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raqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zeidi’s visits to Washington, Tehran and Ankara in quick succession are significant in terms of demonstrating the new government’s approach to foreign policy. For Iraq, Washington and Tehran are two capitals closely linked to security, capital, historical influence and developments in Iraqi domestic politics. Ankara, on the other hand, represents the most concrete, stable and reliable economic route through which the country can access global markets. For this reason, al-Zaidi’s visit to Ankara immediately following his engagements in Washington and Tehran should not be viewed as a mere neighbourly visit. This visit demonstrates that Baghdad, which has placed economic development at the centre of its government program, views Türkiye not merely as a trading partner but as a strategic gateway in Iraq’s production, transport and energy equation.

The most significant aspect of the talks in Ankara is not the number of documents signed, but rather the needs of Iraq and Türkiye that they address. Five memoranda of understanding were signed between the two countries covering educational and academic cooperation, youth and sport, industrial property, rail and road transport via the Fishhabur–Ovaköy border crossing, and the development of transport infrastructure in Iraq in exchange for natural resources. Whilst the first three agreements broaden the social and institutional foundation of the relationship, the latter two are of direct strategic importance for Iraq’s economic future. This is because these agreements strengthen the necessary links to move the Development Corridor Project – which aims to connect the Grand Faw Port in Basra to the Turkish border via Iraq and from there to Europe – into the implementation phase.

The visit also demonstrates that the strong relations established between Iraq and Türkiye in recent years are being maintained by the new Iraqi government. During President Erdoğan’s visit to Baghdad in April 2024, 27 legal texts were signed, whilst 11 documents were signed at the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council meeting held in May 2025. The fact that Zaidi has included Ankara in the itinerary of his first foreign visit since taking office suggests that Türkiye has secured a permanent place in Iraq’s development plans.

Oil production but lack of control

Iraq has been producing oil for many years but has been unable to establish sufficient control over the routes by which this oil is transported. The fact that a very large proportion of oil revenues depends on exports via the southern ports and the Strait of Hormuz means that any military tension in the Gulf directly becomes a problem for the Iraqi budget. The closure of ports and disruption to tanker traffic affects not only oil companies but the entire state apparatus, from public sector wages to social spending. Road, rail and pipeline links via Türkiye therefore represent both a means of facilitating trade and a tool for economic security from Baghdad’s perspective.

This is where the true significance of the Development Corridor comes to the fore. If successful, the project—which is planned to link the Port of Faw to Türkiye via a network of approximately 1,200 kilometres of railways and motorways—will do more than simply transport containers from Basra to Türkiye. It will also create new industrial zones, logistics centres, energy networks and urban development areas along the route. Given Iraq’s young population and high unemployment rate, this transformation could provide an alternative to the limited employment opportunities currently available in the oil sector alone.

Türkiye plays a role in this equation that no other neighbour can easily fulfil. Iran is linked to Iraq through energy, trade and political networks, whilst the Gulf states can provide capital to Iraq. However, Türkiye is the only direct neighbour capable of connecting Iraq to the European market by road and rail, and to the Mediterranean via Ceyhan. Moreover, the economic foundation between the two countries will not be built from scratch. Trade volume between Türkiye and Iraq reached approximately 17 billion dollars in 2025, and Turkish companies have undertaken over 1,000 projects in Iraq with a total value of around 40 billion dollars. The setting of a medium-term trade target of 30 billion dollars during the Ankara talks demonstrates the will to roughly double the current level of trade.

Developments in the energy sector also demonstrated that the visit was not limited solely to the transport agenda. Although no long-term, comprehensive energy agreement was signed at the ceremony in Ankara, TPAO’s acquisition of a 15 per cent stake in the company managing BP’s operations in Kirkuk is a step that could transform Türkiye from merely being a buyer and transit country for Iraqi oil into a production partner.

A few days after the visit, Türkiye and Iraq signed a provisional agreement extending the use of the existing oil pipeline for another year, with a capacity of 750,000 barrels per day. This also showed that the talks in Ankara had begun to produce concrete results. Whilst time is being gained to prepare a broader energy agreement, Baghdad has secured the use of the only operational oil export pipeline. Given that the pipeline carries approximately 170,000 barrels per day, increasing the current capacity could be a significant step in Iraq’s efforts to reduce its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz.

The secret behind the fifth agreement!

The signing ceremony in Ankara also brought to light the main obstacle facing the Iraqi government. Whilst the signing of five agreements was expected, President Erdoğan’s realization that one agreement had not been signed, followed by Zaidi’s turn to Iraq’s Minister of Transport, Veheb al-Hasani, and the subsequent inclusion of the remaining documents in the signing process, were widely discussed in the media of both countries. Hasani later explained the incident as a technical and protocol-related disagreement. A spokesperson for the Iraqi Ministry of Transport, however, stated that there had been a prior dispute on the Iraqi side—involving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Oil—regarding the inclusion of the document in the visit’s program.

In contrast, some Iraqi and Turkish commentators alleged that the minister, who has a background in the Badr Organization, was attempting to slow down the Development Corridor agreement under Iranian influence. This claim could not be definitively confirmed, and the available information is insufficient to characterize the events as a definitive act of sabotage by Iran. However, the incident itself remains significant. Whether the problem stems from a lack of protocol, inter-institutional disagreement or political influence, it demonstrates that during the implementation of strategic decisions in Iraq, different ministries, parties and actors with external connections are not acting in unison. Viewed from this perspective, the success of the Zaidi government’s economic program will in fact depend not so much on how many agreements it signs abroad, but rather on the extent to which it can implement state decisions at home.

Economy in Ankara, missiles on the ground

The joint Saudi Arabian–US air strikes that took place immediately after the visit to Ankara once again demonstrated just how fragile the security environment is in which Zaidi’s development diplomacy is being conducted. US Central Command stated that the strikes targeted logistics and weapons sites belonging to groups it alleged were directed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Reports citing Iraqi and Iranian sources stated that at least 20 members of the Hashd al-Shaabi were killed. Baghdad condemned the strikes as a violation of its sovereignty, and Zaidi cancelled his visit to Riyadh, which had been scheduled for July 30. Thus, within a matter of days, Iraq – which had been discussing transport corridors and economic integration in Ankara – has once again been drawn into the military arena of US-Iranian tensions.

This development does not diminish the importance of the Ankara visit; on the contrary, it enhances it. This is because the path for Iraq to extricate itself from regional military rivalry does not lie solely in maintaining balanced relations with Washington and Tehran. Iraq must raise the cost of the conflict by developing its economic ties, thereby forcing countries to step back from clashing on its territory. It would be difficult to claim that the intensive trade, energy and transport networks to be established with Türkiye will provide Baghdad with an absolute security guarantee. However, these links will make Iraq’s stability more valuable to Türkiye, Europe, the Gulf states and international companies. Economic interdependence alone will not prevent war, but it will help Iraq move away from being perceived solely as a country defined by militias, military bases and spheres of influence.

Looking at Zaidi’s initial foreign policy moves, he is seeking investment from Washington, political balance from Tehran and economic links from Ankara. Among these three capitals, Türkiye stands out for offering the most viable route to turn Iraq’s geography into an economic advantage. Multi-billion-dollar deals in Washington could provide capital and technology. Relations with Tehran cannot be entirely disregarded in terms of internal stability. However, Iraq’s ability to generate non-oil revenue, open up to Europe, create new employment opportunities and reduce its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz depends to a large extent on the operationalisation of the routes extending northwards.

Ultimately, the visit to Ankara has done more than simply demonstrate Iraq’s growing rapprochement with Türkiye; it has also revealed the direction of the new government’s approach to development. The real issue is not the signing of the five documents. The real issue is whether the pipeline stretching from Ovaköy to Faw, the oil flowing from Kirkuk to Ceyhan, and the $30 billion trade target will make the Iraqi state stronger and more independent. If the Zaidi government can support these projects with institutional reform, transparency and state authority, relations with Türkiye could transform Iraq’s quest for balance in foreign policy into an economic strategy. Otherwise, the documents signed in Ankara will simply be added to the long list of agreements that Baghdad has accumulated over the years but has been unable to implement. .

(Originally published in Turkish by Middle East Africa)

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urkish Presidential Communications Director Burhanettin Duran said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s threats and accusations against Türkiye and Syria reflect Israel’s growing international isolation and domestic political concerns.

Speaking to Anadolu Agency, Duran described Netanyahu’s recent remarks as an attempt to create imaginary threats and enemies and distract international attention from Israel’s policies in Gaza, Syria and Lebanon.

“Netanyahu’s threats and lies against Türkiye and Syria are a new reflection of the Israeli prime minister’s growing international isolation, political fears and delusions,” Duran said.

He argued that international criticism of Israel’s policies has increased, including among the United States, Britain and other countries. Duran said Netanyahu was using hostility toward Türkiye as a political tool amid domestic pressures and competition with more radical elements within Israel’s political system.

Türkiye says Israel is fueling regional instability

Duran accused Netanyahu’s government of pursuing an increasingly aggressive regional policy, including military operations in Gaza, Syria and Lebanon, as well as allowing attacks by Israeli settlers in the occupied West Bank.

He said Israel’s attempt to blame Türkiye following its strikes in Syria demonstrated what he described as an effort to shift responsibility for its own actions.

“The problem is not that people do not understand Israeli policies,” Duran said. “It is that more and more people understand and reject these policies.”

He said Türkiye did not pose a threat to Israel but opposed policies that undermine regional security and stability.

According to Duran, Ankara would continue supporting countries pursuing peaceful policies in the region, particularly Syria, while seeking to prevent further escalation.

He said Türkiye had sufficient experience and strength to respond to threats while maintaining a cautious and measured approach.

Duran calls for two-state solution

Duran also pointed to criticism of Netanyahu within Israel, saying opposition politicians had described his anti-Türkiye rhetoric as irresponsible and extreme and warned that it was creating concern among the Israeli public.

He argued that Israel was losing international support and said tensions with Türkiye had produced no meaningful benefit for Israel.

Duran emphasized Türkiye’s position as a NATO member with significant military and diplomatic capabilities, saying Ankara would continue to prioritize regional peace and stability.

He urged Israel to abandon what he described as destabilizing policies and instead work toward a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

“The most rational course for the Israeli government would be to work toward a two-state solution that would completely resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to stop taking further destabilizing steps in the region,” Duran said.

He also criticized Israeli policies concerning the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem and plans for new settlements in the occupied West Bank.

Duran said Türkiye would not allow Netanyahu’s policies to undermine regional peace or threaten the security of Türkiye and its allies.

“Türkiye’s prudent and peaceful foreign policy will thwart the bloody games of figures like Netanyahu who are willing to set the region on fire to secure their own political futures,” he said.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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he Israeli military has acknowledged for the first time that its forces fired on a vehicle carrying 5-year-old Palestinian girl Hind Rajab in Gaza in January 2024 and announced a criminal investigation into the incident.

The Israeli army had previously denied that its troops were involved in the killing. Months after the incident, a preliminary military investigation concluded that Israeli forces were “not present near the vehicle or within firing range.”

The new findings mark a significant reversal in the military’s account of one of the most widely publicized killings of a Palestinian child during the Gaza war.

Hind was traveling with six members of her family in a vehicle in northern Gaza when it came under Israeli fire. She survived the initial attack and remained trapped inside the car, where she made a desperate phone call to Palestinian Red Crescent paramedics asking for help.

An ambulance sent to rescue her also came under fire.

Twelve days later, rescuers found Hind’s body inside the bullet-riddled vehicle alongside the bodies of her relatives.

Military acknowledges firing on vehicle

In a statement, the Israeli military said an examination had found that Israeli troops had fired at a vehicle “that was approaching them.”

The military said the findings, combined with what it described as apparent failures in coordinating the movement of the Palestinian Red Crescent ambulance, had led to the decision to open a criminal investigation by the Military Police Criminal Investigation Division.

The investigation is part of the Israeli military’s first comprehensive review of alleged war crimes since the beginning of Israel’s war in Gaza in October 2023.

The military said its General Staff’s Fact Finding and Assessment Mechanism had examined 150 incidents and transferred them to the military’s top legal authorities to determine whether criminal investigations should be opened.

Of five decisions announced Wednesday, two resulted in criminal investigations: the killing of Hind Rajab and the March 2025 killing of 15 Palestinian paramedics and first responders.

Family calls for independent investigation

Hind’s mother, Wesam Hamada, welcomed the decision as a long-overdue development but said it did not amount to justice.

She called for an independent and transparent investigation and genuine accountability for those responsible for her daughter’s death, rather than a closed military inquiry.

Palestinian Ambassador to the United Nations Riyad Mansour also questioned whether the Israeli military could conduct a credible investigation into its own forces. He described previous Israeli investigations as neither independent nor credible and said accountability should include the arrest of those responsible.

The Hind Rajab Foundation similarly criticized Israel’s military justice system, arguing that investigations into alleged violations by Israeli forces frequently end without meaningful prosecution or punishment.

No criminal probes into aid worker killings

The Israeli army also announced that it would not open criminal investigations into three other incidents involving humanitarian workers.

They included the April 2024 Israeli strike that killed seven World Central Kitchen aid workers in Deir el-Balah, a February 2024 strike on a Doctors Without Borders shelter in Khan Younis that killed two employees, and a November 2023 attack on a Doctors Without Borders convoy that killed two others.

In the World Central Kitchen case, the Israeli military acknowledged “serious failures” that led its forces to mistakenly believe the convoy had been taken over by Hamas fighters. However, the military advocate-general concluded there was no reasonable suspicion of criminal misconduct.

World Central Kitchen condemned the decision, saying it was inconsistent with the full circumstances of the attack and failed to provide meaningful accountability.

Australia also criticized the decision because one of those killed, Australian aid worker Zomi Frankcom, was among the seven WCK employees.

Foreign Minister Penny Wong said Frankcom’s family deserved justice and that the decision fell “far short” of the accountability Australia expected. She said Australia would summon Israel’s ambassador and continue pressing Israel over the deaths.

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.S. envoy Jared Kushner said Monday that the United States would not support rebuilding Gaza until Hamas gives up its weapons, as Israel continues carrying out attacks across the devastated Palestinian territory.

Kushner made the remarks after meeting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in an effort to advance a U.S.-backed roadmap for ending the genocide. The meeting did not produce a breakthrough, with major disagreements remaining over Hamas’ disarmament and an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.

“We have a plan to rebuild Gaza, but we will not allow Gaza to be rebuilt until the demilitarization occurs,” Kushner told Fox News.

He said Washington did not want reconstruction funds to be invested in Gaza if the territory could again become a battlefield.

Disarmament remains key dispute

Hamas had agreed to disarm as part of the U.S.-backed proposal, which would also involve an Israeli withdrawal and an end to attacks on Gaza. Israel, however, rejected the proposal earlier this month, saying it would not make concessions until Gaza was fully demilitarized.

Kushner appeared to align closely with Israel’s position, emphasizing that Hamas would need to surrender its weapons before major reconstruction and Israeli withdrawal could proceed.

“We’re also not going to restrict Israel’s right to defend itself if there are any imminent threats,” Kushner said, adding that Washington had sought to clarify what that provision would mean.

His comments came despite President Donald Trump earlier Monday calling for an end to Israeli attacks on Gaza.

“Israelis should not be striking in Gaza. Hamas agreed to lay down their weapons,” Trump said.

Israel has continued launching near-daily attacks on the territory. According to the figures cited by Al Jazeera, at least 1,265 Palestinians have been killed in Gaza since a ceasefire came into effect last year. The broader Israeli war on Gaza has killed more than 73,000 Palestinians since October 2023, according to the same source.

U.S. pushes Gaza roadmap

Kushner also met Hamas officials on Sunday in a rare direct encounter as Washington seeks to move its Gaza plan forward. He described the discussions as “very cordial” but said the United States would judge Hamas by its actions rather than its promises.

“They said all the right things,” Kushner said, while expressing skepticism about the group’s willingness to fulfill its commitments.

He said Hamas could potentially surrender its weapons and tunnels within 60 to 90 days, describing such an outcome as a major security gain for Israel.

Kushner warned that if Hamas failed to follow through, the group would lose international support and Israel would have greater backing from Washington and other countries to continue military action.

The U.S. envoy also argued that the proposed agreement would benefit Israel by removing what he described as a major security threat.

The dispute over reconstruction highlights one of the central obstacles to the U.S.-backed plan. Gaza has suffered enormous destruction during the Israeli genocide, creating an urgent need for housing, infrastructure, health care and other basic services.

Washington has remained a major supporter of Israel throughout the genocide. According to Al Jazeera, the United States has provided Israel with about $25 billion in military aid over the past three years and has defended the Israeli government at international forums.

The latest diplomatic efforts come as Washington attempts to reconcile its calls for an end to the fighting with Israel’s demand for Hamas’ complete disarmament before any broader political settlement.

For Palestinians in Gaza, however, the continuation of Israeli strikes and the conditions attached to reconstruction leave the territory’s future uncertain, even as international efforts seek to establish a lasting ceasefire and begin rebuilding.

)Source: Aljazeera English)

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hilst the Middle East region has undergone significant change and transformation as a result of the attacks launched by Israel from 7 October 2023 onwards, the US-Israel–Iran war that began on 28 February 2026 has further fuelled this change, pushing it to a point of no return. For had these events not occurred, the ‘Mecca Joint Defence Agreement’, signed on 7 August 2026 between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, might not have been possible.

Developments necessitating “regional ownership”

Türkiye’s long-standing stance that the region’s problems should be resolved by the countries of the region themselves – a concept defined by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan as “regional ownership” – had not received sufficient support from the countries of the region. Whilst the reasons behind this may vary from country to country, ultimately external interventions aimed at resolving the region’s problems have failed to heal the wounds; on the contrary, they have either caused existing wounds to bleed anew or allowed them to simply harden into calluses without being resolved. Consequently, it has become apparent that interventions in the region—particularly from the West and, of course, the US—have failed to produce results and have not brought peace and stability to the region.

However, following the events that began on 7 October 2023, Israel’s adoption of a revisionist policy towards the region—believing that the conditions were favourable—and its subsequent attacks targeting not only Gaza and the West Bank but also Lebanon, Syria and Iran, have led to a shift in the preconceptions held by countries in the region towards Türkiye.

For whilst it is evident that almost all of the Western countries expected to resolve the region’s problems have taken sides in the war between Russia and Ukraine, providing Ukraine with billions of dollars in aid as well as both political and military support; whilst Israel’s razing of Gaza, massacred over 73,000 people and committed a massive genocide; deepened its annexation of the West Bank; gradually sought to alter the status of the Al-Aqsa Mosque; occupied southern Lebanon and attempted to provoke a civil war there; and, as if its decades-long occupation of the Golan Heights—which is Syrian territory —as if that were not enough—it unilaterally suspended the 1974 agreement following the revolution on 8 December 2024, occupied further Syrian territory, and sought to prevent Syria from achieving stability by manipulating the Druze and the SDG/PKK terrorist organisations.

The extent to which external actors remain indifferent to crises or conflicts in our region has once again been exposed in the war against Iran. For just as it is unjust and wrong for an actor such as the US to fall into Israel’s trap and attack Iran, it is equally wrong for other Western countries not to have taken the initiative to dissuade the US from this war, as was the case with Ukraine. Although these countries—the majority of which are also NATO members—were called upon by the US to deploy troops to open the blockaded Strait of Hormuz – although this was not in accordance with NATO regulations – they did not heed this call and, whilst not becoming directly involved in the war, they made their stance clear by expanding sanctions against Iran rather than exerting pressure on Israel to bring the war to an end.

During this war, Iran’s decision to attack Gulf states and other countries hosting US bases on their territory – rather than Israel and the US, which were directly attacking it – both because they were relatively easier targets and with the intention of indirectly exerting pressure on the US, has once again demonstrated the importance of regional ownership.

Israel’s revisionist policies and the perception of threats by regional countries

All these developments have made a mechanism such as the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement imperative, with the aim of thwarting the plans of a country like Israel—which, despite its small size, seeks to destabilize the region and derive benefit from the situation by leveraging its lobbying power in the US and Europe and relying on their support—and to establish a new status quo. Furthermore, whilst Israel recently proposed an alignment strategy—such as the “hexagon bloc”—which has yet to materialize on the ground, the formation of a counter-front by countries outside this bloc that perceive the current developments as a threat to their national interests must be regarded as inevitable.

Despite the security guarantees the US has provided to the Gulf states to date, the fact that these states have been exposed to Iranian attacks during the war against Iran has not only called into question the reliability of US guarantees in the Gulf, but has also inevitably led to a search for alternatives regarding the future of the region’s security architecture. It is therefore highly likely that the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement will address this necessity; in particular, should the US withdraw from the region following the war with Iran, it is conceivable that it might be open to entrusting the region’s security to three key and powerful allies: Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the fact that the US has not made any negative statements regarding the Mecca Agreement to date is interpreted in this light and reinforces the view that there is coordination between the signatory countries and the US.

Why is the agreement so important?

Among the key factors that make the agreement significant are the characteristics and capabilities of the signatory countries. Türkiye, for instance, is not only a NATO member but also a candidate country for the EU and has made significant strides in the defense industry in recent years. It is therefore an indispensable actor for both the Middle East and the European security architecture. Pakistan, meanwhile, is the only Muslim country to possess nuclear weapons and also has a substantial population. As for Saudi Arabia, it stands out as a key player not only due to its abundant energy resources but also because of its strategic location at the crossroads of global trade routes. Furthermore, as a leading figure in both the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Arab League, and as the custodian of Islam’s holy sites, it is an actor held in high regard and whose word carries weight among both Arab and Muslim states.

The coming together of these three major powers to form a defense alliance would create a synergy whose effects are likely to extend beyond the region. Furthermore, should this agreement be successfully implemented, it would inevitably create a domino effect, making it likely that other countries in the region would join the agreement. Considering similar initiatives that have been attempted at various times but could never be brought to a conclusion due to both regional and circumstantial conditions, the most significant impact of this agreement, as of today, is that it stands as the sole development capable of curbing Israel’s aggressive, occupying and expansionist regional vision. Not only will the Abraham Accords no longer hold any appeal for countries in the region, but it is also understood that, should the US withdraw from the region following a war against Iran, the new security architecture of the region will be centered on the new pact established by this agreement.

What will the agreement provide for the signatory countries?

This agreement is of a defensive nature, aimed at protecting the signatories from attacks by other countries; in this way, it offers the signatory countries a security guarantee similar to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Türkiye’s current capabilities, Pakistan’s nuclear power and Saudi Arabia’s financial support not only demonstrate the agreement’s capacity and potential but also serve as a powerful deterrent to any actors seeking to attack one of the signatory states.

Consequently, in addition to Türkiye’s NATO membership, the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement has now emerged as the sole agreement in the region offering an additional defense guarantee to regional countries, and it has been announced that the agreement remains open to new participants. Although it has been stated in the announcements that no specific country is being targeted, it is clear that a strong deterrent has been created for those with designs on the region – particularly Israel – or those claiming to shape its future.

Whilst there are no doubts regarding the agreement’s deterrent effect, as we do not yet possess detailed information on the nature of the agreement, it is not fully known how a response would be mounted in the event of an attack on any of the signatory states. Furthermore, given the geographical locations of the signatory states—particularly Pakistan’s relatively remote position—it is difficult to predict how such a response would be carried out. However, despite all these uncertainties, the implementation of such an arrangement in our region is of great importance.

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merican President Donald Trump has welcomed a new defense agreement between Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, describing the trilateral pact as an important step toward greater security cooperation in the Middle East.

“Very happy to see that Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan have recently, and finally, signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement,” Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform.

He said the agreement showed that countries in the Middle East were “coming together” and would be better positioned to defend themselves. Trump described the pact as a “BIG, BOLD, IMPORTANT FIRST STEP.”

The agreement was signed in Mecca on August 7 amid escalating regional tensions and the ongoing U.S.-Iran war, which has expanded beyond the two countries and affected several states across the Middle East.

Three countries expand military cooperation

Under the agreement, Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia will establish strategic political and military mechanisms involving their defense and foreign ministers, as well as chiefs of staff or commanders of their armed forces.

Military cooperation is expected to develop gradually, beginning with command-post and field exercises. The three countries could later conduct joint exercises involving ground, naval and air forces, air defense systems and unmanned platforms.

The agreement also includes a commitment by the three countries to participate in efforts aimed at resolving the conflict between Iran and the United States.

The pact builds on an earlier Saudi-Pakistani mutual defense agreement signed in September, which stated that an attack against either country would be considered an attack against both.

Saudi Arabia has increasingly sought to diversify its defense partnerships as its critical infrastructure and energy facilities have come under attack amid the regional conflict.

Pact comes amid regional tensions

The agreement also reflects the broader security concerns facing the three countries. Saudi Arabia has been directly affected by attacks linked to the wider U.S.-Iran war, while Iran-backed Houthi forces have targeted regional shipping and other interests.

Türkiye, meanwhile, has faced growing tensions with Israel over the war in Gaza which resulted in broader regional conflicts, including fighting involving Iran and Lebanon.

Pakistan has increasingly positioned itself as a potential mediator in regional disputes while strengthening its security relationship with Saudi Arabia and expanding defense cooperation with Türkiye.

The three-way pact brings together three major Muslim-majority countries with significant military capabilities and strategic influence. Türkiye is a NATO member, Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons, and Saudi Arabia is one of the world’s largest oil producers and a key U.S. partner in the Gulf.

Trump’s endorsement marks a notable reaction from Washington to the emerging security arrangement. His comments suggest that the United States views greater defense cooperation among regional powers as potentially complementary to broader efforts to strengthen security in the Middle East.

The agreement could also reshape regional security cooperation as countries seek greater capacity to protect their territory and infrastructure amid continuing instability and the widening consequences of the U.S.-Iran war.

(Source: Daily Sabah)

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he diplomatic initiatives that have been ongoing for some time between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have now materialized into a concrete security architecture with the Joint Defense Agreement signed today in Mecca. Although the agreement in question may appear to be a manifestation of the historical and religious ties between the three countries in foreign policy, it can in fact be regarded as part of a much broader regional transformation. This agreement, signed by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif at the Safa Palace in Mecca, the holy city of the Muslim world, constitutes a full-fledged ‘collective defense’ pact, as it stipulates that an armed attack against any one of the three states shall be deemed an attack against all of them.

Furthermore, the fact that the agreement is based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which governs the right to self-defense, can be seen as a reflection of the initiative led by the three countries’ quest for legitimacy within the framework of international law. Consequently, the resulting joint defense mechanism aims to serve as a deterrent not only at the regional level but also in the eyes of global actors.

Outcome of regional developments

It is evident that the agreement goes beyond a merely symbolic initiative. In this regard, the normalization process between Turkey and Saudi Arabia since 2022 and the subsequent acceleration of strategic cooperation, followed by Saudi Arabia’s move to expedite its rapprochement with Pakistan in the security context, culminating in the signing of the Joint Strategic Defense Agreement in 2025, have been the key driving forces behind this process. President Erdoğan’s emphasis on defense industry cooperation during his visit to Saudi Arabia at the start of the year, along with signals of joint investment in the KAAN National Fighter Aircraft, also demonstrate that the signing in Mecca was the result of a process that had been under way for some time.

Beyond its strategic and symbolic significance, the Mecca Agreement is of critical importance given the context in which it emerged. The growing regional instability following the war launched by the US and Israel against Iran on 28 February has led all countries to seek alternatives. When compounded by Israel’s continued pursuit of aggressive and expansionist policies and Washington’s silence in the face of these developments, the confidence of many regional actors, particularly the Gulf states, in the traditional security architecture has been permanently shaken. Furthermore, the US’s failure to provide the expected security umbrella to the Gulf states, whose vulnerabilities were laid bare by Iran’s attacks, has eroded these actors’ trust in traditional security guarantors. Consequently, Washington’s inconsistency in providing protection to its allies during times of crisis has driven regional capitals to diversify their own security arrangements.

Signed against this backdrop, the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement can be seen as a concrete outcome of the quest to reduce dependence on external security guarantees and to build an intra-regional deterrence mechanism amongst regional actors. From Türkiye’s perspective, this step constitutes a key pillar of its long-stated vision for a regional security architecture. In line with the initiatives it has taken in recent years, Ankara has played a critical role in intensifying cooperation amongst regional actors. During this process, Türkiye has strengthened its cooperation with countries including the Gulf states, as well as Egypt and Pakistan, and has sought to implement partnerships across various sectors.

During this process, one of the areas on which Türkiye has placed particular emphasis has been partnerships in the defense industry. Viewed in this context, it should also be noted that, beyond its security dimension, the Mecca Agreement provides a framework for deepening cooperation in the defense industry. Saudi Arabia’s preference and policies in recent years to transition from the role of a customer to that of a co-producer in the procurement of defense industry products have led to concrete steps being taken in this context between Ankara and Riyadh. In this regard, Türkiye has demonstrated its commitment by signing agreements with Saudi Arabia on the joint production of unmanned aerial vehicles, radar technologies, anti-tank guided missiles and other defense industry products.

Defense projects between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia

Indeed, Türkiye has successfully concluded its negotiations with Saudi Arabia regarding the co-production of the Gökbey national helicopter project, and an agreement was signed in February 2026 between TUSAŞ and the Saudi Arabian Defense Industries Organization. It is expected that the Mecca Agreement will not only strengthen the joint security mechanism but also increase such collaborations in the defense industry sector. It can be argued that, in the coming period, this initiative will not only go beyond security cooperation but also pave the way for deepening economic ties between the three countries.

Although the Mecca Agreement was signed between the three countries, President Erdoğan stated in his announcement that this security initiative is open to the participation of all countries. At this stage, it can be said that countries such as Qatar and Egypt are likely to be among those adopting a positive stance towards this security architecture in the initial phase. Given that it adopts an inclusive approach rather than an exclusionary one, unlike certain alliances that have emerged in the region in the past, it can also be noted that this alliance is set to play a strategic role in the future of the regional security architecture.

On the other hand, it remains unclear what impact the differences in foreign policy priorities and the relative divergence in threat perceptions between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan will have within the context of the agreement. Indeed, the fact that Turkey’s security priorities, centered on Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean, do not align with Saudi Arabia’s threat perception, which is largely centred on Iran, or with Pakistan’s security reflexes, which are focused on India, may be seen as a constraint. However, it can be argued that the impact of this divergence on the practical feasibility of the agreement will also be limited. Indeed, the fundamental dynamic behind the tripartite alliance is not so much divergent perceptions as shared, concrete threats. This situation forms the basis for the consolidation of power and a shared security vision along the Ankara-Riyadh-Islamabad axis.

The Joint Defense Agreement signed in Mecca stands out as an initiative that clearly sets out the signatory countries’ perspectives. This agreement, which can be seen as the tangible outcome of regional actors’ quest to build their own security amongst themselves, a quest directly influenced by the hardships caused by the interventions of external actors, serves as the nucleus of a far more comprehensive regional security architecture. At this juncture, it seems inevitable that Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, which have so far acted within the framework of a shared vision, will move towards a much stronger alliance should they align their foreign policy orientations, harmonize their strategic objectives and integrate their security capabilities.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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yria and Russia have reached an agreement that will significantly reshape Moscow’s military presence along Syria’s Mediterranean coast, with Damascus set to take control of two strategically important facilities previously used as Russian military outposts.

Under the agreement announced by Syria’s Foreign Ministry, Syria will assume control of the Hmeimem air base near Latakia and the commercial berth at Tartus port as part of its civil administration. Military facilities at both locations will instead be transformed into joint training and qualification centers.

The ministry described the arrangement as a “reorganizing of the Russian presence” along Syria’s coast and said it represented the most significant development since negotiations began about a year and a half ago.

Russia’s military presence in Syria

Russia had been the most important political and military ally of former President Bashar Assad throughout Syria’s civil war. The Hmeimem air base and Tartus naval facility became central pillars of Russia’s military presence in the eastern Mediterranean, allowing Moscow to project air and naval power into the region.

The agreement comes after Assad was overthrown following a lightning insurgency. Russia did not intervene to prevent his removal but subsequently granted asylum to Assad and his family. Russian forces remaining in Syria have gradually withdrawn since the change of government.

Despite the reduction of Russia’s military role, Syria’s new leadership has sought to maintain relations with Moscow. Interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa has visited Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow twice since taking power, with the future of the two Mediterranean facilities among the key issues discussed.

The latest agreement does not appear to end Russian-Syrian cooperation altogether. Instead, the conversion of the military facilities into joint training centers suggests that Damascus and Moscow intend to preserve some form of defense and institutional relationship while reducing Russia’s role as a military power stationed on Syrian territory.

Russia had not immediately issued a public comment on the agreement.

Syria’s new foreign policy

The development also reflects a broader transformation in Syria’s foreign policy following Assad’s fall. While Damascus has maintained ties with Moscow, it has simultaneously strengthened relations with Western governments and neighboring Arab states that had distanced themselves from Syria during Assad’s crackdown on opposition protests.

The United States has lifted most of its sanctions on Syria, while European countries have also begun rebuilding diplomatic relations with Damascus.

French President Emmanuel Macron visited Syria in July, during which he announced that France and Syria would appoint ambassadors for the first time in 14 years.

The shift has placed Syria at the center of a wider geopolitical realignment. For years, Russia’s military presence in Syria provided Moscow with a strategic foothold in the Mediterranean and helped sustain Assad’s government. The new arrangement indicates that this role is now being substantially reduced under Syria’s new leadership.

For Damascus, taking control of Hmeimem and the commercial facilities at Tartus represents an important assertion of sovereignty over strategic infrastructure. For Moscow, maintaining joint training facilities could preserve elements of its longstanding relationship with Syria even as its former military footprint is scaled back.

The agreement is likely to become an important marker of Syria’s transition from the Assad era, as the country seeks to balance its longstanding relationship with Russia against growing engagement with Türkiye Europe, the United States and Arab countries.

(Source: CNN)

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he Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, signed on August 7, 2026, in Mecca between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, marks a significant transformation in the security equation between the Middle East and South Asia. At the heart of the agreement lies the principle that an armed attack directed against one of the parties shall be deemed to have been directed against all three states. This provision goes beyond traditional defense  cooperation to establish a new security mechanism based on the principle of collective deterrence.

The agreement’s primary significance in terms of international relations stems from the convergence of the signatory states’ diverse power elements within a single security framework. Turkey possesses NATO’s second-largest military force, advanced operational capabilities and a defence industry that has grown significantly in recent years. Pakistan is the only Muslim state to possess nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, stands out for its energy resources, financial capacity and influence in Gulf geopolitics. For this reason, the Mecca Agreement constitutes a strategic configuration of complementary capabilities formed by complementary strategic capabilities, rather than a traditional military alliance between three similar states.

The international context in which the agreement emerged is also significant. Rising military tensions in the Middle East, the security of energy transport routes, Iran-centred conflict dynamics and the tendency of regional states to diversify their security guarantees are reinforcing the search for a new regional security order. Within this framework, the Mecca Agreement can be interpreted as a demonstration of the will of regional states to support their security needs increasingly through mechanisms established amongst themselves, rather than through guarantees provided from outside.

The concept of strategic autonomy is particularly significant here. Since the end of the Cold War, one of the fundamental pillars of the Middle Eastern security system has been the US military presence and bilateral security relations. The Mecca Agreement does not directly abolish this system. It is also explicitly stated that the parties’ existing bilateral or multilateral obligations remain in force. However, the agreement demonstrates the will of regional actors to establish their own deterrence mechanisms alongside the Washington- centred security architecture. This situation can be interpreted as a transition from a dependence on a single security centre to a multi-layered security architecture.

The significance of the agreement for the participants

From Turkey’s perspective, the agreement also has a unique dimension. Turkey is a member of NATO. The Mecca Agreement, whilst enabling Ankara to maintain its NATO membership, also allows it to expand its institutionalised defense relations with regional powers outside NATO. Turkey is thus positioning itself strategically from which it can forge links between the Euro-Atlantic security system and the Middle East–South Asia security spheres. However, the relationship between the collective defense obligation under the Mecca Agreement and Article 5 of the NATO Treaty will require detailed legal and strategic scrutiny in the coming period, particularly in the event of simultaneous crises.

Pakistan’s participation in the agreement, meanwhile, shifts the deterrence debate to a different level. Pakistan’s nuclear capability enhances the agreement’s psychological and strategic weight. However, it cannot be concluded from current statements that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence has been extended to Turkey or Saudi Arabia. Saudi officials have also stated that the agreement is not linked to nuclear purposes or an arms race. Consequently, based on the current data, it does not appear appropriate to characterise the Mecca Agreement as a nuclear umbrella agreement.

From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, the agreement represents a continuation of its policy of diversifying security partnerships. By linking its economic capacity with Turkey’s defense industry and Pakistan’s military capabilities, Riyadh may secure a greater degree of strategic manoeuvre. To the extent that this framework extends to areas such as defense industry investments, joint production, technology transfer, training, intelligence sharing and maritime security, it will acquire a lasting institutional character.

The principle of collective defense

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Agreement is the principle of ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’. This provision is reminiscent of NATO’s logic of collective defense. However, there is currently a significant institutional difference between the two organizations NATO is an institutional alliance with over seventy years’ history, underpinned by a military command structure, joint defense planning, force structure, standards and permanent political bodies. The implementation mechanisms of the Mecca Agreement, however, are not yet as transparent, based on the information made public.

For this reason, the true strength of the agreement will be measured not so much by its signing as by the extent to which it becomes institutionalized. Should a joint military committee be established, joint operational plans drawn up, regular exercises conducted, an intelligence-sharing mechanism put in place and defense industry projects undertaken jointly, the Mecca Agreement could evolve into a genuine collective defense system.

From Iran’s perspective, interpreting the agreement as a direct counter-alliance requires caution. The parties have specifically emphasized that the agreement does not target any particular state. Given Turkey’s shared border with Iran, its economic ties and regional diplomatic channels, the agreement’s potential to take on a sectarian dimension could entail significant strategic costs for Ankara. Consequently, the sustainability of the agreement will depend on maintaining a balance between the principle of collective defense and the policy of avoiding regional polarization.

Towards a new regional security architecture

From Israel’s perspective, the new framework presents a distinct area for strategic calculation. The convergence of Turkey’s NATO capabilities, Pakistan’s military strength and Saudi Arabia’s regional influence within a common security mechanism holds the potential to influence the balance of power in the Middle East. However, it is not possible to draw a definitive conclusion from current statements suggesting that the agreement constitutes an alliance formed against Israel.

A broader implication of the Mecca Agreement is the possibility of institutionalizing security cooperation within the Islamic world. Whilst the Organization of Islamic Cooperation is a broad political organization with 57 members, it lacks an effective collective defense mechanism. The tripartite structure emerging in Mecca could, if successful, form the core of a narrower yet highly operational security platform that could expand with the participation of other states.

At this point, the fact that the agreement is named ‘Mecca’ also carries symbolic significance. The signing of the agreement at the most important holy centre of the Islamic world lends it political and historical visibility beyond that of a purely military text. However, the agreement’s future legitimacy will be shaped not so much by its symbolic value as by its contribution to regional peace, its compliance with international law, and its capacity to prevent crises.

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istory rarely announces itself. But occasionally, a single agreement tells us that something fundamental has changed.

The defense pact signed in Mecca between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye may be one of those moments.

Its most consequential provision is remarkably simple: an armed attack against one of the three countries will be considered an attack against all three.

For Pakistan, this represents something bigger than another defense agreement.

For decades, Pakistan’s military power, including its nuclear deterrent, was viewed overwhelmingly through the prism of South Asia, particularly its rivalry with India. Pakistan was already a formidable military power, but the strategic reach of that power was largely geographically contained.

That is beginning to change.

Pakistan’s security sxtends beyonf South Asia

Pakistan is now part of a collective-defense architecture stretching from South Asia through the Gulf to Türkiye.

And consider what these three countries bring together.

Türkiye possesses NATO’s second-largest army and has transformed itself into a major defense producer, from drones and missiles to warships and advanced aerospace technology. US President Donald Trump himself recently described the Turkish military as “tremendous” and “powerful.”

Saudi Arabia brings enormous economic and energy influence and the political weight of one of the Arab and Islamic world’s most consequential states.

Pakistan brings one of the world’s largest militaries, considerable operational experience and, crucially, is the world’s only Muslim-majority nuclear-armed state.

The nuclear question is therefore unavoidable.

Nothing publicly released about the agreement says Pakistan has extended a nuclear umbrella over Saudi Arabia or Türkiye. It would be wrong to claim otherwise.

But deterrence is also about perception. Any state contemplating a major confrontation with one member must now factor in the possibility of Pakistani involvement. The presence of a nuclear-armed state within that collective-defense framework inevitably becomes part of the strategic calculation.

Also, it’s worth mentioning that for Türkiye and Pakistan, this is the culmination of something much older.

Ankara and Islamabad: A growing relationship

The relationship between Ankara and Islamabad has long gone beyond diplomacy. It is rooted in unusually strong political and public ties and has evolved into substantial military cooperation,  from training and joint exercises to defense-industrial collaboration and Turkish-built MILGEM warships for Pakistan.

The Mecca pact takes that relationship a significant step further: from close defense partners to countries formally bound by collective defense.

And its implications stretch beyond the three signatories.

India says it is closely following the agreement. Its “great friend” Israel will surely be watching closely too.

Just a day before the agreement was signed, Narendra Modi received a call from Benjamin Netanyahu. According to India’s Foreign Ministry, the two discussed developments in West Asia and reviewed progress in the India-Israel Special Strategic Partnership.

There is no evidence connecting that call to the Mecca pact, and India has explicitly rejected subsequent reports that it sought a defence agreement with Israel to counter it.

But the wider picture is difficult to ignore. From New Delhi to Tel Aviv, capitals will now be assessing what this new arrangement means for a strategic landscape already undergoing profound change.

Having ties to China and the US at the same time

Pakistan occupies an especially interesting position within it.

China remains Pakistan’s “all-weather” strategic partner. Yet Islamabad continues to engage Washington, while simultaneously playing an active mediating role between the United States and Iran.

Perhaps US Vice President JD Vance summed up Pakistan’s standing in Washington most simply when asked about Islamabad’s role in the latest diplomatic efforts: “Very good, we love Pakistan.”

That ability to maintain relationships across geopolitical divides is increasingly rare.

Pakistan can speak to Beijing and Washington, Riyadh and Tehran, and the wider Gulf — without being completely confined to any single geopolitical camp. And now it has added a collective-defense commitment with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye to that equation.

That puts Pakistan in a remarkably unusual strategic position.

The pact also reflects a wider transformation in the Middle East. For decades, regional security depended heavily on external powers. Years of war, uncertainty and shifting American priorities have increasingly encouraged regional states to look towards one another.

Is this agreement like NATO? Well, we still do not know how integrated military planning will become or how its obligations would work during an actual war.

But deterrence begins long before a shot is fired. It begins with the calculations an adversary makes before deciding whether to fire one.

Turkish military and technological power, Saudi economic weight and Pakistani conventional and nuclear strength are now connected through a formal mutual-defense commitment.

(A version of this article was first published in Turkish by Kriter)

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audi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan are set to sign a trilateral defense agreement on Friday, marking a significant expansion of security cooperation among three of the Muslim world’s most influential military powers as conflict with Iran reshapes the strategic landscape of the Middle East.

The agreement will be signed in the Saudi Red Sea city of Jeddah during a summit attended by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, is also expected to participate in the high-level meeting, underscoring the military significance of the pact.

Regional officials familiar with the negotiations said the agreement follows nearly a year of discussions aimed at strengthening defense coordination among the three countries amid mounting security challenges across the Gulf and surrounding waterways.

Although officials have confirmed that an agreement will be signed, none of the governments has publicly disclosed the precise scope of the pact or the commitments each country will undertake.

The trilateral accord comes at a time of heightened instability following the U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran earlier this year and Tehran’s subsequent retaliation against military installations, energy infrastructure and strategic targets across the Gulf. The conflict has exposed vulnerabilities in regional security arrangements while threatening one of the world’s most critical energy corridors.

The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil supplies normally pass, has experienced repeated disruptions since hostilities escalated. Commercial shipping has slowed considerably as insurers raised premiums and shipping companies rerouted vessels due to fears of further attacks.

Against this backdrop, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan have increasingly sought closer strategic coordination, reflecting concerns that existing regional security mechanisms may not adequately address evolving threats.

A Turkish official confirmed that the defense agreement would be signed but declined to provide further details.

Expanding strategic partnership

The agreement would bring together three countries with considerable military and geopolitical influence.

Türkiye possesses NATO’s second-largest military and has significantly expanded its domestic defense industry over the past decade, becoming a leading exporter of drones, armored vehicles and missile systems.

Saudi Arabia remains one of the world’s largest defense spenders and has accelerated efforts to modernize its armed forces while investing heavily in domestic military manufacturing as part of its Vision 2030 economic transformation program.

Pakistan, meanwhile, is the only Muslim-majority nation possessing nuclear weapons and maintains one of Asia’s largest standing armies. Islamabad has long maintained close defense ties with Riyadh, including military training, intelligence cooperation and joint exercises.

Security analysts say combining the capabilities of the three countries could create one of the region’s most significant military partnerships, although its effectiveness will ultimately depend on the operational mechanisms established under the agreement.

Building on existing cooperation

The new arrangement appears to build upon the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement signed between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in September 2025.

According to Saudi officials who previously described the agreement, the bilateral pact treats an attack against either country as an attack against both and provides for cooperation using “all military means.”

Whether Türkiye will assume identical obligations under the expanded framework remains unclear.

Reuters reported earlier this year that negotiations were underway to broaden Saudi-Pakistani security cooperation to include Türkiye, reflecting Ankara’s growing role in regional diplomacy and defense affairs.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said in January that Ankara supported establishing broader regional security platforms capable of promoting stability through multilateral cooperation rather than relying exclusively on outside powers.

Friday’s signing appears to represent the first major institutional step toward realizing that vision.

Maritime security takes center stage

Regional media reports suggest maritime security will feature prominently in discussions during the Jeddah summit.

The three countries have already backed Saudi Arabia’s recently announced multinational maritime initiative aimed at protecting commercial shipping through the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

The initiative gained urgency after repeated attacks on commercial vessels and energy infrastructure during recent regional conflicts disrupted global trade routes.

The Houthis in Yemen have also intensified attacks against Saudi-linked shipping in the Red Sea, further complicating regional security calculations.

Meanwhile, tensions in the Strait of Hormuz have highlighted the vulnerability of energy exports from Gulf producers, particularly Saudi Arabia, whose economy remains heavily dependent on oil exports.

Analysts say closer military coordination could improve intelligence sharing, naval patrols and joint responses to emerging threats affecting maritime commerce.

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housands of Palestinians gathered in Gaza City on Tuesday for one of the largest mass funerals since the start of the genocide, mourning 112 members of the Abu Shreia and al-Hassaina families whose remains were recovered from beneath the rubble nearly three years after an Israeli airstrike destroyed their homes.

The funeral, held in the Sabra neighborhood, marked the first time many relatives had been able to bury their loved ones since the attack in November 2023, when entire extended families were killed and buried under collapsed buildings.

Rows of white body bags containing the recovered remains were carried through the streets as mourners wept, prayed and scattered flowers from balconies overlooking the funeral procession. The ceremony brought together thousands of relatives, neighbors and residents, many of whom said the burial reopened wounds that had never healed.

For 39-year-old Lara Abu Shreia, the funeral was the painful conclusion of nearly three years of waiting.

“Today felt like the first day I lost them,” she said. “It was a renewed grief, saying goodbye to them this way.”

The November 22, 2023 strike destroyed her family’s residential compound in Sabra while she, her husband and their five children had already been displaced to southern Gaza following Israeli evacuation orders issued at the start of the genocide.

Fourteen of her closest relatives were killed, including her mother, Nawal, eight siblings and several nieces and nephews.

“My family disappeared almost in one moment,” she said.

Everyone was trapped under the rubble

While displaced in southern Gaza, Lara remained in regular contact with one of her sisters whenever communications allowed. On the night the attack occurred, she learned that airstrikes had hit Sabra but initially hoped the silence from her family was due to communication outages that frequently affected Gaza during the genocide.

Instead, her husband received the devastating news that the family compound had been destroyed and everyone inside was trapped beneath the rubble.

For months, Lara struggled to accept the loss.

When she returned to northern Gaza after the fighting eased, she visited the destroyed home, hoping against all odds that someone had survived.

“I kept telling myself maybe they were playing a trick on me. Maybe someone was hiding,” she recalled. “Maybe I will find someone we didn’t know about.”

Instead, she found only ruins.

In recent weeks, Palestinian Civil Defense teams began extensive recovery operations at the site, eventually retrieving 112 sets of remains from buildings where officials believe 153 people had been buried.

The operation was among the largest recovery missions conducted since the war began.

Mahmoud Basal, spokesperson for Gaza’s Civil Defense, described the funeral as unprecedented.

“Today, 112 martyrs are being buried in one funeral for the first time in the history of the Palestinian cause,” he said.

8,000 bodies remain under the rubble in Gaza

According to Civil Defense estimates, more than 8,000 bodies remain trapped beneath collapsed buildings across Gaza.

Recovery efforts have been hampered by extensive destruction, damaged infrastructure and a shortage of heavy equipment needed to clear debris safely.

“We need the capabilities and equipment to enter Gaza so Civil Defense teams can carry out this humanitarian mission,” Basal said.

He added that in many cases identifying victims has become increasingly difficult after years beneath the rubble.

“Some bodies have disappeared. Some have evaporated. Some have been scattered into very small pieces, making identification extremely difficult,” he said.

For Lara, witnessing the recovery process became a personal necessity despite relatives urging her to stay away.

“I told them, ‘I want to see. Even if it is just a bone, I want to see something from them,'” she said.

Another relative, 50-year-old Ali Abu Shreia, also lost two brothers and their entire families in the attack.

He said the strikes unfolded rapidly as relatives moved between houses in search of safety before gathering in the home of Mufeed al-Hassaina, a former Palestinian minister of public works and housing.

“They thought they would be safe, but the war machine did not distinguish between civilians, homes or families,” he said.

Ali described the victims as ordinary civilians with no military role.

“They were business owners, traders, people active in their community,” he said. “Seven families were completely erased from the civil registry.”

The funeral highlighted the enduring humanitarian consequences of the war, which has left thousands of people officially listed as missing because their remains have never been recovered.

More families on the waiting list

Families across Gaza continue to wait for excavation teams to reach destroyed neighborhoods where relatives are believed to remain buried.

Civil Defense officials say the search continues across multiple locations, although limited equipment means many recovery operations progress slowly.

Tuesday’s ceremony brought together grieving families who had lived for years without graves to visit or funerals to attend.

As the procession wound through Sabra, elderly relatives, parents and children walked behind the rows of white body bags, many overcome with emotion after years of uncertainty.

Women standing on balconies overlooking the funeral scattered flower petals onto the procession below while prayers echoed through the neighborhood.

For Lara, however, the burial offered little sense of closure.

Instead, it marked the beginning of another chapter of grief.

“I wanted to hug the bag,” she said quietly. “I wanted to hug whatever remained of them.”

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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he 36th NATO Summit, held in Ankara on July 7-8, 2026, addressed critical agenda items not only concerning key themes such as the Russia-Ukraine War, defense spending or European security, but also within the context of NATO’s policies towards neighboring regions. In this context, the Summit can also be seen as a platform for redefining relations with the Middle East, North Africa and Gulf countries, which form the Alliance’s southern flank. NATO’s relations with the Gulf countries, which have been caught in a spiral of strategic uncertainty due to the US-Iran conflict, were specifically addressed at this Summit.

The summit held in Ankara demonstrates that the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), launched with the Gulf states at the 2004 Istanbul Summit, has regained strategic importance 22 years later. As will be recalled, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, launched at the 2004 Istanbul Summit, marked the starting point of NATO’s institutional engagement with the Gulf states. However, over the span of 22 years, this initiative has failed to deliver the transformative impact that was anticipated. The potential of the Ankara Summit to revitalise this framework deserves to be assessed from both a symbolic and a strategic perspective.

The primary aim behind the establishment of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative was for NATO to contribute to the security architecture in the Middle East and the Gulf region in an inclusive and collaborative manner. In particular, the Gulf states’ reliance on external sources for security and their fragile structure were the underlying reasons for this initiative. However, in 2004, only four out of the six Gulf states joined the initiative, meaning full inclusivity could not be achieved. Nevertheless, NATO continued to invest in the initiative, hoping that other Gulf states might eventually join Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, which had already joined the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

At this stage, the fact that membership of this initiative remains limited to four countries, with Saudi Arabia and Oman continuing to remain outside it, can be regarded as both a symbolic shortcoming and a structural weakness. The fact that Saudi Arabia and Oman, two of the most critical countries when it comes to the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf and the security of the Strait of Hormuz, are not part of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative can be cited as the main reason why this initiative has remained a ‘limited-impact’ framework to date. Indeed, this situation also highlights the limitations that the Gulf states’ divergent security perceptions and foreign engagements may impose on cooperation with NATO. Consequently, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative’s failure to demonstrate the expected trajectory of development can be explained not only by fluctuations in NATO’s regional priorities but also by the divergent approaches of the Gulf states.

NATO-Gulf cooperation in the shadow of crisis

From the perspective of Gulf geopolitics, it can be argued that the key factor distinguishing the 2026 Ankara Summit from the 2004 Istanbul Summit was the context in which the meetings took place. The Istanbul Summit was held in the wake of the largest wave of expansion in NATO’s history and against a relatively optimistic global backdrop. The Ankara Summit, however, took place in an uncertain geopolitical environment in which a conflict between the US and Iran, which had started on February 28, was directly affecting the Gulf states and posing a serious threat to their security. This situation has distinctly set this year’s IIG session apart from the routine diplomatic contacts of previous years.

In this context, NATO foreign ministers and representatives from the Gulf states came together at a meeting held on the margins of the summit. At the meeting, a consensus was reached on strengthening cooperation in the face of the security challenges posed by the conflict in the Gulf region. This approach can be interpreted as a sign that the initiative may be evolving beyond a purely rhetorical framework of cooperation towards a crisis-management-centered function. A notable aspect here is the shift in the rhetoric of European allies. The fact that the stability of the Gulf is now framed not merely as a regional issue but as an integral part of European security and energy supply security can be interpreted as a shift in rhetoric that enhances the strategic significance of the IIG. This shift also points to the concretization, specifically in the context of the Gulf, of the ‘360-degree security’ approach that has long been debated within the Alliance.

On the other hand, from the perspective of representation, it is noteworthy that whilst the foreign ministers of NATO countries attended the meeting, only Kuwait, among the Gulf states, was represented at the level of foreign minister. The attendance of State Minister for Foreign Affairs Mohammed bin Abdulaziz al-Khulaifi from Qatar, State Minister for Defense Mohammed bin Mubarak Fadil al-Mazrui from the UAE, and Director-General for Bilateral Relations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Abdullah al-Khalifa, from Bahrain, highlights that, despite strong diplomatic messages and rhetoric on cooperation, the Gulf states had limited expectations of the summit.

In terms of positive outcomes, however, it was observed that discussions took place at the summit regarding the possibility of taking some concrete steps between NATO and the Gulf states within the framework of the GCC. In this context, the agreement reached between Qatar and NATO on a partnership program to frame civil and military cooperation between the two sides, and the fact that the establishment process for a regional centre for peace support operations planned to be set up in Qatar is approaching its final stage, can be regarded as concrete steps in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative’s transition beyond being merely a consultative platform.

State Minister al-Khulaifi, who attended the summit on behalf of Qatar, emphasized in his statement that his country attaches great importance to the IIG and is ready to implement concrete outcomes. Kuwait, another country taking concrete steps in cooperation with NATO and hosting the GIG-NATO regional centre, launched the Kuwait-NATO Political and Security Dialogue Mechanism in January 2026. Sheikh Jarrah Jabir al-Ahmed al-Sabah, Kuwait’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, who attended the Ankara summit, also proposed in his statement that the GCC Ministerial Summit be held in Kuwait in 2027.

The future of NATO-Gulf cooperation

At this stage, it remains unclear whether NATO’s renewed engagement with the Gulf states is the result of a temporary momentum generated by current crises, or the outcome of a process aimed at implementing lasting structural measures. Given the Gulf states’ quest for security, having recognized the ineffectiveness of a security mechanism entirely dependent on the US during the Iran conflict, it is reasonable to suggest that they may wish to consider NATO as a new alternative security provider. Indeed, the Gulf states, which already maintain strong partnerships with NATO member states such as the US and Turkey, may also aim to formalize institutional cooperation with NATO.

Turkey’s role in this process, as the host of the Ankara Summit, is also noteworthy. Having hosted the 2004 Istanbul Summit during the enlargement process, Turkey has, by 2026, become a more central actor on the Alliance’s southern flank, owing both to its geographical location and its growing defense industry capacity. Efforts to position the reconstruction process in Syria as a bridge between NATO’s sphere of influence and Gulf capital can also be cited as one of the concrete manifestations of this central role. The progress Turkey has made in the defense industry sector and its transformation into a significant actor in terms of military deterrence have made Ankara an important security partner for the Gulf states.

Consequently, the Ankara Summit has had limited yet positive implications for the future from the perspective of the Gulf states. The interactions revealed by the Summit, particularly regarding the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, demonstrate that an initiative which had seen relatively limited progress over the past 22 years has been able to regain significance in the wake of the crisis. At this stage, the most significant question mark concerns whether this momentum will translate into a permanent institutional framework.

Whether the NATO–ICI dialogue will remain a temporary reaction to the geopolitical uncertainty created by the US–Iran conflict will become clear through the concrete steps the parties take in the future. Key factors in this regard will include whether key actors such as Saudi Arabia and Oman will join the initiative, and to what extent the emerging cooperation programm will be reflected in practice. Consequently, the most tangible dynamic in NATO’s future in the Gulf can be identified as the success of the transition from rhetorical solidarity to sustained institutional cooperation.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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nly one in three Americans support the U.S. war with Iran, while a large majority believe President Donald Trump has failed to clearly explain the conflict’s objectives, according to a new Reuters/Ipsos poll.

The nationwide survey, conducted from July 24 to 26 among 1,246 U.S. adults, found that support for the war has fallen to its lowest level since the conflict began five months ago. Only about one-third of respondents said they back the military campaign, while support has remained below 40% for five consecutive months.

Despite declining support for the war, Trump’s overall job approval rating rose three percentage points from the previous month to 37%, although it remains historically low for his presidency.

The poll found widespread uncertainty about the administration’s objectives in Iran.

Overall, 69% of respondents—including roughly 40% of Republicans—said Trump has not clearly explained why the United States is fighting in Iran.

Since the conflict began, Trump has cited multiple goals, including:

• Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
• Destroying Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities.
• Encouraging Iranians to overthrow their government.

The White House defended the administration’s approach. Spokesperson Olivia Wales said Trump would not base decisions on “fluid opinion polls” and reiterated that preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon remains the administration’s central objective.

Support lags far behind previous U.S. wars

Reuters noted that public backing for the Iran conflict is substantially lower than support recorded during the early stages of previous American military campaigns.

According to historical Gallup polling:

• Around 70% of Americans supported the Iraq War during its initial months in 2003.
• Approximately 90% backed military action in Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks in 2001.

By contrast, Reuters/Ipsos polling has shown support for military action against Iran never rising above 40% since the conflict began on February 28.

The survey suggests the war may become a significant political challenge for Republicans before November’s congressional midterm elections.

Independent voters surveyed by Reuters/Ipsos favored Democratic congressional candidates over Republicans by 36% to 20%. Independents also gave Democrats higher marks on economic issues, reflecting concern over rising living costs linked to the conflict.

The war has contributed to higher energy prices, with average U.S. gasoline prices climbing above $4 per gallon compared with about $3 before hostilities began.

Republican strategist Alex Conant, who served in President George W. Bush’s administration, said the conflict is making it harder for Republicans to focus on economic issues that they had hoped would dominate the election campaign.

Voters question the purpose of the war

Several voters interviewed by Reuters expressed uncertainty about the reasons for the war.

Alex Womack, a retired Marine from Georgia who previously supported Trump, said he no longer understood the purpose of the conflict.

“It’s not clear why we started a war with them. I have no idea,” Womack said.

Another Georgia voter, Rhyan Anderson, who voted for Trump in 2024 after supporting former President Joe Biden in 2020, argued that the administration should focus more on domestic priorities than overseas conflicts.

“My biggest thing is just focus on the people who are actually in the country,” Anderson told Reuters.

According to Reuters, 18 U.S. service members have been killed since the conflict began, while thousands of people have died in Iran and in Lebanon, where fighting between Israeli forces and the Iran-backed Hezbollah has continued.

The combination of rising fuel prices, uncertainty over the war’s objectives and persistent public skepticism presents a growing political challenge for Trump as his administration seeks to sustain support for a conflict that has now entered its sixth month.

(Source: Reuters)

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ran transported Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders, military advisers, and missile- and drone-related equipment to Yemen earlier this month, according to four sources familiar with the matter, in a move that could strengthen the military capabilities of the Iran-aligned Houthi movement and increase threats to shipping in the Red Sea.

The sources, including two Iranian officials, Yemen’s information minister, and a regional security analyst, told Reuters that the personnel and equipment arrived aboard a Mahan Air flight that departed Tehran on July 13. The aircraft was reportedly bound for the Houthi-controlled capital, Sanaa, but diverted to the Red Sea port of Hodeidah after Sanaa International Airport came under attack by forces aligned with Yemen’s Saudi-backed government.

According to the two Iranian sources, between 10 and 21 IRGC personnel, including senior commanders, were aboard the flight. One source said the officers were deployed to support Houthi military operations and provide training on new missile systems. The source also alleged that Iran shipped gold on the aircraft to help finance Houthi activities.

Reuters could not independently verify the claims.

Iran denies allegations

Iran’s Foreign Ministry did not immediately respond to requests for comment. Tehran has consistently denied supplying the Houthis with missile capabilities or directing the group’s military operations.

Abdel Rahman al-Ahnomi, a Houthi media official who said he was on the flight, rejected the allegations, describing them as “lies and fabrications.” He said all passengers were civilians. The Houthis have repeatedly maintained that they develop their own weapons and are not acting as an Iranian proxy.

The reported deployment comes amid escalating regional tensions following renewed fighting involving Iran and the United States.

Three days after the reported flight, Reuters reported that Tehran had instructed the Houthis to prepare to close the Bab al-Mandab Strait if U.S. attacks targeted Iranian power infrastructure, raising concerns over global energy supplies and maritime security.

On Monday, the Houthis announced a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia, describing it as retaliation for the July 13 bombing of Sanaa airport, which they blamed on Saudi Arabia. The announcement effectively ended a four-year truce between Riyadh and the Houthis and heightened concerns over the security of one of the world’s busiest shipping routes.

The group later claimed responsibility for attacks on two Saudi oil tankers, further escalating tensions in the Red Sea.

Multiple confirmations

Yemen’s Information Minister Moammar al-Iryani confirmed to Reuters that IRGC personnel and military equipment had been transferred to Yemen, citing intelligence reports. He said their mission was to strengthen Houthi military capabilities and enable the group to threaten international maritime traffic through the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

Regional security analyst Mzahem Alsaloum also confirmed the arrival of the Iranian advisers, saying the cargo included components for short- and medium-range missiles and drones similar to systems previously used in attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Alsaloum further alleged that Iran had deployed military advisers to Yemen during last year’s conflict with Israel by routing them through Somalia, a claim Tehran has denied.

The reported transfer followed the resumption of direct flights between Tehran and Sanaa, which the Houthis say are intended to ease what they describe as a Saudi-imposed blockade on Yemen.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei said the July 13 flight was primarily intended to return a Houthi delegation that had traveled to Tehran to attend the funeral of Iran’s late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, along with Yemeni citizens who had received medical treatment in Iran.

According to the sources, the return flight also carried IRGC commanders and military advisers. Before landing in Sanaa, however, the aircraft diverted to Hodeidah after strikes targeted the airport.

The developments underscore growing concerns among regional governments and maritime security analysts that Yemen’s conflict could become increasingly intertwined with the broader confrontation between Iran and the United States, raising the risk of further disruption to international shipping through the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait.

(Source: Reuters)

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n internal Israeli government document obtained by Al Jazeera has revealed that Israeli authorities collected information on more than 150 international humanitarian organizations in 2013, identifying several prominent charities as supporters or critics of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement against Israel.

The spreadsheet, accessed through an Israeli government ministry website, listed basic information on international charities, including directors’ names, contact details and areas of operation. A separate comments section, however, contained assessments of some organizations’ positions on Israel and the Palestinian issue.

Among the organizations singled out were Oxfam, which the document described as “active in global BDS efforts,” as well as France-based Première Urgence International, labelled a “critic of Israel,” Geneva-based Defense for Children International, described as “involved in anti-Israel campaigning,” and Spain’s Mundubat, characterized as “highly involved in BDS.”

Responding to the findings, Oxfam said the comments reflected allegations rather than objective assessments of its work.

The organization said it does not support or promote the BDS movement and operates under humanitarian principles and international legal standards. It reiterated its position that Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank violate international humanitarian law.

Experts say file shows early monitoring strategy

Analysts interviewed by Al Jazeera said the document offers insight into Israel’s approach to monitoring international civil society organizations during a period when the BDS movement was gaining international momentum.

The document dates from October 2013, a year marked by several high-profile boycott initiatives, including physicist Stephen Hawking’s withdrawal from a conference in Israel, academic boycott campaigns, and efforts by religious organizations to oppose products originating from Israeli settlements.

Mayssoun Sukarieh, a senior lecturer at King’s College London, said Israel was beginning to feel the impact of the growing BDS campaign and may have been gathering information that later informed legislation targeting boycott supporters.

In 2017, Israel enacted a law barring entry to foreign nationals who publicly support the BDS movement.

Tania Hary, executive director of the Israeli human rights organization Gisha, said the document demonstrated government monitoring of humanitarian organizations rather than addressing legitimate security concerns.

She argued the file reflected long-standing scrutiny of organizations providing assistance to Palestinians living under Israeli occupation.

Giovanni Fassina of the European Legal Support Center said the document illustrated what he described as an early phase of Israel’s broader efforts to track organizations supporting Palestinian rights.

NGOs respond

Several organizations named in the document disputed the characterizations.

Germany’s Medico International said it had never endorsed the BDS movement, although it supports the right of individuals and groups to advocate for boycotts as a form of political expression.

By contrast, the Palestine Solidarity Association of Sweden acknowledged its support for the BDS campaign, describing it as a nonviolent strategy aimed at promoting Palestinian rights and encouraging Israel to comply with international law.

The report comes amid continued debate over the relationship between Israel and international humanitarian organizations operating in the occupied Palestinian territories.

Aid groups have repeatedly raised concerns over restrictions on humanitarian access to Gaza, administrative requirements imposed on international organizations, and increased scrutiny of aid operations during the conflict that began in October 2023.

The Israeli Ministry of Welfare and Social Affairs, through whose website the document was reportedly accessed, did not respond to Al Jazeera’s request for comment.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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he United States and Iran exchanged another round of military strikes on Thursday, sharply escalating tensions in the Gulf and raising fresh concerns over the stability of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical global energy corridor.

The latest escalation came after U.S. forces launched a second wave of attacks against Iranian military infrastructure overnight, with Washington saying the operation was intended to safeguard freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz following Iranian attacks on commercial shipping.

Iran responded hours later by launching missile and drone strikes against U.S. military facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait, marking another direct exchange between the two countries despite previous diplomatic efforts to halt the conflict.

The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) said its latest operation struck approximately 90 military targets across Iran, including air defense systems, coastal surveillance installations, missile and drone storage sites, naval assets and military logistics infrastructure along Iran’s southern coastline.

The strikes followed an earlier round of attacks this week in which U.S. forces targeted more than 80 Iranian military sites.

Speaking to reporters while returning from the NATO summit in Türkiye, U.S. President Donald Trump defended the operation, describing it as retaliation for Iran’s attacks on commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

“We just hit them very hard,” Trump said. “Every time they hit us, we’re going to hit them 20.”

Earlier, Trump declared that the interim agreement intended to halt fighting between Washington and Tehran was effectively “over.”

Iran retaliates against US bases

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced that it had carried out strikes against U.S. military positions in Bahrain and Kuwait in response to the American attacks.

The Guards warned that further retaliation would follow if the United States launched additional strikes against Iranian territory.

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf said the Strait of Hormuz would operate only under what he described as “Iranian arrangements,” adding that U.S. “bullying and breaking its commitments no longer come without a cost.”

Iranian state media reported that three people were killed and several others injured in U.S. strikes near Ahvaz in southwestern Iran.

Multiple locations along Iran’s southern coast were reportedly hit, including Bandar Abbas, home to Iran’s largest commercial port and major naval facilities belonging to both the Iranian Navy and the Revolutionary Guards.

Additional strikes were reported in Konarak, Chabahar and Iranshahr, where a firefighter was killed during an attack on the city’s airport. Iranian media also reported damage to a railway bridge near Aqqala in northern Iran.

Oil prices climb

Global oil prices rose as markets reacted to renewed fighting and concerns that continued hostilities could threaten shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil supplies normally pass.

Brent crude futures rose more than 1% to nearly $79 per barrel, while U.S. West Texas Intermediate crude also gained more than 1%.

The latest exchange follows a familiar pattern seen during previous rounds of fighting, with Iranian attacks on commercial shipping followed by U.S. military retaliation and subsequent Iranian strikes on American military facilities in the Gulf.

Despite the escalating military exchanges, analysts say both sides may still be seeking to strengthen their negotiating positions while avoiding a broader regional war, although the collapse of the interim agreement has significantly reduced prospects for an immediate diplomatic breakthrough.

(Source: Reuters)

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resident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said NATO must evolve into an alliance that strengthens its members rather than creating dependency, as Türkiye concluded its hosting of the 36th NATO Summit with calls for greater burden-sharing, stronger defense industrial cooperation and renewed diplomatic efforts to address global conflicts.

Speaking at a press conference following the two-day summit at the Presidential Complex in Ankara on Wednesday, Erdoğan said the meeting marked a significant step toward building a stronger alliance at a time when Euro-Atlantic security faces unprecedented challenges.

“NATO should be an alliance of allies that strengthen one another, not one of countries dependent on each other,” Erdoğan said, arguing that genuine deterrence depends not only on defense spending but also on technological superiority, industrial capacity and sustainable military production.

The summit, the first NATO leaders’ meeting ever held in Ankara and Türkiye’s second time hosting the alliance after more than two decades, brought together heads of state and government from all member countries.

Erdoğan said allied leaders agreed on the need for European members to assume greater responsibility for collective defense while maintaining fair burden-sharing within the alliance.

“We have laid the foundations for a stronger NATO in which European allies undertake greater responsibility and military capabilities are reinforced through equitable burden-sharing,” he said.

Türkiye highlights military contributions

The Turkish president stressed that Türkiye has become one of NATO’s leading military contributors after decades of confronting regional conflicts and terrorism largely on its own.

He noted that Türkiye commands NATO’s second-largest land army and has safeguarded the alliance’s southeastern flank for decades while making substantial contributions to NATO missions, operations and common funding.

Erdoğan announced that Turkish F-16 fighter jets will deploy to Estonia beginning in August as part of NATO’s Air Policing mission.

He also said Türkiye will continue commanding the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) until September 2026 and will assume command of the NATO Response Force during 2028-2029.

“Türkiye has always fulfilled its responsibilities within the alliance, taking risks and paying the price when necessary,” Erdoğan said.

Defense industry emphasized

A central theme of Erdoğan’s remarks was Türkiye’s growing defense industry, one of the country’s key strategic advantages.

He said Türkiye now manufactures its own fighter aircraft, tanks, warships and air defense systems while ranking among the world’s leading producers of unmanned aerial and naval vehicles.

“True deterrence comes from three dimensions: advanced technology, sufficient scale and sustainable production,” Erdoğan said.

He welcomed the adoption of the “Ankara Strategy” during the NATO Defense Industry Forum, saying it would strengthen cooperation between NATO and defense manufacturers.

Erdoğan also renewed calls for the removal of remaining restrictions on defense trade among allies and argued that European Union defense initiatives should complement NATO rather than duplicate its efforts.

He warned that excluding non-EU allies such as Türkiye from European defense projects would limit their effectiveness.

Ukraine, Middle East discussed

The summit also addressed ongoing security crises, including Russia’s war in Ukraine and instability across the Middle East.

Erdoğan reiterated Türkiye’s offer to facilitate renewed peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.

“The war has become a machine of destruction that claims tens of thousands of casualties every month,” he said. “There are no losers in a just peace.”

Turning to the Middle East, Erdoğan welcomed the Islamabad Agreement, which Türkiye has supported, while expressing concern over continued violence in Lebanon and Gaza.

He said attacks in Lebanon have displaced civilians and destroyed cities, while the humanitarian crisis in Gaza continues.

“There is no room in our region for new tensions or new conflicts,” Erdoğan said. “Humanity needs peace, stability and security.”

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he United States and Iran have reached a preliminary agreement to end months of conflict and reopen the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz, marking the most significant diplomatic breakthrough since the outbreak of war earlier this year and triggering a sharp decline in global oil prices.

The framework agreement, announced by U.S. President Donald Trump and confirmed by Iranian officials on Monday, is intended to halt military operations across multiple fronts and establish a pathway toward broader negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions relief.

The memorandum of understanding is scheduled to be formally signed in Switzerland on Friday following mediation efforts led by Pakistan.

“The Deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran is now complete,” Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform on Sunday evening. The announcement came shortly after Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif revealed that negotiators had reached an agreement.

If implemented, the deal would represent the most important diplomatic achievement since the conflict began in February with joint U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran, a war that has killed thousands, destabilized the Middle East, and disrupted global energy markets.

Ceasefire across multiple fronts

According to Pakistani officials, the agreement calls for the immediate and permanent cessation of military operations throughout the region, including in Lebanon, where fighting between Israel and the Iran-backed Hezbollah movement has complicated diplomatic efforts.

Iran’s Supreme National Security Council confirmed that military operations on all fronts would cease beginning Monday night.

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said the agreement would establish a 60-day ceasefire period during which negotiators would work toward a more comprehensive settlement.

The future agreement is expected to address some of the most contentious issues dividing Washington and Tehran, including economic sanctions, regional security arrangements, and Iran’s nuclear activities.

Despite the breakthrough, uncertainty remains over how the agreement will affect Israel, which has not participated in the U.S.-Iran negotiations and has repeatedly insisted on maintaining freedom of military action against perceived threats in the region.

There was no immediate official response from the Israeli government following the announcement.

Strait of Hormuz to reopen

One of the most significant elements of the agreement concerns the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway through which a substantial portion of the world’s oil and natural gas exports pass.

Since the escalation of hostilities, Iran has effectively restricted shipping through the strait, while the United States imposed countermeasures targeting Iranian ports and maritime operations.

Trump announced that the waterway would reopen on Friday and said he had ordered an end to the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports.

“Ships of the World, start your engines. Let the oil flow!” Trump wrote.

Financial markets responded immediately to the news.

Brent crude prices fell more than 4 percent in early trading as investors welcomed the prospect of restored energy supplies and reduced geopolitical risk. Stock markets across Asia also posted gains as concerns over disruptions to global trade eased.

Market analysts cautioned, however, that many details of the agreement remain unclear.

“The lack of details, especially on freedom of shipping, is a concern, but not one that should constrain markets today as the surge in risk appetite plays out,” said currency analyst Sean Callow.

Nuclear issue deferred

While the agreement addresses military hostilities and maritime security, negotiators have postponed decisions regarding Iran’s nuclear program, one of the central issues behind the conflict.

Sources familiar with the talks said nuclear negotiations will take place during the 60-day ceasefire period.

Trump has repeatedly stated that any final settlement must ensure Iran cannot develop nuclear weapons.

Iran maintains that its nuclear program is peaceful and has consistently denied seeking a nuclear arsenal.

Before the conflict, Iran had accumulated more than 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to levels approaching weapons-grade purity, according to international estimates. The future of that stockpile is expected to become one of the most difficult issues in upcoming negotiations.

Officials involved in the talks have offered differing accounts of the draft agreement.

A senior American official indicated that the eventual settlement could require the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program and the removal or destruction of highly enriched uranium stockpiles.

Iranian officials, meanwhile, suggested that Tehran would retain the ability to dilute and manage enriched uranium domestically rather than surrendering it.

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year after its introduction in Congress, the proposed Block the Bombs Act has gained significant support among U.S. lawmakers, reflecting growing debate in Washington over military aid to Israel and the humanitarian consequences of the war in Gaza.

The legislation, introduced in June 2025 by Representative Delia Ramirez, initially attracted 21 Democratic co-sponsors. That number has now risen to 73 lawmakers, including one Republican, marking one of the most substantial congressional challenges to longstanding bipartisan support for military assistance to Israel.

Speaking at a news conference on Capitol Hill, Ramirez described the growing support as evidence that views within Congress are shifting.

“While some thought that the bill was extreme, it has, in fact, become pretty mainstream,” she said.

Despite the increase in backing, supporters acknowledge that the proposal remains far from securing a majority in the 435-member House of Representatives, where Republican leadership has not allowed the measure to come to a vote.

Bill targets specific weapons transfers

The Block the Bombs Act would prohibit the transfer of certain heavy bombs and artillery ammunition to Israel, weapons that supporters say have been used in some of the deadliest attacks during the war in Gaza.

Backers of the legislation argue that U.S. military assistance should be conditioned on compliance with international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians.

Representative Rashida Tlaib said public opinion has increasingly shifted toward questioning unconditional military support for Israel.

“Americans want us to invest here at home,” Tlaib said. “They want us not to invest in death and destruction and bombs. They want us to invest in clean water and housing and childcare and so much more.”

The legislation has attracted support from lawmakers who were not previously associated with efforts to restrict military aid to Israel. Representative Valerie Foushee, who previously received support from pro-Israel advocacy groups, endorsed the bill in 2025, arguing that weapons should not be supplied if they are not used in accordance with international law.

This week, Representative Thomas Massie became the first Republican co-sponsor of the measure.

“America is morally obligated to end support of Israel’s devastation of Gaza and its people,” Massie said in announcing his support.

Growing debate over US policy toward Israel

Advocates say the bill reflects broader changes in public opinion regarding U.S. policy toward Israel and the Palestinian territories.

Recent polls have shown declining support among Americans for providing military aid to Israel without conditions. Supporters of the legislation argue that Congress should better reflect those changing attitudes.

The bill has also received support from the Congressional Progressive Caucus. Its chair, Greg Casar, said public activism has played a major role in increasing support for the proposal.

“The idea behind the Block the Bombs Act is simple: The United States should not be supplying bombs that we know will be used to perpetuate one of the worst disasters of our lifetimes,” Casar said.

The debate comes amid broader congressional scrutiny of U.S. policy in the Middle East. Earlier this week, the House approved a resolution aimed at limiting President Donald Trump’s authority to conduct military action against Iran without congressional authorization.

In addition, 40 senators voted in April to block the transfer of military bulldozers to Israel, signaling growing willingness among some lawmakers to challenge aspects of U.S. military support.

Advocacy groups backing the legislation welcomed the increase in support but stressed that much work remains.

Jewish Voice for Peace Action Political Director Beth Miller described the growth in co-sponsors as significant but said the total remains well below a congressional majority.

Supporters of the measure argue that continued humanitarian suffering in Gaza requires a reassessment of U.S. military assistance, while opponents maintain that aid to Israel remains essential for the country’s security.

With Congress still largely supportive of Israel, the legislation faces difficult odds. Nevertheless, its growing backing highlights a notable shift in the political debate surrounding U.S. arms transfers and Washington’s role in the war.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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srael and Lebanon have agreed to implement a ceasefire aimed at ending months of hostilities, the Trump administration announced on Wednesday, raising hopes that a broader agreement to end the U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran could be within reach.

The agreement, reached following negotiations in Washington, requires a complete cessation of hostilities by the Iran-backed Hezbollah and the withdrawal of its fighters from southern Lebanon’s Litani region, according to a joint statement issued by the United States Department of State.

The development comes despite continued violence across the region and mounting tensions involving Iran, Gulf states, and U.S. forces.

A previous ceasefire announced last month failed to halt fighting, with clashes continuing after Israel launched operations in Lebanon in March against Hezbollah, which had opened a front against Israel in support of Tehran.

The latest agreement is viewed as a key component of wider diplomatic efforts to end the regional conflict that erupted following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran earlier this year.

Gulf attacks and Strait of Hormuz tensions continue

Even as diplomatic efforts advanced, regional tensions remained high.

Kuwaiti authorities said Iranian missile and drone attacks damaged facilities at Kuwait International Airport, killing one person and injuring more than 60 others. Airport operations were temporarily suspended before flights resumed later in the day following emergency safety measures.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps denied targeting the airport directly, claiming the damage was caused by failed U.S. interceptor missiles. The U.S. military rejected that account, saying Iranian drones deliberately targeted the airport.

At the same time, the United States Central Command reported carrying out defensive strikes against missile launch sites and naval assets in southern Iran. U.S. forces also struck targets on Qeshm Island near the strategically important Strait of Hormuz after what officials described as attempted Iranian attacks.

The Strait of Hormuz, a critical route for global oil and gas shipments, remains largely closed more than three months after the conflict began. Oil prices rose nearly 2% on concerns about continuing disruptions to energy supplies.

Negotiations with Iran remain fragile

The ceasefire announcement comes amid ongoing efforts to secure a broader agreement between Washington and Tehran.

Iran has linked progress in negotiations to an end to fighting in Lebanon and is seeking access to frozen oil revenues, sanctions relief, an end to restrictions on its ports, and guarantees regarding future access to the Strait of Hormuz.

Abbas Araqchi said negotiations with the United States had not been suspended but acknowledged that no significant progress had been made in recent days.

Meanwhile, President Donald Trump expressed optimism that developments could occur soon.

“If it happens, it could happen over the weekend,” Trump told reporters at the White House, without providing further details.

Trump also indicated that negotiators were attempting to separate discussions about reopening the Strait of Hormuz from the conflict in Lebanon.

Despite the ceasefire announcement, violence continued on Wednesday. Lebanese security sources reported Israeli drone strikes that killed at least six people in southern Lebanon and targeted areas near Beirut. Israel said it had intercepted a hostile aircraft believed to have been launched by Hezbollah.

Araqchi warned that Iran would respond decisively if Israel expanded military operations against Beirut.

The conflict has killed thousands of people, primarily in Iran and Lebanon, while disrupting global trade and energy markets. Although the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire has raised hopes for a wider diplomatic breakthrough, ongoing military incidents underscore the fragility of the situation and the challenges facing negotiators seeking a broader regional settlement.

(Source: Reuters)

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he war between the United States, Israel, and Iran has profoundly affected the Middle East and, by extension, the entire world. Following the ceasefire declared at the end of the 40th day, the war entered a negotiation phase. Prior to the first round of talks in Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital, the parties clearly articulated their expectations of one another. The United States’ demands regarding the agreement included the following:

– The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which had been closed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

– The complete suspension of all nuclear enrichment activities for 15 years

– The handover of 460 kilograms of uranium enriched to over 60 percent

– The closure or strict control of key nuclear facilities (Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow)

– The suspension of long-range missile capabilities

– The cessation of support for groups under its control in neighboring countries

However, Iran sought full sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, including control of transit fees, international recognition of its right to enrich uranium, a five-year moratorium on uranium enrichment, dilution of uranium enriched to 60 percent instead of handing it over, $270 billion in compensation for damage to critical infrastructure, release of $120 billion in frozen Iranian assets, inclusion of China and Russia in the process as guarantors of the new agreement, and complete lifting of sanctions.

U.S. demands from Iran

The war between the United States, Israel, and Iran has profoundly affected the Middle East and, by extension, the entire world. Following the ceasefire declared at the end of the 40th day, the war entered a negotiation phase. Prior to the first round of talks in Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital, the parties clearly articulated their expectations of one another. The United States’ demands regarding the agreement included the following:

– The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which had been closed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

– The complete suspension of all nuclear enrichment activities for 15 years

– The handover of 460 kilograms of uranium enriched to over 60 percent

– The closure or strict control of key nuclear facilities (Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow)

– The suspension of long-range missile capabilities

– The cessation of support for groups under its control in neighboring countries

Following the talks, US Vice President JD Vance stated that the Iranian delegation appeared more reasonable and flexible than in the past. Yet, he criticized the Iranian side for not acting in a manner willing to reach an agreement or focused on a solution. In response, Foreign Minister Iraqchi, one of the lead Iranian delegation representatives, stated that the US side was greedy and had made unacceptable demands. These statements highlighted that the parties had failed to reach an agreement and that the expected outcome of the talks had not been achieved.

Iran’s losses and survivors

Upon examining the negotiation process in question, it is evident that there is a prevailing consensus among U.S. officials, with no apparent divergence of opinion or division. Although many Americans have criticized the initiation of the war and the management of the process, which has even caused unease within the US military, securing as many concessions as possible from Iran at the negotiating table is clearly seen as a historic opportunity that no one would turn down. However, the situation was far different for Iran, which suffered heavy destruction and losses throughout the war. The most devastating loss was the assassination of Ali Khamenei, the leader who held absolute authority in the country for 37 years.

While serving as Iran’s supreme leader, Khamenei held a position of authority and influence that allowed him to make final decisions on everything from minor issues to long-term strategic planning and policymaking processes. This was thanks to his unifying power over all state institutions and the absolute obedience he commanded. Although he was perceived as open to consultation, he insisted on critical decisions regarding the nuclear and missile programs and policies toward Syria and Iraq. This stance often prevented dissenting voices from emerging across all levels of the administration. The removal of such a powerful and influential leader was bound to create a distinct leadership vacuum in the country. Indeed, events have unfolded in this direction, and it is now clear that this vacuum has led to serious consequences within the administration and on the ground.

Thanks to its multi-layered political and military system, which has been intertwined with religious and ideological beliefs for decades, Iran was able to avert a serious crisis that could have triggered its collapse. The expected collapse did not materialize. However, there are signs of a deadlock in the decision-making process regarding the ongoing ceasefire and negotiations, as well as power struggles and divisions.

The Khatam Al Anbiya Headquarters

One of the clearest examples of this is the statement by the Khatam Al Anbiya Headquarters, one of the IRGC’s most important centers, that “passages will remain closed as long as the enemy’s hostile attacks continue,” following Iraqchi’s announcement after the first round of talks that limited and authorized passages through the Strait of Hormuz would be permitted. Headlines in Keyhan, a hardline conservative newspaper formerly close to Ali Khamenei, have targeted Muhammad Bakir Galibaf, a member of the negotiation team, and the negotiation efforts. Similar broadcasts by Iranian State Television have criticized Galibaf and the negotiations with the US.

It should be noted that Galibaf is one of the regime’s iconic figures. A former high-ranking commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), he wields significant influence and power in both the military and politics. Although he is associated with conservative figures, Galibaf’s stance and policies can adapt to the conditions of the time. During the war, he survived an environment in which key figures such as Ali Khamenei, Larijani, and Shamkhani were eliminated. By conducting negotiations with a moderate approach, he established a presence on the international stage. His desire and efforts to rise in politics, despite having run for president twice and having a military background, may have also played a role in this process.

Trump’s remarks from the outset that “there are alternative leadership options within the regime” and his statement at the end of the war that “we are in contact with reasonable figures” drew attention to Galibaf. Opposition media in the diaspora claimed that Galibaf was one of these “reasonable figures” from the beginning and even before the war began. Therefore, he was deliberately spared from being targeted.

While it is difficult to assert that these claims are part of a long-term, premeditated plan, Galibaf’s ambition for the top spot is well known throughout his political career. Notably, unlike many other IRGC commanders, he has adopted a more moderate stance following the destruction wrought by the war and the successive removal of high-ranking figures. One could argue that this approach is based on the desire to keep the regime afloat through controlled normalization with the U.S. and secure the top of the power pyramid by outmaneuvering rivals in the emerging new balance of power.”

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fter the end of the Cold War, the United States began to dominate the world as the sole superpower. Over the past 35 years, the Americans, maintaining this singularity, have tried to punish their enemies and the countries they declared as enemies by invading them. For this purpose, they occupied Afghanistan and Iraq, the latter having no connection to the 9/11 attacks while the former’s sheltering of Bin Laden did not require invasion of the whole country. Allies also did not withhold their support from the U.S. in these occupations.

Americans, together with Israel, who consider it their duty to attack countries they have labeled as enemies and try to legitimize it with excuses such as democracy and human rights, most recently attacked Iran on February 28. More than two months have passed but the Israel‑U.S. duo, which killed all Iranian leaders on the first day with Iran’s initial naivete, still have not achieved their goals. No regime has collapsed, no country has been occupied, Iran’s nuclear program has not been destroyed, and the Iranian army has not been neutralized. Moreover, Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz has plunged the whole world into an economic crisis.

In short, Iran is a big bite for the U.S. and Israel, and they could not swallow it. Although Trump repeatedly proclaimed victories, there is no real victory. If the allies had supported America, the outcome might have been different, but the allies declared they would not do anything for the U.S. by refusing to enter a war that the U.S. itself does not even have. Moreover, the U.S. was planning to occupy Greenland, NATO territory, just a few months ago.

Super‑power status open to debate?

The United States’ failure naturally opens its super‑power status to debate. Five years ago, while writing an academic paper on whether the U.S. is still a superpower, I observed that despite being the world’s most powerful country in many areas, the U.S. does not possess the power to control the entire world. For example, 24 % of global GDP belongs to the United States. With that share, it is impossible to dominate the remaining 76 % of the world. Militarily, the U.S. is the strongest country, but even in this field the days of policing the world are far behind.

However, while writing the paper I concluded that the U.S. remains a superpower thanks to its allies. Especially because many European states, Japan, South Korea, Canada, and numerous European allies accept U.S. leadership, America’s super‑power status continued.

The tide has turned, and now the United States is led by Donald Trump, a leader whose actions are uncertain even in his own country, whose statecraft is debated, and who does not hesitate to target his own allies. In the Iran war, Trump entered the conflict without any ally’s approval, simply because Israel wanted it. Even though he eyed Greenland and threatened to withdraw from NATO, he still expected support from allies. Yet his allies, not being as reckless, did not join a war that the U.S. itself had not started, leaving the U.S. (and Israel) alone.

Israel is an ally of the US more than Europe

Today, Israel is the United States’ closest ally. You will not see Israel suffering the insults Trump directed at Europeans. Conversely, Israel’s closest ally is not the United States. In other words, Israel will not go to war for the U.S.; they see the U.S. as a country whose resources will be exploited. Unfortunately, this is the painful truth many know but dare not say about U.S.–Israel relations.

As a result, the United States is more alone than ever, which provides a good opportunity to test its power. The Iran war became an example serving exactly this purpose. It is evident that the U.S. cannot maintain hegemony alone. Perhaps it could win a one‑on‑one war against Iran or another country, but the price would be heavy. Therefore, if it does not engage in an existential war, every war it joins will take pieces from its existence and further weaken it.

It is also necessary to emphasize the clumsiness of the American army. Americans are truly ahead in internet technology, which helps keep their economy strong. However, they struggle to keep up with changes in the weapons industry. While Iran managed to push away massive aircraft carriers with a few thousand‑dollar kamikaze drones and, according to claims, shot down an F‑35 with a lower‑technology air‑defense system, battlefields are filling with smaller, more effective weapons, yet the U.S. still relies on large‑scale armaments. Consequently, some of its assets have been destroyed or forced to withdraw from the region. If this trend continues, the United States’ biggest asset will be its nuclear weapons, whose production becomes easier over time. Thus, American hegemony in weaponry is rapidly declining.

Moreover, as long as the Trump administration governs, it is unlikely that Washington will abandon its current policies for a more rational foreign policy. Since American voters elected Trump, Americans themselves need to do a reckoning for their country and elect leaders who truly believe in the “America First” motto and think more sensibly. Otherwise, even if they do not realize it, their country is sliding downhill rapidly.

If this trend continues, the American era will end much earlier. Assuming the U.S. emerged as a superpower in 1945, its hegemony would not even last a hundred years. No hegemon lends its power to another country for free, alienates its friends, conducts arbitrary invasions, or hands state power to leaders who are blackmailed, have a dark past, and are incompetent.

U

nited Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia reported new drone-related security incidents on Sunday, highlighting rising regional tensions as diplomatic efforts to end the war involving Iran remain deadlocked.

Emirati officials said a drone strike caused a fire at the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant, while Saudi Arabia announced it had intercepted three drones entering from Iraqi airspace.

The incidents came as U.S. President Donald Trump intensified pressure on Iran, warning that Tehran must move quickly toward a deal with Washington.

“For Iran, the Clock is Ticking,” Trump wrote on Truth Social. “They better get moving, FAST.”

UAE investigates strike near nuclear facility

According to Emirati authorities, the drone that penetrated air defenses struck an electrical generator outside the inner perimeter of the Barakah nuclear facility. Officials said there were no injuries and no release of radioactive material.

The UAE defense ministry stated that two additional drones were intercepted successfully after approaching from the country’s “western border,” though officials did not specify who launched them.

The UAE’s Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation later confirmed that the plant remained safe and fully secure.

The International Atomic Energy Agency said emergency diesel generators were supplying power to one reactor unit and called for “maximum military restraint” around nuclear sites.

Emirati officials condemned the attack as a dangerous escalation and warned the country reserved the right to respond against those responsible, whether directly or through proxy groups.

Saudi Arabia intercepts drones from Iraq

Saudi Arabia separately announced that its air defenses intercepted three drones entering from Iraqi territory.

Riyadh warned it would take all necessary operational measures to defend its sovereignty and national security.

Since the April ceasefire in the broader Iran conflict, several drones have reportedly been launched from Iraq toward Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

The incidents underscore how regional tensions continue despite the reduction in large-scale hostilities after the ceasefire took effect more than five weeks ago.

The United States is demanding that Iran dismantle its nuclear program and loosen its control over the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most critical energy corridors.

Iran, meanwhile, is seeking compensation for war-related damage, an end to the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports and a halt to fighting across multiple fronts, including clashes involving Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Reuters reported that Trump is expected to meet national security advisers this week to discuss possible military options if diplomacy continues to stall.

Iranian military spokesperson Abolfazl Shekarchi warned that any renewed U.S. military action would trigger “new, aggressive, and surprise scenarios.”

Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baqaei accused the United States and Israel of destabilizing global energy markets through what he described as “unprovoked military aggression.”

Strait of Hormuz remains central to conflict

The continuing disruption in the Strait of Hormuz has contributed to major instability in global oil markets.

Iran has maintained restrictions on shipping traffic through the waterway since the conflict began following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran in February. In response, Washington imposed a blockade on Iranian ports and said it had redirected dozens of commercial vessels to enforce sanctions measures.

Iranian officials said Tehran is preparing a new mechanism to regulate shipping through designated routes in the strait, though details have not yet been released.

Despite ongoing tensions, some diplomatic efforts elsewhere in the region have continued. Israel and Lebanon agreed Friday to extend their ceasefire for another 45 days, although clashes along the border have not fully stopped.

The broader regional conflict has already caused thousands of deaths in Iran and Lebanon and continues to threaten international energy supplies and maritime security across the Gulf.

(Source: Reuters)

S

ince the war began on February 28, the US administration has suffered from profound strategic blindness in assessing the crisis between Washington and Tehran. This is particularly evident in its misjudgement of Iran’s strategic resilience and decision-making mechanisms. Washington continues to formulate strategy based on a flawed analogy with Venezuela, one entirely detached from on-the-ground realities, just as with its decapitation strategy aimed at regime change in Iran.

The idea that President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance see Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf as similar to Venezuela’s pragmatic politician Delcy Rodríguez and believe he could be pressured to negotiate is wishful thinking. In reality, however, the final decision-making authority in Iran does not lie with civilians or individual politicians. Rather, it is the exclusive preserve of a rigid military-security core consolidated around the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

This new hegemonic elite, which includes Kalibaf, is firmly committed to the fundamental ideological tenets of the Islamic Republic. The idea that individuals like Kalibaf could transcend military tutelage, alter Iran’s strategic trajectory, and become negotiating partners is a delusion on Washington’s part. This notion disregards the regime’s decision-making structure.

At the heart of the current impasse between Washington and Tehran is the asymmetry between the U.S.’s coercive approach to diplomacy and Iran’s survival priorities. The Trump administration’s classic “carrot-and-stick” approach, based on the assumption that every actor will yield at a certain cost, is ineffective against Tehran. The issues that the US brings to the negotiating table—the right to enrich uranium in its nuclear program, ballistic missile capabilities, regional proxy forces, and freedom of movement in the Strait of Hormuz—are not negotiable for Tehran.

The Iranian leadership interprets American demands that would undermine these existential pillars as a call for surrender. Tehran is prepared to bear enormous economic and military costs rather than yield to these demands because simply surviving American pressure is a victory in itself. As long as both sides persist in their mutual illusion of self-confidence—believing that their gains on the ground have forced the other side to make concessions and that the other side has suffered more damage from this crisis than they have—the formation of a credible basis for diplomatic agreement seems highly unlikely.

The ‘neither war nor peace’ dilemma and the naval blockade

The Trump administration’s decision to extend the ceasefire was not a quest for peace but a strategy of attrition aimed at altering the nature of the conflict in the US’s favor. Tehran perceives the indefinite extension of the ceasefire while the de facto naval blockade against Iran continues as the worst-case scenario, which is intended to gradually erode its strategic capabilities. Iran rejects this state of suspension — this “neither war nor peace” limbo. A report in The Wall Street Journal on April 28 detailed Donald Trump’s directive for an expanded naval blockade aimed at choking off Iran’s oil exports. This indicates that the crisis has not subsided, but rather been tactically recalibrated. However, according to Iran’s strategic community, this move is a psychological delaying tactic designed to create the illusion that active hostilities have ended. This would weaken the country’s security mechanisms and pave the way for a surprise US-Israeli attack.

Conversely, the belief that Washington could force Iran to submit through a naval blockade is as misguided as expecting regime change. Iran has developed asymmetric resistance against economic sanctions for decades, so a naval blockade is not just another routine embargo for them; it is a declaration of war waged through other means. Therefore, from Iran’s perspective, the current situation is not a de-escalation, but rather the beginning of an escalation phase that will, sooner or later, trigger a more intense wave of asymmetric conflict. Iran will not confine its response to its own waters but will spread the cost across the global system.

Although its conventional navy has largely been destroyed, the DMO has built a massive, asymmetric “mosquito fleet” in the Strait of Hormuz. This fleet comprises hundreds of low-cost speedboats, unmanned systems, and advanced sea mines, such as the Maham series. Rather than focusing on controlling the strait, this structure enables Iran to block rivals’ access and retain the leverage to provoke a crisis in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, as well as the Strait of Hormuz, should the blockade intensify.

The nuclear paradox and the new security architecture

Military action is also far from resolving the structural issues between the US and Iran. Attacks by the U.S. and Israel targeting missile or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) facilities in the region only temporarily reduce capacity. This tactic, known in military literature as “mowing the grass,” does not permanently eliminate the threat. Iran’s military infrastructure is deeply integrated into the geography and relies largely on domestic production, so it can be rapidly replenished.

Furthermore, the maximum military and economic pressure being applied has created an extremely dangerous paradox regarding the nuclear program. Rather than deterring Iran from its nuclear objectives, the growing existential threat and successive conflicts are reinforcing the belief in nuclear armament within the DMO. In the eyes of Iranian decision-makers, achieving nuclear capability is no longer merely desirable; it is now viewed as an indispensable guarantee of the regime’s survival.

Looking back at the recent past, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei presented a pragmatic profile despite being an ideological leader. He possessed the flexibility to reach a nuclear agreement with the Obama administration and was cautious enough to avoid risks while responding to the period following October 7, 2023, and the direct Israeli attacks in 2024. However, with his death, this delicate balance vanished, giving rise to an Iran that is far more unpredictable and dangerous to regional security. Terminating the 2015 Nuclear Agreement (JCPOA) without a concrete alternative was a major political blunder rather than a strategic move. This move removed international restrictions and monitoring mechanisms on Iran, creating an opportunity for the regime to expand its nuclear capabilities.

As a result, Iran has increased its uranium enrichment level from 3.67 percent to 60 percent, shortened the time needed to acquire a nuclear weapon from one year to a few weeks, and effectively become a “nuclear threshold state.” For Iran, 90 percent enrichment is now a matter of choice, not capability. Since crossing the technological critical threshold, Iran has the ability to process its existing stockpile of 440 kilograms of enriched uranium to the final stage in small-scale facilities. Completely halting the nuclear program by military means would require a ground operation that is virtually impossible in the current situation.

Inevitable escalation

The gap between Iran’s unwavering stance and the US’s minimum acceptable limits is so wide that diplomatic efforts have devolved into mutual accusations rather than compromise. There is no credible way out, nor any room for flexibility, to defuse the tension. Washington’s reliance on sanctions and temporary military interventions, dubbed “mowing the lawn,” is insufficient to resolve this strategic impasse.

Consequently, unless Washington scales back its maximalist objectives or Iran fundamentally alters its security approach, this spiral of coercive pressure will yield neither compromise nor capitulation. This scenario, in which no sustainable diplomatic solution exists, is more likely to usher in a far more destructive phase of conflict. In this phase, costs would be spread across the global system through asymmetric means, transcending borders and rendering predictability entirely lost. This phase would be far worse than simply plunging the parties into a conventional war of attrition.

(Originally published in Turkish by Middle East Africa)

W

hile nuclear negotiations between the U.S. and Iran were ongoing, the U.S.-Israel-Iran War began with Israel’s attack on Iran, which received a green light from Trump. This attack occurred just as it had on June 13, 2025, and continued with U.S. participation. For the time being, the war has come to an end with the 15-day ceasefire declared on April 8. This ceasefire occurred because Iran administration survived despite the human casualties and damage to its infrastructure in the war. Iran simultaneously struck Israel with ballistic missiles, spreading the war to Gulf states and closing the Strait of Hormuz. Iran achieved a relative balance of power. One of the reasons for the ceasefire on the US side is Trump’s unwillingness to bear further costs.

Shortly after the ceasefire was declared on April 8, the U.S. and Iranian negotiation delegations met in Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital. They left Islamabad without reaching an agreement due to failing to find common ground on the conditions put forward by both sides. However, they did agree to maintain the ceasefire. However, both sides declared their resolve to return to war should no agreement be reached.

While both the US and Iran appear to agree on not prolonging the 40-day war, Israel—which initiated the war and drew the US into it—does not want to end the war or see an agreement between the US and Iran. This is because Israel has yet to achieve its objectives against Iran. Although Israel has stated that it will comply with the ceasefire, its approach to the process has unfortunately rendered the ceasefire exceedingly fragile. Israel’s stance complicates any potential agreement requiring the US to act contrary to Israel’s interests and concerns.

Just as Israel has pitted the US against Iran through its sustained campaign over the years, it does not wish for this war to end without securing maximum benefit from the situation. In other words, it wants to bring about internal turmoil or regime change that would lead to Iran’s fragmentation. To this end, Israel is attempting to poison the negotiations and render any potential agreement impossible by utilizing all its influence and power over the US administration.

Israel’s negative stance toward ceasefires is not limited to those between the U.S. and Iran. In fact, even the ceasefire with Lebanon, secured under US pressure, holds no significance for Israel. While appearing to have reached an agreement with Lebanon, Israel continues its attacks under the pretext of Hezbollah. Consequently, it is evident that Israel cannot accept ceasefires in Iran and Lebanon and is therefore trying to break them and return to war.

This study will examine Israel’s attempts to undermine ceasefires in the region separately for the Iranian and Lebanese fronts. In the conclusion, an attempt will be made to explain what Israel aims to achieve through these moves.

Israel’s approach to the ceasefire between the US and Iran

The justifications Israel cited for initiating the war against Iran are the same as those it is now citing to violate the ceasefire and, if possible, prevent an agreement from being reached. Yet, over the course of the 40-day war, it has become clear that nearly all of the claims Israel made regarding the Iranian regime were false.

Most notably, the claims that Iran was on the verge of possessing a nuclear weapon were baseless. This reinforces the argument that Israel made this claim solely to initiate the conflict. Claims that the Iranian people would not support the regime and that the regime would collapse if the religious leader were killed have also been proven false. It has also come to light that Israel deceived Trump on this matter.

However, despite all these facts, Israel continues to demonize Iran by claiming that it has the potential to acquire nuclear weapons and plans to eliminate first Israel, then the United States, and rest of West; in doing so, it seeks to prevent the establishment of mutual trust and to block any agreement with what it portrays as such an “enemy of civilization.”

Israel has done more than circulate these narratives to undermine the ceasefire. It has also pressured Trump and his administration through the Jewish lobby in the U.S. While doing so, Israel has enlisted the support of Jewish senators and members of the House of Representatives in the U.S. Congress, including senators like Lindsey Graham, who is funded by the Jewish lobby. Israel has used these tactics to persuade Trump to break the ceasefire and return to war.

Israel’s most significant assets in sabotaging negotiations with Iran have been Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, both of whom were part of the U.S. negotiating delegation. Both of these Jewish figures have close ties to the Israeli government and Netanyahu. As with the process of securing the ceasefire in Gaza, this pair relayed all discussions to Netanyahu and took no steps without his approval. Following the February 26 negotiations, Witkoff stated that “everything was on track and we could now move on to technical matters.” However, after the outbreak of war on February 28, he attempted to exonerate Israel, which initiated the war, by spreading the lie that “the Iranian delegation threatened them by claiming to possess 400 kilograms of enriched uranium and the ability to produce at least 11 nuclear bombs during the final negotiations,” thereby seeking to legitimize the war.

For this reason, the Iranian side announced that they would not accept Witkoff as head of the U.S. negotiating delegation and preferred Vice President J.D. Vance instead. Consequently, Vance chaired the negotiations in Islamabad. However, Israel did not remain idle during this process. According to media reports, Vance spoke with Netanyahu by telephone during the negotiations to convey Iran’s proposals. The negotiations stalled due to Netanyahu’s negative stance.

As can be seen, while Israel seeks to both undermine the ceasefire and prevent a potential agreement by portraying Iran as an unreliable actor, on the other hand, through its mouthpieces in the U.S. media, it has published analyses claiming that the ceasefire was a mistake, that an agreement with Iran would strengthen Iran and damage U.S. prestige, and that the best option is for the U.S. to bring Iran to heel through the use of force. Not content with this, Israel has sought to influence the U.S. public and exert pressure on the Trump administration’s decisions by mobilizing all institutions of the Jewish lobby.

The impossible ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon

Although the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, which began on November 27, 2024, is technically still in place, it is highly unlikely to be upheld due to Hezbollah’s involvement in the conflict on Iran’s behalf since March 2. Israel had also frequently violated the ceasefire, carrying out attacks—particularly in Beirut’s Dahiye district and southern regions beyond the Litani River—under the pretext of targeting Hezbollah. However, with Hezbollah’s intervention in the war, the ceasefire has officially ceased to exist.

From March 2 until the 10-day ceasefire was announced on April 17 following talks held on April 14 under U.S. facilitation and hosting, Israel used Hezbollah as usual and, following the ground operation that began on March 16, established an 8–10-kilometer buffer zone in southern Lebanon. Consequently, by the time the ceasefire took effect, Israel had occupied approximately % 6 of Lebanese territory and refused to allow the return of Lebanese civilians forcibly evacuated from the area.

One of the preconditions for the ceasefire between the US and Iran was that Israel cease its attacks on Lebanon. However, due to Israel’s continued attacks, the Lebanon issue was deemed outside the scope of the US-Iran ceasefire. Nevertheless, at Trump’s insistence, the Israeli and Lebanese ambassadors were brought together in Washington to declare a ceasefire. Trump then prohibited Israel from attacking Lebanon. Although Israel did not take this ban seriously, Iran’s demand was ultimately met.

However, since the Lebanese government and army were unable to disarm Hezbollah as assigned under the ceasefire, Israel continues its attacks on the pretext that the necessary conditions have not been met.

Despite these setbacks, on April 24, before the ceasefire period expired, the Israeli and Lebanese ambassadors met again in Washington under the leadership of U.S. Secretary of State Rubio. At a ceremony attended by Trump and Vance, they announced that the ceasefire had been extended for an additional three weeks more.

While the continuation of the ceasefire is positive, Israel’s occupation of Lebanese territory persists, and Hezbollah has stated that it will continue to fight Israel. Thus, the ceasefire appears likely to remain on paper only. Indeed, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam has stated that Lebanon will not agree to a final settlement unless Israel ends its occupation of Lebanese territory. Meanwhile, it has been leaked to the media that Trump plans to sign a peace agreement in Washington within approximately a month, with Netanyahu and Lebanese President Aoun in attendance. However, as long as Israel continues to attack Lebanon and attempt to provoke a civil war by pitting Hezbollah against other ethnic and sectarian groups, this seems unlikely to materialize.

Consequently, since Israel has not yet achieved its objectives regarding Iran, it is trying to undermine the ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran to keep the war going. Although Israel appears to have agreed to a ceasefire in Lebanon on paper, it is continuing its attacks under the pretext of Hezbollah. Israel is also attempting to establish a permanent presence in the territories it has occupied. As long as Israel maintains its current policy, neither a ceasefire nor lasting peace in the region will be possible.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

F

ollowing Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz on 28 February 2026, in response to attacks launched by Israel and the US against Iran, the impact of this conflict was clearly felt in the global economy. Even in its early stages, it was evident that the effects would extend beyond the regional level. The closure of this waterway, through which 20 per cent of the world’s oil is transported, caused the price of Brent crude, at around $72 on 27 February, to rise to $110 by the end of April.

Disruptions to the transit of not only oil and liquefied natural gas, but also numerous other commercial goods, have sparked widespread concern about the future. For example, news reports disseminated to the global public via mainstream media have highlighted the expectation that fertilisers unable to reach their destination ports in the aftermath of the outbreak of war will visibly impact the agricultural sector, and consequently food production.

Beyond the commercial goods transported through the Strait of Hormuz, war risk premiums, which previously stood at 0.25 per cent, have risen to 3 per cent, which is a significant additional cost for companies conducting maritime operations in the region. Consequently, the commercial environment in the region has a bleak outlook for everyone in the short term. While all these developments remain in the spotlight, potential scenarios involving Iran closing the Bab el-Mandeb Strait as a second geopolitical trump card after the Strait of Hormuz are also being discussed. Iran is said not to have fully deployed its proxy forces on the ground in the early days of the war.

Given the likelihood of such an event being reinforced by statements from Iranian officials such as Ali Hezriyan, a member of the National Security Commission of the Iranian Parliament, it is important to examine the potential influences on the situation, considering the strait’s current position in global trade and the valuable assets in its vicinity.

The geopolitical importance of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a narrow waterway connecting the Gulf of Aden with the Red Sea. Alongside the Suez Canal, it has gained undeniable importance in global maritime trade. This strait is an essential route for travel from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean, and it currently hosts a significant proportion of maritime transport between Asia and Europe. Situated in the southern Red Sea, this 36-kilometer-wide passage is bordered on the eastern side by Yemen and on the western side by the coasts of Eritrea and Djibouti.

Iran’s strategic influence over the strait is exercised through its key proxy in Yemen, the Houthis. This week, Hezriyan stated that the Houthis had completed drills for closing the strait and that, should this occur, non-hostile vessels would have to choose between paying an additional 30 million dollars to circumnavigate the strait or paying 5 million dollars to the Houthis for safe passage.

Should it materialize, there is no doubt that the economic repercussions of such an initiative would engulf the entire world, much like the Hormuz crisis. For this reason, it is crucial to assess the actors involved in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and analyze the balance of power there. The Houthis, Iran’s proxy in Yemen, are the most prominent factor in the current landscape, given the possibility of closing the strait to traffic. According to UN estimates, the number of Houthi fighters increased from 220,000 in 2022 to 350,000 by 2024.

The Houthis can be defined as part of the resistance axis, which Iran has devoted significant effort and resources to in order to counter the Israel–US partnership, or the Zionist alliance, which constitutes the primary threat to Iran in the Middle East. Through this connection, Iran gains the ability to control the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb, and consequently Red Sea traffic, despite having no land or maritime borders with the region.

The Chinese military base in Djibouti

Alongside these familiar regional actors, another noteworthy factor is the Chinese military base in Djibouti. While the People’s Republic of China has no other overseas military bases, in 2017 it made a significant financial investment to establish its first overseas military base at the heart of the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb. It is understood that activities related to aviation and space operations are also conducted at this base.

Taking into account all these actors, as well as all international military activity in the region, including the Turkish military base in Mogadishu, despite its distance from the strait, it is possible to draw the following conclusion. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait has emerged as the next focus of the Hormuz crisis, part of the war that began between the US/Israel and Iran on 28 February 2026, and is of great significance not only to the course and outcome of this war, but also appears set to be one of the region’s most discussed topics in the coming years, even outside the context of the war.

Yemen, a country situated in a strategic position overlooking the strait and serving as a stage for Iran’s sphere of influence, whilst also hosting the UAE’s military presence (the UAE maintains close ties with Israel), has long been plagued by instability. The rare strategic presence of a distant country such as China in this region, alongside Ethiopia’s intense efforts to secure a direct link to the Red Sea amidst high tensions in its relations with neighbors and the concurrent trajectory of the rivalry between Eritrea and Djibouti with that of regional powers, all appear set to dominate the global agenda for some time, alongside the Middle East and East Africa.

(This article was originally published by the Middle East and Africa website in Turkish)

I

n late April, Istanbul hosted the Muslim Impact Forum, bringing together political figures, civil society leaders, and organisations from across dozens of countries. Framed as a platform for collaboration, the forum aimed to confront a recurring challenge: how can a fragmented global Muslim landscape respond more effectively to shared political, social, and humanitarian pressures?

It is a question that has become increasingly urgent. From ongoing conflicts in parts of the Muslim world to rising anti-Muslim sentiment in Western societies, the pressures are both external and internal. Against this backdrop, the forum positioned itself not simply as a space for dialogue, but as an attempt to build coordination.

The presence of senior Turkish officials reflected an effort to bridge political leadership with civil society initiatives. Mehmet Şimşek, Türkiye’s Minister of Treasury and Finance, set a high-level tone for the assembly by framing the current geopolitical turbulence as a “new normal” defined by polarization and trade fragmentation.

The macro-vision: Regional integration and the trust deficit

For Şimşek, the solution to this global instability is structural and proactive. “Can we invest in regional integration as an antidote against fragmentation?” he asked, highlighting that the world is currently suffering from a significant “trust deficit”. By positioning Türkiye as a mediator and an advocate for new trade and energy corridors, Şimşek’s address provided the macroeconomic framework for the forum’s goals: transforming sectarian and ethnic diversity into a “source of richness” rather than a cause for “perpetual conflict”.

Yet the central question remains: can such gatherings move beyond conversation? In an interview on the sidelines of the forum, Humza Yousaf, former First Minister of Scotland, framed the moment in stark terms. “Forums like this are needed now more than ever before,” he said, pointing to the “extremely difficult situations” facing Muslim communities globally.

“How do we use all of the energy, talent, money and expertise that we have as a collective Ummah, not just to solve our problems, but to make the world better for all of humanity?” For Yousaf, the issue is not a lack of capacity, but a failure to act collectively. The distinction matters: representation alone does not guarantee impact. Without access to decision-making power, presence can remain symbolic.

That diagnosis was echoed by Aazim Kidwai, director of the forum, who described fragmentation as the defining challenge. “We see Muslims fragmented. We see organizations all doing their own thing,” he said. Rather than proposing new structures, the forum’s approach is to connect existing actors, on the assumption that cooperation is already possible, but not yet realized.

The Internal Architecture: Dismantling Ego and Fear

At the core of this approach is a simple but often elusive concept: trust. While Minister Şimşek identified the “trust deficit” as a global barrier, Kidwai noted its impact on an organizational level: “When people have trust, then they sign up to work together”. Partnerships announced during the forum were presented as early steps in that direction, though the durability of such initiatives remains shaped by competing interests and institutional rivalries.

If fragmentation is widely acknowledged, its causes are less often addressed openly. Kidwai pointed to two factors that repeatedly undermine cooperation: ego and fear. “Organisations often want to retain things in their own name… their own brand,” he said. “And there’s also fear, that if they step back, someone else will take over”.

These are not purely organisational issues. They reflect deeper structural dynamics—competition for visibility, funding, and influence—that shape how institutions operate. Yousaf added that to overcome these, “We have to encourage excellence in our young people… to take leadership positions with confidence”.

The significance of the forum will ultimately be measured not by the prestige of its attendees, but by its follow-through. Grand visions of “Middle Corridors” and high-tech integration are essential, yet they remain fragile blueprints. The real test is whether the partnerships announced in Istanbul can survive the transition from the conference hall to the boardroom. The Muslim Impact Forum reflects a growing, urgent awareness that isolated responses are no longer sufficient in a polarized world. However, as the insights from Yousaf and Kidwai suggest, the “skeleton” of infrastructure cannot move without a nervous system of trust.

If global Muslim leadership is to move from conversation to coordination, it must do more than build roads and railways; it must dismantle the internal architecture of ego and fear. Only then can the “trust deficit” be bridged, turning a moment of dialogue into a movement of impact.

H

ow is the Ukraine-Russia War going? Who has suffered what losses? Which country is in the stronger position? Is Russia close to victory? Is Ukraine definitely losing? So many years have passed since the war began, and we still do not know…

There is a war between the US-Israel coalition and Iran; what is the situation for each side? How heavy are America’s losses? What is the situation in Israel? Is Iran losing? What is the capacity of the parties to continue the war? Ismail Kaani; has he betrayed Iran, been executed, fled to Israel, or is he still in his post in his country and fighting? Who attacked the girls’ school in Iran? Why are Trump and his team now denying the attack they initially admitted to? Did Iran fire missiles at neighbouring countries, or is it all a Mossad ploy to expand the front?

Once again, attempts are being made to sow seeds of discord between Turkey and Azerbaijan. There is a desire for the war to spread to encompass all countries in the region, and disinformation is being churned out ceaselessly.

It is possible to extend these events and questions to all wars and conflicts. But is it ever possible to obtain the true answers in all their stark reality?

The battle for communication during war

Our region has long been shaped by intense geopolitical tensions, wars, conflicts, proxy wars, civil wars and various forms of inter-state competition. One of the most fundamental challenges facing the public during such periods is the issue of access to reliable information. In an environment where conflicts are taking place, a significant portion of the news, images and commentary circulating are often not merely neutral accounts of events; they are also fragments of information produced, selected, framed or distorted in line with specific strategic objectives.

This situation is directly linked to the nature of modern warfare. This is because contemporary wars involve not only battles fought on physical fronts—such as space, air, land and sea—where military units confront one another, but also a comprehensive communication struggle aimed at shaping public perceptions.

In this context, the information domain has become just as significant as the military dimension of war. States, armed groups, intelligence services, international actors and, in some cases, even private communications companies seek to influence the production and circulation of information in conflict environments. The primary aim of these efforts extends far beyond merely influencing rival military forces; it targets a much broader audience.

Various objectives, such as undermining the morale of rival societies, boosting the morale of one’s own society, gaining the support of the international public, generating diplomatic legitimacy, and obscuring military failures, lie at the heart of these communication activities. Consequently, a significant portion of the information circulating during wartime functions as strategic communication tools.

Historically, it is evident that propaganda and psychological operations have been an integral part of modern states’ war strategies. Propaganda bureaus established in Europe and America during the First World War developed systematic communication techniques to mobilise public opinion. During this process, the communication tools of the era—such as newspapers, posters, cinema and radio—were utilised extensively. Subsequently, during the Second World War and the Cold War, propaganda techniques became even more institutionalised, and states’ communication strategies became an integral part of military doctrine. Today, digital communication technologies have made this process far more complex and rapid.

The impact of evolving communication

The emergence of social media platforms, in particular, has dramatically increased the speed and volume of information circulation during times of war. Whilst information reaches the public via specific editorial processes in traditional media systems, these filtering mechanisms appear to have weakened significantly in the digital environment. Social media algorithms operate not according to criteria of accuracy or reliability, but according to the logic of the ‘attention economy’. This leads to content that is emotionally striking, dramatic or provokes anger spreading much more rapidly. Consequently, the flow of information the public faces during periods of war is not only intense but also highly irregular and difficult to verify.

Another significant reason for the spread of false or distorted information in conflict environments is military secrecy and information control. A significant portion of actual data regarding military operations is naturally classified or restricted. States do not share operational details for security reasons, and the information presented to the public is often filtered to some extent. This situation creates a breeding ground for speculation to fill the gaps. At the same time, the parties to the conflict may be inclined to exaggerate their own successes, inflate their opponents’ losses, or downplay their own losses. Such rhetorical strategies have been frequently observed throughout military history and have become far more visible with the advent of modern communication technologies.

The development of digital technologies has also significantly expanded the technical scope of information manipulation. Image editing software, AI-assisted video production techniques, and visual material taken out of context have introduced new tools that make it difficult to assess the accuracy of war reporting. For example, footage from an old conflict may be presented as evidence of a new incident, or a video filmed in a different geographical location may be linked entirely to a different event. When such content spreads rapidly, particularly on social media, it can provoke strong emotional reactions among the public. However, subsequent verification efforts may reveal that the context of this content is incorrect.

Today, many people believe they are watching wars almost in real time. Footage shot on mobile phones, social media posts and live news feeds create the impression that conflicts are being followed directly and without interruption. Yet this is largely an illusion. The content the public sees is often narratives produced about the events rather than the events themselves. These narratives are presented within specific frames and lead the viewer to perceive the event from a particular perspective. Consequently, there is a significant difference between the war itself and the way it is represented in the media.

It is observed that narratives produced during periods of conflict generally take shape around specific patterns. Whilst narratives of heroism and resistance are highlighted on one side, themes of victimhood and human drama may be emphasised on the other. Furthermore, discourses portraying the opposing side as entirely irrational, barbaric or inhuman are also widely used. Such narrative patterns may be repeated in state propaganda apparatus, individual social media posts and the news language of certain media organisations. This is because people often find it easier to accept and share information that aligns with their own identities, political views, or emotional inclinations.

Information in times of war

Under all these conditions, the fundamental problem faced by ordinary citizens is an epistemological one. In other words, the issue is not merely knowing which information is true, but understanding how to access accurate information. In conflict zones, it is often impossible to arrive at absolute truths. Obtaining definitive information regarding military developments, diplomatic negotiations and the actual situation on the ground usually takes time. The true scale of many events may only become apparent months or years later. For this reason, it is important to avoid definitive judgements and to develop a certain intellectual caution when approaching information during times of war.

To make a more informed assessment of information in such an environment, certain methods can be employed. Firstly, comparing different sources is of great importance. Relying on a single media source can lead to a significant narrowing of perspective, particularly when international conflicts are involved. Comparing news reports from media organizations in different countries allows one to see how events are presented within different frameworks. Furthermore, reports from independent research institutions, academic analyses and open-source intelligence studies can also assist in making a more balanced assessment.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

W

hen Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan says he does not want to see “a new conflict in the Horn of Africa,” he is not making a throwaway remark about a distant region. He is speaking after high-level talks in Addis Ababa and phone calls that range from Abu Dhabi to Mogadishu, at a moment when Red Sea tensions, Ethiopia’s search for sea access and Somalia’s first offshore drilling project are all converging. I don’t read this as a routine diplomatic line. To me, it is a sign that, for Ankara, stability from Ethiopia to Somalia has become a strategic test of its broader foreign policy narrative.

Over the last few years, Türkiye has steadily expanded its footprint along the Red Sea–Gulf of Aden corridor. Somalia hosts Turkish trainers, engineers and aid workers. Ethiopia has become one of Ankara’s largest investment destinations on the continent. Sudan, Djibouti and even Eritrea now enter Turkish debates about sea lanes, energy routes and security risks. Erdoğan’s latest message simply makes explicit what policy choices have already been saying quietly: the Horn of Africa is no longer a side file.

That matters because the region sits at the intersection of several fires at once. Civil war in Sudan, unresolved tensions inside Ethiopia, maritime insecurity in the Red Sea and the persistent threat of al-Shabaab in Somalia all blur into one another. For a country that sees itself as both a regional stabilizer and a rising middle power, ignoring this arc of instability is not really an option.

From a “Somalia file” to a regional vision

Türkiye’s entry point into the Horn of Africa was Somalia. What began as humanitarian aid during the 2011 famine turned into a long-term relationship that combines military training, infrastructure projects, and political support. Ankara built roads, hospitals and schools in Mogadishu, opened an embassy when many others stayed away and later established a major military training base to support Somali forces fighting al-Shabaab.

Over time, this “Somalia file” stopped being just about one fragile state. Turkish diplomats and security officials increasingly framed it as part of a wider picture that stretches from the Suez Canal to the Indian Ocean. Turkish Airlines routes, port projects and naval deployments all reflect the same logic: what happens around the Bab el-Mandeb strait and the Gulf of Aden directly affect Türkiye’s trade, energy security and diaspora connections.

As Ethiopia’s leadership began to talk more openly about its need for sea access, and as Sudan’s war threatened to fragment another coastal state, Ankara’s calculus shifted again. It was no longer enough to work only with Mogadishu. Relations with Addis Ababa deepened around investment, defense cooperation and discussions on how Ethiopia could secure access to ports without triggering a wider conflict. The message coming out of Erdoğan’s meetings has been consistent: any solution on sea access should be based on regional consensus, not unilateral moves that risk pulling everyone into a crisis.

This is happening in a crowded field. The United States, Gulf countries, Egypt, the European Union and China all have their own military bases, port concessions and political projects in and around the Horn. Türkiye is not the biggest player in terms of money or firepower. Its difference lies in what it is not: it has no colonial history in the region; it presents itself as a partner from the Global South and it speaks the language of both security and development at the same time.

Security that tries to reduce, not export, risk

Erdoğan’s Horn of Africa message is rooted in very concrete security concerns. Ethiopia is still managing the aftershocks of internal conflicts. Sudan’s civil war threatens to spill over into Chad, South Sudan, and the Red Sea. Eritrea remains a closed but influential actor. In Somalia, al-Shabaab has not disappeared, even as security forces have made gains. Across the water, Yemen’s conflict and Houthi attacks on shipping lanes have turned the Red Sea into a zone of permanent alert.

In such an environment, escalation rarely stays local. A border clash between Ethiopia and a coastal neighbor, a miscalculation in Sudan or a major attack on shipping could quickly draw in Gulf states, Western navies and regional rivals. Trade routes, energy flows and migration patterns would all feel the shock.

Türkiye’s answer has been to invest in local capacity rather than posture as a front-line power. In Somalia, Turkish officers train army and police units, while naval forces contribute to anti-piracy and maritime security missions. The aim is to help local institutions stand on their feet, not to replace them. The same logic applies to Ethiopia and Sudan, where Ankara stresses respect for territorial integrity and advocates political dialogue even as it supplies equipment and technical support.

From Ankara’s perspective, stability in the Horn is tied directly to its own security. New refugee flows, disrupted shipping in the Red Sea, or the spread of extremist networks would quickly reach the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond. At the same time, a more stable Horn offers opportunities: safer trade corridors, energy cooperation with Somalia, and a friendlier environment for Turkish investment in Ethiopia and Sudan.

Ports, planes and people-to-people ties

Security is only part of the equation. The Horn of Africa has also become an economic and diplomatic laboratory for Türkiye. Turkish companies are active in ports, construction and logistics projects, seeking a role in upgrading infrastructure that links landlocked states to global markets. Every port concession, every logistics hub has a dual meaning: commercial opportunity and geopolitical leverage.

For a middle power with limited resources, every naval mission, every training base and every trade deal has to serve more than one purpose. A presence in Mogadishu is not only about counterterrorism; it is also about giving Turkish firms a foothold in a market that others have long ignored. Investment in Ethiopian manufacturing is not only about cheap labor; it supports a political partnership that Ankara hopes will last through leadership changes on both sides.

Soft power runs alongside these hard interests. Scholarship programs bring Ethiopian and Somali students to Turkish universities. Development agencies support health, education and agriculture projects in remote areas. Turkish NGOs operate clinics and schools that often outlast news cycles. In quiet times, these efforts build goodwill. In moments of crisis, they provide channels to actors who do not always sit at official tables.

P

resident Donald Trump has rejected Iran’s latest proposal to end the two-month war, according to a U.S. official, dealing a setback to already fragile diplomatic efforts and raising concerns over prolonged disruptions to global energy markets.

The proposal, delivered by Iranian officials through regional intermediaries, reportedly seeks to postpone negotiations over Tehran’s nuclear program until after a ceasefire is achieved and maritime disputes in the Gulf are resolved. But Washington has insisted that any agreement to end the conflict must address Iran’s nuclear activities from the outset.

A U.S. official familiar with internal discussions said Trump was dissatisfied with the plan because it sidelines the nuclear issue, a long-standing point of contention between the two countries. “The president has been clear about the need to deal with nuclear concerns early in any negotiation,” the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

The White House declined to comment directly on the proposal. A spokesperson said the United States “will not negotiate through the press” and reiterated that Washington’s red lines remain unchanged as it seeks to bring the conflict to an end.

Iran’s plan

The war, which began in February with U.S. and Israeli strikes targeting Iranian assets, has killed thousands and severely disrupted oil shipments through the Gulf, a critical artery for global energy supplies. The conflict has also added upward pressure on inflation worldwide, as oil prices continue to rise amid constrained flows.

Iran’s plan, according to sources familiar with the discussions, envisions a phased approach to negotiations. The first stage would involve halting hostilities and securing guarantees that the United States would not resume military action. This would be followed by talks on lifting a U.S. naval blockade and restoring normal shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important oil transit routes.

Only after these steps would negotiations turn to broader issues, including Iran’s nuclear program. Tehran has long maintained that its nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes and continues to seek international recognition of its right to enrich uranium.

The U.S. position reflects deep skepticism rooted in the collapse of the Iran nuclear deal, which had imposed strict limits on Iran’s nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief. Trump withdrew from the agreement during his first term, arguing it failed to address broader security concerns, a move that led to escalating tensions in subsequent years.

Diplomatic momentum slowed

Diplomatic momentum appears to have slowed in recent days. Planned talks in Islamabad were called off after the U.S. cancelled a visit by its special envoy, while Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi has continued a series of regional and international meetings aimed at rallying support.

Araqchi travelled to Moscow this week, where he met President Vladimir Putin, securing backing from a key ally. He has also held discussions in Oman and Pakistan as part of ongoing shuttle diplomacy efforts.

Meanwhile, the situation in the Gulf remains tense. Shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has dropped sharply since the conflict began, with only a handful of vessels transiting the waterway in the past day, according to maritime tracking data. Several tankers carrying Iranian oil have reportedly been turned back due to the U.S. blockade, underscoring the war’s impact on global supply chains.

Iran has condemned the seizures of its oil shipments, describing them as acts of “piracy” and warning of consequences if restrictions on its exports continue.

Markets react

Energy analysts say the market is increasingly focused on physical supply disruptions rather than political rhetoric. Reduced tanker traffic and uncertainty over the security of key shipping lanes have driven oil prices higher, with traders closely watching any developments that could signal either escalation or de-escalation.

At home, Trump faces growing political pressure to bring the conflict to a close, as declining approval ratings and rising fuel costs weigh on public sentiment. Iranian officials, for their part, argue that Washington has yet to achieve its stated military objectives and should return to negotiations without preconditions.

With both sides holding firm on core demands, prospects for a near-term breakthrough appear limited. The gap between Washington’s insistence on immediate nuclear concessions and Tehran’s push for a phased process suggests that any resolution to the conflict will require significant compromises — ones that neither side currently appears ready to make.

(Source: Reuters)

G

lobal military expenditure reached a record $2.887 trillion in 2025, marking the 11th consecutive year of growth, as countries responded to heightened geopolitical tensions, ongoing conflicts and long-term security concerns with sustained defense investments. The latest data shows a 2.9 percent increase in real terms compared to 2024, according to newly released figures by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Although the overall growth rate slowed compared to the sharp 9.7 percent rise recorded in 2024, the increase underscores a continued global trend toward rearmament. The deceleration was largely driven by a decline in United States spending, while most other regions recorded substantial gains. Excluding the US, global military expenditure rose by 9.2 percent in 2025.

The combined spending of the world’s top three military powers—the United States, China and Russia—amounted to $1.48 trillion, representing 51 percent of total global expenditure. This concentration highlights the continued dominance of major powers in shaping global defense dynamics.

The global military burden, defined as military spending as a share of gross domestic product (GDP), rose to 2.5 percent, its highest level since 2009. Analysts attribute the sustained increase to persistent insecurity, protracted wars and rising competition among major powers.

Temporary reduction by Washington

Despite remaining the world’s largest military spender, the United States reduced its expenditure by 7.5 percent to $954 billion in 2025. The decline was primarily due to the absence of newly approved military aid packages for Ukraine, contrasting with the $127 billion allocated over the previous three years.

However, the reduction is expected to be temporary. Washington continues to invest heavily in both nuclear and conventional capabilities, with a strategic focus on maintaining military superiority and countering China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Approved spending for 2026 already exceeds $1 trillion and could climb significantly higher in the coming years.

In contrast, Europe saw one of the sharpest increases in military spending, rising by 14 percent to $864 billion. The surge was largely driven by the ongoing war in Ukraine and intensified efforts by NATO members to strengthen defense capabilities and meet updated alliance spending targets.

Russia’s military expenditure grew by 5.9 percent to $190 billion, accounting for 7.5 percent of its GDP. Ukraine, meanwhile, recorded a 20 percent increase, reaching $84.1 billion—equivalent to a staggering 40 percent of its GDP—reflecting the immense cost of sustaining its defense amid the prolonged conflict.

Europe’s NATO members

European NATO members collectively spent $559 billion in 2025, with 22 out of 29 countries meeting or exceeding the alliance’s benchmark of allocating at least 2 percent of GDP to defense. Germany emerged as the largest spender within the group, increasing its budget by 24 percent to $114 billion. This pushed its military burden to 2.3 percent of GDP, surpassing the NATO threshold for the first time since reunification.

Spain also recorded a significant rise, boosting its military expenditure by 50 percent to $40.2 billion, similarly crossing the 2 percent threshold for the first time in decades. Analysts note that this rapid growth reflects both a drive for greater European strategic autonomy and pressure from the United States for increased burden sharing within NATO.

In the Middle East, military spending remained relatively stable at $218 billion, with only a marginal 0.1 percent increase. Israel’s expenditure declined by 4.9 percent to $48.3 billion following a reduction in the intensity of the Gaza genocide after a ceasefire in early 2025. Nonetheless, Israel’s spending remains nearly double its 2022 level.

Türkiye’s military spending

Türkiye’s military budget rose by 7.2 percent to $30 billion, driven partly by its ongoing operations in Iraq, Syria and Somalia. Meanwhile, Iran’s military expenditure fell by 5.6 percent in real terms to $7.4 billion, largely due to high inflation, although actual spending levels may be higher due to off-budget financing mechanisms.

Asia and Oceania recorded the fastest growth in military spending, increasing by 8.1 percent to $681 billion—the region’s largest rise since 2009. China, the world’s second-largest military spender, expanded its budget by 7.4 percent to $336 billion, marking its 31st consecutive annual increase as it continues a long-term military modernization program.

Japan’s military expenditure rose by 9.7 percent to $62.2 billion, reaching 1.4 percent of GDP—the highest level since 1958. Taiwan also posted a significant increase of 14 percent to $18.2 billion amid rising tensions and increased military activity around the island.

Experts suggest that growing uncertainty about US security commitments has prompted allies in the region, including Japan, Australia and the Philippines, to boost their defense spending independently.

I

n the 21st century, wars have begun to take shape not only through purely physical conflicts but also through systems integrated with cognitive, cyber and artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. We can say that modern conflict and battlefields encompass operations targeting information, perception and the human mind, alongside the use of military force. This new form of warfare is referred to in the literature as cognitive warfare. The fundamental objectives of cognitive warfare can be described as influencing the adversary’s decision-making processes, steering the psychology of the target population(s), and weakening political will. NATO’s 2025 Cognitive Warfare report highlights that contemporary conflicts and wars are increasingly behavior-centric, and that the decisive arena is no longer geographical; rather, it is based on the strategic reality of how individuals and groups perceive, interpret, decide and act.

Within this framework, it can be argued that today’s mass media, the increasing use of AI-enabled technologies, and the undeniable influence of social media are effectively forming the new operational front of war. Cognitive warfare extends to social foundations such as trust, shared epistemic standards and institutional legitimacy. From a force development perspective, AI platforms are utilized alongside elements of cognitive warfare, both for threat/attack purposes and as a countermeasure. In other words, techniques that enable enemy influence can also be utilized through reverse engineering to support defensive cognitive security (such as detecting anomalies in influence networks and pattern recognition of coordinated deceptive behavior).

At this stage, whilst neuroscience and neurotechnologies are emerging as tools for influencing the mind by affecting the brain, it can be said that AI platforms have become the primary means of influencing the mind by manipulating the information ecosystem. Consequently, the operational concern is not merely that AI produces persuasive content. It also lies in AI’s ability to: Optimize narratives in real time across all channels, automate social media interaction (using bot or hybrid actor swarms), generate artificial credibility (deepfake videos, fake expert profiles, fabricated evidence), exploit cognitive biases and psychological vulnerabilities (the salience effect, fear conditioning, polarization dynamics).

In this context, cognitive warfare can be regarded as the process of preparing the groundwork prior to a physical attack. In NATO documents, the cognitive domain is discussed as the sixth operational domain following land, sea, air, cyber and space. The tensions between the US and Iran, and particularly the military conflicts of recent years, have clearly demonstrated just how significant cognitive warfare has become in modern war doctrines. As of 28 February, the attacks launched by the US against Iran have involved not only conventional military force but also intensive use of cyberattacks, cognitive warfare integrated with information manipulation, and AI-supported, target-focused strikes. The key question here is: how did the US utilize AI-integrated systems, which combine data-driven targeting with AI-integrated cognitive warfare, as a strategic tool throughout Operation Epic Fury, the offensive launched against Iran?

The use of military artificial intelligence

Military AI encompasses a wide range of systems and tasks. On this basis, we can state that it is fundamentally divided into two main categories: autonomous weapon systems and decision support systems. Autonomous weapon systems have the capability to select and/or engage targets independently. Decision support systems, on the other hand, are regarded as a key focus in the technology-driven structure of many modern armies today. These systems can be considered software applications that provide intelligence and planning information to personnel.

Admiral Brad Cooper, Commander of CENTCOM, stated during the US-Iran conflict that the US military was using AI systems and that AI assisted in data processing, but that final decisions were made by humans. It is known that the US military utilizes AI systems based on large language models (LLMs) for logistics, administrative support, intelligence gathering and analysis, as well as decision support systems on the battlefield. Claude, developed by Anthropic, is cited as an example of a decision support system rather than a weapon.

Claude is integrated into the intelligent system known as Maven, which is widely used by military, intelligence and law enforcement organizations. Maven uses AI algorithms to identify potential targets from satellite and other intelligence data. In this context, Maven accelerates the military’s offensive capabilities by suggesting and prioritizing targets. Whilst these AI systems have a relatively long history, the US military’s ability to utilize them did not emerge overnight. We are also aware that many Iraqi and Afghan civilians lost their lives as a result of analytical errors and cultural biases within the US military.

Most recently, there is strong evidence that the use of AI systems led to a Tomahawk cruise missile striking a girls’ school adjacent to an Iranian base, contributing to the deaths of approximately 175 people, the majority of whom were students. This attack could be interpreted as a failure of US intelligence or as an indiscriminate strike. Indeed, the effective use of automated systems depends on comprehensive infrastructure and personnel capable of operating them. In this context, it is also worth noting that the US’s ability to utilise AI in warfare today is the result of decades of investment and experience.

AI-supported targeting systems in the context of cognitive warfare

In the context of the US–Iran conflict, one of the prominent features of modern warfare is the increasing role of AI-supported decision-making systems in attacks. Applications emerging in active war and conflict zones, particularly in the Middle East, demonstrate the potential consequences of these technologies in terms of both operational effectiveness and ethical responsibility.

Furthermore, the AI systems utilised by the US in its military and intelligence operations against Iran constitute a significant part of this transformation. Systems such as Maven, developed within the US Department of Defence, play a significant role in intelligence analysis concerning Iran’s military infrastructure, nuclear facilities and regional militia networks. In this context, discussions regarding AI-supported target identification systems used in Gaza are important for understanding the cognitive and technological warfare practices that may emerge in future high-intensity geopolitical rivalries such as that between the US and Iran.

The AI system named “Lavender”, used by Israel in Gaza, was developed to identify individuals believed to be linked to Hamas by analysing vast datasets. The system generates a score regarding an individual’s likelihood of being a Hamas member by analysing numerous data points, including telephone data, communication networks, address changes, social connections and intelligence records. However, although it is known that these algorithmic assessments are not definitive and contain a certain margin of error, there is evidence that the lists generated by this system were used in large-scale target identification processes during the first weeks of the war.

Whilst the Lavender system flagged tens of thousands of people as potential targets in the early stages of the war, some military sources have stated that this figure reached approximately 37,000. It emerged that a significant proportion of these individuals were not high-ranking military figures, but rather people of lower rank or with indirect connections.

The ‘Where’s Daddy?’ system, used in conjunction with the Lavender system, is designed to track the locations of designated targets. This system specifically aims to identify the moment the target returns home in order to determine the most opportune time for an attack. The practical consequence of this approach has been that many attacks have taken place in residential properties where the target was present alongside family members. In research, some intelligence officers have noted that military operations are often carried out not whilst individuals are engaged in military activities, but whilst they are at home, and that this leads to an increase in civilian casualties.

Furthermore, it is stated that the use of these systems has significantly lowered the accepted ‘collateral damage’ thresholds in military operations, particularly during the early stages of a conflict. In general, it has been noted that even when targeting a low-ranking militant, a certain number of civilian casualties is deemed acceptable for the operation. This situation forms the basis for serious debates regarding AI-assisted target identification systems, not only in terms of military efficiency but also in relation to international humanitarian law and the ethics of war.

AI-assisted target identification systems and ethics

The ethical debates surrounding AI-assisted target identification systems demonstrate that cognitive warfare affects not only societies’ perceptions but also the mental processes of decision-makers. In this context, the debates surrounding systems such as Lavender and Where’s Daddy, used in Gaza, serve as a significant example for understanding the human–machine relationship and how decision-making processes are transforming in modern warfare. In particular, the fact that these systems classify potential threats by analyzing extensive datasets during target identification processes highlights that the role of human decision-makers on the battlefield is becoming increasingly complex.

From a cognitive warfare perspective, this situation can be viewed not merely as a technological advancement, but also as a factor influencing military personnel’s perceptions, risk assessments and ethical boundaries. Consequently, we can state that the large-scale target identification processes generated by the Lavender system’s lists make a significant contribution to military planning.

However, despite the awareness that algorithmic assessments may contain a high margin of error, data indicates that these outputs are often approved with limited human oversight due to the need for rapid decision-making in operational processes. This situation suggests that recommendations generated by AI could exert a powerful cognitive influence on human decision-makers, leading to the algorithmic output effectively becoming a decision-making mechanism in practice. The fact that the ‘Where’s Daddy’ system focuses specifically on identifying the moments when target individuals return to their homes has resulted in operations frequently taking place in residential areas.

This situation has given rise to significant debates not only from a military strategic perspective but also regarding the ethical dimensions of warfare. Indeed, the fact that target identification processes rely heavily on algorithmic analysis leads military personnel to place greater trust in the recommendations of technological systems when making decisions, which in turn can narrow the scope of human assessment.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

T

he process, which began on 28 February with US and Israeli attacks on Iran and rapidly escalated with Iran’s direct retaliations, is no longer merely a conflict between two sides but has transformed into a war dynamic that has spread across the region. From the very first days of the war, Iraq has been the sole country where the direct and indirect attacks of both the US/Israel axis and Iran have intersected; the country has effectively become the second front of this war. Furthermore, whilst Iraq has become one of the parties that is involved in the war, it also lies at the centre of a multi-layered crisis spiral where military, political and strategic dimensions feed into one another.

It would not be inaccurate to say that the impact of the US/Israel–Iran war on Iraq goes beyond a classic example of a ‘neighboring country being affected’. The emerging picture shows that Iraq has become not only country bearing the consequences of the war but also a terrain where the war is being waged directly. In this sense, it would be appropriate to analyze the dynamics unfolding in Iraq today through the lens of a three-layered reality.

Consequently, in this process, Iraq has transformed into a ‘secondary front’ militarily; strategically, Iran and the US/Israel have begun to wear each other down through its territory; and politically, the Iraqi state has once again demonstrated that it faces sovereignty issues within its own borders. Indeed, from the very first days of the war, the targeting of US bases, diplomatic missions and energy infrastructure, coupled with the rapid development of a high-intensity attack capability by Iran-backed militia networks, has transformed Iraq from a passive spectator into an active theatre of conflict.

Indeed, the decisions taken at the meeting of the Iraqi National Security Council on 24 March, following the attack on the Popular Mobilization Forces headquarters in Anbar on the night of 23 March—in which more than 15 PMF members lost their lives—are noteworthy. In a statement issued after the Iraqi National Security Council meeting, whilst it was emphasized that the state is the sole authority on decisions regarding war and peace, it was also announced that a decision had been taken to respond to attacks against Iraqi security forces—particularly the PMF—within the framework of the “right to legitimate self-defense and retaliation”.

Iraq no longer outside the conflcit

Whilst this decision does not technically constitute a declaration of open war against any state, it demonstrates that Iraq has effectively abandoned its position of remaining outside the conflict. This is because, for the first time on this scale and with this clarity, the state has defined its authority to provide a collective and institutional response to attacks against its own security apparatus. More importantly, rather than interpreting this decision merely as a defensive reflex, it can also be assessed as a step that redefines Iraq’s position within the conflict. Whilst this decision challenges the monopolisation of decisions regarding war and peace by non-state actors, it simultaneously positions the state itself as one of the parties to this conflict.

Although the decisions taken by the Iraqi National Security Council—which include the simultaneous protest against US and Iranian representatives and the expression of preparations to appeal to the United Nations—may indicate that Iraq is attempting to pursue a policy of balance, the reality on the ground is increasingly eroding this balance. In this context, the decision in question reveals that Iraq is positioned not as a ‘declared party’ to the war, but as an actor that has become involved both de facto and institutionally.

Consequently, Iraq has moved beyond being merely a geographical area where conflict is waged, becoming a country directly involved in the dynamics of this war through its own security institutions, political decision-making mechanisms and military reflexes. This marks a new threshold for Iraq; the country’s capacity for neutrality has been replaced by controlled participation and compulsory engagement.

How are the attacks in Iraq taking shape?

Today, the military manifestation of the Israel/US–Iran conflict in Iraq is, in fact, creating a hybrid arena where two distinct models of warfare intersect. The fact that the majority of attacks are carried out using drones and rockets, supplemented by a limited number of ballistic missiles and precision air strikes, indicates that the parties are pursuing a strategy focused on low-cost, sustained pressure that wears down the opposing side’s defence systems, rather than conventional frontline warfare. The war in Iraq is being waged, on the one hand, by actors possessing high-intensity conventional warfare capabilities and, on the other, through proxy networks carrying out low-cost, flexible and deniable attacks.

Within this framework, the Iranian axis seeks to establish territorial pressure through quantity—that is, via intense and dispersed attacks—whilst the US/Israeli axis strives to achieve qualitative superiority through more selective and lethal targets. The methods employed by structures affiliated with or aligned to Iran are aimed at saturating air defence systems, straining reaction times, and creating a constant state of alert to reduce the operational tempo of the opposing side. In contrast, the US-Israel axis’s approach aims to disrupt the integrity of the network by targeting command-and-control nodes, logistics centres and critical infrastructure through intelligence-based targeting.

However, this asymmetric balance creates a persistent climate of insecurity across Iraqi territory rather than producing a definitive outcome on the ground. This is because one side’s dispersed and regenerative attack capacity cannot be entirely neutralised by the other side’s high-precision but limited interventions.

At this juncture, the decisive factor is increasingly the ‘shadow militias’ and proxy structures. As these structures provide both operational flexibility and political deniability, they ensure the conflict’s continuity whilst keeping its costs under control. In this context, the military picture emerging on the Iraqi battlefield can be interpreted as a war of attrition rather than a decisive war. Rather than gaining ground, the parties are focusing on eroding the opponent’s capabilities, testing their deterrence, and exerting long-term pressure. This renders the conflict unpredictable, fragmented and chronic. Indeed, even if tensions between Israel/the US and Iran were to ease in the coming period, or even if the war were to end, it would not be wrong to expect the conflict dynamics in Iraq to persist. Furthermore, this conflict dynamic will not be confined solely to the military sphere; as seen in the country’s political system following 2003, it could drag Iraq into a multi-layered system of competition.

Iraq’s strategic depth

Indeed, on the strategic level, Iraq serves as a ‘proxy depth’ for Iran and a ‘containment corridor’ for the US and Israel. Through its militia networks in Iraq, Iran is able to exert pressure on the US without opening a direct and costly front, thereby keeping the conflict away from its own territory whilst actively utilizing its regional influence. This model provides Iran with both operational flexibility and escalation control.

This situation removes Iraq from being a buffer zone in the classical sense, transforming it into a flexible and permeable arena of conflict where both sides impose costs on one another. In other words, no actor can fully control Iraq, yet all actors utilize Iraq for their own strategic calculations. This state of ‘uncontrolled use’ enhances Iraq’s geopolitical value whilst simultaneously deepening its fragility.

The most severe consequence of this military and strategic pressure is manifesting in the political sphere. The Iraqi state is compelled to both maintain its security relationship with the US and react to the targeting of militia structures that form part of its own security architecture. This situation pushes Baghdad into a contradictory position, making it both dependent on Washington yet in tension with it. This contradiction goes beyond a diplomatic dilemma for Iraq; it directly becomes a matter of state capacity and sovereignty. This is because if Iraq remains silent regarding the targeting of The Popular Mobilization Forces elements—which it defines as part of its own security structure—it weakens its internal legitimacy; if it responds, however, it increases the risk of direct tension with the US. Consequently, Baghdad is becoming increasingly trapped in a ‘policy of forced balance’ with a narrowing scope for manoevre.

This predicament has become more apparent in recent decisions taken by the Iraqi National Security Council. More importantly, the manner in which these decisions are implemented has the potential to affect directly Iraq’s internal political balances. The question of which actors will exercise the right to self-defense, to what extent, and under what coordination, could redefine the balance of power between the central state and militia structures. If this process cannot be managed under central command, the scope of action for non-state actors may expand, and this could further deepen Iraq’s already contentious ‘multi-headed security structure’.

Conversely, should central authority bring this process under control, the position of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) within the state could become even more institutionalized. Both scenarios carry the potential to create new fault lines in Iraqi politics. For this reason, the current situation should be assessed not merely as a classic foreign policy crisis, but as a structural breaking point simultaneously transforming Iraq’s state structure, security architecture and political balances.

D

onald Trump has said the United States is likely to resume bombing Iran as a fragile ceasefire approaches its expiration, underscoring rising tensions despite ongoing diplomatic efforts.

Speaking on Tuesday, Trump indicated he did not intend to extend the 14-day truce, which is set to end on Wednesday. He framed renewed military action as part of a strategy to strengthen Washington’s position in negotiations, saying the US was prepared to act if talks failed to produce results.

“We’re ready to go. The military is raring to go,” he said, adding that he expected force would ultimately help secure a favorable agreement. However, he did not specify what such a deal would entail or how quickly it might be reached.

The remarks were accompanied by statements on Truth Social, where Trump accused Tehran of repeatedly violating the ceasefire. While such claims could serve as a basis for renewed strikes, they have not been independently verified.

Diplomatic channels remain open

At the same time, diplomatic channels remain open. A new round of talks is expected in Islamabad, where US Vice President JD Vance is set to meet Iranian parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. The discussions are seen as a last effort to extend the truce or reach a broader agreement before hostilities potentially resume.

Trump’s latest comments reflect a broader pattern of mixed messaging from the administration, alternating between warnings of escalation and suggestions that a deal may be within reach. Earlier in the week, he warned that “lots of bombs” could be used if negotiations collapsed, even as officials pointed to ongoing diplomatic engagement.

Senior figures in Washington have also adopted a hard line. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth recently said US forces were “locked and loaded,” signaling readiness to target Iran’s infrastructure, including its energy sector.

Firm Iranian opposition to coercive diplomacy

Iranian officials have responded with firm opposition to what they describe as coercive diplomacy. Ghalibaf said Tehran would not negotiate “under the shadow of threats,” while military leaders warned that any renewed US strikes would prompt an immediate and decisive response.

The standoff has already had wider implications, particularly for global energy markets. Fatih Birol, head of the International Energy Agency, warned that the crisis could have unprecedented consequences, especially when combined with ongoing disruptions linked to Russian gas supplies.

Analysts say the next phase of the conflict will likely hinge on the outcome of talks in Islamabad. A breakthrough could stabilize the situation, but failure to reach an agreement may lead to a rapid return to military confrontation.

With the ceasefire deadline fast approaching, both sides appear to be preparing for multiple scenarios—keeping diplomacy alive while signaling readiness for escalation.

(Source: The Guardian)

A

t least 12 British universities paid a private security consultancy run by former military intelligence officials to monitor student activists and academics, including individuals expressing support for Palestine, according to a joint investigation by Al Jazeera English and Liberty Investigates.

The investigation found that Horus Security Consultancy Limited, a firm established by former military personnel, collected and analyzed publicly available data from social media platforms, conducted background checks, and produced intelligence briefings for universities across the United Kingdom. The activity, which universities say is aimed at maintaining campus safety, has sparked criticism from rights groups, academics, and student activists who argue it amounts to systematic surveillance.

Documents obtained through freedom of information (FOI) requests reveal that universities collectively paid the firm at least £440,000 ($594,000) between 2022 and early 2025. Institutions named in the investigation include some of the UK’s most prominent universities, among them Oxford, Cambridge colleges through affiliates, Imperial College London, University College London (UCL), King’s College London (KCL), and others.

Open-source data

According to the findings, Horus provided a service that compiled daily or periodic intelligence updates using open-source data, including students’ social media posts. These reports were sometimes sold to universities for subscription fees of around £900 per month.

One such case involved a PhD student at the London School of Economics (LSE), whose social media activity during a pro-Gaza protest encampment in 2024 was included in a briefing sent to university security staff. The student, Lizzie Hobbs, said she was unaware her posts had been monitored until contacted by journalists.

“We knew surveillance was happening, but it is shocking to see how systematized it is,” she said, describing the practice as “deeply concerning.”

The investigation also highlighted the case of Palestinian-American academic Rabab Ibrahim Abdulhadi, who was subjected to a counter-terrorism “threat assessment” prior to delivering a guest lecture at Manchester Metropolitan University in 2023. The assessment, commissioned by the university, reviewed her academic work, public statements, and social media presence.

“Shocked” to learn of the report

Abdulhadi said she was “shocked” to learn of the report, adding that it raised serious questions about academic freedom. “They made an assumption of guilt and started investigating me because of my scholarship,” she said.

Universities have defended their use of external intelligence services, citing legal obligations and security concerns. Under the UK’s Prevent strategy, institutions are required to assess risks related to extremism, including those associated with external speakers and campus events.

A spokesperson for Manchester Metropolitan University said such assessments are routine and necessary to “ensure the safety of our community and external speakers.” Similarly, Imperial College London stated that the information gathered by Horus is drawn from publicly available sources and is used to identify potential risks, not to surveil individuals.

The University of Sheffield also rejected claims of targeting activists, saying its use of external services is intended to “horizon scan” for large-scale events that could affect campus operations. “It is incorrect to suggest this discourages lawful protest,” a spokesperson said.

Serious ethical and legal concerns

However, critics argue that the scale and nature of the monitoring raise serious ethical and legal concerns. Gina Romero, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, warned that the use of artificial intelligence to analyse student data could lead to disproportionate surveillance.

“The use of AI to harvest and analyze student data under the guise of open-source intelligence raises profound legal concerns,” she said, adding that such practices may lack transparency and accountability.

The investigation also found that several universities refused to disclose the full extent of their contracts with Horus, citing commercial sensitivity. Under the UK’s Freedom of Information Act, institutions can withhold information if its release could harm a third party’s business interests.

Jo Grady, general secretary of the University and College Union (UCU), criticized universities for what she described as a misuse of public funds. “It is shameful that institutions have spent hundreds of thousands of pounds monitoring their own students,” she said.

A

t approximately 08:10 am on 28 February 2026, the US and Israel launched targeted and comprehensive air strikes against Iran. It is understood that in the initial phase of the attacks, public buildings in Tehran were targeted by Tomahawk cruise missiles fired from US warships in the Mediterranean. Indeed, footage of Tomahawk cruise missiles in motion along the Iraq-Iran border emerged in open-source media during the morning hours.

Furthermore, in the initial phase of the attacks targeting Tehran, air-launched ballistic missiles were employed. In this context, it has been assessed that the ballistic missiles named ROCKS and Blue Sparrow—previously known to have been launched by F-15 fighter jets—were the munitions used in the assassination of Supreme Leader Khamenei. In the first phase of the attack, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed in a targeted air strike at the Leader’s residence. However, this assassination and Khamenei’s death were not announced until later that night.

Although this development was announced late, Iran’s retaliatory strikes—which differed in terms of intensity and scale—were assessed as a key indicator supporting the view that the assassination took place during the initial phase of the Israeli and US air strikes. Compared to Iran’s previous retaliatory attacks, the fact that it simultaneously targeted US bases in the region and Israel marked a significant difference in the scale of the retaliation’s scope and intensity. On the other hand, this situation has been assessed in the literature as a horizontal escalation of the conflict. Conversely, the air strikes by the US and Israel have been characterised as vertical escalation. Indeed, this distinction could be explained by the consequences of the attack suffered by Iran.

As with its previous asymmetric retaliatory attacks, Iran has named these retaliatory strikes ‘True Promise’. Once again, in line with its previous retaliations, it has employed ballistic missiles and kamikaze UAVs as part of these asymmetric attacks. Iran has thus moved into the fourth phase of the “True Promise” retaliatory attacks, alongside the asymmetric retaliatory attacks it launched against Israel between April and October 2024 and since June 2025.

In this respect, the conflict in question is a continuation of the conflict known as the 12-Day War and represents a new and deepening example of asymmetric warfare. Indeed, Iran’s re-designation of its retaliatory attacks as ‘True Promise’, and Israel’s similar use of the name ‘Lion’ for its attacks, point to the ongoing nature of this conflict. This situation can be assessed as a continuity on the part of both conflicting sides, including in their operational nomenclature.

Horizontal escalation

Iran’s resort to horizontal escalation and retaliation attacks can be grounded in consistency and coherence with the capabilities previously tested in its arsenal. Indeed, during the one-month conflict, in high-value strategic targeting of US military bases in the region and Gulf states, it has been observed that Iran has increasingly relied on the asymmetric capabilities it has developed across the region—including through proxy forces—since the 2019 Aramco attack.

In this context, the Toufan kamikaze UAV—which features a delta-wing design and cost-effective characteristics and was first used in the Aramco attack—has demonstrated a consistent profile in effective attack scenarios, evolving subsequently into the Shahed-136, a loitering munition and kamikaze UAV derivative. Furthermore, the Fateh-class ballistic missiles (200–800 kilometres), characterised by high strike accuracy and short range, have also yielded effective results in these targeting operations.

Indeed, open-source reports indicate that the Shahed-238 kamikaze UAV, a newly developed variant of the Shahed-136, has been used in effective attacks against the AN/TPY-2 long-range THAAD air defense radars, AN/FPS-132 early warning systems and AN/MPQ-65 Patriot air defence radars in the region. Furthermore, solid-fuelled short-range ballistic missiles with precision strike capabilities, including the Fateh-110, Raad-500, Fateh-313 and Qiam/Zolfaghar variants, have demonstrated effective capabilities in targeting operations against Gulf states.

The effective and precision strike capabilities of this short-range class, despite air defence systems (Patriot ADS), have demonstrated consistency with previous usage examples. Indeed, Iran has deployed its Fateh-class short-range ballistic missiles against various targets, primarily in Iraq (Ayn al-Asad Airbase in 2020, Erbil Ballistic Missile Strikes in 2022), and within the context of these attacks, it has been observed that variants of this class possess the capability to carry out precision strikes and that their hit rates are relatively high.

Targeting and escalation trends

On 28 February 2026, the US and Israel expanded their attacks aimed at crippling Iran’s second-strike capabilities, this time targeting the southern region in addition to the western region. The western region emerged as one of the key focal points in both the 12-day conflict and the 28 February US-Israel and Iran clashes. In this context, it is possible to categorize the US and Israeli targeting into four main categories: public buildings and civilian infrastructure, nuclear facilities, military bases and installations (land, sea, air and space), and high-ranking religious, political and military figures.

Consequently, specific and priority targets have included military bases, production centres, silos and depots within Iran’s ballistic missile and UAV programmes. In contrast, Iran has struck various mobile or fixed long-range radar and early warning systems at military bases in the region, as well as high-value military and strategic assets (KC-135 and E-3 AWACS aircraft).

By the second week of the conflict, the US and Israel had begun striking civilian infrastructure in Iran. In this context, they targeted oil tankers in Tehran, Karaj and Bushehr. During the second and third weeks, around mid-March, the US and Israel both escalated attacks on civilian infrastructure and carried out strikes against the Natanz Uranium Enrichment Facility, the Arak Heavy Water Reactor and the Bushehr nuclear facility. In response, Iran has also escalated its actions, gradually beginning to target industrial zones and energy facilities in Gulf countries and Israel. The parties have rapidly escalated the conflict to a high level, mutually expanding the scale of violence and targeting.

This situation has led to a tendency to target each other’s nuclear facilities (Iran/Natanz – Israel/Dimona and the Negev Nuclear Research Centre) and has caused the escalation to develop within the nuclear domain as well. In other words, the parties, having begun the escalation at the highest level, rapidly exhausted all stages of escalation within a month. This reinforces the conclusion that the escalation in this conflict is showing signs of spiralling out of control.

Iranian ballistic missile retaliatory strikes

On Saturday, 28 February 2026, at approximately 11.10 am, Iran launched retaliatory strikes using ballistic missile salvos in response to targeted air strikes by the US and Israel. The first salvo, launched with approximately 30 ballistic missiles, was followed by a second salvo at around 11.28 am, after which approximately 44–45 salvos continued intermittently until late into the night. The ballistic missile and kamikaze UAV attacks, carried out in approximately 87 waves over the month since the conflict began, have been designated as Operation ‘True Promise-4’.

According to open-source information, some launch sites can be listed as Shiraz, Isfahan, Yazd, Damavand and Fardis/Alburz. Based on sources from the US, Israel, Gulf states and Iran, it can be inferred that approximately 1,300 or more ballistic missiles were used in these attacks, targeting Israel, Jordan and the Gulf states. Furthermore, it can be argued, based on various open-source reports, that approximately 4,000 or more kamikaze UAVs were deployed.

Furthermore, according to Israeli sources, approximately 540 ballistic missiles were fired at Israel during the one-month conflict. The missiles that hit their targets were frequently warhead types carrying submunitions such as Ghadr-F and Khorramshahr-4, which carry submunition/fragmentation warheads (42 missiles – 230 distinct impact points), as well as the solid-fuelled Kheibar Shekan/Fattah and the liquid-fuelled Shahab-3 derivative Emad, which created 54 impact zones with 12 hits, based on open-source assessments. In response to these retaliatory strikes, Israel employed medium- and high-altitude air defense systems, including the Arrow-2/3, David’s Sling, THAAD and other defense systems.

In this regard, it can be said that Israel demonstrated a tendency to use Arrow-3 interceptor missiles quite selectively throughout the month-long conflict. Instead, it is assessed that Israel relied more heavily on lower-tier interceptor missiles, which are relatively low-cost and easier to produce and procure. Another observation concerns the engagement of medium and high-altitude air defense interceptor missiles with the separated fragments and first stages of the ballistic missile rather than its warhead. This situation likely resulted from the air defense system’s inability to distinguish the warhead due to inoperable or ineffective radar (sensors damaged- hit by missile/kamikaze UAV), leading to target selection issues.

These vulnerabilities in the defense system were also observed within two impact zones located very close to the Negev Nuclear Research Centre. It appears that Fattah-1/2 (21 March 2026 – Wave 73) and Emad (25 March 2026 – Wave 81) ballistic missiles were used in these impact zones.

Based on images of missile debris reflected in open-source materials, it has been assessed that each Khorramshahr-4 ballistic missile carries 80 warheads, each weighing 18 kilograms. The Khorramshahr-4 (Kheibar) ballistic missile has been identified during both the launch phase and the terminal phase of atmospheric re-entry (5 March 2026, True Promise-4/Wave 19/Tel Aviv and Ben Gurion Airport/Waves 22-23-43-44/Northern and Central Regions of Israel).

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

I

ndian Prime Minister Modi had told Russian President Putin in the context of Ukraine, “This is not a time of war.” India had not condemned Russia either, but it must have realised it could not say the same to Trump. Many countries, likely including India, had assumed that the conflict between Iran, Israel and the US would come to a swift end. New Delhi was probably among those who thought this way and had hoped to weather the storm through silence. It now seems this approach has not been very effective.

As the Iran War escalates, we are witnessing how decision-makers in the US and Israel have miscalculated Iran’s resilience and resolve. At the same time, they have underestimated Tehran’s leverage over the Strait of Hormuz. As the world is shaken by the consequences of the Iran War, India is striving to maintain its neutrality whilst managing the risks and interests in the Middle East and beyond amidst the expanding conflict. India has a large diaspora in Arab states, as well as significant trade and investment ties.

Delhi, which keeps communication channels open with all parties, believes it is managing the situation well. Is that really the case? Iran’s refusal to compromise and its resolve in the face of constant missile attacks by the US and Israel offer lessons for the world, but they also hold a mirror up to India. Modi never shies away from saying that the world is watching India. It certainly is watching, but how?

India has also been severely affected by rising fuel prices, pressure on the rupee and strained diplomatic relations. According to Goldman Sachs, whilst approximately 14 per cent of its exports to Gulf countries pass through the Strait of Hormuz, remittances sent home by the roughly 10 million Indian workers employed in the Middle East account for 40 per cent of the annual total. For India, the Strait of Hormuz is a vital energy source through which approximately 90 per cent of its LPG imports and around 50 per cent of its crude oil imports pass.

On the one hand, Indians are forming long queues outside LPG distribution centres with empty LPG cylinders, while on the other hand, four of India’s Union states are preparing for elections in April (the repatriation of many Indians will significantly impact these and other Indian elections over the next 12 months), and meanwhile, New Delhi—balancing public silence with diplomatic flexibility—is conducting intensive consultations with all stakeholders.

Delhi’s stance

India’s top priority is to maintain access to all actors. The Iran War may have granted India a 30-day exemption advantage for Russian oil (though this is characterised by some Indian commentators as humiliation, and they are not entirely without a point – consider that your trade policy is shaped, or could be shaped, by another power in this situation, subject to US approval), but a far greater blow is being felt in its strategic relations across Asia, including the Gulf.

The Iran War began on 28 February, yet Modi was in Israel on 25–26 February. During his visit, which elevated bilateral relations to the level of a special strategic partnership, Modi—greeted as a brother by Netanyahu—stated in the Israeli parliament, the Knesset: “India stands firmly by Israel’s side, both now and in the future.” It remained a matter of speculation whether Modi was aware of the attack launched 1.5 days later. However, this visit and his subsequent prolonged silence on critical issues amounted to a loss of prestige for India and a strategic detriment to its long-term interests. Delhi did not condemn the US and Israeli attacks on Iran, but supported a draft resolution at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) condemning Iran’s attacks on various Gulf states.

In the Iran crisis, it appears that India’s efforts to remain in the background have pushed it into the sidelines. It is positioning itself through quiet rhetoric rather than action. It is expressing its concerns to Gulf leaders regarding Iranian attacks in the context of the safety of Indian workers, but at the same time, it seems to be opting to turn a blind eye to US and Israeli attacks.

New Delhi is driven by a desire to become a major power. It argues that it is entitled to a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. It is on its way to becoming the world’s fourth-largest economy. At every opportunity, India states that recognizing its global role would also mean giving a voice to the Global South and the developing world, which are currently unrepresented on the UN Security Council. However, this is now highly open to question. A perception has emerged that India is not a neutral player in the conflict, but rather is aligning itself with the US-Israel camp, even if it does not explicitly state so.

The torpedo attack by an American submarine on the Iranian naval vessel IRIS Dena, which had been invited to participate in the MILAN exercise held in Visakhapatnam by New Delhi on 4 March, has made matters even more difficult for the Indian government. Not a single word was spoken to the US. The Indian Navy’s statement made no mention of the attack that sank the vessel or of any regret over the sailors’ deaths. Of course, the ship was outside Indian waters and India bore no legal or political responsibility. However, Delhi had previously gone to great lengths to prove and establish its role as the ‘clear security provider’ in the Indian Ocean region. Yet in this incident, the same Delhi went to great lengths to clarify that the Indian Ocean was not India’s ocean. This formalistic perspective on such a serious incident was, in a sense, an attempt to justify the American action and Delhi’s lack of responsibility.

Silence and choices

India, which has expended immense effort to establish itself as the “voice of the Global South”, now faces not only the challenge of safeguarding the image of Global South leadership it has sought to build, but also the handicap of protecting the strategic autonomy it has jeopardized in pursuit of a special relationship with the US and Israel. India’s stance appears to amount to nothing more than hoping the problems will resolve themselves. Just as Venezuelan President Maduro did during his ousting by the Americans in January 2026.

Some circles in India view Delhi’s silent response to the war as a cool-headed calculation aimed at safeguarding the interests of a rising power across multiple fronts. In their view, silence is a legitimate strategic tool when there is no bargaining power. This is theoretically defensible, but there is a difference between an ambiguous silence and principled restraint. Not only did it refrain from condemning the death of Iran’s religious leader, but it even avoided sending an official message of condolence.

The Ministry of External Affairs explicitly instructed all Indian ambassadors in world capitals not to sign any book of condolence opened by their Iranian counterparts without prior authorization from New Delhi. Ultimately, in the face of mounting domestic criticism, the Indian Foreign Minister visited the Iranian embassy to convey his condolences. However, the initial stance went beyond mere silence. This gives the impression that silence was used not as a strategic tool, but rather as a reflexive means to please the US and Israel.

Given its immense interests in the Gulf, Delhi’s choice to remain silent and defend this stance strategically may, in one sense, be a justified position. Yet, in another sense, it is incomplete. For India, Iran is not merely a trading partner. Nor is the issue solely about its energy imports via the Strait of Hormuz. For India, Iran represents a way to bypass the China-Pakistan axis. It is about bypassing Pakistani control in land access to Central Asia.

It is the cornerstone of the International North-South Transport Corridor and the gateway to the Chabahar port. India has invested at least 120 million dollars, diplomatic capital, infrastructure resources and long-term strategic planning into this framework over a period of more than twenty years. And for India, Iran represents a bond extending to cultural ties, as Foreign Minister Jaishankar has noted (for instance, even whilst the British were attempting to conquer the subcontinent, Persian remained at the heart of Indian court life).

The BRICS factor

Meanwhile, India currently holds the presidency of BRICS. BRICS is a multilateral coalition established with the aim of challenging American financial hegemony. Iran is a BRICS member and enjoys the support of China, Russia and South Africa. Consequently, Delhi finds itself at odds with other BRICS member states, particularly during the year it holds the group’s presidency. It is ironic to lead a multipolar coalition whilst sending mixed signals as if orbiting a unipolar power.

It is true that foreign policy requires caution. However, India has failed to apply this in this crisis. Taken as a whole, although it might be termed ‘strategic silence’, India’s omissions—which show a marked bias towards Israel and the US—are creating the perception that Delhi is on the side of the aggressors in this war. Those with a realistic perspective know that in international politics, words are worthless and actions are more effective than words.

However, one must not overlook the fact that, ultimately, the pressure of US sanctions has strained India’s relations with Iran. It has significantly reduced its oil imports and has almost entirely divested its stake in the Chabahar port. It may have concluded that it must position itself alongside the US, Israel and the Gulf states to maintain its dominance in this war. If so, it must have reached this conclusion at the cost of damaging its future credibility.

Using international diplomacy as a ploy to buy time and lull the Iranians into a false sense of security, the targeted assassination of a president who was not in hiding, false claims regarding the right to pre-emptive strikes, the torpedoing of a ship returning from a fleet inspection, Israel’s occupation of Lebanese and Syrian territory. Delhi has remained silent on all of these. Modi addressed the Knesset, received his medal, and departed with a series of defense-technology agreements. Just 36 hours after returning from Israel, Israeli-US missiles began bombing Iran.

Even without prior knowledge, speculation about a possible US-Israeli attack had been rife for weeks, and the timing inevitably drew attention. Could it be that India had agreed to align its foreign and security policies with American interests? The US Deputy Secretary of State said at the 2026 Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi: “India must understand that we will not make the same mistake with India that we made with China 20 years ago.” In other words, he is saying we will not allow India’s economic development to reach the point where it becomes a commercial rival. Were those who believed Delhi could become a major power by clinging to the coattails of a superpower mistaken?

I

sraeli airstrikes across Lebanon intensified sharply this week, killing hundreds and wounding more than a thousand in a single day, as the country remains excluded from a fragile regional ceasefire framework, raising fears of a wider Middle East conflict.

According to the Lebanese Health Ministry, at least 303 people were killed and more than 1,150 injured in strikes carried out on Wednesday alone. The ministry said the attacks, which targeted dozens of areas across the country, included residential areas and critical infrastructure. Among the dead were at least 110 women, children, and elderly people, highlighting the heavy civilian toll.

The latest wave of bombardment brings the overall death toll in Lebanon since March 2 to 1,888, with more than 6,000 injured. Emergency teams continue to search for victims trapped beneath rubble in several locations, particularly in the capital, Beirut, where entire buildings were reduced to debris.

Attacks on southern Lebanon

In southern Lebanon, Israeli strikes hit at least 52 towns and villages over a 24-hour period, killing 24 people, according to official figures. The deadliest attacks included a strike on a residential building in Zrariyeh that killed 10 people, as well as additional strikes in Abbassiyeh and Jibsheet.

The Israeli military said it was targeting positions linked to Hezbollah. It claimed to have killed a senior figure associated with the group’s leadership in a strike on Beirut. However, the scale and spread of the bombardment have drawn international condemnation and renewed scrutiny over the proportionality of the attacks.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has defended the operations as necessary for national security, while also instructing officials to prepare for potential direct talks with Lebanon. The announcement of possible negotiations came even as strikes continued, underscoring the contradiction between military escalation and diplomatic outreach.

Efforts to contain the crisis are now intensifying on the diplomatic front. The United States has confirmed it will host talks next week aimed at reaching a ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon. A State Department official said the meeting would focus on mechanisms to halt hostilities and prevent further regional spillover.

The United Nations has welcomed the prospect of negotiations, stressing that diplomacy remains the only viable path to resolving the escalating violence. However, Lebanese officials have made clear that they will not enter talks without a prior cessation of hostilities, calling for a multi-day ceasefire as a precondition.

Hezbollah rejects direct talks with Israel

Hezbollah has also rejected the idea of direct negotiations with Israel, reiterating its position that any dialogue must follow an immediate halt to Israeli attacks. The group’s stance reflects broader domestic pressure within Lebanon, where public anger has surged amid mounting casualties and widespread destruction.

International reaction has been swift and critical. Emmanuel Macron warned that continued Israeli strikes risk undermining ongoing peace efforts and destabilizing the region further. Norway’s foreign minister said the attacks could constitute violations of international humanitarian law, while Canada issued a strong condemnation of the airstrikes and called for respect for Lebanon’s sovereignty.

In the region, Türkiye accused Israel of expanding its war beyond Gaza, warning that the conflict is entering a more dangerous phase. Pakistan also condemned the strikes, emphasizing that Lebanon must be included in any broader ceasefire arrangement tied to ongoing US-Iran negotiations.

The crisis is unfolding against the backdrop of a fragile understanding between Washington and Tehran aimed at reducing tensions elsewhere in the region. Former U.S. President Donald Trump, commenting on the situation, warned that Iran was failing to uphold commitments related to oil transit through the Strait of Hormuz, adding another layer of uncertainty to an already volatile situation.

Iran, for its part, has warned that continued Israeli attacks on Lebanon could render ongoing diplomatic efforts “meaningless,” signaling that escalation on the Lebanese front could derail broader regional negotiations.

Within Lebanon, the government has taken steps to assert greater control over the security situation, instructing the army to enforce a state monopoly on weapons in Beirut. The move appears aimed at stabilizing the internal environment as the country faces simultaneous external attacks and internal political pressure.

Despite these efforts, the situation on the ground remains highly volatile. With Lebanon still excluded from current ceasefire arrangements and military operations continuing unabated, fears are growing that the conflict could expand into a broader regional confrontation.

As diplomatic efforts gather pace ahead of next week’s talks in Washington, the coming days are likely to be critical in determining whether the violence can be contained—or whether the war will deepen further across the region.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

T

he war launched by the US-Israel alliance on 28 February 2026 through a direct attack on Iran has, within the current geopolitical equation, evolved from a limited conflict into a multi-layered and multi-actor regional security crisis. The military escalation between these three countries has not been confined to traditional front lines; through Iran’s asymmetric warfare strategy, it has spread across the entire region via energy fields, sea lanes and proxy forces, evolving into a global issue in terms of its consequences.

Understanding these dynamics necessitates setting aside normative approaches and the reflex to take sides, and instead viewing the situation through an objective and analytical lens from an international relations perspective. Consequently, this article will attempt to clarify the current positions of Israel and Iran in light of these projections.

What is Israel’s objective?

Israel’s regional moves, initiated following 7 October 2023 and escalating into a full-scale war with direct US involvement by 28 February 2026, represent an attempt to establish a new status quo along a broad geopolitical axis stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Gulf of Basra, from the Red Sea to the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb and the Arabian Sea. This multi-dimensional strategy, in which military expansion, control of energy resources and demographic engineering tools are mobilized in concert, is aimed at becoming a ‘proxy hegemonic power’ by exploiting power vacuums in the Middle East.

At the heart of Israel’s new regional strategy lies the dismantling of Iran—which it has designated as its greatest enemy—and its network of proxy forces. In this context, Tel Aviv has succeeded in integrating American military power into its own strategy, thereby risking an open-ended and protracted regional war launched on 28 February. Washington, however, has been swept into a position serving Tel Aviv’s priorities due to the extreme vagueness of the ultimate strategic objective in this war.

The target set for Israel’s military attack on Iran, with US support, goes beyond a mere act of military weakening, focusing instead on the total elimination of Tehran’s leadership, command-and-control, deterrence and institutional survival capabilities. In this regard, the Tel Aviv-Washington alliance aims to paralyze Iran’s asymmetric force projection at its source by destroying integrated air defense systems, ballistic missile production facilities and nuclear infrastructure in critical locations such as Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz and Kerman. Another move in the alliance’s military doctrine involves conducting systematic decapitation operations targeting the Revolutionary Guide and senior Revolutionary Guards generals, with the aim of collapsing the regime’s ‘centre of gravity’.

Israel’s quest to establish a new regional status quo

This multi-layered set of objectives represents the most aggressive manifestation of Israel’s quest to establish a new regional status quo by sidelining its greatest adversary in the regional power balance along the axis extending from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Gulf, where it has initiated a process of hegemonic consolidation. However, as a backlash to this strategy, Iran is far more eager to acquire nuclear weapons than it was in the pre-war period. This motivation could materialize in the near future.

Israel’s new strategy relies not only on military objectives but also on the control of regional energy resources and strategic territories by land and sea. Seizing the opportunity presented by the power vacuum in Syria, Israel has established a permanent forward base by occupying the Syrian side of the strategic Mount Hermon (Jebel al-Sheikh) following intensive air strikes that paralysed the military infrastructure, thereby expanding its influence in Western Syria. In the context of energy and maritime geopolitics, Israel is expanding its exclusive economic zones by securing control over disputed natural gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean—such as Gaza Marine, Karish and Kana (where some agreements were reached with Lebanon in October 2022)—as well as energy reserves like Leviathan and Tamar.

The desire to control a corridor extending as far as the Litani River in Lebanon is based on the logic of securing access to water resources and safeguarding maritime energy objectives from land. Furthermore, projects such as the EastMed pipeline and structures like the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) have become exclusionary geopolitical mechanisms instrumentalised to exclude regional rivals such as Turkey from the energy equation and to reinforce maritime asymmetries in its favour.

Iran’s new geopolitics

Tehran’s decision to launch simultaneous attacks targeting US military bases and strategic economic infrastructure across the Gulf region has created a new geopolitical rupture in the Middle East that is virtually unprecedented. These actions have gone beyond a mere cycle of regional tensions, triggering a structural transformation in the region’s security dynamics. Given the reality that the Iranian regime will not collapse in the near future despite the severe military pressure it faces, this regional crisis will reshape security relations and geopolitical balances in the Middle East for years to come.

Iran’s operational doctrine is largely shaped by the concept of the ‘indirect approach’ and aims to exert structural pressure on the US and Israel by increasing the global economic cost of the war. Through this strategy, Tehran seeks to spread the conflict across a wide geographical area and, in particular, to raise the global economic cost of the war by effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz and increasing pressure on energy routes and trade corridors. Ultimately, this doctrine seeks to exert structural and political pressure on the US and Israel—going beyond mere military success—by depleting expensive defence systems with low-cost munitions and imposing inflationary pressure on global markets.

In this context, more than half of Iran’s ballistic missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks in the region have been directed not at US or Israeli targets, but at Gulf Arab states. Although this strategy, which Iran has adopted at great cost to avoid ‘losing’, deepens its regional isolation, it has been seen to generate severe shockwaves on a global scale; particularly in global oil markets. In terms of escalation dynamics, Iran’s greatest trump card is the desalination plants that supply 90 per cent of the Gulf Arab states’ water needs. Targeting these facilities would trigger a crisis of existential proportions in the region. The US and Israel’s response to this could be to target Kharg Island, Iran’s oil export hub, and its domestic energy infrastructure. However, in the current state of the conflict, both sides are deliberately crossing escalation thresholds through calculated moves.

I

s the situation the United States finds itself in vis-à-vis Iran solely due to Trump, or is it the result of a process that has been unfolding in plain sight since the end of the First Cold War? Will it be actions arising from the US streets—that is, from the grassroots—that bring Trump down, or will the fact that the warnings issued by the establishment in the past are finally being heeded, albeit belatedly, prevent this course of events?

On Wednesday, 25 March 2026—the 26th day of the war—an interesting report was broadcast on the US media outlet NBC. According to at least three sources within NBC’s management, Trump was being briefed on the course of the war solely through two-minute videos featuring the US military’s successful attacks. Consequently, he only became aware of the destruction of US tanker aircraft during the attack on Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia through the media. Although this report by NBC was denied by the White House Spokesperson, it could serve as an important reference point for explaining the content of Trump’s statements regarding the course of the war, which do not align with reality.

Furthermore, if Trump has been receiving information about his country and world history in the same manner as these war briefings, the situation in which the US finds itself becomes clearer. At this point, I would like to make a brief aside regarding the concept of the ‘war’ Trump is waging against Iran. Interestingly, Trump is currently avoiding describing the events unfolding in the Middle East as a ‘war’.

Moreover, he has borrowed a phrase used by Russian President Putin regarding Ukraine: ‘We are not at war; we are conducting a special operation’. It is possible, albeit difficult, to justify Putin’s use of this phrase under the pretext of protecting the Russian-speaking population living on Ukrainian soil. But if, according to Trump’s definition, the US military is not at war whilst spending approximately 2 billion dollars a day, what exactly is it doing?

Kennan had warned about Israel before Kent

There was no need to wait for the resignation of Joe Kent, Director of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre, on 17 March 2025, or for the reasons he gave for his decision, to understand where Trump and his team went wrong regarding Iran, and why and how they failed. A similar warning had been issued to another US president exactly 78 years ago, immediately following the establishment of the State of Israel. See how John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt describe the warning given to US President Truman regarding Israel in 1948 in their work *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy*:

“When Israel was established in 1948, US policymakers did not regard Israel as a strategic asset… Truman’s decision to recognise Israel stemmed not from strategic reasons, but from his sympathy for the suffering of the Jewish people… Key advisers, including Secretary of State George Marshall and Director of Policy Planning George Kennan, opposed this decision on the grounds that it would strain US relations with the Arab world and allow the Soviets to gain influence in the region. According to a secret note written by Kennan in 1948, ‘supporting the extreme objectives of political Zionism was contrary to the United States’ security objectives in the Middle East’. In Kennan’s view, this decision to recognise the state would increase the opportunities available to the Soviet Union in the region, jeopardising oil revenues and the base rights the US had secured there.”

If you replace ‘Soviet Union’ with ‘People’s Republic of China’ in Kennan’s warnings, you can see exactly where the current war stands. George Kennan was no fortune-teller. On 22 February 1946, he sent the longest telegram in history—8,000 words—from Moscow to Washington, outlining Stalin’s true objectives and setting out the framework for the strategy required to contain the Soviet Union. Kennan, who was serving at the US Embassy in Moscow, had in a sense written the manifesto of the First Cold War in 1946, and by 1948 had accurately identified the troubles Israel would cause for the US.

However, it was not just Trump; from Kennedy onwards, US Presidents not only failed to heed Kennan’s warning but, particularly through legislative measures during the Nixon era in 1972, handed over the reins of US policy to the Zionist lobbies. Let us now turn to the Trump administration’s lack of strategy.

The US’s 35-year strategic debacle

Trump’s contradictory statements and constantly shifting objectives throughout the first month of the war are sufficient proof that the US embarked on this adventure without a strategy or political objectives of its own, merely tagging along behind Israel. The fact that, from the 20th day of the war onwards, the sole objective was reduced to merely ‘reopening the Strait of Hormuz’ speaks volumes about how the process was conducted without any strategic acumen.

The strategic failure the US has been experiencing since 2026 is not merely a problem that emerged with Donald Trump’s presidency and can be resolved by his departure. Andrew Marshall, known as the “Pentagon’s Yoda” and who served continuously as Director of the US Department of Defence’s Office of Net Assessment (ONA) from 1973 to 2015, was another figure who, like Kennan, had foreseen these times, having served eight US presidents. In 1973, US President Nixon established the ONA within the Pentagon as a think tank.

The organization’s purpose was to identify threats to the US and formulate military policies for at least the next 30 years. Nixon appointed Andrew Marshall, then an assistant to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, as the head of this institution. Marshall did not merely steer US military policy; he also prepared psychological profiles on leaders whom the US perceived as threats, notably Putin. Figures such as Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, Zalmay Khalilzad and Donald Rumsfeld were groomed under his tutelage.

Lieutenant General Chen Zhou, who authored between four and nine White Papers—depending on the source—outlining the defense doctrines of the People’s Liberation Army of the People’s Republic of China between 1998 and 2015, stated in an interview in 2012 that, from the 1990s onwards, his country had drawn upon Marshall’s views in reshaping its defense doctrines. Indeed, when Andrew Marshall, shortly after the victory in the First Cold War in the 1990s, issued a research directive to the office he headed titled ‘Why Can’t the US Produce Strategists Anymore?’, many, intoxicated by the victory over the USSR, greeted this directive with derision. Just as they had laughed at the warnings in Zbigniew Brzezinski’s 1995 book *Out of Control*, written by the National Security Advisor during the Carter administration.

In his book, Brzezinski highlighted, through a manifesto of some 20 points, that the US was in the midst of a social, economic and moral collapse. He pointed out that, to prevent this collapse, defense spending—which had become redundant following the USSR’s withdrawal from the scene—must be redirected immediately towards the reconstruction of the US and the enhancement of domestic prosperity. Instead of heeding these warnings, US administrations embarked on a policy of expanding NATO to reach the Russian border as quickly as possible; they encouraged the Saddam regime to invade Kuwait through a false-flag operation; and, following Israel’s lead, set about dismantling the unitary structures in the Middle East.

The rationale for US presence, rather than NATO, should have been questioned

The US-Israel duo, adrift in a sea of intellectual and moral destitution, might even risk the use of tactical nuclear weapons to defeat Iran militarily. However, one must not confuse this victory with triumph. The economic and political consequences of the war for the US will continue to be debated for many years to come in terms of the global order that needs to be reshaped. The prediction that the US would face a new ‘Vietnam’ should it launch a ground operation is also unrealistic.

Even the Vietnam War ultimately yielded positive results that facilitated the US’s rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China. However, this struggle with Iran will yield no result other than further isolating the US within “the prison designed by Israel”. Just as being captivated by Adolf Hitler’s charisma did not absolve the German people of their crimes, so too will Trump’s having been persuaded by Israel to support the genocide in Gaza that began in 2023, the occupation of Lebanon and Syria, and the declaration of war on Iran, fail to absolve the US of its sins.

Trump’s dismantling of the UN-centered global order did not merely divide the streets of the US. It also plunged the country’s bureaucracy, politics, EU-US relations, the balance of power within the NATO alliance, and the US’s relations with the Gulf states into irreversible crises. Trump’s equating of Democratic Party MPs with Iranians on 28 March, or the remarks he made about the Saudi Crown Prince at the Miami Investment Forum on 27 March, have pushed both his administration and his country to the brink of a “worthless isolation”.

In the debates that began with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992 and continue to this day—‘Is NATO still necessary? Does NATO still have a mission?’—it is clear that the questions have always been asked incorrectly. Perhaps the fundamental question that should have been asked was: “Do we need a aimless, adrift nuclear superpower that has made its own currency the dominant global currency, yet lacks any strategy?”

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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n a dramatic shift in Middle East politics, tensions between the United States and Iran have eased following the announcement of a two-week ceasefire, described by observers as a potential “last chance” to prevent a wider regional war.

The breakthrough came after Donald Trump confirmed that Washington had agreed to halt military operations against Iran for two weeks, citing a 10-point proposal from Tehran as a “workable basis for negotiations.” The announcement was made just hours before a deadline previously set by the U.S. administration.

The ceasefire, facilitated through mediation by Pakistan, includes an immediate halt to hostilities across multiple fronts, including Lebanon and other areas affected by the broader war. Pakistani officials have invited delegations from both sides to meet in Islamabad on Friday for continued negotiations, marking what could be the first face-to-face talks since the war began.

Trump stated that “significant progress” had been made toward a long-term agreement, adding that the temporary pause in military action would provide the necessary space to finalize a comprehensive deal.

Widespread international support

The agreement has been met with broad international approval, with countries across Asia and beyond urging both sides to use the opportunity to pursue lasting peace.

Indonesia called on all parties to respect sovereignty and prioritize diplomacy, as Australia welcomed the ceasefire as a step toward ending the war. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said his country is working with international partners to support diplomatic efforts and reopen the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz.

Similarly, Japan emphasized continued diplomatic engagement, particularly regarding the safe reopening of the strait, a critical global energy route. Malaysia also expressed support, with Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim calling for the Iranian proposal to evolve into a comprehensive peace agreement benefiting not only Iran but also Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen.

UN and regional reactions

The United Nations welcomed the ceasefire, with Secretary-General António Guterres urging all parties to commit to international law and work toward a sustainable resolution. His spokesperson stressed the importance of adhering to the ceasefire terms as a pathway to comprehensive peace in the region.

Regional powers also reacted positively. Egypt described the move as a significant step toward de-escalation and stability, highlighting its importance for global security and international navigation. Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty reportedly discussed the development with U.S. Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff, expressing strong support for renewed diplomatic efforts.

Meanwhile, Iraq’s Foreign Ministry called for a “serious and sustained dialogue” between Washington and Tehran to address the root causes of their tensions and build mutual trust.

Next steps and uncertainties

According to U.S. officials cited by American media, the ceasefire is expected to take effect once Iran reopens the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint for global oil shipments. Sources indicate that the upcoming talks in Pakistan could mark a turning point, as they would be the first direct negotiations between the two sides since the outbreak of war.

However, some uncertainty remains. Reports suggest discrepancies between the Persian and English versions of Iran’s ceasefire proposal, particularly regarding uranium enrichment—an issue likely to remain central in upcoming negotiations.

While the agreement has sparked optimism worldwide, analysts caution that the two-week ceasefire represents only a narrow window for diplomacy. Whether it leads to a lasting peace or merely a pause in hostilities will depend on the willingness of both sides to compromise on long-standing disputes.

For now, the deal offers a rare moment of hope in a region long marked by instability, with global leaders urging both Washington and Tehran to seize what may be their final opportunity to avoid a broader war.

(Source: News Agencies)

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ver the centuries, the Sultanate of Oman has navigated geopolitical shifts through a foreign policy characterized by calmness, deliberation, and positive neutrality. This approach stems from the profound understanding of current events held by its decision-makers, and is rooted in the country’s long history of adapting to its regional and global environment. It has strengthened Oman’s regional standing, ensured the stability of its political system and contributed to its continued existence as an independent state.

It has also given Oman a unique position in managing developments within the Arab Gulf region, with Muscat often playing the role of a conduit between conflicting parties without becoming embroiled in polarization or alliances. Oman’s role as a mediator or facilitator stems from the confidence that regional states and non-state actors have in its ability to resolve differences and find solutions to crises. Muscat is renowned for its constructive dialogue and diplomatic approach, avoiding confrontations that would otherwise harm the region.

This has led some political analysts to describe Oman as the ‘Switzerland of the Middle East’. However, the joint US-Israeli attack on Iran on 28 February 2026, following a round of indirect negotiations between the US and Iran, took Oman and other regional actors by surprise. His Excellency Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi, the Omani Foreign Minister, stated that an agreement was imminent following a round of negotiations held in Muscat and later in Geneva, he stated that progress was being made towards de-escalation in order to maintain the necessary calm in the region. This is vital as it is an important energy artery that cannot withstand military confrontation and its repercussions for long without seriously disrupting the global supply of oil and gas. This raises questions about Oman’s ability to fulfil its traditional role in the region, given its limited capacity to leverage its soft power, which is crucial for defusing tensions between conflicting parties.

In contrast to its previous calm and covert rhetoric, Muscat has openly voiced its opinion on the ongoing conflict, adopting a clear stance against joint US-Israeli aggression towards Iran. In an article published in The Economist, the Omani foreign minister emphasized that a war on Iran would be illegitimate and would not serve the interests of the region. It would also have serious repercussions for the security and economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, as well as for the global economy and energy markets more broadly. He urged Washington and its allies to de-escalate and resume diplomatic efforts.

A changing regional landscape

The Arab Gulf region has been unique for decades, with its own political, economic, cultural and religious characteristics. Long ago, it became an arena for competition between the great powers, starting with the arrival of the Portuguese in the late 15th century and continuing with the growing influence of the Dutch, British and French between the 17th and 19th centuries. The discovery of oil in the early 20th century further cemented the region’s prominence, even while the great powers were preoccupied with conflicts such as the First and Second World Wars. The discovery of oil coincided with the establishment of the Third Saudi State in 1932. This state is characterized by its vast geographical area, regional influence and prominent role in global energy markets. However, the region has not been immune to geopolitical changes that have disrupted its relative stability.

These include communist maneuvers in southern Oman (1965–1975), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), the Iranian Revolution (1979), the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990), the impact of the 9/11 attacks, followed by the US invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), the subsequent Arab Spring (2011), the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen (2015) and the blockade of Qatar (2017). These events have cast a shadow over the political landscape of the Middle East and the relationship between the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. This raises questions about the future of the GCC, more than four decades after its foundation. This puts Oman’s foreign policy in relation to the region at stake and is exacerbated by the uncertainty surrounding the stance of the other GCC states.

Despite being relatively isolated from its regional surroundings since the dissolution of the Omani Empire in 1856, anyone familiar with Oman’s foreign policy towards the Arab Gulf region will realize that, since Sultan Qaboos came to power in 1970, Oman has been keen to achieve unity and consensus with its neighbors, focusing on collective action for human development rather than conflict. This approach has earned Oman the trust of various parties through its balanced policies, adherence to principles, maintenance of neutrality, avoidance of involvement in ill-conceived conflicts that could prove costly, and pursuit of diplomatic efforts in cooperation with regional partners, especially its ‘brothers’ in the GCC.

This independent and unique approach has continued under the leadership of His Majesty Sultan Haitham bin Tariq, who ascended to the throne on 11 January 2020. His Majesty affirmed that the Sultanate of Oman would continue its noble mission and play a positive role in the region. He emphasized the independence of Omani policy and its sovereign decision-making by stating that Oman would not be swayed by whims and desires and would not enter into blocs and alliances directed towards a specific party. This summarizes the balance and stability of Omani foreign policy over the past five decades.

His Majesty also affirmed Oman’s support for Arab and Muslim causes, foremost among them the Palestinian cause, within a balanced diplomatic framework that focuses on opportunities for peace. This framework affirms the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to establish an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital, based on a two-state solution. It also completely rejects Israeli attacks that affect Palestinian lands and rights, as well as repeated violations of the sovereignty and security of other countries.

Oman’s approach to the crisis

While Muscat has achieved a certain level of political maturity and learned to adopt a moderate and non-confrontational approach to conflict, avoiding escalatory rhetoric and utilizing international channels to maintain calm, it has also demonstrated a firm desire to adhere to the principles of moderation and preserve regional balance and stability. However, recent events have challenged Muscat’s approach to the crisis, given the damage to Omani infrastructure caused by drone attacks on coastal investments, such as the ports of Sohar and Salalah and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in Duqm. While the physical damage was limited, the broader economic implications threaten the coastal investment strategy outlined in Oman’s Future Vision 2040, in which coastal investments are a crucial pillar of the economic diversification strategy.

Such attacks on Oman have revealed that traditional neutrality no longer guarantees security, and the breach of sovereignty sent an alarming signal to Muscat that a more explicit stance was necessary. Muscat condemned the attacks, some of which Tehran denied. Muscat then repeatedly criticized US-Israeli aggression against Iran, which brought chaos to the region. This was after the Omani Foreign Minister announced that the US and Iran were on the verge of reaching a genuine agreement on most of the complex issues causing hostility. The minister described the attacks as ‘illegal, shocking, but not surprising’ when military strikes were favored over a peace treaty that was within reach, and only hours after the most crucial round of talks. Furthermore, he described Iran’s immediate retaliation as ‘inevitable, albeit deeply regrettable’, as it led to unacceptable consequences and further escalation.

While other GCC capitals took a stronger position, refusing to support or participate in military operations, Muscat urged all sides to stop what it called ‘grave miscalculations’, calling for an immediate return to negotiations through engagement with other GCC states and other regional and international partners. Muscat emphasized its criticism of the war and called for an immediate ceasefire.

During the GCC foreign ministers’ meeting on 30 March, Muscat expressed its position to representatives from Russia and Jordan. At the same time, it continued its role as go-between through indirect talks with Washington and Tehran, stressing that the door for diplomacy remained open. Therefore, Oman is continuing its role as a stabilizing force, prioritizing diplomacy over all other means of resolving conflicts to ensure the stability of the Arab Gulf region and avoid military entanglement. This is in accordance with the fact that Oman’s security and economy are directly affected by the repercussions of the war.

Challenges to Muscat’s active role

One of the most significant challenges facing Muscat in its efforts to play an active role is reaching a consensus with the other GCC capitals on regional issues. These political differences have resulted in the absence of a collective GCC response mechanism to regional issues, whether political or military. Firstly, despite the GCC’s 45-year existence and the Peninsula Shield Force’s (PSF) 44-year history, this modest military force remains largely symbolic and lacks the capability to engage in a large-scale regional conflict due to its lack of air and naval elements. Secondly, Muscat is affected by regional polarization and a changing security landscape, which makes acting as an intermediary between the GCC states and Iran more difficult. Amid a polarized Arab Gulf environment, maintaining cordial ties can be difficult, reducing the chances of Muscat maintaining its neutrality. Therefore, Oman may be pressured into choosing sides, which would contradict its long-held political orientation.

Thirdly, the lack of robust leverage means that Oman’s regional role is being challenged by the emergence of new regional mediators, such as Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt. This reduces Oman’s unique diplomatic role, particularly given Muscat’s stance on the current crisis: it has explicitly condemned American and Israeli strikes on Iran, and warned against regional escalation and its repercussions for the region and the world. Fourthly, unlike other wealthier GCC states, Oman has financial constraints in the form of low financial reserves and high public debt. This reduces its ability to finance diplomatic initiatives and consequently reduces its regional footprint. Finally, Oman faces economic constraints, developmental challenges and an increasing unemployment rate, as well as a desperate need for economic diversification. This may reduce its ability to pursue an active foreign policy and instead divert its focus to domestic affairs.

Based on the foregoing and Oman’s traditional foreign policy approach, it is clear that Muscat has taken a firm stance by condemning both the American-Israeli and Iranian strikes. Calling on all parties to exercise restraint and avoid escalation, Muscat has also appealed to Iran to keep trade routes open and not to militarize the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, Oman recognizes that neutrality does not always guarantee security, as demonstrated by Iran’s targeting of some of its vital infrastructure. Therefore, Muscat now needs to achieve balance through two main strategies: Firstly, it should maintain its rapprochement with Tehran in order to advance diplomatic solutions, joining the initiative of regional actors such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt and Turkey to ensure the safety of maritime navigation routes and a regional environment conducive to foreign investment. This is vital to the future economic visions of all GCC states.

Secondly, Muscat should play a leading role in adopting a unified stance among the Gulf capitals regarding any foreign intervention that could lead to crises affecting the GCC states first. This can only be achieved by setting aside differing viewpoints and focusing on the collective benefits of regional stability. There must also be a firm conviction that prolonging the conflict will have serious repercussions for the GCC states themselves before it has regional and global effects. During a high-level briefing at the UN Security Council meeting on 2 April, GCC Secretary-General Jassim Al-Budaiwi stated that ‘The Gulf states do not favor war over peace, security and stability’, emphasizing that ‘dialogue and diplomacy remain the best way to address crises’ and that ‘continued escalation would undermine regional security and lead to serious repercussions for international peace and security’.

This could serve as a basis for a collective GCC perspective on regional politics and security that benefits not only Oman, but the entire region. While it does not necessitate a total transformation of Oman’s foreign policy or its decision-making autonomy, it does mean working in a more balanced manner with regional partners to ensure the security and stability of both the region and the country itself.

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ensions in the Middle East have intensified after senior Iranian adviser Ali Akbar Velayati warned that Tehran and its allies could move to shut the strategic Bab al-Mandeb, a vital maritime chokepoint linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. The threat comes amid an already fragile situation following disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, raising fears of a severe shock to global trade and energy supplies.

Velayati’s remarks signal a potential escalation in the standoff between Iran and the United States, particularly after U.S. President Donald Trump warned of possible military action if Tehran does not ease restrictions on Hormuz. Analysts say that if both waterways were simultaneously disrupted, the consequences for the global economy could be unprecedented.

The Bab al-Mandeb is one of the world’s most critical shipping routes. At just 29 kilometers wide at its narrowest point, it funnels maritime traffic between Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Around 10 percent of global trade passes through the strait, including vast quantities of oil, gas and consumer goods.

The waterway is bordered by Yemen to the northeast and Djibouti and Eritrea to the southwest. Control of the area has increasingly fallen under the influence of the Iran-aligned Houthi movement, which has demonstrated its capacity to disrupt shipping in recent years.

The strait’s importance has grown even further as alternative routes have come under strain. With instability affecting Hormuz, Gulf states have increasingly relied on Red Sea export routes, making Bab al-Mandeb an essential corridor for energy flows.

Energy markets at risk

Energy analysts warn that the closure of Bab al-Mandeb, especially in conjunction with restrictions in Hormuz, could block up to a quarter of the world’s oil and gas supply. Such a scenario would likely trigger a sharp spike in global energy prices, exacerbating inflation and straining economies already dealing with supply chain disruptions.

In 2024 alone, more than 4 billion barrels of crude oil and refined products transited through Bab al-Mandeb. Major producers such as Saudi Arabia depend on the route to export energy to Europe via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.

Riyadh has sought to mitigate risks by expanding use of its East-West Pipeline, which transports oil from the Gulf to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. However, experts note that pipeline capacity cannot fully replace maritime routes if both chokepoints are compromised.

“The global energy system is not designed to absorb simultaneous disruptions at Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb,” said one energy market analyst. “Even a temporary closure could send shockwaves through oil markets.”

Beyond energy, a closure would severely disrupt global trade flows. Goods shipped from Asia to Europe—ranging from electronics to clothing—typically pass through the Red Sea en route to the Mediterranean. If the Bab al-Mandeb becomes inaccessible, vessels would be forced to reroute around the southern tip of Africa via the Cape of Good Hope.

Such detours could add weeks to shipping times and significantly increase fuel costs. The result would likely be higher prices for consumers worldwide and delays in the delivery of essential goods.

Shipping companies have already shown sensitivity to security risks in the region. During previous Houthi attacks, insurers raised premiums or withdrew coverage altogether, forcing many firms to suspend operations in the Red Sea.

A “nightmare scenario” for global trade

The potential closure of the strait is closely tied to regional military dynamics. The Houthis have previously targeted vessels they associate with Israel or the United States, and analysts say it would take only a handful of attacks to halt commercial traffic entirely.

Former U.S. diplomat Nabeel Khoury noted that even limited strikes could have an outsized impact. “All it would take is a few successful attacks on ships to effectively shut down the corridor,” he said in recent commentary.

However, such a move could provoke a swift military response. The United States and its allies have repeatedly emphasized the importance of maintaining freedom of navigation in international waters. Any sustained disruption could trigger retaliatory strikes, particularly against Houthi positions in Yemen.

Experts describe the simultaneous disruption of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb as a worst-case scenario for the global economy. Elisabeth Kendall, a Middle East specialist, warned that such a development could “cripple” trade routes between Asia and Europe.

“It’s a knife-edge situation,” she said, noting that escalation could rapidly spiral beyond control. “The consequences would be felt far beyond the region, affecting everything from fuel prices to food supply chains.”

Despite the rhetoric, some analysts believe that a full closure remains unlikely, as it would risk drawing regional and global powers into a broader conflict. The Houthis, while capable of disruption, may seek to avoid provoking a large-scale military response from Saudi Arabia or Western forces.

For now, global markets remain on edge as diplomatic and military developments unfold. The threat to Bab al-Mandeb underscores the vulnerability of key maritime chokepoints and the outsized role they play in sustaining the global economy.

Whether the warnings translate into action remains unclear. But with tensions rising and strategic waterways under pressure, the world faces the prospect of a major disruption to trade not seen in decades.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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enocide and humanitarian crisis overshadowed what is traditionally a celebration of hope and renewal.

With fewer than 1,000 Christians remaining in the Gaza Strip, the community marked its third Easter under the devastating war that began after October 7, 2023. Many families are displaced, and churches that once hosted vibrant celebrations now hold only modest prayer services. Community members described the occasion as one of mourning rather than festivity, honoring those killed while clinging to hope for survival.

Basic necessities remain scarce across Gaza, affecting even symbolic traditions. Items like eggs—commonly decorated during Easter—are largely unavailable due to severe shortages. Longstanding restrictions, intensified during the genocide, have limited the flow of food, fuel, and essential goods into the territory, leaving residents struggling to maintain even the simplest customs.

Traditions lost, faith endures

Residents recalled how Easter once brought together families and neighbors—both Christian and Muslim—in shared celebration. Festive meals, visits to relatives, and children receiving sweets and gifts were once central to the holiday. Today, those traditions have largely disappeared, replaced by displacement, loss, and economic hardship.

Churches such as Gaza’s only Catholic parish have also suffered damage during the war, and attendance has declined as many Christians have fled. Still, those who remain continue to gather for prayer, emphasizing their deep-rooted presence in the land and their shared suffering with the wider Palestinian population.

Restricted worship and displacement

For the second consecutive year, Gaza’s Christians have been unable to travel to Jerusalem to attend services at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, one of Christianity’s holiest sites. Movement restrictions and security measures have further isolated the community during a period that typically draws pilgrims from around the world.

Meanwhile, ongoing displacement has forced many families to seek shelter in churches or temporary housing, often under difficult conditions. Elderly residents and long-time community members described a stark contrast between past celebrations filled with joy and the present reality marked by grief and uncertainty.

Despite these hardships, Gaza’s Christian community continues to observe its religious traditions in whatever way possible—holding onto faith and resilience in the face of ongoing war.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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lobal transfers of major arms rose sharply in the past five years, with European demand surging to unprecedented levels, according to new data released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The report highlights a 9.2 per cent increase in the volume of international arms transfers between 2016–20 and 2021–25, marking the largest rise in over a decade.

The increase was driven primarily by a dramatic escalation in arms imports to Europe, which more than tripled during the period. European states accounted for 33 per cent of global arms imports, making the region the world’s largest recipient for the first time in recent history. The surge reflects growing security concerns linked to Russia and the ongoing war in Ukraine, which alone received 9.7 per cent of all global arms transfers.

SIPRI researchers pointed to a broader shift in European defense policy. “Most European states have significantly increased their arms imports to strengthen military capabilities against a perceived growing threat from Russia,” said Mathew George, director of the institute’s Arms Transfers Program. In addition to Ukraine, countries such as Poland and the United Kingdom were among the region’s largest importers.