Seven years ago when the civil war erupted in Syria, the Balkans considered itself far away from the war zone. However, when Daesh (ISIS) gained prominence in early 2014 and emerged as an influential non-state actor across eastern Syria and northwestern Iraq, the terror group began recruiting fighters quickly, and the Balkans became a region with some of the highest numbers of foreign fighters joining Daesh’s ranks.

Studies conducted at research centers based in western Balkan countries such as Albania, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have shown that people, who joined the Daesh terror group often lack education, are members of marginalized groups with extremist ideologies, and experience poor emotional and economic situations. Most importantly is the lack of access to correct knowledge about their faith which causes vulnerable young people to be influenced by propaganda from various groups.

In the Balkans, the largest number of fighters joining Daesh came from Kosovo, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to a lesser extent from Serbia, Montenegro and Northern Macedonia. According to the Extremism Research Forum-Albania Report, 144 people joined extremist groups in 2013. The Ministry of Interior and the Albanian National CVE Coordinator reported that the number of Daesh fighters from Albania dropped to 0 in 2015. This was the result of Albania’s 2014 Penal Code amendments criminalizing participation in, and recruitment of, citizens to engage in armed conflicts abroad.

According to a European Commission report on Albania, 45 individuals have returned from Syria while 26 are believed to have died, 73 individuals remain in Syria. Before Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring, last month, around 50 children from Albania were living for months in Syrian camps. Turkey’s ambassador to Tirana, Murat Ahmet Yoruk, said last month in a press conference that the repatriation of Daesh fighters including children and women from Syria was a priority. Yoruk said that Turkey was exchanging information with the Albanian government but did not give any more details about when a repatriation effort might be expected.

The Extremism Research Forum– Kosovo report noted that 400 people have travelled from Kosovo to Syria or Iraq between 2012 and 2017. One third have already returned to Kosovo. Country Reports for terrorism by the U.S Department of State in 2018 shows that 74 of them are deceased. 133 of these individuals have returned while approximately 196 remain in conflict zone, which includes 40 children who were born in the conflict zone to Kosovo citizens. Generally, the age of fighters from Kosovo varies from 21 and 30.

Currently trials and investigations are continuing in Kosovo for 52 suspects and 21 cases. What is important to emphasize is that the prosecutors lack experience in these kinds of cases which Kosovo has never faced before. In April 2019 , according to the New York Times, the Justice Minister of Kosovo Ablerad Tahiri told journalist that “a planned operation to bring back some of our citizens from Syria ended successfully.” Among the group were four men suspected of being Daesh fighters who were arrested, 32 women and 74 children. Nine of these children had lost parents during the fighting in Syria. The justice minister claimed that these women and children are victims and deserve to reintegrate in the society. Meanwhile the number of Kosovo fighters that remain in Syria is around 90, and it is still not clear if any operation will be organized for their return.

Citizens of North Macedonia have also been included in Daesh recruitments, too. According to the Extremism Research Forum Report (2017) in early 2018 the number of Daesh fighters from North Macedonia reached 140 men, and 14 women. North Macedonia has the second highest number of returnees in the Western Balkans which is 80.

As a country with different ethnic groups – Macedonians, Albanians, Turks and Albanians from North Macedonia were the largest group to join Daesh. Taking in consideration the political situation between Albanians and Macedonians, often threats of violent extremism is misused by political elites. According to a research report by Regional Cooperation Group (RCG) a good example is the “Montra Case” where in 2012, “five ethnic North Macedonians were killed under (still) unclear circumstances”. The Interior Minister of North Macedonia said at the time that it was a ‘horrific assassination that was perpetrated by followers of radical Islam’ however, no relevant evidence was provided to confirm this.

The RCG report also stated that there were two large law-enforcement operations known as “Cell 1” and “Cell 2” in August 2015 in which 14 individuals were arrested under suspicion of conducting recruitment, financing or facilitating the travels of foreign fighters from North Macedonia to Syria and Iraq. To prevent radicalization the new government of North Macedonia introduced two strategies in March 2018 – the “Prevention of Violent Extremism” and an updated “Strategy on Countering Terrorism”.

Bosnia and Herzegovina historically been known to be a magnet when it comes to attracting foreign fighters. Bosnia’s State Investigations and Protection Agency reports show that between 2012 and 2016 around 200 men and 70 Bosnian women and a total of around 60 children travelled to Syria and Iraq. As the country made an effort to enforce laws in order to prevent recruitment, the number of individuals going to Syria fell sharply in 2016. In March 2019, two people were supposed to be repatriated to Bosnia with one successfully returned. Currently, Bosnian authorities are expecting to repatriate nine people, while 120 are still imprisoned in Northern Syria with repatriation procedures in process. In 2017, 46 people were reported by the Ministry of Justice.

The biggest challenge facing Bosnia right now alongside other Western Balkans countries is the treatment of returnees. In an Interview with the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) The Bosnian Security Minister Dragan Mektic said that “they will be treated according to our laws and the evidence we have and which is given to us by our partner countries. We are part of the global coalition for the battle against ISIS since the very beginning, we have been part of that process for a long time and we will fulfil all our obligations from our participation in that coalition”.

While civil society groups argue that women and children are victims, academics argue that even women should be investigated and prosecuted on a case-by-case basis as was done in Kosovo. However, Bosnian officials argue that extremism will still continue to be a threat for the country. What has raised the issue even more is a statement by the French President Emmanuel Macron in an interview for The Economist calling Bosnia a “ticking time-bomb” claiming that the country contains a danger from returning jihadists. However, this declaration was criticized by Bosnian officials and Islamic Community in Bosnia since according to them they are doing the best to deal with this issue, albeit being a huge challenge.

Serbia has one of the smallest numbers of Daesh fighters from the Balkans. According to the Interior Ministry of Serbia, 49 individuals joined the so-called Islamic State and most of them were from Novi Pazar, a city with Muslim majority in Serbia. The BIRN investigations show that there are 20 Serbian women in Syrian camps and until now Serbian authorities have not taken any measures to bring them home. The only politician that has spoken out about this issue is Muamer Zukorlic, a leader of a small Bosniak party and an MP in the Serbian parliament. He stressed that the state must do more, especially when it comes to saving the children. However, according to the US State Department Report the level of Daesh recruitments activities in Serbia are low.

When the influx of Daesh recruits began in 2012 and in the following years, the situation in Montenegro caused this issue become highly politicized so that even though the number of fighters was small compared to other Western Balkan countries, in 2015 the state responded by developing a Countering Violent Extremism Strategy. Balkan Insight writes that according to the latest European Commission report on Montenegro, 23 individuals went to Syria among them five women and three children. Out of that number six have reportedly died, while 10 returned to Montenegro. The first case to be persecuted by High court of Podgorica was in 2015 with the trial still ongoing.

What made the issue of Daesh recruitments in the Balkans, especially in Kosovo and Albania, all the more sensitive was when in April 2019, The New York Times broadcast video footage showing camps in Syria holding relatives of Daesh fighters. In the video, viewers could clearly hear voices speaking in Albanian saying “Oj Sare!” (Hey Sara!) “Ku eshte Sara?” (Where is Sarah?) Public reaction was immediate, prompting both the Kosovo and Albanian governments to take steps to return their citizens. Kosovo has the highest number of returnees and it seems to be the most successful country in the Balkans in terms of repatriating its citizens, however this all happened with the help of the United States.

Currently, Balkans countries especially Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina are facing major challenges on how to deal with returnees. National and international organizations are conducting different training programs for psychologists as well as sociologists. The Balkans as a poorer region of Europe lacks expertise and often seeks help from the EU on dealing with cases.

Other neighboring states of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, do not have a high number of individuals who have gone to fight in Syria. In Bulgaria, some members of the Roma community include a Muslim majority were accused of recruiting individuals to go to Syria but there is no exact number. Croatians were shocked when in 2015 a Croatian citizen who joined Daesh was said to have been killed in Syria. These countries are usually used as transit routes for terrorists from Europe to Syria and Iraq. As part of the EU, they enforced laws and strategies according to EU requests.

Unlike other Western states who have often publicly refused to accept the repatriation of their foreign fighters, Balkan states have shown leadership by taking responsibility for their citizens, especially women and children. However, despite statements by some Balkan representatives that returnees are unlikely to pose a public risk, the long term issues that may arise with the return of battle-hardened fighters still remains of utmost concern. For now, many Balkan states face the challenging process of integrating returnees, an unfamiliar situation which will require thoughtful responses.

Written by Antigona Imeri – ISTANBUL

Current concerns about Daesh (ISIS) detainees have been growing but almost all of the fears are emanating from European foreign fighters. At the same time, other states have had an important number of their citizens join Daesh as well, particularly post-Soviet Central Asian states. Currently, there are thousands of Daesh foreign fighters detained in prisons, which are now under the control of Turkey, Iraq and non-state actors in Syria. And today, Turkey, Iraq and other actors in Syria have concentrated on the repatriation of European detainees. There are, however, a similar number of radicalized detainees from Central Asia and Europe. While democratic states in Europe worry about the future of its citizens if foreign fighters return home, due to the lack of laws to efficiently deal with those people, authoritarian states in Central Asia have a more flexible legal approach. However, it is the inability of these states to distinguish between radical Islamist groups, their discrimination against mainstream Islamic practices, and corruption that may lead to even bigger security threats.

After failing to establish long term territorial control in Syria and Iraq, Daesh is attempting to build up its network elsewhere, including in Afghanistan and Central Asian states. While much as the world is concerned with European foreign fighters, it should also be looking at the issue of terrorists from Central Asian states who were some of the most infamous fighters of Daesh, and played an important role in its military activities.

Since 2013, at least 5,000 foreign fighters from Central Asia have joined Daesh, over 2000 of them female, and the real number of recruits may be even bigger. Additionally, many of these foreign fighters have children who were born in Syria. They grew up in detention camps alongside radicalized Daesh members. Estimates claim that the number of Uzbekistan’s citizens who joined Daesh exceeds 1,500 people. While Tajikistan, which has a population four times smaller than Uzbekistan is estimated to have at least 1,300 citizens who joined Daesh. These states are followed by Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan with at least 500 each and by Turkmenistan with at least 400 foreign fighters who joined Daesh. It is important to note that these numbers are dated between 2015 and 2016, except those for Kazakhstan. It is believed that the total number of fighters from Central Asian states in the ranks of Daesh exceeds 5,000. Some of these countries like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan conducted several operations to repatriate their citizens, while the threat posed by these terrorist fighters remains high, especially due to the unstable situation in Afghanistan.

In trying to deal with security threats, Central Asian governments moved in the wrong direction by discriminating against the broader Muslim population and their religious practices. This included proscriptions on religious activities and limitations on religious networks, and frequent amendments to laws on radicalization. For instance, Turkmenistan tried to ban the import of any religious books; Kazakhstan attempted to ban Islamic clothes and on the establishment of any Islamic societies; Tajikistan attempted to ban religious political parties and put an age limitation on visiting mosques but actually these efforts play into the hands of extremists. The Central Asian States have important problems such as corruption, forced secularism, poverty, high unemployment rates, and the feeling of alienation for conservative Muslims, which may gradually promote radicalization of the Central Asian population.

Moreover, an important part of the terrorist attacks that happened in the last decade in the world were conducted by terrorists originally from Central Asian states. While some of the most brutal terrorist attacks undertaken in recent years were by individuals of Uzbek origin. Several politicians and individuals from Central Asian countries have also been involved in the evolution of Daesh as well. For example, the Tajik special military forces commander Gulmurod Khalimov joined Daesh and later recruited his employees within the Tajikistan military.

In this context, analysis shows that a serious threat might be in the revival of Daesh in Central Asia. At the moment, while the international community is focused on the threat of European radicalized fighters, there should be a larger concern about Daesh recruits from Central Asian states, with reports that Daesh is trying to organize these fighters in exile within the chaotic situation of Afghanistan. While Central Asian countries are repatriating their radicalized citizens from Syrian territories, in order to provide security after their return these states need another approach. Post-Soviet countries have attempted to secure their border with Afghanistan, but there is still a huge number of ethnic diaspora groups in Afghanistan, which may result in further radicalization into Central Asian states. The authoritarian rule of these states in line with the general discrimination of Islamic practices will only fuel radicals who try to organize in exile. These states may able to control their citizens within their borders with an iron fist, but they cannot do it for the diaspora who in return will influence the situation within their own country.

Today, Central Asian states may rely heavily on Russia’s military force in case of any attacks from the outside, but if the state has a weak government and the institutions are not developed enough, such as in the case of Kyrgyzstan, then this may lead towards serious attempts by Daesh groups to establish a terror network. This was the case in Tajikstan where a large number of attacks have already occurred. Moreover, in the case of a recent terrorist attack, the threat was felt on the Tajik-Uzbek border. So in fact, there is a huge risk that some of the Central Asian countries could become the new locus for the revival of Daesh.

Consequently, today there is a need to concentrate on the fate of Daesh (ISIS) foreign fighters from Central Asia, just as the international community does with Europe. There is also a need to develop rehabilitation centers, hospitals, schools to de-radicalize fighters in the post-Soviet States and to encourage these states to loosen the harsh restrictions on Islamic activities, and to differ between radical Islamist groups and other Islamic institutions who operate freely around the world.

The author is thankful to Liliya Sayfulina for her contribution to this article.

When the war in Syria attracted radicals from across the globe, almost all of them were not hindered from leaving their countries despite being listed as potential suspects. The governments and their intelligence agencies, especially European states, wanted their problems to be exported to Syria. The laws in these countries are not equipped to properly address the criminal issues arising from their activities abroad, and leaving them to die in Syria appeared to be an easy choice. However, things turned out differently. The suspected terrorists went to Syria, facilitated the buildup of an alleged caliphate, murdered thousands of people, created a mess in the Middle East, conducted terror attacks in European capitals and survived.

After the territorial defeat of Daesh, the home countries are now confronted with new challenges. In contrast to their expectation, the suspected terrorists did not die but had children and survived. Many of them are now imprisoned in Syria, Iraq and Turkey. Taking those foreign terrorist fighters back is the legal obligation of their home countries, but most know that their laws are incapable of declaring a proper sentence against them. If their terror export returns, they will import battle-hardened militants who may be released from prison in a short period of time. All of this happens while the European Union denies Turkish citizens visa free entry to the EU due to the ‘harsh’ terror laws in Turkey.

European states are for the first time really facing the dilemma of terrorists and the problems of dealing with them within existing legal frameworks. If the laws of the EU are not adjusted, returning fighters might exploit it and become a new security threat. There is also an increase of Islamophobia that could in turn radicalize a number of Muslims living in Europe. If this is combined with former Daesh members released due to insufficient laws, it would potentially be a national security threat for the EU states in the near future. On the other hand, if the EU does adjust its laws, it won’t fit into the legal standards the EU demands from the candidates wanting to join the Union.

The Turkish government’s declaration that Turkey won’t be a hotel for terror exported by foreign states, did not come out of nowhere. It fits into a broader process. Turkey has signed a refugee deal with the EU to hinder the flow of refugees into Europe but complains that the other side does not act in line with the agreed terms. As Turkey is carrying the burden of 3.6 million refugees alone, and sees nothing but obstacles from the EU to accelerate the return of refugees back to the safe-zone planned by Turkey, the Turkish government’s patience is low. Ankara is not willing to take on the burden of foreign terrorist fighters as well. In addition to the European terrorists, the Turkish government also has indirect control over foreign terrorists from the Operation Euphrates Shield areas and the Operation Peace Spring areas. In total, the number of Daesh prisoners is almost 1,500 with a significant number of foreigners.

At the current moment, European states are shirking their duties to handle their self-created terror problem. The EU’s attempt to export its terror threat has seemingly backfired in a more dangerous way. Either the European governments take responsibility by accepting their citizens back, or the EU will be dependent on Turkey, Iraq and non-state actors in Syria, all of whom will use the inmates as a legitimate tool of pressure with little interest in taking care of them. If a terrorist is being released by the YPG for example, the EU will have limited means to prevent that person from smuggling into the EU and conducting a terror attack.

Many Daesh members are held in makeshift camps, most notably the Al Hol camp in Syria, in which thousands of Daesh women are held together with their children. The camp is mainly divided into two sections, the first hosting foreign Daesh members, the second Syrian and Iraqi Daesh members. Not all of the inhabitants of the camps are Daesh members, especially children. However, the situation in the camp has a huge potential to create the next generation of Daesh, similar to Camp Bucca in Iraq whose inmates including Abu Bakr al Baghdadi formed Daesh out of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

This time the camp promises a long lasting resurgence of Daesh. Despite Turkey’s warnings, the US opted to go with a YPG-led organization and now the organization is incapable of dealing with the situation. However, small but effective steps can be undertaken to minimize the threat in the short-term, sparing some time to find a lasting solution to the issue of Daesh members.

The Al Hol camp situated in the governorate of Hasakah is inhabited by more than 68,000 people of whom 55% are children under the age of 12. In recent times, female Daesh members asserted their de-facto control over the Al Hol camp implementing Daesh methods within the camp. The female members formed so-called Hisba battalions within the camp and maintained order on their own. The inhabitants organize alleged Sharia-courses and propagate the ideology of Daesh.

The YPG’s lack of control over the camp was demonstrated again recently when a Turkestani Daesh member was heavily beaten up by Russian Daesh members of the camp when she refused to attend the courses. More dramatically, the YPG security discovered the dead body of a woman who was likely killed by the Daesh Hisba group in the camp.

If Daesh captives are left to the YPG who are reportedly incapable, and the issues are not addressed correctly, the Iraqi scenario will likely repeat itself, only more dangerously and brutally than before.

Previously other women and even a little girl were said to be killed by other female Daesh members inside the camp. Other incidents include the burning of tents and the harassment of women and children who do not comply with the rules of the Daesh Hisba in the Al Hol camp. As Turkey warned several times before, the YPG/SDF is overwhelmed with the task of how to deal with Daesh members in custody. Together with Sila Naz Engin, we wrote about the dangers of having terrorists in the hand of other terrorists.

A solution for al-Hol camp

I suggest a two-step approach to the situation. The first should address the urgent situation, ease current risks and win time. The second should be more lasting.

Firstly, the international coalition needs to force the YPG to divide the camps into many smaller ones. No camp should be inhabited by more than one thousand Daesh members. These camps might be bordering each other, but there should be no opportunity to establish contact between the camps for the inhabitants.

Secondly, the international coalition should establish a training center in Turkey to train personnel to manage the affairs in such camps. The training should not be limited to security personnel but also of social employees, teachers and religious scholars. It is important to use the experience of Turkey as a Muslim country and the experience of the Syrian opposition to determine how to deal with Daesh members and people traumatized by Daesh.

The rehabilitation center in Marea or Jarablus might be a good example of a model to follow. The rehabilitation camps have plenty of success stories including children who changed their goals from becoming a suicide bomber to becoming a successful student. Currently, there is no such center in YPG-held areas. After being adequately trained, the employees of these camps should be totally independent from militias on the ground, act under the Syrian Interim Government, be provided security guarantees from the international coalition, and should take total control over the camps and prisons in the area.

However, if Daesh captives are left to the YPG who are reportedly incapable, and the issues are not addressed correctly, the Iraqi scenario will likely repeat itself, only more dangerously and brutally than before.

The phenomenon of foreign (terrorist) fighters recently became a matter of international politics when U.S. President Donald Trump made an abrupt call to European countries, chiefly Britain, France, and Germany, to take back their citizens who have been foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) in the ranks of DAESH and who now are prisoners in Syria. What made the issue a bone of contention further especially across Europe was the call by Shamima Begum, a British teenager who had joined DAESH four years ago, who requested to return to the United Kingdom. The British government’s response was stripping her of British citizenship.

Needless to say, no country is willing to take back its citizens who have been in the ranks of DAESH one way or another in Syria and Iraq. The issue is so much a concern for countries so that there are even a United Nations Security Council resolution (2178) specifically targeting foreign fighters. To some extent, countries are right to be concerned about the implications of accepting their citizens back, who have been in war-zones for a while as members of terrorist organizations. It is possible to mention a number of threats that FTF returnees are likely to pose, on which there is also a quasi-consensus in the literature.

First of all, a significant source of concern is the fact that FTFs –most of the time- gain battlefield skills during their time in the ranks of a terrorist organization, unless they are deemed “extremely useless” and employed in trivial jobs such as cooking. This makes them experienced militants with abilities to use different types of weaponry and in some cases improvising explosive devices as well as bomb disposal.

Secondly, FTFs are exposed to ideological indoctrination of the organization they join not less than the indigenous militants. Ideological indoctrination aims at instilling a different conscious and a different set of “values” in the members of the organization. Furthermore, it helps to make the militants identify more with the “cause” of the organization, provide and maintain the motivation to fight for it and turn a mere sympathizer into a reckless militant.

Thirdly, FTFs have a higher propensity to use violence in case they return to their country of origin, compared to the home-grown sympathizers or members of a terrorist organization. This is due to the fact that they experience real war and violence in war-zones and this “socialization” with violence makes it more “normal” for FTFs to carry out a violent act with more ease and skill.

Fourthly, FTF returnees would be in contact with networks or sleeper cells of the terrorist organization in their home country. These contacts could either be developed overseas or returnees might come back with certain references.

Foreign terrorist fighters gain battlefield skills during their time in the ranks of a terrorist organization and this makes them experienced militants with abilities to use different types of weaponry.  

All of these potential threats that the FTF returnees of a terrorist organization, say DAESH pose, apply to FTF returnees of the YPG – the PKK’s offshoot in northern Syria, without any exception. Still, it is almost impossible to see a similar stance politically and legally towards the latter in case of return. Nor do they spark a Europe-wide controversy as did DAESH’s Shamima Begum. For instance, none of the FTF returnees of the YPG have been stripped of citizenship before and after their return so far.

There are instances of interrogation and prosecution of YPG’s FTFs especially in the U.K. and Australia but none of their cases were handled similar to the ones of DAESH and none of them faced a serious prison sentence. Moreover, they are not even deemed as “foreign fighters” in mass media accounts, but as “volunteers,” which also shapes the public discourse and perception of these FTFs. In addition, some of the FTF returnees of the YPG have been interviewed by major media outlets and they even wrote opinion pieces on those media outlets such as the BBC, The Independent, The Guardian, Daily Telegraph, and Daily Mail, which is inconceivable for their DAESH counterparts.

This conspicuous difference in the treatments of FTFs of DAESH and the YPG stems from the difference in the perception of the two in the eyes of both governments and the public with regards to the threat they pose. In fact, the YPG/PKK has not carried out outrageous attacks such as bombings and ramming vehicles into crowds in European cities so far as DAESH has. Nevertheless, both FTF returnees of the YPG and indigenous PKK members in Western countries have engaged in different sorts of crimes and violence than those of DAESH. To illustrate, a number of FTF returnees of the YPG have been making propaganda for YPG mostly through their social media accounts and also through other online platforms. Likewise, some of them got into the act of recruitment for the YPG, again through online platforms. On the other hand, an FTF returnee of the YPG was involved in a monstrous murder once he returned to his home country.

All potential threats posed by foreign terrorist fighters that returned from DAESH also apply to those that returned from the YPG. Still, it is almost impossible to see a similar stance politically and legally towards the latter in case of return.

Apart from these materialized crimes and violence, there are also other potential threats that would likely be posed by the FTF returnees of YPG upon their return to their home countries. Firstly, although nothing has been reported as such, it is very likely that a considerable number of FTFs suffer from PTSD since they were exposed to extreme levels of violence in Syria. It is already known that some were suicidal even before travelling to the war zone in Syria.

Secondly, they are likely to target state institutions in case of a disagreement with a given policy. This was showcased by PKK members two weeks ago as they attacked the Council of Europe HQ in Strasbourg and injured three policemen. Thirdly, they are likely to engage in PKK’s crime and terror activities in their home countries such as vandalism against especially Turkish state properties, attacks on Turks and Kurds who are not PKK supporters and violent demonstrations. These were already undertaken by indigenous PKK members in European countries many times and it is a matter of time for FTF returnees of the YPG to follow suit.

Despite the disregard by governments and public in Western countries towards the threats or risks that are already posed and are likely to be posed by FTF returnees of the YPG, a considerable element of instability and violence is simmering in their bosom. Western governments should take the issue of FTF returnees of the YPG seriously at least for the sake of their own public order and stability if not for taking an ethical stance by not differentiating between two terrorist organizations. 

On Wednesday (February 20) Egypt executed 9 men over allegations of killing the country’s chief prosecutor, Hisham Barakat, in 2015. Nine young men told the judges during their trial that their confessions were taken under torture. One told the judges that he was threatened by his torturers saying that they would take his parents and do what they want. Another young man told the jury “give me a taser, and I will make someone confess that he killed Sadat.” The country has executed 165 convicts since Abdel Fatah al-Sisi’s coup that toppled the democratically elected president of the country in 2013.

Egypt is one of the scenes where the Arab Spring ended up with an Arab Winter. Egyptians overthrew a military-backed dictator, Mubarak, only to be crushed by another, Sisi. The story started happy as hundreds of thousands gathering in Tahrir Square protested Mubarak, the man who ruled the country for nearly three decades. Mubarak resigned on 11 February 2011, a process led to the 2012 presidential elections in which Mohamed Morsi was elected. Morsi was removed from power with the coup on 3 July 2013, which was led by the army chief general Sisi. As a result of his hijacking of the regime with the coup, Sisi is still the president of the country. Morsi is still in prison and many of his supports have shared the same fate. Egypt put thousands behind bars and the Egyptian courts did not hesitate to give death penalties in hundreds. Torture has become an ordinary method of interrogation and many, most recently last week, were executed based on confessions under torture.

Egypt is one of the scenes where the Arab Spring ended up with an Arab Winter. Egyptians overthrew a military-backed dictator, Mubarak, only to be crushed by another, Sisi.

Despite all the humanitarian crimes the Sisi rejime has been committing, Sisi has kept his good relations with the West undamaged from the coup up until today. What Sisi mas managed so far is to crush the democratic forces of the country thanks to his ongoing war with Daesh militants in the Sinai Peninsula. He whitewashed all his abuses under the guise of fighting against extremism and terrorism. The country has executed at least 165 people up to now since the 2013 coup with hundreds more in the death row. Nevertheless, this is just an invisible detail in Sisi’s relations with the West, particularly the U.S. The people on the Arab streets know very well that Sisi’s repressive regime cannot survive without the U.S. support. It is this Western hypocrisy that drives the masses in the Middle East against the West. It is the relentless Western support for Arab dictators that radicalize those suffering under such horrible rules.

And such a hypocrisy, once again, is seen after the execution of 9 young men in Egypt. We heard very little about it compared to what the Western outlets were pumping against Morsi during his presidency. People are being electrified in masses, being forced to confess the crimes they did not commit, and being executed yet the world seems to be happy with Sisi’s fight with extremism(!)

People on the Arab streets know very well that Sisi’s repressive regime cannot survive without U.S. support. It is this Western hypocrisy that drives the masses in the Middle East against the West. It is the relentless Western support for Arab dictators that radicalize those suffering under such horrible rules.

Of course we heard about the executions, if not from the politicians then from the media outlets. Yet, many established outlets tried their best to distract the readers from this vast scale of atrocities. This is how the Washington Post concluded its piece on the executions: “Egypt has been battling Islamic militants for years. Last year, the government launched a broad security operation focused on northern Sinai, where an Islamic State [Daesh] affiliate has carried out many attacks in recent years.” You open the page in order to read the brutal executions of nine young men yet the ending lines plant the Daesh threat in your mind although the executions have nothing to do with it.

The hypocrisy is not limited to politicians or media outlets, but even the most needed organizations like Freedom House. This Egypt has the same score with Turkey on civil liberties (6 out 7, 7 being the lowest). All this anti-Erdogan rhetoric in the Western press is louder than the tortures and executions of Sisi. Sisi, on the other hand, like Mohammad Bin Salman of Saudi Arabia, is the hope of the West against extremism in the Middle East.

The reality is the opposite though as tortures, executions, and all this repression is fueling radicalization and extremism in the Middle East. And all these complaints about the West is not about asking them to be fair in their opinions of the Middle East. Personally I do not care what individual Western politicians think of Sisi or other political leaders of the region. Nor it is about some big empty kind words from the West for human rights. This is not about words or opinions. And this is not about blaming the West for anything bad occurring in the Middle East. This is about the concrete and tangible Western support for dictators like Sisi. Unlike the toppled president Morsi, Sisi has nothing else other than Western support. Those nine young men would be alive with their families today if only the West had not supported Sisi.

Shamima Begum, the ISIS teenage bride who just this week lost her U.K. citizenship, is making the headlines, not simply because what a U.K. minister appears to have done is against international law, but also because of her lack of remorse for supporting the terror organization.

It is this chilling lack of regret which perhaps has led to less of a hue and cry than what we might have expected given that the polemic move by Sajid Javid is going to stir debate for months to come and possibly even make the London 19 year old an icon with some Muslim communities. Many might deem it too “extreme” an action, given that she was a child when she left the U.K. and that she is a U.K. citizen.

Certainly, a number of highbrow Muslim commentators in the U.K. and even some Middle Eastern pundits based in London (who have played the ‘racist’ card against me on Twitter) are ready with their opprobrium and their argument that it wouldn’t happen to a white, Anglo Saxon jihadist.

The young Minister’s tact might be messy and even illegal under international law. It may even be ‘racist’ in its dimension.

And they are right on this point. But what they fail to grasp is that the alternative which is in store for white British extremists is in fact even more extreme. The government has said that up to 350 jihadists will face ten year prison sentences in the U.K., under new anti-terror laws being drafted. And if that isn’t enough to satisfy the baying crowd who want blood, then the Americans have plans to extradite a number of jihadists already in the U.K. who are being given the soft treatment by Britain straight to Guantanamo for life terms.

Either way, there are plans under way to oppose the softly-softly approach by some countries like Denmark which rehabilitates the jihadists and gives them new homes and a job. The crackdown both in the U.K. and in the U.S. is the start of a new ‘extremist’ approach for acts of terrorism. ISIS type terrorism requires extremist measures as it is unprecedented and many would argue the jihadists themselves would not consider leaving the U.K. to support the caliphate if there were not tough measures in place in the first place. Britain is trying to take the first steps to prevent radicalized Muslims taking advantage of liberal, cosmopolitan Britain to propel them into the arms of terror groups, on home soil or even abroad.

Britain is trying to take the first steps to prevent radicalized Muslims taking advantage of liberal, cosmopolitan Britain to propel them into the arms of terror groups, on home soil or even abroad.

But what Lina Khatib and Shiraz Maher both fail to grasp though is that even if it is racist, it was a failure of international law and racism in its most heinous form which maimed and killed U.K. citizens in a number of ISIS inspired attacks. Muslim commentators tend to forget that racism is not the exclusivity of Caucasians, as anyone in the Middle East who has experienced what a car bomb does to humble people shopping in malls will tell you.

If we are to ask the 22 families of the victims of the Manchester bombing their views, I’m sure they will find their loved ones being torn to pieces an act of appalling racism, given that it was orchestrated by a British Muslim of Libyan origin. It was his hideous indulgence in appalling racism and a flagrant lack of any laws which allowed him to murder those innocent concert goers, many of them young girls enjoying a night out.

There cannot be a greater racist organization than ISIL as, in fairness to those who play the racist card, it is equally forgotten that the biggest victim of jihadist terrorism is by far modest Muslims themselves, which is why Javid’s move is a curious one. It keeps Begum and her new born child in the Middle East which gives us all food for thought.

His approach might be illegal and deemed racist by some, but the alternative is that she comes to the U.K. and faces jail time, and that her tenure in prison is sensationalized both by media and U.K. Muslims and that, due to U.K. liberal views on those serving time (access to legal aid to fight appeals) she could well be a rod for the government’s back. She could also be an inspiration for other young girls and could even, in time, slip through the surveillance net and go back to her own ways.

We saw this with the case of Anjam Choudary who repeatedly ran a banned extremist organization in the U.K. for years before the law finally gave him a pathetic five year prison sentence, which he only served half of in reality. British extremists have repeatedly shown that they do not repent and merely exploit the liberal system – often living off benefits as many invariably do not work – for their own evil purposes.

Begum was a breaking point for the U.K. Something had to give and the government’s decision will no doubt send a message to immigrants who came to the U.K. from Bangladesh and other Muslim countries that even your own first generation British born children can lose their citizenship if they join terror groups which kills and maim U.K. citizens. It’s hardly ideal. But it’s a start of a much needed extremist reaction to ISIS type terrorism as many jihadists in the U.K. take advantage of the U.K.’s tolerance with heinous consequences, which is making Britain the laughing stock of many Arab countries.

My own personal view is that Javid’s reaction was actually quite moderate in that it keeps Begum from Guantanamo Bay or a ten year stretch in the U.K. prison system. A much tougher approach on U.K. jihadists – Anglo Saxon or Muslim country origin – would be to strip their families of all social benefits. I suppose the paid Arabists on the commentary circuit would no doubt find this racist as well. 

The debate on the U.S. withdrawal from Syria suffers from a couple of frequently repeated arguments that do not reflect the realities of the conflict, especially in northern Syria. Some argue that the U.S. should not abandon their allies on the ground and leave them to their fate, which would amount to a “betrayal of the Kurds.” This line of thinking makes a couple of flawed assumptions starting with equating the PKK’s Syrian affiliate the YPG with Syrian Kurds in general. The reality is that the YPG does not represent even the majority of the Kurds in Syria, nor are they reliable partners as they have been promoted. Since the beginning of the conflict, they refused to fight the Assad regime, maintained connections with Russia, and prolonged the anti-Daesh fight as much as possible to ensure the U.S. remained in Syria as their protectors.

The U.S. military has openly promoted the “accomplishments” of the Syrian Democratic Forces, a rebranding of the YPG, despite the fact that U.S. intelligence community as well as high-level officials have repeatedly admitted on the record that the YPG is the “Syrian militia” of the PKK. The U.S. military officials, especially those at CENTCOM, have expressed displeasure about Turkey as they have perceived Turkish efforts in northern Syria as hindering their anti-Daesh mission despite the fact that Turkey has been part of the anti-Daesh coalition from the beginning. Turkey’s reservations and repeated warnings against allying with the YPG seem to have been received by the U.S. military more as an annoyance than legitimate national security concerns of a NATO ally.

Some argue that the U.S. should not abandon their allies on the ground and leave them to their fate, which would amount to a “betrayal of the Kurds.” This line of thinking makes a couple of flawed assumptions starting with equating the PKK’s Syrian affiliate the YPG with Syrian Kurds in general.

The disconnect between the U.S. and Turkey on the YPG issue has widened and deepened in recent years. As both the Obama and Trump administrations adopted a policy of “by, with, and through” local partners to fight Daesh, Turkish concerns have been ignored until very recently. President Trump’s withdrawal decision created an opening for repairing the long-simmering tensions between the two countries contingent on a rethinking of the U.S. partnership with the YPG. In the early days of the decision, I commented that the withdrawal might not translate to an immediate halt to the U.S. support for the YPG. Today, all indications are that the U.S. policy planners are trying to convince Turkey to forego any potential military operations against the YPG once the U.S. leaves. However, Turkey’s refusal to commit to not fighting the Syrian branch of the PKK should surprise no one. While the “betrayal of the Kurds” argument might have some currency among at least some policymakers, reassuring a NATO ally should take priority.

Turkey has not only supported the U.S. withdrawal decision but also offered ways to make it an orderly and successful process by leaving no room for a political vacuum. Turkey’s insistence on establishing a safe zone along the border with Syria in the north aims to achieve two main goals, which would ensure its national security and allow for stability in the region. First, the YPG would no longer control the border, which would reassure Turkish security concerns about arms transfers into Turkey and the PKK control in the region. Second, significant numbers of refugees would be settled in northern Syria to relieve Turkey of some of the political burden of hosting more than 3.6 million refugees. From the American perspective, however, the safe zone appears to be a demarcation zone where Turkey and the YPG would be separated from each other so that the U.S. forces would not leave the YPG at the “mercy” of Turkey. Just as the two NATO allies’ approaches to the YPG has diverged, their conceptions of the function of the potential safe zone are not aligned. Once again, their basic disagreement about the YPG spells potential for disaster in bilateral relations.

By establishing a safe zone along the border with Syria in the north, Turkey aims to achieve two main goals: First, the YPG would no longer control the border, which would reassure Turkish security concerns about arms transfers into Turkey and the PKK control in the region. Second, significant numbers of refugees would be settled in northern Syria to relieve Turkey of some of the political burden of hosting more than 3.6 million refugees. 

It is time for a truly honest and in-depth strategic conversation between the two allies about the U.S. relationship with the YPG. Characterizing it as a tactical and temporary alliance will not suffice as the withdrawal discussions show that the U.S. feels it owes the YPG as if it is actually a strategic partner for the long haul. Turkey needs reassurance that this is not the case and the reassurance cannot be in words only. The U.S. policy planners need to make it clear to Turkey that they are not looking for ways to protect the YPG as part of their withdrawal plan.

The recent change in Ankara’s strategy towards certain terrorist organizations has been a game changer. Since 2016, Turkey has been rapidly eliminating FETO and Daesh threats. However, the policy shift and the effectiveness of the fight given against the PKK threat has been incredible so far.

The numbers regarding the counter-terrorism performance shared by Turkey’s Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu last week demonstrated how Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy has been functional in the fight against the PKK, particularly following the attempted military coup. Since the July 15 failed military coup attempt, Turkey has been revolutionizing its counter-terrorism strategy, especially in containing the PKK threat not only in Turkey but also in Syria and Iraq.

Ankara has made a drastic adjustment in its strategy towards the PKK. Before July 15, the PKK had found great opportunity to consolidate its military and political capacity to transform itself from a terrorist organization to an acceptable armed and political actor in Syria and Iraq. While the PKK has been enjoying the strategic advantages of the “reconciliation process” by reformulating its long-term strategy in Turkey, it has been repossessing its entire political and military organization and geopolitical agenda with the increasing international status notably gained following Daesh’s offense in Kobane (also known as Ayn al-Arab) in Syria and Iraq. The first attempt to achieve a territorial autonomy (known as democratic autonomy) in Turkey has failed due to Turkey’s active counter-terrorism strategy and has been territorially contained by Turkey’s military offensive in Syria and Iraq later on.

The success of Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy was shaped by three revolutionary steps; the paradigm shifts in counter-terrorism strategy, security sector reform following the failed military coup, and the changing military strategy in tactical and operational level on the ground against the PKK. Besides these steps, one of the most important driving factors behind this success is the political decisiveness in sustaining a counter-terrorism campaign against the PKK. Undoubtedly, President Erdogan’s leadership role has been playing a vital role in consolidating the political determination of Turkey.

The success of Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy was shaped by three revolutionary steps; the paradigm shifts in counter-terrorism strategy, security sector reform following the failed military coup, and the changing military strategy in tactical and operational level on the ground against the PKK.

Firstly, Turkey’s new counter-terrorism strategy integrates and synchronizes political, security, economic, and the technological components that reinforce the state as the ultimate legitimate authority over the population while reducing PKK influence over the Kurdish population, particularly. This was primarily the case following the collapse of the peace process in 2015. The counter-terrorism strategy was designed to simultaneously protect the population from PKK violence in city centers and strengthened the capacity of the state institutions to marginalize the PKK’s perception in the eyes of the local people. Especially the process of de-PKKization of the municipalities was one of the most important strategic decisions taken by the government to undermine the PKK’s mobilization activities, particularly in the economic, political and military domains.     

The changing understanding regarding the reformulation of the military operation modality is another revolutionary step in containing the PKK threat. Until recently, Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy had been based on one-dimensional strategic calculation aimed to prevent the terrorist attacks conducted by the PKK against the military and security units, especially in the South-eastern part of Turkey where the PKK’s main terrorist campaign takes place. This one-dimensional counter-terrorism strategy is based on the action-reaction operational model in which security forces usually carry a reactionary military operation following the terrorist attack against any target in a specific geographical zone.

The new counter-terrorism strategy, however, is based on non-stop anti-terrorist security and military operations not only in city centers where the PKK-affiliated persons might live but also in rural areas. More importantly, the preemptive operational model that aims to neutralize the PKK threat in its base has become the central operational mentality for Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy.

Turkey’s new counter-terrorism strategy is based on non-stop anti-terrorist security and military operations not only in city centers where PKK-affiliated persons might live but also in rural areas. 

According to figures shared by Minister Soylu, Turkish Security Forces carried out 87,838 operations against the PKK in 2018. As a result of the anti-terrorism operations in 2018, Turkish security forces have neutralized 1,289 terrorists. The percentage of the operations carried by Turkish security forces is also remarkable compared to previous years. Turkish security forces have increased counter-terrorism operations in rural areas by 173 percent over the last two years.

Turkey’s superiority in terms of surveillance technology and advanced intelligence capacity also facilitated the effectiveness of its counter-terrorism strategy and helped to prevent potential PKK attacks. Thanks to the strong intelligence network among the state security institutions and efficiency of the intelligence information shared in the operational domain, 100 senior terrorists were neutralized in 2018, including those who were listed under the red, blue, and grey categories of the most wanted terrorist list. In 2017, for instance, the PKK planned 965 armed attacks. However, this figure dropped to 677 in 2018 demonstrating the impact of Turkey’s effectiveness in military intelligence. More importantly, while the PKK conducted 250 improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in 2017, the number of IED attacks in rural areas decreased to 148 in 2018.

According to figures shared by Minister Soylu, Turkish Security Forces carried out 87,838 operations against the PKK in 2018. As a result of the anti-terrorism operations in 2018, Turkish security forces have neutralized 1,289 terrorists.

Recruitment is also vital to the PKK’s survival to sustain its terrorist campaign and propaganda. However, the numbers show that the PKK has not been effective in recruiting new fighters because of the counter-narrative program of Turkey. This is the new face of the Turkish counter-terrorism strategy in containing PKK influence over the Kurdish population. Turkey’s effective control of public space and improved population-centric counter-terrorism understanding, the PKK lost its efficiency in delivering its propaganda. The number of terrorists recruited to compensate for others killed during the counter-terrorism operations is in decline. Participation in PKK events has reached its lowest level in the last 30 years. In 2016, while the total number of terrorist recruitment was 3,881, only 95 joined to the ranks of PKK in 2018.

The security sector reform process adopted following the July 15 failed military coup attempt is another driving factor that positively shaped Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy. While the relocation of the Gendarmerie under the Ministry of the Interior was an act strengthening the effectiveness of the internal counter-terrorism operations, the Turkish Armed Forces found a great opportunity to focus on extra-territorial counter-terrorism operations against the PKK, particularly in Iraq, which operationally prevented the terrorist organization to find extra space for maneuver to infiltrate into Turkey.

More importantly, the institutional reformulation of the Village Guards (VG) in counter-terrorism operations facilitated the effectiveness of internal operations in rural areas. The numbers show the increasing effectiveness of the Village Guards in fighting against the PKK. While the number of Village Guards reached 52,395 (plus 19912 volunteers) in 2018, the average age among the village guards decreased to 32. This is not limited to the increasing number of the VG; their technological capacity and training programs were also reformulated and improved following the new requirements of the PKK’s threat.

The harmonization of the technological capacities of different state/security institutions is also a critical infrastructure investment that Turkey has been doing since 2015. The reformulation of intelligence sharing, improvement of joint operation room and joint operational information mechanism facilitated the joint counter-terrorism operations. The number of professionals in Gendarmerie is 65 %, which is incredibly high as compared to previous years. To detect and end terrorist mobilization, especially in special counter-terrorism operations, drone technology provided Turkey another great opportunity in containing the PKK threat. Except for the TAF’s drone capacity, the drone capacity of the Ministry of Interior has increased 50 percent over the last two years. This is especially vital in creating a joint security umbrella to sustain active intelligence and rapid reaction against the PKK.

Turkey is revolutionizing its counter-terrorism strategy not only against the PKK in Turkey but also against other terrorist organizations in Syria and Iraq. The new face of terrorism and changing dynamics in the Middle East are likely to push Turkey to revolutionize its military engagements in the near future.  

The final declaration of the Istanbul summit, which included Turkey, Russia, Germany, and France was interpreted by some authorities as Turkey having changed its Syria policy. The reason for those comments was the insistence of Russia and France to include the Assad regime in the process of democratic transition in Syria and Turkey’s silence on the Russian and French demand on that matter.

In effect, during the summit Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan clearly expressed that for Syria to transit to a democracy, Assad had to leave his seat and the future of Syria had to be decided by the Syrian people, including the opposition groups and civilians which now reside outside of the country. Almost 3,5 million of them have taken refuge in Turkey from the start of the civil war.

Indeed, Turkey has followed the policy of regime change or democratic transition from the very beginning of the Arab Revolt in Syria. The inclusion of Assad to the process of democratic transition does not necessarily mean that Turkey’s policy on Syria has changed. To remind the reader, once the toppling of the Assad regime by the opposition through a military struggle proved impossible, especially with the Russian intervention in September 2015 and the U.S.’s policy shift of seeking regime change in Syria to providing support to the YPG against Daesh, the political solution to the Syrian crisis has become more salient. Turkey, to an extent, has conceded to a shift from a military to political solution to the Syrian crisis.

Turkey still maintains its position at the outset to remove the Assad regime in Syria. What has changed is merely the path towards that end, the political solution replaced the military solution to the crisis.

However, it can’t be argued that shifting from military to political means constitutes a policy change. The policy change does include not a change in means but a change in ends. Turkey still maintains its position at the outset to remove the Assad regime in Syria. What has changed is merely the path towards that end, the political solution replaced the military solution to the crisis.

Turkey’s current policy towards Syria is shaped around preparing the ground for political change, shift from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one. The final step for ending the crisis in Syria harbors holding free elections in the country, which is expected to be resulted with the loss of Assad and its supporters since they constitute the minority. For that goal, Turkey has been struggling to sustain and enlarge its military presence in the country.

Turkey’s military operations in Syria – Operation Euphrates Shield and Operation Olive Branch – to purge terrorist groups from Jarabulus and Afrin respectively and the Idlib concord with Russia to protect civilians in the region and the Manbij concord with the U.S. to cleanse the region from the terrorist elements can be mentioned in this context.

Turkey’s policy of keeping and enlarging its military presence in Syria has two aims: Sustaining Turkey’s national security against YPG and Daesh terror and achieving democratic change in Syria.

More, President Erdogan declared that after Manbij, Turkey will hold another large-scale military operation towards the east of the Euphrates in order to dismantle terrorist elements from the region. This will also serve the same purpose of sustaining and enlarging Turkey’s military presence in Syria to make possible the political solution to the crisis. Having military presence on the ground and transferring it to political force at the table constitutes Turkey’s current policy towards the Syrian crisis.

Thus, Turkey’s military operation in northern Syria cannot be reduced to its struggle with the YPG. This policy of keeping and enlarging Turkey’s military presence serves for a double purpose: Sustaining Turkey’s national security against YPG and Daesh terror and achieving democratic change in Syria. It includes both defensive and revisionist goals. However, Turkey’s revisionism in Syria should not be interpreted as territorial expansion. One of the clauses of the declaration of the Istanbul summit clearly expresses that Syrian territorial integrity is to be respected and maintained. All countries signing the declaration agree on that Syria should continue its sovereign independence.

Turkey’s position in Syria should not be interpreted as territorial expansion. One of the clauses of the declaration of the Istanbul summit clearly expresses that Syrian territorial integrity is to be respected and maintained.

Nevertheless, it is still not clear that whether the two great powers, the U.S. and Russia, and Iran as well, will adjust to that policy of democratization in Syria. Turkey and European countries, especially Germany, will seek to end the crisis in Syria by finally democratizing the country. Both countries have borne the brunt of the undemocratic political conditions in Syria. Germany suffers from the refuge flood whereas Turkey suffers from both refuge flood and terrorist threats.

In the first year of President Trump’s tenure, Turkish-American relations went through what we can call a period of “sizing up,” as hopes for a new beginning were somewhat moderated by strategic challenges. The Trump administration had inherited the Obama policy of supporting “local forces” (read YPG) against Daesh with no U.S. boots on the ground save for the “military advisors.” Turkey was patient in Trump’s first year to allow the administration some time to re-evaluate the mission and start working with Turkey instead of the PKK’s Syrian branch. When it became clear that the Trump administration would settle on the same policy, Turkey launched a military operation in Afrin to ensure the YPG forces would not go west of the Euphrates river.

The serious divergence on the ground in northern Syria has continued, but efforts to put the U.S.-Turkey relationship back on track also continued, as outstanding legal cases (Brunson and Zarrab cases) were compartmentalized away from broader policy questions. However, the pressure from the Evangelical base of the Trump administration led to an ill-timed ultimatum by President Trump and Vice President Pence, resulting in yet another bilateral crisis.

As a result of the pressure, the U.S. imposed sanctions against Turkish ministers and additional steel and aluminum tariffs, a first against a NATO ally. These measures appeared to be largely symbolic, but they had a serious impact on the Turkish Lira’s devaluation against the U.S. dollar. As Turkey refused to bow down to such economic pressures, the relationship came to the brink of total breakdown. Clearly, the Brunson case was a major catalyzer in this process, but the underlying strategic disagreements and the already existing mutual distrust has created a fertile ground for a major crisis.

With the Turkish courts deciding to release Pastor Brunson last week, however, an important new phase might just be starting in the bilateral relationship. Brunson’s return to the U.S. and President Trump’s hosting of the pastor in the oval office with high level administration officials sends a strong message to the Evangelical base ahead of the midterm elections in November.

Not that Trump risked losing the support of the Evangelicals, but Brunson’s return gives his standing with Evangelical supporters a big boost. Turkish leadership has maintained the legal process played itself out and both sides insisted there was no specific deal. We should note that there does not need to be a deal for this development to have a positive impact on the U.S.-Turkey relationship.

The fact that a legal case derailed the relationship between two NATO allies should give everyone a pause. It underscores the complexity of the strategic environment in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood and heightened security concerns Turkey feels as a result of U.S. policies in the region. President Trump’s positive remarks about Turkey reflect his concern over his standing with the Evangelical voters, but this will not be enough for a broader strategic conversation between the U.S. and Turkey.

The recent changes in the U.S. Syria policy have given at least a limited amount of reassurances to Turkey that its interests would be taken into consideration more carefully. The U.S. rhetorical support for Turkey against an imminent military operation against Idlib was a welcome development in this sense. Yet, without a more comprehensive policy coordination between two sides, the mutual skepticism will continue, especially as the U.S. continues to support the YPG.

The upside for the relationship is that the “sizing up” period may be over and both sides are much clearer about their positions. The ambiguities regarding northern Syria as well as the uncertain fate of the Brunson case are no longer excuses for the lack of an honest dialogue. The regional crises will almost certainly create new challenges and the U.S.-Turkey ties will be tried. The lesson from the Brunson case is that Turkey will not bow to threats and pressures, and that the U.S. will need to pursue diplomatic options instead. Going forward, a talk-first-shoot-later approach will have to win for a healthier U.S.-Turkey relationship.

This year the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to two people – a victim of sexual assault and a doctor that treats victims of sexual assault. The prize was not awarded to a victim or an institution fighting such assaults in Europe or the U.S. However, with reference to the world statistics provided on cases of sexual abuse, the old and new continents show similar rates of sexual violence.

For instance, in Sweden, a total of 7,726 rape cases were recorded in 2017. When considering the 2016 record of rape cases, Sweden ranks the world’s second country in which rape cases occurred the most. Or, according to a study conducted by the Thomas Reuters Foundation, the U.S. ranks third in the list of the world’s most dangerous countries for women (2018). Also, according to the French Institute for Demographic Studies (INED), 580,000 women and 197,000 men were subject to various forms of sexual violence in France throughout 2015, while more than 60,000 women were harassed or raped. Bear in mind that all these odious incidents took place in an environment of peace and order, not in times of war or conflict.

Undoubtedly, there are numerous people and institutions in the West striving for the rehabilitation of the victims or resisting and acting against sexual violence. The Nobel Peace Prize could and should have been awarded to one of them. This would have at least given the opportunity to re-discuss the obsolete theories of the Freud school on “sexual repression and its consequences.” Although the theory collapsed long ago, since nothing seems to have been repressed in Europe for the past 50 years, the award could have paved the way for a new discussion platform on this issue.

This year’s Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to an Iraqi Yazidi woman, Nadia Murad, who was abducted by Daesh in 2014, and who was subject to sexual violence, and to Dr. Denis Mukwege, who has been treating women who have been subject to sexual violence in Congo since 1999. Statements made by the Norwegian Nobel Committee illustrate that these two names were chosen in order to raise awareness for sexual violence and the use of sexual violence as a weapon in wars or conflicts. If the Committee really had this intention, then the prize should have been awarded in a way to accentuate the situation in countries that are not in war.

Of course, Murad’s and Mukwege’s experiences are unbearable and the duty they take on is virtuous. However, it does not seem a mere coincidence that the issue is finally linked to the terrorist group, Daesh, which is pointed as an example of Islam by all Islamophobics, including academics, politicians, and journalists.

On the other hand, it is ironic that Western countries raise awareness against violence through Africa – a continent they colonized and exploited for centuries. Besides, the world media never mentions the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a terror group that has been active for 30 years, and is no less violent than Daesh.

Is anyone familiar with the LRA, which operates in Uganda, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and which has the aim of establishing a theocratic Christian state? They cut people’s limbs using the machetes they accept as sacred and introduce the children they abduct to their violent activities by forcing them to slice their families.

The group also enslaves women and is accepted as the leading child abusive organization in the world. Founded in 1987, with the aim to establish an order in compliance with the Ten Commandments, the LRA is responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths and displacements in Uganda, Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Its leader Joseph Kony, is sought for war crimes including sexual slavery, rape, torture and kidnapping. The limited number of news reports published about the organization never link it to Christianity or the Bible, as opposed to the millions of analogies between Islam and terror made through the Daesh case. When the LRA is occasionally mentioned, it is referred to as a mystic rebel group.

Despite the Nobel Prize, the name of the group, which was storming the world media until a few years ago, was not brought up. Instead, the general title of “war and rape” was employed since everyone, including the troops sent by the UN and other state forces, were involved in rape cases during the civil war in Congo.

The Nobel Peace Prize is already a controversial one. Irish writer Bernard Shaw once said: “I can forgive Alfred Nobel for having invented dynamite, but only a fiend in human form could have invented the Nobel Prize.” Sweden and Norway, whose colonialist past in Africa has only been brought to the agenda recently, have drown attention with their humanitarian aid organizations in the continent over the last 50 years. Well, they could share the Nobel Peace Prize among themselves. If the aim is to give a message against sexual violence, it is still no problem. Now the message of “Daesh and Africa, the continent of civil wars” are extremely perfunctory even in today’s post-truth world.

“Why does Islam scare the French?”, “All the disturbing facts about Islam,” “Islam and violence,” “Islam and the communitarianism threat,” “Islamophobia,” “The Republic against Islam,” “The Christians against Islam,” “Middle East, Israel, Islam,” “Our financial and Islamist enemies…”

These captions about Islam and Muslims are from the front covers of two French weeklies, namely Le Point and L’express – published only within a year. If you still don’t get enough dose of Islamophobia after reading these two, (because weekly magazines have higher circulations than daily newspapers in France), take a look at the other weekly or monthly magazines, daily newspapers and TV programs.

Consider also the remarks of the prominent intellectuals in the country, such as Alain Finkelkraut, Eric Zemmur, Robert Badinter, Plantu, Houllebecq and others… Or, listen to the politicians other than Marine Le Pen, including the representatives of right, left, and center groups. It is highly possible to find a whole slew of phobic hints between their lines.

After acquiring Islamophobic tendencies, it is time to get bolder. As Elizabeth Badinter argues, “one should not be afraid of being called Islamophobic and condemned for that.” After all these manipulations, it’s time to develop your own ideas, voice your own apprehensions and anxiety, make judgements without hesitation, and fabricate new fears.

In such a country, a report entitled “The Islamist Factory” was released instead of something called “The Islamophobic Factory.” Although Hakim El Karoui, a Franco-Tunisian consultant, presented in the liberal Montaigne Institute his third report under this title, the 617-page report focuses on “Islam.” His aim is to conduct a study on how to form a “French Islam” upon the demand of his old colleague President Emmanuel Macron from their years in Rothschilds’, and organize and finance the religion of Islam in a way to break the effect of Islamism in France.

When it comes to the report and Karoui’s approach, the interviews he formerly gave provide some clues. In one of his interviews, Karoui is asked: “60 percent of the Muslims believe that wearing headscarf should be allowed in schools. Isn’t this a failure?” And he answers: “No, everyone has respected and conformed to the laws. But as Marcel Gauchet says, there is a phenomenon of individualization in social relations. They regard the headscarf as a symbol of belonging, which is actually a success of the Islamists, just like the issue of halal meat. In France, 40 percent of the Muslims think that eating halal meat is among the five pillars of Islam, which is absolutely wrong.”

Although the report emphasizes that its primary purpose is to avert radicalization through the power that Islamic doctrines like Wahhabism and Salafism enjoy on social media and financial support of a number of countries, the general tone of the report suggests much more. The leading questions in the case study published in the report include the issues such as the headscarf, halal meat, virginity, obedience to men and frequency of mosque visits. It also sketches a crude outline of the view of Muslims on world politics and anti-Semitism and the countries that they are antagonistic to.

Everything presented in the report is intertwined together with a plain logic. In another interview, Karoui says: “25 percent of the Muslims in the country are against the Republican values,” whereas the newspaper interpreted this as a “shock.” While referring to the Republican values, Karoui surely means secularism a la French. Accordingly, the secularism experience of France shows that what is actually desired is an “invisible and indiscernible Islam.” Former Interior Minister Jean Pierre Chenevement, who was elected as the chair of a foundation that was established to invent a French-style Islam two years ago, summed up the situation as follows: “Muslims should freely live their faith but since we are going through hard times, they should not be very visible in public spaces.”

Associating a terror group with Islam is scandalous. Would have DAESH been called a “humanist terror group” had the group defined itself as a humanist organization fighting for human rights? Asking Muslims to be less visible in the public by departing from this shows the absurdity of the situation. As for the report, there are undoubtedly serious differences between a Muslim performing the rules of Islam and a religious belief developed by the hybrid identities in-between the West and Islam amid the dynamics and problems of the modern world that is completely disconnected from traditions.

But when looked at the Muslims through the perspective of Republican values and secularism, a mindset that does not differentiate these two or three is prevalent, which is called Islamophobia. Since this factory is operating full-time, it is not a surprise that some other doctrines have been emerging simultaneously. These two are fueled by the same engine, both the secularist world and Salafi and Wahhabi doctrines are in a battle against traditional Islam.

The upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey will be held on June 24 – during the state of emergency. The U.S., UN, and the Council of Europe issued criticisms and warnings to Turkey with regard to this situation. Heather Nauert, the U.S. Department of State Spokesperson, stated upon a question: “During a state of emergency, it would be difficult to hold a completely free, fair and transparent election in a manner that’s consistent with … Turkish law and also Turkey’s international obligations … We have concerns about their ability to hold it during this type of state of emergency.” Following this, the UN also warned Turkey that the elections during a state of emergency will not be reliable. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called upon the Turkish government to lift the state of emergency to enable the credibility of the early elections. Meanwhile, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament Spokesperson referred to Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights and pointed out that a state of emergency cannot be implemented based on assumptions or possibilities, but that the danger is required to be present or tangible.

In France, the latest presidential elections were held during a state of emergency since a total of 241 people were killed in Daesh attacks in France from January 2015 to the election date. During the first Daesh attack in the country on November 13, 2015, 130 people were killed, upon which France declared a state of emergency nationwide. Although a state of emergency can last a maximum of 12 days in the country under normal conditions, it was extended on November 20, 2015, one week after the attacks, for three months and again extended for the second time until July 26, 2016. Following another Daesh attack that killed 84 people in Nice on July 14, 2016, it was extended for another six months. So, the state of emergency in France, which was extended four times, was lifted on November 1, 2017 – 719 days after its declaration.

Then, the emergency rule became the “new normal.” With the new security law signed by President Emmanuel Macron, which entered into force on October 30, 2017 and will expire in 2020, four rules that were in effect during the state of emergency passed into law. The new law restrains the ones linked to terror groups from going outside of their residential areas and introduces judicial control to them on a daily basis. Such individuals are also banned from entering certain areas. Besides, as in the emergency rule, the investigating authorities are entitled to search houses according to the new security law.

Some 25 mosques were closed during the state of emergency, and the law also authorizes the relevant bodies to shut down places of worship where extremist ideas are propagated. The law also allows identity checks in border areas or within a 10 km radius of airports and international stations. French Interior Minister Gerard Collomb said during a speech he made at the national parliament, “We are still in a state of war,” adding that the threat level was still “very serious.” Collomb also remarked that around 20.000 people were blacklisted and the officials who are thought to have been radicalized would be discharged.

So, why did Turkey declare a state of emergency? Daesh attacks in the country started back in 2014. Between 2015 and July, 2016, a total of 1864 people, including civilians, police and military officers, were killed in the attacks of Daesh and the PKK terror group. Despite all, Turkey did not declare an emergency rule. On the night of July 15, 2016, however, the Gulenist Terror Group (FETO) and its operatives who infiltrated the state apparatuses of the country attempted to stage a military coup. They held the Chief of General Staff hostage, opened fire on the National Intelligence Unit headquarters, attacked Special Forces, and shelled the Parliament. People took to the streets all across the country to resist, remained on vigil in front of military posts and stood before tanks. 248 people were killed while 2.200 were wounded. Most of the wounded suffered loss of limb. Meanwhile, the PKK’s Syrian offshoot operated as the land force of the U.S., who is an ally of Turkey.

In the Ottoman Code of Civil Law (Mecelle), which was finalized in 1876, there is a rule: “Bad examples do not serve as models.” I recalled the French case in view of this rule. In proportion to the terror attacks in France, the 719-day long emergency state and the normalization of the emergency rule through new laws set a bad example to the world. On the other hand, what Turkey has gone through over the past years, including the threats posed by Daesh, PKK, FETO and various external factors, is incomparable to the incidents in France. In Turkey, the state of emergency was declared on July 16, 2016 on the grounds of Article 120 of the Turkish Constitution. And on April 19, the Turkish Parliament voted to extend it for the sixth time by July 22, 2018.

The PKK terror group and all of its offshoots use women not only as suicide bombers, but also as propaganda tools in order to soften their negative images among global audiences. Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, particularly female members of the PKK have become famous under the mask of their combat against Daesh in northern Syria. Accordingly, even their uniform, for example, became fashionable and were sold by H&M’s clothing retailer chains. At that time, some rumors about female terrorists were also quite sensational – such as male Daesh fighters being afraid to combat the female branch of the PKK, because they believed that those killed by women will go to hell. The Independent covered this story referring to a PKK-affiliated YPG female member. It does not matter whether it is true or not, it became obvious that it was just an ‘interesting’ story to cover for the media, as long as you ignore the bloody face of the PKK.

Although listed as a terror group by many Western states and Western-based institutions such as NATO and the EU, various Western media outlets have paved the way for the PKK and its offshoots to feature in their reports within a positive and overwhelmingly feministic image. It seems that it is not an aimless effort. Rather, it even may be a conscious editorial policy in order to moderate the image of the PKK and the YPG in the eyes of the global media audience and then open the matter of its illegal status to discussion (and reappraisal). Therefore, the PKK has chosen a feminist discourse in an effort to gain more support from the “free world.”

In 2015, for example, alongside many newspapers such as the Guardian, Daily Mail, even the BBC, made numerous reports about YPJ members and their “heroic” fight against Daesh in Syria. As an example, in 2014, the British broadcaster filmed a short documentary titled ‘Who are the female fighters of the PKK?’ and the following year it published a picture gallery headlined ‘PKK fighters prepare for battle with IS.’ While the first one claims that nearly 40% of PKK members are women with a lot of footage showing them singing, smiling and enjoying their lives, the second one focuses on the personal stories of female members. They literally resemble them as if they are at a girl’s school, although the topic in discussion is an organization that has carried out numerous bloody attacks on officials and civilians on European and Turkish soil.

In fact, this made-up image is not new. Under the rule of Abdullah Ocalan, who has been in prison since 1999, the PKK attempted to reinvent itself as ‘a social movement with self-administration at a local level, an alternative type of economy, ecologism and feminism as central pillars.’ In addition, Jenna Krajeski, an Istanbul-based journalist, conducted an interview with Sebahat Tuncel, a politician under investigation due to suspected links with the PKK, who named the group a feminist movement and its leader Ocalan a feminist. Moreover, a New York Times article, dated January 29, 2018, written by Nujin Derik, a female YPG member, again writes about how female members of the YPG were ‘instrumental in the defense of Kobane and the liberation of Raqqa – where a major objective was the freeing of the Yazidi women the jihadists had taken there as slaves.’ However, the other side of the medallion is completely different, as seen in the PKK’s misuse of females and its emotional exploitation of femaleness.

The other side of the medallion

The PKK has carried out suicide attacks through female members in many cases. Zeynep Kinaci is known to be the first instance of the PKK using a pregnant woman as a suicide bomber. She killed six Turkish soldiers on June 30, 1996. A few months later, Leyla Kaplan, while pregnant, triggered explosives at a police department in Adana. She reportedly witnessed beforehand a PKK male commander execute a young woman who had denied to carry out the bombing. In the 1990s, female terrorists had performed 11 of the PKK’s 15 suicide attacks in Turkey. The latest example was on January 28, when Avesta Khabur, a 20-year-old from the YPG’s women unit YPJ, blew herself up targeting a Turkish battle tank and soldiers in Syria’s Afrin. After the attack, her unit called her “a model of free Kurdish women,” likening her to prior female PKK suicide bombers.

It is such a contradiction for a self-proclaimed ‘feministic’ organization to use its women members as suicide bombers, whether they are pregnant or not. This is not just limited to these events. The women have also been abused by male members of the PKK. According to a report by the Interior Ministry of the Republic of Turkey, the PKK regards the family as an institution of the feudal system and Abdullah Ocalan expressed that women shouldn’t be limited to a single male.

Many high-ranking leaders of the group, including Ocalan, sexually abused women who were subsequently executed due to false accusations of being agents. In late 1984 (or early 1985), Saime Askin, a senior female member and harsh critic of sexual abuse in PKK ranks, faced execution in the group’s Lolan camp based in Iraq. Besides, the Report on Trafficking in Persons issued by the U.S. State Department claimed that the YPG, the Syrian wing of the PKK, continues to recruit and use boys and girls, including children under the age of 15. In a similar vein, the Human Rights Watch’s interviews reveal that many children appeared in the YPG’s “youth centers” without the knowledge of their families. Families later found out that their children were forcibly recruited by the YPG. Since 2012, the group has used boys and girls under the age of 18 at checkpoints and bases in the Afrin, Kobane and Jazira cities of Syria.

Apparently, the outlawed PKK uses women not only as suicide bombers but also abuses and even executes them if they oppose the decisions of their so-called “top leaders.”  Furthermore, the organization emotionally exploits ‘femaleness’ by instrumentalizing female members as means of propaganda. Its feminist discourse makes the group in no way innocent, but the female-dominated portrayal of the PKK has already earned sympathy in the Western world. The PKK’s bloody face against the Turkish state, Turkish and Kurdish civilians and even its own members who oppose the group cannot be justified by the media. Shouldn’t the international media take action against these human rights abuses instead of praising them? Doesn’t the indifferent attitude of the media agents, which falsely portray the women in the PKK, mean that they are playing an indirect role in crimes committed by the terrorist organization? These are questions that are worthy of extensive thought.

It was only in January when former Secretary of State Tillerson announced a Syria policy with several goals (ensuring no return of Daesh, countering Iran, and the return of refugees) but with no clear strategy to achieve them. President Trump made his views known at least partially by removing Tillerson not long afterward. Following the Pompoe and Bolton appointments, President Trump just announced last week that the U.S. would pull out of Syria “very soon.” Tillerson’s policy announcement had suggested an open-ended U.S. military commitment in Syria but Trump’s statement refers back to his campaign rhetoric that promised overwhelming firepower against Daesh yet saw Syria as somebody else’s problem.

Ironically, the Obama administration had refused to intervene in Syria early in the conflict until the emergence of Daesh, to which it responded with a policy of supporting “local partners” such as the YPG in northern Syria. Trump continued this policy because he wanted to declare victory against Daesh but has not created a major initiative to resolve the Syrian crisis. Trump did not seem to mind that Russia and other regional powers like Turkey took the lead in the diplomatic track. While U.S. military leaders and diplomats criticized Turkey’s most recent Afrin operation, President Trump himself avoided any public comments on the issue. Clearly, this policy disconnect between the White House, Pentagon and the State Department is partially responsible for these differences but it is also because Trump is not committed to Syria for the long haul.

If he follows through with his promise despite grumblings from U.S. military leaders on the ground about the lack of strategy and an early withdrawal, President Trump will actually be more in line with the public opinion that does not see the Syrian civil war as America’s problem but is willing to tolerate a campaign against Daesh without a long-term commitment. Many foreign policy analysts have questioned the wisdom of withdrawing from Iraq prematurely and not intervening in Syria early in the conflict. However, it seems that the somewhat conflicted American public opinion that sees a need in fighting Daesh but is against serious military commitments in the Middle East wins the day for both Presidents Obama and Trump.

Of course, geopolitics and strategic interests have a way of undermining the weight of public opinion and presidents often prioritize national interests, which they sometimes have the luxury of defining. Both Obama and Trump defined defeating Daesh as national interest but Syria’s stability was not a core U.S. interest. During the campaign, Trump had benefited immensely from his tough talk on Daesh while criticizing the Iraq war (albeit belatedly). His latest announcement about getting out of Syria is reminiscent of his predecessor’s approach as well as a reflection of the American public’s non-interventionist inclination.

It remains to be seen whether, when and how Trump may be able to end U.S. military presence in Syria. For this to happen, the Trump administration would have to define what the primary U.S. national interest in the region is. For the new comers to his administration, the answer is Iran and they may argue that being in Syria is essential to countering Iran among other goals. On Iran, Trump will likely pull the U.S. out of the nuclear deal but it is not clear whether the administration will seek to create a comprehensive policy to counter or contain Iran. It may just be that Trump orders U.S. troops out of Syria without a larger Syria policy. Similarly, he might pull the U.S. out of the nuclear deal without an Iran policy in place. This would mean more uncertainty for the region. This would also mean the continuation of the weakening U.S. leadership in the Middle East trend but it may just be what Trump would label as “America First.” And perhaps, that’s what many Americans want.

The U.S. and Turkey have been pursuing conflicting strategies in northern Syria for a while now. Turkey adamantly pursued to end the U.S. support for the YPG while the Trump administration has seen the group as its “local partner” in the coalition’s anti-Daesh efforts. Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch has recently ended the YPG’s control over Afrin, a city in which the U.S. has declared no interest but expressed “concern” about the Turkish operation. While Turkey is focused on clearing its borders from the YPG and Daesh, the U.S. is insisting that Turkish military operations distract from the fight against Daesh.

The strategies of the two countries diverge from one another so much that they carry the potential to come head to head in Manbij. However, negotiations in bilateral strategy talks, a mechanism established following the former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster and Secretary of State Tillerson’s visits to Turkey, could yield a cooperation deal in Manbij, which could potentially be broadened. In such an optimistic scenario, the anti-Daesh fight would actually be strengthened while Turkey’s security concerns vis-à-vis the YPG could be met. A deal that pushes the YPG back east across the Euphrates and establishes a U.S.-Turkey coordinated patrol of Manbij can be the basis of broadened cooperation in northern Syria.

Today, Turkey is pushing the U.S. to end the YPG control in Manbij, a promise made by Vice President Joe Biden under the Obama administration. The capture of the town was so alarming that Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield in August 2016, only a month after the failed coup attempt of July 2016, in order to prevent further spread of the YPG control in the area. For Turkey, the PKK was trying to accomplish what it could not inside Turkey by creating an autonomous zone in northern Syria through the YPG. By intervening for the first time militarily in Syria, Turkey took the matter into its own hands as multiple U.S. reassurances about the short-term and tactical nature of its support for the YPG did not materialize.

Turkey has been able to change the strategic environment on the ground through its military operations at the expense of both the YPG and Daesh. Clearing its border from both terrorist organizations seems to be its current strategy. The U.S. strategy only partially overlaps with the Turkish strategy but that could be considered as a glass half full. Through an arrangement as described above, diversification of the governing structure of Manbij more representative of the ethnic makeup of the area could be accomplished. U.S.-Turkey military cooperation in patrolling the city can be a trust building measure. Such success in Manbij would not erase the overall strategic differences between the two allies but it would pave way for a broader and meaningful strategic conversation.

The U.S.-Turkey strategic realignment will be very difficult to achieve as the U.S. keeps its exclusive focus on Daesh while ignoring Turkey’s legitimate security concerns regarding the YPG. However, if Manbij can serve as a success story of military and political cooperation on the ground, both Ankara and Washington can build upon it. Regular strategic conversations to coordinate policy are a must between the American and Turkish governments and it can start with Manbij. This is true not only for their Syria policies but other regional issues as well.

As the Trump administration is gearing up to pull the U.S. out of the Iran nuclear deal, a new era of uncertainty and tensions will likely emerge. President Trump has championed “America first,” a slogan that at times manifested itself as unilateralism in foreign policy. The recent addition of the Pompeo-Bolton duo to the administration promises more unilateralism than multilateralism. The administration will likely find an unwilling Europe to corner Iran, and Turkey is not likely to take a confrontational stand against Iran. Yet, if the U.S. and Turkey can work together in northern Syria, they could broaden their regional strategic conversation that might also include Iran in the near future. A cooperation in Syria between two NATO allies is not a wishful thinking; it is a matter of whether they will.

President Trump’s dismissal of Rex Tillerson via a Twitter message together with the appointment of Mike Pompeo to head of the State Department has raised many questions about the future course of U.S. foreign policy. So far, the Trump administration has not exactly put its stamp on foreign policy and continued the Obama administration’s policies, perhaps with less micromanagement and more authority to the “generals.” Between his campaign promises and disdain for Obama’s foreign policy, Trump is not ready to settle for approaches favored by the “adults” in his administration. Tillerson for him was not the right man for the job of devising a Trumpian foreign policy.

In the anti-Daesh coalition efforts, the administration allowed CENTCOM to take the lead and continued the policy of allying with “local partners” (YPG) to defeat Daesh, resulting in tensions with NATO ally Turkey. Trump felt forced to continue the Iran deal, which has irritated him deeply as “ripping apart” the deal was a pronounced campaign promise. On North Korea, Trump sought to apply unprecedented pressure to force Kim Jong Un to come to the table through sanctions and with China’s help. These policies were not significantly different when compared with Obama’s, which is seen as having been bothering the president. It seemed like the Tillerson-Mattis duo was “watering down” Trump’s campaign promises and the maximalist positions he favored. Both on North Korea and Iran, Tillerson looked like he was charting a different path that did not exactly reflect the “Trump Doctrine.”

When Trump answered the journalists’ questions on Tillerson’s firing, he particularly emphasized that their differences on Iran was a major reason. Trump has long been unhappy with the nuclear deal as it signifies a major foreign policy accomplishment of Obama’s legacy. Tillerson, along with Secretary of State James Mattis, has opposed the U.S. pulling out of the agreement and Pompeo seems like the right choice to accomplish a renegotiation (which is unlikely) or simply, the U.S. pullout of the deal. Pompeo has been vocal about his critique of the deal and Trump said they shared the same “mindset” when it comes to Iran. Given their long-standing shared criticism of the deal, it has become very likely that the U.S. would end up pulling out of the deal all together.

When it comes to Syria, Pompeo appears to see it as an arena to confront Iran’s influence, yet similarly shows his concerns regarding the Russian support for the Assad regime either. He shares the same belief as Turkey in that the Assad regime is a source of instability and that U.S. interests will not be served as long as he remains in power. Trump in the past has sought to punish Assad for chemical attacks but refused to pursue a regime change in Syria. It is not entirely clear if Pompeo will try to convince Trump about the need to weaken the Assad regime as a way to reduce Iranian and Russian influence in Syria.

Tillerson certainly seemed to understand Turkey’s concerns about the YPG and established a strategic dialogue mechanism to resolve the differences between the U.S. and Turkey. When asked about the issue in an American Enterprise Institute speech, Pompeo referred to the Pentagon’s commendable work in northern Syria but avoided addressing the “complications.” At the same time, there is no reason for Pompeo to prevent the strategic conversation from going forward. All indications are that he would share Tillerson’s willingness to work with Turkey and continue the discussions on the Manbij issue. Unless, of course, the Trumpian “unilateralism” renders forging a common approach with Turkey impossible.

We will most likely see the continuation of several policies particularly in Syria. However, U.S. foreign policy might become more Trumpian with the arrival of Pompeo. Although Pompeo may help bring a more aggressive posture, the American public’s low tolerance for large-scale military interventions might temper this tendency. Trump promised a heavy-handed approach against Daesh but he also championed non-interventionism by attacking the decision to invade Iraq. Trump most probably perceived Pompeo to be the right man to create and implement the Trump doctrine.

The PKK’s Syrian branch, the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD) has been elevated to the status of a major political actor just across the Turkish border. The organization had remained a low level one since its formation in 2003 by the PKK until the Syrian Civil War, which began in 2011. Its rise and spread has paralleled the rise and spread of the war in Syria with a short lag. The PYD developed a tacit mutual understanding with the Syrian regime forces and despite sporadical small scale clashes between them, the two parties tolerated each other as they prepared for a military encounter with the rebel forces. The growth of Daesh in Syria threatened both sides but it also created an opportunity for the illicit partnership of the regime and the PYD. As Daesh grew stronger in Syria, it militarily suppressed other rebel forces and became a “useful” enemy for both the regime and the PYD, as they depicted themselves as the only alternative to a future Syria ruled by Daesh brutality. Eventually Daesh was defeated and lost its strongholds on many fronts against Russia and Iran-backed regime forces, Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army and the U.S.-backed PYD.

While the PYD first expanded its territory with the withdrawal of regime forces starting from 2012, it gained further pockets of land with the erosion of Daesh control. As Daesh was losing ground, the PYD exponentially increased the amount of territory under its control. The organization happened to rule hundreds of thousands in four self-declared cantons: Cizire (Jazira or Al-Haseke), Euphrates (formerly Kobani or Ain al-Arab), Shahba (which is only partly under the PYD control) and Afrin. As Daesh lost its self-declared capital to the U.S.-backed YPG forces with interesting twists, now major cities and districts such as Raqqa, Manbij, Haseke, Kobani, Qamisli, Afrin, Tel Abyad, Tel Rifaat, are all fully or partially under the control of the PYD. Nevertheless, such a speedy expansion in land and resources was not a smooth process – it not only relied on U.S. military and diplomatic support but also on U.S. toleration of vast human rights violations, including ethnic cleansing via forced mass displacements.

In the summer of 2015, 15 Syrian rebel groups accused the PYD of deliberately displacing thousands of Arabs and Turkmens. A year later the Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported serious human rights abuses committed by the PYD, including torture in custody, which in some cases led to the death of the detained. Considering the fact that the HRW could only visit a limited area (only Jazira canton for the aforementioned report) due to security concerns, it begs further questions for areas where the PYD’s rule was and still is more contested and more controversial.

In an earlier account, the British daily newspaper, the Times, reported that “thousands of civilians have fled their homes in northern Syria as Kurdish forces carry out what appears to be a campaign of ethnic cleansing against Sunni Arabs.” The report refers to the PYD as “Kurdish forces” and this is problematic as the organization also has a reputation for suppressing any Kurdish organization that falls apart from the PKK’s pre-determined lines. The formerly mentioned HRW report indicated that not only non-Kurds but that Kurdish opposition members have also been “convicted in apparently unfair trials” by the PYD. This is no surprise to observers who already know that the PYD left no political network other than its own by targeting Iraq’s Kurdistan Democratic Party affiliates (i.e., the Kurdish National Council, KNC) in Syria.

The cases of vast human rights abuses committed by the PYD, specifically forced displacements, are not limited with the findings of HRW. In its report ‘US ally’s razing of villages amounts to war crimes,’ Amnesty International stated that by deliberately demolishing civilian homes, in some cases razing and burning entire villages, displacing their inhabitants with no justifiable military grounds, the Autonomous Administration [the PYD] is abusing its authority and brazenly flouting international humanitarian law, in attacks that amount to war crimes.” In order to reach this conclusion, Amnesty International did not only talk to locals but also used satellite images to see the full scale of the demolition, which showed almost entirely demolished villages.

As people escape from the brutality of war in order to keep their beloved ones in a safe distance, the incoming groups that fill the vacuum usually take advantage of such situations. As Syria Direct reported based on the statements of “Kurdish activists, residents and a police officer from Qamishli in northern Al-Hasakah,” according to the conscription regulations of the PYD, “real estate and other property belonging to residents who have fled the canton will be held by self-administration authorities, with any income, such as rent, generated by the holdings going to “develop the society.”” The same report, based on witness accounts, highlights the pattern of confiscation even for those who have not fled yet. As expressed by a witness, “At first, [the PYD’s Asayish branch] offered to rent the residence, but we refused,” then “they asked to buy it” but when the owners refused again, “The third time, they confiscated our [the owners’] apartment.” It is unfortunate that UN reports under-stress such immense human rights abuses by simply describing them as “some reports alleging forced displacements” and rationalizing the implementations that “reportedly looted houses belonging to Arab villagers” with references to the war conditions.

The PYD, under U.S. military and diplomatic protection, has committed vast human rights violations ranging from arming children to training them in terror camps. As of today, the entire PYD-controlled areas are full of PKK leader Ocalan’s posters along with dead suicide bombers who are called “heroes.” It is unfortunate that the PYD is cheered within international circles for its alleged “liberal values,” while in fact its school books are full of the jailed leader of an internationally recognized terrorist organization (see link for a sample textbook and witness accounts). It is also unfortunate that the very same totalitarian structure is celebrated for holding elections, which do not allow opposition parties to compete by torturing their members or arresting its leader. Despite the given double standards to the unconditional U.S. support for the PYD, and despite the politically guided one-sided media coverage of it, some reports could come out to show what lies beneath the mask. Nevertheless, these reports and accounts are just a drop in the bucket and more effort is needed to grasp the real reign on terror in northern Syria, not only for the displaced non-Kurdish people, but also, and especially, for Kurdish residents being forcefully conscribed to the ranks of the organization in their childhood.

On 20 January the Turkish Armed Forces started Operation Olive Branch, which aims to clear terrorists in the Afrin region of Syria.

While numbers vary, there are between 8,000-10,000 terrorists in the region. Approximately 700 of them have been neutralized since TAF began the operation.

Unlike the U.S., which has justified its cooperation with the PYD/YPG on the basis of “fighting against DAESH,” Turkey is fighting against all terrorist groups in Syria.

Despite the fact that Turkey called for the Trump administration to stop arming and assisting the YPG, the U.S. have remained doing so. Only recently during a phone call between the presidents of the two countries it was stated that Trump promised to stop arming the terrorist group.

Although it will take a matter of time to see whether the U.S. will keep its promise, the fact that the PYD/PKK and DAESH have agreed on a deal to fight together re-emphasizes the ignorance of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.

According to security sources as reported by the Anadolu Agency, in order to aid their fight against the Turkish Armed Forces and the Free Syrian Army, PYD/PKK released Daesh members from prisons in Afrin, Raqqa ad Deir ez-Zour on the basis that they fight against the Turkish forces.

Around 400 DAESH terrorists were taken to the town of Jinderes, south of Afrin.

The PYD/PKK convinced these Daesh terrorists by promising an end to their punishment, having their names struck off the terrorist list and ensuring that their home countries stop tracking them.

This not only re-iterates the argument made by the Turkish government that the U.S. ought to stop financing terrorism in order to fight against another form of terrorism, but also rebuts the absurd claims that Turkey was once apparently “helping ISIS [Daesh].”

During 2015 and 2016, Turkey confronted multiple and diverse terror threats. Over the course of these years, the outlawed PKK, DAESH and the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C) went beyond testing Turkey’s security capacity and dared to reach their separatist, extremist and diverse objectives with the attacks they organized. In a period during which an operational upper hand was accomplished against these terror groups, the July 15, 2016, coup attempt, orchestrated by the Fetullah Terror Organization (FETO), provided these groups with an opportunity to compensate their losses. Due to the lack of qualified human resources in state institutions in charge of counter-terrorism – a problem which emerged after the coup attempt – the PKK, whose urban attacks had been repelled, increased its mobilization in rural areas. More, the West, which not only failed to side with Ankara on issues such as migration, security and defense, but by debarring Turkey from technical amenities, also worsened the challenges Turkey faced in its fight against terrorism.

2017 has been a turning point for Turkey’s fight against terrorism as the diversity and differentiation of terror threats, the structural problems in security architecture and the lack of trust in international alliances forced Turkey to accelerate its efforts in this regard. While the problem of human resources was resolved, the lack of technical source was met with national sources.

What changed in counter-terrorism efforts in 2017?

During a speech he delivered at the Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard Academy on January 20, 2017, Turkey’s Minister of Interior Suleyman Soylu underlined that Turkey’s counter-terrorism efforts had entered an offensive phase. Throughout this year, counter-terror activities have been maintained within this direction and intelligence and operational efforts have gained an upper hand over the terrorist organizations.

As part of the operations launched in 2017, a total of 2,156 PKK militants have been rendered ineffective – 1,560 of these were killed, 238 apprehended and 358 surrendered. In addition, a total of 2,328 abettors were caught. These operations have primarily undermined the PKK’s human resources, a factor declining its mobility. More, the terror group lost its mobility to a great extent due to the loss of intelligence, logistic supply and financial resources that were cut by means of the apprehended abettors.

The Operation Euphrates Shield (OES) continued during the first three months of 2017 and ended the hybrid threats developed by DAESH against Turkey. Following the completion of the OES on March 30, 2017, the fight against DAESH continued through intelligence and law enforcement operations. Foreign fighters who tried to hide among the refugee population have become the main target of operations. The apprehended terrorists who fled through the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq were caught either inside the country or on the borders. With the preventative law enforcement operations organized in Ankara on May 21 and in Istanbul on October 27, DAESH attacks were prevented and their cells and connections were effectively destroyed. Throughout these operations, a total of 3,068 DAESH militants and adherents were rendered ineffective – 1,338 of them were killed while 1,730 were arrested.

In order to boost its international recognition by taking advantage of the Syrian Civil War, in addition with the efforts of some groups to create an unstable atmosphere in Turkey, DHKP-C also activated its militants over the past few years. 2017 has been a tough year for the DHKP-C since the group’s capacity to organize attacks has declined to the point of dissolution. DHKP-C militants, who endeavored to form a living space for themselves within various civil society organizations, began to leave Turkey as they suffered a great loss in their capacity due to the intelligence and law enforcement operations. A number of militants who attempted to flee to countries such as Greece, Belgium and Germany, were rendered ineffective on their way, while others were caught in cities including Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. As part of the operations against the terror group, one member was killed while a total of 129 DHKP-C terrorists were arrested.

Throughout 2017, attacks organized by terrorist organizations remained below their capacities in comparison to their attacks in 2015 and 2016. The PKK’s conventional attack threats in rural areas, which began in Spring 2017, were repelled due to intensive operational pressure from the Turkish military. Thus, by June, the number of attacks had decreased by a great extent. Due to the intensive law enforcement operations, DAESH and DHKP-C attacks in Turkey were also minimized to a mere zero-point. With well-timed and effective interventions, the attacking capacities of both groups were brought to an end. A DAESH attack, planned to take place on September 6 in Mersin province, was also prevented with a timely intervention.

As indicators reflect, counter-terrorism activities in Turkey have focused on operations against active armed militants and abettors of particular terrorist organizations. While it can be observed that the operations launched against the strategic, operative and tactical leaders of these groups have contributed to the fight against terrorism, their backgrounds need to be improved. As already known, with the aim to capture terrorists, a “wanted” list was issued in Turkey for the first time in September 2015. In this respect, those providing intelligence were rewarded. This wanted list categorizes terrorists into five color-coded groups – red, blue, green, orange and grey – depending on their threat level and positions within the organizational structures without making any distinction between the terrorist groups. As of November 2017, there were 14 terror groups and 791 terrorists on the list – 69 of these terrorists have been killed. When we focus solely on the PKK, DAESH and DHKP-C, the number of wanted militants decrease to 690. However, no change is observed in the number of terrorists rendered ineffective.

If we view Turkey’s fight against terrorism through this list, it can be observed that the government’s efforts have been more influential against leaders on a tactical rather than strategic and operative level. While it is somewhat easier to deal with leaders on the tactical level due to the operational upper hand, the greatest challenge encountered in dealing with strategic and operative terrorist leaders is the fact that these individuals are protected in foreign countries. The capacities to reach and engage with these leaders therefore ought to be improved.

The qualities of operations against terror groups

Operations by the Turkish Armed Forces have been conducted mostly in areas where the terror groups organize their attacks or in the vicinity of their living spaces, infiltration and deployment areas or in the depths of their source areas. Categorically, operations aiming to prevent attacks and render terrorists ineffective have some fundamental qualities. In this scope, the operations can be categorized as follows:

1. Operations aiming to prevent attacks

Dynamic protection operations: Tactics of such operations are employed in depth in order to ensure the security of the special purpose activities and facilities. Police and military convoys in rural areas and regular road checks in urban areas are in the scope of such operations. With such measures, threats are kept out of their actual field of activity.

Deterrence operations: These operations aim to deter the terror group from organizing attacks by forcing them to make cost-benefit analysis. Not only the active armed militants, but the activities of financial, logistic and intelligence components are also targeted. These operations are followed by severe legal sanctions.

On-site counteractive operations: These operations have a quality of reaction and begin with the identification of an activity by any terror unit before, during or after the perpetration.

2. Operations aiming to render terrorists ineffective

Responsive operations: Such operations generally entail the use of reactive force following the provocative activities of terrorist organizations. As responsive operations may lead the terror group to justify its following attacks on its own terms, they are generally applied moderately while reviving the conflict processes.

Preventive operations: These operations are directly launched against the terrorist units who are found in preparation of an attack. The aim of such operations is to prevent the attack while also targeting to render the terrorist ineffective. Terrorist groups are generally targeted with various military means by creating a shock effect while the groups are outside of their field of action. Instant air raids and the operations launched by fire support elements or special operation units are within this scope. These types of operations are of critical importance in terms of consolidating Turkey’s fight against the PKK. The fight against the PKK has been solidified as the counter-terrorist activities in rural areas turned from horizontal to vertical engagement. The inclusion of unmanned air vehicles and air force units within the fight against terrorism has inherently increased the influence of preventive operations.

Intervening operations: These are offensive operations organized against terror groups with large-scale and regular military units, special operations units and local paramilitary forces. Intervening operations are long-termed and require the concept of joint operation. They also demand extra efforts in order to form the force structure, enable coordination among forces and develop the notion of joint action. The main purpose here is to retrace, wear down or eradicate terror groups, or to remove them from the field of action. This requires field control and dominance in the zone of operation. Generally, a consolidation operation follows the offensive and the establishment of a local administration system is needed in this sense. Turkey’s OES, which was launched against DAESH, is an example of an intervening operation.

Turkey’s fight against terrorism yielded effective results in 2017, as a large number of militants and abettors have been rendered ineffective. Besides, it has been observed that security forces have enhanced their capacities and established an initiative in all spaces where terrorist groups are active, which consequently, has declined terrorist activities. Nevertheless, it is evident that the inadequate support or reluctance of international allies hampered Turkey’s counter-terrorism efforts. Today, several leaders of the aforementioned terrorist organizations are currently residing in ally (!) countries.

Operations targeting DAESH and DHKP-C are still ongoing with various law enforcement activities. Although preventing terror and eliminating terrorists is crucial for ensuring national security, operational efforts must be supported with public diplomacy, whereas local, regional and international solidary in counter-terrorism must be urged with firm methods. Counter-terrorism activities throughout 2017 forced terrorist organizations to pursue a qualitative and quantitative transformation. The effect of this transformation on Turkey’s security must be analyzed thoroughly in the upcoming years.

On Monday the BBC reported that a deal which allowed 350 Daesh fighters and more than 4,000 of their family members to leave Raqqa was made between Daesh and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a US-backed force largely comprised of PKK/PYD terrorists.

The US media has remained largely silent on the occasions even after the BBC’s report.

“This was a local solution to a local issue, and it demonstrated the importance and power of local governance,” the Pentagon said in a statement. “The central priority here was the protection of civilian lives and the arrangement was reached by our partners and their local affiliates.”

“Part of the by/with/through approach is that we might not fully agree with our partners at all times, but we have to respect their solutions to their own issues,” it added.

Turkey has always been a critic of the relationship between the US and PYD, the Syrian branch of the PKK, which has waged a terror campaign against Turkey for 33 years causing the death of more than 40,000 people.

“With respect to all of that, we continue to encourage all parties to seek political solutions and we continue to work with the SDF because our focus is to defeat ISIS [Daesh]” Pentagon chief spokesperson Dana White said at a press briefing on Turkey’s criticism of the US stance on the deal.

BBC reported that according to many of those involved in the evacuation a huge convoy consisting of around 50 trucks, 13 buses and more than 100 Daesh vehicles left Raqqa for Daesh-controlled territory to the southeast, adding that Daesh also withdrew at least 10 vehicles loaded with arms and ammunition and the fighters included foreigners alongside Iraqis and Syrians.

Turkey did not hesitate to respond; describing the agreement as “a grave mistake,” Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdag criticized the attitude displayed by the US.

More, on Thursday, Bozdag emphasized that the terrorist groups could not have possibly made such an agreement without the knowledge of the US.

On Tuesday the Pentagon defended the deal, which allowed hundreds of Deash terrorists to escape from Raqqa describing it as a “local solution to a local issue,” namely the siege of Deash’s de facto capital in Syria.

Pentagon spokesman Eric Pahon claimed it aimed to provide civilians and families “an opportunity to leave the city and to allow the tribal leaders an opportunity to reconcile and reintegrate Syrian men who had been under ISIS [Daesh] control during its brutal three-year regime.”

Although they were “present at the discussions,” Pahon denied any role of the US-led coalition against Daesh representatives in the withdrawal negotiations.

As to the question whether Secretary of Defense James Mattis had been informed about the deal, White answered that she did not want to speak on that.

During the briefing, a question was also asked about the total number of US troops abroad. Joint Staff Director Lt. Gen. Kenneth McKenzie informed that there are 14,000 US troops in Afghanistan, 5,262 in Iraq and 500 in Syria.

Earlier this month Army Maj. Gen. James Jarrard initially put the number of US troops on the ground in Syria at 4,000 – a figure far exceeding the official count. When asked to affirm the 4,000 figure, Jarrard appeared to be caught off guard and claimed he “misspoke.”

US media silent on US support of PKK/PYD-Daesh deal

While the deal has not made headlines in the US media, according to a report by the Anadolu Agency, Pentagon spokesman Peter Cook corrected his statement that the US is delivering arms to the PKK/PYD to “the arms went only to the Syrian Arab Coalition and not to the PKK/PYD,” as it was perceived problematic to US discourse with its NATO ally, Turkey.

Last month PKK/PYD hung posters of Abdullah Ocalan dedicating the seizure of Raqqa to the convicted PKK terrorist leader who has been jailed in Turkey since 1999.

*This report was written by Suna Nur Sarıhan.

Turkish government officials expressed their shock as the US openly defends PKK/PYD’s deal that allowed hundreds of Daesh fighters to flee the besieged city of Raqqa.

Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim slammed the statement issued by the Pentagon as “shocking.”

“Siding with a terrorist organization for demolishing another terrorist organization is not the kind of work which should be done by states.”

“Local solution to a local issue,” is how Pentagon spokesman Eric Pahon defended the agreement to allow around 250 fighters and 3,500 of their family members to flee their de facto capital of Raqqa on November 12.

Pahon said that the “central priority here was the protection of civilian lives and the arrangement was reached by our partners and their local affiliates.”

The US did not elaborate on how the deal was going to save civilians, but Turkish Prime Minister responded to the unprecedented revelation by pointing to its dangers.

“Those Daesh members, who were freed with their weapons, will be able to cause the killing of innocent people, notably in Turkey, Europe and America,” he said.

The deal not only saved one terrorist organization, Daesh, but it opened the gate for another terrorist organization, PKK/YPG, to move in. The prime minister highlighted the multifaceted risks this deal has raised.

According to reports, the deal was struck between Daesh and the SDF, a US-backed force that consists largely of PKK/PYD terrorists. 50 trucks, 13 buses and more than 100 of the group’s own vehicles enabled Daesh’s flight from Raqqa.

The revelation raised serious questions across the world over the role of the US in countries where it has been involved militarily, including Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. In a recent interview with Mehdi Hasan, former Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai accused the US for collaborating with Daesh in order to maintain its presence in the war-torn country for a long term.

The Turkish government is continuing with its fight against terrorist organizations that operate in Turkey and within the wider Middle East.

Following the failed coup attempt last year, the AK Party administration has maintained its determination to fight against the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO).

The terrorist organization has not only infiltrated Turkish state institutions, but also has wings abroad, predominantly in Africa and countries like Germany. Overseas actors have been of great finance facilitators.

While hundreds have been suspended from their governmental positions, police sources confirmed on Monday that at least 58 soldiers of the Turkish Armed Forces have been arrested in counter-terrorism operations across Turkey, for alleged links to FETO.

The arrests came following warrants that were issued last Thursday by the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office in central Konya. Konya police had ordered the launch of operations in 31 provinces.

Daesh

Apart from FETO, the fight against Daesh within and outside Turkey’s borders also continues.

Security officials confirmed that Turkish police have arrested at least 61 Daesh-linked terror suspects in eastern Erzurum and northwestern Bursa provinces on Sunday.

According to Anadolu Agency, in Erzurum, 22 suspects, including senior members of Daesh, were arrested as part of the investigation conducted by the Erzurum Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office against the terrorist group.

It has also been reported that teams from the police counter-terrorism branch carried out operations against members reportedly linked to Daesh in central Yakutiye, Palandoken and Azizye districts.

The police seized several weapons including two unlicensed guns, two unlicensed hunting rifles, digital data and organizational documents.

In addition to Erzurum, 39 suspects were also arrested during operations carried out in Bursa.

Suspects included two Azerbaijani and 28 Syrians, while eight of them have been reported to be “under age.”

Over 319 people have lost their lives in Daesh attacks in Turkey, where the terrorist organization has targeted civilians in suicide bombs, rocket and gun attacks.

PKK

According to a statement issued by the Interior Ministry on Monday, Turkish security forces killed, captured or detained 44 PKK terrorists last week in nationwide operations.

The statement also informed that security forces launched almost 1,260 operations against terrorist organizations between October 23 and October 30.

Nineteen PKK terrorists were killed, 12 others were captured and 13 more surrendered to the security forces.

The PKK, which is listed as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the U.S. and the European Union, resumed its armed campaign against Turkey in July 2015.

Since then, it has been responsible for the deaths of more than 1,200 Turkish security personnel and civilians, including a number of women and children.

In recent years, non-state armed actors have increasingly used unmanned vehicles as an attack method. DAESH, Hezbollah, Hashid Shaabi, Syrian oppositions, PYD/PKK are continuing to use drones. The IEPs placed on the remote controlled mini land vehicles are used by DAESH for attack purposes. The Houthis in Yemen are using drones to conduct kamikaze attacks on Saudi SAM batteries, and using bomb-laden unmanned marine vehicles for attacking Saudi frigates. From this perspective, it can be said that the nature of future wars will be shaped by unmanned robotic vehicles. Therefore, the countries that fail to develop relevant technologies both for defensive and offensive purposes will be the ones most harmed during times of conflict and combat. This analysis has focused exclusively on drone technology, which is an imminent threat and used regularly by non-state armed actors for the purpose of attack.

DAESH’s new attack tool: Drones

The tactics that non-state armed actors use in the Middle East by the means provided by technology have made it difficult to combat against these actors with conventional methods. In particular, DAESH’s character and the way it uses technology has made it the most dangerous terrorist organization that threatens regional and international security and has made it difficult to combat. In this context, the drones that people can freely obtain for hobby and leisure purposes are being used by DAESH for lethal purposes.

When used in conjunction with an explosive device, drones, having just a few hundred dollars of cost, can make the million-dollar vehicles become unusable, cause personnel casualties and, most importantly, drop the personnel motivation in the field through the psychological pressure it imposes. From this perspective, drones that were first used for reconnaissance and surveillance activities on a tactical level in Iraq and Syria are now being adopted on a strategical level and have gained greater impact.

Two main Goals: maximizing casualty and producing organizational propaganda

When examining the usage methods of drones by DAESH, we can observe that they have been endorsed for two purposes. The first is to cause the other party maximum casualties and the second is to spread capabilities of the terrorist organization in the media for propaganda purposes. To achieve these goals, drones are used in three different ways:

1. Reconnaissance/surveillance activities for gathering intelligence,
2. Coordinating SVBIED attacks for the purpose of maximum casualty,
3. Conducting a direct attack by dropping IED or kamikaze attack with an IED loaded drone.

According to the documents captured from DAESH, the terrorist organization, contrary to what is thought, has a systematic drone program that makes preparations to use drones as a weapon and conducts R&D activities in order to increase capabilities. The above image demonstrates its drone strategy. DAESH aims to maximize the causalities and to fabricate propaganda by using all these tools and methods together.

DAESH’s effective use of drones slowed down the Mosul Operation

Since the beginning of the operation in Mosul conducted by the Iraqi security forces against DAESH, drones have been popular in coordination of SVBIED attacks. Through these attacks the extent of casualties in Iraq reached a point that the Eastern Mosul Operation (the third phase of Operation Conquest) had to be halted for two weeks and the Western Mosul Operation (the fourth phase of Operation Conquest) stalled. Moreover, the percentage of casualties reached 40 percent among Iraqi Special Forces (Golden Division). This reflects the fact that a mere simple technology has the potential of being very effective when, and if, it is used with a good strategy and a correct method.

The drone program, which was successfully implemented by DAESH in Mosul, was put into action against the PYD/PKK in Raqqa. Despite all the US material support, DEASH’s use of drones as an attack vehicle could not be prevented. While the PYD/PKK elements were moving towards Raqqa, as the terrain remains open, drones have been used for reconnaissance/surveillance and the dropping of IEDs. However, as the PYD/PKK elements entered the city center of Raqqa, SVBIED attacks coordinated with drones have increased. Due to the natural camouflage provided by the city center, the SVBIEDs failed to be recognized until the last moment, which caused the Raqqa operation to slow down as a result of the increase in casualties. In an attempt to close the personnel gap that emerged due to the casualties, the PYD/PKK have increasingly turned to recruiting child soldiers who are under the age of 18 years.

A new rising threat in the world

The use of drones for attacks, which was introduced to the literature of irregular warfare by DAESH, has gained an international dimension as other non-state armed actors have begun to adopt similar methods.  The Hezbollah and Opponents in Syria, the Hashid Shaabi in Iraq and Houthi in Yemen have started to use drone technology. The use of drones in the battlefield in a cost-effective manner for offensive, defensive and reconnaissance purposes, is likely to cause regular state armies to include drones in combat concepts in the near future.

Turkey is one of the very first countries, which is challenged by the threat of drones as it is neighbor to Iraq and Syria and is combating DAESH and PYD/PKK at the same time. As a matter of fact, DAESH used drones for attacks against Turkish military units who carried out Operation Euphrates Shield in Syria. In addition, when the member of the DAESH terrorist organization who attacked Reina was captured, two drones were seized in his home. Moreover, a DAESH terrorist was caught in Adana while he was planning to carry out a bombed attack using a drone on a US plane located in the İncirlik Air Field, and to attack a field where US troops were located.

Besides, the PYD/PKK has learned to use this technology as an attack tool while fighting against DAESH in northern Syria.  Within this scope, in August 2017, the first attack was realized by dropping an IEP with a drone on one of the Turkish outposts on the Syrian border. Very likely the PYD/PKK is now preparing to use drones against Turkey regularly, just like DAESH. As it can be seen, both terrorist organizations are in preparation to use drones against Turkey as a means of attack. For this reason, it is necessary for Turkey to rapidly develop combat methods against this new weapon.

What should the combat method be?

The threat posed by drones can be decreased by technological developments. However, an anti-drone system that can thoroughly and successfully defeat drones is yet to be developed. Still, drone technology rapidly continues to advance. In particular, the number of drones commanded by a single operator increases every passing day. The progress in night vision will increase the magnitude of the danger in the near future. Firms sought alternative methods in the fight against drones, among which are mesh arms, electronic jamming systems, protection by eagles and hunting down drones with nets. However, none of them have been sufficient on their own.

ASELSAN is one of the leading companies in the world that produces technology against drone threats. The “IHTAR” developed by ASELSAN against this new threat was presented to units of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the Presidential Complex. This system is based on the soft-kill principle, which is to disable the drone by electronic jamming. However, in order to combat this threat, both soft-kill and hard-kill methods must be developed together. Thus, when a detected and tracked drone cannot be deactivated by electronic jamming, the hard-kill system would be activated and the IEP or kamikaze attack by the drone would be prevented. This kind of hard-kill system can easily be integrated into ASELSAN’s IHTAR system.

In addition to fighting with drones by developing new technologies, the following preventive measures should also be taken:

• The close monitoring of the commercial drone market to prevent bulk purchases of such devices.
• Those who purchase drones of 0.5-4 kg, which is called DRONE0 category, should be subject to registration procedures as is the case for the other drone categories such as DRONE1 and DRONE2.
• The prevention of unauthorized flights over institutions and organizations critical for the national security of Turkey and military security zones; the prevention of the procurement/supply of such aerial vehicles by terrorists for potential use in bomb attacks and reconnaissance activities against Turkish security forces and institutions and organizations with high vulnerability; and the prevention of shooting films and taking photos of the aforementioned venues.

The independence referendum for Kurds in northern Iraq is set to take place on September 25 despite international disapproval. Masoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Regional Government insists on pursuing the referendum knowing that neither Turkey nor the United States support the decision.

Ankara and Washington

There have been many arguments as to why the two countries do not support the proposed independence referendum. While the US has been a long advocate of Kurdish autonomy, President Trump has stated that the timing of the referendum is wrong and that it will negatively affect the fight against Daesh. Moreover, he has called for the KRG to maintain diplomatic dialogue with Baghdad, something the US is willing to lead and observe.

Being a neighbor, the independence referendum will have a highly significant impact on the domestic and foreign politics of Turkey. Not only due to regional stability depending on the territorial integrity of Iraq, the domestic fight against the PKK also has the ability to be shaped by the independence referendum in northern Iraq. While relations between the KRG and Turkish state have been maintained on stable levels, the potential fear of the PKK hijacking an independent Kurdish state has always remained salient. Continuous remarks and warnings have been issued against the KRG from both President Erdogan and Prime Minister Yildirim, urging the KRG to defect from their decision to hold the planned referendum.

United Nations

Other than Turkey and the US, the United Nations Secretary General has also warned against the Iraqi Kurdish referendum. Gutteres stated that the unilateral decision to hold the independence vote ‘would detract from the need to defeat Daesh,’ underlining the worries of Turkey and the US.

“The Secretary-General believes that any unilateral decision to hold a referendum at this time would detract from the need to defeat ISIL, as well as the much-needed reconstruction of the regained territories and the facilitation of a safe, voluntary and dignified return of the more than three million refugees and internally displaced people,” Stephane Dujarric said in a statement, referring to the Daesh militant group.

Iraq

With the unilateral territory and sovereignty of Iraq at stake, Vice President Nouri al-Maliki warned the KRG of creating a ‘second Israel’ in northern Iraq. Israel has been the most prominent country in support of the referendum, as it sees a Kurdish state as an end to its own isolation in the region.

With the latest developments, the Iraqi Supreme Court has ruled to suspend the Kurdish referendum on Monday 18 September until it makes a final ruling on the case at the request of Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.

The office of the Iraqi PM Abadi said that he filed the court case against Kurdish President Masoud Barzani and the Kurdish parliament speaker Yousif Mohammed.

The statement said Abadi called on the court to not allow “any region or province to separate from Iraq.”

On 15^th September, the Iraqi Kurdish parliament voted to hold an independence referendum planned by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), which is currently opposed by Baghdad, Turkey and the United States.

The resolution passed by an absolute majority with 65 out of 68 deputies in the chamber, while three MPs rejected the resolution.

The referendum is due to take place on 25 September 2017.

Ankara and Washington call for the suspension of the referendum

Both Ankara and Washington have urged the KRG to call off the independence referendum, on the basis that it will increase the isolation of Kurds in the region and will affect the fight against terrorist organizations.

While the US has long been a supporter of Kurdish autonomy, it claims that the current referendum is not suitable due to its timing. It claims that the referendum will further de-stabilize the region and affect the fight against DAESH.

Moreover, President Donald Trump has called for the KRG to engage in serious dialogue with Baghdad, which Washington “has repeatedly indicated it is prepared to facilitate.”

In attempts to persuade the KRG, US envoy Brett McGurk visited Masoud Barzani, leader of the KRG, in order to call off the referendum and to engage in a new diplomatic initiative.

Likewise, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has claimed that the initiated referendum lacks reason and experience. In a statement made, he stressed that Turkey would not allow steps that would threaten Iraq’s territorial integrity.

In addition, Prime Minister Binali Yildirim called the Iraqi Kurdish region’s decision to hold an independence referendum a “false step.”

The independence referendum carries importance for Turkey not only due to potential territorial changes in the region, but also in concern of its fight against the PKK, which is recognized as a terrorist organization by both the US and Europe.

The Operation Euphrates Shield (OES) which was launched on August 24, 2016 in order to clear the presence of terrorist organizations along Turkey’s southern border and to prevent the illegitimate PKK entity in Syria, seems to have reached its major objectives. While Turkey has carried out an intense counter-terrorism campaign at home in recent years, she has also adopted a strategy of eliminating terrorist threats at their roots by increasing military activism abroad. Along with the waves of frequent terrorist attacks in the country, the rapid proliferation of terrorist groups with the exploitation of the civil war in Syria made this strategy shift imperative.

Although it is often claimed that the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) would face capability problems in case of a military operation in foreign lands due to the discharges after the July 15 coup attempt, the OES was successfully completed on March 30, 2017. The OES, planned and implemented with the concept of Joint Operations, has demonstrated that the TAF has the level of capacity and readiness, capable of dealing with hybrid terrorist threats in foreign lands as well as in urban environments. The fact that the operation was carried out with the Free Syrian Army (FSA), is an experience that further raises the value of the success and makes the OES an exemplifying campaign. However, it is understood that hybrid warfare practices and innovative terrorist tactics encountered in the theatre of war have created some problems for the course of the OES.

Military and Tactical Experiences

During the operation, the biggest threats faced by OES elements were Suicide Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Devices (SVBIED) and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM). A significant number of the martyrs given during the operation was the result of SVBIEDs, and many of the destroyed armored vehicles are of those ATGMs. Particularly in the western and northern parts of al-Bab, the tanks were repeatedly exposed to ATGMs allowing SVBIED attackers to become more able to reach the OES base areas. The fact that suicide attackers instantly had car bombs ready in their present location at the time increased the shocking effect of the threat, exacerbating  the obstruction of the attack.

Smashing the enemy defense lines with the maneuverability and the fire power of the armors and mechanized units was a vital component of the OES. However, the high level of armor losses calls attention to the necessity of a number of regulations and developments in the tactical deployment, use, and handling of tanks in the hybrid warfare environment. On the other hand, due to limited TAF personnel at the beginning of the operation, the armor advances that were heavily dependent on the FSA infantry capacity, has come to a standstill due to the problems originated from the FSA components in adapting to the rapidly developing battle environment. This situation was only improved after the deployment of the Turkish Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Commando Teams to the battlefield at increasing rates. Furthermore, the lack of close air support was felt in many cases, in particular when the armored units were in vulnerable positions against the sudden attacks.

It was observed during the OES that DAESH evaluated the timing factor in the theatre of war. The time slot in question is the period of temporary fragility of the OES elements during deployments in liberated areas immediately after it was captured. In that time slot, which generally came across the early hours of the morning, DAESH resorted to its traditional counter-attacks with raids and hit and runs. SVBIED, guided missile and mortar attacks were followed by the close engagement of small DAESH teams into OES elements. During these raids, it was observed that DAESH provided effective cover for its attacking militants as well as putting pressure on the OES elements by suppressive fire via ZSU-23 Shilka anti-aircraft weapons. DAESH militants also harassed positioned tanks through these weapon systems, aiming tanks to leave their positions and to turn them into open targets for guided missiles. Another significant factor that created difficulties in DAESH counter-attacks was the weather conditions. Particularly the serious fall of visual range due to the dense fog made it inevitably difficult to counter asymmetrical and sudden threats.

The Necessity of Stable Diplomatic Relations

It should be noted that the inability to overcome some diplomatic problems is another critical factor that slowed down the operation. After rapid acquisitions in the early days of the OES, the Manbij became a target of the operation. However, it was forced to halt by the US’s manipulation and intimidation strategy. Afterwards, the OES continued towards the western direction. Another development was that in the time period between the capture of Dabık and the preparation stage for the al-Bab operation, both Syria and Russia created various problems with military threats by means of air forces, which caused the operation tempo to be adversely affected. In the same period, the US-backed YPG/PKK attacked elements of the OES in the vicinity of Mare, rapidly multiplying and complicating instant security threats. The fact that the Russian Air Forces hit Turkish soldiers on the 9th of February shows the seriousness of the whole complexity. Therefore, stable dialogue between interstate relations is a necessity for the military initiatives carried out on thin diplomatic lines.

Population Centric Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence

Through the OES experience, it became clear that counter-terrorism strategies must be population-centric. The reason for this is due to the fact that public acceptance of the OES components was not only essential for the successful completion of the operation but also for its long-term returns. In respect to counter-terrorism, it can be suggested that Turkey has succeeded in the activities of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) during the operation. The most crucial factor that contributed to this success was the support of the local people. While the evaluation of HUMINT during the OES highlights its success, it can be stated that technical intelligence activities should be intensified and surveillance in general should be upgraded to a stronger technological infrastructure.

Military Operation with a Local Partner

By allying with the local opposition groups, Turkey initiated the OES as an alternative model of Joint Operations. Conducting a military operation in a different geography, operating in an environment in which the dominant language is different and variations in socio-cultural dynamics in the region made Turkey more reliant on FSA forces during the operation. While combating hybrid threats, operations with local partners require a number of improvements in terms of motivation and battle performance.

On the tactical and organizational level, an ideal military cooperation that overcomes the principal-agent problem can be achieved through an integrated approach to the concepts of initiative, intelligence, and integration between units and services, leadership, motivated soldiers and learning. However, in these phases, it is inevitable not to encounter structural problems. First of all, local partners participating in the operation may need to conduct patrol and ambush operations outside the garrison and at night, so that an operation against irregular/terrorist elements can be successfully carried out. Disruptions in the implementation of these tasks may slow down the operational tempo and may even cause retreatment of the forces. At this stage, taking into account the components of the FSA forces, it should be noted that the traditional warfare culture of FSA is different from the TAF. In the light of this information, it may be necessary for the FSA forces to be trained at a tactical level regarding the necessities of the battlefield.

Secondly, in areas of complex conflicts like the Syrian Civil War, the advantage of local opposition groups is to have a deep and strategic knowledge of the population and local conditions. However, being deprived of this advantage or reducing it to a minimum can have vital consequences. In order for intelligence regarding the  population and local conditions to be beneficial for the operation, it is important to integrate intelligence gathering as well as analyzing and spreading capabilities and general knowledge of acquired knowledge. However, most of the time, information may not be shared among armed actors formed by the integration of several different groups such as the FSA, and informational disparities between the units may have negative consequences on the scene. In this context, it is necessary to establish a common ground between the commanders and the units to provide trust and information sharing.

Thirdly, in order to ensure complete control and security of an area in the operation, it is necessary for the forces participating in the operation to have the ability to work together. Besides, when unexpected resistance by terrorist elements are detected, reinforcement of forces may turn out to be a necessity. In the case of OES, the FSA forces formed an important part of the offensive force, while the armored units supported the FSA forces. This situation increased the role and significance of the FSA in the operation, as the main offensive force in the elimination of potential anti-tank units targeting armored troops.

Establishing Dynamic Coordination

On the other hand, the collaboration of commanders with leadership qualities among local partners constitutes a more dynamic coordination of the co-operative forces. From time to time disagreements among the commanders of the components of the FSA, and the suicide attacks of DAESH on these commanders have been one of the major problems affecting the course of the operation during the OES.

Moreover, the disagreement between the local partner and the protecting power may lead to motivation problems. For a long time, Turkey tried to persuade the opposition forces, who perceive the Syrian regime as the primary threat, to fight against DAESH instead of the regime. With the change of this threat perception of the FSA towards DAESH, the integration of the groups with low motivation to the operation posed a trouble in the conduct of the OES.

There is no doubt that tactical training is intended for conventional military operations. However, operations such as the OES, which are conducted with a local partner against irregular/terrorist elements, will require continual learning for conventional and hybrid threat operations, moving beyond high-level skills and standard procedures.

Despite huge American support, PKK-affiliated YPG forces are trying hard to take Raqqa from DAESH. After the quick withdrawal of DAESH from the Raqqa countryside, their resistance against the US-backed YPG is strong. It seems like the YPG is scrambling to take over the city unlike the Manbij experience. Therefore, the US-led international coalition is massively bombing the city, but DAESH has heavily fortified itself inside.

Ineffectiveness of the YPG in Raqqa and DAESH Resistance

On June 6, the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) announced the start of the Raqqa operation. Even if the list of participants was long, the main force in the operation are the PKK-affiliated YPG. Thuwwar al-Raqqa, which is the only brigade in the region which once governed Raqqa city and fought at Ayn al-Arab (Kobane) alongside the YPG against DAESH, has been excluded from the Raqqa operation, which has resulted in a lack of local support for the operation. Also, the Arab Quwwat al-Nukhba brigade (The Elite Forces) of Jarba was forced out of the Raqqa operation. Both brigades were forced out for the same reason: they weren’t obeying YPG orders. The number of Arabs within the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces was already low and with the exclusion of these two bigger brigades, it became even less than it was before.

The low number of Arabs in the ranks of the SDF and the exclusion of the only brigade in the region with governing-experience in Raqqa led to a lack of local support for the Raqqa campaign. Due to a lack of local support, it was certain that the operation will lack intelligence and insightful information which is important in urban fighting. Nevertheless, the huge US-support for the operation in terms of weapon supplies, military training, supervision and air support in the face of current DAESH-weakness led to estimates that DAESH will soon collapse in Raqqa. But it has been otherwise.

The YPG forces are apparently inefficient and have low fighting moral and discipline. DAESH on the other hand is still using their Suicide Vehicle Borne IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) and other forms of suicide attacks which is completely inhumane, but it shows their fighting moral. In addition to suicide attacks, DAESH is heavily reliant on snipers. In DAESH propaganda videos, they show how their snipers kill YPG forces, smoking cigarettes on terraces. Despite long and systematic US-training for the YPG-led SDF, the fighters are lacking basic knowledge in urban warfare.

Airstrikes by the International Coalition in Raqqa to compensate for YPG ineffectiveness

Facing the ineffectiveness of the YPG, the US-led International Coalition is massively bombarding Raqqa. The bombardment is so intense that geolocation with DAESH propaganda videos became impossible. Not only DAESH propaganda videos, but also CENTCOM press releases show the huge destruction of Raqqa. Since the start of the operation, the US-led International Coalition has struck Raqqa 1,606 times in 68 days. That’s an average of 24 strikes per day. Compared to 5 strikes per day in Mosul in May 2017, the airstrikes are incredibly frequent. If one also compares the scales of Mosul and Raqqa, the intensity of airstrikes will become more visible. Or one can also compare the number of airstrikes to the number of Turkish airstrikes at the beginning of the Euphrates Shield Operation which was 211 in 66 days, or 3 strikes per day.

One point which shows the ineffectiveness of the YPG forces in Raqqa is the rising number of airstrikes conducted by the US-led International Coalition over time. While the International Coalition bombed Raqqa 21 times per day in June, it increased to 23 times per day in July and to 30 per day in the first 12 days of August.

The Future of Raqqa after the defeat of DAESH

The decision by the US-administration to start the Raqqa operation with the PKK-affiliated YPG-forces instead of the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army seems to be a huge mistake, which will be clearer after the defeat of DAESH. This choice also increases the costs of the operation enormously, and makes it harder for President Trump to explain the undertaking to the U.S. public.

Compared to the operation to take Al-Bab, which was captured by Turkish-backed FSA forces and only partially destroyed in some western neighborhoods, Raqqa is being completely wiped out by airstrikes. Due to the lack of local support, which would be available if the Raqqa operation was conducted by the Syrian Arab rebels, and the ineffectiveness of the YPG in fighting in Arab areas, the US-led International Coalition is forced to wipe out Raqqa with airstrikes. Now, the rebuilding of Raqqa without the support of Turkey, which shares a long border with Raqqa province, will become very difficult.

Furthermore, the extremist-leftist ideology of the YPG and their ethnic Kurdish-identity are two main reasons why the Raqqa population sees them as a ‘foreign power’ which will occupy the city much like DAESH did for years. The YPG experience against factions like Thuwwar al-Raqqa which did not obey YPG orders is known. The leader of the brigade who fought in Ayn al-Arab (Kobane) is now under house-arrest by the YPG. In addition, Kurdish opposition parties like ENKS were systematically suppressed by the YPG. Therefore, the question of how Raqqa will be governed and rebuilt after it is destroyed remains unanswered. Claims of a US-Russian agreement of handing over the city to the Assad regime after the defeat of DAESH, seem for the time being unlikely, but not impossible either. If this happens, it will be the result of the unwise decision made by the US in Raqqa, when it preferred to work with the PKK-affiliated YPG forces instead of their NATO ally Turkey and the Free Syrian Army.

Despite criticisms from local groups and regional governments, on September 25, residents in the Kurdistan region of northern Iraq will vote in a referendum on whether they want to completely separate from the Republic of Iraq. While the region has enjoyed autonomy for decades, if the referendum approves the secession, an independent state will be born with a distinctly Kurdish identity, a long held aspiration for the ethnic group. But questions linger about the timing of the referendum, and how the new state will deal with the ethnic and sectarian schisms that are tearing apart the region.

Serif Dilek and Hazal Duran spoke with Hemin Hawrami, senior assistant to President Masoud Barzani, and the head of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

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Did you negotiate with Baghdad about the independence referendum? How does Baghdad approach this process? How do you expect Baghdad’s position to be after the referendum?

The independence referendum is not a new issue. We have discussed it with Prime Minister Abadi three times. And also, when President Barzani led a large Kurdistan delegation in September 2016, he discussed the forthcoming referendum for independence. But its date had not been fixed. In Baghdad, definitely there has not been that much negative reaction. The major concern of Baghdad is the continuation of dialogue. Of course, they prefer us to stay in Iraq. But we argue that a federal, an inclusive Iraq is over. The federal system has failed in Iraq. Because Iraq has not adhered in practice to a federal state structure although it is written in the constitution. This referendum in fact comes after a long process of dialogue with Baghdad. So, we hope that this positive atmosphere built on the cooperation against DAESH in Mosul and also on the cooperation that the Kurdistan region hosts nearly 1.8 million internally displaced Iraqi people (IDP) will help us to find new formulas in establishing bilateral relationships.

Does the referendum for the Kurdistan region indicate independence? If so, what kind of process does Iraqi Kurdistan expect after the referendum?

Yeah. The referendum is for independence and the referendum has one question: Are we with an independent Kurdistan, yes or no? So, there is no third question or a third option. After the referendum, there will definitely be a long process with Baghdad. The Kurdistan delegation, from representing all the political parties, all the components, including Christians and Turkmen; they will talk to Baghdad about for example how we can establish a healthy economic interdependence between Baghdad and Kurdistan in the post-referendum process; how we can continue on a joint military defense strategy built on what we did in Mosul together; how we can use, for example, pipelines between Iraq and Kurdistan; and how not to have visas; how to have one market for both sides and some kind of other further economic interdependency. So, these are the details that we will be taking in the post-referendum period.

Some Kurdish parties (Gorran, for example) harshly criticized the decision of the referendum. Was the referendum decision a result of general compromise between the Kurdish parties or just a decision of President Masood Barzani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)?

I cannot speak on behalf of Gorran. But, in principle, Gorran is not against independence. The charter of Gorran stipulates that they support self-determination and the independence of Kurdistan. Maybe they have concerns about the mechanism of the referendum. Well, President Barzani has communicated with all the political parties, including Gorran and we sent invitations to them for a meeting on the  7^th of June. There are eleven blocks represented in the parliament and Gorran is one of them. Except Gorran and the Islamic Group of Kurdistan, the other nine blocks came to the meeting with President Barzani. The referendum issue was discussed and put to unanimous vote with the participation of the nine blocks. So, the decision was taken unanimously by all the political parties attending the meeting. It was not a unilateral decision made by President Barzani.

http://thenewturkey.org/intra-kurdish-approaches-to-the-independence-referendum-in-northern-iraq/

It is stated that the referendum will also be held in the disputed territories. According to Article 140 of the Constitution, it was specified that the people living in these regions would be connected to the Central Government of Iraq or Iraqi Kurdistan through a referendum, but the mentioned referendum did not happen. Will it mean that these regions will be a part of Iraqi Kurdistan if the result will be “yes” in the referendum?

The referendum decision was made unanimously by all the parties and with President Barzani. This referendum is for Iraqi Kurdistan. Disputed territories mean that both the Iraqi government and Kurdish regional government have a right in administration. In fact, we have been waiting for 10 years for Article 140 to be implemented, however, it was not. If the people of this region participate in the referendum and if they vote ‘yes’, it means that they want to be part of independent Kurdistan.

Of course, Kirkuk has a special state in Kurdistan. We believe that the Turkmen, right now, enjoy much more rights and freedom than they enjoy in other parts of Iraq. The Turkmen will be the second largest ethnic group and they will be true partners in governing the Kurdistan region. If you look at the election results in 2005 in the disputed territories, the majority voted for the Kurdistani list, which included the Kurds, the Turkmen and others. And the fight against ISIS… If it was not for the Peshmerga and KRG, this area would have been controlled by ISIS like Mosul. So, although right now we have the full military, administrative and political control of the area, we don’t want to impose anything.

In addition to this, the disputed territories have been historically and geographically parts of Kurdistan as it has faced Arabization. But we don’t want to impose a de facto situation and asked them whether you want to have a Kurdish ethnic state. It’s a Kurdistani state based on partnership.

The regional and international actors’ approach to the referendum is not positive. How accurate is it to take a decision on independence at a time where international support is weak? In addition to this, is it possible that there will be any breaks in the relations between the Iraqi Kurdistan and some international actors after the referendum?

First of all, this is a domestic issue between Kurdistan, us and Baghdad. Secondly, the international community is more interested in whether this referendum might affect the fight against ISIS negatively. Well, long before the referendum in 2014, we had nothing but we fought against ISIS. We reassure the regional and international community that an independent Kurdistan will be much stronger in fighting terrorism. Thirdly, when the Iraqi government violated the constitution and the Iraqi army melted down against Daesh, was there really an international community to stand against the chaotic situation?

Please look at the last 26 years and make an analogy. Kurdistan’s contribution to Iraq’s security and stability is immense. Take Turkey, for example. Kurdistan contributes to Turkish national security by acting like a buffer zone between the unstable part of Iraq and the Turkish southern borders. It also makes a positive contribution to the trade relationship with Turkey and the other countries. It provides energy security. In terms of governance, despite a small region with only 5 million people, we are hosting 1.8 million IDP’s and refugees. So, if we were not a functioning political entity, all these people would flee to Turkey or Europe.

Of course, we don’t except the international community to say “okay, we are officially supporting the breakup of Iraq.” But our message for the international and regional community is that the current status quo cannot continue; that Iraq is already divided on sectarian and ethnic lines between the Shiites and Sunnis, between the Arabs and the Kurds. I recently have heard from the head of a Shiite endowment, who said that “there is no room for Christians to stay in Iraq anymore.” Even if you take Kurdistan out, the remainder of Iraq is divided. It is a failed state and we need to prevent the Iraqification of the Kurdistan region.

As you know, the economy of Iraqi Kurdistan is largely dependent on oil revenues and also the budget of the region is dependent on Baghdad. How can a politically independent Kurdistan survive in economic terms? What kind of policies are you going to implement to ensure economic independence?

First, I don’t agree with the term “economic independence.” Now, all economies are interdependent and there is no independent economy. Secondly, we have survived two sets of sanctions in the past: UN sanctions on Iraq and Iraqi sanctions on Kurdistan. Third, Iraqi Kurdistan – here I should underline that I did my masters on the political economy of Kurdistan, on the rentier state – primarily wants political independence, because we want to get rid of the understanding of a frontier mentality we inherited from Baghdad. We want to diversify our economy by not relying only on oil.

We don’t have a taxation system in Kurdistan because of the central budget law. We need sovereignty first in order to go through a systematic reform to change the equation from a public-oriented economy to a private-oriented one and to help the private sector to grow. So, the Kurdistan region can survive. And Kurdistan has the 9th largest oil reserves in the world and has 8 trillion cubic meters of proven natural gas. The world economy needs that. Turkey needs that. You need our resources; we need your pipelines and your transportation. So, it’s a win-win situation. We do believe an independent Iraqi Kurdistan will be a more strategic economic partner for Turkey.

Do you have another option to export your natural gas or oil to other countries?

Turkey is our strategic partner but we will also be looking forward to have a strong partnership with Baghdad so that our economic interdependence would allow us to export our natural gas and oil through Baghdad.

We just want to get back to the point we have discussed earlier. There is ongoing regional instability in the Middle East. In addition to the chaotic situation of Iraq and Syria, there are millions of people who have either been displaced or became refugees because of DAESH. Today Iraqi Kurdistan is home to about 1.9 million refugees. How suitable is it to take a decision of referendum in such kind a complicated environment?

My question to you: when will there be a perfect environment? Those who criticize and say that it’s not perfect timing, our question to them is “just tell us two or three perfect times in the next ten years?” When is the ideal timing? There is no ideal and perfect timing. If we keep the current status quo, we can’t be sure of our future.

I am asking myself, “have we been part of the problem or have we been part of the solution?” It was not us who created DAESH but it was us who broke the myth of DAESH. In terms of the Shiite-Sunni sectarian fight, we are not taking a side. The Kurds are Sunnis, we say. We don’t care about Shiite-Sunni division because we are Sunnis.

Look, we’ve been providing support to the IDPs regardless of their sectarian affiliation. In terms of the economic stability, we were the second largest market for Turkey after Germany. Out of $12 billion trade with other parts of Iraq, why is there $9 billion with Kurdistan region? Because we’ve been part of that solution for Turkey. So, when some argue about the instability, we have not been the factor behind it. Actually, the instability in the Middle East is the result of post-colonial failed state systems, Sykes-Picot more precisely. The borders are not reflecting the true realities of the people in the region.

What do you think the referendum will result in?

In 2005, we did an informal referendum and 96% of the people voted ‘yes.’ So, this time, I believe that the landslide majority of people, including the Turkmen, Christians, and Arabs living in the disputed areas, will vote “yes” and prefer to live in a stable Kurdistan rather than for an unknown future.

How about your personal expectation about the forthcoming elections in Iraq, the general and provincial elections?

Are you sure that there will be elections? Because we aren’t. If the Iraqi parliament is going to be elected according to the current election law, which gives Shiites majority, no matter how many Kurds or Sunnis participated, we, as the Kurds, are not going to participate in the next Iraqi parliament election. Because we are giving legitimacy to an illegitimate situation. For example, if all Kurds participate in the upcoming election, we will have only 60-65 seats. That’s why we want this election law to be amended from 18 constituencies to make all of Iraq one constituency.

How will an independent Kurdistan deal with minorities such as the Turkmen, as they are opposing the independence referendum at some point, and some minor groups also oppose this idea. Which rights and guarantees will they have?

We don’t call them minorities. That’s the first guarantee. Irrelevant of their number, we will accept them as ethnic groups. Secondly, they have 5 members in the current parliament. They have the right to have education in their native language from kindergarten to university.

We don’t call it a Kurdish state; we call it Kurdistan state. Because, Kurdistan, like Turkey, is the homeland for the Kurdistani citizens. You don’t call everyone who lives in Turkey a Turk. Right? Because Turkey is home to citizens with Circassian, Armenian, Kurdish, Turk, and Arab background. So, Kurdistan is also home for whoever lives there and that’s another guarantee.

Absolutely, we will need international support for it. I mean how we can draft the constitution before the declaration by law. The rights of different ethnic groups must be guaranteed and what kind of mechanism could be established to assure their participation? I can assure you the oppressed people are not going to oppress others.

http://thenewturkey.org/mosul-in-ruins-kirkuk-awaits-a-similar-destiny-what-can-turkey-do/

What are your ideas about the PYD in Syria? Commonly, you know that there is a major dispute between them and PDKS (Partiya Demokrat a Kurdistanê li Sûriyê – Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria).

PYD is the PKK. There is no difference between them. We have supported the Kurdish uprising and Syrian opposition since the beginning. We wished and supported them to have a kind of Supreme Council through the first Erbil Agreement in 2012, Second Erbil Agreement 2013 and then the Duhok Agreement in 2014 to help them to have a kind of shared and common administration. But unfortunately, the PYD did not have a clear vision for the future of the Rojava. They’ve been collaborating one time with the Syrian regime and with others without having a political future. And the PYD has been oppressing non-PYD political parties like closing their offices by not allowing them to have any political activities, or by arresting them. Because of that we’ve been against such actions of the PYD.

Do you have any ideas of a population exchange?

No. I want to make it clear. This independence referendum is for Iraqi Kurdistan and it is not going to change the current Iraqi international border, which will be the official border of Kurdistan with Turkey, Iran, and Syria. This is a propaganda by some PKK circles, who argue that there will be a connection between Rojava and Kurdistan. That’s not true. That’s not going to happen.

Our last question is about the name of the state. How will it be named if the referendum results in “yes”? Kurdistan or the Republic of Kurdistan?

Definitely, it will be a liberal republic. But the name, I can’t tell. It has something related to Iraqi Kurdistan. Honestly, I have no idea. You should ask that question after the referendum either to the referendum committee or to the founding fathers.

During the NATO meeting held in Brussels on May 25 2017, several assessments were made on the issues occupying the most significant place in the organization’s agenda so far which are expected to mark real progress. Two of these issues had great importance.

The first was to determine required steps to increase the effectiveness of the NATO in the fight against international terrorism, primarily DAESH, and to solve central problems like intelligence sharing among the member states.

The second issue was fairer burden-sharing on NATO’s defense spending throughout the alliance which has been on the agenda for a considerable period of time and frequently emphasized by the United States, particularly after Trump came to power. In order to stop cuts in defense spending, at the Wales Summit in 2014, all NATO allies agreed to spend at least 2% of their GDP on defense within a decade. With its sharing of around 4% of its GDP on defense, the highest amount compared to the rest of the Alliance, the US has been imposing diplomatic pressure on its European allies in particular for the last four or five years to make them spend more on defense, and this topic also holds a great significance in Trump’s agenda and his discourse.

In the current situation, 22% of NATO’s budget is funded by the US, 15% is funded by Germany and 10% is funded by the United Kingdom. The effectiveness of the decision made at the Wales Summit can be seen both by evaluating the data of 2015, which reflects that the cuts on defense spending came to a stop, and having a look at the 3.8% increase in total in 2016 on defense spending across Europe and Canada.

It is a well-known fact that the NATO has been facing challenges with effective intelligence sharing in the fight against terrorism. The Alliance’s current policy of counter-terrorism has been shaped in NATO’s Policy Guidelines on Counter-Terrorism declared in May 2012 and it was based on three main principles: 1) awareness (to promote a common understanding on counter-terrorism), 2) capabilities (meaning the ability that NATO could impose its own methods of countering terrorism on the international level, and 3) engagement, (strengthening the NATO allies’ capacity for countering terrorism at the local level by training local forces in operation areas instead of NATO to send troops to the conflict area).

Prior to the Brussels Summit, Jens Stoltenberg, the Secretary-General of NATO, made several statements on NATO’s Policy Guidelines on Counter-Terrorism to express the steps and implementations taken with reference to this concept. Mr. Stoltenberg’s emphasis on the ongoing potential of NATO becoming a part of a 68-member anti-DAESH Global Coalition drew particular attention. In fact, even if 28 members of NATO have been individually participating the Coalition, the NATO has not involved itself directly and institutionally with the Coalition.

On the contrary, the NATO has participated in the Coalition with an observer status. Therefore, the Alliance’s wish to take an active role in the fight against terrorism was discussed at the Brussels meeting. Among these declarations, some other details about the NATO’s contribution to the Coalition with regard to technical and military aspects such as the effective use of AWACS surveillance aircraft were also mentioned. These details were to transform into an action plan in which the Alliance’s activities to counter international terrorism were discussed. The action plan will establish an ‘Intelligence Fusion Cell’ that will enable the NATO to strengthen cooperation on counter-terrorism within the Alliance and in addition, a senior NATO official would be designated as coordinator.

Above all, there are questions about the sincerity and seriousness of NATO allies. The US in the first place as a leading ally gave the impression that they will follow their own political-military strategies and the NATO its own. In an environment where self-interests and policies distinctively differ, making common policies and implementation of these have become much harder. Hence, the raison d’être of the Alliance comes into question.

Even a president who relied on discourses and statements against the NATO, prefers to shelter his country in the Alliance when it comes to Middle East policies within the context of countering terrorism. This indicates seeing the NATO more as a temporary political and psychological tool than an urgent need. As a matter of fact, the expectation of the Alliance’s institutional involvement in the US-led Global Coalition against DAESH proves its commitment to this situation. Moreover, it could be indicated that the Alliance’s contribution to the fight against DAESH holds political significance rather than being militarily operational, since the member militaries will not all directly enter combat.

The Alliance’s involvement will hold a much more supportive quality which prioritizes providing intelligence and training in the frame of its Policy Guidelines on Counter-Terrorism. On the other hand, the NATO’s focus just on DAESH has been questioning by the allies in terms of sincerity and confidence. That is, the YPG can be counted as an ally in the fight against the DAESH even though Turkey, one of the most significant members of the NATO, has been struggling with its organically linked fraction, the PKK.

Furthermore, even though Turkey’s objections, warnings and all diplomatic efforts, the US has been supplying this terrorist organization with weapons; therefore, this also challenges for NATO’s struggle for a common strategy in the fight against international terrorism. For this reason, the Alliance’s assertions and efforts to create a common understanding of terror reflect a vain perspective. As a result, a NATO with policies and functions intended to be determined in accordance with several members’ interest and varied threat and threat perceptions bodes ill for the future of the alliance.

Another policy that needs clarification is that in NATO’s efforts to display a great idealism, the Alliance will be confronting many challenges due to intelligence sharing which held a considerable importance in the Policy Guidelines on Counter-Terrorism meeting as well as the Brussels Summit 2017. Yet, prior to the NATO Summit, the leaking of some details and photographs of a terrorist attack in one of the key members of the Alliance, the UK’s city Manchester, provoked a crisis between the security agencies of the UK and the US. UK Prime Minister Theresa May brought up this issue and clearly reminded attendees of the importance of safeguarding shared intelligence between security agencies. These explanations pointed out that the UK considers the US intelligence and security officials as responsible for the leak and also shows a lack of confidence between them.

President Trump, assessing this leak as a ‘serious problem’ through a written statement, is accused of lacking an understanding of intelligence gathering because he has shared top-secret classified information, including the threat of terror attacks on airlines forwarded by the Israeli intelligence agency, with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov during a meeting in the Oval Office on May 10. Therefore, this situation causes a lack of confidence in intelligence sharing between two allies with different understandings of how secrets should be disclosed. Following this event, during his visit to the US, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu emphasized that the intelligence coordination between these countries is “terrific.”

Despite its good intentions and development as an institution, the NATO will likely continue struggling with its traditional problems. At the root of these problems are the alliance’s dominant members, who seek to lead the organization according to their own understanding and policies. Therefore, in an environment comprised of different threat perceptions by the member states, the problem of a NATO led and shaped by dominant members and their political preferences emerges.

Since the end of the Cold War, the expectations from the NATO’s missions have changed. That is, in the context of regional conflicts and the fight against international terrorism, the NATO has been challenged to undertake new responsibilities and this leads to serious problems among the Allies due to different interests and political understandings. Challenges on intelligence sharing constitute just one of the main examples of challenges in the context of cooperation.

In recent years, Turkey’s defense industry has been developing rapidly. At the very beginning of the 2000s, the country’s rate of dependency on foreign industrial suppliers was around 80%. It now is able to create weaponry and systems with its local resources. In this regard, The 13th International Defense Industry Fair (IDEF 2017) was important in demonstrating the development of Turkey’s defense industry.

Turkish firms showcased their weapons and weapon systems. The National Corvette MilGem, National Attack Helicopter T129 ATAK, National Main Battle Tank ALTAY, National Assault Rifle MPT-76, National Combat Aircraft TF-X, Turkish Light Utility Helicopter T625, Armed Hürkuş, Missiles (Cirit, Kaplan, Mızrak, Hisar, Som, Bora), National Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Bayraktar TB2, Anka and Karayel, Göktürk-1 Satellite and Armored Combat Vehicle are some examples.

There are many other ongoing weapon and weapon systems projects like these that have been completed and are being used by the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and the police force. The era of direct procurement from abroad is soon to be over. From joint production and partial design, Turkey evolves towards creating genuine and unique designs.

Strategic Value

The defense industry is actually an integral component of a country’s grand strategy, national security strategy, defense strategy and hierarchy of military doctrines. The success of these strategies mostly relies on military capacity, consisting of national weapons and weapon systems. Therefore, we can talk about the development of military technology in accordance with the aims determined by the hierarchy of strategies.

While the security threats that emerged with the Arab Spring in the Middle East indicated the scope of possible threats posed by states and non-state actors, it also underscored the importance of having and utilizing domestic military technology. Turkey has repeatedly experienced the said strategic value of the defense industry. From the hardships faced before and after the Cyprus Peace Operation to the ones that are faced in fighting terrorism, from direct and indirect embargoes from Western countries to internal and external actors trying to halt the development of the Turkish defense industry, the country has experienced many difficulties. However, despite these past experiences, the Turkish defense industry has started to attract increasing international attention and become a rather hot topic over the last fifteen years. Two Turkish defense firms are now among the world’s top hundred defense firms. According to a 2016 evaluation by Defense News, ASELSAN has risen from 62nd rank to 58th, while TUSAŞ from 78th to 72nd. It should be pointed out that no other member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation is on this list.

Despite being in a better condition than in previous decades, the Turkish defense industry has to employ multiple methods to meet its strategic aims in shorter periods. The defense industry has critical projects for the future; the national combat aircraft TF-X is one of them. There are alternative solutions for Turkey to eliminate the deficiencies in terms of qualified personnel capacity and technical infrastructure in a short time. According to TUSAŞ General Director Temel Kotil, “The TF-X will be a fifth generation combat aircraft. When we develop this aircraft, we will become the fourth ranking country in this field. TUSAŞ will collaborate with BAE Systems for the initial stage of the project. We are planning to have the first flight in 2023 and employ the aircraft by 2029.”

Political Value

In fact, President Erdoğan’s will for the development of national defense industry allowed the sector to become what it is today. He enforced an approach that relied on local solutions and national power to ensure security and stability. In this respect, it was decided to minimize external dependencies with all kinds of incentives and support for the domestic the defense industry. While the rate of domestic resources being used to meet security needs was 24% in 2002, it rose to 41.6% in 2007 and 54% in 2011. Today, it is around 68%. Having 80% locality in terms of the defense industry, which is seen in developed countries, is what Turkey aims to achieve in the shortest time possible.

Fighting against terrorist organizations like the PKK/PYD and Daesh in recent years, Turkey once again observed the necessity of a local defense industry in its struggle for power with regional and global actors. The US’ strategic armament support to the YPG, and Western countries enforcing a direct or indirect arms embargo on Turkey as a tool during times of strained relations are now frequent occurrences. European countries are either not delivering the promised products or doing whatever they can to delay the delivery. Meanwhile, the systems that are being developed entering the inventory to ease Turkey’s anti-terror strategies and extraterritorial operations are necessary for building up a military power capacity. Looking at the transformation in anti-terror operations due to the use of UAVs is a telling enough sign.

http://thenewturkey.org/securing-turkeys-borders-a-proactive-strategy-with-high-tech-approach/

Müjdat Uludağ of the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM) stated the following: “The tensions between countries are undoubtedly affecting defense industry cooperation negatively. Especially countries with powerful defense industries are enforcing an industrial policy which aims to prevent new actors from emerging, just to protect their own positions. Turkey’s priority is to establish a completely independent defense industry. Yet, Turkey is also open to cooperation in the defense industry with allied countries; because the real threat is common issues faced by countries, like global terrorism. Common threats require common resolutions.

Keeping this in mind, our institution continues to have bilateral and multilateral cooperation with many countries around the world. We have ongoing cooperation projects with the countries of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Asia-Pacific countries with developed technological infrastructure, South American countries and allies in the Middle East. Turkey will maintain its win-win policy in these defense industry cooperation strategies. In this respect, we expect more active support from our NATO allies against all terrorist activities that pose a threat to Turkey.”

Nevertheless, it is important to make this a goal not only championed by the political establishment, but also by the bureaucracy. Universities and research centers must be engaged in this process and collaborate with the defense industry. This will ease the development of the defense industry and allow its value to be understood by the public. It is obvious that there are certain deficiencies in the cooperation between the defense industry, universities and research centers in our country, especially when compared to other countries. However, according to Kotil, there are hopeful developments in this field:

“The interest in developing technologies in the universities, innovation, intellectual and industrial property, and entrepreneurship has increased in the recent years, showing a parallel with the diversification of support and incentive programs. In this respect, we can say that industrial cooperation both in our firm and country is rapidly developing. With a proactive approach, various policies are being developed and mechanisms created to strengthen the ties with universities. With the implemented applications, strategic cooperation with universities is expected. In this context, TUSAŞ has R&D cooperation protocols with 25 universities, KOOP (long-term internship) with two universities, integrated education program with three universities and Program for Training Defense Industry Researchers (SAYP) protocol with sixteen universities. As a part of these protocols, we are sharing certain information with university staff in engineering departments and research centers about our technological road map and how to conduct projects together. On the other hand, we are working on cooperation protocols regarding research and education with many other universities. A holistic view of Turkey suggests that the country has more potential in developing cooperation between the universities and the industry. For this reason, we try to understand the expectations of universities. We want to improve our cooperation with mutual trust, long-term common goals and win-win principles.”

Therefore, these kinds of cooperation will have positive outcomes in the future. Providing figures will clarify the importance of the subject: today, only at Teknopark Istanbul, there are 170 R&D firms and their 2,750 R&D personnel started around 600 national projects up to today. Moreover, the numbers of firms, personnel and projects are increasing by the day.

Economic Value

Beside its political and strategic yields, the defense industry also has important economic outcomes. Especially with the incentives for exporting and the development of products that can compete on the international market, the defense industry contributed to the economy of the country. Around $196 million in defense and aviation exports in 2004 skyrocketed to $1.673 billion in 2016. The total defense and aviation turnover of $1.855 billion in 2006 is now around the $6 billion mark. As the figures suggest, the capacity and the income of the sector were at lower levels thirteen years ago. Yet, it still lags behind powers that focus on this sector.

Uludağ evaluated the situation in his following statement:

“Our defense and aviation exports are sevenfold when compared to the 2002 data. While the said rise shows that our defense industry is improving in terms of competence, it also indicates to a huge potential waiting to be tapped. As platforms, we have achieved important exports in land vehicles in the past. We are aiming to reach high figures in exports in the global markets in parallel with our business development plans for ship and helicopter platforms along with UAV systems. To reach this target, we are working in coordination with certain public institutions in providing long-term loans for products by the defense and aviation industry that have high strategic value. Meanwhile, the platforms and systems we produce are being used by TSK and our security forces; this will prove to be an advantage for the firms. Yet, our firms focusing on the international markets and strategically prioritizing their efforts with a holistic outlook is also crucial for reaching higher figures in exports.”

Therefore, it could be said that the defense industry may build up a momentum with steady steps and cling onto the international markets. A $25 billion export target has been set for 2025. While this target may be deemed as impossible in the short-term, it is quite possible with the value-added that will be provided by nationalized production of software and hardware. According to the 2016 report of SSM, SSM has approved 269 projects which amounted to TL123 billion. Looking at the distribution of the projects, it could be seen that 47.58% is for domestic development, 8.18% for domestic direct procurement, 20.07% for R&D, 8.5% for joint production projects, and 10.78% is for foreign direct procurement. Therefore, support for projects that are more local than others will bring the desired economic value with it.

Turkey is the world’s sixth largest armament importer and fifteenth largest armament exporter. According to SIPRI data, Turkey spent $15 billion on its defense budget in 2016. Transitioning from a procurer of weapons to producer of weapons contributed to our exports. Turkey’s leading export partners in terms of the defense industry are the US, Germany, Malaysia, the Gulf countries and Azerbaijan. 34.3% of the exports were done with NAFTA members, 23.7% with the EU, 18.5% with Middle Eastern countries, 8.6% with Far Eastern countries, and 7.5% with CIS countries.

There are many steps to be taken for Turkey to have a defense industry that can compete globally; however, looking at the efforts, we easily can say that Turkey is on the right track. The more independent its military technology, the more powerful Turkey will be. In this respect, the private sector has to contribute more and take the initiative.

Turkey is fighting against multiple security threats in a region mired in conflict. To not have any vulnerabilities in its fight, Turkey has to increase and consolidate its military capacity. In this sense, the defense industry has to adopt the network-centric warfare doctrine and shape its efforts accordingly. On the other hand, there are certain risks that obstruct the national defense industry. The Gülenist Terrorist Organization’s (FETÖ) activities serve as a break for certain crucial projects. Similarly, embargoes enforced by Western countries bring the risk of slowing down these projects. However, the most important risk is that immense efforts to improve the defense industry may be halted by bureaucratic procedures. Despite all the hardships and challenges, Turkey must continue developing its national defense industry and seek ways to accelerate even further.

DAESH, which first appeared in Iraq followed by Syria and became the world’s number one terrorist organization, even surpassing Al-Qaeda, harbors a significant number of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) within its ranks. According to the UN’s estimates, some 30,000 FTFs from more than 100 UN member states are actively involved in the DAESH terrorist organization. One of the groups among these FTFs that draws the most attention is those coming from former Soviet states.

According to official figures from Russian authorities, approximately 3,500 Russian citizens are fighting on behalf of DAESH in Syria and Iraq. Apart from Russia, there are also fighters from Central Asian countries like Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Based on the numbers estimated by the Soufan Group Strategy Research Center, a US-based institute tracking the FTFs, these Central Asian fighters account for 2,000-2,500 fighters in DAESH. However, the reason why these FTFs stand out more than the others is not their number but their positions and activities within DAESH. According to the International Center for Counter-Terrorism, Tajik, Caucasian, Kazakh and Uzbek FTFs were the perpetrators in 46 of the 126 suicide attacks organized by DAESH in Iraq and Syria from December 2015 to November 2016. This piece of data alone indicates the importance of FTFs from the former Soviet Union.

Why are they fighting in Syria?

There may be different reasons for FTFs who are Russian citizens to come to Syria and join DAESH. But the major cause for Caucasian FTFs from Chechnya and Dagestan to join is deeply rooted in their history. The history of Russia’s Chechen conflict dates back to the period of Tsarist Russia in the 19th century. In recent times, 2007 is referred to as the turning point in the conflict. The declaration of the Caucasus Emirate during this period under the leadership of Doku Umarov and the statement of a goal of “establishing an independent and united Islamic republic throughout the north Caucasus” made the conflict a trans-national one.

Russia’s extreme and disproportionate force against the Chechen fighters, especially under the leadership of Vladimir Putin during and after the Second Chechen War, caused extreme radicalization of armed groups in these parts of the country. For the first time in the history of the conflict, Chechens started to use suicide attacks against Russians. Since the 2000s, over 20 suicide attacks have been carried out within the borders of Russia against security forces.

The establishment of a “caliphate” by DAESH following their seizure of vast lands in Iraq and Syria has also influenced the dynamics in the North Caucasus. Even before Doku Umarov was killed in 2014, groups of fighters disintegrated from the Emirate and decided to join DAESH. This disintegration continued and gained momentum with Umarov’s assassination, and many members of the Caucasus Emirate pledged allegiance to the terrorist organization.

Russia’s extreme security measures in Chechnya and Dagestan, its effective operations and Doku Umarov’s death caused a significant limitation in the capacity of armed groups in the region to conduct activities. So, when the declaration of the caliphate by DAESH and Russia’s involvement in Syria alongside the Assad regime coincided, armed groups in the North Caucasus found it important and expedient to be involved in the internal conflict of Syria.

However, just as in Russia, the Caucasian FTFs in Syria also experienced divisions among themselves. While a significant part of them joined DAESH, others either joined the moderate opposition or formed their own small groups and continued to fight against the Syrian regime and Russia.

The reasons why Central Asians are joining DAESH are similar to those for FTFs from the Caucasus. After the new leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Usman Ghazi, declared his allegiance to DAESH in 2015, there was a serious increase in the flow of FTFs from Central Asia to Syria. Moreover, the region itself is going through a radicalization process that entails deepening violence. Both the denial of rights to freely practice religion during the Soviet period, and widespread poverty and unemployment today can be regarded as the main reasons for this process. The fact that this radicalization has even reached to government officials was made public when Gulmurod Khalimov, the head of the Tajik Special Forces, declared in a video that he joined DAESH.

Negative Impact on Turkey

Turkey is among the first countries to really combat DAESH within the international sphere. According to the Foreign Ministry, 37,121 people were prohibited from entering Turkey from 2011 to February 2016 due to security and terrorism concerns. However, the lack of cooperation from the countries of origin for FTFs puts a heavier burden on Turkey’s workload on combatting terrorism and managing the refugee crisis, and as Turkey has been a target for DAESH, it has called for more cooperation and serious efforts by the countries of origin to stop the flow in the first place.

DAESH members from Central Asia and Caucasus have conducted some of the deadliest terrorist attacks in Turkey, including the attack at Atatürk Airport on June 28, 2016, which caused 44 deaths, and the latest attack, on a night club in Istanbul on New Year’s Eve of 2017 which took 39 lives.

The Danger of Returning to Russia  

As the power of DAESH diminishes and it starts to lose ground, a new concern for the countries of origin of FTFs has emerged: the possibility of these FTFs returning home. Among many, Russia may as well be the most concerned country in this respect. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated many times that the possibility of returning Russian FTFs in Syria to Russia will create a great security threat and this cannot be allowed to happen.

The activities of terrorist organizations in Russia have been fairly limited in the last two years. However, from March 14 to April 3 of this year, there were three terror attacks that took place in Chechnya, St. Petersburg and Astrakhan, where a total of 9 security officials and 14 civilians were killed. This is a worrying development in Russia, indicating that DAESH has started its operations there.

If DAESH continues to increase its capacity within the borders of Russia, there is quite a high possibility that Russia will have to face new terror attacks. The main question now is what Russia will do in order to prevent the FTFs from returning home.

Although the latest NATO Summit held in Brussels on May 25, 2017 was a symbolic meeting meant to open the organization’s new headquarters and unveil some new memorials, it was significant since the new U.S. President Donald Trump, who has described the military alliance as “obsolete,” met the other leaders for the first time. As the leaders of all the member countries were present, several important subjects were also discussed in the summit alongside the openings.

Increasing military expenditures to favor US-based weapon companies

Still shocked by Trump’s election victory, European leaders were concerned about the possibility of the U.S. President’s pressing upon them with new demands during the summit. During a period in which Russia particularly came into prominence with its aggressive policies, they did not wish the impairment of their security partnership with the U.S. although they abstained from shouldering the burden necessitated by this partnership. While the U.S. military expenditure reached 3.3% of the country’s GDP, Trump urged the European members of NATO to increase their military expenditures up to 2% of their GDP, asserting that the countries falling behind this would owe a debt to the alliance. For countries whose military expenditures are around 1.2% of their GDP, such as Germany, this demand is quite a challenge. To meet this demand by the U.S., Germany will have to increase its military expenditure up to $70 billion and allocate far more funds to compensate for insufficient spending in the past. Several European NATO members including Spain, Italy and the Netherlands do also have the same concern in the face of the U.S. pressure due to their low military spending.

Planning to boost U.S. military expenditure to more than 4% of GDP, the Trump administration’s push for European NATO members to increase their military expenditures signals Washington’s reluctance to provide for the safety of Europe and the expectation that European countries will allocate more funds for their own security. Trump’s insistence on this matter is understandable given that U.S.-based weapons manufacturers will earn considerable profits from the increased defense budgets. Not wishing to return from Europe empty-handed following his Middle East tour, during which he made multi-billion dollar arms deals with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, Trump is highly aware of the fact that the European continental countries offer a market on par with the oil-rich Gulf Arab region.

It is not surprising that the first country Trump targets in this respect is Germany, which had a $295 billion foreign trade surplus last year. Being a businessman, it is unsettling for Trump to see Germany as the trade surplus champion of the world in a period when the U.S. had a $734 billion trade deficit. Having previously accused Berlin of pursuing an aggressive trade policy, Trump regards Germany’s excessive trade surplus as one of the causes of the excessive trade deficit in the U.S. A more balanced picture can be expected provided that Germany increases its military expenditure and the quantity of the weapons it buys from American companies.

The European countries are even more in need of the U.S. security umbrella given the aggressive policies Russia has adopted in the past years, which increased its military expenditure to 4.9% of its GDP. Therefore, although they are disturbed by Trump’s negative views on NATO and the speculations regarding Trump-Putin relations, it can be argued that the European allies will acquiesce to the pressure of the U.S. and increase their military expenditures.

http://thenewturkey.org/us-failed-to-stick-up-for-democracy-in-the-night-of-july-15-coup-attempt/

One of other most prominent subjects at the NATO Summit was cooperation in the campaign against terrorism. During his Middle East tour, Trump called the leaders of the Islamic countries to joint action against terrorism in his address in Riyadh. He also addressed the NATO allies in Brussels to take joint action with regard to preventing terrorism. Despite that, the U.S. has been providing indirect support to the outlawed PKK, one of the most dangerous terrorist groups in the region, through the medium of the PKK’s Syrian offshoot, the People’s Protection Units (YPG).

The summit took place only a few days after the terrorist attack in Manchester, England; consequently, cooperation against terrorism under the umbrella of NATO was particularly highlighted during the summit. The joint fight against terror has been one of the main reasons for NATO’s existence since the end of the Cold War. However, it is not possible to say that the alliance’s members are in full solidarity with each other regarding terrorism, which has been posing a severe threat to most NATO countries.

Turkey does not rely on NATO

It is obvious that Turkey is the leading country in NATO effected by terror. Being subjected to simultaneous assaults by a number of terrorist groups, including the PKK, the Gülenist Terror Group (FETÖ) and Daesh, Turkey has not received the support it expected from NATO allies. It turned out that some allied countries adopted certain policies that sided with the terrorist groups in question. Having invoked Article 5 of its founding treaty after 9/11, NATO has not exerted any efforts to aid Turkey, which has been rocked by devastating terror attacks. Ankara’s outlook towards NATO has changed negatively as the U.S. and some European NATO allies protected or condoned the activities of the PKK and FETÖ militants who have been the perpetrators of the attacks against Turkey.

Various factors have brought NATO into discredit in the eyes of Turkey. Although listed as a terrorist organization, the PKK has easily found militants and financial resources in Europe. Washington openly provided weapons to the PKK’s Syrian offshoots, namely the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing the YPG. Germany and several other NATO members are reluctant to recognize FETÖ as a terrorist group by dismissing FETÖ’s link to the July 15 coup attempt and giving asylum to FETÖ leaders, including military officers directly involved in the attempted overthrow. Besides, Turkey did not receive any support from NATO when it was targeted economically and politically by Russia at the end of 2015 because of the situation in Syria. This also played an important role in Turkey’s declining trust in the alliance.

In addition, Turkey was confronted with several problems while buying the weapons it needed from NATO allies to fight against terror and other threats in the Middle East, which constituted another component of the security-related crises between Ankara and Brussels. Following the July 15 coup attempt, the Western allies turned their backs on Ankara while Ankara was expecting their support. To add insult to injury, the allies issued some statements suggesting that Turkey’s NATO membership might be canceled due to Turkey’s measures against coup plotters during the critical period following the failed coup attempt. These developments fomented a profound unrest among the Turkish public and led masses to believe that some of the NATO allies might have been behind the coup attempt.

After having trust issues with its Western allies, Turkey sought rapprochement with Russia and leaned towards military cooperation with the country, which was sealed with the deal to purchase S-400 air defense missiles. Russia also gave overt support to Turkey after the coup attempt, which posed a major problem for NATO. While NATO has been unremittingly making mistakes that might result in losing their 65-years-long ally to Russia, some European members of the alliance intervened in the domestic affairs of Turkey by endorsing the “no” campaign ahead of the April 16 constitutional referendum in Turkey. Such factors tested Ankara’s limits.

After it was decided NATO’s would join the fight against Daesh at the summit, Germany reportedly considering withdrawing its troops stationed in İncirlik Air Base as part of the anti-Daesh fight, upon which Turkey remained indifferent. This also manifests the severity of the problems within the alliance. It will be a good start to resolve at least some of those problems if the European members of NATO and the U.S. realize that they have adopted certain policies against Turkey that are incompatible with the alliance, especially over the past few years, and start supporting Ankara in its fight against terrorist groups including the PKK and FETÖ.

 

 

President Erdoğan’s meeting with US President Trump was overshadowed by the Pentagon’s decision to provide heavy weaponry to the YPG. Meanwhile, Trump’s mind was preoccupied with rumors of impeachment over allegations his administration shared state secrets with Russian officials. Some circles in Washington, on the other hand, tried to prevent the one-on-one meeting of Erdoğan and Trump.

The Pentagon’s hasty decision to equip the PKK/PYD with heavy weaponry was due to a possible revision in the planning of the Raqqa offensive after the two leaders’ meeting. There were no substantial changes in the planned Raqqa offensive, which is being coordinated by the Pentagon, but Turkey was able to relay its concerns about the PYD/YPG and the demographic engineering in the region at the highest official level. Turkey was also able to secure certain guarantees about the fight against the PKK, and made clear the fact it would actively continue its fight against the terrorist organization. Moreover, Turkey emphasized that it wouldn’t stand idle as the PKK/PYD, Daesh, and Iran-backed Shiite militias carried out ethnic and sectarian cleansing in the region.

Trump’s statement underscoring the strategic and military partnership between Turkey and the US was crucial. Even though the Turkish delegation returned to the country with a cautious optimism, this statement was perceived as the herald of a new era in Turkey-US relations, which had been on the decline since May, 2013. No one was expecting all the issues between the two countries to be resolved in an instant, but the image of the two leaders standing side by side was interpreted as the beginning of a more promising period for bilateral relations.

This was not the only indication that the level of understanding and cooperation between the US and Turkey could be on the mend.

Factors prompting the normalization of Turkey-US relations

The normalization in relations between Turkey and Israel, which had been in a crisis since the Mavi Marmara incident, will cause a gradual change in how Turkey is perceived both by the Trump administration, which has been especially sensitive on the issue, and circles that are associated with the Israeli lobby in Washington, which have advocated anti-Turkey sentiments for some time now. While Turkey will continue to advocate for the basic rights of the people of Jerusalem and Palestine, it will be more careful to avoid tensions with Israel. There are concrete efforts to increase the common interests of the two countries, especially in energy, tourism and trade.

Another issue that both Turkey and the US converge on in this new era is Iran’s expansionist policies in the Middle East. In particular, Iran-backed militia forces which are trying to gain ground using a sectarian discourse and ideology are posing a threat to the interests of many countries and local elements in the region. Checking these militias, whose presence is rationalized as a necessary counter to Daesh, brings Turkey, the US and many other countries in the region on common ground.

http://thenewturkey.org/will-the-trump-administration%E2%80%99s-syria-policy-change-after-the-chemical-attack/

Enclosing Sunni countries with a “Shiite crescent” – a policy that was covertly endorsed by the Obama administration to limit the Sunni governments in the region much to the chagrin of traditional allies like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf countries and Israel – is no longer sustainable. The Trump administration, which is yet to take over the control of security and foreign policy from the Obama administration’s military and civil bureaucrats, will realize that cooperation with Turkey could yield more effective results than surrounding the country with terrorist organizations like the PKK/PYD and Shiite militia forces.

Turkey’s success in Operation Euphrates Shield already debunked the myth that the PKK/PYD is the most effective force in the fight against Daesh. If Brett McGurk, the US envoy to the coalition against Daesh, and an Obama administration appointee who has built his own career on the an alliance with the PKK/PYD, and certain CENTCOM officials take a step back, the permanent and constructive possibilities of coordination with Turkey will become more apparent.  Turkey can provide a solution that is sustainable given the region’s sectarian and ethnic patterns, unlike the PKK/PYD, which has only sought to exploit these dangerous fault-lines.

The US’s persistent support to the PKK/PYD is antagonizing moderate Syrian Kurds who are being dominated by the terrorist organization, along with Arabs in Northern Syria who have been forced from their own lands, not to mention Washington’s own ally, Turkey. If the Trump administration is to adopt a controlled chaos strategy in the Middle East, just like the Obama administration, instead of an orderly one, they can continue their alliance with PKK/PYD; however, if the US wants to stabilize the region and win over the allies it has offended, they have to widen their narrow perspective. In this respect, Erdoğan and his team went to Washington with a comprehensive plan.

Another development which may cause the Trump administration to revise its relations with Turkey is the level of popular support President Erdoğan has demonstrated through the constitutional amendment referendum. Certain circles in Washington have been trying to prove that Erdoğan has little support and will not remain in office long, a campaign that began with the Gezi Park Protests in May, 2013. Having emerged with the clear support of the people both in the July 15 coup attempt and the April 16 constitutional referendum, Erdoğan has shown that he is has the backing of Turkey, and he is not going anywhere. Decision makers in Washington, along with leaders of other countries will have to acknowledge this sooner or later.

Erdoğan, at his meeting with Trump, expressed a sincere hope for more cooperation between the two countries, while also highlighting Turkey’s concerns on the road to normalization. Ankara is eagerly waiting to see how Trump will respond to its call. It is still not clear whether the relationship between the two countries is to become strategic in terms of regional politics. Another question that the whole world anxiously awaits the answer to is whether Trump will be left standing after his ongoing power struggle with the Washington establishment.

After the recent death of senior Daesh operative Abdurakhmon Uzbeki as a result of a US Special Forces raid in Mayadin, in eastern Syrian near Deir ez Zor, the complexity of the threat exposed by Daesh towards Turkey, has once again been proven. A US military statement acknowledged that Uzbeki was the “facilitator” of the Reina Nightclub attack on New Year’s Eve. Furthermore, he was a “close associate” of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-proclaimed “Caliph” of the terror group and he had a “key role” in the coordination of external terror plots and the movements of foreign fighters as well as organizational funding activities.

Involvement of such a high-profile operative in an attack on Turkey implies that Daesh operations in Turkey have a firm chain of command directed from the headquarters in Syria or Iraq. Leadership decapitation, generally, has great contributing effects over the dissolution of terrorist organizations, however, Daesh has been known as a group which endures this type of damage because of its strategic flexibility. The rejuvenation of the leadership cadre would maintain the danger that Daesh will be able to pose in its external military operations, meaning that leadership coordinated and sleeper-cell supported Daesh attacks may still be a great danger for Turkey’s national security, stability, and social harmony, as was the case with the Reina attack. Therefore containment of that sleeper cell threat is the most pressing national security issue that must be resolved before it becomes too late.

The Threat after Losing Territorial Control

Sleeper cells committed to Daesh would be the most significant threat in the aftermath of a Daesh defeat in Iraq and Syria. They have already proved how real that danger is by carrying out surprising and shocking attacks in the eastern parts of Mosul where Iraqi forces thought that Daesh elements were cleared. A similar incident occurred in Kirkuk in October 2016, when hidden Daesh militants equipped with sniper rifles, machine guns, and suicide vests launched a very surprising attack on the city.

Operation Euphrates Shield has ensured that no Daesh militant will be able to slip across the Turkish border into the country. The extraordinarily long period of time without a Daesh attack in Turkey between August 20 and January 1 has demonstrated the group’s ability to launch attacks has been diminished by the much stronger security along the Turkish-Syrian border, preventing militants and weapons from slipping across to Turkey. But the neutralization of Daesh activities along the border, inextricably, increased the significance of sleeper cells for the terrorist group.

Sleeper cells are different from hit squads, which infiltrate the target country shortly before launching the attack. A sleeper cell, however is well-placed and integrated into the social fabric. A Sleeper cell consists of a small group of militants who maintain their lives in ordinary ways, and seems legitimate in order not to be detected, and lay in wait for appropriate circumstances to take action in order to result in the best outcome from the attack. For instance, Turkish police operations after the Reina attack revealed that the members of the uncovered cells were posing as doctors, business men, dentists, or artisans.

A sleeper cell may be an autonomous structure, however, they take action in response to incoming orders, most of the time. Members of sleeper cells, generally, have no ties to each other, and are unknown to other cells in the country, in the case that if all militants in one cell were arrested, a militant does not transform into an informant.

The Reina Nightclub attack was carried out by a sleeper cell-supported professionally trained Daesh foreign fighter staying in Turkey for about a year, rather than highly mobilized hit squads who pass into Turkey from Syria shortly before carrying out the attack, as was the cases for most of the previous Daesh attacks in Turkey. It is remarkable that Abdulgadir Masharipov has taken a wide range of support from sleeper cells based in Konya, Izmir, and Istanbul when planning and conducting the attack. Therefore, the nightclub attack was a definite Daesh operational shift with strategic national security implications and more importantly it could represent the specific pattern of future attacks in the country.

The Character of the Threat and Turkey’s Counter-terrorism Efforts

Daesh sleeper cell members in Turkey seem to have varying backgrounds in terms of both nationality, and of organizational status. The geographical proximity of Turkey to the inner circle of Daesh, the region encompassing both Syria and Iraq, caused this diversification. That situation, simply, exacerbated the threat by mixing all types of elements of Daesh. These cells include group leaders, veteran fighters, as well as Turkish recruits.

Group leaders are generally responsible for the coordination of these sleeper cells according to the directives coming from the headquarters, and veteran fighters are battle-hardened militants who are the potential perpetrators of future attacks, while Turkish recruits facilitate the operation with their local knowledge for the creation of appropriate conditions in order to carry out the attack. Although it is not possible to identify a certain type of sleeper cell profile in Turkey because of the lack of concrete evidence, it is safe to claim that most of them comprise of Syrians and Iraqis. However, it is also a noticeable trend that groups from the Caucasus and Central Asia have increasingly been targeted by police operations in the country.

Turkey’s security operations against Daesh in the homeland have been a major component of the counter-terrorism strategy in the country. Especially after the Reina attack, the intensity and scale of the operations have skyrocketed. Many leaders were captured and imprisoned while lots of terrorist cells were uncovered. However, it is no doubt that the terrorist group still has a significant capacity to strike Turkey and the sleeper cells would possibly be the most vital instrument for doing that.

In order for Turkey to meet this volatile threat, some crucial steps may be implemented or intensified. Closely tracking the movements of militants and weapons, tracing the communication between group members, cutting off cash flows, and obtaining intelligence from arrested militants are the measures that have already been implemented by the national intelligence agencies and security forces. These measures may simply be boosted and widened.

In the past, it was seen that rapid collection of intelligence, increasing readiness among police forces, and the execution of joint special operations have ensured effective results against the terrorist cells in the country. Furthermore, raising awareness among Turkish society would have a great impact on counter-terrorism efforts by building social resilience, especially in the longer-term. It is already seen that several police raids have been conducted recently thanks to the information and intelligence obtained. Thus, the maintenance and broadening of the current policies and developing awareness among society would no doubt constitute a significant aspect of containing the possible Daesh sleeper cells in the country.

Daesh, the world’s most modern and sadistic terrorist organization – known for putting people into cages and burning them, selling women they have captured as slaves, lining people up and beheading them one by one – has courteous relations with one country: Israel. Israel’s former Minister of Defense Moshe Ya’alon raised eyebrows this April by saying “There was one case recently where Daesh opened fire and apologized.”

Committing terrorist acts all across the globe and killing hundreds in Australia, Canada, Kenya, Italy, Yemen, Tunisia, Russia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, the US, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Belgium, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Denmark, France, Sweden and Turkey, Daesh apologized to Israel as shots were fired from a territory under its control. This incident mentioned by Ya’alon was also acknowledged by the Israeli military last November. Israeli officials said that one of their patrols was attacked with rockets and light weapons in the southern portion of the Golan Heights, a region Israel controls. In exchange, Israel announced it hit the vehicle carrying the Daesh members with an airstrike. The same statement highlighted that during the attack, which was claimed by the Daesh-linked group Yarmouk Martyrs, no Israeli citizen was killed, while 4 Daesh members were killed.

According to the Times of Israel, this incident was kept secret until the former minister’s statement at a cultural festival on April 24 in a town named Afula, in the north of the country. The newspaper explained that the incident was kept secret because it might have “caused shame to both Israel and Daesh.” In the very same statement, Moshe Ya’alon also said the following about Israel’s Syrian policy: “There are many actors in Syria, such as Iran, Russia, Al-Qaeda and Daesh. Under this condition, one has to have a responsible and balanced policy. If Israel intervenes on behalf of any side, this will be in the interests of others. For this reason, we have announced our red lines in this matter. Whoever tries to infringe our sovereignty, they will feel our force.”

Despite Ya’alon’s statement, it is definite that Israel prefers one side to the other. And this is not even a secret. In the near past, while the terrorist organization was called ISIS, Israel had expressed that they preferred Daesh to the Assad regime. The head of Israel’s Military Intelligence Herzi Halevy took it even further last summer: “Israel doesn’t want the Syrian crisis concluding with Daesh’s defeat.” Speaking at the Herzliya Conference, where Israeli security and defense policies are discussed, Halevy elaborated on why they don’t want Daesh to be defeated, after talking about the challenges Daesh faced during the first three months of the so-called caliphate: “Withdrawal of super powers will put Israel in a tight spot against Hezbollah and Iran. For this reason, we have to do whatever we can to evade this kind of a situation.”

Daesh’s disposition towards Israel since the beginning has been intriguing. This situation was also intriguing while I was shooting a three-part documentary on Daesh, interviewing European and Turkish academics, military and intelligence personnel. Known for his work on Daesh, Princeton researcher Cole Bunzel said that he followed all the announcements, both vocal and written, from ISIS and that the terrorist organization never mentioned Israel as a target, even though they designated Middle Eastern governments and Shiites as their targets. There were other peculiar incidents as well. For instance, the “founding father” of Daesh and Iraqi Al Qaeda Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s escape from Afghanistan and finding shelter in Tehran, Iran. However, this is not our subject; it’s about Daesh’s relations with Israel and their approach to Palestine.

As one of its first heinous crimes, Daesh had attacked the Yarmouk Camp seven kilometers from the center of Damascus, where 200,000 Palestinians sought refuge after they were forced to leave their lands with Israel’s foundation in 1948. Today, 20,000 Palestinian refugees still at Yarmouk Camp are under attack by both regime forces and Daesh. French sociologist Olivier Roy, whom I have interviewed for the Daesh documentary, indicated that Daesh wasn’t following a pragmatist politics, and their attack on Yarmouk Camp was an example of this. After noting that the Palestinian issue is what motivates most young Muslims today, he said: “They [Daesh] attacked Yarmouk Camp near Damascus and beheaded all Hamas members there. Therefore, they’re not seeking any kind of political compromise. For instance, they don’t even try to establish a political alliance with Hamas; on the contrary, they see Hamas as an enemy. This is because those who are not a part of Daesh are their enemies.”

According to one claim, Daesh is terrified by Israel. German journalist Jürgen Todenhöfer who spent 10 days with Daesh militants in Mosul in 2015, wrote that Daesh members were terrified by only one country and that was Israel. A former CDU deputy between 1970 and 1992, Todenhöfer made some interesting remarks in his interview to Jewish News: “Daesh members are terrified by only one country: Israel. In fact, Israel is the only country they don’t even think about conquering in the Middle East. Daesh militants have repeatedly expressed that Israel is too powerful for them.”

While it’s unclear whether they do it out of fear, strategy, or friendship, it’s definite that Daesh doesn’t attack Israel. Furthermore, the destruction Daesh caused in the Islamic world is also definite. Despite their terrorist attacks and videos they publish, their real enemies are Muslims, not Christians and Jews. They have declared Muslims who are different from them infidels; this means, in their opinion, 1.5 billion Muslims are infidels. They have killed thousands of Muslims, starting in Iraq. Through Daesh’s actions, Islamophobia has been on the rise in the US and Europe, and it has become normalized.

Moshe Ya’along, who resigned from his post last year due to disagreements with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, revealed a secret. Beyond not posing any threat to each other, it seems that Daesh and Israel have some kind of a dialogue going on between them. Moreover, the whole world witnessed that Daesh apologized to a country, that country being Israel. What’s more interesting is that Western media didn’t carry Ya’alon’s statements in the headlines, even though Daesh massacred and continues to massacre thousands of people. If these words were uttered by another country’s minister of defense, I’m not talking about only Muslim countries but any country, it would have been discussed for days and the said country would be accused of being a proponent of Daesh. None of this happened. International media outlets just published a brief piece on it and let it be.

Why? Because it is Israel and they can do whatever they want. They can occupy any land, openly state they don’t want Daesh to be defeated, and accept the apology of Daesh. Does anyone dare to remind Israel of their claim to being a democratic state of law? No. The world is shaped in accordance with their perception of threats. Recently, Israel announced that they have banned tourists who visit Jerusalem from going to Palestinian cities and the West Bank. It’s an attempt to prevent people who witness Israel’s cruelty and oppression from telling it to others, I guess. However, those who have seen it are so horrified that they can’t even tell it to others. Moreover, even if they tell the tales of cruelty and oppression, who would care?

Former US President Barack Obama had designated Turkey as a model partner in his first term. However, regional priorities of the Obama administration shifted drastically after 2012. The attack on the US diplomatic mission in Benghazi in September 2012, which resulted in the death of the US ambassador, is thought to be one of the main reasons behind this shift. After 2014, a new US foreign policy approach led to the containment of Turkey from all sides. The Obama Administration’s decision to form an alliance with the terrorist PYD/YPG against DAESH in Syria was a turning point for Turkey.

The US political and military support for PYD encouraged the PKK and other terrorist organizations to target Turkey. The PKK ended the reconciliation process in the summer of 2015 and commenced its terror attacks against the country. Simultaneously, DAESH started to increase the frequency of its attacks against Turkey. The US’s clear stance against Turkey might have been a factor behind the failed coup attempt by FETO (the Fetullah Gülenist Terror Organization) in the Summer of 2016. The leaders of FETO had probably calculated that given the Erdoğan administration’s unpopularity in Washington policy circles, not many actors in the US would resist such a coup attempt. They were right in the sense that not so many people among the Obama administration clearly and vociferously condemned the putschists that tried to topple the democratically elected government of Turkey. However, FETO leaders miscalculated the Turkish people’s own resistance and strong reaction to the coup attempt.

Obama’s foreign policy approach was not just directed against Turkey. Although the second term of the Obama administration was a nightmare for traditional US allies including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Ukraine, Obama’s policies produced a favorable environment for the US’s rivals like Iran, Cuba, and Russia. The containment of Sunni countries with a “Shiite crescent” was truly ensured during the Obama administration. Nuclear talks with Iran, political developments in Iraq and the US’s military retreat from Iraq paved the way for Iran and its sectarian geopolitics. Iran was the primary beneficiary of the Obama Administration’s Middle East policy. “The strategy to balance old allies with old rivals” was costly for the US’s traditional allies. However, all actors started to seek new means to compensate for their losses. Turkey’s balancing strategy and recalibration efforts were the result of such a quest.

Turkey was in search of a new partner to overcome the internal and trans-border security challenges that the country was facing. Turkey’s attempts to improve relations with Russia and contacts with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization were a direct result of this search. Indeed, Operation Euphrates Shield that aimed to cleanse the Turkish-Syrian border from terrorist elements commenced only after mutual agreement with Russia. The search for new cooperation opportunities in Turkish foreign policy does not entail becoming a part of a new alliance system in the short term; however, it caused Turkey to distance itself from the alliance system that it is a member of. The new orientation of Turkish foreign policy may cause it to form issue or region-based strategic partnerships or limited alliances. The adoption of a dynamically balanced policy instead of relying on a particular alliance for increasing security in the short and midterm seems a more probable option.

In the short-term, Turkey will try to have a much more balanced relationship with the US, Russia and EU. To have a reasonable balanced policy, Turkey should do its best to avoid any situation that could bring these three actors in line against itself. At the regional level, on the other hand balancing Iranian expansionism, and sectarian rhetoric as well as the containment of the PKK/PYD and DAESH will be Turkey’s top priorities.

Being surrounded by the PKK/PYD, DAESH and Iranian-backed sectarian militias is the worst-case scenario for Turkey. However, Turkey is not the only actor unhappy with the activism of the aforementioned violent non-state actors and militia groups. Turkey may be in a position to take risks against these actors because unlike for the US, EU and Russia; PKK/PYD, DAESH and the sectarian militias constitute an existential threat against Turkey’s security. Turkey’s more assertive struggle against these actors in the field may encourage three major actors (US, EU and Russia) to cooperate or at least to stop resisting against Turkey. These diverse objectives may eventually contradict each other, which is the main challenge for Turkey.

Transition from Axis to Balance Policy

Turkey abstained from direct military intervention in the Syrian civil war and this was something unexpected by Washington, which, previously too, had not received logistical support from Turkey during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The US administration seems to have been frustrated by Turkey’s military refraining from intervening in Syria in the framework of the alliance with the US, and started to question the necessity of an ally that didn’t act in the interest of Washington. On the other hand, relations with President Erdoğan and the AK Party government became tense.

The period following the downing of a Russian fighter jet near the Syrian border by the Turkish Air Force in November 2015 had been painful for Turkey. The country’s relations with both the US and Russia became tense since early 2015. Meanwhile the EU was also indifferent towards Turkey’s sensitivities in its struggle against terrorism. All factors combined, each and every one of these actors tried to benefit from the fragility of the country and expected Turkey to go along with their interests. The Gülenist coup attempt of July 15, 2016, took place in such a fragile environment.

Today, Turkey’s top priority is to have more balanced relationships with the US, Russia, and EU. Improving the relations or being on friendly terms with at least two of these actors is a key to Turkey’s economic and political stability. Keeping a delicate balance between the US, Russia and EU is quite significant for maintaining Turkey’s relative autonomy in its foreign relations as much as in its domestic security. On the other hand, however, balancing interests in the economy and security is another challenge for Turkey. There is no magic formula to reach these objectives at the same time but the balancing policy should henceforth be the pivotal term for Turkish foreign policy. Having tense relationships with more than one global actor accompanied by other regional security challenges makes Turkey less immune to domestic and international shocks.

The turbulent era of Turkish foreign policy, especially during Barack Obama’s second term, is the reflection of the struggle to adapt to the new foreign policy approach. It is probable to have a more rational policy, based on the mutual interests of the two countries during the Donald Trump presidency. At some point, the Trump administration will have to make a strategic choice between Turkey and the PKK/PYD in Syria and it will shape the future of Turkish-American relations. The competition between US CENTCOM and the US EUCOM will also influence the end result. While US CENTCOM has chosen PKK/PYD as its strategic partner, EUCOM may choose to improve cooperation and collaboration with Turkey in critical security issues regarding Europe.

On the other hand, Turkey’s efforts to coordinate its Syria policy with Russia, despite certain difficulties, may have positive outcomes for Turkey’s security. If the Astana Process for the resolution of the Syrian conflict produces some productive outcomes, this might help the resolution of other issues as well. We have to keep in mind that Turkey and Russia are still far from reaching a strategic agreement in any significant security related issue including the future of Syria.

The EU is a more complicated counterpart for Turkey. Although there are more areas of potential cooperation and mutual interests between Turkey and the EU, especially in the fields of economy and security, the possibility of strengthening ties in the near future is quite grim due to internal political complications and challenges of both actors. The results of parliamentary elections in Germany in September 2017 and French presidential elections will have a significant influence on the leadership of the EU. Until then, EU-Turkey relations may be unstable at best.

The legacy of openings to other regions such as Africa, Latin America and East Asia is positive but these regions do not have strategic value for Turkey’s foreign policy agenda. If the EU institutions decide to continue more hostile relations with Turkey and try to isolate Turkey, alternative options including the Shangai Cooperation Organization may be considered more seriously. Fluctuations and instabilities in US-Russian relations will have a direct impact on Turkey’s strategic decisions and choices. That is why the decision makers in Turkey will be following this relationship closely. Turkey is entering a new era where diplomacy has to be conducted meticulously to meet the new challenges.

Chemical weapons have been used 45 times in Syria since last year, according to the Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which monitors the elimination of the toxic arms in order to ensure international security. The most recent chemical attack to draw world attention took place on April 4, 2017 in Khan Sheikhoun district, which is located in southern Idlib. The Khan Sheikhoun attack also prompted the fledgling Trump administration to carry out a cruise missile strike on a Syrian airbase allegedly used for the chemical attack, which targeted innocent civilians and children.

The Red Line in US Syria Policy

In response to the use of chemical weapons against innocent civilians, the root causes of the Trump authorization of a missile attack in Syria have been widely discussed at the international level. Trump’s missile strike could be interpreted as taking a stand against the use chemical weapons, which had been clearly marked as a ‘red line’ in Washington’s Syria policy by the previous administration. Back in 2013, President Obama had said any violation of the red line could lead to a possible change of US policy towards the Syrian civil war.

Apparently, Trump and his predecessor Obama are on the same page about what a red line in the Syrian civil war is. According to US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, the top leadership of the Assad regime ordered the Khan Sheikhoun attack and decided to employ deadly chemicals including sarin gas to hit innocent people. Nevertheless, Syria and Russia are adamant that the recent sarin gas attack is a ‘false flag’ operation that Al-Qaeda or one of the Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist groups that controls the Idlib province set off in order to elicit an American intervention which put 20% of Assad’s air force out of action. However, if we take a look at the recent history of the use of chemical weapons in Syria, despite international condemnation, significant non-overlapping arguments were laid out by the Syrian government and even by the OPCW.

Even though Syria signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in October 2013 and OPCW reported Syria had removed all of its chemical arsenal in June 2014, the Syrian government went on to carry out chlorine gas attacks several times in Idlib. It is possible that Syria has used the Chemical Weapons Convention as a screen, so it can attribute future deadly chemical attacks on opposition groups fighting in Idlib.

Most probably, the Syrian government did not expect a sudden US attack that  would destroy one of their significant airfields. From now on, there is a possibility that Trump’s retaliatory attacks might stop Assad from using chemical weapons. Apparently Russia can quickly replace the lost aircraft at the destroyed airbase, so it is difficult to anticipate the future of Syria and how the recent US attacks might change the balance of power on the battlefield, specifically in Idlib province where the next “mother of all battles” is yet to come.

Trump’s Policy in the Middle East Will Not Be a Huge Departure from That of Obama’s

Following the chemical attack, the international community has renewed calls for supporting regime change and removing Assad from Syria, arguing that if this does not happen, Syria will stay vulnerable to further gross human rights violations. Even though the US has followed a pro-active policy in the region over the last 15 years, this time it seems that Trump’s policy in the Middle East would be “reactive.” So far, Trump’s policy has not offered any concrete solution to stop the humanitarian crisis except offering condemnation and carrying out some warning attacks. Most probably, Trump’s policy in the Middle East will not be a huge departure from that of Obama’s.

Trump’s reaction to the deadly chemical attack is rather symbolic and discursive, and does not change his stated aim that his top priority in Syria is to defeat DAESH. Syria urgently needs two rational solutions for two rising concerns which threaten the collective security of the region. One of them is to curtail the presence of terror organizations such as DAESH and PYD in the region. The other is to stop chemical attacks targeting civilian-inhabited areas and causing mass casualties. In this regard, Turkey could possibly get a leading role and step up for a pro-active policy in the region, especially after its Euphrates Shield Operation in Syria has been shown to be so successful.

Turkey Was Right to Consistently Call for Assad’s Ouster

After wide-spread chemical attacks in Syrian territory, the international community has been able to find the lowest common denominator and chanted “Assad must go” with one voice, however Turkey has known of the urgency of Assad’s ouster since the beginning of the war. After the chemical attack Turkey has renewed this call one more time.

The state apparatus in Syria has completely been destroyed and the legitimacy of the regime is highly questionable. More than 11 million people have been displaced (almost half of Syria’s population) and the economy has shrunk 65% since the start of the war. This is in addition to the situation even before the conflict began, when many Syrians were complaining about high unemployment rates, widespread and normalized corruption, and a lack of political freedoms.

Who Will Take the Lead in the Syrian Battleground?

The current situation in Syria is pathetic, as another deadly chemical attack was launched against innocent civilians, but no single institution or government seems sure of what the next step will be, and who is going to take the leading role. Moreover, there are communication problems between Moscow and the US, whose priorities are clashing against each other, with one side working for the “survival of the regime” and another for “fighting DAESH.” No one knows how Russia will take the facts of the recent chemical attack in discussions with their US counterparts, so the level of dialogue is very critical between the two powers and will determine the future of Syria under the Trump administration.

After a meeting with Putin on May 3, Erdoğan will meet with Trump on May 16. That meeting will turn out to be critical, as it will be the first “face to face” encounter between the two leaders. Additionally, two key NATO allies will have the chance to mend a relationship that was wounded by persistent US cooperation with PYD, the Syrian branch of the PKK.

Turkey should be neither too pessimist nor too optimist especially after Rex Tillerson’s statements on Syria, which were recently laid out after a joint press conference with Russian counter-part Lavrov. Tillerson underlined the urgency of Assad’s departure, however he added that the US is not going to lead it. His statement is a good summary of the American position, in that it is standing up for Syria.  The next step should be to realize that Turkey has a clear strategic advantage and can become that leading figure on the Syrian battleground needed to remove Assad.

If the referendum on the presidential system in Turkey was a close call for “no,” for instance with 50.1% of the total votes, no one in this world would question its legitimacy. It would have been deemed as a tremendous victory of the anti-Erdoğan wing. It didn’t come to pass and the bill passed the referendum with 51.4%. Then, it must be Erdoğan’s triumph! President Erdoğan received the public support by acquiring 1,300,000 more votes than “no” in a referendum which was attended by 86.4% of the eligible voters. Kurdish votes showing 10-20% increase in certain cities played an important role in Erdoğan’s victory,  who has been at the helm of the government for 15 years, first as the prime minister and then as the president.

A Turkey which is surrounded by wars, hosts 2,500,000 Syrian refugees, has been targeted by both Daesh and the PKK, recently overcame a coup attempt on July 15 Gülenist infiltrators instructed by Fetullah Gülen who tried to move the country into an unprecedented chaos. Considering the reactions of especially the US universities and think-tanks, along with some Europeans ones, there is a president who is being condemned for “surviving the coup attempt.”

A president who has been more eager than his predecessors in making Turkey a full member of the EU, who has recognized the Kurdish problem and commenced the reconciliation process, who has realized education reforms for thousands of women that were forcibly thrown out by the police and forced to leave their schools just because they were wearing headscarves, and who extended his condolences to Armenians on April 24 and asked for an international commission to research what has transpired during 1915 incidents… A president who embraced the doorkeeper of the hotel he was staying in Brussels, along with the German Chancellor Schröder, who calls and talks with his childhood friends, who has earned the love and interest of the people… The most significant political leader since Atatürk.

It has become ambiguous when it did happen; however, the said president started to be compared to the cruelest man of the last century, Hitler, deemed as a dictator and alleged for massacring Kurds with an elaborate perception management that was devised by the West. In a short time the anti-Erdoğan club became quite cosmopolitan: even Daesh leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, PKK, Gülen and his henchmen became the members of it. A fabulous cosmopolitan coalition of opposition! It should be mentioned that this coalition inevitably brought quite a support to Erdoğan and affected the result of referendum in a positive way.

Talking about Turkey, there are a few members of the opposition who voted “no” and constantly criticize as they want the system to become more democratic and have a robust judicial system. Nevertheless, whatever be the discussion, the “no” movement has always been spearheaded by the main opposition party CHP which comes from a Kemalist tradition. Justice and Development Party (AK Party) which has been governing Turkey for 15 years, has proposed numerous proposals about changing the 1982 constitution that was implemented by the junta.

The main opposition party opposed all of these proposals. This wasn’t surprising, as this is the nature of the Kemalist opposition parties. However, what is surprising is that the opposition party has never proposed a change or an alternative to the 1982 constitution, the same constitution that the all people in Turkey unanimously want to change. Let alone preparing a proposal that could worry AK Party, they haven’t even scribbled a draft of a constitution. Indeed, for 15 years AK Party and its leader Tayyip Erdoğan have been always challenging their own records in elections and broke them with unprecedented figures.

Erdoğan and his party that don’t have to worry about a legitimate opposition have overcome numerous illegitimate attempts aiming to depose them. The referendum was held under the conditions of the state of emergency that was declared right after the July 15 coup attempt. The subject matter was a change in the system of government; however, this wasn’t being voted in the referendum. It was between those who are against Erdoğan, both in Turkey and the world, and those who stood with Erdoğan.

Despite the campaigning since February, almost none of the voters regardless of their point of view are aware of either the so-called parliamentary system that grants excessive authority to the president or the presidential system which is different than the existing system. Among those who are aware, the objections of the main opposition party’s voters were not taken much into consideration as they refrained from criticizing the existing odd system and, moreover, as they were the ones that made it stranger. On the other hand, even though the AK Party voters were concerned about certain things, the “yes” won because of the trust in Erdoğan.

Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) which allied with AK Party for the referendum failed to garner the expected support. However, the Kurdish votes played a decisive role in the referendum by increasing support for “yes” in 14 cities located in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. Considering the vote AK Party garnered in November 1 elections in 2015, there is a varying increase between 10% and 20% in cities in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. The concerns for security, believing Erdoğan will resolve issues of the region and the reaction against PKK’s trench and urban warfare contributed to the victory. Moreover, there were those who voted “yes” as they believed that 1982 constitution is indefensible and it is impossible to resolve the Kurdish problem with the existing parliamentary system. For this reason, Erdoğan was able to increase its votes in Diyarbakır from 22.2% to 32.43%, in Batman from 30% to 36.48%, in Mardin from 30% to 40.96%, in Siirt from 40% to 48.1%, in Şırnak from 13% to 28.41%, and in Şanlıurfa from 67.8% to 70.82%.

As a result, it could be said that Erdoğan who is the indubitably the most prominent political figure of Turkey for 15 years has received less votes than his potential. However, the precedents of Turkish political history and sociology, along with the experience, show that Erdoğan will be able to maintain his government. Even if the transition to presidential system wasn’t realized, he still would be a powerful president due to the provisions of the constitution, along with being elected president in the first round with 51.8% of the votes. He himself was powerful before; now, his seat is also powerful.

A small portion of the AK Party voters abstained from voting “yes” not because of a concern about Erdoğan, but because they weren’t sure of the answer to the following question: “what will happen after Erdoğan?” Erdoğan, who will become the leader of his party due to the constitutional change, will probably take some steps that will answers the expectations and concerns of his voters, while also taking the Kurdish voters’ support into consideration. It is also highly probable that the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) which is perceived as the only representative of Kurdish politics by the international community will face new rivaling competitors in the region, beside their only rival AK Party.

What began due to the killings of a group of Syrian teenagers, who drew revolutionary slogans on the wall of a school, has inarticulately turned into a catastrophic bellum, which is not likely to end soon. Syria has turned into a battlefield, whereby weapons, belligerents and strategies have come from foreign countries. While Syrian forces are continuing to fight for regaining control over the country, the story of the “civil war” continues. With no doubt, from the very beginning, this war is carried out by foreign powers. Therefore, to name this war solely as a civil war would be misleading. Because of that, the war in Syria, which is presumed to be a local conflict, rather fits in the context of a global geopolitical struggle whereby significant powers are involved with convergent interests.

Destabilization of Europe

Incompetent tinkering on how to approach Syria by European elites has resulted in a zone of chaos and disorder in Europe. Due to global shockwaves of the conflict, not only countries such as Greece and Italy, which form the borders of the EU, have been seriously affected, but also Eastern- and Western European countries. Wars waged in the Middle East have caused millions of people to flee their countries to enter Europe. Especially Eastern European countries have rigorously reacted against the influx of refugees. For example, the foreign minister of Hungary Peter Szijjarto answered the question, “Why has the Hungarian government used racist slogans”? by saying the following: “We can be hypocritical, we can continue being politically correct, so I think it is a stupid debate whether uncontrolled migration has led to the increase of terror in Europe or not, because it did. There were hundreds of thousands of illegal migrants entering the territory of the EU without knowing who they are, without any kind of registration.”

When compared to ten years ago, clearly, there is a world of difference now. Although Middle Eastern and North African states were regarded as authoritarian, at least, they had been stable dictatorships where people who were not involved in politics had decent lives. Europe had good relations with Russia, and Ukraine was a country in peace. Currently, Syria has gone up in flames and has become a source of millions of refugees.

Nevertheless, the Syrian Civil War has not only bothered EU member states with the mass influx of refugees. Prominent member states have been confronted by bloody terrorist attacks by DAESH, which has caused persistent anxiety among their citizens. Heavy responses from terrorist groups have come against the air attacks carried out by states such as France, Germany and Belgium. Subsequent to the Paris attacks, Marine Le Pen, the leader of the far right National Front party stated the following: “France and its citizens are no longer safe. Accordingly, emergency measures need to be taken. Islamic fundamentalism must be annihilated. France must ban Islamist organizations, shutter radical mosques and deport foreign hate preachers, as well as immigrants who have no business being here.” The right-wing leader in the Netherlands, Geert Wilders said the following after the Brussels attacks: “It is time to act. First of all, we must close our national borders and detain all the jihadists whom we have foolishly allowed to return from Syria. We must also tell people the truth. The cause of all this bloodshed is Islam. We need to de-Islamize the West. That is the only way to safeguard our lives and protect our freedom.”

European capitals might have considered that appealing for sanctions via the UN would have no impact on the attitude of the Assad regime. Moreover, due to the fact that the situation in Syria is incredibly complex due to the myriad of organizations and fronts involved in the war, it is feasible to predict possible backlashes.

Besides, a steady increase in far-right politics is observable in European countries in general. Mainly domestic issues, such as high rates of criminality and failed integration are regarded as the leading causes. Nevertheless, EU countries have taken these conditions into account before adopting an attitude towards the refugee crisis. In the end, Europeans are acknowledging that they are fed up with ethnic minorities and are putting the blame of faltering economies and segregated living on them. Therefore, while rightist senses are on the rise, many governments have not applied an open door-migrant policy. The ones who have applied it, have either regretted their decision, or have experienced a serious decrease in support for their parties. The consideration that migrants have not succeeded in integrating into the society, or the idea that states have failed to apply integration policies properly, brings within itself the assumption that certain parts of the society were excluded. In this respect, people who regard themselves as ‘outsiders’, express themselves in radical manners to have a voice, which again leads to harsher reactions from European states.

There is a big difference with regards to the situation of Europeans and Americans when taking the shockwaves of this conflict into account. European states are directly affected because of their geographical location. It is not astonishing that the EU has signed an agreement with Turkey to keep refugees attempting to enter the Union. The EU has received much criticism for being cynical about its adopted attitude towards the refugee crisis. In fact, practice of the Union that consists of 27 member states has nothing to do with ethics. The initial reaction of Europe on the increasing migration flow caused a blind panic. Not only were policymakers under pressure hounded by the envious eyes of far right people, but also the media did not have any idea how to approach the issue, which had obvious effects on the general public. Cancelling legal options for asylum seekers to enter Europe led to human traffickers making a serious profit while engaging in fatally dangerous activities. Also the internal solidarity within Europe has suffered after Eastern European states refused to equally allocate refugees in the continent.

What is predictable is that the shockwaves of this conflict will affect Europe as long as the war continues. Under the pressure of public opinion and right-wing parties, European states put forward statements, which appear as if there is no space for refugees on European soil. The main arguments for not accepting asylum seekers are related to the assumption that refugees will pose a threat to their prosperity and social security. They advocate for the settlement of Syrian refugees in their neighboring countries, however they are not even thinking about their own reception capacities while they are already causing serious tensions. All in all, the EU politics towards the Syrian crisis has not been a sustainable one as they continuously attempt turning a deaf ear to the main problems. Keeping a distance to the refugee crisis and at the same time seeking to maintain domestic stability will lead to a failure, if not to a catastrophic success.

When the Syrian civil war erupted, no one could easily predict the battlefield would evolve to a multi-dimensional and multi-territorial conflict where thousands of foreign proxies and fighters from different countries have been dragged into expeditiously. Based on the fact that the general overview of the battlefield has expanded and even most ominously crossed the borders of Syria and spilled over Iraq, it is unrealistic to talk about presence of just one battlefield but there are numerous battlefields where proxies have buckled down to debilitating each other.

DAESH is causing a radical sociological transformation in the region

Even though there are various actors actively playing on the ground, DAESH and its earlier incarnations are the main precipitating factors welcoming a radical sociological transformation in the region. DAESH has a bid of “becoming a state” leaning on a rather apocalyptic vision with a rhetoric of self-proclaimed caliphate. This rhetoric rips up the main notion of the Westphalian state system called ‘soil integration’ and destabilizes traditional state envisagement. When DAESH hit the road to implement a deconstruction model in the region, its golden shot was the seizure of Mosul in June 2014 which symbolized the tearing up of the Sykes-Picot Border of 1916, which demarcates Iraq from Syria. Only then did it grab the attention of international community and especially that of the US.

DAESH is slaughtering tens of thousands of people ferociously under its rule with a desire to expunge each force on its way, which puts in danger its autocratic rule. From the very beginning of the war; the reason of Russia and the US’s entry into the war respectively is primarily about saving Assad and destabilizing the region in the favor of PYD, Syrian branch of the PKK, where they are dominating a vast majority of Syria’s northern border; currently advancing towards Deir-Ez Zor Euphrates Axis and pushing towards DAESH de facto capital Raqqa with the full support of the US-led coalition.

Fighting against the threat posed by DAESH is one of Assad’s rationalization for staying in power and to be protected by Russia; however; it is crystal clear that neither Assad with a constant military, diplomatic and financial support from Russia and Iran nor the US is fighting DAESH to root out its cruel militias from the Middle East. One incident which is worth remembering: Syrian troops were driven out of Palmyra in December, 2016 following leaving of Russian soldiers and abandoning the historical city to fate of guardianship of the Syrian army in April. Syrian troops retook Palmyra from DAESH for the second time in March, 2017; nevertheless; it is blatant that there is a sham fight among Syrian troops and DAESH militants to leave and recapture the strategic territories in the Syrian civil war.

A success story in the Syria battlefield: Operation Euphrates Shield

Owing largely to the quest for a new pro-active foreign policy direction; Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield on August 24 to purge the region from terrorist groups such as the PYD, YPG and DEASH along with the Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army force and Turkish officials confirmed that the 2,200-square-kilometer area has been completely cleared of the DAESH militants. While the operation has turned out an unequivocal success; a number of foreign policy commentators both in the national and international level are running a campaign to discredit significant gains by Turkey in the Al-Bab operation after the US deploys heavily armed marines to Syria to launch the Raqqa offensive with the YPG dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) amid Turkey’s objections to the US authorities.

However, as Turkey Presidential Spokesperson İbrahim Kalın stated yesterday; it is not yet certain which groups and policies will shape the future of Raqqa. Taking into consideration the above-mentioned facts; the speculation of Al-Bab operation is rather baseless; where Turkey’s gains on the ground are so obvious. In addition, one thing should be emphasized that Turkey is the only country in the world coordinating its fight against the PKK, its affiliate in Syria the PYD, and DEASH at the same time.

Manbij Operation: Outcome of military success in Al-Bab

Relying on its recent military success in Al-Bab, Turkey has launched an operation of encircling of the Western Manbij even though Russian General Staff declared that an agreement was reached between the Assad regime and the YPG for the peaceful transfer of Manbij’s control to Assad regime forces. Free Syrian Army continues its operations against Syrian Democratic Forces despite arrival of government fighters due to the fact that Manbij Military Council which is under the domination of the US allied Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) denied handing over areas to the Assad regime in a menacing manner.

In addition, as the US state department explained earlier this week; the US is insistent on not seeing the YPG as a terrorist group despite raising Turkish concerns which is a clear sign of the US authorities would carry on protecting YPG forces at all costs.  It seems that the US is going ahead with several measures with an intention to refute Turkey’s leading argument on the Syrian battleground, especially following Turkey’s announcement in the previous week that should the YPG forces does not withdraw from Manbij which was promised several times by the US authorities over the past few months, Turkey will storm the YPG forces.

The US recent moves are leveraging the crisis in the region

Apparently, the US’s recent moves are clear indicators of its willingness to escalate the crisis with Turkey. After Trump took office on January 20, 2017; it is still unclear what kind of a US is Turkey going to ally with? The latest moves of the US invite Turkey to reshape the basic parameters of Ankara’s relation with the US. Despite the fact that Turkey has been successful in blending its wider objectives with a clear intention to fight DAESH and YPG, the ambiguity that the US breeds in Syria is still eliciting many risks that Turkey should withstand. Based on a precarious sort of balance prevalent in the region, the final move of the US might be interpreted as way of blunting Turkey’s recent gains throughout the Al-Bab Operation.

Recent military maneuver of the US might raise up tensions between various actors in the battlefield

The US’s recent policy has produced a direct confrontation with Turkey such as once was experienced heavily with Russia. This would be the biggest foreign policy test for Ankara, on how much is it able to adjust to its new pro-active foreign policy instruments to the new phase of the US foreign policy. It seems that the US foreign policy priorities happen to line up with PYD which causes ramping up of divergence between the US and Turkey in terms of Syria policy and the Middle East as a whole. Nonetheless, recent military and political maneuvers of the US might lead to inter group and intra group struggles in the region taking into consideration sectarian and demographic vulnerabilities embedded in the region, especially while it is obvious that all the actors and borders have intertwined each other like never before. Having been confronted with multidimensional threats, Turkey appears determined not to leave off its advantageous position in Syria across swathes of strategic attacks coming from both national and international level.

A sustainable resolution to the instability in the Middle East that emerged with the Arab Spring has yet to be proposed. The countries in the region are already being affected negatively by the instability. Terrorist and sub-state actors have gained such vast areas of influence that a long time is needed to eradicate their harmful effects. International actors have stayed passive while they should actively and staunchly work for the elimination of instability, instead their inaction has led to the perpetuation of the instability.

Of course, the countries of the region share the blame, having prioritized historical rivalries and striving for power and increasing their influence in the new regional order. All of these caused terror to gain momentum, for proxy wars to flourish, and shook the nation-states to their very core. It should not be forgotten that political actors like al-Assad, who laid waste to his own country, have also contributed to the chaos in the region.

The aforementioned factors made the instability a stable feature of the Middle East. It is obvious that Turkey and the Gulf countries are not content with the regional developments. They had been the US’ strategic partners during the Cold War, but disillusioned with the US after the Second Iraq War (2003) and the Arab Spring, respectively. Especially President Obama’s Middle East policies, which exacerbated the instability, raised concerns in Turkey and the Gulf countries over their own national security. Obama’s presidency and heritage will remain as bitter memories in both nations’ minds.

President Erdoğan recently went on a Gulf tour consisting of three countries: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. He was welcomed by high-ranking leaders in all three counties and returned to Turkey after striking deals in the trade, finance, culture, and defense sectors. It should be noted that Iranian leader Rouhani was visiting the other two Gulf countries, Oman and Kuwait, while Erdoğan was in the Gulf. These visits revealed which actors Turkey and Iran had better relations with. We can say that Turkey and the Gulf countries are of the same mind in certain regional issues, while keeping in mind that Gulf countries have certain differences amongst themselves. When it comes to US relations, regional stability, and terror, Turkey and the Gulf countries have common concerns.

Common Concerns

Firstly, there are issues concerning foreign policy: the security of the Gulf becoming a secondary concern for the US, the US paving the way for Iran’s influence with the nuclear deal, and the US’ stance towards countries of the region like Iraq and Syria. The US’ retreat from the Gulf in the military sense caused a serious trauma to the Gulf countries, as the US had been the de facto guarantor of the Gulf since World War II. The content of this trauma reminds one of the serious crises caused by President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 1964 letter to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü. With this letter, Turkey experienced the disadvantages of relying on a single actor in its security policies.

Still, Turkey experienced even worse relations with the US in the last couple of years. The July 15 coup attempt being almost disregarded by the US,  the US arming PYD and YPG in Syria and providing to political support to the said organizations, along with not adequately supporting Turkey in its fight against terror, are some of the indicators of this troubled period. Moreover, while Turkey is having judicial problems with the US over the extradition of FETO leader Fetullah Gülen, the Gulf countries also have judicial issues with the US over recent legislation allowing Americans to sue foreign governments for alleged support for terrorism (JASTA).

Secondly, limiting Iran’s influence in the region and regional stability are common concerns. While the Gulf countries centered their national security policies around the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring began, these policies shifted after the nuclear deal was signed between the P5+1 countries and Iran. Iran was once again the main threat to Gulf countries, especially to Saudi Arabia. Following the nuclear deal, Gulf countries began to have closer relations with Turkey in order to counterbalance and limit Iran. Turkey and the Gulf countries, with the exception of Qatar, were in different positions during the Arab Spring. The shift in policies is also closely linked with Saudi King Salman’s ascension to the throne. Iran’s aggressive and interventional stance in Syria, Yemen and Iraq raised concerns in Turkey and the Gulf countries. They all now agree on preventing Iran from gaining further influence.

Thirdly, there are mutual concerns over the elimination of terror, which is the most significant source of the region’s instability. DAESH, the PKK, YPG-PYD, and other terrorist organizations in the region are a threat to countries’ national security, as their regular series of bombings and attacks clearly demonstrate. DAESH’s terrorist actions in both Turkey and Saudi Arabia revealed how much a threat it is to these countries. Since the beginning, Turkey and the Gulf countries have been supporting the international coalition fighting against DAESH, which has employed its field and weapons potential.

But this determination to fight DAESH became more focused after the group carried out suicide bombings in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. DAESH has also threatened Bahrain, through one of its high-ranking leaders Turki al-Binali who is of Bahraini descent, revealed the extent of the danger posed by the group. Similarly, Turkey is fighting against DAESH, the PKK-PYD-YPG, and FETO with little support. Therefore, Turkey and Gulf countries understand each other better in regards of the fight against terrorism. FETO’s recent recognition as a terrorist organization by the Gulf countries is a crucial indicator of this support.

Similar Methods

The aforementioned three factors indicate the necessity for closer relations between Turkey and the Gulf countries. Moreover, these countries have all interposed the threats with almost similar methods. While Turkey is trying to establish its national security outside its borders with Operation Euphrates Shield, Gulf countries have responded to Iran trying to surround them with the Yemen operation. The Gulf countries tried to step up their military drills (e.g. North Thunder) and redesign their military alliances (e.g. Islamic Military Alliance). On the other hand, Turkey improved its military relations with Russia in order to overcome the issues it’s facing in Syria. Therefore, Turkey and the Gulf countries are trying to prepare themselves for an expected future in which the US’s Middle East policies are expected to change with the Trump administration. In this sense, Trump’s statements about Iran and DAESH can be perceived as the harbinger of what’s to come.

In parallel with this, it is possible to make some observations about Erdoğan’s Gulf tour. Firstly, it can be said that Turkey and Gulf countries are thinking of influencing the US’ new Middle East policy. Secondly, they are looking for cooperation in curbing Iran’s excessive influence and pushing it back to its borders. Considering all of these, Erdoğan’s statement about “Persian nationalism” in Bahrain is significant. Lastly, the upcoming Raqqa operation against DAESH will be seemingly vital for regional politics. Turkey expressed that it wants to be alongside the US in the Raqqa operation.

Moreover, Turkey asserted that it wanted to remove PYD-YPG form the operations and replace them with an army which is comprised mainly of Arabs. Therefore, it is possible that Erdoğan requested support from the Gulf countries to have more Arabs in the army which will besiege Raqqa, and to persuade the US to follow this approach. Considering all of these factors, the close cooperation between Turkey and the Gulf countries on issues like Syria, DAESH, Iran and regional stability will yield a win-win situation for both parties in the short and midterms.

On Oct. 31, 2015 the Iraqi National Alliance, a front of Shiite political groups, announced that they are in the process of drafting an important document called the “Historical Settlement.” On February 6, 2017, Ammar al–Hakeem, the leader of the Alliance, stated that the project is the result of intensive and constructive talks with all Iraqi groups and has the backing of regional stakeholder governments. Moreover, the United States and the UN will have a role in it too, and it will be announced after the end of the war against DAESH. Thus, the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) will draft the final version of the Historical Settlement after the document is approved by both the parliament and the Cabinet and Iraqi parties agree to abide by it. UNAMI will try to convince regional institutions, namely the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to support the project. The document is to addresses key issues, including power and wealth distribution between the Federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and the grievances of Sunni Arab provinces. The implementation of the Historical Settlement has many opportunities as well as insurmountable challenges, and to succeed Iraq needs to avail itself from the experience of other countries who have dealt with the same kind of divisions.

Road to Historical Settlement

Iraq, like other countries which have witnessed dictatorship and civil war, is in need of a national reconciliation. Though Iraqi governments in the past have officially committed themselves to the achievement of national reconciliation, very few tangible steps have been taken so far. In 2003, the government of Ayah al-Alawi, the leader of Iraqiyah Bloc, and Nouri al-Maliki, who would serve as Prime Minister, officially committed their governments to the process, but no concrete steps were taken. As Prime Minister, Al-Maliki pursued sectarian and authoritarian policies which resulted in alienating Sunni Arabs and Kurds, and led DAESH to try championing the Sunni cause.

In July 2014, Haider al-Abadi came to power as prime minister with a promise to curb corruption and broker national reconciliation. However, his efforts were hindered by the pro-al-Maliki group and the rising power of al-Hashd Shaabi, Shiite militias which have Iranian backing. Those Shiite militias have taken very uncompromising steps. Besides, pro-Iranian political circles used their best to prevent the formation of a National Guard in Sunni Arab majority provinces, and they made the long awaited Amnesty Law, which was passed in the parliament on August 2016, toothless and too late. For these reasons, even if DAESH were to be expelled from the cities, the grievances of Sunni Arabs will continue.

Opportunities

Through Iraq’s distant and modern history, it is evident that its diverse ethnic, religious, and cultural communities have succeeded in peaceful coexistence and intermixing. Unlike many other countries, where Shiites and Sunnis live apart, before the effects of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Shiite and Sunni Iraqis lived in integrated communities in many mixed regions, especially in Baghdad. There are several powerful tribal confederations which have a mixed Shiite and Sunni membership. These are potential resources, which need to be tapped in for reconciliation. For example, in 2007 a group of facilitators from the US Institute of Peace (USIP) in the district of Mahmoudiyah, an area south of Baghdad which was known as the “Triangle of Death,” helped to broker a reconciliation pact through tribal chieftains from Sunnis and Shiites that still endures. This experience needs to be generalized to other regions in Iraq. Besides, the implementation of the stated policies of US president Donald Trump with regard to the curbing of Iran’s undue influence in Iraq and al-Abadi’s imminent victory against DAESH will have a combined impact of weakening the al-Maliki camp and pro-Iranian Shiite militias. These will give national reconciliation internally a great momentum.

Challenges

The most serious challenges to national reconciliation are the lack of trust among various Iraqi groups, the exclusiveness in the nature of some influential elements on both sides, structural flaws in the post-2003 government, Iranian interference in Iraq, and the lack of a determined will to have reconciliation. After the US invasion, Iraqis agreed to form governments of communities, instead of government of citizens, as a power-sharing formula. Since 2014, al-Maliki’s group, supported by Iran, has been calling for the formation of a government of a “political majority.” In reality, al-Maliki is trying to use democracy to establish the government of a Shiite majority to the exclusion of Sunnis (Arabs and Kurds). In addition, al-Abadi’s inability to live up to his government program with regard to the Kurds has forced the Kurds to distrust Shiite politicians in Baghdad. During the first week of February, al-Hakeem visited the KRG to sound them out on his project. He received a cold response from their leaders, who have mostly opted for separation from Iraq and waiting to see what Trump’s future policy on Iraq will be.

These and other challenges have been spelled out in a well-written piece by Nazli Tarzi in the Middle East Eye. Tarzi rightly points that there is a lot of vagueness in the project and it has been drafted in the dark unilaterally by Shiite groups. It is not so inclusive either. But all these challenges could be overcome, if al-Hakeem’s proposed document was to be discussed openly with prominent Sunni groups and the international community lends its support to it.

Turkey and Iran have many stakes in its success and they should and could play an important role in this regard. Joost Hiltermann of the International Crisis Group in a 2007 report, and more recently the al-Bayan Center for Study and Planning, an Iraqi think tank based in Baghdad, have prepared projects for national reconciliation which reiterate the same points: the complex nature of the conflict in Iraq has reached a point where an international and regional intervention is necessary. Iraq needs to upgrade the role of Jan Kubis, the head of UNAMI, from that of good will ambassador to that of an arbiter. The US also needs to use its influence and leverage among all communities in Iraq for this purpose. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan must put pressure on Sunnis (Arabs and Kurds) to show a readiness for a historical compromise to achieve a durable and lasting peace. Iran has to be pressured to exercise a positive influence on Iraq’s Shiites. Except for a few extremist groups, the war-weary majority of Iraqi groups are now ready to accept this.

And the Iraqis need to benefit from other countries which had experienced civil wars. The formation of a body in Iraq similar to the Committee of Truth and Reconciliation, which was established in 1990 in South Africa, for example, is noteworthy. This Committee addressed the needs of the victims of the Apartheid regime by recognition and remedies instead of revenge and punishment. It convinced the perpetuators of the crimes to admit and apologize for their deeds. The new constitution of 1996 guaranteed the rights of black majorities and safeguarded that of white Afrikaners.

Traditional and tribal institutions were utilized to bring harmony to the conflict-torn country. The hastily drawn Iraqi constitution of 2005 needs to be amended to address the needs of Sunni Arabs. The controversial practice of de-Baathification should be reversed and de-politicized and be left to the judicial authorities. The controversial current Iraqi laws and regulations on terrorism have to be either eliminated or amended to exclude its future abuse. The high-ranking Iraqi religious authorities among Sunnis and Shiites need to act as peace-makers similar to the role South-African Archbishop Desmond Tutu played. Furthermore, the issue of disputed territories and control over oil and gas revenues with the KRG needs to be addressed by resorting to a third-party for mediation, as well as the Supreme Court of Iraq.

Iraq has a chance to achieve a much needed national reconciliation, if political groups exhibit a true will to do so and receive the needed external support.