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ecent legislative amendments have brought about changes to the structure of the National Security Council in Turkey, which has played a decisive role in domestic politics throughout the history of the Republic. With the establishment of the Directorates of Internal Security Research and Assessment, External Security Research and Assessment, and Defense Planning Coordination, the expanding nature of security in the global arena has been taken into account. Furthermore, such an expansion should also be viewed as a consequence of Turkey’s changing foreign policy and geopolitical perceptions.

President Erdoğan delivered a speech highlighting key points at the opening of the National Security Conferences, a series planned to articulate Turkey’s approach to security. Alongside an emphasis on historical state tradition, the speech drew attention to the harmonious coordination between Turkey’s institutions in the face of the region’s ongoing and seemingly endless ‘ring of fire’, whilst also heralding the National Security Council’s return to its core remit. In light of the reforms implemented and this announcement, it is worth asking whether there has been a shift in Turkey’s security culture alongside its evolving foreign policy approach.

The relationship between foreign policy and security culture

Security culture is a concept frequently used in the study of International Relations (IR). In this context, it is defined as the totality of norms that shape how a state or society perceives security, defines threats and formulates responses to the security challenges it faces. Security culture, centered on the perception of threats, helps us understand what a state regards as a threat, or which policies it views as such, and, in parallel, the values by which it defines itself and the historical memory through which it does so. At the same time, the behavioral framework that develops through these elements forms a state’s established code of conduct in the international arena.

Consequently, the perception of security becomes a concept directly linked to foreign policy as a natural outcome of these definitions and perceptions. For when a state’s strategic mindset and self-definition change as a product of an internal process, foreign policy is naturally updated, which in turn implies a shift in the reference points of the security narrative. Just as a definition of interests, resulting from a protectionist mindset and a narrow geopolitical narrative, reflects a limited context, such a narrative also leads to the perception of security threats being viewed from a considerably broader perspective.

What is Turkey’s security culture?

The most fundamental element shaping Turkey’s security culture has been the identity redefined alongside the establishment of the state. With the acceptance of a Western identity as the cornerstone of the state, foreign policy was entirely shaped by a Western geopolitical narrative, and security culture was naturally shaped by the perception of areas outside the West as sources of threat. Paradoxically, despite waging war against the West, Turkey has constructed its security culture on a plane identical to that of the West, defined its perception of threat as originating from outside the West, and sought to meet its security needs through Western organizations or alliances.

Historical experiences inherited from the Ottoman Empire led to the new state being security-focused; the new Republic, through discourses on national sovereignty, territorial integrity and the unity of the state, necessitated a strong state structure. This, in turn, led to Turkey’s security culture becoming state-centered, and institutions have largely defined their roles as significant power factors in domestic politics by relying on this discourse.

The Middle East and the Caucasus represented the core regions perceived as threats by this security culture; the attempt to demonize Islam, the Kurdish issue and the identities defined through these factors were framed as problems for Turkey. As a result of the geopolitical narrative reflecting a narrow hinterland, distant regions did not even fall within the scope of this security culture. Consequently, Turkey’s security culture has reflected a framework synonymous with the West and its interests; adherence to the NATO concept, both during and after the Cold War, has been Ankara’s foremost priority.

The shift in the security paradigm

Since 2002, the changes in Turkish foreign policy have naturally led to a shift in the security paradigm, as they also signified a significant transformation of identity. Firstly, the norms guiding foreign policy have diverged, and Turkey has begun to perceive its historical ties not as a threat but as a source of strength. A foreign policy approach has begun to prevail in which Turkey defines itself through an identity that, without disregarding Western values, places greater emphasis on its own identity elements, an identity that, in the simplest terms, can be expressed by the concept of our ‘heartland’. In parallel with this shift in self-definition, the definitions of interests and threats have changed, and the geopolitical perspective has expanded from a framework confined to the West to encompass a much broader geography stretching as far as Africa, Asia and the Americas.

So, what has changed in Turkey’s security culture? First and foremost, Turkey has become a country that understands very clearly that it must ensure its own security. In particular, the situation into which European states have fallen following the war in Ukraine continues to be discussed as an example illustrating just how accurately Ankara has assessed the situation. In this respect, from its very inception, Turkey has moved away from relying on international coalitions and policies dictated by them, and has begun to define its own security framework. In the words of Erdoğan, Turkey has shattered the glass ceiling over it and has transformed into an actor capable of redefining concepts at a regional level, writing its own narrative and shaping its own future. This situation has been interpreted as a reflection of self-confidence; by enhancing its own capabilities, Turkey has been able to devise solutions through its own policies whenever it perceives a threat to its security.

Regions where the traditional security culture held a perception of security threats have largely come to be viewed as areas for cooperation; security has been perceived not merely as a need secured by closing oneself off within borders, but rather as synonymous with taking proactive action. Security has been linked to the deepening of relations and increased mutual interdependence; where security vulnerabilities have arisen as a result of this approach, necessary measures have been taken to expand security boundaries. In this context, cross-border operations have constituted one of the most significant indicators of the shift in Turkey’s security paradigm. Consequently, security boundaries have been expanded, and Turkey has risen to the status of a state capable of implementing its own policies, demonstrating that security can also be ensured through new points established beyond its borders. Furthermore, it is a fact that, in line with Turkey’s evolving and expanding geopolitical understanding, the country now maintains military bases in many countries.

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rom the past to the present, the sustainability of the parties has been a decisive factor in conflicts and wars. In situations where defensive or offensive capabilities prove insufficient, there is a greater reliance on diplomacy. The systems deployed by the parties in the Ukraine-Russia War and the difficulties encountered in replenishing losses have had a ‘wake-up call’ effect on the world’s armed forces.

In conventional warfare, it became apparent that capabilities were being rapidly depleted from stockpiles, that meeting the demand for these systems domestically during wartime was difficult, and that procurement from abroad was challenging. Indeed, third parties faced stock and inventory issues as a result of “aid”. Consequently, an unprecedented “mass production” initiative was launched worldwide. As countries strive to secure mass production capabilities, the international standing of those with such capabilities is strengthening. It is evident that Türkiye’s relations with various countries have significantly strengthened in this context, and dismissive attitudes—which were entirely unfounded—have given way to realistic discourse.

A war with global implications and repercussions has begun following the US-Israel coordinated and sudden attack targeting Iran. Whilst the war has many dimensions, this study seeks to highlight defence industry applications within the scope of a “situation assessment” from Türkiye’s perspective, focusing on specific systems.

The aggressor’s tools: US-Israel

In the joint US-Israel attack, strategic and air defence assets in Iran were primarily destroyed. By dismantling the command-and-control structure, attempts were also made to establish secure corridors. Concurrently, early warning and command-and-control aircraft, along with electronic warfare assets, were deployed in the region. Iran’s air defence, electronic warfare and command-and-control assets were placed under pressure.

It is known that Türkiye has carried out similar operations within its limited geographical area and possesses these capabilities. Türkiye currently maintains a comprehensive inventory of sea- and land-based electronic warfare assets. In the air, the upcoming HAVASOJ systems will provide significant capabilities. Whilst fighter aircraft and UAV systems are currently operated with electronic warfare assets of varying capabilities, Türkiye’s introduction of HAVASOJ and İHASOJ systems will enhance the overall capability. Similarly, in the future, manned and unmanned early warning and command-and-control aircraft equipped with national systems will complement Türkiye’s Iron Dome.

Airstrikes

Combat aircraft taking off from US aircraft carriers and bases in the region are striking targets in Iran with various GBU series air-to-ground munitions. In this bombardment, where it has been announced that over 10,000 targets have been struck, bombs enhanced with guidance kits (to increase strike accuracy) and various missile systems are prominent. These include bombs from the JDAM family and missiles such as the Hellfire, used on platforms like helicopters and UAVs. Whilst fighter jets struck identified targets, MQ-9 Reaper UAVs—capable of remaining airborne for extended periods—targeted ‘opportunistic targets’ and launch vehicles detected in real-time. The UAVs conducted long-term intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations, whilst their munitions delivered devastating effects. Furthermore, long-range air-launched cruise missiles (AGM-158, Rampage, and other ALCMs) were extensively used by the US and Israel. Thanks to their high strike accuracy and long ranges, successful engagements against strategic targets deep within Iranian territory were made possible.

From Türkiye’s perspective, it is fair to say that alternatives to almost all the systems used by the US and Israel in air-to-ground attacks are produced domestically and nationally. Key organisations producing guidance kits and smart bombs in Türkiye include MKE, ROKETSAN, ASELSAN, TÜBİTAK SAGE, ASFAT and others. The key here is the ability to procure high-consumption munitions and kits in large quantities for the inventory. Furthermore, it is essential to have a structure capable of maintaining production capabilities in the event of hostilities.

Compared to the munitions used by the US in UAVs, Türkiye possesses broader capabilities. Türkiye ranks among the leading countries with the widest range of lethal products in UAV systems. ROKETSAN’s MAM family of smart munitions (MAM-C, MAM-L, MAM-T), the TRLG family of missiles (UAV-TRLG-122/230/300), TÜBİTAK SAGE’s KUZGUN series (KUZGUN-KY/SS/TJ) and BOZOK smart munitions, among others, are customized solutions for UAVs. The munitions mentioned in the previous paragraph can be used on UAVs.

There are various solutions of a similar nature or purpose to the ALCM missiles used by the US and Israel against strategic targets. In addition to the SOM series of cruise missiles, the ÇAKIR series of cruise missiles are currently in the Turkish Armed Forces’ inventory. Key takeaways include: the need for a robust inventory in the event of a prolonged conflict, the implementation of cost-effective product customizations, and the calculation of storage, sustainment and logistics processes in line with potential threats. Türkiye’s stockpiles must be robust, and its serial production capabilities must continue to be developed. The position within the inventory of cruise missiles and munitions that are modular and adaptable to different threats, such as the ÇAKIR cruise missile, must be strengthened. Necessary actions must be taken by reviewing the current structure in light of the facilities struck in Iran and the resulting outcomes.

Furthermore, the US Navy has engaged strategic targets deep within Iran using ship-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles. Türkiye, meanwhile, is conducting activities on its warships involving similar capabilities and purpose-built cruise missiles via the MIDLAS system. These efforts, like other projects, are continuing under strict secrecy.

It was observed that the US deployed its LUCAS systems for the first time, which are similar in nature to Iran’s one-way Shahid kamikaze UAVs. Described as a cost-effective solution (80,000 US dollars), these kamikaze UAVs were launched from US naval assets towards targets on the Iranian mainland. Türkiye possesses similar, multi-purpose solutions. Baykar’s K2, introduced by the company, is a significant force multiplier in the upper segment, featuring multi-role capabilities and a range of 2,000 kilometers.

In the region, the US is observed to be using HIMARS artillery rockets and PrSM missiles, which possess precision strike capabilities. Türkiye’s equivalent artillery rocket systems are the KAPLAN and KASIRGA systems produced by ROKETSAN. Long-range cruise missile solutions such as the KARA-ATMACA, alongside TRLG artillery rocket systems capable of laser-guided guidance, are in service (combat-proven). A qualified and sufficient inventory of artillery systems capable of engaging precision and long-range ground and fixed targets is essential.

Destruction operation: Navy

The US announced that the Iranian Navy had been almost completely destroyed, citing this as a cause for ‘pride’. Torpedoes and anti-ship missiles were deployed in the destruction of the fleet, which included corvettes, frigates and submarine platforms. Türkiye currently possesses domestically developed anti-ship missiles such as the ATMACA, as well as various torpedo solutions including the AKYA and ORKA. Furthermore, capsule-launched ATMACA missiles can be fired from submarines. Whilst Türkiye is strengthening the position of these two offensive assets within its inventory, domestically produced REİS-class submarines and MİLGEM corvettes and frigates are operating with national weapon systems.

Türkiye’s land-based BARBAROS coastal defense system can also be operated from the coast using long-range anti-ship missiles. The state of the Iranian Navy makes Türkiye’s countermeasure solutions crucial. Whilst the platforms are equipped with advanced sonar systems, they also possess anti-submarine warfare (ASW) rockets and countermeasure torpedo solutions such as ASELSAN’s ZOKA. Ships are also fitted with advanced point and close-in air defense systems to counter potential anti-ship threats. It is essential that all elements are operated in a network-centered and effective manner (via a unified picture). The common picture established by Türkiye for ‘Gök Vatan’ (Sky Homeland), similar to the ‘Iron Dome’, is being established for the platforms in ‘Mavi Vatan’ (Blue Homeland).

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ecent statements from Israeli political figures and media commentators suggest that Türkiye is increasingly being framed as a potential target in Israel’s evolving regional strategy, particularly in the aftermath of tensions with Iran. While the emergence of other regional crises could delay such a focus, the broader pattern indicates that Israel’s list of perceived threats is expanding. Indeed, proposals such as Yair Lapid’s suggestion to designate Qatar as an enemy state reflect a political climate in which new adversaries can be identified and  cdftgrvdlegitimized with relative ease.

Within this framework, it is plausible to argue that Türkiye may eventually be subjected to direct Israeli targeting. Importantly, this is not because Ankara seeks confrontation or pursues policies aimed at eliminating Israel. Rather, Türkiye’s position has largely consisted of vocal criticism of Israeli military actions and regional policies. From Ankara’s perspective, such criticism is both morally grounded and politically justified. However, Israeli discourse increasingly equates criticism with hostility, effectively redefining rhetorical opposition as a security threat. In doing so, Israel lowers the threshold at which it may justify coercive or even military action.

This dynamic is critical. When a state openly labels another as an “enemy”—even in rhetorical terms—it contributes to the construction of a justification framework for future action. Israeli strategic behavior in past conflicts demonstrates that such framing is rarely incidental. Instead, it is often accompanied by a broader process of narrative building in which the target is portrayed as dangerous, expansionist, or imminently threatening. This process typically involves political statements, media amplification, and the mobilization of supportive networks to shape international perception.

Preemptive strikes

At the operational level, Israel has repeatedly demonstrated a preference for preemptive or preventive strikes. These actions are designed to neutralize perceived threats before they fully materialize, thereby allowing Israel to maintain strategic initiative. The role of Mossad in enabling such operations is widely acknowledged, particularly in cases involving covert infiltration, targeted assassinations, and the preparation of operational environments. Past incidents—ranging from sabotage operations to targeted killings—highlight the extent to which intelligence-driven preemption forms a cornerstone of Israeli military doctrine.

For potential targets, this doctrine creates a profound strategic dilemma. Waiting for an attack may result in severe losses, particularly if the first strike is designed to cripple leadership structures, military infrastructure, or critical assets. The experience of other regional actors illustrates this risk. Failure to anticipate and respond to evolving threats can lead to significant strategic setbacks, including the loss of key personnel and command capabilities.

Conversely, international law and strategic logic both recognize that under certain conditions, preemptive action may be considered legitimate. If a state can demonstrate credible evidence that an attack is imminent, anticipatory self-defense may be justified. In this sense, Israel’s own reliance on preemptive strikes contributes to a normative environment in which similar actions by other states can be argued as legitimate. Put differently, a doctrine consistently employed by one actor may, over time, be invoked by others facing comparable threat perceptions.

Indicators of intent

In the case of Türkiye, this issue becomes particularly salient. Israeli leaders, including former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have at times identified Türkiye as a potential future target. Parallel narratives in pro-Israeli media further reinforce this perception by portraying Türkiye as a destabilizing force or a latent threat. Such discourse not only shapes public opinion but may also serve as a preparatory stage for policy escalation.

If this pattern continues, Türkiye may interpret these signals not merely as rhetoric but as indicators of intent. In such a scenario, the combination of explicit labeling as an enemy and the demonstrated Israeli practice of preemptive warfare could be seen as creating a legitimate basis for anticipatory action. That is, if a state is both designated as a target and faces a credible risk of sudden attack, it may argue that waiting passively would constitute a strategic error.

Moreover, Israeli practice suggests that military action is often preceded by intensified information campaigns. These may include allegations that the target supports terrorism, pursues destabilizing policies, or seeks advanced weapons capabilities. Similar narratives regarding Türkiye have already begun to appear with greater frequency. Should this trend intensify, it may further reinforce Ankara’s perception that it is being positioned as a future target.

The risk of miscalculation remains significant

Ultimately, the question is not whether conflict is inevitable, but how strategic perceptions evolve in an environment of mutual distrust. If Türkiye concludes that an Israeli strike is not only possible but imminent, it may consider preemptive options as part of its strategic calculus. Such a decision would not be taken lightly, given the immense risks involved. However, it would be shaped by a combination of factors: Israel’s rhetorical positioning, its established military doctrine, and the broader regional security environment.

In this context, Israel’s own approach to preemptive warfare may have unintended consequences. By normalizing anticipatory strikes as a legitimate tool of statecraft, it implicitly provides other actors with a framework through which similar actions can be justified. Thus, the very doctrine that underpins Israeli security strategy could, under certain conditions, be invoked by Türkiye to legitimize a preemptive response.

Absent meaningful efforts to de-escalate tensions and clarify intentions, the risk of miscalculation remains significant. In a region already marked by volatility, the convergence of adversarial rhetoric and preemptive doctrines could pave the way for a dangerous cycle of action and reaction—one in which the line between defense and offense becomes increasingly blurred.

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yrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa announced on Sunday a comprehensive ceasefire and a far-reaching integration agreement between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), marking a major shift in the balance of power in the country’s northeast after years of fragmentation and conflict.

According to details published by the state-run Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), the agreement provides for an immediate and full ceasefire across all fronts and contact lines between Syrian government forces and the SDF. The deal is to take effect alongside the withdrawal of all SDF-affiliated military formations to areas east of the Euphrates River, a move described as a preparatory step for redeployment and reintegration.

Under the agreement, the provinces of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa will be handed over fully and immediately to the Syrian government, both militarily and administratively. This includes the transfer of all civilian institutions, public facilities, and local administrative bodies to state control. Employees currently working in civil institutions in the two provinces will be retained within relevant Syrian state ministries, and the government pledged not to take punitive measures against SDF personnel or members of the existing civil administration.

The integration of all civilian institutions in Hasakah

The deal also stipulates the integration of all civilian institutions in Hasakah province into Syrian state administrative structures, further extending Damascus’ authority over territories that had remained outside direct government control for much of the past decade.

A key element of the agreement concerns strategic economic assets. The Syrian government will assume control of all border crossings as well as oil and gas fields in the northeast. According to SANA, Syrian forces will secure these sites to ensure that revenues are returned to the state, a development expected to have significant economic implications for a country struggling under years of war and sanctions.

Developments on the ground appeared to move in parallel with the political announcement. In eastern Deir ez-Zor, Syrian tribal forces took control of major oil and natural gas facilities previously held by the YPG/SDF, Anadolu Agency reported. Tribal groups operating east of the Euphrates, reinforced by fighters arriving from the western side of the river, seized the Al-Omar oil field and the Koniko natural gas field, two of Syria’s most important energy sites.

Withdrawal of U.S. forces

Local sources said the advances followed the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the area, which had previously used several of the oil and gas facilities as military bases. The U.S. pullout created a security vacuum that accelerated the collapse of SDF control in large parts of the region.

As tribal forces advanced, they also took control of several towns and villages east of the Euphrates, including Shehil, Al-Hawayij, Ziban, Tayyane, Abu Hamam, Hatla, Garanij, Baghouz, Susah and Shafeh. SANA broadcast images showing SDF withdrawals from key locations such as the Al-Halabiya Roundabout, described as a major transportation hub linking the eastern, western and northern countryside of Deir ez-Zor.

The Syrian army and internal security forces expanded their presence in other strategic areas. SANA reported that government forces took control of al-Tabqah Prison west of Raqqa province, while the army’s Operations Command announced full control of the al-Tabqah military airport. Internal security units were also deployed to villages in the western Deir ez-Zor countryside to consolidate control and restore order.

Regional reactions

Regional reactions to the developments were swift. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held a phone call with President al-Sharaa on Sunday, stressing that the complete removal of terrorism from Syrian territory is vital for Syria and the wider region. According to a statement by Türkiye’s Communications Director Burhanettin Duran, Erdoğan reaffirmed that Türkiye’s support to Syria, particularly in counterterrorism efforts, would continue to increase.

During the call, the two leaders discussed bilateral relations and recent developments in Syria. Erdoğan emphasized that Türkiye attaches great importance to Syria’s territorial integrity, unity, stability and security—principles Ankara has repeatedly highlighted in its policy toward the Syrian conflict.

The agreement between Damascus and the SDF represents one of the most significant political and military shifts in northeastern Syria in recent years. The region, long shaped by U.S. military presence, SDF administration and complex tribal dynamics, is now witnessing a rapid reassertion of Syrian state authority.

While questions remain about the long-term implementation of the deal and the future role of former SDF militants within state structures, the combination of political agreements, tribal mobilization and regional backing signals a decisive moment in Syria’s protracted conflict, potentially closing one of its most enduring territorial and governance divides.

(Source: Anadolu News)

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he 1970s and 80s saw regular armies in Latin America, Asia and later Africa, including Turkey, facing serious problems in their fight against terrorist groups, guerrillas and paramilitary groups. The appetite of Western countries such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, and most intensely the United States, to intervene in regimes in many countries around the world, along with the financing of the U.S.’s shadowy paramilitary companies and military-industrial complex through hundreds of operations conducted by the Pentagon and the CIA, led to an unprecedented expansion in the volume of arms and ammunition imports by developing countries, both Atlantic and non-Atlantic.

In the post-World War II era, when NATO was established, global military spending stood at around 500 billion dollars in today’s figures. As the Cold War escalated and tensions between the Western and Eastern blocs deepened, military spending first rose to 1.5 trillion dollars and then to 1.8 trillion dollars just before the end of the Cold War. Of this expenditure, $750 billion was by the United States, $1 trillion by NATO, $600 billion by the Soviet Union, and the remaining $200 billion by countries not belonging to any military pact. After the Cold War, in the early 2000s, global military spending fell to $1.2 trillion, with $750 billion spent by NATO, approximately $100-150 billion by Russia and China, and $250-300 billion by the remaining countries.

Global military expenditure at record levels: $2.8 trillion

Today, particularly since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War in 2022, we are talking about global military expenditure that has surpassed $2.8 trillion on an annual basis as of the first half of 2025, up from $2.2 trillion. In the defence sector, the 15 leading countries, including Turkey, in terms of military power and capability; are caught between coordinating, transitioning, and adapting to conventional army structures, conventional weapons, ammunition, and platforms; new-generation irregular warfare techniques; new-generation warfare technologies and strategies; and artificial intelligence-focused new-generation weapons, ammunition, and platforms. They are struggling to train sufficient high-quality personnel and manage costs effectively. The United States’ defence spending, which has reached $1 trillion, is now straining the federal budget.

Therefore, after taking office for a second term, President Trump made it clear that it is not possible for the United States to bear the entire burden of the Atlantic Alliance and NATO’s defence and warfare capabilities. He warned that if NATO member EU countries do not increase their military investment and spending by at least 2.5-3 times by 2028, the United States may withdraw from NATO to some extent. Therefore, despite objections from some EU countries, at the recent NATO summit, all countries pledged to comply with the U.S. call for spending and investment. Russia’s drone and fighter jet violations in September, first in Poland, then in Estonia, and subsequently in some Scandinavian countries’ airspace, have prompted NATO to take action.

Consequently, strategic efforts to design a more comprehensive air defence system under NATO and to deepen NATO’s capabilities will be accelerated. For this reason, many NATO countries have also accelerated mutual cooperation with Turkey in the areas of defence, security and new generation warfare technologies.

Rewriting the global defence architecture in the age of drones

Especially in the last five years, the concept of warfare has changed radically. With drones, land, sea and submarine platforms are no longer just reconnaissance or surveillance tools, but have become strategic elements with direct attack capabilities. The Russia-Ukraine War has proven on the ground how low-cost but deadly unmanned systems can upset the balance on the front lines. Ukraine’s FPV drones and the naval drones it uses in the Black Sea have shaken the traditional understanding of naval and air superiority.

The 2020 Azerbaijan–Armenia Karabakh War demonstrated that UAVs could alter the course of ground warfare without the need for air superiority, opening the door to a new doctrine. This change in warfare techniques on the battlefield heralds an era described internationally as ‘lethal transparency.’ New-generation electronic warfare systems, artificial intelligence-supported swarm algorithms, and layered air defence networks have now become integral components of the new generation battlefield.

This rapid evolution is also forcing NATO to take radical steps. At the recent summit in The Hague, alliance members agreed on a target of defence spending reaching 5% of their GDP. This ratio represents a radical departure from the long-neglected 2% spending threshold in many European countries. Russia’s increasingly frequent violations of NATO countries’ airspace in the Baltic and North Seas are raising the need for ‘active defence’ beyond deterrence. Faced with this situation, Trump first sent a loud message to European capitals to ‘fulfil your commitments’. Trump stated that Russian aircraft and drones should be shot down immediately if they violate airspace but left the details of U.S. support on this issue up in the air.

Turkey’s historic defense leap forward in the last decade

NATO’s new concept centers on drone technologies and electronic warfare capabilities, focusing on a vision of a multi-layered ‘defence dome’ that effectively covers the skies and seas. Thus, the alliance aims to establish a security architecture that integrates not only land and air forces, but also space and cyberspace. In this historic transformation process that NATO must rapidly implement, Turkey has become a power centre not only regionally but also globally. Ten years ago, Turkey accelerated revolutionary steps to produce its own UAVs and SİHA (unmanned aerial vehicles) with local and national capabilities, and in just five years, it has become the world’s most ambitious drone manufacturer and exporter.

Baykar’s TB2 and Akıncı models have successfully served in Syria, Libya and Karabakh, and have become symbols against the Russian army in Ukraine. The TB3’s ability to take off and land from the TCG Anadolu has propelled Turkey into the drone carrier concept and placed it at the forefront of sea-air integration. Unmanned combat aircraft projects such as Kızılelma and ANKA-3 also enable manned and unmanned air assets to converge under the same doctrine.

In addition, the process of building short, medium and long-range air defense layers with domestic capabilities under the HİSAR and SİPER programs and the Steel Dome project is being followed with admiration by many of Turkey’s allies and is also facilitating the signing of successive long-term defense technology and security cooperation agreements between Turkey and these allies. The GÖKDENİZ close-range air defence system, TF-2000 air defense frigates and the naval drones under development also reinforce the ‘system of systems’ vision in terms of Turkey’s new generation warfare doctrine and strategy.

Our defence industry exports, which reached $1.8 billion in 2024 and are already projected to exceed $2.5 billion in 2025, demonstrate in figures how this historic leap is transforming into high added value for the Turkish economy on a global scale. Turkey’s goal is to gradually increase its defence industry exports from $11 billion to $15 billion in the 2028-2030 period.

In a context where the emerging E7 economies are accelerating strategic cooperation and wide-ranging joint project steps to deepen their economic, commercial, political and military cooperation with Turkey without exception, the President’s fair, strong and determined stance, which reinforces the perception of a ‘Strong Turkey’, is causing the messages he has delivered and will deliver at all international meetings to be followed with great interest by the international public.

Therefore, under the visionary leadership of the Turkish President, the giant strides taken over the past 20 years in the fields of defense, security, energy and digital technologies, along with our capabilities and capacities that have elevated the Turkish Armed Forces to among the world’s strongest armies, enable a strong Turkey to stand up for its own geography and the oppressed, to hold those responsible to account, and to manage a strong diplomatic process both on the ground and at the negotiating table. Under President Erdoğan’s strong, determined and visionary leadership, Turkey has assumed the role of a ‘game changer’ that is reshaping the destiny of Eurasia. A strong Turkey also forms the essence of the Vision for the Turkish Century.

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merican President Donald Trump’s newly announced 20-point plan to end Israel’s genocide in Gaza and release hostages has sparked mixed reactions across the Middle East, with key regional allies backing its ceasefire goals but rejecting elements that were not part of their proposals.

The announcement came just days after Trump publicly declared that he would not allow Israel to annex the West Bank, a statement marking one of his sharpest breaks with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu since returning to office.

“I will not allow Israel to annex the West Bank. It’s not going to happen,” Trump said on Thursday at the White House, calling the idea a “red line” opposed by Arab and Muslim leaders. “It’s been enough. It’s time to stop now,” he added, saying he had personally discussed the issue with Netanyahu.

Trump made the pledge during a closed-door meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, where leaders and senior officials from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, Türkiye, Indonesia, and Pakistan met with him to discuss a framework for peace in Gaza.

The 20-point “board of peace” plan

On Monday, Trump formally unveiled what he called the “Principles for Peace”, a 20-point plan intended to halt Israel’s nearly two-year genocide in Gaza and secure the release of all hostages. The proposal, which Trump described as the product of “extensive consultation with friends and partners throughout the region,” was announced at a joint press conference with Netanyahu at the White House.

Under the plan, hostilities would end immediately upon acceptance by both parties. Israeli forces would withdraw to agreed positions, and all military operations would be frozen pending the implementation of a phased ceasefire. Within 72 hours, all hostages — both living and deceased — would be returned, and Israel would in turn release 250 life-sentence prisoners and 1,700 Gazans detained after Oct. 7, 2023.

Hamas members who agree to disarm and “commit to peaceful co-existence” would receive amnesty, while those wishing to leave Gaza would be granted safe passage to third countries.

During the announcement, Netanyahu reiterated Israel’s opposition to a Palestinian state, calling recognition of one “a mistake.” Trump appeared to agree, saying some European allies had “foolishly recognized the Palestinian state” out of fatigue rather than strategy.

Reactions: support and skepticism

Reactions to Trump’s initiative have been cautious. While Arab leaders welcomed the effort to stop the bloodshed, several signaled unease over key details.

Pakistan’s top diplomat Ishaq Dar told reporters on Tuesday that the plan released by the White House was “not our document.”

“This is not our document, which we sent to them. There are some key areas that we want covered. If they are not covered, they will be covered,” Dar said at a news conference in Islamabad. He emphasized that the joint Muslim proposal prioritized “a ceasefire, humanitarian aid, and an end to forced displacement.”

Dar said the eight Muslim nations — Türkiye, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Egypt, Jordan, and Indonesia — were committed to continuing diplomatic coordination, even if differences remained.

Later, speaking to Geo News, Dar reiterated that the published U.S. version “does not include all of our proposals,” adding that Islamabad would continue discussions to ensure their priorities were incorporated.

His comments echoed concerns voiced by Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, who told Al Jazeera that Trump’s plan achieved “a key objective by ending the war” but that “some issues require clarification and negotiation.”

“We hope everyone will look at the plan constructively and seize the opportunity to end the war,” Al Thani said, noting that Doha had not yet received Hamas’s response.

Mounting pressure on Israel

Trump’s initiative comes amid mounting international pressure on Israel to halt its offensive, which has left over 66,000 Palestinians killed, most of them women and children, since October 2023. Gaza’s infrastructure has been devastated, and widespread famine and disease have taken hold, according to the UN.

For months, global outrage over civilian suffering and the displacement of millions has forced Washington to recalibrate its public stance, even as the U.S. continues to provide Israel with military and diplomatic backing.

Arab and Muslim leaders, while wary of Trump’s political motives, see the plan as a potential opening to reassert their influence over a post-war Gaza — provided it does not compromise Palestinian sovereignty or legitimize Israeli control.

As one senior Arab diplomat told regional media, “If Trump wants to be the chair of peace, he must first prove he can deliver justice.”

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

T

he Steel Dome project is a testament to Turkey’s vision in the field of air defense. It is a system architecture that will adapt to the future battlefield. With its multilayered structure, command and control infrastructure supported by artificial intelligence, and sensor, weapon, and communication systems developed entirely with domestic resources, Steel Dome is a defense umbrella and the product of technological and strategic vision.

Two critical events that occurred in June 2025 offered valuable insights into the evolving role of air power in modern warfare and its strategic implications. First, on June 1, Ukraine launched simultaneous unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks on several air bases in Russia. Then, on June 13, Israel launched a large-scale, coordinated air campaign targeting Iran’s nuclear program and military infrastructure. Iran subsequently retaliated against Israeli territory with ballistic missiles and kamikaze drones. Noteworthy in both incidents were not only the technical characteristics of the air platforms used but also how these platforms were integrated with intelligence, electronic warfare, and command-and-control systems.

These developments have produced consequences that must be considered at the operational, strategic, technological, and doctrinal levels. Furthermore, the fact that these events occurred in regions bordering Turkey underscores the need to assess these threat dynamics not only theoretically but also geographically, from Turkey’s national security perspective. In this context, Turkey’s efforts to develop its own air and missile defense systems are crucial for advancing defense technology, achieving strategic autonomy, and promoting regional stability.

In this context, the Steel Dome project stands out as a system architecture that embodies Turkey’s vision in the field of air defense and will adapt to the future battlefield. Announced to the public at the Defense Industry Executive Committee (SSİK) meeting on August 6, 2024, Steel Dome is a project that will serve as a defense umbrella. With its multi-layered structure, command and control infrastructure supported by artificial intelligence, and sensor, weapon, and communication systems developed entirely with domestic and national resources, the Steel Dome project is a defense umbrella and a product of technological and strategic vision.

Steel Dome

Following the August 6, 2024 meeting of the Defense Industry Executive Committee (SSİK), the project was announced to the public. Steel Dome is essentially the name of the structure that will be formed by bringing together early warning, command and control, communication, and weapon systems for Turkey’s air and missile defense.

The statement issued regarding the meeting summarized the project’s three key dimensions: a multi-layered structure; an artificial intelligence–supported command and control infrastructure; and a national system focus. These dimensions are a multi-layered structure, an AI-supported command and control infrastructure, and a national system focus. This statement summarizes the project’s three key dimensions. As a “system of systems,” Steel Dome’s architecture reflects the interwoven layers of air defense.

In order to explain the three fundamental characteristics of the Steel Dome, it is necessary to examine the main threats in modern air warfare.

Cruise missiles

Cruise missiles: These are guided munitions that fly straight to their targets like an aircraft. They usually fly at low altitudes and autonomously correct their course with the help of their guidance and control systems. Various guidance and navigation technologies are used for precision targeting. Most cruise missiles in widespread production and use are jet-powered and have subsonic flight speeds. However, supersonic and hypersonic cruise missiles (traveling at speeds of at least five times the speed of sound) have also begun to proliferate in recent years.

Kamikaze Drones: These drones, which are a transitional form between unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and cruise missiles, have been in production since the 1980s. They came to public attention during the Russia-Ukraine War when Russia used Iranian-made Shahed 136s. Initial models flew straight toward a pre-programmed target. However, subsequent versions gained the ability to change speed, altitude, and course; loiter in the target area; and receive target updates from the ground. Due to their small size and low speed, these drones are difficult for air defense sensors and weapon systems designed for combat aircraft or missiles to track and destroy. They have caused significant damage to Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in particular.

Ballistic missiles: These long-range weapons follow a ballistic trajectory after launch to reach their target. They gain thrust with the speed they achieve during launch, and after this stage, the engine shuts down and the missile enters the free flight phase. This section is defined as the “midcourse.” Then, the missile enters a steep dive toward the target in the final approach phase, called the “terminal phase.” If the missile has an advanced guidance system, it can make minor trajectory corrections during this phase. Due to the high speed at this point, the kinetic energy is high enough to cause serious destruction to the target.

Advances in materials, electronics, sensors, and software technologies have enhanced the capabilities and performance of the aforementioned air threats, enabling them to undertake new missions. For instance, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), originally developed for reconnaissance and surveillance, were first armed for precision strikes. Now, UAVs equipped with sophisticated sensors are being used for electronic warfare and airborne early warning missions.

These air threats have different flight altitudes, speeds, maneuverability, range, and coverage areas of their weapon systems and sensors. This underscores the fact that a comprehensive early warning and defense system against air threats must consist of interlocking layers.

This multi-layered structure is also at the core of the Steel Dome’s “system of systems” approach.

Components of the Steel Dome

Ballistic Missiles: These long-range weapons follow a ballistic trajectory after launch to reach their target. They gain thrust with the speed achieved during launch, and after this stage, the engine shuts down and the missile enters the free flight phase. This section is defined as the “midcourse,” after which the missile enters a steep dive toward the target in the final approach phase.

The Hisar family of air defense missile systems, developed jointly by ASELSAN and ROKETSAN, covers low and medium altitudes. As of 2021, the Hisar-A+ (low altitude) and Hisar-O+ (medium altitude) systems have reached the serial production and inventory entry stage. The Hisar-A+ consists of radar and electro-optical sensors mounted on an ACV 30 tracked armored vehicle chassis produced by FNSS and four vertical launchers that fire infrared-guided missiles with a 15-kilometer range. The system provides defense against low-altitude UAVs, cruise missiles, and helicopters. The Hisar-O+ is a medium-altitude solution mounted on a tactical wheeled vehicle with a 25-kilometer range.

The Hisar family also includes a derivative called the Hisar-D RF, which was developed for use on combat ships. These missiles are carried and fired by the National Vertical Launch System (MİDLAS), which was developed by ROKETSAN for use on ships. They will contribute to the air defense capabilities of national warships, beginning with the İstif class.

The Siper system

Developed by ASELSAN, ROKETSAN, and TÜBİTAK SAGE, Siper is designed to defend strategic infrastructure, bases, and facilities from air attacks. It will be the cornerstone of Turkey’s air defense system thanks to its active radar-guided missiles, advanced command and control infrastructure, and radar capable of detecting, identifying, and tracking targets from long distances. At the Grand National Assembly of Turkey’s Planning and Budget Commission, where the Ministry of National Defense’s 2025 budget was discussed, Minister of National Defense Yaşar Güler provided information on the subject. He stated that the first missile of the system, the “Siper Product 1” missile, has a range of 100 kilometers and has entered service.

Güler also stated that development and testing activities are ongoing for the Siper Product 2, which has a range of 150 kilometers, and the Siper Product 3, which has a range of 180 kilometers.

The Hisar family includes a derivative called the Hisar-D RF, which was developed for combat ships. These missiles are carried and fired by the National Vertical Launch System (MİDLAS), developed by ROKETSAN for use on ships. The Hisar-D RF will contribute to the air defense capabilities of national warships, beginning with the İstif class.

The aforementioned air defense weapon systems receive airspace and target data from ASELSAN’s Alp series of early warning radars and Kalkan series of air defense radars. The Hakim Air Command and Control System is the backbone of this entire network structure. Launched by ASELSAN in March 2020, Hakim is a C4I (command, control, communications, computers, and information) system designed to provide full integration between all command and control centers at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of the Turkish Air Force Command. Hakim can also create a “joint picture” using sensor data from land and sea forces. It is compatible with the NATO ACCS (Air Command and Control System) architecture and can exchange air pictures with allied countries when necessary.

Hakim’s architecture allows for the real-time tracking of all air traffic in Turkey and its surrounding airspace. It can detect and identify potential threats from a long range using different sensors and prevent these threats using the most appropriate weapon systems. Thanks to its flexible and modular design, the system can also integrate new sensors, weapons, and platforms as they enter the inventory of the Turkish Armed Forces. This feature enables Turkey to develop military-strategic cooperation with its allies through interoperability.

Steel Dome is Turkey’s response to the rapidly changing and evolving nature of air threats. Various solutions and projects are being implemented around the world in this regard. As was evident in the recent Iran-Israel war, ballistic missiles in particular have highlighted the heavy burden placed on modern air defense architectures.

F

ollowing the July 15 coup attempt, Turkey accelerated its nationalization efforts and launched the KAAN development project, with TAI as the prime contractor, to replace the F-16 fighter jets currently in its air force. The 5th-generation manned fighter jet project, which will be the most advanced stage of the Turkish Military Aviation Industry, will not only be a milestone in aircraft production but also a key milestone in Turkey’s strategic independence. The KAAN project, which will strengthen Turkey’s regional and international standing, will also enable the Turkish Air Force to operate with domestically produced weapons and mission systems.

Turkey’s national fighter jet, KAAN, ushering in a new generation of the Turkish defense industry, broke the record for the largest single export in Turkish defense history, reaching a contract value of $15 billion just one year after its first contact with the sky. Under the defense agreement signed between Turkey and Indonesia at the INDO Defense 2025 Fair in Jakarta, 48 5th-generation KAAN fighter jets will be produced and exported to Indonesia within 120 months.

The KAAN fighter jets to be produced under the agreement will also utilize engines developed domestically and nationally by Turkey. Additionally, technologies transferred from Indonesia will be incorporated into the 48 KAANs.

The ability to produce 5th-generation fighter jets

Following the U.S., Russia, China, and South Korea, Turkey has joined a limited number of countries capable of producing 5th-generation fighter jets with the KAAN. The National Combat Aircraft KAAN, a quintessence of Turkish defense engineering and one of the most crucial production capabilities for Turkey’s strategic goal of independence, is poised to shift the balance not only in our homeland but also on the global aviation scene. Following the agreement with Indonesia, Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) General Manager Mehmet Demiroğlu announced that they are in contact with several other countries regarding the KAAN.

Indonesia is negotiating with several countries to procure fighter jets to strengthen its air force. In this context, 42 aircraft have been ordered from France, with initial deliveries scheduled to begin in 2026. An agreement has been reached with the US for 24 F-15EX fighter jets, but the final contract has not yet been signed. Indonesia is also evaluating an offer from China for 42 second-hand J-10Cs, particularly in light of the Pakistani Air Force’s operational experience.

Meanwhile, the agreement reached with Russia for 11 SU-35 fighter jets has been suspended due to US CAATSA sanctions. Finally, in addition to the KAAN agreement signed with Turkey at the INDO Defense 2025 Fair, the Indonesian government resolved issues with the KF-21 fighter jet program with South Korea. The government has also decided to restructure its financial contribution to the project, reducing it from approximately $1.168 billion to $438 million. Under the agreement, 48 KF-21 aircraft will be delivered to the Indonesian Air Force.

Domestic Aviation Adventure, From Vecihi Hürkuş to Nuri Demirağ

The Ottoman Empire was one of the first states to establish military aviation. Starting in 1909, several initiatives were undertaken in the field of air warfare, and exploration was carried out to establish aircraft factories in Kayseri and Sivas. Furthermore, the world’s first use of fighter aircraft in combat was by the Italians against the Ottoman Empire during the Tripoli War, and the first fighter aircraft used in combat was shot down by Turkish soldiers 113 years ago.

Following this dream inherited from the Ottomans in the early years of the Republic, Turkish pilot Vecihi Hürkuş designed and built the first Turkish aircraft, the “Vecihi K-VI,” in 1924, using aircraft parts left over from the Greeks after the war. However, the flight of the Vecihi K-VI was delayed, and after a member of the committee responsible for permitting the flight said, “Vecihi, we can’t give you this license. If you trust your plane, jump in, fly, and save us too,” HÜRKUŞ made his maiden flight with the Vecihi K-VI on January 28, 1925. However, Vecihi’s flight was penalized for being unauthorized.

The “Turkish Aircraft Society” was founded in 1925, and Vecihi Hürkuş was declared “Turkey’s Chief Aircraft Pilot” and entered the society as a pilot. That same year, the Turkish Aircraft and Engine Corporation (TOMTAŞ) was established in partnership with Junkers, a pioneer in German aviation. A year later, the Kayseri Aircraft Factory was commissioned, and maintenance and repair activities for two types of aircraft were carried out at the factory. However, shortly thereafter, due to various pressures and political reasons, TOMTAŞ was closed, and the factory was transferred to the Ministry of National Defense.

Nuri Demirağ

Meanwhile, Nuri Demirağ, one of the wealthiest businessmen of the early Republic, spent a significant portion of his fortune establishing a national aircraft factory. As part of this effort, Demirağ established an aircraft factory in Beşiktaş in 1936. The factory produced the Nu.D-36 model training aircraft that same year. The Turkish Aeronautical Association (TAA) requested the training aircraft produced by Demirağ, and a certain number of aircraft were ordered.

In 1938, the aircraft produced were ordered to undergo final testing before delivery and brought to Eskişehir. The aircraft, piloted by engineer pilot Selahattin Reşit Alan, who had also drawn the plans for various aircraft, including the Nu.D-36 trainer aircraft, crashed into a ditch dug to prevent animals from entering the runway during landing. Tragically, Selahattin Reşit Alan, one of Turkey’s first aircraft engineers, lost his life in the accident.

Following this tragic loss, the Turkish Aeronautical Association canceled its orders for the Nu.D-36 model training aircraft, claiming they were unfit for flight and did not meet the desired requirements. Demirağ took the Turkish Aeronautical Association’s order cancellation to court, but despite expert reports stating that the aircraft were airworthy and had not suffered any accidents, the court ruled in favor of the Turkish Aeronautical Association.

Following this process, Nuri Demirağ continued his aviation studies with renewed vigor and began work on the Nu.D-38 aircraft, using domestic and national resources except for the engines. Designed for civilian passenger transport, the aircraft was also designed to be convertible into a bomber with various modifications applicable in the event of war.

By 1944, the Nu.D-38, which had completed its flight tests, had attracted interest from Spain in Europe, and from our neighbors, Iran and Iraq. However, the government of the time enacted a law preventing the export of aircraft manufactured in Turkey. Consequently, Demirağ, unable to secure domestic orders, closed his aircraft factory.

The Etimesgut Aircraft

Following Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s instigation in 1937 to establish a national aircraft and engine industry, the Turkish Aeronautical Association Etimesgut Aircraft Factory began operations in 1941, the Turkish Aeronautical Association Gazi Aircraft Engine Factory in 1947, and the Ankara Wind Tunnel (ART) in 1950.

A total of 15 different types of aircraft were manufactured at the Turkish Aeronautical Association Etimesgut Aircraft Factory between 1941 and 1950, but one jet-powered aircraft remained in the project phase. It is said that the drawings for the THK-16 aircraft, which remained in the project phase, were smuggled to Germany.

In addition to aircraft manufacturing, the factory also carried out maintenance and modernization work on 63 aircraft for the Ministry of National Defense and 48 for the Turkish Aeronautical Association. The Etimesgut Aircraft Factory and the Gazi Aircraft Engine Factory, which were in their tenth year of operation and continuing their successful activities, were transferred to the MKE Institution by a law enacted in 1951.

The Gazi Aircraft Engine Factory was converted into a tractor factory in 1954, and the Ankara Wind Tunnel was abandoned until its reopening by TÜBİTAK in 1998. The Etimesgut Aircraft Factory now lies idle. The Etimesgut Aircraft Factory was destined to share the same fate as Nuri Demirağ’s aircraft factory.

On June 22, the U.S. struck three nuclear facilities in Iran with radar-stealthy B-2 bombers. Following the incident, numerous comments were made on social media about the design similarities between the THK-13 Aircraft Wing Glider, produced at the Etimesgut Aircraft Factory, and the B-2 Bomber. The THK-13 was manufactured in 1948 as a single-seat national flying wing glider, but the project was terminated following a flight test accident.

During the years when aircraft factories in Turkey were bankrupted and closed down, the US Northrop Corporation’s project to develop a powered bomber aircraft based on the YB-49 flying wing design, although it failed to reach mass production, utilized the design and engineering expertise gained from this project to create a war machine that began production in 1988 and is now capable of taking off from American soil, striking Iran, and returning.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

On July 15, 2016, Turkey experienced an attempted military coup that seemed, by all conventional measures, destined for success. Backed by significant segments of the armed forces, including elements of the air force and navy, the coup appeared technically unassailable. And yet, within a matter of hours, it collapsed. Understanding how this happened requires us to look well beyond the military dimension and into the political, sociological, and organizational fabric of contemporary Turkey.

One of the most compelling analyses of this failure comes from Prof. Dr. Cemil Koçak, a leading historian of 20th-century Turkish history. Drawing on decades of research on the early republican period, authoritarianism, and Turkish civil-military relations, Koçak, in his recent talk at the Institute Social, a newly founded think-tank in Istanbul, frames the July 15 coup as a singular event, one that both fits within and dramatically departs from Turkey’s long history of military interventions.

Prof. Koçak lays out a multilayered analysis that reveals the sociopolitical complexity behind the failure. He places the July 15 coup attempt outside of conventional categories. His analysis is crucial to understanding how the FETÖ (Fethullah Gülen Terrorist Organization) emerged as an “exceptional” example of clandestine state infiltration – and how, despite its reach, the coup unraveled.

In Koçak’s view, FETÖ’s organizational structure occupies a highly unusual place in Turkey’s history of covert movements. On one hand, it found support, at times tacit, at times explicit, from different layers of the state and successive political governments. On the other hand, it built a vast educational and financial network within a legal framework, while simultaneously developing international alliances. Through institutions like schools and media outlets, the group maintained a public-facing, legitimate image while quietly capturing key positions within the state and pursuing covert infiltration of the judiciary, bureaucracy, and the armed forces. This dual structure, namely legal visibility and covert penetration, gave the organization a kind of institutional flexibility and strength unseen in prior examples.

Koçak draws a stark comparison between the 1960 military coup and that of 2016. The former was executed with just 12 tanks; a 13th couldn’t be found. In contrast, the July 15 plotters commanded enormous force, especially from the air forces, substantial portions of which were under FETÖ’s influence. The fact that dismissals are still ongoing years later illustrates the scale of infiltration. For Koçak, this means the July 15 coup was, technically, an operation with a high likelihood of success. So why did it fail?

The Night the Military Lost Control–and the People Took Over

Koçak points first to weaknesses internal to the organization. One key issue was the degradation of merit within military recruitment and promotion. Military entrance exams became formalities; loyalty to the movement, not professional competence, became the primary criterion. This created a cadre of officers who, during moments of crisis, lacked the initiative and flexibility required to act decisively. The leadership deficit was further compounded by mistrust within the organization itself. Officers were often subordinated not to military superiors, but to “imams” appointed by the organization’s internal, non-military hierarchy. In one telling example, Koçak notes that coup plans sent to the U.S. were reviewed not by strategic experts but by a theology-trained imam, a sign of the movement’s internal insecurity and preference for tighter control over “professional” insight.

These structural flaws played out in operational decisions. The most obvious was the last-minute decision to launch the coup earlier than planned. Originally set for 3:00 a.m., the operation was abruptly moved to 8:00 p.m. due to fear of exposure. This shift disrupted the previously coordinated plans, triggered panic, and paralyzed the command structure. Orders did not flow properly, and the chain of command disintegrated. According to Koçak, this failure of coordination, rooted in organizational dysfunction, was a decisive factor in the coup’s collapse.

Yet, Koçak argues that the most critical failure was not organizational, but societal. Unlike in previous military coups, there was no meaningful support from political parties, the media, or large segments of society. The opposition’s support and approval of the coup attempt were tacit and silent. In 1960 and 1971, however, larger parts of the public and political class supported the military, either actively or passively. This time, both the press and the public at large resisted. People took to the streets in unprecedented numbers. Koçak suggests the coup plotters failed to account for this possibility. Without historical precedent, they assumed no such resistance would occur. “They could not imagine that something which had never happened before might actually happen,” he notes.

This shift in civic behavior, Koçak emphasizes, is deeply tied to changing political reflexes. Since the 2000s, and especially following the 2007 e-memorandum, the AK Party government and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in particular began to push back against military tutelage. The firm stance taken during that period, Koçak argues, instilled new confidence in society. A collective awareness emerged: that military interventions were neither inevitable nor unstoppable.

In this regard, Koçak underlines Erdoğan’s leadership on July 15 as a decisive factor. The refusal to flee, the direct appeal to the public, and the call for resistance all contributed to a new political dynamic. “Give Caesar what belongs to Caesar,” Koçak says. In all previous coups, civilian leaders had capitulated. This time, they did not. Nor did the public. Nor the media. July 15, then, marks not only the failure of a coup but the collapse of long-standing expectations about how such events unfold and how institutions respond.

J

ust a year earlier, the issue of right-wing politics had come to the forefront of discussions in Turkey. Its significant impact on the national discourse, coupled with its remarkable performance in the May 2023 elections, had put the xenophobic and anti-immigrant Victory Party in particular in the spotlight.

Under the leadership of Ümit Özdağ, the Victory Party carved out a distinct niche in Turkish politics by echoing European far-right parties, particularly through its exclusionary rhetoric against immigrants. This stance sets it apart from Turkey’s other nationalist factions. In the 2023 general election, the party’s presidential candidate, Sinan Oğan, received 5.2 percent of the national vote, while the Victory Party itself received 2.3 percent. Following these results, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who finished behind Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the first round of the presidential election, noticeably sharpened his stance on immigration, marking a departure from the more inclusive tone he had maintained throughout the campaign.

The success not only of the Victory Party, but also of the Iyi Party in alliance with the CHP, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Grand Union Party (BBP), partners of the AK Party, had sparked debates about the popularity of nationalism in Turkey. In this context, the Iyi Party, which broke its alliance with the CHP, has gradually moved away from its goal of becoming a center-right party by increasing its nationalist tone.

Total defeat for Akşener’s Iyi Party and Özdağ’s Victory Party

The local elections on March 31 were a total defeat for the Iyi Party and the Victory Party. The Iyi Party, led by Meral Akşener, who has set her sights on the presidency, had a decent record in the three previous elections in which it participated, with close to 10% of the vote. This time, however, in Istanbul, where the elections were held in a general election-like atmosphere, the party fell to 0.6 percent.

Only a year ago, the Iyi Party had won 8.2 percent in Istanbul. Moreover, the Iyi Party received only 3.7% of the national vote this time. It should also be noted that some of these votes were partly due to the high profile of some of their candidates in some provinces, such as Ordu and Nevşehir.

Contrary to the predictions of many political analysts that the Victory Party would increase its votes, its share of the vote in Istanbul fell from 2.8 percent a year ago to 1.7 percent, despite having nominated a very strong mayoral candidate. In Turkey as a whole, their share of the vote fell to 1.5%.

In other words, these two political parties in the opposition bloc lost a huge chunk of their votes, which totaled around 12% in the last election. This lackluster performance also means that the influence of the right-wing in Turkey’s political debate will decline, at least for a while.

Ümit Özdağ’s rhetoric

Ümit Özdağ’s rhetoric, which focused on anti-immigrant sentiments, did not accurately reflect the complexity of Turkey’s migration challenges, although it had some success in influencing Turkish political discourse and the 2023 election results. In areas with large immigrant populations, the vote share of the winning party was not significantly different from its performance in other regions. For example, in the 2023 elections, the Victory Party’s vote share in Esenyurt and Sultanbeyli, the two Istanbul districts with the largest immigrant populations, was 2.6 percent and 2.5 percent, respectively, slightly below the provincial average.

A similar trend can be observed in other provinces and districts. Iyi Party, which is known for its hardline stance on immigrants and came in second after the Victory Party, also failed to gain additional support in districts with large immigrant populations. This suggests that support for these parties is driven more by ideological orientation than by labor market concerns.

The main opposition CHP, which refrained from intensifying its nationalist rhetoric during these elections, emerged as the main recipient of votes that might otherwise have gone to the Iyi Party. In addition, the actions of the CHP’s Istanbul mayor, Ekrem İmamoğlu, aimed at securing Kurdish votes in the election’s final weeks—actions that deviated significantly from nationalist talking points—did not prevent this shift of support.

Inflation

Turkey has been struggling with rising inflation for some time. Following the 2023 general election, the incumbent economic team began implementing a series of measures that signaled a period of fiscal austerity for citizens. Against this backdrop, the main opposition party, the CHP, came out on top in the March 31 local elections for the first time in nearly half a century. In his initial reaction to the election results, President Erdoğan acknowledged that the electorate’s concerns about the economy had been taken into account.

Thus, as economic grievances became more pronounced, the appeal of right-wing ideological rhetoric seemed to diminish. Voters chose to express their dissatisfaction with the government’s economic policies by supporting the most viable opposition candidate.

These results are likely to spur economic policymakers to devise solutions that mitigate the adverse effects on middle- and lower-income groups. Therefore, simplistic explanations that attribute the rise of right-wing sentiments solely to economic factors deserve a thorough reassessment.

T

urkey has become the third largest exporter of TV series in the world, behind the United States and Britain. In recent years, international audiences have become more aware of Turkish history and culture, as well as Istanbul’s beautiful sceneries and astonishing Bosporus views.

This incredible achievement masks difficult beginnings and some controversial trajectories taken by the Turkish film industry.

Until recently, the movie business in Turkey was tightly controlled under military oversight, which pursued a staunchly secularist agenda. However, political shifts invariably impact the cultural landscape. Over the last twenty years, Turkey has been emancipating itself from this oversight, steering towards a more inclusive political and social order. This transformation is mirrored in its cultural outputs, paving the way for global audiences to explore Turkish culture through new and diverse lenses in the future.

It is noteworthy to mention that in the 2010s an important debate about the Turkish movie industry raised the question, “Why are there no characters representing women wearing Islamic headscarves in TV series?”.

Back then, the wife of the elected prime minister, who wore an Islamic headscarf, preferred not to attend receptions on important days because of the reaction of the security establishment. She could not enter a military hospital because of her Islamic attire.

Understanding Turkey’s transformation

In 2007, the possibility of electing a religious president resulted in the issuance of a memorandum by the General Staff and leading opinion columnists in prominent newspapers, and a significant part of the political and bureaucratic elite made statements in support of this memorandum. When the Justice and Development AK Party cadres came to power as conservative democrats, they fought against the tutelage powers within the state. It was only in the 10th year after the government came into power that the Islamic headscarf was allowed in universities.

Understanding Turkey’s transformation goes beyond high-level political crises and legal changes. The headscarf movement epitomises the religious majority’s fight to assert its place within the political core, modern society, urban spaces, education, the upper echelons, economic spheres, and, naturally, state institutions.

The primary barrier to Turkey’s journey towards democracy has been the military tutelage system and its political backers, which staunchly resisted the integration of religious perspectives into the political mainstream. This division fostered a profound disconnect between the state and its citizens, becoming a pivotal source of social polarisation for years. Issues such as unequal access for religious groups to public resources, cultural disparities, and the security bureaucracy’s dominance over civilian governance have consistently sparked significant debate within Turkey’s political arena.

CHP changes its line

The AK Party’s coming to power in 2002 was an important turning point in terms of gaining such freedoms in Turkey. Since 2002, The Republican People’s Party CHP, the main opposition party, has supported these anti-religion restrictions and bans under the guise of protecting secularism.

However, having lost several elections since 2002, the CHP has gradually started to change its line. Following multiple electoral defeats in the past two decades, the CHP has been shifting its ideological stance. As the 2023 elections approached, it tried to dilute its earlier positions and move beyond the previously entrenched polarisation. Therefore, in the run-up to the 2023 elections, the political environment in Turkey transcended this axis of polarisation.

The two major contesting alliances, the People’s Alliance and the Nation’s Alliance, both included parties that appealed to secular and religious constituencies. The People’s Alliance, led by the AK Party, included the DSP, which had previously split from the CHP and had a similar ideological position, while the Nation’s Alliance, led by the CHP, included parties founded by people who had left the AK Party. Moreover, the CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s election campaign produced a discourse that criticized and apologized for past practices that excluded religious people.

These developments represent an important milestone for Turkish politics. The alliances and discourses of the parties in these elections were indicative of social progress.

Polarization

In the meantime, Turkey’s cultural environment was also moving in a similar direction. For some time now, Turkish TV screenplays have been produced on historical figures that feature religious themes more than ever before. Religious lifestyles, which had previously been allocated to low classes in society, such as housekeepers and peasants, have now become associated with successful urban youth characters in modern Turkey. Examples of recent television series in this context include Ömer, which tells the story of a religious young man; Kızılcık Şerbeti, which tells the story of two families, one secular and the other religious, who meet around a love story; and Kızıl Goncalar, which brings to the screen the social encounters between people who belong to a traditional religious sect and the former practitioners of harsh secularism in Turkey.

Given the significant increase in rural-urban migration in Turkey since the 1970s and the emergence of new urban religious practices for over fifty years, it’s evident that mainstream Turkish media was slow to reflect this social trend. Similarly, the CHP’s belated shift towards inclusivity did not bring the success they expected in the elections.

On the other hand, the increase in the number of religious characters in Turkish TV series should be noted as a positive development, both as a sign of overcoming the secular-religious polarization and as a means of socialization and durability of this progress.

It is still difficult to say that the film industry has captured the full societal picture. But, at least, this means that international audiences will watch a more kaleidoscopic and inclusive take on Turkish life.

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resident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Egypt on February 14 and his bilateral meetings with his counterpart Abdel Fattah Sisi can be seen as a result of the normalization talks that started in 2021 and as a clear statement of a concrete will to reestablish partnerships between the two countries in many fields. Undoubtedly, the potential cooperation between Turkey and Egypt, which are the main actors in regional issues such as Libya, Sudan, and the Eastern Mediterranean, especially on the Gaza issue, can pave the way for the transformation of these crisis areas. However, when regional issues are considered within the framework of global geopolitics, the two countries’ common stance on regional crises has different meanings.

In fact, the ongoing diplomatic rapprochement between Ankara and Cairo signals a significant shift in global power dynamics. At this point, the harmonization of Turkey’s and Egypt’s foreign policy approaches can position the two countries as a united center of power against the backdrop of the multipolar world order. This scenario comes to the fore as the U.S. influence in the Middle East diminishes noticeably and the sanctions it imposes through economic, military, and political engagements lose their effect. The evolution of relations between the two countries from competition to cooperation will provide important opportunities to fill the perceived gaps in the regional strategies of the United States, and will allow the development of partnerships with countries that seek to expand the European Union’s influence, especially in the region.

The European Union and the Eastern Mediterranean equation

From the perspective of the EU, the emerging Ankara-Cairo axis can be assessed in more than one dimension. First, the rapprochement between Turkey and Egypt may provide an opportunity within the EU for joint negotiations on the issue of more coordinated migration flows through the Eastern Mediterranean. The cooperation of two regional powers, which in the past were at opposite poles, means ensuring stability and peace in various crisis spots such as Libya and Sudan, which are seen by EU countries as the source of uncontrolled migration flows.

On the other hand, Turkey’s and Egypt’s control and coordination of migration management, especially for EU countries bordering the Mediterranean, means that the two countries can use their positions as key transit countries to tip the balance in ongoing negotiations with European countries in their favor. The two countries’ chances of gaining concessions or support on other regional issues may also increase.

At the same time, the united front formed by Turkey and Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean raises various concerns in terms of energy exploration by EU companies and the energy trade interests of the countries concerned. In some respects, however, it also offers strategic opportunities. To elaborate: in the recent past, the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, in which Greece, the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC), and France were active, tried to include Egypt in the formation in order to leave Turkey on its own in the regional equation—and was relatively successful in this goal. In fact, the maritime agreement signed between Egypt and Greece damaged Egypt’s interests and priorities in realpolitik, and jeopardized its gains according to international law in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The fact that in the same period the agreement offered by Turkey to Egypt added an area in the Mediterranean Sea the size of three islands of Cyprus to Egypt’s territory was important in that it put the Sisi government in a difficult position vis-à-vis domestic public opinion and showed that national interests would be at risk if Egypt pursued the EU path. Currently, the manifestation of the Ankara-Cairo axis in the Eastern Mediterranean means that Turkish and Egyptian energy companies take the lion’s share of the reserves in the region. At this point, the energy cooperation in question will also enable EU countries to have more reliable access to energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In this sense, it has become increasingly clear in recent years that the energy resources of the Eastern Mediterranean and Africa are of vital importance to Europe. Since the Russia-Ukraine war broke out in February 2022, the Eastern Mediterranean has played a central role in the global energy equation and in import/export supplies. So much so that EU countries seeking to reduce their dependence on Russian natural gas see countries in Africa and the Middle East as the strongest and most realistic alternative, with Algeria, Libya, and Nigeria standing out in this respect. Indeed, the new balances in the Eastern Mediterranean and the rapprochement between Turkey and Egypt could make these plans a more rational option in the medium to long term, both politically and commercially.

The US Perspective on Turkish-Egyptian Rapprochement

From the perspective of the U.S., which has minimized its footprint in the Middle East under the Biden administration, the cooperation that is developing between Ankara and Cairo can be assessed under two subheadings. First, it should not be forgotten that throughout history Turkey and Egypt have been traditional and strategic U.S. allies. At a time when Israel’s political, economic, and cultural involvement in the Middle East is decreasing due to the Gaza issue, the U.S. will maintain its sphere of influence in the Middle East at low cost by implementing the “remote balancing” strategy. As is well known, the U.S. has been providing Egypt with serious military aid since the Camp David agreement in 1979.

However, since the day he took office, Biden has distinguished himself from the Trump administration by maintaining a distant attitude towards the monarchies in Egypt and the Gulf countries. This approach is one of the main factors behind Egypt’s move towards regional partnerships. Moreover, the emergence of the Turkey-Egypt bloc as a regional power could provide certain advantages in balancing Iran, one of the United States’ main regional rivals. In parallel, Iran’s recent expansion into Africa and the Houthis’ attacks in the Red Sea have led to arguments that a space has opened up for Iran in the Middle East after October 7, 2023. In this conjuncture, the fact that two actors—Egypt and Turkey—that have distant relations with Iran are positioned side-by-side in regional crisis areas points to opportunities rather than threats and difficulties in the eyes of U.S. policymakers.

The second issue is the defense industry, which was mentioned during President Erdoğan’s visit to Cairo, and military cooperation, which is likely to deepen in the medium to long term. The Turkish defense industry has been continuously increasing its market share by building on its successes in the Libyan and Karabakh wars, and is becoming the first choice of countries experiencing conflicts and civil wars in Africa. The entry of Turkish defense industry equipment into the Egyptian market, which is dominated by U.S. and Israeli companies, could position Turkey as a prominent player in the sector.

The Sisi government’s counterterrorism operations in the Sinai Peninsula require this advanced technology and equipment, adding additional strain to Egypt’s relations with Israel over Gaza. Due to the tensions in Gaza, the city of Rafah, which lies within Egypt’s borders, is frequently subjected to Israeli air strikes. Therefore, the possible cooperation with Turkey to increase Egypt’s armed unmanned aerial vehicle capacity could be another important parameter in the relations between the two countries.

Although the Turkish-Egyptian rapprochement is mainly examined through regional units of analysis, it has the potential to influence global political dynamics. The move presents both difficulties and opportunities for Western powers including the management of migratory flows, the transfer of energy resources to global markets, the EU’s position in relation to developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the U.S. reaction to its relatively diminished presence in the Middle East. With its military, economic, and political dimensions, the Turkey-Egypt rapprochement could usher in a new paradigm in the global geopolitical balance.

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he security and defense agreement signed between Turkey and Somalia in February 2024, although not talked about enough in Turkey, made a major impact and generated discussion globally on the role of Turkey especially in the Horn of Africa. The impact and interaction of this 10-year agreement is likely to be felt in the region for many years. However, what does this agreement mean for Turkey and its overall Horn of Africa policy? How should we understand it in a broader perspective?

First of all, this agreement is part of the Turkish strategy in recent years whereby any crisis should be utilized to the maximum level for the benefit of Turkey’s national foreign policy. In the past, during the crisis of Qatar and the Gulf countries in 2017, Turkey acted quickly and decisively, increasing its military presence in the Gulf and opening a military/training base in Doha. After several years of criticism and complaints, it is now clear that Turkey has a firm military place in the Gulf.

What we see here is a similar case. When Ethiopia and Somaliland signed an agreement granting the former naval and commercial access to Somaliland’s coast, Somalia’s central government saw it as an existential threat. Not only did a security crisis occur, but many inside the Somali government interpreted this as a sovereignty crisis between Somalia and Ethiopia. Ankara quickly responded to the Somali request for help to the central government in Mogadishu. Ankara evaluated the crisis and signed an agreement to increase its military presence in Somalia.

This agreement is important in two aspects for Turkey. First, it will increase Turkey’s military in Somalia and possibly lead to the addition of a small airport for military planes in the military training center in Somalia, the lack of which came to the fore during the evacuations in Sudan. Second, it can clearly pave the way for Turkey’s presence in the open seas in the region and, therefore, its effectiveness in the developments in the Gulf of Aden.

The agreement is both a continuation of the deepening military relations between Turkey and Somalia in the last decade, and a reflection of the self-confidence that Somalia has gained over al-Shabaab, allowing it now to act more independently in regional politics. In addition, the agreement can be interpreted as the most effective playmaking move made by Somalia in the geopolitics of the region after 2010.

Effects and Reflections

The United Arab Emirates is likely the country most disturbed by the Turkey-Somalia security and defense agreement. The UAE has been conducting serious diplomacy for the last year to sign a very similar or even more advanced security agreement with Somalia. However, the response from Somalia has been reluctant—which is why there is both reaction and disappointment on the part of UAE about this development.

Ethiopia also was shocked and uncomfortable with the agreement, but, at the same time, attaches great importance to relations with Turkey. Ethiopia-Turkey relations experienced their golden period in 2020-2021 when Turkey helped Ethiopia in its fight with the Tigray region by supplying drones and other military equipment. It will be difficult to return to the same period again, however, multidimensional military-security relations between Turkey and Ethiopia are at a point of no return with mutual trust on this issue being well established.

For this reason, Ethiopia, which is experiencing serious economic difficulties, does not want problems with a country with which it works closely in the field of security. Nevertheless, one should expect that we will see the reflections of Ethiopia’s discomfort with the relevant agreement in its relations with Turkey in the coming period; however, the continuously deepening security-centered relationship is likely to balance this.

Turkey in the Horn of Africa

The most important question now is “What should Turkey do next in the Horn of Africa?” The geopolitics of the region will be reshaped as an atmosphere of insecurity has emerged: Somalia is dealing with al-Shabaab; Ethiopia is struggling with internal problems such as Tigray and Oromia; Somaliland is seeking independence; Kenya is preoccupied with domestic political issues; and the civil war in Sudan deepens and becomes a stalemate.

Turkey’s Horn of Africa policy in the 2010s was to strengthen the Sudan-Somalia line against the Ethiopia-Kenya line, and ensure the historical regional order. This approach manifested itself in Ankara’s activities that contributed to state-building efforts in Somalia and to socio-economic stability in Sudan. But in 2011, Sudan was divided into two, and a military coup and, most recently, the ongoing civil war destroyed the regional balance.

Despite this, Somalia has made progress in re-establishing order economically, politically, and militarily beyond expectations. The Somali diaspora has supported this process economically, and Somalia has presented itself as a new actor in the region. Turkey recently provided serious support to the Somali central government in the fight against al-Shabaab terrorism and made an sizable contribution to the strengthening of the country’s military.

Alongside its support to the Somalia-Sudan axis, Turkey has also established serious relations along the Kenya-Ethiopia axis. Political and military relations with Ethiopia, and commercial relations with Kenya came to the fore. This process has made Turkey one of the key countries in the region’s geopolitics.

The main axis of Turkey’s future policy in the region is likely to be based on further strengthening its presence there. Ankara may consider opening a consulate in the restored former Turkish Consulate General in Harar, Ethiopia. This move will strengthen Turkey’s social and religious ties on the Harar-Hargeisa-Djibouti line.

The second move may be paying special attention to Mekelle, the second-largest city in Ethiopia, in order to develop social bonds with the local population. Recently, the Turkish Maarif Foundation opened a school in Mekelle as a sign of Turkish interest in developing relations with the Tigray region. In the past, the tomb of King Negus in Mekelle was restored by the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), but it is currently abandoned. The Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs can establish a presence in Mekelle by hiring a local imam and re-establishing ties with the region. The school opened by the Turkish Maarif Foundation in Mekelle is currently the most popular school in the region and is working at full capacity.

Turkey has been conducting a mediation process between Somalia and Somaliland for a long time without any serious progress. It would be appropriate now for the regional countries to support the Turkish effort to establish workable relations between the two countries and between Somalia and Somaliland and the other countries in the region, including Ethiopia. Following the security agreement between Turkey and Somalia, such a constructive move will reinforce Turkey’s constructive influence in the region, bringing an end to the disturbances between Somalia and Ethiopia. This, though, can only be achieved with the help of the regional countries.

Today, Turkey is visible everywhere in the Horn of Africa in a multidimensional manner and continuously emphasizes the tantamount importance of regional peace. Turkey is the only country that has established schools across the region, namely in Djibouti, Hargeisa, Mogadishu, Harar, Mekelle, and Addis Ababa. Regional countries need to utilize Ankara’s presence and relations with different countries in the region for the benefit of the entire region. Only under such circumstances, will everyone win, including Turkey.

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n a press statement on Sunday, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan lauded the Antalya Diplomacy Forum as an internationally recognized brand and a distinguished intellectual platform in the field of diplomacy.

Fidan highlighted the forum’s evolution into a global brand, emphasizing its regional ownership perspective. Speaking on the X platform, he stated, “It serves as a platform where various approaches and experiences tackling global issues are exchanged, and a wide range of worldviews are articulated.”

The Foreign Minister expressed his gratitude as he revealed that the 3rd edition of the Forum, held recently, successfully hosted approximately 4,700 participants from 48 countries. He extended thanks to all participants and colleagues who contributed to the organization’s success.

The third forum

This year’s Antalya Diplomacy Forum 2024, from March 1-3, was held under the auspices of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of the Republic of Turkey. The event was initiated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Hakan Fidan.

The forum, in its third edition, brought together heads of states and governments, ministers, diplomats, business leaders, academics, think-tankers, as well as representatives from youth and media for an extensive debate. The overarching theme for 2024, “Advancing Diplomacy in Times of Turmoil,” aims to provide a comprehensive reflection on the turbulent global period.

The challenges addressed include ongoing wars, acts of terrorism, irregular migration, the rise of xenophobia and Islamophobia, risks associated with AI, climate change, natural disasters, pandemics, and widening socioeconomic gaps. The erosion of trust in the rules-based international order is also identified as a concerning trend, undermining the predictability of the environment in which states operate.

Third of world’s population heads to polls

Against the backdrop of several global turmoils, the forum aims to explore the potential structural changes in the political, economic, and security landscape. As one-third of the world’s population heads to the polls in 2024, the impact of elections on pressing international issues and concerns about AI-manipulated disinformation and fake news will be central to the international agenda.

Minister Fidan stressed the importance of adopting a novel understanding of diplomacy beyond its traditional framework of dialogue. The Antalya Diplomacy Forum is positioned to offer its distinguished participants an interactive and thought-provoking platform to address challenging global and regional issues and to discuss innovative tools to advance diplomacy in times of turmoil. #ADF2024 will be the official hashtag for the event.

Sources: Anadolu Agency and Antalya Diplomacy Forum

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he agreement signed between the defense ministers of Turkey and Somalia on February 8, 2024, has had a significant impact on national, regional, and global politics. At the current stage, there is no official statement regarding the details of this agreement, and examining its possible repercussions is a more promising endeavor than attempting to make assertive statements about it.

Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mahamud stated, “Our Turkish brothers will only protect our seas for ten years under this agreement. After ten years of cooperation, we will have a navy that will protect our seas.” The president’s statement reveals an important detail about the content of the agreement between Ankara and Mogadishu, namely the signing of a 10-year cooperation agreement between the two countries regarding maritime security. It also discloses that Turkey’s presence in Somalia, which began in 2011, and its influence in the Horn of Africa are on even more solid ground following this latest development.

If the agreement with Somalia is evaluated alongside the defense agreement signed with Djibouti on February 19, it becomes clear that Turkey’s presence in the Horn of Africa has increased. The U.S., the United Kingdom, France, China, Italy, and Japan have military bases in Djibouti, while Germany and Spain have military assets in the region, but no military bases. In the medium term, Turkey’s growing presence in the Horn of Africa may also lead to the establishment of a naval base in Somalia or Djibouti.

In addition, given Turkey’s recent rapprochement with the West and its already good relations with Djibouti, Turkey can be expected to contribute to the risks and threats in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. If Turkey were to become a security actor in the Gulf of Aden, this would likely put Iran in a position of concern. Thus, although the agreement was signed between Turkey and Somalia, it has regional implications as well.

Moreover, as Turkey continues its rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, one of the critical issues is likely to be the Houthis. One way to eliminate the parameter of Houthi violence in terms of the security of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is to stop the arms shipments. This, however, could create a situation that directly concerns Iran and Saudi Arabia; as a result, the moves in Somalia and Djibouti are seen as very critical in the context of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

The Houthis’ asymmetric attacks, especially in the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Gulf of Aden, have continued since October 19. The attacks are perpetuated primarily with weapons of Iranian origin; if arms smuggling in the region is prevented, the Houthis could be neutralized—a situation that could become a concern for Iran.

The agreement with Somalia paves the way for Turkey to make frequent naval deployments in Somali waters. The presence of the Turkish navy in Somali waters could create a situation that would help curb the illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing activities of countries such as Iran and China, as well as the recent resurgence of piracy off the Somali coast. Both in the long and medium term, the Turkey-Somalia agreement is likely to strengthen Somalia’s navy and coast guard, with the potential to further deter illegal fishing and piracy. In this context, it is projected that Somalia is losing at least $500 million in revenue annually due to illegal fishing activities.

The economic problem, in fact, is as significant as the current terrorism problem in Somalia. After being elected president of Somalia for the second time, in his speech during his visit to SETA in Ankara July 2022, President Mahamud stated that he would focus very seriously on the fight against terrorism. At the same time, Somalia’s economic development will eliminate many of the security problems caused by al-Shabaab and other militants.

Regional implications of the agreement with Somalia

President Erdoğan visited Somalia in 2011 when the country had been left to its fate. That year was a new beginning for Somalia, and now, the new agreement between Turkey and Somalia, which heralds a renewed alliance between the two countries, can be regarded as a “second 2011.”

The agreement has the potential to allow steps to be taken towards the security of Somalia’s territorial waters, allowing investments in Somalia and tourism activities in the coastal area to increase. What is more, economic prosperity in Somalia can be expected to increase and security problems to decrease. At the same time, the improved security environment, supported in part by Turkey, will also provide an opportunity to increase investments in relevant regions.

An important aspect of the agreement is the compatibility of the development with Egypt’s foreign policy. Recently, immediately after the meeting between President Erdoğan and Egyptian President Sisi, the Egyptian Deputy Foreign Minister for African Affairs visited the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The possible cooperation between Turkey and Egypt in Africa was discussed during the meeting, establishing that Egypt has accepted the presence of Turkey in East Africa.

In addition, the Turkey-Somalia agreement has the potential to affect the Egypt-Ethiopia-Sudan equation in the context of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in terms of regional competition in the Horn of Africa and East Africa. Of course, the agreement does not directly affect this issue; however, the expectation of increased cooperation with the Egypt-Turkey normalization can potentially affect the security perspective of Egypt’s attitude towards Ethiopia regarding the dam with Ethiopia. It should be noted, though, that Turkey should not be expected to intervene directly on the issue.

Egypt also supports the Federal Government of Somalia against the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU. At this point, Turkey and Egypt stated that they stand by international law against Ethiopia’s move into Somalia. Yet, it should be noted that the agreement that Turkey made with Somalia was not related to the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU, and that Turkey has good relations with Ethiopia. In fact, in addition to the economic ties between Ethiopia and Turkey, which is the second country with the most investments in Ethiopia after China, they seem to stay away from attitudes that would negatively affect mutual relations.

Global Actors’ Reactions to Turkey’s presence in the Horn of Africa

After the agreement signed by the defense ministers of Turkey and Somalia, the United States and the United Kingdom, which had previously been active in Somalia, took initiatives to hold meetings there with the Somalian government. Global and regional actors are likely to be concerned about Turkey’s increased influence and footprint in the Horn of Africa, and the U.S. can be seen to have expectations of cooperation with Turkey in the region.

Somalia has a federal structure, and the U.S. and the UK are working closely with the administrations of Puntland and Somaliland, respectively. It is possible that the U.S. will cooperate with police forces and maritime security in Puntland, which borders Somaliland and has a coast on both the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. In fact, Puntland’s maritime security forces are being trained by the U.S. At the same time, the UK is implementing a similar plan in Somaliland.

Following the agreement with Somalia, the U.S. expects cooperation with Turkey in new areas. Turkey and the U.S. are already cooperating against al-Shabaab terrorism in Somalia. However, the gains that Turkey and Somalia can achieve together in Somali waters, especially for Somalia’s blue economy, can potentially affect U.S. economic interests. On the whole, Turkey and the U.S. are not expected to directly confront each other regarding the conflict and challenge in Somalia, and have the potential to cooperate on specific files both in Somalia and throughout Africa. At the forefront of these issues is the fight against terrorism.

Overall, although Turkey and the U.S. are two allied countries within the NATO alliance system, they pursue very different policies in the context of Africa. Energy and economic policies play an essential role in U.S. policy in Somalia and Africa as a whole. On the other hand, Turkey’s success story in Somalia and across the African continent is rooted in a policy that is “people-oriented,” and based on the principles of “winning together” and “partnership.” In this light, Turkey and the U.S. have different approaches to Africa.

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he KAAN fighter jet, developed as part of the National Fighter Aircraft Program, made its maiden flight on February 21, 2024. This was the first time the Turkish public witnessed the flight of a manned fighter jet developed entirely with domestic resources.

The contract for the KAAN development project was signed between Turkish Aerospace Industries and the Secretariat of Defense Industries (SSB) in August 2016. Turkish Aerospace, as the prime contractor, completed the KAAN preliminary design activities in 2018-2022. In 2023, the KAAN fighter made its runway debut, known in aviation as a rollout, before making its maiden flight on February 21, 2024. In other words, KAAN made its first flight eight years after it graduated from an idea to an active project.

By comparison, the United States, which has developed numerous fighter jets to date, took approximately five years from the initiation of the F-35 project to its first flight. The completion of the KAAN project in eight years is commendable for Turkey, especially considering that it is the first domestically developed fighter jet.

Turkey’s domestic and national defense industry

This important achievement can be attributed to Turkey’s “domestic and national defense industry” policy, which the country began to implement decisively, especially after 2004. In a key meeting of the Defense Industry Executive Committee (SSİK) in 2004, it was decided to forgo the purchase of many off-the-shelf systems from abroad and instead focus on “co-production” or production using “domestic capabilities.”

The KAAN fighter is a complex “system of systems” requiring the development of numerous subsystems and technologies. These include special materials for low radar visibility, air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions, an AESA radar, electro-optical systems, communication systems, electronic attack and support systems, and flight computers. The significance of the first flight on February 21 underscores Turkey’s remarkable progress in defense and military aviation over the past two decades, demonstrating significant developments in advanced technology.

Within the Turkish Air Force’s inventory, the F-16 Block 30/40/50/50+ aircraft are classified as 4^th-generation aircraft. In contrast, Turkey’s upcoming procurement of F-16 Block 70 fighters is considered 4.5 generation due to the integration of the AESA radar, which enables more precise and long-range detection of air and ground elements. Similarly, aircraft such as the Eurofighter Typhoon (Europe), the KF-21 (South Korea), and the Rafale (France) fall into the 4.5-generation category.

5th generation stealth capabilities

On the other hand, the F-35 (U.S.), F-22 (U.S.), J-20 (China), Su-57 (Russia), and KAAN are classified as 5th generation due to their stealth capabilities, which include low radar (RF) and infrared (IR) visibility, as well as advanced sensor systems and situational awareness. Notably, only four countries, including Turkey, currently operate 5^th-generation fighter jets.

The KAAN, which measures approximately 21 meters in length, is capable of operating at an altitude of 55,000 feet and reaching speeds of up to 1.9 mach. Currently, the KAAN is powered by F110 engines, which are identical to those used on the F-16. Unlike the single engine configuration of the F-16, the KAAN has two F110 engines. However, for KAAN to achieve 5^th-generation status, it must be able to reach supersonic speeds without relying on the afterburner. This is critical because the afterburner increases both fuel burn and the aircraft’s thermal, or IR, signature, reducing its range and making it more vulnerable to IR-seeking missiles. Efforts are underway within the SSB to develop an advanced turbofan engine to replace the F110 engine.

KAAN is equipped with internal weapon stations similar to many 5^th-generation fighters and as a result, it doesn’t visibly carry ammunition during flight. Instead, when engaging air or ground targets, the covers on the weapon stations and sides of the fuselage retract, allowing ammunition to be fired. This provides two significant advantages: maintaining a minimal radar cross section due to the reduced aircraft surface area, and maintaining operational secrecy by concealing whether the aircraft is armed or unarmed.

In essence, Turkey has acquired an aircraft that is significantly more advanced than the F-16 Block 70, Eurofighter Typhoon, Rafale, and even the F-35, especially in terms of air-to-air combat capabilities. This is a triumph not only for the Turkish defense industry, but also for Turkish diplomacy. Just as indigenous alternatives were developed following the Canadian embargo on the electro-optical cameras used in Turkish UAVs, the KAAN fighter jet foreshadows the indigenous development of the Eurofighter Typhoon, previously unattainable due to Germany’s veto. Despite the short- and medium-term challenges posed by embargoes, particularly in the defense industry, the eventual emergence of indigenous versions of these products offers significant strategic and economic advantages.

KAAN’s flight testing

The strategic importance of Turkey’s domestic and national defense industry becomes clear when one considers the procurement of 40 F-16 Block 70 fighter jets, along with billions of dollars’ worth of ammunition and pods, which sparked significant public debate. The crux of the matter is that while Turkey can develop ammunition and other payloads domestically, integration into the F-16 Block 70 is hampered by the proprietary flight computers and software, or “source codes,” owned by the United States. As a result, the manufacturer mandates the purchase of ammunition, which poses a risk to the sustainability of ammunition stocks in potential war scenarios. Therefore, Turkey’s emphasis on developing its domestic defense industry is not just a preference, but an imperative.

Following its maiden flight, KAAN’s flight testing will continue with various prototypes until 2029, accompanied by ongoing design and hardware improvements. Then, between 2029 and 2033, the Turkish Air Force will add the first 10 KAAN Block 1 aircraft to its inventory, allowing Turkish pilots to gain flight experience with KAAN through intensive operations. From 2033 to 2040, Turkish Aerospace will diversify KAAN configurations and continue full-scale production.

While this timeline may seem long, it’s worth noting that the F-16 fighter jet, introduced in 1974, is still in production today and has evolved to its Block 70 configuration over nearly five decades. It’s important to note that KAAN is expected to reach full operational capability in about a decade.

KAAN is important not only for Turkey, but also for Azerbaijan and Pakistan. Both countries have recently decided, to varying degrees, to participate in the national fighter project. Pakistan, which currently operates a fleet of Chinese fighter jets, has decided to participate, while Azerbaijan, with an aging fleet of Soviet-made fighter jets, is undergoing modernization by the Turkish defense industry, rebranding its Su-25 fighter jets as “Su-25 LACIN.” As a result, these friendly nations are poised to become the second and third users of KAAN after the Turkish Air Force.

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recent threat by the United States to impose sanctions on financial institutions engaged in business with Russia has led to a slowdown in Turkish-Russian trade, affecting payments for both imported oil and Turkish exports, according to seven sources familiar with the matter.

The U.S. executive order issued in December did not specifically target the energy sector, but it has complicated payments related to Turkish imports of Russian crude and Russian payments for a broader range of Turkish exports. The sanctions aim to reduce Kremlin revenue and disrupt its activities in Ukraine without impeding Russian oil flows to global markets.

While the threat has not disrupted Turkey’s crude supplies significantly, some delays and disruptions in payments have occurred, particularly due to Turkish banks reviewing business relationships and tightening compliance with Russian clients. Russia, a major crude and diesel exporter to Turkey, has faced similar payment problems with other countries, affecting oil supplies to India and complicating those to the United Arab Emirates and China.

Complexity to the trade relationship

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan have been working to maintain close ties, with Ankara opposing Western sanctions on Moscow. However, the recent threat of secondary U.S. sanctions on Turkish banks and companies has added complexity to the trade relationship.

The disruption in payments began after the U.S. executive order on December 22, raising concerns among Turkish banks about potential risks associated with doing business with Russia. Turkish exports to Russia in January saw a 39% year-on-year decline, while imports from Russia fell 20.2%. The impact has been more prominent in non-oil trade, with exports of machinery, in particular, coming to a halt.

Turkish banks are said to be taking “extremely meticulous” measures regarding sanctions, with compliance departments closely scrutinizing transactions. The U.S. State Department expressed encouragement for reports that Turkish banks are reviewing and tightening their compliance programs for Russian clients, emphasizing the responsibility of foreign financial institutions to avoid processing transactions benefiting Russia’s military or circumventing U.S. measures.

Heightened restrictions

Additionally, two other Turkish banks have reportedly issued 30-day closure notices to Russian corporate clients who had opened accounts following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The affected businesses include those using Turkey as a transit jurisdiction for settlements and deliveries, along with oil and gas traders, according to Iskander Mirgalimov, an international payments consultant for Russian businesses.

Individual clients are also facing heightened restrictions, including the necessity to maintain a higher account balance, as Turkish banks adjust their practices in line with increased scrutiny and compliance requirements.

These developments mark the latest impact of the U.S. sanctions threat on Turkish-Russian economic relations, adding further complexity to the financial landscape between the two countries. The situation continues to evolve, with potential consequences for businesses and individuals engaged in cross-border transactions.

Source: Reuters

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holistic assessment of the defense industry as a comprehensive ecosystem, rather than the combat effectiveness of individual large platforms, will make it easier to understand its impact on the fight against terrorism. With the progress made, Turkey is now in a position to produce systems and subsystems that are vital in the fight against terrorism.

The establishment of a national defense industry, with the breakthrough achieved in the recent period, has strongly influenced Turkey’s defense strategies and the instruments used in this field. The technology-intensive dimension of the fight against terrorism is one of the most obvious indicators of this breakthrough. In the 1990s and 2000s, Turkey began to produce its own platforms and subsystems, which were considered essential for operations against the PKK and up to that point in time had to be procured from abroad.

This resulted in a number of important advantages, including the prevention of personnel losses, better intelligence gathering, access to hard-to-reach areas, maintaining the tempo of operations, and cost efficiency. In the process, Turkey has raised its offensive and precision strike capabilities to a higher level, particularly through developments in unmanned systems and national munitions. This development, in turn, initiated a process at the doctrinal level, which included an increased focus on targeting the so-called senior members of the terrorist organization.

The emergence of unmanned systems

The importance of armed and unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) becomes clear when considering the fight against terrorism, in general, and the geographical characteristics of certain areas in northern Iraq occupied by the PKK as safe zones. Military technological developments have provided various solutions in these areas, which are very difficult to reach with conventional forces. Operations that were previously limited to fighter aircraft such as the F-16 can now be carried out more flexibly and over longer periods with UAV systems. In this sense, UAV systems have played a decisive role in operations that require approaching the target in closed and difficult terrain.

By using UAV systems, the safety of the pilot’s life is not jeopardized, and, at the same time, the flight time of fighter jets and the cost of their ammunition are saved. Similarly, due to their characteristics, UAV systems have eliminated problems such as aerial resupply, and the inclusion of a large number of UAVs in the inventory has enabled uninterrupted surveillance of PKK targets. Such an opportunity paved the way for the rapid neutralization of PKK targets, especially the so-called senior members of the PKK. In recent years, the security forces and the MIT have carried out numerous operations in this way, and statements by members of the terrorist organization indicate that they are feeling this pressure.

It should also be noted that Turkey has adopted a continuous development line in the field of unmanned systems, working on complementary products that can meet all kinds of needs. For example, the Alpin, a rotary-wing UAV system or an unmanned helicopter developed by Titra, began providing logistical support to security forces in mountainous, hard-to-reach areas last year, which is a significant development. In the coming period, we can expect UAV systems to become increasingly capable of performing some of the functions of not only fighter aircraft such as the F-16, but also helicopter platforms such as the ATAK and Sikorsky.

PKK efforts to acquire military technology

Meanwhile, the risk of military technology products falling into the hands of terrorist organizations or non-state armed groups should always be considered. The concept of UAV attacks, popularized by DAESH in Syria and Iraq by planting explosives in commercial drones, has been seen in other countries in recent years and has become even more sophisticated in regions such as Yemen. In recent years, the PKK has made similar attempts at a rudimentary level, attacking Turkish military posts and tactical units on Turkish soil and in Iraq and Syria with improvised explosive devices attached to commercial drones or model aircraft.

Although the PKK has not achieved any results from these attacks, it is likely that it will continue to invest in this area as part of its long-term strategy in a security environment where UAV systems are becoming increasingly popular among terrorist organizations. Past examples show that the presence of a supporter/supplier plays an important role in the acquisition of such capabilities by terrorist groups or non-state armed actors.

Border security

Undoubtedly, one of the most important factors in the fight against terrorism is to ensure strong border security and to deter members of a terrorist organization from using certain points. It is also important to deploy low- and very low-altitude air defense systems on the border line against old-generation rocket and mortar systems that can be fired by terrorist elements across the border. The problems caused by both the infiltrations from the border line and rocket attacks from the other side have been clearly understood aftermath the civil war in Syria and ensuing proliferation of terrorist groups such as the PKK and Daesh.

The Turkish defense industry is carrying out extensive work to strengthen the border line, from advanced radar systems to cameras that can provide high-resolution surveillance and low-altitude air defense systems to patrol robots. Given the length of Turkey’s southern borders, it is reasonable to assume that unmanned systems will become increasingly important for this area, too. For example, there is a global trend towards the increased use of robot dogs in border areas, particularly for patrolling. While the U.S. is known to have various plans in this regard for the Mexican border, it is understood that similar efforts are underway in Turkey. Similar platforms may also be used in specific missions such as for cave operations against the PKK which are riskier due to the advantages the caves provide to terrorist components.

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n a new development, Turkey has agreed to provide combat drones and other cutting-edge technologies to Egypt, marking a pivotal moment in the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two nations. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan confirmed this announcement on Sunday, highlighting the importance of the burgeoning ties and the potential for technological collaboration.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is scheduled to visit Egypt on February 14, a historic trip that signifies the restoration of diplomatic relations after a decade of strained ties. The relations between Turkey and Egypt had been tense since the 2013 military coup that ousted the late Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi, leading to a prolonged period of diplomatic standoff.

Fidan, in an interview with private A Haber television, stated that the normalization of relations holds significant importance for Egypt to gain access to specific technologies. He expressed that Turkey and Egypt have reached an agreement to provide unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), commonly known as drones, and other advanced technologies. While the details of the technological collaboration were not explicitly outlined, the move suggests a deepening of cooperation in various sectors, including defense.

Demand for Turkey’s drones

The demand for Turkey’s drones has soared on the international stage, gaining recognition for their effectiveness in conflicts across regions such as Syria, Libya, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine. Turkey’s drones, particularly the Bayraktar TB2 developed by Baykar, have played pivotal roles in altering the course of conflicts, making Turkey a major global supplier in the defense industry.

The Bayraktar TB2, known for its long endurance, operational altitude, and versatility, has been instrumental in conflicts where it demonstrated its capability to neutralize advanced anti-aircraft systems, artillery, and armored vehicles. Baykar, the developer of these drones, has successfully exported them to more than 30 countries, solidifying Turkey’s position as a key player in the global defense market.

President Erdoğan’s upcoming visit to Egypt is expected to address various bilateral and regional issues, including trade, energy, and security. The commitment to providing combat drones and advanced technology underscores the depth of the evolving partnership between Turkey and Egypt.

Turkey’s ambition to become self-reliant

This move also reflects Turkey’s ambition to become a self-reliant defense industry powerhouse, with technologies ranging from UAVs to fighter jets and warships. The collaborative efforts between Turkey and Egypt are anticipated to extend beyond defense, contributing to mutual economic and strategic interests.

As Turkey continues to expand its global influence through technological collaborations and diplomatic initiatives, the visit of President Erdoğan to Egypt holds the promise of further cementing ties and fostering a new era of cooperation between the two nations. The potential sale of Turkey’s advanced drones to Egypt is not only a strategic move for both countries but also underscores the transformative impact of Turkey’s defense industry on the geopolitical landscape.

Sources: Daily Sabah and Reuters

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urkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced a groundbreaking achievement as Turkey embarked on its first human space mission, marking a significant milestone as the nation enters the second century of the Republic.

In a video message, Erdogan expressed pride in this historic moment and underscored the importance of Turkey’s manned space mission, which symbolizes a new chapter in the nation’s scientific history.

“We are taking a step into the second century of our Republic, the Century of Turkey, with the manned space mission we have undertaken for the first time,” declared president Erdoğan, emphasizing the cultural and scientific contributions of Turkey throughout history.

He highlighted the mission’s inspirational aspect, as Turkey sends its first citizen, Alper Gezeravci, a former pilot in the Turkish Air Force, into space. Gezeravci’s journey to the International Space Station is part of Turkey’s National Space Program, and Erdogan expressed pride in achieving one of the program’s key goals.

13 experiments

Erdoğan emphasized the scientific significance of the mission, with 13 experiments covering diverse fields such as astronomy, medicine, genetics, and material science to be conducted during the 14-day mission at the International Space Station.

The launch, initially planned for January 9, took place on January 18 from Cape Canaveral, Florida, under the Ax3 mission by private space exploration firm SpaceX. Four space travelers, including representatives from Turkey, Spain, Italy, and Sweden, are set to conduct over 30 scientific experiments and demonstrations during their orbital research on the ISS.

Axiom Space Astronaut Mission

In a separate development, Axiom Space successfully launched Turkey’s first astronaut, Alper Gezeravci, and three other crew members on the Ax3 mission from NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in Cape Canaveral.

The Axiom quartet, aboard a SpaceX Crew Dragon capsule atop a Falcon 9 rocket, embarked on a 36-hour flight to the International Space Station (ISS). The mission is a testament to Axiom’s growing business of arranging commercially sponsored missions from its Houston-based startup.

The launch was a significant achievement for Turkey, marking its entry into the exclusive group of ISS-guest countries. The mission aims to conduct more than 30 scientific experiments during the crew’s approximately 14 days in microgravity aboard the ISS, focusing on various aspects of human health and disease in space.

The success of this all-European commercial astronaut mission reflects the increasing global interest in space exploration and enhances the prestige and capabilities of participating nations.

Source: Anadolu Agency and Reuters

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n a New Year’s message, Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan, announced the country’s commitment to maintaining a moral, rational, and effective foreign policy throughout 2024. Fidan underscored the pivotal role Turkey has played on the global stage, shaping the international agenda and exerting influence in critical regions. Under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey has pursued an independent foreign policy that has garnered attention amid the uncertainties and instabilities within the international system.

Fidan acknowledged the completion of the 100th anniversary of the republic and the 500th anniversary of the founding of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He highlighted the strength Turkey derives from its people, emphasizing the nation’s determination to speak out against global injustices and defend the truth. Fidan’s message resonated with the country’s vision, the “Century of Turkey,” which aims to elevate the nation’s standing and impact on the world stage.

“We will further increase the depth and dimensions of our independent national foreign policy,” stated Fidan, outlining Turkey’s ambitions to expand its influence and engagement in the international arena. The foreign minister’s commitment to a foreign policy rooted in moral values comes at a time when global dynamics are marked by uncertainty and shifts in power balances.

In a New Year’s message, Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan, announced the country’s commitment to maintaining a moral, rational, and effective foreign policy throughout 2024. Fidan underscored the pivotal role Turkey has played on the global stage, shaping the international agenda and exerting influence in critical regions. Under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey has pursued an independent foreign policy that has garnered attention amid the uncertainties and instabilities within the international system.

Fidan acknowledged the completion of the 100th anniversary of the republic and the 500th anniversary of the founding of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He highlighted the strength Turkey derives from its people, emphasizing the nation’s determination to speak out against global injustices and defend the truth. Fidan’s message resonated with the country’s vision, the “Century of Turkey,” which aims to elevate the nation’s standing and impact on the world stage.

“We will further increase the depth and dimensions of our independent national foreign policy,” stated Fidan, outlining Turkey’s ambitions to expand its influence and engagement in the international arena. The foreign minister’s commitment to a foreign policy rooted in moral values comes at a time when global dynamics are marked by uncertainty and shifts in power balances.

“During this period when the international system involves uncertainties and global instability is at stake, our Türkiye-centric independent foreign policy carried out under the leadership of our president [Recep Tayyip Erdoğan] has transformed our country into a significant actor shaping the international agenda and exerting influence in critical regions,” Fidan said in a video message on X.

The minister stressed that his country will uphold a “rational and effective foreign policy guided by moral values” in 2024.

“With the strength we receive from our nation, we will not give up raising our voice against global injustices and wrongs. We will never hesitate to defend the truth,” he remarked. “We will further increase the depth and dimensions of our independent and national foreign policy that we follow within the framework of our Century of Türkiye vision.”

Source: Anadolu Agency.

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n response to the recent attacks by the PKK terrorist group in northern Iraq, Turkey’s Ministry of National Defense declared the elimination of at least 26 terrorists in airstrikes carried out in both Iraq and Syria. The retaliatory actions came following the murder of 12 soldiers in PKK attacks.

The ministry specified that the airstrikes targeted terrorist targets and resulted in the neutralization of 26 terrorists. The operations focused on areas along the Turkish border with Iraq and Syria, regions that have historically been favored hideouts for the PKK.

Defense Minister Yaşar Güler stated that the assessment of the total casualties is ongoing, and further details will be provided as the information becomes available. Previously, on December 24, Güler announced that 30 terrorists had been neutralized since the soldiers’ killings.

A series of airstrikes and operations

Turkey’s response involved a series of airstrikes and operations to dismantle PKK targets, including caves, bunkers, shelters, and oil installations. The operations, overseen by Defense Minister Güler, aimed to deliver a strong message of deterrence against the terrorist group.

Additionally, Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT) reported the neutralization of Erdinc Bolcal, codenamed Ali Xebat, a high-ranking PKK member responsible for the Silan Guyi Academy. Bolcal, who provided ideological and military training to terrorists, was eliminated in a targeted operation in Sulaymaniyah.

Turkey to prevent the emergence of a terrorist structure

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reiterated Turkey’s unwavering commitment to combat terrorism, stating that the country would pay any cost to prevent the emergence of a terrorist structure in northern Iraq and Syria. Since the recent PKK attack, Turkey has neutralized a total of 56 terrorists in ongoing counter-terrorism efforts.

Speaking at an event in Istanbul on Saturday, Erdogan emphasized that Turkey is determined to prevent the existence of any terrorist organization in northern Iraq or northern Syria, underscoring that the country will spare no effort, regardless of the cost, to ensure the security of its southern regions.

The PKK, designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the U.S., and the EU, has been engaged in a decades-long terror campaign against Turkey, resulting in the loss of more than 40,000 lives. The recent operations are part of Operation Claw-Lock, launched in April 2022 to target PKK hideouts near the Turkish border in northern Iraq.

Sources: TRT World, Daily Sabah and Aljazeera English

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s the Republic of Turkey leaves a century behind, it is impossible to fit the past, present, and future of relations between Turkey and Russia into this 100-year timeline. The nature of the relations between the parties is still dominated by the paradigm that the Russian tsar and first emperor Peter the Great established for his country at the beginning of the 18th century. In order to make sense of the current state and future of Turkish-Russian relations, it is necessary to embark on a journey that starts in the 18th century.

Tsarina Catherine’s “Eastern Project,” the naval Battle of Çeşme in 1770, the 1833 Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi, the Crimean War of 1853-1856, the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878, World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution, the Montreux Straits Convention and World War II, the First Cold War, the dissolution of the USSR and the Syrian civil war have all had a direct impact on the shaping of Turkish-Russian relations.

Turkish-Russian Relations as a Part of Global Geopolitical History

In order to make sense of why Turkish-Russian relations are often shaped around conflicts, it is necessary to take a close look at the maps of Asia and Europe during the reign of Peter the Great at the beginning of the 18th century. Aiming to transform the Tsardom of Russia into an empire, Tsar Peter I sought to dominate the sea trade routes.

Russia’s policy did not only consist of reaching the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the Red Sea. At the beginning of the 18th century, under these conditions, the Tsardom of Russia, which had no coasts on the high seas except the North Sea, had no way of increasing its trade and diversifying its economy.

Given the maritime technologies of the 18th century, it was not possible to build a global empire through the North Sea, which only allowed sailing for a limited period of the year. Peter I’s first goal was to open the Baltic Sea route and establish direct trade with Britain. To this end, first, he went to war with the Kingdom of Sweden, which completely dominated the Scandinavian Peninsula and the Baltic Sea.

Peter the Great did not achieve all of his goals, but the door to Russia’s imperial ambitions had been cracked open. This development, to which his successors remained indifferent for a while, gained momentum in the second half of the 18th century under Catherine the Great.

Unlike Peter I, Catherine the Great did not only use the army to expand her country’s borders—she also mobilized the Orthodox Church and Slavic nationalism. The 1770 naval battle of Çeşme, in which the Ottoman fleet was wiped off the battlefield, paved the way for Greek revolts in the Peloponnese.

The Russian Tsardom was now active wherever there were Orthodox churches, and Greeks and Slavs in the Ottoman lands. Having taken Crimea in 1792, the Russian Tsardom reached its natural borders by reaching the borders of today’s Georgia. It should be emphasized that at the same time, Russia had not yet penetrated the territories of the Turkish khanates in Central Asia.

From the 19th century onwards, the Russian Tsardom was to expand its sphere of influence in the West and the Middle East by using the factors of religion and ethnicity, while in the Caucasus and Central Asia it was to pursue a colonialist war policy with the support of Britain.

At the end of the war, even though the Ottoman state was part of the victorious alliance, the Treaty of Paris signed in 1856 did not provide any advantage to the former. On the contrary, it gave France and Britain a greater say in the Danube River traffic and the Balkans, while a status quo was created in the Black Sea that would neutralize both the Russian and Ottoman navies.

After the Crimean War, Russia shifted its geopolitical goals to a different field. With the Great Game, which is assumed to have lasted from 1856 to 1914, the Russian Tsardom competed with Britain in the geographical direction of Iran-India-Central Asian Turkic States while sharing common colonial goals.

The British governments’ support for the Russian Tsardom’s colonial policy in Central Asia would undermine the Ottoman Empire’s relationship with Britain and pave the way for the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878. In this war, the Ottoman state suffered the biggest territorial loss in its history.

In addition to being subjected to a wave of migration that turned the country’s economy and social structure upside down, the seeds of the antagonism that would become entrenched in the Turkish society against Russia and carry on into the 20th century were also sown.

The policies of the Russian Tsardom in the 19th century, both in Central Asia and in the Balkans and Anatolian periphery during the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878, would also serve as a basis for the anticommunist propaganda and intelligence work of Nazi Germany during World War II and then the United States of America during the First Cold War.

As a result of the war, the Russian Tsardom was inserted into Eastern Anatolia and Rumelia, where it supported the final move that would completely separate the Balkan states from the Ottoman Empire. It was a natural consequence of this historical process that the Ottoman Empire’s participation in World War II began with the bombing of Russian ports on the Black Sea coast.

One of the most violent fronts of the war was in Eastern Anatolia and the Black Sea region, where the Ottoman and Russian armies faced each other. However, the October Revolution in 1917 not only changed the course of the Great War and world history, but also took the dynamics of Turkish-Russian relations to a whole new dimension.

The Last Century of Turkish-Russian Relations

Having first defeated the Western-backed Tsarist forces in their territories, the Bolsheviks moved on to Warsaw in 1920. If the Red Army won the Battle of Warsaw, there would be no obstacle to the revolution in Russia reaching Germany and Italy. However, the defeat and repulsion of the Red Army at the gates of Warsaw in August 1920 made the existence of the liberation movement in Anatolia critical for the new leadership in Moscow.

The Soviet leadership needed every ally it could find against the imperialist threat from the West, and the existence of a Turkish state that could block threats from both the Black Sea and the Caucasus was vital. The leaders of the Soviet revolution supported the Ankara government with arms and money. While this conjuncture-induced cooperation enabled the risks of the 1920s to be overcome, the parties also treaded cautiously against each other.

In an interview with Istanbul journalists at the Izmit Pavilion on January 16-17, 1923, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk gave the following answer to a question about relations with Russia: “Our official relations with Russia are favorable and amicable. However, there are many elements that detract from the sincerity of this friendship. Russians want to be friends with the Turks. But they want to be friends unconditionally. They want Turkey to be unconditionally subordinated to their policies and to walk in the direction that they will steer. Furthermore, they want the state organization and internal structure of the state to resemble the nature of their own organization. The present character of the Russians demands this.”

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urkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has expressed concerns over Israeli nationals purchasing property in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), a matter he intends to discuss with the Turkish Cypriot authorities. Addressing the Turkish Parliamentary Budget Committee, Fidan acknowledged the investigation into claims of substantial land acquisitions by Israelis and intermediaries related to Israel.

Fidan noted that the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) is monitoring the situation but also highlighted that Israelis rank 12th among all nationalities buying property in the TRNC since 2000. He contrasted this with the UK and Iran, which lead the foreign property ownership stakes over the past five years and since 2000, respectively.

While Fidan seeks to address the issue through the proper Turkish Cypriot channels, considering each property sale in the north requires approval from the local ‘cabinet,’ concerns extend beyond just the nationality of the buyers.

Calls for legislative reform

The north faces scrutiny over potential money laundering activities linked to property purchases by third-country nationals. Cafer Gurcafer, the chairman of the Cyprus Turkish construction contractors’ association, warned of the risks of the TRNC being excluded from the Swift banking system due to non-compliance with global anti-money laundering standards. He urged the Turkish Cypriot Central Bank to take immediate action to avoid international sanctions.

Gurcafer expressed concern that the current laxity in money movement compared to European countries has made the region vulnerable to abuses by those exploiting loopholes in the system. The lack of state action against such vulnerabilities, he warned, risks tarnishing the region’s global reputation.

Emphasizing the importance of updating legislation to reflect contemporary standards, Gurcafer called on the Central Bank and parliament to swiftly enact necessary reforms. His vision for Northern Cyprus is to become a destination for legitimate holiday home purchases rather than a haven for money laundering activities.

Preventing money laundry

Echoing these sentiments, Huseyin Sadeghi, a board member of the Real Estate Agents’ Association, underscored the importance of a nuanced approach. While acknowledging the need for regulatory measures to prevent money laundering, Sadeghi warned against broad generalizations that could harm the region’s vital real estate sector.

Failure to pass such legislation could result in Northern Cyprus being placed on the global “grey list” for anti-money laundering, joining the ranks of Bulgaria, Croatia, and Turkey, among others. This inclusion could have significant implications for the region’s financial relations and could further increase scrutiny and restrictions.

The “black list,” featuring countries like North Korea, Iran, and Myanmar, represents an even more severe level of non-compliance, highlighting the urgent need for Northern Cyprus to align its financial regulations with international standards.

Source: Cyprus Mail.

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he first contact in Turkish-U.S. relations began towards the end of the 18th century when the Ottoman Empire and the U.S. established maritime trade relations in Ottoman Mediterranean ports. Despite the interaction in the Mediterranean and the appointment of a U.S. consul in Izmir in 1802, no official relations between the Ottoman Empire and the U.S. were established until the opening of a U.S. embassy in 1831.

Likewise, the Ottomans were slower than European countries in assigning diplomatic missions to the U.S. and the first Ottoman consulate in the U.S. was opened in 1858. Bilateral relations began to deteriorate over time due to the U.S. missionary activities in Ottoman territories, the U.S. policies against the Ottoman Empire in favor of Armenians, and the U.S. reluctance to sell weapons to the Ottoman Empire.

Then, Turkey-U.S. relations were completely severed in World War I when the U.S. declared war against Germany, an ally of the Ottoman Empire. Despite the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 and the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, which ended the Armenian and Eastern Questions, and notwithstanding the negotiations and signing of an agreement to restore relations between the two countries, official relations did not commence until February 17, 1927, four years after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey.

The delay in the resumption of diplomatic relations between the newly established republic and the U.S. can be traced to the support of the United States for the Western occupying states and its attitude towards the Treaty of Lausanne after the War of Independence in spite of the U.S. claim to a neutral policy during the war. In this period, Turkey ended its enmity with the states it had opposed in the War of Independence, took advantage of the opportunities offered by peace, and took steps to strengthen its relations with these countries in the course of time.

Strategic approach

The defining approach of Turkish foreign policy was succinctly expressed in the words of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the republic: “Peace at home, peace in the world.” Between 1923 and 1945, the newly established Republic of Turkey adopted a foreign policy based on neutrality and non-alignment that prioritized peace, sovereignty, and national development. Between 1920 and 1955, Turkey pursued a policy of securing its national security through various pacts and declarations of friendship with neighboring countries.

Despite these regional pacts, Turkey, which was not a member of any official organization until 1939, managed to remain independent in its foreign policy and maintain friendly relations with all states. As a continuation of this policy, Turkey refused to enter World War II despite pressure from the Allied powers.

However, the Soviet threat that emerged in the post-World War II era played an important role in the development of Turkish-U.S. relations. The Soviet threat caused the U.S. to abandon its traditional isolationist policy in the bipolar world order and turn to a policy of containment. Moreover, the Soviet Union’s annulment of the Non-Aggression Pact it had signed with Turkey in 1925 and its subsequent demands for military bases in the Turkish Straits and for the possession of Kars and Ardahan in 1945 led Turkey to abandon its traditional policy of neutrality.

These developments are important factors in the evolution of Turkey-U.S. relations and show how the relationship evolved into a strategic partnership. The Truman Doctrine in 1947 highlighted the dangers facing Ankara and sowed the seeds of Turkey’s transatlantic relations. In the same year, Turkey was included in the Marshall Plan, which was designed to utilize U.S. economic aid to reduce Soviet influence in Europe.

Overall, the Soviet Union and security-oriented policies were the common strategic threat linking the U.S. and Turkey during the Cold War. This common threat made Turkey an important Western ally on the southern flank of NATO, and, at the same time, ensured Turkey’s protection from Soviet aggression and played an important role in the U.S. containment policy as a buffer state against the Soviet Union.

Although one of the main reasons for Turkey’s desire to position itself with the West was rooted in security concerns, there were other normative reasons. The pivot towards the West, which began with Westernization and modernization during the Ottoman Empire between 1839 and 1876, continued with reforms after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey and became an important feature of Turkish foreign policy.

After World War II, the ideals of liberal internationalism such as democracy, self-determination, and transnational institutions/organizations were revived by U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt. As a member of many international organizations established as part of this rules-based liberal international order led by the United States, as of 1947, Turkey positioned itself along the line of liberal values and the institutions that supported them.

However, this did not necessarily mean that the strategic partnership continued smoothly during the Cold War. The 1964 Cyprus crisis was a turning point in Turkey-U.S. relations. The letter of then U.S. President Lyndon Johnson admonishing Turkey after Turkey’s involvement in Cyprus led to a questioning of NATO’s support for Turkey and raised serious concerns about the reliability of the alliance with the West.

Developments after 1960 led to a deterioration in Turkey-U.S. relations. These developments included inadequate U.S. military aid; NATO’s adoption of the “flexible response strategy” instead of the “massive retaliation policy,” which had relied on the capacity for a response to the aggressor with nuclear weapons; the withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey during the Cuban Missile Crisis without consulting the Turkish government; poppy cultivation in Turkey; and Turkey’s eventual 1974 intervention in Cyprus.

With the end of the Cold War, the Truman Doctrine became obsolete, and the disappearance of the common threat raised questions about the future of the relationship. However, the change in the world order did not alter Turkey’s geostrategic importance for the Western alliance. Since the emergence of new centers of conflict and Turkey’s geographical proximity to Iraq, Iran, and the Caucasus made cooperation indispensable in any crisis, strengthening relations with Turkey was again an important security strategy for the United States.

In short, the two countries’ experiences, especially between 1960 and 1980, laid the groundwork for the current mutual mistrust and brought historical concerns to the forefront. On the other hand, although crises and differences of opinion have occasionally caused tensions between the U.S. and Turkey, such temporary crises have never become structural.

In recent years, the gradual decline in U.S. defense support to Turkey, which eventually turned into indirect or direct arms embargoes, forced Turkey to seek alternatives in the defense sector, leading to the purchase of the S400 missile defense system from Russia and the subsequent U.S. imposition of the Countering Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) targeting Turkey’s Defense Industry Directorate. This development led to further friction in bilateral relations.

The U.S. support for Greece’s and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus’s theses on the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean, the U.S. support for the YPG (the Syrian extension of the PKK in Syria), and the failure to extradite the leader of FETO, who carried out the July 15, 2016 coup attempt, to Turkey are issues that have long been awaiting solution in Turkey-U.S. relations.

Despite strategic mechanisms established between the two countries to resolve some of these disputes, no concrete progress has been made to date. The past has shown that there is always a way for transatlantic partners to make their alliances work, even if such differences sometimes cause cracks that undermine transatlantic solidarity. Given the involvement of both actors in regional and global issues beyond Turkey and U.S. bilateral issues, the war in Ukraine presents an opportunity for the two countries to reconsider their foreign policy approaches and bilateral relations.

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he Balkans are one of the regions adjoining Turkey and have a historical and emotional significance for the country as for centuries they constituted the central lands of the Ottoman Empire. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey itself is also a Balkan country. Turkey, along other regional powers, compete for influence in the Balkans. How did Turkey approach the Balkans throughout the 100 years of the Republic? What were its priorities and objectives? What were the main continuities and changes in the policies pursued towards the region?

Early Republican Period (1923-1945): National Security

When the Republic was founded, there were five independent states in the Balkans, namely Greece, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Romania. After years of destructive wars, both Turkey and the Balkan states needed restructuring in every field. With the exception of Bulgaria, all Balkan states and Turkey were in favor of maintaining the status quo and stability in the region in order to focus on internal reforms.

What is more, with the demilitarization of the Straits and Thrace, Turkey was vulnerable to an attack from the west, and sought to strengthen relations with its neighbors in the Balkans to establish a lasting peace. With this in mind, Turkey did not claim any rights over its former territories in the Balkans, and between 1923 and 1925, it established diplomatic relations with all Balkan countries and signed friendship treaties with Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia.

After encountering problems over issues such as the implementation of the population exchange and the election of a new Greek Orthodox patriarch, relations with Greece finally took a positive turn in the late 1920s. With the mutual visits of the prime ministers and the signing of a series of agreements in 1930-1934, Turkey and Greece turned a page in their relations and became two friendly countries in the region.

During the interwar period, Turkey resorted to both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to prevent the revisionist influence of the great powers  on the Balkans. Bilateral agreements were signed with Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Greece guaranteeing the inviolability of borders. Turkey also welcomed the idea of a “Balkan Union” first put forward by Greek statesmen and participated in the first Balkan conference in 1930 and organized the second one in 1931. In 1934, Turkey become one of the signatories of the Balkan Entente.

Although the entente was expected to bring long-lasting stability and interdependence, it was soon weakened when Yugoslavia and Romania came under the influence of Germany. After the outbreak of World War II, despite all of Turkey’s efforts, the Balkan countries failed to develop a common measure to preserve the status quo. Given the situation, Turkey focused on its own national interests and security. Through bilateral diplomacy, it ensured the non-aggression of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Germany, and hence prevented the possibility of an attack from the Balkans. Despite all its concerns, Turkey did not object to the occupation of the Balkans by Germany and later the Soviet Union.

First Half of the Cold War (1945-1965): A Western-Oriented Policy

At the end of World War II, the Soviet Union was the biggest security threat to Turkey. While communist governments were established in all Balkan states except Greece, the rapprochement between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia was perceived by Ankara as the emergence of a Slavic-Orthodox bloc in the Balkans. If the communists won the civil war in Greece, Turkey would be surrounded from the north and west by the Soviet Union and its satellites.

Under these circumstances, Ankara saw getting closer to the Western bloc as a solution. Although it initially favored the idea of a “Mediterranean Entente” to be supported by Britain or France, Ankara, taking into account the growing U.S. interest in Turkey, later preferred to become a direct member of the Western bloc. Thus, Turkey adopted a foreign policy in full harmony with the United States, whose support was seen as vital against the Soviet threat.

After Yugoslavia broke away from the Eastern Bloc, Washington encouraged Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia to come together under a security pact. Consequently, the Balkan Pact was established in 1954. Ankara’s expectation from the pact was to create deterrence against the Eastern Bloc with the support of NATO. However, with the normalization of Yugoslavia’s relations with the Soviet Union and the deterioration of Turkish-Greek relations due to the Cyprus issue, the pact turned into a dead letter within a few years.

Second Half of the Cold War (1965-1989): Cautious Rapprochement

Turkey had anchored its security interests to the Western bloc due to threat perceptions from the Soviet Union and the Middle East, and did not pursue a specific policy towards the Balkans until the mid-1960s. Its cooperation with the region was largely limited to the Balkan Pact, which was almost an extension of NATO, rather than a genuinely regional initiative. During these years, thinking the Soviets were behind it, Turkey rejected the cooperation plan proposed towards the Balkan countries by Romanian Prime Minister Chivu Stoica.

While Turkey was distancing itself from the communist regimes in the Balkans, Greece started to improve its bilateral relations with these states and even found support on the Cyprus issue. Resulting from the disappointment towards the U.S. caused by the Jupiter affair and the Johnson Letter, Turkey realized that it was necessary to formulate its own policy towards countries outside the Western world. Thus, it began to pursue a more active foreign policy towards the Balkans and the Soviet Union. In the second half of the 1960s, the first high-level visits of the Cold War period took place in Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania.

Turkey’s main priority in its rapprochement with the Balkan countries was to find support for itself on the issue of Cyprus. Additionally, the foundations of bilateral cooperation in areas such as transportation, law, trade, and culture were laid during this period. However, despite these positive developments, Turkey continued to act cautiously in the Balkans. The different political and economic regimes of the countries limited the potential for relations and the rise of left-wing anarchist terrorism in Turkey kept suspicions of communist regimes alive. As a result, despite constant messages of “mutual respect,” “friendship,” and “good neighborliness,” no significant deepening of relations took place between Turkey and its neighbors.

In the 1980s, while relations with other Balkan countries remained calm, there were years of tensions with Greece due to disputes over the Aegean Sea and with Bulgaria over the forced assimilation of the Turkish minority. Although problems with Bulgaria were quickly resolved after the ousting of Todor Zhivkov in November 1989, crises with Greece continued into the 1990s.

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olitical parties are shaped by the different divisions within society. Studies on the emergence of political parties generally take into account different variables such as socioeconomic divisions, religious and ethnic distinctions, urban and rural divisions, sentiments towards the current system of governance, foreign policy preferences, and whether economic policies are state-oriented or private entrepreneur-oriented. However, the shaping of politics over time, the presence of parties in the political arena, as well as their rise or fall in influence, are also explained through various other dynamics.

Although political tendencies in the world are categorized on the basis of two main labels, namely right and left, the breadth of the political spectrum cannot be explained solely on the basis of this distinction. The practice of political culture, the conjunctural positioning of election periods, and the constitutional and legal obligations of the political and electoral system often render a distinction solely based on a template of values ambiguous. In Turkey, despite the changes and transformations in politics and society, the main issues and axes that shape voter behavior still remain decisive.

For example, in the 2023 elections, as a manifestation of Turkish modernization, the idea of shaping society from the top down through elites influenced the political actors of the opposition bloc as they tried to bring together parties with different identities under the leadership of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), assuming that the electorate would accept their engineered political vision. Through the discourse of the “historical and intellectual background of the Table of Six,” the opposition bloc tried to idealize the combination of right-left, conservative nationalist and secular liberal as a search for a kind of social contract, through ideas that even the actors sitting at the table themselves were ambiguous about.

Some of those who expressed this view, which was put forward as a “Century of accumulation,” did not hold back from declaring that after the elections the last thing they would want in their political lives was to be a CHP candidate. They misconstrued the transformation in politics and society in Turkey and presented de-politicization as a political tactic. This interpretation of politics was a manifestation of a failure to analyze fully the dynamics of Turkish politics and the basic worldviews and perspectives of Turkish society.

Continuities and ruptures in political culture

The divide that has existed between society and elites since Ottoman modernization has been the dominant determinant of Turkish politics in the last century. This dividing line, which stands out in political and sociological analyses as the center-periphery divide, has formed the founding basis for political parties in Turkey and the way they relate to society.

Since the Tanzimat period, certain elitist interest groups led and articulated by the military and civilian bureaucracy, mainly the forces representing the center, have supported political parties hat represent the interests and worldview of the latter. Meanwhile the more traditional, conservative, and religious segments of society, representing the periphery, have mostly clustered around the parties that are the main carriers of right-wing politics within the periphery bloc. Periodically and conjecturally exceptions exist and there are partial crossovers between these two main blocs, but for the most part identities are the main determinant of the behavior of the majority of voter clusters. In other words, the weight and determinacy of right-wing politics in Turkey persists.

Since its foundation, the CHP has represented the central forces, while the Democrat Party and its successors have been the representatives of the periphery. In the entire history of the republic, these two main blocs have also determined the course of ruling-opposition relations. Although the manifestations of social transformation were clearly visible in the 2000s, the CHP failed to achieve a meaningful increase in voter support, let alone win elections. Unable to come to power through democratic means, elitist interest groups and the tutelary structures with which they are allied have historically relied on the fragmentation of political space and the weakness of political structures to reduce the determinism of right-wing politics.

Since the 1960s, intellectuals and the press have played a central role in the fragmentation and polarization of Turkish politics. Most political scientists agree that the fundamental problem of fragmentation and volatility in Turkish politics is the result of intervention through different means and methods in the political sphere.

Political parties in Turkey were established at the beginning of the last century. A multiparty system was first introduced during the Second Constitutional Monarchy (Ikinci Meşrutiyet). In the early Republican period, the opposition attempted to form political parties, but they were soon shut down, as for example in the case of the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası). In the single-party period, opposition parties were not permitted, and in 1936, the CHP, which was the only party, was integrated into the state.

Multiparty politics began in 1946, but democratic politics began on May 14, 1950 when the Democratic Party (DP) came to power. Since the DP’s first years in power, the state elites—civil and military bureaucracy, the majority of the educated class including the academia, and the economic class fed by the state—wanted democracy to be practiced in a restricted sphere and aspired to monopolize the normative sphere of politics.

By supporting military coups against civilian politics and demanding the permanence of the tutelage establishment, these groups created mechanisms of distrust towards political parties. They believed that only they, as opposed to democratically elected politicians and political parties, could determine the developments that would be in the long-term interests of society.

Thus, when political parties “went astray,” military coups could be “legitimized.” From this perspective, these self-interested tutelage groups supported the coups and coup attempts of 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, and 2007, blaming the parties elected by popular vote. In order to justify their undemocratic behavior, they took refuge behind the argument that the “political parties had deviated from Atatürk’s principles.”

In order to construe a “flawed democracy,” the elite blamed the people who voted for political parties they did not approve of. When the parties they opposed were elected, they devalued the people’s preferences by saying “democracy is not just about the ballot box” and that the majority of voters belonged to the “ignorant masses.” The idea that the main characteristic of Turkish modernization was its top-down, coercive nature, that democracy could be dictated from above, and that the people should vote for the indicated parties was defended even by political scientists who described themselves as democrats.

Parties voted into power by the people were punished, periodically removed from power, and had their institutional structures banned from the political arena. Their replacements were asked to engage in politics in a limited and narrowly defined field and, if they came to power, to deal only with roads, sidewalks, bridges, and infrastructure services. Foreign policy, security, higher education, even education and youth policies were required to be framed and implemented by the presidential office under the control of tutelage and the civil and military bureaucracy under its command.

Since the transition to democracy and until the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, no party has been in power for a long period of time, with the exception of the DP’s 10-year uninterrupted government that ended with a coup d’état. In every election held from the late 1980s until 2002, a different party came out on top.

In Turkey, political parties have always lacked institutionalization and existed as leader-centered entities. The parties of leaders who could not manage political elite change and management well were constantly divided and lost ground. Again, as a result of the lack of institutionalization, external interventions in political parties’ elites often facilitated divisions. With the exception of the AK Party and the DP, none of the parties that were founded as offshoots of major parties have been able to become an alternative to power; these efforts have only contributed to the fragmentation of the political sphere, serving populism and the devaluation of politics.

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he century-long development journey of the Turkish defense industry can be characterized by its pioneering actors and decisive breaking points. The developmental phases of the Turkish defense industry can be outlined in the following phases: (i) Early Republican era (1923-1950), (ii) NATO accession (1952-1964), (iii) the Cyprus Peace Operation (1964-1978), (iv) embargoes on the Turkish defense industry (1980-1990, (v) change in domestic and foreign procurement models (1990-2002), and (vii) the final development phase of the Turkish war industry 2003-2023.

First Steps

The importance of the first phase (1923-1950) lies in the awareness of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the new republic after its heroic liberation struggle, who encouraged self-reliance in national self-defense by developing military skills and capabilities with domestic and national resources. The legacy inherited from the Ottoman Empire, the century-old Sevres conspiracy of the Great Powers, and the transformative impact of World War I on military technology and the arms race played an important role in this consciousness.

For this reason, on the one hand, Atatürk adopted a “peaceful” rhetoric in foreign, security, and defense policies with the principle of “Peace at home, Peace in the world”, and, on the other, he considered the formation of a land, air, and naval war industry as essential for the political, military, diplomatic, and economic rights and interests of the country.

With his instructions, the small arms and cannon repair ateliers, and cartridge and carpentry facilities were gathered under the umbrella of the General Directorate of Military Factories, which was established in 1921 and transferred to the Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corporation (MKEK) in 1950. This initiative accelerated the activities of the arms, ammunition, and chemical factories.

Another distinctive feature of Atatürk’s era was the encouragement of private sector entrepreneurship. Revolutionary names such as Nuri Demirağ and Vecihi Hürkuş, as well as the Turkish Aeronautical Association (THK) and the Turkish Aircraft, Automobile and Engine Limited Company (Tayyare, Otomobil ve Motor Türk Anonim Şirketi, TOMTAŞ), which are today cited as pioneering actors in the history of the Turkish defense industry, are products of the early Republican period.

Likewise, the Gölcük Shipyard, the largest facility of the naval warfare industry today, was established based on the decision to found the Naval Base in Gölcük with Law No. 2173 approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in May 1933. However, despite the attempts made during this period, Turkey continued to procure weapons from abroad.

The reason for foreign defense procurement was the desire, on the one hand, not to burden the state with the new enterprises, and, on the other, the time that was required for Turkish companies to reach the technological level to meet the needs of a more modern Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and to move to the mass production stage. Meanwhile, following Atatürk’s death and World War II, the Turkish warfare industry entered a period of stagnation.

While the destructiveness of the war and its impact on the world economy put many countries into financial bottlenecks, the East-West struggle centered on the Soviet Union and the U.S. was instrumental in strengthening Turkey’s warfighting capability and capacity, while at the same time sowing the seeds of a long-lasting “dependency.”

The third phase (1964-1978) was characterized by the Cyprus Peace Operation in 1964 and the subsequent arms embargo imposed by the U.S. until 1978. With the so-called Johnson Letter Turkey once again realized how vital it was for its national security and interests that it establishes a war industry and maintains it with national sources.

In fact, this bitter experience was not only about the shortage of spare parts and logistical support for the TAF; it also led to the realization of how quickly Turkey’s foreign policy decisions could isolate it from its regional alliances, with which it had developed high-level and multiple engagements.

Thus, Turkey once again turned to indigenous initiatives, this time in a more institutionalized and industrialized manner. The Air, Naval and Land Forces Foundations (Turkish Armed Forces Foundation as of 1987) and companies such as Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ or TAI in English), ASELSAN, a defense electronics company, Rocketsan, a rocket and missile manufacturer and defense contractor, and HAVELSAN, a software and systems company, which are the leading institutions and organizations of the Turkish defense industry today, were born in the 1970s.

The fourth phase (1980-1990) of the Turkish defense industry was characterized by overt and covert embargoes. Turkey’s counterterrorism operations against the PKK—as well as its Syrian offshoot, the PYD/YPG today—often lacked support from its NATO and European allies, who introduced new procedures and decisions that made it difficult for Turkey to use the weapons, ammunition, and equipment that Turkey had procured from them.

However, as a result of the lessons learned from the 1970s, Turkey entered the 1980s with a higher level of awareness which led to institutionalization efforts to achieve a more modern defense industry, first with the establishment of the Presidency of Defense Industry Development and Support Administration (SAGEB) in 1985 and then the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM) in 1989.

Another important aspect of this period is that, despite all the political conflicts of interest and challenging economic conditions, Ankara highly valued cooperation, and in this sense, the joint establishment by the U.S. and Turkey of Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) and TUSAŞ Engine Industries (TEI) provided an extremely important theoretical and technical input to the domestic defense industry.

The fifth phase (1990-2002) saw a change in domestic and foreign procurement models thanks to this institutionalization. In this context, Turkey’s procurement trend shifted from smart supply to production under license, co-production, technology transfer, and cooperation.

While the F-16 project was valued as an important acquisition of knowledge and experience, new projects were initiated by the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation companies from this accumulation and capability enhancement.

The indigenization of the defense discourse

The sixth and final development phase (2003-2023) of the Turkish war industry is the period from the beginning of the 21st century to the present day. The defining characteristic of this period is the defense industry discourse of the AK Party, which has been in power for the last 20 years, and which has been widely featured in both the party charter and election manifestos.

This discourse is based on the pursuit of indigenization, nationalization, and strategic autonomy, and subsequently took on a more robust face with the “National Technology Initiative.” A Defense Industry Executive Committee (SSİK) meeting in 2004 represented the first breaking point in these discourses and practices. In this meeting, it was decided to cancel many foreign procurement projects that were already on the table, and to develop the new procurement structure, which was envisioned to be applied to many old projects whose seeds were sown in the 1990s, by maximizing the support of domestic resources and capabilities. In the new period, Turkey has given higher priority to indigenous design and R&D models, taking advantage of co-production, technology transfer, and cooperation models.

This revolutionary decision initially raised some concerns about meeting the needs of the TAF in a timely manner and with competent technology. However, the projects that were realized in a short period of time, and the platforms that were quickly brought into the national inventory and put into the development phase with feedback from the field, gained the confidence of the TAF.

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he ongoing crisis in the Middle East once again confirms that Turkey is the safest and most reliable route for East-West trade. However, how could Turkey further utilize its geo-economic, geopolitical, geostrategic, and geocultural location in global trade competition and in the new era of rising trade corridor wars? Why is there an argument that there can be no corridor without Turkey? And why must Turkey be included in all relevant new trade routes and economic corridors?

As a country positioned at global trade crossroads, Turkey both strategically and logistically should be part of all trade equations between East and West. This is both for Turkey’s own benefit and for the longer-term success of such projects. Turkey’s involvement in these projects may also create significant positive regional and global externalities. Improving relations with the Gulf could, for instance, foster a solution for energy and trade equations in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Turkey has greatly strengthened its privileged position thanks to remarkable infrastructure investments in the last 20 years. Turkey’s infrastructure is well prepared as huge investment projects, from bridges and highways to seaports and airports, new high-speed train lines and other large-scale projects such as the Marmaray, are already completed.

Global power balances are also shifting: together with global integration and cooperation, global and regional competition is also a fact. Multipolarity is the new contemporary reality, and Ankara is strengthening its position in this new era of global economic competition, aiming to preserve its strategic autonomy. Meanwhile, as part of this geostrategic competition, numerous new trade routes or economic corridors are under discussion, and have given rise to economic and political debates.

In this sense, sundry new major developments are in order in the global political and economic landscape. New transformations have been triggered by new trade routes, tackling dependence on reserve currencies; by regional and strategic cooperation mechanisms gaining significance with the changing global economic center of gravity, and the increase in the importance of new economic and political cooperation organizations such as BRICS; and by the increasing importance and weight of the Asia-Pacific, Africa, and the Middle East in the global economy and global politics.

Turkey is at the epicenter of the most suitable trade routes from East to West, providing the most convenient corridors from Asia and Africa-MENA to Europe; political considerations, however, often push this reality into the background. The options to keep Turkey out of the equations are often kept on the table as a bargaining card too.

Yet, Turkey is the safest and most suitable route from East to West, thanks to its human capital, logistic transportation, supply chain infrastructure, and strategic intercontinental advantages. Turkey is a natural candidate to connect economies along all cardinal directions and its stance regarding the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC), or any similar projects, is crystal clear. Turkey monitors all regional trade and economic cooperation attempts, and reminds all parties that there can be no corridor without Turkey.

The IMEEC, on the other hand, was a rather surprise outcome of the G20 Summit in New Delhi, India, in September 2023. This new trade route is projected between Asia and Europe, and is supported by the U.S. and the EU. The IMEEC is a new strategic extension to the global trade routes or supply chains; however, in many ways, it also resembles the historical Spice Route and has thus been described as a “modern Spice Route.”

The memorandum of understanding or declaration to build this new economic corridor was signed during the G20 meeting in India. The IMEEC is a new framework to build an economic cooperation and a trade corridor to enhance cross-border economic cooperation and integration in South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. The project was signed by India, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the U.S., the EU, France, Germany, and Italy. The corridor is expected to pass through India, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, Cyprus, Greece, and Italy.

The project consists of maritime, railway, and highway legs. It will have a maritime leg in the Arabian Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, and railway transport and land routes on the Arabian Peninsula and in Europe. New railway networks in addition to the existing sea and land routes are expected to be established between India, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, and Europe.

Goals and questions

The IMEEC corridor is commonly perceived as

• a major alternative route to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and
• a means to contain China and promote the Indian economy.

It further aims to

• mitigate China’s growing proactive role, and counter its economic and political influence in the Middle East and Asia;
• support alternatives to the Belt and Road Initiative (as in the 2022 announcements regarding the Global Gateway);
• foster the normalization process in the region and improve connectivity (adding on to the Abraham Accords);
• enhance regional stability and global economic cooperation;
• build huge infrastructure investments, new railways, and ports;
• improve global digital connections, and create new “green and digital bridges” (using cable connections);
• strengthen the supply chains between East and West as part of the search for new alternatives after the COVID19 pandemic; and
• facilitate regional economic growth.

The IMEEC aims to connect India, the new global manufacturing hub, to the Middle East and Europe. The U.S. and EU support this project despite India’s economic, political, and even military cooperation with Russia. Meanwhile, the Gulf region economies are still looking for ways to diversify their economies from dependency on fossil energy exports.

That being said, the potential impacts on other regional trade routes and projects should also be considered. Maritime jurisdiction disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Arabian Sea are a critical issue in terms of security. For instance, the project in its current form seems to pass through the Turkish EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone), and it seems unlikely for Turkey to approve a project that would exclude it from partnership. The EastMed pipeline is a good example of such a failed project.

Moreover, the multilayer steps in transportation could also increase monetary and time costs. Loading ships two times, once in India and once in Israel, and unloading them twice, once in the UAE and then in European ports, indicate a very inefficient process. The fact that regional projects without Turkey are just corridors (consisting of sea, railway, and highway legs) with more filling and unloading means significant loss of time and cost. Even just for this, Turkey’s exclusion from such projects does not appear to be a rational choice.

Factors such as political uncertainty in the region, controversial bilateral and multilateral relations, security, time, and profitability are also noteworthy disadvantages for the corridor in question. Despite the current positive atmosphere, the economic rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE (both of which are focusing on saving their economies from energy dependence and their investments in the energy and technology sector and the problems that Israel may experience with the countries in the region may also pose a handicap for the project.

Furthermore, while the chosen IMEEC route aims to divert trade from insecure routes such as Syria, Iraq, and Iran (and even pirate attacks in the Red Sea), the Israeli territory may not be that safe either, as has been the case recently. This very fact is proven once again with the Palestinian-Israeli conflicts resumed in October 2023.

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he 20th century did not start off well for the Ottoman Empire. The expansionist states of the period saw the Ottoman Empire, which they described as the “Sick Man of Europe,” as a country whose resources and territory were to be shared.

In 1923, Turkey had won the War of Independence on the military front, but it was vulnerable to new threats from outside as it was not among the economically and militarily powerful actors in the international political system established after World War I. In addition, the Ottoman Empire was among the war’s defeated states and suffered great territorial losses, forced to give up many regions with rich economic resources, notably energy.

The newly established Republic had a population of 12.5 million, a GDP of $561.4 million, exports of $51 million, and imports of $87 million. (Table 1) With these indicators, the new Republic, whose share in the world was insignificant, directly neighbored Britain and France, the major power centers of the period, via Iraq and Syria, which were under their tutelage.

Via the Dodecanese, Turkey neighbored Italy, which had declared fascist rule with Mussolini’s rise to power in 1922 and did not hide its expansionist ambitions by calling the Mediterranean “Mare Nostrum” (Our Sea). Turkey was also neighbors with the Soviet Union, another important state of the time, via the Caucasus. Under these circumstances, Turkey, surrounded by threats on all four sides, had to increase its economic and military capacity rapidly while pursuing a policy of balance through successful diplomacy in order to eliminate the risks of its relative weakness.

TABLE 1: TURKEY’S POPULATION AND BASIC ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN THE PERIOD 1923-1960

Source: Ekrem Pakdemirli, Numerical Outlook of Our Economy, Milliyet Publications

An analysis of economic data from 1940 reveals that Turkey did not make significant progress in increasing its power, and that its foreign trade volume remained at a similar level to that of 1923, despite nearly tripling its GDP in the ensuing 17 years. In this period, the share of European countries in Turkey’s foreign trade was more than 60%, indicating the weight of Europe on Turkish foreign policy.

In parallel with its low economic capacity, Ankara tried and succeeded in staying out of World War II. Despite the alliance agreement it had signed with Britain and France in 1939, Turkey did not enter the war against Germany and its allies, citing the lack of military support from these countries and maintaining a policy of balance throughout the war. However, in 1945, when the outcome of the war became clear, Turkey officially declared war against Germany and Japan.

Asymmetric dependency

Turkey’s economic and military weakness in the postwar period was the main determinant of its foreign policy in the newly emerging bipolar international political system. Ankara, which felt that it did not have the means to resist the pressures and threats of the Soviet Union, decided to pursue rapprochement with the Western bloc. As a result, Turkey decided to transition to democracy and sent troops to Korea to join NATO, the Western bloc’s main military organization.

By 1950, Turkey’s population had reached 20.8 million and its exports and imports had risen to $263 and $286 million, respectively. With 0.84% of the world’s population, Turkey’s share in total world exports was 0.47%, while its share in total world imports was 0.49%. Increased military and economic cooperation with the United States led to a significant increase in Turkey’s GDP, reaching $9.2 billion in 1960, but also to an asymmetrical political dependence on Washington.

Although Turkey continued to be part of the Western bloc between 1960 and 1980, it was during this period that it experienced its first major crises with the United States. The two major crises of 1964 and 1974 were caused by tensions over Cyprus. Washington prevented Turkey from using its guarantor rights to help the Turks under attack in Cyprus in 1964 with the Johnson Letter, and imposed an arms embargo on Turkey in 1974 following Ankara’s military intervention on the island after the coup d’état. Turkey’s dependence on the United States for its defense industry made it easier for Washington to pressure Ankara with measures such as the arms embargo.

Diversifying foreign policy

Turgut Özal, who left his mark on Turkish politics in the 1980s, wanted to reduce the excessive weight of the United States in Turkish foreign and domestic policy through new collaborations. In this framework, Özal revived relations with the European Union and made EU membership one of the most important goals of Turkish foreign policy.

Özal also aimed to improve cooperation with Iran, Pakistan, and later with Central Asian countries under the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), and with the countries around the Black Sea, especially Russia, through the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC). The most important of these initiatives, which aimed to balance the U.S. by diversifying Turkish foreign policy, was undoubtedly the cooperation with the EU.

Özal hoped to alleviate the discomfort that Turkey’s pursuit of a more independent foreign policy would cause in Washington. Thus, while Turkey’s improved relations with the countries of the Middle East and Central Asia, as well as with Russia, would have disturbed the United States, it would not be easy for the U.S. to object to Turkey’s rapprochement with the European Union.

However, the EU shifted its interest in enlargement to this region in the wake of the Eastern European revolutions and no longer saw much need for Turkey’s security contribution. As a result, in 1987, the EU rejected Turkey’s application for full membership, exposing the limits of Özal’s policy of rapprochement with Europe. Moreover, even though Turkey’s economic capacity increased significantly during the Özal period due to its shift to an export-oriented development policy, the dependence on Western countries for foreign trade and foreign direct investment continued.

The weight of the West in the world economy and the U.S. dominance in the Cold War resulted in the U.S. and European countries being the most important determinants of Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s. During this period, Turkey was once again governed by coalition governments, which led to political instability and the February 28 coup d’état. Following this coup, which was supported by wide circles in the U.S. and European countries, the weaknesses in the country’s economic management led to the 2001 crisis, one of the biggest economic crises in Turkey’s history.

One of the most important consequences of the crisis was Ankara’s increasing dependence on Western countries and the international financial institutions they dominate. After coming to power in late 2002, the AK Party government had a very difficult task ahead of it: to manage this relationship without harming Turkey’s interests.

The 21st century also began with difficult conditions for the Republic of Turkey. Turkey was experiencing one of the biggest economic crises in its history and was struggling politically with the instability caused by the February 28 coup in 1997. After scoring a victory at the November 3, 2002 elections, the AK Party came to power alone and brought stability to Turkey. Rapid economic growth and military capacities were able to suppress foreign pressure and intervention in the 2010s, making Turkey more resilient.

Multilateral balanced policy planning

On the one hand, the AK Party administration had to maintain close relations with the U.S. and European countries in order to access the financial resources Turkey needed, and on the other, it had to prevent Washington and European capitals from excessively interfering in Turkey’s foreign and domestic policy. The first major tension in this context was with the United States. Washington had expected Ankara to support the intervention in Iraq, which was against international law, in return for its economic support to Turkey; however, as a result of the March 1 decree, the U.S. could not open a front against Iraq through Turkey which led to a long-lasting crisis in Turkey-U.S. relations.

The steps taken by the U.S., which had invaded Iraq, to foster the development of the PKK in that country and to prevent the Turkish Armed Forces from continuing their operations against this organization in northern Iraq once again demonstrated that Turkey needed to establish a more balanced relationship with the U.S. in line with its national interests.

The first serious crisis in relations with the EU, which had been progressing well in line with the goal of membership in the first years of the AK Party’s rule, emerged over the Cyprus issue. The Merkel government, which came to power in Germany in 2005, openly expressed its opposition to Turkey’s EU membership, and the Cyprus issue was used as leverage to block membership. The 2007 French presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy, who was openly against Turkey’s membership, led to a crisis in Turkey-EU relations.

Turkey’s move towards a more independent foreign policy as a result of its economic and military prowess in the 2000s caused discomfort in the U.S. and its European allies. Their pressure and sanctions in the 2010s to bring Ankara back to Western-oriented policies, in turn, led to an escalation of the crisis.

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urkish-Greek relations, which navigated a strained course after 2016 with harsh discourse and even frictions on the ground, have ushered in a new era with the earthquakes disaster that occurred in Turkey on February 6, 2023. Greece was among the first countries to offer help and dispatch search and rescue teams to Turkey.

Shortly after the disaster, on February 12, Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias came to Turkey and paid a visit to the earthquake-hit region alongside his Turkish counterpart Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu. With this visit, the diplomatic relations, which were suspended completely during the era of frayed relations, were somewhat revitalized.

The official statements given by both sides in the course of the ensuing months became moderate. In addition, Turkish President Erdoğan and Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis held a meeting in the Lithuanian capital, Vilnius, on the margins of the NATO Summit. The meeting, which involved the participation of the foreign ministers as well, was stated to be held in “good atmosphere,” and the statements on the heels of the meeting included expressions such as “both sides agreed to build on this positive momentum and activate the multiple channels of communication between the two countries in the upcoming period.”

They also agreed that the next meeting of the High-Level Cooperation Council at the leaders or the ministerial level be held in Thessaloniki in autumn. It was indicated that the leaders tasked their foreign ministers with “guiding the processes and reporting on the progress.”

The meeting between Foreign Ministers Fidan and Gerapetritis

Another crucial step of the abovementioned positive process was the visit of the Greek foreign minister to Turkey on September 5, 2023. During the visit, Giorgos Gerapetritis held a meeting with his counterpart Hakan Fidan, both of whom had newly assumed their positions. The statements of the foreign ministers during the press release following their meeting, offered hints of a deepening of the dialogue between the two parties.

First and foremost, Foreign Minister Fidan proclaimed the inauguration of a new era. “We have entered a new and positive era in our relations with Greece,” he stated. He said that the relations were exhaustively reviewed in Vilnius in line with the directives of the countries’ leaders and that they have been working on a road map for the forthcoming periods. He went on to add that the “Political Consultations and Joint Action Plan” meetings at the deputy foreign ministerial level would be held in Greece in October, and emphasized that the meetings of “Confidence-Building Measures” and exploratory talks were also on the agenda.

Another important matter, expressed in Vilnius, was that the decision to hold the fifth meeting of the High-Level Cooperation Council under the chairmanship of their leaders in Thessaloniki before the end of the year. This statement revealed that both parties are determined to resume relations at the highest level. In addition, the two leaders would meet at the inaugural meetings of the UN General Assembly in mid-September.

Fidan affirmed that they were pleased with the Joint Action Plan, and that the deputy foreign ministers would hold a meeting in Greece in December during which they would also discuss the progress made. The steps to be taken on the commercial matters would also be discussed.

Another remarkable point, which is equally important as the concrete steps in the dialogue process, is Turkey’s vigorous will to uphold the process. Minister Fidan indicated that revitalization of the channels of dialogue and the high-level contacts were a positive step, and that Turkey retains the will to maintain this by reaffirming that Turkey is ready to carry on with the process unconditionally and to develop relations in all aspects on the basis of common interests. Turkey has always espoused this approach and Minister Fidan reiterated that the problems between the two neighbors and allies can only be resolved through constructive dialogue.

Beyond the clear-cut determination regarding the dialogue process, it is important to clarify the developments that took place or are likely to take place on the settlement of the problems between the two countries. Explaining that the problems regarding the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean were also comprehensively assessed, Fidan revealed that a tangible dialogue has begun for the settlement of the problems. He highlighted that these problems had been addressed in the past during the consultative talks, and that they have been in talks to restart the process. More importantly, Fidan affirmed that they are in consensus about “introducing novel ways to resolve the problems.” He also stressed that Turkey has always defended the principle of equitable sharing in the context of the Eastern Mediterranean.

Nearly all important matters were, thus, discussed during the Fidan-Gerapetritis meeting. While demanding more cooperation on the fight against the PKK, FETÖ, and the DHKP-C terrorist organizations and irregular migration, the Turkish side also raised the issue of the need to resolve the problems facing the Muslim Turks in Western Thrace. Addressing regional problems and the questions of Ukraine, Russia, and Syria, and EU-Turkey relations, Turkey stressed that the bilateral problems can be settled “on the basis of mutual rights and interests as well as respect to international law.”

Gerapetritis’s statements indicated that the Greek approach is quite similar to the Turkish one. Rather than discussing the specific issues that were addressed in the meeting, Gerapetritis underscored the need to keep the lines of communication open and stressed the principles to form the basis of the settlement of the problems. Underlining that attempts to commence and maintain dialogue would contribute to the development of bilateral relations, he indicated that this is of paramount importance for the tranquility of the region. In this vein, he explained that the commitment which was assumed was a historical one and that this assigned the task of “maintaining good neighborly relations, observing the mutual interests of the people, and taking initiatives within the framework of a sustainable peace” to both countries.

Athens’s move to express that it is in favor of dialogue with such unambiguous and conclusive terms indicates that dialogue is an irrevocable process for Greece, which is promising.

The emphasis on building new and positive approaches by setting aside mutual biases, and even overcoming the animosity between the two countries that stems from historical events, constitutes an integral part of good relations and the settlement of bilateral issues. Reaching a reconciliation by making mutual compromises requires the alleviation—and if possible the elimination—of biases and animosity.

In this respect, a few points that Gerapetritis touched upon in his speech are worth noting. He conceded that the grief of the past cannot be erased with a stroke of a pen, but underlined that they were compelled to contain crises-prone disagreements and stereotyped understandings by investing more in sincerity and mutual understanding. Stating that it is difficult to harbor hopes to patch up all problems in the near future as their settlement requires a milder environment, Gerapetritis stressed that it is better to focus on the unifying factors and to stay away from what has set the two countries apart.

Emphasizing the fact that the dialogue is a three-pronged process, Gerapetritis explained that the first stage would be the “level of political talks,” the second was the “Confidence-Building Measures” negotiations soon to be started, and the third the aides agree that the positive agenda ought to be chaired by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece Konstantinos Fragkogiannis,. The last stage would cover areas such as trade, maritime sector, communication, and climate and environmental problems.

Athens does not appear to have had a change of heart with regard to its attitude towards Ankara-Brussels relations and Turkey’s EU membership bid. As Gerapetritis expounded, Greece has long bolstered Turkey’s EU orientation but has not backed away from referring to the preconditions (which extend beyond the membership criteria) that vex Ankara. By the same token, Gerapetritis was not unaware of politically driven and unilateral preconditions to Ankara’s membership when he suggested during a press conference in the wake of the meeting that Greece backed Turkey’s bid provided that the latter fulfill the EU criteria.

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n the morning of Sunday, October 1, around 9.30 a.m., during the opening day of the new legislative session of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM), two PKK terrorists arrived in a light commercial vehicle at the entrance to the complex housing the Turkish Ministry of Interior and the General Directorate of Security. Using long-barreled firearms, they carried out a suicide attack.

In the aftermath of the incident, an initial official statement by the Turkish Minister of Interior Ali Yerlikaya revealed that one of the terrorists detonated an explosive device, while the other assailant was effectively neutralized by law enforcement personnel.

The Ankara terrorist attack, due to its timing, target, the affiliation of the perpetrators, and the modus operandi requires a careful and thorough examination.

Examining the unusual aspects of the attack

At the outset, it is imperative to acknowledge the limited open access information on the planning, reconnaissance, and financing phases of the attack. Nevertheless, a comprehensive examination of the operational methodology is possible by examining CCTV footage.

The available footage shows that at approximately 9:30 a.m. local time, a grey Renault Kangoo vehicle arrived at the prescribed coordinates. Two terrorists, armed with long-barreled firearms and a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, alighted from the vehicle and proceeded to directly target the guards stationed at the compound’s checkpoint gate.

The attack took the form of an abrupt incursion, with one of the assailants attempting to breach the checkpoint’s ballistic fortifications with the rocket launcher. At the same time, the other assailant activated an explosive device in order to facilitate the entry of the second terrorist into the area, while rendering the checkpoint security personnel ineffective.

Intelligence reports indicate that an armed confrontation ensued between the first assailant, who was trying to breach the checkpoint, and the law enforcement personnel. The prompt intervention of the security forces resulted in the neutralization of both assailants, although two police officers, Alim Reis Demirel and Erkan Karataş, were slightly injured.

While the manner in which the Ankara terrorist attack was carried out, i.e., a sudden and violent breach of a checkpoint,  has tactical parallels with an earlier incident in Mersin, it is important to highlight the notable technical differences between the latest incident and the Mersin episode, including facets such as the typology of targets, the specifications of equipment, and the profiles of the perpetrators.

Weapons cache and connections

In the aftermath of the attempted attack, following an investigation launched by the security forces, a cache of weapons was seized, consisting of 9,700 kg of C-4 explosives, three hand grenades, a rocket launcher (specifically the RPO-A Shmel thermobaric rocket launcher), a Glock pistol fitted with a suppressor, a Blow pistol, a M4 carbine with an extended barrel, and a AK-47 with an extended barrel.

Of particular importance is the M4 carbine, a weapon developed by the American company Colt. Celebrated for its rapid-fire capabilities and lightweight design, the M4 is primarily used in close-quarters combat, with an effective range of 350 meters, and is among the weapons sent by the United States to the PKK/YPG.

The most conspicuous among the seized weapons systems is the RPO-A Shmel with a range of 20 to 1,000 m. This weapon was used by the assailant who attempted to breach the ballistic defenses at the checkpoint gate. The RPO-A Shmel, similar to the Light Anti-Tank Weapon (LAW) developed by the Soviets, is characterized by its thermobaric composition, which gives it incendiary properties, and had been previously seized by the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) during operations in Syria in 2022 and 2020.

Furthermore, the RPO-A Shmel was used in an attack by PKK terrorists in the Metina region in 2020, which resulted in the death of five Peshmerga fighters. It is known that operatives in terrorist organizations are subjected to specialized training regimes to achieve proficiency in the operation of this weapon system. Meanwhile, the protracted Syrian civil war has, to some extent, facilitated the acquisition of such weapons by terrorist organizations.

Terrorist faction and motivation

The attack, which took place on the opening day of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, was claimed by a faction of the People’s Defense Forces (HPG), the military wing of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), known as the “Immortal Battalion.” The terrorist organization named the perpetrators as operatives under the aliases “Rojhat Zihan” and “Erdal Şahin.”

Following forensic investigations, the government authorities have officially confirmed that one of the neutralized terrorist was Hasan Oğuz. The identity of the other assailant is currently the subject of ongoing forensic investigation. As the results of these investigations crystallize, they will serve to clarify the context of the attack.

Given that the “Immortals’ Battalion” operates under the direct authority of the terrorist organization’s top leadership, specifically under the command of Murat Karayılan, it is reasonable to assume that the order for the attack came from the highest levels of the organization’s hierarchy.

The communiqué issued by the terrorist organization claiming responsibility for the attack,  stated that the attack was dedicated to the memory of deceased terrorist Hülya Demirer, known by the alias “Axin Muş.” Demirer is said to have been a member of the HPG and YJA Star Command Council and, in particular, served as the “Amed” province commander within the organization’s hierarchy. The attack was explicitly dedicated to her associates, specifically “Rohat Pasur” (Cihat Ay), “Egid Berxwedan” (Habib Karakoç), and “Demhat Setkar” (Çetin Temel). These terrorists had been neutralized in an operation carried out in Diyarbakır’s Kulp district in September 2022.

The operation had been carried out under the auspices of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Directorate of Security, and involved the use of the latest technology, including UAVs of the General Directorate of Security and UCAV platforms of the Gendarmerie General Command. The neutralized terrorists had been prominently featured on the Ministry of Interior’s list of wanted terrorists, color-coded “red,” “orange,” and “grey”  respectively.

Importantly, Hülya Demirer is known to have played a key role in orchestrating a series of bomb attacks: the attack in Istanbul’s Sancaktepe district on May 12, 2016; in Istanbul’s Fatih-Vezneciler district on June 7, 2016; in Istanbul’s Beşiktaş district on December 10,  2016; and, most recently, along the Diyarbakır-Mardin highway on December 16, 2022.

From the point of view of the terrorist organization, the decisive neutralization of such a consequential figure represented a profound development, especially in terms of eroding the morale and motivation of its domestic human resources in Turkey. The attack of October 1 served the dual purpose of sending a message to the organization’s dispirited human resources in Turkey, and confirming the organization’s continued ability to carry out attacks on strategic targets within Turkish territory.

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Qadir’s observations underscore an important point: Muslims living in the West often find themselves caught up in the complexities of politics and day-to-day life. While this might sound exhausting, it’s not a rarity, but rather a common experience for Muslims in the West.

In stark contrast, Qadir points out that this level of complexity is noticeably absent in Turkey. The challenges Muslims face in the West seem less pronounced in the Turkish context and daily life as a Muslim is significantly less burdensome. The more streamlined and unburdened life gives Turkish Muslims a sense of ease and clarity.

Qadir’s perspective is a testament to the attraction Istanbul holds for Western Muslims and provides insight to the growing trend of Western Muslims moving to Turkey.

Islamic heritage and Western comfort

Adding to Turkey’s allure is the presence of numerous mosques, shrines, and landmarks intimately tied to Islamic history. These structures serve as tangible reminders of Turkey’s rich spiritual heritage and accentuate its appeal to Western Muslims, allowing them to embrace their faith openly while staying connected to their Western lifestyle. 

Lauren Booth, a British Muslim, author, and activist, shares her perspective on Turkey’s appeal: “It’s a great mix of Islamic and Turkish culture—that’s what’s incredible to me as a European.” “I can feel at home here as a Muslim and as a European. For me, it’s like two sides of my life are matched, finally,” she adds.

Booth also notes the growing trend of many Muslims being drawn to Turkey from countries such as the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. She describes this as a significant coming together that promises a hopeful atmosphere of prosperity and unity. Her experiences in Turkey, especially her visits to the grand mosques, led her to reevaluate her ideas about the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish people, and to acknowledge that her earlier understanding had been influenced by Western-centric Orientalism.

The lure of Western comfort and Islamic character make Turkey an ideal destination for Western students of Islam. Students from countries such as the United States find the mix of a developed society and political freedom and Islamic values particularly appealing.

Turkey’s educational institutions offer comprehensive Islamic Studies programs which attract those with a thirst for in-depth knowledge of theology, history, Islamic fine arts, and jurisprudence. Western Muslims who want to learn more about their faith, history, and culture respond to these points of attraction as well. 

Family ties and cultural bridges

Family ties and cultural heritage influence Western Muslims’ decision to make Turkey their new home. These ties provide a familiar touchstone in a foreign land and foster a sense of community and support. The presence of established networks can ease the transition and help newcomers navigate their new lives in Turkey.

Turkey’s social openness, and the warmth and welcome by the local population offer comfort and a sense of acceptance to Western Muslims who face discrimination in their home countries. In addition, the diversity within expatriate communities creates a supportive environment for newcomers seeking companionship and mutual understanding as shared experiences bridge cultural differences.

Muhammad Tahiri, a longtime resident of Turkey who leads a community of Western Muslims, emphasizes the appeal of Istanbul’s Islamic diversity and modernity. Unlike other Muslim countries with polarizing labels, Turkey has a harmonious atmosphere where labels such as “Salafi” or “Sufi” are less important. The ease of hearing the adhan (call to prayer) on the street and then shopping in well-stocked malls adds to this unique experience.

In addition, the freedom to access the Internet and mobile applications without surveillance contrasts with more controlled environments. Complementing this context, the Majlis of Istanbul Muslims has emerged as an initiative dedicated to fostering spiritual, social, intellectual, and professional dialogue within the Istanbul Muslim community, providing avenues for growth, collaboration, and the promotion of Islamic values and thought.

The migration of Western Muslims to Turkey reflects a blend of historical significance, religious freedom, social openness, and educational prospects. Turkey’s rich history, religious tolerance, and promising opportunities continue to attract Western Muslims seeking a fresh start. In their search for an environment that is consistent with their values and conducive to their faith, Turkey is proving to be a destination where these aspirations can be realized.

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he global agenda is concerned with the enlargement of BRICS, a non-formal economic organization consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Though the group does not have an official status, it functions as an international organization and accepts or rejects memberships of applicant countries.

In August, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa announced at the 15th BRICS Summit that Iran, Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates had been invited to join the bloc and the membership will take effect on January 1, 2024.

Aside from new members, 16 countries have formally applied to join BRICS while 16 others, including Turkey, have shown interest in the group. The increasing amount of interest attests to the popularity of the bloc, which attracts countries mainly from the Global South. With new members, BRICS will represent 46% of the global population, 29.3% of global GDP, 43.1% of global oil production, and 25.1% of global exports.

Why do countries want to join BRICS?

There are several reasons why the BRICS are attractive to certain countries. First, current members, future members, and other applicants are non-members of the Western bloc and generally disadvantaged against the U.S. and the EU in many respects. Among many such countries, there is a general understanding that the West tries to maximize its economic and political power and interests on account of the rest of the world. What is more, the maximization policies of the West are considered unfair and often morally questionable actions. Therefore, BRICS-like groupings are seen as a way to resist the destructive dominance of Western economies, best summed up perhaps by the phrase “United we stand.”

Western economic cooperation and organizations may be damaging to the BRICS economies, but they also inspire them to counter them. Indeed, the model of economic cooperation, namely the EU, introduced by the transatlantic alliance worked well after World War II, enriching Europeans. Thus, BRICS members are following Europe’s path to strengthen their economies; BRICS is an organization that both imitates Western institutions and counters them.

New members are not aligned to any bloc, making BRICS the only economic body they can approach. It is quite unlikely that Ethiopia, Argentina, or any Middle Eastern country will one day become an EU member—their best choice for economic cooperation is to be a member of BRICS.

Middle Eastern countries, particularly, tried their best to align with U.S. interests but were disappointed with Washignton’s policies towards them. No Middle Eastern country is willing to be satisfied with allying with the U.S., for example, against Iran and Israel. The example here is political, but politics affect economic relations and alliances. Moreover, new members and BRICS enthusiasts are ideologically closer to BRICS members than the West.

Will Turkey join the BRICS?

As for Turkey, being a BRICS member will bring economic benefits to the country. However, for all countries, including Turkey, economic alliances have political repercussions and are mostly formed according to countries’ political postures. As BRICS is an unofficial union formed by big powers of the Global South, Turkey’s membership would have the greatest consequences compared to any other membership.

To begin with, Turkey sees itself as a European country. While a small part of its territory is on the European continent, it has historical and political ties with Europe and has always turned its face to the West. The secular community which founded the country in 1923 distanced itself from the East (and South) arguing that Turkey should be in the Western bloc.

On the other hand, Turkey’s conservative democratic community, which now governs the country, is not fully aligned with the West nor is it anti-Western. In fact, it would welcome EU membership more than any other economic grouping. Currently, even though Ankara no longer maintains a full allegiance to the West and relations are not at a desired level with the U.S. and the EU, the incumbent government still wants to keep strong ties with both.

At the moment, Ankara prefers not to part ways with Western powers and, concurrently, improves relations with the rest of the world. While it tries to remain neutral in world politics on account of its NATO membership and EU candidacy, it does not want to change its axis completely. Turkey’s balancing policy can be tied to its “Century of Turkey” motto, referring to an independent foreign policy, which is more assertive and gives priority to the country’s own interests. Besides Turkey’s new foreign policy, being estranged by its Western allies compels Turkey to seek new cooperation opportunities. BRICS is not a political bloc and being a BRICS member does not mean an axis change. Yet, being a BRICS member does have political consequences.

In the current circumstances, the Turkish government will most likely opt for improving economic cooperation with each BRICS member rather than becoming a member of the organization. Relations with the BRICS bloc will continue informally and without formal membership.

In addition to Turkey’s orientation towards the West, certain structural problems of BRICS also compel Ankara not to join. First, although China appears to be leading the bloc, its leadership is weak and other members may not accept a more influential member joining the bloc. It is also questionable to what extent members will unite against rivals such as the EU. While Western countries act as a bloc in their economic and foreign relations, this may not be the case for BRICS members.

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt, for example, will join BRICS for the economic benefits and thus have a sort of backing against Western powers. Russia and China are already challenging the West, while the West is relentlessly trying to pull India out of the group and may sooner or later succeed.

BRICS may not offer Turkey what it expects. The only reason Turkey might apply to join BRICS is as a result of deteriorating relations with Western states. Turkey’s relations with the West are strained, but not bad enough to force the country to go down that road.

Rekindling Bonds: A Momentous Journey of Diplomacy

The recent visit of the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to three prominent Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries has captivated attention, illuminating the Turkey-Gulf relations and pointing towards a rekindling of the pre-Arab Uprising era in bilateral ties. On July 17, President Erdoğan embarked on a Gulf tour, encompassing Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), with an economy-oriented agenda to foster and fortify trade and investment relations with these influential Gulf nations.

Following the significance of President Erdoğan’s re-election on May 28, his visits hold special importance, with Gulf monarchies poised to form a cornerstone in Turkey’s foreign policy for the next five years. The Turkish elections garnered profound attention in the Gulf region, leading to swift and warm congratulations from Gulf leaders, underscoring their desire for continuity and stronger ties with Turkey. The GCC nations, in an unequivocal display of commitment, expressed their steadfast determination to bolster relations with Ankara throughout President Erdoğan’s forthcoming term, setting the stage for an era of promising collaboration and mutual growth.

The timing and significance of Erdoğan’s visit were of utmost importance, given Turkey’s ongoing efforts to revitalize its struggling economy, which has been grappling with currency devaluation, soaring inflation, and depleting reserves. The expectations back in Turkey regarding a potential trade and investment deal with Gulf monarchies were set high. Notably, Turkey’s new economy managers, Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek and Central Bank Governor Hafize Gaye Erkan, preceded President Erdoğan’s visit with their arrival in Saudi Arabia on July 11. Their purpose was to lay the groundwork for the high-ranking Turkish delegation’s visit, further underscoring the importance of the occasion. Minister Şimşek, along with Turkish Vice President Cevdet Yilmaz, also embarked on visits to Qatar and the UAE to strengthen economic ties with these nations earlier in July.

Enhancing Bonds: Agreements, Gestures, and Gifts

Accompanied by 200 businesspeople, the Turkish President embarked on his first visit to Saudi Arabia, where he held a significant meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman. The Saudi Arabia-Türkiye Business Forum took place in Jeddah on July 18, resulting in the signing of five key agreements between the two countries, covering investment, energy, communication, and defense industry cooperation.

Of notable importance among these agreements is the cooperation deal with Baykar Technology, which demands considerable attention. The partnership with the Saudi Ministry of Defense represents Turkey’s most substantial defense and aviation export agreement ever, as confirmed by Haluk Bayraktar, the CEO of Baykar Technologies. Beyond the scope of mere trade relations, these deals also encompass joint production and technology transfer. Baykar Technologies highlighted that the primary objective of this collaboration is to bolster the high-tech development capabilities of both nations in the foreseeable future.

Emphasizing the depth and significance of the collaboration, Baykar Technologies stated, “With this comprehensive agreement, there will be a focus on technology transfer and joint production to propel the high technology development capabilities of both countries.”

Following the business and diplomatic contacts in Saudi Arabia, President Erdoğan arrived in Qatar on the second leg of his Gulf tour. During an official ceremony at Lusail Palace, President Erdoğan met with his counterpart Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani. During the visit, the two countries inked an MoU on the occasion of the 50^thanniversary of diplomatic relations.

Throughout the last decade, Turkey has proven to be a reliable and unwavering partner for Qatar, a bond that became even more evident during the 2017 Gulf Crisis. Ankara swiftly and consistently extended its political, economic, and military backing to Qatar, solidifying their relationship as vital regional allies. Both nations hold significance for each other, serving as trusted and strategic foreign policy allies in the region.

In a joint statement both countries noted, “Türkiye-Qatar relations reflect deep-rooted historical ties built on political and social foundations, as evidenced by the fact that the two countries have consistently supported each other in the spirit of brotherhood and solidarity throughout many pivotal periods in their history, and the two countries continue to mutually support each other in various fields.” The two leaders are expected to meet again later this year at the 9th Qatari-Turkish Supreme Strategic Committee meeting slated to take place in Qatar.

The third and last stop of President Erdoğan’s Gulf tour was the UAE. In a two-day official visit, Turkey and the UAE signed 13 agreements in fields such as energy, transportation, infrastructure, logistics, e-commerce, finance, health, food, tourism, real estate, construction, defense industry, artificial intelligence, and advanced technologies. The total worth of agreements announced stands at $50.7 billion. The two countries also agreed on establishing a “High Level Strategic Council” to elevate the bilateral relations to the level of strategic partnership.

Apart from business deals, personal gestures and significant gifts have become remarkable features of President Erdoğan’s recent Gulf tour: President Erdoğan gifted a Togg, Turkey’s first domestically manufactured electric car, to each of the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. Media attention was high as President Erdoğan and Gulf leaders personally examined the car together. Apart from its importance domestically, it appears that the Togg might be a diplomatically significant tool in Erdoğan’s foreign policy over the upcoming five years.

During his official visit to the UAE, President Erdoğan was honored with the prestigious Order of Zayed by Emirates President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ). The Order of Zayed, named after the UAE’s founding father, is the highest civilian honor bestowed upon world leaders and heads of state, symbolizing humanitarianism, international cooperation, and the pursuit of peace worldwide. The award of the Order of Zayed is as a goodwill gesture in strengthening bilateral relations between the UAE and Turkey.

Beyond the Horizon: Key Reflections and Future Trajectories

The primary dimension that will define the trajectory of Turkey-Gulf relations in the upcoming five years is undeniably its profoundly business-oriented nature. This strategic focus on bolstering economic ties has been eloquently emphasized by Nail Olpak, the president of the Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK). During this recent Gulf tour, which he aptly dubbed #businessdiplomacy, the profound developments and engagements with the Gulf monarchies have been unambiguously centered around forging robust business alliances and sealing consequential deals. It becomes evident that business collaborations are not merely a means to an end but, rather, they represent the very essence of the diplomatic engagements with these Gulf nations, underscoring the critical role they play in shaping the future of Turkey-Gulf relations.

Defense and energy cooperation stand out as the primary pillars of collaboration between Turkey and the Gulf. The agreements forged in these critical sectors hold the potential to pave the way for enduring and steadfast cooperation, owing to the remarkable synergy in supply and demand between Turkey and the GCC monarchies.

Within the energy domain, Turkey’s position as a net energy importer harmoniously corresponds to the pivotal role played by Gulf states as prominent energy exporters. The surging prominence of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in Turkey’s natural gas imports serves as a poignant testament to the indispensability of energy relations, particularly with Qatar. Moreover, Turkey’s allure as an attractive investment destination for renewable energy projects mirrors the ambitions of Gulf monarchies seeking to transition their economies beyond oil and achieve net-zero emissions. These converging factors underscore the mutual benefits and profound significance of fostering robust energy cooperation between Turkey and the Gulf countries.

In the realm of defense, the Gulf nations are actively pursuing the diversification of their military partnerships and reinforcing their drone capabilities to counter unconventional attacks on oil facilities. At the same time, Turkey is keen on leveraging its advanced and cost-effective drone industry to reap both economic and strategic advantages. With these parallel objectives and shared interests, defense cooperation emerges as an immensely advantageous endeavor for both parties, promising mutual gains and strengthened security measures.

From a strategic perspective, defense sector productions and technologies serve as critical commodities that establish enduring dependencies between sellers and buyers. By forging defense ties, especially with technology transfer and joint production, with the Gulf monarchies, Turkey can effectively strengthen its presence and strategic importance in the Gulf region in a sustained and integrated manner. This proves particularly advantageous for the Gulf monarchies, as procuring Turkish defense productions and technologies, as a NATO member, is less likely to trigger significant backlash from the United States and Western partners, unlike military cooperation with China and Russia, which often raises concerns among these powers. Given the close alliance between the Gulf monarchies and the U.S., this advantage holds substantial weight.

Economically, the numbers speak for themselves: Turkey’s defense exports witnessed a remarkable 42% increase between 2020 and 2021, with the total export value reaching an impressive $4.4 billion in 2022. Notably, for prominent firm Baykar, foreign contracts constitute more than 90% of its revenue in this sector. Additionally, Turkey has set ambitious goals to achieve $6 billion worth of arms exports by 2023. Consequently, the Gulf states are ideally positioned to fill the trade and investment gap, thus providing crucial support to Turkey in reaching its economic objectives in this domain.

The strategic alignment of interests in these areas not only ensures mutual benefits, but also sets the stage for sustained, long-term partnerships, further solidifying the bond between Turkey and the Gulf nations providing that the political will and trust-building measures between both sides continues.

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t the end of June, the World Bank Group approved a $1 billion financing package for the earthquake-hit region of Turkey as part of the total $1.8 billion in financial assistance agreed upon earlier. This part of the financing will focus on public services and rural housing. The World Bank, together with the Turkish Treasury and Finance Ministry, has also agreed on an additional new project worth $450 million for Turkish SMEs (small and medium enterprises) in the 11 provinces of the earthquake region.

Meanwhile, Turkey has already launched construction projects for more than 180,000 new houses in the earthquake-hit region. The first group of houses will be handed over by October 2023. Search and rescue operations in these 11 provinces of southern Turkey are long over. New shelters, safe longer-term housing, and reviving economic activity are the new challenges. Above all, new physical and financial investments are needed to rebuild all the damage.

The earthquakes, two back-to-back earthquakes of 7.7 and 7.6 magnitude, have undoubtedly led to a massive loss of wealth in Turkey, and now is the time to invest and rebuild that wealth. However, a thorough recovery that can be managed and sustained over the long term will require new infrastructure, housing, and investment in human and physical capital. And these efforts, of course, raise a new issue: finding new financing to repair the earthquake damage.

With an average value of $60 billion, the longer-term reconstruction cost estimate ranges from $45 billion to $80 billion. This amount mainly reflects the direct costs associated with the loss of growth, debris removal, reconstruction of buildings and homes, renovation, loss of labor and human capital, costs of infrastructure and public facilities, and loss of education and human capital. The range could be increased to $45-150 billion if secondary costs are taken into account.

Financing options

There are already many alternative financing options that can be used during the long reconstruction process. New avenues are opening up to fund reconstruction, including more promising green finance options, microcredit, new blockchain-based financing models, Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), and more antiquated Islamic financial instruments in addition, among others, to attracting foreign direct investment, public subsidies, debt-based financing, and equity-based and non-equity crowdfunding options.

Meanwhile, even an ex-ante funding source (such as reserve funds) could also help to secure advance funding for disaster-related costs. However, they have relatively higher opportunity costs compared to ex-post financing instruments such as debt financing, taxation, or other forms of international support.

In addition, Turkey has a considerable economic cushion to respond to and finance the reconstruction effort. A stable budget and low debt-to-GDP ratios give the Turkish economy and government considerable room to implement new public financing initiatives. The low debt-to-GDP ratio (below 35%) provides more room for borrowing. The fiscal situation is also not dire due to soaring tax revenues in 2022 (an increase of almost 100%).

In addition to tax incentives and subsidies, government spending could also be used effectively. At the same time, public policies such as new taxes, such as tax increment financing or TIF, and government spending also help economies recover much faster (via the investment and demand effects). Finally, business continuity and the resilience of the financial sector are extremely important. New infrastructure investments, construction projects, support and subsidies for energy and agriculture, and the inflow of large amounts of foreign and domestic capital into the region could help boost local economies in the short to medium term.

However, domestic budgetary or cash resources won’t be enough and external mechanisms are therefore expected, including substantial financial and diplomatic assistance. The World Bank, for example, will be essential as a major international organization with extensive expertise in crisis management. In particular, the longer-term international financing possibilities offered by the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) could prove very helpful in the future.

In the meantime, when deciding which financing options to prioritize, less costly, less bureaucratic, and more liquid and direct options should probably be given priority. Emergency funds of multinational organizations, existing national or international emergency financial assistance funds, and insurance instruments could be used more effectively. Other instruments, such as bonds or loans, are longer-term and more bureaucratic options. In the future, the creation of a European emergency fund or possibly the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) emergency fund should also be considered.

Another example is contingent loans which are low-cost emergency loans from international institutions to disaster-stricken economies and are used effectively by international organizations such as the World Bank. Special earthquake bonds (a type of debt-based financing) and tax increment financing options could also provide much needed funds to local authorities. Debt-based financing methods such as Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) or pay-as-you-go options could be repaid with incremental taxes.

Alternative payment options are becoming increasingly popular in these uncertain and unsettling times. One such area of cross-border and peer-to-peer payments is the use of blockchain technologies and cryptocurrencies. Even when banking activities are suspended or temporarily banned, this tool still allows money to be transferred. Favorable, low-cost loans from international institutions, access to international Islamic finance fund options, and sukuk-type bonds could prove useful in financing reconstruction efforts. Earthquake or broader catastrophe bonds (CAT bonds) are also used effectively today in many international natural catastrophe cases.

The construction of physical infrastructure such as hospitals, roads, bridges, and schools, and electricity, water, gas, and sewage systems is likely to be financed by international organizations, including the World Bank. These examples could be backed by one-off taxes, bonds, and even central bank money. Earthquake insurance, specific earthquake taxes, personal savings and assets, private bank loans, NGO support, domestic public assistance (from the Ministry of Finance and other public agencies), and external funding (from international organizations and governments) are just a few examples of a world of institutional funding sources for post-earthquake reconstruction.

The inflow of financial capital, including aid and loans, strong fiscal figures, strong financial resilience, and low debt-to-GDP ratio could help Turkey’s reconstruction efforts. All these foreign capital inflows, financial support, new stimulus packages, housing reconstruction, new infrastructure investment, and restructuring of rehabilitated companies could subsequently boost economic activity and put an end to a potential economic downturn. However, the focus should be on efficient, timely, and less bureaucratic funding schemes.

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he elections in Turkey, the most important elections of 2023 worldwide, rolled on after the May 28 runoff, with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan getting 52.18 percent of the votes against his rival, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, and being re-elected.

On June 3, Erdoğan attended the swearing-in ceremony at the parliament and named the cabinet members right after the ceremony, the same evening. New faces have appeared in fifteen ministerial positions except for two ministries: the ministries of health and culture. The foreign, interior, defense, and finance ministries were among the most crucial cabinet posts with new incumbents. These four vital positions have been filled by well-known, experienced, and respected politicians and bureaucrats who have played critical roles in the country’s past two decades.

The replacement of the foreign minister, Mevlut Çavuşoğlu, with Dr. Hakan Fidan, who served as the head of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), and the assignment of Prof. Ibrahim Kalin, who served as a presidential spokesperson and advisor to Erdoğan, as the new head of Turkish intelligence have attracted the attention of not only regional powers but also international players due to the duo’s importance for the country and President Erdoğan.

Despite some analysts considering the new assignments as indicators of change, this is not the case. In the past three years, Turkey has adopted a normalization policy merged with its financial aims of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI).

The past three years’ diplomatic and economic attempts have aimed at the deliberate preparation of Turkey’s transforming foreign policy and economy. This transformation has brought about a series of hardships for the country resulting from the fall of the Turkish currency as Turkey seeks to be a regional financial hub. However, the Turkish government plans to make Turkey a “center country” as suggested by Wallerstein’s world systems theory which argues that the world economic system serves to benefit some countries and exploit others.

Turkey’s recent achievements in the defense industry (fighter jets, drones, missiles, etc.), technology, and its indigenous car (TOGG) are among the vital indicators of this intention. Rather than being exploited, Turkey wants to decrease the value of the Turkish lira, and stabilize and improve its relations with regional powers as part of its normalization efforts.

What is more, the country’s proactive role in several conflicts has brought it to the fore as a regional and international spot for resolving conflicts. Since this strategy requires a stabilized region and good diplomatic ties, Ankara, witnessing the decreasing hegemonic power of the U.S., started mending its ties with its neighbors, particularly the Gulf countries, which could impact a wide range of areas and regions, including the Maghreb.

Turkey and the Maghreb

What can be expected next in Turkey’s relations with the Maghreb countries in light of Turkey’s new cabinet?

First, it is vital to remember the fact that the newly assigned foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, has been behind the scene of Ankara’s normalization efforts with regional powers. Egypt is among the countries with which Turkey has sought normalization, and Ankara and Cairo have already announced the assignment of their ambassadors after several years of cold diplomatic ties. The normalization between Ankara and Cairo is important since it can help resolve Libya’s more than decade-long conflict, along with the disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey’s strengthening ties with Egypt would provide Ankara with an advantage against Greece, which signed an MoU with Cairo a year after Ankara signed one with Libya’s UN-backed government.

This can also provide an opportunity to find a solution for the Eastern Mediterranean gas and border rift. Regarding Libya, Turkey has been backing the UN-recognized government headed by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah while being in touch with several parties to the conflict. On the contrary, Egypt has been one of the closest allies of warlord Khalifa Haftar, the Tobruk-based parliament’s speaker and its PM-designate Fathi Bashagha. During Bashagha’s failed attempts to enter Tripoli, Turkey played a balancing role by stopping the clashes and mediating between the warring parties.

Following the visit of CIA Director William Burns to Libya in the middle of January in which he met with Dbeibah and Haftar, Fidan was quick to take action and meet Dbeibah, Menfi, Khalid al-Mishri, the Chairman of the High Council of State, and even Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

Hakan Fidan

Turkey’s foreign policy during Hakan Fidan’s tenure at the MIT was a conversion of his background activities into diplomatic steps, with Ankara’s grand strategy remaining the same: making Turkey a more independent, balanced, and proactive foreign approach, considering the decreasing hegemonic power of the U.S. in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have been seen to be happy with Erdoğan’s re-election as they were among the first countries to congratulate him on his election victory. Considering the upcoming visits and meetings between Turkey, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, Fidan could lead Ankara towards a solution of its long-standing issues.

With an operational intelligence service, proactive foreign policy efforts, and a qualified staff comprising among others the aforementioned ministers, Turkey only needs to eliminate its economic hardships. An improving Turkish economy would also help heal the wounds of the region and the world at large. As the U.S. is losing its hegemony across the region, Turkey, after recovering from an economic and diplomatic crisis, will seek to become a regional and global hub for trade, diplomacy, and politics as per its grand strategy.

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elations between the republics of Argentina and Turkey date back to the early 20th century when thousands of Ottoman subjects started migrating to Argentine territory. The family migratory chains, popularly (and wrongly) called Turcos (Turkish), were mainly Christian or Jewish (from what today would be the territory of Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine) and were composed of migrants who left the Ottoman Empire mostly in “irregular” ways.

The Ottoman Empire’s interest in keeping in touch with its nationals helped to establish the first bilateral relations. The economic aspect was secondary, to which the Argentine government paid more attention, and the focus was on people’s immigration and religion.

From the 1990s onwards, political and economic cooperation accelerated through the signing of a series of agreements: the Agreement on Economic and Trade Cooperation (1992), the Agreement on Visa Exemption (1992), the Agreement on Scientific-Technical Cooperation, the Air Services Agreement (2011) and the Agreement on Customs Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (2018), among others.

The increased political cooperation translated into growth in trade: Trade exchange between Argentina and Turkey grew 411% between 1992 and 2018. The maximum peak of the trade exchange was achieved in 2022, reaching $1.18 billion, with more than $711 million of Argentine exports. Although the trade exchange has grown in recent decades, it is still a very insignificant part of the total exports for both countries (Turkey represented 0.8% of Argentine exports in 2022, and Argentina represented less than 0.2% of Turkish exports in 2022).

In turn, the trend in trade with Turkey – as with the Middle East – mirrors the pattern of Argentina’s trade with developed countries: a preponderance of commodities or primary products with limited added value in exchange for industrial or manufactured goods.

Turkish Foreign Policy and the Global South

Turkey foreign policy has been linked to regional and global dynamics in recent decades, such as the various conflicts bordering its territory (Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, and now Ukraine) or the Russo-Western tensions in the broader Black Sea region that have turned Turkish foreign policy into a more assertive one, anchored in regional power and national security.

Additionally, the Turkish presence has become increasingly global, especially in the Global South. In the last decade, Turkey’s neighborhood has been embroiled in cumulative turbulence, including active armed conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh, and Moscow’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, and the competition for advantage in terms of maritime delimitation and energy resources in the eastern Mediterranean.

As a central example, Turkey’s relationship and interest in Latin America hit its peak in the 2010s through the growth of trade and the use of Turkish soft power. As part of the Global South, Latin America still holds a place in Turkish foreign policy since this relationship is aligned with Turkey’s rhetoric of independence in international relations, national self-sufficiency, exploration of economic opportunities, and national security.

Within this juncture, Argentina (for economic opportunities) and Turkey (for autonomy and national interests) launched the satellite cooperation project in 2019 between Investigaciones Aplicadas Sociedad del Estado (INVAP, the Applied Research State Company), a company owned by the Province of Río Negro of Argentina, and Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI, a Turkish state-owned company) through the creation of a joint venture called GSATCOM.

The Turkey-Argentina venture’s main objective or goal is the construction of a Geosynchronous Equatorial Orbit (GEO), “à la carte, with a modular and scalable design”: a high-throughput satellite (HTS), with all-electric propulsion and reconfigurable, onboard equipment to adjust to market demands, and the capacity to be adapted to the whole range of existing launchers.

The antennas of these satellites with ion engines can be redirected with a very low loss of efficiency and their onboard signals can be digitized for retransmission. Flexible loading allows the satellite to have a useful life of 15 years at a significantly lower cost; therefore, it can adapt to market changes.

In this regard, tasks were allocated according to the strengths of each company: INVAP is in charge of leading the development of the communications system, while TAI is in charge of the structure and thermal subsystem. This first jointly produced GEO satellite is scheduled to be ready by 2024, according to official information. The project suffered some delays (completion was originally estimated for 2021) due to the COVID-19 global pandemic and Argentina’s budgetary restrictions.

What does the GEO joint satellite cooperation between Turkey and Argentina project demonstrate? Granted, the relationship between the two countries in political terms was –and still is – not optimal, with ups and downs mainly due to an Armenian diaspora lobbying against Turkey and blocking Argentina from developing relations further, and the bilateral relationship lacking an important commercial exchange. Yet, it was possible to develop this joint project because the two companies, with similar origins of being created by their national states and with similar objectives, have shown sound development and are constantly searching for technological innovation and commercial opportunities, which played instrumental roles in achieving this collaboration.

An industrial infrastructure

Yet, it was possible to develop this joint project because the two companies, with similar origins of being created by their national states and with similar objectives, have shown sound development and are constantly searching for technological innovation and commercial opportunities, which played instrumental roles in achieving this collaboration.

In addition, after the end of the Cold War, both Turkey and Argentina developed an industrial infrastructure and a sizable scientific-technological complex despite struggling with constant economic crises. However, unlike in the past, Argentina, through the INVAP, was the one that took the initiative and studied the whole satellite chain for market niches.

In Latin America, Argentina has one of the biggest developed industrial-scientific complexes. For example, Argentina has three Nobel Prizes in Science (for instance, Brazil, which is five times bigger in terms of population, has none). It’s quite surprising that a country like Argentina’s has nuclear, satellite, and aerospace capabilities when most of Latin America mainly depends on natural resources for their economies. 

Once it found an opportunity, Argentina searched for several years for a partner and found TAI. Once the talks between the two companies began in 2017, they successfully established the joint venture in 2019, including the public-private collaboration to achieve the objective. As Gonzalez Levaggi and Blinder point out, “Having differing motivations (referring to Argentina and Turkey) does not mean that cooperation is unachievable.”

This case of South-North cooperation, in which Argentina and Turkey develop their potential to climb the ladder of technological innovation, is a good example of a foreign policy emphasizing developing autonomous capabilities. In other words, it is a policy that widens the margins for developing countries to navigate an increasingly uncertain international sphere.

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urkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan expressed his jubilation as he declared the commencement of the “Century of Turkey” during his inauguration speech on April 4. Employing the metaphor of the “New Red Apple,” Erdoğan described the current era as one of conquest, proclaiming that the “doors of our country’s growth have been opened.”

With the centennial of the Turkish Republic approaching on October 29, 2023 the AK Party (Justice and Development Party) government has unveiled an ambitious vision for the nation’s future. Throughout his election campaign, the recently re-elected president emphasized his 2023 vision and showcased projects initiated in alignment with the “Century of Turkey” plan.

This comprehensive vision comprises 17 principles encompassing sustainability, science, technology, peace, stability, and power, constructing a future-oriented perspective that fosters proactive transformation both domestically and internationally. To gain a deeper understanding of this plan, let us explore the “Century of Turkey” through President Erdoğan’s statements.

The vision was initially presented by Erdoğan on October 28, 2022, during an address to a crowd in Ankara. In his speech, Erdoğan expressed the desire for a robust start to the new century of the Turkish Republic with the “Century of Turkey.” He stated, “At a time when the world is facing vital challenges, we want to make our country one of the 10 largest states globally in all fields of politics, economy, technology, military, and diplomacy.”

Economic revival takes precedence in the agenda

During his first cabinet meeting, President Erdoğan outlined three primary goals for the early stages of the “Century of Turkey”: reducing inflation to single digits, facilitating the voluntary and dignified return of refugees, and contributing to global peace through an enterprising and active foreign policy.

Addressing Turkey’s economic challenges emerges as Erdoğan’s top priority. To tackle the persistent high inflation rate, currently at 39.59%, he appointed former deputy prime minister Mehmet Şimsek as the minister of treasury and finance. Şimsek’s international stature reassures both domestic and global stakeholders.

The appointment of Hafize Gaye Erkan, who held prominent positions in the banking sector in the United States, as the head of the Central Bank of Turkey, has also garnered attention. After years of pursuing a low-interest rate policy, Erkan’s appointment signifies a move towards normalization in the eyes of the markets.

Emphasis on a stronger and stable Turkey

Underlining that the Republic has not been able to live in peace within itself for a significant part of its century-long history, President Erdoğan remarked, “The calculations of imperialists on our country have never been lacking. The pawns used in these dirty calculations have never been lacking either. It was the same yesterday and it is the same today. Instead of relying on the supremacy of the national will, our country has wasted golden years in the hands of governments that remained under the guidance of the forces of tutelage.”

Erdoğan stressed that Turkey has now become a stronger nation capable of withstanding threats from both domestic and foreign actors. He asserted, “They did everything to strip us of these lands. They tried to do so sometimes by coming here in person and sometimes by using their pawns. We, as the nation, liberated our homeland in the War of Independence and shouted once again to the whole world that we would never accept slavery. Lastly, they attempted to invade our homeland by making the traitors within attack us on the night of July 15. We stopped it, as well, in solidarity with our people.”

“Let us face east and west – but, most importantly, the truth.”

Another priority of the “Century of Turkey” vision marks a turning point in Turkish foreign policy: adopting a more proactive and multipolar perspective rooted in compassion. Erdoğan pledged to strengthen Turkey’s diplomatic hand around the world. He noted that “the international community will see a Turkey that takes more initiative in solving global crises, strives more for the establishment of peace and stability in its region, works harder for the development of the Turkish and Islamic world, and protects the oppressed and victims.” The “Century of Turkey” envisions a revolution that will bring democracy, development, peace, and welfare to every corner of the world. Hakan Fidan, who was the head of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) since 2010, was appointed as the new foreign minister.

Full-scale fight against terrorism

The scope of Turkey’s counterterrorism vision is expanded in the “Century of Turkey” plan. Erdoğan promised determination to eliminate terrorist elements saying that interlocutors would find a determined, braver, more compassionate, and more active Turkey that fights terrorist organizations inside and outside its borders more decisively. “They stalled us with terror for years. They wasted our resources and energy for years. They stole away our children’s future, the light in their eyes and the hope in their hearts. They worked to raise walls of blood and tears in the way of our people. They tried to undermine our eternal fraternity by setting Turks and Kurds against one another…” He went on to add, “The separatist terrorist organization is a dagger with which the imperialists stabbed our country in the back in order to spill our blood and weaken us.”

Transitioning from a coup d’état-drafted to a libertarian constitution

In his speech at the Presidential Inauguration Ceremony, President Erdoğan said, “We will strengthen our democracy with a libertarian, civilian, and inclusive constitution by getting rid of the current constitution, which is a product of a coup. We will continue to make our country grow through investment, employment, production, exports, and current account surplus. We are determined to put Gazi Mustafa Kemal’s principle of ‘Peace at Home, Peace in the World’ into practice in its true meaning.”

With the launch of the “Century of Turkey,” President Erdoğan aims to propel Turkey towards a transformative future, characterized by progress, development, and global engagement. The vision encompasses various aspects, including foreign policy, counterterrorism efforts, constitutional reforms, and economic improvements. As Turkey celebrates the 100th anniversary of its Republic, the “Century of Turkey” represents a significant milestone in the nation’s history, setting the stage for a new era of growth and influence.

With Turkey’s transition to a presidential system in April 2017, after a historic referendum that saw 51.4% of the votes cast in favor of the new system, political parties in Turkey immediately began to adapt to the new system. The presidential system, which requires candidates to win an absolute majority of first-round votes, forged pre-election alliances. It became clear to all opposition parties, led by the Republican People’s Party (CHP), that on their own they could not defeat Erdoğan or the AK Party (Justice and Development Party) under Erdoğan’s leadership.

The rapprochement between the AK Party and the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) after the July 15, 2016 failed coup attempt merged into an alliance called the “People’s Alliance” for the June 2018 presidential elections. The People’s Alliance was also joined by the BBP (Great Unity Party). This was followed by the opposition’s first serious move to form an alliance: the CHP, the Iyi Party, the Felicity Party (SP), and the Democratic Party (DP) formed an alliance for parliamentary elections, but disagreed on supporting a common presidential candidate. The June 2018 presidential election was a disaster for the opposition with Erdoğan’s winning 52.59% of the vote in the first round.

Over the past few years, Turkey has experienced a major economic crisis and recently a devastating earthquake. This led many political analysts to surmise that Erdoğan’s long, invincible reign in Turkish politics may be coming to an end with the presidential elections of May 14. Nevertheless, the opposition had to take over the reins tight and embark on an impossible mission: to bring together Turkey’s liberal, democratic, right-wing, left-wing, Turkish nationalist, and Kurdish nationalist circles and societal segments. This ideologically incoherent, politically unstable, and sociologically irreconcilable alliance united for one purpose: to overthrow President Erdoğan.

The coalition formed by opposition to Erdoğan was named the “Nation Alliance” or the “Table of Six,” which included most of the political groups in the opposition except the HDP, which contested the May 14 general elections under the YSP (Green Left Party). The YSP, overwhelmingly dominated by Kurdish ethno-nationalists, including some far-left political groups, did not nominate a presidential candidate, which translated as open support for Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu.

The implicit inclusion of the Kurdish ethno-nationalist separatists in the coalition created an insurmountable ambiguity and a bizarre situation for the opposition. If there is one thing that Turkish society as a whole would not accept, it is an overt or covert coalition with the HDP, the political wing of the PKK terrorist organization, as Erdoğan’s discourse reveals on every occasion. Kılıçdaroğlu’s promises to release Selahattin Demirtaş, the currently imprisoned former co-chair of the HDP, to grant autonomy to the Kurdish-majority provinces, and his perpetual silence to the statements of the leading PKK figures supporting his candidacy were perceived by most of the Turkish people as an imminent threat to the unity of the state.

The rallies of the opposition in the eastern and southeastern provinces of Turkey brought the tacit coalition to the surface. The CHP and YSP flags were waved together, and especially the victory signs by Selvi Kılıçdaroğlu, the wife of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, and Dilek İmamoğlu, the wife of Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, angered Turkish people who frowned on the now obvious enlargement of the alliance to include Kurdish nationalists in an already Kemalist, liberal, secular, conservative, and nationalist coalition.

This incoherence led a wider public to see the opposition as insincere, unreliable, and unsustainable, so they once again turned to Erdoğan because he symbolized stability and a kind of idealism for the nation despite the economic crisis. The result on May 14 was yet another electoral defeat for the opposition candidate —for the 11th time—with 44.88% of the vote, and another victory for Erdoğan with 49.52% of the vote.

President Erdoğan pioneering the national will, yet not necessarily adhering to a nationalist view, has managed to regain the confidence of the masses and is now very close to winning the runoff on May 28, 2023, on the eve of the symbolically important day of the conquest of Istanbul by the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet II, the Conqueror. The irony is that a few days before the runoff, the opposition, as if lurching from one frustration to another, insists on the strategy that already cost them the election. Once again, they are attempting a “mission impossible.”

To win the votes of Sinan Oğan, a right-wing candidate who surprisingly won 5.17% of the vote, Kılıçdaroğlu’s newly formed campaign team clumsily and abruptly shifted the focus of the discourse to an anti-refugee and nationalist one. On May 24, after long negotiations, Kılıçdaroğlu was able to reach an agreement and secure the support of Ümit Özdağ, the far-right leader of the Victory Party, a staunch nationalist and the most vocal political figure promising the immediate deportation of millions of Syrian refugees. As well as injecting a nationalist discourse into Kılıçdaroğlu’s campaign, Özdağ tacitly revealed on his Twitter account that in return for support he would be appointed interior minister if Kılıçdaroğlu won the runoff.

The agreement infuriated YSP voters, who took to social media to express their anger, while the YSP’s central board expressed its dismay over the terms of the agreement between Özdağ and Kılıçdaroğlu. However, despite the agreement, the YSP publicly stated that they would still support Kılıçdaroğlu since Erdoğan is their biggest enemy and called voters to vote for the Nation Alliance’s candidate. It is unknown how people in the eastern and southeastern provinces will respond to this call and whether they will be able to overcome their disapproval. Kılıçdaroğlu’s final political tango could cost him the large number of YSP votes from Turkey’s eastern and southeastern provinces, estimated at around 10% of the country’s total.

Endorsed by Sinan Oğan in his presidential candidacy on May 22, President Erdoğan can comfortably watch his rival’s final political maneuver from left to right. Obviously, this latest episode by Kılıçdaroğlu is also doomed to failure, as the opposition’s deadlocked and irreconcilable coalition has proved to be incredulous, untrustworthy, and incoherent in the eyes of the public.