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ne of the most significant turning points in Turkish political life undoubtedly took place on the night of July 15, 2016. The coup attempt, which arose from a mutiny by a group within the military affiliated with the FETÖ organization, was thwarted thanks to the resolute stance demonstrated by the public and the strong political will displayed by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This event not only directly influenced political processes but also served as a catalyst for a profound transformation in Turkish political culture. On the night of July 15, whilst the public’s silence in the face of the military largely came to an end, a clear tendency to embrace the political mechanism emerging from the manifestation of civilian will also became evident.

Following the failed coup attempt on July 15, social and political codes in Türkiye began to be restructured within a new paradigm. By opening the door to an understanding of the risks posed by—or that could be created by—movements characterized by external dependencies and a high degree of esotericism, July 15 brought about a historic turning point in terms of redefining the perception of security in Türkiye and reorganizing the relationship between the military and politics from the ground up.

The radical changes in these two areas have not only had a clear impact on domestic politics and the structuring of institutions, but have also been felt just as distinctly in Türkiye’s approach to international politics and its foreign policy practices. In this new reality, where the approach to countering external threats has shifted, Ankara’s strategic choices—particularly regarding the Middle East—exhibited a striking parallelism with both the region’s own conditions and the domestic transformation taking place within the country.

The strategy to contain Türkiye in the run-up to July 15

The foreign policy vision set out and the policies implemented following the 3 November 2002 elections, which brought the Justice and Development Party to power, enabled Türkiye to reposition itself in global politics and, in particular, to become a founding actor in the Middle East. In particular, the status quo that emerged as a result of the popular revolutions in the region during the 2011 Arab Spring bore the hallmarks of Ankara’s new global political vision. However, in the strategic transformations in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and Libya, the significant electoral success of Islamist and conservative parties—which reflected broader societal trends rather than those of groups aligned with the West—completely altered the perspective of the US and other Western actors on the region.

Furthermore, with the open support provided by Russia and Iran to prop up Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, a serious attempt was made to put a brake on the Middle East’s drive towards independence. During this process, in which Ankara’s relations with the region were taken to a new level, the unease arising amongst global and regional actors evolved into a situation characterized by a succession of initiatives aimed at restricting Turkey’s room for maneuver. The sudden emergence in 2013 of events in Türkiye, Egypt and Bangladesh—which shared similar backgrounds, support bases and rhetoric—constituted steps taken to stem the new momentum within the Muslim world. Alongside the violent protests at Gezi Park in Türkiye, the Tamarod protests in Egypt and the Shahbag protests in Bangladesh were a reflection of a coordinated strategy.

Following the overthrow of Mohamed Morsi in Egypt on July 3, 2013, through a coup, Ankara’s stance on this event led to the emergence of a new dynamic in the region. Alongside the deepening crisis in Syria, the efforts of certain regional actors to bring the popular revolutions to an end and restore the authoritarian status quo led to a narrowing of Türkiye’s foreign policy parameters, driven by both external and internal factors.

During this period, the terrorist organizations that emerged in northern Syria (ISIS and the YPG), alongside the PKK’s tendencies to undermine stability within the country, constituted attempts to erode the government in power before July 15 and, consequently, the legitimate and civilian political will. In particular, the deliberate efforts by members of FETÖ, who had infiltrated the security bureaucracy to a significant extent, to slow down decision-making and implementation processes and to prevent the government from exercising its proper authority through the dissemination of manipulative information, formed part of a plan to undermine Türkiye’s distinctive and independent character in global politics and reduce it to the status of an ineffective actor.

Against a backdrop of growing threats to Türkiye’s border security from Syria, the aircraft crisis with Russia has gone down in history as one of the profound challenges Ankara has faced. The tension that arose between Moscow and Ankara following the downing of a Russian SU-24 aircraft that had violated Turkish airspace caused serious difficulties for Türkiye, a country that was becoming increasingly isolated in the region and whose security concerns were being disregarded by the Western world.

However, under the leadership of President Erdoğan, and following the decision-making elite’s prudent management of the situation, the crisis between Ankara and Moscow was largely resolved, whilst at the same time Türkiye began to adopt a more resilient stance in the face of regional and global challenges. The fact that the collapse anticipated by FETÖ members and their external supporters did not materialize – due to Ankara’s protection of the country’s security and stability through alternative strategies and its continued resolute policy in the face of all threats – led to the attempt on the night of July 15 to overthrow the government by coup and eliminate Türkiye’s sovereignty.

Post-July 15 purge and Türkiye’s new Middle East policy

Following July 15—one of the longest nights in the history of the Republic—and the failure of FETÖ members’ attempts to eliminate the country’s political autonomy and restrict its capacity for action, Ankara began to pursue an action-oriented policy within a new paradigm. During this process, in which security and the perception of threat were formulated in a manner consistent with the reality on the ground, the security bureaucracy took steps—particularly through the purging of harmful elements within the military—within the framework of the hierarchical relationship that should exist between the government and the military.

On 24 August 2016, to send a message to the entire world and to demonstrate in concrete terms that it would combat all forms of terrorism without making any categorical distinctions, Ankara launched Operation Euphrates Shield in northern Syria, with the support of the Free Syrian Army. As part of this operation, which resulted in a crushing victory over ISIS elements, Ankara made a highly strategic move aimed at eliminating threats to its borders originating from Syrian territory and establishing a safe zone for Syrians in the north of the country.

By demonstrating a radical model of alignment between theory and practice through Operation Euphrates Shield, Türkiye not only altered the balance of power on the ground through its military activism but also assumed both an independent and a founding role in initiating a new process regarding Syria’s future. The fact that, for many years, US and European actors refrained from taking constructive and realistic steps to end the civil war in Syria and ensure the safe return of Syrians led Ankara, following July 15, to adopt a stance that engaged Russia more closely under a new framework.

The establishment of a Syria-focused dialogue framework involving Türkiye, Russia and Iran, and the Astana Talks, which represented an alternative initiative to resolve the crisis in the country, went down in the records as a concrete positive contribution of the July 15 events. Alongside its fight against Daesh, Türkiye—which is determined to prevent the PKK/YPG structure in Syria from undermining Syria’s territorial integrity in any way—carried out the Olive Branch and Peace Spring operations in line with its concept of strategic autonomy, despite reactions from the Western world, thereby consolidating its position as a game-changer in the region.

Having swiftly observed the outcomes of its post-July 15 purification efforts in Syria, Ankara adopted a more active strategy to escape the atmosphere of constriction and isolation that had emerged following the reversal of the post-Arab Spring process. During this period, the transformation of the domestic political system also facilitated Türkiye’s ability to pursue independent foreign policy practices.

The establishment of a new model, in which the executive branch has been strengthened and communication between institutions has been accelerated under the Presidential System of Government, played a decisive role in minimizing the negative effects of the July 15 coup attempt and in enhancing Ankara’s global standing. As a reflection of this, Türkiye demonstrated its influence in the region to all parties by openly supporting Doha against the blockade imposed by the Gulf Cooperation Council countries aimed at disciplining Qatar. Furthermore, following the purge within the country’s civil and security bureaucracy, the acceleration of developments in the defense industry and Türkiye’s transformation into a major security producer have enabled Ankara to reposition itself in global politics. This situation has undoubtedly led to a reassessment of ties with Ankara among regional actors and the reactivation of previously frozen relations.

Although the July 15 coup attempt appears to be an intervention in the political mechanism due to its direct targeting of President Erdoğan and his administration, it is clear that this failed attempt was actually the result of a will to eliminate Türkiye’s subjectivity in the global arena. Considering that a significant portion of classical or postmodern coups in Turkish political life have occurred as a result of Ankara establishing contact with alternative actors or presenting a new global political vision, it is evident that the FETÖ mechanism was activated to undermine the effects of President Erdoğan’s new perspective on the international stage and to transform Türkiye back into a secondary actor.

Having overcome this organized threat against the country’s sovereignty and independence, Türkiye, having largely purged harmful elements from its ranks, has begun to develop more original strategies in the global arena. The most concrete manifestation of this is Türkiye’s founding and decisive role in the Middle East. Changing the status quo in the region and successfully balancing regional actors, Ankara has become one of the most effective actors in both Middle Eastern and global politics over the past decade.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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he military operation launched by the US and Israel against Iran on February 28, 2026, which has now evolved into a fragile ceasefire, has reopened the debate on NATO’s institutional and geographical boundaries. The Trump administration’s stance, demanding that its European allies make their airspace and military bases available for use, as well as deploying active naval assets to the Strait of Hormuz, has triggered a structural tension within the Alliance.

Whilst Article 5 of the Treaty limits the obligation of collective defense to attacks on the territories of member states in Europe or North America, Article 6 further narrows this geographical scope by clarifying the definition of the ‘North Atlantic area’. Although the fact that the Washington–Tehran crisis unfolded entirely outside NATO’s formal area of responsibility provided a legal basis for the Alliance to refrain from taking the initiative as an actor, strategic considerations have been the decisive factor here. Although the Alliance claims to be a ‘global security actor’, its members prefer to define the organization as a regional defense pact, whilst avoiding turning their ‘out-of-area’ engagements into an institutional obligation.

Trump’s demands and Europe’s alliance dilemma

The most striking manifestation of the crisis at the operational level is the profound asymmetry between the expectations of the hegemonic power and the allies’ capacity to resist. Washington’s demands have gone beyond a classic burden-sharing debate to become a test of loyalty for the allies. The main objection raised from the European side in the face of this demanding stance is the political rejection that the process has been escalated without consultation with the allies and that ‘the war in question is not Europe’s war’. During this process, Spain adopted the toughest stance by closing its military bases and airspace to US use; Italy demanded strict prior coordination, whilst France and the UK raised various reservations regarding the allocation of bases.

However, despite these restrictive decisions, the European continent – led by Germany – effectively served as a vital logistical base for American military operations. As the crisis deepened and Iran began retaliatory strikes against Gulf states, France, Italy and the UK deployed their military forces to the region to fend off missile and drone attacks, thereby taking up active positions on secondary fronts. On the other hand, whilst the closure of the Strait of Hormuz dealt a severe blow to Europe’s economic interests, the capacity limitations of their own armed forces and their reluctance to be drawn into a conflict imposed by the US led European states to reject Trump’s demand to reopen the strait by military force. This collective refusal by Europe paved the way for Trump to accuse his allies of disloyalty and to threaten to withdraw the US from NATO.

This situation has left European decision-makers facing a classic ‘alliance dilemma’. Allies found themselves caught between, on the one hand, the fear of being drawn into a conflict in the Middle East (entrapment) in the name of US regional interests, and, on the other, the anxiety of being abandoned (abandonment) without the protection of the American security umbrella in the face of the Russian threat. This structural impasse has pushed Europe towards a strategy of ‘active inertia’, one that appeases the US politically whilst refraining from military engagement.

Legal basis for operations outside Article 5

Two historical precedents in which NATO was able to take action even in crises falling outside the scope of Article 5 provide an important comparison of how this structural limitation can be overcome. The Alliance’s military engagement in the Bosnian crisis (1992–1995), which it experienced during the post-Cold War period, was based on a process of deriving legitimacy directly through the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) phased authorisation mechanisms. Similarly, in Libya, the Alliance’s basis of legitimacy was derived not from its own founding articles but from the UN Security Council’s authorisation to protect civilians (Resolution 1973);

NATO became the institutional vehicle implementing this authorisation due to its command-and-control capabilities, yet the composition of participants remained variable, with members such as Germany remaining on the sidelines. The possibility of this scenario being repeated in the Iran crisis is structurally precluded: Russia and China’s veto powers on the Security Council block any Bosnia- or Libya-style authorisation from the outset. This has reinforced the conclusion that NATO has no capacity to take institutional action on the Iran issue, either within its own Articles 5 and 6 framework or through the UN; consequently, the only realistic option remaining is individual or coalition-based action centred on the US-Israel axis.

Furthermore, the Alliance’s structural fissures are manifesting themselves in various ways on the ground. The Alliance’s past operations against piracy in the Gulf of Aden or its missions to combat terrorism and smuggling in the Mediterranean demonstrate a modest yet functional capacity for action that underpins NATO’s claim to protect global trade routes. However, these historical examples are fundamentally at odds with the military and political nature of the threat in the Strait of Hormuz: Whilst operations in the Gulf of Aden or the Mediterranean are policing-style missions conducted against weak and non-state actors, patrolling under the NATO flag in the Strait of Hormuz amounts to engaging in a direct show of force with a sovereign state possessing advanced ballistic capabilities.

Indeed, this structural incompatibility came to the fore as recently as 2019, amidst the deepening US-Iran nuclear crisis and a situation where attacks on oil tankers were threatening global trade. At that time, rather than uniting under a common umbrella, NATO members established two separate naval forces, each operating independently and guided by opposing strategic rationales: the US-led IMSC (2019), focused solely on military deterrence, and the French-led EMASOH (2020), which aimed solely at diplomatic de-escalation without being drawn into the US–Iran conflict. The fact that this two-pronged structure, with its conflicting objectives, has been established outside NATO has clearly demonstrated that the Alliance lacks a shared perception of threat and the capacity for joint decision-making in ‘out-of-scope’ crisis regions.

Turkey as a NATO member

The evasive manoevres of European allies are transforming into a far more complex geographical and strategic equation centered on Turkey, which forms the Alliance’s south-eastern flank. Turkey’s long-standing border with Iran and its reflexes to preserve the regional balance of power, combined with a normative opposition to Israel’s military doctrine, are keeping Ankara away from kinetic conflict and forcing it into a conciliatory diplomacy.

Whilst this strategy of isolation is accepted by Washington, strategic infrastructure integrated into NATO, such as the Kürecik radar and Incirlik Air Base, which Turkey hosts on its own territory, creates structural pressure and the risk of ‘spatial entrapment’. To prevent these facilities from being instrumentalized by the US for unilateral operational intelligence or pre-emptive strikes, Ankara has blocked American manoevres by strictly limiting the rules of use within the Alliance’s formal defense framework. This stance demonstrates that geographical realities shape a security framework far more decisively than Alliance texts.

Ultimately, the ‘active inaction’ strategy developed by European states whilst caught in the ‘alliance dilemma’, alongside Turkey’s efforts to restrict the use of NATO infrastructure under its sovereignty to counter the risk of ‘spatial drift’, have clearly demonstrated that the allies will not unconditionally align themselves with a hegemonic power’s unilateral regional conflict. Although Donald Trump has sought to portray the Alliance as a weak and ‘ineffective’ institution in the eyes of the public, citing the allies’ rhetorical distancing and limited support as justification, the logistical and operational realities on the ground point to the exact opposite.

The difficulties the US has faced throughout the crisis against Iran, which possesses asymmetric capabilities, have clearly highlighted the limits of unilateral force projection, despite its military superiority. Ultimately, this crisis has paradoxically demonstrated the extent to which a hegemonic power needs the strategic depth and structural alliance architecture offered by its allies in order to consolidate its regional presence and project power.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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s the global and regional security environment has become more complex, unpredictable and fragile in recent years, it is evident that a country’s capabilities play an effective role in both deterrence and the establishment of a peaceful environment. In such a context, the EFES 2026 Combined Joint Live-Fire Field Exercise, hosted by Türkiye, goes far beyond being merely a military show of force. The exercise can be interpreted as a ‘deterrence and peace equation’ where military, diplomatic and technological messages are synchronized on the ground.

Both the tactical depth of the day and night scenarios and the domestic and national defense industry solutions integrated into the exercise each year are noteworthy. The Turkish Armed Forces’ (TSK) flawless capability in both “combined and joint operations” is being demonstrated. During the Distinguished Observer Day activities, attended by high-ranking state officials and representatives of friendly and allied nations, Türkiye’s role as a guarantor of regional peace and stability is proclaimed to the world through the language of strategic communication.

The Defense Industry Exhibition within the scope of the EFES 2026 Exercise serves as the clearest demonstration of Türkiye’s leadership in the transformation of modern warfare doctrines and its commitment to the goals of full independence. This exhibition goes beyond traditional fair concepts; it is not merely a space where systems are displayed statically, but also serves as a ‘laboratory’ where they are tested against the realities of the actual battlefield.

Integration with allies and partners: Libya and Syria

One of the key elements that makes the EFES Exercise unique on a global scale is the ability to manage forces from different nations—despite differences in language, doctrine and operational culture—with a ‘united and joint’ will within the same scenario. EFES 2026, meanwhile, saw a record level of foreign personnel participation, in line with both the current geopolitical context and Türkiye’s position within the global system. A particularly notable aspect was the fact that a total of 502 personnel from eastern (331) and western (171) Libya—regions that had recently been at war with one another—underwent joint training with the Turkish Armed Forces during the exercise.

This goes far beyond ordinary military cooperation. The fact that Türkiye’s long-standing objective of “One Libya, One Army”, pursued on the ground in the name of regional and global peace, has materialised in such a massive international exercise demonstrates Ankara’s capacity for diplomatic and military integration. Similarly, the participation of a core element of the Syrian army, which is currently undergoing a restructuring process, in the exercise demonstrates Turkey’s determination to shape the regional security architecture in line with its own vision.

“Putting the future concept of warfare into practice”

The Russia-Ukraine War, the US/Israel-Iran War and other regional conflicts currently dominating the global agenda are bringing the transformation of the modern battlefield into sharp relief. During this period, it has become increasingly clear that manned and unmanned platforms are working in tandem, decision-making processes are being accelerated through AI-integrated solutions, and autonomous systems are creating a multiplier effect. An examination of the EFES 2026 scenarios clearly demonstrates how closely Türkiye is following this transformation and developing pioneering doctrines.

The inclusion of Türkiye’s unmanned combat aircraft, KIZILELMA, in the demonstration flight formation alongside manned platforms such as GÖKBEY, HÜRKUŞ and HÜRJET during the various scenarios conducted throughout the exercise signals the dawn of a new era in air power. The fact that autonomous and AI-supported unmanned kamikaze aerial vehicle systems (Baykar K2 and Sivrisinek kamikaze UAV, VTOL KALKAN UAVs; Skydagger FPV drone; STM’s 20-strong KARGU swarm) struck targets simulated with live warheads astonished everyone. In exercises conducted worldwide, it has not previously been observed that unmanned kamikaze aerial vehicles of different types were operated in a similar scenario within a ‘swarm architecture’.

Either live warheads were not used, or only formation capabilities were demonstrated. EFES 2026 went down in the records as the first live, explosive application field. Furthermore, within the scope of the exercise, F-16s’ HGK-84 (Precision Guidance Kit), alongside the 20mm cannon of the ATAK helicopters and their attacks with UMTAS missiles, and the coordinated scenario involving supporting fire from 155mm FIRTINA II howitzers, demonstrates the level of network-centred warfare capability achieved by the Turkish Armed Forces. This ultimately proves that Türkiye is not merely limited to producing platforms; it has built up significant tactical expertise regarding how these systems are to be utilised as part of combined and joint forces within complex combat scenarios.

The defense industry’s field test

One of the most significant innovations that elevates the EFES exercises beyond a mere military manoeuvre is the organic integration of the Defense Industry Exhibition into the exercise. The realities of the battlefield are always different from laboratory tests. Thanks to the visionary coordination of the Ministry of National Defense and the Presidency of the Defense Industry, domestically developed systems are being tested directly under the dust, smoke and stress of the field. The entire process is operated within a structure that includes foreign personnel. The performance demonstrated by the systems will undoubtedly feature in the ‘reports’ that these foreign personnel will present upon their return to their home countries.

The “Steel Dome” system demonstration presented to the country’s leadership and international guests as part of the Distinguished Observer Day marks the pinnacle of the strategy on display. The participation of the STEEL DOME – the integrating element of Türkiye’s layered air defense architecture – in an international exercise simulating combat conditions serves both to convey the message of “full independence in national defense” and to demonstrate the system’s operational readiness to potential buyer nations. Projects such as the Denizhan, a national naval gun produced by MKE and currently in active service, are the clearest indication of how Türkiye is gradually breaking its dependence on foreign sources. The opportunity for foreign delegations to meet directly with the engineers responsible for production on the operational field ensures that they experience Türkiye’s technological capabilities not through brochures, but by observing them in the field. This situation creates an invaluable opportunity and reference point for defense exports.

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hen we hear news of a conflict in the Middle East or across the Sahel, one of the first images that comes to mind is the pickup truck with a heavy machine gun mounted on its bed. Racing along desert roads, sometimes accompanying the convoy of a state army, sometimes forming part of a militia raid, these vehicles have become one of the most familiar images of modern warfare.

The footage that emerged from Mali on the morning of April 25, 2026, revived that memory once again. Coordinated attacks carried out by al-Qaeda-linked JNIM and the FLA forces advocating Azawad independence brought these desert cavalrymen back into the global spotlight.

Yet, of course, no “victory” won in this region comes merely through off-road vehicles fitted with PK machine guns. So before asking who is financing and directing the war in the Sahel today, it is worth looking at who first turned these vehicles into some of the most iconic war machines of irregular warfare, and under what circumstances.

The 1986–1987 Libya–Chad War, a.k.a. the Toyota War

At the heart of the crisis unfolding in the Sahara in the second half of the 1980s lay the Aouzou Strip, located along the Chad–Libya border. This desert territory, covering roughly 114,000 square kilometers, carried the burden of vague, arbitrarily drawn borders inherited from the colonial era. Libya, under Muammar Gaddafi, regarded the area as a matter of historical right, while Chad saw this claim as a direct threat to its national sovereignty.

When the war began, the military balance on paper heavily favored Libya. The Libyan army resembled a Soviet-equipped steel fist. Gaddafi’s regime controlled the Aouzou Strip with roughly 8,000 troops, T-55 tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery units, and Mi-24 helicopters, famously known as “flying tanks.” Facing them were the Chadian National Armed Forces, who knew the terrain far better but had only limited technological capabilities.

By 1987, however, the intelligence, weapons, and air support provided by France under Opération Épervier quickly shifted the course of the war in Chad’s favor. France was the most critical actor behind the Chadian government, seeking both to protect Western bloc interests and to break Libya’s influence south of the Sahara. These were, after all, the years when Cold War rivalry increasingly turned local conflicts into proxy wars.

The Battle of Fada on January 2, 1987, marked the turning point in this shift. The French Air Force had suppressed Libyan air operations and largely neutralized Gaddafi’s air superiority. Alongside this, hundreds of Toyota pickups supplied by France, together with MILAN anti-tank missiles capable of destroying a tank from roughly two kilometers away, were among the main factors that turned the battlefield equation against Libya. Indeed, Khalifa Haftar, one of the most influential figures in Libyan politics today, was among those captured by Chadian forces during that period.

100 kilometers into Libyan territory

By September 1987, Chadian units carried out a daring raid, infiltrating roughly 100 kilometers into Libyan territory and striking the Maaten al-Sarra Air Base. Numerous aircraft, ammunition stocks, and military assets belonging to the Libyan air force were destroyed before they could even take off. Conducted under French command, this raid became one of the most critical moves in undermining Libya’s air superiority in the region and forcing Gaddafi toward the diplomatic table.

The Chad–Libya War of 1986–87 is now remembered as the “Toyota War.” These low-cost pickup trucks, brought into the country with French support and fitted with heavy machine guns and anti-tank missiles, had been transformed into mobile war machines capable of destroying million-dollar T-55 tanks from hundreds of meters away. While Libya’s heavy Soviet tanks sank into the sand and turned into static targets, the lightweight Toyotas, with their wide tires, seemed almost to float across the desert surface. According to an account that even found its way into military reports, Chadian soldiers would cross Libyan minefields at speeds exceeding 100 kilometers per hour. They moved so fast that even if a wheel triggered the fuse of an anti-tank mine, by the time the explosion occurred the pickup had already left the blast radius.

The real strength of these vehicles, known in modern military literature as “technicals,” lay not in their armor but in their speed and simplicity. When a tank broke down, it required a team of specialist engineers, heavy maintenance infrastructure, and a complex supply chain for spare parts. When a Toyota broke down, basic technical knowledge, limited equipment, and a bit of ingenuity were often enough.

Of course, these vehicles were not what won the war on their own. Without France’s suppression of Libya’s air superiority, the MILAN anti-tank missiles it supplied, the flow of intelligence, and the political-military guarantee provided by Paris, such an outcome would not have been possible. For this reason, the Toyota War is remembered not merely as a story of light vehicles defeating heavy tanks, but as a striking example of how asymmetric warfare, when combined with external support, can change the outcome of a conflict.

The Toyota Hilux and similar vehicles, which have entered popular culture as the archetypal “terror pickup,” have become a constant feature of conflict zones stretching from the Middle East to the Sahel due to their durability, low cost, and ease of weaponization. Having first emerged in the deserts of Chad in the 1980s, where speed, simplicity, and geography gave them an edge against heavy tanks, these vehicles are now back on the battlefield in Mali.

So, are the pickups and drones now pushing southward in Mali truly being commanded by the rebel alliance alone?

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hen Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan says he does not want to see “a new conflict in the Horn of Africa,” he is not making a throwaway remark about a distant region. He is speaking after high-level talks in Addis Ababa and phone calls that range from Abu Dhabi to Mogadishu, at a moment when Red Sea tensions, Ethiopia’s search for sea access and Somalia’s first offshore drilling project are all converging. I don’t read this as a routine diplomatic line. To me, it is a sign that, for Ankara, stability from Ethiopia to Somalia has become a strategic test of its broader foreign policy narrative.

Over the last few years, Türkiye has steadily expanded its footprint along the Red Sea–Gulf of Aden corridor. Somalia hosts Turkish trainers, engineers and aid workers. Ethiopia has become one of Ankara’s largest investment destinations on the continent. Sudan, Djibouti and even Eritrea now enter Turkish debates about sea lanes, energy routes and security risks. Erdoğan’s latest message simply makes explicit what policy choices have already been saying quietly: the Horn of Africa is no longer a side file.

That matters because the region sits at the intersection of several fires at once. Civil war in Sudan, unresolved tensions inside Ethiopia, maritime insecurity in the Red Sea and the persistent threat of al-Shabaab in Somalia all blur into one another. For a country that sees itself as both a regional stabilizer and a rising middle power, ignoring this arc of instability is not really an option.

From a “Somalia file” to a regional vision

Türkiye’s entry point into the Horn of Africa was Somalia. What began as humanitarian aid during the 2011 famine turned into a long-term relationship that combines military training, infrastructure projects, and political support. Ankara built roads, hospitals and schools in Mogadishu, opened an embassy when many others stayed away and later established a major military training base to support Somali forces fighting al-Shabaab.

Over time, this “Somalia file” stopped being just about one fragile state. Turkish diplomats and security officials increasingly framed it as part of a wider picture that stretches from the Suez Canal to the Indian Ocean. Turkish Airlines routes, port projects and naval deployments all reflect the same logic: what happens around the Bab el-Mandeb strait and the Gulf of Aden directly affect Türkiye’s trade, energy security and diaspora connections.

As Ethiopia’s leadership began to talk more openly about its need for sea access, and as Sudan’s war threatened to fragment another coastal state, Ankara’s calculus shifted again. It was no longer enough to work only with Mogadishu. Relations with Addis Ababa deepened around investment, defense cooperation and discussions on how Ethiopia could secure access to ports without triggering a wider conflict. The message coming out of Erdoğan’s meetings has been consistent: any solution on sea access should be based on regional consensus, not unilateral moves that risk pulling everyone into a crisis.

This is happening in a crowded field. The United States, Gulf countries, Egypt, the European Union and China all have their own military bases, port concessions and political projects in and around the Horn. Türkiye is not the biggest player in terms of money or firepower. Its difference lies in what it is not: it has no colonial history in the region; it presents itself as a partner from the Global South and it speaks the language of both security and development at the same time.

Security that tries to reduce, not export, risk

Erdoğan’s Horn of Africa message is rooted in very concrete security concerns. Ethiopia is still managing the aftershocks of internal conflicts. Sudan’s civil war threatens to spill over into Chad, South Sudan, and the Red Sea. Eritrea remains a closed but influential actor. In Somalia, al-Shabaab has not disappeared, even as security forces have made gains. Across the water, Yemen’s conflict and Houthi attacks on shipping lanes have turned the Red Sea into a zone of permanent alert.

In such an environment, escalation rarely stays local. A border clash between Ethiopia and a coastal neighbor, a miscalculation in Sudan or a major attack on shipping could quickly draw in Gulf states, Western navies and regional rivals. Trade routes, energy flows and migration patterns would all feel the shock.

Türkiye’s answer has been to invest in local capacity rather than posture as a front-line power. In Somalia, Turkish officers train army and police units, while naval forces contribute to anti-piracy and maritime security missions. The aim is to help local institutions stand on their feet, not to replace them. The same logic applies to Ethiopia and Sudan, where Ankara stresses respect for territorial integrity and advocates political dialogue even as it supplies equipment and technical support.

From Ankara’s perspective, stability in the Horn is tied directly to its own security. New refugee flows, disrupted shipping in the Red Sea, or the spread of extremist networks would quickly reach the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond. At the same time, a more stable Horn offers opportunities: safer trade corridors, energy cooperation with Somalia, and a friendlier environment for Turkish investment in Ethiopia and Sudan.

Ports, planes and people-to-people ties

Security is only part of the equation. The Horn of Africa has also become an economic and diplomatic laboratory for Türkiye. Turkish companies are active in ports, construction and logistics projects, seeking a role in upgrading infrastructure that links landlocked states to global markets. Every port concession, every logistics hub has a dual meaning: commercial opportunity and geopolitical leverage.

For a middle power with limited resources, every naval mission, every training base and every trade deal has to serve more than one purpose. A presence in Mogadishu is not only about counterterrorism; it is also about giving Turkish firms a foothold in a market that others have long ignored. Investment in Ethiopian manufacturing is not only about cheap labor; it supports a political partnership that Ankara hopes will last through leadership changes on both sides.

Soft power runs alongside these hard interests. Scholarship programs bring Ethiopian and Somali students to Turkish universities. Development agencies support health, education and agriculture projects in remote areas. Turkish NGOs operate clinics and schools that often outlast news cycles. In quiet times, these efforts build goodwill. In moments of crisis, they provide channels to actors who do not always sit at official tables.

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hen Pakistan’s defense minister went on television at the end of February and spoke of an “open war” with the Taliban government in Kabul, he was not simply using a dramatic phrase for a familiar border clash. He was signaling that the Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre – long managed through deniable strikes, proxy groups and quiet understandings – had entered a new and more dangerous phase.

His announcement came as Pakistani warplanes hit Taliban-controlled areas near the capital and along the eastern frontier, targeting what Islamabad describes as TTP safe havens that fuel attacks inside Pakistan. For people on both sides of the border, this looked less like the start of a brand-new conflict and more like a sharp escalation in a security problem that never really went away.

Islamabad said the strikes targeted militants of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) responsible for repeated attacks across the border and inside Pakistan. Taliban authorities in Kabul countered that civilians, including women and children, were among the dead, and that Afghan sovereignty had been violated yet again by a neighbor that long used their soil as a strategic area. Both sides accused each other of sheltering militants and of turning a porous line on the map into a revolving door for armed groups.

The first theatre of the “war on terror” is now moving toward an undeclared confrontation between two governments that once cooperated closely. As this front heats up, the question becomes more concrete: in a crowded and contested international agenda, who has both the interest and the capacity to help limit the damage? Middle powers such as Türkiye are increasingly part of the answer, but their real room for maneuver is still being tested.

From counterterrorism to open war

For years, Afghanistan-Pakistan borders sat in a grey zone. Pakistani jets and artillery occasionally hit suspected militant camps across the border. Taliban leaders quietly tolerated some of these strikes, publicly condemned others and tried to manage a relationship built on decades of covert cooperation, refugee flows and shared enemies. The line between a counterterrorism operation and a cross-border skirmish was kept deliberately vague.

Late February 2026 changed the atmosphere. Pakistani warplanes bombed Taliban-held areas near Kabul and in eastern provinces, while officials spoke openly about dismantling what they describe as TTP safe havens inside Afghanistan. Taliban spokesmen responded with their own casualty figures, allegations of civilian deaths and an ultimatum: respect Afghan territory or face consequences. When both sides use language such as “open war,” the space for quiet de-escalation narrows quickly.

This is not only a matter of public rhetoric. When armed groups move across borders, governments still have a certain flexibility in how they respond and how they explain their actions. Once capitals and regular forces are engaged in a declared confrontation, domestic audiences, rival factions and external partners all push for more rigid positions. Political costs rise for any actor who wants to step back.

A nuclear shadow over a crowded map

The Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier links two nuclear-armed states and sits close to a third, India, which has its own history of war with Pakistan. It also lies on top of the supply routes, smuggling lines and ideological networks that have sustained jihadist movements since the 1980s. In a relatively small space, tribal structures, armed groups and long-standing border disputes overlap and feed into each other.

In such an environment, escalation can move faster than intentions. A few days of airstrikes and retaliatory raids might remain limited; several weeks of miscalculation could start to affect stability in Central Asia, the Gulf and even China’s Xinjiang region. Pakistani security planners are clearly aware of these linkages. Taliban commanders understand as well that allowing TTP fighters extensive freedom of action from Afghan territory increases the chance of additional punitive strikes.

The timing of this crisis matters. It comes as the U.N. Security Council is already dealing with a crowded agenda dominated by the fourth year of the Ukraine war and the unresolved consequences of the Gaza genocide. Diplomatic bandwidth in many capitals is limited. Intelligence services and foreign ministries are managing several urgent files at once. Adding Afghanistan-Pakistan to this list makes coordination harder at the very moment when it is most needed.

Where middle powers step in

At this point, middle powers come into focus. States with regional reach, flexible diplomacy and no colonial baggage in Afghanistan-Pakistan have a specific advantage. Various reports and commentaries already point to regional mediators such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia, as well as Türkiye and possibly the UAE. All of them have channels to Islamabad, some degree of contact with the Taliban and a clear interest in avoiding a prolonged war on the edge of the Muslim world.

Türkiye enters this picture with a record that combines alliance ties and autonomous initiatives. As a NATO member that maintained dialogue with Moscow during the Ukraine war, Ankara helped build the Black Sea grain corridor when many saw little space for compromise. On Gaza, Turkish officials engaged in back-channel contacts involving Israel, Egypt, Qatar and the United States while keeping a critical public line. In Afghanistan, Türkiye sought a role at Kabul airport after the U.S. withdrawal, signaling that it did not intend to disappear from the file when Western militaries left.

This pattern has strengthened Ankara’s claim to a certain mediation capacity. Middle powers accumulate influence not only through defense sales or summit diplomacy, but also by repeatedly entering crisis management roles when larger powers are divided or simply tired. The Afghanistan-Pakistan confrontation is another test case. For Pakistan’s leaders, a Muslim-majority partner with established defense links and personal relationships is a good option. For Taliban figures who do not want to depend on a single patron, an interlocutor that talks about security, trade and political process at the same time has clear value.

This does not mean a middle power can impose a settlement between Pakistan’s security establishment and the Taliban leadership. It does mean expectations are shifting about which actors are asked to “do something” when escalation threatens to spin out of control.

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n recent years, Turkey’s foreign policy has fundamentally focused on establishing a belt of stability and development stretching from Asia to Africa. In this context, Ankara has played a constructive role in regional crisis areas with the aim of achieving lasting stability. Thanks to Turkey’s positive approach, crises have been prevented from deepening in many areas, including Libya, Somalia, Syria and Sudan.

Ankara has not hesitated to cooperate with like-minded actors, bringing together all parties that can contribute positively to the processes and striving to implement solution-oriented, multilateral approaches. Rather than deepening divisions, Turkey’s position has been to bring regional actors together around common interests, resolving the problems encountered through the region’s own dynamics. In this context, Turkey has recently joined forces with countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan, adopting joint positions on regional policies and acting in a coordinated manner to resolve issues.

Alliance motivations of regional powers

The primary motivation behind Turkey’s proposed alliance structure, which would integrate the region’s leading countries, is to address mounting security concerns and ensure lasting stability. This would allow the Middle East and the Islamic world to tackle the issues they have faced increasingly in recent years, and could pave the way for a climate of peace. In recent years, the divergent agendas and policy preferences of the relevant parties have produced destructive rather than constructive results, leading to instability becoming the norm in crisis-stricken countries and across the region as a whole. This is evident in crisis regions such as Syria, Libya, Sudan and Yemen, where resolving crises has proven much more difficult during periods of discord and lack of cooperation among regional actors.

Another motivation behind this process of rapprochement among regional powers is anxiety caused by shifts in global power balances and the resulting uncertainty. The new approach to US policy in the Middle East, coupled with increasing signs of Washington’s diminishing presence in the region, has caused regional actors to adopt a more cautious approach to traditional security mechanisms. Consequently, countries in the region have increased their efforts to establish new security and cooperation mechanisms. While Turkey and Saudi Arabia’s recent initiatives towards this goal have resulted in concrete agreements being signed, the prospect of alliance structures emerging, comprising actors with shared priorities who intend to join, has strengthened.

Another factor encouraging the formation of regional alliances is the economic cooperation potential that has been stifled by an unstable political environment. Competitive foreign policies, regional leadership ambitions and mutual distrust among the region’s leading figures have hindered rapprochement and occasionally pushed these countries towards hostile policies. This situation creates a geo-economic context that conflicts with the goals of regional actors seeking to strengthen their economies or establish stronger, more resilient economic models through diversification. Cooperation initiatives between countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have the potential to foster closer interaction, both in terms of security and economically.

A political ecosystem established with the encouragement and leadership of regional powers would encourage the participation of other actors and pave the way for all parties to embrace the broader goal of achieving economic stability and development, particularly in the Middle East and the Islamic world. If embraced by the region’s leading actors, such an initiative will yield lasting benefits in terms of its potential outcomes and will help establish long-term stability. This is particularly true for the founding and participating countries of this alliance.

Turkey’s leadership in regional cooperation

Turkey currently supports such an initiative and, in this context, is intensifying its coordination with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in particular. Turkey has been active in many crisis areas in the region in recent years and has made intensive efforts to resolve crises and achieve lasting stability. However, Ankara prioritises cooperation with all relevant actors to achieve lasting solutions in regional crisis areas, and in this context it also needs allies. Acting together with the region’s leading powers will strengthen Turkey’s capacity to resolve crises. Increased cooperation with Egypt in Libya and Somalia, Saudi Arabia in Sudan and Qatar in Syria, for example, would strengthen coordination between these actors and enable them to play a more active role in post-stabilisation reconstruction processes in the relevant countries.

Another example of this can be seen in Gaza. Since 7 October 2023, Turkey has taken the strongest stance against the massacres carried out by Israel in Gaza and conducted intensive diplomacy with regional and global actors to stop Tel-Aviv. In particular, Turkey acted in concert with Egypt and Qatar to pressure the United States into forcing the Israeli government to agree to a ceasefire. On 9 October 2025, the Gaza Peace Plan — prepared under US leadership and agreed by Israel and Hamas — came into force, having been signed by Egypt, Turkey and Qatar. Intensive coordination between Ankara and Cairo during this process pressured both the US and Israel into accepting the ceasefire. In this respect, Ankara and Cairo’s joint action on Gaza can be seen as one of the most effective steps towards finding a solution.

Another concrete outcome of Turkey’s potential alliance with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and other leading regional countries could be the implementation of a joint defence system. Pakistan’s nuclear capacity, Saudi Arabia’s financial power and Turkey’s advanced defense technologies, if combined, could create a power centre that would redefine regional geopolitics. Supporting and expanding such a structure in future with the involvement of like-minded countries could provide the ‘ability to act together’ that has been lacking in the Islamic world for many years. This would be of critical importance in enabling faster and more effective steps to be taken in resolving crises, fighting external threats, coordinating foreign policies and acting jointly in development processes.

In a geopolitical landscape where global risks are increasing and regional unity is becoming more important, an alliance led by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey would, in principle, be open to actors adopting constructive regional policies and not susceptible to external destructive agendas. This bloc will adopt the fundamental approach of being an ‘inclusive cooperation platform to protect common interests’ rather than a rigid bloc.

In addition, this alliance will adopt a multinational and participatory philosophy, particularly when it comes to resolving crises centred on the Middle East, ending conflicts, and building a collective future. This approach aims to prioritise the welfare and security of the peoples of the region. The existence of such an alliance would play a pivotal role in re-establishing the Islamic world’s presence in global diplomacy, enabling countries that have struggled to form meaningful alliances for many years to become significant players in international politics.

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here was an expectation- and still there is- about possible coordination and dialogue among regional actors of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) especially after the Trump Administration announced Gaza Peace Deal. This expectation is relying on probability of rise of a new balance of power-based order in the region. The regional states have had hopes to take some concrete steps related to functional, normative and institutional sides of this newly establishing order.  Ankara may be one of the most eager regional actors in this regard. Türkiye wants to institutionalize its bargaining power and influence in this new regional diplomacy-first atmosphere. That is not surprising if one reminds that Ankara prioritized normalization and improvement in bilateral relations in MENA – especially within the period 2021-2023, till October 7 attacks and Gaze War.

Back to Polarization?

However, these expectations have not fully realized so far. There are still many unresolved conflicts and uncertainties in the MENA region. Meanwhile Eastern Mediterranean geopolitics is giving signals of back to the future, back to the atmosphere of polarization that was dominant feature of the region in the period of 2017-2021. Recently there are many minor and major developments strengthening this tension. Some of these developments may not have the objective of fueling polarization in the region, but consequently they contribute to increase strategic competition in the Eastern Mediterranean. Two examples easily come to mind: The first one is signing of an agreement, that limits Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of the Greek Cypriot Administration and Lebanon in November 2025.

The second example is Israeli’s approval of Egypt export gas deal in December 2025. While these agreements may seem like functional collaborations for Lebanon and Egypt, which are currently experiencing political uncertainty and economic vulnerabilities, these deals also strengthen the positions of the Greek Cypriot Administration and Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean, demonstrating that South Nicosia and Tel Aviv have a kind of actorness in the region. These deals were used by Tel Aviv and South Nicosia to give certain messages to the other regional players, including Ankara. On the one hand South Nicosia wants to show that it may continue to ignore rights of Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

On the other hand, Israel wants to prove that Tel Aviv can find partners in the region even if the Palestinian issue remained unresolved. However, these messages might have been weakly voiced if not for another obvious development: the triparty strategic rapprochement among Israel, the Greek Cypriots and Greece. At the end of 2025 Athens, Tel Aviv and South Nicosia not only deepened their defense and security ties but also did everything to make it visible for other regional actors including Ankara.

What does the trio want to achieve?

The rapprochement between South Nicosia, Tel Aviv, and Athens in the Eastern Mediterranean is not new. In the early 2000s, the discovery of natural gas in the region brought the three capitals into dialogue about potential East-West gas trade. However, this dialogue was never confined to the intended functional framework and failed to trigger regional stability and cooperation. Therefore, the Obama administration’s attempts to promote intercommunity reconciliation and cooperation in Cyprus issue through “imaginary pipelines” became unsuccessful. While the dream of Eastern Mediterranean gas bonanza returned to be a fantasy rather than a reality, the triparty ties have evolved into strategic partnership aims to constrain and marginalize Türkiye — albeit not explicitly — by exploiting existing fault lines and disagreements in the MENA region following the Arab Spring.

After 2015 the U.S. was uneasy with Russia’s presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and hence Washington was also partially drawn into this three-party re-alignment to constrain Russian posture in the region. Greece and the Greek Cypriots are the member of the EU. Between 2017 and 2021 some of the EU members wanted to increase their influence in the Eastern Mediterranean by supporting Athens’ and South Nicosia’s posture there. These European actors also misinterpreted what is happening in Libya, Lebanon and Syria. As a result, Türkiye felt that Ankara was facing with multiple challenges and the trio- supported by Washington and by some European capitals- tried to restrain Ankara’s hand in the region.

However, this regional context has gradually changed after 2021. Washington also revised its priorities in the Eastern Mediterranean and the U.S. concluded that exclusionary, polarizing alignments were unsuccessful in limiting Türkiye’s influence. Besides, Washington did not want to lose Ankara as a potential partner in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Between 2017-2021, Ankara succeeded to strengthen its strategic and diplomatic presence in Syria, Libya, and the TRNC by increasing its civil-military maritime assets in the neighboring seas. Observing the realities on the ground Biden Administration decided to withdraw its support from the East-Med natural gas pipeline project. That means the East-West natural gas trade through this tripartite alignment failed as well by 2021.

Polarization logic has slowly changed

Although the strategic environment based on polarization logic has slowly changed after 2021, this high-tension period between 2017 and 2021 revealed two facts related to the strategic game in the region. First, the Greek Cypriots and Greece can take, and indeed took, the advantage of the above-mentioned polarization to procure new weapon systems from various sources, primarily Israel and the United States. That has led revival of arm race/security dilemma logic in the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean Sea region. Washington was well aware of risks of security trap in the region among Athens, South Nicosia and Ankara but the U.S. also calculated the potential of constraining Russia.

It is a well-known fact that Washington can more easily support its Trans-Atlantic/European allies, like Greece and South Cyprus by arm procurement than others since the U.S. has upper-hand over NATO. As a result, the U.S. ignored Ankara’s and North Cyprus’ protests and decided to arm both Athens and South Nicosia – which endangers the delicate balance between Türkiye and Greece, as well as Turkish and Greek Cypriots on Cyprus. Meanwhile, Israel viewed Greece and Greek Cypriots as useful components of its revitalized Peripheral Doctrine. One of the major aims of this new Peripheral Doctrine is increasing Israel’s strategic depth without direct conventional deployment around Tel Aviv’s rivals, particularly Ankara. Therefore, Türkiye would face costs for its increasing presence in areas important to Israel.

Secondly, the 2017-2021 period proves that Western actors, both the U.S. and Europeans, prioritize area control within the framework of East-West connectivity – assumed to be provided by Greece-Greek Cypriot-Israel connection. However, it soon became clear that, to achieve full control or area denial capacity, all Western/U.S. allies (including those in the Gulf, Egypt, and Türkiye) needed to be part of the East-West connectivity, or at least they do not challenge the way of this connection. This explains why both the Biden and first Trump administrations worked on different formulas especially to attach the Gulf monarchies and Türkiye to the Europe-Israel/ West-East connection. The Biden Administration encouraged normalization agreements among the players, Trump Administrations suggested different versions of Abraham Accords.

What’s new in Greek-Greek Cypriot- Israeli quasi alliance in 2025?

Today’s three-party rapprochement can be seen as an extension of above-mentioned competitive logic. Therefore, it is also part of the process of creating perception that Ankara’s influence in the Eastern Mediterranean can be restrained by a rival bloc although the parties claim that this triparty cooperation is not against any other external actor. Accordingly, there are three elements in this renewed re-alignment: The first element is the deepening of security and defense cooperation between these three countries, though this cooperation does not include a joint defense guarantee or pledge. The second element is the establishment of mutual interoperability in the fields of defense and security. The third element is the rearmament of Greece and the Southern Cypriots by Israel that emerges as the main security provider. These three elements form the backbone of this renewed alignment among Athens, South Nicosia and Tel Aviv.

Within this context, recently, the South Cypriots acquired Barak air defense system from Israel. Meanwhile, Greek Foreign Minister Dendias claimed that Ankara’s progress, particularly in the field of UAVs/UCAVs, poses a threat to Greece. Dendias also stated that they would strengthen air defense in the Aegean Sea and deploy missile and anti-aircraft systems — some of which are expected to be procured from Israel— to the Aegean Islands. Leaders from three countries met in Jerusalem at the end of December, and they applauded Netanyahu’s words: “We will defend the area against those who want to rebuild their empire.” Considering that Athens and South Nicosia are part of Western institutions, this gathering, while not reflecting a common Western view, is a performance reflecting the desire of actors to use a hypothetical expansionism as a convenient excuse for Israel’s current expansionism.

Therefore, Jerusalem summit among Greek, Israeli and Greek Cypriot leaders was not just a realist act of balancing. It was a tacit support of two Western/European capitals to Israel’s policies in Gaza and West Bank- including war crimes. Hence, Athens, South Nicosia and Tel Aviv could find each other as available partners in micro-state strategy but because of shadow of war crimes and atrocities committed by Israel in Gaza, the cost of this reproachment for the Western actors will likely be greater than just triggering security dilemma between the trio and Ankara.

Without doubt, by this alignment Israel, Greece and Greek Cypriots attempt to provoke Ankara. By poking Türkiye unnecessarily, these three capitals, not only test the limits of Ankara’s reaction but also try to push Türkiye to make strategic mistakes. This strategy is an unreasonable strategy because it will not help western desire to have access and control on East-West as well as South-North (Eastern Mediterranean-Caspian) connectivity.

All in all, the atmosphere in the Eastern Mediterranean has turned from moderate hopes to polarization very quickly. This shift may be expected but the pace of this shift is still surprising. Therefore, one should ask, why this shift is happening now?

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or decades, the Ninth Symphony by the world-renowned Austrian composer Ludwig van Beethoven (1770–1827) has been a source of inspiration for European artists and art movements. Over the years, the piece gained political significance and was performed across continental Europe as a symbol of freedom after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The symphony became the anthem of the European Union (EU), an umbrella organization representing European values after centuries of war and power struggles. The anthem was inspired by the words of the German poet Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805), who was influenced by the French Revolution.

With its rhythm and the feelings it evokes, the anthem reflected the sentiments of the 1980s and ’90s, when it was officially declared, symbolizing the EU’s creed, which is built on democracy and European values. However, the optimistic picture created by new members joining in waves of enlargement over the years has given way to a more pessimistic climate due to recent regional developments. Perhaps Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, familiar for its “tat-tat-tat-tam” sound often used as a suspenseful backdrop in films, better reflects the union’s current mood.

The irony in the union’s relations with Turkey begins at this point. Developments that strain the political atmosphere in Europe can also bring about rapprochement in the dialogue established with Turkey. Currently, the negative attitude toward Turkey seems to have given way to a more pragmatic framework and vital priorities.

EU touch in Turkey’s struggle for democracy

After years of war and attrition, the EU project emerged as a stabilizing umbrella within European borders. Since the 1960s, Turkey has officially expressed its desire to be part of the project. As the expansion processes gained momentum, particularly following the collapse of the Soviet Union, European countries gained moral superiority in line with the liberal free market creed. From the 1990s onward, peripheral countries, including Turkey, also steered toward this democratic standard. The opening of new channels and the reforms implemented have raised Turkey’s democratic standards and facilitated the activation of channels that could not be opened through internal dynamics. In particular, the influence of the concept of “guardianship,” which gained political significance over the years and impacted various areas, has been eroded by reforms carried out under EU guidance.

Difficult years began in 2007, despite positive progress on the EU roadmap. As Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan emphasized in recent interviews, this positive momentum gradually reversed after Nicolas Sarkozy came to power in France. The Sarkozy administration blocked five of the 35 chapters that needed to be opened within the framework of the EU acquis. Encouraged by this, the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) blocked the opening of six more chapters. Currently, only 16 of the 35 chapters have been opened, and the remaining chapters remain politically deadlocked. Fourteen chapters cannot be opened for negotiation at present due to the Cyprus issue, even if the technical requirements are met. (Note: Technically, negotiations are being conducted on 33 chapters. Chapters 34 and 35 will be introduced after all other items have been closed.)

The longest year in Turkish-EU relations: 2019

The developments in Turkey’s EU accession process are taking on new forms and shifting axes. This is due not only to factors between the two parties, but also to regional developments. One of the most significant developments was the EU’s decision to collaborate with Turkey to reduce the influx of migrants, which was a direct result of the war in Syria. The visa liberalization agreement that followed the Turkey-EU Summit in March 2016 was an important step in this context. The agreement not only addressed irregular migration management but also established parameters that could revitalize relations. However, following the attempted coup on July 15, the parties’ priorities changed, resulting in different positions. The real deterioration in relations began during this period.

In 2019, tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean dragged Turkey-EU relations to their lowest point, despite a positive start to the year. The Eastern Mediterranean crisis and the EU’s categorical opposition to the Maritime Jurisdiction Agreement signed by Turkey and Libya caused relations to reach a new low. The decisions made on July 15, 2019, led to the suspension of high-level dialogue channels, including the “Partnership Council,” and the withdrawal of the European Investment Bank’s credit support. Ultimately, the mechanisms for monitoring the process were disabled.

Does it matter that Cyprus holds the rotating presidency?

As is customary, one of the 27 EU countries holds the rotating presidency for six months at a time. As of January 1, that country is Cyprus. Interestingly, Cyprus has assumed this role at a time when relations with Turkey, the country that has caused the most headaches during the candidacy process, are positive. Although rotating presidencies do not play a particularly decisive institutional role, they can set the agenda for the Council. Progress can be made in micro-scale policies where members share a common view. In practice, it seems unlikely that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will facilitate or complicate matters regarding Turkey.

However, the GKRY will make some moves with the aim of cornering Turkey. According to reports, the GKRY’s foreign minister plans to invite Hakan Fidan to the informal European Union Foreign Affairs Council (Gymnich) meeting to be held in southern Cyprus in spring 2026. Turkey was invited to the 2024 meeting after a five-year hiatus (another aftershock of the 2019 incident). It seems unlikely that Turkey will respond positively to this invitation. The Leaders’ Summit usually takes place in Brussels every term, but it is also common practice for the term presidents to organize an additional summit in their own countries.

It has been suggested that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus could organize an additional Leaders’ Summit within this framework and invite President Erdoğan to attend. It would be nearly impossible to expect Turkish officials to participate in summits that take place in a territory Turkey does not recognize. Conversely, it is reasonable to assume that the GKRY would exploit these invitations for political gain, concealing its maximalist objectives regarding the TRNC and the Eastern Mediterranean. Within the union, it is accepted as established practice that the rotating presidencies traditionally take a neutral position. It is also important to note that no significant crisis occurred during the GKRY’s last presidency in 2012.

The recent rapprochement between Israel, Greece, and the GKRY is also being closely monitored. At the tripartite summit in Jerusalem on December 22, Turkey was the hidden subject, and future plans centered on a strategy that would sideline Turkey. Although Israel is not a member, its Eastern Mediterranean agenda resonates at both ends of the Aegean.

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lthough the announcement of Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is a diplomatic move, it reveals a process that undermines the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity in the Horn of Africa. This move is also a strategic step toward shifting the balance of power in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean. The timing of this move is no coincidence.

Recent regional developments include renewed momentum for southern secession in Yemen, discussions of a de facto division in Sudan’s Darfur region, successful direct elections in Somalia’s Benadir region (including the capital), the crash of an aircraft carrying the Libyan chief of staff and his delegation, and Israel’s decision to recognize Somaliland. These events have transformed the situation into an issue of regional security architecture, especially given the more visible anti-Türkiye alliance in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean.

It is important to understand which negotiations and settlements recognition opens the door to, as well as the consequences it will have on the regional process. Recognition is more than an outcome; it creates a situation that gives rise to new demands, risks, and precedents. Furthermore, today’s events raise concerns about the principle of state integrity across the continent, including Somalia, as well as the fundamental pillars of the international order.

The strategic logic of recognition: Sea routes, platforms and corridor policy

The best way to understand the Somaliland issue is to look at a map of the region. In today’s global politics, geopolitical analyses and efforts to understand the transformation of the global system necessitate an update to traditional methods of interpretation. It is now imperative to understand the process within the context of security, the immediate environment, alliances, balancing, multilateralism, geo-economics, connectivity, and capacity.

Therefore, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea are too dynamic to be viewed merely as bottlenecks of global trade or vital transit points of the global economy. At the same time, this region is a force field where military access, intelligence, pressure, and deterrence are produced. The Houthis’ ability to target maritime traffic in Yemen strengthens the pursuit of a “southern encirclement.” In this context, Somaliland’s geography offers external actors a lower-cost, higher-leverage option through its port infrastructure and access opportunities. Thus, recognition is a strategic instrument that goes far beyond a political gesture, paving the way for the construction of a platform on the ground.

The second axis of this process can be interpreted as corridor politics. The trade and energy links stretching from India to the Gulf, Eastern Mediterranean, and Europe should be discussed as the backbone of geopolitical competition, not just economic projects. Israel’s deepening relations with India, the UAE’s regional networks established through its ports and logistics, and the emerging alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) place a potential recognition of Somaliland within a broader strategic context.

If recognition is detailed through port, access, and base agreements at this point, the debate will move beyond legal status and actively enter the field. Therefore, this situation represents the most critical threshold. The nature of the issue will shift from Somaliland’s independence to whether Somalia’s sovereignty is effectively curtailed. Thus, recognition, beyond the debate of international law, will open the door to establishing a permanent settlement, which will bring numerous potential crises.

Regional chess and multi-front pressure on Türkiye

Although the recognition of Somaliland is presented as a single issue, it should actually be understood as part of a broader regional chess game. The rapprochement between Israel and the UAE, and its consequences in Libya, Sudan, Gaza, Yemen, Syria, and the Eastern Mediterranean, are particularly significant for Türkiye.

Prominent issues include the emergence of anti-Türkiye coordination in the Eastern Mediterranean, the establishment of spheres of influence through port and logistics power in the Gulf, overlapping moves in the Sudan and Syria files, and competition centered on oil, port, and space projects in the Horn of Africa. All of this makes it possible to interpret the Somaliland move as a means of applying pressure to regions where Türkiye’s capacity expansion is at stake, rather than as a form of recognition.

Five critical issues stand out here: Ethiopia, Yemen, Sudan, Syria, and the Eastern Mediterranean. First, prior to the Ankara Declaration, Addis Ababa’s search for access to the sea clashed with Somalia’s sovereignty sensitivities, escalating tensions. Second, Israel’s move towards recognition could set a precedent for Ethiopia. It could encourage other countries to more readily consider recognizing Somaliland. This would put pressure on Somalia from two fronts simultaneously. The erosion of international legitimacy and the growing debate over coastal access and sovereignty are indeed among the pressures.

The second issue is the southern division shaped by Yemen and the Southern Transitional Council (STC). The new balance of power over control areas and oil regions in southern Yemen is fueling another wave of division around the southern Red Sea. Read in conjunction with the recognition of Somaliland, this perception is reinforced, suggesting that a fragmented sovereignty pattern is being encouraged in the southern belt rather than a state-centered order. This perception pushes regional countries toward tougher security measures and deepens the security dilemma.

Warnings that the presence of the Darfur-based Rapid Support Forces (RSF) carries the risk of de facto division highlight the danger of the Somaliland example. If the option of “recognition” is offered as a lifeline to proxy structures trapped on the ground, the Sudan file could become the second link in a similar chain of fractures. In this case, the Red Sea basin would experience multiple separation crises simultaneously. This situation could lead to the further militarization of maritime security discourse and a prolonged period of instability.

Finally, Türkiye is under multi-pronged pressure, combined with issues in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean. In every issue that could potentially harm Türkiye, Israel’s overt engagement and moves such as those in Somaliland appear to be linked to Türkiye’s regional projects and spheres of influence. This interpretation is reinforced by the simultaneous increase in rhetoric challenging Türkiye, accompanied by imagery and statements from the Eastern Mediterranean.

While maintaining steadfast support for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, it is crucial to address the issue in terms of regional stability and the fundamental principles of the international system, rather than merely at the level of bilateral relations. This is because recognizing Somalia would set a precedent that concerns not only Somalia, but also all of Africa and the future of the principle of sovereignty.

What might happen in the coming period?

This process considers three main scenarios for the future. The first, and least likely, scenario is the emergence of a controlled tension process. In this scenario, while recognition remains a political message, it does not turn into a broad wave of recognition. In this scenario, Somaliland gains practical advantages. Its level of representation increases, and it makes more bilateral agreements. However, there is no significant progress regarding ports, bases, or access. Mogadishu increases its diplomatic mobilization, and the territorial integrity of Africa is more visibly defended. Tensions remain manageable. Nevertheless, the fragilities do not completely disappear.

A second scenario is emerging: a wave of gradual recognition. In this scenario, Somaliland could become a platform. One or more countries will take steps toward recognizing Somaliland. Through port access and surveillance systems, Somaliland effectively transforms into a security platform. This reduces Somalia’s sovereignty. It also increases pressure on Ethiopia to gain access to the sea. It also deepens the security dilemma in Djibouti and neighboring countries. The region settles into a state of constant yet manageable tension. A process of “normalized militarization” emerges in the region.

In the final scenario, a domino effect occurs, resulting in a fragmented order along the Yemen-Somalia-Sudan border. The separation of South Yemen accelerates in this scenario. Following Somaliland’s recognition, new fractures are created in the region and on the continent. There are attempts to politicize the de facto areas of control in Sudan. The Red Sea basin simultaneously experiences multiple “recognition/separation” crises. This could extend as far as Morocco, Mali, and other Sahel countries. The discourse on maritime trade security becomes more militarized. Proxy networks harden and the capacity for compromise diminishes. This scenario is considered the highest-risk scenario. Once a fragmented sovereignty order becomes entrenched, the cost of reversal becomes prohibitively high.

Ultimately, while it may appear to be a mere statement, the recognition of Somaliland could evolve into a framework on the ground in the future. The fundamental issue is the trade-offs on which these frameworks are built and the new precedents they will set. Stability in the Horn of Africa will not be determined by individual moves, but rather by the new architecture created by linking these moves together. If this architecture erodes sovereignty, both Somalia and the entire Red Sea region will become a long-term zone of tension.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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n the night of January 3, Caracas was jolted awake by a sequence of explosions so sudden and precise that, for hours, the world believed Venezuela had entered a new war. Reports indicated that more than 150 U.S. Armed Forces aircraft operated over the region, while a dozen cruise missiles struck critical sites across the capital and beyond: Oil facilities, military headquarters, air bases, Fort Tiuna, the Presidential Palace, the mausoleum of Hugo Chávez, and installations on the strategically vital island of Margarita.

Yet what followed did not resemble war. There was no cascade of air-defense fire, no counterstrike, no troop mobilization, and no descent into chaos. Within hours, the White House announced that President Nicolás Maduro and his wife had been captured and transferred to the United States. What at first appeared to be an act of American military domination, upon closer examination, look entirely different.

Extraction, not invasion

The most puzzling aspect was not the missiles but the silence that greeted them. Venezuela’s air-defense network, regarded as the most advanced in Latin America, failed to respond. Independent monitoring systems and eyewitnesses were reported to have confirmed that not a single defensive missile was fired. Even more telling were accounts suggesting that Venezuelan special forces had taken control of air-defense sites hours before the strike, effectively disabling them. This pointed not to a failure of technology, but to a decision from within. The implication was stark: The gates of the country’s airspace appeared to have been opened deliberately. That American missiles did not target air defenses is a key clue indicating an inside operation.

The implications deepened when reports emerged that Maduro had not been seized in a Hollywood-style raid by American commandos, but rather arrested by his own senior officers. High-ranking figures within the Venezuelan military were said to have detained Maduro and his wife and handed them over to U.S. Delta Force operatives at Caracas International Airport. The missiles, in this account, were not the spear of conquest but a curtain behind which an internal transfer of custody occurred. The spectacle of military power provided cover for a political act already decided.

This interpretation gained further weight when U.S. Senator Mike Lee was quoted in accounts as saying that the missile strikes were intended to facilitate Maduro’s extraction, not to trigger a ground invasion. Once Maduro was in custody, American military operations quickly halted. There was no attempt to dismantle the Venezuelan state, seize ministries, or install a new government; the machinery of power remained intact, merely missing its former occupant. In this context, Trump remarked, “The first attack was so successful, we probably don’t have to do a second, but we’re prepared to do a second wave…” Viewed through the lens of traditional regime change, this was an anomaly. In the emerging logic of multipolar geopolitics, it was a masterclass in containment.

A Coup that wasn’t

Perhaps the clearest indication that this was not a traditional U.S.-driven coup lies in who emerged afterward. Instead of the pro-American opposition figure María Corina Machado, a right-wing politician who had cultivated close ties with Trump, especially after her October Nobel Prize, which she publicly dedicated to him, the U.S. president dismissed her as lacking both the backing and the “respect” required to lead Venezuela.

Power instead passed to Diosdado Cabello, widely regarded as aligned with Russia, China, and Cuba. Even American analysts acknowledge that Cabello represents continuity in Venezuela’s strategic posture against Washington. Had the United States intended to remake Venezuela in its own image, such an outcome would have been inexplicable. But if Washington’s objective was simply to remove a volatile, sanctioned, and diplomatically paralyzing leader without triggering open war, the result becomes far more intelligible.

The great power understanding

The shadow of Beijing and Moscow quietly loomed over the unfolding drama. In the days leading up to Maduro’s arrest, Venezuelan authorities were reported to have held confidential meetings with Chinese diplomats. Just hours before his capture, Nicolás Maduro received Qiu Xiaoqi, China’s special envoy for Latin American affairs, at the Miraflores Presidential Palace. Around the same time, former President Trump met with U.S. Ambassador to China David Perdue. A week earlier, Chinese officials convened with their Russian counterparts in Moscow to discuss Venezuela. These parallel diplomatic tracks suggest that Maduro’s removal was not a unilateral American operation, but a calculated maneuver tacitly acknowledged by the major powers invested in the country.

On January 4, 2026, Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, commented on Trump’s actions, describing them as unlawful but consistent with the defense of U.S. interests. “It must be acknowledged that, despite the obvious unlawfulness of Trump’s behavior, one cannot deny a certain consistency in his actions. He and his team defend their country’s national interests quite harshly,” Russia’s TASS news agency quoted Medvedev as saying. Medvedev added that Latin America is traditionally considered the “backyard” of the United States and suggested that Trump appeared determined to exert control over Venezuela’s oil supplies.

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urkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said Wednesday that a comprehensive investigation has been launched into the plane crash in Türkiye that killed Libya’s army chief and several members of his delegation.

Speaking at the Justice and Development (AK) Party’s extended provincial heads meeting in Ankara, Erdoğan said the incident “deeply saddened us” and extended condolences on behalf of Türkiye to the “brotherly Libyan people,” the Libyan armed forces and the government.

The Libyan Chief of the General Staff, General Mohamed Ali Al-Haddad, and four members of his delegation, as well as three crew members, died when a Falcon 50 business jet crashed shortly after taking off from Ankara.

Erdoğan said relevant Turkish ministries would provide further information as the investigation progresses.

Black boxes recovered as search and inspection continue

The aircraft was located about 2 kilometers south of Kesikkavak village in Ankara’s Haymana district. Search and rescue operations continued overnight despite heavy rain and dense fog, with efforts coordinated from a mobile command center established by Türkiye’s Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD).

Turkish Interior Minister Ali Yerlikaya said the plane’s flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder were recovered early Wednesday, and the examination process has begun to determine the cause of the crash. He added that debris from the aircraft is spread across an area of approximately 3 square kilometers.

More than 400 personnel, supported by 103 ground vehicles and seven aircraft, are working at the site.

A Libyan military delegation arrived in Ankara on Wednesday to inspect the crash scene, while a separate 22-member delegation — including relatives of the victims and officials from Libya’s Defense and Interior ministries — also traveled to the Turkish capital.

Authorities said findings from the investigation will be shared with the public once the analysis is complete.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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he developments in North Africa have had a decisive impact on the current climate of instability in Mali. In this context, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emerged during the Algerian civil war in the 1990s and continues to operate in the Sahel. A group of Tuareg fighters received military training under Gaddafi’s ‘Islamic Legion’ project in Libya and came to northern Mali following NATO’s 2011 operation in Libya. These fighters established the Azavad Liberation Movement (MNLA) organisation and rebelled against the Malian state. These are the most fundamental examples of this claim.

The Tuaregs, constituting around 10 per cent of Mali’s population, organised under the MNLA and demanded an autonomous state. In order to repel state forces in the north, they formed alliances with various radical organisations, including AQIM, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Ansar Dine. In March 2012, Amadou Toumani Touré, Mali’s president at the time, was overthrown in a coup by the army, who claimed that the government was unable to quell the rebellion.

The collapse of state institutions in the north enabled the MNLA to seize strategic centres such as Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. However, a dominant group within the MNLA that embraced a secular-nationalist ideology caused a deep split within the organisation. The MNLA subsequently withdrew from the alliance because its secular-nationalist ideology was incompatible with that of the other radical groups, and the MNLA entered into armed conflict with them. Following clashes that began in Gao, the radical groups eliminated the MNLA.

Initially pursuing a secular goal of independence, the insurgency turned into a terrorist threat dominated by jihadist Salafi ideology when radical groups advanced southwards to capture cities in central Mali. Amid increasing instability, the Malian government accepted Algeria’s comprehensive peace plan and signed a peace agreement with a coalition of independence movements in the Azawad region, including the MNLA. However, excluding radical groups from this coalition has allowed them to expand their influence and spread their control towards central Mali and neighbouring countries, such as Burkina Faso and Niger.

In 2017, the Sahel branch of AQIM, Ansar Dine, the Katiba Macina Front and al-Mourabitoun merged to form Jemaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Led by the Tuareg leader Iyad Ag Ghali, JNIM pledged allegiance to the al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and the Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada following its formation. Since 2017, the organisation has increased its activities in the Sahel region, centred in Mali.

JNIM’s new strategy: Economic warfare

In landlocked Mali, which has a population of around 25 million, terrorist and violent acts that have been ongoing for over a decade reached a critical threshold in 2025. In recent months, the country has faced an intensifying siege as JNIM has cut off vital supply routes to the capital, Bamako. Moving beyond classic guerrilla tactics, JNIM has begun to target transport convoys and logistical routes, exploiting the state’s economic vulnerabilities.

In September 2025, JNIM announced a ban on fuel imports into Mali from Senegal, Mauritania, the Ivory Coast and Guinea, effectively aiming to isolate Bamako from the outside world. This embargo has led to one of the most serious crises in Mali’s history. JNIM militants have targeted fuel tankers and transport companies in the Kayes-Nioro corridor in the west of the country, destroying hundreds of tankers and cutting off the main roads connecting Mali to Mauritania and Senegal. This has effectively besieged the capital, Bamako. As a result of this economic blockade, fuel supplies to Bamako came to a standstill.

Additionally, JNIM has targeted gold and lithium mines operated by foreign investors, kidnapping foreign engineers and demanding high ransoms in exchange. The fuel blockade is part of JNIM’s evolving operational strategy, which now encompasses economic warfare. Rather than seizing the capital Bamako directly, JNIM aims to weaken the government in the eyes of the people by tightening the circle around the regime using economic tools. As a result of these attacks, the country has experienced fuel shortages, price increases, power cuts, and supply chain disruptions. These issues are having a paralyzing effect on daily life, creating both psychological and political pressure on the regime.

The governance gaps within the Malian state, coupled with the socio-economic and cultural divisions in the north and centre, have played a decisive role in JNIM’s rapid rise. The central authority’s inability to respond to the demands of rural areas in particular, coupled with the economic and social neglect of the population, has facilitated the establishment of shadow governance structures by JNIM. These structures have fuelled JNIM’s growing support and influence by forging local agreements with different sub-communities in Mali. Mali’s political turmoil in recent years has also deepened the security vacuum. Military coups in August 2020 and May 2021 brought Colonel Assimi Goita to power. Although the Goita regime promised to address security issues in the north of the country, it has not yet achieved this.

The role of international actors and failed security models

Since 2012, security measures, military operations and regional and international cooperation have played an important role in countering ongoing terrorist and violent acts by radical groups in Mali. In 2013, Mali requested assistance from France to counter the terrorist threat spreading southwards. France responded with Operation Serval in 2013. This operation later evolved into Operation Barkhane, which is centred in Chad and targets radical groups in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. It involves 3,000 personnel. This operation helped the Malian forces to recapture key cities.

However, large areas of the countryside remained outside state control, enabling armed groups to proliferate. Not only did the presence of French forces on the ground fail to end terrorism, it also led to growing resentment among the local population. Anti-French sentiment, stemming from the colonial past, fuelled a series of military coups in the region, particularly in Mali. The Goita regime expelled French and UN troops from Mali, claiming that France was violating the country’s sovereignty.

Following France’s failed military missions in Mali and its subsequent withdrawal from the region, this has presented both an opportunity and a challenge for Russia. Since 2021, the Wagner Group, a private military company with links to the Kremlin, has been operating in Mali, supporting counter-terrorism operations and internal security missions. The recapture of the symbolically important city of Kidal was initially regarded as a triumph for the Mali-Russia alliance. However, in July 2024, around 80 Russian mercenaries and 50 Malian soldiers were killed in an ambush by Tuareg rebels and JNIM near the Algerian border.

These developments demonstrate that the Malian army is facing serious challenges on the ground, despite receiving external support. Furthermore, reports that Ukraine may have shared intelligence with Tuareg forces against the Wagner Group highlight the increasingly complex and internationalised nature of the conflict in Mali. Following the death of Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin in mid-2023, the Russian presence in Mali was reorganised as the ‘African Corps’. However, Russian forces have largely withdrawn to their bases and have not succeeded in stopping radical groups from advancing across the country.

The regional security environment has deteriorated further following the 2023 coup in Niger. This has led to fragmentation within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES): a military and political alliance between Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. The AES was formed on 16 September 2023 through the Liptako-Gourma Charter. It was designed as a response to the West’s withdrawal from the region and the sanctions imposed by ECOWAS against military regimes. The AES aims to establish an alternative security architecture that is independent of Western influence and asserts ‘regional strategic autonomy’.

Since 2012, the collapse of state authority in northern Mali and the rise of radical movements have created an environment of insecurity that threatens the entire country. The Russian mercenary model, introduced as a replacement for France’s failed counter-terrorism strategy, has resulted in greater instability and increased civilian casualties, with terrorism now reaching the capital. This situation demonstrates that security crises cannot be resolved solely by military means or by relying on external actors. In the short and medium term, the most serious threat to Mali is the erosion of the state’s legitimacy and the strengthening of JNIM as an alternative authority. Mali’s return to lasting stability will only be possible through local solutions centred on inclusive governance, socio-economic development and regional cooperation.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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N Special Rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territories Francesca Albanese said she will continue speaking out against Israel’s actions in Gaza despite U.S. sanctions, personal threats and mounting political pressure, insisting that attempts to silence her will fail.

In an interview with Anadolu in London, Albanese said the sanctions imposed by Washington and the accusations levelled against her are part of an escalating campaign aimed at suppressing scrutiny of alleged crimes in Gaza.

“They have become more and more vicious with personal threats and physical threats, and then the sanctions are a combination of it,” Albanese said. “But you cannot silence the truth in the face of a genocide.”

Sanctions and accusations

The United States imposed sanctions on Albanese more than five months ago, barring her from travelling to the country and allowing for the freezing of any U.S.-based assets. The measures were announced after Washington accused her of encouraging International Criminal Court (ICC) action against U.S. and Israeli officials.

Albanese said she has faced what she described as “spurious accusations of antisemitism” and claims of supporting terrorism, allegations she firmly rejected.

“These accusations have found fertile ground in the hypocrisy of many Western countries,” she said, adding that the pressure has only strengthened her resolve.

In August, several UN experts warned that sanctions on a UN special rapporteur risk undermining the independence of the international human rights system.

Call for accountability

Albanese stressed that accountability must extend beyond international courts and include individuals and institutions at the national level.

She noted that citizens from countries including the UK, France, Italy, Belgium and Tunisia have served in the Israeli military during the Gaza offensive, arguing that governments should investigate whether laws have been breached.

“They should be held accountable. They should be considered suspects,” she said, referring to individuals and entities allegedly complicit in crimes.

Israel is currently facing proceedings at both the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court. In November 2024, the ICC issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

UN membership and cultural boycotts

Commenting on several European broadcasters withdrawing from the 2026 Eurovision Song Contest in protest over Israel’s participation, Albanese said it was striking that cultural platforms were acting before diplomatic institutions.

“It’s incredible that Eurovision is the first public gathering where Israel is effectively being boycotted,” she said. “This should have happened in the UN General Assembly.”

She added that Israel’s UN membership should be suspended, arguing that the call is based on the scale and persistence of alleged violations rather than singling out one state.

Following confirmation earlier this month that Israel would compete in Eurovision 2026, broadcasters in Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Spain announced their withdrawal.

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he UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) warned Monday that the world must make “bold and smarter choices” in managing land, soil and water if it is to feed a projected global population of 10 billion by 2050.

Releasing its latest State of the World’s Land and Water Resources for Food and Agriculture (SOLAW 2025) report, the agency said these core resources are finite and under growing pressure, calling for urgent action to safeguard global food security “now and in the decades ahead.”

According to the report, an estimated 673 million people experienced hunger in 2024, while many regions faced severe and recurrent food emergencies driven by conflict, climate shocks and economic instability.

Rising demand as global population nears 10 billion

FAO warned that pressure on food systems will intensify sharply as the global population climbs toward 9.7 billion by 2050, requiring agriculture to produce 50% more food, feed and fiber than in 2012, along with 25% more freshwater.

Meeting that demand, however, is increasingly difficult. The report noted that over the last 60 years global agricultural output tripled, even though agricultural land expanded by just 8%. But this growth came “at high environmental and social costs.”

The agency said more than 60% of human-induced land degradation now occurs on agricultural land. Expanding farmland by converting forests or fragile ecosystems is “no longer viable,” it warned, given the escalating toll on biodiversity, soil health and water resources.

Smarter production needed, not simply more

FAO said the world still has the potential to sustainably feed up to 10.3 billion people by 2085, but only if countries adopt more efficient, climate-resilient and environmentally sound practices.

“Future productivity gains must come from smarter, not simply more, production,” the report said.

Recommended priorities include, closing yield gaps by raising productivity in underperforming regions, diversifying into resilient crop varieties suited to shifting climate patterns, strengthening soil health and water efficiency and adopting locally-tailored, resource-efficient farming techniques.

“There is no single pathway and no one-size-fits-all solution,” FAO stressed, urging countries to build coherent policies, invest in innovation and improve governance of land and water systems.

Climate crisis reshaping global agriculture

FAO Director-General QU Dongyu said rising climate impacts, worsening droughts, and ecosystem degradation are dramatically reshaping global food production.

“With the climate crisis reshaping global agriculture, the choices we make today for the management of land and water resources will determine how we meet current and future demands while protecting the world for generations to come,” he said.

The agency called for scaling up sustainable financing mechanisms, better risk management tools and more equitable access to land and water—warning that failure to act will deepen hunger, increase economic losses and accelerate environmental decline.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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The Russia-Ukraine war, which has been ongoing for over three years, has become the strongest driving force for military technological innovation. The war’s trajectory has directly influenced defense industry investments, with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), precision-guided artillery systems, and electronic warfare technologies being prominent examples of this transformation.

However, unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) have had a decisive impact on the naval front of the war despite remaining in the shadow of all these systems. This points to a critical military technological development.

In this regard, the recent discovery of a Ukrainian Magura V5 USV drifting towards the Trabzon coast by Turkish fishermen was a noteworthy event, both symbolically and technically.

Ukraine’s unmanned maritime systems and operational objectives

The Magura V5 is a new generation member of Ukraine’s series of unmanned maritime vehicles, located off the coast of Trabzon. Previous versions include the V3 and the most recent V7. The Magura V5 is capable of firing the Russian-made R-73 air-to-air missile, which has been modified for this purpose. In fact, Ukraine announced that it shot down a Russian Mi-8 helicopter over the Black Sea in December 2024 with an R-73 missile launched from a Magura V5 platform. However, no such munitions were found in the V5 that washed ashore in Trabzon. Instead, it was determined that the vehicle was loaded with explosives. This suggests that the USV was on a kamikaze mission.

Ukraine’s shift toward unmanned naval systems began in the first year of the war. For Ukraine, which lacks a conventional navy, such systems gained strategic importance early on because they enable asymmetric naval warfare. In October 2022, for example, Ukraine carried out a coordinated attack against Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol using USVs and UAVs. The fleet’s flagship, the Admiral Makarov, and the minesweeper Ivan Golubets were damaged as a result of this operation. Russia described this attack as the largest naval operation against its fleet since the invasion began.

Following this success, Ukraine invested heavily in unmanned surface vehicles (USV) technology. In a short time, a wide variety of naval targets were added to the USVs target list, including frigates, intelligence and mine-hunting vessels, as well as aircraft and helicopters. According to Ukrainian officials, the ships Sergey Kotov, Ivanovets, and Ceasar Kunikov were hit in these attacks, as were two Mi-8 helicopters and two Su-25 fighter jets.

Following these successes, Ukraine established an institutional structure for USVs. The Unmanned Surface Vehicles Brigade, established in August 2023, was the world’s first. This structure, which integrates the navy and intelligence units, has played a critical role in designing new platforms and developing usage concepts.

Finally, the V7 version of the Magura was able to carry FPV drones and fire AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles. In May 2025, Ukraine announced that it had shot down two Russian Su-30 aircraft with this system.

Turkey’s USV capabilities and areas of development

The rapid advancement of unmanned maritime technologies is being closely monitored worldwide. Turkey has also gained significant momentum in this field. The country’s first indigenous USV systems, Marlin and Ulaq, reached an important milestone when they participated in NATO exercises.

Other platforms, such as Salvo, Albatros, Sancar, Mir, and Çaka, are also part of Turkey’s growing USV inventory. These systems range from 10 to 15 meters in length and can operate within a range of 300 to 600 kilometers. They are used for surface warfare, mine countermeasures, anti-submarine warfare, electronic warfare, reconnaissance, and surveillance.

Recently, Turkish USVs successfully fired domestically produced Çakır, Cirit, L-UMTAS, and Kuzgun missiles. Some models have gained torpedo-firing capabilities, and the Albatros and Çaka systems are reportedly being used in kamikaze roles. Furthermore, Turkish engineers are developing technology to launch UAVs and FPV drones from naval platforms.

Similar to Turkey’s success with unmanned aerial systems, these developments demonstrate its ability to create a broad product family in the USV field. These developments have the potential to generate new export opportunities for the Turkish defense industry.

The future of autonomy at sea

The war in Ukraine demonstrates that unmanned systems are changing the dynamics of combat, including naval warfare. Ukraine broke the naval blockade imposed by the Russian Black Sea Fleet through USV operations, severely restricting the mobility of Russian ships.

This situation shows that asymmetric naval engagements can effectively deter large naval forces. The doctrine of sea denial is expected to become increasingly important in the future.

Rapid advances in artificial intelligence and autonomy are expected to extend this process to the underwater dimension. Ukraine’s Marichka and Toloka underwater maritime systems, which are currently under development, could pose a significant threat to submarines and surface vessels in the future. Similarly, Turkey’s projects, such as the Neta 300  demonstrate its interest in this field.

Alongside these developments, new advances in acoustic detection systems, such as maritime patrol aircraft and sonobuoys, are to be expected. Increasing autonomy at sea will compel major powers that embrace the doctrines of sea control and sea command to develop new defense strategies.

Consequently, it is foreseeable that unmanned surface and underwater systems will play a decisive role in future naval warfare in regions such as the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea, where US-China competition is concentrated.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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he United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) warned on Tuesday that surging global demand for air conditioning and refrigeration could more than triple by 2050, driving a steep rise in energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions unless countries adopt sustainable cooling measures.

According to UNEP’s Global Cooling Watch Report 2025, cooling currently accounts for an estimated 4.1 billion tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO₂e) annually — about 7% of global greenhouse gas emissions. Two-thirds of that figure stems from the electricity needed to power cooling systems, while the rest comes from refrigerant leaks.

If current trends continue, UNEP projects emissions could reach 7.2 billion tons CO₂e by mid-century under a “business-as-usual” pathway. However, a shift toward a “sustainable cooling pathway” could slash emissions by as much as 97%, bringing them close to net zero by 2050 while saving trillions of dollars in energy and infrastructure costs.

“Cooling is both a lifeline and a major climate challenge,” the report states. “It protects people from extreme heat, preserves food and medicine, and underpins productivity — yet it is also a growing source of energy demand and emissions.”

A growing crisis in a warming world

The report emphasizes that the world cannot simply “air condition its way out” of rising temperatures. Global population growth, rapid urbanization, and more frequent extreme heat events are expected to dramatically increase the need for cooling — particularly in low- and middle-income countries in Africa and South and Central Asia.

Without intervention, the global stock of cooling equipment — including air conditioners, refrigerators, and cold storage — could expand from 22 terawatts (TW) in 2022 to 68 TW in 2050. The steepest increases are expected in developing countries, where access to cooling remains limited but temperatures are rising fastest.

At the same time, even high-income regions such as Europe will face sharp growth in cooling demand as extreme heatwaves become more frequent, UNEP warned.

A pathway to sustainable cooling

UNEP’s Sustainable Cooling Pathway proposes a four-step hierarchy: reducing cooling loads through passive building design, using low-energy cooling methods like fans and evaporative systems, maximizing efficiency in cooling technologies, and rapidly phasing down hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) refrigerants, which have high global warming potential.

Adopting these measures could reduce the projected 2050 cooling capacity by 41%, from 68 TW to 40 TW. That would cut emissions by 64% compared to business as usual, while saving an estimated US$17 trillion in electricity and grid investment costs between 2025 and 2050.

“Practical and integrated solutions already exist to deliver sustainable, equitable and climate-aligned cooling for all,” UNEP said. “Scaling these measures can deliver deep cuts in emissions, strengthen resilience to extreme heat and unlock trillions of dollars in avoided energy and infrastructure costs.”

The report also calls for passive cooling strategies such as cool roofs, green spaces, and natural ventilation, which can lower indoor temperatures by up to 7°C and reduce energy use by nearly 30%.

Policy progress and gaps

UNEP’s analysis of 192 countries shows growing recognition of cooling as a climate issue but highlights significant policy gaps.

So far, 134 countries have incorporated cooling measures into their national climate plans, and 29 have set specific emission reduction targets for the cooling sector. However, only 54 countries have policies covering all three pillars of sustainable cooling — passive building design, efficiency standards, and refrigerant transition.

The report warns that many developing nations still lack building energy codes or regulations mandating efficient cooling technologies. “Critical implementation gaps remain,” UNEP notes, “particularly in regions where regulatory frameworks lag urgent cooling needs.”

Even as air conditioner sales grow, nearly three billion people are projected to remain without adequate access to cooling by 2050 — a gap that will disproportionately affect women and low-income communities.

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t this historic crossroads, as the global power equation is rewritten and paradigms are shaken, the parameters of national sovereignty are undergoing a fundamental transformation. Full independence is now measured by control over not only land, sea, and airspace but also the digital (cyber) and space domains, which connect these elements via invisible networks. At the heart of this equation is one of the most critical technologies: national positioning systems. Turkey’s decision to develop its own national positioning system is a strategic response to 21st-century challenges and a concrete manifestation of the “Turkey Century” vision.

A country’s economic functioning and military operational capabilities depend on invisible signals, namely Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). Turkey, a long-time user, is now taking decisive steps toward becoming a system builder. Developing a national navigation and global positioning system is not just a technological ambition, but a strategic necessity that has become one of the cornerstones of the country’s future sovereignty, security, and prosperity.

Alongside Turkey’s space program, the Regional Positioning and Timing System (RPS) will be established as a vital capability. Thus, Turkey’s positioning, navigation, and timing data needs will be met with high-precision, domestically produced systems that will replace those currently in use.

Warning from the field: Breaking the dependency spiral

There is experience from various war environments regarding jamming and interference activities targeting Global Positioning System (GPS) systems. The precision guidance capabilities of today’s modern armies’ striking elements are priority jamming targets. In this context, reports have emerged of Russian GPS jamming (electronic warfare) applications against HIMARS and various smart munitions provided to Ukraine in the Russia–Ukraine War. Even advanced systems equipped with receivers that obtain data from different positioning systems and anti-jamming subcomponents are not immune to jamming or deception under current conditions.

Although GPS is an important data source, sophisticated munitions do not rely solely on a single GNSS source or GNSS-based guidance technologies. Ballistic and cruise missiles can currently operate without being affected by jamming with inertial navigation systems; however, the increase in flight time causes deviation errors to grow proportionally over time. For this reason, hybrid structures that support data such as GPS are needed.

Counterterrorism operations in Syria and Iraq, as well as in areas of national interest such as Libya and Azerbaijan, have confirmed the Turkish defense industry’s game-changing role in technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and missiles. However, there is a bitter truth on the other side of the coin: the risk of strategic blindness. Our long-range ballistic and cruise missiles depend on foreign-sourced GPS signals, particularly those controlled by the U.S., for position and target data. Rival powers can compromise the effectiveness of our most advanced weapon systems by jamming or misleading these signals through intensive electronic warfare applications, even momentarily.

This situation represents an unacceptable strategic vulnerability that undermines Turkey’s ability to determine its own destiny. Rival forces’ ability to jam or mislead these signals through electronic warfare measures means the effectiveness of your most advanced weapon systems could be compromised at the most critical moment. This situation is an unacceptable strategic vulnerability that conflicts with Turkey’s determination to chart its own course. A national system would eliminate this vulnerability by providing a military signal similar to a P/M code that is resistant to such interference, fully encrypted, and accessible only to the Turkish Armed Forces.

Examples from around the world: Regional positioning systems

Today, many GNSS satellites are in operation. Each satellite has its own unique frequencies for transmitting navigation and timing information and typically operates in low and medium orbits. The global positioning (GPS) data they provide is intended for different users. GPS services include the C/A code, accessible to all users, and the encrypted P(Y) code, accessible only to authorized users. The system operates with three components: space (satellites), ground (ground control stations), and user (GNSS or GPS receivers). Receivers determine position using signal data from both space and ground components.

Regional positioning systems result from the need to provide positioning data for specific areas or purposes using indigenous resources. Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) enhances GNSS signal performance in Japan and neighboring East Asian regions by employing a mix of satellites in various orbits (GEO and MEO) to augment GPS. The QZSS program was announced with four operational satellites and currently operates with seven.

India launched the NavIC program to end its dependence on foreign GPS data amid tensions with Pakistan. Designed to cover mainland India and the surrounding region within a 1,500-kilometer radius, the NavIC system uses geostationary (GEO) satellites. Furthermore, satellite-based augmentation systems (SBAS) have long been used in North America (“WAAS”) and Europe as a method of providing positioning services for critical applications, such as civil aviation.

Turkey’s National Technology Initiative: Actors and roadmap

Recognizing the importance of independence in strategic capabilities is the driving force behind Turkey’s national technology initiative. The leading institutions of the defense industry are transforming this vision into reality. TÜBİTAK UZAY’s satellite technology expertise, ASELSAN’s electronic warfare, signal processing, and cryptology expertise, ROKETSAN’s launch and fuel technology competence, and FERGANİ’s satellite target team form the pillars of this major project. Rather than a series of disjointed efforts, Turkey’s goal is a complementary, holistic strategy coordinated by the Turkish Space Agency.

This goal will not be achieved overnight, but rather through systematic accumulation over many years. In the first stage, rather than bearing the enormous cost and time burden of establishing a global system, the goal is to establish a regional positioning system (RPS) that covers Turkey and its sphere of influence, including the Balkans, the Caucasus, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East. This system will provide a more precise, secure, and uninterrupted service in a specific geographical area using fewer satellites than existing global systems. Successful implementation of the first phase will provide Turkey with invaluable technological expertise and lay a solid foundation for the TR-KKS, which aims for full global coverage in the long term.

The first and most realistic goal is to establish a regional satellite navigation system covering Turkey and its immediate surroundings, such as the Blue Homeland, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. This system would be similar to India’s NavIC or Japan’s QZSS. Like other systems, this one will consist of three to seven satellites operating in different orbits (GEO and MEO) and will provide a much stronger and more accurate signal in the region than existing global systems. Implementation of this phase is expected to begin in the early 2030s with the launch of the first satellites.

The long-term objective is Global Coverage (TR-KKS). Upon building on the success of the regional system and the technological expertise gained, the long-term goal is to transition to a full global constellation of 24–30 satellites placed in low- and medium-Earth orbits (LEO and MEO). This would elevate Turkey to the same level as systems such as GPS (US), GLONASS (Russia), Galileo (EU), and Beidou (China). This phase could be realized by the 2040s.

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he world became accustomed to a unipolar order after the Cold War. However, it has been confronted with a new geopolitical reality in recent years. In this new era of intensifying competition between major powers, medium-sized powers are attempting to forge their own path instead of remaining confined within traditional alliance structures. One of the most striking examples of this trend is the defense industry partnership emerging between Türkiye and Japan, two countries located at opposite ends of Asia.

Centuries-old bonds of friendship could bring the two countries together, combining their complementary technological strengths to strengthen their strategic autonomy and become more effective global actors. As President Erdoğan pointed out in his August 29 article in Japan’s Nikkei newspaper, this partnership is evolving beyond technical and military cooperation. It also represents middle powers’ search for new types of strategic engagement in the global security architecture. At the heart of this potential cooperation are two key technologies: unmanned aerial vehicles and semiconductors.

The relationship between Türkiye and Japan is based not only on current geopolitical calculations, but also on a history of mutual sympathy and respect. One of the most well-known symbols of this friendship occurred when the Japanese people showed great assistance and sacrifice to the crew of the Ottoman frigate Ertuğrul after it sank off the coast of Japan in 1890. This historic event forged an indelible bond between the two nations. In the modern era, these ties have been further strengthened through humanitarian gestures, such as Turkish Airlines’ rescue of Japanese citizens stranded in Tehran during the Iran-Iraq War in 1985.

These historic moments have fostered a strong climate of trust between the two countries. In 2013, upgrading relations to a “strategic partnership” and frequent high-level visits between leaders demonstrate that current defense industry cooperation is a natural evolution of a deep-rooted relationship, not just a new beginning. This solid foundation makes the potential partnership more resilient and long-term.

Türkiye’s UAV revolution and Japan’s strategic quest

Türkiye’s defense industry has undergone a remarkable transformation over the past two decades. Once highly dependent on Western suppliers, Türkiye’s defense industry was forced to pursue self-sufficiency due to embargoes and tensions with allies. The most visible result of these efforts is the Baykar-produced Bayraktar TB2 UAV system. TB2s have gained global renown for changing the course of wars around the world, including in Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine, Syria, and Libya.

They have proven to be more economical and operationally effective than their high-cost Western counterparts. This success has elevated Türkiye to one of the world’s leading suppliers of armed UAVs, with exports to many countries. The recently developed Bayraktar TB3 is designed for use on aircraft carriers and has the potential to demonstrate technical compatibility with Japan’s Izumo-class ships thanks to its foldable wing design. This is an important sign of possible future cooperation.

Japan is showing great interest in Türkiye’s UAV revolution. The main reason for this interest is Japan’s search for strategic solutions for its defense industry. Compared to systems such as the MQ-9 Reaper procured from the U.S., Turkish UAVs are more economical and could alleviate pressure on Japan’s defense budget. However, cost is not the only issue. Article 9 of Japan’s 1947 constitution prohibits the declaration of war and the maintenance of military forces. This has led to the country’s heavy reliance on the U.S. for security, which is enshrined in the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

Under Article 5, both parties recognize an attack on Japanese territories as a common danger. Meanwhile, Article 6 grants the U.S. the right to maintain military bases in Japan to preserve peace in the Far East. This alliance provides Japan with a nuclear umbrella and access to advanced defense technologies. However, it also limits Japan’s independent procurement options and creates a structural dependence on the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program. Japan’s defense and security cooperation with the European Union reflects its desire to establish strategic partnerships amid growing mutual concerns about China. This signals Japan’s intention to diversify its defense ties, not only with the U.S., but also with other allies.

Japan’s domestic defense industry has long been fragile. Due to factors such as a limited domestic market and low profitability, many second- and third-tier suppliers have withdrawn from the sector. This internal hollowing-out phenomenon has driven Japan towards international partnerships, providing access to new capabilities and enabling the restructuring of the defense industry through technology transfer, joint production, and the revitalization of domestic demand.

A large portion of Japan’s defense contracts are concentrated among a few firms. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries holds the largest share at 25.5 percent, followed by Kawasaki Heavy Industries at 11.5 percent and Mitsubishi Electric at 5.4 percent. This distribution exacerbates the sector’s structural dependency, making Japan’s quest for strategic autonomy even more urgent.

The Heart of complementarity: UAVs, semiconductors and global supply chains

The Turkish-Japanese defense partnership is fundamentally based on the principle of each country complementing the other’s shortcomings. Türkiye excels in the field of UAVs with operational success and cost-effectiveness, while Japan is a global leader in semiconductor technologies, the backbone of modern warfare platforms. Modern UAVs are more than just aircraft and cameras. They require state-of-the-art semiconductors for high-resolution sensors, autonomous navigation systems, secure communication infrastructures, and artificial intelligence–supported data processing capabilities.

Although Türkiye has made significant progress in the UAV industry, it must collaborate with countries that possess expertise in advanced electronic components, a market worth trillions of dollars. This has transformed Türkiye’s need to develop domestic technological capacity within its defense industry from a strategic goal to a structural necessity. As stated in the Turkish Academy of Sciences (TÜBA) publication Global Transformations and Türkiye (2024), the international system provides a highly suitable ground for middle powers to establish strategic partnerships, particularly in the field of semiconductors.

Japan’s technological prowess is currently of great importance to Türkiye. Japan’s semiconductor industry policy has continuously evolved since the 1970s in order to adapt to global competition. Japanese companies that produce the world’s most advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, specialized chemicals, and integrated circuits are critical components of the global electronics supply chain. Alongside industry leaders such as Renesas and Tokyo Electron, new domestic manufacturers like Rapidus are competing with them in cutting-edge production processes, such as 2-nanometer production.

This situation aligns with Türkiye’s search for a secure supply chain to meet its semiconductor needs and Japan’s goal of finding new export opportunities beyond the Chinese and Western markets. Through this partnership, Türkiye can maintain its superiority in UAVs technology while transitioning to more autonomous systems. Meanwhile, Japan can seize the opportunity to establish defense industry cooperation that will deepen and solidify bilateral relations. The emphasis on semiconductors as strategic enablers underscores that this collaboration is not just a technical exchange, but also a means of fostering a strategic alliance.

Obstacles, opportunities and future scenarios

Although there is great potential for Turkish-Japanese defense cooperation, there are some potential obstacles that must be overcome. For example, Japan’s pacifist constitution and public opinion, which reject aggressive militarism, could restrict the scope of such a partnership. Notably, U.S.-origin components in Japanese semiconductors could restrict their re-export to Türkiye under the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Alliance sensitivities are also a significant factor. Over ninety percent of Japan’s defense imports come from the U.S. This indicates that Washington may be concerned that Turkish-Japanese defense ties could lower Tokyo’s supply priority. Türkiye’s NATO membership and its procurement of S-400 systems from Russia create a complex dynamic. These sensitivities must be diplomatically managed with great care.

Despite these challenges, recent high-level visits from both Tokyo and Ankara demonstrate strong political will. Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani’s visit to Ankara in August 2025 and his tour of Baykar facilities were concrete demonstrations of the importance of this cooperation. Japan’s defense and security cooperation with the European Union, initiated amid growing mutual concerns about China, signals its desire to establish strategic partnerships. This signals that Japan is diversifying its defense ties, not only with the U.S., but also with other allies.

On the other hand, it is important to note the allegations that Japan may purchase drones from Israel instead of Türkiye. If Japan, known for its respect for human rights and values, were to sign such an agreement, it would cause great disappointment in the global public opinion due to Israel’s ongoing genocide and war crimes in Palestinian territories. This is not merely a commercial preference, but also an ethical and political stance.

In terms of Turkish-Japanese cooperation, Japan’s “minilateralism” approach, developed through experience in international projects in various fields, could be instructive. The Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) with the United Kingdom and Italy aims to develop a new generation of stealth fighter jets. The Mogami-class frigate agreement with Australia is one of the most significant exports since World War II. These multilateral collaborations could create a new sphere of influence, increasing the visibility of both countries in the international arena and moving beyond the competition between major powers.

Based on these possible scenarios, the most reasonable approach to cooperation between the two countries appears to be a phased, incremental partnership. In the first stage, Japan could test a limited number of Turkish UAVs to supplement its existing capabilities, and Türkiye could incorporate Japanese semiconductors into certain platforms. More ambitious scenarios could include co-development programs for joint UAVs or electronic systems projects or “minilateralism” frameworks involving third countries, such as the United Kingdom or Australia.

Ultimately, the defense partnership between Türkiye and Japan may exemplify middle powers seeking greater autonomy within existing alliances rather than providing an alternative to alliances in the global security architecture. By combining complementary technologies, diversifying supply chains, and gaining strategic flexibility, these two countries could become more effective actors in a multipolar world. This partnership is a striking example of how technological complementarity meets political pragmatism.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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urkey’s Defense Ministry said on Thursday that negotiations with the United Kingdom on the possible procurement of Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets are progressing positively and that Ankara expects the process to move toward a contract “at an appropriate time.” In the same briefing, the ministry also signaled Turkey’s readiness to contribute troops to an emerging multinational Gaza Task Force aimed at stabilizing the territory under a ceasefire agreement.

The remarks — the clearest indication in months that discussions over the aircraft are still on track — come as Ankara seeks to bolster its air force during the transition period before Turkey’s indigenously developed KAAN next-generation fighter becomes fully operational.

“Following the talks held with the United Kingdom, positive steps have been taken, and it is aimed to complete the procurement process at an appropriate time,” Defense Ministry sources said. “When the Eurofighter aircraft procurement reaches the contract stage, official announcements will be made by our side.”

Officials cautioned against speculation in foreign media about the size or configuration of the order, saying negotiations are ongoing and that “claims beyond this should not be taken seriously.”

Transition period until KAAN

The ministry said that Turkey’s air force capability will be supported by allied systems until the KAAN platform enters serial production and broad deployment.

“Until the deliveries of our domestically produced KAAN begin, the Turkish Armed Forces will acquire the systems required to fulfill its missions primarily from allies and other relevant countries,” the sources said, highlighting continued reliance on NATO interoperability.

Ankara has pursued the Eurofighter option partly to hedge against continued delays in export clearances. The fighter is jointly produced by the UK, Germany, Spain and Italy — meaning any final sale requires approval from all four governments. The UK is strongly supportive, while Berlin has been slower to sign off, citing broader EU-Turkey tensions.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan discussed the procurement last week in Qatar, where Turkey has positioned itself as a key actor in Gulf and Mediterranean security frameworks.

Turkey signals role in Gaza task force

The ministry also confirmed that Turkey stands ready to participate in a potential multinational Gaza stabilization mission, expected to fall under a broader International Stabilization Force (ISF) after months of ceasefire diplomacy.

“The Turkish Armed Forces, with the experience it has gained from previous peace missions, stands ready to assume any duties entrusted to it for the establishment and maintenance of peace, within the framework of international law,” the sources said.

Diplomatic contacts are underway between guarantor states of the Gaza ceasefire, including Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, and the U.S. Under the emerging architecture, the ISF would coordinate humanitarian relief, infrastructure rehabilitation and border security.

Defense officials said Turkey’s preparations are “ongoing in coordination with relevant state institutions,” reinforcing Ankara’s intention to play a central role not only diplomatically but also operationally.

Syria, SDF integration, and regional security calculus

The ministry also addressed developments in Syria, saying cooperation with Damascus continues to deepen after years of rupture between the two governments.

“Following the signing of the memorandum of understanding on Joint Training and Advisory Cooperation on Aug. 13, 2025, training, visits, advisory, and technical support activities aimed at enhancing Syria’s defense and security capacity are ongoing,” the statement said.

Turkey emphasized that it is closely watching the planned integration of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian Army — a process that could potentially end the group’s semi-autonomous command structure in the northeast.

“The integration of the SDF terrorist organization into the Syrian Army is of critical importance,” the ministry said. “This process must proceed in a manner that does not harm Syria’s political unity and territorial integrity.”

Turkey reiterated its red line of “One State, One Army,” viewing the re-centralization of the Syrian security sector as essential to its border security interests.

For now, the timing of a Eurofighter contract remains tied to intra-European negotiations. But Ankara’s public confirmation that talks are advancing — alongside an explicit signal about peacekeeping readiness in Gaza — suggests Turkey’s military diplomacy is entering a new phase as it seeks to leverage its experience in multinational stabilization missions from the Balkans to Libya.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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he 1970s and 80s saw regular armies in Latin America, Asia and later Africa, including Turkey, facing serious problems in their fight against terrorist groups, guerrillas and paramilitary groups. The appetite of Western countries such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, and most intensely the United States, to intervene in regimes in many countries around the world, along with the financing of the U.S.’s shadowy paramilitary companies and military-industrial complex through hundreds of operations conducted by the Pentagon and the CIA, led to an unprecedented expansion in the volume of arms and ammunition imports by developing countries, both Atlantic and non-Atlantic.

In the post-World War II era, when NATO was established, global military spending stood at around 500 billion dollars in today’s figures. As the Cold War escalated and tensions between the Western and Eastern blocs deepened, military spending first rose to 1.5 trillion dollars and then to 1.8 trillion dollars just before the end of the Cold War. Of this expenditure, $750 billion was by the United States, $1 trillion by NATO, $600 billion by the Soviet Union, and the remaining $200 billion by countries not belonging to any military pact. After the Cold War, in the early 2000s, global military spending fell to $1.2 trillion, with $750 billion spent by NATO, approximately $100-150 billion by Russia and China, and $250-300 billion by the remaining countries.

Global military expenditure at record levels: $2.8 trillion

Today, particularly since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War in 2022, we are talking about global military expenditure that has surpassed $2.8 trillion on an annual basis as of the first half of 2025, up from $2.2 trillion. In the defence sector, the 15 leading countries, including Turkey, in terms of military power and capability; are caught between coordinating, transitioning, and adapting to conventional army structures, conventional weapons, ammunition, and platforms; new-generation irregular warfare techniques; new-generation warfare technologies and strategies; and artificial intelligence-focused new-generation weapons, ammunition, and platforms. They are struggling to train sufficient high-quality personnel and manage costs effectively. The United States’ defence spending, which has reached $1 trillion, is now straining the federal budget.

Therefore, after taking office for a second term, President Trump made it clear that it is not possible for the United States to bear the entire burden of the Atlantic Alliance and NATO’s defence and warfare capabilities. He warned that if NATO member EU countries do not increase their military investment and spending by at least 2.5-3 times by 2028, the United States may withdraw from NATO to some extent. Therefore, despite objections from some EU countries, at the recent NATO summit, all countries pledged to comply with the U.S. call for spending and investment. Russia’s drone and fighter jet violations in September, first in Poland, then in Estonia, and subsequently in some Scandinavian countries’ airspace, have prompted NATO to take action.

Consequently, strategic efforts to design a more comprehensive air defence system under NATO and to deepen NATO’s capabilities will be accelerated. For this reason, many NATO countries have also accelerated mutual cooperation with Turkey in the areas of defence, security and new generation warfare technologies.

Rewriting the global defence architecture in the age of drones

Especially in the last five years, the concept of warfare has changed radically. With drones, land, sea and submarine platforms are no longer just reconnaissance or surveillance tools, but have become strategic elements with direct attack capabilities. The Russia-Ukraine War has proven on the ground how low-cost but deadly unmanned systems can upset the balance on the front lines. Ukraine’s FPV drones and the naval drones it uses in the Black Sea have shaken the traditional understanding of naval and air superiority.

The 2020 Azerbaijan–Armenia Karabakh War demonstrated that UAVs could alter the course of ground warfare without the need for air superiority, opening the door to a new doctrine. This change in warfare techniques on the battlefield heralds an era described internationally as ‘lethal transparency.’ New-generation electronic warfare systems, artificial intelligence-supported swarm algorithms, and layered air defence networks have now become integral components of the new generation battlefield.

This rapid evolution is also forcing NATO to take radical steps. At the recent summit in The Hague, alliance members agreed on a target of defence spending reaching 5% of their GDP. This ratio represents a radical departure from the long-neglected 2% spending threshold in many European countries. Russia’s increasingly frequent violations of NATO countries’ airspace in the Baltic and North Seas are raising the need for ‘active defence’ beyond deterrence. Faced with this situation, Trump first sent a loud message to European capitals to ‘fulfil your commitments’. Trump stated that Russian aircraft and drones should be shot down immediately if they violate airspace but left the details of U.S. support on this issue up in the air.

Turkey’s historic defense leap forward in the last decade

NATO’s new concept centers on drone technologies and electronic warfare capabilities, focusing on a vision of a multi-layered ‘defence dome’ that effectively covers the skies and seas. Thus, the alliance aims to establish a security architecture that integrates not only land and air forces, but also space and cyberspace. In this historic transformation process that NATO must rapidly implement, Turkey has become a power centre not only regionally but also globally. Ten years ago, Turkey accelerated revolutionary steps to produce its own UAVs and SİHA (unmanned aerial vehicles) with local and national capabilities, and in just five years, it has become the world’s most ambitious drone manufacturer and exporter.

Baykar’s TB2 and Akıncı models have successfully served in Syria, Libya and Karabakh, and have become symbols against the Russian army in Ukraine. The TB3’s ability to take off and land from the TCG Anadolu has propelled Turkey into the drone carrier concept and placed it at the forefront of sea-air integration. Unmanned combat aircraft projects such as Kızılelma and ANKA-3 also enable manned and unmanned air assets to converge under the same doctrine.

In addition, the process of building short, medium and long-range air defense layers with domestic capabilities under the HİSAR and SİPER programs and the Steel Dome project is being followed with admiration by many of Turkey’s allies and is also facilitating the signing of successive long-term defense technology and security cooperation agreements between Turkey and these allies. The GÖKDENİZ close-range air defence system, TF-2000 air defense frigates and the naval drones under development also reinforce the ‘system of systems’ vision in terms of Turkey’s new generation warfare doctrine and strategy.

Our defence industry exports, which reached $1.8 billion in 2024 and are already projected to exceed $2.5 billion in 2025, demonstrate in figures how this historic leap is transforming into high added value for the Turkish economy on a global scale. Turkey’s goal is to gradually increase its defence industry exports from $11 billion to $15 billion in the 2028-2030 period.

In a context where the emerging E7 economies are accelerating strategic cooperation and wide-ranging joint project steps to deepen their economic, commercial, political and military cooperation with Turkey without exception, the President’s fair, strong and determined stance, which reinforces the perception of a ‘Strong Turkey’, is causing the messages he has delivered and will deliver at all international meetings to be followed with great interest by the international public.

Therefore, under the visionary leadership of the Turkish President, the giant strides taken over the past 20 years in the fields of defense, security, energy and digital technologies, along with our capabilities and capacities that have elevated the Turkish Armed Forces to among the world’s strongest armies, enable a strong Turkey to stand up for its own geography and the oppressed, to hold those responsible to account, and to manage a strong diplomatic process both on the ground and at the negotiating table. Under President Erdoğan’s strong, determined and visionary leadership, Turkey has assumed the role of a ‘game changer’ that is reshaping the destiny of Eurasia. A strong Turkey also forms the essence of the Vision for the Turkish Century.

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he recent rapprochement in Turkey-Egypt relations is becoming increasingly evident through mutual visits and cooperation in various fields. Following visits by the presidents of both countries last year, relations gained new momentum, resulting in concrete outcomes. The two countries’ joint stance on Israel’s attacks on Gaza; joint foreign policy moves in crisis areas such as Libya, Sudan and Somalia; increased economic and social interaction; and, finally, accelerating cooperation in the defense industry can be considered important concrete outcomes.

Ministerial-level visit to Egypt

Meanwhile, diplomatic actors have been working intensively to maintain the momentum of this process. In this context, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited Egypt three times over the past year, demonstrating Turkey’s determination to develop relations. The most recent of these visits took place in August 2025. During the visit, Hakan Fidan, who was received by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, also met with his Egyptian counterpart Bedir Abdulati and Arab League Secretary-General Ahmed Abu Ghait to discuss regional issues, particularly Gaza, and bilateral relations.

The main agenda of Fidan’s visit was undoubtedly to stop Israel’s massacres in Gaza. In a press statement with his Egyptian counterpart Abdulati, Fidan stated that Israel’s intention to completely occupy Gaza would be a new phase of genocide, emphasising that they rejected this plan. In his statement, Foreign Minister Fidan also targeted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, saying, “The oppressor will be erased from history along with his oppression. You will see this happen to Netanyahu too. You will see that the blood of the people he has condemned to starvation, killed, and targeted daily by snipers for his own pleasure will drown him.”

Egyptian Foreign Minister Abdulati similarly emphasized that Israel’s massacres must end, and a ceasefire must be implemented immediately, demonstrating Cairo’s determination to end the crisis.

Joint stance against Israel

The anti-Israel stance in the two ministers’ statements reveals that Turkey and Egypt have adopted a common policy on this issue. Indeed, Ankara and Cairo are seen as leading actors in protecting the rights of Palestinians at a time when Gulf countries have remained relatively unresponsive and the U.S. has given its full support to Israel. This issue is particularly critical for Turkey. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s clear stance against Israel is a clear indication of this. At this point, Turkey’s efforts to stop Israel by intensifying its cooperation with other Arab countries in the region and other Islamic countries are noteworthy.

On the other hand, Egypt is being pressured by both domestic and regional public opinion to be more active on the Palestinian issue due to the deepening humanitarian crisis in Gaza. The Israeli administration’s plan to force the population of Gaza to migrate to Egypt, with the support of U.S. President Donald Trump, is putting serious pressure on Cairo. Feeling this pressure increasingly, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi is forced to act more cautiously so as not to damage his close relations with the U.S. and Gulf countries. On the other hand, the El-Sisi administration is also attempting to form a united front against Israel by acting in concert with Turkey.

Turkey’s advanced technology

Following contacts between the military staffs of the two countries, Egyptian Chief of Staff Ahmed Halife visited Turkey in May and inspected Turkey’s advanced technology products in the defense industry, particularly the KAAN project. The contacts that continued after the visit accelerated the process of intensifying cooperation between the two countries on the joint production of both KAAN and other military equipment. Claims that official agreements in this area could be signed before the end of 2025 have been reported in international media outlets.

These developments are closely related to Turkey and Egypt’s desire to reduce their dependence on foreign countries, particularly in the defence industry, while also strengthening their position as exporters of defence products. In this sense, Ankara’s performance, which has made significant progress in recent years, has also attracted the attention of countries prioritising economic diversification initiatives in the region.

Turkey, one of the world’s leading exporters of UAVs and UCAVs, has also become a major player in the export of unmanned naval vehicles, military land vehicles and other defense industry products. Aiming to become the fourth country after the U.S., Russia and China to produce this technology with its national capabilities through its fifth-generation fighter jet project, Turkey attaches great importance to the KAAN project.

Cooperation between Turkey and Egypt in this area could usher in a new era in regional alliances and lead to the emergence of a deterrent political will against Israel, which is seen as a threat by many actors in the region. Indeed, Israel’s massacres in Gaza, its violent actions against Palestinians and its aggressive policies in Syria are drawing the reaction of not only regional but also many global actors, prompting initiatives to increase international pressure on Tel Aviv to change its policies.

At this point, Turkey aims to take more deterrent measures against Israel, with the support of countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Pakistan and Spain. In addition, by developing fifth-generation fighter jet projects such as KAAN and air defense systems such as SİPER, Ankara also aims to prevent Israel from posing a direct threat in the future.

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he world’s water cycle is becoming more unstable, swinging between devastating droughts and destructive floods, according to the State of Global Water Resources 2024 report released today by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO).

The report highlights that only about one-third of global river basins experienced “normal” conditions last year, marking the sixth year in a row of widespread imbalance. Severe droughts gripped the Amazon Basin, southern Africa, and northern South America, while parts of Africa, Central Europe, and Asia endured unusually wet conditions.

“Water sustains our societies, powers our economies and anchors our ecosystems. And yet the world’s water resources are under growing pressure,” said WMO Secretary-General Celeste Saulo. “At the same time, more extreme water-related hazards are having an increasing impact on lives and livelihoods.”

The study links these extremes to a combination of climate change and the year’s record-breaking El Niño, which disrupted rainfall across continents. Europe faced its worst flooding since 2013, while Africa’s tropical zone saw heavy rains that killed 2,500 people and displaced 4 million. In Brazil, catastrophic floods in the south coincided with ongoing drought in the Amazon, affecting nearly 60% of the country.

450 gigatons of ice lost in 2024

Glaciers also continued to shrink at alarming rates, losing an estimated 450 gigatons of ice in 2024—the third consecutive year of widespread loss. This annual melt, equivalent to filling 180 million Olympic swimming pools, added about 1.2 millimeters to global sea levels, heightening risks for coastal communities.

Groundwater levels showed similar instability, with just 38% of wells worldwide recording normal conditions. Over-extraction and persistent drought further strained supplies in regions like Africa, the Americas, and Australia.

The WMO warned that nearly 3.6 billion people already face water scarcity at least one month a year, a figure projected to rise to over 5 billion by 2050. Saulo called for urgent investment in monitoring, data-sharing, and cooperation: “Reliable, science-based information is more important than ever before because we cannot manage what we do not measure. Without data, we risk flying blind.”

The annual report, based on satellite observations, hydrological modeling, and contributions from WMO members, aims to provide decision-makers with authoritative insights into global freshwater trends. It is part of the UN agency’s broader effort to strengthen water security and resilience in the face of mounting climate risks.

Water resources are under growing pressure

“Water sustains our societies, powers our economies, and anchors our ecosystems. And yet the world’s water resources are under growing pressure, and—at the same time—more extreme water-related hazards are having an increasing impact on lives and livelihoods,” said WMO Secretary-General Celeste Saulo.

The report highlights escalating pressure on freshwater sources as climate change intensifies, with only one-third of river basins worldwide experiencing “normal” conditions last year — the sixth consecutive year of imbalance.

The Amazon Basin and southern Africa endured severe drought, while central and eastern Africa, Central Europe, and parts of Asia were hit with unusually heavy rainfall. Extreme weather events took a devastating toll:

Africa’s tropical zone floods killed 2,500 people and displaced 4 million, Europe saw its worst flooding since 2013, and Brazil suffered both catastrophic floods in the south and a prolonged Amazon drought affecting nearly 60% of its territory.

Saulo stressed the urgency of closing monitoring gaps: “Reliable, science-based information is more important than ever before because we cannot manage what we do not measure. Continued investment and enhanced collaboration in data sharing are vital. Without data, we risk flying blind.”

The WMO urged governments to invest in monitoring systems and adopt integrated water management strategies, warning that worsening instability in the water cycle poses a growing threat to global health, food security, and economic stability.

(Source: WMO)

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srael’s ongoing genocide and aggression in Gaza has not been limited to Palestine but has taken on a regional dimension with airstrikes targeting Tehran, Beirut, Damascus and Sanaa. On September 9, 2025, the Tel Aviv regime launched an air strike on the Qatari capital, Doha, claiming to target Hamas leaders. Five Hamas members and a Qatari internal security official were killed in the attack, which targeted Hamas’s negotiation delegation. This step went down in history as another direct attack on the territory of a sovereign country by Israel.

While the Doha administration described the incident as ‘state terrorism,’ President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also emphasised that the Netanyahu government now poses a threat not only to Palestine but to the entire region. This attack demonstrated that Israel’s aggression knows no bounds and pushed regional countries to adopt a common stance. Even the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which had previously entered into a normalization process with Israel, condemned Tel Aviv. Arab and Islamic countries viewed Israel’s move as a threat that sabotaged the search for peace.

The U.S. security umbrella

Qatar hosts the U.S.’s largest military base in the region, Al-Udeid. Despite this, it was unable to protect itself from the Israeli attack. This situation has led to questions about Washington’s security commitments. Although U.S. President Donald Trump emphasised Qatar’s importance in a cautious statement, he only issued symbolic warnings to Israel. He even reiterated his support by sending U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio to Israel. This stance increased doubts about the U.S.’s reliability in the Gulf.

In fact, this loss of trust is not new. In 2019, Washington’s indifference following the Houthis’ attacks on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities caused great disappointment in Riyadh. Today, similar mistrust has resurfaced following the attack on Qatar. Gulf countries believe that the U.S. is applying double standards in favour of Israel and that its security guarantees are no longer valid. As a result, the U.S.’s traditional role as a security provider has been seriously undermined.

Regional security efforts

The collective response following Israel’s attack on Qatar indicates that a new security architecture is emerging in the Middle East. Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani called on the international community to abandon double standards and adopt a collective response. The extraordinary joint summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Arab League, held in Doha on September 15, 2025, was a concrete example of this response.

At the summit, 57 OIC and 22 Arab League countries adopted a united stance against Israel’s attacks. Iran’s proposal for a ‘joint operations centre’ brought military cooperation among Islamic countries to the agenda. At this point, Egypt also brought the idea of a joint Arab defence force, which had been shelved for years, back to the table. According to Cairo’s plan, a joint army consisting of land, air and sea armies from member countries would be established, with initial command given to Egypt. This structure, which could be spearheaded by powerful armies such as those of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran, aims to provide regional deterrence. Thus, similar to NATO’s Article 5, the principle that ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’ could be transformed into a concrete defence mechanism within the OIC and Arab League.

Turkey-Qatar solidarity

A few days after Israel’s attack on Qatar, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan travelled to Doha to attend the extraordinary summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). President Erdoğan met with the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and conveyed Ankara’s message of solidarity. In his speech at the summit, President Erdoğan strongly condemned Israel’s attacks on Gaza and its provocation towards Doha. Ankara stated that Israel’s actions pose a threat not only to Palestine but to the security of the entire region. Turkey also called for supporting diplomatic initiatives such as Palestine’s full membership to the United Nations (UN) and a permanent ceasefire in Gaza. Stating that Israel must be economically pressured, President Erdoğan said that concrete steps could be taken within the OIC and new mechanisms could be established.

Turkey’s role in the new process in the Middle East is not only diplomatic but also prominent in terms of its military capacity. Ankara’s progress in the defence industry in recent years sets an example for countries in the region. Domestic UAV and missile systems, as well as national fighter jet projects, have made Turkey an actor that reduces its dependence on foreign countries. Countries such as Qatar and the UAE have also begun to add these military equipment to their inventories. This situation is encouraging Gulf countries to increase their defence investments in a similar manner. Saudi Arabia’s acceleration of domestic defence projects is an indication of this trend.

Turkey’s military strength has been proven in many parts of the region, such as Syria and Libya. Iran’s direct or proxy wars with Israel, Egypt’s military capacity, and the Gulf’s economic power could present a tangible power projection against Israel. Therefore, the Middle East is on the verge of a new era in response to Israeli aggression. In this sense, Israel’s attack on Doha has brought the region to a critical threshold. Regional countries are seeking joint mechanisms to ensure their own security at a time when the U.S. security umbrella is increasingly losing its meaning.

On the other hand, the joint statement issued at the Doha summit conveyed the message that there would be no silence in response to Israel’s actions. The Qatari Emir’s statement that ‘our right to respond is reserved’ indicates that military options are also on the table. In the coming period, if Turkey’s diplomatic and military power, Egypt’s military experience and the Gulf’s financial support are combined, the establishment of a new security order in the Middle East could accelerate. As long as Israel’s aggression continues, the solidarity reflex of the countries in the region seems likely to strengthen. These developments point to a turning point that could fundamentally change the balance of power in the Middle East.

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hen assessed as a whole across four contexts, the Turkey-Italy-Libya Summit has signaled the first signs of a search for a new balance in the Mediterranean. In the geostrategic sphere, a framework linking the Eastern Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan Africa. In the economic sphere, a development vision supported by energy, integration and logistics routes. In the regional cooperation sphere, technical committees, multilateral formats and a process institutionalized with UN support, and finally, in the context of EU security, common solutions to irregular migration and human trafficking stand out.

The trilateral summit between Turkey, Italy and Libya, held in Istanbul in early August, was a critical meeting where long-term strategic lines for the Mediterranean basin and Africa were discussed. This summit also presents a framework that is coherent in terms of geostrategic, economic, regional cooperation and European security contexts. Each of these contexts exists and functions as interlinked rings. Therefore, it is a fact that this trilateral summit cannot be reduced to a single dimensional parameter.

From the Eastern Mediterranean to Sub-Saharan Africa

One of the most critical aspects of the tripartite summit is the new equation it presents in a geostrategic context. The Eastern Mediterranean has long been at the center of attention due to energy discoveries, disputes over maritime jurisdiction and regional competition. The maritime jurisdiction agreement signed by Turkey with Libya in 2019 invalidated the plans of Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) and suspended projects such as the EastMed pipeline. Today, the fact that Italy, a member of the EU and NATO, is sitting at the same table with Turkey and Libya confirms this agreement. Thus, a geopolitical reality has emerged in which Greece and the GCA are isolated, and the Ankara-Tripoli-Rome axis has been strengthened.

However, in this geostrategic picture, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and Turkey are dimensions that should not be overlooked. Israel’s rhetoric has recently increased, tending to portray Turkey as a “threat center”. As in the cases of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Iran, the reasons cited are the expansion of defense industry capacity, the construction of a nuclear energy reactor for peaceful purposes, and support for Palestine. In particular, allegations are being made that the nuclear power plant in Akkuyu is intended for a nuclear weapons program. Furthermore, Turkey’s UAV base in the TRNC, its signal intelligence facilities and its reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities are being presented by Israel as potential threats. These statements actually reveal that Israel has pursued a strategy of dividing the area into small pieces rather than engaging in a major conflict directly, thereby restricting the opponent’s room for maneuver through rhetoric and alliances.

To this end, Israel is increasing its efforts to build closer ties with the Republic of Cyprus and Greece. It is noteworthy that, despite Turkey not pursuing a policy of hostility towards any actor in its own region or within the global system, various actors share common ground with Israel through their opposition to Turkey. In this context, the Turkey-Italy-Libya cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean has the potential to act as a balancing factor against new alliance initiatives targeting Turkey, in addition to energy and migration issues and the Cyprus case.

Energy, Integration and Logistics Routes

The economic agenda became a natural complement to the geostrategic picture. At the summit, joint projects in the energy, oil and gas sectors, port investments, infrastructure projects and Libya’s connection to regional projects in the Mediterranean in terms of connectivity were at the forefront. Indeed, these issues serve as tools for economic cooperation and strategic integration. Turkey’s infrastructure and construction experience, combined with Italy’s energy investments through ENI, present a critical opportunity for cooperation in Libya’s reconstruction process.

In terms of logistics routes, the transformation of Libya’s ports into a new bridge to Europe and the interior of Africa is in line with the common interests of the three countries. Thus, it creates an effect that strengthens economic integration, security and geopolitical interests. At this point, the potential of economic development to mitigate the driving factors of migration will also enable energy and infrastructure projects to have a mitigating effect on irregular migration in the future. Therefore, it is considered that the economic agenda is directly linked to the migration and security agendas.

From technical level to multilateralism

On the other hand, the institutionalization of regional cooperation is the third link that completes the economic context. The establishment of technical level committees in a tripartite structure at the Summit enables the committees to begin working on concrete steps. The mechanisms formed by the committees aim to transform cooperation from abstract declarations of intent into action. In addition, the quadripartite format proposed by Libyan Prime Minister Dibeybe, which would include Qatar and involve ministers, demonstrates the intention to broaden the scope of cooperation. Qatar’s financial, humanitarian and logistical contributions are a factor that will increase the feasibility of the projects.

This situation signals that regional coordination will evolve beyond the Mediterranean coastal countries to include the Gulf countries. Furthermore, the political process to be conducted with UN facilitation and the support given to the elections reflect Turkey’s approach to enhancing the role of the UN in the international system. Indeed, in the face of increasing criticism of the UN and the questioning of its role in the international system, Turkey appears to be making a positive effort. Therefore, it can be said that Turkey aims to strengthen the legitimacy of the multilateral system, beyond bilateral and trilateral relations.

Common solutions to common challenges

As the fourth and final link, the migration issue has emerged as one of the most prominent topics of the Summit. Migration is a matter directly related to European Union (EU) security. Italy, as one of the most vulnerable countries on the EU’s southern border, considers limiting migration flows a vital priority.

Meanwhile, Turkey has long been implementing joint projects with Europe to combat irregular migration and human trafficking. Libya, as the main departure point for migration routes, is at the center of this triangle. The Summit was expected to discuss action plans to combat human trafficking networks, prevent irregular movements, and support Libya in managing migration pressures. The important point here is that migration is being addressed both as a security issue and as an economic and humanitarian matter. Italian Prime Minister Meloni’s desire to transfer the cooperation experience with Turkey, which she described as ‘excellent results,’ to Libya can be seen as a sign that the EU will also be indirectly involved in this process.

This context also serves as a reminder that Turkey is an integral part of EU security. Ankara’s role has the potential to counteract the influence of policies within the EU that prioritize the narrow interests of Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. Thus, migration can be seen not only as a crisis issue but also as a basis for establishing a new security architecture between Turkey and Europe.

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n a major policy move with wide-ranging global repercussions, U.S. President Donald Trump has reimposed tariffs on imports from nearly 70 countries, reviving and expanding a central theme of his “America First” trade strategy. The new tariffs, formalized in an executive order signed on July 31, range from 10 percent to 41 percent and target some of the United States’ closest trading partners, as well as traditional adversaries.

Citing the “continued lack of reciprocity in our bilateral trade relationships,” Trump justified the move as necessary to address what he described as an ongoing national emergency under Executive Order 14257. The tariffs, described by the White House as “reciprocal duties,” are structured to penalize countries where the U.S. maintains a trade deficit while rewarding those with favorable trade balances.

While most of the tariffs are scheduled to go into effect on August 7, tariffs on Canada took effect immediately on August 1. Trump increased Canadian tariffs from 25 percent to 35 percent, accusing Ottawa of failing to stem the flow of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids into the U.S.

Canada and Others

In a separate fact sheet, the administration outlined specific grievances with Canada’s border enforcement and cooperation on drug trafficking. The sharp escalation drew criticism from Canadian officials, though Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has yet to comment publicly.

Among the 69 countries affected, tariff rates vary dramatically. U.S. allies like the United Kingdom and Australia received baseline 10 percent tariffs, while others saw significantly higher rates:

The inconsistent rates have confounded trade analysts. Deborah Elms, head of trade policy at the Hinrich Foundation, called the formula “illogical and politically motivated.” She told Al Jazeera, “The original formula may have been flawed, but it had internal coherence. This new list appears arbitrary.”

According to Steve Okun, CEO of APAC Advisors, “Each country gets its own tariff rate based on the president’s current view—trade-related or not. There’s no overarching trade theory here.”

Countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Algeria, South Africa, and Libya also face tariffs of 30 percent or more, despite having relatively modest trade volumes with the U.S.

Space for Negotiation

Despite the sharp rhetoric and steep penalties, the administration left the door open for negotiations. With tariffs on most countries delayed until August 7, the White House appears to be inviting last-minute bargaining. Inu Manak, a trade expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, explained: “Countries already in talks with the U.S. now have a week to finalize a deal and avoid being hit.”

The Trump administration has already concluded new trade arrangements with several partners, including, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam,  the Philippines, Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand and Pakistan.

These agreements reportedly involve changes in market access, rules of origin, and sectoral protections in exchange for lower tariffs.

China and Mexico: High Stakes, Different Timelines

Two of the world’s largest exporters to the United States—China and Mexico—were notably absent from the current tariff list. But both are under pressure.

Following a high-level meeting in Stockholm, China has until August 12 to strike a new deal with Washington or face a 30 percent blanket tariff on most exports. The stakes are especially high given the fragility of the global economy and China’s export dependence.

Meanwhile, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum secured a 90-day extension on tariff increases after a direct call with Trump. According to a statement from Sheinbaum, the two leaders agreed to continue dialogue to forge a long-term agreement.

The White House also announced forthcoming changes to rules of origin, designed to curb the use of third-country transshipment to evade tariffs. Goods shipped indirectly to the U.S. will now face stricter documentation and inspection, with full technical guidelines expected later in August.

While aimed at stopping trade circumvention, these changes could disrupt supply chains, especially in electronics, textiles, and auto parts—sectors that rely on complex cross-border production.

Political Motivations and Economic Risks

The latest tariffs come as Trump ramps up his 2026 midterm campaign messaging, appealing to working-class voters and manufacturing states. He has positioned tariffs as a tool for economic sovereignty, national security, and job creation.

However, economists and industry leaders warn that the long-term impact could be harmful. Sectors such as construction, retail, automotive, and manufacturing are likely to experience rising costs, which could trickle down to consumers.

The international backlash has already begun. Several governments have hinted at retaliation or WTO challenges. Trade experts warn of renewed trade wars, higher inflation, and decreased investor confidence if escalation continues.

Trump’s tariffs mark a significant shift away from the multilateralism that has underpinned global trade since World War II. Instead, the administration is embracing a transactional, country-by-country approach that prioritizes bilateral deals over global consensus.

“There is no longer one U.S. trade policy,” said Deborah Elms. “There are 70 U.S. trade policies—one for each country.”

With just days left before many of the tariffs take effect, the world’s trading partners are scrambling to renegotiate terms, challenge the measures, or brace for economic fallout. For Trump, the tariffs represent strategic leverage. For others, they may usher in a new era of global economic uncertainty.

ٍ(Source: Aljazeera)

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n conflict zones around the world, water has become a weapon, leading to dire consequences for civilian populations. From Yemen to Ukraine to Libya, the deliberate targeting or indirect impact on water infrastructure has exacerbated humanitarian crises, highlighting the urgent need for innovative solutions to minimize civilian harm.

In Yemen, a country plagued by civil war since 2014, both state and non-state actors have targeted water infrastructure as part of their military strategy. The Houthis, backed by government forces, have engaged in a tug-of-war over control of water resources, leading to blockades and attacks on water supplies.

The resulting water shortages have contributed to food insecurity and disease outbreaks, disproportionately affecting women and children. Humanitarian organizations struggle to provide assistance amid ongoing conflict and logistical challenges, leaving millions in desperate need of aid.

Destruction of water infrastructure in Ukraine

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has brought devastation to the country’s water infrastructure. The deliberate destruction of civilian infrastructure, including the Nova Kakhovka Dam, has led to displacement and water shortages for millions of people.

The interconnected nature of water and energy systems means that attacks on one system can have ripple effects on the other, further exacerbating the crisis. Despite international condemnation, Russia continues to target critical infrastructure, leaving civilians without access to clean water and sanitation.

Libya, torn apart by a decade of conflict, has also seen its water infrastructure targeted and destroyed. The collapse of dams and water systems in cities like Derna has led to catastrophic flooding and displacement. Different factions vie for control over water resources, leading to looting, sabotage, and threats that impact water availability for civilians. The Great Man-Made River Project, a vital water supply network, has become a battleground, further exacerbating the humanitarian crisis.

Devastating consequences for civilian populations

The weaponization of water has had devastating consequences for civilian populations in conflict zones. In addition to water shortages, communities face food insecurity, disease outbreaks, and displacement. Women and children are particularly vulnerable, with girls facing increased risks of violence and barriers to education. Humanitarian organizations struggle to provide assistance amid ongoing conflict and logistical challenges, leaving millions in desperate need of aid.

Addressing the weaponization of water requires innovative solutions and international cooperation. Investing in resilient water infrastructure, addressing climate change’s impact on water resources, and promoting conflict-sensitive development are essential steps. Additionally, enforcing existing international law and holding perpetrators accountable for their actions can help deter future attacks on water infrastructure. However, these efforts must be supported by sustained political will and financial resources to make a meaningful impact.

The weaponization of water in conflict zones represents a global crisis that demands urgent attention and action. From Yemen to Ukraine to Libya, civilians are bearing the brunt of this devastating tactic, facing water shortages, food insecurity, and disease outbreaks. Addressing the root causes of the crisis and investing in resilient water infrastructure are critical steps towards mitigating its impact and ensuring the well-being of affected populations.

Source: Wilson Center

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resident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Egypt on February 14 and his bilateral meetings with his counterpart Abdel Fattah Sisi can be seen as a result of the normalization talks that started in 2021 and as a clear statement of a concrete will to reestablish partnerships between the two countries in many fields. Undoubtedly, the potential cooperation between Turkey and Egypt, which are the main actors in regional issues such as Libya, Sudan, and the Eastern Mediterranean, especially on the Gaza issue, can pave the way for the transformation of these crisis areas. However, when regional issues are considered within the framework of global geopolitics, the two countries’ common stance on regional crises has different meanings.

In fact, the ongoing diplomatic rapprochement between Ankara and Cairo signals a significant shift in global power dynamics. At this point, the harmonization of Turkey’s and Egypt’s foreign policy approaches can position the two countries as a united center of power against the backdrop of the multipolar world order. This scenario comes to the fore as the U.S. influence in the Middle East diminishes noticeably and the sanctions it imposes through economic, military, and political engagements lose their effect. The evolution of relations between the two countries from competition to cooperation will provide important opportunities to fill the perceived gaps in the regional strategies of the United States, and will allow the development of partnerships with countries that seek to expand the European Union’s influence, especially in the region.

The European Union and the Eastern Mediterranean equation

From the perspective of the EU, the emerging Ankara-Cairo axis can be assessed in more than one dimension. First, the rapprochement between Turkey and Egypt may provide an opportunity within the EU for joint negotiations on the issue of more coordinated migration flows through the Eastern Mediterranean. The cooperation of two regional powers, which in the past were at opposite poles, means ensuring stability and peace in various crisis spots such as Libya and Sudan, which are seen by EU countries as the source of uncontrolled migration flows.

On the other hand, Turkey’s and Egypt’s control and coordination of migration management, especially for EU countries bordering the Mediterranean, means that the two countries can use their positions as key transit countries to tip the balance in ongoing negotiations with European countries in their favor. The two countries’ chances of gaining concessions or support on other regional issues may also increase.

At the same time, the united front formed by Turkey and Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean raises various concerns in terms of energy exploration by EU companies and the energy trade interests of the countries concerned. In some respects, however, it also offers strategic opportunities. To elaborate: in the recent past, the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, in which Greece, the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC), and France were active, tried to include Egypt in the formation in order to leave Turkey on its own in the regional equation—and was relatively successful in this goal. In fact, the maritime agreement signed between Egypt and Greece damaged Egypt’s interests and priorities in realpolitik, and jeopardized its gains according to international law in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The fact that in the same period the agreement offered by Turkey to Egypt added an area in the Mediterranean Sea the size of three islands of Cyprus to Egypt’s territory was important in that it put the Sisi government in a difficult position vis-à-vis domestic public opinion and showed that national interests would be at risk if Egypt pursued the EU path. Currently, the manifestation of the Ankara-Cairo axis in the Eastern Mediterranean means that Turkish and Egyptian energy companies take the lion’s share of the reserves in the region. At this point, the energy cooperation in question will also enable EU countries to have more reliable access to energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In this sense, it has become increasingly clear in recent years that the energy resources of the Eastern Mediterranean and Africa are of vital importance to Europe. Since the Russia-Ukraine war broke out in February 2022, the Eastern Mediterranean has played a central role in the global energy equation and in import/export supplies. So much so that EU countries seeking to reduce their dependence on Russian natural gas see countries in Africa and the Middle East as the strongest and most realistic alternative, with Algeria, Libya, and Nigeria standing out in this respect. Indeed, the new balances in the Eastern Mediterranean and the rapprochement between Turkey and Egypt could make these plans a more rational option in the medium to long term, both politically and commercially.

The US Perspective on Turkish-Egyptian Rapprochement

From the perspective of the U.S., which has minimized its footprint in the Middle East under the Biden administration, the cooperation that is developing between Ankara and Cairo can be assessed under two subheadings. First, it should not be forgotten that throughout history Turkey and Egypt have been traditional and strategic U.S. allies. At a time when Israel’s political, economic, and cultural involvement in the Middle East is decreasing due to the Gaza issue, the U.S. will maintain its sphere of influence in the Middle East at low cost by implementing the “remote balancing” strategy. As is well known, the U.S. has been providing Egypt with serious military aid since the Camp David agreement in 1979.

However, since the day he took office, Biden has distinguished himself from the Trump administration by maintaining a distant attitude towards the monarchies in Egypt and the Gulf countries. This approach is one of the main factors behind Egypt’s move towards regional partnerships. Moreover, the emergence of the Turkey-Egypt bloc as a regional power could provide certain advantages in balancing Iran, one of the United States’ main regional rivals. In parallel, Iran’s recent expansion into Africa and the Houthis’ attacks in the Red Sea have led to arguments that a space has opened up for Iran in the Middle East after October 7, 2023. In this conjuncture, the fact that two actors—Egypt and Turkey—that have distant relations with Iran are positioned side-by-side in regional crisis areas points to opportunities rather than threats and difficulties in the eyes of U.S. policymakers.

The second issue is the defense industry, which was mentioned during President Erdoğan’s visit to Cairo, and military cooperation, which is likely to deepen in the medium to long term. The Turkish defense industry has been continuously increasing its market share by building on its successes in the Libyan and Karabakh wars, and is becoming the first choice of countries experiencing conflicts and civil wars in Africa. The entry of Turkish defense industry equipment into the Egyptian market, which is dominated by U.S. and Israeli companies, could position Turkey as a prominent player in the sector.

The Sisi government’s counterterrorism operations in the Sinai Peninsula require this advanced technology and equipment, adding additional strain to Egypt’s relations with Israel over Gaza. Due to the tensions in Gaza, the city of Rafah, which lies within Egypt’s borders, is frequently subjected to Israeli air strikes. Therefore, the possible cooperation with Turkey to increase Egypt’s armed unmanned aerial vehicle capacity could be another important parameter in the relations between the two countries.

Although the Turkish-Egyptian rapprochement is mainly examined through regional units of analysis, it has the potential to influence global political dynamics. The move presents both difficulties and opportunities for Western powers including the management of migratory flows, the transfer of energy resources to global markets, the EU’s position in relation to developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the U.S. reaction to its relatively diminished presence in the Middle East. With its military, economic, and political dimensions, the Turkey-Egypt rapprochement could usher in a new paradigm in the global geopolitical balance.

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n a move that could exacerbate already strained relations between the Maldives and India, Turkey has initiated the delivery of its renowned combat drones, the Bayraktar TB2, to the island nation. The delivery, part of a bilateral agreement between Turkey and the Maldives, aims to enhance the security capabilities of the Maldivian armed forces amid escalating tensions in the region.

The agreement, which includes the supply of a command control station and six TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), follows a visit by Maldives President Mohamed Muizzu to Turkey in November 2023. During the visit, President Muizzu engaged in discussions with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and toured several Turkish defense industry companies.

The timing of the drone supply is significant, as it comes amidst growing tensions between the Maldives and India since President Muizzu assumed office last year. Traditionally, the Maldives has maintained close ties with India, but under Muizzu’s leadership, the country has been tilting towards closer relations with Beijing, raising concerns in New Delhi.

Indian troops in the Maldives

One of the major points of contention between the Maldives and India has been the presence of Indian troops in the Maldives. President Muizzu has been vocal in calling for the withdrawal of Indian military personnel stationed in the country, adding to the diplomatic friction between the two nations.

Developed by Baykar, the Bayraktar TB2 drones have gained recognition for their effectiveness in various conflicts worldwide, including in Azerbaijan, Libya, and Ukraine. The TB2 drones played a significant role in countering Russian forces during the early stages of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, showcasing their combat capabilities on the global stage.

The supply of TB2 drones to the Maldives underscores Turkey’s growing influence in the defense industry and its willingness to expand its strategic partnerships beyond its immediate region. With exports to 33 countries, including NATO and EU member states, Turkey’s defense industry continues to make strides in the international market.

However, the delivery of the drones to the Maldives is likely to further strain relations between the Maldives and India, potentially leading to heightened tensions in the region. As both countries navigate delicate diplomatic waters, the impact of Turkey’s involvement in the region remains to be seen.

The delivery of the Bayraktar TB2 drones to the Maldives marks another chapter in the evolving geopolitical landscape of the Indian Ocean region, with implications for regional stability and security.

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s conflict continues to escalate in the Middle East, the role of Russia in the region becomes increasingly prominent. Anna Borshchevskaya delves into Russia’s strategy, particularly how Moscow leverages defense relationships to engage in a long-term power struggle with the West in the Middle East.

Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Middle East had become Russia’s second most important arms market, re-establishing itself as a top arms exporter globally, trailing only the United States. Despite the invasion diverting Russia’s focus, arms sales, military relationships, and paramilitary activities in the Middle East remain central to Moscow’s strategy for expanding its influence and advancing anti-Western interests.

Russia’s share of global arms exports had declined before the Ukraine invasion, mainly due to reduced imports by India, the largest purchaser of Russian weaponry. However, the Middle East remained a focal point for Russia’s arms sales. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported that military exports to the Middle East accounted for 40-50% of Russia’s total military exports, amounting to approximately $6 billion per year before the invasion.

Although sanctions and export controls constrained Russian weaponry supplies post-invasion, reports indicate that Middle East officials expressed concerns about Russia’s ability to deliver on existing contracts. However, the nature of Russian exports, primarily aircraft, engines, and missiles, mitigated the impact, with continued interest in air defense systems from countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Despite Russia’s poor military performance in Ukraine, there hasn’t been a corresponding drop in interest in Russian arms in the Middle East. The West’s sanctions may limit additional purchases, but the appeal of Russian aircraft, missiles, and air defense systems persists, particularly considering regional security challenges.

Closer military ties with Iran and Wagner

The invasion of Ukraine accelerated strategic cooperation between Russia and Iran. Reports suggest a deepening high-tech and defense partnership, with potential deliveries of advanced weaponry, including Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets and helicopters. This collaboration raises concerns for the Gulf states, potentially shifting the military balance in Iran’s favor.

Russian-Iranian and multilateral exercises, along with diplomatic efforts, underscore a trend of strategic cooperation that predates the Ukraine invasion. Russia’s active pursuit of stronger military ties with Iran aligns with its broader geopolitical objectives, challenging the US presence in the region and enhancing its influence.

Russia’s interest in the Mediterranean and attempts to gain access to naval bases in Libya and Sudan reveal its determination to project military power into the Middle East and Africa. Despite setbacks, including losses in the Black Sea Fleet, Russia persists in seeking strategic positions that could exert diplomatic and economic pressure on the European Union.

Private military companies (PMCs) like the Wagner Group play a crucial role in Russia’s endeavors. Rebranded as Afrika Korps, this paramilitary force facilitates Moscow’s foreign policy objectives. Russia’s aim to establish military bases in Libya and Sudan demonstrates its commitment to expanding influence in the region.

Taking the long view of Russia

While some may interpret Russia’s declining arms trade and sanctions on its military-industrial complex as signs of diminishing influence, such a view is myopic. Russia continues to pursue its strategic objectives in the Middle East through defense relationships, cementing access to ports, and leveraging paramilitary groups. The war in Ukraine serves as a chief military, foreign policy, and economic priority for Russia, shaping its societal and economic dynamics.

Western policymakers need to adopt a long-term perspective that accounts for Putin’s strategic objectives and the implications of the Ukraine conflict. Without sustained Western pressure, Russia may persist and potentially tip the scales decisively in its favor, diminishing America’s standing and emboldening its adversaries on the world stage.

Source: The Washington Institute

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he overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi’s 42-year-long regime in 2011, following public uprisings, plunged Libya into a political, social, and military crisis. Even after 13 years, the country has yet to achieve unity and integrity. The uprising, ignited on February 17, 2011, is considered by some as the root cause of today’s conflict environment, while others view it as a justified and legitimate quest for a new order.

Revolution dilemma

Although the February 17 revolution emerged as a popular movement, the post-revolution phase, particularly two years later with the enactment of the “political isolation law’” that marginalized former Gaddafi-era soldiers and bureaucrats from the political scene, followed by the military polarization of 2014, indicated that the revolution had been co-opted by certain political and military cliques into a struggle for power.

This scenario and the historical flow extending to the present day reveal that the masses, aspiring for better living conditions and a fairer governance model, have relinquished control of the revolution to the country’s political elites. The fragile and fragmented security atmosphere, perceived as a window of opportunity by tribal and militia groups active in the east and west, led to deep divisions and polarizations across various sectors, constructed through narratives and policies securitized within the narrow agendas and interests of the relevant actors.

Over time, this division evolved into armed conflict, leading to the deaths of tens of thousands of Libyans in the civil wars of 2014 and 2019, and further laying the groundwork for the emergence of regional animosity and seeking of revenge. Despite being ethnically more homogeneous compared to many countries in the Middle East and Africa, the North African nation witnessed its initial revolutionary vs. anti-revolutionary divide deepen into Islamist vs. secular, east vs. west, and even city vs. town polarizations, all of which have hindered the processes of reconciliation and state reconstruction.

For instance, the city of Misrata stood out as both a stronghold of the revolution and in favor of the influential Islamist Muslim Brotherhood movement, while the city of Benghazi transformed into a hub for revolution opponents and former Gaddafi-era soldiers and bureaucrats, especially following the rise of militia leader Khalifa Haftar in the east. Additionally, the capital, Tripoli, along with influential western cities like Misrata, Zawiya, and Zintan, became strategic points where armed groups are engaged in a power struggle, specifically aiming to expand their spheres of influence and augment their control over official institutions in the post-revolutionary era.

Disruptive interventions by external actors

Parallel to these internal balances, Western countries within NATO, which planned and executed air strikes against Gaddafi in 2011, have continued to intervene in the process. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), established under the auspices of the UN, has remained inadequate in terms of providing a foundation for permanent and sustainable solutions, instead supporting interim governments and similar power-sharing agreements formed in 2015 and 2021.

More importantly, NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya, the first peacekeeping operation implemented under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, neglected the responsibility to rebuild, a crucial component of the R2P approach. The post-Gaddafi reconstruction process was left to Libya’s incomplete institutions and a society lacking a developed sense of citizenship. Subsequent international conferences, such as those in Palermo and Berlin, witnessed meetings that veered into a dominance struggle, far from solving issues, and were marked by disagreements stemming from conflicting interests among Western nations.

On the other hand, the authority vacuum and weak borders have transformed Libya into a hub for mercenaries, on the brink of regional crises, where fighters are gathered and dispatched. The period during which Gulf countries and the Russian private military company (PMC) Wagner Group financed numerous Syrian, Chadian, and Sudanese foreign fighters within Haftar’s ranks was documented in several open sources. From this perspective, it can be stated that external interventions have been as detrimental to Libya’s unity and integrity as internal factors.

The Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), convened under the auspices of the UN in Switzerland on February 5, 2021, designated the Government of National Unity (GNU), led by the businessman from Misrata Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, as the new transitional administration to guide the country towards the elections planned for December 2021. Gaining relative support from rival figures in a short period, the GNU prioritized economic and political reforms. However, the postponement of the planned elections due to controversies over candidate criteria and constitutional debates led to a broader division, culminating in the establishment of a new parallel government in February 2022. The developments following this date can be identified as primary causes for the conflicts erupting in and around Tripoli, closures of oil facilities, and the resultant economic and political crises.

Militias and Libyan politics

The current situation has enabled militia groups in the country to evolve into political entities over time, leveraging the privileges and powers they have accumulated. This transformation is elucidated by the concept of “militia diplomacy,” which denotes the distribution of shares in military and political institutions. According to this approach, militias affiliated with tribes or community-based in the east, west, and south aim to position actors sympathetic to them in government during transitional processes.

The deviation from this scenario not only questions the legitimacy of the new structure in the eyes of these groups but also leads to potentially destabilizing endeavors. Many analysts focusing on Libya argue that militia groups, which have been integrated into the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, and Presidential Council since 2011, have become “statized,” positing this as a significant impediment to democratic processes.

Currently, it is possible to discuss some initiatives regarding the reorganization of the December 2021 elections that were canceled. Alongside mechanisms involving local and international actors led by the UNSMIL, priority should be given to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs. A united Libya requires unified institutions and, more importantly, a unified military. At this point, both the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA), comprised of Haftar’s forces in the east, and the fragmented security bureaucracy in the west of the country indicate chronic problems for the future.

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elations between Turkey and Egypt have been particularly strained in the aftermath of the 2013 military coup against then president Mohamed Morsi, with tensions manifesting themselves in multiple areas. Positioned on opposing sides, particularly on issues in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean, the two countries have made efforts to counterbalance each other diplomatically, economically, and militarily in key conflict zones in the Middle East and Africa. Within this historical context, the 2021 normalization efforts mark a discernible shift toward a détente in this previously tense relationship.

The progression of diplomatic engagements, beginning at the level of deputy ministers and culminating in a significant institutionalized framework with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Egypt on February 14, indicates a pivotal moment of rapprochement. This newfound proximity paves the way for multifaceted opportunities for cooperation, with Libya standing out as a key area given the discord it has caused since 2014.

Key factors that elevate Libya’s importance in the foreign policy considerations of both nations include strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, migration routes, and energy resources. In this sense, the potential for joint efforts promises to produce tangible results in the country which has been characterized by political volatility and a precarious security landscape.

Encouraging the implementation of electoral processes

Libya’s elections, scheduled for December 2021, were postponed due to a number of constitutional and political challenges. This development, which facilitated the formation of the government led by Fathi Bashagha with the support of the eastern-based parliament and the backing of militia leader Khalifa Haftar, has exacerbated fragmentation and conflict in the country. Currently, the election issue remains in a state of ambiguity. Ongoing efforts by the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) under the leadership of Secretary General Abdoulaye Bathily, coupled with initiatives by Western actors and legislative discussions within Libya, have failed to achieve the desired resolution. At this juncture, the involvement of Turkey and Egypt could play a key role in reducing the prevailing division.

While maintaining substantial ties with the eastern segment, Egypt has also actively engaged in diplomatic relations with the Government of National Unity (GNU), which was formed in February 2021. In parallel, Turkey initiated a diplomatic outreach to eastern Libyan actors in the same year. Moreover, prior to his visit to Libya, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan announced Ankara’s intention to reopen its consulate in Benghazi in a joint media briefing with Malta’s Minister for Foreign and European Affairs and Trade Ian Borg, underscoring Turkey’s commitment to reestablishing its diplomatic presence in eastern Libya. This scenario accentuates the potential and capacity of both Turkey and Egypt to mitigate the competition between Libya’s eastern and western factions or, alternatively, to play a mediating role in the reconciliation process.

On the other hand, given their different priorities and agendas, Turkey and Egypt could serve as catalysts for the establishment of peace and stability in Libya. Turkey needs a certain level of stability to protect its national interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and to maintain its commercial ties with Libya. Conversely, the Abdel Fattah al-Sisi government prioritizes the foreign exchange earnings of Egyptian workers in Libya and the potential role Egypt could play in Libya’s reconstruction phase. The Libyan dossier is also sensitive for Egypt because of the extensive land borders it shares with Libya’s eastern region and is critically important for strengthening its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

It should be noted that Turkey and Egypt are key actors in western and eastern Libya, respectively. The most tangible cooperation that could materialize between the two countries, specifically regarding Libya, would be their commitment to overcoming the disputes of local actors and ensuring that elections are held in a fair and transparent environment. In such a scenario, instead of power-sharing models, both countries could increase their influence in local, regional, and international organizations to support the establishment of a people-based governance system, thereby reducing the influence and control of spoilers.

Steps and potential DDR initiatives

Since 2011, Libya has witnessed a rapid proliferation of armed factions, a phenomenon largely attributed to the power vacuum and the ensuing internal conflict. These groups, which vary in size, allegiance, and ideological orientation, have become entrenched in Libya’s sociopolitical landscape, posing complex challenges to the peacebuilding process. As a result, effective implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) in Libya requires a nuanced understanding of the local environment, the heterogeneity of these armed entities, and the intricate interplay of regional and international influences.

Several international organizations have demonstrated their commitment to the DDR process in Libya. In particular, the UNSMIL, led by Senegalese diplomat Abdoulaye Bathily, has been active in facilitating dialogue and providing technical assistance. The United States, the European Union, and countries such as Italy and Germany have made significant contributions through financial assistance and capacity-building initiatives. For these efforts to be truly effective, however, there must be a concerted effort to align them with Libya’s national goals and priorities.

When it comes to the Turkish-Egyptian model, it is safe to say that their consensus could produce more effective results and gain local support. Turkey’s and Egypt’s positive relations with the various factions in Libya could serve as a crucial bridge in the implementation of the DDR process. Turkey’s close ties with elements of the Libyan army and Egypt’s relationship with the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Khalifa Haftar could facilitate a basis for dialogue and reconciliation between these two factions. Particularly during the disarmament and demobilization phase, both countries have the potential to influence actors on the ground to increase efforts to disarm and disband military units.

The spectrum of DDR efforts currently underway in Libya demonstrates a range of methodologies. These initiatives range from basic disarmament and demobilization activities to more holistic programs that include psychosocial support, vocational training, and the facilitation of employment opportunities for ex-combatants. In the reintegration phase, Turkey and Egypt have the potential to promote social cohesion and create jobs in Libya through economic and social development projects.

For example, support for infrastructure and education projects as part of Libya’s reconstruction could facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life. Regarding the transition to a unified army in Libya, the sharing of military and security expertise by Turkey and Egypt is expected to contribute to the modernization and professionalization of Libya’s defense and security sectors. This is expected to strengthen central authority in Libya and help achieve security and stability throughout the country.

As two actors involved in the process since the beginning of the Libyan file, Turkey and Egypt have supported peace and stability in Libya according to their own priorities and agendas. The current rapprochement between the two countries, which is different from similar initiatives in the past, could lead to a more cautious approach and consensus on Libya. In this context, addressing the issue of elections and overcoming the security challenges posed by militias are priorities, while the establishment of a unified army and the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs remain crucial.

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n a new development, Turkey has agreed to provide combat drones and other cutting-edge technologies to Egypt, marking a pivotal moment in the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two nations. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan confirmed this announcement on Sunday, highlighting the importance of the burgeoning ties and the potential for technological collaboration.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is scheduled to visit Egypt on February 14, a historic trip that signifies the restoration of diplomatic relations after a decade of strained ties. The relations between Turkey and Egypt had been tense since the 2013 military coup that ousted the late Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi, leading to a prolonged period of diplomatic standoff.

Fidan, in an interview with private A Haber television, stated that the normalization of relations holds significant importance for Egypt to gain access to specific technologies. He expressed that Turkey and Egypt have reached an agreement to provide unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), commonly known as drones, and other advanced technologies. While the details of the technological collaboration were not explicitly outlined, the move suggests a deepening of cooperation in various sectors, including defense.

Demand for Turkey’s drones

The demand for Turkey’s drones has soared on the international stage, gaining recognition for their effectiveness in conflicts across regions such as Syria, Libya, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine. Turkey’s drones, particularly the Bayraktar TB2 developed by Baykar, have played pivotal roles in altering the course of conflicts, making Turkey a major global supplier in the defense industry.

The Bayraktar TB2, known for its long endurance, operational altitude, and versatility, has been instrumental in conflicts where it demonstrated its capability to neutralize advanced anti-aircraft systems, artillery, and armored vehicles. Baykar, the developer of these drones, has successfully exported them to more than 30 countries, solidifying Turkey’s position as a key player in the global defense market.

President Erdoğan’s upcoming visit to Egypt is expected to address various bilateral and regional issues, including trade, energy, and security. The commitment to providing combat drones and advanced technology underscores the depth of the evolving partnership between Turkey and Egypt.

Turkey’s ambition to become self-reliant

This move also reflects Turkey’s ambition to become a self-reliant defense industry powerhouse, with technologies ranging from UAVs to fighter jets and warships. The collaborative efforts between Turkey and Egypt are anticipated to extend beyond defense, contributing to mutual economic and strategic interests.

As Turkey continues to expand its global influence through technological collaborations and diplomatic initiatives, the visit of President Erdoğan to Egypt holds the promise of further cementing ties and fostering a new era of cooperation between the two nations. The potential sale of Turkey’s advanced drones to Egypt is not only a strategic move for both countries but also underscores the transformative impact of Turkey’s defense industry on the geopolitical landscape.

Sources: Daily Sabah and Reuters

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evelopments in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, which surround Turkey’s 4,000-kilometer coastline and over which Turkey has sovereign rights, are of great importance to Turkey. In light of recent developments in the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean, predictions of possible developments in 2024 are also important in this regard. In the recent past, Turkey has shown a determined attitude in defending its sovereign rights in the seas and airspace of these two important regions.

In the Aegean Sea, Turkey has maintained its stance against Greece’s expansion of its territorial waters and the arming of the Eastern Aegean islands, as well as its legal position on the delimitation of the continental shelf. In the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey has continued its actions to protect its continental shelf rights and to protect the rights of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). At the same time, Turkey has sought to improve its bilateral relations with Greece, Egypt, and Israel. As a result, local tensions stemming from fundamental problems in both the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean have decreased significantly.

This analysis will focus on whether there are threats to this positive trend in 2024, especially after Israel’s ongoing attacks on Gaza that began in early October 2023 and possible Turkish positions vis-à-vis such threats.

Turkey’s Approach to the Aegean Problems in the Recent Past

The deterioration of relations between Turkey and Greece, especially since 2016, has led to serious tensions over existing core issues in the Aegean. Issues such as the arming of the Eastern Aegean islands and Greece’s national airspace have led to concrete frictions. In early 2021, consultative talks between the two countries resumed, but they were broken off after only three rounds. Greece’s efforts to persuade the U.S. to take a position against Turkey led to the suspension of all talks, including high-level ones.

However, both countries are aware of the fact that even if bilateral problems cannot be solved, as neighbors, it is necessary to ensure that bilateral relations remain good. Even at the NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, on July 11-12, 2023, President Erdoğan and Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis met and agreed to activate several channels of communication between the two countries and to initiate a High-Level Cooperation Council at the level of heads of state or ministers.

Another positive development is the economic diplomacy initiatives, or “Positive Agenda” meetings, which started in April 2021 with an agreement between Foreign Ministers Çavuşoğlu and Dendias in Ankara. These initiatives made progress after the disasters experienced by both countries and paved the way for new areas of cooperation in the economic context. An important step in this positive process was the visit of Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis to Turkey on September 5, 2023. During the visit, a meeting was held with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara.

Finally, President Erdoğan’s visit to Athens on December 7, 2023 marked the first meeting of the Turkey-Greece High-Level Cooperation Council in almost seven years since its inception in 2010. The fourth meeting of the Turkey-Greece High-Level Cooperation Council was last held in Izmir on March 8, 2016.

During his visit to Athens, President Erdoğan met with Greek President Sakelaropoulou and Prime Minister Mitsotakis. The official statements following the talks indicate that, as expected, mainly Positive Agenda items were discussed and progress was made. At the end of the talks, the “Athens Declaration on Friendly Relations and Good Neighborliness between Turkey and Greece” was issued. Some concrete decisions were also announced within the framework of the understanding stated in the Athens Declaration. Accordingly, the parties agreed to hold “continuous, constructive and meaningful” consultations on the basis of the specified “pillars.”

Another important stated intention was to continue “confidence-building measures,” including military measures, which would contribute to the elimination of unwarranted sources of tension and related risks. The parties undertook to refrain from any declaration, initiative, or action that would undermine this declaration or jeopardize the maintenance of peace and stability in their region.

Aegean Forecasts for 2024

Turkey’s position on sovereignty issues in the Aegean Sea will continue with the same determination. Indicative of this was Foreign Minister Fidan’s statement that Turkey’s rights in the Aegean Sea and the rights of the Turkish Muslim minority in Western Thrace and the Dodecanese Islands will be protected. It is clear from the official statements made before President Erdoğan’s visit to Athens that there was a “sovereignty issues are not up for discussion” approach on the Greek side. This essentially meant that the core issues could not be the subject of negotiations.

However, the main objective at this stage will be to maintain the moderate atmosphere in relations and strengthen the positive agenda. As President Erdoğan has stated, Turkey wants to conduct a process in which both sides will win. Although it was stated that the Athens Declaration would not be a binding international agreement for the parties in accordance with international law, the commitment to continue dialogue, good relations, and cooperation was expressed by stating that the letter of the document should not be violated.

There are some important expectations for the next period. The first is that the good atmosphere created between the two countries at the beginning of 2023 will now be transformed into a system of bilateral cooperation, and that the political dialogue and cooperation mechanisms will continue. As stated in the Athens Declaration, the parties are expected to avoid statements and attitudes that would complicate this process, and, even beyond that, to take steps to strengthen the process. The most important aspect of this process is that third parties, such as the U.S. and the EU, should not be allowed to undermine it.

The second expectation is to resume the process of consultative talks in order to resolve the main issues that cause tension between the two countries. The question of when it would be appropriate to start this process can be evaluated separately; however, in order to achieve results, it is important that the process start at a stage that is free from elements that could disrupt or stop it again.

President Erdoğan’s proposal, just before his visit to Athens, that “not only the delimitation of the continental shelf, but all Aegean problems should be taken to the International Court of Justice” is of great importance. This proposal both negates Turkey’s allegations that it “does not abide by the law” and forces Greece to change its “single problem” approach that blocks the solution of the problems. President Erdoğan’s approach is expected to have important repercussions in the context of the solution of fundamental problems in the future.

Recently, Turkey has taken a harsh stance against Israel’s attacks on Gaza, which have been ongoing for the past two months. On the other hand, most EU countries, including Greece, and the U.S. have taken almost the opposite stance and supported Israel, creating an anti-Turkey atmosphere which has the potential to have an impact on Turkey-Greece relations as well.

Meanwhile, Greece’s skeptical and exaggerated “fear of Turkey” persists. Even a routine statement by Foreign Minister Fidan that Turkey’s rights in the Aegean Sea and the rights of the Turkish Muslim minority in Western Thrace and the Dodecanese Islands will be protected was presented as a matter of concern in the Greek press. In the coming period, such situations threaten to have a negative impact on bilateral relations, which have been progressing with a positive agenda.

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ussia’s relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) reveal a multifaceted and increasingly strategic nature as recently witnessed by the visits of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Discussions on issues such as the Russia-Ukraine war, Israeli attacks on Gaza, and OPEC+ point to a deepening engagement beyond traditional energy cooperation.

President Putin visited the UAE and Saudi Arabia on December 6. The visits were notable as they were among the rare visits made by the Russian president after the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for him. As a result of the arrest warrant, for example, Putin did not attend the recent BRICS summit in South Africa or the G20 summit in India.

While Putin’s visit to the Gulf is critical in many respects, it is also fundamentally related to the structure of Russia-Gulf relations after the Russia-Ukraine war that began in February 2022. The visits to the UAE and Saudi Arabia focused on the Russia-Ukraine war, Israel’s attacks on Gaza, OPEC+ energy issues, and the Yemen issue.

Analysis of conjunctional developments on the Russia-Gulf line

With the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war, the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, showed a neutral foreign policy tendency. In essence, the Gulf countries’ refusal to participate in the sanctions against Russia imposed by Western countries—led by the United States—was similar to the foreign policy trends before the Russia-Ukraine war.

The Gulf states were already having problems in their relations with the U.S. because of its rhetoric and actions about withdrawing from the region; however, after the Taliban took power in Afghanistan, relations entered a crisis of confidence. In addition, the U.S., which has problems with Saudi Arabia over, among others, the Biden-Muhammad bin Salman tension and oil production policy, has also experienced tensions in its relations with the UAE over issues such as Russia-UAE relations and the UAE’s relations with the Assad government in Syria.

In fact, the Gulf countries, which have intensified their search for both regional and international partnerships, did not participate in the sanctions against Russia imposed by Western countries. At the same time, within the framework of this search for partnership, normalization processes with Israel, Iran, and Turkey have been carried out since 2020, albeit at different levels. The depth of the Gulf states’ positions on the Russia-Ukraine war, in fact, can be attributed to signs of a multipolar world order prevailing among them.

The Gulf views Russia as an alternative power in a multipolar world order and a critical actor in terms of energy policy, strategic partnerships, and regional security concerns. The decline in global demand for oil and natural gas derivatives from 2019 onwards, in the context of pandemic measures and the transition to renewable energy projects, was the point at which Russia and the Gulf countries sought a common solution. At a time when the discourse on reducing the use of fossil fuels was one of the most important dimensions of the fight against global climate change, the loss of global oil and gas supplies made Russia and the Gulf countries strategic energy actors once again.

The sanctions imposed by Western countries on Russia’s oil and gas exports as of February 2022 enabled Russia and the Gulf countries to effectively use the OPEC+ platform in global international relations. Despite serious criticism and sometimes veiled threats from the U.S., since 2019, the largest producers, Russia and Saudi Arabia, have taken decisions to reduce oil production within OPEC+ several times, and price stability in the oil market has been achieved.

At the same time, Russian oligarchs are protecting their financial resources mainly in Middle Eastern countries and, in particular, in places like the Emirate of Dubai, and  do not want to lose them due to the pursuit of sanctions by Western regimes. According to 2022 data, Russian citizens came first in the purchase of houses in Dubai, leaving behind British and Indian citizens—a sign that explains Russia’s strategic relations with the Gulf countries.

Background of the strategic security and defense partnerships

Russia’s relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates date back beyond recent years, when signs of a multipolar world order were seen, and the Russia-Ukraine war. It should be remembered that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been developing military, defense, and security cooperation with Russia since the 2010s. Saudi Arabia’s purchase of the S-400 air defense system, Kornet-EM anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) systems, and other specific military equipment from Russia was on the agenda. The two countries also signed a military cooperation agreement in August 2021. At the time, the move by Saudi Arabia was interpreted as a strategy to build relationships with influential international actors and achieve relative autonomy through partnerships, rather than relying solely on the United States in security and defense policy.

Like Saudi Arabia, the UAE has long been engaged in military, defense, and security partnership cooperation with Russia. So much so that Russia is known to be negotiating with the UAE and India on the joint production of the fifth-generation SU-57 fighter jet. At the same time, defense and security cooperation between Russia and the UAE has manifested itself in Russia’s interventions in Syria and Libya since 2015, while the UAE has sought to harmonize its strategy and power with Russia’s strategy in both regions. In addition, the two countries seem to be pursuing a joint strategy in South Yemen. Also, between 2009 and 2013, Russia supplied the UAE with Pantsir-S air defense systems, which were subsequently reformed.

For many years, Russian companies have been able to present their current products at international exhibitions held in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the UAE. Such platforms can be used to broker contracts for the supply of military equipment. All in all, it should be noted that the UAE’s defense/security partnership with Russia is a strategic diversification choice rather than a conjunctional necessity.

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taly’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni hosted African leaders in Rome on Monday to unveil her long-anticipated development plan for Africa, known as the Mattei Plan. This initiative, aimed at reshaping Italy’s relations with African nations, comes at a crucial time when global powers are intensifying their presence on the African continent.

Prime Minister Meloni, known for her far-right stance on migration, introduced the Mattei Plan, a strategic vision inspired by Enrico Mattei, founder of Italy’s state-owned energy giant Eni. The plan positions Italy as a pivotal bridge between Africa and Europe, proposing a unique approach – swapping energy investments for efforts by African nations to curb migration, particularly across the Mediterranean Sea.

The Mattei Plan, initially funded at €5.5 billion ($5.9 billion), includes investments in various sectors such as energy, agriculture, water, health, and education. Meloni envisions Italy becoming a central energy gateway, aligning with European countries’ goals to reduce dependence on Russian gas.

Global context and critics’ concerns

This ambitious plan unfolds against the backdrop of Italy’s heightened interest in Africa and its G7 presidency in 2024. However, critics argue that Italy, burdened by substantial debt, may struggle to compete with other global players like China, Russia, and Gulf states, all vying for influence in Africa. Some detractors also highlight the plan’s emphasis on fossil fuels, calling for a more substantial focus on renewable energy to address the urgent needs of over 40% of Africans lacking energy access.

As Italy engages with Africa, the Mattei Plan intersects with broader foreign policy objectives. It follows Prime Minister Meloni’s recent visit to Turkey, where she aimed to strengthen ties with key nations. Italy seeks to expand trade and defense deals while addressing migration challenges collaboratively, notably with Libya.

The summit, titled “A bridge for common growth,” witnessed representatives from more than 25 countries, including European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and officials from UN agencies and the World Bank. Meloni hailed the summit as successful, emphasizing the potential for cooperation, particularly in the energy sector.

However, discord emerged during the summit, with Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairman of the African Union Commission, expressing the desire for prior African consultation on priorities. He stressed the need to move from promises to concrete actions, urging participants to honor commitments.

Italy’s geostrategic focus and global competitions

Italy’s strategic focus on Africa aligns with a global trend where major powers are expanding their influence on the continent. While Italy aims to position itself as a key player, it faces stiff competition from other nations actively engaging with Africa, including China, Russia, India, Japan, and Turkey.

The Mattei Plan involves pilot projects addressing issues at the root of migration, such as modernizing grain production in Egypt, purifying water in Ethiopia, and providing renewable energy training in Morocco. The success of these initiatives will depend on effective collaboration, addressing concerns of African nations, and navigating the complexities of international partnerships in a highly competitive global context.

Italy’s diplomatic initiatives under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni mark a significant shift in strategy, positioning the country as a key actor on the global stage. As the Mattei Plan unfolds, its repercussions are poised to reverberate throughout the African continent and European geopolitics in the coming years. Italy’s diplomatic ambitions, encompassing both Africa and Turkey, indicate a calculated effort to carve out a unique and influential role in the ever-evolving landscape of international relations.

India and Italy

In a poignant reflection on the robust relationship between Italy and India, Italian Ambassador Vincenzo De Luca highlights the strides made in bilateral ties throughout 2023. With Italy poised to assume the G7 presidency in 2024, the Ambassador acknowledges India’s exemplary role in addressing global concerns and underscores the mutual commitment of both nations to building a stable and interconnected world.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s visit to India in March 2023 marked a watershed moment in bilateral relations. The meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi set the stage for a new era of collaboration, emphasizing key areas such as defense, space, connectivity, and energy transition. A joint statement emerged, providing a robust framework for future cooperation.

The diplomatic momentum continued with PM Meloni’s visit to India for the G20 summit in September. This engagement facilitated high-level talks, involving Deputy PM and Foreign Affairs Minister Antonio Tajani, Defense Minister Rajnath Singh, and Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal from Italy, along with India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar and Defense Minister Rajnath Singh. These interactions solidified the foundation for a multifaceted partnership.

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n April 2023, war broke out in Sudan between the Sudanese National Army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), killing thousands and displacing millions. As the fighting has spread, many now fear that the entire country could be plunged into a full-blown war.

This war has its investors and beneficiaries; for years, the UAE has pursued its narrow interests by providing the RSF with a lifeline of money and weapons to carry out its genocide in Darfur. It’s time for the world to put pressure on the UAE to stop perpetuating this vicious cycle of violence.

The RSF was primarily created in 2013 by restructuring the notorious Janjaweed militia to support the central government’s counterinsurgency operations in Darfur and South Kordofan. In 2017, the Sudanese parliament passed a law legitimizing its activities, even though the militia has reportedly committed countless crimes and atrocities, including the destruction of villages, the killing of protesters, sexual assault and rape, and the unlawful detention of activists.

The UAE’s support for the militia comes in various forms, from direct funding to logistics and military equipment. In December 2019, an investigative report revealed that the militia received vehicles from the UAE that could be easily modified and equipped with machine guns. The report also revealed how UAE-based front companies, such as Tradive, were used to channel the funds to the militia.

Escalated military support

During the ongoing war, and in flagrant violation of the UN arms embargo resolution, the UAE escalated its military support to the militias through Chad, where, under the guise of a humanitarian operation, it established an airport and a hospital to transfer weapons and ammunition to the militias and to treat militia fighters. The national army reportedly destroyed a UAE military shipment to the militia in Nyala, South Darfur.

According to military sources, the shipment included drones, ammunition, advanced rocket launchers, and sophisticated communications systems. At the beginning of the war, the RSF militia received military aid from the Wagner Group through the al-Khadim airbase in eastern Libya, which was controlled by General Haftar, the notorious UAE-backed warlord. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, the Wagner Group also supplied the RSF with surface-to-air missiles.

The UAE is also the hub for the RSF militia’s social media team, which the militia brothers run to disinform the world about their ongoing genocides and violations. Previously, an investigative report revealed that a Dubai-based private equity firm was helping the militia lobby British parliamentarians and influence their opinions about the RSF militia’s crimes in the ongoing war.

The UAE support extends to diplomatic and political support for the militia. For example, the UAE has so far failed to cooperate and implement the sanctions imposed by the U.S. on the companies and leaders of the RSF militia. The UAE is also a safe haven for the militias’ leader. Recently, Dagalo made his first appearance since the outbreak of the war; flight records show that he arrived in Addis Ababa on a royal jet that had flown from Abu Dhabi to Uganda’s Entebbe International Airport.

Why does the UAE support the RSF?

In fact, there are several reasons for the UAE to invest heavily in the RSF militia. In recent years, the UAE has begun working on agricultural projects and signed a $6 billion contract to build a Red Sea port. In April 2020, the UAE hired a firm to lobby the military council, of which the militia was then a core part, to take control of the PortSudan Facility, the country’s most important facility.

Assuming the militia emerges victorious in this war, the UAE will have a strong ally to complete these plans and further its political agenda. In this scenario, the UAE will import more raw gold from Sudan to the UAE. The UAE will also find it easier to resume its shadowy recruitment of Sudanese and send them as soldiers to fight in Libya. Thus, it could be argued that the UAE is not interested in seeing any democratic experiment in the Middle East region that might influence the regime dissidents at home.

This military support provided the militias with the necessary tools to commit countless crimes, such as attacking hospitals, churches, and media facilities, and setting up markets to sell women as slaves. In the city of Wad Madani, the militias engaged in large-scale looting of homes and markets, as well as the UN World Food Programme’s warehouses, which provide life-saving food and nutrition to 20,000 children and pregnant and lactating women. In addition, tens of thousands were forced to leave the city to escape this hell—their flight, however, was prevented by the militia. In a serious development, the militia offered to protect villages in exchange for youth joining their ranks.

Impact on the Darfur region

The UAE’s support for militias has had a more significant and devastating impact in the Darfur region, where the militias have committed several acts of genocide and ethnic cleansing. Armed citizens descended from African tribes, particularly the Masalit, were raped and buried in mass graves in Ardamata and El Geneina. Independent reports have documented that the RSF militias and the Arab militias they supported humiliated their victims and called them slaves as they chased from street to street. In some cases, RSF militiamen recorded innocent civilians as they were being executed. In other areas of Darfur, refugee camps have been besieged, killing and injuring thousands.

The UAE’s irresponsible intervention also caused diplomatic tensions in the region and threatened to exacerbate the situation in Darfur. In December 2023, after being publicly accused by a Sudanese official of facilitating arms transfers to the RSF militia, the Chadian government declared four Sudanese diplomats personae non gratae. In return, the Sudanese government announced that it would take reciprocal measures soon thereafter. Chad initially decided not to intervene directly, and later reversed this decision after the UAE signed several agreements and memorandums promising to help Chad with some energy projects.

By fueling the war in Sudan through its RSF alliance, the UAE insidiously risks threatening the entire Sudanese social fabric and deepening the divisions between tribal and ethnic groups. It can’t be overlooked that the tribes and local communities from which most of the militias come will be targeted and discriminated against in postwar Sudan.

So far, many voices have condemned this military support. For example, a group of Democratic members of the U.S. Congress sent a letter to the UAE Foreign Minister expressing their concern about the continued funding of the militias. The move was welcomed by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee. In addition, scholars, human rights advocates, and a leading expert on Sudan, international law, and the prevention of atrocities issued a statement calling for an end to all sources of UAE funding for the militias. Meanwhile, Sudanese around the world have taken to the streets and launched social media campaigns demanding an end to this military support.

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hree months have passed since the genocide launched by Israel against civilians in Gaza on October 7, 2023. According to the latest figures announced by the Palestinian Ministry of Health on January 7, 2024, 22,835 Palestinians have lost their lives in the past three months, 70% of them women and children. In other words, 7 in every10 people killed by Israel so far are either women or children.

Israel, one of the most important perpetrators of the continuous chaos in world politics for the last 75 years, aims to destroy all of Palestine under the so-called fight against terrorism. In this context, with the help of its collaborators, it is hiding under the mask of “the right to self-defence” to legitimize its ongoing genocide.

Who has the responsibility to fight against Israel which is committing a clear genocide? The answer is simple. This responsibility belongs to everyone except Israel. In other words, the international community, global actors, and regional powers bear this responsibility. However, why do they all avoid taking the responsibility? The answer to this is simple again. Everyone avoids taking responsibility or tries to avoid doing so by assigning it to others. The concept of buck-passing, which has long been included in International Relations dictionaries, offers us an explanatory perspective.

To understand this concept, it is helpful to look at its dictionary definitions. For example, the definition in the Oxford Dictionary of Politics and International Relations is as follows: “Buck-passing is the unwillingness or failure to accept responsibility for the consequences of a policy decision and blame another person or institution instead.” Cambridge Dictionary defines it as “to blame someone or make them responsible for a problem that you should deal with.”

We can briefly define the concept as not taking responsibility for the solution of an issue, assigning the responsibility to someone else, or deferring the responsibility. The action of passing the buck can be expressed verbally or implicitly by remaining silent; in any case, the issue or issues remain unresolved because everyone avoids taking responsibility.

In international politics, the term “buck-passing” is essentially used to describe the strategy of states to avoid taking responsibility for stopping another state that has an aggressive attitude or preventing an approaching threat, and to shift this critical responsibility onto other states. In this respect, buck-passing is primarily related to interstate relations. However, when we take a broader approach, we can also use the concept when states or the international community are reluctant to end a crisis or refrain from taking initiative on such an issue. Buck-passing is the perfect way to describe the fact that the international community, global actors, and regional powers are unwilling to stop Israel’s massacres in Gaza and constantly shift the responsibility for this issue to others.

Global powers are among the actors that have to put a stop to the massacres that Israel has committed not only in Gaza, but also all across Palestine. The most important such powers are undoubtedly the U.S., Russia, China, France, and the UK, which have veto power in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). UNSC members Russia and China do not take any responsibility for stopping Israel’s genocide in Gaza, just as they do not take responsibility for issues that do not directly concern them.

The United States, the dominant power of the current international system, is Israel’s protector in every matter; far from reacting to the genocide in Gaza, it supports Israel to the end. Thus, instead of taking responsibility for the fight against Israel, the U.S. prevents others from taking this responsibility by using its veto power in the UNSC. France, on the other hand, is a very “experienced” country in this regard, as it is a state with a record of genocide. For this reason, France defends the lie that “Israel has the right to protect itself” and supports Israel’s genocide in Gaza. In fact, France does not even see a situation that requires taking responsibility.

Regional actors are no different from global powers. The book Palestinian Policies of Regional Actors (İdeal Kültür Yayıncılık: 2023), which we recently compiled and published in English and Turkish, offers satisfactory content on this subject. The question of how the countries in the region cannot stop Israeli oppression, even though almost all of them consist of Muslim-dominated societies, led us to prepare this book.

A very understandable conclusion emerges from the book, which thoroughly analyzes the policies followed by countries in the region from Algeria to Iran, Iraq to Libya, and the Gulf to Turkey. Regional countries are not willing to fight against Israel because almost all of them approach the issue from the perspective of interests. A limited number of countries, such as Turkey, approach the issue from a humanitarian perspective and take various initiatives to resist this oppression. However, at the end of the day, they remain helpless because the solution to the issue is physical/military power; taking responsibility, does not have much practical value.

The international community also remains silent in the face of Israel’s oppression. For example, the UN, which claims to protect world peace, is literally turning a blind eye when it comes to Israel’s genocide in Gaza. What is more, the U.S., one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, is an unconditional supporter of Israel and prevents the council from making any decisions against Israel. For this reason, the UN cannot take any responsibility to stop the genocide in Gaza.

The European Union (EU), which set out to build permanent peace in Europe, is in a similar situation. The EU and its members, which try to teach the world a lesson about human rights at every opportunity, ignore Israel’s human rights violations in Gaza. Both the EU administration and its member states refrain from taking responsibility by resorting to the fallacy that Israel has the right to defend itself against Hamas. The clearest statement on this issue was made by EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell when he said, “The EU does not have the capacity to solve this problem. The only actor that can do this is the U.S.” Thus, Borrell, on behalf of the EU, passes the buck to the United States.

To sum up, everyone and every state undoubtedly has a responsibility to stop Israeli oppression. However, except for a limited number of countries, including Turkey, no one wants to take responsibility on this issue, or they constantly shift the responsibility to others. Unfortunately, every day, Palestinians are more and more oppressed under Israel’s apartheid state. Nevertheless, with the belief that this oppression will surely end one day, when that time comes, history will judge those who turned a blind eye to Israel’s genocide.

B

eijing was instrumental in the resumption of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, hosting Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. However, despite this intense activity and the cracks in the geopolitical fault lines, there is no initiative on the horizon that will embrace the Palestinian people as the Soviet Union did during the First Cold War—a move that also served as a nuclear deterrence.

“‘Why do you want to make war against the whole world, or at least against the United States?’ you asked. No one in our country, neither workers, nor peasants, nor writers, nor doctors, nor adults, nor children, nor members of the government, wants war, big or small.

We want peace. There are other things we are interested in: planting wheat, building our country, making new inventions, writing books and going into space. We want peace for ourselves and for everyone on the planet. For our children and for you, Samantha.”

This was Yuri Andropov’s response to 10-year-old Samantha Smith who wrote to him from the U.S. state of Maine after his appointment as general secretary of the Soviet Union’s Central Committee of the Communist Party in November 1982, having served before that as chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB) for 15 years.

Although the First Cold War poisoned the relations between the Arab nationalist regimes, supported by the USSR, and the Gulf dynasties, supported by the U.S. and Britain, in the Arab and Islamic geography, the bipolar world order and the existence of the USSR were crucial for the balances in the Middle East. Today, the unlimited support of the G7 countries is the main source of motivation for Israel’s ruthless genocide against Gaza, and the international community suffers from the fact that there is no deterrent and balancing force against this support. The fact that more than 5,000 Palestinian children who lost their lives in the first 45 days of the Israeli attack did not have a leader like Andropov to address a letter towards like Samantha has become one of the sources of the current geopolitical problems.

Moscow’s deterrence protected Palestine

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Moscow’s abandonment of its spheres of influence in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East upset an already precarious balance. On the principle that nature does not accept a vacuum, while the U.S. and Western European states were re-entering these areas with colonial practices dating back to the 18th century, the People’s Republic of China was also entering the game. Russia made belated attempts to return to its former spheres of influence in the following years with instruments such as the private military company Wagner Group and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The revelation of the inadequacy of Russia’s conventional military power set off a domino effect, and a new movement to abandon Russian hegemony in Central Asia and the Caucasus has begun. In the Middle East, the efforts of countries, especially Saudi Arabia, to balance U.S. hegemony and diversify their economic activities have come to the fore. The People’s Republic of China has moved into the space vacated by Russia in order to secure trade routes to European ports with energy resources in the Middle East.

The Beijing government, which was instrumental in the resumption of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, hosted Mahmoud Abbas in June and Bashar al-Assad in September. But despite this flurry of activity and the fracturing of geopolitical fault lines, there is no initiative on the horizon that will embrace the Palestinian people and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) like the Soviet Union did in the First Cold War.

The USSR’s leading role in every crisis in the Middle East

After the “Iranian crisis” of 1946, which sounded the first alarm bells of the First Cold War, the Soviet Union never shied away from taking part, and even playing a leading role, in every major development in the Middle East. During the Suez Crisis of 1956, the French-British-Israeli attack on the Suez Canal which had been nationalized by Egyptian President Nasser, and Israel’s plan to seize the Sinai Peninsula and the Straits of Tiran were thwarted by the USSR’s nuclear deterrence. Although the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the 1970 Jordanian crisis, and the 1973 Arab-Israeli war resulted in the defeat of Moscow’s allies, the map of the Middle East would have been very different from what it is today without the USSR’s nuclear deterrence in its final phase. The parties involved in these wars against Israel could have been wiped off the map at a very early stage.

Moscow’s defense in the Eastern Mediterranean

In the immediate aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis in the early 1960s, the Soviet Union realized that the Arab-Israeli conflict posed a direct threat to its security in the Eastern Mediterranean, as the U.S. Navy rushed to the region to intervene. Having withdrawn its Jupiter missiles from Turkey in 1963 following the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the U.S. was transferring its new weapon to the region. When submarine USS Sam Houston (SSBN-609) entered the port of Izmir on April 14, 1963, carrying a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile, alarm bells went off in the Kremlin. The missiles on this submarine were capable of hitting all strategic targets in the west of the USSR, especially Moscow, from the Eastern Mediterranean at a range of 2,800 kilometers.

Thus, the Soviet Union established the “Fifth Operational Fleet” against the U.S.-NATO threat in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Soviet Navy was now ready to play hide-and-seek in the region with its U.S. counterpart, which it did in the 1967 and 1973 wars. The Soviets naturally positioned themselves against Israel on the Palestine issue in order to be able to use the Egyptian port of Alexandria and the Syrian ports. The departure of the Soviet Union in 1991 did not only change the military balance in Europe: the castles that had been built with the diplomatic and defense support of the Soviets began to collapse.

The end of the First Cold War and pro-Palestine leaders

First, we had the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, then Palestinian President Yasser Arafat’s placement under Israeli siege and subsequent death, then the civil war in Libya. The Assad regime in Syria was on the verge of collapse in 2014, but managed to survive, at least for the time being, with the support of Russia, which has radically changed the balance in the Syrian civil war. But, Russia cannot remove its navy from the Black Sea because of its war with Ukraine, and it cannot move its Baltic, North Sea, and Pacific fleets to the Mediterranean because of developments in these regions, and is, therefore, far from protecting the Palestinian people to the extent that it did in the past. Nor does Russia have an effective state-level ally in the region.

While it is trying to hold on to eastern Libya through General Haftar, the Assad government it supports in Syria has no influence beyond Damascus and the Mediterranean coast. Under these circumstances, the best Russia could do was, on October 18, 2023, bring up the threat of hypersonic missiles—a field where it is somewhat ahead of the U.S.—against the U.S. Navy in the Eastern Mediterranean.

“This is not a threat. In accordance with my instructions, the Russian Aerospace Forces will begin permanent patrols in the international airspace of the Black Sea. And this mission will be carried out by MiG-31 fighter jets equipped with Kinzhal missiles. I must emphasize that this is not a threat. But we will also monitor what is happening in the Mediterranean with our weapons systems.”

Although the Russian president began his sentence by emphasizing that this was not a threat, the international community calculated the content of the message and the points it could reach. In the following days, on October 18, Russia added further steps to this deterrence discourse indicating that it would further increase its nuclear weapons capacity and deterrence. So, is it possible that this superpower, which has obviously stumbled, can offer the same level of protection to the Palestinian people now as it did in the past?

T

he Israeli-Palestinian conflict has polarized Africa. The earlier reflection of this was seen in Israel’s attempt to join the African Union. It has become clear that African countries that have cordial relations with Western countries side with Israel on Gaza. The Middle East and Gaza in particular has divided African nations one more time.

The Palestinian cause, whose origin dates back to 1917, remains important in the global system today. Israel’s occupation of Palestine, which began in 1948, is important not only for the Middle East, but also for countries struggling against colonialism, such as numerous countries in Africa. Israel’s inhumane practices in Palestine, i.e., apartheid, displacement, injustice, and disregard for human rights, are practices that African countries have also been subjected to and have similar intersections with many of the practices of colonial forces in Africa in the past, such as capitalism and dispossession.

Israel’s occupation of Palestine based on strategies similar to those that underpinned colonialism and apartheid in Africa has survived despite 75 years of criticism and reactions. In fact, Israel’s unfair land acquisition/usurpation of Palestinian lands, the blockade in Gaza, the apartheid wall in the West Bank, the failure to treat the real owners of the land as human beings, its discriminatory policies, and practices in place stopping the Palestinian people from practicing their culture and beliefs as they wish are all part of Africa’s dark legacy. It all feels like a familiar memory. These difficulties are an important factor in the Palestinian people empathizing with the injuries and inequalities experienced during the colonial period, on the one side, and in the peoples of Africa supporting the Palestinians’ struggle for freedom, on the other.

This intersectionality is emphasized in the statement by Nelson Mandela, the former president of South Africa, who said, “Our freedom will be incomplete without the freedom of the Palestinian people.” The fact that South Africa’s support for Palestine has attracted the most attention in Africa is a reflection of a sensitivity towards the apartheid system. While this is an example of solidarity extending from one continent to another, it is also a strong message that emphasizes support for societies that share similar difficulties, evils, and injustices.

The African Union’s position

Africa’s solidarity with Palestine is based on Palestine’s solidarity with Africa. Historically, the Palestinians see their struggle for liberation in the context of the struggles of most African countries against Western colonialism. Resolution 77 (XII) adopted by the African Union in 1975 states, “The racist regime in occupied Palestine and the racist regimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa have common imperialist origins, form a whole and have the same racist structure and policies aimed at the suppression of human dignity and integrity.”

The African Union has taken decisions on Palestine that are fundamentally supportive of its independence and sovereignty, and aim at ensuring a just and lasting peace between the two countries. The African Union supports the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian question, and takes the position that the capital of the Palestinian state will be East Jerusalem. However, not all members of the African Union, which has 55 members in total, have the same opinion, and each country takes a position within the framework of different national interests. For example, countries such as Ghana, Kenya, and Rwanda support Israel and condemn Hamas.

Competition and new opportunities for cooperation on the African continent are leading some countries to move away from the united stance of the past and towards pragmatic relations. In this context, Israel’s initiative to become an observer member of the African Union in 2021 was viewed by the African Union Commission as controversial. However, following this decision, several countries such as South Africa, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Namibia, Botswana, Comoros, Tunisia, Djibouti, and Mauritania announced their opposition to the decision.

The African Union responded to the ongoing conflict between Hamas and Israel with a statement issued through the African Union Commission calling for an end to the attacks and encouraging the parties to negotiate a two-state agreement as the only solution to the conflict.

Forty-six of the 55 African Union member states have established diplomatic, economic, and development cooperation with Israel. This cooperation has not, however

Division in Africa after October 7

The conflict between Hamas and Israel which began on October 7, 2023 has revealed divisions in public opinion in Africa and world. While some states claim that Israel has the right to defend itself against Hamas’s attacks, others stress that Israel continues to occupy Palestine and separate the Palestinian people living in Gaza and the West Bank, viewing Hamas’s attacks on Israel as justified.

In the face of Israel’s massacres in Gaza, some African countries abstained from voting for a ceasefire at the UN General Assembly, namely Tunisia, Gabon, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Zambia. Countries such as Kenya and Rwanda are among those supporting Israel. While Rwanda issued a statement “expressing its deepest condolences and sympathy to the government and people of Israel following the attacks on Israeli territory,” Kenya’s foreign minister also condemned the attack in Israel and said he was “saddened by the tragedy.”

Meanwhile, Israel’s interest in African countries has increased in recent years. As diplomatic relations have grown, so has cooperation in areas such as defense and security, counterterrorism, intelligence, and border control. In addition, arms transfers between African countries and Israel have reached a remarkable level. In fact, over the past decade, various arms transfers have taken place between Israel and countries such as Senegal, Morocco, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles, Uganda, and Zambia. In fact, the silence of some African countries on Israel’s genocide and massacres in Gaza is due to their dependence on the West and Israel in political, economic, and security terms.

Determined support for Palestine in Africa

According to research by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), Israel’s military operations against Gaza have sparked a wave of protests and rallies around the world. Protests over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which account for 38% of global demonstrations, are estimated at 4,200 in total. More than 3,700 of these demonstrations were pro-Palestinian and more than 520 pro-Israeli. Morocco is the country with the most pro-Palestinian protests (267 protests in total) despite its government remaining close to Israel.

There are also countries on the continent that are reacting against Israel’s bloody policy, massacres, and genocide in Gaza. Countries such as South Africa, Nigeria, Chad, and Algeria have taken actions that go beyond expressing support for Palestine. For example, while the Nigerian Senate called for a ceasefire and the start of negotiations for a two-state solution, South Africa called for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza. South Africa went a step further and issued statements accusing Israel of genocide and war crimes. Chad also supported South Africa, which recalled its diplomats from Israel and withdrew its ambassador from Tel Aviv.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has polarized Africa. An earlier reflection of this polarization was seen in Israel’s attempt to join the African Union. African countries that have friendly relations with Western countries side with Israel on the Palestinian issue. However, the people of these countries, who have experienced pain similar to that of Palestine in the past, do not always agree with their governments. The structure of the international system is reflected in today’s relations between states and the countries with which they are heavily interdependent. Areas of economic cooperation are undoubtedly reflected in global politics, and Africa’s positions and reactions on the Palestinian issue should be read in this context.

However, the African people, who have brutally experienced firsthand mankind’s disregard for human life, stand by the Palestinian people, regardless of their rulers and policies that support Israel against Palestine. Africans’ principled stances and the positions of the governments that govern them are not aligned. All in all, Africa’s position on the Palestinian issue is weakening the continent’s standing with divisions between governments and societies, and between countries supporting Palestine and those supporting Israel.

T

he “Jewish problem,” which the Western world defined as such and has made efforts to resolve up to a century ago, was thrown into the Islamic world as a bomb with a Zionist-Evangelical alliance. Due to the chaos caused by World War I in the Islamic world and the instability that emerged after the Ottoman Empire was forced to withdraw from the Arab world, Jewish invaders, who were encouraged by the West to migrate by force, began to settle in Palestine under the auspices of Britain. The Palestinian territories and the geography of Jerusalem were occupied over time as a result of raids on villages and towns by Jewish terrorist organizations, and this de facto situation gave birth to “Israel” in 1948.

The “Jewish problem” of the Western world became the “Israel problem” of the Islamic world, and Palestine turned into an all-out cause. On its 75th anniversary, this occupying power, which still acts with the reflex of an organization and tries to destabilize the region and feed on the violence and chaos it causes, has been condemned and isolated by the world’s collective conscience following the recent massacres it has perpetrated. Palestinians, on the other hand, have succeeded in turning their cause into humanity’s common cause by passing the flag of resistance against this century-old policy of occupation, plunder, and usurpation from generation to generation. In the face of the disproportionate attacks and massacres they suffered after the raid on the occupation outpost in the Gaza envelope on October 7, 2023, the Palestinians have given their struggle for freedom a global dimension.

Operation Al-Aqsa Flood started as a reaction to the silent death of Gaza for the last two decades, but has also led to regional mobilization and change. Faced with the threat of expulsion from their land, the Palestinians did not leave their homeland in the face of the bombardment, exposing the “de-Palestinization of Palestine” project that has been talked about in the occupation circles for decades. In fact, this plan is a continuation of the policy of occupying the land and expelling its inhabitants, which has been practiced since 1948.

Today, 70% of Gaza’s population is made up of Palestinians who have been expelled from their land over the last 75 years; in other words, people who have been forced to become refugees in their own homeland. The people of Gaza, who have been subjected to ethnic cleansing by Israel for its own survival and to obtain a Jewish-majority territorial integrity, did not leave their land of refuge, this time at the risk of death.

The Abraham Accords (Safqat al-Qarn/The “Deal of the Century”) 

With the Arab revolutions that started in Tunisia in 2011 and spread across the Arab world, particularly in Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, the Palestinian issue took a back seat. Peaceful street demonstrations, which started with demands for freedom, justice, and dignity, eventually turned into civil wars in some countries, and nearly ten times the number of people who were massacred in the Palestinian territories over the course of the century lost their lives. In short, Baghdad, Damascus, Aleppo, and Yemen cannot be compared to any Palestinian city in terms of humanitarian catastrophe.

One of the two axes that emerged with the Arab revolutions was in favor of maintaining the status quo, and Israel cooperated with this axis and increased its pressure on Palestine. However, since it perceived the mass demands for change and transformation in the region as a long-term threat, it pursued a policy of rapid normalization with the Arab regimes in the region. Some Gulf monarchies, perceiving the demands emerging with the Arab revolutions as a threat, accelerated their normalization policy by aligning with Israel. The Abraham Accords, announced by then U.S. president Donald Trump at a ceremony attended by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Jordan and Egypt, were proclaimed to be the “Peace of the Century.”

In fact, the accords were an acknowledgment that Israel was a source of regional unrest and in perpetual violation of regional peace. These initiatives, which it should be noted did not involve Palestinian actors, envisaged numerous economic, political, and cultural activities, such as the flooding of economic aid to the region; support for the governments of Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt; the establishment of investment zones in Sinai where Gazans would work; and the construction of a high-speed railway between Gaza and the West Bank. As part of these cultural activities, a Jewish group organized joint events with certain Gulf countries which expressed the universal peace messages of the three Abrahamic religions.

A Medinan farmer invited a British Jewish family to his date palm orchard in Medina and planted a symbolic date palm sapling, which was reported in the news as “the first time in 1,400 years that a Jew has been in Medina.” Although the main purpose of this agreement was to approve Israel’s occupation policies and normalize relations with the countries in the region, the Palestinians, i.e., the real victims, were completely ignored. These attempts to determine the fate of Palestine by excluding the Palestinians seem to have failed with Al-Aqsa Flood, as the massacres that started afterwards unsettled Arab countries involved in this initiative.

The Jewish “Israel Question” 

Since its inception, Israel has been trying to survive with financial support by claiming that it is the state for all the world’s Jews in accordance with its founding philosophy, the Zionist ideology. While Israel settled the world’s Jews in the “Jewish ghettos” it systematically established in the occupied Palestinian territories, it promised them a trouble-free, secure life. With Al-Aqsa Flood, this Israeli firewall collapsed, and all Jews were affected by the conflict and became victims of the atmosphere of violence produced by their own state.

After the 1973 defeat, Israel’s Jewish citizens were traumatized, and the security they had been promised and felt confidence in became a moot point as they began to feel the same fear and anxiety that Palestinians had been experiencing from the very beginning. The questioning of Israel’s aggressive policies, which are a product of radical Zionism and Christian Evangelicalism, continues at an accelerated pace and Jews outside Israel are uneasy about these developments. In addition, since the beginning of the Gaza massacres, Western leaders known for their Christian or Evangelical identities, have traveled to Tel Aviv to support war criminals there, which has drawn the reaction of people across the world.

Israel’s disproportionate use of force in its attacks on Gaza, raining bombs on hospitals, educational institutions, and shrines, and massacring innocent civilians, mostly children and women, have left a mark on the world’s collective conscience. The protests against Israel, which started in Europe, the United States, and other countries, grew in numbers and turned into anti-Zionism. Especially the demonstrations in European countries, where criticism of Israel and Zionism is viewed under the shadow of anti-Semitism, have revealed that being against Israeli policies is not anti-Semitic. With the recent massacres in Gaza, the state of Israel has been crushed under the responsibility and privilege of being a state, exposing the fact that 75 years after its establishment, it still has not reached the maturity required to call itself a state in the true sense of the word.

Palestine: A cause of dignity and freedom

The issue of Palestine and Jerusalem, which was overshadowed and forgotten by the Arab revolutions, has come to the forefront once more with the recent massacres in Gaza, and the cause has taken on a global dimension. People of all religions, nationalities, and ideologies have taken to the streets to show that they embrace Palestine as a cause of honor and freedom, regardless of their countries’ regimes. The Palestinian cause has become the youth’s new motto for independence and freedom, and this issue has transcended Arabs and Muslims and has reemerged as the common conscience of all humanity. The people who took to the streets in European and U.S. cities to condemn Israel’s massacres, despite obstacles, are also criticizing the pro-Israeli policies of their own administrations.

For a long time, the U.S. administration has not made any effort for a two-state solution. On the contrary, it has defended Israel’s occupation and supported policies that have led to the gradual erosion of the Palestinian West Bank. Today, more than half of the West Bank territory is controlled by Israel with the support of Jewish donors in the United States. By openly supporting Israel’s massacres, governments in the Western world have provoked the reactions of their own people. In addition, the mainstream media in the Western world has amplified these reactions with its pro-Israeli coverage. Despite all these constraints, the united, common cry by the public, especially in the squares of the Western world, makes the Israeli administration uneasy. At the same time, Palestine’s cause for dignity and freedom can be crowned with permanent solutions only if the political actors within Palestine unite under the Palestinian cause.

After 75 years of systematic occupation and the recent Gaza massacres, Palestinian leaders have reached a new crossroads. The political divisions that took place after Oslo have pushed the Palestinian Authority towards two different axes. The West Bank is dominated by the Fatah movement under Mahmoud Abbas, while the Gaza Strip is under the control of Hamas. As long as the Fatah and Hamas administrations do not act in unison against the Israeli occupation, which is the reason that brought them both into existence, it is not possible to solve the current problems.

This unification does not seem possible without solving the structural problems of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the common umbrella organization of Palestinian political actors. As a matter of fact, this mission was underlined in the Extraordinary Joint Summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Arab League, which came together to condemn the massacres in Gaza and to determine a road map. The resolution issued after the meeting in Riyadh, stated, “We emphasize on that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and call on all Palestinian factions and forces to unite under its umbrella and shoulder their responsibilities under a PLO-led national partnership.”

As a result of the decision taken at the Arab League summit in Cairo in 1964, the PLO was established with the aim of gathering the Palestinian groups on the ground under a single umbrella organization in line with the will of the Arab leaders led by Gamal Abdel Nasser. Due to the conjuncture of the period of its establishment, the PLO had a national socialist and secular character. Under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, the leader of the Fatah movement, the representation of other Palestinian groups was reduced over time.

As of today, the PLO is completely identified with the Fatah movement and other effective groups on the ground are excluded from it. Hamas, whose popular support across Palestine is at least as strong as that of Fatah, is not represented under this umbrella. It is time for the PLO to include all Palestinians so that they could face the unfolding genocide in Gaza and elsewhere targeting their very existence.

W

arfare, including civil wars, counterterrorism, and other conflicts, is a part of daily life around the globe. From the end of the Cold War to the present, not too far in the past, in other words, the world has witnessed many wars and armed conflicts. This includes the war in Bosnia, the civil war in Somalia, the war in Kosovo, the Chechen rebellion, the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, Israel’s attack on Hezbollah, the Arab Spring, and subsequent civil wars like those in Libya, Yemen, and Syria.

Added to these, the massacres of the Rohingya, the terrorist attacks of ISIS, and Russia’s attempt to invade Ukraine followed. In addition, there is the continued occupation of Palestine by Israel, which in the last two months has escalated to genocide in Gaza.

Muslim states or groups make up one or both sides in most wars. At the same time, other Muslims are greatly affected and enraged by the killing, inflicted injury, oppression, and abuse of their fellow Muslims throughout the world. These events have sparked resistance among affected Muslims and the emergence of armed factions, some of which later evolved into terrorist groups such as ISIS. Overall, however, Muslim responses have been and continue to be largely nonviolent.

The intensity of the responses has varied from conflict to conflict. For example, Muslims denounce the invasion of Muslim nations, the persecution of Muslim minorities, and the persecution of Arab authoritarian regimes. But more than any war, tyranny, struggle, or act of brutality of any kind, Israel’s occupation of Palestine has provoked the most anger among Muslim populations.

Given that more people have died in earlier conflicts, many people find the overwhelming support for the Palestinians strange and even incomprehensible. Thus, for instance, Muslims denounced the Assad regime’s killing of 500,000 Syrians, but they still feel Israel’s crimes against Palestinians are incomparable. The U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan angered Muslims, but Palestine remains their top priority.

Non-Muslims in particular seem perplexed by this anger, but they shouldn’t be. It is reasonable to pay more attention to the occupation of Palestine for a series of reasons. First, Israel has been occupying Palestine for 75 years, during which the Palestinian people have been systematically massacred, displaced, imprisoned, and their land stolen.

Palestine is still being annexed today. What is more, thousands of Palestinians are imprisoned by Israel at any given time, and since October 7, 2023, Israel has been carrying out ethnic cleansing and genocide. After the indiscriminate killing of more than 27,000 civilians by the Israeli army, 70% of whom were women and children, including those who died under the rubble, Gaza has been virtually destroyed.

Israel’s horrific actions have led to the denouncement of the genocide in Gaza not only by Muslims but by people of other faiths as well. Given how long Palestine has been persecuted, even if the recent genocide had not occurred, Palestine would still be on the world’s radar. Israel’s persecution is continuous, and when the world begins to lose interest in the Palestinian cause, an Israeli attack or a decision to build more illegal settlements draws people’s attention back again.

Second, Israel is undeniably the offending party and has no justification for occupying and harming Palestinians. Israel is acting illegally and in violation of international law. Not even its supporters, including the U.S., support the occupation. Legally speaking, no one supports Israel’s policy, because it is completely unlawful and immoral; Palestinians, conversely, are universally accepted as the victims of Israeli aggression and supported by both Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

For example, while Muslims were generally opposed to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden’s presence in the country and the Talibans’ self-defined Islamic rule that was seen as overly fanatic, softened Muslims’ reaction to the U.S. invasion. Added to this, while the Americans eventually withdrew from Iraq, Israel seeks to occupy all of Palestine and perhaps its surroundings permanently.

Third, Palestine never had the opportunity to acquire weapons to oppose Israel. The Palestinians were forbidden to arm themselves by both Israel and other international actors. With a better equipped army, Israel has continuously murdered Palestinians in cold blood. As expected, outsiders, especially Muslims, could not resist Israel’s massacring of civilians with advanced weapons.

Fourth, the Zionist movement is using religion it its war against Palestinians. The British offered the Zionists many different places to live, but they insisted on Palestine, saying that the region was the homeland promised to them by God—despite the fact that the majority of Zionists, in fact, were secular.

When the Palestinians did not hand over their land to Jewish migrants, the latter used force to annihilate them. The Muslim community feels obligated to speak out against Israel’s actions because religion is still heavily used by the Zionist movement. In other words, Muslims respond with their religious beliefs because the criminal party, i.e., Israel, invokes Judaism when it kills. Thus, faith-based activities elicit faith-based responses.

I

n a startling revelation, General Yassir al-Atta of Sudan has publicly accused the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of providing support to the controversial Rapid Support Forces (RSF), marking the first official accusation of the UAE’s involvement in Sudan’s intricate war. The conflict has already caused massive displacement and widespread ethnically driven violence, particularly in the Darfur region.

During a speech to the General Intelligence Service, which was later circulated on social media and reported by Reuters, al-Atta claimed that intelligence sources, including military and diplomatic channels, have confirmed the UAE’s logistical backing of the RSF. The RSF, which evolved from the Janjaweed militias, has been a significant force in the government’s efforts to quell rebellions, most notably the crisis in Darfur during the 2000s.

The UAE, when solicited for comments, reiterated its stance advocating for de-escalation and peace talks in Sudan, contrasting with al-Atta’s allegations. Emphasizing its humanitarian role, the UAE pointed to the establishment of a field hospital in Chad to support those affected by the conflict.

Aid to the RSF

General al-Atta also asserted that the UAE had channeled aid to the RSF via other African nations, including Uganda, the Central African Republic, and Chad. This week, aid was reported to have arrived at Ndjamena’s airport in Chad, which had previously seen aid routed through the city of Amdjarass.

In an unexpected turn, al-Atta commended Russia for its action against the Wagner Group, a paramilitary organization allegedly involved in supporting the RSF. The RSF has refuted any connections with Wagner Group.

The RSF has recently gained a strategic advantage in the conflict, seizing several states within the Darfur region and accumulating advanced military equipment, including drones and artillery. This has led to increased scrutiny of the origins of such weaponry, with some claiming it was captured from military bases.

Mixed responses

Responses to General al-Atta’s claims have been mixed, with Uganda’s state minister for foreign affairs dismissing them as “absolute rubbish.” Meanwhile, the Sudanese army, Chad, and the CAR have yet to provide official statements.

In a video released by the army, references to the UAE were notably absent, which some observers have interpreted as a potential edit. This comes as General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the army leader and al-Atta’s superior, announced an impending visit to the UAE, coinciding with the U.N. climate summit COP28.

The UAE’s involvement in Sudan has been multifaceted, including supporting a failed political transition post-2019 and engaging in economic ventures, such as building a Red Sea port and investing in agriculture.

As the conflict in Sudan escalates, the international community watches closely, weighing the implications of foreign interference and the prospects for peace and stability in a region long-torn by strife and political upheaval.

Source: Reuters

A

n official document of Israel’s Ministry of Intelligence recommends that Israel carry out a forced and full transfer of all residents of the Gaza Strip to North Sinai, Egypt as the preferred option among the three alternatives it offers regarding the future of the Palestinians in the Strip at the end of the war and calls on the international community to harness the move. The document also suggests promoting a dedicated campaign for the residents of Gaza that will “motivate them to agree to the plan.”

The document recommends that Israel act “to evacuate the Gazan population to Sinai” during the war: to establish tent cities and new cities in northern Sinai, which will accommodate the deported population, and then “to create a sterile zone of several kilometers inside Egypt and not allow the population to return to activity or residence near the Israeli border.” At the same time, countries in the world, and primarily the USA, must be harnessed to implement the move.

The ten-page document is dated October 13, 2023 and features the logo of the Ministry of Intelligence headed by minister Gila Gamliel of the Likud. An official at the Ministry of Intelligence confirmed to “Local Talk” that this is an authentic document, which was distributed to the security system on behalf of the Ministry’s Policy Division, and “was not supposed to reach the media.”

The document unequivocally and explicitly recommends carrying out a transfer of civilians from Gaza as the desired outcome of the war. This week its existence was reported in “Calcalist”. The transfer plan is divided into several phases: in the first phase, the population in Gaza must be “vacated to the south”, while the Air Force strikes will focus on the northern part of the Strip. In the second phase, ground entry into Gaza will begin, which will lead to the occupation of the entire strip, from north to south, and the “cleansing of the underground bunkers from Hamas fighters.”

At the same time as the Gaza Strip is occupied, the citizens of Gaza will move to Egyptian territory, leave the Strip, and will not be allowed to return to it permanently. “It is important to leave the traffic lanes towards the south usable, to allow the evacuation of the civilian population towards Rafah,” the document states.

According to an official at the Ministry of Intelligence, the Ministry’s personnel stand behind these recommendations. The source emphasized that the ministry’s studies “are not based on military intelligence” and are only used as a basis for discussions in the government.

Last week, the Meshgav Institute, a right-wing research institute led by Meir Ben Shabat, a close associate of Netanyahu and the former head of the National Assembly, published a position paper that similarly called for the forced transfer of the population of Gaza to Sinai. The institute recently deleted the publication from Twitter after it drew strong international reactions.

Interestingly, the deleted study was written by Amir Weitman, an activist in Likud, and according to evidence, is also an associate of Minister Gila Gamliel in the Ministry of Intelligence. Weitman recently interviewed Knesset member Ariel Kellner of the Likud, who told him that “the solution you are proposing, moving the population to Egypt, is a logical and desirable solution.”

In relation to this difficulty, the document states that Egypt will have an “obligation under international law to allow the passage of population”, and that the United States can contribute to the move by exerting “pressure on Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates to contribute to the initiative either in resources or in taking in displaced persons”. The document proposes starting a dedicated public campaign that will be addressed to the Arab world, to countries such as Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia, “in which the message of aid to the Palestinian brothers and their rehabilitation is focused, even at the cost of a tone that scolds or offends Israel.”

Finally, it is written that “massive migration” of the population from combat zones is a “natural and necessary result” that also happened in Syria, Afghanistan, and Ukraine and that only the deportation of the population will be “an appropriate response that will allow the creation of a significant deterrent in the entire region.”

“The most dangerous alternative”: a Palestinian state

The document presents two other alternatives regarding the citizens of Gaza the day after the war. The first is to import the rule of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza, and the second is to grow another local Arab rule as an alternative to Hamas. Both alternatives, it is claimed, are not desirable from a strategic and security point of view for the State of Israel. The drafters of the study claimed that the introduction of the Palestinian Authority into Gaza is the “most dangerous alternative” of the three alternative scenarios, because it could “lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state.”

“The division between the Palestinian population in Yosh and Gaza is one of the main obstacles today to the establishment of a Palestinian state. It is not possible that the result of this attack (Hamas, October 7), will be an unprecedented victory for the Palestinian national movement and paving the way for the establishment of a Palestinian state,” the document reads.

The document claims that a model of Israeli military rule and PA civilian rule, as exists in the West Bank, is expected to fail in Gaza. “There is no way to maintain an effective military occupation in Gaza only on the basis of a military presence and without settlement. In a short time there will be an internal Israeli and international demand for withdrawal.”

The drafters of the document added that in such a situation the State of Israel “will be considered a colonialist power with an occupying army… similar to the situation of Yosh today, only worse”. This is a reason to think that it will be possible for her to rule there today.

The last alternative, the formation of a local Arab leadership to replace Hamas, is not desirable according to what is written in the document, because there are no local opposition movements to Hamas and the new leadership may be more radical. “The likely scenario is not an ideological change of perception, but the establishment of new, perhaps even more radical, Islamist movements,” it says in relation to this alternative.

What is truly astounding is not the dangerous thinking of this document but the fact that such recommendations are all too typical of those at the core of the Netanyahu cabinet and that the views of such zealots are not aberrations. Top Israeli officials admitted they are ethnically cleansing Palestinians. Israeli Security Cabinet member Avi Dichter boasted, “We are now rolling out the Gaza Nakba”, in reference to the colonial mass expulsion of 1948.

As the incremental genocide of the Palestinian people unfolds under an open concentration camp, I am reminded of the words of Yeshayahu Leibowitz the great Israeli Orthodox Jewish public intellectual and polymath known as “the conscience of Israel”: “Since the Six-day war Israel is no longer a democracy. It deprives 2 million people of civil and political rights. The State of Israel is the only dictatorship that exists today in the enlightened world. A Judeo-Nazi mentality exists in our country!”

T

he coup in Niger has the potential to create significant problems for regional security. Sharing a 1,500-kilometer border with Nigeria, Niger also neighbors Benin. At the intersection of these three countries, there is the presence of the terrorist organization Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), which might seek to fill the power vacuum that may emerge in the region.

The existence of such a risk has the potential to affect North and West Africa, and could pose a threat to Turkey’s interests in the region, especially in Libya. These risks could also affect Turkey’s trade with Africa, which has been developing and gaining momentum in recent years.

Turkey’s increasing engagement in the region

Turkey’s trade with the African continent is estimated at about $35 billion with Sub-Saharan African countries accounting for $12.9 billion. Moreover, according to TurkStat data, Turkey’s trade with West Africa is estimated at $6.5 billion and $4.1 billion with the Sahel region, which includes Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, and Eritrea.

Graph 1 and Graph 2 show the details of this trade. With the exception of Eritrea and Sudan, all countries are in the West African sub-regional system, while the countries shown in orange are also in the Sahel sub-regional system.

West Africa and the Sahel region also account for 18.5% and 11.7% of Africa’s overall trade volume, respectively. In other words, as seen in Graph 2, Turkey’s trade volume with the region shows a significant rise, when 2013 TurkStat data are taken into account. In 2013, Turkey’s total foreign trade volume with Africa was $21.5 billion.

The latest figures show that Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 32% of Turkey’s trade volume across Africa. However, in Sub-Saharan Africa, the share of trade with West Africa is 34.7% with a trade volume of $2.4 billion and the share of trade with the Sahel region countries is 18.8% with a trade volume of $1.3 billion. In 2013, West Africa and the Sahel region accounted for 11.1% and 6% of Africa’s overall trade volume, respectively.

This economic data shows Turkey’s growing economic presence in the Sahel and West Africa over the last decade. In addition, Turkey’s political and military influence in the region has also increased in recent years. In order to ensure that the increasing trade volume does not decline and that Turkey’s strategic interests in the regional and other subregional systems do not affect Ankara’s security, it is of utmost importance for Turkey to contribute to the resolution of crises in the region without delay.

Regional security risks and challenges for Turkey

The effects of the coup d’état that took place in Niger at the end of July, which is in a strategic position to affect all regional dynamics, will occupy the agenda for a long time. Therefore, not only the Sahel and West Africa but also Libya and Algeria in North Africa, where Turkey has strategic interests, have the potential to be affected by the crisis in Niger.

Taking a broader perspective, the presence of al-Qaeda and DAESH-linked terrorist organizations in the region is a dire reality. If the environment gives terrorist organizations the opportunity to increase their presence, their influence may increase in the east of the Sahel.

In such a scenario, the al-Shabaab terrorist organization, which is an extension of al-Qaeda in Somalia in East Africa, and other terrorist organizations have the potential to cooperate and cause major instability beyond the Sahel region.

Respecting the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and the principle of “African solutions to African problems,” Turkey can take diplomatic and cooperation initiatives to mitigate the impact of the crisis in Niger and support the maintenance of regional stability.

Especially in the face of the junta’s negative stance towards the return to power of ousted president Mohamed Bazoum, Turkey is capable to take steps to ensure a fair and transparent election, promote social reconciliation, and resolve the crisis as quickly as possible through diplomatic means.

In addition to its support to the governments of various countries in Africa in the fight against terrorism, Turkey can share its experiences and help the countries in the Sahel region improve their capacities, specifically in the field of security cooperation. This is essential for Turkey to protect its strategic interests, first in the context of West Africa and the Sahel region, and then in Libya.

Turkey has many investments in the countries of the region. For instance, two companies that stand out in Turkey’s commercial activities in West Africa and the Sahel are Karpowership, which carries out energy activities in West African countries such as Senegal, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Ghana, and Gambia; and SUMMA, which carries out large-scale infrastructure and superstructure projects in West African countries such as Niger, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.

Turkey’s continued presence in the region is important primarily for its commercial interests which are not only valuable for Turkish companies, but also play an important role in supporting the development efforts of the countries in the region.