the party. Since Ince received  31% of the votes as a presidential candidate of the CHP against Erdoğan, while the CHP only recieved 22 % of the votes in the parliamentary elections. Ince later started another intraparty opposition movement after the elections. However, he suspended his initiative because of the local elections.

It is obvious that Muharrem Ince is the only threat against Kılıçdaroğlu’s chairmanship and the leftist circle’s hegemony within the CHP. Ince clearly underlined this conflict between the two groups during his press conference. Because of this,, this latest incident was an effort to discredit Ince’s position before the upcoming congress, and to prevent the rise of an intraparty opposition movement against Kılıçdaroğlu. Nevertheless, it seems that the initiative of the leftist bloc has already failed and the conflict between the two groups will continue until the congress.

James Le Mesurier was found dead outside of his home in Beyoglu, Istanbul on Monday, November 11. He was a backer of the Syrian Civil Defense Agency, more commonly known as the ‘White Helmets’. While the investigation into his death continues, Police report that it was not caused by foul play. He was aged 48 years old.

Who was Le Mesurier?

Born James Gustaf Edwards Le Mesurier in Singapore. Le Mesurier was active in Syria since 2013. He is the official founder of Mayday Rescue, who describe themselves as supporters of a network of volunteer rescue workers known as Syria Civil Defense aka The White Helmets. Mayday Rescue has offices in Amsterdam and Istanbul.

Le Mesurier’s body was found just outside of his home in Beyoglu, Istanbul during the early hours of the morning by visitors of a nearby mosque. While his death continues to raise eyebrows, statements by the Turkish Police suggest that Le Mesurier died by suicide. Camera footage showed that no one had entered his home and police report that there were no suspicious signs inside his apartment either.

Earlier media speculation of the possibility that Le Mesurier was murdered emerged after the British newspaper The Independent pointed out that Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova accused Mr. Le Mesurier of being an English spy on Twitter just three days before his death. However, the Russian Foreign Ministry fired back by saying: “It is unclear why the UK media made this reference to the Russian Foreign Ministry’s official statements at this particular time, because we have already made such statements in the past, and on several occasions”. Indeed, the Ministry issued many statements in the past stating that Le Mesurier was a British intelligence agent and accused the White Helmets of having a close relationship with terrorist groups Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaeda. An accusation widely condemned by the White Helmets and their supporters. Both the UK and Russia are waiting Le Mesurier’s autopsy report to clarify the circumstances surrounding his death. Le Mesurier’s body was returned to the UK last Wednesday on November 20, 2019.

This isn’t the first time spies have been the focus of tension between the UK and Russia. The poisoning of double-agent Sergey Skripal and his daughter in Salisbury in March 2018 also created tension after Russia was again blamed by the UK for the attack. While Russia denied the accusations the diplomatic fall out resulted in the deportations of 23 Russian diplomats from the UK and Russia declaring the same number of British diplomats as persona non grata.

The British media who refer to Le Mesurier as a ‘former British Army officer’ have been keen to dismiss suspicions about Le Mesurier’s activities. Karen Pierce, the United Kingdom’s Ambassador to the United Nations, stated that the accusations against the late humanitarian, labelling him a spy, are ‘categorically untrue and that the United Kingdom will be ‘looking very closely’ into Mr. Le Mesurier’s death.

The White Helmets twitter account responded to the death posting: “We have learned with shock and sadness the news of the death of James Le Mesurier, founder and director of the humanitarian organization Mayday Rescue. Mayday is one of the institutions supporting the White Helmets.”

Who are the White Helmets?

The White Helmets are a first responders group active in Syria since 2013, they claim to have saved over 100,000 lives and lost more than 200 of its own volunteers in the process. Their backer, James Le Mesurier, was awarded an OBE title by Queen Elizabeth II in 2016 for his efforts in Syria. The group itself was nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize in the same year. A short documentary film about the group on Netflix called ‘The White Helmets’ won the Academy Award for best short documentary in 2017 and the group were also the subject of another award nomination for ‘Last Men in Aleppo’ the following year.

The group receives funding from a number of governments, including the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States as well as individual donations. Their mission in the field is to not only rescue people but to also document the attacks carried out by the Assad regime and its allies.

In a statement made by the Russian Foreign Affairs in December 2016, the group was accused of staging their videos. Russia’s accusations continued as several videos and photos were distributed with content that alleged that the White Helmets were staging their own attacks. Iran, along with Russia and the Syrian regime, have also declared the White Helmets as a terrorist group.

The White Helmets has faced serious funding cuts from the United States and some European countries such as the Netherlands since 2018, which they feared would cost more lives due to a lack of resources. The White Helmets have stated they face a serious shortage of medical supplies especially in the Idlib region saying: “The already stretched doctors no longer have the resources to provide healthcare to three million people. This leaves them in an unimaginable situation: continuing their work without pay, with dwindling supplies, and facing unconscionable questions of which life to save, which patient to treat.”

Supporters argue that the White Helmets are being intentionally targeted because they play an important role in Syria and portray the realities of the abuse and violence carried out by the Assad regime and Russian military forces. Revelations that chemical attacks were used by the Assad regime in April 2018 in the city of Douma were reported to the media by the White Helmets. This resulted in increased counter-accusations by the Assad regime and Russia that the White Helmets had staged their rescues.

The White Helmets mocked this accusation by participating in a ‘mannequin challenge’. However the video resulted in a backlash and was used to cast further suspicion on the group’s activities by opponents. Leadership from the organization later apologized for the video stating that while it aimed to highlight the situation facing Syrians it was not authorized.

In an interview in 2018, Raid Salih the head of the White Helmets stated that Le Mesurier was never the founder of the White Helmets but the founder of Mayday Rescue, another humanitarian organization active in Syria since 2014. “Mayday Rescue is one of the supporters of the White Helmets but that does not make Mr. Le Mesurier the founder of the group. The founders are young Syrians.”

While Turkey does not deny the fact that James Le Mesurier was a British Intelligence Officer, Turkey does not recognize the White Helmets as a terrorist group, in fact the Turkish Search and Rescue Association (AKUT) trains White Helmets volunteers in Turkey. In 2017 in the midst of accusations made against the White Helmets, Nasuh Mahruki, the head of AKUT made a statement saying that AKUT did not play any role in selecting volunteers. “There might be people with links to terrorist organizations within the 3.000 people they train. It is not impossible of them to leak into group of trainees”.

Despite statements to the contrary, Le Mesurier is largely seen as the co-founder of the White Helmets, and the loss of such a major advocate for the group might impact the future activities of the organization.

Written by Ahsen Akdemir – ISTANBUL

During Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring in the north of Syria, US President Donald Trump sent an unpleasant letter to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that was later returned to him during Erdoğan’s visit to the White House. But besides Trump’s undiplomatic language, he also made an offer to facilitate negotiations between Turkey and a so-called “General” on the Northern Syrian issue. However, there was a problem. The person Trump referred to as a “General”, was actually a wanted terrorist by Turkey on Interpol’s red notice list and the US relationship with Kobani has become a sore point Turkish-US relation

After Kobani’s name was mentioned alongside the other European politicians, Turkish President Erdoğan strongly took issue to the fact that Mazloum Kobani is terrorist wanted by Turkey. “Now we are at a point that some European countries such as France and Germany are negotiating with leaders of this terrorist organization. Again, some American authorities discuss with them. And in the face of these developments, we ask them ‘What is this situation?’ On the one hand, we talk about counter-terrorism, on the other, unfortunately, you open your doors to them and sit around the table with them. You even sent their letter as an addition to your letter” he told in a press interview.

Turkish President Erdoğan also said that Washington has to hand over Kobani to Turkey according to international law. “We have an extradition agreement. The USA has to give this man to us. Because this is the requirement of ‘wanted by the red notice’ he said.

Who is Mazloum Kobani?

Ferhat Abdi Şahin, who is better known by the adopted name of Mazloum Kobani and also as Mazloum Abdi, or by the nom de guerre Şahin Cilo, was born in Afrin, Syria in 1967. Despite a lack of information about his early life, sources say that he met with the so-called leader of the PKK Abdullah Ocalan when he was a child. It was during Ocalan’s years in Syria that the bond between them was said to have grown. Because of his close relationship with Ocalan, Kobani is considered to be Ocalan’s spiritual son.

According to sources, in 1990, when Kobani was 23 years old, he joined the PKK. From 1991-1996, he worked as a so-called Cilo Region Manager in Turkey’s Hakkari province. Kobani was responsible for the 22 August 1996 rocket attack that killed five people and wounded 11 others in Hakkari’s Şemdinli province. He was also responsible for the 8 November 1996 rocket attack that killed 17 people and wounded eight other at Hakkari’s Çukurca Province.

From 1997 to 2003, he was assigned as the PKK’s Europe Manager. In these years, he established the PKK’s Europe organizational scheme. He described this period as ‘political works’ during some interviews. Sources say that during this period he made a lot of connections with governmental institutions in the name of the PKK.

Besides his ‘political works’ in Europe, he also organized some activities such as festivals and camps mainly in the Netherlands to promote the PKK.

When Ocalan was captured at Kenya in 1999, Kobani was living in Europe. After 2003, he returned to Syria and according to Euronews he was imprisoned by the Syrian Government on five occasions and until 2009 he spent most of his time in prison.

In 2013, during the early years of the Syrian civil war, he began to work for the YPG as a so-called special forces manager and individual responsible for intelligence. It was during these years that Daesh began to strengthen in Syria and despite Turkey’s objections, the US decided to collaborate with the YPG with the purpose of defeating the Daesh.

In 2018, after Daesh was defeated, the US administration began to refer to Mazloum Kobani as ‘General Mazloum’. Particularly after the US Defense Ministry Spokesman Col. Robert Manning first referred to him as ‘General’ and argued that the US would continue to help the YPG as long as they fight against Daesh. The usage of the term ‘General’ was condemned by Turkey. After Manning’s statement, Turkish Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hami Soylu gave a press brief about the situation saying “the Pentagon Spokesman spoke nonsense on Afrin matter”.

When Turkish President Erdoğan met with US President Trump in the White House this November, a month after Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring, the Turkish delegation showed a short documentary about Kobani to US officials. In the documentary Kobani was shown to have “cost of the life of 313 Turkish security forces, honourable men and women whose sole duty and purpose was to protect and serve their people. He also killed five civilians during attacks on 29 police stations between 1991 and 1995. His preferred modus operandi, a method all too familiar to our fellow audience: Suicide.”

Following this crucial meeting that some Republican Senators also attended, some specialists commented about Kobani’s possible Washington trip. Luke Coffey, a foreign policy expert at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative policy think tank, was one of them. “Ferhat Abdi Şahin (aka Mazloum Kobanê) should NEVER be allowed to step foot on American soil” he said on his verified twitter account. He also made a special statement on Turkey’s state television TRT at beginning of Operation Peace Spring. “To defeat a terrorist organization by collaborating with another terrorist organization is a great insincerity. Entirely meaningless… If the citizens of the USA knew that the taxes that they paid to the government transferred to the YPG, which is an arm of the Neo Marxist PKK in Syria, they would not like this” he said.

After these developments Turkey’s Communications Director İbrahim Kalın wrote an article about the attitude of American politicians towards Kobani’s possible Washington visit. “Why would U.S. lawmakers roll out the red carpet for the top commander of a terrorist group, who is the subject of an Interpol Red Notice? The senators are extending an invitation to Şahin due to his role as the head of the YPG, which the U.S. has chosen to support as part of its counterterrorism strategy in Syria. This decision is riddled with too many contradictions to list. This invitation not only damages Turkish-American relations, but also constitutes a potential crime under U.S. law, given the YPG’s ties with the PKK.” he stressed.

“The Turkish public will not forget or forgive those who invited Şahin to the U.S. in order to legitimize him. Our NATO ally’s efforts to glorify a terror organization’s leader will be etched in our memory for many years. Şahin’s invitation to the U.S. will create a lasting wound in the hearts and minds of thousands of innocent Turkish families that have lost their loved ones” Kalın also emphasized.

Ahmet Hakan, a Turkish Journalist from Hurriyet Daily commented on the Kobani’s situation after the Trump- Erdoğan meeting. In his opinion the Kobani video that was shown to the US officials ended Kobani’s positive reputation. He also noted that Turkish journalists President Erdoğan watched the Kobani video together with President Erdoğan after the significant meeting. He noted that “having watched the video, we turned our sight to President Erdoğan, who told us: ‘I got Trump and the senators to watch this. I saw that Trump was influenced by the video’”.

After this diplomatic movement, there is still no clear consensus between Ankara and Washington on the issue of Mazloum Kobani. Following the meeting in the White House, international media has stressed that Erdoğan strengthened his hand against Trump. In particular, CNN International’s White House correspondent Kevin Liptak wrote an Opinion piece about the meeting entitled “Trump declares himself a ‘big fan’ of Turkey’s strongman leader Erdoğan,” and writing that “Erdoğan isn’t the only global strongman to have caught Trump’s attention. But no leader has appeared to get what he wants from Trump quite like Erdoğan.”

Written by Yeter Ada Şeko – ISTANBUL

Three months ago when the Assad regime surrounded the Turkish observation post in Idlib’s Morek, I argued that Turkey needed a new approach to Idlib in order to prevent a bigger disaster. Since then, the situation in Idlib has relatively calmed down and the joint Syrian-Turkish military operation against the YPG has redirected the focus of the world to northeast Syria. The dynamic situation in this region, including the development of bilateral agreements between Turkey and Russia and between Turkey and the US in addition to the repositioning of the US to the oilfields of Syria has resulted in a general ignorance of the current situation in Idlib. Every side is using its energy to gain a bigger piece of the cake in northeast Syria, except for Iran. The latest attack on the IDP camp in Qah, in its inhuman brutality has no military purpose but was intended to shift the focus from northeast Syria to Idlib.

The dynamics between Russia and Turkey in Idlib and northeast Syria are opposite but similar to each other. The Russians demand the withdrawal of radical elements from the agreed demilitarized zone; the Turks demand the withdrawal of the Marxist YPG from the agreed safe-zone. Both sides criticize the other for not implementing the agreement and threatening the other with a military operation. However, there are also significant differences. The situation in northeast Syria is a direct threat to Turkey’s national security, but the situation in Idlib is not for Russia.

Another Turkish-backed operation against the YPG would not have costs for Russia except for the loss of additional gains and leverage. A Russian-backed operation on Idlib would be catastrophic for Turkey as Turkey can’t bear the burden of a further two million more refugees. On military terms, Russia has air superiority in Idlib, but Turkey has air superiority in northeast Syria. In all of this, the US has given massive de-facto support to Russia’s position against Turkey but does give diplomatic and rhetorical support for Turkey in Idlib.

A Russian-backed operation on Idlib would be catastrophic for Turkey as Turkey can’t bear the burden of a further two million more refugees.

In recent times, Idlib has witnessed several important developments. The 4th Division of the Syrian Arab Army of Maher al-Assad known for its ties to Iran has repeatedly failed to advance against the Syrian opposition forces and HTS or HTS-aligned groups in the Kurdish mountains of Latakia. While the resistance of the armed opposition and HTS-aligned groups in Latakia’s Kabbanah is being portrayed as a heroic one, in the end when the regime side is persistent enough and gets sufficient Russian air support, the defense line will collapse sooner or later. Such a gain would have significant effects on the military balance of power in Idlib. If the regime succeeds in gaining the upper hand in this area, it can fight downhill towards the operationally significant town of Jisr al Sughour.

In the meantime, a popular uprising against HTS in the city of Kafr Takhharim is an important proof of the social movement in Idlib which rejects the regime as well as radical groups. This will be an important asset for any policy and strategy for Idlib.

Therefore, I argue that the focus on northeast Syria should continue as much as possible and attempts by the regime, Iran, or Russia to change the focus to Idlib should be prevented by increasing the escalation in northeast Syria to force the regime to allocate reinforcements to this region and to call out the manpower limits of the regime which may prevent the regime from starting another major military campaign. In the meantime, Turkey needs to change the balance of power in Idlib in its favor in order to have a stronger position in the tit-for-tat dynamic that Russia may try to create. In this manner, it is important to note that opposition groups have sent no reinforcements from Idlib to northeast Syria, but the Assad regime had to send its Russian-trained and Russian-equipped 5th Corps due to lack of manpower.

The 32^nd federal party convention of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) will be held in East Germany’s city of Leipzig this upcoming Friday and Saturday (22-23 November). During this convention, a new leader will not be elected but the future projections of the party will be addressed and determined. Given the fact that the Social Democrats (SPD), the junior partner of the current grand coalition government since March 2018, are also heading into the final phase of their leadership search at the end of this month, the CDU’s party convention might be of general relevance and importance too.

In order to clarify the party’s future plans and goals during the convention, CDU party chairperson and the federal minister of defence Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer called on her opponents to openly state their criticisms thus paving the way for possible controversial debates during the convention. It is a move that Kramp-Karrenbauer most likely hopes will present her as a strong leader who is able to cope with harsh criticism from her party’s ranks.

Kramp-Karrenbauer’s more recent decisions have been the subject of criticism by other party members, such as her surprising call for an internationally controlled safe zone in Northern Syria. Party members have also called for a new negotiation of the current coalition with the Social Democrats. However, in a recently published interview, Kramp-Karrenbauer once again stated that there were no concerns about the existing coalition agreement with the CSU and SPD and thus rejected new negotiations on it.

Furthermore, the youth organization of the party called for a new process to determine the party’s future chancellor candidate which would involve the participation of all CDU members. This recommendation was interpreted as a challenge against AKK personally. But the youth organization is not the only group seeking a new process, five other CDU associations on the state and local levels are also in agreement. However, it is expected that these recommendations will be rejected at the convention, despite the youth organization’s suggestions being taken into serious consideration by the party members.

Kramp-Karrenbauer on the other hand, has constantly tried to portray a rather strong and self-confident image of herself while calling her party’s members to criticize and even discredit the CDU’s policies, and she does this by pointing to the positive achievements of the CDU’s coalition since 2005. However, more recently Kramp-Karrenbauer has become self-critical of her one year performance as chairperson and the party’s decreasing vote shares according to polls.

In addition to several criticisms against Kramp-Karrenbauer, it seems that she still trying to hold a stable position which her intra-party opponents –at least at the moment– do not dare to challenge openly. However, recent polls indicate that for CDU members Kramp-Karrenbauer is not the most popular figure as the next chancellor candidate, but Friedrich Merz. For the moment, however, Merz is not openly challenging Kramp-Karrenbauer, who he lost the leadership race to last December. During that leadership contest, Kramp-Karrenbauer received 517 of the 999 all valid votes while Merz only received 482 votes. Whether a rather different result might occur today is an interesting question which has not been not openly addressed. This is actually related to Merz’ most likely secure strategy.

Merz currently denies any kind of “showdown” at the convention against the CDU chairperson and also strengthened his official stance supporting her. However, even though Merz rejects any kind of a debate on a new chairperson of the CDU, he has said that he will continue his critical statements concerning specific issues.

The CDU currently elects the chancellor candidate within narrow party committees where Merz would have less chances to persuade the party’s delegates. But if all CDU members would be able to determine the next chancellor candidate then Merz would have more chances compared with Kramp-Karrenbauer. Although Merz officially does not favour such an option, at least for the moment, his supporters have tried to push for this method. Therefore, it seems that Merz will eventually welcome some new processes for the election of the party’s future chancellor candidate.

On this upcoming Friday and Saturday, the CDU is unlikely to challenge its current chairperson. The party’s leading figures will most likely address other topics, among them Turkey’s EU process, which will be also problematized once again, and most likely in a rather unfortunate way due to Turkey’s recent legitimate operation in Northern Syria. But the leadership question of the CDU will most likely continue to be on the party’s table at least until the next parliamentary elections in 2021. Until then, it seems a very clever move by Merz not to risk any chances to challenge the current chairperson Kramp-Karrenbauer who he would most likely lose against, a loss that might result in the end of his political career. Due to this, Merz prefers to officially support Kramp-Karrenbauer while simultaneously continuing to appear as an alternative in any future leadership crisis, something which might occur in the next months.

While Merz is most likely aiming to solidify his own position as a long-lasting alternative, Kramp-Karrenbauer must currently persuade her party members of her future performance. In addition, the SPD’s ongoing leadership search and their final decision in December whether to continue the coalition with the CDU is also an important topic that concerns the entire coalition.

President Erdoğan met President Trump in the White House last Thursday. The content of the meeting largely met with expectations, and some of the key issues discussed included the issue of the YPG, the S-400-F-35 dilemma, the future of Syrian refugees, the FETO problem, the Halkbank case, and the Armenian bill. While a number of key issues remained unresolved, the meeting indicated a mutual commitment towards improving bilateral relations into the future. Although two issues at the top of the agenda, the YPG issue and the S-400-F-35 dilemma, were not resolved, President Erdoğan and President Trump underlined that Turkey and the US will continue to work on the resolution of key issues in the following days.

During the meetings with the President Trump and the members of the Senate, President Erdoğan stressed that the YPG could not be accepted as a legitimate organization representing the Kurds in the Northern Syria. President Erdoğan also shared evidence of the involvement of the YPG in terrorist attacks with the US officials. Moreover, a comprehensive report covering Turkey’s arguments prepared by Turkey’s Directorate of Communications was presented to the US side. Nevertheless, the US side seems eager to continue their relations with the YPG since the U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper recently stated that the “good relations” between the USA and the YPG would continue.

When it comes to the second most critical issue, the S-400-F-35 dilemma, both countries had a clear conflict of interest. The US stated that Turkey could be accepted into the F-35 program so long as it does not activate the Russian S-400 missile air defense systems. However, President Erdoğan stated that this option was not compatible with Turkey’s interests. Thus, both countries will need to continue to negotiate on this issue to find a common solution.

The future of Syrian refugees, the FETO problem, the Halkbank case, and the Armenian bill were other critical issues discussed during the meeting. President Erdoğan underlined that Turkey had already sent the necessary documents to the US to resolve the FETO problem, which includes the extradition of the FETO leader and shutting down FETO-affiliated schools and institutions, an issue which remains of utmost interest to Turkey. However, the US side did not provide an official response to Turkey’s requests, and it seems that the FETO problem, the Halkbank issue as well as the creation of the safe zone in Northern Syria are all issues still waiting on the negotiation table.

However, the first concrete outcome of the meeting was the blocking of “the Armenian genocide” bill in the Senate. Prior to the meeting, President Erdoğan had already expressed Turkey’s concerns regarding the bill with President Trump. After the meeting, Senator Lindsey Graham emphasized that lawmakers should not “sugarcoat history or try to rewrite it” and moved to block its passage in the Senate.

Overall, it is obvious that the meeting did not solve all the intractable problems between both countries. However, it was an important step for both countries to create a conciliatory environment in order to start further negotiations to solve more deep-rooted issues. Since both countries have used face-to-face negotiations to solve the ongoing problems between the countries, it seems this will occur into the future especially in relation to the Syrian issue which is likely to occur in upcoming days. 

There have been rumors regarding a possible easing of tensions between Qatar and its troubled GCC partners Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. After a decision by the Saudi, Emirati and Bahraini officials to send their teams to Qatar for the 24th Arabian Gulf Cup of 2019, certain positive interpretations followed in the international media. Along with this decision, high-level policymakers’ statements both in Saudi Arabia and Qatar have demonstrated their partial willingness for constructive dialogue to be established between the two parties. Many argued that this “football diplomacy” would help ease the tension between these three countries and Qatar. As the political and economic blockade imposed by Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Manama has been waning gradually, there was some hope that Gulf countries would recover the relationship. However, this is not as simple as many would like to think.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s lack of success on a number of regional issues, particularly the Qatar blockade, have led these countries to reconsider their foreign policies. The Saudi-Emirati axis was not able to force Qatar to bow down and meet with the initial demands. While Qatar, remaining defiant, has not made any change to its foreign policy, particularly with regards to 13 demands announced by the blockading countries. The Riyadh and Abu Dhabi administrations have come to the realization that the blockade of Qatar, which has been one of their main foreign policy miscalculations, can no longer continue. Despite realizing this there is still no genuine change to the hostile nature of these two countries’ attitude towards the Doha administration. While a majority of the issues that created division between Qatar and the Saudi-Emirati axis still exist, many initiatives of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are not and will not be supported by the Doha administration.

Therefore, it can be misleading to expect that the Qatari administration will take a positive attitude towards the rapprochement of these two countries. As a matter of fact, with the blockade in 2017, Qatar has reshaped its foreign policy and acted with the reflex of a country surrounded by hostile neighbors. As part of this strategy Qatar has developed strong alliances with regional and international actors, such as Turkey, Iran and the United States and diversified its political, diplomatic and economic alliances. 

Rather than being obliged to establish a means of dialogue with the Saudi-UAE axis, Qatar has done more to build consolidated international partnerships particularly with Turkey, the US and Iran. Bilateral relations, trade volume, military cooperation and socio-cultural harmony have seen a boost between Turkey and Qatar, with partners intending to reach record levels of bilateral trade and military cooperation particularly. With the US, Qatar has enjoyed the privilege of hosting the largest US airbase in the Middle East, and the US has also the made promises of enlarging it at despite Qatar’s regional entanglements. Qatar has also built a stronger relationship with Iran, one that was already in place even before the blockade was initiated.

Another reason as to why a genuine rapprochement between Qatar and its hostile neighbors will not occur is the way Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain treated the Doha administration. The attitude of Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Manama during the early stages of the blockade had a strongly negative effect on the both Qatari political and social actors. As the Qataris were being humiliated by its neighbors, their trust toward them was significantly damaged. Although there have been some constructive attempts by these countries to redress this more recently, the damage remains and is almost impossible to be recovered.

Finally, in the latest developments to ease tensions between the Saudi-UAE axis and Qatar, it doesn’t seem reasonable for Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed to change course. Having spent a tremendous amount of effort, money and manpower to be the regional-agenda-setters, Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed firstly intended to isolate Qatar to punish its allegedly disobedient foreign policy behavior. Being stalemated against Iran, being stuck in Yemen and having assumed an unassertive role in the global oil market, the Saudi-UAE axis aims to ease the existing tensions with Qatar, only to demonstrate their vulnerability and give countless regional concessions.

Despite suggestions that the recent football diplomacy may be a way out to the already deepened crisis in the Gulf region, it is hard to believe that there can be an easy solution to the existing problems between the parties. The idea of a rapprochement is wishful thinking at the simplest level of analysis, as the effects of the blockade continues and mistrust between the parties persists. The humiliation and insults toward Doha by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates is something fresh and unforgettable for both the political leadership and popular masses in Qatar. The Doha leadership was able to remain strong and solid during the hardest period of the crisis and it will simply not forget the mistreatment it was subjected by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.  

For a long time, Germany’s political system has been regarded as stable without any need for change. However, recently some voices have begun calls for reform. Among them is Germany’s Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy, Peter Altmaier, a close ally of Chancellor Angela Merkel. He recently called for a fundamental reform of Germany’s political procedures, which should be launched even this year. In a German newspaper, Altmaier wrote that “it seems as if the traditional political system of our country has been in a kind of permanent crisis” pointing to the recent state elections in Thuringia, where the Left Party and the far-right AfD received more than 50 percent of the votes.

Altmaier argued, that “it’s no longer about any new chairman, chancellor candidate or minister, it’s not about coalition compromises, it’s about fundamental issues of trust and acceptance”. According to Altmaier, “politics would be responsible, when the proportion of voters who no longer voted for a party represented in the German government had doubled”. Altmaier thus states that all parties – particularly the big parties – should be ready for fundamental political changes that will involve citizens into the decision-making process.

However, his concrete proposals are currently limited to reducing the number of members of the German parliament (Bundestag). Although the German constitution requires a minimum number of 598 MPs, there are currently 709 MPs in the Bundestag. The disparity in the number of seats can be explained by Germany’s electoral system which awards seats on the basis of votes received for individual constituencies and a party list. Procedures that aim to balance the outcomes between these two categories create so called overhang seats (Überhangmandate) in which further seats are added to party’s total allocation. More recently, this system has been accused of unfairly favoring the CDU.

According to Altmaier, however, the number should gradually be reduced to an “appropriate number” and the number of cabinet ministers should also be limited to fifteen. In addition, the high number of secretaries of state (currently 35), and government employees should also be reduced by one third in the next government’s tenure. Finally, Altmaier also suggests that the tenure in the federal legislature should be increased from four to five years, and that federal and state elections should coincide; that is to say, Altmaier does not agree that there should be a permanent mood of election campaigning in the country due to state and federal elections taking place during different times, and which also has an impact on the federal government’s agenda.

Until now, Altmaier’s calls have not led to any actual serious debate though some opposition politicians from the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and Greens have criticized Altmaier and his CDU for being responsible for the current conditions. They blame Altmaier and his government for increasing the number of secretaries of state. On the other hand, the FDP blasted Altmaier for not talking with his own party about the matter and instead talking to the media.

A further criticism came from the AfD, who argued that the fact that secretaries of state as members of the executive are also simultaneously MPs of the legislative body undermines the separation of powers. However, it is not clear what kind of a solution Germany’s parliamentary system should bring regarding the AfD’s criticism. Furthermore, besides prime ministers or chancellors, nearly all cabinet members are also members of the parliament, and although this may not be the best way of separating powers, it is actually quite typical across parliaments.

Furthermore, a few days later and independently from Altmaier’s remarks, the leader of the FDP, currently in the federal opposition, also called also for a substantial change to current regulations. Christian Lindner proposed a two-term limit on the tenure of the German Chancellor to 5+5 years. Some senior voices opposed this idea stressing that German citizens decide every four years who can be the Chancellor, and, that Germany is not a presidential democracy where term limits are meaningful. However, others supported Lindner’s –call.

The question of who should decide what arises. In Germany, the Chancellor is elected by the Bundestag, not by the citizens. In a presidential democracy, the citizens directly elect the president. Thus, it is also asked why term limitations should be wrong in Germany while being right in a presidential democracy?

Well, as one notices, there are currently some occasions for debating Germany’s political system which has become even more interesting due to the decreasing importance of centrist parties over the last couple of years. In such conditions, a country with a robust political system or system of government generally will proves itself against several challenges. Given Altmaier’s and Lindner’s proposals, it seems that the long-lasting tenure of Chancellor Angela Merkel has highlighted some difficulties regarding Germany’s post-1945 parliamentary democracy, even though there are not that many voices both in political and media circles that have raised these issues.

Besides Altmaier’s somewhat superficial proposals, it’s with no doubt a meaningful idea to consolidate federal and (16) state elections, which currently causes a de facto permanent election environment. This most likely constrains already fragile coalition governments at the federal level, particularly recently. A fresh debate concerning new opportunities or even proposals about the political system would not be that bad for Germany. However, it should be kept in mind that making some fundamental changes to the system will not eliminate problems caused by the rise of the extreme right and left. For this, other a changes in political content as well as structural adjustments are needed.

President Erdoğan will be paying a visit to President Trump in the U.S on November 13. After rising diplomatic tensions between two countries during Operation Peace Spring, this visit will be important in determining the future of Turkish-American relations. This face-to-face meeting will be a chance to solve problems that emerged between the two countries in recent years.

President Erdogan has stated that the top item on the agenda with President Trump will be the fight against the FETO terror group. The extradition of Fetullah Gulen, the FETO leader, to Turkey has been a long standing source of tension between Turkey and the US, and prioritizing this issue indicates a clear intention to make progress towards developing a more collaborative relationship to address security threats.

The Syrian crisis and Operation Peace Spring will also be at the top of the agenda. During Turkey’s military operation in Syria, Turkish-US relations deteriorated due to a conflict of interests and misunderstandings between the two countries on the Syrian issue. Obviously, the biggest issue of conflict is the YPG’s presence in Northern Syria. While Turkey sees it as a threat to its national security, the US sees them as useful to prevent the rise of Daesh in the region. Tensions between the two nations escalated and de-escalated several times during the operation and as a result, this visit will be important to repair relations between Turkey and the US.

President Erdoğan almost certainly be bringing the Turkish-American agreement on the safe zone to the table. President Erdoğan recently said “We know that there are still terrorists in the planned safe zone. These areas have not been cleared of terrorists yet”. Since the agreement requires the withdrawal of YPG members 30 kilometers away from Turkey’s border, President Erdoğan will most likely discuss why the agreement has not been fulfilled yet.

When it comes to the American side, it appears that while President Trump sees the visit as a chance to discuss the Syrian border, terrorism and the YPG,  the American side is much more pessimistic about the visit, and it is likely that US officials will continue to take a firm stand on the YPG’s presence outside of the safe zone. It has also been said that while the two leaders may solve the existing problems, they also have to convince the Washington bureaucracy which is still angry about the agreement and Trump’s decision to withdraw from Syria.

The future of 3.6 million refugees living in Turkey. As was previously stated by Turkey, one of the main aims of the establishment of a safe zone is the resettlement of approximately 1.5-2 million Syrian refugees within the safe zone. In his UN speech, President Erdoğan underlined that Turkey could not maintain hosting 3.6 million refugees and it was urgent to establish the safe zone and resettle refugees in that area.

Another prominent issue for the Erdoğan-Trump meeting will be the sanctions against Turkey and the resolution passed by the House of Representatives to commemorate “the Armenian Genocide”. It is a well-known fact that both decisions were taken by the US to force Turkey to halt Operation Peace Spring. President Erdoğan stated that he discussed the decision of the House of Representatives with President Trump on the phone and that Trump decided to examine this issue.

Other issues such as the Halkbank case, the future of the YPG in Syria will all be handled during the visit. Some of these issues have been in negotiation with the US for a long time and the outcome of this visit on these issues will be of interest.

It seems that even if the two leaders are eager to solve the existing problems between two countries, there is the obstacle of a resistant Washington bureaucracy. The ongoing impeachment investigation against Trump and the media’s aggressive stance against Turkey has forced him to take a confrontational stance against Turkey. Nevertheless, good relations between the two leaders helped in finding solutions for deep-rooted problems in the past, and ongoing intractable issues may be solved at the table once again.

Months have passed since the beginning of the sit-in protests of Kurdish mothers in front of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) Diyarbakır provincial office. A reaction against the outlawed PKK responsible for abducting and recruiting their children. While the number of protesting families are now more than 50, the number of sit-in protesters increases with each passing day with new protestors joining in support of the others.

More recently, we witnessed the heart-wrenching story of 82-year-old Hurinaz Omay, a mother who has never ceased to hope. Her son was abducted by the PKK in Bitlis province 24 years ago, and she has never seen him since. Omay even went to Qandil and Mahmur, the headquarters of the PKK, twice in the hope of finding him. She sheds tears full of grief and sorrow during the later years of her life, and still dreams of finding her son no matter whether he is dead or alive. Omay says in all honestly that the HDP does not represent the Kurdish people but deceives Kurdish children into joining the PKK, clearly expressing her revolt.

For the past two months, we have been hearing many stories we have never heard of. On one side there are a slew of losses that have been hidden from the state, and on the other side there is the HDP, the real addressee of the issue, and who strive to position themselves as the political wing of the Kurdish movement. The HDP admitted its direct relation to the PKK in various statements and in many cases. More recently, the HDP deputy Leyla Güven said: “Recruitments in “guerilla forces”, conflict and war will continue as the Kurdish issue continues to persist,” revealing the HDP’s expectation of Kurdish families and their attitude towards kidnappings.

It would not be an exaggeration if we say that this civilian protest and response vocalized as “edi bese” (meaning “enough is enough” in Kurdish) was the first time the PKK and the HDP faced a loud and clear stance from their own base. Some families lost trace of their children many years ago, while others lost their children only recently. Several families whose children were kidnapped by the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), the offshoot of the PKK based in Iran, also joined the sit-in for their children. Families and parents of many military and police officers who were abducted by the PKK also joined them.

We first faced the stark truth we already knew about when Hacire Akar turned up at the doorstep of the HDP Diyarbakır office one night. Only a week later, on September 3, 2019, the movement of the families inspired by Akar turned into a collective sit-in protest. Akar’s son Mehmet returned home on August 24, giving hope to the many other families who had also lost their children. Following Hacire Akar, women like Fevziye Çetinkaya, Remziye Akkoyun and Ayşegül Biçer showed up at the HDP office and demanded the return of their children. Their resilience and resistance set an example to other mothers.

Vigil at the HDP Office

After Süleyman Çetinkaya, son of Fevziye Çetinkaya, disappeared on August 31, a member of his family said in protest: “No young people have remained in Diyarbakır because of you, they are either in grave or in prison, the hell with your Kurdistan cause!”, which shook society. The fact that this expression was uttered by a Kurdish family in Diyarbakır proved that this was the last straw. In following days, families started their hopeful wait to reunite with their children.

The Biçer family, who joined the sit-in for their 17-year-old kidnapped son, became one of the most well-known names of the protest alongside Hacire Akar. Thirty-two-year-old mother Ayşegül Biçer told the press that their son was deceived and kidnapped 11 months ago, adding that they recieved a phone call two weeks after his kidnapping and learned that their son was in the hands of the YPG terror group in Syria. During my visit to Diyarbakır on September 8, I asked all the protesting families the same question: “Your children are lost, but why are you searching for them in front of the HDP office?” The answers of all the families were alike. They said that their children started visiting the HDP office and made new friends there before they were kidnapped, and the friends they made later pretended that they had never met their children after they disappeared. The families believe that their children were brainwashed at the HDP’s Diyarbakır office.

Another couple Fevziye and Şahap Çetinkaya joined the sit-in six days after their son Süleyman disappeared. Encouraged by Hacire Akar’s story, the parents thought that their sit-in would yield a result in a short time. When asked about how their son was kidnapped, they said that Süleyman was a very keen and skilled football player and was enrolled in a local football club (the mother also added that she does not know the club’s name). The travelling costs between their village and the club was paid for by the club. One day her son left home to play football and never returned. Fevziye also said that she saw her son entering and leaving the HDP office once while she was in the city to visit a doctor. The interviews we conducted with other families on the subject verify that children have been subjected to ideological indoctrination at various events held in places like cultural centers, music schools and sports clubs, not only in Diyarbakır but in many other cities, especially in Istanbul. They have been encouraged to support the PKK and join pro-PKK meetings and marches in such social environments.

Nevertheless, the families do not give any political or ideological message. They only express a wish that this atmosphere of conflict and war be over and for their lives to be normalized, stating that they were tired of worrying about the lives of their children all the time. Ayşegül Biçer calls out to her son with these words: “Give us a call please. If you can’t come, we will pick you up. Even though you are behind the mountains, we can cross them to reach you. Just give a call, and we will be there for you.” The Biçer family also underlined that they were threatened by the PKK after they joined the sit-in protest.

A mournful mother Saliha Edizer’s son Yakup was kidnapped in 2015, when he was only 16. Saliha said that she raised her son in poverty and her only wish was to see him study. According to her, Yakup, a hardworking student who loved his school and teachers, was kidnapped by the HDP and sent to the mountain only a week before he would have completed his second year in high school. His mother cannot help but say: “My son was lying his head on his soft and clean pillow when he was at home, and he is probably lying on rocks right now, I could not stand that”. It is known that some of the children went up to the mountains after indoctrination while some of them were abducted, numbed with drugs, and used in various services of the terror group. 

Many other examples can be listed. All these painful and hopeless stories are angering. However, in our time in which everything appears as a “narrative” and perceptions precede reality, we need to meticulously reflect on this issue’s historic importance.

Mothers In Between ‘White Kurds’ and ‘White Turks’

The sit-in protests in front of the HDP Diyarbakır office are completely ad-hoc, and there is not any institution or organization behind them. Hacire Akar arrived at the doorstep of the HDP office taking every risk as a mother who has lost her son to the PKK and with nothing to lose. Until recently, publicly blaming the HDP in Diyarbakır was an act that was always wished for but never dared. As Ayşegül Biçer says, there are thousands of mothers who wish to turn up at the HDP office, but are afraid to do so.

The mothers’ protest means challenging a narrative told for years and built a supremacy of one specific discourse by the PKK and imposed on the people in the region. Thanks to this protest, they are saying: “Yes, I am protesting against you, and I no longer believe in your cause. You cannot use me, my family and my children, whom I gave birth to for the continuation of my bloodline, not for your so-called cause.”

Mothers can now clearly see that while poor Kurdish children have been wasted for nothing under a policy that was built on conflict.  These children brought up in poverty were taken away from their mothers, while at the same time the children of senior figures of the HDP enjoy their comfort in Istanbul, living very privileged lives and studying at the best schools.

The protesters are not afraid to speak out about this fact now. Celil Begdaş, who lost his 17-year-old son to the PKK, showed journalists photos of senior HDP figure Pervin Buldan’s children vacationing in Paris and London. Begdaş does not wish that his child would be able to visit a hip café in Paris, he only wishes that his son could go to a public school, have a decent job, and just live with human dignity. After years constructing a protest discourse, it is clear there is now a yawning gap between the white Kurds and the Kurdish people.

The sit-in protests in Diyarbakır are not only staged by women, fathers are also present in support of the families. However, as Hacire Akar, Ayşegül Biçer and Fevziye Çetinkaya came to the fore in the media, the protests are mostly attributed to mothers. If their protest were against the state, they would have been supported by white Turks, secularists and those who lecture on women’s rights. Then such a protest would be documented by the foreign press and followed across the world.

But unfortunately, those who portray the YPJ’s underage girl fighters as heroes of freedom do not want to see Hacire Akar’s vigil at the HDP office. Women right’s lecturers would like to draw a picture of a homogenous “Kurdish women’s movement” which reiterates a specific role attributed to the activism of Kurdish women since the 1990s. There is a trend of valorizing, romanticizing and glorifying the Kurdish women’s movement, which has been politicized so far only in a specific framework.

However, women who go beyond the limits of the activism that has been deemed suitable for them,  or beyond the roles given to them in politics, women klike Hacire Akar who take steps to solve their own problems on their own terms, using their own methods and agenda are ignored as they do not serve certain interests. Hacire Akar’s revolt and her exclaimation of “edi bese” is not seen as being a part of women’s activism since it does not fit into the general framework of a homogenized women’s movement which is attached to the leftist ideology.

Kurdish women are treated like a “homogenous mass” and are mostly associated with extremely conventional codes, local clothes, lack of education and means, and “honor killings” with the exception of educated and secular Kurdish women leaders. On the other hand, with their clothing and Marxist-Leninist ideologies, Kurdish women in politics are not representing Kurdish culture; they only determine how the true representatives would be positioned. Besides, they do not represent the political discourse woven from the pain of people. They only represent a movement that fed on people’s grief for 40 years, could not burgeon in Turkey despite foreign support and the support from the European public, and responded violently to the AKP government that took a step to resolve the issue in 2012.

The children who were born and grew up over the course of this time are neither representatives nor addressees of the pain they legitimized. They are drifting in a whirlwind of Kurdish nationalism, unhappiness, nihilism and conflict that does not end in the minds of their “white” children who were born and raised in metropolitan cities. The HDP’s women, who also suffered losses during early periods of the movement and have been in the fight, do not have anything to give to Kurdish mothers other than conflict and sorrow. While building and leading their own lives, they could not give Kurdish mothers anything but poverty, loss of children and despair.

Kurdish Women

The losses, grief, and violations of rights during the 1990s ascribed a certain identity to Kurdish women in their own communities and public sphere. This identity was inevitably against the state due to the circumstances of that time. In this framework, all kinds of violation of rights and attacks on ethnic and religious identities experienced in Turkey throughout the 1990s turned into political movements in the following years for the members of the aggrieved communities. In this sense, the headscarf ban and Kurdish question shared some similarities. 

The activism of Kurdish women, who became active agents in the Kurdish political movement, came to the fore and gained a symbolic character during these years. The most talked-about and most sympathized feature of the entire Kurdish movement has been women’s activism within the movement. In this sense, one of the greatest achievements of the Kurdish political movement during the early 2000s was mobilizing Kurdish women, who were made to join the rallies, meetings and marches of the movement with their local clothes. I am saying they were “made to join” since I believe that the women at the base of the Kurdish political movement never had any real agency through a principle of reciprocity which would allow them to transform the movement in line with their own pain.  This separatist movement, which has a rigid structure and is based on a radical Marxist-Leninist ideology with strong intellectual side, has never treated these women equally although they defended equal citizenship and equal rights at a discourse level.

In the 1990s, identity politics became prominent across the world. People around the world tried to liberate their identities, ethnicities and religious allegiances from the pressure of nation states, and the women’s movement gained strength parallel to this. In Turkey, the women’s movement was also mobilized during these years and the Kurdish women’s movement could easily find an audience in this trend. Thus, they became increasingly visible in the public sphere, took on active roles in political parties, spoke in rallies and opened a space for themselves.

But did all these actors visible in the public sphere really represent Kurdish women? While opening such a new space, did those acting on behalf of Kurdish women change the movement in a way to meet the needs of the women at the movement’s base? I have to say that this critical question remains unanswered, and I should also add that such a question has never been asked since asking such a thing would cause anger. Has the movement that abducted the older son of Hacire Akar done anything to prevent her second son from going down the same path? What has this movement given to Hacire Akar for 40 years? Which problems has it solved, what kind of a difference has it made?

What kind of connection is there between the educated, secular, leftist Kurdish women activists who speak many foreign languages fluently and women like Hacire Akar, who were not sent to school, do not speak Turkish and cannot travel on their own? Who is the real representative of Kurdish identity, and who speaks on behalf of this identity?

Nothing has changed in the lives of these women who have patiently waited for years, lost their children, and inherited the ongoing pain of generations from their mothers. They waited for decades without even saying good-bye to their beloved sons. Their opinions have never been asked, and it does not even matter to the movement if these mothers consent to the roles ascribed to them.

When these women, the true representatives of Kurdish culture, appeared and exclaimed: “We want our children!” they confronted the educated female parliament members and politicians who told them to continue fanning the flames of the conflict. The latter consists of a group of privileged women who owe their existence to the pain of the former. Female Kurdish politicians are throwing other children into the fire while protecting their own children from conflict and radicalization. This is what Kurdish women are deemed worthy of by the Kurdish women’s movement that has been valorized for years. These mothers are now ignored since they say “edi bese” and want their children back from Qandil and Mahmur.

 *This article was penned by Meryem Ilayda Atlas and first published in Turkish in Kriter Magazin’s October issue. 

Operation Peace Spring launched by Turkey last month with the aim of securing its border with Syria against the threat posed by terrorist organizations such as the YPG and Daesh aroused very strong reactions in the international community, and especially within the European Union.

Perceived as a sudden invasion, the EU immediately condemned Turkey for its unilateral action. A prompt reaction came firstly from the High Representative on behalf of the EU, calling on Turkey to ‘cease the unilateral military reaction’ and adding that ‘Turkish military action risks to protract instability in northeast Syria, providing fertile ground for the resurgence of Daesh”.

Actually, the EU’s top foreign policy official’s statement echoed what was previously declared by the President of EU Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, who asked Turkey to “stop operations’’ and stated that “if the Turkish plan involves the creation of a so-called safe zone, don’t expect the European Union to pay for any of it.”

Following these statements, reactions of the individual member states did not wait long. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said that ‘the Turkish offensive threatens to cause a new humanitarian disaster … Turkey is willingly risking further destabilizing the region and a resurgence of IS’ (Daesh)’.  The same security concern was shared by the UK and France, whose Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian urged Turkey to stop the operation as ‘it calls into question the security and humanitarian efforts of the coalition against Daesh and risks undermining Europeans’ security’. Moreover, several European countries summoned Turkish envoys to condemn the military action, Dutch Foreign Minister, representing the general political spirit of the EU, underlined the possibility of a “terrible humanitarian crisis that can trigger new refugee flows and harm the fight against IS and stability in the region.”

At the same time, the main squares of several European cities hosted protest against Turkey, where in some cases YPG flags, effigies of Abdullah Ocalan, and posters in favor of the outlawed PKK have appeared. It was clear an approximate media campaign began to demonize Ankara.

In fact, according to most European observers on Syria, Turkey would have conducted an operation of ethnic cleansing against the Kurds, confirming not only a prejudicial approach, but above all a certain difficulty in understanding the dynamics of the region. It also demonstrated on their behalf the failure of setting a clear distinction between terrorist organizations and the Kurdish population. Furthermore, a narrative of the forced repatriation of Syrian refugees hosted by Turkey has started to become viral.

Although this was the third Turkish operation across the border to guarantee its own security, coming after the operations Euphrates Shield in 2016 and Olive Branch in 2018, this time European leaders and the public opinion reacted almost univocally in condemning Turkey as an aggressor state, marking the apex of a bias and to some extent of a hypocritically contradictory approach.

Indeed, the EU bloc’s foreign ministers pledged to suspend weapons exports to Turkey, although consensus was delayed by the intervention of some voices in the EU such as the UK who supported a softer stance towards Turkey as because as “a key partner of the European Union.”  

Nevertheless, EU nations succeeded in banning arms sales to Ankara, marking the first time such a move was made against a partner and a NATO ally. In the same spirit of rare consensus, the European Parliament also voted on a resolution condemning ‘Turkey’s military intervention’ and urging Ankara to ‘withdraw all of its forces from Syrian territory’. The European Parliament also called for “appropriate and targeted economic measures against Turkey” and the freezing of preferential treatment for Turkish agriculture exports to the EU. Moreover, it further called upon the European Council ‘to introduce a series of targeted sanctions and to impose visa bans on Turkish officials responsible for human rights abuses during the current military intervention” adding ‘the suspension of the EU customs union with Ankara’.

Eventually, along with the statements by European MPs referring to the words of the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as ‘weaponized’ by threatening Europe with refugees, some other measures aimed at freezing any new funds in support of Turkey for hosting almost four million of Syrian refugees was to be considered, even though it seems unlikely to happen.

As a matter of fact, Turkey’s hospitality towards Syrians has to be considered good practice and an example for the world as from the beginning of the war in Syria Ankara had been taking on the burden almost unilaterally, and much before the March 2016 agreement with EU entered into force. Indeed, it is recognized worldwide that Turkey is one of the biggest humanitarian donors and key policy-makers towards Syrian refugees. In recent progress reports, the EU itself underlined Turkey’s good progress on migration and asylum policies.

Despite migration and refugees being a thorny issue for the EU, it has not yet implemented any efficient policy on this issue.  While Turkey has been treated as a sort of useful tool in containing the flow of refugees and avoiding the spread of social tensions across Europe.

EU nations succeeded in banning arms sales to Ankara, marking the first time such a move was made against a partner and a NATO ally.

However, as in all marriages of convenience, problems arise when conditions are not met. Although the final purpose of the 2016 agreement has been widely honored, there are serious shortcomings in fully satisfying its terms. Ones which contradict the guiding spirit of the international law based on the principle of pacta sunt servanda or simply, deals must be respected.

In exchange for Turkey’s great effort of welcoming and accommodating Syrians fleeing the war, Brussels was to facilitate the visa liberalization process for Turkish citizens within the Schengen area, as well as providing large funds for humanitarian purposes. Both conditions have not been fulfilled by the EU while Turkey has continued to honor its commitments to Syrian refugees and to the European Union.

Along the current operation, fears of new waves of asylum seekers have alarmed Europe and especially those gateway states. Greece and Hungary underlined the need of not being caught off  guard in case new waves of refugees were to occur and called upon additional financial assistance by the EU to Turkey, acknowledging that the 2016 agreement has been the only effective mechanism in coping with the crisis. However, these are isolated voices and the issue is still extremely divisive within the Union. In this regard, the attitude of Brussels and its representatives resembles a capricious child, who gets without being satisfied, blames without taking responsibility, and refuses without proposing alternatives.

This is observed in the tension over the creation of the safe zone on the Turkish-Syrian border as strategically planned by Ankara. A main aim of Operation Peace Spring according to the Turkish government is to establish an approximately 30 km long safe area where a large number of Syrian refugees residing in Turkey would eventually return.

Despite being a complex issue and a fairly ambitious long-term goal, for Ankara this seems to be the only plausible solution to the growing number of refugees, particularly considering its frustration of not feeling sufficiently supported by the international community in responding to  the humanitarian crisis. In other words, Turkey felt alone in bearing the weight of millions of lives and investing billions of dollars in humanitarian aid, and the establishment of a safe zone is vital for enhancing Turkish domestic security finding a lasting solution to cope with the immigration issue, and to restore social cohesion. Nevertheless, the EU Parliament has ‘firmly rejected’ this ambition and it called for a UN-led security zone. The same idea has been endorsed by Germany’s defense minister who proposed sending German soldiers to Syria, an outcome which would further complicate the situation.

In short, Turkey’s operation brought to the surface all of the unresolved issues and tensions existing between Turkey and the European Union and further exacerbated their respective frustrations. Once again it seems that there is merely a chorus of condemnation rather than any attempt to find or implement sustainable solutions for both parties. In this context, ideologically oriented street protests seen in Europe are only one aspect of the serious gap in the relations between Ankara and Brussels, which over the years have been fed by a profound hypocrisy and zigzagging approaches by the EU which goes far beyond the logic of real-politik.

The Social Democrats of Germany are still searching for dual-leadership from which they hope to escape from the party’s current lack of perspective and prospects. Given the results of the Thuringia state elections, the once strong centrist party of Germany is increasingly heading towards becoming a marginal one, which will most likely have serious difficulties in achieving the five percent voter threshold at the state level, and perhaps also at the federal level. As I previously addressed, Germany’s Social Democrat Party (SPD) has had a fundamental problem of maintaining its chairpersons. The party witnessed several chairpersons who were not able to receive the necessary support both from the party’s base and leading figures in the party’s senior circles. Even despite this, since 2013 the SPD has interestingly insisted on continuing to be the junior partner of Chancellor Merkel’s grand coalition governments.

In the last 24 months, the party had an overrated chairperson, Martin Schulz, who became SPD chairperson with 100 percent of the party’s votes, but resigned subsequent to the party’s federal election losses in September 2017. Then, Schulz’ successor Andrea Nahles, became the first female chairperson of the party in its more than 150 year history. However, due to several failures and miscalculations regarding the state elections, during which the SPD faced and still faces a decreasing and catastrophic voting trend, Nahles also resigned as chairperson.

The party then decided to elect its chairperson through a vote of all of its 420 thousand members. Currently, the party is being led by an interim leadership-trio. For the first time, several co-candidates declared their candidacy. Approximately 53.3 percent of the SPD members voted in the election, in which twelve co-candidates ran. However, no candidate was able to achieve an absolute majority in the first round. Consequently, a second round of voting will be scheduled between 19 and 29 November. Following this date, the results of the winning duo will be declared at the SPD party convention in early December. The interesting point is that on this convention day the SPD will also decide their future as part of the grand coalition as well.

The current Finance Minister and Vice Chancellor Olaf Scholz and his running mate, Klara Geywitz, received most of the votes (22.68%) in the first round, followed by Norbert Walter-Borjans and Saskia Esken (21.04%). Resulting in both of these duos achieving the right to run for the party’s new co-leadership in the second round.

Polls indicate that 37 percent of members want to see Walter-Borjans and Saskia Esken as the party’s new co-leaders, while only 25 percent support Scholz and Geywitz. However, 38 percent of those polled do not support any of the co-candidates. On the other hand, leading political figures such as the SPD’s current foreign minister Heiko Maas, or the former chairperson Martin Schulz, have recently declared their support for the Scholz-Geywitz duo. Similarly, media outlets also suggest that Germany’s current Finance Minister Scholz is the favorite to lead the SPD together with Geywitz.

In the next weeks, SPD members will ultimately have a new chairperson on whom party members will set their hopes. However, in reality choosing new leadership will not guarantee that the existing obstacles within the party, and dismal predictions at the ballot will find any resolutions. But the fact that Maas and Schulz, prominent figures of the SPD, have shown support for Scholz and Geywitz, indicates the possibility of a continuation of a political line which may not be not so attractive from the point of view of voters seeking more promising change.

It is also very debatable whether the current method of electing a new chairperson of the SPD is the best one. It does not seem very convincing that a new top-leader and a potential candidate for chancellor will emerge with this kind of extended and unexciting election process.

Finally, it is a fact that the German Finance Minister Olaf Scholz only narrowly received most of the votes during the first round, which then triggered the second round. This indicates that all of the SPD’s candidates have a similar support rate, and further suggests the lack of a new and exciting mood within the party. In reality, any potential successful chairperson of a major centrist party will have to deliver much more than what Social Democrat circles are currently offering. It is clear that the current mood and choice of candidates signal that there will not be any extraordinary changes for the SPD in general, which hardly seems an appropriate development to stem the tide of voter dissatisfaction and a growing right-wing populist trend.

On November 3, 2002, Turkey’s parliamentary elections resulted in a great surprise. The AK Party, which was established almost a year and a half earlier, came to power by receiving 34 per cent of the total votes and winning 363 out of 550 MP’s in the parliament. This was despite being underestimated by both media and other political parties during the election process. There was a common perception in the media that it was not possible for the AK Party to get majority of the votes in the elections since it was newly established and did not have enough power to influence voters. Nevertheless, the AK Party’s victory started an unprecedented era of Turkish political history that still continues.

Indeed, it was not easy for the AK Party to rule the country in the beginning. All actors in the system such as the army, the judiciary, political parties, and, last but not least, media were clearly against the AK Party rule. According to these actors, the AK Party was a threat to Turkey’s modernity and secular values. Moreover, the party’s chairman, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was initially banned from running as a candidate in the elections due to a conviction for reciting an “Islamic” poem at a political rally, an act which the Constitutional Court considered to be against laicism in Turkey. It was a therefore a tough beginning to AK Party rule.

Despite this, the AK Party government achieved a difficult goal and the party has been in power for the past 17 years. Under the AK Party’s rule, Turkey made considerable achievements economically and sociologically, and many steps to democratize the country were taken. For instance, the state launched the first Kurdish language TV and radio channels and provided more rights to minorities. Furthermore, the Turkish economy reached the highest growth rate by 2010 as a result of economic reforms. Considering this legacy of the AK Party, what are the possible challenges and opportunities for AK Party rule in the upcoming period?

The first critical issue for the party is renewing itself to become more compatible with the dynamics of new political system.  Turkey switched to a presidential system after the June 2018 general elections, and all political parties are still experiencing some difficulties in understanding the new political dynamics under the presidential system. Since the presidential system requires 50 per cent +1 votes, cooperation between parties will become crucial for success in elections. However, parties still do not seem to understand the new rules of the game. For instance, political party members cannot differentiate between coalitions, requiring unanimity of all participating parties on all issues, and pre-electoral alliances, depending more on restricted cooperation between political parties. As a result, even a small disagreement between political parties are perceived to signal the end of alliances. The AK Party and the MHP experienced this situation in November 2018, and the CHP and the Iyi Party have been experiencing this more recently. Even the CHP and Iyi Party have been experiencing some disagreements, this disagreement may not turn into a break of their alliance as it was claimed. Thus, all parties, including the AK Party, needs to understand these dynamics.

The second eye-catching issue for the AK Party is understanding the sociological transformation of Turkish society over the last 17 years. This transformation has also affected voting behavior and has changed expectations for political parties. Almost all surveys show that the main determinant of voting behavior is no longer the ideology of political party as it was before. Instead, voters are paying more attention to secondary issues such as environmental and youth policies. This new voter profile also focuses on individual gains such as economic benefits. Because of this, the AK Party like all other parties will likely adjust their policy agenda to meet the changing expectations of voters.

The third important issue for the party is rejuvenating its members in preparation for the future. Indeed, the political participation of young people significantly increased during the AK Party rule. The AK Party government also decreased the age of candidacy in parliament from 25 to 18 and has the highest percentage of MP’s between the age of 18-29 in parliament. However, the party needs more youth participation especially in decision-making processes to attract the attention of young people.

Another issue for the party is the emergence of new splinter parties established by previous AK Party politicians. There is an ongoing discussion in the media that these parties may challenge the AK Party and split their votes, which may weaken the party’s position in the political arena. Even if it is too early to measure the impact of these parties on the AK Party government, the ongoing discussions in the media seem to suggest that these parties do not have the potential to break the AK Party’s power in politics. To be sure, if the AK Party pays attention to all these issues, these challenges may become opportunities for the party to maintain its rule in the following years.

When the war in Syria attracted radicals from across the globe, almost all of them were not hindered from leaving their countries despite being listed as potential suspects. The governments and their intelligence agencies, especially European states, wanted their problems to be exported to Syria. The laws in these countries are not equipped to properly address the criminal issues arising from their activities abroad, and leaving them to die in Syria appeared to be an easy choice. However, things turned out differently. The suspected terrorists went to Syria, facilitated the buildup of an alleged caliphate, murdered thousands of people, created a mess in the Middle East, conducted terror attacks in European capitals and survived.

After the territorial defeat of Daesh, the home countries are now confronted with new challenges. In contrast to their expectation, the suspected terrorists did not die but had children and survived. Many of them are now imprisoned in Syria, Iraq and Turkey. Taking those foreign terrorist fighters back is the legal obligation of their home countries, but most know that their laws are incapable of declaring a proper sentence against them. If their terror export returns, they will import battle-hardened militants who may be released from prison in a short period of time. All of this happens while the European Union denies Turkish citizens visa free entry to the EU due to the ‘harsh’ terror laws in Turkey.

European states are for the first time really facing the dilemma of terrorists and the problems of dealing with them within existing legal frameworks. If the laws of the EU are not adjusted, returning fighters might exploit it and become a new security threat. There is also an increase of Islamophobia that could in turn radicalize a number of Muslims living in Europe. If this is combined with former Daesh members released due to insufficient laws, it would potentially be a national security threat for the EU states in the near future. On the other hand, if the EU does adjust its laws, it won’t fit into the legal standards the EU demands from the candidates wanting to join the Union.

The Turkish government’s declaration that Turkey won’t be a hotel for terror exported by foreign states, did not come out of nowhere. It fits into a broader process. Turkey has signed a refugee deal with the EU to hinder the flow of refugees into Europe but complains that the other side does not act in line with the agreed terms. As Turkey is carrying the burden of 3.6 million refugees alone, and sees nothing but obstacles from the EU to accelerate the return of refugees back to the safe-zone planned by Turkey, the Turkish government’s patience is low. Ankara is not willing to take on the burden of foreign terrorist fighters as well. In addition to the European terrorists, the Turkish government also has indirect control over foreign terrorists from the Operation Euphrates Shield areas and the Operation Peace Spring areas. In total, the number of Daesh prisoners is almost 1,500 with a significant number of foreigners.

At the current moment, European states are shirking their duties to handle their self-created terror problem. The EU’s attempt to export its terror threat has seemingly backfired in a more dangerous way. Either the European governments take responsibility by accepting their citizens back, or the EU will be dependent on Turkey, Iraq and non-state actors in Syria, all of whom will use the inmates as a legitimate tool of pressure with little interest in taking care of them. If a terrorist is being released by the YPG for example, the EU will have limited means to prevent that person from smuggling into the EU and conducting a terror attack.

David C. Rapoport, a name often referenced in literature on terrorism, explains modern terrorism using a “four waves” theory based on models of political violence that change over the course of history. According to Rapoport, each wave represents one generation with each generation inspired by a different ideology (anarchism, anti-colonialism, socialism and religious fundamentalism). The first wave was the “Anarchist wave” that began in the 1870s and continued until the 1910s, during which achieving a revolution by targeting political leaders and assassinations using explosives took place. The second wave was the “Anti-Colonial wave” prominent between the 1920s and 1960s, led by the political principle of self-determination. This wave was driven by the desire to establish new independent states by overthrowing colonialist administrations, and mainly targeted the colonial police and the military using guerrilla style hit-and-run tactics. The third wave was the “New Left wave” that made its mark between the 1960s and 1980s. It was motivated by a desire to dissolve the capitalist order, and targeted governments like the U.S. During this wave, hijacking, abductions and assassination attempts were common. The fourth is the “Religious wave” that started in 1979 and is predicted to continue to the end of the 2020s, in which the mass media and communication tools are used to target the U.S., Israel and Europe for the intent and purpose of founding a “global Islamic Caliphate,”. In this wave, suicide attacks are commonly organized while air and land vehicles are widely used as weapons.

Rapoport’s “four waves of terrorism” has greatly contributed to terrorism studies in conceptual, theoretical and empirical terms, but it could not escape from becoming one of the most criticized approaches. According to some critics, the four waves theory is problematic for attributing certain types of terror acts only to specific periods, and because the waves do not always coincide with reality. The theory, as argued, might be misleading for attempting to explain terrorist violence using historical trends, which make sharp distinctions between each period. Likewise, Rapoport ignores the fact of “organizational learning”, that is to say he glossed over the lessons that terrorist groups learned from history when developing his wave theory. No matter if they are newly-founded or long-established, terror groups are known to observe, analyze and benefit from the knowledge, experience, success or mistakes of other terror groups; and develop new tactics, strategies and targets peculiar to their own dynamics. By departing from the wave theory and its criticisms, terrorist groups can simultaneously embody different ideologies, and use a plurality of discourses, hence adopting many forms and practices of political violence. Looked at from this perspective, the relations between states and non-state armed actors are no longer considered to be “covert” or “illegitimate” as it was in the past. To put it more clearly, the relationships between states and non-state armed actors are currently more overt and based on legitimate grounds. These relationships increasingly fall within grey areas, which become more and more blurred. This reality, known as “proxy wars” in the literature, explains the dubious network of relations between these actors and also how the actions of terror groups are legitimized by states politically, militarily, diplomatically or judicially.

Political and Institutional Dimensions

Turkey has confronted, both directly or indirectly, all four terrorism waves stated above. In this sense, Turkey has a long-standing experience of fighting an uphill battle against a variety of terror groups, which have different purposes and motives, are utterly flexible and can quickly adapt to new conditions in terms of their recruitment and attacking methods. These various terror groups with different ideological causes and target groups, have included the DHKP-C, TKP/ML, MKP, MLKP, THKO, PKK/PYD/YPG, ASALA, JCAG-ARA, IBDA/C (Hezbollah), FETO/PDY and Daesh (ISIS).[1]

Since the early 1980s, counterterrorism gained priority in determining Turkey’s domestic, foreign, security and defense policies, and has become a focal point in Turkish politics. So how has Turkey’s counterterrorism strategy changed over the course of time?  What is the picture of Turkey with growing terrorism experience in the face of terror groups with a growing (organizational) learning capability?  This picture has undergone some substantial changes from the 2000s due to the major transformation of the actors and factors both inside and outside the country. Turkey had to revise and change some aspects of its counter-terror policy during the early 2000s after the PKK, a terror group Turkey has been fighting for decades, adopted an ethnicity-centered separatist discourse in response to changing developments nationally, regionally and internationally although it was originally founded on the basis of a Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Since the early 1980s, counterterrorism gained priority in determining Turkey’s domestic, foreign, security and defense policies, and has become a focal point in Turkish politics.

The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent terror attacks in Istanbul, London, and Madrid at the turn of the millennium changed the course of counterterrorism strategies on a global scale. Security parameters were redefined and military strategies and technologies were reviewed within the framework of a threat and risk-based analysis. This process made it necessary for Turkey to evaluate the military-political transformation in the world and led to an increasing awareness of the need for a military-political transformation of its own. Under this process, a new political will, which prioritized Turkey’s national security and defense according to the needs and purposes of the era, emerged.

Political will was demonstrated when Ankara first endeavored to build a balance between the “civilian” and “military” bureaucracy that determined national security and defense strategies. Ankara projected that this would not be enough to prevent the differing civilian and military divisions from having domination over the other and a reformation of the bureaucracy that would enable coordination, close cooperation and a joint decision-making mechanism was needed. This manifested in the strong inter-governmental dialogue mechanism established between the Presidential Office, Foreign Ministry, National Defense Ministry, General Staff and National Intelligence Office (MIT) that considered foreign, security and defense policies.

Military and Strategic Dimensions

The most obvious and tangible conceptualization of Ankara’s changing strategic approach in the counterterrorism fight has been the transition from a “reactive strategy” to “proactive strategy”. Ankara abandoned a “wait and see” strategy and “retaliatory action”, and instead adopted the method of identifying, finding, tracking and neutralizing the enemy in its own place/location in order to prevent any sort of threats, such as carrying out a “pre-emptive air strike” on the PKK’s training camps in Northern Iraq. This new approach was also seen in Operation Euphrates Shield, Operation Olive Branch, and recently in Operation Peace Spring, and is currently ongoing in full force with the “Operation Claw” outside the borders and the Operations Kıran 1-2-3-4 inside the country.

The implementation and functionality of this strategy required Turkey to consolidate its intelligence and operational skills.  Reorganization and reformation endeavors were carried out in many areas including the military system, defense methods, internal security apparatus, joint operations between the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and the MIT, and integrated security and defense mechanisms. The reforms made particularly in the security sector ensured a more systematic approach to Turkey’s counterterrorism activities.

Turkey’s MIT intensified its cross-border intelligence activities, formed a stronger information network and focused investments on human resources.

In this context, Turkey also strived to reanalyze the scale of threats, including from both state and non-state armed actors, in terms of their conceptual features, means and capabilities and medium or long-term objectives. This was done in line with Turkey’s security perception, risk maps, perpetuity concerns and national interests.

As an extension of this endeavor, the MIT intensified its cross-border intelligence activities, formed a stronger information network by becoming more active in the field and focused investments on human resources to expand and strengthen its intelligence analysis skills. It is obvious that the intelligence analyses will enable Ankara to have more information on the means and capabilities (both quantitatively and qualitatively) of threat factors and thus make decision-making processes more informed while increasing the chances of getting favorable results.

Technological Dimension

Ankara also focused its attention on ways to eliminate the limitations it faced in its defense capacity. Conflicts of interest with other NATO allies, particularly with the U.S., has always resulted in a heavy price for Turkey. For this reason, Ankara aims to gain an independent status in security and defense while remaining loyal to regional alliances like NATO. Gaining this independence does not mean that Ankara would only cooperate with alternative actors other than NATO. In contrast, Ankara diversified the scope of its foreign suppliers in order to avert dependence on a single source and encouraged existing and new suppliers inside the country. In doing this, Ankara presumed that Turkey will obtain the means and capabilities required for “self-defense”, and now domestic resources fulfill more than 60 percent of the Turkish Armed Forces’ needs. Furthermore, Ankara subjected its defense bureaucracy to institutional reformation and made it answerable to the Presidential Office, while also mobilizing the Turkish defense industry on a pathway to realizing greater technological superiority and global competitiveness.

The increase in the product range and export figures of the Turkish defense industry proves the progress made in this field. Turkey’s employment of its domestic and national defense products in the counterterrorism operations inside and outside the country has been very useful in terms of its institutional reputation and self-assurance. Considering that non-state armed actors today have easier and quicker access to technologies compared to past (such as kamikaze UAV attacks), it must be noted that Turkey cannot afford to neglect the objective of technological superiority.

Socio-Cultural Dimension

Ankara has adopted a multi-dimensional approach in its counter-terrorism policy as of the early 2000s. As a requirement of this approach, Ankara has sought to break the impression that Turkey solely resorts to hard power and tried to show that it has been prioritizing a broader position that shows care in using soft power instruments. For this purpose, Ankara has developed a set of measures to prevent terror groups from gaining recruits and supporters while endeavoring to neutralize the terror elements. Ankara also started taking initiatives in social, cultural and educational fields by being cognizant of how vital it is to develop preventive and proactive measures against the “radicalization” efforts of the political and military offshoots of the PKK-YPG-PYD terror network. Allowing language freedom in mass media is only one example of these initiatives.

As a result, Ankara has adopted a model that combines both soft and hard power elements in its counterterrorism policy, which over the course of the past 18 years has made Turkey a more effective country in the fight against terrorism.

[1] One of the recently published article on this issue is entitled as “Terrorism in Turkey from the New Left Wave to the Global Wave”.  See Avcı, Engin, “Yeni Sol Dalgadan Küresel Dalgaya Türkiye’de Terörizm”, Kara Harp Okulu Bilim Dergisi/Science Journal of Turkish Military Academy, Haziran /June 2019, Cilt/Volume 29, Sayı/Issue 1, s 139-166.

Last Monday, Germany’s Defense Minister and Chairperson of the Christian Democrats (CDU), Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (AKK), surprisingly raised a proposal for an internationally controlled safe zone in northern Syria. AKK who is currently Chancellor Merkel’s preferred successor, stated that Germany “cannot just stand by and watch and not do anything” about Syria, while outlining her safe zone suggestion, one that which would be internationally controlled and involve Turkey and Russia.

Following her statements, the question arose as to whether she had shared this idea with her coalition partners, and above all, with the actual office responsible for foreign issues, namely, Germany’s Federal Foreign Office and its Social Democrat (SPD) foreign minister, Heiko Maas.

However, it became clear that neither the SPD nor the junior coalition partner, the Christian Social Union (CSU) and its leader Markus Söder, were informed about AKK’s ambitious proposal. Consequently, a dispute occurred behind closed doors between the coalition partners, and the proposal as well as the possible deployment of German troops to northern Syria was severely contested.

The foreign minister’s initial comments also revealed the uncomfortable mood among the coalition members. Maas stated publicly that there were some unanswered questions and that Germany had received skepticism from its EU allies. He added that there was no current discussion among partners to create such an international safe zone, and criticized the time and style in which the proposal was made.

Despite similar irritation and silent criticism by other SPD members, it seems that CDU officials instead supported the defense minister in a quasi-obligatory way, while opposition parties criticized AKK’s proposal. For instance, the Left Party called the proposal “ridiculous”, while the Greens stated that the proposal raised more questions than answers. Interestingly, the former SPD chairman and foreign minister, Sigmar Gabriel, welcomed AKK’s proposal on its content.

Neither the SPD nor the junior coalition partner, the Christian Social Union (CSU) were informed about AKK’s ambitious proposal.

In the following days, though, AKK accused Turkey of annexing parts of northern Syria which consequently caused a backlash even from the German public. Thus, some opposition members harshly criticized the defense minister for spreading “false information” while others described her as “incompetent on such issues”. AKK’s usage of the term “annexation” showed her lack of knowledge regarding military issues. It is generally accepted that there is no intention of a permanent integration of northern Syria into Turkey, which makes AKK’s assertion even more unacceptable.

One day following her public proposal, AKK did not receive the hoped for support from other NATO defense ministers. Furthermore, this recent weekend, Foreign Minister Maas made a surprise visit to Ankara, where he indirectly criticized his colleague’s safe zone proposal. When he was asked about the unclear plan, Maas answered “we were told it was not realistic. Therefore, we prioritized issues that are more important for us at the moment.”

Given the current circumstances; how should we comment on these recent events? It is quite interesting to observe that AKK is preferring to use language which stresses that the situation in Syria is massively compromising the security interests of Germany and Europe. She also criticized both actors for acting too much like “onlookers” and argued that only “a political initiative from Germany for a European advance through NATO makes sense.” But what may be AKK’s main purpose and interest in proposing such an unrealistic step, one which even the German Foreign Minister had to dismiss during his recent visit in Ankara?

Actually, it is no doubt a risky step that aimed to increase her political importance and public popularity, which has been gradually decreasing over the past couple of months. In addition, the recent blow in the Thuringia state elections has also been related to AKK’s performance as the CDU chairperson.

Therefore, as the potential future German chancellor, AKK most likely made a move to achieve a success story on an international platform. This, however, did not receive that much support and even deteriorated the intra-coalition relations, as Maas had stressed during his short-planned visit to Ankara, in which Maas made it clear that Germany’s foreign policy was not determined by the CDU leader and defense minister, but by his ministry. However, other CDU politicians and even opposition figures preferred to criticize Maas’ undiplomatic words that targeted (and even offended) their cabinet colleague.

At the end of the day, the move by the CDU leader will most likely not contribute positively towards her ambitions of becoming Germany’s next chancellor in 2021. Although her previous rival for chancellor, Friedrich Merz is not currently attacking her personally, he has focused attention instead on Chancellor Merkel as the main person responsible of the electoral defeat in Thuringia and other failings of the party. Importantly, Merz recently stressed that the current grand coalition could not continue until 2021.

While these were not direct criticisms of AKK, it can be surmised that such statements will ultimately affect the position of AKK herself, and the future of the coalition partnership as a whole. One which has suffered heavily due to the recent unplanned safe zone move by AKK and the undiplomatic reactions by the foreign minister abroad.

On 9 October, 2019 the Turkish Armed Forces and the Syrian National Army launched a joint military operation in the east of the Euphrates against the YPG, the Syrian extension of the PKK terrorist organization. Turkish forces captured many areas in a short time, including Tal Abyad and Rasulayn. Right from the onset, there has been an extensive campaign against Turkey conducted by Western governments and media outlets. Many fake news stories were circulated on social and conventional media aiming to undermine the ethical ground of the operation. Baseless allegations such as bombing civilians or conducting ethnic cleansing were attributed to Turkey. Despite all this, Turkey continued its operation decisively and with the highest sensitivity for civilians. In fact, Turkey was the only country that has paid attention to the humanitarian needs on the field when compared with the US, Russia, and Iran. One can determine this quickly by looking at the post-operation pictures of the areas in which these countries operated.

Nevertheless, Turkey did not exclude any political solution which would meet its objectives. In this regard, on October 17, Turkey agreed with the US to halt the military operation temporarily. Accordingly, the YPG members were supposed to withdraw from the area that Turkey designated as the safe zone within 120 hours. Even though this plan did not function properly, US troops pulled back from the area. On October 22, Turkey turned to Russia and made another deal to maintain its border security in Sochi. The Sochi agreement paved the way for securing Turkey’s borders and was marked as a great diplomatic achievement. With these two agreements, the YPG’s dream of creating a separate state inside Syria collapsed. Even though Turkey eliminated the YPG threat on its southern border, and Iran announced its welcome of the new Sochi deal, Iran’s stance with regards to the operation tells a lot about its calculations in Syria and possible developments in the near future.

Iran’s objection to Operation Peace Spring

From the first minute of the operation Iran condemned Turkey’s actions. Many in Iran, ranging from government to ill-informed lay citizens, raised their objections to Operation Peace Spring. President Rouhani stated that even though he understood Turkey’s security concerns, there were other ways to solve problems such as dialogue. Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif emphasized the 1998 Adana Agreement and encouraged dialogue between the Turkish government and the Assad regime. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement asking Turkey to stop the operation and pull back. Many MPs in the Iranian parliament, especially from the Kurdish populated areas, harshly criticized Turkey’s action. Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Parliament, canceled his scheduled visit to Turkey as did the former president of Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Friday prayer leaders of the various provinces slated Turkey in their sermons. Some protesters gathered around the Turkish Embassy in Tehran and wrote hideous slogans on the Embassy’s wall. While others protesting around the country burned Turkish flags. Many artists, musicians, and film directors protested against Turkey on social media. 

It is possible to detect a shared language and the usage of a particular discourse about Turkey’s operation in these protests. The discourse was exactly the same which Western countries tried to disseminate. It is a gripping example of how quickly an anti-Western country can adopt to a biased Western discourse when it comes to Turkey.

Iran sacrificed its long term stability in the region for its short term geopolitical gains.

Even so, not all sections of Iran protested and objected to the operation. Some members of the parliament from the regions inhabited by Turkic Iranians intensively opposed the anti-Turkey rhetoric. They gave reminders about the PJAK’s terrorist actions against civilians and of the security personnel and Iranian people who lost their lives fighting the PJAK, the Iranian branch of the PKK terrorist organization. Many Turkic people living in Iran sided with Turkey on social media. Some football players of Tractor Sport Club, a football club of the Azeri city of Tabriz, and the majority of its fans expressed their support for the operation. Diversity of reactions in Iran to Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring wonderfully depicts the range of Iran’s ethnic heterogeneity and the role of ethnicity in political life.

Along with ethnicity, other factors also made a difference in Iran’s daily politics, such as religious sects, political positioning, and institutions. There are various elements and power centers which have voiced their criticism towards Turkey’s action. Although there are several centers of power influential in Iran’s general politics, this cannot be regarded as a polyarchy, as described by the influential political theorist Robert Dahl. According to Dahl, within democracies, there are many power centers which function as stabilizers. Therefore, one power bloc cannot assume power by itself but must share it with others. Dahl describes this as “rule by many”. However, the real picture of Iranian politics exhibits a hierarchy rather than polyarchy. Some institutions have more power than others. At the top of the system, the supreme leader steers the whole political process. Most of the time, he acts as an arbiter between different blocs, but at the end of the day, he has the last say on crucial matters. Therefore, the establishment, led by the Supreme Leader, could control the anti-Turkey discourse circulated among Iranians. However, events did not unfold in this way.

Iran’s U-Turn

In fact, in the last summit of the leaders in Ankara on September 16, 2019, Rouhani had acknowledged Turkey’s security problem in northern Syria and said Turkey had a right to protect its borders. However, he approached things differently when it comes to Operation Peace Spring. What could motivate Iran to act against Turkey’s security interests in Syria? Why would Iran oppose Turkey’s involvement in Syria?

Firstly, Iran sees Syria as a hallway to reach the Mediterranean Sea and Lebanon, where Hezbollah is based. In its geopolitical vision, Syria has an indisputable place. Secondly, Iran invested huge money and manpower in Syria from the beginning of the civil war in 2011. It is understandable from Tehran’s point of view that it does not want to lose influence in Syria. Put differently, Iran wants to see the fruits of this investment. In this context, Turkey is regarded as another stakeholder, and its involvement is seen as a challenge to Iran’s hegemony. And lastly, Iran is not happy with Turkey having a close relationship with Russia. Turkey got the support of Russia in Operation Olive Branch and in Operation Peace Spring. Even though Iran allied with Russia in 2015 to keep Assad in power, its long-term strategic goals differ. In Russia’s perspective, there is room for Israel’s security perceptions regarding Syria and Iran. But Iran’s security perceptions and vision for Syria require a limitation of Israel’s activities. That is why Hezbollah has such importance and Iran wants to keep Syria for Hezbollah’s focus.

Nevertheless, Iran has its own PKK problem as well. The PKK’s Iran branch the PJAK has been active for years in Iran and took several lives of Iranian people. If the YPG gained territorial sovereignty in Syria, Iran would be vulnerable to terror attacks like Turkey. This would put the region’s stability and security in jeopardy. Yet, Iran voluntarily closed its eyes to that reality. In other words, Iran sacrificed its long term stability in the region for its short term geopolitical gains described above. However, Iranian decision-makers fail to see that their short-term gains are also at stake in the light of the latest developments in Syria. With each passing day, Russia is becoming less keen to allow Iran’s activities and influence in the region. Russia allowing Israel airstrikes against Iranian forces in south Syria is an important manifestation of this. Moreover, losing Turkey’s support will add additional costs.

Iran’s attitudes undermine a possible Turkey-Iran alliance related to border security and general regional problems. Iran’s ambivalent policy fuels distrust of Turkey’s decision makers towards Iran. President Erdogan lately expressed his disappointment with Iran’s actions and reminded of Turkey’s support to Iran in the matters of sanctions and nuclear activities. As long as Iran continues to act in this way, there will be no concrete and constructive relations between the two countries. This would result in the further increase in regional problems, and Iran will most likely be even more isolated in the face of sanctions and other instruments that the West has been using against them for some long time.

When Turkey purchased the S-400 missile defense system from Russia it created a diplomatic furor among some NATO allies, primarily the US, that saw the decision as a threat to NATO solidarity. On the other hand, the purchase decision was regarded domestically as a sign of Turkey’s increasing confidence to pursue its own domestic defense agenda, particularly in the face of an unreliable and even hostile international partners. But what can we understand of the relationship between defense trade and foreign relations, and in what way do economic and political requirements dictate a state’s defense and foreign policy agendas. Dr. Merve Seren spoke with Ruslan Pukhov, Co-founder and Director of the Moscow-based Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), a leading defense industry and arms trade think tank to answer some of these questions.  

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Mr. Pukhov, do you think todays’ export policies are largely shaped by economic and commercial gains?

During the Cold War, arms exports and sales were not a matter of foreign trade but of foreign policy. The U.S. was the only country that considered the arms trade as a tool of arms policy while other states considered this in commercial terms, especially France, Israel and Russia. It was for Russians mainly foreign trade. But the situation changed with the arrival of Donald Trump, who is the first U.S. president who considers the arms trade as a business not as foreign policy. That’s why the American share in the arms trade market is rapidly growing. The U.S. is taking the shares which formerly belonged to Israel, Russia and France. This is happening at a time when the global market for arms trade is becoming denser as countries such as Turkey and South Korea, which were importers 20 years ago, but are now successful arms exporters.

Turkey bought the Russian-made S-400 air defense missile system. Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian system provoked reaction in the West, as this system is not a tactical one, but rather a very sophisticated, strategic and deterrent one. Do you agree that Turkey’s NATO allies are right to be fearful about this?

When we are speaking about procurement within NATO, we should always remember the phrase by the Former Secretary of Defense General Jim Mattis, who was basically defending Turkey. Every NATO member decides for itself what to buy. Slovakia and Greece already have the previous generation of this defense system, the S-300. It would be a double injustice to Turkey since there are other NATO members having this system. I believe it is just a pretext that Turkey’s purchase can harm NATO security, it is very anti-Turkish and has nothing to do with NATO solidarity.

But Slovakia and Greece that use Russian missile defense systems say that they are not strategic or operational. Furthermore, the NATO members who use former Soviet and current Russian technology are trying to replace them with newer European or American technologies.

All defense technologies we can speak of can be divided, roughly into a black and white picture, into two big categories: high-tech and lower-tech. For the time being, Turkey is doing very well with the lower-tech products, such as Yonca-Onuk boats. But their propulsion comes from Germany. The design is Turkish, the integration is Turkish, but certain key items are not. So, if Germany decides to punish Turkey for some reasons, they might stop selling the propulsion. Like you used to have problems with the Fırtına howitzers, their propulsion is also German.

The same is true with air defense and the missiles. Missiles themselves do not require extremely sophisticated technology, but when we speak of an air defense system, yes, it is sophisticated and the states producing such defense systems are limited. These systems vary from MANPADS like Stinger, and IGLA up to strategic ones like Patriot and the S-400. We don’t know how effective the European’s SAMP/T system is, but if you want to have a strategic system which protects your sovereignty in the skies, you only have two options: Patriot and S-300 or S-400.

A friend of mine, a former pilot from Australia told me that the only thing you can do without Americans in their fighter jets is to send mayday signals! Because America uses sophisticated equipment, full of magic black boxes which can basically stop and deactivate your equipment. 

If the U.S. deprives Turkey of the F-35s, Turkey will not be losing that much. Turkey is not desperately in need of buying fighter jets now. Turkey can wait and see.

From this point of view, the F-35 is very good if you know that you will be fighting as an ally of the United States. But if you want to challenge the U.S. or if you pursue an independent foreign policy, they will basically have you in a grip. There is no doubt the F-35 is the best aircraft on the market but only under the condition that you’re a country like Poland or the Czech Republic. But if you are a country like Brazil, Turkey, Malaysia, even India, and you pursue an independent foreign defense policy and if you do not follow the Washington party line, American systems are not always the best choice.

So, if the U.S. deprives Turkey of the F-35s, Turkey will not be losing that much. There are other options. But before that we have to look at who really can challenge Turkey. When I speak about supersonic aircrafts, Armenians don’t have them but only subsonic aircrafts. Assad regime is in ruins in many respects. Iraq has a limited number of F-16s. Greece has a limited number of F-16s and they are the previous generation. When we look at your neighbors, Turkey is not desperately in need of buying fighter jets now. Turkey can wait and see. If you would get it, let’s say within five to seven years, it is not a catastrophe for your military buildup.

There is an expression “You don’t only buy arms, but also buy the friendship of the exporter country”. Do you believe that arms trade can create a long-term engagement, and perhaps a strategic cooperation between customers and their suppliers?

Twenty years ago we developed a theory at our center which turned out to be true. It was just an intellectual exercise before it was proven. When analyzing the arms trade, understanding the motivation of the buyer is important. Because people buy weapons with different motivations. One motivation is exactly as you describe, you are buying “friendship”, and you are buying “security guarantees”. When, for example, Saudi Arabia is massively buying from the United States, a little less from Britain, less from France and little bit from Russia, it is exactly that, they are buying security guarantees. They wish to please the seller.

When countries such as China or Brazil buy weapons, they buy them because they wish to get a technological leap. Brazil bought supersonic aircrafts, because Sweden offered Brazil a great “offset opportunity” within the framework of the “Technology Transfer Program”, which started in 2015. Today, the Brazilian Embraer became a world class aviation firm thanks to the education and production they joined in these offsets, and the firm has now teamed up with Boeing. So, the initial motivation was technological, Brazilians bought these aircrafts for a technology and skill transfer.

Sometimes people buy to fight, but not very often. To tell the truth, nowadays, this is not the predominant motivation. As the Cold War is over, the purchase of sophisticated military equipment came to an end. Sometimes people buy to replenish the pockets because corruption often goes together with the arms trade. Because the same tank can cost, let’s say, two million dollars or five million dollars, it depends on the kickback and on the commission. That is why sometimes the arms trade is an excellent opportunity to steal public funds. Because weapons are not oil, not food, not metals. There is no price stock for a main battle tank, there is no price stock for a fighter jet. It can differ a lot and depends on the client.

So, when we look at Turkey, I think in the beginning it started as a pure military decision. Because Turkey became a very influential actor in the Middle East and in Eurasia, in 20 years but especially in the last 15 years. But this Turkey was not the master of its own sky. It had almost zero air defense. A little bit on the Bosphorus but all of it tactical. That is why starting from neighbors who can intrude, up to unmanned aerial vehicles, Turkey needs to protect its sovereignty in the skies. It started more as a technical decision but then many political things ended up happening.

I thought President Erdogan wanted the United States and Brussels to focus their attention on the Turkish contribution to NATO and European security. The burden of the refugee crisis is so high and Turkey is not a free-rider as many other NATO members. Turkey is really sharing the burden but getting much less. So, by purchasing the S-400, Erdogan wanted to raise this problem. Basically Turkey is saying we are a loyal supporter of the United States and the NATO alliance but what do we get? We only contribute without getting anything in return. That is why they wanted to raise the value of Turkey in NATO, so that people will not take Turkish loyalty for granted. I think this was the idea.

So, you build up your relationship according to the motivations of the buyer.

Yes. It depends on what the buyer wants.

Could you give your thoughts on the capabilities and the vulnerabilities of the Russian defense industry? 

When we look at Russia, there are areas where Russia is traditionally good and probably the best such as the air defense systems. In contrast, Russian fighter aircrafts were not that potent, we were always one step behind the West. 

Pakistan is a great example of this. In 1982, Pakistan got the first F-16 in their inventory, but the Soviet Union and Afghanistan were still operating with aircrafts of the 4th generation. At that time the MIG-29 and SU-27 were still going through test flights. The Soviet air forces didn’t have it in their inventory at the time. That is why Pakistan had air superiority over the Soviet Union in tactical fights over the Pakistani border. 

Russia’s aviation was always behind the schedule of delivery. Look, why is the SU-77 so big in size? Or let’s compare our Black Shark helicopters on the one hand and the Airbus’s TIGER helicopter on the other. Our Black Shark helicopter is 1.5 times heavier. Why? Because the quality of Russian Kevlar is not as good as the quality of German or French ones. It is similar to the Russian full metal jacket, ours weighs 10 kilos while the European one weighs five kilos, because the materials are not that good. 

This question was related to why the Russian aircrafts were so big. Because our chipsets were not that good and our radars were heavy and big. So, we are lagging behind in combat aviation. Because of that the Soviet political and military effort massively invested in air defense. That is why Russia’s air defense is really a gem, a real diamond. For this reason, Turkey is buying the best. 

Or look at Russian ship building if you like. It is in a very poor state. Turkey is now building helicopter landing docks, right? Yes, this is a Spanish project but Turkey developed it indigenously. We [Russia] were basically obliged to go and buy the Mistral from France. At the end of this story we haven’t got the Mistral but our industry is unable to produce, at least in the foreseeable future and for reasonable money, things like Mistral type helicopter landing docks. That is why, in certain areas we are really not that good. 

If you could speak about possible criticisms, what are the vulnerabilities of the Russian defense industry? Especially from the perspective of Russian defense bureaucracy. 

I’m not an expert on bureaucracy but I can tell you that one area is chipsets, like all these microelectronics. Why do you think that Russian satellites are not that reliable? Because we are not producing the chips of space quality, which can deal with the radiation. That is why American satellites and European satellites are in orbit for years but ours only for months. Because in the Soviet Union, we were behind with all of this microelectronics. And when the Soviet Union collapsed, we became even more behind. So there are areas where we were behind the West, and still behind. You [Turkey] already have combat Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and apart from ANKA you have from President Erdogan’s son-in-law’s firm.

Yes, you are talking about Bayraktar. 

You have two types of UAVs, not only observation ones but also attack ones too. We have only observation ones, and these are Israeli Searcher MK-2. And our UAVs are still under the test flights. In the area of UAVs, we are not only behind Turkey, we are also behind Iran. Because China, Iran, and Turkey are in the club of countries which produce their own attack UAVs with missiles. But great Russia with nuclear weapons do not have UAVs with missiles, it’s ridiculous. 

When I was asking about vulnerabilities in the Russian industry, I was also asking about the defense eco-system. Do all the defense companies in Russia belong to national companies or are there support mechanism for private companies in order to increase Russian arms export? For instance what is the level of government control in joint development? 

I can tell you that, we used to have strong and privately owned national champions. We have, yes, a state agency such as Rosoboronexport, which is almost the state’s Ministry of Armament. If it is in final production, Russia uses Rosoboronexport to export, but if it is not, you can do it without Rosoboronexport. For example, if a Russian and Turkish firm jointly develop something, like for example the BrahMos – Russian Indian Cruise missiles, there is no Rosoboronexport. It is a joint venture between Indian and Russian companies. Because it is not pure trade and is a joint development. If it is a joint development and it is not within a seller-buyer paradigm, it is in another basket, another regulation. 

The government is controlling everything, but there are different ways of controlling. There are direct and indirect ways of exercising control over the production process. For example, Russia may or may not give the export license. There are cases where the government is a direct shareholder, like in your case ANKA, but sometimes the government is not a shareholder. 

This is a complicated and a long story. Now in Russia, they are trying to favor state run firms, which are very often not that efficient and rights and licenses to export are not given to private firms which are efficient. For example, they prefer to support inefficient state-run yards, but not to support like the Russian Yonca-Onuk successful champions. We also have this problem. 

What is your analysis about the current security policies and defense strategies of Putin’s Russia in regards to its regional involvements and deployments? Do you think President Putin has started to adopt a much more offensive and expansionist posture, considering the Russian intervention in Georgia, Ukraine, Crimea, Syria and even Afghanistan (through negotiations with Taliban)? 

I view it differently. It is not because Russia became more assertive or aggressive, but because when we look at world leaders there is no serious leadership initiative. In this environment, Emmanuel Macron, for example, looks like a serious leader because there is no leadership either in Germany or in Britain, even in the United States. People may like Erdogan or not. People may like Putin or not, but there is no doubt both are national leaders. They exercise leadership. Although I’m not a big fan of President Erdogan, I should also say that every time people attacked him he faced it and responded. He went and meet the challenge just like Putin. So, in the absence of other leaderships, some leaders like Putin may act more assertive or aggressive, respond challenges and don’t hide behind problems. I don’t think Russia is more active or more assertive. I think Russia is defensive, but it looks like this because of the absence of leadership elsewhere. 

Lastly, as a security and arms expert, I want to ask what your assessment about the future characteristics of warfare is. From the point of “Gerasimov Doctrine”, are we moving towards “hybrid warfare”, what states should invest or develop in order to encounter hybrid threats? 

To answer to this question in a coherent way, I will provide you with three snapshots. First of all, I don’t like the term “hybrid warfare” because every warfare is hybrid by definition. Since ancient times, every war is hybrid and there is always a mix of linear, nonlinear, open, and covert operations. 

Secondly, it is obvious that the next wars would be different from the previous ones. You already experienced this when you lost your soldiers, your proxy fighters and main battle tanks in al-Bab. Because humanity lives in big and crowded cities and metropolises such as Istanbul, Damascus and Moscow. So future wars will be like the battle of Aleppo, it will be tough and different. And the people, warfare, and equipment must be adapted to an urban war theaters which are essentially different.

And thirdly, apart from classical war threats, there is the issue of growing population. Imagine that in 20 years, there will be half a billion population in Europe, two billion in Africa in 20-30 years. Many people from Africa would like to move into Europe, and some of them will move to Europe through Middle East. So, how to combat huge flows of immigration will be of grave significance. So, the main issue will not be an assertive Russia or Turkey, but possible demographic challenges. 

My last question is about military spending, because it is said that military spending is decreasing, even now Russia is the second largest arms exporter country but is actually shrinking a little bit. What do you observe in Russia’s military spending? Are there any reactions from society? I am asking this because Europe has to spend at least 2% of their GDP in defense spending. Is there a limitation on Russia to spend this kind of a percentage or is there any reaction from the society on military expenditure? 

In fact, the Russian political and military establishment understand very well that if infrastructure like roads, pipe-lines, and electricity lines are not renewed, then the security of Russia will not be better if people are not satisfied with the quality of their lives. There is a balance between let’s say how much fighter aircraft we are buying and how much and how many new bridges we can build. Russia is different than the Soviet Union and the country now gives its military and defense industry the minimum they need, but expecting the maximum return they can deliver.

As Turkey launched its Operation Peace Spring, an unfortunate phenomenon has been observed once again among European and German circles. Namely the continuation of a myth about the YPG. This begins with their practice of legitimizing the YPG as the representative of all Kurds – no matter whether they are living in Turkey, Syria or in Germany, and despite the strong evidence to the contrary.

Without taking into consideration the diversity within the Kurdish community, a false narrative is established in which YPG members, sympathizers and even its leading figures are only discussed within a positive and uncritical narrative. This disguises the true face of the PKK and its offshoot, the YPG in Northern Syria. A mistake rooted in both a lack of knowledge and an intention to shape public opinion, observable among politicians, artistic circles, media representatives, journalists and even think-tankers.

Most of the media outlets disregard or do not explicitly mention the fact that the PKK/YPG is officially listed as a terrorist organization by Turkey, EU, and the US. The term used to describe the terrorist organization in the media is the “prohibited Kurdistan Workers’ Party” which implies two incorrect meanings: First, Turkey’s supposed undemocratic political landscape where minority groups are not allowed political representation, and second the alleged legality of the PKK and its supposed leftist credentials. There are thousands of articles which either hide the PKK’s ethno-nationalist, separatist and armed character or mention that it is prohibited in the US, EU and Turkey without ever explaining why. It is by using this kind of language that a positive perception of the terrorist group is generally achieved.

If one focuses on the stances of German politicians and compares their approaches towards Daesh and to the YPG, particularly with the rise of Daesh (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria, it is noticeable that unfortunately one –secular– terror group was preferred in order to fight another terror group Daesh. This is despite the Western world’s powerful militarily superiority. The question is, if both are deemed to be abhorrent terrorist groups why was one of them acceptable, even to become an ally to the US and EU?

It appears the ethnic-separatist, neo-Marxist and totalitarian PKK/YPG is somehow deemed to be a lesser threat to Europeans and the West, who instead classify so called religiously inspired terrorism at the top of their hierarchy of evil.

In addition to the ideologically motivated stance of journalists and politicians with regard to the YPG, the most striking issue is the ambivalent behavior of academics’ and think-tankers’. Not for the first time, experts on the PKK/YPG were seen to disregard their own research on the YPG on television and radio. But why choose to disregard what you know? It would seem the societal, media and political pressure which underpins the YPG myth have led these academics to disregard their research, opinions and analyses regarding this terrorist group.

Academics spoke about the YPG as if it had no relation with the PKK while their own publications openly stress a PKK-YPG relationship. Unfortunately, popularity, professional “reputation”, financial dependence, and current political developments seem to trump academic integrity. Similarly, think-tankers, who are likely responsible to their sponsors have disregarded their own publications and have even made calls to support a terrorist organization.

Nevertheless, at the end of the day, more realist approaches appear to be winning favor. In this context, Germany’s defense minister and leader of the Christian Democrats recently proposed the establishment of an internationally controlled security zone in Syria in cooperation with Turkey and Russia. It is too early to tell whether these delayed proposals will have any effect on the current discourse and myths surrounding the PKK/YPG terrorist organization in Germany, the same applies to whether such moves will be taken seriously at all both domestically and internationally.

Countries such as Russia and Turkey will most likely reject such delayed calls after their history of disregarding previous efforts, particularly of Turkey. It should be remembered that during those times Western states took no responsibility but tried to put themselves in the foreground. Due to this, it seems rather unlikely that Turkey will accept certain states interrupting an ongoing process, particularly since the recent memorandum of understanding was signed between Turkey and Russia on north-eastern Syria. The picture will become clearer in the coming days and weeks.

After Turkey began its military operations in Northern Syria on October 9, public debate focused on how the military operation would affect Turkey’s relations with Western countries, especially the US, and whether the operation would change the power balance in Syria. Turkey and the US then came to an agreement to suspend the operation for five days while the US oversaw the withdrawal of the YPG from the region. After the de-escalation of the conflict in Northern Syria, Turkey’s main opposition party, the CHP, changed its position towards the operation, again. As I wrote earlier, from its inception, Operation Peace Spring received the support of all of Turkey’s political parties, except the HDP. Even the resolution of the Turkish Assembly renewing authorization for the Turkish Armed Forces to launch a military operation in Northern Syria received the support of the AK Party, CHP, MHP, and Iyi Party. It was the first time since the July 15, 2016 coup attempt that all political parties were unanimous on an issue.

However, this did not last long. Turkey’s opposition parties adopted their critical positions again. Especially the CHP, which turned back to its harsh position towards the government’s Syria policy. Indeed, even if the CHP had supported the military operation from the beginning, there was a lot of criticism from the party’s pro-HDP circles towards the operation.

For instance, Canan Kaftancıoğlu, head of the Istanbul branch of the CHP, criticized Turkey’s military operation in a written statement and underlined that the operation should not be conducted. Moreover, Sezgin Tanrıkulu, the CHP’s Istanbul MP, blamed Turkey for “invading” Syrian territories and killing civilians living in that area.

The CHP’s flip-flopping position on the Syria issue shows a clash of opinions between two different blocs within the party. While Kemalist and nationalist circles support the operation without any hesitation since they see the operation as Turkey’s right to secure its borders, pro-HDP circles within the CHP are clearly against the operation, and do not acknowledge that the CHP has supported to the operation from the start. The prominent names of this pro-HDP circles, Canan Kaftancığlu, Sezgin Tanrıkulu and Aytuğ Atıcı have been explicitly criticizing the operation and calling it an “invasion”. When it comes to Kemalist and nationalist circles, the leading figures of this group including Muharrem İnce, Umut Oran, and Tanju Özcan supported the military operation. Thus, it is obvious that the recent shift in the CHP’s position after Turkey’s agreement with the US over Syria is also related to the dominance of the pro-HDP group in the party politics. Since the members of this group were clearly against the operation from the beginning, and did not favor the official stance of the party that supported the operation, their hegemony in the party caused the shift in the CHP’s position.

Why did the CHP support the operation although pro-HDP circles are dominant in the party? When the operation started on October 9, the mobilization of nationalist sentiments in the country forced the CHP to support the operation. Although the pro-HDP circles of the CHP were clearly against to the operation, it was not an option for the CHP to oppose to the operation while all of the Turkish public was united in favor of the operation. In other words, the CHP had to perform a pragmatic action to prevent a negative reaction from the public, especially its voters, a certain amount of whom are nationalist voters. Nevertheless, rising tensions in US-Turkey relations, the escalation of a diplomatic crisis with the US, as well as the ambiguity of Russia-Turkey relations during the operation forced the CHP to change its discourse. At this point, the pro-HDP group’s position towards the Syria issue became dominant in the party’s official stance.

The recent statements of the CHP’s Chairman, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, reflects the recent shift in the discourse of the party and the dominance of pro-HDP groups. Even if Kılıçdaroğlu is closer to the pro-HDP groups rather than Kemalist and nationalist circles as the chairman of the party, he had to support the operation because of the increasing nationalist sentiments in Turkey. Nevertheless, Kılıçdaroğlu criticized the government after the agreement and said that Turkey should not be involved in the Syrian issue anymore and should stay away from “the quagmire of Middle East”. Moreover, to strengthen his position in the political atmosphere where nationalist sentiments are still on the rise, Kılıçdaroğlu focused on Trump’s letter to Erdoğan and problematize it as a matter of honor for Turkey.

Indeed, incidents in the last two weeks show that the CHP’s position towards the Syrian issue is more compatible with Western perspectives, as the party does not see the establishment of a Kurdish state in Northern Syria as a threat to Turkey. This party position is shaped by the former bureaucrats of the Foreign Ministry who are influential within the party and in pro-HDP circles. This group includes prominent names within the party such as Ünal Çeviköz and Faruk Loğoğlu, and since the beginning of the Syrian crisis this group defended the idea that the Turkish government should have negotiated with the Assad regime. According to their approach, Turkey’s quest to build a safe-zone on the border is nothing but a “demographic engineering project”, as was stated in the final report of the CHP’s Syria Conference. Since these groups were critical of the operation from the beginning, their discourse became the main determinants of the CHP’s position in time.

Because of this, Turkey’s operation to Northern Syria showed again that pro-HDP groups within the CHP are more powerful than its Kemalist and nationalist circles. It also proves that the pro-HDP group dominates the party’s discourse on critical issues. Even if the increasing nationalist sentiment during the operation forced the party to support the operation in the beginning, it did not take so long for the CHP to adopt its traditional approach to the Syria issue which is highly dominated by the pro-HDP group.

As the basis of the international system, sovereignty is understood as the capability of a country to govern itself, prevent the intervention of other countries, and its recognition in the international arena. Beyond its traditional meanings, in his famous book Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy Stephen D. Krasner broke down sovereignty into four types. ‘Interdependence sovereignty’ is the one of them and it is the requirement that a state have effective control of its borders in order to maintain its domestic security. Krasner discusses this and says “if a state cannot regulate what happens across its borders, it will not be able to control what happens within”. In light of this approach, I invite the readers of this piece to think of Turkey’s position, a country which shares its southern border with a fragmented state in a desperate civil war, with terrorist groups close to its border, and facing the risk of a huge flow of further refugees from Syria, in addition to more than 3.5 million already living in the country.

Indeed, Turkey’s latest military operation should have been understood within the framework of border security. However, Operation Peace Spring launched by the Turkish Armed Forces in collaboration with the Syrian National Army generated an entirely different debate in the international arena—whether Turkey’s operation was an invasion or not. These discussions also focused on the supposed political ambitions of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as a potential motivation for the operation. Putting these misleading perceptions aside, the collective support by the Turkish people for the military operation provides robust evidence of how people from different political backgrounds attach utmost importance to state sovereignty, especially when it comes to questions of national security. Interpreting the operation as an invasion misunderstands a major factor that drives Turkish foreign policy, that it is thoroughly about Turkey’s national security.

To clearly understand this, one should look back to the recent history of Turkish politics. A new security agenda for Turkey surfaced in the 1970s when the first Kurdish opposition groups emerged, and soon after evolved into an ethnic based separatist movement. This generated the PKK, which was recognized as a terrorist organization by the U.S. and EU and took over 40,000 lives in its 30 years of terrorist activity, the PKK terror group became a primary challenge for Turkey’s territorial integrity.

Despite the fact that since the 2000s, the root causes that brought forth the PKK were handled using democratic methods, the territorial integrity issue was not negotiable. Since the 1990s, in line with domestic policy, foreign policymakers responding to the PKK threat sought alliances in the Middle East and cooperated with the US to avert the possibility of an independent Kurdish state. Stances towards the PKK have become a main determinant for Turkish foreign policy. As was demonstrated when Syrian state support to the PKK brought the two countries to the brink of war in 1998.

Since 2011, the Syrian Civil War triggered an ongoing humanitarian catastrophe and turmoil in the region and led to an elevated security concern for Turkey. From the perspective of Turkish policymakers, the refugee crisis and the armament race among terrorist groups at Turkey’s southern borders put the country in a risky position, pushing it to apply stricter and more responsive security measures. The armament of the PYD and YPG, offshoots of the PKK, with the help of the US and European states particularly intensified Turkey’s security concerns. The unending war in Syria,  the insufficient intervention by international actors to address the crisis, and the persistent downgrading of Turkey’s efforts to address the Syrian refugee crisis by European states caused distrust between Turkey and its allies.

Moreover, Turkey had to witness the formation of a terrorist corridor in northern Syria that would pose a long-term security threats to its territorial integrity. Turkey’s concerns about this development and calls for a safe zone were left unanswered until the recent deal was announced with the United States. This signaled the first public affirmation of the need to prioritize Turkey’s security needs as a NATO ally. However, the territorial integrity and border security of Turkey are still largely disregarded by its allies, as reflected in the hostile responses of other NATO members to Turkey’s operation.

The constant conflation of the YPG, PYD and the PKK with the broader Kurdish community, as has been the practice of international media and commentators reveals a complete lack of awareness of regional realities in the simplest terms. The YPG’s ambition to capture territory from warn-torn areas under the Syrian war’s cover the darkness, fed turmoil in the region and caused millions of people to be displaced.

Turkey now hosts almost four million Syrian refugees. Despite the abundant number of refugees compared with other states, such Germany, Turkey has shown the most welcoming response to hosting refugees fleeing the Syrian crisis. However, the latest developments undeniably bring both domestic and international problems for Turkey. Between the build-up of the YPG and Daesh (ISIS) terrorist groups near Turkey’s borders and the huge refugee population, Turkey should have taken further steps to protect its security and ensure more effective control of its borders. Across domestic and foreign policy, responding to the refugee crisis and terror threat become a sovereignty problem of increasing concern to the Turkish public. The creation of safe zone and the push back of terrorists from its southern borders became an obligation.

The previous and recent military operation of Turkey occurred in such a context. Turkish officials repeatedly declared that the territorial integrity of Syria will be protected and the only aim of the operation was to prevent the creation of terror corridor and to establish a safe zone for refugees. Therefore, calling it an invasion falls short of explaining the conditions that brought Turkey to this threshold. Indeed, the latest operation of Turkey is a matter of self-defense. The recent pause in Turkey’s operation in response to the YPG leaving the 20 mile deep safe zone demonstrates that Turkey is sticking to its declarations. Degrading the operation to the level of a leader’s ambition, or portraying it as an invasion is both inaccurate and lazy. Unfortunately, this has become a frequent feature of Western media analysis of Turkish foreign policy. Regardless of the government, assessing foreign policy over time ensures more accurate assessment. Allowing a zone full of terrorists at its southern borders is an unacceptable condition for Turkey and any sovereign state would not accept it. Thus, the Operation Peace Spring is a matter of border security to protect the sovereignty of Turkey rather than the nonsense argument of invasion.

New realities have surfaced on the ground in Syria after the US and Turkey inked their mutual agreement. The partial withdrawal of the US’s troops from Syria led the PKK/PYD to cooperate with the Assad regime,m an alliance designed to restrain Turkey’s intervention by inviting regime forces to areas of critical importance. The PKK/PYD’s also attempted to keep the US’s support at the south of Turkey’s security corridor, in order to reduce the burdens of its new pledges to the Assad regime and Russia. The balance in Syria has clearly changed from its previous position. Less interested actors, such as European states, are still late to perceive the overall picture. And although Turkey has often been accused of an ‘axis shift’ due to its collaboration with Russia, this allegation may also be applied to other actors in the region who face new decisions. Hence both ‘friends and foes’ will have to reassess each other and determine to whom they can lean on. In order to understand the overall picture in Syria, the positions of each actor should be individually scrutinized.

The U.S.

The US was keen to provide support to the PKK/PYD and benefit from them as a tool in their plans to redesign a narrower Middle East, from Iran to Syria. But the US devastated its own policy after a long awaited decision by President Trump, most probably because of the PKK/PYD’s lack of capacity despite the billions of dollars spent by the US government.

However, internal political dynamics confused the overall process, President Trump made a U-turn in order to reiterate the ‘America First’ narrative of his election campaign. The way Trump sees the Syrian case is actually smart and pragmatic. The US has gained nothing from its relationship with the PKK/PYD, who falsely claimed credit for defeating Daesh, while the role of US Special and Air Forces in this victory has always been underestimated.

In parallel to the Iranian case and the energy politics in the Middle East, President Trump projected long term goals of the US that required him to erase the PKK/PYD folder from his cache. Although he still confused whether to embrace or repel Turkey based on his contradictory tweets, the wider politics of the Middle East, along with the Mediterranean and Black Sea region pushed President Trump to review his engagement with Turkey.

Russia

Russia’s approach has been to emphasize the Adana Agreement of Turkey and Syria which allows Turkey to intervene between 5 to 10 kilometers into Syria in case there exists a terror threat inside Syrian territory. The goal of Russia’s recent discussions at the Tehran, Moscow and Ankara summits were to have Turkey and the Assad regime engage with each other in favor of Russian interests. Such an expectation appears impossible for Turkey since Turkey expects the Genova Process to find a political solution, one that could see Assad removed pending constitutional amendments and the facilitation of free elections. Hence Russia can only push one button: choose the PKK/PYD or the Genova Process.

However, Russia does have the ‘luxury’ of including the PKK and its affiliate organizations in a new Syrian apparatus after the US’s withdrawal. The PKK/PYD’s rapprochement with both the Assad regime and Russia facilitated the expansion of Russia’s sphere of influence in shaping what will be the ultimate outcome of the Syria crisis. Meanwhile, Russia provided a shield to the Assad regime to achieve more territorial gains while the PKK/PYD terror network has been left humiliated by the imposed conditions, destined to compromise with Assad.  After all, the main question for Russia appears to be if it needs to stick with the Turkish cause as was agreed to before Operation Peace Spring or allow the PKK/PYD to serve in Syria unless the US Government changes the Syria policy one more time. On the other hand, the Genova Process seems to be a wise option for Russia in order to achieve a cost-effective resolution to the overall crisis.

Turkey

The PKK/PYD has exhibited how incapable it is, and how it must lean on another actor for its own protection and survival. The release of Daesh (ISIS) prisoners proved it cannot handle its responsibilities. The success of Turkey’s military operation has marginalized its status in the eyes of its sympathizers and has tarnished its dream of building an autonomous region in Syria. The PKK/PYD has now subjected itself to a higher authority and clearly demonstrated its inability to sustain an armed movement except for the use of terror strategies. As the reality of the PKK/PYD is being understood by both Russia and the US Government, Turkey is now in-between both countries to find a wise solution to the decade-long Syria conflict.  

Turkey’s political balance needs to be understood to determine its preferred course. It is a fact that the big picture of the Middle East and global politics requires Turkey to align itself with Russia. But long-term conditions will push Turkey to mend its ties with the US. However, the parameters are not that easy. Turkey need to enjoy the support of both parties to destroy the PKK/PYD threat and at the same time deescalate tense inter-state relations facilitate smoother regional politics with the USA.

At the final stage, Turkey’s growing relations with Russia and the US, along with the moderate opposition under the authority of the Syrian Transition Government, are relations which will offer new opportunities for de-escalation of the Syrian conflict. Turkey will be a bridge between the big players and effective local actors. Then should we not we think about a trilateral summit between the US, Russia, and Turkey to end the Syrian crisis?

After Turkey and the Syrian opposition started a joint military operation against the YPG terror group in northeastern Syria, many new developments are beginning to reshape the situation in the region and the future of Syria. One of the most important will be the summit to be held today between the Turkish and Russian presidents in Sochi. While many are awaiting the outcome of the summit, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov’s recent remarks about the possibility of amending the Adana agreement raises the question if this might be one of the outcomes today’s meeting. Sergei Lavrov stated: “This is the existing international legal framework that has been recently confirmed by both parties, including in the context of current events. If the parties, in the course of contacts, consider it necessary and mutually accept to clarify or amend this agreement in any way, this will be their decision, we will certainly accept and support it,”

In his following remarks, according to Sputnik News Agency, Lavrov underlined that “all Kurdish structures on Syrian territory should be solidly covered by the Syrian legislation, the Syrian constitution, so that there are no illegal armed groups on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic, and so that there is no threat to security of the Republic of Turkey”

The Adana protocol signed by Turkey and Syria in 1998 outlines that the Syrian government will recognize the PKK as a terror group and will ensure the total destruction of PKK networks and operations in Syria, it also allows Turkey to cross five kms into Syria if necessary.

Russia has long argued for the reactivation of the Adana protocol to facilitate direct contacts between Damascus and Ankara, knowing that direct contact will change the diplomatic and political environment dramatically in favor of Russia and the Assad regime it backs. However, the Turkish government argued that direct contact with Damascus is only possible after a genuine political transition process and the election of a new government in free and fair elections.

Currently, the new dynamics in Syria have forced Turkey and Russia to find a new pathway forward. With the US withdrawal and the joint Syrian-Turkish military operation, the dynamics in Syria have changed dramatically. The Assad regime signed a deal with the YPG to control the front lines and borders with Turkey and the Syrian opposition, and to prevent their further incursion. After the entry of the regime into Manbij and Ayn al Arab, the operations in those areas were halted. During his announcement of the Turkish-American agreement for the safe-zone in northeast Syria. The Turkish Foreign Minister also said that Turkey will discuss the removal of the YPG from these areas with Assad backed by Moscow.

However, Ankara is frustrated that the Assad regime has not cracked down on the YPG in the areas it entered after a deal with the US. Most notably, the region of Tal Rifaat is of great importance as a present example. Not only did the residents who fled the region after its capture by the YPG not return, but the YPG has continuously attacked Turkish soldiers and the Syrian National Army from Tal Rifaat.

Turkey knows that the regime is unlikely to crackdown on the YPG and will likely use it as a tool against Turkey, and that Syrian refugees won’t return to regime-held areas. This would mean that the Turkish safe-zone project might fail to achieve its objectives. The recent deal with the American side allowed Ankara to gain important leverage ahead of the summit in Sochi, but no one can foresee what the two presidents will agree on in today’s summit. At the end of the day, the outcome of the summit will be determined by the personal relationship between Erdogan and Putin as well as their negotiation skills.

Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring was launched with the purpose of establishing a safe zone to remove the YPG terror group from southern borders of Turkey. Now, Turkey’s military operation has been paused for 120 hours as a result of the deal reached with the US yesterday evening. Observers noted during the course of the operation so far that the images of Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK’s imprisoned leader, left hanging over walls in the border towns of Tal Abyad and Rasulayn. This is a clear indication of the YPG’s tie to the PKK, its sympathy with Ocalan, and its shared aspiration to establish an ideologically Marxist and ethno-nationalist statelet in the region.

Since the operation was launched, Western media and politicians along with PKK sympathizers and nationalist Kurdish social media users, have harshly criticized Turkey. They presented Turkey as an invading or occupying force with no intention to leave Syria in the long run. They have further portrayed Turkey’s fight against the YPG as being against international law, although, in fact, the operation was supported by local Arab Muslims and regional Christian groups.

A deeper analysis of such criticisms by Western journalists and politicians reveal the fact that these are deeply biased responses devoid of any engagement with facts. Some have accused Turkey of targeting civilians while others have described Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring as part of an oft-repeated plot to establish a Neo-Ottoman Empire.

It is so strange that Turkey’s security concerns emanating from the PKK terror threat over four consecutive decades are not properly addressed, and that neither NATO allies nor Western journalists or think-tankers paid due attention to the subject except a few thoughtful exceptions (I>; II).

Analysts have embellished and insisted on the narrative that Turkey’s military operations will result in strengthening Daesh (ISIS) and the Assad regime ignoring that this would only happen against Turkey’s interests in the region.

The narrative about Daesh prisoners, for example, ignores the fact that the Turkish Armed Forces have fought against this terror threat more than any other country in the world through military and security operations inside and outside the country. While instead, Western governments have chosen not to support a NATO ally in the fight against Daesh, but preferred to back a terror group, as President Trump indirectly admitted in a recent statement.

Despite Turkey’s ambitions to establish the security conditions required so that more than one million Syrians may be resettled in the north of Syria, some Western critics have argued that Turkey’s recent operations might cause the number of Syrian refugees heading to Europe to increase. Most of the critics do not address and disregard the fact that the YPG itself has succeeded in changing Northern Syria’s demographics causing many to flee to across the border.

Most observers of Turkey find that unlike their own opinions, the majority of Turks support the operations against the YPG, including politicians from the main opposition party the CHP. Others have also stated that the operation has strengthened President Erdogan’s domestic position without analyzing the reasons. Analysts have tried to dismiss support for President Erdogan by explaining it away as a simple “rally round the flag”, however without looking at the Turkish context in particular, these theoretical approaches fail to explain the reality on the ground. Instead a greater focus by western analysts appears to be on how the operation will supposedly make Turkey much more isolated in the global context.

It is interesting to note the disappointment expressed by foreign observers highly critical of Erdogan that the new mayor of Istanbul (CHP), who they have often lauded as a “hope” for Turkey, is also supportive of “Erdogan’s operation”. Demonstrating once again their failure to understand Turkey’s complex social dynamics and also exposing the way in which highly rigid, ideological narratives dominate their readings of Turkish politics. Some deliberately do not want to understand that most Turks fundamentally reject any kind of cooperation with the PKK’s offshoots.

On the other hand, discussions in Europe and in Germany have also focused on the fact that there are no European instruments that can be used to effectively oppose Turkey’s actions in the Syrian context, except for the somewhat symbolic steps made by some European authorities to halt arms exports to Turkey. Ultimately in the words of the Foreign minister of Luxembourg’s recent tweet, “We as Europeans are not able to stop that. This has to be told honestly to the people”.

Turkey’s security concerns are for the most part disregarded while those of a terrorist organizations are tolerated and even supported. Leading Western countries, think-tanks, and media representatives who aware of the dangers of PKK affiliated organizations, do not hesitate to challenge Turkey in favor of the YPG. This however appears to be rooted in a reading of Turkish politics and foreign affairs that disregards facts and opinions inside Turkey, and the conditions on the ground in Northern Syria. Such a situation cannot continue forever, and as Turkey is an important NATO player in the region, it will only be a matter of time until the importance of Turkey as an ally will be once again rediscovered.

Turkey’s cross-border military operation, Operation Peace Spring, was launched on October 9, 2019. The Turkish Armed Forces secured some critical targets including Rasulayn and Tal-Abyad. After the operation started, numerous fake news stories and manipulative content were published targeting Operation Peace Spring and the endeavor was turned into a propaganda war. With the YPG forces about to quickly lose their power and domination in Northern Syria militarily, they have turned to the long-standing support of Western nations as a way out. And for this, they are relying on their well-oiled propaganda machine.

Which tools are being used by the YPG in the propaganda war? First of all, the YPG’s main goal is getting the support of Western countries and encouraging them to use their foreign policy tools. And indeed, they appear to be successful in gaining the public support of most Western countries. These countries now threaten Turkey with embargoes and military measures to end the military operation. Finland, Norway, Netherlands, Germany, and France have already suspended arm sales to Turkey. European countries are trying to force Turkey to terminate its operation in the region.

But why are European countries acting so harshly towards the operation? One of the answers lies in the imagined idea of Rojava. For a long time, Rojava, the YPG-led autonomous region of Northern Syria, has been imagined in Western media as a democratic and pluralistic society flourishing in the heart of a troubled Middle East. However, the reality on the ground was quite different, with the YPG carrying out a campaign of violence, intimidation and displacement in order to secure territorial gains. 

After the capture of Northeast Syria by the YPG forces in 2012, the PKK’s long-lasting democratic autonomy project was implemented in Rojava. At this point, it is crucial to understand what the PKK’s democratic autonomy project is. Since 2007, both the PKK and ethno-nationalist separatist Kurdish political parties have underlined that the solution to the problems facing Kurds requires the creation of an autonomous region enabling Kurds to govern themselves, without the intervention of any other actor. This project began to be implemented with the establishment of Rojava with this region becoming a laboratory for this project. But the terrible abuses carried out in the name of establishing Rojava speaks for itself. 

Instead, most Western media channels depicted life in Rojava as a place where women and other vulnerable groups directly participated in political processes, and where decisions are taken by consensus. Indeed, most of this coverage paid specific attention to the secular policies of Rojava and compared it to the practices of the Daesh.  For instance, the New York Times Magazine defined Rojava as a “Dream of Secular Utopia in ISIS’ Backyard” and underlined how secular education policies were being implemented in the region.

Because of this reason, Western media channels have also represented the YPG as freedom fighters who ended the brutality of Daesh in the region. The operation by Turkey was therefore perceived as the fall of the Rojava dream. This was reflected in the remarkable headlines and stories by some Western newspapers and journals such as “Rojava Betrayed. An End to our Dream of Revolution?” and “Turkish Attack on Syria Endangers a Remarkable Democratic Experiment by the Kurds”. Therefore, the long-lasting glorification of Rojava in the Western media strengthened the hand of the YPG in the propaganda war.

Secondly, the cooperation between the United States and the YPG was instrumentalized to urge the Trump administration not to withdraw its support to the YPG. Since the Obama administration, the US had been aiding arms to the YPG forces, this aid became formalized during the Trump administration in order to speed up military operations in Raqqa and ensure victory over Daesh. Thus, the US media are now accusing the Trump administration of betraying “the Kurds”, who are considered to be “the US allies who ended the Daesh dominance in Northern Syria”. Since the Trump administration is under pressure, President Trump has been trying to satisfy public opinion and decrease the domestic fall out by threatening Turkey with new sanctions. Nevertheless, almost all leading Western newspapers and journals are not convinced about the rationale behind Turkey’s operation in the region and this has empowered the hand of the YPG in its propaganda.

The first days of the operation and the success of the Turkish Armed Forces on the ground show that success in a propaganda war has not changed the real situation for the YPG. Because of this, the YPG has been trying to find a new ally to push back against the Turkish army. In order to seek a way out the YPG appears to have shaken hands with the Assad regime and Russia. When for so long the Assad regime has been blacklisted for its brutal role in the Syrian civil war, including the use chemical weapons on civilians, how such an alliance will impact the YPG’s image into the future remains to be seen.

On October 9, Turkey launched Operation Peace Spring for which it had been preparing for months. Understanding that diplomatic efforts with regional and international actors could not prevent the establishment of a planned corridor by the YPG terror group in northern Syria, Ankara decided to take a unilateral step towards eliminating the threats against its territorial integrity and national interests. Acting within the framework of international rights and obligations and with the legitimacy of international law, Turkey emphasizes that the primary objective of Operation Peace Spring is to prevent a terrorist controlled corridor along its southern border.

In fact, within the scope of this, Turkey’s multi-staged plan began to be  implemented three years ago, on August 24, 2016, through Operation Euphrates Shield. Organized with the wide participation of the Turkish Armed Forces’ air and ground troops, Operation Euphrates Shield played a critical role in minimizing some of the negative consequences of the Syrian Civil War. The Operation made significant progress in blocking the PYD, the Syrian branch of the PKK, and the YPG, the military wing of PYD, from establishing a “terror corridor” in the region. The push back against this organization that is supported by the United States, Turkey’s now unreliable ally, through all kinds of weapons and ammunition, was crucial for Ankara. Turkey believed that YPG constituted a permanent threat along its southern borders. Therefore, eliminating the terror group was of vital significance not only for the national security of Turkey, but also for the long-term interests of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Operation Euphrates Shield may be seen as a  milestone in the history of modern Turkey.

The second operation was carried out between  January and March 2018 under the name Operation Olive Branch that was the next step in the process. Through this operation, an important area in the West of the Euphrates, including the city of Afrin, came under the Turkish control and the groups supported by Ankara. The city of Afrin was a strategic location for the YPG and regarded as one of its strongholds in the region. With these two operations, Turkey proved its determination to eliminate all kinds of threats directed to its national security.

In the last stage of this initiative, Turkey launched Operation Peace Spring. It was announced that the Turkish Armed Forces have initially aimed to control the area between the towns of Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ayn. In the later stages, the operation aims to create a safe zone, which will be 480 km long and 30 km deep on the other side of Turkey’s border with Syria. With Operation Peace Spring, Ankara aims to free a total of 13,500 square kilometers from terrorist elements and to achieve four goals to ensure its national security.

The first and primary objective of Operation Peace Spring is to prevent the establishment of a terror corridor in Northern Syria. Turkey aims to not only make terrorist elements leave the area but to also create a peaceful safe zone along its southern border where the Arab, Turkmen and Kurdish civilian population of the region can live in peace. For this, the liberation of the cities under the YPG control was vital.

Turkey’s second goal is to send a message to the international community and regional actors that Ankara is determined to use hard power when needed. Through Operation Peace Spring, Turkey once again shows its determination in the face of any anti-Turkey policies by global and regional actors, and that it will not hesitate to resort to military options if its national interests are threatened. While Turkey considered both diplomatic and military options in finding solutions to regional problems, it also demonstrated itself to be a decisive power in responding to initiatives which may attempt to undermine Turkey’s rights in other conflict zones such as the Eastern Mediterranean.

Another important objective of Operation Peace Spring is to create a safe zone for the return of the Syrians. As President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated, Syrian refugees who want to return to their country will be able to return to the cities that will be liberated and built after Operation Peace Spring. This step will be in line with the demands of various social groups inside Turkey that have criticized the government for its handling of Syrian refugees. It is understandable that Ankara aims to prevent further polarization over Syrian refugees.

Finally, Turkey plans to safeguard the territorial integrity of Syria, which it has been defending from the beginning of the civil war. Through Operation Peace Spring, Ankara reemphasized its commitment to ensuring the territorial integrity of Syria, which is ignored by external players involved in the conflict. From the very beginning of the war, Turkey has  tried to cooperate with other actors to protect Syria’s territorial integrity and to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Turkey has taken initiatives to settle the issue with Russia and Iran. It should be noted that former US President Barack Obama supported the terrorist organization the YPG instead of cooperating with Turkey, and thus, the formation of a terrorist state in the region became a serious possibility. This development clearly threatens the territorial integrity of Syria. In order to prevent the partition of Syria, Turkey decided to take a unilateral step and launched Operation Peace Spring.

Turkey has recognized that there may be a greater threat to its own interests in the future if such an ethno-nationalist Kurdish state is established, and has taken a decisive stance to eliminate this terror corridor despite international pressure. Due to this determination, Turkey could turn a deaf ear to regional and global actors. In spite of the serious reactions and threats by the US administration, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stressed that Operation Peace Spring will continue until it reaches its goals.

Several international organizations such as the European Union and the Arab League raised concerns about the operation but Turkey’s response to these statements were harsh. In one of his speeches, President Erdogan gave a strong response to the condemning messages by countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Reminding listeners that Saudi Arabia was responsible for thousands of civilian deaths in Yemen, he stressed that Riyadh had no right to criticize Turkey’s operation against terrorist organizations. He also mentioned that Sisi, who came to power with a military coup in Egypt, was a “democracy killer” and that Cairo would not be successful in its smear campaign against Turkey.

It should be reiterated that most of the governments in the Arab world are regimes that do not derive their legitimacy from the people, and do not reflect the views and will of their public. The foreign policies of these regimes do not go beyond the desires of their Western allies. These regimes are taking a position against Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring as they think Turkey’s actions could threaten their own interests or their Western allies. Therefore, it would be misleading to think that the statements made by these countries have also been endorsed by the Arab masses. In contrast, the Arab people support the leadership of Turkey led by President Erdogan in the Middle East as public opinion polls show that he is the most respected and trusted leader in the region.

With Operation Peace Spring, Turkey has taken a vital step towards ensuring peace and stability in the region. Despite facing all kinds of threats and pressure, Ankara has shown the international community that it will never allow a terrorist organization on its borders. With its military capacity, technical equipment and operational capability developed in recent years, the Turkish Armed Forces are one of the most important actors that have contributed to launching Operation Peace Spring. The operation is also endorsed and supported by almost all political parties represented in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Only the HDP, which has close links to the PKK/YPG terror group, did not support the operation. No doubt, Operation Peace Spring will take its place in the history books as a military operation through which Turkey’s future was saved by today’s leadership.

Iraq has been witnessing popular protests that have taken the lives of more than 100 civilians. Political instability, economic hardships and increasingly difficult living conditions have caused the masses, especially young people, to protests against the government. A rapid escalation of violence during the protests caused death of at least 100 protesters in a few days. The course of events was very similar to last year’s wave of protests in the southern city of Basra, where scores of civilian protesters were also killed.

In both cases, unknown assailants were accused of attacking protesters with live weapons. Various social media accounts and eyewitnesses reported that a number of unknown assailants were seen as they shot protesters. It was speculated that some groups close to Iran could have been behind the attacks on the protesters as the demonstrators were strongly against Iranian influence on Iraq. While anti-Iran slogans are common, protesters carried banners criticizing Iranian influence in the country. Despite the claims, the role of any Iran-related groups in the spiral of violence is not clear.

However, Iran was associated with another key development that triggered the protests. The dismissal of Abdulwahab Al-Saadi from his position as the deputy head of the Counter-Terrorism Unit, came as a surprise for many, particularly for his followers. Al-Saadi was a key figure in Iraq’s fight against ISIS over the past years. Al-Saadi was seen as pro-American due to his record of working with US military as part of training for the Counter-Terrorism Unit, which was created by US forces. He was therefore considered as an obstacle for Iran-backed groups to have influence on the Counter-Terrorism Unit. Al-Saadi’s increasing charisma would have been also considered as a threat by circles that are close to Iran. So, it is widely believed by Al-Saadi supporters that he was removed from his position because he didn’t seem loyal enough to Iran as Tehran wished him to be. Therefore, Al-Saadi’s supporters, who thought he was dismissed because of his position toward Iran, voiced their discomfort with Tehran’s increasing influence over Iraq. While protesters shouted slogans like “Iran out” and “Free Iraq”, they also burned the Iranian flag. 

There is no doubt that Iran’s influence on Iraq has increased in recent years. This can be seen in political and social life. Pro-Iranian figures are granted high-ranking positions, and many Iraqis avoid making critical comments against Iran publicly. Iranian influence is also seen on Iraq’s security establishment. For instance, the Hashdi Shabi, which is composed of Shiite militias and backed by Iran, has become one of the most vital institutions in today’s Iraqi security sector. It is stated that Hashdi Shabii is the most organized military organization in contemporary Iraq. 

Apart from the Iranian aspect, another major cause of the wave of protests is the poor political and economic conditions in Iraq. Despite being one of the richest countries in world in terms of oil reserves, Iraqis have to confront with instability, poverty, unemployment, high inflation, power shortages and inadequate public services. Fed up with economic and political uncertainties, Iraqi youth no longer hesitate to raise their voices against the government.

Corruption is also seen as one of the main causes of the current problems in Iraq. According to international observers and local sources, at least $80 billion is said to disappear due to corruption annually. Experts state that a significant portion of this money may be going to Iran, which suffers economic problems due to international sanctions. If true, this flow of cash from Iraq could be helping the Iranian economy enormously.

Finally, the protesters also targeted Adel Abdul-Mahdi, who became the prime minister a year ago. Abdul- Mahdi is seen as incapable of leading the country, which has been witnessing a deteriorating political and economic environment and he was criticized for being too slow in making any progress to address the country’s urgent problems. Despite the criticism, Abdul-Mahdi made a public speech on TV and suggested that he would take steps to solve the problems that protesters raised. He also announced that he would implement some reforms in the coming period. These statements, however, were not enough to ease the anger of the demonstrators. The government declared a curfew in many cities, including the capital Baghdad, to prevent people gathering outside. The government also shut down internet access in order to prevent protesters from organizing through social media.

Even though the demonstrations in Iraq have slowed down after the intervention of the security forces and the government’s reform announcements, it should be underlined that the demands of the Iraqi youth remain and the reaction against the increasing influence of Iran in the country continues. Iraqi politics, which is already fragile, may be subject to greater complications if protests continue One of the most serious concerns discussed about the future of Iraq is the breakdown of the state and a possible division of the country. This has the potential to have lasting and serious consequences for both Iraq and the countries in the region. The concerns of the youth in Iraq should be taken into consideration and a lasting solution should be offered in order to protect the territorial integrity of the country.

Turkey will no longer tolerate the presence of a terrorist group on its southern borders as the country’s leading figures recently announced their determination to start a military operation as soon as possible. As has been globally observed in recent days, the U.S.-backing of the YPG/PYD has decreased at the U.S. presidential level despite the heavy criticism and pressure from both the Republicans and Democrats. The following days will most likely involve a greater clarification of positions towards Turkey’s planned military operations.

Besides the operation’s potential scope and its military purpose which will be discussed in detail, it is interesting to observe that most of the U.S. and Western voices in general take a position that blindly supports the YPG, which is the Syrian branch of the PKK terrorist organization.

Turkey’s alliance with the U.S. and NATO has 67 years of history. The country has positioned itself long ago in the Western alliance, viewing it as a strategic partnership in the fight against regional and global terrorism. Given this, it is not understandable why most Western politicians, media representatives and social media users directly or indirectly prefer the YPG despite Turkey’s serious security concerns.

Turkey’s struggle against the PKK terrorism is disregarded. Instead, the U.S. and other Western democracies describe “Kurds” as friends or allies. Referring to “Kurds” instead of the more accurate YPG/PKK, reinforces a false narrative because not every Kurdish person is a YPG/PKK member or supporter, and further implies that opposition to the YPG and PKK is in reality opposition to the Kurdish people themselves. The more accurate question is whether the West has ever truly been friends of the Kurdish people when they have themselves been facing PKK terrorism for more than 35 years. But this reality is ignored when PKK propaganda in the form of political liaisons with PYD/YPG is widespread.

Unfortunately, this attitude is of fundamental concern and should not be ignored while Turkey conducts military strikes in the upcoming days. There should be research to discover the roots of Western and even some domestic support for the PKK. This issue is perhaps not well addressed today, but for future readers and researchers, it is important to understand the current positions of Western democracies, their media and even their civil representatives in favour of the PKK/PYD.

How it is possible that democracies and their media hide, disregard, downplay the activities of a neo-Marxist and ethnic-separatist terrorist organization? How can a terrorist organization such as the PKK, which is regarded as a prohibited terrorist organization both in Europe and the U.S. enjoy comfortable support by Western powers? This happens despite several reports, opinion pieces, studies, and interviews with experts from the Western world that prove the obvious connection between the PKK and PYD/YPG.

I doubt that a realism-based approach is able to explain such irrational positions. Furthermore, the preferred arguments that “defeating Daesh terrorism has to be the priority” does not answer why a terrorist organization such as the YPG is actively preferred by Western policymakers and even supported by civilians in order to fight another terror organization such as Daesh. Actually, this narrative has been reiterated for more than six to seven years and therefore more people in the West are inclined to play down the PKK’s actual role as a terrorist organization while disregarding the fundamental concerns of an ally.

The direct or indirect support of the PKK through its offshoot in Syria has perhaps functioned until now but it is clear that this blind stance will not guarantee a long-term approach. It is not acceptable that an ethnic-separatist and neo-Marxist terrorist organization is normalized.

In Turkey, there is one political party, the HDP, and only a few supporters from among radical Marxist groups that declared their support for the YPG. Turkey’s main opposition party, the CHP’s current stance is not to support a Turkish military strike openly against the YPG in Northern Syria. But this should not confuse observers. Although there are sympathizers of Kurdish separatism among the ranks of the CHP administration, the party rejects the existence of the YPG/PKK and supports the fight against it. This also counts for all other terrorist groups no matter what their political agendas are. A high majority of Turkish citizens oppose the PKK/PYD, Daesh, FETO and all other terrorist groups, and this is a stance which should be reflected in the allies of Turkey, which at the moment appears to only be Spain.

As a result of Turkey’s decisiveness, the White House announced that the U.S. forces in Syria will withdraw in expectation of a Turkish military operation into the region, opening the way for Turkey and the Syrian opposition to go after the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK terrorist organization. Since then, many experts have been discussing the potential scope and implications of the operation, but it is most likely that the operational plan of the joint Syrian-Turkish military operation will occur in Arab areas between Tal Abyad and Rasulayn and in the region of Manbij west of the Euphrates.

Immediately before and since the announcement by the White House, many developments have occurred on the ground in Syria and Turkey. Most notably, the U.S. soldiers evacuated their bases along the Turkish-Syrian border and left the area. With this move, the U.S opened the way for a joint Syrian-Turkish military operation between Tal Abyad and Rasulayn. A second development is ongoing on the Turkish side of the border where Turkish Armed Forces are amassing troops and equipment between Akcakale and Ceylanpinar, which are on the other side of the border from Tal Abyad and Rasulayn. This Turkish preparation also includes the buildup of howitzer and artillery positions suitably located to shell the strip between Tal Abyad to Rasulayn. The armed Syrian opposition, the Syrian National Army, has sent reinforcements to Jarablus to cross into Turkey and take position along the Syrian-Turkish border strip between Tal Abyad and Rasulayn.

On the other side, the region of Manbij is seeing an intensive arrival of reinforcements by the Syrian National Army and the Turkish Armed Forces. The Syrian opposition has sent massive reinforcements to the frontlines of Manbij chanting that they will liberate Manbij from the terrorists occupying the area. Additionally, the Turkish Armed Forces have been sending heavy armory and Special Forces through Jarablus towards the region of Manbij.

The region of Manbij is crucial as the Assad regime in the south and the Syrian opposition in the north are of equal distance to Manbij city, and both sides have ambitions to control this strategic area. This includes the Tishreen dam, which is located at the Euphrates in Manbij and is the second most important dam in Syria after the Tabqah dam. In case of a military operation, both sides may race for control over this area, and the YPG is likely to hand the region to the Assad regime which will improve its speed of advance. In this regard, the Syrian opposition may try to cut the advance route of the regime as they are stationed west of Manbij and received training on air-landing with Turkish helicopters. By cutting the route of the regime to Manbij, the Syrian National army can guarantee its control over the region. However, if they cannot act fast enough, the region will fall to the regime, opening its way towards the east of the Euphrates. From the Turkish perspective, Manbij is also of upmost importance as its liberation will enable the return of the Sulayman Shah tomb to its original place by the Euphrates River.

The joint Syrian-Turkish operation will firstly aim to liberate Arab areas from the YPG. By doing so, the operation will in its initial phase contradict critics who state that the main goal of the operation is demographic engineering. Additionally, by liberating Arab areas first, the number of recruits in the Syrian National Army may increase massively as the local Arab population and tribes are strong supporters of the Syrian opposition. The scope and possibility of a second stage towards Arab areas in the south or towards mainly Kurdish populated areas in Ayn al Arab and Qamishli may most likely be decided after the Trump-Erdogan summit on November 13.

After long-lasting negotiations between Turkey and the United States, a cross-border military operation in Syria has been decided. Although President Erdoğan emphasized many times that Turkey would conduct a military operation in Northern Syria for the creation a safe zone, the conditions of the operation and the US’s role were ambiguous. That ambiguity ended on Sunday night when the White House Office of the Press Secretary announced that “Turkey is preparing to launch a military operation in Northern Syria, and the United States will withdraw its troops in the area ahead of the long-planned attack”. Thus, the US will not join the military operation and will not intervene, contrary to pro-YPG claims.

Since the operation was announced, there has been a lot of debate about how it will impact regional dynamics and Turkey’s foreign policy in general. How will ongoing alliances among political parties be affected by the operation? Will the operation deepen the current conflicts between the CHP and Iyi Party? What will be the early responses of political parties to the operation?

It seems that there are two different approaches to the upcoming military operation among political parties in Turkey. The AK Party, the MHP, and the Iyi Party support the military operation in Northern Syria but the CHP and the HDP are clearly against it. Three parties supporting the military operation see it as an obligation to provide regional security and protect Turkey’s interests in the region. As the members of People’s Alliance, the AK Party and the MHP already had a consensus on this issue for a long time. However, the Iyi Party, contrary to its partners in the Nation Alliance, also supports the operation. Meral Akşener, leader of the Iyi Party, has often underlined that Turkish military should take the necessary steps in Syria and Iraq to overcome threats against Turkey’s security.

When it comes to the CHP and HDP, both parties are against the military operation in Northern Syria. Indeed, the CHP’s approach towards the operation can be seen from the outcomes of their recently-conducted conference on Syria. As I stated in my latest column, the CHP regards Turkey’s efforts to create a safe zone on the border as a “demographic engineering” project and underestimates the threat of the YPG against Turkey. For the CHP, Turkey should negotiate with the Assad regime rather than conducting an operation. Despite this, the CHP does not offer any roadmap to overcome the existing threat or how the involvement of the Assad regime in the negotiation process will help to overcome these threats. The CHP’s early response to the operation also demonstrated this. CHP Group Deputy Chairman Engin Özkoç stated that Turkey should get out of the “Middle East quagmire” rather than conduct a military operation for political interests of the government.

The HDP is also clearly against the operation. According to the official statement of the party, this operation will not bring stability and peace to the region. Since the party perceived the previous military operations as “ethnic cleansing” against the Kurds in the region, it is obvious that they will have the same reaction to the recent operation, too.

How will the operation affect the alliances between the parties in Turkey? As Burhanettin Duran stated in his latest column, the variation of approaches towards the military operation of Turkey in Syria will escalate ongoing conflicts among political parties in Turkey. Thus, if the CHP choose to show the same reaction as the HDP against the military operation, it will deepen the current conflicts in the Nation Alliance since the Iyi Party has underlined that cooperation with the HDP is the Iyi Party’s redline. And the party will not stand for the rapprochement between the CHP and HDP anymore. Because of this reason, the military operation will potentially be a significant determinant for the future of political alliances in Turkey.

In a speech he delivered at the 74th General Assembly of the United Nations in New York on September 24, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan held up a poster illustrating four different maps of Israel since 1947 and asked: “where are the borders of the State of Israel? Is it the 1948 borders, the 1967 borders, or is there any other border? How can the Golan Heights and the West Bank settlements be seized, just like other occupied Palestinian territories, before the eyes of the world if they are not within the borders of this State? Does the “deal of the century” aim to eliminate the people and the State of Palestine?”, and added: “The solution is the immediate establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the basis of 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. Turkey will continue to stand by the oppressed people of Palestine as it has always been until today.”

Although the superpowers of today’s world seem to ignore it, a comparison of these four maps show that the Palestinian territories gradually shrank from 1947 whereas Israel has kept getting bigger, and is likely to get even bigger still. Besides, the dwindling Palestinian territory is not recognized as a state by the U.S. and many European and Asian countries. This is the point of Erdogan’s comparison.

And like the ever expanding borders of Israel, we also face another phenomena, one that is continuously extended with the propaganda and lobbying activities of Israel: the very definition of anti-Semitism. The scope of this term has expanded from encompassing hate speech and racist acts against Jewish people to criticism of Israel itself. So, following his speech in the UN General Assembly, the Tel Aviv administration called Erdogan an anti-Semite.

The term ‘anti-Semitism’ was first used in 1879 by a German journalist, and originally means hostility to or prejudice against Jews. As Orientalist scholar Bernard Lewis said, Christians saw Jews as having a dark and deadly power with skills of cosmic evil. Following numerous periods of tyranny against Jews in the history of Europe, the most systematic and scientific atrocity against Jews in history took place under Nazi Germany. Around six million people were brutally killed just for being Jewish under Hitler’s leadership, including women, children and the elderly. A genocide in the midst of Europe of which witnesses and Holocaust survivors are still alive.

Following the Holocaust, many European countries enacted laws that introduced special protection for Jews separate from other laws related to racism. Denying the Holocaust was criminalized in a total of 14 European countries, including Germany in 1979 and France in 1990. In France, the Gayssot Act made it an offense to deny the Holocaust, a crime against humanity defined in the London Charter of 1945, on the basis of which Nazi leaders were convicted by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1945 and 1946.

Although anti-Semitism means hostility to or prejudice against Jews, new definitions of anti-Semitism have been invented by Israel and some writers starting from the 1990s. For instance, anti-Zionism was also included in the scope of anti-Semitism. Israel has been defined as the homeland of the Jews, and criticisms of Israel are associated with anti-Semitism.

In 2017, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, a centre which defines the issues related to fundamental rights for the improvement and reform of EU Law incorporated some of these elements into their definition of anti-Semitism. The Center defines anti-Semitism as: “a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred of Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of anti-Semitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.”

This definition is followed by statements that give Israel some exceptions not made to any other state or nation in the world. The statement goes on to read that: “manifestations of anti-Semitism might also target the State of Israel, conceived of as a Jewish collectivity.” Some examples of the manifestations of anti-Semitism that are associated with the State of Israel are listed as follows: “Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor, applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation, and drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.”

According to this, it looks like criticizing Israel will be considered de facto anti-Semitism. For Israeli officials, this seems to be the case already. In response to the argument that it is not even possible to criticize Israel, a test was published in Israel to reveal to what extent the country could be criticized. For Israel, it is possible to distinguish legitimate criticisms of Israel from anti-Semitism using a 3-D test of anti-Semitism developed in 2004 by the Natan Sharansky, Chairman of the Executive of the Jewish Agency. This test and an article on it were published in Jewish Political Studies Review. The test was also recognized by the U.S. Department of State.

The test consists of three main concepts: delegitimization, double standards and demonization. According to Sharansky, hiding behind the veneer of legitimate criticism of Israel constitutes a kind of anti-Semitism that is more difficult to expose. The delegitimization part of the test argues that claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor discriminates against Jews by singling them out as ineligible for the basic right for self-determination as is determined by international law. According to this discursive contention, since any discrimination against a specific ethnic, religious, racial or national group is considered a type of racism, delegitimization of the Jewish people right to self-determination is racism against Jews. (To put it otherwise, you can freely express it when other states engage in racism, but you will commit the very crime you are talking about when you accuse Israel of racism!)

According to the second part of the test, namely Double Standards, “If a person criticizes Israel and only Israel on certain issues, but chooses to ignore similar situations conducted by other countries, they are performing a double standard policy against Israel.” (This is actually a rephrasing of the first title. The criticisms of other countries are within the limits of freedom of expression but it is forbidden to issue such criticisms on Israel!) The second title reads: “The implementation of a different moral standard for Jews and Israel compared to the rest of the world discriminates against a specific group and is labeled as antisemitism,” (Then several other countries might be added on the list while criticizing Israel). Meanwhile, the test states that the boycott, divestment and sanctions movements, such as BDS, might also be the manifestations of anti-Semitism, “since any discriminatory act to isolate Israel in international arena and the rejection of equality before laws for Israel is a new anti-Semitic behavior.” (This article indicates that boycotting Israeli products is a manifestation of anti-Semitism. And it does not seem possible to avoid it even if you add some other countries on the list beside Israel).

The third D is demonization. Demonizing Jews is of course racist, but this goes for all races in the world. It would be acceptable to underline this factor in reference to the “Jewish image in Christianity”, but there is a significant difference here: portraying the State of Israel as demonic is anti-Semitic whereas it seems to be no problem to do so for other states. Moreover, expressing conspiracy theories about Jews, referring to the power of Jews as a collective, and stating that the Jews control the media, economy, government and other societal institutions are also defined as anti-Semitic actions. Among the 3Ds, this title seems to be the only one that could be handled within the scope of a traditional definition of anti-Semitism.

The perspectives and criteria that form the basis of this test have been included in some legal regulations for the past few years, and is reflected in the anti-Semitism definition of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia in 2017. In Germany, anti-Zionism was included in the scope of anti-Semitism, and discussions in France are ongoing. Calls to boycott Israeli products have been recognized as illegitimate anti-Semitic actions in Germany and in some U.S. states.  

According to the 3D test, the limits to the criticisms against Israel’s policies and actions are as narrow as today’s Palestinian territory. For instance, in his 2006 book entitled Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, renowned Israeli historian Ilan Pappé seems to have breached most of the conditions of elements of the 3D test when discussing the gradual genocide in Gaza and depicting what has been done to Palestinians in the region. After the book was published, Pappé was subjected to pressure in the University of Haifa, where he was employed at the time, and finally left Israel after being subjected to diatribes and serious accusations by various circles in the country. He is currently a faculty member in the history department of the University of Exeter in England.

Unfortunately, anti-Semitism is a phenomenon that is still present in the world. Today, we increasingly confront many different kinds of racism against Muslims and various other minorities. But Israel has reached such an extreme point that it even regards Jews who criticize the Israeli state as anti-Semitic, a stance which is supported by several other countries, particularly by the U.S. The absurdity of the situation is best portrayed by this anecdote:

“-The weather is cloudy, I think it might rain.

-Did you just call me a duck?”

Of course, Israel labels almost every critic as anti-Semite not because it is excessively resentful or paranoid in demeanor, this is a propaganda technique that has become a major power play and is at least as important as weapons in today’s post-truth world. What is required is to speak in the name of truth and justice against Israeli crimes undauntedly and to emphasize the truth across every platform as Israel does. As President Erdogan lately expressed, the best possible solution is “the immediate establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the basis of 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.”

Former French president Jacques Chirac passed away last week at the age of 86. As a well-known personality with a political career spanning more than 40 years in France, Europe and internationally, several articles on his life have been published in the past days. Most of those briefly summarized his life, focusing on the most interesting incidents of his career both domestically and internationally. I do not aim to repeat these details, though some significant points should be addressed.

As a representative of the so-called Neo-Gaullist stance, Chirac started his political career by entering the French Assemblée Nationale. In the following years, he was promoted by former Presidents Pompidou and Giscard d’Estaing. However, disagreements with d’Estaing became more and more obvious. Consequently, Chirac quit his job as a high ranked member of his cabinet.

Chirac led his RPR party (Rassemblement pour la République / Rally for the Republic) between 1976 and 1994, which he had established after he quit his membership at Giscard’s UDR in 1976, both officially and later during his presidency in a de facto way.

In 1977, Chirac was elected as the first elected mayor of Paris, which contributed to his increasing popularity. When the Socialists under President François Mitterrand achieved power at the presidential level, by lost the majority at the legislative level, Chirac was appointed as prime minister by Mitterrand.

Under this so-called “cohabitation” period, and after serving two times as prime minister, Chirac finally won the French presidency in 1995. Following this first tenure which lasted seven years, he once again became President in 2002, receving 82 percent of the votes in the second round against far-right Jean-Marie Le Pen.

By this, Chirac became France’s second longest serving post-1945 president after his predecessor, socialist President Mitterrand. Although Chirac was given a suspended jail sentence in 2011, for corruption during his period as mayor of Paris (1977-1995), today, he is still considered the most popular French president (33 percent), according to polls, even more popular than François Mitterrand (21 percent) and Charles de Gaulle (17 percent).

Despite his position in the international context, in my opinion, Chirac has had a fundamental impact on the trajectory of the French system of government and its consolidation over the years. He played important roles in his stance against the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, his positions regarding Turkey in the EU context, and his very controversial decision of ordering tests of French nuclear weapons in the South Pacific subsequent to being elected as President in 1995.

Despite these issues, Chirac has been a main figure who shaped and consolidated the country’s “presidentialized” framework and, particularly, its current president-party relationship. President Chirac, who had one of the longest continuous political careers in France and Europe, is seen as a successor of previous leaders such as Charles de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou. Described mostly as a so-called “Neo-Gaullist”, referring to the “founding figure” and first president of the Fifth Republic since 1958, Chirac is also considered a nationalist in the specific French context and among French republicans.

Like all French presidents, who became influential political figures in the country since the adoption of the 1958 Constitution, Chirac, too, dominated the political scene, particularly in his first tenure from 1995 to 2002. He supported constitutional reforms which reduced the tenure of the president from seven to five years, while changing the election periods. This meant that since 2002, parliamentary (legislative) and presidential (executive) elections are held quasi-simultaneously, that is to say, legislative elections are held only some weeks after the presidential elections. Consequently, due to the so-called “coattail effects” which are also seen in the U.S. presidential context, no “cohabitation” cases occurred again. And due to this, the president is able to work in harmony with a parliamentary majority.

In order to understand the specific path of France and the trajectory of its system of government, it is useful to explore Chirac’s political path, the manoeuvres of his political party and its relations between the executive and the legislative arms of government. Chirac’s successor President Sarkozy also continued with similar president-party relations by broadening the informal relations to a more formal one.

Today, the French semi-presidential system is based on a leader focused presidency that mostly operates through the president’s party or supporting parties. Most likely, the same counts for President Emmanuel Macron, who is the informal but actual leader of his so-called En Marche! party.

During the past weeks, Egypt has witnessed unexpected anti-government protests. The demonstrations were triggered by the social media posts of businessman Mohammad Ali, who did construction projects for the Egyptian military, but did not receive payments for some time. Mohammad Ali heavily criticized the Sisi regime and the Egyptian army by revealing their serious malpractices. As his videos became popular, the interest among the youth to organize protests against the regime increased. On September 20 and 21, thousands of Egyptians took to streets to protest the regime despite the fear of arrest by the security forces. While protests didn’t last long, it was surprising for many that some people would actually go to streets and protest. The regime’s responses were harsh. Hundreds of protesters were arrested in the following days. However, the demonstrations failed to produce tangible results.

The lack of international support for the protesters and the continued backing of Sisi by global actors are the main factors behind this. Egyptians know that the increasing regime pressure on civilians will not be condemned, and human rights abuses will continue to occur. Therefore, even though Egyptians wish for the regime to topple, activists were cautious to go to the streets to protest. This applies to Muslim Brotherhood members as well. As the group experienced the harshest pressure in its history under the Sisi regime, they rightly abstained from participating in protests in order to prevent further oppression.

However, the Muslim Brotherhood’s peaceful struggle for democracy has been the main motivation for a handful of protesters who could stand up against the regime. As the movement lost the opportunity for civil opposition inside the country, it had to carry its struggle outside. The movement was keen on staying peaceful and sought every means to establish a democratic system in Egypt. 

One of the most important factors behind the protests in Egypt is the continuation of the democratic struggle of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, especially through the use of traditional and social media. One of the most important tools in this sense is the regime-critical television channels. Istanbul-based Mkemmelin and Sharq are two major TV channels that the Egyptian opposition use to broadcast critical coverage of the Sisi regime. These channels have millions of viewers in Egypt where state media allows no critical coverage. While the discussion programs broadcast on these channels reach millions of Egyptians via satellite, they are an alternative source of news for media organizations, which are one of the propaganda tools of the oppressive regime in the country. These programs, which have widespread popularity among young people, reveal the true face of the regime in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood is also supported by other political and intellectual figures in its struggle for a democratic Egypt. These efforts represent a hope for the domestic masses in Egypt and encourage them to continue their struggle for democracy.

Another dynamic that triggered the protests was the use of social media. In an environment where oppositional discourses cannot be expressed in the public sphere, young people often use social media tools for political activism. While Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, which were used extensively in the early periods of the Arab revolutions, remained popular, it has been observed that regime critical posts and publications have increased significantly.

In addition to criticism on social media, Egyptians have shown their dissatisfaction towards the Sisi regime in street as well. Sisi’s regime has not been able to provide political stability, find a solution to the economic crisis, and prevent deepening social inequalities. The regime’s spending on various sectors was also source of discomfort. The most obvious example of this is the expenditures in the defense industry. In an environment where inflation is increasing and purchasing power is gradually decreasing, the Sisi regime’s purchase of billions of dollars of defense industry products has been met with public reaction. A similar situation can also be said in the context of giant projects such as the construction of the new capital and the expansion of the Suez Canal. It is widely argued that these projects did not produce intended outcomes and were waste of public resources. 

It is unclear how anti-Sisi protests will have an impact on the future of the regime. As a matter of fact, although there is dissatisfaction with Sisi within the army and political bureaucracy, there is no clear indication that regional and global actors have disregarded Sisi. On the other hand, these protests will strengthen the perception that Sisi’s image, which has been damaged in domestic public opinion, has become even more negative before these actors. Therefore, since 2013, the countries that support Sisi have been forced to consider an alternative name in case of a possible change in government.

Sisi was placed in power by regional and global actors led by the US, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE with the aim of ending the revolutionary process in Egypt in 2011. Sisi fulfilled his duty by preventing the revolutionary process, prioritizing Western interests, guaranteeing the security of Israel and eliminating the Muslim Brotherhood from political life. However, given both the lack of internal stability in Egypt and the growing reaction against Sisi, it is seen that although Sisi is still a functional actor, and he has completed the mission given to him in the counter-revolution process, there may be an increasing demand for a new and more charismatic actor in Egyptian politics. Therefore, the future of Sisi will depend not only on the developments within Egypt, but also on the attitude of regional and global actors that have an impact on this country.

Many Daesh members are held in makeshift camps, most notably the Al Hol camp in Syria, in which thousands of Daesh women are held together with their children. The camp is mainly divided into two sections, the first hosting foreign Daesh members, the second Syrian and Iraqi Daesh members. Not all of the inhabitants of the camps are Daesh members, especially children. However, the situation in the camp has a huge potential to create the next generation of Daesh, similar to Camp Bucca in Iraq whose inmates including Abu Bakr al Baghdadi formed Daesh out of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

This time the camp promises a long lasting resurgence of Daesh. Despite Turkey’s warnings, the US opted to go with a YPG-led organization and now the organization is incapable of dealing with the situation. However, small but effective steps can be undertaken to minimize the threat in the short-term, sparing some time to find a lasting solution to the issue of Daesh members.

The Al Hol camp situated in the governorate of Hasakah is inhabited by more than 68,000 people of whom 55% are children under the age of 12. In recent times, female Daesh members asserted their de-facto control over the Al Hol camp implementing Daesh methods within the camp. The female members formed so-called Hisba battalions within the camp and maintained order on their own. The inhabitants organize alleged Sharia-courses and propagate the ideology of Daesh.

The YPG’s lack of control over the camp was demonstrated again recently when a Turkestani Daesh member was heavily beaten up by Russian Daesh members of the camp when she refused to attend the courses. More dramatically, the YPG security discovered the dead body of a woman who was likely killed by the Daesh Hisba group in the camp.

If Daesh captives are left to the YPG who are reportedly incapable, and the issues are not addressed correctly, the Iraqi scenario will likely repeat itself, only more dangerously and brutally than before.

Previously other women and even a little girl were said to be killed by other female Daesh members inside the camp. Other incidents include the burning of tents and the harassment of women and children who do not comply with the rules of the Daesh Hisba in the Al Hol camp. As Turkey warned several times before, the YPG/SDF is overwhelmed with the task of how to deal with Daesh members in custody. Together with Sila Naz Engin, we wrote about the dangers of having terrorists in the hand of other terrorists.

A solution for al-Hol camp

I suggest a two-step approach to the situation. The first should address the urgent situation, ease current risks and win time. The second should be more lasting.

Firstly, the international coalition needs to force the YPG to divide the camps into many smaller ones. No camp should be inhabited by more than one thousand Daesh members. These camps might be bordering each other, but there should be no opportunity to establish contact between the camps for the inhabitants.

Secondly, the international coalition should establish a training center in Turkey to train personnel to manage the affairs in such camps. The training should not be limited to security personnel but also of social employees, teachers and religious scholars. It is important to use the experience of Turkey as a Muslim country and the experience of the Syrian opposition to determine how to deal with Daesh members and people traumatized by Daesh.

The rehabilitation center in Marea or Jarablus might be a good example of a model to follow. The rehabilitation camps have plenty of success stories including children who changed their goals from becoming a suicide bomber to becoming a successful student. Currently, there is no such center in YPG-held areas. After being adequately trained, the employees of these camps should be totally independent from militias on the ground, act under the Syrian Interim Government, be provided security guarantees from the international coalition, and should take total control over the camps and prisons in the area.

However, if Daesh captives are left to the YPG who are reportedly incapable, and the issues are not addressed correctly, the Iraqi scenario will likely repeat itself, only more dangerously and brutally than before.

Turkey’s main opposition party has held a conference in Istanbul on Syria recently. While the conference was mostly conducted with the participation of academics and journalists interested in the issue, its aim was to bring together middle level officials from the Syrian government in an informal platform. However, the conference could not achieve its intended impact since it did not include broader participation and the outcome of the conference was one sided.

Before understanding the reasons behind holding the conference, it is necessary to evaluate the critical junctures of the CHP’s Syria policy. After the Syrian civil war erupted in 2011, the CHP’s approach to finding a resolution to the conflict was to support a power-sharing mechanism bringing together all parties, including the Assad regime. From the CHP’s perspective, involvement of representatives of the Assad regime was crucial to a peaceful transition. In accordance with this, the CHP made three formal visits to Assad from 2011 to 2013.

However, after the war escalated and reports by international organizations proved that the Assad regime used chemical weapons against civilians in 2013, the CHP ended meetings with the regime and adopted a relatively neutral approach compared to their previous one. Even with the rising nationalism in Turkey after 2016, the CHP kept this approach towards the Syrian conflict. For instance, the party supported cross-border military operations in Syria although it had reservations on the issue.  

Nonetheless, the party has been experiencing another shift in its Syria policy and the conference reflects this change. Since the last year, the CHP had again started to underline the importance of Assad’s involvement in the negotiation process. Because of this, the party invited representatives of the regime to the conference, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not give them permission to enter Turkey.

It is not exaggeration to say that since the CHP has strengthened its position in domestic politics, it has also started to deal with foreign policy issues more. The party’s relative success in the latest local elections accelerated the CHP’s quest for a new strategy in foreign policy. Thus, the CHP’s recent shift in its Syria policy should be evaluated within this framework.

Nevertheless, the party did not completely leave its relatively neutral approach in Syrian conflict. Since a potential cross-border military operation is on the table, the CHP did not invite any official YPG representatives to the conference. But at the same time, the party did invite some pro-YPG experts such as Professor Amy Austin Holmes to hear their perspectives.

After the conference, the invitation of Amy Austin Holmes caused a crisis for the party, and the decision to invite her was harshly criticized especially on social media. Beyond this issue, the most problematic issue of the CHP’s initiative was the final declaration of the conference.

As the report states, the party sees the safe zone as “demographic engineering” which may deteriorate the future relations between various ethnic groups in the region. According to the report, the stakeholders should count on peace building rather than further escalation of the conflict to find an effective solution. Furthermore, the party clearly stated that they want the Turkish government to work with the Syrian regime for a resolution of the conflict. Another problematic issue was the final declaration report’s lack of attention to the YPG’s threat to Turkey’s security in the region.

All of these factors show that CHP’s new approach to Syrian policy will get a negative reaction from the public including its own voters. Since the YPG threat is still alive and Turkey will prioritize its security, the CHP’s new policy may get even more negative reactions from the public.

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had said earlier in September that he would discuss the problems between Turkey and the United States when he met with the U.S. President Donald Trump on September 25, as part of his trip to New York for the opening of the United Nations General Assembly. But neither side has revealed what was discussed and if anything was resolved.

There was no shortage of issues for the two leaders to talk about. There are still Americans imprisoned in Turkey. The U.S. refuses to deport Fetullah Gülen, whom Ankara holds responsible for the 2016 coup attempt. There is an ongoing dispute over the enforcement of sanctions on Iran. Perhaps most immediately and gravely, Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 anti-aircraft system from Russia will, by the letter of American law, incur sanctions that could do serious harm to the Turkish economy.

Still, there are creative ways around most of these issues. For example, the U.A.E. has strong economic ties with Iran, and the U.S. abides it. Proposals have already been put forth to finesse the S-400 issue, and so on. The crux of the U.S.-Turkey dispute, and the one where interests are radically incompatible, is Syria.

In the summer of 2011, after months of trying to find a peaceful resolution between Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and protesters failed because of the regime’s  continuing murder of civilians, the Turkish government, which already provided a safe haven for refugees fleeing the carnage, began supporting the nascent armed rebellion. The U.S. ostensibly supported the revolutionary movement, though never seriously tried to tip the balance in its favor and over time shifted its policy ever-more-firmly in Assad’s favour for reasons related to Iran policy.

When the U.S. was eventually forced to intervene in Syria in late 2014 by the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS / Daesh), the U.S. tried to engage in counter-terrorism alone. The U.S. wanted to avoid entanglement in the underlying Syrian war, particularly any anti-Assad activity, because the Iranians had made it clear that they would walk away from nuclear negotiations if their proxy regime in Syria was threatened. The attempt by the U.S. to run a narrow counter-terrorism war in Syria was inherently flawed on its own terms, since Assad was the incubator of ISIS and counter-terrorism cannot be separated from the political context. But in the choice of partner for this mission, the U.S. created a whole new crisis.

The U.S. chose to work with the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), to defeat ISIS. The PYD/YPG has had close relations with the Assad regime, Russia, and Iran for decades, and retained cordial relations with the pro-Assad coalition after the war began. The PYD/YPG thus could be trusted not to draw the U.S. into a confrontation with the regime. As a side-effect of the anti-ISIS war, the PYD/YPG was left in control of nearly one-third of Syria that ISIS had taken away from the rebels—a radical redrawing of the political map in Syria that the U.S. was publicly opposed to meddling in. And this created problems that were not limited to Syria.

The PYD/YPG that the U.S. has so vastly empowered is a department of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a terrorist group that has waged war on Turkey since the mid-1980s. The attempt to rebrand this force as the “Syrian Democratic Forces” (SDF) by attaching a few dependent Arab groups might suffice to convince the Western media that “Rojava” is a multi-ethnic democracy, but it is hardly convincing to the people who live under its authoritarian rule.

Whatever the ethnic composition of the SDF and its civilian affiliates, the PKK retains sole military-political control. Within Syria, this has created an explosive situation where a demographically and politically alien party is ruling over resistant Arab populations, and for Turkey a PKK state on its borders is seen, not unreasonably, as a dire security threat. That the U.S. is underwriting this project has created a rift in NATO that Russia has been quick to exploit.

Turkey has twice intervened in Syria, in 2016 and 2018, to push the PKK away from areas of its border in the west and continues to hold these zones through Syrian Arab proxies. These operations left the PKK holding territory mostly to the east of the Euphrates, and Erdogan has repeatedly threatened to initiate a third operation against this zone.

The U.S.’s response to this has been to try to avert a Turkish incursion in eastern Syria where its own forces are based. To do this, the U.S. proposed the “Manbij roadmap”, a model that would, in theory, assuage Ankara’s concerns by removing YPG/PKK control of various urban centres and setting up joint U.S.-Turkish patrols. This has since morphed into a proposal for a “safe zone” that would buffer between Turkey’s border and the PKK-held areas. Given the failure of this concept in Manbij, where the PKK simply reflagged its cadres, Ankara was understandably sceptical to begin with and negotiations have duly stalled. While there has been misdirection on all sides, and proposals for the U.S. to arm-and-equip a 100,000-man PKK force in Syria indefinitely do little to improve the atmosphere, the fundamental problem is less bad faith than diametrically opposed priorities.

Turkey sees the PKK as the primary issue and wants a twenty-mile (30 km) zone under its control inside Syria to deal with this. The U.S., focused monomaniacally on ISIS, wishes to preserve “stability”, however short-termist the definition, and is therefore prepared to grant a much more limited Turkish presence in an area it intends to continue to control, but which is supposedly clear of PKK forces. Displeased with the process, the Turkish government has attempted to gain leverage by signaling a willingness to act unilaterally.

In early August, Erdogan said that Turkey could “only be patient for so long”. At the end of that month, the Turkish president said, “If our soldiers do not control the region [east of the Euphrates] within a few weeks, we will put our own operation plan into effect”. On 18 September, Erdogan said the U.S. has two weeks (to 2 October) to deliver “results”, or else Turkey would go it alone. Most recently, in his U.N. speech, just hours before he met Trump, Erdogan spoke of establishing a 30-km “peace corridor” along a 480-km stretch of the Syria-Turkey border into which two million Syrian refugees in Turkey could be resettled. To underline his point, Erdogan brought along a map.

So, what happens now?

It is extremely unlikely that Turkey will intervene east of the Euphrates by the early October deadline, and highly unlikely that Ankara will risk clashing with U.S. forces at any other time. As such, some version of the status quo—with the U.S. buying time and Turkey preparing to intervene but never quite getting there—could perpetuate for quite some time. That said, low probability, high impact events are not unknown in the Middle East, and this is a situation that has two major wildcards, Erdogan and Trump, plus a trendline that from several angles favours one particular outcome.

From the Trump side, he wants to leave Syria—he has tried twice and been restrained by his officials—and it is possible that he might finally get his way, especially with people like National Security Adviser John Bolton now out of the administration. Trump’s “maximum pressure” rhetoric is a thin veneer for his desire for a deal with Iran, and he might well follow Obama in trading Syria away to get Tehran’s signature.

If the U.S. withdraws under a deal to let the Turks in, it could significantly mend U.S.-Turkey relations; without a deal, Erdogan could still get what he wants but there would be much less political windfall to the alliance. It is also possible, however, that the U.S. would withdraw after organizing with Russia to reconcile the PKK and the Assad/Iran system. Even if Turkey got a narrow buffer zone under this latter arrangement, it would fully restore to Damascus the PKK weapon it used for decades against Turkey.

On the other side, because it is so clear Trump wants out—the number of U.S. troops has been halved to 1,000 this year—Erdogan might calculate that an incursion would not result in triggering the U.S. tripwire, but in Trump deciding to wash his hands of the Syria dilemma altogether. He might even be correct, though it would be a reckless gambit with profound political costs to a relationship with America that is, after all, and despite the current President’s view, about more than just Trump.

This October marks the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. The Chinese government has been preparing for this anniversary by organizing a massive military parade. A show of force which will display the outcome of the country’s economic modernization.

In this regard, this event will be more than a mere joyful celebration of the China’s rising power that will be observed globally. It also reflects the historical remembrance of a communist nation-state which emerged just after World War II, in the aftermath of a civil war between two ideological divisions, that of Chinese nationalism and communism.

In light of this historical staging, today, China is governed by a communist regime under single party rule, and is proud of having arrived at a significant stage as the second biggest economic power globally. This however represents just one part of the reality China is facing.

Nation-state feeling haunts China

The first issue is the state’s political ideology being distinct from economic ideology. Despite being a communist regime, China represents an example of economic modernization based on the capitalist system, or as others say, through adopting the values of economic liberalization.

As observed in the last four decades, China has affiliated its economy with Western liberal values and one may argue that there are few countries which base their political ideology on communism, but have gained such significant economic modernization.

China is very unique in that it is already a globalized power leading the contemporary world economy. And there is almost a consensus upon the fact that China has been a sustaining power on the global stage in almost all aspects of economy, such as being a great investor and trading partner.

The country is always looking for ways to boost its capacities at the regional and global scale, taking into consideration all opportunities through its own multilateral institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The latest examples of this policy can be seen in the very recent bilateral ties made with the Pacific region countries of the Solomon Islands and Kiribati.

Commencing from the 1970s, China has implicitly and explicitly decided to comply with the rules of the global capitalist economic model. As a testament to its success in this regard China was accepted as a member country of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December, 2001.

But the problem as witnessed in official statements and in the media representing the Chinese government, China acts as a nation-state feeling itself under a constant threat, and wishes to aggressively sustain its economic development in a mood of revenge.

One may argue that this psychology is determined by historical factors. Hence, it is questionable as to whether it is reasonable or not, since this attitude causes an obsession in which China wishes to overtake everything that, in particular, the US has gained.

China fails to build confidence

The second issue is related to whether China can build confidence for a healthy political environment which will contribute to regional and global peace. China has been increasing its military power in the Asia Pacific and recently built its first home-grown aircraft carrier which aims to withstand the navy power of the US. Although we cannot deny that Western capitalist states have failed in the creation of sustainable global peace, we can at least say that there are multiple approaches available to give space for distinct political and social forces in the West.

China is a relatively novel playmaker but has yet to gain the confidence of its neighboring countries and in the global stage. Some experts argue that China is a model country as its policies are being emulated by other countries. On the contrary, starting from neighboring countries such as member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China is perceived as a growing threat. The contested situation in the South China Sea is definitely a test for China on how to tackle issues with relevant countries in a way that builds more confidence.

Human rights issues

The third issue is related to whether China will be able to convince the global community about its record on universally recognized issues from the environment to human rights.

Though China still abides by the measures taken in 2015 Paris Climate Agreement, the country has also been facing natural calamities and environmental problems owing to the aggressive developmental projects.

However, multiple rights issues are among the most crucial challenges for the Chinese government in front of the global community. Highly publicized cases of the repressive measures taken in autonomous regions such as Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet, and the tight controls effecting the daily lives of the general public in mainland China, which were exposed in the 2019 World Report on Human Rights are reflections of the ideological stand of the state.

While China is celebrating the establishment of its state based on the Maoist version of communist ideology initiated seven decades ago, it has multiple issues to face in the domestic, regional and global spheres. But we should acknowledge that these issues are not merely China’s national problems, rather they are real threats targeting regional and global peace.