The NATO Summit in London has ended, but its outcomes are still a main topic of discussion for member countries. Since the main issue of concern was the future function of NATO, to save it from being “brain-dead”, as President Macron put it, the outcomes of the Summit have attracted the attention of the public as well as decision-makers. However, the final declaration of the Summit was far away from resolving all ambiguities related to the organization.

Although the declaration did not meet expectations, it was valuable to see the possible direction of NATO in the near future. The declaration underlined the importance of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which emphasizes that an attack against one ally shall be considered an attack against all members. The declaration also emphasized the importance of joint action against common threats such as terrorism and “security for all”.

Nevertheless, the Summit did not answer the question of how NATO would provide security for all members while its members had conflict of interests among each other. When the ongoing conflicts between Turkey and Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean issue was put to the NATO Secretary-General Stoltenberg, he stated that NATO was not part of the process to resolve issues between two countries. Indeed, this position clearly contradicts the final declaration of the Summit, and does not clarify the role of the organization when disputes arise between the member states.

Furthermore, the Summit could not draw a road map for renewing the function of NATO in the changing global order. The final declaration shows that unity against Russia’s “aggressive policy” is still at the top of the agenda for the organization. Moreover, the Summit paid attention to another rising challenger from the Far East, China, for the first time in its history. Although China’s increasing role in the defense industry and investments in 5G technology had been perceived as a challenge against NATO’s influence, NATO officially acknowledged this issue for the first time. “We recognize that China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance”, stated the final declaration. Thus, NATO seems to be paying more attention to China’s increasing role in the global order.

As well as these structural problems, the NATO Summit also could not meet expectations in resolving ongoing problems on the ground. The issue of foreign Daesh fighters was one of the topics leaders discussed during the summit. But, the sarcastic dialogue between Trump and Macron showed that European countries are maintaining their position of refusing to accept the return of foreign fighters. “Would you like some nice ISIS fighters? I could give them to you. You could take everyone you want,” asked Trump to Macron, but could not get a positive response.

The Summit also revealed that member states have differing interests in regional and international politics which also varies their security concerns. For instance, Turkey’s security concerns about YPG terrorism in Northern Syria is still not acknowledged by member states. Despite this, President Erdoğan’s emphasis that Turkey is determined to provide security in the region was a clear message to the member states criticizing Turkey’s military operation in the Northern Syria.

Overall, the London summit showed that NATO needs a more strategic approach to set long-term goals in a changing world order. It still suffers from trying to emphasize a common understanding of security for all member states without establishing a unified understanding of what that common threat might be. Whether China will fill this gap or not will be understood in the following years.

As the NATO summit celebrates the organization’s 70^th anniversary this week in London, this summit will not only discuss ongoing security issues, but unlike previous meetings will also include a more in-depth discussion on the future of NATO itself. Since French President Emmanuel Macron recently stated that NATO was  “brain dead” in his criticisms of Turkey’s actions in Syria, and far from meeting the security needs of member states, there have been increasing discussions on what should be the focus of NATO into the future.

Indeed, Macron’s statement is crucial to understand NATO’s position in the world. Since it was established during the Cold War era in response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union, its function since the end of this era has always been controversial. Although member states have had changing security concerns in the post-Cold War era, NATO has generally functioned well to overcome these security threats. However, disputes among the member states on the future role and function of NATO has been increasing in recent years.

One of the main reasons for this dispute is the rising tensions between the US and European countries over NATO’s short and long-term strategy. The US has criticized the contribution of European member states to NATO and has argued that the US does not get value in return. For instance, one of the prominent issues of disagreement is the disproportionate defense expenditure of NATO members. President Trump in particular has been highly vocal in his criticisms of European countries who did not meet their pledge to increase expenditure on defense spending to 2% of GDP. However, in a gesture of reconciliation before the summit, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced widespread defense spending increases across NATO, also highlighting that nine allies will meet the 2% target this year, an increase from three allies a few years ago.

Alongside this issue of expenditure, NATO indeed has more serious problems which may shape the future of the organization. These include relations of NATO members with Russia, terrorism threats, the intractable Syrian conflict, and the refugee crisis. Resolution of these issues will not be straight forward as many members hold differing positions on these issues. A situation which may continue to be a source of tension between member states into the future.

The latest example of this conflict was seen in the case of the defense plan for the Baltics. Turkey refused to sign the plan. This dispute is also related to the ongoing disagreements between the member states. During Turkey’s military operation in Northern Syria, Turkey could not get the support of NATO member states as it wanted. Because of this reason, Turkey blocked the recent plan to protest the double standards by NATO allies who clearly support the security of the Baltic countries and Poland but not Turkey.

As is seen in the case of this recent dispute, NATO member states do not have a common security strategy especially in the long term. This Summit will provide a platform for member states to discuss the current problems and create a common security strategy. However, it is obvious that since most of these problems are intractable and long-lasting, it will not be possible to solve them in the short run. Without solving the current problems and satisfying the security needs of member states, it is not possible to have a consensus on a common security strategy. Despite this, the Summit may be useful to discuss how NATO can change to meet the needs of a new global order.

David C. Rapoport, a name often referenced in literature on terrorism, explains modern terrorism using a “four waves” theory based on models of political violence that change over the course of history. According to Rapoport, each wave represents one generation with each generation inspired by a different ideology (anarchism, anti-colonialism, socialism and religious fundamentalism). The first wave was the “Anarchist wave” that began in the 1870s and continued until the 1910s, during which achieving a revolution by targeting political leaders and assassinations using explosives took place. The second wave was the “Anti-Colonial wave” prominent between the 1920s and 1960s, led by the political principle of self-determination. This wave was driven by the desire to establish new independent states by overthrowing colonialist administrations, and mainly targeted the colonial police and the military using guerrilla style hit-and-run tactics. The third wave was the “New Left wave” that made its mark between the 1960s and 1980s. It was motivated by a desire to dissolve the capitalist order, and targeted governments like the U.S. During this wave, hijacking, abductions and assassination attempts were common. The fourth is the “Religious wave” that started in 1979 and is predicted to continue to the end of the 2020s, in which the mass media and communication tools are used to target the U.S., Israel and Europe for the intent and purpose of founding a “global Islamic Caliphate,”. In this wave, suicide attacks are commonly organized while air and land vehicles are widely used as weapons.

Rapoport’s “four waves of terrorism” has greatly contributed to terrorism studies in conceptual, theoretical and empirical terms, but it could not escape from becoming one of the most criticized approaches. According to some critics, the four waves theory is problematic for attributing certain types of terror acts only to specific periods, and because the waves do not always coincide with reality. The theory, as argued, might be misleading for attempting to explain terrorist violence using historical trends, which make sharp distinctions between each period. Likewise, Rapoport ignores the fact of “organizational learning”, that is to say he glossed over the lessons that terrorist groups learned from history when developing his wave theory. No matter if they are newly-founded or long-established, terror groups are known to observe, analyze and benefit from the knowledge, experience, success or mistakes of other terror groups; and develop new tactics, strategies and targets peculiar to their own dynamics. By departing from the wave theory and its criticisms, terrorist groups can simultaneously embody different ideologies, and use a plurality of discourses, hence adopting many forms and practices of political violence. Looked at from this perspective, the relations between states and non-state armed actors are no longer considered to be “covert” or “illegitimate” as it was in the past. To put it more clearly, the relationships between states and non-state armed actors are currently more overt and based on legitimate grounds. These relationships increasingly fall within grey areas, which become more and more blurred. This reality, known as “proxy wars” in the literature, explains the dubious network of relations between these actors and also how the actions of terror groups are legitimized by states politically, militarily, diplomatically or judicially.

Political and Institutional Dimensions

Turkey has confronted, both directly or indirectly, all four terrorism waves stated above. In this sense, Turkey has a long-standing experience of fighting an uphill battle against a variety of terror groups, which have different purposes and motives, are utterly flexible and can quickly adapt to new conditions in terms of their recruitment and attacking methods. These various terror groups with different ideological causes and target groups, have included the DHKP-C, TKP/ML, MKP, MLKP, THKO, PKK/PYD/YPG, ASALA, JCAG-ARA, IBDA/C (Hezbollah), FETO/PDY and Daesh (ISIS).[1]

Since the early 1980s, counterterrorism gained priority in determining Turkey’s domestic, foreign, security and defense policies, and has become a focal point in Turkish politics. So how has Turkey’s counterterrorism strategy changed over the course of time?  What is the picture of Turkey with growing terrorism experience in the face of terror groups with a growing (organizational) learning capability?  This picture has undergone some substantial changes from the 2000s due to the major transformation of the actors and factors both inside and outside the country. Turkey had to revise and change some aspects of its counter-terror policy during the early 2000s after the PKK, a terror group Turkey has been fighting for decades, adopted an ethnicity-centered separatist discourse in response to changing developments nationally, regionally and internationally although it was originally founded on the basis of a Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Since the early 1980s, counterterrorism gained priority in determining Turkey’s domestic, foreign, security and defense policies, and has become a focal point in Turkish politics.

The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent terror attacks in Istanbul, London, and Madrid at the turn of the millennium changed the course of counterterrorism strategies on a global scale. Security parameters were redefined and military strategies and technologies were reviewed within the framework of a threat and risk-based analysis. This process made it necessary for Turkey to evaluate the military-political transformation in the world and led to an increasing awareness of the need for a military-political transformation of its own. Under this process, a new political will, which prioritized Turkey’s national security and defense according to the needs and purposes of the era, emerged.

Political will was demonstrated when Ankara first endeavored to build a balance between the “civilian” and “military” bureaucracy that determined national security and defense strategies. Ankara projected that this would not be enough to prevent the differing civilian and military divisions from having domination over the other and a reformation of the bureaucracy that would enable coordination, close cooperation and a joint decision-making mechanism was needed. This manifested in the strong inter-governmental dialogue mechanism established between the Presidential Office, Foreign Ministry, National Defense Ministry, General Staff and National Intelligence Office (MIT) that considered foreign, security and defense policies.

Military and Strategic Dimensions

The most obvious and tangible conceptualization of Ankara’s changing strategic approach in the counterterrorism fight has been the transition from a “reactive strategy” to “proactive strategy”. Ankara abandoned a “wait and see” strategy and “retaliatory action”, and instead adopted the method of identifying, finding, tracking and neutralizing the enemy in its own place/location in order to prevent any sort of threats, such as carrying out a “pre-emptive air strike” on the PKK’s training camps in Northern Iraq. This new approach was also seen in Operation Euphrates Shield, Operation Olive Branch, and recently in Operation Peace Spring, and is currently ongoing in full force with the “Operation Claw” outside the borders and the Operations Kıran 1-2-3-4 inside the country.

The implementation and functionality of this strategy required Turkey to consolidate its intelligence and operational skills.  Reorganization and reformation endeavors were carried out in many areas including the military system, defense methods, internal security apparatus, joint operations between the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and the MIT, and integrated security and defense mechanisms. The reforms made particularly in the security sector ensured a more systematic approach to Turkey’s counterterrorism activities.

Turkey’s MIT intensified its cross-border intelligence activities, formed a stronger information network and focused investments on human resources.

In this context, Turkey also strived to reanalyze the scale of threats, including from both state and non-state armed actors, in terms of their conceptual features, means and capabilities and medium or long-term objectives. This was done in line with Turkey’s security perception, risk maps, perpetuity concerns and national interests.

As an extension of this endeavor, the MIT intensified its cross-border intelligence activities, formed a stronger information network by becoming more active in the field and focused investments on human resources to expand and strengthen its intelligence analysis skills. It is obvious that the intelligence analyses will enable Ankara to have more information on the means and capabilities (both quantitatively and qualitatively) of threat factors and thus make decision-making processes more informed while increasing the chances of getting favorable results.

Technological Dimension

Ankara also focused its attention on ways to eliminate the limitations it faced in its defense capacity. Conflicts of interest with other NATO allies, particularly with the U.S., has always resulted in a heavy price for Turkey. For this reason, Ankara aims to gain an independent status in security and defense while remaining loyal to regional alliances like NATO. Gaining this independence does not mean that Ankara would only cooperate with alternative actors other than NATO. In contrast, Ankara diversified the scope of its foreign suppliers in order to avert dependence on a single source and encouraged existing and new suppliers inside the country. In doing this, Ankara presumed that Turkey will obtain the means and capabilities required for “self-defense”, and now domestic resources fulfill more than 60 percent of the Turkish Armed Forces’ needs. Furthermore, Ankara subjected its defense bureaucracy to institutional reformation and made it answerable to the Presidential Office, while also mobilizing the Turkish defense industry on a pathway to realizing greater technological superiority and global competitiveness.

The increase in the product range and export figures of the Turkish defense industry proves the progress made in this field. Turkey’s employment of its domestic and national defense products in the counterterrorism operations inside and outside the country has been very useful in terms of its institutional reputation and self-assurance. Considering that non-state armed actors today have easier and quicker access to technologies compared to past (such as kamikaze UAV attacks), it must be noted that Turkey cannot afford to neglect the objective of technological superiority.

Socio-Cultural Dimension

Ankara has adopted a multi-dimensional approach in its counter-terrorism policy as of the early 2000s. As a requirement of this approach, Ankara has sought to break the impression that Turkey solely resorts to hard power and tried to show that it has been prioritizing a broader position that shows care in using soft power instruments. For this purpose, Ankara has developed a set of measures to prevent terror groups from gaining recruits and supporters while endeavoring to neutralize the terror elements. Ankara also started taking initiatives in social, cultural and educational fields by being cognizant of how vital it is to develop preventive and proactive measures against the “radicalization” efforts of the political and military offshoots of the PKK-YPG-PYD terror network. Allowing language freedom in mass media is only one example of these initiatives.

As a result, Ankara has adopted a model that combines both soft and hard power elements in its counterterrorism policy, which over the course of the past 18 years has made Turkey a more effective country in the fight against terrorism.

[1] One of the recently published article on this issue is entitled as “Terrorism in Turkey from the New Left Wave to the Global Wave”.  See Avcı, Engin, “Yeni Sol Dalgadan Küresel Dalgaya Türkiye’de Terörizm”, Kara Harp Okulu Bilim Dergisi/Science Journal of Turkish Military Academy, Haziran /June 2019, Cilt/Volume 29, Sayı/Issue 1, s 139-166.

Germany became a member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the sixth time at the beginning of this year. While being a member for 2019-2020, Germany will also hold the UNSC’s presidency in April, which it took over from one of its closest partners, France, for the first time. The last time Germany acted as a non-permanent member of the UNSC had been in 2011-2012, when a CDU/CSU-FDP coalition was governing Germany and when the country faced harsh criticism by its Western allies due to abstaining from the UNSC vote on intervention in Libya (2011).

As a current non-permanent UNSC member, Germany’s main goals will be to concentrate on addressing ongoing crises and conflicts, where it will set its own priorities. By this, the country’s foreign ministry points to issues such as “women, peace and security” which “will play a key role, as will disarmament and arms control.”

Germany’s 2024 projections to increase its defense spending to 1.5% of gross domestic production will not meet NATO’s expectations of the 2% target.

During the same week that Germany took over the UNSC presidency, NATO commemorated its 70th anniversary in Washington, where alongside U.S. Vice President Mike Pence, several other think-tanks and platforms close to American lobbies criticized Germany’s unwillingness to increase its defense spending. Some commentators have even addressed a return of a so-called new “New German Question in Europe.”

In this sense, although it is known that Germany’s 2024 projections to increase its defense spending to 1.5% of gross domestic production will not meet NATO’s expectations of the 2% target, Germany has once again faced direct and indirect criticisms from various circles. But to be honest, both in Germany and abroad, expectations to meet the 1.5% target until 2024 is not perceived credible at all.

Therefore, Germany’s ambitions, particularly in the context of its UNSC membership for the next two years, will ultimately end the discourse of defense spending. However, the fact that Germany has the ambition to become a permanent UNSC member in the long run, which is unrealistic and unlikely to happen, will most likely not match the main expectations of the five permanent members of the UNC – who at the end of the day, have the power to veto any form of UNSC reform proposal.

Germany has found itself in an uncomfortable position: on the one hand, it wants to become a dominant power in global politics, but, on the other, it is constantly being criticized by the U.S. and NATO for not spending “enough” on defense.

Thus, Germany has found itself in a rather uncomfortable position, as while on the one hand it wants to become a more dominant power in global politics, on the other, it is constantly being criticized by the U.S. and NATO for not spending “enough” on defense. In order to circumvent and by-pass these accusations and challenges, Germany has been acting with France. But one should not disregard the crucial differences between these two leading EU countries. It is a fact that Germany will not become a permanent member of the UNSC in the foreseeable future and that France has been a permanent member since the establishment of the body in 1945. Moreover, while Germany has stressed its support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which aims to limit the global spread of nuclear weapons, there is less hope that P5 states will share similar positions.

Cooperating and acting closely with France and attempting to utilize the UNSC presidency that will last for a month alone are factors that underpin Germany’s global importance and ambitions of being a more active global actor. However, the reality – such as the false dream that Germany will become a permanent UNSC member and Germany’s unwillingness to increase its defense spending – will only cause limited local achievements.

Turkey held one of the most important local elections this past week. The election campaigns were mostly shaped by Turkish foreign and security policies concerning the Syrian crisis, the PKK, and the fight against terrorism. The AK Party won the popular vote although it lost the major strongholds to the main opposition party. Istanbul, traditionally ruled by conservative parties since 1994, and the capital Ankara were lost to the opposition bloc, which was represented by a coalition called the National Alliance (In Istanbul, the re-count of votes are still ongoing and an official declaration will be announced by the YSK). It seems that the AK Party will continue dominating the Turkish political landscape via the 45% majority vote that it scored recently, which is unchallengeable by any other single party alone at this stage – It must be noted here that the People’s Alliance, consisting of the AK Party and MHP (Nationalist Movement Party), won the majority of the votes by 52%.

Winning Istanbul in 1994 was the first step of President Erdoğan’s long-term journey in the Turkish political sphere, in which he became the first political leader in Turkish politics who has stayed in power for more than 16 years. However, whether or not he has lost his first love, Istanbul– which he frames as Islambul, remains unclear not only because of the election result but also due to the changing nature of politics in Turkey. The result depends entirely on which side of the coin you look at to make sense of the result of the local election.

President Erdoğan remains Turkey’s most powerful leader while others’ approval individually is not more than 20% and more importantly, his ruling AK Party maintains its dominant party position in Turkish politics. While his rating is somewhat high especially compared to others, the results of the local election are taken seriously by him and high-level AK Party members on whether the AK Party should rethink its political strategy and narrative regarding current Turkish politics. This was highlighted by the President in his traditional balcony speech just after the local election while the result of Istanbul was unclear. He strongly underlined that the political message that his supporters wanted to give him was understood. He stressed that Turkey has serious challenges in its foreign and security policy, including the fight against terrorism and other regional issues such as Syria, and underlined that his term would continue for more than four years, where he and his ruling party would use their abilities to reshape Turkish politics regarding what AK Party supporters and the rest of the society would like to see.

After the election results on Sunday, President Erdogan strongly underlined that the political message that his supporters wanted to give him was understood. 

President Erdoğan and his ruling party are aware of the reality that there is a mutually constitutive relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy. The subject of survival was articulated heavily during the election campaign where it held the dominant narrative. The concept has been a dominant reference point of Turkish domestic and foreign security policy for more than two centuries. However, in current Turkish foreign policy, the AK Party and President Erdoğan should focus on firstly, a comprehensive foreign and security policy strategy, rather than emphasizing the concept of survival. In international politics, survival is an integral part of understanding state behavior, and most believe that it is the ultimate behavior of state; and that states should seriously seek for the best strategy to survive. It is true that Turkey has many challenges stemming from its own geopolitical landscape and long-time allies, namely the U.S, but Ankara should rethink its foreign and security policies beyond the concept of survival.

The reason is simple; the future of the AK Party at home will be determined by its performance in its foreign and security policy, or vice versa. More to the point, the success of the AK Party came to be as a result of its ability to adjust the domestic-international balance simultaneously. It took Turkey’s EU journey into account: The EU agenda was one of the important determinants factors behind the rise of the “Turkish model” in the Middle East and beyond while domestic politics became free from military tutelage.  

The concept of survival has been a dominant reference point of Turkish domestic and foreign security policy. But now the AK Party and President Erdogan should focus on a comprehensive foreign and security policy strategy.

There are three reasons why Turkey should be serious about its foreign and security policy. The first one is economic reasons, which President Erdoğan also emphasized would be the most important priority in the government’s agenda. The economy has been a crucial component of Turkish foreign policy for sixteen years which Turkey has enjoyed being a “trading state” where the concept is based on trade-driven integration strategies rather than security-driven foreign policy, especially in its surrounding regions. Under the shadow of current economic pressure, Turkish foreign policy has to recalculate its strategy and should find a new modality regarding how to recalibrate its economic relations to overcome the current economic upheaval. Turkey is still one of the most energetic countries in the MENA region with its dynamic economy, large population, the relative weight of its diplomatic influence over the regional issues and rising defense industry. There can be no ultimate strategic gain for Turkey without maintaining its economic rise in foreign affairs, and there is no economic gain without maintaining its diplomatic engagements.       

The second reason is political stability, which President Erdoğan has been underlining its strategic importance to consolidate Turkey’s rise in international politics since he came to power. The post-local election period poses opportunities, as well as challenges, for Turkey’s gradual rise. The structural and political consolidation of the presidential system is the most challenging one. From a structural side, the institutional regulations in the post-parliamentary order are still dynamics where many institutions need to be properly relocated and redesigned. From a very political perspective, it is possible to argue that the election dynamics in Turkey have significantly changed; which indicates the possibility of an achieved bipolar balance despite the continued dominance of the People’s Alliance.

The local election emphasizes that there are many ways in constituting an alliance system between different parties irrespective of their ideological differences. From a truly pragmatic reading of politics; it reminds us of the well-known saying: “the ally of today could be your rival tomorrow.” Therefore, political stability under President Erdoğan for the next four years is strategically important, where domestic and international balance will mutually facilitate one another to keep political stability in Turkey since both the AK Party and MHP, strongly support the continuity of the People’s Alliance. The foreign and security policy of Turkey will be certainly influential not only to consolidate political stability but also to maintain the alliance between two parties.        

There has been increasing radical-extremist political ideologies across to Europe which influences Turkey’s EU perspective but, securitizing Europe is not a good strategy for Turkey’s long-term interests.

The third reason is the combined foreign and security domain, in the scope of the upcoming practical issues in Turkey’s external affairs. First and foremost, re-energizing the Turkey-EU relationship, which has been poisoned by the rise of anti-Turkish politics and increasing unwillingness to have Turkey join the EU, particularly since 2013, is crucial. The EU has been the main determining factor, if not only one, behind the consolidation of Turkish democracy, including civil-military relations and basic human rights. Turkey and the EU should learn how to compartmentalize their relations. Under the current geopolitical upheaval stemming from BREXIT to Trump’s unwillingness towards both NATO and the EU, Turkey remains a strategically important powerhouse, especially with its crucial engagement with Russia, and political and military engagement to the Syrian conflict. Turkey, on the other hand, should not homogenize or categorize Europe only with reference to Islamophobia, far-right extremism, or Turkofobia. Yes, it is true that there has been increasing radical-extremist political ideologies across to Europe which influences Turkey’s EU perspective but, securitizing Europe is not a good strategy for Turkey’s long-term interests.

In addition to the EU/Europe, the Turkey-U.S. relationship is under significant challenges. The U.S. administration since 2013 has been repeatedly undermining Turkey’s national security interests by supporting the PYD-YPG in Syria and currently is threatening in retaliation for Ankara’s decision to move ahead with the purchase of a Russian air missile system. The foreign and security issues are not limited to the U.S. Turkey should be careful with regards to the PKK issue in Syria, but at the same time should not forget that the Middle East is bigger than the PKK. It does not necessarily mean that Turkey should not prioritize the PKK, as it is a high-level national security threat. Rather, it means that Turkey should consider the Middle East and its interests from a wider geopolitical perspective.

The EU has been the main determining factor behind the consolidation of Turkish democracy, including civil-military relations and human rights. Turkey and the EU should learn how to compartmentalize their relations.

The region is significantly transforming, the nature of actors in the region are dramatically changing and the geopolitical competition among the regional actors is getting more antagonizing. The regional system sends clear signals that Turkey should respond with caution. What Turkey needs to do in the post-local election period is to redraw its foreign policy priorities from a very pragmatic and practical way, refocus its reformist agenda in foreign policy, and obtain a balanced strategy.  

The murder of Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul has revealed the truth about “surveillance culture” in Turkey. During the investigation phase of the incident, many noticed that Istanbul has a widespread network of security cameras that either belong to official security units or private owners. This network of security cameras was the most important instrument that helped the police and intelligence officials to determine the fate of the Saudi journalist after he entered the Saudi Consulate and could not leave. Investigators revealed the details of how the Saudi hit-squad of 15 men mobilized before, during, and after the unfortunate incident that took place on 2 October.

As the events unfolded, the Saudi officials claimed that their camera system was not working on that days, causing serious suspicions regarding their role in Khashoggi’s disappearance. In the aftermath of these claims, following a thorough analysis on the security camera network around the consulate, Turkish security sources were able to confirm that Khashoggi never left the consulate building. Soon after this information was made public, the Turkish media reported that the police have the visual and audio evidence of how Khashoggi was brutally murdered inside the Saudi Consulate on that day.

The use of surveillance cameras that belong to security services and privately owned units reveal that there is a well-established culture of electronic security systems in Turkey. This culture has been growing rapidly since the early 2000s. In this regard, Turkey is one of the best-equipped countries in its neighborhood, including many EU member states.

This surveillance culture has played a crucial role in the prevention of crimes, the detection of criminals and the security of the general public. For instance, there are around 7000 security cameras that belong to the City Security Management System of the Istanbul Security Directorate. The existence of these cameras play a crucial role in securing the largest city in Turkey, Istanbul, which has a population of around 17 million. In addition to this, Istanbul’s security is also ensured with around a 100,000-strong network of security cameras in local municipalities, shopping centres, offices, housing units, social facilities, parking lots, and public transportation vehicles.

Security camera network in Turkey is not only limited to Istanbul. Many metropolitan cities throughout the country are equipped with an extensive network of security cameras. On the other hand, security camera systems used in houses and workplaces have also been increasingly popular for individuals and companies. In most cases, these systems provide instant viewing and archive data for a specific period. While such systems are becoming more common in Turkey, they still stand around 2%, while in countries such as the U.S., this rate is 20%. However, it’s important to bear in mind that while the global market of security camera networks has increased around 7%, this rate is 10% for Turkey.

Turkish security and intelligence units have been benefiting from security camera networks in their struggle with terrorist organizations such as the PKK, PYD and DAESH. Particularly in recent years, security forces have been able to thwart attacks from these terrorist organizations with the help of electronic security systems. Therefore, the widespread use of surveillance camera networks has serious consequences for such terrorist organizations and other illegal groups.

With the increasing success in Turkish security and intelligence units, terror groups have been pressured more than ever before and thus are discouraged from organizing attacks. More, their capacity has also collapsed due to the complex defense instruments that are utilized by security forces.

A concise and wide network of security cameras is also a factor that prevents crime. Terrorist organizations and criminal networks that are aware of these intense electronic security measures have been unable to operate as they used to. With the increasing advancement that comes with such technological capability, it has become easier to identify individuals that commit such crimes or terrorist attacks.

The most recent example of this occurred with Jamal Khashoggi’s murder. Turkish security units tracked down the 15-member hit squad who are responsible for the murder. It’s due to Turkey’s developing surveillance culture and utilization of security camera networks that allowed the police to figure out the details of the killing, which was later – as they had no choice – admitted by Saudi authorities.

Despite the provisions aimed at preventing Turkey’s procurement of F-35s in H.R. 5515 (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019), the Pentagon confirmed that Turkey’s first F-35 delivery will take place – as it did – in Fort Worth, Texas on June 21. While it is clear that the U.S. government is employing the F-35 program as political leverage against Ankara, an approved restriction on Turkey’s F-35 procurement process is likely to create a lose-lose situation for both NATO allies, and yield dire consequences for Turkish-American bilateral relations and strategic military partnership in the Middle East.

As put forth in the House bill, the U.S. insists on removing Turkey, a prominent Lockheed partner and NATO ally, from the F-35 program. Turkey’s intention to purchase Russian S-400 air missile defense systems, and the detention of the American pastor, Andrew Brunson,– who has been accused by the Turkish court for serving the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) following the July 15 coup attempt– are stated to be the major reasons behind the American resentment.

The emergence of terrorist groups such as Daesh and the PYD, and various external threats emanating from the interest of international actors against Turkey’s will in the region have made it necessary for Ankara to obtain air defense systems. The idea of removing Turkey from the F-35 program is hazardous as it will further deteriorate Turkish-American relations, push Turkey towards further cooperation with Russia and discredit American legitimacy on the international arena.

Turkish-American relations have considerably deteriorated due to the U.S.’s encouraging approach towards the PKK/PYD in Syria. Preventing Turkey from procuring F-35s on the eve of a potential political rapprochement over the agreement of Manbij and the FBI-initiated investigation on the FETO case is likely to further damage cooperation between the two NATO allies. By procuring F-35s, Ankara aims to protect Turkish national interests and provide safety in its immediate surroundings, which is not only beneficial for Turkey but also for the NATO alliance.

Turkey has long served as NATO’s Eastern-wing by participating in numerous joint military operations and monitoring tasks, globally. Instead of disqualifying Turkey from the F-35 program, the U.S. should focus on improving military cooperation with Ankara. If the Senate passes H.R.5515 without an amendment to the current provisions against Turkey’s F-35 procurement, Turkey will have no choice but to purchase Russian S-400s to compensate its essential air defense system needs in the short-run. This will also accelerate Ankara’s desire to cooperate with other non-NATO countries in the defense sector.

From a political point of view, the current provisions of the House bill degrade the U.S.’s international legitimacy and trustworthiness, as the pastor Brunson case is a conjuncture and a bilateral issue and has no direct links to the F-35 program. It is, in fact, entirely incidental that pastor Brunson’s case casts a pall on such a crucial military and economic agreement. Turkey is one of the original nine partner countries and has been dedicated to the F-35 program. Currently, Turkey’s industrial participation in the manufacturing and assembly of the F-35 program reaches over $12 billion. The interruption of such a high-volume military project will not only put a severe financial burden on the U.S. but will also slow down the production and procurement processes of the F-35s for the remaining partner countries, undermining the U.S.’s adherence to international commitments. If the U.S. Senate insists on Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program due to the S-400 deal and pastor Brunson case, the ongoing conjunctural issues between the two states are likely to turn into deepened structural crises.

In case of removal, Turkey might rethink its ongoing military commitments involving the Incirlik Air Base. This includes intelligence surveillance, fight against terrorism, and other NATO-affiliated international missions. During the Cold War era, it was understood that military and economic sanctions are not the best strategies to alter Turkey’s independent policies. More importantly, in the presence of the current security issues in the Middle East and other critical regions, such as Eastern Europe, there is a competing geopolitical narrative vis-a-vis Turkey’s strategic importance among U.S. security establishments. This will be the main determining factor in the Pentagon report to the Senate, which will provide a detailed analysis on U.S.-Turkey relations.

It is evident that Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program will not eliminate potential risks by Russia. It will only hamper NATO influence in the region and further deteriorate Turkish-American relations, as part of a lose-lose scenario.

Since the beginning of the 2000s, Turkey has been one of nine prime partner nations of the JSF and one of its biggest customers – with 116 stealth fighters on order. Besides, Turkey has been partnering with Lockheed Martin for over 25 years, primarily on the F–16 and continued this partnership by joining F–35. However, a bill introduced by senators Lankford, Tillis and Shaheen aims to prevent the transfer of F-35s to Turkey and aims to keep the country out of being a maintenance depot for stealth fighters.

The bill set the stage for reconsidering relations between Turkey and the U.S., as it seems like the two country’s are no longer strategic partners, but rather are turning into foes. As can be expected, neither will the U.S. or Turkey live happily ever after, nor will the hostile attidue of the senators continue forever. In any case, in the end, “mutual interests” will probably suppress the “clash of interests.”

U.S.-Turkey relations have soured since March 1, 2003, when the Turkish Parliament refused to pass a proposal to allow U.S. troops to operate from the Incirlik Base during the Iraq War. Since then, Turkey has repeatedly come face-to-face with the U.S. in the Middle East. So the current F-35 case is not the first and will not be the last case for Turkey having experienced undesired congressional responses whenever the country disagrees with U.S. policy due to its defense and security needs. An example of this in recent years is the big clash that arose due to the “local force” that was initially designed by the U.S. to be used against Daesh.

For Turkey, the PYD/YPG is a terrorist organization and the Syrian arm of the PKK – which the country has been fighting against for almost 40 years both within and outside its borders. The same terrorist organization – the YPG – is accepted by the U.S. as the most capable ground force (although it is initially listed by the CIA as an offshoot organization of the PKK in Syria) in fighting Daesh, and thus deserves to be fully supported with aids and arms. In addition to this, the Turkish government has been seeking the extradition of Fetullah Gulen, while American pastor Brunson is still being judged in Turkey. Tensions again rose to a higher level due to the AK Party’s severe criticism towards Israel and U.S. opportunism in Syria and Palestine, as well as Turkey’s planned purchase of S400 systems and the contract signed for domestic industrial cooperation.

Same Punishment Methodology

Ankara eventually got used to undesired responses, threatening patterns of Congress and sanctions whenever the interests of the U.S. clashed with Turkey’s. As you may also recall, the Cyprus issue (Johnson’s letter warning Turkey not to use NATO equipment), the 1974 Peace Operation (U.S. Congress to impose an embargo on arms transfers to Turkey), and the political differences between the U.S. and Turkey, especially in regards to the fight against terror, are the first examples that come to mind. Congress is once again utilizing the punishment methodology on its strategic partner and wants Turkey to be sanctioned if Ankara completes the purchase of Russia’s S-400s. However, Congress needs to remember that the U.S. was also a bidder in the T-LORAMIDS but could not fully meet Turkey’s criteria in regards to technology transfer, local contribution, delivery date and price.

Besides, Congress should also keep in mind that Greece is the only NATO member that purchased the Russian made S-300PMU-1 system in the mid-1990s (Bulgari and Slovakia are also NATO members that posses S-300s in their inventories). Moreover, at the NATO Missile Firing Installation in Crete, in December 2013, Greece carried out its first test firing of the missle as part of an operational live exercise, “White Eagle.” Here we must ask why Greece has the privilege to make use of a Russian system operative after so many years and why Israel is the only country allowed to customize U.S. F-35s.

Political reaction, not final decision

The bill is a political reaction against the AK Party government, and is not really dealing with technological concerns. Certainly, the political reasoning behind the bill is Ankara’s close ties with Moscow. For the U.S. and NATO, F-35s symbolize the deterrent power of the West against challenger powers such as Russia and China. If Turkey purchases S400s, then Turkey will become a strategic deterrent with Russian military technology. If Russia sells this system to a NATO country, then it will also increase its own current deterrent.

From a different perspective, the main goal of acquiring high tech systems such as F-35s is to increase deterrence and military capabilities against hostile state and non-state military actors. As a matter of fact, the U.S. clearly defines the potential hostile countries as Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. Therefore, Turkey’s cooperation and trade in military technology with Russia is somewhat perceived as a successful attempt of the Putin administration to shade U.S. power. However, Turkey’s external orientation in purchasing a missile system from Russia must be analyzed through the whole process – namely how Turkey was left alone in struggling to meet its defense and security needs.

Lose-lose situation

If Senate approves the bill to punish Ankara, then it will punish its own defense company Lockheed Martin as well. Yet Turkey is one of the company’s biggest customers, with 116 stealth fighters on order. Either way, Turkey will pay a high price for a fifth-generation jet fighter purchased from either the U.S. or another country. None of the world’s largest arms exporters would want to lose a customer such as Turkey while Russian and Chinese companies are dying to sell their own combat jets. In other words, during a time where rivalry is increasing among suppliers, none of the world’s largest arm exporting countries – including the U.S. – would ever want to lose such a major client. In this respect, the Senate needs to carefully examine its gains and losses in regards to the income that will be earned by companies within the defense ecosystem as well as their power of lobbying. Losing Turkey by keeping it out of the JSF also means that the U.S. would weaken its own strategic objectives in the Middle East.

What really happens if Turkey is left out of the F-35 program?

Firstly, Turkey’s deteriorating relationship with the U.S. will worsen; the increasing tension between the two countries will bring unfavorable reflections over deals in areas such as terrorism, especially against Daesh in Syria. More, this decision might also have negative impacts on relations between Turkey and NATO. As it is known, NATO plans to set up a 30,000-strong reserve force in order to improve its combat readiness. As a NATO member sanctioned by the U.S., Turkey would most probably not want to contribute to the Atlantic Alliance and would not want to take an active place in a variety of missions.

Secondly, Turkey will bring the issue to a trial and file a claim for compensation in accordance with the original agreement. This agreement is not only about purchase through foreign procurement, but is also about co-production. For instance, Turkey’s Roketsan collaborated with Lockheed Martin for the development, production, marketing, selling and supporting of Turkey’s SOM-J air-launched cruise missile for the F-35 Lighting II combat jet. Likewise, TAI has also undertaken important responsibilities in contributing to the program. For instance, one of the most complex structural sections of the aircraft, “F-35A Center Fuselage” is produced by TAI as a second source. There are also other work-packages such as F-35 A/B/C Composite Components, F-35A’s Metallic Sub-Assemblies and Air Inlet Ducts and F-35 A/B/C Air-to-Ground Alternate Mission Equipment Pylon Manufacturing.

Thirdly, Turkey might embark on a quest to buy fifth generation fighters from other countries such as Russia’s SU-57 and China’s J-31. However, if Turkey decides to buy a fighter jet from a non-NATO country, this may lead to infrastructure and technology problems. Lastly, the Senate’s sanction method does not seem to be the best way to keep Turkey in NATO’s security architecture. While political issues are undermining relations between Turkey and the U.S., the military aspect is without a doubt the most crucial part to sustain strategic relations between the two countries.

President Trump announced the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Iran Nuclear Deal. This brief will shed light on several legal implications arising from this historic decision by the Trump administration. First, while the Iran Nuclear Deal connotes an international agreement signed by six states and the Islamic Republic Iran, it does not have the same legal features as an international agreement does under international law. It is a mere political commitment, as opposed to a legally binding international agreement. Former President Barack Obama made considerable efforts to strike this deal. However, he followed the procedure to adopt the deal as an executive agreement, rather than a treaty passed by the Senate. Therefore, this facilitated his successor to withdraw from the agreement, specifically at the international level. Nevertheless, the Trump administration would not have been legally bound to continue with the deal, even if it had been adopted as a treaty.

So, how does the current legislation define the scope of the sanctions regime? Section 3 of the presidential memorandum signed on May 8 provides a to-do-list for the State Department and Treasury Department. According to this section, several executive orders will be “re-issued,” and individuals on the sanction lists will be “re-listed.” The government will re-register more persons and entities on the list of Specifically Designated Nationals (SDN), and this will require more enforcement effort. It will be more likely that a company, whether in the U.S. or overseas, appears on the radar unless they cut their commercial relations with Iran. These increased enforcement efforts can result in more cases that are brought against entities, banks, and companies.

The direct effect against Iranian nationals and entities in the U.S. is not anticipated to be much, since the withdrawal decision was not a surprise for them. They can move all of their assets from U.S. jurisdiction, limiting the territorial effect of the decision. However, the adverse effect will be dramatic for Europe, since U.S. enforcement authorities are not reluctant to exercise their jurisdiction over individuals and entities overseas. The withdrawal decision allows them no option but to cut off their commercial relations with Iran. The memorandum issued on May 8 explicitly instructed the State and Treasury Department “to [prepare the] guidance necessary to educate United States and non-United States business communities on the scope of the prohibited and sanctionable activity.” Hence, the government will make additional efforts to assist business communities around the world to adapt to the changes.

While U.S. authorities will attempt to implement a detailed plan to revive the sanctions against Iran, it is not clear how this will produce far-reaching effects on non-U.S. business. For instance, the high amount of fines will not only jeopardize business, but also create additional political conflict between European countries and the U.S. One notable example was the fine imposed against BNP Paribas in 2014. The amount of the fine did not only harm the French financial system, it caused tension between former presidents Obama and François Hollande. If the scope of the sanctions will be wide, there is much more possibility that this kind of conflict will occur again between Europe and the U.S. If individuals attempt to circumvent the sanction rules by committing other ‘crimes’ under U.S. law, such as conspiring to defraud the U.S., or bank fraud, they are likely to sit as defendants in a criminal trial.

The Iran Deal plays a particular role for Europe, and the trade between Iran and the EU considerably increased after signing the deal in 2015. The efforts made by European leaders, namely President Emmanuel Macron and Chancellor Angela Merkel, stem from interest in their commercial ties with Iran. These efforts include the meetings held in Washington D.C. to convince President Trump to save the deal. On 8 May 2018, European leaders promptly reacted to the decision made by President Trump. President Macron underlined the significant interest in preserving the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In a similar vein, German Foreign Minister pointed out the risk of jeopardizing the long-term relations between Europe and the U.S. Foreign Minister of the U.K., Boris Johnson, expressed his regrets of this decision. A week after the decision of May 8, several European politicians met the Foreign Minister of Iran in order to devise an effective plan. For instance, Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the EU, expressed their willingness to carry out determined work to keep the commitments of the deal.

From a legal point of view, the withdrawal decision does not force any other parties to quit, but the abovementioned extraterritoriality will hamper the ability of others to comply with the deal in practice. For this reason, the European Union plans to use other means to keep the deal alive. For instance, the EU might impose the notorious “blocking regulations.” These regulations, which were adopted in 1996, are intended to protect European companies from the “extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country.” In the past, it was considered effective against the extraterritorial sanctions imposed against Cuba by the U.S.

Another option could be the change of currency. EU members could carry on their trade with Iran by using the Euro, so that U.S. authorities will be less likely to exercise their jurisdiction over these transactions. The rationale behind the extraterritorial application of the sanction regime is that U.S. authorities need to establish the link between an extraterritorial transaction and territory of the U.S., and, once a transaction is made in U.S. dollars, it is sufficient for the U.S. government to exercise its jurisdiction based on this link. The single fact that a bank processes U.S. dollar transactions means that this bank is on the radar of U.S. enforcement authorities, as observed in the case of PNB Paribas. If this bank fails to comply with the sanction regime as part of the domestic law of the U.S., authorities will impose a fine on this bank. In order to mitigate the loss and escape from U.S. jurisdiction, the change of currency offers a useful alternative for the EU, albeit the business between these countries is unlikely to take any legal or financial risk. Similarly, the EU can take the Indian investments in Iran, which are made in the currency of Indian rupee.

Moreover, as the spokesman of the French government suggested, the EU could challenge this withdrawal decision at the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Unit by arguing it would adversely affect the trade between WTO members. In this case, the EU could attempt to resolve this issue as a trade dispute. Although they could make reasonable arguments before the WTO, a ruling from a panel may not produce an effect powerful enough to force the Trump administration to reconsider the future of the Iran deal.

The U.S. decision will undoubtedly affect Turkey as a major trade partner of Iran. Similar to the EU, this decision can decrease the trade volume between the two countries. Turkish politicians read the situation from the same page, and Turkey is likely to join the resistance against the U.S. decision. From a legal point of view, due to the uncertainty of a criminal trial brought against two Turkish citizens, namely Reza Zarrab and Hakan Atilla, Turkey will act cautiously in their commercial ties with Iran, at least in the early stage of re-instituting sanctions against Iran.

It is most likely that these possible actions within international law are largely ignored by the Trump administration. In his speech, he did not explicitly refer to any issues arising from international law. For example, the future of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 remained unaddressed. While the Trump administration’s decision may cause increased conflict with Europe, the disregard for the international community’s interests and laws was not a complete surprise for the international community, and neither was the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal.

On the 58^th day of the military campaign Operation Olive Branch, Turkey declared its victory against the PKK/YPG in Afrin. Following the collapse of the PKK’s defense strategy and its unexpected isolation within the geopolitical struggle, the city is now under full control of the Turkish Armed Forces and the TAF-backed Free Syrian Army. One way or another, it is clear that this military-political victory of Turkey will provide more opportunities for strategic manoeuvres in Ankara’s next military move, particularly towards its ongoing military campaign against the PKK in northern Syria. Upon the liberation of Afrin city, with the surprisingly little resistance by the PKK, Turkey is now reconsidering its military and political options to minimize the PKK’s role in the midterm, and de-territorialize the PKK and YPG in Syria and Iraq.

Speaking in Ankara, a day after the TAF and Free Syrian Army cleared Afrin, President Erdogan vowed to further Turkey’s fight against terrorism beyond Afrin. In his speech, Erdogan said: “We have eliminated most of the terror corridors in the region,” and “we will continue this process until we entirely eliminate this corridor that includes Manbij, Qamisli, Ayn al Arab (also known as Kobani) and Rasuylayn.” President Erdogan also underlined that Turkey’s next military move will take place in Manbij – a region that is still under the control of the U.S.-backed PKK/YPG forces. Following the visit of former U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to Turkey to negotiate about the PKK issue in Manbij, Turkey’s foreign minister Cavusoglu expressed that the YPG will hand over the governance of Manbij to the Turkey-led Free Syrian Army in the presence of the U.S. military units there. However, after Trump’s unexpected Pompeo move, as the new Secretary of State, Cavusoglu made a minor revision in his early announcement about the agreement with Tillerson over the issue of Manbij. Cavusoglu stated that Turkey and the U.S. have not reached an “agreement,” but a common “understanding” regarding the issue of the U.S.-PKK alliance in Syria. At this stage, there is still an ambiguity regarding the position of the new State Secretary in negotiations with Turkey.

While the U.S. administration’s stance towards Turkey remains unclear, President Erdogan said that Turkey would also continue its fight against the PKK in Sinjar, a region that has been controlled by the PKK since 2014. Now, the foreign and security policy circles in Ankara are speculating how Turkey will carry out its military campaign against the PKK in Iraq. Turkey sees Sinjar just as strategically important as Afrin and other PKK-controlled regions. The geographical proximity of Sinjar to Turkey, and the role of Sinjar as a hub between Qandil and northern Syria threatens Turkey’s national security, and provides the PKK with more space to freely mobilize its militants and military equipment. It is crucial to note that the PKK’s presence in Sinjar threatens Iraq’s territorial integrity as well as the political stability of northern Iraq.

The strategic rationality behind Turkey’s move against the PKK in Sinjar is very simple. Turkey believes that the PKK’s presence in Sinjar does not meet with the regional geopolitical expectations, similar to the PKK experience in Afrin. Turkey and Iraq recently reached a tacit agreement over the PKK issue in northern Iraq. Iran seems to share a similar perspective regarding the PKK presence in northern Syria and Iraq. The KRG’s independence referendum showed how an intra-regional competition turned into an ad hoc realistic alliance in the presence of a common threat. Therefore, it is possible to claim that the PKK lacks an intra-regional support in maintaining its political and military presence in Sinjar. More critically, the PKK does not benefit from the U.S. air protection in Sinjar. Thus, the security and foreign policy centers in Ankara believe that the PKK will be isolated if Turkey decides to intervene against the PKK in Sinjar.

However, this does not necessarily mean that Turkey will take unilateral action against the PKK in Iraq. There are three alternative scenarios that should be taken into consideration. First and foremost, Turkey will try to evacuate the PKK from Sinjar by encouraging the Iraqi central government to take military action. Secondly, Turkey and Iraq will take a joint military action against the PKK together, if the PKK does not peacefully hand over the city. The recent visit of Hulisi Akar, Turkish Chief of General Staff, was the first step in convincing Iraq to take military action against the PKK. After his visit, the two countries underlined the importance of commonality in the fight against terrorism. The third and yet undesired option is part of Turkey’s ongoing military activism in the region against the PKK. At domestic, regional and international levels, Turkey benefits from its trans-frontier military initiatives as the active use of military forces provide a strategic superiority for Turkey to contain security threats and strengthen its diplomatic relations. The launch of Operation Olive Branch is a good example in understanding how the use of power consolidates Turkey’s diplomatic efforts on regional and international scales.

Articulated as such, according to the third option, Turkey is likely to act unilaterally against the PKK in Sinjar. Many in the governmental circles believe that Turkey might also use its new proxy forces against the PKK in Iraq. It is fair to conclude that Turkey wants to secure its borders, and also its regional strategic priorities. The use of military power will be part of this strategy in the future until Syria and Iraq reach a level of sustainable stability and security. The regional dynamics, as well as the new trends in Turkish security and foreign policy, enables Turkey to carry out its military campaign beyond Afrin.

A simplistic view of the Syria war from distance would explain that the war is all about overthrowing the evil called Daesh from the worn torn country. Every contending power – the US, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Iran – including their regional allies have the same claim. But under the barrage of daily media reports, which advance the same view as that of the contending powers, the inside story is ever more intricate to an extent incomprehensible to the distant gaze.

The most remarkable has been the role of the US in the war. The US particularly ventured into the war to eliminate the terrorist organization Daesh, and seldom did it acknowledge that its objectives were determined by the presence of its global rival, Russia, and the regional felon, Iran.

Recent revelations by the former spokesperson of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Talal Silo, who last month defected from the amalgam, will have consequences beyond Syria and most importantly Turkey. In an exclusive interview with the Anadolu Agency on Friday, the former high-ranking commander of SDF, Silo gives a detailed account of the Syrian war that helps us to see what is happening behind the scene.

Someone trying to draw the mental picture of the Syrian war must, first of all, dismiss Daesh as a mere media object that covers up the superpower proxy. That is to say, one must directly and simply focus on role the US is playing in the war to counter its rival’s increasing regional influence.

The real motive behind the US intervention in Syria never was to fight Daesh. Rather the US intends to secure its interests, that too by aligning with the SDF, much against the wishes and security of the regional ally, Turkey.

SDF is an amalgam of different ethnic and religious groups but dominated by PKK supporters. The armed group receives its weaponry, vehicles and military support from the US to apparently fight Daesh in different regions of Syria – most recent Raqqa and oil-rich Deir Al-Zor provinces – where the US wants to be ahead of Russian backed groups.

According to Silo’s revelations, the US along under the name of its allies SDF and YPG targeted to reach Bukamal and Mayadin districts before the rapidly advancing Syrian regime forces.

More interesting part of the war is the oil trade by the PKK which it sold over Daesh areas and also to the regime through an officer of the regime, al-Katirji, who is the general responsible for taking oil from the PKK. Moreover, the money transactions in oil trade was carried out through banks from Lebanon and Europe through accounts belonging to PKK members.

He even revealed that an American intelligence officer wanted them to advance towards Deir Al-Zor and that the US will give the “necessary support to provide a post towards the sea to the SDF and the Syrian Democratic Parliament.” The logic the intelligence officer gave that SDF and PKK wing YPG can only maintain a viable structure only if they have an “access to the sea” – (called Mediterranean corridor).

By giving an example of Kurdistan and Erbil, which do not have any access point to the sea, hence always needs to convince the other parties to export oil, the US promised the “Mediterranean corridor” but failure in the Deir Al-Zor operation dashed the hopes.

On the question of the US protecting weapon depositories for the YPG, Talal Silo’s revelations go in line with Turkish claims. It was Americans not only providing weapons to YPG but also protecting them by keeping them in their own bases which Turkey could not target.

If it were the US supporting the SDF and YPG in Deir Al-Zor, in Afrin the story was different. When the US denied to support them in Afrin they approached the Syrian regime through Assad’s cousin, Hussein Assad.

“He told me to establish a line between the SDF and the Russians positioned at Khmeimim base,” said Talal Silo.

More than the outcome of these proxy dealings among Americans, Russians, the Syrian regime and Iran, the mere act of these dealings is significant. They tell multiple stories: that the world powers only act for their own interests – to distribute the ruins of Syrian war at the cost of Syrian peoples’ lives. Second, by collaborating with the SDF and YPG, Turkish security concerns were thrown into disguise. Despite the long insistence of Turkey that the armed groups are closely allied to the PKK terrorist organization, which is involved in a decades-long war against Turkish state, all the sides involved in the Syrian war have been providing support to these groups to exploit them for their own interests.

*Written by Waseem Ahad. 

The evolving uncertainties of world politics and diverse forms of threats have compelled Turkey to take new decisions in terms of strategy. There are both realized and impending changes that are to follow these tendencies in order to establish partial alliances and to increase the capacity of strategic weaponry. In this respect, the S-400 missile system is at the junction of the aforementioned two trends.

Global fluctuations and security threats evolving around Turkey requires the country to be prepared for multiple risks. While new phenomena, such as using terrorism as a weapon and proxy wars have emerged, these have not completely eradicated the concept of conventional war. Therefore, precautions against conventional and nuclear warfare are as vital as those taken against terrorism. In this respect, the threats Turkey has faced in the last 7 years, especially those after June 2015, are striking.

Allocating events in chronological order might provide some clues about the bigger picture: In June 2012, a Turkish military aircraft was downed and in response, the air defense systems demanded from NATO were placed six months later. Turkey changed its rules of engagement and transitioned into an alert state. Later in March 2014 and November 2015, Turkey downed a Syrian and a Russian military aircraft, respectively. While the PKK declared autonomy in Syria, Daesh was on the border of Turkey, and the YPG/PKK threat become more prominent after Daesh’s attack to Ayn al-Arab. After the said siege, Daesh bombarded Turkish soil with mortars and rockets. By the end of 2015, Russia placed S-400 missile systems in Syria. Turkey was at the brink of war with Russia after the downing of Russian military aircraft. Following the June 7 elections, the PKK started to commit terrorist attacks in Turkish cities. The terrorist organization tried to gain ground through its “trench strategy.”

First Germany then the US withdrew their Patriot air defense missile systems from Turkey. In other words, they left Turkey vulnerable to attacks from terrorist organizations and other international actors.

Amongst these crises and attacks, first Germany then the US withdrew their Patriot air defense missile systems from Turkey. In other words, they left Turkey vulnerable to attacks from terrorist organizations and other international actors. Turkey fought against these threats on its own and incapacitated many of them. The most prominent consequence of these series of events was Turkey’s further advance into the defense industry – there were also certain initiatives in the past years in this respect.

While on one hand the Turkish administration accelerated the production of weapons with use of its own resources, the government preferred to buy products, such as defense systems, whose production and usage is feasible in the long-run, from other countries. While the pursuit to acquire defense systems goes back to the 90s, an important step in this regard was taken by announcing a tender for the procurement of such systems. With the ultimate aim of protecting its own territory, the conditions declared that Turkey also placed importance on common production and technology transfer. While these conditions suspended the financial burden of such systems, the condition of “50% joint production” was a premise for developing, diversifying and nationalizing the imported defense system in the following years. While the Chinese company CPMIEC satisfied the requirements of the Turkish administration and thus won the bid, the process was later cancelled in September 2015, as it was announced that Turkey decided to initiate the process of producing its own long-range missiles.

The Process of Procuring S-400s

After 4 years, Turkey was back to square one in terms of air defense systems. Comments made by Western politicians and military figures along with the discussions in the public sphere were reminiscent of what can be called a “déjà vu” – Same arguments, similar statements! Not so concerned about the country’s national security, the western public sphere, media and bureaucracy once again diverted their criticisms towards Turkey. This attitude is embodied in the statement made by the US Chief of Staff, merely “concerning.” This matter was also up to debate in the US Congress, and the purchase of S-400s were described as “worrying.” Ironically however, it is also a US Special Forces commander who is able to mockingly state that they advised the YPG to change their name. More, it is the US that supplies the YPG in Syria with weapons that many countries do not even possess. The US can only guarantee by word of mouth that these weapons will not be used against Turkey. This reminds us of the withdrawal of Patriot air defense missiles from Turkey, as discussed earlier. It can strongly be stated that, the guarantees provided by these actors in regards to Turkey’s fight against threats it faces is only bound by words. Hence therefore, Turkey has to take necessary precautions.

Responding to a question asked by reporters on the way back from his Gulf tour in July, 2017, President Erdoğan stated that negotiations for the S-400 defense system was coming to an end. Following, during the second week of September, Erdoğan announced that the agreement was almost complete and that a deposit payment had been made to Russia. The cost of this system for Turkey is going to amount to approximately US$2.5 billion. The first two systems and its equipment will be transported from Russia to Turkey, while the rest of them will be produced in Turkey. Nowadays, there are reports that an intensive work process is continuing for S-400s to be placed and become ready for use in Turkey. Since the emergence of the issue into the public agenda, many questions have begun to be debated intensively. These are the main questions:

How does an S-400 function and what are its features?

What is an S-400 defense system? Why does Turkey need it? Is it possible to integrate with NATO?  Does this preference mean that Turkey has detached from the West on a political level? Is co-production and technology transfer possible in the short term?

The main function of an air defense system is to detect and destroy attacking aircraft and ballistic missiles. In general, the system has four stages of operation: detection, identification, tracking and destruction. The only defense system that has the ability to detect a missile from its launch and destroy it out of the atmosphere is currently possessed by the US alone. The US realizes this tracking system through satellites. Other systems are usually able to detect and destroy missiles after they enter a certain range. The length of this range can vary depending on the radar support of the defense system. For instance, NATO has numerous command centers, radar systems and missile launchers deployed in very large and diverse locations.

The system works as a whole. Simply put, satellites, or the radar system in Kürecik detects a missile, relays the information to the command center in Germany and the battleships in the Mediterranean destroy the missile.

One of the questions raised at this point is whether this system will be integrated into NATO. When reviewing different explanations made at different times in this regard, Turkish experts stated that they could create an interface for the defense system that was to be acquired from China, which would allow integration with the NATO system. This is also true for the S-400 defense system. The latest statement made by the NATO Secretary General is also significant in this respect. While Stoltenberg stated that member states were free to acquire any equipment they wanted, he did not make a technical statement about NATO compliance. He only mentioned that this matter could be discussed in case of such a demand. This indicates that the will of respective parties will be the determining factor in this matter. It is certain that there will be many concerns and drawbacks. For instance, US military experts are talking about the possibility of Russia accessing NATO data by manipulating the system. It is important to note that this disclosure is directed at the public, as the system has not yet been tested in this sense. Moreover, the deployment of S-400s in Turkey does not account for the dismissal or replacement of NATO.

Will the S-400s not integrated into NATO remain completely dysfunctional?

This question is answered with a “yes” quite boldly. Although the reasons are not explained, it is asserted that S-400 defense systems that are not integrated with the NATO system will be unable to detect and destroy ballistic missiles. However, although the radars integrated into the S-400 system do not have satellite capability, they are able to destroy missiles in the specified range, as illustrated in Table 1. Moreover, S-400 defense systems can also detect all kinds of hostile aircrafts, ranging from fighter jets and heavy bombardment aircrafts to UAVs. Turkey’s primary technical aim is to reconfigure the detection system according to its own military doctrine and friend-or-foe definition.

In this respect, it could be asserted that S-400s have the capacity to satisfy the needs of Turkey in the short-term. Naturally, advanced defense systems that are integrated with satellites could be preferred. However, as stated earlier, only the US possesses such systems and they are reluctant to sell them. Turkey’s preference of S-400s is not limited to facilitating its security in the short-term. The publicized information suggests that work on joint production, technology transfer and human resources are prominent aspects of this agreement. While the details of the agreement are yet to be announced, it is definite that the first batteries will be transported from Russia and the remaining batteries (50%) are to be produced in Turkey. Therefore, this procurement will allow Turkey to establish an infrastructure for defense systems in the long-term.

Air defense system is a must for Turkey

Considering the transformation of international politics and the emerging potential of threats posed, Turkey’s need for a defense system is urgent. The preference of S-400s was thus shaped within the framework of Turkey’s needs and the positions of its allies. It was frequently expressed that the first offers were made to the Western allies of Turkey in respect to eliminating this need. However, the US and other NATO allies’ reluctance to sell or jointly produce these defense systems had the potential to increase Turkey’s dependency. Therefore, Turkey’s preference of S-400s as an alternative is partially an outcome caused by the attitude of its allies.

The point to be questioned here is that although Turkey has been a NATO member since 1952, and the closest to the Soviet threat in terms of proximity, the country still does not have a defense system and is totally dependent in this area. The circumstances of the Cold War are now irrelevant as the threat is not posed by a single actor. Turkey is not a country that could ensure its security by being completely dependent on either NATO or Shanghai. A Turkey failing to achieve independence in terms of defense and offense can never become a true global actor. In short therefore, Turkey’s quest for a defense system and its insistence on S-400s should be regarded within this framework.

Iraq has lately been the focal point of world politics due to the discussions regarding the Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum, which has been urged by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Apparently, no country in the region other than Israel supports the referendum. Iraqi Kurdistan President, Masoud Barzani’s insistence on holding the referendum has even played a role in converging Ankara, Baghdad and Tehran administrations.

While it is more than natural for the referendum to be discussed within Turkish media circles due to the territorial proximity with Iraq, the discussions conducted often go too far as policy recommendations that will strain Turkey are made. Within these discussions many facts are distorted and this unavoidably leads to growing confusion within the public. Due to this reason, it is crucial to clearly answer and understand the question as to what Turkey desires and expects from Iraq.

First, the leading subject matter Turkey pays attention to within its Iraq policy is preventing the outlawed PKK and other terror groups from using the country’s territory. The fundamental reason for Ankara’s close interest in Iraq is due to the country’s failure to ensure security within its own territory and its failure to prevent the PKK’s deployment in northern Iraq. Maintaining a successful fight against the PKK within its own borders, Turkey primarily confronts Iraqi territory when it concentrates on cutting off the external sources of the terrorist organization.

As Baghdad and Arbil cannot or do not impede Qandil’s employment as the PKK headquarters, where the terror attacks against Turkey have been plotted for years, the PKK aspires to expand its domain to Sinjar by taking advantage of the upheaval stirred by Daesh. The PKK’s rising influence in Iraqi territory inevitably increases Turkey’s interest in the country. If the PKK seizes territory in Iraq or Syria, Turkey’s fight against the terror group will have a poor chance to succeed. Therefore, Ankara’s fight against the PKK begins from Iraqi and Syrian territories and extends to as far as Germany, Belgium and even the United States.

The second most important aspect of Turkey’s Iraq policy is the protection of the country’s territorial integrity. Considering the current Iraqi Constitution, it can be stated that the KRG’s insistence on independence is far from being rational. This is due to the fact that the KRG is quite influential in the country’s administration, as it rules federated areas with its autonomous parliament and government and has its own armed forces. This venture Barzani has undertaken in order to guarantee the political future of his own family, as he is cornered in domestic politics, is likely to bring a series of devastating consequences to the entire Middle East. Therefore, Ankara objects to the independence referendum to avert such a ravage.

http://thenewturkey.org/the-kurdish-quest-for-independence-in-iraq-and-its-repercussions-for-turkey-and-the-region/

Moreover, the third important feature of Turkey’s Iraq policy is the protection of Iraq’s independence. This goal means objecting to turning the Baghdad government into a puppet controlled by Tehran or Washington. The Iraqi government’s increasing reliance on the United States or Iran leads to developments that upsets the delicate balance between Shia Arabs, Sunni Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens in the country, and certainly leaves the country in constant chaos. The uprising of Sunni Arabs and the subsequent rise of Daesh following the extreme Iran-focused policies of the Maliki period can be drawn as a reflective example to this.

In addition, guaranteeing the rights of Turkmens is another subject Turkey attaches importance to as part of its Iraq policy. The Turkmens in Iraq regard Turkey as a guarding power regardless of their sects, which lays an extra burden on Ankara.

The final objective that stands out in Turkey’s Iraq policy is sustaining and improving economic cooperation with the country. During the tenure of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) governments, the approach that lays emphasis on economic cooperation in the context of relations with other countries, especially neighbors, has also been effective in the relations with Iraq. In this framework, Iraq has become Turkey’s third largest export market. Considering that a great deal of this export is made to the KRG region, it becomes more understandable that Ankara would not wish to jeopardize its relations with the Arbil administration. However, due to the above-stated security concerns, the main determinants of Turkey’s Iraq policy have inevitably been the PKK question and Iraq’s territorial integrity.

Turkey stepped up efforts to acquire its own missile-defense system after the US, Germany and the Netherlands – all NATO members – decided at the end of 2015 not to renew their Patriot-missile deployments in southern Turkey.

Under the $2.5 billion agreement Ankara is due to receive two batteries of the antiaircraft missile from Moscow within the coming year and then produce two more batteries in Turkey.

While this has been a major step in modernizing Turkey’s defense system, worries have elapsed over Turkey’s affiliation with NATO. Although members of the security pact have expressed their concerns with Turkey shifting away from NATO, the Turkish administration have made it clear that the deal with Russia will not affect its duties under the organization.

It is true that relations between Turkey and NATO have been strained due to the recent negative press during the German federal elections, the on-going war in Syria and the unsupportive comments made by western allies during the July 15 Coup attempt, where FETO attempted to hijack the Turkish government.

After recovering from the first shock caused by Donald Trump’s unexpected victory in the U.S. presidential elections, the U.S.-based analysts began speculating on what kind of an inner circle Trump was going to form. During his election campaign, Trump promised that he would wage a war on the Washington establishment, highlighting it as one of the backbones of his campaign with the assertion that he was an alternative to the political elites in Washington. For weeks, various rumors and speculations over who would serve in the Trump administration followed one another.

When Trump overtly waged a war on political elites and the establishment during his campaign, dozens of foreign policy and security experts close to the Republican Party announced that they would not accept any position in Trump’s team despite the fact that he was a Republican candidate. Among the ones releasing such statements were names who were formerly in key positions especially during the term of a Republican leader. As Trump’s staff in charge of appointments put a distance to the names who once issued negative remarks on Trump, the repository of available experts became inevitably restricted to a serious extent.

This subject matter was frequently discussed during the appointment procedures that ran quite slowly in the transition period following the elections. The first appointments of Trump hinted that he was keeping his promise with regard to fighting the political elites. For instance, Steve Bannon, who was among Trump’s strategists during the campaign period, is known to be a name confronting elites for years on the radio shows he hosted. As Bannon, who represents the far-right, and names like Stephen Gorka were appointed to the White House, President Trump sought to smoothen the reactions by assigning the Republican National Committee (RNC) Chairman Reince Priebus as White House Chief of Staff, which is one of the most critical positions in the White House. This choice was interpreted as Trump’s effort to build a dialogue with the political elite since the RNC’s chair was assigned to the position that would primarily be in charge of relations with Congress. Soon after these two names were announced, comments suggesting that the two might contend each other comprised one of the top topics on the agenda. Bannon’s greatest advantage was his personal affinity to the President while Priebus had an upper hand since his position has direct access to the President.

While successively making unexpected appointments to the White House, in considering the confirmation process, President Trump chose not to take risks in regards to Cabinet positions and assigned names that would appeal to a majority of the Senate. For example, while Retired General James Mattis, who is respected by both parties, was appointed as the Secretary of Defense, Exxon company’s CEO Rex Tillerson was appointed as the Secretary of State. These names were welcomed by the Washington bureaucracy, who were closely following the appointment process. During the appointments procedure, what would happen to the positions of general John Kelly, who was appointed as the Secretary of Homeland Security, and Mike Flynn, who was appointed as the National Security Advisor, was another matter of question in the overall picture. Although Flynn was formerly Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the comments made about him during and in the aftermath of his term in office stressed his unusual profile. Furthermore, Jared Kushner, who is arguably less popular compared to the other names, was appointed as senior advisor to the President. This prompted a series of questions as to what kind of balance policy Trump would adopt amongst these names.

Endeavoring to accomplish domestic and foreign political objectives with a team comprising of names with such different backgrounds was one of the most significant challenges Trump was to confront. He faced the first challenge in this respect while trying to form the National Security Council (NSC). Bannon was included in the NSC while the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA Director were removed, which led to the speculations that Bannon became the second man all of a sudden. Subsequently, it was highly discussed that Bannon was the name behind the travel ban on people from six Muslim-majority countries, being among the first campaign promises implemented by the Trump administration. Within this process, Bannon was present at the Oval Office during the telephone conversations Trump made with world leaders, which consolidated this assumption. The rising influence of Bannon spurred the hearsay that Priebus was particularly uncomfortable with this situation and it led to tension between the two.

Successive Dismissals in the White House

The rise of Steve Bannon in the White House, which had previously been viewed as unavoidable, has been stopped personally by the President. The mention of Bannon as the chief strategist of the White House prompted Trump to declare abruptly on TV that he was the actual chief strategist of the administration and Bannon was ultimately an official under his command. Shortly after this, details surrounding the inner conflicts within the White House administration began to leak to the press. First, it was leaked that Trump was not sufficiently informed on the decision to include Bannon in the NSC. Shortly after the news surfaced, Bannon lost his place on the Council. Next, Bannon was portrayed as the mastermind behind the much-disputed travel ban concerning visitors from six Muslim-majority countries. The situation got complicated further by the allegations that Trump’s daughter Ivanka and her husband Jared Kushner also opposed Bannon’s influence within the White House. These moves undoubtedly significantly damaged the public profile of Bannon.

While it was wondered when Bannon would be dismissed from the White House, White House Chief of Staff Reince Priebus was unexpectedly forced out of his position. This decision made Priebus the shortest-serving Chief of Staff in White House history. The explicit reasons for the dismissal are unknown. Informed guesses include reasons such as Priebus not being effective enough in defending Trump, Trump holding Priebus responsible for the failure of his healthcare bill in the Senate and Trump never fully trusting Priebus. But the words of Anthony Scaramucci, the White House communications director at the time who was appointed days before Priebus’ dismissal, are thought to have been influential in this process. Scaramucci had previously signaled in an interview with a journalist that the dismissal would occur by using scathing remarks towards Priebus.

Shortly after the dismissal of Priebus, the Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly was appointed as Chief of Staff. With this decision, the two most important positions within the White House administration, Secretary of Homeland Security and Chief of Staff, were both occupied by officials with a military background. The decision thus highlighted Trump’s preference in favour of individuals with military backgrounds in his appointments. The first move by Kelly, who was viewed as having the seniority and experience required to calm the storm within the administration, was to sack Scaramucci, making Scaramucci the shortest serving communications director in White House history. Following Priebus’ dismissal, groups close to Bannon began a campaign against the National Security Advisor McMaster. The information leaked to the press had been portraying McMaster as opposing Flynn and Bannon’s influence within the NSC by removing officials thought to be close to them. This process again ended with an announcement from Trump.

The previous week, in the aftermath of this process and as the waters of the White House administration seemed to calm, Bannon was ousted from his position. As with Priebus’, Bannon’s dismissal has many underlying reasons.  The events that occurred in Charlottesville and the rise of far-right extremism, plus the newly published book named “Devil’s Bargain” detailing the relationship between Bannon and Trump are thought to have been important factors in Trump’s decision. The emphasis Trump places in portraying his election victory as solely his own has been a source of tension in the relationship between him and Bannon from the very beginning. But the atmosphere that triggered Bannon’s dismissal was created by Kelly and his decision to take an initiative regarding Bannon. Thus, Bannon, the biggest link between far-right extremism and the White House, was dismissed from the administration. It seems that retired military officials such as Mattis, McMaster, Kelly and former businesspeople such as Kushner and Tillerson will play the most effective role in the administration.

Has the storm in the Trump administration calmed?

At this point, it seems that the turmoil within the Trump administration, or at least within the White House, has calmed down and even if another power struggle occurs it will not be as loud and obvious. Of course, Trump can influence this process with unexpected moves. It is unknown how two important figures such as Kelly and McMaster will influence Trump’s policies and how much they will be able to shield Trump from crises. How Kelly will influence the relationship between Trump and Congress is an especially curious point since Kelly does not have a background neither with Congress nor with the Republican party. McMaster, who was appointed after Flynn’s dismissal, will likely remain target of the far-right due to his removal of certain individuals from the NSC. However, his influence in matters of foreign policy and security is unlikely to wane due to his relationships with Mattis and Tillerson. Jared Kushner will continue to be one of the biggest game changers in any fractions and power struggles that might occur in the future. So far Kushner has preferred to work with more conventional figures.

All these names within the administration will also be tested by the problems that come with Trump’s unpredictable Twitter announcements. Trump will continue to pull the brakes on any figure that might begin to overshadow him, just like he did in the Bannon case. The situation within the White House is seemingly calm now, but the power struggles based on other concerns and topics will likely continue in the foreseeable future.

The administration’s problems outside the White House might possibly continue. Trump and Attorney General Jeff Sessions have not been seeing eye-to-eye recently. Trump has been criticizing Sessions due to his decision to recuse himself from the investigation into Russian interference in the U.S. elections. The investigation that influenced the dismissals of Comey and Flynn might also negatively impact Trump’s relations with his close associates.

On July 20, 2016, five days after the July 15 coup attempt, a state of emergency was declared in Turkey and has been further extended by the Parliament every three months since the coup attempt upon the demand of the Cabinet on the grounds of ongoing terror attacks and the state’s fight against the Fetullah Gülen Terror Group (FETO). The state of emergency enables the state to eliminate those threats and risks that could not be overcome under ordinary rules of law. As part of the emergency powers, state authorities are extended and fundamental rights and liberties are restricted compared to the ordinary period. Article 15 of the 1982 Constitution, which regulates restricting fundamental rights in states of emergency was borrowed from Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Therefore, Turkey’s legislation on state of emergency powers are in line with the standards of democratic states of law.

In a state of emergency, the Cabinet is vested with the authority to issue decree laws according to the final paragraph of Article 121 of the Constitution. Throughout the state of emergency declared following the July 15 coup attempt, a total of 26 decree laws have been issued. Within the scope of the decree laws, the civil servants affiliated with FETO have been dismissed from profession with an aim to purge FETO cliques from the public institutions. Also, the educational institutions, dormitories, healthcare facilities, media organizations, associations and foundations affiliated with or financed by FETO have been shut down.

According to the Constitution, the state of emergency decrees are accessible to all sorts of judicial review; however, Article 148 of the Constitution rules that a lawsuit cannot be filed in the Constitutional Court regarding the state of emergency decrees. The Constitutional Court refused the lawsuit filed by the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) on grounds of this provision. As a result, administrative objection means were clogged for the civil servants discharged and the institutions shut down as part of the decrees while their possibility of resorting to jurisdiction was also removed. With an aim to monitor the actions taken as part of the decree laws and upon the discussions questioning the review of the decisions, it was decided to establish an investigation Commission on the state of emergency decrees on January 23, 2017.

According to the decree law, the Commission consists of seven members elected from judges, prosecutors and public officials by the Prime Minister, Justice Minister, the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors, the Supreme Court of Appeals and the Council of State. Elected among senior bureaucrats, most of whom are judges, the Commission members were finalized on May 16. Selahaddin Menteş, the Deputy Secretary of the Justice Ministry, was elected as the chairman of the Commission.

Given that the number of files required to be examined by the Commission is more than 100,000, a secretariat and a group of assisting personnel were required within the Commission. Over the course of a long period since the decree on the establishment of the Commission was issued, all the preliminary works and preparations were completed. Around 200 personnel including rapporteurs, experts and officials were assigned to the service of the Commission, which is composed of seven members. The Military Court of Cassation office, which was shut down with a constitutional amendment, was allocated for the Commission.

http://thenewturkey.org/fetos-civil-administrators-and-their-trips-abroad-before-the-coup-attempt/

According to the manifest on the decree laws and their subsequently published rules of procedures, the Commission is to operate for two years, which can be extended if required. The application period is sixty days as of July 17, 2017, the date when the Commission started to accept applications, or as of the date when a new proceeding is conducted. The Commission can demand all kinds of data and documents it needs from relevant institutions and issues its decisions based on these files. The Commission decisions are fulfilled by the relevant state offices without any delay. Annulment actions can be filed against the Commission decisions in certain administrative courts in Ankara determined by the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors.

The establishment of the Commission has enabled the filing of both judicial and administrative applications regarding the state of emergency decrees. The main problem with regard to the proceedings conducted within the state of emergency decree laws was the absence of the possibility of objecting to them and that they were not reviewable. With the establishment of the Commission, the means to object to and monitor the proceedings were provided.

Throughout the state of emergency period, some occasional allegations of unjust treatment were made in the context of the fight against FETO and it was further claimed that the proceedings were abused to settle personal or political accounts. Thanks to the Commission, such claims and requests will be examined. Although it is suggested that every institution must monitor the decisions issued within itself instead of a central Commission, which will assure coherent and standardized implementations. In so doing, all the proceedings regarding one particular subject across the country will be examined by one centralized unit and the principles adopted with the Commission decisions will be a precedent for all the other institutions fighting against FETO. In other words, a uniform implementation will be ensured across the country, which will avert arbitrary decisions according to persons or institutions.

The establishment of the Commission also paves the way for judicial review alongside the administrative monitoring. After the Commission issues a decision, a person can file a lawsuit to an administrative court or the Council of State to object to the decision. Following the administrative procedures, they can file an individual application to the Constitutional Court and ultimately to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In so doing, a full-scale judicial review can be executed.

The assignment of only one administrative court in Ankara for the subject is criticized in terms of the natural judge principle. However, entitling only one court for the Commission decisions will enable stare decisis. The same court will be able to issue decisions by taking previous decisions in similar situations into account and prevent different implementations. Besides, a similar practice was adopted for the formerly established compensation commissions, which the ECHR did not regard as a breach of convention.

The investigation Commission on the state of emergency decrees is not a court but an administrative body. Therefore, the members of the Commission were appointed by the Prime Ministry, Justice Ministry and judicial institutions. So, the Commission cannot be expected to consist of completely independent and impartial judges. Still, the majority of the appointed members are judges. The objective of the Commission is to swiftly investigate the state of emergency proceedings through administrative mechanisms before they are litigated and to rectify the faults.

Before the Commission began to work, thousands of applications were already filed both in the Constitutional Court and the ECHR. The ECHR rejected the applications filed to itself with a decision issued on June 12, 2017, referring them to the State of Emergency Commission, which is a domestic remedy that must be exhausted before applying to the ECHR. Likewise, the Constitutional Court demanded the petitions it had on the subject to be referred to the Commission and the exhaustion of judicial procedures.

This Commission is not an unprecedented body for Turkey. Previously, two individual commissions were established to swiftly deal with the violations of rights through administrative means, both of which operated successfully for years. The first one was the “Counter-Terrorism Damage Assessment Commission” founded in 2004, while the other one was named “Human Rights Compensation Commission.” Both commissions were established through similar methods and members and recognized as effective domestic remedies by the ECHR.

When all the preparations and similar past experiences regarding the establishment of the Commission are considered, the negative campaign against the Commission through arguing that it deems to fail before it actually gets to work, is not helpful. Turkey’s fight against FETO and the purge of this terror group members from the state offices are vital for the country. The Commission is going to play an important role in ensuring that the fight on terror is carried out in accordance with the law and that the mistakes made during the process are being corrected. At this very initial stage, therefore, the Commission should be given time and support.

Turkey’s border security cannot be maintained only by the physical presence of border posts along the border of the country, but needs a holistic approach that requires an efficient border management system and intelligence capacity for pre-emptive measures on both sides of the border.

The Limits of Authority

Turkish law assigns three military forces to securing the borders. The Turkish Army is responsible for the protection of land borders while territory under water at the coasts is directed to Turkish Coast Guard Command and air space is under the coverage of the Turkish Air Force. But Turkish law flags the Ministry of Interior as the authorized body for the border affairs through provincial Governors. Customs, on the other hand, is under the Ministry of Customs and Trade. Hence the laws pertaining to border affairs involve three different ministries, which may make coordination more difficult, although their lines of authority are clearly demarcated. But the issues of centralization and the unity of command to cover all borders are concerns, especially if the Turkish General Staff is added to this list, since the law also gives it authority in some respects.

Border Security Architecture

Turkish borders are far longer than many European borders, and have a complicated terrain. Hence the usual approach by the European Union to secure borders does not meet the realities of the Turkish border coverage. For this reason, Turkey is confronted with numerous challenges to design a new sui generis architectural structure to secure her borders in accordance with new threats, security needs, and geographical positions and domestic/foreign policy choices. Turkey needs to tighten security measures and augment the current structure along the Syrian and Iraqi borders because of the demographic facts, contradictory political strategies of outer powers, and the presence of secessionist groups.

Initially, a promising border security architecture needs to be constructed upon the regional characteristics of Turkey’s borders and its neighbourhood. The issues include illegal immigration, human trafficking, goods and drug trafficking, infiltration by terror networks, communication between divided families and tribes, reconnaissance and surveillance activities of neighbouring states, potential conflicts over disputed islands and isles, and containing crises surrounding Turkey in their countries of origin.

Aside from static factors (like geography) and a global power struggle in the Middle East, there are also other dynamics or newly-emerging factors forcing Turkey to improve security at its borders. For instance, since the 1990s Turkey has long been faced with illegal immigration stemming from migrants and refugees fleeing from conflict zones such as Iraq, Syria, Iran and Afghanistan in order to reach Europe. These problems, which no state actors aside from Turkey face, require a determined stance at the borders with active and pre-emptive undertakings to respond to all the listed concerns.

Contrary to the security picture, the relevant Turkish law limits the border security units by having them stay in designated zones except in exceptional circumstances, meaning securing the area requires an active and flexible border security strategy. An active border security strategy should have a holistic and flexible nature based on a functional decision making process that addresses concerns far beyond the borders. Regarding these static and dynamic risk factors, Turkey should reconstruct the border architecture with more ‘preventive’ security measures which would go beyond the formal distance limits determined in the applicable law.

More precisely, Turkey needs to adopt and implement a much more ‘proactive border security strategy’ than ever before, in order to meet current and urgent needs for detecting and deterring security threats. The border units must have the capability of confronting threats, mainly emanating from international terror networks.

A “proactive border strategy”

Accordingly, national law as well as the implications of cross-border legislation should be reviewed and a “proactive border strategy” should be reformulated after determining and describing the focus and scope of the new border policy, instruments to be developed for tasks and tools to be used for control mechanisms. Likewise, this new architecture must allow dispatching through a central control center while possessing an enriched and authorized structure in terms of intelligence tools, technologically-oriented border control systems, deeply echeloned and retaliation capabilities. What is intended with the word ‘integrative’ when speaking of new border architecture is not to demarcate borders by land, sea or air but rather taking border incidents in all their three-dimensional aspects; hence using the accurate and efficient tools that are available to the state.

By adopting such a holistic approach, no matter what kind of challenges are being confronted, the crucial thing is determining the engagement rules which will be then comprehensively enforced by all government bodies, in the light of previously defined policies and strategies of the Turkish state. However along with the provincial governors who are the national authorities responsible for the administrative tasks in implementing border management policy, it is necessary to create a new organization that can coordinate the entire capabilities of the state. Hence a centralized border organization, like a Directorate of Border Security, is a vital need to track all reported events, create a rapid decision-making mechanism and guide the relevant border units in accordance with the policies and strategies of the Turkish Government. Thus, a management system for land, sea and air borders appears to be a pre-condition for efficient coordination and integration of efforts.

The second issue appears to be the intelligence organizations and assets possessed by border units. Within the overall framework of border security management, deploying the assigned (frontier) personnel in watchtowers or on monitoring/surveillance activities run by these personnel at the borders is not merely inadequate but also potentially risky. On the other hand, considering the wide terrain which a border battalion is in charge of, technology-focused solutions must be taken into account with a broader perspective of border security.

Turkey has modernized the equipment used by its border units/troops, and also has procured and deployed armored vehicles equipped with long-range detection and tracking systems in recent years. Furthermore, Turkey has developed various projects related to the procurement and use of unmanned aerial vehicle systems (UAVs) on the borders as well as accelerated procurement of foreign and domestically produced surveillance balloons. As a result of these developments, many positive steps have been taken towards implementing a comprehensive border security strategy. These efforts have without doubt contributed to securing the border and augmenting force protection of Turkish border units.

Technology-focused solutions

As for intelligence-driven border security, it is an undeniable fact that technology-focused solutions are crucial in intelligence-related systems. Due to the high insecurity level in risk-based environments, border guards/units on all levels should be legally authorized and equipped with high-tech intelligence systems in order to detect, deter and prevent threats effectively. In particular, the threat of infiltration or attempted attacks on Turkish troops by terrorist organizations harboring separatist tendencies deployed across the Iraq and Syria borders can be diminished by establishing an integrated and effective working intelligence mechanism.

Ground radars and thermal cameras, for instance, can be used for short range surveillance tasks. Mini-UAVs can fly up to 15 km while tactical and operative level UAVs are allotted for strategic collation tasks. But border units should see far beyond these limits to identify threats by exploiting high-tech intelligence assets of various intelligence disciplines to verify or falsify suspected border threats long before they are close to Turkish borders. The integration and coordination of border units’ intelligence gathering will provide early warnings to all positioned border units before any potential attack occurs.

The threat of terror emanating from Syria and Iraq especially calls for Turkey to prevent infiltration and attacks by these networks using effective intelligence systems. To construct such an intelligence system, Turkish border units need to extend their surveillance capacities 50-100 km at both sides of the border at battalion level for tactical purposes. Furthermore, strategic intelligence systems need to be procured that can be directed to 200 km at least. These assets are not only ground radars, but all sorts of intelligence assets. An integrated all source intelligence system; say combining assets of imagery, open source, human, measurement and signature, signal intelligence at tactical and operative level appears to be the essential system needed for border security.

In order to secure the homeland, it is key to ensure border security, to prevent the illegal crossing of humans and goods. Hence current border security needs to be bolstered with a new security architecture. The current border security of Turkey is functional and adequate, but needs to be improved by, first, an efficient management system that coordinates the involved institutions of four ministries. Secondly, high-tech products rather than human-based solutions, mainly intelligence capabilities, appear to be an urgent field requirement to detect border threats before they are too close to combat. A multi-disciplinary intelligence perception is needed to build such a system.

President Erdoğan’s meeting with US President Trump was overshadowed by the Pentagon’s decision to provide heavy weaponry to the YPG. Meanwhile, Trump’s mind was preoccupied with rumors of impeachment over allegations his administration shared state secrets with Russian officials. Some circles in Washington, on the other hand, tried to prevent the one-on-one meeting of Erdoğan and Trump.

The Pentagon’s hasty decision to equip the PKK/PYD with heavy weaponry was due to a possible revision in the planning of the Raqqa offensive after the two leaders’ meeting. There were no substantial changes in the planned Raqqa offensive, which is being coordinated by the Pentagon, but Turkey was able to relay its concerns about the PYD/YPG and the demographic engineering in the region at the highest official level. Turkey was also able to secure certain guarantees about the fight against the PKK, and made clear the fact it would actively continue its fight against the terrorist organization. Moreover, Turkey emphasized that it wouldn’t stand idle as the PKK/PYD, Daesh, and Iran-backed Shiite militias carried out ethnic and sectarian cleansing in the region.

Trump’s statement underscoring the strategic and military partnership between Turkey and the US was crucial. Even though the Turkish delegation returned to the country with a cautious optimism, this statement was perceived as the herald of a new era in Turkey-US relations, which had been on the decline since May, 2013. No one was expecting all the issues between the two countries to be resolved in an instant, but the image of the two leaders standing side by side was interpreted as the beginning of a more promising period for bilateral relations.

This was not the only indication that the level of understanding and cooperation between the US and Turkey could be on the mend.

Factors prompting the normalization of Turkey-US relations

The normalization in relations between Turkey and Israel, which had been in a crisis since the Mavi Marmara incident, will cause a gradual change in how Turkey is perceived both by the Trump administration, which has been especially sensitive on the issue, and circles that are associated with the Israeli lobby in Washington, which have advocated anti-Turkey sentiments for some time now. While Turkey will continue to advocate for the basic rights of the people of Jerusalem and Palestine, it will be more careful to avoid tensions with Israel. There are concrete efforts to increase the common interests of the two countries, especially in energy, tourism and trade.

Another issue that both Turkey and the US converge on in this new era is Iran’s expansionist policies in the Middle East. In particular, Iran-backed militia forces which are trying to gain ground using a sectarian discourse and ideology are posing a threat to the interests of many countries and local elements in the region. Checking these militias, whose presence is rationalized as a necessary counter to Daesh, brings Turkey, the US and many other countries in the region on common ground.

http://thenewturkey.org/will-the-trump-administration%E2%80%99s-syria-policy-change-after-the-chemical-attack/

Enclosing Sunni countries with a “Shiite crescent” – a policy that was covertly endorsed by the Obama administration to limit the Sunni governments in the region much to the chagrin of traditional allies like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf countries and Israel – is no longer sustainable. The Trump administration, which is yet to take over the control of security and foreign policy from the Obama administration’s military and civil bureaucrats, will realize that cooperation with Turkey could yield more effective results than surrounding the country with terrorist organizations like the PKK/PYD and Shiite militia forces.

Turkey’s success in Operation Euphrates Shield already debunked the myth that the PKK/PYD is the most effective force in the fight against Daesh. If Brett McGurk, the US envoy to the coalition against Daesh, and an Obama administration appointee who has built his own career on the an alliance with the PKK/PYD, and certain CENTCOM officials take a step back, the permanent and constructive possibilities of coordination with Turkey will become more apparent.  Turkey can provide a solution that is sustainable given the region’s sectarian and ethnic patterns, unlike the PKK/PYD, which has only sought to exploit these dangerous fault-lines.

The US’s persistent support to the PKK/PYD is antagonizing moderate Syrian Kurds who are being dominated by the terrorist organization, along with Arabs in Northern Syria who have been forced from their own lands, not to mention Washington’s own ally, Turkey. If the Trump administration is to adopt a controlled chaos strategy in the Middle East, just like the Obama administration, instead of an orderly one, they can continue their alliance with PKK/PYD; however, if the US wants to stabilize the region and win over the allies it has offended, they have to widen their narrow perspective. In this respect, Erdoğan and his team went to Washington with a comprehensive plan.

Another development which may cause the Trump administration to revise its relations with Turkey is the level of popular support President Erdoğan has demonstrated through the constitutional amendment referendum. Certain circles in Washington have been trying to prove that Erdoğan has little support and will not remain in office long, a campaign that began with the Gezi Park Protests in May, 2013. Having emerged with the clear support of the people both in the July 15 coup attempt and the April 16 constitutional referendum, Erdoğan has shown that he is has the backing of Turkey, and he is not going anywhere. Decision makers in Washington, along with leaders of other countries will have to acknowledge this sooner or later.

Erdoğan, at his meeting with Trump, expressed a sincere hope for more cooperation between the two countries, while also highlighting Turkey’s concerns on the road to normalization. Ankara is eagerly waiting to see how Trump will respond to its call. It is still not clear whether the relationship between the two countries is to become strategic in terms of regional politics. Another question that the whole world anxiously awaits the answer to is whether Trump will be left standing after his ongoing power struggle with the Washington establishment.

Turkey has long been in search of strengthening its border security and protecting its military bases, and for sure high value facilities, scattered in the mountains of south eastern Anatolia. Terrorist organizations based in Iraq and Syria, including the PKK/KONGRA-GEL/PYD/YPG/DEASH, frequently attempted to infiltrate Turkish territory either for attacking Turkish citizens or in a quest for gaining local support in the region. Turkey deployed its military and security forces along the border to prevent such undertakings while equipping troops with high-tech surveillance systems.

However, Turkey failed to enrich its UAV inventory via foreign procurement through Western, in particular Israeli, aviation firms as the primary suppliers, at the beginning of the 2000s. This era was a disappointing period for Turkey as the country had to confront a highly politicised Western defence industry. Without doubt, the invasion of Iraq, by US-led coalition forces, was a clear challenge for Turkey’s quest to procure intelligence and security assets. Turkey’s democratic choice not to participate to the invasion of Iraq hampered its desire to acquire these assets to counter terror threats. Persistent Threat Detection Systems (PTDS), or in Turkish military literature “surveillance balloons,” were one of these kinds of assets.

The initial efforts to acquire PTDS for the Turkish Army’s inventory were based on importing these systems from foreign suppliers, mainly US-based manufacturers. But the project could not be finalized until because of bureaucratic challenges stemming both from the US and Turkish decision-making mechanisms. A security expert claims that, in order to defend against casualty risks, there was an increasing demand on military intelligence assets to provide security for outposts facing imminent terror threats. This concern encouraged young and talented officers as well as non-commissioned officers of Turkish Armed Forces Intelligence School to build their own surveillance balloons by recycling scrapped equipment with a budget of just 1,100 TL (about $450 at the time). They had aimed to construct a cost-efficient system with simplified operating procedures that could be operated by regular soldiers with basic training.

Initially, dedicated Army soldiers conducted an experiment with a weather (meteorology) balloon on which they mounted re-purposed camera parts. They attached the balloon to a simple ground station with a cable that was bought in a local market. Although this first try was a failure, it was a big step. They replaced the balloon with the one made of a stronger fabric and upgraded the equipment with something more functional. The aim was simple: to have the altitude of the balloon be fixed at maximum of 500 meters and monitor any individual within a distance of 6 km. After unofficial consultations with the young soldiers, the Turkish technology giant ASELSAN agreed to sponsor the local amateur project.

ASELSAN provided old domestically manufactured equipment such as video cameras at no expense. With the aid from ASELSAN, a more sophisticated surveillance balloon could now be designed with a higher altitude and increased payload capacity. One problem left to be solved was having the balloon continue its surveillance task even if it was shot by light rifles. The shooting test was very successful after a private Turkish company in Ankara, OTONOM, manufactured a persistent and long lasting balloon. The balloon, which stayed aloft despite seven bullet holes in it, was also stabilized against harsh weather conditions by integrating additional fixing materials and software. Actually, the adventure of Turkish soldiers in building a surveillance balloon has pushed domestic private companies to start partnerships and pool their manufacturing capabilities to meet the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces. Hence, the project was in the hands of these companies afterwards.

The ASELSAN and OTONOM partnership produced surveillance balloons named “Global” (Küresel), a small balloon with 500 meters altitude, and the “Water Drop” (Su Damlası) with a maximum altitude of 1,000 meters. Apart from the ASELSAN-OTONOM partnership, Turkish satellite and cable network firm TURKSAT also developed another surveillance balloon with 800 meters altitude, which might be described as a medium-size PTDS in the defence market. TURKSAT, making deals with the foreign firms, enriched the competition in the emerging balloon sector.

The payloads of these Turkish surveillance balloons can be enhanced depending what the surveillance mission requires. Standard payloads include day and night cameras, laser pointers and radio relay systems. It is possible to integrate them to early warning systems used by ground troops in order to compliment, in other words “cueing,” other information collection efforts by integrated software. Furthermore, acoustic radar can also be mounted to detect explosions and movements of any sorts of vehicles. ASELSAN offers a great inventory of surveillance systems that can be integrated to any sort of these balloons.

Another option for the Turkish Army is the procurement of the PTDS from the Western defence market. In this context, Turkey is about to acquire two PTDS assets from the U.S. Army as a pledge. The U.S. Government granted two PTDSs from Lockheed Martin to the Turkish Army for countering illegal border crossing, especially by DEASH terrorists. The deal entails U.S. donation of the two PTDS assets at no expense for Turkey, but leaves maintenance responsibilities to Turkey. These PTDSs, most probably, will be have been used previously in Iraq or Afghanistan, and can be described as old and worn out. In order to maintain these systems, Turkey will need to meet their costs, and will be dependent on importing spare parts from abroad for them. Besides, the huge size of the balloon requires a huge amount of helium gas to run it, which reveals another challenging problem for the Turkish Army. However, this dependency creates an unwillingness within the circles of the Turkish Army to include these systems into its inventory or at least accept using them for urgent short-term needs until they are no longer functional.

The exploitation of the U.S. PTDS in Afghanistan is an indicator for whether it will meet the needs of the TAF and to see its efficiency. The PTDS was a distinguished intelligence asset for monitoring urban areas with its sensitive payload.  On the other hand, similar to small surveillance balloons, the PTDS of Lockheed Martin was strictly limited by harsh weather conditions; mainly wind, humidity, atmospheric pressure, cloud, and atmospheric electrical charge (including thunderstorms). Due to these shortcomings, the balloons were often grounded and fixed to command trailers. As in Afghanistan, harsh weather conditions along the border of Iraq and to some extent Syria, will hinder the effective exploitation of the U.S. PTDS.

Although the same weather conditions will certainly effect the functionality level of the Turkish surveillance balloons, their loss would be much more tolerable because they are domestically manufactured and cheap. The affordable cost of Turkish systems makes them more attractive than other PTDS products in the Western market. For instance, the cost of a PTDS manufactured by Lockheed Martin is around $15 to $20 million, which is prohibitive when it comes to usage in the rugged terrain conditions of Turkey. Thus, in order to cover the harsh terrain, security forces would probably demand additional PTDS assets over time. A comparison of terrain features of the U.S.-Mexican border and the Turkish-Iraq border illustrates this dilemma. The U.S. border is rather flat, so PTDS can serve for detecting illegal border crossings. On the contrary, the Turkish border with Iraq is full of rugged creeks, therefore several PTDS assets cannot provide either physical or border security since imagery intelligence (IMINT) assets require line of sight. Hence Turkey needs cost-efficient of surveillance balloons that could cover wide ranges that excludes the expensive PTDS.

As the Turkish Army’s priority is not solely based on border security, but also the force protection of ground troops, the needed surveillance balloons should be positioned for monitoring roads, neighbouring villages, and key terrain in the vicinity of military bases. For this purpose, the Turkish Army needs to procure small, mobile, easy to use surveillance balloons in large numbers. Basic military tasks such as target acquisition, directing fires, and location capturing ought to be the main capabilities of the surveillance system. The Turkish surveillance balloons offer such functions using simplified software. Software can be enhanced depending on the regional needs of Turkish Army in comparison to complicated and fixed software. Another advantage of the Turkish PTDS is the small number of operating personnel it requires. Just three personnel for each shift can run the system, which makes the entire 24 hour crew just nine personnel. On the other hand, the U.S. PTDS needs at least 10-12 personnel for each shift to run properly, corresponding to 30-36 operators over a 24-hour period, excluding team leaders.

Consequently, the indigenously developed surveillance balloons by ASELSAN-OTONOM, and to some extent TURKSAT, seem appropriate for the operational needs of the Turkish Army in comparison to the ones of outer market. They are mobile, small and simple systems to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance tasks in potential combat zones. Turkey’s technology is respondent to develop surveillance balloons and export to the other countries in need. Additionally, coast guard, police and gendarmerie forces, can also acquire these Turkish surveillance systems to complement existing threat detection systems, in order to monitor critical urban areas while countering crime.

Knowing your enemy is half of the battle, as the old adage goes. This is no less true when it comes to defending against cyber-attacks. Turkey, like many other states, faces a range of threats today that go beyond conventional violence, touching instead on the complex dependencies built into modern infrastructure, from defense systems, to banks, to electricity and other essential services. Facing a number of recent high-profile, headline-grabbing attacks through the internet, the issue of cyber security has come to the forefront of the national security discussion in Turkey. Dr. Merve Seren talks to Halil Öztürkci, a “White Hat” hacker, about how governments are trying to use the expertise of otherwise malicious cyber attackers to build better defenses.

Mr. Öztürkci, would you like to explain the notion of “White Hat Hacker”? Should “White Hat Hackers” be perceived as people who serve states and protect interests of states?

They do not necessarily function as servants of states. Hackers are categorized into three groups:

1. White Hat Hackers
2. Black Hat Hackers
3. Grey Hat Hackers

“Black Hat Hackers” generally violate computer security laws and log into systems for personal gain without an official permission. There is also another group called “White Hat Hackers” having the purpose of preserving computer security to counteract Black Hat Hackers’ cyber-attacks. White Hat Hackers also break into protected systems and networks to test and assess the security systems they work on. But their activities focus on the protection of systems. While doing so, they have to be capable of thinking as a Black Hat Hacker to clearly solve the origin, type and target of the attacks. Therefore, this means that White Hat Hackers are as equipped as Black Hat Hackers in terms of the capability for cyber-attacks. However, apart from Black Hat Hackers, White Hat Hackers use this capability to protect systems and to discover the security flaws in systems. In addition to these two groups, there also emerges a third one. Grey Hat hackers, who, when it is needed, discover the security flaws, log into systems or protect the systems.

Then, can we assume Grey Hat Hackers are people who are Black Hat Hackers in the night but turn into White ones during the day time?

Yes, you are right; this is the point describing the grey term. But there are other classifications among this one. For instance, socialist hackers are called “Red Hat Hackers,” whereas Islamist- jihadist ones are called “Green Hat Hackers.”

The Turkish Standards Institution provides a certificate of cyber security to individuals who are able to pass standards of their course. Hence, could it be inferred that a state may utilize the skills of White Hat Hackers for its own sake? Or does Turkey have such a strategy to employ White Hat Hackers to meet the needs of cyber security? Secondly, White Hat Hackers’ knowledge of security flaws could lead them to turn into Grey Hat Hackers. How could this be handled?

White Hat Hackers could be used to meet needs in the cyber security field. However, the question, whether the employment of White Hat Hackers can meet the need, still remains unanswered. Furthermore, there are strict government standards and procedures which one cannot change. For instance, an employee in this cyber security field should be a university graduate. However, it is a fact that there are people who are perfectly talented when it comes to cyber problems, but do not have university diplomas. Here is where the problem lies.

In that sense, Russia provides benefits or payment to people on a temporary or permanent basis without acknowledging them as official servants. Could this also be done in Turkey?

I think, Turkey should employ both temporary and permanent cyber security specialists. Institutions such as the Turkish Standards Institution, other private corporations or universities, somehow manage to fulfill the temporary part of it. However, the state must take the initiative to develop an integrated policy on cyber-security and create an area of expertise. It is in relation to this that the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (ICTA) has stepped into action recently.

The “cyber camp” which is held with the co-operation of Turkcell, could be able to provide cyber specialists to firms. ICTA also took a step like this in order to create a field of expertise in itself. As mentioned, people who are talented in the cyber world but do not have a university diploma, were also chosen for those courses. This is something hopeful for the future of cyber-security. However, the mentorship and the development of those people must be done well.

How do the White Hat Hackers in this model compare with what is found in Western countries? For instance, Russia has many employees working for the sake of the national interests. But are there any standards applied to those people, such as not having any cybercriminal background?

People with a cybercriminal background cannot be employed as official servants. However, I think we can benefit from their skills in one way or another. They do not necessarily have to be categorized as state servants. To give an example, it is a well-known example that once the head of the US cyber army participated in a conference called Black Hat and declared the state’s need for more hackers. Therefore, it is acceptable to gather all kinds of people working in the cyber area.

In Turkey, there is a group called the Ayyıldız Team [or “Star and Crescent Team”] which definitely has a significant impact on the cyber world. The Ayyıldız Team is capable of preventing attacks and furthermore of carrying out attacks. So, is it possible to collect and employ the same kind of groups like Ayyıldız Team? Or let me ask, are there any other alternatives to the Ayyıldız Team?

Yes, there are, such as Cyber Warriors [CW]. There are many others with different ideologies or intentions. But such groups do not follow a higher authority to make them organized and follow orders.

There is another field called “computer forensics”. Computer forensics evokes the idea of criminal case investigations. What are the most difficult computer forensics case studies you have ever confronted? How much does it take for you to detect them?

We make investigations through “digital evidence” that is very different from other types of evidence. It is really sensitive because it can be destroyed or fully erased easily. Therefore, in order to conduct investigations we have valid and appropriate digital evidence. The more technology advances, the harder it gets to detect threats.

Which type of attacks or cases have you been working on nowadays?

These days, we are working on Advanced Persistent Threats (APT). Turkey is under attack, both its public or private institutes. We both detect these threats and try to prevent them. In this period of detection, the departments have the responsibility of repulsing those attacks, and experts must think and act like cyber-hunters. Here, cyber-hunting implies the procedures of detecting the threats.

I would like to ask about a different topic, about Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). The government occasionally restricts access to Twitter and Facebook. Then, users download VPN applications to have access to the restricted services.  How does the use of a VPN effect personal privacy?

VPNs certainly effect personal privacy in a negative way. VPNs are like tunnels to help you to access websites or applications that you cannot reach through your server. These tunnels that help you also have the capability of reaching the personal information that lies in your cell-phone or computer.

Are there any official or national VPNs?

There are not any such official or national VPNs yet, but some institutions are trying to develop one.

Mr. Öztürkci thank you very much for sharing your time with us.

Turkey’s fight against PKK terrorism dates back to early 1980s, and since that time, despite suffering from various unpleasant experiences, the Turkish military has made considerable progress towards enhancing skills, knowledge and expertise in many areas in dealing with counter-terrorism operations. On the other hand, despite all the advanced conventional war-fighting capabilities or highly sophisticated weapons systems acquired, none of these favorable conditions should be taken for granted, for it would mean neglecting needs and capacity assessments for the success of future military operations in both rural and urban terrains.

These assessments are critical to preparing and supporting the armed forces for the challenges of changing operational situations that will likely occur under any scenario in future conflicts.

Identifying and meeting the perceived and actual needs of the military remains as crucial as ever for establishing a much more comprehensive, timely, and effective response to prevent terrorist attacks.

In particular, the military’s technology readiness for implementing countermeasures to protect its aircraft is a key issue, especially considering the most recent Man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) attack by the PKK.

On 13 May 2016, PKK militants dressed in camouflage fatigues shot down an armed AH-1W Super Cobra helicopter capable of close air support using what appears to be either a SA-16 or SA-18 MANPADS missile.  The helicopter had been dispatched to provide support to soldiers at the Çığlı base, in the Çukurca district of Hakkari province, near the Iraqi border.  PKK militants had killed six soldiers at the base, and the helicopter’s downing martyred the two pilots on board.

This is not the first time that PKK militants have successfully used such portable and shoulder-fired systems to hit military helicopters. Over the decades-long war between Turkey and the PKK, the PKK has downed one AH-1W Super Cobra, one AS-532 Cougar, as well as an S-70A Black Hawk.  On May 18, 1997, the AH-1W Super Cobra and AS-532 Cougar were shot down on 18 May, 1997, in the very same Çukurca district as the most recent attack, using a SA-7B (9K32M Strela-2M). The S-70A Black Hawk, meanwhile, was downed by an RPG-7 (rocket-propelled grenade) in Northern Iraq, on February 24, 2008.

A Highly-Effective, Cheap, and Easy to Use System to Bring Down Aircraft

The SA-7/14/16/18 – like their US-manufactured Stinger counterparts, which were used highly effectively in the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan – is designed to meet the low altitude air defense needs of ground units.

Armies have always wanted an air defense system with a low cost, that can easily be used and requires minimal training, and is maintenance free for use on the battlefield. Two generations of MANPADS have been manufactured, and both can be used by a single soldier alone, but need two soldiers to carry them.

A basic MANPADS consists of the launch tube, the missile, and battery.  Several generations of the weapons exist, with the earliest types being guided by the user simply firing toward the target, and later ones, including the SA-7/14/16/18 and Stinger series, using the heat signature left by aircraft engines to hone in on their targets. Other, more sophisticated MANPADS are also used, some requiring aircraft to “paint” a target so the missiles can close in on them, and others guided during flight by an operator on the ground, yet these require extensive training and additional resources to be present on the battlefield.

The 13 May PKK attack likely used a heat-seeking SA-16 or SA-18 MANPADS.

The “kill box” – the cylindrical area it can hit a target with the shooter at the center – for the most advanced MANPADS is approximately 10,000 meters in diameter and 5,000 meters high.

They are highly effective weapons: with well-trained personnel shooting a target within the kill box, the systems have a 95% kill ratio against fixed wing aircrafts, and a 98% kill ratio for rotary wing aircrafts like helicopters.  Even older generations, like the Stingers used against Soviet aircraft in Afghanistan in the 1980s, had high kill-ratios: according to US military assessments, of 340 missiles fired, 269 hit their targets.

An SA-18 MANPADS takes just 5 or 10 seconds after being activated to fire, and can fly for the next 17 seconds at speeds more than three times the speed of sound  approximately 1,200 km/h at sea level).

The target’s only option after the missile is fired to try and evade it as quickly as possible.  Countermeasures like firing flares to confuse the missiles’ heat seeking systems have become increasingly ineffective, especially since the 3rd generation of MANPADS, because of the speed of the missile itself and the short amount of time it takes to reach the target.

Missiles also tend to have proximity fuse mechanisms, so that if the target take evasive action and change its flying direction, the missile’s on-board computer will decide not to wait for a collision before detonating, exploding the warhead as near as possible to the target. The missile’s warheads are thus designed to explode in fragments, to create as wide a zone of destruction as possible in cast the target is not actually hit directly.

The weapons systems are also quite cheap, with some costing less that $10,000 to manufacture, making it a good choice for bringing down a $2 million MI-17 helicopter.

Easily Proliferated and A Natural Choice for Non-State Actors

The Russian-made SA series MANPADS are especially selling to many countries, and easy to find in the open weapon market. There are some training simulators for western products, but a typical MANPADS is very easy to use after one real try.

So we have a weapon system that is cheap, easy to use, easy to find, maintenance free, and can be used against all aircraft for low altitude air defense purposes. MANPADS weapons are combat-proven systems, especially since the Afghanistan and Kosovo Wars. With these qualities, non-state actors like the PKK will prefer MANPADS for their arsenal for future needs.

The only military option against this threat is to eliminate its supply routes, and develop some supporting technology against MANPADS.

Within this context, a critical discussion needs to be had on the possibility of using unmanned aircraft, UAVs, to enhance low-altitude air defense capabilities. With MANPADS so easily available, and so often being used by the PKK, a greater shift needs to be made towards UAVs, which will not have the same human cost as a conventional aircraft if shot down, and can be used to monitor and counter militants on the ground more effectively.

The Turkish Army’s bitter experiences, such as the PKK’s recent attack near the Çığlı military zone, highlights the unanticipated consequences of shortfalls and limitations in countermeasure abilities against MANPADS, and draws attention to the need to strengthen capabilities for detecting, locating, identifying, and defeating targets through UAVs.